University of KwaZulu-Natal
College of Agriculture, Engineering and Science
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UNDERSTANDING HOSTILITY TOWARDS SO-CALLED "BARBARIANS"

A Quantitative Analysis of Public Attitudes towards Foreign Nationals in Post-Apartheid South Africa

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Steven Gordon's thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the academic requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Science from the School of Agricultural, Earth and Environmental Sciences (University of KwaZulu-Natal). As the candidate's supervisor, I have approved this thesis for submission.

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Abstract

South Africa is a regional hub for international immigration and the country currently hosts at least two million international migrants. Public opinion surveys in South Africa have shown clear evidence of the public's animosity towards international immigrants and immigration. Non-quantitative researchers have highlighted the role of nationalism and racial alienation in shaping these attitudes. But the influence of these factors has not been tested using quantitative public opinion data. Existing quantitative attitudinal research on international migration in the country is instead mainly focused on discerning changes in public opinion. As a result, significant gaps in the scholarship have emerged that impair our understanding of how attitudes towards immigrants and immigration form in post-apartheid South Africa.

The *aim* of this study is to investigate what micro-level sociological indicator factors are shaping attitudes. The study examines four different types of attitudes: (i) general evaluations; (ii) prejudice; (iii) perceived threat; and (iv) policy preferences. The thesis expands on previous public opinion research by using quantitative research methods to quantify different determinants of these attitudes. Nationally representative public opinion data from the South African Social Attitude Survey was used. The study examines how adult South African public's attitudes towards international migrants are affected by three key clusters of micro-level sociological indicators: (i) socio-economic status; (ii) group identities; and (iii) intergroup contact. This thesis provides new insight into how we understand anti-immigrant sentiment in the country and sheds new light on areas that past academic literature has either neglected or overlooked.

The study follows the *'papers model'* and consists of five peer-reviewed research articles. Each paper uses quantitative research methods to discern what micro-level sociological indicators are influencing attitudes towards foreign nationals in post-apartheid South Africa. Two main conclusions can be drawn from the study. First, individual socio-economic status was not a central driver of attitudes towards international migrants and immigration. Second, intergroup contact and group identities (and the key factors related to group identity) tend to be better drivers of attitudes. The most influential group identity factors driving attitudes are: (i) social ties with neighbours; (ii) national identity; (iii) societal interest; and (iv) racial alienation. The results of this study suggest that anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa can be confronted by changing patterns of intergroup contact and group identifications. This will require a war of ideas, a battle for ordinary South Africans' hearts and minds.

PREFACE

I, ..Steven Lawrence Gordon.. declare that

1. The research reported in this thesis, except where otherwise indicated, is my original research.

2. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.

3. This thesis does not contain other persons' data, pictures, graphs or other information, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other persons.

4. This thesis does not contain other persons' writing, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other researchers. Where other written sources have been quoted, then:
   a. Their words have been re-written but the general information attributed to them has been referenced
   b. Where their exact words have been used, then their writing has been placed in italics and inside quotation marks, and referenced.

5. This thesis is by publication and consists of five publications which have been submitted and undergone peer-review. All five publications have either been published or are in press and published. The details of each publication are included below:
   a. 2016 "Xenophobia across the Class Divide: South African Attitudes towards Foreigners 2003–2012." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 33 (4): 494–509. DOI: 10.1080/02589001.2015.1122870
   b. (in press). 'Subjective National Wellbeing and Xenophobia in Sub-Saharan Africa: Results and Lessons from South Africa'. In *Dimension in Community' Wellbeing* to be edited by Patsy Kraeger, Scott Cloutier and Craig Talmage. Springer Press: International Society for Quality-of-Life Studies Young Scholars Book Project.
   c. 2015. "Neighbourhood-Level Social Capital and Anti-Immigrant Prejudice in an African Context: An Individual-Level Analysis of Attitudes towards Immigrants in South Africa." *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 53 (2): 197–219. DOI: 10.1080/14662043.2015.1013296 (co-authored with my supervisor Brij Maharaj).
   d. 2016. "Waiting for the Barbarians: A Public Opinion Analysis of South African Attitudes towards International Migrants." *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. (published online). DOI:10.1080/01419870.2016.1181770.
   e. 2016. "Immigration Policies that Include or Exclude: A South African Public Opinion Study of Immigration Policy Preferences". *Social Dynamics*. 42 (3): 443-461. DOI: 10.1080/02533952.2016.1238336.

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While writing my doctoral dissertation, I took an internship with the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). My internship within the HSRC's Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery (DGSD) Programme afforded me the time, resources and support necessary to complete my doctoral studies. This thesis would not have been possible without the HSRC's investment in me. I am particularly grateful to Benjamin Roberts, my mentor at the HSRC and my friend. I thank him for his openness, his enthusiasm, his insight and his humour. Mr. Roberts provided me with guidance on statistical analysis and imparted efficient and responsive support at all stages of my study. I benefited significantly from his wisdom and generosity.

This study involved an ongoing collaboration with the HSRC-based South African Social Attitude Survey (SASAS) team. I would like to express my profound gratitude to the whole SASAS team who both introduced me to the survey and provided me with valuable and perceptive commentaries on its use. In particular, I want to thank the team coordinators, Jarè Struwig and Benjamin Roberts, for their warm welcome and for their astute, far-sighted and sensible advice. I was extremely privileged to be able to learn from these exceptional researchers.

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Glossary of Key Terms

This glossary acts as a guide and provides simplistic dictionary definitions of many of the terms used in the thesis for the assistance of the reader.

Attitude object: Everything that can be thought of and be evaluated can function as an attitude object. Attitude objects may be abstract or concrete, individual or collective.

Bivariate analysis: An analysis which has two variables (one independent variable and one dependent variable) under examination.

Causality: The relation between cause and effect.

Continuous Variable: A variable that can have any value between its minimum and maximum value (i.e. a variable with fractional values such weight or time).

Correlation: A common statistical measure (usually abbreviated as *r*) that measures the degree of the (often linear) relationship between a pair of variables in a sample.

Data: A set of recorded observations, typically in numeric (if quantitative) or textual (if qualitative) in nature.

Dependent Variable: A variable whose value depends on (or responds to) that of another (i.e. independent) variable.

Ethnocentrism: Officially, a viewpoint in which the world is understood from the perspective of the person's ingroup. It is frequently employed to signify a prejudiced attitude towards outgroups in general.

Factor analysis: A form of statistical analysis that is used to discern variability among, correlated variables in terms of a possibly lower number of unobserved variables known as factors.

Group identification: The degree to which individuals see themselves as: (i) belonging to a group; (ii) their appraisal of that group; and (iii) their emotional commitment to that group.

Hypothesis: A formal declaration about the anticipated relationship between variables in a scientific research study, which is (usually) then subsequently tested by the researcher.

Independent variable: A variable whose value does not depend on (or respond to) that of another variable.

Ingroup: In social psychology studies, as well as sociology, 'ingroup' denotes a social group with which an individual psychologically identify as a member.

Linear relationship: A situation where any change in the independent variable will result in a corresponding change in the dependent variable.

Longitudinal study: A research method within data is collected the same research subjects at different points in time.

Ordinal Variable: A variable is a categorical variable in which the possible values are ordered –it is the order of values that is significant but not the distance between values.

Outgroup: In social psychology studies, as well as sociology, 'outgroup' represents a social group with which an individual *does not* psychologically identify as a member.

Majority group: The larger (in terms of population) of the different groups in a social context.

Mediator: A variable which can help to explain the effect of an independent variable on the dependent variable.

Minority group: Literally the smaller of two (or more) groups in a social context

Moderator: A variable that affects (sometimes we say moderate) the strength of the correlation between an independent variable on the dependent variable.

Multivariate analysis: Denotes any statistical technique that analyses the interrelatedness between and within a set (i.e. more than one) of variables.

Nationalism: A form of group identification which emphasises positive attachment to a country and also includes the concomitant denigration of other countries.

Patriotism: A form of group identification which emphasises positive attachment to a country but *does not* include the denigration of other countries.

Realistic threats: A perception that an outgroup proposes realistic threats to the wellbeing of the ingroup, usually economic in nature but can include threats to physical security or political power of the ingroup.

Stereotyping and stereotypes: The ascription of a trait (or numerous traits) to individuals on the basis of their membership of a particular group.

Symbolic threats: A perception that an outgroup proposes a challenge to the morals and cultural practices which symbolise the identity of the ingroup.

Validity: A measure can be labelled valid if it offers a suitable approximation or indication of the construct it is purporting to measure.

Variable: An observable attribute that describes anything that can be measured or countered. The value of the variables in a sample can *vary*.

Variance: A measure used to designate how widely individuals in a sample vary. Variation within a distribution can be calculated by averaging the squared deviations from the mean of a distribution.

1 Introducing the Study

A diverse and vibrant population of international migrants live within the borders of South Africa. This introductory chapter will outline how public opinion surveys in South Africa have shown clear evidence of the public's animosity towards international immigrants and immigration. The chapter will then discuss the significant gaps in the scholarship that have emerged and how these gaps impair our understanding of how attitudes towards immigrants and immigration form in post-apartheid South Africa. This goal of the thesis is to provide new insights into our understanding of anti-immigrant sentiment in the country and explore areas that past academic literature has either neglected or overlooked. The dissertation follows the *'papers model'* and consists of five peer-reviewed research articles. The introductory chapter will describe this model and explain the structure of the dissertation.

1.1 Introduction

In November 1894, Constantine P. Cavafy wrote a poem, '*Waiting for Barbarians*', portraying the state's and the people's reaction to an approaching barbarian horde. The poem ends with news that there are no barbarians and no one is coming. In the last lines of the poem, Cavafy writes:

> "And now, what's going to happen to us without barbarians?
> They were, those people, a kind of solution".

The poem helps us reflect on the term barbarian, from the word *barbaros* used by the ancient Greeks to distinguish themselves from non-Greek speakers[1]. By the time of Aristotle, the term *barbaros* had acquired implications of inferiority and was a fundamentally hostile term. Prominent Greek philosophers (like Aristotle) stigmatised the mingling of Greek and barbarian cultures as a grave mistake and supported urban designs that kept Greeks separate from barbarians. Historical investigations reveal that the attitudes of ancient Greeks to foreigners were largely hostile (Harrison, 2002). The 3rd century (BC) mathematician, geographer and astronomer Eratosthenes railed against the unnatural division of the world into barbarian and Greek in his *Geographica*. Eratosthenes was objecting to the unnatural fear and hatred of *xenoi* (foreigners) in his society –what the ancient Greeks called xenophobia, from the Greek *xenos* and *phobos* (fear)[2].

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[1] *Barbaros* is thought to originate from the supposed (and pejorative) description of foreign languages to Greek ears (i.e. 'their language sounds like 'bar bar bar'). In an ironic coincidence, a similar derogatory neologism for 'foreigner' ('*makwerekwere*') has developed which describes the mimicking of the sound of 'foreign' language to South African ears. I have heard it said that "*makwerekwere* " is more than a derisive parody of foreign languages. *Makwerekwere* has been called an onomatopoetic term meant to imitate the chirping of queleas, a genus of passerine birds that are tremendously destructive when they flock together.

[2] The common dictionary definition of xenophobia is the "hatred or fear of foreigners". In this dissertation, I use the common dictionary definition of the word 'xenophobia' Many scholars studying anti-immigrant attitudes have used this dictionary definition (see, for instance, Wimmer, 1997; Brown, 2011). I acknowledge, however, that there are other definitions in use and over the years the term has been inconstantly applied. Some scholars prefer, for example, a broader interpretation and have used the term to define hatred of groups other than foreigners (see, for instance, Watts, 1997; Hjerm, 1998).

In the latter part of the 20th century, South Africa has become a regional hub for international migration (Crush and Dodson, 2007; Crush, 2012). Discourses on immigrants and immigration in the country have typically brought forth very fervent public responses. Such discourses are often characterised by persistent calls from the public to exclude foreigners from South African society. It would be fair to say that international migrants have come, in the eyes of some South Africans, to be seen as modern 'barbarians'. Eratosthenes would have as much reason to criticise the situation in contemporary South Africa as he had to criticise the Greek *politai* (citizens) of his own day. But criticism alone will not provide us with the information needed to understand the drivers of public attitudes toward immigrants and immigration in the country.

There is no need to underscore the ongoing reality of anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa. Since the mid-1990s public opinion scholars inside the country have tracked the presence of negative public attitudes towards international migrants and migration (see, for example, Mattes *et al.,* 1999; Crush and Pendleton, 2007; Crush *et al.,* 2008). Labels have power and labelling an event or an individual xenophobic can result in a legitimate demand for institutional action[3]. But simply labelling an individual or an event xenophobic can be reductive. We should not force a binary answer (i.e. xenophobic or not xenophobic) onto multifaceted phenomena. In order to effect real change in South Africa, we need more nuanced attitudinal scholarship.

This dissertation will identify key determinants of attitudes and seek to obtain a multifaceted understanding of the public's opinions (both positive and negative) of international immigrants and immigration. The study is structured according to the 'papers model' –a dissertation comprising of five published papers. The thesis will use quantitative research methods to assess what ascriptive, attained or attitudinal micro-level sociological indicators factors are shaping attitudes on international migrants in South Africa. The study will look at a range of different attitudes. In the course of this dissertation, I will consider general evaluations of international migrants and prejudice[4] towards migrants, as well as public

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[3] Consider the label 'refugee'. In a thoughtful essay, Zetter (1991) discusses the power of this label. Such a label defines the rights (i.e. shelter and security) afforded to the labelled group. Labelling an individual a refugee confers an entitlement to certain protection and aid. But Zetter (1991: 40) argues against focusing overmuch on legal definitions of any label as the "apparent simplicity of a *de minimis* legal label very quickly evaporates" when states are confronted by the responsibilities implied by the 'refugee' label. It is necessary, for Zetter, to be cognisant of the extent to which political interests play a role in determining how refugees are defined. As a result of the perceived costs of this 'entitlement', many governments have treated "refugee status" as a scarce, valuable and finite resource (also see Zetter, 2007).

[4] Prejudice can be defined as any attitude, emotion or behaviour towards members of a group, which directly or indirectly implies some negativity or antagonism towards that group. Allport defined prejudice as an 'antipathy' and he emphasised negative emotions as the main element of intergroup relations. It has been argued by Eagly and Diekman (2005) that Allport's focus on antipathy led attitudinal scholars to focus on those types of prejudice that produce violence to the detriment of those more subtle types of prejudice (also see Brown, 2011). This is particularly a problem in South Africa where the academic focus of xenophobia is often exclusively characterised as violent. Prejudice, however, comes in many different configurations that disadvantage groups without overt antipathy.

preferences for different immigration policies. I hope that this nuanced approach will provide an empirical basis for policy recommendations.

This introductory chapter outlines the structure of, and the basis for, this dissertation. The rationale for the study will be sketched out in section 1.2. Following this, the research questions will then be outlined in section 1.3. The place of this study within the broader South African public opinion literature will be described in section 1.4 and, subsequently, the contribution of the thesis will be discussed in section 1.5. Finally, the structure of the study will be presented and brief summaries of each chapter provided.

1.2   The Rationale for the Study

To quote the influential sociologist Peter Berger, the interest of the sociologist is primarily theoretical. In his classic *Invitation to Sociology*, Berger (1963: 4) clarifies, saying that the sociologist "is interested in understanding for its own sake". But I recognise that the results of this work can, and should, have real policy implications. I feel it is necessary to state that there is a genuine need to target and reduce prejudice against international migrants in South Africa. Existing knowledge gaps on the influence of certain important micro-level sociological indicators limit our ability to make generalising claims about what are the drivers of public attitudes towards international migrants. Understanding the relative strength of different micro-sociological drivers in attitude formation can help inform efforts to reduce prejudice. The study will *not,* however, engage directly with existing anti-xenophobia policies in South Africa. Nevertheless, I hope that the results can provide a basis to judge the efficacy of existing policies and can be used to inform the design of future policies.

The goal of this study is to better understand *what* drives the attitudes of the mass public. Understanding this '*what*' cannot easily be achieved if we would rely on expert interviews or focus groups. The issue of representativity would be a constant danger for the researcher and undermine any generalising claims made. The study will adopt a quantitative approach and use public opinion survey data to make generalising claims about attitudes. I believe that quantitative research is an effective tool that will allow me to find out how a whole population feels about a certain issue. I acknowledge, however, that the researcher cannot observe the world as a *totally* objective and impartial outsider. Rather than concentrating on *absolute* certainty, this study uses quantitative methods to focus on confidence, asking how well do certain factors (e.g. educational attainment) predict certain outcomes (e.g. the holding of negative attitudes)?

The outcomes of this dissertation may have tangible implications for the South African case, but will also provide theses that could be transferred and tested in other geographical contexts. As will be discussed in this chapter, most studies on the determinants of anti-immigrant sentiment concern attitudes in Europe and North America. By using South Africa as the site of study, this thesis will produce tested findings that are more applicable for the socio-economic realities of Sub-Saharan African countries rather than those produced outside the continent. My work develops tested hypotheses that could more readily be applied and re-tested in other countries. This will advance the emerging tradition of non-Western (particularly Sub-Saharan African) quantitative attitudinal research on international migrants and immigration. There may also be implications for countries outside of Sub-Saharan Africa who may benefit from an outsider perspective.

1.3   The Research Questions of the Study

In this dissertation, xenophobia is investigated through the prism of public opinion. The *purpose* of this study is to explore the association between key micro-level sociological factors and attitudes towards international migrants in modern South Africa. The main task of this dissertation is to weigh the validity of these micro-sociological drivers. The study will look at both attitudinal (e.g. attachment to the national community) and non-attitudinal (e.g. educational attainment) drivers. The focus will be on three core micro-level sociological indicators: (i) socio-economic status; (ii) group identities; and (iii) intergroup contact. In addition to pursuing this focus, this study will seek to discern how public attitudes in South Africa towards foreign nationals have changed over the period 2003-2012. This period is considered crucially important because it is not covered as comprehensively as the late 1990s when multiple studies (e.g. Schutte *et al.*, 1997; Mattes *et al.,* 1999; McDonald *et al.,* 2000) published public opinion data on anti-immigrant sentiment in the country.

In order to fulfil the aims of the thesis, as outlined above, the study poses the following research *questions*:

   (i).   How have attitudes towards international migrants changed over the recent modern (2003-2013) period?
  (ii).   Are individual socio-economic characteristics associated with holding positive and negative attitudes towards international migrants?
 (iii).   How do people in South Africa view the consequences of international migration and how do those views influence their attitudes?
  (iv).   Do differing levels of contact with international migrants change the attitudes of South African citizens towards migrants?
   (v).   How do different conceptions of group identity influence public opinion on international migration and migrants?

The 'object' of study that concerns this dissertation is *attitudes* (both positive and negative) towards international migration and migrants. The study will look at four different types of attitudes: (i) general evaluations; (ii) prejudice; (iii) perceived threat; and (iv) policy preferences. The dissertation will also look at the hierarchy of individual preferences between different immigrant groups. Such an investigation of preferences has only been imperfectly done by existing research and would be a boon to our understanding of attitudes towards international migrants in South Africa.

1.4   How to Study Public Opinion and Attitudes

The use of public opinion data to understand anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa is not unique. Researchers at the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) included questions on undocumented immigration in the 1994 October Omnibus Survey. The HSRC was responding to a perceived increase in tensions between immigrants and citizens in the country during the 1994 period. These tensions were so palpable that on 2nd September 1994 the *New York Times* published a story by Bill Keller on xenophobia in South Africa. In the article, Keller wrote: "More than ever, South Africa has become a mecca for the continent's destitute. But more than ever, it is a place of uncertain welcome". The article went on to note that many people blamed incoming immigrants for stealing jobs and business, and wanted the government to "sniff them out and send them home". This shift in mood was picked up by

parliamentarian Robert Davies who talked about a rising tide of intolerance against foreigners during an interview with the press later that month (<u>Mail & Guardian</u>, 23/09/1994).

In December 1994, protesters in Alexandra Township marched on their local police station to demand that all Malawians, Mozambicans and Zimbabweans 'go home'. Anger over this issue soon morphed into the anti-immigrant riots known as 'Operation Buyelekhaya' (Go Back Home) in December 1994 and January 1995[5]. These riots provoked a new interest in the attitudes of ordinary citizens towards international migrants and immigration. Supported by the HSRC and the Institute for Security Studies, Schutte *et al.* (1997) conducted the first large-scale post-apartheid public opinion survey with a core focus on international migration in 1997. Work by Schutte and his colleagues was followed up by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) which was led by prominent scholars like Jonathan Crush and Wade Pendleton. The SAMP conducted two public opinion polls in South Africa in 1997 and 1999 which supported the findings of Schutte *et al.* (1997). Since the late 1990s, SAMP has helped conduct some follow-up surveys in South Africa, as well as with citizens of Southern Africa.

It is impossible to discuss anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa without acknowledging the existence of anti-immigrant violence in the country and recognising that such violence has occurred frequently in South Africa. A significant number of academics are interested in, and are researching, collective xenophobic violence in South Africa. As a result, a noteworthy academic literature on collective violence towards international immigrants has developed in the country (see, for instance, Hassim *et al.,* 2009; von Holdt *et al.,* 2011; Hayem, 2013). Here, the concern is with the rationale or motivations behind violent xenophobic behaviour rather than attitudes towards international migrants. This parallels a growing scholarly interest in xenophobic violence in Sub-Saharan Africa more generally. Most of the research on xenophobia in Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Dunn, 2009; Adida, 2014) has focused on the political economy of collective violence. Most have eschewed investigations of mass public opinion. The literature on xenophobic violence in South Africa (and Sub-Saharan Africa more broadly) can offer some interesting insights into how attitudes form. But often this literature is too narrowly focused in its analysis to allow us to fully understand attitudes towards migrants more generally.

As outlined briefly above, there is an established body of research on attitudes towards international migrants and immigration in South Africa. But much remains unknown about what is driving public opinion on international immigrants in the country. SAMP researchers have been most interested in monitoring changes in the pulse of public opinion and their publications (e.g. Crush *et al.,* 2008; 2013) have sought to emphasise volatility or stability in the holding of certain attitudes towards immigration. Although some scholars have tested the determinants of attitudes towards immigration in South Africa (e.g. Dambrun *et al.,* 2006; Du Toit and Kortze, 2011; Facchini *et al.,* 2013), the influence of socio-economic self-interest, collective identities and intergroup attitudes has not been comprehensively tested. There is an extensive amount of non-quantitative academic scholarship on xenophobia in South Africa (Nyamnjoh, 2006; Dodson, 2010; Neocosmos, 2010; Matsinhe, 2011). This work has

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[5]. During the so-called Operation Buyelekhaya, mobs in the Alexandra Township attacked foreigners. Minnaar *et al.* (1996) describe how international immigrants (and suspected immigrants) in the township were targeted. Mobs looted the homes of foreign nationals and vandalised their businesses. Some of the mob rounded up foreigners and demanded that the local police take them back to their country of origin.

speculated about the effect that nationalism and racial alienation may have on attitudes. Much of the academic research on xenophobia in South Africa has focused on philosophical arguments and suppositions. There has been little quantitative analysis of attitudinal data, a lacuna this thesis attempts to address.

A substantial body of public opinion research on attitudes towards immigration and immigrants has developed outside South Africa. Some of the major themes of this literature deal with the role that the following key micro-level sociological indicators play in predicting attitudes towards international migrants: (i) socio-economic status; (ii) collective identities; and (iii) intergroup contact (Wimmer, 1997; Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Most of these scholarly analyses of opinion have focused on attitudes in Europe, North America and Israel. This emphasis on the Global North has been criticised by a number of scholars, including Lawrence (2011), Miller (2012) and Whitaker and Giersch (2015). As a result of this overemphasis on the Global North, it is difficult to know if findings from this body of work can offer useful insights for the South African environment. In order to adequately understand what micro-level sociological indicators are correlated with anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa, there is a need for further in-depth quantitative public opinion research.

1.5   The Research Approach and Thesis Contribution

When completing a doctorate, the so-called *'papers model'* thesis has become common in what is sometimes called the 'technical' social sciences. The '*papers model*' requires the researcher to write a thesis that is shorter in length than the *classic* dissertation and usually comprises five papers which are published in accredited publications. During the last four years, I have had a number of papers accepted for publication and I have selected five to be included in this thesis. Each of these papers has been peer-reviewed by accredited publications and each has been (or is in the final stages of) publication. Each should be considered a stand-alone piece of work.   These articles have already contributed to the existing field of knowledge on attitudes towards international migrants in South Africa.

As already discussed, the focus of this study will be on the relationship between different attitude types and individual (or micro) level factors. The thesis will design testable hypotheses to evaluate the correlation between the core micro-level sociological indicators and the different types of attitudes outlined in the previous section. To test these hypotheses, a number of multivariate and bivariate methods will be employed throughout this dissertation. The study will use the public opinion data from the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS). This dataset captures the opinions of a nationally representative sample of all adults living in South Africa, rich and poor, black and white. The SASAS dataset was chosen because it contains data on the different attitudinal and non-attitudinal factors that I wanted to explore.

This dissertation will contribute to the existing body of knowledge on attitudes towards international migrants in South Africa in a number of different ways. The study will argue that South Africans do *not* base their attitudes towards international migrants and migration primarily on the putative influence exerted by socio-economic status. This would suggest that attitudes are *not* predominantly the product of rational evaluations of economic self-interest. The thesis will show that non-economic factors are key drivers of attitudes. Group identities (and the key factors related to group identity) are particularly prominent drivers of attitudes. The most influential group identity factors are: (i) social ties with neighbours; (ii) national

identity; (iii) societal interest; and (iv) racial alienation. In addition, the study will also present data on how the perceived consequences of international migration (which circulates in society via formal and informal channels) play a prominent role in shaping attitudes. I hope that knowledge of these attitudinal drivers can (and should) help inform design policies and programmes that aim to reduce anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa.

1.6   Structure of the Dissertation

As discussed in the previous section, this study is structured according to the *'papers model'*. As such, there is not a 'standard' methodology or a literature review chapter in this thesis. Instead, the study is made up of five papers which have been peer-reviewed and are now accepted for publication in accredited publications. In addition to the five papers and this introduction, there are two chapters included in the dissertation that are not peer-reviewed: (i) a review of the key literature on attitudes and their importance; and (ii) a conclusion. Descriptions of all the chapters included in this dissertation are provided below.

It is almost a cliché to speak of the crucial normative role that public opinion surveys perform in a democratic society. Although the concept of 'attitudes' has been a fundamental one in a number of academic fields (especially social psychology) for decades, as Eagly and Chaiken (2007) admit, there remains some confusion about what constitutes an attitude and why attitudes are important (also see Greenwald, 1989; Zaller, 1992; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Wilson, 2013). Chapter 2 of this dissertation will review the literature on attitudes and consider why they are of scholarly importance and how they form. The function of this chapter is to appraise the main arguments surrounding these questions and provide a general overview of the underlying factors that inform attitude formation.

Chapter 3 will describe the dataset used in this study. This chapter provides a detailed account of this dataset and its limitations.

Chapter 4 presents public opinion on international migration between 2003 and 2012. The chapter will also focus on citizens' preferences for different immigrant groups and will discern which foreign groups are favoured least by citizens. This will provide an opportunity to determine whether such preferences vary across important socio-economic groups in South Africa. The chapter will use this data to make judgements about the government's attempts to combat xenophobia over the recent ten years.

Chapter 5 examines positive evaluations of international migrants (i.e. the extent to which foreigners living the country are viewed as positive and friendly). The chapter will explore the relationship between subjective national wellbeing and pro-immigrant sentiment. Separate analyses will be conducted for each of Hadley Cantril's three classic wellbeing ladder groups: (i) Low; (ii) Medium; and (iii) High to understand the effect of subjective wellbeing on pro-immigrant sentiment. This chapter will conclude by discussing how quality of life research can be used to better understand prejudice in countries like South Africa and beyond.

Chapter 6 analyses public tolerance towards living in proximity to international migrants. This chapter will assess the effects of interpersonal trust, social bonds with neighbours and a sense of community on tolerance. This is the first study that conducts such a test in the South African context. The relationship between tolerance and political tolerance will also be tested. The chapter concludes with a discussion of what programmes are required to reduce anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa.

Chapter 7 examines public perceptions about the negative consequences of immigration. The chapter questions whether such perceptions are correlated with a sense of interracial competition and threat. The effects of interracial contact on attitudes are also tested. The factors that predict these public perceptions may differ by race group, hence each of the four major race groups are examined separately. The chapter concludes by arguing that fighting xenophobia is connected to the larger problem interracial disharmony in South Africa.

Chapter 8 examines public support for policies that would exclude international migrants from the country. The chapter assesses attitudes towards: (i) granting legal immigrants the same rights as citizens; (ii) excluding illegal immigrants from the country; (iii) granting legal immigrants the same access to public education as citizens; (iv) prohibiting immigrants buying land in the country; and (v) closing the borders to immigrants and refugees. The chapter focused on understanding the predictive power of Group Threat Theory in understanding support for these policy proposals. The chapter concludes that programmes designed to promote a nationalism characterised by inclusive multicultural civic patriotism will improve public support for the inclusion of international immigrants.

The final chapter reviews the arguments and findings of the dissertation and discusses the scholarly and policy implications. It also identifies areas for further research.

2 Study Attitudes: The '*Why*' and the '*How*'

The concept of 'attitudes' has been essential to the quantitative study of intergroup relations. However, there remain some misperceptions about what comprises an attitude and how attitudes form in a given population. This is particularly true in South African academia where attitudinal analysis has been criticised by scholars on the left as reductive. In an attempt to correct these misperceptions, this chapter will review the literature on attitudes as it pertains to the topic of this dissertation. The aim of the review is to evaluate the main arguments surrounding attitudinal analysis and present a broad outline of the primary factors that drive attitude formation. The review will grapple with the South African experience and make reference to current policy approaches to xenophobia and anti-immigrant violence. A considerable academic literature exists on attitudes and, as a result, the chapter will be very selective in the works that are reviewed.

2.1 Introduction

In determining the research plan for this dissertation, both quantitative and qualitative methods were considered. As discussed in the first chapter, the former was selected. Although the use of public opinion data to understand anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa is not unique, such a positivist approach is relatively uncommon. I recognise that a positivist approach has its disadvantages, but I would agree with Turner (1993) that a quantitative analysis can provide insight for the social sciences. For Turner, the key to conducting meaningful quantitative research is having a clear understanding of the unit of analysis. In this case, the unit of analysis is '*attitudes*'. But this answer provokes further questions: what is an *attitude* and why should we concern ourselves with studying *attitudes*?

Attending a 2014 seminar on xenophobia in Pretoria, I began to present quantitative data from a recent public opinion survey. A member of the audience challenged my use of quantitative attitudinal data, asking what value studying *attitudes* had in the study of xenophobia in South Africa. Attitudinal analysis is a highly respected avenue of scholarship, but its implicit value may not be readily apparent. Indeed, most scholars investigating xenophobia in South Africa do not use public opinion survey data. This chapter seeks to provide a detailed and comprehensive answer to the question of *why* studying public attitudes in South Africa matters. To answer that question, this chapter will consider first *what* attitudes are and *how* attitudes relate to behaviour and policy.

Section 2.2 will present evidence that attitudes can and should influence the policies of a democratic state as well as individual behaviour. If we accept the premise that attitudes are worthwhile objects of study, then we arrive at the implicitly vital question: how do attitudes form? This is a passionately debated question that has produced a substantial quantity of academic literature (as reviews of the literature by Zaller, 1992; Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; and Sniderman *et al.*, 1993 show). There is no simple answer to this question other than to say that there are multiple factors at play. Section 2.3 will offer an outline of the main relevant arguments about what drives attitude formation. Although this review will discuss attitudes in general, it will primarily focus on those arguments that are related to the study of prejudicial attitudes.

2.2   Why Studying Attitudes is Important

Social researchers have considered attitudes as important units of analysis for almost a century. Allport (1935: 798) argued that "the concept of attitudes is probably the most distinctive and indispensable concept" in social psychology. But what is an 'attitude'? Greenwald (1989: 432) defined an attitude as "the affect associated with a mental object". However, some have considered this definition too vague (for an overview of these detractors, see Eagly and Chaiken, 2007). Eagly and Chaiken (1993: 1), evaluating the various definitions and metaphors used to describe 'attitudes' over the decades, arrive at a general definition: "a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favour or disfavour". Although this is a cogent definition, it does not tell us why examining attitudes may be important to the study of xenophobia. This section will attempt to provide an answer to that question.

Subsection 2.2.1 reflects on whether in South Africa we can consider xenophobia an attitude. Following this discussion, subsection 2.2.2 will examine the relationship between attitude and behaviour, noting how this relationship is often non-linear. According to empirical theories of democracy, a modern democratic state (like South Africa) must be responsive to the preferences of its citizenry. Given this theoretical underpinning, and moving beyond behaviour, subsection 2.2.3 will consider the relationship between public policy and public attitudes. Then subsection 2.2.4 assesses whether attitudes can be measured. Finally, subsection 2.2.5 presents a brief history of the use of quantitative public opinion data to investigate attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa.

2.2.1   In South Africa, is Xenophobia an Attitude?

In front of the South African Parliament in April 2015, President Jacob Zuma denied that people in South Africa are xenophobic, condemning violent attacks by mobs on international migrants as "shocking and unacceptable" (News24, 16/04/2015). The President was denouncing violent riots that had occurred in several urban areas of KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng in April 2015. President Jacob Zuma subsequently reaffirmed his position on xenophobia in a June 2015 address to the African Union: "South Africans are not xenophobic. We do not believe that the actions of a few out of more than 50 million citizens justify the label of xenophobia" (News24, 14/06/2015). The President's response to the April 2015 attacks reflects a definition of 'xenophobia' that is centred on collective violence. Under this definition, xenophobia is not fear, antipathy or hatred of foreigners but rather a violent act.

The Zuma Administration established two committees to investigate the motivations behind the April 2015 attacks. The first was the Parliament's Joint Committee on Probing Violence against Foreign Nationals. The Co-Chair of this committee (and Member of Parliament), Tekoetsile Motlashuping, went even further than the National President in distancing South Africans from the label 'xenophobic'. Co-Chair Motlashuping told the press that the label did not apply to South Africans and warned the media not to use that word (IOL, 10/07/2015). The conclusions and recommendations made by the Joint Committee in their final report (published in November 2015), did not mention the term 'xenophobia'. The second committee was the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Migration which had a larger mandate in that it was tasked with addressing concerns raised by the public with regards to international migration. When the Committee Chairman (and Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development) Jeff Radebe published the committee's findings in late 2015, he confirmed in a

press briefing that there was no evidence that a hatred of foreigners was behind the April attacks (<u>EyeWitness News,</u> 11/11/2015).

In the face of the April 2015 attacks, the press criticised the Zuma Administration for xenophobic 'denialism' (see, for example, <u>Mail & Guardian</u>, 12/06/2015; <u>IOL</u>, 17/04/2015a). Similar accusations were made against former National President Thabo Mbeki when he was confronted by mass anti-immigrant violence in May 2008. Sandwith (2010) provides a thoughtful exploration of media debates and narratives on the May 2008 violence that emerged. Sandwith's analysis gives special emphasis to what this choice reveals about national myth-making, the production of consensus and modalities of power in the post-colonial South African state (also see Gibson, 2012). Since 2008, the South African government has developed an official narrative that a small criminal element was solely responsible for xenophobic violence and the South African public were not xenophobic (Crush and Ramachandran, 2014). The government's choice of the crime narrative as the dominant interpretive scheme of xenophobic violence was particularly evident during the April 2015 attacks.

Debates about xenophobic violence in South Africa can devolve into a lengthy debate about what is meant by the term 'xenophobia'. The Joint Committee on Probing Violence against Foreign Nationals, for example, made a deliberate decision *not* to define 'xenophobia' as the holding of negative attitudes (or prejudices) towards international migrants when compiling its final report. Xenophobia was, instead, defined primarily in terms of violence against international migrants. Reading the minutes of the final meeting of the Joint Committee, particularly the discussion between Committee Co-Chairperson Nozabelo Bhengu and Committee members Zephroma Dlamini-Dubazana and Roger Chance, the *intentionality* of this decision is clear (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2015). Framing the analysis of anti-immigrant prejudice in terms of collective violence, rather than attitudes, is reductivist. It leads us to rely on manifestations of violence as our lone metric of xenophobia, ignoring other observable actions inspired by anti-immigrant sentiment.

Non-violent collective actions may be just as disruptive to the peaceful integration of international migrants into South African communities as violence. Consider, for example, an incident that occurred in Gauteng in mid-October 2011. Throughout the township of Alexandra, residents put up posters on street lamps warning foreigners to evacuate government housing (<u>Mail & Guardian</u>, 19/10/2011). Pamphlets were distributed which read: "We demand that you vacate at your own free will without being pushed like animals or aliens". Such mass actions, although directed against international immigrants and harmful to social cohesion, tend to attract little attention from the media or the academia. This thesis does not adhere to the view that xenophobia can be defined solely within the confines of violent behaviour. This study looks at the attitudes of individuals and contends that attitudes are an important subject of study.

2.2.2   The Attitude-Behaviour Relationship

For early social psychologists like Thurstone (1929), attitudes were particularly important because they could be used to predict and motivate social behaviour. Allport (1935: 820) argued that attitudes exercise "...a directive or dynamic influence upon the individual's response to all objects and situations with which it is related". In fact, Triandis (1991: 485) went so far as to define attitudes in terms of a behavioural predisposition, saying attitudes were "a state of a person that predisposes a favourable or unfavourable response to an object, person, or idea" (also see Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). Reflecting on the importance of

conducting attitudinal research in South Africa, Mattes (2013: 491) asked what is public opinion research "if not the attempt to identify the values, beliefs and understandings that inform actions". The word 'inform' used by Mattes is telling, as there is no clear linear relationship between attitude and behaviour.

There is a significant and growing literature on *when* attitudes predict behaviour and *how* this process may occur. Much of the literature is based on the Theory of Planned Behaviour which hypothesises that attitudes are the major determinants of behavioural intentions (Ajzen and Fishbein, 2005). Although this theory emphasises the effect attitudes have on behaviour, the theory concedes that situational, normative and individual characteristics also have effects on behaviour (also see Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Fazio, 1986; Petty *et al.,* 1997). In other words, the correlation between attitudes and behaviour is mediated by both internal and external factors. This is especially true if we consider the relationship between prejudice and behaviour. Prejudice can be suppressed by anti-prejudiced norms as well as personal standards, beliefs and values (Dovidio and Gaertner, 2004). Prejudice's manifestation in actions depends on a justification that allows the individual to express prejudice without facing sanction. Interestingly, anything –a piece of information, say, or an external event – can be seized on as a justification for prejudicial behaviour.

The degree to which the attitude-behaviour relationship is consistent is assumed to be moderated by factors related to the characteristics of the attitude itself, the individual performing the behaviour and the environment within which it is performed (Ajzen and Fishbein, 2005). The influence of attitude (affect) on behaviour through mediating cognitive processes involves the individual's perceptions of and cognitions about the attitude's 'object' (also see Greenwald, 1989; Ajzen and Fishbein, 2000). In the 1990s, meta-analytic summaries of the prejudice-behaviour relationship came to a rather optimistic view about the strength of the relationship[6]. These scholarly investigations concerned themselves with *when* and *how* prejudice directed at an outgroup translates into behavioural discrimination. Although there is still some debate, the consensus seemed to be that a relationship between prejudice and discrimination exists, but that the relationship depends on several moderators.

Attitudes towards an object can be related to behaviour that does not directly involve the attitude's 'object'. Consider, for instance, how negative attitudes towards an outgroup (e.g. international migrants) may impact on the behaviour that occurs within groups of individuals who share the same prejudice. Individuals harbouring anti-immigrant attitudes, for instance, may not engage in behaviour that directly affects foreigners but may express that prejudice in other ways. Such attitudes may lead them to adopt intermediate positions that allow them to express prejudice in more socially-acceptable ways (for a discussion on aversive racism, see Dovidio and Gaertner, 2004). They may choose to support a political party or a political programme dedicated to deporting most or all of international migrants back to their 'home country' –what Watts (1997) has called 'political xenophobia'. They may refuse to participate in (or support) efforts to integrate international migrants into the host society. Although these examples of behaviours are not directed at international migrants, they do affect them indirectly and are evidence of a prejudice-discrimination relationship.

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[6] Based on an examination of 60 independent studies, Schütz and Six (1996), for example, found a significant mean correlation ($r = 0.36$) between prejudice and behaviour and an even stronger correlation ($r = 0.45$) between prejudice and behavioural intentions. A similar result was found by Dovidio *et al.* (1996) using an analysis of 23 studies. These meta-analytic summaries show that prejudice and discriminatory behaviour correlate.

2.2.3   The Relationship between Public Opinion and Public Policy

Aside from the attitude-behaviour relationship described in subsection 2.2.2, the attitude-policy relationship must also be considered. In the modern world, the responsiveness of government policies to the preferences of citizens is an essential concern of most normative and empirical theories of democracy (Dahl, 1973). But the idea that public opinion influences public policy has a long history. Considering the historical development of public opinion research, Wilson (2013) argues that public opinion has been an "orderly force," contributing to social and political life for thousands of years. For Wilson, the idea of public opinion can be found in the Ancient Athenian belief in citizen participation in political decision-making. The correlation between public opinion and public policy is considered to be a moral good, a crucial characteristic of successful democratic governance. Scholars in modern democracies have expressed shock and alarm when they do not detect a strong relationship between public opinion and public policy[7].

The policy-attitude relationship is not perfectly linear and the relationship's direction of causality can be, at times, difficult to detect. Studies (e.g. Page and Shapiro, 1983; Soroka and Wlezien, 2010) have acknowledged this reality but still argue that it is a relationship between public opinion and policy formation in some democracies. It could be argued that public opinion may not influence public policy in South Africa in the same way that it does in Western Europe or North America. For most of the country's democratic period, the political arena has been characterised by single-party dominance and elections are uncompetitive. The ruling African National Congress controls most of the country's local and district municipalities and has a clear majority in the National Parliament. Under a system where a single-party is dominant, it could be contended that there is less room for public opinion to influence policy. However, the party dominance 'theory', at least as it applies to South Africa, has come under criticism of late (see, for example, Suttner, 2006). There is evidence to suggest that government has at least to consider the opinion of the general public when making decisions.

Let us consider the recommendations made by the Joint Committee on Probing Violence against Foreign Nationals in their November 2015 report. The report proudly states that its findings and recommendations are based on consultations with the communities affected by the violence. The Inter-Ministerial Committee on Migration also boasted of broad public consultations during the launch of their final report (also published in November 2015). Both committees' reports make frequent references to the harm being done to South Africa by international migrants[8]. The Joint Committee on Probing Violence against Foreign Nationals

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[7] In an influential article on democracy and public opinion in the United States, Lax and Phillips (2012) were appalled to find that State governments translated public opinion into policy only about half the time and labelled this a 'democratic deficit'.

[8] Let us reflect on the findings of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Migration report in particular. In a speech laying out the committee's main findings, the Committee Chair Minister Jeff Radebe linked the April 2015 attacks to the high number of foreign nationals in South Africa as well as poor border management and immigration controls (SA News, 10/11/2015). Minister Radebe promised that the government would review immigration policy to tighten border controls. On a related matter, the Committee Chair has said that the government intends to audit and license informal businesses in townships, in response to complaints that foreigners were 'unfairly' competing with locals (SA News, 11/11/2015). He described foreign-owned spaza shops as "cartel-like" and expressed alarm that millions of

report, for instance, made repeated references to foreigners unfairly challenging locally-owned businesses and expressed distress over the number of small-scale, foreign-owned businesses in South African communities. Recommendation 5 of the report clearly stated that there needs to be an emphasis on the *responsibilities* of international migrants in perpetuating the April 2015 violence.

An even better example of the likely relationship between public opinion and policy could be the multidisciplinary interdepartmental Operation Fiela (in Sesotho, Fiela can be translated as 'sweep clean'). Acting Cabinet Spokesperson Phumla Williams proudly announced in May 2015 that the operation was launched after a number of engagements with communities affected by the April 2015 attacks (including 77 events being held in the week following the April attacks). Speaking to the press about these engagements, Spokesperson Williams said: "Out of those consultations, one of the things that consistently came across was the criminality […] These areas that keep being pointed might be having a lot of foreign nationals" (SA News, 14/05/2015). The operation, which included components of the army and the police, was designed to focus on undocumented migrants, human trafficking, unlicensed businesses, the illegal occupation of land and prostitution. One of the clear motivations of the Operation Fiela was to appease public opinion. When the operation was launched, Minister Jeff Radebe described the motivation behind Operation Fiela as follows: "We want to sweep our public places clean so that our people can be and feel safe" (SA News, 28/04/2015).

A coalition of non-governmental organisations against xenophobia has criticised Operation Fiela for "harassing and arresting [international migrants] on a mass scale" (Mail & Guardian, 18/05/2015). Members of the coalition have gone so far as to allege that the Operation was, in effect, "state-sponsored xenophobia". Referencing the strong support Operation Fiela has received from communities, the government has rejected calls to cancel the Operation. Speaking in the community of Eersterust (east of Pretoria), Spokesperson Phumla Williams said: "The support we have received from the Eersterust Community Policing Forum and concerned residents has been instrumental in the success of our operations" (SA News, 06/11/2015). In an article for the press, the academic Loren Landau called Operation Fiela an appeasement of the "most exclusionary fears among the citizenry" and "placating angry citizens by arresting foreigners" (Washington Post, 11/05/2015). Indeed, it would be difficult to describe Operation Fiela as a policy initiative that is unpopular amongst the general public.

South African communities have been known to try and *force* congruence between attitudes and policy. Consider, for example, an incident that took place in Gauteng towards the end of 2011. In November of that year, business owners, religious groups and a number of residents from Ekurhuleni marched on Johannesburg against foreign-owned shops in local townships (Mail & Guardian, 03/11/2011). A spokesman for the group, Baznaar Moloi, demanded that action be taken against these businesses which he accused of "running down" the businesses of locals. A memorandum stating the grievances of the marchers was delivered to the office of the province's Premier. Even non-governmental advocates for policy change are constrained by public opinion. In her study of migrant, refugee and asylum-seeker advocacy organisations, Pugh (2014) highlights the substantial difficulties faced by these organisations because of the unpopularity of the groups they represent. Although the relationship between

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foreigners had been permitted to 'settle' in the country. It would be difficult to say that the Minister is not pandering to popular prejudices about international migration.

public opinion and policy may not be perfectly linear, the examples provided here suggest that there is some connection. In summation, I feel that the analysis of mass public opinion has a particularly palpable importance in South Africa.

2.2.4 Attitude Can Be Measured

In the opening decades of the 20th century, Thurstone (1929) infamously stated that "attitudes can be measured" and could be measured using structured questionnaires. Likert's 1929 dissertation noted that quantitative practices in intelligence measurement could be applied to attitudinal surveys (for an overview of the first era of public opinion research, see Groves, 2011). Attitudinal research techniques were a boon to the study of intergroup relations and prejudice. In the 1950s, Gordon Allport underlined the importance of outgroup stereotypes (i.e. rumours about outgroups) in understanding the nature of prejudice towards a group (i.e. the attitude's 'object'). As noted in the introduction, Allport (1954: 10) defined prejudice as "an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalisation" in his famous *The Nature of Prejudice*. In its fullest form, prejudice embraces the belief that another group is both innately inferior and threatening to the ingroup (also see Eagly and Diekman 2005). Under this useful definition, prejudice involves affect, evaluation and cognition. According to Eagly and Chaiken (1993), most attitudes involve cognition, affect, and behaviour –what is sometimes called the 'tripartite model' (also see Petty *et al.,* 1997; Wilson, 2013).

The most common method for measuring attitudes is self-reporting questionnaires. This involves asking people to rate the attitude object on bipolar evaluative dimensions (e.g. agree versus disagree) on questionnaires. Let us take the work of Ian Douglas MacCrone as an example. In the 1930s and 1940s, MacCrone was interested in how South Africans viewed each other and how these views are shaped by racial attitudes. He used self-reporting questionnaires to capture the attitudes of Black African students in tertiary education. In his 1937 book, *Race Attitudes in South Africa: Historical, Experimental, and Psychological Studies,* he identified feelings of antagonism towards Whites among Black Africans. He characterised this antipathy as "Boer phobia", a response to the political domination of Black Africans by the white minority (also see MacCrone 1947). His work was highly important for future generations of attitudinal scholars labouring on intergroup relations in South Africa.

MacCrone was interested in what the general public thought about race relations in South Africa. But he used student samples which can be convenient but also problematic for intergroup research. The use of student samples has been particularly critiqued by Henry (2008). He noted that the high internal validity offered by student samples is achieved at the price of external validity. He was concerned about the artificial conditions under which students functioned as research subjects. In addition, university students tend to have less-developed attitudes, weaker senses of self, stronger cognitive skills, stronger tendencies to conform to authority, and more unstable peer-group relationships. The ability of studies using student samples to generalise their findings to situations outside that of the experimental context of the university or laboratory is heavily circumscribed. To better understand attitudes, scholars like MacCrone needed to develop tools to measure attitudes on a much larger scale.

In the early 20th century, a group of scholars began experimenting with the first systematic largescale attitudinal surveys. This work, based in the United States, was credited with pioneering the 'public opinion poll', but we should be clear about what is meant when we use the term *'public opinion'*. Early public opinion scholars, like George Gallup and Elmo Roper, understood that the "public" was comprised of nothing more than a group of individuals with

varied opinions and ideas (Zaller, 1992). These scholars used an approach whereby attitudinal data was gathered from a systematic sample of a pre-defined population (Groves, 2011; Wilson, 2013). In addition to this central innovation on sampling, the other key features of his approach were: (i) the employment standardised "closed" questions to measure subjective attitudes of respondents; (ii) interviewing respondents face-to-face; (iii) using trained interviewers; and (iv) utilising quantitative analysis to understand respondents' answers. Cognitive psychological theories of comprehension, memory and processing were applied to question wording and questionnaire construction (for an overview, see Sudman *et al.,* 2010). The pioneering work by Gallup, Roper and others cemented the public opinion survey as an important and powerful research tool for scholars and academics by the 1960s.

The modern public opinion research movement had an important impact on the study of intergroup relations. But opinion surveys are expensive, technically complex and logistically difficult. For most of the 20th century, the kind of inclusive mass public opinion surveys envisioned by George Gallup and Elmo Roper were not put into the field in South Africa[9]. But data availability alone was not the reason that many scholars in South Africa discounted public opinion surveys as a tool of study. The succeeding subsection will discuss some of the reasons why South African academia did not favour the public opinion survey as a research tool.

2.2.5 Criticism of Public Opinion Research in South Africa

Surveys of the mass population were conducted in South Africa at various points in the 20th century. Most were either household surveys used to gather data on occasional production or consumption or national censuses. Christopher's (2009) work on the country's national censuses shows that white politicians and technocrats in South Africa saw surveys, particularly national censuses, as a mechanism to classify and demarcate the non-white population. Christopher argues that these attitudes were informed by the racist animus of the times and census data were routinely manipulated to meet the political demands of the moment (also see Maré, 2011). Within the country's white population group, some attitudinal surveys were conducted. Lever (1974), for example, focused on political and racial attitudes. Attitudinal surveys that focused on the non-white population, when they were done, were concentrated in a limited geographic area and were not representative of the entire non-white population (see, for example, Schlemmer, 1976).

During the 1970s, in South African academia, modernisation theory came under attack from proponents of dependency ideas and neo-Marxism. It was alleged that survey research methods were steered by modernisation theory and the methodological tool was tarnished (Seekings, 2001). During this period, most left-leaning South African academics chiefly depended on historical and qualitative methods in their research and were generally hostile to research techniques associated with "bourgeois social science" (Jubber, 2006). The idea that 'attitudes' could be measured using surveys was seen at best as a naïve (but invalid) bid to imitate physical scientists and at worst crass, culturally inauthentic and reductive (also see Mattes, 2013). The very first largescale opinion survey amongst black South Africans was conducted by a team of sociologists and political scientists from Germany (Hanf *et al.,* 1981). The recommendations of Hanf and his colleagues were used to support the apartheid

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[9] This stands in contrast to other countries in the Global South like India where a notable tradition of opinion research on political attitudes had evolved in the late 1960s (for an overview of opinion public research in India, see Kumar and Rai, 2013).

government policy of racial segregation. This further discredited the opinion survey as a research tool amongst liberal South African academia.

Since the early 1980s, the winds of political liberalisation have warmed the climate for survey research in South Africa. The Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), for instance, funded a survey that included Coloured and Indian South Africans as well as white people in 1982. Although the sample was restricted to residents of what is now the Gauteng province, the first HSRC opinion survey that included a large Black African sample was fielded in 1984 (de Kock *et al.*, 1985). As funding for public opinion surveys became more readily available, some researchers welcomed the opportunity to measure public opinion and better understand intergroup relations. A number of South African scholars made significant advances in how we understand interracial relations in South Africa (for an overview of this work, see Seekings, 2001; Bornman, 2011; Mattes, 2013). Public opinion scholars who focused on international migration and migrants did not have the same impact on South African academia, however.

Research that employs attitudinal surveys still faces opposition in some quarters of South African academia. In the early 2000s, Gouws and Gibson argue that there is a prevalent "bias against the supposedly 'positivist' study of attitudes, under the mistaken assumption that these types of studies are ignorant of human complexity and context" (cited in Seekings, 2001: 5). Writing more than ten years later, Mattes (2013) contended that this bias continues and complained that systematic public opinion survey research is not taught widely at South African universities. He highlighted that there was an invasive lack of training in the basic logic of systematic empirical research methodology in the disciplines of sociology and political science in the country. Of course, critiques of positivist research methods in the social science are not a purely South African phenomenon[10]. However, an anti-positivist bias seems particularly strong in the country's social sciences.

Researchers seeking to understand xenophobia in the country tended to favour qualitative research methodologies (see, for example, Nyamnjoh, 2006; Dodson, 2010; Landau, 2010; Neocosmos, 2010; von Holdt *et al.,* 2011; Matsinhe, 2011). Scholars like Francis Nyamnjoh and Michael Neocosmos, using the methodological and theoretical guidelines of Frantz Fanon and Alain Badiou, have led the field in this area. Funding for researchers studying xenophobia in South Africa has tended to flow through independent research organisations, like the African Centre for Migration and Society and the Society Work and Development Institute, which favour case study research. These academic investigations tend to be dominated not so much by an attempt to understand attitudes, but by efforts to understand collective violence motivated by xenophobia. This trend has gone so far that a number of studies frame xenophobia almost exclusively in terms of collective violence (see, for instance, Hassim *et al.,* 2009). This has led to a number of digressions about whether the motivations behind certain incidences of mass violence can be classified as 'xenophobic', racism, 'Afrophobia' or anti-outsiderism.

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[10] For a review of the main anti- positivist arguments made by scholars outside of South Africa, see Turner (1993) and Heidtman *et al.,* (2000). For a more indepth critique of public opinion polls, see Ginsberg (1993) and Bourdieu (1982). These respected scholars have scrutinise the construction and operation of public opinion polls in society, examining the some of the problematic assumptions associated with the practice of polling (also see Osborne and Rose, 1999).

The use of quantitative public opinion data to investigate attitudes towards immigrants and immigration in South Africa remains a minority tradition. A few studies (e.g. Dambrun *et al.,* 2006; Facchini *et al.,* 2013) have explored the determinants of anti-immigrant sentiment in the country using public opinion data. But the existing literature neglects many important areas, such as the influence of important group identity variables (like racial alienation or patriotism) on attitudes towards international migrants. The limited nature of the work on anti-immigrant sentiment has, for instance, prevented us from understanding if the theoretical and empirical insights obtained from studies in other geographical contexts are valid in South Africa. As a result, significant gaps in the scholarship have emerged that impair our understanding of how attitudes towards immigrants form in the post-apartheid nation. This is unfortunate given that, unlike many other African countries, there is widespread public opinion data on attitudes towards immigrants in the country.

2.3   How Do Attitudes Form?

Accepting the importance of attitudes, we need to ask ourselves how attitudes form. The South African government has tended to endorse the view that negative attitudes towards immigrants in the country are the product of economic competition. The government's Inter-Ministerial Committee on Migration, for example, cited socio-economic conditions as significant drivers of hostility towards foreigners in their final report (EyeWitness News, 11/11/2015). Traditionally, after an episode of collective anti-immigrant violence, left-leaning academics and civil society leaders have linked hostility towards international migrants amongst the South African public with poverty and unemployment. The pro-poor explanations presented in the media following the May 2008 attacks, for instance, generally adhered to this line of thinking (Sandwith, 2010). These explanations told a story of ordinary law-abiding South Africans who suddenly turned violent and hateful under conditions of extreme economic stress[11]. These explanations tended to be accompanied by the language and images of economic crisis and failure and often serve as critiques of the country's contemporary capitalist society.

How attitudes form remains a subject of expanding debate as researchers incorporate knowledge from related fields (such as social cognition) into their theoretical models. Public opinion theorists, like Zaller (1992), Sears (1993) and Wilson (2013), tend to favour reasons other than economic self-interest in explaining the formation of attitudes. These scholars, of course, do not argue that economic characteristics play *no* role in driving attitudes towards a particular object. But scholarly interest has been moving away from material self-interest as a *prime* driver of attitudes and has focused more on non-economic drivers in recent decades. Growing emphasis has been placed on social identity and societal interest. These trends serve to remind us of the complexity of trying to understand how attitudes form.

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[11] There is a tendency amongst Neo-Marxist scholars seeking to explain xenophobia and xenophobic violence in South Africa in terms of material economic dispossession. In a review of this argument, Crush and Ramachandran (2014) argue that these scholars seek an economic justification for xenophobic violence in the country. These scholars identify structural economic inequalities, under the propagation of economic neo-liberalism, as the main causes of xenophobia in South Africa. The authors label this argument as 'xenophobia minimalism'. For Crush and Ramachandran, 'xenophobia minimalism' legitimates the idea that the presence of migrants and refugees constitutes an enduring threat to alleged autochthons.

This section will provide a brief review of the existing literature with the aim of identifying a few key trends in the expanding debate. I will discuss the most relevant literature on self-interest as a driver of attitudes, as well as the possible alternative drivers which include: (i) information, (ii) symbols and values; and (iii) collective identity. Given the volume of literature that has been published on these subjects, and the space available, the chapter is highly selective in the works that are discussed and cited. This section focused on those works which were perceived to be important for the development of the field and which had the most relevance for the dissertation's topic.

2.3.1 Information, Memory and Heuristics

One of the most important factors driving the formation of attitudes is information. Indeed, attitudes have been categorised as knowledge structures or what Kruglanski (1989: 139) called "a special type of knowledge, notably knowledge of which content is evaluative or affective". For Kruglanski, attitudes are represented in memory as associative networks of interrelated beliefs and evaluations. Attitudes in the present are formed using information stored in memory. The ease with which information can be retrieved from memory should, therefore, influence attitudes (also see Fazio, 1990). In the attitudinal literature, one of the oldest theses is that individuals find information supporting their preconceived attitudes easier to absorb and memorise than information challenging their predetermined attitudes (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). Studies investigating preferential recall of attitude-consistent information have shown this thesis to be largely valid (Pratkanis and Greenwald, 1989).

Consider the following example of how information may inform attitudes. In early October 2015, rumours began spreading that an "Arab man with a beard" was responsible for a series of murders in the Eastern Cape town of Grahamstown. In a press statement, the Unemployed People's Movement discussed the rumours:

> "…[people] have said that all the bodies were mutilated, that more bodies have been found and have blamed the murders on a shopkeeper from Pakistan. It was rumoured that body parts were being stored in his fridge" (TIMES Live, 24/10/2015).

Processing this information about a 'murderous foreigner', some individuals may begin to form negative attitudes towards international migrants in Grahamstown. This seemed to be how the situation played out, and the rumours appeared to heighten prejudices amongst local communities against foreign Muslim shopkeepers, including those from Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Somalia. On October 16th 2015, people began looting shops owned by Muslim foreigners (although the violence soon spread to all foreign-owned shops).

Accepting memory as an important part of attitude formation, we should remember that memory is not merely an individual affair but is socially structured. Memories can also be collective, containing representations of group experiences –whether that 'group' be subnational, national or other. A number of scholars, like Halbwachs (1992) the founding father of collective memory analysis, have documented how representations of the past are selectively organised and deployed (though often not entirely invented) to serve the interests of present-day elites. But a growing body of public opinion research has revealed that ordinary people (non-elites) also selectively represent their groups' shared pasts (e.g. Schwartz and Schuman, 2005; Griffin and Bollen, 2009). These studies have shown that ordinary individuals may remember their groups' collective past in ways that are distinctly different from elite or even *official* representations. Moreover, these studies suggest that individuals may use their memories of groups' collective past in assembling their present-day attitudes.

To better comprehend how people use information to formulate attitudes, public opinion scholars have borrowed the psychological concept of 'schema'. This adoption, in the 1980s, revolutionised how we understand the relationship between information and attitude formation (Pratkanis and Greenwald, 1989; Fiske and Taylor, 1991). Schemas are basically cognitive structures of attitudes and their relationships to others. Schema theorists propose that opinions are structured by cognitive frameworks of knowledge about a group, an event, a person or an abstract concept, which include both knowledge of concept and associations to related concepts. Pratkanis and Greenwald (1989) argue that attitudes provide simple strategies for problem-solving, organising memory for events, and sustaining a positive self-image (also see Sudman *et al.*, 2010). Attitudes were, in other words, cognitive representations of evaluations which play a central role in helping individuals comprehend their social world. This social-cognitive approach acknowledges that individuals are under a constant barrage with new stimuli entering the brains from moment to moment.

In as much as we use schemas to help efficiently organise our attitudes, often people have limited information about a subject. Sniderman *et al.* (1993), using sophisticated experiments, found that people make sense of the world using *heuristics* (or mental cues and shortcuts). Instead of engaging in exhaustive attention to and processing of information, individuals used cognitive heuristics to categorise the limited information accessible to them and simplify attitude formation (also see Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Petty *et al.,* 1997). Cognitive heuristics are especially used when individuals are asked to frame attitudes towards complex policy issues. Cognitive heuristics can include general assumptions about human nature or political predisposition or even elite clues (Kuklinski and Quirk, 2000). By using these cognitive heuristics, individuals can form attitudes that are 'rational' in the sense that these attitudes are internally consistent. This, as Sniderman *et al.* (1993) argued, is a very limited conception of rationality as it ignores any deeper rationality requirements for the content of attitudes.

2.3.2   The Assumed Power of Self-Interest

For much of the 1950s and the 1960s, public opinion scholars tended to view attitude formation through the prism of self-interest. The Rational Choice school of thought was introduced into attitudinal analysis by Anthony Downs in his pivotal work *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957). His economistic perspective essentially argues that the individual approaches opinion formation as a cost-benefit analysis. Rational choice theorists tend to give materialistic motives a superordinate role in attitude formation. To put it another way, a desire to acquire material wealth and prosperity is thought to have a powerful impact on attitude formation. In stressing self-interest as the dominant human motive, we are building on the philosophical work of Thomas Hobbes as well as the neo-classical economists (Mansbridge, 1990). During the 1950-1990 period, given its simplicity and its ostensible explanatory power, this rational materialistic model appealed to many in academia. Completing his review of the attitudinal literature on self-interest, Sears and Funk (1991: 3) argued that it was "not unfair to say" that the leading modern psychological theories of motivation have been essentially *egoistic* and *hedonistic*.

In those societies and nations where ideologies of individualism have distinct political support and funding, the assumption that self-interest is a prime motivator tends to have wide currency. Tracing the rise of the idea from its roots in Greek civic life, Mansbridge (1990) shows the continuous use of self-interest to understand political life in Western Europe and (later) North America. In the last thirty years, however, a growing amount of the social science research on public opinion had demonstrated the inadequacy of self-interest in explaining attitude formation. Sears and Funk (1990; 1991), for example, have shown that

self-interest is only a weak determinant of attitudes. Later case study research by Miller and Ratner (1996; 1998) only replicated this general finding. However, what was interesting about the work of Miller and Ratner (1998) was how their research participants used self-interest to predict the actions of others. For example, participants who thought women had a greater vested interest than men in a hypothetical medical plan expected women to have more positive attitudes toward the plan. It appears that both experts and ordinary people over-exaggerate the power of self-interest in predicting attitude formation.

There are several reasons why scholars have assumed that self-interest drives attitude formation. The first is hedonic –for egoistic reasons, individuals' attitudes should be highly responsive to those emotions (e.g. fear, pleasure etc.) that affect them most intensely. The second is accessibility –we assume that self-constructs are principally more accessible than any other social constructs. In effect, we assume that the 'self' functions as a background setting against which new information is interpreted. The 'self' is distinctly salient for any individual and can, therefore, function as a reference-point against which an individual can evaluate attitude 'objects' (for further discussion, see Higgins and Bargh, 1987). Finally, we assume that direct personal experience with an attitude object has a potent effect on the individual. Moreover, direct experience provides an individual with more information about the object, making the attitude more salient and, therefore, more likely to provoke a behavioural response.

One of the major theorems that have developed based on direct personal experience was 'Group Threat Theory' developed by Blalock (1967). In his research, Blalock found that the size of an outgroup affected the ingroup's evaluations of that outgroup. In other words, the ingroup's attitudes were a 'rational' reaction to the size of the threat posed by the outgroup. Another major theorem to emerge from direct personal experience was 'Contact Theory' developed by Gordon Allport (1954). According to this theorem, contact between groups generally fosters more favourable intergroup attitudes[12]. However, Allport's original formulation outlined four basic conditions for successful intergroup contact: (i) equal status, (ii) cooperation, (iii) similar goals, and (iv) official endorsement. Determining which of these conditions is essential rather than simply significant remains a topic of debate (for example, see Pettigrew, 1998b; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Hewstone and Swart, 2011). In a wide-ranging review, McGuire (1985) argued that direct experience (e.g. contact with people) does have robust effects on attitude formation.

2.3.3   Symbols, Values and Ambivalence
Writing about race in the 1960s, scholars of public opinion adopted the economic perspective of rational self-interest and assumed that citizen attitudes towards race 'issues' (such as racial

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[12] I must, as Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) do, acknowledge that it is often not possible to discern the direction of causal processes of this relationship. Individuals may deliberately avoid contact with groups they associate with social ills, like crime or disease. In other words, contact may reduce prejudice (i.e. contact effects) but prejudice may also reduce contact (i.e. prejudice effects). A number of studies have used longitudinal data to establish the direction of a particular contact-prejudice relationship. Path analyses by Binder *et al.,* (2009), for example, produced both lagged contact effects and prejudice effects (see Christ and Wagner 2012 on the causation problem and methodological issues in longitudinal research). The central thesis of Allport's ''Contact Theory', nonetheless, remains valid as long as manipulated contact can be shown to affect attitudes (as it has been done in a number of studies, see Hewstone and Swart, 2011).

segregation or affirmative action) were determined by their own self-interest. In the late 1970s, one group of researchers led by David Sears (1993) refuted these assumptions using the psychological model of "symbolic politics". Sears and his colleagues argued that individuals' attitudes to race issues were shaped by "symbolic predispositions" (such as nationalism or racism). Sear *et al.* (1979) suggest that these predispositions tend to develop and solidify by the end of early adulthood (although such predispositions are not entirely unalterable). Consequently, they are not responsive to the impulses of adult material self-interests and research work has shown this to be the case (for an overview, see Sears and Funk, 1991). For the symbolic theorists, policy issues evoke longstanding affective responses that defeat an apparently rational, self-interested, cost-benefit analysis. The notion of symbolic politics, in other words, is that symbols activate core predispositions reflexively (Sniderman *et al.,* 1993).

More informed individuals are not more influenced by self-interest than the less informed. The symbolic racism thesis put forward by Sears (1993) above is one example of how attitude formation is explained by the influence of political culture on identity boundaries. As research by Sears *et al.* (1979) suggests, high-information individuals are even more affected by symbolic predispositions than by self-interest. Following their research in the late 1970s, other studies have found that symbolic predispositions have a far stronger effect on the well-informed and the influence of self-interest is not heightened by greater information (Sniderman *et al.,* 1993). Zaller (1991: 1215) contends that public opinion is a "marriage of information and values" —information to produce a mental image of what is at stake and values to make a decision about it. A citizen who strongly values humanitarianism, for example, is more likely to approve of social welfare policies than a person who values individualism (also see Zaller, 1992). Importantly, the influence of an individual's value predispositions will be contingent on whether the individual holds the relevant information required to translate their values into an evaluation of a particular object, person or policy.

Symbols can be similar to values but are not the same –when public opinion scholars use the term values, they are talking about something distinct. Values are usually theorised in public opinion scholarship as higher-order evaluative standards, denoting desirable means and ends of action and, therefore, serve as 'abstract standards' (Rokeach, 1968). A functionalist approach suggests that values satisfy psychological needs for the individual because they can be used to evaluate specific objects, individuals and policies (Fazio, 1990; Ajzen and Fishbein, 2000). Research by Alvarez and Brehm (2002) found that individuals hold a number of core values that they rely upon when answering questions on an opinion poll. In their book, Alvarez and Brehm (2002: 18) state:

> "The utility of values for the survey respondent arises from the economy of a generalised standard that can be used in a wide-ranging set of political domains. Instead of maintaining separate political attitudes over diverse questions, respondents need only assess the relevance of the questions to a relatively limited set of core values".

Hence, work by Alvarex and Brehm (2002) suggests that respondents do not express as much ambivalence as may be imagined when answering survey questions. The symbolic racism thesis put forward by Sears and his colleagues is just one example of how attitude formation is explained by the influence of individual values and suggests the importance of group or collective identity.

Adherence to a group identity can help explain attitude formation on a range of issues. For instance, Kinder and Sears (1985), in *Public Opinion and Political Action*, inspected the lack of issue consistency in American public opinion and found that group attachments predicted

individuals' political support. Symbolic politics often relate to the social identity of the individual. Here personal identity must be separated from social identity –an individual's identity is made up of an assortment of different attributes. Social identity, on the other hand, denotes the social categories or components of the self-concept that individuals shared with others in their group and define individuals as being similar to others in their group (Brewer and Gardner, 1996). Social psychologists have used the concept of identity in their studies of behaviour, arguing that group identity strongly influences the attitudes and behaviour of an individual (Tajfel, 1981). For the social theorists, social comparison, social identification and self-esteem maintenance are important factors driving attitude formation (also see Brown, 2000).

2.3.4   The Collective Dimension

Many studies, as discussed in subsection 2.3.2, have been concerned with citizens' individual material self-interest when studying intergroup relations and prejudice. However, individuals may consider the interests of others when forming their attitudes towards a particular group or when judging a specific policy proposal. According to Brewer and Gardner (1996), there are two basic social motives other than self-interest: (i) motives for another's benefit; and/or (ii) for the collective welfare. In explaining collective interests in public opinion formation, Funk (2000) uses the term 'societal interest' to refer to an orientation towards the collective welfare of all. Of course, an individual's perspective on what constitutes the 'collective' will be subjective. The collective can be thought of as a fluid group boundary that can vary depending on the situational context of the individual (Tajfel, 1981). In other words, the collective may be a neighbourhood, a racial group or the whole nation.

Attachment to an ingroup can include the belief that the ingroup is superior and its members should be in a superordinate position with others. Festinger's (1954) theory of social comparison and Merton's (1968) research on reference groups are prominent attempts to understand how ingroup versus outgroup considerations influence attitudes. Influential social identity theorists seem to imply a connection between ingroup attachments and attitude formations (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1981). The social psychological approach to identity considers prejudice to be the result of individuals' categorisation of the world into ingroups and outgroups. But other scholars, such as Allport (1954), argue that ingroup favouritism can be correlated with a full range of different attitudes toward outgroups – everything from hatred to tolerance (also see Brown, 2000). The work of the social identity theorists underpins a large degree of the scholarly work on how attitudes towards outgroups form[13].

To understand what societal interest may look like in practice, consider a speech given in South Africa by the isiZulu King Goodwill Zwelithini on the 23rd of March 2015. In a public address in the small town of Pongola, the isiZulu King allegedly said that foreigners were changing the nature of South African society. In other words, negatively affecting an ingroup (i.e. South African nationals) that the King felt strongly attached to. Speaking on the subject of moral regeneration, King Zwelithini reportedly urged "all foreigners to pack their bags and

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[13] One of the most important forms of social identity arises from an attachment to national identity, for instance. A love of one's country has, under certain circumstances, been shown to promote prejudice against foreigners (see, for example, de Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003; Raijman *et al.,* 2008; Pehrson *et al.,* 2009).

leave"[14]. The President's son Edward Zuma expressed strong agreement with the sentiment "all foreigners must go" in a press interview a few days later (News24, 01/04/2015). In the interview, Edward Zuma warned that the country was sitting on a "ticking time bomb" because foreigners were taking over South Africa. Both the King and the President's son appear to be expressing their concern for the collective rather than their own personal position.

Societal interest implies a commitment to considering the interests of the collective when evaluating an attitude object. A robust finding from the public opinion literature on political attitudes is that voters rely on what Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) call "sociotropic" concerns (i.e. appraisals of national-level conditions) when making political judgements (see, for example, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000). Mutz and Mondak (1997) advance the concept of "sociotropic justice" to denote how individuals evaluate not fairness to themselves, but rather fairness to their group (e.g. their race group or national group). Some have criticised an emphasis on societal interest as a factor in the formation of attitudes, calling it self-interest in disguise (Mansbridge, 1990). Rational choice theory suggests that citizens consider the welfare of others only to the degree that the welfare of others benefits their own self-interest.

Public opinion research into self-interest and societal interest suggests that many individuals are willing to sacrifice self-interest for the benefit of the collective. Laboratory experiments have demonstrated that priming group identity can provoke self-sacrificing behaviour from participants to the extent that the participants restrict self-interest in the name of the collective good (Brewer and Kramer, 1986). Funk (2000) shows that a commitment to societal interest drives individuals' evaluations on a variety of policy positions and can motivate policy attitudes (also see Funk, 1998; Mutz and Mondak, 1997). In their evaluations, citizens appear able to distinguish between private and public concerns. The tendency to rely on public-level considerations in political judgments may be explained by cognitive processes that lead to the "morselisation" of private and public experience (Sears and Funk, 1991). Civic norms that inspire citizens to evaluate political issues in terms of the collective good may also be a contributing factor.

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[14] Some have called King Goodwill Zwelithini's speech xenophobic. Police Minister Nathi Nhleko sought to defend King Goodwill Zwelithini. The Minister said that the isiZulu monarch had in fact been urging the government to deport undocumented immigrants and had not been inciting xenophobia (News24, 19/04/2015). He said that he was present during the king's speech in Pongola and that Goodwill Zwelithini had only bemoaned the fact that there were too many immigrants living in the country. The Minister explained that there was no isiZulu word that would accurately translate as 'deportation', saying the only manner in which 'deportation' could be articulated would be "Mabahambe [They must go]" or "Mababuyele ekhaya lababantu [These people must go back home]".

3 Data Used

Each of the papers presented in this dissertation uses quantitative research methods to understand attitudes in post-apartheid South Africa. The main task of each paper is to weigh the validity of micro-sociological drivers of public attitudes towards international immigration and migrants. The dataset used in these papers is the South African Social Attitudes Survey. A detailed discussion of this dataset is presented in this chapter. Particular attention is paid to sample design, data quality and the survey's ethical considerations. In addition, the limitations of the dataset used will be sketched out with regards to the general limitations of quantitative research approaches.

3.1   Introduction

The review provided by the previous chapter has shown that attitudes should be considered worthy of academic analysis. Attitudes have an important effect on both behaviour and public policy and should, consequently, be quantified and measured. Researchers believe that one of the best ways to measure attitudes is through public opinion surveys and by examining data quantitatively we can better understand how attitudes form. Taking a pragmatic approach to research methods requires trying to figure out what kinds of questions are best answered using quantitative public opinion surveys, as opposed to other methods (like focus groups or indepth interviews). In my opinion, the research questions outlined in the first chapter of this thesis are best answered by the use of a quantitative methodology.

The ultimate goal of my research is to *generalise* the "truth" found in this study to the adult population in South Africa. Pursuing such a goal requires using a dataset that can effectively represent that population. In other words, it is very important to select the right dataset. The dataset used in this study will be presented in each of the empirical chapters. However, due to constraints of word count imposed by the publications in which these chapters were published, it was not possible to provide a comprehensive discussion of the dataset in the empirical chapters. This chapter will present a more detailed discussion of the dataset used in this study, highlighting the limitations of the dataset used. Many of the limitations highlighted are intrinsic to the nature of public opinion polling and not the dataset itself.

This study used secondary attitudinal data from the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) which is administered by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). Designed as a time series, SASAS has been conducted annually by the HSRC since 2003. I received ethical clearance from the University of KwaZulu-Natal to conduct my research using this data –the protocol reference number is HSS/1135/013D. In the spirit of full disclosure, I must acknowledge my role as a junior member of the management team of SASAS. The remainder of this section will provide an outline of this dataset, focusing on the following on the essential aspects of the dataset.

3.2   The Sample Design

In the social sciences one of the greatest obstacles to valid inference, perhaps the greatest, is selection bias (King *et al.* 1994). This is one of the largest barriers to inference in qualitative research. As discussed in the previous chapter, the random sample is a method for eliminating bias in a quantitative methodology. The survey design of SASAS handles selection bias in two ways: (i) the respondent does not self-select to enter the survey; and (ii) the interviewers

are given meticulous instructions as to whom they should enter the survey. In this way, SASAS has been constructed to produce a nationally representative sample of adult individuals living in South Africa in households geographically distributed throughout the country's nine provinces. SASAS is not perfectly representative of all adult South Africa but nevertheless offers a better cross-section of the adult population than would almost any other approach.

SASAS is an adult survey and 'adults' are defined here as individuals aged 16 and older (with no upper age limit). The sampling frame employed here was founded on the most relevant national census and a set of small area layers (SALs). Estimates of the population numbers for a number of categories of the census variables were acquired per SAL. In this sampling frame, special institutions (e.g. military camps, hospitals, schools and university hostels, old age homes), industrial areas, recreational areas and vacant SALs were omitted before drawing of the sample. The rest of this subsection will provide a description of how the individual SALs were selected and then how the respondents within those SALs were chosen.

Figure 3.1: An Example of the Map of the 500 selected Enumeration Areas in 2013

Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS)

A complex sample design was employed to draw the sample which encompassed stratification and multi-stage sampling procedures. The explicit stratification variables used in the sample were SALs which were employed as primary sampling units. The estimated number of dwelling units (taken as visiting points) in the SALs was the secondary sampling units. In the first stage of the sampling procedure, the primary sampling units (i.e. the SALs) were selected with probability proportional to size. Here the estimated number of dwelling units in an SAL was used as a measure of size. As secondary sampling units, the dwelling units were delineated as separate (non-vacant) residential stands, flats, structures, homesteads, and so on. In the second stage of the sampling procedure, a pre-set number of individual dwelling units (or visiting points) were selected with equal probability in each of

the selected dwelling units. Lastly, in the third stage of the sampling procedure, an individual was selected with equal probability from all persons 16 years and older in the chosen dwelling units. Figure 3.1 provides the graphical representation of the location of the 500 selected SALs in SASAS 2013 as an example.

Province, geographic type and majority population group were employed as distinct stratification variables for the sample. The allotted number of primary sampling units (which could vary between different strata), within each stratum, was selected using proportional to size probability sampling with the estimated number of dwelling units in the primary sampling units as an indicator of size. Seven dwelling units were selected in each of these drawn primary sampling units. A list of the 500 drawn SALs were given to geographic information specialists and maps were then generated for each of the 500 areas (indicating clear navigational beacons such as churches, schools, roads etc.). Before fieldworkers started the interviewing process, supervisors were instructed to visit the local police stations, indunas, traditional leaders or relevant authorities in the specific SAL (such as the one in Figure 3.2). This was done to ensure that the authorities were aware of the survey and to notify the communities of the survey's intent.

Figure 3.2: An Example of an SAL Map used to Assist the Fieldwork Teams

Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS)

Fieldworkers were advised that commercial farms, in particular, should be treated with caution and that they should visit the local Agri South Africa offices before entering commercial farms. Official letters were distributed to the authorities, outlining the project's purpose, its duration and the appropriate ethical issues. This procedure was followed, not only as part of the HSRC's research and ethical protocol but also to guarantee the safety of the fieldwork teams. After fieldwork team arrived in the SAL and notified the local authorities of the survey, supervisors had to identify the selected households. Once these households had been identified, a household member was selected as the survey respondent. This household member (respondent) needed to be an adult (i.e. 16 years or older). The

household member was selected randomly –to do this the fieldworker employed the KISH grid to randomly select the household member (see Kish, 1994).

3.3   Data Weighting

To take account of the unavoidable reality that not all respondents selected in the survey had the same probability of being chosen by fieldworkers, the data was weighted. The weighting procedure had three distinct stages: (i) visiting point (address); (ii) household; and (iii) individual. The procedure was designed to mirror the relative selection probabilities of the individual at the main phases of selection. In order to guarantee representativity of smaller groups (such as Indian South Africans), special weights needed to be applied. Person and household weights are benchmarked using a variety of different variables. The marginal totals for the benchmark variables were attained from the relevant population estimates published by Statistics South Africa. In other words, the estimated South African population is used as the target population.

3.4   Questioning Respondents

Respondents were asked to complete a questionnaire consisting of about three hundred questions. In order for the survey to be an appropriate instrument for social scientists, the questionnaire is translated into the country's major languages –namely isiZulu, isiXhosa, Tshivenda, Xitsonga, Setswana and Afrikaans. People speaking any of the official languages in South Africa should be able to complete the SASAS questionnaire. Fieldworkers were provided with hard copies of the translated templates to safeguard consistency of translations for the country's various official languages. All translations are overseen by a steering committee which works with translators to ensure comparability across all versions of the questionnaire. This procedure affords the survey the ability to efficiently collect information on attitudes and behaviours across the post-apartheid nation's varied multi-cultural communities.

It is important to be aware of the limitation of using a questionnaire like the one employed by SASAS. Anti-positivists will argue that opinion surveys rely on a 'reality' that can be observed objectively. For ardent anti-positivists, all truth is relative and cannot be enumerated as the positivists seek to do (Turner, 1993; Heidtman *et al.,* 2000). I recognise that the researcher cannot be totally objective and impartial and there is a degree of researcher imposition to all surveys of this type. When developing the SASAS questionnaire, the SASAS researchers were making their own assumptions and judgments about what is and is not salient to the research objective. Academic proponents of explorative sociology will contend that such an approach will result in the researcher eschewing everyday experience from the explanation of positivist evidence. Of chasing validation of what has already been assumed to be 'true'.

SASAS questionnaire instruments are mostly composed of items constructed by researchers that allow respondents to choose between predefined options. In other words, gathering limited information from respondents without explanation. The SASAS respondent is constrained by which questions to ask, and how the question and responses options are framed. The standardisation of SASAS response options may, consequently, hide nuance and detail in a respondents' answer. Moreover, there is no mechanism to tell how much thought and honesty a respondent in SASAS has put in when answering the questionnaire. The validity of treating respondents' answers to questions as 'true' pre-existing views —what

could be thought of ontological valid opinions –is key assumption on the part of this study. As a result, the question of validity is presented when considering representations of the public opinion gathered using questionnaires of this sort.

A key phenomenologist argument is that quantitative public opinion research produces 'opinions' which are merely synthetic constructs. Writing in the 1970s, Pierre Bourdieu (1993: 150) said that:

> [The opinion poll's] most important function is to impose the illusion that there is something called public opinion in the sense of the purely arithmetical total of individual opinions; to impose the illusion that it is meaningful to speak of the average of opinions or the average opinion".

Bourdieu did not dismiss the gathering of mass attitudes but rather argued for the need to acknowledge the 'constructed' nature of opinion polls (also see Ginsberg 1982; Osborne and Rose 1999). But a pessimistic interpretation of survey research would envision such research as recreating a widely disseminated set of possibilities and set limits to what can be 'known' in the objective world. Such an interpretation implies that users of surveys are trapped in a hegemonically sanctioned version of reality.

3.5   Quality Control

The SASAS research team conducted a conscientious quality control effort. SASAS researchers physically completed random visits to selected SALs to guarantee that fieldworkers had followed ethical research practices required by the survey. These researchers checked that the fieldworkers had appropriately identified the selected households and respondents in the household. In addition, the researchers checked that the appropriate procedures were followed in administering the research instrument. Telephonic backchecks were also completed with 15% of the drawn sample. A team dedicated to the data-capturing function checked that there were no data-capturing errors. The Data Curation Unit (DCU) at the HSRC has rigorous data cleaning protocols. Data were checked and corrected –the DCU checked for logical consistency, for permitted ranges, for reliability on derived variables and for filter instructions. Realisation rates for SASAS are typically above 75% of the drawn sample. The high realisation rate observed was attained because communities were well informed about the survey as well as the face-to-face data collection methodology employed.

As discussed in the previous section, the SASAS questionnaire is composed of close-ended questions and it must be acknowledged that such a format does not allow research participants to identify issues and themes in a way that a qualitative format would. Survey questions can be understood differently by different respondents but also that the same answers can have different explanatory significance. SASAS fieldworkers undergo training aimed to ensure that they are able to effectively communicate the question to respondents. In addition, all SASAS undergo a period of piloting in which several teams of fieldworkers administer the survey in specially chosen SALs. After the teams have finished surveying these SALs, reports are given to the management team on how communities understood and interpreted the survey questions. Changes to improve the survey instrument are discussed based on these reports.

A succession of sociological scholars has highlighted the disadvantages of closed-ended questionnaires in public opinion research. There is no denying that opinion surveys have their limits but alternative methodologies also have their own drawbacks. Qualitative methodologies can generate findings that are weighed down with their own (if not greater)

limitations and even bias (King *et al.,* 1994). Standardisation, reliability, and representativeness provide surveys with recognised properties that provide valuable and valid data for researchers (Zaller, 1992; Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Wilson 2013). Quantitative survey research tools can help researchers in a way that other more qualitative methodologies cannot. That is not to suggest that surveys *always* produce superior data about mass attitudes but that survey instruments have value in the academic research of attitudes.

3.6   Ethical Considerations and Consent

The HSRC subscribes to a strict internal Code of Ethics. The study design and research tools (questionnaires, consent and assent forms, training manuals, etc.) were approved by the HSRC's Research Ethics Committee. A questionnaire is included in the SASAS field round only if the HSRC Ethics Committee has approved it. Fieldworkers had to obtain respondents' consent. Although verbal consent was to be secured from the respondent starting the interview, written consent forms had to be signed upon completing an interview. The remainder of this subsection will discuss the consent form procedures.

All respondents aged 18 years and older were required to provide written informed consent by completing a consent form. This document had six components, it: (i) clarified the purpose of the study; (ii) stressed that participation was voluntary; (iii) outlined the expected duration of the interview; (iv) summarised how confidentiality of information was to be preserved; (v) presented an honest assessment of the risks/discomforts and benefits related to participation in the survey; and (vi) provided contact details for the HSRC's tollfree ethics hotline and survey coordinator contacts. All respondents aged 16-18 years were also required to provide written informed consent by completing a consent form. But in cases where the selected respondent was a minor but still old enough to participate in the survey (i.e. aged 16 or 17 years) the informed consent process that was respected was that of the HSRC's Guidelines on Research with Orphans and Vulnerable Children. A dual consent process was obligatory, both from the minors and the minor's parent or guardian.

4 Xenophobia Across the Class Divide: South African Attitudes towards Foreigners 2003–2012

ABSTRACT

In May 2008, anti-immigrant riots in South Africa displaced more than a hundred thousand people. Despite the media attention that the riots attracted, there has been no study that presents trend data on anti-immigrant sentiment for the period after 2008. This paper uses data from the nine rounds of the South African Social Attitudes Survey over the period 2003–2012 to fill this gap and test the success of government commitments to reduce anti-immigrant prejudice. The results reveal that attempts to combat xenophobia have been ineffectual, with anti-immigrant sentiment prevalent and widespread in 2012. Afrophobia was observed, with a majority of citizens identifying foreign African nationals as the group they least wanted to come and live in South Africa. The government is advised to urgently address the alarming and widespread pervasiveness of anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa.

4.1 Introduction

Since the mass anti-immigrant riots of May 2008 displaced more than a hundred thousand people in South Africa[15], the prevalence of anti-immigrant sentiment in the country has been the subject of extensive debate. The South African government has pledged to fight xenophobia and promote tolerance towards foreign nationals. In the aftermath of the May riots, then national President Thabo Mbeki addressed the nation, promising to "entrench…full acceptance within all our communities of new residents from other countries". His successor, President Jacob Zuma, reiterated the commitment of his administration to combating xenophobia on taking office in 2009. However, recent outbreaks of xenophobic violence in the country have provoked questions about the effectiveness of government efforts to reduce xenophobic sentiment. This paper aims to ascertain the level of anti-immigrant attitudes in the country since 2008, using public opinion survey data. Such an investigation will shed new light on how effective the government's anti-xenophobia measures have been. I will argue that the South African government has failed to adequately prioritise xenophobia as a serious issue.

Academics have made a concerted effort to understand anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa, particularly after the events of May 2008. This article will contribute meaningfully to this growing body of knowledge and debate. The results of my investigation will show that anti-immigrant attitudes are widespread in South African society. Discussions of xenophobia in South Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa more broadly, are often equated with anti-immigrant

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[15] The riots began on 11 May 2008 when violent attacks began in Alexandra: a township north of Johannesburg. The rioting quickly spread to many separate settlements across the province of Gauteng before moving to communities across the country (Crush *et al.,* 2008; Desai, 2008). During the period of the rioting more than 150,000 people were displaced, 670 were wounded and 62 people were killed (Hayem, 2013). After, what some criticised as a slow reaction, the government moved decisively to quell the violence calling in the national army to end the rioting.

violence. In this article, I seek to better understand anti-immigrant attitudes rather than anti-immigrant violence per se. Although xenophobic violence is an important component of any study on xenophobia on the African continent, it is important to remember that anti-immigrant sentiment does not only manifest itself in violent acts and that xenophobia has many manifestations. Nor can one assume a simple relationship between xenophobia and anti-immigrant violence: hostility towards immigrants does not, in of itself, result in violence.

Explanations of xenophobia have been linked to the economic conditions of South African communities and labour market competition (see Desai, 2008; Dodson, 2010; Neocosmos, 2010 who comment on this trend). This suggests a simple linear relationship between anti-immigrant prejudice and economic status. Using quantitative public opinion data, I will explore the validity of this relationship, arguing that no simple linear association exists. This article will contend that anti-immigrant sentiment would be better understood as a political discourse rather than a response to economic conditions. Public attitudes towards immigrants and the government's reaction to that anti-immigrant sentiment must be understood as part of a political discourse that prioritises indigeneity and promotes a South African exceptionalism.

4.2   The Migrant Population in South Africa

International migration has always been an integral part of the modernisation and industrialisation of contemporary South Africa. Such migration dates back to the mid-nineteenth century when extensive migration systems were created by the colonial state to serve the mining and agricultural sectors (for a discussion of these systems, see Arrighi *et al.,* 2010). These systems (which were further entrenched during the apartheid regime) began to break down in the 1980s as the racialised apartheid state itself began to collapse. Following the breakdown of the apartheid system, the new democratic government – led by the African National Congress (ANC) – discouraged the recruitment of foreign workers in the country (Neocosmos, 2010). This decision was made in an effort by the state to protect 'indigenous' South African labour from foreign competition.

Following the democratic transition, South Africa continued to attract international migrants despite a decline in labour recruiting. Based on data on legal migrant movements into the post-apartheid nation at legal entry points collected by the South African government, this trend was clear to policy-makers (Segatti, 2011a). The number of reported legal entries increased in the decades following the transition and continued to grow every year with the exception of a mild downturn in 2009 (also see Crush, 2012). Immigrants in South African occupy a wide variety of economic spaces – including teachers, doctors, construction workers etc. – and mainly reside in the nation's townships and cities. A significant number of migrants have applied for asylum status, and South Africa is currently one of the key asylum-seeker destinations in the world[16].

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[16] Between 1994 and 2004 there were 150,000 asylum applications received by the South African Department of Home Affairs (Crush, 2012: 16). The department is unable to process these applications quickly and the state has been slow in the granting of asylum to applicants and the refugee determination process is currently characterised by a considerable backlog. During the period 1994–2011, only 53,000 applicants were granted refugee status. In the period 2008–2012 the number of applications for refugee status increased and in 2009 alone there were 220,028 new applications (Crush, 2012: 7). The vast majority of applications were from sub-Saharan African countries, particularly Zimbabwe (two-thirds of all applicants in 2009) which has suffered economic and political turmoil since 2000.

The flow of foreign migrants into South Africa seems to have produced substantial debate, especially over the size of the migrant population residing in the country. Accurate data on this population and human mobility in the country is difficult to obtain (see Landau *et al.,* 2011 who remark on the difficulties faced by local municipalities in tracking human mobility). This is partially a result of ineffective information-gathering systems and partially a result of irregular immigration into South Africa. National census data, as well as World Bank population data, suggests that the foreign immigrant population in the country may be slightly over 2.2 million as of late 2012. Most immigration into the country seems to be from sub-Saharan Africa, although immigrants are also increasingly arriving from other parts of the Global South including Pakistan, Bangladesh and China.

4.3   Previous Public Opinion Survey Research on Immigration in South Africa

Anti-immigrant sentiment is not limited to South Africa alone. Immigration tends to provoke a strong response from the public in many nations, especially in the Global North. A significant body of research has been developed to measure and track public opinion on immigration and immigrants in Europe and North America (for a review of this work, see Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010). This scholarship notes that a considerable share of the public in the Global North holds anti-immigrant opinions. Attitudinal studies of public opinion towards immigrants and immigration, however, are less well understood in the Global South (see Lawrence, 2011; Miller, 2012 who remarks on this research gap). In particular, sub-Saharan Africa is largely ignored, with few public attitudes survey studies available to measure trends. This is counter-intuitive, as there are striking similarities between the immigration debate in the Global North and South. In international migrant receiving countries in the Global South, public debate on immigration is characterised by concerns that immigrants cause crime, take jobs from locals and are a burden on already pressured social welfare nets. Given the nature of these debates, public opinion research is required in order to better understand xenophobic attitudes in the Global South.

Unlike other nations on the continent, there is reliable public opinion data on immigration available in South Africa. Through public opinion surveys, the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) has documented anti-immigrant sentiment in the country since the late 1990s. In 2001 and 2002, SAMP conducted attitudinal surveys on immigration policy and perceptions of foreigners among the citizens of Southern Africa (Crush and Pendleton, 2007). This research instrument, known as the National Immigration Policy Survey (NIPS), allowed the SAMP researchers to measure xenophobic attitudes in the region. Another set of the national attitudinal surveys was conducted by SAMP in South Africa in 1997, 1999 and 2006. This section reviews the SAMP attitudinal research to discern how the results may shape the construction of our understanding of recent trends in South African attitudes towards foreigners.

Evidence from the SAMP survey literature suggests that anti-immigrant sentiment is widespread in Botswana, Namibia and particularly South Africa. Using 2007 public opinion survey data from Pew's Global Attitudes Project, Miller (2012) noted a similar finding. Crush and Pendleton (2007: 64), using the NIPS research instrument, found that in Southern Africa citizens tended to exaggerate the number of foreigners residing in their country, and tended to view immigration as 'a problem rather than an opportunity'. In comparison with citizens of other nations, South Africans were found to be the most supportive of restrictions on immigration (also see Crush *et al.,* 2008). Immigrants, however, are not viewed as a

homogenous group by the South African public. To better understand xenophobic opinions in South Africa, the 2006 SAMP survey on attitudes towards immigration asked questions about foreigners from specific countries. The results indicated that South Africans viewed immigrants from the North Americas and Europe more favourably than foreigners from Africa.

According to the public opinion data from SAMP on South Africa, a majority of South Africans believed that immigrants create unemployment and drain the country's economic resources (Crush and Pendleton, 2007: 71–72; Crush *et al.,* 2008: 29–30). The findings from SAMP also revealed, however, that negative attitudes towards foreigners in South Africa cut across class, gender and racial lines. Supporting this finding, Du Toit and Kortze (2011: 182–188) found, using the World Value Survey data, that restrictive immigration attitudes were fairly widespread among the country's different socio-demographic groups. In other words, rich and poor, employed and unemployed, black and white, all conveyed similar attitudes. A study by Fauvelle-Aymar and Segatti (2012) on those factors associated with the wards where the 2008 anti-immigrant riots occurred is of interest. Unemployment and absolute poverty were not found to play a decisive role, debunking explanations which place emphasis purely on such economic characteristics as the drivers of xenophobic violence.

Despite the magnitude of public feeling and the level of xenophobic violence evident, there has been little quantitative research on attitudes towards migrants after 2008. Given the significant events of the 2007–2011 period, this represents a considerable knowledge gap in our understanding of xenophobic attitudes in South Africa. Most studies are qualitative in nature, and make subjective judgements on the prevalence of xenophobia from micro-level analysis (in her review of the relevant literature, Dodson, 2010 came to a similar conclusion). The gap makes it difficult to discern whether the opinions of the South African public towards foreigners have altered since 2008. Government anti-xenophobia measures, as well as civil society and government condemnation of xenophobia in recent years, may have resulted in a decline of anti-immigrant sentiment. This paper will provide insight into how attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa may have changed in the years following the May 2008 riots.

4.4   Measuring Xenophobia Using Public Opinion Data

To gain a better understanding of changing attitudes towards foreigners, data were used from the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) for the period 2003–2012. The survey is administered between October and November and has been repeated annually by the Human Sciences Research Council since 2003. The survey series is nationally representative of all people living in private households in South Africa who are 16 years and older. This nationally representative probability sample does not include people living in hospitals, care centres, old age homes, orphanages and so on. The realised sample size for the survey in terms of respondents averages at around 3000 per year for the period. The implicit stratification variable was the enumerator areas from the national census. The data were weighted to the mid-year population estimates published by Statistics South Africa. SASAS contains detailed information about the socio-economic, demographic and labour force characteristics of respondents making the survey ideal for research of this kind.

The survey employs a range of questions designed to capture South African perceptions providing indicators with which to better understand and monitor South African attitudes. When constructing measures for anti-immigrant sentiment, the question asked consistently

Figure 4.1: Attitudes towards Welcoming Immigrants, South Africa, 2003-2012

I generally welcome to South Africa…?

Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey (2003-2012)
Notes: 1. Data are weighted using the weights specifically designed for SASAS.

Table 4.1: Most Undesirable Immigrant Groups in South Africa, 2003-2012

Which, if any, group would you least want to come and live in South Africa?

	Nigerians		Other Africans		Asian		Other		Can't Choose	
	(%)	Std. Err.	(%)	Std. Err.	(%)	Std. Err.	(%)	Std. Err.	(%)	Std. Err.
Year										
2008	21	(1.03)	30	(1.12)	3	(0.44)	11	(0.78)	34	(1.19)
2009	17	(1.04)	30	(1.19)	4	(0.49)	22	(1.16)	26	(1.18)
2010	20	(1.08)	32	(1.26)	5	(0.53)	19	(1.06)	23	(1.11)
2011	22	(1.03)	39	(1.24)	7	(0.63)	16	(0.96)	15	(0.92)
2012	26	(1.34)	34	(1.37)	9	(0.79)	14	(1.05)	16	(1.04)

Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey (2008-2012)
Notes: 1. Data are weighted using the weights specifically designed for SASAS.

across nine rounds of SASAS was: "Please indicate which of the following statements applies to you: I generally welcome to South Africa…(a) All immigrants; (b) Some immigrants; and (c) No immigrants". The first category denotes complete acceptance of immigrants, the second more selective acceptance and the third complete rejection. It is possible, using responses to this question, to trace patterns of hostility towards foreign migrants over the 2003–2012 period (Figure 4.1). Beginning in 2008, SASAS also began tracking which immigrant group respondents would least want to come and live in the country using the open-ended question: "Which, if any, group would you least want to come and live in South Africa?", which allows for identification of the most 'undesirable' immigrant groups.

In 2003, approximately a third of South Africans expressed the view that they would not welcome any immigrants. Another third indicated that they would be receptive to the presence of some immigrants, with only 34% willing to welcome all foreign migrants. Such sentiments have tended to fluctuate within a relatively narrow range over the nine rounds of SASAS conducted between 2003 and 2012 (also see Gordon *et al.,* 2012 in which a version of these trends was first discussed). The findings of this study corroborate those of the SAMP researchers (see Crush and Pendleton, 2007; Crush *et al.,* 2008). The widespread condemnation of the May 2008 violence by government and civil society leaders may be responsible for the comparatively low level of anti-immigrant sentiment observed in late 2008. However, this effect appears to have been short-lived, with the 2009–2012 results showing a rapid return to pre-2008 levels. In late 2012, only 27% of the population stated that they welcomed all immigrants to South Africa.

The results suggest that many South Africans differentiate between the international migrants they want and the migrants they do not. This suggests that the indiscriminate use of the term 'immigrant' in this context is unwise. This argument is not unique to South Africa. In his study on British attitudes to migrants from seven different regions, Ford (2011) reviews recent sociological research on ethnicity and finds that most studies do not disaggregate between immigrant groups and that this is a serious shortcoming on their part. Ford argues, in his UK study, that robust differences do exist in how public attitudes are formed about different ethnic groups with an emphasis placed on perceived cultural differences between immigrant groups and citizens as a key determinant. If the ethnicity of the international migrant involved is an important factor in the formation of public sentiment, then this begs the question: which foreign immigrant 'groups' are particularly undesirable to adult South Africans?

Researchers (e.g. Murray, 2003; Nyamnjoh, 2006; Matsinhe, 2011) have noted that anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa is directed primarily towards those from other African countries, derogatorily referred to as the *makwerekwere*[17]. This would suggest that African immigrants are the most undesirable in the country and, indeed, the data analysis supports this hypothesis. In 2012 more than half (55%) of the nation's adult population identified African immigrants as the most undesirable foreign immigrant group (Table 4.1). Although there are regular xenophobic attacks on South Asians and Chinese foreigners in South Africa, it is clear that these migrants do not attract the same kind of attention that African migrants do. The group most commonly identified by adult South Africans were immigrants from

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[17] The word is an offensive term for African foreign nationals in South Africa originating from onomatopoeic references to the supposedly 'strange ways' that the foreign African nationals speak (Nyamnjoh, 2006: 39).

Nigeria. Interestingly, no other group seems to have elicited the same level of attention, a finding that was consistent across the 2008–2012 period[18].

4.5   The South African Government Response to Xenophobia

Since its inception, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) Monitoring Project has evaluated the South African government's response to xenophobia. The 2011 APRM report criticised the South African government's efforts on combatting xenophobia, indicating little or no progress. Criticism was levelled at several of the initiatives that have either not been maintained or effectively rolled out. The report suggested that there was even a level of denialism on the part of officials. This was not a new revelation and government denialism on xenophobia had been featured in a number of academic studies in South Africa (e.g. Desai, 2008; Landau, 2010; Neocosmos, 2010; Hayem, 2013). Indeed, former President Thabo Mbeki's reaction to the 2008 May attacks[19] is perhaps the most eloquent expression of this denialism although the current President Jacob Zuma is also somewhat guilty of denialism[20].

Given this denialism, it is not surprising that a review of government efforts to reverse xenophobic attitudes suggests that the state's programme of action on the issue has been lacklustre. Between 2008 and 2012, the government has held 49 community dialogues to encourage social cohesion and combat xenophobia. The country's Department of Home Affairs has established a counter-xenophobia unit and established a communication strategy to promote cohesion between foreigners and citizens. The National Development

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[18] Of those who selected a group when asked about least preferred international migrant group, three additional questions were asked. Respondents were queried whether "Thinking of the group you just mentioned, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements: (i) The group presents a threat in terms of job opportunities?; (ii) The group presents a threat in terms of crime? ; and (iii) The groups presents a threat to my culture and lifestyle?" Of those individuals who selected 'Nigerians', three-quarters (74.9%) agreed that this group presents a job opportunities threat, nine-tenths (91.6%) agreed that this group presented a crime threat and about half (54%) agreed that this group was a threat to their culture. This data seems to offer some indication of why some South Africans selected 'Nigerians' as their least preferred group.

[19] In a public address, on 3rd July 2008, then President Thabo Mbeki spoke out against violent attacks on foreign nationals. The former President seemed to struggle with the idea that xenophobia was widespread and prevalent in his country. During the address he stated that: "What happened during those days was not inspired by possessed nationalism, or extreme chauvinism, resulting in our communities violently expressing the hitherto unknown sentiments of mass and mindless hatred of foreigners – xenophobia… I heard it said insistently that my people have turned or become xenophobic… I wondered what the accusers knew about my people which I did not know. And this I must also say —none in our society has any right to encourage or incite xenophobia by trying to explain naked criminal activity by cloaking it in the garb of xenophobia" (cited in Dodson, 2010: 7).

[20] A good example of his approach in this matter is President Jacob Zuma's statement in a 2013 debate in the country's National Assembly: "I think that at times there's a bit of an exaggeration, where people say that xenophobia is a big problem in South Africa. I think that is a bit of an exaggeration, although I am not saying it's not there, because, at times when incidents occur, it is seen, particularly when people react. Foreigners are busy everywhere, in every corner of this country, and they are employed, and that feeling is not that big" (cited in the Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2013).

Commission has proposed countering xenophobia by conducting sustained campaigns, although details on how this would be done are negligible. These activities have been acknowledged by the 2013 and 2014 APRM reports on South Africa. But given the level of anti-immigrant sentiment amongst the country's adult public, these measures seem inadequate and at best circumspect.

In 2012, a National Social Cohesion Summit was held to improve social cohesion in the country, and during the two-day event government leaders heard strategic initiatives to combat xenophobia in the country. The summit was cited by the APRM reports on South Africa as an important part of the government's efforts to reduce xenophobia. In a media statement, the Director of the African Centre for Migration and Society at the University of the Witwatersrand Professor Loren Landau stated that anti-foreigner sentiment was evident at the 2012 summit, and instead of condemning it, many politicians were passive in their response (Mail & Guardian, 03/09/2012). In a later newspaper article, he went further, arguing that national discussions about social cohesion and discrimination almost entirely exclude questions of ethnicity and immigration (Mail & Guardian, 17/05/2013).

The passivity of the authorities in combatting xenophobia extends to government efforts to punish perpetrators of anti-immigrant violence. As noted by Hayem (2013: 89–90), many of those arrested for their participation in the May 2008 attacks were released under pressure from both community and political leaders, as well as for other reasons. The police have been slow to act during other (lesser publicised) incidences of xenophobic violence since 2008 and, as Landau (2010) argues, an atmosphere of impunity often exists in such cases. Recommendations for more stringent anti-xenophobia measures have been heard but not implemented. For instance, a recommendation by the South African Human Rights Commission for the development of hate crime legislation and appropriate support measures has languished for years without resolution.

4.6   The Economic Rationalism of Anti-Immigrant Sentiment

A popular explanation for anti-immigrant sentiment, as already outlined, is that poverty and economic underdevelopment are drivers of xenophobia in the country. The former Editor-in-Chief of the nation's popular weekly, *Sunday Times,* Mondli Makanya, even went so far as to characterise this narrative as common sense. Speaking in an interview, he stated:

> "I think that most black South Africans understand why black working-class South Africans feel the way they do. It's about economics. It's also about people in transition, about a class of people arriving below them, undercutting them and competing with them in a context where they must scramble, of high unemployment, where the state is absent" (cited in Desai, 2008: 58).

This explanation has attracted significant media attention. This narrative occasionally makes use of Fanonian logic –that the oppressed, bereft of other alternatives turn their aggression inwards (Gibson, 2012). In the APRM report (2013: 112), this link is made, the authors of the report stating that "[s]ocio-economic circumstances precipitate some resentment towards foreigners who in certain sections of the labour market seem to be favoured by employers because they work hard for much lower wages than are offered to citizens". If this explanation for xenophobia is accepted, then government efforts to fight xenophobia can be restricted to efforts to reduce poverty and create jobs. No, or very little, type of other campaigning will be required.

In South Africa, economic explanations for anti-immigrant sentiment in the country are often grounded within an understanding of the negotiated democratic transition. From a regime based on racial oppression and authoritarianism, the country has transitioned to a multiracial democracy has produced a multitude of new democratic rights for South Africa's formerly oppressed population groups. However, this transition has at the same time created a deep contestation over the realisation of these rights (Murray, 2003; Nyamnjoh, 2006; Neocosmos, 2010). As early as the late 1990s, Tshitereke (1999: 4) sought to explain xenophobia in South Africa in such terms. Indeed, he links inequality with xenophobia, arguing that:

> "In the post-apartheid epoch, while people's expectations have been heightened, a realisation that delivery is not immediate has meant that discontent and indignation are at their peak… This is the ideal situation for a phenomenon like xenophobia to take root and flourish".

The emphasis placed on economic factors by these advocates for competition theory allows their analysis of xenophobia to be conveniently packaged with broader criticisms of the nation's macro-economic policies. Even a cursory overview of the performance of the post-apartheid economy will reveal troubling economic indicators. Unemployment remains high and poverty prevalent (Gibson, 2012), despite the fact that the ANC-led government has expanded the social welfare net and spent millions on public works programmes. Frustrated with the slow pace of service delivery, many communities have engaged in (at times violent) protest action[21]. Particularly after 2004, the pervasiveness of such actions has grown, and some have been accompanied by anti-immigrant rhetoric[22].

The link between economic self-interest and competition theory indicates that antagonism is likely when different groups (i.e. citizens and foreigners) are rivals for the same limited resources. The economic competition argument states that realistic fears about the economic impact of immigration on the local labour market and welfare system affect attitudes towards immigrants (Miller, 2012). As a consequence, therefore, those less exposed to economic hardship are thus more likely to exhibit more favourable sentiments towards foreigners than those unshielded. Evidence of public opinion analysis in Europe and North America suggests a link between individual-level economic indicators and anti-immigrant sentiment (Ceobanu

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[21] The reader should be aware that there is a tendency to exaggerate the state of community unrest in South Africa. The South African Police Service's (SAPS) Incident Registration Information System (IRIS) recorded 156,230 'crowd incidents' between 1997 and 2013. Of those incidents, 90% were categorised as 'crowd (peaceful)' and 10% as 'crowd (unrest). The latter category should not be equated with 'violent protests' and evidence produced by Alexander *et al.,* (2015) in a report on the IRIS data shows this to be the case. The notion of 'increasing and continual violent protest actions' has been used (by General Riah Phiyega, the National Police Commissioner and others) to justify increases in SAPS spending and a militarised approach to crowd control. It could be argued, as Alexander and his colleague do, that the effect of the official discourse on 'violent protests' to stigmatise an important feature of a democratic society: protests.

[22] This was noted in a book by Von Holdt *et al.* (2011) on eight case studies where service delivery protests and xenophobic attacks occurred. Von Holdt and his colleagues argue that participants in these protests were involved in a struggle to impose a regime of national citizenship. Under this regime, according to this argument, citizenship would carry a claim to resources. This claim would, at the same time, carry the exclusion of foreign nationals (i.e. non-citizens). Under this paradigm, the accumulation of resources by foreigners is seen as illegitimate. Work by Misago (2012) and Hayem (2013) also refers to the growth of nativist revivalism in the country).

and Escandell, 2010). This evidence seems to support the assumption that in South Africa there is a link between economic self-interest and anti-immigrant sentiment.

4.7   Does Xenophobia Cross the Class Divide?

There has been considerable debate about class classifications in South Africa. There are several mechanisms, as Burger *et al.,* (2014) has shown, by which class can be measured and discerned in the country. But these authors contend that class identification in the country is complicated by perceived tensions between racial and cultural identity and persistent confusion around what terms like 'middle class' represents (also see Southall 2014). Given that discussions on xenophobia by Mondli Makanya and others are often premised on individuals' conscious identification with certain class statuses, I used a subjective measure of class in the analysis[23]. The results suggest that in 2012, those who described themselves as part of the upper class were less likely to say they welcomed no immigrants while those who saw themselves as belonging to the lower class were the most likely to support this statement (Figure 4.2). This represents a distinct change from what was observed in both 2008 and 2010 when the opposite was true.

Does anti-immigrant sentiment vary between other measures of economic and social strata in South African society? The results of bivariate analysis reveal that there is a degree of variation in anti-immigrant sentiment between the different rungs of the country's socio-economic ladder. If anti-immigrant sentiment is examined by employment status, it is apparent that the unemployed and part-time employed are no more likely than their full-time employed counterparts to welcome immigrants. If anti-immigrant sentiment is analysed by population group, it is evident that the white minority is less welcoming than the black majority. Educational status is, however, a better measure of socio-economic position than employment status or population group. If the data are examined by this measure (Table 4.2), it is apparent that tertiary-educated South Africans are more likely to be selective in their acceptance of immigrants than the less well-educated who favour complete rejection. In many countries, class often commonly associated with occupation and I ran an experiment using reported occasion as a determinant of attitudes towards international migrants. The results did *not* suggest that occupational status was a robust predictor of attitudes[24].

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[23] Economic status was determined by a subjective self-identification measure. Respondents were asked: "People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the: (i) lower class; (ii) working class; (iii) middle class; (iv) upper middle class or (v) upper class?" Responses were then coded into the following categories: (i) lower class; (ii) working class; (iii) middle class; and (iv) upper middle class.

[24] In SASAS, respondents were asked, "What is your current occupation (the name or title of your main job)?" Using responses from this question, I constructed a three dummy variables: (i) no occupation; (ii) unskilled; (iii) semi-skilled; and (iv) high skilled. Multinomial regression analysis was used to predict the relationship between these dummy variables and the measure on welcoming international migrants. Here I employed SASAS data from 2012. Using unskilled as the reference, I found that the high-skilled ($r = -0.991$; $SE = 0.288$) were less likely to select 'no immigrants' (versus all immigrants) even controlling for a range of demographic variables. Standard goodness-of-fit tests do not suggest that our occupation dummies adequately explained a noteworthy degree of variance in the model.

Figure 4.2: Attitudes towards Welcoming Immigrants by Subjective Class Groups, 2008, 2010 and 2012

I generally welcome to South Africa...

Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey (2008, 2010, 2012)
Notes: 1. Data are weighted using the weights specifically designed for SASAS.

Table 4.2: Attitudes towards Welcoming Immigrants across Socio-Economic Groups in South Africa, 2008, 2010 and 2012

I generally welcome to South Africa… immigrants?

	2008			2010			2012		
	All (%)	Some (%)	No (%)	All (%)	Some (%)	No (%)	All (%)	Some (%)	No (%)
Educational Status									
Tertiary	38	43	19	28	50	23	28	56	16
Completed Secondary	45	24	31	34	39	28	26	46	28
Incomplete Secondary	41	28	31	35	35	30	28	41	31
Senior Primary	45	23	32	35	36	29	27	40	33
Junior Primary and Below	54	11	35	36	33	31	28	35	37
Urban/Rural Status									
Urban Formal	41	31	27	31	37	32	28	45	26
Urban Informal	48	20	32	33	45	22	26	46	28
Trad. Auth. Areas	46	18	36	39	36	25	26	37	37
Rural Formal	43	30	27	32	42	26	25	48	27
Subjective Economic Status									
Affluent	36	37	27	21	50	30	37	39	24
Comfortable	40	37	24	26	44	30	25	53	21
Getting Along	48	23	29	34	37	28	27	44	29
Poor	42	19	39	42	31	28	26	36	38

Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey (2008, 2010, 2012)
Notes: 1. Data are weighted using the weights specifically designed for SASAS.

Perceived family wealth may be an important indicator of anti-immigrant sentiment. If self-reported economic status[25] is used as a measure of economic position (Table 4.2), it is apparent, however, that only a minority of those who think of themselves as affluent favoured complete acceptance. Between 2010 and 2012, the share of those who favoured complete rejection increased among those who defined themselves as poor. This may suggest a hardening of attitudes amongst the poor in the recent period. Statistical tests, however, did not show individual economic position to be a good explanatory factor of anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa[26]. The results indicate that the relationship between economic status and anti-immigrant sentiment may be more complicated than first thought.

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[25] Respondents were asked "Would you say that you and your family are: (i) wealthy, (ii) very comfortable, (iii) reasonably comfortable, (iv) just getting along, (v) poor or (v) very poor?" Responses were then coded into the following categories: (i) affluent, (ii) comfortable, (iii) getting along and (iv) poor.

[26] Multivariate analysis was employed to test the results. Multinomial regression analysis was used to predict categorical placement for our immigrant sentiment measure. The results did indicate that self-reported economic status was statistically significant predictor of whether an individual would welcome international migrants. The results indicated that the higher an individual on the post-apartheid ladder in 2012, the less likely that individual will be to reject all foreigners. Goodness-of-fit tests (using standard measures contracted by McFadden as well as Cragg and Uhler on whether the model fitted the data) revealed that the economic indicators in the model do not adequately explain a large share of variance in public sentiments towards immigrants. This seems to suggest that other non-economic factors might be better predictors of public attitudes towards immigrants.

Those on the higher rungs of the South African socio-economic ladder were found to be more prone to identify Nigerians as the most undesirable type of immigrant (Table 4.3). The less educated, on the other hand, were more likely to identify other African foreigners as unwelcome. It is clear that there is no simple relationship between economic self-interest and hostility towards foreign Africans in the country. What then can explain this observed Afrophobia (to borrow a term from Matsinhe, 2011)? Why have foreign Africans (especially those from Nigeria) attracted so much anti-outsider sentiment? Morris (1998) puts forward the 'biocultural' thesis, contending that because of their physical biocultural features (clothing style, bearing, physical features etc.), foreign nationals from Africa are in general clearly distinct and the indigenous are able to pick them out for animosity. I find this explanation unconvincing. The South African 2011 national census indicates that there are 24,000 Nigerian nationals in the country. Although the census may not have captured irregular Nigerian immigrants, it seems improbable that the observed animosity towards this group is driven by the visibility of Nigerians in South African communities.

Evidence of anti-outsider violence in post-apartheid townships in recent years suggests that it is particularly important to consider the changing distribution of attitudes in informal urban areas. Almost half of all informal urban residents favoured complete rejection in October/November 2007, six months before the May 2008 attacks. In 2010 the proportion of informal urban dwellers expressing this view had dropped to less than a quarter (before increasing again in 2012). Many informal urban South Africans have shifted from complete rejection to selective acceptance, with almost half expressing this opinion in 2012. A majority of informal urban dwellers were found to report African foreigners as undesirable, with a fifth identifying Nigerians as undesirable. It is important to remember at this juncture that a xenophobic climate, as Misago (2012) contends, does not itself explain outbreaks of anti-outsider violence. Such violence may be driven by a number of different factors. Fauvelle-Aymar and Segatti (2012), for instance, find that incidences of anti-outsider violence during the May attacks were linked to community heterogeneity (both economic and culture).

4.8   Indigeneity and South African Exceptionalism

The results section suggests the limitations of public opinion data in offering answers to the question of xenophobia in South African society. If anti-immigrant sentiment in the country cannot be associated with a simple linear relationship with economic status then where can the source of such animosity be located? Neocosmos (2010) argues, using a Fanonian approach, that the politics of nationalism originated on emphasising indigeneity lies at the root of post-colonial xenophobia (also see Dunn, 2009). Instead of understanding xenophobia in South Africa as a mere reaction to economic deprivation, it should rather be understood as a political discourse. Landau (2010) has argued that the discursive and institutional efforts to control political and physical space have generated an often violent prejudice towards the foreign outsider in South African cities. The attitudes of the public in South Africa should not be seen as isolated from the country's policies towards immigrants and immigration.

In the early post-apartheid period, migration into South Africa was governed according to the controversial Alien Controls Act (No. 76) of 1991, a piece of apartheid-era legislation which remained in place after the political transition and was only replaced in 2002. Scholars, like Crush (1999), described the Act as an item of legislation premised on principles of control, exclusion and expulsion, and argued that the post-apartheid migration management system was characterised by corruption and racial double standards (also see Segatti, 2011b). The

Table 4.3: Most Undesirable Immigrant Groups in South Africa across Socio-Economic Groups, 2012

Which, if any, group would you least want to come and live in South Africa?

	Nigerians		Other Africans		Asian		Other		Can't Choose	
	(%)	Std. Err.	(%)	Std. Err.	(%)	Std. Err.	(%)	Std. Err.	(%)	Std. Err.
Educational Status										
Tertiary	35	(4.13)	20	(3.10)	12	(2.47)	9	(2.16)	24	(3.37)
Completed Secondary	25	(2.62)	29	(2.43)	7	(1.35)	16	(2.22)	23	(2.19)
Incomplete Secondary	23	(1.96)	34	(2.10)	8	(1.31)	14	(1.62)	21	(1.80)
Senior Primary	20	(3.58)	37	(3.97)	8	(1.89)	11	(2.22)	23	(3.12)
Junior Primary and Below	17	(3.44)	33	(4.37)	8	(2.41)	11	(3.14)	30	(4.40)
Urban/Rural Status										
Urban Formal	30	(1.82)	28	(1.68)	7	(0.85)	14	(1.36)	21	(1.46)
Urban Informal	20	(3.33)	27	(3.74)	11	(2.97)	19	(3.28)	24	(3.30)
Trad. Auth. Areas	15	(1.95)	39	(2.53)	9	(1.59)	11	(1.64)	27	(2.39)
Rural Formal	17	(3.35)	40	(4.49)	6	(1.89)	7	(2.35)	30	(3.78)
Subjective Economic Status										
Affluent	24	(3.44)	30	(4.25)	7	(2.05)	11	(3.08)	27	(3.72)
Comfortable	28	(2.78)	28	(2.59)	10	(1.66)	14	(2.31)	20	(2.21)
Getting Along	25	(2.12)	30	(1.99)	8	(1.32)	13	(1.51)	24	(1.90)
Poor	19	(2.14)	35	(2.34)	6	(1.06)	15	(1.76)	25	(2.15)

Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey (2012)

Notes: 1. Data are weighted using the weights specifically designed for SASAS.

ideological foundation of the legislation, according to scholars like Crush (1999) and Peberdy (2001), was the creation of 'Fortress South Africa' –a bastion against the influx of the non-indigenous (also see Murray, 2003). The government's management of immigration during this early period has been criticised as archaic and reminiscent of the apartheid regime.

In the years after the democratic transition, a number of politicians seem to have promoted an anti-immigration message. The Minister of Home Affairs during the late 1990s, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, for instance, made a series of statements arguing that African foreigners were a threat to local economic development in the country and that a considerable number were involved in criminal activities (Desai, 2008; Neocosmos, 2010). The anti-immigration stance of the government is most evident in its stereotyping of African migrants. Misago (2012) noted with interest that respondents in his study echoed long-standing state discourses blaming foreigners for the country's ills (also see Landau, 2010). Although subsequent ministers have been more politic in their statements to the press, it could be argued that the Department of Home Affairs has not done enough to counter the evident xenophobia of the public. The image of the 'foreigner as a threat' seems to permeate immigration regulations and law enforcement even at the local level[27].

As the previous section made clear, Afrophobia should not be understood simply as a problem of the poor. Matsinhe (2011) argues that the pervasiveness of negative stereotyping of African foreigners in South Africa is associated with the dynamics of intergroup relations during the country's authoritarian colonial period. The psychological implications of these dynamics perpetuated the formation of South African identities that attach an 'otherness' to African foreigners. For Matsinhe, it would be better to understand the prevalence of Afrophobia in the country as a consequence of identity formation in the post-apartheid period. It seems that the 'otherness' of African foreigners, for many South Africans, is best personified under the label 'Nigerian'. It may be that 'Nigerian' represents a stereotypical image of the foreignness to many in the country, a label conveying the supposed 'barbarity' of an imagined Africa.

Political liberalisation tends to provoke debates over citizenship and autochthony[28]. The democratisation trend in sub-Saharan Africa in recent decades, as Dunn (2009) argues, has often spawned such debates, throwing political identities into flux. Neocosmos (2010) has identified a discourse of exceptionalism in South African public culture emerging in the years after the country underwent political liberalisation (also see Matsinhe, 2011; Gibson, 2012).

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[27] Drawing on research conducted in 2010 in focus group interviews with municipal officials in five urban South African municipalities Landau *et al.,* (2011) on internal and external migration. The researchers found that although some municipal officials display a positive attitude towards international migrants, most tended to perceive foreign immigrants as threats to social order and economic prosperity in their municipalities.

[28] In the Greek "autochthony" can be translated into "son of the soil" (i.e. *autos* "self," and *khthon* "soil") and is most often used as a synonym for 'indigenous'. In ancient Greece, this word was used to refer to the first humans to inhabit or possess a particular area of land (e.g. the Arcadians in Peloponnese). Greek philosophers of the period, like Herodotus, would use the word "autochthony" to describe how these original peoples (*autochthons*) kept themselves free from mixing with foreign (*xenos*) peoples (Harrison 2002). In contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa, a number of scholars have argued that questions over concerning "autochthony" are currently among the most crucial and contested issues in political life (see, for instance, Dunn, 2009; Neocosmos, 2010; Matsinhe, 2011).

This discourse (and those who espouse it) contends that South Africa –due to its industrialised, democratic character –is fundamentally different from any other Sub-Saharan African country. In order to maintain the exceptionalism of South African society, African foreigners must be rejected as contaminates. During the post-apartheid period, the political elite in South Africa have tended to characterise African foreigners in a negative light. In her study of immigration policy in the country, Peberdy (2001: 24) notes that policymakers believe that African foreigners "supposedly threaten 'the nation' by endangering its physical and moral health, and its ability to provide services, employment, and to control crime". For Peberdy this discourse is awash with depictions and descriptions of Africans as disease carriers (also see Murray, 2003).

The discourse of South African exceptionalism does not only play itself out at the national macro policy level but is also evident at the micro-level as well. Research from the African Centre for Migration and Society, conducted by Misago (2012), argues that competition in community leaderships has encouraged the emergence of populist and violent forms of local leaders who seek to enhance their authority and power by reinforcing communities' resentment towards what is perceived as 'threatening' foreign nationals. Local leaders exploit the notion that indigeneity is the primary avenue for accessing resources and jobs, manipulating notions of national subjectivity (also see von Holdt *et al.,* 2011). Micro-politicians in the country's informal urban settlements are adapting institutionalised xenophobia that particularly dehumanises foreigners from elsewhere on the continent.

Police officers have been accused of negligence in protecting the rights of immigrants, particularly those from Africa. Perhaps what is most surprising about the conduct of the police, and government authorities more broadly, is how the old racist ideas have persisted in the new era. State authorities often identify immigrants on the basis that they 'look foreign' with dark skin pigmentation an indication of foreignness (Nyamnjoh, 2006; Desai, 2008; Landau, 2010). The police specifically target foreign Africans in special campaigns, blaming them for crime, and immigrants are common victims of police corruption. Police have also been observed failing to intervene during anti-immigrant riots, destroying the identity documents of migrants and abusing foreigners more generally (also see Misago, 2012). The police torture and murder of 27-year-old Mozambican immigrant, Mido Macia, in February 2013[29] is a poignant example of the lack of concern for immigrants' rights exemplified by South African law enforcement.

4.9   Conclusion

An analysis of public opinion data has shown that government efforts to reduce anti-immigrant sentiment in the country have been, at best, ineffective. Given the passivity of the state's anti-xenophobia campaign, this is not a surprising finding. The findings also suggest that there is no simple relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and economic self-interest in South Africa. Examining the public opinion evidence, it is clear that xenophobia is prevalent across the different socio-economic groups in the country, while a statistical examination suggests that economic self-interest may not explain anti-immigrant sentiment. Finding the economic competition argument has been found inadequate, I argue,

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[29] Emidio Macia died after being dragged for metres attached to the back of a police van and then assaulted (Mail & Guardian, 15/03/2013). A subsequent report revealed deep cuts on arms, abrasions on his face and lower limbs, bruised ribs and testicles, bleeding and water on the brain. His death was caused, in the end, by a lack of oxygen.

alternatively, that xenophobia could better be understood as the product of political subjectivities.

The South African governing elite –in a similar fashion to other ruling classes on the continent (see Dunn, 2009) –has organised citizenship rights around political indigeneity. The assertion of such politics is less overt in the current period and immigration policy, in particular, has softened in the recent period (Segatti, 2011b). The government has begun to implement a migration policy that allows for greater skilled labour immigration and emphasis on the developmental role of immigration. This shift has allowed many South African businesses to employ migrants although opportunities to access temporary migrants are still limited. Despite this tempering, however, the ideological proponents for 'Fortress South Africa' remain strong and contemporary state policy remains focused on defending the national borders from the 'threats' presented by immigration. Indeed, these proponents were most evident in recent public policy discussions which argued for a further 'securitisation' of South African immigration policy.

It is apparent, given the results of this study, that there is a need for a more proactive and concerted effort to change public opinion on immigration and immigrants. As an overview of the current programme of anti-xenophobia measures in the country illustrates, there is a mismatch between the resources available to fight xenophobia and the scale of anti-immigrant sentiment. It could be argued, however, that this is more than a resource issue. Although more substantive educational campaigns (in partnership with civil society bodies) will undoubtedly reduce xenophobic sentiment in the country, what is required is an alternative to the current politicisation of indigeneity. The discourse of exceptionalism and Afrophobia that characterises much of South African political life must be challenged.

5 Subjective National Wellbeing and Xenophobia in Sub-Saharan Africa: Results and Lessons from South Africa

ABSTRACT

In Sub-Saharan Africa, political leaders tend to link the presence of immigrants with dangers to the national community and accuse foreigners of seeking to take jobs, power and land from true *autochthons*. Emphasising their autochthonous status, such leaders blame immigrant communities for a decline in national wellbeing and rationalise discriminatory action against them as a defence of the collective community. This chapter aims to analyse subjective national wellbeing using public opinion data and to map the linkages between national wellbeing and xenophobia. The chapter will explore this hypothesis within each of Hadley Cantril's classic three subjective wellbeing ladder groups. Using South Africa as a case study, this is the first time that such tests will be conducted in a Sub-Saharan African environment.

The chapter used data from the 2012 South African Social Attitudes Survey, a nationally representative opinion poll of 2,521 respondents. Standard linear multivariate regression is used to test the relationship between subjective national wellbeing and xenophobia. Among each of the Cantril subgroups, there were similar predictors of pro-immigrant sentiment: intergroup contact, perceived consequences of immigration and subjective national wellbeing. Improving levels of subjective national wellbeing in the country will, therefore, have a negative impact on xenophobia in the country. This chapter will conclude by discussing future areas of research to explore and present recommendations on how quality of life research can be used to better understand prejudice in countries like Sub-Saharan Africa and beyond.

5.1 Introduction

The "nation" is a central component of what Anthony Appiah (1994) called the "collective dimension" of individual identity, and, therefore, important to studies of community wellbeing. In Sub-Saharan Africa, political leaders tend to link the presence of immigrants to dangers to the national community and accuse foreigners of seeking to damage that community. Emphasising their autochthonous status, such leaders blame immigrant communities for a decline in national wellbeing. Discriminatory action against foreigners can, therefore, be justified as a defence of the collective national community. A recent example of this phenomenon occurred in South Africa in April 2015 when anti-migrant riots in the cities of eThekwini and Johannesburg broke out. The violence left a number dead and saw the displacement of thousands into makeshift refugee camps. Pictures of the violence (particularly the death of Mozambican national Emmanuel Sithole) made international headlines and provoked reflection and commentary on, and concern about, the character of South African society.

The recent and recurrent anti-immigrant violence showcases the need for further attitudinal academic research into xenophobia in the country. South African President Jacob Zuma denounced the April 2015 attacks. During his condemnation, he indicated that he was sensitive to the frustrations of the poor in the country, which he identified as one of the root

causes of xenophobia. Mmusi Maimane, the leader of the main opposition party in the South African parliament, also condemned the attacks. He likewise said that he understood the frustration being felt by South Africans, especially unemployed youth, who struggle to access opportunities to improve their lives. The April 2015 violence was reminiscent of large-scale anti-immigrant riots which affected foreign communities throughout the country in 2008[30]. During the 2008 riots, the frustrations of the poor were also put forward as an explanation for the violence.

The implicit assumption in the statements made by Jacob Zuma and Mmusi Maimane is that there is a relationship between quality of life and xenophobia in South Africa. Indeed, the country seems divided by those who are dissatisfied with their lives (and future prospects) and the more satisfied, optimistic and hopeful in society. I believe that quality of life research can shed new light on what is driving xenophobia in a Sub-Saharan African environment. Quality of life researchers, like Cummins *et al.* (2003), have tended to distinguish between subjective personal and national wellbeing. Given the rhetoric surrounding recent anti-immigrant violence in South Africa, subjective *national* wellbeing may be significantly correlated with attitudes towards immigrants in the country. This correlation may hold, regardless of the personal wellbeing of the individual. This chapter aims to analyse the validity of this proposition and map any linkages between national wellbeing and xenophobia.

Since the early 20th century, social psychology research has postulated an association between negative experiences and increased prejudice toward outgroups, known as Frustration-Aggression Theory. According to this theorem, individuals transfer the frustrations they experience in daily life onto members of outgroups (Dollard *et al.,* 1939). Scholars have used Frustration-Aggression Theory to link aggression towards with individual feelings of deprivation (also see Brown, 2011). Cognisant of Frustration-Aggression Theory, this chapter explores the relationship between subjective national wellbeing and attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa. Standard quantitative techniques will be used to test the thesis that there is a relationship between national wellbeing and xenophobia. The chapter will first place the study within the context of the existing literature on immigration and xenophobia in South Africa. Then the bivariate and multivariate analysis will be presented and the results of this analysis discussed.

The April 2015 attacks seem to showcase deep divisions in South African society, highlighting the existence of a disillusioned and frustrated minority. The determinants of anti-immigrant sentiment may be different amongst this minority than amongst those who are more content and optimistic about life. It may be that those who are frustrated with their lives will be more likely to view immigrants as hostile if they perceive their national community to be in danger. In order to explore this assumption, the relationship between subjective national wellbeing and anti-immigrant sentiment will be tested within each of Hadley Cantril's classic three subjective wellbeing[31] ladder groups. This is the first time that such tests will be

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[30] The May 2008 riots were the most striking examples of collective anti-immigrant violence in South Africa. Over a hundred thousand displaced were displaced during anti-immigrant riots that last about two weeks. These riots saw the deaths of more than 60 and left roughly 700 people wounded. A report by the Human Sciences Research Council (2008) provides a detailed description of the attacks (also see Hassim *et al.,* 2009).

[31] Wellbeing is generally viewed as a description of an individual's quality of life as a whole. In general, wellbeing can be measured using objective and subjective approaches. The first

conducted in a Sub-Saharan African environment. The aim of the chapter is to contribute meaningfully to the quality of life literature and seek to better understand how quality of life may be driving prejudicial attitudes in a developing country.

5.2   Literature Review

Economic competition theory points to self-interests over limited resources —such as jobs and social welfare benefits —as driving conflict between groups. Consequently, this theory suggests that attitudes vary according to an individual's position in a society's hierarchy (Hardin, 1995). For example, the poor, the unemployed and the uneducated are expected to feel insecure about their position and, therefore, be unwelcoming of outsiders (see, for example, Sides and Citrin, 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Citrin and Sides, 2008 who discuss and test this hypothesis). The existing public opinion research on attitudes towards immigration has also found that group concerns will have a relationship with anti-immigration attitudes[32]. In other words, individuals' evaluations of their collective environment are related to their perceptions of outgroups. This scholarship suggests that the more negatively an individual evaluates the health of the collective (in this case the nation), the more hostile that individual will be towards immigrants. The multidimensional character of evaluations of the group collective –frequently termed "sociotropic" evaluations in social psychology –is often ignored in most studies on public attitudes towards immigrants. As a result, their relationship with anti-immigrant sentiment has been inadequately investigated.

The brief description above of the existing literature on the economic competition theory suggests the need to test how evaluations of the group collective affect attitudes towards international migrants. This chapter, as aforementioned, will conduct this test by focusing on subjective *national* wellbeing. In order to put subjective national wellbeing in South Africa in context, the following literature review will present a comprehensive picture of South African society. The first part of the review will present a discussion on emerging patterns of quality of life in the country since the early 1990s. I will then provide a concise description of immigration into South Africa and then in subsequent section expound on the problem of xenophobia in South Africa. This last section will touch briefly on the relevant quantitative literature on intergroup relations.

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understand wellbeing through certain observable 'facts' such as economic, social and environmental statistics. For example, we could measure wellbeing using personal annual income per capita. The second considers an individual's wellbeing to be best understood using self-reported survey measures. Subjective measures of an individual's use an individual's self-reported evaluations of their life's quality (Diener and Suh, 1997). Scholars studying subjective wellbeing contend that such evaluations involve a multidimensional process which includes cognitive judgements of life satisfaction and affective evaluations of emotions and moods (also see Diener, 2009; Cummins *et al.,* 2009; Gulyas, 2015). Subjective wellbeing is thought to be a more holistic indicator of quality of life than objective indicators like income or consumption.

[32] Individual assessments of national economic performance have been shown to be influential in attitudinal research on immigration. A recent review of the existing literature on immigration attitudinal research by Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) noted that when examining and analysing attitudes toward immigrants, individual assessments of the economic state of the nation have proved influential, often more so than the effect attributed to personal economic circumstances.

5.2.1 Subjective Wellbeing in South Africa

Since the early 1990s, the democratic governments in South Africa have promised "a better future" for all those living in the country. This slogan captured the optimism and euphoria of a nation transitioning out of authoritarianism towards democracy. Evidence of this heightened jubilation was found in the South African Quality of Life (SAQoL) trend study which had been monitoring life satisfaction in the country since the 1980s. The academic output from this study noted elevated euphoria in the transition period (e.g. Møller, 2004; 2007; 2013). However, following an upswing in life satisfaction in the early 1990s, a considerable decline was noted in the mid-1990s (also see Møller and Roberts, 2015). During the period 1995-2007, average subjective wellbeing in South Africa remained relatively flat. This period of stagnation was followed by an (albeit mild) upswing in subjective wellbeing in the 2008-2012 period. Placing these trends in context, this study will now briefly discuss the progress made in securing a better life for all in South Africa.

In 1994, the new democratically elected government faced significant challenges, particularly widespread racial inequality and poverty. The Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development (PSLSD) was one of the nation's earliest inclusive household income and living standards surveys. This project was started by the World Bank at the request of the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the ANC in 1992. The project's final report, published in 1994, showcased the harsh reality of the country's history of racial separation, contrasting the impoverishment of 'black' rural South Africa against the wealth of 'white' urban areas, giving rise to the infamous phrase: "plenty amidst poverty". Under post-1994 democratic governments, South Africa has made significant economic and social progress in redressing these problems. There has been a significant increase in access to basic services for the black majority (particularly access to electrical connections and piped water) under well-funded public works programmes. The country's social welfare system now provides social grants and free municipal services to registered indigents[33]. In the last decade, the proportion of South Africans living in poverty and hunger has dropped considerably according to a recent Statistics South Africa (2014b) report.

Living standards for most South Africans have improved significantly since the democratic transition but the country still faces many serious challenges. A good mechanism to identify the most critical of these problems is by asking ordinary South Africans themselves. In a 2010 SAQoL survey, respondents, once they had rated their own happiness, were asked what would make them happier? Most respondents identified jobs and income that would provide financial security (Møller, 2013). These concerns reflect the stark realities of the South African labour market which has failed to absorb increasing numbers of young entrants. Unemployment (particularly amongst the youth) in the country has remained high during the period 1995-2014[34]. The second most identified item was, unsurprisingly, better access to

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[33] Since 1994 there has been considerable expansion of the South African social welfare system to include millions of poor Black Africans. Government efforts to assist the poor gain access to basic services has seen the provision, under the Free Basic Services policies, of free water, electricity, sanitation and waste removal to millions of people (Statistics South Africa, 2014a). The government has made cash transfers to millions of households through the social grants system. Through the Child Support Grant, the national pension scheme and other social grants, some 16 million South Africans were beneficiaries of government cash transfers in 2014 (Statistics South Africa, 2014b: 20).

[34] A 2015 World Employment and Social Outlook and Trends report by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) documents how unfavourably the South African labour market

services. At the municipal level, poor financial management and corruption have hindered the delivery of basic services to the public. Community protests demanding greater access to services and better governance at the municipal level have escalated since 2010. Protests have become increasingly violent in the last five years[35].

5.2.2 The Context: South Africa and Immigration

As with many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, immigration has played an extremely important role in the history of modern South Africa. The chapter will now discuss the immigration context in the country from a historical perspective. Colonial era dispossession of land and restrictions on land ownership forced large numbers of Black Africans into the colonial labour market as migrant workers (Wolpe, 1972). Between 1921 and 1951, for example, the number of Black Africans making a living as small-scale farmers declined drastically from 2.38 million to 447 653 (Union of South Africa, 1960). Land ownership for Black Africans was confined to designated 'homelands' or native reserves, and migration in and out of these 'homelands' was severely restricted (also see Lipton, 1986). The reproduction of this migrant labour system hinged on the inability of the migrants (as individuals or as a group) to influence the political institutions that governed them. Political repression was essential to the system and Black Africans were subject to a political order that deprived them of multiple essential freedoms in social, political and economic terms.

In the 19th century, migrants were brought into South Africa from elsewhere in the region to work in the country's mineral and (to a lesser extent) agricultural sectors. Significant numbers of workers were also recruited from Asia, Europe and North America. Some of these immigrants settled permanently, of which one of the most interesting examples is South Africa's Indian minority. Originally brought in by colonial authorities to work on sugar plantations, many settled permanently and currently the country has one of the largest Indian diaspora populations outside South Asia (Klotz, 2013). Many immigrants from Southern Africa engaged in cyclical migration, moving between South Africa and their home country. Acting as "labour reserves", nations in Southern Africa became sources of cheap labour for the development of the capital economy in South Africa (Wolpe, 1972). By the mid-20th century, the country was the main receiving centre (and beneficiary) of a transnational system of labour migration that stretched across the macro-region.

Between 1910 and 1990, the white minority government in South Africa maintained a strict racial hierarchy. Coercive social engineering programmes were used to enforce a system of

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compares with other countries. Out of the 107 nations included in the report, South Africa was estimated to have the 8th highest unemployment rate in 2015. Unemployment rates amongst the adult youth (36.1% in 2014) were substantially higher than those of other adults (15.6% in 2014). The adult youth account for less than two-fifths (39.9%) of total employment. The considerable disparity in the absorption rate noted between adult youth and other adults further reflects the scarcity of job opportunities for the adult youth in the national labour market. Cross-national comparative data presented in the ILO (2015) report estimates that South Africa will have the 6th highest level of youth unemployment out of 107 countries in 2015.

[35] The Civic Protest Barometer (CPB) report by Powell *et al.* (2014) provides data on trends on recorded protest action in South Africa's municipalities. Since 2010 the number of civic protests has grown, standing at 218 in 2014. The CPB measures the percentage of protests that involve an element of violence. It would appear that incidences of violence are growing and in 2014 more than four-fifths (83%) of recorded protests were considered violent.

economic and social favouritism based on racial demarcations (see Lipton, 1986 for a comprehensive discussion of this system). In the 20th century, the main opposition to this system within South Africa was the African National Congress (ANC) formed in 1923. As opposition to settler colonialism (known from the 1950s on as the apartheid system) gained momentum in the 1960s, the ANC sought the assistance from newly independent neighbours on the African continent. Many ANC leaders received asylum (as well as military training and logistical support) in countries like Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique (Neocosmos, 2010). The ANC, working with trade unions and social movements, was eventually able to force the white minority government of the late 1980s to allow democratic elections. These were held in April 1994.

There have been five (largely) peaceful national elections in South Africa between 1994 and 2014, all of which have been won by the ANC. The post-1994 governments sought to dismantle the old system of migrant labour (which had already begun to decline in the 1980s, see Crush and Dodson, 2007), amending old immigration legislation and eventually passing new laws making the recruitment of foreign workers more difficult (Segatti, 2011b). As a consequence of this shift in direction, immigration patterns into the country began to change, becoming more informal (McDonald *et al.,* 2000). Many international migrants have, for example, settled in South African cities as entrepreneurs, establishing small-scale businesses in poor urban communities. An extensive post-apartheid literature covering this process has accrued, primarily from the prominent research institutions, the African Centre for Migration Studies and the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP). Due to the poor data collection, it is difficult to accurately track these patterns or even the exact size of the international migration population in the country.

5.2.3   Blaming Outsiders in South Africa

Foreigners in South Africa are often blamed for many of the problems facing the country. Disparagingly called '*makwerekwere*', an unfair reference to their cultural backwardness, international migrants are often unjustly vilified as deceitful and immoral. Under the direction of the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), negative anti-immigrant sentiment was first documented in a national survey of 2,200 South Africans in October 1994 (Minnaar *et al.,* 1996). The HSRC study found considerable levels of negative sentiment, noting that South Africans blame undocumented immigrants for national problems such as crime and unemployment. Similarly, high levels of xenophobia were recorded in nationally representative surveys undertaken by SAMP in 1997, 1999, 2006 and, most recently, 2010 (e.g. Mattes *et al.,* 1999; McDonald *et al.,* 2000; Crush *et al.,* 2013). Chapter 4, using an alternative public opinion dataset for the period 2003-2012, substantiated these SAMP findings. Following a growing escalation in anti-immigrant violence in the late 2000s, the South African government has pledged to reduce xenophobia amongst the public.

A crucial catalyst for the formation of prejudice is a perception that a group presents a threat (whether explicit or not) to the position of an individual (or their group). The perception can rationalise hostility towards an outgroup and adoption of hostile attitudes towards members of that outgroup (Hardin, 1995). Public opinion research in North America and Europe has demonstrated a clear link between negative outgroup evaluations and perceptions that an outgroup is a threat (see, for example, Scheepers *et al.*, 2002; Citrin and Sides, 2008). The types of threat under discussion often relate to the negative impact that immigration will have on the social protection system, the quality of education or the cultural unity of the nation. Mattes *et al.* (1999), using SAMP data, found a clear link between anti-immigration sentiment and negative perceptions about the consequences of immigration in South Africa.

Dodson (2010) notes an interesting gender dimension to this sense of threat, with foreign nationals identified as "stealing" women from local men. It will be important, therefore, to examine perceived consequences of immigration among the South African public when studying the determinants of anti-immigrant attitudes.

Academics in South Africa have made a concerted effort to understand anti-immigrant sentiment in the country. When examining negative attitudes towards foreign nationals, a number of scholars have cited public frustrations over poverty, unemployment and inadequate infrastructure as primary factors (see Dodson, 2010 who provides an interesting overview of the academic discourse on xenophobia in South Africa). Scholars such as Neocosmos (2010) opposed this discourse, arguing that the formation of an exclusivist South African nationalism can better explain the formation of xenophobia in the country. Neocosmos also places ample blame on the country's political elite including senior government ministers. He claims that their public statements on immigration contributed to the legitimisation of an anti-foreigner discourse in the country (also see Klotz, 2013). Almost all scholars writing about xenophobia in the country identify the origins of anti-immigrant sentiment in the racism, nationalism and isolation of the apartheid era.

A strong national identity and national pride can be an empowering, affirming mechanism in the face of the old discrimination and chauvinism of the colonial and apartheid periods. Certainly, individuals can hold positive attitudes towards both their ingroup as well as outgroups. For example, a study by Brewer and Campbell (1976) found that of 30 ethnic groups in East Africa, individuals who demonstrated in-group favouritism were not particularly hostile towards the other ethnic groups (also see de Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003). National context may play a significant role in understanding anti-immigrant sentiment and may explain why such sentiments seem to vary so considerably over time. The most convincing example of this effect is the upsurge of xenophobia in Europe and North America which followed international economic and military conflict (see Brown, 2011 for a history of the public opinion studies related to this phenomenon). Examining the period 1860-2010, Klotz (2013) notes that xenophobia in South Africa seems most prominent during periods when the South African 'nation' was perceived to be in crisis.

5.3   Data and Method

In order to examine anti-immigrant sentiment among the South African public, data from the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2012 wave was used. SASAS is a nationally representative public opinion survey and uses a multi-stage sampling method based on census enumerator areas. The sample consists of adults (aged 16 years and older) living in private residences and the survey has been conducted annually by the HSRC since 2003. A total of 2,521 persons were interviewed by trained fieldworkers between October and November 2012. The questionnaire was translated into the country's major languages, and each interview was conducted in the respondent's home language. I will now present three descriptive sections on how I constructed measures for (i) Cantril's life satisfaction subgroups; (ii) subjective national wellbeing; and (iii) attitudes towards international migrants.

5.3.1   The Cantril Ladder as a Measure

In 2012, SASAS replicated a life satisfaction module designed by Hadley Cantril and published in 1965. The exact phrasing of Cantril's module was used, with the English-language cues translated into the numerous official languages spoken in South Africa.

Fieldworkers asked respondents to consider their wishes and hopes, and then their fears and frustrations exemplified in the best and worst possible life they could imagine. Following this, respondents were shown an illustration of a symbolic 11-point 'ladder of life' with the bottom being the worst life as they had defined it, and the top being the best. Respondents were then asked where they stood on the 'ladder of life' at (i) five years ago; (ii) at present; and (iii) in five years' time. Results to these questions are showcased in Figure 5.1. Responses tended to be clustered at the mid-point when individuals in the country rated their past and present. There was a greater distribution of ratings for the future, with the distribution skewing towards the right.

It is interesting to consider individual wellbeing evaluations in South Africa by population group. The Black African majority tend to report lower levels of subjective wellbeing in comparison to other groups, particularly the white minority. This is a finding that has been noted in every SAQoL wave between 1995 and 2012 (Møller, 2007; Møller, 2013). The SASAS 2012 data on past and future life evaluations were analysed in a recent working paper by Møller and Roberts (2015). Their research noted that Cantril ratings for the future go in opposite directions for black and white respondents. Black South Africans tended to evaluate their future prospects favourably, while White South Africans, in contrast, were more doubtful about the future. Pessimism among the white population in South Africa has been well-documented by researchers, such as Møller (2004; 2007; 2013), using SAQoL data. This disparity between population groups probably reflects the expectations and aspirations for a 'better life' promised to the black majority by the ANC-led governments during the last twenty years.

A good life situation overshadowed by fears for the future is very different from a bad present situation accompanied by hope according to Gulyas (2015). Cognisant of this distinction, researchers (most notably those working for the Gallup World Poll) have combined present and future evaluations of personal well-being to create composite subgroups of subjective wellbeing. Based on this delineation, three Cantril subgroups were created for this study by combining the personal ratings on the Cantril for PRESENT and FUTURE to create a composite 0-10 measure. Testing confirmed the reliability and validity of this measure (Cronbach alpha 0.68) which then used to create a categorical variable based on the Gallup grouping. The distinct groups (independent) groups are: High (8-10); Medium (5-7) and Low (0-4).

5.3.2 Measuring Subjective National Wellbeing

In order to test whether a relationship between subjective national and the Pro-Immigrant Attitude Index exists, this chapter needs to construct a measure of subjective national wellbeing. Six items on national wellbeing were included in SASAS 2012 and these six were used to construct the National Wellbeing Index (NWI). These items measured public evaluations of the country's economic, natural, governmental, social and security environment[36]. The NWI was designed as a domain-level representation of subjective national wellbeing (Cummins *et al.,* 2003). The NWI is a composite score that provides a more precise measurement of sociotropic concerns. In order to construct each index, the

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[36] Six questions were asked: "How satisfied are you with: (i) the economic situation?; (ii) the state of the natural environment?; (iii) the social conditions?; (iv) how the country's affairs are managed?; (v) business?; and (vi) national security?" In line with the standard methodology on the NWI (Cummins *et al.,* 2003), each item was measured on a single 11-point scale ranging from 'completely dissatisfied' to 'completely satisfied'.

relevant items are converted into a 0-100 score and then combined. The final range on each index is 0-100 with the higher the value, the higher the self-reported level of satisfaction (Table 5.1). The discriminant validity of NWI was investigated using Principal Component Analysis with varimax rotation and multivariate regression analysis[37].

Table 5.1: Mean Scores and Principal Component Analysis on the National Wellbeing Index

	Mean	Principal Component Analysis	Average Interitem Covariance	Alpha
Economic situation in South Africa	46.61	0.776	254.5	0.845
State of the natural environment in South Africa	52.00	0.754	261.4	0.848
Social conditions in South Africa	50.33	0.786	260.3	0.844
Country's affairs are managed in South Africa	46.95	0.826	244.8	0.834
Business in South Africa	50.51	0.746	258.7	0.850
National security in South Africa	49.76	0.686	272.3	0.862

Notes: 1. The data is weighted; and 2. A higher mean (ranged 0-100) indicates a higher level of satisfaction with the relevant item.

Responses on the NWI will reflect the individual perceptions about external conditions for the national population as a whole according to Cummins *et al.* (2003). The public evaluated South Africa's economic situation (M =46.8) and security (M =49.7) negatively on average (Table 5.1). This probably reflects their concerns about the level of unemployment, law and order issues (e.g. the prevalence of crime and poor policing) and poverty which have featured in studies by Møller (2013) and others. Overall the NWI was 49.6 and this score can be compared with a reported Australian NWI of 61.1 in 2007 (Cummins *et al.,* 2009:149). The results on the NWI suggest that many in the country are concerned about the current wellbeing of South Africa.

5.3.3 Attitudes towards International Migrants

In order to understand attitudes towards foreigners in South Africa, two items on attitudes towards foreigners living in the country were included in the SASAS 2012. These two items asked respondents to use a scale 0-10 (where 10 was positive and 0 was negative) and to "Please describe how you feel about foreigners living in South Africa in general. Are they (i) negative or positive?; (ii) hostile or friendly?" Responses to these two items (depicted in Figure 5.2) were combined and averaged to create a composite 0-10 index (called the Pro-Immigrant Attitude Index). A high value on this index indicates a favourable evaluation of foreigners living in South Africa. I computed Cronbach's alpha statistic (0.91) for the scale formed and noted that and its reliability proved to be satisfactory. Mean responses on this index were low (M =4.7; SD =2.8), indicating that many in the country do not view immigrants in a favourable light.

Since the 2008 anti-immigrant riots, the South African government has sponsored initiatives in recent years to combat xenophobia, build social cohesion and create spaces for positive societal integration. Given these efforts, the results presented in Figure 5.2 are disquieting.

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[37] The different NWI dimensions were loaded onto a clearly defined factor which explained 58.3% of variance. The factorability of the correlation matrix also met the other assumptions for such an analysis. Therefore expectations, based on previous research, regarding the measurement of this latent concept are confirmed.

South African leaders in government and civil society should be commended for their denunciation of anti-immigrant violence in South Africa. However, the results of this study suggest that most people in South Africa have an unfavourable opinion of foreigners and view this group as a threat. Furthermore, these findings provoke serious questions about the efficiency of current efforts to combat intolerance and xenophobia in South African society.

5.4   Results

The first part of this section will test whether subjective national wellbeing has a significant correlated with attitudes towards immigrants in the country at the bivariate level. The second section aims to analyse the validity of this proposition at a multivariate level and chart any associations between national wellbeing and xenophobia. Both sections are interested if the proposed relationship between subjective national wellbeing and attitudes towards international migrants holds regardless of the personal wellbeing of the individual.

5.4.1   Bivariate Analysis by Cantril Subgroup

In SASAS 2012, respondents were asked: "Which, if any, group would you least want to come and live in South Africa?" Responses to this question were open-ended and respondents were not read a list of predetermined answers. Responses to this question were later recoded into nine subcategories. Weighted responses to this question are considered across the three Cantril subgroups designed for this study (Figure 5.2). The results show that no one Cantril subgroup was significantly more likely to select 'cannot choose' than the other. Respondents were more likely to select groups from Sub-Saharan Africa as their least tolerated foreign group in comparison to groups from Asia, North America or Australia. The most mentioned foreign African groups were Nigerians, Zimbabweans and Somalians. Certain differences were noted between Cantril subgroup in Figure 5.3. Those in the High group were more likely to select Nigerians compared with the Low and Medium. Perhaps surprisingly, 'returning South Africans' were selected by larger share (8%) of the Low than was expected.

The results in Figure 5.3 suggest a particular aversion to certain types of immigrants among many South Africans. The distribution of public sentiment towards immigrants *in general* across the three Cantril subgroups is shown in Figure 5.4. As can be observed, responses on the Pro-Immigrant Attitude Index are similar for the High and Medium groups. The Low group is different from these two other groups, with a somewhat larger share of this group reporting negative attitudes towards immigrants. However, variations in responses between the three Cantril groups were relatively minor and it would appear that, regardless of life satisfaction, individuals in South Africa hold negative attitudes towards foreigners living in the country.

Tables 5.2 and 5.3 give sample characteristics by Cantril subgroup. The result suggests a progression on the Cantril Ladder from lower to higher ratings by observed socio-economic status, and between population groups. Respondents more likely to be in the Low group are Black African, undereducated, unemployed and from the rural areas. Those groups with higher levels of material wellbeing (e.g. the better educated, the employed, urban dwellers) tend to be located in the High and Medium groups. Both Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 also give mean responses on the Pro-Immigrant Attitude Index broken down by a range of socio-economic attributes. Although minor variations between some subgroups were noted, on the whole, the evidence in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 challenges the popular tendency to identify xenophobia as the 'problem' of one particular group (such as the youth or the unemployed) in South Africa.

Figure 5.1: Personal Ratings on the Cantril Ladder

Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey (2012)

Figure 5.2: Public Attitudes towards Foreigners Living in South Africa

Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey (2012)

Figure 5.3: Most Disliked Foreign Groups in South Africa

Group you would least want to come and live in South Africa

■ Low (0-4)　■ Medium (5-7)　■ High (8-10)

Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey (2012)

Figure 5.4: Pro-Immigrant Attitude Index by Cantril Subgroups

Describe how you feel about foreigners living in South Africa in general

■ Low (0-4)　■ Medium (5-7)　▨ High (8-10)

Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey (2012)

Table 5.2: Mean Responses to the Pro-Immigrant Attitude Index by Selected Socio-Demographic Subgroups

	Total			Low(0-4)			Medium (5-7)			High (8-10)		
	N	M	SD	N	M	SD	N	M	SD	N	M	SD
Gender												
Male	946	4.71	2.77	195	3.83	2.85	483	4.80	2.64	246	5.43	2.82
Female	1489	4.58	2.78	391	4.24	2.75	736	4.68	2.67	334	5.00	2.97
Population Group												
Black African	1437	4.56	2.89	424	3.99	2.82	722	4.68	2.79	271	5.16	3.10
Coloured	445	4.97	2.41	84	4.57	2.37	232	4.82	2.37	115	5.78	2.44
Indian	210	4.31	2.59	26	3.45	2.75	97	4.62	2.30	85	4.23	2.83
White	342	4.89	2.40	52	4.47	2.91	168	5.02	2.05	108	5.38	2.36
Age groups												
16-19 years	207	4.78	2.82	24	3.96	2.88	98	4.55	2.55	83	5.36	3.09
20-29 years	519	4.85	2.69	107	4.25	2.77	278	4.86	2.61	125	5.61	2.60
30-39 years	459	4.53	2.87	97	3.85	2.82	247	4.55	2.81	107	5.25	2.91
40-49 years	442	4.45	2.86	132	4.06	2.93	197	4.60	2.66	100	5.00	3.04
50-59 years	365	4.78	2.61	94	4.47	2.76	189	4.94	2.60	76	4.69	2.75
60-69 years	266	4.38	2.70	77	3.56	2.83	129	4.78	2.40	54	4.96	2.92
70 years +	175	4.19	2.96	54	4.11	2.36	81	5.03	2.98	33	3.58	3.28

Notes: 1. The data is weighted. 2. High mean scores indicate positive sentiments towards immigrants while low mean scores indicate negative sentiments. 3. All individuals who reported they were not citizens of South Africa were excluded.

The types of variation observed did not differ considerably with what was observed in Chapter 4 and the pattern of results depicted in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 support the findings of the previous chapter. One interesting trend that was apparent was that educated people tended to be more positive in their assessment of foreigners although the size of the observed difference was marginal (Table 5.3). This suggests that educational attainment will have a statistically significant but minor effect on attitudes towards international migrants. But on the whole, the results suggest that people across the country's socio-economic spectrum tend to hold anti-immigrant opinions. The same patterning was observed, regardless of the Cantril subgroup under investigation. In other words, even hopeful and contented individuals in South Africa view foreigners living in the country in a negative light. What can explain the lack of variation between the Cantril subgroups? It may be that the factors that are driving pro-immigrant sentiment differ by Cantril subgroup. Alternatively, life satisfaction could have a weak (albeit negative) relationship with prejudice towards international immigrants, and other factors might better explain the formation of pro-immigrant sentiment in the country.

Table 5.3: Mean Responses to the Pro-Immigrant Attitude Index by Selected Socio-Economic Subgroups

	Total			Low(0-4)			Medium (5-7)			High (8-10)		
	N	M	SD	N	M	SD	N	M	SD	N	M	SD
Labour Market Status												
Unemployed	726	4.48	2.86	251	4.03	2.97	364	4.66	2.73	108	4.84	3.07
Employed	611	4.86	2.65	87	4.62	2.52	314	4.77	2.57	203	5.26	2.79
Part-time Employed	182	4.91	2.87	47	3.64	3.11	95	5.01	2.46	36	6.16	3.18
Labour Inactive	865	4.67	2.75	196	3.79	2.56	435	4.75	2.69	224	5.17	2.85
Educational Attainment												
Primary and Below	504	4.41	2.87	174	4.42	3.05	241	4.33	2.75	81	4.68	2.92

Incomplete Secondary	881	4.55	2.72	214	3.84	2.68	442	4.79	2.62	216	4.82	2.84
Completed Secondary	610	4.79	2.85	115	3.84	2.70	330	4.77	2.68	160	5.85	3.06
Tertiary education	284	5.20	2.64	33	4.53	2.62	146	5.05	2.54	102	5.77	2.68
Geographic Type											
Urban, formal	1482	4.70	2.62	265	4.21	2.65	751	4.74	2.48	428	5.17	2.76
Urban, informal	213	4.53	2.62	61	3.89	2.68	111	4.94	2.40	38	4.50	2.88
Trad. Auth. Areas	537	4.48	3.16	215	3.87	3.01	251	4.57	3.10	65	5.58	3.46
Rural, formal	206	4.96	2.54	46	4.53	2.61	106	5.20	2.35	49	5.65	2.53

Notes: 1. The data is weighted. 2. High mean scores indicate positive sentiments towards immigrants while low mean scores indicate negative sentiments. 3. All individuals who reported they were not citizens of South Africa were excluded.

5.4.2 Multivariate Analysis by Cantril Subgroup

In order to adequately test the relationship between subjective national wellbeing and xenophobia, I turn to multivariate modelling and employ a standard Ordinary Least Squares regression. The dependent is the Pro-Immigrant Attitude Index, and a positive coefficient represents a positive evaluation of foreigners living in South Africa. A number of different control variables were created for the multivariate analysis; these are introduced and discussed below.

5.4.2.1 Constructing Independent Variables for the Model

Age was measured using a continuous variable coded as the age of the respondent in years at the time of interview. Education is coded as a continuous variable using years of educational attainment (0-16). Provincial location, population group, marital status, gender and labour market participation were controlled for using dummy variables. Political affiliation was captured using a survey question on which political party an individual would vote for if there was a hypothetical general election tomorrow. Responses were coded onto a categorical variable, for which the categories were: ruling party (African National Congress), main opposition (Democratic Alliance), other opposition and undeclared/refused. I included a measure of personal life evaluations in the past five years (Past Five Years Evaluation) measured on a 0-10 scale with 10 representing the best possible life. I control for the relationship between the Pro-Immigrant Attitude Index and negative stereotypes about immigrants by using the Perceived Foreign Threat Index.

For social identity theorists studying anti-immigration sentiment, nationalism has been a dominant factor in explaining attitudes towards immigrants (see, for example, de Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003; Sides and Citrin, 2007; Citrin and Sides, 2008). Group identity theory posits that an individual's sense of group belonging and pride can result in a simultaneous process of outgroup hostility, without any perceived or real competition (Tajfel, 1981). Supporters of this position argue that individuals' general need for cultural socialisation and identity can result in fear of unfamiliar culture and cultural change. Fear of this kind can produce prejudice (also see Brown, 2011). Nationalism is controlled by using a 1-5 measure which combined two items[38] on how proud an individual was to be a South African, with the high score indicating pride in the country. It must also be noted that national pride is a

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[38] Respondents in the survey were asked comparative questions on national pride, asking if they agreed or disagreed that: (i) "I would rather be a citizen of South Africa than of any other country in the world"; and (ii) "Generally speaking, South Africa is a better country than most other countries". Responses were reversed and coded onto a five-point Likert scale which was then reversed (1 strongly disagree, 5 strongly agree).

multidimensional concept and the measure constructed here may not adequately capture the different facets of South African nationalism. Due to data limitations, I was unable to construct a multidimensional measure of a national sentiment to distinguish between different components of national pride.

In intergroup relations research, a popular theorem is that regular social interaction can overcome antagonisms between different groups. According to this hypothesis, which was first formulated in Allport's (1954) seminal work *The Nature of Prejudice*, intergroup contact has a positive impact on reducing prejudice between groups. The nature of this contact is, however, also highly influential and Allport argued that contact could only reduce prejudice if that contact occurred under certain conditions of friendship (e.g. contact had to be 'intimate', cooperative, and equal). Many surveys on intergroup relations often fail to include measures that address the nature of contact between individuals, resulting in an inability to test whether the preconditions suggested by Allport have been met (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). Cognisant of this conditionality, contact with immigrants in this study is accounted for using a categorical variable: no contact; casual contact (foreign acquaintances but no foreign friends); and friendship with foreigners living in South Africa[39].

Table 5.4: Mean Scores and Principal Component Analysis on the Perceived Foreign Threat Index

	M	SD	Principal Component Analysis	Average Interitem Covariance	Alpha
Immigrants increase crime rates	3.82	1.14	0.793	0.632	0.709
Immigrants take jobs away	3.76	1.22	0.804	0.597	0.702
Immigrants bring disease to South Africa	3.44	1.26	0.782	0.611	0.719
Immigrants use up our country's resources	3.77	1.09	0.712	0.737	0.756

Notes: 1. The data is weighted; 2. A higher mean (ranged 1-5) indicates a higher level of agreement with the relevant item; and 3. All individuals who reported they were not citizens of South Africa were excluded.

In 2012, SASAS respondents were asked to specify the extent to which they agreed or disagreed that immigrants (i) increased crime rates; (ii) took jobs away from people who were born in South Africa; (iii) spread disease; and (iv) drained resources from the country. Respondents were coded onto a standard 1-5 agreement scale and then reversed (1 = disagree strongly, 5 = agree strongly). The majority of the adult population was found to agree with these statements (Table 5.4). The results on each individual item correspond with what has been found by SAMP surveys on public attitudes towards immigrants (e.g. Mattes *et al.,* 1999; Crush *et al.,* 2013). To produce a Perceived Foreign Threat Index, responses to these SASAS questions were then combined and averaged which ranged from 1-5, with the higher value representing the higher level of perceived threat from foreigners. The validity of the measure was confirmed using reliability testing (which produced a Cronbach alpha of 0.77) and via factor analysis. The distribution on the index is skewed towards the right, indicating that most in South Africa believe that foreign immigrants are a threat to material livelihoods in their communities.

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[39] Two questions are employed to create this categorical variable: (i) "How many acquaintances do you know who have come to live in South Africa from another country?"; and (ii) "Of the people you know who have come to live in South Africa from another country, how many would you consider to be your friends?"

5.4.2.2 Multivariate Findings

The primary goal of the chapter is to show the relationship between subjective national wellbeing and attitudes towards immigrants amongst the different Cantril subgroups. But it would be instructive to look at how the independent variables describe in the previous section correlate with the dependent variable amongst the *entire* citizen adult population. For this test, three models were produced. The first includes only the standard socio-demographic and economic background variables while the second introduces the Past Five Years Evaluation indicator as well as the NWI. The final model introduces the Perceived Foreign Threat Index as well as the contact variable and is the fully specified model. No variance inflation value exceeded ten. By testing the variance inflation values on each model, multicollinearity among the independent variables was assessed. The results of the multivariate analysis are represented in Table 5.5.

In Model III, even after controlling for a range of socio-economic, behavioural and attitudinal variables, the NWI remained a significant determinant of the dependent. It is notable that the size of the correlation between the NWI and the dependent declined (from *beta* = 0.22 in Model II to *beta* = 0.18 in Model III) when the Perceived Foreign Threat Index and the contact variable were introduced. However, the NWI was the second most salient of all independent variables in the final model. As may be expected, the Perceived Foreign Threat Index was the most salient correlate in Table 5.5. Individuals' evaluations of the past five years also had a statistically significantly affect at the 0.1% level in Model III. Although the size of the observed coefficient (*beta* = -0.08) was small in comparison to the NWI, it indicators that positive evaluations of life tend to lead to more positive attitudes towards international migrants.

In the final model, population group was found to be a weak but significant predictor of attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa. The Coloured (*beta* = 0.05) and white racial minorities (*beta* = 0.06) were found to be significantly different from the Black African majority although the scale of this difference was slight. This result is unsurprising given the findings showcased in Table 5.2. The effect of education on attitudes towards outgroups has been investigated by a number of scholars. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007), for example, found a significant effect of education on attitudes towards immigrants using European Social Survey data (also see Coenders and Scheepers, 2003). The results depicted in Table 5.5 suggest a weak but positive relationship between education and the Pro-Immigrant Attitude Index.

As expected, confirmatory evidence was found for Allport's contact hypothesis in Table 5.5. The results clearly corroborate the pattern observed in other studies concerning the nature of contact (see, for instance, Pettigrew, 1998b; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006), namely that those who had contact with immigrants were more likely to demonstrate higher levels of pro-immigrant sentiment than those with no foreigner contact. Those with foreign acquaintances but no foreign friends were not significantly more tolerant than those with no contact, confirming the thesis that the type of contact matters. The role played by national pride is also tested and it is clear that, as can be observed in Table 5.5, the nationalism variable did not behave as expected. In none of the three models was national pride a significant predictor of attitudes.

Table 5.5: Multivariate on the Pro-Immigrant Attitude Index amongst the Entire Adult Citizen Population

	Model I				Model II				Model III			
	CoEff.	Std. Err.	Beta	Sig.	CoEff.	Std. Err.	Beta	Sig.	CoEff.	Std. Err.	Beta	Sig.
Female (ref. male)	-0.08	0.12	-0.01		-0.02	0.12	0.00		-0.02	0.11	0.00	
Age	-0.01	0.00	-0.05	*	0.00	0.00	-0.03		0.00	0.00	-0.01	
Married (ref. not married)	-0.16	0.15	-0.03		-0.21	0.15	-0.03		-0.27	0.14	-0.04	
Population Group (ref. Black Africans)												
Coloured	0.56	0.22	0.06	*	0.43	0.22	0.05		0.44	0.21	0.05	*
Indian	0.41	0.35	0.03		0.32	0.35	0.02		0.28	0.34	0.02	
White	0.50	0.24	0.06	*	0.57	0.24	0.07	*	0.51	0.23	0.06	*
Labour Market Status (ref. employed)												
Unemployed	-0.28	0.17	-0.05		-0.31	0.17	-0.05		-0.17	0.16	-0.03	
Part-time Employed	0.28	0.25	0.03		0.21	0.25	0.02		0.16	0.24	0.02	
Labour Inactive	-0.03	0.17	0.00		-0.23	0.17	-0.04		-0.17	0.16	-0.03	
Years of Education	0.06	0.02	0.07	**	0.05	0.02	0.07	**	0.04	0.02	0.05	*
National Pride	-0.05	0.07	-0.01		-0.15	0.08	-0.04		-0.05	0.07	-0.02	
Past Five Years Evaluation					0.09	0.03	0.08	**	0.09	0.03	0.08	***
National Wellbeing Index					0.04	0.00	0.22	***	0.03	0.00	0.18	***
Foreign Contact (ref. no contact)												
Acquaintances									0.23	0.16	0.03	
Friends									0.66	0.13	0.11	**
Foreign Threat									-0.82	0.06	-0.26	***
N		2254				2123				2123		
Adj R-squared		0.04				0.09				0.17		
Root MSE		2.72				2.64				2.51		

*** p<0.001, **p<0.01,* p<0.05

Notes: 1. The regressions also control for the province of residence, political affiliation and geographic location, 2. The data is weighted, 3. Positive coefficients indicate positive sentiments towards immigrants while negative coefficients indicate negative sentiments, and 4. All individuals who reported they were not citizens of South Africa were excluded.

Table 5.6: Multivariate on the Pro-Immigrant Attitude Index amongst the Different Cantril Subgroups

	Model I: Low(0-4)				Model II: Medium (5-7)				Model III: High (8-10)			
	CoEff.	Std. Err.	Beta	Sig.	CoEff.	Std. Err.	Beta	Sig.	CoEff.	Std. Err.	Beta	Sig.
Female (ref. male)	0.44	0.24	0.08		-0.03	0.15	-0.01		-0.35	0.24	-0.06	
Age	-0.01	0.01	-0.07		0.01	0.01	0.04		0.00	0.01	-0.02	
Married (ref. not married)	0.40	0.32	0.06		-0.10	0.19	-0.02		-1.27	0.31	-0.21	***
Population Group (ref. Black Africans)												
Coloured	0.44	0.53	0.05		0.32	0.28	0.04		0.51	0.45	0.05	
Indian	0.78	1.03	0.03		0.53	0.46	0.03		-0.12	0.57	-0.01	
White	0.22	0.55	0.02		0.56	0.32	0.07		0.43	0.44	0.06	
Labour Market Status (ref. employed)												
Unemployed	-0.18	0.36	-0.03		0.05	0.22	0.01		-0.23	0.36	-0.03	
Part-time Employed	-0.60	0.53	-0.06		0.26	0.31	0.03		0.99	0.50	0.09	
Labour Inactive	-0.64	0.40	-0.10		-0.04	0.22	-0.01		-0.04	0.31	-0.01	
Years of Education	-0.12	0.04	-0.16	**	0.07	0.02	0.09	**	0.14	0.04	0.17	***
National Pride	-0.05	0.16	-0.01		-0.10	0.10	-0.03		-0.02	0.15	-0.01	
Past Five Years Evaluation	0.12	0.05	0.11	*	0.11	0.04	0.08	**	-0.04	0.05	-0.03	
National Wellbeing Index	0.02	0.01	0.14	**	0.04	0.01	0.20	***	0.02	0.01	0.10	*
Foreign Contact (ref. no contact)												
Acquaintances	0.30	0.34	0.04		0.37	0.20			-0.42	0.38	-0.05	
Friends	0.89	0.29	0.15	**	0.38	0.17	0.07	*	0.58	0.26	0.10	*
Foreign Threat	-0.69	0.15	-0.21		-0.72	0.09	-0.24	***	-0.98	0.13	-0.31	***
N		499				1100				524		
Adj R-squared		0.17				0.17				0.23		
Root MSE		2.52				2.41				2.55		

*** p<0.001, **p<0.01,* p<0.05

Notes: 1. The regressions also control for the province of residence, political affiliation and geographic location, 2. The data is weighted, 3. Positive coefficients indicate positive sentiments towards immigrants while negative coefficients indicate negative sentiments, and 4. All individuals who reported they were not citizens of South Africa were excluded.

Now I examine how the independent variables describe in the previous section correlate with the Pro-Immigrant Attitude Index amongst the different Cantril subgroups. Three linear regression models were conducted, one for each of the three subgroups. The results of this modelling are represented in Table 5.6. In all Cantril subgroups, public concerns about the welfare of the nation had a salient relationship with the dependent in other words. It was interesting to note that in Model II (*beta = 0.20*) the size of the beta coefficient on the NWI was notably larger than the coefficient observed in Models I (*beta = 0.14*) and III (*beta = 0.10*). The remainder of this subsection will discuss other findings that emerged from the multivariate testing in Table 5.6, noting differences between the models.

Individuals' assessments of their lives in the past five years did not have a statistically significant effect on the dependent in Model I and III. This measure of personal life appraisals was, however, correlated (*beta* = 0.08) with the Pro-Immigrant Attitude Index in Model II. Given the findings in Table 5.5, it was unsurprising to note that the Perceived Foreign Threat Index had a robust relationship with the dependent in all three models, although the size of the beta coefficient was larger in Model III (*beta* = -0.31) than in Model I (*beta* = -0.21) and II (*beta* = -0.24). Friendship was also statistically associated with the dependent in all three models. The correlation between friendship and the dependent was, however, weaker in Model II (*beta* = 0.07) when compared to what was observed in Model I (*beta* = 0.15) and III (*beta* = 0.10).

An intriguing finding was observed when considering the influence of marital status on attitudes towards international migrants. Marital status has generally been found to be a weak and inconsistent predictor of attitudes towards foreigners (see, for example, de Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003; Sides and Citrin, 2007). Marital status did not seem to have a statistically significant correlation for those in the Medium and High Cantril subgroups. In Model III, however, those who were married were found to be much more negative (*beta* = -0.21) in their assessment of foreigners than the unmarried. Foreign nationals are often accused of breaking up 'local' marriages and the prevalence of this stereotype may explain this observation. It is not clear why this finding only holds for those who are in the High group. Perhaps married individuals who are satisfied with life may be afraid of losing what they have. Another noteworthy observation from Table 5.6 concerned educational attainment. This independent variable had a significant and positive correlation with the dependent in Model II *(beta = 0.09)* and III *(beta* = 0.17*)*. However, the correlation between educational attainment and pro-immigrant sentiment was negative in Model I *(beta = -0.16).* It is not clear why educational attainment should have a negative relationship with the Pro-Immigrant Attitude Index among the Low group[40].

5.5   Discussion

In South Africa, the government faces substantial pressure to deliver on the personal hopes of the electorate for a better life. There already exists in South Africa a substantial block – roughly 24% of the total adult population –of discontented and disillusioned individuals. It is possible to imagine a scenario where unmet expectations lead to an expansion of this block, a

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[40] It could be argued that the observed effect here is due to the low numbers of tertiary educated respondents in the Low Cantril subgroup. This supposition is based on the thesis that there are significant nonlinearities in the association between education and pro-immigrant attitudes. Using European data, scholars like Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007), have argued that such nonlinearities exist.

growing population of individuals who are stressed, worried, depressed and angry. Although avoiding this outcome is a worthwhile goal, such a change may not alter the level of xenophobic sentiment in the country by a considerable margin. The evidence presented in this study showed that even among those who are in the 'High' Cantril subgroup, anti-immigrant sentiment is strong. While there were some interesting differentiations between the different Cantril subgroups, on the whole, the factors that are driving pro-immigrant sentiment did not differ by Cantril subgroup. Among each of the three Cantril subgroups, there were similar predictors of pro-immigrant sentiment.

One of the main aims of this study was to discern whether subjective national wellbeing had a relationship with pro-immigrant sentiment. Multivariate testing showed that public concerns about the welfare of the nation have a salient relationship with attitudes towards foreign nationals regardless of Cantril subgroup. Immigration policy in South Africa may have played a role in constructing this link. According to Klotz (2013), post-1994 immigration policy in South Africa has certainly tended to promote the notion of immigrants as the 'other' (also see Segatti, 2011b). Reviewing the history of immigration policies in the country, he argues that anti-immigration policies have been used as a mechanism to reassure the boundaries of national 'identity'. Neocosmos (2010) contends that the post-1994 state's nation-building policy encouraged divisions between 'citizens' and 'foreigners'. Regardless of the cause, it seems apparent that individual identification with the collective dimension in South Africa has resulted in a relatively robust correlation between subjective national wellbeing and anti-immigrant sentiment.

Figure 5.5: National Ratings on the Cantril Ladder

Where would you put South Africa on the ladder

■ National PRESENT ▨ National PAST ■ National FUTURE

Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey (2012)

Given the relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and subjective national wellbeing, it would seem important to present data on individual's past and future evaluations of national wellbeing. In SASAS 2012, respondents were asked to indicate how they would rate the

country on a symbolic 11-point ladder in which the top rungs represented their greatest hopes for South Africa and the bottom their worst fears. Respondents were asked where the country stood on the ladder (i) five years ago; (ii) at present; and (iii) in five years' time[41]. The results (Figure 5.5) show that national ratings of the country's future tended to be, on average, positive. Mean evaluations of the past five years in the country, by contrast, were more negative. Investigating this data further, Møller and Roberts (2015) found that past national rating tended to be higher for the economically better-off in society. The poor tended to be more positive about the future, indicating their expectations for further socio-economic development. Black Africans tended to rate the immediate past quite negatively in comparison to the white minority but were on average much more positive in their assessment of the future.

Evidence of negative evaluations of subjective national wellbeing among many South Africans suggests the importance of better understanding the public's hopes for a better nation. Looking at hopes for the future of the South African nation among the public using the Cantril Method, Møller and Roberts (2015) found that South Africans were very inward-looking and raised almost no concerns concerning issues beyond the nation. The majority of national hopes are 'precarious' economic and political ones (i.e. hopes paired with fears or hopes defined by deprivation, see Gulyas, 2015). The most common hopes for the future included: employment, protection from crime, honest government, adequate standard of living, good governance and leadership, a strong economy and a good public health service. Addressing many of the negative trends (in terms of unemployment, poverty and crime etc.) that the public feels are damaging the nation should improve subjective national wellbeing in the country.

In many industrial countries, education has been seen as an antidote to racism and xenophobia. But educational attainment had a negative relationship with pro-immigrant sentiment among South Africans who were in the Low Cantril subgroup. The direction of relationship here could help explain why many better-educated South Africans tend to exhibit similar levels of anti-immigrant sentiment in public opinion surveys (e.g. Minnaar *et al.,* 1996; Mattes *et al.,* 1999; Crush *et al.,* 2013). It is not immediately clear, however, why educational attainment should have such a different relationship for those in the Low Cantril subgroup compared to the other two subgroups. Education systems often make use of national symbols and mythos (Brown, 2011). Exposure to the education system (under certain circumstances) could heighten the perceived differences division between insiders (i.e. citizens) and outsiders (i.e. foreigners). More research is clearly needed to better understand this finding, focusing on the past and present education systems in South Africa.

One of the limitations of this study was that it was unable to identify those characteristics associated with xenophobic violence. This study has not investigated the relationship between subjective national wellbeing and intergroup violence and there is no evidence, currently, that links the NWI with intergroup violence in a linear fashion. Although evidence was found for a relationship between pro-immigrant sentiment and subjective national wellbeing, the

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[41] Pairwise correlations between the composite subjective National Wellbeing Index constructed for this study (i.e. the NWI) and these three measures showed that five year future evaluations (0.405) had a higher correlation coefficient with the NWI than past five year evaluations (0.115). Also using pairwise correlations, future evaluations of the state of the nation (0.146) were found to have a higher correlation coefficient with the Pro-Immigrant Attitude Index than past evaluations (0.067).

relationship between outgroup hostility and violence is complex. Fauvelle-Aymar and Segatti (2012), in their study of the 2008 anti-immigrant riots, identify those characteristics associated with the areas where the violence occurred: male dominated, linguistically diverse, highly unequal, and a high proportion of black informal urban dwellers. This research has been unable to speak to which characteristics are associated with violent behaviour towards immigrants. More scholarly work (like that conducted by Fauvelle-Aymar and Segatti) should be conducted investigating the determinants of anti-immigrant violence in South Africa.

5.6   Recommendations and Conclusions

The ongoing refugee influx into Europe, North America and parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, highlights the need to better comprehend the determinants of xenophobic prejudice in a fast changing world. The central goal of this chapter is to show that a better understanding of quality of life can help us better understand social tolerance towards diverse groups. Although this goal is somewhat outside the remit of the discipline, quality of life scholars have often pushed beyond the boundaries of their own discipline to explore broader issues and make new connections (see, for instance, Michalos, 2013). Quality of life indicators can act as vital measures of a nation's health and their relationship to prejudice should become an important site of study alongside other macroeconomic indicators. The chapter has followed this tradition and shown that quality of life data can be employed to better comprehend prejudice by utilising a multidisciplinary lens. In this way, the chapter has contributed meaningfully to the quality of life academic field.

The chapter has added to our understanding of quality of life in South Africa. But the findings of this chapter, and their significance, go beyond the confines of South Africa and suggest a new mechanism to understand prejudice in Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere. Two of the three main predictors identified in this chapter (i.e. intergroup contact and perceived consequences of immigration) are well-known predictors of anti-immigrant sentiment. The other predictor was subjective national wellbeing, which is an indicator often ignored by scholars studying intergroup relations. In this study, subjective national wellbeing acted as a determinant of pro-immigrant sentiment, regardless of whether we look at the frustrated and disillusioned or the satisfied and sanguine. Quality of life researchers should be cognisant of this relationship and should consider how the results of this study may impact on their own work. For quality of life researchers interested in understanding prejudice, there is a need to identify and monitor subjective national wellbeing. Efforts must be made to field the National Wellbeing Index in nationally representative surveys at regular intervals in Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere in order to gather the appropriate data for future studies.

The chapter has shown that there may be a link between individuals' sense of a national 'self' and anti-immigrant prejudice. The focus of this study was national subjective wellbeing, but subjective community wellbeing may have an equally robust relationship with anti-immigrant sentiment in developing countries like South Africa. As quality of life research expands further into Sub-Saharan Africa, a priority should be placed on measuring and understanding subjective collective wellbeing at different levels (e.g. neighbourhood, village, town, region etc.). Future research should advance our knowledge on the link between subjective collective wellbeing at different geographies and prejudice. The classic measures designed by Hadley Cantril on subjective individual and national wellbeing performed well in heterogeneous South Africa. These Cantril measures should be considered as part of future quality of life studies that look at the relationship between prejudice and different kinds of

subjective community wellbeing. In conclusion, I feel confident in predicting that community wellbeing studies will have a particularly important role to play in future investigations of xenophobia and prejudice in a diverse array of geographic settings.

6 Neighbourhood-level Social Capital and Anti-Immigrant Prejudice in an African Context: An Individual-level Analysis of Attitudes towards Immigrants in South Africa

ABSTRACT

African states are often characterised as low trust societies. Could a deficiency of social capital explain prejudice towards immigrants in such societies? Using South Africa as a case study, this paper tests the effect of social trust, social bonds with neighbours and a sense of community on attitudes towards foreigners. The results reveal that social capital may be a more important predictor of attitudes than economic status. Social bonds between neighbours and a sense of community were found to be more salient determinants of prejudice than social trust. In African societies it is, therefore, important to invest in programmes that promote social cohesion within communities.

6.1 Introduction

In many African societies, anti-immigration prejudice is a widespread problem which can be a threat to social order. A study of attitudes towards immigration across 47 countries found that many citizens in African nations, particularly those south of the Sahara, had negative attitudes towards immigration (Miller, 2012). In Sub-Saharan Africa, such prejudice has caused social upheaval in a number of countries, including Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa. Could this reflect a social capital deficit among such societies? Is xenophobia – a form of racism– influenced by flagging social bonds in neighbourhoods in African countries, and what is the direction of this relationship? Putnam (2000) has argued that social capital acts as a foundation for collaboration and co-existence between groups and contributes to the creation of integrated and cooperative communities. This paper will explore these questions, using South Africa as a case study.

Like many African nations, South Africa is a culturally heterogeneous nation characterised by significant economic and social inequalities. The results of international public opinion surveys clearly show that citizens in the country are, on average, very distrustful of strangers. But these levels of trust are similar to those in other African countries. Using the 2010–2012 Afrobarometer survey, for example, it is possible to compare social trust in South Africa with 32 other countries on the African continent. Less than a fifth (17%) of South Africans thought that most people could be trusted compared to about four-fifths (81%) of those who thought that you cannot be too careful[42]. The country was found to have middling levels of social trust when compared to other African countries in the survey. Social trust in the country was below Namibia (25%) and Senegal (30%), but above Kenya (9%), Zambia (10%) and Nigeria

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[42] The question used to measure social trust in the 2010–2012 Afrobarometer survey is a two-point indicator which asked respondents, "[g]enerally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?" Respondents answered either (i) most people can be trusted or (ii) need to be very careful.

(16%). As a result, the country serves as an interesting social laboratory for studying the relationship between intergroup relations and social capital in an African context.

The relationship between social capital and anti-immigrant prejudice, suggested by Putnam (2000), has not, however, been adequately tested in the developing world. Of those studies that do quantitatively explore the determinants of anti-immigrant sentiment outside North America and Europe, there is little focus on indicators of social capital. This paper will rectify this knowledge gap by testing multiple measures of social capital on attitudes towards immigrants in an African society. South African data from the 2011 South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) will be utilised for this purpose. The results of this study will contribute significantly to the scholarship on how social capital influences attitudes towards immigrants in such societies.

6.2   The Setting: Immigration in South Africa

According to population data from the United Nations' Population Division (UNPD), South Africa has one of the largest international migration populations on the African continent and only Côte d'Ivoire is comparable (UNPD, 2013). To place the country in perspective, the available cross-national data suggest that of the more than 17 million international migrants reported by the UNPD to be living in different Sub-Saharan African countries, almost one-seventh (13.9%) are located in South Africa. However, it should also be remembered that international migrants comprise only a small share (4.5%) of the total population of that country. The immigrant population has grown significantly over time. According to data from the World Bank and the South African 2011 national census, the number of immigrants in the country increased from 1.2 million in 1990 to 2.2 million in 2011. It is very difficult, however, to arrive at a precise count of the number of immigrants in the post-apartheid nation, due to sustainable evidence of undocumented migration (see Segatti, 2011a).

Immigration has played a prominent role in the pre-transition history of South Africa. During the centuries of white minority rule, the colonial and then apartheid governments recruited Black Africans from southern Africa (and beyond) to work in the nation's mines and farms as cheap, unskilled labour. After the end of white minority rule in the early 1990s, and the beginning of the democratic process, South Africa enjoyed a relatively high level of economic development and political freedom, and was considered an attractive destination for immigrants on the continent. Following the first truly democratic elections in 1994, a significant number of immigrants entered the country, with the bulk of the new arrivals coming from Sub-Saharan Africa (Crush, 2012). These immigrants entered a nation recovering from the racial segregation and intergroup conflict that had characterised South Africa for much of its history as a modern state.

South Africa, along with many other African states, emerged from nondemocratic rule during the feted third wave of democratisation. This transition was, however, considered unique because the new democratic government was faced with the daunting task of dismantling a system of racial segregation and privilege –the apartheid system– which favoured the country's white minority. Evolving out of colonial-era legislation, this system resulted in a highly racially polarised society (e.g. Gibson and Gouws, 2000; Gibson, 2006) characterised by interracial economic and social inequality. Among the legacies of the colonial and apartheid periods was a strong subcultural pluralism where racial (as well as intra-racial or ethnic) divisions were central to politics. Steenkamp (2009) has argued that social distrust

permeated pre-transition South Africa. Creating social cohesion, and consequently palatable intergroup relations, was one of the central tasks of the country's post-transition government.

In rebuilding the post-apartheid nation, the new government, led by the African National Congress (ANC), began a programme of nation-building, reconciliation and national unity. The notable scholar Neocosmos (2010) has argued that the nation-building programme launched by the ANC has been decidedly hostile to the growing immigrant community. Certainly, notwithstanding shifts in policy, the government has tended to focus on preventing undocumented migration into the country (also see Segatti, 2011b). Authorities have been granted wide powers to detain and deport those who violate the country's immigration control laws. The extensive powers to detain suspected undocumented migrants granted to the authorities have resulted in a high arrest rate (Landau, 2005; Nyamnjoh, 2006) and hundreds of thousands are deported from South Africa every year. The political opposition in South Africa (which is relatively small and receives support from only a minority of the electorate) have done little to challenge this state of affairs.

Mass urban anti-immigrant riots broke out in South Africa during May and June 2008. The riots resulted in the death of 62, the arrest of 1384 and the displacement of more than a hundred thousand (Misago, 2012). Such xenophobia was largely directed against black immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, who are derogatorily referred to as *makwerekwere* in South Africa. Although the largest and most extensive anti-immigrant riots observed so far in the country, the 2008 riots should be seen as part of a general pattern of anti-immigrant violence that has been a troubling feature of the post-apartheid period. Much research in South Africa has focused on the causes of xenophobic violence (Dodson, 2010). It is important to be cognisant of the fact that the drivers of xenophobic violence will not perfectly correlate with the drivers of xenophobic prejudice more generally. The decision to engage in such violence is mediated by a number of factors other than simple prejudice, as research by Horowitz (2001) has shown.

A number of public opinion surveys in South Africa have captured attitudes towards immigration during the post-apartheid period. Attitudes towards immigrants more generally were well documented by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP), using a number of public opinion surveys in 1999, 2006 and 2010. The findings of these surveys show that a majority of South Africans preferred restrictive immigration policies[43] and held anti-immigrant sentiments (Crush *et al.,* 2013). The 2001–2002 National Immigration Policy Survey, fielded in Southern Africa, confirmed these findings (Crush and Pendleton, 2007). Despite this survey work, the quantitative public opinion research on anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa is relatively thin. As far as the author is aware, no current study on attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa has investigated the impact of social capital on anti-immigrant sentiment using quantitative opinion data.

6.3   Determinants of Anti-Immigrant Sentiment: A Literature Review

A number of researchers have sought to explain xenophobia in South African society. In particular, scholars have sought to better understand the relationship between intolerance of

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[43] These findings were further verified by international survey evidence. According to a study by Miller (2012: 3) using data from the 2007 Global Attitudes Project, South Africans were found to be more supportive of restricting immigration than any of the other 47 different nations surveyed, except for citizens of Tanzania and Malaysia.

foreigners and material conditions in South African communities. In her review of the literature on xenophobia in South Africa, Dodson (2010) notes this trend, particularly in the aftermath of the 2008 riots. In Europe and North America, economic competition theory has been utilised by social scientists to test a connection between economic position and prejudice towards immigrants (see, for instance, Citrin *et al.,* 1997; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; McLaren and Johnson, 2007). The credence of this argument seems to have been strengthened by the fact that post-apartheid South Africa, like many developing countries, suffers from high levels of unemployment, considerable income inequality and widespread poverty.

A number of scholars writing about xenophobia in South Africa have questioned the link between anti-immigrant prejudice and material conditions (for a review see Dodson, 2010). Using often qualitative techniques, researchers such as Nyamnjoh (2006) and Neocosmos (2010) have argued that issues of identity (both political and social) act as drivers of xenophobia in the country. An interesting and noteworthy study on xenophobic violence in South Africa may offer insights into what drives anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa. Fauvelle-Aymar and Segatti (2012) ask whether there was an objective correlation between the areas affected by the 2008 anti-foreigner riots and a certain socio-economic profile. Using ward level data, the researchers concluded that unemployment and absolute poverty were not correlated with the occurrence of the 2008 riots. Heterogeneity, in terms of both income and ethnicity, however, was found to be significantly correlated. Obviously, correlates of xenophobic violence and anti-immigrant sentiment will not be identical. Nonetheless, Fauvelle-Aymar and Segatti's study demonstrates the importance of social identity in understanding attitudes towards foreigners in South Africa.

6.3.1   Social Identity: Nationalism and Race

Group identity may be an important predictor of attitudes towards immigrants. An individual's sense of group belonging and pride, social identity theory postulates, can result in a simultaneous process of outgroup hostility (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Other scholars, such as Allport (1954), dispute the link between prejudice and ingroup pride or loyalty. In the case of attitudes towards foreigners, beliefs about the nation are particularly important. Attitudes towards immigrant communities in Europe have been shown to be strongly correlated with more symbolic concerns about cultural threats that such groups represent to established national unity and distinctiveness than with economic position (see, for instance, McLaren and Johnson, 2007; Citrin and Sides, 2008). In South Africa, social identity is complicated by the colonial and apartheid-era social engineering programmes that sought to divide and separate communities along racial lines. Despite the end of these programmes attachment to racial identity remains strong in South Africa[44] (Gibson and Gouws, 2000; Gibson, 2006). This paper will examine the impact of social identity on attitudes towards immigrants, using multiple social identity variables.

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[44] Attitudinal evidence for this reality has been captured in a number of academic works including by Gibson and Gouws (2000), Gibson (2006) and Bornman (2010, 2011). It could be argued that the apartheid racial categories have been given new life and renormalised by the post-apartheid state. In fact, Maré (2003) has advanced the contention that the commitment of the African National Congress to 'non-racialism' is unachievable because there has been no serious theoretical investigation and reinterpretation of these categories. He described South African society as having transitioned from a racialised past to a racialised present.

Social identity theory would suggest a link between anti-immigrant sentiment and national pride. The link between nationalism and attitudes towards immigration has been the subject of great interest in Europe and North America (see, for example, Maddens *et al.,* 2000; de Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003). Acknowledging the anti-rural and pro-urban character of modern South African nationalism, Neocosmos (2010) argues that contemporary xenophobia in the country is caused, in part, by national pride. Neocosmos, however, did not test this association using quantitative data. As far as the author is aware, national pride has not been used as a predictor of anti-immigrant sentiment in quantitative public opinion studies in South Africa. Lawrence (2011), using the 2002 Latin Barometer Survey which covers 17 Latin American nations, found that national pride was not a significant predictor of opposition to immigration. This raises doubt as to the salience of national identity pride as a predictor of attitudes across different immigration contexts, and this study will control for how a general sense of national pride influences anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa.

Anti-immigrant sentiment has strong ethnic and racial overtones in many countries and, given that xenophobia is a form of racism, we expect racial attitudes to be salient determinants of anti-immigrant sentiment. In South Africa, the apartheid system put forward an ideological (as well as pseudo-scientific and religious) rationale for intergroup differentiation and stratification, encouraging outgroup hostility. Early post-apartheid evidence in South Africa suggests a link between attachment to racial identity and prejudice. Gibson and Gouws (2000) found, for example, that those who expressed a need for group solidarity and derived psychic benefits from their group associations were more likely to be intolerant of individuals with opposing political opinions. However, a recent study by Gibson (2006), which measured the impact of racial identity on inter-racial and political intolerance, found no correlation between racial identification and prejudice. This mixed evidence suggests that attachment to racial identity may play a role in attitude formulation among the South African public. Based on this evaluation of the literature, we derive the following hypotheses:

H1. A strong attachment to racial identity will be correlated with attitudes towards foreigners, with strong attachment positively correlated with negative attitudes.

Qualitative research in the country on the 2008 anti-immigrant riots suggests that micro-level political factors triggered the violence. Misago (2012) argued that political leadership vacuums and competition for community leadership helped translate prevailing xenophobic attitudes into anti-foreigner action. The violence revealed deep divisions between parts of the electorate and locally-elected leaders, and the absence of conflict resolution mechanisms in many communities. This study found that community leaders at the township level mobilised communities using nativist discourses – such mobilisations were characterised by a distinct level of political intolerance. This speaks to the role played by democratic values in understanding prejudice formation in South Africa. In a multivariate analysis of intergroup attitudes, Gibson (2006) found that blacks and whites in South Africa who were more supportive of democratic institutions were more tolerant. To explore the relationship between political intolerance and xenophobia, we propose the following hypothesis:

H2. Political tolerance in South Africa will be negatively associated with anti-immigrant sentiment.

6.3.2   Social Capital: Trust and Community Cohesion

Social capital, as defined by Putnam (2000: 19), is the associates among individuals' "social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them". Putnam

argues that communities whose members are more socially cohesive will be more tolerant and therefore more likely to have positive attitudes towards outgroups. This suggests that, particularly in the context of tightly-knit communities, social networks have a positive function in reducing prejudice[45]. The relationship between social capital and anti-immigrant sentiment has received relatively little attention in the literature on xenophobia in South Africa. Steenkamp (2009), one of the few scholars making the link between social capital and anti-immigrant prejudice in the country, argues that anti-immigrant violence in South Africa exposed the high level of social distrust in post-apartheid society. Steenkamp, however, fails to ground her conclusions in evidence from public opinion surveys and, as such, her assertions remain untested.

Traditionally the neighbourhood has been seen as an important setting for many of the processes which affect the construction of social identity (Sarason, 1974; Low and Altman, 1992). Its principal role historically as a 'space' for extended domestic activities made the neighbourhood an extension of an individual's 'home' and, therefore, very significant in identity terms. Individuals who socialise in their local environment and build social networks with their neighbours will develop locally-based identities that could inform their attitudes (Cuba and Hummon, 1993). The cohesive nature of the neighbourhood, measured in social capital, will have an impact on an individual's social identity formation (also see Forrest and Kearns, 2001). Although the neighbourhood may be an important source of social identity, there are concerns in South Africa that the neighbourhood is being eroded as a source of identity due to, among other things, increased spatial mobility. On these arguments, a lot is contingent on the quality of our spatial mobility comparisons.

For those scholars investigating social cohesion and social capital, the neighbourhood has re-emerged as an important site of study. It is important, as Forrest and Kearns (2001) note, that neighbouring is distinct from the neighbourhood. People may feel attached to their neighbourhoods as physical environments but do not seek or practise neighbourhood social interaction (also see Tartaglia, 2006). As a result, it may be important to look at social bonding in the neighbourhood as a predictor of attitudes. It is difficult to predict what impact social bonding within neighbourhoods will have on attitudes towards immigrants. In their review of the key debates on social cohesion, Forrest and Kearns (2001: 2141) argue that most of the systematic research on neighbourhood cohesion "has been undertaken in the US and the conclusions drawn can only be cautiously transferred as research questions to be posed in other national and cultural contexts". However, the work of Putnam (2000) seems to indicate that having strong social bonds with your neighbours will reduce prejudice. This study is interested in how social bonding in the neighbourhood influences attitudes towards immigrants and, based on a reading of the social capital literature, we hypothesise as follows:

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[45] In South Africa, our conversations about social cohesion, especially as it concerns cities, tend to be quite pessimistic (Struwig *et al.,* 2013). Our communities are depicted as outside Putnam's wholesomely cohesive conception. Since its inception, the idea of cities as potential zones of affable sociability has been at the root of the social science according to Thrift (2005). He argues that misanthropy is a natural condition of urban spaces and that there is a misanthropic thread that runs through modern cities. In closing he reasons that we cannot simply explain away this malign background as a 'crisis of modernity'. Rather we must learn to endure it as part of how cities are experience –as a phenomena which cannot be regulated out of existence.

H3. Individuals who have strong social ties with their neighbours will be more tolerant of immigrants than those with weak social ties.

The examination of the role played by social capital as a predictor of attitudes towards immigrants is a relatively new area of research and few scholars have investigated the role played by bonds in neighbourhoods in reducing prejudice towards foreigners. In order to best test this hypothesis, this paper investigates social bonds in neighbourhoods alongside two other measures of social capital (i.e. social trust and attachment to community). This will allow for a more comprehensive analysis of the role played by social capital in determining attitudes in an African country such as South Africa. We expect that social bonding in the neighbourhood will have a greater influence on attitudes than social trust or community attachment. The two other measures of social capital will now be discussed in the later text.

Social trust (sometimes termed interpersonal trust) can be thought of as the level of trust an individual has towards strangers (Putnam, 2000). This logically results in a greater tolerance of all strangers, including members of outgroups. Herreros and Criado (2009) argue that societies with high levels of social capital will have more positive attitudes towards immigration. Drawing on the 2002/2003 European Social Survey, Herreros and Criado show that, regardless of the impact of other individual-level variables, those individuals with high social trust do exhibit more positive attitudes towards immigration (see also Citrin and Sides, 2008; Rustenbach, 2010). Social trust shown to strangers may be conditioned by the stranger's ethnic or national identity. Delhey and Newton (2005: 312) argue that "[o]utgroups are mainly evaluated and categorised according to the congruency with ingroup beliefs", and as a result "similar groups are assessed more favourably" than dissimilar groups. Consequently, social trust may not be a significant predictor of tolerance towards all outgroups. Interpersonal trust may have a different impact in a nation (such as South Africa) which is so deeply and recently affected by past racial segregation programmes. Social trust will be included as control when testing the role of neighbourhood social interaction.

Sense of community is currently one of the most discussed concepts within community psychology and, over the last 30 years, work on this concept has grown substantially (for a review of this literature, see Tartaglia, 2006). As Sarason (1974) predicted, this research has shown that a sense of community has been linked to social and political participation and life satisfaction. A sense of community is associated with local identity, which is closely connected to social identity and a strong group identity may (as scholars such as Tajfel and Turner, 1979 have argued) be associated with prejudice towards outgroups. Few studies have, however, examined the correlation between prejudice and a sense of community. Researchers in Italy have investigated the relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and community cohesion (Prezza and Zampatti, 2008). The results of this research found little evidence that a territorial sense of community is correlated with ethnic prejudice. Based on these findings, there is some evidence to suggest that attachment to a community may not be related to attitudes towards immigrants and this will be tested in this study.

6.4   Data and Measurement

The data selected for use in this study were the 2011 SASAS. This cross-sectional survey has been fielded by the Human Sciences Research Council since 2003. The aim of this survey series is to generate data on how public attitudes, behaviour and values are changing in the country. SASAS is nationally representative and has a sample of 3057 respondents living in private households aged 16 and older in 2011. This sample is composed of 500 Population

Census enumeration areas, stratified by province, geographical subtype and majority population group. Interviews were completed in the interviewee's language of choice and the survey was conducted during the October/November period. The chapter focuses on those who claim citizenship and will only provide an analysis of their attitudes. As the SASAS 2011 sample consisted of both citizens and non-citizens, we restricted the group of investigation to those who claimed citizenship (N = 2954).

Public opinion surveys can capture a wide variety of information and this can help identify and map the location and concentration of social problems such as prejudice. The SASAS survey instrument contains a broad spectrum of information on socio-economic, demographic and labour-force-related characteristics of adult South Africans. Each round consists of a core module of questions on social and political attitudes as well as rotating modules on specific themes. The 2011 round included a module on social cohesion that included questions on social bonding in a neighbourhood as well as intergroup tolerance. Questions from this module will be used in this study. The data available for this study relate to the 2011 period. More detailed information on trends in perceptions and understanding of different categories of 'stranger', 'migrant' and 'immigrant' and better delineation of their changing meanings over time is unavailable.

6.4.1   Dependent Variable

In order to measure negative attitudes towards outgroups in South African society, we used a question on tolerance towards certain groups. Respondents were asked how satisfied or dissatisfied they would be to have a foreign immigrant as a neighbour, a question derived from a similar question in the World Value Survey (WVS). The use of the word 'foreign' is employed to distinguish international immigrants from other migrants or strangers in the South African context. This question used a five-point scale ranging from 1 'very satisfied' to 5 'very dissatisfied'. As there are only five categories in the dependent variable, a linear regression approach was considered to be inappropriate and an ordered logistic regression approach was selected.

6.4.2   Independent Variables

Gender was measured using a dummy (1 = female; 0 = male), as was marital status (1 = married; 0 =not married). Census classification of respondents' area of residence was coded as a set of dummy variables (urban formal, urban informal, rural formal and rural areas under traditional authority) capturing the geographic complexity of South Africa. Race group (Black African, Indian, 'Coloured' and White), labour market status (full-time employed, part-time employed, unemployed, student, retired and labour inactive) and educational attainment[46] (junior primary and below, senior primary, incomplete secondary, complete secondary and tertiary) were likewise measured using a set of dummy variables. Economic status was assessed using a subjective question on personal and family wealth and recoded into a six-point categorical variable: (1) wealthy, (2) very comfortable, (3) reasonably

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[46] Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007: 428) suggest that when examining the role of education as a determinant of attitudes towards immigrants, education should be measured categorically as these scholars noted 'substantial nonlinearities in the relationship between education and attitudes toward immigrant'. Using data from the European Social Survey, these authors found that college education had a more positive association with support for immigration when compared with high school education. Interestingly, completing elementary schooling was reported as having negative influence on individual support for immigration.

comfortable, (4) just getting along, (5) poor and (6) very poor. Age was measured using a continuous variable (age in years).

Contact with immigrants may reduce anti-immigrant sentiment according to Contact Theory, first developed by Allport (1954), which states that contact with outgroup members can reduce hostility towards that outgroup. Subsequent research on intergroup contact, according to Pettigrew (1998a: 76), has concluded that "friendship potential" is an "essential, not merely facilitating, condition for positive intergroup contact effects that generalise". The importance of intimate contact has been shown in European studies for predicting anti-immigrant attitudes (see, for example, Herreros and Criado, 2009). Therefore, it will be necessary to control for intimate contact with immigrants in this study. Contact is measured using a categorical 'friendship with immigrants' variable with 1(no foreign friends), 2(a few foreign friends) and 3(some or many foreign friends).

A series of different attitudinal variables were used in this study. *National pride* was measured using the question: "Do you agree or disagree that generally speaking, South Africa is a better country than most other countries?" The question: "Do you agree or disagree that being a member of my race group is an important part of who I am as a person?" was used to measure *racial attachment*. Responses to both these questions were captured on a five-point agree–disagree Likert scale with 1 representing 'strongly agree' and 5 'strongly disagree'. *Political intolerance* is how satisfied or dissatisfied they would be to have a person with different political views from own as a neighbour. This question used a five-point scale ranging from 1 'very satisfied' to 5 'very dissatisfied'. In order to adequately understand the role played by political tolerance, political affiliation must also be considered. We controlled for political affiliation in the 2009 national elections[47], creating a categorical variable.

Social trust was measured using three questions on interpersonal trust[48]. Responses to these questions are coded using an 11-point scale of satisfaction (0, completely dissatisfied to 10, completely satisfied). The responses were combined (Cronbach alpha 0.821) into a 0–10 score with 0 representing the lowest level of interpersonal trust and 10 the highest. *Neighbourhood bonding* was measured using three questions on reciprocal relations with neighbours[49]. Responses to these questions are coded into four-point scales with 1

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[47] The question used to construct this variable was: "For which party did you vote in the last national election, which was held in 2009?" Answers were then categorised to identify partisan support – the following dummy variables were created: ANC, Democratic Alliance (DA), other political parties and undeclared/undecided) The DA is the main opposition party in South Africa, although the share of the electorate who vote for the DA is relatively small in comparison to the ANC. The DA has not made immigration a central part of its party agenda, which is informed by economic liberalism.

[48] The exact wording of these questions is as follows: (i) "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?"; (ii) "Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?"; and (iii) "Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?"

[49] The exact wording of these questions is as follows: (i) "How comfortable would you be asking a neighbour to lend you a cup of sugar if you needed it?"; (ii) "How comfortable would you be asking a neighbour to take you to a doctor or clinic if you were sick?"; and (iii) "If you were short of money, how comfortable would you be asking a neighbour if you could borrow R20 [about two dollars]?"

representing 'very comfortable' and 4 'very uncomfortable'. These scales were combined (Cronbach alpha 0.866) and converted into an index ranging from 0 (weak links between neighbours) to 10 (strong links between neighbours).

As a proxy for community attachment, we use an 11-point scale of community satisfaction (0, completely dissatisfied to 10, completely satisfied) based on the question: "How satisfied are you with feeling part of your community?" This allows the construct of the ordinal *satisfaction with community attachment (SCA)* variable. It is important to note that a sense of community is a multidimensional concept, traditionally consisting of four interdependent dimensions: 'membership', 'influence', 'integration and satisfaction of needs' and 'shared emotional connection' (Prezza and Zampatti, 2008). Tartaglia (2006) suggests that when measuring a sense of community it is important to distinguish between the different components of community ties. Due to data limitations, we were unable to construct a multidimensional measure of a psychological sense of community or to distinguish between the components of community ties.

6.5   Results

The SASAS results reveal that few in South Africa would be satisfied to have a foreign neighbour. Less than two-fifths (37%) of the public would be satisfied living next to such a group. Given the level of anti-immigrant sentiment observed (which corresponds to the high levels of xenophobia found by the SAMP researchers, see Crush *et al.,* 2013), it is possible to highlight xenophobia as a major problem in South Africa. Xenophobia in the country coexists with widespread evidence in the SASAS data of social distrust (Figure 6.1). Confirming the arguments made by Steenkamp (2009), many South Africans exhibit weak levels of interpersonal trust. The SASAS data are comparable to data gathered from public opinion surveys, such as the Afrobarometer survey, which found that South Africans generally score low on trust scales. These results are comparable with findings in post-transition states in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (Delhey and Newton, 2005).

The dismantling of the apartheid system and the creation of a democratic society should have resulted in growing interpersonal trust in the post-transition period. However, using WVS wave data, social trust has been observed to have declined in South Africa between the first survey wave (1981–1984) and the fourth (1999–2004). A notable increase in trust was observed in the sixth wave (2010–2014), although social trust remained below what it was before the political transition[50]. What can explain such persistent levels of distrust observed in the WVS data? Using survey data from seven societies, 1999–2001 Delhey and Newton (2003) found that individual-level determinants of social trust included a sense of public safety, perceptions of social conflict, social status and life satisfaction. In a wider study of 60 countries, using WVS data, Delhey and Newton (2005) found correlations between social trust and country-level factors such as corruption, inequalities and governance. The failures of the post-apartheid state in addressing issues of community-level inequalities, crime and poverty may explain the low levels of social trust observed.

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[50] The question used to measure social trust in the WVS is a two-point indicator which is identical to the 2010–2012 Afrobarometer survey item referred to earlier in this paper. For an analysis of social trust in data for 60 countries collected from wave II for 1989–1993 and wave III for 1995–1997 of the WVS using two-point item see Delhey and Newton (2005).

Figure 6.1: Indicators of Social Capital in South Africa

Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey (2011)

Notes: 1. The data is weighted to be representative of the national population, and 2. All cases that had any missing data for any of the variables used were removed, and 3.All individuals who reported they were not citizens of South Africa were excluded.

As is evident from Figure 6.1, levels of community attachment (M = 6.59, SD =0.05) and neighbourhood bonding (M = 5.85, SD =0.08) in South Africa were found to be, on average, higher than social trust (M = 4.53, SD =0.05). But it is clear that many South Africans feel detached from their communities. It is difficult to know, however, if this is a modern post-apartheid phenomenon, reflecting a decline in community cohesion. Reliable nationally representative quantitative public opinion data on neighbourhood cohesion are not available in South Africa for the apartheid or pre-apartheid period. It is possible that opposition to apartheid created social cohesion within and between Black African communities, and that this cohesion declined in the modern period because of the re-fragmentation of former 'resistance' communities and the disintegration of these communities through market competition[51]. Forrest and Kearns (2001) contend that other drivers of neighbourhood cohesion would be feelings of safety, shared values and participation in social and communal activities. A decline in these factors between the apartheid and the modern period could also be connected to a weakening of neighbourhood cohesion. Due to data limitations, it is not impossible to map such a decline using existing nationally representative public opinion data.

To better understand what drives xenophobia in South Africa, we use multivariate analysis to test the validity of the hypotheses constructed for this study. Five models are created. The first is a base model containing the socio-economic, demographic and contact controls. The second model introduces national pride and racial group attachment (H1) into the base model. The third tests whether political intolerance (H2) is associated with a negative impact on attitudes. The fourth tests the predictive power of social capital measures (H3) to examine whether social capital will reduce prejudice towards immigrants in South Africa. Finally, a fifth model is constructed to determine the relative effect of all the variables together. The final model will test whether all signs and significance levels of the variables observed in the five other models are preserved in the full model. Odds ratios are presented for ease of interpretation (Table 6.1).

In Model I, it was apparent that the indicators of economic position, both objective and subjective, were not found to be a good predictor of the dependent variable. Although this may appear surprising, it is broadly consistent with findings on anti-immigration hostility in Europe and North America which find that individual economic self-interest plays only a minor role in explaining anti-immigrant sentiment (see, for instance, Citrin *et al.,* 1997; McLaren and Johnson, 2007). Research in the developing world is more mixed and Lawrence (2011) and Miller (2012) find evidence to support economic self-interest as a good determinant of attitudes towards international migrants. Those with several or many foreign friends have more positive attitudes than those with fewer or no friends among immigrants. Given the substantial evidence that has emerged on intergroup contact, this is not surprising (see Pettigrew, 1998a).

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[51] The argument for a transition from solidarity to fragmentation is, however, a supposition and cannot be supported by evidence. In fact the opposite could be argued. Neocosmos (2010) evokes the work of Marian Lacey and others to argue that apartheid and colonial regimes 'refurbished' African traditionalism with an emphasis on ethnic and cultural separatism. The apartheid-era homeland policy is just example of this divide-and-rule policy (also see Christopher, 2009; Maré, 2011). The ANC-Inkatha Freedom Party internecine violence of the early 1990s is another example of fragmentation in resistance communities to which Neocosmos (2010) makes reference to (also see Gibson, 2012).

Table 6.1: Ordered Logistic Models, Dissatisfaction with an Immigrant Neighbour

	Model I		Model II		Model III	
	OR	SE.	OR	SE.	OR	SE.
Female (ref. male)	1.00	0.09	0.98	0.09	0.95	0.09
Age	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.00
Married (ref. not married)	0.82	0.08*	0.81	0.09*	0.90	0.10
Race group (ref. Black African)						
Coloured	1.19	0.19	1.20	0.19	1.20	0.18
Indian	1.73	0.30**	1.71	0.31**	1.84	0.31**
White	1.50	0.28*	1.48	0.27*	1.44	0.28
Geographic type (ref. Urban formal)						
Urban informal	1.06	0.16	1.05	0.16	1.03	0.16
Rural, traditional areas	1.23	0.16	1.20	0.16*	1.26	0.17
Commercial farms	0.92	0.18	0.93	0.18	0.94	0.19
Employment status (ref. full-time employed)						
Part-time employed	1.03	0.18	1.03	0.18	1.08	0.19
Unemployed	0.81	0.17	0.81	0.17	0.87	0.18
Student	0.98	0.21	0.98	0.21	0.97	0.21
Retired	0.86	0.15	0.86	0.15	0.88	0.15
Other labour Inactive	0.74	0.16	0.74	0.16	0.76	0.17
Self-reported poverty status (ref. wealthy)						
Comfortable	1.11	0.18	1.09	0.17	1.16	0.19
Just getting by	1.25	0.19	1.22	0.19	1.36	0.22
Poor	1.21	0.21	1.23	0.21	1.40	0.25
Very Poor	0.89	0.23	0.88	0.23	1.15	0.30
Educational attainment (ref. junior primary and below)						
Senior Primary	0.95	0.20	1.01	0.21	1.02	0.22
Incomplete Secondary	1.00	0.20	1.07	0.21	1.12	0.22
Completed Secondary	1.01	0.21	1.08	0.23	1.13	0.23
Tertiary	0.89	0.23	0.95	0.24	1.04	0.27
Immigrant Contact (ref. no friends)						
Few friends	0.58	0.07***	0.59	0.07***	0.62	0.07***
Some or many friends	0.38	0.06***	0.38	0.06***	0.41	0.07***
Racial attachment			1.16	0.07*		
National pride			0.81	0.04***		
Political intolerance					1.65	0.10***
Social trust						
Neighbourhood bonding						
SCA						
/cut1	-2.26	0.39	-2.43	0.49	-0.77	0.43
/cut2	-0.36	0.39	-0.52	0.49	1.21	0.43
/cut3	0.81	0.39	0.67	0.49	2.42	0.43
/cut4	1.87	0.39	1.74	0.50	3.52	0.44
N	2778		2771		2763	

*** p<0.001, **p<0.01,* p<0.05

Notes: 1. Odds ratios greater than 1 indicate negative attitudes (intolerance) towards immigrants, 2. The data is weighted to be representative of the national population, 3. All cases that had any missing data for any of the variables used were removed, 4.All individuals who reported they were not citizens of South Africa were excluded; and 5. The regressions also control for the province of residence and political affiliation.

Table 6.1: Ordered Logistic Models, Dissatisfaction with an Immigrant Neighbour (continued)

	Model IV		Model V	
	OR	SE.	OR	SE.
Female (ref. male)	0.98	0.09	0.93	0.09
Age	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.01
Married (ref. not married)	0.81	0.09*	0.89	0.10
Race group (ref. Black African)				
Coloured	1.11	0.18	1.18	0.22
Indian	1.66	0.30**	1.75	0.36**
White	1.38	0.26	1.47	0.32
Geographic type (ref. Urban formal)				
Urban informal	1.02	0.16	0.98	0.16
Rural, traditional areas	1.37	0.18*	1.34	0.19*
Commercial farms	0.94	0.18	0.96	0.19
Employment status (ref. full-time employed)				
Part-time employed	1.10	0.19	1.13	0.20
Unemployed	0.90	0.19	0.96	0.20
Student	0.93	0.20	0.92	0.20
Retired	0.92	0.16	0.98	0.17
Other labour Inactive	0.79	0.17	0.87	0.20
Self-reported poverty status (ref. wealthy)				
Comfortable	0.96	0.16	1.02	0.17
Just getting by	1.09	0.18	1.22	0.21
Poor	1.05	0.19	1.26	0.24
Very Poor	0.81	0.22	1.09	0.30
Educational attainment (ref. junior primary and below)				
Senior Primary	0.92	0.19	1.05	0.23
Incomplete Secondary	1.02	0.20	1.21	0.25
Completed Secondary	1.01	0.21	1.20	0.26
Tertiary	0.85	0.23	1.07	0.28
Immigrant Contact (ref. no friends)				
Few friends	0.55	0.07***	0.61	0.07***
Some or many friends	0.36	0.06***	0.39	0.07***
Racial attachment			1.28	0.08***
National pride			0.87	0.05***
Political intolerance			1.62	0.10***
Social trust	0.95	0.02*	0.95	0.02
Neighbourhood bonding	0.92	0.02***	0.92	0.02***
SCA	0.91	0.02***	0.93	0.03**
/cut1	-3.81	0.45	-1.71	0.60
/cut2	-1.88	0.45	0.30	0.59
/cut3	-0.69	0.45	1.54	0.60
/cut4	0.40	0.45	2.67	0.60
N	2684		2663	

*** p<0.001, **p<0.01,* p<0.05

Notes: 1. Odds ratios greater than 1 indicate negative attitudes (intolerance) towards immigrants, 2. The data is weighted to be representative of the national population, 3. All cases that had any missing data for any of the variables used were removed, 4.All individuals who reported they were not citizens of South Africa were excluded; and 5. The regressions also control for the province of residence and political affiliation.

In Model II, national pride was found to be significantly associated with attitudes towards immigrants. Although an extensive body of evidence would suggest that national pride should be positively associated with anti-immigrant sentiment, the inverse was found in this model. Those South Africans who were more likely to believe that their country was better than other nations were found to be less likely to show intolerance towards immigrants. A racial hierarchy was evident in the base model with South Africans of European and Asian descent more likely than other racial groups to express anti-immigrant sentiment. Crush *et al.* (2013) noted a similar hierarchy using descriptive statistics from a 2010 SAMP survey, and it is notable that this observed hierarchy persists even when controlling for economic and human capital status.

In all of the models in Table 6.1, educational attainment did not have predictive power in Model I[52]. In a bivariate analysis (including post hoc Scheffe tests) of attitudes towards having immigrant neighbours we also did not detect significant differences between well-educated South Africans and their less well-educated counterparts. Given that a positive link between human capital and tolerance is often found in other contexts (see, for example, Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Citrin and Sides, 2008), this is unanticipated. In an effort to understand this surprising finding, I repeated the analysis by race group to discern if educational attainment had different effects within different groups. The results show that educational attainment had no effect on the dependent regardless of which race group was examined. The analysis was also repeated by age group to give further depth to the finding on educational attainment in Table 6.1. The age cohorts used here were 16-29, 30-49 and 50 years of age and older. The results showed that educational attainment had no effect regardless of which group was examined.

Racial group attachment was found to be only weakly correlated with attitudes in Model II, but the results indicate that those who believe that their racial identity is an important part of their identity are more hostile towards foreigners. In Model III, the political intolerance scale is included in the base model along with political affiliation, and the odds ratios on the political intolerance scale are significantly associated with the dependent variables. Those individuals who were intolerant of other political views were found to be less tolerant of immigrants. Controlling for a range of socio-economic variables, political affiliation was not found to be a significant predictor of attitudes. To test the role played by social capital, social trust, satisfaction with community attachment (i.e. SCA) and the neighbourhood bonding scale were added in Model IV. It is evident that sharing reciprocal ties with your neighbours and feeling part of your community are important determinants of attitudes towards foreign nationals. Social trust was found to be a significant predictor at the 5% level in this model.

In conclusion, this study found a strong connection between indicators of social capital (particularly at the neighbourhood level) and attitudes towards foreigners. All the independent variables created for this study are introduced into Model V. SCA and neighbourhood bonding were found to be more powerful determinants of anti-immigrant sentiment than educational status, economic status or labour market position. When controlling for social capital, racial attachment and political intolerance were found to have a

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[52] It could be argued that this is an empirical artefact related to including multiple measures of social position (such as education, labour market position and economic status) in the same model, which would suggest multicollinearity problems. But even if educational attainment was used as the only proxy for societal position, no relationship between educational attainment and the dependent was observed.

strong influence on the dependent. Given the findings showcased earlier, promoting social capital and strong social ties within communities is evidently key to combatting xenophobia in South Africa.

6.6   Discussion

Colonial regimes tended to use divide-and-rule strategies to maintain political power. African states have often struggled to overcome the legacies of division created by these policies and promote social cohesion. South Africa is no different, with low levels of social trust observed. The results of this research suggest that in an African context social bonds, particularly in neighbourhoods, may be a more important determinant of attitudes towards immigrants than material concerns or labour market status. This study reinforces the need to use measures of social capital in academic explorations of public attitudes towards immigrants in such societies. In addition, the results suggest that programmes that promote neighbourhood cohesion, particularly social bonds within neighbourhoods, can reduce prejudice towards immigrants in African countries such as South Africa. While improving general interpersonal trust in the country is an important policy goal in itself, our findings show that strengthening neighbourhood cohesion will have a greater influence on anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa.

Given the prevailing scholarship on xenophobia in South Africa, the findings presented in the previous section provoke the question: How can these findings be reconciled with the fact that xenophobic violence has been largely confined to poor townships and informal settlements populated by black South Africans? It could be argued that there is a disjuncture between observed levels of violence and the paper's finding that indicators of socio-economic status are not salient predictors of anti-immigrant prejudice, after controlling for attitudinal factors such as social trust and group attachment. However, the decision to engage in violent action against members of an outgroup is not, in itself, a measure of hostility to that outgroup. Horowitz (2001), in his analysis of interethnic riots, notes that violence against an ethnic group develops under certain structural conditions. Anti-immigrant sentiment need not manifest as violence and may surface as other forms of discrimination.

Identification with the nation is a multidimensional process and there are differences in the effect exerted by the different dimensions of national belonging. Given this, it is unsurprising that a single item measure of national pride was not found to be negatively associated with tolerance judgements towards immigrants. De Figueiredo and Elkins (2003), in their North American study, subdivide national pride into nationalism and patriotism and find that 'patriots' tend to be more tolerant of non-natives and exclusive ingroup loyalty does not come at the expense of tolerance[53]. Due to data limitations, we were unable to distinguish between different dimensions of national pride. In order to better understand the impact of national

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[53] Using European data, Maddens *et al.* (2000) contend, for example, that when examining the relationship between nationalism and xenophobia, a distinction should be made between imagining the nation as an ethnic or republican construct (also see de Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003). The republican construct views national identity as an adherence to a contract between citizens based on shared respect for the rule of law. The ethnic construct (or ethno-nationalism), on the other hand, views the nation as essentially connected with the ethnic heritage of a cultural group. An ethnic identification with the nation is positively associated with negative attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. In contrast, a republican identification with the nation could coincide with a more positive view of foreigners.

pride on attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa, future researchers must unpack the concept of post-apartheid nationalism.

There seems to be a link between xenophobia and racialism in the country, as foreigners from Sub-Saharan Africa seem to attract a greater level of prejudice than foreigners from other regions. This study did find that racial group attachment was positively correlated with animosity towards foreigners. Qualitative research in South Africa has suggested that 'foreignness' in South Africa seems to be associated with the 'darkness' of an individual's skin, with the especially 'dark-skinned' stigmatised as foreigners (see, for instance, Nyamnjoh, 2006). This suggests that the legacy of apartheid continues to have an impact on attitudes towards immigration in the country. Although the finding of this study requires further investigation, they do suggest the importance of racial identification and racialism in the formation of anti-immigrant prejudice in South Africa. Civil society and government actors can reduce prejudice towards immigrants by encouraging citizens to adopt a non-racial national identity.

Educational attainment was not correlated with progressive immigration attitudes in this chapter. In their review of attitudinal studies in North American and European studies, Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) argue that an observed education effect on attitudes is likely capturing differences in liberalism, ethnocentrism, cultural capital and political correctness in a given population. The last one of these is an interesting consideration and deserves further discussion. Writing about North America, Jackman (1978) argued that a disjuncture existed between professed beliefs in abstract principles of racial equality and support for actual policies to enact racial equality. Jackman's argument suggests that the well-educated are more likely to recognise 'the right' (i.e. most politically correct) answers in surveys on social tolerance but may not apply to situations involving social tolerance[54]. As a result, the consistently reported positive association between attitudes of tolerance and education may be spurious, rather than substantive (also see Dovidio and Gaertner, 2004). What does this mean for our results? It may simply be that norms of political correctness that would lead individuals in other countries to avoid expressing anti-immigrant attitudes do not exist in South Africa.

In the production (and reproduction) of xenophobic attitudes, a number of scholars in Africa have put forward the argument that the lack of political leadership as a key factor. Dodson (2010) notes in her review of the literature on South Africa that, among senior government figures, attitudes towards foreigners in South Africa seem to have been either ambivalent or (on occasion) openly hostile (also see Landau, 2005; Nyamnjoh, 2006; Neocosmos, 2010 who note this trend). Rather than a lack of leadership, there is also evidence of politicians and community leaders, particularly at the micro-level, utilising anti-immigrant discourses to leverage public support. In his analysis of the anti-immigrant violence of 2008, Misago (2012) argues that anti-immigrant violence is connected to micro-level struggles over political leadership in communities. At one level the violence seems to be a kind of anti-establishment protest, although Misago contends that the attacks also seem to reveal an

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[54] Although Jackman was writing about racial tolerance, his study could have significant effects on studies of immigration. In a Swiss study, Hainmueller and Hangartner (2013) demonstrate that the gap between stated and applied immigration preferences can be substantial. In their study, Swiss natives' immigration 'revealed' preferences were distinctly different from their 'stated' preferences in comparable public opinion surveys (also see Janus, 2010).

aggressive territorialism and a growing localised ethnic understanding of national entitlements. This suggests that it is necessary to reconceptualise the role and functions of community leadership structures at the local level in the country.

6.7   Conclusions

The results of this paper highlight the need to invest in building socially cohesive communities on the continent in order to counter animosity towards immigrants. But could there be a contradiction in calling on the state to combat xenophobia through programmes aimed at community building? Doesn't such a call suggest that projects focused on building trust would do more good than efforts to alleviate poverty and address the unfulfilled promises of post-apartheid democracy –especially access to housing, jobs, services, education and health care? On the other hand, the re-joining question could be: Wouldn't addressing these promises improve social cohesion? As already discussed, quantitative public opinion research by Delhey and Newton (2005), as well as others, has shown that improving the security, good governance and economic development within communities will have a positive impact on neighbourhood social cohesion (also see Forrest and Kearns, 2001). Not enough nationally representative quantitative public opinion research has been conducted on social bonding in the neighbourhood in South Africa, however, to answer this question.

More studies must be undertaken in South Africa on the determinants of neighbourhood cohesion using nationally representative quantitative public opinion data. Such research could explore how higher levels of social bonding in neighbourhoods can be created and examine the influence of community governance on such bonding. Existing international research suggests that greater efforts aimed at reducing corruption and inequalities at the local level and bolstering community governance may be the key to strengthening social cohesion at the neighbourhood level (Forrest and Kearns, 2001; Delhey and Newton, 2005). Certainly, as Misago (2012) and others have pointed out, the absence of strong local governance, as well as high levels of corruption and inequality in many communities, can create conflict, undermining social bonding in those communities. Results from this study also show that promoting a climate of political tolerance is important in reducing anti-immigrant sentiment.

It is important to be cognisant of the difference between collective xenophobic violence and anti-immigrant prejudice more generally. It is worthwhile, therefore, to reflect on how a future opinion survey instrument could be conducted so as to obtain more data about violence against 'foreigners' in a country such as South Africa. Certainly, there are limits to the extent to which survey data can reflect on social problems such as anti-immigrant violence. Public opinion data can obtain information on the public attitudes towards this form of violence, however. In order to counter anti-immigrant violence, it is helpful to better understand public tolerance of, and public reactions to, such violence. In 2010 SAMP conducted a survey on public attitudes towards immigration that included questions on the acceptability and possible causes of the mass urban anti-immigrant riots in South Africa during May and June 2008 (for results, see Crush *et al.,* 2013). The inclusion of similar questions in a survey instrument such as SASAS would better allow researchers to understand how neighbourhood cohesion might influence attitudes towards anti-immigrant violence.

Xenophobic sentiment may cut across social class groups in South Africa but xenophobic violence cannot be isolated from the struggles of poor and working-class black South Africans for access to housing, jobs and services that were denied to the black population during the pre-transition period. As the work of Misago (2012) and others demonstrates,

outbreaks of anti-immigrant violence are intertwined with these broader community struggles, which may help explain why such violence emerges in poor black townships such as Alexandra. According to Horowitz's (2001) theory of ethnic riots, one of the structural conditions that are likely to provoke violence towards an ethnic group is government policy that threatens the socio-economic position of host communities. Given this context, it is important to address the development concerns of South African communities in order to prevent xenophobic violence.

7 Waiting for the Barbarians: A Public Opinion Analysis of South African Attitudes towards International Migrants

ABSTRACT

South Africa's democratic nation-building programme has sought to encourage a new non-racial nationalism. Over the last thirty years, racial divisions have lessened as the country has successfully consolidated a new democratic political system. However, interracial animosity and a sense of interracial competition continue to characterise many aspects of everyday life. Does this sense of interracial competition have an association with the emergence of widespread xenophobic sentiment in the country? Using the 2013 South African Social Attitudes Survey, a nationally representative survey, this paper will investigate determinants of anti-immigrant attitudes. The results show that anti-immigrant sentiment is linked to a sense of interracial competition and alienation. A belief that immigrants were beneficial to society was also strongly (and negatively) correlated with attitudes towards immigrants. These results suggest that reducing xenophobia in the country should be seen as part of a larger project of promoting social-cultural cohesion in the country.

7.1 Introduction

In 1980, the South African-born Nobel Laureate John Maxwell Coetzee published a novel entitled *Waiting for the Barbarians,* a bleak but masterful story of intergroup animosity and violence. Coetzee borrowed the title of this novel from an 1898 Greek poem by Constantine P. Cavafy on the relationship between civilisation and the outsider (i.e. the barbarian). The word "barbarian" has its origin in Ancient Greek, a pejorative reference to how non-Greek speakers were thought to sound. In modern South Africa, international immigrants (particularly those from elsewhere in Africa) are often derogatorily labelled *makwerekwere,* a similarly pejorative reference to how foreign language speakers allegedly sound. Xenophobia against this group –these new "barbarians" –is widespread and has received considerable international media attention in recent years, due to large-scale anti-foreigner riots[55] in the country.

When writing *Waiting for the Barbarians* in the 1970s, Coetzee was inspired by the contentious race relations of his native South Africa. During this period, the country was characterised by a system of racial segregation and institutionalised white supremacy. More than forty years later, and following a largely peaceful transition, racial divisions in the country (particularly in economic terms) remain stark. Interracial animosity and a sense of

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[55] The most well-known of these riots occurred in May 2008 and have become recognized as the most striking examples of anti-immigrant violence in the country. Over a two-week period, riots in many South African townships left more than sixty died, 700 wounded and over a hundred thousand (mostly international migrants) displaced (Neocosmos, 2010; Crush *et al.,* 2013). Anti-immigrant riots, however, have been evident in South Africa since the early 1990s. The first occurred in 1994 when residents of the Alexandra (a township near Johannesburg) organized Operation 'Buyelekhaya' (Go Back Home) in an effort to drive foreigners out.

interracial competition continue to characterise many aspects of everyday life. White South Africans fear the growing power of the Black African majority and Black Africans resent the continuing economic advantages enjoyed by the white minority. The central thesis of this paper is that this fear and resentment are correlated with attitudes towards international migrants in the country.

The article will attempt, using quantitative research methods, to show that the problem of interracial cohesion has an influence on xenophobia in South Africa. In order to investigate the relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and attitudes towards multiracialism, this study will use public data from the South African Social Attitudes Survey. The association between negative attitudes towards immigrants and indicators of racial alienation will be examined, controlling for a range of factors including intergroup contact and the perceived quality of interracial contact. Multivariate regression analysis will allow multiple factors to be tested and the relative strength of each to be discerned. Micro-level explorations of this type are important, as they allow us to explore how public discourses of belonging are impacted by economic characteristics and cultural values.

7.2   The Hypothesis: Multiracialism and Xenophobia

In this section, I will sketch a brief general overview of the continued importance of racial identity in South Africa. Then I will make an argument for the salience of interracial sentiment in predicting anti-immigrant attitudes by drawing on the literature on immigration policy debates in South Africa. Finally, I will review the existing quantitative public opinion research on immigration in South Africa and outline the paper's hypothesis.

7.2.1   Racial Identity in South Africa

During the colonial era, an economic and social hierarchy was imposed on the black majority that favoured the white settler minority. Racial segregation in the country intensified under new legislation that was instituted in the 1940s –evolving by the 1950s into the notorious apartheid system. For most of the 20th century, South Africa was an intensely segregated society where interracial contact was restricted and tightly controlled, often confined to unequal workplace relationships (Horowitz, 1991). State social engineering caused social divides to overlap and converge so that factors such as race and class become intertwined (also see Chipkin, 2007). Classifying racial groups were essential to this process. The Population Registration Act of 1950 decreed that all South Africans were to be categorised into four population groups (i.e. Black Africans, Coloureds, Indians/Asians and Whites). Although the struggle against apartheid gave rise to alternative meanings for these labels, the Registration Act categories have become embedded. Currently, the four population group labels are used in official statistics published by the modern South African state and in most of the current academic literature on the country.

The end of the apartheid political system and majoritarian elections brought the African National Congress (ANC) to power in 1994. The new government immediately embarked on a nation-building initiative designed to promote liberal values and overcome apartheid-era divisions. Majoritarian democracy created major changes in the political dispensation, and therefore, in the construction of national identity. The South African democratic nation-building programme has sought (at least officially) to encourage a new non-racial nationalism characterised by an attachment to multiculturalism (Chipkin, 2007). This programme invokes images of a shared history and a narrative around the 'transformation' and 'healing' of society (also see Neocosmos, 2010; Klotz, 2013). The legacy of apartheid was to be corrected

and equality between the race groups achieved. Progress on reducing interracial economic disparities has, however, been slow and economic differences between race groups remain stark[56].

In assessing the future of South Africa in 1990, Horowitz (1991) warned that an awareness of racial difference would not necessarily evaporate after the end of legal racial segregation or white minority rule. Increased interracial contact and interaction may, he argued, confirm social borders and sustain feelings of racial alienation and a greater need to identify between racial groups. Recent quantitative public opinion research in the post-apartheid period has found that South Africans still strongly identify with their 'racial identity' and maintain evaluative comparisons with other race groups (see, for example, Bornman, 2010; Gibson and Claassen, 2010; Bornman, 2011; Durrheim and Tredoux, 2011). Moreover, interracial contact continues to occur within a context of unequal power relations (also see Vincent, 2008). Even outside of interracial contact, individuals of all races in South Africa have to negotiate different unequal constructs of race in many aspects of their everyday lives. This can heighten a sense of competition between race groups and alienation from racial 'others'.

7.2.2   Debating International Migration in the South Africa

In post-apartheid debates over immigration policy, fears that an influx of foreign immigrants could disrupt the nation-building process (i.e. the transformation and healing of society) were prevalent. Discourses developed that depicted foreigners as contaminates, damaging the 'healthy body' of the nation. Current restrictions on the entry of foreign immigrants into the country are justified by the threat officials imagined and ascribed to immigrants and migrants. Such debates are significant for what they reveal about South African society's contested interpretative frameworks. This subsection will review the literature on immigration policy debates in South Africa to highlight the salience of race in these debates.

In the 1990s, South African politicians often described international migrants and immigrants as parasitic, criminal and carriers of disease in their public speeches and during policy discussions (for a review of post-apartheid immigration policies and their discourse, see Peberdy, 2009; Klotz, 2013). Mangosuthu Buthelezi, who was Minister for Home Affairs from 1994 until 2004, was infamous for speeches that stoked public fears about immigrants. In an informative intellectual exercise, Comaroff and Comaroff (2001) draw equants between the panic surrounding the 'invasion' of alien plant species in the vicinities of Cape Town and the public's fear of international migrants. For the Comaroffs, fear of the socio-political "aliens" is indicative of the effective naturalising capacity of autochthony discourse in South Africa. The salient concern is that the conditions for social reproduction are under acute threat and that the existing ecosystem that sustains communities was being disrupted by a 'foreign' element.

The casting of immigration (and immigrants) as agents of national contamination by South African politicians has occurred before in the country's history. Peberdy (2009) examines past discourses around immigration, as well as immigration policies and practices of the South African state during the non-democratic period. An examination of the discourses on immigration during the colonial and apartheid periods reveals the centrality of racial identity constructions, particularly of white identity (also see Klotz, 2013). Often these debates

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[56] The reality of the interracial economic disparity is evident in a 2012 report by Statistics South Africa which breaks down racial inequality in terms of household income and expenditure.

referred to the health of the body public and 'immigrants' as inputs that could either fortify or contaminate the metaphysical body of the nation. At the beginning of the 20th century, for example, anxieties over the 'contamination' that Asian immigration might bring dominated debate on immigration policy among White South Africans.

During the pre-democratic period, immigration policy in South Africa (and immigrant selection criteria in particular) showcased the (often brutal) construction of national identity and autochthony in the colonial and apartheid state. Immigration procedures were designed (and constantly redesigned) to filter out "undesirable" immigrants (Peberdy, 2009; Klotz, 2013). Racial identity and perceived threats (from groups as diverse as Eastern European Jews and Southern European Catholics) to autochthonic 'white' South African-ness were important determinants of these discourses. Modern immigration policy debates are not fixated on 'whiteness' but seem absorbed with the danger posed by allegedly 'backward' African international migrants. Often, in these debates, the alleged regressive nature of immigrants is contrasted with the progressive nation-building project of modern South Africa (Neocosmos, 2010). These immigration discourses are embedded in notions of 'South African exceptionalism' (the belief that the country is not analogous to economically and socially regressive African countries, see Lazarus, 2004). The racial reasoning to these debates has been highlighted by Matsinhe (2011) who compares them to their colonial and apartheid equivalents.

7.2.3   Past Quantitative Research on Attitudes towards Immigrants

A significant public opinion scholarship based in Europe and North America has developed on attitudes towards international migration. Research in the Northern Hemisphere has followed two broad traditions in explaining immigration attitudes: (i) individuals' self-interest; and (ii) group-related attitudes and symbols. Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) provide a comprehensive overview of the voluminous international literature on public attitudes towards immigration. This body of work has also highlighted contact as a determinant of attitudes noting how individuals' interpersonal networks shape opinions (also see Berg, 2009; Ha, 2010). The usefulness of this literature for the South African case can be questioned. It could be argued that the country is exceptional due to its history of racial segregation. In this respect, assumptions of South African exceptionalism suggest that the country cannot be compared to others in terms of attitudinal variables such as xenophobia.

There is a small (but significant) tradition of quantitative scholarship on attitudes towards international migrants in South Africa. The Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) has actively funded research of this type, conducting public opinion surveys on immigration and immigrants. South African quantitative public opinion scholarship on immigration has been concerned with whether anti-immigrant sentiments are more likely to form amongst the socio-economically underprivileged (see, for example, Crush *et al.,* 2013; Facchini *et al.,* 2013). The results of existing quantitative public opinion scholarship in South Africa, however, suggest that attitudes towards immigrants are not driven by micro-level variations (such as labour market status) in socio-economic status. Past studies have found that negative attitudes towards immigration do not vary considerably by labour market status or population group in the country.

In an early 1999 SAMP analysis of Black Africans' attitudes to African international migrants, negative views of other race groups (i.e. Indian/Asians, Whites and Coloureds) correlated positively with an aversion to African foreigners. The results seemed a little counter-initiative to the report writers who stated:

> "One might think that the more that African South Africans reject white, Asian and Coloured South Africans, the more they would embrace fellow Africans from outside the country due to some kind of pan-Africanist, pro-black sentiment" (Mattes *et al.,* 1999: 24–25).

The research concluded briefly that dislike of African foreigners may be linked to broader racialism in the country. But, then we could ask, what about the country's racial minorities? Does aversion to other race groups result in anti-immigrant sentiment among White, Indian or Coloured South Africans? I hypothesise that the more an individual perceives her/his race group as threatened, the more likely it will be that the individual will perceive immigrants as threats. I will, therefore, test the relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and a sense that other race groups are threatening amongst all four major race groups in the country.

7.3   Data and Measurement

This study uses attitudinal data from the 2013 round of the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS). A repeated cross-sectional survey series, SASAS has been conducted on an annual basis by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) since 2003. The survey series has been designed to yield a nationally representative sample of individuals aged 16 and older who live in private residences. Households were sampled from all of the country's nine provinces. The sample consisted of 2,882 respondents and the questionnaire was translated into South Africa's major languages to improve respondent understanding of the questionnaire.

The SASAS 2013 round included a module on attitudes towards foreign 'immigrants'. One of the key limitations of any quantitative study of anti-immigrant attitudes in South Africa will be the definition of who is South African and who is foreign. For many respondents, this definition is complicated by the linguistic, historical and ethnic dynamics of the country. A Xhosa speaking black South African, for instance, in the Western Cape could conceivably consider a Zulu-speaking black South African 'foreign'. In order to contend with this problem, in this section of the survey respondents were told by fieldworkers that they would be asked "questions about people from *other countries* coming to live in South Africa".

One of the first questions in this module was: "Which, if any, group would you least want to come and live in South Africa?"' The question was open-ended and respondents were not prompted with predetermined options. A diverse range of responses was given, but respondents' answers did not include a group from inside the country. Respondents listed groups (such as Somalis) that were from *other countries*. Nigerians and Zimbabweans emerged as the most cited groups. However, there was a minor exception: a small segment (4%) of the adult public selected 'returning South Africans' (i.e. those who had emigrated but were now immigrating back). Responses to this question were comparable with previous survey research in South Africa (see, for example, Crush *et al*., 2013). Most international migrants in South Africa are from Sub-Sahara Africa[57] and this fact may, or may not, have influenced respondents' answers.

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[57] The South African 2011 Census estimates that most of the 2.2 million international migrants in the country are from Sub-Saharan Africa, but this figure should be treated with caution. Due to poor data gathering by the state, obtaining accurate data on the size and composition of the international migrant population is problematic.

The three primary indexes used to test this study's hypothesis are: (i) the Perceived Foreign Threat Index; (ii) the Perceived Foreign Benefit Index; and (iii) the Multiracial Threat Index. The construction of these indexes will be discussed in the following three subsections.

7.3.1   Measuring Attitudes towards Migrants in Post-Apartheid South Africa

Using 1997 SAMP public opinion data, Mattes *et al.* (1999) found that a majority of South Africans saw immigrants as a threat. Immigrants were seen as spreading disease, causing crime and triggering unemployment. This finding was later substantiated using more recent (2006 and 2010) SAMP survey data (see Crush *et al.,* 2013). In the SASAS 2013 module on immigration, a similar set of questions on the negative consequences of immigration was included after the survey item on 'unwanted' foreign groups[58]. The responses (not shown) to these questions were similar to what was observed in the SAMP surveys. Responses were then combined and averaged to produce a single 1-5 Perceived Foreign Threat Index with 5 indicating the highest level of perceived threat. A set of reliability tests were conducted and their results confirmed the validity of the measure. The distribution on the Perceived Threat Index amongst the SASAS sample is skewed towards the right suggesting that on aggregate, the adult population tended to view immigrants in negative terms.

Indexes similar to the Perceived Foreign Threat Index have been used to measure anti-immigrant sentiment in European and North American public opinion studies (e.g. Berg, 2009; Pehrson *et al.,* 2009). Perceived threat (whether tangible or not) from an outgroup has been considered a crucial catalyst for the formation of prejudice since the 1950s (Allport, 1954). The identification of a threat rationalises the exclusion of outgroups from a range of political rights and societal entitlements (Messick and Mackie, 1989). Perceived threat can also be used to justify legitimate punitive action against the 'threatening group'(also see Tajfel, 1981). No doubt there will be a strong association between the Perceived Foreign Threat Index and positive views about the benefits of immigration. Using 2013 SASAS data, it is possible to observe how widespread public beliefs are about the positive developmental role that foreign immigration can play. In the survey, respondents were asked three questions on whether immigrants were beneficial to the national economy and society[59].

Responses were then combined and averaged to produce a single 1-5 Perceived Foreign Benefit Index[60]. The distribution on this index tends to be skewed towards the left, indicating that the adult population tended not to view immigrants as agents of development. This finding is unsurprising given what was found by Mattes *et al.* (1999) using similar measures on the perceived benefits that international immigrants could bring (also see Crush *et al.,* 2013 who provides an outline of SAMP trend data). When examining the determinants of the Perceived Foreign Threat Index, this study will control for perceptions that immigrants have

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[58] Respondents were asked if they agreed (1 = disagree strongly, 5 = agree strongly) with the following statements: immigrants: (i) increase crime rates; (ii) take jobs away from people who were born in the country; (iii) bring disease to South Africa; and (iv) use up our country's resources.

[59] Respondents were asked if they agreed (1 = disagree strongly, 5 = agree strongly) with the following statements: immigrants: (i) are generally good for South Africa's economy; (ii) make South Africa more open to new ideas and cultures; and (iii) bring skills that are needed in South Africa.

[60] A test of reliability produced a Cronbach alpha (0.74) that suggests that this is a reliable index. Further testing, using principal component analysis factor analysis, confirmed that this was a valid index.

developmental value for the nation. It is important to recognise the limitations of these two indexes which are based on questions which did not attempt to differentiate international migrants by country of origin. It is, therefore, impossible to unpack the public's attitudes towards different types of international migrants.

7.3.2 Measuring Multiracial Sentiment in Post-Apartheid South Africa

In divided societies (like South Africa), individuals typically develop strong social identities and tend to psychologically divide the world into 'insiders' and 'outsiders'. According to social identity theory, attitudes and values associated with claiming strong ingroup identities are correlated with hostility towards outgroups (Tajfel, 1981). Hostility emerges because identification with one's group is maintained through evaluative comparisons between the ingroup and relevant outgroups (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996). What is crucial is the process by which the individual arrives at an assessment of her/his group's position and the value and status they acquire through their group membership (also see Bornman, 2010). Social identifications in South Africa emerged from within an essentially colonial environment, and were (and continue to be) deeply influenced by that period's legacy (particularly the period's racist and ethnic undertones, see Chipkin, 2007). It is necessary to construct a measure that assesses individual fears about other racial groups and feelings of alienation from these groups.

The HSRC has long been interested in race relations and there is a module in SASAS 2013 on racial identity and interracial evaluations. In late 2013, respondents were asked four questions[61] on whether they thought that other race groups were threats to their economic, political and cultural position. The mean results on responses to these items are comparable with other public opinion data published on race relations that show that many South Africans still hold negative opinions of the racial 'other' (e.g. Gibson and Claassen, 2010; Bornman, 2011; Durrheim and Tredoux, 2011). Responses were then combined to produce a single 1-5 Multiracial Threat Index. Validity testing, via factor analysis, confirmed the legitimacy of the measure.

The degree of racial alienation observed should correspond to a race group's historical position in a country's social structure. Group position is part of how current and historical dimensions of group experience are comprehended and recognised at the micro-level (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996). If mean responses on the Multiracial Threat Index are considered by race group, it is important to note that relatively low variations were noted between groups. Coloured South Africans (M =3.51 SE =0.36) were found to feel moderately more threatened than members of the Black African (M =3.47 SE =0.19), Indian/Asian (M =3.45 SE =0.47) and White (M =3.33 SE =0.42) population groups. These results suggest that no one race group in South Africa feels secure in their relative power and status advantages in the country's social structure. This study will test the relationship between the Multiracial Threat Index and the Perceived Foreign Threat Index. In order to adequately conduct this test, a

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[61] Respondents were asked whether respondents agreed or disagreed (1 = disagree strongly, 5 = agree strongly) that: (i) other race groups in South Africa are trying to get ahead economically at the expense of my group; (ii) other race groups in South Africa tend to exclude members of my group from positions of power and responsibility; (iii) the traditions and values that are important to people of my race are under threat because of the influence of other races in this country; and (iv) other race groups in South Africa will never understand what members of my group are like.

multivariate analysis will control for interracial contact and the perceived quality of interracial contact.

7.4   Bivariate and Multivariate Analysis

The relationship between interracial animosity and attitudes towards immigrants will be explored using bivariate and multivariate quantitative methods. This section will discuss how the models were constructed and then present the results.

7.4.1   Building the Models

The dependent variable used in the bivariate and multivariate analysis is the Perceived Foreign Threat Index which has already been described and discussed. A series of independent variables are included in the analysis, some of which have already been outlined (such as the Multiracial Threat Index). Others have yet to be described and the remainder of this subsection will outline how these variables were created.

Two variables were created to account for contact in the analysis: (i) contact with international migrants; and (ii) contact with other race groups. Contact with international migrants is using responses to the question: "Of the people you know who have *come to live in South Africa from another country*, how many would you consider to be friends?" Responses on this indicator ranged from 1(none) to 5 (very many). In Chapter 6 this form of contact (i.e. friendship or intimate) was found to be more closely linked with reducing xenophobia in South Africa than mere acquaintance (non-intimate) contact. Interracial contact was based on four questions on whether respondents had friends from the four major race groups. Responses to these questions were captured on a five-point scale (1, none to 5, very many) and then combined to create a single five-point index of interracial contact that measures the size of individuals' interracial friendship networks.

An index on the perceived quality of interracial contact was created to account for how individuals feel about the way other race groups treated them. Respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed (1 agree strongly, 5 disagree strongly) that when they come into contact with other race groups, contact was (i) equal; and (ii) friendly. These two questions were reversed and combined to create a five-point Quality Interracial Contact Index. Two variables were created to measure the strength of group identity: (i) racial and (ii) national identity. The former was measured using responses from a question on whether the respondent agreed or disagreed (1 disagree strongly, 5 agree strongly) that "being a member of my race group is an important part of who I am as a person". Nationalism was controlled for by combining two items on national pride into an index[62].

The variables described above were used in the bivariate analysis. A number of socio-economic and demographic variables were created for inclusion in the multivariate analysis. Binary dummy variables were used to capture: urbanisation (urban, rural), gender (male, female) and marital status (married, not married). Political affiliation was drawn from responses to a question on which political party respondents would vote for if there were an election tomorrow. Responses were reduced to three dummy variables (ruling party,

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[62] Respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed (1 = disagree strongly, 5 = agree strongly) that: (i) "I would rather be a citizen of South Africa than of any other country in the world"; and (ii) "Generally speaking, South Africa is a better country than most other countries".

opposition party and undeclared). Race was measured using a self-reported item where respondents categorised themselves into either Black African, Coloured, Indian/Asia, White or Other. Those who selected 'Other' (N=2) were coded as missing.

To control for socio-economic status, three objective measures were used: (i) labour market status; (ii) educational attainment; and (iii) an asset index. Educational attainment was measured in completed years of schooling (0-16) and derived from a question on the highest level of education a respondent had completed. Labour market status was extrapolated from a question on current employment status and reduced to three categories (employed, unemployed, and labour inactive). The asset index employed was based on the Living Standards Measurement (LSM) designed by the South African Advertising Research Foundation to measure economic position[63]. The LSM is divided into the 10 groups (1 = lowest to 10 = highest asset level).

7.4.2 Bivariate Results

Standard pairwise correlation testing was used to understand the relationship between the key independent variables constructed for this study and the dependent (Table 7.1). As this study is only interested in the opinion of citizens, the sample in Table 7.1 was restricted to this group alone. Four separate pairwise correlations are conducted, one for each of the country's four race groups. A positive coefficient indicates negative attitudes towards immigrants. It is important to note that previous public opinion scholarship in South Africa found that there is relatively little variation between race groups in terms of anti-immigrant sentiment. This observation is confirmed using the 2013 SASAS data. Although interracial differences may be low, Mattes *et al.* (1999) suggest that the factors that predict attitudes towards immigrants will differ by race group.

Table 7.1: Pairwise Correlation Matrix for the Perceived Foreign Threat Index

	Black African		Coloured		Indian/Asia		White	
	Co. Eff.	Sig.	Co. Eff.	Sig.	Co. Eff.	Sig.	Co. Eff.	Sig.
Nationalism	0.060	†	0.012		0.087		-0.055	
Years of Education	0.006		-0.072		-0.203	*	-0.215	‡
Living Standard Measure	-0.100	*	0.002		-0.298	‡	-0.100	
Multiracial Threat Index	0.222	‡	0.302	‡	0.352	‡	0.377	‡
Multiracial Friendship	-0.120	‡	-0.093		-0.259	‡	-0.104	
Quality Interracial Contact	-0.162	‡	-0.096		-0.238	†	-0.028	
Racial Identity	0.017		0.022		0.128		0.142	
Perceived Foreign Benefit	-0.340	‡	-0.357	‡	-0.480	‡	-0.388	‡
Foreign Friendship	-0.264	‡	-0.205	‡	-0.257	‡	-0.200	‡

‡p<0.001, †<0.01,* p<0.05
Notes: The Bonferroni adjustment was used to calculate significance levels to counteract the problem of multiple comparisons and control for the familywise error rate.

A key tenet of intergroup relations research is that frequent social interaction can reduce hostilities between groups. Contact Theory, first formulated by Allport (1954), has been

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[63] A respondent access to services and ownership of assets was established using thirty questions. Because responses from these questions are used to discern economic status in a South African context, the questions were designed specifically for the South African reality.

substantiated by a number of quantitative studies on immigration attitudes (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010). The bivariate analysis shows a relatively good correlation between the foreign contact variable and the dependents in Table 7.1. Recent quantitative work on immigration attitudes has highlighted the role played by the core networks (as well as the broader social environment) in the formation of prejudice (see, for example, Berg, 2009; Ha, 2010). In these studies, the compositions of social networks condition the effects of group threat and intergroup contact. Multiracial core networks could, therefore, have an influence on attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa. In Table 7.1 multiracial friendship networks were found to be associated with reduced prejudice amongst the Black African and Indian/Asia population groups.

In the quantitative public opinion literature on immigration, educational attainment is often correlated with tolerance and acceptance of migrants and immigration[64]. However public opinion research in South Africa has struggled to establish a similar connection (see, for example, Crush *et al.,* 2013). In Table 7.1, the education system seems to be playing the expected role as a mediator of the multicultural values and, in this manner, dampening anti-immigrant attitudes for Indian/Asian and White South Africans. The results seem to indicate that educational attainment did not play a significant role in reducing negative attitudes among the Coloured and Black African population groups. The results may reflect the unique experience of Coloured and Black African learners in the education system[65] and suggest the need for greater scrutiny of how the current educational system fosters multicultural values.

Strong ingroup identities can play an important role in predicting prejudice (Tajfel, 1981; Messick and Mackie, 1989) although the results of this are less conclusive in South Africa (Bornman, 2010; 2011). The racial identification variable did not have a statistically significant association in any of the pairwise correlations in Table 7.1. Positive perceptions of immigration had a negative impact on prejudice in all four correlations. This result highlights the importance of information environments on the formation of anti-immigrant opinions. More importantly for this paper, feelings of interracial threat and alienation (measured using the Multiracial Threat Index) had a comparatively good correlation with the Perceived Foreign Threat Index for all four groups. In other words, the findings from the pairwise correlations seem to suggest that xenophobia in the country cannot be disassociated from attitudes towards multiracialism and the racial 'other'.

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[64] There has been a degree of debate over why there is a link between educational attainment and immigration attitudes. Some have argued that educational attainment affects labour-market competition. But, using European data, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) argue that the connection between the education of individuals and attitudes towards immigration and migrants has very little to do with fears about labour-market competition. These researchers see education as conferring cultural values and beliefs that promote tolerance (also see Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014).

[65] Apartheid and colonialism left the South African education system with institutions whose residual character is 'colonial' in subtle but embedded ways. In one example, Vincent (2008), in an examination of different stories of young South Africans, noted how dislocating and angering Black African students found entering historically white universities. Such experiences seem to strengthen feelings of racial alienation and racialised patterns of reasoning.

7.4.3 Multivariate Results

I now turn to multivariate modelling. Given the nature of the dependent variable (i.e. Perceived Foreign Threat Index), an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression analysis was conducted. Four regressions were completed one for each race group, and the sample was restricted to the citizenship group. In each regression, multicollinearity among the independent variables was tested through variance inflation factor post-estimations. No variance inflation value surpassed 10. The results are displayed in Table 7.2 and a positive coefficient indicates a hostile opinion of foreign immigrants. The findings confirm the bivariate results, showing that the Multiracial Threat Index had a robust relationship with the Perceived Foreign Threat Index. Even controlling for the strength of racial identification, the level of multiracial contact and the quality of interracial contact, this finding held true. The size of the beta coefficient on the Multiracial Threat Index was larger for the White (*beta= 0.27*) population group compared to the Indian/Asian (*beta= 0.23*) and Black African groups (*beta= 0.21*) as well as the Coloured (*beta= 0.20)* group. The Perceived Foreign Benefit Index also had a strong relationship with the dependent in Table 7.2. The beta coefficient on this index was larger for the Indian/Asian (*beta = -0.45*) and Coloured (*beta = -0.38)* groups than the Black African (*beta =-0.34)* and White (*beta =-0.31)* group.

In Table 7.2 multiracial friendship networks were found to be associated *(beta =-0.06)* with anti-immigrant sentiments for the Black African majority, but not for racial minorities. There was a negative (*beta = -0.13*) correlation between the Quality Interracial Contact Index and the dependent for Coloured South Africans. For the three other groups, contact with other races had no impact on their attitudes towards international migrants. Intimate contact with foreigners reduced prejudice amongst the Black African (*beta =-0.20*), Coloured (*beta = -0.17*) and Indian/Asian (*beta = -0.12*) groups. No statistically significant relationship was observed for White South Africans. In contrast to what was observed in Table 7.1, the racial identity variable had a significant and positive association with the dependent for the White (*beta = 0.15*) group, but not for the other groups. Nationalism was positively associated with negative perceptions of foreign immigrants for the Black African (*beta = 0.09*) group. For racial minorities, there was no statistically significant association between nationalism and the dependent.

There was a negative and significant association between the LSM asset index and the dependent for Indian/Asian South Africans. For the three other race groups, economic position (measured in terms of asset accumulation) was not correlated with the Perceived Foreign Threat Index. This is not unanticipated, given the findings presented in Table 7.1 and the work of other scholars looking at the role of economic status in determining anti-immigrant attitudes in South Africa (e.g. Facchini *et al.,* 2013). In Table 7.2 educational attainment has the predicted significant association (*beta = -0.17*) with negative perceptions of foreigners among the Indian/Asian group. No significant relationship, in contrast, was noted for the three other race groups. It is difficult to explain this intriguing finding and more South African research on the relationship between educational attainment and anti-immigrant sentiment is required.

7.5 Discussion and Recommendations

The results of this study support the hypothesis outlined in the introduction. Both the bivariate and multivariate analysis showed that feelings of racial alienation were associated with greater anti-immigrant sentiment for each of the major race groups in South Africa. The.

Table 7.2: Multivariate Analysis of the Perceived Foreign Threat Index

	Black Africans			Coloured			Indian/Asian			White		
	CoEff.	Std. Err.	Beta	CoEff.	Std. Err.	Beta	CoEff.	Std. Err.	Beta	CoEff.	Std. Err.	Beta
Female (ref. male)	-0.04	0.04	-0.02	-0.31	0.07	-0.18‡	-0.11	0.08	-0.07	-0.29	0.08	-0.18‡
Age	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00	-0.10	0.00	0.00	0.04
Married (ref. not married)	0.16	0.05	0.07†	0.00	0.08	0.00	0.13	0.08	0.08	-0.08	0.08	-0.05
Rural (ref. urban)	-0.01	0.06	-0.01	-0.13	0.15	-0.04		omitted		-0.06	0.40	-0.01
Political Affiliation (ref. ruling party)												
Opposition	0.16	0.07	0.06*	-0.03	0.11	-0.02	0.06	0.15	0.04	-0.06	0.63	-0.04
Undeclared/Unaffiliated	-0.01	0.05	-0.01	-0.05	0.12	0.03	0.03	0.15	0.02	-0.09	0.63	-0.05
Labour Market Status (ref. unemployed)												
Employed	0.20	0.05	0.09‡	-0.09	0.09	-0.05	-0.27	0.14	-0.17	-0.22	0.14	-0.14
Labour Market Inactive	0.14	0.05	0.06†	-0.08	0.09	-0.04	-0.20	0.14	-0.13	-0.11	0.13	-0.07
Years of Education	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.02	-0.10	-0.04	0.02	-0.17*	-0.04	0.02	-0.11
Living Standard Measure	-0.01	0.02	-0.02	-0.05	0.03	0.08	-0.09	0.04	-0.18*	0.04	0.04	0.06
Foreign Friendship	-0.16	0.03	-0.20‡	-0.18	0.06	-0.17†	-0.12	0.06	-0.12*	-0.03	0.04	-0.04
Nationalism	0.09	0.03	0.07†	-0.02	0.06	-0.01	0.04	0.05	0.04	-0.08	0.05	-0.09
Racial Identity	0.04	0.03	0.03	-0.03	0.04	-0.03	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.11	0.04	0.15†
Multiracial Threat Index	0.26	0.03	0.21‡	0.22	0.05	0.20‡	0.20	0.05	0.23‡	0.25	0.05	0.27‡
Multiracial Friendship	-0.07	0.03	-0.06*	0.06	0.05	0.08	-0.07	0.05	-0.08	-0.01	0.05	0.02
Quality Interracial Contact	-0.01	0.02	-0.01	-0.13	0.04	-0.13†	-0.05	0.06	0.05	0.01	0.05	0.01
Perceived Foreign Benefit	-0.35	0.03	-0.34‡	-0.37	0.04	-0.38‡	-0.42	0.05	-0.45‡	-0.28	0.05	-0.31‡
N	1406			435			253			302		
Adj R-squared	0.31			0.33			0.46			0.34		
Root MSE	0.78			0.71			0.55			0.64		

‡p<0.001, †<0.01,* p<0.05;

Notes: 1. The regressions also control for the province of residence, 2. The data is weighted, 3. Positive coefficients indicate negative sentiments towards immigrants while negative coefficients indicate positive sentiments, and 4. All individuals who reported they were not citizens of South Africa were excluded.

correlation was significant, even controlling for a range of objective (gender, age, labour market status etc.) and attitudinal factors indicating the robustness of this finding. This article will conclude by considering the academic implications of the analysis, outlining future areas of research, and then make some concluding recommendations

7.5.1 Discussion

The results of this study have shown that a belief that immigrants were beneficial to the development of the state (i.e. favourable to the current nation-building project) is strongly (and negatively) correlated with anti-immigrant sentiment. Information about the developmental benefits of immigration can be distributed through a variety of channels including education, elite rhetoric and, interestingly, the media. Quantitative studies in North America have shown how depictions of immigrants in the media —and which immigrants the media depict —influences opinion and attitudes (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Scholars have been critical of the South African media's depiction of international migrants. Nyamnjoh (2006) has argued that credulous and sensationalist reporting has driven mass-mediated myths about foreigners (also see Comaroff and Comaroff, 2001; Neocosmos, 2010). The monitoring of the media discourse on immigrants in the country is, therefore, important as is how immigration is discussed by influential national leaders.

The predictive power of the Multiracial Threat Index was almost as powerful as the Perceived Foreign Benefit Index. The main finding, consequently, to emerge from subsection 7.4.3 suggests that feelings of accumulated experiences of racial differentiation, inequality and discrimination (whether personal, familial, community or collective) have contributed towards anti-immigrant opinion formation in South Africa. This finding sheds further light on earlier work by Mattes *et al.* (1999), as well as others, and has allowed the relationship between interracial sentiments and attitudes towards international migrants to be more comprehensively examined. Racial alienation has a collective dimension, emerging from a historical experience and current socio-economic conditions, and can become culturally shared (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996). The legacy of apartheid, in other words, has a significant impact on how attitudes towards international migrants are formed.

A sense of threat to the race group could provoke a desire to guard the boundaries of authentic racial identity. In South Africa, mass-mediated myths about how international migrants are allegedly different from the *autochthonoi* tend to focus on the configuration of the physical body. In the collective imagination on 'foreignness' in the country, the 'foreigner' bears physical features that are distinctively "strange" or "alien". Methods to identify international migrants are often grounded in objective physical characteristics (particularly skin colour[66]). This suggests the level of value, in a political and social sense, that many individuals in the country attach to racial identity markers. Reviewing the physical markers used to differentiate *autochthonoi* from "foreigner", Matsinhe (2011) argues that the strength and development of South African racial group identities appear critical to the formation of xenophobia (also see Nyamnjoh, 2006; Neocosmos, 2010). The findings of this study seem to suggest a level of support for this assertion.

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[66] An interesting part of the collective South African imagination is the notion that foreigners' skin is darker in complexion than authentic black South Africans. The physical self-presentations of foreigners as 'dark skinned' have been noted in a number of qualitative studies (see Nyamnjoh, 2006; Neocosmos, 2010; Matsinhe, 2011).

The way that individuals understand their racial identity is crucial to how prejudice against international immigrants forms. But there is no simple relationship between the strength of a social identity (e.g. racial identification) and outgroup animosity in South Africa (Bornman, 2010; 2011). Unfortunately, this study has been unable (due to data limitations) to discern if the collateral attitudes that arise from racial identity formation (e.g. perceived physic benefits of group membership or level of group solidarity) are consequential for the formation of xenophobia. In addition, the relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and interracial threat and alienation may be mediated by national identifications. The impact of dimensions of national identifications and xenophobia depended on how national groups are defined by their members (as research by Pehrson *et al.,* 2009 suggests). Due to data limitations, this paper also did not distinguish between different dimensions of national belonging. The association between xenophobia and multidimensional forms of belonging (in terms of racial and national identity) is worthy of additional research using qualitative and quantitative methods. Despite these limitations, it is clear that this study has contributed to our understanding of the determinants of anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa.

7.5.2 Recommendations

Most North American and European studies have tended to focus on the relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and economic conditions or nationalism (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). In this study, interracial relations had a *stronger* impact on public attitudes towards international migrants than economic circumstances, national pride or even contact. The results of this study should not be categorised as the product of an alleged 'South African exceptionalism'. In other transitional countries emerging from conflict, interethnic or interracial tensions may play a large role in shaping anti-immigrant sentiments. I would argue that understanding a transitional country's history of ethnic differentiation and discrimination is central to understanding xenophobia in that nation. From a research perspective, therefore, I would recommend that public opinion researchers investigating xenophobic attitudes in transitional societies explore the explanatory power of interethnic or interracial attitudes.

From a policy and activist perspective, levels of anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa should be reduced. The relationship between attitudes and behaviour is not always linear and is influenced by environmental conditions. Individuals may hold xenophobic attitudes, for instance, but not engage in violence against international migrants. Indeed, violence against a group is likely to develop only under very specific circumstances. An extensive study of collective interethnic violence by Horowitz (2001) has made clear that there are certain structural conditions required for prejudice to transform into violence. A notable study conducted by Fauvelle-Aymar and Segatti (2012) on the 2008 anti-immigrant riots using ward-level data provides important insights into the structural conditions that characterise xenophobic violence in South Africa. Interestingly, the authors did not find an association between outbreaks of violence and unemployment and poverty levels. This study focused on anti-immigrant attitudes and did not attempt to show a relationship between such attitudes and behaviour (such as violence). Although the attitude-behaviour relationship is often not linear, reducing anti-immigrant attitudes in South Africa should be a priority because of the well-known association between prejudice and discrimination.

The advent of the democratic transition in South Africa has not seen an awareness of racial difference, and a sense of interracial threat, vanish (as the attitudinal literature attests, see Bornman, 2011; Gibson and Claassen, 2010; Durrheim and Tredoux, 2011). The empirical results of this paper suggest that for anti-immigrant sentiments in the country to be addressed, race relations need to improve and social cohesion between race groups strengthened. There

must be greater recognition of the inadequacy of programmes designed by the state to redress racial inequality and continued levels of (subtle and overt) racial discrimination that still exists in the country. Reducing levels of social and economic racial inequality, and new thinking on how power and privilege operate in the country is required. In closing, it should be remembered that this recommendation cannot serve as a panacea for xenophobia in South Africa since this study has not traced all the possible determinants that could be associated with anti-immigrant attitudes.

8 Immigration Policies that Include or Exclude: A South African Public Opinion Study of Immigration Policy Preferences

ABSTRACT

South Africa is a regional hub for migration on the African continent and is home to a growing documented international migrant community. Foreigners in the country, however, often face violations of their established rights and are the victims of abuse. This paper examines public support for policies that would exclude international migrants from the country. Data from the 2013 South African Social Attitudes Survey, a nationally representative opinion poll (N=2,739) of all adults in the country, is used. This paper found that many South Africans favoured restrictive immigration policies and opposed granting foreigners the same rights as citizens. Multivariate analysis is employed to discern determinants of this opposition.

Respondents' perceptions of the numbers of foreigners in their communities did not affect support for inclusion. It can be inferred, therefore, that the growth of the immigrant population has not provoked exclusionary attitudes in the country. Rather, results revealed that it is national pride (cultural versus political) and fears about the consequences of immigration that drive such attitudes. Programmes and policies designed to improve public perceptions of how foreigners' impact society and the promotion of a nationalism characterised by inclusive multicultural civic patriotism will improve public support for the inclusion of international immigrants.

8.1 Introduction

In Southern Africa, debates over the extension of political and social rights to immigrants have a long history of contention and strife. Despite two decades of restrictive immigration policies, migrant populations in South Africa have grown larger and more diversified, altering the country's already diverse ethnic fabric. The presence of growing migrant populations confronts the South African public with a central question: what sort of immigration policy should the country have? And, equally important, what sort of membership status should immigrants enjoy in the country? Answering these questions means adequately engaging with a public that often displays animosity towards international migration. Public hostility to immigrant integration in the country can sometimes turn violent, highlighting the academic relevance of studying public opinion towards immigrant inclusion in Southern African societies.

The importance of understanding what drives public attitudes towards granting documented foreigners rights has been recognised by a number of scholars working in Southern Africa in recent decades. This study hopes to contribute towards this emerging body of literature on immigration and integration. In this paper, public support for restrictive exclusionary immigration policies will be explored, using public opinion research techniques. Determinants of such support will be tested using multivariate regression. An investigation of this type will shed light on an important layer of the social climate that surrounds migrant groups in modern Southern Africa. Specifically, this paper will test the applicability of Group

Threat Theory and its validity in understanding public attitudes towards immigration in South Africa.

Group threat theory is an important area of the public opinion scholarship on immigration (see Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010 for a review). This theory suggests that the size of immigrant communities in an area will have an influence on how people in that area think about foreigners and their social inclusion. There is currently no widespread consensus on how immigrant size impacts public opinion on immigration and immigrants. The relationship between the number of immigrants in an area and exclusionary attitudes has not been adequately tested in a Southern African context using quantitative data. In order to better understand this relationship and, correspondingly better counter xenophobic sentiments, it is necessary to quantitatively test for determinants using public opinion data. This study will also consider alternatives to the Group Threat Theory thesis, particularly how social identification with the nation may better explain exclusionary attitudes.

8.2   The Rainbow Nation as a Case Study

South Africa is a highly diverse country, home to a large number of distinct ethnic groups, each with its own interlocking languages, traditions and histories. The pre-democracy governments of the country promoted these ethnic divisions and encouraged the development of subnational identities[67]. The country's pre-transition history was also characterised by the implementation of aggressive social engineering projects (which culminated in the apartheid system) that sought to favour the white settler minority at the expense of the black indigenous majority. This was a complex process, however, and it is not feasible to provide a detailed history of it here. The literature review provided below will discuss international immigration into South Africa and the emergence of the country's current international migrant community.

8.2.1   Immigration Policy in South Africa

Immigration into South Africa did not start with the political transition and there is a well-established literature on migration in Southern Africa. The following subsection will summarise briefly the immigration context in the country. During the pre-transition period, the country's growing economy generated substantial demand for both unskilled and skilled labour. A significant share of this labour demand was met by international migrants, often recruited from other countries on the African continent. During the apartheid period, the government refused black foreigner labourers basic rights. Skilled white immigrants were much better treated and, particularly after the 1960s, actively recruited (Segatti, 2011b). Racial barriers softened with the Aliens Amendment Act of 1986 which allowed skilled Black Africans to migrate legally to the country (also see Crush and Dodson, 2007; Peberdy, 2009). Significant numbers of African refugees were granted entry into South Africa in the late 1980s, fleeing conflicts in Zimbabwe and Mozambique. When the last distinctions

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[67] The apartheid state attempted to group alleged Black African 'tribes' into national identities through mechanisms like the Bantu Authorities. Neocosmos (2010) discussed this process when reviewing the origins of nationalism in South Africa, noting the attempted making of 'ethnic-national' citizenship (also see Peberdy, 2009; Klotz, 2013). We could classify this system within the ambit of Mahmood Mamdani's 'ethnic despotism'. The struggle against apartheid left many questions relating to the various meanings of non-tribalism and 'ethnic' identity. The debate about which groups constitute 'ethnic minorities', and how they should be defined, has never been resolved.

between white and black migrants were removed in 1991, as the apartheid system collapsed, South Africa had a growing population of international migrants.

Following the end of the apartheid system, the new democratic government began a nation-building project aimed at moving the country towards a liberal multicultural democratic republic. The government has, at least officially, sought to promote national attachment to a non-racial multicultural concept of the nation (i.e. the 'Rainbow Nation') among the public. Regular (or documented) immigrants in South Africa were granted legal protections as well as access to social services such as healthcare and education (Peberdy, 2009; Segatti, 2011b). However, the rights and protections granted to documented immigrants in South Africa depend on their immigration status. There is a significant difference, for instance, in the rights granted to asylum-seekers versus those granted to refugees.

Highly varied and speculative estimates of the international immigrant population have been offered in the media, although no accurate data on the size of this population exists[68]. The ambiguity presented by this 'unknowable' number of international migrants has created a certain discomfort among some about just how many immigrants there are in the country. In a revealing article, Maré (2011) engages with Arjun Appadurai's essay on "The Fear of Small Numbers" to showcase how South Africa presents us with the 'fear' of numbers, the fear of 'how many are there who threaten what is ours'. For Appadurai, counting non-citizens creates anxieties in the public because of the implied "relationship of many individuals to state-provided goods – ranging from housing and health to safety and sanitation – since the entitlements are frequently directly tied to who 'you' are and thus to who 'they' are" (cited in Maré, 2011:617). Counting non-citizens serves (perhaps even intentionally) to conceal or highlight certain aspects of social division in South African society.

8.2.2 Post-Apartheid Xenophobia

There is a large and growing literature on xenophobia in South Africa, much of it produced by researchers from the African Centre on Migration and Society (ACMS) and the Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP). This valuable scholarship has dealt (in great detail) with the historical and political context within which xenophobia has emerged in the country. In particular large-scale violence directed mostly at foreigners in the country's townships (such as the notorious May 2008 riots[69]) have drawn academic attention. This article focuses on attitudes, however, and attitudes do not have a linear relationship with behaviour. To understand xenophobic violence we must instead analyse the circumstances under which attitudes may lead to such violent behaviour. Due to the limitations of space, it is not possible

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[68] A considerable number of South Africans believe that most or many of the foreigners living in the country are undocumented. According to Crush *et al.* (2013: 21), almost half (45%) of adult South Africans agreed that many foreigners living in South Africa are undocumented and more than a fifth (21%) agree that almost all foreigners living in South Africa are. Due to data limitations, I was unable to construct a variable that measured the perceived number of documented versus undocumented immigrants in a community.

[69] The May 2008 riots were not the start of a phenomenon of xenophobic violence in the country but rather, as Neocosmos (2010) and Landau (2010) point out, the most large-scale and shocking example of a general pattern of post-apartheid violence against persons identified as foreigners. The violence of May 2008 may not have recurred on the same scale but incidences of xenophobic violence have been frequently observed in the post-2008 period (Crush *et al.*, 2013: 52–69 provides a timeline on xenophobic violence and riots for the period 2008-2013).

to review in detail this literature. The remainder of this subsection will argue that public attitudes towards immigration have an important relationship to policymaking in South Africa.

The new democratic government (particularly in the 1994-2004 period) pursued a restrictive immigration policy aggressively seeking to limit the number of foreigners entering the country. Peberdy (2009) argues that the policy is linked to the post-apartheid nation-building project which involves the construction of new national identities and idioms of exclusion (also see Neocosmos, 2010; Segatti, 2011b). Adjai and Lazaridis (2013) examine the development of immigration policy in post-apartheid South Africa, as well as ways in which it has informed the behaviour of state officials from 1994 to 2008. The authors note that the policy-makers have made some strides towards increasing the protections afforded documented migrants (also see Pugh, 2014). New 2013 immigration regulation and restrictions in South Africa have recently, however, reignited debate about immigrant inclusion in the country.

Immigrant communities often face numerous violations of their established rights and are the victims of abuse from immigration authorities and the police[70]. Many poor citizens are similarly marginalised but what separates such abuses, as Landau (2010) argues, is the degree to which the exclusion of foreigners is socially legitimate (also see Neocosmos, 2010; Matsinhe, 2011). Many different categories of documented foreigners find it very difficult to regularise their presence or claim the status of 'inviolable insider' or resident[71]. The space available for civil society to effectively advocate for greater protection of immigrant communities, as well as structural and political change, is constrained by the presence of significant anti-foreigner sentiment in the country, as scholars like Pugh (2014) and others have argued (also see Adjai and Lazaridis, 2013).

Public attitudes in South Africa have a bearing on the formation of policies towards immigrants and their integration. In interviews with parliamentarians, Pugh (2014) noted how they felt pressured to respond to their constituents' fears about immigrants and immigration. Interviewing civil society advocates and politicians, Pugh concluded that unpopularity of immigrant communities is a substantial obstacle to the advocacy of a progressive immigration regime. The social construction of target populations among the public has a strong influence on public officials and policy-makers, shaping both the policy agenda as well as the design of policy. Schneider and Ingram (1993: 334) identify the construction of target populations as "cultural characterisations or popular images of the persons or groups whose behaviour and wellbeing are affected by public policy". Groups so constructed are soft 'targets' because

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[70] The violation of the rights of documented migrants, particularly refugees and asylum-seekers, has been well-documented in case-study evidence by civil society organisations as well as scholars with the African Centre for Migration and Society and elsewhere (see, for instance, Landau, 2010; Neocosmos, 2010; Adjai and Lazaridis, 2013; Pugh, 2014).

[71] Due to the limitations of space, it is not possible to review in detail the different immigration regulations in the country. A number of scholars, however, have analysed the design and implementation of immigration policy in modern South Africa (e.g. Crush and Dodson, 2007; Peberdy, 2009; Segatti, 2011b) and have noted that considerable obstacles are often placed in the path of regularisation for different categories of documented migrants. The groups most obstructed are asylum-seekers and contract workers. It has been suggested by Landau (2010) and others that some of this obstructionism could be rooted in illicit economies where bribes are exchanged for greater regularisation.

public officials can inflict punishment on negatively constructed groups who have little power to retaliate. Indeed, the general public often responds positively to the punishment for groups that have been so constructed. Taking this argument further, Ingram *et al.* (2007) suggested that policy-makers respond to social constructions of target groups in anticipation of public feedback (i.e. approval or rejection).

8.3   Hypothesis Building

Drawing on the quantitative research conducted both inside and outside South Africa, this paper will outline two hypotheses to be tested. These two hypotheses will be presented and discussed in detail in the preceding subsections.

8.3.1   H1: Group Threat Theory

One of the most influential theories utilised to explain exclusionary attitudes towards outgroups (such as immigrants) was crafted by Herbert Blumer (1958). He argued that perceived threat (explicit or implicit) from an outgroup to the ingroup's position is the catalyst for prejudice towards that outgroup. Prejudice is primed when an outgroup: (i) competes with an ingroup for scarce resources (such as jobs) and (ii) challenges the symbolic and political power of the ingroup. Building on Blumer's work, Blalock (1967) argued, using North American public opinion data, that the size of an outgroup living within a certain territory has an impact on the perceived threat felt by the ingroup. Individual *exposure* to the outgroup generated a sense of threat and the larger the outgroup the greater the exposure and, consequently, the perceived threat. According to this thesis, contact with, and proximity to, an outgroup will heighten perceptions that the outgroup is a threat. By logical extension, Blalock (1967) proposes that the larger the size of the outgroup, the more likely the ingroup is to feel threatened.

The work of Blalock (1967) has been utilised to understand the relationship between the size of an immigrant community within an expansive geographic unit and citizen's anti-immigration attitudes. Scholars are concerned with whether *exposure* to immigrants will result in prejudice towards immigrants and support for restrictive exclusionary immigration policies (see, for example, Quillian, 1995; Scheepers *et al.,* 2002; Semyonov *et al.,* 2004; Hjerm, 2007). Most have examined the relationship between attitudes and the number of international immigrants at the *national level*. Schlueter and Scheepers (2010) have criticised this approach, arguing that using this method may mask variation in intergroup relations. Immigrants are rarely distributed evenly across a geographic space and may predominate in certain neighbourhoods rather than others. The authors, therefore, recommend investigating the effect of outgroup size within small local contexts such as neighbourhoods.

There is a well-established relationship between contact and intergroup attitudes. In studies of immigration attitudes contact has been found to have a positive impact on prejudice reduction (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010). Critics of Group Threat Theory, like Hjerm (2007), have used Contact Theory to offer a counterhypothesis to Blalock (1967) and his interpretation of Group Threat Theory. These critics suggest that the presence of outgroups in host communities will reduce prejudice towards these groups because contact will breed familiarity and acceptance. Consequently, individuals will be less willing to support restrictive immigration policies. Constructive contact (as opposed to acquaintanceship contact) between citizens and foreigners has, indeed, been found to reduce support immigrant exclusion in Europe (see, for instance, Schneider, 2008). In conclusion, therefore, the following hypothesis is presented for testing:

> H1. Perceived immigrant population size in a community will have a relationship with individual support for restrictive immigration policies.

8.3.2   H2: National Pride

A possible alternative to the hypothesis outlined above would be the influence of national pride on public attitudes towards immigrant and immigration exclusion. Symbolic theorists, such as Tajfel and Turner (1979), focus on individual psychological processes in order to understand prejudice rather than relations between groups. For many social psychologists studying ethnocentrism and prejudice, outgroup prejudice is the result of different forms of ingroup pride that act as catalysts for outgroup hostility. Ingroup identification allows ingroup members to act in their collective interest but also "provide a fertile ground for antagonism and distrust of those outside the ingroup boundaries" (Brewer, 1999: 442). The mechanism here is the point of reference –some forms of pride are inherently comparative (i.e. other-referential) and tend to encourage ingroup members to view those outside the ingroup as inferior. Chauvinism can be defined as the downward comparison of other groups combined with a blind attachment to the ingroup. It is the focus on chauvinistic forms of ingroup identity that distinguishes scholars utilising Group Threat Theory from those employing symbolic theory to explain attitudes towards immigration.

National pride is an important form of ingroup pride and is often cited as a determinant in studies of prejudice. But national pride is multidimensional and, according to Viroli (1997: 6), can be on the one hand "generous, compassionate and intelligent" and "exclusive, deaf and blind" on the other. There is no simple relationship between national pride and denigration of outgroups and it is necessary, therefore, to distinguish between different forms of patriotic solidarity. Most studies looking at the relationship between national pride and support for exclusionary immigration policies distinguished between cultural and political patriotism (see, for example, Hjerm, 1998; Coenders and Scheepers, 2003; Raijman *et al.,* 2008). The former is often other-referential or ascriptive-objectivist and should be associated with the rejection of the 'other' in the name of preserving a sense of national unity. Cultural patriotism has been equated with chauvinism or a belief in national superiority —a commitment to the rejection of all alternatives to the nation's culture. Political patriotism, at least under democratic conditions, balances ingroup attachment with a common respect for all humanity. This form of patriotism is self-referential, non-competitive and takes the form of individual commitment to the social system and values of the nation (for a more in-depth discussion, see Smith and Kim, 2006).

The democratic transition in South Africa has triggered intense debate on nation-building, nationalism and patriotic culture. Officially, the state promotes multiculturalism and rejects chauvinistic nationalism (Peberdy, 2009). Support for multiculturalism should be associated with a more inclusive (less nativist) national pride. Neocosmos (2010) has argued, however, that national pride has played a role in spawning anti-immigration sentiment in South Africa. He highlights the alleged exceptionalism that is embedded in some forms of patriotism in the country. This discourse of 'South African exceptionalism' suggests that, although the country is African geographically, it is supposedly incompatible and culturally different from the rest of the continent (also see Matsinhe, 2011). For Neocosmos, such nationalism is other-referential and exerts the superiority of South African culture to the cultures of other African nations. As a result of colonial dispossession, understanding nationalism in South Africa is further complicated by public attitudes towards land ownership, an issue of special resonance

in the country. Based on this brief review of the literature, the subsequent hypothesis is offered for testing:

> H2. National attachment will have a significant impact on individual opinions towards restrictive immigration policies.

8.4   Data Used

I use data from the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), a repeated cross-sectional survey that monitors social, economic and political values and attitudes. Using proportional to size probability sampling, the sample was drawn and is nationally representative of all individuals in South Africa aged 16 and older living in private residences. A limitation of this dataset is that it does not include those below 16 and, therefore, I cannot adequately judge the attitudes of teenagers. The questionnaire is translated into six languages (isiZulu, isiXhosa, Tshivenda, Xitsonga, Setswana, and Afrikaans) as well as English, allowing SASAS fieldworkers to effectively gather information on attitudes and behaviours across the post-apartheid nation's diverse multi-cultural communities. The 11th (2013) round of SASAS included questions on immigration, immigrant communities and national identification.

8.4.1   Support for Closing Borders and Excluding Migrants

This study examines five questions that focus on public support for excluding international migrants from South Africa. Responses to each of these five questions were measured on a five-point agreement scale. The exact phrasing of the question, as well as the weighted distribution of the responses, is depicted in Figure 8.1. The item on illegal migrants suggests that the adult public overwhelmingly favour exclusionary measures towards undocumented immigrants. Many favoured closing the country's borders to immigrants and refugees, and a majority opposed foreigners owning land in the country. Support amongst the adult population for the inclusion of documented migrants was, comparatively, weak.

Five five-point agreement (1 strongly disagree to 5 strongly agree) scales were created based on the items in Figure 8.1. Respondents who answered 'don't know' when asked these questions were coded as missing. Reliability checks on the five questions, using inter-item correlations (co-variances) and Cronbach's alpha, found that they did not load onto a single index. This suggests that they are measuring conceptually distinct notions in South Africa and, as a result, these five items are not combined into a single indicator. In order to understand if the size of the local immigrant community had a relationship with these different items, measures would have to be developed that could capture proximity to, and contact with, international migrants.

In SASAS 2013 respondents were to indicate how many: (i) immigrants lived in their area?; (ii) acquaintances do you know who have come to live in South Africa from another country?; and (iii) how many of the people you know who have come to live in South Africa from another country? Responses were measured on a five-point scale, ranging from 1(none) to 5(very many). Interestingly, almost half (49%) of the adult population described the number of international migrants living in their area as either many or very many. Much lower shares of the public reported having either many or very many foreign acquaintances (28%) or friends (5%). Mean scores on each of these three items (i.e. foreign neighbours, acquaintances and friends) are presented in Table 8.1 disaggregated by province or residence.

Figure 8.1: Public Support for International Immigrant Inclusion and Exclusion, 2013

Notes: The data is weighted to be representative of all adult South Africans.

According to the United Nations' Population Division (2013), there were 2.4 million foreigners present in South Africa in 2013 (a seventh of all international migrants on the continent were living in the country in that year). The South African National Census 2011 found that there were about 2.2 million during the survey period. Table 8.1 presents National Census data on the number of people living in South Africa but born outside the country (as well as the share of international stock as a portion of the total population) alongside self-reported contact. Table 8.1 results do not suggest a strong correlation between the number of international migrants and the perceived number of immigrants. However, the size of the immigrant population in South Africa is difficult to measure accurately, due to poor migration monitoring by the state, and the Census figures may be inaccurate.

An Analysis of Variance analysis was conducted between the five measures depicted in Figure 8.1 and the items of self-reported proximity to international migrants (Table 8.2). The bivariate analysis did not reveal a strong relationship between the perceived size of foreigners in the area and a desire for exclusion. Not one linear and positive relationship between a preference for exclusion and perceived size could be identified in Table 8.2. Given these results, it is probable that alternative hypotheses will be more effective at explaining support for restrictive immigration policies in South Africa. As already indicated, this paper will consider the explanatory power of other factors as an alternative to the group threat hypothesis.

Table 8.1: Contact with International Migrants Disaggregated by Province

	Neighbours		Acquaintances		Friends		Census 2011	
	Mean	Std. Err.	Mean	Std. Err.	Mean	Std. Err.	N	%
Gauteng	3.73	0.10	2.63	0.11	1.66	0.07	1134587	9%
Western Cape	2.71	0.11	1.75	0.08	1.52	0.07	260952	5%
KwaZulu-Natal	2.65	0.09	2.30	0.09	1.47	0.05	169377	2%
Limpopo	3.98	0.09	3.50	0.11	1.64	0.07	165351	3%
Mpumalanga	3.31	0.11	2.61	0.11	1.96	0.10	153115	4%
Northern Cape	3.60	0.12	3.00	0.12	1.76	0.08	152504	2%
Eastern Cape	2.28	0.08	1.99	0.09	1.41	0.06	75319	1%
Free State	2.43	0.12	2.07	0.10	1.50	0.08	68896	3%
North West	3.34	0.17	2.55	0.18	1.45	0.07	19770	4%

Notes: 1. The data is weighted; 2. Mean values (1-5) represent self-reported contact with international migrants from 1(none) to 5(very many)**.**

Table 8.2: Public Support for International Immigrant Inclusion and Exclusion by Self-Reported Exposure with International Immigrants

	How many immigrants would you say live in your area?					
	None	Few	Some	Many	Very Many	Prob > F
Land	3.67	3.60	3.32	3.50	3.77	0.000
Equal Rights	2.86	2.82	2.77	2.90	2.85	0.686
Undocumented	3.96	3.90	3.86	3.84	4.05	0.008
Equal Access	3.13	3.07	3.25	3.28	3.23	0.047
Close Borders	3.89	3.82	3.57	3.74	3.84	0.001

Notes: 1. The data is weighted; 2. Mean values (1-5) represent individual agreement (1 = disagree strongly, 5 = agree strongly) that: (i) Legal immigrants to South Africa who are not citizens should have the same rights as South African citizens (Equal Rights); (ii) South Africa should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants (Undocumented); (iii) Legal immigrants should have equal access to public education as South African citizens (Equal Access); (iv) Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in South Africa (Land); and (v) South Africa should close its borders to immigrants and refugees (Close Borders); and 3. Prob > F column present results from significant tests based on Analysis of Variance analysis –the lower the Prob>F the higher the level of significance.

Table 8.3: Immigration Consequence Index Interitem Correlations (covariances) and Principal Component Analysis

	Mean	Std. Err.	Average Interitem Covariance	Alpha
Crime [a]	3.84	0.03	0.30	0.54
Economy [b]	3.22	0.03	0.36	0.60
Job [a]	3.78	0.04	0.31	0.56
New Ideas [b]	3.03	0.03	0.40	0.63
Culture [a]	3.29	0.03	0.41	0.64
Test Scale			0.36	0.65

[a] 1 = disagree strongly, 5 = agree strongly [b] 1 = agree strongly, 5 = disagree strongly

Notes: Respondents were asked if they: agreed with the following statements: immigrants: (i) increase crime rates (crime); (ii) are generally good for South Africa's economy (economy); (iii) take jobs away from people who were born in country (job); (iv) improve South Africa's society by bringing new ideas and cultures (new ideas); and (v) generally undermine South Africa's culture (culture).

Table 8.4: Cultural and Political Patriotism and Principal Component Analysis

	Mean	Std. Err.	Principal Component Analysis	
			Political	*Cultural*
The way democracy works	2.60	0.03	0.755	
South Africa's economic achievements	2.66	0.03	0.799	
Its social security system	2.58	0.03	0.750	
Its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society	2.71	0.03	0.654	
Its scientific and technological achievements	3.07	0.03		0.755
Its achievements in sports	3.24	0.03		0.777
Its achievements in the arts and literature	3.15	0.03		0.832
Its history	3.21	0.03		0.540

Notes: Respondents were asked how proud are you of South Africa in each of the… (4)Very proud; (3) Somewhat proud; (2) Not very proud; (1) Not proud at all.

8.4.2 National Pride and Other Alternatives

Based on a review of the literature, it is clear this paper will need to distinguish cultural patriotism in South Africa from its civic counterpart, political patriotism. In order to achieve this using public opinion data, eight questions are used from SASAS 2013 on which aspects of South Africa individuals are proud of. These aspects are subdivided into two dimensions (cultural and political) and two indexes are drawn based on responses to questions in each dimension. The processes used to create the indexes are drawn from Hjerm (1998) who provides empirical support for the proposed theoretical argument that civic patriotism should be separated from ethnic nationalism (also see Coenders and Scheepers, 2003; Raijman *et al.,* 2008). The validity of these concepts has been established in a number of different country contexts (including South Africa) according to Smith and Kim (2006). Adult South Africans were found to score highly on sources of cultural pride but less well on sources of political patriotism. Statistical tests for validity and reliability, in particular Principal Component Analysis, confirmed the cogency of these indexes (Table 8.3).

Using multivariate regression analysis, this paper will examine the influence of cultural and political patriotism on individual preferences for restrictive immigration policies. In addition to these two dimensions of national pride, the role played by perceived consequences of immigration will be assessed. Perceived threats have been shown to influence both discriminatory attitudes and prejudices against the outgroup in a divided society (see, for example, Raijman *et al.,* 2008; Schneider, 2008; Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010). The link between perceived threat and discrimination can be observed in one of the most penetrating of the quantitative studies on xenophobia in South Africa: Crush *et al.* (2013). Using public opinion data from 2010, Crush and his colleagues investigated attitudes towards xenophobic violence. This SAMP study found approximately three-fifths of the respondents thought that a primary cause of the 2008 riots was that migrants are involved in crime (64%), cause unemployment (62%) and are culturally different (60%). This suggests that is it important to understand how public perceptions of immigration impact on individual support for restrictive immigration policies.

In exploring the hypotheses proposed, this paper will account for how adult South Africans perceive the impact of immigrants on their society. SASAS respondents were asked three questions about the consequences of immigration on South African communities, focusing on social problems like crime and unemployment (see Table 8.4 for exact order and question wording of the individual items). Each variable is a five-point agreement-disagreement scale. An Immigration Consequence (IC) Index was created from these five items (Cronbach alpha 0.65) after testing for the validity of the proposed scale. A high value on the index indicates a negative assessment of the consequences of immigration. This paper will assess the correlation between IC Index and support for immigration exclusion using multivariate regression techniques.

8.5 Multivariate Analysis

In order to accurately refute or prove the two hypotheses outlined this paper, I turn to the multivariate analysis. Five regressions were conducted, one for each of the five indicators of individual preferences for immigration policies (see Table 8.2 for the exact question wording of the individual items). In order to adequately test the two hypotheses, a number of background independent variables had to be created. These variables are described and discussed below.

8.5.1   Building the Models

The background variables created for this study are: age (in years), gender (male, female), marital status (married, not married) and geographic type (urban formal, urban informal, rural formal and traditional authority area). A question on citizenship allowed a separation to be made between those with non-citizen parent(s) and those without. Other control variables are education (years of completed education) and labour force position (full-time employed, part-time employed, unemployed and labour force inactive). Political party affiliation is measured, based on who the respondent would vote for if there was an election tomorrow (African National Congress, the Democratic Alliance, other opposition party and undeclared).

Economic status was obtained using individual asset accumulation. In order to provide an accurate representation of asset accumulation among adult South Africans, an asset index was employed. This indicator is the Living Standards Measurement (LSM), an index developed by the South African Advertising Research Foundation to gauge social class[72]. It is evident that the ethnic identity of an individual should be controlled for when examining national attachments. Racial categorisation may obscure differences within the heterogeneous black majority. In order to avoid this, and to distinguish between racial minorities and the main ethnolinguistic subgroups within the racial majority, I constructed eight dummy variables: White, Coloured, Indian, Sesotho, Setswana, isiXhosa, isiZulu and other Black African minority groups.

8.5.2   Results

Five regression models are presented in Table 8.5. In Models I-III, a positive coefficient indicates support for restrictions on international immigration. In contrast, in Model IV and V, a positive coefficient designates a preference for immigrant inclusion. Before the main hypotheses outlined in this study are investigated, it is worth commenting on the role played by economic factors in predicting support for exclusion and inclusion. The results show that educational attainment[73] was not associated with the dependent in any of the models. Unemployment was found to be positively associated with the dependent in Model I but was negatively correlated with the dependent in Model III. Controlling for a range of socio-economic and attitudinal factors, the LSM scale had a negative relationship with a preference for closed borders (Model III). Asset wealth also had a significant (and positive) association with individual support for granting documented immigrants equal access to public education (Model V) although only at a 10% level of significance.

Previous chapters have generally not noted a statistically significant correlation between political affiliation and attitudes towards international migrants. In Table 8.5, however, some unanticipated results were observed when political affiliation was considered. Supporting the Democratic Alliance was positively correlated with the dependent in Model II and negatively

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[72] Respondents are asked more than thirty questions about their asset ownership access and to services to segment the market. The Living Statement Measure divides the population into 10 groups (1 = lowest to 10 = highest).

[73] Educational attainment has been shown to be a significant determinant of exclusionary attitudes in research that focuses on Europe and North America (Quillian, 1995; Scheepers *et al.,* 2002; Raijman *et al.,* 2008). In order to establish that this was not an empirical artefact related to including multiple measures of class in the model, a pairwise correlation was conducted to detect significant correlation between years of schooling and the dependents. The results confirm the findings of the multivariate regression.

Table 8.5: Ordered Logistic Models, Public Support for International Immigrant Exclusion and Inclusion

	Model I		Model II		Model III	
	Land		**Undocumented**		**Close Borders**	
Age	-0.001		-0.002		-0.004	
Female (ref. male)	0.099		0.005		-0.022	
Married (ref. not married)	0.255	*	-0.094		-0.071	
Non-Citizen Parent(s) (ref. none)	-0.366		-0.102		-0.266	
Ethnic group (ref. White)						
Coloured	0.019		-0.178		-0.163	
Indian	-0.089		-0.308		-0.628	*
Sesotho	0.478		0.011		-0.010	
Setswana	0.792	*	-0.207		0.160	
isiXhosa	0.653	*	-0.006		-0.184	
isiZulu	-0.035		0.025		-0.270	
African Minority	0.423		0.036		0.013	
Geographic Type (ref. urban formal)						
Urban informal	-0.041		-0.448	†	-0.374	
Rural, traditional areas	0.095		-0.094		-0.226	
Commercial farms	-0.108		0.274		-0.733	**
Party support (ref. ANC)						
Democratic Alliance	-0.127		0.530	*	-0.419	†
Other Opposition	0.282		0.139		-0.249	
Uncertain/Refused	0.072		0.193		-0.043	
Years of Education	-0.002		0.031		-0.027	
Employment status (ref. employed)						
Part-time	0.134		0.315		-0.263	
Unemployed	0.336	*	0.317		-0.327	*
Labour Inactive	0.238		0.364	*	-0.046	
LSM Scale	-0.062		-0.009		-0.122	*
Immigration Consequence Index	0.464	***	0.814	***	0.773	***
Foreign Contact						
Perceived Immigrant Size	0.036		0.040		-0.032	
Foreign Acquaintances	-0.015		0.029		0.006	
Foreign Friends	-0.354	***	-0.089		-0.037	
Political Patriotism	-0.039		-0.154		0.037	
Cultural Patriotism	0.330	**	0.412	**	0.236	*
N	2372		2372		2370	
/cut1	-0.467		0.400		-1.838	
/cut2	0.898		1.770		-0.288	
/cut3	1.752		2.662		0.820	
/cut4	3.355		4.509		2.315	

*** *p<0.001, **p<0.01,* p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Notes: 1. The regressions also control for the province of residence, 2. The data is weighted to be representative of all adult South Africans; and 3. Positive coefficients indicate individual agreement (1 = disagree strongly, 5 = agree strongly) with the relevant item.

Table 8.5: Ordered Logistic Models, Public Support for International Immigrant Exclusion and Inclusion (continued)

	Model IV Equal Rights		Model V Equal Access	
Age	-0.005		0.000	
Female (ref. male)	-0.235	*	-0.133	
Married (ref. not married)	0.060		0.129	
Non-Citizen Parent(s) (ref. none)	0.548	*	-0.005	
Ethnic group (ref. White)				
Coloured	-0.369		-0.014	
Indian	0.035		0.131	
Sesotho	-0.460		-0.143	
Setswana	-0.008		0.143	
isiXhosa	-0.283		-0.052	
isiZulu	-0.248		0.009	
African Minority	0.432		0.416	
Geographic Type (ref. urban formal)				
Urban informal	0.264		-0.143	
Rural, traditional areas	-0.056		-0.127	
Commercial farms	-0.001		0.011	
Party support (ref. ANC)				
Democratic Alliance	-0.090		0.259	
Other Opposition	-0.110		-0.155	
Uncertain/Refused	0.040		0.079	
Years of Education	-0.001		0.015	
Employment status (ref. employed)				
Part-time	-0.057		0.296	
Unemployed	-0.138		0.212	
Labour Inactive	-0.022		0.214	
LSM Scale	0.045		0.085	†
Immigration Consequence Index	-0.680	***	-0.547	***
Foreign Contact				
Perceived Immigrant Size	0.030		0.064	
Foreign Acquaintances	-0.022		0.070	
Foreign Friends	0.004		-0.049	
Political Patriotism	0.179	†	0.215	*
Cultural Patriotism	-0.006		0.059	
N	2323		2369	
/cut1	-4.171		-2.264	
/cut2	-2.625		-1.044	
/cut3	-1.954		-0.234	
/cut4	-0.164		1.485	

*** p<0.001, **p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10

Notes: 1. The regressions also control for the province of residence, 2. The data is weighted to be representative of all adult South Africans; and 3. Positive coefficients indicate individual agreement (1 = disagree strongly, 5 = agree strongly) with the relevant item.

correlated with the dependent in Model III. Some interesting ethnic group differences were also noted in Model I and III. These observed differences may be explained by non-economic characteristics. Consider for example how groups' memories of their collective past may impact on their assessments of land ownership. It is clear that ethnic group differences on immigration exist and such differences should be acknowledged and studied. Further quantitative research will be needed, however, to discern the factors that inform these differences.

It is evident that perceived outgroup size does not have a negative impact on the dependents in any of the models in Table 8.5. This finding builds on the findings from the bivariate analysis and refutes the first hypothesis that perceived immigrant population size in a community will have a relationship with individual support for restrictive immigration policies. Friendship contact had a negative correlation with a preference for a prohibition on foreigners owning land (Model I) but was not a significant determinant in Models II-V. As could be expected, the political patriotism index is significantly associated with the dependent in Models IV and V and the expected relationship is observed. In contrast, a negative relationship was found for the cultural patriotism index in Model I-III, suggesting that feelings of national superiority are driving support for immigrant exclusion in the country. This suggests support for the second hypothesis. The other important finding to emerge from Table 8.5 was the significant relationship between the IC Index and the dependents (as would be expected). Citizen support for the inclusion or exclusion of immigrants is driven by perceptions that this group will negatively impact society.

8.6   Discussion and Conclusion

Group threat theory is based on citizen *exposure* to immigrant communities –for Blalock (1967), citizens must be aware of their proximity to international immigrants to feel threatened by them. According to Group Threat Theory, therefore, the perceived size of the foreign population in a community should be significantly associated with attitudes towards immigration. In South Africa, there is no evidence of an association between perceived immigrant group size and attitudes towards immigration. It may be that individuals picked up on a national discourse in the media (or elsewhere) about the number of foreigners in the country and this influences their support for immigrant exclusion or inclusion. This would suggest that their preferences are driven by myths about the number of international migrants, not exposure to immigrant communities. The findings of this paper, therefore, cast doubt on the often quoted presumption that citizens' preferences for immigrant exclusion are driven primarily by local-level competition from foreigners.

The results of this study suggest that public support for some forms of immigration exclusion and inclusion were significantly (but weakly) correlated with economic position. Quantitative research on immigration attitudes in South Africa has often been critical of associating economic self-interest with citizens' attitudes towards immigration policies. Public opinion studies by Gordon (2016a) on refugee protection[74] and Facchini *et al.* (2013) on migration restrictions suggest that in South Africa individual preferences on immigration do not vary

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[74] A public opinion study by Gordon (2016a) on immigration policy found that many in South Africa opposed granting asylum to people persecuted for political reasons in their own countries. Though economic deprivation did have an influence on attitudes towards refugee protection, other non-economic indicators (such as national identity) were found to play a stronger role.

considerably by economic characteristics (also see Crush *et al.,* 2013). The relationship between economic position and xenophobic violence has also been challenged. Fauvelle-Aymar and Segatti (2012), using ward-level data and multivariate techniques, examined the socio-economic characteristics of the areas affected by the 2008 May riots. The findings from their research broadly reject explanations for the violence based on unemployment or poverty. Economic deprivation as a driver of xenophobia or xenophobic violence has also been criticised by scholars such as Neocosmos (2010) who asks why if ordinary South Africans feel economically depressed they should blame foreigners.

Often, individuals are unaware of how many immigrants co-exist with them in a certain territory –a finding noted in a number of European studies (also see Schneider, 2008; Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010). Is there any relationship between this perceived size variable and the actual size of the international migrant population in a given area? National public opinion surveys are not the best instrument to obtain an accurate count of immigrants in the country as past experience in South Africa has shown[75]. Although it is not possible to draw a relationship between the perceived and actual size of the international migrant population, the findings of this study suggest that immigrant group size is not correlated with public preferences for immigrant exclusion at the local level. The policy implications of this finding are therefore clear: reducing the number of international migrants in a given community in South Africa will not improve public support for immigrant inclusion in that community.

How do the results of this study compare with those of other public opinion studies on immigration attitudes? The public research in Europe and North America on the link between immigrant population size and immigration attitudes has produced mixed evidence. For example, Quillian (1995) and Scheepers *et al.* (2002) have shown that the *actual* size of the foreign population has a significant impact on attitudes towards anti-immigrant prejudice. Schneider (2008) has also shown that there is a relationship with *perceived* immigrant size and anti-immigrant sentiment (also see Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010). Scholars, like Hjerm (2007), however, have refuted this association, arguing that immigrant population size is not a significant predictor of prejudice (also see Semyonov *et al.,* 2004). The results of this paper indicate support for this latter position and, in a South African environment, reject the relationship between perceived immigrant group size and exclusionary attitudes. As far as the author is aware, this is the first time the hypotheses outlined in this paper have been tested in a South African context using public opinion data.

Cultural patriotism was found to be positively associated with support for immigrant exclusion. This suggests that anti-immigrant sentiment is driven by other-referential forms of ingroup identity rather than local-level competition from international migrants. This study

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[75] In the mid-1990s, the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) asked a nationally representative sample of adult South Africans: "How many people who are not South African citizens live in the houses around this property?" Respondents' answers were regarded as accurate assessments of the numbers of international migrants in a given community and were used by HSRC officials to make estimations about the size of South Africa's foreign population. This method produced numbers that showed enormous levels of immigration in and out of the country every few months. Crush and Dodson (2007) pointed out the absurdity of this method and, extracting data from these early surveys, showed that the methodology was decidedly dubious. In 2001 Mark Orkin admitted that the methodology was inoperative and retracted all findings produced using this method.

has explored pride in certain aspects of South African patriotism but not others. One element that this study was unable to adequately capture was the unique imprint of apartheid and colonialism on national identification in the country. In a qualitative analysis, Matsinhe (2011) argues that the colonial history of group relations needs to be taken into account when examining xenophobia in South Africa. What makes South Africa unique is how the racial discourses used by the white minority in the pre-transition period have been internalised by the black majority and applied to immigrants from Africa in the current period (also see Landau, 2010; Neocosmos, 2010). Data limitations, however, prevented me from investigating the complex manner in which colonialism informs the construction boundaries and social identities in South Africa.

In this chapter, we noted that educational attainment was a poor predictor of the policy preferences under review. The weakness of educational attainment as a correlate of attitudes was a common finding in other chapters in this study. This may reflect the interlude between a transformation in political regime and the capability of the educational system to socialise learners into the transformed political culture. Coenders and Scheepers (2003) argue that educational effects on tolerance vary according to the length of liberal-democratic tradition. Using survey data from 22 countries, their research showed that the effect of education on support for exclusion is smaller in recently established democracies. It may, alternatively, reflect that a lack of political correctness on questions of immigration policy in South Africa (see Chapter 6, section 5). Janus (2010) has tested this supposition and found that the immigration attitudes of the well-educated noted in a number of North American studies may be the product of such 'correctness'. To substantiate this supposition, future research must focus on the role of the South African education system in reducing intolerance.

Perceptions that immigration has harmful consequences were correlated with support for repressive migration policies. The pervasiveness of such destructive beliefs can be linked to the anti-immigrant rhetoric of political leaders in South Africa. As scholars like Neocomos (2010) have argued, xenophobia is a political discourse in South Africa. The official discourse on immigration from political leaders and government officials has been, and still can be, characterised by depictions of immigrants (particularly from other African countries) as anachronistic and harmful (also see Peberdy, 2009; Matsinhe, 2011; Adjai and Lazaridis, 2013). Although international immigrant communities continue to grow, these communities are targeted by immigration officials and the police in semi-official crackdowns because of the alleged undocumentedness and criminality of these groups (Landau, 2010). The launch of Operation Fiela (which can be translated as "sweep the dirt") against undocumented migrants in early 2015 is just another example of this continuing trend.

In the conclusion to this paper, I will outline some areas for future research. Future quantitative examinations of the impact of nationalism on anti-immigrant attitudes in South Africa must explore the role played by colonialism and globalisation in the formation of autochthonic identities. Transnationalism, democratic decentralisation and global economic liberalisation have, moreover, transformed social identification in the country. Understanding how this new geography impacts public attitudes towards foreigners requires a combined approach using public opinion data with more qualitative techniques. Such an approach would generate scholarship that will provide a better understanding of how autochthonic attachments intertwine to explain support for immigrant exclusion among the public and citizens' behaviour towards foreigners.

9 Concluding the Study

The *aim* of this study was to investigate what micro-level sociological indicator factors are shaping attitudes towards international migrants and migration in South Africa. In the five papers presented in this dissertation, four different types of attitudes were examined: (i) general evaluations; (ii) prejudice; (iii) perceived threat; and (iv) policy preferences. These five papers expanded on previous public opinion research by using quantitative research methods to quantify different determinants of these attitudes. The study investigated how adult South African public's attitudes towards international migrants are affected by three key clusters of micro-level sociological indicators: (i) socio-economic status; (ii) group identities; and (iii) intergroup contact. Two main conclusions were drawn from the findings of these five papers. First, individual socio-economic status was not a central driver of attitudes towards international migrants and immigration. Second, intergroup contact and group identities (and the key factors related to group identity) tend to be better drivers of attitudes. These conclusions will be discussed in more detail in this concluding chapter.

9.1 Introduction

The aim of this study was to understand what factors drive attitudes towards international migrants and migration of the mass public in South Africa. Attitudes also have an important impact –if at times an indirect one –on social behaviour. The attitudes of citizens on key social and political issues, therefore, be (and should be) an essential concern of policy-makers in a democracy. Theorists of democracy, like Dahl (1973), have argued that democratic governments should reflect the will of their citizens (also see Soroka and Wlezien, 2010; Wilson, 2013). Mass public opinion has the potential to shape the design and the implementation of public policy. Beyond these considerations, I consider public opinion significant in its own right because of what it tells us about the beliefs of ordinary people on issues of importance.

In this thesis, data has been presented to show that many South Africans hold anti-immigrant views. On the other hand, there are a significant number of South Africans who hold positive tolerant progressive views. Thousands took to the streets of Johannesburg and eThekwini to express those views when civil society worked with the government to organised public demonstrations to denounce xenophobia in April 2015. Marchers chanted "Down with Xenophobia" and "A United Africa". However, not everyone favoured such demonstrations. When a large group of anti-immigrant protestors, wielding pangas, tried to disrupt the eThekwini march, the police were forced to disperse the protestors with stun grenades, tear gas and water cannon (IOL, 17/04/2015b). The success of the march demonstrated the plurality of attitudes towards international migrants and immigration in South Africa. The march, however, also highlighted clear divisions on the issue of international migration and the danger proposed to the country by anti-immigrant prejudice.

During the course of this dissertation, several important findings on the determinants of attitudes towards international migrants and immigration in South Africa have been put forward. In short, it can be said that xenophobia is not the province of the poor and underprivileged. Material concerns are not irrelevant to the formation of xenophobic attitudes however. But these concerns are not limited to those on the deprived end of the economic

spectrum. This has significant inferences for how we understand social cohesion[76] in South African communities. These findings will be summarised and outlined in section 9.2. This part of the chapter will also demonstrate the linkages between the different empirical chapters in this thesis. In section 9.3 the contributions of this study to the literature are summed up and briefly discussed. A final section sketches out areas for potential future research.

9.2   Summary of the Findings

My study allows us to understand how applicable hypotheses developed in Europe and North America are for the South African case. The results show us that many theses that were developed using European, Israeli and North American data are not inconsistent with what has been found in South Africa. This section will summarise the findings of this dissertation, outlining what micro-sociological factors are driving attitudes in the country. The study has highlighted how widespread negative South African citizens' attitudes towards international migrants are. The degree of this anti-immigrant sentiment is sketched out in subsection 9.2.1. Then the section will focus on the main drivers of attitudes identified in subsection 9.2.2, 9.2.3 and 9.2.4. These distinct subsections summarise the study's findings on self-interest, intergroup contact and group identity and group interest respectively.

9.2.1   Hostility and Negativity Over Time
Prior to asking an individual to report on their attitudes toward a subject (especially a contested subject such as 'immigration') one must be sure that the individual has an approximate mental representation of that subject. But public opinion surveys typically do not define the term 'immigrant' and some scholars (e.g. Blinder, 2013) have raised this as an issue of concern. In the SASAS datasets used for this study, respondents were informed that they are going to be asked questions about 'people from other countries coming to live in South Africa'. The implicit assumption here is that people in the country have absorbed enough information to understand the conceptual difference between an internal (i.e. domestic) migrant versus an external (i.e. international) migrant. It could possibly be argued that respondents may have misunderstood this instruction. In a recent article, I found that the South African public is rather ill-informed about international affairs (Gordon, 2016b).

In SASAS, respondents were asked the open-ended question "[w]hich, if any, group would you least want to come and live in South Africa?" Responses to this question are presented in Chapter 4 (and then again in Chapter 5 and 7). Respondents' answers demonstrate an understanding of what was meant by the phrase 'people from other countries'. Respondents seemed to have a cogent understanding of the difference between an internal and external migrant. In other words, the average South African does seem able to comprehend the concept 'international migrants'. This is perhaps unsurprising. Since the early 2000s, debates

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[76] The significance and definition of the term 'social cohesion' is innately clear-cut, signifying 'solidarity' and a more harmonious egalitarian society. The consequence given to the term by researchers is undermined, nonetheless, by the insufficiency of the ways that academics have to describe and measure 'social cohesion'. In an effort to ground 'social cohesion' in the South African reality and, consequently, better comprehend the level of social disunity in that country, Struwig *et al.,* (2013) conducted a comprehensive study of 'social cohesion'. The researchers brought in numerous stakeholders to weigh on what social cohesion would mean in the South African context. The result was a complex but inclusive multidimensional tool for understanding and measuring social cohesion.

about the status of foreign migrants have been very much in the public domain and in all forms of media.

Data on attitudes towards international migrants over the period 2003 and 2012 are presented in Chapter 4. Throughout the course of this decade, most of the adult public said that they would be prepared to welcome either none or only some international migrants into the country. Over the period 2003-2012, the public demonstrated a consistent hierarchy of preferences between immigrant groups. A majority of citizens consistently identified foreign African nationals as the group they least wanted to come and live in South Africa. The hostility towards international migrants identified in Chapter 4 was corroborated in the other empirical chapters of this thesis. In Chapter 6 it can be observed that many adult South Africans would be dissatisfied to have an international migrant as a neighbour. Chapter 7 found that a clear majority of the country saw international migrants as having a harmful influence on the country.

Chapter 8 presented data, not on attitudes towards international migrants, but citizens' preferences on different immigration policies. As can be observed in that chapter, most South Africans in 2013 favoured restrictive immigration policies and opposed granting foreigners the same rights as citizens. In summation, this study found that many South Africans hold very negative views of international migrants and favour restricting international migration into the country. These results verify the high levels of anti-immigrant sentiment found by other researchers (e.g. Crush and Pendleton, 2007; Du Toit and Kortze, 2011) in South Africa who also have used public opinion surveys to study attitudes towards immigration. These findings are also in line with my recent research (e.g. Crush *et al.,* 2013; Gordon, 2016b) on foreign policy preferences.

9.2.2 Self-Interest and Economic Status

Economic competition theory points to the rivalry for limited resources as the main driving force behind intergroup conflict. This theory contends that there should be a strong relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and economic status (Hardin, 1995). The notion that public opinion is mainly governed by self-interest is a part of political philosophy in Western Europe and North America. No less famous a Western philosopher as Thomas Hobbes, for instance, viewed self-interest as the first (and foremost motivator) of the individual (discussed in Mansbridge, 1990). Given the influence of Western philosophy on South African academia, it is understandable that many assume a relationship between economic resources and attitudes towards immigrants. Yet, as was discussed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, many scholars of public opinion are increasingly sceptical of self-interest as a dominant force in attitude formation. In exploring determinants of public attitudes towards international migration and migrants, this thesis has investigated the role played by socio-economic status.

In Chapters 4 statistically significant variations in attitudes towards international migration and migrants by socio-economic status were not found. Using multivariate analysis, Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 found that educational attainment, material wealth and labour market status tended to be poor predictors of attitudes. Chapter 7 revealed that an individual's economic resources were not a good predictor of public perceptions about the negative consequences of immigration (i.e. perceived threat). Even using a comprehensive measure of household asset wealth, a strong correlation between perceived threat and economic status was not observed in this chapter (with one exception). Subjective measures of economic status fared no better. Chapter 5 presented data showing how subjective personal wellbeing was an inadequate

predictor of individual evaluations of international migrants. In Chapter 6, self-reported economic status did not emerge as an important predictor of attitudes. The results of this dissertation do not suggest that economic factors have *no* influence on public attitudes towards international migrants. Rather, the findings suggest that micro-level socio-economic factors do not correlate well with such attitudes.

The findings presented in this study suggest that people tend to view foreigners in very negative terms if they *perceive* international migrants as a socio-economic threat. Chapter 5 highlighted the role played by public perceptions about the consequences of immigration as a predictor of attitudes towards international migrants. This relationship holds even when multivariate techniques are used to account for socio-economic status. In Chapter 8, I emphasised the influence that such perceptions had on public support for different immigration policies. This finding complements one of my recently published works which shows that the *perceived* realistic (or economic) threat posed by immigration influenced individual attitudes toward preferred immigration level (Gordon, 2016b). In other words, the notion that international migration has harmful impacts on economic and social conditions in the country is driving attitudes.

9.2.3 Intergroup Contact

Since the 1950s, scholars have highlighted the role of intergroup contact as a predictor of prejudice. The architect of Contact Theory, Gordon Allport (1954), placed conditions on the nature of the interaction if prejudice were to be reduced, making the quality of contact important. Friendship is likely to encompass most of the conditions identified by Allport (Pettigrew, 1998a; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). Based on this assumption, this study differentiated the quality of contact by looking separately at acquaintanceship (i.e. casual contact) and friendship (i.e. intimate contact). This distinction delineates simple desegregation (i.e. the physical mixing of groups) from integration (i.e. situations that meet, or come close to meeting, Allport's key conditions of optimal intergroup contact). Chapters 5, 6 and 7 highlighted the role played by intergroup contact in predicting different attitudes towards international migrants.

The study found that intimate contact tended to have a positive impact on attitudes while casual contact was a statistically insignificant predictor of attitudes. Intergroup friendship contact enables individuals to empathise with, and consider, the perspective of an outgroup (like international migrants). The antithesis of Contact Theory is Group Threat Theory which suggests that the size of an outgroup population living near an ingroup population leads the ingroup to develop exclusionary attitudes towards the outgroup (Blalock, 1967). This theory suggests that citizens' proximity to international migrants will have an effect on exclusionary attitudes towards that outgroup. Chapter 8 tests this theory and finds that the *(perceived)* size of the immigrant population in a neighbourhood did not have a relationship with individual support for restrictive or inclusive immigration policies. However, in the chapter, I did not grapple with how the use of a small unit of analysis (i.e. a neighbourhood or area) may affect the chapter's results.

Chapter 8 suggests that negative perceptions about immigration were one of the main drivers of exclusionary policy preferences. It could be argued that the South African media projects images of 'foreign swarms of invaders' around the country and the locally-born do not need to interact with international migrants in order to perceive them as a threat. In addition, there is a need to consider the fact that prejudicial attitudes may lead individuals to avoid heterogeneous contact. To put it more simply, while contact with immigrants could have an

effect on anti-immigrant sentiment but such sentiments may lead an individual to avoid contact. Xenophobic individuals living in immigration-receiving neighbourhoods *may* opt to move out to semi neighbourhoods that are more homogenous[77]. If a scholar was to study the attitudes of the locally-born from a municipal-level perceptive, the relationship between immigrant population size and anti-immigrant sentiment would be positive because this migration has occurred within a municipality. But from a neighbourhood-level perceptive - the viewpoint taken by Chapter 8 –then the relationship becomes negative because the xenophobes have existed. Due to data limitations, this study was unable to engage with this phenomenon and whether it had occurred.

The thesis has followed the literature on intergroup contact and has largely attributed intergroup contact to opportunity structures. Consequently, this study has ignored the problem of reverse causality as it pertains to Allport's Contact Theory. Without longitudinal public opinion, however, it is difficult to discern the direction of this relationship. Most likely attitudes and behaviour are part of a mutually reinforcing cycle, the direction of which is difficult to detect. It should be stressed, nonetheless, that the existence of the reverse path (from attitudes to contact) does not undermine the value of contact as an intervention to reduce prejudice (for more information, see Hewstone and Swart, 2011; Christ and Wagner, 2012). Regardless of the direction of the relationship, establishing the direction of the correlation was important as it allowed me to show that negative stereotypes about international migrants are detrimental to the quality of citizens' relationships with said migrants.

9.2.4 Group Identity and Group Interest

One of the key areas of investigations for this thesis has been the relationship between attitudes towards international migrants and South African nationalism. Throughout the thesis, the potential role that nationalism could play in determining attitudes has been explored. Chapters 5 and 6 made use of a simple measure of national pride and found that pride in one's country was not associated with anti-immigrant sentiment in the country. Many scholars have argued that it is necessary to distinguish cultural (or ethno-nationalism) from more political (or civic) patriotism in order to properly understand the relationship between national pride and anti-immigrant sentiment. We see a relationship emerge between cultural patriotism and attitudes towards immigration policy in Chapter 8. The results of this chapter suggest the importance of examining and critiquing ethno-nationalism and chauvinistic nationalism in South Africa.

In this study, simply being proud of the national collective is not associated with anti-immigrant sentiment. A number of public opinion researchers point to group interest as a strong determinant of intergroup attitudes (see, for example, Brewer and Gardner, 1996; Brewer, 1999; Funk, 2000). An individual's perception that their group is under threat will influence their attitudes towards outside groups. This relationship should be salient, regardless of whether the group in question is the national collective or the ethnic/racial collective. A number of studies (e.g. Mutz and Mondak, 1997; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000; Sides and Citrin, 2007) have found that people tend to rely on "sociotropic" concerns

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[77] The exodus of xenophobes to surrounding neighbourhoods could create a 'halo' of xenophobic areas around a more diverse neighbourhood. These 'border' neighbourhoods may have contact with foreigners but not intimate contact which tends to have a much more positive impact on attitudes. The 'halo effect' has been noted in studies of right-wing voting (e.g. Rydgren and Ruth, 2013; Valdez, 2014).

when forming opinions. Most of these studies focus on how individuals consider the health of the nation when forming their attitudes. In South Africa, how an individual perceives the position of her/his race group may also have a strong influence on attitude formation.

Chapter 5 uses the National Wellbeing Index (NWI) to test the influence of sociotropic concerns about the national collective on individual evaluations of international migrants. The NWI was a significant determinant of attitudes, which shows that individual multidimensional concerns about the national collective are correlated with adult attitudes towards international migrants in South Africa. This seems to confirm the argument, made by Wimmer (1997), that xenophobia becomes prolific during times of national crisis as a way of reassuring the national 'self'. The association identified in this study could help us better understand why the adult public's attitudes towards international migrants seem subject to cyclic fluctuations. In Chapter 7 individual perceptions that their race/ethnic group was under threat were found to be significantly associated with attitudes towards migrants. The chapter showed that individuals who perceive their race group as under threat were more likely to regard international migrants as threatening.

The absence of a strong group identity can be just as damaging as the presence of an aggrieved sense of one. The 'neighbourhood' can be thought of as an imagined community – certainly a 'neighbourhood identity' is no more constructed an identity than a 'racial' or 'national' identity. In Chapter 6, social bonds between neighbours and a sense of community were found to be salient determinants of prejudice against international migrants. If South Africans feel that they have strong bonds with their neighbours, they are more tolerant of foreign nationals. However, based on the results presented in Chapter 6, many members of the adult public appear to feel detached from their communities. It is difficult to ascertain if this is a post-apartheid phenomenon, as work by von Holdt *et al.* (2011) and others would suggest. The issue is one of social cohesion at the neighbourhood level, an issue which is complemented by the focus on interracial cohesion in Chapter 7.

9.3   Contributions to the Literature

The thesis has demonstrated the utility of studying public opinion about international migrants and migration in South Africa. Quantitative methods can map the effect of particular variables (e.g. intergroup contact) and have the ability to account for sociodemographic characteristics in a way that is not available in qualitative research (where each study may represent a unique instance). Quantitative measures can reveal counter-intuitive outcomes and produce results that are repeatable and generalisable. The utility of quantitative research to understand attitudes towards immigration has been acknowledged in a recent work by Whitaker and Giersch (2015). These authors realised that it was necessary to complement work on xenophobia in Sub-Saharan Africa by critically investigating the drivers of anti-immigrant sentiment using quantitative research techniques. Aside from demonstrating the utility of quantitative public opinion research, this thesis has made several contributions to the existing literature on attitudes towards international migrants and migration.

This study makes a contribution to our understanding of whether economic self-interest drives xenophobia in South Africa. If attitudes on international migration were based primarily on rational economic self-interest, then we would have seen attitudes vary significantly across different economic subgroups. However, as discussed in the previous section, non-economic indicators were consistently more important attitudinal correlates than economic characteristics. This finding supports non-quantitative scholars like Dodson (2010),

Neocosmos (2010), Matsinhe (2011) and Crush and Ramachandran (2014) who are critical of the economic competition model as an explanatory for xenophobia in South Africa. This result also lends credence to other existing quantitative research on South Africa which has struggled to detect a link between an individual's economic position and their attitudes towards international immigration (e.g. Facchini *et al.,* 2013; Gordon, 2016b) and granting refugee protections (e.g. Gordon, 2016a).

The different chapters presented clear evidence that educational attainment had less of an effect on attitudes towards international migrants than may have been imagined. Regardless of the reason for this observation, the relationship between educational attainment and anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa seems to be more complex than the international literature would suggest. Other quantitative public opinion studies on immigration attitudes in South Africa discussed throughout this dissertation have also struggled to find a correlation between education and immigration attitudes (also see Whitaker & Giersch 2015 who looks at a subset of African countries). However, this dissertation presents a more exhaustive quantitative test of educational attainment on different types of attitudes on international migration.

This thesis has made a number of important contributions to how we can understand key potential non-economic drivers. This study provided the most comprehensive test of how contact quality may influence prejudice towards international migrants in South Africa. Chapter 8 presented the first test of Group Threat Theory and its ability to explain exclusionary attitudes towards international migrants in South Africa. Another major contribution of this dissertation was to clearly show the relationship between collective identity –especially national pride –and anti-immigrant sentiment. The results of this study speak well to the emerging qualitative literature on xenophobia which has tended to focus on social identity rather than economic factors. The remainder of this subsection will discuss this contribution in more detail.

An infamous paper by Putnam (2007) asserts that neighbourhood ethnic diversity results in residents 'hunkering' down. This 'hunkering' leads individuals to distrust their neighbours and refrain involvement in institutions. As may be apparent, Putnam's thesis on social trust and diversity has important implications for community building and intergroup animosity during periods of immigration. The research produced in this thesis did *not* present a direct test of this controversial thesis and there is a growing degree of evidence that has challenged the validity of Putnam's claims (see, for instance, Kesler and Bloemraad, 2010; Sturgis *et al.,* 2010; Abascal and Baldassarri, 2015). Chapter 6 undertook the first investigation of how neighbourhood alienation may impact on prejudice towards immigrants in South Africa using quantitative public opinion data[78]. The results show that policies oriented at increasing social bonds between neighbours may be more beneficial in promoting pro-immigrant attitudes. This has important implications for the study of social cohesion within South African communities.

This study provides wide-ranging evidence of how group identity influences individual attitudes towards international migrants. Chapter 8 found that cultural patriotism was positively associated with support for immigrant exclusion and provided support for the

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[78] Other forms of alienation may also play a role –in a study (i.e. Gordon, 2016b) on attitudes towards preferred immigration level, I found that distrust in political institutions was associated with anti-immigration sentiment, for example.

suppositions of scholars like Neocosmos (2010) on nationalism. This finding builds on a recently published work of mine which shows that cultural patriotism was a salient determinant of attitudes toward preferred immigration levels in South Africa (Gordon, 2016b). Chapter 5 provided the most comprehensive test in the country on the relationship between societal interest and attitudes towards international migrants, using the NWI to measure sociotropic concerns. The NWI is a composite score that provides a more precise measurement of sociotropic concerns than is found in most studies of intergroup attitudes. The chapter is the first to test the relationship between this important subjective wellbeing measure and positive evaluations of international migrants. The results suggest that public attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa may vary, depending on changes in subjective national wellbeing. My study of the relationship between subjective national wellbeing and anti-immigrant sentiment provides important insight into how macro-factors (e.g. national unemployment) impact on such sentiments.

The papers presented in this thesis are part of an emerging tradition of quantitative attitudinal research in Sub-Saharan Africa on international migrants and immigration. The findings of this thesis can help inform the existing findings of this tradition, particularly when trying to understand how macro-factors influence attitudes on the continent. For example, Whitaker and Giersch (2015) studied public opinion from eleven Sub-Saharan African countries and found that public opposition to immigration was significantly higher in countries that are more democratic and have higher levels of ethnic diversity. The results of this dissertation suggest that it is not so much democracy and diversity that are driving xenophobia, but the difficulty of forging social cohesion in such environments. This dissertation provided a comprehensive examination of how racial and social alienation may influence attitudes towards international migrants. In Chapter 7, in particular, a sense of racial alienation was shown to influence individual attitudes towards international migrants. This result, as well as the finding on cultural patriotism, suggests that attitudes are affected by a complex politics of 'indigeneity' in South Africa. Ultimately, I would say that is perhaps the most thought-provoking contribution of this thesis to the existing body of scholarship.

9.4   Areas of Future Research

In this thesis, I have presented a comprehensive positivist study on public attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa, looking at both economic and non-economic predictors. During the course of this dissertation, I have identified areas of future *quantitative* research that I have unable to undertake due to data limitations and time.   It would be useful to conclude this closing chapter by considering some of these future potential research areas. Some of these areas I have already started to explore in my recent work, while others remain difficult to investigate due to the limitations of existing public opinion datasets. These concluding remarks will not be able to outline all available research that might help predict South African citizens' attitudes towards international migrants. Instead, the goal of this final subsection is to identify how the gaps in my work can be rectified through new quantitative research.

The importance of contact outlined in this thesis suggests that future work on attitudes towards international migrants should focus on negative factors that prevent intimate contact. I have a chapter in a book project coordinated by Loren Landau and Oliver Bakewell (entitled *Forging African Communities: Mobility, Integration and Belonging*).   In the chapter, I have examined which factors best predict citizens' engagement in social relations with international migrants. The focus is on whether political and social alienation, as well as fear,

are associated with the hosts' level of contact with foreigners. The results (as yet unpublished) suggest that political efficacy and fear of crime, as well as interracial friendship, are important determinants of citizens' contact with immigrants. But this chapter did not completely address the problem of reverse causality[79] however. Further experimentation, employing longitudinal data, may resolve the problem of reverse causality that this dissertation's investigation of intergroup contact was unable to resolve. The work produced by Binder *et al.,* (2009) presents an interesting example of the direction this research could take.

In the previous section, I identified this dissertation's findings on educational attainment as one of the significant contributions of this study. There are multiple mechanisms through which exposure to formal education *may* act on attitudes as a number of scholars have pointed out (e.g. (Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). Consequently, it is difficult to know why educational attainment is not producing the results which we have anticipated. Further quantitative experimentation might be required to improve our understanding of the observed education effect in this study. Obtaining additional data on individual's quality of education may help more accurately discern the relationship between exposure to formal education and attitudes for example. Another methodology, which could be of substantial value, would be quasi-experimental manipulation of education levels in future studies of immigration attitudes.

This thesis made a valuable contribution to the literature by examining the power of national identity to influence attitudes towards international migration. The types of nationalism looked at in this thesis, however, followed standard constructions used in many surveys around the world. A more vibrant critique of chauvinistic nationalism in South Africa may require the design of new survey instruments to measure different types of sub- and supra-national identifications in the country. In a study on attitudes towards immigration levels, for example, I experimented with two types of supranational identifications and found them to be salient determinants of attitudes (Gordon, 2016b). The work presented in this thesis suggests that the complex role of aggrieved sub-nationalism needs further investigation and such explorations may have important consequences for the study of intergroup relations in other parts of Africa.

Public opinion studies using macro-level indicators can provide an informative picture of how institutional and socio-political macro-level factors can affect the emergence and manifestation of attitudes. Traditionally, the inclusion of macro-structural conditions in attitudinal studies allowed researchers to test a range of hypotheses while controlling for individual-level attributes. In this thesis, the role of self-reported neighbourhood social cohesion in predicting attitudes seems to suggest the importance of neighbourhood-level factors (such as the level of neighbourhood ethnic diversity, for instance). Moving forward, I

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[79] I controlled for animosity towards migrants to separate the role of preferences from that of structural constraints using multivariate techniques. In the chapter I detected lower frequency of contact for certain socio-demographic host subgroups (i.e. the elderly, the unemployed and certain racial minorities) even accounting for anti-immigrant preferences. This seems to suggest that these groups have no contact with international migrants due to structural constraints rather than intentional avoidance. In the chapter, I argued that addressing these structural constraints for these host subgroups will lower the 'cost' of heterogeneous contact. In addition, this will encourage the identified subgroups to pursue solid enduring forms of contact with international migrants.

feel that further study of the relationship between subjective national wellbeing and anti-immigrant sentiment will provide new insight into how macro-factors impact on attitudes and why changes in macro-factors over a long period of time affect attitudes.

Repeated references have been made to collective anti-immigrant violence in this study. There is a need to explore the link between anti-immigrant sentiment and anti-immigrant behaviour. Crush and Ramachandran (2014) argue that many scholars in South Africa investigating anti-immigrant violence eschewed xenophobia as an explanation for the violence. They describe a dearth of 'xenophobic realism' –the notion that hostile xenophobic attitudes translate into violent xenophobic actions –in Southern African academia. I agree with Crush and Ramachandran, xenophobic attitudes have a formidable mobilising influence on individual action. I plan to test this hypothesis using recently collected data on public attitudes towards anti-immigrant violence[80]. Using multivariate testing, I will explore the predictive influence of anti-immigrant sentiment on the anti-immigrant behaviour.

The quantitative work presented in this dissertation has made a valuable contribution to the literature. I acknowledge, however, that the findings of this study have raised questions which a quantitative analysis will be unable to answer. There are limitations to the ability of positivist data to produce knowledge and I have discussed these limitations in (especially the third chapter of) this dissertation. The methodology used in this study tends to allow the researcher to act only within a limited analytical context. Respondents' answers to questionnaires are unavoidably contained within a fixed subjectivity and this approach limits the researcher's room for self-understandings and self-discoveries which may be manifold and fluctuating. Non-quantitative research may be able to address these problems and help the researcher answer questions that quantitative research cannot. A more qualitative methodological approach could be used to 'discover' new topic areas not initially considered by the researcher, bringing new understanding to the complex problem of xenophobia in South Africa.

9.5   Conclusion

South African leaders in government have a tradition of condemning violence against international migrants, a tradition this thesis has highlighted. Although these leaders should be applauded for making such statements, there is a concern that the powerful in South Africa will not pursue the fight against xenophobia. This concern is rooted in the belief that many politicians seem to deny the seriousness of the problem. Doubting the seriousness of xenophobia in South Africa is a mistake. Crush and Ramachandran (2014: 21) put it best when they said:

> "Disowning the existence of xenophobia not only flies in the face of a large body of quantitative and qualitative research, it illustrates a continuing lack of political will (first evident in the mid-1990s) to own the problem and act against one of the most destructive and anti-democratic forces in post-apartheid South Africa".

The attitudinal analysis presented in this thesis demonstrates that xenophobia is a significant problem in South Africa. In doing this, my dissertation is echoing the results of other studies on anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa. The results of this study suggest that the underlying problem of widespread anti-immigrant attitudes is not being addressed with the

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[80] Preliminary data on how willing adult South Africans are to participate in violent attacks on foreign nationals were published by the author and his colleagues in a recent article (Roberts *et al.*, 2016).

necessary zeal and political will. I would urge policy-makers (and civil society leaders) not to underestimate the size of this problem.

The thesis has been able to identify some of the main correlates of anti-immigrant attitudes in the country. The findings of this dissertation have the potential to assist the government in the fight against xenophobia. Throughout this study, the author has assumed that the state, acting with civil society, can decrease the level of xenophobia amongst the general public in South Africa. However, I have been unable to prove that the government can make a difference in improving attitudes towards international migrants and reducing prejudice. I believe that it would be defeatist, however, to assume that the government cannot fight xenophobia in the same way that the state fights against sexism and racism. If the effort and resources devoted to combatting xenophobia in society are equal to the problem's scale, I believe that the state can make a positive difference in reducing the level of xenophobia within the adult South African public.

Appendix

Table A.1: Summary Statistics on the Dummy and Continuous Variables used in Multivariate Analysis in Table 5.5

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Female (ref. male)	2450	0.61	0.49	0	1
Age	2447	41.81	17.15	16	95
Married (ref. not married)	2453	0.35	0.48	0	1
Population Group (ref. Black Africans)					
Coloured	2449	0.18	0.39	0	1
Indian	2449	0.09	0.28	0	1
White	2449	0.14	0.35	0	1
Labour Market Status (ref. employed)					
Unemployed	2390	0.30	0.46	0	1
Part-time Employed	2390	0.08	0.27	0	1
Labour Inactive	2390	0.36	0.48	0	1
Years of Education	2285	9.63	3.68	0	16
National Pride	2441	4.10	0.82	1	5
Past Five Years Evaluation	2387	5.00	2.23	0	10
National Wellbeing Index	2304	49.36	16.51	1.67	98.33
Foreign Contact (ref. no contact)					
Acquaintances	2453	0.18	0.39	0	1
Friends	2453	0.33	0.47	0	1
Foreign Threat	2437	3.71	0.89	1	5
Party support (ref. ANC)					
Democratic Alliance	2453	0.16	0.37	0	1
Other Opposition	2453	0.09	0.29	0	1
Uncertain/Refused	2453	0.29	0.45	0	1
Geographic Type (ref. urban formal)					
Urban informal	2453	0.09	0.28	0	1
Rural, traditional areas	2453	0.22	0.41	0	1
Commercial farms	2453	0.08	0.28	0	1
Province (ref. Western Cape)					

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Eastern Cape	2453	0.14	0.35	0	1
Northern Cape	2453	0.06	0.23	0	1
Free State	2453	0.07	0.26	0	1
KwaZulu-Natal	2453	0.23	0.42	0	1
North West	2453	0.07	0.25	0	1
Gauteng	2453	0.16	0.36	0	1
Mpumalanga	2453	0.08	0.27	0	1
Limpopo	2453	0.08	0.28	0	1

Table A.2: Summary Statistics on the Dummy and Continuous Variables used in Multivariate Analysis in Table 6.1

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Female (ref. male)	2953	0.57	0.49	0	1
Age	2953	40.91	16.58	16	93
Married (ref. not married)	2945	0.40	0.49	0	1
Race group (ref. Black African)					
Coloured	2954	0.16	0.37	0	1
Indian	2954	0.09	0.29	0	1
White	2954	0.13	0.34	0	1
Geographic type (ref. Urban formal)					
Urban informal	2954	0.08	0.27	0	1
Rural, traditional areas	2954	0.21	0.41	0	1
Commercial farms	2954	0.08	0.27	0	1
Employment status (ref. full-time employed)					
Part-time employed	2842	0.27	0.44	0	1
Unemployed	2842	0.09	0.29	0	1
Student	2842	0.14	0.35	0	1
Retired	2842	0.32	0.47	0	1
Other labour Inactive	2842	0.09	0.28	0	1
Self-reported poverty status (ref. wealthy)					
Comfortable	2949	0.28	0.45	0	1
Just getting by	2949	0.34	0.47	0	1
Poor	2949	0.18	0.38	0	1

Very Poor	2949	0.04	0.20	0	1
Educational attainment (ref. junior primary and below)					
Senior Primary	2927	0.12	0.33	0	1
Incomplete Secondary	2927	0.38	0.49	0	1
Completed Secondary	2927	0.30	0.46	0	1
Tertiary	2927	0.12	0.33	0	1
Immigrant Contact (ref. no friends)					
Few friends	2948	0.19	0.39	0	1
Some or many friends	2948	0.10	0.31	0	1
Racial attachment	2947	4.26	0.82	1	5
National pride	2950	4.05	0.96	1	5
Political intolerance	2938	2.35	0.98	1	5
Social trust	2919	4.51	2.17	0	10
Neighbourhood bonding	2874	5.67	3.45	0	10
SCA	2950	6.73	1.97	0	10
Party support (ref. ANC)					
Democratic Alliance	2940	0.06	0.24	0	1
Other Opposition	2940	0.19	0.39	0	1
Uncertain/Refused	2940	0.26	0.44	0	1
Province (ref. Western Cape)					
Eastern Cape	2954	0.12	0.32	0	1
Northern Cape	2954	0.06	0.24	0	1
Free State	2954	0.07	0.25	0	1
KwaZulu-Natal	2954	0.20	0.40	0	1
North West	2954	0.07	0.25	0	1
Gauteng	2954	0.19	0.39	0	1
Mpumalanga	2954	0.08	0.27	0	1
Limpopo	2954	0.09	0.29	0	1

Table A.3: Summary Statistics on the Dummy and Continuous Variables used in Multivariate Analysis in Table 7.2

	Black African					Coloured				
	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Female (ref. male)	1665	0.65	0.48	0	1	510	0.65	0.48	0	1
Age	1665	38.42	16.47	16	92	510	42.40	17.04	16	90
Married (ref. not married)	1642	0.30	0.46	0	1	502	0.41	0.49	0	1
Rural (ref. urban)	1665	0.41	0.49	0	1	510	0.10	0.29	0	1
Political Affiliation (ref. ruling party)										
Opposition	1665	0.11	0.31	0	1	510	0.42	0.49	0	1
Undeclared/Unaffiliated	1665	0.32	0.47	0	1	510	0.41	0.49	0	1
Labour Market Status (ref. unemployed)										
Employed	1645	0.27	0.44	0	1	501	0.31	0.46	0	1
Labour Market Inactive	1645	0.30	0.46	0	1	501	0.39	0.49	0	1
Years of Education	1643	9.10	3.77	0	16	502	9.65	3.05	0	16
Living Standard Measure	1528	5.31	1.68	1	10	450	6.85	1.60	2	10
Foreign Friendship	1640	1.59	0.93	1	5	504	1.38	0.74	1	5
Nationalism	1660	4.26	0.71	1	5	507	4.16	0.71	1	5
Racial Identity	1657	4.31	0.74	1	5	505	4.15	0.80	1	5
Multiracial Threat Index	1657	3.45	0.81	1	5	506	3.48	0.84	1	5
Multiracial Friendship	1608	1.54	0.80	1	5	471	1.98	0.91	1	5
Quality Interracial Contact	1656	3.43	0.96	1	5	506	3.65	0.83	1	5
Perceived Foreign Benefit	1652	3.02	0.93	1	5	505	2.98	0.83	1	5
Province (ref. Western Cape)										
Eastern Cape	1665	0.16	0.36	0	1	510	0.15	0.36	0	1
Northern Cape	1665	0.05	0.21	0	1	510	0.13	0.34	0	1
Free State	1665	0.10	0.30	0	1	510	0.03	0.17	0	1
KwaZulu-Natal	1665	0.17	0.38	0	1	510	0.09	0.29	0	1
North West	1665	0.10	0.31	0	1	510	0.02	0.13	0	1
Gauteng	1665	0.12	0.32	0	1	510	0.10	0.30	0	1
Mpumalanga	1665	0.11	0.31	0	1	510	0.00	0.06	0	1
Limpopo	1665	0.16	0.36	0	1	510	0.00	0.04	0	1

Table A.3: Summary Statistics on the Dummy and Continuous Variables used in Multivariate Analysis in Table 7.2 (continues)

	Indian/Asian					White				
	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Female (ref. male)	310	0.67	0.47	0	1	388	0.57	0.50	0	1
Age	310	46.76	17.46	16	86	388	51.43	18.32	16	92
Married (ref. not married)	303	0.58	0.49	0	1	376	0.63	0.48	0	1
Rural (ref. urban)	310	0.00	0.06	0	1	388	0.03	0.16	0	1
Political Affiliation (ref. ruling party)										
Opposition	310	0.34	0.47	0	1	388	0.68	0.47	0	1
Undeclared/Unaffiliated	310	0.56	0.50	0	1	388	0.31	0.46	0	1
Labour Market Status (ref. unemployed)										
Employed	306	0.27	0.45	0	1	372	0.40	0.49	0	1
Labour Market Inactive	306	0.60	0.49	0	1	372	0.49	0.50	0	1
Years of Education	302	10.53	3.07	0	16	363	12.15	2.35	2	16
Living Standard Measure	279	8.26	1.41	5	10	343	8.99	1.22	3	10
Foreign Friendship	306	1.48	0.69	1	4	370	1.56	0.89	1	5
Nationalism	308	3.90	0.79	1	5	387	3.84	0.95	1	5
Racial Identity	307	4.25	0.73	1	5	383	3.81	1.07	1	5
Multiracial Threat Index	306	3.55	0.85	1	5	382	3.35	0.85	1	5
Multiracial Friendship	288	2.11	0.85	1	5	365	2.02	0.89	1	5
Quality Interracial Contact	307	3.56	0.87	1	5	377	3.91	0.73	1	5
Perceived Foreign Benefit	305	2.89	0.82	1	5	380	2.97	0.86	1	5
Province (ref. Western Cape)										
Eastern Cape	310	0.01	0.11	0	1	388	0.07	0.25	0	1
Northern Cape			n/a			388	0.11	0.31	0	1
Free State	310	0.01	0.08	0	1	388	0.11	0.31	0	1
KwaZulu-Natal	310	0.64	0.48	0	1	388	0.15	0.36	0	1
North West	310	0.01	0.08	0	1	388	0.07	0.26	0	1
Gauteng	310	0.29	0.45	0	1	388	0.22	0.42	0	1
Mpumalanga	310	0.01	0.10	0	1	388	0.12	0.33	0	1
Limpopo	310	0.00	0.06	0	1	388	0.02	0.15	0	1

Table A.4: Summary Statistics on the Dummy and Continuous Variables used in Multivariate Analysis in Table 8.5

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Age	2735	41.73	17.68	16	95
Female (ref. male)	2738	0.60	0.49	0	1
Married (ref. not married)	2739	0.42	0.49	0	1
Non-Citizen Parent(s) (ref. none)	2685	0.07	0.26	0	1
Ethnic group (ref. White)					
Coloured	2739	0.17	0.38	0	1
Indian	2739	0.12	0.32	0	1
Sesotho	2739	0.14	0.35	0	1
Setswana	2739	0.08	0.27	0	1
isiXhosa	2739	0.14	0.34	0	1
isiZulu	2739	0.13	0.34	0	1
African Minority	2739	0.11	0.32	0	1
Geographic Type (ref. urban formal)					
Urban informal	2739	0.05	0.22	0	1
Rural, traditional areas	2739	0.22	0.41	0	1
Commercial farms	2739	0.05	0.21	0	1
Party support (ref. ANC)					
Democratic Alliance	2739	0.18	0.38	0	1
Other Opposition	2739	0.09	0.29	0	1
Uncertain/Refused	2739	0.33	0.47	0	1
Years of Education	2664	9.60	3.60	0	16
Employment status (ref. employed)					
Part-time	2617	0.08	0.27	0	1
Unemployed	2617	0.33	0.47	0	1
Labour Inactive	2617	0.35	0.48	0	1
LSM Scale	2544	6.32	2.09	1	10
Immigration Consequence Index	2698	3.42	0.74	1	5
Foreign Contact					
Perceived Immigrant Size	2729	2.96	1.42	1	5
Foreign Acquaintances	2734	2.32	1.36	1	5

Foreign Friends	2728	1.59	0.91	1	5
Political Patriotism	2686	2.49	0.75	1	4
Cultural Patriotism	2675	3.12	0.62	1	4
Province (ref. Western Cape)					
Eastern Cape	2739	0.13	0.34	0	1
Northern Cape	2739	0.06	0.24	0	1
Free State	2739	0.08	0.26	0	1
KwaZulu-Natal	2739	0.20	0.40	0	1
North West	2739	0.07	0.26	0	1
Gauteng	2739	0.15	0.35	0	1
Mpumalanga	2739	0.08	0.27	0	1
Limpopo	2739	0.10	0.30	0	1

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