AN ASSESSMENT OF NIGERIA'S COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICIES AGAINST BOKO HARAM

Dissertation submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (MA) in Politics at the School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal

By

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DECLARATION

I, Olumuyiwa Temitope Faluyi, hereby declare that this dissertation is my own original work and that all sources have been accurately reported and acknowledged, and that this document has not previously in its entirety or in part been submitted at any university in order to obtain academic qualification.

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DECLARATION BY SUPERVISORS

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Regular consultation took place between the student and us throughout the study. We advised the student to the best of our ability and approved the final document for submission to the School of Social Sciences' Higher Degrees Office for examination by the University appointed Examiners.

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DEDICATION

In memory of all the victims of Boko Haram's vices and to all who have worked tirelessly to ensure peace reigns in Nigeria.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ABSTRACT

Boko Haram has perpetrated its terrorist acts within Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin since 2009. This has drawn local and international attention. The *modus operandi* of the sect has taken the forms of shootings, kidnappings and use of Improvised Explosive Devices. The Nigerian government has responded to the Boko Haram quagmire. However, despite government's response, the sect has continued to unleash its terror. This study seeks to assess government's counter-terrorism policies against Boko Haram. This culminated into the generation of salient questions like what the policies are, factors that informed government's rationale for adopting these policies, how effective the policies have been and how government can have pro active strategies to address the Boko Haram crisis.

Systems and state fragility theories were used as the theoretical lens that guided the study. The systems theory was used to explain factors that informed the adoption of government's counter-terrorism polices and why feedback is necessary. The feedback is necessary in order to discover flaws in a policy so that such flaws can be addressed and better polices can be made and implemented. This is the thrust of this study. The state fragility theory was used to explain how the weakness of the Nigerian state aided the emergence of Boko Haram and has also affected Nigeria's counter-terrorism policies in mitigating the excesses of Boko Haram. The weakness of the Nigerian state is hinged on weak state institutions which has manifested through economic inequality, poverty, porosity of border, brutality of the security apparatus and political instability.

The study adopted qualitative data analysis method. This was actualised through the review and assessment of journals, books, reports, newspapers and media reports. The study assessed National Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the Legislative Acts directed towards counter-terrorism in order to have a robust assessment. The policies are deemed weak due to poor implementation caused by weak state institutions. The manifestations of a fragile state were seen as factors responsible for the non optimal performance of these policies in the course of implementation. The need to strengthen state institutions was given as suggestion on how to make the policies work effectively.

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GLOSSARY

ACGSF: Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund

AD: Anno Domini

AfDB: African Development Bank

AQIM: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

CBN: Central Bank of Nigeria

CCTV: Closed Circuit Television

CCTVs: Closed Circuit Televisions

CJTF: Civilian Joint Task Force

CSOs: Civil Society Organisations

CTR: Currency Transaction Report

DIA: Defence Intelligence Agency

DSS: Department of State Security

ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States

EDCs: Entrepreneurship Development Centres

EFCC: Economic and Financial Crimes Commission

EU: European Union

FCT: Federal Capital Territory

FGN: Federal Government of Nigeria

FTO: Foreign Terrorist Organisation

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GIABA: Inter-governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa

GSMC: Global System for Mobile Communication

GSPC: *Salafist* Group for Preaching and Combat

ICC: International Criminal Court of Justice

ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross

IDPs: Internally Displace Persons

IEDs: Improvised Eplosive Devices

IEP: Institute for Economics and Peace

IIP: Interfaith Initiative for Peace

IRA: Irish Republican Army

ISIS: Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

JOTRO: Joint Military Task Force named Operation Restore Order

LCBC: Lake Chad Basin Commission

MASSOB: Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra

MLPA 2011: Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2011

MLPA 2012: Money Laundering (Prohibition) (Amendment) Act, 2012

MNJTF: Multi-national Joint Task Force

MOSOP: Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People

MOU: Memorandum of Understanding

MUJAO: Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa

MW: Mega Watts

NACTEST: National Counter-terrorism Strategy

NBS: National Bureau of Statistics

NCS: Nigerian Customs Service

NDLEA: National Drug Law Enforcement Agency

NEMA: National Emergency Management Agency

NFIC: Nigerian Financial Intelligence Centre

NFIU: Nigerian Fraud Intelligence Unit

NIA: National Intelligence Agency

NIMC: National Identity Management Commission

NIREC: National Interfaith Religious Council

NIS: Nigerian Immigration Service

NPC: Northern Peoples Congress

NPF: Nigerian Police Force

NSCDC: Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps

ONSA: Office of the National Security Adviser

PFLP: Popular Frontier for the Liberation of Palestine

PINE: Presidential Initiative on the North East

POC: Proceeds of Crime

PSTD: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

RPG: Rocket Propelled Grenade

RRF: Refinancing and Restructuring Fund

SALWs: Small Arms and Light Weapons

SIM: Subscriber Identity Module

SMEDAN: Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency of Nigeria

SMMEs: Small and Medium Scale Enterprises

STR: Suspicious Transaction Report

TPA 2011: Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011

TPA 2013: Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013

TSCTP: Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership

UBEC: Universal Basic Education Commission

UK: United Kingdom

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

UNESCO: United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

US DOD: United States Department of Defence

US: United States

USAID: United States Agency for International Development

VSF: Victims Support Fund

₦: Naira, Nigeria's Official Currency

$: United States of America Dollars

CHAPTER ONE
GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

1.1   Introduction

Since the attainment of statehood in 1914, Nigeria has been engulfed in different ethno-religious and political crisis resulting in substantial casualties (Aborisade and Mundt, 2002; Isichei, 1987; Ojie and Ehwhrujakpor, 2009; Suberu, 1996). Prior to the year 2000, several lives and properties were lost to ethno-religious crisis. The post-2000 era has witnessed other forms of violent confrontations; the most devastating has been terrorism, perpetrated by the Islamic group, Boko Haram. Successive Nigerian administrations, since 2009, have had to deal with the menace of terrorism.

After decades of military rule, Nigeria returned to civil rule and the fourth democratically elected president was sworn in on May 29th, 1999 (Nkechi, 2013). Despite the advent of democratic rule, the inability of political leaders at all levels to address germane developmental issues has led to the emergence of ethnic militias from different regions in Nigeria which have in turn threatened the nation's security architecture (Ahokegh, 2012; Isyaku, 2013). According to Omitola (2012), the state's inability to effectively perform its functions resulted in the gradual loss of interest in the national project and a shift in the people's allegiance to other groups that are filling this vacuum created by the Nigerian state. These contradictions led the populace into the waiting arms of several insurgency groups, (who later embraced absolute violence) deriving support from ethnically characterised allegiance and those using religion as a mobilisation strategy (Omitola, 2012). Hence, the country has been enmeshed in the quagmire of ethno-religious tensions and an insurgency in the oil-rich Niger Delta (Brinkel and Ait-Hida 2012).

Ikelegbe and Okumu (cited in Akinola and Uzodike, 2013) attributed this endemic occurrence of violence to the poor conflict resolution mechanism of the Nigerian state. The government ignored the socio-political demands of several groups hitherto made in a peaceful way. According to Abiye (cited in Patrick and Felix, 2013), these groups took advantage of the government's inefficiency and inactions in dealing with the fundamental elements of nationhood such as internal security, resource control, injustice, corruption, ethnicism, overlordship and

marginalisation. Some of these groups later became organised and militarised under different militias like the Oodua People's Congress, Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), the Niger Delta Volunteer Force, the Arewa People's Congress, Egbesu Boys, Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), Ijaw National Congress and for over a decade now, Boko Haram (Audu, 2015; Omitola, 2012). These groups consistently protested against marginalisation, environmental degradation, poverty, political freedom, demand for federalism, autonomy and political leadership (Olowoselu *et al.,* 2014). For instance, MOSOP and other groups in the Niger Delta demand for resource control, fiscal federalism and agitating against environmental degradation caused by oil exploration. MASSOB demands for political freedom while Boko Haram's demand is an Islamic state (Brinkel and Ait-Hida, 2012; Felix *et al.,* 2014; Olowoselu *et al.,* 2014; Omitola, 2012). These are just some of the groups and their demands. The means for the achievement of these objectives include bombings, killings, kidnapping, vandalism among others (Akinola and Tella, 2013). However, what distinguishes the Northern originated Boko Haram terrorist group from among others are the motives behind its vices which seem political, social and/or religious in nature (Akinola and Tella, 2013).

Boko Haram's agenda has a strong religious mandate (Brinkel and Ait-Hida, 2012). Akinola and Uzodike (2013: 392) recall that 'Northern Nigeria has witnessed the emergence and resurgence of revivalists, extremists, reformists, radicals, fundamentalists and revolutionary Islamist movements since the early 19th century'. This reveals that the desire for strict Islamic values is not a new thing in Northern Nigeria. Historically, the Nineteenth-Century Jihadist legacy of Usman Dan Fodio and his abhorrence for paganism can be adjudged as the root of radical Islam in Nigeria (Azuma, 2015). International influence as evidenced in the 1979 Iranian Revolution further fuelled the quest to smother the secular status of Nigeria and incline it to a pure Islamic system (Chaliand, 1987; Loimeier, 2012). An obvious effect of this was the Maitatsine crisis in the early 1980s to late 1980s which were repressed by security forces (Loimeier, 2012; Schweitzer and Shaul, 2003; Udounwa, 2013).

Akyeampong (cited in Maiangwa 2012) commenting on post-independence Nigeria, explained the emergence of many extremist Islamic sects calling for Islamic reform and cleansing of their societies. These groups include *inter alia* Derika, the Yan Izala, Maitatsine and the Northern branch of Muslim Students Society (Isichei, 1987). Akyeampong (cited in Maiangwa 2012)

recalls that the groups were united in their hatred for a Western way of life (they linked the adoption of a Western system of government to corruption in Nigeria) and that an Islamic state governed by strict *Sharia*[1] law is the solution to the failure of the country's leadership problems. These Islamic groups' quest to have an Islamic system of governance as a panacea for government's lapses has been a historical matter (David, 2013; Schweitzer and Shaul, 2003).

These Islamic groups have been violent and the response of the government has always been military/police deployment, commission reports on each crisis (which may never be implemented) and arrests (Onuoha, 2010). However, the moment such crisis are quelled, little is heard about the prosecution of suspects and the government even ignores the root causes of such movements (Onuoha, 2010). This is why Adesoji (2011) submitted that there has always been a *de facto* succession even if a group is contained. The Boko Haram group is an ideological movement that appeals to the poor masses (especially in Northern Nigeria) exploiting social and religious fault lines in the country (Udounwa, 2013). Boko Haram terror has its root in such domestic factors as acute poverty, state and leadership failures, ethnic nationalism and power struggles (Onapajo *et al.,* 2012). However, the phenomenon cannot be isolated from the global trend of religious terrorism (Onapajo *et al.,* 2012). Put differently, Boko Haram is a product of Nigeria's domestic, political, socio-economic and to some extent religious problems (Ahokegh, 2012).

Boko Haram is a militant Islamic sect based in Northern Nigeria and otherwise known as *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad* (people committed to the propagation of the Prophet Mohammed's teachings and *Jihad*[2]) (Popoola, 2012: 46-47). The group was formed around 2002 and is guided by the name 'Boko Haram' which when loosely translated from *Hausa* means 'Western education is forbidden' (Okemi, 2013: 2). Boko Haram operated in a relatively peaceful manner in its first seven years of existence as it engaged in low-level conflicts

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[1] Sharia stands as the Muslim legal code. Its sources are the Quran, the Sunna (the traditions coming from Prophet Mohammed himself), the kiyas (analogical deductions from other sources) and Ijma (consensus among Islamic jurists) (Aborisade and Mundt, 2002). Muslims believe the Quran contains God's message which encompasses social, political, economic and legal systems based on Sharia set down to guide all spheres of human behaviour (Khan, 2013).

[2] Jihad is an inner struggle of the individual believer to obey God's commandments and avoid worldly temptations. However, there is an outward aspect of Jihad as well. In this sense, the concept refers to the defence of the Islamic religion which is a duty of each believer. The concept of Jihadism is oriented towards this latter meaning. Jihadism can be an extreme political ideology characterised by the divine endeavour to spread Islam over the whole world by waging war against all unbelievers (Brinkel and Ait-Hida, 2012).

with the police and unco-operative villagers (Olowoselu *et al.,* 2014; Uchehara, 2014). The group utilised bows, arrows, knives, petrol bombs and machetes as tools for violence (Solomon, 2012). In this early stage, the government's response focused on utilising security agencies to tackle the uprisings in the absence of any formal policy specifically directed at terrorism (Dasuki, 2013; Onuoha, 2010). This inevitably led to failure in addressing the root causes as government saw the matter as requiring pure law enforcement (Dasuki, 2013; Onuoha, 2010).

 The sect became popular in 2009 when it participated actively in the insurgency and violence which occurred in Northern Nigeria (Patrick and Felix, 2013). This can be adjudged as the beginning of the sect's history of violence (Johnmary, 2013). They attacked a police station in Bauchi city in July 2009 which resulted in shifting violence to Maiduguri in Borno, Yobe, Kano, Gombe and other states in Northern Nigeria from Adamawa to Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Niger, Kaduna, Kogi and so on (Johnmary, 2013). After the violence settled, its leader, Yusuf Mohammed was arrested and murdered by the Nigerian Police Force in a mode which was reviled by the global community (Onuoha and Ugwueze, 2014). This once again suggests that the government did not adopt concrete policy actions but used physical force as a panacea against those considered political dissidents (Onuoha and Ugwueze, 2014).

The operational tactics of Boko Haram have become sophisticated and it now encompasses hit-and-run attacks, targeted assassinations, drive-by shootings, use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDS), suicide bombings, surprise attacks on security establishments and gun attacks on some civilian locations (Onuoha, 2014). In addition, Akinbi (2015) noted that the most recent method was kidnapping (like the case of 276 Chibok girls' kidnapping), shooting of victims at close range, throat slitting as well as daylight and nocturnal attacks. They also invaded communities, killed some of the residents and took over territories within the Nigerian boundary (Isine, 2016; Marama, 2016). The activities of the sect particularly since 2009 have constituted a major security hazard to the nation and made Northern Nigeria, in particular, the North East (where their activities are widespread) the most unsafe place to live in Nigeria (Akinbi, 2015). The viral destruction of lives and properties perpetrated through terrorism in the Northern part of Nigeria has weakened the once vivacious economic bastions and the tourism life of Kano and Plateau states respectively, as some cities and towns in the North now live in perpetual fear (Isyaku, 2013). This has negatively affected the lives of women and children and has crippled the socio-economic and political activities of the region (Isyaku, 2013). Official figures put the death

toll originating from Boko Haram violence at over 20,000 and properties lost worth over 40 million Dollars (Akpan *et al.*, 2014 and *Vanguard*, 4th June 2016).

The Institute for Economics and Peace in its Global Terrorism Index[3] 2015, indicated that Nigeria is ranked 3rd after Iraq and Afghanistan in global terrorism ranking (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015). The report went further to state that Nigeria has witnessed the largest upsurge in terrorist deaths ever experienced by any country, increasing by over 300 percent to 7,512 fatalities (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015). According to Lawal (cited in Onuoha 2010), apart from its thousands of members in Northern Nigeria, the sect also has members from the Republics of Niger, Chad and Sudan. There are speculations on Boko Haram having links with Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb and *Al-Shabaab*[4] in Somalia (Campbell 2014). This could then be linked to the fact that the violent activities of the insurgents have assumed international dimension coupled with the kidnappings and brutal killings of some Europeans. It also attacked the United Nations (UN) building in Abuja in August 2011 killing 23 people (Walker, 2012).

The activities of Boko Haram have crippled the social and economic activities in border communities of Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger Republic and Chad (Olowoselu *et al.*, 2014). This has created a deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Lake Chad Basin (Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon) with close to 2.2 million people forcibly displaced in the region (UNHCR, 2016; United Nations, 2015). Food crisis globally also had a marginal increase resulting from the nefarious activities of Boko Haram. Northern Nigeria, which prides itself as the "food basket of Africa" producing and exporting such food products as onions, peppers, yams, potatoes among others have been negatively affected as farmers have been scared away by Boko Haram and

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[3] Global Terrorism Index is a comprehensive study which accounts for the direct and indirect impact of terrorism in 162 countries in terms of its effects on lives lost, injuries, property damage and the psychological after effect of terrorism (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015).

[4] 'Al-Shabaab is an extremist organisation that controls most of Southern and Central Somalia. It learned its strategy and tactics from al Qaeda and the Taliban and relies relatively on a relatively small number of foreign fighters, most of whom are Somalis with foreign passports from the large Somalis in diaspora' (Shinn, 2011: 203). This reveals that the group has international affiliations. This is why Megged (2015) submitted that 'it is a jihadist group based in Somalia with its allegiance to the international Islamist outfit Al Qaeda. It draws its membership from youths between 15 and 45 years of age both Somalis natives and foreigners. It has posed major threat and attacks to the Eastern region especially Kenya and Somalia'. The group's threat to Kenya justifies why the Kenyan government has put in place measures to check the group within the Kenyan territory. The group equally has its presence in Uganda (Clarke and Lekalake, 2016).

farms abandoned after the locals were threatened with extermination by the terrorists (Akinola and Uzodike, 2013: 393).

There has been support by global partners towards curbing terrorism in Nigeria. The United States-Nigeria Bi-National Commission which is a working group has met on how to strengthen Nigeria's security (Nkechi, 2013). The United States (US) has designated Boko Haram as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) as this creates a global awareness on the lethal nature of the sect, provided security related training by the United States Department of Defence (US DOD), provision of aid by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and proscription of Boko Haram leaders with placement of $7 million bounty on Abubakar Shekau, the group's leader (Onuoha and Ugwueze, 2012). Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) has also set up a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of up to10, 000 comprising troops from Nigeria, Niger Republic, Chad, Cameroon and the Benin Republic to forestall the cross-border activities of the group within the Lake Chad region (Amnesty International, 2015; Clarke and Lekalake, 2016).

The Nigerian government on its part has taken different policy measures to combat Boko Haram. These policy measures became necessary because the military action which was *ad hoc* had hitherto not addressed the menace. They were put in place with effect from 2010 after the group started its violence following the death of its leader and emergence of a new leader, Abubakar Shekau (Loimeier, 2012). These include prosecution of arrested members, deployment of troops, temporary closure of part of the Northern Nigerian border, deportation of illegal immigrants, capacity building of security forces on counter-terrorism, installation of surveillance equipment and initiation of negotiation moves by the government (Onuoha, 2014). Other measures taken are: poverty alleviation programmes, economic development, social reforms and provision of basic education for the *Almajiri*[5] (Akpan *et al.,* 2014). State of emergency was also declared in parts of some states in Northern Nigeria (Akpan *et al.,* 2014). Furthermore, the government created the 7th Division of the Nigerian Army headquartered in Maiduguri and relocated the

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[5] 'The word Almajiri is derived from the Arabic word 'Almuhajirun' migrants. It refers to a traditional method of acquiring and memorizing the Glorious Quran in Hausa/Fulani land where boys at their tender ages are sent out by their parents or guardians to other villages, towns or cities for Qur'an education under a knowledgeable Islamic scholar called Mallam' (Yusha'u *et al.*, 2013: 126). Such practice is predominant in Northern Nigeria. The inability of the Malams to feed these children make the former wonder the streets for food remnants in order to keep body and soul.

military command centre to the North East (precisely Maiduguri and Yola), which are the strongholds of Boko Haram (Akinbi, 2015; Campbell, 2014).

The group has been able to survive counter-terrorism moves by the Nigerian government (Brinkel and Ait-Hida, 2012). For example, the negotiation initiative failed. President Jonathan-led administration (2010 to 2015) initiated dialogue with Boko Haram on the premise that if the latter lays down its arms, it will grant it amnesty but this met a brick wall because members of the sect remain faceless (Akinbi, 2015). Boko Haram is not a registered organisation with a physical address and their press statements are usually sent to the media with hardly any trace (Popoola, 2012). The group's unwillingness to negotiate is consequent upon having a splinter group, *Ansaru* [6](Akpan *et al.* 2014; Uchehara 2014; Walker 2012). The reported splitting of the group in 2009 has made it difficult for the government to meet the 'contact person' to negotiate with. They have the Abubakar Shakau group and the Mamman Nur and al-Barnawi led group called *Ansaru* (Campbell, 2014; Chiluwa and Ajiboye, 2014; Pérouse de Montclus, 2014a). The recent naming of Abu Musab al Barnawi by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) as the new leader of Boko Haram who has replaced Shekau (though Shekau rejected this) further affirms the division within the sect (Ajayi, 2016 and Somorin, 2016a).

Former President Olusegun Obasanjo and an activist, Shehu Sanni tried to initiate talks with the sect by going through Yusuf's brother-in-law, Babakura Fugu, but shortly after departing from Fugu's residence, Fugu was assassinated (Walker, 2012). This might have been another sign that Boko Haram was against dialogue because he was not mandated to speak for them (Uchehara, 2014). The variations and difficulties in the demands of the sect make dialogue a mirage. The demands include having Nigeria divide into two (North and South), the whole of Nigeria be converted to Islam and *Sharia* adopted and that former president, Goodluck Jonathan convert to Islam (Walker, 2012). However, the demand that the killers of Mohammed Yusuf be prosecuted and their senior members arrested be released can be met (Walker, 2012). In March 2016, a statement issued by Abubakar Shekau revealed that the sect is not willing to negotiate at all (*Vanguard,* 1ˢᵗ April 2016). The negotiation the government seems to be embracing now is

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[6]*Ansaru* shares the ideology and doctrine of Boko Haram, although there are differences in tactics. First, unlike Boko Haram even from inception, Ansaru committed itself to not harming innocent Muslims except in self-defence. Second, Ansaru condemns the killing of innocent security operatives. Third, Ansaru proclaimed itself the defender of Islamic interests all over West Africa and indeed Africa as a whole as distinct from Boko Haram's localisation in the North of Nigeria (Mohammed, 2014).

detainee-hostage swap deal (Nwabughiogu, 2016). The government has decided to swap the over 200 Chibok girls kidnapped with Boko Haram detainees and even gave Boko Haram to engage any recognised international non-governmental organisation to facilitate this (Adetayo, 2016). The conflicting messages from the sect about negotiation make negotiation an option far from being realised.

A Further contributing factor to the failure of these measures is the limited adherence to the rule of law. A good example is the unlawful detention of suspects including women and children in deplorable military facilities without being charged to court (Dasuki, 2013; *Punch*, 18th July 2016). In order to have documented policy documents that can bring about a framework, rule of law and accountability, the government further initiated the National Counter-terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE[7]) Programme, Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 (TPA 2011); Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013 (TPA 2013); Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2011 (MLPA 2011) and Money Laundering (Prohibition) (Amendment) Act, 2012 (MLPA 2012) (Dasuki, 2013).

The government's response to the continued destruction of lives and properties by Boko Haram and the threat they portend to the security of the state remains the focal point of this research. That is to say, despite the steps taken by the Nigerian government, the menace of the terrorists continues to undermine the authority of the state over its territory as well as the capacity of the state to protect its citizens - a very fundamental attribute of a state. The research will assess these policy measures to ascertain if they have significantly curtailed terrorism. To achieve this, the study will be structured into seven chapters.

The first chapter presents a background to the study, problem statement and research questions. Methodology, the definition of key terms, significance and limitation of the study also form part of this chapter. Chapter two reviews terrorism from its historical perspective. Furthermore, the section reviews the literature on counter-terrorism from the global view and counter-terrorism

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[7] CVE is a programme meant for counter-radicalisation and deradicalisation. Counter-radicalisation includes religious, cultural, communication and governance components. It is religiously and culturally focused by creating inter-faith dialogue, implementing an Imam training programme, empowering research on Islam, creating a database on Islamic institutions and focus on extracurricular activities for youths like sports. The deradicalisation aspect is prison based. The objective is to engage violent extremists, convicts/suspects in theological, ideological, physical and entrepreneurial value change that leads to positive transformation in their behaviour (*The Nigerian Observer*, 17th October 2014). However, this programme will not be evaluated because it is not in the public domain owing to security reasons.

policies in Nigeria. The theoretical frameworks within which the study is situated are the systems and state fragility theories make up chapter three. The Nigerian state from a historical, economic and political perspective was considered in Chapter four while the latter part of the same chapter focuses on counter-terrorism policy process in Nigeria. Chapter five provides deeper insight into Boko Haram's origin, evolution, survivalist strategies and structure; havoc perpetrated, international links and sources of fund. The sixth chapter explains what the NACTEST is as well as the Acts. The chapter also assesses the NACTEST as a siamese with the legislative Acts based on their effects on the activities of Boko Haram. The last chapter consists of a summary, suggestions and conclusion.

1.2 Statement of Problem

There has been an appreciable number of scholarly works on the Boko Haram phenomenon. These range from the origin of the sect, factors leading to its emergence, their *modus operandi* and extent of the damage inflicted by the sect. The Nigerian government has responded to the sect's menace. The activities of Boko Haram which is over a decade seems strange to the security framework of Nigeria as a result of its terrorism dynamism.

There have been some policies that have been implemented by the government on counter-terrorism ranging from executive pronouncements, presidential orders, acts and policy documents. These policies include *inter alia* declaration of a state of emergency, creation of the 7th Division of the Nigerian Army, the relocation of the military command centre to Maiduguri, TPA 2011, NACTEST (Akinbi, 2015; Campbell, 2014; Dasuki, 2013). These studies have created avenues to ascertain if these policies are effective in neutralising the strength and prowess of Boko Haram. There has been limited research on NACTEST and the legislative Acts that has to do with counter-terrorism in Nigeria. It is important to give these a consideration based on the fact that NACTEST and these Acts are the pillars upon which other measures are constructed. Consequently, this study seeks to examine the performance of Nigeria's counter-terrorism policies amidst continued destruction of lives and properties by the Islamic sect.

1.3 Research Objectives

The primary aim of this study is to assess the effectiveness of Nigeria's counter-terrorism policies against Boko Haram while the research objectives are to:

a) Examine the counter-terrorism policies made by the Nigerian Government;

b) Assess the motivations behind the choice of such counter-terrorism policies;

c) Evaluate how effective government-led counter-terrorism policies against Boko Haram have been; and

d) Proffer sustainable policy options and pro-active counter-terrorism strategies to combat the Boko Haram reign of terror in Nigeria.

1.4 Research Questions

The main question addressed in this study is to ascertain the effectiveness of Nigeria's counter-terrorism policies on the activities of Boko Haram. This is broken down into the following:

a) What are the counter-terrorism policies made by the Nigerian Government?

b) What are the motivations behind the choice of such counter-terrorism policies?

c) How effective are the government-led counter-terrorism policies against Boko Haram?

d) How can government implement proactive counter-terrorism strategies?

1.5 Research Assumption

The researcher is working under the hypothesis or assumption that weak counter-terrorism policies implemented by the Nigerian government explain the persistence of the Boko Haram menace.

1.6. Research Methodology and Methods

The study adopted a qualitative approach founded on primary and secondary sources of data. The qualitative approach encompasses 'attributes, characteristics, or categories that describe an individual and cannot be quantified' (Marczyk *et al.*, 2005: 97). According to Denzin and Lincoln (1994: 2), qualitative approach involves studying 'things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to

them'. Qualitative research affords a researcher an understanding of people within their social and cultural contexts (Myers, 1997). Qualitative research is connected to in-depth exploratory studies where the prospect for quality responses is available (Biggam, 2008: 86). This study does not favour the use of interviews or survey research partly because of security risk and confidentiality associated with terrorism. Secondary sources are useful in understanding intellectual analysis of the phenomenon under study. Whilst primary sources form the foundation for which answers are provided to important questions the research seeks to answer (Rugg and Petre, 2007: 32).

The primary sources for this study include legislative Acts, government bulletins, internet resources, newspaper reports and official reports from local and international sources like the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and UN among others. Primary data generated in the Nigerian security architecture and key members of Boko Haram are presented and available in the public domain (local and foreign), internet resources, government and other official documents which are adequate for a robust analysis of the subject-matter.

The restricted time-frame for completion of a master's degree programme, the sensitivity of terrorism in Nigeria, the reluctance and hostility of gatekeepers towards approving interviews, vulnerability of Northern Nigeria to massive loss of lives and the inability of the Nigerian security institutions to guarantee the security of lives and properties have rendered the use of interview as a methodical tool extremely remote. The secondary sources include textbooks, journals, conference papers and unpublished materials. Therefore, desktop data gathering and analysis was employed.

1.7   Definition of Key Terms

Some terms that are germane to this study will be defined. These include terrorism, counter-terrorism, public policy, radicalisation, deradicalisation and counter-radicalisation.

1.7.1 Terrorism

There is no clear and universally acknowledged definition and as a result, the phenomenon continues to generate debates as to what actually constitutes terrorism (Akinola and Tella, 2013; Coady, 2004; Crelinsten, 2009; Franks, 2006; Griest and Mahan 2003; Isyaku, 2013; Merari, 2007; Oberschall, 2004).

Griest and Mahan (2003) postulated that conceptualising the right definition of terrorism is subjective. They further posited that some definitions primarily include religious motivations, others include hate and catastrophic groups, some others refer to non-state actors while others refer to state-sponsored terrorism. This subjectivity has metamorphosed into dynamism over the years in its definition and that is why Schmid (cited in Neumann, 2009) opined that the phenomenon is complex and its meaning has transformed over the centuries ranging from the French revolution to the small non-state groups which represent a more contemporary understanding of terrorism. This is why Weinzierl (2004) cited examples of the Western nations' use of the term to condemn and define enemies of the state as well as label some acts like bombings, assassinations and kidnappings as terrorist acts. However, he noted that despite these difficulties in finding a common definition, acts of terrorism are intended to evoke responses and generate fear from an audience much wider than the immediate victim (Weinzierl, 2004). Another reason for the difficulty in arriving at a definition as posited by Kielsgard (2006) is that definitions reflect the values and goals of the authors.

In agreement, Hoffman (2006) opined that tagging an individual or group as 'terrorists' becomes almost inevitably subjective depending to a great extent, on whether one has sympathy for or in opposition to the person/group/cause concerned. A third reason for the lack of consensus on the concept is that hardly anyone christens the word to oneself or one's actions, this is why the perpetrators do not admit that their crimes are wrong (Hallett, 2004; Primoratz, 2004). Terrorists believe their actions are fully justified by the absolute corruption of the world on the one hand and the limpidness of their own motivation on the other hand (Hallett, 2004; Primoratz, 2004).

According to Resolution 1566 (2004) adopted by the Security Council of the UN at its 5053rd meeting on 8th October 2004, terrorism is:

"criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism" (United Nations, 2004).

In this study, this definition represents the basic usage of the term terrorism. It must be noted that terrorism, as projected in this study, is different from crime, guerrilla tactics and robbery, but may utilise any of these to accomplish its purpose. This UN definition encompasses the basic features of terrorism such as ideology, political intent, deliberate action, violence, multiple actors and supporters, a disaffected individual and an enabling group (Borum, 2004; Franks, 2006; Richardson, 2006). While the definitions of terrorism may vary according to perspectives, these attributes bring one to the conclusion that the act is targeted at a fear-inducing activity (Aston, 1981). This is echoed by Crelinsten (2009: 3) when he posited that 'kill one, frighten 10,000; actions speak louder than words; propaganda by the deed'. The intention here is to create fear beyond their immediate victims.

1.7.2 Counter-terrorism

The varying nature of terrorism and their driving force/ the driving force behind them in different countries determine what should be committed into countering it (Crelinsten, 2009). These include funds, personnel, institutions and time (Crelinsten, 2009). These assertions explain why Chailand (1987) sees counter-terrorism as a response to terrorism and also one of the crucial outcomes of it. Echoing this, Richardson (2011) opined that until policy makers have a grip of the factors that lead to terrorism, they may be unable to make and implement policies to prevent the act. A comprehensive policy in response to terrorism is an upshot of an understanding of its root causes (Kundnani, 2015). However, a response should entail police investigation, military actions and preventive measures (Kundnani, 2015). These are hard and soft approaches to countering terrorism. Hoeft (2015: 3-6) aptly explains this when he acknowledges that 'war on idea' (soft approach) and 'not war on terror' is crucial in dealing with terrorism, but that military actions (hard approach) may be necessary where terrorists defy the soft approach. He concludes that measures in countering terrorism that work for a given country may not work for another (Hoeft, 2015).

Lum *et al.* succinctly submitted that 'counter-terrorism strategies may include prevention and alleviation of early risk factors, situational prevention of actual events, or post-event responses (Lum *et al.*, 2006: 491). The Nigerian government has been involved in all of these three phases through programmes like deradicalisation to prevent military actions and post-terrorist attack responses (Amy, 2014; Dasuki, 2013). This study adopts Stepanova's definition because the definitions for both counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism are inseparable and this aptly captures the Nigerian situation. It also describes the combination of hard and soft approaches to counter-terrorism. Stepanova's definition goes thus:

> *"Counter-terrorism is seen as a security task performed by the security component of a national or international authority, the use of political, legal, economic, civil society and other peace-building instruments for the purposes of both countering and preventing terrorism is more broadly referred to as anti-terrorism" (Stepanova, 2003: 8).*

Hence, the anti-terrorism referred to in this definition will be jointly adopted with that of counter-terrorism and both will be utilised as a single definition of counter-terrorism.

1.7.3 Public policy

Government's actions and inactions on specific matters often reflect its policies. This explains why Aminu *et al.* (2012: 57) view public policy 'as an attempt by government to address a public issue by instituting laws, regulations, and decisions pertinent to the problem at hand'. In this study, public policy is 'whatever government chooses to do or not to do' (Dye, 1981: 1). This definition has been adopted because the government's inactions also determine its stand. Although the concept of policy is being considered, public policy has been adopted because it is government policies that are being considered in this study.

A key feature of public policy is that it has legal backing, which gives it legitimacy (Crosby, 1996). A policy may also guide the implementation of other policies. These are called mega policies and Eneanya (2009) described these as frameworks to be followed in developing other policies and are otherwise called master policies.

Policies go through a process. The policy process usually begins with the identification of issues that need attention and then engaging the necessary institutions and groups in all stages of the

process. This explains why Lindblom and Woodhouse gave an illustration of the policy process as:

> *"a step-by-step method begins with examination of how policy problems arise and first appear on the political agenda. There follows analysis of how political actors formulate issues for actions, how legislative or other actions ensues, how administrators subsequently implement the policy, and how policy is evaluated"* (Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1993: 10).

1.7.4 Radicalisation

An understanding of the concept of radicalisation lays the foundation for good deradicalisation and counter-radicalisation measures (Hoeft, 2015). There is a general agreement among experts that radicalisation is a process (Schmid, 2013). This is why Olesen (cited in Schmid, 2013: 17) defined radicalisation as 'the process through which individuals and organisations adopt violent strategies – or threaten to do so – in order to achieve political goals'. Concurring to the assertion that radicalisation is a process, Borum (2011) views radicalisation as the process of building extremist ideologies. Radicalisation may be as a result of divisions, grievances, group influence, charismatic leaders' influence, family and peer influence (Hoeft, 2015). However, some terrorists do not subscribe to extreme ideologies: they get enlisted into the terrorist fold for other reasons (Borum, 2011). The reasons why people join terrorist groups is aptly captured by Gupta (2004) when he postulated that some join for selfish interests in order to be able to loot, rape or acquire power; some join for the purpose of ideology to be able to boost the welfare of the group. Gupta (2004) further postulated that others join because they are coerced into doing so.

In contrast, radicalisation does not lead to terrorism alone, but it could lead to other forms of political violence like guerilla warfare, damage of public properties and ethnic cleansing among others (Schmid, 2013). However, radicals who subscribe to extreme ideologies have a high tendency of becoming terrorists (Borum, 2011). Summarily, not all radicals are terrorists as radicalism may not always result in violence but may pose a threat which may be a potential violence (Sedgwick, 2010). In Nigeria, not all radicals are terrorists. This explains why the government has embraced counter-radicalisation and deradicalisation so as to have ideological transformation. Therefore, the definition provided by McCauley and Moskalenko will be adopted. 'Radicalisation means change in beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that

increasingly justify inter group violence and demand for sacrifice in defense of the in-group' (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008: 416).

1.7.5 Deradicalisation

Apparently, the low rate of terrorist-related crimes being recorded is proof of the success of any deradicalisation programme (Schmid, 2013). Schmid sees deradicalisation as simply 'preventing and de-programming those already radicalised' (Schmid, 2013: 20). Evidently, deradicalisation comes after radicalisation.

Deradicalisation is an after effect move. In essence, it is those who have been radicalised and have become terrorists and those who are radicalised and not yet terrorists that need to undergo deradicalisation. For the purpose of this study, the definition by John Horgans will be adopted. According to John Horgans (cited in Counter-terrorism Implementation Task Force, 2008: 5), 'the term deradicalisation, on the other hand, is used to refer to programmes that are generally directed against individuals who have become radicals with the aim of re-integrating them into society, or at least dissuading them from violence'. The thrust of any deradicalisation programme is to rehabilitate and reorientate a suspected terrorist into the society in order to ensure they do not reembrace violence any longer (Schmid, 2013).

1.7.6 Counter-radicalisation

The global wave of terrorism has laid upon countries a necessity to take moves that will counter extremist ideologies. These extremist ideologies if allowed to 'blossom' may evolve into terrorism. Hence, Schmid (2013) views counter-radicalisation as an anticipatory step. Counter-radicalisation encompasses mitigating conditions that may make an individual become a terrorist. Counter-radicalisation efforts are endeavours at hindering radicalisation from coming to fruition and aimed at interrupting those individuals and groups who are on the verge of radicalising (Hoeft, 2015).

Horgan defined counter-radicalisation as:

"policies and programmes aimed at addressing some of the conditions that may propel some individuals down the path of terrorism. It is used broadly to refer to a package of social, political, legal, educational and economic programmes specifically designed to deter disaffected (and possibly already radicalised)

individuals from crossing the line and becoming terrorists" (cited in Counter-terrorism Implementation Task Force 2008: 5).

This is a pro-active measure because even if terrorists are killed, arrested or deradicalised, there is need to identify factors that may lead to terrorism in the future and address such.

1.8   Significance of the Study

The Nigerian government's response to the nefarious activities of Boko Haram has made tackling terrorism appear to be the government's only function or pre-occupation while its other functions seem to go unnoticed. Boko Haram poses tremendous threat to the Nigerian state and its citizenry. The sect did not just emerge suddenly; a lot of factors led to their emergence and by extension their nefarious acts. According to Ahokegh (2012), the threat faced by the Nigerian government from the Boko Haram menace remains unique in all spheres. This is because it is different from conventional or well-known security challenges. It is pertinent that any response of the government to this sect must be informed by the factors which led to the latter's emergence in the first place. International best practices on counter-terrorism should also be taken into consideration. There have been counter-terrorism policies which the Nigerian government has either initially or recently promulgated as a result of the Boko Haram menace. This study is geared towards understanding the strengths of these policies in order to ascertain if their content and implementation are well positioned towards tackling the said terrorists.

Through the systems theory, the rationale behind government's policies on counter-terrorism is explained and how the government's successes or failures with regard to its policies are measured via feedback on its policies. The state fragility theory serves as a yardstick for examining the effectiveness of state institutions in counter-terrorism. The study x-rays how systems and state fragility theories can be utilised to assess Nigeria's counter-terrorism policies. This will also be an avenue to join the existing number of literature (Cilliers and Cisk, 2013; David Easton, 1965; Dye, 1981; 1983; Eneanya, 2009; Erasmus, 1994; John, 2008; Kaplan, 2014) on the two theories.

The menace of Boko Haram has been restricted to Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Kano, Kaduna, Bauchi and Gombe states as well as the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. This study becomes

important to proffer practical suggestions on how well-targeted government policies could effectively/decisively deal with the Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria.

1.9   Limitations of the Study

Carrying out a study on terrorism has its challenges and Boko Haram is no exception/is not exempted. With reference to Boko Haram, some of the secondary data sources available pose great challenges in distilling accurate information. However, this study carefully employs the use of relevant literature and other reliable information sources. Another challenge is the difficulty in gaining access to members of the terrorist group which militates against the utility of personal interviews, and more importantly, due to the insecurity located in the crisis zone.

The rich data from both primary sources like internet resources, institutional reports and newspaper reports are adequate for quality research. Therefore, this study stimulates a robust assessment of Nigeria's counter-terrorism policies with respect to the Boko Haram menace.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1   Introduction

The study offers a review of salient literature on counter-terrorism from the global view and Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy. It is important to have insight into scholars' views on the subject areas thereby laying the foundations for a robust research. To begin with, an understanding of terrorism from the historical perspective is expedient. This gives an opportunity to establish the verity of Boko Haram being a terrorist organisation. For these reasons, Nigeria's counter-terrorism policies are being examined with respect to its implementation in tackling the group's arms wielding behaviour.

2.2   Terrorism: Historical Perspective

Throughout history, terrorism has been an instrument of inciting fear (Chalian and Blin, 2007). A glance at terrorism from historical standpoint sheds light on acts that have been tagged terrorism globally (David, 2013). Terrorism had taken a religious dimension for ages. According to Nuemann (2009) and Weinzierl (2004), the Jewish zealots provoked a revolt against Rome (60 to 70 A.D) while the assassins (Muslims), a radical *Shiite*, Islamic sect, waged a campaign in order to achieve purification of Islam (1090 to 1275 A.D). Nuemann (2009) gave a third group which is the Hindu group in India known as the Thugees who terrorised travellers and strangled the latter according to ritual and offered them to the goddess of destruction, *kali*. The group was active from the seventeenth century and only ceased to exist in the middle of the nineteenth century (Nuemann, 2009). These show that the nexus between religion and terrorism is not new (Hoffman, 2006). Isyaku (2013) opined that the French Revolution (1793 to 1794) was also remarkable in the inception of the modern era of terrorism. The government of France sponsored terrorism so as to keep to power and suppress opposition.

Rapoport (2004: 47) gave four waves of modern terrorism in a linear *cum* chronological form, namely the Anarchist Wave, the Anti-Colonial Wave, New Left Wave, and Religious Wave. The Anarchist wave which held sway in Europe from the late 19th century to the 1920s was characterised by the termination of state authorities and government structures and the replacement of such with ideological groups through the assassination of state officials (Rapoport, 2004). This period witnessed the assassination of government officials across Europe (Rapoport, 2004). An example in Russia was the assassination of Czar Alexander II in 1881 and Czarist officials by an ideological group in Russia called Narodnaya Volya (The People's Will) (Marsella, 2004). The Anti-Colonial wave spanned the 1920s to the 1960s (Rapoport, 2004). As the name implies, this wave of terrorism was primarily characterised by the pursuit for national self-determination in opposition to colonial hegemony (David, 2013). Colonial territories in Europe, Africa and Asia dominated this wave and they targeted, police, judges, soldiers and relatives of state officials of the colonial masters (Rapoport, 2004). An example is the Basques Fatherland and Liberty in Spain (Marsella, 2004).

The third wave, New Left wave emerged in the 1960s and contended against observed global injustice perpetrated by the West (Marsella, 2004). The conduits of nationalism and radicalism were utilised during this period (David, 2013). Groups in this wave employed tactics such as hostage-taking, kidnapping, guerrilla warfare and assassination against its targets (Chaliand and Blin, 2007b; David, 2013). According to Chaliand and Blin, (2007b: 227-229) the groups were Italy Red Brigades, 'provisionals' IRA (Irish Republican Army), Japanese Red Army amongst others. Other examples are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and Shining Path of Peru (Marsella, 2004). Richardson (2006) illustrated the IRA as a group formed in early twentieth century to fight for Irish independence from Britain. It later split in late 1969 into the 'provisionals' and 'officials' grouping (Richardson, 2006: 13). The 'provisionals' waged a thirty-five-year-long violent campaign for Irish unity and they called an end to their campaign in 2005 (Richardson, 2006: 13). On the effect of this beyond the shores of Ireland, their experiment encouraged the struggle for independence in other colonies (Chaliand and Blin, 2007a).

The last phase which is in vogue at the moment is the religious wave. This phase has been enveloped by Islamic radicalism (Leonard and William, 2010). It surfaced in 1979 and is characterised by struggles for a religious state (David, 2013). It was indeed about religious self-determination. The ascension of political Islam and the emergence of Islamist terrorism have

defined the current age (Neumann, 2009). According to Hoffman (2006), the revolution that transformed Iran into an Islamic Republic in 1979 played a major role in the modern advent of religious terrorism. In agreement with Hoffman and more elaborately, Leonard and William (2010), traced the advent of this wave to the Iranian Revolution of 1979 as well as the Soviet Union's decision in 1979 to offer military assistance to the secular and pro-communist regime in Afghanistan in which the latter was met with brick walls from Islamist proponents. In essence, hatred for the West and the Marxist East brought about self-defence which is being expressed through *Jihad* (Roy *et al.,* 2000). This phase has taken the dimension of terrorists operating beyond a specific state but having affiliation with religious *cum* internationalist networks with the major aim of countering secular governments (Roy *et al.*, 2000).

This revolution has triggered the rise of *Shiism*, and of militant Islamism in countries like Lebanon, Nigeria and Malaysia (Chaliand, 1987). Al-Qaeda, for example, has network in more than 50 countries (Roy *et al.,* 2000). This is evident in the attack on the World Trade Centre in 1993 as well as the World Trade Centre and Pentagon on 11th September 2001 (Khan, 2013; Marsella, 2004). This era has also witnessed Islamist extremists gaining control of over 90% of Afghanistan and the bombing of a US military barracks in Saudi Arabia in 1996 (Esposito, 1999). Al-Qaeda presently has affiliates in Africa. For example, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) which operates in some parts of North and West Africa (Abdalla, 2011; Akinola and Uzodike, 2014). *Al-Shabaab* claims it has links with Al-Qaeda also operates in Somalia, parts of Kenya and remains a threat to East Africa (Clarke and Lekalake, 2016). This wave has got its effect evident in Nigeria through the Maitatsine riots of the 1980s and the current Boko Haram uprisings (Adesoji, 2011; Onapajo *et al.,* 2012). Boko Haram's proclamation of affiliation to ISIS is also a proof that Boko Haram falls under this wave and that Islamic radicalism has gone borderless. ISIS was involved in the hierarchical permutation of Boko Haram in 2016 (Ajayi, 2016; Somorin, 2016a). The fraternity of Boko Haram with this wave manifests in the sect's quest to have *Sharia* law entrenched in Northern Nigeria and if possible the whole of Nigeria (Patrick and Felix, 2013). This is because this wave has *Sharia* enthronement and the establishment of Islamic caliphate as crux of their programmes. An understanding of the history of terrorism brings to fore the need to understand the concept as a global phenomenon.

There has been a rising wave of terrorism globally (Okemi, 2013). This has snowballed into an array of literature (Brinkel and Ait-Hida, 2012; Hoechner, 2014; Johnmary, 2013; La Roche, 2004; Loiemier, 2012; Neumann, 2009; Oberschall, 2004; Ogbonnaya *et al.,* 2014). These studies have reflected under different subjects like definitions, root causes, characteristics, methods of operation, counter-terrorism, roles of actors *et cetera.* Brown (2008: 20-21) sees terrorism as 'the deliberate murder of innocents in pursuit of a political end whether carried out by an individual, group or state'. He further views terrorism as an 'illegitimate response to a legitimate grievance'. His first assertion establishes the fact that one may have a lone wolf terrorist, a group as terrorists and even state terrorism. The illegitimate response can be in the form of guerrilla warfare, political assassinations, political rioting, bombings, hijackings, suicide bombings and kidnappings (Gutteridge, 1981; La Roche, 2004; Schweitzer and Shay, 2003).

Such illegitimate actions are evident in the *modus operandi* of Boko Haram (Akinbi 2015). All these vices may as well be applied by other criminal networks (Akinbi 2015; Marama, 2016; Onuoha, 2014). However, what distinguishes terrorism from other crimes is their aim which is the transformation of a social and political order, hence; this makes them a political organisation (Neumann, 2009). This portrays why Boko Haram seeks to establish the Islamic caliphate enveloped in the tripartite parcel of abhorrence of Western education, opposition to modern nation-state of Nigeria and use of violence (Azumah, 2015). In a similar position, Pérouse de Montclus (2014a) gave his view about Boko Haram being political because the group abhors Western values and culture, is against the secularity of the Nigerian state and believes that democracy is a corrupt practice spearheaded by ruling elites.

Drawing from Brown's (2008) view, it is expedient to point out the similarities and differences between terrorism and other forms of violence. To have a robust juxtaposition, terrorism will be examined *pari passu* with some of the other forms of political violence. Political violence connotes a broader understanding than terrorism. It captures all forms of violent conflicts directed at achieving socio-political and economic objectives; terrorism is therefore a form of political violence (Whelan, 2016). Riot, communal violence, militancy, guerrilla warfare, insurgency and terrorism are all forms of political violence (Whelan, 2016). Violence in any form which is employed for a political motive is political violence (Whelan, 2016). All forms of political violence (from low-level riots to communal violence, terrorism, and insurgencies) have similarities; they are all progenies of a political grievance; a broad term which encompasses a

range of grievances, from sole-issue matters to broader societal marginalisation (Hoffman, 2006). Hence, virtually all forms of political violence are offshoots of political grievance. A crucial feature that distinguishes terrorism from other forms of political violence is that the former perpetuates attacks with the intention of gaining attention through surprises and shocks (Whelan, 2016).

In order to have a grip of each form of political violence in relation to terrorism, it is important to distinguish each one from terrorism. Messages passed through riots may be a mixture of clear as well as vague information but such messages are still conveyed to expected audience in most cases (Marx 1970). Terrorism is habitually accompanied by very plain political messages by means of media stretching from the symbolism of projected targets to paper manifestos, and YouTube videos (Whelan, 2016). These mediums of passing messages are regularly used by ISIS and Boko Haram.

Insurgency refers to violence employed 'to obtain political goals by an organised and primarily indigenous group using protracted, irregular warfare and allied political technique' Scott *et al.*, (cited in Whelan, 2016: 12). The 'irregular warfare' in this definition is a distinguishing factor and this entails application of a guerrilla tactics which rides on the wings of guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare is staged when fairly armed groups aim to pester the enemy and steadily erode his will and capacity by launching tremendously mobile, hit-and-run attacks (O'Neil 2005). The nexus between guerilla warfare and insurgency explains why Stewart (2014) coined the term 'insurgent warfare'.

Violent activities of a personality or group holding a belligerent position in championing the course of a given ideology or a cause refer to militancy (Ajayi and Nwogwugwu, 2014). Psychologically, such individuals or group of persons who is a militant do subscribe to a physically aggressive stance (Nwaodike *et al.,* 2010). A common style among militant groups is the validation of utilising force in their pursuit. They recruit members through volunteering, enlistment and conscription (Nwaodike *et al.,* 2010). All these features are like similar to those of terrorists. However, one of the major differences is that the force behind the aggression of militants may be economic, social and in some circumstances political but that of terrorists include these as well as religious/ideological agenda. Succinctly, the demands of militants are mostly due to exclusive politics and could be addressed within the confine of politics that

government can meet but demands of terrorists are most times far from being fully considered by the government. This is because meeting the demands of the latter is tantamount to government whittling down one of its major duties which is the maintenance of law and order without bias (Walker, 2012). This is why armed Niger Delta agitators are tagged as militants, while Boko Haram is reffered to as militants and terrorists (Ogbonnaya and Ehigiamusoe, 2013).

Apparently, there are differences between terrorism and other forms of political violence. However, the constituents of political violence remain inseparable. Perpetrators easily switch from one form to another. This is aptly captured by Whelan (2016) that 'the use of a spectrum of political violence, ranging from rioting to terrorism and insurgency, has appeared an insightful method of assessing terrorism in relation to other forms of political violence'. One of the reasons for this is that if for example the requests relating to protests are not given proper attention by government, a group may become militarised. For example, the IRA started with protests but later went lethal in its approach (Whelan, 2016: 17).

Another factor engendering switching among these components of political violence is that perpetrators engage in similar crimes in order to chart their courses. Dandurand and Chin (2004) explains that terrorists and other criminals are involved in other crimes include *inter alia* drug trafficking, illegal trade of arms, kidnapping, robberies, tobacco fraud, medical insurance fraud, visa fraud, money laundering as evidenced in USA, India, UK, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Kenya, Colombia, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Turkey among others. Nigeria is inclusive. Other criminals within this context refer to other forms of political violence. Although the definition by the United Nations Security Council did not make the distinction between, state terrorism, non-state terrorism, and international terrorism, offering explanations of these three is expedient. This accentuates a grasp on terrorism more.

Gibney *et al.* (cited in Institute of Economics and Peace, 2015: 70) in defining state terrorism termed it as political terror by stating that it is 'a state sanctioned or state perpetrated violence against its citizens'. An example is the 'death squads' actions in Brazil between 1969 and 1972 (Chaliand, 1987: 83). Another example given by Marsella (2004) is the French Revolution (1789-1799) which brought Maximilien de Robespierre to power as an enemy of the French monarchy and an advocate of democratic reforms. He orchestrated the death of King Louis XVI and later eliminated both moderate and political extremist factions thereby instituting a reign of

terror (Marsella, 2004). However, a state could also sponsor terrorism against those not its citizens. An example is the Pan Am 103 flight bombed over Lockerbie, Scotland by Libyan terrorists in December 1988 (Marsella, 2004). According to Maiangwa (2012: 17), 'non-state terrorism is usually carried out by aggrieved citizens who either feel excluded or alienated from their states'. A good example in Nigeria was the Maitatsine violence of the 1980s and the perpetual Boko Haram terrorism (Aborishade and Mundt, 2002; Dasuki, 2013). Johnmary defined international terrorism as:

> *"the demonstration of terror within and across a sovereign state with the goal of reaching foreign concession and attaining specific goals. Such terror could be organized [sic] within a country, it could be unleashed against neighbouring [sic] state(s) and it could be targeted at the gathering or institutions of multinational states" (Johnmary, 2013: 27).*

A good example was when in 1968, Popular Frontier for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked an Israeli El Al plane and forced its landing in Rome for the purpose of exchanging passengers they held hostage for Palestinian terrorists imprisoned in Israel (Chaliand, 1987; Hoffman, 2006).

Terrorists have some underlying factors that inform their actions. Although, many terrorist groups try to engage in political actions like lobbying, negotiation and bargaining, but they hardly exhaust these available options before considering terrorism as an option (Richardson, 2006). Abi-Hashmen (2004) and Franks (2006) attributed the root causes of terrorism to be poverty, economic exploitation, neglect of health and education and religious indoctrination. However, Franks (2006) gave another factor as culture in the sense that if an existing culture of a society is infiltrated by a foreign culture, it may culminate into terrorism. This is why Ankersen, (2008) attributed a cause of terrorism to the perceived hegemony of American culture orchestrated through globalisation on the Middle East. These views are indications that terrorists mostly come from the lower class of the society.

However, O' Brien, (2010) contended that certain terrorists come from comfortable backgrounds, give up their comfortable lifestyle and wage *Jihad*. He further posited that many are not exposed to the West in a positive manner because they believe the Western lifestyle is evil. Crenshaw (1981) echoed this when he submitted that terrorism does not necessarily result from being deprived the basic necessities, hence, it is not an apparatus of the downtrodden but

instead a tool of the privileged. Crenshaw (1981) supported his view by citing examples of terrorist organisations like the Red Army faction in West Germany, Japanese Red Army and the Italian Red Brigades. Chronologically, La Roche (2004) opined that terrorism is a progeny of cumulative exposure towards extreme behaviour and socialisation. This concurs with the fact that terrorism can manifest as a result of being deprived certain benefits but also subscribes to the fact that some terrorists chose such path despite the fact that they were of average living standard or even very comfortable. The study further accedes to the fact that these are spiced with socialisation which has religion (within this context) as its nucleus.

The conglomeration of these root causes is responsible for the emergence of leaders and foot soldiers for the Boko Haram. In a similar vein, Akinola and Uzodike (2013) attributed the rising disciples of Boko Haram to poverty in Northern Nigeria. Holistically, Ahokegh (2012) aptly agrees that terrorism in Nigeria is grounded in the economic and political quagmire in Northern Nigeria as well as its history of inseparability from Islam. These views about the root causes of terrorism apply to Boko Haram as well. Onuoha (2010) opined that Boko Haram gets its members from disaffected youths, unemployed graduates, and even the comfortable[8] by Nigerian standards. Commenting on the nexus between the root causes and curtailing terrorism, Ahokegh (2012) posited that even if Boko Haram is checked, failure to address issues such as social injustice, corruption and economic mismanagement will lead to the emergence of similar groups. This brings to fore the need to examine if Nigeria's counter-terrorism policies are really addressing the root causes of Boko Haram's terrorism and to suggest proactive policies.

2.3   Counter-terrorism: Global View

The strength of any counter-terrorism move lies in the model applied. According to Crelinsten, (2009), any counter-terrorism policy adopted by any state or international body is always a ratio between the use of hard and soft power[9]. Crelinsten described hard power as the state assuming

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[8] 'Comfortable' within this context has examples like Alhaji Buji Foi, a former commissioner in Borno State and Kadiru Atiku, a former university lecturer was/are the sect members. The two of them by virtue of their positions are not sympathisers of Boko Haram because they are poor, perhaps they share same ideology with Boko Haram.
[9] Hard power includes 'arrest and detention, prosecution and trial, punishment and trial, international law and policing, proactive policing, criminal intelligence, anti-terrorism legislation, peacekeeping, retaliatory strikes, military invasion, gunboat diplomacy, economic blockades, military exercises, military occupation, counterinsurgency training and peacekeeping' (Crelinsten, 2009: 238). Soft power seeks to whittle down the foundations that terrorists are built on and it encompasses 'regulation of resource utilisation, trade, foreign aid,

its monopoly in the fight against terrorism through engaging its military, police and law courts while soft power takes persuasive form through economic reforms, public education, communication and advocacy as well as diplomatic initiatives (Crelinsten, 2009). Commenting on the nexus between hard power and the Nigerian government initiatives, Uduonwa (2013) opined that relying on hard power to fight Boko Haram has brought forth the solution to the plights of the areas affected by Boko Haram's activities. Counter-terrorism models can also take the form of military and non-military action. The military model encompasses peacekeeping operations, utilising threat of military intervention as a tool for deterring states from supporting terrorism, military aid to equip military and use of the military to distribute humanitarian aids (Kielsgard, 2006). Non-military model revolves around persuasive methods like addressing the idea that causes terrorism and deradicalisation initiatives (Crelinsten, 2009; Kielsgard, 2006). The root causes which are similar but may sometimes vary across countries should inform countries' strategies and models for combating terrorism (Brown 2008; Institute of Economics and Peace, 2015; Richardson, 2011). Whichever approach any nation or body adopts, intelligence gathering is very expedient (Bobbitt, 2008).

The strategy adopted by the UN is global which makes it universal in outlook. The UN model (also called 5Ds) which stands on a pentagonal frame consists of *dissuading* people from resorting to terrorism or supporting it, *denying* terrorists the means to carry out attacks, *deterring* states from supporting terrorism, *developing* state capacity to defeat terrorism and *defending* human rights (United Nations, 2006). This is corroborated by Onuoha and Uwgueze (2014) who opined that the scourge of terrorism has attained a global dimension, hence, there should be close to a uniform approach to the menace globally. The refusal of terrorists to accept being called terrorists and the variation in countries' view on terrorist acts makes it intricate to develop a one-stop shop counter-terrorism strategy (Hallett, 2004; Hashmen, 2004; Bobbitt, 2008). Literature on counter-terrorism (Bobbitt, 2008; Briggs *et al.*, 2006; Crelinsten, 2009; Gambari, 2006; Hoeft, 2015; Kielsgard, 2006; Primoratz, 2004; Taşpinar, 2009) do reflect the UN model either fully or partially. Specifically, these authors' views have centred on definitions of counter-terrorism,

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employment policies, promoting economic growth, market liberalization, development programmes, amnesties, negotiation, reform, counter radicalisation [sic], community policing that aims to promote trust and open dialogue' (Crelinsten, 2009: 240). The emphasis of soft power is centred on the war on ideas as against war on terror (Hoeft, 2015). Hard and soft powers could also be tagged hard and soft approaches respectively.

approaches to counter-terrorism, motives that inform choosing counter-terrorism approaches, rules of counter-terrorism and the roles of the state in counter- terrorism.

Gambari (2006) postulated a multilateral approach premised on the fact that the 5Ds are good but regional organisations like the African Union, European Union (EU), and Commonwealth amongst others need to co-operate with the UN. These regional bodies have their respective strategies which he viewed must not antagonise the 5Ds but coexist in synergy. This is reflected by Richardson (2006) when he gave co-operation among countries as one of the rules of terrorism. Kielsgard (2006) recommended an integrated approach which he developed from the UN strategy. This he divided into three which are the military (deter, develop and defend), law enforcement (deny, develop, and defend) and human rights (dissuade, develop and defend). He concluded that human rights should be the nucleus of any counter-terrorism approach (Kielsgard, 2006). Crelinsten, (2009) chose not to use the term approaches but settled for 'kinds of counter-terrorism'. He gave four kinds which reflect Kielsgard's (2006) approach but with different nomenclatures which are coercive counter-terrorism, proactive counter-terrorism, persuasive counter-terrorism and defensive counter-terrorism (Crelinsten, 2009).

Emphasising on the 'war of idea', Hoeft (2015: 5-6) proposed a soft approach to counter-terrorism which he opined is tripartite with radicalisation, counter-radicalisation and deradicalisation as its elements. He, however, concluded that this approach cannot be a sole panacea to terrorism issues. Primoratz (2004) did not develop a specific model but gave an array of principles a society needs to embrace in order to cope with terrorism. He viewed that 'societies that are bearing the burden of terrorism whether local or international, cope by passing and enforcing laws, designing and implementing policies, making political decisions and moral choice and acting on them' (Primoratz, 2004: x). Primoratz's view portrays an inexplicit position as he did not specify if the actions will take a soft or a hard approach. This may create lopsided and unbalanced actions by policy makers perhaps for parochial reasons thereby leading to mediocrity in government's actions.

Chaliand (1987) suggested the need for countries to nip terrorism in the bud before it gets to guerrilla phase. However, if not combated at this stage, he recommended actions to stop it at its early guerrilla stage. This he postulated will be feasible through actions like gathering intelligence, taking the war to where terrorists are domiciled, crippling the terrorists logistically,

making life comfortable for its citizens to dissuade them from having sympathy for terrorists and making the terrorists politically incapable (Chaliand, 1987). Chaliand's school of thought invariably is in consonance with having a soft and hard approach combined and also specifying what stage of counter-terrorism each one should come on board. Making the United Kingdom (UK) as a case study and sourcing data from field and secondary sources, Briggs *et al.* (2006) settled for a community-based approach. This they arrived at on the grounds that terrorism in the UK is perpetrated by Muslims, hence the need to involve Muslims in the whole policy process of counter-terrorism. This model is soft in its approach; however, it does not give any room for any military action perhaps because it has to do with combating terrorism within the British territory. Seeking to create a strong tie with the Muslim community is laudable, however, it may alienate Muslims because they may question the rationale behind engaging them on the fact that they question the rationale behind the objective scale for which the government based its decision assuming that some of their faithfuls are terrorists.

Disagreeing on relying totally on military campaign, Gupta (2004) pointed out that terrorists operate in groups (sometimes cells) hence, he gave ideological alternatives as a complement of military efforts. This he stated can be achieved through long term measures in education, delivery of social services and using the press to promote positive societal values (Gupta, 2004). In a relatively similar view, Marsella (2004) argued that pure military response is synonymous to *crying over spilled milk* no matter how successful it may be; he, therefore, was in support of tackling terrorism's root causes in order to prevent its emergence. However, there is partial disagreement with his view considering the fact that tackling the root causes may not totally guarantee total eradication, hence the military may still be needed in order to combat those that have metamorphosed from radicals to terrorists.

Counter-terrorism has been a global affair as a result of the global terrorism imbroglio. This has culminated in the adoption of various counter-terrorism policies by different countries. Counter-terrorism policies in Kenya and Algeria will be reviewed. What informs this is because terrorism in Kenya and Algeria has some features similar to the *modus operandi* of Boko Haram. A good example is that terrorist organisations in Kenya and Algeria have local and international affiliations.

Kenya has witnessed a series of terrorist attacks since 1975 (Mohochi, 2011). Some of these include the bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi on August 7th, 1998 and suicide bombers driving a car into a hotel in Kikambala (Amnesty International, Kenya, 2005). The most recent are the attacks by *Al-Shabaab* since 2011 (Megged, 2015). Kenya's joint military operation with Somalia against *Al-Shabaab* orchestrated the former being attacked by the terrorists (Clarke and Lekalake, 2016). The British Broadcasting Corporation reported in 2014 that the group is made up of about 25% Kenyans (Clarke and Lekalake, 2016). *Al-Shabaab* attacked the Garrisa University College and killed about 145 Kenyans mostly students (United States Department of State, 2016a). *Al-Shabaab* equally attacked West Gate shopping mall on 21st September 2013 (Wuyep, 2015).

Kenya's response has been both hard and soft which is apparent in its military and non-military reactions. The policies of the Kenyan government reflect in legislative reforms, institutional building, training and bilateral as well as multilateral collaboration with the US and UK (Mohochi, 2011). The military approach includes the creation of Anti-Terrorism Police Unit in 1998 whose personnel has been deployed to the border with Somalia, pre-university military training for Kenyans to foster acclimatisation with basic defence tenets in periods of attacks, construction of perimeter fence along the Somali border and increase in defence budget (Megged, 2015; Mohochi, 2011). The Joint Terrorism Task Force was also established (Mohochi, 2011).

The non-military approach adopted by Kenya comprises local security policy otherwise known as '*Nyumba Kumi* initiative' which incorporates participation of the local populace in intelligence gathering through reporting suspicious characters and individuals, engagement of Muslim clerics to spread messages devoid of Islamic extremism and freezing assets of *Al-Shabaab* sympathizers as well as preventing money laundering (Megged, 2015). The other measures adopted by the Kenyan government include the collaboration of the National Security Intelligence Service and the US Anti-Terrorism Assistance, passing of the Terrorism Suppression Bill into law in 2003 and the establishment of the National Counter-terrorism Centre (Mohochi, 2011). The implementation of the Kenyan government counter-terrorism strategies has been concentrated in predominantly Muslim dominated areas (Mohochi, 2011). This has generated allegations of discrimination along race, ethnic and religious lines (Mohochi, 2011). Amnesty International also reports that there have been reports of detention without charge, disallowing

detainees from having access to their family members, torture and harassment of detainees' family members (Amnesty International, Kenya, 2005). Allegations of discrimination may be difficult to prove because it may be that not all those arrested were made based on sentiments but as a result of their involvement in terrorism.

Algeria has been one of the hotspots of terrorism consequent upon its history (Botha, 2008). Political parties/organisations like Islamic Liberation Front, Armed Islamic Group, *Salafist* Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) and its successor Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) *et cetera* have been linked to terrorism (Abdalla, 2011). Most of these groups evolved to become affiliated to Al-Qaeda to emerge as what is presently known as (AQIM) (National Security Consultant, 2014). This explains why Torelli (2013) submitted that Algeria's know-how in counter-terrorism can be traced back to GSPC in the 1990s and later AQIM. Aside Algeria, AQIM now also operates in Mali and Mauritania (Torelli, 2013).

Algeria does not have a comprehensive counter-terrorism approach and the fundamental strategy is not so apparent (Hasan *et al.,* 2012). However, Algeria has adopted policies that have taken the outlook of hard and soft approaches. The hard approach includes the formation of military intelligence service, the creation of inter-departmental task force charged with the suppression of terrorism, pre-arraignment of detention period extended, criminal responsibility age reduced to 16 years and increase in the compass of death penalty application (Hasan *et al.*, 2012). There has also been military crackdown on hideouts of terrorists since 2009 (Hasan *et al.*, 2012). This was apparent in the deployment of about 4,000 soldiers at the Tunisian border and the deployment of 75,000 and 50,000 troops to the South Eastern and Libyan borders respectively (Torelli, 2013; United States Department of State, 2016a).

The soft approach includes persuading repentant Islamist militants to speak publicly; offering amnesty for terrorists; preventing the young from becoming terrorists through offering jobs in the public sector, giving bonuses, building houses and enrolling some of them into the military (Hasan *et al.,* 2012). Monitoring sermons preached by Imams and the introduction of the importance of preventing extremism in the curricula of religious schools (Hasan *et al.*, 2012). The Algerian government has also made law to forestall and prosecute terrorism financing and money laundering; increased detention of a terrorist suspect to 12 days and collaboration with foreign countries in sharing Deoxyribonucleic Acid data (The Law Library of Congress, 2015).

In essence, Algeria's counter-terrorism efforts are a mixture of a hard (military) approach for combat purpose with a soft (religious) approach to forestall religious extremists from engaging in terrorist acts (Hasan *et al.*, 2012).

The Criminal Court in Algiers was meant to hear 27 terror related cases in 2015 (Radio Algerie, 2014). Also, in February 2015, 41 suspected terrorists appeared in the Algiers Criminal Court to answer terrorism accusations (alchourouk.com). The Algerian Ministry of National Defence also reported that it killed or captured 157 terrorists in 2015 as a result of its operations and that it also seized equipment, arms, ammunitions and drugs from terrorists (United States Department of States, 2016a). The United States Department of State (2016a) through its country reports on terrorism 2015 also reported that 9,000 terrorists have been pardoned under the amnesty programme. The hard and soft approaches of Algeria have yielded results but the recording of 62 terrorist cases in 2015 (United States Department of State, 2016a) is a clear indication that more needs to be done in its counter-terrorism drive.

Nigeria (just like Kenya and Algeria) has also adopted military approaches like deployment of troops, the creation of the 7th division of the army and relocation of the military command centre to Maiduguri (Akinbi, 2015; Campbell, 2014). The non-military approaches include setting up of Internally Displace Persons (IDPs) Camps, CVE programme among others (Campbell, 2014; *The Nigerian Observer,* 17th October 2014). Nigeria has also collaborated with foreign partners (Onuoha and Ugwueze, 2012). However, there have been cases of unlawful detention by the military, malnutrition at the IDPs camps among other flaws (Mohammed, 2014; Ojeme, 2016). Successes were however recorded in the areas of arrests and killing of some Boko Haram members (Onuoha, 2014). Nigeria has equally trained its military in terrorism combat operations (Azumah, 2015).

The review of these studies has signified that counter-terrorism does have reflections of soft or hard approaches or a mixture of both. Nigeria's counter-terrorism measures have hard and soft ingredients; however, knowing the ratio of the former to the latter is crucial as this better places this study in the position to carry out an objective assessment.

2.4   Counter-Terrorism in Nigeria

The Boko Haram menace has prompted the enactment of policies by the Nigerian government, as well as the emergence of bilateral and multilateral ties. These include the declaration of state of emergency, imposition of curfew, establishment of the 7th Division of the Nigerian Army in Maiduguri, establishment of *Almajiri* schools, relocation of military command centre to Maiduguri, banning and restoration of Global System for Mobile Communication (GSMC) services, establishment of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) and setting up of administrative panel to negotiate with Boko Haram (Akinbi, 2015; Akpan *et al.,* 2014). Others are setting up a committee on the proliferation of small and light weapons, CVE Programme, rolling out of NACTEST, as well as legal frameworks like MLPA 2011, MLPA 2012, TPA 2011 and TPA 2013 (Dasuki, 2013; *The Nigerian Observer,* 17th October 2014).

The bilateral and multilateral moves include MNJTF put in place by the LCBC, training of 650 Nigerian soldiers in combat operations by the US DOD, listing of Boko Haram as a proscribed terrorist organization by the UK in 2013, labelling of Boko Haram as a FTO by the US in 2014, designating Boko Haram as a terrorist organization by the UN and the EU in 2014 (Amy, 2014; Campbell, 2014; Onuoha and Ugwueze, 2012; Panapress, 2015). Assistance has also taken the forms of provision of aid by the USAID, and proscription of Boko Haram leaders with placement of $7 million bounty on Abubakar Shekau, the group's leader by the US and Nigeria's recent entry into the Saudi-led Coalition of Muslim Countries against Terrorism (Akinbajo, 2016; Amy, 2014; Campbell, 2014; Onuoha and Ugwueze, 2012; Panapress, 2015).

Akpan *et al.* (2014); Uchehara (2014) and Walker (2012) observed that the terrorists have refused to negotiate with the Nigerian government. *Raison d'être* the former's demand to Islamize Nigeria is not supported by any moral justification and that the group is cell like (splintered) hence; nothing forms the basis for negotiation. Affirming the disintegrated nature of the sect, Campbell, (2014) identified a splinter group called *Ansaru.* Akpan *et al.* (2014) equally evaluated efforts like troops being reinforced, the leadership of the movement being targeted, the international joint task force being put in place, declaration of a state of emergency, GSMC services banned and restored as well as curfew imposed. They holistically opined that Nigeria's government's efforts have been reactionary and not proactive. They gave suggested solutions like the group should start to be treated as terrorists and not freedom fighters like the Niger Delta

militants. The Niger Delta militants only resorted to violence after all peaceful means to get government's attention to their plight failed (Maiangwa, 2012). Their environment had been badly damaged due to oil exploration and this had affected other economic activities in the region which have increased poverty level in the region (Maiangwa, 2012).

Akinbi (2015), sees government's response in the form of dialogue, military expedition (in which he discovered that some 'bad eggs' in the military divulge classified information to the sect members which contribute to failure in military operations), declaration of state of emergency, call for international assistance and relocation of military command center to Maiduguri. He concluded that these measures are good options but noted that, in the case of Boko Haram, it has not yielded the desired positive result. He also advocated for the strengthening of the joint task force in the area of intelligence, surveillance among others and the necessity to address poverty. Akinbi's views align with the fact that intelligence is a strong pillar of counter-terrorism (Chaliand, 1987; Bobbitt, 2008). Making an assessment on the level of intelligence, Solomon observed that:

> *"even within this narrow counter terrorism [sic] lens, Abuja's approach to Boko Haram is problematic. It is indeed hard to fight an organization [sic] when one does not know even its name let al.one its organizational [sic] structure. This also points to the human intelligence assets the Nigerian State has on the sect" (Solomon, 2012: 8).*

This portrays the poor intelligence gathering of the Nigerian security system and the need to jettison prejudice in their operations. Equally commenting on intelligence, Babatunde (2009: 23) in his interview with a security agent commented that security agents 'react to but do not prevent' violence of which Boko Haram terrorism is among. He further asserts that slow response to information on potential violence matters result in violent conflict as it was in the case of the Maitatsine riots in the 1980s to the present Boko Haram crises (Babatunde, 2009). Solomon (2012) equally observed that Boko Haram will continue to grow except their financial support networks are handicapped. This establishes the fact that the terrorists have sponsors as one of the major sources of their finance. Ogbonnaya *et al.* (2014) observed that some terrorists and a couple of their sponsors that have been arrested are being persecuted in various law courts across the country. Isyaku (2013) commented on the arrests that have been made on terrorist-related matters but criticised the bail applications being granted to suspected terrorists amidst endangering the security situation of the country. This is corroborated by Serrano and Pieri

(2014: 205) who submitted that the 'weak judicial and penal systems in the country, which also suffer from varying degrees of corruption, have made it so that there is only limited faith that insurgents will be properly prosecuted or effectively detained'. The prosecution of Boko Haram suspects may thus generate some reservations.

Northern Nigeria has suffered low enrolment rate especially at the primary school level (Patrick and Felix, 2013). The reason for this was given by Ruquyyatu (cited in Patrick and Felix, 2013) who blamed the situation on the longstanding effect of Islamic education[10] as most parents are yet to embrace Western education. Historically, 1902 was the year the British completed its imposition of authority over the entire Northern Nigeria (Kenny, 1996). The British made concerted efforts to preserve Islam in Northern Nigeria especially by not allowing Christian missionaries to introduce Christianity and Western education to the region (Kenny, 1996). However, this did not mean Western system of education was completely a *persona non-grata* in the North. Western education later and somehow found its way to Northern Nigeria during the 1910s and 1920s (Umar, 2001). Consequently, the British established Katsina College which was the first higher Western education institution in the North (Umar, 2001).

However, the Muslim-dominated North still had apathy towards Western education. They started embracing it after independence when they observed that the South was far ahead economically and that Western education was a tool for ascendancy to administrative positions and political power (Umar, 2001). The educational gap between the South and North remains wide with the former still ahead (Umar, 2001), prompting the federal government to tag the North, 'less-developed education area'. Although, the government takes this into consideration, in terms of policy implementation and admission into higher education'; the marginal effect of this gap is the continued economic marginalisation of the North (Ajakaiye *et al.*, 2016).

They would rather prefer to leave their children to become *Almajiris* who are at the mercy of their teachers and are left to metamorphose to street beggars (Patrick and Felix, 2013). Soyinka (cited in Hoechner, 2014) concluded that this makes them become potential recruits for all sorts of vices including terrorism. Consequently, the government established schools for the *Almajiris*

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[10] The development of education in the North trailed that of the South far from behind. While the Eastern and Western regions gave children of school age free education between 1952 and 1958, the North could not adopt this because of financial complaints (Fafunwa, 1974). The Northern political and religious leaders also at this period were quite sentimental in that they favoured Islamic education above Western education (Fafunwa, 1974).

to give them Western education as this was viewed as one of the solutions to the growing number of Boko Haram members (Akpan *et al.*, 2014). David (2013) gave his findings when he visited one of the *Almajiri* schools in Talata Marafa, Zamfara State and discovered that the school remained closed and unused for unknown reasons. Although Zamfara is not in the North East but the North West of Nigeria, it shares similar socio-economic conditions with states in the North East (Danjibo, 2009).

In a more general way, Ahokegh (2012) argues that the approach of the government which has been confrontational has failed to yield results. He suggested a long-term solution in the form of a national conference where representatives of ethnic groups and other stakeholders would meet to discuss Nigeria's problems. He also identified bad governance as one of the factors that led to Boko Haram's emergence and suggested that government at all levels should create job opportunities for the youths.

Amy (2014) assessed responses to Boko Haram and categorised all into local, state, federal and international responses. He faulted the human rights violations in the legal frameworks like the death penalty and gaining access to a suspect's house without a warrant as he opined that this is against an internationally accepted standard. In all, he attributed the corruption in the Nigerian government and the military as the bane confronting counter-terrorism. Amy's claim is further affirmed in the ongoing arms deal case levelled against some politicians and military officers who have not been able to account for over $2 billion meant for arms purchase (Agbambu, 2016a; Amaefule, 2016). Amy (2014) therefore suggested a more balanced and coordinated approach to countering the group.

Campbell (2014) levelled accusations of incompetence, collusion and cruelty against the Nigerian military which has made it not up to the task of defeating the terrorists but rather makes their disposition in terms of cruelty almost at par with that of the terrorists. Corroborating Campbell's view, Dietrich (2015) drawing his position consequent upon a field research conducted in Nigeria's North East region submitted that the military has failed to protect potential target communities from attacks; not been able to evade collateral damage during combat operations against the sect and antithetical to civilians through unlawful detention, harassment, property destruction, sexual violence, uncontrolled targeting of young men, torture, and being surfeit in the use of force resulting in injury and death. Campbell (2014) further

acknowledged the efforts of the US DOD in training Nigerian military on combat operations that will be devoid of human rights abuses. In furtherance, he suggested humanitarian support from USAID, an establishment of a US consulate in Kano, as well as US co-operation in anti-corruption. However, Campbell was sceptical about having success in tackling the Boko Haram menace when he argued that other violent religious groups in Nigeria have often disappeared only to reappear again with a different identity and he attributed this to not tackling the root causes that led to the emergence of these groups (Campbell, 2014).

The TPA 2011 and TPA 2013 prohibit all acts of terrorism and terrorism financing as well as the penalties for various offences (FGN, 2011a; FGN, 2013). The MLPA 2011 and MLPA 2012 prohibit terrorism financing and a framework to co-operate with financial institutions to partner with government agencies charged with the responsibilities of preventing terrorism funding (FGN, 2011b; FGN, 2012). The NACTEST seeks to nip in the bud the desire to become terrorists or finance terrorism, boost protection capacity against terrorism, identify through early warning systems potential terrorist acts and mitigation of terrorist attacks through appropriate institutions (NACTEST, 2014).

The implementation of the NACTEST and these acts need to be equally assessed due to the sparse studies on counter-terrorism policy performance against Boko Haram threat to peace and security. These documents also serve as formal legislation for some of the other existing policies as it further expands the scope and grip of the existing policies. It further justifies why there is the need to examine these policy documents in order to have a holistic view of Nigeria's counter-terrorism.

2.5   Conclusion

There has been a review of the literature on terrorism, counter-terrorism and counter-terrorism in Nigeria. Counter-terrorism in Nigeria was discussed within the Boko Haram context. Counter-terrorism in Kenya and Algeria were also reviewed in order to have a glimpse into how terrorism is being combated in other African countries.

Nigeria's counter-terrorism policies have hitherto been reactive rather than proactive. This explains why the root causes of terrorism are hardly addressed. The introduction of legislative Acts and a strategy to address terrorism in Nigeria was seen as a welcome development. There

has been scarce research in assessing Nigeria's counter-terrorism policies on the platform of these documents. The need to have a robust assessment through utilising these policy documents, therefore, justifies this study.

CHAPTER THREE

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1   Introduction

The dissertation is located under two theoretical understandings, systems and state fragility theories. These theories serve as the framework to respond to the problematic in the study. The systems theory emphasises the relationship a political system has with other systems and how it shapes the types of policies to be made, how they will be made and how policies are evaluated. The state fragility theory complements the systems theory by explaining how the weakness of state institutions can affect policy making, implementation and evaluation.

3.2   Theoretical Framework Explained

Bezuidenhout (2014: 55) defined theoretical framework as 'a specific collection of thoughts and theories that relate to the phenomenon that we choose to investigate. It is the conceptual starting point and the frame of a research study'. It is, in essence, using theories or models to explain a study. The theoretical framework is used to shape the scope of a study, provide guideline through which a study is examined, identify key variables and it points to critical research questions that need responses (Bezuidenhout, 2014).

There has been an avalanche of theories explaining terrorism in relation to its origin which also serve as platforms for shaping counter-terrorism measures. This is why Gupta (2004) aptly explains that a military approach alone cannot effectively combat terrorism but there must be ideological rebranding as well as good social service delivery. In essence, political, social and economic causes of terrorism when taken as key elements in counter-terrorism measures make it effective in its explanation. The theories that have been utilised in terrorism not only explain its root causes but also play crucial roles in shaping counter-terrorism measures. These theories include frustration-aggression theory (Borum, 2004; Victoroff, 2005), social learning theory (Borum, 2004; Victoroff, 2005); oppression theory (Borum, 2004) and relative deprivation

theory (Flynn, 2011). Consequent upon the literature reviewed, this study adopts two theories as theoretical lenses that guide this study. The first is the systems theory which posits to explain the reasons for Nigeria's counter-terrorism policies, factors taken into consideration in arriving at the policies, the role of the actors involved and how feedbacks revert to policy makers for 'redress' purposes. The second theory is the state fragility theory which offers the explanation on how the dismal dispositions of the state cause terrorism and also affects the institutions of the state in implementing counter-terrorism policies.

3.3   Systems Theory

The use of systems theory is not restricted to the field of political science or its subfield, public policy alone. This is why Bertalanffy (cited in Erasmus, 1994) asserts that general systems theory is interdisciplinary, that is, it can be utilised for phenomena investigated in different traditional branches of scientific research. In addition, it is not confined to material systems but applies to any whole consisting of interacting components (Bertalanffy cited in Erasmus, 1994). According to Dye (1981: 40), the conceptualization of systems theory is highlighted in David Easton's books-*An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems (1957) and A Framework of Political Analysis (1965).* This could be adjudged as when the theory was applied to politics.

The political system is subject to several influences coming to it from the environment or from events that occur within a political system (Easton, 1965). The political system is itself a subset of the environment. The environment includes the horde of social, economic and political phenomena which serve as platforms to have problems presented to policy makers and subsequently assist in resolving such problems (Shakansky, 1972). In essence, the environment comprises various systems which co-exist in a mutual manner. These include political, social, economic and international systems with each one having its subsystems which could serve as stand-alone systems in some instances (Easton, 1965). Almond and Powell (cited in Erasmus, 1994) stated that systems theory is based on the assumption that all phenomena can best be analysed not only by studying them in isolation but rather by considering them as part of a systemic whole.

According to Dye (1981), systems theory portrays public policy as an output of one of the systems in the environment which is the political system. He further asserts that the concept of

'system' implies an identifiable set of institutions and activities in society that function to change demands to authoritative decisions which require societal support. He postulates further that the concept of 'system' also means that elements of the system are interrelated in that the system can respond to forces emanating from its environment, and that this is done in order to preserve itself. According to Erasmus (1994: 85), 'in terms of a systems view, a society is deemed to comprise several interrelated subsystems of which the system of governance is one'. This theory is applicable to public policy as the government is the overarching subsystem. That is why David Easton (cited in Dye, 1981: 41) stated that 'another way to conceive public policy is to think of it as a response of a political system to forces brought to bear upon it from the environment'. This no doubt points to the fact that the political system has the franchise of transforming the influences from the environment and within itself into public policy. This is often done through institutions of the state. Buttressing this is the fact that public policy operates within an environment which made Eneanya (2009) view public policy as the response of the political system to demands arising from its environment.

In the case of Nigeria, the government being the political system has responded to the menace (bombings, kidnappings amongst others) caused by Boko Haram through its counter-terrorism policies by declaring a state of emergency, deployment of troops *et cetera* (Akpan *et al.*, 2014). These responses perhaps made government preserve itself and to make its wheel to continue to run as security is a key issue in governance. The whole gamut of system theory according to Grin and Loeber (2007) is that problems emanating from society are transformed into the input (demands and supports) for the political system to be processed by its policy makers. The policy makers produce outputs in order to resolve the societal problems which are implemented by the executive arm but these may generate a new set of demands perhaps due to imperfections in the earlier ones (Grin and Loeber 2007).

Aligning with this, Hanekom (1987) maintains that inputs from the external environment such as community needs and problems serve as the rationale for actions by the policy maker. He posits further that through intensive debate, compromise and agreements, decisions are taken on what is to be done to alleviate problems or to satisfy needs, that is a policy (output) pertaining to the debated aspect is made. Hanekom concludes that the result of the adopted policy again serves as feedback to the system. That is, the feedback serves as a scale to judge governance. The feedback serves as the pivot of this study as it seeks to put the policies of the Nigerian

government through the barometer in order to know how it has fared as regards the menace of Boko Haram. Easton (1965: 112) depicted the systems theory in a diagrammatic manner which he tagged 'A Simplified Model of a Political System' as shown:

ENVIRONMENT   ENVIRONMENT

Demands   Decisions and

INPUTS   Support   OUTPUTS

THE

POLITICAL

SYSTEM

Actions

ENVIRONMENT   ENVIRONMENT

Figure 1: A Simplified Model of a Political System

Source: *Easton (1965: 112).*

The political system is affected by forces from the environment regarded as *inputs* (Dye, 1981). These can also be viewed as transmissions sent from the environment to the conversion stage which is domiciled in the political system and they may be in the form of demands for policy, resources and support or opposition to the actions of those in the political system (Sharkansky, 1972). The *environment* is any condition or circumstance external to the boundaries of the political system (Sharkansky, 1972). The *political system* is the group of interrelated structures and processes which function authoritatively to allocate values for a society (Dye, 1981). Through its structure and processes, the system acts on the inputs from the environment in such a way that they are converted to outputs (McCool, 1995). *Outputs* are the values that are

authoritatively allocated and these allocations constitute public policy (McCool, 1995). They are made available to the environment and such include services, tangible goods and behavioural regulation statements, gestures and activities which send signals to the populace on the result of its demands (Sharkansy, 1972). *Demands* occur when individuals or groups in response to environmental conditions act to affect public policy (Dye 1981). *Support* is rendered when citizens perform their obligations (Dye 1981).

The *feedback* is not a component of the diagram; it, however, exists as a *de facto* component of the systems theory. According to Popoola (2012), it is unavoidable for the political system to be fed with messages, demands and requests in which the system must read, treat and react to appropriately. Decisions on such messages must be made known through appropriate feedback mechanisms as this enables the system to achieve its goals of meeting the aspirations of people (Popoola, 2012). Making his stand on the importance of *feedback*, Easton (1965) opined that the capacity of a system to stand in the face of stress is a function of the presence and type of information and other influences that return to its actors and decision makers. He further asserts that if a system is to persist through time, it must obtain adequate feedback about its past performance and this, in turn, shapes its future actions. To corroborate Easton's view, Eneanya (2009) pointed out that the feedback translates to new demands which make the flow continue in that cycle. The feedback is the nexus between output emanating from an old input and new input (the link that makes some outputs turn back to input). The feedback serves as the platform to assess the strength or weakness of state institutions.

With regard to the Boko Haram menace and the Nigerian state, the *input* has to do with the recurrent challenges posed by Boko Haram as these shape government's counter-terrorism policies. Isine (2016) recalled a situation when the government offensively reacted to Boko Haram's hold over territories in Northern Nigeria by reclaiming such territories. The *environment* represents the Nigerian people, international community, social institutions, and religious institutions amongst others. The *political system* is the Nigerian government and its institutions. *Outputs* are the policies that have been made in response to the menace of Boko Haram. These *inter alia* include: NACTEST, promulgating the TPA 2011, TPA 2013, MLPA 2011 and MLPA 2012 (Dasuki, 2013). *Demands* are public opinions, protests, reports, pressure groups' views which snowballed as a result of the conspicuous insecurity (Akinbi, 2015). Demand also has as one of its constituents in the Nigerian 1999 Constitution as the government's

duty is to make laws for peace, order and good governance of the federation (FGN, 1999). Hence, the onus lies on the government to respond. The *support* has to do with the obligations of citizens to the state. For example, as a result of the violent activities of Boko Haram, curfew has been declared at several instances, citizens remained indoors at such times and in such locations in compliance (Akpan *et al.*, 2014). The *feedback* mechanisms are the various monitoring and evaluation parameters used by independent bodies, research by academia, newspaper opinion polls amongst others. A very good example of the feedback effect was the withdrawal and restoration of GSMC services within the affected areas.

The restoration perhaps was due to the conviction on the side of the government that the withdrawal might have a negative effect on the socio-economic life of those in the North East (Akpan *et al.*, 2014). The amendments of the legal frameworks are clear evidence to the fact that feedback got from the environment necessitated the amendments (Amy, 2014). According to Carment (2003), the response of a state towards the demands strengthens the support the political system receives from the environment which informs its output and having a good feedback mechanism guarantees continued stability of the political system. These demands include security, social and economic infrastructures hence ensuring the stability of the political system.

Commenting on the utility of the systems theory, Eneanya (2009) noted that the positive side of the systems theory makes enquiry into policy formation and significant aspect of the political process. That is, it explains how the political system is able to convert demands into public policy and preserve itself over time. A further strength of this theory was captured by Hanekom (1987) when he posited that the value of the system theory is found in the continuous feedback implied by utilising the effects of policies as additional inputs to the system. He concluded that this paves the way for determining if a specific policy indeed has the effect intended by the policy maker which is a focal point of this study.

Asforth (cited in Erasmus, 1994) captured a shortcoming of the systems theory when he opined that it is more apparent than it is real and that it is poor in coping with complexity and dynamism. Hanekom (1987) highlighted a weakness of the systems theory in the conversion of inputs to outputs by highlighting its unclarity. Partially, what this portrays is that the political system's insensitivity to issues of poor economy, corruption, social infrastructure, resource

control and dictatorship may lead to breakdown of the rule of law and consequently the political system (Campante and Chor, 2012). Nigeria is not an exception in this imbroglio.

The Nigerian government is obligated in the 1999 Constitution to provide public safety and order as well as political, economic and social services for its citizens (FGN, 1999). However, these obligations are hardly met as those met are in the interest of the ruling elite. Hence, there is no transparency and demands, as well as feedbacks, are hardly taken into consideration. This is due to corruption, the long reign of military rule which has alienated Nigerian citizens from the political process, bureaucratic inefficiency and ethnoreligious tensions (Brinkel and Ait-Hida 2012; Nkechi, 2013). Apparently, these are consequences of weak state institutions. In a similar view, Omitola (2012) postulated that the Nigerian state is gradually moving into failed status attributed to the loss of its structural balance of input and output. He further posited that the political system no longer receives support from the people and even not the target of demand as a result of no confidence being expressed in the state. Hence, citizens are hardly involved in the political process which questions the popularity and potency of government's policies. An example of a negative effect this has had is the taking of territories by Boko Haram (Isine, 2016). This further questions the sovereignty of the Nigerian state.

The criticisms against this theory do not invalidate the appropriateness of its utility for this study. Hanekom's (1987) criticism of the systems theory regarding how inputs are converted to output has necessitated the need to adopt state fragility theory to complement the systems theory. This will offer the opportunity to examine the roles of the institutions concerned with the conversion process. Apparently, the whole process in the political system may not be made public for security reasons but transparency is equally crucial. These policies came as a result of what was going on in the environment. The feedback mechanism has informed the necessity for policy change and coming on board of new policies in countering Boko Haram's reign of terror: this is another focal point of this study as it seeks to also suggest proactive policies.

3.4   State Fragility Theory

The status of a state is achieved when a political unit has a population, a clearly defined territory, a government and competence to relate with other states (John, 2008). The presence of these features makes a state sovereign. There is little accord on what best describes the identity of a

fragile state (Kaplan, 2014). This is because the extent of fragility remains a relative one (Maiangwa, 2012). However, there is agreement on the responsibilities of sovereign states in performing basic functions of security, the socio-economic wellbeing of its citizens, regulatory and diplomatic roles (John, 2008). Success or failure can either be recorded by a state with relation to the discharge of its responsibilities (Maiangwa, 2012). Fragility connotes a state characterised with dwindling capacity and dismal performance regarding security and development (Cilliers and Cisk, 2013). 'A state is said to be fragile when it is unable to provide for basic human security or create the public goods and conditions needed for gains in human development' (Cilliers and Cisk, 2013: 7). It is not in all cases that a state is unable to discharge its duties but the capacity of the state prowess in doing this may be weak. This aptly describes why Vallings and Moreto-Torres (2005) postulated that state fragility encompasses government's weakness in delivering the hub of the functions of government to its people.

State fragility has causes as well as consequences and these are inseparable because they form a vicious circle. The factors that contribute towards the fragility of the state are also its consequences. The grounds for the fragility of a state includes frail governance, economic inequality, poverty, violence, political instability, the porosity of border and weak state institutions (Cilliers and Cisk, 2013; John, 2008; Kaplan, 2014). The correction of these causes and effects of state fragility hinges on effective state institutions. The consistency of state institutions is very important in containing the fragility of a state and intrastate conflicts (Brinkerhoff, 2011). State institutions include executive branches such as police, law courts, parliament and non-governmental organisations (Vallings and Moreto-Torres, 2005). The whole gamut of state fragility theory connotes the difference between a fragile and resilient state which is hinged on the weakness or otherwise of state institutions (Kaplan, 2014; Vallings and Moreto-Torres, 2005).

An examination of the Nigerian state in relation to other states creates a platform to understand how fragile the former is. The most widely accepted state fragility rating is that undertaken by the Foreign Policy Failed State Index and the Fund for Peace (Vallings and Moreto-Torres, 2005: 50). Nigeria's position is shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Nigeria's Positions in the Failed State Index (2005 to 2015)

Year	Position	Number of Countries Rated
2005	54	76
2006	22	146
2007	17	177
2008	18	177
2009	15	177
2010	14	177
2011	14	177
2012	14	177
2013	16	178
2014	17	178
2015	14	178

Source: *Fund for Peace (2015).*

Failing state structure, violence and poverty are what Nigeria has been suffering from (Brinkel and Ait-Hida, 2012). The indicator for this rating in Table 1 is premised on social and economic indicators as well as political and military indicators (Fund for Peace, 2015). Social indicators include mortality, IDP camps and challenges, violence and human capital development amongst others (Fund for Peace, 2015). The economic indicators include *inter alia* ratio of rich to poor, unemployment rate, access to services, inflation (Fund for Peace, 2015). The political and military indicators include corruption, policing, small arms proliferation, militancy, public service provisions, foreign assistance, prosecution methods and so on (Fund for Peace, 2015). These indicators for determining the state fragility are evident in Nigeria in that the country has not performed well in measuring up to standard in having the sub-indicators adequately catered for. This accounts for the country's ranking to be consistently rated less than twenty in 9 years out of 11 years ratings.

Nigeria has always found itself within this range for over a decade. The ethno-religious violence coupled with political uprisings that have bewildered the country since independence further justifies this. Religious and ethnic violence have been a recurrent issue in Nigeria as shown in

Table 2. Out of 188 countries, Nigeria was ranked 12th as at 2013 in maternal mortality rate with 560 per 100,000 live births (UNDP, 2015a). This is a failure of the health institutions. Another factor contributing to Nigeria's ranking in the state fragility index is the ratio of policemen to citizens. Popoola, (2012) revealed that as at 2011, Nigeria had about 357,000 policemen who do not match up to the UN recommendation of a policeman to 400 citizens. This is because the country's population as at then was high (UNDP, 2015a) in relation to the number of policemen meant to police it. Surely, the country is under-policed and this further questions the ability of the Nigerian government to secure its people which is one of the basic roles of a state. The fragility of the Nigerian state manifested in the emergence of militant groups including Boko Haram and the weak state institutions are responsible for this and the dismal way of responding to their violent acts.

Poverty in Nigeria affects over half of the population who live below the poverty line of $1 per day with the North West and North East worst hit (AfDB, 2014). Provision of basic amenities has been at a dismal level affecting health, education, water, sanitation and other social needs (AfDB, 2014; African Statistical Year Book, 2014; UNDP, 2015a). The country has had a history of war and violent conflicts since independence in 1960 of which the Boko Haram uprisings is one of them (Aborisade and Mundt, 2002; Brinkel and Ait-Hida, 2012; Isichei, 1987; Kenny, 1996; Suberu, 1996). Nigeria equally has a high level of corruption (Cilliers and Cisk, 2013). These problems confronting Nigeria are inevitably progenies of weak state institutions and the continued existence of these quagmires weaken state institutions.

Boko Haram is associated with violence. Most countries of the world do have a history of violence but the ability of a state to mitigate such on time determines if such violence will expose the fragility of such states (John, 2008). These aforementioned facts in the preceding paragraphs on the faltering of the Nigerian state as regards its duties towards its citizens further affirms Ahokegh's (2012) view that Boko Haram is an upshot of Nigeria's domestic, political, socio-economic and to some degree religious problems. In essence, these factors responsible for the emergence of Boko Haram are responsible for its continued existence and the incapacity of the state's institutions to contain the sect. This explains why John (2008) acknowledged that a fragile state gives terrorist organisations a field day for their activities. This is evident in the activities of Boko Haram in their operations in Northern Nigeria (Cilliers and Cisk, 2013).

Nigeria does not have challenges with formulating laudable policies but the problem is always with the implementation. These hindrances to effective policy implementation are dependent on weak state institutions. An example of institutional performance in Nigeria is the $180 million Halliburton corruption saga that involved Nigerian public officials who were alleged to have collected the said amount from a foreign consortium to secure a Liquefied Natural Gas plant construction project (Omonobi, 2012; Tukur, 2016). Sadly, the foreign collaborators have been prosecuted in their respective countries but the case was *swept under the carpet* in Nigeria and those alleged to be involved are presumed to still walk freely on the streets (Tukur, 2016).

The most recent is the issue of fund budgeted to purchase arms meant to prosecute the Boko Haram fight. Over $2 billion was mismanaged by serving and retired military officers as well as their civilian collaborators (Daniel and Omonobi, 2015). These examples reveal that anti-corruption institutions are weak. It is also obvious that corruption which is a key symptom of weak institutions has colossally impeded policy implementation through the arms deal issue. The roles of state institutions do reflect in the political system as argued by the systems theory. State fragility theory seems to bear relevance to check weakness or otherwise of institutions saddled with the implementation of counter-terrorism policies. Hence, the justification for its adoption for this study and why systems theory has been examined in order to have a more comprehensive overview of why, what and to what extent Nigeria's counter-terrorism policies have fared.

3.5   Conclusion

Systems theory and state fragility theories have been explained in general as well as in relation to the Nigerian government's response to Boko Haram. These theories will further be utilised in assessing government's framework on counter-terrorism in chapter six of this study. The systems theory provided an overview of the role of both state and non-state actors in government decision making process. The weaknesses of the systems theory, however, did not deter its adoption for this study. This is justified by the utilisation of state fragility theory to complement systems theory. The state fragility theory explains the weakness of the Nigerian state in making and implementing potent policies. The parameter used in measuring the weakness of the Nigerian state is the Fund for Peace failed state index. This index is premised on social, economic, political and military indicators. This will be expanded with an examination of the Nigerian state in Chapter Four.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE NIGERIAN STATE AND ITS COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY

PROCESS

4.1 Introduction

Like other countries, Nigeria has formulated and implemented several policies in response to economic, political, ethnic and religious crisis. The ethnic and religious plurality of the Nigerian state has informed the types of policies to be formulated and the ways in which such policies are implemented. This chapter examines the Nigerian state, with emphasis on the historical, economic and religious perspectives. These features of the Nigerian state have inevitably shaped its counter-terrorism policies hence, counter-terrorism in Nigeria policy process is equally examined.

4.2 The Nigerian State: History, Geography and Politics

Prior to the British conquest of 1861, the entity called Nigeria today consisted of different 'nations' with each having its peculiar values, customs, traditions and system of government (Oni, 2014). These indigenous nations and ethnic groups which are *inter alia*, the Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba, Ikwere, Afizere, Angas, Ndokwa, Bini, Gusu and others existed as separate societies (Ojie and Ewhrudjakpor, 2009). The Protectorate of Northern Nigeria came into existence in 1900 and by 1906; a separate protectorate was created by the fusion of the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria (Aigboba, 2013). Hence, the entity called Nigeria is a progeny of the Amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates in 1914 by the British (Eliagwu, 2007). According to Kirsten (1996: 506), 'from its inception, Nigeria has been an artificially constructed state and the result of colonial power enforcement in Africa'. This was why Eliagwu, (2007) saw amalgamation as a British unilateral and parochial decision in which they only considered administrative convenience and economic reasons rather than the differences in ethnic, religious and historical antecedents of each 'nation'. Oni further opined that:

"to amalgamate such nationalities in a marriage of inconvenience was to anticipate a failed relationship, a relationship which no doubt has been characterised inter alia by mutual suspicion, hatred, deep animosity, violence, sectionalism, and ethnic chauvinism till date" (Oni, 2014: 8).

Hence, amalgamation was carried out on nationalities that had virtually nothing in common and there has been close to divorce situations emanating till date which has manifested in terms of ethno-religious crisis.

Nigeria has a population of about 178.5 million (as at 2013) making it over one-fifth of the people in Africa and the largest black population (Aborisade and Mundt 2002; UNDP, 2015a). There are over 250 ethnic groups and 500 and more languages and dialects in Nigeria (Federal Ministry of Education, 2015). The religious proportion of Nigeria comprises 50% Muslims; Christians make up to 40% while traditional African religion constitutes only 10% of the population (Brinkel and Ait-Hida, 2012). The country is a plural society but Christians and Muslims have always engaged one another in conflicts (Brinkel and Ait-Hida, 2012). The Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba ethnic groups make about two-third of its population (Agbiboa, 2013). These diversities in ethnicity and religiosity are features of a plural nation (Khan, 2013). The country is located in West Africa and its boundaries are the Niger Republic to the North, to the North East is Chad, Cameroon to the East, the Benin Republic to the West and to the South is the Gulf of Guinea (Otobo, 1999). Nigeria has a land area of 923,768km^2 (AfDB, 2014).

The quest for national unity in order to manage the ethnic, religious and political plurality of Nigeria led to the adoption of a federal structure (Kirsten, 1996). It obtained its independence from Great Britain in 1960 and at that period, three regions, which are North (dominated by the Hausa-Fulani), East (Igbo speaking majority) and West (Yoruba speaking part) were in existence (Schwarz, 1965). In 1963, the Mid-West region (majority are Edo speaking with other minority groups) was created (Schwarz, 1965). The state system was adopted in 1967 and this culminated in the creation of 12 states and had since increased to 19 in 1976, 21 in 1987, 30 in 1991 and 36 in 1996 (Kirsten, 1996; Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). The third tier of government which are local governments as known in the Nigerian parlance is 774 in number (Federal Ministry of Education, 2015). The late 1990s witnessed the division of the country into six 'mini official'

geopolitical zones[11] for the purpose of power sharing (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005: 7). The hitherto regional identity of the pre and post-independence era still exists despite these geopolitical zones with the South West and South East still reflecting the Yoruba of the old West and Igbo of the old East respectively; North West still represents the so-called 'core-North'; NorthEast is the core of the old 'Borno axis' of the North; North Central comprises the old Middle Belt and South South covers the erstwhile group of Southern minorities (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005: 7).

The North is influenced basically by Islam with little Western education influence, while the South is vehemently influenced by Western civilisation (Fafunwa, 1974; Schwarz, 1965). This is why Okpanachi gave his assertion on the ethno-religious differences in Nigeria when he posited that:

> "The Hausa-Fulani and other communities residing in Northern Nigeria are mainly Muslims while the South-South minority areas and Igbo speaking areas in the SouthEast are predominantly Christians. The Middle Belt (or North.-central zone) is a mixture of Christian and Muslim populations, while the Yoruba-speaking communities in the SouthWest are about half Muslims and half Christians. This differentiation underlies the North-South cleavage (in terms of the North being predominantly Muslim and the South predominantly Christian) and sharpens ethnic cleavages in the country, especially in the North" (Okpanachi, 2009: 7).

The view of Okpanachi inevitably substantiates the division of the country along ethnic and religious lines. However, this division takes a more religious outlook, especially on Northern Nigeria. Osaghae and Suberu (2005) submitted that the majority Muslim group in the North is differentiated from the non-Muslim minorities in the region. However, in the South, majority groups are discriminated from minority groups on an ethnic basis (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). Aigboba (2013) gave his support to this view when he described Nigeria as the most divided state in Africa consequent upon its complex religious and ethnic diversity. Christianity came through the Atlantic Ocean to Southern Nigeria as has been noted that both Islam and

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[11]The six geopolitical zones have all together 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. Amy (2014: 2) outlined the states based on geopolitical zones
'North-East- Taraba, Borno, Bauchi, Adamawa, Gombe, and Yobe;
North-Central: Kogi, Niger, Benue, Kwara, Plateau, Nasarawa and the Federal Capital Territory;
North-West: Kaduna, Kebbi, Zamfara, Sokoto, Kano, Jigawa and Katsina;
South-East: Ebonyi, Enugu, Imo, Abia and Anambra;
South-South: Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Edo, Cross-River, Rivers and Delta; and
South-West: Ekiti, Oyo, Ogun, Lagos, Ondo and Osun'

Christianity have spread southward and northward respectively, while the middle-belt of Nigeria has been the point of intersection of both religions (Tajudeen and Adebayo, 2013).

This inevitably explains why Boko Haram has a Northern flavour, characterised by religious affiliation, though not devoid of economic issues. This necessitates the need to offer explanations on the history of Islam in Nigeria as well as Islamic religious movements and history of religious crisis in Nigeria.

4.2.1   Islam in Nigeria

Nigeria represents the most Southern tip of the Islamic sphere of influence which was predominant in North Africa from the 10th until the 19th Century. The penetration of this Islamic influence had, however, been stopped before it could reach the Southern part of the country (Kirsten 1996: 501). Hence, Islam has been in Nigeria for a long time/since a long time ago. According to Sunderlal (cited in Khan, 2013), the history of Islam can be traced to Saudi Arabia where it originated in the 6th Century. The religion later spread to Middle East, Asia, Europe and Northern part of Africa (Khan, 2013). Activities of Muslim merchants from North Africa and Middle East through Trans-Saharan trade routes down to the present day West Africa can be adjudged as the means through which Islam reached Nigeria (Omotoso, 2011; Tajudeen and Adebayo, 2013). Specifically, Islam came into *Hausa* land by traders and scholars through the activities of about forty *Wangarawa (*Malian) traders thought to be responsible for introducing Islam to Kano during the reign of Ali Yaji (1349-1385) as well as the adventure of Al-Maghili, a famous scholar of his era, brought Islam to Katsina in the 15th Century (Oloyede, 2014). However, other small trade routes existed between the Kanem and other communities surrounding her as this suggested the avenue through which Islam spread to other parts of Northern Nigeria (Omotoso, 2011).

The evolution of Islam in Northern Nigeria took a new twist with the *Jihad* orchestrated by Usman Dan Fodio, a *Fulani*. In the 19th Century, he led a *Jihad* which led to the removal of the Hausa rulers whom he accused of adulterating Islam with paganism, oppression of their subjects as well as corruption and their subsequent replacement by him, hence, this is the origin of having the traditional institution theologically inclined among Muslims in Northern Nigeria till date (Loimeier 2012; Omotoso, 2011). The *Jihad* led to the introduction of *Sharia* in most parts of the

present day Northern Nigeria (Kenny, 1996). He had his headquarters in Sokoto and Gwandu and appointed emirs who performed both spiritual and political functions (Okibe, 2000). The spiritual functions basically centre on ensuring their subjects adhere to strict Islamic principles.

Sokoto, a major city in the North fell to the British in 1903 (Amy, 2014) and this resulted in two things: in a bid to shield Islam in Northern Nigeria, Christian missionaries were prevented from moving Northward to spread Christianity and *Jihad* was prevented from spreading to places hitherto not affected by it especially in Southern Nigeria (Omotoso, 2011). This is why Hiskett (1987: 212) opined that the 'pre-colonial period and that of the colonial administration benignly did little to harm Islam and much to nurture it'. These gave the British a soft landing in the Muslim-dominated North.

The indirect rule system was also a tool in the hands of the British to achieve this (Ajayi, 1961). This system ensured the rule through the use of native chiefs as existing political institutions in all the regions and by extension; Islam was not tampered with in the North (Obike, 2000; Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). Indirect rule in Northern Nigeria was successful because Northern Emirates were virtually intact and strong (Agbiboa, 2013). In districts and villages, heads of districts were appointed from the Muslim ruling houses even in non-Muslim areas, resulting in the practice of Islam in Northern Nigeria remaining unhindered (Omotoso, 2011).

The Christian missionaries in the South brought with them Western education which the Southern leaders embraced while the Northern leaders who were shielded from Christian missionaries seldom allowed the British have their way in implanting much of Western education in their system, as preference was given to the Islamic educational system (Fafunwa, 1974; Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). Consequently, only few Western schools were built in Northern Nigeria (Danjibo, 2009) and this has made the South more educationally advantaged and the North educationally disadvantaged. The continued embracement of Islam and by extension *Sharia* is glaring in the introduction of *Sharia* legal system in 12 Northern states between 1999 and 2000 (Brinkel and Ait-Hida, 2012).

4.2.2 Islamic Religious Movements in Northern Nigeria

Islam in Northern Nigeria has been balkanised into several fragmented groups (Azuma, 2014). For the purpose of this study, some Islamic religious movements that have employed violence in

their operations, especially in Northern Nigeria, will be considered because, Boko Haram as a group has a religious agenda and hence the need to have some insight into such movements.

4.2.2.1 The Izala

It is called *Jamā'at izālat al-bid'a wa-igāmat as-sunna* (Society for the Removal of the Innovation and the Re-establishment of the Sunnah) but simply referred to as Izala (Kenny, 1996: 343; Oloyede, 2014: 21). It was founded in Jos in 1976 by Ismaila Idris who is a Fulani from Katagun born in 1937 but under the spiritual guidance of Sheik Abubakar Gummi (Amy, 2014; Isichei, 1987; Oloyede, 2014). These are youths who are poor and who form a chunk of *Izala* devotees (Kenny, 1996). As a result of differences in ideological positions, its members were involved in scuffles with other Muslims throughout Northern Nigeria for many years but later directed its violence towards Christians (Kenny, 1996). The group also condemns the celebrations associated with naming ceremony (Isichei, 1987).

Its scope of violence has covered some towns in Plateau State, Wukari and Minna but it does not make wars on the society except its Muslim opponents (Isichei, 1987). They also got involved in violence with Derika in 1978 over control of the market (then central) mosque in Zuru, Kebbi State, which led to the closure of the mosque and resulting in the two groups worshipping in two separate mosques to this day (Danjibo, 2009).

4.2.2.2 The Nigerian Muslim Brothers ('Shiites')

The group has its root in Zaria and the leader of the group is Ibrahim Zakzaky (Kenny, 1996). They operate under the inspiration of the Iranian Ayatollah, and Sayyid Qutb and Hasan al-Banna of Egypt (Kenny, 1996). The *Shiites* hold firm to the principles of rejecting the Nigerian constitution, flag and legal institutions, as well as accepting only *Sharia* (Kenny, 1996). The movement has been accused of fomenting violence (Kenny, 1996; Oloyede, 2014). The violence they have perpetrated includes attacks on the Daily Times newspaper office in Katsina and the Emir of Katsina on March 29th, 1991 over a publication which they alleged insulted Prophet Mohammed (Kenny, 1996). There was also a riot on the 19th of April 1991 which led to the burning of a central mosque and the recent attack on the convoy of the Chief of Army Staff in Zaria on 11th December, 2015 (Akhaine and Tsokar 2015; Kenny, 1996).

4.2.2.3 Maitatsine

Marwa, an Islamic scholar, was the leader and founder of the group, who migrated from a town called Marwa in Northern Cameroon to Kano in 1945 (Aborishade and Mundt, 2002). The derogatory nature of his preaching and abhorrence for those in authority, led to his imprisonment and deportation to Cameroon in 1962 (Aborishade and Mundt, 2002; Isichei, 1987). However, he found his way back into Nigeria in 1966 and between 1972 and 1975, but he was again arrested and detained for his disparaging preaching and abuse of those in authority (Aborishade and Mundt, 2002; Danjibo, 2009). Finding his way back brings to question Nigeria's immigration policy and porosity of borders which are still evident in the activities of Boko Haram in its cross-border vices. Boko Haram has members in Chad and Niger (Danjibo, 2009) and they easily perpetrate violence in Nigeria and return to these countries without much resistance.

Marwa's nickname is Maitatsine and this evolved from the syllables *Mai* which means possessor while *ta- tsine* means he curses (Hiskett 1987). Hence, he was a possessor of curses and this is evident in his reigning of curses on those who smoke cigarettes and those who ride bicycles (Hiskett 1987). Its followers are made up of the *ulamas/almajiris,* who are students/disciples of the *mallams* (Islamic or Quranic teachers) who are available for the latter's tutoring. Put differently, Maitatsine had a lot of follower's courtesy of the dwindling economic situation which produced an army of *Alamjiris* that have embraced Islamic education and has no stable means of livelihood (Danjibo, 2009). In essence, his followership was mainly from the unemployed (Kenny, 1996).

Maitatsine condemned Muslims praying and facing Mecca, an act he claimed originated from Prophet Mohammad and not from the Quran and postulated that a Muslim may pray facing any direction he pleases (Hiskett, 1987). This opinion gave rise to the weighty accusation from *Sunni* Muslims that he discarded the Prophet Mohammad as a messenger of God and this was further substantiated after his death when copies of the Quran found in his house had the name of Mohammad substituted with his own (Hiskett, 1987). He claimed to be a prophet (Isichei, 1987). The movement sought to 'cleanse' Nigerian Muslims from the influence of the West (Brinkel and Ait-Hida, 2012).

The Kano state government asked the group to relocate and this led to its first riot which erupted in Kano in December 1980, in which his group was defeated by the army and he himself was killed (Kenny, 1996). His followers regrouped and rioted again in Kaduna in 1982 (Kenny, 1996). They orchestrated another riot in Bulumkutu and Rigasa, Borno state in 1982 but were defeated by the army, another one in February 1984 in Jimeta ward in Yola in the old Gongola state but were suppressed by security forces and finally in Gombe in April 1985 but defeated by government forces (Isichei, 1987). Marwa and about 10,000 of his followers died in those attacks (Kenny, 1996). The death of Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram's leader just like Marwa has not led to the end of Boko Haram. The sect has even become fiercer after Yusuf's death (Akinbi, 2015; Isine, 2016; Loimeier, 2012; Marama, 2016; Onuoha, 2014). This points to the fact that the leader can be killed but the ideology cannot be stopped unless deradicalisation and counter-radicalisation are taken seriously.

4.3   History of Ethnic, Religious and Political Violence in Nigeria

Nigeria has witnessed series of ethnic, religious and political crisis before and after independence. Table 2 provides details of some of these vices.

Table 2: Chronology of Ethno-Religious and Political Violence in Nigeria

S/N	Year	Region (E, P, R and Ec)	Description/Cause of Violence	Casualty/Damage
1	1945	North (E)	Between Hausa and Igbo. It was as a result of ascendancy issue in the Jos area between Hausa settlers and indigenes in 1932 but later culminated into a fracas between the Hausas and Igbos by 1945.	2 people died and several properties were destroyed.
2	1953	North (E and P)	Kano riots occurred as a result of the clamour for self-government in 1956. The North felt it was not prepared for that and this led to fighting between Hausas and Igbos in Kano.	36 deaths and 251 wounded.
3	1958	North (E and P)	Northern Peoples Congress (NPC)/ Northern Element Progressive Union political parties riots in Maiduguri.	NA

4	1960	North (E and P	Tiv riots caused by a revolt against Hausa-Fulani hegemony in the North through NPC and later led to the formation of United Middle Belt Congress by Tarka to check NPC domination within the region.	15 to 60 deaths.
5	1964	North (E and P)	Tiv riots which were an over flow of that of 1960.	About 2000 people died and much property destroyed.
6	1965	South (P)	Violence occurred in the Western region between the supporters of Awolowo over the election of Akintola.	NA
7	1966	North and South (E and P)	Five army Majors staged a coup which led to the death of the Prime Minister, Western Region Premier, Northern Region Premier, Federal Minister of Finance and others on 15th January. This was seen as an 'Igbo' coup against the North because four of those Majors were Igbos.	NA
8	1966	South (E and P)	July 1966 coup by some military officers of Northern extraction. The Head of State and Military governor of the West were killed in Ibadan. It was seen as retaliation to the earlier one. It culminated in the killings of military and civilians of Igbo extraction, resident in Northern Nigeria.	About 10,000 deaths.
9	1967	South (E and P).	The 30-month Biafran civil war started in 1967 and ended in January 1970. The Eastern region attempted to secede from Nigeria.	About 2 million deaths.
10	1980	North (R)	Occurred in December when the Kano State governor asked the Maitatsine movement to leave. They revolted against this and opted for a riot.	Mohammed Marwa, its leader and about 4177 deaths.
11	1982, 1984 and 1985	North (R)	Mohammed Marwa's followers regrouped in 1982, 1984 and 1985 and rioted in Kaduna, Yola and Gombe towns respectively.	Almost 6,000 in total were killed.
12	1987	North (R)	Kafanchan crisis due to the disagreement between Muslim and Christian students of the	NA

			Kafanchan Teachers College. This later spread to Kaduna, Katsina and Funtua where a Muslim mob attacked Christians and Southern Nigerian migrant communities. Other incidents religious-based violence occurred in Kano, Sokoto and Jos within the same period.	
13	1992	North (EC and R)	This was caused by the decision to relocate the Zango-Kataf district market which was vehemently rejected by the Hausa community. This later turned to inter-religious conflict.	NA
14	1997	South (E)	This was an intra-ethnic conflict between the Modakeke's and the people of Ife. It finally ended in 2000.	NA
15	1998	South (E and P)	Protests over the death of MKO Abiola while in government detention, which occurred in Lagos, Ibadan and some South West states. It later led to the attack of Hausas in these states.	NA
16	1999	South (E)	Ijaw/Itsekiri violence.	NA
17	2000	North (R)	Protests over the introduction of *Sharia* in 12 Northern states.	About 2000 deaths
18	2000	North (R)	Protest over attempt to host the Miss World beauty contest in Kaduna.	About 200 deaths
19	2011	North (E, P and R)	Post-election violence erupted in a lot of Northern cities in protest against the emergence of Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian from the South as winner of the election and the loss of Mohammadu Buhari, a Muslim from the North.	More than 800 deaths and about 65,000 displaced.

Notes: **E**- Ethnic Based Crisis, **P**- Politically Based Crisis, **R**-Religious Based Crisis, **EC**-Economic Based Crisis and NA-Not Available

Source: (Aborisade and Mundt, 2002; Harnischfeger, 2014; Human Rights Watch, 2011; Isichei, 1987; Kenny, 1996; Ojie and Ehwhrujakpor, 2009; Okpanachi, 2009; Onuoha, 2010; Suberu, 1996).

These are just some of the conflicts. There are many others that were under reported or not documented. The incessant clashes between Fulani herdsmen and farmers (host communities) over grazing areas have also cost lots of lives and loss of properties in recent times (Adankin and

Ikpefan, 2016; Odebode *et al.,* 2016). Table 2 indicates that the cause and nature of each of the violence which may be ethnic, religious, political and economic, are always interrelated in which there is always difficulty differentiating among them in some cases. This assertion is echoed by Aigboba (2013: 19) that 'the mélange of religion and ethnicity coupled with the complex web of politically salient identities and history of chronic and seemingly intractable conflicts and instability, qualifies Nigeria as the most deeply divided state in Africa'.

The policy measures taken by the government to check ethno-religious imbroglio in Nigeria include: the indirect rule system, introduction of federalism in 1953, the National Youth Service Corps, and the Federal Character Principle (Kirsten, 1996; Ojie and Ewhrudjakpor, 2009). Other responses to these crises are: making arrests, use of police and in the case where the police is incapable, inviting the military to quell such crisis and set up commissions of enquiries (Danjibo, 2009). These measures have done very little in checking these unrests as Table 2 shows that as a crisis ends, another one comes on board. That is, as one is resolved, another one erupts. This study aims to determine the reason for the persistence of Boko Haram despite the government's counter-terrorism efforts.

4.4   Nigeria: the Political Environment

The Nigerian political scene has been informed by military and civilian leaderships drawn from the North and South. The military incursion and lengthy period in the Nigerian politics, introduced self-aggrandisement in the disposition and use of power, having a lone source of power, less emphasis on merit and repression (Ikelegbe, 2001). The military has ruled for a total of 29 years and some months in total since independence in 1960 (Aborishade and Mundt, 2002). Governance through the civilians has also not been a better alternative. Hence, both military and civilian governments cannot absolve themselves of Nigeria's social, security and economic challenges.

Pre-independence political parties and politicians had ideological differences but these were set aside and they unified in the struggle for the political independence of Nigeria (Oboki, 2001). Ake (1993) emphasized that the political parties in those periods were based along ethnic lines; with NPC representing the Hausa-Fulani, the Yorubas had the Action Group as their party while the National Council in Nigeria and the Cameroons represented the Igbos and other minority

groups in the then Eastern region (cited in Kirsten, 1996). Although political parties after the first republic hardly reflected ethnic alignment, Nigerian politicians still utilised ethnic and religious identities to score political points (Campbell, 2014). Nigeria became a republic in 1963 and prior to this period, Nnamdi Azikiwe was the Governor General who represented the Queen of England as the ceremonial head of the country (Oboki, 2001). In 1963, Nigeria became a republic, and the title 'Governor General' became 'President' as the queen ceased to be the Head of State (Oboki, 2001: 131). Hence, there was a partial passing of the leadership baton in 1960 but the baton was fully collected by post-independent leaders in 1963.

However, 'post independence efforts at nation building have been stifled by Nigeria's complex ethno-religious configuration' (Aigboba, 2013: 4). This is because the 'perception' that the amalgamation of over 250 ethnic groups could breed a nation devoid of ethnoreligious polarisation could no longer stand the test of time. The elites in their bid to have continued access to state resources, have always manipulated the masses on ethno-religious grounds even before independence (Ojie and Ewhrudjakpor, 2009). Examples of such actions are statements credited to Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (who later became the Prime Minister) and Nnamdi Azinkiwe (who later became the first President). Abubakar Tafawa Balewa at the 1947 Legislative Council Debate said that he decided to 'make it clear to you that if the British quitted Nigeria now at this stage, the Northern people would continue their interrupted conquest to the sea' (Ojie and Ewhrudjakpor, 2009: 9). What he meant by his statement is that the Northern hegemony will continue to be extended to Southern Nigeria. This obviously created suspicion in terms of trust between the two regions and continued divisions along ethnic lines not only by language and culture but politically. Ojie and Ewhrudjakpor equally made reference to Nnamdi Azikiwe's comment in the July 6th, 1946 edition of the *West African Pilot* newspaper that:

> *"It would appear that the God of Africa has specially created the Ibo nation to lead the children of Africa from the bondage of the ages 'and that' the martial prowess of the Ibo nation at all stages of human history has enabled them not only to conquer others but also to adapt themselves to the role of preserver…The Igbo nation cannot shirk its responsibility" (Ojie and Ewhrudjakpor, 2009: 9).*

This statement negatively affected the relationship of other ethnic groups with the Igbos. The fusion of the multi-ethnic state of Nigeria and the parochial *cum* non-statesmanship disposition of post-independence leaders at all levels produced consequences like the Tiv Riots of 1960,

Western regional crisis of 1962, 1962/63 census crisis, national election crisis of 1964 and the Western region 1965 election crisis (Okibe, 2000). These have further caused distrust within the broad ranks of the populace (Kirsten, 1996). The snowballing of these quagmires was enough 'excuse' for the first military coup of 15th January 1966 in which the majority of those killed were Northerners.

The coup plotters were primarily Igbos but the coup failed (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). However, the most senior military officer in the country, Aguiyi Ironsi (of Igbo descent) became the head of State (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). He abolished the federal structure and introduced a unitary system of government through the Unification Decree 34 of May 1966 (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). This was seen from some quarters as an attempt by the Igbos to have a hegemonic sphere over Nigeria (Ojie and Ehrudjakpor, 2009). This led to the counter-coup of July 1966 which was seen as an 'anti Igbo coup' (Ojie and Ehrudjakpor, 2009: 12). It paved the way for a new military leader, Yakubu Gowon who is from the North (Ojie and Ehrudjakpor, 2009). The events of 1966 led to the pogrom of the Igbos (both military and civilian) especially those domiciled in the North (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). This ultimately metamorphosed into the 30-month civil war in which the Eastern region attempted to secede to form the Republic of Biafra (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). The ethnoreligious sentiments by the leaders and the populace at all levels, were kept abase after the civil war but this was just a fragile unity.

Constitutional debates were held prior to the commencement of the second republic in 1979 (Oboki, 2001). A case was made for the possibility of extending *Sharia* courts from the state level in the Northern region, to federal courts all over the country, to have a *Sharia* Court of Appeal at the federal level (Aborisade and Mundt, 2002). However, these were rejected; rather what was imputed into the constitution was that only the Federal Court of Appeal was allowed to hear appeals from *Sharia* courts (Aborisade and Mundt, 2002). If this proposal had scaled through, Christians would have felt that the country's leadership tended to favour Islam against Christianity, thereby subjecting them to hardship. The second republic witnessed a less ethnic-based era but not without allegations of election malpractices and corruption (Kirsten, 1996). Ironically, this period was the beginning of religious fundamentalism as perpetuated in the activities of the Maitatsine movement (Danjibo, 2009). The military again came into politics without invitation on December 31st, 1983.

The April 1990 failed coup attempt against the Babangida administration by Gideon Orka and others, was seen from some quarters, as an attempt by Christians to wrestle power from Muslims because the leader of the coup plotter was a Christian while the military President was a Muslim (Aborisade and Mundt, 2002). The coup was also seen as ethnically inclined as the leader (from Delta State) of the coup announced the ceding of five highly Islamic Northern states from Nigeria except they renounced their Islamic fanaticism (Kenny, 1996). However, the coup was aborted, so this was never accomplished (Kenny, 1996). This further cracked the once-fractured relationship between the two major religions and the various ethnic groups. The 1993 presidential election led to the emergence of a Muslim President and Muslim Vice President-elect because Nigerians did not put religious sentiments into voting for these candidates (Kenny, 1996). However, the election was annulled (Kenny, 1996). The annulment of the election by Babangida (Adele, 2013) was seen as an action to prevent a Southerner from becoming Nigeria's president even though a Muslim.

Evidently, ethnoreligious conflict in Nigeria is not new but its momentum in the fourth republic has increased (Okpanachi, 2009). The fourth republic began on May 29th, 1999. Hardly had the new administration settled down than Zamfara State introduced the *Sharia* legal system (Brinkel amd Ait-Hida, 2012). This was followed by eleven other Northern states (Brinkel and Ait-Hida, 2012). This move was in contradiction of the provisions of the 1999 Constitution. Chapter one, Part 2, Section 10 of the 1999 Constitution prohibits the government of the federation or of a state from adopting any religion as a state religion (FGN, 1999). It was also seen as an Islamic agenda against a Christian President, Olusegun Obasanjo, in order to cause chaos for the administration (Harnischfeger, 2014). The zoning formula of the presidency which was a *de facto* arrangement of the Peoples Democratic Party, equally became adopted as a strong determinant of who occupies Nigeria's number one political position (Campbell, 2014). This has been adopted by other political parties as well (Onwudiwe and Berwind-Dart, 2010). The presidency is now rotated on a North to South Muslim-Christian basis (Campbell, 2014). This is obviously another instrument of polarising the country along ethnic and religious lines. This shows that even when merit is needed, ethnoreligious consideration comes first. This was evident in the election of Goodluck Jonathan as president in 2011, as the North felt short changed because it presumed it was yet to complete its 'eight-year tenure' in which former president

Yar'adua had only been three years into before his sudden demise. This led to the post election violence of April 2011 as shown in Table 2.

4.5   Nigeria: Economy in Focus

Agriculture was the mainstay of the Nigerian economy prior to the discovery of crude oil in commercial quantity in 1958 (David, 2013). The country was a leading producer of cocoa, oil palm, rubber and groundnut, as this earned the country over 70% of total export earnings until the 1960s (Obadina, 1999). Crude oil was discovered in commercial quantity in 1956 at Olobiri but exploration did not start until 1958 (Ayadi, 2005). However, as at the time when independence was attained in 1960, oil had little or nothing in the management of the economy as agriculture was still the sector that greased the wheel of commerce (Ayadi, 2005).

The increase in global oil price in the early 1970s, made agriculture to be relegated and oil became the major source of income as foreign earnings for agriculture reduced from 70% in 1960 to less than 2% as at the late 1990s (Obadina, 1999). Nigeria is the largest producer of oil in Africa and the tenth in the world in terms of oil reserve with a production level of about 2 million barrels per day (Aliyu, 2009). The country has between 25 and 35.2 billion barrels of oil reserve and the gas reserve is about 187 trillion cubic feet but it lacks the technological capacity to adequately utilise the latter (AfDB, 2014; Ayadi, 2005; Obadina, 1999). In lending his view on the impact of oil on the Nigerian economy, Lewis (1999: 50) opined that 'the country's emergence as a leading global oil producer in the 1970s gave rise to a centralized, state-dominated economy, in which the allocation of mineral rents is a principal source of growth, class formation and political control'. With Lewis' opinion, it is obvious that the oil which should be a blessing has been used as a platform for corruption, continued ethnic division and has made the country's economic system mono-cultural.

The sharp drop in international oil price led to the deflation of oil boom in the 1980s (Lewis, 1999). Expectedly, there was a decline in government's revenue and a negative consequence on the economy. The government had no choice but to embrace the Structural Adjustment Programme which was introduced by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in 1986 (Lewis, 1999). This programme resulted in currency devaluation, the abolition of import licensing, dismantling of commodity boards, deregulation of banking (Obadina, 1999) and

privatisation of some government parastatals as its constituents. The programme initially recorded short lived success but was later ravaged by the carnivores of absolutism and brazen corruption (Lewis, 1999). Consequently, the middle class was faded (Lewis, 1999) and the country was left with the dual social strata of a few rich and larger poor. As at 2010, the share of income held by the poorest 10% was just 1.8% while the one held by the richest 10% is 38.2% (African Statistical Report, 2014).

Events that occurred in the early 1990s till the late 1990s further exacerbated the state of the economy due to a breakdown in the nation's refineries (domestic fuel supplies became difficult) and the continued decay of public utilities (Lewis, 1999). Hence, even after the oil glut of the early 1980s and fluctuating (increase and decrease) oil prices to date, Nigeria has not been able to optimise the benefits associated with oil production. This is because Nigeria sells its crude oil at 'good' prices but continues to import refined fuel at higher prices. This is corroborated by Aliyu (2009: 2) that 'an oil price increase, all things being equal, should be considered positive in oil exporting countries and negative in oil importing countries, while the reverse should be exported when the oil price reduces'.

The fourth republic which has raised hopes due to it being a fully-fledged civilian administration, has not really helped matters but only a mixed result of deterioration and improvement. The Nigerian government had generated up to $300 billion in oil revenues between 1960 and 1999 (Lewis, 1999). Only a few are employed in the oil sector. Agriculture as the dominant employer of labour, it employs about 70% of the labour force but contributes only 30% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (GIABA: 2014b) and hardly attracts foreign earning.

There has not been an effective use of the country's wealth to check poverty (Brinkel and Ait-Hida, 2012). Consequently, unemployment is still on the high side, as up to 25.1% of labour active segment of the population were not employed as at 2014 (Ajakaye *et al.,* 2016). Oil is found in the South (South South/Niger Delta), the major contribution of the North to the economy of the country is agriculture. Resources such as tin, iron ore (AfDB, 2014), gold *et cetera* found in the North are under-tapped, which makes the region of little economic value. This further aggravates the poverty level of the North. This is why Ajakaye *et al.* (2016) opined that the perceived economic marginalisation of the North was a significant factor that fueled the birth of Boko Haram. In essence, youths who engage in farming in places like Northern Nigeria,

no matter how they labour, get little profit from their farming activities, hence they easily become vulnerable to being engaged for terrorists acts in exchange for stipends, if not huge cash. The World Bank record shows that Northern Nigeria's unemployment rate is higher compared to the South because two-third of the population of the former engage in subsistence farming, while the majority of the population of the latter engage in self-employed wage work (Ajakaye *et al.*, 2016). This affirms that agriculture remains a key sector that can address the scourge of unemployment in Nigeria (GIABA: 2014b) and consequently reduce poverty levels in the North.

The country's rapid economic growth fails to translate into sufficient employment, poverty reduction and checking of the wide disparity between the few rich and the larger poor (GIABA, 2014b). Corruption has been the bane in Nigeria; it has become omnipresent, reaching an alarming rate (Campbell, 2014; Oni, 2014) and has prevented the use of oil proceeds in playing positive roles in terms of infrastructural development. This is evident in salient economic indicators. The country is ranked 152 out of 188 countries in the Human Development Index of 2015 (UNDP, 2015a). Close to 63% of the population live below the $1.00 poverty line, with regional disparities with the North having the highest level of poverty and social deprivation compared to the South (AfDB, 2014). Poverty tends to be more intense in the North West (about 86%) and North East (around 78%) (AfDB, 2014). Boko Haram has its root in the North East and its activities are more prevalent in the North East and North West. Hence, linking poverty as one of the causal factors of Boko Haram is further supported.

Access to safe water increased from 47% in 1990 to become 61% in 2011, while 69% are not privileged to have basic sanitation (AfDB, 2014; African Statistical Year Book, 2014). Life expectancy at birth as at 2014 was 52.8 years which represents the 8th lowest in sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP, 2015a). The lackadaisical attitude on the part of government towards safe drinking water and sanitation cannot be detached from being a major factor for the low life expectancy. Nigeria is averagely ranked in the 133rd position out of 149 countries in the adult (ages 15years and older) literacy level within the years 2005 to 2013 (UNDP, 2015a). This shows the level of commitment to education. Nigeria has the highest number of out of school children in the world with 11.4 million out of 20 million worldwide (Ikpefan, 2016). One out of every five Nigerian school age child is out of school (Abdulmalik, 2013).

There are regional disparities in the enrolment rate. According to a NBS report on the school enrolment of children ranging from ages 5 to 14, as at 2014, the South East had 90.8%, the South South had 88.9%, the South West had 82.8%, the North Central had 79.2%, the North West had 64.3% and the North East had 60.7% (NBS, 2014). This invariably translates to having lower literacy levels in North East and North West regions. Although the literacy rate given by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is 15 years and older, the rate of enrolment in school determines to a great extent, the literacy rate. The enrolment being indicated by NBS is about enrolment into Western education. This explains the reason why there are *Alamjiris* existing as stand-by armies for acts of terrorism in these regions, as this is due to their low exposure to Western education. Hence, they are susceptible to being brain-washed for terrorist acts. The North right from pre and post independence have subscribed to Islamic education as against Western education (Fafunwa, 1974). This is corroborated by another NBS 2014 report on reasons why children ages 5 to 14 are not enrolled in schools. One of the reasons among several is 'no time/interest', the North East and North West had 46.5% and 43% respectively compared to North Central that had 24.4%. South South had 13.5%, South West had 13. 4% and South East had 0% (NBS, 2014).

This poor enrolment rate in the North needs to be worked upon seriously by the government because the lack of exposure to Western education which makes children, especially in the North 'available' to becoming/getting brainwashed for vices like terrorism as 'terrorism education' may be the only way out. Life expectancy and literacy level addressed in the preceding paragraphs reveal that government is not committed to the provision of basic infrastructure for the Nigerian people.

The whole gamut of the issues with the Nigerian economy was commented on by Oni when he gave his view that:

> *"despite the abundance of human and material deposits in the most populous black nation of the world, the country and its people still wallop in abject poverty by manifesting greatly in high levels of unemployment, falling health and educational standards and poor economic financing" (Oni, 2014: 23).*

Hence, Nigeria is a country that has the potential to carry out the responsibilities of a state like infrastructure, employment and security but corruption and weak state institutions have

continued to undermine this. Giving his consent to this is Lewis (1999) who concluded that both the private and public sectors of Nigeria have become culprits in the imbroglio of corruption. Lewis further emphasised that Nigeria has remained among the most corrupt countries in Transparency International's annual survey.

Table 3 shows Transparency International ranking from the year 2000 till 2015 ranked based on the corruption level of countries.

Table 3: Transparency International- Corruption Perceptions Index (2000 to 2015)

Year	Position	Number of Countries Assessed
2000	1st	90
2001	2nd	91
2002	2nd	102
2003	2nd	133
2004	2nd	146
2005	3rd	159
2006	18th	163
2007	32nd	180
2008	58th	180
2009	44th	180
2010	42nd	178
2011	37th	182
2012	35th	174
2013	31st	175
2014	36th	174
2015	32nd	168

Source: http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview[12]

Table 3 shows the high level of corruption Nigeria has been in for a long period of time. Nigeria was ranked between first and second from 2000 to 2004. However, from 2006 till 2015, its least ranking was 18th and this is an indication that there was a/some fight against corruption. These performances still portray the country as being very corrupt, as against the number of countries rated from 2000 to 2004 and from 2006 to 2015. The weakness of the state provides an avenue for political elites to enrich themselves through corruption (Brinkel and Ait-Hida, 2012). Within

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[12] This link shows transparency international corruption perception index over and beyond the years reflected in the table.

the last four decades, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) estimated that as at the mid-2000s, past rulers in Nigeria have embezzled about £220 billion (Chizea and Tonye, 2006). Institutions responsible in checkmating these excesses have become the elites' 'stooge' or instruments with which they hunt opponents. The country moved away from the first four positions in 2008 with corruption still on a large scale.

Nigeria had been in the mess of corruption prior to independence but it became full blown from the late 1980s. For example, revenue generated from the first Gulf War windfall, which was $12.2 billion (realised from the sale of crude oil) has never been accounted for till to date (Obadina, 1999). General Abacha's net worth at the time of his death was reliably estimated at $6billion, a sum accumulated during his nearly five year's regime. In 2016, talks were still on with foreign banks on how to retrieve part of this stolen fund stashed in accounts within the diaspora by the erstwhile dictator (John, 2016). The most recent is the fund intended for the purchase of arms meant to fight Boko Haram. An amount of over $2 billion has been mismanaged by serving and retired military officers, as well as their civilian collaborators (Daniel and Omonobi, 2015). These instances of corruption were perpetrated under both military and civilian administrations.

4.6   Counter-Terrorism Policy Process in Nigeria

The wheel of a society is steered through policies and such policies that a state makes and implements determine the extent of sustainability or failure of the state (Fund for Peace, 2015; Paki and Ebienfa, 2011). The Nigerian government as described in Section 14 subsection 2b of the 1999 Constitution has security and welfare as the core of its policies upon which other functions of government are hinged on (FGN, 1999).

In Nigeria, three organs of government are involved in the policy process (Eneanya, 2009). The executive arm implements and equally coordinates government policies to ensure that policy execution is carried out according to the agenda of the original plan (Oni, 2013). The executive arm consists of civil servants, public servants and security agencies. The National Assembly (legislature) may override the decisions of an agency, especially through repealing of laws (Eneanya, 2009; Oni, 2013). This may change the pattern of implementation. The role of the

judiciary is to interpret policies when issues arise about the specific application of some policies (Eneanya, 2009). An example of a policy being implemented in Nigeria is the annual budget.

The result of evaluation may signify the termination of a policy, provided it has accomplished its purpose or its modification (Jann and Wegrich, 2007). The modification forms part of the input in the systems theory (Dye, 1981). Hence the cycle continues in that form. Monitoring and evaluation can be conducted by scientific researchers who consult for the government, international watchdogs, courts and the parliament (Bovens *et al.*, 2006). A very good example in Nigeria is the oversight function of the legislature - National Assembly (Fashagba, 2009).

Nigeria has formulated many laudable policies but the problem is always with effective implementation. The factors responsible for these include: lack of political will/attitude to policy implementation, inadequate resources, corruption, ethnocentric dispositions, multiplicity of policies to address similar issues, incompetent manpower, selective and non-implementation of budgets as well as misplaced priorities (Paki and Ebeinfa, 2011).

Policy statement is germane in the policy process. Egonmwan (cited in Aminu *et al.,* 2012) described a policy statement as a formal expression of the intention of government which may be in the form of legislative statutes, decrees, presidential orders, administrative rules and regulations and court opinions. Hence, the policy process is a mixture of inputs from the legislature, judiciary and executive (appointed, elected and career officers).

Identification of the menace of terrorism, prompted the Nigerian government to take some policy measures which were implemented, monitored and evaluated in order to have modifications to suit prevailing circumstances. This justifies the need to have a holistic review of the roles of the different organs of government in the policy process, for a better understanding of Nigeria's counter-terrorism policy process. The policy process has encompassed activities of the three organs of government: the legislature, executive and the judiciary.

The 1999 constitution permits the president to make some presidential orders which may or may not need legislative approval. An example is Section 305 which vests the power to declare a state of emergency in any part of the country where peace is being threatened but such proclamation can be approved by the National Assembly between 2 and 10 days after (FGN, 1999). However, if two-third of the federal legislatures do not approve the president's proposal, the state of emergency ceases to exist (FGN, 1999). The emergency holds for the first six months but if

peace is not restored, it can be extended by another six months on the president's request but with the approval of the National Assembly (FGN, 1999). An example is the declaration of a state of emergency in parts of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states in May 2013, which was extended twice but the National Assembly rejected the fourth request for it in November 2014 (Jacob and Akpan, 2015). The onslaught of Boko Haram which still continued after 18 months of the emergency rule was what necessitated the request to extend the emergency rule (Jacob and Akpan, 2015). The non-approval of the state of emergency after November 2014 was due to an evaluation of the previous ones by the legislative arm which is an oversight function (Fashagba, 2009; Jacob and Akpan, 2015).

The suspension of the GSMC services by the government through the military in areas affected by the state of emergency was also a policy that was actualised through delegation of power to the military (Jacob and Akpan, 2015). This policy was made, implemented, monitored and evaluated by the military. The drafting of policy documents like NACTEST and CVE, however, entailed inputs from technical departments of concerned ministries, National Defence Council and National Security Council (Eneanya, 2009; FGN, 1999). In this case, the monitoring and evaluation was done by both the executive and legislative arms of government. Other policies like deployment of troops, relocation of the military command centre and setting up of IDP camps (Akinbi, 2015; Campbell, 2014) were strictly presidential orders and administrative rules and regulations. The latter was subject to normal administrative procedures.

The roles of the legislature included the passing of bills into laws, ratifying of international treaties, approval of foreign loans and oversight functions (Fashagba, 2009). The first counter-terrorism legislation enacted in Nigeria is the TPA 2011 (Onuoha, 2014). Bills[13] passed became laws and the former may be introduced by the executive, members of the legislature and even private individuals and groups. MLPA 2011, MLPA 2012, TPA 2011 and TPA 2013 (Dasuki, 2013) became acts only after their respective bills had been passed by the legislature. It is pertinent to note that bills like the TPA 2011 and TPA 2013 emanated from the need to address the imbroglio of terrorism and inputs were taken from technical departments of concerned ministries, National Defence Council and National Security Council (Eneanya, 2009; FGN, 1999) before being sent to the legislative arm for passage.

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[13] How bills are passed in Nigeria can be viewed from the official website of Nigeria's National Assembly: www.nass.gov.ng

After the passing of such bills into laws, the implementation was effected by the executive. The counter-terrorism policy process in Nigeria was a joint effort of the three organs of government. The various court cases going on over the arms deal (Adesomoju, 2016 and Suleiman, 2016) and trial of suspected terrorists involved both the executive and the judiciary. Suspects in the arms deal saga were being prosecuted by the EFCC, which is a branch of the executive and the federal high court (Adesomoju, 2016; Daniel and Omonobi, 2015; Suleiman, 2016). These serve as avenues for implementing, monitoring and evaluating government policies.

4.7 Conclusion

The geographical, political and economic history of the Nigerian state has been considered in this chapter. This evolution of Nigeria showed that the nation's antecedents and present state are responsible for ethnoreligious crisis and the inability of the state to check these crises. The examination of the counter-terrorism policy process in Nigeria shows that public policy in most cases is a progeny of a societal problem. This process requires the input of the three organs of government- executive, legislature and the judiciary. A scan through the counter-terrorism policy process and counter-terrorism policies in Nigeria further attests to the fact that virtually all these policies came as a result of the Boko Haram menace.

CHAPTER FIVE

UNDERSTANDING BOKO HARAM

5.1   Introduction

Boko Haram is a terrorist organisation that has taken different nomenclatures and its methods of carrying out its attacks have become sophisticated over the years. It is associated with various acts of violence which have brought global attention. This chapter considers its evolution and ideologies. The factors that orchestrated its existence and those factors that engender its sustainability are also examined. Its leadership and structure will also be considered. The evils perpetrated by the group were also viewed as well as its international links and funding.

5.2   Origin and Ideology of Boko Haram

Boko Haram has been camouflaged under several names which include among others, *Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'a 'ala Minhaj as-Salaf*, interpreted as "People of the Tradition of the Prophet and the Group according to the Salafist Method"; another is *Jama'at Ahl al-Sunnah li Da'wah wal Jihad,* which is translated as "Community of the People of the Tradition for Preaching and Holy War" (Brinkel and Ait-Hid, 2012: 11). It has also assumed names like Nigerian Taliban and *Yusuffiya* Movement (Solomon, 2012). Maiduguri residents nicknamed the group Boko Haram instead of 'Book Haram' because of the anti-Western preaching of Mohammed Yusuf (Jacob and Akpan, 2015). Okemi explains Boko Haram as:

> *"The term "Boko Haram" comes from the Hausa word boko symbolically meaning "Western education", literally from the English word "book" and the Arabic word haram which is allegorically "sin" or "forbidden". When loosely interpreted from Hausa, the name signifies "Western education is forbidden" (Okemi, 2013: 2).*

However, its members refer to the group as *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad* (people committed to the propagation of the Prophet Mohammed's teachings and Jihad)

(Chiluwa and Ajiboye, 2014: 319). Boko Haram is an Islamist group which is active in the North Eastern Nigeria and came to limelight in 2009 as a result of fisticuff with the Nigerian security operatives in which its leader, Mohammed Yusuf was among those that were killed (Mohammed, 2014). Its method of recruitment includes indoctrination, making use of the internet to spread its ideologies and conscription of escapees from prisons through the sect's jail break operations (Onuoha, 2014). The sect's members are recruited from disillusioned youths, unemployed graduates, educated and even influential people (Onuoha, 2010). Some influential known members of the sect are late Buji Foi, a former commissioner in Borno State and a former University lecturer, Kadiru Atiku (Onuoha, 2010).

The movement has been building up in the North Eastern part of Nigeria since 1995 (Onuoha, 2014). The sect's name at that time was *Ahlulsunna wal'jama'ah hijra* (Onuoha, 2010: 55). The group then was just a religious study group at the Alhaji Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri (Azumah, 2015; Uchehara, 2014). Shortly after the founder of the sect, Abubakar Lawan, left for further studies at the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia (Onuoha, 2010). Mohammad Yusuf was appointed as their leader in 2002 after a decision was arrived at by a group of clerics (Onuoha, 2014). Afterwards, Mohammad Yusuf expelled the clerics who appointed him on corruption allegations and failure to appropriately interpret the dictates of the Quran (Onuoha, 2014). Yusuf's preaching appealed to the unemployed youths from Yobe and Borno states as well as Chad and Niger. At around this time, the group became known as the *Yusufiyya* movement (Onuoha, 2014). Mohammed Yusuf refused to acknowledge that the Sultan of Sokoto was the head of all Muslims in Nigeria (Azumah, 2015).

The first challenge of the sect against the Nigerian state began in 2003 when a group that called itself the 'Nigerian Taliban' withdrew from Maiduguri and retired to a rural area called Kanama in Yunusari local government area of Yobe State (Mohammed, 2014). This location is close to the Nigerien border and it was constructed in the similitude of a military regimented compound (Mohammed, 2014). The group attacked police stations and government buildings in the area between December 2003 and January 2004 (Mohammed, 2014). The group later carried out a couple of attacks after which they were dislodged by the military (Mohammed, 2014). The group afterwards attacked police stations in Borno State in September 2004 and was subsequently defeated by the army (Azumah, 2015). The heat of the September 2004 attacks made Yusuf flee

to Saudi Arabia but months later, the Borno State deputy governor facilitated his return to Nigeria (Azumah, 2015).

Those that survived the Kanama onslaught later joined Yusuf in 2005 (Mohammed, 2014). Yusuf continued to preach his messages in Maiduguri and its environs (Mohammed, 2014). It operated under the umbrella of the *Yusuffiya* movement under Yusuf's leadership and the group later coined itself *dawah* upon which it recognized its mission as a return to the *Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama'a* (Adherents to the *Sunnah* and the Community of Muslims), and regarded its members as 'brothers' (Mohammed, 2014: 13-14). After Yusuf's death in 2009, Sani Umaru acted briefly before Abubakar Shekau emerged the new leader of Boko Haram (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014a).

Boko Haram is a sect that believes states in Northern Nigeria are being ruled by corrupt Muslims. It seeks to wage war against them and the entire Nigerian population in order to have a 'pure' Islamic state ruled strictly by *Sharia* law (Walker, 2012). The sect wants all institutions that are symbols of government like military, police and other paramilitary agencies to be crushed and replaced by a new Islamic order (Akinola and Tella, 2013). The group sees Western culture as anathema (Olowoselu *et al.,* 2014). Modern science, education, religion and democratic system of governance constitute what they refer to as Western culture (Audu, 2015). They do not subscribe to accepted facts like having male and female genders under the same roof, the theory of evolution that man originated from ape and the stationary state of the sun (Audu, 2015). Yusuf does not believe that rain is as a result of evaporation but that it is the work of God and he does not believe in the Nigerian constitution and the Nigerian flag (Onuoha, 2010). Boko Haram's ideology under Yusuf trod the path of radical Islam which centres on the rejection of religious freedom, democracy, and anything Western (Mohammed, 2014). This is why Mohammed (2014: 17) opined that 'the rejection of Western education and Westernisation were the twin pillars which defined the movement'. Mohammed Yusuf ironically used cars, mobile phones and computers which are products of Western education (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014a). The group as a whole uses products of Western civilisation like motorcycles, cars, cellular phones, AK-47 rifles and the likes (Onuoha, 2014).

The sect wants the *Sharia* law to operate in the whole of Nigeria and if this seems unrealistic, they would prefer to have a caliphate carved out from the Nigerian territory for them where they

will be able to run an Islamic state unhindered (Olowoselu *et al.*, 2014). The group's underlying principle is hinged on religion. This is why Brinkel and Ait-Hida submitted that:

> *"members behave as if they belong to a religious sect. They usually pray in their own mosques and do not mingle with the local population. They can be recognised by their long beards and black headdresses. However, their first and foremost common characteristic is adherence to a specific form of radical Islam. The members see themselves as Muslims, who in their own opinion preach the only true interpretation of their religion" (Brinkel and Ait-Hida, 2012: 12).*

Boko Haram's Leaders' speeches center on seeking justice for the poor through the application of the *Sharia* legal system (Campbell, 2014). The group also abhors any Muslim that supports or participates in modern government or the democratic system (Campbell, 2014). The group moved from the *dawah* (inducing people to join) stage characterised by fiery preaching to the violent phase in July 2009 (Mohammed, 2014). Prior to 2009, the sect had not fully committed itself to violence (Mohammed, 2014). The group also called for the prosecution of police officers involved in the murder of Yusuf and the killing of their members in the 2009 uprisings (Uchehara, 2014).

5.3 Survivalist Strategies of Boko Haram

The survivalist strategies of Boko Haram emphasise factors that led to the emergence of the group and those factors that have continued to bolster its continued existence. There is no single factor responsible for the origin and continued existence of Boko Haram but all factors are hinged on political, social, economic and religious reasons (Ahokegh, 2012). These factors are explained in the following subsections.

5.3.1 North- South Power Tussle

The power shift from the North to the South in 1999 which saw the emergence of Olusegun Obasanjo as president was seen by the former as a move to whittle their influence politically, militarily and economically (Isyaku, 2013). There was power alternation[14] based on North-

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[14] The ruling Peoples Democratic Party had an in-house caucus arrangement of power alternation structure based on the North-South/Christian-Muslim rotational arrangement. If a President is from the South and a Christian, the vice

South/Christian-Muslim arrangement which is not a law but an elite arrangement. The election of Goodluck Jonathan in 2011 was seen as a 'robbery' that has prevented the North from completing its 'eight-year rule' which was started by late Umaru Yar' Adua in 2007 (Ahokegh, 2012). A lot of Muslims especially from the North felt the president should be a Northern Muslim (Brinkel and Ait-Hida, 2012). This is why Osuni (cited in Ahokegh, 2012) opined that fielding candidates against people's wishes was one of the remote factors responsible for Boko Haram. Boko Haram has been seen as a tool by the North to frustrate the Southern presidency of Goodluck Jonathan. This explains why Nkechi (2013) submitted that the emphasis laid on political power in Nigeria was so high that any group or region will go to any length to take and maintain political power. Hence, it was perceived that Boko Haram dislikes the rule of any president who is a Christian.

5.3.2 Porous Borders

Border porosity is one of the signs of a fragile state (Fund for Peace, 2015). Nigeria has 1499 illegal borders and 84 legal borders (Onuoha, 2013). Security officials deployed to the borders have outdated equipment to work with, are few, poorly trained and badly remunerated (Onuoha, 2013). The porosity of the borders has been engendered by the corruption of immigration officials, poor record on migration statistics and no central database to identify who is a Nigerian and who is not (Omitola, 2014). Given that Nigeria's border was porous, it makes the movement of foreign mercenaries at ease and also given that arms proliferations are rarely checked (Ahokegh, 2012). Arms used during the Libyan unrest are assumed to have been smuggled into Nigeria for use by Boko Haram (Nkechi, 2013). The porous borders have facilitated Boko Haram's contacts with Libyan and Malian rebels who ride camels and exchange small arms for cash (Omitola, 2014).

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must be a Muslim from the North and if it is a Southern Muslim president, the vice must be a Northern Christian. If the president is a Northern Muslim, the vice must be a Southern Christian and if the president is a Northern Christian, the deputy must be a Southern Muslim. Olusegun Obasanjo, a Christian from the South was president for 1999 to 2007. He was succeeded by Umaru Yar'Adua, Muslim from the North and unfortunately, Yar'Adua died in 2010, just three years to his tenure. The North felt they should have been given the opportunity to rule till 2015 which would have completed their 'eight-year tenure' with effect from 2007. The emergence of Goodluck Jonathan, a Southern Christian (the former vice president of Yar'Adua) as president in 2011 was seen as an arm twisting strategy against the North. The need to have a Northern Muslim elected in 2015 also had influence in the emergence of Muhammadu Buhari, a Northern Muslim in the 2015 election. Although Buhari is of the All Progressives Congress (APC), the power rotation has become a norm even for the non-elites as well.

The porosity of the borders makes it possible for nationals who have religious and ethnic similarities with some states in the North East to easily enlist into the sect (Adesoji, 2011). In essence, the porous borders in Northern Nigeria which is the strong base of the sect have continued to boost the arsenal of small and light arms available to them (Onuha, 2013: 5). A very good example was given by Onuoha (2013: 5). On the 12th of July 2013, for instance, soldiers in Kebbi State impounded a petrol tanker loaded with three AK-47 Rifles, one rocket-propelled grenade (RPG)-2, nine AK-47 magazines, two bombs, three RPG chargers and 790 rounds of 7.62mm of special ammunitions in the fuel compartment of the tanker. The arms seized may not be unconnected to the use of Boko Haram attacks despite the fact that Kebbi is in the North West.

5.3.3   Historical Affiliation of Northern Nigeria to Islam

Radical Islamists who take the Quran literally form part of the Muslim faithfuls in Northern Nigeria (Brinkel and Ait-Hida, 2012). They do call to mind the 19th Century Islamic rule of Usman Dan Fodio and Boko Haram is inclined to this (Brinkel and Ait-Hida, 2012). Boko Haram's leadership seeks to restore the Islamic empire which has its pillars on strict *Sharia* in Northern Nigeria (Harnischfeger, 2014). Northern Nigeria has been the epicentre of religious violence and this has been seen as moves to return the region back to its form in the Usman Dan Fodio period (Roelofs, 2014). In essence, what Usman Dan Fodio achieved through the entrenchment of 'pure' Islam in Nigeria has been the primary focus of most religious crisis in Northern Nigeria and by extension Nigeria (Uchehara, 2014).

5.3.4   Iranian Revolution of 1979

The 1979 Iranian revolution led to the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty and the establishment of an Islamic Republic in Iran (Campbell, 2014). This has fueled the emergence of Islamic movements worldwide craving for Islamic states (Campbell, 2014). This orchestrated Islamist extremists in Northern Nigeria in their quest for an Islamic state on the basis that it will purify the country from the 'manipulation' of Western culture (Brinkel and Ait-Hida, 2012). This revolution was also seen as a motivating factor of the Maitatsine uprisings of the 1980s and

Shiites movement of El-Zakzaky amongst others (Adesoji, 2011; Campbell, 2014). This has also boosted Boko Haram's quest for a pure Islamic state in Nigeria because the sect sees it as a global wave.

5.3.5 Bad Governance and Corruption

The actors that act the scripts of bad governance and use political office for parochial purposes are rarely put to check in Nigeria as a result of weak state institutions. This is why Adesoji (2011: 112) posited that 'the culture of impunity pervades governance in Nigeria'. Bad governance has distanced the citizens from the political class and the former will always find alternatives to having its basic needs met. This explains why Omitola submitted that:

> *"the current reign of terror is a manifestation of a more serious delinkage and inconsonance that exists between the state and the people, with popular movements providing an alternative platform for spaces, voices and benefits from the streets and away from the state"* (Omitola, 2012: 5).

Long years of bad governance by both civilian and military governments have fostered the loss of faith in the state (Omitola, 2012). Leadership of military and civilian administrations in Nigeria have been involved in large-scale corruption thus enriching themselves with public funds (Brinkel and Ait-Hida, 2012; Maiangwa, 2012).

Infrastructure, rule of law and security which should form the crux of government's responsibilities towards its citizens have almost fully eluded Nigerians (Maiangwa, 2012). This explains why Akinola and Tella (2013) opined that the ruling class has failed to deliver good governance to the Nigerian populace. This has metamorphosed into unemployment and a non-self-reliant army of youths especially in Northern Nigeria (Ahokegh, 2012). Consequently, Brinkel and Ait-Hida (2012: 10) opined that 'against the background of state failure, poverty and feelings of humiliation, the radical jihadist group Boko Haram emerged with the aim of overthrowing the government of Nigeria and establishing an Islamic state in the whole of the country'. State failure, poverty and corruption are offshoots of bad governance. Corruption in Nigeria even when discovered hardly receives deserved punishment (Campbell, 2014). The Boko Haram terrorism is a direct result of persistent poor governance by all levels of government in

Nigeria, political marginalisation of Nigeria's North East and North's dense impoverishment (Campbell, 2014). Boko Haram has always been uncomfortable with widespread corruption in government (Uchehara, 2014).

5.3.6 Poor Funding and Brutality of the Security Forces

Funding of the security agencies especially the intelligence arm is gloomy (Adesoji, 2011). This makes these agencies incapable of adequately containing Boko Haram. Poor funding and modern capacity building have whittled down the capacity of the security agencies to check the activities of Boko Haram (Maiangwa, 2012). The security agencies are poorly equipped and this negatively affects their effrontery to face Boko Haram (Dietrich, 2015). Inadequate and unreliable intelligence reports on the activities of Boko Haram have made it difficult to effectively check the violence perpetrated by Boko Haram (Maiangwa, 2012).

The security agencies also unlawfully detain (without trial), kill innocent people and even kill some of their detainees (Dietrich, 2015). The draconian actions of the security agencies are seen as similar to the reign of terror of Boko Haram themselves (Campbell, 2014). These brutalities on the part of security agencies make the locals reluctant to give intelligence information that could aid the arrests of Boko Haram suspects and would rather have sympathy for them. This 'support' the terrorists sometimes get from the populace boosts their pursuit. The use of force and extrajudicial killings make the terrorists develop *thick skins* thus seek vengeance always. An example of security agencies brutality is the questionable murder of Mohammed Yusuf by the Nigerian Police force (Olowselu *et al.*, 2014). He should have been tried according to the rule of law.

5.3.7 Poverty, Unemployment and Ignorance

The oil glut of the 1980s and the adoption of SAP increased the poverty rate in Nigeria (Lewis, 1999). The North was badly affected because agriculture had been neglected prior to these periods. The North's main contribution to the economy is agriculture (Ajakaiye *et al.,* 2015). Hence, the income accruing to the Northern region was low and this affected employment provision, infrastructural facilities and quality Western education. This explains why poverty is more intense in the North West and North East (AfDB, 2014).

The country's wealth has not been employed to tackle poverty and inequality successfully (Brinkel and Ait-Hida, 2012). Northern elites without giving consideration to their populace display their wealth gaudily and radical Islam approach was seen by the latter as the best means to *strike a balance* between the two classes (Mohammed, 2014). Boko Haram is a key actor embracing radical Islam to check perceived imbalance in the society. This invariably is a rebellion which has emanated from poverty, illiteracy and unemployment which themselves are progenies of corruption and social neglects (Harnischfeger, 2014). Mohammed Yusuf capitalised on the pro-Islamic sentiment, poor education and widespread poverty in the North East and he established Islamic schools (*madrassah*) and associations that gave a lot of disadvantaged Muslim youths a sense of belonging (Jacob and Akpan, 2015). Nevertheless, a significant number of those that joined the sect were gainfully employed people (Jacob and Akpan, 2015). Mohammed Yusuf won membership from unemployed youths by his hate speeches against the police and political corruption (Okemi, 2013). Young boys and girls who migrated to the urban areas in search of job hardly get employed (Onuoha, 2010). They are willing to become recruits for Boko Haram so as to fight the system that has refused to cater for them (Onuoha, 2010). These have made young men in the region vulnerable to being engaged in terrorist activities (Akinbi, 2015). The ready 'army' is in a weak position to question whatever they have been told to do (Akinbi, 2015). The sect has its membership drawn from school drop-outs, unemployed graduates most of whom have destroyed their certificates (Nkechi, 2013).

The *Almajiri* system in Northern Nigeria has also boosted the strength of Boko Haram. This is why Zenn submitted that:

> *"when you have millions of young boys, as is the case in Northern Nigeria, for example, that are part of a largely unregulated educational system where all they learn is Arabic language Qur'an recitation from Islamic scholars, whose credentials and loyalties may be dubious, it can make those boys more susceptible to violent interpretations of the Qur'an that Boko Haram endorses……In addition, without financial or family support, these boys in the* al-majiri *system might find even the small amount of financial support or camaraderie that Boko Haram offers to be enticing" (Zenn, 2013).*

It is presumed that these *Almajiris* form the chunk of the foot soldiers of Boko Haram (Onuoha, 2014). Yusuf and Shekau were hitherto *Almajiris* but improved themselves through diligent acquisition of Islamic knowledge (Harnischfeger, 2014). The sect recently offered loans to some artisans in return for the latter to join the groups (Somorin, 2016b). Boko Haram also forces

families to receive cash payments from them so that families can release its members so that the boys can join the sect (ICC, 2015). These children are used for intelligence gathering to monitor the movement of the military because the military sees them as minors with little or no threat (ICC, 2015). The offering of such financial aid further strengthens the sympathy the people in the North East have for the sect.

5.3.8   Rejection of Western Education and Values

The sect is against and completely rejects Western education, Western civilisation as well as contemporary science (Akinbi, 2015). The group viewed government as evil and regarded Muslims participating in governance as infidels (Campbell, 2014). For most Muslims in the North, they believe Westernisation has contributed to moral and economic decay in the region so they embrace having religion as a liberating instrument (Harnischfeger, 2014). Boko Haram uses this as an avenue to have followers. The flair for Quranic education instead of Western education in Northern Nigeria further accounts for the availability of *Almajiri* who can be easily manipulated for acts of terrorism (Danjibo, 2009). It is presumed by Northerners that Western education has not developed the region (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014a). They are driven by the fact that the evils in the society are progenies of Western civilisation and that only the principles of an Islamic society are an antidote to such decadence (Danjibo, 2009). They believe this can be achieved through *Sharia* law implementation and it also explains why products of westernisation like police stations and government buildings are destroyed by the sect (Danjibo, 2009). This explains why youths who are drop outs and unemployed university graduates are members of Boko Haram on the premise that Western education which they hitherto embraced have not paid off (unable to fetch them employment) (Danjibo, 2009).

5.3.9   Sharia Legal System

The Governor of Zamfara State in late 1999 began moves to have a *Sharia* legal system in his state that will take effect from January 1st, 2000 and he was successful (Brinkel and Ait-Hida, 2012). Eleven other Northern states replicated this (Brinkel and Ait-Hida, 2012). Some saw the implementation of the *Sharia* legal system in the North as myopically implemented because it still exists with the secular laws (Nkechi, 2013). Full implementation of *Sharia* in Borno state

was one of Boko Haram's conditions for supporting the election of Alimodu Sheriff as Governor of Borno state in 2003 (Onuoha, 2014). However, Sheriff upon assumption of office did not fully implement *sharia* and this infuriated Yusuf who later turned the group against the Borno state government (Onuoha, 2014). Boko Haram saw the implementation of *Sharia* in the twelve Northern states that adopted it as haphazard and believes through terrorist acts, they will be able to effect its full implementation (Mohammed, 2014). In some states, its application is only restricted to cases of inheritance, matrimonial matters among other civil cases (Harnischfeger, 2014).

The inability of Northerners to control politicians has made the full implementation of S*haria* a potential and handy tool to check the excesses of leaders (Harnischfeger, 2014). Boko Haram believes that religion can address the social and economic rot in the Northern region (Harnischfeger, 2014). Boko Haram believes that there should be no difference between religion and the state and that the 'merger' of the two can only be achieved through full implementation of S*haria* (Adesoji, 2011).

5.4   Leadership and Structure

Mohammed Yusuf before his death in 2009 was the spiritual leader as well as commander-in-chief (*amir ul-aam*) of Boko Haram (Onuoha, 2014). Under his tutelage, a cabinet and a *Shura* (decision-making) Council were constituted to supervise the group's activities (Onuoha, 2014). Yusuf was then assisted by two deputies (*na'ib amir ulaam I* and *II*) who were Abubakar Shekau and Mamman Nur and a third close associate named Khalid al-Barnawi (Campbell, 2014). A commander (*amir*) headed each state where the sect operated and each local government area where they operated also had an *amir* (Onuoha, 2014). The Kanuri regions of Niger and Chad equally had their commanders (*amirs*) (Onuoha, 2014). After Yusuf's death in 2009, Sani Umaru acted briefly before Abubakar Shekau emerged the new leader of Boko Haram (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014a). Leadership under Abubakar Shekau was slightly different as he operated a loose command structure that each unit/cell operates autonomously but takes command from one commander (Onuoha, 2014).

These trio (Abubakar Shekau, Mamman Nur and Khalid al-Barnawi) that succeeded Yusuf initially worked together to re-establish Boko Haram after 2009, Nur and al-Barnawi later broke

with Shekau whom they accused of killing too many Muslims (Campbell, 2014). 'They organized [*sic*] the Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Lands, commonly called Ansaru' (Campbell, 2014: 9). This group is commonly referred to as the Boko Haram splinter group. Boko Haram's target on Muslims caused the Ansaru to separate from it (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014a).

There are claims that Boko Haram and Ansaru have come together. This is why Campbell revealed that:

> *"The relationship between Shekau and Ansaru is likely fluid. Ansaru has been silent for many months, and it is possible that its operatives have recently rejoined Shekau's followers, potentially following an obscure power struggle that resulted in a collective leadership. The kidnapping of the Chibok school girls has the characteristics of an Ansaru operation; though Shekau claims Boko Haram is responsible for it" (Campbell, 2014: 9).*

The number one position in Boko Haram has taken a new twist as the Islamic State (IS) in August 2016 announced Abu Musab al-Barnawi (former spokesman of Boko Haram and son of its late leader, Mohammed Yusuf) as the new leader of Boko Haram (Ajayi, 2016 and Somorin, 2016a). This has been dispelled by Abubakar Shekau as he still claims to be the occupier of the zenith office of the sect (Iroegbu, 2016a). This leadership tussle can be linked to the fact that in March 2015, Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and reaffirmed this allegiance in March 2016 (21st Century Wilberforce Initiative, 2016).

5.5 Reign of Terror

The dispute with the *Salafist Izala*[15] group over the use of a mosque in Maiduguri which led to disagreement and subsequent arrest of 67 Boko Haram members including Abubakar Shakau was the beginning of events that led to the 2009 violence in Maiduguri and Bauchi (Mohammed, 2014). The harassment of the group's members while returning from *dawah* and the enforcement of the use of motorcycle helmet by a joint security outfit called operation flush was seen as

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[15] The *Salafist Izala* is otherwise known as the society for the eradication of un-Islamic innovations and the establishment of the *sunnah*. Its doctrine which is a bit close to that of Boko Haram centres on following God's commandments as evident in the Quran and *sunnah* meticulously. *Izala* does not subscribe to attacking state apparatus through violence but it lays credence to taking over state apparatus (Harnischfeger, 2014). Mohammed Yusuf was a member of *Izala* till the year 2000 (Harnischfeger, 2014).

deliberate acts against its members group (Mohammed, 2014). The final event that caused the 2009 uprising was the shooting by security agents of its members who had gone to bury one of their dead in a cemetery in Maiduguri by operation flush and the refusal to allow them to see the wounded in the hospital (Mohammed, 2014). This led to the attack on Dutsen Tanshi police station, Bauchi State and later spread through four states within four days (Onuoha, 2010). The group mobilised its members in Bauchi and Maiduguri for revenge against the security forces and this led to the 2009 violence which caused the death of about 800 persons, the capture of Yusuf and his gruesome murder by the Nigerian police (Onuoha, 2014). One of the sponsors of the group and a former commissioner in Borno State, Buji Foi was also killed as a result of the 2009 incidence (Akinola and Tella, 2013). The massive killing of its members by security operatives in the 2009 fracas and the gruesome murder of Yusuf infuriated the group (Mohammed, 2014). The group went underground thereafter. There were reports that the group diffused into neighbouring countries to reorganise, recruit more members and get more trained (Maiangwa, 2012). It started wrecking havoc from late 2010 in Plateau, Borno, Yobe and Abuja (Walker, 2012). This re-emergence was seen as a means to seek vengeance against the Nigerian state for the death of Muhammed Yusuf (Uchehara, 2014). It has since then engaged in a series of attacks.

The sect renders its havoc through throat slitting and beheadings (Campbell, 2014). Its other methods of lethal acts include targeted assassinations, drive-by shootings, suicide bombings and the use of IEDs (Onuoha, 2014). The IEDs are made up of substances like trinitrotoluene, pentaerythritol, and ammonia (fertilisers) and the IEDs can be attached to vehicles, motorcycles, tricycles and the human body for conveyance and subsequent detonation (Onuoha, 2014). Boko Haram's violence has claimed up to 20,000 lives (Ajayi, 2016). The method of operation of the group is aptly captured by International Criminal Court of Justice (ICC) thus:

> *"The group's modus operandi varied according to the intended objective of the respective attacks. Some attacks were carried out by just two or three gunmen on a motorcycle, others by hundreds of fighters supported by tanks and anti-aircraft weapons mounted on trucks. Boko Haram reportedly divided its forces during larger attacks, specifically assigning different groups to pillage houses and shops prior to setting them on fire. Groups were tasked with killing people, abducting residents or preventing them from fleeing. Other Boko Haram attacks included bombings of civilian areas, such as places of worship, markets or bus stations, often by suicide bombers" (ICC, 2015: 46).*

These methods of attack affirm the fact that the group has access to weapons to operate and also that Boko Haram is well organised. The sect attacks cut across boards. Table 4 reveal an outline of Boko Haram attacks based on the ones that took place during the 2009 uprisings, before and after the legislations on terrorism and NACTEST were enacted.

Table 4: Boko Haram's Attacks during the 2009 Violence

S/N	Date	Location and Type of Attack	Casualties and Impacts
1	26th July 2009	Attack on Dutsen Tanshi Police Station, Bauchi, Bauchi State.	The police station was destroyed. There were killing and arrest of over 40 and 200 Boko Haram members respectively.
2	July 26th to 27th 2009	Maiduguri, Lamisula and Gamboru Towns in Borno State were affected. Police command headquarters, Police Mobile Unit College, National Directorate of Employment office, Maximum Prisons complex, Makera police station and some churches were attacked.	A police sergeant, a prison official and five police officers at the college that were on training were killed, over 30 vehicles and some churches and mosques burnt, and prison inmates freed.
3	27th July 2009	Violence in Damaturu and Potiskum, Yobe State. Police area command, Office of the Federal Road Safety Commission, Calvary Baptist Church and National Population Commission office were attacked.	Three policemen and a staff of fire service was killed while seven policemen were injured; suspects in police custody were also freed by the sect.
4	27th July 2009	Attack in Wudil, Kano state where Wudil Police station was attacked.	The divisional police officer and a mobile policeman were injured while three Boko Haram members were killed.
5	29th July 2009	The sect members engaged security operatives in a battle at Mamudo village, along Potiskum-Damaturu Road in Yobe state.	33 members of the sect got killed.
6	29th July 2009	Boko Haram members battled with security operatives at railway terminus, Maiduguri, Borno State.	An unreported number of deaths and the sect's operational base destroyed.

Source: (Onuoha, 2013; Onuoha and Ugwueze, 2014).

Table 4 shows the extent of the 2009 violence that took place in the states of Borno, Yobe, Adamawa and Kano. This was the beginning of the mean dispositions of Boko Haram.

Table 5: Boko Haram's Onslaught before the NACTEST and Other Associated Acts

S/N	Date	Location and Type of Attack	Casualties and Impact
1	7th September 2010	Attack on Bauchi prison.	Five feared dead and 701 inmates freed.
2	24th December 2010	A bomb explosion in Barkin Ladi area of Jos, Plateau State.	30 people died.
3	31st December 2010	Bomb attack at Mammy market, Mogadishu Cantonment Abuja.	11 people killed.
4	28th January 2011	All Nigeria Peoples Party governorship candidates' convoy was attacked at Lawan Bukar ward, Maiduguri, Borno State.	The governorship candidate and 6 others were killed.
7	2nd April 2011	Bomb explosion at Dutsen Tanshi Police station, Bauchi state.	2 policemen sustained injuries.
9	4th May 2011	A prison in Maiduguri was attacked.	An official of the prisons service died.
10	9th May 2011	2 Islamic clerics, Sheikh Goni Tijani and Mallam Abur, at Mairi and Bulabulum Wards in Bauchi, state were attacked at their residences.	The two clerics were killed.
11	29th May 2011	During Goodluck Jonathan's swearing in as new President, bomb explosions were recorded in Abuja and Bauchi.	14 people died and 8 lost their limbs.

Source: *(Akinbi, 2015; Olowoselu et al., 2014; Onuoha and Ugwueze, 2014).*

Table 5 explains the extension of Boko Haram's lethal activities beyond the four states. These are just some of the attacks carried out by Boko Haram during this period. It was also an indication that their weapons have become more sophisticated. These waves of attacks signify

the methods of attacks outlined by Onuoha (2014) which included targeted assassinations, drive-by-shootings, suicide bombings and the use of IEDs. The other approaches to attack include invading communities and killing of some of the residents (Isine, 2016 and Marama, 2016).

Table 6 shows Boko Haram's attacks after the legislations on counter-terrorism were made and before and after amendments were made on those that were amended.

Table 6: Boko Haram's Onslaught after the NACTEST and Other Associated Acts

S/N	Date	Location and Type of Attack	Casualties and Impact
1	16th June 2011	The bombing of Nigerian Police Headquarters Abuja. Car park affected.	A traffic warden and the suicide bomber died.
2	9th July 2011	The clash between Boko Haram and the military in Maiduguri.	31 people lost their lives.
3	26th August 2011	Suicide bomber attacked UN building in Abuja.	23 people died and over 60 sustained injuries.
4	25th December 2011	Bomb blast at St. Theresa Catholic Church, Madala, Niger State.	12 passersby and 35 worshippers were killed.
5	6th January 2012	Attacks in Yola and Mubi, Adamawa, State.	37 people died.
6	20th January 2012	Multiple bomb blasts and gun attacks in Kano.	About 250 lost their lives.
7	15th February 2012	Korton Karfi prison, Kogi State, prison break.	A prison warder died and 199 inmates were freed.
8	29th April 2012	Bayero University, Kano attacked.	1 non-teaching staff, 2 teaching staff and 15 Christian worshippers lost their lives.
9	24th November 2012	Bomb explosion rocked St. Andrew's Anglican church at the premises of the Armed Forces Command and Staff College Jaji, Kaduna state.	15 people feared dead.
10	25th December 2012	Maiduguri mosques were attacked.	56 worshippers killed.
11	29th September	Attack on Giba College, Yobe State.	Over 50 students murdered.

	2013		
12	14th March 2014	Giwa Military cantonment attacked.	Boko Haram detainees freed but some were rearrested.
13	14th April 2014	Government secondary school, Chibok, Borno state kidnapping.	276 students (girls) abducted.
14	14th April 2014	Bomb blast in Nyanya Motor Park Abuja.	75 killed and 200 injured.
15	31st October 2014	Bomb blast at Gombe central bus station.	8 people died and 17 were injured.
16	28th November 2014	Triple suicide bomb blasts and gun attacks at Kano central mosque.	35 worshippers died and 157 were injured.
17	6th December 2014	Minna Prison, Niger state attacked.	164 inmates freed.
18	3rd to 7th January 2015	Widespread killings in Baga, Borno state.	Over 2000 died and Boko Haram took control of the town after razing it down.
19	18th January 2015	Attacks on villages in Northern Cameroon.	3 killed and 80 kidnapped.
20	16th June 2015	Twin bomb blasts targeted at police headquarters and police academy in the Chadian capital.	24 died and more than 100 sustained injuries.
21	24th March 2016	Attack on Sabongari village, Adamawa state.	14 women and 2 girls were abducted.
22	6th June 2016	Attack on Bosso town, Niger Republic.	Boko Haram took over the town and killed 30 Nigerien and 2 Nigerian soldiers and about 50,000 fled the town.
23	28th July 2016	Ambush of a humanitarian convoy in Kawuri, Borno State.	2 soldiers and 3 civilians got injured.
24	29th October 2016	Twin explosions in Maiduguri, Borno State.	9 dead and 24 injured.
25	5th November 2016	Gun attack on 272 battalion of the Nigerian Army located at Mallam Fatori.	An Army Lieutenant Colonel and 4 soldiers were killed and 4 soldiers injured.

Source: (Ajayi and Marama, 2016; Akinbi, 2015; Ngwaogu, 2016; Olowoselu et al., 2014; Olugbode, 2016; Onuoha and Ugwueze, 2014; Sani and Iroegbu, 2016; Sudan Tribune, 16th June 2014; Vanguard 6th June 2016).

Table 6 further shows some of the evils perpetrated by Boko Haram and the extension of its nefarious activities beyond the shores of Nigeria. These are just some of the attacks. Boko Haram's vices had impacted negatively on the activities of about 14.8 million Nigerians in the North East (21st Century Wilberforce Initiative, 2016). The continued wave of violence after the enactment of these acts and NACTEST further justifies the need to examine how effective these policies are on the activities of Boko Haram.

5.6   International Links and Funding

Organisations that perpetrate violence and have international links are not deterred by cultural differences (Khan and Singh, 2014). This has been enhanced by globalisation which has manifested through improved communication and technology (Khan and Singh, 2014) which suggests that Boko Haram has global allies and its sources of fund are interwoven. The fourth wave of terrorism is characterised with terrorists opertating without territorial limitations. Boko Haram as a group has got international support as well as operated beyond the boreders of Nigeria

A Boko Haram spokesman, Ali Sanda Umar Konduga, who was arrested confessed to the Department of State Security (DSS) that a former Nigerian Ambassador (now late) and a serving senator, Ali Ndume fund them (Okemi, 2013; Pérouse de Montclos, 2014a). Buji Foi, a former commissioner in Borno State was also a major sponsor of the sect before his death (Adesoji, 2011). Also, a Boko Haram spokesman claimed that (former) governors Ibrahim Shekarau and Isa Yuguda of Kano and Bauchi states respectively had paid them monthly (Okemi, 2013). The sect raids military bases to source ammunitions (Wuyep, 2015). They equally source funds through membership dues. Each member was levied ₦100 when Yusuf was alive but it is not yet confirmed if that has continued till now due to the sect's secretive disposition (Onuoha, 2014).

Mohammed Yusuf and Mohammed Damagun (proprietors of Daily Trust Newspaper) were tried in 2007 before a Nigerian High Court for receiving $300,000 from Al-Qaeda to recruit and train Nigerians in Mauritania for terrorist acts and for supporting terrorists in Nigeria (Onuoha, 2014). They further confessed that other sources of funding included the Al Muntada Trust Fund with

headquarters in the UK and the Islamic World Society with headquarters in Saudi Arabia (Okemi, 2013). Salafists in Saudi Arabia were alleged to have made donations to Yusuf as a result of two of his trips to Saudi Arabia (Nkechi, 2013). The sect has also received funds from *Musilimi Yaa'maa,* an Islamic group based in Algeria (Onuoha, 2014).

The sect has links with international terror organisations such as Al Qaeda and its affiliates like *Al-Shabaab* in the Arabian Peninsula, Somalia and AQIM (Adele, 2013; GIABA, 2013). AQIM has been training some Boko Haram members and also supplies them with arms and ammunitions (Adele, 2013; GIABA, 2013). The similarity of the North East in terms of religion and culture with Islamic nations creates a conduit for foreign assistance for the sect. This explains why Nkechi (2013: 14) postulated that 'Nigeria's far north is contiguous to the troubled Sahel and Maghreb regions, which also are contiguous to the Middle East states in the grip of Islamism'. Wealthy people in Northern Nigeria equally support the group. For example, a Kano businessman arrested by the DSS in 2006 was linked with sending some children for training in an Al-Qaeda camp in Mauritania and to some *mujahideen* fighters in the Republic of Niger (Nkechi, 2013). The group robs banks, bullion van convoys, business premises in Maiduguri and Bauchi. Unverifiable sources claim it made up to N500 million from this (Walker, 2012).

 In 2012, when AQIM and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO[16]), and Ansar al-Din were in control of the Northern part of Mali, some Boko Haram Fighters travelled to that country to show solidarity and also foster a strong tie with these groups (Zenn, 2013). There are about 100 Boko Haram fighters who are part of MUJAO fighters (Solomon, 2012). Apart from Nigeria, the sect draws its membership from Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Sudan (Onuoha, 2014). This was confirmed further after the 2009 onslaught by the Nigerian security forces when documents retrieved from the sect's members that were killed revealed they were from countries like Chad and Niger (Johnmary, 2013). Boko Haram has attacked communities in Chad and Cameroon, imported weapons from Chad and its fighters fled to Chad whenever an assault was being launched on them by the Nigerian security forces (Zenn, 2013). The United Nations Security Council reported that some members of Boko Haram were trained in a Tuareg camp in Mali (Campbell, 2014). Some Boko Haram members have also been trained in Afghanistan (Johnmary, 2013). Boko Haram has also sent its members for training in Lebanon,

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[16] MUJAO is a splinter group from AQIM which is preoccupied with Jihad in West Africa and the Sahel regions (Solomon, 2012).

Iraq, Pakistan, Mauritania and Algeria (Solomon, 2012). These foreign training explain reasons why the group moved from using crude weapons like bows, arrows, knives to the use of IEDs (Solomon, 2012). Their other weapons are General Purpose Machine Guns, surface-to-air rocket launchers, grenades and detonators (Onuoha, 2010). Its attacks also have the similitude of foreign terror organisations like the ones of Mumbai in 2008 and AQIM's attack on UN offices in Algiers (Solomon, 2012). Boko Haram equally attacked the UN office in Abuja (Nkechi, 2013). Boko Haram has about 280,000 members cutting across Northern Nigeria, Chad and Niger (Danjibo, 2009).

5.7   Conclusion

Boko Haram has continued to brandish its prowess in terrorist acts despite Nigeria's counter-terrorism measures. This chapter has also revealed the sophistication of the sect in terms of its arms wielding. Its links with foreign organisations, its continued access to funds as well as government's inability to adequately tackle economic, social and political issues have been wholly responsible for these. These factors that have continued to grease the wheel of Boko Haram need to be brought to a halt through a counter-terrorism policy. However, its leadership evolution and the tussle experienced within its echelon have not abated the group's violence. The terror acts perpetrated by the sect have gone through the pre and 2009 era, post-2009 era and those perpetrated after the making of NACTEST and the legislative Acts against terrorism.

This necessitates the need to access the Nigerian government's policies on the activities of Boko Haram. This is addressed in Chapter Six.

CHAPTER SIX

NIGERIA'S COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICIES: EXPLANATION AND ASSESSMENT

6.1   Introduction

The response of the Nigerian government to terrorism has been characterised by *ad-hoc* approaches in resolving issues that any terrorist act generates at any point. This was captured by Umar (2013) when he opined that the Nigerian government's response to terrorism, has been characterised by reactions to the symptoms of terrorism alone. The initial methods of reaction to terrorism by the Nigerian government had its backing in Section 11 of the 1999 Constitution (Amy, 2014). This section of the constitution, states that the National Assembly shall make laws for public safety and public order for the federation (FGN, 1999). Hence, most steps taken against terrorism drew inspiration from the constitution. Therefore, no law addressed terrorism directly.

The need to address terrorism from its root causes and develop the capability to react to its symptoms necessitated the making of laws and a strategy on counter-terrorism. The laws are the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011, (TPA 2011); Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2011, (MLPA 2011); Money Laundering (Prohibition) (Amendment) Act 2012, (MLPA 2012) and Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013, (TPA 2013) while the strategy is the NACTEST (Dasuki, 2013). Therefore, this chapter will utilise the NACTEST to assess Nigeria's counter-terrorism policies. However, reference will continuously be made to TPA 2011, MLPA 2011, MLPA 2012 and TPA 2013, because all of these documents cannot be evaluated in isolation but together. Put differently, the NACTEST forms the core of the assessment but other parts of the Acts that relate to NACTEST will also be assessed. This is in a bid to offer a robust and comprehensive assessment of the documents.

6.2 The Establishment of NACTEST and other Associated Acts

The government promulgated the TPA 2011, TPA 2013, MLPA 2011 and MLPA 2012. These Acts were assented to in order to provide a legal framework to the government's counter-terrorism measures. TPA 2011 was revised in 2012 leading to the enactment of TPA 2013 in February 2013 (United States Department of State, 2015a). The TPA 2011 and the TPA 2013 stipulate how terror suspects can be arrested and prosecuted, checkmating terrorism financing, and taking measures to check international terrorists influence on terrorism in Nigeria (FGN, 2011a; FGN, 2013). That is, the Acts cover terrorist funding, terrorists' properties, prosecution and international co-operation to extradite suspected terrorists (Umar, 2013). The Money Laundering Acts of 2011 and 2012 are against terrorism financing, either from local or international sources, as well as how offenders are arrested and prosecuted through the regulatory institutions and the judiciary (FGN, 2011b; FGN, 2012). These laws are interpreted through the Federal High courts and implemented by agencies of government like the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), EFCC, Nigerian Customs Service (NCS), Nigerian Fraud Intelligence Unit (NFIU), Prisons Service, and the Inspector General of Police, amongst others (FGN, 2011a; FGN, 2011b; FGN, 2012; FGN, 2013).

The TPA 2013 gave the ONSA authority to co-ordinate the security and enforcement agencies for the purpose of implementation (FGN, 2013). Although the Acts exist alongside the NACTEST, the purpose of making NACTEST the core document for assessment in this study is because the NACTEST sums up what all the Acts seek to achieve. It also contains the roles of more agencies and bodies (beyond those stipulated by TPA 2013) responsible for its implementation in the single document and their activities are coordinated by a body (NACTEST, 2014). These include the Federal Ministry of Environment, the Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), and the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) amongst others (NACTEST, 2014). The ONSA coordinates the enforcement of all counter-terrorism activities (Amy, 2014: 26). The office of the Attorney General of the Federation ensures that all counter-terrorism implementation aligns with international best practices (Amy, 2014).

NACTEST is a document on Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy. It seeks to embrace non-violent strategies to combat terrorism by adopting a comprehensive approach that addresses both the root causes and the most effective response to terrorist attacks (Barkindo and Byranss, 2016). In other words, 'NACTEST takes a comprehensive and holistic approach to counter-terrorism' (Dasuki 2013: 9). Hence, NACTEST is a merger of hard and soft approaches. It is designed to identify the root causes of terrorism and proffer necessary measures to tackle such so as to de-radicalise extremists and prevent radicalisation (Ackerman, 2014).

The NACTEST is a presidential directive signed on the 30th April 2014 (Barkindo and Byranss, 2016). It is a framework that guides all the counter-terrorism measures of the Nigerian government and it brings about the synergy of all the agencies saddled with counter-terrorism (Dasuki, 2013). The ONSA has the Counter-Terrorism Center domiciled in it (NACTEST, 2014). The Counter-Terrorism Center is saddled with the implementation of the NACTEST.

6.3   Objectives of NACTEST and other Associated Acts

The NACTEST framework is pentagonal, consisting of five objectives which are forestall, secure, identify, prepare and implement (NACTEST, 2014). In order to have a comprehensive assessment of Nigeria's counter-terrorism policies, it is expedient to have some detailed insight into the objectives.

6.3.1   Forestall

The core of the forestall part of NACTEST is 'preventing terrorism in Nigeria by engaging the public through sustained enlightenment/sensitization campaigns and deradicalisation programmes' (NACTEST, 2014: 16). This will be achieved through the promotion of good governance, prison deradicalisation, enhancing Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMMEs) for job creation, media campaigns and utilising the education sector, monitoring activities of religious organisations and capacity building in all areas of Criminal Justice System to deter terrorism (NACTEST, 2014).

Poor governance is a key factor that engenders insurgency (Uduonwa, 2013). Good governance is the foundation upon which other efforts of government at forestalling are built on. The Mo

Ibrahim Foundation defines governance as the 'provision of the political, social and economic public goods and services that every citizen has the right to expect from their state, and that a state has the responsibility to deliver to its citizens' (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2016: 96). This definition is a reference point for what government stands for which is provision of social needs and security. Poor governance fuels terrorism and also hinders a government's counter-terrorism strategy. This is because if the political, social and economic expectations of the citizens are not met by government, they could be frustrated and resort to compelling government to do their bidding through terrorist acts. In addition, poor governance is an offshoot of weak institutions which weaken counter-terrorism efforts.

In 2015, Nigeria ranked 36th in Africa's good governance index, as the country stood at 46.5%, which is below Africa's average of 50% (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2016). The building blocks that mould good governance are safety and rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity as well as human development (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2016). Provision of infrastructures, job creation, a good criminal justice system and viable government institutions are what make good governance a possibility.

Poverty has been attributed as one of the factors that led to the emergence of Boko Haram as well as a major factor for its increasing membership (Onapajo *et al.,* 2012). The chunk of the nation's wealth goes to a few rich, while the poor majority share the crumbs (African Statistical Year Book 2014). The level of unemployment in Nigeria is high and this cannot be disconnected from the high level of poverty. Youths constitute the bulk of the Nigerian population (UNDP, 2015b). Youths aged 15-35 account for about 67% of the unemployed (AfDB, 2014: 10). Youth unemployment (ages 15 – 24) increased from 29.9% in 2010 to 37.7% in 2011. In 2015, there was a decline in youth unemployment as it stood at 17.8% for ages 15-24 and 10.8% for ages 25-34 (UNDP, 2015b). The unemployment rate in Nigeria was 23.9 % as at 2013 with disparities in regions, the North East being 33% and Lagos 8% (AfDB, 2014). The North has a whopping 72% of its population living in poverty while only 27% of the Southern population live in poverty (21st Century Wilberforce Initiative, 2016).

In terms of employment creation throughout a ten-year span (2006-2015), Nigeria has increased employment creation by 6.9% (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2016). However, this increment in job creation may not have much effect on dependency rate (less effect on poverty reduction) because

according to UNDP (2015a), the population growth rate is 2.7% annually. The federal ministry of youth and sports in conjunction with the UNDP, reinvigorated the Nigerian Youth Entrepreneurship Development Programme, which is to create 3000 jobs annually. A total of 475,180 jobs were created in the third quarter of 2015, out of which 90.2% were from the informal sector, 8.8% from the formal sector and government jobs accounted for 1% (UNDP, 2015b). Evidently, the informal sector can help check poverty, especially in the North and consequently reduce the vulnerable youths that are potential terrorists.

The Nigerian government's inability to employ those qualified prompted the government to introduce policies that will aid the setting up and operations of Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMMEs) (Ilegbinosa and Jumbo, 2015). Government's knowledge of the nexus between poverty and terrorism, necessitates giving SMMEs the enabling environment to operate. This is evident in the fact that SMMEs constitute about 90% of businesses in Nigeria but they only contribute 1% to the GDP (Gbandi and Amissah, 2014). SMMEs in Nigeria include motor vehicles and motorcycles repairs, food service activities, transportation and storage, sewage and waste management, agriculture, fishing and forestry, leather tanning, automotive spare parts, tie and dye (Oyeyinka, 2010; SMEDAN/NBS, 2013). Constraints faced by SMMEs in Nigeria include financing, high import tariff, high rent, multiple taxing, high unskilled workforce and preference for foreign goods over local goods by customers, inadequate infrastructure as well as poor education and experience (Ilegbinosa and Jumbo, 2015; Oyeyinka, 2010). Finally, intellectual properties are hardly shielded as over 70% of entrepreneurs do not have patent rights (SMEDAN/NBS, 2013).

The actions of government aimed at boosting SMMEs include giving credit facilities, providing infrastructures, regulatory framework among others (Oyeyinka, 2010). The fund government provides for SMMEs is low compared to other sources of funding. Personal savings source accounts for 96.4%, 3% from the informal sector and 0.21% from formal financial institutions (Gbandi and Amissah, 2014). The sources of capital for SMMEs include personal savings, loans, family source, co-operative and grants (SMEDAN/NBS, 2013). The formal financial institutions include the CBN, commercial and microfinance banks.

The government, through the CBN introduced the ₦220 billion Micro Small and Medium Enterprises Development Fund (CBN, 2015). This fund is being distributed to beneficiaries

through state governments, as well as commercial microfinance banks (CBN, 2015). A total of ₦48.59 billion had been disbursed as at the end of June 2015 and the interest rate was between 2 and 3 percent (CBN, 2015). The UNDP and Gombe state government have trained 600 youths and women in such vocational skills as carpentry, welding, weaving, knitting and tailoring and the majority of these trainees now have their own enterprises set up (UNDP, 2015b).

The SMME Refinancing and Restructuring Fund (RRF) is also a package that has been introduced by the Nigerian government to reduce poverty (CBN, 2014). From its inception, the RRF as at 2014 had disbursed a total of ₦339.73 billion, generated about 1.2 million indirect jobs and created 16, 845 direct jobs in 2014 (CBN, 2014). The CBN has also signed a MOU with some State Governments for the running of Entrepreneurship Development Centres (EDCs) (CBN, 2014). EDCs in Calabar, Makurdi and Maiduguri had trained 6361 young entrepreneurs and generated 6422 new jobs as at the end of 2014 (CBN, 2014). In addition, the government has the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund (ACGSF) (Gbandi and Amissah, 2014). The ACGSF as at 2014 had given 931,863 loans valued at ₦84.5 billion (CBN, 2014). This is to boost agricultural production. The North is predominantly agrarian and such a scheme as ACGSF is crucial for the alleviation of poverty in the region. Food and Agricultural Organisation and Gombe state government have supported 3,300 IDPs with farm inputs, seedlings and processing equipment (UNDP, 2015b). A recent reform in agriculture is the Growth Enhancement Scheme, which embraces farmers using the mechanism of their mobile phones or Electronic-wallet system (or E-wallet) to receive 50% subsidy on fertilisers, for a maximum of two bags (UNDP, 2015c). In 120 days, over 1.2 million farmers already purchased their subsidised fertilisers using this system (UNDP, 2015c). The aim of the scheme is to bring 20 million farmers out of poverty through a blend of input support, access to markets and fund as well as the creation of 3.5 million jobs by 2015 (UNDP, 2015c).

Nigeria is regarded as the number one in farm output in Africa and 25th in the world (AfDB, 2014). However, this has not transformed into checkmating poverty in the country due to infrastructural deficits. The availability of these infrastructures boosts income that can be earned from agriculture and also make SMMEs operate at profit level.

The availability of standard infrastructure is crucial to the growth and development of a nation. Some of them are linked directly, while some are indirectly linked to forestalling terrorism. For

instance, good infrastructures make the cost of running SMMEs tolerable. If SMMEs, run above break-even point they will be able to employ more people and by extension reduce poverty. These infrastructures include electricity, water, sanitation, health facilities and good road. There has been the dearth of infrastructures in Nigeria. To have infrastructure that can fill the infrastructure lacuna of the country, Nigeria needs to improve on infrastructures like irrigation, power, transport, water and sanitation (Foster and Pushak, 2011). This would cost the country $14.2 billion annually (Foster and Pushak, 2011).

The debilitating state of rail transport, as well as the cost of air transport has made road transport a major means of transportation in Nigeria (*The Guardian*, 8th November 2015). Roads infrastructure aids movement which affects moving farm produce, raw materials and finished products. In essence, good road network is grease necessary to oil the wheels of commerce of a society. Nigeria's road network is the largest in West Africa with about 200,000 km of roads (Federal Ministry of Works, 2015). However, the country's large population which has necessitated an annual increase in car importation has continued to undermine the importance of the large road network and made them fall below standard (Federal Ministry of Works, 2015). About 67% of tarred roads are in reasonable condition and about 33% of untarred roads are in a reasonable state (Foster and Pushak, 2011). Only about 20% of rural Nigerian dwellers have access to roads at all seasons (Foster and Pushak, 2011). The poor state of Nigerian roads has led to the loss of lives through accidents and loss of man hour and these have hindered economic development (*The Guardian,* 8th November 2015). Northern Nigeria is a largely agrarian area.

Most parts of the North engaged in agriculture are the rural areas and poor road access affects agriculture negatively. Farm inputs and produce are moved with difficulty in such situations. Hence, the poor state of roads further exacerbates the poverty level in Northern Nigeria and this makes its youths vulnerable to violent extremism and terrorism (Ajakaiye *et al.*, 2015). To address defects on Nigerian road infrastructure, the government has floated a Road Sector Development Team[17].

Poor access to portable water fuels poverty (UNESCO, 2015). This is because time and money that should otherwise be used to meet other needs like education, health, investment among others, are used in sourcing for and purchasing water from water vendors (UNESCO, 2015). In

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[17] This team manages roads and bridges. Its major sources of funds are $330 million assistance from World Bank and $162 million loans from AfDB. This information was sourced from http://roadsector.org/?page_id=171

addition, water is needed for irrigation to boost agricultural production. In Nigeria, urban areas have 75% access to improved water compared to rural areas which have 45% (Foster and Pushak, 2011). In essence, 58% have access to portable water while those that have access to good sanitation are 31% (AfDB, 2014). African Development Bank (AfDB) initiated water projects in Yobe, Taraba and some states aim to increase safe water supply to 70% of the population (AfDB, 2014).

Power is another infrastructure critical to national development, poverty alleviation and containing terrorism. However, many business enterprises in Nigeria run their businesses on alternative sources of power (generating set), inverters, as compared to getting power from the national grid (SMEDAN/NBS, 2013). This increases the cost of running the businesses and consequently affects profit generation and the capacity to employ. Electrification rate percentage of the population and electrification percentage rate of rural population is 56.6% and 34.4% respectively (UNDP, 2015a). In the global electrification rate, Nigeria ranks 143rd out of 188 countries (UNDP, 2015a). About 40% of Nigerians have access to electricity and about 80% of the rural dwellers are not connected to the national grid (UNDP, 2015b). Nigeria's need for stable power supply is 10,000 MW but it currently generates only 5,000 Mega Watts (MW) (AfDB, 2014). Ochelle (2015) puts the daily hourly supply of power between April 2013 and September 2015 at 6.2 hours.

The government is poised to increase from the rate of 5,500MW to above 50%, (8,000MW) by 2016 (Olaoye *et al.*, 2016). The population bulge in the country explains higher demand for electricity. Commenting on the present power situation in the country, the Minister of Power, Works and Housing, Raji Fashola stated that the country was generating a little over 3000 MW as at May 2016 due to the vandalisation of gas pipelines (*Premium Times,* 19th May 2016). This is because apart from hydro, the country depends on thermal sources of energy which is powered by natural gas (*Premium Times,* 19th May 2016). Hence, renewable sources like wind, solar, amongst others which if harnessed with hydro and thermal could fetch the country up to 60,000MW (Olaoye *et al.*, 2016).

Education, either through the formal education platform or public enlightenment is also a means to forestall terrorism. Nigeria places comparatively low on most global education indices as a result of the poor funding of the sector (UNDP, 2015c). At the global level, children that are out

of school are about 20 million, of which 11.4 million are from Nigeria (Ikpefan, 2016). The population of out-of-school in Nigeria takes the dimension of a North-South dichotomy, with the North having low enrolment especially at the primary level (Federal Ministry of Education, 2015). The National Bureau of Statistics report on enrolment of children ages 5 to 14 ranked the North East and North West below other geopolitical zones in the country (NBS, 2014). The North East and North West have 60.7% and 64.3% respectively while the South East has the highest with 90.8% (NBS, 2014).

This result also portrays Western education enrolment rate. One of the major reasons given for this low school enrolment from the North is the lack of interest in Western form of education (NBS, 2014). This is corroborated by Aghedo and Eke (2013) when they opined that the *Almajiri* constitute the highest number of out of school children in Nigeria. A 2009 survey reflects that enrolment into Quranic schools was three times that of formal schools in Sokoto and Zamfara states (Aghedo and Eke, 2013). This affirms why Fafunwa (1974) aptly maintains that Northern Nigeria has always placed higher value on Quranic education[18] than Western education. Hence, the predominance of the *Almajiri* system in Northern Nigeria.

The vulnerability of the *Almajiris* creates a suspicion that they are potential foot soldiers that could be engaged by Boko Haram (Hoechner, 2014). This vulnerability is caused by having these children who are between the ages of 7 and 15, to making ends meet by roaming the streets in order to beg for alms and scavenging from waste bins (Yusha'u *et al.*, 2013). These boys who are of school age engage in begging and petty labour to survive because the Quranic schools they attend do not take care of their feeding (Hoechner, 2014; Taiwo, 2013). Hence, they could easily be lured with financial and material benefits and even brainwashed for terrorism and other vices.

Government's view that a necessity is laid upon her to address the *Almajiri* menace led to the merging of Western education with Quranic education. This culminated in the establishment of *Almajiri* Integrated Schools which are progenies of the National *Almajiri* Education Programme in 27 states in Nigeria (Federal Ministry of Education, 2015; Yusha'u *et al.*, 2013). This programme commenced in April 2012 (Taiwo, 2013). This was done to address the education lacuna created by the non-formal education enrolment of about 9 million *Almajiris* in Northern

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[18] Quranic education is given by Quranic schools and they teach about reading and practicing the dictates of the holy Quran; these schools are devoid of the basic subjects of a formal educational system like mathematics, English language, social studies and sciences (Aghedo and Eke, 2013).

Nigeria (Federal Ministry of Education, 2015). The programme is divided into three streams in order to have effective implementation. These are to establish Model *Almajiri* Schools; to support community owned *Tsangaya/Islamiyyah* and *Tahfeez* Primary Schools; and to introduce Basic Education into *Makarantun Allo, Tsangaya* Schools and *Ile-kewu* (UBEC, 2015: 2). As at 2015, a total of 117 model *Almajiri* schools had been constructed in 27 states including FCT, 36 *Tsangaya* Schools and 138 existing *Islamiyyah* and *Ma'ahad* schools in 30 states and the FCT were identified and provided with funds to expand their infrastructural facilities (UBEC, 2015: 3).

Government did not only establish these schools but adopted some measures to boost learning there. These include training of 58 quality control and *Almajiri* desk officers on quality control by the Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC), training of 270 *Almajiri* Model School proprietors and head teachers on curriculum implementation; use of textbooks; training of 174 state desk officers and local government education officials on establishment of school-based management committees on *Almajiri* schools (UBEC, 2015). The constraints encountered by the *Almajiri* school system include non-integration of *mallams* (teachers of *Almajiris* in Quranic schools) into the programme, and recruitment of teachers who are not Muslims to teach in the schools (UBEC, 2015). Feeding should be a means of encouraging the programme and this will be well carried out by state and local governments but only a few state governments do feed the pupils in these *Almajiri* schools (UBEC, 2015). A visit to one of the schools in Zamfara state revealed that the school was not operational for any justifiable reason (David, 2013).

The inclusion of civic education in the school curriculum is also one of the objectives of the forestall aspect of NACTEST. Civic education has been introduced to the lower (Primary 1-3), middle (Primary 4-6) and upper basic education (Junior Secondary School 1-3) levels (Awofala, 2013). The topics in the civic education subject relating to terrorism awareness and prevention include disaster risk management as well as peace and conflict resolution (Igbokwe, 2015). Nigeria is a member of Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) (United States Department of State, 2016a). The TSCTP in conjunction with Kano State government conducted programmes on human rights and security for *Almajiris* in Kano in order to reduce their vulnerability to being enlisted into the folds of terror (United States Department of State, 2015a). Training on peace building and conflict transformation efforts have been organised for youths, women, traditional leaders, and religious leaders on conflict transformation skills (United States

Department of State, 2015a). The TSCTP has also organised media campaigns on conflicts (United States Department of State, 2015a). TSCTP equally carried out programmes in Kano, Kaduna and Jos on leadership tolerance and civic engagement and this was done to train teachers and students who will in turn train others (United States Department of State, 2015a; United States Department of State 2016a).

The awareness and communication framework for the NACTEST is a conglomeration of efforts from government agencies and civil society organisations (Amy 2014). Media organisations, civil society organisations, Nigerian army civil military relations department, council of *Ulamas* and relevant government agencies saddled with information dissemination crucial to creating awareness on prevention violent extremism and relevant security precautions (Amy 2014). A shortwave radio program targeting North Eastern Nigeria called *Dandal Kura*, has been a source of educating youths on why they need to shun violent extremism (United States Department of State, 2016a). *Dandal Kura* also uses the internet and social media (Short Message Service, e-mail, Facebook, Twitter, and a website) to get in touch with the public (United States Department of State, 2016a). The programme has experienced mass followership since its commencement in January 2015 (United States Department of State, 2016a).

The criminal justice system comprises the police, prisons, other security agencies and the judiciary. Policemen who hold command structure at state levels develop good relationships with traditional leaders, town union leaders and other key stakeholders in order to foster synergy to combat crime (Otu and Aro, 2013). The police also aligns with local communities through its community public relations committees which meet periodically on how there can be mutual exchange of information to preventing and combating crime (terrorism inclusive) (Otu and Aro*,* 2013). The Nigerian Police has a programme that broadcasts on the Radio Nigeria Network which is called Police Diary (Otu and Aro*,* 2013). This is a live call-in forum where police and members of the public interact, thereby creating an avenue for educating the populace on security matters as well as getting feedbacks on its activities (Otu and Aro, 2013). Topics[19] treated so far in the programme *inter alia* include training on counter-terrorism, safety measures on how to identify suicide bombers, securing public places and criminal justice administration. The best part is that past programmes are recorded and can be listened to anytime on the website

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[19] These topics were sourced from Radio Nigeria website and even some were listened to. The source is http://ww2.radionigeria.gov.ng/frprog-pg-ar.php?title=Police%20Diary

of Radio Nigeria. Intelligence revealed to the military that some Boko Haram members disguising their dressing to appear like hunters in order to evade arrest (Omonobi, 2016b). They consequently inform the communities in the affected areas to be vigilant (Omonobi, 2016b).

ONSA through the CVE is implementing a crucial aspect of the forestall part of the NACTEST. However, the implementation of other constituents of the forestall aspect is devoid of the CVE. Hence, a consideration of the forestall part of NACTEST will be best explored partly using the CVE. In describing the CVE, Amy (2014:32) explained that 'it seeks to counter Boko Haram by implementing multiple government-sponsored initiatives that address terrorist motivations, grievances, and behaviours on the local, state and federal' levels. The programme was rolled out on the premise that force alone cannot check violent extremism (The Abuja Declaration, 2016). The CVE programme is headquartered in Abuja and has national, local and state coordinators (*The Nigerian Observer,* 17th October 2014). It aims at counter-radicalisation and deradicalisation (*The Nigerian Observer,* 17th October 2014).

The government seeks to achieve counter-radicalisation and deradicalisation from extremism through mass media advocacy and robust military-civil relations (NACTEST, 2014). It monitors radicalisation processes and groups prone to radicalisation and through a programme like the CVE to integrate such groups into the society (NACTEST, 2014). Counter radicalisation includes religious, cultural, communication and governance components. It is religiously and culturally focused by creating inter-faith dialogues, implementation of an Imam training programme, empowering research on Islam, creating a database on Islamic institutions and focusing on extra-curricular activities for youths like sports (*The Nigerian Observer,* 17th October, 2014). Counter-radicalisation has been examined in this study in the preceding paragraphs which dealt with SMMEs, infrastructural provision and enlightenment.

The deradicalisation aspect is prison based (Barkindo and Byranss, 2016). The objective is to engage violent extremists, convicts/suspects in religious, ideological, physical and entrepreneurial value change that lead to a change in their behaviour (The Abuja Declaration, 2016). The deradicalisation is linked to the prison aspect of the forestall objective of NACTEST and its primary focus is on de-radicalising individuals and not the adoption of joint disengagement for violent extremism (Brakindo and Byrans, 2016). Prisons have been one of the platforms for inmates to get radicalised (UNDP, 2015d). However, the CVE applies to those who

had been radicalised before arrest or those who had not been radicalised before arrest but display tendencies of embracing extremism (Brakindo and Byrans, 2016). The thrust of the CVE is to change prisoners' radical or extremist perceptions and ensure they do not resort to the use of violence as a means of achieving their results (Brakindo and Byrans, 2016). The deradicalisation programme is to run concurrently in a number of prisons.

The pilot programme was kick-started (in March 2015) from Kuje medium security prison in Abuja in order to assemble inadequate manpower and physical resources (Barkindo and Byrans, 2016). The prison was architecturally improved (renovated) to offer the needed facilities to run a deradicalisation programme (Barkindo and Byrans, 2016). Apparently, a separate housing block was made available to accommodate the violent extremist prisoners, alongside a mosque, teaching rooms and an outdoor sports space (Barkindo and Byrans, 2016). Prison personnel were drawn from the manpower used in implementing the programme and these included imams, pastors, medical practitioners, psychologists, vocational instructors and teachers (Barkindo and Byrans, 2016). Local and international CSOs were also involved in the prison-based deradicalisation programme (Amy, 2014).

The state of the Nigerian prisons is however, a matter for concern and may create hiccups to the programme's implementation. Majority of Nigerian prisons are overcrowded thereby making reformation, rehabilitation and reintegration which should be what confinement seeks to achieve a herculean task (Grace, 2014). The designed capacity of Nigeria's prisons is 50,153 inmates (United States Department of State, 2016b). Prison inmates as at 2011 were 75,261 in 239 facilities (UNDP, 2015c). Delays in the judicial process are responsible for the overcrowding of the nation's prisons (Grace, 2014). Prisons in Nigeria are in an appalling state, characterised by poor feeding, inadequate water, poor ventilation, poor sleeping facilities, extra-judicial killings and threat of rapes of female inmates by prison officials (United States Department of State, 2016b). In some prisons, male and female prisoners were held together in the same facility, so also were juvenile offenders and adults (United States Department of State, 2016b). Children born in prison often stayed with their mothers. As at 2013, 69 children lived in prison facilities with their mothers nationwide (United States Department of State, 2016b). The harsh conditions of the prison system may hardly reform inmates and detainees as terrorists may become further hardened. Frequent strikes and poor renumeration of judicial workers also slow down the quick administration of justice.

Religious institutions are seen as the main platform for violent extremism. The 19 Northern state governors have taken steps to monitor the activities of religious institutions to prevent the latter from preaching messages that may incite extremism (Akhaine, 2016). This they seek to achieve through the establishment of a regulatory mechanism to monitor the activities of registered and unregistered religious organisations in the region (Akhaine, 2016).

6.3.2 Secure

The secure aspect has as its focal points 'ensuring protection of life and property, public and key national infrastructure/services including Nigerian *[sic]* interests around the world' (NACTEST, 2014: 16). This aspect of the NACTEST would be achieved through strengthening border security, protecting critical national infrastructure and training security forces to respond to threats of terrorism (NACTEST, 2014). The secure agenda is to equip security agencies to have capacity in order to guard against the terrorist menace.

One of the major factors accounting for Boko Haram's success is the unabated movement of arms and illegal immigrants into the country's porous borders (Uduonwa, 2013). Individuals, business men, terrorist organisations and corrupt government officials have taken or take advantage of the porous borders, corruption, weak institutions, weak laws and poverty to launder money from crime proceeds and to perpetrate crimes (United States Department of State, 2015b). Boko Haram has been alleged to use animals and women and also disguise as women to traffic small and light weapons for cross-border arm transportation (Onouha, 2013). Fulani herdsmen are nomads who move within the West African sub-region with their cattle and have been alleged to transport small arms and laundering money through their livestock (Omitola, 2014). Security agents hardly subject them to search because they feel they are just animal herders and the routes they take are so remote that they can most times hardly come in contact with security agents. However, the length of the borders, coupled with inadequate border patrol capacity made border closures difficult to implement (Solomon, 2012).

The border with Cameroon to the East is 1690 kilometres, while the one shared with Niger to the North is 1497 kilometres; the one shared with Chad in the NorthEast is 87 kilometres and the length to the West with Benin Republic is 773 kilometres (Onuoha, 2013). Nigeria's former interior minister, Abba Moro revealed that there were 1,499 illegal routes and 84 legal routes

into Nigeria (Onuoha, 2013). Consequently, Nigeria's North East borders with neighbouring countries were closed (Onuoha, 2014). These borders have been perceived as routes notorious for frequent entry of large cache of arms (Chizea and Iyare, 2006).

This smuggling of small arms prompted the government to set up a committee on the proliferation of Small and Light Weapons (SALWs) (Dasuki, 2013). The Nigerian Police, Immigration and Customs officials have been trained on border patrol to enable them to carry out border patrol effectively (United States Department of State, 2016a). A crucial security measure adopted at airports was the collection of records containing passengers' names in advance for commercial flights (United States Department of State, 2016a). Collection of biometric data in the process of issuance of Nigerian passport has also commenced (United States Department of State, 2016a). This was to check infiltration into the country by foreigners on the pretence of being Nigerians. In 2015, screening of passengers improved at the point of entry through major airports in Abuja, Kano and Port Harcourt (United States Department of State, 2016a). However, securing land and sea borders have remained a major challenge (United States Department of State, 2016a). The Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS) has established a border patrol corps which was saddled with the responsibility of having a comprehensive border management and patrol (NIS, 2013). This will be achieved by increasing the number of patrol bases and control posts (NIS, 2013).

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) -EU small arms project is an ECOWAS project funded by EU and implemented by the UNDP Nigerian office in association with CSOs and other stakeholders (UNDP, 2016). The project educates border communities, strengthens operational and institutional capacities like national commissions and CSOs on the dangers of SALWs (UNDP, 2016). The end result was to encourage the voluntary surrender of arms and collection in exchange for development projects that are community-based (UNDP, 2016). The UNDP in partnership with the Presidential Committee on Small and Light Arms organised a 4-day capacity training programme for 80 security officials that included the military, para-military and DSS as well as community leaders in selected border communities with Niger Republic (UNDP, 2016). It was geared towards educating them on the dangers of small arms and reduction of cross-border small arms smuggling (UNDP, 2016). However, it has been discovered that security agencies sell and give out ammunitions to militant groups: a claim substantiated by the arrest of some security personnel alleged to have sold arms and live

ammunitions to criminals (Nwanuole and Iwuoha, 2012). The most recent was a revelation from the House of Representatives when it summoned the Inspector General of police on the 'loss' of four rifles (Ovuakporie and Agbakwuru, 2016). There was a likelihood that Boko Haram might have benefited from the 'largesse' of some corrupt security officials. The Nigerian military has also recovered a large cache of arms and ammunitions from Boko Haram (Agbambu, 2016b; Haruna, 2016b).

The government has used the military and other security agencies to secure- a joint security task force, the creation of an additional army division and the relocation of the military command centre to Maiduguri (Akinbi, 2015; Campbell, 2014). Para-military agencies now have counter-terrorism units. The Joint Military Task Force named Operation Restore Order (JOTRO) was established on 12th June 2011 with its headquarters in Maiduguri (Onuoha, 2014). The JOTRO was later named Operation *Zaman Lafiya* and subsequently Operation *Lafiya Dole*, a Hausa word meaning 'peace by force' (Musa, 2016; *Vanguard,* 21st June 2015). The synergy of the military with police and the state security services make up the JOTRO (Campbell, 2014). The fusion of these security agencies was done in a bid to pool their expertise together and to allow a free flow of information among them (Solomon, 2012). Their operations included patrols, mounting road blocks as well as cordon and search operations (Umar, 2013).

The TPA 2013 was accorded military power to arrest and detain people on matters relating to terrorism (Amnesty International, 2015). Section 2 Subsection 5b of the TPA 2013, grants law enforcement agents the power to arrest with regard to terrorism matters (FGN, 2013). JOTRO has recorded some achievements with some arrests and killing of Boko Haram leaders and members (Onuoha, 2014). One of the most recent achievements of the JOTRO was the rescue of one of the kidnapped Chibok girls with her 10-month-old baby on the 6th of November 2016 (Ajayi and Marama, 2016). However, some arrests were made and the suspects detained without being charged to court or having access to lawyers (*Punch*, 18thJuly 2016). The JOTRO has finds it difficult differentiating Boko Haram members from civilians and a lot of civilians have been killed consequently (Mohammed, 2014). The Nigerian security forces have since March 2011, arrested up to 20, 000 young men with about 7, 000 out of this already dead (ICC, 2015). Such deaths are orchestrated by extra-judicial killings and poor detention facilities (ICC, 2015). Amnesty corroborated ICC when it reported that from June 2011 to June 2015; about 7,000 young men had died in military detention (Iroegbu, 2016b). An example, was after attacks on a

military patrol vehicle and injuring some soldiers by suspected Boko Haram members at Baga, Borno State, in retaliation, the military killed 185 civilians and burnt about 2000 houses (Mohammed, 2014). It is not confirmed whether the bulk of those killed were suspected Boko Haram militants. These acts of the abuse of the rights of civilians by the Nigerian military have root causes which cannot be separated from derth in training on civil relations. In interviews granted by Nigerian security officials, Dietrich (2015) obtained the fact that training on civilian protection was largely absent within the military. The UNDP and the government of Japan trained 250 civilian and military personnel on civilian protection and civil-military co-operation (UNDP, 2015b). Some of the trainees have been deployed for peacekeeping operations in the North East (UNDP, 2015b). However, on 7th November 2016, the Nigerian army released 1271 detainees after investigations revealed that the detainees were not Boko Haram members (*Vanguard*, 7th November 2016).

The responses of the government to these human rights abuses have been like 'looking the other way, approach' as only cases of mutiny and cowardice were prosecuted, while human rights violations crimes have not been prosecuted (Human Rights Watch, 2016). The brutality of the security agencies was inevitably responsible for the low public confidence by the Nigerian populace. Nigeria ranked least in public confidence in the armed forces (40%) and police (21%) in Africa in a 2014/2015 survey, carried out by Clarke and Lekalake and published in an Afrobarometer policy paper (Clarke and Lekalake, 2106).

Summarily, the JOTRO operations have had imposing curfews, mass arrests, house-to-house searches, destruction of people's homes, and unwarranted detentions and/or interrogations of anyone suspected to be associated with Boko Haram as its constituents (Serrano and Pieri, 2014). Serrano and Pieri, (2014) further concluded that these are reactionary moves and not proactive actions. The reason for this was poor intelligence gathering (Akinola and Tella, 2013). Inter agency mistrust made intelligence sharing among the security agencies charged with combating Boko Haram to be at its loWest ebb (Amy, 2014). However, the Nigerian Airforce has acquired drones which have been deployed to the North East for surveillance and air strikes (Alli and Joel, 2015; Runsewe, 2016). Intelligence efforts by the DSS, army and Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) have led to some discoveries of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) cells in Kano and Boko Haram's magic book respectively, as well as some effected arrests (Muhammed, 2016; Omonobi, 2016b; *The Sun*, 20th June, 2016).

Security agencies have been trained and this was aptly captured by Musa as cited by Onuoha that:

> *"training in special reconnaissance, close-quarters combat, urban warfare, amphibious operation, information operation and management, tactical communication, civil-military relations and forensic analysis have equally been expanded in the training curricula of the armed forces and other security agencies" (Onouha, 2014: 176).*

These training are to engender Nigeria's security agents in international best practices on their roles in counter-terrorism. These are in a bid to effectively equip the security agencies to combat terrorism. The military has also established a canine handling unit in order to boost its forensic capability. Training has been conducted for about 5000 lower ranking security personnel and 167 officers that are ranked up to the equivalent of Major (Azumah, 2015). The U.S government, in conjunction with the Nigerian government conducted training for 120 personnel from the Nigerian Police Force on protection and handling of IEDs and preservation of evidence from crime scenes after terrorist attacks (United States Department of State, 2015a). The EFCC and the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) have also received training on crime scene with regard to investigations and counter-terrorism (United States Department of State, 2016a).

The Nigerian police have a counter-terrorism squad[20] which has the responsibility of carrying out special operations, investigating, and prohibiting terrorist acts perpetrated by organisations, groups and individuals. The NPF in response to public complaints over police brutality, established a complaints response unit in November 2015 (Amnesty International Report 2016). The police are the closest security agency to the public because they can be easily accessed by the latter. However, the Nigerian police is being confronted with major constraints[21] like understaffing, poor funding and being poorly equipped. These constraints put the police in a relatively weak position in general crime prevention and control. The staff strength of the Nigerian Police Force as at 2011 was 357,000 policemen who do not match up to the UN's recommendation of one policeman to 400 citizens (Popoola, 2012).

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[20] The Police anti-terrorism squad is headed by a commissioner of police and its headquarters is in Abuja. The functions of the squad were sourced from the Nigerian Police website: http://www.npf.gov.ng/anti_terrorism.php

[21] This information was sourced from the website of the Nigerian Police Force. The Nigerian police have insufficient bullet proof jackets, inadequate vehicles for operations, power failure in police formations and insufficient fund to carry out their activities of intelligence gathering, forensic analysis, investigation and combat operations. Although, information is not available on the arms and ammunitions strength of the force. These information were sourced from The Nigerian Police website: http://www.npf.gov.ng

The NSCDC equally has a counter-terrorism unit[22] with similar functions to its sister organisation, the Nigerian police. The NSCDC was through intelligence efforts able to discover Boko Haram's spiritual book (*The Sun*, 20th June 2016). The book called *Guduma* written in Arabic was suspected to have been used to hypnotise victims, indoctrinate Boko Haram followers to submit to their leaders and possibly help them evade arrests (*The Sun*, 20th June 2016). The DSS in June 2016 discovered an ISIS training camp in Kano and arrested five persons (Muhammed, 2016). Considering Boko Haram's link to ISIS (21st Century Wilberforce Initiative, 2016), this discovery was a key achievement. The Nigerian Air force has a special force operations team made up of special commandos which it deploys for counter-terrorism purposes (Akioye, 2016). This team conducted a simulation exercise in conjunction with other security agencies on how to respond to terrorist attacks at airports (Akioye, 2016).

On May 29th, 2015, the day President, Muhammadu Buhari was sworn in; he relocated the military command centre to Maiduguri, with an annex in Yola, Adamawa State (Akinbi, 2015; Dietrich, 2015). This has led to the boosting of the morale of troops on the battle ground and can also be connected to the recapture of territories hitherto seized by Boko Haram (Dietrich, 2015). In essence, as at January 2015, Boko Haram had seized 17 Local Government Areas in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa but as at July 2015, the MNJTF in collaboration with the Nigerian forces had assisted in reclaiming most of these territories (Human Rights Watch 2016). However, between May 29th, 2015 (when the command centre was relocated) and the end of August 2015, 1000 people had been killed in 60 terrorist attacks (Ewi, 2015). This brings to question the effectiveness of relocating the command centre. The military declared 100 key Boko Haram members wanted and only three have been captured so far (Onapajo, 2016). This further raises concern over the capability of the armed forces and there was likelihood that those on the run might have gone underground in order to later reemerge and orchestrate more attacks (Onapajo, 2016).

The 7th Infantry Division of the Nigerian Army was created and made up of 8000 troops (Omonobi, 2013). However, Iroegbu and Olugbode submitted that by June 2014, the division started experiencing fracas between commissioned and non-commissioned officers (Iroegbu and Olugbode, 2014). The commissioned officers accused the non-commissioned officers of

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[22] The NSCDC counter-terrorism unit performs similar functions like its police counterpart. The information was sourced from NSCDC website: http://www.nscdc.gov.ng/

cowardice while the non-commissioned officers accused their superiors of corruption in the form of releasing classified information to Boko Haram. This led to mutiny within the army hierarchy. The military's top echelon has been accused of corruption as they use ₦9 out of ₦10 meant to be committed to the Boko Haram campaign for their gains (Amy, 2014). Hence, despite committing large amounts of money to defence, the purpose of such commitment is often times defeated by corruption (Dietrich, 2015). Funds over $2 billion, were set aside for the fight against Boko Haram was mismanaged (Daniel and Omonobi, 2015; Suleiman, 2016). However, some of the perpetrators have been arrested and are presently being prosecuted with some amounts having been recovered (Alli, 2016). Another hiccup to the military campaign was the use of outdated equipment and arms compared to the sophisticated arms being brandished by Boko Haram (Amy, 2014). This has evolved into occasions where soldiers flee from Boko Haram fighters (Dietrich, 2015). A very good example was in October 2014 when soldiers of the 234th battalion fled their post when Boko Haram overran and took over Mubi in Adamawa State (Paden, 2015).

Borno state government also partnered the military to train youths for intelligence gathering and effecting of arrests. The army of youths ages 15 to 35 was called the CJTF (Strochlic, 2014). The CJTF engaged the sect in battles, especially in Borno State and this was achieved through nocturnal activities to protect their communities, intelligence gathering and handing over arrested Boko Haram members to security agencies (Strochlic, 2014). Unconfirmed sources have claimed that some CJTF members are ex-Boko Haram, hence their efforts are fruitful as they have appreciable knowledge of the sect's tactics but some hunters are also members of the CJTF (Dietrich, 2015). They are only armed with cutlasses, axe, bows and arrows and they have recorded success in killing and arresting Boko Haram militants (Strochlic, 2014). A report from the British Broadcasting Corporation in May 2015 reported that the CJTF had a well organised structure in 25 local government areas in North Eastern Nigeria (Amy, 2014). The government subsequently recognised the CJTF. The Borno state government provides a monthly stipend for the CJTF members (Amy, 2014).

The CJTF have been accused of rape and other forms of human rights abuses (Malik, 2015). These actions are corroborated by Brinkel and Ait-Hida's (2012) views in their submission that 'armed groups, organised around local or regional strongmen, can maintain order and security, but they may just as well turn into armed insurgents, criminal gangs, or protection rackets, and back into vigilante groups again'. However, the Borno State government promised to engage

20,000 of them through recruitment as fire fighters, vehicle inspection organisation officers and absorbing some of them into the state civil service through the enactment of the Youth Vigilante Empowerment Agency Law 2015 (*Premium Times,* 11[th]April 2016). A total of 250 and 30 of them have also been absorbed into the non-commissioned cadres of the Nigerian Army and DSS respectively (Haruna, 2016a). These were done to forestall them from embracing crimes or even defecting to the side of Boko Haram, especially in light of unemployment as a justification.

6.3.3   Identify

The purpose of this objective of NACTEST is 'ensuring that all terrorist acts are properly investigated and terrorists and their sponsors are brought to justice' (NACTEST, 2014: 16). Identifying will be achieved through proper investigation and prosecution, co-operation on intelligence gathering amongst security agencies, Subscriber Identification Module (SIM) card registration, monitoring of cyberspace and controlling terrorism financing (NACTEST, 2014). A look at the channels through which the identify objective will be achieved is expedient.

Section 2 Subsection 5a of the TPA 2013 grants security agencies power to investigate in order to ascertain if anyone has been involved in terrorist activities (FGN, 2013). Suspects arrested and detained by the military had no access to their families, lawyers and were not even brought to court (Amnesty International, 2016). These arrests were made without being preceded by thorough investigation and some of those arrested were killed in an extra-judicial manner (Amnesty International, 2016). The effective positioning of the criminal justice system was a key area in identifying. The criminal justice system was the structure on the ground that balanced investigation and prosecution of criminal matters. Effective criminal justice system entails ensuring criminal justice practitioners exercise their authority in a fair and just way by being inclined to justice, law and order in dealing with the citizenry (Otu and Aro, 2013). In May 2015, the administration of Criminal Justice Act was passed into law (United States Department of State, 2016a). This act regulated the activities of the judiciary in the administration of criminal justice (United States Department of State, 2016a). Its major provisions are that victims of crime be compensated, sentences served outside prisons and proceedings be recorded electronically (Amnesty International, 2015). The Act makes provisions for sentences to be served outside the prisons and this allows parole, suspended sentences and community services (United States

Department of State for 2016b). In essence, the Act prohibits the maltreatment of detainees (United States Department of State 2016b).

The Anti-torture Bill was also passed in 2015 but has not been signed into law (Amnesty International, 2016). It was passed to strengthen the criminal justice system and explains what torture was and prohibits it in any form (Unites States Department of State, 2016b). The state of prison facilities in Nigeria does not engender a vibrant criminal justice system. This assertion was well captured by Amnesty International (2016: 275) that, 'however, prisons remained overcrowded and court processes slow; frequent strikes by court employees, such as court clerks, over pay and the consequent closure of courts lead to delays in trials and the supervision of pre-trial detention'.

Criminal justice practitioners needed regular capacity-building and training in order to position them for effective responses to crimes of terrorism (UNODC, 2009). Such efforts should be integrated, cross-sector and human rights based (UNODC, 2009). The National Human Rights Commission in 2015 trained some members of the armed forces on human rights (Unites States Department of State, 2016b). The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in conjunction with the National Judicial Council, developed a Human rights training manual for the NPF (UNODC, 2014). The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has delivered training to DSS officials, the police, prosecutors and judges in Nigeria on their roles in the criminal justice system with regard to counter-terrorism (UNODC, 2014). The training touches on areas of Nigeria's national legislation, including provisions on fundamental human rights in the Constitution, the counter-terrorism legislation as well as the international legal framework (UNODC, 2014). The outcome of this training seeks to achieve enhanced capacity to handle effective investigation, prosecution and adjudication of cases of terrorism (UNODC, 2014).

Criminal justice system which has thorough investigation as its major component can be aided through effective birth and death registration. The NACTEST stipulates that births and deaths will henceforth be registered by the National Identity Management Commission (NIMC) in collaboration with National Population Commission (NACTEST, 2014). This data will be kept in the custody of the National Planning Commission, Federal Ministry of Health as well as the National Population Commission and the NPF and other agencies that can be granted access to

such data (NACTEST, 2014). However, birth registration was low in Nigeria as only 30% of children under age 5 were registered between 2005 and 2013 (UNDP, 2015a). A major contributing factor to this was the number of health facilities in Nigeria. For example, health facility/population ratio in Rivers State was in the proportion of 1:1,089 and that of Borno State was higher with 1:8,758 (UNDP, 2015c). This lack of registration largely accounts for why some crimes that were committed go by undetected and foreigners infiltrate the country to perpetrate crimes.

As at June 2015, about 500 cases on matters relating to Boko Haram members arrested had been submitted to the office of the Attorney General of the Federation for prosecution (ICC, 2015; Unites States Department of State 2016b). A Lagos High court sentenced three suspected Boko Haram members to 25 years' imprisonment on charges of terrorism and possession of ammunitions (United States Department of State, 2016b). Nigeria has recorded a couple of convictions against suspects of terrorism (GIABA, 2014b).

 In July 2015, the Inspector General of Police announced a review of Force Order 237 which hitherto allows a police officer to shoot any suspect who tries to evade arrest or escape from custody whether or not they pose a threat (Amnesty International, 2016). The Nigerian Police between 2012 and 2015 had paid about ₦1billion in compensation to victims of human rights violations by the force (Amnesty International, 2016).

The Cyber Crime Act was passed into law in May 2015 and its section 38 allows law enforcement agencies to access data from internet service providers' customers without a court order (Amnesty International, 2016). Internet service providers were required to keep a record of their customers' activities on the internet for a period of two years (Amnesty International, 2016).

Section 15 of the MLPA, 2012 prohibits any form of terrorism financing (FGN, 2012). Section 10 of the TPA, 2013 equally makes terrorism financing illegal (FGN, 2013). Consequently, the CBN has trained financial institutions and ordinary financial institutions like bureau de change on how to detect and report suspicious transactions (GIABA, 2014a). This has facilitated reporting on Critical Transaction Reports (CTRs) and Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) sent to the NFIU (GIABA, 2014a). CTRs and STRs sent by banks to NFIU in 2014 was 3,988,210 and 2,180 respectively (NFIU, 2015). STRs reported between January 1st, 2015 and

September 30th, 2015 was 1, 468 while CTRs reported within the same period was 1, 451, 046 (United States Department of States, 2016c). No conviction was recorded on money laundering between January 1st and September 30th 2014 (United States Department of States, 2015b). In addition, between January 1st, 2015 and September 30th, 2015, 30 prosecutions and 2 convictions were made on money laundering (United States Department of States, 2016c). However, reports did not indicate if these money laundering cases were in connection with terrorism financing.

Boko Haram members buy goods that do not pose security threats and send these to their fellow sect members- this serves as one of the major sources of income for the group (GIABA, 2013). Retailers of telecommunication accessories also send part of their profits to Boko Haram to finance the group and also supply unregistered SIM cards to the terrorist organisation (GIABA, 2013). The mandate of government that all service providers register all customers' SIM cards in gathering intelligence led to the arrest of Boko Haram members like Sani Mohammed, Kabir Sokoto and Shuaib Bama (Jacob and Akpan, 2015). This SIM registration makes enforcement of Section 29 subsection 2a of the TPA 2013 easy to enforce. That part of TPA allows the court to grant security agencies permission to request a service provider about details of a customer's activities on the network (FGN, 2013).

International non-governmental organisations/charity organisations based outside Nigeria, open accounts in Nigeria and use such to finance terrorism in the guise that such organisations are supporting Islamic clerics (GIABA, 2013). However, Boko Haram was the benefactor of these gestures (GIABA, 2013). The fact that religious institutions dominate non-profit charity organisations establishes this claim (Maharaj *et al.*, 2008). A treasurer of Boko Haram confessed that members make voluntary and compulsory contributions (GIABA, 2013). The voluntary contributions are made based on individual ability (GIABA, 2013). The group equally engages *Almajiris* and the elderly who pose as beggars to raise funds (GIABA, 2013). Proceeds from the sale of arms (in some cases such arms are given to Boko Haram free) are also sources of fund for the sect (GIABA, 2013). Although there are people behind the mask regarding those who sell these arms, their identities remain unknown. These arms are moved either for sales or distribution through smuggling (GIABA, 2013). Women are used to convey arms and cash because they are less subjected to security checks (GIABA, 2013).

Sections 12 in TPA 2011 and TPA 2013 authorise the national security adviser or the inspector general of police to seize funds linked to terrorism financing (FGN, 2011b; FGN, 2013). Terrorists and their financiers have had their assets frozen and confiscated (United States Department of State, 2016a). The United States Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 reports that 'the Nigerian government froze and confiscated terrorist assets as designated by U.S. Executive Orders and by United Nations Security Council Resolutions; however, delays sometimes occurred. The Nigerian government did not monitor non-profit organizations [*sic*] to prevent misuse and terrorism financing' (United States Department of State, 2016a: 46). The Nigerian legislature passed bills to check money laundering and combat the financing of terrorism in 2015 (United States Department of State, 2016c). These bills are the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Centre (NFIC) Bill that accords the NFIU autonomy, and the Proceeds of Crime (POC) Bill which have not yet been signed into law (United States Department of State, 2016). The NFIU ensures compliance with anti-money laundering and combating financing of terrorism legal frameworks (NFIU, 2015).

Deportation of illegal immigrants was also a key aspect of the 'identify' objective of the NACTEST. The implementation of the TPA 2011 and TPA 2013 had enabled the Nigerian government to deport illegal immigrants from Niger, Chad and Cameroon (Akinola and Tella, 2013).

6.3.4 Prepare

The thrust of the objective tagged 'prepare' focussed on 'preparing the populace so that the consequences of terrorist incidents could be mitigated' (NACTEST, 2014: 16). The objective is envisaged to be achieved through the agencies' prowess in responding to direct damages caused through terrorist acts, identifying potential risks that Nigeria could face as a result of terrorism and assessing the effects thereof (NACTEST, 2014). A look at the steps government have taken to achieve the prepare objectives will be relevant.

NACTEST outlines the need to locate a call centre that will operate for 24 hours daily to take anonymous calls on terrorism matters to be located within the ONSA (NACTEST, 2014). NEMA will ensure the establishment of Disaster Response Units in government establishments and ensure coordinated training and multi agency co-operation among stakeholders (NACTEST,

2014). Consequently, NEMA has toll-free emergency hotlines[23] which are 0800CALLNEMA/080022556362. NEMA was the co-ordinating agency that cares for victims of terrorism (Amy, 2014). The Emergency numbers on the website of the Nigerian Police Force has two phone numbers[24] (each has 11 digits) through which 56 officers can be contacted. The flaw with these emergency numbers to the Police and NEMA is that they contain too many digits to remember in the case of an emergency.

Setting up IDPs camps was a response to the effects of terrorism. NEMA was saddled with the responsibility of setting up and taking care of these camps (Campbell, 2014). As at April 2016, there were a total of 2, 155,618 displaced persons in Nigeria out of which 1.8 million were due to terrorism and as at May 2016, a total of 186,473 Nigerian refugees were in neighbouring countries (UNHCR, 2016). The states affected are the six North Eastern states while the IDPs camps are in Adamawa, Borno and Gombe (Sidi, 2015). NEMA in partnership with relevant Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) provides humanitarian relief in the form of food, medical services, sanitary supplies and educational services (Amy, 2014).

However, there are reported cases of malnutrition in the IDPs camps (Ojeme, 2016). This claim was further verified by the recent suspension of two traditional rulers in Yobe State for diverting food meant for IDPs (Joel, 2016). There was also allegation by the Borno State governor, Kashim Shettima that some NGOs were hijacking the state of the IDP camps by soliciting funds from foreign philanthropists without remitting such funds for the use of the IDPs (Salau, 2016). The security agencies have also been useful in the IDPs. Recently three attempted suicide bombings were foiled by the Nigerian military in an IDP camp in Monguno, Borno State (Omonobi, 2016a).

Installation of Closed Circuit Televisions (CCTVs) in major areas was also a proactive initiative to curb terrorist activities. Installed CCTVs should be linked to a central database and central coordinating centre manned by trained personnel (NACTEST, 2014). The federal government initiated a Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) project which was also known as the National Public Security Communication System to secure Abuja and Lagos (Gbadebo, 2016). Although, the project commenced in 2010, it has not averted terrorists' attacks in Abuja since 2010 as 7

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[23] Details about these hotlines was sourced for NEMA's website: http://nema.gov.ng/how-muhammad-sani-sidi-repositioned-nema/
[24] Sourced from the website of the Nigerian Police Force: http://www.npf.gov.ng/images/pro_contacts.pdf

terrorist attacks were recorded between 2010 and 2014 (Isine, 2014). The project has been flawed by the prevalence of corruption (Isine, 2014). The CCTV devices are solar powered because of the country's epileptic power supply (Gbadebo, 2016). The ones installed in Abuja were only within the three arms zone which harbours the presidential villa and the legislative chambers as well as other government buildings and the business districts (Isine, 2014). Six years after the installation in Abuja, only 40 out of 1000 installed are online while the remaining 960 are either comatose or have been vandalised (*Thisday*, 31st May 2016).

The Presidential Initiative on the North East (PINE) in partnership with the Victims Support Fund (VSF) provides economic assistance to assist victims whose families have been killed by Boko Haram (Amy, 2014). PINE has a $187.5 million fund set aside to rebuild schools that have been destroyed by Boko Haram (Amy, 2014). In order to boost economic growth in the North, PINE has $2.3 billion fund to enhance rice and sugar cane production (Amy, 2014). To ensure security in schools in the North East, a Safe School Initiative has been introduced by the federal government (Amy, 2014). The Nigerian government established the VSF in 2014 (Dietrich, 2015). The VSF works with communities, government at state levels and relief agencies like NEMA and the International Committee for the Red Cross, to ascertain the conditions of victims (Dietrich, 2015). It also works with religious bodies such as the Christian Association of Nigeria, and the Islamic Council to encourage inter-religious acceptance while discharging its duties (Dietrich, 2015).

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) clinic was established in Kano in 2014 to take care of those who have experienced psychological trauma from terrorist attacks (Amy, 2014). It was envisaged that PTSD clinics will be established in all of the geo political zones (Amy, 2014).

Identifying potential risks was one of the core areas of the prepare objective. The training conducted by the Nigerian Air Force on airport terrorism was also a proactive measure in terms of the prepare objective (Akioye, 2016). Security agents discovered bomb factories in Suleja and Yola (Akinola and Tella, 2013: 75). The discovery of the ISIS cell by the DSS in Kano as well as Boko Haram's spiritual book by the NSCDC are great achievements in identifying potential risks (Muhammed, 2016; *The Sun*, 20th June 2016). IEDs have been used by Boko Haram for several operations and fertiliser was one of the major ingredients used in manufacturing IEDs (Ismaila, 2014). IEDs have accounted for about 25% of terrorist attack deaths between 2009 and 2013

(Ismaila, 2014). The Federal Ministry of Agriculture, NPF, Federal Ministry of Solid Minerals amongst others are to control the flow of materials that can be used to manufacture IEDs and also regulate activities of quarries that use explosives (NACTEST, 2014). The Nigerian army in June 2016 stopped the flow of fertilisers to the North East (Agbakwuru, 2016). This was because of suspicions that fertilisers could be used to manufacture IEDs (Agbakwuru, 2016). However, suicide bombings with the use of IEDs have continued with the most recent being the twin bomb attacks in Maiduguri in October 2016 which left 9 dead and 24 injured (Olugbode, 2016).

6.3.5 Implement

The core of the implement objective of NACTEST was 'devising a framework to effectively mobilise and sustain a coordinated cross-governmental population-centred effort' (NACTEST, 2014: 16). The office of the National Coordinator on counter-terrorism has been created to coordinate all agencies and participate in international co-operation in implementing NACTEST (NACTEST, 2014). The roles of agencies in the NACTEST, TPA 2011, TPA 2013, MLPA 2011 and MLPA 2013 include the curbing of terrorism financing, creating awareness, investigations, arrests, prosecutions and military operations. The CBN, EFCC, NFIU, National Insurance Commission *et cetera* are agencies which spearhead and liaise with other local and international agencies in checking terrorism financing and drug trafficking (FGN, 2011b; FGN, 2012). The Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria, National Orientation Agency and National Broadcasting Commission in conjunction with CSOs and other relevant agencies all promote awareness (NACTEST, 2014).

The defence headquarters coordinates the activities of other security agencies in the combat against terrorists (NACTEST, 2014). The DSS and NIA are in charge of intelligence for the security apparatus of government on the local and international scenes respectively (Umar, 2013). The co-operation of the ONSA, NIA, DSS, Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), police, military, other law enforcement agencies and stakeholders would foster intelligence gathering and investigation through identifying groups that promote terrorism (NACTEST, 2014). However, inter agency distrust has made intelligence sharing among the security agencies charged with combating Boko Haram very low (Amy, 2014). Domestic information exchange has also taken place between NFIU and EFCC, DSS, NPF, NCS, NIA, NSCDC and other

agencies (NFIU, 2014). This co-operation was to check money laundering. The TPA 2011 and TPA 2013 stipulated co-operation with countries on extradition of terrorists across countries (FGN, 2011b; FGN, 2013).

The NACTEST also emphasised co-operating with other countries and multilateral organisations (NACTEST, 2014). It is envisaged that the ministry of foreign affairs would spearhead working relations with NIA and DIA for the implementation of NACTEST on foreign matters (NACTEST, 2014). A major suspect in the Nyanya Abuja bombing of April 2014, Sadiq Ogwuche, who fled to Sudan, was extradited to Nigeria by the Sudanese authorities (*Sudan Tribune,* 16th July 2014). This was a proof of international co-operation. The Nigerian government has solicited assistance from countries with technical prowess, experience, resources and personnel to combat terrorism (Uduonwa, 2013). Foreign governments and international organisations have also partnered with Nigeria in implementing NACTEST in the areas of training, financial aid and military involvement.

The MNJTF which comprised troops from Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad, was set up in 1998 to check cross-border banditry (Amnesty International, 2015). However, its scope broadened to include containing Boko Haram in 2012 while Benin Republic joined after the 2014 kidnapping of the Chibok girls (Amnesty International, 2015). The coagulation of troops from Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Benin Republic with the backing of the LCBC and the African Union culminated in the formation of the MNJTF (Clarke and Lekalake, 2016). However, the emergence of this coalition has led to increased attacks by Boko Haram in Chad, Niger and Cameroon (Clarke and Lekalake, 2016). The African Union approved the deployment of the MNJTF made up of 7,500 troops, including civilian staff (Tejpar and Albuquerque, 2015). The troop's strength later increased to 10,000 (Amnesty International, 2015).

The main function of the MNJTF is to protect civilians within the geographical areas in which Boko Haram operates (Dietrich, 2015). The MNJTF strictly carried out patrols without harassing locals and when the need arose, also assisted in regaining lost territories (Dietrich, 2015). In June 2016, the Nigerian Airforce launched an airstrike operation in the North East code named Operation *Gama Aiki*[25]. This was used as an air support for the MNJTF to survey and bomb known Boko Haram strongholds within the Lake Chad Basin (Iroegbu, 2016c; Mutum, 2016).

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[25] Gama Aiki is a Hausa word which means 'finish the job. An earlier version of the assault was 'Operation Crackdown' which was terminated earlier (Iroegbu, 2016c).

There have been concerns over co-operation between the Nigerian troops and other troops that make up the MNJTF (Dietrich, 2015). For example, reports have it that whenever the MNJTF regains lost territories hitherto taken by Boko Haram, Nigerian troops hardly maintained its presence in order to restore the confidence of the locals who had fled the area to return (Dietrich, 2015).

The US/Nigeria bi-national commission signed agreements on areas of good governance and transparency, energy reform and investment as well as food security and agriculture (Onuoha and Ugwueze, 2014). The US deployed 80 personnel to Chad to assist in the search for the abducted Chibok girls (Ackerman, 2014). The US also gave support in efforts towards the rescue of the kidnapped Chibok girls in terms of intelligence and communication as well as ways of guarding against future kidnappings (Jackson, 2014). The US government has equally provided funding and training for security (Onuoha and Ugwueze, 2014). The US trained 650 Nigerian military personnel in combat training between April and August 2014 (Amnesty International, 2015). The US military has provided training to Nigerian troops on counter-insurgency. A total of $8.4million was provided for military support (Onuoha and Ugwueze, 2014). The American government labelled three Boko Haram leaders, Abubakar Shekau, Abubakar Kambar and Khalid Al-Barmawi as foreign terrorists due to their affiliation with Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (Adele, 2013). Subsequently, the US placed a $7 million bounty on Abubakar Shekau (Onuoha and Ugwueze, 2014).

Italy, Germany and Israel also pledged to provide security and technical assistance towards tackling the Boko Haram menace (Adele, 2013). The UK and France have equally provided military training to the Nigerian armed forces on counter-terrorism (Amy, 2014). The right to access the Cameroonian airspace was given to the Nigerian Air Force by the Cameroonian authorities in order to enable the latter to pursue fleeing Boko Haram members who may want to seek refuge in Cameroon (Amy, 2014). Canada, China, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Israel, Norway, Russia, South Africa, Ukraine and the US supplied arms to Nigeria between 2013 and 2014 (Amnesty International, 2015). China provided some drones, while Russia provided five combat helicopters (Amnesty International, 2015). Training for the judiciary and anti-terrorism financing as well as advice on the legal frameworks, crises management and bomb scene management were provided by the UK (Amnesty International, 2015). Russia trained

officials of the Nigerian Army, Police and DSS in September, 2014 (Amnesty International, 2015).

The Japanese government donated $3 million to the Nigerian government to support the recovery from incidents of terrorist attacks in the North East (*Vanguard,* 15th August 2016). The Swiss government took active part in the peace process that led to the release of 21 out of the over two hundred girls kidnapped by Boko Haram who were released on October 13th, 2016 (*Aljazeera*, 13th October 2016).

CSOs at the local and international levels have also had input in implementing the NACTEST. This implementation has taken the forms of security, report generation, public enlightenment, promoting rule of law, negotiation and relief support (NACTEST, 2014). The majority of the CSOs generate reports based on their findings in their respective areas of intervention. A breakdown was provided by Humanitarian Response Plan that:

> *"at present, 62 humanitarian organizations[sic] are operating in the four focus states of North-East Nigeria in support of a Government-led response, by the National and State Emergency Management Agencies (NEMA/SEMA) in particular. This includes 27 international non-governmental organizations[sic](INGOs); 19 national NGOs; 11 United Nations offices, agencies funds and programmes; three Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Organizations[sic]; and one inter-governmental organization [sic]"* *(Humanitarian Response Plan, 2015: 10).*

The Humanitarian Response Plan has always been in support of the national response and early recovery from disaster (Humanitarian Response Plan, 2015). Bill Gates and Melinda Gates Foundation donated $1 million to the Borno State government to mitigate the aftermath of Boko Haram attacks (*Thisday,* 15th August 2016). This was used by the state government to provide food items and rejuvenate farming for farmers who had their farmland destroyed. It has been projected that some 40,000 victims would benefit from this intervention (*Thisday,* 15th August, 2016). The Nigerian government gave Boko Haram the freedom to engage any recognised international non-governmental organisation to facilitate the release of the kidnapped Chibok girls (Adetayo, 2016). Consequently, the International Committee for the Red Cross on October 13th, 2016 was instrumental in the release of 21 out of the over 200 Chibok girls that were kidnapped (*Aljazeera*, 13th October 2016).

The #BringBackOurGirls campaign which was a civil society organisation formed after the kidnap of the Chibok girls has been very active (Allison, 2016). It has through its campaigns made the government rise up to the task of searching for the kidnapped girls (Allison, 2016). The Centre for Democracy and Development, a CSO has trained 200 clerics on counter-radicalisation so as to be enabled to counter the ideologies Boko Haram has passed through its messages (Yusuf, 2016). The trainees comprise Imams, Islamic scholars and teachers in *Almajiri* schools and these participants are from Yobe, Borno and Adamawa states (Yusuf, 2016).

The diverse culture and religion in Nigeria (Toki *et al.*, 2015) has made dialogue and interreligious relations crucial. This is because the interaction between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria has always been full of suspicions, as there have been deaths and displacements due to feuds between the two faiths (Toki *et al.*, 2015). The Boko Haram matter cannot be divested from religion (Onapajo *et al.,* 2012). This was why having an interreligious entity was crucial and also why NACTEST emphasised that the National Interfaith Religious Council (NIREC) has roles to play in its implementation. The NIREC has predominantly government input in its creation. Hence, Paden (2015: 8) described the NIREC as 'the quasi-governmental NIREC set up in 1999 with twenty-five Muslim and twenty-five Christian leaders'. NIREC was meant to give the federal government advice on religious matters.

The role of NIREC within the NACTEST framework was to promote inter-religious harmony in Nigeria and ensure that there was interfaith co-operation after terrorist attacks (NACTEST, 2014). The NIREC seeks peace maintenance through interacting with various religious groups (UNDP, 2015c). The NIREC was very effective under the co-chairmanship of the Sultan of Sokoto and the former chairperson of the Christian Association of Nigeria, John Onayeikan (a Roman Catholic Cardinal) (Paden, 2015). The shifting of the presidency of the Christian Association of Nigeria to the Pentecostal fold polarised NIREC and this led to divisions among Christians resulting in non-co-operation between Christians and Muslims (Paden, 2015). This culminated in the emergence of an NGO called the Interfaith Initiative for Peace (IIP) to fill the lacuna created by the dissection within the NIREC (Paden, 2015). However, not much has been noticed about the achievements of NIREC and IIP.

6.4   Conclusion

This chapter was able to outline and assess the NACTEST and the Acts targeted against terrorism and by extension Boko Haram. The chapter established that these policy documents deliberately targeted terrorism. The roles of the Nigerian government, CSOs, and the international community in Nigeria's counter-terrorism policy implementation were also examined. The assessment was done under the key objectives of NACTEST which are: forestall, secure, identify, prepare and implement. The thrust of these objectives are that terrorist acts could either be prevented or its consequences managed. These policy documents take a combination of hard and soft approaches.

The achievements recorded in Nigeria's counter-terrorism campaign cannot be said to be total victory as more needs to be done. The Boko Haram issue is yet to be rooted out. Therefore, the sect still poses a major threat to the Nigerian state and the Lake Chad Basin countries. Lapses such as dismal inter agency intelligence sharing; corruption and institutional dysfunctionalities were seen to be the cog in the wheel of effective counter-terrorism policy implementation in Nigeria. Consequently, this makes chapter seven crucial to giving suggestions on pro-active measures to contain terrorism.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

7.1   Summary

The overall objective of this study was to assess the effectiveness of Nigeria's counter-terrorism policies against Boko Haram. Chapter One provided an introduction about Nigeria and how it has addressed violence in the past. It examined historical antecedents with respect to combating violence and the strategies employed to counter contemporary terrorism by Boko Haram. The study highlighted the measures adopted in the initial stage of the Boko Haram menace and how such strategies have evolved till the present. The chapter laid emphasis on the fact that despite efforts of the government's in pursuing counter-terrorism strategies, the violence perpetrated by Boko Haram has continued almost unabated. It also highlighted the research objectives adopted for the study and the key questions raised for the study. It finally presented the research methodology adopted for the study, defined key terms, significance,as well as defined the limitations of the study.

Chapter Two focused on the review of literature on terrorism from a historical perspective, counter-terrorism from the global view and specifically counter-terrorism in Nigeria. The evolution of terrorism, as well as its religious, political and economic alignment, was discussed. This section of the literature review brought to light the need to understand the root causes of terrorism in order to be able to develop an effective counter-terrorism strategy. A plethora of literature on counter-terrorism with regard to its hard and soft approaches was reviewed. A general review of literature on counter-terrorism as well as those of counter-terrorism in Kenya and Algeria was done. These countries were chosen due to their similarity with Nigeria in respect to terrorism and counter-terrorism. The Counter-terrorism policies of the Nigerian government were equally reviewed. An avalanche of literature has emerged on the efforts of the Nigerian government in containing the Boko Haram quagmire; however, literature was replete in

assessing Nigeria's counter-terrorism policies through the NACTEST and other legislative Acts, which this study addressed.

In Chapter Three, systems and state fragility theories were employed as the theoretical lenses for the study. Systems theory explains how opinions, challenges, past decisions of government and international influence determine government policies on counter-terrorism in Nigeria. This theory was linked to Boko Haram's terrorist activities and how this has resulted in Nigeria taking steps towards curbing terrorism in the country. The feedback mechanism in the systems theory was seen as a channel to see the lacuna in existing policies and how these are channelled to the political system for such gaps to be filled. The systems theory was used alongside the state fragility theory. This was necessary as there was the need to assess the roles of state institutions in Nigeria in its effectiveness in dealing with terrorism. The theory was linked to how lapses of state institutions could encourage terrorism and affect negatively the implementation of effective counter-terrorism policies.

Chapter Four commenced with a view of the Nigerian state in the backdrop of Islam in Nigeria; its history of religious activities, political and ethnic crisis, politics and economy and how these contributed to the emergence of Boko Haram and the prowess of the Nigerian state in handling the sect's menace. A look into the Nigerian state from these aforementioned variables resulted in the observation, that even though the violent groups are being checked, others emerge in their place with different nomenclatures. Security policy process in Nigeria was equally reviewed in this chapter. The policy process was weaved into the counter-terrorism policy process in order to have an overview of how the government makes and implements counter-terrorism policies in Nigeria and the roles of each organ (executive, legislature and judiciary) of government.

Chapter Five highlighted the origin and ideology of the sect. Its abhorrence of Western education premised upon the sect's quest for full *Sharia* law implementation was given as the nucleus of its ideology. The factors which led to the emergence of the group to some extent accounts for its continued existence were also examined in this chapter. The leadership structure of the sect from inception and the current leadership fisticuffs due to the 'dethronement' of Abubakar Shakau and 'enthronement' of Abu Musab al-Barnawi as a result of ISIS' interest in Boko Haram's echelon were explained. This chapter also shed light on the violence perpetrated by Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria and Lake Chad Basin. Its international links which have bolstered its funding and the training of its members was equally x-rayed in Chapter Five.

Chapter Six started with an explanation of NACTEST, TPA 2011, TPA 2013, MLPA, 2011 and MLPA 2012 as strategic instruments to curb terrorism in Nigeria. These policy documents were used as frameworks to explain Nigerian government's counter-terrorism policies, especially as they apply to Boko Haram. The extent to which these policies have been implemented which reflectes their achievements and flaws were also explained. These flaws informed the need to have policy suggestions which formed one of the cardinals of Chapter Seven.

7.2   Recommendations

The Nigerian state has always underperformed in the area of governance. This has by extension affected its counter-terrorism policy implementation. This is as a result of corruption, decades of military rule which has alienated Nigerian citizens from the political process, bureaucratic inefficiency and ethno-religious tensions (Brinkel and Ait-Hida 2012; Nkechi, 2013).

The provision of basic infrastructures was the primary role of governments. This engenders good governance and boosts the legitimacy of government. Electricity can be improved through considering other sources of generation in addition to thermal and hydro sources. Government should construct roads with good quality materials to ensure such roads last long. Dissident groups that can easily appeal to Nigerians on the guise that they can meet their economic needs will no longer have a field day if necessary infrastructures are provided and fully operational. Government should invest in infrastructural development and effectively repair dysfunctional amenities. Hence, the government could always maintain infrastructure as a way of guaranteeing their longevity. The citizens should also be involved in the proper maintenance of public properties through frugal usage. This can be encouraged through public enlightenment programmes organised by the government in conjunction with CSOs on the careful handling of public property.

The provision of infrastructure will create an enabling environment that would enable SMMEs operate beyond break-even points. This will culminate in making more profit and consequently employment of more people. It will also attract foreign investors which will consequently lead tomore youths getting employed. More credit facilities need to be made available to support the establishment of more SMMEs. Campaigns on the need to patronise made-in-Nigeria goodsshould be actively pursued. This is to reduce the competition SMMEs are subjected to

from imported products. High tariffs should also be placed on foreign products so as to increase demand for local products and services which are progenies of SMMEs. Original products and services manufactured/rendered respectively by SMMEs or manufacturer should be well protected with patent laws. This will in turn encourage hard work, increase production, improve profit generation and consequently lead to employment generation and the eradication of poverty.

There should be a diversification of the economy. Dependence on crude oil as the major source of income for the country has affected agriculture negatively. More attention should be given to agriculture. The North has been worst hit by this neglect of the agricultural sector because of its potential in agriculture owing to its highly fertile soil and large arable lands. Government can create an enabling environment for agriculture through irrigation, hybrid seedlings and infrastructure which will encourage youths to get more involved in this sector. Apart from crude oil and agriculture, other potential economic boosters like solid minerals should be given adequate attention by the government.

All births should be registered. Those that have not been registered hitherto should be registered irrespective of their ages. However, attaining a comprehensive birth registration may be a mirage due to the scourge of poverty. This is because many do not make use of health facilities as a result of the costs associated with such visits. They rather opt for delivery in churches and traditional centres. Hence, maternity services should be made free and easily accessible. This will check the infiltration of illegal migrants. The National Population Commission and NIMC should be equipped to co-operate with the hospitals to stimulate registration of all births. This will make necessary information needed about the new born to be captured in the birth registry. In essence, all agencies and institutions saddled with obtaining biometric information from the public, need to co-operate and pool all data collected into one so as to have a central database. It will also check the possibility of Fulani migrants from other countries being used in laundering money and smuggling arms and in addition stop the infiltration of Boko Haram by foreign mercenaries.

Corruption has been a major problem of the Nigerian state and society: it impedes effective implementation of some aspects of these policies. Those that have been named in allegations of corruption should be prosecuted. Anti-corruption should not be based on party, religious or

ethnic sentiments: those involved in corruption should be swiftly prosecuted and convicted. The public should be public enlightened on anti-corruption, on the need for Nigerians to abstain from corrupt practices and to report anyone suspected of being involved in corrupt matters with anonimity of the reporters' identities . The NFIC and POC bills should be signed into law so that anti- corruption drive will be engendered.

The emergency numbers in the event of disasters should be well centralised; the issue of different government agencies having different emergency numbers should be stopped. The existing emergency numbers are in most cases 11 digits. Hence there should be one general emergency number which handles security, disaster response and other emergency matters. Such a number should be only 3 digits for easy recollection and toll free. Nigerians should also be properly enlightened on how to respond in a disaster situation, identify an IED and have an idea of how an individual having an IED on him/herself would react in most emergency situations.

Intelligence should be taken as paramount. Intelligence and surveillance through the co-operation of communities, security agencies deploying plain clothed operatives to gather information, use of CCTVs, and drones should be properly harnessed. Security agencies should have training on how to relate with the populace and the effect of such training should be regularly evaluated. Security personnel accused of human rights abuse should be swiftly prosecuted. This will reduce brutality on the part of security agents, reduce arbitrary arrests and detention as well as boost the people's confidence in informing security agents on any impending security threat. Security agencies should not see intelligence sharing amongst themselves as a mirage. They should see security not as a competition but as an achievement if there is co-operation amongst them. Territories reclaimed by the military should not be stabilised by the military as this puts too much stress on the military. Sister security agencies like the police, NSCDC in collaboration with DSS and CSOs should help stabilise such territories so that the military can reclaim more territories hitherto occupied by Boko Haram.

Steady power supply will also go a long way in aiding the constant functioning of the CCTVs. This will enable the cameras work for 24 hours and be connected to a control room. The CCTVs should be installed beyond Lagos and Abuja. It should extend to all parts of the country this will in turn boost surveillance and intelligence gathering. Drones should not only be deployed to the North East where Boko Haram operates but should occasionally be deployed to other parts of the

country for surveillance and intelligence gathering. One of the reasons for spreading the tentacles of intelligence to all parts of Nigeria is that Boko Haram members who may be in other parts of Nigeria, apart from North East, will be detected and fished out.

The Nigerian government needs to regularly share intelligence with other countries because of Boko Haram's foreign links. There should be collaboration with foreign countries, institutions and CSOs to stop Boko Haram's foreign sources of fund, check training of the sect's members in foreign countries and the repatriation of Boko Haram members on the run. Such co-operation will also help check Boko Haram's foreign alliances in terms of training and access to arms.

The Nigerian government has done well in terms of collaborating with other countries in the area of training her security personnel. However, more can still be done in this respect. Local and foreign CSOs should be actively involved in Nigeria's counter-terrorism drive in the areas of public enlightenment, peace/conflict and disaster management. CSOs should be properly screened by government so that those with self aggrandising objectives will be rooted out in the process. CSOs and development partners should not only focus on IDP camps but also help in rebuilding communities and empowering the previous occupants of such communities. The NIREC and other religious and inter-religious bodies should be well positioned to play major roles in peace and conflict (prevention) resolution.

More judges should be appointed to speed-up court processes. Judicial workers should be well remunerated so as to prevent incessant strikes in the sector. Prison facilities need to be improved so that prisons will not be places for radicalisation and making of hardened criminals but correctional and places of rehabilitation. More prison facilities should be constructed so that the deradicalisation programme can succeed. Those that have been deradicalised should be economically empowered after their release so that the beneficiaries will have a means of livelihood. Prisons armed guards should be well trained in the prevention of jail breaks to a great extent. Prisons should be well fortified with up-to-date alarm systems and surveillance instruments such as CCTVs. Intensive counter radicalisation through the media and CSOs should be done in all parts of the country (through the print and electronic media inclusive) of the country so as to prevent those vulnerable from becoming radicalised.

Security agents should be well equipped with modern arms and ammunition so as to match the fire power of Boko Haram. The issue of security personnel running away from Boko Haram's

attacks will be checked through this. It will also boost the morale of the security agencies. The immigration and customs officials should be well equipped to be better able to protect borders in order to check illegal migrants and arms smugglers. Drones and surveillance aircraft should be deployed to border communities to give surveillance and intelligence support for border securities. Fulanis traverse the length and breadth of Nigeria to graze their animals and this action has been used to smuggle arms and launder money to aid terrorism. Hence, ranches should be created in different parts of Nigeria so that the mobility of the herdsmen will be restricted and they could easily be monitored by security agencies. Government should also deploy intelligence personnel to park stations, airports, seaports and warehouses so that arms and ammunitions smuggling could be intercepted. The black legs among the security agents who may divulge confidential information in the strategies against Boko Haram should be brought to book. Government should regularly check the weapons used for its security apparatuses so as to curb the menace of security agencies selling arms and ammunitions to criminals and terrorists.

The government, with the collaboration of state and local governments should always send education inspectors through unscheduled visits to the *Almajiri* schools. This will enable government to assess school operations in conformity with standards. The *Alamjiri* school system should be well funded so that it can have a feeding programme integrated into it. The level of poverty prevalent in the country, especially in Northern Nigeria, will make this feeding programme worthwhile. Students should be encouraged to attend these schools. The teachers of the local Quranic schools should be absorbed as teachers in the *Almajiri* schools so that there can be more support for it. All schools in Nigeria should have counsellors and psychologists that will be responsible for counter radicalisation. Civic education clubs should be introduced in all schools. This will further create awareness on conflict resolution, citizens' obligations and security consciousness.

Politics should be de-commercialised. This will make those aspiring for political positions see politics as a call to service and not as a means to amass wealth or representation of an ethnic or religious group. This will reduce the North/South and Muslim/Christian polarity that has characterised the Nigerian political system. Using merit as reasons for voting aspirants into political offices will also reduce the North/South and Muslim/Christian dichotomy. Politicians should always be held accountable for their stewardship through elections and viable anti-corruption drive(s).

7.3   Conclusion

Boko Haram as a group has continued to advance in its *modus operandi*. The group is always a step ahead of government's efforts at containing it. This establishes the need to be pro-active in handling Boko Haram. The international alliances of the group further signal the need to co-operate with regional and international actors in fighting terrorism in Nigeria. This is because if Boko Haram is 'crippled' internally, it may receive resuscitation from international terrorist groups. The inability of the Nigerian state to address key governance issues like infrastructures, rule of law and security, continues to boost ethnic dissidents and 'Boko Haramism'. The ineptitude of the Nigerian state has been apparent in the switching of allegiance of people to these dissident's groups owing to the fact that they feel these groups will fill the vacuum created by the state's dismal performance.

The failure of the Nigerian government to address these matters informed the seeking for an alternative in the light of strict *Sharia* law implementation by Boko Haram. The diversity of the country ethnically and religiously drives sentiments and the unchecked division of the Nigerian state. This necessitates the conveying of another sovereign national conference in which the people will elect those who will represent them in these conferences. This will address a lot of ethno-religious differences and apparently reduce ethnic, political and religious crises among the various groups in Nigeria. This will also make government policies reflect the desires of the people.

NACTEST and Acts against terrorism are good but failure to address issues of governance generally makes the implementation of these policy documents difficult. The continued perpetration of violence by Boko Haram after rolling out NACTEST and the Acts are proof that absolute success has not been recorded and as a result, Nigeria's counter-terrorism policies have not been effective. Although some achievements have been made, the ineffectiveness is a function of weak state institutions which makes implementation difficult. This inevitably portrays the policies as being weak. Government did not work to correct the anomalies that have bewildered institutions in Nigeria before rolling out the policies. For instance, funds meant for some aspects of the implementation have been embezzled owing to the fact that this has always been the norm as past perpetrators have gone scot free. The norm in some instances is that even if they are prosecuted, they do a plea bargain by returning the money stolen (sometimes not the

full money) without going to jail (Bulus, 2013; Ibekwe, 2014). These corrupt officials are not losing in any way because such money will have been ploughed into businesses and they would have generated enough profits. Hence, anti-corruption institutions and the judiciary should be empowered to retrieve/recover stolen funds and assets as well as mete out necessary punitive measures.

These policies have the hard and soft elements. The long reign of military rule has made government divert more attention to the hard approach and be military-centric in its counter-terrorism drive. These military-centric moves have made the sect become more violent due to human rights abuses by security agencies. This was obvious in the gruesome murder of its leader, Mohammed Yusuf. His death made the group increase its violence against the Nigerian state. The issue with governance has made the soft approach aspect receive less attention. The group may be defeated in terms of reducing its arm wielding but ideology cannot be defeated except key developmental issues upon which radicalisation is premised, are addressed.

The hard and soft approaches in these policy documents should be accorded adequate attention by government and state institutions should be strengthened to implement them. Government institutions should be strengthened to have a holistic counter-terrorism implementation: both hard and soft approaches. Staff of all government institutions should be encouraged (through good remuneration, equality and enlightenment) to embrace the spirit of good service because the dedication of each staff has marginal effects on the success of any institution. Those saddled with counter radicalisation, deradicalisation, securing and preparing should be well positioned and equipped to carry out their responsibilities.

This is necessary so that/to ensure that even if Boko Haram is defeated, another 'Boko Haram' does not rise in its place. There should be the synergy of all the institutions saddled with counter-terrorism and they should regularly/constantly exchange ideas, review progress, detect flaws, resolve such flaws and progress. More funds should equally be made available to state institutions to function optimally. Issues like corruption, human rights abuse and slow justice system should be addressed. Special courts for anti-corruption and terrorism which are at least equivalent of high courts should be set up to aid speedy judicial process. Individuals and communities should equally be empowered in terms of information, infrastructure and poverty reduction so that they will not be vulnerable to terrorist indoctrination and support for terrorists.

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