

**THE DIALECTICS OF NATION-BUILDING AND
IMMIGRATION PRACTICES IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1994-
2008**

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DECLARATION – PLAGIARISM

I, Yolokazi Zoxolo Mtha Mambi, declare that the attached assignment is my own work and does not involve plagiarism or collusion.

Signed:

Date: 26 January 2018

PREFACE

This dissertation is prepared on the fourth semester of the University of KwaZulu-Natal's Masters by Research programme, Political Science.

Supervisor

Dr. Khondlo Mtshali

Written by

.....

Signed Y.Z.M Mambi

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DEDICATION

If any of you lacks wisdom, let them ask God, who gives generously to all without reproach, and it will be given unto them. But let them ask in faith, with no doubting, for the one who doubts is like a wave of the sea that is driven and tossed by the wind. For that person must not suppose that they will receive anything from the LORD, He is a double-minded person, unstable in all their ways.

James 1:5-8

Not by might, nor by power, but by the Spirit of YHWH

To the onward progression of the human condition

Mayibuye!

ABSTRACT

Title: The Dialectics of Nation-building and Immigration Practices in South Africa, 1994-2008

Post 1994 South Africa has experienced outbursts of xenophobic violence. These incidences of xenophobic violence beckons one to delve deeper and search for explanatory causes of such inhumane sentiments and actions. While there is abundant research on xenophobia, few studies, in this quest, have interrogated the nature of the post-colonial state. Premising itself on Frantz Fanon's humanist project, this study examines the nation-building practices and ideology of the South African state from 1994 – 2008. With an interest in grasping the dialectic of immigration and nation building, this research questions the nation building practices and discourses of two former Presidents, Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. This is a desktop study that relies on secondary and primary data sources. The secondary sources include literature on nation, nation-state and nation-building. The primary sources include the writings and speeches of Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. This research uses discourse analysis to analyse its data. For Mandela, nation-building is written as having and therefore reduced to service provisioning. The latter thus provides the basis through which African nationals are excluded in South Africa. Whilst Mbeki's analysis provides an Africanist perspective on nation-building, the immigration policies and laws continue to be based on excluding African nationals. Since the postcolonial situation continues to abhor that which is black, Fanon (1961[1991]) positions nation-building as a means through which concepts may be used to progress the human condition.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|-------|---|
| AA | Affirmative Action |
| ACA | Aliens Control Act of 1991 |
| ANC | African National Congress |
| BEE | Black Economic Empowerment |
| BMF | Black Management Forum |
| IFP | Inkatha Freedom Party |
| NEPAD | New Partnerships for Africa's Development |
| NGO | Non-governmental Organisation |
| RDP | Reconstruction and Development Programme |
| TRC | Truth and Reconciliation Commission |
| WEF | World Economic Forum |

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study: The Birth of the post-1994 South Africa

The goal of apartheid amongst many others, was to separate the economy – and consequently the lived African experiences. It did this by creating a model that supported white capital through the laborious efforts of black Africans whilst continuing trade relations with black Africans. The latter occurred despite their exclusion from the apartheid social welfare state. As a result, black people were in perpetual cycle of poverty and grave economic injustice. The transition into a democratic era therefore had to address the inequalities and inconsistencies prevalent in the economic model of the state whilst asserting political emancipation for all people. From the beginning, South Africa's nation formation was bound to be inextricably linked to racial tensions and materialism. Because historically, South Africa's political inequalities were tied with diminishing the ability to create wealth for black Africans and thus the "national question" (Jordan, 1997) sought to address such issues.

What one needs to consider, with regards to South Africa's democratic transition, is that it occurred during the period of monumental change in the international state system. Many academics postulated on the dominance of liberal democracy and one such policy expert went as far to state that, this is "the end of mankind's ideological evolution" (Fukuyama, 1992: xi). Fukuyama (1992) attributed the latter to the success of liberalism (liberal democracy) across many European, Latin American, and African states. And thus, since liberal democracy had evolved as the best form of governance, all other countries had no option but to achieve a liberal democracy. Thus, the end of Communism and Socialism reformulated South Africa's transition and marked liberalism as a dominant paradigm. South Africa therefore fell into the trap of intermingling democracy with the rhetoric of market economy/freedom as being inherently democratic (Neocosmos, 2010). Due to this, the nation-building narrative was stringent on securing economic benefits for the previously dispossessed people of South Africa to the exclusion of others. Consequently, national discourses were constructed with a high value being placed on territorial borders and their protection from foreign others.

Ironically, foreign others did not pertain to 'goods' because South Africa's democratic transition held into high esteem the free movement of goods which would address the inequalities within South Africa. Goods, as capital, received a resounding welcome in the national discourse; whilst the progression of humanity through freedom of human movement was restrained. Put differently, the benefits of historical materialism as the offset for maintaining a dehumanised apartheid state continued to set the course for democratic

transition as it demanded monetary growth and progression more than humanity. Thus, the national question was continuously involved in producing favourable outcomes for capital more than humanity.

A pertinent question arising from this is, was the value of human capital – so to speak – underappreciated to improve economic inequality or was it ignored because South Africa’s nationalism focussed on ‘natives’ attaining from the state? The latter can be attained from the introduction of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) as an essential programme that sought to address the national question (Jordan, 1997). Looking at the RDP, one can attain that the national question lay squarely on the implementation of policies that would ensure that national oppression was addressed through socio-economic transformation for ‘citizens’ (Jordan, 1997). The progression of South Africa’s nation-building therefore emanated from the construction made in the RDP paralleled with the creation of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The implemented Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution strategy (GEAR) thus respectively dealt more with healing the past without completely addressing it and improving economic growth by backing out of the promises entailed in the base document of the RDP (Neocosmos, 2010). Therefore, the birth of the post-1994 era in South Africa was laden with South Africa’s unjust past.

1.2 Background to the Research Problem

The post-apartheid era of South Africa has been hailed by many Western leaders as an example to other African nations, particularly those mired in war, that a new era of democratic rule, ushered in peacefully, is possible. Given South Africa’s colonial and apartheid past, democracy thus meant liberation from the anti-dialectical character of the state; which sought to exclude Africans from the dialogue of humanity. South Africa has had an astounding historical opportunity to bring forth true liberation for the people. However, the political elite in their discourses brought a halt in the possibilities of liberation for the masses.

Early discourses of transition included describing an economic paradigm that would settle issues such as the legacy of poverty and inequality. The economic project was, however, mired by it being a “project for elite transformation” (Herbst and Mills, 2015: 2) that only created a few rich people through affirmative action measures. The latter was an intentional project that sought to increase black capitalists as a means to decrease “race consciousness” (Jordan, 1997) within the racialised economy of South Africa. Fanon (1961[1991]) in, *The Wretched of the Earth*, describes this as ‘intellectual laziness’ stating

that national liberation is not fully achieved because the political elite failed to continue with liberatory ideology that shapes and transforms the anti-dialectical nature of the state.

The South African apartheid state was anti-dialectic in character. Its anti-African stance removed the dialogue of humanity for Africans within a nation-state. The defeat of apartheid brought hopes for a possible adoption of a liberatory ideology that all Africans could identify with. The ideologically incompatible policy decisions put forward by the South African government since 1994, sometimes referred to as “the salad days of our new democracy” (Pithouse, 2016:43) brought forth discourses that would later brew violent anti-African immigrant conflicts. This phenomenon is not new and has been described by some scholars as neo-colonialism. Pithouse (2016:64) states that, “governments that have come to power on the tide of popular resistance to oppressive systems ... ended up reinscribing central aspects of the system they had opposed.” The purpose of this research is to consider one aspect of these “oppressive systems”, that is, nation building.

1.3 Preliminary Literature Study and the reason for choosing this topic

Mavroudi (2010) makes a clear and concise case of nation-building discourses. The analysis begins with simply understanding the character of nationalism, which is understood as both good and bad. Generally, a government attains power over a territory which they aim to unify through the pursuit of a common goal. The latter gives mandate for the controlling of the masses. Since people are innately longing for belonging, nationalism discourses are used to distinguish those who belong and have a right within the territory and from the outsiders (Mavroudi, 2010).

From the onset, one can realise both the positive possibilities embedded in nationalism and its negative potentialities. The “potential for unity, liberation and collectivity [may be overruled by] ... a tendency towards purity and homogeneity, even in the 21st century” (Mavroudi, 2010:219-220), if there is no intentional move illustrated in the nation-building efforts. At the commencement of the latter, national identity is also a cry heeded by the leaders that is also muddled in the miry ocean of paradoxical discourses, leaving them spaces to be manipulated. Mavroudi (2010:221) quotes Fine (1999:154) who mentions that such discourses are “a fickle beast”. Thus, the emerging problem is how the elite sometimes use purist notions to create a state (that has been arbitrarily structured) which then involves the implementation of ‘othering’ policies.

The rationale behind this research is that the nation-state should constantly produce acts of belonging that unifies the people with the state, despite the different communities of belonging they associate themselves with. It should be clarified once again that the study will

not address the history of deprivation in South Africa with reference to the ‘natives’ nor does it seek to understand what the role of immigrants in South Africa should be. The aim is simply to explain why immigrants should not pose as a challenge to the South African state and that nation-building may be used as a tool in rooting out the supposed challenge of immigrants in South Africa.

1.4 Research Problems and Objectives: Key Questions to be asked

The objectives:

- To describe how nation-building practices have been understood and addressed.
- To describe the dialectical relation of nation-building practices to immigration policies and laws.
- To give a descriptive analysis on the dialectical relation of nation-building practices to immigration policies and laws during the Mandela era and Mbeki eras.

The research questions:

1. What are nation-building practices?
2. What is the dialectical relation of nation-building practices to immigration policies and laws?
3. What is the dialectical relation of nation-building practices to immigration policies and laws during Mandela’s era?
4. What is the dialectical relation of nation-building practices to immigration policies and laws during Mbeki era?

1.5 Research Methodology and Methods

Historically, social research has morphed from the different ways to conceptualise thinking about the world we see and how to observe the social phenomenon within the world. The School of Social Science has vast number of ways in which social research can be investigated. However, it is important to note that one’s method and methodological approach is determined by the hypothesis or research questions posed. Firstly, the methodology determines how the research will be constructed, either through acquiring their knowledge with the aim of objectively presenting reality and/or situating it contextually (positivist or post-positivist) (della Porta and Keating, 2008). Methodology may also be determined by looking at the contextual reality of the social phenomenon or focus the “values, meaning and

purposes” (della Porta and Keating, 2008: 32) that emanates from social reality constructed, respectively Interpretivist or Humanistic.

The positivist or post-positivist methodologies usually require a quantitative approach by using research methods such as experiments and statistical analysis (della Porta and Keating, 2008). This requires gathering up numerical data to provide a causal or correlative relation of the data analysed. On the other hand, the interpretivist and humanistic methodologies follow a qualitative approach; thus, following thematic analysis of words, textual analysis or discourse analysis may be used as a method. The differences between the quantitative and qualitative research methods is that one uses numbers and codes and the other depends on words.

The social science domain provides many methods and approaches for the use of research. Given this, it is important to employ methods and approaches that consolidate the stated research questions and hypothesis with the aim and purpose of the research. This study looks at the dialectical relation of nation-building and immigration practices. As a result, this follows a qualitative project which studies the rhetoric within the speeches of Mandela and Mbeki and the content available in the policy frameworks constructed during their presidency. Qualitative research seeks to give meaning to the social and political events occurring in the world using words in theory (Given, 2008). Meaning, the interpretation of data will occur upon the examination of words as it is situated in its political and social context (della Porta and Keating, 2008). To ensure that the presentation of data is valid, qualitative research gives one the opportunity to give meaning descriptively and critically of the data within its political immediacy. However, since the study seeks to analyse the dialectical interaction of nation-building discourses and immigration practices, the viability of the qualitative approach will be strengthened by following the critical discourse analysis research method.

1.5.1 Data Collection

The search for the often-unstated power relations at play in discourse affords one, one of the broadest forms of attaining data (Wodak and Meyer, 2001). Therefore, analysing the research qualitatively, in this instant, will require interpreting chunks of textual data, attained through desktop research. These textual data include Mandela’s Release Speech, 1990; the Speech at the Annual World Economic Meeting in Davos, Switzerland, 1992; and Mandela’s Inauguration Speech. Also, policies emanating from Mandela’s nation-building project are analysed, specifically the White Paper on Reconstruction and Development Programme, the

Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy and the White Paper on International Migration.

For Mbeki, the textual data include his 1996 *I am an African* Speech, the 1998 *Two Nations* speech, and the speech made at the *Annual Conference for Black Management Forum* in the year of 1999. This is followed by the policies which are the Affirmative Action Measures, the New Partnership for Africa's Development, and the Immigration Act, 2002 in relation to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The data was attained from internet searches (online magazines, websites), published books and journal articles. Speeches of the two presidents were attained mainly from *South African History Online: Towards A People's History* and the policies were attained from the *ANC online archives* and government websites. Because speeches and gazetted policies are limited in their ability to offer the discursive interaction that occurred during their production, different perceptions and discourses were sourced from books written by authors who were frequently exposed to the former presidents. And within these books methods such as narrative analysis and interviews were followed to determine the interpretative value of certain policies mandated by the Presidents. The policies were downloaded from relevant South African departmental websites.

Given that there are many texts which may be analysed of these two Presidents I have chosen the aforementioned texts because they frequently interacted with the public during celebratory events and during times when policies were discussed. Thus, they provide rich and diverse implications to what critical discourse analysts would state to be relations of power, symbols, and structure within a society.

The data collected was analysed through discourse analysis. This analysis leans towards associating discourse in themes specifically: "Time and Place", "Forms of Consciousness", "Activities and Instruments" (Fairclough, 2001). Consequently, words are read and analysed to give meaning to the power relations at play. During the analysis process all themes are juxtaposed with policies emanating from the nation-building discourses of that time to understand whether nation-building continues onwards as a discourse for human emancipation within the state.

Due to this, the dissertation therefore chose to interact with discourse coming from the Presidency of Mandela and Mbeki. The latter is because Critical Discourse Analysis believe that data collected is mutually constitutive of the status quo. In other words, words expressed, particularly for political reasons, constitutively interact with the dynamic power relations, structures and culture placed within the society. Thus, selecting Mandela and Mbeki, to the

exclusion of Zuma, is specific in conceptualising that democracy was still being constituted throughout their presidential years when the scars of apartheid were still painfully raw. Furthermore, Mandela and Mbeki's presidency interacted immensely with immigration laws and practices during which xenophobic sentiments were heightened.

1.5.2 Application of Methods

The critical stance reflected in data collection requires a multi-disciplinary focus, this is operationalised through critical discourse analysis which fortunately makes use of a “multi-methodical approach” (Wodak and Meyer, 2001:2). Given that the study seeks to look at the dialectical relation of nation-building practices to immigration policies and laws, employing a dialectical-relational approach offered by critical discourse analysis theorist Norman Fairclough strengthens the constructional validity of the study's quest. A dialectical-relational approach should allow one to understand the power structures at play in the initial point of nation-building which will explain how African immigrants should not pose a challenge to the South African state.

Social science research addresses social and political phenomena and produces theory, makes inferences, or gives a statistical study of the phenomena. Accordingly, this study was informed by a social ill stemming from xenophobic sentiments and violence towards African immigrants. This study seeks to produce meaning based on theoretical assumptions of the units of analysis – nation-building and immigration practices. Nation-building and immigration practices are obfuscated concepts. Due to this, critical discourse is useful as it gives meaning to social issues and discovers trends in “opaque relationships” (Mogashoa, 2014:105) within rhetoric and super/substructures.

Critical Discourse Analysis as a research method is necessary because it describes the discursive interaction occurring in speeches with the ideologies and structures of power shaping the nation. Furthermore, critical discourse analysis, as a discursive method, places importance on the context or historicity, and the structural power in which the manoeuvres of speech occurs (Wodak and Meyer, 2001:5). Discourse that is understood as speech, or writing, is therefore informed by the institutionalised conception of its ends (Wodak and Meyer, 2001). The claim of critical discourse theory is that discourse does not exist alone, it is based on certain practices of power and historical processes; and as a result, discourse is a social practice (Wodak and Meyer, 2001). Fairclough and Wodak (1997:258 cited in Wodak and Meyer, 2001: 5-6) state that,

describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the

situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s), which frame it. The discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them, that is, discourse is socially constitutive as well as *socially conditioned* [my emphasis] – it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it.

The unfolding phenomenon theorised by Fairclough (2008) has its similarities to structuralism, whereby the structure in which the discursive events occur in, stimulates the consequences of the events. The main rule of following a dialectical-relational approach is that it is pragmatic/interpretive and situated on solving a problem within the social world (Fairclough, 2009). Thus, the dialectical-relational approach begins at the point of a social problem that should be analysed with inferences being drawn to the social nature it is constituted in, fully acknowledging that that social world is also constituted of the discourses arises from it.

Attaining a point of entry through the social problem (Fairclough, 2009) of immigrants being a challenge to the state ensures a dialogue with the nation-building discourses and immigration policies of the Mandela and Mbeki era. It becomes dialectical-relational because “each intensifies the others without being reducible to them” (Fairclough, 2009:163). In other words, the political textual data of the presidents are to be understood as giving effect to actions of the state and the people within the state; in other words, they are fundamental and constitutive discourses that help in the construction of the nation.

Critical discourse analysis reveals this interesting approach known as the dialectical-relation approach. It will therefore entail unfolding the dialectic occurring between the nation-building discourses and the post-colonial society, in which it finds itself, entangled in, which frame and produce the immigration practices. Consequently, the unit of analysis, nation-building is understood as a powerful ideological tool that creates as well as maintain the way national consciousness relates with immigrants.

1.6 Structure of the Chapters

The explication of this dissertation will occur in six chapters. The first chapter introduces the research study, explicates the methods to be followed and formulates objectives and questions based on the evidential lacuna found on the preliminary research, in the scholarly work of nation-building in South Africa. The second chapter looks at literature that discusses the emergence of nationalism (conceptualised as national identity and national culture construction) which is equated to nation-building efforts in post-colonial nations. The

third chapter looks at theoretical presuppositions granted by the post-colonial scholars on nation-building, with a focus on Fanon's philosophical humanism. The fourth chapter initially presents the historical context (volatile situation and negotiations) in which the discourse of Nelson Mandela enters in, then gives a presentation and review of the official policies and discourses applied in implementing nation-building and immigration practices in South Africa from 1994-1999. Similarly, the fifth chapter looks at the emergence of the African renaissance of Thabo Mbeki and the renewed hope of the African dream, it is juxtaposed with the policies implemented during his tenure – particularly how immigration policies were dealt with. The fourth and fifth chapter will also provide analytical perspectives on the discourses and policies emanating from Mandela and Mbeki's rhetoric, inferring a dialectical relationship nation-building practices have with the configuration of immigration practices. The sixth and final chapter will surmise the dissertation and show how the hypothesis has been addressed through the application of theoretical knowledge and methodology. Furthermore, it will conclude on the usefulness of such theories for post-colonial African nations facing "challenges" of African immigrants and xenophobic violence, and how nation-building discourses can be used as a tool to create endless emancipatory praxes within a nation, with a special attention drawn to African immigrants. Finally, recommendations will be drawn in which nation-building discourses are set to influence a humanist dialectical relation with immigration practices that carries emancipatory potential.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

After more than twenty years, South Africa's transition brought an end to undemocratic, authoritarian, apartheid rule, and yet the state has not yet fully recovered from anti-dialectical and inhumane practices towards African immigrants. Scholars have offered various theories through which South Africa can recover from the pains of apartheid, and its inhumane practices and become a beacon of hope for Africa. This study seeks to zero in on nation-building practices in South Africa and how they relate to immigration practices. The preliminary literature review looked at how the practice of nation-building has been submersed into the realm of political transition. As a result, South African nation-building discourses tend to be theorised as the initial democratisation measures set to strengthen the South African nation-state emerging from the ending of apartheid. Due to this, nation-building practices (in the post-colonial world) are conceptualised as a discourse that is only performed after the anti-colonial struggle until democracy prevails. That reduces nation-building as being only a project that lifts South Africa from its antithesis of humanity into the absolute of universality – liberal democratic nation-state. There needs to be a move away from this thinking and evaluate nation-building as a continuous process through which immigration practices dialectically interact – to establish humane or inhumane practices.

There are three schools of thought that warrant closer examination and analysis: Institutionalism, Identity and Othering, and Dismantling Western Historicity. Proponents of Institutionalism contend that nation-building is a mandate of development within the nation and cannot be used for ideological inferences. Therefore, nation-building is only relative as a project of the state. Second, Identity and Othering maintains that nation-building is a continuous exercise of national identity and othering the foreigners. Thus, nation-building is the basis of an initial programme to impose the superiority of the nation in its everyday lived experience and in the implementation of borders and jurisdiction. Lastly, Western Historicity focuses on a historical analysis of nation-building as emanating from the West; thus, its use is problematic in a post-colonial polyethnic nation. Nation-building will therefore consistently involve the ideologies of the majority ethnicity which will to some degree produce 'democratic' othering. Furthermore, this chapter will examine how South African scholars have written about nation-building, during the years and after the years of political transitioning. From this, it will be stated that the school that seeks to dismantle Western Historicity gives a better explanation of the postcolonial situation. This is because it acknowledges the need to distinguish nation-building in post-colonial polyethnic society giving it a place where it can be a tool through which emancipatory praxis is attained.

For the case of post-apartheid South Africa, Institutionalism is not applicable. While the institutions play an important role in a transitioning society, immigration practices are not primarily only about technical developments and change occurring within a society. Identity and Othering is short-sighted in its aspirations because it does not consider how and why people integrate into different societies. To presuppose the necessity of difference cancels the entire history of humanity. Thus, postulating nation-building in these terms is restricted. Western Historicity is also unwieldy. It presupposes the avenue of a majority ethnicity to portray the engagement between nation-building and immigration practices. However, it does offer a means to reconceptualise nation-building within South Africa.

2. Nation, nation-building, nationalism, and migration in context

2.1 The Institutional Perspective of Nation-Building

In, *For a Theory of Nationalism*, Jaffrelot (2003) seeks to establish a narrow conception of nationalism so to eliminate it from nation-building theories and theories of ethnicity. As a result, Jaffrelot (2003) analyses theories used in nation studies and endeavours to show their irrelevance in defining what nationalism truly is. In this work, Jaffrelot (2003) therefore seeks to distinguish between the work provided by the school of nation-building and those clearly set aside for investigating nationalism. The working hypothesis is therefore, nation-building theories are institutional and do not deal with the “political ideology at stake” (Jaffrelot, 2003:12) within nationalism.

Jaffrelot (2003) states that these theorists have missed the point because initially the school of nation-building was not set to investigate nationalism but looked at the amalgamation of the nation “on the basis of technical developments” (Jaffrelot, 2003:9). Thus, Jaffrelot (2003) dislikes the psychological take nation-building theories have, when subsumed into nationalism, as it removes the essence of nationalism which is to create a theory that pertains to ideological constructions. And for Jaffrelot (2003), nation-building only addresses national consciousness which is the later effect of having separated oneself from another through coercive ideological construction. Because of this, theories of ethnicity, those that pertain to identity and othering, are considered by Jaffrelot (2003) as a better fit in understanding the dialogical construction of groups. Thus, for Jaffrelot (2003:12) if there is no “political ideology at stake” and a need to assert oneself from an invading other – then nationalism cannot be conferred on that theory.

Nationalism, or the theories emanating from it, is based off ideological inferences that seek to distinguish one from the other to determine their being outside of an ‘alien’ other. Therefore, nationalism is, purely, an ‘ism’ – as it falls under the domain of ideology

construction that informs the being of a nation (Jaffrelot, 2003). This is because nationalism per Jaffrelot (2003) is based on the unifying aspect of the nation to the exclusion of others, thereby strengthening constructions of identity and culture. Because of the narrow construction of nationalism, Jaffrelot (2003) is continuously dismissive of any postulations of globalisation and “the impact of migrations” (Jaffrelot, 2003: 45). This is because they delve further into the history of nations as they pertain to humanity. Accordingly, this search is useless in the theory of nationalism Jaffrelot (2003) holds.

The nationalism conceptualised by Jaffrelot (2003) therefore gives us a point to enter the discussion of nation-building as only being understood as tool for institutional praxes. Institutionalists, such as Jaffrelot (2003), limit the scope of nation-building to it being a work of policies that ensure the effective running of the state. The issue with this understanding is that it exposes nation-building to possible undemocratic pursuits in the name of administrative efficacy. This is because the nation is not attached to these actions and the being of the nation continues to be constructed as being democratic even when the state grounds anti-dialectical actions in the nation. The being and belonging of the nation in Institutionalism is therefore unfounded on the states action, usually seen in the policies constructed before the amalgamation of the democratic nation-state. Therefore, the politics of the nation becomes removed from the nation-state policies and practices. The principle of evasion (to scapegoat) whenever xenophobic sentiments arises is derived from understanding nation-building as removed from the being of the state. Due to this, nation-building dialectically relates to immigration practices on the level of state measures that provide structures for the institutions to properly function.

2.2 Identity and Othering in National Discourses

The Naturalisation of Identity Formation

Identity and Othering scholars discuss the creation of identity with the intention of separating oneself from a foreign other. This school of thought holds that societies undergoing modernisation face a threat of losing meaningful attachment given by traditional society; or forget the foundation that created the existing attachment measures in the modern society. Unlike Institutionalism, which places a heavier emphasis on directed systematic practices as creating the basis for how the nation relates to immigrants, Identity and Othering focuses more on what they believe is the ideological but what can be assessed to be nation-building practices. This school of thought therefore is unaware of their discussion on nation-building practices as constituting the outcome of how the nation relates to immigration.

In the chapter, *Remembering Banal Nationalism*, Billig (1995) highlights his displeasure with the misconstrued understanding of nationalism as it associates nationalism as an ‘-ism’ of the ‘others’ rooted in barbaric acts of misguided passion. And due to this, nationalism therefore becomes embodied with negative connotations resulting in the forgetting of every day, banal acts of nationalism. Therefore, to comprehend the totality of nationalism it is imperative to analyse these everyday acts. This is because national fervour tends to emanate from unacknowledged banal acts of nationalism. What is retrievable from Billig (1995) is the conceptualisation of national fervour through everyday acts. Put differently, nationalism is not an ideology that exists outside Western civilisation because nationalism also includes lived experiences and realities of being within the nation-state. These actions therefore seek to guide who belongs within the state and who exists illegally as a foreign other. Thus, making an account for banal nationalism gives space for these everyday actions to become a unit of analysis in academia and in institutional practices, forcing one to constantly remember these actions. Through this Billig (1995) allows one to have a point of reference through which ‘othering’ might develop within a relatively stable democratic nation.

In other words, forgetting the daily production/banality of nationalism runs a risk of naturalising and overlooking the national project of Western nations. Maintaining the latter, brackets off the lived experiences of the masses as daily productions are not attributed as national discourse. Given the emancipatory possibilities of the grassroots in their lived experience to imagine a nation that is inclusive, failing to analyse banal actions is detrimental for nation-building and immigration practices.

Another scholar portrays the identity and othering as move in history. According to Anderson (1983), certain manners of being began to dissipate as modernity was on the rise and “print capitalism” (Anderson, 1983:36) flourished. Anderson (1983) shows that nationalism is a process of the history of humanity and their search for association, once the religious and dynastic powers dissipated from the state. This is an important contribution but lacks the analysis of exclusionary practices in nationalism, leaving one questioning whether humans are the main determinants of what occurs in history or whether history determines the actions of humans. One is left unsure with this regard and whether there is a role played by the state elite in the formation of nationalism. But what Anderson (1983) brings to the discussion of nationalism is its cultural basis and that identity formation and ideologies may emanate from cultural practices.

For Anderson the nation is, currently, the most consistent political value in our life time, and having been derived from cultural attachments Anderson provides an interesting dimension to the nation-building discourse in South Africa. Given, the historical progression stipulated by Anderson that leads to the imagined community one might give due consideration on the cultural artefacts that are at the disposal of political administrators at the point of conception for a new national identity within a nation. Thus, Anderson provides the view that takes into consideration the cultural elements that can be put forward within a nation-state to foster the construction of an imagined community through which people draw association to. In other words, the African principles enshrined at the inception of democratic South Africa matter, with regards to the identity constructed and lived within South Africa. This imagining can occur in different ways especially in post-colonial nations, one of which may be through nation-building practices or discourses that enable the building of nation-state. Anderson (1983) does not hypothesise this but also gives reference to the fact that nationalism or nation-ness (existing within in a nation that you are attached to) is a cultural artefact (Anderson, 1983:4).

In Anderson (1983) the nation is imagined as limited and sovereign taking on the reigns religion had. Furthermore, people who live separate lives, unbeknown to the entire community develop a deep sense of belonging through their daily interactions managed within the nation. Thus, Anderson (1983) provides that a nation is an imagined community because people who do not know each other perceive one another as 'one'. Therefore, the nation is imagined as also having borders and jurisdiction over what happens internally.

The Identity and Othering school of thought therefore highlights the unspoken but desperate need of the people to be associated within a nation in the post-modern age and that the nation-state's construction enables the attachment. Institutionally, if everything is appearing democratic and yet immigrants are treated inhumanely, then one can attest to this school of thought the silent practices of othering through embodied actions. Anderson (1983) takes it further by including that exclusionary practices are attained from the pre-modern cultural and religious practices of othering. Othering continues in the modern world because 'naturally' the people are still searching for association even with the rise of modernity.

Even so, identity and othering fails to note that these everyday acts are also factored as a process of national construction. This continuation signifies a building, albeit subconscious. Billig (1995) in portraying the nationalism of the Western nations as it pertains today (to everyday actions) brings forth an analysis of nation-building. Thus, those every day actions confirm the praxis of nation-building and its influence on immigration through

othering. This school of thought also runs the risk of wanting to subsume nation-building as an ideology rather than clearly portraying an anti-dialectic and inhumane practice occurring within the international community in the construction of national identity through nation-building practices. Nation-building practices need to be understood as a powerful tool, much like how this misdirected banal nationalism is responsible for othering.

In conclusion, Identity and Othering seeks to unify the diversity in the citizens within the nation through singling out those who cannot relate to the events that draw attachments; or in creating closed groups of association othering those who cannot relate. This is a psychoanalytical framework as it deals with the subconscious actions of the people. Thus, if a person fails to identify psychologically with such actions, nationals will seek to project those as foreign others, aliens. Identity and Othering, by conceptualising attachment and associations as emanating from cultural and ideological needs, produces an unclear road map to understand the dialectical relation between nation-building and immigration practices. This is because the psychoanalytical construction of the nation forbids the interaction with immigrants and therefore scorning the appearance of immigrants through nation-building practices.

2.3 Dismantling Western Historicity

2.3.1 A historical account of nation-building

This school of thought, from the onset, distinguishes between nation-building and state-making and goes further to propose that nation-building occurs in four different ways based on the nation-state's history. Furthermore, it asserts that essentialising nation-states by assuming that nation-states are natural unit is problematic as immigration is conjured as a threat to nationalism (Wimmer and Schiller, 2002). Wimmer and Schiller (2002) recover the relation between nation-building and immigration practices by addressing methodological nationalism, whilst Smith (1986) brings into this discussion how certain difficulties might arise when dealing with immigration practices in a post-colonial nation that undergoes nation-building.

When one refers to concepts such as nationalism, nation, and state there is a desire to determine without a doubt what came first. It becomes the chicken or egg algorithm. Smith (1986) shows that post-colonial societies, such as South Africa, should not fuss over this because a degenerative model of nationalism occurred that led to violence on the people living there. Many people in post-colonial nations went about existing in a society, unacknowledged and treated as a cog in the machine of colonialism; in which the colonialists became the entity that represented the nation from which a state could be edged around.

Smith (1986) makes one realise that the plight of the nation-state, in post-colonial nations, emerges from the west's superior stance and all nations attempting to duplicate what has occurred in the Western nations. Smith (1986) mentions that, the European rational state model, having been greatly opposed, still exists. Furthermore, it has been exported to other regions despite the inherent differences within those nations.

Therefore, while other scholars are focussed on discussing the 'true' essence or character of nationalism, Smith (1986) is more concerned with looking at the phenomenon occurring in between the formulation of these concepts into the society. In so doing, a case is made as to why the nation-state is difficult to maintain in post-colonial polyethnic societies. Smith (1986) does this by giving a historical account of the formation of the rational European state, and its imposition on other regions particularly in the colonies. Smith (1986) therefore makes an introspective search on the relationships occurring between state and nation. Thus, looking at the factors interacting during the creation of the state and nation reveals the role of nationalism or national construction within different societies; what it achieves, and how it is most likely to achieve it.

A short account of history would show that there were various political units in society, however, the state system overruled other political units and was assimilated into nearly all societies (Smith, 1986). The latter is attributed to the construction of the rational state model, in England and France, which succeeded immensely because it was culturally homogenous (Smith, 1986). The administrative efficacy drawn out of these two nations led to its duplication throughout the world and where it was not, it became imposed through colonisation. However, Smith (1986) makes a clear thesis on the differences other regions shared in comparison to the advantages present in England and France which led to a successful rational state model. Even with these differences the rational state model was implemented and duplicated on demand and is not the foundation for the world's political system.

Due to this, Smith (1986) interrogates the incessant use of this political unit in other regions and the factors that lead to the creation of a nation-state. Smith (1986) finds that what maintains the nation-state is the state elite, and this is what Smith (1986) highlights as missing in other prevalent theories that deal with state-making and nation-making. The will of the state elites led to the actual formation of the Western state in other regions, "it was their policies and qualities of will and administrative skills that ensured the victory of the modern European state" (Smith, 1986:239). Therefore, the state elites participated in a homogenising project in other regions through contracts (policies) for the people that placed

their existence as being derived only from the constructed modern European state (Smith, 1986).

So what Smith (1986) brings to the table in the discussion of state-making is that nothing comes out of nowhere. Rather, in this world, people have agency and whether that agency transpires from a hierarchical system is not important; the evidence of contingency, possibility within a community of people¹ is what matters. The evidence of such is the Westerners recreating the rational European state in colonial regions through the appeal to nationalism, a common culture amongst the colonialists.

In the same vein, Smith (1986) postulates, that a nation can also be made through willed nation formation. Four historical models are highlighted. The applicable model, the colonial model, highlights the intricacies of state-making and nation-making. As has been mentioned, in colonised regions, the modern European state is violently imposed to various 'ethnies'. Upon independence, these regions "use this territorial state and its 'nationalism'² to create a unified nation out of these divergent ethnies" (Smith, 1986:242). The political elite in the post-colonial nations find themselves in a conundrum where they use the territorial region that has been imposed by colonialism to create a nation out of the state.

According to Smith (1986), nation-building rests on the presence of a dominant ethnicity, and if there is no dominant ethnies, it becomes difficult to form a nation (Smith, 1986). Therefore, the nation-state for Smith (1986) still rests upon the rational European model and due to this Smith (1986) gives no care to describe the nation alongside a neutral post-colonial trajectory. The nation-state as a variable is fixed to its historicity. Given this analysis, one questions the role of immigrants within a nation-state and how Smith (1986) would have their situation dealt with. It is clear then, that Smith's (1986) work presupposes difficulties a nation inherits if immigrants are introduced in the nation-state. Looking at the United States model, Smith (1986) states that immigrants could assume the mythology of the nation as a group and create certain political communities. However, Smith (1986) claims that it will be difficult for African societies to use the United States immigrant model because African immigrants have a territorial base, in their home country, making it difficult for them to assimilate.

¹ The contingency apparent in society is the ability of the people to assert their will and create a state with the use of their administrative skills. In so doing, they enhance the rational European model further – geographically and economically – through supporting the Industrialisation of the west, with the resources of the colonies.

² According to Smith (1986) their nationalism is nation-building as it becomes an ideology than a "tool of analysis" (Smith, 1986:232) which the elite assert their national identity.

Furthermore, nation-building as an ideology³, determined by Smith (1986), is a restrictive ideology that seeks to only achieve cultural homogeneity and fails to work accordingly if this cultural homogeneity is challenged. Smith (1986) therefore shows that state-making in polyethnic societies can lead to the creation of an “ethnie”⁴ by the elite – highly pretentious and ‘detached’ from tribal associations, such as a ‘rainbow ethnicity’. So, if the political elite are bent on creating a nation that they want, that accedes with the state already in place, they will create dispositions of a “common historic culture and lifestyle” (Smith, 1986:245), which did not necessarily exist.

Smith (1986:245) states, “an ethnic community becomes a named human population sharing common myths of descent, shared historical memories, a common culture, an association with a recognized territory and a sense of solidarity.”⁵ And due to the latter, the human population can become a nation (Smith 1986). Smith (1986) therefore releases the discussion of myth creation in post-colonial nations, as emerging from the need to have an “ethnic core or ethnic past” (Smith, 1986:243), without which state-making and nation-making is unlikely to occur ‘successfully’. The description of the ethnic core and ethnic past reveals gaps in Smith’s 1986 state-making and nation-making discourse. This is because in removing the nation-building as a tool of analysis to an ideology, Smith (1986) reified the processes of the west that sought to create the nation in the post colony by asserting the necessity of an ethnic past like the west.

Thus, by highlighting the need for an ethnic core or past, Smith (1986) has managed to show why myth creation becomes paramount in nation-building projects in post-colonial polyethnic societies. It is unfortunate that the approach is reductionist through Smith’s (1986) inability to portray other African state models that have emerged,⁶ but even so the historical account is extremely useful. Overall, Smith (1986:258) states that “the ‘nation’ is not, as we see, built up only through the provision of ‘infrastructures’ and ‘institutions’, as ‘nation-building’ theories assumed; but from the central fund of culture and symbolism and mythology provided by shared historical experiences.” Evidently, the problem arising from

³ It is important to recall that Smith (1986) renders the nation-building project in post-colonial societies not as tool of analysis (not praxis through which the nation-state is stabilised) but as an ideology within itself. Smith (1986) gives reasons to this because “the state is having to work hard at just keeping its various ethnic groups together, let alone ‘build’ a nation” (Smith, 1986:232).

⁴ Smith (1986) offers a definition of the ethnie in polyethnic societies, “by ethnicity we mean here a common the sense of common historic culture and lifestyle” (Smith, 1986:245).

⁵ Solidarity is with the those who fought against the apartheid evils or the post-colonial evils

⁶ Kabamba, P. (2012). In and Out of the State: Working the Boundaries of Power in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. *Open Anthropology Cooperative Press Occasional Paper #15*.

this conceptualisation is that nation-building materialises as an ideology more than practice-of-being and it being dialectical. This is problematic because being and belonging is reduced to geographical locations, and yet nation-building should not restrict the humanity of a person and their right to movement.

In other words, Smith's (1986) account fails to let loose of methodological nationalism which is the assumption that a nation-state is a natural unit (Wimmer and Schiller, 2002). Yet still, the strength in this school is in drawing out the historical and in situating the political or state elite as the main actors in the national system when constructing a national discourse. And due to this, one can state that nation-building practices, as they relate to immigration practices, throughout the years, are based on the contingency of the state and political elite.

2.4 South African Nation-Building

The discussion surrounding nation-building has many schools of thought. The overarching being the multifaceted approach of nationalism, the stance of a nation-state being a homogenised unit within which people draw associations to. Slabbert (1994) regards nation-building as a token word used by the political elite to make belief that there is progress occurring in the nation. For Slabbert (1994), what needs to be highlighted is the pursuit for institutional stability within which the 27 constitutional principles are mandated. Similarly, Leibenberg (1994) understands that pursuing nation-building on the onset of democracy is not viable. South Africa should first "muster towards building a society structured upon a working and sustainable democracy" (Leibenberg, 1994:18). Both scholars have an institutionalist paradigm which is laden with post-modernist perspectives therefore portraying nation-building a "useless concept for analytical purpose" (Slabbert, 1994:449).

On the other hand, Schlemmer (1994) bases his analysis on nation-building as a mode through which inherent differences are accepted by allowing spaces of interaction for all ethnic associations. Therefore, as professed by Kotze (2012), nation-building purposes are centred on building a national culture; that consequently, leads to a national identity that will not emphasise racial relations but rather focus on the cultural constructs within the nation by "establishing a common goal towards which all are working" (Kotze, 2012:106). Isaacs-Martins (2012) therefore emphasises the need to create a solid national identity which would be based on civil rights that would surpass the attachment people have, to their social identities. Nation-building, for Isaacs-Martins (2012), is needed so that the state does not promote welfare to a social identity because "nation-building requires a salient national identity that embraces tolerance of difference" (Isaacs-Martins, 2012:178). Implicit in this

argument is the collapsing of nation-building to an identity and othering construction whilst attributing social identity to welfare.

Additionally, Degnaar (1994) establishes a post-modernist perspective but offers a pragmatic take on nation-building. Nation-building discourses are therefore understood to stem from the praxis of culture and ethnicity. The state in this instance is conceptualised as having been ontologically divided in discourse and praxis through the creation of myths and ethnic associations. Consequently, the nation for Degnaar (1994) is reduced to a less problematic term (analytically) and may be acknowledged in its juridical status. The assumption is that since South Africa has juridical status further creations of a “common culture or myth” that the people within the land identify with is not to be pursued. Instead, South Africa should base its legitimacy on the concept of “civic nation[hood]” stated by Habermas (1992:3). This would mean that the process of transition within South Africa would be situated around discourses on civil rights which would be the basis of the democratic culture South Africa aims to promote.

Degnaar (1994:43) states, “nationalism ... cannot accommodate communal cultures for a nation entails uniformity since it refers to a group of people mobilised, organised and legitimised based on the principle of congruence of (one) culture and power.” Therefore, it is more important to fulfil the task of “democracy creation” (Degnaar, 1994:44). The assumption is that South Africa should rather look at its point of political transition outside the scope of nation-building and focus on instilling democratic principles. This proposition, however, lies on a dangerous fallacy that all things preceding political transition and in alignment with liberal democracy are inherently democratic. This is done whilst removing democratic connotations on nation-building which is a limited reading for a post-colonial state like South Africa. Degnaar (1994) thus draws similar perspectives as Slabbert’s (1994) that rests on nation-building being a weak way of unifying people in the state because it may suppose opened ended undemocratic translations.

Lastly, nation-building is conceptualised along cultural nationalism which Marx (2002) is highly sceptical of because of the past segregatory cultural Afrikaner nationalism. Nation-building for Marx (2002) is what happened during the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Due to such actions, the government gained legitimacy and could avoid following through with the individual reparations as they stated that there are greater structural changes that need to occur for the community at large – making inferences to the ubuntu anthropological platitude (Marx, 2002). Marx (2002) further explains that it is no

coincidence that the upsurge of xenophobia has occurred within the post-apartheid time, the time which is supposed to be constitutional and inclusive.

Nation-building in South African academia continues to be interpreted according to the limitations inherent in the rational state model and Western historicity. What needs to be engaged with is interpreting colonialism as a historical trajectory for the post-colonial nation through which nation-building converges or diverges. If the latter were followed, the historical immediacy of the South African apartheid state, as an anti-dialectical, and inhumane state model would be used to conceptualise nation-building as a model aiming for the progression of humanity. However, South African academia missed the point to reveal nation-building as an inherently Westernised phenomenon that requires a readjusted thought process when applied in post-colonial nations. Due to this, the discussion surrounding nation-building has been increasingly limited as the years of democracy progress. Therefore, nation-building is left to dwell in the realm of transition never allowing it to be a useful tool in the emancipatory praxis of human existence within the nation. It is important that one investigates and assesses the ‘so-called’ nation-building practices of the early years of democracy and explain why African nationals continue to be viewed as challenging the state.

2.6 Conclusion

There is an ardent need to move away from this (methodological nationalism) conceptual ignorance and divulge the actions of the past by retrieving the true global history of the nation-state. Such problems have only proven to reify the national border lines especially in postcolonial nations where borders were arbitrarily placed. Therefore, having understood the role of social science and the plight of the nation-building research, it becomes of high prerogative that other thinkers and theorists be approached. Pertaining to the latter, Smith’s (1986) analysis is useful in providing a broader analysis on nation-building. Smith (1986) therefore created academic precedent that nation-building in post-colonial nations can be thought about differently. As a result, this dissertation seeks to adhere to an understanding of nation-building that is not held by methodological nationalism, institutionalist paradigms, or the universalism of Western historicity. Rather, it will seek to propound nation-building as tool of analysis that helps situate national construction as a progression of the human condition. The latter will be clearly discussed in the following chapter – ‘The Theoretical Framework’.

CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

It is important that theory emerging out of this dissertation supports an emancipatory theoretical praxis. To conceive an emancipatory theoretical praxis, one needs to understand that concepts emanating from theory ought to be living. The ‘living’ within the concepts is produced by taking notions from the masses at their historical and politically immediate context. As a general observation, human beings are constantly evolving, changing, and meeting their desires based on prior and *a priori* knowledge. Due to this, an emancipatory theoretical praxis provokes an understanding of liberation that is not static. It strives on the dynamics of political immediacy resulting in a transformative process through which oppressed groups operate to free themselves from the imposition of dominant ideologies and hegemonic discourse.

The contention that nation-building practices should release possibilities of human potential wherein the African immigrant is not problematised in another African nation is to provide, in theory, a sufficient framework that supports the intricacies of the masses acting against oppressive elements that perpetuate their subordinate positioning. This chapter will therefore question what the role of the post-colonial in present theories within post-colonial nations is; it will also look at how Western theories subordinate black experiences, followed by an inquiry into a suitable post-colonial philosophical humanistic framework. Ultimately, a model befitting the South African experience, as dissected by the inquiry, will be brought forward that should seek to expose and work around the intricate contours of liberation in a post-colonial society.

3.1 What is the post-colonial?

In the context of the world’s historical narrative, the time at which a discussion about creating a theory is brought up is imperative as it determines who is mentioned as a subject of thought or as an object that cannot offer thought (Praeg, 2014). The latter is an injustice which must be exposed when one writes a theory on Africa. As a result, many scholars within African Studies and in Diaspora Studies suspend the use of Western theoretical frameworks because the latter places white subjectivity as the normative framework for humanity (Gordon, 2006). The act to suspend postulations on Africa, via white normative theory, is political. It seeks to make a statement on the politics of Africa emerging, which is, post-colonialism.

Postcolonialism is understood as having nothing to do with the historical time of what the epoch after colonialism is. Rather, it should be accepted as a process through which the

colonised interacts with the “past and present effects” (Quayson, 2000:2) of colonisation and the postmodern world. As a result, Quayson (2000) writes postcolonialism as one word so to call to attention its value in praxis. What emerges from this understanding is that postcolonialism is heavily embedded in cultural dimensions (Quayson, 2000). This is because the dynamic interactions at each inflection, during the struggle against colonisation, are considered to constitute what the postcolonial is. Consequently, the notion of postcolonialism can participate in Hegelian-type dialectic because the process through which it is constituted is interwoven with its current character and possibly its coming character. Additionally, postcolonialism is constructed by the progression from a diminished historicity on epistemology, to the assertion of a living knowledge constructed in the fight to re-imagine oneself as human.

Therefore, postcoloniality is the occurrence of the people reclaiming their existence, unassimilated from the ontology of Western universalism before independence. Since postcolonialism was first accounted for in literary and cultural narratives, by writing stories on the experiences of the masses, during colonial occupation; the postcolonial should be thought of as a reflexive inquiry (Quayson, 2000). In other words, the postcolonial is therefore a reflexive inquiry with one’s precolonial and dynamic culture of the anticolonial struggle to provide meaning for the praxis of the masses in the post-colonial state (Fanon, 1961[1991]). Praxis or the lived realities of the people therefore becomes the crux of postcolonialism. That is, it is more of a process than a hegemonic discourse. This is because it is attained from the interactions of the people and can never be reduced to a few elite asserting unfamiliar, and distorted social arrangements on the people. The critical narration of postcolonialism therefore penetrates the tendency of certain ideologies to construct hero worshipping on the few elite, particularly the party – much like what has occurred in South Africa.

What one may therefore notice about the postcolonial is that it is anticipatory (Quayson, 2000). It may appear self-important as it responds with an answer for many societal problems however, that is the essence of a thought in process. Fanon (1952[2008]:91) eloquently puts it as, “I am one who waits; I investigate my surroundings, I interpret everything in terms of what I discover, I become sensitive.” Therefore, “a ‘postcolonial’ project should be alert to imbalances and injustices wherever these may be found in East and West, North and South, and whether they are to do with racism or child pornography, women’s labour or micro-minority rights, political authoritarianism or the degradation of the environment. The point is that postcolonialism must be a project to correct

imbalances in the world, and not merely to do with specific ‘postcolonial’ constituencies” (Quayson, 2000:11).

To ask what the post-colonial is, is to allude a history of historical injustice towards humanity’s dialectical progression. This is because the post-colonial is the grounding discipline or foundation through which African theory is reimagined. Thus, understanding what the postcolonial is, helps one comprehend the means as to which the nation will be built bit-by-bit. To have the postcolonial as such, establishes that the postcolonial is the First Philosophy of African humanistic theory. Consequently, more than the post-colonial being an epoch for African theory, it becomes the place through which political action emerges. Answering what the post-colonial is, is to remind the reader that the colonial subject experienced grave historical injustice, slavery, and colonialism. In other words, the post-colonial is about how, “[Africans] have always been consigned to responding from the place where ... [they] ought not to have been standing” (Quayson, 2002:587).

3.1.1 The Postcolonial as an Essence of Moving Imaginaries

From this, there is a clear need to explain the postcolonial through interrogating the standard of timing in history. The knowledge claims and discourses of power and subordination on Africa, by Western ideologues, rooted in the “negative interpretation” of Africa led Mbembe and Rendall (2002) to interpret the African experience through the essence of time. The post-colonial is as an epoch submerged with many imaginaries both local and global that inflict the complexities present in the construction of an African theory by Africans. Its philosophy is premised on actional existence in the search for emancipation.

The theory on Africa therefore becomes a political search for recognising agency through all ages, through different movements in time. Mbembe and Rendall (2002) states that the unique formations of society and statehood in Africa have nothing to do with the failure to attain a universal substance but are “rooted in a multiplicity of times, trajectories, and rationalities that, [are] ... particular and sometimes local ...” (Mbembe and Rendall, 2002). Due to this, the post-colonial situation should not consider essential categories of African identities (Mbembe and Rendall, 2002). To understand this clearly, a critique of Afroradicalism and Nativism is considered. Mbembe (2002) views the latter models as trying too much to contradict Western theories by showing their ‘own’ form of being African. Amid this, they achieve the very thing that Western theory did but just in an African manner. For instance, Nativism takes a turn to create boundaries between the native and the non-native other and because of these boundaries, distinctions can then be made between the authentic and inauthentic (Mbembe, 2002:245). Likewise, Afro-radicalism is focused on the unity of a

nation based on membership to the black race. The nation is subjected to an Afro national identity, opposed to Western constructions, which is superficial and through it *only* a cult of victimisation is nurtured. This type of theory is refuted by Mbembe (2002:272) claiming that, “African identity does not exist as a substance. It is constituted, in varying forms, through a series of practices, notably practices of the self.” Thus, dwelling on substance fails to describe the African identity; however, it limits it to an essentialist understanding of identity.

The thesis on self-practices as time describes postcoloniality as ceding to its own mental weakness, thus undergoing perpetual childhood through the formulation of Afrocentric theories. Mbembe (2002) expresses that ‘African modes of self-writing’ would be incorrect to theorise African identity as being of substance when the understanding of substance was derived from a lack of it. The contention by Mbembe (2002) is interesting as the interpretation of the African subject is open to different epochs and events. Even, so the post-colonial as an epoch is insignificant, rather the series of practices as they occur at that time and the inflections they make of the past, present and future play a greater role in determining the construction of the African.

3.1.2 The Experience of the Postcolonial

As mentioned above, the politics of Africa is understood as experience in the post-colonial. The post-colonial is therefore an outcome of the imposition of white colonial subjectivities on the black body, and the anti-colonial struggle for humanity. The post-colonial however is praxis; thus, experience is measured more accurately post-independence. Because of this the post-colonial becomes the amalgamation of global imaginaries in the post-modern world and the local imaginaries in the post-colonial world. The western dominated global world is aligned with the market capitalism and individualism, which infringes on the dialectical progression that humanity would achieve in the post-colonial world. The post-colonial is therefore the ironic experience ex-colonial regions go through, in constructing themselves as local theoretical praxis⁷ in a world that demands post-modernity in their culture (Praeg, 2014).

What one derives out of this, is that independence ended the act of colonialism; however, postcoloniality lay bare within the nation (Maldonado-Torres, 2007:243). Within the postcolonial school of thought concepts have already been established that are versed around postcoloniality – concepts such as national liberation, national identity, and national

⁷ This statement on the post-colonial is highly inspired by the analysis Leonard Praeg makes on Ubuntu as a local construction under the super complexities of fitting in the hypermodern world. This is found in his book Praeg, L., 2014. *A Report on Ubuntu*. Scottsville: UKZN Press.

culture. Unfortunately, the emancipatory potential of dealing with the latter concepts is mired with the frivolous homogenous concepts produced by the national elite, in an attempt to build a nation-state. Chandra (2013:481) succinctly illuminates how the modern state is still a target of colonial tendencies and states that, “the role of the modern state, itself a vestige of the colonial past, remains a critical target for postcolonial scholars for its elitist and authoritarian tendencies.”

To delve further with this issue of postcoloniality In, *The Devil on the Cross* Wa (2017) writes a narrative, on the bodily and mental experience of the post-colonial. The experience is seen through the lens of Wariinga (the protagonist). The protagonist is positioned in an Independent state where the political elite’s ascension to power is like the power hungered for by the colonialist as they succumb to a ‘thieving capitalism’. Thus, the plight of betrayal is carried by Wariinga’s agonies which portray the repressed reality of the masses soul, as she faints. The inability to transport oxygen, that life giving agent, shows how suffocated the possibilities of humanity are within the post-colonial, elitist constructed nation-state. Wariinga’s fainting is timely; she only faints when the ‘devil’ is mentioned symbolising the character the political elite give off to the masses. Wa Thiong’o (2017: 8) writes,

And there and then the people crucified the [d]evil on the [c]ross and they went away singing songs of victory. After three days, there came others dressed in suits and ties, who, keeping close to the wall of darkness, lifted the [d]evil down from the [c]ross. And they knelt before him, and they prayed to him loud voices, beseeching him to give them a portion of his robes of cunning. And their bellies began to swell, and they stood up, and they walked towards Wariinga, laughing at her, stroking their large bellies, which had now inherited all the evils of this world.

Thus, the post-colonial is the experience of independence, transition, and the desire to construct an identity which is accepted globally. What Wa’ Thiongo (2017) establishes is that even in the scandalous reconstruction of the political elite, they are still subjected to the tyrannical image of the west having to kowtow to their historical constructions. So, the post-colonial is the experience felt by the masses through suffocating and the political elite by having to constantly feed the evil within them. Thus, the post-colonial emphasizes how the creation of the modern state has been surrounded by the mechanisms of power and domination and bureaucracy continues to abhor difference (Chandra, 2013). Due to this, the

exploration of human history in the modern state is stagnated and those who exemplify difference, that challenges the homogeneity of the state, find themselves demonized, criminalized and subject outside the legal parameters of the state (Pithouse, 2016).

3.2 The Pre-text of Western Theories

3.2.1 Forgetting African experiences in theory

Gordon (2006) in the exposition of African-American philosophy reveals that referring to continental divide in the discussion about humanity is a recent phenomenon that is rooted in the colonial project of domination. Therefore, understanding the ontological divide of Africa, America and Europe is imperative, as it reveals that humanity (the people before the colonial project begun) had been interacting with one another, reconstituting themselves and relocating to different regions across the world (Gordon, 2006). Their movement thus portrayed the natural progression of humanity before it was disturbed by modernity which was rooted in Scientific Racism (Gordon, 2006). Simply stated, the west hijacked the discussion of human activities and construction to fulfil their hopes of industrialisation by seeking to dehumanise a group of people through racists exploits. African-American philosophy makes out a case of humanity as being inclusive of “those premodern, morphologically dark people” (Gordon, 2006:2) as opposed to what Western discourses would express.

African-American philosophy interacts with the political and historical suppression of black lived reality in the current age – given that it was part of the epistemological discussion about humanity prior to enslavement and colonisation (Gordon, 2006). The latter is important to note in theory because of the “historical amnesia” (Gordon, 2006:2) that occurs for African experiences in theory. This signifies a forgetting of African experiences as they transpired in the precolonial world and in the anticolonial struggle. The amnesia is evident in the work of ethnicity in a post-colonial African state (Ake, 1993). Ake (1993) notes that there is a tendency to reduce African experience in the post-colonial era. This occurs through the process of democratisation where the colonial state is sometimes legitimated through the supporters of the ruling elite and in the aftermath of democratisation. The latter is when development is sought to improve the livelihood of the nation. In effect, what occurs is that ethnicity is reduced to a problematic variable in the equation of democratic politics – which really is a liberal form of politics (Ake, 1993). By imposing this notion upon ethnicity what is good about it is completely forgotten.

Ake (1993) contends that ethnicity is forgotten through its entry into the post-colonial state as a problem. Ethnicity becomes the sum equivalent of violence in the post-colonial

state. Furthermore, the tendency to demarcate a failed democratic system with backwardness is usually aggregated with ethnic/cultural divides in democratisation discourse. On the contrary, ethnicity has positive connotations that impact political consciousness throughout the nation as people derive from ethnicity, cultural concepts that contain emancipatory potential (Ake, 1993). Writing about ethnicity as from the colonial state or Western liberal state, is thus viewed as a means to divide and rule the masses, by forgetting the initial positive impact ethnicity may hold in discourse (Ake, 1993). Ethnicity holds the power of language which can be used to increase participation in politics as the people hold power over political rhetoric (Ake, 1993). The latter would decrease the hegemonic control, the enforced Western liberal state has on the people, through civil society. To simply speak about ethnicity as a problem in Africa leads to its anathema as it constructs a discourse of violent and uncompromising people without looking at the emancipatory struggles being fought through the praxis of ethnicity. In so doing, it forgets African experiences as they do not fit in with the liberal state model.

Evidently, the pre-text of Western theory construction has been rooted on producing a politics of knowledge creation that fails to reveal the ontology of knowledge creation in theory; "because of the imposition of white normativity as a subtextual mode of legitimation" (Gordon, 2006:8). Blackness is reduced as unable to offer theory. As a result, black experiences are forgotten in the construction of the post-colonial state (Gordon, 2005). This claim shows that whiteness has been normalised as that which is universal, while that which is black is singular and different. Thus, what emerges are black people who are placed outside the system of order and rationality. For example, African ethnicity is vilified for its violent potentialities, within the nation-state, while forgetting that also Western experiences have been constructed from ethnic groups disassociating themselves from other nations to claim their own sovereignty. Similarly, Christianity, that which is good, is presented in theology as a 'white man's' religion; however, the truth is, Christianity shares its roots from "East African and from the *colored* Middle East" (Gordon, 2006:8). Based on this one might interpret that Western 'universal' theory continues to perpetuate 'historical amnesia' (Gordon, 2006:4), thereby creating a vacancy which is filled by fallacy. Which leads to "the standard view ... that things white represents the universal and things black are locked in a web of particularity" (Gordon, 2006:8). Theories following such a trajectory are liberal and hegemonic theories which rely "on denying the contradictions of the system" (Gordon, 2006:8). The quest, therefore, is to return to the true meaning of universalism as being humanity, which enables one to practice theory in a humanistic way.

3.2.2 The Passive and Counter Revolutionary Subject

African experiences are not only repressed in theory but their revolutionary actions are often subjected to silencing tactics (Trouillot, 1995). In *Silencing the Past*, Trouillot (1995) shows how the Haitian Revolution was overlooked as it was “unthinkable” (Trouillot, 1995:82). This revolution is often referred to as a rebellion in history books because the backlash against slavery was not based on a grand narrative per se but rather formulated as the slaves practiced their revolutionary emancipation at different times (Trouillot, 1995).

To expand further on this point, Trouillot (1995:72), observing a set of notes, sets the tone of the colonialists with regards to the spiritual atmosphere amongst the slaves, a few months before the revolution,

... There is no movement among our Negroes. ... They don't even think of it. They are very tranquil and obedient. A revolt among them is impossible ... We have nothing to fear on the part of the Negroes; they are tranquil and obedient ... The Negroes are very obedient and always will be. We sleep with doors and windows wide open. Freedom for Negroes is a chimera.

Clearly, the ability to measure out the possibility of slaves performing freedom was not readily available in the minds of these colonialists. A framework that provided the capacity to think about emancipation for slaves was evidently unimaginable. Trouillot (1995:75) states that during this intense period of slavery the ‘idea of Man’ and humanity was more frequent. The latter meant that the interpretations of humanity, in the Renaissance, instead of it being disqualified by the practices of slavery, were strengthened further by ontologically dividing the world. This was done by subcategorising the black person; further highlighted during the Enlightenment, where it was acceptable to own slaves even if one was considered a freedom fighter, like Thomas Jefferson (Trouillot, 1995). The slaves in Saint-Domingue/Haiti were so dehumanised that performing horrendous acts against their own humanity, to free themselves, and their children from slavery – was characterised as a disease, a defect on the part of their sub-humanness (Trouillot, 1995). In other words, having the action of killing their babies and running away from their master overlooked brings to light the zone of non-being slaves had been reduced to in Haiti (Trouillot, 1995).

Trouillot (1995) shows that Western theory tends to silence the past, leaving the actions of the Haitian slaves as a ‘non-event’, a passive work of rebellion. Typically, what occurs is that the past is erased as “it did not *really* happen; it was not that bad, or that important” (Trouillot, 1995:96) and the other seeks to lighten up the issue by focusing and

trivialising events somewhat cynically through “banalization” (Trouillot, 1995:96). For Haiti, this occurred because Western ideologies could not provide an ‘intelligible’ theoretical answer of the slaves revolting. Thus, theory that works towards emancipatory praxes that addresses the status quo should constantly be aware of side-lining every turning point of historicity in self-determination. Aime Cesaire (cited in Trouillot, 1995) stated that, “Haiti [was] where negritude stood up for the first time and said it believed in its humanity.” Negritude was the basis of essentialist theories on the African subject and it is evident that through theory it helped confront past evils so to reach a clearer mode of writing about Africa.

3.2.3 Marginalising the Political Society

Many post-colonial transitioning states fail to realise the marginalisation the theories from the west tend to produce on political society. This is because such theories are predicated on the modernisation narrative that post-colonial regions did not experience. Essentially, the Western experience led to a society with rational exchanges of thought about welfare. Consequently, a government under the rule of law was born. As the rational political exchanges in society progressed, the government extended its powers to the civil society which took the form of non-governmental organisations, international organisations, and aid. Civil society was thus placed to balance the state’s shortfall in realising the interests of the poor.

Considering this, civil society presupposes two intrinsically related things, ‘free citizens’ and a democratic regime. And thus, the significance of citizens in this society is based on the accumulation of human rights (Chatterjee, 2004:30). Thus, civil society becomes a place where people’s needs are represented and a space where non-government organisations intervene through projects created to fast-pace the citizen’s recognition of their rights (Chatterjee, 2004). Unfortunately, civil society fails to fully achieve the latter mainly because it has been limited to few people the state considers legitimate. Therefore, Chatterjee (2004) suggests that, to escape the confines of the modernisation narrative, a field of practice mediating between state institutions and civil society should be created.

In other words, civil society is a mediating force for the state and by the state; and serves to enhance the post-colonial states legitimation project through human rights based discourse. Chatterjee (2004) states that human rights are only reducible to a legalistic conception and voting becomes a tool to legitimate democracy. Therefore, the introduction of a civil society curbs the emancipatory process of mass demonstrations resulting in the depoliticisation of the masses. Civil society therefore presupposes the recognition of the rights

in nation-state, which is ruled by the ‘assistance’ of international aid based on liberal values, and in other instances the government is a donor to the NGOs. Thus, the interference by these institutions marginalises the poor since the policies created by the NGOs aim to satisfy the neoliberal donor.

For this reason, as an ideal, civil society continues to “energize an interventionist political project, but as an actual form it is demographically limited” (Chatterjee, 2004: 39). It is demographically limited as the untouchables; the people who do not fall under the ‘democratising’ mission of the post-colonial, do not share in the prosperity of democratic governance because their concerns are not deemed valuable. Civil society, instead, highlights the split between the organized elite domain and the unorganised subaltern domain (Chatterjee, 2004:39).

In India, the peasants have come together to defy the state by resisting forced removal and resorting to violence as a means of overcoming this marginalisation (Chatterjee, 2004:45). Their collective actions are in this way political, only it is a different kind of political to the state’s political (Chatterjee, 2004: 39). As they portray themselves as subaltern subjects trying to become national citizens (Chatterjee, 2004:51). This point of political action is the domain through which the untouchables interact with emancipatory praxes, which are rooted on the presupposition of universality, in politics, being equality (Ranciere, 1992). Consequently, the use of civil society within a nation-state, undergoing postcoloniality, reduces the often messy and dialectical experiences the masses share outside the liberalised civil societies, thus marginalising political society.

3.2.4 The Invisibility of Black People

In the postcolonial African setting, the people participating in the political society are black people. Their marginalisation is predicated on making invisible black people because they are a subject that cannot be categorised in the perfectly categorised Western society. Du Bois (cited in Gordon, 2006: 6) characterises this phenomenon in the study of the Philadelphian Negro, explaining that history has seen black people being reduced to one essential quality: problematic (Gordon, 2007). Gordon (2006) therefore, exposes the tendency of theoretical practice of falling into the web of theodicean tendencies where black people are perceived as problems instead of depicting them as people with problems in an unjust system or society (Gordon, 2006).

Gordon (2006) gives due cognisance to the fact that the black experience is inundated with suffering, resulting in black people acting inwards which makes them implode. The implosion occurs because initially the system rejects all that is black and attaches it to

illegality (Gordon, 2006). The latter occurs because the system, upon the removal of God and the imposition of secularity, assumes the position of God. Therefore, the system through which all bodies operate is assumed as being intrinsically good and providing justice (Gordon, 2006). The paradoxical construction of black people means that the black body is mixed in array of suffering, and in a just system can only be theorised as “problems-in-themselves’ (Gordon, 2006:5). In short, the legitimacy of black people is their being invisible, never appearing within the society because they are marked as problems (Gordon, 2006). Thus, Western theory writes about the African experience as invalid because their sufferings are illicit to the perfect system of nation-states.

Consequently, because experiencing blackness is illegal, Western theory tends to make black people perform their existence twice, experiencing the “double standard of citizenship” (Gordon, 2006:7) known as double consciousness (Gordon, 2006). Double consciousness is the performance of black lived reality twice because stating that a theoretical and meaningful concept is black from the onset is an anomaly. Furthermore, the “psychological constitution of the self” (Gordon, 2006:6) makes redundant things that are innately black constructions as they are negated from the black lived experience and then reintroduced into black realities. This is all part of the falsehood of Western theory in negating and making invisible the humanity of blacks. Due to this, ‘black’ is read as an imitation of another better form such as the terms, “black Mozart; Ms Black America” (Gordon, 2006:7). Put differently, black lives cannot create meaningful concepts but constantly fall short of the white standards set by Western theory. Similarly, in citizenship, the pigmentation of people tends to declassify them as existing outside the parameters of the nation because they are an antipathy to all the nation-state had intended (Gordon, 2006).

3.2.5 The Suppression of Agency

Since black people are conceptualised as problems the west conspires to fix this by creating a concept, democratisation. Consequently, democracy, or the performance thereof, becomes the emancipatory political project for post-colonial experiences. The latter is evident through mass movements and popular struggles, such as the one that occurred in Tunisia, from December 2010 until January 2011 (Marshall, 2013). In Tunisia, the people decided to overthrow their authoritarian regime for a system they believed would be a rule by the people for the people; as a result, incorporating the politically active people who fought for their freedom (Neocosmos, 2011:359). Generally, one would explain what occurred in Tunisia as a mass movement that removed autocracy and instilled democracy. However, on the eve of their movement, international organisations were called upon to help the people transform

into a democracy built on the trajectory of Westernised ideals of progress, liberty, and emancipation (Neocosmos, 2011).

Neocosmos (2011:360) states that this process is generally understood as one of democratisation. The democratising mission is legitimated by the entering of human rights discourse, much like how democracy is legitimised by universal suffrage. Human rights discourse therefore enters the arena of politics as a tool that is used to legitimate the reason as to why the west should intervene in the people's popular struggle, as the west presumes itself to be the only force that holds the epistemological construction of the democratic state.⁸

The human rights discourse is important in this conceptualisation as it ensures that people are led to believe that through their citizenship their first, second and third generation of human rights in the Constitution are what presupposes their existence in South Africa. One could say that the role human rights play is one of a 'schoolmaster', who enforces rule, what he explains is for the good of the students, without asking whether the students are in any manner inflicted by its application (Ranciere, 2010:167). In other words, there is no room for the student to be critical of the master's belief system. Thus, human rights become a universally understood concept that is used to justify how the west takes over popular mass struggles in the name of 'democratising' their transition process. As a result, human rights discourse enforces a return by the people to their allotted place in the social structure and for them to vacate the field of politics, leaving it to those who know how to follow, unquestioningly, technocracies (Neocosmos, 2011). The latter deliberately leads to the suppression of agency through Western concepts that do not take the political society Chatterjee (2004) offers.

3.3 Post-colonial Political Theory

3.3.1 Towards an Emancipatory Theoretical Praxis

Imagining an emancipatory theoretical framework destabilises how the creation of theory was rooted in excluding certain people from intellectual conversations (Ranciere, 2010). For years on end, theory has been used as a tool to suppress colonised bodies both in academia and in their lived experiences. For Ranciere (2010), ensuring that theory supports the political, meant treating equality as the point of departure as opposed to that which the masses work towards. Ranciere, (1992:60) states in his earlier work that, "equality is not a value to which one appeals; it is a universal that must be supposed, verified, and

⁸ This democratic state is exposed to the neo-liberal agenda of the west and thus avails structural adjustments programmes that ensure that the newly developed countries open their market to them and thereby taking part in global politics.

demonstrated in each case.” Ranciere (1992) sought to demonstrate that for emancipatory praxis to occur the governing need to be intentional in creating a space for performing politics where the universal *is* equality (Ranciere, 1992). Since “the universal in politics is equality” (Ranciere, 1992:60), equality must be afforded to all people at the onset of the process of emancipation.

For a theory to be sufficient for an emancipatory theoretical praxis, it must also afford intelligence to all people, irrespective of their social location (Ranciere, 2010). This is vital as one’s social location does not define one’s degree of intelligence. Creating a space for people where they use their ability to think and act, a sense of equality will thrive and the needs of the people can be recognised. In this instance, theory will then avoid the reduction of black people “only to their experiences and... to the epitome of experience itself” (Gordon, 2006: 32). This will prevent the tendency of forcing pre-existing Western theory that fails to represent the realities of the people. Such theories interact with the fallacy of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ experience of ontology rather than the people’s being and belonging, becoming the motive behind the creation of an emancipatory theoretical framework. Therefore, if a commitment to human rights is sufficient for an emancipatory praxis then human rights discourse should adhere to the standard of equality as the point of departure and must afford the political to all people irrespective of their social location which it fails to do.

Equality, therefore, transcends “*citizen or human being ... [a person’s ontology] ... it is involved in the ‘what follows’, in its discursive and practical element”* (Ranciere, 1992:60). The assurance of equality in a nation means that dialogue is constantly encouraged where the people redefine through constitutive practices of self – their nationhood. Equality is to assume that all humans can think, whether they live in shack settlements or in Sandton. It is an assumption that no one should retreat, be marginalised or silenced because the political is not available to them. In the case of emancipatory theory, every prior historical failure to imagine the universal is a moment to change the application of theory (Fanon, 1952[2008]). Theory should be emancipatory through having the ability to engage the future through present dialectical practices. Therefore, the universal being applied within a nation or as a theoretical framework should be established on ensuring continuous emancipatory praxes by the people. This would mean that extending the people’s power or being cannot be based on a theory that denies the humanity of others in a political space, whilst exalting only the citizen or the human – as described by white experiences.

To reiterate, equality, that praxis of the universal in the political, is premised on placing agency and intelligence on the people who share the power with intellectuals.

Ranciere (1992) thus depicts emancipation as the acknowledgment and the verification of the potential of the equality of intelligence at the point of policy construction and governmental authority. Consequently, theory that fails to place credence on the dialogical and constitutive practices of emancipation beyond their being and belonging fails to pursue an emancipatory theoretical praxis.

Due to this, one should be acutely aware of the disposal of theory when delving into the mystery of the somewhat misunderstood African trajectory. Theory should aim for objectivity so that readers may discern who and for what purposes a theory is being used. Therefore, the application of theory, in this study, will take into deep consideration the fact that Africa has been used as the test site where ethnographic information is sourced (for Western interest); and not where positive theory based on lived experiences might be expanded. The viability of theory discussing Africa may be affirmed by its ability to deconstruct research paradigms that have enabled the lack of emancipatory academic praxis for Africa.

The performance of an emancipatory theoretical praxis is therefore still needed having seen the clear racist portrayal of black people in history. Fanon (1952 [2008]), in *Black Skins, White Masks*, highlights one of the interactions that leads him to deny the theoretical subjugation black lived experiences endure. Fanon (1952[2008]: 85) states, “All I wanted was to be a man among other men. I wanted to come lithe and young into a world that was ours and to help to build it together”. Fanon (1952 [2008]) highlights the performance the black soul seeks to be part of, in society, and its desire to exist in humanity and hold the capacity of thinking about the human condition.

For Fanon (1952 [2008]) there are more meaningful practices that a human can achieve or work towards, this practice is much better than that which was experienced in the ‘narrow world’ of colonialism. So, the “central question for Fanon was always that of releasing possibilities of human existence and history imprisoned by the colonisation of experience and racialisation of consciousness” (Sekyi Otu, 1996:17). The importance of Fanon as a political and psychoanalytical theorist is that his observations are not based on how a certain group of people are doing or thinking about their freedom now – when he was writing his treatises. Rather, Fanon subjects his theoretical analysis under the same black treatment he experienced daily and that experience was further subjected to an analysis of the colonial world and the racist intentions it decreed on black people. Once the latter is brought into light, Fanon goes on further to reveal the essence of those lies with a transcendental truth of political immediacy that can at any moment be presented as an absolute (Sekyi Otu, 1996).

In so doing, Fanon affirms the humanity of black people at every point in theory when racism was aiming to wipe out the existence of the thinking black. There, in the darkest corner of Western universal rationalism, where reasoning lay on the foot of whiteness, lay the incandescent humanity of the black soul, through which whiteness sought to affirm their superior value (Fanon, 1952 [2008]).

What Fanon (1952 [2008]) offers is therefore the dialectic of experience through which lived experiences are to be interpreted and released for human possibilities – which is known as Fanon’s philosophical humanism (Sekyi Otu, 1996). To take the latter further, Fanon produces an understanding of the universal as emanating from a lack of the ability to release black people to experience the fullness of the human condition. The black person in this case is analysed in the immediacy of the postcolonial situation, and the historicity of the construction of the black soul is the white man’s artefact. Historically whiteness has no issue in exploring an array of human potentialities because it is constructed as validating the efficacy of the system.

However, Fanon (1952 [2008]:3) notes that “the white man is sealed in his whiteness” and therefore the search of the universal becomes impossible because of the “human level” (Fanon, 1952 [2008]:3) they have moulded. Therefore, whiteness for Fanon (1952 [2008]) becomes a zone of unreleased human potential (stagnant waters) because the epistemology of whiteness was based on a fallacy of superiority towards the black constructed soul (Fanon, 1952 [2008]). The unfortunate position that whiteness finds itself in, is due to the Manichean world the white man has created within the colony and has engendered the very existence of another human being in violence. The going forth, “towards a new humanism” (Fanon, 1952 [2008]:2) therefore includes having to interact with this black-white relation which can stop the “universality inherent in the human condition” (Fanon, 1952[2008]:2) if not addressed correctly.

For the black person, the task is imminent and requires providing lived solutions, a dialectic of experience, on the “black problem” (Fanon, 1952[2008]:83) which is the “zone of nonbeing” (Fanon, 1952[2008]:2). It is important to note then, that nonbeing means you are not even given the opportunity to perform as human, in theory, about your lives. Rather, non-being means offering ones ‘objecthood’ as a data for white reality. Alienation from the existence of humanity, however, does not prevent black souls to practice and aspire for the human level.

Drawing Fanon’s (1952[2008]) disposition back in alignment with the search of an emancipatory theoretical praxis, one notes that the main aim of a post-colonial nation in the

building of an image in a new society should be releasing the masses towards human possibilities. Nation-building should seek to eradicate the experience of alienation and dispossession but this action is based on the primacy of the political (Ranciere, 1992). The political status of the human in the post-colonial state is important as their being arrives at a point of politics. Freedom and emancipation from poverty and the racial, bigoted, chauvinistic, and tyrannical rule of colonialism should be eliminated through political action (Fanon, 1961[1991]).

3.3.2 The Dialectics of National Construction

In the chapter “The Fact of Blackness”, Fanon (1952[2008]) goes through moments of grandeur against white doctrine in constructing an identity and theory about blackness. The stages that tend to manifest in his perusal of self, range from crushing debilitating nonexistence, recognition of the black soul in negritude with its narration by Sartre in *Black Orpheus*, to understanding that blackness can stand in society with all its essence to produce a better understanding of the human condition. The dialectic that is offered by Fanon (1952[2008]) is in no way neat, but takes different turns that are somewhat untidy as knowledge construction and other elements that fall under the radius of nonexistence are portrayed. In so doing, the dialectic presented by Fanon (1952[2008]) requires terms or concepts that continually produce emancipatory praxis.

Fanon (1952[2008]) makes evident that whiteness will continue to restrain black reality to experiencing immobility when trying to think outside their constructed racialised category of being. This is seen in the critique Sartre offers of negritude and Fanon’s (1952[2008]) response to it. Negritude, according to Fanon (1952[2008]), was retaliation towards the insensibility of whiteness to accept that, “all I wanted was to be a man among other men. I wanted to come lithe and young into a world that was ours and to help to build it together” (Fanon, 1952[2008]:85). Thus, submerging oneself into Negritude, by wanting to be a Negro so to converse with this irrational being that white reason refuses to accept. Sartre (cited in Fanon, 1952[2008]) therefore states that doing such by Fanon (1952[2008]) was an action that had to be performed, for-themselves, so to move from this essentialised stage of being into the class struggle of the *proletariat* (Fanon, 1952[2008]). Thus, negritude was a passage way to becoming in the Marxist tradition (Fanon, 1952[2008]).

After the blow experienced by the consciousness of black people, in the response Sartre makes about negritude, Fanon (1952[2008]) notes an error on the critique stated by Sartre. Fanon (1952[2008]:102) answers,

For once, that born Hegelian had forgotten that consciousness has to lose itself in the night of the absolute, the only condition to attain to consciousness of self. In opposition to rationalism, he summoned up the negative side, but he forgot that this negativity draws its worth from and almost substantive absoluteness. A consciousness committed to experience is ignorant, has to be ignorant, of the essences and the determinations of its being. *Orphee Noir* is a date in the intellectualization of the experience of being black.

This quote seals the dialectic of experience as viewed by Fanon which states that a term in the dialectic is unknown formerly in theory. Theory is only produced as the struggle or the revolution continues. The totality of the nation for Fanon (1961[1991]) is dialectically experiencing their realities through the progression of humanity and is not rooted in the search for political legitimacy or experiences predetermined by Western trajectories.

Fanon's philosophical humanism thus sets an interesting point for national construction, that in each historical moment, through the untidy dialectic of experience, concepts or values of being should be made available that strengthen the human condition. The latter also believes in the political agency of the masses and this can be strengthened further to understand how the world has been ontologically divided by providing national discourse and policy for the agency of the masses. Fanon (1961[1991]:187) states that, "we must create a national policy, in other words a policy for the masses. We ought never to lose contact with the people which has battled for its independence and for the concrete betterment of its existence." Therefore, nation-building discourses and policies should acknowledge agency in the human condition. The dialectical relation between nation-building and immigration practices is constitutive of national concepts that instigate the next event in the progression of humanity.

3.3.3 Surmising Post-Colonial Theory and its Limitations

This prompts one to be specific to a country's colonial past and in delving further in South Africa's nation-building discourse one must deal with the matter at its immediacy. The post-colonial theoretical framework is of benefit because it applies measures of analysis based on the immediacy of a situation and is not fixated on producing a linear understanding of African postcoloniality. The inability to form one "united theory or theoretical framework" (Styhre, 2007:161) within postcolonial theory has been subject to criticism.

However, such a framework enables one to not fall subject to the "objective" truths of the west that define what a nation should be like. Chandra (2013:481) states that such academic "positional superiority" continues to strengthen the older order of colonialism after

independence. Post-colonial theory enables us to debunk Eurocentric thought and use different epistemologies or ontology (that recognize the immediacy of a nation) in dissecting the ideologies forthcoming from modern, colonial, and imperially based thought, which make a mark on the reproduction of the current discourse around nation-building.

Other limitations that have been noted by critics of the post-colonial studies is that it endows power to the word ‘colonial’ as if all things African have been initially derived from that epoch (Soyinka-Airewele and Edozie, 2010). It is important to note that post-colonialism as a theory is not a derivative of teleological devices in understanding the history of Africa (Soyinka-Airewele and Edozie, 2010). Rather the use of ‘-colonial’ helps denote and make clear that post-colonial theory “seeks to engage with the complex power strata’s and discourses” that are still prevalent in nations after independence (Soyinka and Airewele, 2010). Postcolonial theory’s abilities to haul the complexities faced by previously colonised nations and place them at the threshing floor of political discourse and academia renders it a useful conceptual framework “hybridity, fluidity and movement are the norm rather than the exception” (Styhre, 2007: 162).

South Africa’s political history is non-linear and engulfed with many paradoxes that are yet to be revealed in the subsequent chapters. At first instance, when the democratic process was still being imagined, many views situated around the Liberal, Socialist, and Pan-African paradigm were espoused in imagining the “new democratic South Africa”. Such theories follow certain microcosm laws, usually serving the interests of the few in society – this does not promote the philosophical humanism advocated by Fanon (a pioneer of postcolonial theory), whose theoretical framework is used in this dissertation. A postcolonial theoretical framework is useful as it debunks the actual causes and processes or failures of the perceived nation-building practice being eschewed within South Africa.

As a result, the study will give a non-empirical analysis based on Fanon’s philosophical humanism under the post-colonial theory. It offers a highly critical perspective and does not pride itself in being bound by one movement or perspective in history. The aim, in this theoretical framework, is to understand whether the way South Africa continues gives space for an emancipatory praxis on the human within a nation. The postcolonial theoretical framework will help me engage with the nation-building practice in South Africa critically analysing nation-building’s ability to explore and interact with the sometimes-interchangeable notions of nationhood in its immediacy and allows for the exploration of history to occur.

3.4 Conclusion


3.4.1 The Importance of theory in the formation of a movement away from the anti-thesis of the oppression of humanity

The theorist, de Tocqueville (1856 cited in Davies, 1962: 5-6) states that, “revolutions are not always brought about by a gradual decline from bad to worse. Nations that have endured patiently and almost unconsciously the most overwhelming oppression often burst into rebellion against the yoke *the moment it begins to grow lighter* (my emphasis).” Davies (1962) juxtaposes the ideas of good and bad propounded by de Tocqueville and Marx to relay a theory of revolution, stating that ultimately “both ideas have explanatory and possibly predictive value, if they are juxtaposed and put in the proper time sequence” (Davies, 1962:6). Davies gives one an important point of entry of revolutions that Fanon easily realised that every revolution in society requires an acute application of its historical and political immediacy. Each point of change must be taken as the society had sought to progress, whether it is at a state of uncertainty, or a pathology of inferiority, each should be addressed according to the time at which it appears at. Consequently, such will be done in the looking at the dialectical relation of nation-building practices to immigration practices.

Therefore, a theory towards radical change is not stagnant but assumes a dialectical progression of each stage of consciousness of the society. In this case any point and time in a society when injustice and inhumanity prevails if the people as a collective are awakened to such issues a change of systemic relations becomes inevitable as there is a desire to improve into a more human system. It therefore becomes extremely important the terms used by the leaders of anti-colonial struggles, even at the point of ‘liberation’ assume an inflection in the dialectic progression of humanity. Reducing the masses in society to a stagnant mental state is violence upon their own ontology, because when you are in a place of wanting progress but having the inability to valorise it, rumination is no longer an option but exploding onto the nearest person who appears as the cause of distress becomes inevitable. The political elite therefore induce suicide when concepts at the time of independence are not released that could produce emancipatory potential, they are no different to their predecessors.

3.4.2 Linking the relation of nation-building and immigration practices with emancipatory concepts

Philosophical Humanism affords the best explanation to the dialectical relation between nation-building practices and immigration practices. The following model is therefore generated:



Emancipatory concepts are needed in a post-colonial society where postcoloniality is an issue and disturbs the human condition. And due to this, political rhetoric and policy that does not support the progression of the human condition dialectically should be rooted out. The act is wholly rooted in making a custom out of historical practices that served an agenda and believing that they are still applicable in our society. It is important to alienate and see how anti-dialectical terms interact with the masses or constitutively relate with immigration practices in South Africa.

What can be accepted is that concepts breed political praxes. What this work will particularly investigate is that the persistence use of concepts that are not emancipatory will lead to negative immigration practices. The model implies that the lack of political consciousness within a nation through the extent of emancipatory political concepts in nation-building (derived from the rhetoric of the president and the ideologies presented for the nation) affects how that nation (the people within the country) will react towards Immigration. Consequently, Nelson Mandela's ideologies and policies will be analysed by placing them in their political and historical context to analyse whether concepts were used to breed emancipatory potential in South Africa's nation-building practices.

CHAPTER 4: NELSON MANDELA ANALYSIS

This fight for democracy against the oppression of mankind will slowly leave the confusion of neo-liberal universalism to emerge, sometimes laboriously, as a claim to nationhood.
(Fanon, 1961[1991]:148)

Fanon's Philosophical Humanism presupposes the understanding that all systems existing in the world are created by humans. The significance of this statement is found in the closing argument Fanon (1961[1991]) presents in, the Pitfalls of National Consciousness (a chapter in *The Wretched of the Earth*), that the building up of the nation is assumed at a collective and historical scale by the whole of the people. Therefore, the act of nation-building presupposes the universality of humanity through the infiltration of emancipatory concepts in the lived reality of the masses. Thus, the latter is easily influenced by ideologies provided by the national leader of the ruling party through discourse and rhetoric. These ideologies may range from holding the potential to "fill ... [the masses] minds and feast ... [the masses] eyes with human things, and create a prospect that is human because conscious and sovereign men dwell therein" (Fanon, 1961[1991]:205) or espouse chauvinism and neo-liberal concepts that do not speak to the post-colonial situation at hand. Due to this, to fully comprehend the dialectical relation between nation-building practices and immigration practices arising from Mandela's rule, one needs to descriptively narrate the concepts presented in his national discourse through utterances found in his dominant speeches and the policies pertaining to immigration.

This chapter will therefore be focussing on the discourse that sought to create the democratic South African nation, as it stems from Nelson Mandela's rhetoric. As is described above, that within the discourse of Nelson Mandela lays a historical objective that framed how he would formulate South Africa's nation-building discourse. One cannot remove the context and therefore where it does appear that there is repetition in this arena it is to help situate the argument within its historical context. This is particularly important as a post-colonial theoretical framework is followed whereby the post-colonial situation is analysed in its immediacy. Firstly, this chapter will endeavour to give an account of the myth of the Rainbow Nation. Secondly, this myth is juxtaposed with the policies that have an integral role in ensuring peaceful and mutual relations with other African nations and people.

4.1 Nelson Mandela: The First Democratic President of South Africa

The release of Mandela on February 11, 1990 released a renewed hope for African theorists who believed in the unification of Africa. It also increased the possibilities of the revival of the anti-colonial struggle for unity which would revive the Pan-African dream. The release of Nelson Mandela for many meant the beginning of awaited change, that slogan and cry of “*Mayibuye i-Afrika*” would become a reality. But, the realities from Mandela’s angle were acutely different. The knowledge of Africa, the familiar relations Africa was attuned to internationally had over the years transformed. Mandela soon realised that the political realities he had considered in 1963, entering prison, had rapidly changed. On Mandela’s imprisonment Klein (2007:197) states that,

a wave of Third World nationalism was sweeping the African continent; now it was torn apart by war. While he was in prison, socialist revolutions had been ignited and extinguished: Che Guevara had been killed in Bolivia in 1967; Salvador Allende had died in the coup of 1973; Mozambique’s liberation hero and president, Samora Machel, had perished in a mysterious plane crash in the repression in Tiananmen Square and the collapse of Communism.

Adjusting to such intense changes came to mean that the way South Africa’s national construction would be formed had to exemplify the discourse of the prevalent atmosphere in the global world. Heightening the tension was the decline of apartheid South Africa’s economy and Mandela’s early stance on nationalisation (Klein, 2007). These factors count as having played a pivotal role in the construction of the democratic South African nation under Mandela. Furthermore, Nelson Mandela had to face challenges inherited from the apartheid state.

Politically, citizens had found themselves in a somewhat ‘tribal’ war-zone where the Zulu’s in Natal opposed the rule of the ANC. Turmoil wrought the nation and nearly bringing in a civil war (Klein, 2007). The leadership of Nelson Mandela, through his discourse of peace and settlement in South Africa, championed the eventual change of the heightened tensions (Klein, 2007); during which, he made Mangosuthu Buthelezi (the leader of the group that had increased black-on-black violence in KwaZulu-Natal) the Minister of the Department of Home Affairs, taken in this study as an integral department in the advancement of African unity within South Africa.

Economically, the landscape was wrought with disparity. The white minority in South Africa was more privileged than the black majority which remained in a disadvantaged position. Hirsch (2005:2) states that, “in 1989, 52% of Africans were living below the

poverty line, compared with 1,6% of whites ... South Africans were 15% poorer in 1993 than in 1984, and the recent years of the early 1990s showed the poorest economic performance.” Given the circumstances, the state of South Africa was dire and the need to boost investor confidence was clear. Even so, it is imperative that during such postcolonially trying times, that the national consciousness offered aims to deal with the progression of humanity within a nation. In other words, the post-colonial nation-state cannot be accounted to by a Western trajectory of the national bourgeoisie without having directly educated the masses to become revolutionary participants in their own emancipation during the democratic era (Fanon, 1961[1991]). A failure to do such would result in the stagnation of the process of building up of the nation bit by bit through humanist content. The option available for South Africa to do the latter was through and continues to be national discourses.

Given these tensions rising from two constituents – the people, allocated in mass democratic movements and the international liberal society – Mandela found himself having to yield his revolutionary rhetoric for a mandate that sought to appease the market. The importance of Nelson Mandela’s utterances during and prior to the transition to democracy became apparent upon his release. He soon found that the ideology one portrays does not only affect the creation of South Africa’s nationhood but it also affects the global market’s response to everything South African (Klein, 2007). This is because “as soon as he was released, the South African stock market collapsed in panic; South Africa’s currency, the rand dropped by 10 percent. A few weeks later, De Beers, the diamond corporation, moved its headquarters from South Africa to Switzerland” (Klein, 2007:206-207). This market greeting Nelson Mandela received upon his release quickly taught him the way the world had changed. This new world showed the disapproval of political utterances, such as writing a letter from prison stating unequivocally that nationalisation is a principle that will be followed by the ANC (Klein, 2007). Klein (2007:207) in the *Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism* states, that “every time a top party official said something that hinted that the ominous Freedom Charter might still become policy, the market responded with a shock sending the rand into free fall.” This occurrence depicts the volatility of the situation from which Nelson Mandela had to come re-create a South African nation-state.

4.2 The Release Speech (1990) and the World Economic Forum/Davos Conversion Speech (1992)

The mandate of the people was a clear concern for Mandela (1990[2015]) which is clearly presented in his release speech. Mandela (1990[2015]) thus took it upon himself to address the importance of democratic procedures, for the benefit of the majority, in the

transition to a new South Africa. Mandela states, “The people need to be consulted on who will negotiate and on the content of negotiations. Negotiations cannot take place above the heads or behind the backs of people. It is our belief that the future of our country can only be determined by a body which is democratically elected on a non-racial basis” (Mandela, 1990[2015]). It was on these grounds that Mandela sought to take an approach that was inclusive of all people. However, it is a paradoxical situation when the political elite attempt to dismantle colonialist structures through the very system that brought it into being – through the reinforcement of the state and the arbitrary placement of democracy as equating to voting and rights. As a result, the political and economic situation did not change within South Africa. Instead, the following year political violence (Klein, 2007) coupled with lower levels of economic disparity ensued (Hirsch, 2005). In other words, the systematic effects of colonialism and the legacy of apartheid were not ended through keeping things the same whilst professing a democracy based on voting rights.

Furthermore, the tension between the reality of apartheid and liberalism increased drastically as Mandela was introduced to a ‘new world’ following a different ‘market logic’ (Klein, 2007) which is made evident in the statement made at *World Economic Forum Meeting, Davos, Switzerland, 2 February 1992* (hereon, *Davos Conversion*⁹). In this speech, the discourse used is predominantly liberal. In the 1990 speech Mandela gave upon his release, he states, “there must be an end to white monopoly on political power and a fundamental restructuring of our political and economic systems to ensure that the inequalities of apartheid are addressed and our society thoroughly democratised.” This potentially emancipatory proclamation is thwarted and subdued by the *Davos Conversion* that states that, “... the need to guarantee the success and permanence of democratic change ... will require a rapid and sustained growth in terms of capital formulation or fixed investment ... it will also require a rapid and sustained expansion of the domestic market, as well as improved access to international markets” (Mandela, 1992[2013]). The *Davos Conversion* rhetoric takes a turn to focus more on systems rather than the masses affected by the realities of apartheid who can offer up praxis that changes the systems – through the production of political consciousness. In so doing, they in turn reinforce Western universalism, which reiterates a belief that inequalities within South Africa are best addressed through market principles, which are inherently undemocratic and counter-revolutionary.

⁹ Referring to this conference and the speech as the “Davos Conversion” is attained from Klein (2007) and Herbst and Mills (2015). These authors insinuate that Mandela, in the 1992 Davos conference, converted from the Freedom Charter’s radical demands to appeasing the global market by conceding to liberal democracy.

Forgetting humanity, for the processing of “high levels of productivity for both capital and labour” (Mandela, 1992[2013]) is in direct contrast to the will of the people. The unpreparedness for the economics of national formation led the nation-building discourse of South Africa down dangerous path of the mental inferiority experienced by an unfairly detained political prisoner. Ashwin Desai is quoted in Klein (2007:210) explaining the consciousness of a prisoner. He states, “If you please the warden more, you get a better status. And that logic obviously transposed itself into some of the things which South African society did. They did want to somehow prove that they were much better prisoners. Much more disciplined prisoners than other countries, even” (Klein 2007:210). As a result, one finds emancipatory praxis that emanates from the masses being replaced for constitutionalism which reduces the emancipatory project of democracy to that “which provides for one person one vote on a common voters roll, separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary and devolution of power to regional and local levels of government, furthermore, we would also like to see an entrenched bill of rights, protected by an independent and representative judiciary” (Mandela, 1992[2013]). Consequently, what erupts from this statement is the change from revolutionary rhetoric/concepts to issues that deal with justice in a Rawlsian sense. The human problem is overlooked for an institutional one, which assumes the supremacy of Western systems in theodician terms. Following this trajectory, however, fails to expose the derivative of the latter (colonialism). Therefore, the subtle subversion to the apartheid system offered by procedural democracy fails to address the rock-solid destruction colonialism wrought amongst the masses.

Constructing the latter as an institutional issue reduced the nation-building project to an issue of rights and service provisioning. This weakened understanding of colonialism provides a space for practices that do not present emancipatory potential; thus, turning towards “materialistic benefits” (Mandela, 1992[2013]) as a means to legitimate the nation-building project. The national construction of the South African democratic nation-state was exposed to derivative paternalistic behaviour attained initially from Davos. The paternalistic role of the state founded on the assumption that concepts such as ‘the market’ evoked democracy (Neocosmos, 2010) kept in abeyance the political. Thus, the radically inclusive society, implied in Mandela’s 1990 and 1992 speech, that paternalistically sought to provide for black people still failed to adequately question who is allowed access to the markets and what determines that their access is for the good of the progression of humanity or the human condition in Africa?

These pertinent questions in ideological formulations remain unanswered; however, in the realm of policy they are sternly addressed. In other words, policies within the state dialectically interact with the nation-building project to address the impoverishment in South Africa as it pertains to exclude people who do not serve to increase the national cake.

The South African state was placed in a position where its nation-building programme is constantly in the sight of the international community, watching as to whether the Africans would betray the call to nation-state formation and nation-building and rather be ‘anarchic’ by supposing tribal relations and removing the white settlers. The speeches of Nelson Mandela are a painful performance of seeking approval from the Western world.

South Africa’s early years of political transition are articulated well by Fanon (1952[2008]) when he narrates the conundrum of blackness that, “while I was forgetting, forgiving, and wanting only to love, my message was flung back in my face like a slap. The white world, the only honourable one, barred me from all participation” (Fanon, 1952[2008]: 86). The consequences of Mandela’s conversion in Davos 1992 (Klein, 2007) was the performative tautology of rainbow nation that aimed for a reconciliatory tone of love and forgiveness, towards oppressors who had not fully grasped the magnitude of suffering inflicted on the majority. Their participation in the new South Africa was constantly met with rugged resistance in the form of policies that still need to be adjusted and legislated for changes in South Africa to occur. Their participation was constantly held as a language they had to unlearn from the past, which was rioting and extreme hate. Their dissent went unacknowledged and their frustration related to their want to strike even when there was no need.

Taking this into consideration, Nelson Mandela’s presidency was to instil confidence amongst the white minority and the people in New York who bid for or against South Africa on the stock exchange (Klein, 2007). Such actions had been perceived well in advance by Ghanaian president Kwame Nkrumah, which at the eve of independence therein lays the stronghold of colonialism, through its ability to keep the cords tied around post-colonial nations through the superstructure of the economy (Nkrumah, 1963). Having understood this international pull, a more daunting and real pull came from the African lived experience of liberation, one of the rebirth of neo-colonial tendencies where the colonisers leave a legacy for the native intellectuals, who, led by economic materialism, to promulgate a notion that states, “*now for the hard part*” [my emphasis] (Hirsch, 2005:5). Insinuating that politics and the creation of the human experience within the nation, through the formation of national culture, was fulfilled at the point of political transition and negotiations and the hard-

economic part had to now be considered. This in effect places the dynamics of a dialectical philosophy of humanity within the previously colonised and misinformed state system unless the political leaders make it a point to attain a national culture *from the people* (Fanon, 1961[1991]; 1952[2008]).

4.3 Revealing the Rainbow Nation

The rainbow nation discourse came into being as a means of symbolising “the imaginary nation being constructed in the post-apartheid era” (Baines, 1998:2). Its strength was ascertained from the reconciliatory discourse that had ensued pre-democracy through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission led by Desmond Tutu. Due to this, one may suppose that the founding logic of the rainbow nation had more to do with moving on from the past (reconciling with and healing our past) and announcing the basis of the ruling of the African National Congress (legitimation processes). This is because when mentioning, the TRC, one invokes the shared history of the transformation of South Africa which occurred through the narration of ‘truth telling’ by the oppressors; and testimonials of violent political experience in a restorative tribunal. This shared history has been engrafted into the psyche of the new South African nation, to the point that the history of domination and oppression has been reduced to the evidence of the TRC (Valji, 2003), as can be seen in the history syllabus of South Africa.

Therefore, South Africa at every point, in the early years of transition finds itself at a juncture where state building potentialities are merged with the legitimation project of the new democratic era. It therefore, appears as if ideas pertaining to nation-building were conjured out of emotions and the momentous achievement of the day (freedom) rather than fully analysing the situation at hand within South Africa. Rethinking the South African narrative occurred quickly (through the practices and lessons attained from the CODESA negotiations). The whole world was watching to see if South Africa would collapse into a Civil War and therefore every point of ‘recreation’ through the work of the political elite in the negotiations was based on curbing the impending violence, not only from the far-right opposition, but between Inkatha Freedom Party (identified as *amaZulu*) and the ANC (identified as *amaXhosa*). Due to this, the rainbow nation was taken as a narrative that would enhance integration within society.

Baines (1998) looks at the construction of national identity in understanding the role of the rainbow nation in nation-building. Baines (1998), frames the term ‘rainbowism’ in a discursive manner, thereby giving space for one to understand it as interacting with the public through the mass public relations campaigns that communicated messages through the media

and sport sponsors. Displaying therein that the myth of the nation was left in the hands of marketing managers through their production of the SABC-TV jingle “Simunye – We are one” and the Castle Lager slogan “One Beer, One Nation” (Baines, 1998). Imagining a discourse of nation-building surrounded by cheap productions of humanity fails to intrinsically instil the belief that the South African nation was aiming to attain through the narrative of the rainbow nation. Such configurations of national identity silence the will and lived experiences of the masses and fails to foster a nation that mobilises its identity from matters that are real and need to be addressed within society. This renders matters such as the presence of African nationals an unvisited matter because ironically lived experiences of the masses were *essentially* unaddressed.

The notion of the rainbow nation was predicated on the beliefs that stemmed from Desmond Tutu’s role in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission but was later adopted by Nelson Mandela and came to symbolise the understanding of South Africa’s new nationalism (Evans 2010). In this Commission, Tutu sought to outline the premises of Ubuntu as an African philosophy that creates the humanity of another person through the actions of others. The validation of that person’s humanity was to be granted by his meaningful participation in a shared community the person abided in. Thus, Ubuntu was a means through which they could stimulate the humanity of perpetrators and reinstate them into society (the African way). Therefore, the TRC produced the state bureaucracy which was to be maintained after the ‘truth-telling’. The TRC offered a system that reconditioned perpetrators into the shared community of the South African state. The remaking of civilians was enabled through granting them forgiveness – a value said to be inherent in Ubuntu. The act was to be of mutual benefit to the victim and the perpetrator, as the victim benefits from the truth and apology and the person or groups of people who committed atrocities are humanised by attaining forgiveness.

These early transactions preceding democratic South Africa set the tone and the mandate of the new government. It also set the African National Congress (ANC) as a humane freedom fighting organisation compared to the rule of the apartheid government. It further led to the continuous phrasing of a “non-violent” struggle by the ANC as they opted for restorative justice. In any case, it effectively distinguished the ANC from the backward thinking apartheid system and set the tone for a new South Africa. This was to be later seen in the political and ethical role the government of South Africa was expected to perform in the international community, particularly in conflict ridden African post-colonial societies.

The premises of ‘African philosophy’, through Ubuntu, had won and proven to be the ‘civil’ way of approaching issues, resulting in reconciliatory narratives coming forth in the nation-building practices before the new South Africa. Evans (2010) notes that the intent was to remove a “conception of nationhood from a primordial¹⁰ one predicated on shared ‘blood’, culture and language (as was the case under Afrikaner nationalism) to one that could accommodate a variety of cultures, races and languages.” (Evans, 2010:309). Based on this, the rainbow nation was not only a concept secured in post-apartheid South Africa as a means to an end (national construction); however, it was a way the political elite (ANC) sought to differentiate their rule from the apartheid rule (political legitimation). This sought to prove the African National Congress as a party structure that could be highly trusted amongst the international circle of nation-states. This is because the rainbow nation discourse was fundamentally the opposite of separate development as it aimed to celebrate difference and encapsulate it as what South Africa inherently is.

With regards to the latter, post-colonial theory through Fanon’s philosophical humanism teaches us that political consciousness is not to be made as a project by the political elite but it is taken from the will of the people and thereby mirroring an organic search for the realities of the nation through which nationhood is to be created (Fanon, 1961[1991]). Therefore, the idea of the rainbow nation even if it might be a legitimating project should offer terms for emancipatory praxis emanating from the masses.

Understanding rainbowism as a political legitimation process of the ANC leads one to understand that it served to legitimise the ANC rule and the state it sought build. This state would therefore present a space for nation-building practices that were accepted in the international community. In its narrowest sense, the rainbow nation narrative is a product of hypermodernity – addressed in Fanon’s theory as having “arrived too late” (Fanon, 1952[2008]:91) – that the South African state experienced. Due to this, since the outcomes of transition (the creation of the democratic nation) are already predicted and experienced by the west Fanon (1961[1991]) offers a solution in which the masses create their liberation through emancipatory praxes. However, because nation-building is situated as a political legitimation project Fanon (1961[1991]) notices that “the elite will attach a fundamental importance to organization, so much so that the fetish of organization will often take precedence over a reasoned study of colonial society” (Fanon, 1961[1991]:108).

¹⁰ The primordial in this dissertation is acknowledged as also being the pre-modern era given the historicity of post-colonialism juxtaposed in a society that is post-modern and in transition as stated by Leonhard Praeg.

This fetish of the organisation seeks to assure that the organisation is the only mechanism through which the anti-colonial struggle was achieved. Liberation becomes subsumed into an organisation that is more concerned in the creation of policies, diagrams, and statistics rather than “the hearts of the people” (Fanon, 1961[1991]:187). Failure to do the latter delimits the dialectical and dialogical process of attaining a radically democratic and global humanity that anti-colonialism has the potential to produce. As we will see later, the organisation, in its attempt to gain political legitimation in the international community, will create policies that are contradictory and end up reinforcing issues of identity and difference in ethnic terms thereby breeding a space for chauvinism, racism, and ultimately xenophobic violence (Fanon, 1961[1991]). A dialectical movement would then be appreciated in the anti-colonial struggle changing the world at the point of its political immediacy.

4.4 Nelson Mandela’s Inauguration Speech: Imagining the South African Nation

The content of the rhetoric used in speeches, in critical discourse analysis, is said to interact with structures surrounding it therefore creating new meanings that are appreciated in different historical contexts. It therefore must be highlighted that during the inauguration, many symbols (or what is known as flagging by Billig, 1995) were flung, carefully modelled to fit in with the occasion. The new South African national anthem was sung with a gush of new South African flags being waved in the air (Evans, 2010). Also, the army stood to attention on the behest of the new President who was previously considered a terrorist. A new era and a new dawn were being performed throughout the occasion. However, the converging of people who had previously been denied positive human interactions within one another on the lawns of the Union Building in Pretoria was the epitome as it symbolised that democracy was upon South Africa. Thus, the stance taken in the concrete context surrounding the speech is that every minuscule action was intentional as the whole world literally sat and gazed at the miracle of the democratic transition within South Africa, through the leadership of Mandela.

Nation-building theorists are dependent upon the occasion of such political ceremonies as it symbolises and often officially introduces the myth of the nation which goes on to be practiced throughout the nation by the waved and unwaved flag (Billig, 1995). However, post-colonial theorists find such occasions to be superficial if they have not been mandated by the people, based on their own political praxis which provides for them an emancipatory paradigm, where they transcend the national into the social and political consciousness (Fanon, 1961[1991]). This arena for Fanon allows for the dialectical move of a philosophical humanism, which survives beyond procedural democracy. Throughout the

process, the human experience is not determined by Western or liberal rationality but radical constructions of daily life from the masses.

The creation of a national identity in the post-colony, according to postcolonial theory, is dynamic and is based upon actional men and women (Fanon, 1961[1991]). Therefore, the progression of humanity is incongruent with passivity and liberal rationality but needs a bourgeois proper to intellectualise national popular action of the masses (Fanon, 1961[1991]). The liberal voice assumes the inconceivability of the masses to become humanity and therefore provides for them a trajectory as an end to their national struggle. Rainbow nationalism holds the potential to spring up this dangerous discourse as it assumes a final understanding of consciousness that is imbued on the people. Mandela (1994[2011]) evokes finality in political emancipation by stating that, “we deeply appreciate the role that the masses of our people and their political mass democratic, religious, women, youth, business, traditional and other leaders have played to *bring about this conclusion* [my emphasis].” However, to assume a national identity based on the construction of time and immediate ‘development’ can no longer be the nations ‘yardstick’ because it leaves the possibility to give up and not work for the future generations (Fanon, 1961[1991]). Furthermore, the rush that occurred in the Inauguration celebration to amalgamate *Nkosi sikelela iAfrika* with *Die Stem* failed to rationalise popular action amongst the masses. It sent a positive sign to the international world, a passive ‘Uncle Tom’ voice of the black oppressed voices that liberalism was a possibility within the nation.

The attempt, one might assume, was to enforce a treatise of peace and settlement as Mandela (1994[2011]) urges the international guests “to stand by us as we tackle the challenges of building peace, prosperity, non-sexism, non-racialism and democracy.” However, it instead introduced a cosmopolitan mindset of the leaders “that come straight out of European treaties on morals and political philosophy” (Fanon, 1961[1991]:163). To emphasise the passivity overflowing in Mandela’s Inauguration speech, Mandela (1994[2011]) states, “we, the people of South Africa, feel fulfilled that humanity has taken us back into its bosom, that we, who were outlaws no so long ago, have today been given the rare privilege to be host to the nations of the world on our own soil.” This utterance continues to dress up the occasion with ‘blanket universalism’ a humanity that is only assumed from Western democratic ideals, which side-lines the imagination and the agency of those previously colonised.

The latter refers to what Gordon states as “things white [continue] to represent universality and things black are locked in the web of particularity” (Gordon, 2006:8).

However, a need to draw from the agency of the masses is just as relevant as a need to draw from the expectations of the international community and the previous apartheid government, they sought to share power with. Otherwise, popular agency of the people is rendered counter-revolutionary, and the nation-state would only accept political agency of a people “assured of their inalienable right to human dignity” (Mandela, 1994[2011]). Accordingly, those existing outside the institutions that ensure the abovementioned inalienable right find themselves targeted in the democratic South Africa.

The rhetoric offered by Mandela (1994[2011]) encourages the production of paternalistic behaviour from civil society. Civil society is based upon a liberal democratic order. It supposes that its actions are legitimate because it speaks on behalf of right-holding citizens. However, what occurs is that the relationship the people have with the state becomes indirect and their political agency becomes emaciated as civil society takes the stage on the masses behalf. The inability to make use of one’s power to effect change is the stronghold of liberalism as it sub-contracts that agency to a civil society because individually one is a vulnerable subject. Having the neo-liberal order loom from the onset of democratic transition in the speech of Nelson Mandela is a fate understood by post-colonial theorists as they champion the necessity of clear ideas that are “profoundly dialectical” (Fanon, 1961[1991]:193). If the latter does not occur but the political is constrained by right-bearing citizens then the notion of a people assured by their inalienable rights silences political society and the progression of humanity.

Fanon (1952[2008]), in *Fact of Blackness* engages with Jean Paul Sartre’s critique of negritude, and notes the unfortunate reductionism black freedom fighters lived experiences’ goes through. The problem arises when that which had deemed you to be sub-human becomes a standard through which one intellectualises one’s power discourses to rule the transitioning nation. Fanon states, “and by taking me out of the world restoring me to it ... I was indignant; I demanded an explanation. Nothing happened. I burst apart. Now the fragments have been put together again by another self” (Fanon, 1952[2008]:82). This cynical yet heartfelt description of the black experience by Fanon, once accepted by the world that once rejected him or her, is a clear display of the occasion or context surrounding Nelson Mandela’s speech in his inauguration, and later was to display the discontent amongst the heart of those who been made a project of liberation in SA, by revealing minor internal conflicts of being through acting African foreign nationals.

4.5 Writing Being as Having: Reconstruction and Development and GEAR

From the very beginning it appears that South Africa was trapped; having no nation and a fallen or downtrodden state, with all its interests', dependant on the market economy which, during the apartheid era, served the few white people through state agents. Due to this, what may be inferred is that South Africa had to choose to adopt a social democratic approach, which ultimately occurred (Hirsch, 2005). This meant giving the state a space to be responsible for the social welfare of the people in South Africa. However, the state was under the pressure of the market economy which is not based upon democratic human principles (Neocosmos, 2010). Working with this pressure meant attaining the new nation's political and democratic legitimacy amongst the people, through the availability of promised goods that emanated from the state. This in effect places the human (experience of a deeper political and social meaning in humanity, through ones lived experience) in the back burner. The experience of being becomes lost in materialism. This was further sealed by the ANC's campaign manifesto, which placed great strain on the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which led to materialism being based as a source of building the nation at its first philosophy (Hirsh, 2005).

In short, the RDP was the policy of the democratic government to ensure that all the socioeconomic challenges faced in the nation are addressed adequately. The general understanding was that growth in South Africa could only be attained through the reconstruction of national, provincial, and local government and that through redirecting resources in the state, development would be ensured. Alec Erwin (2016) states that Derek of the Development Bank of Southern Africa was asked what South Africa's debt was and he replied "I can tell you what the debt of this South African central government is; but I cannot tell you the debt of Transkei, Ciskei, and all these other Bantustans and endless development corporations. We tried to find out, but we really do not know' (Erwin, 2016:144). Thus, it became the mandate that when democracy came to prevail, a programme that addresses inequality and indebtedness of the apartheid state would be implemented.

The RDP White Paper is an important document as it registers the clear hopes of transformation in South Africa. The strategy used clearly indicates what South Africa desired. In the introductory chapter (Preface) section 0.4 it is stated that, "this White paper translates the Base Document into a set of concrete implementation strategies. It seeks to enrich and elaborate the RDP through systematic consultation within the GNU and with all organisations of civil society" (White Paper on Reconstruction and Development, 1994). Throughout the document, democratisation is the chief cornerstone of the implementation of the strategies

listed in the document. The process of democratisation undoubtedly follows the cue of other liberal traditions that seek to empower civil society as the main driver of the process of political consultation. The RDP has been structured so that national policy is only attained from above and is implemented from above without the political education of the masses. As has been stated above, doing such limits the possibility of radical democracy where all people take part in their governance, beyond universal suffrage. The duty of the native intellectuals such as “Alan Hirsch, David Lewis, Steven Gelb, Moss Ngoasheng, Max Sisulu ... Chris Liebenberg ... Thabo, Trevor, Tito, and others” (Erwin, 2016:144) was “to put at the people’s disposal the intellectual and technical capital that it has snatched when going through the colonial universities” (Fanon, 1961[1991]:150). Arguably, the government gazetted this White paper which could equate to making it available to the people. However, when national policy is enriched and made alive from the lived realities of the people it adheres to the standard of humanity which dialectically infers the process of African renewal.

The RDP White Paper (RDP) continues from a point of master and slave understanding, the one is educated and holds the keys to save the slave and one takes the instruction from the literate master who flounces theoretical terms like a memorable song. Consequently, the RDP White paper infers that civil society becomes the determinant through which political realities are addressed. This is seen through the persistent need to use the term civil society as a democratic principle. The referencing of civil society in the document makes belief that the grassroots have also been taken into consideration. To this point we call verbiage. Fanon (1961[1991]) aptly notes that in the experience of the Algerian Revolution it was more effective to have the native intellectuals reduce themselves to the heart of the people and revive intelligence to ensure the “onward progress of their consciousness” (Fanon, 1961[1991]:188). Thus, to use consultative means that is not inclusive of the masses goes against the praxis of emancipation and limits the space for the political.

This was done through side-lining grassroots organisations and mass democratic movements that took part in the anti-apartheid struggle. Once the ANC had grounded their rule through legitimisation programmes, the continuous rhetoric of the ‘enemy’ did not end. The ANC constructed a democratisation discourse that stated that anyone against the ANC was an enemy of progress and was anti-development being coerced by a ‘Third Force’. Due to this, some trade unions and grassroots movements submerged themselves into state agencies and the ANC (Neocosmos, 2010). Additionally, some grassroots movements were lured into civil society movements that essentially professed a politics immersed in state discourse “and in the language of constitutional and human rights” (Gibson, 2011:29).

Consequently, mass protests and demonstrations continue to be viewed as criminal and anti-democratic (Gibson, 2011). Due to this, utterances from the ANC appear to teach the masses to unlearn the politics of 'striking' through their 'violent' protests as the ANC believes this was a language used against apartheid and not for continuous political consciousness. Evidently, the state continues to assume an elitist approach to democracy and thereby believes that injustice is conquered through service provisioning. The assumption that democracy is achieved through civil society is high treason for philosophical humanism, as civil society is subsumed in systems and donor models that betray the call for universality. National discourses therefore interacted and created a weak construction of the people's agency based on chauvinism and xenophobia.

Since the ending of apartheid had more to do with instilling rights (institutional measures) that were previously denied, the emphasis of politics fell short in the construction of national identity. Thus, the dialogue necessary for a growing national identity was reduced to issues in government and service delivery. In following this construction, one realises that the interests of government were set as top priority as opposed to the interests of the poor and unorganised. Given the inherent legitimisation project of the ANC, within state structures, grassroots faced challenges when their voices need to be heard particularly when it required due diligence from the political elite (Fanon, 1961[1991]). The grassroots tend to challenge colonialist structures and attempt to follow radical humanism in their politics. The grassroots conception of politics is a strain to the nation-state system adopted by democratic South Africa because of its historicity rooted in capitalist intentions. Thus, when new humanisms are willed, these business-like post-colonial states require the unapologetic search for universality that places great importance of the human within the state. Put differently, allocating humans, through policy formulations, sustains the business-like state-nation system of the post-colonial world thus lacking emancipatory potential. The existence therefore of African migrants should be adjusted through the intentions of philosophical humanism, and not historical materialism.

The latter sums up the problem inherent within the rainbow nation, being the economic model, it produces as will be seen through RDP and GEAR. The problem is that it fails to historicise the suffering of humanity, subjected under colonialist structures, and therefore assumes that the masses lack agency and should be 'given' what they need to survive. Gibson (2011:34) states, "It [rainbow nation] fails to historicise suffering and simply reinforces the idea of 'these people' as sufferers, and thus naturalises them and objectifies them."

Furthermore, following Fanon's line of thinking, the use of technical language should be opposed and everything should be explained to the people (Fanon, 1961[1991]). This occurred in the Algerian Revolution and through this they found that the creation of new concepts gave birth to a new humanism (Fanon, 1961[1991]). Therefore, producing policy documents pertaining to national matters, that lack consultation with the grassroots, is the epitome of the pitfalls of national consciousness. In other words, the consciousness of the masses is left to stagnate because being is continuously interpreted as having. Essentially, nation-building discourses associate no problem with the stagnation of political and national consciousness besides the opportunity to broaden one's mind through their participation in the political as right-bearing citizens. However, in the case of the post-colonial nation-state, this evokes pertinent questions surrounding the positionality of the people, usually the wretched of the earth, who do not receive assistance from the state. How are they interpreted within a state that assumes having as the determinant for being and belonging within a nation-state? Because fundamentally these humans cannot be part of the South African nation because of the universalising mission of service provision which portrays them as a threat to the state because they unduly exacerbate the scarce resources available. This construction of the nation is anti-dialectical as it removes the possibility of the people to emancipate themselves, through hard work, and it abrogates on the statement made in the Freedom Charter that "South Africa belongs to all who live in it." The people of Algeria when they were addressed in simple terms that were emancipatory they freed themselves and started to think of theoretical questions about the conditions of work, and productivity (Fanon, 1961[1991]). As a result, given the document like the RDP, the spirit of discouragement was bound to continue.

As Fanon's philosophical humanism would have it, the RDP document was put on hold and during Mandela's reign a new document was introduced namely, the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution: A Macroeconomic Strategy. Erwin (2016:145) states that "it was the more technical dimension, trying to address the gaps in terms of economic policy." Additionally, Erwin (2016:145) states that "we could not have a public discussion around GEAR, because if you do that the capital markets respond to everything you say." To root out the possibility of engaging with the people is the root cause of antithetical actions dominating the 'citizens' of South Africa and their incessant fear of African nationals who use up state resources. The RDP document had been introduced out of social development intentions however; the strategies gave birth to neo-liberal like economic restructuring in South Africa through GEAR (Neocosmos, 2010).

Growth, Employment, and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR) was processed with the intention of implementing “a faster fiscal deficit reduction programme to contain debt service obligations, counter inflation and free resources for investment” (Department of Finance, GEAR:2) through creating “a stable environment for confidence and a profitable surge in private investment” (Department of Finance, GEAR:2). The basis of GEAR was to increase the GDP phenomenally by allowing the rich to get richer and the growth of a middle class through which tax and growth could be extracted from. Doing, the latter however, brought upon deplorable conditions in South Africa that continue until today where inequality is at its highest.

Creating a middle class through a national policy is to be shunned in the post-colonial state because the new-found wealth they attain is not based off the hard work and will of the bourgeoisie as state funds continue to be distributed to ‘entrepreneurs’ who are actually businessmen as they fail to champion the resilience of the middle class (Fanon, 1961[1991]). The bourgeois phase was the weakness of the South African post-colonial nation-state as they do not hold capital that makes them a bourgeois proper (Fanon, 1961[1991]). As they ask for more concessions, “in fact, the landed proprietors will insist that the state should give them a hundred times more facilities and privileges than were enjoyed by the foreign settlers in former times” (Fanon, 1961[1991]:154); the masses will also rally behind this attitude and demand that African foreign nationals should leave as their shops are burned and street stalls are wrecked (Fanon, 1961[1991]:156).

4.6 The White Paper on International Migration

The essence of the White Paper has been to re-adjust the policies that have been drawn up during the apartheid regime. The understanding is that the Aliens Control Act (ACA) needs to be reassessed to see if it fits into the spectrum of self-determination that the new government hopes to achieve and that it is also in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. What is shocking is the inability to recognise that writing a White Paper that reconsiders the essence of apartheid (segregation due to national ethnicity) is already a failure in framing the exercise of dealing with immigrants. Reconsideration and recommendations on the biases present in ACA are incomprehensible in what is supposedly democratic South Africa. To clarify, without appearing over-excited, the ACA was premised on morphology. Thus, if you looked black, you are treated like an alien and immediately your existence within the apartheid state of South Africa is criminalised. However, coming across a German or Dutch name in the Immigration offices was, comely as it ensured the continuous existence of the supreme white race ruling apartheid South Africa.

The immigration policy was constructed surrounding South Africa's building of national identity of being amounting to having. An Immigration policy situated on the materialistic need for the right-bearing citizens rather than as a continuum of human movement throughout history lacks an emancipatory potential from the onset. According to Fanon's philosophical humanism, ideological conceptions are fundamental in the formulation of an immigration policy. Thus, immigration policy should replace dichotomous Western categories of citizenship and non-citizenship with the progression to a dialectic of humanity more than nationality. Immigration policy is preferred to be consistent with discursive values of humanity. According to philosophical humanism, the work of the political elite is to humanise the people through the provision of powerful concepts.

In the case of South Africa, re-writing a policy framework for immigration was necessary due to the Aliens Control Act which focused more on border control. The White paper places focus on "community and workplace inspection" (Department of Home Affairs, White Paper on International Migration). Thus, the purpose of the White paper was to regulate who can exist in South Africa and this was guided by a clear framework that: "will support the country's efforts at reconstruction, development, and nation-building" (Department of Home Affairs, White Paper on International Migration). Thus, those who are considered as the 'untouchables' are barred from South African society by making South Africa appear unfriendly.

The White paper (Department of Home Affairs, n.d: s. 5 para 2) goes on further to state bluntly that, "one could argue that the objective of GEAR could be best achieved by the maximum possible limitation on the entry of any migrant other than tourists and business person, so as to reduce the number of people to whom the government needs to supply services and for whom the economy provides" (Department of Home Affairs, n.d: s. 5 para 2). Typically, immigrants that require assistance from the government come from dire situations such as conflict-ridden African states. Given the White Papers association with GEAR and nation-building projects, it can be deduced that human conditions, particularly as they pertain to African nations, was not considered and set aside for a weak formulation of development within the South African state. In not so clear terms, the White Paper implicitly states that the presence of African nationals is unseemly because of the national policy documents presiding over the nation-building within South Africa. As a result, the White paper legitimates making migration an exceptional occurrence on a historical scale within South Africa, using the limitations clause in the Constitution and the use of "citizens" and "any person".

This leads to the inhumane discussion of who is considered an alien according to immigration policy. In Section 3.1 of the White Paper (Department of Home Affairs, n.d: s. 3.1), the negative impact of illegal aliens are stated:

They compete for scarce resources with millions of South Africans living in poverty and below the breadline; they compete for scarce public services, such as schools and medical care, infrastructures and land, housing and informal trading opportunities; they compete with residents and citizens for our insufficient job opportunities, and offer their labour at conditions below those prescribed by law or the applicable collective bargaining agreements; a considerable percentage of illegal aliens has been involved in criminal activities; and they weaken the state and its institutions by corrupting officials, fraudulently acquiring documents and undeserved rights and tarnishing our image locally and abroad (Department of Home Affairs, n.d: s. 3.1).

The current policy emphasis was on implementing a community-based approach to eradicate illegal immigrants. The White Paper states that the, “community is responsible for cooperating with internal policing actions to ensure that illegal immigrants are not attracted to South Africa” (Department of Home Affairs, White Paper on International Migration). The rhetoric offered by this policy framework is highly problematic as it substitutes consciousness of the people with blatant chauvinism.

Lastly, Césaire (cited in Gibson, 2011: 114) states,

“In a tram one night, facing me, a Black. He was a Black tall as a pongo who tried to make himself very small on a tram seat. On that filthy tram seat he tried to abandon his gigantic legs and his starved boxer’s trembling hands. And everything had left him, was leaving him. His nose was like a peninsula off its moorings; even his negritude was losing its color through the effects of perpetual tanner’s bleach. And that tanner was Poverty ... He was COMICAL AND UGLY. COMICAL AND UGLY, for a fact. I sported a great smile of complicity my ... my cowardice revealed!” (Aimé Césaire, *Notebook of a Return to My Native Land*)

The Immigration Policy worked on by Mangosuthu Buthelezi and the various stakeholders is a literal translation of Césaire’s (cited in Gibson, 2011: 114) cowardice mentioned above. The failure of the South African nation-building discourses to acknowledge that speaking positively about immigrants would not cause a challenge to the state because all the immigrant wants to be is human. The above quote fits well with the experience of introducing a neoliberal policy framework as national consciousness that would consistently

require one to move away from the interaction of being black in black Africa, amongst post-modern and highly technological Western states. The fact of the matter is, the realities of blackness are evident – the damned of the earth are still in an unyielding search for humanity; but the refusal to immerse oneself in that experience by creating policy with the help from the US Immigration services is cowardly. Opposing the revolutionary by complying with the situation instead of drinking from the cup of the wretched of the earth contributes to the malaise of humanity, which should be opposed.

4.7 Conclusion: The Mandela Era

Mandela's national discourse came to be interpreted emphatically by Mangosuthu Buthelezi in the Immigration Policy Framework. Buthelezi's job was to incorporate the prevalent national policy and ensure that it is fulfilled and out of this investigation the White Paper on International Migration emerged. The national discourses provided led to the emergence of "neo-liberal universalism" albeit unwelcomed. The latter was the resultant inability of the "educated class" (Fanon, 1961[1991]:148) to get in touch with people and a failure to mobilise a humanist political will of the people.

The transition from an apartheid state to a democratic nation-state in South Africa is correctly hailed as an unexpected moment, considering the relevant peacefulness associated with the political transitioning. However, there is a massive humanistic problem within this narrative of peacefulness and 'democratisation', in the political domain of South Africa, as it ignores the violence that ensued on the masses when their lived reality was overlooked for a 'Western universal' imagination of the nation. The inherent problem when dealing with the 'khumbaya' narrative of South Africa's transition is the tendency to neglect the imposition of white normative systems in the formulation optimism of nation-building in post-colonial South Africa. Thus, Gordon (2005 cited in Gibson, 2011:8) states that it is important to shift the "geography of reason." In other words, it is imperative to analyse where one attains and builds their foundation for national identity because consciousness is best addressed according to the masses lived reality. Consequently, assuming a national discourse that is top-down based on knowledge systems that are not aligned with the masses livelihoods can be detrimental; as it de-intellectualises the lived experiences of the people on the ground thereby subjecting them to rhetoric and discourses that they cannot adequately critically engage with.

The political transitioning that occurred therefore under Mandela's rule needs to appeal to reality – it needs to draw inspiration from political maturation, a people whose humanity is constantly opening space for a new humanism lead by an emancipatory praxis. Furthermore, there has been a historical misinterpretation of "national effort and national

unity” (Fanon, 1961[1991]:149) as the political elite were unable to give meaning to popular action as dialogue was only considered within the civil society. The latter is laden with the “intellectual laziness of the national middle class” (Fanon, 1961[1991]:149). This is marked by their inability to take hold of their national culture in its political and historical immediacy but instead interpret the culture as one stemmed from Western cosmopolitan mindset, thus submerging the post-colonial state into the Western rational state model. This historical problem is made worse by the economic reality of the middle class that they hold “no economic power” (Fanon, 1961[1991]:149) duly creating the notion that migrants disturb the potential of ‘natives’ and therefore they are the mitigating factors for their lack of material wealth. Thabo Mbeki therefore sought to attribute intellectuality to African ideological constructions to ‘correct’ the loopholes found in rainbowism. Mbeki’s national discourse therefore undergoes an analysis to understand whether emancipatory potential can be attained from it.

CHAPTER 5: THABO MBEKI ANALYSIS

*The time has come that we say enough and no more, and by acting to banish the shame
remake ourselves as the midwives of the African Renaissance*

Thabo Mbeki, 1998

The prevalent discourses espoused during Mandela's presidency offered a safety valve for Western ideologies and sustained the necessary systematic peace within the South African state. However, constructing an African identity, in the era of hypermodernity, reveals an array of complexities entangled in the existential reality of the African, particularly as the identity is conjured in the atmospheric pressure of liberalism. In other words, the nation-building work done prior to Mandela's reign had created a post-colonial state stuck in perpetual childhood. Mbeki (1996) explicitly noted the latter in the "Two Nations" dictum. These were the early signs that Mbeki had understood and perceived the failure of the "rainbow nation" ideology. Mbeki was quick to realise the continuous political immaturity inspired, reinforced, and founded by the colonial mental-enslavement of the colonised people, within certain misdirected nation-building discourses followed in the salad days of democracy.

This chapter will therefore deal with the different approach that Mbeki introduced, while he was still deputy president or the so-called "Prime Minister of South Africa" and the implementation and consequences of these nation-building projects he instilled whilst in office. In doing so, the underlying framework will be to divulge descriptively the ideologies introduced and their weakness to imagine the progression of the human condition based on Fanon's philosophical humanism. In short, the chapter will espouse the nation being constructed through the descriptive analysis of the rhetoric used in the "I am an African Speech", with the implementation of the African Renaissance through the New Partnerships for Africa's Development (NEPAD) – continentally; the "Two-Nations Speech" and the "Speech at the Annual National Conference of the Black Management Forum in November 20, 1999" with the Affirmative Action measures implemented nationally. In relation to the analysis drawn from the Immigration Act will also be analysed. The latter will develop the basis for the dialectics of nation-building and immigration discourses.

5. Mbeki the President of South Africa

5.1 Mbeki: Conceptualising the realities of the nation

The ideological framework held by Thabo Mbeki was introduced into the South African national discourse during his ‘Prime Minister’ days, before he was officially elected as the President of South Africa (Buthelezi, 2016). Mbeki came to give an ‘actional’ description of the solutions to African issues. Mbeki’s conceptualisation of building up the post-colonial African nation-state was to be introduced through the understanding of one’s paradoxical construction of African ontology.

This move scared many neoliberal and non-racialism proponents as Mbeki continued further to address the racialised economy of the South African societies. Uncomfortable as it was for the liberals, African Renaissance was a necessity, according to Mbeki, as it introduced to the people the intricacies of African consciousness. However, despite this glorified stance Mbeki aimed to achieve, according to Fanon’s philosophical humanism, rhetoric offered by the native intellectuals is only necessary to clarify what is already present in praxis. In other words, the theoretical conceptualisation of African consciousness by the native intellectual is constructed from the lived reality of the people which in all African truth is theoretical. This is because black lived reality is not just ethnographic or experimental data but black lives offer theoretical reflections. Therefore, in descriptively analysing Mbeki’s African Renaissance and the concrete policies emanating from New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), such theoretical implications should already be present within society for them to hold ground in the development of agency and the progression of the human condition.

5.2 The Existence of the African: The nation

To introduce one’s discourse through the oration of their African being is to acknowledge the intrinsic complexities manifest in being black. The experience of being black is inundated with the struggle against the continuous domination of the Western world and the search of the universal invective against oppression. Mbeki’s ideologies and utterances expatiates philosophical anthropology of the African. Furthermore, the strength of his rhetoric is born from the position of fighting for liberation from his early years. Many consider that Mbeki, as the “child of the ANC” (Chikane, 2016:178), was raised by the struggle and thus his lived reality was inculcating the desire for liberation amongst Africans. One might go as far to state that, his blackness defined was constructed in the troupe of liberatory movements against Western universalism, making his ideology pertinent for the South African nation.

Nonetheless, one is pressed to ask whether his rhetoric holds substance for the lived reality of the South African poor majority who daily face the offensive of white universality. The question many ponder on is whether his positionality offers him the right to speak about the lived reality of the people and whether his utterances reflect the hopes of the nation? Essentially, these are the problematic variables that arise in the post-colonial nation-state when nation-building is assumed as per constructing a new national identity. Pondering on the abovementioned questions highlights the necessity of agency within the populace that needs to be acknowledged by the ruling political elite in their dissemination of national construction. Thus, it would be necessary to analyse how the nation being propounded by Mbeki in his speeches addresses the political and given his positionality what would the role of nation-building within the post-colonial state be.

5.2.1 I Am an African

Frantz Fanon (1952[2008]) in the work of *Black Skin, White Masks* gives a scathing account on the embodiment of blackness. The incongruity of black identity is derived from colonisation's destruction of the metaphysics of black identity resulting in "the black man [having] no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man" (Fanon, 1952[2008]:83). In other words, there is never a moment for black identity to account for itself without the constitutive relation of whiteness – founded in colonialism. Thus, the presentation of black identity is muddled with the discursive practices of white culture that subject the consciousness of blackness and incorporate it into white reality. Due to this, Fanon (1952[2008]) asserts that when the black body gives an account or an egress from the "self-white dialectic", it occurs through three schematic experiences.

These experiences are subtly provided in Thabo Mbeki's *I am an African* speech, and entail the corporeal schema, historical schema, and the racial schema – the last being further analysed in the *Two Nations* speech. Mbeki (1996) dissects the African bodily experience in prosaic form that offers an "ontological resistance" (Fanon, 1952[2008]:83) through the corporeal experience of existing as an African. Mbeki (1996) states, "I am an African, I owe my *being* [my emphasis] to the hills and the valleys ... that define the face of our native land." Mbeki (1996) polices his own bodily existence through the spirituality of the African known by those who are engrafted in Africa's landscape – in other words, through the historical experiences. Mbeki (1996) states, "my body has frozen in our frosts ... it has thawed in the warmth ... the dramatic shapes of the Drakensberg, the soil coloured waters of the Lekoa, iGqili noThukela and the sands of the Kgalagadi, have all been panels of the set on the natural stage on which we act out the theatre of our day." Mbeki (1996) therefore develops an

important means through which belonging might be achieved. As opposed to Western discourses that assume citizenship to be democratic and applicable within their nation-state proper; Mbeki proposes, in his speech, the being and belonging be underwritten by the corporeal experience mixed with the separate experience of history and race in Africa. An array of different people constructs the nation, “the Khoi and the San ... the migrants who left Europe ... the Malay slaves ... and the warrior men and women that Hintsa and Sekhukhune led ...” (Mbeki, 1996). All these people have different bearings but their ecological foundations have however converged within Africa, as a result that nation was entangled with the pain, adventure, oppression of the experiences of the people who exist in that land. Therefore, instead of the nation being constructed through people who are the same culturally and religiously (as the Western state model observes) the African national identity is situated in the political realities of all the people who have existed within the African landscape and draw historical, corporeal and racialised associations from it.

5.3 The African Renaissance and NEPAD

Two years later, after the *I am an African* speech, Mbeki delivered *The African Renaissance Statement* (1998) in which he details the purposes of the African Renewal. The speech lays out the continental shift Mbeki (1996) had envisioned for the national consciousness of African nations, particularly South Africa. Mbeki’s vision was thus effectively fleshed out in the AR statement. As an Africanist, the renewal of Africa, for Mbeki, was based on Africa’s pre-colonial form and its progression of the human condition. What stirred this shift was Africa’s continued demise after colonialism and the lack of assistance offered for Africa’s humanitarian issues. Africa thus, was written as a story of lack and dispossession imbibed in recurring violence and tyrannical rule. Because of the hopelessness attached to the African situation and the minimal assistance received from international institutions Mbeki believed that African problems should be resolved by African people, who understand intrinsically what means to be an African. Thus, the historicity of Africa, as the cradle of humanity, and Africa’s exceptional inventions (Mbeki, 1998), according to Mbeki, would be the foundation that Africa would work to achieve greatness.

Evidently, the founding of the African Renaissance had everything to do with establishing a black identity in which all Africans would restore their personhood complex by addressing the lie propounded by colonialism that black people are “sub-human” (Mbeki, 1998). Mbeki (1998) states that,

the beginning of our rebirth as a Continent must be our own
rediscovery of our soul, captured and made permanently

available in the great works of creativity represented by the pyramids and sphinxes of Egypt, the stone buildings of Axum and the ruins of Carthage and Zimbabwe, the rock paintings of the San, the Benin bronzes and the African masks, the carvings of the Makonde and the stone sculptures of the Shona. A people capable of such creativity could never have been less human than other human beings and *being as human as any other* [my emphasis], such a people can and must be its own liberator from the condition which seeks to describe our Continent and its people as the poverty stricken and disease-ridden primitives in a world riding the crest of a wave of progress and human upliftment.

The African Renaissance is a quest for humanity. And in doing so, it aims to not only provide ontological resistance against Western constructions of the African condition, but also fight against humanities oppression from the point of knowledge systems. Thus, the abovementioned extended quote from Mbeki (1998) sought to enforce that African nations are not in need of Westernised systems to maintain their existence. Instead, because humanity stems from Africa, mechanisms that address the African human condition can continue to be derived within Africa.

Furthermore, the work needed to achieve the latter required that all Africans work together to achieve the greatness of Africa. Due to this, Mbeki (1998) makes an appeal to the Diaspora, to return and help manifest the rebirth of Africa. Mbeki (1998) states, “I dream of the day when ... the African mathematicians and computer specialists ... the African physicist, engineers, doctors, business managers and economists, will return ... to add to the African pool of brain power, to enquire into and find solutions to Africa’s problems and challenges.” Mbeki’s vision is clear, the return of the people in Diaspora would pressure the elimination of, ruling tyrants and dictators, as intellectual praxis would be the order of African affairs (Mbeki, 1998). This is a necessary call and ultimately unifying as it appreciates that all need to take part in politics for the human condition to progress. And yet, this statement in support of people in the Diaspora, in which some are technically not citizens, raises many questions with regards to the Immigration Policy of South Africa. It leads ones to ponder whether the implementation of systems providing entry and citizenship into South Africa may be efficiently adjusted for the return of the people in Diaspora. In fact, Neocosmos (2010) mentions that immigration regulations were curbed in 1994 to allow immigrants to attain “citizenship voting rights in South Africa ... in other words it is forgotten that the post-apartheid state could indeed adapt legislation regarding citizenship to make it more inclusive when it wished to do so” (Neocosmos, 2010:5). Taking into consideration the African

Renaissance statement in 1999, Mbeki's rhetoric denotes an easily avoided conceptualisation of the nation and citizenship by stating that people in the diaspora can return; effectively loosening the conceptual knot around belonging being associated with citizenship, and nation-state formation equating to stricter Immigration regulations. However, The White Paper on International Migration (mentioned in chapter 4) portrayed African nationals as causing a massive inconvenience within South Africa. Due to Mbeki's (1998) African Renaissance statement, one can assume the evidence of a changing narrative on Immigration policies that reflect a more flexible approach towards skilled immigrant labourers.

Given that the Immigration Law in South Africa ends up taking a softer approach towards skilled immigrant labourers, one is forced to question to whom African Renaissance spoke to. Asking this question reveals the true intent of the renewal of Africa, propounded by Mbeki, because it reveals whose life it serves to benefit and on what grounds. For Mbeki, legislation could be amended to appease the hopes for his national discourse, and it appears that the wretched of the earth who exist outside of civil society (usually deemed as unskilled migrants) continue to be marginalised and receive limited access in the South African state. The association of national discourse (or ideologies held by the President) and Immigration Laws are dialectically constituted. Additionally, considering these selfish undertones of national consciousness, one is forced to question whether the African Renaissance was more of a rhetorical device used for the benefit of African leaders and the political elite – to process their legitimacy – more than it being for the benefit of the masses, so to ensure their agency? In other words, was the political eschewed in African Renaissance for the political elite and, if so, how was African humanistic progression going to be achieved if it excluded certain people from politics. All these questions arise due to the ability to change legislation for the purposes of the Diaspora whilst failing to acknowledge the voices on the ground which would provide emancipatory praxis of the lived reality of all persons in South Africa.

These issues are fleshed out in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) that was championed by Mbeki and comrades, and other African leaders. Wiseman Nkuhlu (2016) elaborates that Obasanjo (former President of Nigeria), Bouteflika (President of Algeria) and Mbeki were initially tasked by the OAU "to make a presentation to the G8 on behalf of the African countries about the cancellation of debt, because most of the African countries were heavily indebted at that time" (Nkuhlu, 2016:190). This task led to these African leaders enlisting the help of more African leaders, namely, Wade of Senegal who was in the process of creating an African initiative document called Omega and a representative from Egypt. As a result, the process of creating NEPAD which was initially known as the

Millennium Africa Plan, then New African Initiative was opened up to African countries across the continent. In short, NEPAD provided in policy what the African Renaissance had esteemed rhetorically. Based on the analysis made above, NEPAD continues in failing to fully address the political by assigning paternalistic and disempowering notions of African consciousness.

Alexander Erwin (2016:149) describes how NEPAD started,

a few of us accompanied Mbeki to a beautiful centre near Oporto in Portugal and first French President Chirac and then Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi, with commendable frankness, said effectively: Africa you are on your own since Europe has to watch its eastern fronts ... Thabo Mbeki, Frank Chikane, Titus Mafole and I were flying back from that meeting. Thabo said, 'So those guys said there is no plan for Africa; we are going to write it' ... that was where NEPAD started: in that aeroplane.

The reasoning behind the creation of NEPAD was to provide a framework for black people who are not written out as “problems-in-themselves” (Gordon, 2006:5) but institute an assault on the supremacy of whiteness. However, in so doing, Africa needed to be careful to not base its progression on the standard of Westernised ideals, as it assumes a tone of kowtowing to doctrines that are inherently not African or humanist in their intensions, which is exactly what NEPAD fails to adequately fulfil. NEPAD came into the spectrum due to the debt African nations faced and the disinvestment occurring which was leading to falling economic growth. The African Renaissance, therefore, presented rhetorically what NEPAD was parading to American investors in April 1997 (M. Mbeki, 2000). Due to this, development for Africa came to be underwritten by the narrative of economic stability modelled by other ‘developed’ nations. Thus, within the document of NEPAD, one is exposed to terms such as aid, market logic and development in the same context which signifies the neoliberal undertones in the African Renaissance. This is because these concepts are used to provide proof for the progression of the human condition and democracy in Africa.

In the introduction of NEPAD it states, “Africans are appealing neither for the further entrenchment of dependency through aid, nor for marginal concessions” (NEPAD, 2001:1). In other words, aid that comes from the west should not be determined, in policy, to benefit the Western world but should achieve the needs of the Africans. However, when contextualised aid is read alongside the need to make good use of the aid received, according to market logic. NEPAD (2001:1) states, “what is required to mobilise these resources and to

use them properly, is bold and imaginative leadership ...” thereby linking the development of the nation, through resource flows from aid, with the political economy of leadership. The association however with the building up of the nation (or African development) with economics rather than the “moving consciousness of the whole people; ... [through the] ... enlightened action of men and women” (Fanon, 1961[1991]:204) is grounded on neoliberal dictates. These neoliberal specks fail to appreciate that nation-building (or African development), due to Africa’s history, is founded on the political consciousness of the people who are deemed to exist as members of the nation, not through arbitrary borderlines or tribalism but their lived reality. Thus, associating ‘aid’ with “market-oriented economies” at first instance embeds national identity in the fallacious assumption that a post-colonial Africa nation can continue to see “concepts such as the ‘market’ and ‘citizenship’ as democratic” (Neocosmos, 2010:78).

Furthermore, NEPAD (2001) produces a surface level account of the African condition. It deals, mostly, with the economics of the continent – mainly addressing how the inequalities raised by the Structural Adjustment Programmes of the 1980s should be readjusted. Because of this, NEPAD is more concerned on addressing how Africa should be understood by the international society than ensuring that effective mechanisms are met to ensure that regional integration occurs so that the developmental objectives are achieved. Fanon’s philosophical humanism comes in handy at this point because it appreciates the importance of human will and construction, by emphasising that systems reflect what humans have enabled. Therefore, to make social, political, and economic systems radically democratic there is a need for the participation of all in the political. Consequently, popular voices and opinions, in Fanon’s philosophical humanism, are ranked as top priority when working towards the ‘development’ of humanity. The latter would therefore lead to a dialectically motivated political attack on patronage and clientelism emanating from the political elite and instil the dignity of hardworking humans that achieve a strong economy. National consciousness, formed from political consciousness, would thereby disqualify the lazy behaviour of the political elite (Fanon, 1961[1991]) which seeks to skip certain stages by ultimately binding themselves to aid without a politically conscious nation. This would mean each nation-state would have politically active persons and leaders who would ensure that the prescribed national policy is not cumbersome to regional integration objectives because the latter is addressed by the people within the nation during nation formation.

Despite the authors of NEPAD (2001) noting the depoliticization of the masses and the unfreedom they experienced on the behest of their leaders, NEPAD (2001) missed the

revolutionary. The latter occurred because the assumption was that politics occurs when leadership is finally fixed and whilst leadership issues are still present in Africa, ‘aid’ would provide the emancipation the people needed. Additionally, emancipation would also be ensured through “democracy and state legitimacy ... [being] ... redefined to include accountable government, a culture of human rights and popular participation as central elements” (NEPAD, 2001:16). In other words, democracy was the basis of the work by the political elite at the top. Due to this, NEPAD also legitimated movements made at the top and stamped an approval of ‘democracy-in-progress’ through state discourses and policies.

NEPAD missed a point on addressing the people and how they will hold accountable the leaders. Were the people aware that NEPAD was a means to create a policy for Africa to assist with its developmental challenges much political activism would have been situated around it. Instead, since consultation with the masses had not occurred, NEPAD was viewed more as a neo-liberal framework that sought to divert investment from the west into the pockets of state institutions for state drawn programmes, outside of popular struggles. And according to popular prescriptions, the latter would entail silencing the masses so that when specific practices that do not bare resemblance to emancipatory praxis occurs, they are silenced through the legitimation of NEPAD as an Africanist front.

Since the people were overlooked they were once again subsumed to a culture of party politics as NEPAD was drawn with the political elite who inhabit party discourses, “with this in view the party is given the task of supervising the masses” (Fanon, 1961[1991]:181). Fanon’s philosophical humanism provides that this is a failure of national consciousness because to ensure a humane consciousness amongst the masses is to “make adults of them” (Fanon, 1961[1991]:181). Thus, to overlook the intellectual ability of the people to conceive a revolution for themselves leaves them in a state of perpetual childhood.

Lacking a continental approach to the open discursive politics of African people relating to one another in providing sustainable nation-building measures gives up this responsibility to the party. Rather, it becomes a need to act because life depends on it and the future generations need it. Opening the discussion of politics across Africa on the ground level ensures that the masses get to elect who deals with African Affairs, how the media represents these sentiments and how the people on the ground who daily interact with shame experiences react to people coming within the African continent. The African Renaissance thus required people, the masses, who carried the mettle of humanity. The politics is continuously the primacy in emancipatory praxis.

5.3.1 Two Nations in South Africa

Based on the conundrum of blackness presented by Fanon (1952[2008]), many people have come to analyse Mbeki's speech through the lens of Manichaeism propounded in the first chapter of *The Wretched of the Earth*. The most pertinent point to expand on is the lust, so to speak, of the black person for all things materially presented as white. This is presented in Mbeki's discourse of nation-building through subscribing the black race into a place of want – that is rooted on assimilating the material benefits that white people attained through their construction of society. This is made evident in his *Two Nation's* speech and with the *Annual National Conference of the Black Management Forum* in November 20, 1999 speech (BMF speech).

The *Two Nation's* speech distances itself from the assumption that the South African nation is progressing quickly and effectively towards the prescribed nation-building objectives, professed by Nelson Mandela's rainbow nation ideology. Mbeki (1998) stipulates that the rainbow nation narrative is a fallacy because the economic reality of South Africa's masses presents a nation divided in two. Thus Mbeki (1998) states that, "nation building is the *construction of the reality* [my emphasis] and the sense of common nationhood which would result from the abolition of disparities in the quality of life among South Africans based on the racial, gender and geographic inequalities we all inherited from the past." In other words, for Mbeki (1998), nation-building is a means to an economic end – an end which adjusts the disparities made prevalent in the apartheid era. Nation-building on all axes thus aims to address the end, that is, economic emancipation within a nation for all people, particularly those who have been previously disadvantaged. Due to this, the primacy of the nation is based on the provision of state reforms and institutional reforms through policy and law, that ensures material benefits are attained by those deemed to be 'natives' of that country. Herein, lays the unstable ground through which national unification is founded during Mbeki's era. National unification is absorbed in creating wealth without addressing adequately the human condition or the hypermodernity at play in post-colonial states, unfounded in Western nation-states.

The *Two Nation's* speech unravels apartheid's core, which was essentially creating an economic model that protected white wealth through state reforms and institutions and the creation of a social welfare state (Neocosmos, 2010). *Two Nation's* through describing Manichaeism is aware of this construction of the apartheid state. However, Mbeki fails to centre his speech on the irrelevance of racial difference in apartheid's nation-building model (Alexander, 2013). To explain this further, apartheid was not essentially based on hating

black people, but hating black people and constructing them as a problem in themselves was beneficial for the apartheid state's white wealth construction. Thus, placing black South Africans in the position of this wealth construction does not change the system but reinforces it because the white master now becomes the black master who continues to hinder the progression of humanity in politics. Therefore Fanon (1961[1991]) states that decolonisation is violent because it replaces races and yet keeping the system the same. Thus, Mbeki should have provided a model that would seek to contest the political more than the racial because the political was effectively racial, without even mentioning it. So, the astute focus on the political would ensure the complete dismantling of the system that essentialised the nation as those who benefited from the state through social welfare. Consequently, belonging would be guided by the masses lived realities which reflects emancipatory praxis for the African human condition.

Mbeki (1998) provides that "we are not one nation but two nations. And neither are we becoming one nation. Consequently, also, the objective of national reconciliation is not being realised." This dissertation places great importance in this statement because it explicitly provides that reference to national consciousness (the nation) has more to do with reconciliation as performed in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) than with retributive justice that seeks to address what was never supposed to occur. To elaborate, the African experience is such that one is always allowed to reclaim or recall any injustice acted upon them by another person, and unlike Western laws, time does not invalidate an injustice done on a person (Ramose, 2001). Thus, the building of the nation through national consciousness entails the necessity to address in dialogue, within the political lived realities of all persons in South Africa, the injustice placed on their humanity. As opposed to reconciliation, that assumes one might reconcile with their oppressors through policy instruments or limited dialogue presented in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) model Africanness challenges extinctive prescription in law (Ramose, 2001).

The Manichean world, correctly projected by Mbeki (1998), should not be addressed through the tantalisation of the lustfulness black people have for the white world but it should remove all systemic realities of whiteness and address the human condition at the point of politics. Put differently, Manichaeism cannot be addressed through watered down neoliberal policy instruments that seek to pleasure a few previously disadvantaged people, it must be violent, in that it removes all systemic and systematic privileges induced by colonialism and replace it with the political will of the people.

On the contrary, for Mbeki (1998), the response to the two-nation's debacle is "the question of affirmative action" (Mbeki, 1998). In the *Two Nation's* speech Mbeki insinuates that instituting affirmative action within the South African state will amount to the beginning of redress which would ensure nation-building and reconciliation. The discourse of belonging being linked to having (Gibson, 2011) was entrenched further in Mbeki's (1999) *BMF* speech. In this speech, Mbeki (1999) states his position on what the steady progression of the building of a nation in South Africa consists of. In this speech, a critical part of nation-building for Mbeki (1999) evolves as the fight against racism which is effectively defeated through "deracialisation of the ownership of productive property in our country" (Mbeki, 1999).

The problem arising within the *BMF* speech is that Mbeki (1999) presents the speech in the post-colonial narrative of emancipation, which makes his speech appear revolutionary and yet it rejects the primacy of politics for the preference of race. It must be reiterated that what is proposed by Mbeki (1999) because of the inadequacy of politics continues to be the perpetuation of the same system that apartheid was founded on. Post-colonialism focuses on racial issues as the primacy of the political in the post-colonial world because of the laziness of the national bourgeoisie to inspire humanity at every dialectical point of independence or political transition.

Neville Alexander (2013) notes that historical materialism was responsible for the perpetuation and institutionalisation of racial order. The historical materialism that is referred to is that Europeans felt superior than Africans as they realised they could plunder and make use of the resources of their land in a bigger scale than the Africans had ever been able to use. As result, there was a mutual constitution between white supremacy and the relations of productions. Alexander (2013) states, that race theory that was perpetuated by the materialistic perception of the nation was not a creation of Afrikaner nationalism. Rather, "legal entrenchment and the other types of formal institutionalisation of racial discrimination were systematically perpetuated by the British colonial rule" (Alexander, 2013:118) to secure their vested interests of gold and maize.

Therefore, the apartheid regime continued from this materialistic perception. So, when the implementation of racial classification occurred, bureaucracy and the apartheid think-tanks were aware of the irrelevance of race in determining a person's mental ability. However, since race is socially constructed the apartheid government continued to use these racial identities because they were easily internalised and since race is an outward appearance people would continue to assume that racial difference exists. Thus, race was made normative

and a 'fact' even when it was not and this was based on 'white fear'. To clarify, whites feared what the natives could do and their strength as a result allowed the apartheid government to continue with such classifications because the government was perceived as the only powerful diffuser to black danger. This fear, as mentioned above, was based on economic interest's white people had in South Africa.

Thus, going ahead and addressing nation-building and reconciliation through affirmative action measures, is equivalent to regressing into the lack of emancipatory praxis which will continue to influence racially inspired national formation that persists on the doctrine of black people being a problem, whilst paradoxically trying to serve a few black elite in the country. Considering these issues, Alexander (2007) debates *Affirmative Action and the perpetuation of racial identities in post-apartheid South Africa*. Before, we discuss affirmative action (hereon AA) we need to acknowledge the fact that post-apartheid South Africa was founded on, among others, values of non-racialism and non-sexism. Thus, the belief Alexander takes is that if this is the case, policies such as AA should not be adhered to at all as it has a causal connection with the perpetuation of racial identities.

Alexander (2007:94) highlights that, affirmative action "is a policy that benefits mainly the rising black middle class and in effect deepens the inherited class inequality in our society." Therefore, if we are to transform the effects of apartheid, transformative measures rather than AA measures should be placed. This is because transformation transcends all boundaries and forms of people in society – gender, race, and class (which is the main challenge) will then all be addressed. So, both urban and rural area people will benefit. Alexander (2007:95) implies that AA is not transformative as there are no present structural, economic, and social changes that make the lived realities of the rural or poor person (typically 'black') better.

Going further to transcend Alexander's (2007) recommendations, if transformation is going to occur in society, it should be willed by the masses. The will however, is not only a moment in the dialectic where racial difference is accounted to as a fad and yet experienced in society, this is not the point. Political will, however, appreciates that "consciousness has to lose itself in the night of the absolute ... a consciousness ... is ignorant, has to be ignorant, of the essences and the determinations of its being" (Fanon, 1952[2008]:102). Thus, the dialectical move on addressing historical injustice is charged with ignorance for it to be humane, and no point is the destination but movement with the politics of people on the ground takes over the 'transformative measures'. Transformation is therefore not achieved by elitist state policies which fail to consider, adequately, the wretched of the earth.

On the contrary, Mbeki (1999) essentialises the formation of a black bourgeois class through the necessity of government aid known as, Black Economic Empowerment. The issue arising in this instance is about the seeming objective that a few “prosperous black owners of productive property” (Mbeki, 1999) need to be made (or created) so they might fulfil the praxis of the global market. The creation of a black bourgeois class is discouraged in Fanon’s Philosophical Humanism because it assumes that the daily praxis of black people in South Africa does not offer theoretical applications in economics or in buying and selling of goods. Thus, Fanon (1952[2008]) offers that all the political elite need to provide is political education that makes the masses understand the theory behind their already present means of survival. Furthermore, this would ensure that Western market doctrines do not infringe on the people’s right to use the resources within their own land to make a living. In other words, how the masses in African nations have been surviving should pave the way through which basic westernised market ideologies might be disrupted through the emancipatory praxis of the people. On the contrary to what “tender and procurement policies the government is following” (Mbeki, 1999) are, emancipatory praxis does not seek to, provide ‘aid’ in a top-down paternalistic approach to black entrepreneurs. Instead, praxis is established from the presiding theoretical livelihood of the masses that requires that the “whole social structure being changed from the bottom up” (Fanon 1961[1991]:35). This change however, is based on the political consciousness of the people at their immediate reality. In other words, decolonisation is not a predicted moment by the national bourgeoisie or a top-down process because the process is wrought with intricate and complex realities of the nation that cannot be constructed out of the rational Western state model.

5.3.2 Fanon’s Philosophical Humanism: Addressing “I am an African” and “Two-nation’s” speech

Taking into consideration, the abovementioned speeches, Mbeki’s nation-building is constructed around ensuring that all people who were disadvantaged achieve prosperity within the nation, which the apartheid government withheld from them. Nation-building’s first philosophy for Mbeki is attaining benefits from the government. Gibson (2011) states that due to this transitional discourse belonging becomes attached to material possession as has been seen in the RDP programme. Thus, it becomes a goal for the state and national discourses to ensure that anything or anyone that appears to infringe on this nation-building project is dealt with criminally and excluded within the society.

Thus, the building of the nation is no longer routed on the Freedom Charter that states that South Africa belongs to all the people who live within it, but instead on a discourse of

citizenship “right bearing persons”, within South Africa which took over the political will and activity of the people within society. The nation consisted of citizens rather than the revolutionary sounding rhetoric presented in the *I am an African* speech. Having citizenship as the means through which political activity occurred limited the essence of emancipatory praxis within the people and therefore subjected all persons within the state to policies supported by the Constitution and instituted by the political elite. This weakened the possibility of a radical democracy which is inclusive of the realities within Africa and nation-building became a buzzword that was subsumed in constitutionalism. The building of the nation was thus scripted under state-ridden policies that sought to comply with the constitution more than the political realities of the nation.

5.4 The Practices of the Immigration in South Africa

The African Renaissance failed to provide emancipatory praxis for the people on the ground, through which national consciousness would be integrated into. Due to this, regional objectives that appeared positive within NEPAD failed to adequately advance due to the overriding national interests produced in Mbeki’s national discourse. The call to be actional, by Fanon’s philosophical humanism, was abjured by the top-down state policy of Affirmative Action which continued to associate being and belonging with having derived from the state and constitutionalism. Due to this, one is persuaded to analyse descriptively the immigration practices, rooted in the Human Rights Discourse of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution), to infer whether the Immigration Act is emancipatory in relation to Fanon’s philosophical humanism.

5.4.1 The Immigration Act of South Africa, 2002

Anxieties of a decreasing black control on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in 1999 (Mbeki, 1999) was exemplified by the insertion of AA measures. The latter failed to remove the continued ill-progress of the black capitalist which thereby instituted an array of assaults on African nationals who were constructed by state officials and legislation as being a problem to the nation-building objectives (Neocosmos, 2010).

If one considers the vivacity of the political during the apartheid era, where all persons were welcomed into political society, by taking part in liberatory movements that sought to dismantle apartheid, one would note what post-colonial reasonability is. The unity present amongst black workers transcended national borders as there was a common comradeship because all were oppressed by white supremacy. Comradeship was so embedded that mine owners and supervisors depended on divide and rule tactics. Thus, they sought to engender difference by separating labourers according to their tribal groups but

even so, the struggle, where revolutionary political work continued, was still based on injustice occurring on humanity than tribal associations. As a result, the Freedom Charter continued to be esteemed as the framework through which the nation would be built. Consequently, political rhetoric was situated around pan-African rhetoric such as *Mayibuye i-Afrika*, *Nkosi sikelela i-Afrika* and *Vuka Afrika*, evidently there was no exceptional reference to South Africa. Due to this, the Immigration Act had a brilliant opportunity to enact post-colonial reasonability within South Africa to ensure the historical progression of humanity.

What hindered the potential progression was the way the Immigration Act was fashioned out. The objectives of the Act state the necessity of “promoting a human-right based culture in both government and civil society in respect of immigration control” (Immigration Act, 2002:12). To situate the people under a culture of human rights abrogates the process of a messy dialectic in the post-colonial. Culture, as a system that manages to bring all systems together in a secular world, in the same way that God brought perfection and justice in the religious oriented world, fails to think beyond relations as they occur in their immediacy (Fanon, 1961[1991]). In other words, it seeks to establish a well formulated experience that carves the consistency attained in religion in a secular world filled with an array of political realities. Thus, to create a culture out of a political concept, such as human rights, brings into finality the relational constitution of humanity. In other words, proposing a human rights culture maintains a humdrum way of existing that has been imposed from the top, it breeds a predictable consistent life of rationality as envisioned by Western rationality. And yet according to Fanon’s philosophical humanism it is imperative to release concepts (such as human rights) so that they induce the actional character of humanity (Fanon, 1952[2008]) by straining them away from the political elites’ construction to the open and dialogical progress of political consciousness.

Additionally, a key issue is that migration policy and law should mean much more than following Western liberal rationalism. It should stay clear from the conceptualisation that keeping migrants away from the nation is based on ensuring a stronger nation-building project or impressing the market logic. This is because they miss “the positive spin-offs from migrant labour” (Ngandwe, 2013:435/536) which could engender a new manner of constructing the nation through political consciousness. Political education, as a tool for nation-building, should not be about strengthening the perceived need that government should base its “resources and efforts in enforcing this Act at community level and discouraging foreigners; [and] detecting and deporting illegal foreigners” (Immigration Act,

2002:12 s. 2.1b). Nation-building should be address more than difference at a conceptual level, portraying the weak established Immigration practices in South Africa.

Furthermore, having assimilated into the Western market logic, in NEPAD through the creation of policy that sought to appease international institutions, the appearance of immigrants is conceptualised under criminality. The market logic requires that ‘healthy’ shock therapy is instituted in nation-states to induce the continuation of the markets, for South Africa this was provided rhetorically appeasing political risk indicators. Basically, South African state officials frequently mentioned and criminalised illegal aliens and subsumed this into the nation-building developmental objectives. Thus, stating that there will be a rooting of criminal elements through the removal of illegal aliens inspires confidence on international investments that developmental objectives are being achieved in South Africa. The criminalisation of African foreign nationals through ‘Operation Crackdown’ and similar state projects epitomises the laziness of the national bourgeoisie, which has failed to address the political by continuing to assault black bodies.

The assault on black bodies is provided in the Immigration Act through the, apartheid-like identification system. The Act states that,

when so requested by an immigration officer any person shall identify himself or herself as a *citizen, resident* or *foreigner* when so requested by an immigration officer or a police officer, and if on reasonable grounds such immigration officer or police officer is not satisfied that such person is entitled to be in the *Republic*, such immigration officer or a police officer may take such a person into custody without a warrant and if necessary detain him or her in a *prescribed* manner and place until such a person’s *prima facie status* or *citizenship* is ascertained (Immigration Act, 2002:62 s. 41).

Furthermore, as stated above community members are encouraged to also report people who should not be residing within South Africa. This would, to some extent, be appropriate if it was not based on prima facie evidence. In other words, people who are most likely to be policed, given South Africa’s history, are black bodies whom many can identify as being morphologically different than ‘native South Africans’. The ability to identify people on the streets reinforces the institutional racism and national chauvinism which the post-apartheid state professes to be against. Overall, the “criminalization, and the supposedly parasitical relationship of non- South Africans to national resources, suggests that the post-apartheid state sees most immigrants, and particularly undocumented migrants, as a severe threat to the nation and to the post-1994 nation-building process” (Peberdy, 2001:25).

Therefore, reconciling the latter with nation-building of South Africa is envisioned with the Human Rights Culture inculcated in the Human Rights Discourse founded on constitutionalism.

Paradoxically, the Act also states the need to “educate communities and organs of civil society on the rights of *foreigners, illegal foreigners* and refugees, and conduct other activities to prevent xenophobia” (Immigration Act, 2002:16). This is paradoxical as it fails to acknowledge the basis through which the education is derived from – liberal rationality. The inability to understand and fear the extent white supremacy (embedded in liberalism) has, to devalue humanity is the actual problem. Fanon (1952[2008]:222) states that, “to educate man to be actional, preserving in all his relations his respect for the basic values that constitute a human world, is the prime task of him who having taken thought, prepares to act.” Thus, the primacy is in releasing the political through allowing all to be led by post-colonial reasonability to constitute the praxis for a human world. The mere fact that the functions of the board members have been delegated to “5 persons from civil society” (Immigration Act, 2002:20) outside departmental representatives and experts appointed by the Minister, portrays the depoliticization of the masses. The ontology of an African is complex but what is clear is what continues to inform it, which is liberal rationality and that should be removed to ensure politics.

5.4.2 The Emancipatory Potential of the Human Rights Discourse

According to South African law all legislation and policy is required to be aligned with the human rights based Constitution. Here, one is led to question whether the human rights discourse, is enough for an emancipatory political praxis amongst the masses; answering this question leads one to deal with whether a human rights discourse offers emancipatory potential framework in which the Immigration Act exists on.

When mentioning the Human Rights Discourse one needs to consider that it is constitutive of two or more actions creating and redefining discursive relations within a society. For post-apartheid South Africa, human rights discourse comprises the interaction between state subjectivities (NGOs and Civil Society) and power. Therefore, Human Rights as it pertains to the humanity of an individual interacts with its initial epistemological construction, the historical immediacy of the nation, and construction of the nation based on liberal, social, communist, or popular frameworks and the substructure of the economy. Human rights discourse is the practical aspect of human rights. As a result, Neocosmos (2010) states that human rights need emancipatory praxis to make it alive, through the inclusion of political agency by the people. The application of human rights can therefore

entail statist discourses or popular emancipatory praxis (Neocosmos, 2010). Due to the latter, it must be brought into cognition the geographical epistemology of the application of human rights in a state.

The first notion of human rights was coined in France, in the Universal Declaration of the rights of man. This did not, however, include women and black people (Ranciere, 2006). The existence of human rights in this context served to emancipate a certain section in society whilst subordinating another, still claiming the universality of the notion. In other words, human rights came to pacify active political discussion and intellectual thought or actions were accorded to those who fit the conceptualisation of 'Man' (Neocosmos, 2010). The application of human rights is therefore a tender process that should ensure equality in politics and policy making from the beginning. And the latter presupposes the freeing up of the field through which people explore universality.

According to Badiou (2010), an event is the creation of new possibilities. The democratic transition for South Africa was however overlooked by the incessant focus on human rights discourse that was dominated by the civil society and NGOs (Neocosmos, 2010). These institutions capitalised on the experiences and intellectuality of the masses through legitimation processes attained from the state and neo-liberal donors. In so doing, human rights discourses mirrored the voices of the state and international organisations more than the political and social consciousness of the masses (Chatterjee, 2004). Thus, the idea of human rights within South Africa became a means to provide citizens a claim to their basic welfare, protection and dignity and statist discourse would have it. Put differently, human rights came to mirror belonging in a state through having due the discursive practices induced by the civil society and NGOs.

Fanon was aware of oppressive methods that flood new possibilities and stressed the necessity to dismantle the oppressor's machinery by introducing new thought processes in the democratic government (Gordon, 2006 and 2011). South Africa however, chose to apply the role of human rights through neoliberal paradigm, where the human rights discourse played the role of a 'schoolmaster', who enforces rule, what he explains is for the good of the students, without asking whether the students are in any manner inflicted by its application (Ranciere, 2010:167). In other words, there is no room for the student to be critical of the master's belief system. Thus, human rights become a universally understood concept that is used to justify the means in which the west takes over popular mass struggles in the name of 'democratising' their transition process. As a result, human rights discourse enforces a return by the people to their allotted place in the social structure and for them to vacate the field of

politics, leaving it to those who know how to follow, unquestioningly, technocracies (Neocosmos, 2010)

Concepts such as human rights tend to be socially constructed to express the current stature of the political order the new society fall under. By means of an example, human rights have been used as a strategic process in the rule of the African National Congress (ANC) whether this is done intentionally or not, particularly when addressing breaches on political praxis by the subaltern (those who are deemed as unintelligible). The state has managed to capitalise on human rights in stopping people from engaging in popular struggles and attaining their needs (Gibson, 2011). Decreasing emancipatory praxes of self-creation and placing the process of nation-building practice within the state through the human rights discourse depoliticises the people by placing power on a paternalistic state that has reached its 'final stage of emancipation'.

The pathologies in the human rights discourse cannot be disregarded as it obfuscates the purposes of an emancipatory political project. It leads up a blind alley for the mere reason that human rights, as a social construct, are associated with democratisation, guided by Western trajectories, as an end to emancipation. Human rights discourses, as applied in the nation-building project, limit the process of "what follows" (Ranciere, 1992:60) as it already assumes a perfected Westernised state with limits in political subjectivity because of citizenship and statehood. Human rights cannot be used as a theoretical framework for emancipation as it pertains to nation-building within South Africa as human rights discourse is written as a final transcript of emancipatory policies.

The work of a human rights discourse continues the imperial project on epistemology noted by Gordon (2011). Gordon (2011) states that epistemology assumes liberal rationality which requires consistency through the application of logical methods assumed from the Western trajectory. To do so however, is unreasonable, particularly in a post-colonial setting where the state exists before the nation and the nation-building project has been derived from "geographical, material imposition and the unnamed millions whose [trajectories] ... collapse not simply from the force of ideas but sword and musket" (Gordon, 2011:95). Thus, it fails to consider changing times and people's agency; thereby continuously developing the belief that those who inscribed Human rights are the only intelligent forces who understand what emancipatory politics is. Due to the, definition of emancipatory theoretical praxis one may conclude and say that there is no final emancipation and that there is always one position that is more emancipatory than another. Consequently, a human rights discourse as the final form of emancipation is not sufficient for an emancipatory theoretical praxis.

The political immediacy of human rights discourse to bring about an emancipatory praxis is social construction. Human rights were not simply human rights as they were constituted during the Enlightenment era. This means that one cannot give a de-epistemological account of human rights. This is because its very existence (immediacy) was based on asserting a grand narrative of universality, that white men are superior in their ontology. How human rights were imagined becomes the very reason as to why it fails as an emancipatory theoretical framework thereby writing off any emancipatory potential existing within immigration practices.

5.5 Conclusion: The Mbeki era

Mbeki's dominance in South Africa's nation-building has been present for longer than his years of being South Africa's president. The utterances and ideologies Mbeki stood on represented the pan-Africanist paradigm of thought. However, given the Immigration Act's structuring one is left to believe that pan-Africanism was a rhetorical promise never to be fulfilled. Fanon's philosophical humanism dictates that emancipation occurs during the contestation of the political, evoking action and much agency from all levels of society within the society through the application of universal humanism. The Act in involving historical materialism in the restriction of movement has been subsumed to whiteness by assuming that the main fight is against the unemployment of South African citizens than the progression of humanistic concepts that dialectically interact with abstract and concrete issues within the nation. It is therefore important to provide a dialectical relational approach that the described and inferred nation-building and immigration practices undergoes and the how nation-building can be used to provide emancipatory praxis within the nation.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

The social practice of hatred towards African nationals occurring across South Africa led to this pertinent investigation. As a result, it was contended that the deficiency of emancipatory political concepts in nation-building discourses gives rise to negative immigration practices. Thus, the availability of emancipatory concepts in political rhetoric and praxes would lead to a more humanising response to African migrants in post-apartheid South Africa. This section will lead a conclusion of the analysis formulated in the previous chapters and recommendations for the entire dissertation by providing answers to the research questions formulated. The latter will be based upon Fanon's philosophical humanism as an emancipatory theory. It will be processed using the methods of critical discourse analysis propounded by Fairclough (2009), who states that discourses and social practices assume a dialectical relationship.

6.1 What are Nation-Building Practices

The transition into an era of democracy in South Africa, as a post-colonial nation, came with many intellectual opportunities of learning and unlearning one's humanity in the post-modern world. The sentiments echoed in this research, which are stipulated from framing critical discourse analysis methods in the post-colonial paradigm, reveal the need for praxis in transition that aims for dialectic in humanity. A dialectic that goes beyond the need to address one's self based on the messages attained from the past and rather addresses things as they are situated now, as a stage that has been set forth by the past injustices. The study puts, that the transitioning moment in South Africa was the climax through which the yoke of inhumane, anti-dialectic and non-African ideals were to be abandoned. A surface level account of the South African state makes belief that all Africans in the state are free; that finally the cry of *Mayibuye i-Afrika* resounds in victory as there is freedom for all Africans. However, is there truly freedom for all Africans when African nationals are criminalised and their violent treatment is overlooked as criminal elements by civilians? Sekyi-Otu (1996:12) asks a pertinent question, "is this event, [democratic transition] for all its particularities, the iridescent light that truly relieves the oppressive monotony of the encircling African gloom? Or is it but another cruel prelude to what Armah, threnodist¹¹ of the postcolonial condition, saw as the ineluctable miscarriage of 'the beauty of the first days'?" Freedom should entail ripping away all scars of apartheid by revealing the systematic effects of apartheid on the

¹¹ This word is used in the quote and refers to a person who writes a poem usually sombre that seeks to lament on a past world.

colonised mind by unapologetically applying emancipatory praxis. This dissertation therefore recommends Fanonian philosophical humanism as a gateway to imagine such a society and critically engage with failures to entrench radical democracy.

What is found is that the political strength of a nation can be viewed by the implementation of policies that not only provide materialistic improvement but provide a foundation for political maturation in the dialectic of humanity. This is because a constitutional democracy or a liberal state based on the flow of 'democratic' market principles does not equate to the freedom of the people even those who were considered rich, because on the streets of South Africa if you appear to be 'too black' and represent another side of Africa you are not free to exist, whether you contribute to the wealth of the nation or not. In other words, until nation-building is used as a tool to address the hatred of things that are black through launching an invective against the system that founded this degenerative logic, the progression of humanity will continue to be limited by epistemic constructions. The issue therefore is not with class or historic materialism but the issue lays squarely on the construction of national consciousness that delimits political and social consciousness which appreciates one's lived reality (African truisms) in the formation of a nation. Thus, laws and policies emanating from the ruling of a president particularly in the early years of democracy, carry the burden of releasing emancipatory praxes which will lead to the development of the nation economically and politically. Using Fanon's philosophical humanism, it was hypothesised that, the more political rhetoric constitutes of emancipatory concepts and praxes, the more humanising the response to African immigrants in post-apartheid South Africa. The eventualities would be removing being and belonging within the post-colonial state from the Western liberal state parameters and placing within the emancipatory praxis of humanity. Therefore, all who live within that community would participate in the rethinking of the post-colonial state through their immediate lived praxis, without the pressure of 'democratisation principles'.

In the case of South Africa, nation-building practices were constituted by the dynamic interaction of the political elite's mediated settlement and the speeches made by the President. Fanon (1961[1991]) states that these speeches serve to pacify the nation and only arouse their consciousness on the celebrations of national holidays that serve as a remembrance for the work performed by the party in freeing the masses (Fanon, 1961[1991]). The practice of nation-building therefore becomes an empty shell of what could have been a great philosophy of praxis. This is evident in South Africa through the masses only taking part in national consciousness as mandated by the national bourgeoisie or ruling party. For

South Africa, this occurs because the political has been appropriated by the party structures particularly within the ANC. The collective building up of a nation is about moving consciousness of the whole people and the assumption of that responsibility on the historical scale. Therefore, the “national government should equal to a government that governs by the people and for the people, for the outcasts and by the outcasts” (Fanon, 1961[1991]:205). Based on this, no leader should be substituted for the popular will. Unfortunately, this is not the case in nation-building practices in South Africa.

In conclusion, Fanon’s philosophical humanism conceptualises nation-building as emanating from the humanistic practices of the people. Nation-building within South Africa has a post-colonial aspect to it, and cannot be attributed to the westernised discourse of nation-building. As a result, the phenomenon of immigration becomes controversial as its historicity becomes muddled in the post-coloniality of the nation. Thus, nation-building becomes a tool in and of itself to champion unity, within a nation rooted in philosophical humanism. Nation-building is therefore not a practice superseded by institutional mandates such as capitalism/state-capitalism, development, civil society, human rights, national bourgeoisie, citizenship, non-racialism, and non-sexism. Nor is it superseded by ideological pragmatism such as democratisation, state-building, modernisation, post-conflict reconstruction, peace-building, and identity formation; rather it is the actual mode through which political consciousness is achieved. Nation-building practices are the root of national action in the political in the postcolonial nation. Thus, the political consciousness of the nation is what is at stake in the formation of immigration practices. And due to this, nation-building informs immigration practices within the nation.

6.2 What is the Dialectical Relation of Nation-building Practices to Immigration Practices

This research assumes that discourses emanating from nation-building practices and immigration practices interact with one another and the diverse social elements within the post-colonial world, to construct African nationals as restricting South African national hopes. The Mandela and Mbeki chapters gave a descriptive theoretical analysis of nation-building and immigration practices and thus by means of conclusion, it is imperative to situate the dialectical relation involved. It is given that nation-building discourses interact with the social elements – immediacy, forms of consciousness, activities and instruments, and subjects and social relations (which are implied in the contention) dialectically (Fairclough, 2009).

Critical discourse analysis states that the production of meaning in speeches is intrinsically constitutive with what led it into being, the structures maintaining or enabling that practice, and the way people interact with the practice (Fairclough, 2009). Thus, social practices are constitutive of the social elements that lead to its production and human enabled movements. To reiterate, discourse according to critical discourse analysis is associated with power. The presence of discourses already lays a basis on which discursive interactions of lived experiences occurs. Discourse, as power, therefore already takes part in its own dialectic before subjects and social relations interact with it particularly in the post colony. In other words, critical discourse analysis acknowledges the dialectic involved in the process of the construction of discourse as a social practice.

The unfolding of the dialectic in the postcolonial world begins with the masses taking their cue from the national bourgeoisie who per party politics already entail a particular construction of their discourses. Additionally, these discourses interact with the national bourgeois experiences in the liberation struggle and the prevailing ideologies within the international system. The actions therefore emanating from the masses is a product of trajectories that do not necessarily appreciate the lived reality of the people. Each discursive moment produces a dialectical action thus relating with other social practices within the state. In short, Fanon (1961[2008]) gives a practical dialectic with national discourses and national attitudes. Fanon (1961[1991]) states that when the national bourgeoisie run after the posts in government and demand that colonialists leave the administration to the natives, the masses also follow suite and pillage houses and businesses of African immigrants (Fanon, 1961[1991]).

Historically, Fanon (1961[1991]) acknowledges the role of a hard-working bourgeoisie, with the means of capital, to provide the powerful ground for the state to create space for the masses to dialectically experience their humanity. Unfortunately, since the national bourgeoisie lack the means, and are too lazy to pursue them, succumbing to deals with the colonialist, the role of the middle class becomes useless in a post-colonial society (Fanon, 1961[1991]). Their uselessness is thus observed dialectically. That is, since humane practices are not established in their pursuit for the bourgeois phase what will emerge are inhumane practices in their pursuit of national consciousness (Fanon, 1961[1991]). Fanon (1961:204) therefore states that “if nationalism is not made explicit, not enriched and deepened by a rapid transformation into a consciousness of social and political needs, if nationalism is not made into a humanism it leads up a blind alley”. This shows that nation-building practices inform the type of immigration policies and laws that will be used in the

nation. Thus, their dialectical relationship is one of mutual constitution as they lead to a form of nationalism within the state that does not provide a space for the humanistic progression of humanity, instead national chauvinism arises.

6.3 What is the Dialectical Relation of Nation-building Practices to Immigration Policies and Laws during Mandela's Era?

6.3.1 Time and Place: The Political and Historical Immediacy in the Mandela Era

The national construction of post-apartheid South Africa was dictated to by hegemonic structures; that is, from the moment Nelson Mandela wrote from prison that nationalisation was a doctrine of the ANC which the ANC would not abandon, systems reacted to it. Due to this, the shock therapy (Klein, 2007) introduced by monopoly capital on the South African state rewrote the narrative of national construction to one of legitimation. The nation-building discourse that would be devoured by the masses in South Africa dialectically interacted with hegemony to reposition nation-formation as suiting Western economic standards. When Mandela's inauguration speech was heard, it had dialectically interacted with the political and historical immediacy of the post-colonial nation instructed by Western agents of change – particularly through the interactions in the World Economic Forum of 1992. From the point of 'conversion' (Herbst and Mills, 2015)¹² at Davos to the Inauguration speech, Mandela became more open and welcoming to the influence of global leaders and systems, thanks to the shock therapy introduced by capital flight from South Africa (Klein, 2007).

Rather than pursuing the revolutionary agenda of the Freedom Charter, Mandela's speeches offered the people of South Africa institutionally aligned, democratic, Western arrangements as the end through which a new South Africa would be created. Popular practices were reduced to universal suffrage and the dictates of the ruling party. This was further institutionalised historically in South Africa to revolutionary subjects being submerged into civil society organisations. The passivity evident in the speeches of Nelson Mandela shows the dialectics of power upon discourses as anti-democratic forces were described metaphorically. That is, rather than mentioning key players within society that protracted liberal and conservative views the notion – 'democratic' market systems – bulwarked them. Consequently, the failure to mention boldly the oppressor constitutively

¹² Many commentators (Klein, 2007 and Herbst and Mills, 2015) state that the Davos conference was where Nelson Mandela converted. They speak about his conversion as Mandela's 'Damascus' experience where he converted from the ANC's nationalisation policy to adopting a neoliberal economic policy for the nation.

interacted with the passive tone of liberal democracy within nation-building discourses, and limited political space. Thus, politics was dialectically inferred as emanating from people who were led by the party structure of the ANC. The rhetoric provided in the speeches therefore left the party, but more so the leader, standing on a high ground upon which no one could supersede. Consequently, the rhetoric on nation-building discourse, available in Mandela's speeches enacted the legitimacy of the government and the party leading it.

Politics is therefore only made available within the party discourse or the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Thus, all that the party 'democratically' allotted as social and economic policy was interpreted as being revolutionary whilst lacking emancipatory praxis. One might then add, that rather than speaking on behalf of the people as their leader, the party spoke on their behalf because they knew 'what was best for them'. This is inscribed through the praxis of constitutionalism and paternalistic party politics. Thus, the acceptance of the party (through the experience at the WEF) by the international society and organisations dialectically interacts with nation-building discourses to formulate a hegemonic construction of the party. That is, the paternalistic policies of Reconstruction and Development Programme and Affirmative Action were constructed because of market principles that were being adhered to by the ANC, after its conversion in Davos.

Amid this, the people, as subjects of this dialectical interaction, are not given the space to conjure responses for themselves. They are also not enabled to think for themselves about the type of national consciousness they are to be awoken to. Therefore, the legitimacy of the party, through its ability to transcend the immediate context of the people and their lived realities confounds the masses and leads them up a blind alley as the people cannot think beyond the struggle days which are aroused during speeches given by the party and the songs sung in commemoration of the struggle.

On this point, Fukuyama (1992) as a proponent of liberal democracy, contends that there has been an end of history. History in this context is used in the same way that post-colonial theorists use it, that is, the progression of humanity or its evolution into a higher form of consciousness. Since the liberal state was being hotly contested, internationally, and advocated for during the years of South Africa's political transition (late 1980s into 1994), its amalgamation was reasonably expected. This continued to espouse a false narrative that free market ideologies are coherent with democratic principles as politically transitioning societies that opted for democratic rule enmeshed it with capitalism. Thus, this international development confused the political and historical immediacy of South Africa particularly due to the defeat of communism following the end of the Cold War. Taking hold of liberal

democracy as the final consciousness of the nation-state, in the case of post-colonial South Africa, meant overlooking that the systems ruling within the nation-state are there because humans have given them the power to operate. As a result, the negation of humanistic progress within the state, produced elitist political systems, evident in nation-building discourses.

6.3.2 Forms of Consciousness in Mandela

Nelson Mandela came to speak about the rainbow nation in his inauguration speech. This form of consciousness presented by Mandela was adopted from Tutu's African humanism based upon the inalienable right to dignity, hope, unity, and peace. These values bestow positive attributes to the discourse of Mandela however the way these values are applied may defer emancipatory praxes. As is the case for rainbow nation, which was first professed in the Inauguration, which positioned 'rainbowism' as a representation of the nation that should be, rather than how things are within the nation. In other words, the way rainbowism was insinuated in the speech portrays that it was enacted (through a top-down process) as a living practice through the materialisation of the RDP, and as a new way of interacting with one another in the nation-state. Put differently, the rainbow nation in its literal sense came to enact ways of relating with one another through the acceptance of diversity and the prevalent rhetoric of tolerance. Since the latter did not exist across the apartheid state of South Africa, there was a performance of a false consciousness, as a national identity of the new South Africa rooted on tolerance. However, what this performative tautology initiated by Mandela did, was instead of addressing past injustices, it overlooked the substandard treatment black people shared. Black people were bound by the unavoidable dehumanisation, experienced in colonialism and apartheid, that provided a generic language for their lost humanity whether an immigrant or 'native'. Thus, black people related to one another as through the overall oppression occurring on black people during apartheid. Therefore, the quick assertion of a rainbow nation served to unite the state more than the nation. This is because non-racialism was and continues to be performed on black lived reality to the exclusion of whiteness. Non-racialism is unheeded for white rationality or universalism and the role it plays in demystifying black lived reality. Rather, it is used to pacify black people so they silence their raging black soul. In other words, blackness accepts misfortune accrued because of apartheid through 'non-racialism' discourses.

The endorsement of rainbow nation thus produced the reasonability of whiteness (through non-racialism being the crux of rainbowism) in society without debunking its being.

Thus, politics is acted out in the sphere of whiteness being reasonable on the basis that it apologised for its ‘inhumanity’ through Tutu’s TRC. Fanon’s philosophical humanism insists that the incessant focus of race, as the colour of one’s skin through ‘non-racialism’, decreases the progression of humanity. The focus on race assumes that once the diverse set of skin colours interact tolerably, racism disappears and everyone can sing kumbaya together under the *dark, mystical African night sky*. Instead, the focus should be on the racially constructed experiences; in other words, emancipatory politics pertains to becoming, that is, constantly reconstituting oneself in a world where black people are a problem. This “racist rationality” (Gordon, 2006:1) needs to be removed from the political consciousness of the nation. So that constitutional democracy and the legal principles mixed with party politics do not infringe on political consciousness to create a weak national culture. Thus, what is revealed is that instead of forms of consciousness that addressed emancipatory praxis, rainbowism and elitist African constructions continued to be performed through sporting events, the media, advertising agencies and the leadership within Africa.

6.3.3 Activities and Instruments in Mandela

The passive presentation of the analysed speeches of the first democratically elected president and its liberal inclination gave birth to a South African socioeconomic policy laden with neoliberal undertones. The discourses therefore produced a citizenry that is only acknowledged by being right-bearing persons within the South African post-apartheid state. To reiterate, the RDP and GEAR policies were the main instruments used to enact the new identity of the South African populace. The RDP as a base document of South Africa’s nation-building provided belonging as having. In the same breadth, GEAR with AA measures created a citizenry entitled to a government that creates positive situations for the citizens without active engagement by the masses on the economic implications of their lived reality. The latter occurred through the instrument of change found in the discourse presented in GEAR, which sought to create growth within South Africa by introducing a form of structural adjustment programmes. These programmes created an entitled middle class, without the drive to champion the national bourgeois cause and as a result, obstacles that infringed on these programmes were removed without the consent of the political praxis of the people of South Africa.

Consequently, an epistemological framework that discursively confers the exceptional upon the South African instruments, constructs a new identity that situates being as having. This occurs through situating the performance of the political (by the party elite), as service provisioning or presenting ‘aid’ to the citizens, through the RDP. In other words, the people,

in policy, who do not attain from the state are constructed as illegal. Thus, the ‘illegal’ people are easily pinpointed because they are the people defrauding those who rightly deserve the benefits of RDP. The synthesis of these discursive categories is the barring of the political and emancipatory potential for the human condition because migration (a historical phenomenon) is deemed to be illegal. As mentioned above, politics is restricted to a few neoliberal instruments within the state. In the liberal doctrine, all men are counted as property owners, in their individual state and are required to work that land, making meaning of their being through property. Property as a statement of material possession falls squarely as having. Thus, those who innately do not have according to South Africa’s policy are considered as being outside the nation. Existing outside the nation leaves humanity vulnerable to those property owners and gives space for the antithetical behaviour such as violence and exclusion from social existence.

The latter dialectically unfolds through the relation of RDP, GEAR, and the White Paper on International Migration. These instruments that have constitutively interacted with one another, and the discourses give rise to other social elements, creating activities in the nation inculcated on the people. Such an activity is immigration practices. The discourse in the White Paper for International Immigration dialectically interacts with the activities represented by the social practice of nation-building. The language, in the Immigration Policy document, clarifies that illegal immigrants are branded through identification processes that occurs on the streets by immigration officers, and the help from citizens who alert the police. The language encourages the notion of Africans in Africa being illegal through the morphological arrangement of belonging within the nation – given the street identification process. Immigration practices have therefore been reconstituted under the social elements that brought nation-building practices into being. Because nation-building practices are built in as ‘national security’ through exceptionalism, measures that strain out the gnat from the soup – immigration practices are therefore produced for the purposes of excluding that which derails nation-building.

6.3.4 Concluding the Dialectic in the Mandela Era

The dialectical relation of nation-building practices to immigration practices in the Mandela era reveal nation-building as continuously interactive with social practices and undergoes the unfortunate move to economic determinism. The state and the forces aligned with it are allotted the primary responsibility of social, economic, and political development. One of the benefits of citizenship under this perspective is eligibility to services provided by the state. Thus nation-building is situated in the discussion of the exclusion of the ‘foreign

other' in attaining resources. Therefore, the relation is in nation-building suffering the impact of depoliticization wherein chauvinistic policies arise that lead to xenophobic sentiments as the political is constantly suffocated through praxis in the nation-state. Thus, as Neocosmos (2010) observed, nation-building in South Africa due to the liberal rhetoric of its politics has become more about managing the situation of state driven politics more than a practice influenced and lead by the people in the constant search of an emancipatory praxis.

6.4 What is the dialectical relation of nation-building practices to immigration policies and laws during Mbeki's era?

6.4.1 Time and Place: Political and Historical Immediacy in Mbeki Era

In many ways, Mbeki's Presidency was a production of Mandela's presidency. Mbeki, therefore was riding the wave of a failing economic model for South Africa's inclusive and democratic society. However, what the dialectical relation emerging from the social element of immediacy provided was that to enrich a democratic society, a black bourgeois class is necessary. Unfortunately, the limitation of political education within the nation meant that the people were not engaged in the resilience of the bourgeois phase. Instead, the ideologies of the president presided over the formation of that economic project. As a result, the "self-limiting political transition" (Gibson, 2011:111) within South Africa's nation-building practices, through the retraction of popular organisation as carrying the will of the people constructed the dominating tone of politics in South Africa.

Nation-building practices related with time and place to formulate a 'self' that was enclosed in the interpretation of the elite and thus awaiting directives from the top to make a move on one's emancipation. Therefore, despite the insinuation of continental consciousness through Africanist notions in the speech *I am an African*, a dominating Africanist perception was not instilled in the South African discourse. In other words, *I am an African* was overlooked by the elitist constructions of national policy. Furthermore, what clouded the Africanist theme inherent in Mbeki's discourse that had a unifying potential was that it was formulated rhetorically during the celebration of an institutional document in which human rights discourse in South Africa would be founded. Thus, the dialectical relation was one of a confounded national identity because the use of human rights does not necessarily initiate the culmination of humanity in the postcolonial state. Human rights discourse fails from the onset in South Africa as cultural and political realities continue to be meshed within the construction of people's identity.

Thus, a universalising ideology like human rights discourse related directly to the liberal democracy. In South Africa's post-colonial history, the liberal state insinuated has

failed to provide that ‘final stage’ of human progression (in terms of Hegelian dialectic) because it failed to ensure peace for all people. This is because cultural and political realities have been meshed within the construction of the nation. As a result, political stability and peace are not a direct product of liberal tenets in the post-colonial nation because liberalism is not used as the only universalising ideology. In other words, ensuring political emancipation and peace does not always coincide with Western ideals such as constitutionalism or human rights discourse as they may be the very system repressing the progression of humanity in the post-colonial world. Liberalism in South Africa’s nation-building discourses interacts to enforce violence, chauvinism and ultra-nationalism in which history is emaciated due to the exceptionality of human movement.

6.4.2 Forms of Consciousness in Mbeki Era

The dialectical interaction of rainbowism and hegemonic structures, by creating new ways of relating between the subjects in the nation-state, was constitutive of the Human Rights Discourse which in turn also interacted with rainbowism. Thus, the introduction of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 led to the inculcation of this manner of being – a national identity of right-bearing citizens. The Constitution having clearly described the people who belong within South Africa through difference infused in citizenship, continues to provide for right-bearing citizens.

Concurrently arising was the African Renaissance as an ideology that had awoken to the fallacy within the Rainbow Nation. Thus its inception was, from the onset, constituted by the prior narrative of rainbowism. The African Renaissance interacted with the forms of consciousness that would awaken the intellectual rigour of Africans across the continent and into the diaspora. As a result, this ideology was not limited to issues surrounding South Africa’s past but was continental in its approach.

In the construction of a prevailing African narrative, Mbeki fails to give meaning to the everyday lived experiences of the people thereby opting for an elitist construction of the African narrative by serving African leaders. One ought not to forget that these leaders before they are in power are given authority by the willed actions of the masses, thus the lived reality of the masses should be preferred over nursing egos of African leaders. Mbeki came to construct consciousness based on the substandard character the west had brandished Africans with. The African Renaissance was internalised as having constitutively interacted with Africans who were trying to prove their humanity as being good enough for the international society. This meant the African Renaissance implicitly made Western universalism as the goal par excellence which dialectically unfolds in the neoliberal construction of NEPAD.

Therefore, the African Renaissance was an endowment of the man of culture within Africa performed dialectically under the constraints of Western universalism. The socioeconomic transformation of the construction of NEPAD was aided by the cultural language provided by Mbeki in the *I am an African* speech. Discourse therefore dialectically interacting with the African Renaissance to bring upon a policy which sought to unite Africa by bringing accountability and transparency on African political leaders.

Evidently, the form of consciousness embedded in Mbeki's nation-building discourse has been constituted by the social process of NEPAD which was not based upon the consideration of a political people. The political was not readily made available thus the materialisation of the discourses seen in the below mentioned activities and instruments was based on a politically inactive citizenry.

6.4.3 Activities and Instruments in Mbeki Era

As mentioned above, politics is restricted to a few neoliberal instruments within the state. In the liberal doctrine, all men are counted as property owners, in their individual state and are required to work that land, making meaning of their being through property. Property as a statement of material possession falls squarely as having. Thus, those who innately do not have according to South Africa's policy are considered as being outside the nation. Existing outside the nation leaves humanity vulnerable to those property owners and gives space for the antithetical behaviour such as violence and exclusion from social existence. The latter is most evident when having is not necessarily attained and thus clear neoliberal policy, such as GEAR and Affirmative Action, is made available without the consent of the people.

With regards to the latter, the dialectical relation of continuously imposed elitist activities and instruments suffocates humanity. In Africa, Immigration Laws, so to speak, formed part of the cultural reality of nation. Given that "African cultures had sophisticated mechanisms for integrating strangers" (Neocosmos, 2010: xii) such systems would have been natural to bring into the politics of a free South Africa. Thus, in South Africa, immigration practices have become embedded in the politics of a weak emancipatory framework for politics. Therefore, the imaginaries of how things should be within South Africa through the construction of immigration practices by those who belong, to exclude those who are outside of the South African society, constitutes the construction of a new identity which is wholly exclusive of African migrants. Essentially, the discourses (the language and rhetoric used in Immigration Law) interacts with the social elements dialectically. They become enacted, through a performative tautology initiated by a passive citizenry, and inculcated through the construction of new ways of being. The new way of being is performed by actively

excluding those who do not belong. These exclusionary practices occur because nation-building is performed as a project which extends into the construction of the nation by excluding those who do not belong through immigration practices.

Due to this, Fanon's philosophical humanism provides that nation-building should instead encapsulate emancipatory political concepts; however, not as a project but as a tool through which the political is constantly invoked in national spaces and constructions. In so doing, Fanon's philosophical humanism postulates that if emancipatory praxis would be made possible, nation-building would avert the tendency to construct African nationals as a challenge to the post-apartheid state of South Africa, and be understood as a historical continuation of humanity – the continuation of history. Nation-building as a tool of analysis shows that nation-building practices inform immigration practise in South Africa. And since their construction have been based off terms that lack emancipatory potential they have misconstrued African nationals, in South Africa, as a threat to national security. Thus, if Nation-building was enriched to give meaning to the lived experiences of the masses a humanistic model would develop.

6.5 Recommendations:

6.5.1 Short Summary

Fanon (1961[1991]) states that we should provide a space for the political which would start the onward progression of humanity that would lead to healthy building of the nation bit by bit (praxis) that would deviate from inhumane and anti-dialectical actions against African foreign nationals. Fanon's humanism perceives that construction of national consciousness is not based upon a perfectly running and consistent system. Rather, it is founded on the actions of humans to will their emancipation and to bring upon humanistic ideologies that construct humanity as capable of thinking outside a system that supposes political supremacy upon the nation. Thus, nation-building when it is assumed within the postcolonial nation should be based on the concept that the human can achieve their emancipation through willed actions in their lived realities. The work of the political elite in the post-colony who are the leaders of the liberation struggle is to let aside the power of the human condition to evolve and give space for this union of thought. "Each generation must out of relative obscurity discover its mission, fulfil it, or betray it" (Fanon, 1961[1991]:206). It is not within the leaders reach to imagine what follows next but the next generation gets to think of a newer and immediate solution that abides with their lived experiences.

To surmise, nation-building in Western discourse is an overall project to achieve the correct formulation of a Western rational state model with the overriding project of myth

construction for the formation of a nation. In South Africa, similar bearings may be seen mainly through the creation of a ‘Rainbow Nation’ and the ‘African Renaissance’. Both concepts have been constituted as a nation-building project within South Africa through the creation of institutional mandates, national identity construction, and ideological configurations. Consequently, what is the first philosophy of the nation, the politics of the national culture has been construed by an overriding Western narrative of what nation-building is – of what building a nation bit-by-bit is.

Post-colonial theorists are concerned with the quick and heightened application of Western dogmas to African situation. As a result, Fanon (1961[1991]) advocates for a national culture that is based on the political and social immediacy of the nation because it can also address hypermodernity or what Fanon calls appearing “Too late” (Fanon, 1952[2008]:91) in the international system. In doing so, one should not be quick to assert that past leaders did not fight hard enough because “they fought as well as they could, with the arms that they possessed then” (Fanon, 1961[1991]:207). However, what needs to be done is that the new generation needs to take up its own fight; and this goes with the responsibility of the older generation of letting way for the new national culture in the state (Fanon, 1961[1991]). The older generation needs to understand that they fought to pave a way for politics to continue; and thus, imposing political rhetoric that fails to engage with the epistemic racism of national construction lacks the emancipation the masses desire. Fanon (1961[1991]) thus shows that in the postcolonial the dialectics of experience is open but messy and provides a way for new concepts and issues to be critically engaged with. In other words, the revolution is not for those fighting it but is for the next generation to keep up the fight to dialectically improve the human condition. The revolutionary agenda can therefore not be kept within the hold of party politics for the political elite.

6.5.2 Enriching the Dialectical Interaction of Nation-building and Immigration Practices

If this is so, then socioeconomic policies should address the need for politics and should not limit this engagement or congest it into nation-building projects or party spaces. Nation-building should be the actual tool for the creation of national culture. Nation-building should therefore be a tool creating space for the political where freedom or the “beauty of the first days” does not create a nation where being and belonging has kept the same – where black people are still constructed as problem people. The people should fashion for themselves their own revolution to change the systems that kept apartheid intact.

Fanon (1961[1991]) made this point in the chapter, *Pitfalls of National Consciousness*, when he referred to the emancipatory praxis of working one's land, during the Algerian Revolution. Managing property, production and their sovereignty was done through the language of the people and their daily desires to have enough and to experience fulfilment in the act of working for-themselves. The consciousness of the people was ignorant and therefore not theoretically inspired (Fanon, 1961[1991]). Put differently, the language of economics and law, the "technical language" (Fanon, 1961[1991]:189), was refuted and rather "the language of everyday" (Fanon, 1961[1991]:188) was initiated. Now the language of everyday is the lived reality of each person, it is a performance of their political immediacy interlocked with historicity which is their continued will to exist even during the psychological and epistemological war of colonialism. The latter is unconsciously performed, in other words it is a consciousness that is ignorant to the performance. Management was the lived reality of the Algerians and due to this "the accumulation of capital ceased to be a theory and became a very real and immediate mode of behaviour" (Fanon, 1961[1991]:190). Out of these actions the Algerians then started asking theoretical questions (Fanon, 1961[1991]). In short, theory did not think for them but their black realities constructed the theory that was appropriate which is what the dialectic is about for Fanon.

Thus, deploying the use of Rainbow Nation or African Renaissance cannot come from a place of maintaining political control but it should come from a place of opening possibilities for all African people. Thus, one needs to comprehend that the forces of each dialectical interaction with nation-building practices and immigration practices are not produced by hegemonic discourses that give rise to ideologies that represent certain people in society as substandard. What the political leaders and native intellectuals must comprehend is that the need to suppose a Rainbow Nation or an African Renaissance as the culture of the nation is unnecessary. The latter is because national culture already exists in the heart and rhythm of the people's immediate realities (Fanon, 1961[1991]). Culture is therefore not superimposed from above but it is what has been occurring during the national liberation (Fanon, 1961[1991]). Nation-building and immigration practices are best constituted through the immersion of national culture, rhetorically asserted by the political elite, and by the people's existence that provides a theoretical basis for the dynamic interaction of national culture. Forgetting the people and asserting a superior culture from Western counterparts is a failure to interact with the epistemic warfare waged against the postcolonial state; which is founded on the assumption that black people cannot offer thought and theoretical concepts that develop the nation.

Thus, to quickly subject the nation to a rainbow myth of inclusiveness and tolerance when the dignity of people continues to be derailed due to the poverty inherited under the rule of white minority is antithetical. This is because the white minority may find it easier to slip into this consciousness as their white reality is reinforced, even in the disdain of blackness, without any performance of removing oneself from their past colonial thought-habits. The sermonising of rainbow nation fails to address the historicity of reason. It does this by forgetting that the concept ‘universalism’ was capitalised by Western racist frameworks. To continue pursuing a universalism, supported by Western rationality, without addressing the epistemological condescension of Western universalism is firstly, illogical for emancipatory purposes and secondly, dehumanising to the suffering black population. Failing to address the latter maintains the stronghold of Western universalism in the political and social consciousness of the people.

On the other hand, the people, or the black majority, who reason was unattainable from, are subjected to inclusivity without having fully achieved emancipation as their actions are slowly set aside (in socioeconomic policy) for the universalising mission of national consciousness that fails to consider the wretched of the earth (Fanon, 1961[1991]). Consequently, to equate *–(um)ntu* with a system that fails to address humanity epistemologically by dressing it up in Western universalistic notions is not emancipatory. Thus, one cannot invoke concepts from a said Ubuntu narrative that fails to address the *–ntu* of it all (Praeg, 2014), and such a discourse is rainbow nation and the Africanist tone found in the African Renaissance. One cannot perform the rainbow nation when the *–ntu* is not given an opportunity to critically engage with its lived realities and in doing so creating theory for its political and social consciousness. As a result, addressing *–ntu* and subsuming it into constitutionalism, democratisation narratives and policies is fatal to the progression of the human condition in South Africa.

Similarly, African Renaissance as a continental attack on colonialism, to superimpose an African culture lacks emancipatory potential because it exists in the social policy which frames a black person who is morphologically untypical of the ‘native’ black South African as a problem to the state. Nation-building and immigration practices should be “an invitation to action and a basis for hope” (Fanon, 1961[1991]:232). If the concepts therefore rest on paradigms that are self-limiting and based on the vulnerability of a person from protecting themselves against a state, such concepts do not serve the purpose of action. And where there is inaction, the restless muscular tension (Fanon, 1961[1991]) of the masses can be translated

into chauvinistic actions against those who these practices deem to be the problem. To quote Fanon (1961[1991]:233) extensively:

We must not therefore be content with delving into the past of a people in order to find coherent elements which will counteract colonialism's attempts to falsify and harm. We must work and fight the same rhythm as the people to construct the future and to prepare the ground where vigorous shoots are already springing up. A national culture is not a folklore, nor an abstract populism that believes it can discover the people's true nature.

To clarify, recital of poems is imperative in the creation of a "critical consciousness" (Gordon, 2006b:1) when there is a space for politics, and when the struggle party or neoliberal frameworks do not close politics. The introduction of *I Am an Africa* is helpful when African culture is not based upon a withheld humanity, displaced emotions, and an inability to break loose of those systems holding back humanity so that the people implode. All that wills emancipation must come from the masses or they implode.

Fanon (1961[1991]) deals with the latter (implosion) as "muscular tension" (Fanon, 1961[1991]: 54,241). This is when a postcolonial nation-building fails to offer a theoretical construction of the lived reality of the people and chooses to use ideas or ideologies to construct a living situation that is non-existent. This false consciousness therefore influences the need to act out by the masses. The stipulation by Fanon (1961[1991]) is that every generation needs to figure out its cause and defend it but when this political event is usurped for the political rhetoric of the party rooted in neoliberal paradigms that people's agency is diminished. And as offered by Fanon's philosophical humanism that appearing too late in the political sphere where every conception of the masses lived situation has already been thought of in advanced there appears to be agony. What is proposed therefore is that this agonising tendency of an imposed neoliberal doctrine being forced amongst the people is self-limiting and the masses implode but since mass suicide is uncommon and neither is mass rage against the legally protected native black South Africans (due to legal systems that protect South African citizens), and neither is it common against the previous white oppressors (given the democratic transition in South Africa); the next people who are affected by this implosion are black men, women and children who have no protection from the law. Thus, the lack of a humanistic framework for immigration practices interacts with nation-building practices to create in South Africa 'anti-black' (Gordon, 2006b) sentiments towards those deemed to be African immigrants, illegal or not.

However, these are dressed in constitutionalism and legally correct language to conceal the actual issue of the construction of nation-building in South Africa. The agency of the masses is therefore performed from the self-limiting construction of the constitution and national policy. As a concluding remark for this section the dissertation therefore puts forward that the implosion is overt. More than muscular tension affecting the people physically, through mass suicide, what occurs is violence against those who look like them – black people. The muscular tension is imminent in their mentality however, since the space for the political is unavailable the people are hardly aware of the inferiority complex building up in their minds. The failure to provide concepts that deal with the reasoning of colonialism and its tendency to theorise black people as problematic and the failure to go further to allow the revolution or the renewal of Africa to be fashioned through the rhythm of the people leads to inhumane and chauvinistic behaviour or frameworks for people.

6.6 Areas Deserving Additional Study

The dialectics of nation-building practice and immigration practice provide us with a skeletal framework of how national construction can disintegrate into inhumane practices from the people who were once dehumanised. Consequently, there is a need to introduce a new humanism from the actional realities of the people. The necessity to build up a nation will therefore stem from the need to build universalising values that are parallel to the progression of the human condition (Fanon, 1961[1991]). It is imperative that studies be conducted that introduce the building up of a nation from colonialism, war, and dictatorship where policies, institutions, and political rhetoric is evaluated and introduced through which the masses may free themselves from being ‘black’ and a political space is opened that extends beyond party politics and the Western sponsored civil society.

Emancipatory terms would address the immediacy of the nation detached from the liberal democratic doctrines. This would require using what is the first-hand experience of the people, language as a powerful tool through which the people re-imagine their nation. Such a notion is one like ubuntu. However, to invoke such concepts would mean that its use should be determined from the immediate lived realities of the people. And due to this, the need to quickly enforce a ‘reconciliatory discourse’ without the actual reconciliation would be unnecessary when potentially emancipatory terms used by the people are invoked – brother, sister, friend and fellow African. Many Sub-Saharan African languages have the meaning of humanity engrained in praxis such as the word ubuntu, but more particularly *-ntu*, which refers to that which is human. This is also derived from the negation of humanity to that which is evil and inhumane, *umthakathi*. Such words are not offered singularly for example

referring to humanistic actions in speaking terms as *-ntu*; rather there is a discursive and cultural attachment to the word deriving meanings such as ubuntu.

Therefore, using words that are derived from the political immediacy of the people gives more meaning to those within the nation-state. This is because initially, life with other black Africans within South Africa was viewed as a norm and political agency was attached to African nationals as their colour rendered them the same treatment 'natives' experienced. Asserting therefore ubuntu towards the situation of the nation as a praxis of gathering all that is human and working it for the good of all humans within the nation-state would lead to better results. Further study in post-colonialism should engender this principle and make use of language discursively to wage war against the epistemic rationalities induced by the west to colonially disparate communities throughout Africa.

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