



**UNIVERSITY OF  
KWAZULU-NATAL**

**CROSS-BORDER INSURGENCY AND THE COPING  
STRATEGIES OF BORDER COMMUNITIES IN NORTH-  
EASTERN NIGERIA**

**BY**

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in the Graduate Programme in the College of Humanities,  
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Okunade, S. K., & Ogunnubi, O. (2018). A “Schengen” Agreement in Africa? African Agency and the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement. *Journal of Borderlands Studies*, 1-19.

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## **ABSTRACT**

Across continents, countries share borders with one another and so, have settlements called border communities. Nigeria is not an exception as she shares borders with neighboring states like Benin Republic in the South-West, Niger in the North, Chad and Cameroun in the North-East. For over 5 years, Nigeria has witnessed serious security challenge most especially, in the North-Eastern region, through the activities of Boko Haram, who infiltrated through porous borders putting the communities on constant threats and invasion. Extant literature reveals that these communities are being marginalized, with little or no attention from government in terms of basic infrastructure needed for daily survival. So far, research has focused on the coping strategy of Internally Displaced Persons and refugees in camps and host communities, to the total neglect of the border communities. It is therefore in this light that this study focuses on the coping strategies evolved by the border communities which ensures their continued survival against cross-border insurgency. This study was underpinned by three theories such as state fragility theory, functional prerequisite, human needs theory while a theoretical model that speaks to the coping strategies of border communities in North-Eastern Nigeria will be constructed from the study. For this study, qualitative research model was adopted using a phenomenological case study approach in exploring the coping strategy of border communities to ensure their survival and continuing existence, against cross-border insurgency. The target population consisted of all inhabitants of border communities in the North-Eastern Nigeria. Purposive sampling method was employed utilizing the typical case in the selection of participants. In-depth Interview (IDI) and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) was employed in collection of data while the interviews conducted were interpreted, transcribed, and content-analyzed. Data from both primary and secondary sources were descriptively analysed systematically and objectively, making valid textual inferences from them by identifying specific characteristics as it relates to cross-border insurgency and the coping strategies of border communities which are the crux of the study. Findings revealed that truly the border communities suffer Boko Haram attacks which has not only created a state of insecurity within the communities but has also created humanitarian crisis. Pathetic to note that this situation has received limited or no response hence, the evolvement of coping strategies by the communities for continued survival. These coping strategies involve reconciliation and unity, vigilance and Prayerfulness, formation of Vigilante Groups, and Bargain. Though, these strategies have been

effective for survival, they have proven not to be totally capable of preventing further attacks in the communities. It is therefore necessary for the government through its agencies most especially, the North-East Development Commission and the Border Community Development Agency to synergize and improve on these strategies so that these communities can continue to experience the peace and tranquility that have eroded them for too long.

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## **DEDICATION**

In memory of all victims of the Boko Haram insurgency and all those who lost their life in the process of salvaging the unfortunate situation.



## **ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

ACP:	African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries
ACSRT:	African Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism
AD:	Action Congress
AIDS:	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AQIM:	The Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ASEAN:	The Association of South East Asian Nations
ATGWS:	Anti-Tank Guided Weapon
ATL:	Anti-Terrorism Legislation
AU:	African Union
AUBIS:	African Union Boundary Information System
AUBP:	African Union Border Programme
BIR:	Rapid Response Battalion
BIS:	Boundary Information System
CAADP:	Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme
CACM:	The Central American Common Market
CAICOM:	The Caribbean Community
CAN:	Christian Association of Nigeria
CAR:	Central African Republic
CBO:	Community Based Organizations
CDF:	Civil Defence Force
CEN-SAD:	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CJTF:	Civilian Joint Task Force
COIN:	Counterinsurgency

COMESA:	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CSI:	The Container Security Initiative
CSSDCA:	Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa
C-TPAT:	The Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism
DPO:	Divisional Police Officer
DRC:	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DSS:	Department of State Security
EAC:	East African Community
ECCAS:	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMOG:	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS:	Economic Community of West African States
EEC:	The European Economic Community
EU:	European Union
EWS:	Early Warning System
FARC:	The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FBO:	Faith Based Organizations
FCT:	Federal Capital Territory
FRSC:	Federal Road Safety Commission
GDP:	Gross Domestic Product
GTZ:	German Technical Cooperation
HIV:	Human Immune Virus
HNO:	Humanitarian Needs Overview
HRW:	Human Right Watch
IBM:	Integrated Border Management

ICJ:	International Criminal Court of Justice
ICRC:	International Center for Religion and Diplomacy
IDP:	Internally Displaced Persons'
IEDs:	Improvised Explosive Devices
IGAD:	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGR:	Internally Generated Revenue
ILO:	International Labour Organization
IPF:	The International People's Friendship
ISIS:	The Syrian Islamic Liberation Front in Syria
JTF:	Joint Military Task Force
LAFTA:	The Latin America Free Trade Association
LDU:	Local Defence Units
LGA:	Local Government Area
LGA:	Local Government Area
LRA:	Lord's Resistance Army
LTTE:	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
LURD:	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MANPADS:	Man-Portable Air Defence Systems
MASSOB:	The Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra
MEND:	The Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta
MJP:	The Movement for Justice and Peace
MNLA:	The National Movement of Azawad
MPCI:	The Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire
MPIGO:	The Ivorian Popular Movement of the Great West

MSF:	Medecins Sans Frontiere
MUJAO:	Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
NACTEST:	National Counter Terrorism Strategy
NBS:	The National Bureau of Statistics
NCFRMI:	National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and IDPs
NCNC:	National Congress of Nigerian Citizens
NDA:	The Niger Delta Avengers
NDLEA:	National Drug Law Enforcement Agency
NEMA:	National Emergency Management Agency
NEPAD:	The New partnership for Africa's Development
NFPT:	National Focal Point on Terrorism
NGOs:	Non-Governmental Organizations
NICS:	The Nigeria custom Service
NPC:	National People's Congress
NPC:	National Population Commission
OAS:	Organization of American States
OAU:	Organization of African Unity
OECD:	The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONSA:	The Office of the National Security Adviser
PCIP:	Pacific Council on International Policy
PIDA:	Programme for Infrastructural Development in Africa
PSD:	Department of Peace and Security
REC:	Regional Economic Communities
RRRP:	Regional Refugee Response Plan

RUF:	Revolutionary United Front
SADC:	Southern African Development Community
SALWs:	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SCC:	The Sudan Council of Churches
SEMA:	State Emergency and Management Agency
SGBV:	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SIRC:	Sudan Inter-Religious Council
SRD:	The Society for Religious Dialogue
SUVs:	Sport Utility Vehicles
The UN:	The United Nations
TPA:	Terrorism Preventive Act
UKZNEC:	The University of KwaZulu-Natal Ethics Committee
UMA:	Arab Maghreb Union
UNDP:	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO:	United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR:	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF:	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIMAID:	University of Maiduguri
UNODC:	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USA:	The United State of America
WOTCLEF:	Women Trafficking and Child Education Foundation
WPV1:	Wild Polio Virus TYPE 1

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# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

### 1.0 Background to the study

Through the ages, Africans have migrated across what has been termed international boundaries as pastoralists, traders, muggers, refugees etc. According to Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013). The scramble for Africa by the colonialists which eventually led to the partitioning of Africa following the Berlin Conference of 1885/1887 brought about the phenomenon of artificial borders on the continent, which in turn resulted in the curtailment of free movement of people, goods and services across the traditional, lax borders. Ikome (2012) assert that the porosity of Nigeria's borders owes as much to the way the colonialists carved up the African continent as to the nature of their management by post-colonial states. To this end, the intention of the colonialists which was sacrosanct to them in the partitioning of Africa was not to create a boundary *per se*, but to create a sphere of influence driven by political and economic motives.

These boundaries defined in terms of latitudes, longitudes, geometric circles and straight lines-split several ethnic and cultural communities, a situation which majorly has made it difficult for most African states to effectively administer their borders cutting across cultural and ethnic groups. A perfect example is the Yekewa and Yardaje communities which, by virtue of the borderlines that cut across them, are separated into different states namely Niger and Nigeria respectively<sup>1</sup>. While porosity of African borders may aptly be blamed on colonialism, African leaders have also contributed no less to it by border mismanagement, thus opening them up to various, foreign, hostile incursions. As Okumu, (2010: 22) notes, "the high level of insecurity on African borders is largely due to the way they are administered and managed, and less to do with how colonialists drew them". What has been generally said of insecurity is particularly true of cross-border insurgency especially in form of armed conflict.

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<sup>1</sup> According to Miles, (1993), Yardaje and Yekewa are two neighboring Muslim Hausa villages of almost equal size, administrative status, and economic importance. Thirteen kilometres apart, they are located within the indigenous region of Daura, attributed as the birthplace of the Hausa people. By virtue of the demarcation of international boundary, the two communities found themselves on opposite sides. Yardaje to Nigeria and Yekewa to Niger.

Armed conflict, prior to and during the Cold War era, was perceived as inter-bellum between sovereign states (Laqueur, 2004). Since the Cold War ended, the experience of armed conflict has transformed into the emergence of non-state actors against their very nation-state (Laqueur, 2004). According to Abbott, et al (2006), insurgency, which has been termed the commonest form of armed conflict, has arguably continued to pose as the greatest peril to global peace and security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Some years back, insurgency was experienced in a few, isolated places, such as the Basque country in Northern Spain, the Northern Ireland, and some locale in the Middle East (Barga, 2012). This phenomenon is now clearly evident across the globe with the uprising of insurgent or terrorist groups such as the Kashmiri groups in India, Karen and Shan groups in Thailand, Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front in Syria (ISIS), Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine and the Taliban in Pakistan.

In India, Lal (2012) averred that “the radical Islamic groups domiciled in Indian Kashmir, insurgent groups in the northeastern provinces, and groups launching attacks on major cities generally have ties to Pakistani extremist groups” (Lal, 2012: 129) such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed (Lal, 2004). They also have a strong link with global Islamic extremist movement such as Al-Qaeda. Initially, the Kashmiri groups primarily focused their attention and activities on the Kashmir region but later spread their tentacles to India’s urban areas. The attacks carried out on India’s Parliament in 2001, the UN Consulate in Calcutta in 2002, and series of attacks in Mumbai in 2008 attest to the preceding. Again, the radical Maoist insurgents otherwise called the Naxalites posed a serious threat on many central Indian states such as Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Orissa.

This insurgent group basically erupted to overthrow the national government and attack the *crème de la crème* who hold ownership of lands. They also violently resist the incursion of foreign companies who have come into India for business purposes and force those that were already in India. They violently attack such formations and disrupt their operations, mostly mining operations (Lal, 2012). This focus earned the Naxalite insurgent groups the sympathy of the tribal locations mainly composed of the minorities who feel neglected in the scheme of things and in the developmental plan of India, and therefore garnered membership from these areas. With a strong membership base, the Naxalites were able to carry out several deadly attacks on police formations

in the earlier mentioned areas. These occurrences made the state governments embark on counterinsurgency (COIN) moves against the insurgents. The government of Orissa commissioned two thousand one hundred special police officers and four battalions of the Indian reserve Police for this purpose. In 2008, several clashes between the government forces and the Naxalites led to the death of seventy-four police officers and twenty-two civilians (Joshi, 2009). In all, about one thousand lives (both security operatives and civilians) were lost in different attacks launched by the Naxalites in the areas. Though, some Naxalites were also killed, figures were not given. Several appeals were made to the Indian government to end the armed response and tackle the issue as a socio-political concern, but the government declined and still treated the issue as breakdown of law and order which needed be addressed by the police (Kripalani, 2008). In fact, government policies further supported armed response through police mobilization rather than recommending swift moves toward economic development of the areas concerned.

In addition, in the North-Eastern region of India, different insurgent groups operate in states that are marginalized and poorly governed and developed such as Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland, and Tripura. Insurgent groups in these states fight the central government on issues that concern the development of the region which it has failed to address. At some point the border communities in these states became tensed up as there was an influx of immigrants from Bangladesh. Their presence threatened the existing culture and poor economic status of the communities. Regardless, the lack of clear government structures in these communities gave the insurgents a wide space to occupy. They therefore went ahead to forcefully collect taxes, ruling over these communities with lethal force. These insurgent groups went further to establish enclaves across borders into neighbouring countries of Bangladesh, Bhutan and Myanmar thus, making a domestic issue become transnational (Lal, 2012).

According to Salehyan (2010), Insurgent groups seek havens in neighboring countries where they settle for the training of their combatants, stockpile the needed resources, and enjoy a level of safety. Once these groups have fully stabilized themselves on external soil, they cease to be a solely domestic affair but draw attention from regional governments. Examples include the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) which constitutes a major threat to the Colombian government and has retained bases all over the North Andean region (Marcella, 2008)



and the Sudanese insurgent groups who succeeded in acquiring a base in neighbouring Chad solely for training of combatants (Jagadish, 2009). The Afghan forces have equally experienced consequential difficulties in tackling the Taliban solely because insurgents are found all around the border with Pakistan (Jagadish, 2009). In the same vein, some countries have maintained significant relations with neighbouring countries to contain and end such insurgency. India, for example, has positively engaged its neighbors to tackle such menace in its northeastern states. While constant attacks remain a continuum, India continues to partner with its neighbours like Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Myanmar (Burma) to combat such insurgent groups so as to curtail their growth and subsequent distribution (Salehyan, 2010).

In Thailand, ethnic insurgent groups such as the Karen and Shan groups have carried out activities across the border into Myanmar which have at various times severed the relationship between the two countries. On a number of occasions when some separatists and Karen National Union strike, forcing the Myanmar military to react by attacking their bases on the side of Thai, the government of Thai responded with a counter force on the ground of defending her territorial sovereignty, thereby impeding the Myanmar forces from infiltrating the Thai border to combat the insurgents (Salehyan, 2010). Furthermore, in February 1992, Thai military through its air force fired shots at Burmese soldiers who crossed its border to attack a Karen base as a warning for them to desist from crossing its border again on such mission (Poole, 1992). These clashes continued to occur until February 2001 when around 200 Myanmar soldiers advanced into Thailand purposely to attack ethnic Shan insurgents. A clash ensued between the Thai forces and the Myanmar forces close to the town of Mae Sai leading to the death of not less than 20 soldiers and civilians mostly, dwellers of communities that straddle the border of Thai (East, 2001).

In June 2002, series of fierce clashes ensued after Myanmar forces attacked a Shan insurgents' base in Thai, "prompting an exchange of artillery fire" (The Nation [Thailand] (2002). The Thai military was on high alert and issued a statement that: "Artillery shells have landed on Thai territory, endangering the lives of villagers. . . . as long as the Burmese government continues to suppress the ethnic minority groups and refuses to embrace democracy, the fighting will continue, and Burma will continue to mistrust Thailand." (The Nation [Thailand] 2002).

Similarly, in 2006 Israel launched series of fierce attacks on Lebanese terrain. This was targeted at the Hezbollah fighters who had apprehended Israeli soldiers and continued to fire rockets across the border into Israeli soil. This move did not only severe the relationship between Israel and Lebanon but appreciably threatened to further weaken regional relations, particularly as Syria declared its staunch support for Hezbollah (Salehyan, 2010).

This menace has been replicated in Africa such that the continent is increasingly becoming a breeding ground for various insurgent and terrorist groups owing to the weak structure of many African states who are unable to apply force within their territory and effectively police their borders (Herbst, 2000). The Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda, the Al-Shabaab in Somalia, the National Movement of Azawad (MNLA) in Northern Mali, the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali, the M23 Rebels in Democratic Republic of Congo, Boko Haram in Nigeria and a host of others are examples of infiltrating insurgent or terrorist groups existing on the continent. Notably, the most damaging effects of these insurgencies around the globe have been the high rate of humanitarian crisis in form of internal displacement, refugee influx, food insecurity, epidemic, and gender and sexual based hostility (Hughes, 2012). Cross-border insurgency equally has the potential of breeding tension within a region which may eventually lead to war. An example is the case of Rwanda who, so many times went across the border into Congo DRC to fight the Hutu insurgents in their hideouts and to punish members of such communities for harbouring such groups (Lal, 2012).

In Africa, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) which operated for more than twenty years unleashed terror in diverse communities across four African countries. Their attacks were targeted at brutalizing, torturing, mutilation, killing and conscription of children as child soldiers. Statistics show that this group which has its origin in northern Uganda abducted over 20,000 children and was responsible for the displacement of over 1.9 million people who lived in different communities that straddle the border (Human Right Watch, 2012). The fierce resistance the LRA met by the Ugandan military forced it to migrate across the Ugandan border into the border region between the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the South Sudan. This led to the massive displacement of more than 2.5 million people and the abduction of children whose figure ranges from 60,000 to 100,000 across the four countries (United Nations Security

Council, 2013; Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2013). Statistics also reveal a varying number of civilians killed by the LRA combatants. While Ahere & Maina (2013) and HRW (2012) admitted that tens of thousands were killed, United Nations Security Council (2013) averred that over 100,000 people were killed by the insurgent group. Of course, this phenomenon instigated a regional military response which enfeebled the group as its membership reduced drastically to a total of 150 Ugandan males excluding the wavering number of abducted children (Ronan, 2015). The continuous attacks communities suffered from, coupled with a weak security and protection measures put in place by the governments involved, made these communities evolve some coping strategies to guarantee their safety within their communities.

So many factors came into play in the different strategies employed across communities. Such factors included personal perception, topography and environmental conditions. Some felt though they wanted to flee, they had nowhere to run to (Li, 2005). Some others had a strong conviction that their homes belonged to them and that no one had the right to displace them, hence their responsibility to defend their heritage. While some took to hiding in the bushes and mountains until they deemed it safe to return into the communities, many others remained there at night and returned in the day to get some food for the elderly and children who perpetually remained in hiding. Many also fled to safer, neighbouring communities and camps whenever the LRA attacked their communities (Sohn, 2005).

Cline (2013) noted that a community leader in Uganda averred that children who witnessed this phenomenon who are now adults see no reason to build houses for themselves because they lived their childhood in the bush where there existed no home setting. In Uganda, the situation also saw the massive exodus of numerous children (between 30,000 and 40,000) as well as many adults from different communities into IDP camps and urban settlements (Amnesty International, 2005; Li, 2005; Sohn, 2005; Cline, 2013). Other strategies involved submission and cooperation with the LRA whenever they came into these communities; restricting movements and where necessary; movement in groups escorted by local security men were encouraged; prayers and rituals offered for peace and an end to the insurgency; early warning system which involved developing a communication system to alert the security personnel of an intended attack or presence of the LRA

combatants; creation of Local Defense Units (LDUs). These measures were employed by the affected communities in the four countries mentioned above.

To further elaborate the analysis on cross-border insurgency in Africa, various dimensions of insurgency are identifiable in Nigeria. Some examples include the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), the Niger-Delta insurgency part of which is the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), the *Ahl al sunnali al alDa'wawa al-Jihad*, popularly called Boko Haram and, most recently, the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) (Ukpong, 2016). However, the major difference between them is situated in nature and space rather than issues and strategies. While the MASSOB, MEND and the like are resource-based conflicts and fully domesticated precisely within the South East and Niger Delta region of the country, Boko Haram is rather religious based, and portends a transnational dimension.

According to Akanji, (2013), *Boko Haram*, an Islamic sect that posits that northern politics has been hijacked by a group of dishonest, corrupt and pseudo-Muslims, seemingly existed before the 21<sup>st</sup> century but was relatively unknown as a violent or terrorist group. The group seeks to wage war against not only these Muslims but also the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in general, with a view to creating and entrenching in the entire country a pure Islamic State governed by Sharia Law. Over time, the sect has fully developed into a terrorist group considering its *modus operandi* and its alliance with other renowned terrorist organizations such as *Al Qaeda* and the Islamic States of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Onuoha, (2011) pointed out that the collaboration between Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was established by the spokesmen of both sects. This collaboration was meant to train Boko Haram members and supply them with weapons to protect Muslims and stop the progress of a minority of Crusaders in Nigeria. The training was worthwhile for them as it became evident in their activities thereafter that they had become skillful in the making and use of bomb and engagement of suicide bombers, whereas until participating in the training camps, Boko Haram did not engage in such practices (Epperson, 2012).

According to Meehan, (2011) Boko Haram became sophisticated in their activities by utilizing internet fora for advocacy and recruitment as well as a source of information sharing. Towing the path of Al Shabaab, Boko Haram used the fora to “increase the group’s legitimacy among the jihadi community”. These media have also been effectively utilized by the group in propagating

their ideology and activities to the global community, such lethal activities which have been detrimental to African border communities continually putting them at risk of losing their lives and properties. Inadequate border security also increases this risk, leaving the communities to personally devise strategies to cope with the situation. This study is therefore geared towards investigating and identifying the coping strategies evolved by these communities to ensure their survival in the face of the looming threat that daily confront them.

## **1.1 Statement of the problem**

Literature is replete with sufficient works on the theme of border life in the context of inequality and marginalization. It is widely held by many a scholar that border communities face neglect politically, socially and economically when compared to the hinterland (cities and towns) of their nation-state. According to Meinhof (2003), in some of the European rural or small-towns in the border regions, people who are considered marginal (such as Sinti, Roma) expatriates from other nations, the politically suspicious and the disabled settle there. Wastl-Walter, et al (2003) averred that border areas are peripheral regions par excellence and in several respects. They also see them as areas that are at the margins of the nation-states. Because of their distance from the core areas, border areas are geographically isolated and marginalized and as such people living there are often also marginalized politically, socially and economically. Wastl-Walter, et'al (2003) focused on the consequences of marginalization on border communities and the strategies inhabitants of these border areas adopt in coping with all of these marginalities. Holly et'al (2003) also investigated in-depth on the phenomenon of social and economic inequality in border communities on both sides of the border and how they cope with such phenomenon.

It is an undeniable fact that border communities in Nigeria face a lot of security threats and challenge through cross-border criminalities. While the current researcher was on a preliminary field trip to borders in Iseyin/ Saki, Idi-Iroko and Imeko/ Ilara, all in the Southwest region of Nigeria, it was discovered that security threats are a peculiar reality to all of them. In fact, it was briefly mentioned by one of the "Baales"<sup>2</sup> in the course of an interview that there was no week that the community would not face attacks from external, terrorist aggressors. This confirms that

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<sup>2</sup> A Baale is a traditional ruler of a small community in the Yoruba land. And of course, border communities in the Southwest are small communities headed by a baale.

security threat is a challenge that consistently threatens the survival of people living in the border communities.

In North-Eastern Nigeria, as a result of Boko Haram's nefarious activities, Salkida, (2012) notes that life in several communities of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states, such as Kawuri, Gwoza, Gamboru-Ngala, Baga, Shuwa, Konduga, Bama, Ajigin, Giwa, Chibok, have been characteristically horrible, brutish and, to say the least, short-lived. The region has stopped to observe civil order, resulting in the appalling humanitarian situation manifesting in human right abuses, human casualties, internal and external displacements, loss of means of livelihood, lack of medical facilities and absence of other basic amenities. Since 2012, the humanitarian situation in North-Eastern Nigeria has further degenerated as various humanitarian agencies have limited access to rural areas where the displaced persons are relocated to. The alarming refugee influx into Nigeria and the spill-over of Boko Haram violence off the Nigerian borders into neighbouring countries such as Chad, Cameroun and Niger over time have resulted in grave regional security consequences. This is despite the formation of a Joint Border Patrol Command established by the Nigerian government which is composed of the military, Immigration, Customs, Civil Defence and the Police, to deal with the increasing security issues emanating from the insurgency (This day, April 16<sup>th</sup>, 2014). Boko Haram has exposed the porous nature of the borders of African countries where it has resulted in increased insecurity and violence in certain border communities of these countries notably Niger, Chad and Cameroun.

HNO (2014), in reviewing the humanitarian needs of affected areas, provides a demographic profile of North-Eastern Nigeria for 2014. As at the end of 2014, 24.5 million people were living in the six states of North-Eastern Nigeria out of which 15.5 million people lived in the affected areas which. Of this number, 0.98 million people were displaced (Eweka and Olusegun, 2016). This simply implies that 14.52 million people remained in the affected areas. The report went further to provide an extensive survey to depict the challenges these displaced persons faced in the various Internally Displaced Persons' (IDPs) and refugee camps and how they were able to cope in the face of those confronting challenges. Looking critically at the population figures above, it is evident that out of the 15.5 million people living in the affected areas, only 0.9 million of the population were displaced while, 14.52 million remain in those communities in the face of the daily looming security threats. HNO (2015) equally executed an extensive need assessment of the

affected population with regard to the IDPs and refugees in their host communities and camps without involving inhabitants of border communities who are the first victims of the dastardly terrorist acts. This confirms what Wastl-Walter, et'al, (2003) asserted about marginality of border communities due to their geographically isolated nature.

From the foregoing, studies have shown that inhabitants along border communities have always been at the receiving end of insurgent activities as they are the first victims of this inimical phenomenon and disturbingly, do not receive adequate government intervention and attention from international humanitarian organizations. In spite of this, they still continue to survive in the face of daily threats. This is to suggest that these communities may have devised coping strategies to guarantee their survival.

Relatedly, though a few studies border on the security threats and challenges that daily confront border communities within the African purview, no scholarly attention has been paid to how border communities have been able to manage such threats and challenges with impoverished assistance from their governments. This is the lacuna that this study intends to fill. It, therefore, becomes necessary to investigate the coping strategies developed by border communities in dealing with cross-border insurgency regarding safety (traditional security) and livelihood (human security).

## **1.2 Research questions of the study**

Research questions are essential because they define the objective of an academic study. Obasi (1999) averred that research question is the most worrying issue of fact that needs to be properly examined and understood. Therefore, the current researcher has raised the following questions to guide this study:

1. What are the patterns of cross-border insurgency in the selected border communities in North-Eastern Nigeria?
2. What are the impacts of cross-border insurgency on these border communities?
3. How has the government (federal, state and local) and international humanitarian organizations responded to cross-border insurgency in the border communities?

4. What are the coping strategies employed by the selected border communities in tackling cross-border insurgency?
5. How has the adopted coping strategies impacted on the continued existence of the border communities?

### **1.3 Aims and objectives of the study**

The study has broad and specific objectives. The general objective is to investigate the coping strategies of border communities vis-à-vis cross-border insurgency in the North-Eastern Nigeria, while the specific objectives are to:

1. Highlight the patterns of cross-border insurgency existing in the selected border communities in the North-Eastern Nigeria.
2. Examine the impacts of cross-border insurgency on the selected border communities.
3. Investigate the measures taken by the government (federal, state and local) and international humanitarian organizations to tackle cross-border insurgency in the selected border communities.
4. Examine the coping strategies employed by the selected border communities in tackling cross-border insurgency
5. Examine the impacts of the adopted coping strategies on the continued existence of the border communities.

### **1.4 Scope of the study**

The Federal Republic of Nigeria is a nation-state geographically located on the Gulf of Guinea in Western Africa with a total area of 923,768 square kms out of which about 13,000 square kms are covered with water bodies (Nigeria Fact Sheets, 2001). The country lies between Benin Republic in the West and Cameroon in the East (Douglas, 2004). The lower route of the Niger River runs south into the Gulf of Guinea through the eastern region of the country. Southern valleys are



formed by swamps forests and mangrove, on the South coast. These valleys are plains in the North and mountainous in the South East. There are forests made up of hard wood in the inland territory.

There are 36 states in the country with Federal Capital Territory (FCT) as the capital city located in Abuja. It is grouped into six geopolitical zones such as North-West, North-Central, North-East, South-West, South-East and South-South. These groupings were done based on states with homogeneous ethnic groups, cultures and common history. North-West zone which is the most populated has seven states with a population figure of 35,786,944; the South-West zone has six states with a population of 27,266,257; the South-South zone equally has six states with a population of 21,014,655; the North-Central zone has seven states together with the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja (1,405,201) with a population of 20,266,257; the North-East zone has six states with a population of 18,971,965 and finally the South -East zone has five states with a population of 16,381,729.

This study was carried out on the North-East (NE) Geopolitical Zone of Nigeria<sup>3</sup> which covers close to one-third (280,419km<sup>2</sup>) of Nigeria's land area (909,890km<sup>2</sup>). It consists of 6 states: Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Yobe and Taraba. According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), these States have 13.5% (i.e. 23,558,674) of Nigeria's population which is put at 173,905,439.<sup>4</sup>

Additionally, the Zone shares international borders with three countries namely the Republic of Cameroon to the East, Niger Republic to the North and Republic of Chad to the North-East. It is a Zone that has been identified to be a major contributor to national net food production. Despite this, the region has the worst socio-economic condition in the Country. Its average total poverty level is estimated at sixty-nine percent (69.0%) which is above the national average of sixty-point nine percent (60.9%). This depicts the Zone as the region with the highest rate of poverty in Nigeria (NBS, 2010). This study focused on three states namely Yobe, Adamawa and Borno being the


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<sup>3</sup> Geopolitical zone of Nigeria refers to any one of the six zones the Nigerian states are sub-divided into. Pertinent to this study is the North-East geopolitical zone which consists of six states of the Nigerian federation.

<sup>4</sup> 2012 National Baseline Youth Survey, NBS

states that share boundary with neighboring states such as Chad, Niger and Cameroon and as such have many border communities situated within them which constitute the locale for the study.

**Figure 1.1 Map of Nigeria Showing the Six Geopolitical Zones**



**Source:**[https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Pius\\_Ekong/publication/51795009/figure/fig1/AS:277168446820360@1443093516012/fig-1-Map-of-Nigeria-showing-the-six-6-geopolitical-zones-For-interpretation-of-the.png](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Pius_Ekong/publication/51795009/figure/fig1/AS:277168446820360@1443093516012/fig-1-Map-of-Nigeria-showing-the-six-6-geopolitical-zones-For-interpretation-of-the.png)

## **1.5 Research methodology and methods**

This section presents the research methods used in gathering and analyzing data for the study. This explicitly spells out what, where, when and how the research was executed. These include the scope of the study, research design and data collection technique, sample size, sampling technique and ethical consideration.

For this study, qualitative research model was adopted using a phenomenological case study approach. According to Padilla-Diaz (2015), Edmund Husserl defines phenomenology as an experimental method which rely on the conscience of phenomena where the pure essences of the contents of consciousness stood out. Husserl is regarded as “the fountainhead of phenomenology in the twentieth century even though the origin of phenomenology can be traced back to Kant and Hegel (Vandenberg, 1997:4). Phenomenology takes the instinctive experience of phenomena as its starting point and tries to extract from it the essential features of experiences and the essence of what we experience (Padilla-Diaz, 2015). Husserl's view was premised on the work of Franz Brentano his teacher who provided a basis for phenomenology (Holloway, 1997) and was further developed by philosophers such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, MaxScheler, Edith Stein, Dietrich von Hildebrand and Emmanuel Levinas. The term ‘phenomenology’ was used occasionally by various scholars in the history of philosophy before Husserl tied it more specifically to his particular method.

Phenomenology counters the idea that natural science alone determines what is real and what is not, and that all concepts that we wish to take seriously must be reducible to concepts of the exact sciences (Overgaard and Zahavi n.d.). Phenomenology avers that the exact sciences do not describe a world that is different from the ordinary world. Instead, they simply utilize new methods to describe and explain the world we already know and thereby allow us to obtain more exact knowledge about it. The scientific ambition of describing reality objectively, that is, from a third-person point of view, is a thoroughly legitimate one. Yet, one should not forget that any objectivity, any explanation, understanding and theoretical construct, presupposes a first- person perspective as its permanent ground and precondition (ibid.). To that extent, the belief that science can provide an absolute description of reality, a description devoid of any conceptual or experiential perspective, is an illusion. Science is deeply rooted in the life-world. It draws upon insights from

the pre-scientific sphere and it is conducted by embodied subjects. For the phenomenologist, science is not simply a collection of systematically related, well established propositions. Rather, science is something that people do; it is a particular markedly theoretical way of relating to the world (ibid.).

Schutz emphasizes that social scientists and natural scientists are motivated by other, more theoretical interests than the everyday person is guided by. The everyday person is an agent rather than a theoretical observer who has practical interests and is normally guided by common-sense knowledge and understanding. The social scientist, by contrast, is not an agent in the social relations she studies. A scientific researcher, regardless of whether she studies social hierarchies in Scottish factories or electrons and amino acids, is an observer, not a participant. Schutz thus insists that the social scientist must maintain a distance to the phenomena she studies. However, the social sciences examine human beings in manifold social relations, and human agents have interests, motives, self-interpretation and an understanding of the world they live in all of which must be taken into account if we want to understand social reality in its full concretion (Schutz 1962; Gurwitsch 1974).

Therefore, a phenomenological approach is utilized to understand the issue from the everyday knowledge and perceptions of specific respondent subgroups (Lindgren and Kehoe, 1981 cited in Vaughn, Schumm, Jallard, Slusher, and Saumell, 1986). It is not primarily concerned with exploring the causes of events but attempts to describe how things are experienced by the people involved directly (Denscombe, 2004). Husserl (1970) averred that pure phenomenological research seeks principally to describe rather than explain, and to start from a standpoint free from hypotheses or preconceptions.

Qualitative research is an exceptional and effective way of gathering culturally specific information about the opinions, values, behaviours, and social context of a particular population. This method equally aims to provide “an in-depth understanding of the world as seen through the eyes of the people being studied” (Wilmot 2011). Merriam, (2009) noted that qualitative research is interested in grasping the meaning people have constructed, in other words, how people make sense of the world and the experience they have in the world. Furthermore, Silverman, (1985) conceives it as an approach to research that assists the exploration of a phenomenon within its

context, utilizing an array of data sources. It involves a continuing interplay between data collection and theory.

It is also useful in identifying intangible factors, such as social norms, gender, socio-economic status, ethnicity, roles, and religion. In the view of Creswell, (2009) qualitative research method allows for exploring and understanding the meaning an individual or group/s ascribe to a problem. The role a researcher plays entails, evolving questions and procedures, collecting data in the participants setting, analyzing data by inductively building from particulars to general themes, and making interpretations of the meaning of the data. This is why Mason (2002), asserts that the qualitative research methodology celebrates richness, depth, nuance, context, multidimensionality and complexity. What therefore distinguishes qualitative research method from other research methods is the opportunity it offers to do an objective and in-depth study and analysis by obtaining first-hand information from respondents. As opined by Fawole et'al, (2006), the potency of qualitative research lies in identifying strengths and weaknesses of a phenomenon.

Owing from the above, this study chose a qualitative research model using a phenomenological case study approach. This is primarily because the study is targeted at gaining in-depth understanding of the lived experiences of inhabitants of selected border communities in the North-Eastern Nigeria as regarding cross-border insurgency which is the activities of the Boko Haram within their various communities. Utilizing a qualitative approach facilitated the generation of a holistic understanding of the experiences of the study population regarding the Boko Haram attacks, and how they have been able to continually live in those community in other words the coping strategies employed by the study population which has made continual existence possible in those communities. Through this same approach, the study was able to discover rich information about the dynamics in the activities of the Boko Haram and the responses of the communities to such within the border communities of the North-Eastern Nigeria.

### **1.5.1 Population of the study and sampling procedure**

The target population of this study included all inhabitants of border communities in the North-Eastern Nigeria.

Purposive sampling method was employed utilizing the typical case in the selection process of participants as the study is strictly qualitative using a case study design (Punch, 2005). This depicts that the population is selected based solely on the knowledge and experience they have acquired which is useful for the study. This method is equally used for an intensive study of community situations. The researcher selected three states from Nigeria's North-Eastern Region namely Borno, Adamawa and Yobe because these are the major states that experience cross-border insurgency in Nigeria. According to ACAP (2018) these states share boundaries with neighbouring countries such as Cameroun, Chad and Niger where Boko Haram carries out its nefarious activities.

The sample size of this study consisted of 276 participants who were interviewed. These respondents are inhabitants of the selected border communities in Nigeria's North-Eastern Region. 46 participants were selected from two modestly populated border communities located in each state. The communities included Gamboru-Ngala and Baga communities in Borno State, Michika and Mubi communities in Adamawa State as well as, Yusufari and Kanamma communities in Yobe State. The service of a guide and interpreter where necessary was employed to facilitate access to these communities<sup>5</sup>.

### **1.5.2 Methods of data collection**

Given the nature of this research work, the data used for analysis were obtained largely from both primary and secondary sources as highlighted below.

**Primary Sources:** According to Alagoa (1985) and Afigbo (1990), primary sources are seen as reliable because the data generated present direct information from the participants or key witnesses thus limiting the possibility of distortion or exaggeration. This assertion is in line with phenomenology which is the research approach for the study. For the purpose of this study therefore, In-depth Interview (IDI) and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) were used. This technique is invaluable in conducting "systematic social inquiry, generating empirical data about (the) social world by asking people to talk about their lives" (Holstein & Gubrium 1995). As opined by Jegede (2006) and Ulin (2002) this is to establish greater precision as detailed information emerges. As

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<sup>5</sup> A guide and interpreter was needed to facilitate access to the communities because the communities have different languages thus, making language a barrier.

an instrument for primary data collection, a structured as well as open-ended interview guide was utilized which allowed participants to express themselves to the fullest without restrictions and which helped the researcher to elicit useful and needed information to the fullest from them. Upon arrival in the communities, with the assistance of a guide, the researcher sought audience with the traditional ruler to formally request his permission to carry out the interviews.

In each of the six (6) communities, six (6) In-depth Interviews were carried out with key stakeholders who included the traditional ruler, the men leader, the women leader, the youth leader, and two Faith Based Organizations (FBOs) identified in each community. Four (4) Focus Group Discussions were conducted with men, women, youths, and the vigilante group in each community. From previous studies conducted, it has been observed that community leaders in border communities emerge based on a number of factors most important of which is vastness in the peoples' history and culture. As a result of this, they are found capable of giving accurate information needed. In communities in Adamawa and Borno states, the FGDs consisted of 10 participants giving everybody an opportunity to share his or her experience. In Yobe state it was quite different. The number of participants varied between 6 and 8. The researcher noted that a point of saturation<sup>6</sup> was reached as these interviews were successfully conducted in Adamawa and Borno states while in Yobe state it was observed that respondents withheld some information especially regarding coping strategies. With the permission of the respondents, a recorder was used during the interview process.

**Secondary Sources:** These included documents, books, journal articles, newspaper articles, from the internet, the library. As a result of the fundamental role these sources of data play in complementing the quality of the primary data gathered, they assisted, in course of analysis, in throwing more light on and validating the content of the primary data gathered.

### **1.5.3 Method of data analysis**

The research employed thematic content analysis to analyze the collected data. The interviews conducted were interpreted, transcribed and content-analyzed. Holsti (1969) defines content

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<sup>6</sup> A point of saturation is a point where in the process of conducting interviews no new information other than the previous ones is being generated from the respondents.



analysis as “any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages”. It involves the “examining of the presence of words or phrases in a text in order to identify the specified characteristics of messages and to make meaning of them”. Patton (2002) defines content analysis as “any qualitative data reduction and sense-making effort that takes a volume of qualitative materials and attempts to identify core consistencies and meanings”. With the use of this technique, the researcher descriptively analyzed data from both primary and secondary sources systematically and objectively, making valid textual inferences from them by identifying specific characteristics as it relates to cross-border insurgency and the coping strategies of border communities which are the crux of the study.

The findings from the border communities were comparatively analyzed where necessary to bring out the emerging patterns in the coping strategies as a result of varying factors that exist in the communities.

#### **1.5.4 Credibility and Trustworthiness of the study**

Credibility and trustworthiness are an integral part of research. It is concerned with dealing with biases and assumptions that come from the researcher’s life experiences or interactions with research respondents, which are often emotion-laden and may therefore negatively reflect in the outcome of the research. In guarding against subjectivity, member checking technique is best used in determining the accuracy of the qualitative findings. This involves taking the final report and specific descriptions or themes back to participants in the various communities for them to determine if the outcome truly reflects their perception of the studied phenomenon. While this would have been the best option for the current researcher to explore, it would seem impossible because of proximity and time constraints, and because the researcher does not share affinity with the study communities in terms of culture, situation and geography.

To correct this anomaly therefore, the study will be subjected to review by an external auditor who does a relatively more thorough job than a peer debriefer. The external auditor who is usually not familiar with the researcher or the project will review the entire project to provide an objective assessment throughout the process of research or at the conclusion of the study. As put by (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) the external auditor’s role is like that of a fiscal auditor, and specific questions exist

that auditors might ask. Having this in mind, therefore, the researcher adhered to Yin's (2009) suggestion that researchers need to document the procedures of their case studies and document as many of the steps of the procedures as possible. He also recommended setting up a detailed case study protocol and database, so that others can follow the procedures. Gibbs (2007) suggested a few qualitative reliability procedures amongst which are checking transcripts to make sure that they do not contain noticeable mistakes made during transcription and making sure that there is no drift in the definition of codes, or a shift in the meaning of the codes during the process of coding. This can be accomplished by constantly comparing data with the codes and by writing memos about the codes and their definitions.

These strategies for curbing subjectivity was employed to assist the researcher in achieving the goal of fairness and equity which is representing participants' viewpoints by avoiding lopsided interpretations that represent the biases of the researcher or only a few participants.

## **1.6 Conceptual clarifications**

Any meaningful conceptualization must begin from a context-based approach which cannot be independent of each other (Osaghae, 2009). It is therefore necessary to clarify the following concepts in this discourse to enable an in-depth understanding of the relationship between them.

### **1.6.1 The Concept of Border**

The concept of border is constantly changing. Border has been conceptualized by different scholars, international, regional and sub-regional organizations who have defied uniformity of parlance. Presently, the prevalent definition has been geographical, independent of all that the concept of border encloses; it would appear that in recent past, there has been a widening of the concept that extend beyond the traditionally accepted meaning of the border (Johnson et al., 2011; Wastl-Walter, 2011; Wilson & Donnan, 2012). Thus, borders give room for new meanings every day, as much as it allows for proliferation of types: diffuse or firm borders, juridical-political borders, territorial or identity borders, cultural borders, symbolic borders, etc. Garcia (2006) cited by Jimenez, Orenes and Puente (2010) identifies eight dimensions of borders: the historical

dimension, the spatial-cultural dimension, the dimension of ideas, the normative dimension, the economic, material, human dimension and the agential dimension.<sup>7</sup>

To understand the concept of border in the present day, Jimenez, Orenes and Puente (2012) further examine its concrete manifestations by grouping the above enumerated dimensions into two fundamental distinct planes namely *geographical borders*, connected with states, and *symbolic borders*. Geographical borders identified with states refer to geography, economics, politics, and the administrative realms, while the symbolic demands significant effort to demarcate given that it does not address a concrete or defined reality. From the foregoing, border can be comprehended as a space demarcated by symbolic limits linked with social representations, whether they coexist with physical and official barriers or not. It has also been noted that border could be seen as a limitation that is mental or imaginary, constrained by variables such as space, identity, time, desires, actions, etc. Border, therefore, becomes a locale in which “we” and the “other” are conceptualized, and which is in some circumstances identified by its permeability, in variance to the stringency of the identity. This is the most related to geographical borders. However, it was suggested that borders are highly complex, social spaces that need interactive and dialogic assumptions to be comprehended in their full extension (Jimenez, Orenes and Puente, 2012).

Grimson (2005) points out that while geographical borders which refer to geography, economics, politics, and the administrative realm identified with states, separate different realities, they simultaneously produce trans-border spaces. Such spaces produce power contest implicating

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<sup>7</sup> The historical dimension (which is determined based on a request by the states themselves and governed by the framework of international or transnational processes, which oversees cross-border actions and dynamics), the spatial-cultural dimension (this suggests the border to be the jurisdiction where a state can exercise its sovereignty or power), the dimension of ideas (this concerns what the people imagine the border to be. It is here that barriers of a symbolic, religious, or ethical nature appear), the normative dimension (this describe how a border is politically constructed thus bringing up the disparity between political borders and borderlands), the economic, material, human dimension (with the economic component, the exchange of resources and goods, migratory flux, and contraband) and the agential dimension (this concerns analyzing the activities, emotions, interactions and expectations of agent (s) situated within these spaces).

diverse territories and identities; they are equally differentiated spaces, which produce or provoke conflicts, and which serve as a locale for trans-cultural dynamics.

Weber (2012) describes a border as a line that symbolizes a boundary. Borders are seen as boundaries between states, while boundaries are markers in existing states. As borders distinguish a state's territory, it also expresses belonging, identities, and political affiliation. Weber goes on to say that borders, boundaries, and borderlands make up numerous potentials as well as obstacles. As borders remain important in demarcating the physical boundaries of state territories, it remains important in daily practice to the people living within such spaces. She further opines that smuggling of small arms, human trafficking, and provision of refuge for armed opposition groups are all activities which can be carried out by borderland communities. This constitutes a risk to the security of the state.

O'Dowd (2002: 24) notes that borders are "places of economic and political opportunity for nations and states as well as for a host of other interest groups and agencies, legal and illegal". He says for some countries, borders have been transformed from barriers, and acquired a new 'bridging' function. Also, in response to 9/11 attack on the United States of America, the definition of borders changed for all countries exporting to the United State of America (USA). In response to the attack, the USA came up with the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) policies, both of which consider the starting point for borders in the country of export. In other words, as the borders were 'pushed out' (Bowman 2006) and thus did not coincide with the geographical borders, they obtained a new meaning from trade and security perspectives.

According to Simmel (1992), border is not a spatial fact with a sociological impact, but a sociological fact that shapes spatiality. In this sense, a border is not defined by the geographical space but by the impact of people. Barka (2012: 5) noted that a border post can be defined as the "location where one country's authority over goods and persons ends and another country's authority begin." It is the location where a multitude of government agencies (i.e Revenue Authority - Customs; Immigration; Security-Police; Ministry of Agriculture; Ministry of Health; Bureau of Standards, etc.) are involved in the various document and goods controls, the calculation

and collection of duties and taxes, as well as immigration. This definition clearly describes how a border is demarcated; it also enlists the stakeholders in the activities carried out at the border.

A border provides a practical opportunity to assist a state to maintain its internal security against external threats and aggression against its territory and people. A border is subsequently, a separation between states but also a process of control on behalf of their national security. Nonetheless, demands made by the current global economic system require a certain degree of border openness. Hence, borders should not just be exclusive (refusing entry to undesirable products and people); they should also be inclusive (facilitating the movement of individuals and goods). It is, therefore, important that states find a balance between the need for mobility and control between “doors and walls”. A completely closed border is not in fact the solution to border insecurities and other transnational challenges. On the contrary, it would be in danger of creating an environment that is propitious to illicit activities. The balance between “doors and walls” should therefore be respected, to facilitate development of legal, economic activities in and beyond the border region and subsequently help reduce the conditions that generate illegal activities.

The function of a border in the definition of the state should not be underestimated. In certain regions of the world, borders are still subject to dispute or are in the process of being stabilized. A lack of clear delimitation and demarcation between two states is a potential source of tension, which can affect other countries in the region. In May 2009, for example, only 25% of land borders in Africa had sufficient demarcation lines (GTZ and GABP, 2009). According to the declaration of the African Union Border Programme and its implementation modalities as adopted by the Conference of African Ministers in charge of border issues held in Addis Ababa, the African Union is aware of the importance of having stable borders for peace, security and cooperation in the continent and in June 2007 it launched the Border Programme, in an effort to define and demarcate the borders of its member states by 2012.

Eselebor (2008) has noted that a border is a line or thin strip delimiting the territories of sovereign states with equal jurisdiction as can be observed at the Nigeria border with Benin Republic at Seme. Eselebor further notes that an understanding and interpretation of what border is and means vary with different strategic interests that could be social, economic, political or environmental; and that our border, therefore, performs the dual function of a line that links and separates. Talking

about international borders, the 29<sup>th</sup> Report of the European Union on the proposal for a European body guard, (2003:9) asserted that:

*borders are natural points at which to make checks on entry to a country, not only on people but on goods for customs, health, plant health and other purposes; and to enforce rules on prohibited and restricted goods. The border is also a natural focus of police activity, as it provides an opportunity to check people arriving and it is also the place where by definition the act of smuggling takes place. Border control therefore have a role to play in combating illegal immigration and various forms of cross-border crime ranging from small smuggling to organized crime and international terrorism.*

The above is what Nigeria's borders connote. These borders exist all over the country where Nigeria geographically connects different countries such as Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Benin Republic.

### **1.6.2 Border Communities**

The term "border communities" most often suggests that the closeness to the border is a major point that a given space is known for. With its closeness to different countries, diverse cultures and practices rub off on these communities. As such, border communities are highly multicultural communities, where traveling and trading frequently take place. They can also be flashpoints for international conflicts, most importantly when the two connecting countries are involved in territorial disputes. According to Conteh (2005), border communities are locations that allow constant movement and exchange during the time of conflict. This is because of the strategic positioning of the communities and their proximity to the borders. Hall (2005) identified a set of features common to border communities. He averred that border communities often lack the needed political and economic control necessary for taking decisions that affect the well-being of its people thus leading to a feeling of alienation and marginalization. This owes to the area being categorized as sensitive zones under the surveillance and protection of the federal or central government of the country. Again, due to their geographical location, these areas are situated on the peripheral of the states, making accessibility to the cities assiduous and expensive. And finally,

these areas are areas known to be rich in aesthetic features as their relatively underdeveloped nature makes it easy for cultural and natural values to be preserved. In sum, border communities are communities that straddle the border. Some of these communities may fall on one side of the border making it exclusively a part of a country while many are being divided by virtue of the borderline that cut across them, making them a part of both sides of the border. In Nigeria, these communities exist across the different regions that share boundaries with neighboring states of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon in the North-Eastern and South-Southern Nigeria and Benin Republic in the South-Western Nigeria. Specifically, for this study, border communities are communities situated along the borders found in three states of the North-Eastern Nigeria namely, Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States.

### **1.6.3 Insurgency and Cross-Border Insurgency**

Insurgency is an ambiguous concept. The United States Department of Defence (2007) defines it as organized movement that has the aim of overthrowing a constituted government through subversive means and armed conflict (See Hellesen, 2008:14). This definition suggests that insurgent groups employ unlawful means towards achieving an end, which could be political, religious, social or even ideological. The goal of insurgency is to confront and overthrow an existing government for the control of power, resources or for power sharing (Siegel, 2007:328).

According to Powell and Abraham (2006), insurgency refers to a violent move by a person or group of persons to resist or oppose the enforcement of law or running of government or revolt against constituted authority of the state or of taking part in insurrection. Insurgency as defined above violates the constitution's criminal law and the international treaty obligations of a nation in the following circumstances:

*When it constitutes an attack on defenceless citizens and other property resulting into injuries, loss of lives and properties as well as forced or massive internal displacement of people out of their habitual places of residence. When it drives business/ investors away from an insecure area and also when it constitutes domestic and international crimes punishable by law such as treasonable felony, terrorism, murder, crimes against humanity and genocide. (Powell and Abraham, 2006).*

Traditionally however, insurgencies seek to overthrow an existing order with one that is commensurate with their political, economic, ideological or religious goals (Gompert and Gordon 2008). According to Kilcullen (2006: 112) “insurgency is a struggle to control a contested political space, between a state (or a group of states or occupying powers), and one or more popularly based, non-state challengers”. He further draws a line between classical and contemporary insurgencies, indicating that the latter seeks to replace the existing order, while the former sometimes strives for the expulsion of foreign invaders from their territory or seek to fill an existing power vacuum.

According to Salehyan (2010), insurgent groups seek havens in neighboring countries, where they settle for the training of their combatants, stockpile the needed resources, and enjoy a level of safety. Once these groups have fully stabilized themselves on external soil, they cease to be a solely domestic affair but draws attention from regional governments as their nihilistic existence no longer affects a single country but multiples. An example is the LRA in Northern Uganda whose activities spread across four countries such as the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the South Sudan, and Uganda. Also, in Nigeria, is the phenomenon of Boko Haram which has spread across four countries: Cameroon, Niger, Chad and Nigeria. Therefore, in this study, cross-border insurgency entails the Boko Haram Sect and its activities which cut across border communities in Nigeria and its aforementioned neighboring countries.

#### **1.6.4 Coping Strategy**

‘Coping’ is majorly a term in psychology used in other disciplines like sociology and biology to explain ways through which a society or an organism engages in an ongoing cognitive and behavioral efforts to manage specific (external and/or internal) demands that are appraised as tasking or exceeding the resources of the individual (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). Coping is seen as strategies used to tolerate physical, financial or emotional stress (Folkman & Lazarus, 1980). Folkman and Lazarus stated that coping strategies might be behavioral, such as problem-solving techniques, or cognitive. Cognitive coping is emotion-focused and involves using psychological approaches to lessen stress, and may include using hilarity, emotional support, or religion (Folkman & Lazarus, 1980). Compas (1987) equally supported the above assertion seeing problem-focused strategies as strategies which aim at the source of the stress, with an attempt to reduce or alter while on the other hand, emotion-based strategy aims at the emotion with an attempt



to regulating it. However, in a study conducted by Tobin et al, (1989) to replicate the primary dimensions of coping discovered in the past, they proposed that adding new items after reviewing the existing scale could increase the possibility that all relevant factors would emerge with a great variety of items. Their finding supported a hierarchical structure with three distinct levels. The primary consists of eight coping strategies such as problem solving, cognitive restructuring, social support, expressing emotions, problem avoidance, wishful thinking, social withdrawal and self-criticism. The secondary level is construed into two. They are the problem-focused coping which involves problem engagement and problem disengagement and the emotion-focused coping which involves emotion engagement and emotion disengagement. The tertiary level is concerned with dealing with stressful situation in two basic ways which are engagement and disengagement. Much later, Park and Folkman (1997) outlined meaning-focused as a third form of coping strategy. This is conceptualized to mean changing the appraisal of a stressful situation to be more consistent with one's goals and beliefs as against the problem and emotion-focused coping which attempts to change or alleviate the stressful event. Therefore, the cogent function of coping strategies is basically to assist an individual, group or communities adapt to whatever situation that confronts them.

Within the context of conflict situation, for people to survive, they are forced to evolve coping strategies. Those who do not do so do not survive (Nordstrom, 1997). Civilians living through violence will make morally impossible choices to protect themselves and their families. According to Sheper-Hughes (2008), civilians confronted with violence are bound to make difficult choices in a bid to protecting themselves and their families. In the same vein, communities confronted with armed conflict are bound to act analogously to protect their members in defence of themselves. Suarez and Black (2014: 1) averred that “conflict-affected populations rely on a sophisticated knowledge and assessment of their environment while simultaneously deploying and adapting their coping strategies to navigate violence.” Therefore, to Suarez and Black (2014: 5) coping strategies are “subtle ways that individuals and communities reconfigure their lives in order to evade social, political, cultural, and economic death.”

Various authors such as (Baines and Paddon 2012; Bonwick 2006; Mégret 2009; Barter 2012; Gorur 2013; Levine 2013; Williams 2013) conceptualized coping strategies along a wide spectrum:

- Hiding, avoidance and fleeing – temporarily or permanently relocating from an insecure vicinity to a relatively secured location.
- Submission, accommodation, and/or cooperation – collaborating with armed groups through the provision of real time information and supplies such as food items and other types of assistance as may be required of them either voluntarily or out of duress.
- Contestation and witnessing – mobilizing public opinion to challenge an armed group, through human rights monitoring, reporting and advocacy.
- Confrontation – uniting and forming an armed unit to confront armed groups or joining one of the fighting parties to counter such armed groups unleashing terror against the people and the community.

According to South and Harrigan (2012), communities cannot engage these strategies in isolation of each other. Practically, civilians will engage a combination of these and many other strategies, depending on the specific context and nature of the armed conflict.

While these strategies have been used to counter threats, they hardly succeed in yielding the desired level of safety that the people need (South and Harrigan 2012). Most often, utilizing some of these strategies may expose the people to different susceptibilities. For instance, while in hiding, there is the need to source for food items thus the need for planting and harvesting crops to feed family members and most often, these communities being typically agrarian, make farming their only source of livelihood. In the process of sneaking into remote areas, they stand the risk of walking into the camps and ambush of the insurgent groups (Suaraz and Black, 2014). In all, the cogent function of coping strategies is basically to assist an individual, or communities adapt to whatever situation that confronts them. Therefore, for this study, coping strategies refer to the responses of border communities to cross-border insurgency which ensures their survival.

## **1.7 Justification of the study**

Creswell (1994) opines that the justification or significance of a study must be concerned with three major questions which are: How is the study going to add to scholarly research and literature in the field? How will the study improve policy? How will the study improve practice? Therefore, this study will contribute to scholarship, policy development and practice.

Primarily, this study is significant in that it addresses the present reality initiated by the Boko Haram insurgency in the border communities, and which largely remains an issue of serious concern in North-Eastern Nigeria. The concern is that since the eruption of the Boko Haram insurgency in 2003, which has claimed countless lives and properties especially of people living in the communities that straddle borders, it has been established that these communities continue to exist and are inhabited. Moreover, by virtue of these communities straddling the borders, this phenomenon has had a spill-over effect on the neighbouring countries such as Chad, Niger and Cameroun, thus making this study critical not only to the Nigerian state under study, but also towards the improvement of the safety of lives and properties of border communities in Chad, Niger and Cameroun.

Furthermore, to generate a theoretical model, one peculiar to the case study of this research was developed from the major findings of the study which directly addresses the coping strategies evolved by the border communities in North-Eastern Nigeria for safety and survival. The study contributes to the increasing spectrum of literature on border studies, specifically on the theme of coping strategies from the Nigerian-state perspective. More importantly, it is useful for engendering further research, and for providing insights into policy and practice in the improvement of identified coping strategies of communities and measures that guarantee the safety of lives and properties in the border communities of countries experiencing cross-border insurgency in West Africa.

### **1.8 Limitation of the study**

The major limitation of the study was the inability to generate adequate data especially in Yobe state. This was majorly caused by the insecurity of the research area. For lack of fund, the researcher was not able to provide for himself security in anyway, and therefore took a risk by proceeding into these communities. In each community, limited time was spent by the researcher collecting data for safety reasons, as advised by the guides. Furthermore, participants were willing to give information in all the communities except in Yobe state where it was observed that participants held back certain information in their responses for reasons best known to them. However, deducing from the few responses they provided and personal observation by the researcher, needed information was gathered for the study.

## 1.9 Ethical Consideration

Ethics means morals, principle, right, proper, and decent. These are words to be put into consideration when carrying out a research. Thus, Bertram and Christiansen (2014) reiterated that “ethics has to do with behaviour that is considered either right or wrong”. It is an important consideration in research, particularly with research involving humans and animals. Strydom (2011), also sees ethics as a set of moral principles which is suggested by an individual or group, is subsequently widely accepted, and which offers rules and behavioural expectations about the most correct conduct towards experimental subjects and respondents, employers, sponsors, other researchers, assistants and students.

With regards to ethical considerations, the researcher strictly followed the theory of autonomy which stresses that the right of self-determination of respondents must be respected. According to Burton (2000) and Babbie (2007) this theory indicates that a respondent has the right to participate or not to participate in a research study. Also, the researcher has to give space while respondents are filling-in the required information in the questionnaire so as to uphold confidentiality and not to influence the respondents. Respect for this right form the basis for attempting to ensure that informed consent is achieved. Babbie (2007) opines that the essential ethical rule of social research is that it must bring no harm to a participant. This is the reason why an informed consent form and ethical clearance form (see Appendices ii and iv) were presented to the participants before the commencement of the various interviews. Winter (1996) identified certain principles which are meant to be addressed by the researcher. These are:

- All participants should be allowed to influence the work;
- The wishes of those who do not want to participate must be respected;
- The development of the work must remain visible and open to suggestions from others;
- Permission must be obtained before making observations or examining documents produced for other purposes;
- Description of others’ work and points of view must be negotiated with those concerned before being published; and
- The researcher must accept responsibility for maintaining confidentiality.

Owing from the above, this study adhered to the ethical considerations in accordance with the policies set by the University of KwaZulu-Natal Ethics Committee (UKZNEC). The accepted proposal and ethical clearance requirements were submitted through the Higher Degrees Committee of the school for approval. Thereafter the proposal was approved, and ethical clearance granted. See Appendix III.

Participants were adequately briefed on the purpose of the study before the interviews were conducted. The researcher equally secured necessary permission from the gatekeepers (Traditional rulers) before starting the data collection process. The respondents were as well informed that their participation in the study was voluntary and if uncomfortable in the process, they were free to withdraw from the study at any stage without restrictions. The respondents were also reassured of their anonymity and that data collected would be treated with uttermost confidentiality. In addition, other scholars' works used or cited in this study were acknowledged accordingly with proper referencing. Upon completion of the final version of the thesis, the thesis will be submitted to Turnitin software to check the percentage of plagiarism. The issued originality report will be given to the College higher degrees office.

## **1.10 Structure of the Thesis**

### **Chapter one: Introduction and Conceptual Clarification**

This chapter provides the background to the study, statement of the problem, research questions, aims and objectives, the significance of the study, research site and scope of the study, theoretical framework, methodology, and the structure of the thesis. It also attempts to clarify some concepts as adopted in the study. These include Border, Border Communities, Insurgency, Cross-Border Insurgency and Coping Strategies.

### **Chapter two: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework**

This chapter covered an extensive review of the literature on border threats in global, regional (Africa) and sub-regional (West Africa) perspectives, and a contextual analysis of the construction of borderline in Africa. It also reviewed literature on the strategies developed by border communities in different kinds of conflict situations across the globe. In the final analysis, the chapter discusses

the theoretical framework that underpins the study and a theoretical model constructed from the findings of the study. The underpinning theories are State fragility theory, Functional Prerequisite, and the Human Need theory. For a phenomenological study of demographic nature, one or two theories are insufficient to explain the three-pronged condition necessitating the study communities to develop coping strategies with insurgencies, hence the need for three theories, one for each prong. The selected theories are useful for this study for the following reasons: while the state fragility theory addresses the failure of the Nigerian state to perform its basic function of securing the lives and properties of its citizens, the functional prerequisite and the human needs theory reveal the basic needs of man for survival and the length to which man can go to get these basic needs for the sole aim of survival. This is true for the selected border communities in the North-Eastern Nigeria who have developed coping strategies for survival of the Boko Haram upsurge.

### **Chapter three: Regional Border Architecture: Africa and West Africa**

This chapter discussed the border framework of the AU and ECOWAS as a regional and sub-regional organization respectively, and the implications their implementation or non-implementation have or will have on the border security of member states, with emphasis on Nigeria.

### **Chapter four: Historical Account of Border Architecture in Nigeria**

This chapter discussed the making of the Nigeria state, the nature and construction of states in Nigeria from independence (Nigeria as a federation with regions and 36 states), factors responsible for the erection of borderlines between Nigeria and its neighbouring states, and finally, the evolution, composition and strategic importance of North-Eastern state and their borders in Nigeria.

### **Chapter five: Cross-Border Insurgency in the North-Eastern Nigeria 2003 -2019**

Using existing literature and data gathered for the study, this chapter extensively reviewed the security situation in North-Eastern Nigeria in relation to cross-border insurgency. It attempts a descriptive analysis of insurgent activities in the region vis a vis the perception of the local population in concrete terms. Finally, the chapter attempted a comprehensive discussion on the impacts of Boko Haram insurgency in the North-Eastern Nigeria especially on women and children in border communities.

## **Chapter six: Interventions by State and Non-State Actors to Cross-border Insurgency in the North-Eastern Nigeria**

This chapter examined the migration flow of the local population as either refugees or IDPs within and without the North-Eastern Nigeria and proceeded to question the responses of the government to the security challenge and humanitarian crisis created in the region. This was done by reviewing the state counter-terrorism policy and its implementation process and analyzing the data gathered from the field to determine the effectiveness of the Government response to cross-border insurgency in the North-Eastern Nigeria. The activities of non-state actors who are at the fore front of addressing humanitarian needs was reviewed based on existing literature and responses from the local population.

## **Chapter seven: Survival Strategies of Selected Border Communities in Nigeria**

This chapter extensively analyzed primary data generated from the various FGDs and IDIs conducted in the selected border communities in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states of the North-Eastern Nigeria. Also, secondary data were reviewed in relation to the objectives of the study which is investigating the coping strategies evolved by border communities in the North-Eastern Nigeria.

## **Chapter eight: Conclusion, Recommendations and Suggestions for Future Research**

This concluding chapter attempted a review of the whole study, a conclusion deriving from the findings of the research and recommendations of better-coping strategies based on the research findings.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

#### **2.0 Introduction**

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section focuses on reviewing existing, relevant literature on themes related to the study. This review covers scholarly works on cross-border criminalities which pose threats to borders and borderlands. These include, but are not limited to, smuggling of small arms and light weapons, trafficking on human beings, trafficking on narcotics etc. from global, African and West African purviews. It equally delved into contextualizing the discourse on the construction of borderlines in Africa. The second section presents an overview of the theoretical framework underpinning the study. These theories include state fragility theory; functional prerequisite; and human needs theory. These three theories conjoin to provide useful insights into why inhabitants of the selected border communities in the North-Eastern Nigeria evolved coping strategies for the sole purpose of survival.

#### **2.1 Border Threats from Global, Regional and Sub-Regional Perspectives**

The high wave of globalization and the explosion in communication technologies, have led to the springing up of new security related threats that are independent of national boundaries. As a result, a new form of war is emerging all over the world; this is because the basic threats to national security have changed essentially (Zalur & Zeckhauser, 2002) from orthodox aggression to assymetric belicose. These threats no longer arise from ideological and territorial disputes among states but from the extent globalization, criminal networks and technological threats have grown to challenge the sovereignty of nation states (Zalur & Zeckhauser, 2002).

Ering (2011) sees border threats as a set of criminal endeavours whose committers and consequences go beyond territorial borders. He identifies such criminal activities to be human trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, cross-border terrorism, corruption and business fraud, drug trafficking, illicit trafficking in diamonds, illegal oil bunkering, among others. These activities are carried out by individuals and organized criminal groups utilizing key technological means such as information networks, the financial system and other sophisticated avenues. Ortuno



and Wiriyachai (2009) upheld the view that the past few years have witnessed a significant increase in global criminal activities as identified above, while pointing out others such as material and nuclear technology, migrant smuggling and the trade in human organs. Equally, evolving crimes such as modern piracy, trafficking in poisonous waste, fake medicines, precious metals or natural resources are evolving, thus adding to the list of criminal activities that occur along the borders. Luna (2008) averred that in recent times, trans-national crime has grown in scope and is characterized by increasingly global reach, involved in multiple forms of criminal activity, expanding criminal markets to include large-scale financial fraud and cybercrime. These syndicates are willing and always ready to protect their activities through violent and brutal means. They go to the extent of connecting with international terrorist groups in a bid to exploring and devising exceptional and notorious organizational strategies to prevent capture. Globally, no region is invulnerable from global reach of transnational crime groups (Ering, 2011). The end of the Cold war has witnessed movement of organized crime groups across continents, taking swift advantage of new opportunities, and moving more readily into new geographic areas. The key international organized crime groups operate in the United States, Latin America, West Africa, Southeast Europe, Asia, Russia and all other regions (Ering 2011).

Boister (2003) defines transnational crimes as crimes that have the potential of causing negative consequence across national borders and as well negate the core values of the international community. Furthermore, transnational crimes also include crimes that daily occur within a country, but their grievous consequences are significantly felt in another country, most often neighbouring countries and countries that serve as transit routes for such dastardly acts. Typically, transnational crimes include but are not limited to trafficking both in persons, goods and commodities, sex slavery, cross-border banditry, terrorism offences, etc. (Sunday and Orji, 2014). The UNODC's definition advances the parties involved in these illicit activities. Transnational crime according to UNODC "involves people in more than one country maintaining a system of operation and communication that is effective enough to perform criminal transactions, sometimes repeatedly" (UNODC Report 2005:14). As such, transnational crimes refer precisely to crimes carried out by organized criminal networks otherwise called crime organizations within a country and across its borders (Sunday and Orji, 2014).

The phenomenon of transnational crimes is not alien to West Africa in particular and to Africa as a whole. AUBP (2012) asserts that most parts of the African continent are characterized by insecurity, underdevelopment and conflict. Some of the fundamental causes of these problems are cross-border criminalities which range from cattle rustling, automobile theft, smuggling of arms, ammunitions and commodities, human trafficking, to terrorism among others. This is because even in the face of globalization and technological advancement, borders in Africa aside from being largely porous, they are often managed by limited personnel that are ill- equipped, ill-trained and unmotivated to prevent cross-border crimes and to facilitate harmonious interactions between countries as a result of the mismanagement of these borders. This situation has therefore nearly perpetually opened the borders to transnational crimes. Because they are largely unchecked, these illicit activities carried out across the African borders daily thrive to the extent of becoming established on the continent and in the West African region respectively. Below is an assessment of the major transnational crimes prevalent in Africa to help unearth the critical need to enhance border management in Africa and West Africa.

### **2.1.1 Smuggling of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs)**

“Small arms and light weapons” depict a broad collection of military grade weapons ranging from hand guns to mortars and their missiles. According to the Small Arms Survey (2010), the term “light weapons” includes mortar systems up to and including 120 mm; hand-held (stand-alone), under-barrel, and automatic grenade launchers; recoilless guns; portable rocket launchers, including rockets in single-shot, disposable launch tubes; and portable missiles and launchers, namely Anti-Tank Guided Weapon (ATGWs) and Man-Portable Air Defence System (MANPADS). SALWs’ combined qualities of destructiveness, adaptability and portability have made them weapons of choice for organized criminal groups. Their unchecked availability has played a part in causing massive violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and in the emergence of a culture of violence and the use of children in armed conflicts, events which have devastated many socio-economic systems in Africa. Criminals and rebel groups have taken advantage of the widespread availability of SALWs to engage in acts that undermine human security and state sovereignty (Small Arms Survey, 2010).

Eselebor (2008) opined that there are several internal and external sources of SALWs. Nevertheless, regardless of their origin, these weapons are smuggled across national borders to reach various destinations where they are sold for much gain. The major destination points spread across all regions of Africa where they have been nefariously used in fighting civil wars and committing violent robberies and terrorist acts. Therefore, there is an established connection between border porosity and the proliferation of SALWs which in turn provokes coups, civil wars, insurrections, ethnic violence and organized crime in Africa.

Wannesburg (2005) averred that trafficking of arms and ammunition can be traced to notorious international organized crime figures such as Leonard Minin and Viktor Bout who were able to carry out the illicit trade of providing arms to governments and rebel groups within the sub-region as a result of corruption, civil wars and political instability that was prevalent, making it possible for fire arms to be owned legally and illegally on a large scale within the sub-region. These weapons were used by rebel combatants to fight civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire etc. while criminal gangs used them for armed robbery, vehicle theft, trafficking and highway robberies of passengers moving from one ECOWAS state to the other (Addo, 2006).

The Executive Secretary of ECOWAS Mohammed Ibn Chambas (2007-2010), gave the estimated number of small arms in circulation within West Africa at 8 million while earlier in 1993 the UN mission gave the figure to be 7 million. These weapons are majorly found within Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone and in other conflict zones like the Casamance province, Southern Senegal, Guinea Bissau, Northern Ghana and Nigeria (Kwadwo, 2005). Addo (2006) pointed out that the cross-border destabilizing activities apparently occasioned by border porosity witnessed in Senegal, Guinea Bissau and The Gambia are largely caused by the movement of refugees and the flow of small arms across borders. Similarly, in 1993, a UN mission estimated the number of firearms in circulation in West Africa to be seven million, with Liberia having between 80,000 – 100,000 weapons circulating within the country and as such pose a problem that has to be addressed within the sub-region as these weapons were traded among member states (Meek n.d).

What is even more worrisome is that between 1993 and 2018, the number of firearms in circulation in West Africa has drastically increased. Recent figures from the Director of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC), Olatokunbo Ige, indicate that

within a period of 25 years, the number has risen from 7 million to 500 million, of which over 350 million amounting to 70 per cent are found in Nigeria (The News, 2006). Suffice it to note that the years between 2008 and 2011 account for 38 major seizures of major weapons majority of which were trooping into West Africa from up-north by land, a situation unarguably made possible by border maladministration (UNODC, 2013; The Guardian, 2018).

The aforementioned study carried out by UNODC however revealed that some of these arms are locally manufactured. Be that as it may, cross-border firearms trafficking resulting from ineffective border policing has spelt doom for citizens of Nigeria and many West African countries, particularly those who are resident in the borderline areas. For its part, Cote d'Ivoire was alleged to have received several deliveries of military weapons while the figure of deliveries in Liberia was given at 49 deliveries in 2002 and 25 deliveries in 2003 (UNODC, 2005).

It was also discovered that Ghana, Sierra Leone, Mali and Nigeria have a large arms manufacturing industry. These arms are smuggled from Ghana through the borders of Togo and Benin into Nigeria where they are used in committing serious crimes. An instance to refer to was the arrest of some arms traffickers who were discovered to be Nigerians by the Benin Customs officers in 2002. The traffickers were in possession of several rounds of ammunition and hunting rifles being smuggled into Nigeria from Ghana. This only constitutes a minute part of arms trafficked within the sub-region. In 2002, the Nigerian Customs Service equally intercepted a shipment of small arms and ammunition estimated to be more than 4.3 billion naira (US \$34.1 million). This was just one foiled attempt out of many that have been carried out successfully along the borders with Benin Republic in the West and Niger, Chad and Cameroon in the North. In 2017, the Nigerian Customs Service intercepted a 20fts container containing 470 pump action rifles imported from Turkey into Tin-Can Port in Lagos (Vanguard, September 21, 2017).

However, Farah, (2004) averred that the situation persists as many governments were found to be accomplices with different suppliers especially China by providing false end-user certificates or by supplying some of the regimes in West Africa with armaments. It is a truism that these governments do this in exchange for trade agreements.

Across the sub-region, different armed groups have been found making use of these weapons to spur up local and transnational unrest. Small arms circulate in the Sahel region where pastoral societies are experiencing extreme environmental stress and conflict related to food security. In Niger, arms are reportedly trafficked between it and its neighbours. In conflict-ridden zones such as the Niger Delta of Nigeria, weapons are also readily available. It has been confirmed that communities have large stocks of automatic rifles and small arms, which are used in communal violence, piracy and other crimes (Davis and Asuni, 2005). Elsewhere, weapons circulate between Mali and Côte d'Ivoire, remarkably in the territory held by the Forces Nouvelles rebels. Also, in 2004 armed fighters from the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) supported Mandingo groups in violent clashes with the Guerze community in the Guinea Forest region.<sup>8</sup>

As noted earlier in this chapter Nigeria is saturated with sophisticated arms and weapons of mass destruction to the tune of over 350 million firearms capable of fueling conflicts and armed robbery in the state (The News 2006). Most of the illicit arms in circulation in Nigeria found their way into the country through its porous borders, be it land, air or sea (Eselebor, 2008). Placing emphasis on the consequential porosity of Nigeria's land borders and its devastating effects on the country, Eselebor (2008) explained further that the consistent provision of smuggled arms into the country particularly via the porous Nigeria – Benin border is quite alarming and needs to be addressed because of its catastrophic effect on the country's national security. Most of the arms trafficked across border into the country are utilized in internal conflicts, drug trafficking and armed robbery and therefore establishing a continuous cycle of violence and insecurity in which basically women and children are brutalized.

The problems caused by the proliferation of SALW in Nigeria cannot be precisely measured. However, (Keili, 2002; Osimen and Akintunde, 2015) averred that there is no dispute that small arms have had a devastating effect on the development, governance and day to day life of Nigerians

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<sup>8</sup> Guinea: Economic crisis and Liberian gunmen threaten stability, *IRIN*, 15 July 2004. This community is home to many of the Guinean migrants to Côte d'Ivoire who left that country when the civil war began and who are resentful of the assistance given to refugees from Sierra Leone, Liberia and native Ivorians. The Guinean government backed the LURD rebels in Liberia.

and as such posed huge threat to our national security, while also contributing in no small measure to cross-border insurgency and insecurity of border communities in the country.

### **2.1.2 Human Trafficking**

Human beings are another ‘cargo’ for cross-border traffickers and smugglers who move them across borders for selfish monetary gains. Trafficked people, mainly women and children, are those who are forced out of their countries and brought involuntarily to be sold across borders into slavery-like conditions and prostitution.

Scholars have defined human trafficking differently; however, the definition given by United Nations Trafficking in Persons Protocol (2000) encapsulates all. It defines human trafficking to be:

*the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, mainly for exploitation.*<sup>9</sup>

The scope of the human trafficking problem is widespread in West Africa. In West Africa, this phenomenon became aggravated by civil wars which resulted in massive refugee flow, internal displacement, the conscription of child soldiers and poor economic conditions (Salah 2001). Organized crime groups therefore utilize this situation as penetrating networks to smuggle women, children and other undocumented persons for labour and sexual abuse.<sup>10</sup> Human Right Watch, (2003) averred that the most prominent kind of trafficking which is child trafficking is prevalent among eleven out of the fifteen member-states of the ECOWAS namely Benin Republic, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Guinea, Togo, Sierra Leone, Niger, Cote D’Ivoire, Gambia and Mali. It provided statistics of an estimated 200,000 children who are victims of this practice in both West and Central Africa. Fitzgibbon (2003) indicated that the International Labour Organization (ILO)

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<sup>9</sup> <https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/ProtocolonTrafficking.pdf>

<sup>10</sup> Trafficking of humans is defined as a phenomenon where an intermediary, who for a fee or violence or persuasion, displaces an individual within or outside the national boundaries of a state or commercial exploitation with the assent of parents: *IRIN*, West and Central Africa, *IRIN focus on regional efforts against child trafficking*, 21 January 2002.

estimated that 200,000–300,000 children are trafficked within West Africa every year. UNICEF gave an estimate of 10,000–15,000 West African children who are being sold for the sum of \$340 to farmers to be used as labourers in the cocoa plantations (ILO, 2001). This shows the vibrancy of this phenomenon within the sub-region. In 1998, about 10,000 to 15,000 Malian children worked as labourers in plantations in Cote d'Ivoire while in 1996, 4,000 children were trafficked from Cross River State to different parts within and without Nigeria. Benin had a record of over 3,000 children trafficked between 1995 and 1999 (ILO, 2001). However, in 1997, more than 700 children were intercepted in Benin within the first seven months (ILO, 2001).

Sarah (2003) points out that in West Africa, recognized trafficking routes utilized involve Ghana, Cameroon, Niger, Benin Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Mali, Nigeria, Togo, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Chad and Senegal. Victims of this dastardly act are frequently garnered from rural areas close to the highways between Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Benin and Nigeria. Wannesburg (2005) points out that from Burkina Faso, children have been trafficked to Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Germany and Côte d'Ivoire. In Mali, Gao is reportedly a transit point for human trafficking. People may be conveyed to Algeria, through Mauritania, Western Sahara and Morocco to Spain or through Mali, Algeria and Tunisia to Italy/Malta. The US Department of State's Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons recently published a report indicating that in 2017, Nigeria was downgraded to Tier 2 watchlist among countries with the highest number of traffickers in West Africa (Department of State, 2017). To corroborate this fact, Ngor (n.d) reports that Nigerian groups dominate the organized human trafficking networks within the sub-region; and have been able to spread the tentacles of their operations into Mali, Togo, Benin, Ghana, and South Africa. They have successfully established both air and land routes which are used to transport the victims to West and southern Africa and Europe.

Titi Abubakar, onetime Nigerian First Lady, saw this situation as abnormal and therefore spearhead the establishment of a non-governmental organization called Women Trafficking and Child Education Foundation (WOTCLEF) to vigorously fight against human trafficking in Nigeria (Agbu 2003). She harnessed and utilized all available means ranging from legal, political, and social, to start off a significant resistance against human trafficking in the country (Agbu, 2003). In July 2003, the Trafficking in Persons' prohibition and Administration Act was passed in

Nigeria. As a legislative framework, the Act resists all forms of trafficking in person and protects children and adults against criminal networks (UNICEF, 2007). Diverse reasons are adduced as to why many Nigerian Children are susceptible to trafficking. UNICEF highlighted these to include large family size, poverty, low literacy levels, high school drop-out rates swift urbanization with deteriorating public service, and to crown it all is the porous borders of Nigeria – Benin republic. This therefore made Nigeria a hub of trafficking in human beings, particularly women and children, as it became “an origin, transit and destination country for trafficking women and children”. Trafficked women and children dispersed to different parts of West Africa, North America, Europe and Middle East from Nigeria mainly via the Seme Border. Benin Republic equally serves as a destination country for children trafficked for labour exploitation from Nigeria. Women trafficked from Nigeria are equally forced into prostitution in Benin (Chinkwanha, 2007).

UNODC (2006) revealed that children trafficked into Nigeria are mainly children who are voluntarily released by their relatives and the ones kidnapped from Benin and Togo, Cote d’Ivoire and Niger. An estimated 96% of that figure comes from both Benin Republic and Togo, with 90% coming from Benin alone. Boys between the ages of five and six years of age trafficked from Benin have been seen peddling drugs and sighted working in exploitive conditions in Nigeria’s mines, quarries, plantations and construction sites mostly in the South-Western part of the country. Trafficked girls are used for domestic services or street hawking as well as commercial sexual exploitation. Regarding women trafficked to Europe for commercial sex a February 2018 report from CNN estimated that 94% are from Edo State while the remaining is from Kano, Delta, and Borno States (UNODC, 2006).

Olujuwon (2006) highlights the ordeal of the trafficked person in the hands of their end users. According to him, trafficked persons suffer physical assault and threats of violence of self and family and also psychological issues. They equally suffer from illness and death. Many trafficked persons die en-route as a result of dangerous track condition and become ill as a result of dangerous working condition. Moreover, trafficked females are constantly raped and harassed by police so that the officers could turn a blind eye to this act. Again, trafficked person, friends and family are being threatened if debts owed are not paid or report will be made to authorities if the trafficked escaped or refused to work.



According to Nshimbi and Moyo (2016), there is a re-victimization by government in diverse ways. Non-citizens and marginalized persons are being treated unjustly while the officials treat trafficked persons as criminals for crossing international boundaries. For instance, trafficked person's passport data page and their identity are printed in newspaper and highlighted in news. Furthermore, trafficked persons are forced to return to their countries swiftly without consideration for safety, justice or need for prosecution witness. Also, they are detained by police, starved, and held in custody longer than necessary while the government fails to put measures that will protect family members of trafficked persons from threats of harm or actual harm by traffickers.

The foregoing points to the fact that border porosity is not only peculiar to Nigeria but to the whole of West Africa. Additionally, it reveals the damaging consequences the phenomenon of border porosity has on individual countries, citizens, diplomatic activities and on the development of the sub-region at large. The foregoing further helps to buttress the need to enhance border management on the continent such that cross-border crimes could be brought to its lowest level within the shortest possible time, for the socio-economic and political betterment of West African countries in particular and of the embattled continent.

### **2.1.3 Trafficking of Narcotics**

The problem emanating from drug trafficking is probably among the most alarming problems in transnational crime (Muna, 2002). Legally, the US defines drug trafficking as “an offense under federal, state, or local law that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute or dispense” (Ering, 2011). It can also be described as the commercial exchange of drugs and drug apparatus which may include any equipment used in the production of illegal drugs or use of them. Drug trafficking is a problem that affects every nation in the world and exists on many levels.

The trafficking of drugs is a dreadful threat that is connected to the porosity of borders. In Africa, drug trafficking routes are similar to the ones usually used in smuggling illegal migrants and contraband, via West Africa and East Africa into Europe and the US. To this extent, drug

trafficking has been widely acknowledged to become a major threat to human security, national sovereignty and regional stability (Ering, 2011).

Studies across regions of the world have shown that drug use is associated with crime and violence. The UN has asserted that the production and trafficking of drugs is a major source of financing rebellions in West Africa. This is the case in countries that are found to be leading producers of Cannabis such as Nigeria, Ghana, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, and Senegal. Cannabis production is alleged to provide the finance for arms acquisition. In such countries, farmers prefer to grow cannabis rather than cash crops like cocoa, rubber, timber etc. because of its high demand and high prices in the world market Neal (n.d). Therefore, drug trafficking is a more lucrative business that is used to finance other organized criminal engagements like terrorism, arms trafficking, and human trafficking.


In Africa, the drug issue has been found to be having another dimension. Aside providing drug traffickers with routes for drugs smuggled into Europe, Africa is increasingly becoming a destination for illegal drugs where they are being consumed, hence the reason for the prevalence of drug abuse and addiction. Some African countries have witnessed an inflow of hard drugs such as heroin and cocaine. In West Africa, most especially, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Senegal have experienced an increase in drug seizures by government officials (ibid.). These substances such as heroin and cocaine are found to be used in the cities of Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Ghana, Benin and Nigeria but the indigenous cannabis produced in these countries still constitute the main substance of abuse in Africa (UN World drug Report, 2010) as it has largely serviced the local and regional drug markets. Youths in the cities peddle this substance, even though some of them may be sold and trafficked to Europe (EUROPOL Organised Crime Report, 2004).

Studies have revealed that West African criminal networks in collaboration with other syndicates use West Africa ports as transit routes for drugs to Europe and the US. This is so as cocaine and heroin have been seized en-route the US and Europe from Togo, Nigeria, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal (African criminal enterprises, Organized Crime Section, FBI, [www.fbi.gov](http://www.fbi.gov)). This illicit trade is being facilitated by the vast and porous land, riverine and seaports and extensive corruption among government and customs officials provide an ideal environment for illicit trade.

In Accra, two Venezuelans were rounded up for allegedly possessing narcotic drugs valued to be \$38 million. The narcotics suspected to be cocaine were found packaged in 588 pieces of wrapped tablets and concealed in paper boxes with a gross weight of 580 kilograms (Ghanaian Daily Graphics, 2005). Again, the Spanish authorities intercepted an aged trawler, registered in Ghana, off the West African island nation of Cape Verde. Onboard was 3,000 kilos of high-grade Colombian cocaine which was seized and the crew who were mostly Ghanaians were arrested (Eric, 2005). In December 2004, Spanish patrols equally intercepted a Togo-flogged ship carrying 4.5 tons of narcotics (ibid.). On a wider scale, the West African Joint Operations Initiative, a regional enforcement project set up by America and Nigeria, made seizures totaling 1,390 kilos cocaine in Togo, Benin, Cape Verde, and Ghana (ibid.).

Figure 2.1 shows that a total of 3,161 and 6,468 kilograms of cocaine were seized in 2006 and 2007 respectively. These statistics given by UNODC as at 31st September 2007 confirms the popularity of the porous route in drug trafficking. The rising use of West Africa as a large cocaine stockpiling space is further confirmed by seizures made by Latin American and European countries of cocaine shipments on its way to Africa (Ering, 2011).


**Figure 2. 1 Annual cocaine seizures in West Africa 2000 – 2007**



*Source:* UNODC: World Drug Report, 2007 and UNODC Data for Africa 2006 – 2007 Statistics in Ering, S.O. 2011. Trans-border Crime and its Socio-economic Impact on Developing Economics. J Sociology Soc Anth, 2(2): 73-8

Figure 2.2 displays the figure of maritime seizure made by European Navies off the West African coast between the year 2005 and 2006, signifying an increase in drug trafficking activities within West Africa.

**Figure 2. 2 Maritime seizures made by European Navies off the African Coast in 2005 and 2006**



*Source:* UNODC individual drug seizures Database and Data for Africa, in Ering, S.O. 2011. Trans-border Crime and its Socio-economic Impact on Developing Economics. J Sociology Soc Anth, 2(2): 73-80.

However, in Nigeria, which is the most populous country in Africa and one of Africa’s major economic players experiences a significant problem of organized crime. As Muna 2002 observed, the police and other security agencies have limited capacity to analyze the structures of organized crime, tending to regard all those whom they apprehend as individuals. This observation, though sixteen years old, remains valid as there is no existing study to prove otherwise. As suggested by Nwannennaya (2017), drug trafficking was initiated in the region of West Africa by Nigerians because many drug plants do very well in Nigeria, leading to increase in cultivation and cross-border transmission. Ghana and Sierra Leone Police Force both allege that drug trafficking was introduced into their countries largely by Nigerian criminals who intend spreading the tentacles of

their illicit trade activities. However as international drug trading in West Africa seems to have been championed by Nigerians and with Nigerian entrepreneurs now being suspected as playing a major role in the international drug trade while under the pretext of the legitimacy of their businesses, every country in West Africa has the capacity to become a transit route used by criminals of any nationality (UNDOC, 2008).

Nigerian Traffickers are known to operate with impunity in Benin likewise the Beninese in Nigeria through the porous Nigeria – Benin border. Traffickers are smart as they use legitimate business to camouflage drug operations. Proceeds made are often reinvested in Real Estate and this assists them to launder illicit profits (Barbara, 2007). For example, most persons with Nigerian International passports that are arrested, prosecuted and convicted of drug trafficking are usually couriers working for drug barons in other countries (Ngor, n.d.), and although it has been pointed out that Nigeria produces the highest number of criminals than its neighbours, it is still important to point out that criminals of other nationalities most especially Beninese may sometimes find it easy to claim being Nigerians:

*But even if one were to make allowance for doubts over the true nationality of some couriers bearing Nigerian passport, there is overwhelming evidence to support the view that drug trade remains one of the specialties of Nigerian criminal group – of couriers intercepted with drug transmitting through West Africa, according to statistics compiled since 2000-2005, 92 percent were West Africans and no less than 56% were Nigerians. UNDOC (2005).*

A striking point to note is the continuous emerging role of Nigeria as a zone of transit. Just within West Africa, narcotics are trafficked from Ghana through Togo into Benin cutting across the Nigeria-Benin border into Nigeria and all the way into Southern Africa.

Drug Dealers employ the services of couriers to do the trafficking and are only shown specific points of delivery. Drug dealers and ‘pushers’ cut across the different segments of society ranging

from highly placed government officials or politicians and business tycoons to unemployed youth looking for greener pastures or desperate to be prosperous at all cost to break the chain of poverty.<sup>11</sup>

*The couriers are mostly youths within the age bracket of 18-40 years. This is substantiated from the arrests made. The methods of peddling drugs vary from simple concealment in personal effects like bags, boxes and shoes, animals, lining of clothing, concealment in women's reproductive organ (the Vagina), designed as talcum powder, packaged in small moulded balls and swallowed, engraved in cultural artefacts to so many ingenious unimaginable methods (Agbu, 2008).*

As a measure of tackling this menace, the Nigerian government established the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) to fight the upsurge in drug trafficking mostly transported across the Nigeria-Benin Border via land, air or sea. The creation of this agency was backed up with the promulgation of National Drug Law Enforcement Agency Act which seeks to enforce laws against the cultivation, processing, sale, trafficking and use of hard drugs and to empower the Agency to investigate persons suspected to have dealings in drugs and other related matters. The NDLEA with the cooperation of other international agencies has relatively fought the war against drug trafficking. This is evident in the arrest made thus far within the country and at exit points but the porous nature of the Nigeria – Benin border remains a bane to the successful operations of the agency (Agbu, 2008).

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<sup>11</sup> A Ghanaian Parliamentarian, together with his accomplice, was arrested for alleged drug trafficking, in November 2005. See the Editorial of the Ghanaian Stateman, 25 November 2005 at <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/newsrunner.php#94959>

#### **2.1.4 Other Commodities**

Some commodities which are termed as contraband by countries are being smuggled in by smugglers. Such commodities which are either sub-standard or hazardous for consumption are being smuggled across African borders. These commodities vary from agricultural products such as tobacco, coffee, vanilla, cocoa, rubber, timber and cattle, manufactured goods like cigarettes, medicines, beverages, electronic gadgets, vehicle and industrial machinery parts, and precious stones such as gold and diamonds. The trafficking and smuggling of contrabands are capable of denying governments tax revenues needed for national development. This act not only deny governments collectible revenues but also hinders local manufacturing companies from thriving as the market is saturated with cheap products, some of which are hazardous to the health and safety of citizens.

Nigeria witnesses the smuggling of commodities such as oil and cars which are mostly smuggled across its borders. The nature of our wide border and coastland with the attendant difficulty of effective manning because of limited resources has aided both the smuggling out and smuggling in of different goods (Nte, 2011). In 2011, 380 cars reportedly stolen in Nigeria were traced to Benin Republic. Oil bunkering has also continued to thrive due to the easy smuggling of the stolen oil via the Seme border. According to the Federal Government, some 300,000 barrels of oil are illegally exported per day with the Nigeria-Benin border acting as a major transit zone (Nte, 2011).

Because of the economic and national security consequences, efforts have been made to reduce smuggling activities to its minimum across border in Nigeria. This reflected in the massive seizure made by the Nigeria custom Service (NICS), Badagry Area Command under the command of comptroller Aliu Barbriel Toba. The value of goods seized was put at N573.3 million. Among the seizure were used vehicles, wines, textile materials, bags of rice, and vegetable oil as well as pharmaceutical products topping the list. These goods were perfectly concealed in a manner that ordinarily will not raise any suspicion (Nte, 2011). Table 2.1 details transnational, organized crimes in the West African region for the earliest periods into the new millennium.



**Table 2. 1 Variations of Transnational Organized crimes in West Africa**

<b>Predominant Border Crimes</b>	<b>Country/ Border Zones of activities</b>	<b>Groups/ Actors Involved</b>	<b>Transit States</b>	<b>Recipient States</b>
Narcotics/ Drug Trafficking	Cape Verde, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo	Narcotic/ Drug dealers	Ghana/ Togo/ Benin/ Nigeria	Spain, Portugal, UK, USA and South Africa
Internet Crime (Advance Fee Fraud/ Money Laundering)	Nigeria, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone	Advanced Fee Fraud gangs or syndicates/ Wealthy business men or government officials	Syndicates commute from the Western part of West Africa (Senegal) across to the Eastern parts (Benin/ Nigeria)	Nigeria and other countries where the '419' fraudsters are resident
Human Trafficking	All across West Africa but mainly around Benin/Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire	Traffickers who serve sometimes as middle men, trade and business partners	Mainly Ghana and Sierra Leone	Other West African countries, and in North America, Europe, and the Middle East
Fire Arms Trafficking	Ghana/ Togo/ Benin/ Nigeria/ Sierra Leone/ Liberia/ Guinea/ Cote d'Ivoire/ Senegal	Rebels, local manufacturers of fire arms and middle men	Togo, Benin, Guinea-Bissau and the Gambia	Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire

Recruitment of Child Soldiers, Mercenarism	Mano River states including Liberia/ Sierra Leone/ Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire	Rebel Groups (including LURD, MODEL, RUF, CDF, New Forces (MPCI, MPIGO and MPJ)	Same countries depending on where conflict spill-over	Mano River States and Cote d'Ivoire
Smuggling of illegal goods, minerals and natural resources and cash crops	Cote d'Ivoire/ Ghana/ Togo/ Benin and Nigeria, and Liberia/ Sierra Leone	Individuals, business men and women, warlords/ civil war combatants	Mainly Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire	In Europe and North America

Source: Addo, P. (2006). Cross Border Criminal Activities in West Africa: Options for Effective Responses

**2.2 Contextual Discourse of the Construction of Borders in Africa**

The construction of borders in Africa can be traced to the nineteenth century when the Europeans scrambled for African land and territories. Countries such as Germany, Britain, France, Spain, Italy and Portugal came into the territory of Africa, divided and ruled over it until late 1960s when most African countries gained their Independence. Phimister (1995) exposes that western expansion and colonization project in Africa came before the 19<sup>th</sup> century, nonetheless Africa became identified with borders and arbitrary boundaries in the 19th century. Stuchtey (2011) evinces that during the phase of High Imperialism between 1870 and World War I, every larger European nation state as well as the USA and Japan participated in acquiring territories outside Europe. Africa as a region was a foremost area that the Europeans expanded to and acquired territories. The conquest of India in the 18th and early 19th centuries, at about the time that Africa was conquered, speaks volumes of European expansion.

However, the existence of borders in Africa can be associated with the incongruous incursion of colonial powers on the continent altering the original structure of nations. Record of the New World Encyclopedia discloses that in 1454 and 1483, the Pope ceded much of Africa to the emerging maritime colonial powers, Spain, Belgium, and Portugal. But in the 19th century, particularly after the 1884 Berlin Conference, or a period from 1890-1910, the European powers established colonial system by partitioning Africa among themselves for economic, political, cultural and military gains. Boahen (1985) notes that the period after 1910 was essentially one of consolidation and exploitation.

The exploitation and control of Africa's human and natural resources goes as far as the period of slave trade. Sankarasubramanian (2015) explains that it was during the slave trade that the European powers first started controlling territories; the territory would be some land around trading posts where European ships could find harbours and offload goods (and in some cases, load their ships with slaves). Stuchtey (2011) stresses it further that the formal use of colonial violence was symbolized in its most illustrative form in the slave trade with the establishment of slave ports on the coasts of West and East Africa as the starting points of slave shipments to the plantations of Middle and South America. To a significant degree, there is a great influence of slave trade being a political and economic invention on border creation in Africa.

Scholars of history such as Asiwaju (1985) and Robinson (2002) have emphasized that borders construction were either absent or weak in pre-colonial Africa and during slave trade. In the same vein, the work of Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2011) has shown while citing Asiwaju (1985); Dowden (2008) and Wesseling (1996) that the main impact of Europeans' influence in Africa was not colonization per se, but the improper border design. African border construction became evident from the moment that the Berlin Conference was concluded in 1885; a period that political and economic rivalries between the new industrial nations in Europe became obvious, as well as the subjugation of African nations and its traditional territorial structures (Britannica Encyclopedia, 2017).

Subsequently, the abolition of the slave trade resulted in the West bringing African nations under a unified but segmented territorial construction. The Western powers initiated and divided African land according to their own interest. Brunet-Jailly (2009) shows that Africa was divided with the

use of map designed from the Berlin Conference. With the map, land, coastal and Island areas of Africa were shared by the European powers among themselves, except territories such as Liberia and Ethiopia (Boahen, 1985). In the process of sharing, the Europeans failed to consider the seemingly differences existing among the people of the nations that they merged into a conglomerated unit. Factually, it was partitioning the African territory that brought about border construction.

Border as a system of checking movement of people from one territory to another became conventional only in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Fisher (2012) recounts that in 1575, 100 Portuguese families and 400 Portuguese troops landed on the African continent's southwestern coast at what is now the city of Luanda. They expanded from there, stopping only when they reached German, Belgian, or British claims. By twentieth century, the Western powers had developed posts and, in some places, implanted symbols to indicate or identify areas and/or territories already conquered. According to New World Encyclopedia (2017), decolonization process during the twentieth century saw the emergence of nation-states with artificial borders, often crossing tribal boundaries and with limited infrastructure. In effect, Western interest in decolonizing Africa was more of protecting Western political and economic interest.

On one hand, border system was an approach that the Western powers employed in forestalling advancement of counterparts into areas of interests or areas already occupied. On the other hand, border construction was the tool that Europeans used in physically claiming conquered territory in Africa. Largely, as a systemic program, through border post the Europeans were able to retain their presence in every colonized area in Africa even after the decolonization. Carter and Poast (2015) stress that borders constitute the international system of states, and accordingly states will from time to time take assertive measures to secure the border, with among the most aggressive strategies being the construction of physical barriers, which we refer to as “border walls”. Due to the physical role that borders play in arresting cross-border insecurity, Carter and Poast made it clear that President Kennedy came to the conclusion that walls are better than wars.

Border construction has become the most functional practice by which colonization principle of divide and rule is brought back to memory. Of course, the colonial legacy relating to border and boundary has generated so much disputes and conflict for the colonized countries in Africa. In

fact, most cases of conflicts among or between countries after the World War II are based on boundary issues. Tolorunshagba (2015), Ikome (2012) and Owhotu (1989), have noted that countries such as Nigeria and Cameroon, Libya and Chad, Somalia and Ethiopia, Togo and Ghana, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Senegal and Gambia, Nigeria and Chad, North and South Sudan, almost went to war because of boundary dispute. In particular, Nigeria and Cameroon in 1981, 1983, 1993, 1994 and 1996 nearly warred over the Bakassi peninsula, until 2012 when the International Court of Justice intervened in the boundary issue with its verdict in favour of Cameroon (Tolorunshagba, 2015, Baye, 2011 and Aja, 2002).

The colonial policy which established the indistinct boundaries in Africa also presented the western powers themselves with serious challenges throughout the year 1900. Accordingly, expanding territories and establishing borders led the Europeans to sign many treaties, such as the Ottoman-German 1914 treaty; the 1919 Treaty of Versailles (established the term of peace after World War I, and obliged Germany to surrender territories under its colony to its European counterparts); the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 delimited the boundaries of Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Egypt and Sudan. Treaties from 1925 to 1945, and subsequently late 1950s were mostly signed between Britain, France and African nations, namely the 1934 British-Egyptian Agreement that delimited the border of present day Libya, the 1935 Franco-Italian Agreement concerning Aouzou Strip. By late 1950s and early 1960s, African nations had started gaining their independence.

As observed by Brunet-Jailly (2009), majority of the treaties identified above were signed just to ascertain sovereignty and control over territories, resources, and consequently to prevent conflict among European powers. Coplan (2010) unveils that borders are nowhere simply the product of geography, because borders in North America and Europe were established by war, domination, and resistance. In Africa, it is almost the contrary because borders were arbitrarily created based on the outcome of Berlin Conference (Asiwaju, 1976 and Englebert et al., 2002). Though the Berlin Conference Act emphasizes occupancy right in relation to geographical control, the European powers failed to recognize the original limits of nations' territories; neither did they bother to delineate nations' boundaries clearly in accordance with their socio-geographical features.

At independence, most of the African nations' artificially designed borders generated several controversies, such that on May 25, 1963, the OAU in Cairo had to compel African nations to sign documents maintaining the territorial boundaries handed to them by their colonizers (Zoppi, 2013 and Munya, 1999). The decision of OAU, now AU, came from the fact that most colonial boundary delimitations in Africa were full of errors. This boundary delineation error was not unnoticed before and even after the United Nations was established in 1945 to maintain international peace, friendly relations among nations and ensure self-determination of peoples or nations (The UN Charter, Chapter I, Article I). In fact, it can be said that since the United Nations could do more or less little about boundary errors, it had to shift the responsibility to the AU to ensure that African Nations maintain colonial-created boundaries to avoid complications.

Presently however, the United Nations is faced with a serious problem of maintaining international peace between some African countries in dispute over boundaries. Again, an argument against the organization is that it has arrested inter-state wars, but has failed to end intra-state wars, namely insurgency, secessionist movements, terrorism, land or boundary conflict etc. Cases of boundary in Africa alone are a sizable workload that the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, called International Court of Justice, is trying to determine. Sumner (2004) shows that the cases of borders between Burkina Faso and Mali, submitted to ICJ in 1983 are still pending. Also, Somalia and Kenya Maritime Boundary Delimitation into the Indian Ocean, Ghana and Ivory Coast border, Tanzania and Malawi colonial border dispute are still pending at the ICJ.

However grievous the effect of colonial borders may be in Africa, there is the understanding that changes in boundary functions might lessen boundary tensions across borderland and border (Stephen, 1959). Initially, borders were barriers by which a state defends its sovereignty. Brunet-Jailly (2009) notes that the European states turned their borderlands into military regions where combat was rehearsed regularly and eventually took place. He also added that borders were originally used to delimit the territorial possessions of sovereign states, which made rulers who were eager to picture the boundary line demarcate their possessions. In Africa, precisely West-Central African States such as Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Benin, borders are used for the purposes of goods and services import and export, checking migration flows, as well as defending states.

In the view of Alesina (2003), in Africa, there are evidences of how separatism or secessionist movement and threats in a sovereign state led to the creation of new state. South Sudan is a newly created state, after recognizable threats against Sudan from which she separated in 2011. Yet, many other Africa states are still confronted with secessionist threats, as in the case of Nigeria, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Chad and Senegal etc. (Kam Kah, 2014; Keller, 2007). Such struggles notwithstanding, the problem of secessionism does not end with state creation because newly created states would definitely want to establish their own borders for effective economic, political, social and geographical control. So, it is clear that the issue of having autonomous boundary or border control in relation to territorial sovereignty is as old as European incursion into Africa, and that it would last for as long as secession remains in sight. Stothart (2014) establishes that the principle of sovereignty, territoriality and autonomy have formed the basis of the international community's political, economic and legal systems for the past 300 years. According to him, the principle entails that humankind is organized principally into exclusive territorial communities with fixed borders, which separate the domestic arena from the world outside.

Basically, the construction of borders in Africa was basically to enhance trade, economic and political relations of the European countries. Nevertheless, the construction today appears to be frustrating its desired purpose. Borders are now more like barriers rather than bridges, and as such it frustrates trades even among countries with the closest borders. In relation to this claim, OECD (2005) recognizes that borders' inefficient procedures are barriers which may likely led to poor export, competitiveness, or make countries less attractive to investment in, in the face of smuggling, fraud and national insecurity. It is vital at this juncture to observe that no country in Africa is absolved of inefficient border procedures with complex trade facilitation. There is a cogent need to make policies that would make borders bridges and not barriers to reduce issues of insecurity, in particular, smuggling.

### **2.3 Coping strategies of border communities from a global lens**

From a global prism, Zartman (2011) dichotomizes two kinds of cross-border conflict using the terminology "transboundary dispute". On the one hand, a transboundary dispute may be dispute about boundaries which erupts as a result of lack of knowledge or dissatisfaction of position of

border lines. On the other hand, dispute across boundaries occurs in one or more countries resulting from a singular or diverse, complex issue, but spills into another country, especially a neighbouring one. This makes dispute across boundaries more complex than the dispute about boundaries.

In the Americas, much as in some countries of Europe and Asia, the protracted border conflicts between the United States and Mexico offers a reading for understanding dispute across boundaries from a global perspective. Those living in the border area of the conflict developed strategies to cope with their situation until formal governmental and/or organizational intervention would become available or sufficient. Of all the conflicts that have occurred in the United States/Mexico border such as those induced by facilitation, development, the environment and water, the “aquifers conflict” which sprang up as a result of claim to water resource particularly serves as reference point for the current study because it is one which attracted personal, concerted efforts of the residents of the borderline areas in terms of coping strategies. Before engaging in an analysis of the conflict in relation to the current study, it is important to first mention that the United States/Mexico border has artificialness in common with many African borders like those of Nigeria and its neighbours. Another important mention is the lack of institutional framework (also referred to by the PCIP as institutional weakness) for managing the aquifers spanning the frontiers, and this has helped in aggravating the conflict. A third note of importance is the absence of collaborative management of the conflict. Again, much like what Nigeria has earlier been reported to be in West Africa, the United States is the major destination of drugs arriving from Latin America, while it happens to be the source of cash and guns flowing southwards. Finally, people in their hundreds of thousands commute across the border for work and other socio-economic activities while the border is known for prevalence of crime and drug trafficking, (Pacific Council on International Policy 2009), just as is the case with many a border between Nigeria and her neighbors.

The principal coping strategy employed by inhabitants of this border community is collaboration which the PCIP has succinctly described as meaningful and mutually beneficial “cooperative solution”. In this sense, the term collaboration differs from its conventional meaning in Peace and Conflict Studies parlance where it depicts a win/win strategy employed by parties to a conflict to ensure that both sides are satisfied. Open discussion of all issues of concern, exploring all alternative solutions, being honest and committed are required in this instance. By collaboration



in this study, we mean the coming together of community stakeholders from the various border communities in both countries, i.e. the United States and Mexico to assuage the devastating effects of the conflict on themselves as much as to attempt a lasting solution to same – not as parties to the conflict, but as victims of the conflict. One feature of collaboration that stands it out as a strategy for coping with or managing conflict is that its bi-national nature makes diversity of perspectives possible, thereby leading to amicable decisions. Another feature is that those such as community heads and group leaders involved in conflict management in the communities, act with power in their domains and have the leverage of involving government delegates and representatives from NGOs. Again, such inter-community collaboration allows for the deployment of expertise in that skilled, experienced and revered personalities get involved in conflict management (or coping strategies) to device decisive, long-term plans based on technical assessment, while follow-up on decisions reached is made easy.

Most importantly, collaboration makes room for a wide range of contribution from affected parties to get actively involved in the process. In the case of the border riverway border conflict between the United States and Mexico, it has been reported that members of each community travel mostly in pairs to the other to assist in tracing illegal weapons confiscated by authorities of both countries. Closely related to this are activities such as mutual recognition of the powers vested in specific individuals who have undergone training from the government of the United States which has made a mark in equipping Mexican law enforcement agents as well as other well-meaning civilians in curbing the conflicts in the area. Nevertheless, the origin of the collaboration strategy between and among residents of the United States/Mexico border is not unconnected to governmental and international policies. By international standards, collaboration of water policies is largely encouraged because of its importance to society at large. To mention but one renowned policy, the 1944 water treaty saw the resolution of a number of disputes emanating from shared riverways with the exception of the All-American Canal which has yet to be resolved collaboratively.

According to the PCIP (2009), wastewater treatment and supply of drinking water happen to be some of the areas of collaboration of the border communities of the United States and Mexico. This has been reported to be a huge success due to the consensual involvement of financial institutions such as the North American Development Bank, environmental institutions like the

Border Environmental Cooperation Commission, and multilateral institutions like the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC). Thanks to the strategy of collaboration, the conflict was efficiently managed to the extent that between 2003 and 2009, the lack of access to sewage and drinking water in both communities has been drastically reduced to less than 14 per cent (PCIP 2009), and it keeps getting better by the year.

Nevertheless, one can point out some challenges to the strategy of cooperation. Viable as it has been in the United States/Mexico border community, has not been without its shortcomings in that many of the efforts made by border community residents have largely been rather unsystematic and *ad hoc*. As a result, they are not governed by any broader vision on the continued management or sustenance of the conflict or even the boundary *per se*, yet sustainability is paramount in conflict management. Consequent upon this, pressure continues to mount on nationalist constituencies of the United States that favour unilateral approaches which encourage less engagement with neighbors to coping with border conflicts. Be that as it may, indigenes of border communities can maintain the collaboration strategy which seems quite viable only if those who see its benefits are as vibrant in their propagation of it as opponents of collaboration seem to be in their criticisms. Another challenge as recently reported by the PCIP is that for reasons of sovereignty, current government regulations in each country undoubtedly impede collaboration among border communities in the United States and Mexico, reasons being that the laws of the land supersede whatever (collaborative) conflict management (or coping strategy) that best suits the communities. For example, gun laws of the United States permit individuals to acquire a range of firearms, unlike in Mexico where such possession would be severely punished. In the same vein, some other countries like Britain have much relaxed restrictions on case of gun display and are nearly entirely unregulated. So, in the collaboration process, border communities on the U.S. end may possess considerable legal authority to prevent and disrupt drug crimes and other crimes related to the waterway conflict, whereas their Mexican counterparts lack such leverage. This undoubtedly makes collaboration difficult, if not completely impossible.

The civil war that occurred in Colombia in the mid-1990s did not just threaten the diplomatic ties between Colombia and its neighboring Ecuador and Venezuela, it equally spread violence across the borders of the trio, of which local communities resident in borderlands were hit by the impact,

thereby driving them to self-help considering the limited presence or total absence of government's timely intervention. The study of Ramirez (2011) reveals that over the years, this state of affairs has largely permitted non-state armed groups and guerrillas in the border areas of the three countries. It has also resulted in the proliferation of paramilitaries and drug cartels in the areas. Like many borders in Africa, with particular reference to Nigeria, the Venezuela-Ecuador-Colombia border area is poorly policed and has become key routes for pushing weapons and explosives, as well as for networking among international drug traffickers. Unlike the United States-Mexico borderline water dispute where governments of both countries took collaborative steps towards conflict management, collaborative government-induced cross-border solutions have yet to be explored by governments of Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. Instead, there have been tendencies of violation of national sovereignty as well as minimal control of border which grants unhindered transit to armed groups.

Observing that the idea of state boundaries transcends the mere division of two territories by means of lines, Ramirez (2011) noted the importance of the involvement of people with close everyday relationship in peacebuilding initiatives as it relates to strategies of coping with conflict situations in border areas. To this end, the scholar recognizes what could safely be termed institutionalized mobilization as a strategy to cope with security issues in border communities. The emphasis here is on civil society cross-border peacebuilding initiatives such as meetings and protests organized and executed by women of both countries, humanitarian action initiatives organized by religious bodies notably the social Action Agency of the Roman Catholic Church and the Jesuit Service for Refugees, a bilateral network for environment, Chambers of Commerce meetings, media forums, and conferences from the stables of bordering municipal local authorities. Significant and seemingly the oldest of such initiatives would be the academic relationship between the main public universities existing in the borderline regions of Columbia and Venezuela. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show the operations of civil societies between Columbia and Venezuela.

**Table 2. 2 Columbia – Venezuela Academic Initiative**

<b>1996 Caracas and Bogotá</b>	Colombia Studies programme at the Venezuela Central University, and Venezuela Studies programme at the National University in Colombia.
<b>1997 Caracas</b>	Joint research programme involving 30 Colombian and Venezuelan professors around the ten most conflictive issues of bilateral relations. Supported by UNDP.
<b>1998 Bogotá</b>	Establishment of the Bilateral Academic Group.
<b>1999 Caracas</b>	Assessment of progress, with support from the Andean Development Corporation (CAF).
<b>1999 Cartagena</b>	Discussion of results and publication of the book <i>Colombia – Venezuela: common agenda for the 21st Century</i> .
<b>2000-01 different locations in both countries</b>	Presentation of results to both governments, to editors and journalists from both countries, to local mayors from border cities, and to other stakeholders from areas along the border.
<b>2002 Bucaramanga (Colombia)</b>	Design of the second stage of the academic initiative.
<b>2003 Maracaibo (Venezuela)</b>	Discussion of results and of the book <i>Colombia – Venezuela: images and reality</i> .
<b>2004 Riohacha</b>	Workshops with local authorities from both countries, and workshops about health issues in the Wayuu indigenous communities.
<b>2005 San Cristóbal (Venezuela)</b>	Discussion of results and of the book <i>Colombia-Venezuela: Discussion about History and Challenges of the Present</i> ; discussions of new intergovernment tensions.
<b>2005 (both countries)</b>	Forum with media and local authorities on new bilateral tensions.
<b>2005 Bogotá</b>	Forum on new bilateral tensions and on the book <i>Colombia – Venezuela: Challenges of coexistence</i> , at <i>El Tiempo</i> newspaper.
<b>2007 Bogotá</b>	Course on 'Bolivarian Venezuela' for Masters degree students and public officers in charge of relations with Venezuela; publication of the book <i>Venezuela today: Bilateral perspectives</i> .
<b>2008-2009 Caracas and Bogotá</b>	Bilateral messages to both presidents.
<b>2010 Panamá</b>	Colombia-Venezuela meeting, including UNDP officers (with Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, CPPF).
<b>2010 Caracas and Bogotá</b>	Message from eminent persons in both countries to the presidents of Colombia and Venezuela

Source: Ramirez, (2011).

**Table 2. 3 Citizens’ cross-border initiatives**

Communities	Academic	Bilateral Dialogue Group	Municipal gov'ts	Women groups	Business & commerce	Media	Environmental	Religious	Humanitarian
Life plans of indigenous communities	Forums 2006-07 Bogotá, Pasto, Quito "For an early and durable coming together"	2007-09 Atlanta Quito Bogotá	Joint cross-border waste management plan, Ipiales/Tulcán, since 2008	Demonstration at the border 2008	Meeting of Chambers of Commerce in Bogotá 2008	Journalists and editors meeting in Quito 2009	Forum of Food Security & Biodiversity 2009	Church's social action meetings along the border	Continued support to IDPs and refugees by the Catholic Church, and several Colombia, Ecuadorian and international NGOs and agencies. Indigenous people's collective initiatives ('mingas')
African Descent People Association, and development plans	Ecuador Studies programme, February - June 2007	Meetings with Presidents Uribe (Col.) and Correa (Ven.)	Bilateral Forum of the Pacific rim	Bilateral event in Colombia 2008	Business meetings in Colombia, 2009	Building a Colombia-Ecuador Fraternity <a href="http://www.frace.org/">http://www.frace.org/</a>	Amazon Bilateral Food Network 2009	Bishops Conference in Ecuador, 2009	
	Bilateral events: 'Building Bridges', with the OAS and UNDP, 2008	More than 150 articles or media reports	Amazon Border Authority meeting, 2010	Business-women Bilateral meeting, Bogotá 2009	Tourist Border Integration Association 2009		Three Borders Environmental Strategy 2010	Relief assistance by the Jesuit Service, along the border.	
	Four Bilateral books	Bilateral books, articles, videos	Andean Authorities Plan 2010				Workshops: <i>Neighbours and Partners in Sustainable Development</i> , 2010		

Source: Ramirez, (2011).

The success of this initiative can be rightly judged by its sixteen years of profitable existence. Employing the strategy of building a framework for communication between various sectors involved in multilateral ties, academic exchange, research and publication coincide with activities carried out by the academic institutions involved in the initiative. The ultimate goal was to help in establishing a multilateral approach towards promotion of better understanding of the problems which underlie disputes from which the border communities suffer in no small measure. As part of strategies to better cope with conflict situations in the border areas of Venezuela and Colombia, educational institutions in both countries were linked to social organizations as well as local and national authorities. Resultantly, urgent conflict issues of concern within and beyond the border areas have been addressed. In very tense situations such as that of Bogota and Caracas, peace has been promoted in the area through issuance of memoranda proffering joint perspectives in spite of differences in economic, political and social conditions of both countries (Ramirez 2011).

In the Colombia-Ecuador space, protest against Colombia's incursion in Ecuadorian territory to burst the Revolutionary armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebel group severed the diplomatic ties between both countries in March of 2008, and the resultant economic and social consequences hit borderland populations in the areas. As coping strategy, the communities that make up the border areas of both countries engaged an unhindered cross-border civil society peacebuilding cooperation which not only helped in managing the crisis along borderlines but also contributed to the normalization of bilateral relations of both countries on a larger scale. Suffice it to note that the academic institutional cooperation or collaboration of the border regions, particularly those of Cofanes, Pastos, Awa, and other African-American communities spanning the borders later enjoyed extension to commit other academic institutions in the hearts of both countries. Through what was termed "life plan" initiatives which aroused cultural and traditional based developments, such collaborations ensured the strengthening of non-violent resistance to war.

Another coping strategy employed by the Colombia-Ecuador border communities in managing crisis was the establishment of a Bilateral Dialogue Group (BDG), comprising ten renowned figures from either country, with the objective of facilitating efforts on mediation by setting up dialogues with the conflicting parties (various governments concerned with the conflict), so as to solidifying diplomatic bilateral ties. So far, it is glaring that one significant feature of the coping strategies employed by the Colombia-Ecuador border communities in surviving the conflict(s) threatening their existence is the involvement of diverse sectors which has been aptly described by Ramirez (2011: 60) as "articulation of broad momentum of social dynamics" deployed to save delicate moments of diplomatic stress.

The import of border communities evolving idiosyncratic strategies to cope with crisis plaguing them cannot be overemphasized in the sense that such an act goes a long way in entrenching relative peace in the communities much as it has the tendency of putting the conflict in check in the inner parts of the country or preventing it from spreading therein in the first instance. One might then as the question of how viable these local strategies might be. Inasmuch as these strategies may initially and unilaterally not be viable overall, they have the tendency of helping to restructure the approach of the central government and calling the attention of the international

community, a situation which is very likely to lead to a satisfactory management or even resolution of the conflict and /or crisis.

Citing the example of Colombia and Ecuador, one can leverage on Jimmy Carter's mediatory efforts in the crisis between the two countries. Again, civil society initiatives helped the conflicting countries to garner external interventions from world class agencies towards a fruitful negotiation process leading to lasting conflict resolution. Of these interventions, financial aid and convening of programs and activities are certainly not the least. In the same vein, cross-border collaboration of border communities has the tendency to trigger further and better collaborations at the international level. For instance, after several attempts to fully contribute to the peacebuilding of Colombia and Ecuador, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) was finally able to operate on both sides of the border of both countries by developing and executing its own initiatives with the help of the Carter Center. In the end, both the UNDP and the Carter Center provided assistance to the GBD local initiative, thereby enabling it to engage fully with the Organization of American States (OAS) for better outcomes.

From the foregoing, it becomes undeniable that the proximity of borderland communities to borderland violence is analogous to incentive for urgent actions and insights into domestic situations in a bid to developing appropriate reactions. To this extent, the coping strategy of collaboration or cooperation as evident in the involvement of civil societies in Colombia and Ecuador finds credence as a viable cross-border solution to cross-border crises, particularly through dialogue and interactions in the face of diplomatic breakdown. Such collaborative efforts are worth more than unilateral state responses which arguably make life harder for inhabitants of border communities whose neighborhood relations are often deplorably distanced. As reported by Ramirez (2011), the decisive cross-border peacebuilding engagement of cross-border civil society between Colombia and Ecuador coupled with its attendant international recognition and support has meant the rapid development of a rapprochement between the two neighbours. A global perspective on coping strategies of border communities in times of crisis having been explored, it would be necessary, for the sake of analytical equilibrium, to consider the subject matter from an African regional perspective.

## 2.4 Regional perspectives of coping strategies of border communities

Jaspars (2010) produced a report from a 2009 study addressing the role of community group and local institutions in addressing food insecurity and threats to livelihoods in North Darfur, Sudan, Northern Africa. This aspect of the study would benefit from the threats to livelihoods area of the report to explore the regional prisms of coping strategies of border communities in times of crisis, particularly as Jaspars' discourse on threats to livelihoods is closely related to insurgency which is partly the focus of this thesis. Jaspars' study focused on the roles played by community-based organizations (CBOs) and analogous groups, and local institutions, in coping with the crisis in the borderlines of the northern part of Darfur where violent conflict has been ongoing for over two decades. Similar to the borderlines of the northern parts of Nigeria, threats to livelihood taking the form of banditry, large scale attacks, localized clashes between government and rebel groups, SLA and Arab groups, as well as localized crimes have persisted for many groups in the border areas of North Darfur, Sudan.

Much like the situation in Nigeria and Colombia-Ecuador-Venezuela, this region experienced significantly reduced government attention, a situation which further encouraged mayhem and necessitated self-help. Likewise, government institutions ceased to function in these (rural) areas. What made the Darfur situation more pathetic was the fact that many CBOs and NGOs also ceased to function in the borderline areas in focus, while the few who remained functional dramatically changed their ways of functionality from active to passive owing to the increasingly worsened insecurity situation, particularly in the regions controlled by the opposition. For instance, the *modus operandi* transformed from empowering communities or strengthening governance to simply aid distribution particularly to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees.

According to Jaspars (2010), the basic coping strategy employed by inhabitants of the conflict-ridden border communities of Northern Darfur in Sudan includes (re)grouping towards institutionalized support by professional associations, women groups, CBOs networks, rural committees and camp committees. Professionals such as blacksmiths, potters and tanners appeared to be faring well in spite of the conflict. This is largely due to their skills been in very high demand, thereby enabling them to be able to continue with their profession in the heat of the crisis. Another factor would be that in Sudan, blacksmiths are locally highly respected; as such they were able to



garner external support to help with managing the conflict and establishing survival strategies for the benefit of the border communities. Additionally, their ability to help in coping with the crisis situation was further enhanced by their potential to influence policy, thanks to their legal identity.

Again, women groups played significant roles in the negotiation of safer movement, trade, and access to aid and other forms of assistance in the border communities. They also played key roles in negotiating between government, SLA and community leaders, as well as other peace negotiations relating to the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) (Jasper, 2010). Practical examples of women's negotiation roles in the borderline areas as identified by (Jasper, 2010) include that of the Women's Development Association (WDA) in Kafod which culminated in the prioritization of women activities and the establishment of a kindergarten and a seed bank. Agencies had been prohibited from working in Kafod which had come under the control of the SLA rebel group in 2004, because the rebel group feared that workers could gather information for the government to their own detriment. Following the intervention of the WDA, it was agreed that agencies could continue with their activities in Kafod.

A second example of the contribution of women groups to managing the insecurity in Northern Darfur is the key role played by women in Shengel Tobai. The women regrouped themselves to persuade local leaders to negotiate safe passage for them in particular and for the entire community in general to El Fasher and Nyala, so as to gain access to work, markets and relatives. Negotiations by women in this regard saw government and SLA agreeing to providing security along the access roads. A third example of the role of women groups in helping to cope with conflict and crisis in the study area concerns an initiative known as "Kebkabiya free from arms". The aim of this initiative was to exclude armed persons from both government and rebel groups from entering into the town's market.


The capacity of women groups to play such important roles in surviving or coping with the crisis in the area is fundamentally traceable to their status as the most directly impacted by the risks associated with economic activities such as farming and trade mobility. In addition to that, women constituted the majority of the population in many of the border communities, and they are considered quite trustworthy for being seen as less violent and less political relative to their male counterparts. In a similar vein, the CBOs networks, for their own part, "established as a way of

remotely managing projects in rural areas, are playing an important role in negotiating free movement in their areas and resolving disputes between villages” (Jaspars 2010:15). The aims are to empower people and communities, to improve efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of interventions, build organizational capacity at the local level, and strengthen governance and links between the states and communities (Jaspars 2010). Furthermore, CBOs engaged in mediations and negotiations as evident in the activities of the Rural Development Network which played a key mediating role between government and SLA concerning security risks in travel conditions in the border area troubled by crises.

In a similar vein, a more recent conflict between the villages of Dalal and Abu Digaise over the Abu Dagas Dam helps to highlight the mediatory roles of CBOs in the study communities. The conflict was referred to the Ajaweed Committee, a local conflict resolution mechanism, which resolved the conflict by proffering far-reaching recommendations, and by bringing the two villages together in a workshop with the aim of discussing issues and improving relationships between them. The CBOs’ success in their efforts at coping, survival and management strategies in the study areas can be linked to their perception as less partial actors than other leaders in the communities, as their group is usually ethnically heterogeneous; whereas the community leaders on the other hand are characteristically close to parties of the conflict, either government or the opposition, while also ethnically homogenous in many cases.


The contribution of rural committees to coping with crisis in the border areas of northern Darfur cannot be overemphasized. Such rural communities include Village Development Committees (VDCs) and associated networks.

**Figure 2. 3 Committees in Abu Shook**



Source: Jasper, (2010).

**Figure 2. 4 Chart 2.2. Committees in Abu Digaise**



Source: Jasper, (2010).

As obvious in the above diagram describing the committees in Abu Shook and its interconnectedness, the committees cut across divers sectors of society such as water, health, youth, education, human rights, and so on. The main strategy employed by these committees is support by remote management which would include long-term food security support in form of provision of seed banks; paravet training, water reservoirs and dams. Specific problems around land, water and trade were also managed by need-specific groups formed by and mostly comprising members of communities themselves. The activities of IDPs camp committees revolve around international organizations interested in assisting the population of the crisis-ridden border communities in North Darfur, Sudan. These committees represent the interests of IDPs in the communities by assisting with distribution of aids. The report of Jaspars (2010) reveals that most of the leaders of the IDPs are not traditional leaders, and often thought to be partisan to government or rebel groups, hence the necessity of camp committees.

From both global and regional perspectives of coping strategies evolved by border communities in managing conflicts and surviving crises as discussed thus far, the idea of social capital readily comes to mind. Social capital, which was put into practice in the instances discussed in this section of the thesis, is not new to the international community, but many states fail to leverage it (Fukuyama 2000) probably because it is a by-product of shared socio-cultural and historical factors outside the control of government (Fukuyama 2001). This definitely makes it a viable tool for tackling insecurity situations and minimization of conflicts in borderline areas where social amenities, cultures and histories are shared by peoples cutting across two or more politically defined lines. As a tool for conflict management in borderline areas, Sanginga et al (2007), citing the example of how a combination of voluntary associations ranging from credit and savings groups, farming groups and church groups in the South-Western Highlands of Uganda, particularly posits that conflicts over scarce natural resources can be minimized where there is strengthened understanding of the synergy between social capital and public policy. Thus, the import of social capital, notably one that transcends tribal borders in conflict management in borderline communities cannot be nipped in the bud, but must be encouraged by individuals, NGOs, CBOs and governments alike for its capacity to build unconventional cooperation based on trust.

As observed by Gerenge (2016), social capital restructures relationships beyond ethnic or religious regroupment while also spurring cooperative predispositions of individuals towards the engendering of peaceful resolution of conflicts. The Liberian example where social capital aided survival of individuals in situation of total governance breakdown serves to underscore this observation. The cooperative engagement of social capital as coping mechanism has also been reported by Sawyer (2005) as building block in the reconstruction of post conflict governance arrangements.

## **2.5 Spill-over effect of cross-border insurgency on the Lake Chad Basin Region**

Running to safety is one of the basic moves that people embark on during a disaster, crisis, violence or war. It is also a natural event that happens when life is being threatened by seen or unseen danger. Based on these statements one can imagine why people involve in forceful migration during war or insurgency. Of course, the act of running to safety is one of the major causes of forceful migration, especially if the pull and push factors of migration are considered. In the report of European Commission, from its 4<sup>th</sup> -5<sup>th</sup> February 2016 International Conference on Understanding and Tackling the Migration Challenges: The Role of Research, it was noted that poverty, instability, natural disasters and in particular violent conflicts in countries in the EU's vicinity drive people to seek safety and to realize their full potential in Europe. There is a similar case in Africa where people run away from violent conflict and becoming Refugees or IDPs.

The migration flow of people who are affected by the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, crossing into neighbouring countries' border communities is today an alarming humanitarian crisis. United Nations (2015) declares that Boko Haram attack has overlapped into regional crises in other countries in Central African Republic, such as Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The agency also notes that significant numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons are adding pressure on host communities that are already food insecure and fragile. It is interesting to know that international agencies and regional organizations such as UN, AU, and ECOWAS, are showing great concerns to arrest the Refugees and IDPs crisis that accompany the Boko Haram insurgency. Their concerns can be associated with the fact that Boko Haram is now a regional and global challenge.

From the moment of declaring the Boko Haram as a terrorist group due to its level of attacks and strategies, which attracted a high response of counter-insurgency from the Nigerian Army and international communities, the number of Refugees and IDPs became increased especially across border communities in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger. UNHCR (2012) estimates 8,806 Refugees who are Nigerians as its total population of concern in 2011. In the same vein, Barna (2014) observe that since 2010 more than 15 000 people have fled as a consequence of the Boko Haram attack. The number of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Nigeria and across her borders in the Northeast is currently very high. UNHCR (2016) notes that in 2015, the Lake Chad Basin Region witnessed increasing waves of violence from the Islamist terrorist group Boko Haram, who expanded its insurgency from north-eastern Nigeria, where to date over 2.2 million people are internally displaced, to neighboring Cameroon, Chad and Niger, killing there over 550 civilians and uprooting some 195,000 people.

When one says that the humanitarian crisis in the countries that Boko Haram has extended its campaign and violence is quite alarming, it is taking into account the increased number of people who are killed or displaced, stripped of livelihoods which include loss of or lack of access to socio-economic activity as well as other valuable properties. Talking about the challenges that Refugees and IDPs are suffering from in the border communities of Cameroon, Niger and Chad, who are hosting over 215,000 Nigerian refugees, they are daily challenged with lack of security, shelters, health, food, water, nutrition, and education etc. UNHCR (2016) remarks that Nigeria's 2016 Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRRP) advocates for the needs of nearly 285,000 Nigerian refugees who are in host communities, in Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Earnestly, life for the border communities is not what it used to be with the expansion of Boko Haram to their areas.

Border communities are presently suffering from insecurity, lack of basic social amenities, such as schools, good roads, pipe-borne water, health centers or clinics, among other problems experienced before the upsurge humanitarian crises caused by Boko Haram. Since early 2015 and 2016 military campaign by Cameroonian and Nigerian troops has pushed Boko Haram fighters out of villages: throughout the region, entire villages have emptied, and markets shut down (ACAPS, 2016). The areas or villages that are directly affected by Boko Haram crisis are located in Far North Cameroon, namely Mayo Moskota, Logone-et-Chari, Mayo-Sava, Gwadale border, Meme

Market, Toumboum-Kare, Nguetchewe village, Tolkomare, Mayo Moskota, Kerewa, Bodo, Kouyape, Afade, Gourounguel etc. All these areas have been recorded with a form of security challenge or being host to people fleeing crisis, such as killing, kidnapping, cattle rustling and human rights violations from the Nigerian or Cameroonian troops.

The border communities of the four West-Central African countries that are directly affected by Boko Haram attacks are mainly known for socio-economic production, even though they have a long history of unfavourable climate and flood which they have developed coping strategies in mitigating it. But as the Boko Haram cross-border attacks continue to build with the target of civilian population, especially those in farmland, markets and remote areas along borders, it has become so difficult for people to keep up their production capacity. World Food Programme (2016) stresses that at the regional level, violence and security threats block productive and trading activities, thereby hurting the Basin's ability to meet growing food security needs. In other words, there is a high food shortage or insecurity in the border communities of Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad, which increases the region chronic problem of malnutrition.

There is no doubting the extent at which the border communities have been hit by the Boko Haram terror attacks, if one considered that Far North of Cameroon together with Northeastern Nigeria are the latest humanitarian assistance focused or concentrated region. Kindzeka (2017) exposes that the number of officially registered refugees in Cameroon has climbed to about half a million, with fresh arrivals coming from both Nigeria and the Central African Republic. Whereas, the United Nations forewarns that if appropriate measure is not taking, the over 1.6 million Refugees and IDPs that it estimated in Cameroon may ascend to 2.7 million. Of course, it has been rightly mentioned that Refugee and IDPs crisis is the highest challenges of the African countries affected by the Boko Haram insurgency. Refugee and IDPs issues are a critical challenge as they always cause overstress of available facilities in areas of occurrence; increase demand for humanitarian assistance from donors and so on.

The challenges that Boko Haram insurgency has instigated for the border communities are so enormous. From the amount requested to meet the need of Refugees and IDPs from Nigeria to Cameroon, Chad and Niger, it cannot be difficult to apprehend the precarious conditions of the countries. According to Reliefweb (2017), Regional Refugee Response Plan 2017, launched in

Yaoundé, on December 16, 2016, involving 36 partners (UN agencies, national and international NGOs), has appealed for approximately USD 241 million for a target population of over 450,000 people (refugees, host populations and displaced persons). In addition, the sectors that have been identified to be greatly of concern include protection, education, food security, health and nutrition, livelihoods and the environment, shelter and non-food products, water, hygiene and sanitation.

Really, overspill effects of Boko Haram insurgency is a serious challenge for the Cameroonian government, even as it plunged the entire country into a sudden and unplanned for humanitarian crisis. As the government increases her effort to curtail the Boko Haram crisis particularly through the strengthening of its region security in the border areas, she has come under attack of gross human right violations just as Nigeria military or government was questioned on the same allegation in 2014. ACAPS (2016) specifically observes that on January 26, 2016, Nigerian civilians claimed that the Cameroonian troops killed at least 40 civilians around Gwadale border, who engaged in cross-border chase of Boko Haram members. But the Cameroonian government denied this claim. Indeed, it is challenging for a government military to be doing everything possible to ensure security, and again be confronted with allegations of human right violations.

Obviously, military and other security operatives are aware of their obligations as regards the rule of engagement in any operation to avoid harassment or death of innocent persons. For a reason of the allegation of human right violations made against the Nigerian military, which the Leahy Law of the United States prohibits, Nigeria was out rightly denied access to purchase US made weapon needed to fight Boko Haram (Tuku, 2014). Up till date, the Nigerian government is still trying everything possible to access US-made weapon, to effectively conduct her counter-insurgency against Boko Haram in the North-Eastern Nigeria. And yet the issue of government military forces and Boko Haram insurgents committing gross human right abuses is conspicuously a very big concern in the border communities of the Lake Chad region.

Areas connecting countries other than Cameroon with Nigeria, such as Diffa and Bosso in Niger, and Lac in Chad, have been pinpointed to be exposed to overspill of Boko Haram insurgency. According to Mercy Corps (2017), in Lac region of Chad and the Diffa region of Niger, the number of displaced people continues to rise due to insurgent attacks in border areas and counter-insurgency operations by each country's respective national military forces. An estimated 400,000



internally displaced persons (IDPs) are now said to be in these localities. The way and rate at which humanitarian crisis are getting increased day by day raises concern. It is important to say that international communities and the affected countries need to adopt a more realistic peace building strategy to support the ongoing military approach that is making insurgents to intensify their attacks along border communities.

Several writings have identified the Lake Chad Basin region to be battling with climatic and environmental conditions, even before the occurrence of Boko Haram cross-border attacks and humanitarian crisis in the region. While quoting Uche et al. 2014, IDMC (2015) informs that livelihoods, access to water and grazing pastures have been under strain for decades as the surface area of Lake Chad has shrunk by 90 per cent over the last 45 years. Stressing his analysis further, it was revealed that people have increasingly migrated southwards along the Lake Chad basin perimeter which, over time, has led some 70 ethnic groups to converge and led to resource competition, tension and conflicts.

Considering the environmental issues of the Lake Chad region, it was unconstrained for the Boko Haram to expand its network and spread its activities in the region by capitalizing on local populations needs. In the view of Mercy Corps (2017) and Danjibo (2013), many of Lake Chad region's challenges stem from decades of governmental underinvestment, marginalizing the communities in the region and instilling a deep-seated sense of injustice, which in turn created the enabling environment for the extremist ideology of Boko Haram to spread. In addition, Ahmed (2014) states it clearly that

*Many Boko Haram foot soldiers happen to be people displaced by severe drought and food shortages in neighbouring Niger and Chad. Some 200,000 farmers and herdsman had lost their livelihoods and, facing starvation, crossed the border to Nigeria (Ahmed, 2014).*

There is no limit to the migration flow of people affected by the Boko Haram conflict. This is because movement depends on where attack is located, or rather where human security problem is. Sometimes people crossed back and forth into any of the border communities of the Lake Chad Basin countries. According to UNICEF (2017) observation people fled to find security in urban

centers. This is why Maiduguri the capital of Borno State, one of the insurgent areas in Northeastern Nigeria has been a favorite destination for many fleeing individuals to seek refuge. Life in the border communities of the Northeastern Nigeria has been equated with hell given the extent of humanitarian assistance and security that is required yonder. It is noted that since there is displacement, food insecurity, prices increased in the region, people now lived with the fear of hunger, disease and boredom, instead of living with fear of attack from Boko Haram.

UNHCR and World Bank (2016) also reiterate the social and psychological impact of the Boko Haram violence on the communities in the Northeastern Nigeria, Far North Cameroon, Niger and Chad. The two international bodies establish that extreme level of violence from Boko Haram has taken a social and psychological toll by spreading fear and apprehension among the population in the region and exacerbating social divisions and distrust, especially toward those suspected of association with the insurgency movement. In the testimony of UNICEF,

*Communities are increasingly suspicious of children who have been linked to Boko Haram, creating barriers to reintegration and reconciliation. Society's rejection of these children, and their sense of isolation and desperation, could be making them more vulnerable to promises of martyrdom through acceptance of dangerous and deadly missions (UNICEF, 2017).*

Gender and children related issues that are generated by Boko Haram insurgency present one with some horrendous psychological stresses that local populations are suffering from. But let more exploration be made of the psychological effect of Boko Haram attacks on border communities. Apart from the testimony of individuals, the United Nations (2017a) has expressed concern about the need to protect civilians affected by terrorism, including those who are victims of sexual exploitation and abuse, extra-judicial killings and torture. There is none of the security conditions identified here that do not cause traumatic stress or post-traumatic stress. For example, the 276 Chibok girls that were kidnapped in Northeastern Nigeria in 2014, which a large number of them are still at large, and even those who were rescued are either with a child or pregnant, is a serious psychological challenge because it comes with stigma for both victims, their families and the communities at large.

United Nations (2017b) has expressed its concern on the weird and unpredictable strategy of Boko Haram attacks, which include raids or ambushes on towns and villages, kidnapping, killing, rape or forced marriage, directed against local populations mainly in border communities of Lake Chad region. All these social crises in the Lake Chad Basin have their psychological reflex or trauma stress. For instance, people out of fear of Boko Haram attack in the night, now adopt the habit of fleeing to bushes only to return in the morning. Also, the fear and frustration which accompany the news or actual act of Boko Haram's raids or mobilizations is a big trauma for the villages and town of the border communities (APF, 2017 and Bagnetto, 2017). Those who have also left behind their production assets or job, lost family members, properties or part of their body to attacks, are not excluded from among people who have been psychologically strained.

Nonetheless, it has been noticed that Boko Haram no longer has control over a whole community as it did sometimes ago. But the terrorist group has changed its tactics to guerrilla warfare, using IEDs, hit and run, and suicide bombing. In launching a suicide bombing attack, Boko Haram has become recently accustomed to use children, girls and women in carrying explosive. United Nations (2016) reveals that nearly 1 out of 4 suicide bombers in the four countries of the Lake Chad region is a child. Exposing a child to the act of carrying bomb or fighting in a conflict is a serious negation of child's right and gross conduct against human right. To a large extent, this current tactic of Boko Haram has seen children blowing themselves up in a gathering in markets, garages, or bus station, military post and inside vehicles (Castern, 2017 and Haruna, 2017).

A frequency analysis on suicide bombing reveals that there is increase in the heinous act from 32 in 2014 to 151 in 2015 (BBC, 2016a). The analysis also shows that Nigeria was with the highest bombing, followed by Cameroon, Chad and then Niger. It also reveals that children constitute element used for suicide attacks. In other words, one out of five children are said to be used for bombing, while 75% of them are said to be girls, who are always drugged before sent on mission. This Boko Haram fighting strategy is seriously disastrous to communities' co-existence, unity and peace, if indeed children are the future of a society. This is because children are now becoming perceived with suspicions. They are perceived to constitute threat to communities since they are the ones that Boko Haram is now using most to carry out attacks.

There is only little remedy to Boko Haram attacks at this moment, because the root causes of the conflict have still yet to be addressed. It should be recalled that poverty is one of the identified remote causes of the Boko Haram. If it is true, one cannot tell if the Boko Haram conflict would be curbed anyway soon. This is because Africa's poverty is still the highest among all continents of the world (Beegle et al., 2016). And the border communities of Lack Chad region where the Boko Haram conflict is located presently are regions that are suffering high level of poverty, drought, malnutrition etc. Seriously, if Africa's numerous problems including conflicts, such as terrorism, insurgency, ethnic-religious and political crisis, and climate change related conditions must be curtailed, the issues of poverty, corruption, bad leadership and injustice among others must first be addressed. Therefore, it is imperative to examine the security and the humanitarian responses of the government most especially and the humanitarian organizations to this reality across the North-Eastern Nigeria.

## **2.6 Theoretical Framework**

A theoretical framework refers to the process of showing how identified core set of connectors within a topic fit together. Obasi, (1999) sees theoretical framework as a scheme for adopting or applying the assumptions, postulations and principles of theory in the description and analysis of a research problem. Theories are not fixed; instead they are possible explanations which we formulate and reformulate in an attempt to make sense of a body of evidence (Baker, 1999). Stacks and Salwen (2009) buttress the importance of a theory by averring that theory organizes and enhances our ideas, like a map for exploring unexplored territories. Chinn and Kramer (1999) also opine that a theoretical framework is a structure that presents the theory which explains why the problem under study exists. Abend (2008) cited by Neuman, (2011) provide different meanings of theory as follows:

- A theory is a logically connected set of general propositions that establishes a connection between two or more variables;
- A theory is an explanation of a specific social phenomenon that identifies a set of causally relevant factors or conditions;
- A theory provides insights into the real meaning of a social phenomenon by offering an illuminating interpretation and by telling us (what it is all about);

- A theory is what a famous social thinker really meant;
- A theory is an entire worldview, or a way of seeing, interpreting, and understanding events in the world;
- A theory is a criticism based on a political moral viewpoint; it presents and stands for a set of beliefs-values from which it critiques the position and arguments of opponents; and
- A theory is a philosophical commentary on key questions or issues about core issues of how we develop knowledge about the social world (for example, how we really construct a sense of social reality).

Explaining a phenomenon may take a theoretical or empirical approach. And a phenomenon may be intuitively conceived; however, for it to be generally acceptable, it must entail logical interrelated set of propositions that qualify as empirical reality, if not it may not be called a theory. Littlejohn (1999) and Kaplan (1964) establish the fact that explanation of phenomenon must be empirical in reality before it can be theory. With this view, theory is a systemic concept that helps to define a subject in terms of knowledge. As rightly defined by Stam (2007), theory is the systemic organization of knowledge in relation to a problem as well as its solution.

There are diverse and relevant theories that have been developed in the field of social sciences, Arts and Humanities to explain phenomena. Out of these theories, three were adopted to adequately analyze and explain the root causes of the focus of this study which are viewed from three perspectives. These theories are human needs, functional prerequisites and state fragility theories. While Functional prerequisite theory and human needs theories were adopted to showcase the underlying factor prompting the insurgency witnessed in border communities in North-Eastern Nigeria, the state fragility theory was adopted to reveal the inability of the government to perform its major function of protecting lives and properties in the border communities. These theories assist to bring to fore the reason for the occurrence of insurgency in Nigeria, and later becoming a cross-border conflict in the Lake Chad region. In other words, the theories explain why the Boko Haram insurgency which started in Nigeria suddenly became a serious challenge for Nigeria and why it spilled over into neighboring states like Cameroon, Niger and Chad. They equally expose the contending issues that make insurgency primarily concentrated by its intensity, cross-border attacks and humanitarian crisis in the North-Eastern Nigeria, without any close end to its effect in the wake of counter-insurgency.

### **2.6.1 Human Needs Theory**

Human needs theory is one of the vast concepts developed to explain conflict and its resolution. It is believed that conflict is inevitable and a natural event in human existence and relations. Coser (1956) is particularly associated with the claim that conflict is inevitable, natural and necessary aspect of human society. Being influenced by the view of Simmel Georg, Coser sees conflict as a form of socialization and functional, because group formation and relations in any society comprise both association and dissociation. As a social function, conflict is thought to be instrumental in a group persistence, existence and life. Similarly, the human needs theory which is espoused by John Burton came as a reaction to the common belief that conflict is inevitable, or that it is in a human essence to be aggressive. In passive agreement, Öğretir Özçelik (2017) reveals that Sigmund Freud is a prominent forerunner of the theory that man is aggressive by nature.

Eweka and Olusegun (2015) stressed that this theory was greatly popularized in the works of Abraham Maslow, John Burton, Marshal Rosenberg and Manfred Max-Neef and it posits that human beings need certain essentials if they must live and attain well-being in any ramification of life. Such essentials are known as (basic) human needs. Coate and Rosati, (1988) assert that human behaviour and social interaction is to a great extent determined and influenced by his needs. When the basic needs of a person or group are not met, there is bound to be conflict. In other words, it has been proven that there is an innate tendency in man to cause conflict. It only requires an iota of dissatisfaction for it to be triggered off. In effect, a person is more likely to behave in a disordered manner when his basic needs are not met. Therefore, the basis of the argument of human needs theorists is that at the point where man has no alternative means to meet his needs (needed for survival) he is bound to resort to violence, illegality in various forms. From the foregoing, it is evident that proponents of this theory have argued it from the conflict point of view but this study argues and adopts it to mean that man has basic needs which are paramount for survival. A man goes ahead daily to make sure that these needs are met so that his continuous survival is guaranteed irrespective of whatever difficulty and looming impediments he is bound to face in the process. This, however, is not to ignore the possible role that aggression may play in the process.

Reacting to the innate concept of aggression, Burton (1988) argues that explaining conflict on the natural aggressiveness of humans is little more than a label and less than a theory. He also argues that it is simplistic to maintain that conflict is inevitable because of the need to compete for inevitably scarce resources. For him, conflict is a social, normal and universal phenomenon. To a great extent, Burton was more particular with conflict resolution than its definition. A close look at his human needs theory, conflict occurs when people or a group is unable to meet their essential and universal needs. Also, it is believed that the universal needs are not limited to food, shelter, water etc, they include personal recognition and identity, security which are directly taken for human development in a society (Burton, 1979). However, the denial of the individuals or group by the society of achieving these above needs would lead to defiant behaviour, conflict or war.

Going by the explanation of human needs theory that conflict is likely to occur when certain basic universal needs of all humans are not met (Danesh, 2011), one can easily understand the origin of, continuity and change in the Boko Haram insurgency, including its escalation across Nigerian border. Max-Neef (1991) avers that development is focused and based on the satisfaction of fundamental human needs. The border communities of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger, are lacking in terms of human capital and societal development, with consideration given to social amenities and other infrastructural elements. Human needs theory provides a good foundation for reading the reaction of Boko Haram to underdevelopment issues in the areas of insurgency, such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, health conditions and low or unequal access to resources and income (Nyako, 2015 and Onuoha, 2014).

In the same vein, it has been explained that conflict occurs from the incompatibility of interest, value, goals and position or power influence (Bercovitch, 1983; Folger, 1993 and Omisore and Abiodun, 2014). In a way, the interest of the Boko Haram insurgents to achieve personal recognition or identity which is closely tied to human needs theory as far as security and development are concerned can be argued to have occasioned the insurgency in the Northeastern Nigeria. Obviously, insurgency is itself a form of conflict; and conflict is a condition that arises from the inability to meet fundamental human and society needs. It can also occur from incompatibility of individual, group or organizational goals, interest, value and position relation,

since there is always the desire to be independent in the processes of reaching the necessary human needs.

Nigeria as a society has been recognized as a multi-ethnic society, where group formation and relationship is based on ethnic composition as well as religious affiliation. According to Parson (1949) conflict describes a relationship in which each party perceives the other's goals, values, interests, or behavior as antithetical to its own. Explaining conflict on the basis of the incompatibility of values, goals and interests which the human needs theory really recognizes is a significant way to explain why there is outbreak of the Boko Haram insurgency. The Boko Haram agenda is against Western education, especially saying that Western Education is forbidden (Thurston, 2016). It is a corollary implication of the terrorist group's view and interest in replacing Western education with Islamic teaching and doctrine is the offshoot of the insurgency in Nigeria.

The incompatibility of the interest of the Boko Haram Islamic group to establish Islamic law, education and religion in the northern or northeastern Nigeria to counter: Western education, the Nigerian government, civil and criminal law (Nigerian constitution), and/or against “the other” religion mainly Christianity created the ground for conflict which became the Boko Haram insurgency. Burton (1988) observes that aggressions and conflicts are the direct result of some institutions and social norms being incompatible with inherent human needs. Largely, the Boko Haram group began its campaign by launching attacks on government and social institutions which they perceived to be making it impossible or difficult for people to attain reasonable level of security and development in the northern part of Nigeria – and to be inimical to the attainment of their goals.

Imagine a better way of explaining the gap between the poor and the rich; the led who are mainly common people (poor) and the leaders who are mainly individuals in governing positions (rich), either as political, traditional or religious leaders. There is a sense of relative deprivation according to the human needs perspective of personal recognition, positive identity, security and development. If one talked about these human needs maxis, it should include having equal opportunity to political positions, education, employment and justice. In an instance that a party could not fulfill those essential aspects of life, either as individuals or as a group, there is bound to be conflict. The International Crisis Group (2014) pinpoints that the people living in northeastern



region where the insurgency is prevalent have the worst poverty, illiteracy and unemployment rating. The social phenomena may though not be the ultimate causes of the insurgency, but they are chief, contributory factors. The conception of Salami (2003) reveals much about not having access to needs.

*The relative deprivation necessitated by the seeming collapse of the state structure due to the government's inability to manage corruption, the rising inequality between rich and poor, the gross violation of human rights, and inaccessible education, could also facilitate radicalization (Salaam, 2013).*

Furthermore, conflict analysis, it has been said, must take account of human relationships, the perceptions and misperceptions of parties to a dispute, their shared and separate values, goals and motivations in relation to the economic, political, social and physical environments (Burton, 1998). With various records of ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria resulting out of separate value, interest, and the norms of the social group, especially ethnic and religious groups in the Northern region, one can easily grasp why the Boko Haram insurgency is particularly prevalent in Northern or Northeastern Nigeria. Moreover, religious, economic and ecological indices of the northern region reflect that the insurgency was actually a trigger from old patches of conflicts like the Maitatsine, identity and poverty crisis (Agbiboa, 2015; Shuaibu and Salleh, 2015). Burton indeed warns that if conflict is thought to be inevitable, it would limit the opportunity of resolving it. In a situation that the northeastern or northern states of Nigeria are dragged behind in terms of economic and human development, there is no escape from conflict situations arising.

A survey of the entire area that the insurgency is overspread in the border community of the Lake Chad region shows that people were struggling to meet their basic human needs. This made it easy for the founder of Boko Haram to sell its ideology to people, ranging from poor children, women, dropout students, and dissidents to ex-fighters from the Lybian upsurge who were at once seeking a living and a haven (Anyadike, 2013). It has become common knowledge that the Boko Haram ideology is mainly influenced by religion, thus its struggle is a value-based one. Even from the testimonies of recruits or followers, the religious reason for joining the Islamic terrorist group is nothing comparable with any other reasons, such as the disparities in the application of law, poverty, unemployment, and frustration from government or political leaders' failings on promises

to better the condition of the poor in the society, who are always forgetting after elections are won (Emuedo et al., 2015 and Blanchard, 2014).

In a situation where a party or a people in a heterogeneous society is finding it difficult to acquire the necessary materials or values that are considered essential for their existence, survival or sustainable development, there is certainly going to be a time that frustration and aggression would set in, calling for reaction against the other parties who are definitely perceived to be responsible for their inabilities and conditions. Staub (2003) observes that cultural and societal conditions that frustrate psychological needs make violence more likely, whereas the conditions that help fulfill these needs in constructive ways contribute to development of peaceful relation and fully human lives. Ajayi (2012) observes that Boko Haram has been in existence since 1995 and was recorded with no or less violence until the death of its leader. The height of the group's frustration came when their leader died in police custody. The police being an institution under government was thus perceived by the insurgent group as a party in the dispute.

The application of the human need theory in the analysis of the root or proxy causes of the Boko Haram insurgency is to establish that conflicts are not unavoidable, so long as human needs remain existent and insatiable. By this, it becomes clear that conflict can be resource-based, value-based and interest-based. According to the human need theory, resource and interest-based conflict can be resolved with less difficulty through negotiation or bargaining (such resources as land, water, air space, money and so on). On the contrary, value-based conflict which reflects the belief or norms of a party is not negotiable because values are rarely easily replaceable, adoptable and adaptable, yet value is the fulcrum of the belief system of a party. With the tenaciously held belief of Islamic terrorists and their religious practices around the world, namely Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, it is quite clear that value-based conflict is not a conflict to usually reach compromise. Each of the terrorist groups enlisted above often holds hard ground against negotiation while encouraging confrontation. But the Nigerian government has indicated interest to negotiate with Boko Haram (Channel Television, September 15, 2015).

Driving on the path of confrontation to coerce a party to accept some conditions and let go of some others is another angle to why conflict is said to be inevitable. Giessmann et al. (2011) avers that conflict can be avoided especially if parties to a dispute can reach a compromise. In the case of

Boko Haram insurgency, it was until the government reacted to the insurgents' confrontations through counter-insurgency that the conflict became escalated. Of course, the escalation of the Boko Haram conflict is expected with insurgents already occupying half of the northeastern territory in Nigeria. The Nigerian military could not do more than applying a reasonable force in retrieving those areas seized by the insurgents. More so, military and militia operations are confrontational, which brings one to another explanation of the human need theory in resolving conflict. Burton (1988) explains that conflict may sometimes require the application of force to make parties concede to terms of resolutions, or at least come to the table for negotiation.

Although the Boko Haram insurgents have not given in for negotiations, the Islamic terrorist can be made to soften its hard ground through the twin-approaches of counter-insurgency mechanism and reconstruction approach to meeting the human needs of communities that are stronghold of the insurgents. Notably, the human needs theory cautions that unless the root causes of conflict are known and attended to, there is no way of fully resolving conflicts that are serious. It means therefore that confrontation may though be employed in conflict resolution (Rummel, 1981), but if the remote issues and causes are not well resolved, the conflict would only disappear to reappear again in a nearby or distance future, a situation which is termed "negative peace" in Peace Studies parlance. This is the case of the Boko Haram and Biafra struggles in Nigeria.

The seriousness of Boko Haram insurgency by widespread violence across border is a significant reason why military operation became an alternative option to negotiation which the human needs theory emphasized. Human needs theory emphasizes that analysis of root cause of conflict be done first to know the nature of conflict and then the resolution method to apply would follow. As a matter of fact, the Boko Haram insurgents' guerrilla war tactics which is presently hit and run, reveal as ever a critical point that the terrorist group is not ready for negotiation but a sophisticated military strategy or retaliation. The nature of the insurgency is no doubt a serious one given the level of violence intensity, casualties and humanitarian crisis across the Lake Chad region. The heinous strategy of the Boko Haram actually called for the offensive approach that the Nigerian military adopted, even though the military response has generated numerous civilian casualties and fearfulness among the local population (Omilusi, 2016).

The Nigerian military counter-insurgency operation against Boko Haram militants is a right step in the right direction however, the issues that cause the insurgency must be sincerely addressed to see an ultimate end to the insurgency. As previously observed, the human needs theory is a conflict resolution proposition that helps to understand why parties engage in conflict. It argues that once parties cannot reach their essential needs, they are likely to resort to conflict. Thus, conflict is inevitable because some parties would always have some needs that may not be met, such as personal recognition or developmental issues. Going by Max-Neef (1991), developmentalism is the generator of experience, ideas and currents of thought which failure of it cannot be ascribed to lack of ideas or dearth of creativity. Developmentalism takes an economic approach which neglects other social and political processes. For this reason, it is sure that the neglect of social and political institutions in developmental processes in a society would lead to dispute or conflict.

By and large, conflict is resolvable, if parties to a dispute can reach a compromise about their human needs. Though, it has been commonly argued that conflicts that are value-based are hard to resolve through compromise mechanism (Landman, 2010), it is important to note that, if parties to a dispute are taught appropriate problem-solving techniques rather than just the instinctive method of confrontation and violence, there is an increased possibility for them to shift grounds. In the case of Boko Haram, there is a high tendency that insurgents who joined the Islamic terrorists may change their positions if their basic human needs are met, especially proper education, employment opportunity and free access to sources of livelihood, right to justice, security, positive religious identity cum acceptance, and the provision of social amenities in the local environment. This suggestion is borne out of the fact that the root causes of the Boko Haram insurgency are closely tied to the above social phenomenon. In essence, once those human needs are fulfilled for frustration to be eradicated, there is a likelihood of the barest reduction of aggression, both factors of which have been widely established as significantly responsible for conflict.

## 2.6.2 Functional Prerequisite Theory

Among the theories that explain the root causes and prevalence of conflict, functional prerequisite as a concept delves into issues relating to how society operates as a system. Functional prerequisite is a social theory that explains the composition of societal fabric in relation to their functions or behaviours. It sees the society as a social system that is structured in a way that each member relates not just as a part but as a whole. Functional prerequisite is an expansion of the functionalist theory which emerged in Europe in the 19th century, having Emile Durkheim, Radcliffe-Brown A. R, Herbert Spencer, Talcott Parson and Robert Merton as its foremost proponents (Mooney et al, 2007; Haralambos and Holborn, 2004 and Wikibooks, 2017). Functionalist theory is often explained in terms of structure functionalism which conceives society in the form of structure, with interconnected parts maintaining harmony to achieve social equilibrium for the whole structure.

Where structure functionalism considers how society is constituted with its social institutions, functional prerequisite explains the basic elements that are necessary for social order among the institutions in relation to the survival and stability of the society. Functional prerequisite is a theory that is particularly committed to establishing essential needs that society must provide in order to ensure cordial relationship in the functions of the societal structure either as parts or whole. Functional prerequisite is mostly attributed to Talcott Parson, who conceives the society as a social system whereby its existence and functionality are dependent on the satisfaction of member's basic needs such as food, shelter, clothing, money and safety, all of which are basic required prerequisites for the survival of individuals as parts and the entire society as whole (Saheed and Khan, 2013 and Parson, 1951a).

Parson (1951a) avers that a social system cannot be so structured as to be radically incompatible with the conditions of functioning of its component individual actors as biological organisms and as personalities, or of the relatively stable integration of a cultural system. Parson as a functional prerequisite theorist believes that the society is a place where actors, either as individuals or social bodies perform certain roles which are inspired by the desire to attain the fundamental human needs. Just like the human needs theory, the functional prerequisite theory provides the basis for explaining the root causes of conflict in the society from the perspective that if a specific function

is not fulfilled, the system cannot maintain itself (Toshiki, 2011). In the analysis of Alberle and Cohen (1950), the performance of a given function is a prerequisite to a society's requirement for meeting the basic human needs and stability in the society.

In relation to how social system performs its function for society to survive, Parson (1951a) and (1968b) identifies the following basic prerequisites which must be met in the acronym of "AGIL": (i) Adaptation; relationship or interaction of society with the environment or external-physical conditions including its resources, (ii) Goal Attainment; goes with the capacity to set goals, make necessary decision and mobilize resources to meet them, which is a basic function of the political unit of a social system, just as it has been seen that political activities organize and direct the affairs of a society; (iii) Integration, is a value or norm consensus level where social institutions ensure uniformity or harmony in the form of internal coherence in the quest of society in satisfying basic needs, such as religious or cultural values and beliefs; (iv) Latency or (latent pattern maintenance) expects social system to maintain the interaction pattern that motivates actors and manage their tension within the system. Maintenance of system may be done by family, school, church or mosque which gets involve in behaviour management and solving problems.

However, the functional prerequisite theory has incurred some criticisms from critics who think that it is too abstract or arbitrary to be adopted in a serious empirical research (Ritzer and Barry, 2001 and Merton, 1968). On the part of Merton, Talcott Parson overgeneralizes the interdependence of the social system as parts with the wider society (Holmwood, 2005). Generally, it is held that the functional prerequisite neglects the fact that a part of the social system (individual) may not be functional in its interrelationship with the (society) as a whole. This is because what is functional for an individual or group may not be functional for the wider society. Being a renounced student of Parson, Merton uses his easy, "*latent and manifest functions*" to show the need to distinguish between system functions. In Merton's view, latent functions are unrecognized actions of social system with unintended consequences, while manifest functions are conscious intentions of social system with objective consequences. It is said also that social system may be dysfunctional where it creates undesirable consequences that threaten the running of the society (Macionis and Gerber, 2010).

Again, functional prerequisite postulation has been accused of assuming that social change is static, or rather that interaction in the social system is embroiled in constant conflict. Coser (1956) and Dahrendorf (1957), cited by Toshiki (2011), reveal that the static character of functional prerequisite necessitated their focus on social change and conflict, particularly seeing that the theory is conservative and substituting 'conflict' for 'consensus', which is thought to be a factor leading to social order, stability and innovation in the society. In other words, it is held that the function of a particular social usage is the contribution it makes to the total social life as the functioning of the total social system (Radcliff-Brown, 1935). Going by this view, if the contributions or functions of individual and group are constructive or productive for social system, a converse situation especially if actors' contributions are dysfunctional will lead to disruptiveness in the functioning of social system.

Bringing to the fore the underlying principle of functional prerequisite in explaining the root cause of Boko Haram insurgency, it is evident that the dysfunctional contributions of the social institutions, mainly the government, education and religious bodies towards societal growth are the causes of the terrorist group actions. This claim can be understood by asking first: what is the agenda of Boko Haram terrorist group? Secondly, who are its remote and ultimate targets? BBC (2016b), Totten (2014) and Thomson (2012) establish that the terrorist group is against Western education, which is taken for why the government, religious institutions, educational institutions, international organisations, among others, have failed in their responsibilities to the Nigerian society in terms of growth and development. In essence, the terrorist group as part of Nigeria therefore launched its insurgency against the government and its associated agencies, making the general public their target with a bid to meeting the basic human needs, which has proven hard or impossible to be met.

As pointed out by Shuaibu and Salleh (2015) Casimir et al. (2014) and Onuoha (2014), the practices of the Boko Haram is a reaction to the functions of the social institutions, such as government who failed in its functions to ensure that the minimum requirements for meeting the basic human needs such as food, shelter, water, money, education, job opportunity, security, are met especially in the northeastern Nigeria. Of course, it could safely be argued that the failure in part or in whole of the social institutions to perform their functions in maintaining social order was

responsible for the Boko Haram insurgency, because the consensus that is supposed to be a factor in social group's interconnection appears to be absent or replaced with outright conflict. Onuoha (2014) stresses that poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and weak family structures make young men vulnerable to radicalization of the Boko Haram, including itinerant preachers conveying religious messages with illustration that government is weak and corrupt.

The issue of corruption has been observed as the primary social phenomenon affecting the progress of the Nigerian state at all levels; economic, political, socio-cultural or environmental level. In the analysis of Mathew and Obasaju (2013), corruption and economic growth have been inversely relating with each other, causing undue arousal or doom among the people over an age. Boko Haram group and its loyalists see the Nigerian government and the elite as responsible for the spread of corruption considering the height of their political brigandage, including government depressive economic policies and laws which make the society dysfunctional. Onuoha (2014) observes that widespread of corruption in Nigeria not only deprived communities of the needed amenities and infrastructure but created an environment conducive for recruitment and radicalization.

Human relations in the society according to Parson's adaptation prerequisite entail the capacity to adjust to the environment, such as territory and economic resources. The external environment of Nigeria, especially the northern region has been found to be embroiled in one form of violence or the other since creation. After Nigeria's independence was the Biafra war in 1966 and many other conflicts that occurred with religious, political and resource undertones, such as Kano Maitasini riot in 1980, Kano religious riot of 1990 caused by Reinhard Bonnke's attempted crusade, Jos religio-political riot in 2001, Kaduna violence in 2002, Niger Delta resource conflict, and the Boko Haram conflict in 2009 (Boston University, 2014; Adesoji, 2011; Jamal, 2010; Okonta and Meagher, 2009 and Afrobarometer, 2002). These external conditions of Nigeria have been recognized to have direct and indirect effects in the disruption or disparity noticed in the integration and interaction of individual or group in the society as well as their social life.

As it is anticipated, the Nigerian government by its legitimate responsibility is supposed to have addressed the social and economic challenges confronting the nation, considering the country's huge resources and economic wealth. Since the discovery of oil in Nigeria in 1958, she has



remained one of the major oil exporting countries in the world, while having oil resources accounts for over 90% of her revenue. As statistics always shows and scholars sadly wonder, what has the oil wealth contributed to the well-being of the Nigerian citizens? (Ibrahim et al., 2014). In the observation of Boston University (2014), despite a per capita income of more than \$2,700 and vast wealth in natural resources, Nigeria has one of the world's poorest populations. An estimated 70 percent of the population lives on less than \$1.25 a day. Again, the economic disparities between the north and the rest of the country are particularly stark. In the north, 72 percent of people live in poverty, compared to 27 percent in the south and 35 percent in the Niger Delta.

Given the above, it may appear as if the northern region is the least beneficiary of the economic resources of Nigeria compared with her other; any such assumption would however only mean hasty conclusion. This is because the Northern region has the highest number of people who always occupy the highest political positions in in the country. A clear example of such a position is the office of the president. However, the main cause of disparity in the economic growth and development of northern Nigeria, just as any other region, is poor governance and lack of effective leadership seen at all levels of the societal structure (Dambazau, 2014). By this understanding, one can rightly say that the grievance or defiant behaviour of the Boko Haram terrorist group was to address the disruptive roles of the Nigerian leadership, especially by reforming the social system of the wider society through establishing Islamic principles in the country. This however explains why the terrorist group immediately declared Caliphate of the areas that it conquered in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, in order to fulfill its mission of establishing an Islamic system.

It is not an understatement that the founder of Boko Haram was not motivated by the way Nigerian social institutions were contributing to the growth and development of the country. Of course, preventing the kind of sensation and action of the Boko Haram was why Parson warned against not motivating actors of social system in performing their functions. By Parson's submission,

*The functional prerequisite of meeting a minimum proportion of the needs of the individual actors, is the need to secure adequate participation of a sufficient proportion of these actors in the social system, that is to motivate them adequately to the performances which may be necessary if the social system in question is to persist or develop (Parson, 1951a:18).*

The consequences of failing to maintain the acceptable pattern of interaction in a social system by motivating all actors in performing their functions is a liable condition for conflict or itself conflict, yet violent conflict or insurgency hardly opens a society easily to development. This is so basically because investors always entertain fear not putting their capital and resources in an undulating environment where they are not sure of the survival and sustainability of their businesses. Awojobi (2014) records that Boko Haram has sacked commercial activities in the North-Eastern Nigeria, as banks, markets, shops, parks and government departments occasionally open, from fear of unprecedented attacks of the terrorist group. Factually, the security challenges that Boko Haram insurgency poses to Nigeria and her neighbouring countries would continue to make the affected regions static in terms of socio-economic development unless urgently curbed.

When the critics of functional prerequisite say that the theory is static, they talk from the understanding that individual or group's interrelationship in social system does lead to conflict. In a situation that the existing integration pattern of social system is obsolete, a demand for structural change can be inevitable, in particular if the basic needs of members of the structure is not met. Radcliffe-Brown cited by Holmwood (2005) posits that for any social system to survive, it must conform to certain conditions. The fulfillment of the conditions or prerequisites for meeting the needs talked about by the functionalist can be argued as responsible for the social order in the structure. Again, the social change that is considered to be orderly in the structure between the parts and the whole of a social system is made possible because the social structures (such as economic, political, religious, legal and educational system) are able to meet the essential needs of its members.

Once the needs of individuals or groups in a social system are not met, there is bound to be conflict. Therefore, some theories such as the action theory, human needs theory and frustration aggression theory have been favoured over their functional prerequisite counterpart, because the latter seems not to acknowledge that social change is a factor of human's action prompted by inability to fulfill his essential needs, against a structural or evolutionary process of change (Meighan, 1986). The Boko Haram, for instance, has found reasons to adopt conflict measures in enforcing social change rather than encouraging the consensus process described by functional prerequisite. From the strategy of this Islamic terrorist group which is total violence, it can be understood that where

functional prerequisite helps to understand that social system exists through consensus of meeting basic needs, the occurrence of conflict is the absence of the basic needs or requirements for the survival of social system (Levy, 1952).

One question that begs for answers at this juncture is: what are the un met basic human needs of the Boko Haram, inducing the preference of conflict over consensus. First, we see from scholarship that the group's religious values or norms have not been properly integrated by custodians. Samu (2012) observes that religion, ethnicity, politics and mimesis of other violent groups (from around the world) are all playing together to complicate and undermine community integrative power. Also, for someone like Parson, the social system at the level of integration where religion, family and cultural custodians belong, must maintain the integration pattern of values and norms to achieve harmony and social order.

Also, at the integration level, political institutions in Nigeria have given only negligible attention to political values that should inspire people to perform their civic functions effectively. Over the years, instead of the political bodies and leadership to perform their leadership functions, they have continued to abuse the system making their services hinder people from meeting their essential needs (Bintube, 2015; Omede, 2015 and Samu, 2012). It must be noted that political institutions include family as its smallest unit. Specifically, parents have been accused of not taking adequate care of their children in the north (Shehu, 2015; Bintube, 2015; NRN, 2013), neglecting the teaching of moral values that should make children perform their civic functions very well in society.

In addition, the judicial system too has failed to ensure justice for all within the Nigerian system. Largely, the issue of injustice in terms of unfair hearing, misapplication of laws and justice is contributory to the ensuing and escalation of Boko Haram conflict (Ibenwa, 2016).

### **2.6.3 State Fragility Theory**

The basis for explaining conflict in countries around the globe corresponds with what fragility theory sets out to do. The theory points to states' inability to fulfill their social contract by providing protection and basic services for its citizens (Perera, 2015). That something is fragile means that it is prone to getting damaged by the slightest carelessness. This is what the Oxford

Dictionary means when it says that fragility is the quality of being delicate or vulnerable. After the event of World War II, most sovereign states became riddled with internal conflict – civil wars and some unbearable conditions working against human and society development, leading them to being classified as either failed or collapsed states. In the analysis of Nayi (2012) and Ferreira (2015), the concept of fragile state became central point in the discourses of foreign policy analysts, international organizations and academics from the early 1990s, as it was employed to explain human and global security issues.

State fragility theory is one of the economic, political, social and environmental concepts in explaining human living conditions and society development or countries using comparative mechanism. Nayi (2012) establishes that the outbreak of wars, factional conflict, economic, religious, ethnic and political conflict, poverty, guerrilla activity and generally the development of “new wars” which are beyond conventional warfare, prompted policy analysts to forge new concepts such as quasi-state and fragile state. According to Kaldor (2013), new wars are the wars of the era of globalization and found in areas where authoritarian states have been greatly weakened as a consequence of opening up to the rest of the world. The new wars may occur in the form of terrorism and insurgency considering the involved state and non-state actors and their goals which always rest on economic, political and social interests or religious identity.

Having established that state fragility theory is more of contemporary than modern concept, it is important to state that fragile states are those that fail to meet the essential human needs of their citizens thereby making them vulnerable to security issues, such as poverty, unemployment, environmental conditions, violent attacks, kidnapping, trafficking, displacement, etc. Torres and Anderson (2004) note that sovereign states are expected to perform certain minimal functions for the security, wellbeing of their citizens and the smooth working of the international system, but in a situation that these states renege or failed in their expectations and citizens become obviously plunged in difficult living conditions, the states necessarily become classified as ‘weak’, ‘fragile’, or ‘poorly performing’. As pointed out by Bolton and Hernandez (2016), 50% of fragile states’ populations live on/under \$1.25USD a day, which significantly increases the likely hood of violence, poor health, low educational attainment, armed conflict as a result of extreme poverty.

The state fragility theory stresses the fundamental failure of a state to perform functions necessary to meet citizen's basic needs and expectations. It also shows the incapability of government in assuring basic security, maintaining the rule of law and justice, or providing basic services and economic opportunities for their citizens. The centrality of state fragility theory posits weak and ineffective central government with little practical control over much of its territory; non-provision of public services widespread corruption and criminality; refugees and involuntary movement of populations (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2008). According to the Department for International Development (2005), state fragility is where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people including the poor. The DFID further sees a fragile state as the insecurity of the ruling elite which leads to the victimization of some or all of a nation's citizens as experienced by the Taliban's in Afghanistan.

The fragile state theory has been widely used to measure the extent to which a state is underdeveloped, developing or developed. It is a very relevant theory adopted in explaining living condition of people in relation to human development and global security from the angle of government policies, their effects or outcome on the larger society. Explaining the numerous developmental challenges confronting Nigeria, from economic recession to factionalisation of political institutions and from ethno-religious conflict to insurgency in the northern region, Nigeria would qualify as a fragile state better than a failed or collapsed state. FFP (2015) actually calls Nigeria a fragile country because of her internal political pressures, ferocious campaign by Boko Haram insurgents in the north, and economic recession caused by the falling oil prices.

Nigeria is one of the countries that have been identified by Fragile States Index (2017) as having high alert, using indicator risk of demographic pressure, Refugees and IDPs, group grievance, human flight, uneven economic development, economic decline, state legitimacy, public services, human rights and rule of law, security apparatus, factionalized elites, and external intervention (FFP, 2017). For the past decades, Nigeria has been battling with issues of security, human rights and rule of law, economic downturn, political and religious crisis, force migration, herdsman and farmers feud, ethnic or communal conflict, and low income for public servants. In fact, the issue of low income or uneven economic development of citizens is one of the many challenges that the Nigerian Labour Congress recently set before the Nigerian government.

However, a fragile state can be identified using the low-income maxim. Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2011) explain that a state condition of fragility in terms of development can be known through direct impact of income and growth or indirect impact of aid allocation. Income level is a very important aspect of human economic development, whereas job availability is the vital measure of a society's development. Low income countries are those that score 3.2 and less according to the definition of World Bank on Country Policy and Institutional Assessment are fragile states (IDA, 2007). This low-income axiom established by World Bank in 2011 was basically replaced in 2013 with a more acceptable term called fragile and conflict-affected states (IEG, 2014). In essence, the fragile and conflict-affected states include countries that are run with weak policies, institutions, and governance. World Bank decision to tag low income countries under stress as fragile is because most low-income countries are conflict-affected, which surprisingly are rich in resources.

Since most fragile and conflict-prone states, especially in the Middle East and North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, Central Asia and Central America are rich in resources (Muggah, 2017), it has become general for analysts to explain the concept of fragile states on the basis of state effectiveness (Torres and Anderson, 2004). About state effectiveness, particularly in the Central and West Africa where countries of the Lake Chad region are found, Muggah (2017) observes that the strongest determinant of their fragility is persistence of conflict and unemployment. The Lake Chad region has been for long observed with issues relating to protracted conflict, climatic conditions, poverty, unemployment, low enrollment in school etc. If state effectiveness is to be measured on the basis of state functions towards citizens in the above region, little can be said to have been achieved in relation to development.

Ferreira (2015) has attributed state ineffectiveness to lack of will or capacity to perform its core functions and frequent political violence, thereby imposing great challenges for the effectiveness of development assistance. In the same vein, DFID (2005) regards fragile states as those in which government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor. Bringing to the fore another standard for identifying fragile states relates to countries with the presence of UN peace support operations or peace building, including countries that are far from achieving the Millennium Development Goals (OECD, 2014; IEG, 2014 and The World Bank, 2013). To help countries especially those that are fragile and conflict-affected out of their

predicaments, International Development Association (IDA) has been fingered to primarily concern with financing countries on the recognition of performance as well as special circumstance of countries (The World Bank, 2014).

A country that is in a difficult environment may automatically fall under stress and become a fragile state, especially when the government fails to assist its citizens in meeting their essential needs. For example, the Lake Chad region has for a longtime been marked for severe climatic condition which causes water and food shortage, forced migration, poverty and poor health due to HIV/AIDS (FAO, 2011). The environmental situation in the Lake Chad region, coupled with poor governance due to the unwilling attitude of state to provide protection and basic services to their citizens, is the main reason for the region's fragility. There is a very high rate of insecurity, cross-border migration, Refugees and IDPs around the border-communities of the region. Magrin, Lemoalle and Lajaunie (2015) and (2016) expose that the fragility of the Lake Chad region in terms of demographic pressure is exacerbating the vulnerability of poor population. For experience like this, fragile states have been regarded as those that are unable or unwilling to harness domestic and international resources effectively for poverty reduction (Torres and Anderson, 2004).

However, fragile states are characterized by low economic growth, low access to infrastructure or absence of basic social services, low levels of life expectancy and high level of infant mortality. In the same vein, Ferera (2015) sums up fragile states in terms of being vulnerable to conflicts, humanitarian crises and environmental shocks. Considering the way countries of the Lake Chad region are tied together, the risk of violent attack or fatal diseases cross-border spill is a reality. In effect, the Lake Chad region is a highly susceptible environment to degradation and legitimacy conflict. Barkindo (2016) explains that environmental degradation could lead to scarcity, which will result in corruption, clandestine economy, organized crime, resource capture by the elite and the weakened legitimacy of governments in power, making the country prone to violent conflict. Of course, there is bound to be frustration, aggression and ultimately violent attack when state legitimacy is under contest.

It is noteworthy to state that the legitimacy of fragile states is always under stress. A state is known by its legitimate power, sovereignty and control over territory. However, most fragile states do not have total control over their territories. In other words, there is always the presence of factionalized

group(s) contesting vehemently for state power. Attempting to quell such groups and their activities most often end in violence, and other security challenges which may make a state fragile. A remarkable point in the emergence and spread of Boko Haram in Nigeria to other countries, which are now regarded as conflict-affected states, was the Boko Haram terrorist group's interest in territorial control and legitimacy. The terrorist group up till now endlessly seeks that its value, belief in Islamic religion and laws be establish in the northeastern Nigeria (Agbiboa, 2013). Consequently, responses from the Nigeria government against the terrorists through state of emergency declaration and the deployment of military officials, including the relocation of military headquarters to the region of conflict have further made the region very fragile.

The fragility of the North-Eastern Nigeria and the border communities of the Lake Chad region have been a serious concern due to the alarming humanitarian crisis that abounds in the region. As known of a fragile state, Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger have become plunged by Boko Haram into conditions that make them request for international support in the area of peace building. Guilbert (2017) recognizes the need for humanitarian assistance by the challenges in the Lake Chad region, which include malnutrition and starvation, breakdown of social fabric, human right violations etc. According to how citizens of fragile states may be, people in the conflict-affected region of northeastern Nigeria and the border communities are in a dire need of access to food security, water, protection from violent attack, education, sanitation, shelter, healthcare, and in terms of human right, they need liberty, freedom of association, free movement and even right to life, etc.

Magrin, Lemoalle and Lajaunie (2015) observe that there are about 50 million people residing in the Lake Chad basin. The huge population of the entire basin has been recognized to be under the influence of complex system owing to environmental factors and mobility. In the same vein, Salkida (2012) establishes that the inhabitants of the very region are contesting for water from the Lake. Each country of the region on their part needs water for effective running of dams, livestock survival and agricultural production of wheat and rice. Generally, the inability of people to access economic resources easily lead to economic grievance, demographic pressure, cross-border attacks, and other fragile states risk indicators which make Lake Chad countries classified as fragile states with high alert (Dauda, 2016).



Scarce resources can bring about factionized or sectarian group in a country which may end up employing conflict to fulfilling their needs. This view is greatly recognized by foreign policy experts and academics who think that fragile states are also characterized by shortage of resources (Nasir et al., 2014; Mildner et al., 2011; Baker, 2008; Collier and Hoeffler, 2005 and 2000; and Homer-Dixon, 1999). Conversely, many countries with rich natural resources have also been seen to be unstable for reasons that fractionalized groups are seek equal access to the wealth of the state, in particular when the state apparatus is dysfunctional. Nordstrom (2008) unearths that the world's fragile states have become dysfunctional, despite vast resource endowments. It is also mentioned that natural resources wealth has spurred not economic growth, but corruption, repression and violent conflict which make many states fragile.

Nordstrom accounts for the following for common features of natural resource governance issues in fragile states: (i) a high degree of resource dependence; (ii) situations of extreme state fragility where groups clash in violent conflict over resources or in attempts to secede by a resource-rich part of a country; (iii) rentier states, surviving on rents rather than traditional taxation of the population; and (iv) lack of economic development and the persistence of repressive regimes, with little ability or desire to promote growth and welfare for their citizens. Nordstrom's analysis is adopted here because it simplifies the position of Maphosa (2012), McNeish (2010) and Peschka (2010) on why fragile states is not necessarily countries with scarce resources, but as well those that are richly endowed with natural resources, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Nigeria, Libya, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Angola.

Fragility in a state can be caused by both natural and man-made factors but the majority of the conflict-affected countries are actually the cause of their own fragile situation. According to the United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action (2012), conflicts over natural resources arise when parties disagree about the management, ownership, allocation, use and protection of natural resources and related ecosystems. It is also put forward that conflict becomes problematic when societal mechanisms and institutions for managing and resolving it break down, giving way to violence. Before conflict becomes violence, it is obvious that most disputing parties hardly give room for discussion about contending issues with a view to resolving them. And until

states begin to take seriously issues of development would they witness the opportunity to avoid chronic indicators of fragility and prevent violent conflict or insurgency.

Rotberg (2003) posits that in a fragile state, there is a tendency for increased criminal violence which further weakens the states' authority. He further notes that fragile states are usually associated with tensed and dangerous warring factions, a situation which most times leads to a breakdown of law and order, increased humanitarian disaster, which concerns not only the people directly affected, but also people in neighbouring states. As Gros, (1996) notes, ethnic genocide in Rwanda and the Balkans or flight of Haitians to Florida can hardly be ignored by the international community. Collier et al. (2003) identify a triad of ripple effects that emerge from armed conflict: the *internal effects* (as a result of the burdens of internally displaced persons), the *regional effects* (as a result of the burden of refugee influx) and the *global effect* (as a result of foreign interventionists). According to them, these triadic ripple effects generate unique challenges. While the internal effects constitute a problem of food insecurity, loss of means of livelihood, rise in the displacement of people, the regional effect constitute spread of contagious diseases across borders from the inflow of refugees, and the global effect constitutes the growth in narcotics trade across borders – sponsored by foreign, non-state actors. As Hentz, (2004) notes such spill-over have occurred in both West Africa (from Liberia) and East Africa (from Democratic Republic of Congo).

The state fragility theory, therefore, gives a critical understanding of insurgency, cross-border insurgency and why border communities have to device coping strategies against the looming daily threats that confront them. The activities of the Boko Haram sect have seriously challenged the security of the state and increased humanitarian crisis in North-Eastern Nigeria especially in the form of food insecurity, leading to a rise in prices of consumable items within the nation and neighbouring nations of Chad, Niger and Cameroon. This continues to increase the rate of refugee influx and adverse economic and security implications (in line with Rotberg, 2003). These are all indicators of fragility which the Nigerian government continues to contend with and fails to adequately address.

## **2.7 Conclusion**

This chapter provided a distinction between the conceptualization and contextualization of the various concepts utilized in the study. These concepts which have been used over the years have evolved different meanings and definitions. While these definitions were clearly reviewed, they were as well contextualized and situated within the space of this study. Again, the existing literature was reviewed to showcase the porosity of the African borders and the various inimical cross-border activities that constantly take place across these borders. Critical to this study is the activities of the Boko Haram sect in the North-Eastern Nigeria which has not only caused chaos within the region but has had a spill-over effect on neighbouring countries of Cameroun, Chad and Niger. The literature was reviewed to show the effect of this phenomenon on the vulnerable within the North-Eastern Nigeria and its neighbours. Conclusively, three theories were presented which define the current situation in the North-Eastern Nigeria. Notably, the Functional Prerequisite and Human Needs theories reveal the basic needs of man and his innate propensity to pursue them purposely towards a goal, which is survival. State Fragility exposes the inability of the Nigerian state to perform its basic role of securing its territory and its citizens thus, leading the people to evolving coping strategies that will ensure their survival within their various communities in the border areas of the North-Eastern region of the country. These three theories adopted adequately explained what has led the inhabitants of the border communities in the North-Eastern Nigeria to evolve coping strategies needed for safety and survival from the three perspectives identified. Finally, this led to the development of a theoretical model that explicitly explains the various coping strategies developed by these border communities and the effects of these strategies towards their very survival.

## CHAPTER THREE

# REGIONAL BORDER ARCHITECTURE: AFRICA AND WEST AFRICA

### 3.1 Introduction

Historically, African borders have remained porous among many reasons because they are an artificial creation of the colonial masters. It has been noted in the preceding chapter that boundaries in Africa states were divided by the colonial lords without considering Africa's social, political, and regional peculiarities. This was what the Berlin Conference of 1884/1885 was meant to achieve so as to meet the aspirations of European superpowers' in a bid to subsume Africa into their notion of nation states (Ahmad, 2013). Scholars have argued on the arbitrariness and artificial nature of African borders but in all, the realities that abound and the revelations from actors who were directly involved in the construction process prove beyond reasonable doubt that these borders were arbitrarily created. A perfect example confirming the above assertion is a remark by Lord Salisbury during the signing of the Anglo-French Convention on the Nigeria-Niger boundary in 1906. According to Anene (1970), Lord Salisbury remarked that the colonialists (British and French) merely drew lines on maps where they have never reached, allocate mountains, rivers and lakes without actual familiarity with the locations.

In the same vein, a British colonial officer commented that the Eastern Nigeria's and Cameroon borders were arbitrarily drawn with blue pencil and a ruler, running from Calabar to Yola. Even during his visit and discussions with the Emir of Adamawa in council, none of them knew he had drawn such a blue line across his domain (Anene, 1970). This pattern of action no doubt was the occurrence witnessed in the demarcation of borders all over Africa. The result is an adverse implication as borders cut across a people with cultural and ethnic affinity all over Africa leading to a division of people, distortion of common social values and disorientation of the border communities.

Asiwaju, (1984) noted that such boundaries demarcated cut across communities with a tradition of common ancestors, strong kinship ties, shared socio-political institutions and economic resources,

common customs and practices, and sometimes acceptance of a common political control. It also separated communities of worshippers from age-old sacred groves and shrines. The Somali's example is a case in point where boundaries separates water and pasture for the flocks. It is thus obvious that the peculiarities of the people were not put into consideration when creating these borders as they partitioned homogenous ethnic and cultural groups and pre-colonial state territories. Asiwaju (1985) opined that there were 104 international borders in Africa within 177 cultural milieu. Posner (2006) as well emphasized on the arbitrariness of the borders in Africa.

In addition to the above stated fact, Ahmad (2013) added that apart from African borders being arbitrary and artificial, some were ill-defined, poorly delimited and demarcated while some were not demarcated at all. An example of such is a part of the Cameroon-Nigeria boundary. This reveals that the Imperialists had little or no knowledge of Africa especially the hinterland. This is evident in East Africa where the Germans, Belgians and British Imperialists had interest even after the Berlin Conference. Ahmad (2013) stressed further that the arbitrariness of African borders as delimited by the Western colonialists:

*...revealed the ignorance of the colonialists as far as the geography of Africa was concerned. It was easy to write down the meridian on paper at a conference in Brussels, but when it came to the demarcation and delimitation of the boundary on land, the colonial administrator in the Congo and Uganda could not easily trace the meridian on the ground.*

The result of this error is serious security threats, terrorism, crime, uncontrolled migration and illicit trade witnessed over the years across borders in Africa as expressed by Weber (2012). Diarra (2013) expressed his disgust that it is also an invitation to tensions, conflicts among many African countries. From Griffiths (1996) to Nana-Sinkam (2000) there were conflicts in the figures of the borders, ranging from 109 to 165, even for the 25percent demarcated. Many of the borders are porous, ill-manned, inadequate Custom Posts even where roads cross the borders, while some boundaries are without roads, rail or waterways as in the Central Africa Republic-Congo, Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Africa occupies about 20 percent of the total land area of the earth and hence ranks second to Asia in size. Its population, about 1 billion people according to a 2009 estimate, and accounts for about 15% of the Earth's population, again second to Asia. The peoples live in 55 sovereign countries, and represent a diversity of racial, ethnic, linguistic and cultural groupings, 177 of which are partitioned by 109 international boundaries. While most of the countries on the main continent that are surrounded mostly by seas and oceans, there are a few island states, which are separated from the rest of the continent by vast tracts of water in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans. Since the majority of the 55 countries are on the continental mainland, they share significant lengths of their land, air or maritime boundaries.

Massive size in both land mass and population, abundant natural resource endowment, and virtually encircled by water, which if properly harnessed should be of great advantage for her economic development, security, peace and stability. Abundant land ensures agricultural, mineral and raw material availability which enable the people to engage in productive and profitable economic activities. The seas and oceans guarantee less costly means of transportation for personal and commercial interactions with each other and with the rest of the world in addition to being rich sources of food and energy. On the other hand, these natural endowments have affected Africa negatively since the 15<sup>th</sup> Century to date by giving room to criminal acts like terrorism and trafficking thus threatening the regional and continental peace, stability and security.

### **3.2 Illicit activities carried out along African borders**

Various scholars have identified eloquently what activities go on along borders in Africa as a result of their porosity. For instance, Martin, (2011) asserts that Africa's borders are open doors to smuggling and other cross-border illegal activities which have evolved trans-national crimes and makes such areas trans-national crime zones. Criminal syndicates involved in African conflicts especially in the Horn and Great Lake Region and Mano River smuggle arms and ammunition across borders with impunity (Kasaija, 2010). A Small Arm Survey Report (2007) reveals that porous borders encourage inflow of weapons thus making its acquisition easy and cheap. This is largely a major cause of regional instability witnessed in Africa especially in West Africa. Auto theft which is a constant phenomenon in South and West Africa is also a constant feature of the porous borders. The same report indicated that in South Africa on a monthly basis, about 100

vehicles, mainly Sport Utility Vehicles (SUVs) and Four-Wheel Drives are stolen and smuggled across the border into Mozambique with the connivance of border inhabitants who are accomplice in this trans-organized crime. Similar experience is reported in West Africa especially in Nigeria that cars stolen are smuggled out of the country through the porous borders into Benin Republic (Small Arm Survey Report, 2007).

Again, terrorism has found its way into the African continent through its porous borders. Okumu and Botha, (2007) averred that terrorists have been crossing porous borders at will with weapons and ingredients for making bombs, especially in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel regions causing havoc within the regions. Its threat has been particularly felt in Eastern Africa, where there have been repeated attacks by Al Qaeda and its African allies like the Al-Shabab, Boko Haram, etc. The experience of August 7, 1998 of the bombing of the United States embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam, authenticates the vulnerability of African countries to transnational terrorism. The failure of Somalia as a sovereign state gave a foothold to Al Qaeda and worsened the security situation of the Horn of Africa. The trend continues in North and West Africa. A common denominator in all trans-national terrorist activities is the ease with which borders are used to transport radical elements and the ingredients for making terrorist bombs (Botha, 2007; Gourley, 2012; Onuoha, 2012).

Furthermore, civil wars in Africa thrived for so long because mercenaries found it easy to crisscross states through their porous borders to be able to fight in some of these conflict zones. This was witnessed in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia (Musah and Fayemi, 2000). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has equally recognised Africa, West Africa more importantly, as transit route for drug trafficking. Drug barons utilize the porosity of borders to get their substance into Europe and Asia. As noted by Okumu, (2016) UNODC asserted that almost all African countries lack the advanced technology to detect harmful substances and goods such as narcotics and weapons. In some cases where the border control personnel have seized contrabands, drugs barons may connive with high-ranking government officials to undermine their efforts.

### **3.3 African Union Mechanism for Border Security**

The changing nature of borders and the challenges of managing them due to technological advancement have rendered the traditional approaches such as tackling border management problems by a single country or the mounting regimes of tightly secured borders obsolete. While some African countries are aware of this trend, they have yet to adopt modern and integrated approaches to border management. The African Union (AU) and the eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs): Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) have taken up this challenge to enunciate strategies and policies that enhance border management at continental and regional levels with an understanding that states are key players (Ndomo 2009).

Since the last five decades (1964 – 2014), the AU and its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), have come up with series of resolutions, decisions, policy directives and strategies to assist Africa's border security as follows:

- a. The 1<sup>st</sup> Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of state and Government of the OAU, held in Cairo (Egypt) in July 1964, as well as Article 4(B) of the Consultative Act of the African Union (AU), adopted the principle of respect of existing borders on achievement of national independence.
- b. The 44<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU, held in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) in July 1986, as well as the relevant provisions of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union adopted the principle of negotiated settlement of border disputes.
- c. The Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapon in 2000.
- d. The Kampala Declaration and Recommendations on Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa came up in 2009.



Other than the above, there exist diverse concerted efforts at the border security made by African countries. For instance, one can account for the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (1981) and its Protocol relating to the Rights of Women (2002) and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, held in Durban (South Africa) in July, 2002, which provides for the delineation of African boundaries where such an exercise has not yet taken place. In 2006, more efforts were made. These include the Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, Especially Women and Children; and the African Common Position on Migration and Development; the Migration Policy Framework for Africa.

One can also cite earlier moves such as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (1997); The OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999); the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003); and The African Union Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism as well as the Common African Position on Anti-Personnel Landmines both of 2004. Also worthy of note are the AU Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention of 2008 and the AU Commission Initiative against Trafficking Campaign as part of the overall Programme of Activities of DSA on Migration and Development for 2009-2012. All these confirm the common efforts on border delineation and demarcation exercise in order to enhance peace, security, economic and social progress.

Despite this elaborate list of programmes, there is the need for greater cohesion to facilitate the wholistic implementation of the clauses in the documents which the African Union should spearhead and give realistic pursuit.

In response to all the aforementioned border issues in Africa, the organization came up with a plan to address all of these issues that confronts members of the Union and the continent at large as it has been explicitly identified earlier. This strategy evolved by the AU was meant to enhance border management in Africa. It is a step taken to consolidate, coordinate and synergize the isolated policies, initiatives, and efforts on border management in Africa. The African Union through its Ministers in charge of Border Issues came together between 4<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> June, 2007 to fashion out ways of managing African borders. The meeting tagged ‘preventing conflict, promoting integration’ was meant to declare African Union’s border programme and its implementation

modalities. This process was greatly guided by a number of Resolutions made before as stipulated in an earlier draft. First, the resolution provides for the principle of respect of existing borders as at the time of attainment of national independence. The Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Resolution AHG/ Res. 16 (I) on border recognises the existing borders of each nation as approved by the 1<sup>st</sup> Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held in Cairo, Egypt, in July 1964. The provisions of the AU Constitutive Act relevant to this study are: with the following provisions:

- i. Peaceful settlement of border disputes at a round table Resolution CM/Res. 1069 (XLIV) on peace and security in Africa through negotiated settlement of boundary disputes, adopted by the 44<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU, held in Addis Ababa in July 1986.
- ii. Pursuit of the border delineation where it is non-existent in order to enhance peace, security, economic and social progress as in Resolution CM/Res. 1069(XLIV), as well as in the Memorandum of Understanding on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, held in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002, which provides for the delimitation and demarcation of African boundaries by 2012, where such an exercise has not yet taken place.
- iii. Willingness to enhance political and socio-economic unity in the continent.
- iv. Pursuit of efforts at avoiding conflicts through the aid of border programme as approved at the 8<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU, held in Addis Ababa in January 2007, encouraging the Commission to pursue its efforts at structural prevention of conflicts, especially through the implementation of the Border Programme.

### **3.3.1 Objectives of the African Union Border Program (AUBP)**

The AUBP is to ensure that borders are delineated where non-existing, and yet seriously pursue economic reforms and cooperation that will encourage unity, develop cross-border system at both national and regional levels, equip personnel to manage borders, encourage regional funding of border efforts, foster cooperation on cross-border agreements, recognise AUBP and its functions,

join forces with other stakeholders and rising to issues (see *Delimitation and Demarcation of Boundaries in Africa: General Issues and Case Studies 2013*). The Committee equally recognized the daunting challenge of transnational criminal activities across African borders and realised the need to tackle it.

In the light of the above, the Committee stressed the need to put in place a new form of pragmatic border management aimed at promoting peace, security and stability, and also to facilitate integration process and sustainable development in Africa.

To implement this laudable programme therefore, the committee advanced its implementation process and how each task should be carried out by each stakeholder at the national, regional and continental levels, to be determined on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity.

A. Border delimitation and demarcation

For delineation purposes, the states should take responsibility for the process especially in areas where they are non-existent within a set time by the Solemn Declaration on the CSSDCA, the RECs should provide needed resources and expertise while the AU takes up the full inventory of African states boundaries and inform the international communities to make the colonial masters release necessary information in their possession regarding the delineation of African borders.

B. Local cross-border cooperation.

The local cross-border stakeholder should work in concert with the states, the RECs that has responsibility to ensure functionality of regional support programmes, provide legal works to ensure cross-border cooperation as well as raises funds at regional level. The major international initiatives should subsume cross-border cooperation through AU Commission and would also encourage information dissemination and expected practices among RECs.

C. Capacity building

In the aspect of capacity building, identification of African and international institutions offering training in this regard and explore collaboration through a design of training programme on border management. This draft was submitted to the Union for further consideration and implementation. Since then several measures have been taken including the setting up of a unit in the Department of Peace and Security (PSD) to implement the AUBP and conduct regional workshops to promote it. In March 2010, the forum of Ministers in charge of border issues in Africa advised the AU Commission to accelerate the implementation of the AUBP after acknowledging its achievements

and challenges faced since its launch in 2007. Some of the achievements include: approval by its African ministers of a declaration on AUBD on 7 June 2007, endorsement of its implementation strategies at the 11<sup>th</sup> session of AU Executive Council on 27<sup>th</sup> June 2007, establishment of a special unit to implement the programme on conflicts and security, articulation and systematic sensitization of the AUBP at state and REC levels, questionnaire on Africa's borders survey launch, establishment of a data bank on boundaries information (BIS), partnering with German Technical Corporation (GTZ) and other specialized institutions, GTZ support for delineation, symposium organized with the Republic of Mozambique in December 2008, publications of books on AUBP, organizing the first ever maritime boundaries conference in Ghana 9-10 November 2009 and drafting of a convention for cross-border cooperation.

In 2012, the Council of Ministers met to review what had been done, the challenges and way forward as regards the implementation of the AUBP. It was indicated in the Report the giant strides that have been made in the face of some challenges such as: inadequate responses to questionnaire sent to member states, only 35 percent of African borders are delineated contrary to CSSDCA's expectation, existing border disputes, lethargy on cross-border cooperation and inappropriate ratio between human and technical/ financial resources. The Committee recognized a potential security challenge with the crisis in the Sahelo-Saharan region and that states should take control of their territories for the purposes of trade and human movements, especially the landlocked territories.

However, in the face of the enumerated challenges, the Committee reaffirmed the need and its commitment to making renewed and consistent efforts to ensure an effective implementation process of the different components of AUBP. This commitment led to the creation of a holistic strategy known as Integrated Border Management (IBM). It is an approach meant to coordinate the implementation of the AUBP in a holistic manner.

### **3.3.2 Delimitation, Demarcation and Reaffirmation of Boundaries**

Deadline of 2017 was set by the Assembly of the Union in 2011 but the Council of Ministers decided on collection of all data for Africa's border survey latest in 2012. There was also the issue of annual progress report to be sent in by each member state as well as delineation of boundaries where that had not been done, using all available legal, financial, institutional measures to ensure

compliance with the 2017 deadline set. For the AUBP to thrive, it is therefore necessary for Member States having border issues to nip them in the bud through the AU intervention. Another element of great importance raised by the Council was the speedy completion of the Guide been prepared on good practices in the delimitation and demarcation of boundaries.

### **3.3.3 Cross-Border Cooperation**

For the purpose of attaining the AUBP's strategic objective, it was further agreed that the AU Convention be adopted by member states who would accede to this Convention and ensure its rapid enforcement by the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Both the AU Commission and the RECs should collaborate to encourage and support local initiative on cross-border cooperation against terrorism and crime, illegal fishing, piracy etc. through information sharing, intelligence by ACSRT. Of grave concern is the reduction in the time of transit and removal of tariff barriers to ease movement of goods and persons. The issues of joint management of trans-boundary resources should be looked into.

### **3.3.4 Capacity Building**

Some priorities have been set to meet the crucial issue of capacity building by the Council of Ministers. For instance, taking inventory of experts, research and training institutions on the continent dealing with border issues, ensuring networking of existing institutions, within and without Africa, development of curricula and training programmes on border issues, the establishment National Boundary Commission by the Member States that are yet to do so, and the organization of training workshops for African border institutions in Africa. This requires international partners, particularly the German Government through the GiZ, the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN) and other bilateral and multilateral partner to provide the necessary resources while the adoption by the Commission should adopt a more integrated approach, given the multifaceted nature of the AUBP.

### **3.3.5 Achievement of the African Union Border Programme (AUBP)**

Barkindo (2008) points out that a major problem the African Union faces does not lie in her inability to fashion out relevant Treaties and Agreements but in the member-states having and

expressing the political will towards implementing such policies. Nevertheless, AUBP has been successful to an extent, as some of the objectives have been achieved thus far while the implementation process is still ongoing. Some of the identifiable achievements which stand remarkable are the adoption of the first declaration on the AUBP by African Ministers in charge of Border Issues on 7<sup>th</sup> June 2007, the endorsement of the Declaration and its Implementation Modalities at the 11<sup>th</sup> Session of the AU Executive Council on 27<sup>th</sup> June 2007, the second Declaration on the African Union Border Programme and the Modalities for the Pursuit and Acceleration of its Implementation by the African Ministers in Charge of Border Issues in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 25<sup>th</sup> March 2010, the third Declaration on the African Union Border Programme and its Status of Implementation by the African Ministers in Charge of Border Issues in Niamey, Niger, on 17<sup>th</sup> May 2012. Again, the AUBP has provided the necessary technical and financial assistance, for crucial equipment and training, among others, for countries implementing the declaration. Of note is the establishment of the African Union Boundary Information System (AUBIS) which is the database that is involved with systematic sensitization at RECs- and Member State levels.

Through the continent-wide survey of African borders by means of questionnaire to all Member States, it has simultaneously completed the demarcation of the remaining 413km of the Burkina Faso-Mali border, the delimitation of the maritime boundary between the Comoros, Seychelles and Tanzania, the reaffirmation exercises between Mozambique and Zambia (330km), Mozambique-Tanzania, Malawi-Mozambique and Mali-Senegal.

Another landmark achievement of the AUBP is the establishment of partnerships and collaborations. The programme has established partnership with development actors, such as the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany especially through the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, multilateral organizations, like the the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the Organization of American States (OAS), etc, and has secured direct GIZ support for some Member States' efforts in this regard. Other than this, the body organized a Pan-African Conference on Maritime Boundaries and the Continental Shelf in Accra, Ghana, November 2009, while also institutionalizing 7<sup>th</sup> June as the annual African Border Day. For the purpose of reference, records and legality, AUBP book series are being published to

give practical guides. Moreover, the implementation of cross-border infrastructure projects, creation and operation of boundary commissions, border disputes' settlement, a collection of all AU documents on resolutions and declarations issued between 1963 and 2012 on African borders are all pointers to the fact that much is achieved (Diarrah 2013).

### **3.4 African Union's Protocol on free movement of persons, goods, services and the African passport**

Contemporary insecure cross-border realities in Africa constitute a hindrance for business, tourism and education to thrive. It has been observed that Africans can only get a visa on arrival in 25 per cent of other African countries, while North Americans, for example, enjoys easier travel access on the continent than Africans themselves (African Development Bank 2016). In a bid to Pan-Africanism, African Renaissance and actualization of Agenda 2063, African leaders proposed making the continent "seamless borders" that encourage the use of a single passport leading to an abolition of visa for Africans visiting African countries by 2018. This would also facilitate free trade engagement across the continent by 2017 (Henderson, 2016). This led to the ratification of the AU Protocol on Free Movement and the African Continental Free Trade Agreement in March 2018.

The Agenda 2063 is built upon past and current initiatives of the African Union such as the Lagos Plan of Action, the Abuja Treaty, the Minimum Integration Programme, the Programme for Infrastructural Development in Africa (PIDA), the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP), the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), and other regional and national plans and Programmes (The African Union, 2015). This call was initially made at the AU Summit held in Johannesburg, South Africa, in 2015, where the African Heads of State and government officials displayed commitment to a number of actions to 'accelerate mobility and integration on the continent' which include the acceleration of the implementation process of the visa-free entry and visas on arrival for Africans by 2018 and African passport (Louw-Vangran, 2015).

This idea of the African Union is modelled after the controversial EU Schengen's free movement agreement, which has led to the creation of a single external border while abolishing many internal

borders to enable visa-free movement across the region by citizens (Louw-Vaudran, 2015). The free movement of people across border is a priority that will bring trade gains and make for economic growth (*Africa Regional Integration Index Report 2016*). This will in the long run foster intra-Africa trade, integration and socio-economic development. To this end, Decision EX.CL/Dec.908 (XXVIII) was adopted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in January 2016 mandating the Commission to develop the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons in Africa, as intended in the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the 1991 Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty), which will also lead to the launching of the African Passport. This protocol came to fruition at the AU summit in Kigali, Rwanda, in July 2016 where the decision on the free movement of persons and on the African passport was passed. The summit in Kigali also charged all member states to support and adopt the African passport and to work closely with the AU Commission to facilitate the process (Xinhua, 2017).

As a follow up on the protocol, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU-PSC) met on 25<sup>th</sup> of February 2017 and called for necessary measures to promote this ideal. The Council reiterated the importance of free movement of people, goods and services in Africa majorly for the facilitation of Africa's regional and continental integration (ibid). Owing from this move, the AU-PSC meeting held on the 26<sup>th</sup> February, and presided over by Louise Mushikiwabo, Rwanda's foreign minister, deliberated and passed decisions on free movement of people and goods and its implications for peace and security in Africa. Reacting to this move by the AU, Liewerscheidt Malte noted that the e-Passport initiative is a welcome development that could help to re-inject some momentum into the regional integration process which is long overdue (Xinhua, 2017).

### **3.5 The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons**

The Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) came into being on 28<sup>th</sup> May 1975 when the treaty establishing it was signed in Lagos, Nigeria, among Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Adepoju (2004) affirms that the quest for the establishment of a sub-regional organization by West African states was born out of the tremendous experiences garnered from other regional groups.



Article 27 of the Treaty affirms a long-term objective to establish a community citizenship that could be acquired automatically by all Member States' nationals, i.e. a borderless West Africa (Adepoju, 2005). Thus, the ECOWAS treaty was described in London as “one of the most ambitious projects of its kind in the world (The Times, 1975)” and in West Africa as by far the most momentous and far-reaching economic treaty (Daily Times, 1975). A key objective of the preamble to the treaty is to remove obstacles to the free movement of goods, capital and people in the sub-region with the aim of promoting co-operation in economic activities for closer relations among its members. This objective is aptly and succinctly captured in the words of Okom and Idoaka (2012):

*In 1975, 15 West African States<sup>12</sup>, conscious of the overriding need to accelerate, faster and encourage the economic and social development of their states in order to improve the living standards of their peoples; convinced that the promotion of harmonious economic development of their states calls for effective economic cooperation largely through a determined and concerted policy of self-reliance; recognizing that progress towards sub-regional economic integration requires an assessment of the economic potential and interests of each state decided to create an Economic Community of West African States which they signed on 28th May 1975 in Lagos, Nigeria (Okom & Udoaka, 2012).*

Owing from this therefore, the Commission enacted The Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Goods and Capital and the Rights of Residence and Establishment in 1979. This protocol is premised on three major provisions of the treaty establishing the ECOWAS of which subparagraph (d) of paragraph 2 of Article 2 calls on Member States to ensure by stages the abolition of the obstacles to free movement of persons, services and capital, while paragraph 1 of Article 27 of the confers the status of Community citizenship on the citizens of Member States, and also enjoins Member States to abolish all obstacles to freedom of movement and residence within the Community. In the same treaty, paragraph 2 of Article 27 of further calls on Member States to

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<sup>12</sup>The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissan, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra-Leone, togo and Upper-Volta.

exempt Community citizens from holding visitor's visa and residence permits and allow them to work and undertake commercial and industrial activities within their territories.<sup>13</sup>

The Protocol thus stipulates that the Community citizens have the right to enter, reside and establish in the territory of Member States, and that the right of entry, residence and establishment referred to in paragraph 1 above shall be progressively established in the course of a maximum transitional period of fifteen (15) years. Another important provision of the Protocol is that the right of entry, residence and establishment which shall be established in the course of a transitional period shall be accomplished in three phases, namely: Right of Entry and Abolition of Visa, Right of Residence, and Right of Establishment. Removing all obstacles to free movement is the only way a borderless region could be realized. The ECOWAS Community envisioned the change of the Union into one “massive borderless region, an ECOWAS of peoples, not countries (Daily Times, online, mar 15, 2008 p.1)”. This was reiterated by the ECOWAS Commissioner for Trade, when it was said that “The ECOWAS Commission... has developed a vision to have an ECOWAS of peoples and a borderless region...” (Daramy 2008).

### **3.5.1 Operationalization and Implementation of the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Goods, and Services**

Adepoju, (2001) opined that the Free Movement of Persons Protocol, the first to be ratified and operationalized in West Africa ushered in an era in which the free movement of ECOWAS citizens within member countries was once again possible. This was a remarkable stride made by the Commission. According to Abdoulahi (2005) for the movement of persons to be guaranteed, restrictions on the entry of private or commercial vehicles in member states were to be removed upon possession of valid driving license, Matriculation Certificate (Ownership Card) or Log Book, Insurance Policy and International customs documents recognized within the Community. Again, a private vehicle can remain in another member state for up to 90 days, while commercial vehicles are restricted to 15 days (within which it is not allowed to engage in business) and are both renewable upon expiration of the permit (Onwuka, 1982). To further facilitate movement of

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<sup>13</sup> Protocol A/P.1/5/79 Relating to Free Movement Of Persons, Residence And Establishment.

people, ECOWAS has issued 'brown card' insurance scheme for inter-state road transport for faster and effective movement of persons, goods and services (Abdoulahi, 2005).

The delayed second phase (Right of Residence) of the Protocol came into force in July 1986, when all Member States ratified it, but up till 2007, the Right of Establishment had not yet been implemented (Adepoju et al, 2007) and nothing in scholarship and practice proves any different to date.

In response to the challenges inherent in promoting and supporting such an approach, the ECOWAS 30th Ordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, held in Abuja in June 2006, mandated the Executive Secretariat to take the initiative in defining an ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration. This was adopted in January 2008 at the 33<sup>rd</sup> Summit of Heads of State and Government in Ouagadougou, with a focus on the following: promoting free movement within the ECOWAS zone; promoting the management of regular migration; policy harmonization; controlling irregular migration and human trafficking, particularly of women and children; protecting the rights of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, taking into account the gender and migration dynamics dimension. The primary objective of the 'Common Approach' is to improve the management of migration through the development of a harmonized system and a comprehensive, balanced approach as a basis upon which member states would develop, strengthen, implement and coordinate migration policies and programmes in cooperation and partnership with the international community (ECOWAS 2003; 2008). There is however a general lack of information on the framework document at national level, even among national officials.

Again, in March 2000, the heads of state and government met in Abuja to fashion out renewed efforts to create a borderless ECOWAS territory after being bothered about the lethargy in implementation. A decision was made on enhancing regional infrastructure to promote economic integration. In achieving this, an economic feasibility study was to be commissioned within six months for the construction of two rail networks namely, a coastal route from Lagos to Cotonou, Lomé and Accra, and a second Sahelian route linking Lagos to Niamey and Ouagadougou. This decision was a response to the poorly maintained communication and transportation facilities hindering cross-border trade, economic activities and movements of persons (Adepoju, 2007; ECOWAS 2000a). Other issues to foster economic integration were discussed. They include the

establishment of a free trade zone and private sector involvement; compliance with the principle of 90 days free entry, and free movement of persons; the removal of all checkpoints on international highways within ECOWAS states; the policing of the diverse border posts solely by essential agents (customs and immigration officials); and the abolition of rigid border bureaucracies, alongside the upgrading of border procedures through the use of passport-scanning machines (ECOWAS, 2000b).

To implement the outcome of the meeting, it was decided that border patrols would be constructed by the neighbouring countries of Niger, Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Burkina Faso and Mali, to monitor and guard each nation for an improved relationship between the police and other internal security agents on the information sharing and on staff training. In the same vein, the need for the effective use of ECOWAS travel certificates, the introduction of ECOWAS Brown Card travel certificates and a multi-country Schengen-type visa, and the adoption of a single ECOWAS passport were deliberated on. Compulsory residency permits were to be stopped, and immigration officials would grant ECOWAS citizens the maximum 90-day period of stay at entry points with effect from 15 April 2000. Member States are still expected to ratify the extradition convention that was signed in Abuja in August 1994, but which has remained largely in the archives (ECOWAS, 2003).

### **3.5.2 Challenges militating against the successful implementation of the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Goods and Services**

The implementation process of the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons has slowed down as a result of the daunting challenges which impede the successful implementation of the protocol through the various stages of the process. The cause of this can be traced to what border symbolizes to some states. Some see the border region as an open area which allows for peaceful interchange while it is a closed area which stimulates tension and conflicts to some (Barkindo, 2008). As observed by Asiwaju (1992), borders are seen by operators of the machine of state in Africa and areas once under colonial dominance as perpetual area that generate conflict. Such conflicts emanate through the adherence of the African elite to the notion of state-centric mentality which makes the elite perpetually live in the euphoria of independence and are all out to defend and

safeguard their hard-won national sovereignty which can be realized by protecting and securing the borders to guarantee the defense and security of the state (Barkindo, 2008).

Dina (2014, p. 37) opines that, “the West African borders are that of chaos, denial of rights to move freely, humiliation of country citizens, myriad road blocks, shameful extortions and lack of political will to pursue the implementation process by Member States”. This was and is still the plight of African borders. These borders are used for clandestine purposes. It was observed that as many member states harbor and accommodated illegal labour migrants without much stress, but the economic downturn yielded chronic unemployment among nationals the illegal immigrants became targets for reprisals through expulsion (Ojo, 1999). Adepaju (2005) also agreed with Ojo’s submission but goes further to include political instability. Foreigners get the blame when governments face worrisome economic and political problems and they become victims of hostility of the local population for whatever economic, social and political problems being witnessed at that time. This had brought about alien must go orders as in Nigeria (1983 and 1985); Ghana in (1969); Cote d’Ivoire (1999); Senegal (1990); Liberia (1983) and Benin (1998).

Economic recession in most West African states stalled the implementation of the proposal on free movement. Nigeria which was a strong advocate and was enjoying oil boom suffered economic downturn which took its toll on her neighbours, once oil boom rescinded and hence in 1985, she broke the Articles of faith. 4 and 27 by expelling between 0.9 and 1.3 million undocumented migrants, mostly Ghanaians (Adepaju, 2009). The last straw was the expulsion of about 200,000 undocumented migrants, which shook the community at large to its foundation.

This phenomenon of expulsion of foreigners was also witnessed in Ghana as many community citizens were expelled out of Ghana, Nigerians being the majority as there were a lot of Nigerians in Ghana at that time. The expulsion of Nigerians from Ghana was majorly due to the fact that there has been an emerging general perception of foreigners as the cause of ‘large-scale unemployment that had befallen Ghana’ (Aremu and Ajayi 2014). Ab initio, the composition of the aliens in Ghana was from other West African states such as Togo, Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire. However, by 1931, the Nigerian population was highest as more Nigerians were invited in by settled Nigerians due to the successes recorded in different businesses that they ran.

This therefore gradually raised tensions in Ghana with the increasing entry of foreigners and the dire socio-economic conditions of Ghanaians. Peil (1974) captured the sentiments thus:

*They (Nigerians) are target workers; immediately they get a few Cedes they go into retail trade and they prosper too. They don't part with their money easily; they are unfriendly and do not help friends when they are in financial difficulty. They are impatient with buyers, arrogant and difficult to come to terms with. They are thrifty and clannish. They don't seem to trust Ghanaians and confide in them.*

The government therefore took steps which led to the mass expulsion of the Community citizens.

Again, Cote d'Ivoire, blessed with vast natural resource, had a small domestic labour force, and was able to accommodate aliens about a quarter of its waged labour force. This became possible as the country's first post-independence president ignored the "arbitrary borders" of the colonialists and encouraged influx from her poor neighbours such as Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Liberia, Senegal and Ghana who flooded the plantations illegally to do menial jobs that the indigenes detested doing. They were given the privilege to bring in their families, and allowed to marry the indigenes, settle and as well vote. At some point, there was a shift in the country's liberal immigration policy which was against foreigners who had dwelt with them for years, leading to a growing violent anti-immigrant reaction. The introduction of the concept of *ivorite*, and the denial of immigrants of some of the rights they previously enjoyed sparked displeasure and mistrust among immigrants, thereby resulting to thousands of nationals of Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea and Nigerian returning to their various countries (Adepoju 2003).

The sub-region is riddled with multiple regional economic groupings spread across different parts of West Africa. These include the Senegal River Development Organization, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, the Mano River Union and the West African Economic Community all encompassed by ECOWAS. They all differ in composition, objectives, memberships and structures. They also allowed for multiple interests in groups with conflicting objectives. To meet the financial obligations became a problem (Ojo, 1999). Adepoju (2005) agreed to this observation by Ojo. This in a way explains the inability by member states to execute the protocols (Ojo, 1999). It became obvious that member states took decisions which negate the ECOWAS Protocol of free movement.

Liberia in mid-2004, took a decision to expel aliens (those supposed to be Community citizens). She informed Embassies of ECOWAS member states (Nigeria and Ghana) to register their citizens who supported them financially and military-wise when the country was almost falling apart. Mauritania equally indicated to a pull off in 1999 which she eventually did in June 2000. Cape Verde was almost pulling out but for the attempted coup which halted the decision.

Agyei and Clottey (n.d) asserts that within the ECOWAS sub-region, due to internal crisis, many member states failed to fulfill their obligations toward the sub-regional body. Border disputes between member states also took their toll as witnessed between Senegal and Mauritania, Ghana and Togo and culminated into expulsion of Community citizens, which is not in consonance with the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons. Liberia's civil war that started in 1989 became contagious and as such filtered into and engulfed Sierra Leone, Guinea Conakry, Guinea Bissau and Cote d'Ivoire, thus leading to mass displacement of people internally and commonly referred to as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Record has it that almost 70 per cent of Liberia's population was displaced, as thousands who fled to Sierra Leone to seek refuge were soon displaced as hostilities broke out there in March 1991. Refugees were therefore dispersed to Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire, only to be caught up in another fight which made them scatter to Mali, Ghana and Burkina Faso (United Nations, 2003).

Furthermore, most member states have ratified, or sustained a series of legislations which restrict 'foreigners', including nationals of Community states, from participating in certain kinds of economic activities which is antithesis to the spirit of ECOWAS. According to (Adepoju 2005) some anti-alien moves were made by member state such as the National Identity Card scheme which was launched in Nigeria mid-February 2003 which was to "effectively control" illegal immigrants and their inimical activities. Liberia followed suit by introducing compulsory exit visa for all residents in the country. This move was criticized as violating the fundamental right of its citizens to free movement in and out of the country. In March 1999, Ghana equally ordered all foreigners to register in order to collect identity cards. At this move, immigrants became apprehensive recalling the 1969 Alien Compliance Order that culminated in the expulsion of non-Ghanaians.

These steps were taken after the ECOWAS revised Treaty of 1992 reiterated the right of citizens of the Community to entry, residence and settlement, charging Member States to recognize and implement these rights in their respective territories. Although, (Adepoju, 2002) averred that the abolition of the compulsory residency permit and granting of the maximum 90- day period of stay to community citizens by immigration officials at point of entry took effect from April 2000 and led to the scrapping of border posts and checkpoints situated on international highways which have constituted a menace to free movement of persons and goods. Checkpoints between Nigeria and Benin were removed while border patrols were instituted by Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Togo, Ghana, Benin, and Burkina Faso to collaborate with the police to monitor and police national frontiers. In a bid to modernize border procedures, passport scanning machines were also designed to ease off the rigid border formalities and to facilitate free and easier movement of persons across borders.

ECOWAS Report (2007) says that in realizing its vision of free movement from an ECOWAS states to another through the creation of a single economic space for abode and business, the inter-state borders remain mini “iron curtains” and “narrow gates” which impedes and restricts free movement. With visa requirements removed, travelers continue to suffer harassment from customs, immigration and police. Even though, the ECOWAS Heads of State had reached an agreement in January 2007 that only two checkpoints should be maintained along common borders (Hounkpatin 2006) it was not honoured. The former President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo reacted sharply against the failure during the Lome Summit in December 2000, arguing that the region was losing out economically and politically. According to him, ‘businessmen who thought they would benefit from integration are frustrated and sometimes find it easier to transact business outside the region’ (National Concord Newspaper 2000). He stated that government officials at border posts see any foreigner crossing into their country as a victim to be harassed and exploited. In an interview conducted with a woman who had USD 2000 removed from a concealed wallet to prevent customs officials at the Seme border from stealing them. Such occurrences of illegal search and seizure of valuables are still the order of the day.

As at 2008, the Nigeria-Seme border had a lot of illegal road blocks with touts used as agents to collect illegal levies from migrants. These touts though not uniformed men were duly recognized by frequent commuters and security men who uses them for their extortion purposes. These touts



who act as fronts for the unscrupulous officers are familiar with and exploit hidden routes unknown to security operatives and constitute a very negative impediment on the free movement of community citizens (Adepoju, 2005). This phenomenon came as a shock to the media practitioners, as they were able to witness the reality on ground which is an ordeal Community citizen go through at point of entry. After over 30 years after the enactment of the Protocol on Free Movement, the situation in the borders presents a scenario that negates the provision of the Protocol. They therefore vowed to use the media to expose this anomaly and as well clamour and advocate for the speedy and full implementation of the protocol on free movement.

According to Dina (2014) one witnesses a long queue of vehicles awaiting entry permission to a Member State for several days thus slowing down economic integration, makes free movement worrisome, frustrating and very annoying experience to undergo as a result of the unnecessary formalities introduced by the corrupt officials who were out for extortion. Mohammed Ibn Chambas, the President of the ECOWAS Commission, in one of his speech alluded to this in his account:

*Whenever I speak in public, one of the first questions I get asked is the difficulty that ordinary people face when they try to move around in the region... The cross-border obstacles they face, particularly at the frontier where the processing of documents is extremely cumbersome and fraught with harassments, intimidation and oftentimes plain extortion. On the highway, you still find a lot of unauthorized checkpoints and road blocks. All of these stand in the way of free movement of persons... (and) goods (Leadership Magazine, 2009).*

In 2007, Jacob Buba at a business forum to assess ECOWAS business activities with a view to improving the process, laid blame at the doors of importers thwarting fiscal policies, import and export regulatory frameworks to which Ghanaian businessmen disagreed and laid the blame on immigration, customs and the police officers.

*In many cases, truck-loads of goods crossing the borders have to stay at the borders for long periods to go through cumbersome formalities even when documents have been provided... After long delays, trucks, passengers and vehicles at the borders*

*are usually subjected to further delays at the several police and customs posts on the routes... all these happen inspite of the numerous (ECOWAS) protocols... to facilitate free movement of goods and people (The Nations Newspaper, 2007).*

### **3.6 Conclusion**

ECOWAS and EACs have been at the fore front of encouraging free movement of persons across borders of member states through policies that encourage free entry for member states and visa on arrival for some states they have working relationships with at the sub-regional level. Since 2002, the AU is stepping in. After reviewing the benefits which they have denied themselves over the years, it is now deemed fit to encourage free movement of persons among member states through the introduction of a unified passport for member states.

Nigeria being one of the strongest proponents of this move has also been found not to be so committed to this course in terms of the implementation process. As averred by James, (1989), Nigeria being one of the moving force towards the establishment of ECOWAS violated one of the major provisions which is the abolition of visas to encourage trans-border movement of persons, goods and services. This was witnessed when Nigeria closed her borders between 24<sup>th</sup> April 1984 and 28<sup>th</sup> February 1986 without due notification given to neighboring states most especially the land-locked Republics of Chad and Niger who relied greatly on the Nigerian Costal ports for most of their importation. Plea was made by these countries, but Nigeria didn't oblige. Professor Asiwaju pointed out that the action taken by Nigeria was a far cry to what her counterparts did. Togo under the leadership of President Eyadema, erected high security wire fencing along the border with Ghana while South Africa erected electric fences and land mines along the borders with Botswana, Mozambique and Angola (Asiwaju, 1992). Barkindo, (2008) asserted that all member-states of the ECOWAS especially Nigeria, have many checkpoints fully manned by armed officers, which increase in number and intensity as the borders are been approached particularly on local market days around the border. This depicts that though they profess to be committed to this course, their actions and activities do not depict this. The nefarious activity of security operatives along the borders is a clear testimony to this point and despite the outcry from migrants the governments seems indifferent to this anomaly as they take no step to curb such.

Professor Anthony Asiwaju (2008) alluded to this as he stated that “important decisions are taken but these are often contradicted by observable action on the ground”.

Routes keep increasing as illegal migrants patronize them consistently. Great fallout from this phenomenon is the fact that the borders have been opened up to trans-border criminal activities evident in the smuggling and cross-border crimes that occur along the borders which in turn endanger and threaten the life of people (Okunade, 2017). These activities have been seen as a norm and not as an aberration. This also explains why the activities of insurgent groups most especially Boko Haram who utilizes the porous borders along Cameroun, Chad and Niger to carry out its dastardly act by taking over some border communities over the years. This phenomenon is the reality even though the government has always indicated and pledged their support towards the defense of its territory by securing the borders.

Member states need to come to a realization that approaching issues from a rigid national sovereignty standpoint has not been helpful in effectively managing and securing the borders. There is therefore the need for them to show more commitment and determination not only in the speeches they make but in the actions they take towards implementing the protocol. In other words, when member states realize the importance and the benefits member states stands to gain, this naturally boost their political will toward the implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol. This can be measured in the zeal and commitment thrown into the implementation process. Now that the AU is throwing its heavy weight on the same for a borderless Africa, it is only hoped that member states will be willing to making this dream a reality. This is because the commitment they show to this course determines the extent of success of the implementation process of the Protocol. The benefits therefore, trickle down from the regional level to the sub-regional level and to Nigeria as a state. Until this is done African borders will remain porous and instead of gradually turning them into bridges, they will perpetually remain barriers at the detriment of member states.

# **CHAPTER FOUR**

## **A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF BORDER CONSTRUCTION IN NIGERIA**

### **4.0 Introduction**

Drawing on existing literature, this chapter provides an historical overview of the border arrangements in Nigeria. Different regimes that have existed in Nigeria are reviewed to establish why and how states were created to making a total of 36 that currently exist in Nigeria. The chapter equally seeks to bring to the fore the rationale for partitioning Nigeria from its neighbours and the strategic importance of the Nigerian borders along the North-Eastern Nigeria. The essence of this discourse is not to justify the demarcation of the borders in the North-Eastern Nigeria but to provide historical insight into the different roles borders in Nigeria have played over time and which it still plays till date. Pertinent to this study is the way these borders have enhanced insurgency within the North-Eastern Nigeria.

### **4.1 The making of the Nigerian State**

Nigeria as a country located in West Africa came into existence in the 1914 and attained independence in 1960. The country's region was one of the favorite territorial areas of the British colonialist in the 19th century, who coined Nigeria's name out of the words "Niger Area" (Olusoji, et'al. 2014). According to Falola and Heaton (2008), before the birth of Nigeria in 1914, through amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates, Nigeria comprised different independent chieftains, states, kingdoms and empires. These, among others, included the Borno Empire, the Hausa States, and the Sokoto Caliphate, in the North and in the South the Igbo segmentary societies, Benin Kingdom and the Oyo Empire.

The geographical location of Nigeria on the map of West Africa shows her occupying between Latitude 4°N and 14°N and Longitudes 4°E and 15°E. Nigeria has a total land area of 923,768 square kilometres. The country is bordered by Cameroon in the east, Republic of Chad in the north east, Benin Republic in the west, and Niger to the north. Its coast lies on the Gulf of Guinea in the

south and it borders Lake Chad to the northeast. Nigeria is a country with notable geographical features, such as the Adamawa highlands, Mambilla Plateau, Jos Plateau, Obudu Plateau, the Niger River, River Benue and Niger Delta.

In the pre-colonial era, Nigeria as a region was occupied by different nations with different historical background, linguistic, cultures, religion and so on. Shaw et al. (2002) reveal that people were already living in the south-western region of Nigeria as early as 11,000 BC. Also, Falola and Heaton (2008) stressed that there is a 9000 BCE Late Stone Age evidence of indigenous habitation in Iwo Eleru rock shelter in southwestern Nigeria, as well as the Nok with their Iron technology and civilization in 600 BCE living near the present-day Abuja. In fact, the chronological account that Falola and Heaton presented showed that 1000-1500 CE registered the centralization of states in Nigeria, such as the Kanem, Borno, Benin, Ife, Oyo, and the Hausa city states.

The above identified places earlier formed the country Nigeria. But a drastic change occurred in the composition of the country during the European scramble for Africa. Sekina (2003) observed that from the Golden Age (1300), when the Europeans engaged in trans-Saharan trade (i.e. slave trade and other commodities trade such as gold, cocoa, palm oil), the Nigerian-European economic, political and social relations were dominated by slave trade, and that resulted in monumental changes in the history of the nation. Even after the abolition of slave trade in 1807 by the British, the Nigerian-British relations still reflected elements of slave trade until the annexation of Lagos, a southern region as Crown Colony in 1861. This period gave room for legitimate trade between Nigeria and Britain.

In the record of Jayeola-Omoyeni and Omoyeni (2014), the northern region of Nigeria came under the influence of Islamic revolution in 1804. The Islamic revolution or Jihad led to the establishment of Sokoto Caliphate, which expanded Islamic religion beyond its previous bound among the elites to the common people. By 1900, the British had entered into the Northern region of Nigeria, created the Northern protectorate, which was concluded in 1903, with the conquest of Sokoto Caliphate and the killing of the Sultan. According to history, the Northern region was easier for the British colonialists to penetrate compared to the west-eastern region. Crowder (1964) explains that the presence of traditionally installed rulers or chiefs in the north aided the British rule so well.

Northern people were already used to taking orders from their Emirs whom the British employed in ruling the people indirectly, and therefore prevented any form of resistance to tax system.

Nigeria became fully placed under the British government control in 1914, when it was amalgamated by Sir Frederick Lord Lugard. Due to Lugard's influence on Nigeria, some scholars regard him as the founding father, but some others think it was Herbert Macaulay, the father of nationalism, who with some journalists used newspapers in 1908 to report and critique the performance of the colonial government (Falola and Heaton, 2008). After Lord Lugard rule in Nigeria were other five eminent colonial masters before independence in 1960. These rulers include Sir Hugh Clifford (1919 – 1925), Sir Arthur Richards (1943 – 1948), Sir John McPherson (1948 – 1954), and Sir James Robertson (1954 – 1960). All these British rulers operated with a writing constitution. The first of it came after Lagos became a Crown Colony, when the British Colonial Constitution was introduced with a Legislative Council comprising a Chief Justice, a Colonial Secretary and a senior military officer to command imperial forces (Olusanya: 1980, p. 518).

Another way of referring to British system of government in Nigeria is its indirect control of all the regions or territories of the country. Gale (2007) observes that the chief characteristic of British rule in Nigeria was its system of local administration, known as indirect rule; a system of centralized political units with local (or native) chiefs at the lowest rungs of the hierarchy. According to him, the system functioned well in the North, with variable success in the West, and poorly in the East. The failure of the British indirect rule in the East has been accounted to the absence of paramount chiefs among the Ibo, Ibibio, and other ethnic groups who made up the Eastern province of those days (Afigbo, 1956). The units of Igbo society in Eastern Nigeria were too small to shoulder indirect rule, and again they already had a local system of governance.

By the end of World War II in 1945, the British rule in Nigeria had begun to face pressure from the campaign for independence, just as witnessed in countries under colonial rule, namely Kenya, Ghana, South Africa, Tanzania, Senegal, etc. The pressure that was put on the British government drew on the provision of Atlantic Charter of February 12<sup>th</sup>, 1941 where United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Minister Winston Churchill agreed on the autonomy of imperial colonies. To a great extent, Gale (2007) shows that the pressure on Britain later called for the

constitutional conference of May and June 1957, which demanded immediate self-government for the Eastern and Western regions, and the Northern to follow in 1959. Nigeria would have gotten her liberation as early as mid-nineteen fifties but for a technical delay by the British government.

Eventually, Nigeria's independence came on October 1, 1960. And as a self-governing state, with three regions, namely Western, Eastern and Northern region, Nigeria was administered from the center by Nnamdi Azikiwe who the Governor and Abubakar Tafawa Balewa who was the Prime Minister. However, Nigeria became a Federal Republic in 1963. During that period, the Midwest Region was carved out of the Western Region, making Nigeria a federation of four Regions. However, the First Republic which entertained a parliamentary system of government came to an end in January 1966, due to a coup which lasted till 1970 (Falola and Heaton, 2008). Evidently, the 1966 coup had a real influence on the making of Nigeria. This will be adequately substantiated in the succeeding section.

Having achieved independence, Nigeria as a West African country became a major influence in sustaining the outcome of the nationalist project against colonization; western power and colonial policies. It has been widely written how colonial policies depressed African economy and political structure. Olusegun and David (2012) specifically observe that economic policies in the colonies were geared toward the benefit and interest of the colonizing powers. However, immediately after independence, Nigeria with her population size, economic, political and military strength made the move to reverse colonial policies resulting to economic depression. First, Nigeria with other West African countries brought about the regional organization known as ECOWAS in 1975. According to International Democracy Watch, ECOWAS' aim was to achieve collective self-sufficiency for the member states by means of economic and monetary union creating a single, large trading bloc.

It holds therefore that Nigeria is not just a West Africa state by geographical location, but by the role that she is playing in the region. Bach (1978) averred that the Nigeria's foreign policy among other West African states has been basically directed towards the integration of African countries. There are 18 countries that make up the West African countries, namely Nigeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, the island nation of Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, the island of Saint Helena, Senegal, Sierra Leone, São Tomé and Príncipe and

Togo. However, the member States of ECOWAS exclude Mauritania, the island of Helena, São Tomé and Príncipe. Figure 3.1 shows West African countries on the map of Africa.

**Figure 4. 1 Map of Africa showing Nigeria’s size and location among other West African Countries**



Source: mapsofworld.com

The map above provides a vivid understanding on the existence of Nigeria, the position or area she’s occupying on the African landscape, which however made the Europeans especially the French and British colonialists interested in the region, even as they thrived greatly in terms of economic activities. It also helps to know why Nigeria is very much concerned about the



cooperation and integration of West African states. Historical analysis of economic benefits from the Niger River Basin, Gulf of Guinea and Lake Chad region by (Mabogunje, 2009; Omede 2006 and Andersen et al., 2005), explains how Nigeria was particularly a contested region between France and Britain. Nigeria till date is still benefiting from the huge natural resources that her region is endowed with, which include relatively good weather, agricultural and mineral gift. Since it is not all states in West Africa or African region that is blessed with enormous resource, it becomes dutiful for Nigeria to extend brotherly hands to other countries.

A remarkable feature of Nigeria as a federation is her willingness to assist other countries in Africa with her enormous resources, so that they can achieve adequate development through trade, socio-cultural, political and economic relations, and even peacekeeping missions, should there be any instability. Azkagu (2015) and Olawale (2015) lay emphasis on Nigeria's contribution in establishing ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), including its peacekeeping operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Rwanda. Olawale (2015) mentions that Nigeria, with all its attributes of natural resources and size, is equally and naturally expected to take the lead in the peace process of her geo-political zone. It was also observed that Nigeria had the highest number of soldiers (over 10,000) during the Liberia Peacekeeping mission, with a financial contribution of 8 billion dollars (Olawale, 2015). The role and performance of Nigeria in peacekeeping in West Africa, Africa and the world at large has made her to be regarded as a superpower at least in West Africa.

The above explains why Nigeria occupies a position in West Africa that makes her a subject of concern since the outbreak of the Boko Haram Insurgency. Apart from the humanitarian crisis that Nigeria's insurgency has affected her neighbours with, there is certainly the threat of insurgency leading to the division of the country. Forest (2012) observes that Boko Haram members are drawn primarily from the Kanuri ethnic group (roughly 4% population who are concentrated in the northeastern Nigeria, such as Bauchi and Borno), and Hausa and Fulani (29% population spread throughout the northern states), while other members came from Niger, Cameroon and Chad. Examining the area that the Boko Haram concentrates its attacks on, it is clear that the terrorist group desires a nation-state of its own. Apine (2014) avers that Boko Haram's form of terror against Nigeria undermines the very foundation of a nation-state.

## **4.2 The politics of state formation in Nigeria**

Nigeria is today a country with a total number of 36 states, and six geopolitical zones, namely South-West, North-Central, North-East, North-West, South-East and South-South. Nigeria is also a country with about 374 diverse ethnic groups, the three major of which are the Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo (Salawu et al., 2011). There are also over 400 languages spoken in Nigeria from the over 1000-2500 languages spoken in Africa depending on different estimates (Ayatse et al., 2013 and UNESCO, 2010). Nigeria is again the most populous Black Country in the world (Okadigbo, 1989), which according to National Population Commission (NPC) is currently inhabited by 182 million people. Also, going by the 2015 World Bank account on countries GDP, Nigeria is the 23<sup>th</sup> richest country of the 195 countries that are presently in the world.

As commonly held, Nigeria is the giant of Africa, a continent that is so blessed with numerous natural resources and serves as a resource extraction site for most parts of the world. This description of Africa also exposes why Nigeria is a favorite destination for most countries of the world, in terms of economic, political, military and socio-cultural relations. For most countries of the world, Nigeria's crude oil is one of the best, which explains why over a long time, the country's major oil exporters have been the US, China, India etc. Of course, Nigeria is rich in oil and other mineral resources which include tin and columbite, coal, iron ore and limestone (Chinago et al., 2015). In a sense, it can be said that discussing Nigeria without making reference to her natural endowment in human, mineral and capital resources would be tantamount to embarking on an incomplete task.

Considering the physical and socio-cultural features that make up any human society, Nigeria is a heterogeneous state where diverse ethnic groups live together as one people. The reality that Nigeria is a territory with multi-ethnic people must have played a huge role in the country's adoption of a Federal System. It is believed that any country with diverse ethnic and linguistic composition as Nigeria needs a federal system. Scholars such as Dickson (2016), Babalola (2015), Sagay (2008), Wheare (1964) and Tamuno (1998) stress that federalism allows power sharing among the central and regional governments such that each of the entities can operate independently. However, concentrating power on the central alone in Nigeria against true federal system has continually raised arguments on the devolution of power. Really, until the federal unit

allows the decentralization of power among its states and local councils, Nigeria may never achieve reasonable development, nor be counted among countries that practice true federalism.

As earlier mentioned, Nigeria was first governed at independence through parliamentary system which was mainly administered by a regional government in the West, North and East. The regional government registered three main governing parties which included National Congress of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) in the Eastern region, headed by Nnamdi Azikiwe, Action Congress (AC) in the Western region, headed by Obafemi Awolowo, and National People's Congress (NPC) in the Northern region, headed by Ahmadu Bello. Lergo (2011) reveals that the three parties dominated their regions and sought to control Nigeria at a federal or national level. In essence, these three-party leaders controlled the affairs of Nigeria throughout the First Republic. But it was unfortunate that their regime was plagued by antagonistic regionalism, ethnicity, declined revenues, and bitter power struggle which led to the first coup in 1966 (Oluwole, 2014).

Going by the issues that caused the coup which resulted into a civil war in 1967, it became wise to adopt the colonial system of divide and rule in fragmenting the different regions of Nigeria into divisional units called states. Twelve states were first created by Yakubu Gowon who became the Head of State in 1966. His action was mainly to respond to the regional minority and majority ethnic rivalry, including a national political power struggle. As Lergo (2011) points out, the creation of 12 states in 1967, 21 states in 1987, 30 states in 1992, and 36 states in 1996, made the power structure of the country to change, particularly as minority ethnic groups started having influence in the power equation of the country, unlike what was the case during the regional government period. To date, ethnics such as the Ijaw, Urhobos, Junkuns Itsekiri, Biroms, Tiv, Ibibios, Efiks etc., are treated as minority among the three major ethnic groups of Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba in Nigeria (Rose et al., 2014 and Sagay, 2008).

The formation of Nigerian states can be said to have been influenced mainly by ethnic and political consciousness or ideologies. Oluwole (2014) explains that ethnicity and ethnic nationalism are critical to state-making as both generate solidarity and garner popular participation of people in politics, yet, ethnicity, by its adversarial nature, is contraindicated to the concept of nation-building. This claim is true of Nigeria, as there are 36 states already, yet the country is still divided along ethnic and political lines without a reasonable advancement or human development. The

condition of Nigeria presently brings to mind the argument that state creation brings about physical growth at the grassroots but there are doubts if it could transform the economy of states (Adetoye, 2016).

The total numbers of states that are found in Nigeria today were created by the military governments. In order to respond to unrests from ethnic agitation, religious, political or elite crisis witnessed during the First Republic, the Second and the Third Republics, the military Heads of State at different points deployed states creation as a mechanism for appeasement or conflict resolution. Citing Suberu (1999), Rose et al., 2014 reveal that

*With the counter coup of July of 1966, in particular, the reins of power fell directly into the hands of Yakubu Gowon, an officer from the Angas tribe, an ethnic minority in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria. Gowon's decision to divide the country into 12 States in May 1967 dramatically altered the configuration of the federal structure and the nature of majority-minority relations (Rose et al., 2014).*

However, the above quotation is not to say that what Gowon did was right or wrong, it is just to show that state creation in Nigeria was mainly influenced by ethnic compositions. In fact, the below quotation from Rose's study would further prove ethnic influence on state creation in Nigeria. In her view,

*By giving relative satisfaction to the long-standing ethnic minority demands for new States, Gowon's 12 State structure not only overturned the structural hegemony of the North, but also liberated many minority communities from the regional stranglehold of the majority groups and undermined local ethnic minority support for the secessionist bid of the Eastern region (Rose et al., 2014).*

The following were the states created in Nigeria after conceivable and open ethnic or political agitations for self-control, in particular the Eastern region cessation campaign in 1967: North-Western State (covering Sokoto and Niger Province), North-Central state (comprising Katsina and Zaria), Kano State, North-Eastern State (comprising Bornu, Adamawa, Saruana and Bauchi Provinces), Benue-Plateau State, Kwara State, Western State, Lagos State (Comprising of the Colony Province and the Federal Territory of Lagos), Mid-western State (covers the present Mid-

Western State), East-Central State (comprising of present Eastern region except Calabar, Ogoja and River Provinces), South Eastern State (comprising of Calabar and Ogoja Provinces), and Rivers State (comprising of Ahoada, Brass, Degema, Ogoni and Port Harcourt Divisions) (Babalola, 2016).

The military regime of Gowon (1966-1975), Murtala Mohammed (1975-1976) Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993) and Sani Abacha (1993-1998) were particularly characterized by state creation. In other words, no civilian regime in Nigeria created a single state, and this was largely due to the over sensitive nature of the ethnic diversity and political rivalry of the nation which civilian heads of state and government found more convenient to cope with, compared with their military counterparts. So, the military regime of Gowon created 12 states, Murtala created 7 states, Babangida who relocated the capital of Nigeria from Lagos to Abuja in 1991 created 11 and Sani Abacha created 6, making the states in Nigeria a total of 36 with a Federal capital territory.

Obviously, the long run effect of state creation in Nigeria continues to date as agitations for creation of more states by minority ethnics are yet to cease, and sometimes boundary dispute is a common hitch from state creation, especially if deposits of valuable resources are perceived to be available or discovered around or between the boundaries of the old and new states. The boundary cases of Kogi and Benue, Akwa-Ibom and Cross River State are good examples. Border dispute among states is a common type of conflict after ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria. However grievous as the ideology and negative effect of state creation may be in Nigeria, there is the claim that state creation has helped in strengthening the Nigerian federation, ensuring Nigerian unity and building the nation (Yongo, 2015).

Executing the project of building a nation, that is a federal state, cannot but rest totally on constitution. Most military regimes in Nigeria failed to consider the constitution while ruling the state. Abacha regime was seriously guilty of this. Throughout his regime, Nigeria was regarded as a totalitarian state because he employed dictatorship style of governance. Until his death in 1998, the country suffered a blow of bad judicial processes and rule of law. It was until Obasanjo was elected and sworn-in in 1999 as a democratic president of the country that the constitution became functional and effective, as power was centralized at the federal level among the legislature, the judiciary and the executive, while the governors and local chairpersons exercised control at the

state and local levels respectively. Below is a map of Nigeria showing its states, borders and neighbouring countries.

**Figure 4. 2 Map of Nigeria showing the 36 States and the Federal Capital Territory**



Source: The United Nations Cartography Department: <http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/nigeria.pdf>

By and large, the formation of Nigeria and her divisional entities called states is the working of the colonialists, Nigerian nationalists and military heads of state that have governed the country at one point or the other. Lately, in 2015 the construction of the country along ethnic, religious and political lines became more open, as political parties mainly the PDP and APC struggled for power at the central stage. These parties played the old card of using ethnic and religious criteria in determining elections outcomes in Nigeria. From the selection of candidates, party campaigns and

voting, political parties hit up the polity and created ethnic and religious divisions among the citizens.

In relation to the above caption, Abubakar (2016) and Nyuykonge et al. (2015) record how it was a general conception that it was for the intervention of international communities, cooperation among the elite that the sitting President, Goodluck Jonathan after losing election encouraged peace by relinquishing power to the elected President, General Buhari (an act that was never recorded in Nigeria's history that a sitting president lost an election), Such intervention saw that Nigeria was not plunged into a political war or another cycle of military coup. If records of post-election violence in Nigeria since the start of the Fourth Republic were to be considered, a possible refusal of President Goodluck Jonathan to accept defeat would have fomented the greatest post-election disaster that could ever be imagined in Nigeria.

Nevertheless, Nigeria is a state of several nations that were fused together by the British colonial lords just for economic gain (Umejesi, 2012). This statement reflects why it was the annexation of territories and resources, unlike the slave system, that dominated post-colonial rule in Africa. Consequently, Nigeria as a reality of colonial rule in Africa has continued to struggle internally and externally in sustaining her territory, people and policies that the British government bequeathed to her. Among the challenges that Nigeria is confronted with today is nationhood and nation-building. The crises of nationhood and Nigeria's perennial quest for constructing a national identity among its citizens have effectively been hampered by strong divisions among its citizens (Akinola, 2012). However, this challenge is one created out of the ethnic groups acting only for their members' interests and courses against national interest, if ever there were any.

### **4.3 Factors responsible for the erection of borderlines between Nigeria and its neighbouring states**

A state power and sovereignty during the colonial era was determined by absolute control over territory which includes an expanse of land, water and air space (Rizmal, 2013 and Matz, 2005). Referring to a state in time past was based on territorial control maxim, it is not different from what it is today, even as countries strive to indicate or exercise control over their territory by measure of land, water and air space. Nigeria among other countries of the world is today

enmeshed in the struggle of determining her territorial boundaries, due to claims and counter-claims of ownership from neighbouring countries over the same areas that either country had once exercised authority over. For instance, boundary dispute has at one time or the other pitted Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Chad and Benin Republic against one another, such that today, the individual countries are seeking a resolution through border construction in order to protect their control of territories.

It can be asked, what are the factors that would make a country or state erect borders along their territorial boundaries, when it is clear that borders are walls or barriers? Response to this question is what this section is all about, especially as Nigeria and her neighbours have constructed some borderlines along their boundaries. The following are factors that led Nigeria and neighbours to dispute over territorial boundary and borderline construction.

#### **4.3.1 Traditional Claim**

It has been said once that Nigeria is made up of many nations who rarely had constructed borders from the beginning of their existence, even though they practiced a culture of identifying their land or territory with certain elements such as trees or plantation, mountain, water edge or stream, sea, lake, rivers bank, and so on. Using traditional elements as evidences to buttress Nigeria's claim of ownership over the land and maritime boundary dispute between her and Cameroon at the International Criminal Court of Justice (ICJ) was rejected (Etekpe, 2013). It was rejected because the colonial masters of Nigeria and Cameroon never considered traditional elements in occupying territories. Yet, maps and geographical features such as rivers and mountain were also used by France to show boundary limit. This is similar to Africa nations' using rivers and mountain to identify their boundary limit. According to Robertson (2013), France mainly occupied territories through signing of treaties, such as Henderson-Fleuriu Exchange of Notes of 1931 on delimitation of Lake Chad.

However, it is quite unfortunate that the traditional claim of Nigeria referring the Efik people who are Nigerians as the original inhabitants of Bakassi peninsula (i.e. the particular land and maritime area in dispute), was rejected at the International Court of Justice who ceded the area to Cameroon. The rejection of Nigeria's claim was made possible because colonial boundary depictions



contravene traditional ones. In fact, this is why there are numerous boundary disputes among African countries apart from Nigeria and her neighbours. Today, legitimate boundaries are only those drawn by the colonialists. Of course, the ongoing Nigeria-Cameroon boundary delimitation which involves using colonial treaties and maps prove how legitimate boundaries are those drawn by colonialists (Robertson, 2013 and AUBP, 2013). The delimitation exercise has continued to witness challenges from the local people who disapprove colonial claims demarcating their lands.

Nigeria and her other neighbours different from Cameroon also have disputes over their boundaries but they did not consider the option of taking Nigeria to court. A reason is that inhabitants of the countries' borderlands share common historical background and cultural affinities such as language (Folarin, 2014). If traditional claims were to be considered in judging boundary disputes between Nigeria and her neighbours, it would only keep the case going unending, and colonial evidential claims are not also an alternative for passing judgments either. In a sense, controversies in traditional claims which are challenges in delimiting boundaries are why most countries, especially Nigeria and her neighbours have resulted in building borderlines.

Nigeria built the Bakassi borderline with the creation of Bakassi Local Council in 1994 to maintain stronghold over her territory against Cameroon. A similar act was also noticed in the erection of borders between Nigeria and Benin Republic. Afolayan (2000) exposes through Prescott's report of 1959 that Nigeria-Dahomey (Benin) boundary was drawn by France and Britain to prevent the territory falling under the control of another European country. In the same vein, after the independence of the two African countries, there were issues of insecurity along their borderlands which warranted the building of further barriers around the borderlands in order to protect individual country's territorial integrity. Folarin et al. (2014) specifically observe that the activities of the Beninese, who incessantly and forcefully collect taxes from Nigerians along the Nigeria-Benin border villages is a reason for encouraging border-posts.

Extant literature has pointed out that border posts are erected mainly to forestall insecurity or unnecessary encroachment into the territory of a sovereign state. Spencer (2007) particularly underpins that border is the first line of defence against terrorism and the last line of nation's territorial integrity. True as this claim is, borderline or border post approach to defending a territory has become frustrated due to same ethnic group division across countries' boundaries or

borderlands. Folarin et'al. (2014) establish the fact that people with historical and cultural interactions are based on a long-shared border of Nigeria, Chad and Niger. Capitalizing on shared cultural make-up by border communities, political and economic relations of countries (i.e. Nigeria and its neighbours), as well as the nature and structure of the inherited borders from the colonialists, it has become very uneasy to operate borders as it is seen in the western countries.

The challenge that traditional claims over boundary poses today explains why ICJ could not easily pass verdict on most African boundary cases brought before it. For example, it took the court over 8 years, from 1994-2002, to pass judgment over Nigeria-Cameroon boundary dispute. Again, the court had to boycott traditional claim of Nigeria presented before it. The court would hardly have been able to conclude the case if traditional evidences were to be entertained against treaties. In a way, how would the court have passed judgment over Nigeria-Benin boundary if the countries had called the court into their dispute? Passing verdict on Nigeria-Benin boundary and avoiding people's traditional make-up would present a huge problem. This is because the border communities of the two countries reflect some ethnic interactions such as with the Yorubas, the Eguns of South-Western Nigeria on one side and the Yorubas, the Gouns, the Fons of the Republic of Benin on the other side (Babatunde, 2014).

By and large, traditional factor in boundary dispute is so sensitive that care needs to be taken before reaching any conclusion. This explains how Nigeria and her neighbours have arrived at the technical way of exercising control over their territories using borderline. According to National Geographic Society, a boundary is a real or imaginary line that separate two thing or regions of the Earth. In effect, borderline can be regarded as rectilinear or serpentine line constructed along boundaries. However, constructing borderline is a challenge for Nigeria and her neighbours, because avoiding the separation of members of an ethnic group across the country's boundary is tough, yet incumbent on both national and international governments. This difficulty is what the colonialists failed to consider before partitioning African land. If Nigeria and her neighbours become insensitive to the ethnic and cultural interaction challenges in constructing boundaries, then they may end up further compounding the boundary issues that the Western colonialists created.

### **4.3.2 Economic resource factor**

Resource is one of the real causes of dispute and conflict in many nations across the world. Nigeria and Cameroon have quite some records of clashes over land and waterways in 1980s and 1990s. For Nigeria, the Bakassi peninsula which lies on the Gulf of Guinea and the estuary of Calabar-Cameroon axis belongs to Nigeria, especially if the historical background of the Old Calabar Kingdom people inhabiting the area were to be considered. However, Cameroon drew its own claim of ownership on legal documents among which is the 1961 referendum of the Southern Cameroon people to join Cameroon; the people are considered as the original occupants of the Bakassi peninsula. In the opinion of the International Court of Justice, of the two African countries, Cameroon's evidence from the treaties signed by French colonialist at different time such as, in 1913 and 1931 proved the ownership of Cameroon of the disputed sphere than Nigeria (Tolorunshagba, 2015).

Nigeria and Cameroon did not engage in clashes over boundary until there was a signal that the area of dispute might be harbouring a large quantum of oil resources (Tarlebba et al., 2010). Holding the point that Addax, Chevron, Exxon-Mobil, and TotalFinaElf oil companies are operating close to the sphere in dispute, there arises the assumption that oil might be seated in the Bakassi peninsula, around the Calabar estuary between Nigeria and Cameroon. The effect of this assumption was the escalation of Nigeria and Cameroon boundary dispute in 1970s, 80s and 90s respectively. Etekpe (2013) and Babatunde (2012) observe that Nigeria and Cameroon engaged in hostility in 1972, 1973 and 1981, causing the death of Cameroon soldiers called Gendarmes and some local population of the Bakassi people. There had never been any open clash between Nigeria and Cameroon until the issue of oil resource came along.

In the case of Nigeria and Cameroon, it is clear that gaining ownership right over the territory in dispute is having right over resources found in the area. More so, in Africa, land and water resources are invaluable assets that often lead to dispute or conflict. Tolorunshagba (2015) reveals that if not that Nigeria exercised her political willpower in accepting the ICJ verdict over Bakassi peninsula dispute which favoured Cameroon, the two countries would have gone to war. This claim is evident with Abacha's erecting border post in the Bakassi peninsula during his regime. Also, presidents before Abacha had made some moves to forestall ceding the particular areas in

dispute to Cameroon, especially the water ways that flow into the Southern part of Nigeria, Cross River, Akwa Ibom and Bayelsa States, due to the economic and security benefit.

Talking about the importance of the land and maritime boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon, what comes to mind immediately is the Bakassi peninsula. The peninsula is a host to different kinds of natural and economic resources, such as fish, shrimps, logs, crabs, periwinkles etc. Tolorunshagba (2015), Omoigui (2012) and Ibekwe (2012) note that the colonial masters of Nigeria and Cameroon also had dispute over the Bakassi area at some point but settled it partially since they had opposed interests with the 1913 Anglo-German treaty, and subsequently with the 1931 Exchanged of Notes between France and Britain. Apparently, the economic resources situated along the boundary of Nigeria and Cameroon is a real factor in why the two countries ended up in border conflict and the current border delimitation or demarcation exercise.

According to Abiodun (2014), delimiting the boundaries between Nigeria and Cameroon especially in the north is a tough task. There is no doubt that delimiting borders in the Northern region which connect Nigeria with Cameroon, Chad and Niger, would present serious challenges, especially if one considers that the very region is a large expanse of land and water such as the Lake Chad. There is also a long historical record of economic relations, religious, cultural and/or marital ties between the Hausa-Fulani in Northern Nigeria, namely Sokoto and Borno, with Chad and Niger people. In spite of all the socio-cultural and physical interconnections that border communities in Nigeria share with neighbouring countries, the economic and security interests of each country weigh heavily on agitation for the demarcation and delimitation of their boundary.

It was easy for Nigeria to cede 33 villages located in the land area of Lake Chad connecting it to Cameroon on the basis of ICJ's verdict, in the sense that the affected areas are somewhat not presently known for harbouring vital mineral resources, otherwise Nigeria would not have totally succumbed to the court's judgment as seen with some other countries of the world. A Senior Advocate of Nigeria and Judge who represented Nigeria in the boundary case at The Hague, Bola Ajibola dissents undoubtedly the ICJ's decision considering only legal position on the case against Nigeria's submission based on effectives and historical consolidation (Ajibola, 2012). Generally, ICJ's judgment which ceded Nigerian villages and Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon is a great boost

to the Cameroonian economy, even as Cameroon now taxes fishermen and traders in the ceded region.

There is also a situation of economic resources resulting to reinforcement of borderline between Nigeria and Benin Republic. The border between both countries, namely Idiroko and Igolo respectively, is a source of economic development. This border compares to other borders in the southwest of Nigeria linking Benin Republic providing almost equal opportunity for the two countries to boost their economies in a sense of cross-border trade. Afolayan (2000) notes that Benin has a very limited domestic market, thus she serves as a transit corridor for imported goods, and local farm exports from Nigeria. Benin is the major link to Nigeria from her west wing, connecting Togo, Ghana and other West African countries along that linear position with Nigeria. It holds therefore that the Nigerian and Benin economies are interrelated through trade, with the expansion of local communities across the border of the two countries.

Expanding across the boundary of Nigeria and Benin by the local populace as a result of making economic gain in either country is a major reason for defining borderline. Areas such as Ajegunle, Ikolaje, Eti-Koto, Itaoba and Sale in Nigeria, have been observed to extend by settlement and road links towards Benin. Since the populations of communities mentioned above are mainly farmers and traders, their economic interaction has sometimes frustrated economic policies, or complicated currency issues of either country. (Afolayan, 2000) remarks that disparities in the economies of the two countries (Benin and Nigeria) are essential elements that affect trans-border movement and trading. It is also why both countries, particularly Nigeria, are encouraging borderline so as to confront external influences on their economies. This is not to suggest that Nigeria does not want to open her economy to foreign market, but that she has to put a check to the possibility of flooding of her market with foreign goods and currencies.

### **4.3.3 Political Control Factor**

The struggle for power, essentially economic and political control in the colonial era was responsible for boundary division between the states in today's Africa. According to Ebuti (2016), in earlier centuries when slave trade was the order of the day, accessing economic resources through opening up of territories to British control was a big motivation for British conquest of

Nigeria. However, when slave trade was abolished in the 1885, the British colonialists started adopting political approaches and, where necessary, military force against traditional rulers, influencing them to sign treaties on the basis of protection. There is hardly a country that was colonized by the Europeans in Africa that had no treaty relating to its territory. In short, treaties or political alliances relating to territories and boundaries are now predominant factors causing boundary conflict between countries in Africa.

Treaties signed in relation to Nigeria's boundary include the Obong of Calabar treaty with Britain in 1884 over Bakassi peninsula, Anglo-German Agreement of 1913 regarding the boundary sectors between Gamana and Cross River, and between Cross River and the Bight of Biafra, the 1931 Exchange Note between France and Britain ratifying previous treaties, and the 1961 General Assembly Plebiscites of Northern and Southern Cameroons (Tolorunshagba, 2015; Omoigui, 2012; Baye, 2011 and Ngang, 2007). Where the British did not sign a treaty, they applied force in annexing a territory. Examples included the British invasion of Sokoto, Kano and Kanem Borno in 1897-1903; the deposition of Kosoko, the slave-trading king of Lagos and installation of Akintoye by British Consul, Beecroft in 1849, and the 1861 annexation of Lagos by Britain to gain monopoly over trade in the Niger Delta (Ebuti, 2016; Audu et al., 2015; Inyang et al., 2014 and Sagay, 2008).

A careful observation of the enlisted treaties above of how Britain penetrated Nigeria reveals that the ideology of treaties ensued immediately after the abolition of slave trade. To exercise total control over territories, the colonial masters introduced treaty and borderline mechanism which helped them to demarcate their areas of interest with posts or pillars. Apparently, border system was created to prevent the encroachment of colonial counterparts on another's territory. It was meant to show colonialist's presence in a territory and forestall encroachment into already occupied territory by others. Rudin (1938) explains that the expression "too late Hewett" depicts English late arrival to Cameroon, already occupied by the Germans. In Rubin's writing,

*Hewett had been busy getting native kings along the coast near Bonny to place their crosses on the numerous treaty forms he had with him. Later, on July 19, 1884, he discovered that he had come too late, for Kings Bell and Akwa had already made*

*their treaty with Dr. Nachtigal, who had come with the Mowe under instructions from Bismarck to establish German rule (Rudin, 1938).*

Several documents on colonialism expose how colonialists were meeting traditional rulers and extending hand of protection to them against external influence but ended up occupying lands, exploiting or extracting resources and using border post and gunboat to prevent any threat to their areas of interest. In the preceding event to German conquest of Cameroon, and the formal announcement to the world in October 15, 1885, it was observed that the Germans were bribing the chieftains to sell their country against the will of the great majority of natives, who had long wanted English control (Rudin, 1938). The emphasis here is that occupation of territories during colonial era was achieved signing of treaties with traditional rulers. Consequently, the treaties now constitute stumbling blocks in determining issues in boundary dispute between countries, notably Nigeria and her neighbours.

In respect to Nigeria and Cameroon boundary dispute, the colonialists were discovered to only consider the land and water resources as the focal point of their interest more than the people who occupied the land when signing agreements. Today, people of same origin are now found across different countries' boundary (Dimico, 2014; Papaioannou et al., 2013 and Asiwaju, 1985). This controversial situation is why Nigeria and Cameroon boundary case took many years to resolve, while Niger and Benin boundary or island case was just concluded in 2016 since 2002, with ICJ declaring that the island of Lété Goungou belongs to Niger. Delays and complex processes in boundary case arbitration inform the decision of Nigeria and Cameroon to entertain political resolution rather than compulsory jurisdiction, which may not survive argument on traditional claims.

Ikome (2012) reveals that prior to, during and after court sessions by ICJ on the boundary case between Nigeria and Cameroon, meetings were organized at The Hague comprising delegates from Nigeria, Cameroon and the UN secretary General, Kofi Annan. With their meetings, they sought political resolution to the boundary dispute, instead of compulsory jurisdiction. One of their meetings in 2011 gave birth to the Greentree Agreement. It was the agreement that mandated the delimitation of the boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon, relocation of Bakassi people into Nigeria as well as the proper settlement of some of them who agreed to remain in Cameroon

(Tolorunshagba, 2015). Also, the agreement provided Cameroon with sovereignty over Bakassi peninsula, and Cameroon now has its security forces called Gendarmes providing security at the delimited borders in the Bakassi peninsula.

Currently, security is a big issue that Nigeria and her neighbours are battling with. Ray (2016) and Shuaibu et al. (2015a) unearth how Boko Haram insurgency which started in Nigeria became a cross-border conflict. The terrorist group now threatens the peace of not just Nigeria, but her neighbours and the world at large. As a result of the group's violent attacks and tactics, such as using border communities as war zones and borders as escape routes and access to arms and ammunition, Nigeria and her neighbours have revived their Multi-lateral Joint Task Force established in the 1990s to enhance their border securities. This is not done without some political processes, such as the meeting of all the continent's presidents in (Chad) to discuss the kind of economic or military contribution that needed to be made.

Politically, Nigeria and Cameroon have forged a synergy that enables free military operations around their borders in order to arrest the Boko Haram insurgency. This synergy includes free movement of Refugees and IDPs which by the principle of territorial sovereignty it may not have been possible. UNHCR (2015) acknowledges the "open door policies" that exist between the countries of the Lake Chad region, in order to support the free flow of mixed populations (e.g. Refugees, returnees and third country nationals) arriving in the countries. Initially, borderlines were encouraged to check movement and maintain security around the porous borders of the involved countries. However, now that there is great insecurity around those borders, countries are mounting border security posts to protect their territories without barring movement. They also encourage camps to be built along their borders as a political measure to immigration crisis.

The political factor in borderline construction has become more vivid as the Boko Haram terror continues to force people out of their natural habitation. Each country is now seen to mount surveillance and security posts in their border areas. This action being a response to insurgency, that is providing security, has largely aided the protection of territories from external crisis in a case of overspill conflict. A typical example of border-post creation relates to Cameroon whose military presence was almost absent in the Far North, but now visibly present due to Boko Haram attacks. Igidi (2014) observed that cross-border movement is now difficult for Nigerians who



spend the night among relatives in Cameroon and next day go to their businesses or farms in Nigeria, since the government of Cameroon does not want refugees to stay along borders, and therefore positioned gendarmes both in camps and along borders in Minawao, Gadala, Barnake etc.

How tremendous is the political understanding of the Cameroonian government towards Nigeria over a period of counter-insurgency against the Boko Haram? Until the Cameroonian government joined Nigeria in fighting the Islamic terrorist group, insecurity as regards border communities' attacks in Cameroon was scarce. However, the moment the Cameroonian, Nigerien and Chadian governments reached an agreement to support Nigeria in her counter-insurgency efforts, these countries started witnessing sudden aggravation of insecurity and attacks on their border villages and towns (Oyewole, 2015). However, it was these countries' experience with Boko Haram attacks that caused bracing up of their borders with posts and checkpoints (Comolli, 2015). In essence, cross-border security is apparently a new dimension in the relations of the Lake Chad countries.

#### **4.3.4 Trade and Commerce**

Over a long time, the borders between Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon, connecting Borno, Adamawa, Yobe and Sokoto in Northern Nigeria, has been a route for the movement of different goods and services, migration of people (slaves), and especially the pastoralists who plied the Sahara and Sub-Sahara regions. Prior to colonial era, the core parts of northern Nigeria basically served as route for commercial activities to states such as Sokoto, Kano, Katsina, Zaria and Borno Empire. When colonial rule became inevitable, the British government led by Lugard in 1903 gained entrance into the Northern region, conquered first; Kano, Sokoto and then Borno, before establishing indirect rule over the regions with appointment of new Emirs and chiefs (Flint, 1989). One major reason that the British colonialists conquered the northern region of Nigeria was to establish the European capitalist ideas or ethics through trade.

However, commerce and trade were the gateway that facilitated the contact of the British with the northern leaders and its people in Nigeria. Before the arrival of the Europeans in Africa and the British colonialist in Nigeria, the Fulbe people who are today referred to as Hausa-Fulani lived mainly on livestock and trading business, such as cattle and other animal products. Kerven (1992)

reveals that the Fulbe people who are pastoral Fulani depended largely on livestock and operated the system of paying cattle tribute to their Emir. According to Kerven (1992), it was this cattle tax called jangali that the British government formalized into the colonial taxation system, which operated during its rule in Northern Nigeria.

Historically, one knows that the pastoralists were awesome migrants who travel wide to provide care for their animals. Records also show that pastoralists went across territorial boundaries in order to trade their commodities. This accounts for why Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon, which are Sahel and Sub-Sahara countries in Africa are hosts to a number of Fulbe ethnics. The Fulbe people were subdivided into three categories in Nigeria before colonial incursion, namely a ruling and settled aristocrats, other settled and primarily agricultural Fulbe and the pastoralists (Kerven, 1992). That the pastoralists naturally moved from place to place in Africa without much hinderance, traded among themselves across nations' boundaries and settled where they got pasture for their cattle, are strong points that colonialists' presence and establishment of regions as protectorates brought about borderline. Bach (1978) notes that Benin was a transit point for cattle travelling from Northern Nigeria and Niger to Ghana.

The borderline between Nigeria and her neighbours was non-existent and invisible until the British and French respectively colonized the four neighbor countries. Suffice it to reiterate that British determination to put an end to the slave trade in the end prepared the way for the eventual British occupation of Nigeria (Inyang et al., 2014). Inyang and Bassey who quoted Orugbani (2005) reveal further that the British appointment of Consuls for the Bights of Biafra and Benin was mainly for the purpose of regulating trade between British merchants and Old Calabar, Bonny, Bimbia, the Cameroons and the parts of the territories of the King of Dahomey. The desperate interest and motive of British government in trade is why there was the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern protectorates. It is also why diverse ethnic nations were merged, while other ethnics were separated along countries boundary.

Using settlement pattern of border communities and ethnic groups, particularly the Hausa-Fulani and Kanuri who reside at the boundary of Nigeria and Niger (having limited or regulated trade access to one another today), it should be clear what borderline has done in Africa. Borderline was introduced by the colonial masters mainly to gain control over territories, economic activities,

trade and commerce. In the excerpt of Refugee Documentation Center Ireland, July 7, 2009, the largest ethnic groups in Niger are the Hausa (53%), while the Fulani are (7%). In Nigeria, another large ethnic group is Hausa-Fulani, predominantly found in the Northern region and sharing boundary with linages in Niger, namely Gaya, Dosso, Maradi. A significant effect of colonial boundaries is the alteration or disconnection created in trade relations between the Hausa-Fulani in Niger, Chad and Nigeria.

Let us imagine that there were no border or boundary between Nigeria and her neighbours, trade and commerce or economic relations between the countries would be as smooth as it was before colonial era, and ultimately free and less heightened by tension and insecurity. To ask why there is insecurity such as smuggling, piracy, deportation of people, boundary encroachment etc., it is because there is no mutual agreement, trust, confidence, understanding and cooperation between the countries involved. Funteh (2015) and Omede (2006) note that Nigeria and Cameroon, as well as Nigeria and Benin sometime in the 1960 and 1970's, were at logger-head due to security issues. In the same vein, but for the current insecurity sparked off by Boko Haram in Nigeria, with an overspill effect in her neighbouring countries, in terms of cross-border attack, Refugees and IDPs challenges, the magnitude of the cooperation now enjoyed between Nigeria and her neighbours may not actually have been possible.

Remarkably, is disheartening that Nigeria and Cameroun have recorded several clashes over their boundaries. It is also sad that the reason the two countries have engaged in hostilities is because of boundary dispute. Nevertheless, it is interesting that Nigeria and her neighbours now allow political, economic and military relations to drive their friendship. Chukwu (2016) remarks that Nigeria and her neighbours are now into international cooperation and assistance in order to strengthen their borders and constantly check movement of people and materials in the face of insurgency. Security demands in Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon have finally led the countries to set up the Joint Trans Border Security Committee. Nigeria and Cameroon signed the agreements leading to the establishment of the committee in 2012 to create a peaceful atmosphere, enhance their trade, economic and political relations.

Without misplacing a point, border security is a significant way by which countries can protect their national integrity, economy and increase their local market gains as well as opportunity for

growth and development. Moreover, nothing gets into a country without passing through the borders. In countries such as Nigeria, Cameroun, Niger and Chad, borderline and/or border posts are a basic strategy for controlling illicit trade across border, or rather illegal materials being imported into the countries. However, despite mounting border security, there is still an unabated challenge in regulating illegal entry and exit, flow of arms and ammunition and other contraband products into the countries. GIABA (2013) establishes the fact that illicit small arms and light weapons trafficking and proliferation remain prevalent and continue to underpin high levels of violence and criminality in West Africa. The need to improve the security of a state is supposed to go beyond constructing borderline.

It is not hard to point out that all the countries of the Lake Chad region are guilty of building borderline or checkpoints for the purpose of security alone without minding the effects on trade and economy of their nations. Though in the eye of the countries, building border posts are meant to curb illicit trade and improve trading and so on; border post construction cannot be the appropriate approach to border security. Onuoha (2013) explains that if Nigeria and her neighbours had properly administered their borders, the issues of insecurity would have been limited. In his analysis, the Nigerian borders are known for limited presence of security and law enforcement officials, who most of the time are few in number, poorly trained, work with inadequate and obsolete equipment, and sometimes poorly remunerated. Due to the enlisted challenges faced by countries and their border security operatives, trade that border is expected to promote has become overregulated, restricted and chained.

#### **4.4 The making and strategic importance of North-Eastern states and borders in Nigeria**

There is no region in Nigeria that is not endowed with a natural resource. The North-Eastern States in Nigeria are particularly known for arable land for agriculture and animal produce. However, it is easy today to identify or associate the North-Eastern states with insurgency, poverty, Refugee or IDPs and so on. But the region was once known for trade, commerce, well-founded political institutions which announced Nigeria to the world (Aregheore, 2009). In fact, the region has a great ovation between 1380-1893 when it overcame attack from neighbouring Arabs and Hausa.

It is unfortunate that British aggressive expansion in the 19th century, when northern Nigeria was made protectorate, completely altered the northeastern region structure.

Babalola (2016) establishes that despite the loss of sovereignty in Northern Nigeria as a result of British conquest of Sokoto Caliphate, Kano and Borno Empire, the strong political and cultural traditions of these societies initially enabled many to accommodate nominal British rule with little change in their way of life. But the settlement pattern and strategic importance of most of their societies changed drastically after Nigeria's independence. The Northeastern Nigeria witnessed its own change mainly with the region being divided firstly into Gongola State, Bornu, Bauchi in 1967, and later in 1976, Gongola being split into Adamawa and Taraba, while Yobe and Gombe were created out of Borno and Bauchi respectively. This is how the northeastern part of Nigeria came into existence with its six states today.

In relation to the pattern of settlement in Northern Nigeria before independence and even colonial era, Solomone (1996) reveals that the region was dominated by the Hausa, but in 1810, however the Fulbe-speaking nomadic tribe, popularly called *Fulani*, invaded the Hausa states, under the leadership of Uthman dan Fodio, and established an Islamic central authority under the Sokoto Caliphate. Without a fight, Bornu Empire which is now part of the Northeastern Nigeria broke away after a few years from the central authority. The point here is that the Fulani invasion of the seven Hausa states, namely, Biram, Daura, Kano, Katsina, Gobir, Rano, and Zazzau, as well as the later birth of other non-Hausa states depicted the "Bastard Seven" namely, Zamfara, Kebbi, Yauri, Gwari, Kwara, Nupe, Ilorin, and introduced a drastic change in the lifestyle and settlement pattern of the Hausa and the Fulani people.

It is well-known that nomadic Fulani have transhumance lifestyle with seasonal movement in search of water. There are also some of them who are sedentary. This is because the Fulani settlement is classified into two types, namely dry-season and wet-season camps. The former camp is usually patronized in November to March when cattle are carried around in search of pasture and water. To a great extent, this pattern of settlement started to change after the infamous jihad. Sampson (2014) pinpointed that surrender to Dan Fodio's jihad and the subsequent establishment of the Islamic Caliphate changed the complexion of state-religion relations in Hausa communities. Since the Fulani were largely pastoralists, Sampson establishes that

*Town Fulani (Fulbe Sirre) never lost touch with their Cattle Fulani relatives, but they settled as clerics, teachers, settlers, and judges—and in many other ways filled elite positions within the Hausa states, adopted the Hausa language, with many forgetting their own Fulfulde language. And their adoption of Islam increased the Fulanis' feeling of cultural and religious superiority to surrounding peoples (Sampson, 2014).*

A glaring change in the composition of northeastern states and communities is seen in its religion or religious perception and ethnic affiliation. There is presently serious ethnic identity diffusion among the Hausa, the Fulani and Kanuri, such as was not in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. It does not come easy to identify who is Hausa or Fulani, just as one would do with the Yoruba and Ibo ethnics in Nigeria. The complexity of the Hausa and Fulani identity is why Northern Nigerian people are better referred to today as Hausa-Fulani. In terms of religion, the majority of Hausa-Fulani are Muslims, credit to Usman Dan Fodio Jihad against Hausa rulers who were practicing paganism. In the description of Chafe (1990), paganism could be referred on the basis of Jihad response to social and economic problems or endless war among Hausa states, compulsory military exercises, oppressive taxes and levies, arbitrary seizures of property and unpredictable behaviour of the sarauta (titled) class.

The success that was recorded with the Jihad War explains why Northern Nigerian communities, structure or composition revolve largely around Islamic religion, socio-cultural practices and law. There is a wide practice of Sharia Law or Sharia Penal Code in the Northern region of Nigeria. The Penal Code Law was enacted in 1959 and amended in 1963. According to Human Right Watch (2004) Sharia is seen by many Muslims as an entire system of guidelines and rules which encompass criminal law, personal status law, and many other aspects of religious, cultural, and social life. The importance attached to Sharia Laws came openly in 2000, shortly after 1999 return to democracy in Nigeria, when Northern States adopted and began to apply Islamic law even to criminal matters. Peters (2005) reveals that Zamfara state was the first to adopt Sharia Law, on 27 January 2000, while Niger followed suit in May. Currently, there are twelve states that have adopted Sharia Law in the North, by setting up courts. They include Zamfara, Niger, Katsina, Sokoto, Bauchi, Gombe, Kano, Kaduna, Yobe, Borno, Jigawa and Kebbi.

With a shared interest in religion, culture or politics, it can be said that what differentiates northern states from each other is just the region. This is because the northern states of Nigeria, mainly the Northwest and Northeast tend to key into same ideologies, even as they have a shared chronological relation in trade, commerce, marriage, politics, religion and so on. They also happened to have similar experiences all time-round as regards ethno-religious and political conflict, health challenges and education issue. The Boko Haram insurgency that has destroyed the fabric of the Northeastern states in terms of security, economy, education, peace stability, human and infrastructure development, has also had its toll on Northwestern and North central states. IFRA-Nigeria (2014) records how the first quarter of 2014 witnessed an upsurge in terrorist attacks with the bombings that took place in Abuja, the capitol of Nigeria, leaving over a hundred dead and many others injured.

It is very easy today to identify North-Eastern region with conflict or insurgency. And of all the regions in Nigeria, it is the most hit by Boko Haram who has made its communities theaters of asymmetric war and established its Caliphate. It was for the insurgent group's heinous attacks and violence that Federal government of Nigeria declared a State of Emergency on May 14, 2013, in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, where communities have suffered great insecurity (Olufemi and Layi, 2014 and Udo, 2013). Apart from viewing the North-Eastern region on the basis of insurgency, the entire Northern states of Nigeria have history associating them with ethno-religious and political conflict. Only that the Boko Haram insurgency in the North-Eastern region has dominated the socio-academic spheres of conflict in Nigeria, owing to its intensity and consequences.

Sule (2015) unveils that since the early 1980s, ethnic and religious crises have become a re-occurring decimal, especially in northern Nigeria. He identifies the following as conflicts that were encountered before the emergence of Boko Haram, namely *Maitatsine* crises in Kano, 1980, Zuru 1980, Maiduguri 1982, Yola 1984, Ilorin 1984, Bauchi 1984 and Kano 1984. Others are the crises in Kafanchan 1987, Gure Kahugu 1987, Birnin Kebbi 1990, Katsina 1991, Tafawa Balewa 1991, Kano 1991, Jalingo 1992, Kaduna Polytechnic 1992, Kasuwar Magani (Kaduna) 1994, Kaduna 2000, Jos 2001, Kano 2001, Tafawa Balewa (since 2000) and Nasarawa 2001, Jos 2004, 2008 and 2010. There have also been the Chamba-Kuteb crises in Taraba State 2013, Tiv-Jukun crisis 2013, Bassa- Igbira crisis in Toto 2012 and a host of others.

The negative impact of conflict in Northern Nigeria (particularly North-East and North-West) is obviously a spatial factor for the region's poor rating on Human Development Index in May 2016. Though the region has for long been confronted with natural and man-made disasters, such as drought, desertification, deforestation and uncontrolled diseases resulting in poverty, famine and malnutrition etc. Vittozzi (2017) stated that UNICEF projected that 400,000 children in North-East Nigeria would suffer acute malnutrition in 2017, and without treatment, approximately one in five of those children – more than 75,000 – was likely to die. It is also on record that UNICEF attended to 160,000 children who are victims of severe malnutrition in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states in 2016. Recent reports of natural and man-made disaster in North-Eastern Nigeria are alarming and thus impacting negatively on the image of the region (Vittozzi, 2017).

Against the endemic maladies that Northeastern region of Nigeria is suffering from presently, the region is well-known for cattle rearing and agricultural produce. In effect, the region boasts produces contributing enormously to Nigeria's economy, such as cattle, cowpea, hides and skin, wheat, sorghum, maize, millet, groundnut, cotton, sugarcane, beans, rice, yam, fish, and vegetables (e.g tomato and pepper) (Ibrahim et al., 2014; Aregheore, 2009 and Blench, 1997). Nonetheless, the natural resources in the northeast include, iron ore, tin and columbite, limestone and other related ceramic materials etc. There is no doubt that the Northeastern region is a strategic location in Nigeria. This is because its economic resources if well harnessed would aid Nigeria's development greatly especially in agriculture.

Going by the analysis of Nairametrics on Internally Generated Revenue (IGR), the North-Eastern states could only generate 26 billion naira for Nigeria in 2015. If one compared the region's IGR with the other regions in Nigeria, the Northeastern generated the least IGR in 2015, whereas South-West generated the highest which is (339bn), followed by South-South (179bn), South-East (62bn), North-West (48bn) and North Central (38bn). There is no reason to wonder why the North-Eastern region generated the lowest revenue because insecurity has continued to slow its production rate. ACAPS (2016), Emmanuelar (2015) and Awodola (2015) reveal that the North-Eastern states especially Borno, Yobe and Adamawa are currently suffering from acute food shortage among other security threats to human and society life. Unless concerted effort is made



through peace building and other conflict resolution mechanisms, it would be hard to end the insecurity in North-Eastern Nigeria.

It is worthy of mention that the insecurity situation experienced in the border communities of North-Eastern Nigeria is a major cross-border or international crisis for Nigeria. This is because the border communities in the North-Eastern region, being troubled by Boko Haram are closely bounded by three countries which explain the strategic importance of the region. The North-East zone plays an integral role in the national security of Nigeria (Nyako, 2015). Nyako specifically stresses that North-Eastern Nigeria has a profound implication for Nigeria's security strategies ranging from immigration policy, custom policy, labour law etc. It was for this reason that Nigeria did not hesitate to enter into border security agreement with her neighbours, as Boko Haram turned the border communities into war zones and escaping into other countries after attacks.

The intensity and trend of Boko Haram insurgency which have caused overspill conflict for Cameroon, Niger and Chad are strong evidences in saying that the communities that linked Nigeria with the three countries are very important for Nigeria's security. Tull (2015) observes that prior to 2013, Cameroon seemed less affected by Boko Haram insurgency and was a safe haven where the authorities tolerated the group in the context of an unspoken mutual non-aggression pact. Nevertheless, the attitude and approach of Cameroon changed toward Boko Haram as the group began to use its border communities with Nigeria as transit routes, recruitment centers, for trafficking arms and ammunition, and launching attacks.

The following are some towns or villages in Northern Cameroon bordering Nigeria that Boko Haram have launched attacks: Bodo, Kouyape, Nguetechewe (Luccino, 2016). Meanwhile, the following places have also been identified as either network, cell, recruitment or transit zones of Boko Haram in Cameroon: Fotokol, Maroua, Amchidé, Kerawa and Ashigashia, Kerawa and Ganse, Zlevet, Kolofata, Kousseri, Amchidé. Other areas, such as Mayo Tsanaga, Diamare, Mandara have been identified for fuel and food supply or safe haven for Boko Haram. Apart from Cameroon and Nigeria, Chad experienced its first attack from Boko Haram in 2015 when the terrorist group attacked Ngouboua, while Niger has mainly suffered Boko Haram attacks in its Southern region particularly in Differ on the Nigerian border. Generally, after Nigeria, Cameroon

is the country with the highest intensity of the terrorist group's operation, thereby informing of the security importance of the border communities connecting Nigeria to Cameroon.

The International Crisis Group (2016) reveals that the Far North is the poorest of Cameroon's regions and has the lowest school enrolment rate with the presence of smugglers, proliferation of highway robbers, traffickers and petty criminals. In effect, the insecurity suffered in Far North Cameroon which is a border area with Nigeria is similar to that in Northeastern Nigeria. Scholars such as Shuaibu (2015) and Adenrele (2012) have identified overspread poverty in Northern Nigeria as a root cause of Boko Haram Insurgency. It is unfortunate that Boko Haram had to take advantage of the social crises which include poverty in the Northeastern Nigeria as well as Far North Cameroon in its campaigning. The International Crisis Group notes that Cameroon was non-reactive even though the jihadist group's presence was in the country in 2011, benefited from a network of local collaborators and exploited the vulnerabilities that the region shares with north-eastern Nigeria.

Considering the fate that Nigeria and her neighbours have suffered in the hand of Boko Haram, each of the country is now seen working hard to improve their border security, check movement and proliferation of arms, banditry, trafficking, smuggling and Refugee or IDP flow. Nforngwa (2014) notes that Cameroon in her security effort has made Rapid Response Battalion (BIR) which was initially created to fight highway robbery and piracy to take up border security. On the part of Nigeria, the Nigerian military and other security bodies, such as Civilian military or vigilante have done well restricting Boko Haram to a designated area (i.e Sambisa forest from where the terrorist group is mainly operating). The Nigerian military should be commended for measuring up to the tactics of the Boko Haram that is overly unconventional.

The Boko Haram terrorist's unconventional tactic was noticed in the group's targeting religious, academic and political institutions; public infrastructure such as schools, churches, markets, mosques, police stations, military posts and UN building, etc. Today, its attacks are soft targets against civilian or military persons in open places, and the attacks usually involved a suicide bomber using IEDs to blow self-amidst a gathering of people in open space. Falode (2016) explains that unconventional warfare is the use of ambushes, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide-bombings, sexual assaults as well as targeted assassinations. Considering these unconventional

tactics, the spate at which they were experienced before now, is a reason why the Nigeria military needs to be commended on its security effort particularly in the Northeast.

To this end, the evolution of North-Eastern states, their strategic importance to Nigeria and neighbouring countries can be summed up in the close relationship that all countries' border communities share in agriculture, trade, commerce, religion, culture and ethnicity etc. Factually, border communities are very important areas for any country's security, sovereignty and integrity. Countries that have encountered cross-border conflict such as Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger can attest to this, or rather those that have boundary dispute where the boundary is host to natural resources. To note, a major reason that Nigeria and its neighbours have encouraged the delimitation of their boundary is to define their territorial sovereignty, integrity or defend their territories against external control and insecurity. Upholding the integrity and security of Nigeria is why the North-Eastern Nigeria, particularly the border communities are very strategic and important.

#### **4.5 Conclusion**

In conclusion Nigeria came into existence as a nation-state with its borders cutting across already established communities, cultures and clans therefore disrupting the established activities that constantly along such spaces of which trading and free movement are not the least. By virtue of being borders, these spaces thus became restrictive in activities and movement thereby attracting undue attention which was hitherto inexistent. On the other divide, these borders have posed some challenges to the Nigerian government. Firstly, for a long time, these spaces have caused rancor between Nigeria and her neighbours. For example, Nigeria and Cameroun had a border dispute on the Bakassi Penninsula which escalated to the level of the ICJ which ruled in the favour of Cameroun, thereby legitimizing Cameroun's claim to the Penninsula. Nigeria accepted the verdict but is not pleased with it. Again, while these borders are meant to be safeguarded and properly managed by the Nigerian government, they remain porous and unsafe a region where cross-border criminalities take place unchecked. Nigeria's borders in the North-Eastern are heightened tension leading to insecurity within the region and across the nation. Instead of these borders serving their purpose as a controlled corridor, they facilitate criminal activities, such as smuggling, armed robbery, trafficking and above all constitute a fertile ground for cross-border insurgency to thrive.

# **CHAPTER FIVE**

## **CROSS-BORDER INSURGENCY IN NORTH-EASTERN NIGERIA 2003 - 2019**

### **5.0 Introduction**

Drawing on available literature and statistics, and data gathered from the study area, Chapter five lays a foundation and as well gives an insight into the socio-political *cum* economic factors prevalent in the North-Eastern Nigeria making it easy for the Boko Haram sect to evolve. It equally provides a discussion of emergence of Boko Haram, its mission and the nefarious activities carried out so far by its members in the region between 2003 and 2019. This chapter also deals with diverse patterns in which the Boko Haram activities manifest in the study area and likewise the sect's modus operandi deployed in carry out such dastardly attacks. The chapter goes further to critically examine the grievous impacts of the activities of the terror group on the local population and the region in general. Consequently, the various counter effort and progress made by the Nigerian government targeted at tackling the Boko Haram menace is reviewed bringing to the fore its successes and failures. However, the constant attacks and impact on the population and the region depicts that the efforts are far from ending the Boko Haram surge within the region. The factors responsible for this, discussed extensively in the chapter, are not far-fetched.

### **5.1 The evolution of Boko Haram in the North-Eastern region**

In Nigeria, it has been observed across all regions that crises are bound to happen/ imminent based on the prevalent situations which naturally lead to upheavals. This manifestation has been witnessed across various regions of the country in different magnitude based on the nature of the crisis and the actors involved. Salaam (2012) identifies such factors to include “poverty and social injustice; illiteracy and the educational disparities between the northern and southern regions; ingrained cultures of corruption; the lack of professional law enforcement capacity; the availability of illegal weapons; the intelligence failure or inability of the security network to prevent and end conflicts; the sublime structure of the Nigerian government, especially in leadership posting and resource distribution; and the porous borders and socio-economic ties across borders.”

Since return to civil rule in 1999 till date, a number of Islamic groups both (liberal and extremists) had sprang whose demands has led to conflict and violence in the Northern region most importantly the North-Eastern Nigeria thus having serious security implications on the geopolitical zone and Nigeria at large. Two major occurrences have shaped the security situation of the North-Eastern Nigeria. They are the Sharia Crisis which eventually led to the ongoing Boko Haram crisis. It is therefore important to trace the evolution of these phenomena.

The transition to civilian rule in 1999 was greeted with annoyance by some northerners. While some saw it as a threat to their authority, others perceived it as an opportunity for cultural and religious renewal (Agbiboa, 2013a). Such perception came through as a result of the loss of power by the north to a Christian southerner which was considered as a political setback which called for moral and religious resuscitation. It was in the light of this and quest for religious purity that the Zamfara state governor, Ahmed Yerima, embarked on a restoration campaign of the Sharia Law in 1999. And to him anyone who governs a society without the Islamic law (Sharia) is an infidel (Agbiboa, 2013a).

This initiative in no time became popular across states in the North as Muslims massively supported the move (Last, 2000). The clerics were equally not left out as they saw it as a rare opportunity for a restoration of the religious and moral custom squashed after colonial subjugation (International Crisis Group, 2010). The common people gave their support because they saw Sharia as a tool for liberation from the hand of the corrupt politicians by creating a safe, just, safe, and compassionate society devoid of corrupt practices (International Crisis Group, 2010). The political class equally gave their support because they saw Sharia as an alternative means of mounting pressure on federal government particularly, the President, having lost hold of the national government. The Sultan of Sokoto Muhammadu Maccido initially did not give his support but had to give in as a result of the position he occupied (Shekarau, 2004). The lead taken by the Zamfara Government in the implementation of Sharia Law attracted other state governors to follow suit though with varying levels of commitment (Shekarau, 2004) all targeted at reinforcing the movement of restoration championed by Usman dan Fodio's Sokoto Caliphate two centuries back (Ekot, 2009).

This wave of Sharia across the north stirred the federal government in denouncing Sharia Law on the basis of its incompatibility with the freedom of religion embedded in the Nigeria constitution (Kendhammer, 2013). This met a sharp resistance by the northern governors who argued and quoted the section of the constitution which vested on the states the concurrent powers to establish their own court systems (Kendhammer, 2013). President Obasanjo, in response avoided a confrontation so as not to ignite religious sentiments and merely admonished pro-Sharia states to exercise some sense of control in the application of Sharia law (Kendhammer, 2013). This caution was not heeded as some states went ahead in fully implementing Sharia. An example to point out was the sentencing of Amina Lawal to death by stoning for adultery in 2002 (Ibrahim and Lyman, 2004) which was later overturned by the Sharia Court of Appeal.<sup>14</sup>

The implementation of Sharia did not go down well with non-Muslims and this further strained the already weak relationship between Christians and Muslims, because, in several areas, the minority Christian populations believed Sharia infringed on their fundamental rights and as such will restrict their actions for instance playing and listening to music publicly as well as public alcohol consumption and that there is every possibility they will be subjected to such laws. All of these resulted in uprisings in Kaduna and Kano in 2000. The protest in Kaduna State was intense as half of the total population is Christian. The clashes resulted in over 2,000 deaths (Ekot 2009).

In 2000, former Governor of Borno state, Mala Kachallah through the Borno state Sharia Administration of Justice Law introduced Sharia laws in the state. In executing this, the Governor instituted an Implementation Committee in February 2001 under the chairmanship of Professor Abubakar Mustapha the former Vice-Chancellor of the University of Maiduguri while the late Mohammed Yusuf was a member (Ali Modu, 2014). As it started off, amputations and flogging were used as punishment for offenders, (World Report, 2011).

As the tenure of the incumbent was running out, the leadership of the Boko Haram sect saw in view the opportunity to unseat a government that was not ready to support their cause which is full implementation of Sharia law by pitching it tent with Senator Ali Modu Sheriff a strong opposition and aspirant to thwart the second-term aspiration of the sitting governor, so that Ali Modu Sheriff

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<sup>14</sup> see <https://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/26/world/facing-death-for-adultery-nigerian-woman-is-acquitted.html>

could be the governor come 2003. The sect decided to support the candidature of Senator because he had promised to implement Sharia in full which is a promise the incumbent did not keep. Ali Modu Sheriff also decided to join forces with the sect because of the numeric strength of its membership majorly composed of youths which will aid in achieving his governorship ambitions and he will in turn implement a stiff Sharia law when he assumed political power (Smith, 2015).

Unfortunately, upon assumption of office, Ali Modu Sheriff reneged on his promise of implementing the Sharia law in its entirety and this strained the relationship between Yusuf and the governor [International Crisis Group, 2014]. Again, Sheriff was said to dump a local gang called 'ECOMOG', which he allegedly utilized as thugs during campaigns and election. He then decided to join Yusuf thus, boosting Boko Haram's membership base and giving it a stronger voice to articulate vigorously its stance against the failure of Sheriff to implement the Sharia Law (Smith, 2015).

### **5.1.1 Structure and composition of Boko Haram**

Boko Haram is a sect that is philosophically rooted in the practice of orthodox Islam. Orthodox Islam to them detest Western education and working in the civil service (Onuoha, 2010). This clearly explains why the group is widely known as the Boko Haram, which literally means 'Western education is a sin' (Boyle, 2009). However, this notion was allegedly rejected by the acting leader of Boko Haram, Mallam Sanni Umaru in one of his statements:

*Boko Haram does not in any way mean 'Western education is a sin' as the infidel media continue to portray us. Boko Haram actually means 'Western Civilisation' is forbidden. The difference is that while the first gives the impression that we are opposed to formal education coming from the West ... which is not true, the second affirms our belief in the supremacy of Islamic culture (not education), for culture is broader, it includes education but not determined by Western education (Vanguard, 2009).*

However, the mission and philosophical stance of the group is clearly spelt out in one of the statements of the sect captured below:

*We want to reiterate that we are warriors who are carrying out Jihad (religious war) in Nigeria and our struggle is based on the traditions of the holy prophet. We will never accept any system of government apart from the one stipulated by Islam because that is the only way that the Muslims can be liberated. We do not believe in any system of government, be it traditional or orthodox, except the Islamic system which is why we will keep on fighting against democracy, capitalism, socialism and whatever. We will not allow the Nigerian Constitution to replace the laws that have been enshrined in the Holy Qur'an, we will not allow adulterated conventional education (Boko) to replace Islamic teachings. We will not respect the Nigerian government because it is illegal. We will continue to fight its military and the police because they are not protecting Islam. We do not believe in the Nigerian judicial system and we will fight anyone who assists the government in perpetrating illegalities (Boko Haram statement Leadership 2011).*

From the above statement the sect's ideological mission is quite conspicuous, as it is to overthrow the Nigerian state and then compel and enforce stringent Islamic Sharia law across all regions of the country. A member of the group pointed that the group's mission was to 'clean the Nigerian system which is soiled by Western education and maintain Sharia all over the country (Hazzad, 2009). Their motivation is stirred up from the conviction that the Nigerian state is being taken over by social vices, and so 'the best thing for a devout Muslim to do was to "migrate" from the morally bankrupt society to a secluded place and establish an ideal Islamic society devoid of political corruption and moral deprivation' (Akanji, 2009). Those who do not believe in this course were therefore tagged *kuffar* i.e. disbelievers; those who go against the truth] or *fasiqun* i.e. wrong-doers (DCCN, 2009). The sect has a unique mode of dressing. They typically wear turbans, full beards and live in communities (Onuoha, 2010).

The precise date of the emergence of the Boko Haram sect has raised a lot of controversy. Howbeit, based on the assertion of the Nigerian Director of Defence Information, Colonel Mohammed Yerima, the sect has been in existence since 1995, under the nomenclature of *Ahlulsunna wal'jama'ah hijra* (Taiwo and Olugbode, 2009). According to Temilola (2013), Boko Haram known as the *Jamatu Ahlis Sunna Lidda* was formed in 1995 in Northern Nigeria, purposely for



the propagation of the prophet doctrines and teachings. It was initially led by Abubakah Lawan, who later departed Nigeria for further studies at the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia handing over to Mohammed Yusuf as the leader. Onuoha (2010) averred that the sect has subsequently metamorphosed under different names such as the “Nigerian Taliban, Yusufiyyah sect, and Boko Haram”. He noted that the name ‘Nigerian Taliban’ is used derogatorily by the local people to condemn the philosophy and teachings of the sect. Though the sect is structured along the Taliban in Afghanistan, it had no link or dealings with them (Onuoha, 2010). Adesoji, (2010); Cline, (2011); Onuoha, (2010); Waldek & Jayaseka, (2011) all asserted that Boko Haram was formed in 2002 by a radical Islamic Ustaz named Mohammad Yusuf in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state. Mohammed Yusuf, born on the 29<sup>th</sup> of January 1970, in the village of Girgir in Jalasko local government of Yobe State, founded Boko Haram in 2002 in the city of Maiduguri with the sole aim of establishing sharia government in Borno State under then-Senator Ali Modu Sheriff (Adesoji 2010).

According to Onuoha (2010), he developed his radical ideological stance from the Quran schools he attended in Niger and Chad after he dropped out from secondary school. Yusuf’s radical stance generated discord among other moderate Islamic scholars like the late Jafa Adam, Yahaya Jingir, Sheik Abba Aji and himself as he was seen as an extremist. His association with the sect equally caused friction in his home as one of his wives revealed that they always quarreled with him for associating himself with the Yusufiyyah i.e. Boko Haram. Suffice it to note that earlier organizations with similar ideologies as had sprang up years before the emergence of Boko Haram. One example of such terrorist organizations is the Maitatsine Movement in Kano.

### **5.1.2 Maitatsine Movement in Kano**

In the 1980s, there was a movement with similar ideology to that of Boko Haram which caused a lot of upheaval and death toll in the north. This movement came into being as a result of the same prevalent situation which heralded Boko Haram as a group. This movement called Maitatsine was led by Mohammed Marwa, a Cameroonian living in Kano. He exploited the dwindling economic situation in northern Nigerian at the time to incite and kick start an insurgency in the 1970–80s. The group carried out its maiden attacks in Kano in December 1980 where Marwa was killed. This aggravated the crisis and made it spread further into Bulumkutu, a few kilometres away from

Maiduguri in October 1982, to Rigasa village and Kaduna city in Yola in March 1984 and into Gombe in April 1985 where it stopped, leading to a death toll of around 10,000 (Isichei, 1987). Marwa's major sermon was premised on purifying northern Nigeria off the corrupt ruling elites for the economy to be improved. This made it easy for him to recruit members who are majorly poor as they were readily convinced towards his course. This explains why he had mass followers because the people were tired of the tough situation despite the oil boom witnessed in the country and as such yearned for economic emancipation and justice, just like those in Fodio's era. This stance was reiterated by the federal government's commission of inquiry set up to investigate the Maitatsine uprising and disturbances in Kano. It averred that unemployment and economic distress among other factors are responsible for the emergence of the Maitatsine insurgency (Lubeck, 1985).

## **5.2 Patterns of Cross-Border Insurgency in the selected border communities in North-Eastern Nigeria**

Boko Haram insurgency has manifested in different forms across the North-Eastern Nigeria. As studies have shown, border communities are the first recipient of these dastardly acts carried out by the devilish sect. Salkida (2012) points out that communities attacked in the region are mostly border communities where life has been horrible, brutish and short-lived. Most of the attacks carried out by the sect are done across the borders of the country and that is why border communities suffers the most. All the respondents alluded to the fact that their communities have suffered a lot of attacks from the sect. They equally expressed their worries and fears of imminent attacks on their communities. Some of the respondents went ahead to mention in concrete terms the number of times such attacks have being carried out and as well counting their numerous losses in the process (Field trip November 2017). As indicated above, the manifestation of the Boko Haram attacks shows up in different form in the border communities.

In Michika and Mubi border communities of Adamawa State, the local population revealed the diverse ways in which Boko Haram attack manifest. These vary from suddenly shooting sporadically which make the people scatter all over the community, destruction of banks, police station and market places and burning of houses in the communities. According to AM-6 (January 2018):

*Boko Haram attack our community by shooting guns here and there. It just happened when some were in church and some in the market. They just started hearing gun shots and everybody started running helter-skelter. It happened one faithful Sunday, I can't remember the date. Before that day people were in fear and have the feelings that something like that may happen. The fear was there even before the attack.*

AMB-1 (November 2017) also said that

*They attacked on Wednesday, when they entered the market, they started shooting and by then they already attacked the Army Barracks and have captured it after this, the soldiers ran away and the insurgents came with their armored tanks and other weapons with which they bombed the police station and the prison, at this point every one ran out of town and no one was left.*

FGD-AMBW (November 2017) showed that the first time Boko Haram came into Mubi community, they started with shootings everywhere which led to a stampede of both the local residents and the soldiers themselves. Although they did not kill people yet at that time as they fired bullets into the air, they proceeded to the Military Barracks, and it was at this point that both the civilians and the soldiers (Military) had to take to their heels as the Joint Task Force (JTF) were not given the go ahead to fight back, they therefore decided to run away with us. The women noted that they were all hiding in the nearby bushes until members of the sect left the community. They noted further that they do not mind allowing the insurgents take away their belongings as their life is more important to them.

In the experience of AMB-4, Boko Haram attacks started manifesting with the killing of a few individuals in the community, and it was at this point that people became afraid and suspicious. Soon, they got information that the sect has started attacking communities in Borno State leading to the death of many including the inhabitants of those communities and members of the JTF. It was at this point the local population became apprehensive and finally the attack got to Mubi community. In the view of AMB-5, the Boko Haram did not come into the community as a group. They only enter like normal people before they start to shoot from different angles of the

community killing innocent inhabitants and burning down houses and churches. Many other respondents in the community attested to this point as well (AMB-6, FGD-AMBY, FGD-AMBV, November 2017).

The manifestation of the Boko Haram attacks in Gamboru-Ngala and Baga communities in Borno State is not in any way different. FGD-BGM pointed that when members of the sect came into the village, “they drove us out and started burning things in the village killing our women and children.” BG-1 added by saying that the community was not only attacked by the Boko Haram but that they carted away their food stuffs and farm produce that they met in different houses. FGD-BGY and FGD-BGC pointed out that members of the sect come into their village, chase out people, kill a lot of people and burnt down houses. They pointed the researcher’s attention to some buildings burnt down by Boko Haram during their attacks. It is such a horrible sight as some of them put up small huts for them to sleep in. In Baga community, BB-4 gave a comprehensive view on the manifestation of Boko Haram’s attacks in the community. He classified such to be full of chaos, pandemonium and wanton destruction of lives and properties. FGD-BBW averred that during attacks, “members of Boko Haram set many places in the community on fire even after they convinced us that they will not harm us but they later start to destroy places”. Members of the Civil Joint Task Force (CJTF) did not say less as they were of the view that Boko Haram members upon arrival in the community start to shoot at anybody they see be it the old, children, men and women while in the process those that can run, ran for safety while those that cannot were caught and shut immediately (FGD-BBC November 2017).

The same pattern is what is witnessed in Yunusari and Kanamma communities of Yobe state. YY-1, FGD-YYM, FGD-YYW, FGD-YYY, FGD-YYV, YK-1, YK-2, FGD-YKM, FGD-YKY, FGD-YKW, FGD-YKV (November 2017) alluded to the fact that Boko Haram’s attacks came with sudden sporadic gun shots leading to pandemonium all over the community. And at the end of such attacks many life and properties are always lost.

### **5.2.1 *Modus Operandi* of the Boko Haram during their attacks**

Boko Haram deploys different tactics in carry out attacks. This has been found out from the various attacks they have carried out across the North-Eastern region of Nigeria. These tactics vary based

on the way the sect have evolved over the years. When Boko Haram kick started their attacks in 2009, they used light weapons like machetes, sticks, bow and arrows but as they got wider support and strong capital base, all these were speedily replaced with sophisticated weapons, arms and bombs. According to the (Economist, 2011; Kira, 2011; Freeman, 2012), after much training gotten from affiliated terrorist groups, the Boko Haram switched from the use of ‘knives, machetes, bows and arrows and petrol bombs’ to the use of ‘suicide car bombings, improvised explosive devices used with such dramatic effect in Afghanistan and Iraq and synchronised assaults like those witnessed in Mumbai in November 2008’. This tactic greatly contributed to the casualties the sect suffered in the different open confrontations they had with the Nigerian Army after the sect declared a war on the Nigerian state (Aliyu, et’al, 2015).

Information gotten from the local population attests to the above stated. In Michika and Mubi communities, the local population explained the different tactics utilized by the Boko Haram based on the different attacks they have experienced. The experiences given shows that they have been attacked both in the day and in the night. AM-1 recalled one of the attacks experienced on the 9<sup>th</sup> of September 2014, between 9am to 10am. He termed it an hour of sorrow as members of the sect came into the community with many cars (Hilux) and motorcycle and were shooting sporadically. They killed many residents of the community. FGD-AMW gave the same view. They averred that they see members of the Boko Haram come in with cars (Hilux) and motorcycles en-mass while some of them who are already within the community join them in the attack. The religious based organizations such as the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and JAMA’ATUL NASRIL ISLAM both said that members of the sect entered the village at night while others lay ambush in surrounding bushes for villages who want to run. FGD-AMY gave a different dimension. According to them:

*The Boko Haram came into our village to live with us so that they can be able to spy the activities of the village, they spy from places even on the mountain tops. And they also made use of our own people and got series of information from them. They even paid some of the people to buy their interest. They were also putting on soldiers’ uniform and they got the people very confused.*

FGD-AMM, FGD-AMV equally alluded to this fact by saying that Boko Haram send spies to check on their activities within the community. They noted that, they employ different methods in carrying out their attacks. Firstly, they target all forms of security that may want to repel their attacks before they start to burn houses and kill innocent people.

According to the AMB-1 (November 2017):

*A few members of the Boko-Haram came into the community and lived among us until when they felt they can attack us. They started by shooting and this made all the community members run away. This was the tactic they used in entering the community before they started to destroy a lot of things. They went to the Emirs Palace, destroyed it and took away his properties, they also entered the 'Hakimi's' house where they met his son and they killed him. In the process, they looted and as well destroyed a lot of properties worth over ₦10billion. They equally burnt churches, Mosques, entered peoples' houses and took away their animals and their belongings.*

Also, FGD-AMBW explained how Boko Haram has been carrying out its activities in their community. They pointed that the sect started by coming into their community to kidnap individuals. While some were kidnaped in their different offices some were kidnaped during events and later found to have been slaughtered and dumped somewhere in the community. Others were never found dead or alive. They further said that

*As time went on, we began to hear that Boko-Haram were in Madagali and Gulak, which means that they were getting close. Because of this news, many left the community under insinuation that Boko Haram will soon get to the community but fortunately, they did not show up and this made the local population return to the community. Shortly after our return, Boko Haram came on a Wednesday and attacked us unawares. With this they were able to capture Mubi (FGD-AMBV November 2017).*

On the other hand, AMB-4 explained how crafty the sect is in terms of how they operate. They discovered that Boko haram came in and lived with them without people knowing it. They lived

like normal people to the extent that they did business with them until they were able to mingle with the local population and the community itself such that they knew the nooks and crannies of Mubi, and before they knew it they were familiar with the whole community thus making it easy for them to attack the community. This conforms with what AMB-5 said. He said that members of the Boko Haram disguised themselves like brothers to the local population. They presented themselves like visitors who mean no harm, and this made the people accepted and accommodated them. Thereafter, they began acquiring information from the people. This information was what was used against the people during attacks. According to FGD-AMBM, FGD-AMBW, and FGD-AMBV the Boko Haram came into the Mubi community as merchants, sellers and herdsmen who meant no harm. Members of the sect came into Mubi and associated themselves with the villagers like normal people without the knowledge of the people that they are evil. Not so long they started to kill and destroy properties in the community. They advanced by using female suicide bombers in purdah who walked straight into public places like the market before detonating the bomb which will lead to a lot of casualties. Equally, they use religious teachings and sentiments by claiming that western education is forbidden as it has no good to offer. Based on this, they were getting the people convinced that western education has brought nothing but harm and stagnation to the people.

Moreover, the tactics employed by the Boko Haram in attacking in Gamboru-Ngala and Baga communities of Borno state are quite similar to the preceding. FGD-BGM revealed that the Boko Haram come into the community from different directions with the aim of surrounding it and with this no one can escape. Anyone who tries to run, and hide is picked up and killed. FGD-BGW alluded that they enter our village with cars (i.e. Hilux) and motor-cycles. This puts a lot of fear in them that they must hide themselves in their houses as women. This was also the description given by the village head. He only added that once they come into the community, they patrol the community like government security forces (BG-1 November 2017). FGD-BGY pointed out that most often members of the sect appear in military uniform (Khaki) inside a lot of Hilux and on motorcycles. They equally noted that they come into the community in the night when people are already sleeping, and they start to fire leaving no way of escape for the local population.

In Baga community BB-1 reiterated that members of the sects at the on-set came in as friends. They announced they will not attack the community, and this gave the local population confidence to remain in the community only to renege on their words later with an attack on the community. He regretted further that if they had known they would have left the community with their families and some of them would have still be alive till today but unfortunately, they are dead. According to BB-5 who gave the timing of Boko Haram attacks, he said the insurgents came into the village at night between 9pm and 12am and opened fire on the people leaving everyone to run for his or her life. BB-4 noted that the attack started on a Wednesday and many Christians and Muslims were killed, and a lot of properties and homes were bombed. According to FGD-BBC the Boko Haram also attack the community in the morning. They recalled a particular one in which they came into the community very early in the morning and started pursuing the local population. The military present in the community tried to repel the attack but the Boko Haram were too much for the JTF to fight. Despite that the CJTF joined forced with the JTF, they were not able to combat the Boko Haram forces (FGD-BBC November 2017).

The trend was slightly different in the Yusufari and Kanamma communities of Yobe state. Harmonizing all the responses, YY-1, FGD-YYM, FGD-YYW, FGD-YYY, FGD-YYV, YK-1, YK-2, FGD-YKM, FGD-YKY, FGD-YKW, FGD-YKV pointed that Boko Haram members initially came into the communities as preachers. They started by gathering the local population with the motive of preaching to them, but members of the sect then suddenly change by surrounding the people and at this point those who have laid ambush in bushes around the community get a signal then they begin to shoot sporadically, and because the people have been surrounded, they cannot run anywhere. This is when they then start their operation. The men and boys are taken away to join them to fight. They also enter their houses and cart away their groceries and farm produce for survival in their camps However, a youth in Yusufari community recalled his personal experience with members of the sect during one of their attacks. He said that the attack was witnessed on a Monday. They broke into their home, killed his father and took him away. He was taken round the community amongst other jobless youths and they were offered the opportunity to work with them with a fantastic salary. This looked a great opportunity to some of the youths and they followed them (FGD-YYY November 2017).



Moreover, on the 24<sup>th</sup> January 2019, the Boko Haram struck in a community in Yobe state. A vigilante said that “as you know, yesterday was our market day in Gaidam, so they took advantage and came in large convoys and started shooting. There was confusion in the whole town. They overpowered the troops and the soldiers eventually fled. We lost two persons and several others were injured. Some persons were also abducted” (Sahara Reporters, 2019). He noted that they (the insurgents) burnt down houses and looted food items. In like manner, on the 13<sup>th</sup> February 2019, members of the sect attacked the convoy of the Borno state governor while he was on his way to Gamboru-Ngala a border town and one of the communities selected for the study in Borno state (Sahara Reporters, 2019).

### **5.2.2 Early warning signals received by border communities prior to the Boko Haram attacks**

At this juncture, it is pertinent to identify if there were some early warning signs in some border communities prior to the Boko Haram attack. According to the National Institute of Disaster Management (2014) Early Warning System (EWS) is defined “as a set of capacities needed to generate and disseminate timely and meaningful warning information of the possible extreme events or disasters (e.g. floods, drought, fire, earthquake and tsunamis) that threatens people’s lives” (East Asia Summit, 2014). Early warning is useful for averting and avoiding conflict. Such information is to assist individuals, communities and organizations vulnerable to prepare and act aptly and in sufficient time to reduce the likelihood of harm, loss or risk. It also assists in reducing or preventing casualty in any occurrence of violence. In this wise, it then becomes imperative to inquire if there were some early warning signals in the affected border communities to warrant the high toll of not just the humanitarian situation created but the high rate of death rate.

In Michika and Mubi communities, there was a divergent view. Some local population averred that they got no early signal while some alluded that they got some signals. They gave instances that corroborate this fact. FGD-AMY gave two different views. While some alluded to the fact that there was no warning prior to the Boko Haram attacks, some said though they got warning, which came in the form of rumours that members of the sect were somewhere close and close and could attack soon but they did not believe such. The experience of AM-4 depicted that there was a warning as they saw many people running from the neighboring village for safety. According

to AM-7, there was an attack on the neighbouring village and as a result they warned the villagers to stay alert and be watchful. It was noted that before the village was attacked, a First Bank branch was destroyed, and an attack carried out in a neighboring village. Some said they saw the Boko Haram flag hoisted in the neighbouring village. This presupposes the fact that there was a signal (FGD-AMM November 2017). In fact, AM-5 said that some relatives in neighbouring village which was attacked warned them that they were likely going to be attacked soon as they got a tip off that Boko Haram has an intention of capturing Mubi and to achieve that, they will have to pass through Michika and with this an attack is imminent.

In Mubi town, a group of women attested that they got a warning signal. In their words, they said that

*“we received some warning but this warning as I told you earlier on, when we heard of their first coming we ran away but it turned out to be mere speculations, but when the warning came the second time, we heard that they were somewhere close and we thought it was going to be like the first time. There was warning but not officially, only as rumours”* (FGD-AMW November 2017).

AMB-4 equally reiterated this fact. In his words

*Yes, we were getting warnings like rumors and there was fear all over, on some instances, people will even run but nothing will happen because we are not sure of their coming and we didn't accept such rumors. We were just living in fear sometimes we run away just like that and then come back, until the real calamity befell us* (AMB-4 November 2017).

Equally, the response of AMB-1 aligns with the above points. Moreover, he went further to give the specific dates. He said that

*one month before the invasion of Mubi, there was rumour that Boko-Haram were coming, then people just started running away, it was around September, when we first ran, so after this, we realize that the news was just mere speculation so we come back and stayed all through September so it was after we came back that the insurgents decide to attack Mubi on the 29<sup>th</sup> of October, 2014. By the time they*

*eventually attacked, we didn't get any warning or rumors of their coming, we only heard their gun shots on that fateful Wednesday signifying their presence in town and the market place which got people confused and running helter-skelter (AMB-1 November 2017).*

A group of youths also lend their voice to this by agreeing that they usually get signals from their neighbors who had suffered attacks in Madagali and Michika before the attack got to them in Mubi. Members of the vigilante also said that there were signals. They pointed out that they were alerted by inhabitants of Maraba as members of the Boko Haram came in through the village and proceeded to Mubi (FGD-AMBY November 2017).

The same trend continued in Gamboru-Ngala and Baga communities of Borno State. Respondents gave varying responses. While some said there was no early warning sign, some said there were some sort of signals which came as a warning to the local population. According to BG-1, FGD-BGM, FGD-BGY, BB-1, BB-4, FGD-BBW, FGD-BBY, BB-5, BB-6 it was clear that there were no warning signals at all as the Boko Haram just carry out attacks unannounced in Baga community.

According to FGD-BGW, as some said the community got no alert of any sort prior to the attacks a few said there was a time their neighbours informed them that they got some signals of an intended attack by the sect which did not eventually occurred (FGD-BGW 2017). Equally FGD-BGY noted that “sometimes, they give us warning, for example if the place they are about to attack has some military personnel, they will inform them before attacking that particular place. In short, some community get warning while some don't get any warning and we are part of those community that didn't get any warning. Sometimes they will attack like five persons, kill four and send the remaining one to go and deliver the message of their coming on a specific day” (FGD-BGY 2017).

It was also affirmatively pointed out that they got some warnings from surrounding communities. And all they could do is to be vigilant while hoping and praying that such will not happen, but it eventually happened. There was little which we can do about it as the members of the sect come in fully armed. In fact, they are more armed than officers of the JTF and that is why they always overpower the JTF whenever they attack (FGD-BBC November 2017).

In the communities of Yusufari and Kanamma in Yobe state, the responses were unique. According to YY-1, FGD-YYM, FGD-YYW, FGD-YYY, FGD-YYV, YK-1, YK-2, FGD-YKM, FGD-YKY, FGD-YKW, FGD-YKV, the local population got warnings signals before they were attacked by the Boko Haram. This warning came mostly in form of letter addressed to the communities. While interacting with members of the JTF, they negated the assertion of the local people as they asserted that they got no glimpse of the Boko Haram attack. They said further that members of the sect attack whenever they want to and that is why they are always alert and combat ready as they can strike anytime.

In all, the question that readily comes to mind is that as some of the communities had a glimpse of the Boko Haram coming to attack why did they waited for them and ended up being victims? This question was posed by the researcher and the responses across board was that they have no place to run to as their homes remain their homes. Some of those who left the communities came back as all they live for abound within the communities. This is in line with the assertion of the Humanitarian Review, (2017) which reported that around 200,000 Nigerians taking refuge in neighbouring states of Cameroun, Chad and Niger as refugees are seen returning to their various homes and communities.

### **5.3 Nefarious activities of Boko Haram**

Boko Haram's first attack occurred on the 24 December 2003 when its members took up arms against security forces in Yobe State. It attacked police stations and government buildings in the towns of Kanamma and Geiam in Yobe State. These buildings were occupied by members of the sect for some days, hoisting the flag of Afghanistan's Taliban movement over the building top. After some days they were dislodged by a joint operation of soldiers and police and in the process, 18 members of the group were killed while several dozens were arrested (Suleiman, 2007). On 31 December 2003 Boko Haram members left the village and diffused into other northern states after the inscription of the word 'Taliban' on a capture vehicle (Morgan, 2009). In 2004 it calved out a base called 'Afghanistan' in Kanamma village of Yobe State, a border town close to the Republic of Niger (Awofadeji, 2009).

The activities of the sect became more terrifying from 2004 when students of tertiary institutions in both states of Yobe and Borno such as the University of Maiduguri, Ramat Polytechnic and

Federal Polytechnic etc, who are members of the sect withdrew from school, tore their certificates into shreds and joined the group for Quaranic lessons and sermons (Lawal, 2009). On 21 September 2004 members carried out attacks on Gwoza and Bama police stations in Borno State, leaving many policemen dead, setting ablaze Gwoza police station and carting away arms and ammunition. A few weeks later the police launched a reprisal attack on the sect and in the process, 24 members were killed, and 22 rifles and other ammunitions were recovered from the operation (Alanamu et'al, 2006). Aliyu Tishau, a major member of the group, disclosed in an interview with Africa Independent Television (AIT) in 2011 that:

*What we are demanding is that those states that have independently declared their states Sharia states should implement it to the letter. Have you seen Sharia cut the hand of someone who steals a cow head, while someone who corruptly enriches himself is left to go free? They [northern political elites] have chased away local prostitutes and brought in international red light prostitutes to replace them. They have also banned local alcoholic drinks, yet they drink imported spirits in their respective government houses. Is that Sharia? They are insincere, so they must be effective in the implementation of Sharia. Sharia is being abused.*<sup>15</sup>

It was observed that while Yusuf lived in material comfort, most of his followers lived in utter poverty (Lawal, 2009) and still had to pay a daily levy of 100 naira to Yusuf their leader. This formed the basic source of funding for the group, in addition to donations from politicians [most especially the former governor of Borno state Ali Modu Sheriff who was alleged to be a major sponsor of the sect), government officials, individuals and organizations within Nigeria (NDIA, 2009). Ali Modu Sheriff was alleged to be a major sponsor because upon assuming office in 2003 he appointed Buji Foi a prominent disciple of Yusuf, into his cabinet as the Commissioner for Religious Affairs while Yusuf was equally appointed onto a Hajj committee which was responsible for selecting Muslims for lesser Hajj (Comolli, 2015). These appointments were seen to be a gateway for Boko Haram to have access to state funds to support their course. It was perceived

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<sup>15</sup> Sahara Reporters, 'The Punch interview: I told the Inspector General of Police in advance that Abuja would be bombed, says Boko Haram leader', 21 September 2011, <http://saharareporters.com/interview/punch-interview-i-told-inspector-general-police-advanceabuja-would-be-bombed-says-boko-ha?page2>. Retrieved on 21<sup>st</sup> September, 2017.

that it is with this the sect was able to acquire its first set of arms and ammunitions (Walker, 2012). The sect was also alleged to be receiving funds from external sources. In 2007, Mohammed Yusuf and Mohammed Bello Damagun an Ustaz who was a member of the group called ‘Nigerian Taliban’ (Pham, 2007) were arrested and tried for offenses related to terrorism. Mohammed Damagun was arraigned before a federal high court in Abuja on three count charges such as “being a member of the Nigerian Taliban, receiving a sum of US\$300 000 from al-Qaeda to recruit and train Nigerians in Mauritania for terrorism, and aiding terrorists in Nigeria. Mohammed Yusuf was arraigned on five count charges, among which was receiving funds from al-Qaeda network in Pakistan to recruit terrorists who would attack residences of foreigners, mostly Americans residing in Nigeria (Suleiman, 2007). Though, Yusuf was discharged and acquitted, he and some of his members were re-arrested in 2008 by security operatives and handed over to the Inspector-General of Police for prosecution. They were granted bail by an Abuja High Court on the 20<sup>th</sup> of January 2009 (Taiwo and Olugbode, 2009). Also, between 2007 and April 2009 some prominent members of the group such as Bukar Shekau from the Niger Republic were arrested in Borno and Kano and were either handed over to the police for prosecution or deported. Regrettably, these members always found their way back into Nigeria often through the porous borders.

The continual arrest of Boko Haram suspects most especially suspected leaders and the refusal of the Bauchi state government to allow the sect freedom to freely and publicly advance its course and recruit more people led to a massive revolt by the sect. The state government purposely denied them the opportunity as it was perceived that an outbreak of religious violence was imminent in view of the radical ideology of the sect. Crisis started in Bauchi, Bauchi State on the 26<sup>th</sup> July and lasted till 30<sup>th</sup> July 2009 (The Economist, 2009). In the process of retaliation members of the sect attacked and destroyed the Dutsen Tanshi police station in Bauchi. This met a formidable response from soldiers and armed policemen who warded off the attack on the police station and nabbed members of the sect in neighbouring vicinity. President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua also authorized the immediate deployment of all the national security agencies to all neighbouring states to contain the crisis. Though security personnel were placed on full alert to make sure that the attacks by members of the sect do not spread elsewhere (This Day, 2009), it eventually filtered into neighbouring states few hours after the presidential order was given. The attack on the Dutsen

Tanshi police station was the “curtain raiser” for a series of civil unrest that spread across four states such as Bauchi, Kano, Yobe and Borno in the succeeding days.

Attacks were carried out by the sects on police stations in Damaturu, the capital of Yobe State, in the early hours of 27<sup>th</sup> of July. This forced the state government to impose a curfew to curb the crisis from escalating and filtering to neighbouring states. In Potiskum town, fundamentalists launched an attack which destroyed many public properties and a police area command. In Kano State, Wudil police station was attacked leaving five policemen injured, including CSP Sagir Idris, a Divisional Police Officer (DPO). Many weapons such as rifles and AK47 were carted away by members of the sect. Three of the fundamentalists were killed and 33 others arrested, including some Chadians who could speak neither English nor Hausa (This Day, 2009). This reveals that foreigners from neighboring Niger and Chad constitute members of the sect.

In Maiduguri, Borno State, members of the sect attacked the police headquarters and some government structures. The Police Mobile College was also attacked, and in the process, nine houses were burnt and some policemen killed. They equally attacked churches and mosques, burning down over 30 vehicles in the process 19 at the Deeper Life Bible Church, three at the Celestial Church, five at the National Evangelical Church Mission and 11 at Elysian Yan’Uwa (Lawal, 2009). Lamisula and Gamboru police stations were as well raised down by the sect. The attacks were so intense in the city of Maiduguri within the five days of attacks because Borno State is adjudged to be the sect’s stronghold. However, the mayhem was eventually controlled by Operation Flush which was a joint operation of the Nigerian military and the police, coordinated by the Borno State special security task force. The operation, led by Colonel Ben Ahanotu on the 28<sup>th</sup> July, carried out a heavy blitz on Mohammed Yusuf’s residence leading to the capture of Mohammed Yusuf in his residence where he was hiding in a goat pen two days later. Unfortunately, after some hours in police detention, Yusuf was killed in what could be termed to be an extrajudicial killing, even though, police officials maintained that he was killed in the process of absconding from police net (Schulze, 2009). The death of Yusuf generated a controversy over how he died. Howbeit, the commander of the operation, Colonel Ben Ahanotu, reiterated that he personally handed over Yusuf to the police chief in Maiduguri after his arrest (BBC, 2009). This

prompted late President Yar’Adua to order an investigation of the killing of Yusuf’s death by the National Security Advisor (Onuoha, 2010).

A retaliatory attack was carried out by Yusuf’s followers. This led to the death of many soldiers, five prison warders and 28 policemen. It equally led to massive displacement of over 3,500 people across various part of the region, over 392 women widowed and over 1,264 children orphaned. Government and private Properties destroyed consist of “48 buildings, three primary schools, over 12 churches and a magistrate’s court” (African Independent Television, 2009). In addition, “security forces freed about 180 women and children believed to have been deceived by their husbands and teachers that they were in Maiduguri to attend a religious function” (Mukairu and Muhammed, 2009). Table 5.1 below helps to give a better appraisal of the different attacks witnessed in the North-Eastern region, the killings and the destructions of properties these attacks led to in concrete terms.

**Table 5. 1 Cross-Border insurgent attacks carried out in the North-Eastern Nigeria between 2003-2017**

<b>S/N</b>	<b>DATE OF ATTACK</b>	<b>STATE</b>	<b>PLACE OF ATTACK</b>	<b>OF CASUALTY/ IMPACT</b>
1	23 <sup>rd</sup> – 31 <sup>st</sup> December, 2003	Yobe State	Police stations in Geidam and Kanamma towns of Yobe State	Several police men were killed, and weapons and vehicles carted away
2	23 <sup>rd</sup> September, 2004	Borno State	Police stations in Gwoza and Bama towns of Borno State	Four policemen, two civilians were killed and ammunition carted away
3	10 <sup>th</sup> October, 2004	Borno State	Kala-Balge town on the border with Chad	12 policemen were taken hostage and were never found



4	26 <sup>th</sup> July, 2009	Borno State	Maiduguri	Many members of the sects were killed including the leader Mohammed Yusuf. A mosque was also burnt down.
5	7 <sup>th</sup> September, 2010	Bauchi State	A prison where Boko Haram suspects were kept	Four people were killed in the process. This includes a soldier, a policeman and two residents.
6	24 <sup>th</sup> – 27 <sup>th</sup> December, 2010	Plateau and Borno States	Jos and Maiduguri	Many people were killed.
7	29 <sup>th</sup> December, 2010	Borno State	Maiduguri	Eight people were shot dead
8	27 <sup>th</sup> May, 2011	Borno State	A police station, a police barracks and a bank in Damboa town near the border with Chad	Eight people were killed. This include four police men and four civilians
9	29 <sup>th</sup> May, 2011	Bauchi State	A beer garden in a military barracks	Thirteen people were killed while 33 people were wounded.
10	6 <sup>th</sup> June, 2011	Borno State	Biu town	A Muslim cleric Ibrahim Birkuti who detest the sect was shot dead in front of his house.

11	7 <sup>th</sup> 2011	June, Borno State	A church and two police posts in Maiduguri	14 people were killed.
12	16 <sup>th</sup> 2011	June, Federal Capital Territory [FCT]	National Police Headquarters in Abuja	Two deaths were recorded.
13	20 <sup>th</sup> 2011	June, Katsina State	A police station and a bank in Kankara	Five policemen and two civilians were killed.
14	27 <sup>th</sup> 2011	June, Borno State	A beer garden in Maiduguri	25 persons were killed and several injured.
15	25 <sup>th</sup> August, 2011	Adamawa State	Two police stations and two banks in Gombi	Seven policemen and nine civilians were killed.
16	26 <sup>th</sup> August, 2011	FCT	United Nations Building in Abuja	23 people were killed.
17	4 <sup>th</sup> September , 2011	Borno State	Zinnari area of Maiduguri	A Muslim cleric Malam Dala was shot dead in front of his house.
18	12 <sup>th</sup> September , 2011	Bauchi State	A police station and a bank in Misau	Four policemen and three other people were killed

19	13 <sup>th</sup> September , 2011	Borno State	An ambush by Boko Haram members in Maiduguri	Four soldiers were shot and seriously wounded.
20	17 <sup>th</sup> September , 2011	Borno State	Maiduguri	Babakura Fugu, bother-in-law to late Mohammed Yusuf was shot dead in front of his house two days after attending a peace meeting with Nigeria's ex-President Olusegun Obasanjo.
21	1 <sup>st</sup> October, 2011	Borno State	Baga market, Maiduguri	A butcher and his colleague were targeted and killed at Baga market  The same day, three civilians were killed in a shoot-out between Boko Haram members and soldiers when fire was opened on military patrol vehicle on its way to deliver food to soldiers at a checkpoint.
22	3 <sup>rd</sup> October, 2011	Borno State	Baga market	Three civilians including a drug seller, a tea seller and a passer-by were killed.
23	23 <sup>rd</sup> October, 2011	Kaduna State	A police station and two banks in Saminaka.	Two people including a policeman and a bank security guard were killed.
24	23 <sup>rd</sup> October, 2011	Kaduna State	A market in Katari town.	Two people were killed in the attacked.

25	25 <sup>th</sup> October, 2011	Yobe State	Damaturu	A policeman was shot dead in his house.
26	29 <sup>th</sup> October, 2011	Borno State	Bulabulin Ngarnam area of Maiduguri	A Muslim cleric Sheikh Ali Jana'a was shot dead.
27	2 <sup>nd</sup> November , 2011	Borno State	Maiduguri main market	A soldier was shot dead while on duty.
28	4 <sup>th</sup> November , 2011	Borno State	Maiduguri	Former Borno State governor's motorcade was attacked on his way from the airport to the government house.
29	9 <sup>th</sup> November , 2011	Borno State	A police station and the office of the Federal Road Safety Commission [FRSC], Maina Village	The two structures were destroyed but no life was lost.
30	26 <sup>th</sup> November , 2011	Yobe State	A police station, six churches, a shopping complex, a beer parlour, a high court, a local	These government structures were destroyed with 11 cars destroyed. No life was lost but three policemen and a civilian were wounded.

			council building in Geidam town	
31	27 <sup>th</sup> November , 2011	Borno State	Maiduguri	A protocol officer in the office of the Borno state governor was shot dead on his motorcycle while driving home.
32	4 <sup>th</sup> December, 2011	Bauchi State	A police station and two banks in Azare	A policeman, a soldier and a civilian were killed.
33	4 <sup>th</sup> December, 2011	Borno State	A wedding ceremony in Maiduguri	The groom and a guest were killed.
34	7 <sup>th</sup> December, 2011	Kaduna State	Oriyapata District of Kaduna city	Eight people were killed in the attack.
35	13 <sup>th</sup> December, 2011	Borno State	A military checkpoint in Maiduguri	10 were killed and 30 got injured in the gun duel.
36	17 <sup>th</sup> December, 2011	Kano State	A raid on the hideout of Boko Haram leader in Darmanawa area	Three police officers and four civilians were killed. 14 Boko Haram suspects were arrested while huge number of arms, ammunitions and bombs were seized.

37	22 <sup>nd</sup> December, 2011	Borno and Yobe States	Maiduguri and a police building in Potiskum	20 people were killed in Maiduguri while four policemen and one civilian were killed in Potiskum.
38	25 <sup>th</sup> December, 2011	Niger State Yobe State Plateau State	Saint Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla town, a suicide bomber attack on a military convoy at the gate of the State Security Service [SSS] headquarters in Damaturu and a church in the Ray Field area of Jos	42 worshippers were killed in the Madalla attack, three SSS officers and the suicide bomber a Boko Haram member were killed in Damaturu while a policeman was killed in Jos.
39	28 <sup>th</sup> December, 2011	Adamawa State	A beer parlour in Mubi town	No life was lost but 15 people were injured.
40	30 <sup>th</sup> December, 2011	Borno State	A military check- point in Maiduguri	Four Muslims worshippers who just left the Mosque after attending Friday prayers were killed.
41	3 <sup>rd</sup> January, 2012	Jigawa State	A police station on Birniwa town	A teenage girl was killed and a police man wounded.

42	5 <sup>th</sup> January, 2012	Gombe State Adamawa State	A church in Gombe city and a hotel in Mubi	Six worshippers were killed and 10 other wounded in Gombe city while five people were killed in a hotel in Mubi.
42	6 <sup>th</sup> January, 2012	Adamawa State	A church in Yola and an area in Mubi town	Eight worshippers were killed in Yola while 17 Christian mourners mourning their relatives killed in an attack on a hotel on the previous day were shot dead in Mubi Town.
43	7 <sup>th</sup> January, 2012	Borno State	Biu town	Three Christian pokers were killed and seven wounded.
44	9 <sup>th</sup> January, 2012	Borno State	Biu town	An SSS officer and his civilian friend were killed after leaving the Mosque.
45	10 <sup>th</sup> January, 2012	Yobe State	A beer garden in Damaturu	Five policemen, two other people and a teenage girl were killed.
46	11 <sup>th</sup> January, 2012	Yobe State	A filling station in Potiskum	Four Christians were killed as they stopped to buy fuel.
47	13 <sup>th</sup> January, 2012	Adamawa State and Gombe State	Pubs in Yola and Gombe city	A police man and three others were killed while two others were injured.

48	17 <sup>th</sup> January, 2012	Borno State	A military check-point and a raid on a Boko Haram hideout in Maiduguri	Two soldiers and four Boko Haram gunmen were killed in the attack on the military check-point while soldiers apprehended six prominent member of the sect during the raid on their hideout.
49	20 <sup>th</sup> January, 2012	Kano State	Multiple bomb explosion in Kano	226 people were killed and several others injured.
50	26 <sup>th</sup> January, 2012	Kano State	An explosion in Sabon Gari area	Many people were injured and many commercial buses were damaged.
51	7 <sup>th</sup> February, 2012	Kaduna State	Army Headquarters in Kaduna	A Boko Haram member who disguised and dressed in a military uniform blew up himself and died in the process.
52	7 <sup>th</sup> February, 2012	Kano State	Kano market and military barracks	Five people were killed.
53	15 <sup>th</sup> February, 2012	Kogi State	Korton Karfi prison	A warder was killed while 199 inmates were freed in the process.
54	8 <sup>th</sup> April, 2012	Kaduna State	A church was bombed on Easter Day	38 people were killed in the attack.



55	29 <sup>th</sup> April, 2012	Kano State	Bayero University	Two teaching staff member, one non-teaching and 15 Christians were killed.
56	17 <sup>th</sup> June, 2012	Kaduna State	Random attacks on different churches	12 people were killed while 80 people were injured.
57	7 <sup>th</sup> August, 2012	Kogi State	Attack on a branch of Deeper Life Church	19 people were killed.
58	24 <sup>th</sup> November, 2012	Kaduna State	A bomb attack on St. Andrew Anglican Church situated in the Armed Forces Command and Staff College, Jaji	15 people died in the process.
59	25 <sup>th</sup> December, 2012	Borno State	Attacks on Mosques in Maiduguri	56 Christians were killed.
60	29 <sup>th</sup> September, 2013	Yobe State	Attack on Giba College	Over 50 students were killed.
61	14 <sup>th</sup> March, 2014	Borno State	Giwa military cantonment was attacked	Some Boko Haram members detained were released though some were re-arrested.

62	14 <sup>th</sup> April, 2014	Borno State	Government Girls Secondary School was attacked in Chibok	276 female students were abducted.
63	14 <sup>th</sup> April, 2014	FCT, Abuja	Bomb blast in a Motor Park at Nyanya	75 people were killed while 200 were injured.
64	31 <sup>st</sup> October, 2014	Gombe State	Bomb blast in a central bus station in Gombe city	Eight people were killed, and 17 people were injured.
65	28 <sup>th</sup> November, 2014	Kano State	Multiple suicide bomb explosions and gun attacks at Kano Central Mosque	35 Muslims died and 157 injured in the process.
66	6 <sup>th</sup> December, 2014	Niger State	An attack on Minna Prison	164 inmates were released.
67	3 <sup>rd</sup> – 7 <sup>th</sup> January, 2015	Borno State	Widespread killings in Baga	Over 2000 people were killed, properties were also destroyed, and the town was taken over by the Boko Haram sect.
68	18 <sup>th</sup> January, 2015	Cameroun	Attacks on villages in Northern Cameroun	Three people were killed, and 80 people kidnapped.

69	16 <sup>th</sup> June, 2015	Chad	Bomb explosions in the Police Headquarters and Police Academy in N'Djamena	24 people died and over 100 people injured.
70	24 <sup>th</sup> March, 2016	Adamawa State	Sabongari village	14 women and two girls were kidnapped.
71	6 <sup>th</sup> June, 2016	Niger Republic	Bosso Town	30 Nigeriens and two Nigerian soldiers were killed while Boko Haram fighters took over the town leading to a mass exodus of about 50,000 dwellers.
72	28 <sup>th</sup> July, 2016	Borno State	An attack on humanitarian convoy in Kawuri	Two soldiers and three civilians were injured.
72	29 <sup>th</sup> October, 2016	Borno State	Bomb attacks in Maiduguri	Nine people died and 24 got injured.
73	5 <sup>th</sup> November, 2016	Borno State	A military barrack in Mallam Fatori	While an Army Lieutenant Colonel and four soldiers were killed, four soldiers got injured.
74	13 <sup>th</sup> May, 2017	Borno State	A twin suicide attack on University of Maiduguri (UNIMAID)	A security guard Mr. Daniel Musa was killed in the process.

75	16 <sup>th</sup> May, 2017	Borno State	Suicide bombers strike in Shuwari and Mandari villages of Konduga LGA.	Some lives were lost including the suicide bomber.
76	8 <sup>th</sup> June, 2017	Borno State	Three suicide attacks were carried out on Jiddari/ Polo general area of Maiduguri Metropolis.	13 people were killed while 24 people were injured.
77	19 <sup>th</sup> June, 2017	Borno State	An attack was carried out on Kofa village.	17 persons including five suicide bombers died while 11 people were injured.
78	20 <sup>th</sup> June, 2017	Borno State	An ambush was laid by members of the sect as the remains of late Seargent Rahila Antakirya was being conveyed to Lassa village in Askira -Uba LGA for burial.	While scores were killed, 14 women mostly police officers were kidnapped.
79	25 <sup>th</sup> June, 2017	Borno State	Attack was carried out on UNIMAID and	16 lives were lost including a UNIMAID security officer.

			surrounding communities of Kaleri, Muna Garage general area.	
80	7 <sup>th</sup> July, 2017	Borno State	A suicide attack carried out in UNIMAID	Two suicide bombers were killed.
81	12 <sup>th</sup> July, 2017	Borno State	An attack on Molai Kura area of Maiduguri Metropolis.	12 CJTF members, four suicide bombers and seven villagers were killed while 23 others were injured.
82	16 <sup>th</sup> July, 2017	Borno State	A clash on a piece of grazing land in Maiduguri.	A life was lost and another injured.
83	25 <sup>th</sup> July, 2017	Borno State	An ambush was laid for a federal government envoy on their return from an oil exploration mission in Bornoyesu village of Magumeri LGA.	While 20 soldiers, 16 CJTF, and five UNIMAID staff were killed, scores were injured and three UNIMAID staff were abducted.

84	1 <sup>st</sup> August, 2017	Adamawa State	An attack on Mildu village in Madagali LGA.	While seven inhabitants were killed and many injured, the village was set on fire.
85	8 <sup>th</sup> August, 2017	Borno State	An attack on fishermen in Baga in Kukawa LGA.	31 fishermen were killed.
86	8 <sup>th</sup> August, 2017	Borno State	An attack carried out in Duguri and Dabar-Wanzam border.	While 17 people were killed in Badar-Wanzam border, 14 people were killed in Duguri.
87	23 <sup>rd</sup> October, 2017	Borno State	Three female suicide bombers attacked Maiduguri.	13 people lost their lives and 16 people were injured.
88	26 <sup>th</sup> October, 2017	North-Eastern Nigeria	A clash between the CJTF and members of Boko Haram during their raid on a military base and as well as a loot on villages.	Six soldiers were killed in the process.
89	30 <sup>th</sup> October, 2017	Nigeria and Cameroon	A suicide attack in Cameroon and Nigeria.	16 people were killed.

90	30 <sup>th</sup> October, 2017	North- Eastern Nigeria.	An overnight attack on a village where many members of the sect were apprehended.	Eleven people were slaughtered overnight.
91	1 <sup>st</sup> November , 2017	Northern Cameroon	A suicide attack was carried out.	Five children were killed and two were wounded.
92	2 <sup>nd</sup> December, 2017	North- Eastern Nigeria	An attack in a market in Biu Town, Borno State	13 killed, 53 people injured, and two suicide bombers killed.
93	15 <sup>th</sup> January, 2018	Chad	A village south of Daboua, Chad	18 people were killed, two wounded, and 10 women kidnapped.
94	22 <sup>nd</sup> February, 2018	North- Eastern Nigeria	A government school in Dapchi village	91 students were abducted. 76 were rescued, 2 were found dead and 13 were still missing.
95	2 <sup>nd</sup> March, 2018	North- Eastern Nigeria	A military base in Rann	11 persons were killed out of who were three UN workers. Equally, 30,000 people fled the town into Cameroun.

96	24 <sup>th</sup> April, 2018	North-Eastern Nigeria	Near Gaboru town in Borno state.	18 forest workers were killed.
97	29 <sup>th</sup> April, 2018	North-Eastern Nigeria	Wumbi village	Three civilians were killed and nine injured.
98	2 <sup>nd</sup> May, 2018	North-Eastern Nigeria	In a Mosque and a market in Mubi Town	More than 27 dead and many injured.
99	17 <sup>th</sup> June, 2018	North-Eastern Nigeria	Twin suicide bombing in Damboa government area in Borno state	At least 23 people were killed and many injured.
100	15 <sup>th</sup> July, 2018	North-Eastern Nigeria	An ambush in Balagallaye village in the Boboshe area outside Bama	23 soldiers were declared missing.
101	20 <sup>th</sup> August, 2018	North-Eastern Nigeria	An attack in Mairari village	At least six people were slaughtered.
102	30 <sup>th</sup> August, 2018	North-Eastern Nigeria	Nigerian Army post in Zari village in Borno state	48 soldiers killed.



103	11 <sup>th</sup> October, 2018	North- Eastern Nigeria	A fierce battle in Metele Village, Borno state	18 soldiers died in a duel with the Boko Haram terrorists.
104	2 <sup>nd</sup> – 18 <sup>th</sup> November , 2018	North- Eastern Nigeria	Attacks on Kukawa, Ngoshe, Gajiram, Kareto and Meteale villages.	About 100 soldiers killed and 31 injured.
105	20 <sup>th</sup> December, 2018	North- Eastern Nigeria	An ambush outside of Damaturu town in Yobe state	14 Nigerian military and police officers killed.
106	28 <sup>th</sup> January, 2019	North- Eastern Nigeria	An attack on Rann town	At least 60 people were killed.
107	16 <sup>th</sup> February, 2019	North- Eastern Nigeria	A suicide bomber attack on Jiddari Polo neighbourhood, Borno State	Eight people killed.
108	22 <sup>nd</sup> March, 2019	Lake Chad Basin Area.	An attack on Chadian Forces in Dangdala, Chad.	23 soldiers killed.

Source: Compiled by author

#### **5.4 Impact of the cross-border insurgency in the North-Eastern Nigeria**

The impact of Boko Haram activities in the North-Eastern Nigeria most importantly in the States of Yobe, Adamawa and Borno cannot be over-emphasized. The region has stopped to observe civil order, resulting in the appalling humanitarian situation manifesting in human right abuses, human casualties, displacement both internal and external, loss of means of livelihood, lack of medical facilities and absence of other basic amenities. The humanitarian situation in North-Eastern Nigeria has degenerated further as a result, various humanitarian agencies having limited access to rural areas where the displaced persons are relocated. The alarming refugee inflow and the spill-over of Boko Haram violence off the Nigerian borders to neighbouring countries such as Chad, Cameroun and Niger over time have resulted in grave regional security consequences. This is despite the formation of a Joint Border Patrol Command established by the Federal Government which is composed of the military, Immigration, Customs, Civil Defence and the Police, to deal with the increasing security issues emanating from the insurgency (This day, April 16<sup>th</sup>, 2014).

While some continued to reside in those communities (border communities), some are displaced across the borders into Chad, Niger and Cameroun as refugees and some into neighboring states of Gombe, Taraba, Bauchi, Jigawa, Plateau etc. as Internally Displaced Persons' (IDPs') (HNO, 2016). Equally, all of these came out distinct from the data gathered from the study area and it is obvious that the affected population have and continues to witness a distortion in their daily living in terms of access to basic necessity of life both in the border communities, host communities and IDP Camps established across the region. These afore explained has made life extremely difficult for those who reside in this region of the country. This discourse on the effects of the phenomenon of the Boko Haram insurgency on border communities in the North-Eastern Nigeria will be unveiled in categories. They are

- i. Destruction of lives and properties
- ii. Insecurity and lack of protection
- iii. Excessive sexual and gender-based violence
- iv. Health system
- v. Education system
- vi. Grounded economic activities

#### **5.4.1 Destruction of lives and properties**

Firstly, the phenomenon of the Boko Haram has led to a high death rate within the North-Eastern region (See table 5.1). Also, the violence has led to the destruction of many properties. The responses of the local population in all the selected border communities depict this. The researcher equally observed this to be true in the region and in the border communities visited. In all the communities, AM-1, AMB-1, BG-1, BB-1, YY-1, and YK-1 averred that the Boko Haram attacks has brought a lot of set back to the community. AM-1 said that “we lost our wives, children, husbands, many lives have been lost and properties has been destroyed.” Equally, AM-4, AMB-5, BG-5, and BB-4 supported the above. They pointed out that a lot of lives and properties have been lost in the process of the different attacks the community has faced. They pointed further that though many businesses, and government establishments have been destroyed, they laid emphasis on the churches and Christians that have being destroyed and killed during the attacks and how this has caused rancour between the Christians and Muslims in the community. Also, FGD-AMY, FGD-AMBY, FGD-BGY, FGD-BBY corroborated the above point. Some of them who are Christians said that the Boko Haram majorly attack the Christians. They (Boko Haram) wanted everyone to become a Muslim and this has led to enmity among Christians and Muslims in the communities leading to mistrust. They have turn into enemies in the community. Some pointed that “the market day used to be on Saturdays but because of the situation, we now have market days as Saturdays and Sundays. Saturdays for the Muslims while Sundays for Christians”.

In the summation of AM-6 the attack has created a lot of animosity between members of the community, family, friends and relatives started having suspicions against one another; particularly across religious line. Christians and Muslims groups, Fulani/ Hausa and other ethnic groups in the community. The Muslim clerics equally pointed to the death of many villagers as an effect of the Boko Haram attack. AM-5, and BG-6, stressed the loss of lives and destruction of properties of inhabitants of the community. According to AMB-4, “the effect is too many, one of it is that our places of worship were destroyed, the market was burnt down, like our Mosques were all destroyed or burnt down Churches in town were all burnt down even the ones in the neighboring villages (outside of town) were burnt, economic activities were greatly affected, so you see, this is a very big effect”.

Based on the assertion of FGD-AMV, FGD-BGC, FGD-BBC, FGD-YYV and FGD-YKV, the main aim of the Boko Haram is to destroy and that is what they always come to do in their communities and other places they have carried out attacks. That is why once they come in they don't only target and kill officers of the JTF but they also kill members of the communities. To cap it up, FGD-AMW, FGD-AMBW, FGD-BGW, FGD-BBW, FGD-YYW, FGD-YKW noted that they have lost so many "treasures" among which are their husbands, children and fellow women including properties and harvests from their farms. The same was said of the men. According to FGD-AMM, FGD-AMBM, FGD-BGM, FGD-BBM, FGD-YYM, and FGD-YKM, many lost their wives, children, and relatives. Again, houses, government structures and hospitals have all been destroyed by the Boko Haram. Some noted that the situation has strained their relationships with many of their friends who no longer come to visit them like before. This is majorly because of the fear of being victims when in the community and because transportation to and fro has been affected.

#### **5.4.2 Insecurity and lack of protection**

Firstly, the violence has led to a breach of human rights and contravention of the humanitarian law. This is witnessed in the recorded injuries, death, sexual violence, disappearances, detention, forced displacement, forced recruitment and attacks on civilian areas (IDP Protection Strategy, 2015). The IDP Protection Strategy report further notes that ‘due to the fluid nature of the conflict, it has been challenging to determine the exact numbers of the displaced and there is still a lack of consensus about the numbers’. In 2013 statistics of IDPs given by the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and IDPs (NCFRMI) indicate about 150,000 persons displaced across the region. As at the end of 2014, varied figures of IDP statistics had been given which ranges from 700,000 to 1.5 million. In February 2015, the figure had increased to 1,235,294 in the North East and North Central of Nigeria. The report pointed out that the difficulty experienced in getting a definite displacement figure is partly due to the fact that these figures are gotten only from IDPs camps, bearing in mind that most IDPs do not take refuge in camps but with distant family members residing in the cities far from their places of abode.

The Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) (2016) points out that the displaced population constitutes 81% living in host communities, thus, putting a strain on available limited resources. The report pointed further that the government response through the activities of the Nigerian armed forces and other armed groups has gravely affected civilians, majorly the vulnerable groups, such as ‘the elderly and chronically sick, people with disabilities, female and child-headed households, unaccompanied/separated children, adolescent boys and pregnant and lactating women’. IDPs in camps are accommodated in crowded shelters in solitary, insecure or unconducive areas, and as such are susceptible to all forms of molestation and abuse and further attack from the Boko Haram sect. In fact, UNHCR’s report have shown that the camps are not secured, unwarranted arrest are made and freedom of movement is not guaranteed (HNO, 2016). 16,925 Nigerians have returned back to Nigeria from Cameroon owing from the inhumane treatment they were given which does not meet up with the international standard. In host communities, limited resources become scare due to the geometrically high demand on them

(UNHCR, 2015). Borno, where most of the attacks are carried out host the highest number of IDPs. Table 5.2 shows that the figures of IDPs in the six states of the North-Eastern Nigeria.

**Table 5. 2 shows the number of Internally Displaced Persons’ (IDPs) between August 2018 and October 2018**

State	Round 24 (August 2018)	Round 25 (October 2018)	Change
ADAMAWA	183,570	197,713	14,143 ↑
BAUCHI	62,687	67,168	4,481 ↑
BORNO	1,441,635	1,475,605	33,970 ↑
GOMBE	34,057	37,284	3,227 ↑
TARABA	67,211	112,197	44,986 ↑
YOBE	137,588	136,635	-953 ↓
Total	1,926,748	2,026,602	99,854 ↑

Source: Displacement Tracking Matrix Round 25

The state hosts 83% of the displaced persons’ in the four states, Yobe hosts 10%, Adamawa hosts 6% while Gombe which hosts the least hosts 1% (HNO, 2016).

Furthermore, the 2017 HNO revealed that, the majority of the 6.7 million people who reside in Borno and in many of the affected LGAs in Yobe and Adamawa are still in need of protection. Limited provision and curtailment of humanitarian services worsen the protection risks to vulnerable people. While some areas are moderately accessible to humanitarian organizations since April 2016, the state of insecurity perpetually limit humanitarian access to affected persons in the hinter part particularly in Borno. This is largely due to the Boko Haram violent activities and counter military operations which have exacerbated the protection risks. Consequently, the affected population – particularly the vulnerable and the people with special needs such as the old, the disabled, the sick, unaccompanied/separated children, adolescent boys, pregnant and nursing

women – face death, body injury, displacement, kidnapping and psychological trauma. The HNO (2007) affirms that:

*there have been attacks in and around IDP sites, with all roads leading out of Maiduguri subject to attack. Logistical challenges (infrastructure damaged by the conflict) and security restrictions (curfews and road blocks), as well as shrinking humanitarian space due to military operations and requirement for armed escort is challenging many INGO's policies and attacks on Government installations further limits service providers reach.*

The report further shows that amid the insecurity, over 152,000 Nigerian refugees have returned from Niger and Cameroon as a result of the inhumane treatment they received there. Such practices alien to international best practices have increased the number of IDPs within the region. While close to a million IDPs have returned to their LGAs of origin in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, many of them and returning refugees have not been able to return. Those who have returned to these newly accessible areas have realized that people in such areas lack security and basic services for daily survival. The returning IDPs also reported possible threat to their lives especially their women and children who lock themselves in their houses for fear of abduction by the Boko Haram through the assistance of those who did not leave their LGAs and have established a strong relationship with the Boko Haram.

Despite the presence of the JTF in the communities and efforts of the various vigilante groups established in the communities, they still feel unsecured. The Leaders of communities visited expressed their fears even though the attacks on their communities has reduced. They still largely feel unsecured and their expression showed fears for their subjects. The leader of Michika community said that “as you can see the community is devastated and we are just trying to recover. We only hope we will not be attacked again as we don't want to lose any member of the community again (Interview at Michika, 2017). It is so sad to know that a new attacked was carried out by the Boko Haram in Gulak town the capital city of Madagali local government on the 6<sup>th</sup> November 2017. This attack which was carried out at around 6.30pm made many of the local population flee the town for safety. One of the villagers who took refuge in a bush recounted his experience. He

said that villagers had to run for their lives when they noticed that even officers of the JTF fled the scene (Daily Trust, 2017).

This therefore shows that the region most importantly, the border communities are still very unsafe for the local population to reside in as attacks are still being carried out by the dreaded extremist group called the Boko Haram.

### **5.4.3 Excessive child abuse**

The Boko Haram conflict has led to serious violations against children who constitute 55 per cent of the IDPs (HNO, 2016). It further averred that in the North-Eastern region, 2.1 million children are affected by the Boko Haram conflict. Out of the displaced population, 1 million (i.e 55per cent) are children and 48 per cent of these are under the age of 5 (481,000). During conflict situations, displaced children are prone to abduction, abuse and molestation because, they are separated from their families who are to cater for them. These abuse ranges from abduction to killing, sexual violence against boys and girls and recruitment by Boko Haram. Boko Haram make use of these children as combatants, especially the boys who are used in the process of carrying out attacks while the girls are used for suicide attacks and for domestic purposes in their various camps across the region. It was discovered that the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) and vigilante groups equally make use of these children in manning checkpoints, routine patrol and intelligence gathering. Kidnapped girls are being exposed to physical and emotional abuse, torture, forced religious conversion, forced labour and forced marriage (HNO, 2016). Due to mass exodus and displacement, most of these children are unable to locate their families, while some of the unaccompanied are orphans as their parents were killed in the various attacks. According to Human Right Watch, (2016),

*Children who are unaccompanied and/or separated from their families, and who are not rapidly identified and provided with safe alternative care can struggle to access to food, water, health services, adequate shelter, psychosocial support and education and are at increased risk of abuse, neglect, violence, exploitation, including exploitative labour and sexual exploitation. There have been reports of trafficking of children for sexual exploitation and forced early marriage.*



The report equally states that kidnaped children rescued face rejection by their communities based on the atrocities they had committed. The adolescent boys who mostly are not found in IDP camps and centres are said not to face only the risk of being abducted by the Boko Haram but also of being detained by security forces and local security groups on speculation of being supporters of Boko Haram. Also, rescued girls who have being sexually abused by Boko Haram are stigmatized against, most especially the pregnant ones and those who have given birth while in captivity or after their rescue or release. This is why many of them are always unwilling to return to their communities, basically for fear of rejection and the feelings that they will bring dishonour to their families.

#### **5.4.4 Sexual and gender-based violence**

The insecurity in the North-Eastern Nigeria has led to increased sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). As children are susceptible to abduction during crisis situations so are women and girls susceptible to exploitation, rape, and forced marriage during these periods knowing fully well that domestic violence and early marriage is a common phenomenon in the region (HNO, 2016). In 2013, despite the fact that such reports are hardly made, 30% of women in the six states of the North-Eastern Region reported their experiences of sexual and gender-based violence (HNO, 2016). The prevalence of SGBV exacerbated in the border communities, host communities and IDP camps as the Boko Haram conflict became intensified. In the process of attack, the sect abducted women and girls in the border communities, move them to their camps and use them for domestic purposes, sexual abuse and lately as suicide bombers. Over 2000 women and girls kidnapped by Boko Haram are repeatedly ‘raped, forced into marriage/labour/religious conversion, physically/sexually/ emotionally abused and are highly vulnerable, exposed to sexually transmitted infections, and often impregnated by their captors’ (IDP Protection Strategy, 2015). Some adolescent girls have been found taking up the role of the bread winner thus, engaging in street/ commercial sex so as to be able to survive and cater for their families (IDP Protection Strategy, 2015). Women and girls in different IDP camps especially camps in Borno, have made report of engaging in ‘survival sex’ for a number of reasons which include exchange for food and free access in and out of the different IDP camps (HRW, 2016). While some of them were able to summon the courage to voice out and make such report, many have been cowed and as such they

cannot make sure reports (HRW, 2016). 2017 HNO statistics reveal that six out of every ten females are reported to have been involved in sexual and gender-based violence. Also, 85 per cent of victims of this dastardly act who solicited for care and help between June and August 2016 were victims of rape (HNO, 2016). The data gathered from the study area also conforms to the assertions made by the HRW. It was observed that the overpopulated nature of the camps and host communities has led to a restriction on peoples' privacy and likewise, there is a breach of human rights and dignity with impunity most especially that of women and girls. In this situation, women and girls are not free and willing to voice out these obvious concerns and challenges majorly because of fear of stigmatization, revenge, and a denial of basic daily needs for survival. Some of the women displaced from Adamawa who returned to their Local Government Area announced their fear of being abducted while in the community and as such stay in doors to avoid being abducted (Interview at Mubi, 2017).

#### **5.4.5 Deterioration in health system**

The Boko Haram violence which started in 2009 has led to an appalling deterioration in the health system and has given rise to an “outbreak of preventable communicable diseases, restricted access to essential medicines and care for non-communicable diseases and a lack of services for pregnant and lactating women and the elderly” (HNO, 2016 p8). This has led to a very high mortality rate within the region given the population of people living in the areas with limited health services and high occurrence of disease to be 12 million (HNO, 2016). The respondents most especially the women, corroborated this assertion. According to a group of women, not all the people who died in the communities were killed by the Boko Haram, many of them died from ailments which could not be treated for a long time thus degenerating and eventually leading to death (FGD-BGW November 2017). Based on the FMOH report, more than 40 per cent of health facilities have been destroyed, many were found burnt down while others had been looted in the process (FMOH, 2016). This was observed to be true as a good part of the structures destroyed are health centres and hospitals. According to the data gathered, members of the communities averred that the Boko Haram did that so that people in the communities will not have access to the limited medical facilities available to them. AMB-5 said that ‘Members of the sect on different occasion carted away medicines from the medical facilities before destroying them’. This has limited the local

population's access to medical care. The respondents especially the community leaders and the women explained their ordeal in this regard and how it has affected their communities negatively especially the sick and the older population and the pregnant women who need constant medical attention. Consequently, it was observed that there is the spread of different communicable diseases that ought to have been curbed with the immediate attention of medical personnel within the communities, but the opposite is the case as there were no government medical personnel *albinio* when the Boko Haram attacks were fierce.

In Yobe and Borno, there is less than one primary health care centre per 10,000 dwellers (FMOH, 2016). In many of the LGAs recently recovered from the hold of the Boko Haram within the region, the health system is in shambles as it has been severely disrupted. In areas where there are IDPs, the limited health facilities have been overstretched due to the high number of IDPs. This is the situation in Borno and other parts of the region. An assessment carried out by FMOH (2016) found that 450 health facilities have been destroyed in Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, and Gombe, out of which 334 are situated in Borno alone. In addition, the health system in the region lacks the availability of needed skilled health care workers, essential medicines, and medical equipment.

Owing from the fragile health status of the region, there has been the outbreak of polio which quickly spread through the North-Eastern region and across the borders into the neighboring states. This added to the prevalent presence of measles, malaria meningitis and acute respiratory disease. This situation put children below the age of 5 years at risk of contracting these diseases as they do not have access to the needed vaccines to combat these endemic diseases. This is evident in the HNO report (2016). According to the report,

*Four cases of wild polio virus type 1 (WPV1) plus two cases of vaccine derived polio virus type 2 have so far been reported in three LGAs in Borno since August (the first in Nigeria for more than two years). Over 2,000 cases of measles were reported from Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe since the beginning of 2016 and there is an ongoing measles outbreak in Borno temporary IDP sites (HNO, 2016).*

Again, in the host communities, the vulnerable group such as children under 5 years, females (15-49 years) and the old (above 60 years) under the poverty line have needs which have thus far been difficult to be attended to by the relevant people. This affects the elderly (0.5 million) greatly

because old age comes with its problems making those in this category have special needs for daily survival. These special needs have not been met as they are being overlooked. This is the same situation these categories of people face in the IDP camps. Women within the reproductive age have been adversely affected by this phenomenon. Statistics shows that:

*over 1 million women within the reproductive age do not have adequate family planning, ante-natal care and post-natal care, safe delivery, emergency obstetric care, prevention and treatment of STIs and HIV, rape treatment and other life-saving reproductive health services (HNO, 2016).*

In 2016, it was discovered that an estimated 180,000 pregnant women were affected by the poor state of health in those communities. And given the high maternal mortality rate already being witnessed within the region before the Boko Haram conflict started it only means that the incidence of death will keep increasing as pregnant women and teenage girls continue to deliver without the professional assistance of the needed skilled medical hands such as doctors, nurses and midwives (HNO, 2016). These issues thus become major issues of health concern as it poses a greater threat to the region and the country at large. Lack of medical care in the region will only aggravate the rate of mortality as this has been the phenomenon in the region before the emergence of the Boko Haram insurrection.

#### **5.4.6 Education System**

Education is another sector that has suffered greatly in the North-Eastern Nigeria. Before the conflict broke out, western education has received enormous clamour for rejection from different quarters in the Northern part of Nigeria. A major proponent is the Boko Haram which is against western education. This explains why they vigorously campaign against all forms of western education and this greatly reflects in their various attacks as they consciously target and destroy institutions of learning be it primary, secondary and tertiary (literature on attacks on schools). The start-off of the conflict led to a distortion in the education sphere and has totally destabilized the education system within the region. Nearly 3 million children between the ages of (3 – 17) have therefore been deprived of education in the region most especially in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa where the conflict is intense (IDP Protection Strategy, 2015). It was observed in the communities

that make up the study area that many schools were burnt down making academic activities grounded in the communities. In fact, AM-1, AMB-1, BG-1, BB-1, YY-1, YK-1 noted that the education system within the region most especially in their communities is non-functional as their children do not have access to good education since the crisis started.

The IDP Protection Strategy report asserted that displaced and non-displaced children and education personnel living in the affected areas are not able to access education. Moreover, over 645 teachers have also been murdered, more than 19,000 displaced, over 591,200 schools have been damaged and destroyed (IDP Protection Strategy, 2015). The report further showed that in some communities and areas where the conflict is fierce, schooling has been stalled consistently for years. Almost all the school structures, teaching and learning materials in the newly recovered areas under the siege of Boko Haram were found to have been destroyed and burnt. This is perfectly the case as observed in the selected communities for the study.

Moreover, the local population in the selected communities made a shocking revelation. This concerns the teachers and academic workers in the communities. A lot of them have been targeted and killed by the Boko Haram while others who survived the various attacks fled the communities. According to FGD-YKM the Boko Haram attacks forcefully drove away the teachers from the community when they were being subject of kidnap and attacks. However, in communities like Yusufari, and Michika, some forms of academic activities were observed. When asked who the facilitators were, they were referred to as volunteers who decided to come in and salvage the situation.

The IDP Protection Strategy report further stated that in some communities and areas where the conflict is fierce, schooling has been stalled consistently for years. This has adversely impacted on host communities as they become overpopulated due to the influx of people from affected areas especially children. A few schools that exist in host communities become overpopulated thus straining the limited and scare educational facilities that existed before the upheaval. Almost all the school structures, teaching and learning materials in the newly recovered areas under the siege of Boko Haram were found to have been destroyed and burnt.

Education workers have been consistently targeted. Personal death threats have led to the exit of a large number of teachers from the profession while some of them have fled the conflict zones. Teachers available are largely untrained and to great extent cannot handle and tackle the massive psychosocial needs of learners who might have been through various degrees of trauma as a result of the conflict. In fact, the report pointed out that the untrained teachers and volunteers available to support and salvage the deteriorated education situation in the newly recovered areas equally have some psychological needs as they are also victims of the conflict. Eventually, a large number of these displaced children especially those that have gone through secondary displacement movements become susceptible to exploitation (sexual and labour), abduction and recruitment into armed groups as well as early pregnancy and marriage. Two cases in point are the recent abduction of the Chibok and Dapchi girls in Nigeria by the Boko Haram sect (see Table 5.1). These girls were abducted in their schools and were driven past the various security check points in those communities. While some of them have been released for an exchange with some of the Boko Haram members in custody some are yet to be released. This situation puts a whole generation at risk of being denied access to education which will have adverse effect on the individual and also on the society as a whole.

#### **5.4.7 Disrupted economic activities**

Finally, another fundamental impact the Boko Haram insurgency has brought on the border communities is a disorder in the economic activities within the communities. Based on observation, farming which happens to be the main pre-occupation of the local population in the North-Eastern Nigeria has suffered a set-back. Farmlands have been destroyed because of the illegal activities of the Boko Haram on them. They have stolen all the farm produce leaving the farmland bare. It was further observed that economic activities are stalled in all the selected border communities. The major economic activity in the communities is trade and this has been affected drastically as villagers only offer for sale produce from their farmlands. Again, the markets have been destroyed making business activities impossible. In communities where there are banks, many of them have been burnt down after they were looted by members of the sect making banking activities interrupted for a long time in those communities. The local population attested to this. They all expressed their grief at this phenomenon. According to the respondents, the insurgency

has brought a setback to them as their markets, and farmlands have been destroyed and their monies, and food items carted away by members of the sect. Many of those who ran out of the communities and later returned according to FGD-AMW, FGD-AMBW, FGD-BGW, and FGD-BBW met their houses looted upon their return into the communities. Their groceries, farm produce and so on had been carted away by the Boko Haram.

This conforms with the assertion of Fanuise and Entz, (2017) that the Boko Haram having destroyed the farmlands in the region have been confirmed to have shifted their activities to stealing livestock, cattle mostly. This is because they have exhausted the looted foodstuffs and, in a bid to survive they need to find a substitute. Searcey, (2016) substantiated this with the assertion that members of the sect have reportedly being found across the Nigerian borders moving cattle stolen from Cameroon. In fact, a Boko Haram spokesman, Abu Aisha who is said to may have been killed in early 2015, was a notorious cattle rustler (Fanuise and Entz, 2017).

The infiltration of the Boko Haram in some trading activities in the region has made the Nigerian military ban such trade as it contributes to the sustenance of the sect. In 2016, the Nigerian government stopped the cattle trade in Maiduguri, which is where Boko Haram hails from, on the speculation that the trade contributes to the continuous survival of the group (Ulf, 2016). It was discovered that Boko Haram with the help of some middlemen sold stolen cattle in cattle markets in Maiduguri at ridiculous prices, so they can be sold off on time (Obaji, 2017). Again, in 2017, fish trade was banned in communities close to the Boko Haram enclaves (Searcey and Gilbertson, 2017). This was done to avoid penetration by the Boko Haram as it has been discovered that many of their agents come to such markets to sell some of the goods and items stolen from the people during the different attacks carried out.

## **5.5 Challenges to Cross-Border Counter insurgency in Nigeria**

In the face of counter-terrorism strategies employed by the federal government so far, Boko Haram continues to wax strong by constantly making its presence known in Nigeria and as well spreading its tentacles across neighbouring states. This is manifested through its activities and constant attacks. This depicts a failure of the government's effort towards fighting the scourge of Boko Haram in the country and in the North-Eastern region in particular. The reasons will be discussed

below.

To start with, the initial military approach introduced to combat the Boko Haram is largely problematic. As opined by Solomon, (2016) it is certainly difficult to fight an organization when its identity is not known, let alone its organizational structure. Owing from the lack of human intelligence resources the Nigerian state has on the Boko Haram sect, it was difficult for her to ascertain the true identity of the sect. Hussein pointed further that while an article in the *Economist* noted that Boko Haram has no vivid structure and chain of command, it is difficult to admit this because of a number of reasons such as the sect's sophisticated mode of carrying out attacks, its significantly increasing public relations crusade, its capacity to carry out attacks in several places simultaneously, and its ability to send recruits in hundreds for training in supporting countries. This suggests that even though the sect seems a loose organization to the observers, this does not mean that the chain of command does not exist in the real sense. This is what the intelligence unit need to unravel so that there can be a more coordinated response and approach in combating the sect. Hussein suggested that for the sect to be able to carry out multiple attacks and coordinated bombings in different cities, presupposes the fact that the sect operate a decentralized system allowing each cell carry out its own activities independently. This reality therefore faults the federal government's response and explains Thomson, (2012 p56) position that,

*The government's reaction to rely solely on force is probably a mistake, even if understandable-its heavy-handed reactions of the past have exacerbated the situation and may have even pushed the Boko Haram to enhance its capabilities. Further, as often is the case with insurgencies, portions of the local population is apt to sympathize more with insurgents when the government reacts harshly. This is critical since sympathy may manifest in additional manpower and resources. In addition, Boko Haram likely has connections to resources and training it did not have even three years ago.*

Secondly, the huge financial strength of Boko Haram poses a big threat to the government. The support the sect has *al binitio* has being so sustaining while it keeps increasing as the sect continue to engage in criminal acts. As pointed out earlier, the sect got financial support from wealthy individuals like the former Borno State Commissioner Alhaji Buji Foi and some politicians,



prominent northern businessmen and religious leaders, as well as various Gulf charities to fund its nefarious activities (Solomon, 2012). According to Fanusie and Entz, (2017), the sect engages in both low and high kidnapping while huge sum is being demanded from captives as ransom. This forms a major source of finance for the sect as they constantly have captives from who ransom is demanded (UNICEF, 2017; Cooper, 2016). In April 2013, the group demanded and got a ransom of \$3 million for a French family (BBC, 2013). Moreover, between February and June 2013, the sect was suspected to be behind the kidnapping of many Nigerian officials who could comfortably afford ransoms of \$10,000 (Zenn, 2013). Quite a number of reporting in 2013 pointed to the former as different cases of kidnap of former and serving local government officials were reported and ransoms of tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars were paid (Audu, 2013). Furthermore, in 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped Cameroon's vice prime minister's wife. Months later, she was released alongside some Chinese hostages, and others for a huge ransom (Sahara Reporter, 2014). Thus, the then -U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Linda Thomas-Greenfield averred in mid-2014 that, "Our suspicions are that they are surviving on very lucrative criminal activities that involve kidnappings" as the sect was believed to have gotten a huge proceed of up to \$1 million as ransoms making this the sect's largest source of funding (Wroughton and Stewart, 2014).

Boko Haram has also gotten funds through extortion and taxation (Fanusie and Entz, 2016). The sect has succeeded in extorting money from the Nigerian government, and from individual, successful business owners, in exchange for protection. Multiple news reports have asserted that some Nigerian government officials paid Boko Haram to stay clear of their spheres and localities. A spokesperson of the sect mentioned that governors of Bauchi and Kano states in northern Nigeria paid them off to stay clear of their states. Between 2004 and 2011, this 'protection' fee in totality summed up over \$1.5 million dollars per year for the two states involved (The Nation, 2012). The informant affirmed that the governor of Kano went into this agreement with Boko Haram in 2004, while his counterpart in Bauchi started in 2008 (The Nation, 2012). Boko Haram started a number of attacks on both states when they stopped payment in 2011 (Aziken, et'al 2012). The sect equally gives out cash gifts, no-interest loans, and support in-kind, to local merchants.

This strategy is used to gain the trust of these individuals and use them for the sect's whims and

caprices. The strategy has also assisted them in recruiting, smuggle and steal for the sect (Gift and Graft, 2016). ‘As recently as April 2016, Boko Haram recruited fighters by giving young entrepreneurs loans, and then conscripting them into the group when they could not repay’ (Nigeria Armed Forces, 2016; CNN, 2016). Inhabitants of territories held and controlled by Boko Haram from 2013 to 2014, were taxed and failure to pay attracted a death penalty (Zenn, 2013). The sect frequently threatens business merchants, government officials and politicians with abduction if they resist and fail to pay the group for protection (Chothia, 2015).

In 2013, the sect robbed not less than 30 banks. In 2014 the sect was said to have made an overall revenue of \$6 million from bank robberies (Fanusie and Entz, 2017). In addition, the sect has been found engaging in stealing from villagers. Items such as gold and jewelries were found with some apprehended members of the sect 100 likewise large number of cattle has been reported stolen from villagers by the sect 101 considering the fact that the market price for each cattle is \$500 (IRIN, 2015). In fact, findings from the field trip of this study revealed that in some villages the sect has made a firm arrangement with villagers to make a delivery of certain items at the end of every month in exchange for protection else they would be killed. Some farms were wholly taken over in some localities (Fanusie and Entz, 2017).

Finally, Boko Haram has gotten support from famous terrorist. According to Fanusie and Entz, (2017) Osama bin Laden supported the sect with a seed \$3 million in 2002 while al-Shabaab and AQIM and other terror organisations have consistently funded the sect though the amount is unclear (Agbiboa, 2013). Some estimates put the annual amount of money that AQIM sends to Boko Haram at “low hundreds of thousands of dollars,” (Stewart and Wroughton, 2014) inclusive of a direct assistance of \$250,000 in 2012 (Cocks, 2014). This solid financial base has made the sect strong enough to carry on its activities irrespective of the counter move by the government.

The lingering Boko Haram scourge is closely linked to the spread of radical Islamist ideologies (Adesoji, 2012). Sufism which has been the predominant form of Islam in Africa is gradually giving way to the Salafist orientation, which is keenly linked to radical Islam (Hills, 2010). Salafist Islam (a school of thought associated with jihad and the austere Saudi tradition of Wahhabism) (Johnson, 2011) denounce the West and Western culture and strictly adheres to the reading of the Koran. “It believes in direct action to both purify Islam of false believers and to

reinstate Islam across the world Islamic community” (Hill, 2010). These radical ideologies consist of the *Tablighi* clerics from Pakistan and *Wahhabist* preachers from Saudi Arabia (Adesoji, 2012). *Wahhabism* most especially is keenly associated to the ideology of *Al-Oaeda* and allied militant Islamic groups. A cogent stand these fundamentalists hold is the notion that the Nigerian state is “*taagut*, or evil, unworthy of allegiance on the part of true Muslims” (Adesoji, 2010). This religious perception explains why politicians, policemen and other government officials have been subject of attack by the sect.

One major factor that has led to this switch is technology. Technology through the internet and social media has led to a geometric growth of radicalisation amongst Nigeria's Muslims especially the youths (Adesoji, 2010). Mohammed Yusuf who himself was a trained Salafist and was a great ardent of the fourteenth-century jihad ideologue, Ibn Taymiyyah nurtured his followers with this doctrine before he was killed (Johnson, 2011). Though he was killed but his message outlived him and has become strong and viral within the North-Eastern region. In the process, the Nigerian government was not conscious of this wave hence the geometric spread of the radical ideology among Muslims in the country.

This is surprising given that the sole aim of the group is to convert Nigeria and Nigerians into a Muslim Wahhabist state and Muslim *Wahhabists* respectively and the fact that it recruits from the Ibn Taymiyyah network of schools which Yusuf had created (Mantzikos, 2010). The result was partially the difficulty of the state's intelligence apparatus to penetrate Boko Haram. Consequently, recruitment seems to be taking place amongst disciples of a particular religious leader in a particular area (Adesoji, 2010). These ties of allegiance between disciple and religious clerics are strongly difficult to break. Also, the government has failed to recognize the potential assets that extremist groups readily have at their disposal (Solomon, 2012). The existence of armed gangs in northern region in Nigeria is a vivid example. These groups include but not limited to the *Almajirai*, *Van Tauri*, *Van Daba*, *Van Banga* and *Van Dauka Amariya* etc. and they readily serve as a recruitment ground for extremist groups (Adesoji, 2010).

Furthermore, counter-terrorism drive by the government is crippled by the inability of the Nigerian Police Force to gather intelligence and carryout forensic investigations (Solomon, 2012). According to Amnesty International (2011 p30), “most police stations do not document their

work, there is no database for fingerprints,' no systematic forensic investigation methodology, only two forensic laboratory facilities, few trained forensic staff and insufficient budgets for investigations". As a result, the police tend to rely solely on confessions made and most often extracted from suspects under duress, which form 60 per cent of all prosecutions. In this situation the culprits often escape while the innocent suffers. In terrorism cases, despite the large numbers of arrests of alleged Boko Haram members and sympathizers made, none has been followed up to a reasonable conclusion. This has therefore led to the growth of Boko Haram and its ability to constantly carry out its dastardly activities. Corruption within the rank and file of the Nigerian Police therefore, continues to undermine and impede the counter-terrorism initiatives (Amnesty International, 2011).

In addition, while military action taken by the Nigerian government is deemed necessary in its counter-terrorism effort, apprehensions have been raised over the modus operandi of its engagement and the general conduct of troops in the theatre of operations which is far from the standard rule of engagement (Eugene, 2016). Counter-terrorism efforts are therefore proving unproductive owing from the brutality unleashed by the security forces on the wrong targets (Solomon, 2012). The Joint Military Task Force (JTF) in the North-Eastern region, engages in unlawful killings, arrests, extortion and intimidation of the poor residents of the region. Evidences has shown that rather than carry out intelligence-driven operations, the JTF randomly engage in house-to-house searches, and at times shooting young men found in these homes (Amnesty International, 2011). This was the tactics used by the JTF in the Kaleri Ngomari Custain area in Maiduguri on 9<sup>th</sup> July 2011, where twenty-five people were shot dead in their homes by officers of the JTF, women and children were molested, homes were burnt, and many men and boys were reported missing (Amnesty International, 2011). Such immoderations on the part of the JTF can only reduce the popularity of the government's drive against the terrorism as security services meant to protect their lives and properties come into their homes to kill their husbands and sons and molest their women and daughters.

This situation is further worsened by the fact that officers who make up the JTF are not indigenes of that region and are not familiar with the culture and the terrain of that locale and as such the inhabitants see themselves as under the siege of a foreign security arrangement (Nicoll, 2011).

This has therefore made the people lose trust in the counter-terrorism efforts of the government because of the wide gap that exists between the promises made and performance witnessed. While promises have been made to end the scourge of Boko Haram, the actions of government do not reflect nor show a sense of commitment to this drive.

## **5.6 The Effect of Boko Haram insurgency on women and children in border communities**

The need to provide a gender and age-based analysis of the overspill effects of Boko Haram insurgency arises from increase involvement of women and children in terrorist attacks. Since the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency, children and women have been the most vulnerable and affected individuals, especially if gender and age variance of community setting is to be considered. UNICEF (2016) explains that the years of violence by Boko Haram in Africa's Lake Chad basin have seen 1.4 million children displaced, while at least one million are still trapped in hard-to-reach areas. Obviously, displacement around border communities of Nigeria and her neighbours, especially where Refugee camps are situated involves a high number of children and women more than men. Reliefweb (2017) and Dobbs (2016) note that Minawao camp in far North Cameroon initially hosted 18,000 refugees, but now it hosts almost 65,000 people who are Nigerians fleeing Boko Haram atrocities, and more than half of the refugees are women (54 per cent), reflecting the camp demographic, and about half are 35 years or older.

What Boko Haram has exposed women and children to can be somewhat used to explain the nature, trend and dynamics of the terrorist conflict. Women have particularly been used to boost the morale of Boko Haram militias, who are promised wives in return for partaking in the terrorist movement or courses. In the testimony of Crisis Group,

By awarding “wives” to fighters, it attracted male recruits and incentivised combatants. Because women were not considered a threat, female followers and forced conscripts could initially circulate in government-controlled areas more easily, as spies, messengers, recruiters and smugglers. For the same reason, from mid-2014, Boko Haram turned to female suicide bombers. Increasingly pressed for manpower, it also trained women to fight (Crisis Group, 2016: i.).

The role and position of women in Northern Nigeria spells why the terrorist group took advantage of women and again resorted to using them as object of attack or defence during combat. Al-Manteeqi (2016) establishes that under Sharia, women are not equal to men, but are considered inferior; they are object of many disparaging remarks in the earliest Islamic source texts, which form the basis for Sharia. Considering Sharia law in Northern Nigeria, women have not been treated any way better than the earliest Islamic texts conceived of them. Typically, the region's religious and cultural norms, codified in law, have defined women's status through marriage and childbearing and largely confined them to a domestic role (International Crisis Group, 2016). In the same vein, women take little or no active part in public functions such as politics. Apparently, they are politically marginalized due to the Islamic practice of Purdah.

In the North-Eastern Nigeria, Islamic values and practices make women's role and positions predominantly unequal with and subordinate to men. Although some Islamic women work as traders, farmers, and some others work in offices, but their roles have largely been subsisted under men's leadership. As a matter of fact, it can be argued that socio-economic and political marginalization of women is a significant factor or influence in the Boko Haram crisis. Mercy Corps (2016) and Onuoha (2014) prove that some youth or rather women out of the decision to improve their socio-economic status, gain self-protection, retained their marital status and promote their religious beliefs allied with Boko Haram. Though, the vast majority of women have been acclaimed to join the terrorist group by force conscription, namely abduction or threat of death.

Bloom and Matfess (2016) hold that Boko Haram's reliance upon women and girls are a part of an organizational shift that includes forced conscription as a means of generating support. The terrorist group did not gain full or worldwide recognition until it kidnapped the Chibok girls. Even when it bombed the UN building in Abuja in 2011, the attention and responses of the International communities were not as decisive and loud as it was with the abduction of the Chibok girls on 14 April 2014. Ever since Boko Haram caught the world attention through rampage abduction and hostage taking of the Chibok girls, it has not ceased to conduct its activities by placing women and girls at the center. It is a common and current tactics of Boko Haram to use women and girls for suicide bombing. As pointed out by Searcey (2016), it is most baffling the ability of the insurgent group to turn captured women and girls into killers.

Examining Boko Haram strategy, women or girls and children are a source of fuel for their struggle, just as the other terrorist groups in the world, such as Al Qaeda, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or ISIS, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Hezbollah and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), have employed women's influence in furthering their courses (Sawicki, 2016 and DePetris, 2014). In the analysis of Bloom and Matfess (2016), Boko Haram depends on female operatives disproportionately as Tamil Tigers, who have used 46 women over the course of 10 years, while Boko Haram in a little over a year and a half have deployed more than 90 women. UNICEF (2017) remarks again that since 2014, 117 children have been used in suicide attacks in Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. It must also be noted that women and children are also the ones who always end up the most affected by any war, conflict or violence.

Bringing to the fore what women and children suffer during natural or man-made crisis, it appears that they are naturally vulnerable, but it is the socially constructed male domination or marginalization in many societies that make them so. The humanitarian crisis across the border communities of Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad Republic, where women and children have been discovered to dominate records of Refugees and IDPs including those who are critically in need of healthcare, education, and rehabilitation, is a living testimony that women and children are though vulnerable by systemic causes. Reliefweb (2017) reveals that some 68 per cent of children go to school in the camp, far above the Far North's 46 per cent education rate average, but still below the 84 per cent national average in Cameroon. How disturbing children are confined to an environment that is absolutely not proper for their upbringing, and again their future is threatened by uncertainty.

Women and children's health challenges which are as a result of insurgency in the border communities reflect another major concern. Oxfam (2016) records how children were at risk of death from malnutrition in the Lake Chad region in September 2016. In the same vein, women and girls abducted by Boko Haram are mostly victims of rape which make them physically, sexually and emotionally abused, and even exposed to sexually transmitted diseases (UNHCR and World Bank, 2016). Oxfam (2016) adds that even within camps, rape, sexual abuse or exploitation are reported in 50 percent of 20 IDP sites in Nigeria. According to International Crisis Group (2016), women being locked up in compounds where most guards and much of the staff are men, have

exposed them to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), or led them to “survival sex” with camp officials and security personnel in exchange for food, money or permission to leave the camp.

With scarce health resources in border communities hosting Refugees and IDPs, and increased health conditions of women and children which are requiring more assistance in camps in Nigeria, Cameroon and Niger, Chad, it can be said that there is certainly a big challenge. One of the challenges can be understood in the slogan of “there is no place like home”, which became active as some Refugees and IDPs in Minawao in Cameroon express their desire to return to their own town and villages in North-Eastern Nigeria, amidst relative and improving security situation (UNHCR, 2016). And those who did not wish to be returned yet, they raised concerns over living conditions, provision of basic services and damage to their homes and infrastructure, including schools and health centres. Categorically speaking, persons who are affected by insurgency, particularly women and children are in dire need to regain their life and improve their livelihood.

The willingness of IDPs to return home can be understood from the fact that many of them had sources of reaching their basic needs before insurgency displaced them and their labours. However, the inability to meet the basic needs, namely of food, shelter, clothing, and exercise great freedom or liberty beyond being restricted to camps counts for the challenges experienced by IDPs. But a primary challenge of IDPs is getting enough foods, water, shelter, health care, and other forms of human security. ACAPS (2016) reveals that IDPs within host communities or informal camps report the highest needs followed by those in formal (government-run) camps. ACAPS also notes that returning IDPs usually receive no assistance despite the near-total destruction of homes and civil infrastructure.

For instance, being concerned about the health challenges of the displaced people and local communities, Medecins Sans Frontiere (MSF) had to open three primary health care clinics that serve the needs of around 35,000 people. The agency also runs a 72-bed hospital in Maimusari, which includes a 12-bed maternity unit and 60 beds for pediatrics, nutrition, and intensive care (MSF, 2015). Among other assistance rendered by MSF include providing support to local health authorities in Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria and Chad; treating the wounded, running mobile clinics,



and providing mental health care etc. In a remark of how women and children are particularly vulnerable on the basis of health challenges, MSF notes that in Chad

*Some pregnant women have walked several kilometers in searing heat to seek medical attention. People are living without proper shelter, and do not have access to food or clean drinking water. Due to the harsh living conditions and the rainy season, we are already treating patients with diarrhea, malaria, and respiratory infections, as well as malnourished children (MSF, 2015).*

The challenges that women and children have been exposed to due to Boko Haram insurgency is really not small. But there is acutely limited or inadequate fund to meet the displaced person's needs, in which women and children have the highest number. In order to meet the need of women and children, UNICEF alongside its partner has to dramatically increase its humanitarian response in 2016, while in 2017, it requests over US\$ 195 million to meet the lifesaving needs of women and children across the Lake Chad basin (UNICEF, 2017). UNICEF's request for huge fund for lifesaving is because the majority of displaced persons are sheltered by communities who themselves count among the world's most vulnerable. Obviously, social amenities such as health centres, roads and water pipelines are not on ground or already damaged by insurgent attacks.

Nonetheless, another gender and age-based oppression that women and children have been subjected to is the stigma and humiliation that those who were raped or impregnated by Boko Haram insurgents suffer in the communities. According to International Crisis Group (2016), the blurred lines between Boko Haram member, abductee, slave, wife, supporter, victim and sympathizer have left many women and girls with the stigma of association. In other words, it is becoming tough due to socio-cultural and religious issues to reintegrate, rehabilitate and reconstruct both communities and individual affected with the Boko Haram crisis. Women who became pregnant from rape or force marriage with Boko Haram are particular stigmatized in the form of isolation and alienation by some family members. In effect, children who are born out of such conditions are considered as fellows who share the blood of criminal fathers.

Humanitarian agencies such as the UNICEF, Mercy Corps and conflict analysts have severally remarked on how women, girls and children are discriminated against by their society because

they were found to have been involved with the Boko Haram militants, either by rape, force marriage, suicide bombing, or as militia. In a reference, Carsten (2017) reveals how UNICEF was obliged to inform people that the children or girls that were used as fighters or bombers by Boko Haram are themselves victims and not perpetrators. Of course, the majority of victims of Boko Haram, and who are more discriminated against are girls and women; those who survived but lost their body part (s) to suicide bombing mission and now disabled; those who are rescued from the custody of the militants, are largely ostracized and rejected by their family, or discriminated against by the society at large.

The challenges of those who are directly or indirectly affected by the Boko Haram insurgency is so enormous that the government of the Lake Chad regions, international communities, NGOs and concern individuals are seeking urgent ways to end the crisis. In other words, the humanitarian crisis that is generated by the Boko Haram attacks is one of the highly rated challenges in the world (Akinbi, 2015 and Shuaibu et al., 2015a). It is therefore germane to work out a well-structured strategy or modality that will help to arrest the insurgency in no longtime. To be frank, the root causes of the insurgency which includes poverty, political and religious extremism, unemployment, and corruption must be sincerely addressed in order to end the conflict. And it must be noted that if the remote causes of the Boko Haram insurgency are not addressed, the consequence would be that the whole military effort that has helped to reduce Boko Haram hostility would be a waste.

A reason for emphasizing that the root causes of Boko Haram crisis must be first attended to, for example poverty, is because studies have identified that poverty is a major influence in the insurgency. While citing David Francis, Ahmed (2014) establishes that majority of foot soldiers of Boko Haram are not Muslim fanatics but poor kids who were turned against their corrupt country by a charismatic leader, namely late Mohammed Yusuf, and presently, Abubakar Shekau. This explains why the government of affected countries must stand up to their responsibilities as leaders and provide the basic amenities as well as enabling environment that would help citizens to have a better life. At this point, governments are supposed to raise the standard of their empowerment programmes so that people, especially the less privilege are truly empowered and their feeling of injustice, inequality and inequity in the society are corrected.

At this juncture, a point to note is that comprehensive solution to the Boko Haram generated humanitarian crisis is not the obligation of the government of Lake Chad region alone. This is why apart from the earlier mentioned world agencies; World Food Programme is using its office to provide support to affected persons by insurgency in the Lake Chad region. The strategy of providing assistance to reduce humanitarian crisis alone cannot help to end the Boko Haram insurgency. What will help is that each country and government of the Lake Chad region focuses their strategies on conflict resolution and peace building, even as military operation is ongoing. They need to engage in programmes that will positively and directly impact the life of the people and reduce their socio-economic challenges, especially in the Northeastern Nigeria where the insurgency is prevalent. Government should imbibe the agenda of UNDP making work or job creation a priority rather than aids given.

## **5.7 Conclusion**

This chapter has explored the past and present security situation in the North-Eastern Nigeria. The discussion shows that the peace of the region has been and remains continuously truncated for long due to the menace of the Boko Haram Sect within the region. The research demonstrated that the activities of the sect have largely led to massive humanitarian crisis in the region causing the local population a lot of pain and hardship. The effects of such attacks have been enormous, and it remains so in the North-Eastern Nigeria. These effects keep lingering as the government has not being able to intervene and tackle such in a timely way. The North-Eastern Nigeria and the border communities thus continue to thrive in the mess the Boko Haram insurgency has brought upon them. This situation clearly exposes the fragility of the Nigerian state. According to Rotberg, (2003), he posits that in a fragile state, there is a tendency for increased criminal violence which further weakens the states' authority. He further notes that fragile states are usually associated with tensed and dangerous warring factions which most times leads to a breakdown of law and order, increased humanitarian disaster, which concerns not only the people directly affected, but also people in neighbouring states. Collier et al. (2003) identify three ripple effects that emerge from armed conflict: the *internal effects* (as a result of the burdens of internally displaced persons), the *regional effects* (as a result of the burden of refugee influx) and the *global effect* (as a result of foreign interventionists). According to them, these three ripple effects generate unique challenges.

While the internal effects constitute a problem of food insecurity, loss of means of livelihood, rise in the displacement of people, the regional effect constitute spread of contagious diseases across borders from the inflow of refugees, and the global effect constitutes the growth in narcotics trade across borders sponsored by foreign non-state actors. A reality of these three dimensions is what is witnessed in the North-Eastern Nigeria.

The succeeding chapter will examine the various responses especially from the Nigerian government to this phenomenon and the result such interventions have yielded if there is any. In a conflict situation like this, the attention of the humanitarian organizations both international and local is drawn to such areas for the sake of rescuing victims and relocating them to safe places. This chapter will equally access their efforts in the area and achievements thus far recorded.

# **CHAPTER SIX**

## **INTERVENTIONS BY STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS TO CROSS-BORDER INSURGENCY IN THE NORTH-EASTERN NIGERIA**

### **6.0 Introduction**

This Chapter focuses on discussing and analyzing the efforts of the different levels of governments towards combating the scourge of cross-border insurgency in the North-Eastern Nigeria. Primary data gathered, supported with existing literature are utilized to show the interventions of the government towards the activities of the Boko Haram in the North-Eastern region most particularly, within the study area. The analysis shows the interventions of the concerned institutions of government in terms of combating the Boko Haram insurgents and responding to the humanitarian crisis in the troubled communities and IDP camps in the North-Eastern Nigeria. In other words, the successes, failures, acceptance and non-acceptance of such institutions by the people identified within the study area are considered. In the same vein, in every disaster region, it is expected that humanitarian organizations (indigenous or international) find their ways into such areas purposely to save life and reduce the rate of casualties. Owing from this, the activities of different humanitarian organizations are discussed and their successes analysed.

### **6.1 Legal Strategies to cross-border counter-insurgency in Nigeria**

As the growing activities of the Boko Haram in the North-Eastern Nigeria became alarming, and the international community especially the United States began to black list Nigeria and Nigerians, it became imperative for the Nigerian government to intervene by joining the league of countries who have come up with a legal frame work to combat terrorism. Accordingly, the Nigerian government took immediate action by coming up with a legal framework to fight the scourge of Boko Haram. After series of letters and reminders from the Nigerian president to the National Assembly, the Anti-Terrorism Legislation (ATL) was passed. This process birthed the Terrorism Preventive Act (TPA) on the 22nd February 2011 and was signed by the president in June 2011

(Sampson & Onuoha, 2011). This anti-terrorism bill was adopted by former president Jonathan's administration to deal with exigencies caused by the Boko Haram (Omede, 2011). According to (FGN 2013; Umar 2013) the TPA focuses on the arrest and trial process of terror suspects, ways to stop terrorism, and break the link between international terrorist groups and the Boko Haram. The Money Laundering Prohibition Act (MPLA) of 2011 which was revised in 2012 targets at cutting off the local and international financial support system of terrorism and covers the trial process of terrorists (FGN 2011b, 2012). The Federal High Courts who remain custodians of the law interpret these laws to government agencies that are responsible for implementing them like the ONSA, EFCC, Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Nigerian Customs Service (NCS), The Inspector General of Police, Prisons Service, and Nigerian Fraud Intelligence Unit (NFIU) (FGN 2011a, b, 2012, 2013).

Moreover, on the 30<sup>th</sup> April 2014, a comprehensive National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST), was ratified for execution by President Goodluck Jonathan. This strategy encapsulates the counter-terrorism policy framework of the federal government of Nigeria. Barkindo and Bryans (2016) averred that it is a comprehensive approach that is meant to identify the core causes of terrorist activities and fashion out the best way to tackle it. According to Dasuki (2013: 9) "NACTEST takes a comprehensive and holistic approach to counter-terrorism". This approach though recommends a soft and hard method, it place much emphasis on the soft method which aims at delving into the root causes of extremism/ religious radicalisation and/ or terrorism and come up with the best way to dissuade the furtherance of such (Ackerman 2014). The second edition was approved under President Buhari's government on August 23, 2016 (Eugene, 2016). This initiative put into consideration the nature of the terrorist threat that confronts Nigeria, the response procedures and mechanism, and the roles stakeholders have to play, and finally the institutions that are needed in the counter-terrorism mission (Eugene, 2016). The NACTEST is systematically grouped into five work streams, each with its distinct objectives. They are:

- a. Forestall
- b. Secure
- c. Identify
- d. Prepare
- e. Implement.

While 'Forestall' is targeted at stopping and discouraging people from becoming terrorists, 'Secure' reinforces protection capacity of the state and its citizens against terrorists, 'Identify' aims at pre-empting danger through early warning signs and detection, 'Prepare' aims at mitigating the impact of terrorist attacks while 'Implement' work stream gives an outline of how coordinated cross-governmental institutions can be coordinated for an effective counter-terrorism drive (Eugene, 2012). This move by the government though considered as an applaudable initiative did not come without its flaws. However, in its flaws, this counter-terrorism move gained support from external actors and made it possible for Nigeria to be classified as one of the countries committed to fighting terrorism. These countries include USA, Australia, Canada, Belgium, New Zealand, Ethiopia, Indonesia, France, South Africa, India, United Kingdom, Italy, Pakistan, Turkey, Philippines, Uganda, among others. Also, the promulgation of the Act made the United States remove Nigeria from the global list of states sponsoring and supporting terrorism on July 24, 2011, thereby ending the diplomatic rift that existed between the two countries.

## **6.2 Security response(s) to cross-border counter-insurgency in Nigeria**

Owing from the high wave of atrocities committed by the Boko Haram sect, in June 2011 the Federal Government under former President Jonathan set up a special Joint Task Force (JTF) in Maiduguri comprising of the military (Army, Air Force and Navy), the Department of State Security (DSS) and the Nigerian Police Force (Amnesty International, 2011). This unified move was strategically made to promote a unity of purpose and that resources can be pooled together among the security forces to fight a common enemy and restore peace and order in the North-Eastern Nigeria. Again, the formation of the JTF was done to promote the unrestricted flow of information between the different security units without any of the security unit feeling superior or undermined as the case may be. Again, as part of a counter-terrorism strategy adopted by the federal government the National Focal Point on Terrorism (NFPT) was established in 2007 but became active in 2012. The central point of the NEPT is composed of several security agencies and government departments charged with the responsibility of implementing Nigeria's national security agenda (Azazi, 2012). The activities of the NFPT were overseen by the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), while the National Security Council, headed by the President, occasionally met to evaluate national security matters. The Nigerian government equally

established a committee to oversee the security in North-Eastern Nigeria.

The JTF was deployed at different times with different code names based on the enormity of the security threat that exists at the time. The first JTF to be deployed in 2011 was named “Operation Restore Order I”. Later in the year, two more units were launched and were named “Operation Restore Order II and III”. In 2013, after the declaration of a state of emergency in three North-Eastern Nigeria namely, Adamawa, Yobe and Borno states, Operation BOYONA was established. The acronym connotes Borno, Yobe, Nasarawa and Adamawa Operation. In the same year, Operation BOYONA was renamed Operation Zaman Lafiya and in 2015 it was renamed Operation Lafia Doyle meaning “Peace by force” (Osakwe & Audu, 2017).

In 2011, 30,000 security personnel forming part of the special task force were deployed to put in force the state of emergency and curfew declared (Omede, 2011). Moreover, to control, monitor movement and the smuggling of arms in and out of the country through the porous borders in the affected region, the government closed the borders between northern Nigeria and neighbouring states of Niger, Chad and Cameroun (Baldauf, 2012; Forest, 2012) which has been proven to be constantly utilized by the Boko Haram. Solomon (2012) averred that the fundamental motive behind closing these borders was to prevent Boko Haram members from escaping into neighbouring countries and as well thwart all efforts at receiving reinforcements of foreign jihadi elements who have found their ways into the region illegally. The whole idea was to make it easy for the JTF to fish out members of the sects before escaping into neighbouring states. However, given the porous nature of the country’s borders, this measure was greeted with minimal success as some of these elements still found their ways into the country through its porous borders. This gives room to question the implementation process of the country’s security strategy as reiterated by the Chief of Defence Staff, General Andrew Azazi who noted that the Nigerian national security strategy lays emphasis on the safety of Nigerians and the stability of the country and as such relies solely on utilizing new technology needed for surveillance, intelligence, informatics and detection as the basis for achieving the counter-terrorism strategy (Azazi, 2012).

The alarming rate at which terrorism was thriving in the region was worrisome (Johnson, 2012). Various attacks that have been carried out in the region attest to the foregoing. Reports have it that the Boko Haram has carried out many attacks in the region, one of which is the Magumeri local



government. Magumeri has witnessed series of attacks that had claimed the lives of many of the local population. Again, it was in this local government that an ambush was laid for exploration workers of the “Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), contracted staff of University of Maiduguri and 15 members Civilian JTF” in Bornoyesu village which led to the killing and kidnap of some of them in July 2017 (Vanguard, 2017). Perhaps, it can be said that for members of the civilian JTF to be on the team shows that they were more trusted not only by the local population but also by the government institutions and organizations when it comes to combating the Boko Haram. Furthermore, the Kurmiri village was attacked on the 18<sup>th</sup> September 2017. This attack led to the death of the Chief Imam of the community and four others who were slaughtered. According to investigation, members of the sect came into the village “armed with Ak47 rifles, knives and machetes, but decided to execute their victims using knives, because the sounds of gunshots would alert many residents hence repel the attacks” (Vanguard, 2017). During this attack, no reprisal attack was recorded.

In addition, an attack carried out on the 6<sup>th</sup> of November 2017 is another case in point. Thousands of the local population had to flee the town of Gulak the headquarters of the Madagali local government when they noticed that the military and the police has being displaced by members of the Boko Haram Sect. A fleeing resident who spoke to Daily Trust confirmed the above assertion. According to him “Boko Haram have taken over the town and thousands of us are here in the bush, we don't know what will happen to us. Can't you hear gun shots?” (Daily Trust, 2017). It is to be noted also that a recent Boko Haram attack on the Magumeri community on the 26<sup>th</sup> November 2017, claimed the lives of three soldiers and six others injured. It was reported that “the terrorists attempted to dislodge the Forward Operational Base in Magumeri, Borno State” so as to successfully carry out their attack on the community (Vanguard, 2017). However, they eventually succeeded in attacking and destroying some platforms in the community asides the soldiers killed (Vanguard, 2017).

Moreover, as the insurgent became more sophisticated in their operations, their attention was shifted from soft targets to hard targets because they now have the capacity to carry out such attacks. Therefore, the insurgents took their activities to the Federal Capital City (FCT), Abuja where a successful attack was carried out on the UN headquarters on the 26th August 2011. To

curb a reoccurrence of the preceding, the government took some steps to enable the security forces function optimally. Check points were erected at various entry points and strategic locations around the federal capital territory of Abuja after it was attacked twice. Also, while a state of emergency was declared in specific location of Niger, Borno, Yobe, and Plateau states where the activities of the sect is being felt (Economists, 2011), a curfew was enforced in Adamawa state (BBC News, 2012).

To sum it up, the above mentioned attacks and many more carried out in the North-Eastern Nigeria were either carried out without any reprisal attack from the JTF, or with a reprisal attack but were over powered by the insurgents due to heavy fire arms they used and the guerilla kind of warfare that they utilize mostly and in fact, the Threat Tactic Report on Boko Haram categorically stated that different reports have shown that, the Nigerian soldiers in the Baga town stripped off their uniforms to avoid being targeted by the advancing militants (TRADOC, 2015). To curtail this, the JTF embarked on a door to door search in the communities to fish out insurgents that take cover in those communities.

According to Osakwe & Audu (2017) the JTF engaged in a fierce search on suspected houses shielding and sheltering insurgents in a bid to root them out from their hiding place. This yielded substantial results as suspected terrorists and many who were caught with arms were arrested. In the same process, diverse kinds of arms, IEDs and ammunitions were recovered from the operation. Despite this workable strategy employed, it did not deter the Boko Haram from spreading its tentacles and advancing its activities which further worsen the state of security in the region. At a point, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) established in 1998 by the military of four countries such as Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad were co-opted to join the JTF in the fight against the Boko Haram. Benin Republic joined after the kidnap of the Chibok girls in April 2014 (Amnesty International 2015). This troop got support from the AU and Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) with its headquarters in N'Djamena, Chad (Buchanan-Clarke and Lekalake 2016).

The MNJTF by virtue of operating at the borders was mandated to protect the local population in the border communities against Boko Haram attack. The troop patrolled these areas and as occasion demanded assisted the JTF when and where necessary (Dietrich 2015). In June 2016, the

Nigerian Air Force in collaboration with the MNJTF launched an air strike to provide aerial cover for the MNJTF who was able to identify and bombed various enclaves of the Boko Haram within the Lake Chad Basin (Mutum 2016). The same operation was repeated in October 2017, leaving all the terrorists dead in Unga, Borno State (Erunke 2017). However, the co-operation between the MNJTF and JTF suffered a setback as it triggered fierce attacks by the Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region making the security situation deteriorate. They carried out these attacks to discourage countries from directing supporting Nigeria in its fight against terrorism (Buchanan-Clarke and Lekalake 2016).

Many countries gave a hand of support to Nigeria in its fight against terrorism. In 2014, France and the UK offered training to the Nigerian military on counter-terrorism (Pate 2014). Germany, France and Italy offered technical and security support to the Nigerian military (Adele, 2013). Between 2013 and 2014, China, France, Canada, Israel, South Africa, Russia, Norway, Ukraine, Czech Republic, and the United States supplied arms to Nigeria to combat Boko Haram (Amnesty International, 2015). Some drones and five combat helicopters were donated to the Nigerian government by the Chinese and Russian governments respectively. Further, in September 2014, the Russian government trained officers of the Nigerian military, DSS and Police (Amnesty International, 2015). Cameroon besides the support rendered through the MNJTF, allowed the Nigerian Air Force access to its airspace should there be a need to do so. Finally, the UK trained the Nigerian judiciary and rendered advice on crisis management, legal frameworks and bomb scene management (Amnesty International, 2015).

At some instances, the Boko Haram took the fight to the door steps of police offices and military formations killing many officers on duty (see table 5.1). As a matter of fact, findings from the field show that the border communities were neglected and left to their fate in the face of the looming perils that confronted them. This was the assertion of majority of the respondents and a section of the local population interacted with in the selected border communities. Many of the community leaders pointed out that the communities were neglected by the government for a very long time including the officers of the local government who were supposed to be more concerned in the plight and pains of the local population. According to AM-2, AMB-1, FGD-BBM the population were left to suffer, and they did suffer in the hands of the Boko Haram who came into the

community at will and did whatever pleased them without any counter action to prevent their constant incursion.

A question was posed to the researcher in Yunusari: “as you can see when you came in, you can see a lot of buildings and properties destroyed and burnt down. Who did you think burnt them down? And why did you think they were able to burn them down?” (YY-1 November 2017). He gave a very succinct response to this amid tears by women around him: “the Boko Haram burnt down our houses, schools, hospitals, bridges, and so on because they were not stopped in anyway. The government didn’t show up at all” (YY-1 November 2017). During group discussions with the women in the selected communities, their responses were given amid sorrowful mood and tears as it made so many of them remember the losses they have suffered. They pointed that they lost many of their loved ones during the different attacks of the Boko Haram on their communities. They made it very clear that this was possible for the Boko Haram because the government did not intervene. Furthermore, the youths displayed their displeasure with great annoyance while being engaged in group discussions. Though they corroborated the above assertion, they further pointed out that the failure of government to intervene made them regrouped themselves to defend their people and fight back oppressing Boko Haram.

However, though many of the respondents in the selected communities were of the view that they were neglected, it was observed that the military were present at strategic locations around the communities. It therefore appeared that the respondents were not being sincere by accusing the government of total neglect. In their responses some were of the opinion that they came in late to intervene when the Boko Haram had succeeded in killing their people and destroying their properties. Some others were indifferent as they pointed that their presence has brought nothing good to them. Although, some of the leaders said that though the military intervened lately but their presence at least douses the tension in the communities. The general perception of the respondents showed that the presence of the military has being a curse to them as they have not really assisted them in anyway. They believe that the JTF are not capable of confronting and combating members of the Boko Haram sect especially when they come to attack. They averred further that on different instances have they seen members of the JTF take to their heels when the Boko Haram come into the communities. Though officers of the JTF seems willing to combat the

menace of the Boko Haram, they have proven not to be capable of dealing with such (FGD-AMV, FGD-AMBV, FGD-BBC, FGD-YKV November 2017). Furthermore, they pointed that the youths and their male children are being harassed and maltreated by officers of the JTF for reasons best known to them. FGDs conducted with the youths equally confirmed this act. They said that officers of the JTF harass them a lot because they see them as informants for the Boko Haram (FGD-AMY, FGD-AMBY, FGD-BGY, FGD-BBY, FGD-YYY November 2017). According to a youth, he said that

we the young men and male children in the community are not free to move around and this has made us stay home most of the time without doing anything meaningful. This is what we are facing. Our friends cannot even come and greet us again..... (FGD-YYY November 2017).

The occurrences in the North-Eastern Nigeria attest to the above. There have been reported cases of officers of the JTF maltreating the local population. Such incidence was reported to have repeated itself in Borno state on the 12<sup>th</sup> of November 2017 where a soldier was said to have shot his superior for trying to stop him from maltreating civilians and thereafter shot himself. This incidence clearly shows that an officer has taken this to the extreme by committing murder and suicide at the same time for being restrained from maltreating civilians (Channels Television, 2017). Furthermore, many of the respondents lamented on hardship they have brought on them. One of which is the restriction on their movements within the communities and outside of the communities. They are not allowed free movement and that has impeded them from carrying out their daily activities. Many of the FGDs conducted revealed this. According to some women in Michika community, they said that they are not being allowed to go the farms and markets freely and as such they are not free to carry out their activities (FGD-AMM November 2017). This partly confirms the assertions of (Ulf, 2016) on the ban the Nigerian government placed on cattle trade in some cattle markets in Maiduguri and (Searcey and Gilbertson, 2017) on fish trade in communities close to the Boko Haram enclave.

Again, in the face of a counter moves and reprisal attacks by the federal government, Boko Haram continues to wax strong. It furthers spreads its tentacles by recruiting from neighbouring countries like Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Mali (Smith, 2011). This assertion was made by Boko Haram

spokesmen as they make bold their recruitment activities in these states. It is therefore on this premise that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has out rightly condemned Boko Haram and thrown its full weight behind the Nigerian government's security initiative against the group. Significantly, in spite of the security measures introduced, the violent attacks of Boko Haram increased both in geographical scope and gravity. The security situation became horrifying that, the former President Jonathan admitted and confessed that the current security state is worse than the civil war of 1967 – 1970 which saw the death of more than a million people. He noted that during the war, it was quite easy to predict rightly where the enemy's attack will come from but in the current circumstance, it was a herculean task thus making it difficult to launch a targeted combat. General Owoye Andrew Azazi, the National Security Advisor to President Jonathan until 22 June 2012, also alluded to failure in combating terrorism. He stated that this was caused as a result of the ill-equipped nature of military infrastructure making it difficult to tackle the terrorist threat posed by Boko Haram (Solomon, 2012). There is need to examine this claim in a separate study which aims at comparing the military readiness of the Nigerian Military with that of Boko Haram.

### **6.3 Humanitarian responses in the selected border communities vis-a-vis cross-border insurgency**

In a disaster zone, it is expected that a major consequence will be a high toll of humanitarian situation. The humanitarian responses such situation receive goes a long way in determining the level of humanitarian crisis it creates. By implication, for the situation not to get worsened, it is imperative that a swift intervention is necessary so that lives can be saved. As pointed out by Salkida (2012), the persistent violence witnessed in the North-Eastern Nigeria most especially in the border communities who are the first victims of the Boko Haram attacks has led to a high toll of humanitarian crisis. According to him, life in many communities of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states, such as Kawuri, Gwoza, Gamboru-Ngala, Baga, Shuwa, Konduga, Bama, Ajgin, Giwa, Chibok, have been characteristically horrible, brutish and, to say the least, short-lived. The region has stopped to observe civil order, resulting in the awful humanitarian situation showing up in the form of human right abuses, human casualties, displacement both internal and external, loss of means of livelihood, lack of medical facilities and absence of other basic amenities (OCHA, 2018).

The humanitarian situation in North-Eastern Nigeria degenerated further because various humanitarian agencies having limited access to rural areas where the displaced persons are relocated (Salkida, 2012). However, recent literature reveals that the huge humanitarian crisis created by the Boko Haram insurgency in the North-Eastern Nigeria since 2009 latter attracted attention and responses from different quarters such as the government (state and federal), to address both the security and humanitarian needs in a bid to save lives that are in danger within the region. According to NORTHEAST: Humanitarian Response (2017),

*Insecurity, especially in parts of Borno and Yobe states, continues to hamper humanitarian operations. However, through coordinated logistics and civil-military coordination efforts, humanitarian teams can now, to the extent possible, access areas previously inaccessible and new depths of devastation are uncovered: civilians desperately need food, health, protection, shelter, water and sanitation, and education (NORTHEAST: Humanitarian Response, 2017).*

The above shows that at some point, the affected communities became accessible to different state and non-state actors to render humanitarian assistance needed for daily survival such as food items, clothing, and shelter etc. It is therefore imperative to investigate the various humanitarian responses of the aforementioned actors ranging from the Nigerian government through its agencies known as the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), to government of different nations and the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) both international and national to victims and communities affected by the activities of the Boko Haram.

### **6.3.1 Responses from Government actors**

National legislation accords the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) the legal responsibility for disaster response across the states of the federation even though there are state and local governments with their own specialized agencies who directly govern the affairs of such environments. Unfortunately, NEMA established in 1990 for disaster management in Nigeria failed to launch operation in the North-Eastern Nigeria when the Boko Haram activities started in 2009 and left many homeless, helpless and stranded. Not until when there were agitations and

outcry from different quarters that the federal government swing into action in 2015 and at this time, the humanitarian situation had gone worse that it became impossible for the agencies to handle such solely (Chidume, et'al 2018). However, according to HCA (2017) the Nigerian government through NEMA and SEMA have to some extent attended to the humanitarian needs of the affected people in the North-Eastern Nigeria especially in the area of food. Chidume, et'al (2018) noted that NEMA provided several relief items and support services to affected areas part of which were sympathy visitations by its officials to affected areas, bereaved individuals, community leaders and District Heads and IDP camps. It equally, organized several meetings and workshops to sensitize corps members and secondary school students in selected schools on disaster management. These efforts NEMA carried out in collaboration with relevant stakeholders as SEMA, local governments, community leaders and NGOs.

The HCA (2017) gave a disappointing remark on the efforts of the Nigerian government to humanitarian crisis so far in the North-Eastern Nigeria. This crisis started at a time when there was economic buoyancy and as such, it was expected that the government will take the lead by making available sufficient funds and disaster management experts needed for a comprehensive humanitarian response, but the opposite was the case. In the communities selected for the study, there was a mixed opinion among the local population from interviews and FGD sessions conducted. While some believed the government through NEMA and SEMA brought relief to them through the provision of food items, some averred that they got no support from them. The youths most especially, falls into this group. The community leaders all alluded to the fact that at some point, the government through NEMA and SEMA came to their rescue by supplying them with food items. According to the AMB-1:

*NEMA, came from the federal government while SEMA was from the state government and they all helped in various ways, they brought help since when the people of Gwoza were here when we ran and came back, they still brought us some relief materials. The government came with their help around early 2015 from January to march because that was the time when people were coming back. The assistance provided by the government was also very impactful because people relied on it for their survival, this was due to the fact that even those who had*



*something which they left behind were destroyed or stolen, so when people came back there was nothing, it was the assistance from the government that helped us to recover from this loss (AMB-1 November 2017).*

Again, FGD-AMW, FGD-AMBW, FGD-BGW, FGD-YYW confirmed that the government brought them food items therefore making it possible for them to have food to eat. Moreover, a group of women in Michika community pointed out that even though the government brought help to the community, the distribution process was not fair. While some got the food items many did not get (FGD-AMW November 2017). This response showed that there was partiality in the distribution of the limited items brought. The youths equally gave their views on the support given to them by the government. Virtually all the youths in the communities were of the opinion that the government (federal, state and local) has neglected them for too long and they have not assisted them in any way. They all pointed this out angrily during the FGD sessions.

Equally, they were embittered against the government because of the way the security situation is being handled which continues to endanger the lives of the local population. They pointed out that the performances of the JTF have proven to them that they are not capable of fighting the Boko Haram whenever they attack. Reiterating this AM-5 was very blunt in his opinion as he noted that government has not done anything as he is yet to see any from the government. The view of AMB-4 also corroborates the above as he said that he has not seen any, but he has heard in the news that support has being rendered to the local population. The response of BB-4 was slightly different. He averred that though the government brought support to the community, but it was done for a brief time as they no longer come again. According to him:

*NEMA and SEMA helped us at first, but now maybe they are tired, they are not helping us like before. Getting to months now, we've not heard from government. People live on support they get from humanitarian organizations (BB-4 November 2017).*

Furthermore, there was a mixed opinion among the local security groups known as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) by the Nigerian government in the border communities. While the FGD-AMV, FGD-AMBV opined that their communities got support from the government, but it has

not been consistent, others FGD-BGC, FGD-BBC, FGD-YYV, FGD-YKV were emphatic on the point that the government has not supported the communities in anyway. They displayed their displeasure in their expressions.

Asides the financial constraints that NEMA faces, there was a scuffle for relevance between NEMA and SEMA which impeded a successful implementation of whatever activity NEMA is set to do. Murtala and Abubakar (2017) gave a clear explanation of why governments' responses are limited through NEMA and SEMA in the North-Eastern Nigeria. Firstly, it was identified that the relation and coordination between the federal and state governments is weak. According to them, "everyday governance is marked by weak and limited inter-governmental coordination". Basically, the State governments favoured a situation where the federal government through NEMA and the humanitarian organizations liaise with them through the SEMAs for a coordinated humanitarian response in the troubled areas. As a result of this state governments turned down decisions reached at the federal level between NEMA and the humanitarian organizations.

While this power play went on, the situation in the affected areas became worsened. They averred further the state of unpreparedness of the state governments to tackle the menace of the Boko Haram in the region. SEMAs across the region had low capacity to respond immediately because they had no specific budget allocation meaning that they only make request as the occasion demands Murtala and Abubakar (2017). In response to this, the federal government insisted that the *status quo* remains because the state governments have been accused of misappropriation of funds and lack of transparency and accountability (Murtala and Abubakar, 2017). Specifically, they (the federal government) noted that there has been reports of corruption, diversion of humanitarian materials, and a misuse of power against the state governments. Moreover, the SEMAs being an office under the Ministry of Special Duties have their staff members drawn from civil service of the states who do not have the experience and the needed training for humanitarian engagements. This therefore reflects in their operations and activities in the various camps as they do not have the knowledge of "camp coordination and management, food distribution or protection monitoring, and were not familiar with the operating procedures of international humanitarian organisations" (Murtala and Abubakar, 2017).

Owing from the preceding, obviously, not much has been done by the Nigerian government through NEMA to respond to the humanitarian challenges the Boko Haram insurgency has created in the North-Eastern Nigeria. As a result, there is heavy dependence on external state actors and non-state actors for humanitarian responses in the troubled region and in the various IDP camps.


### **6.3.2 Responses from international actors and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)**

Historically, NGOs especially, international humanitarian organisations have proven to play a key role in conflict zones where humanitarian crisis is prevalent. They are always seen at the fore front of violent scenes saving lives at the expense of their own lives. Also, international state actors mostly developed countries of the world identify with the plight of nations that experience such humanitarian crisis by sending relief materials and giving donations to alleviate the suffering and hardship that the population in the disaster zones face. Since the Boko Haram violence started in 2009, the presence of various international humanitarian organisations have been seen in the North-Eastern Nigeria, most especially in the different IDP camps where the daily needs needed for survival are provided to the IDPs. According to OCHA (2017: 4) “90 humanitarian organisations have provided aid to 4.5 million people, including nearly 2 million people who are reached monthly with food assistance and over 4 million people who received out-patient or medical health services”. Equally, donations have being given in cash or in kind by different countries, international organisations and concerned individuals.

From the preceding, the bulk of the funds available for such missions in the region are donations given by international state actors, Non-Governmental Organizations and concerned individuals to attend to the needs of the troubled and displaced persons. Odufowokan (2016) gave a list of donors towards this course in the North-Eastern Nigeria. The World Bank donated 800 million US dollars, Aliko Dangote and some concerned individuals donated 6.5 million naira, the United Nations Development Funds (UNDP) donated 248 million US dollars. Some concerned countries equally gave their support among which are the Australian government with a donation of 9 million Naira, the United States government with a donation of 200 million dollars, and Saudi Arabia who donated 750 million naira. Also, support materials were donated such as food items in the forms of grains such as millet, maize, ground nut, sorghum, and cowpea, clothing such as dresses for

women and children and shelter in the form of tents. Chart 6.1 and table 6.1 show the support gotten from different countries and agencies in figures in 2015 and in the current year 2019.

**Figure 6. 1 Humanitarian Donations in Nigeria as at 2015**



Source: Murtala and Abubakar (2017)

**Table 6. 1 Donations from Countries and Organizations as at January 2019**

<u>Source org.</u>	<u>Funding US\$</u>	<u>% of response plan/appeal funding</u>	<u>Pledges US\$</u>
United Kingdom, Government of	5,193,523	48.0%	0
Germany, Government of	4,597,881	42.5%	0
Central Emergency Response Fund	688,130	6.4%	0
Spain, Government of	284,414	2.6%	0
International Organization for Migration	59,750	0.6%	0

Source: Nigeria 2019 (Humanitarian Response Plan).

From the chart and table, the United States government topped the list with a donation of 48,364,272 million US dollars while the Switzerland government gave the least with a sum of 1,296,415 million US dollars. These donations summed up reveal the heavy support the humanitarian crisis in the region has attracted from different concerned actors.

In the selected border communities, one unique feature observed was the noticeable presence of different humanitarian organizations in the form of structures and facilities erected majorly Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) facilities. These facilities create a hygienic environment suitable for daily survival. In the responses of the study population, they noted that support have been gotten from the different NGOs at various times and such support to an extent has aided their survival in the communities. The relief materials have been in the form of food items, medicine, clothing etc. The leaders of the communities alluded that the support they have gotten from such organisations and NGOs have made it possible for the local population to survive. In his response, AMB-1 revealed that there was a formal meeting organized by the United Nations High Commissioner in Adamawa state. He said categorically that,

*we had A UN-Adamawa Peace Initiative in partnership with United Nations High Commissioner for refugees, they bought to us food items such as rice, Maize, beans and other organizations too who gave their own assistance, but I can't remember some of them gave their assistance through red cross and were given to us. They sent items like blankets, mats, Rice, Maize, Milk which was given to women, cloths for little children, drugs for pregnant women and the sick as well as the old people to relieve them of the hardship/pains they incurred while escaping for their lives (AMB-1 November 2017).*

According to AMB-4 some humanitarian organizations (names not mentioned) came from Abuja and did some recordings of the losses of the local people which was of course majorly their houses, market places and government structures. Equally, they selected 50 people, 25 Muslim and 25 Christian under Muslim Council and CAN respectively who they provided with grinding machines and sewing machines.

The youths also made it very clear that different NGOs have come to their rescue. According to FGD-AMBY, FGD-BGY, FGD-YKV they have gotten support from different NGOs' specifically from the UNICEF, UNHCR, SALVATION WONDERS, SAVE THE CHILDREN, ACTION AGAINST HUNGER and the RED CROSS. They asserted that the NGOs have provided them with food items, shelter and even sunk boreholes in some communities. This falls in line with the opinion of the FGD-AMBV who pointed out that the NGOs provided them with zincs for roofing and food stuffs so that the people can have food to eat. They were thrilled that they (NGOs) were really concerned about the well-being of the people in the community.

Observing the whole humanitarian assistance the selected communities have gotten, of a truth, it can be said that the NGOs are doing their best to support the local population but far from it, the support gotten so far does not match the needs on ground indicating a high level of poverty in these communities. This then raises questions as to where the support systems of NEMA, SEMA, and other actors focuses on. The best response will be that they focus more on the IDPs in the various camps. It is then imperative to examine the level of response in the IDP camps.

Examining the situation at the various IDP camps established by the government and where attention is more concentrated more than the border communities, the reality is the same. According to Lenshie and Yenda (2016), the challenges IDPs face in the various IDP camps across the North-Eastern Nigeria are enormous and overwhelming. Due to the huge number of the IDPs in the region, there is a heightened level of competition for limited resources such as water, food and temporary shelter. As a matter of fact, the scarcity of these essential needs has led to what can be termed a secondary displacement of the IDPs in the region. There have been reports of several human rights violation of both women and children as they constitute a huge percentage of the IDPs. These are violation of the Kampala Convention which mandates a creation of a better living conditions for the IDPs through the provision of basic needs essential for daily survival. Besides reports on abuses, there have been reports of malnutrition in the IDP camps (Ojeme 2016) and cases of food items and other relief materials diverted by officials of the camps for their personal use and the elites (Faluyi, et'al 2019). In Yobe State, two traditional rulers were sanctioned for diverting food items meant for the IDPs (Joel 2016). There have been accusations of some government officials repackaging and diverting grains donated for the the IDP camps especially

rice (Haruna 2016c) and a few NGOs sourcing for financial aid from international donors under the pretense of carrying that out in the interest of the IDPs (Salau 2016).

Figure 6.1 shows the irritating scene of how children queue for food in their tattered clothes and embarrassing bowls and plates. The sight of this tells the living conditions these children and their mothers are subjected to in the various IDP camps across the region.

**Figure 6. 2 Internally displaced children queue to receive supplementary food in Banki IDP camp, Borno state, North-Eastern Nigeria**



Source: Murtala and Abubakar (2017)

If the above explained is the situation in the recognized IDP camps, then it shows that the observations made in the selected border communities are valid, hence the need for urgent attention in those communities.

## **6.4 Conclusion**

The responses of the government to the security and humanitarian challenges that exist in the border communities are limited and does not seem capable of addressing the phenomenon in the region. In 2011 when the Nigerian government responded to the Boko Haram crisis, she was

compelled to doing so due to the actions of the international community especially the United States sanction which blacklisted Nigeria as one of the supporters of terrorism in the world. With this move, the Nigerian government swung into action by coming up with a legal framework to tackle the menace of Boko Haram. In June 2011 the Anti-Terrorism Act was signed by the president and a tactical security force was established to combat the Boko Haram insurgency and restore peace and normalcy in the North-Eastern Nigeria. It should be noted that this effort was coming 2 years after the insurgency started. In 2009 the insurgents used local arms and weapons to attack soft targets but in 2011, they have become more grounded and sophisticated in their activities due to the support they got from international terrorist networks. This reflected in their modus operandi and the kind of weapons that they use. The simple interpretation of this is that while the Boko Haram was busy causing mayhem in the North-Eastern Nigeria and collaborating with the likes of *Al Qaeda* and *ISIS*, the Nigerian government was not concerned and did not take the insurgents serious. So, their response was coming at a time when the armoury of the Boko Haram could match that of the Nigerian military. This and many other factors as discussed in chapter five have made it difficult for the government to totally dislodge and end Boko Haram attacks in the North-Eastern Nigeria.

Moreover, the same could be said of the government's response to the humanitarian crisis that ensued from the Boko Haram menace. The response of the government through NEMA did not come until when the various actors pushed the government to do so in 2015. And at this time, the humanitarian needs had increased geometrically signifying the huge funds needed for such intervention. In responding to the humanitarian needs, the Nigerian government was impeded in a way. The federal and state governments had severed relationships which trickled down to their agencies (NEMA and SEMAs) meant to carry out such missions. Both agencies were involved in a tussle for relevance. While the SEMAs want to be in full control of the ground work, NEMA equally wants to exercise its right as the national body empowered to respond to and manage disaster in Nigeria. This among many other factors articulated in chapter five have impeded the federal government from effectively responding to the humanitarian challenge that exists in the North-Eastern Nigeria.



It is therefore clear that the responses of international state actors, international organisations, NGOs both local and international and concerned individuals have been the major source of humanitarian intervention witnessed in the North-Eastern Nigeria while the concerned institution which is the Nigerian government has been lackadaisical in the whole process. No wonder it was observed in the selected communities that the only visible presence of government was the military who the local community do not have so much trust in because of their failure to curb and combat previous Boko Haram attacks in their communities. According to the 2019 Humanitarian Response Plan, the total required funds amounts to US\$847,703,581 while the donations on ground amounts to US\$10,823,698 meaning that so far only a minute fragment of the total needs can be catered for as it stands because the available funds can only cover 1.3% of the total needs. Holistically, this means that a lot need to be done for the plight of the displaced to be alleviated in the North-Eastern Nigeria. However, the border communities should not be left out in the process basically for two reasons. Firstly, the local population already have a feeling of neglect by the government governing a country they are a part of and secondly, sooner or later, the displaced will find their ways back to their communities to resettle. Therefore, it is imperative for these communities to be reconstructed and rehabilitated so that the people can return to their normal life.

## **CHAPTER SEVEN**

# **SURVIVAL STRATEGIES OF SELECTED BORDER COMMUNITIES IN NORTH-EASTERN NIGERIA**

### **7.0 Introduction**

Cross-border conflict is not particular to Africa or to Nigeria, and same can be said about the phenomenon of inhabitants of conflict-ridden border communities employing local strategies to cope with crisis. Literature has revealed that regions outside of Africa have been faced with same phenomenon and in some ways were able to survive as a result of evolved strategies that made it possible for them to cope in one way or the other. As this chapter is dedicated to discussing the coping strategies evolved by the communities to tackle and combat the scourge of cross-border insurgency in the North-Eastern Nigeria it is equally imperative to discuss the coping strategies border communities have evolved in the past from a global and continental perspective as provided in existing literature on the theme of coping strategies by marginalized communities across the different continents of the world. Succeeding is the discussion on the coping strategies selected border communities in the North-Eastern Nigeria came up with for continuing survival in the communities and from this a conceptual model from the findings of the study to situate the dynamics of coping strategies in selected border communities vis-a-vis cross-border insurgency witnessed in the North-Eastern Nigeria will evolve. Finally, though coping strategies assist greatly to sway through situations confronted with but how sustainable are these strategies to ensure that they continue to guarantee survival. It is on this note that it is necessary to dissect the short term and long-term effects of these coping strategies based on the information gathered and observations made in the communities with a view to making workable suggestions that will ameliorate the living conditions of border communities in North-Eastern Nigeria.

### **7.1 Coping strategies evolved by the selected border communities**

As established in previous chapters, the nefarious activities of the Boko Haram in the North-Eastern Nigeria has been gruesome causing serious humanitarian crisis in the region especially in the border communities from where they launch attacks. Many in the region have been displaced

as either refugees or Internally Displaced persons (IDPs). According to statistics, in Adamawa and Borno states, about 190,000 persons have moved between November 2017 and mid-August 201. While 153,000 are IDPs, 36,000 are returnees (OCHA, 2018). Moreover, despite the presence of the JTF in the communities who do their best to curb the Boko Haram insurgency, attacks are still being carried out on the communities. The confessions from the local people revealed that the government has not helped the situation. The security they provided cannot fight Boko Haram hence, the reason why the Boko Haram attack is so intense in the communities. This exposes the fragile nature of the Nigerian state. The state has failed in its core function of protecting the lives and properties of its citizen. The security situation in the North-Eastern Nigeria is far from being resolved as lives of both the civilians and the soldiers are being lost to several attacks by the Boko Haram (EASO,2018; TimesLive, 2019), and this continue to have adverse economic and security implications (in line with Rotberg, 2003). As this phenomenon continue to thrive, witnessing a displacement of people across the region, many continue to live in the border communities where the insurgents attack and (or) use as a launch pad whenever an attack was and is to be carried out. How these communities continue to survive and exist remain unexplored. This is the lacuna this study explored and investigated.

In the selected border communities, it was observed that the coping strategies evolved by the local population were targeted at safety and survival of the local population within the communities. It was discovered across the selected communities for this study that the local population generally adopted five major pragmatic strategies to ensure their safety and survival within these communities. These include:

- i. reconciliation and unity
- ii. vigilance and prayerfulness
- iii. the formation of local vigilante groups
- iv. bargaining.

These identified strategies which to a great extent, have been deployed by the selected communities and ensured their survival will be discussed to demonstrate the different and overlapping patterns of their utilization by the selected communities.

### **7.1.1 Reconciliation and Unity**

Unity and oneness are critical factors that guarantee peace and progress in any group, environment and community. A community that is partitioned along ethnic, religious and social divide will never stand. According to Weran (2017), for peaceful co-existence in any community, there must be cooperative and inter-religious dialogue achievable by occasionally creating fora for debates as to how to facilitate and improve cooperation among the civil societies, religious leaders, and different groups within a space. Without this especially in conflict-prone environment, misconception, division, and conflict is bound to erupt. Diverse examples of countries that have experienced and some still experiencing this phenomenon include India, Columbia, Venezuela, Sudan, Rwanda, Cameroun, Mali among others. In Sudan, Sudan Inter-Religious Council (SIRC) was formed by four religious groups namely. The Sudan Council of Churches (SCC), the International People's Friendship (IPF), International Center for Religion and Diplomacy (ICRD), and the Society for Religious Dialogue (SRD) to consolidate the ideals of co-existence, tolerance and cooperation among different religious groups in Sudan (Weran, 2017). The SIRC was commissioned to carry out four key functions which are to commence dialogue and facilitate unity among religious leaders, guard religious freedom, resolve conflicts between religious groups and lastly to encourage cooperation among religious sects.

Nigeria has a history of ethno-religious conflict resulting from divergent values, interest, and the norms of the social group, especially ethnic and religious groups in the Northern Nigeria. This easily explains why the Boko Haram insurgency is primarily domiciled in Northern or North-Eastern Nigeria. Agbiboa, (2015); Shuaibu and Salleh, (2015) noted that religious, economic and ecological indices of the northern region reflect that the insurgency stemmed from the remnants of conflicts like the Maitatsine, identity and poverty crisis as proven in previous chapters. Therefore, when the Boko Haram attacks started, they began attacking Christians and burning down churches in these communities. YY-2, AMB-5, and BG-5 pointed out that many Christians who fled at the dawn of the attack never returned into the community as at when the interview was conducted. This led to discord and created enmity between the Muslims and the Christians who have lived together for years as neighbors and families within the same communities because, the Christians saw this as an attack on them and their places of worship. FGD-AMBW, FGD-BGW, FGD-BBW,

FGD-YYW, and FGD-YKW attested to this fact most especially women. The core reason for this perception among Christians is not farfetched and at this juncture it is important to briefly cast back on the evolution of the sect in the Northern Nigeria and why their attacks led to a rift between Christians and Muslims. The radical ideology popularized by Mohammed Yusuf which outlived him and thereafter propagated by his disciples was solely meant to Islamize Nigeria. According to Mantzikos (2010) the main target of the sect is to convert Nigeria and Nigerians into a Muslim Wahhabist state and Muslim Wahhabists respectively and the fact that it recruits from the Ibn Taymiyyah network of schools which Yusuf had created attests to the assertion (Mantzikos, 2010). This was the same phenomenon witnessed in Sudan where the non-Muslims and non-Arabs and their culture were assaulted ceaselessly. This took the form of “direct and indirect assault which included forcible assimilation (forced Islamization and Arabization), driving men out, internal starvation, force displacement and relocation, indoctrination, rape and other gender assaults, aerial bombardment, militia raid, enslavement and malign neglect. These assaults on human dignity have been most evident in Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains of west and central Sudan; and more recently in Darfur, western Sudan” (Beny and Hale, 2015:16).

In Nigeria Maiduguri precisely, an attack was carried out by the sect on a University residence in August 2013. The insurgents killed the men, separated women who are Muslim and the non-Muslims, and the Christians among them were serially raped (Barkindo et al 2013). Such attacks on Christian women by Boko Haram can be regarded as an extension of other institutionalised and long-term discriminatory practices against them in northern regions. Onapajo & Uzodike (2012) attributed this act against Christian women to the age long discriminatory practices they are subjected to, both in the domestic and professional domains in the Northern Nigeria. They have fallen victims of acid-attacks for carrying out activities that are termed to be ‘un-Islamic’ or ‘dishonouring Islam’, such as a refusal to wear the hijab (Turaki 2010). In 2006, riots occurred after a Christian female teacher seized a Qur’an from a student and that led to the killing of over 50 Christians who were mostly women and children. (Alao 2009).

In the light of the preceding, it is obvious what could be the level of discord and disunity the phenomenon of the Boko Haram has caused in these communities where neighbours now became foes to themselves and were combat ready should there be a need for that. Moreover, religious

leaders could not salvage the situation especially the Christian clerics as they were losing grip of their flocks who faced attack daily. Christian clerics interviewed in the border communities in Adamawa and Borno States averred that during that period, they were helpless as they were in a confused state having to watch over the Christians as their shepherd, making sure that they were protected from attacks. However, the tide turned after the Boko Haram attacks got a new dimension. In their various attacks, they began attacking and killing Muslim clerics and as well burning down Mosques (see Table 5.1) but at this time the discord had already being established to a point that members of both faiths has started to harm one another.

Upon return of the inhabitants into some of the communities, they had to put an end to the cacophony between members of both faith by restoring peace and unity which is the only foundation upon which the fight against the Boko Haram can be made and planed as it became clear to the local population that the Boko Haram attack not just Christians, but they attack everybody found within the environment during attacks. This was made clear in the interview sessions conducted with the community leaders. They all averred that at the initial stage, the Boko Haram attacks turned members of the same community against one another most especially, Christians and Muslims which degenerated into intra-community attacks and as such needed to put an end to that for unity to be restored into the community. BG-1 noted that “peace needed to be restored among the Christians and Muslims in the community because, they were fast becoming enemies” (BG-1 November 2017). AMB-4 equally pointed out that, “our home is our home. We are staying and praying to God for peace. It has been very difficult. We just adjusted, and everyone try to maintain vigilance” (Mubi November 2017).

This thus led to different efforts targeted at this course. At different points, reconciliation meetings were held to reunite warring parties in the communities. It was noted by some leaders of the communities that the Bishop of Maiduguri came in and met with the youths and others, preaching the message of peace and unity which is a panacea to ensure safety in the community. This move was very effective in reuniting the people most especially, the youths. AMB-4 said that:

*when we came back, we started uniting the religious leaders with government officials. We called a meeting just to understand each other, and by that we grew stronger and suspicious people or movement were reported to the military, that's*

*how we experience peaceful living. The government, religious leaders and traditional leaders were all part of the movement for uniting the community. That's how we were able to co-exist (Mubi November 2017).*

The above assertion seemed a genuine and sincere one as it was observed in the communities especially in Adamawa and Borno states that people lived in harmony as they went about their daily activities. Worthy of note was the kind of unity and solidarity that existed among the women and the youth. This was greatly exhibited during the different interview sessions across the communities as they shared their pains and losses together. Despite the past events that turned them against each other, they saw the need to put the past behind them for peace to reign in the communities. This same strategy was used in Sudan. Regardless of the complicated nature of the conflict, Muslim-Christian inter-faith and inter-religious initiatives made attempts to address the religious and ethnic conflict. For instance, in the north, in 1995, some Arab elites through the Middle East Council of Churches inaugurated an Arab group to facilitate Islamic-Christian dialogue (Weran, 2017). This move for unity and oneness largely remain a major means through which peace can be restored. In the case of the selected border communities in the North-Eastern Nigeria, the reunion formed a strong foundation upon which other strategies were built. This will be revealed in succeeding discussions.

### **7.1.2 Vigilance and Prayerfulness**

Upon the failure of the state to carry out its security duties of defending the territorial integrity of the Nigerian state and as well protecting and safeguarding the inhabitants of peripheral communities in the Northern Nigeria most importantly, the North-Eastern region, inhabitants of border communities in the region took it up as a duty to defend and protect their domains and as well secure the life of inhabitants. Chapter 5 exhaustively discussed the various efforts of the government in tackling the menace of the Boko Haram and how and why such efforts have failed thus leading to an escalation of the crisis within the region. On return of the inhabitants into their communities, as explained in 7.1.1, aggrieved parties especially along religious lines were reunited for formidable force to be built to confront the dastardly acts of the Boko Haram. It was on this pedestal that the selected border communities were able to rebuild the trust that once existed among them which in turn assisted in making unified decisions and carrying out unified actions as well. Before many of them were chased out of their communities, the Boko Haram insurgents had come

to live with them. They came in as friends who have decided to relocate from their base and resettle in the new communities where they found themselves. Little did the inhabitants know that they were wolves in sheep clothing.

As accommodating communities, they were accepted and given assistance for speedy settlement. In the process the Boko Haram spies mingled with the people consciously identifying and observing their strengths and areas of weakness before they invited their members into the communities for actions. Respondents from communities visited in Adamawa and Borno states alluded to this assertion pointing out that they fell for it in a big way as they were caught unawares in many of the attacks. YY-4, FGD-BGM, FGD-BGW, and FGD-AMM explained that after peace was restored into the community, members of the communities discovered that members of the Boko Haram lived with them as spies without them knowing. They have mingled and related so well with the local population that they know the nook and crannies of the communities. Once they are able to have a full grasp of the terrain, they alert their members and then the attack happens. AM-1 averred that:

*They (members of the Boko Haram) came into our village to live with us so that can be able to spy the activities of the village, they spy from places even on the mountain tops. And they also made use of our own people and got series of information from them. They even paid some of the people to buy their interest. They were also putting soldiers' uniform and they got the people very confused (Michika November 2017).*

These set of youths opened the researcher up to another dimension of strategy used by the sect. Putting on army uniforms made it difficult for the people to distinguish the real soldiers from the fake ones and since they are always armed made it impossible for the local people to act.

This tactic used by the Boko Haram worked so well for them as it reflected on the impact the various attacks carried out on the communities had on them. This was possible because the insurgents knew where, when and how to attack for a maximum impact to be felt. This dealt a huge blow on many of the communities as many lost their lives and many ran for safety. And so, upon return and reconciling aggrieved parties, there was a call for vigilance in the communities and as such



members were advised to be police of themselves and report any suspicious movement or any strange face sighted in the communities. They took a decision to be wary of strange faces especially those they never saw before in the communities. The women upon sighting any quickly made a report to a male youth or a man close to them who then swings into action by raising alarm for such people to be accosted. In the response aggregated such people were approached in fierce manner and if no reasonable and convincing responses were advanced by the suspected persons, they were either mobbed or taken to the village square for further questioning. FGD-YYW, FGD-BBM, FGD-BGW noted that many of them (insurgents) that were identified came into the community as strangers and they were warmly accepted and welcomed. It was also pointed that upon their arrival, they provided them with shelter and food without knowing they are enemies (FGD-AMM, AMB-1, FGD-AMBM, FGD-BGM November 2017). This close relationship they once had with these insurgents assisted them to be able to recognize many members of the sect that come into the community as spies thereafter and they were able to apprehend and foil their proposed attacks.

This strategy has been advanced in the literature as a key strategy for combating insurgency or domestic terrorism at various levels be it national or community level. According to the United States Department of States (2017) the height of ISIS's activities in Iraq and Syria, the terrorist group got sympathizers from Sweden who were mostly men of immigrant background but not related to Syria or Iraq in any way. These men gave their support by leaving Sweden for Syria to join the group as foreign terrorist fighters. Report has it that out of the 300 persons who travelled to join ISIS, 44 were killed while fighting while 146 returned to Sweden. The return of these individuals was viewed with skepticism by the Swedish government as they suspected that the returnees could stage an attack on the Swedish soil and even influence others to wanting to travel to Syria to fight.

The Swedish Security Services (SAPO). In late 2016, SAPO intimated the public through its media of a reduction in the number of travelers. As a result, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (SCCA) embarked on awareness program by linking up with different agencies and communities sensitizing them on the threat that the foreign terrorist fighters pose and the need for them to be vigilant for such attacked to be prevented. Again, this same strategy was recommended in late 2015 after the Paris attacks. In concrete terms, "SÄPO stated the reason for raising the alert level

was not due to specific evidence of planning, but for a need to raise the citizenry's vigilance following the Paris attacks" (United States Department of State, 2017: 157). This was the situation in many European countries that were targets countries of the refugees and migrants from the troubled Syria. It was discovered that ISIS wanted to exploit the situation to smuggle in their operatives as refugees into those countries. This forced such countries to raise alarm and call for an increased vigilance among its security operatives and citizenry.

The preceding explicitly shows the potency in this strategy. As primary as it seems, it is capable of tackling insurgency at the basic level. It is therefore not out of place for these communities to have resolved to this strategy as one of the strategies to tackle insurgency in their communities. The communities were able to carry this out religiously as their safety partly depend on it. FGDs with the women across the communities revealed that though many of them lived in fear, they had to summon courage so that they can be vigilant enough to be able to identify the spies in their midst and fish them out. This they did not do without been prayerful. Though, this may seem insignificant, it is a strategy which communities believed has so much worked for them. Many of the respondents noted that they keep offering prayers to God and they are convinced he hears them. Many averred that when it is possible to gather, Muslims offer their prayers in the Mosques while the Christians offer theirs in the church. Many of the women pointed out that while their husbands and matured sons stood guard in the communities, they stayed at home and prayed for the safety of themselves, their husbands and children and the communities at large (FGD-AMW, FGD-AMBW, FGD-BGW, FGD-BBW, FGD-YYW, FGD-YKW November 2017).

### **7.1.3 Formation of local vigilante groups**

Communities seeing the security vacuum created decided to provide security for themselves. All they did was making use of an established system to achieve this aim. They converted a group of people into the local security force of the communities. As averred in subsequent chapters, inhabitants of these selected communities are majorly, farmers, fisher men, traders and hunters. Those who are hunters automatically became local security men to guard the communities. They were called local vigilante groups formed in the communities for the sole purpose of surveillance and policing against the insurgents who continue to attack and kill the people uncontrollably. FGDs and interviews revealed that men and the youths in the communities formed the vigilante groups.

Part of their duties are to constantly patrol the communities and mount check points at strategic locations of the communities. According to AMB-1:

*at first we gathered all the “Jauro’s” (Assistant district heads) for series of meetings with the security personnel’s, we formed “Yan Banga” (local Vigilante), and all the assistant district heads took precautionary measures in their district such that any strange face see in the community will be reported to them and they will also report the same to the military, and those local vigilantes were stationed in the nook and crannies of the community where bad people can hide in, or use as an exit, all the places were well monitored. In the community, we know all the people there, so any strange face we see, we report because we didn’t know where the person comes from and the security men will take action on the person. Even in the market, the leaders of various associations in the market were all called and cautioned to be vigilant, that whatever they find or see as suspicious they should report to the authority that was how we were able to protect ourselves (Mubi November 2017).*

FGD-AMV, FGD-AMBV, FGD-BGC, FGD-BBC, FGD-YYV, FGD-YKV noted that they made use of local weapons in attacking the insurgents such as local guns, machetes, bow and arrow, and big stick called “Gora” in Hausa. These local weapons are used in protecting the local people and according to them they have proven to be highly effective in helping them defend themselves and the communities. FGD-BGC noted that these weapons are always prepared with traditional charms for them to be efficacious. BB-2 affirmed same but was particular about local guns, bows and arrows which can be shut from afar. Moreover, those who handle such weapons wear some charms on their bodies before handling such weapons. This serves as protection for them and it has assisted in reducing casualties when they are being attacked by the insurgents.

Vigilantism is not a new phenomenon in Africa. In fact, it predates the formation of formal policing structure in many African countries. In Nigeria, it existed before the Police force was established by the British Colonial government in 1861. Vigilante groups serve as a major Informal security actor in the provision of security in several African communities. The informal security sector can otherwise be termed the “informal policing structure” or the voluntary policing sector (VPS). In

Nigeria, these formations have been ascribed different nomenclature such as neighborhood watch, vigilantes, traditional police, and community guards of all vigilante is the term widely used. In traditional Nigerian communities, vigilantes are known as yan banga (vigilante) in the north, ndinche (guards) in the east, and olodes (hunters/ vigilante), among many more names. According to Ogbozor (2016), “Vigilantism dates to the precolonial era, when vigilante groups were small, characterized by loose and uncoordinated leadership and activities, and operated independently in the various local areas of the federations. As time went on, the vigilante groups unified to form the VGN, with operations at the local, state, regional, and national levels”. The position taken by the vigilante groups in different communities is justified because the major security force which is saddled with maintaining peace and order across the country is insufficient, ill equipped, and ill managed. Ogbozor (2016) explained that Nigeria has about 377,000 police officers to protect the population of 170 million. Despite that it’s a ratio of one policeman to 500 Nigerians, half the number of policemen serve the politicians as security aide to protect them and their families instead of been deployed to local communities. He averred that police officers now prefer to take up duties where they can get more income and gratifications such as manning security checkpoints, guarding central and commercial banks, and serving politicians. This preceding explains why many communities in Nigeria have taken up the role of securing their environments. This is called community policing<sup>16</sup>. In like mind, the border communities took a decision that was best for them if they really wanted the Boko Haram attacks on their communities to abate or stop eventually.

This strategy as averred by the respondents proved effective as the vigilante groups made up of the men and the male youths in the communities were courageous enough to confront the insurgents and foil many of their attacks in these communities. AMB-1 with a show of pride noted “they (the Vigilantes) were attacking in front while the soldiers were following them from behind, these charms will make any modern weapon that you know inoperative and ineffective against them, so with this method, the vigilantes in front and soldiers coming from behind, that was what we used in capturing Mubi from the insurgents. You know when the local vigilantes came in, guns, became inoperative in Mubi, because of the local charms, so we believed in this and through the

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<sup>16</sup> According to Trojanowicz and Buequeroux, (1990, p. 5), “community policing is a new philosophy of policing, which emphasizes the working partnership between police officers and citizens in creative ways in order to solve community problems relating to crime, fear of crime, and neighborhood disorders”.

use of this arms, the local vigilantes will go and apprehend the insurgents face to face with their weapons and hand them to the soldiers, and they were only using bow and arrow, Gora, and local guns, this was what they did, and even up-to now, traditionally we still value this strategies and charms in northern Nigeria” (Mubi November 2017). They (the vigilantes) became prominent to an extent that they were recognized as the Civilian Joint task Force (CJTF) and this name soon spread across the region.

According to the Vanguard (2016) “initially, the civilian joint task force (CJTF) members were a bunch of idle, but angered young men, residing in different parts of the Northeast, who tolerated years of hostility of their population and intrusion of their territories by the insurgents. Fed-up, they decided to join the anti-terror war voluntarily to liberate their communities from the hands of Boko Haram. Such guts deserved special commendations”. Their activities and achievement in providing local security attracted the attention of the Chief of Army Staff General Buratai. He officially recognized the groups in the North-Eastern Nigeria and appreciated the giant stride they are making in assisting the Joint Task Force (JTF) to combat the Boko Haram. They were therefore mandated to work in collaboration with the JTF in securing the communities and warding off any form of attack by the deadly Boko Haram sect. They were specifically deployed in gathering intelligence for the JTF to block supplies to the Boko Haram camps and to ambush them at the point of attack (The Vanguard, 2016).

#### **7.1.4 Bargaining**

Bargaining as a strategy though could not be linked directly to any of the responses by the local people was deduced to be used by some of the border communities selected for the study if not all of them in the real sense of it. Though no respondent in all the communities mentioned that this measure was utilized at some point or the other, interactions with some officers and men of the JTF across board pointed to the fact that communities bargained with the Boko Haram covertly. Specifically, in the selected border communities in Yobe state, the researcher observed that the local people held back some information as regard the coping strategies they came up with or that they have adopted to ensure their survival. In a bid to get useful information from them, they said nothing aside the fact that they rendered prayers to God for safety and the efforts of the vigilantes

who have taken it up to fight and protect the people against the Boko Haram attacks (FGD-YYW, FGD-YKW November 2017).

They (the local people) expressed their grievance against the government and all its institutions that have been involved in the fight against the Boko Haram. They showed so much apathy for the JTF present in the communities and picking a clue from that the researcher interacted with the members of the JTF. In the process some soldier revealed why this was so. The soldiers noted that they are not getting support from the people because they already entered into an agreement with the Boko Haram and anyone who divulges useful information stand the risk of been killed. When they were asked what they offer the Boko Haram, they (JTF) noted that all the local people have to offer was their farm produce which is what the Boko Haram need for survival in their different camps as they do not have constant supply of groceries from their sources and giving real time information to the insurgents.

Basically, they (the soldiers) stressed that whatever bargain they did was meant to prevent the Boko Haram from attacking their communities thus making them safe while they offer groceries, cattle and some other items in exchange monthly. The assertion of the Financial Task Force corroborates this finding. According to the report, “Nigerian authorities report that Boko Haram members confiscate farms from villagers, or tax farmers and require them to give produce to Boko Haram” (FATF, 2016). And since this bargain has been made and sealed, they see the JTF as intruders who have come to truncate their peace and safety as the presence of the JTF will only attract the attention of the Boko Haram to carry out attacks on the communities. This is so because, their presence automatically distorts the arrangement and agreement already made and since the Boko Haram need these items for daily survival in their enclave, they have no choice than to attack and forcefully get what they need to get from the communities. In the process of this happening, many lives are lost.


A number of reporting in 2013 pointed to different cases of kidnap of former and serving local government officials who paid ransoms of tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars to the Boko Haram (Audu, 2013). Also, many news reports have asserted that some Nigerian government officials paid Boko Haram to stay clear of their spheres and localities. A spokesperson of the sect mentioned that governors of Bauchi and Kano states in northern Nigeria paid them off to stay clear

of their states. Between 2004 and 2011, this ‘protection’ fee in totality summed up over \$1.5 million dollars per year for the two states involved (The Nation, 2012). The informant affirmed that the governor of Kano went into this agreement with Boko Haram in 2004, while his counterpart in Bauchi started in 2008 (The Nation, 2012). Boko Haram started a number of attacks on both states when they stopped payment in 2011 (Aziken, et’al 2012).

The sect equally gives out cash gifts, no-interest loans, and support in-kind, to local merchants. This strategy is used to gain the trust of these individuals and use them for the sect’s whims and caprices. The strategy has also assisted them in recruiting, smuggle and steal for the sect (Gift and Graft, 2016). ‘As recently as April 2016, Boko Haram recruited fighters by giving young entrepreneurs loans, and then conscripting them into the group when they could not repay’ (Nigeria Armed Forces, 2016; CNN, 2016). Inhabitants of territories held and controlled by Boko Haram from 2013 to 2014, were taxed and failure to pay attracted a death penalty (Zenn, 2013). This corroborates the assertion made by officers of the JTF on the relationship that exist between the Boko Haram and some of the communities and of course, this kind of agreement which will be done in the hidden will not be relayed publicly by members of the communities for loyalty sake and fear of being attacked by the sect as there are moles among the local population. This further explains why there is so much apathy for the JTF by the people.

Figure 7.1. details the conceptual model developed from the analysed coping strategies evolved by the communities spanning across the study area.

**Figure 7. 1 Conceptual model for coping and survival of selected border communities against cross-border insurgency in the North-Eastern Nigeria**





### **7.1.5 Causal conditions of the phenomenon of cross-border insurgency and the context surrounding the evolvement of the coping strategies**

Basically, four causal conditions were deduced from the findings of the study which exclusively led to the evolution of the insurgency in the North-Eastern Nigeria. These conditions were; Western Education, poverty, unemployment and corruption. These conditions which have been discussed in chapter two and five, laid the foundation for the start of the Boko Haram. Poverty, unemployment and corruption were so endemic in the system till date that it led to a protest against western education. The idea was that if the western education which we inherited from the colonialist and still forms our model of education cannot change the lots of the people and give them a good life, why not jettison it and adopt a system to tackle these vices and improve the living conditions of the people. It was on this premise that Boko Haram started. Boko Haram literally means “against western education”. The various responses of the government to this sect most especially the killing of its leader Muhammed Yusuf was what escalated the situation and made the group a full-fledged terror group terrorizing, killing, and maiming the people in the North-Eastern Nigeria especially the border communities situated on the peripheral of the Nigerian state. It grew so strong that it was able to attack hard targets in the FCT such as the UN building, Police HQ and other security formations both in the FCT and in the North-Eastern Nigeria.

Therefore, it was based on the preceding that coping strategies for survival were developed by the border communities as a response to the overwhelming threats, helpless feelings, and psychological stress they were subjected to by the Boko Haram. Such contextual markers included; no or limited Intervention on the part of the government, consistent attacks, constant disorder, and threat to life and properties in the communities. The first marker is closely related to the causal factors which has to do with poverty, unemployment and corruption. The fact that these factors existed before the emergence of Boko Haram were an indication to the local people that little or no response is likely going to come from the government. Coupled with the deeply rooted feeling of marginalization that long existed in the North-Eastern Nigeria, the people were forced to act fast and device means of protecting and themselves. This could also explain the much apathy or less cooperation shown to the JTF by the local people. This could not be unconnected to the kind of humiliation and

harassment many of them were subjected to during the various raids carried out by the JTF in those communities which led to the arrest and killing of many of their husbands, wives, fathers, mothers and children especially the male children aside from the deaths they had recorded when the Boko Haram started. As report by Amnesty International (2011) supports the above claim. In an operation carried out by the JTF, twenty-five people were shot dead in their homes by officers, women and children were molested, homes were burnt, and many men and boys were reported missing in the Kaleri Ngomari Custain area in Maiduguri on 9<sup>th</sup> July 2011.

### **7.1.6 The coping strategies: influencing factors and the consequences on coping and survival.**

Aside context, there were some conditions that directly or indirectly influenced the choice of strategies evolved by the communities. Such intervening conditions involve religion, cultural beliefs, resources and sex. Religion was so influential in the kind of coping strategies that were developed. Majorly Christians and Muslims lived together in peace and harmony before the insurgency started and caused rancour between the people. After members of both faith realized that the discord that existed between them was a strategy meant to foment more chaos in the communities by the Boko Haram, they both came together, settled their scores and took a decision to consistently engage prayers to God as they believe that God alone is the one that can deliver them from the clutches of the Boko Haram. And so, the Christians did sessions of prayers to God whenever they gather and in their various homes while the Muslims did the same in the mosques. Cultural beliefs and resources influenced pragmatic security measures taken by the people. The communities long had a security structure that oversee the security of the community. These are hunters that hunt for wild animals in the bushes and forests. They have weapons such as guns, machete etc. as well as traditional means such as charms to protect and arm themselves against attack from wild animals. They decided to come together to put these resources into use by confronting and combating the Boko Haram insurgents.

In the light of the context and intervening conditions, the phenomenon of insurgency prompted the local population to develop strategies for coping and survival against the former. Such strategies include reunion, vigilance and prayerfulness, formation of vigilante Groups, and bargaining. These strategies as analysed in this chapter symbolizes the fact that

they were effective to a great extent in ensuring the continuing existence and survival of the local population within these communities. Reunion formed the bed rock on which other strategies were built because it settled all the rancour that existed between warring factions especially Christians and Muslims. It was based on this that other measures evolved worked most especially the vigilante groups that were formed in the communities. They were so effective that government institutions utilized them as escorts in their engagements across the North-Eastern Nigeria. Equally their activities attracted the attention of the Chief of Army Staff who recognised them as CJTF. As a result, they were officially co-opted in assisting the JTF in fighting the Boko Haram. Evidences through reports and the newspapers show that they have been resourceful in combating the Boko Haram.

In the same vein, the strategies utilised by the selected communities surely had consequences on the people and on the communities at large. These strategies succeeded in ensuring that the purpose for which they were developed was achieved and that is survival against all odds in their communities. However, while these strategies were a success, it has not eliminated the menace caused by the Boko Haram in the North-Eastern Nigeria especially in the border communities. In all, these strategies have restored and consolidated unity and the spirit of oneness which once eroded the communities due to misconception on the part of different parties. The strategies have also assisted the communities to cope and survive against the dastardly acts of the Boko Haram in their communities.

## **7.2 Conclusion**

This chapter depicts that the cooperative engagement of social capital as discussed in chapter two came to play in the border communities in North-Eastern Nigeria as it formed a basis for which the coping strategies were evolved. These strategies include a reunion, vigilance and prayerfulness, formation of vigilante groups, and finally bargaining. These strategies were utilized in all the selected communities except for bargaining which is unique with the border communities in Yobe state. Every sane individual was involved in the process of implementing or carrying out these measures. At one point or the other men, women, male youths and female youths were involved. Their various efforts were targeted at making sure that no vacuum was left for the insurgents to utilize for striking in their communities. As

discussed above, these strategies have all proven to be effective in their own little ways in terms of limiting the Boko Haram's access into the communities and as well carrying out attacks at will. The fact that they (the Boko Haram) once lived in many of the communities made it easy for the local people to recognize and identify them whenever they come into the communities as spies. So, as they became more alert and vigilant, it became almost impossible for the insurgent to penetrate these communities anymore. Another veritable strategy utilized was the vigilante groups that were formed across the communities. This was quite easy for them (the local people) to form because many of the men engage in hunting as a profession. They hunt after small and wild animals, so they are not scared to face the Boko Haram in a duel. The courage these hunters showed made other men and youths who are farmers, fishermen and so on to join in the fight by picking up arms against the insurgents.

The vigilante groups performed excellently well by laying siege and foiling many attempted attacks by the Boko Haram thus attracting public attention and the name CJTF. It was on this premise that the Chief of Army Staff recognized these groups and co-opted them into the JTF which is mainly composed of the Nigerian military and some para-military outfits to combat the Boko Haram in the North-Eastern Nigeria. It is important to note that of all the strategies discussed above, bargaining strategy remains unique in that findings revealed that it was only utilized secretly by some border communities in Yobe state.

However, with these strategies evolved by the communities, the effect of the Boko Haram insurgency still abounds within the border communities in the North-Eastern Nigeria symbolizing the fact that the impacts of the Boko Haram insurgency on the affected communities cannot be over-emphasized. As a matter of fact, the effects abound in the selected communities and the local population continue to live with these inhumane situations. Majority of the local population still live in fear as they are still being attacked by the sect.

These attacks now manifest in varying forms. Many now manifest in the form of suicide attacks carried out especially by women in purdah. Basic amenities destroyed by the sect largely remain unrepaired while structures such as schools, and hospitals remain unreconstructed. Though, it was observed that some bridges in some of the communities are

being reconstructed, many of them remains unattended to by the government. Again, while it was observed that some of the local population have returned to their daily engagements majorly farming and fishing in the selected communities especially in Michika and Mubi communities of Adamawa state, hunger still continue to permeate some communities as they rely on supplies from NGOs such as the Red Cross, UNICEF, UNHCR, Salvation Wonders, Save the Children, Action against Hunger etc.

In addition, the NGOs has been at the fore front of reuniting missing children with their parents in the North-Eastern Nigeria. This has gone a long way in relieving the local population off the psychological trauma they are going through most especially, the women. The Red Cross Rescue Team reunited some minors displaced by the Boko Haram with their mothers after nearly seven years. These minors were identified by the Red Cross in Cameroun and flown back to Nigeria where they were reunited with their mothers in Borno state (Channels Television, 2017).

These are communities where people inhabit. As stressed by the local population through the interviews, FGDs and informal interactions, many are not ready to leave their communities as they are willing to defend and protect their heritage even if it will cost them their life. Many averred that they have nowhere to go or run to as their homes remain their homes. This shows the resilient spirit displayed by the local population to defend their heritage with everything that they have at their disposal.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

### CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 8.0 Introduction

The primary objective of this study was to investigate the coping strategies adopted by selected border communities in the North-Eastern Nigeria. This concluding chapter provides a summary and conclusion of the study drawing on both the literature reviewed, and the empirical data collected from respondents in the border communities selected for the study. The chapter also brings to fore the central thesis of the study and from there suggests pragmatic recommendations on how to address the plight of border communities as laid bare in the study. These recommendations are relevant to all stakeholders including government at all levels, the Joint Task Force, the local population and to researchers in the field of border studies. Finally, in the last part of this chapter, the study points out possible trajectories for future research on strategies for border security.

#### 8.1 Conclusion

Chapter one introduced the study by providing a concrete background, setting out the research problem, the objectives of the study, and the research questions. The chapter also established the scope of the study, its significance, theoretical framework, preliminary literature, and a conceptualization of key concepts. Other aspects covered in the chapter included a succinct description of the methodology, and an outline of the structure of the thesis.

The overarching objective of the study is targeted at exploring the coping strategies evolved by border communities vis-à-vis cross-border insurgency (Boko Haram) in the North-Eastern Nigeria. Understanding the strategies would provide further explanation and assist in appreciating why some of the local population continue to reside and survive in these communities. This is despite continued attacks from Boko Haram and relocation by some inhabitants to different locations both within Nigeria and across the borders into neighbouring countries such as Niger, Chad and Cameroun. The research problem generated questions that are germane and key to this academic adventure. These questions are posited to identify the different patterns in which cross-border insurgency manifest in the selected border

communities. It equally sought to examine the impact of cross-border insurgency on the selected border communities and the responses of the government to tackle such inimical activities and restoring the needed peace and safety in these enclaves. The study further explored the strategies that has made it possible for the inhabitants of these communities to survive against the dastardly acts of the Boko Haram in the region and finally, how the adopted coping strategies has impacted on the continued existence of the border communities.

The chapter also provided the research methodology and methods including approaches; research design; study population; sample size; data collection methods; validity and reliability of the instrument; data analysis and ethical issues. This research engaged a qualitative research model using a phenomenological case study approach. The choice of these methods was informed by the nature of the research and the need to rely on the use of words rather than numbers which is often associated with a quantitative study.

The target population of this study included all the inhabitants of border communities in the North-Eastern Nigeria. Typical case purposive sampling method was employed in the selection of participants as the study is strictly qualitative using a case study design. This implies that the population sample was selected based on the experience and knowledge they have which is useful for this study. The researcher chose three states of the North-Eastern Region of Nigeria namely Borno, Adamawa and Yobe because, they are the major states that experience cross-border insurgency, i.e. the most affected part of the nation that shares boundaries with neighbouring states such as Cameroun, Chad and Niger where Boko Haram carries out its nefarious activities.

The sample size of this study consisted of 276 participants who were interviewed. These respondents were inhabitants of the selected border communities in Nigeria's North-Eastern Region. A convenient representative sample of 46 participants were selected from each of the modestly populated border communities located in each state. In each of the six communities, six In-depth Interviews were carried out with key stakeholders who included the traditional ruler, the men leader, the women leader, the youth leader, and two Faith Based Organizations (FBOs) identified in each community. Four Focus Group Discussions were conducted with men, women, youths, and the vigilante group in each community. The selected communities included. Gamboru-Ngala and Baga communities in Borno State, Michika and Mubi

communities in Adamawa State as well as, Yunusari and Kanamma communities in Yobe State. In each state, the service of a local guide and interpreter was employed to facilitate access to these communities and their inhabitants who were respondents for the study. In-depth interviews, focused group discussions and raw data from reports, constituted the sources of primary data for this study. The secondary sources were drawn from books journals, and verifiable newspaper sources retrieved from the library and the internet. The data gathered for the study were content analysed in a systematic and thematic way that addressed the research questions which the main crux of the study was.

The strategy of dealing with subjectivity was employed to assist the researcher in achieving the goal of fairness and equity which is representing participants' viewpoints by avoiding thwarted interpretations that represent the biases of the researcher or only a few participants. With regards to ethical considerations, the researcher strictly followed the principles of autonomy and anonymity which stresses respects that the right of self-determination of respondents must be respected. This study therefore adhered to the ethical considerations in accordance with the policies set out by the University of KwaZulu-Natal Ethics Committee (UKZNEC) (see Appendix III). The researcher equally secured verbal permission from the traditional rulers before starting the data collection process in each community. Also, the respondents were informed that their participation in the study was voluntary and if uncomfortable in the process they were free to withdraw from the study at any stage without restrictions or penalty. Above all, the respondents were reassured of their anonymity and that data collected would be treated with uttermost confidentiality.

Equally, conceptualizing and contextualizing some key concepts and as well reviewed some literature relevant to the study. These concepts are germane to this study hence, why it is of essence to clarify them as used in the study. These concepts include border, insurgency and coping strategy. The concept of border is constantly changing. Border has been conceptualized by different scholars, international, regional and sub-regional organizations who have defied uniformity of parlance. Currently, the predominant definition has been geographical, independent of all that the concept of border encompasses; it would appear that in the last few years, there has been a broadening of the concept that surpasses the traditionally accepted identification of the border. For this study therefore, border is the point



of demarcation that separates Nigeria from neighboring countries such as Cameroon, Chad and Niger where border communities are situated.

Insurgency as an ambiguous concept connotes an organized movement that has the aim of overthrowing a constituted government through subversive means and armed. This definition suggests that insurgent groups employ unlawful means towards achieving an end, which could be political, religious, social or even ideological. The goal of insurgency is to confront and overthrow an existing government for the control of power, resources or for power sharing (Siegel, 2007:328). Therefore, in this study, insurgency entails the Boko Haram Sect and its activities which cut across border communities in Nigeria and its neighboring countries such as Cameroon, Niger and Chad.

Chapter one further conceptualized the term coping and border communities. ‘Coping’ which is mainly a term used in psychology and has also found expression in other disciplines such as sociology, biology to explain ways through which a society or an organism is defined. It is perceived as ongoing cognitive and behavioral efforts to manage specific (external and/or internal) demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the resources of the individual as asserted by Lazarus and Folkman (1984). In essence therefore, the cogent function of coping strategies is basically to assist an individual, or communities adapt to whatever situation that confronts them and as such for this study, coping strategies refer to the responses of border communities to cross-border insurgency which ensures their survival in those communities.

The term “border communities” most often suggests that the closeness to the border is a major point that a given space is known for. With its closeness to different countries, diverse cultures and practices rub off on these communities. As such, border communities are highly multicultural communities, where traveling and trading frequently take place. They can also be flashpoints for international conflicts, most importantly when the two connecting countries are involved in territorial disputes. This is because of the strategic positionality of the communities and their proximity to the borders. Essentially, border communities are communities that straddle the border. Some of these communities may fall on one side of the border making it exclusively a part of a country while many are being divided by virtue of the borderline that cut across them, making them a part of both sides of the border. In Nigeria, these communities exist across the different regions that share boundaries with neighboring

states of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon in the North-Eastern and South-Southern Nigeria and Benin Republic in the South-Western Nigeria. Specifically, for this study, border communities are communities situated along the borders found in three states of the North-Eastern Nigeria namely, Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States.

Chapter two started off with a review of the literature which centered on various themes and sub-themes that are related to the study. The themes examined included border threats from the global, regional and sub-regional point of view, and the construction of borderlines in Africa. Border threats which could otherwise be called transnational crimes include crimes that daily occur within a country, but their grievous consequences are significantly felt in another country, most often neighbouring countries and countries that serve as transit routes for such dastardly acts. Transnational crimes include but are not limited to trafficking both in persons, goods and commodities, sex slavery, cross-border banditry, and terrorism offences etc. and are carried out by organized criminal networks otherwise called crime organizations within a country and across its borders.

The phenomenon of transnational crimes is not alien to West Africa in particular and to Africa as a whole. Literature has shown that most parts of the African continent are characterized by insecurity, underdevelopment and conflict. Some of the fundamental causes of these problems are cross-border criminalities which range from cattle rustling, automobile theft, smuggling of arms, ammunitions and commodities, human trafficking, to terrorism among others. This is because even in the face of globalization and technological advancement, borders in Africa aside from being largely porous, they are often managed by limited personnel that are ill-equipped, ill-trained and unmotivated to prevent cross-border crimes and to facilitate harmonious interactions between countries as a result of the mismanagement of these borders. This situation has therefore nearly perpetually opened the borders to transnational crimes. Because they are largely unchecked, these illicit activities carried out across the African borders daily thrive to the extent of becoming established on the continent and in the West African region respectively. Examples of the major transnational crimes prevalent in Africa are Smuggling of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs), Human Trafficking, Trafficking of Narcotics, and other commodities.

Chapter two equally engaged the literature to trace the artificial construction of borders in Africa since the nineteenth century with the Europeans' scramble for African land and territories. Countries such as Germany, Britain, France, Spain, Italy and Portugal came into the territory of Africa, divided and ruled over it until late 1960s when most African countries gained their Independence. Scholars of history have emphasized that border construction were either absent or weak in pre-colonial Africa and during slave trade. This explains why African border construction became evident from the moment that the Berlin Conference was concluded in 1885; a period that political and economic rivalries between the new industrial nations in Europe became obvious, as well as the subjugation of African nations and its traditional territorial structures.

Literature further revealed that the colonial policy which established the indistinct boundaries in Africa also presented the western powers themselves with serious challenges throughout the year 1900. Accordingly, expanding territories and establishing borders led the Europeans to sign many treaties, such as the Ottoman-German 1914 treaty; the 1919 Treaty of Versailles (established the term of peace after World War I, and obliged Germany to surrender territories under its colony to its European counterparts); the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 delimited the boundaries of Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Egypt and Sudan. Treaties from 1925 to 1945, and subsequently late 1950s were mostly signed between Britain, France and African nations, namely the 1934 British-Egyptian Agreement that delimited the border of present-day Libya, the 1935 Franco-Italian Agreement concerning Aouzou Strip. By late 1950s and early 1960s, African nations had started gaining their independence.

Majority of the treaties identified above were signed fundamentally to ascertain sovereignty and control over territories, resources, and consequently to prevent conflict among European powers. In America and Europe, borders are nowhere simply the product of geography, but established by war, domination, and resistance. In Africa, it is almost the contrary because borders were arbitrarily created based on the outcome of Berlin Conference.

Therefore, the erection of borders in Africa was targeted at enhancing trade, economic and political relations among the European countries. Nevertheless, the border construction today appears to frustrate its desired purpose. Borders are now more like barriers rather than bridges, and as such inhibit trades even among countries with the closest borders. It is vital

at this juncture to observe that no country in Africa is absolved of inefficient border procedures with complex trade facilitation. There is a cogent need to make policies that would make borders bridges and not barriers to reduce issues of insecurity smuggling.

This chapter went on to review the coping strategies of border communities that have experienced cross-border communities from a global and regional lens. In the Americas, much as in some countries of Europe and Asia, the protracted border conflicts between the United States and Mexico offers a reading for understanding dispute across boundaries from a global perspective. Those living in the border area of the conflict developed strategies to cope with their situation until formal governmental and/or organizational intervention would become available or sufficient. Of all the conflicts that have occurred in the United States/Mexico border such as those induced by facilitation, development, the environment and water, the “aquifers conflict” which sprang up as a result of claim to water resource particularly serves as reference point for the current study because it is one which attracted personal, concerted efforts of the residents of the borderline areas in terms of coping strategies.

The principal coping strategy employed by inhabitants of this border community was collaboration which the Pacific Council on International Policy (PCIP) has succinctly described as meaningful and mutually beneficial “cooperative solution”. Collaboration as used in this study differs from its conventional meaning in Peace and Conflict Studies parlance where it depicts a win/win strategy employed by parties to a conflict to ensure that both sides are satisfied. Open discussion of all issues of concern, exploring all alternative solutions, being honest and committed are required in this instance. By collaboration in this study, we mean the coming together of community stakeholders from the various border communities in both countries, i.e. the United States and Mexico to assuage the devastating effects of the conflict on themselves as much as to attempt a lasting solution to same – not as parties to the conflict, but as victims of the conflict. One feature of collaboration that stands it out as a strategy for coping with or managing conflict is that its bi-national nature makes diversity of perspectives possible, thereby leading to amicable decisions.

Chapter two showed how collaboration in different climes made room for a wide range of contribution from affected parties to get actively involved in the process remediating a

worsening situation be it a resource-based or value-based conflict as in the US/ Mexico and Sudan or a full-fledged war as in Columbia/ Ecuador and Venezuela. In the case of the border riverway border conflict between the United States and Mexico, members of each community travel mostly in pairs to the other to assist in tracing illegal weapons confiscated by authorities of both countries. In Columbia and Venezuela, border communities engaged in civil society cross-border peacebuilding initiatives such as meetings and protests organized and executed by women of both countries, humanitarian action initiatives organized by religious bodies notably the social Action Agency of the Roman Catholic Church and the Jesuit Service for Refugees, a bilateral network for environment, Chambers of Commerce meetings, media forums, and conferences from the stables of bordering municipal local authorities while in Colombia-Ecuador border communities, there was an establishment of a Bilateral Dialogue Group (BDG), comprising ten renowned figures from either country, with the objective of facilitating efforts on mediation by setting up dialogues with the conflicting parties (various governments concerned with the conflict), so as to solidifying diplomatic bilateral ties. And in Colombia-Ecuador, border communities established a Bilateral Dialogue Group (BDG), comprising ten renowned figures from either country, with the objective of facilitating efforts on mediation by setting up dialogues with the conflicting parties (various governments concerned with the conflict), so as to solidifying diplomatic bilateral ties.

In Sudan, the basic coping strategy employed by inhabitants of the conflict-ridden border communities of Northern Darfur in Sudan includes (re)grouping towards institutionalized support by professional associations, women groups, CBOs networks, rural committees and camp committees. Professionals such as blacksmiths, potters and tanners appeared to be faring well in spite of the conflict. This is largely due to their skills being in very high demand, thereby enabling them to be able to continue with their profession in the heat of the crisis. Another factor would be that in Sudan, blacksmiths are locally highly respected; as such they were able to garner external support to help with managing the conflict and establishing survival strategies for the benefit of the border communities. Additionally, their ability to help in coping with the crisis situation was further enhanced by their potential to influence policy, thanks to their legal identity.

The chapter concluded with a discussion on theories; this study was anchored on three theories: (i) the state fragility (ii) Functional Prerequisite (iii) Human needs. While the state fragility theory was adopted to explain the inability of the government to perform its major function of protecting lives and properties in the border communities, Functional prerequisite theory and human needs theory were adopted to illustrate the basic assumptions prompting the evolvement of coping strategies by border communities. Above all, a theoretical model that speaks to the coping strategies of inhabitants of border communities was developed from the findings of the study (see Figure 7.1).

Chapter three provided an historical overview of the border arrangements in Nigeria and the chronological evolution of its state structure. Nigeria as a country located in West Africa came into existence in the 1914 and attained independence in 1960. The country's region was one of the favorite territorial areas of the British colonialist in the 19th century, who coined Nigeria's name out of the words "Niger Area". Before the birth of Nigeria in 1914, through amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates, Nigeria comprised different independent chieftains, states, kingdoms and empires. These, among others, included the Borno Empire, the Hausa States, and the Sokoto Caliphate, in the North and in the South the Igbo segmentary societies, Benin Kingdom and the Oyo Empire.

In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century when Nigeria became fully placed under the British government control in 1914, when it was amalgamated by Sir Frederick Lord Lugard and eventually became independent in October 1, 1960. A self-governing state, with three regions, namely Western, Eastern and Northern region, Nigeria was administered from the center by Nnamdi Azikiwe who the Governor and Abubakar Tafawa Balewa who was the Prime Minister. However, Nigeria became a Federal Republic in 1963. During that period, the Midwest Region was carved out of the Western Region, making Nigeria a federation of four Regions.

The chapter shows the diversity that exist to this day, and how this has informed the current number of states and the geopolitical zones that Nigeria has been divided into. Today Nigeria is a country with a total number of 36 states, and six geopolitical zones, namely South-West, North-Central, North-East, North-West, South-East and South-South. Nigeria is also a country with about 374 diverse ethnic groups, the three major of which are the Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo. There are also over 400 languages spoken in Nigeria from the over 1000-2500

languages spoken in Africa depending on different estimates. Nigeria is again the most populous Black Country in the world with a population of over 190 million according to the National Population Commission (NPC). These existing diversities prompted the adoption of a federal system of government which is still operational in the country to date.

Conclusively, the chapter touched on the long run effect of state as agitations for creation of more states by minority ethnics are yet to cease, and sometimes boundary dispute is a common hitch from state creation, especially if deposits of valuable resources are perceived to be available or discovered around or between the boundaries of the old and new states.

Chapter four reviewed the nature of African and the West African borders. It equally examined the responses of the African Union (AU) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to border related issues through the border architecture of both organisations as a regional and sub regional organisation respectively. This was necessary to reveal the various efforts of both organisations in tackling the issue of border porosity within the region and why it has been quite easy for rebels, insurgents and terrorists to move across the African borders freely.

Historically, African borders have remained porous partly because of the way they were created. African borders are an artificial creation of the colonial masters. These boundaries distinguishing different sovereign states of the continent were drawn by colonialist in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century without the knowledge of the African people and in the predominant peculiarities. As noted in chapter two, this was what the Berlin Conference of 1884/1885 was targeted at which was to satisfy the cravings of European superpowers' quest for territories and to make an attempt to integrate Africa into the European concept of nation states with clearly defined and demarcated borders.

As explained by the African Union (AU) through its border program (AUBP), the geographical circumstances of the continent have placed the states on different location. While most of the countries on the continent are surrounded mostly by seas and oceans, there a few island states, which are separated from the rest of the continent by vast tracts of water in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans. Since the majority of the 55 countries are on the continental mainland, they share significant lengths of their land, air or maritime boundaries. These

circumstances explain why the continent is prone to different threats hence the illicit activities of criminals, terrorists, and traffickers to exploit the undefended water ways and porous borders to engage in illegal activities that threatens regional and continental peace, stability and security.

The chapter identified the responses of the AU having identified this phenomenon as a challenge which needs urgent attention. Some of such efforts was the decision made in the 1<sup>st</sup> Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of state and Government of the OAU, held in Cairo (Egypt) in July 1964, as well as Article 4(B) of the Consultative Act of the African Union (AU), which adopted the principle of respect of existing borders on achievement of national independence, the shared commitment to pursue the work of border delimitation and demarcation as factors for peace, security and economic and social progress, as affirmed notably in Resolution CM/Res. 1069(XLIV), as well as in the Memorandum of Understanding on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, held in Durban (South Africa), in July 2002.

This chapter equally reflected critically on the challenges that confront the AUBP. These revolved round lack of commitment and co-operation by member states towards the success of the program. Howbeit, many successes were recorded some of which are the adoption of the first declaration on the AUBP by African Ministers in charge of Border Issues on 7<sup>th</sup> June, 2007, and the endorsement of the Declaration and its Implementation Modalities at the 11<sup>th</sup> Session of the AU Executive Council on 27<sup>th</sup> June 2007; Provision of technical and financial assistance covering among others, crucial equipment and training for various countries implementing the AUBP; Completion of the demarcation of the remaining 413km of the Burkina Faso-Mali border, and above all the African Union's Protocol on free movement of persons, goods, services and the African Passport.

At the sub-regional level, the chapter delved into the West African sub-region; Article 27 of the Treaty establishing ECOWAS affirms a long-term objective to establish a community citizenship that could be acquired automatically by all Member States' nationals, in other words, a borderless West Africa. This formed the basis for the Commission enacting a treaty called The Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Goods and Capital and the Rights of



Residence and Establishment in 1979. This Protocol thus afford community citizens the right to enter, reside and establish in the territory of Member States. The right of entry, residence and establishment were structured to be accomplished in three phases, namely: Phase I – Right of Entry and Abolition of Visa; Phase II – Right of Residence and Phase III – Right of Establishment.

The Implementation of this laudable effort of ECOWAS started smoothly as the first phase was introduced and implemented by member states. The second phase (Right of Residence) which was delayed eventually came into force in July 1986, when all member states ratified it, while the last phase which is the Right of Establishment has not yet been implemented. Different efforts were targeted at setting the third phase in motion. In March 2000, the heads of state and government met in Abuja to fashion out renewed efforts to create a borderless ECOWAS. Also, the ECOWAS 30th Ordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government held in Abuja in June 2006, mandated the Executive Secretariat to take the initiative in defining an ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration. However, despite these efforts, and just like the AU is experiencing, the implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol on free movement has suffered a great set back due to several issues which ranges from the egotism of member states that see itself as a sovereign state, expulsion of aliens from some member states which negates the whole raison d'être of establishing ECOWAS (Ghana, Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire fall into this category), the inter-state borders remain mini "iron curtains" and "narrow gates" and barricades erected on the trans-boundary roads are done on the basis of security which obstruct free traffic of persons, goods and services.

The chapter therefore concluded by identifying what needs to be done, if the vision of borderless region and sub-region of Africa and West Africa respectively is to be realizable. For instance, member states have to discard the notion of a rigid state Sovereignty and see the need to join forces towards managing the borders. Also, they should be more committed and determined not only in the speeches they make but in the action they take toward implementing the protocols. This can be measured in the zeal and commitment thrown into the implementation process. Until this is done, African borders will remain porous and instead of gradually turning them into bridges, they will perpetually remain barriers at the detriment of member states.

Chapter five critically reviewed the security situation in North-Eastern Nigeria in relation to cross-border insurgency which is the Boko Haram. Engaging the literature backed up by findings from the study, the chapter addressed research questions one and two by attempting a chronological descriptive analysis of insurgent activities in the region, and the challenges impeding a successful counter-activities against insurgency.

This chapter began by attempting to trace the evolution of Boko Haram through a review of the situation that existed during that period. This all started when Zamfara Governor Ahmed Yerima, embarked on a restoration campaign of the Sharia Law in 1999. This initiative in no time became popular across states in the North as Muslims massively supported the move. The common people gave their support because they saw Sharia as a tool for liberation from the hand of the corrupt politicians by creating a safe, just, safe, and compassionate society devoid of corrupt practices. The political elite and the Saudana of Sokoto equally gave their support. While former Governor Yerima went ahead to implement this law, some other northern governors followed suit all in a bid to reinforcing the movement of restoration championed by Usman dan Fodio's Sokoto Caliphate two centuries back. At some point, the federal government denounced the Sharia Law as it does not conform with federal laws governing Nigeria, but this was met a massive resistance by the northerners. As states went ahead to implement in full the Sharia Law, it met a serious resistance from Christians who believed the law goes against their fundamental human right. This led to serious upheavals in Kano and Kaduna in 2000 and as a result, more than 2,000 lives were lost.

In 2002, Boko Haram was established by Mohammad Yusuf in Maiduguri, Borno State. The resistance of the government which turned the group into a violent group made them start to carry out attacks on government installations and facilities. Its first attack was carried out on the 24 December 2003 when its members attacked police stations and government buildings in the towns of Kanamma and Geiam in Yobe State. They occupied those structures for some days until the military and the Police dislodged them killing 18 members of the sect. This made them disperse into other parts of the north and later in 2004 calved out a base called 'Afghanistan' in Kanamma village of Yobe State, a border town close to the Republic of Niger. It was at this point the Boko Haram grew more ferocious in their attacks as they began to attack with sophisticated weapons. This was made possible as they began to get support

from international terrorist networks like Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab, AQIM, etc. This support was gotten in the form of funds and arms donation and training of its members. This support gotten, contributed enormously to the continuous existence of this sect and its nefarious activities carried out on communities found in the North-Eastern Nigeria to date.

The impact of these attack on the region cannot be over emphasized. Such impacts include among others, high toll of mortality, displacement and humanitarian crisis, destruction of many lives and properties, excessive child abuse, excessive sexual and gender-based violence, destabilization of the health care and education system. The activities of the sect have brought upon the people all the afore-mentioned causing the local population a lot of pains and hardship on a daily basis.

Chapter six addressed research question three by examining the role which the state and non-state actors have played in quelling the Boko Haram menace. The Nigerian government took a step to quell the activities of the sect. This they attempted military wise and policy wise. Policy wise, in 2011 the government adopted a counter-terrorism strategy established in 2007 called the National Focal Point on Terrorism (NFPT). It is composed of several security agencies and government departments charged with the responsibility of implementing Nigeria's national security agenda. Its activities were overseen by the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), while the National Security Council, headed by the President, occasionally met to evaluate national security matters. However, on the 30<sup>th</sup> April 2014, a comprehensive National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST), was ratified for execution by President Goodluck Jonathan. This strategy encapsulates the counter-terrorism policy framework of the federal government of Nigeria. The second edition was approved under President Buhari's government on August 23, 2016. This initiative put into consideration the nature of the terrorist threat that confronts Nigeria, the response procedures and mechanism, and the roles stakeholders have to play, and finally the institutions that are needed in the counter-terrorism mission.

Military wise, in June 2011 the Federal Government under former President Jonathan set up a special Joint Task Force (JTF) in Maiduguri comprising of the military (army, air force and navy), the Department of State Security (DSS) and the Nigerian Police Force. The government equally took some steps to enable the security forces function optimally. Check

points were erected at various entry points and strategic locations around the federal capital territory of Abuja after it was attacked twice. Also, while a state of emergency was declared in specific location of Niger, Borno, Yobe, and Plateau states where the activities of the sect is being felt a curfew was enforced in Adamawa state. Asides response from the Nigerian government, many countries supported in this counter-terrorism move by donating weapons and offering trainings for both the JTF and civilians on the best modern practices of countering terrorism. However, with this support system the Nigerian government has, Boko Haram still carry out their attacks killing both the security personnel and civilians.

Moreover, the chapter extensively analysed the humanitarian responses to the humanitarian crisis created by the Boko Haram in the North-Eastern Nigeria. Many actors were involved such as the Nigerian government through its agencies NEMA and SEMA established for disaster management across the country, international state actors such different countries across the globe, local and international government and non-governmental organizations, cooperate establishments and concerned individuals. Many of these actors donated funds and relief materials such as food items and other relief materials while others were on ground to assist the affected people majorly in the IDP camps and much later in the affected communities. The responses of the local population and the observations made indicated that much needs to be done in terms of responding to the needs of the people and getting them back to living a normal life. There is a need for extensive rebuilding and reconstruction in the affected communities. This falls majorly on the desk of the Nigerian government who do not need to be pushed to action at this time as they were pushed by various actors in 2015 to stand up for its dying people in the North-Eastern Nigeria.

Chapter seven in response to research questions four and five, critically analyzed and discussed the findings of the study in relation to the literature reviewed and the theoretical framework that underpinned the study. Findings revealed that most of the attacks carried out by the sect occur around the borders thus making the border communities susceptible to constant attacks. While all the respondents alluded to the fact that their communities have suffered a lot of attacks from the sect, they equally expressed their worries and fears of imminent attacks on their communities. Boko Haram attacks have manifested in the selected border communities in the form of massive deployment of members of the sect who shoot

sporadically on motorcycles and Hilux vehicles. This always led to chaos and pandemonium in the communities making the local population run helter-skelter within the communities in a bid to be safe.

Again, findings showed that the Boko Haram utilized different tactics in carrying out attacks in the selected border communities. Members of the sect carry out attacks both in the day and in the night. While some of its members lay ambush in surrounding bushes, some proceed into the communities shooting sporadically in order to raise tension in the communities. Once the people hear the sound of the guns they began to run and the process they are being shot dead by those who laid siege in the bushes. At times, they break into the houses, bring the people out, shoot them, loot their houses and set the houses on fire. It is shocking to know that in some selected communities, the local population discovered that some members of the sect came into their communities as spies without the villagers knowing it. Some came in as visitors to live with them. They were accepted into the communities and well taken care of by the people until when they fully mastered the nooks and crannies of the communities. Once this is done, they signal their members and an attack is carried out on such communities carting away their valuables and leaving many people dead and properties destroyed.

Prodding into the reactions and responses of the government vis-à-vis the Boko Haram attacks, it was discovered that, though literature have advanced that this phenomenon attracted the attention of the government with the establishment of a Joint Task Force (JTF) comprising the military, the DSS and the Nigeria Police to quell the crisis and fight the Boko Haram sect to a stand-still within the region, findings showed that the border communities were neglected and left to their fate in the face of the looming perils that confronted them. This was the assertion of majority of the respondents and a section of the local population interacted with in the selected border communities. Many of the community leaders pointed out that the communities were neglected by the government for a very long time including the officers of the local government who were supposed to be more concerned in the plight and pains of the local population. Respondents in some of the selected communities made it clear that the presence of the security forces is of no benefit to them. If they were to be, Boko Haram would not be successful in the attacks they carry out which has left the communities

to almost dead zones. Basic infrastructures and structures in the communities have been destroyed thus, making life unbearable for the local people.

The perception of majority of the respondents showed that the presence of the military has being a curse to them as they have not really assisted them in anyway. They believe that the JTF are not capable of confronting and combating members of the Boko Haram sect especially when they come to attack. They averred further that on different instances have they seen members of the JTF take to their heels when the Boko Haram come into the communities. However, few of the respondents appreciated the presence of the JTF as it has allayed their fears to some extent.

Finally, based on the nature of man that stirs up his willingness to survive under whatever situation he finds himself and given the circumstances the selected border communities found themselves in it was discovered across the selected communities for this study, that the local population came up with five major pragmatic strategies to ensure their safety and survival within these communities. These strategies include a reunion, the formation of local vigilante groups, prayers to God, and bargain. The first step taken by the selected communities was to mend the fence created by the Boko Haram attacks between the Christians and the Muslims.

At the initial stage of attacks, Christians were targeted and killed while churches were burnt down. This continued until the Christians had a perception that the attacks were against the Christians in the communities. This brewed a kind of cold war between members of both faith as friends and family members suddenly turned enemies to the point of attacking one another until the dimension of the attacks changed and Mosques and Muslims were being attacked as well. Suicide bombers simply entered the Mosques during morning and evening worship and suddenly detonates the bomb on him or herself or started to shoot sporadically killing the worshippers and eventually killing himself. The local population discovered that without the discord been resolved, peace cannot be restored back into the communities and when there is no peace the communities cannot forge ahead with regard to evolving workable strategies that will ensure their survival against the inhumane activities of the Boko Haram. Once this was resolved, they discovered that some members of the Boko Haram sect lived with them as spies thus the need to be vigilant and always alert. Members of the communities were encouraged

to be police of themselves by identifying strangers and strange movement to appropriate quarter once sighted.

Building up on this, vigilante groups were created to police the communities and guard against the further incursion of the sect. The men and the youths in the communities constitutes these groups. In fact, in some communities, male children were found to be a part of these group. Furthermore, since these communities were religious communities constituting Christians and Muslims, whatever the circumstance might be they believed God is always there to save them as His children if they call on Him. This they continued to do during the time of worship. It was discovered that because of fear, the women stayed in-doors and rendering prayers to God for the safety of themselves, their husbands and children and the communities as a whole.

Conclusively, it was discovered that some hinter communities had no choice than to bargain with the Boko haram for their safety to be assured. They entered this sort of contract because they saw it as the only way they can survive since they were abandoned by the government who is supposed to secure them as citizens. Boko Haram make monthly demands especially food items which they thrive to provide at the end of each month else they risked been fiercely attacked by the sect. Members of the JTF revealed that upon their entry into these communities, they met serious resistance by the people. This manifested in their relationship with them. They do not give them information as to the whereabouts of the Boko Haram for fear of being killed. This has made the military come under severe attacks in these communities which has led to the death of many soldiers. The villagers will rather keep mute that divulge information for fear of been killed afterwards. As regards feeding, some of them had access to their farms which they tilled for subsistence while many relied mostly on humanitarian organisations who brought food, clothing and shelter to them in the midst of fierce attacks.

## 8.2 Recommendation

The following recommendations are made:

To the Government

1. While the government has been able to draw up a counter-terrorism strategy policy to combat the scourge of the Boko Haram insurgency and as well deployed the Joint Task Force to the North-Eastern Nigeria, there is the need to be more pragmatic in its approach toward combating this menace because obviously, the Boko Haram keeps waxing strong as they still carry out sporadic attacks on border communities.
2. It is high time the government started to address the salient underlining issues that culminated into the Boko Haram menace. Issues such as poverty, unemployment, food shortage, marginalization and inequality and access to basic infrastructure should be tackled. It was observed that in some border communities, some rebuilding projects are on-going like the rebuilding of bridges etc. These projects that are long overdue continues to drag. The schools and health facilities largely remained untouched.
3. It is also of necessity for the government to carryout institutional capacity and structural reforms, especially with institutions that are directly linked to the fight against the Boko Haram. Government's main focus is to combat and denounce corruption in all its forms, so that the fight against this scourge can be objective and worthwhile.
4. The JTF Unit should be handled seriously by the government just like the duty they are called up to do largely remains a serious one. Although there is no contention in the zeal and readiness of the soldiers to take the fight to the Boko Haram enclave and end the insurgency, however the morale to sustain their efforts is not there. The weapons supplied does not match with the enemy's. Officers of the JTF are not been well taken care of on the field and their salaries which is meagre is being delayed. These should be addressed else the morale of the soldiers will keep dwindling.
5. The building of public trust and legitimacy is very crucial especially those of people living in the North-Eastern Nigeria. This could be achieved by upholding transparency and accountability in the management of oil wealth. Periodic release of accurate data that highlight fuel consumption and subsidy payment as well as the



release of any other data necessary information should be prioritized by the government.

To the Joint Task Force

1. They should adhere strictly to the rules of engagement guiding their operations in the region irrespective of whatever situation that confronts them.
2. They should desist from molesting and maltreating the local population in the region especially the youths. This is sheer transfer of aggression and should be stopped. If not stopped it will continue to decrease their acceptance in the region as they will as the second foe rather than being the savior.

To the local population.

1. They should continue to build on the peace that they have restored and built as there lies their strength as communities. It forms the solid foundation upon which their activities in the communities is built.
2. Again, as communities, they should continue to engage in community policing irrespective of the presence of the JTF. They should not desist from being vigilant and carrying out surveillance.

### **8.3 Contribution to knowledge**

The contribution of this study is unique. HNO (2014) in the process of reviewing the humanitarian needs of affected areas, gave a demographic profile of the North-Eastern Nigeria for 2014. As at the end of 2014, 24.5 million people were living in the six states of the North-Eastern Nigeria, 15.5 million people were living in the affected areas, out of which 0.98 million people were displaced. This simply depicts that 14.52 million people remained in the affected areas. This work went further to provide an extensive survey on the challenges these displaced persons face in the various Internally Displaced Persons' (IDPs) and refugee camps and how they were able to cope in the face of those confronting challenges. Looking critically at the population figures above, it is evident that out of the 15.5 million people living in the affected areas, only 0.9 million of the population were displaced while, 14.52 million remains in those communities in the face of the daily looming security threats. HNO (2015) equally executed an extensive need assessment of the affected population with regard to the IDPs and refugees in their host communities and camps with no attention accorded the

border communities. This conforms to the assertion of Wastl-Walter, et'al (2003). He averred that border areas are peripheral regions par excellence and in several respects. They also see them as areas that are at the margins of the nation-states. Because of their distance from the core areas, border areas are geographically isolated as well as being marginalized and as such people living there are often also marginalized politically, socially and economically.

Extant literature have therefore revealed the laxities of the studies as they have simply focused on the humanitarian crisis cross-border insurgency has created and the humanitarian attention and intervention this situation has received from agencies of government and international humanitarian organizations with regards to IDPs and refugees while little or no attention has been given to border communities who are the first victims of cross-border insurgency and in the same vein how they have been able to manage, cope and survive through the security threats and challenges that daily confront them in their communities.

This study has therefore made three key contributions. First, by investigating and examining the coping strategies that have been evolved by the border communities thus, making it possible for them to continue to live in their communities despite the looming danger that surrounds them, the study has filled a gap in literature on the coping strategies of border communities where clearly, there has been a dearth of academic research on how inhabitants of border communities in the North-Eastern Nigeria have being able to cope against the Boko Haram insurgency.

Second, this study has also raised an issue that is subject to a debate. This centers on how these strategies evolved has impacted on the continued existence of these communities. To this end, the study though advocated for more of government response in the region, went beyond merely advocating for that but by strongly appealing for a consolidation of some of the strategies evolved which I feel will go a long way in protecting the people and sustaining the communities against future internal crisis and violence on the long run. The peace that has been negotiated successfully should be jealously guarded so that issues that degenerate into ethno-religious crisis does not occur again at any point in time.

Lastly, aside the theories adopted, the study has developed a theoretical model that encapsulate the coping strategies of the selected border communities against cross-border insurgency in the North-Eastern Nigeria.

#### **8.4 Suggestions for further study**

The thesis offered an in-depth investigation and examination of the coping strategies evolved by some selected border communities in the North-Eastern Nigeria. Among the many border communities situated in that region, the study was limited to two border communities in each of the three states that share boundaries with neighbouring countries including Niger, Chad and Cameroon. These states are Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. Since there are many border communities affected by this phenomenon, future studies may want to concentrate on other border communities that are not considered in this study in order to afford a holistic appraisal on the coping strategies adopted by border communities in the North-Eastern Nigeria.

There is also the need for future studies to engage more on the theme insecurity as new ferocious threats continue to emerge within the Nigerian state. A case in point is the Fulani herdsmen who have started to unleash terror on rural communities not only in the northern region of Nigeria but equally in the southern region where it is least expected that such attacks can be carried out. The various attacks carried out by the Fulani herdsmen have led to the death of many, destruction of properties and on the extreme, extermination of a whole community. Equally, there are media reports to show that in the southern region, the Fulani herdsmen have engaged in kidnapping for the purpose of extorting money from their victims who are usually successful people in the society. This indicates that they continue to spread their tentacles despite the threat they pose to the Nigerian state. Delving into this phenomenon is important so as to unravel the issues surrounding the various attacks carried out by the Fulani herdsmen and why and how they continue to wax strong within the Nigerian state more so that they constitute a more serious threat than the Boko Haram witnessed so far in Nigeria.

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# **APPENDICES**

## **APPENDIX I: CODING**

### **CODING FOR ADAMAWA STATE**

#### **MICHIKA COMMUNITY**

AM-1: Community leader in Michika

AM-2: Men leader in Michika

AM-3: Women leader in Michika

AM-4: CAN representative in Michika

AM-5: Director of Jama'atul Nasril Islam of Michika

AM-6: Mr Ibrahim Musa a lecturer with College of Education Hong, Adamawa and an indigene of Michika. (telephone interview).

AM-7: Leader of the vigilante Group

#### **FOCUSED GROUP DISCUSSIONS**

FGD-AMM: FGD with men in Michika

FGD-AMW: FGD with women in Michika

FGD-AMY: FGD with youths in Michika

FGD-AMV: FGD with vigilante group in Michika

FGD-AM

#### **MUBI COMMUNITY**

AMB-1: Mubi District Scribe

AMB-2: Men leader in Mubi

AMB-3: Women leader in Mubi

AMB-4: Chairman Muslim Council in Mubi

AMB-5: Assistant Secretary of the CAN in Mubi

AMB-6: Youth leader in Mubi

## **FOCUSED GROUP DISCUSSIONS**

FGD-AMBM: FGD with men in Mubi

FGD-AMBW: FGD with women in Mubi

FGD-AMBY: FGD with youths in Mubi

FGD-AMBV: FDG with vigilantes in Mubi

## **CODING FOR BORNO STATE**

### **GAMBORU-NGALA COMMUNITY**

BG-1: Village Head in Gamboru-Ngala

BG-2: Men leader in Gamboru-Ngala

BG-3: Women leader in Gamboru-Ngala

BG-4: Youth leader in Gamboru-Ngala

BG-5: A member of CAN in Gamboru-Ngala

BG-6: A representative of the Muslim Council in Gamboru-Ngala

## **FOCUSED GROUP DISCUSSIONS**

FGD-BGM: FGD with men in Gamboru-Ngala

FGD-BGW: FGD with women in Gamboru-Ngala

FGD-BGY: FGD with youths in Gamboru-Ngala

FGD-BGC with CJTF in Gamboru-Ngala

### **BAGA COMMUNITY**

BB-1: A representative of the District of Baga community

BB-2: Men leader in Baga community

BB-3: Women leader in Baga community

BB-4: A member of CAN in Baga community

BB-5: Youth leader in Baga community

BB-6: A representative of the Muslim Council in Baga Community

### **FOCUSED GROUP DISCUSSION**

FGD-BBM: FGD with men in Baga community

FGD-BBW: FGD with women in Baga community

FGD-BBY: FGD with youths in Baga community

FGD-BBC: FGD with CJTF in Baga community

### **CODING FOR YOBE STATE**

#### **YUNUSARI COMMUNITY**

YY-1: Community leader in Yunusari community

YY-2: A representative of CAN

YY-3: A representative of the Muslim Council

YY-4: Men leader in Yunusari community

#### **FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS**

FGD-YYM: FGD with men in Yunusari community

FGD-YYW: FGD with women in Yunusari community

FGD-YYY: FGD with youths in Yunusari community

FGD-YYV: FGD with vigilantes in Yunusari community

YY-1, FGD-YYM, FGD-YYW, FGD-YYY, FGD-YYV

#### **KANAMMA COMMUNITY**

YK-1: A representative of the community leader in Kanamma community

YK-2: Men leader in Kanamma community

#### **FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS**

FGD-YKM: FGD with the men in Kanamma community

FGD-YKY: FGD with the youths in Kanamma community



FGD-YKW: FGD with the women in Kanamma community

FGD-YKV: FGD with the vigilantes in Kanamma community

YK-1, YK-2, FGD-YKM, FGD-YKY, FGD-YKW, FGD-YKV

**All the interviews were conducted in November 2017 except for AM-6 which was conducted in January 2018 via the phone.**

## **APPENDIX II: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE**



### **INTERVIEW SCHEDULE**

My name is OKUNADE, Samuel Kehinde, a PhD student with Student Number: 216076644 in the Department of Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies in the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa. The title of my study is “Cross-border insurgency and the coping strategies of border communities in North-Eastern Nigeria”.

Your sincere responses will go a long way in assisting to respond to the research questions of this study adequately. This information shall be treated confidentially and used only for academic research. Therefore, you should be comfortable and honest in responding to the questions as you possibly can.

Thank you for your anticipated cooperation.

1. Has your community been attacked by the Boko Haram?
2. In your own opinion, what are the different tactics Boko Haram employ in attacking your community?
3. What are the various ways in which Boko Haram’s attack manifest in the community?
4. In your own opinion, what are the effects of these attacks on the community?
5. Does the community get an early warning prior to Boko Haram attacks?
6. If yes, how do they get these warnings and what are their reactions to such?
7. How has the community reacted to these attacks, during and after the attacks?
8. How has the community been able to exist in spite of the constant attacks on the community?
9. What are the various mechanisms devised by the community to combat insurgency in the community?

10. Has the community gotten external support from international humanitarian organizations, Faith Based Organizations etc to ensure their safety and survival?
11. If yes, mention them and the kind of support rendered the community?
12. How effective are their interventions in terms of survival and safety of the community?
13. Is there any intervention from the government be it the federal, state and local government?
14. If yes, at what point did they intervene and how has the government intervened to ameliorate the situation faced by the community?
15. What are the impacts of government intervention in relation to safety and survival?
16. How effective has the mechanisms devised by the community being towards their survival and existence in the community?

## APPENDIX III: ETHICAL CLERANCE



12 January 2017

Mr Samuel Kehinde Okunade 216076644  
School of Social Sciences  
Pietermaritzburg Campus

Dear Mr Okunade

Protocol reference number: HSS/2081/016D

Project title: Cross-border insurgency and the coping strategies of border communities in North-Eastern Nigeria

### Full Approval – Expedited Application

In response to your application received 28 November 2016, the Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee has considered the abovementioned application and the protocol has been granted **FULL APPROVAL**.

Any alteration/s to the approved research protocol i.e. Questionnaire/Interview Schedule, Informed Consent Form, Title of the Project, Location of the Study, Research Approach and Methods must be reviewed and approved through the amendment /modification prior to its implementation. In case you have further queries, please quote the above reference number.

**PLEASE NOTE:** Research data should be securely stored in the discipline/department for a period of 5 years.

The ethical clearance certificate is only valid for a period of 3 years from the date of issue. Thereafter Recertification must be applied for on an annual basis.

I take this opportunity of wishing you everything of the best with your study.

Yours faithfully

.....  
Dr Shenuka Singh (Chair)  
Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee

/pm

cc Supervisor: Dr Olusola Ogunnubi  
cc. Academic Leader Research: Professor Maheshvari Naidu  
cc. School Administrator: MNs Nancy Mudau & Mr N Memela

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Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee

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## APPENDIX IV: CONSENT FORM



### SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

#### CONSENT FORM

Dear Participant,

My name is Okunade Samuel Kehinde (Student N0: 216076644). I am a PhD candidate studying at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus. The title of my research is: **Cross-border insurgency and the coping strategies of border communities in North-Eastern Nigeria.**

The aim of the study is *to investigate and explore the coping strategies of border communities vis a vis cross border insurgency in the North-Eastern region.* I am interested in interviewing you so as to share your experiences and observations on the subject matter.

Please note that:

- The information that you provide will be used for scholarly research only.
- Your participation is entirely voluntary. You have a choice to participate, not to participate or stop participating in the research. You will not be penalized for taking such an action.
- Your views in this interview will be presented anonymously. Neither your name nor identity will be disclosed in any form in the study.
- The interview will take about one hour
- The transcript and any other items associated with the interview will be held in a password-protected file accessible only to myself and my supervisors. After a period of 5 years, in line with the rules of the university, it will be disposed of by shredding and burning.

- If you agree to participate please sign the declaration attached to this statement (a separate sheet will be provided for signatures). I would be using a tape recorder for the interview.

I can be contacted at: School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus, Scottsville, Pietermaritzburg.

Email: [216076644@stu.ukzn.ac.za](mailto:216076644@stu.ukzn.ac.za) /

[samuel\\_okunade@yahoo.com](mailto:samuel_okunade@yahoo.com)

Cell: +27833455442

My supervisor is Dr Olusola Ogunnubi who is located in the School of Social Sciences, Pietermaritzburg Campus of the University of KwaZulu-Natal.

Contact details:

Email: [ogunnubi@ukzn.ac.za](mailto:ogunnubi@ukzn.ac.za)

Phone number: +27833455442

The Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee contact details are as follows: Ms Phumelele Ximba, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Research Office, Email: [ximbap@ukzn.ac.za](mailto:ximbap@ukzn.ac.za), Phone number +27312603587.

Thank you for your contribution to this research.

## DECLARATION

I..... (full names of participant) hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project.

I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire. I understand the intention of the research. I hereby agree to participate.

I consent / do not consent to have this interview recorded (if applicable)

SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT

DATE

## APPENDIX V: TITLE PAGE OF PAPER 1



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# A "Schengen" Agreement in Africa? African Agency and the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement

Samuel Kehinde Okunade & Olusola Ogunnubi

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## APPENDIX VI: TITLE PAGE OF PAPER 2

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## The African Union Protocol on Free Movement: A Panacea to End Border Porosity?

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