



UNIVERSITY OF  
**KWAZULU-NATAL**

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**YAKWAZULU-NATALI**

**INTRA-POLITICAL INFIGHTING VERSUS SERVICE  
DELIVERY: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF INTRA-  
POLITICAL INFIGHTING ON SERVICE DELIVERY IN  
UMSUNDUZI LOCAL MUNICIPALITY**

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## Declaration

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Nomaswazi Portia Dlamini

7 March 2017

Dr Noleen Loubser

7 March 2017

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## **Abstract**

This study is concerned with assessing the impact of intra-political infighting on service delivery in Msunduzi municipality. Essential to this study are the challenges facing service delivery in the municipality, as well as the role and impact of political parties in the municipality's performance on service delivery. In addition, the study analyses national government policies on local government municipalities. Another aim is to understand the role of the South African Local Governance Association (SALGA) in the operation of municipalities.

The study was qualitative in nature. The research used purposive sampling to collect and analyse data and questionnaire interviews from 18 respondents from Msunduzi local municipality and SALGA. Using Easton and Almond's systems theory and structural functionalism, this research concluded that political systems, when applied to patterns of power and authority, expose the unequal relationship between the governors and the governed and can help to understand the impact of intra-political infighting on service delivery.

The findings show that intra-political infighting has a negative impact on service delivery. When internal squabbles take precedence, services take a back seat; time spent trying to resolve squabbles results in delays in providing services. Finally, this research suggests the promotion of good governance as one of the tools to strengthen oversight bodies in order to ensure better accountability and provision of services in local government, and to strengthen communication between the communities and the municipality, particularly in Msunduzi municipality.

## **Acronyms**

ANC	African National Congress
COGTA	Cooporative Governance and Traditional Affairs
DA	Democratic Alliance
ESKOM	Electricity Supply Commission
EXCO	Executive Council
GEAR	Growth, Employment and Redistribution
IDP	Integrated Development Plans
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KZN	KwaZulu-Natal
LED	Local Economic Development
LGSETA	Local Government Sector Education Authority
MF	Minority Front
MIG	Municipal Infrastructural Grants
NCOP	National Council of Provinces
NEC	National Executive Committee
NERSA	National Energy Regulator Of South Africa
NFP	National Freedom Party
PSAM	Public Service Accountability Monitor
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
SALGA	South African Local Governance Association
SALGBC	South African Local Governance Bargaining Council
SCM	Supply Chain Management
UKZN	University of KwaZulu-Natal
WB	World Bank

# Chapter One: Introduction

## 1.1 Background and research problem

The aim of this research is to examine the impact of intra-political infighting on service delivery in the Msunduzi municipality (around the city of Pietermaritzburg, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa). In recent years, there has been considerable intra-political infighting in the Msunduzi local municipality. It is hypothesised that this would have affected service delivery negatively. In the press, in 2010, it was reported that Msunduzi municipality had R4,8 million in the bank while it needed R200 million to cover its monthly costs. The financial crisis in the municipality resulted in lack of service delivery which caused many protests and disrupted economic activities (Times Live, 16 August 2010).

The municipality was facing bankruptcy and allegations of intra-political infighting between the mayor and deputy mayor of the previous administration, which affected service delivery to the various sectors within the municipality. Also affected were the budget and resources for services. Mismanagement of funds and intra-political infighting have a considerable impact on service delivery. During the period of the previous municipal administration, Msunduzi municipality was placed under administration by Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA).

According to Times Live, Johann Mettler's first investigations had shown that the municipality was facing "bankruptcy because of rampant misuse of its money and infighting among council members" (Times Live, 16 August 2010). Rate payers of Pietermaritzburg were to blame as well, because an inspection that had been done a week before revealed that ninety percent of the city's small to medium sized businesses had interfered with their water meters resulting in significant revenue loss.

### *1.1.1 Intra-political infighting*

In June 2007, the Mail and Guardian reported that the Former Minister of Local and Provincial Government, Sydney Mufamadi, said that municipal service delivery should not be allowed to be affected by political infighting. The Minister further said, "Surely it is wrong for people who failed to secure nominations as candidates for their parties not to direct their energies towards helping today's incumbents to serve the people as expected" (Mail and Guardian, 6 June 2007). On 2 February 2010, News24 reported that the ANC intended to tackle the infighting that was affecting service delivery in the province of the Eastern Cape. The ANC would also monitor

councillors' performances and hoped to deal with the troubled relationships within municipalities (this was said in a statement by the then spokesperson Mlibo Qoboshiyane). Furthermore, the party planned to address the problems with the "political-administrative interface which were undermining the integrity and functioning of municipal councils through intra- and inter-party conflicts" (News24, 2 February 2010).

The years of 2010 or 2011 were filled with tension and division in the ANC. The Moses Mabhida region (Pietermaritzburg in the province of KwaZulu-Natal) experienced considerable amounts of intra-political infighting within the ANC. The Mercury newspaper reporter, Bongani Hans, reported that Alpha Shelembe, a former Speaker and Deputy Mayor of the Msunduzi municipality, was forced to resign as the Deputy Mayor and ANC Regional Treasurer in 2011 because of allegations of corruption and being behind the burning down of the ANCs' Moses Mabhida regional offices in Pietermaritzburg. Shelembe faced these allegations while he was mixed up in an internal ANC power struggle (Hans, 2013). Skhumbuzo Miya from The Witness newspaper reported that Sbongile Mkhize, an ANC resolute, believed that the incident of setting fire to the ANC offices in Moses Mabhida Region was meant to take away attention from the meeting between the dissatisfied cadres in the region and the ANC NEC member, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, who was heading the national task team established by the ANC headquarters to investigate alleged irregularities that occurred during the nominations of the ANC election candidates in the region, (Witness, 12 June 2011). The burning of the ANC offices in the Moses Mabhida Region had happened in November 2010 as well, leaving the upper level of the building completely destroyed with some offices needing to be relocated, (Witness, 12 June 2011). With this background informed by media reports, this study examines how intra-political infighting can have an impact on service delivery in the municipality.

### ***1.1.2 Reasons for choosing the topic and literature reviewed***

When a municipality faces challenges that might have an impact on the livelihood of the communities to whom it is expected to provide services, this is likely to have an effect on the relationship between the community and the municipality. In recent years, there has been considerable intra-political infighting in the Msunduzi local municipality. It is hypothesised that this would also have affected service delivery negatively. This section of the study reviews relevant literature on the relations between the structure of Msunduzi municipal governance, intra-political infighting and the challenges facing service delivery. It includes a discussion on municipal governance and indicators of good governance, the challenges facing service

delivery in Msunduzi municipality and the impact that intra-political infighting has on service delivery. Furthermore it elaborates on the research methodology and theoretical setting employed by this study, and makes a review of the party-political system at local government level and the electoral system.

Various scholars such as Reddy and Govender (2013), Holtzhausen and Naidoo (2011) and Sebugwawo (2013) have published research on assessing the role of political infighting and its impact on service delivery in local municipalities. This study is based on research by de Visser (2010) on the political-administrative interface in South African municipalities assessing the quality of local democracies. De Visser (2010) claimed that South African municipalities are faced with important challenges dealing with boundaries between politicians and officials. In local government, the lack of separation of powers between legislative and executive authority is responsible for this. Furthermore, it is suggested that instead of focusing on looking for possible ways of separation of powers in local government, more focus should be on the governance make-up of municipality. This would include political and administrative leadership of municipalities and the impact this has on the functioning of the municipalities towards service delivery.

In addition, de Visser (2010) explored “the allegation that councils, and their councillors, are inward-focused, preoccupied with the goings-on within the political realm of the council and technicalities of administration” (88). He concluded that often municipalities are concerned with regional and sometimes national politics rather than community concerns. He gave choices for institutional change, essentially stating that there was a need for ethical leadership on some aspects of local government politicians and their administrators as well as on the part of the party political structures that surround local government (de Visser, 2010: 89).

On the other hand, Sebugwawo (2013) stated that South African municipalities are faced with mass protests, demonstrations and petitions because of lack of service delivery, indicating the municipal governments’ failure to take action regarding community challenges. Furthermore, the “protests were seen as a threat to the dominance of the African National Congress (ANC) on the political scene, a view that has been recently challenged” (Sebugwawo, 2013). In addition, Sebugwawo stated that one of the main issues facing the municipality and the community of Makana in the Eastern Cape was poor communication. Hence, Sebugwawo suggested that “there is a crucial need for municipalities to prioritise community concerns and create functional communication channels” (Sebugwawo, 2013).

### ***1.1.3 More literature reviewed on municipal governance and service delivery***

Goss (2001) described local governance as the way local government agencies interact at a local level. In addition, Goss claimed that Rhodes described governance as “carried out through self-organizing, inter-organizational networks” (Goss, 2001: 11). Governance involves both formal and informal politics. Goss (2001) used ‘governance’ to describe new emerging forms of collective decision-making, at the local level, which lead to the development of distinct relationships amongst citizens and public agencies. Furthermore, to managers and politicians at local level, governance through a network of agencies is becoming more of a reality, with local agencies working across organisational boundaries; some have made this work (Goss, 2001). In addition, the role and purpose of governance “is also directly influenced by the ideology and projects of the dominant political parties” (Goss, 2001: 12). But local government is mainly intended to provide basic essential needs of the people (community).

According to Holtzhausen and Naidoo (2011), despite over twenty years having passed since the end of apartheid, nearly half of South African communities do not have adequate service delivery. Local government (municipalities) are the weakest sphere in South Africa because while some municipalities show relatively effective governance, some are simply appalling, (Holtzhausen and Naidoo, 2011). Hence effective governance alone will not end ills of service delivery in municipalities but effective governance is crucial in improving service delivery in local government. Holtzhausen and Naidoo claimed that since the achievement of the ruling party (African National Congress, ANC) to render some service to the poor in the fields of water and sanitation, housing, electrification, health and education, the dividends from smaller municipalities resulting from improved service delivery have shown to be disappointing with regard to reducing poverty and dealing with ongoing socio-economic problems in local government (Holtzhausen and Naidoo, 2011: 735).

In addition, the Public Service Accountability Monitor (PSAM) of the United Nations argued that “a major obstacle to poor service delivery in South Africa, especially at local government is poor governance, which includes not simply corruption, but also poor performance on the part of leadership and government officials in their management of public resources as well as lack of political will to act against underperforming officials” (Holtzhausen and Naidoo, 2011: 736). The Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) identified similar reasons to the PSAM, such as poor ability of councillors to deal with the demands of local government; inadequate accountability measures and support systems and resources for local democracy; poor compliance with regulatory and legislative frameworks; tensions

between the political and administrative interface; lack of clear distinction between the legislative and executive; and insufficient separations of powers between municipal councils and political parties” (Holtzhausen and Naidoo, 2011: 736).

Reddy and Govender (2013: 78) stated that several governance challenges have emerged, such as “inter-alia; unfunded mandates; rampant corruption; nepotism; violent service delivery protests; capacity constraints; crime; lack of communication; transparency and accountability; limited civic engagement and a significant number of municipalities that are not financially viable”. This has a negative impact on good governance and ultimately on outcomes and outputs. In addition, the Department of Cooperative Governance has also mentioned several challenges facing local government, such as poor assimilation of planning and budgets and simultaneous sector programmes; capacity constraints; poor coordination of government service delivery and cooperative governance (Reddy and Govender, 2013: 92). Over the years, past interventions by provincial and national government to improve the situation in the previous years, through improved execution of its responsibilities, providing additional resources, training staff and developing in general the capacities of municipalities, have largely been unsuccessful, as a result of poor implementation and not due to the constitutional and legislative systems in place (Reddy and Govender, 2013: 92).

In order to address these challenges faced by the municipalities, President Jacob Zuma and the then Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs introduced the Delivery Agreement on 29 April 2010. The agreement was aimed at achieving responsive, accountable, effective and efficient local government systems (Reddy and Govender, 2013: 92). Furthermore, the huge number of public protests against poor municipal service delivery showed that consultation and civic engagement structures were not functioning well; also, poor quality of local leadership impacted negatively on local governance (Reddy and Govender, 2013: 93). In addition, “there is a strong view that local government is concerned with political opportunism rather than advancing the interests of local communities” (Reddy and Govender, 2013: 93). Increasingly, governance principles and values are sacrificed for political power and individual gain. Therefore it is questionable whether one can claim that “local communities can be empowered through the transfer of power and resources thereby enabling them to resolve local issues and promoting local democratic participation in the process” (Reddy and Govender, 2013: 93). When people are placed in similar power positions, will they not do the same as the previous leaders? Reddy and Govender (2013) showed how people in leadership tended to optimise their own political interests instead of those there are supposed to serve.

The broader issues to be investigated included examining how intra-political infighting can have an impact on service delivery. The research aimed to understand the role and impact of political parties in the municipality's performance on service delivery. It also intended to assess the challenges of service delivery within the municipality and to understand the role that SALGA can play in trying to curb intra-political infighting and with helping to improve service delivery.

This is a qualitative study that used quota purposive sampling from 18 respondents to explore the impact that intra-political infighting has on service delivery. Essential to this study are the challenges facing service delivery in Msunduzi municipality as well as the role that can be played by SALGA to assist the municipality in combating intra-political infighting and improving service delivery.

The theoretical framework behind this research is systems and structural functionalism theory. This theory is appropriate for this study because it supports the notion that researchers study functions within their structures through the scope of systems and that the internal structure of the political system is generally applied to patterns of power and authority that characterise the relationship between the governors and the governed. This explanation relates to how intra- and inter-party politics can have an impact on service delivery of the ones governed.

This research purposefully selected 16 municipal councillors representing different political organisations within the municipality as well as two senior managers (one senior municipal official and one senior manager representing SALGA-KZN). The data was collected over a period of three months. The respondents answered 15 questions in an interview and provided biographic information. The respondents were selected on the basis of their availability and willingness to participate. This research was purely for academic purposes and no compensation was given to the respondents. The interviews took place at the municipality in the office space provided by the municipality. Chapter Four describes research methodology in detail. The next section provides an overview of the six chapters.

## **1.2 Structure of the research dissertation**

*Chapter One: Introduction* has introduced the study by presenting the background of the research, its objectives, research methodology and concludes with an overview of the chapters.

*Chapter Two: Theoretical Setting* analyses different political system theories in order to understand the type of system used by municipalities in South Africa. Systems theory appears

the most appropriate to the understanding of local government in South Africa, guided by structural functionalism.

**Chapter Three** analyses government policies related to local government or municipalities. It traces these from the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which was the basis of the ANC election manifesto in 1994. The chapter focuses on the role of local government in South Africa and briefly explores the reasons for service delivery protests, which will be discussed in relation to service delivery in Msunduzi municipality in the discussion chapter. The chapter also analyses different political systems theories for understanding municipalities in South Africa. The aim of this chapter is to examine how different government policies impact on service delivery in local municipalities.

**Chapter Four** critically discusses qualitative research methods with a focus on purposive sampling which was used in this research. This chapter also presents a schedule of the overall research which was conducted over a period of three months, by means of 18 interviews which were recorded.

**Chapter Five** discusses the results obtained from 18 participants from Msunduzi municipality as well as SALGA KZN. The chapter presents four research themes that emerged from the data analysis which address the key research questions.

In addition, Chapter Five refers to literature from the media and the theory to critically discuss the research themes and address the main research topic: assessing the impact of intra-political infighting in service delivery in Msunduzi municipality. The chapter also discusses the limitations of the study encountered.

**Chapter Six** is a summary of the thesis and makes recommendations on how the municipality can better improve service delivery and deal with intra-political infighting.

## **Chapter 2: Theoretical Setting**

### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter analyses different political systems theories in order to explore the type of system used by municipalities in South Africa. For the purpose of this study it argues that systems theory is the most appropriate for the understanding of local government in South Africa. This research has been guided by systems and structural functionalism theory. Within political systems, both systems and structural functionalism theory have value. The theory essentially assists researchers to bring structure into abstract conditions. While structural functionalism traces its origins back to the ancient Greeks and the writings of Aristotle, systems theory surfaced much later (Fisher, 2010: 71). Researchers study functions within their structures using the scope of systems.

### **2.2 Political Systems**

According to Fisher (2010: 71), the systems approach of David Easton and Karl Deutsch grew out of communication and sociological theory which was a move towards working with the data of politics and theory. In contrast, Almond's study of political systems grew out of a "tradition of political theory and draws from sociological and communications theories" (Fisher, 2010: 71). According to Laszlo and Krippner (1998, 2), the broader conception of a 'system' can be described as a "complex of interacting components together with the relationships among them that permit the identification of a boundary-maintaining entity or process". Furthermore, systems theory proposes a method to model complex entities established by various interactions of components by abstracting particular details of structure and concentrating on the differences that defines the characteristic functions, properties and relationships that are internal or external to the systems (Laszlo and Krippner, 1998: 2).

In addition, the internal structure of the political system is generally applied to patterns of power and authority that characterise the relationship between the governors and the governed. In systems theory, Fisher (2010: 72) alluded to how political roles deal with decision making on behalf of the society and with performing actions that implement decisions and allocate essential resources.

Smith (undated: 114), however, defined government functionally as those activities that influence “the way in which authoritative decisions are formulated and executed for a society”. While Fisher claimed the role of government is to make decisions and deliver services on behalf of the community, according to Smith, the role of government is to influence decisions made for a society. So, in practical terms, Fisher was saying that in a municipality, the council makes decisions on behalf of the community as part of their political role. And Smith was saying that the council should play the role of ‘big brother’ and oversee the needs of the society and addressing these needs. This arguably makes accountability and transparency channels controversial in local government because of the blurred lines between what the local council representatives deem to be their role and what the communities expect from them. In terms of David Easton’s five modes of action, it is deemed necessary for all political systems and decisions to be formulated and executed for society, namely, in administration, legislation, adjudication, development of demands and development of support and solidarity. Smith suggested that they could be grouped as input and output basics of government systems (undated: 114).

Fisher drew on Almond’s suggested classification of structures that are based on the degree of differentiation between structures, the extent to which the system is established or noticeable, the stability of the functions of the various roles and the distribution of power in a system which can generally be thought of as being self-contained and distinct from their environment (Fisher, 2010: 72). However, according to Fisher, most systems are subject to external influences, therefore, analysis should be tentative with boundaries that detect relationships across as inputs and outputs.

Systems theory has been criticised mainly in three areas by Fisher: the weaknesses of the methodological approach, lack of suitability for empirical research and strong political bias (2010: 74). Some critics have claimed that systems analysis is misrepresentative and unrealistic because it assumes that ‘reality’ consists of systems whereas in reality, “societies consist of far more individual and isolated events than systems [analysis] are capable of handling” (Fisher, 2010: 74). Another part of the criticism was that it was not easy to identify boundaries and variables, therefore making it difficult to formulate operational definitions and perform empirical studies. In addition, critics have claimed that it is impossible to define the concept of equilibrium except in economic terms where inputs and outputs intersect and in order to be able to identify the equilibrium point, one does not necessarily need to study it sufficiently.

On the other hand, structural functionalism's main criticism was that its classifications were "too undifferentiated to be of real help in actual research" (Fisher, 2010: 79). Even though Almond's functional classification has greater 'specificity and serviceability' than the systems approach, it is still seen as nothing more than a "translation of familiar and known phenomena into blandly broad categories" (Fisher, 2010: 79). As it is, it promotes a "terminological rather than an essential transformation in the discipline" (Fisher, 2010: 79). In addition, the methodological approach was also criticised: a list of functions is created and then suitable structures are identified and this can lead to "empirical contortions" to satisfy the framework, (Fisher, 2010: 79). As a final criticism, Fisher stated that functionalism "harbours an ideological slant" that maintains structures that already exist (2010: 79). Instead of describing what ought to be, it describes what already exists, thereby maintaining the status quo.

These theories are relevant to this study and have been used to assess and show how intra-political infighting has an impact on service delivery. Within a system of government, researchers study functions within their structures. Some scholars have argued that the huge number of public protests against poor municipal service delivery showed that consultation and civic engagement structures were not functioning very well; in addition, poor quality of local leadership has impacted negatively on local governance (Reddy and Govender, 2013: 93). Systems theory explains how the internal structure of the political system is generally applied to patterns of power and authority that characterise the relationship between the governors and the governed. Thus, systems and structural functionalism theory provide a relevant theoretical framework in assessing intra-political infighting and its impact on service delivery. Also, municipal governance consists of systems and structures that play a role in the delivering of services. In addition, the classification of structures as suggested by Almond and Coleman, according to Fisher (2010: 72), are based on "(a) a degree of differentiation between structures, (b) the extent to which the system is 'manifest' or 'visible', (c) the stability of the functions of the various roles, and (d) the distribution of power" and will be useful explaining how these structures help to mould the municipality's functioning when providing services to communities. Also essential to this study, and discussed in the next section, is qualitative research methodology and purposive sampling as the main research method used.

Intra-party can be defined as "any intra-party combination, clique, or grouping whose members share a sense of common identity and common purpose and are organized to act collectively – as a distinct bloc within the party – to achieve their goals" (Zariski in Boucek, 2009: 468).

According to the American Heritage Dictionary of Academic Learning (2016), infighting refers to “contentious rivalry or disagreement among members of a group or organisation”. Intra-political infighting in this study refers to belligerence within one political party for whatever reason, such as attaining power or positions within the party. These power dynamics are evident in local government especially around elections which take place every five years. The elected government implements and amends policies to suit the needs of the people, which guides local government regarding the delivering of services.

## **Chapter Three: Local Government in South Africa**

### **3.1 Introduction**

Every five years, South Africans elect councillors as their representatives at a local government level. Once the Council is in place, it first elects a speaker then a mayor, who in turn appoints a mayoral committee, to deliver on the manifesto of the majority party in Council. The Council has the responsibility to appoint the Municipality Manager who will have the mandate to appoint other managers to govern the day to day business of the municipality.

In South Africa, municipalities are key role-players in improving the lives of ordinary people. According to the manifesto of political parties, each at least at a local government level promises to deliver on clean water, do away with the bucket system in Black areas, deliver on proper roads, ensure electricity is working, and ensure that there is proper collection of gabbage. In short, the infrastructure for creating a better life for all people is there. This is in addition to the broader issue of lack of houses for the poor which has become one of the key promises by politicians.

In terms of the Acts that apply to local government, one of the key objectives is for local government to ensure sustainable service delivery takes place at this level of governance which ultimately affects every citizen. The Act also facilitates the participation of communities in their own development through local government (Jolobe, 2007).

This chapter is an analysis of the government policies linked to local government or municipalities. Secondly, it traces these from the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which was the basis of the ANC election manifesto in 1994. The ANC became the governing party in 1994; its promises are important and need some form of evaluation. Thirdly, the chapter focuses on the role of local government in South Africa and briefly touches on the reasons for service delivery protests, a matter that will be taken up in a later chapter when I discuss issues of service delivery in relation to Msunduzi Municipality. The aim of this chapter is to examine how different government policies impact on service delivery in local municipalities.

### **3.2 Party-political systems at local government level (electoral system)**

This section focuses on the objectives of local government and the electoral system used to elect the municipal council in local government. Therefore, the objectives according to section 150 (1) of the Municipal Electoral Act are as follows:

- (a) To provide democratic and accountable government for local communities;
- (b) To ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner;
- (c) To promote social and economic development;
- (d) To promote a healthy and safe environment; and
- (e) To encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government (de Visser, 2005: 76).

The municipality must strive within its financial and administrative capacity to achieve all these objectives. In addition, regarding the electoral system for local government, the municipal electoral act lays the foundation for the electoral systems for local government. “Metropolitan councils and local councils with wards consist of 50% of councillors elected from a party lists on a proportional basis and 50% of ward councillors, elected in a ‘winner takes all’ system to represent a ward” (de Visser, 2005: 91). In a ward, candidates can independent or nominated by a party. Also, traditional leaders had the right to be ex officio members of municipal council in their areas under the interim constitution. But under the final constitution, traditional leaders are no longer ex officio members of the council and they can only be designated as advisory members of the council.

Under democracy, both sections 152(1) (a) and (b) are based on the creation of a democratic dispensation for local government which relies on concepts of representation, accountability, and people-centered government (de Visser, 2005: 70). Subsection 152(1) (b) instructs local government to ensure sustainable service delivery whereby the consumers can afford the services supplied using their own ongoing means (de Visser, 2005: 70). Subsection 152(1) (c) recognises that an adequate standard of living through the delivery of government services and through self-empowerment (employment, social upliftment) is dependent upon a productive local economy and improved social conditions (de Visser, 2005: 70-71). Lastly, subsection 152(1) (d) incorporates two notions: a safe environment, related to issues of security (crime prevention, traffic safety) and a healthy environment (de Visser, 2005: 70-71). These subsections are supposed to inform the basis of operations or functioning of municipalities and help them improve and be efficient in delivering services to communities. But service delivery

and service delivery protests are still a major challenge facing most municipalities in South Africa.

### **3.3 Policy influences on the role of local government**

In South Africa under apartheid, local government was divided based on skin colour, thus municipalities were racially categorised. Black people had to live in homelands and were allowed in municipalities solely on the basis of Natives Laws Amendment Act of 1952, Section 10 of the Group Areas Act. This act allowed any Black person to reside in an urban area if they had work and the employer had to sign the reference book (dompass) of their employee. Should they lose their jobs, they had to go back to the designated homeland based on ethnic origins.

The Freedom Charter, a policy document of the Congress Movement adopted in 1955 at the Kliptown Congress (a meeting that took place in Kliptown in June 30, 1955 where the Congress of the People adopted the Freedom Charter), responded to this in its Preamble: “South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no man can claim authority, unless it is based on the will of the people” (Mandela, 1956).

Trevor Manuel, South African Minister of Finance since 1996, had this to say about the Freedom Charter, which he regarded as the main source of the Constitution of South Africa:

All people shall have the right to live where they choose, to be decently housed and to raise the families in comfort and security; Unused housing space shall be made available to the people; Rent and prices shall be lowered; food plentiful and no-one shall go hungry; A preventive health scheme shall be run by the state; Free medical care and hospitalisation shall be provided for all, with special care for mothers and young children; Slums shall be demolished, and new suburbs built where all have transport, roads, lighting playing fields, crèches and social centres; The aged, the orphans, the disabled and the sick shall be cared for by the state; Rest, leisure and recreation shall be the right of all; Fenced locations and ghettos shall be abolished, and laws which break up families shall be repealed. (Manuel, 2011: 8).

In addition, the Annual Report of 2014/15 of SALGA clearly articulated the role of local government and is similar to Chapter 7 of the Constitution of South Africa. It stated that local government must:

Improve the quantity and quality of municipal basic services to people. This is specifically related to the areas of access to water, sanitation, electricity, waste management, roads and disaster management; enhance the municipal contribution to job creation and sustainable livelihoods through local economic development (LED);

ensure the development and adoption of reliable and credible integrated development plans (IDPs); deepen democracy through a refined ward committee model; build and strengthen the administrative, institutional and financial capabilities of municipalities; create a single window coordination of support, monitoring and intervention in municipalities; uproot fraud, corruption, nepotism and all forms of maladministration affecting local government; develop a coherent and cohesive system of governance and a more equitable intergovernmental fiscal system; develop and strengthen a politically and administratively stable system of municipalities; restore the institutional integrity of municipalities. (SALGA, 2015: 11)

Cameron (2010: 97-98) has explored phases of the South African local government from the apartheid government to the democratically elected government. He noted that South Africa has one of the most advanced government systems in the world. There is greater functional interdependence between the various tiers/spheres of government based on the integrational model. Within the spheres of government, local government is seen as an instrument for implementing national policies (Cameron, 2010: 99). In addition, de Visser (2010: 94) explained that there is “undue political interference by political parties in municipalities” while the “Code of Conduct for Councillors includes a provision that prohibits councillors from interfering in the administration (item 11 Schedule 1 Systems Act)”. Also de Visser (2010: 88) claimed that “the continuing spate of community protests, directed at councillors and municipal officials, is evidence of a serious breakdown of relationships between communities and councillors”.

The Local Government Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 (Chapter 5 in Functions and Powers of Municipalities, Section 83. Sub-section (1) under General) discusses the functions and powers assigned to it in terms of sections 156 and 229 of the Constitution.

Sub-section (3) states that a district municipality must seek to achieve integrated, sustainable and equitable social and economic development of its areas as a whole by:

- (a) Ensuring integrated development planning for the district as a whole;
- (b) Promoting bulk infrastructural development and services for the district as a whole;
- (c) Building the capacity of local municipalities in its area to perform their functions and exercise their powers where such capacity is lacking; and
- (d) Promoting the equitable distribution of resources between the local municipalities in its area to ensure appropriate levels of municipal services within the area, (Act 117 of 1998:61).

The focus of this research is the Msunduzi municipality, which is a local municipality and hence, section 88 of the Act about co-operation between district and local municipality is most relevant. Sub-section (1) states that local and district municipalities within the area of the district must co-operate by supporting and assisting each other.

(2)(a) A district municipality, on request from a local municipality within its area, may provide financial, technical and administrative support services to that local municipality to the extent that this district municipality has the capacity to provide those services. The same applies vice versa, as well as towards another local municipality within the area.

In addition, the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, section 81, makes provision for responsibilities of municipalities when providing services through service delivery agreements with external mechanisms.

Sub-section (2) states that a municipality, through a service delivery agreement:

- (a) May assign to a service provider responsibility for
  - (i) Developing and implementing detailed service delivery plans within the framework of the municipality's integrated development plan;
  - (ii) The operational planning, management and provision of the municipal service;
  - (iii) Undertaking social and economic development that is directly related to the provision of the service;
  - (iv) Customer management;
  - (v) Managing its own accounting, financial management, budgeting, investment and borrowing activities within a framework of transparency, accountability, reporting and financial control determined by the municipality, subject to the Municipal Finance Management Act;
  - (vi) The collection of service fees for its own account from users of services in accordance with the municipal council's tariff policy in accordance with the credit control measures established in terms of Chapter 9, (Act 32 of 2000:92)

(3) The municipal council has the right to set, review or adjust the tariffs within its tariffs policy. The service delivery agreement may provide for the adjustment of tariffs by the service provider within the limitations set by the municipal council.

These acts provide a framework and reference for municipalities on how they should operate while providing services to communities. And they also clearly articulate the roles and responsibilities or functions for local and district municipalities, (Act 32 f 2000:93).

Councillor Nawa, in his 2012 speech on the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) Debate on budget vote No. 3 (which is a budget debate and broader discussion on policies related to challenges and successes of local government during Local Government Week, held annually by COGTA with SALGA) conveyed his deepest empathy for local government representatives, especially ward councillors who constantly bear the brunt of violent elements of protests regarding service delivery. He implied that many issues raised in these protests were in fact not Local Government functions but he did not provide examples on what those functions were, (Nawa, 2012: 2).

Furthermore, he explained that there would be a continuous challenge to capacitate Councillors to play their relevant roles with an understanding of oversight and accountability. Cameron (2010: 103) claimed that some central government departments ignore local government when it comes to planning and development of services. He further explained that a major study that had been done in KwaZulu-Natal discovered that even though local government is relatively independent, councillors are led, if not controlled, by members of their party who occupy provincial and national positions. He argues that this is in contradiction of the Constitution where in section 151(4) it clearly states that “national or provincial government may not compromise or impede a municipality’s right or ability to exercise its powers or perform its functions”. These clauses indicate a vital “shift away from the system of provincial control of local government, which has characterised South Africa’s intergovernmental system since 1910” (Cameron, 2010: 102).

In addition, Councillor Nawa advocated for ensuring the ultimate objective of building and strengthening a more decentralised form of government which does not take responsibility for service delivery away from the municipalities.

According to Cameron (2010: 99-100), a classical definition of a decentralised local government would be as follows:

- Local authorities should be constitutionally separate from central government and be responsible for a significant range of services;
- They should have their own treasury, separate budget and accounts and their own taxes to produce a significant part of their revenue;

- They should have their own personnel with the right to hire and fire staff;
- Local policy should be elected by local councils, consisting predominately of local representatives;
- Central government should play an indirect advisory, supervisory and inspectorate role.

Even though the Local Economic Development (LED) policy framework provides “a vision for creating robust and inclusive local economies, exploiting local opportunities, real potential and competitive advantages, addressing local needs and contributing to national development objectives” (Rogerson, 2010: 482) there have been critical divisions on “how local government should provide a direct solution by supporting projects for job creation or an indirect solution in a form of creating an enabling environment” (Rogerson 2010, 483). With an increase in contradicting signs and “lack of clarity of direction from national government, it is not always clear to local authorities, especially the smaller ones, what their planning priorities should be and how they should go about promoting LED” due to the 2008 IDPs being completely project focused (Rogerson, 2010: 483).

Additionally, in practice, municipalities do not have enough capacity to compile and implement resourceful Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) as part of local economic development. According to Pycroft (2000: 149), one of the main reasons for this is “the absence of compatibility between the municipal financial year (which runs from June to July) and the provincial and national financial year (which runs from April to March) which undermines efforts to synchronize national and provincial plans with the municipal IDPs”. Further, Pycroft (2000) argued that “there is lack of understanding, particularly at provincial level, of the municipal planning process, and a reluctance on the part of provincial governments (which already feel constrained by national dictates) to further concede autonomy over their development objectives to municipal plans”. Cameron’s classical definition of a decentralised local government becomes challenging to achieve while there is this divergence of clear functions and roles between the three spheres of government. Also the dynamics of each sphere have an impact on the governance and implementation of policies.

### **3.4 Pros and cons of trying to implement RDP and the shift to implementing GEAR**

On the other hand, Goss (2001: 12) explained that the role and purpose of governance “is also directly influenced by the ideology and projects of the dominant political parties”. One of the dominant political parties currently in South Africa is the African National Congress (ANC)

which is the ruling party. In 1994, when the ANC-led government [at the time, led by the late President Nelson Mandela] came into power, one of the key policy documents in their manifesto was the Reconstruction Development Programme (RDP). The RDP was aimed at addressing the inequalities of apartheid, increasing economic growth and improving service delivery of social goods, health care, education, and housing as one of the economic activities to improve economic growth and job creation (Pycroft, 2000: 143). It is true that South African municipalities have faced many structural and system weaknesses which were mainly inherited from the apartheid regime, but there has been some progress made in the provision of basic needs for communities through the RDP policy.

According to South African History Online (1994), the six RDP principles that underlie the entire RDP are as follows:

- *An integrated and sustainable programme*: where the RDP brings together strategies to harness all resources in a coherent and sustainable manner, which will be implemented at all levels and spheres of government.
- *A people driven process*: because the RDP is focused on the people's most immediate needs and in turn relies on their energies to meet their needs.
- *Peace and security for all*: RDP promotes peace and security which involves all people and must be built and expanded on the National Peace Initiative.
- *Nation building*: aimed at eradicating the inequalities and divisions left behind by the apartheid government,
- Which requires *links between reconstruction and development*, of which reconstruction of society works hand-in-hand with development. A united society stands a better chance at healing itself and attracting investments and creating stability which can improve the economy as well, ultimately the livelihood of society.
- Finally, all this can be possible through the *ongoing democratisation of South Africa*. Hence all the people affected by the apartheid regime need to be integrated in decision making and as part of society.

Even though economically, “the RDP was successful in articulating the main aspirations of the movement for post-apartheid South Africa, that is growth, development, reconstruction and redistribution”, it unsuccessfully tried to reunite the original “Keynesian approach to the RDP with a set of policy statements and recommendations that were inspired by the neo-liberal framework” that had already been offered as an alternative by various stakeholders like the

financial institutions (IMF and World Bank), big businesses and so forth (Adelzadeh, 1996: 66).

In concurrence with Adelzadeh's view on the shortcomings of the RDP, de Visser (2005: 111) stated that the RDP did not articulate very well a programme for achieving its main aims: hence it ended up as a wish list for too many people because it was too broadly formulated. On the other hand, Aregbeshola (2010) claimed that the "government established achievable programmes over a five-year period" in the RDP document. But criticised the "shortfalls of the RDP emanated from Government's inability to generate needed resources to finance the program, coupled with its failure to establish an industrial policy" (Aregbeshola, 2010). Hence, the introduction of Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) as a macroeconomic strategy in 1996 was in contrast to the delivery of RDP objectives (Adelzadeh 1996, 66).

In addition, Adelzadeh (1996: 67) argued that the substantive relinquishment of the RDP as originally formulated was indicative of a panic response to the exchange rate's unsteadiness and was a lame succumbing to the policy dictates and ideological pressures of the international financial institutions. Furthermore, he also questioned the policy's ability to substantially increase the growth rate of the economy; the reversal of unemployment crisis and yielding sufficient progress towards equitable distribution of income and wealth, (Adelzadeh, 1996: 70). In addition, he criticised the document's inability to clearly distinguish and articulate the difference between 'growth' as opposed to 'sustainable growth' and what would constitute criteria for sustainable growth. It was imperative for the RDP document to thoroughly explain or provide a definition of and differences between the two terms.

De Visser (2005: 111) noted that the government would soon run in trouble with meeting the demands of providing basic services as stipulated in the RDP document. There were indeed huge backlogs in providing access to basic services. There was also provincial maladministration of primary nutrition programmes that had taken place which resulted in an increase in dissatisfaction of service delivery and employment creation as articulated in the RDP. But he also commended the government for having established "a very extensive welfare system, catering for the aged, disabled, children in need, foster parents and many others too poor to meet their basic social requirements" (de Visser, 2005: 111). In particular, free health care programmes were implemented for pregnant women and small children, and free meals were provided for between 3.5 to 5 million school children (de Visser, 2005: 111).

One of the main aspects of the RDP was that, it linked reconstruction and development hence “it proposed job creation through public works – the building of houses and provision of services would be done in a way that created employment” (Knight, 2001: 2). The late President, Nelson Mandela, in his opening address in 1997, mentioned that more houses were built than in any other time in South African history. Over 700 000 people had been supplied with water. Millions of people were enjoying the benefits of electricity and the Primary School Nutrition Programme had benefited over three million children.

Despite Mandela’s speech, which mentioned that there was consistent expansion estimated at 3% growth during the course of 1996, Aregbeshola (2010) said that there was a financial crisis that had “hit South Africa in 1996, which resulted in capital flight and economic instability, necessitating a national call” by Mandela on the “public and private sectors to develop and implement a national vision” (Aregbeshola, 2010). Hence, towards the end of 1996, the government saw the need to shift RDP to GEAR in order to try and enhance economic growth and achieve development through attracting investments and creating more jobs in order to reduce unemployment.

In addition, GEAR was “more technical ... trying to address the gaps in terms of economic policy. It spelled out monetary policy more carefully – deficit policy, interest rate policy, exchange rate policy – and it linked technically from an economics point of view to the tariff level” (Erwin, 2016: 145).

Some, like Pycroft (2000: 143) viewed the shift from RDP to GEAR as an opportunity to attract foreign investment and promote trade. He explained that this switch did not mean that the RDP was disregarded as a policy but GEAR superseded RDP in order to promote investor confidence to improve the economy. Therefore, based on Pycroft’s (2000: 144) point, GEAR was a strategy policy aimed at positioning South Africa within a global economy, through SA’s emerging macro-economic framework, including taxation, national debt management, fiscal and monetary policy.

Moreover, Pycroft (2000: 144) suggested that “a successful macro-economic strategy that facilitates access to the advantages of the global economy requires a significant restructuring of government institutions – particularly those inherited from apartheid”. In concurrence with Pycroft’s suggestion, Gelb (2006) explained that RDP policies did not have a chance to succeed because “a harsh interest rate policy was adopted from 1990 to counter inflation, and fiscal stringency – including deficit targets – from 1994”, long before GEAR was introduced. The

large influx of foreign capital was a huge factor behind the instability of the rand, which since then has destabilised growth and most likely would have also impacted negatively on economic growth even if RDP had remained in force.

In spite all this, many people criticised the shift to GEAR, including COSATU which is part of the Tripartite Alliance with the ANC and the initial attempt of implementing RDP. The government acknowledged that the shift to GEAR meant that there would be more reliance on the private sector which would have a negative impact on the provision of social needs of the people as stipulated by the RDP document or policy. COSATU claimed that GEAR had failed to live up to its “promise of economic and job growth or significant redistribution of income and socio-economic opportunities in favour of the poor” (Knight, 2001: 3). Furthermore, COSATU criticised GEAR for focusing on rigorous “monetary and fiscal targets, conflicts with the goal of the RDP of growth based on job creation, meeting people’s needs, poverty reduction and a more equitable distribution of wealth” (Knight, 2001: 3). “In the period of 1996-2001 the economy only grew by 2.7% instead of 6% as originally envisaged ... employment decreased by 3%; more than 1 million jobs were lost; real government investment grew at 1% instead of 7.1%; and real private sector investment dropped sharply – from 6.1% growth rate in 1996 to -0.7%” (de Visser, 2005: 114-115).

On the other hand, Stephen Gelb (2006), who was one of the ‘technical team’ that drafted the GEAR document presented an interesting argument that “GEAR did not introduce any fundamentally new policies into the macroeconomic policy regime” hence a “sharp break with the RDP doesn’t hold” (Gelb, 2006: 3). The only new thing that GEAR did was to “essentially re-package then-existing macroeconomic policy in an effort to re-affirm” (Gelb, 2006: 4). Furthermore, he said that the “attempt to insulate had the unintended consequence of making GEAR in a sense a more significant intervention in alliance politics than it was in macroeconomic policy” and its essence “within the alliance turned out to be its fatal flaw”, (Gelb, 2006:4). Furthermore, Gelb (2006) explained that even though the Tripartite Alliance was not directly involved with the formation of GEAR, it was responsible for its implementation and its failure because a “comprehensive analysis suggests the possibilities that macroeconomic policy without popular support is likely to fail” (4). This could discourage foreign investments and in turn impact on local government to render and deliver some services. Also Erwin (2016: 145) explained that the lack or inability to publicly debate GEAR had an impact on its lack of success. Furthermore, Erwin (2016: 145) stated that “we should

have probably warned the trade unions a bit earlier that we had inherited an economically bankrupt country from the apartheid regime”.

### **3.5 Service delivery protests and public perceptions of local government**

One of the biggest challenges facing local government [municipalities in particular] is service delivery protests. According to Alexander (2010: 26), local political protests or local protests take the form of “mass meetings, drafting of memoranda, petitions, toyi-toying, processions, stay-aways, election boycotts, blockages of roads, construction of barricades, burning of tyres, looting, destruction of buildings, chasing unpopular individuals out of townships, confrontations with the police and forced resignations of elected officials”. But the main focus of this section is locally organised protests regarding service delivery which tend to be violent. It is noted that most of these actions mentioned by Alexander (2010) are common in violent service delivery protests as opposed to peaceful mass demonstrations. Also, Alexander (2010: 26) noted that mass demonstrations where tyres are burnt and used to barricading the streets, vandalism of buildings / property and there are confrontations with the police, usually originate in poorer neighbourhoods like informal settlements and townships.

One of the main reasons for violent protests apart from lack of or insufficient service delivery is protests against selfish, uncaring, corrupt leaders of municipalities (Alexander, 2010: 25). In addition, Nleya et al. (2011: 15) explained that “protests point towards feelings of betrayal over skewed material opportunities, and in fact a host of other grievances extending far beyond the realm of service delivery”. Hough (2008: 6) also explained that the “frustration of promises not kept regarding service delivery, the wider problem includes crime, the growing gap between the rich and the poor, and the deteriorating condition of government departments such as Home Affairs and Justice”.

In addition, Bond and Mottiar (2013: 285) have argued that “protests represent resistance to the commodification of life – e.g. commercialisation of municipal services – and to rising poverty and inequality in the country’s slums”. Hence, “in most provinces the majority of the Gatherings Act protest incidents concerned rising costs of (or even gaining basic access to) water, sanitation and electricity” (Bond and Mottiar, 2013: 285). In concurrence, Booysen (2007: 24) explained that a huge number of citizens who lived in poverty stricken communities were unable to pay municipality rates and the municipalities had no option but to cut off the services of water and electricity to non-payers.

On the other hand, Hough (2008: 7) posited an interesting view of a ‘third force’ in local protests, where political party leaders and councillors who do not make it to a party list before elections instigate protests. In support of the above, Booysen (2007: 23) explained that even though “reasons for service delivery protests changed from one community to the next”, they included “mobilization against incumbent councillors and, occasionally, infighting within structures of the governing ANC”. While the Gatherings Act of 1993 recognised “public gatherings as freedom of assembly and protest as democratic rights, and sought to ensure that these were practised in a peaceful manner” (Alexander, 2010: 26), Hough (2008) noted that in most instances the communities/people who protested violently were usually reacting to the presence of the police through vandalism or blockage of roads. He further noted that “in 2006, there were 920 recorded cases of unrest related to poor service delivery in South Africa”, (Hough, 2008: 7). In 2005, Booysen (2007: 23) noted that 881 illegal protests had occurred during March 2004 to February 2005 and were reported in parliament. Bond and Mottiar (2013: 283) claimed that “by the turn of the twenty-first century, the rate of protests recorded by the police was amongst the world’s highest”.

In addition, most scholars agree that the youth and students as well as various social movements seem to be the major players in these protests. Alexander (2010: 25) stated that “a key feature has been mass participation by a new generation of fighters, especially unemployed youth but also school students”. In support of the above, Nleya et al. (2011: 15) explained that the willingness to participate in protests is dependent on age and income. They further explained that some “biological availability literature suggests that being employed is related to lower likelihood of participation, empirical studies suggests otherwise, as explained by an increase in resources. Family commitments and marriage are inversely related to participation”. Hence, students were most likely to participate because they did not have more rigid commitments. Bond and Mottiar (2013: 284) noted “a new wave of social movements erupted in most social sectors including healthcare, municipal services, land, education and even international economic relations”. They drew attention to society’s “lack of genuine socio-economic transformation”. This might explain why they have been labelled revolutionary movements and some may be viewed as the ‘rebellion of the poor’. “Marx and Engels defined collective action as an outcome of social structure rather than individual choice” (Nleya et al., 2011: 15). Also, they argued that “contradictions between social classes were a historical truth and inevitable” (Nleya, 2011: 15). Who, then, is supposed to account or respond to people’s grievances regarding service delivery? While Hough (2008) acknowledged that when

community members demand better services they are not unrealistic, he argued that councillors should not be held accountable if the community's service delivery demands are not met.

Booyesen disagreed with Hough's (2008: 8) view that councillors should not be blamed for making false promises to the communities and she claimed "there should be report-back meetings or community visits to councillors to reinforce demands and needs, in order to further drive home the need for municipal action" (2007: 23). However, they both shared the view that protests tend to be directed at municipalities because municipalities are the first point of government manifestation representation, (Booyesen, 2007 and Hough, 2008). In addition, Hough (2008: 10) noted "allegations of major corruption in government, in addition to poor service delivery" which were presented by the IFP in their September 2007 march protest that had turned violent. Furthermore, Hough (2008: 10) quoted the former ANC chairperson, Mosiuoa Lekota, when he said that many "ambitious poor-quality 'comrades' occupy government positions, and some steal public funds because politics doesn't pay". Also, Booyesen (2007: 23) stated that either real or perceived corruption "affecting the quality and allocation of services contributed to the emergence of protest". SALGA, in their 2014/15 Annual Report, clearly articulated that the Municipal Finance Management Act No. 56 of 2003 was "established to secure sound and sustainable management of the financial affairs of municipalities and other institutions in local sphere of government. And also seeks to establish treasury norms and standards for local government and to provide for all related matters". This means that local government has to create better accountability measures to ensure that local government [in municipalities] is not in violation of this act.

According to Fourie (2009: 1115), Cheema and Rondinelli identified seven forces of globalisation that are likely to shape service delivery in the 21<sup>st</sup> century and have also determined perceptions of governance in a way that defines the roles and functions that government takes on as an enabler, facilitator and regulator. These forces are as follows:

- Increased international trade and investment;
- Rapid progress in information;
- Changes in communications and transportation technology;
- Mobility of production;
- Rapid transmission of financial capital across borders;
- The emergence of knowledge economies and electronic commerce; and
- The worldwide expansion of markets for goods and services.

Each of these forces has vital implications with regard to what extent governments intervene in the economy, society and relations for good governance in order to render and deliver better services.

### **3.6 The call for good governance**

Goss (2001) described local governance as the way local government agencies interact at the local level. Alluding to Rhodes, Goss (2001: 11) perceived governance as “carried out through ‘self-organizing, inter-organizational networks’”. Essentially, governance is about formal and informal politics. Goss uses the word governance to describe new emerging forms of collective decision-making at the local level, which lead to the development of distinct relationships amongst citizens and public agencies (Goss, 2001: 11). Furthermore, to managers and politicians at local level, the reality of governance through a network of agencies is becoming more evident and local agencies are working across organisational boundaries (Goss, 2001: 11).

Good governance could be the key to combating service delivery protests facing local government. Fourie (2009: 1114) defined good governance as “consisting of the various operational processes and systems which a public organization requires to deliver services to the public”. On the other hand, Woods (2000: 825) stated that good governance is about “strengthening the rule of law and the predictability and impartiality of its enforcement”. Furthermore, “it also means rooting out corruption and rent-seeking activities, primarily by focusing on transparency and information flows and by ensuring that appropriate information is collected and released about the policies and performance of institutions so that citizens can monitor and scrutinize the management of public funds” (Woods, 2000: 825). Also, Fourie (2009: 1115) noted that there were quite a number of administrative challenges that could hinder effective governance. For example, “low capacity (such as weak personnel and system capabilities) could be due to an inadequate skills base, low compensation and poor human resources and organizational policies” (Fourie, 2009: 1118).

But Bovaird and Loffler (2003: 322) have listed the following characteristics of good governance while also noting that these have been debated:

- Citizen engagement,
- Transparency,
- Accountability,
- The equalities agenda and social inclusion (gender, ethnicity, age, religion, etc.),

- Ethical and honest behaviour,
- Equity (fair procedures and due process),
- Ability to compete in a global environment,
- Ability to work effectively in partnership,
- Sustainability, and
- Respect for the rule of law.

If municipalities tried to implement and practise these characteristics, they could improve on service delivery. Strengthening the oversight bodies and ensuring accountability would also help. In addition, party deployment needs to end and best practices and experience within the country need to be identified through proper and tested processes and procedures. Furthermore, the role of municipalities would also need to be clarified to communities. For instance, what is the role of a municipality in the delivery of housing to the poor, and how does this role directly relate to the role of the Department of Housing and Development. Another issue, as an example of what needs to be clarified, is whose responsibility it is to provide electricity to the masses, especially in villages. Is it the responsibility of Eskom or of a municipality? In cases where the municipality has bought the rights to provide electricity in a particular area, can Eskom be called upon to assist with the provision of electricity. There are many similar questions that relate to service delivery which this research hoped to answer. .

### **3.7 Conclusion**

This chapter has examined the government policies of local government or municipalities. Secondly, it traced these from the RDP which was the basis of the ANC's 1994 manifesto elections. Thirdly, the chapter focused on the role of local government in South Africa and briefly touched on the reasons for service delivery protests, a matter that will further be discussed in relation to issues of service delivery in the Msunduzi municipality. Political systems were also discussed as part of the backbone that informs the theoretical framework of this study. In conclusion, this chapter proposed the promotion of good governance as one of the tools to improve service delivery in local government. The next chapter considers the research methodology including theoretical frameworks and assumptions.

## **Chapter Four: Research Methodology**

### **4.1 Introduction**

In this chapter, qualitative research methods are described as they have been used in this research. The chapter also describes purposive sampling and finally, selected research methodologies are critically discussed and a brief conclusion provided for this chapter.

### **4.2 Research methodology and methods used**

This study is qualitative in nature, which means it attempts to study human action from the perspective of the social actors. According to Morgan and Smircich (1980: 491) qualitative research is an “approach rather than a particular set of techniques and its appropriateness derives from the nature of social phenomena to be explored”.

Furthermore, these scholars explained that between theory and method there has been a failure to examine the importance of the relationship. Devers and Frankel (2000: 265) stated that “almost all qualitative research approaches require the development, maintenance, and eventual closure of relationships with research subjects and sites”. Hence, it is essential to develop and maintain good relationships for productive sampling and credibility of the research. There is also a danger that one kind of inattentive rationality will be replaced by another, if a good relationship between efficient sampling and credibility of the research is not maintained (Morgan and Smircich, 1980: 491). In addition, the case for qualitative or quantitative research cannot be presented in the abstract because the competency and choice of a method characterises a diversity of assumptions regarding the “nature of knowledge and the methods through which that knowledge can be obtained, as well as the set of root assumptions about the nature of the phenomena to be investigated” (Morgan and Smircich, 1980: 491). Therefore, “if the goal is not to generalize to a population but to obtain insights into a phenomenon, individuals, or events, as is most often the case in interpretivist studies, then the qualitative researcher purposefully selects individuals, groups, and settings for this phase that increases understanding of the phenomena” (Onwuegbuzie and Leech 2007a, 242).

Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2007a: 240) noted that generally quantitative research makes one type of statistical generalisation of findings from the sample to the underlying population. On the contrary, in qualitative research when interpreting their data, “qualitative researchers typically tend to make one of the following types of generalization: (a) statistical

generalizations, (b) analytic generalizations, and (c) case-to-case transfer” (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2007a: 240). The basis for all approaches to social science is the interrelated set of assumptions concerning ontology, human nature and epistemology (Morgan and Smircich, 1980: 491).

Morgan and Smircich stated that “research practice should also consider perspectives characteristic of the Radical Humanist and Radical Structuralist paradigms, within which the qualitative / quantitative research issue would be regarded as an ideological debate of minor significance” (1980: 492).

This study is concerned with assessing the impact of intra-political infighting on municipal service delivery. Essential to this study are the challenges facing service delivery in Msunduzi Municipality as well as understanding the role of SALGA in the municipality. A structural functionalism theoretical framework is relevant to this study because it supports the notion that researchers study functions within their structures through the scope of systems and that the internal structure of the political system is generally applied to patterns of power and authority that characterises the relationship between the governors and the governed. This explanation relates to how intra-political infighting had an impact on service delivery of the ones governed. As Babbie and Mouton (2001) explained, it may be difficult to make another person not from the field of social sciences understand, the generalizing of qualitative sampling results and also that there are typical factors that need to be considered before making methodological choices. This is relevant because the aim of this study is to provide an understanding of the meaning which one or two people attribute to a certain event (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 274). This research maximised understanding of the phenomenon using purposive sampling.

Purposive sampling is the most common method of sampling in qualitative research (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2007b: 111). It can be used in both qualitative and quantitative research according to Tongco (2007). In purposive sampling, the researcher randomly chooses the people of interest but must first obtain a list of individuals of interest for the study, using one of several methods of purposeful sampling, and then randomly selects a desired number of individuals from this list (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2007b: 113). Purposive sampling strategies are designed to “enhance understandings of selected individuals or groups’ experience(s) or for developing theories and concepts” (Devers and Frankel 2000: 264). Researchers seek to accomplish this goal by selecting information rich cases, that is individuals, groups, organisations, or behaviours that provide the greatest insight into the research question”,

(Devers and Frankel, 2000: 264). This is the main reason that this study has selected different party representatives from Msunduzi local municipality as ‘rich informants’ or participants.

Tongco (2007) emphasised the importance of choosing a reliable and competent informant when gathering data. Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2007b) claimed that other qualitative methodologists such as Miles and Huberman have not mentioned whether the research can use any of the random sampling techniques – such as politically important sampling which refers to selecting relevant informants who may need to be included or excluded because they connect with politically sensitive anticipation in the analysis. In addition, Devers and Frankel (2000: 265) emphasised the importance for researchers to be able to “explain the use of purposive sampling in any particular study and discuss the implications for the research results” because “poor description often leads to criticism of qualitative research based on inadequate sampling designs”.

### **4.3 Participants**

The population is the total number of municipal councillors in Msunduzi local municipality at the time this study was conducted, which was 71 (excluding two councillors that had recently died), of which 28 were females and 43 were males. There was one Coloured female; eight Whites of which two were females; eleven Indians of which six were females; 52 Blacks of which 20 were females. The total number in Msunduzi local municipality is also inclusive of Local Proportional Representative Councillors known as PR Councillors. For example, the Minority Front (MF) has one ward councillor; the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) has four ward councillors as well as the National Freedom Party (NFP), whereas the Democratic Alliance (DA) has 15 ward councillors and the African National Congress (ANC) has 48 ward councillors. Hence the executive is comprised of ANC councillors and members as the ruling party.

From this population, a sample of 18 respondents participated in this study, of which ten were Black, two were Indian, one was Coloured, five were White, twelve were males and six were females. Of this total, seven councillors represented the ANC, six councillors represented the DA, two councillors represented the IFP, one councillor represented the MF and no one represented the NFP as it was not possible to set up interviews with them, despite numerous attempts made over three months (May-July 2015). Contact was made with the party’s chief through phone calls, messages, and the researcher went personally to the Msunduzi Council

meetings to set up a dates and times for the interviews. One of the challenges encountered by the researcher is that some of the appointments that had been made were not kept by one of the political parties. One Senior Municipal Official represented the executive of the municipal administration and there was one Senior Official representing SALGA. The selection of these particular respondents was informed by the number of councillors representing each ward from each political party in the municipal council and also by the willingness to participate in the study.

Initially, the intention was to have a quota of six participants from each political party based on proportional representation. However some political parties had only one to four representative members, so the number of participants had to be adjusted accordingly, also based on their willingness to participate. Hence purposive quota sampling was used. Questionnaires as an interviewing tool were used, as the researcher wrote down the responses while the interviews were being audio recorded as well, with the consent of the participants.

**Table 4.1: Demographic representation of councillors**

	Black		Coloured		Indian		White	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
ANC	4	2		1				
DA	1						4	1
IFP	1	1						
MF						1		

Table 4.1 shows the demographic representation of 16 respondents who participated in the study from the four political parties represented in the municipality. The ANC, as the ruling party with the majority of seats and councillors, was represented by seven councillors, of which four were Black males, two were Black females and one was a Coloured female. Six councillors also participated from the DA as the main opposition party, with one Black male, four White

males and one White female. The IFP was represented by one Black male and one Black female. Lastly, the MF had one Indian female participant.

Participants refer to people who contribute or participate in a particular event. In summary, the participants included seven councillors from the ruling party, ANC, six councillors from the opposition party, DA, two councillors from the IFP, one councillor from the MF as well as the Senior Municipal official and the Senior official from SALGA in KZN.

#### **4.4 Materials (schedule)**

In light of the research objectives, the research questions focused on assessing the impact of intra-political infighting on service delivery in Msunduzi Local Municipality. The research questions were formulated by the researcher as follows:

- What impact does intra-political infighting have on service delivery?
- What role and impact do political parties have on the municipality's performance with regard to service delivery?
- What are the challenges facing service delivery in Msunduzi municipality?
- What role can be played by SALGA (South African Local Governance Association) in combating intra-political infighting and helping to improve service delivery in the municipality?

The above questions were formulated into a questionnaire by the researcher. As part of the materials used, interviews were scheduled in a form of questionnaires which were administered and recorded by the researcher. They comprised of 15 interview questions (see Appendix A) which were given to each respondent. Each questionnaire asked for biographic information such as, race, gender, organisation or sub-unit or directorate, official job title, the number of years in that particular position and so forth. In addition, informed consent forms which ensured anonymity and confidentiality (see Appendix B) and declarations were read and signed by each participant before the questionnaire interview. The data was collected over a period of three months from the beginning of May 2015 to the end of July 2015.

#### **4.5 Procedure**

Ethical Clearance and full approval of the university is required before conducting any field work. Ethical clearance certificates are given by the Humanities and Social Sciences Research

Ethics Committee. The application must clearly specify if the research will be recorded or not and must include the questionnaire or interview schedule, an informed consent form, declaration, title of the project, location of the study and research approach and methods. In addition, the research topic must be clearly articulated and should not be offensive in any way. All research must be purely for academic purposes. Once ethical clearance is given, an ethical clearance certificate is awarded and is valid for the following three years. Research data must be securely stored away in the discipline or department for a period of five years after which it must be destroyed by shredding.

This study adhered to the university application process and applied for ethical clearance through the Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee with all the relevant documents. An ethical clearance certificate or letter was issued (reference number HSS/0139/015M). The field work was conducted over a period of three months, from May to July 2015, with 18 respondents (16 Municipal Councillors including the Mayor, as well as the Senior Municipal Official and the Senior Provincial Representative from SALGA).

Firstly, the researcher got permission from the Speaker to conduct the research. All respondents willingly availed themselves to participate in the study. They each signed an informed consent form (see Appendix B) which assured their anonymity and confidentiality and were not compensated in any way for their participation. It was explained that this research was purely for academic purposes and was being conducted as part of the researcher's requirement to fulfil her masters research dissertation at UKZN. All interviews were conducted at the municipality offices except for one interview with the Senior Representative from SALGA which took place at UKZN. Each interview lasted approximately 30 minutes.

All participants answered 15 questions (see Appendix A) from the questionnaire regarding which they had signed the informed consent form (Appendix B) prior to the questionnaire interview.

To conclude, this chapter has discussed purposive sampling as one of the key qualitative methods used in this study. It has described in detail the participants and the interview process, including issues of ethical clearance. The results are discussed in the next chapter.

## **Chapter Five: Results and Discussion**

### **5.1 Introduction**

Intra-political infighting for this study refers to belligerence within one political party for reasons such as attaining power or positions within the party as explained in the previous chapter. This chapter focuses on the results obtained from Msunduzi municipality. There were 16 respondents representing four political parties in the municipality as well as the Senior Municipal Official as well as the KZN Provincial Senior Official representing SALGA. The findings from the interviews are discussed below and tables are used to illustrate and quantify the responses.

### **5.2 Findings**

In Chapter Two, intra-political infighting was defined as “any intra-party combination, clique, or grouping whose members share a sense of common identity and common purpose and are organized to act collectively – as a distinct bloc within the party – to achieve their goals”, (Zariski in Boucek, 2009: 468).

The respondents understood intra-political infighting as the attainment and maintenance of political power, whereby people who gain power or are in power determine which positions are filled, by whom within their party, who gets tenders, which projects are prioritised and which policies take precedence in the functioning of the municipality. When such power is lost or is threatened, there are internal squabbles and friction that escalates between members in the party. Two councillors from the IFP mentioned that one of the main causes for intra-political infighting is that councillors treat their positions and role as employment because they are paid to be councillors. Therefore, councillors fight to maintain their positions and power. One councillor from the ANC mentioned that intra-political infighting happens in all political parties. The senior official from SALGA described intra-political infighting as the contestation for positions for deployment or for positions within the party that become available. Hence, the municipality becomes affected if it is part of the process of determining those political deployments.

The respondents appeared to understand the meaning of intra-political infighting. Table 5.1 presents the answers of the respondents regarding the presence or absence of intra-political infighting within their own political parties and representation in the Msunduzi municipality.

**Table 5.1: Is there intra-political infighting within your political party? [Question 4]**

	<b>ANC</b> (n=7)	<b>DA</b> (n=6)	<b>IFP</b> (n=2)	<b>MF</b> (n=1)	<b>SALGA</b> (n=1)	<b>Senior Municipal Official</b> (n=1)
<b>Yes</b>	4	3	1	1	0	1
<b>No</b>	3	3	1	0	1	0

The senior official from SALGA claimed that intra-party contestations such as those in Msunduzi Municipality are also evident in other municipalities. Four councillors from the ANC claimed there was intra-political infighting in their party. One explained that infighting happens because councillors are greedy and they want to maintain their positions. The other two councillors said when intra-political infighting happens, the organisation deals with it and finds solutions. The fourth councillor claimed they experience intra-political infighting on a very small scale. The three councillors that answered ‘no’, described disagreements and vibrant contestations not intra-political infighting per se.

The three councillors from the DA that said ‘yes’, claimed it was because people wanted to be re-elected to power and that political intra-infighting is common in all parties. One councillor described the infighting as immature and detracted from their position as main opposition in the municipality. The three councillors that said ‘no’ claimed there were simply personality clashes that get resolved and life went on. But in the ANC, there was intra-political infighting which was very visible in the municipal council meetings.

One councillor from the IFP mentioned inter-party infighting is mainly because of the ANC’s inability to work together with other political parties and claimed there was no intra-political infighting in the IFP. The IFP councillor that said ‘yes’, claimed people were concerned about being re-elected and retaining their power and positions. Table 5.2 presents the reasons given by the respondents that cause intra-political infighting within and among political parties.

**Table 5.2: What are the causes for intra-political infighting? [Question 5]**

<b>Reasons given</b>	<b>ANC (n=7)</b>	<b>DA (n=6)</b>	<b>IFP (n=2)</b>	<b>MF (n=1)</b>	<b>SALGA (n=1)</b>	<b>Senior Municipal Official (n=1)</b>
Struggle / vibrant contestation for power or political space; leadership control for resources, positions and power	5	2	1	1	0	0
Greed and personal vendettas	1	1	0	0	0	0
Boasting and undermining each other	0	1	0	0	0	0
Male egos	0	1	0	1	0	0
Concerned about lack of service delivery, corruption, fraud and Auditor General's Reports made public	0	1	0	0	0	0
Lobbying and aligning with top leadership	1	0	0	0	0	0
Fear of losing power	0	0	1	0	0	0
The influence of power that one has access to	0	0	0	0	1	0
No reason given	0	0	0	0	0	1

The table above presents the reasons given by the respondents for intra-political infighting in their political parties. One of the councillors from the ANC mentioned that the aligning with top leadership and the lobbying happens from national to local government in order to retain positions and political power. The two councillors (one from the DA and one from the MF) mentioned male egos as one of the causes claiming there were too many men in local government, especially in Msunduzi municipality. These causes have an impact on service delivery in addition to the challenges presented below in Table 5.3 that are faced by the Msunduzi municipality.

**Table 5.3: What are the challenges faced by the Msunduzi municipality in failing to deliver services? [Question 2]**

<b>Challenges mentioned</b>	<b>Respondents out of 18</b>
Electricity related (e.g. illegal electricity connections, electricity hikes, lack of payment for electricity rates, etc.)	7
Budget related (e.g. insufficient funding / budget, insufficient capital or financial resources, unconducive financial environment, small grants given, etc.)	11
Related to payment of services received (e.g. water and sanitation, electricity, and debt collection, etc.)	4
Related to lack of maintenance (e.g. poor infrastructure, roads, buildings, clean water and sanitation, sewage systems, etc.)	5
Lack of oversight and service delivery, corruption, regulations that take too long to be approved and delay service delivery	6
Unfilled vacancies, lack of capacity development, unskilled labour, etc.	4
Intra-political infighting and protests	3
Population profiling and demarcation	2
Issues of human settlements and economic development	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>18</b>

This table illustrates the challenges experienced by the respondents. Eleven respondents expressed their dissatisfaction with the budget that is allocated to the municipality. They claimed the budget was not enough to render and deliver services to the various communities regardless of the claims of corruption and misuse of funds available and lack of oversight that were also mentioned by the other six respondents. Seven respondents mentioned issues related to electricity facing the municipality. For example, the cost of electricity has led to illegal connections and some communities failing to pay for electricity and water rates timeously. This results in the municipality having huge debts with ESKOM, NERSA and Umngeni Water. Msunduzi municipality includes communities that are poor and unable to pay for rates and services. In addition, two respondents mentioned that the demarcation between the urban and the rural community is challenging for the municipality to deliver or render services at the same time and on a par among both communities. According to one respondent, the rural community is under the jurisdiction and rule of the chiefs who do things the old ways which sometimes delays service delivery. On the other hand, four respondents criticised the municipality for employing semi-skilled or unskilled labour, and for having so many unfilled vacancies as well

as undeveloped councillors which all slow down and prevent service delivery. While three respondents mentioned intra-political infighting and protests as challenges facing the municipality, most of the respondents noted that these two challenges have improved. Table 5.4 presents the respondents' answers regarding whether the challenges mentioned previously have a role in intra-political infighting.

**Table 5.4: Do you think that those challenges have a role in intra-political infighting? [Question3]**

	ANC (n=7)	DA (n=6)	IFP (n=2)	MF (n=1)	SALGA (n=1)	Senior Municipal Official (n=1)
<b>Yes</b>	4	5	2	1	0	0
<b>No</b>	2	1	0	0	1	1
<b>Sometimes</b>	1	0	0	0	0	0

The above table shows that four ANC councillors and one councillor claimed that the challenges mentioned previously play a role in intra-political infighting. They gave reasons that some councillors use the ANC's failures to deliver services to discredit the ANC and its work. Also, they mentioned that some councillors that do not do anything except to come back and retain their positions by creating internal squabbles. Lastly, they mentioned that when the municipality delivers services selectively to different wards, this complicates things because the councillor representing the ward where service delivery is not taking place, views this act as sabotage which creates intra-political infighting. The two councillors that said 'no', claimed that service delivery challenges are not related to intra-political infighting.

The five DA councillors who said 'yes', mentioned that the challenges have a role in intra-political infighting because the municipality is led by the ANC and the community does not have faith in their leadership regarding service delivery. Another councillor claimed the ANC sabotages their wards by not delivering services to the wards that they lead which then creates intra-political infighting. One DA councillor claimed the DA could capitalise on the ANC's lack of or inefficiency in service delivery. The other councillor said 'no', the challenges have no role in intra-political infighting.

The IFP councillors felt that the challenges mentioned previously have a role in intra-political infighting because being a councillor is viewed as an opportunity to get access to tenders and enrich themselves. The ruling party does not take suggestions from other parties. In addition, the respondent from the MF mentioned that the ruling party and the opposition party tend to

prioritise the areas in which they live and which they represent and take much longer to deliver services to other areas which in turn creates inter-party infighting. The senior official from SALGA mentioned that intra-party contestations do not affect service delivery; hence the challenges mentioned previously do not have a role in intra-political contestations. In agreement, the senior municipal official stated that the challenges facing the municipality do not play a role in intra-political infighting because there are different departments responsible for the rendering and delivering of services in the municipality. Table 5.5 below presents the kind of impact that intra-political infighting has on service delivery according to the responses given.

**Table 5.5: What impact do you think this intra-political infighting has on service delivery? [Question 6]**

	<b>ANC</b> (n=7)	<b>DA</b> (n=6)	<b>IFP</b> (n=2)	<b>MF</b> (n=1)	<b>SALGA</b> (n=1)	<b>Senior Municipal Official</b> (n=1)
<b>Yes, it has a negative impact</b>	6	5	2	1	0	1
<b>It has a positive impact</b>	0	1	0	0	0	0
<b>Both, Negative and positive</b>	0	0	0	0	1	0
<b>No, it has no impact</b>	1	0	0	0	0	0

This table shows that six ANC councillors said that intra-political infighting has a negative impact on service delivery because it slows down development, it delays projects and consequently it impedes service delivery. Also, one of the councillors mentioned that being in the wrong ‘lobby group’ has a negative impact on service delivery because as a councillor you may have power but if you are not using it correctly, this damages the party’s credibility. In addition, one councillor said that it has no impact on service delivery because the municipality always tries not to neglect service delivery despite any differences on how to deliver services or which projects to prioritise. The five DA councillors had similar reasons for stating that intra-political infighting has a negative impact on service delivery. Furthermore, one councillor mentioned that time spent debating, arguing, or fighting about personal issues is wasted and delays projects because more time has to be spent trying to resolve issues. Also political interference from political parties delays projects.

In addition, one councillor said that municipality management takes too long to approve projects and funding and they are biased in terms of which projects they approve and prioritise

which has a negative result on other wards and service delivery. One councillor said that intra-political infighting has a positive impact on service delivery. When the DA fights for all citizens to uphold the law, including politicians that is good for the DA. The IFP had similar views to the ANC and the DA, that intra-political infighting has a negative impact on service delivery because it delays projects and hinders service delivery. The more time spent on infighting, the more service delivery is neglected which is why it is not good to have one political party in the majority. In the same way as other political parties, the representative from MF stated that intra-political infighting has a negative impact because it slows down service delivery.

In contrast, the senior official from SALGA, explained that there can be either a positive or a negative impact on service delivery if a party that is contesting for elections is unable to resolve any challenges it encounters. This could disadvantage the community that is represented by that political party in being represented for elections at a national level. The senior official from the municipality mentioned that intra-political infighting has a negative impact on service delivery. Most of the respondents acknowledged that intra-political infighting has a negative impact on service delivery because it slows down projects to be implemented and the budget approval process takes some time. Hence, there is a role and need for public participation through izimbizo meetings to be strengthened so service delivery can be improved. The table below presents the respondents' answers to whether there is a need for public participation.

**Table 5.6: is there a need for public participation through izimbizo meetings? [Question 7]**

	ANC (n=7)	DA (n=6)	IFP (n=2)	MF (n=1)	SALGA (n=1)	Senior Municipal Official (n=1)
<b>Yes</b>	6	3	2	1	0	1
<b>No</b>	1	2	0	0	0	0
<b>Sometimes (yes/no)</b>	0	1	0	0	1	0

Table 5.6 shows that six ANC councillors agreed that there is a need for public participation because it creates a platform for dialogue and communication between the councillors and the communities they represent. It also creates an opportunity for the community to hold the councillors accountable to addressing their grievances. One councillor claimed it was more effective to hold ward committee meetings compared with izimbizo meetings. The three DA councillors (inclusive of one councillor that said 'sometimes') that said 'no' gave reasons for the izimbizo meetings being ineffective. These meetings can end up being more of an ANC

rally then communities constructively participating. The other councillor mentioned that the meetings were not effective because they ended up being more of a blaming game, where the community blames councillors for not delivering and the councillors become defensive. Three councillors said ‘yes’, izimbizo meetings have an important role to play in public participation in order to strengthen communication between councillors and communities. The other councillor mentioned that public participation is crucial, but the turnout is usually poor, especially in community wards where councillors keep in touch via emails and so forth. But the councillor emphasised the importance of ward committee meetings as well as izimbizo meetings at local government, where serious service delivery issues are discussed.

In addition, the two IFP councillors stated that izimbizo meetings were important and should be held often because they create a platform for communication among the communities and the councillors, and also enable the community to hold the councillors accountable. In support of all the other councillors that said ‘yes’, the representative from MF also mentioned that izimbizo meetings were important and public participation was crucial. Hence, the meetings should be advertised widely using all media available, such as local radio stations, newspapers and so forth. Also the senior municipal administration official agreed that public participation through izimbizo meetings strengthened communication between the communities and the councillors. The senior representative from SALGA had a different view. He questioned the essence and reality of izimbizo meetings, whether the meetings do what they were initially meant to do. He gave an example about how these meetings tend to be more of an address from government officials than an open dialogue between everyone involved. Table 5.7 below presents the responses given by the respondents on whether there is a role that can be played by political parties.

**Table 5.7: Is there a role that can be played by political parties? [Question 8]**

	<b>ANC</b> (n=7)	<b>DA</b> (n=6)	<b>IFP</b> (n=2)	<b>MF</b> (n=1)	<b>SALGA</b> (n=1)	<b>Senior Municipal Official</b> (n=1)
<b>Yes</b>	7	4	2	1	1	1
<b>No</b>	0	2	0	0	0	0

The table above shows that seven ANC councillors agreed that there was a role that could be played by political parties to assist the municipality in combating service delivery challenges. Councillors are elected by the community to represent them and to be link between them and

the municipality and to debate policy on their behalf, irrespective of the intra-infighting that happens within and among political parties. Communities need to be able to voice out their concerns and needs to the municipality. Moreover, one of the councillors explained that it is important for political parties to deploy hard-working and high quality leaders or councillors who can read and write because there are huge documents that have to be read and understood by councillors and so forth. One councillor stated that even though there is a role to be played by political parties, they must guard against interference with municipal systems in doing things, and maybe they should play a role of being more accountable to the communities they represent. In addition, another councillor stressed the importance for political parties to assist in delivering services rather than pushing their political agendas. The four DA councillors also agreed that there was a role to be played by political parties, to give support and good ideas to the municipal administration on service delivery and strengthening policy; also to be a mediator between the municipality and the community and to be more accountable to the people than the party. It was important to contribute positive ideas on service delivery issues but also to play the role of oversight in the municipal administration management. Moreover, one councillor complained that project proposals take too long to be approved by municipal management if they are from opposition parties. Two DA councillors claimed that politics should not be in local government at all and that there was no meaningful role that could be played by political parties who spend the taxpayers' money on meaningless functions and events. The other councillor stated that under the current leadership dominated by the ANC in the municipality, there was no meaningful role to be played by political parties unless the leadership changed.

In addition, the two IFP councillors agreed that there was a role to be played by political parties, but in order to be able to contribute meaningful ideas, the ANC has to be willing to take suggestions and implement them in the municipality. Also, political parties must represent their community wards adequately to ensure service delivery. Hence, the political leaders and councillors must be capacitated and go to workshops to become efficient in their leadership. The representative from MF mentioned that political parties could play a meaningful role by meeting each other half way, communicating with the community and working together to address challenges of service delivery. The senior official representing SALGA had similar views that political parties mainly contested elections to represent various communities in local government and assist in service delivery. Similarly, the senior municipal administration official stated that councillors from political parties were elected by communities to represent

them in the municipality. Most respondents agreed that there was a role that could be played by political parties in order to assist the municipality combat service delivery challenges. Some of the challenges that have faced the municipality are a result of the previous municipal administration. The respondents gave the following reasons for the municipality being under administration in 2010.

**Table 5.8: In 2010, when the municipality was under administration, what was the cause? [Question 11]**

<b>Reasons / causes</b>	<b>Respondents out of 18</b>
Intra-political infighting, division between two camps (mayor vs. deputy mayor)	8
Bad / poor leadership, lack of oversight, abuse of power, lack of administrative control, failure to deliver services	10
Corruption, misuse of resources, overtime and funds	11
Bankruptcy, failure to pay for services by the community, huge municipal debt due to lack of financial management and funds	6
Political interference	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>18</b>

Table 5.8 presents the reasons and causes that placed the municipality under administration under the leadership of the previous municipal administration, given by the respondents, informed by their own experiences, observations, Auditor General’s reports, media and so forth. The majority of the respondents stated that corruption, misuse of resources, funds and overtime as well as bad leadership, abuse of power, lack of oversight and administrative control played a huge role in lack or inefficient service delivery in the municipality. Table 5.9 categorises the respondents’ answers regarding mismanagement of funds and intra-political infighting which resulted in the municipality being put under administration during the leadership of the former municipal administration.

**Table 5.9: Do you think that intra-political infighting and mismanagement of funds played any role in the municipality failing to render and deliver services in 2010? [Question 12]**

	<b>ANC (n=7)</b>	<b>DA (n=6)</b>	<b>IFP (n=2)</b>	<b>MF (n=1)</b>	<b>SALGA (n=1)</b>	<b>Senior Municipal Official (n=1)</b>
<b>Yes</b>	6	6	2	1	1	1
<b>No</b>	1	0	0	0	0	0

The above table shows that six ANC councillors agreed that mismanagement of funds and intra-political infighting played a huge role in the municipality failing to render and deliver services. Maladministration and political interference led to some politicians using community protests to block certain projects from being implemented. One of the councillors said that some of the municipal officials were involved in looting of municipal resources and there was lack of accountability and oversight misuse of funds. The one councillor that said 'no' explained that the current administration resolved any differences that existed and re-committed to fulfilling its goals and mandate.

All six councillors from the DA agreed that mismanagement of funds played a role but it was intra-political infighting that had the greatest impact. Due to male egos, the mayor and the deputy mayor were constantly 'at each other's throats'. There was also considerable political interference and the municipal administration management was not strong enough to handle this, according to one councillor. Another councillor explained that more time was spent on squabbles than on delivering services because there was division in the ruling party.

The IFP councillors concurred that mismanagement of funds and intra-political infighting was the main cause for the municipality to be placed under administration. Because people tend to support 'camps', divisions are formed within a party. This was evident in all three spheres of government. The councillor gave an example of how when there were squabbles in national government, this extended to local government which had an impact on service delivery. The representative of MF mentioned that some people were no longer working at the municipality because due to misuse of funds in the previous administration. The senior official from SALGA attested that some people in the municipality were made accountable. The senior municipal administration official stated that mismanagement of funds played a huge role in the municipality being put under administration. During the previous administration, protests also took place. Presented in Table 5.10 are the responses given by the respondents regarding what they viewed as the main cause for community protests.

**Table 5.10: Are protests a result of the failure of the municipality to deliver services or and it is the intra-political infighting in the municipality? [Question 9]**

	ANC (n=7)	DA (n=6)	IFP (n=2)	MF (n=1)	SALGA (n=1)	Senior Municipal Official (n=1)
<b>It is the failure of the municipality to deliver services</b>	0	1	1	1	0	0
<b>It is because of intra-political infighting in municipality</b>	0	1	1	0	0	0
<b>Yes it is both</b>	6	4	0	0	0	1
<b>No / no view on the matter</b>	0	0	0	0	1	0
<b>Another view different from above</b>	1	0	0	0	0	0

The table above shows that six ANC councillors stated that most service delivery protests were due to the failure of the municipality to render and deliver services on time as well as because of intra-political infighting that continues to exist in the municipality. Even when the public was genuinely protesting about issues of service delivery, certain political parties used this to their advantage by perpetuating incorrect misconceptions about that current leadership. Also, when they are divisions within one's party, some people push their own agendas because they have political aspirations. One councillor mentioned that sometimes the communities are impatient and do not wait for services to be delivered before they protest.

In support of the reasons mentioned by some ANC councillors, four DA councillors also noted that other people with political aspirations instigated community protests and exploited them to discredit other political parties. One councillor also criticized the ruling party's inability to take suggestions from other parties as one of the root causes for intra-political infighting in the municipality which impacts service delivery negatively. One councillor explained that people protest when they are frustrated due to lack of service delivery, especially if there is no communication to address why services were delayed or were not happening in their wards. Hence it was crucial to hold community meetings to inform the public about what is happening in their ward. Also, it was important for councillors and political parties to identify which needs were most important in communities. While noting that people had a right to protest and raise their concerns, the IFP councillor felt it was wrong to burn and vandalise property. The other

IFP councillor blamed the municipality for its lack or failure to deliver services on time and stated that if the municipality delivered services, there would be no protests. Conversely, the MF representative mentioned that people were frustrated with paying for services like water and electricity and not receiving these services, hence they protested in an attempt to be heard.

The senior representative from SALGA wondered whether the people who protested, were doing so as members from a certain political party or if they were genuinely concerned citizens from a particular ward. The senior municipal administration official mentioned that communities sometimes had genuine reasons for protesting. But some politicians used and exploited such situations for their own personal gain. In addition, intra-political infighting also had an impact on elections and who gets placed in leadership positions and how they will deliver services and so forth. Presented in Table 5.11 are the opinions provided by the respondents on the increase or decrease of intra-political infighting closer to elections.

**Table 5.11: Closer to elections, in your opinion does intra-political infighting increase? [Question 13]**

	<b>ANC</b> (n=7)	<b>DA</b> (n=6)	<b>IFP</b> (n=2)	<b>MF</b> (n=1)	<b>SALGA</b> (n=1)	<b>Senior Municipal Official</b> (n=1)
<b>Yes it increases</b>	7	5	2	0	0	1
<b>No it decreases</b>	0	1	0	1	1	0

The table above shows that all seven councillors from the ANC agreed that closer to elections intra-political infighting increases because people want to attain or maintain political power and positions. This is especially so now that councillors get paid a salary. One councillor stated that being a councillor should come from within, from wanting to uplift and develop your community, not for selfish gain such as political power and money. Many people that died during the apartheid regime sacrificed their lives for the democracy that South Africa enjoys today. Five DA councillors agreed that intra-political infighting increases because people wanted to retain and attain power and influence. Political parties try to present themselves as the best candidates to be voted into power through any means, such as making promises they do not keep. Politics should not be in local government. This slowed down service delivery and retards development because time was spent fighting and discrediting each other instead of

providing services to the communities. Two councillors also noted that intra-political infighting happened in all three spheres of government and it impacted service delivery negatively. One councillor said intra-political infighting depended on how each political party elected its candidates or councillors. He gave an example of how the DA has strict policies and procedures for choosing their councillors. After councillors have been nominated by the community, they have to go through a series of interviews to determine whether they were the best candidates to represent the community under the DA.

One councillor from the IFP said that intra-political infighting increased towards elections because people were power hungry. They wanted their camps represented in local government. Another councillor had a different view, that inter-party infighting existed more during elections because the ruling party did not take suggestions from other political parties. The representative of the MF stated that no there was no increase in intra-party infighting towards elections because the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) had very strict policies regarding any infighting and disruption of elections. All the councillors had to sign and abide to a code of conduct. The representative from SALGA claimed that intra-party infighting definitely decreased closer to elections because people of the same party were united and campaigning for their party. But tensions may have arisen when the party had to choose who would represent it in the elections. The senior administration official representing the municipality mentioned that intra-political party infighting increased because people wanted to maintain political positions.

Institutions like SALGA have a huge role to play when conducting workshops for councillors to teach them about the code of ethics in the municipality, among other things. Presented in Table 5.12 are the examples given by the respondents on the kinds of roles SALGA does or can play to assist the municipality to combat service delivery challenges.

**Table 5.12: Do you think there could be a role played by SALGA? Provide examples [Question 10]**

	ANC (n=7)	DA (n=6)	IFP (n=2)	MF (n=1)	SALGA (n=1)	Senior Municipal Official (n=1)
<b>Yes</b>	4	6	2	0	1	1
<b>No</b>	1	0	0	1	0	0
<b>Very little role to play</b>	2	0	0	0	0	0

The above table represents the responses given on the role that can be played by SALGA. Table 5.13 below gives examples of the kind of roles that can be or are played by SALGA according to the respondents.

**Table 5.13: SALGA’s role**

<b>Examples given on what role SALGA can play / is playing</b>	<b>Respondents</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To build capacity through training, developing skills, providing study materials that clearly articulate the role of councillors</li> </ul>	6
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To liaise with national and provincial government to get financial support, increase budget and to get general assistance and support</li> </ul>	5
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To play a role of oversight, ensuring that there is no corruption or misuse of funds, etc.</li> </ul>	3
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To continue negotiating salaries on behalf of the municipality</li> </ul>	4
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SALGA should be de-politicised [not led by the ANC only]</li> </ul>	2
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SALGA should remove stumbling blocks to service delivery such as employing unqualified staff, infighting, etc.</li> </ul>	3
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SALGA represents the Msunduzi municipality in the NCOP to represent their interests when laws are made, their budget is protected by not adding more services to be delivered without increasing the budget.</li> <li>SALGA represents Msunduzi in all other provincial structures like Lekgotls’s etc.</li> <li>SALGA also represents the municipality in salary negotiation of employees.</li> <li>SALGA also provides training and development through capacity building, where 2000 or more employees are trained, such as fire fighters, etc. and councillors.</li> <li>SALGA also provides general support to management.</li> </ul>	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>18</b>

According to the SALGA (2014/15: 17) annual report, SALGA has six main functions, which are as follows:

- **Lobby, advocacy and represent:** This refers to representing the interests of members in legislature and other policy-making and oversight structures. It also refers to engaging with various stakeholders in public debates and other platforms in the interests of local government.
- **Employer body:** This refers to being an effective employer that represents its members. This representation is carried out in collective bargaining as stipulated in the Labour

Relations Act. However, it also includes various other structures including but not limited to those established in the SALGBC.

- **Capacity building:** This refers to facilitating capacity building initiatives through representing member interests in the Local Government Sector Education Authority (LGSETA).
- **Support and advise:** SALGA needs to provide the tools and services that enable municipalities to understand and interpret trends, policies and legislation affecting local government and to implement them.
- **Strategic profiling:** Elements here refer to enhancing the profile and image of local government as an important and credible agent for the delivery of services. Profiling needs to take place on a national level as well as in Africa and the rest of the world.
- **Knowledge and information sharing:** This refers to building and sharing a comprehensive hub of local governmental knowledge and intelligence. This will enable the informed delivery of the other mandates of SALGA. The knowledge hub is also a useful reference point for all who seek local government information.

From the findings discussed above, five themes were identified. These themes are further discussed in detail in the following section.

### **5.3 Research themes emerging from research questions**

From the participants' responses to the research questions, five main themes emerged which addressed the key objectives of this study. These research themes are as follows:

- Infighting and service delivery
- Political parties and service delivery
- Challenges impacting service delivery
- South African Local Governance Association (SALGA)
- Protests and service delivery

The respondents noted that there was indeed intra-political infighting within political parties as well as among political parties. A few respondents, especially from the ruling party, did not admit to this in the interview but off the record they did and through observation; the researcher picked up that there was tension within their parties but they did not want to mention this on record. Most of the respondents from other parties admitted on record that they are experiencing intra-party infighting which was impacting negatively on service delivery. In

addition, almost all respondents agreed that there was a role to be played by political parties in improving service delivery but some respondents complained that the political parties need to be more influential and participate in policy formulations and financial management of the municipality in order to be able to assist in improving the provision of services to all communities. Also, projects to develop communities need to be implemented.

Most respondents or participants seemed to agree and mentioned similar challenges that were facing the municipality. Challenges such as the community's inability to pay for services rendered, like electricity and water rates; huge backlog of infrastructural maintenance; delay in approving and implementing projects; high levels of corruption and lack of efficient oversight as well as service delivery protests which were more evident especially during the previous municipal administration, prior to 2010. Another research theme discussed was the role of SALGA. Evidently, most respondents were not aware of SALGA's role but they gave suggestions as to how SALGA could assist in combating intra-political infighting and improving service delivery in the Msunduzi local municipality.

#### **5.4 Intra-political infighting and service delivery**

Some of the respondents were reluctant to discuss whether there was intra-political infighting in their political parties but most admitted to it. One respondent claimed not to have noticed any infighting but other respondents from the same party mentioned that there was infighting, especially towards elections. Other respondents admitted to infighting in their own political parties. One of the respondents claimed that intra-political infighting was more evident within the ANC and gave an example of how ANC councillors behaved like a united front in council meetings but when it came to delivering or rendering services, they were not united. Furthermore, the respondent explained that there was a place called Vulindlela and a place called Edendale which are both led by two councillors from the ANC. Services seem to be better at Edendale than at Vulindlela. The respondent mentioned that Edendale had bridges for children to cross over the rivers when going to school whereas at Vulindlela there were no bridges. Previous councillors had put forward proposals for bridges to be built years but today they are still not built. This makes the Vulindlela councillors look incompetent and not delivering services to the community while the Edendale councillors are glorified. This respondent further mentioned that "infighting between political parties is not visible but it is done by the ANC to undermine other political parties" especially when they had to vote and adopt certain policies. Another respondent mentioned that if another political party puts

forward a good proposal for service delivery, the ruling party (ANC) will either take the proposal or adopt it as their own or they will ‘shoot it down’ and not support it.

One of the respondents disputed that there was any intra- or inter-political infighting in their political party because the different parties had agreed on common goals to render and deliver services to the public of Msunduzi municipality. The respondent further elaborated that there was no infighting except maybe contestation for space and leadership in order to control resources. Most respondents mentioned that some of the main causes for intra-political infighting were based on contestation of space and wanting to be the majority ruling party in addition to contesting for positions within their own political parties.

Another respondent mentioned that greed and corruption were the main causes for intra-political infighting because once a person is put in power that person tends to want more power at any cost. This ultimately affects service delivery because now people are more focused on keeping their positions than delivering services to the people that put them in power by voting. One of the respondents said that “intra-political infighting is taking away their focus from being the main opposition party” (Respondent 9). The respondent further elaborated that intra-political infighting in the “ANC is more evident through municipal management. Within the NFP, some of their councillors were re-called from the council and then called again because the person who had called them had no authority. Also, the IFP has its own problems they are facing and the MF well has no-one to in fight with because there is only one councillor representing them.” Lastly, this respondent mentioned that “personal vendettas” were the main cause for intra-political infighting: people pushing their own personal interests instead of working towards achieving the party’s goals and delivering services. The repercussions were detrimental to communities expecting service delivery.

Almost all respondents mentioned that the reasons for the municipality to go under administration in the previous administration was because of intra-political infighting that was between the then Mayor and the Speaker of the ANC, who were divided into two camps which caused havoc in the municipality and affected service delivery negatively. The majority of the respondents claimed that intra-political infighting was bad and should be prevented because it disrupted service delivery.

The municipality found it difficult to function when there was intra-political fighting because this affected service delivery to the various sectors. It also affected the budget and resources allocated for rendering services. In some instances, the mismanagement of funds played a role

in intra-political infighting and also contributed greatly to the lack of or inefficient rendering of services to the different communities. The next section emphasises intra-political infighting among the ANC and its impact on service delivery in Msunduzi Municipality during the previous administration.

On 6 June 2007, the Mail and Guardian reported that the Former Minister of Local and Provincial Government, Sydney Mufamadi, said that municipal service delivery should not be allowed to be affected by political infighting. The Minister further said, “surely it is wrong for people who failed to secure nominations as candidates for their parties not to direct their energies towards helping today’s incumbents to serve the people as expected” (Mail and Guardian, 6 June 2007). In addition, on 2 February 2010, News24 reported that the ANC intended to tackle the infighting that was affecting service delivery in the province of the Eastern Cape. The ANC would also monitor councillors’ performances and hoped to deal with its troubled relationship with municipalities (this was said in a statement by the then spokesperson Mlibo Qoboshiyane). Furthermore, the party had planned to address the problems with the “political-administrative interface which are undermining the integrity and functioning of municipal councils through intra- and inter-party conflicts” (News24, 2 February 2010).

Tension and division were evident in 2010 and 2011 in the ANC Moses Mabhida region that attests to intra-political infighting within the ANC. The Mercury newspaper reporter, Bongani Hans reported that Alpha Shelembe, a Former Speaker and Deputy Mayor of the Msunduzi municipality was forced to resign as the Deputy Mayor and ANC Regional Treasurer in 2011 because of allegation of corruption and being behind the burning down of the ANC’s Moses Mabhida Regional offices in Pietermaritzburg. Shelembe faced these allegations while mixed up in an internal ANC power struggle (Hans, 2013). Skhumbuzo Miya from the Witness newspaper reported that Sbhongile Mkhize, an ANC resolute, believed that the incident of setting fire to the ANC offices was intended to take away attention from the meeting between the dissatisfied cadres from the region and the ANC NEC member, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, who was heading the national task team established by the ANC headquarters to investigate alleged irregularities that occurred during the nominations of the ANC election candidates in the region (The Witness, 12 June 2011). The burning of the ANC offices had happened previously, in November 2010, leaving the upper level of the building completely destroyed with some offices having to be relocated (The Witness, 12 June 2011). Political parties are

crucial in the municipality but their contribution and role is impeded by intra-political infighting, which ultimately impacts service delivery.

### **5.5 Political parties and service delivery**

The majority of the respondents mentioned that political parties have a huge role to play in helping the municipality to combat the challenges it is facing. They also mentioned that intra-political infighting tends to increase towards elections because once people have tasted power, they do everything in their power to hold on to it. One of the respondents gave an example of how councillors who may have not done well find a way to manipulate the system and be re-elected for second or third terms.

One of the respondents felt that the role that can be played by political parties was minimal because they do not have administrative power: “What you must remember is that political parties do not have administrative power. No politician has administrative power; politicians have what you call itinerary power but they do allow facilitation, they do allow you to be the link between the community and administration. And in that way they do strengthen the link between the community and the administration” (Respondent 3). Another respondent agreed that there was a role to be played by political parties but highlighted that at Msunduzi this was not the case because some political parties were opportunistic and did not see eye-to-eye with the municipality management: “sometimes you find that some of the political parties will try to distract what the municipality is saying in order to gain something from that, which is what mostly happens” (Respondent 4). Another respondent added that “politics should not be in local government. Just because of the whole nature of it, people wanting to score points and things like that and the money spent of functions should be spent on providing services or rendering services” (Respondent 11). Another respondent mentioned that “political parties can contribute meaningful suggestions but only if the current ruling party can take those suggestions and implement them” (Respondent 17).

Respondent 18 explained how political parties’ role in service delivery was crucial but could also have pros and cons:

Absolutely, in fact that is why political parties are appointed and they contest. In council also individuals are allowed to contest. The weakness with independent candidates is that they cannot formulate long held views because they do not have institutions supporting them to have a sense of a wider picture and so forth. And to relentlessly

pursue ideologies. If we recognize that as a weakness then definitely political parties have a role to play. If political parties have weak structures and political ideologies among their *deployees* then political parties will also be useless but not to say that independent are useless. To lead a community you do need support so as an individual you might have less support or not support structures. A political party can contribute positively, for example, in cases where they have a *deployee* who has the necessary skills and qualifications. But there are also cases where a political party expresses views of a community and as a results property value of that place goes up, roads are clean, it's a safe community, there is local economic development, also Black economic empowerment. All these things you know happen and that is where a political party is doing a great job. In fact all the objectives of local government occur. But we also see it when it does not happen, where a political party will have a direct disfunctionality in Supply Chain Management (SCM) processes at the appointment of service providers, irregular activities, and lack of accountability. So you see political parties can play a wonderful role but also can play a bad role, including the recruitment of Mayors, MM, and so forth. We need more equitable employment policies in the municipalities. And that is important, when it does not happen then also you have a municipality that does not have women in their exco and that is also political failure. The municipality we are talking about currently does not have women in their exco which is political failure; the policy of fifty, fifty rule representation is not honoured.

### **5.6 Challenges impacting service delivery**

The majority of the respondents mentioned similar factors as challenges faced by the municipality that affect service delivery. Most respondents mentioned insufficient funding or financial distress or lack of appropriate budget as one of the most important and common challenge facing the municipality. The respondents mentioned the following challenges:

- Illegal electricity connections;
- Shortage of staff to work due to unfilled vacancies;
- Service delivery protests.
- Huge backlog of infrastructural maintenance;
- Delay in approving and implementing projects;
- Community's inability to pay for services such as electricity and water;

- Human settlements (especially because most of the population is poor and was previously disadvantaged);
- High levels of corruption and lack of oversight;
- Intra-political infighting and greed;
- Division and provision of services in communities according to jurisdiction

In addition, in one of the earlier sections in this chapter, the core functions of SALGA were listed. Most respondents were ill informed on the main functions of SALGA but they had views on how SALGA could assist the municipality regarding challenges of service delivery.

### **5.7 South African Local Governance Association (SALGA)**

The majority of the respondents appeared to be confused about the role SALGA plays within the municipality but made suggestions on how SALGA should have mechanisms in place for checks and balances in the functioning of the municipality. Respondent 1 said that SALGA “can play a role by building the capacity of municipalities so that they are better equipped to deliver on their mandate of service delivery to the community. This can be done through training and also through liaison with National Treasury to influence the financial/ budget allocation to municipalities”. Respondent 4 explained that SALGA did not have

financial capacity or muscle but the little that they have, they can use to alleviate service delivery challenges faced by the municipality. And then again we can talk about communication because communication plays an important role in municipalities and also that communication between the communities, public participation is also very important in this regard, in these issues.

In addition, one Respondent 11 who was more informed about SALGA’s current role mentioned that

SALGA could potentially play a huge role because, for example, some time back there took over the bargaining of salaries with the workers with helped enormously, as much as there may not have any knowledge on how to deal with protests and things like that but the little that there can do makes a difference especially in bargaining on behalf of the municipality.

The respondent that represented SALGA (Respondent 18) explained the role that SALGA currently plays in the municipality:

In Msunduzi municipality, we represent them in the NCOP in order to represent their interest when the laws are made, in that way they do not get any new services that they should render. So we protect their budget by saying do not give them any new services to render without increasing or giving them funding. Secondly, we also represent Msunduzi in all other provincial structures that are there like your Lekgotlas, etc. just the other day we were saying 'if they want Msunduzi to be a Metro municipality we want X amount', an argument which might have never come, similar to what we do for other municipalities. We explained that this demarcation process and amalgamating is going to cost you this much. And they gave us half the amount of what we asked for and we said that is not enough. We also provide guidance for Msunduzi when it comes to salary of employees. It can be very difficult to negotiate salaries at local government because the people are outside your door. So it is better if they negotiate with us (SALGA). Lastly, the amount of capacity building which we do which benefits Msunduzi like fire fighting is quite important. We train about 2000 officials annually. In many instances, in local government most legislations do not become law, the bill does not become law until SALGA has been consulted, which gives us a very important role to play in the cabinet laws that impact municipalities. That is how we can assist in service delivery.

Clarity was requested on what SALGA was doing to ensure that municipal councillors were aware of their role and the support structures they offer the municipality, especially since the results showed that most respondents were not aware of SALGA's role. Respondent 18, from SALGA, thought that SALGA had taken it for granted and presumed that they were known because some of their office bearers are councillors:

The current mayor (in 2015) of Msunduzi municipality is in the structure of SALGA, he represents the municipality. It is only now that we are realising that we need to have projects that touch from all, from a fire-fighter right up to the mayor. In KZN, unlike other provinces, you have mayors sitting in SALGA in the executive structure, which is odd, because if you go to other provinces there it is not such a thing. The hierarchy here has played itself in a different manner whereas in other provinces there is lack of protocol which allows a person to come from being a speaker or mayor to sit in the executive, we do have a unique situation here in KZN but I do believe SALGA has embarked on a re-branding where there will be new logos, names and corporate identity, with the view of renewing ourselves. Because what we have learnt is that every five

years the people that we have been availing ourselves to go and change positions in municipalities. And then the new people come in, and they are still learning about how to be a councillor, so our new corporate identity is targeting the public whom we know eventually when they come in as councillors, or to be employed in the municipality they will now know that there is SALGA. But we do have our regulars that we have done well to be known by them but certainly there is still quite a long way.

In light of the depth discussion of the role of SALGA, it was clear that there is a role in the mandate of SALGA to assist the municipality in better improving service delivery, which in return might assist in decreasing service delivery protests.

### **5.8 Protests and service delivery**

As discussed in Chapter Three, over the years protests on service delivery seem to have become more prominent even though it cannot be denied that service delivery has improved in South Africa since the new democracy. Most of the respondents felt that service delivery protests had improved since the new administration.

Service delivery protests appear to be a challenge to most municipalities in South African local government. Msunduzi municipality is not the exception. In 2007, service delivery protests in Pietermaritzburg, under Msunduzi municipality, escalated from two per month to one every two days in 2012 (Brisbane, 2014). One of the greatest challenges facing Msunduzi municipality in 2014 was ongoing massive protests by citizens who were angry and protesting over rising electricity tariffs that caused debt and disconnections with many businesses having to downscale, relocate or close up (Brisbane, 2014). Brisbane (2014) stated that there were lessons to be shared that “reflect deeply on the state of our democracy and the accountability of government to its citizens”. The protest was provoked by the “imposition by Msunduzi Municipality of a 10% tariff increase, before the National Electricity Regulator (NERSA) had considered an application from the municipality to increase its tariff above the recommended 7 percent” (Brisbane, 2014). The municipality decided to make up the shortfall in revenue by imposing massive hikes in charges. The ‘MCB’ charge and switching of a light bulb were the two fixed costs levied through massive hikes.

In September 2014, the residents of the Ezinketheni informal settlements protested against lack of service delivery, particularly, lack of electricity, claiming that the Msunduzi municipality had failed to electrify the area as promised (Peters, 2014). The angry protesters barricaded the

New Greytown, Bhambatha road, with burning tyres, rubbish and boulders denying entrance and exit to Copesville residents and taxis. The police used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse the angry protesters (Peters, 2014).

In Sobantu, in 2013, an estimate of 400 residents took to the streets: they were “fed up” with being “cast aside” by the municipality and demanded better service delivery and jobs (Daily News Reporter, 17 April 2013). Residents burned tyres and blocked main roads; taxis could not enter or leave Sobantu, leaving school children and workers stranded. One of the protesters gave the rationale for the strike as follows: “we have been promised houses for years, but still we have received nothing. We are forced to live in makeshift shacks. Our refuse is not collected. Electricity is an ongoing issue and some of us have to take water from our neighbours. We are not being taken care of” (Daily News Reporter, 17 April 2013). Another protester complained about the nearby factories employing people not residing in Sobantu. He claimed this was not fair to the Sobantu community and it increased unemployment in the area, (Daily Newspaper, 17 April 2013).

In SALGA’s 2013 conference, municipal authorities complained about violent service delivery protests which resulted in government facilities such as municipal offices, libraries and government buildings being burnt or damaged (Mkhize, 2013). In addition, national and provincial government departments, large companies and individual households owed municipalities in KwaZulu-Natal more than 11 billion rand which crippled their capacity for service delivery. This emerged during the conference. The Auditor-General, Mr. Nombembe “accused government departments and other state entities of wasting R30.8bn on unauthorized, irregular and fruitless expenditure during the 2012-13 financial year” (Mkhize, 2013). Approximately, R3.5 billion (31%) of debt owed to KwaZulu-Natal municipalities is for water whereas, another R3.5 billion is for property rates. Large private sector owes R2.5 billion and households owe R6.4 billion (Mkhize, 2013).

At the conference the Premier of KwaZulu-Natal appealed to the people of the province to develop a culture of paying for services. Apparently, “eThekweni municipality is owed the largest amount at R5bn, followed by UMgungundlovu district municipality at R2bn – of which R1.5bn relates to debt owed to Msunduzi municipality for water and property rates in the province capital, Pietermaritzburg” (Mkhize, 2013). Service delivery challenges can put a strain on the functioning of the municipality as well as the relations amongst political parties, especially the ruling party; the public tends to put more pressure on and push their lack of

service delivery frustrations onto the ruling party which has more say on and delivery of services in a municipal administration. Intra-infighting among or within political parties contributes negatively to service delivery.

These themes discussed above lead to the conclusion that there is intra-political infighting within political parties represented in the municipality but also among political parties. One of the main reasons for this is the contestation for political space and councillors wanting to remain in power at all costs, even when they are not performing well in the wards they represent. The results also point to the issue of putting political squabbles before the needs of the society. But apart from this, the municipality is facing serious challenges in the provision of services to communities due to various reasons given by the respondents. It is evident that in politics, there are always divergent ideologies but the reasons communities have placed each political party in power to represent them, remains more important than their differences. Communities are more interested in being provided with the services they need such as, living in a safe neighbourhood, having access to clean water and sanitation and electrification. Whether the municipality has enough capacity and manpower to provide all those services for improving livelihoods for everyone at the same time remains a critical issue. But some suggestions that can be considered by the municipality are provided in the final chapter. This research thesis encountered certain minor limitations which are briefly noted in the final section of this chapter.

## **5.9 Limitations of the study**

One of the limitations of this study was that one of the political parties represented in the municipality did not agree to participate in the research, despite several attempts to contact them. Another limitation to this research was the reluctance of participants to disclose factional battles within their own parties during interviews but admitting to this off the record. Finally, while questions were frank and open-ended, there is no way of knowing if participants were censoring themselves.

The findings of this research have been discussed in detail in this chapter. The next chapter summarises all the chapters before providing some conclusions and suggestions on how to better improve service delivery in the municipality.

## **Chapter Six: Summary and Conclusion**

This study has looked at intra-political infighting in the Msunduzi local municipality. It also examined the impact of this intra-political infighting on service delivery in municipality. Chapter One outlined all the other chapters and gave a background to the study. It critically analysed government policies linked to local government or municipalities focusing on the role of local government in South Africa and briefly touching on the reasons for service delivery protests in relation to service delivery in Msunduzi Municipality. The study argued that under theoretical setting, systems theory was the most appropriate to understanding local government in South Africa and showed how different government policies have had an impact on service delivery in local municipalities.

Qualitative research methods were discussed with purposive sampling method as the main focus. The research was conducted for a period of three months, using 18 questionnaire interviews, according to UKZN procedures for collecting data.

Results have been discussed that were obtained from 17 participants from Msunduzi municipality as well as one senior representative from SALGA, KZN. Intra-political infighting, the role of political parties as well as SALGA, service delivery protests and the challenges facing the municipality were critically discussed as the main themes that emerged from the data analysis to address the key research questions of the study. The findings show that there is intra-political infighting in Msunduzi municipality which is also common among the different political parties and in other municipalities. In addition, the findings revealed that even though some of the respondents were not well informed about SALGA's role in the municipality, they were all able to give various suggestions of the role that should be played by SALGA. This could involve building capacity through training; developing skills; providing study materials that clearly articulate the role of councillors; liaising with national and provincial government for financial support; as well as general assistance and support. SALGA needs to play an oversight role, ensuring that there is no corruption or misuse of funds, and so forth. The results of the study are supported by writing in the media which has described how the communities of Msunduzi local municipality have embarked on a number of service delivery protests to show their dissatisfaction regarding the municipality's inefficiency in delivering services.

In conclusion, intra-political infighting appeared to be more visible in local government towards elections and has a negative impact on service delivery as noted by the respondents.

Findings have been tabulated and discussed in detail in Chapter Four which shows that there is considerable intra-political infighting in Msunduzi local municipality. Based on this, the thesis comes to the conclusion that intra-political infighting will continue to exist if the current situation continues. This leads to corruption and takes resources from the poor and results in poor administration of resources with a lack of understanding by administrators of the legislative framework under which they operate. The lack of skills within the municipality and inefficiency from the councillors lead to poor service delivery.

To overcome some of these challenges, the municipality could consider strengthening the oversight bodies and ensuring accountability. Party deployment needs to end and best practices and experience identified within the country through proper and tested processes and procedures. Political interference in municipal administrations needs to be limited and powers in local government clearly demarcated. In addition, SALGA working together with COGTA, needs to take a more vital and proactive role in ensuring that political parties as well as the municipality work together to efficiently deliver and render services to the Msunduzi community. For SALGA's role to be effective, constant communication and consultation is required as well as feedback to the various communities under the Msunduzi Local Municipality. Finally, the researcher hopes to conduct more research in the future looking into inter-party infighting and its impact on service delivery on a broader scale.

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix A

#### Interview Questionnaire

Title: \_\_\_\_\_

Names: \_\_\_\_\_

Gender: \_\_\_\_\_

Race: \_\_\_\_\_

Organization / Sub-unit / Directorate:  
\_\_\_\_\_

Official Job Title:  
\_\_\_\_\_

1. How long have you been in the position you are in? (*number of years or months*)

\_\_\_\_\_

2. What Political Party or Alliance do you belong to? For exec members: is there intra-political infighting in the municipality?

\_\_\_\_\_

3. What is your understanding about intra-political infighting or intra-political squabbles?

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

4. What challenges do you think that the municipality is facing in failing to deliver or render services to communities?

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
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5. Do you think that those challenges have a role in intra-political infighting? If no, why not?

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6. Would you say that there is any intra-political infighting in your current political party that you represent and belong to? And amongst or towards other political parties? Please elaborate further what you mean by yes/no.

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7. What do you think is the main cause for intra-political infighting among political parties?

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8. What impact do you think this intra-political infighting has on service delivery?

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9. Do you think that public participation through izimbizo meetings plays any significant role in strengthening communication between municipal officials and the communities as part of being accountable for their failure to render services? (if yes/no, please elaborate)

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10. Do you think that there is any role that can be played by political parties to assist the municipality in combating challenges facing service delivery? Why or why not?

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11. Do you think that service delivery related protests are a result of the failure of the municipality to deliver services or/and intra-political infighting among political parties which affect the functioning of the municipality? (Why or why not?)

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12. What role do you think should be played by SALGA to eradicate service delivery challenges facing the municipality?

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13. In 2010, when the municipality went under administration, what do you think was the cause for that?

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14. Do you think that intra-political infighting and mismanagement of funds played any role in the municipality failing to render and deliver services in 2010? Why or why not?

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15. Close to elections, in your opinion does intra-political infighting increase? Please elaborate your response further.

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The end. Thank you very much for your valuable contribution.

## Appendix B

### Informed Consent Document

Dear Participant

My name is Nomaswazi Dlamini. I am a Political Science Masters student in the School of Social Sciences at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus. The title of my research is Intra-Political Infighting versus Service Delivery: Assessing the impact of intra-political infighting on service delivery in Msunduzi Municipality. The aim of the study is to examine how intra-political infighting can have an impact on service delivery of the municipality through the study of municipal officials and political party representatives. I am interested in your authentic response to answering the questionnaire on the subject matter.

Please note that:

- The information that you provide will be used for scholarly research only.
- The information that you provide will be recorded during the interview questionnaire in the digital recorder or any other means of audio recording available.
- Your participation is entirely voluntary. You have a choice to participate, not to participate or stop participating in the research. You will not be penalized for taking such an action.
- Your views in this questionnaire will be presented anonymously. Neither your name nor identity will be disclosed in any form in the study.
- The questionnaire will take about 15-25 minutes.
- The record as well as other items associated with this research will be held in a password-protected file accessible only to me. After a period of five years, in line with the rules of the university, it will be disposed by shredding and burning.
- If you agree to participate please sign the declaration attached to this statement (a separate sheet will be provided for signitures)

I can be contacted at: School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus. Email: [207523256@stu.ukzn.ac.za](mailto:207523256@stu.ukzn.ac.za), Tel: 033 260 5249. Cell: 0794757218

The Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee contact details are as follows: Ms Phumelele Ximba, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Research Office, Email: [ximbap@ukzn.ac.za](mailto:ximbap@ukzn.ac.za) Tel: 031 260 3587.

Thank you so much for your contribution to this research.

#### DECLARATION

I ..... (*Full names of the participant*) hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project.

I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire. I understand the intention of the research. I hereby agree to participate.

SIGNITURE OF PARTICIPANT

DATE

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