SOUTH AFRICA AND PEACEBUILDING IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC) 1996 - 2016: PROBING THE ATTITUDES OF CONGOLESE REFUGEES IN DURBAN

BY

MAKANDA JOSEPH
(STEMNO: 213529780)

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PIETERMARITZBURG CAMPUS, SOUTH AFRICA

SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR MAHESHVARI NAIDU

CO-SUPERVISOR: DR KHONDLO MTSHALI
DECLARATION

I, Makanda Joseph, Student Number 213529780, hereby make the following declaration:

1. That the research initiative reported in this thesis except where otherwise stated is my original work.

2. That this thesis has not been submitted for any other degree for examination at any other University.

3. That this thesis does not contain any other person’s data, pictures or graphs including any other information without due acknowledgment of those sources.

4. That this thesis does not contain any other person’s writing unless specifically acknowledged and has been referenced, and where other sources have been quoted, I certify that;

   i. Their words have been re-written and that any general idea attributable to them has been duly referenced
   ii. And where their exact words have been used, they have been placed in quotation marks and equally referenced

______________________________  ________________________________  
Makanda Joseph                                            Date

Professor Maheshvari Naidu  Dr Khondlo Mtshali
Supervisor                                                              Co-Supervisor

Date: ____________________________ Date: ____________________________
DEDICATION

To the faculty of my reason and its free thinking escapades

To all refugees in the world whose role in peacebuilding interventions has been marginalized as a result of their subverted status in the society
DISCLAIMER
This thesis emanates from a scholarly endeavour which was underpinned largely by field research. The views, arguments, findings and conclusions presented in this thesis are not intended to vilify or compliment actors/parties identified herein.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My profound thanks to my supervisor, Professor Maheshvari Naidu, for her indefatigable support and guidance. Her unstinting academic support enabled me to carry out this research -although under immense pressure - in its prescribed time. It has been an exceptional privilege to learn from her experiences as an NRF rated researcher and as an academic and a mentor. I acknowledge her towering influence on my research life and thus I would be remiss not to thank her for her painstaking critique and insights at the time when this manuscript was being written.

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I owe a debt of gratitude to Gift of the Givers Foundation for its scholarship that has seen me through my graduate studies and in carrying out this study.
ABSTRACT
This study is anchored on the crisis of Congolese refugees that is taking an astronomical proportion in South Africa. While in different parts in South Africa Congolese refugees may initiate actions that may fuel the magnitude of a new or the ongoing conflict on one hand, and those that may transform and end war the DRC’s war. The study probes the views and insights of the Congolese refugees on South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict and contends that South Africa can draw from the views, insights and perception of Congolese refugees as another alternative of bolstering its current peacebuilding interventions in the DRC.

The study draws heavily on data gathered from four (4) focus group discussions and 58 in-depth interviews (comprising mainly, the Congolese scholars and civil rights activists in Durban). The study uses conflict transformation and realism theories. From a conflict transformation perspective, the study argues that drawing from the views and insights of the Congolese refugees may bolster an all-encompassing South African peacebuilding intervention in the DRC’s conflict. On the other hand, through the tenets of realism, study argues that South Africa can draw from the insights of the Congolese refugees as one way of achieving its dominant interests of having a stable DRC and Africa.

Through a survey of scholarship on the link between refugees and conflict transformation, the findings of this study reveals that the inclusion of the views and insights of Congolese refugees in its peacebuilding interventions may earn South Africa respect on the continent as a country that respects the contribution of refugees in peacebuilding. This may advance South Africa’s interest of taking the lead in peace operations in Africa. However, the study also reveals that by participating in peacebuilding while pushing for more economic relations with DRC, the South Africa’s interventions in the DRC’s conflict can be termed as a predatory and exploitative way of the economics of war. For instance, the Inga Dam, agriculture and the abundance of mineral resources to which some South African companies own mining rights, underscores a realist argument that any intervening state intervenes in a conflict country in pursuit of its national interests.

The findings of this study also reveal that, by drawing on the views of the marginalised non-state actors like Congolese refugees in its peacebuilding interventions in the DRC, South Africa may fulfil its desire of avoiding spill-overs from the effects of the war in the form of
the incessant influx of Congolese refugees. An end to war in the DRC may be one way of furthering economic interests of the South African business segments.

Having taken note that the major findings of the study revolve around contentious primary issues relating to the role of Congolese refugees within South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions, a number of recommendations are made. These include:

1. Establishment of refugees’ resource centres as a new approach of mitigating their forgotten role in peacebuilding processes.
2. Clarification of the conflicting interests of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC.
3. Inclusion of other non-state actors in South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions.

Finally, a paradigm shift is needed in the conceptualization of what constitutes conflict transformation more so peacebuilding interventions. This includes a new theoretical thinking based on gaining vital views, insights and perspectives from non-state actors like Congolese refugees in South Africa.
ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACCORD</td>
<td>African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes</td>
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<td>ACMS</td>
<td>Africa Centre for Migration and Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>AZN</td>
<td>Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Allied Democratic Forces</td>
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<td>AFDL</td>
<td>Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African Nation Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCTR</td>
<td>Cosmopolitan Conflict Transformation and Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNP</td>
<td>The National Congress for the Defence of the People</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSVR</td>
<td>Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHA</td>
<td>Department of Home Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>Rwandan Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNLC</td>
<td>National Front for the Liberation of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMSP</td>
<td>Forced Migration Study Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<td>HSRC</td>
<td>Human Science Research Council</td>
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<td>i. d.</td>
<td>internet document</td>
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<td>ICD</td>
<td>Inter-Congolese Dialogue</td>
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<td>ICGLR</td>
<td>International Conference on the Great Lakes Region</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally displaced persons</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>ISS</td>
<td>Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<td>M23</td>
<td>March 23 Movement</td>
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<td>MLC</td>
<td>Movement for the Liberation of the Congo</td>
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<td>MNC</td>
<td>Congolese National Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNC(s)</td>
<td>Multinational corporation(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>n. d.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOREF</td>
<td>Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>Congolese Rally for Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPA</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Army</td>
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<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SANDF</td>
<td>South African National Defense Force</td>
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<td>SAPBC</td>
<td>South Africa’s Peacebuilding</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIHMA</td>
<td>Scalabrini institute for Human Mobility in Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLM</td>
<td>Sudanese People Liberation Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>Union for Democracy and Social Progress</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNCHR</td>
<td>United Nations Refugees Council</td>
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<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Union for Total Independence of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPC</td>
<td>Union of Congolese Patriots</td>
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<tr>
<td>US$</td>
<td>United States dollars</td>
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<tr>
<td>US (A)</td>
<td>United States (of America)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War II</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZAR</td>
<td>South African Rand</td>
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction
After more than half a century free of colonialism, many African countries remain moribund
and on the precipice of intrastate war (Tive, 2014). These include countries such as South
Sudan, Mali, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Somalia and the Democratic Republic
of Congo DRC. This is contrary to what independence is claimed as embodying (Kagwanja,
2009; Obiora, 2011). As a result “Africa is in the throes of its most serious refugee crisis as
conflicts in Burundi, CAR, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali have
forced hundreds of thousands of people to flee their homes” (UNHCR, 2015:1). The causes
and drivers of conflicts in warring African countries vary from the increasing and growing
global human population, the widening gap between the rich and the poor, unsustainable
development, depletion of natural resources and ecology to greed for power among leaders.
The ongoing conflicts in countries such as DRC and other sub-Saharan African countries
continue to raise concern for international security (AU, 2015; Weiss and Welz, 2014).

When conflicts erupt, there is destruction of decades of development projects in the countries
affected. This leads to worse social, political and economic circumstances. As a result, many
citizens of the war-torn countries are increasingly becoming refugees in different
neighbouring and faraway countries. In Africa, South Africa is bearing the brunt of increasing
numbers of refugees from across the globe (Cohen and Deng, 2012). According to the United
Nations Refugees Commission for Refugees (UNHCR, 2014), South Africa is a home to
millions of refugees. The increasing number of refugees in the country is putting enormous
pressure on South Africa to take a dominant role in intervening in African conflicts, economic
derprivation and political instabilities (Adebo, 2010; Olusola, 2014; Pry, 2010). However,
South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in African conflicts is creating scholarly critique
of the country’s capability in peacebuilding on the continent (Nabishika, 2011; Pillay, 2013;

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1 An immigrant who fails to remain in or return to his country and decides to settle in his/her
host country due to past or on-going war/economic/political disruption as a consequence of
war (Andrews, 2003:1).

2 Peacebuilding refers to all strategies that are designed to promote a secure and stable lasting
peace in which the basic human needs of the population are met to avert the recurrence of
violent conflicts (Ramsbotham et al, 2011).
Mbeki, 2013). Nabishika (2011) lauds South Africa’s contribution to peacekeeping³ and peacemaking⁴ missions on the continent. What Nabishika (201:8) queries is whether South Africa has “mandate and the will beyond rhetoric to effectively address the root causes of the African conflicts” which many developed Western countries have failed to quell. On the other hand, Pillay (2013) sees better military tools and expenditure that makes South Africa to have the capacity to intervene in any African conflict. According to Pillay (2013), South Africa’s military budget is one of the biggest in Africa accounting for nearly 65% of total military spending in Southern Africa and 27% in Africa.

Many scholars argue that instead of resolving African conflicts, South Africa is using conflict resolution as a tool of expanding its hegemony on the continent. Vickers (2012), Cilliers (2013) and Oppenheimer and Nick (2014) argue that there is historical evidence to prove that South Africa has ulterior motives in its peacebuilding intervention on the African continent. For instance, Oppenheimer (2011) argues that in 1998, the Mandela government used military intervention in Lesotho as a realist foreign policy tool, to pursue its strategic and economic interests, without the authorization from the UN, the AU and the SADC. Hadebe (2014) emphasises that South Africa’s role in transforming conflicts in Lesotho is premised on the country’s quest for national security and for economic interests like the Rand Water project. Similarly, Cilliers (2014) argues that South Africa used uncalled for diplomacy in the DRC in 1998: Mandela used this crisis to settle his discontent with Robert Mugabe - the then-SADC chair. Also Mandela had unclear support of both Laurent Kabila and Mobutu Sese Seko. This is because the government of Mandela had different economic interests with both Mobutu and Kabila. Likoti (2007) questions whether South Africa’s conflict resolution strategy in the DRC in 1998 was necessitated by economic self-interests of South Africa’s ruling elite or for the nation. Whetho (2013) argues that by continuously intervening in the DRC, South Africa is joining a group of both state and non-state actors who scramble for the DRC’s vast mineral

³ Peacekeeping is a third party intervention in a conflict country that is done by military forces from another country/group and is often closely associated with the United Nations (www.un.org, McAskie, 2006). The military forces must be neutral soldiers of the United Nations or group of neutral nations. Peacekeeping’s main aim is to help in separating the fighting parties by putting a barrier (buffer zone).

⁴ Peacemaking is the diplomatic attempt to end violent conflict between and amongst conflicting parties (Ramsbotham et al, 2011; Lederach, 2009; Fisher, 2010). A recent peacemaking event is the involvement of former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan in negotiating to end Kenya’s 2007 post-election violence (Goldsmith, 2012).
resources - a major factor that is perpetuating conflicts in the DRC (Whetho, 2014; see also Weiss, 2000; Taylor, 2003).

In the Sudanese conflict, Chingono and Nakana (2009) argue that South Africa’s during Mandela’s presidency played a key role in derailing peace talks and by supplying weapons to both the Sudanese government and to the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) (Kagwanja, 2009). Cilliers (2013) criticizes Thabo Mbeki’s government for using South Africa’s conflict transformation strategy as a means of selling South Africa’s arms to the war-torn countries of the Great Lakes region and in Algeria (see also Oppenheimer, 2011). In 2013, the government of Jacob Zuma was in the limelight over the death of 13 SANDF soldiers who had been sent secretly to the Central African Republic (CAR). Many scholars and security experts questioned why South Africa was secretly serving its perceived ‘peacekeeping mission’ in CAR. The issue that was raised was whose interests was the mission serving in the CAR- was it for South Africans, ANC elites, CAR, AU or UN? (Dawes, 2013; Thomson, 2013).

The influx of refugees from different warring African countries in South Africa is also seen as one of the major motivation of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in African conflicts. For instance, Duncan (2012) and Harris (2008) argue that if South Africa is to address the refugee problem, it has no option but to consolidate its privileged position to stabilize the continent. Mbeki (2013) and Duncan (2012) argue that the 2008 xenophobic attacks are an example of social ills that South Africa will continue to experience if it does not democratize and stabilize Africa. Being the most ‘democratic and developed’ African economy that is attracting many African immigrants from war-torn countries, Zuma (2015) cited the 2015 xenophobic violence as an indicator of South Africa having no option but to reinforce a culture of peace, democracy and human rights on the continent. In 2013, Moelletsi Mbeki applauded President Zuma for sending a strong contingent of South African Defence Force (SANDF) to help root out the M23 rebel group in the Eastern part of the DRC (ISS, 2014; ACCORD, 2014).

The foregoing varied arguments on South Africa’s role in peacebuilding interventions on the African conflicts is pave a way for new research trends into understanding the country’s role in conflict transformation in Africa. However, most of the assertions of the preceding scholars on South Africa and peacebuilding are one-dimensional: they focus on the peacebuilding
intervener (South Africa), its interests in the conflict situation, humanitarian assistance and integration or repatriation of refugees. However, there is a dearth of literature on what role refugees residing in South Africa can contribute towards South Africa’s peacebuilding mission in war or post-war African states. Also, there is scarcity of literature on attitudes and perceptions that refugees from war-torn countries have on how South Africa’s involvement in their countries’ conflict transformation benefits them or South Africans. The lack of literature on the foregoing assertion is resulting into deficiency of empirically verifiable conclusions.

1.2 South Africa’s Interventions in the DRC (1996-2016)
Since the 1960s, the DRC has been an epicenter of unending war in the Great Lakes region. Kamukana (1998) in *Recent Conflicts in the Great Lakes* argues that the major trigger of the DRC conflict has been the fight over natural resources. Other triggers are: tribalism, multinationals corporations, presence of many rebel forces and international forces. Historically, the DRC has been a bedrock of chaos and confusion since the withdrawal of the Belgian rule in 1960. Since then, the DRC conflict has been a subject of international concern and study among international, regional and local scholars. Efforts to break the circle of violence in the DRC by leaders such as Patrice Lumumba⁵ were mysteriously thwarted by international actors. Just four days after the DRC’s independence, violence over political antagonism, tribalism, resources and geographical diversity erupted (Merriam, 1961:3). Scholars such as Taylor (2003: 45) argue that the first years of the DRC’s independence were awash with tribal wars; the main reason being that tribal leaders/rulers had more power than the central government (Whetho, 2014). Furthermore, Maeresera (2012) argues that the DRC has experienced two civil wars: 1996-1997 (*First Congo War*) and 1998-2003 (*Second Congo War*). The *First Congo War* led to the ousting of President Mobutu Sese Seko while the *Second Congo War* highlighted the resource dimensions of conflicts (Weiss, 2000: 4).

To date, violence in the DRC continues to be breaking news among many media houses (*third war*). While many actors continue to seek a lasting solution to the DRC conflict, the complexity and profitability of the DRC’s natural resources and conflict continue to attract many foreign national armies, rebel groups, grass root militias and several profiteering networks - *war economies*. For instance, there are several rebel and militia groups like the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC), Patriotic Force for the Liberation of Congo (FPLC),

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⁵ Patrice Lumumba was Congo’s first Prime Minister.
National Integrationist Front (FNI), and the *Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda - Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi* (FDLR-FCA) in the DRC just to name a few (World Factbook, 2013). In the context of other foreign armies, the DRC is still grappling with the issue of the Rwandan and Ugandan troops especially in the eastern part of the country. Also, there are a number of Multinational Corporations that are involved in the lucrative mining sector.

The rebel groups, foreign national armies, multinational corporations and militia groups have made the DRC to remain dangerously unstable and prone to war (Nyathi, 2012; Nabudere, 2004:3; World Factbook, 2013). The presence of worthy natural resources also attracts actors with economic interest who are willing to use peacebuilding intervention as an instrument that will enable them access the resources and profit from them (Pry 2010). Based on the foregoing arguments, it can be argued that the continuous involvement of internal, regional and international peacebuilders in the DRC is an attempt to access revenues and natural resources in the country (Adebo, 2010). This is because there are some known factors that continue to trigger conflict in DRC: ranging from foundations of colonialism, land issues, greed and weak system of governance that can be globally (by developed nations) addressed so as to end the DRC war.

According to Montague (2002), Maystadt et al (2014) and Laudati (2013) the DRC is one of the wealthiest nations in the world in terms of natural resources. On the contrary, the DRC is classified as one of the poorest in the world. The DRC boasts of minerals like tin, tantalum, tungsten, gold, diamonds, cobalt, copper, coltan and timber from its natural forests. Rather than making the lives of Congolese better, the multiplicity of natural resources has contributed to an interminable history of conflict. As a result, millions of people have lost their lives while other have fled to different countries or are residing as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) within the DRC. Vogt *et al* (2012), Lichbach (1995) and the Human Rights Watch Report (2014), argue that availability of natural resources and conflict are the two major issues that have made the DRC to become a theatre of international debate among scholars. As a result, the DRC has become a perfect exemplar of a dysfunctional postcolonial African state where millions of its citizens are refugees due to unending war.

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6 Situation whereby different actors see war as an opportunity to engage in arms and mineral business (see Coulomb and Dunne, 2008:46).
South Africa hosts the majority of Congolese refugees - mostly those who have run away from the DRC (UNHCR, 2014). By involving itself in peacebuilding intervention in the DRC, while hosting a large number of refugees, South Africa is increasingly becoming a better ground for Congolese refugees, rights groups, movements and activists to communicate their grievances over the political situation in the DRC. Also, Congolese refugees have on several occasions expressed their dissatisfaction with South Africa’s association with the regime of President Joseph Kabila (Institute for Global Dialogue, 2014). For instance, in 2012, a group of Congolese refugees demonstrated at Luthuli House (the Headquarters of African Nation Congress – South Africa’s ruling political party) expressing their dissatisfaction with the Zuma administration’s support of the illegitimate re-election of President Kabila to continue occupying the DRC’s presidency. During the demonstration, a section of Congolese refugees accused the ANC government of supporting Kabila because of business ventures between Khulubuse Zuma, a nephew of president Zuma and Katumba Mwake, a wealthy businessman and Kabila's advisor (Nganje, 2012 in SABC News, 2012).

Congolese refugees in South Africa have also in several occasions protested and questioned the way South Africa is conducting its peacebuilding mission in the DRC. For instance, in 2013, Congolese refugees accused the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) of training a Congolese Battalion whose aim was to crack down Kabila’s dissidents and post-election protesters in Kinshasa. On this occasion however, there was a clash between Congolese refugees who were pro- and those who were anti-Kabila. The 2013 demonstration showed that Congolese refugees residing in South Africa are not homogenous. Furthermore, the foregoing demonstration clearly indicated that although Congolese refugees are residing in South Africa, they had/still have some perception on the dynamics of what sustains the DRC conflict and how South Africa should carry out its peacebuilding interventions in the DRC (UNHCR, 2013; Nganje, 2014).

At the level of analysis, the foregoing 2012 and 2013 demonstrations by the Congolese refugees in South Africa give ground for a rethinking of issues, approaches and theories that must inform South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. Therefore, there is a need for an attempt to establish exactly what South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC intend to achieve. This is particularly significant in terms of whether South Africa is using conflict peacebuilding intervention as a way of benefiting from the potential business initiatives that can emerge from its involvement in the DRC conflict or for the interest of Congolese citizens. It also problematizes whether South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions
in the DRC are becoming overtly politicized to protect private businesses owned by South African elites in the DRC and other conflict countries like the CAR that South Africa has intervened in (Pillay, 2013; Naidu, 2013; DA, 2013). This brings into question what distinctions South Africa needs to put in place in protecting the interests of Congolese and the narrower interests of the ANC elites while undertaking its processes in the DRC.

Since 1996, South Africa has made several peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s unending war. The current study builds on and feels the gaps and dearth literature on an empirical nexus between South Africa and peacebuilding in the DRC’s conflict, how the Congolese refugees perceive it and if the Congolese refugees can contribute to South Africa’s peacebuilding mission in the DRC. The study aims at understanding the rationale or motive behind South Africa’s conflict transformation strategies in the DRC. It therefore becomes questionable to reach such a conclusion on whether or not South Africa has the mandate or the capacity to resolve the unending DRC conflict without drawing some substantive evidence from the Congolese refugees who are party to the conflict and understand the dynamics of the DRC’s war (as victims and perpetrators). This study will also seek to understand if South Africa’s peacebuilding effort is an altruistic act of South Africa seeking to stop self-immolation by the war-torn DRC. In this study, the ‘moral intent’ of South Africa’s intervention in the DRC conflict will not be besmirched. However, the study will seek to explore whether South Africa is driven by the personal quests of South African elites to secure their share of business interests in the mineral rich DRC; or, if it is the case of South Africa seeking to compete with major world powers in transforming the unending DRC war without involving the Congolese refugees. Without detracting from the estimable urgency of stabilizing the DRC, the study focuses on finding out if the involvement of Congolese refugees can boost South Africa’s peacebuilding mission in the DRC.

This study uses Conflict Transformation and Realism as the relevant theoretical paradigms of analysing the Congolese refugees’ attitudes/perceptions towards South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in their country’s conflict. In doing so, the study is questioning whether the decision for South Africa to intervene in the conflict is meant to address the underlying causes of war in the DRC or meant to repatriate Congolese refugees back home. This study clearly points out that there is dearth of research on views of Congolese refugees residing in South Africa, pertaining the efforts that are being exerted by the South African government to intervene in resolving the conflict in the DRC. Therefore, this study’s focal point is that
documenting and analyzing the views and perceptions of the Congolese refugees residing in South Africa will possibly contribute towards improving South Africa’s efforts at conflict resolution and also provide a critique of why and how South African intervention in the DRC and other parts of Africa may be problematic. By doing so, this will become an original and a new approach in examining the issue of intervention in a conflict situation intended to make a scholarly contribution to what refugees can offer to an intervening state in their country’s conflict. Arising from this background, this study is also developing a framework that will be crucial in understanding the role of refugees abroad in their countries’ conflicts through the examination of South Africa and peacebuilding intervention in the DRC while probing the attitudes of the Congolese refugees residing in Durban (along Mahatma Gandhi and Russell Streets).

1.3 Research hypothesis

This study supposes that there is a link between refugees and conflict transformation (in peacebuilding interventions) that ought to underpin the strategic behaviour of peacebuilding interveners in any conflict zones. The study probes and explores the understanding, meanings and attitudes that Congolese refugees (in South Africa) create towards South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC. Another assumption of this study is that there is a possibility that South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions since 1996 are meant to address the influx of Congolese among other refugees within South Africa. This study also assumes that there may be a link between Congolese refugees in South Africa and DRC’s conflict that may underpin the strategic behaviour of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in that Country. Still, the study assumes that South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC’s conflict is meant to promote its national interests, be they economic or consolidating a hegemonic position on the continent and to be counted among world powers like the United States of America (USA), China, Russia, France and England. Lastly, this study assumes that there is a possibly new dimension of peacebuilding intervention that South Africa can draw from the insights and views of Congolese refugees in relation to the DRC’s conflict. Some of the views, insights and opinions of Congolese refugees regarding peacebuilding interventions may help South Africa to bring an end to decades of war in that country. This is because the inclusion of the views of Congolese refugees in South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention may open a room for a new array of conflict transformation among other existing dimensions of peacebuilding. According to Nderitu (2013:8), peacebuilding interventions should not be
conservative in their orientation but need to open new approaches and stages that may bring lasting peace. For instance, many international organizations (such as OAU, UN, MUNUSC, SADC) and other national armies (Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe) have attempted to quell the DRC war (without involving the locals), yet the conflict rages on. The failure of all the preceding efforts to end the conflict validates a new approach of intervening in the DRC’s conflict; that is, for South Africa to draw on the views of the Congolese refugees on peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. This study argues that by incorporating the views of the Congolese refugees in its peacebuilding intervention policies, South Africa stands a high chance of bringing an end to decades of war in the DRC. As a result, an end to DRC’s conflict will be a gain for South Africa’s national interests, be they economic or attaining a powerful position on the continent or addressing its surging refugee problem.

1.4 Research problems and objectives: Key questions:

The aim of this study is to understand the meanings and attitudes Congolese refugees (in South Africa) create towards South Africa’s peacebuilding mission in the DRC. While a number of scholars (Kadima, Denis and Kalombo, 1995; Smit and Rugunan, 2014; Tonheim and Swart, 2015) have contributed to the body of knowledge on the role of South Africa and peacebuilding interventions in the DRC, such studies have /not interrogated the attitudes Congolese refugees residing in South Africa. Given the misconceptions that the Congolese refugees and other African immigrants are associated with while in South Africa, the issue of their role in South Africa’s intervention in the DRC conflict remains an important one in peacebuilding within the under-researched scenery. Therefore, this study assumes that there is a lot that Congolese refugees can contribute towards South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC. The key questions that this study asks are:

1. How aware are Congolese refugees in Durban, of interventions in the DRC’s and what contributions can they make to South Africa’s peacebuilding initiatives in the DRC?
2. How do the Congolese refugees perceive they can contribute to the peacebuilding interventions in the DRC?
3. What do Congolese refugees see as the immediate and proximate causes of war in the DRC?
4. What are some of the national interests that validate South Africa’s intervention in the DRC according to the Congolese refugees?
5. How can the views and insights of Congolese refugees be drawn on to potentially shape the national interest of South Africa’s interventions in the DRC?

1.5 Research problems and objectives: Broader issues

Research on conflict transformation has dedicated much effort on peacebuilding by focusing largely on how to use short, medium and long-term process of either averting or rebuilding war-affected communities so as to reduce the likelihood of occurrence or recurrence of war and/or violence (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Curle, 2011:199). Curle (2010) and Lambourne (2004) suggest that if we are to reach the desired goal of conflict transformation, focus should be on building/rebuilding the political, security, justice, social and economic fabric or institutions of a society in war or those emerging from conflict. Other peace scholars suggest that the root cause of conflict needs to be addressed by promoting social and economic justice as well as putting in place institutions of governance and rule of law which will serve as a foundation for peacebuilding, reconciliation and development (Nkhulu, 2005; Botes, 2001:43). In many of these studies, there is powerlessness of refugees from countries ravaged by war to contribute towards building/rebuilding peace in their countries. This study aims to explore the forgotten role of refugees in peacebuilding.

Therefore, the aim of this study is to explore the views, insights, perceptions and attitudes that the Congolese refugees in Durban have towards South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict. The researcher also aims at explicating some of the factors that may hinder the incorporation of the views and insights of Congolese refugees within South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s war. Some of the broader issues that will be investigated include:

1. Identifying the aspired role(s) of the Congolese refugees within South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict.

2. Identifying how the views and insights of the Congolese refugees may contribute to an all-encompassing South African peacebuilding intervention in the DRC’s conflict.

3. Ascertaining whether or not the national interests of South Africa may subvert the contributions of the Congolese refugees in its peacebuilding interventions in the DRC.
4. Establishing some of the interests of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC as narrated by the Congolese refugees.

1.6 Significance of this study
A number of scholars have inquired into the question of how refugees may participate or contribute in peacebuilding interventions of their countries’ conflicts. Scholars such as Taylor and Lederach (2014), Snyder (2015), Tint, Chirimwami and Sarkis (2014) and Rana (2016) argue that most peacebuilding efforts globally concentrate on resettling and giving humanitarian assistance to the refugees from conflict countries. The preceding scholars concur that humanitarian assistance boosts refugees’ livelihood while in the host countries. However, Lambourne (2014) argues that refugees’ participation in mediation and restoration of peace in their countries is minimal and that the exclusion of refugees from taking an active role in rebuilding peace of their country is an injustice that most mediators do. There is also a section of scholarship that explores the role of refugees on social, political, economic and environment sectors of their host countries (Smit and Rugunanan, 2014; Tonheim and Swart, 2015). According to Nderitu (2014), there is no gainsaying that scholars’ works - albeit limited but growing - have addressed some of the triggers and dynamics of the DRC’s conflict and peacebuilding interventions: the involvement of rebels, foreign armies and multinational corporations in conflict-prone countries like the DRC. However, there is a dearth of research on the insights, views and attitudes of Congolese refugees residing in South Africa, pertaining to the efforts that are being exerted by the South African government to intervene in resolving the conflict in their country. Little has been researched on what role the perceptions of the Congolese refugees can possibly contribute towards improving efforts at conflict resolution in the DRC and at the very least provide a critique of why and how South Africa’s interventions may be problematic. This taints novel attempts by scholars to explore the strategic behaviours of refugees vis-a-vis the unending DRC’s conflict. This implies that academics have largely ignored the refugees’ role in transformation of their countries’ conflict. This view is relevant in the context of South African peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict.

This study addresses the need to realize that the inclusion of the insights and views of the Congolese refugees (in South Africa) may bolster South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict. The study promises a perspective that could shape the dynamics of
intervention in conflicts such as that of the DRC, South Sudan, Somalia and Syria among others. Therefore, beyond the claims and counter-claims by scholars on the role of refugees in conflict transformation, this study is an empirical analysis of the views, insights and perceptions of the Congolese refugees towards South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict. Inclusion of the views and insights of the Congolese refugees within South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions can be argued to be another dimension of seeking lasting peace to the unending war in the DRC.

The study finds relevancy in interrogating the “why and how” questions in South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. By doing so, the study addresses an extant gap by exploring attitudes and perceptions that Congolese refugees have towards the efforts of South Africa in DRC’s peacebuilding process. In addition, by examining the motivations and interests of South Africa in the DRC’s conflict, this study is an empirical approach adding to the existing scholarship on the political economy of peacebuilding interventions. At a more practical level, this study suggests some new policies, recommendations and new framework(s) that may stimulate an effective and all-encompassing South African peacebuilding intervention strategy in the DRC’s conflict. This case study may also serve as a new lesson for other interveners in other conflicts.

1.7 Research methodology and methods:
The attitudes and perceptions of Congolese refugees towards South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflicts in this study require a combination of historical and qualitative research approaches with some flexibility. Historical research “involves developing an understanding of the past through the examination and interpretation of evidence” which may exist (or be collected) in the form of texts and recorded data, interviews and observations (Hancock, 2006: 80; Kumar, 2005:188-203). As qualititative research, this study is offering a “close-up” data analysis of phenomena (attitudes of the Congolese refugees towards South Africa’s peacebuilding mission) without the use of statistics and other forms of quantification (Thomas and Magilvy, 2011:152). The strengths of a qualitative research like this one is that it allows the researcher to explore a convoluted phenomenon (the role of the Congolese refugees in South Africa’s peacebuilding mission in the DRC) in a holistic fashion (Lincoln and Guba, 1985 in Thomas and Magilvy, 2011:152). In end, it addresses the tendency of the researcher to impose personal assumptions or biases,
conclusions and results from the data and thus, it obviates *a priori* conclusions (Wiersma, 1995: 211-212).

### 1.8 Data collection

The nature of this study necessitated the use of both primary and secondary data garnering tools.

#### 1.8.1 Primary sources

Primary sources used were personal interviews, general participant observation and focus group discussions. As a method of data collection, interviews allowed the researchers to study experiences and meanings as accounted for by the participants (Kumar, 2005: 127). Also, by using interviews as a method of data collection, the researcher was able to give each participant an opportunity to narrate his/her views in his/her own words about South Africa’s peacebuilding efforts in DRC.

General 'participation/observation' afforded meaningful, usually first-hand, information to this study. It served as both an approach to enquiry and as a data gathering tool. During interviews and focus group sessions (organized with the help of one key informant), the researcher observed the behaviours of participants as they interacted.

Focus group discussions were of immense utility in the collection of data during this study. Through focus group discussions, the researcher was able to gain immense information from participants in the course of their interactions with one another to articulate ideas and arguments that might not have emerged during personal interviews.

#### 1.8.2 Secondary Sources

Through the use of secondary sources, the researcher managed to get a grasp of the subject and the provision of extensive bibliographic information for delving further into the research topic. Secondary sources were used to complement primary sources. Secondary data was gathered from various conflict and peacebuilding journals and books, newspapers and magazines, archival material, unpublished theses and the internet as well as seminar papers.

### 1.9 Data Analysis

According to Nueman (2000:292), “content analysis involves gathering and analyzing of the context of the text; language, words, phrases, themes and symbols”. In this study, data obtained were all subjected to substantive and extensive qualitative analysis through the instrumentality of content analysis, descriptive-historical analysis method and textual
criticism. Analysis was situated within specific contexts of research questions and structured hypotheses for the study. In summary, data were dissociated from sources (both primary and secondary) and communicated to this researcher who in turn placed the data in a context that he constructed, “based on knowledge of the surrounding conditions of the data, including what he intended to know about the target of the content analysis” (Phillips, 1997:190).

1.10 Scope of the study
This study explicated the perceptions and attitudes of Congolese refugees towards South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC’s conflict. The collection of data was done through general observation, interviews and focus group discussion with Congolese refugees residing in Durban (along Mahatma Gandhi and Russell streets). It was impossible for the study to analyse the views of all Congolese refugees residing in South Africa.

In terms of timeline, this study interrogated the underlying motivations, strategic interests and character of South Africa’s peacebuilding initiatives in the DRC during the epoch characterised by the eruption and continuation of conflicts in the country. The study’s timeline is divided into primary and secondary periods. The primary period that the study focused on was between 1996 and 2006, which, arguably, was the most traumatic in the recent history of the DRC. During this period, the country was plagued by what has been labelled “Africa’s First World War” (Prunier, 2009: 23), and subsequent localised conflicts in eastern DRC. The secondary period was the post-2006 to 2014 epoch, which has been marked by efforts to build peace and rebuild the country.

These period, therefore, are the most amenable to analyse South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. These two epochs are relevant for unpacking South Africa’s initiatives that facilitated or undermined peacebuilding in the country.

1.11 Limitations of the study
The nature of this study is not immune to limitations. Firstly, the researcher acknowledges his intentional sampling criteria favours the views of “the educated” category of the Congolese refugees on the subject matter of this study. This may be seen as ruling out the views of the non-educated category. Also, since majority of this study participants narrated strong anti-Kabila sentiments, there is a possibility that the researcher did not capture the views of
participants who are pro-Kabila as well as those who might be neutral. In order to address this challenge and mitigate its effect as well as to ensure objectivity, the researcher undertook a careful combination of participants’ views as outlined in the data analysis section of this chapter.

Another limitation is the speed at which developments unfold in the DRC. Indeed, since 1960s, DRC has been a field of conflict research, almost all published works on the country’s crisis “risk” being overtaken by new/unforeseen realities within a relatively short time. This study may not be immune to the very fate: before its completion, or while it is being examined or by the time other readers peruse it. As this study is being printed (December 2016), there are undergoing violent protest in the DRC about the expiry of the presidential term limit of President Kabila.

Another limitation is language barrier. Since the researcher is not a Congolese, the language of conducting interviews was limiting especially to Congolese who could not understand English or Kiswahili. Also, some Congolese refugees found it difficult to narrate their opinions on the subject while being tape-recorded. They wanted to know the motive. To address these concerns, the researcher relied heavily on the use of Congolese research assistants to interpret the language and also to create trust between participants and the researcher.

During data collection, a number of participants insisted on being paid as a precondition for participating in the study. Due to research ethics, the researcher was unable to meet this demand by participants. Because of this, some prospective participants declined or withdrew from participation in the study. Regrettably, only a few of the participants in this category – based on information supplied by research assistants – had extensive knowledge of the key issues that this study explored. Nonetheless, it can be safely assumed that their non-participation has not substantively undermined the study and its findings. Similarly, although some participants who consented to be interview without being paid were unable to guarantee ‘honest’ answers. This was due to participants’ natural instincts of being cognizant that they are being studied without pay. To alleviate this concern, the researcher triangulated his findings: The researcher used secondary sources. The use of secondary sources in this was seen as key in addressing this limitation.
1.12 Conceptual clarification of key words
This study – in its title and through its chapters – utilised certain concepts/terms or key words, which this section defines, conceptualises and operationalises in its context. These key words are conflict, peace, peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. This section does not explicate conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation, as they are discussed extensively in the theoretical framework segment (chapter four).

1.12.1 Conflict
Many scholars agree that in the nature of human beings, conflict is a recurring phenomenon (Miall 2005; Shelling, 1980; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2011). This is because of the competing and contrasting interests: one’s own interests are superior to those others (Donnelly, 2002). In normal life, conflicting interests of human beings is understandable given the differences in value, attitudes, interests, orientations and goals. However, this clash of interest becomes negative in its effects if they lead to violence (what is commonly referred to as war). According to Schelling (1980: 201), it is the inability of human beings to reconcile and resolve their divergent objectives or positions that leads to frustration or aggression.

In this study the concept conflict is utilized as an outcome of a clash or struggle between two or more actors due to their irreconcilable ideas, positions and goals whereby one actor to the conflict may seek to neutralize or defeat or eliminate the other for the purpose of pursuing his/her defined objectives. So as to achieve his/her goal and to defeat the opponent in any conflict, an actor may use different ways including violence (use of armed conflict) and propaganda (Lambourne, 2005). By doing so one actor may achieve either tangible goals (acquisition of a political position, property or win an election) or intangible ones (control, domination or prestige). One or more actors may achieve their goals despite the consequences of their actions which may include colossal loss of lives, destruction to infrastructure, human displacement, social dislocation (loss of property) and psychosocial traumas (Staub, 2005). This violence leads to loss of life, devastating effects on political, social and economic development when violence breaks out, development within a family, work place or a state is also derailed.
1.12.2 Peace

Johan Galtung (1969:168), a renowned peace scholar, argues that definition of peace may depart from the common, social or to political usage depending on one’s grasp of what conflict is. In peaceful transitions and democracy Resart Bayer (2010: 1) affirms that many scholars conceptualize peace as absence of violence. However, the absence of violence does not necessarily mean peace because conflicting parties may view each other as threats (Goertz, 2005). This has made many peace scholars to contend that there are two descriptions of peace; that is negative peace as the absence of turmoil, tension, conflict and war. Positive peace refers to conditions that are good for management that is ‘orderly resolution of conflict, harmony associated with mature relationships, gentleness, and love’ (Boulding, 1978: 3; also see Galtung, 1985, Fisher, 2005; Ledarach, 2004).

This study utilizes the concept peace as the transformation of the actual or potential violence into peaceful (non-violent) processes of social and political change (Galtung 1985:168).

1.12.3 Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping can be termed as a third party intervention that is often done by military forces and is often closely associated with the United Nations (Annan, 1992). According to the United Nations Agenda for Peace (1992), military forces must be neutral soldiers of the United Nations or group of neutral nations and they should help to separate the fighting parties. Also, peacekeepers are used to put a barrier (buffer zone) between conflicting parties and keep them away from attacking each other. In conflict resolution and management, peacekeeping is an important tool and appropriate on three levels; when containing violence and preventing it from escalating into war, limit the intensity of war once it has broken out and lastly to secure a cease fire. A recent case of peacekeeping is the deployment of French soldiers to end the recent Malian violence in 2013. Thus peacekeepers are needed to stabilize hotspots and diffuse tensions (Ramsbothams et al 2011: 147).

Although peacekeeping is vital in managing violent conflicts by itself it cannot settle disputes because it is not adequate for long term recovery. The UN peacekeeping missions were criticized for their role in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. In Rwanda and Somalia intervention came late. The civil war had already started in 1986 in Somalia and erupted into a full war in 1988-1990 and the Security Council only took action in 1992. The UN’s intervention in Rwanda was not planned and force numbers were greatly reduced and
they were powerless to prevent the killings whereby 800 000 people died in the genocide. A recent taint to peacekeeping efforts is the 2013 case of SANDF involvement in CAR without the consent of the AU or UN.

This study operationalizes peacekeeping as the use of third part military or police in lowering the level of destructive behaviours during war, monitoring, policing the situation of war and support of humanitarian intervention (Galtung, 1992; Ramsbothams et al, 2011).

1.14.4 Peacemaking

Peacemaking is the diplomatic attempt to end violent conflict between and amongst conflicting parties. A recent peacemaking event is the involvement of former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan in negotiating to end the 2007 Kenya’s post-election violence. Usually there is a third party to negotiate the peace process and this negotiator may be government envoys, group of regional organizations or the United Nations. The nature of a diplomatic intervention mostly depends on the unpredictability of political events. Negotiations are important in conflict resolutions because they provide a channel of communication where by parties look for peaceful settlements and settling their differences (Dasse 2012: 111). Another example is the Zimbabwean conflict whereby Thabo Mbeki, the former president of South Africa, was chosen by SADC to be the mediator between the conflicting parties and move them towards dialogue so that they reach a peace agreement GPA. This means negotiations seek to construct analytical abilities which assist conflicting parties to recognize common interests and formulate solutions to achieve mutual gains and co-operation. Successful peace settlements must be precise especially in difficult issues in the transitional process like demobilization of assembly points, ceasefire details and voting rights.

The disadvantage of peacemaking is that negotiations are often slow and gradual. This means that conflict will still be going on whilst conflicting parties are holding negotiations. The greatest issue to lasting and sustainable peace settlements is the issue of credibility of those mediating (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Curle 2011:188).

This this study conceptualizes peacemaking as endorsed by Masunungure (2009). According to Masunungure (2009:13), peacemaking is the use of a third party negotiator to settle disagreements that have led to conflict.
1.12.5 Peacebuilding

The most used concept in this study is peacebuilding. This is what the thesis sees as the focal point of South Africa’s intervention in the DRC. Peacebuilding can be commonly described as what it means to have and build lasting peace. Peacebuilding is a long term procedure that takes place after conflict has stopped and marked by a cease fire or peace agreement. It is also often described as last phase in the conflict cycle. This implies that the participants have the independence to create an environment that will eradicate reasons that made them to resort to violence. For peace building to be effective there is need for sensitivity to local needs and cultural needs to avoid the imposition of an external model (McAskie2006:18). Peacebuilding is a multifaceted system that compromises of multiple medium and long term programmes to address both the cause and consequences of a conflict.

Many scholars argue that for a lasting and enduring peace, peacebuilding must be able to address structural factors. Galtung (2001) argues that structural violence exists when people fight for resources because of the unequal distribution and people are willing to die for these resources (also see Tickner 1995: 51). Peacebuilding is also meant to restore and alter broken relations, for example reconciliation and trust-building. Donna Pankhurst (1999:239) argues that the truth process is vital in policies of reconciliation. The success or failure of peacebuilding cannot be determined in two or three years; it is a long process that includes security issues and political planning. Peacebuilding is also a set of challenges facing countries that have had violence, for example setting up institutions that guarantee the establishment of political process that can be considered as open and inclusive. This helps communities to have a sense of community and common identity and peace building that can move from negative peace to positive peace whereby disputes do not lead to violence and war (Pankhurst, 1999).

Peacebuilding has been criticized for its failure to include refugees, IDPs, women and the youth in peacebuilding processes. The foregoing groups in times of conflicts are active participants and take up different roles during violent conflicts but they are never recognized in peace building processes. This thesis investigates the roles that Congolese refugees can contribute towards South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC.

This study uses Galtung’s conceptualization of peacebuilding. According to Galtung (1996:112), peacebuilding is the infrastructural, military and socio-economic and political efforts by an intervener to offer an alternative in removing root causes of war in a conflict.
country. “This is a way of attempting to overcome the contradictions which lie at the root cause of the conflicts” (Galtung, 1996:112).

1.12.6 Refugee

In most of literature on migrant situations in the world, the concepts refugee and immigrant have been used synonymously to mean the same (Mutambanengwe, 2012; Andrews, 2003; Forced Migration Studies programme, 2007; UNHCR, 2015). Daley (2013) describes a refugee as one who has fled his/her country in times of war, political oppression, or religious persecution. According to UNHCR (2015), “a refugee is someone who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country” (UNHCR 2010:14).

There are other definitions of a refugee that have been adopted. The United Nations (2010) describes refugees as people who are running away from being persecuted in their own country, from war or those who are at the risk of having their human rights violated in their home country (Mutambanengwe, 2012). Similarly, Andrews (2003:1) describes a refugee as a person who fails to remain in or return to his country and decides to settle in his/her host country due to past or ongoing war/economic/political disruption. Another definition adopted by the Forced Migration Studies programme (2007) defines a refugee “as one who is fleeing from his/her home in fear of persecution “(Mutambanengwe, 2012: 14). Although the foregoing definitions and description of refugees have different approaches, there is a one commonality among all of them. In one way or another they describe “a refugee as a person who is a product of either a partial or total breakdown of the state vis-à-vis provision of basic needs to its citizens in terms of human rights, socio-economic needs, or political instabilities caused by war” (Boswell, 2002:15).

Most of the preceding definitions of refugees are based on those that were formulated after World War II when literature on refugees became an area of concern. There is one inference that can be deduced from the aforementioned conceptualization of refugees: that is, no one becomes a refugee by choice. To be a refugee one has to have been forced by some factors

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*Resolution 429(V) of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the United Nations General Assembly of 14 December 1951 (which was later reviewed in 1967).*
and circumstances. Most of these factors are compounded by some sort of state repression of its citizens in an attempt to establish new order or to force them to submit to government demands (UNHCR Report, 2015). Also, citizens of a particular state may become refugees as a result of foreign invasion and inability of their state to protect them from such invasions (FMSP Report (2007). All in all, by being a refugee, one’s concern is liberty, life and individual security. This is because one has been forced to leave his/her home against his/her will (Mutebi, 2003; Dickson, 2002; Horst, 2013). Furthermore, over the years, the UNHCR has expanded the understanding of a migrant to including all persons of concern. According to the UNHCR there are also asylum seekers, internally displaced persons and stateless persons that are of the current global concern as shown in figure 1.

**Figure 1. Definitions of migrants/refugees**

**Definition of Terms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>Any person outside his or her country of origin who is unable or unwilling to return there because of a well-founded fear of persecution for one of the reasons set out in the 1951 Convention. Additionally, if a person has received serious and indiscriminate threats to his or her life, physical integrity, or freedom resulting from generalized violence or events seriously disturbing public order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum seekers</td>
<td>Persons who have sought international protection for refugee status, but their claims have not yet been determined. Not every asylum seeker will ultimately be recognized as a refugee. Every refugee is initially an asylum seeker.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internally displaced persons</td>
<td>Those individuals who have been forced to leave their homes as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or manmade disasters and who have not crossed an international border.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stateless persons</td>
<td>Individuals who are not considered as nationals by any state under the operation of its law. They do not possess the nationality of any state. It may also include persons with undetermined nationality, such as those persons born in a refugee camp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td>Former refugees or internally displaced persons who return to their country of origin either spontaneously or in an organized manner.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While the refugee community is part of the diaspora, this study makes it clear that the diaspora is not the refugee community. This study argues that other segments of diaspora—scholars and business—are at times considered in peacebuilding. However, most refugees are not considered as part of the diaspora that can contribute to peacebuilding of their country. Therefore, the understanding of refugee in this study is relatively ‘broad’ as it covers individuals recognised under the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol as well as individuals recognised under the 1969 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa. It also covers asylum seekers; that is, individuals who have sought international protection and whose claims for refugee status have not yet been determined (Lindley, 2014).

1.12. 7 Ethnicity and tribalism

The understanding and definition of ethnicity and tribalism is slippery and rife with complications. According to Thiong’o (2009), the invocation of the concept ‘tribe or ethnic’ in the African context, evokes images of a society defined by kinship and regional ties, often at odds with other tribes in the region. According to Prunier (1995), from an African viewpoint, both ethnicity and tribalism can be argued as two types of political imagination that are at work on the continent. Prunier adds that at the heart of this imagination, is a story or set of stories—initially told by the first colonial settlers and now reproduced through the postcolonial state—namely, that Africans incorrigibly live in tribes that are always at war with each other. While such a story provided a ready justification for colonial presence in Africa, it also served to sustain the colonial policy of divide and rule. As a result, it led to the formation of African nations in which the very assumptions of tribes, tribalism, and of “constant warfare” has come to be reproduced and confirmed.

Tribalism as a concept seems to have served an important functional construct to European colonizers. Because of tribalism, the African tribe was seen as a residue from some pre-modern epoch, an expression of the barbarity and irrationality of African peoples. As tribalism was Africa’s ‘natural’ condition it extended backward and forward into the expanse of time, seemingly in perpetuity (Braathen, 2000). A good example is the case of Rwanda, where the concepts ‘Tutsi’ and ‘Hutu’ were in reality positions of status, not tribal affiliation,
prior to the advent of colonialism (Mamdani 2001). With the introduction of colonial bureaucracies, identification cards and censuses served to stagnate social movement between the groups. In the case of Rwanda, as in other post-colonial African states, ‘tribe’ and ethnic identity were made essential to the African body politic through the process of colonization. As Mamdani (2001) argues, these systems were necessary to facilitate indirect colonial governance. It is for this reason that he argues that “[t]ribalism then was the very form that colonial rule took within the local state. This action was undertaken for two important reasons: it prevented solidarity between colonized groups; as well as giving the colonizing power a lessened load from the internal governance of the colony” (Mamdani, 2001:15).

One element that was evident in the conceptualization of tribe and ethnicity during colonial period was the systematic marginalization of particular communities and social inequalities. This has had important ramifications for the post-colonial African landscape. Returning the example of Rwanda, the Belgian colonizers privileged the Tutsi community over the Hutu, going so far as to require all non-Tutsi to invest forced labour into constructing the colonial infrastructure.

According to Wanjala (200), ethnicity is essential to the identity of the individual; that it is an immutable fact of history, region and society. However, it is not a given that ethnicity is automatically more important to an individual than other social cleavages, such as religion or region. Most importantly, the primacy that such an argument places upon ethnicity and tribe distracts from the structural causes for conflict; it echoes the claims of irrationality that colonizers used to legitimize their rule. As Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o (2009:10) argues, assumed ‘traditional’ hostility was deemed sufficient to explain the reasons that the Kikuyu were the victims of 2007 post-election violence in Kenya. The explanation that there exists a “traditional enmity between Tribe X and Tribe Y” was considered sufficient. Therefore, to argue that tribalism is Africa’s ‘natural’ condition of the African political system is to argue against the dynamism and fluidity of identity.

Although generally considered a cause for conflict, ethnicity and tribalism should not be considered as explanations for Africa’s major challenges. Ethnicity, therefore, can be a cause for social upheaval, conflict and disintegration, while on the other hand, it can also be a source of progress, as people celebrate plurality of ideas and identities in a progressive democracy. According to constructionists, ethnicity and tribalism are concepts that are framed by historical factors and current contexts. By being a construct, categorization of people into
different ethnic and tribal groups is a consequence of a ‘socio-historical process by which groups are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed’ (Omi and Winant, 1994:55). Using the Hutu and Tutsi as an example, Mamdani shows that rather than assuming that “Hutu” and “Tutsi” are identities that reflect either biological or cultural differences, they should be seen as political identities that were formed first and foremost through the state.

Some understanding of ethnicity and tribalism can be applied in the context of the DRC. The DRC has a lot of identities. These include tribal, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious and geographic identities. When many observers argue that the Congolese conflict is between different ethnic and tribal groups, they are explicitly endorsing the presence of ethnicity and tribalism in the DRC. However, according to Mamdani, ethnic and tribal differences in the DRC are not grounded in natural differences nor naturally arises out of differences in their respective cultural histories. Rather, it is the effect of a particular history of state formation. Crucial in this process is the significance of myths, political assumptions, and stories. Thus, the study will advance the argument that DRC’s mode of ethnic or tribal profiling are socially constructed concepts that are framed by historical, political and economic factors.

1.13 Structure of the study

There are eight chapters in this study. Chapter one is an introduction/background to the study. It provides a general background and an overview of the study. It includes an outline of the research problem, a statement of the research hypothesis, objectives of the study, and research questions. It also explicates the significance of the study, the study’s methodology and research design, its scope as well as its methodological and practical limitations. It finally gives a clarification of key concepts/terms/words as used in this study.

Chapter two is a review and comparison of literature on the nexus between refugees and conflict transformation. The chapter examines the contending narratives that corroborate and rebut the role of refugees in peacebuilding interventions. The chapter probes the potential and actual impacts of interveners’ peacebuilding processes in conflicts. The essence of the chapter is to engage critically with extant literature on the correlation between South Africa’s intervention in the DRC and Congolese refugees. In doing so, the chapter foregrounds the intervening variables on the contributions of the Congolese refugees (in South Africa) in South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC conflict.
Chapter three is the theoretical framework and methodology. It underscores a nuanced understanding of conflict transformation and realism theories as contextual frameworks for unpacking South Africa’s and peacebuilding initiative in the DRC and the influx of the Congolese refugees. The chapter discusses why South Africa need/not to constitute Congolese refugees (in South Africa) in its peacebuilding intervention in the DRC.

The chapter also gives an overview of the methodology and data collection techniques and how they were presented during the period of this study (2015-2016). This is vital in qualitatively exploring the attitudes and the perception of the Congolese refugees towards South Africa’s intervention in the DRC.

Chapter four gives a historical overview of peacebuilding interventions in the DRC (protracted proliferations of intrastate and interstate conflicts) since 1960 to date. The chapter provides some explanations to the causes of the conflict and intervention approaches that were used in reference to different epochs, regimes and events that have characterized the present-day DRC. The chapter also explicates the major actors in the DRC conflict and their contribution to conflict in the region. Finally, the chapter looks at how South Africa has historically been involved in peacebuilding in the DRC, its effects and some reasons why the former has to respond.

Chapters five and six both constitute major and critical components of the study as they report and analyse the data gathered from both primary and secondary sources in relation to this study. Chapter five underscores the idea that South Africa’s interventions in DRC is not premised on an assumption that peacebuilding is a means of addressing the high influx of Congolese refugees. In doing so, this chapter contends that there is a need for South Africa to draw from the opinions, views and insights of the Congolese refugees as a way of attempting to bolster its peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict. This may offer South Africa another alternative of bring an end to decades of war in the DRC. As a result, an end to the DRC’s war may promote the promising role of South Africa as a continental peacebuilder and further its economic interests in the DRC.

Chapter six contextualizes the apparent competing values of theory (what was argued in theoretical chapter and the qualitative data presented in chapter five. Chapter six begins by presenting the root causes of war in the DRC (that Congolese refugees were aware of) as
narrated by Congolese refugees in Durban. Among the causes of war in DRC is poverty and inequality, weak government institutions and corruption, international actors and MNC’s greed for money and communal deprivation. Chapter six also presents the characteristics, strategies and behaviours of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. In the end it sets a scene for locating South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions within the tenets of cosmopolitan conflict transformation and realism paradigms in chapter seven.

Chapter seven contains the findings of the research that are qualitatively analysed within the framework of the core of objectives of the study which were as follows: the role of Congolese refugees in South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC, identification and establishment of how the interests of South Africa were the primary motivating factor that informed South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC’s conflict.

Chapter eight is the concluding chapter. It presents a summary of the study and draws some conclusions from research findings. The conclusions engender salient recommendations on the perceptions and the role of the Congolese refugees towards South Africa’s peacebuilding processes in the DRC. A consolidated summary of the whole thesis is made after which recommendations are suggested. While this study focuses on the DRC’s conflict, there are recommendations that are made that may aid in informing other peacebuilding interveners in other countries that are plagued by or emerging from conflict like South Sudan, CAR and Somalia. Therefore, this study also calls for further investigations on how valuable refugees (residing in an intervening country) may contribute positively in the peace process.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction
As noted in the preceding chapter, this study explores the attitudes of the Congolese refugees in South Africa towards South Africa’s peacebuilding mission in their country. The previous chapter has set the scene for what the study seeks to do and how it seeks to achieve that. It discussed the background to the study, the research problem and objectives of the study. It also contained the justification for the study, the research methodology for the study and finally concluded with the chapter outline for the study. The study’s focal point of analysis underscores what Congolese refugees residing in Durban South Africa have pertaining to the efforts that are being exerted by the South African government to intervene in resolving the conflict in their country, the DRC. Although the literature on conflict is expanding, the role of refugees in transformation of their respective countries’ conflicts has largely been ignored or under-researched. However, documenting and analysing refugee’s views and perceptions can possibly contribute towards improving these efforts at conflict resolution and at the very least provide a critique of why and how peacebuilding interventions may be problematic. Therefore, in this study, probing the perceptions of the Congolese refugees towards South Africa peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict opens new scholarly approach to examining the issue of peacebuilding intervention in a conflict situation.

This chapter reviews past studies, critical and relevant literature on interconnectedness between refugees and conflict transformation. The chapter is divided into several themes. The first theme is on refugees in the world, Africa and South Africa: it will focus on different definitions, triggers and causes of refugee problem in the world. It gives global, continental and South African statistics of refugees. It also looks at the relationship between refugees and conflicts. The second theme is an understanding and a critique of scholars’ grasp of the role of refugees in conflict transformation. Under this theme, literature on Congolese refugees in South Africa which is in direct relation to the study, will be reviewed.

This chapter is a crucial attempt to provide a critical overview of existing studies accounting for refugees; particularly Congolese refugees’ role in South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. This is useful for two purposes. First, is its value in situating and mapping the stretch of current studies in this area by providing a nuanced overview of the focal areas of interest in relation to Congolese refugees residing in South Africa. This would
afford a worthwhile categorization of these planks of literature along thematic patterns. Secondly and perhaps more importantly is the imperative of understanding existing gaps in current literature to afford a careful situating and mapping the contribution this current study is hoping to make. By summarising key points and identifying the existing gaps which this study intends to fill, the intention of this chapter is not to align this with or against scholarly arguments on the role of refugees and conflict transformation. However, it mainly teases out aspects of the debate that furnish insights into the nexus between Congolese refugees and South Africa’s interventions in the DRC’s conflict. Thus, by doing so, the chapter is advancing an explanatory framework that engenders a nuanced understanding of the contribution(s) that Congolese refugees may/not add to South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC.

2.2 The link between refugees and conflicts
Since the end of World War II, there has been an increase in the emergence of refugees globally. According to the United Nation Commission for Refugees (UNHCR, 2015), refugees were firstly documented when the Soviet forces crushed the Hungarian Revolution in 1956. Since then, scholars have paid much attention on interconnection between conflicts and the migrant crisis of displaced populations which continues to take an astronomical proportion globally (Naidu and Makanda, 2015:96). Prior to emphasis on interconnectedness between conflicts and refugees globally, in 1950s the literature was based on how the United Nation Refugee agency was going to help Europeans that had been displaced by WWII (The Refugee Convention, 1951). However, turmoil in Africa due to decolonization war increased. As a result, there was a shift on literature from refugees in Europe to those in Africa. Since then, the migrant refugee crisis of displaced populations has taken on alarming and astronomical proportion globally (Naidu and Makanda, 2015). To date, intra-state conflicts and their links to displacement and migration of people in search of safety is becoming an ever present aspect of global society (Bariagaber, 2013). This has led to evolution of many protocols that govern the protection of refugees in the world. There is the 19518 and 19679 United Nation Protocol relating to Status of Refugees. The preceding UN protocol is based on Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of human rights of 1948. It “recognizes the right of persons to seek

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8United Nations General Assembly resolution 429(V) of 14 December 1950, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f08a27.html
asylum from persecution in other countries, the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted in 1951, is the centrepiece of international refugee protection today” (UNHCR, 2010:2). Until January 2016, when this study is being done, over 150 countries have acceded and enshrined into their legislation, both 1951 and 1967 UN Refugee Convention.

Other protocols on protection of refugees include that of the Organization of African Unity (now African Union) Convention governing the Specific aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa that was adopted 10 September 1969. According to the AU protocol there is a need for a continuous collaboration between the AU and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on the increasing numbers of refugees in Africa and desirous of finding ways and means of alleviating their misery and suffering as well as providing them with a better life and future\textsuperscript{10}. There is also the European Union Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004\textsuperscript{11}. Another protocol on protection of refugees was adopted by the Colloquium on International Protection of Refugees in Latin America, Mexico and Panama at Cartagena, Colombia in November 1984 (UNHCR, 2010). The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees was purposely convened to protect refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama.

There are a number of studies that have investigated other factors that lead individuals to flee their countries. A study done by Forced Migration Studies programme, FMSP Report (2007) found out that there are other factors that make people to become refugees. Although the FMSP (2007) links many factors to the upsurge of refugees in the world, the UNHCR Global Report (2015) see both intra and interstate conflicts as the major causes of the situation. The UNHCR (2015) argues that there is compelling evidence to prove that countries that are in conflicts either intra or interstate war are the greatest contributors to this problem of refugees in the world. According to the United Nation Refugees Council Report (2015), in 2014 there were over 60 million displaced people across the globe, including 14.4 million refugees, the largest amount since the Second World War (The Economist, 2015). There were 2.9 million new refugees in 2014, the highest ever 8 recorded rise. Of these 51% were children and 86%
were hosted in developing countries (UNHCR, 2015:2). Accordingly, most of the preceding population was forcibly displaced by war.

**Figure 2. Global population displaced by war** (UNHCR Global Trends, 2015)

There is compelling evidence – anchored substantially on case studies from Africa and Asia – suggesting that countries that are experiencing war are the leading contributors of refugees in the world. For instance, Albrecht (2015) argues that warring countries such as Syria, Pakistan, Yemen, Ukraine, DRC, CAR, South Sudan, Somalia and Burundi (had generalized violence and human rights violations) are the leading contributors of refugees in the world. This is well documented in the UNHCR 2014 Global Refugees statistics as shown in Figure 2. According to the Global Peace Index (GPI), the current instability that is being experienced in many countries has made, “the world to become an increasingly unstable place, thus contributing to an inevitable rise in displaced peoples” (GPI, 2015:46). As figure 2 shows, although economic situation and natural disasters are also contributors to the global refugee menace, war is considered as the greatest.

There are many scholarly reasons why war is a major contributor to the global refugee menace. Bussy and Gallo (2016) argue that countries that are experiencing war have the highest levels of abuse to human rights and autocratic and controlling regimes. As a result, citizens of war-torn countries are most likely to run into exile in search of refugee. Sriram, Martin-Ortega and Herman (2014) argue that war and violence give an opportunity for massive violation of human rights. This has been vindicated by a need for prosecution of perpetrators of crimes against humanity in post-conflict situations like Rwanda, Kenya and Ivory Coast (Autesserre, 2014). Chikanda and Crush (2015) and Fritsch, Johnson and Juska (2010) argue that countries that are experiencing conflict are likely to be less economically
developed. It is the effects of war coupled with economic constraints that make citizens of a warring country to run away to other countries in search for asylum and refugee. According to UNHCR (2014), the violation of violation of human rights and poor economies as a result of war continues to heighten the increasing numbers of refugees in the world. Therefore, it can be argued that, war provides the basis on which the influx of refugees occurs. One dominant view in the preceding literature on war refugees is that although no one knows where refugees are headed to, but he/she can be certain of where they are coming from: that is, warring countries as shown in table 1.

Table 1: Regional statistics of refugees (UNHCR, 2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Refugees and those in refugee-like status</th>
<th>Those assisted by UNHCR</th>
<th>Asylum Seekers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>3,377,724</td>
<td>3,024,094</td>
<td>454,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>6,317,462</td>
<td>5,371,934</td>
<td>165,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>1,152,762</td>
<td>25,459</td>
<td>400,418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>382,025</td>
<td>97,944</td>
<td>22,937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>424,011</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>106,491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>45,295</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14,818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,699,279</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,519,442</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,164,449</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adopted by the Author from the UNHCR Global Trends (2014)

Table 1 above shows that Africa and Asia that are the main contributors of the refugees in the World.

2.3 Refugee situation in Africa.

The literature on the link between conflict and refugees in Africa encompasses a plethora of perspectives. A survey of the literature suggests that some broad scholarly positions encapsulate various narratives and reflect the contentions around the subject. For example, the works of Stola (1992) highlighted over two decades ago, the sheer size and magnitude of the phenomenon of refugees and forced migration in the context of Africa, and traced its historical evolution, “intensity and atrocity in time and space” across Africa. However, more recently, Hendricks (2015) and Moore and Shellman (2004) point out that the literature on refugees and forced migration is dominated by the “idiographic”, meaning that it appears to
primarily comprise “descriptive case studies, advocacy and awareness pieces, and policy evaluations” (Moore and Shellman 2004:723). They also point out that the literature is also mainly “systemic” and “structural in its theoretical” stance, protesting that the same is not true for the extant work on voluntary migration. For example, some literature on refugee situation in Africa is sceptical in blaming the current mounting reluctance and increasing lack of interest of Western countries to intervene in African civil and political conflicts as a root cause of refugee situation on the continent (Fuertes, 2016). Yet amidst different scholarly positions on African conflicts, there is empirical evidence that Africa has contributed to 30% of refugee global population (UNHCR, 2015).

From this point henceforth, it is worth noting that literature on the interface between conflict and refugees in Africa consists of three strands. The first strand examines the African conflict countries that are greatest contributors of refugees and those that host them. In the second component are analyses that focus on refugees, their reception in host countries and humanitarian assistance. The third strand is the participation and role of refugees in conflict transformation.

According to Naidu and Makanda (2015), Central African Republic, South Sudan, Mali, Burundi, Somalia and Democratic Republic of the Congo are example of countries in Africa that are imbricated in political instability, strife, war and to a lesser extent, natural disasters. According to UNHCR (2015:1), “Africa is in the throes of its most serious refugee crisis as conflicts in Central African Republic, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali have forced hundreds of thousands of people to flee their homes” (UNHCR 2015:1). The global rising numbers of refugees from Africa is contrary to what independence is claimed as embodying or meant to embody (Tint, Chirimwami and Sarkis, 2014). For instance, the UNHCR Report (2015) projected that the numbers of people of concern in Africa were expected to decrease slightly from 15.1 million in 2014 to 14.9 million in 2015. This was attributed to the increasing global repatriation, resettlement of refugees and other durable political solutions that were being put to avert wars in conflicting countries. On contrary, despite Africa having the highest number of peace operations since 2011, the number of refugees has continued to increase (Arrous and Feldman, 2014). As a result, there has been an increase in growth in literature on conflicts in Africa (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Yearbook 2012).
To-date, Africa continues to register a high rate of armed conflict, violence and human rights abuses. For instance, of the estimated 54.7 million displaced persons, “more than a quarter (27%) of the globally displaced are in Sub-Saharan Africa” (Colleta, 2015: 273). Similarly, the UNHCR Global Trends (2015) found out that in 2014 alone, the sub-Saharan Africa saw 3.7 million people become refugees and 11.4 million IDPs. This was a 17% increase compared to 2013. Most of these refugees were mainly from Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Central Africa, DRC, Burundi, Mali and Eritrea (UNHCR Statistical Yearbook, 2013: 29).

Regionally, the horn of Africa and the great lake regions are the leading contributors of refugees on the continent. In 2015, using large datasets obtained from a diverse group of conflict prone countries in the horn of Africa and great lake region, the UNHCR projected that the influx of refugees will skyrocket from 2015-2017 due to continuing upheavals, violence and instabilities in CAR, DRC, South Sudan, Burundi and Somalia. In the horn of Africa, the outbreak of violence in South Sudan in 2014 has so far displaced 1.5 million persons of which over 500,000 have fled to the countries like Ethiopia (188,500), Uganda (128,400), Sudan (115,500), and Kenya (67,000). Similarly, there has been an influx of 123,000 Eritrean refugees into Ethiopia. In Somalia, the ongoing violence and drought has forced many Somalis to flee mainly into Kenya (11,500), Ethiopia (6,300), and Yemen (17,600). In the great lakes, there is renewed fighting between rebels and government forces in the DRC. This has so far displaced over 1 million persons in which thousands of Congolese who have fled into Uganda (13,300), Burundi (7,500), and Kenya (6,000). Also, the continuing fighting in the CAR has forced over 160,300 persons to flee into Cameroon (116,600), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (19,500), Chad (14,200), and the Republic of Congo (11,300). In these regions, Kenya and Tanzania are the two countries that are saddled with the devastating effects of refugees’ influx.

In the West Africa, there has been some stability which has led into more positive efforts being put into repatriations of Ivorian refugees back to home from neighbouring countries. In June 2014, however, the outbreak of Ebola virus in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone hampered repatriation. To-date there is still a significant number of Mali and Niger people (about 267,000) who remain displaced internally and externally. In Nigeria, the Boko Haram\textsuperscript{12} insurgency in North-eastern Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon has forced more than

\textsuperscript{12}An Islamic terrorist group based in northeastern Nigeria, also active in Chad, Niger and northern Cameroon (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of counterterrorism, 2014).
650,000 displacement within Nigeria and an estimated 70,000 have become refugees in Cameroon, Chad and Niger.

In North Africa, there are still instabilities that are being experienced in countries like Egypt and Libya. Also there is terrorism that is being carried out in the Sahel and Sinai regions (UNHCR, 2015). In most cases, the North Africa has remained either as transit or final destination for sizeable mixed migration flows from sub-Saharan Africa. North Africa is known as gateway to Europe where many illegal immigrants have drowned in the Mediterranean Sea.

In the Southern Africa region, the social political atmosphere remains relatively calm. However, instabilities in Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland and Madagascar are contributing to increasing numbers of refugees mostly in South Africa and Botswana. According to UNHCR (2015), there are more than half a million people of concern. Most of the population of concern in the Southern region are migrants from the East, Central and West regions of Africa; majority of refugees reside in South Africa, Botswana and Angola. Among the mentioned, refugees host countries, South Africa continues to harbours the challenging effects of hosting the highest number of refugees. Globally, South Africa is ranked number three in the world in terms of reception of refugees and asylum seekers (UNHRC, 2015).

**Table 2. 2014 Africa’s refugee statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of refugees</th>
<th>% increase in 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central and Great lakes</td>
<td>662,600</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East and Horn of Africa</td>
<td>2,601,400</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>174,700</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>252,000</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of refugees</td>
<td>3,690,700</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source UNHCR Global Trends (2015)

Thus far, it can be seen that the statistics on refugees in the East and Horn of Africa and the central and Great lakes where the DRC is situated are the leading contributors of refugees on the continent. Still, majority of Congolese refugees live in South Africa (Hendricks, 2015). It
is on the foregoing basis that the researcher was motivated to explore some of the interests of peacebuilding interveners within the African continent. In the context of this study, due to incessant war the DRC has attracted a number of peacebuilding interventions both from inside and outside Africa. According to the UNHCR Global Report (2014), has contributed to over 1.2 million refugees and almost 27,000 asylum seekers, 108,000 returnees and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons (UNHCR Global Report, 2014; Nderitu, 2014) in the world. For instance, by January 2014, over 455, 522 refugees had fled the DRC (ASR, 2014). In Africa alone, the number of Congolese refugees represents 18% of the total refugee population. The Annual Tripartite Consultation and Working Group on Resettlement (ATCWR, 2015) conducted a study and established that out of 455, 522 Congolese refugees, 50% (225,609 persons) are spread across five countries in the Great Lakes Region, 39% (177,751 persons) are spread across six countries in East and Horn of Africa, and 11 per cent (52,162) are in the Southern Africa region of which majority of reside in South Africa (ATCWR, 2015).

2.4 The Refugee Situation in South Africa
According to Betts, Loescher and Milner (2013), there are three important reasons why South Africa attracts both war and economic migrants. Firstly, most migrants see South Africa as one of the richest and most developed economy on the continent, where they can find better life. Secondly, Betts, Loescher and Milner see South Africa to be unique in the context of hosting refugees. In South Africa refugees do not live in camps. This is contrary to many African host countries like Kenya and Uganda where refugees still live in camps (UNHCR, 2013). This is one of the reason that has made South Africa to be “a country which experiences the highest rates of asylum seekers of any country in the world” (UNHCR, 2009b). By 2012, South Africa was among the top three countries in the world in terms of receiving and hosting refugees and asylum seekers: USA had 70, 400, Germany had 64, 700 and South Africa had 61, 500 (UNHCR Global Trends, 2014). Thirdly, Betts, Loescher and Milner (2013) argue that most immigrants use South Africa not just as a destination in itself but, also as a gateway and transit to other places like Europe and the United States. The preceding is some of the reasons why since 2007 to-date (2016), South Africa has been experiencing a significant increase in the number of refugees and asylum seekers. Majority of these refugees originate from neighbouring Zimbabwe (UNHCR, 2011) and from the conflict-prone DRC, Sudan and CAR (UNHCR, 2015).
As a country, South Africa became a signatory to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention in 1993 but legislated its refugee Act (Act no.130) in 1998. This was after the country started to experience a high influx of refugees. According to the Refugees Act (no. 130 of 1998), one qualifies for refugee status if that person:

(a) owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted by reason of his or her race, tribe, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group, is outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country, or, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his or her former habitual residence is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it; or (b) owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing or disrupting public order in either a part or the whole of his or her country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his or her place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge elsewhere; or (c) is a dependant of a person contemplated in paragraph (a) or (b) (DHA, 1998:6–8).

The Refugee Act No.130 of 1998 made South Africa to be one among few countries in the world that had put in place legislation that grants refugees their basic principles of protection: freedom of movement, work and access to basic social services. For this reason, South Africa is respected global as a country that has enacted one of the most progressive law on refugees.

Although the Refugees Act No.130 provides refugees with basic principle of protections, there are studies that show that Refugees residing in South Africa typically rely on an informal economy (Landau, 2004; Lindstrom, 2003). For instance, Misago and Monson (2010) and Polzer (2007) argue that most refugees in the country lack proper documents. This limits their access to jobs, housing and other public services; rental accommodations and permits for businesses. Refugees in South Africa are targets of institutionalised xenophobia. This is due to a section of South Africans who perceive migrants as criminals who have come to steal their jobs (Misago and Monson, 2010). Other studies have established that most refugees in South Africa are in many cases, less vulnerable than South Africans in terms of their abilities to generate income (Landau and Duponchel, 2011). For instance, UNHCR (2010) found out that in South Africa refugees and asylum seekers benefited from the government’s numerous legal rights; right to work health care and social services. Other scholars argue that despite South African government facing challenges of service delivery to its people it is also facing a mounting task of assisting refugees and asylum seekers (UNHCR, 2010). It is important to note that in South Africa, an asylum seeker is not classified as a refugee until DHA recognises him or her as such. Once asylum is granted and refugee status
approved, the refugee is allowed to access to certain rights, as described in Refugees Act No. 130 of 1998. As previously argued, unlike other refugee host countries especially in Africa, South Africa has no official refugee camps.

By January 2015, South Africa had over 300,000 both registered refugees and asylum seekers. Most literature contend that majority of refugees in South Africa reside in urban areas; inner-city areas (Landau, 2006). According to Landau (2006), due to complex situation of urban areas, it is challenging for the government to offer refugees protection. For instance, in 2008, there were xenophobic attacks that were experienced across the country’s major urban areas where 62 people dead, wounding over 670, dozens raped and more than 100,000 displaced (Misago and Monson, 2010). Similarly, in 2015, there was another wave of xenophobic attacks that were mostly experienced in the city of Durban (Crea et al, 2016). Instead of the South African government putting a restriction on the attacks, most of the senior officials were sceptical and in denial of the existence of xenophobic violence. Accordingly, some of the official used statements that instigated the preceding violence (Amnesty International, 2015). Other challenges that refugees in South Africa face beyond xenophobia includes weak presence of state to offer them security. Foster (2012) argues that there is weak state security accorded to refugees which perpetuates a culture of impunity for offenders who commit crime against foreigners. Marindze, (2010) blames authority figures who perceive asylum claims of insecurity as bogus, as key cause of a culture of impunity. Neocosmos (2010) links corruption and laxity among government officials as a leading contributor to government’s lack of protection of refugees. In this case, many officials are “collectively going out of their way to repel, hinder, and undermine asylum seekers’ capacity to receive fairly adjudicated claims” (Neocosmos 2010: 48). According to Women Refugee Council (WRC, 2011), urbanization has also made it difficult for the government and NGOs to get effective evidence documenting and supporting the needs of refugees. For instance, WRC (2011) established that many women refugees who had received livelihood support were forced to locate their business in unsafe areas of Johannesburg. Still, the WRC (2011) argue that many women refugees who had established small businesses had inadequate government support for licensing and stocking their businesses (Krause-Vilmer and Chaffin, 2011a).

The foregoing discussions on situations of refugees in South Africa are important as they enhance the understanding of how the country is grappling with increasing influx of refugees
from all over the world. The preceding scholarship situate government laws guiding the reception of refugees in the country by moving away from the simplistic tendency to draw a linear linkage between how the government has protected the rights of refugees and challenges it faces. For example, in 2014, the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP, 2014), the Institute for Security Studies (ISS, 2014) and the Africa Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS, 2014) established that there was limited government efforts in curbing hostility of locals towards foreigners (Crush and Tawodzera, 2014; ISS, 2014; Landau, 2012; Vearey, 2013). This has made the government to come up with new legislations that seek to curb the unprecedented inflow of refugees and in assisting new migrants to resettle in the country (Kamwimbi et al, 2010; Mhlanga, 2011). Despite all the difficulties and the pressure that the South African government is facing, the country remains a leading host of most African refugees. Table 3 shows the number of refugees in South Africa and their countries of origin (Bekkai, 2015)

Table 3. Statistics of refugees in South Africa by Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Refugees</th>
<th>Asylum Seekers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>23,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>9,600</td>
<td>4,600</td>
<td>14,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>20,400</td>
<td>189,000</td>
<td>209,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>43,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>68,000</td>
<td>245,100</td>
<td>313,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adopted by the Author from the UNHCR Global Appeal (2015).

According to DHA (2014), 230,000 migrants arrived in the country seeking asylum in 2014 alone. Out of the 230,000, the DHA granted refugee status to about 65,000. As table 3 shows, the leading refugee contributing countries in 2014 were: Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Zimbabwe, Burundi, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Somalia.

2.5. Refugees and Conflict Transformation: Exploring the toolbox

Most of the literature on refugee crisis links the occurrence of conflicts and the outpouring of refugees, its impacts on political, social and economic in the world. In most of the literature, there is an assertion that a positive correlation exists betwixt (re)occurrence of conflicts and resurgence of the refugee problem. However, since 1945 (the establishment of Peace Studies as a discipline) much literature on conflict resolution has mainly concentrated on the termination of war. While conflict transformation tends to deal with conflict itself: causes and how to terminate it, peacebuilding deals with addressing structures (political, social and
economic) within which the conflict was embedded in and how to find its long term process (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Oliver, 2011:288). The bulk of the literature on conflict transformation however, has focused on analysing and understanding the dynamics of the conflict (Stedman, 1996:61; Liden, 2009a; Richmond, 2012). Wallenstein (2002) argues that the basic elements of conflict resolution should be honouring the peace-agreement: a formal understanding among the conflicting parties. A similar view is held by McAskie (2008) who argue that if conflict is to be resolved, the former conflicting parties should be willing co-exist and tolerate each other so as to positively resolve the conflict. Some scholars argue that conflict transformation should ensure that all actors are incorporated in stopping the violence (Staub, 2006; Lambourne, 2007; Rigby, 2001; Parkhurst, 2010; Ramsbotham et al, 2011).

There is a section of scholars who are at leery with the current literature on conflict transformation that hinges on liberal-peace 13 conceptualization of peacebuilding. For instance, McGirty (2009) argues that liberal conceptualization of peacebuilding has led to endorsement of hegemonic rules within conflicting state. According to McGirty, contemporary interventions have concentrated on stabilising/ending violence in war-torn countries by dealing with the conflict elites without addressing their root causes. Similarly, Banks (2010) argue that the contemporary liberal approach to peacebuilding need to expounded so as to accommodate the needs of all people of a conflicting country and not only serve the interest of the conflicting elites. As a result, Banks (2010) criticise the current liberal model of peacebuilding for being: 1) conservative and stability based- focuses on state-building. 2) Orthodoxy and characterized with pluralisms and democratic reforms. 3) justice-emancipatory but lacking the interest of civil society and common citizens (locals). Additionally, Boege (2012) argues that by focusing exclusively on state-building and regime change/endorsement, liberal model of peacebuilding overlooks the causes of war and the interest of the locals. Therefore, it serves the interests of the interveners and not the conflicting country. As a result, it displaces the indigenous legitimacy with institutions that are inflexible; this is one characteristic of politics in many unstable African states. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Curle (2011:233) criticize liberal conceptualization of peacebuilding for being in contradiction of what conflict transformations aims at achieving. According Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Curle (2011:233), any peacebuilding intervention

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13 A claim that countries that are democratic see no need of going to war with one another. Therefore, a proper strategy of ending war is by democratizing the conflicting country (see Rosato 2003:585)
need to be transformative and cosmopolitan in that it should seek to privilege local and civilian capacity building and should re-negotiate between local and international interveners. From the preceding paragraph, it can be deduced that most scholarship is concerned with the question whose interests should conflict transformation serve? However, in the context of peacebuilding intervention in African and Asian conflicts, Lederach (2004) and Williams (2015) note that there is a sizeable literature that has challenged peacebuilding interveners’ role in conflict states. According to Lederach and Appleby (2010) peacebuilding interventions should empower locals of war-torn countries, promote human rights and cultural resources within a given setting. Staub (2006), Ramsbothams, Woodhouse and Curle (2011) argue that conflict transformation in a conflict or post-conflict society should engage with all actors to stop the occurrence or re-occurrence of violence. Staub (2006) argues that peacebuilding efforts should serve to correct severed relations, violated norms, distorted identities and absorbed impacts of trauma created as a result of violence. “This becomes an important mechanism of restoring trust for building a shared future thus, averting future violence” (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Curle, 2011: 231). While the role of interveners in any conflict is contested, Reychler and Colorado (2001:12) argue that there is ‘no one-size fits all strategy’. According to Reychler and Colorado, interveners need to employ more than one strategy: this attests to the variegated nature of peacebuilding intervention exercise (Reychler and Colorado, 2001). In the context of this study, one way of having an integrated peacebuilding intervention strategy is to incorporate the views of refugees hosted by an intervening state. In one way or another, while in their countries of origin, refugees are either perpetrators or victims of the ongoing or a past conflict (Lwambo, 2013). Still, refugees may be influencing an ongoing conflict at the comfort of their host country; this may be an intervening state. Therefore, there is a need for erecting a scholarship that is grounded on the roles of refugees in peacebuilding interventions; this is what this study is founded.

At this juncture, it is worth noting that a review of literature on conflict transformation since 1945 has given no/least attention to the role of refugees in peacebuilding intervention processes in their countries’ conflict. Despite the literature paying less attention to refugees, the dichotomy between conflict transformation and peacebuilding is blurred. While conflict transformation tend to deal with conflict itself: causes and how to terminate it, peacebuilding deals with addressing structures (political, social and economic) within which the conflict was embedded in and how to find its long term process (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Oliver, 2011:288).
UNHCR (2015) reports that at the end of 2014 over 45.2 people globally had been forcefully displaced by war. Instead of addressing the root causes of conflict, most peacebuilding intereners, have either militarily or diplomatically intervened in warring states as a way of addressing the refugee crisis. While this being the case, peacebuilding intereners have lacked to tap on the wisdom of the refugees before carrying out their military or diplomatic interventions. As a result, the role of refugees in peacebuilding interventions has been subverted or least investigated by most scholars.

However, there are scholars who have attempted to investigate the role of refugees either in the host or home countries. Jacobsen (2002) argues that while in their host countries, refugees pose security, economic and environmental benefits and burdens. According to Jacobsen (2002) refugees are human resource assets to the host countries in form of humanitarian assistance, economic assets and human capital. In support of Jacobsen argument, a study done by Addo (2008) in Ghana established that Liberian women refugees were involved in various income-generating activities: petty-trading, hair-dressing and dress-making which were helping in improving the economy of Ghana. A study done in Canada by MacLean et al (2004) established that the influx of refugees and immigrants from Malaria-prone tropical countries was a threat to Canadian public health. So as to curb the spread of malaria, MacLean et al (2004) recommended that the Canadian authorities needed to improve the surveillance of increasing number of refugees.

In the context of conflict transformation, there exist a small number of scholarship that has given refugees a priority. Loescher, Milner, Newman & Troeller (2010) in argue other than seeking their opinions, most host and intervening states are concerned with immediate humanitarian assistance, repatriation, and restrictions on a wide range of rights of the refugees. According to Loescher, Milner, Newman & Troeller, refugees are considered as a threat to security and political concerns of host states. This is the reason why most host countries restrict refugees’ movements and places them in confined camps. An study done by Chimni (2002 found out that most host countries mount pressure to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to facilitate and promote the return of refugees in their countries. Preceding category of host countries do not care whether the conditions that bred war in refugee’s home countries have been addressed or not. A current example is the case of Somali refugees in Kenya, whereby the Kenyan government is insisting that the UNHCR should repatriate them even though the conditions in Somalia are not yet conducive
for return (Stanley, 2015). According to Sanchez (2011: iii), “If the issues causing displacement were to be solved, then the intervening host countries would be able to concentrate on their own population” (Sanchez, 2011: iii). However, while Chimmi (1998), Sanchez (2011) and Stanley (2015) suggest that refugees should play a crucial role in their countries’ peacebuilding, they do not spell out whether or not an intervening host state should consider the views of refugees on peacebuilding interventions. A study done by Menkhaus (2010) established that Somalian refugees especially in England and US were both assets and liabilities to peacebuilding in Somalia: some were perpetuating war while other were contributing to peace. Positively, Somalian diaspora were continuously becoming civil society activists who funded and advocated for good governance, progressive principle and ensuring that the intervening states in the Somalia’s conflict puts the interest of local at heart. Negatively, Menkhaus (2008) argues that many Somalian diasporas were using their resources to finance the escalation of the ongoing conflict in that country. According to Anderson and McKnight (2015), some of the Al-Shabaab funding comes from some Somalis in diaspora. There is also literature that deals with the role of Palestinian refugees and immigrants in resolving the Palestinian conflict. According to Rempel (2013), since 1990, the Palestinian refugees sought to negotiate for a seat in negotiation between PLO and Israel in securing a lasting solution to the Gaza conflict.

The foregoing scholarship shows that there is global growing recognition of the role of refugees in peacebuilding interventions. The growing recognition of refugees as party to the conflict, reveals that they may offer some contribution on building peace in their countries’ conflicts. (Aleinikoff and Poellot, 2013). The foregoing scholarship on refugees and peacebuilding depicts that in some situations, refugees may contribute positively. However, there cis dearth of scholarship on how refugees may contribute positively to peacebuilding of their country. For instance, there a number of studies that show how South Africans while in exile played an important role in pressuring the host countries in Africa, Europe, Asia and North America to support their struggle against the apartheid regime. Ottaway (1991) argues that after going into exile in 1961, the then president of the ANC established a number of anti-apartheid missions across the African continent. It was in some of the established missions that many South African had their military training grounds and for strategizing on how to dismantle the apartheid government. Freund and Padayachee pointed out that in the US and UK, there were a number of South African exiles who solicited funding for the ANC
and also drew the attention of the international community to the plight of South Africans under the apartheid regimes (Freund and Padayachee, 1998).

A studies done by Vanore et al (2015) and Horst et al (2010) established that those who are forced into exile can build peace in their country of origin through political or economic means. For instance, Horst et al (2010) argues that the political role of the Somali refugees living in Italy led to an evolution of different Somali Association. The associations provided a form of support to the new and incoming Somali refugees. This association also assisted new Somali refugees to know their rights and how to become legal in Italy. According to Horst et al (2010:19) the political engagement of Somali refugees living in Italy was termed as “translocal politics”. This term is “defined as the initiatives of migrant communities or individuals who seek to provide concrete support to specific localities in the country of origin… through political activities in which the migrant communities engage the government of their country of residence on issues that exclusively concern the country from which they came” (ibid). Similarly, Adele Galipo (2011) argues that through financial remittance to their home country, refugees in Europe- with a particular focus on those in Italy- can be viewed as positively affecting the peace process. The idea is that these financial remittances go into developmental projects in their homelands. Galipo (2011) nonetheless emphasizes the political dimension as quite pertinent as through this, the refugees are able to exert pressure on and call the international community to the plight of their fellow country people. As Abdille and Pirkkalainen (2009:34) see it, “advocacy and lobbying are instruments used by diasporas to bring issues concerning their respective countries of origin to the international agenda”. Further still, Galipo (2011), citing Horst (2009) argues that through lobbying, the refugees among another segments of diaspora raise awareness, organize demonstrations for certain causes and promote public education and relations. “The lobbying usually takes place in the country of settlement, but it may be that refugees manage to network with international agencies, regional organizations and NGOs” (Galipo, 2011:10).

However, despite the fact that literature from the South African exiles and Somali refugees in Europe indicate that refugees and immigrants can play a crucial role in peacebuilding, most scholarship have concentrated on the need for humanitarian assistance and repatriation. There is also a growing scholarship on why refugees are the root cause of anti-foreign sentiments from the locals. According to Kibreab (1993) and Amnesty International (2015), refugee and immigrants are the root cause of anti-foreign stereotype and xenophobia. Other than
addressing the root causes of xenophobia: socio-economic factors, Amnesty International (2015) established that South Africa enforced tough immigration rules so that to limit the number of immigrants entering the country. The Human Science Research Council (HSRC, 2010) argues that xenophobic sentiment in South Africa is shared by a considerable proportion of South Africans across the socio-demographic and socio-economic spectrum. It appears that negative stereotypical views about refugees are fairly widespread, especially among South Africans who perceive them as threats in the job market (Amnesty International, 2015; HSRC, 2010; Landau, 2011).

Shifting away from the concerns of foregoing scholars, Mbeki (2013) argues that the 2008 xenophobic attacks are example of social ills that South Africa will continue to experience if it does not participate in peacebuilding interventions on the continent. Similarly, Zuma (2015) cited the 2015 xenophobic violence as an indicator of South Africa having no option but to intervene in African conflicts so as to promote democracy and human rights. While reaping from the negative impacts of war on the continent-refugees- a number of scholars are now paying attention to the South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in Africa. At this point, it is imperative to critique the literature on the role South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in Africa. Later on, South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC will be given special attention.

2.6 South Africa and peacebuilding intervention in Africa.
A number of scholars have critiqued the relevancy of South Africa’s involvement in transforming conflict situations in different African countries (see Pillay 2013). Pillay (2013) claims that because of better military tools and expenditure, South Africa has the capacity to intervene in any African conflict, pointing out that South Africa is the largest military spender in Africa accounting for nearly sixty-five percent of total military spending in southern Africa and twenty-seven percent in Africa. Duncan (2014) argues that if South Africa is to be rid of political and economic immigrants, it has no option but to consolidate its privileged position to stabilize the continent. Moeletsi Mbeki, the brother of former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, has publicly claimed that the mounting migration of other African citizens, especially from war-torn areas into South Africa, is a wake-up call for the country to act. Mbeki mentions the 2008 xenophobic attacks as an example of social ills that South Africa will continue to face if it does not democratize and stabilize Africa. Being the most ‘democratic and developed’ African economy, Jacob Zuma, current President of South Africa,
in turn publicly informs the country that South Africa has no option but to reinforce a culture of peace, democracy and human rights on the continent.

Other scholars argue that instead of resolving African conflicts, South Africa is using conflict resolution as a tool for expanding its hegemony and enacting a double standard, “as Africa’s Big Brother”. Cilliers and Schunemann (2013) argue that historically, in some conflict situations, there is some evidence that South Africa had ulterior motives—other than conflict resolution—in its intervention, claiming that Mandela used this crisis to settle his discontent with Robert Mugabe—the then SADC chair. Chingono and Nakana (2009) add that the regime of Mandela played a key role in derailing peace talks in Sudan by supplying weapons to both, the Sudanese government and to the Sudanese People Liberation Movement. Cilliers and Schunemann (2013) criticize Mbeki’s time in the Presidency for using South Africa’s conflict transformation strategy as a means of selling South Africa’s arms to the war-torn countries of the great lakes and in Algeria and to campaign for the country’s permanent position at the United Nation Security Council. By continuously intervening in the DRC, South Africa is joining a group of both state and non-state actors who scramble for the DRC’s vast mineral resources—a major factor that is perpetuating conflicts in the DRC (Taylor 2003; Whetho 2014).

The foregoing scholars’ work in South Africa’s role in resolving and transforming African conflicts, is thus cumulatively and potentially paving way for more (hopefully new) research trends into understanding South Africa’s role in conflict transformation in Africa. However, one asserts that there are also new types of empirically based research that are needed. This is because most literature of literature on South Africa and peacebuilding focuses on the intervener (South Africa), its interests in the conflict situation, humanitarian assistance and integration or repatriation of refugees. However, there is a dearth of literature on what role refugees residing in South Africa can contribute towards South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions warring and post-war African states. Also, there is scarcity of literature on attitudes and perceptions that refugees from war-torn countries have on how South Africa’s involvement in their countries’ conflict transformation benefits them or South Africans.

Furthermore, it is worth noting that the intend of this study is to offer ‘thick’ empirical and material contexts of how lived experiences of the refugees residing (in South Africa) can enhance and deepen the scholarship on understanding the imbricated complexities in South
Africa’s peacebuilding interventionist stance on the continent. While the above points to the kinds of qualitative research being suggested, other scholars propose theoretical models that can also change the shape of focused work on South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in Africa. Prominent peace scholars like Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Curle (2011), Ledarach (2005) and Doyle (2000) propose a reconstructed model of conflict resolution—a transformative and cosmopolitan model that seeks to privilege local and civilian capacity building and to renegotiate between local and international perspectives. Still Ledarach (2015) and Paffenholz (2014) advocate for a transformative and cosmopolitan model of peacebuilding that includes those in exile such as refugees and migrants. In retrospect, this study argues that by focusing on refugees, the venture of peacebuilding interventions scholarship should bring one back to the empirical contexts and the qualitative and lived experiences that the researcher is contending for. In this case, the researcher brings into context the empirical and qualitative case of the role of Congolese refugees (in South Africa) within the South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC.

2.7 South Africa, Peacebuilding and Congolese Refugees
Tonheim and Swart (2015) argue that the DRC’s conflict has become one of the most important cases for gauging the capacity and the will of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions on the African continent. According to Tonheim and Swart (2015), the way the Syrian conflict has become gauge for the power of the military power of the US and Russia, DRC’s conflict is to South Africa. While South Africa continuous to seek peace in the DRC, at the same time, it is experiencing a high influx of Congolese refugees. This has made the influx of Congolese refugees in South Africa not to be immune from scholars’ contestation. While a number of scholars have paid attention to the capacity of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions on the continent (as shown in the preceding sub-section), there is a growing scholarship on Congolese refugees in South Africa. For instance, the works of Bouillon (1996a&b) mainly focuses on discrimination Congolese and other Franco-phone refugees undergo while settling in South Africa. Other scholars like Kadima, Denis and Kalombo (1995) argue that it is a daunting task for Congolese refugees to get identification documents in South Africa. This hampers their efforts of looking for work or doing business. More recent works of Smit and Rugunanan (2014) argue that due to lack of identification documents, refugees from the DRC, Burundi and Zimbabweans were interviewed between running informal businesses and illegal hawking. Similarly, very recently, Gordon (2014) and Mondoko-Inaka argue that Congolese refugees migrate to South African urban centres
for economic, political, cultural and psychological survival. Lakika, Kankonde and Ritchers (2015) describe and analyse the psychological trajectories Congolese refugees undergo while coping with their post-war suffering they harboured from the country. Lakika, Kankonde and Richters (2015) gave attention to the counselling services offered by an NGO (Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, CSVR) in Johannesburg and found out that that many Congolese refugees were unaware of the purpose of counselling. “They attended sessions primarily with the hope that by doing so they could find ways out of their socio-economic plights and receive referrals to urgently needed medical services”(Lakika, Kankonde and Richters, 2015:xii). In relation Congolese politics, a group of Congolese refugees demonstrated at Luthuli House (African Nation Congress Headquarters) expressing their disappointment with the Zuma regime over its apparent disinterest in the DRC post-election stalemate in 2012 (Smit and Rugunanan, 2014).

In the context of Durban (location of this study), most scholarship present Congolese as the biggest group among the refugee population (Sabet-Sarghi, 2000; Amisi, 2005; Zihindula, Meyer-Weitz and Akintola, 2015). For instance, the 2012 DHA Durban Refugee Reception centre statistics shows that out of the 6412 new asylum seekers applicants 30% were from DRC (Cohan, 2014). Majority of literature presents Congolese refugees in Durban as people who are concerned with eking a daily living. For instance, in attempt to understand the livelihood strategies of Durban Congolese refugees, Amisi (2005:2) established that Congolese in Durban formed social networks as their social capital. This has enabled them to meet their day-to-day needs through easy access to additional resources. Still, Amisi (2005) Congolese like any other refugees are considered to be a threat to the existing social fabric and, consequently, they are not easily integrated in Durban by South Africans. According to Amisi, the Congolese refugee community revives and strengthens the existing and new informal and formal social networks as a survival strategy in Durban.

Most of the foregoing literature view and refract the Congolese refugees as those in need of humanitarian assistance, psychosocial help, in need of a good reception in their host countries and to be repatriated back to their homes at the end of the conflict. This has left them (the subaltern refugee) vulnerable, both in the DRC and in South Africa, and to have no role in peacebuilding of their country. Such arguments assume that all Congolese refugees are people who are preoccupied with only the immediate concerns of supporting themselves and eking out a living while in South Africa. Such studies lack the recognition that there is also a
particular group of Congolese refugees and Rights groups (intelligentsia, academics and activists) whose concern is a better DRC and an all-encompassing South Africa’s peacebuilding process in their country.

However, there is a small category of scholars who are showing how the Congolese refugees in Durban are becoming involved in politics and peacebuilding of their country. For instance, Khwela et al (2014) argues that there is a growing solidarity of Congolese scholars, right groups and activists who are concerned with good governance and an end to the DRC’s conflict. In many instances, the preceding Congolese solidarity has come out and expressed their dissatisfaction with South Africa’s lack of interest in interfering in the DRC’s governance and mistreatment of Congolese in South Africa. For instance, in 2014, Congolese refugees in conjunction with Abahleli Basemjondolo (a civil society group that advocates for the rights of shack-dwellers) demonstrated in Durban CBD to expose both South African and international agents that were perpetuating conflicts in the DRC (Khwela et al 2014). A similar protest had been done in 2002 during the first ever AU summit at the Durban’s International Convention Centre. During this summit, Congolese refugees demonstrated and protested against the Rwanda’s interference in the internal affairs of DRC (Pan African News agency, 2002). Such demonstrations highlight the need for the involvement of Congolese refugees residing in South Africa a chance to participate in the affairs of their country. In most of their demonstration, the Durban Congolese refugees have argued that South Africa was not concerned with the DRC’s governance and conflict.

Therefore, one can argue that the preceding demonstration proves that there is a particular groups of Congolese refugees whose are concerned with seeing a better DRC and an all-encompassing South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in their country. This is paving way for new research on the role of Congolese refugees in South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. As the strongest economy coupled with experience of a peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy and a culture of respect for human rights, South Africa is perceived by Congolese as a country that can be a tool for peace in the DRC. However, in relation to the DRC’s conflict, Gbaya (2015:57) argues that the rate and the level at which South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC is determined by the extent to which the South Africa’s economic interests are threatened. Like the current trends of interventions, this study admits that South Africa has narrowed its peacebuilding interventions in the DRC by focusing largely on how to ‘use short, medium and long-term
processes of either averting or rebuilding war-affected communities so as to reduce the likelihood of occurrence or recurrence of war and/or violence’ (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 199). In a similar vein, Shepherd (2014) suggests that the limited success of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC is a result of a lack of commitment or a lack of adequate insight into the best possible way to bring about sustainable peace in the DRC. Accordingly, Shepherd accedes that a true and lasting peace can only be emplaced in the DRC if intervention efforts adopt a multilateral approach which considers all parties (implicitly refugees) in the peace building process. In relation to this study, one approach that can be accentuated is the incorporation of the views of Congolese refugees in Durban with the South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC. This study is of the view that most scholars need to explore the attitudes and the perceptions of the Congolese refugees towards South Africa’s intervention in the DRC on one hand, and on the other hand, to explicate the capacity and the interests of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC.

However, from the survey on literature, the role of Congolese refugees within the South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC’s conflict remains under-researched. Ones argues, a study like this one: that explores the attitudes and perceptions of the Congolese refugees towards South Africa and peacebuilding in the DRC, is valuable. While most of scholars (as shown) assume that most Congolese refugees are people who are concerned with immediate concerns of supporting themselves and eking out a living, the under-researched role of Congolese refugees (in Durban) on South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in DRC becomes a motivation and edifice of this contemporary study. From the foregoing discussions, a logical conclusion this study is founded on is that the analysis of the role of refugees in peacebuilding interventions is dependent, not on humanitarian assistance received from the host country, but on interrogating their lived experiences on the root causes of war in their country as narrated by them. These are what have been lacking or less documented by many scholars in relation to South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. As such, this study bridges this scholarly gap.

Therefore, this study’s utilization of cosmopolitan conflict transformation (CCTR) and realism tenets (as discussed in the next chapter) is informed by a quest for a refined understanding of the role of Congolese refugees in South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions. This study applies some of the elements captured in this review section in its explication of the role of Durban Congolese community. In view of the subject matter of this
research, the study places emphasis on the role of Congolese refugees residing in Durban in South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. Although the tenets of cosmopolitan conflict transformation and realism paradigms may be trailed by contradictions and academic controversy, the elements associated with a nuanced understanding of the preceding paradigm will be useful parameters within which one can interrogate the South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. As such, the study will potentially fill the gap left by preceding scholars’ non-empirical assumption on what perception Congolese refugees have towards South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. By gaining such vital insights and perspectives from the Congolese refugees in Durban, this study will cast a more critical gaze on what has motivated the lack of incorporation of refugees in peacebuilding interventions. In the end, this links in general the subject matter of this study: South Africa and Peacebuilding in the DRC; Probing the attitudes of Congolese refugees in Durban

2.8 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to interrogate and contextualize the literature on the South Africa and peacebuilding interventions in the DRC: the role of refugees within the South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions. The section noted that most of works done by scholars contains narratives that corroborate, modify or rebut the role of refugees in peacebuilding interventions. This has led to a robust scholarly debate about the nexus between refugees and conflict transformation.

This chapter examined this debate and highlighted the neglected realities of refugees’ role in peacebuilding interventions. In many countries that have experienced war are greatest contributors of refugees in South Africa and globally.

However, the section noted many scholars have carried out theoretical studies that suggest the difficulties that refugees face while in their hosts’ countries, particularly in South Africa. Such difficulties included: humanitarian, economic, social, physical and psycho-social construction of their lives after war. However, the review of many of these literatures lacked empirical backing of refugees’ role in peacebuilding interventions of their countries. Given that refugees are party of the ongoing or ended conflicts either as victims or perpetuators, they understand the dynamics of the root causes of wars in their countries. Therefore, there is need to probe their attitudes and perceptions towards peacebuilding interventions of their countries. In doing so, the thrust of the chapter found out that experiences, insights and arguments of empirical realities of the subaltern Congolese refugees in Durban, can
substantively contribute to the knowledge of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in DRC and on the continent. The next chapter examines theoretical and analytical perspectives of cosmopolitan conflict transformation and realism; combines scholarly narratives with the review and comparison of various schools of thought on conflict transformation and realism paradigms.
CHAPTER THREE:
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

The aim of this study is to attempt critical analysis of what constitutes peacebuilding interventions as narrated by refugees. So as to arrive at its aim, this chapter explicates theoretical frameworks (conflict transformation and realism theory), methodology and methods that were adopted in this study. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section presents cosmopolitan conflict transformation (CCTR) and realism as the major approaches of unpacking South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. Firstly, CCTR is explicated as an intervention perspective that advocates for the transformation of attitudes and relationships of all parties to the conflict: conflicting parties, non-combatants, civilian, refugees and IDPs by use of bottom-up and top-down strategies. Secondly, the section contextualises realism as an international relation theory. According to Pugh, Cooper and Turner (2016), by choosing to intervene- whether diplomatically or militarily in a conflict state, an intervening country does so in pursuit of its interests which may include foreign, economic and security interests. While CCTR seeks to address and end the root causes of conflicts in the DRC, realism explains the motives behind and why and whose interests South Africa’s peacebuilding in the DRC are serving. MacGinty and Richmond (2016) argue that it is difficult to conceptualize national interests. This is because in collectives and institutions, what appears as collective or institutional interest may be the interest of a segment within a state (Nye et al, 2012: 10). For instance, what may appear to be national interest of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC may be the interest of South Africa’s business class and elite. According to Iglesias (2014), it is conceivable that a segment of South Africa’s state and business actors actually benefit from the conflict in DRC. Therefore, the utilization of realism allowed the study to meet one of its objectives: to explore some of the benefits South Africa can reap from its incessant peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. Similarly, realism justified this study’s aim as to why the inclusion of the Congolese refugees within South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC could promote the continental interest of South Africa of being seen as a stable African country (Zuma, 2014).

The second part of this chapter presents the research design, methodology and methods of analysis that were employed during the study. According to Silverman (2000), methodology defines how one will go about studying the phenomenon while the methods are the
techniques that are used to collect the data. The idea in this section is to explicate how data was obtained during fieldwork, sampled, presented and to situate the data in the context of the discussion in preceding theoretical chapters.

This study was done qualitatively by exploring and discovering what attitudes, concerns and perceptions refugees have towards an intervening state’s peacebuilding interventions in their country in a way that generates “rich data” (Domegan and Fleming, 2007; Hopkins, 1980). As qualitative research, this study is offering a “close-up” data analysis of phenomena (attitudes of the Congolese refugees towards South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions) (Thomas and Magilvy, 2011:152). The strength of a qualitative research like this one is that it allows the researcher to explore a complex phenomenon (the role of the Congolese refugees in South Africa’s peacebuilding mission in the DRC) in a holistic fashion (Thomas and Magilvy, 2011:152). In end, it addressed the tendency of the researcher to impose personal assumptions or biases, conclusions and results from the data; thus, it obviated *a priori* conclusions (Wiersma, 1995: 211-212).

The third section of the chapter is an explication of data analysis methods and ethical considerations made throughout the study. The ethical considerations guiding this study were embedded in protecting the autonomy of the participants and ensuring that they were well informed during the collection of data. The study was also based on the beneficence of the treatment of participants (Creswell, 2012:22). Beneficence insists on maximising good outcomes while minimising risks for the participants.

Finally, the chapter looks at data analysis with a view to systematically search for meaning (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2007). When the data collected is examined, it will yield a coherent account of the findings (Green et al., 2007). Thus, analysis of data was engaged in to establish findings on the Congolese refugees in Durban. The study used thematic analysis on primary data and content analysis on secondary data. Both methods of data analysis complemented each other to shape the evaluation of the comprehensive data collected.

**3.2 Major Theories upon which the study was adopted**

Conflict transformation and realism were the two theoretical paradigms that this study adopted. The choice of the two theories was to assail the arguments of proponents of conflict transformation and peace research like Galtung (1969), Kriesberg, (2004), Ledarach (2005) and Ramsbothams, Woodhouse and Curle (2011) who argue that the causes of war and
problems of sustaining peace are so complex that no single approach can be used to address them. In choosing the two theories, the researcher aimed at using multiple cognate theories so as to understand South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC.

At this juncture, it is worth noting that conflict transformation and resolution emerged as a non-violent response in offering ways to “resolving” rather than containing or managing conflicts. However, there may be different ways and dimensions that Congolese refugees may see as the immediate and proxy causes of war in the DRC. Although South Africa has a clue on what precipitates war in the DRC, this study argues that by drawing from the insights of the Congolese refugees, South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC’s conflict may be enhanced. This may give South Africa a new approach of resolving and transforming conflict in DRC and quite possibly elsewhere in Africa (see Adebayo, 2005:231). From a realist perspective, however, by choosing to intervene in the DRC’s conflict, it is to be understood that South Africa would nevertheless work to protect its own sovereign interests - whether through means that are economic or security or military. In situating why and whose interest South Africa serves in its peacebuilding intervention in the DRC, realism is a relevant paradigm of explicating this. Among other national interests of South Africa, is the problem of the influx of refugees (Mbeki, 2013). Therefore, South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC can be argued to among many ways of having a stable and peaceful DRC so as to reduce the influx of refugees. By having lasting peace in the DRC and other war-torn African countries, South Africa will have a less influx of refugees and thus, be able to focus on economic empowerment of its citizens.

3.2.1 Conflict transformation theory
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an increase in intra-state conflicts, especially in Africa (Lambourne, 2004:21) as a result of poor governance and frustration of the peoples’ basic needs (Connolly 2012). This has made many peace scholars to be preoccupied with the quest for understanding the causes and non-violent mean of ending conflicts. One such scholar was Johan Galtung (1964). Galtung (1964: 432) is the first peace scholar to envisage two descriptions of peace; negative peace (the absence of turmoil, tension, conflict and war), and positive peace (conditions that are good for management, orderly resolution of conflict, harmony associated with mature relationships, gentleness, and love) (Boulding, 1978: 3). This later led to the emergence of conflict transformation as a field of study and a profession.
As a field of research into what breeds war and how to non-violently end it, Lederach (1995b:17) argues that “conflict transformation emerged as a search for an adequate language to explain the peacemaking venture”. It became “a relatively new invention within the broader field of peace and conflict studies” (Botes, 2003: i. d.) and “a process that will make up for the inadequacies of mere resolution” (Mitchell, 2002: 1). According to Galtung (1969), effective conflict resolution and rebuilding peace in any conflict society requires engaging all actors of the conflict (victims, perpetrators, society, policy makers) (Staub, 2005:890). Therefore, it emerged among conflict transformation theorists like Miall (2005:4) that any intervention in any conflict should surpass “reframing of position and the identification of win-win outcomes”. This is because, when violence or war breaks up, many strategies of interveners tend to address antagonisms between top conflicting elites and militant group leaders without addressing the root cause(s) of war; frustrated basic human rights and needs (Sandole,2010:9). The preceding approach in resolution of conflict was referred to as liberal approach which serves the interest of the powerful and in maintaining the status quo in a conflict society. Other than eliminating the root causes of war, the liberal approach was faulted for creating favourable conditions that endorsed a culture of violence.

Auvinen and Kivimaki (1996:3) argue that in any conflict situation, peacebuilding interveners should seek constructive changes rather than satisfy the demands of the warring parties. According Auvinen and Kivimaki (1996:3), there are other casualties that are more fundamental to and involved in a conflict than at the level of conflict. Similarly, Spence (2001:45) argues that conflict transformation should give interveners minds “that are flexible, consultative and collaborative and that operate from a contextual understanding of the root causes of conflict”. Furthermore, Miall (2005:4) contends that “conflict transformation should be a process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses, and if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict”. By seeking to change “the conditions that give rise to the underlying root causes of the conflict” (Diamond, 1994: 3), the rationale of conflict transformation is to prevent the emergence or resurgence of conflict (International Alert, 1998: 28) and, at the same time, “to
promote nation and state-building\textsuperscript{15}, reconciliation forgiveness and justice\textsuperscript{16}, change agentry, and social transformation” (Botes, 2003:i).

Galtung (1964) in his founding \textit{Journal of Peace Research} was the first peace scholar to make an attempt to develop a theory that could explicate an understanding on how to end violent conflict. In his attempt, Galtung envisaged two descriptions of peace- that is, \textit{negative peace} as the absence of turmoil, tension, conflict and war and \textit{positive peace} as conditions that are good for management, ‘orderly resolution of conflict, harmony associated with mature relationships, gentleness, and love’ (Boulding, 1978: 3). This led to the founding of \textit{Positive-negative peace theory}. Positive-negative peace theory bases its conceptualization of conflict transformation on the understanding of violence as direct and indirect violence. It is an expounded conceptualization of violence and hence has an expounded understanding of peace.

Galtung saw peace research as research into conditions that draw closer to peace while averting violence. This led him to conceptualize negative peace as the absence of violence and positive peace as an integration of the human society (1964: 2). However, he argued that these two dimensions of peace are inseparable; one leads into the other. Galtung argues that negative peace is characterized by ceasefires or what we see when the world’s powerful nations or the UN or NATO, equipped with their coercive military power, try to bring about an end to war or violence. Although he does not advocate for coercion, he asserts that it may lead to positive peace. Like Galtung, Sandole (2010:9) notes that “negative peace might be a necessary condition for positive peace. However, negative peace tends not to be sufficient.” According to Sandole (2010), negative peace falls short of transforming deep-rooted causes and conditions of conflict which might arise. This is because, when violence or war ends,

\textsuperscript{15} Nation-building is process of (re)building a common identity among citizens of a country either culturally or politically (Fukuyama, 2007:10). State-building is the process of (re)building legitimate and functioning institutions to enable a country to effectively deliver economic, political and social service to its citizens. Nation and state building complement each other (Fukuyama, 2007:10).

\textsuperscript{16} Reconciliation is the mutual acceptance by groups of each other. It aims at changing the psychological orientation of the groups towards each other after massive violence (Staub (2005). Forgiveness is the means by which the wrongs committed to each other by former antagonists are sought to be moderated through truth telling (Tutu, 1999). Justice may mean fairness in one situation while in another; it may mean a form of reconciliation (Ramsbotham et al, 2011).
many strategies of conflict resolution tend to address antagonisms between top leaders without addressing the root cause(s) of war (frustrated basic human needs). According to Galtung, effective conflict resolution requires engagement with all actors to the violence (victim and perpetrators) with the society at large, policy makers who shape policies and governance of a conflicting society (Staub, 2005).

The development of positive-negative peace theory was inspired by the health sciences whereby health can be seen as absence of disease as well as the capability of the body to resist disease. Galtung in positive-negative peace theory likens negative peace to curative health while positive peace is likened to preventive health (Galtung 1985). According to Galtung, peace research should concern itself on how to avert conditions or root causes of that which breeds violence and conflicts and their relation to negative and positive peace: structural violence (Wolff and Yakinthou 2011). Galtung (1990) in positive-negative peace theory is preoccupied with the notion of structural violence which he sees as a consequence of cultural violence. Galtung ruled out the liberals’ just war theory17 arguing that it was violence committed by self-styled leaders in the world. Due to increased intra-state and inter-state conflicts that were experienced in the 1990s, Galtung (1990:24) redefined violence as ‘the avoidable insults to basic human needs’. According to Galtung, violence runs from a created liberal culture of violence (cultural violence) to socio-political and economic structures that do not meet the basic needs of all (structural violence). This leads to war and upheaval (direct violence). Therefore, structural violence exists when economic and social conditions lead to loss of lives and sufferings as a consequence of the unequal distribution of resources, not as a result of physical violence. This led to the development of conflict transformation theory as “a process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses, and if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict” (Miall, 2005:4).

In dealing with the effects of war, conflict transformation should seek to “address the underlying structures, agencies and practices within socio-political system that precipitates violence” (Whetho, 2014: 117). The task of interveners in conflict transformation should

17 Just war theory argues that there are cases where war is justified and permissible and gives norms that justifies war and how soldiers ought to carry out a just war (Clark, 1988, Norman, 1995 and Walzer, 1977). In his support of just war, Brandt (1972: 153) uses Winston Churchill as an arbiter of just war theory. According to Brandt, Churchill justified obliteration bombing as retaliation (1972:158).
transcend beyond issues of conflict to transform relationships between all conflicting/non-conflicting parties. In doing so, peacebuilding intereners will be paying attention to structure of parties and relationships that may/not be embedded in conflict and those that extend beyond the conflict (Miall, 2005: 4). Put vividly, conflict transformation is the “process by which people change situations, relationships or structures so that they become less violent, less conflictual and less unjust” (International Alert, 1998:28). The main aim of conflict transformation is to address violence that runs from a created culture of violence (cultural violence) to socio-political and economic structures that do not meet the basic needs of all (structural violence). Therefore, intereners should focus on structural violence that exists when economic and social conditions that lead to loss of life and suffering, as a consequence of unequal resource distribution, rather than as the sole result of physical violence (Galtung, 2001:24). Doyle and Sambanis (2011:31) add that the success of conflict transformation is determined by a multitude of elements that contribute to the enhancement of peace. These elements according to Ali and Matthews (2004:12) include; negative peace (closure of violence), a healthy economy, resettlement of displaced persons and refugees, new political institutions that are broadly representative, and mechanisms which deal with the injustices of the past and the future. There is also a need for interventions that aim at healing traumas. This is to ensure that there is a positive orientation between antagonistic groups after violence – reconciliation (Staub, 2005:894).

Although the concept of conflict transformation emerged in the 1990s as the world witnessed both intra and interstate wars, Ramsbotham et al. (2009: 22) argues that the emergence of these conflicts opened a room for a need of transforming and (re)construction and/or a (re)conceptualization of existing paradigms of intervention. The aforementioned wars also led to a numbers of peace scholars to argue that the “existing conflict resolution mechanisms were ineffective in confronting this model of conflict development” (Ramsbotham et al., 2009: 5). While advocating for the traditional conflict transformation and resolution, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (2011) and Botes (2009) criticize a number of approaches for resolving conflicts that were being used by ‘liberal interveners’. “Modern conflict transformation strategies concentrate mainly on termination of war, drafting constitution and electioneering without analyzing and understanding the deep-rooted causes of conflict and all the affected parties” (Wellerstein, 2007:13). As a result, *cosmopolitan conflict transformation theory (CCTR) in the field of conflict and peace research* was adopted.
3.2.1.1 Cosmopolitan Conflict Transformation Theory (CCTR)

Other than remaining within the realms of the traditional negative-positive peace and conflict transformation theories, the CCTR is a more comprehensive structural and systematic approach (Ramsbotham et al., 2009: 23) of analyzing the attitudes of all parties to the conflict. According to Botes (2009), Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Curle (2011) and Lederach (2010), CCTR is a framework that seeks to incorporate all parties to the conflict in finding lasting peace to an on-going or previous conflict: conflicting parties, non-combatants, civilian, refugees and IDPs by use of bottom-up and top-down strategies. CCTR advocates that people’s basic needs have to be met (culture of peace and, reconciliation and peace education) while the latter involves transformation of institutions and leaders. Involvement of all stakeholders in a war-torn or post-conflict society brings lasting peace.

While advocating for CCTR, Ramsbotham et al (2011) and Lederach (2010) appeal back to the tenets of negative-positive peace: negative peace as the absence of turmoil, tension, conflict and war and positive peace as conditions that are good for management, ‘orderly resolution of conflict, harmony associated with mature relationships, gentleness, and love’ (Boulding, 1978: 3 in Makanda, 2014). Wellerstein (2007) argues that any peacebuilding interventions should put into consideration the following three approaches: a) conflict dynamics, b) need-based conflict origins, and c) rational strategic calculations. In doing so, the preceding CCTR will allow interveners to transform structural dimensions of a society, oppression of people and ensure that that there is a more democratic society which supports peace and social justice (Cannolly, 2012). Also, Kriesberg (2004:35) argues that there is a need for a CCTR strategy that addresses the complex environmental, communal and socio-economic issues in maximizing mutual benefits to all groups that find themselves in conflict.

According to Wolff and Yakinthou (2011), CCTR is long-term perspective of peace that seeks to avoid intractable conflicts, transforming protracted conflicts into tractable ones. It is a theory that underscores the significance of “addressing the structural roots of conflict by changing existing patterns of behaviours and creating a culture of non-violent approaches that proposes an integrated approach to peace-building aimed at bringing about long-term changes in personal, relational, structural, and cultural dimensions” (United States Institute of Peace, 2011: 15-16). In the context of this study, CCTR is based on (re)constructive and long-term development of peace and security in a divided society like the DRC. By seeking long-term development, CCTR is a process of building peace, which, according to CARE International
(2010: 7) recognizes and supports the central role played by local and international actors and all other stakeholders and processes that are deemed necessary in ending violence and constructively addressing both the immediate effects and structural causes of violent conflict (Shulika, 2013:89). The fundamental principle of CCTR is to view conflicts in a holistic way and “seek to transform not only the parties’ perceptions but also the environment within which conflict occurs” (Whetho, 2014:123). According to Lederach and Maiese (2003: i. d.), there are four central modes that CCTR targets in any conflict. These are: personal/actor transformation, relational transformation, structural transformation, and cultural transformation. However, other scholars, Ramsbotham et al (2011) and Miall (2005: 10) add context and issue transformations as the fifth and the sixth targets of CCTR as shown in the table 4.

Table 4. CCTR Modes

Adapted by the Author from Ramsbothams, Woodhouse and Oliver (2011).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Context transformation</td>
<td>Changing local, national, regional and international environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure transformation</td>
<td>change from asymmetric to symmetric relations, power structures and root causes of violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor transformation</td>
<td>Changes of leadership, goals and intra-party politics. changes in party’s constituencies and actors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Issue transformation        | - transcendence of contested issues  
|                             | - constructive compromise  
|                             | - changing issues  
|                             | - de-linking or re-linking issues |
| Personal/elite transformation| - changes of perspective  
|                             | - changes of heart  
|                             | - changes of will    |
From table 9 above, CCTR is a peacebuilding perspective that is geared towards a long-term, structural and relational transformation in an ongoing or a past war. The strength of CCTR as shown in the table 9 lies in its comprehensiveness, its emphasis on tackling the root causes of conflict, and its recognition of the need to change not only situations but also people, relationships, structures and agencies that engender conflict. This underscores the researcher’s growing scholarly interest in applying the framework in South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC.

Over the years, as it is argued in chapter four, the DRC is a country whereby violence has been used as a tool of addressing conflicts. In many intervention strategies in the DRC, interveners have made it to witness many transformational processes ranging from simplification to exaggeration, polarization to de-polarization, and escalation to de-escalation of conflicts. As a perspective that explicates the various impacts and factors in conflict (historical legacies, agencies, structures, and relationships), CCTR furnishes the insights on the role of Congolese refugees (residing in South Africa) in South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC.

In this study, by highlighting South Africa’s peacebuilding initiative in the DRC using CCTR, the researcher has generated new data and added to the existing discourses on the role of refugees in conflict transformation. Boates (2009) argues that many interveners, negotiators and peacemakers intervene in conflicts by offering mediations between key conflicting elites while sidelining other minor groups. This sets new grounds for future conflicts (MacGinty and Richmond, 2016). Within the DRC’s context, Nderitu (2013) argues that most efforts to bring peace during the first and the second Congo wars involved reconciling top conflicting elites. In the context of this study, the decision of most interveners to deal with decision making elites, opinion makers and influential figures in a conflict country, subverts the role of refugees as an equally important party to the ongoing or ended conflict of their country (Richmond and Tellidis, 2014) This study utilizes CCTR in showing how the views and insights of the Congolese refugees on peacebuilding can serve as one among other
alternatives contributing to an effective South African intervention in the DRC’s conflict. Also CCTR is used as perspective that is vital in offering some explanation as to why exclusion of the Congolese refugees just like any other groups within conflict country, foregrounds future conflicts. Therefore, through the tenets of CCTR, this study argues that although Congolese refugees are non-state actors, their views on peacebuilding may enhance South Africa’s interventions in the DRC’s conflict in one way or another.

Scholars like Ledarach (2015) and Ramsbothams, Woodhouse and Curle (2011) have used CCTR approach to understand the role played by interveners among other actors that are involved in current conflicts. They have not used this approach in analysing the role of Congolese refugees-residing in South Africa - in South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. As such, this study is aimed at being a potentially new contribution to the existing literature in conflict transformation, particularly in unending peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. As Isike and Okeke-Uzodike (2010: 683) argue, any peacebuilding intervention should have the capacity to conceive of and engender meaningful responses that are capable of resolving the incidence of violence and its recurrence in society.

3.2.2 Realism: Explaining the interest of peacebuilding interventions

As it is argued in chapter four, looking at both international and local actors’ interests and behavior in the DRC from 1960 to 2014, it was evident that the interests of some social and economic groups are changing considerably over time, prompting changes in behavior toward peacebuilding intervention projects. This fluidity of interests in the DRC’s conflict presents an important opportunity for South Africa to seek to promote the peace and rule of law in that country. This does not rule out the fact that South Africa does not have other national interests in the DRC. It is through the tenets that such interests can be explicated.

Realism has endured as a traditional tenet in political thought. According to Baldwin (1993:11) precursors of realism such as Thucydides, Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes among many others emphasize the anarchic, self-interested and militaristic nature of the international order (Baldwin 1993: 11). It became prominent as response to, or as an attack on the perceived inadequacies, alleged failures and weaknesses of idealism\(^\text{18}\) (that had emerged at

\(^{18}\text{Idealism in international relations represents a set of ideas which together oppose war and advocate the reform of international community through dependence upon moral values and the development of international institutions and international law (Herz, 1951).} \)
the end of the First World War) from preventing the re-occurrence of the Second World War. The failure of idealism to avert the Second World War exposed idealism as a failed tool for studying international relations. This led Hans Morgenthau, E. H. Carr, and Kenneth Waltz to coin realism as a new perspective of studying international relations (Hollis and Smith, 1990:21).

According to Donnelly (2002), realism is based on two core assumptions. Firstly, it assumes that people are essentially selfish and competitive, egotistic (concern for one’s own interests or wellbeing, or selfishness; the belief that one’s own interests are morally superior to those others). According to realism, states are composed of, and led by, people who are inherently selfish, greedy and power-seeking meaning that state behaviour cannot but exhibit the same characteristics. This is also a defining characteristic of human nature that had been advocated by Thomas Hobbes. Secondly, realism contends that the state-system operates in a context of international anarchy (lack of central government in the international system), in a sense that there is no authority higher than that of states (Morgenthau, 1948: 75). From the preceding assumption realists maintain that no form of world government can ever be created: international relations is in effect conducted in an international state of nature. Realists view states as coherent and cohesive units and regard them as the most important actors on the world stage. This is why according to realists the international system is characterized by an irresistible tendency towards conflict (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1981:189). As a theory, realism identifies power, national interests and state survival as crucial in the analysis of interstate relations (Clapman, 1996:230).

According to realism, any international interactions between states\(^{19}\) are simply guided by the laws of nature (anarchy). In these interactions/dealings the state is the major and most important actor of all. The works of Carr (1946: II) and Morgenthau (1948) shape a coherent conception of the claims of realism. Carr (1946) argues that the international system is defined by insecurities, uncertainties, tensions and selfish cooperation between states seeking to maximize their parochial interests (Keohane and Martin 1995: 40). To expound Carr’s view, Zachary and Masters (2013) cite the anarchic nature of the permanent members of the United Nation Security Council (UNSC). Zachary and Masters (2013) use the Syrian crisis to contextualize how Russia, China and the USA are supporting different parties to the Syrian

\(^{19}\) State is a compulsory political organization with a centralized government that maintains a monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a certain territory (Weber, Lassman and Speirs, 1994).
conflict in pursuance of their national interests. This is against the principle of impartiality that is exemplified by the UNSC. The handling of the Syrian crisis re-echoes Morgenthau’s view that “political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated” (Morgenthau, 1951:18).

From the preceding paragraph, it can be argued that the dealings, interventions and cooperation between states and other international actors for instance, the United Nations (UN) is shaped and defined by and in terms of national interest: that is national power and security of survival (Morgenthau, 1948: 75). Realism upholds that, in international interactions, each state acts in accordance with its interests (whatever they are). Accordingly, this makes states to be generally selfish in pursuing their interests (Donnelly, 2008; Goodin, 2010) while in a particular international cooperation. Due to selfishness of the state system and the conflicting interests among the actors, the international system becomes one which is marked by constant struggles for dominance by one actor or a group of actors (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1981:189). Therefore, in realists’ view, power, national interests and state survival are what characterize interstate relations (Heywood, 1997:142; Hoffman, 1999: 241-250). Furthermore, realism advocates that some nation states may sometimes break international guiding principles in pursuing and safeguarding their national interests which to some extent may be for public benefit. Even in cases where states act unselfishly towards each other, they are inclined to pursue parochial objectives which they often explain as their “national” interests’ (George and Keohane, 1980:260).

Contextualised in Africa, the common challenge involved in intrastate conflicts is evident in the fact that internal conflicts are raising concerns around refugee flows, arms proliferation and the growth of organized international criminal enterprises and terrorist organizations (Bizos 2011: 2). For instance, the Somalia conflict (by Al Shabaab) is adversely affecting the security situation of Kenya, Ethiopia and Eritrea (Ogola, 2012; Lockwood, 2011; Downie, 2011; Booth, 2005). The crisis in the DRC for instance, has spread its malevolent effects across the eastern, central and southern African regions for over five decades (Reuter, 2013; Thomson, 2013). The Somalia, Central Africa Republic, South Sudan and Burundi among other warring nations highlight some instances where internal conflicts in Africa have metastasized into regional challenges. Within the umbrella of the UN or AU IGAD, SADC among others (intergovernmental bodies that are expected to confront the security challenges on the continent has been termed ineffective in carrying out this mandate (Murithi, 2012),
some individual African countries have taken dominance of using the foregoing IGOs to intervene in some African conflicts. For instance, Kenya has become the highest contributor of troops that have intervened in Somalia under AMISON. Still, due to its economic and military advantage, Kenya has utilized IGAD and dominated in the affairs of the Great Lakes region (Ogola, 2012). In so doing, Kenya has protected its national interests within the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes regions. Similarly, South Africa has utilized its advantaged position in Africa under the UN, AU and SADEC to continue intervening the DRC, CAR, Lesotho and Zimbabwe (Thomson, 2014). In this context, it is the insecurities, uncertainties and tensions that the preceding African conflicts pose to Kenya and South Africa that have made the preceding countries to intervene as a way of protecting their national interests.

According to Mearsheimer and Walt (2013), in most cases, realism sees state’s military capability as the most vital intervention strategy in achieving any national interest of an intervening state (Dougherty, Robert and Pfaltzgraff, 2000: 84). For instance, the US and NATO have been justifying the use of military force in Iraq in and Afghanistan so as safeguard the interests of the US and members of NATO. Waltz (2000: 67) further argues that any state firstly seeks its survival from physical threat(s) before seeking other national interests (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2013). In the context of this study, this means that any state’s decision to undertake peacebuilding intervention (either militarily or diplomatically, whichever the case) does so in pursuing its interests. From a realist perspective, the success of any state’s peacebuilding intervention in any conflict, asserts, preserves and improves the powers of an intervening state. At the same time any failure of peacebuilding intervention could weaken and ruin the power of an intervener (Morgenthau, 1951:27). In peacebuilding intervention as the study outlines, the exercise of power by intervening states includes military, economic and technological capability. It is the foregoing powers that shape peacebuilding interventions, actions and behaviours of the intervener.

A substantive approach that can be used to analyse South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC’s conflict from a realist perspective is to situate South Africa’s intervention efforts in the purview of the country’s foreign policy. Gbaya (2015) for instance, conceptualizes South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy as one vital tool to addressing the issue of poverty, promoting development internally and externally. The underlying rationale here is the supposition that in dealing with the conflicts that surrounds it, South Africa will undoubtedly be promoting its own prosperity. Thus, one correlation between South Africa’s
peacebuilding intervention and promotion of interest hinges on the desire on the part of the South African government to avoid a spill-over of the effects of the war in DRC in the form of the incessant influx of refugees into South Africa and to further establish itself as a regional and continental hegemon.

That is to say, South Africa through its intervention efforts seeks to promote her own interests by ensuring a peaceful and stable DRC. As Gbaya (2015) argues that through its foreign policy, “South Africa accords central importance to its immediate African neighbourhood and the African continent”. Accordingly, the direction of South Africa’s foreign policy would be to continually support (directly or indirectly), regional and continental processes that respond to and resolve crises. The preceding supposition does not intend to deny the conduction of South Africa’s foreign affairs in the absence of ethical values. Lalbalhadur (2014) however supposes that “foreign policy decisions are not simply a matter of applying ethics and values. Rather, these decisions are often complex and need to calculate the trade-offs between competing domestic and international imperatives, as well as short and long term interests” (in Gbaya, 2015:14)

Again, another equally important way to sift out the presence of interests in South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC takes the shape of economic expansion. At the heart of South Africa’s economic interests is a peaceful DRC. It is said that South Africa has more regional investments than any other African country, with a reasonable amount of such investments in the DRC. Gbaya (2015) suggests that regional investments contribute about 1.8 trillion ZAR to the South African economy. With regards to its peacebuilding intervention efforts in the DRC, Gbaya suggests that South Africa’s bid for political leadership in Africa, its attempts at economic integration and expansion “has consistently implied that it should help resolve African conflicts and play a more active role in peace missions” (2015:3).

Supposedly, economic prominence stems from a political and military presence; the realists view that a salient intent for the promotion of interests precedes a country’s decision to intervene in another country’s conflict (Coates, 2013). The Inga Dam, agriculture and the abundance of mineral resources to which some South African companies own mining rights, further support the realists’ view that South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC is driven primarily by interests. Effectually, Gbaya (2015:15) emphasizes that “South Africa determines its policies towards the DRC according to its national interest or its role as a champion of Africa in the handling of crises”. Therefore, South Africa’s approach to the DRC

So far, the realist perspective has been used to examine how interests (economic, security and hegemonic) have been the guiding compass for South Africa’s intervention in the DRC. A dearth of literature however exists as to the actual role or how the South African government has made efforts to include the opinions of the Congolese refugees living in the country in the peace process of their homeland. Although realism has not been utilised to show how refugees-who are not state actors- can influence South African foreign policies, this study uses it to explicate reasons as to why South Africa needs to draw from their insights so as to bring an end to decades of war in the DRC and to promote the current promising South Africa’s economic interests in the Congo. An end to war in the DRC could position South Africa among global powerhouses. With the current talks of having a permanent African representative at the UNSC, any approach that South Africa uses to bring an end to war in the DRC and other war-torn African countries will make it win the continental support as a permanent representative of Africa in the UNSC (Zuma; 2015). Therefore, this study argues that the incorporation of Congolese refugees’ insights and perspectives within its peacebuilding intervention in the DRC holds key in understanding what breeds war in that country and thus, gives South Africa a better chance of bringing an end to that conflict; it may may give South Africa a continental support for its quest for a permanent position at the UNSC and respect at the AU. By taking inventory of the Congolese attitudes towards South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC, this study argues that the tenets of CCTR will become the national interests of South Africa; it also assails realism.

3.3 Research methodology and methods
There are three major approaches in which social realities can be studied. These are; quantitative, qualitative and a mixed method approaches. This study adopted the qualitative approach in its inquiry. For Denzin and Lincoln, (2005), qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter; it attempts to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meaning people bring to them. According to Tsang (2013), the aim of the qualitative approach is that it intends to explore and to discover issues
about a problem. The underpinning rationale here is that very little knowledge is available and there are different dimensions to this one problem. At the time when the study was being undertaken, there were no updated official profiles and statistics of views of Congolese refugees on South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. For this reason, the nature of this research demanded that the researcher takes an exploratory analysis. Hence, through the gathering of qualitative data from observation and participant observation (fieldwork), interviews and review of documents, the study was able to observe this complex phenomenon. Still, by carefully exploring it, the study was able to describe it and very importantly make new discoveries. Denzin and Lincoln (2000) assert that qualitative research places emphasis on the process of discovering how the social meaning is constructed and accentuates the relationship between the investigator and the topic studied.

As a qualitative research, this study broadly sought to understand the social reality of individuals and groups within a particular context (Sarantakos, 2005). That is to say that by employing the use of the qualitative approach, the intention of the researcher is to explore amongst other things the comportments, the perceptions and the experiences of people and what shapes such. Essentially, the core of a qualitative research hinges on an interpretive approach to social reality and in the narrative of the lived experiences of human beings (Creswell, 2009). Due to the divergent ways through which social realities can be approached, a primary task of a researcher would be to find the best way to design how to approach the phenomenon they intend to explore. This can be realised by having an effective research design that can discern the kind of evidence that is needed in order to adequately address the research questions, objectives, and problem statement (Mouton, 2008:49).

Arguably, the value of a research design is such that it ensures that whatever evidence is gathered in the course of an inquiry should enable the researcher to effectively answer whatever questions the study intends to address (Creswell, 2013). According to Yin (2013), the focus of a research design is on the logical structure of a proposed inquiry. Implicit in the preceding notion is the supposition that a research design does not refer to a mode of data collection. It concerns itself with ensuring that a researcher asks the right questions so as to gain the right answers. Gathering evidence requires a specification of the type of evidence needed to answer \textit{inter alia}, the research question, or to accurately describe some phenomenon. In other words, when designing research, we need to ask: “given this research question (or theory), what type of evidence is needed to answer the question (or test the
theory) in a convincing way” (Vaishnavi and Kuechler, 2015:25). Therefore, a research design affords researchers with the acuity of what evidence they need to gather in response to their research questions and objectives.

This study was done qualitatively through an exploration of views, insights and attitudes of Congolese refugees - in Durban - towards South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict. It was done in a manner that it generated “rich data” (Domegan and Fleming, 2007) for the subject under investigation. In using a qualitative approach, the researcher was able to explore this complex phenomenon (the role of the Congolese refugees in South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention is the DRC) in a holistic fashion (Magilvy, 2011:152). In addition, it addressed the tendency of the researcher to impose personal assumptions or biases, conclusions and result from the data – thus, it obviated a priori conclusions.

3.3.1 Case study methodology
This study adopted a qualitative case study approach. According to Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack (2008), a qualitative case study methodology allows one phenomenon to be explored and understood from multiple facets or lenses. In other words, it is ‘a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon while using multiple sources of evidence’ (Hsieh, 2004). According to Simons (2009:21) “case study is an in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of the complexity and uniqueness of a particular project, policy, institution, programme or system in a ‘real life’ context”. Similarly, Roberts et al (2004) posit that in a case study, the intent is to provide a ‘telling case’ out of which theory, concepts and hypotheses can be drawn. Insights from these studies can then be transferred to other situations where similar conditions exist (Roberts et al. 2004). In Yin’s (2013:25) view, a case study analysis is described as an “empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context. Especially when the boundary between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and it relies on multiple sources of evidence”. Similarly, Tsang (2013) submits that the value of using case study analysis hinges on the fact that the researcher investigates predefined phenomena and has no power to manipulate variables. The main objective of case study analysis is the focus it places on investigating phenomena within its context.

From the preceding positions, it can be postulated that one merit of using case study is that “the in-depth approach taken in case studies means that, by documenting and analysing
developments as they occur, it is possible to provide timely insights into the factors that researchers consider to be critical to the outcomes of the ‘case’ under examination” (Moriarty, 2011:16). In exploring the attitudes and the views of Congolese refugees towards South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC, this study firmly posits that the use of a case study will enable it to “document multiple view points and highlights areas of consensus and conflict” (Moriarty, 2011:17). Another advantage of adopting a case study analysis is that it makes the research design more precise, manageable, credible, concentrated, and practical. Additionally, and in concurrence with some (Simons, 2009; Moriarty, 2011) of the aforementioned positions, a case study analysis also accords the researcher an opportunity to identify substantial resource materials for the study.

Durban was chosen as the study location. According to Lindau (2013) most migrants in South Africa settle in the major cities such as Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban. This study was initially planned to be carried out in Johannesburg. Johannesburg unlike Durban hosts the highest number of refugees and immigrants from all over the world including Congolese refugees. Due to technical and logistical constrains, Durban was chosen as the second city with the highest population of Congolese refugees. Therefore, the researcher hastens to point out that the cases selected for this study are not representative of the entire Congolese refugees in South Africa but act as an instrumental case study. Creswell (2012:465) states that an instrumental case ‘serves the purpose of illuminating a particular issue.’ Thus, an instrumental case provides insight into a subject under study.

3.4 Sampling
According to Cohen et al (2007) sampling in relation to appropriate research methodology determines the quality of any study. This means that researchers ought to choose a well calculated sampling criterion and be guided by the principle so that his/her study sample does not necessarily represent the ‘undifferentiated’ or wider population (Cohen et al., 2007). In the context of this study, the researcher obtained the views of 58 Congolese refugees. Although 58 participants may be viewed as a small sample, given the narrative nature of this study, it had the potency of producing a representative view of the entire Congolese refugees (Charmaz, 2012:21). Although it can be argued that 58 participants cannot represent all the views of Congolese refugees in South Africa, the sample chosen yielded the required empirical data on the role of refugees in South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. Still, Babie and Mourton (2012) argue that qualitative research is not to base its
analysis of data on statistical suggestion as those demanded by a quantitative inquiry. This is in tandem with “the tradition of qualitative research which tends to focus on meaning and motivation that underlie understandings of processes in the social world” (Kalof et al 2008:79). In this study, the selection of sample did not intend to meet numerical representativeness of the Congolese refugees in Durban and mostly, South Africa. Reason being that the research was exploring a particular social context: how the views of Congolese refugees can contribute towards a more comprehensive and all-encompassing South African peacebuilding intervention in the DRC’s conflict.

In this study, the researcher favoured purposive sampling which consisted of intentionally selecting Congolese refugees who met the set requirements (Babbie and Mouton, 1998: 166; Robson, 1993: 141; Babbie, 2012). Creswell (2012:206) posits that the standard for choosing a sample through purposive sampling is whether they are ‘information rich.’ Tongco (2007) asserts that purposive sampling is a deliberate choice of an informant due to the qualities the informant possesses. In this study the obvious quality that was used was the participants’ awareness of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions of ages between 18 and 70. It was based on the foregoing purposive sampling criterion that the researcher deliberately considered Congolese academia, civil rights activists, former government soldiers and rebels with less consideration of street vendors whose most concern was to eke out a living. The study assumes that the educated category or civil rights activities are more aware of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict.

3.5 Data collection
In qualitative research, data collections involve obtaining intricate details about a social phenomenon. This includes observing feelings and thought processes of participants (Creswell, 2012). So as to achieve the foregoing details from the participants, the researcher used three qualitative methods of collecting data to probe the views of Congolese refugees on South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC; personal interviews, focus group discussions, general participant observations and review of relevant documents.

3.5.1 Personal interviews
As a method of data collection, interviews allow researchers to study experiences and meanings as accounted for by the participants. Kumar (2005: 127) posits that the choice of interviews is determined by at least three criteria: the “nature of the investigation” (that is, the sensitive nature of issues involved); the “geographical distribution of the study population”;
and the “type of study population.” The researcher favoured the use of interviews over questionnaires because this study primarily aimed at understanding the opinions of Congolese refugees whom it purposively located as participants (Congolese refugees who are academics and those involved in informal employment).

By using interviews, the researcher was able to mitigate the problems of “limited administration/application, low response rate and limited opportunity to clarify issues/views that questionnaires could have accorded this study” (Kumar, 2005: 114). Also, by using interviews as a method of data collection, the researcher was able to give each participant (in the selected sample) an opportunity to narrate his/her views in his/her own words about South Africa’s peacebuilding efforts in the DRC.

Before interviews commenced, Congolese refugees who showed interest and met the sampling criteria were given a consent form which included details of the intended study and the descriptions of the research. The researcher strove to recruit Congolese refugees from all walks of life as its participants: academics, activists, business owners and those in employment-self or in organizations. However, the study was biased towards the views of Congolese intelligentsia, academics and rights activists because the nature of interview questions demanded specific background and knowledge of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict. However, this did not mean that the researcher discredited the views of other participants; who were more preoccupied with their immediate daily needs what South Africa was doing in the DRC. Also, all participants were informed on the nature of the interview and were informed that no money or any other incentive was to be given to participants to take part in this study.

While preparing for this study, the researcher had sought to garner the views of 60 purposively sampled Congolese refugees. However, during this study, the researcher managed to garner views from 58 Congolese refugees. Interviews took three forms; face-to-face, telephonic and electronic. It was face-to-face interviews that enabled a deeper exploration and engagement with issues pertaining South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict. All in all, whether face-to-face, telephonic and electronic, most interviewees’ responses to questions offered personal insights that the researcher could not obtain during focus group discussions or general participant observation.
So as to gain deep understanding of participants’ views, the researcher made interviews informal. This allowed participants to narrate their views with ease. Subsequent interviews were also done. However, subsequent interviews depended on the information provided in the first one. In all interview sessions the researcher restricted interviews within a particular time frame (45 minutes-long personal interviews).

3.5.2 Focus Group Discussions
Focus groups discussions are of immense utility in the collection of qualitative data. This is because, they allow participants in the course of interactions with one another to articulate ideas and arguments that might not have emerged during personal interviews. Fontana and Frey (1994: 364-365) argue that it is necessary for a focus group to be small and to include individuals from different fields or “walks of life”- that is, if the subject matter of the study permits (Babbie and Mouton, 1998: 166; Robson, 1993: 141; Babbie, 2012). In this study, the researcher re-grouped participants whom he had interviewed into 6 focus discussion groups. The reason for using same participant as those used in interview was to address the question of a new recruitment strategy and to validate some of the views that had been garnered during personal interview sessions.

Initially, each focus group discussion comprised 10 participants. In most of the focus group discussions, different sessions were moderated by a participant who was unanimously elected by the group. This allowed the researcher to be a participant and not a moderator. The researcher intervened on situations where there was a need for clarity and in situations where discussions became disruptive and chaotic. The researcher organized two sessions each lasting for an hour. During the focus group sessions, the researcher was subsequently tape-recording and transcribing the proceedings. In sum, the focus group discussions complemented other data collection modes, namely interviews and document review. One challenge that the researcher experienced during focus group discussion was disagreement among participants which disrupted the rest of the session. Focus group discussions became a basis on which the researcher drew some themes (see the theme on participants’ region of origin in the DRC). It became evident that while Congolese refugees are away from home, the communal identity that characterize the realpolitik of the DRC exists among them.
According to table 5, two focus groups were held in 2015 and the other two held in 2016 with Congolese academics, activists and few from informal sector in the city of Durban. The researcher had hoped to carry out six focus groups comprising 10 participants each. However, focus groups that took place comprised of 9, 8, 7 and 11 respectively as shown in table 5. In total 35 persons - comprising of Congolese academics, rights activists, professionals and business persons – participated in the focus group discussions.

### Table 5. Focus Groups distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>No. of Participants</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3.5.3 General Participants Observation

As a methodological approach, 'participation/observation' affords meaningful, usually first-hand, information. It serves as both an approach to enquiry and as a data gathering tool. During the period of this study (2015- 2016), the researcher visited and resided along Mahatma Gandhi and Russel streets (Durban CBD) - where some Congolese families are residing - on five occasions: 1 week per month. Also, during focus group sessions (organized with the help of one key informant), the research could observe the behaviours of participants as they interacted.

#### 3.5.4 Review of Document and Scholarly Articles

This study also garnered data through review of relevant documents on the subject. Documents that were reviewed included formal policy statements of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation in relation to South Africa’s foreign policy on African conflicts. Newspaper articles and radio interview transcriptions were also reviewed. Other sources of secondary data for this study comprised books, journal articles, magazines, newspapers, government legislations/reports, company reports, UN reports and the internet. The internet served as an invaluable source of information for the study given the contemporary nature of the subject matter of the study and the typically dramatic manner in which events unfold in the DRC. These secondary sources provided extensive bibliographic and contextual information that complemented the primary sources of data, thus illuminating the study.
All the foregoing data-gathering tools will provide the study with a fairly sufficient pool of information for garnering the attitudes of the Congolese refugees towards South Africa's conflict resolution strategies and policies in the DRC.

3.6 Analysis of Data
In analysis, the researcher brings order, structure and meaning in the data obtained. During this process, pertinent themes and patterns are identified within the collected data (Ngulube, 2009; Corbin and Strauss, 2008). In this study, content and narrative analysis were the main processes that were used to bring order, structure and meaning to garnered data. Content analysis is defined as “any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics within a text” (Krippendorff, 2004: 9). Lasswell (1949:120) says that content analysis seeks to find out “who says what, to whom, why, to what extent and with what effect?” Weitzmann further observes that “in any content analysis, the task is to make inferences from data to certain aspects of their context and to justify these inferences in terms of the knowledge about the stable factors in the system of interest” (Weitzmann, 1995:95). Content analysis in this study will mean that data be transcribed, coded and presented under emerging themes. This means the analysis of information is conveyed in various forms so that the researcher may be able to situate data in the research context. A key to doing this was to delineate the object of inquiry (Altheide, 1996: 14), and to situate the data in the context of the main aspects of this study.

Narrative analysis is a method whereby researchers give emphasis on the content of a text, “what” is said more than “how” it is said, the “told” rather than the “telling” (Riessman, 2005:3) to find a common thematic element across research participants as they narrate and respond to interview questions (Langellier, 2001: 700). In this study, narrative analysis involves making sense of what Congolese refugees narrated during interviews and focus group discussions.

For the purpose of this research, analysis was performed relative to and justified in terms of the context of data. The following basic concepts offered a conceptual framework within which the researcher’s role was represented: the data as communicated to the researcher; the context of the data; how the researcher’s (analyst’s) data partition researcher’s reality; the target of the content analysis; inferences as the basic intellectual task; and validity as ultimate criterion of success. The preceding framework was “intended to serve three purposes: prescriptive, analytical and methodological” (Babbie, 2007:95); prescriptive in the sense that it guided “the conceptualization and the design of practical content analyses for any given
circumstance” (Babbie, 2007:95); analytical in the sense that it facilitated the critical examination of context analysis results obtained by others; methodological in the sense that it directed “the growth and systematic improvement of methods for content analysis” (Babbie, 2007: 95).

3.7 Reliability and validity

In this study, validity and reliability was realised using Lincoln and Guba’s (2000) four constructs; credibility, dependability, transferability, and confirmability. Credibility was demonstrated through the presentation of a full account of this study in a very accurate manner. The researcher achieved dependability through keeping and maintaining a clear account of the data analysis process of this study. Since the researcher viewed peacebuilding intervention as a variegated process, he was aware that some questions could have been answered differently if they were to be asked by another researcher. Therefore, the researcher respected the fact that participants can change their minds at any given moment. Dependability of this study was achieved by the purposive nature of the sample of participants selected: the researcher selected participants that he considered enlightened about the subject under investigation. In relation to transferability, the researcher ensured that the findings of this study can be applied to other contexts: context in which peacebuilding interveners can draw from the knowledge of refugees on their country’s conflicts. For instance, the findings of this study can be applied to peacebuilding interventions in South Sudan, CAR and Syria among other conflict-prone countries. In the foregoing assertion, this study does not generalize its findings but it is adding to a scarce body of knowledge on the role of refugees in peacebuilding interventions. Confirmability in this study ensured that researcher reflects the actual responses of participants.

Being an international student and coming from a country that is marred with identity conflicts, the views of some the participants of this study documented the researcher’s subjective self in this study. The researcher hails from Kenya, a country that is yet to heal from the impacts of 2007/8 post-election violence. For instance, on 29th December 2007, Kenya was marred with violence in different parts after the announcement of the former President, Mwai Kibaki as the victor in a disputed general election (Hansen, 2013). Branch (2011) argues that the 2007/8 Post-election Violence (PEV) was an insurrection of a section of some Kenyan communities registering their discontent with the Kibaki regime. Mwakilishi
(2012) and Goldsmith (2012) argue that the heart of the 2007/8 PEV in Kenya was a consequence of structural injustices: communal deprivation, economic and political marginalization of other communities practiced by all post-colonial regimes. Participants selected in this study yielded enormous data as some of their views confirmed or refuted some scholarly claims on the causes of war in the DRC (Malterud, 2001:333; Stearns, 2012). This aided this study to realize its research question on what Congolese refugees consider to be proxy and immediate causes of war in the DRC.

3.8 Conclusion
This chapter critically discussed conflict transformation (CCTR) and realism as relevant lenses through which data of this study can be refracted for analysis. According to CCTR, interveners not only need to end wars but also address the sources and causes of the situation that breeds conflicts. Interveners should also necessitate conditions for transforming attitudes and relationships between all actors in a conflict by use of bottom-up and top-down strategy. In the former, people’s basic needs have to be met (culture of peace and peace education) while in the latter, institutions within a conflict country enjoy more attention (Lederach, 2015). The chapter unpacked the idea of conflict intervention using cosmopolitan conflict transformation theory (CCTR): an expounded model of conflict transformation theory which has its root in negative-positive peace model (Galtung, 1969).

Firstly, the chapter made a case for CCTR due to its strengths. It was noted that CCTR differs with some contemporary conflict transformation strategies that are modelled on liberal peace. This renders their approaches inadequate to deal with all actors in a conflict situation. A distinguishing element of CCTR perspective to other conflict transformation paradigms is the idea that it emphasizes an orderly resolution of any conflict and that peacebuilding interventions should undergo several processes or ebbs and flows depending on the interests and actions of belligerents, (non)armed groups and interveners. In addition, CCTR advocates the replacement of structures and conditions that breed violence/war with those that build sustainable peace. CCTR is of utility to this study in the context of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the ebbs and flows that have characterized conflicts in the DRC.

For the purpose of providing a holistic framework of understanding the interests of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC, the chapter unpacked the tenets of realism. This study noted that in its traditional conceptualization realism considers Congolese
refugees as non-state actors who probably have no role in peace building. In its peacebuilding interventions, South Africa is seeking for a stable DRC so as to pursue its economic and security interests. One way of looking for solution for a peaceful and stable DRC according to this study, is for South Africa to draw on the insights and views of Congolese refugees as part of its peacebuilding intervention. An end to the DRC’s conflict will position South Africa among other global powers and in claiming status at the UNSC and AU. Whilst literature on realism tends to ignore non-state actors, this study sees incorporation of Congolese refugees in its peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict as one among many ways of realising some of South Africa’s national interests globally. Using the realist paradigm as a theoretical tool of analysis, the tenets of cosmopolitan conflict transformation are assailed by realism.

Finally, the chapter discussed research design, methodology and methods, data analysis and presented Congolese refugees in different themes. The chapter justified the use of the qualitative case study methodology for this study. Purposive sampling was used to select the participants of this study. Through purposive sampling, the researcher selected an information rich sample: Congolese refugees that were cognizant of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. Personal interviews, focus group discussions and general participant observation were used to garner data. Data garnered was analysed through content and narrative analysis and presented using different themes; gender, age, educational levels, marital status and their different political and ideological comportments. In summary, data garnered was dissociated from sources (both primary and secondary).

Therefore, one notes that the background and research problem (Chapter one), review of relevant literature on interface between refugees and conflict transformation (in Chapter Two) and analyses of conflict transformation and realism and methodology in this chapter (Chapter Three) provides the backdrop for exploring the views and attitudes of Congolese refugees in Durban (location of this study) towards South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict. However, before an explication of the views of the Congolese refugees, it is important that a historical perspective of peacebuilding be re-echoed. The next chapter presents the historicity of the DRC’s conflict and peacebuilding interventions. A historical perspective of peacebuilding interventions aids this study to locate the views of the Congolese refugees within the history of the DRC’s conflict.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE HISTORY OF PEACEBUILDING INTERVENTIONS IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: FROM 1960 TO 2014

4.1 Introduction
As it was argued in the background chapter, the condition of war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is not a new occurrence. The country has been engulfed in violent inter and intra state conflicts despite efforts by local and international actors to solve the conflicts after DRC’s independence. This has resulted in the current ranking of Central Africa and the Great Lakes region as among the United Nations populations of concern, with the DRC contributing over 1.2 million refugees and almost 27,000 asylum seekers, 108,000 returnees and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons (UNHCR Global Report, 2014). While the complexity of the wars in DRC is grounded in many factors that include the legacies of colonial rule, the divisions of postcolonial leaders’ dictatorship and autocratic rule, war in neighboring countries such as the 1994 genocide in Rwanda have had huge impact, for example, the influx of Rwandan refugees to constant military excursions into the DRC by Rwanda and wars against DRC with Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, Zimbabwe and Burundi. Also, the DRC has several rebel groups, many of them ‘protectors’ of mines and conduits of western powers (Autessere, 2006).

This chapter gives a historical development of peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict and antagonisms. The assumption in this chapter is that, through a historical overview of peacebuilding interventions in the DRC war which is multifaceted, the interests of interveners in their quest for an all-encompassing conflict transformation strategy can be understood. The chapter begins by contextualizing peacebuilding and interventions and peacebuilding and conflict transformation. The second part of the chapter is a historical exploration of DRC’s conflict and South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention efforts from 1996 to 2014. In doing so, the chapter provides some explanations to the causes of the conflict and some peacebuilding interventions by referring to the different histories, regimes and events that have characterized the present DRC. The chapter eventually looks at South Africa as a major actor in the DRC’s peacebuilding interventions from 1996 to today. This is an attempt to locate some of the views of the Congolese refugees on South Africa’s peacebuilding initiatives within the larger context of the history of peacebuilding in the DRC.
4.2 Peacebuilding interventions and conflict transformation

Recently, most interventions and peace operations have emphasized peacebuilding in conflict and post-conflict societies. In this context, the dichotomy between interventions (be it military or for humanitarian assistance) and peacebuilding has become fluid. On one hand, it can be argued that peacebuilding interventions in a conflict or post-conflict situation can take different forms. On the other hand, it can be said that peacebuilding interventions depend on who the interveners and their interests in a post conflict situation are. Du Plessis (2000:1) contextualises intervention as any form of “interference of one state in the affairs of another state thereby resulting in the temporary interruption of normal bilateral patterns of relationship between the two”. Leurdijk (1986:90) and Holsti (1995: 204) see intervention to “designate any activity that deliberately seeks to change the political leader(s) or the constitutional structure of a foreign political jurisdiction”. Intervention may take place in two ways: 1) In a situation where an intervening state sets aside the existing relations with the target state and puts all its efforts towards changing the political structure and authority of that target state. 2) In cases where an intervening state seeks to preserve the existing political structure and authority of the target state (Amer, 1994:5; Rousenau, 1968: 161-165). In most cases it refers to unlimited actions that may be undertaken by intervening states or intergovernmental organization or sub-regional organizations for the maintenance of peace and security (Du Plessis, 200:4; Rousenau, 1968:167).

From the foregoing, it seems that the concept of intervention covers a wide range of issues and phenomena such as attempts by given states to change the internal political, economic, military, and social structures of those target states with or without the consent of the target states. Intervention can also refer to those actions undertaken by states or group of states with the approval of international organisations such as the UN Security Council, regional organisations such as the AU and sub-regional organisations like SADC. The underlying factor is that these actions (whether coercive or non-coercive) will be in pursuit of given objectives (as in the case of intervention by a given state) or regional or international values such as restoration of democracy and peace (as in the case of intervention by multilateral and regional organisations (Du Plessis, 2000:5 See also Schwarz, 1970:175-177).

For attainment of peace and order within the global scene, intervention may be coercive, humanitarian or peaceful. Coercive intervention refers to those actions undertaken by a state
or a group of states in utilising the available conventional military arsenal such as battle tanks, fighter aircraft and strategic, operational and tactical deployment of combat troops who are expected to engage in coercive military action (Du Plessis, 2000:10; see also Kanter and Bruce, 1994:14-15). It is within this coercive action where there is movement of regular troops or forces (airborne and water borne) of the intervening states or states from their territory into the territory or territorial waters of the target state country, or “forceful military action by troops already stationed by one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute” (Pearson and Baumann, 1988:2). It is also important to note that military intervention in intrastate conflicts involves the large scale troop deployment to either stabilize a regime against anti-government forces or to overthrow an established set of authorities. More often, intervention is the result of a crisis which calls for such an action; troops are rapidly deployed and the insurgents or rebels are often caught by surprise (Holsti, 1995:206).

In humanitarian intervention, armed force by a state or states is used to protect the citizens of the target state from pronounced human rights violations. The cases of UN and AU missions in Darfur are notable examples of this type of humanitarian intervention. Whilst it may be directed at a given regime that violates human rights through repression, humanitarian intervention can also be directed at non state actors such as ethnic groups involved in genocidal activities. In terms of definition, humanitarian intervention thus refers to the limited use of force for altruistic reasons with a humanitarian objective (Du Plessis, 2000:12). It also covers a broad scope of non-forcible action such as humanitarian assistance or relief operations which complement peaceful interventions (Roper, 1998:208; Du Plessis, 2000:12). These operations could include the distribution of food relief aid among others.

In the case of peaceful military intervention, there is non-use of combat and force. Military forces are only deployed for the enforcement of peace (peacekeeping). Ramsbothams, Oliver and Woodhouse (2011) argue that peaceful intervention is appropriate on three levels; 1) when containing violence and preventing it from escalating into war. 2) To limit the intensity of war once it has broken out and 3) to secure a cease fire. One good example is the recent deployment of France soldiers to end the 2012 Malian violence. Such deployments are often carried out by multilateral security regimes such as the UN and related regional bodies like the AU or NATO for the purposes of humanitarian assistance involving peace support operations (Seawall, 1994:84-85; Du Plessis, 2000:10). Du Plessis observes that the role of
the armed forces in peaceful military interventions would be to assist the vulnerable, that is, non-combatants such as women and children, and to help maintain the ceasefire while negotiations among the belligerent parties are underway (Du Plessis, 2000:11; Freedman, 1994:3). Non-combatants, especially women, children, the disabled, the poor and the elderly, are more prone to the vicious effects of armed conflicts (The United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa 2005:8). The idea of employing peacekeeping troops was emphasised by then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 Agenda for Peace which proposed that collective security regimes such as the UN Security Council, NATO, the AU Peace and Security Commission, the SADC OPDSC should be the institutions responsible for the effecting of multilateral peaceful interventions (Du Plessis, 2000:11; Ghali, 1992:78). Ghali advocated for the deployment of peacekeeping troops by security regimes for the purposes of preventing the escalation of conflicts which could lead to humanitarian catastrophes such as the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Ghali also proposed that peacekeeping troops could be deployed for the purposes enforcing peace through forcible military intervention (Ramsbotham, 1995:20; Evans, 1993:8-10).

In the context of this study, peacebuilding intervention is to be understood as any form of intervention geared towards positive peace (be it coercive, humanitarian or peaceful); that is, “orderly resolution of the conditions that give rise to the underlying root causes of the conflict” (Diamond, 1994:3) and in preventing the emergence or resurgence of conflict (International Alert, 1998:28) and, at the same time, to promote nation-building and state-building\(^\text{20}\), reconciliation forgiveness and justice\(^\text{21}\), change agentry, and social transformation” (Botes, 2003:i). Although humanitarian intervention is sometimes regarded as being similar to peacebuilding intervention, the difference between the two is that the former is undertaken for humanitarian purposes (Du Plessis, 2000:12; Arend and Beck, 1993:112) while the latter

\(^{20}\) Nation-building is process of (re)building a common identity among citizen of a country either culturally, politically (Fukuyama, 2007:10). State-building is the process of (re) building legitimate and functioning institutions to enable a country to effectively deliver economic, political and social service to its citizens. Nation and state building complement each other (Fukuyama, 2007:10).

\(^{21}\) Reconciliation is the mutual acceptance by groups of each other. It aims at changing the psychological orientation of the groups towards each other after massive violence (Staub, 2005). Forgiveness is the means by which the wrongs committed to each other by former antagonists are sought to be moderated through truth telling (Tutu, 1999). Justice may mean fairness in one situation while in another; it may mean a form of reconciliation (Ramsbotham et al, 2011).
is an infrastructural effort either within or between nations that offers alternatives in removing root causes of war (eliminating structural violence within a conflict society) (Galtung, 1969).

According to Miall (2005:4) conflict transformation is a process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses, and if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict”. Dealing with the effects of war, conflict transformation should seek to “address the underlying structures, agencies and practices within socio-political system that precipitates violence” (Whetho, 2014: 117). Contextualized as a form of intervention, conflict transformation will mean any means that interveners use to seek constructive changes in a conflict or a post-conflict situation (Auvinen and Kivimaki, 1996:3). The desire of conflict transformation is to achieve peacebuilding. While the main aim of conflict transformation is to root out conditions that breed war within a conflict society, peacebuilding on the other hand focuses on long-term process, and is committed to pursuance of constructive change. Both peacebuilding and conflict transformation intervention are geared towards eliminating structural violence that breeds war.

There is a big role that is played by interveners in peacebuilding and conflict transformation. One of the key interveners in most conflicts has been the UN and regional bodies like the AU, NATO among others. For instance, in Sudan and Somalia, the African Union sent a peacekeeping mission to the countries to facilitate peace processes, contain the unrest and protect civilians. Civil societies and NGOs have played a key role in peacebuilding interventions. Most of civil societies have been advocates of human rights. Individuals and groups of states in many cases have played an active role in intervening into some conflicts across the globe.

Therefore, peacebuilding interventions include all actions taken by intergovernmental bodies, states, civil societies and NGOs so as to identify and support structures which strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict (Ghali, 1992:8). However, some scholars have asked on what conditions and when interveners are allowed to intervene in peacebuilding. It is against this backdrop that there has been a wide debate on peacebuilding intervention in the DRC. There are many peacebuilding intervention attempts (both internationally and locally) that have been put in place to end the DRC conflict. According to
the United States Bureau of African Affairs Report (2011), between 1997 and 2013, twenty-
three peace agreements have been signed in the DRC with no sign of visible peace. Most of
these attempts have achieved several partially respected ceasefire agreements. However, they
have failed to end the violence or to re-establish central government authority throughout the
DRC (Nugent, 2011). For instance, rebel armies and militia still retain a firm grip on the Kivu
Provinces in the Eastern DRC and have defied many peace agreements that include the
Amani programme of January 2008, bilateral accords between Rwanda and the DRC and the
engagement of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) that have tried to stabilize the region. This proves that
conflicts in the DRC continue despite ongoing peacebuilding interventions and peace

4.3 The history of conflict and Peacebuilding interventions in the DRC: 1960-2014
The DRC borders the Atlantic Ocean and nine countries, the Republic of Congo, the Central
African Republic, Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zambia and Angola. The
country has an overall population of more than 75 million people. While the country has
sufficient resources to guarantee both human and state security to its citizen, unending
conflicts have made it to be ranked among the poorest countries in the world (World
Factbook, 2014). The country has experienced both unending intra and interstate conflict
since its independence in 1961. Due to its richness in natural resources, scholars such as
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) have vindicated their arguments that intra-state and interstate
conflict is rampant in countries that are endowed with valuable natural resources like
diamonds, gold and oil. Due to greed, there is a high tendency of the elite in countries like
DRC to finance violence as means of competing for natural resources (Collier and Hoeffler,
2004:563). Also, the availability of valuable minerals has made the DRC’s neighbouring
countries to directly or indirectly contribute to the conflict by either engaging their national
armies or supporting rebels (Hochschild, 1998). For example, the DRC’s wars against
neighbouring states like Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Zimbabwe and Angola, have
compounded the conflict in the DRC (Autessere Severine, 2006). Also, rebel groups who
claim support from neighbouring countries like Rwanda and Uganda, hold large parts of the
East and North of the country (Crawford, 1965).

4.3.1 Pre-independent Congo
The DRC was colonized by Belgium as a free state. The Belgians put in governing systems
that promoted exclusion and pitted ethnic groups against each other. Between 1937 and the
mid-1950s, the Belgian colonial administration resettled thousands of Rwandans in today’s DRC to provide a ready workforce for large colonial agricultural and mining concerns in North-Kivu. This resettlement was relatively easy as the area then known as Ruanda- Urundi and now known as Rwanda and Burundi was by then under Belgian rule. Significant numbers of Rwandan migrants also came to Congo to seek land in the then relatively sparsely populated east of the country. In 1959, it was alleged that the Tutsi had plotted to kill Hutu leader Gregoire Kayibanda. Rumors that Hutu politician Dominique Mbonyumtwi had died at the hands of the Tutsis set off the Hutu’s against the Tutsi in violence that they called “the wind of destruction”. The Belgians arrived to quell the violence and support the Hutu. The UN set up a special Commission to investigate which reported in the Tutsi’s favour. Several Tutsis were exiled to neighbouring countries. The Tutsi who fled to the Congo became known as the Banyamulenge. The Banyamulenge to date play a significant role in the issues that guide peace and war in the DRC.

During the colonial period, the Belgian Government treated the Congolese like lesser people with no intellect. Most of Congolese were denied access to formal education especially at higher levels. For instance, by independence unlike other colonies, not even one Congolese citizen had received a university degree (Hochschild, 1998). Congo remained a colony until agitation for independence forced Brussels to grant it freedom on June 30, 1960. At this time, two people were visible as leaders for the agitation for independence: Joseph Kasavubu and Patrice Lumumba. The former was in charge of Abako party (Alliance des Bakongo). The party was mostly made up of the Bakongo from the lower Congo River. Patrice Lumumba was President of the Congolese National Movement. His party was dominated by nationalist sentiment and growing demands for independence (Nugent, 2011). Due to continuous demands for independence, the Belgian gave in and elections were held in 1960 in which Patrice Lumumba of the leftist Movement National Congolais became Prime minister while Joseph Kasavavubu of the ABAKO Party became the head of state. In just four days after Congo attained its independence (after the Belgians withdrew their forces), there was an open conflict over political antagonism, tribalism, conflict for resources and geographical diversity (Alan, 1961).

As from July 1960 (just after independence), regional secessionist movements sprung up. For instance, within weeks of independence, the Katanga Province (supported by Belgium) led by Moise Tshombe, seceded from the new republic. Similarly, South Kasai - another mining
province - seceded from the central republic. As a result, civil war emerged. Belgium sent paratroopers to quell the civil war with no success. Also, the central government became paralyzed by conflict between Kasavubu (a conservative) and his Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba (a nationalist) (Vanthemische, 2000). With Kasavubu and Lumumba of the national government in conflict, the United Nations flew in a peacekeeping force (Wrong, 2000). However, Kasavubu who had the support of the West, staged an army coup d’état and handed Lumumba over to Katangan forces (led by Tshombe) in November 1960. It is argued that Tshombe’s army killed Lumumba in January 1961 (UN Investigation Commission, 1961).

The demise of Lumumba made the DRC to become a major Cold War theatre. This is because Lumumba had enjoyed the backing of the Soviet Union. After his death, the Soviet Union halted their peacekeeping troop’s contributions to U.N. As a result, the UN became financially constrained for years (UN Investigation Commission, 1961).

There were several efforts that were put in to build peace in the DRC. At this stage, most peacebuilding efforts were led by the UN. The UN started to initiate reconciliation plans between Tshombe and Kasavubu. However, Tshombe rejected the UN-led national reconciliation plan. This made the UN to send its troops to intervene. On the contrary, Tshombe saw the UN troops as enemies of the DRC and declared war against them. In January 1963, Tshombe’s troops were defeated by the UN. As a result, there was a period of peace that prevailed in DRC for a short while till 1964.

In 1964, the U.N. troops were withdrawn. This was after the UN felt that the DRC was now a united country (all secessionist movements had been thwarted). Despite a united DRC, the country was politically divided. Still, there were secessionist threats in the key regions of Katanga, South Kasai and Kivu. In order to fight rebellion from the preceding regions, Kasavubu (the then the head of state) named Tshombe as a premier. Tshombe (an ally of the west) used foreign mercenaries and Belgian paratroops airlifted by U.S. planes, to defeat any serious opposition to Kasavubu. In 1965, Kasavubu abruptly dismissed Tshombe. This made Colonel Joseph-Desiré Mobutu, army chief of staff to oust Kasavubu out of power (Crawford, 1965).

4.3.2 The era of Mobutu Sese Seko
During mid-1950’s, Mobutu belonged to Lumumba’s nationalist movement, a movement that had helped DRC to attain independence. Although Mobutu re-echoed popular nationalist
sentiments during his presidency, it is claimed that he played a role in the killing of Lumumba. When he became the president in 1965, he renewed Lumumba’s nationalistic campaign that was meant to bring ‘national authenticity’. He changed the country’s name to Zaire and his own to Mobutu Sese Seko kuku Ngbendu wa za Banga – the all-powerful warrior who, because of his endurance and inflexible will to win, will go from conquest to conquest leaving fire in his wake’ (Hochschild, 1999: 303). Due to Cold War politics, president Mobutu enjoyed the support of the capitalist countries - USA and the United Kingdom. Although he violated human rights during his tenure, he was unconditionally supported by the mentioned countries. This is because the US and some parts of Europe were interested in the rich mineral resources which through Mobutu, they had easy access to. For decades, the United States propped up Mobutu, who was obviously an autocratic dictator, allowing him to get away with gross human rights violations and corruption, so long as he served the interests of the United States as a bulwark against Soviet Communism during the Cold War. This allowed Mobutu to rule the DRC with an iron fist, murdering opponents and ruthlessly stifling dissent.

Mobutu reignited the Belgian governing systems that promoted politics of tribal exclusion and ethnicity. He also exploited the Congo as if it were his personal property. His rule opened up avenues to corruption. Mobutu was involved in siphoning resources and acquiring massive personal wealth. Under his rule, his country went through a plunge in copper prices, and mounting debt that led to enormous economic downturns (Arnold, 2005). Hochschild argues that Mobutu’s ‘national kleptocracy’, made him to become rich by dipping into state-owned enterprises and sharing with family, friends, generals and others that he needed to keep in line. Mobutu and his entourage helped themselves to state revenue so freely that the Congolese government ceased to function. Extreme disparities existed between Mobutu, his cronies and the Congolese communities. Mobutu, his Generals and business people close to him participated directly in the disenfranchisement of a growing underclass. By some estimates, Mobutu was worth some $ 4 billion.

Mobutu amassed a fortune while his people got poorer in their diamond and mineral rich nation, as the United States looked on (Gault – Hunter, 2006). Stewart argues that political, social, cultural and economic inequalities among groups are important catalysts to violent conflicts (Keen 2008: 757). At the end of the Cold War, a growing arms trade had enveloped the DRC conflict zones in which rebel groups due to inequality and greed for power started to
vie for regional lordship. According to Stewart (2011) horizontal inequalities between groups- ethnicity, religion, age and gender may become catalysts for conflicts (Stewart, 2011:541). In the DRC, there was an upsurge in ethnic tensions in North-Kivu after Mobutu attempted to launch a transition to multiparty democracy - in April 1990. The attempt by Mobutu to bring democracy was viewed as a threat to political office that had been previously held by the ‘indigenous’ people – the Hunde and Nande. The Hunde and Nande ganged up against the Banyarwanda whom they considered as foreigners. Consequently, the Hutu Banyarwanda reacted by initiating a campaign of resistance to Hunde and Nande political control. Ethnic-based militias took shape and in March 1993 conflict erupted when Hunde and Nyanga militias massacred the Hutu and Tutsi (Rwandese coming in as a result of the genocide) who fought back (Collins, 1997). This led to formulation of new Zairean laws on nationality in 1994. According to the new laws, Zairean nationality was bestowed to those who could trace their ancestry within the country to 1885 - the date when the Congo was established as a Free State. This became a major root cause of civil war as many people fought to establish their roots in the Congo.

To date, the preceding ethnic identity conflict has been an edifice on which the DRC’s incessant conflict is based. For instance, the present day rebel group M23 is made up of Congolese Tutsi rebels) and Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo (mainly made up of Banyamulenge. The preceding rebel groups argue that their identity within the DRC has been left unattended to in many of the peace agreements. Mobutu’s rule ended when the Soviet Union collapsed at the end of the Cold War. He had outlived his strategic usefulness to the West and the US and was easily overthrown (Collins, 1997). Prior to his being overthrown, Mobutu had issued an order calling for all Tutsi’s to leave the DRC or face the death penalty in 1996. However, with support of the Banyamulenge (who were mostly seen as Rwandese Tutsis), Laurent Kabila the spokesman of Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo started an uprising that led him to overthrow Mobutu

However, due to the support that Mobutu had received from the US and west, the 1980’s and 90’s DRC’s conflicts attracted little international interventions. This was because Mobutu was serving the interests of the US and the west global trade circuits (William, 2011).
4.3.3 1996-1997; the First DRC war

There are several events that preceded the 1996 DRC first major conflict (first war). In late 1996, the members of the Tutsi community, the Banyamulenge, indigenous to South Kivu supported by Rwanda started a rebellion (Collins, 1997). For instance, in August 1996, the media was full of reports on the ‘Banyamulenge’ uprising in the Eastern DRC. The cause of the preceding uprising was for the group to assert their identity as Congolese and not Rwandese as they had been referred to. It is because of being referred to as ‘Kinyarwanda’ speakers and the orders of Mobutu for Tutsis to leave DRC that made group to take up arms to claim their ‘confiscated’ Congolese citizenship. They were named Banyamulenge after the group had been settled near Mulenge Mountains in South Kivu by the Belgians during the colonial period (Melvern, 2004). In October 1996, the Banyamulenge started to identify with the Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo (AFDL) whose spokesman was Laurent Desiree Kabila.

The first war Congo began in September 1996. During this war, a coalition of neighboring foreign armies – from Uganda and Rwanda - invaded the DRC. President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and the Rwandan Minister for Defense, Paul Kagame launched an offensive to overthrow Mobutu, joining forces with locals who had opposed his rule. The invasion of the DRC by Uganda and Rwanda ended up attracting more African States and a number of proxy movements with varying degrees of local mobilization and support. It became to be known as the First War (Weiss, 2009). There was intense conflict between August 1996 and May 1997. It resulted into the toppling of the Mobutu Regime by the Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Angola-backed AFDL that was led by Laurent Kabila. The AFDL troops crossed the vast Zaire from the East to the West in seven months. According to Turner and Ngoy (2007), Kabila with a huge disgruntled group of Congolese marched from the west to Kinshasa and took over the government (Turner and Ngoy, 2007).

During the first Congo war, peacebuilding interventions mainly involved the UN invoking declaratory resolutions demanding an end to the war. At practical level, the UN did nothing to stop the war. However, there was some “intense international and regional diplomatic efforts to negotiate Mobutu’s exit” (Shah, 2010: 28). Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun of Algeria was appointed in January 1997 as joint UN–OAU Special Representative for the Great Lakes region. It was during the first Congo war that South Africa begun to be involved in peacebuilding intervention in the DRC. In 1997, the then South African President, Nelson
Mandela volunteered to be a principal mediator in an attempt to end the DRC’s first war. Moose (1997), Rice (1997) and the US State Department (1998) argue that there was a meeting that heralded the DRC’s future of peace agreements. Mandela facilitated a first meeting between rebels and president Mobutu in Cape Town on 20th February 1997. The US was also in support of the preceding meeting (US State Department Reports, 1998). However, the first efforts for Mandela to bring a peace agreement between Mobutu and rebels collapsed. Also, other future subsequent peace negotiations failed. This was because the rebels faulted Mandela’s mediation efforts that only considered Kabila’s and Mobutu’s forces and aimed at ensuring a smooth exit for Mobutu. Other groups accused Mandela of failing to include the non-violent opposition, who were unarmed opposition as opposed to the rebels. These included Congolese NGOs, churches, and long-time opposition leaders. It was on May 17 1997 when Mandela and Sahnoun were seeking another last minute intervention to include all parties to the DRC in ending war, that the Mobutu military and government were defeated by Kabila backed by Rwanda, Uganda and Angola (Carayannis, Tatiana and Weiss, 2003). The ouster of Mobutu by Kabila through military force internalized the use of force in resolution of any future Congolese conflict (Carayannis, Tatiana and Weiss, 2003).

In Mandela’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC, the exclusion of the so called non-violent opposition meant that armed groups realized that they could fight their way to a peace table and negotiate for political power. It meant that power lied in the gun and not on negotiations. Ignoring the unarmed political leaders was therefore a huge mistake on Mandela’s role in the 1997 peacebuilding interventions.

4.3.4 1998-2001; the second Congo war
After Kabila had overthrown Mobutu he proclaimed himself as the new head of the state newly named the Democratic Republic of Congo. It was at the onset of the Kabila presidency that the DRC became known for its culture of signing peace agreements that are yet to bring peace (Gondola, 2002). However, when Kabila ascended to the presidency, the Ugandan and Rwandan troops were still calling the shots in his government and army. For example, the Chief of General staff of the DRC was James Kabarebe, a Rwandan. The control of government and army by Uganda and Rwanda made Kabila very uncomfortable. At first he had thought that after supporting him, Uganda and Rwanda will pull out their troops. Also, there was huge public discontent among Congolese on the influence of Uganda and Rwanda over the Kabila regime (Juma, 2006). In 1998, Kabila decided to break ranks with Uganda.
and Rwanda. However, he later on organized new power networks that were based on his ethnic group the Baluba.

In July 1998, some of the Rwandan troops that (mainly of Tutsi origin) Kabila had asked to leave the DRC started to reorganize themselves and formed a rebellion known as Rassemblement Congolais Pour la Democratie – Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD). The foregoing rebel movement earned the support of Rwanda and Uganda - whom Kabila had fallen out with (Melvern, 2004). Rwanda and Uganda became the DRC’s external enemies. Internally, Kabila faced opposition from the elites that he had suspended and usurped as he came to power. In the Northern and Southern Kivu province, there were rising discontent from Rwandan allies (Nderitu, 2013). Due to his fallout with Rwanda and Uganda in 1998, Kabila’s options to thwart any rebellion were few. Kabila decided to turn to the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) – where DRC had become a member four months after Kabila took the presidency - for support. Kabila got the support from Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia (AZN coalition) (Arnold, 2005).

According to the Council on Foreign Relations Report (1999) the second Congo war also known as the Great War of Africa began in August 1998. The actors in the second Congo war were Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, DRC, Rwanda and Uganda and twenty-five armed groups within the DRC. This was the largest war in the history of African conflicts. During this war external militaries from Uganda and Rwanda supported rebels who wanted to topple the regime of Kabila. On the other hand, AZN militaries supported the government of Kabila (Wrong, 2000:29). The war was further exacerbated by the new Tutsi-led Government of president Kagame in Rwanda. Through the support of Kagame’s military forces, the Congolese Tutsi leaders began to increasingly use the issues of ethnicity and land as a means of securing their power base and their control over economic resources. In 1998, Kabila’s allies turned foes, Rwanda and Uganda attempted to oust him through clandestinely backing RCD. However, with the switching of sides portrayed by Angola - who in the first war had backed Uganda and Rwanda - the preceding countries’ efforts to oust Kabila were not successful (Human Security Report, 2009). At different times the AZN troops supported Laurent Kabila and later on his son, Joseph Kabila, who took over from him when he was shot dead (Arnold, 2005).
As a way of seeking international intervention, Kabila portrayed the second Congo war as a case of Rwandan and Ugandan aggression towards his government. He denied the existence of internal rebellion within the DRC. He also publicly denied to recognize the RCD - that was backed by Uganda and Rwanda - as a belligerent. On the contrary, the RCD claimed that their cause of fighting was a revolution against Kabila’s dictatorial regime. According to the RCD, the second Congo war was a fight between them and the Kabila army (Reyntjens, 2009). The war was further compounded when other rebel forces joined forces with the RCD in 1999. As a result, Kabila too lost a grip to over half of the country to the rebels. Due to internal wrangles, the RCD split into two. One movement became to be known as Mouvement de Liberation (ML) and was backed by Uganda. The other movement became RCD of Goma and was supported by the Rwandan government. Another anti-Kabila rebel group, Mouvement pour la liberation du Congo (MLC) was established in the Northern Province of the DRC. MLC was supported by the government of Uganda.

Before the end of the second Congo war, there were peacebuilding interventions that came in two weeks into war. After two weeks of the second Congo war, the UN and OAU representatives started to prepare a ceasefire draft document that was meant to address, abate and prevent future conflicts in the DRC. According to the ceasefire, all the conflicting parties in the DRC were to define and interpret their issues. However, all parties to the conflict interpreted the cause of the conflict differently: they could not agree on who was/were the belligerent(s). The ceasefire lacked to understand who started the conflict and why. However, the ceasefire identified AZN troops, Rwanda and Uganda as external parties to the conflict. Rwanda and Uganda denied the presence of their military troops in the DRC. On the contrary, it was ironical for Rwanda and Uganda to protest the exclusion of Congolese rebel groups from the list of signatories (Reyntjens, 2009).

More efforts were put in as peacebuilding intervention of ending the second Congo war. South Africa played its role in peacebuilding by supporting the SADC Led-Lusaka Peace Accord. For instance, during the SADC 18th summit in Mauritius in 1998, South Africa endorsed the appointment of the Zambian President Frederick Chiluba as the chief mediator in the DRC’s conflict - what is commonly known as the Lusaka Peace agreement. The European Union appointed Aldo Ajello as Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region in the agreement. Also, the US intervened by dispatching Ambassador Thomas Pickering, the then Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs and Howard Wolpe, a former Senator as Special
Envoys to the Great Lakes Region in the agreement (Spagat, Andrew, Tara and Kreutz, 2009). According to the Lusaka Peace Agreement, all stakeholders in the DRC war were asked to end their hostilities, military actions and propaganda within twenty-four hours of signing the deal. Within the agreement an attempt was made to address the issue of hate speech so as to avert genocide like the one that had happened in Rwanda: hate speech was seen as the igniter of violence in Rwanda and DRC. Not only did the agreement call for disarmament, but also the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the DRC. The peace deal also called for the exchange of hostages and prisoners of war between all foreign troops; AZN, Uganda, Rwanda and DRC (Spagat, Andrew, Tara and Kreutz, 2009).

The signatories of the agreement were Kabila and most of the internal rebel movements and the six countries that were involved in the war. According to the agreement, the UN peacekeeping was asked to take a peace enforcement role in the DRC. Peace enforcement is the practice of ensuring that there exists peace in an area or region. It is different from peacemaking in that peace enforcement gives peacekeepers an alternative of using force so as to bring conflicting parties to the negotiations table. The Lusaka Peace Agreement explicitly authorized the Security Council to authorize coercive force, if necessary, to achieve its objectives of disarming the various armed groups (Carayannis, 2003). Kabila signed off the Lusaka Ceasefire Accord which was later supported by other accords. This was the beginning of subsequent future DRC’s peace deals, accords and agreements.

However, the Lusaka Accord did not fully stem the war in the DRC. There was still mistrust and antagonism between the belligerents. Due to the mistrust between belligerents of the second Congo war, Laurent Kabila was assassinated in a palace coup in January 2001. After his death, his son, Joseph Kabila became the new DRC President. Joseph Kabila faced a lot of challenges when he took over the war-torn DRC (Prunier, 2009; UNEP: 2007: 89). However, Joseph Kabila was well versed on how to wage war: a skill which he had learnt from his father and as “once commander of the infamous army of child soldiers known as Kadogo’s” (International Crisis Group, 1999:7).

4.3.5 The Era of Joseph Kabila and the menace of rebels: 2003- To-date
On paper, the second DRC war ended officially in July 2003 when Joseph Kabila’s Transitional Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo took power (U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2007). However, scholars like Carayannis
(2003) and Olsson and Heather (2004) argue that the second Congo war evolved seamlessly into the third Congo war that is currently characterized by the menace of rebels in different parts of the DRC. According to Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002:148) and Clement (2009: a), behind the celebration of the success of the Lusaka Peace Agreement, war on the ground went on unabated. Paule and Bomboko (2004) Stearns (2011) and Vinci (2007) see this war as competition for minerals and control of mineral-rich regions by rebels and proxy conflict groups and that it begun in 2001 after the death of Laurent Kabila.

In order to thwart rebellion, Joseph Kabila reached out to Belgium, France, USA and the Bretton Woods institutions seeking for support for peacebuilding of the DRC. He also made an effort of reviving the Lusaka peace agreement process. On 4th May 2001, the Lusaka agreement signatories met in Lusaka and signed a Declaration on the fundamental principles of ending the DRC war (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:148; Clement, 2009a). This was just two weeks before the UNSC visited the region.

On 25th February 2002, dialogue on DRC’s peace re-opened in Sun-City in South Africa. As the preceding dialogue was in process, battles continued to rage in the DRC. The MLC – one of the rebel movements - refused to participate in the Sun-City peace talks arguing that Joseph Kabila had sent bogus civilian opposition parties. However, later on, all parties including the MLC participated in the talks. Unfortunately, 52 days later, the mediators during the dialogue conceded that the talks were unsuccessful in achieving a general agreement among all conflicting parties (Paule and Bomboko, 2004). The favourable agreement reached was a power sharing one whereby Joseph Kabila was to be the President and MLC leader Jean-Pierre Bemba be the prime minister. Both Kabila and Bemba signed the preceding power sharing agreement despite the RCD – Goma, a rebel group backed by Rwanda and other opposition parties feeling sidelined and rejecting the agreement. According Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002:148), the peace deal “was not wholly successful”. However, it brought a temporary cessation of violence in the DRC (Stearns, 2011). Events that followed the power-sharing peace deal included the withdrawal of almost all foreign troops. Afterwards a unified army comprising both government and militia troops was constituted. Most of militia troops in the unified army willingly joined the MONUC.

Kabila and Bemba attempted to establish some form of democracy that sustained some relative peace in the DRC. This involved the inclusion of unarmed opposition groups in the
government. However, the attainment of relative peace did not last for long. Weiss (2011) and Winter (2012: 56) argue that instead of president Kabila and Prime Minister Bemba’s teams seeking lasting solution for peace, they concentrated on negotiating for plum government positions for themselves. Due to competition for government plum positions, the country lapsed into chaos once more. Later on the DRC relapsed into a state of a new armed conflict (Vinci, 2007). Winter (2012) argues that the root cause of the new war was due to failure of negotiators of the Sun-City agreement in recognizing and including war lords in the preceding peace deal. According to Winter (2012:56), the marginalization of the RCD-Goma during the Sun-City peace agreement meant that the Rwanda backed movement’s underlying objectives were not addressed. As a result, to-date, this continues to haunt all peacebuilding processes and intervention in present day eastern DRC (Weiss, 2011).

The underlying objectives of the rebels and warlords that were not addressed during the Sun-City peace deal became evident during the historic democratic election in 2006. Although the election gave hope for DRC’s stability and peace, its merit was short-lived. In 2006, deadly fighting between government forces and another rebel group known as National Congress for People Defense (NCPD)-led by General Laurent Nkunda began in the North Kivu region. Nkunda and NCPD threatened to expand rebellion beyond eastern DRC and to overrun Kinshasa. The NCPD managed to conquer huge mining territories of the DRC (Nellemann and Refisch, 2010). The success of Nkunda in defeating the DRC army was because the latter was largely disorganized and had divisions within its base in Kinshasa. A number of DRC forces fought alongside rebel troops (International Crisis Group, 2010).

The intervention into the third Congo war once more involved a number of neighbouring countries. The countries that were involved were: Rwanda, Uganda, Angola and Zimbabwe. Stearns (2011) argues that all the foregoing intervening states believed that if general Nkunda was arrested, it was going to be a solution to one of the impediments of restoring democracy to Eastern DRC. General Nkunda was arrested on January 22, 2009, inside Rwanda. The Rwandan government imprisoned Nkunda in an undisclosed location and without bringing any charges against him. However, the DRC government issued an international warrant for his arrest over allegations of war crimes, insurrection and crimes against humanity. Rwanda refused to hand him over fearing that the General might be tried and killed on the basis of his Tutsi ethnicity. However, according to the International Crisis Group (2010), many observers
argued that Nkunda formed the NCPD to protect the ethnic Congolese Tutsi (Banyamulenge) against the Hutu, who were terrorizing the former in exile after the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

The real reason for the intervention into the ongoing third Congo war by foreign countries became apparent when the conflict degenerated into a fight for resources. Although Uganda and Rwanda claim that their armies have been withdrawn, scholars like Kigambo (2012) argue that the agents of the preceding countries are still at large in the DRC. To date, Arieff et al (2011) argue that the role of foreign countries continues to feature in the DRC conflict. For instance, on 25th July 2012, it was reported in the East African Standard (2012) that ‘a visibly angry’ Kagame president of Rwanda threatened to release General Nkunda. Kagame’s sentiments worried many regional leaders who argued that the release of Nkunda risked exploding a series of unrest in the DRC and that such war was going to spill over in the whole of the Great Lakes region (Kigambo, 2012). Also, the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the DRC Government accused Rwanda of backing Bosco Ntaganda, Nkunda’s former chief of staff and successor of the NCPD leader. Ntaganda recently gave himself up to the International Criminal Court to answer charges of crimes against humanity (ICC Today, 2014; Arieff et al, 2011). Bomboko (2012) argues that there are claims by the DRC government that Rwanda has been backing the M23(rebel group in Eastern Congo formed in 2012) so as to establish a sphere of influence in the DRC through direct military occupation, proxy forces or both.

To date the DRC has several militia groups like the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC), Patriotic Force for the Liberation of Congo (FPLC), National Integrationist Front (FNI), the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda - Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (FDLR-FCA) and M23. As a result of the preceding groups President Joseph Kabila is amassing troops, ready to attack. On the other side, rebels and militia groups are also threatening war, saying they have what it takes to mount a battle against the government (Human Rights Watch, 2014). Also, there are many international actors that are involved. For instance, there are a number of multinationals from Canada, USA among other Western countries that are backing different militia groups to support and secure their business interests. The presence of international actors and multinationals in the DRC has incapacitated the government, regional international organizations like the SADC, the AU and the UN in resolving the conflict (Nyathi, 2012). As a result, many crimes against humanity continue to be perpetuated against innocent Congolese. Reports by the Human
Rights Watch (2014) and Amnesty International (2014:15), show that due to the unending civil wars in the DRC, over 8 million Congolese have lost their lives, hundreds of thousands have become refugees and many women and children were raped. Many Congolese are internally displaced as violent conflict continues to be driven by among others, trade in minerals and between competing armed proxy groups, militia groups and people in government. Other effects of the Congolese conflict are the skyrocketing inflation and plummeting value of the Congolese Franc. There is also spillages of the effect of the third Congo war to the Great Lakes region and Southern Africa. Nabudere (2014) in *Africa’s First World War*, describes the DRC’s civil war as the first ever unending imperialist war. Like other imperialist wars, Nabudere (2014:3) says that the DRC war is about the distribution of wealth and power.

**4.4 South Africa’s Interventions in the DRC**
The DRC’s conflict is an interesting phenomenon because all three of South Africa’s post-apartheid regimes have been involved in their attempts to securing lasting peace. Some analysts argue that South Africa’s intervention or lack of interest in the DRC’s politics and conflicts is leading to a growth of a number of rights groups and activists within the Congolese community residing in the country. For instance, in 2012, a group of Congolese refugees demonstrated at Luthuli House (African Nation Congress Headquarters) expressing their dissatisfaction with the Zuma regime over its disinterest in the DRC post-election stalemate. They accused Zuma’s regime for supporting the illegitimate re-election of Joseph Kabila to continue occupying the DRC’s presidency (Institute for Global Dialogue, 2014). Nganje (2012) argues that the Congolese refugees who were protesting claimed that president Zuma was supporting Kabila because of Zuma’s nephew, Khulubuse, who has business ties with Katumba Mwake, a wealthy businessman and Kabila's advisor.

South Africa became actively involved in the DRC conflict in 1996 (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1998). To date, the sound of war drums in the DRC is ominous, coming at a time when regional powers like South Africa are trying to resolve the crisis. South Africa is one of the country that is bearing the brunt of the DRC’s conflict (Tshiyembe, 2010). For instance, it is estimated that in South Africa alone, there are over 500,000 Congolese refugees (UNHCR, 2014). Most of them reside in major cities of South Africa; Johannesburg, Cape Town, Pretoria and Durban. Many analysts argue that due to increasing numbers of Congolese among other refugees in South Africa, the DRC’s conflict is one of the most important cases of gauging the breadth and depth of South Africa’s commitment towards peacebuilding in
Africa (NOREF Report, 2015). However, having harbored the worst effects of the DRC’s war since 1996, South Africa has no option but to reinforce a culture of peace, democracy and human rights in the DRC.

There are a number of attempts that the regimes of Mandela, Mbeki and currently, Zuma have made so as to bring lasting peace in the DRC. The first major post-1994 diplomatic initiative was made by President Mandela (the then chairperson of SADC) in 1997 during the first Congo war (Tonheim and Swat, 2015:2). As it was argued earlier, the first Congo war happened as a result of Laurent Kabila and his rebel group ADFL fighting fiercely and overthrowing President Mobutu. Before Kabila overthrew Mobutu, Mandela had led a strong South African intervention: initiated talks at Pointe-Noire (Congo Brazzaville) between Mobutu and Kabila. Mandela wanted Mobutu to leave the DRC for exile after which Kabila would be the president and was to accommodate other elements of the DRC’s opposition (Landsberg, 2002: 172). However, Kabila refused to attend the talks. This became a failed attempt by the first democratic regime of South Africa (Los Angeles Times, 1997). This led to a distrustful relationship between South Africa and the DRC for the whole duration that Kabila was in power.

Another attempt was in the 1998 DRC war (second Congo war; 1998-2003). As discussed earlier this war was as a result of Kabila turning back on his former allies (Rwandan and Ugandan) who had helped him to oust Mobutu from power. Having not have learned from his first failed attempt, Mandela still insisted that dialogue and negotiation were to be the only means of settling the conflict rather than use of military deployment (Nabishika, 2011). This did not work out. Things changed when Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe took over as the chairperson of SADC. Firstly, Mugabe defended Laurent Kabila’s regime by deploying Zimbabwean military forces in the DRC. Mugabe’s strategy was supported by Angola and Namibia. Angola supported Mugabe’s strategy because it was fighting its own rebels who were using DRC’s as their back up. This angered Mandela who publicly reprimanded Mugabe for his action. Mandela led South Africa to call for an emergency summit of SADC leaders in Pretoria on 23 August 1998 so as to discuss Mugabe’s actions. On the contrary, the legitimacy of the Mugabe strategy in helping the government of Kabila and DRC using military deployment was endorsed (Santoro 1998).
Mandela’s regime became reluctant in the DRC’s peacebuilding after the events that had happened at the SADC summit of 1998. Later on the Kabila regime started to accuse South Africa of siding with anti-government forces in the DRC (Mangu, 2003). For instance South Africa was accused of selling arms to Rwandan and Ugandan troops that were fighting the Kabila regime (Curtis, 2007). At the same time, while the Mandela regime was strongly supporting a non-violent approach to the second Congo war, it opted for a military approach to end the 1998 Lesotho conflict. South Africa was accused of applying double standards in its peacemaking approaches by the Kabila regime (Human Rights Watch, 2000).

South Africa’s approach to the DRC crisis changed when Thabo Mbeki became president in 1999. Mbeki contended that “South Africa’s policy toward the DRC was in need of a major overhaul” (Tonheim and Swat, 2015:2). Mbeki initiated a plan by urging the withdrawal of all foreign armies in the DRC. Contrary to Mandela, the Mbeki regime contributed SANDF troops to the UN peacekeeping forces in the DRC. According to Landsberg (2002:178), Mbeki’s acts were to avert South Africa from its previous disinclination to the very peace that it intended to make. It was during the Mbeki regime that calls for increased involvement of and stronger pressure from international and regional bodies in the DRC’s war was made by South Africa (Weiss, 2000). However, South Africa did not intervene in the DRC conflict individually but through SADC, the AU and its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the UN.

Similarly, it was during the Mbeki regime that the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (an initial step that led to Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) was promulgated in 1999. The ICD led to the first democratic election in the DRC in 2006 (Rogier, 2004: 27–28). Curtis (2007: 264) argues that South Africa renewed further its attempt to end the DRC’s war when it hosted the IICD talks at Sun City (25th to April 19th 2002). Apart from hosting the ICD talks, South Africa invested a lot of human resource in the peace talks. This became a litmus test for South Africa’s reputation as the continental peacemaker (Rogier, 2004). During the ICD talks Mbeki played a crucial role of directing the process: he presented two possible power-sharing plans. The first power sharing plan was rejected by rebels as too pro-Kabila while the second one was rejected by Kabila as too pro-rebel (Mangu, 2003). The failure of these talks diminished South Africa’s role in Africa’s peacemaking process. However, South Africa entered into a privileged relationship with Rwanda (who were seen as RCD-Goma rebel sponsor) to convince the rebels to enter into a deal. This led to the resumption of Sun-City II
ICD talks which eventually led to an all-inclusive agreement in December 2002 and the signing of a transitional constitution agreement that led to democratic elections in 2006. Mbeki continued to play a key role in ending the Congolese conflict. According to Kabemba (2007: 537), Mbeki was “omnipresent throughout the transition, jetting into the DRC every time peace [was] threatened and taking part in all the important events”. Mbeki’s regime also led to increased contribution of SANDF in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). Also, Mbeki initiated the signing of a General Cooperation Agreement (Bilateral relation) between South Africa and the DRC. This healed the mistrustful relationship that had been there since the Mandela regime (SAFPI, 2012).

However, South Africa’s peacemaking initiative in the DRC had expectations of getting some returns after the election of Joseph Kabila in 2006. Surprisingly, “instead of doing business with South Africa, who had helped him to find peace, Kabila turned to China” (Tonheim and Swat, 2015:3). This made South Africa to quickly withdraw from the Congolese scene. The relationship between the DRC and South Africa became unclear and distant. For instance, in 2009, South Africa did not take part in the signing of the peace deal between the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) and the Congolese government.

Jacob Zuma took over the Presidency in 2009. During this time, due to the DRC’s association with China, there was reluctance by the West to fund the upcoming DRC’s 2012 general election. The DRC sought South Africa for help. In 2011, The Zuma regime contributed $15 million (R126 million) to assist with the cost of holding the elections in the DRC. While South Africa was contributing towards the cost of elections, a number of bilateral contracts were being signed (The East African, 2013). For instance, in June 2010 the Lake Albert Oil Blocks 1 and 2 were allocated to CapriCat and Foxwell, two companies linked to President Zuma’s nephew, Khulubuse Zuma (Moneyweb, 2010). In 2012, immediately after elections, a memorandum of understanding on the Inga dam project was signed between South Africa and the DRC (African Business, 2012). Although the credibility of the elections was questioned by international observers, the DRC’s main opposition party, many civil organisation and countries, South Africa quickly recognised the re-election of Joseph Kabila as the democratic (Daily Maverick, 2011). South Africa’s support of Kabila’s re-election deepened the relationship between the two countries but deteriorated South Africa-Rwanda relations. For example South Africa granted asylum to Faustin Kayumba...
Nyamwasa - former Rwandan Chief of Staff and intelligence of the Rwandan army (*Mail & Guardian*, 2010).

In April 2012, there emerged a rebel group known as M23. In November 2012, the M23 humiliated MUNUSCO troops and seized the control of Goma, the provincial capital of North Kivu. The magnitude of which M23 operated led UN Group of Experts to suspect Rwanda and Uganda to be supporting the group (UN Group of Experts, 2013; Reuters, 2013). To address the M23 menace, there were two peace talks that took place: The Kampala and Addis Ababa peace talks between M23 and the Congolese government. The Kampala peace talks broke down in October 2013. However, the Addis negotiations were fruitful and led into the signing of the most recent Congolese peace agreement, the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF) on 24th February 2013. Eleven African countries signed the agreement – the DRC, Angola, the Republic of Congo, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, the Central African Republic, Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan and Zambia. Similarly, the UN, the AU, the ICGLR and the SADC were four main guarantors of the foregoing peace deal. This was the first time South Africa was a signatory to a peace agreement on the DRC. During the Addis negotiations, “South Africa brought in the political support that Kabila needs by creating more of a balance within the parties to the negotiation but also by standing in the way of the bullying that could have taken place from the Rwandan side” (Tonheim and Swat, 2015:5). Currently, South Africa is deeply engaged in the implementation of the foregoing peace agreement. In 2013, the Institute of Security Studies (2014) and ACCORD (2014) reported that South Africa had started to deviate from the non-violent approach to peacebuilding in the DRC. ACCORD (2014) argued that in 2013 President Zuma sent a strong contingent of South African Defence Force (SANDF) to enforce peace through the neutralisation of rebel group M23 in the eastern part of the DRC.

Furthermore, in 2013, South Africa played a key role in the formulation and constitution of resolution no. 2098 of the UNSC. UNSC Resolution 2098 authorized the MUNUSCO forces to use ‘offensive’ combat force in dealing with rebel forces in the DRC (UN Security Council, 2013). To date, South African soldiers form the backbone of the MUNUSCO intervention brigade in the DRC. Out of 3,069 MUNUSCO troops, there are 1,345 members of the SANDF. The rest of the MUNUSCO troops constitute Tanzanian and Malawian forces (*Mail & Guardian*, 2013).
In support of the Kabila regime, the Zuma government has been involved in arresting Congolese dissidents. For instance, in February 2013, South African police arrested 19 Congolese men in Limpopo after they were accused of planning a coup d’État to topple the Kabila regime. Another show of loyalty to the Kabila regime by the Zuma government is the 2014 deployment of SANDF forces that is achieving some rare victory over rebels in eastern DRC. In trade, Zuma and Kabila have signed a number of trade agreements and treaties. One of the major trade deal is the Grand Inga Hydropower Project (Grand Inga 3), the world’s largest hydropower dam. It is based on the preceding trade deals that President Zuma (2013) had to send a strong contingent of South African Defence Force (SANDF) to help root out the M23 rebel group in the Eastern part of the DRC (ISS, 2014; ACCORD, 2014).

To date, due to more trustful relationship between Zuma and Kabila, South Africa appears to be the only African country with some kind of influence in the DRC. Also the influence of South Africa on the Kabila regime has surpassed that of the EU and the US which has become minimal (Mail & Guardian. 2013). However, other commentators argue that South Africa has influence on the DRC regime because the former is playing a host to many Congolese refugees and asylum seekers who are anti-Kabila and furious after the 2011 fraudulent election. As a result, Kabila is alleged to fear that if his regime’s relationship with South Africa deteriorates, the latter may allow the ant-Kabila refugees to use its territory to plan seizing power from the former (Tonheim and Swat, 2015). From the foregoing assertion, based on this view, this study argues that Congolese refugees residing in South Africa may (not) play a key role in South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC as it will be shown in the forthcoming chapters.

4.5 Conclusion
Bujra (2002) quotes Adebayo (1999) arguing that political, economic, social and cultural factors are the main triggers of conflicts in the developing world. Furthermore, Clover (2004) sees the causes of intrastate conflicts to be rooted in political grievance, poor governance and economic and social inequalities between different groups within a state. This chapter has shown how all indications are that the DRC war will continue to spill in several neighbouring countries as fighting on different sides continues. This is not a scenario Africa wishes to experience. In the interest of the innocent men, women and children of the DRC who continue to die daily and those who are seeking asylum elsewhere, there is a need for a
lasting solution to Africa’s greatest war. The question is how to intervene in Africa’s unending Congo war (The East African, 2012).

The chapter has been historical in nature. Firstly, the chapter presented a summary of the DRC conflict. The preceding historical background has established that the several factors continue to trigger the conflict and will be responsible for its continuity. Among factors that were established are: the foundations of colonialism, land issues, greed and weak systems of governance, fights over resources and ethnicity in addition to external influences and the presence of foreign troops from neighboring countries. This has become the edifice on which violence was laid for resolution of any DRC conflicts. To date, rebel and militia groups continue to hold large parts of the country, subjecting the civilian populations to prolonged instability and civil strife. In addition, poor methodologies and intervention strategies in solving conflicts have fueled the DRC situation further. The chapter also established that South Africa has been actively involved in the DRC conflict since 1996. This is because all three of South Africa’s post-apartheid presidents have been involved in efforts to secure peace. Also, the chapter established that South Africa has successfully used its peacebuilding intervention to create a trusting diplomatic relationship that has led to lucrative trade deals between the two countries. In the end, South Africa is the chief beneficiary of bilateral trade pacts with the DRC.

The next chapter is an exploration of the views of participants (Congolese refugees) of this study on South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s unending conflict.
CHAPTER FIVE
VIEWS OF CONGOLESE REFUGEES ON SOUTH AFRICA’S PEACEBUILDING INTERVENTIONS IN THE DRC

5.1 Introduction
Initially, as stated in the background chapter, this study sought to explore how the views of Congolese refugees may enhance South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict. From a survey of literature in chapter two and presentation of data in three, this study is the first of its kind on the incorporation of views and opinions of refugees within South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC and other African conflicts. Although the most recent official government analysis of statistics on refugees and asylum seekers was done in April 2016, it only comprises statistics on refugees who have been granted or denied asylum status in South Africa. The DHA (2016) statistics do not give statistics on how refugees have participated in South Africa’s peace missions on the continent.

Within the history of peacebuilding interventions (as shown in the foregoing chapter) in the DRC, it can be argued that the views and insights of the Congolese refugees are yet to be incorporated in the past or ongoing peacebuilding interventions in that country. Therefore, it can be argued that, this study is among the few attempts (as far as is known) exploring how the views and insights of the Congolese refugees in South Africa, may bolster South Africa’s
peacebuilding interventions in the DRC conflict. This chapter bases most of its arguments on responses given by participants of this study.

5.2 Congolese awareness of South Africa’s peacebuilding in the DRC
The first major concern of the researcher was to establish whether Congolese refugees in Durban were cognizant of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. During the study, 38 out of 54 participants interviewed, were cognizant (in broad terms) of South Africa’s ongoing peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. At this point, a note on the profiles of respondents on the awareness of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC is instructive. It is worth noting that the majority of the respondents were aware of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC for the following key reasons: Firstly, it is worth mentioning that most participants in this study were academics, activists and former soldiers and rebels as presented in the methodology segment of this study. Therefore, their level of awareness of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC was relatively high. The academics\textsuperscript{22} (especially social scientists), activists and former soldiers and rebels - although living in South Africa - have been concerned with issues that relate to governance, violence and poverty in the DRC. Secondly, former soldiers and rebels argued that they knew well that South Africa was sending its troops to the DRC for peacekeeping. This gave them the awareness that South Africa was intervening in the DRC\textsuperscript{23}. Most participants in this study were interested in seeing a more stable, peaceful and a better DRC. As argued in the background, Congolese right activists have been vocal on the role of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC since 2012 (Kets and De Vries). For instance, in 2013, Congolese refugees accused the South African Defence Force (SANDF) of training a Congolese Battalion whose aim was to crack down Kabila’s dissidents and post-election protesters in Kinshasa (Abegunrin, 2014). From there active involvement in protest against South Africa’s support of the Kabila regime since 2012, it can be said that most Congolese right activists are aware of South Africa’s interventions in the DRC.

\textsuperscript{22} For instance, I found out during my interview with a lecturer that there were some studies that had been conducted at that particular university in relation to war and mineral resources in the DRC. The lecturer argued that research on DRC has made many scholars richer due to international funding.

\textsuperscript{23} It is instructive to note that during my field work, I established that former soldiers-cum rebels were generally opposed to granting face-to-face interviews for their security reasons. Given the sensitive nature of this study, this set of participants apparently felt that phone interviews protected their anonymity than face-to-face interviews or focus group discussions.
As figure 3 shows, from the data collected, it can be argued that there is a high level of awareness among Congolese refugees on South Africa’s interventions in the DRC. Although this study purposively targeted the educated category among the Congolese community in Durban (academics, ex-military and activists\textsuperscript{24}), it was established that the question of understanding the refugees’ awareness of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC is a complex one. There were different levels of awareness of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC among academics and activists. For instance, most ex-military and ex-rebels argued that they were aware that South Africa was using SANDF to fight rebels as a way of building peace\textsuperscript{25}. One activist argued that South Africa was building peace in the DRC by funding infrastructures such as roads, airports and Inga Dam project as a way of improving livelihood in the DRC. “By constructing our roads, airport and the Dam, South Africa is addressing unemployment and poverty in the DRC”\textsuperscript{26}. There were also views that South Africa was involved in electioneering and political events of the DRC so as to determine who succeeded Kabila. “South Africa is funding many political institutions so as to determine who becomes the next president. This is a way of ensuring that bilateral trade between Kabila and South Africa are maintained”\textsuperscript{27}. From the varying views of the educated category, it can be argued that awareness of the Congolese refugees of South Africa’s

\textsuperscript{24} For instance, during interviews most Congolese scholars, rights activists and former soldiers argued that it was ideal for South Africa to be impartial in its peacebuilding interventions in the DRC since the latter is part of the SADC.

\textsuperscript{25} Views of a Congolese ex-soldier
\textsuperscript{26} Views of a Congolese lecturer in Durban
\textsuperscript{27} Views of a Congolese student in Durban
peacebuilding interventions depends on the conceptualization of what can bring lasting peace or what breeds war in the DRC.

Scholars such as Kadima, Denis and Kalombo (1995), Smit and Rugunan (2014) and Tonheim and Swart (2015) had restricted their studies on the humanitarian assistance that Congolese refugees should be accorded by South Africa. However, from the different levels of awareness of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC as narrated by participants, the issue of refugees remains an important one within the under-researched scenery in conflict transformation and peace studies. For instance, it was from the different levels of awareness of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions as narrated by the participants that this study established that most views of the Congolese refugees had been shaped by their region of origin in the DRC. Based on the different levels of awareness of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC, this study established that the majority of the participants are from the eastern parts of the DRC: this is considered by many scholars as the heart of the DRC’s conflicts (Aussesserre, 2012; Nderitu, 2013; Whetho, 2014; Vogel and Raeymaekers, 2016).

5.3 Origin of Participants and their Support of the DRC’s Government
As argued from the preceding subsection, this study revealed that most of participants originated from the eastern part of the DRC and predominantly speak Kiswahili. In this study, it was established that most participants were indigenes of the four provinces in the eastern part of the DRC; of Sud-Kivu, Nord-Kivu, Katanga and Maniema as shown in figure 4. According to Geenen (2012), the eastern part of the DRC is endowed with rich mineral resources and has been the centre of resource conflicts.

Figure 4. The map showing administrative provinces of the DRC (Global Maps, 2015)

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28 Kiswahili (or Swahili) is an African language spoken mainly by the people of eastern and central Africa. That is, people who live in Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, eastern Zaire, northern Zaire, northern Malawi, northern Mozambique, northern Zambia and Somali Republic (Marshall, 2015).
According to Cuvelier, Diemel and Vlassenroot (2013), since 1960s, competition for minerals by both local and external actors in the eastern DRC has given the region continuous instability. As a result, the region has become the highest contributor of Congolese refugees who have sought refuge in east and Southern Africa (Nderitu, 2013). As table 6 below shows, in Durban, most participants of this study originated from the eastern part of the DRC.

Table 6. The origin of participants in the DRC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province in DRC</th>
<th>No. of Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nord-Kivu</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sud-Kivu</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maniema</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katanga</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oriental</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasai-Oriental</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasai-Occidental</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bandundu</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equateur</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bas-Kongo</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>58</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The findings of table 6 above corroborate Bariagaber’s (2016) argument that regions that experience high levels of instabilities are the highest contributors of refugees in the world. Most of the participants in this study come from the war-prone eastern parts of the DRC.
The realization that most of participants originated from the eastern parts of the DRC led the study to inquire whether most Congolese refugees in Durban were pro-government or anti-government as shown in table 7 below.

**Table 7. Participants’ support of the DRC government**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support of current government</th>
<th>No. of Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-government</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-government</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Stand</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the reasons as to why many participants expressed strong anti-government sentiment can be traced from their provinces of origin. According to Titeca and Fahey (2016), due to seclusion from the government, the eastern part of the DRC has remained rebellious to the regime of president Joseph Kabila. For Mushi (2013) the eastern part of the DRC is mostly considered a rebel-prone and an opposition stronghold which is characterized by strong anti-government sentiments. For instance, one participant argued that there was no need for people from the eastern part to support the current government of President Joseph Kabila because since independence, their region had been sidelined in development. Similarly, an ex-military commander argued that while the eastern part of the DRC was rich in minerals, its residents remained poor. “our region benefits outsiders and not us. The government cares about investors who loot our minerals”.

Most of the participants’ anti-government sentiment endorse Vogel and Raeymakers’s (2016) view that despite its rich minerals, poverty levels are high in the eastern parts of the DRC. This is an indication that most post-colonial regimes in the DRC have neglected the region (Mamili, 2015). As a result, Parker, Vadheim, and Economics (2016) argue that the high level of poverty among the population of mineral-rich provinces of Sud-Kivu, Nord-Kivu, Katanga and Maniema has exacerbated the formation of some militia and rebel groups that have sought to protect this region from both government and international exploitation. Still, militia and rebel groups have used poor infrastructure and lack of presence of governance in

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29 Interview with a Congolese activist in Durban
30 Interview with a former military commander
the eastern part of the DRC to enrich themselves by engaging in illegal mining. Nabudere (2014:3) adds that due to government negligence of the region, eastern DRC has harboured the existence of many rebel movements like the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC), Patriotic Force for the Liberation of Congo (FPLC), National Integrationist Front (FNI), and the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda - Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (FDLR-FCA) and M23. It is for the foregoing reason that the researcher saw as a cause of strong anti-government sentiment among participants of this study: most Congolese refugees interviewed in this study were anti-government.

There are other scholarly arguments that vindicate why most participants of this study expressed strong anti-government sentiments as shown in table 7 above. According to Bomboko (2012), the two most mineral rich provinces of Sud-Kivu and Nord-Kivu border Uganda and Rwanda (see the map of DRC). The historicity of the DRC’s conflict has shown that Uganda and Rwanda have been supporting selected rebel actions in the eastern Congo so as to establish a sphere of influence. In some cases, Uganda and Rwanda have directly used their military to cause conflicts in the eastern DRC (Bomboko, 2012). One participant argued that Uganda and Rwanda provided some sort of security to their region which the DRC government has failed to do so. Also, another participant argued that “the only way that the eastern part of the DRC can mount pressure to the government was through the support of the Ugandan and Rwandan armies or rebels”

Jones and Naylor (2014) argue that just like other post-colonial African states, the practice of negative ethnicity and politics of favouritism has justified the DRC presidents to use their offices to build patronage. In doing so, most presidents appoint elites from tribes that are affiliated to them to hold senior government posts at the expense of other communities. In this case, despite the eastern part of the DRC being rich in natural resources, it has been excluded in participating in the politics and governance of the country (Whetho, 2014).

31 A key former rebel soldier argued that the reason why he became a rebel was to protect his territory from government sponsored foreign exploitation.
32 Interview with a Congolese trader
33 Interview with a Congolese businessman in Durban
5.4 Participants’ support and views on the Role of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC

While the finding reveals that most participants are anti-DRC government, it is under the regime of Joseph Kabila that South Africa-DRC relations has flourished. According to the Mail & Guardian (2015), South Africa has become the biggest supplier of goods and services to the DRC, providing more than 21% of the country’s imports. At the same time, it is under the regime of President Kabila that South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC has increased. The participants’ anti-Kabila regimes sentiments and his relationship with South Africa underpinned another study’s quest of finding out the support of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC as narrated by the Congolese refugees. In this study, most of the participants of this study were concerned with seeing a better and peaceful DRC. The majority of participants (31) supported the efforts that South Africa was making in seeking lasting peace in the DRC as shown in table 8 below. One participant argued that since South Africa is the leading trading partner with the DRC, it has no option but to end conflicts in the DRC.34 Another participant argued that since the DRC was part of the SADC region, problems that faced it were also affecting other countries in the region. “Since South Africa is the most developed in SADC, it has the capacity address problems of war in the DRC”35.

Table 8. Participants support of the SA peacebuilding interventions in the DRC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SA peacebuilding in the DRC</th>
<th>No. of Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in Support</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not concerned</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>58</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most participants who were against South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC argued that South Africa was supporting the corrupt regime of President Joseph Kabila. “Why would I support initiative that favour corruption and poor governance in the DRC?”36 Some participants questioned the motive of South Africa of increasing its imports to DRC while at the same time carrying out its peacebuilding interventions.

However, from the findings, most participants agreed that South Africa had a role to play in ending war in the DRC. After finding out that most of the study’s participants supported

34 Interview with Congolese right activist.
35 Views of a Congolese medical doctor
36 Views of Congolese Ex-rebel in Durban
South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC, the study sought to explore some aspired role of the Congolese refugees on South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. This became an epitome on which the researcher sought to find out why the scholarship on the role of refugees in peacebuilding interventions has been less documented. There were a number of views that participants narrated as the role of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict. Most of the participants’ view on the role of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention were that South Africa should address the root causes of war in the DRC. Participants’ views varied on root cause of war. For instance, all former military and rebels that the study interviewed argued that media superficially portrayed the causes of war in the DRC. One ex-rebel argued, “on television, I see simplistic reporting of war in the DRC. Some media reported that rebels were causing war so as to enrich themselves. What is not known is that rebels were working in collaboration with government soldiers who they share looted proceeds” 37. An ex-military commander added that by working with the Congolese army in its peacebuilding interventions, South Africa is unaware that the government could not lead an offensive against rebels 38.

Most views of participants on the role of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC were based on their awareness of the dynamics of what breeds war in Congo. To get more insights, the study ensured that participants identified specific peacebuilding roles that they thought South Africa’s was playing in the DRC. Each participant to the best of his/her knowledge, could identify the role of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC as shown in Figure 5 below

37 An interview with a Congolese ex-rebel in Durban
38 An interview with a former government soldier
According to figure 5 above, most participants argued that the role of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC was to support the government of President Joseph Kabila. The second largest category of participants argued that the role of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention was to protect businesses owned by South Africans in the DRC. Most of the participants who saw South Africa’s peacebuilding as either the support of President Kabila or protection of the South African businesses argued that such action had dangerous impacts on the stability of the DRC. A Congolese civil right activists with Abahlali BaseMjondolo argued that “South Africa’s support of the DRC government and protection of business owned by South Africans was perpetuating the conflict further. This is because, such actions were angering rebels and militia groups especially in the eastern parts of the country”\(^39\). A former military officer argued, “since many people in the eastern provinces of the DRC were dissatisfied with the current government, South Africa support of the regime of Kabila was going to prolong the conflict”\(^40\). Geenen (2014), Prunier (2004) and Beswick (2009) argue that since the second Congo war, the eastern part (which is argued to be harbouring rebels from Uganda and Rwanda) has been in resistance to both Laurent and Joseph Kabila’s rule. Therefore, by supporting the government of Joseph Kabila, as narrated by participants, South Africa’s peacebuilding was fuelling rebels’ anger; thus, abetting new forms of conflicts in the eastern DRC.

The study linked some of the above views of the participants on the role of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC to Congolese protests and demonstrations that took place in 2012 at Luthuli House (African Nation Congress Headquarters). During the 2012 demonstrations, the Congolese community registered its discontent with South Africa’s support of what they considered an illegitimate re-election of President Joseph Kabila (Institute for Global Dialogue, 2014). This explains the reason as to why most participants narrated anti-Kabila sentiments. It can be argued that although most participants are away from the DRC, they have not legitimatized the re-election of Kabila. Therefore, according to these participants, by supporting the current government, South Africa was sustaining and not averting war, especially in the eastern parts of the DRC - a disgruntled and anti-Kabila region.

\(^{39}\) Interview with a Congolese civil rights activist.

\(^{40}\) Interview with a member of Congolese civil right group in Durban.
Some informants held views that South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC’s conflict was an instrument of thwarting Kabila’s critics and civil rights organizations. This category of participants argued that, rather than South Africa being impartial in its peacebuilding interventions, it was in support of the Kabila government. This was considered as perpetuation of the culture of immunity in the DRC. One key informant argued, “SANDF forces were not only fighting rebels in the east but were also training a Congolese police force that was used to quell any anti-government demonstration organized by civil societies”\textsuperscript{41}. The preceding participant’s view can be linked to the demonstration that was done by Congolese refugees in Johannesburg in 2013. During, the 2013 demonstration, most Congolese accused SANDF of training a Congolese army battalion that was being used to crack down President Kabila’s critics and dissidents in Kinshasa (Human Rights Watch, 2013). The views from this category of participants was that South Africa’s peacebuilding was another instrument of sustaining Kabila’s regime which many Congolese, according to participants, are dissatisfied with.

There were also participants who argued that South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention has helped to root out some rebels in the eastern DRC. One participant argued “the most tangible success of the South Africa’s interventions in the DRC is the disbandment of the M23 rebel group in 2014”\textsuperscript{42}. “By weakening the activities of M23, South Africa was creating room for positive peace in the DRC”\textsuperscript{43}. The views of the preceding participants were re-echoed during president Jacob Zuma’s State of the Nation address in 2014. According to President Zuma (2014), peace in the DRC can only be realized if rebel groups were eliminated. Similarly, Sandole (2010) argues that the elimination of armed rebel groups and militias (violent groups) necessitates negative peace which is a starting point of positive peace (conflict transformation). Zuma (2014) and Sandole’s (2010) views were re-echoed by some participants of this study. For instance, a Congolese lawyer in Durban argued, “the elimination of rebel groups like M23 by SANDF was going to create non-violent conditions in the eastern parts of the DRC. This is going to allow peace programs to be implemented by both local and international peacebuilders”\textsuperscript{44}.

\textsuperscript{41} An interview with a civil rights activist who is a volunteer at BaseMjondolo in Durban.  
\textsuperscript{42} Views of a Congolese lecturer in a Durban based University  
\textsuperscript{43} Views of a Congolese lecturer  
\textsuperscript{44} An interview with a Congolese lawyer in Durban.
As a way of protecting its interest in the DRC, this study established two intertwined roles of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions as narrated by the participants. Firstly, there were participants who narrated that South Africa was using peacebuilding interventions to expand its trading interest in the DRC. This was by protecting South African-owned business in the DRC. Secondly, another category of participants narrated that since it began its peacebuilding interventions in the DRC, South Africa has increased its bilateral trade in the DRC. According to the Mail & Guardian, in 2015, the DRC accounted for 21% of all South Africa’s exports in Africa. For instance, a Congolese lawyer argued that he considered the role of SANDF as a security to South African business elites or for creating a conducive environment for South African companies. According to Gbaya (2015), the Inga Dam, agriculture and the abundance of mineral resources to which some South African companies own mining rights, are some of the interests of South Africa peacebuilding’s interventions in the DRC. In a realist view, Gbaya (2015:15) emphasizes that “South Africa determines its policies towards the DRC according to its national interest or its role as a champion of Africa in the handling of the DRC's conflict”. Gbaya’s (2015) view was re-affirmed by a participant who argued that “there were a number of business, especially in the mineral and construction sectors that were owned by South Africans. Therefore, the quest for South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions was to protect South African businesses and not to protect Congolese”.

The table below shows South Africa’s economic interest in the DRC in the form of imports and exports. The table covers six years in which South Africa became extensively involved in peace keeping missions in the DRC. The figures in table 9 below stand as numerical evidence of the extensive interest of South Africa in the DRC that could be prompting it to be involved in peacebuilding.

**Table 9. South African import and exports to the DRC**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports to SA from DRC</th>
<th>Exports to DRC from SA</th>
<th>Total Trade Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>47 768 011</td>
<td>2 479 644 104</td>
<td>2 431 876 093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>54 034 126</td>
<td>4 369 539 310</td>
<td>4 315 505 184</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

45 An interview with a Congolese scholar in Durban.
46 Interview with a Congolese economist lecturer in Durban.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>HBOC</th>
<th>HOHE</th>
<th>HOHE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>43 239 861</td>
<td>9 203 936 291</td>
<td>9 160 696 430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>72 354 386</td>
<td>4 829 931 726</td>
<td>4 757 577 340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>72 354 386</td>
<td>6 318 722 965</td>
<td>6 218 211 954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>106 500 768</td>
<td>8 040 664 774</td>
<td>7 934 164 006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>67 436 251</td>
<td>12 141 678 103</td>
<td>12 074 241 853</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Gbaya (2014:58)

The link between South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions and businesses in the DRC prompted one participant to argue that the actions of South Africa were providing a recipe for disaster. The preceding views of participants led the researcher to see some deleterious connections between South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention, business and conflict in the DRC. From the views of most participants, it can be argued that South Africa is providing grounds for (re)occurrence of conflicts in three ways. Firstly, “by involving itself in mineral businesses, South Africa was interfering with the interests of some MNCs and Congolese mining companies”⁴⁷. As a result, another informant argued that “some of South African mining companies could be involved in funding rebels to destabilize the DRC for their profit maximization”⁴⁸. On the other hand, “South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC endangers underpinning rebels’ source of livelihood (mineral money) which the current government cannot offer”⁴⁹. As a consequence, “South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions were eliciting more rebel-like actions other than peace”⁵⁰.

The views of participants on the role of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions re-affirm the second and the third hypothesis of this study. As argued in chapter one, South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC’s conflict is a function of the interplay of interveners’ specific factors and variables in the local, national and international environments in which they operate. Therefore, some of the views of the preceding informants on the role that South

⁴⁷ Interview with a Congolese civil society activist.
⁴⁸ Arguments of one informant during focus group A discussion in Durban –
⁴⁹ Arguments of one informant during focus group B discussion in Durban
⁵⁰ Arguments of one informant during focus group C discussion in Durban

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Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in DRC rest on the link of what the interveners will benefit and not for the benefits of the Congolese (hypothesis two of this study). Still, some of the participants’ views in this study vindicate the assumption that South Africa is using its peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict so as to consolidate its position in Africa and in the world: to build its hegemony (hypothesis three of this study).

5.5 Participants’ view on the importance of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention

After exploring different views of the participants on the role of peacebuilding, the study saw it worthwhile to find out how participants of this study rated South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. During the study, 41 participants argued that South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC were very significant. 17 participants termed South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC as of no significance or importance.

41 participants argued that there was value in South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention as it was step forward in addressing the protracted DRC conflict. For instance, in most focus groups the majority of participants said that since 2013, when SANDF dismantled the M23 rebels, there has been some relative peace in the eastern DRC. Similar views were reported in the Guardian Newspaper of Tuesday 5th November, 2013. According to the Guardian (2013) the SANDF under the MUNUSCO mission backed by the Congolese army had captured and forced M23 rebels to declare a ceasefire of disarming and demobilizing and to start pursuing a political settlement with the DRC government. This vindicates participants’ views that South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict were of great value.

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51 Focus group discussions of February, 2016
There were 17 participants who felt that the South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC were of no importance simply because, they are not all-inclusive. For instance, an activist with Abahlali BaseMjondolo argued that South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions favoured one party to the conflict at the expense of other disgruntled actors. By sideling other actors to the Congolese conflict, the preceding participant added that, “the South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions were prolonging, complicating and perpetuating the DRC’s conflict further”. In addition to complicating and prolonging conflicts, an ex-rebel argued that “since South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions were one-sided, they were producing other deleterious complications”. “By neglecting rebel and other disgruntled groups in its peacebuilding interventions in the DRC, South Africa was setting new grounds for future conflicts in the DRC”, argued a former Congolese ex-rebel. According to the views of the ex-rebel, South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC were undermining the influence of the rebel groups in the eastern parts of that country.

According to Ramsbothams, Woodhouse and Curle (2011), neglecting other parties to the conflict risks exacerbating conflict. This is because, when conflicts arise, no party recognizes the other as having legitimate claims (Lambourne, 2014). In this context, a Congolese professor in a Durban university argued that “conflicts in the DRC are due lack of recognition of political regimes since 1996. Therefore, by recognizing and negotiating with the Kabila government (which is considered illegitimate), South Africa was fostering warlordism in the DRC”. A Congolese human rights lawyer argued that by favouring Kabila, South Africa’s peacebuilding initiative was paying a blind eye to the role being played by Rwanda and Uganda in the DRC’s conflict. Scholars such as Nderitu (2013) argue that Rwanda and Uganda have been accused of supporting the actions of the rebels in the DRC since 1998. According to Sadiki (2014), Rwanda and Uganda have been accused by international peacebuilders of arming and financing different rebel groups in the DRC. Therefore, from the views of some participants, by exclusively supporting the government of Kabila, South

52 Interview with a civil society activist in Durban
53 Interview with a Congolese activist in Durban
54 An interview with a former rebel soldier.
55 An interview with a former rebel soldier.
56 An interview with a former rebel soldier.
57 Warlordism is a situation whereby there is an emergence of leaders and groups of militias that are accountable to nobody when the central government is weak (Prunier, 2010)
58 Interview with a Congolese Professor at a Durban university
59 Views of a Congolese human rights lawyer in Durban
Africa’s peacebuilding interventions can be argued to be resuscitating the effects of Rwanda and Uganda in the DRC’s conflict.

5.6 Aspired contributions of the of Participants to South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC
This sub-section explores aspired contribution(s) of Congolese refugees to South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC as narrated by participants. The section answers questions on what participants consider to be the proxy and immediate causes of war in the DRC and what their aspired contributions to South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC are. Asked on what participants considered to be the causes of war in the DRC, a number of reasons were given as shown in table 10 below

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause of war</th>
<th>No. of Participants</th>
<th>Participants contribution to SA PCB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communal deprivation</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Identify tribal barons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International actors and MNC</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Identify MNC’s and companies that funded rebels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrupt Weak DRC’s government institutions</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Identify corrupt individuals and institutions in DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty and inequality</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Elaborate how poverty recruited youth into rebel groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other factors</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Identify factors such as illiteracy and ignorance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to table 10 above, 15 participants argued that it was deprivation of some communities to participate in politics of the DRC\(^60\) that was the root cause of war in the DRC. This category of participants further argued that their aspired role within the South Africa’s peacebuilding could be to identify different forms of deprivations that some communities were subjected to in the DRC. This included deprivation of basic needs, security and political participation. There were 7 participants who argued that it was the actions of international

\(^60\) The fact or state of belonging to a social group that has a common national or cultural tradition (Lonsdale, 2014).
actors and MNCs that were precipitating war in the DRC. This group of participants added that their aspired role in South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions would be to name companies and MNCs that were financing and arming rebel groups for their own interests. 14 participants argued that it was the DRC’s weak and corrupt government institutions that were causing conflicts. According to the preceding group, South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention could benefit from their identification of corrupt elites and institutions in the DRC that were diverting money meant for development to fund conflicts. 18 participants argued that poverty and inequality were main causes of war in the DRC. According to the preceding participants, South Africa could reap from their views that poverty and inequality made many Congolese youths to join rebel groups. Still, they argued that violence was the only means of addressing inequalities and poverty in the DRC. Only 4 participants saw other factors like illiteracy and ignorance as the causes of war in the DRC. They argued that due to ignorance of their rights, many Congolese were unable to hold government accountable. Ignorance among Congolese was perpetuated by illiteracy. To the last category of participants, South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions could be beneficial if South Africa launched peacebuilding educational programmes that fought ignorance and illiteracy.

A number of inferences and plausible explanations can be made from the result of informants’ arguments on the causes of war in the DRC and their contribution to South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions. Firstly, it is possible that informants who saw ‘tribalism’ and ‘ethnicity’ as a cause of war could have lost some of their relatives and properties in a tribal conflict. As such, they linked tribalism with war. However, it may be conjectured that the 15 informants who saw tribalism as a cause of war in the DRC were affiliated to tribes from the eastern parts of the DRC that had been marginalized and secluded within the realpolitik of the DRC. Secondly, it can be argued that 18 informants who saw poverty and inequality as causes of war could be indigenes of the mineral-rich part of DRC; despite the eastern part of the DRC having been endowed with rich mineral, most of its population remains poor. The preceding argument can also be linked to the assertion of the first category of 15 informants who saw greed for ‘mineral money’ as a cause of war. According to one participant “if most Congolese could benefit from their rich minerals, then it is likely that no one will become a rebel due to greed or access to mineral money”61. Thirdly, “it is corruption and weak governance that has made specific individual and external

61 Interview with a Congolese businessman in Durban
to compete for rich minerals in the DRC while leaving the majority of the population poor.”

The foregoing reason is a plausible explanation for the second category of the 14 informants who saw the weak DRC’s government institutions and infrastructure as a cause of war in the country. Poverty and exclusion, tribalism and ethnicity, greed for mineral money and weak government can be plausible explanations of why 7 informants argued that some international actors - including peacekeepers and MNCs abetted the DRC war so as to maximize profit from illegal minerals.

It is pertinent to state here that the majority of participants originated from the areas that are plagued with resource-related conflicts. Therefore, it can be argued that most of informants provided information based on their personal experiences and understandings of the strong links between natural resources and conflicts in these areas as well as the involvement of government and foreign actors in conflicts and in the peacebuilding process.

5.9 Presuppositions on views of Congolese refugees

The foregoing sub-sections presupposes that Congolese refugees in Durban are aware of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. Having said that, an objective analysis of their views in relation to this study challenges a number of scholars’ assertion on the role of refugees in peacebuilding. From the foregoing data, it is worth stating here that recognizing the voice of Congolese (as transnational subalterns) allows one to see that there are levels of subaltern agency as a response to being forcibly uprooted, including having legitimate opinion/s on what is happening back home. It is due to bias and lack of gaining vital insights and perspectives from the subaltern Congolese in South Africa, that has made many scholars not to cast a more ‘grounded gaze’ on the motivations propelling South Africa’s peacebuilding efforts in the DRC’s conflict. Therefore, an exploration of views of Congolese refugees presented in this chapter reveals that while extant of scholarship on refugees and conflict transformation is extensive (as presented in literature review segment), it is also myopic, and short-sighted in not interrogating the attitudes of refugees towards peacebuilding interveners in the refugees’ home countries.

In ending this subsection, it is vital to mention that the preceding views of the Congolese refugees towards South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict have challenged a number of scholars’ assumption. The first assumption that has been challenged

62 Interview with a Congolese student in Durban
is the scholarly view that there is a homogeneous Congolese refugee community that is concerned with only seeking a humanitarian assistance from South Africa. As this chapter has revealed (preceding data), the Congolese refugee community in Durban is heterogeneous in all aspects including those who are concerned with seeing a better DRC (gender, age, education, marital status, political affiliation and their stand on the role of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC). Therefore, the explication of the views of Congolese refugees in this chapter has challenged some sections of scholarship for being one dimensional in their assumptions.

The preceding qualitative data has challenged the view Kadima (1993), Amisi(2004) and Rugunan and Smit (2014) that Congolese refugees are people who are only concerned with immediate concerns of supporting themselves like eking out their daily living. On the contrary according to Table 5.8, most Congolese refugee, street vendors, businesswo/men and intelligentsia, academia and activists among others are aware of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC. From table 5.8 it can be argued that most of the concerns of the informants was to see a better DRC and an all-encompassing South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention.

A third assumption that has been challenged through the exploration of the views of Congolese refugees towards South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC, is the argument that Congolese refugees have come to South Africa to earn a living and are a liability to the government. Scholars such as Chimni (2002) and Tonheim and Swart (2015) contend that most South Africans stereotype refugees as dependents and parasites. On the contrary, figure 7 reveals the high level of education and skill that Congolese refugees in Durban are endowed with. According to figure 7 Congolese refugees are highly qualified academically. However, due to their disadvantaged position in South Africa, most of them have been rendered jobless or employed in the informal sector.

5.10 Conclusion
In line with this study’s hypothesis, this chapter underscored the idea that South Africa’s interventions in the DRC may/not be edified on an assumption that peacebuilding is a means of addressing the high influx of Congolese refugees. In doing so, this chapter contends that there is a lot that Congolese refugees can contribute towards South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. Therefore, the chapter foregrounds the view that an in-depth
analysis and examination of different views, attitudes and perceptions of Congolese refugees residing in Durban towards South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC holds key as opposed to simplistic or reductionist explanations, and engenders a holistic understanding of how the national interests of South Africa can be realized through conflict transformation. The question that merits attention is: how can the analysis of the views of the Congolese refugees be used to inform South Africa’s foreign policy in its interest to end conflicts in Africa.
CHAPTER SIX
AN ANALYSIS OF THE VIEWS AND ATTITUDES OF THE CONGOLESE REFUGEES TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA’S PEACEBUILDING INTERVENTIONS IN THE DRC

6.1 Introduction
Gschwend and Schimmelfennig (2011) argue that whether qualitative or quantitative or mixed method, social science research becomes relevant when a balance between the apparent competing values of science (theory) and human relations (practice) is reached. Broomhall purports that the relevance of social research is subjective. Despite Broomhall’s assertion, it is imperative that a researcher takes into account both the social and the scientific relevance in any study (Laher, 2013:10). Therefore, theory and practice have to be intertwined so as to come up with an interpreting paradigm of a particular phenomenon (Gibson 1986:143).

In an attempt to apply theory into practice, this chapter contextualizes the apparent competing values of theory (what so far has been argued in chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4) and practice (the qualitative data presented in chapter five) - an analysis of the views and attitudes of the Congolese refugees towards South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. Firstly, while the theoretical chapters of this study aided in understanding scholarly arguments, the qualitative data segment probed the actual views of the Congolese refugees residing in Durban on the subject under investigation. As it was mentioned in chapter five, some of the scholarly arguments were challenged by the views and attitudes of the Congolese refugees towards South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC.

Secondly by linking theory and practice (in this chapter) this study explicates why scholarship in the context of Congolese refugees within South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC is extensive yet myopic in not including the actual voices of Congolese refugees in South Africa. Accordingly, the chapter argues that it is due to short-sightedness of scholarly works on not gaining vital insights and perspectives of attitudes and views of Congolese refugees in South Africa, that has limited from casting a more ‘grounded gaze’ on the motivations propelling South Africa’s peacebuilding efforts in the DRC.

Therefore, this chapter analyses the attitudes and the perceptions of the Congolese refugees towards South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC on one hand, and on the other hand, it explicates the capacity and the interests of South Africa’s peacebuilding mission in the DRC. By drawing on the experiences, insights and arguments of the empirical realities of
Congolese refugees residing in Durban, towards South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC, this chapter contributes new knowledge on peacebuilding in the DRC. Additionally, by drawing on the experiences, insights and arguments of the empirical realities of Congolese refugees residing in Durban, towards South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC, this chapter is helpful in probing some scholarly assumption on South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC: if it is to consolidate its position among the world’s powers or maintaining hegemony (as espoused within the tenets of realism) or for positive peace in the DRC (as espoused within the tenets of cosmopolitan conflict transformation). It is based on these analyses that the researcher fills in the dearth in literature on the role of refugees in exile and their contributions to peacebuilding interventions in their country of origin. As such, this chapter moves this study from being merely descriptive to a more dynamic one.

6.2 Arguments of the Congolese refugee on the causes of war in the DRC

As mentioned in the literature review, research on conflict transformation has narrowed much work on the efforts of peacebuilding by focusing largely on how to ‘use short, medium and long-term processes of either averting or rebuilding war-affected communities so as to reduce the likelihood of occurrence or recurrence of war and/or violence’ (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 199). Lambourne (2004) suggests that if one is to reach the desired goal of conflict transformation, focus should be on building and rebuilding the political, security, justice, social and economic fabric or institutions of a society in war or those emerging from conflict. Other peace scholars suggest that the root cause of conflict needs to be addressed by promoting social and economic justice as well as putting in place institutions of governance and rule of law, which will serve as a foundation for peacebuilding, reconciliation and development (Nkhulu 2005; Botes 2001: 43). Similarly, cosmopolitan conflict transformation theory argues that there is a need for an all-encompassing intervention strategy in warring/post-war countries so as to necessitate the actual transformation of attitudes of parties to the war. In this case, interveners should incorporate all parties to the conflict: conflicting parties, non-combatants, civilians, refugees and IDPs in peacebuilding by use of bottom-up and top-down strategies. However, according to realism, by choosing to intervene whether diplomatically or militarily in a conflict state, an intervener (whether a regional body, state or individual) does so in pursuit of its objectives and policies which may include foreign, economic and security interests.
In most of the preceding arguments, there is the perception (by scholars and interveners) of refugees from countries ravaged by war as powerless agents in contributing to building and rebuilding peace in their countries. In the context of this study a number of scholars have contributed to the knowledge of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC (Smith and Rugunanan, 2014; Gordon, 2014; Lakika et al, 2015; Tonheim and Swart, 2015). As such, the preceding scholars’ works depict how the DRC is still a gauging capacity for South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. Coupled with different labels and misconceptions that refugees in South Africa are associated with, South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC are still an important component of conflict transformation on the continent. However, there is a dearth on empirical studies that interrogate the attitudes, perceptions and views that Congolese refugees (residing in South Africa) have towards South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC.

This sub-section highlights and explicates the seemingly scholarly forgotten role of the Congolese refugees in South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC by focusing on the views, attitudes and arguments of the Congolese community residing in Durban (as expressed in chapter five). As such, this section foregrounds a new type of empirically based research that is needed in understanding South Africa’s role in conflict transformation in Africa.

6.2.1. Poverty and inequality as the causes of war in the DRC
As argued in chapter one, peacebuilding is a long term process whereby all parties to the conflict (armed and non-armed) have the independence to create an environment that will eradicate the root causes of violence. According to McAskie (2006: 18) lasting peace can be achieved when interveners become sensitive to the needs of locals and not for the sake of interveners’ interests. One way of being sensitive to the needs of the locals is to allow them to voice out what they consider to be the root cause of war within their society. In the case of this study, analysing the root causes of war in the DRC from the perspective of the Congolese refugees in South Africa (Durban), holds key to understanding the root causes of the DRC’s conflict. One challenge to peacebuilding has been the quest for interveners to address the antagonisms between top conflicting elites and militant groups’ leaders without addressing the root cause(s) of war - frustrated basic human rights and needs (Sandole, 2010:9). Therefore, South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions can harness a good starting point if
they pay attention to the views of the Congolese refugees on how they view poverty and inequality as the root causes of war in the DRC as shown in table 5.13 in chapter five.

According to table 5.13 the majority of Congolese refugees argued that poverty and inequalities are the key root causes of war in the DRC. Such arguments correlated with most literature on the DRC’s general economic situation. For instance, the April 2016 IMF statistics show that the DRC’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per person has shifted from 2,389.50 in 1980 to 489.796 in 2016. This DRC’s GDP is reported to have been worse between 2001 (121.345 USD) and 2005 (196.635usd). These were years close to the end of conflict (2003). According to the Global Finance Magazine (2015), the DRC was the poorest country in the world between 2009 and 2013. The DRC’s GDP between the preceding years placed it among 19 poorest countries situated in Africa. This reiterates Keen’s (2008: 757) view that political, social, cultural and economic inequalities among groups are important catalysts for violent conflict. According to Keen (2008:757), inequalities between groups - ethnicity, religion, age and gender that may lead into problems with poverty reduction in turn lead to violent conflict (Stewart, 2011:541). Similarly, the views of Congolese refugees that poverty and inequalities are the root causes of war in the DRC resonate with Walter’s (2003:371) assertion that conflicts are evident where ‘the first is a situation of individual hardship or severe dissatisfaction with one’s current situation (poverty due to inequality). The second is the absence of any nonviolent means for change’. These differences are not as a result of a difference in an inherent profitable quality but a form of a forced inequality between different groups living in the same society. In the context of the DRC, due to politics of reward, nepotism and seclusion, the elite from other parts of the country and foreigners have accumulated wealth for themselves in mineral-rich provinces at the expense of the indigenes of those regions. Most of the indigenes of mineral-rich provinces have no alternative non-violent means of advocating for change of their situations. As such, many of them resort to violence as their last option. This makes the DRC like in other conflict cases to vindicate many scholarly arguments that violent conflicts arise as a result of inequality and poverty.

To further vindicate the Congolese views that the root causes of conflict in the DRC are poverty and inequality is the situation in the eastern provinces of the country. Although rich in minerals, the eastern provinces of the DRC are not immune to poverty. In fact, the eastern parts of the country are considered the poorest provinces in the DRC. According to the
UNDP (2009), the eastern part of the DRC has the highest rate of poverty at 84.7%. According to the result of the 1-2-3 survey in 2005, the eastern part of the DRC had a 58.2% rate of unemployment. The eastern part of the DRC also has a weak education rate of 53.3% at primary level, only 14.8% and 2.5% of household have access to water and electricity respectively. There is poor healthcare system in the eastern parts of the DRC; a hospital of 16 beds serves about 100,000 habitants. Similarly, the ratio of a doctor to patient is 1: 24,699. 80% of the population do not have toilets (UNDP 2009). To cope with this situation, the UNDP’s (2011) statistics show that 9 out of 10 (90%) indigenes of the eastern parts work in the informal sector. This is contrary to the vast rich-minerals that the region is endowed with.

According to a key Congolese refugee informant, “at the expense of the poverty of the Congolese indigenes in mineral rich east, the government has allocated vast majority of the mining sector the elites and powerful civil servants from other parts of DRC, MNC and entered multilateral deals with other countries”\(^{63}\). Furthermore, a civil right activist argued that the elites from the east, “due to corruption have also colluded with the government in allocating the rich mining industry to the preceding groups who have pre-occupied themselves with creating wealth for themselves, at the expense of the poor locals”\(^{64}\). This assails the argument that although the eastern parts of the DRC is the economic hub of the DRC, its wealth is controlled by elites, MNCs and bilateral agreements with other states (Whetho, 2014). Since independence, most regimes in the DRC have used the eastern part of the DRC to reward their cronies, tribeswomen and men, MNCs and other countries while depriving citizens of basic needs such as such as security, food and shelter. The increasing poverty level and the indigenous Congolese has been identified by scholars as a root cause of establishment of rebel groups like the M23 (ISS, 2012). In one of his argument a former M23 soldier now residing in Durban argued that “due corruption and politics of reward, the government has allowed the mineral resources of the eastern DRC to be dominated by outsiders”\(^{65}\). Furthermore, the former M23 soldier argued that he decided to join the group as his best way of reclaiming and protecting his region against the government decision of allowing foreign based MNCs from stealing their mineral wealth.

Most of the arguments of informants assailed Edward Azar’s (1992) argument that protracted social conflicts are vibrant in most post-colonial African societies that have been dominated

\(^{63}\) An interview with a former rebel soldier in Durban.
\(^{64}\) An interview with a Congolese civil rights activist.
\(^{65}\) An interview with a former M23 Soldier in Durban
by a particular or a coalition of groups that are unresponsive to the needs of other groups. According to Azar (1992) in most post-colonial societies, conflicts arise due to some groups or parties demanding political access, autonomy, secession or control due to contemporary resentment against socio-cultural, economics and political constraints. As it was argued in chapter two, the DRC has an abundance of resources. However, due to exclusion and divisionary politics, many Congolese especially in the eastern part of the country are disappointed with their region’s exclusion in political power, access to development funds, under representation of their region/ethnic group in the government and administration and allocation of their land to other ethnic groups (of the ruling ethnic group). This has made the region an epicenter of war for decades. Different militia and rebel groups led by elites from mineral rich east (with the aid of rebels and national armies of Uganda, Rwanda and foreign actors) and the government scramble to control the extraction of minerals. The elites, individuals and rebels in the eastern part of the DRC see the accessibility to abundant mineral resources as equivalent to their sustainability and eradication of their poverty situation for their families\textsuperscript{66}.

A number of scholars have argued that most previous and current peacebuilding initiatives seek to end the DRC war at a superficial level (\textit{negative peace}). However, according to a Congolese scholar\textsuperscript{67} poverty and inequality which he describes as the edifice of all conditions that lead to violence in the DRC are still at large. According to the same scholar, this is still a reason why South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC may not address the conditions that underpin war in the DRC. “Since South Africa has favoured a liberal mechanism of addressing the DRC war, electioneering and protecting the legacy of President Joseph Kabila, poverty and inequality among the Congolese will be left as a lingering effect to peace by dividing and polarizing Congolese even further\textsuperscript{68}.” Many informants were of the view that external peace negotiators and policy makers in regards to the DRC war have not involved or considered the needs of locals in coming up with a constructive way of addressing poverty and inequality. As a result, their peacebuilding and recovery efforts have failed to avert violence in the country.

Another key informant argued that although poverty and inequality (despite mineral richness) can be seen as sufficient in understanding the root causes of DRC’s war, the situation has

\textsuperscript{66} Views from a Congolese rights activist residing in Durban.  
\textsuperscript{67} Views of a Congolese lecturer at a Durban University.  
\textsuperscript{68} A former Congolese military rebel.
been compounded by external factors (international actors) that have escalated the violence. The emergency of China and India as new economic powers within the international system has led to unfair competition for DRC’s minerals. Due to poverty, many Congolese have been easily “bought and bribed to become rebels so that they may protect the interests of Chinese and Indian mining companies. This does not exclude European and American MNC that have easily funded rebel actions for their own survival”\(^69\). Non-governmental organizations have been in the forefront in peace education in the DRC. However, for their survival and continuous existence, “NGOs have given handout to poverty stricken Congolese. As a result, they have failed to empower Congolese to be self-reliant”\(^70\). Other than alleviating Congolese from war and poverty, external actors (MNCs and NGOs) have promoted war economies. According to economics of war theorists, war is a profitable investment for MNCs and peacebuilding NGOs and industrialized and powerful states (Ostby, 2008: 143).

The proceeding arguments of informants assails Stewart’s (2011) argument that poverty and inequality coupled with actions of external actors are a mixture of factors that promote war in most post-colonial African states. The DRC is not an exception. For instance, Hoebeke (2010)\(^71\) argues that the first, second and third Congo wars were premised on ethnic disgruntlement due to politics of exclusion, division and reward. The exclusion of other ethnic groups by the ruling one has created a speculation that the ruling group is the sole beneficiary of the mineral wealth at the expense of their poverty. This has made the DRC war to eventually turn from ethnic animosity to resource curse. In the end, poverty and inequality (amid the abundance of natural resources) has resulted in negative economic and social politics in the DRC. This has become a recipe for incessant violence in the Congo (Auty, 2001:346)\(^72\). As one Congolese engineering graduate - now a street vendor in Durban - argued, “War in the DRC is sectorally done by some groups of Congolese (both elite and individuals) who are discontent with most of post-colonial regimes”\(^73\). Summed up well with a Congolese human rights activist, “the DRC war is as a result of ethnic, economic and political inequalities between different groups”\(^74\).

\(^{69}\) An interview with an upcoming Congolese economist
\(^{70}\) Interview with a Congolese rights activist in Durban
\(^{73}\) An interview with a Congolese electronics repairer.
\(^{74}\) An interview with a Congolese rights activist working with Basemjondolo in Durban.
6.2.2 Weak government institutions and corruption

Le Billon (2001) and Auty (2001) argue that the weakness of institutions within a state is more likely to fuel conflicts. According to Le Billon (2001: 562), states with weak institutions are more likely to have unending intra and inter-state conflicts while those with functioning strong institutions with good governance are less likely to go to war. When a state has poorly laid down institutions and structures, it triggers the formation of social classes in the society. It is the social classes formed that become an obstacle to development: weak institutions lead do different forms of injustices (political, social and economic). A number of informants justified the incessant DRC war as the only option for finding justice. According to Musa75 “the only way that the current international community and the Kabila regime can attend to deprivation of basic human needs to the Congolese civilian-especially those in the eastern parts of DRC, is through incessant violence”. For Musa, continuation of war in the DRC is the only means that will free most of the Congolese from the oppression that they have faced from all post-colonial regimes. Musa’s arguments resonate with Azar (1992) who claim that deprivation of basic human needs such as security, communal recognition and distributive justice due to weak government institutions is a major precondition for protracted social conflict: hence, conflicts are the only means whereby those who feel deprived can get access to their basic needs.

Underlying structures and institutions that deprive some group justice catalyze conflicts (Galtung, 2001). In the DRC, war due to natural resources is attributed to weak and poor government institutions that are easily manipulated by elites and external actors. This denies Congolese access to justice in their own country. While many efforts have been put in place to avert the DRC war, they have been left at negative peace-ceasefire and peace deals - without transforming weak institutions that continue to breed injustices that are root causes of war. This is a re-affirmation of Sandole (2010:9) who argues that ‘negative peace might be a necessary condition for positive peace …but falls short of transforming deep-rooted causes and conditions of conflict’. One informant argued that the efforts of international bodies to end war in the DRC always culminate in negotiating and addressing antagonisms between top conflicting parties. Apparently, “the efforts of the international community fail to address the unjust and weak DRC institutions and structures that frustrate basic human needs of a

75 An interview with a Congolese lecturer at a Durban university.
This being the case, one civil rights activist argued that war in the DRC is justified as the only means of facilitating creation of just structures, institutions and good governance in the country. A former M23 rebel soldier argued that the international community has been aware that there were no structures and institutions in the DRC that can hold those who violate the constitution. However, their efforts for peacebuilding in the DRC have promoted immunity for most elites. This being the case, war in the DRC continues to be abetted.

The incessant DRC war is attributed to poor institutions and weak governance. This is contrary to countries like United Arab Emirates (UAE) which like the DRC are rich in oil but have strong institutions that promote good governance and just distribution of resources to all (Fearon, 2004). The presence of good institutions and governance in UAE contradicts a famous scholarly argument that abundance of resources triggers conflict, the resource course narrative (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Stewart, 2011). In fact, the presence of good governance in oil rich UAE shows how abundance of diamond, oil, gold among others, should reduce the occurrence of conflicts if such resources benefit all (Le Billion, 2001). In the context of the DRC, Le Billion’s (2001) argument is inapplicable. It does not offer an explanation as to why the abundance of mineral resources in the DRC has promoted presence of weak and unjust institutions that do not promote good governance. On the contrary, abundance of resources in the DRC has promoted both internal and external strife in the country. One informant argued that “if the DRC government can set up industries and structures to process its mineral, it can create employment for majority of Congolese who are languishing in poverty due to unemployment.” The preceding argument shows that industrialization and infrastructure development has remained minimal. Although mineral resources in the DRC have occupied the centre of power in the Congolese realpolitik, most of the minerals are extracted as raw material and processed elsewhere in the world. This has continued to hamper industrial and infrastructure development. As it was argued earlier, the DRC has a poor transport network. Some parts of the country are not accessible. Since independence, all governments have made mineral resources the centre of power. Those who have felt left out by the government have promoted the occurrence of civil wars in two ways. Firstly, they have promoted or funded civil wars as a way of toppling the ruling regime so as

76 An interview with a Congolese business owner in Durban
77 Telephone interview with a former M23 rebel in Durban.
78 Interview with a former DRC government employee.
to get access to power. Secondly, the centre of power is located in Kinshasa. Due to poor transport network parts that have been neglected by the government despite being rich in minerals continue to experience war lordship: rebels have taken control of such regions (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).

Weak institutions, lack of good governance and poor infrastructure provide opportunities for unjust regimes, individuals and organizations to accumulate wealth corruptly. According to one informant, due to lack of institutions that hold those who committed crimes in the DRC accountable, both government and rebel leaders have used ordinary Congolese as instruments of their enrichment (Nazli and North, 1993). They have directly or indirectly supported the efforts of warlords. For instance, a former M23 soldier argued that the “installation of Mobutu Sseseko was an attempt by the international community to disregard weak DRC government institution. It was also a way of using poor leadership that the country is known for to strip off DRC its abundant natural resources”.

Institutions and governance have further been weakened by inter-governmental institutions like the International Criminal Court (ICC), African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN). For instance, in April 2004, the government of Joseph Kabila referred the DRC conflict to the ICC so as those who were suspected to have violated human rights to be investigated and prosecuted. According to Hanson (2008), the ICC responded to the DRC request and announced the opening of investigations in June 2004. Unfortunately, only rebels and militia group leaders were indicated by the ICC for committing crimes against humanity. The ICC did not call for prosecution of senior government officials who had been implicated for committing crimes against humanity. The ICC, AU and the UN argued that prosecution of government official was going to destabilize the DRC further (Clark (2007). Implicitly, the action of the ICC, AU and the UN inculcated a culture of impunity. In this sense, to be in government is the only way of escaping crimes. Clark (2008) and Xinhua (2009) argue that President Joseph Kabila and other senior government officials ought to have been held accountable for abuse of human rights in the DRC conflict. The non-indictment of Kabila and other senior government officials makes Clark (2008) and Xinhua (2009) to argue that to be in government is to be immune from the laws of the DRC.

Some of the views of participants of this study assail a number of scholarly arguments. According Pruner (2010), the DRC conflict like is characterized by accessing government
positions as immunity to any form of prosecution against any form of abuse of public office. For instance, a Congolese professor at a Durban university argued that “holding a public office or being a senior state official meant access to the DRC’s national “cake”79. Still, to be a senior government official, means lack of accountability. “This is the reason why many development plans in DRC cannot be sustained”80. Additionally, “instead of investing in physical, human, economic, political and social infrastructure, those who hold senior positions in the government use the weak judicial system and spent mineral revenues sumptuously without any form of accountability”81. Similarly, another civil rights activist argued, “the DRC government has spent a fortune of the mineral wealth buying military equipment instead of investing in infrastructure and strengthening institutions. This is the reason why the entire country has a poor road network that enables rebels to carry out their mission with easiness”82.

From the preceding arguments, most participants in focus group A, B, C and D concurred that the best peacebuilding intervention in the DRC needs to strengthen weak institutions, governance and infrastructure so as to improve service delivery in the DRC. There are a number of participants who argued that constructive peacebuilding interventions in the DRC needs to be directed towards addressing structural injustices that abet continuation of violence in the country. However, there were participants who also raised reservations with ongoing South African peacebuilding interventions. For example, an ex-rebel argued that South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions are modelled on liberal peace which focusses on the “use of military to stop belligerents from fighting. At the end of fighting, most interveners have failed to address the causes of war in the DRC”83. Most participants argued that South Africa needs to learn from the history of peacebuilding intervention in the DRC. As it was argued in chapter four, most peacebuilding efforts in the DRC have failed to address the issue of weak institutions and poor governance as both a proxy and immediate cause of conflicts in the DRC. For instance, one Congolese rights activists blamed South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions for weakening government institutions further. According to the preceding participant, weak institutions have failed to promote sustainable development84.

79 Interview with a Congolese professor at a Durban university
80 Interview with a Congolese professor
81 Interview with a Congolese lawyer
82 Congolese activist with BaseMjondolo in Durban.
83 Interview with a former M23 rebel.
84 Interview with a Congolese human rights activists
6.2.3 International actors and MNCs greed for ‘mineral money’
A number of scholars argue that since the end of World War II, there has been enormous expansion of MNCs in mineral rich African countries (Guenther, 2005; Richani, 2005; Kanagaretnam and Brown, 2006; Patey, 2006a). This is because many third world mineral rich countries offer generous tax incentives, low costs of factors of production and low labour costs that enable them to pay low wages: thus, they maximize profits in third world countries unlike in the developed ones. However, there is evidence that MNC’s activities continue to expand in conflict-prone African countries. For instance, Kanagaretnam and Brown (2006:2) argue that operation of MNCs in conflict-prone zone strategizes them to access cheap natural resources that enable them to maximize their commercial interests. “Recent history of several conflicts has shown that access to lucrative economic resources with the active participation of MNCs has played an important role in fomenting and sustaining conflicts” (Kanagaretnam and Brown, 2006: 1).

During this study, a number of informants argued that due to availability of strategic and rare minerals in the DRC, many MNCs and other international actors have participated in fueling the conflict. Although some informants argued that there are MNCs that have focused on initiating peacebuilding projects in the DRC, most of them argued that most MNCs were initiating and sustaining the DRC conflict in two ways. Firstly, most informants argued that due to weak institutions in the DRC, MNCs as powerful non-state actors wield enormous influence on the government. Due to corruption of most senior government officials, MNCs have taken advantage of state incapacity and political instability to easily buy out their resource-extraction and trading with the support of the government in conflict zones of the DRC. As a result, government-protected activities of the behaviours of the MNCs have elicited grievance from the local artisanal miners, militias, rebels and traders in the form of war. In the end, it has turned up to be a conflict between government forces - who are meant to protect MNCs - and rebels. In the end, the DRC government has lost out on the revenue for funding basic services and infrastructure. At the same time, this has abetted a cycle of poverty among locals who have in turn joined militia and rebel groups as the only means of protecting their wealth. The beneficiaries to the violence between government and rebel forces are MNCs; they have escaped to pay taxes due to ongoing war.

Secondly, a lecturer at a Durban University argued that some MNCs have directly funded some action of rebels. “Some MNCs use rebels as protectors of their mines in exchange for
money and arms. Still, another participant argued that the “support from rebel or government forces offered some “protection” for corporate investment and activities in conflict zones. Resource entrepreneurs typically rewarded armed protection with financial incentives, which provided warring parties with economic and military arsenal”. For example, during the focus group C discussions, a number of participants narrated how MNCs were accorded security by the army or rebel commanders with the latter obtaining personal favours in return. Some of the views of participants on the role of MNCs in earning the support of the rebel and the army are assailed by Luadati (2013). According to Luadati (2013), some MNCs assist rebels to procure arms, acquire uniform, to carryout international financial transactions and settling the wage bill of officers. Similarly, Vogel and Raeymaekers (2012) argue that there exists a “symbiotic relationship” between some corporate actors and rebels/some members of the national army. For Vogel and Raeymaekers (2012) the preceding relationship between some MNCs and rebels or army commanders suggests that there is some form of complicity of mining companies in the DRC’s conflicts.

During the focus group D discussions, a number of participants narrated that it is only in the eastern part of the DRC (mineral rich) that was experiencing war while most parts of the country were experiencing relative peace. During the preceding focus group discussions, many participants linked war in the mineral rich eastern part of the DRC with the presence of some MNCs. Additionally, some participants claimed that neighbouring countries like Rwanda and Uganda were funded by some MNCs to cause instability in the eastern DRC so that they can loot lucrative minerals with ease. Due to funding that they receive from MNCs, “Rwanda and Uganda have been used as breeding and training ground for some rebel groups. Such MNCs do not want to see an end in the DRC’s war”. From the view of the preceding participant, Geenen (2012) view’s that an end to war in DRC would mean an end to some MNCs mining business becomes understandable. For instance, as it was argued in chapter four, according to McKinley (1997: i.d.), less than two days after the AFDL captured Lubumbashi, executives of MNCs “were already flying into the city aboard private jets. They could be seen meeting at poolside and over meals with the rebels’ finance minister and the newly appointed Governor of the province” (McKinley, 1997:1.d). It is reported that the America Mineral Fields (AMF) was among the first MNCs to do business with the AFDL.

85 Interview with a Congolese lecture in Durban
86 Interview with a Congolese lawyer in Durban
87 Interview with a former Congolese army commander in Durban
rebel group. According to McKinley (1997), the AMF signed a contract worth US$885 million with Laurent Kabila—former leader of the AFDL in return for exclusive mining rights (at that time) to copper and zinc in the DRC (McKinley, 1997: i, d)

From the arguments in the foregoing paragraphs, it can be argued that the increasing global demand for rich minerals resources is increasing MNCs’ competition in the DRC. In order to satisfy the growing mineral demand, many MNCs have been found in a trap of collaborating with conflicting parties that are involved in the DRC’s conflict: this includes financing both the rebels and the government. In doing so, the collaboration between rebels and companies (which were viewed as “international actors”) somewhat legitimizes the rebel groups and undermines the national government, thereby exacerbating the crisis of legitimacy in the DRC. Therefore, from the views of participants, it can be argued that South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions need to pay attention to the economics of war and MNCs. According to Coulomb and Dunne, 2008:46) war and economics are one thing. This is because all actors, be they local or international, seek to protect their interest in a conflicting state. From some views of participants of there are claims of changing economic behaviour of MNCs. The changing social and economic behaviours of the MNCs in the DRC are prompting some instances of negative efforts towards state building and peacebuilding in the DRC. It can be argued that the views of participants on the role of MNCs in war present one of the most important opportunities for South Africa to promote peace and rule of law in the DRC. Still, the views of participants of this study, provide South Africa a different approach on the inventory of actors that are involved in the DRC’s conflict and in answering the research questions on whose interest should peacebuilding interventions serve.

6.2.4 ‘Politics of Communal deprivation and Identity in the DRC’

According to Mills (1997:89), tribalism, race and ethnicity are forms of identity injustices that are committed when a “superior” race, group or community stamps a contract with itself, allowing no input from other races, groups or communities. When understood through the views of Congolese refugees residing in Durban, Mills’ argument can help to clarify the role of communal deprivation in the DRC. The realpolitik of the DRC is characterized by a shifting (re)alignment of communities around a communal political elite or leader. In doing so, politics of identity—whereby particular groups of people/communities align and re-align in support of a particular leader—has justified the exclusion of other communities from participating in the DRC’s political process. “In the DRC, politics of rewarding specific
community leaders has justified the acts of President Kabila building patronage. In most cases President Kabila has appointed leaders from communities that support his political ideology. As a result, one Congolese rights activist added that, most of the aforementioned elites and individuals use their power to create wealth for themselves and their communities and not to objectively serve most of the Congolese. Leaders are powerful enough to interfere with the functioning of institutions that are meant to hold them accountable (as it was earlier discussed). When faced with criticism from other communities or civil society, most leaders may recruit members of their community to defend them. In most cases, they incite their supporters or communities to use violence as a tactic of keeping them in power. For such individuals, war is the only means of keeping retaining power. In the DRC, “war is politically expedient for the elites to foster ethnic and tribal disunity so as to ascend to power.” Poverty and inequality has provided a gap in which political elite bribe youth from their communities to cause violence in the DRC. In doing so, it has been taken as a given that communities that support or are affiliated to the president should produce senior government officials to hold key government institutions. “Communities that are “perceived” to be in opposition are subjected to unemployment or junior positions within key government institutions. This is what fuels violent revenge from the secluded tribes.

The views of Congolese refugees in this sub-section show how power held by presidential appointed tribal and community barons has been at the heart of the first, second and third Congo wars. For instance, in chapter one, it was argued that the first years of the DRC’s independence were awash with tribal wars; the main reason being that tribal leaders/rulers had more power than the central government (Nderitu, 2014). Still, most if not all, post-colonial presidents have been influential in buttressing tribal stratification in DRC so as to keep power and privilege. Similarly, the views that were expressed by most informants during this study proved that there still exist similar notions of power to construct tribalism in a way that privileges particular ethnic groups and tribes over others in the DRC. One informant argued, “It is due to awarding privileges to particular groups or communities over others, that is one of the key causes of war in the DRC.” Another informant argued that

88 Interview with a Congolese businessman in Durban
89 Interview with a rights activist.
90 Interview with a former M23 soldier.
91 Interview with a Congolese street vendor in Durban
92 Interview with a Congolese lawyer in Durban
93 Interview with a Congolese street barber in Durban.
94 Congolese scholar at a Durban university.
tribal exclusionary strategies of successive post-colonial government in addressing the poverty in DRC has led to marginalization and deprivation of the basic needs and rights of majority of the DRC’s population. According to the preceding informant, “since the dawn of independence in 1961, the presidency has continued with divisionary politics that were exercised by colonial masters: fostering tribal superiority and inferiority politics”\textsuperscript{95}. This is a similar practice that is practiced in most post-colonial African states. However, in the DRC “politics of exclusion have failed to adequately address the problem of poverty, land, security, unemployment and development”\textsuperscript{96}. As a cause of war in the DRC, divisionary politics have created inequalities that have bolstered the notions of inferiority among the tribes that are denied access to the political processes. Most communities that are marginalized and excluded from the political processes in the DRC have ganged together and developed an identity grievance to fight the domination of the tribes that are considered “superior”. During the focus group discussion, most participants expressed that communal deprivation grievance has been responsible for development of identity categorization that causes war in the DRC.

This explains why the eastern part of the DRC continues to experience war. In these parts, war is considered as the one means of some communities rooting out foreign tribes from dominating their rich mining industry. According to one Congolese scholar, “most communities from the eastern parts of the DRC are poor. This is despite the fact that their region is rich in minerals”\textsuperscript{97}. The presence of communities whom they consider as beneficiaries of the government in their region makes them see them as oppressors. In the long run, they justify “killing, evicting and destruction of oppressors who also act in self-defense. This causes incessant violent conflict”\textsuperscript{98}. In this case, “most communities from this region support the action of militia and rebel groups whom they consider as protectors of the regions’ riches”\textsuperscript{99}.

From the interviews and focus group, it became evident that poverty and inequality among Congolese communities - an obvious act exercised by consecutive post-colonial DRC regimes - are key triggers of the DRC’s conflict. Some informants accused peacebuilding interveners of paying no attention to the tribal aspect of Congolese politics. One Congolese scholar argues that “if interveners in the DRC’s conflict do not implement a strategy that

\textsuperscript{95} Views of a Congolese scholar at a Durban University.
\textsuperscript{96} Views of a Congolese rights activist.
\textsuperscript{97} Interview with a Congolese lecturer at a Durban university
\textsuperscript{98} Views of a Congolese street vendor in Durban
\textsuperscript{99} Interview with an ex-M23 soldier in Durban
addresses tribal inequalities in the DRC, there is no guarantee that their efforts will bear fruits.”\textsuperscript{100} According to the foregoing scholar, “understanding inequalities created by communal deprivation is one step close to understanding some of the triggers of the DRC’s conflict.”\textsuperscript{101} For instance, the recent acts of the DRC parliament to extend the forthcoming 2016 presidential election till 2017 has already started to raise both the pro and anti-Kabila sentiments among different communities in the DRC. This study notes that communal division among supporters and those who are opposed to the rule of president Kabila will exacerbate the already existing tension and divisions in the country. Those who are affiliated to the rivaling political parties have started to use ethnic and tribal cards to win the populace. Others are using the existing inequalities in the DRC to have a political mileage (Aljazeera, 2016).

The preceding sub-section has deliberated on how Congolese refugees view poverty and inequality, international actors and MNCs, weak government institutions and tribal and ethnicity as the three key triggers of the DRC’s conflict. From the views and insights of this study’s participants it can be deduced that the three triggers of war in the DRC are so intertwined: one leads and feeds into the other. For instance, by summoning the influence of inequality, communal deprivation and divisions, poverty, weak and discriminatory governance, from the refugees’ perspective, it is worth noting that the DRC’s conflict and realpolitik is vitally influenced by those in power, both locally and internationally. Following the interrogation of cosmopolitan conflict transformation theory, some of the views of the participants of this study on the causes of the DRC’s conflict point to loopholes in the ways past and current peacebuilding interventions are being carried out in the DRC. Some insights and views of the participants concur with Larmbourne’s argument that most interveners and peacebuilders do not go beyond the interest of elite conflicting groups in their analysis of an ongoing or previous conflict (Lambourne 2010:34). Through the tenets of cosmopolitan conflict transformation theory, most of the views of the Congolese refugees in this sub-section point to the fact that the root causes of the DRC’s conflict are more serious than the political cupidith that peacebuilding interveners pay attention to. As found in the literature review (chapter two), the views and the insights of the study’s participants bring the view that peacebuilding intervention has been narrowed to ideological misunderstanding of the top conflicting elites. In the context of the DRC’s conflict, the participants’ views indicate a need for South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention to pay attention to the acts political exclusion,

\textsuperscript{100} A Congolese lecturer in a Durban university.
\textsuperscript{101} An interview with Congolese lecturer in a Durban University.
ethnic inequality and other structural injustices created by extensive networks of patronage and nepotism.

From the views and insights of participants, this study makes an assumption that many strategies used by peacebuilding interventions pay less attention to root causes of war in the DRC. Based on the foregoing assumption, the study sought to find out the views of participants in regard to strategies that South Africa was using to build peace in the DRC. This is discussed vividly in the next sub-section.

6.3 Characteristics of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC

Peacebuilding is a long term procedure that takes place after conflict has stopped and marked by a cease fire or peace agreement (McAskie: 2006:18). Through the lenses of cosmopolitan conflict transformation, the most views of this study’s participants (as discussed in the previous sub-sections of this chapter) show that most interveners and peacebuilders in the DRC have been striving for a possible quick-fix and a band aid solution to a complex and deep-rooted conflict. There is a need to rethink on issues, approaches and theories that inform strategies that South Africa is using in its interventions in the DRC’s conflict. As an attempt to establish exactly how South Africa is building peace in the DRC, the study went further to find out how participants could contribute towards South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict: this was one of the research questions.

In chapter five, it was established that most informants were aware of the presence of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in their country. During interviews and focus group sessions, the researcher posed the question asking what strategies participants thought were the best in addressing the complexity of the DRC’s conflict. It became clear that most participants were dissatisfied with South Africa’s peacebuilding strategies in the DRC. According to the views of a Congolese professor, “South Africa was not doing enough in its peacebuilding role in the DRC. If indeed South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions were contributing to the DRC’s conflict transformation process, then it is likely that the performance of such roles was devoid of the input of those who bear the brunt of this unending war”\(^\text{102}\). Still, “there is a possibility that South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s war were somehow secretive”\(^\text{103}\), added another participant. In some instances, participants were sharply divided into two contrasting groups; pro-South African and anti-South African peacebuilding intervention camps. Another division was that some participants

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\(^{102}\) An Interview with a Congolese human rights lawyer.

\(^{103}\) An interview with a Congolese rights activist in Durban
were in support of the continuous contribution of SANDF in South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC while other were opposed it and therefore, expressed diametrically opposing views. The key lesson that the diametric and opposing views of the study’s participants provide is for the formulation of cross-informant understanding of what constitutes South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention and what does not. The cross-informants understanding of the peacebuilding by participants helped this study to obviate claims and counter-claims about the nature of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict.

During focus group A and B discussions, two key distinct narratives on the strategies that informants would prefer South Africa to use in the DRC emerged. There was a group of participants that were pro-military while another one was anti-military interventions. Participants who were pro-military intervention were in support of the ongoing contribution of the SANDF in the DRC. On contrary, participants who were against the use of any military interventions argued that if South Africa was to find a lasting solution to the DRC’s conflict, it has to use a political initiative: one that can address the lingering causes of war in the DRC and not to use the SANDF.

6.3.1 Pro-SANDF intervention in the DRC
According to Ogola (2012) intervention scholar Rosenau (1990) highlights two reasons as to why military intervention takes place: 1) when the intervening state set aside the existing relations with the target state and put all its efforts towards changing the political structure and authority of that target state. 2) Intervention may also take place when the intervening state seeks to preserve the existing political structure and authority of the target state. Most participants who supported the SANDF interventions in the DRC based their arguments on the level of armed threat that rebel and militia groups like the M23 pose to any peacebuilding interventions. One street barber argued, “dawa ya moto ni moto”\(^{104}\); translated to English means medicine for fire is fire. Put simply, the preceding Congolese street barber argued that “you cannot use diplomacy on someone who is ready to shoot you with a gun. You have to shoot in self-defense”\(^{105}\). According to another Congolese scholar in a Durban university - who sought to protect his identity - “SANDF intervention’ follows considerable developments of security instability as a result of the militia and rebel prone nature of the DRC crisis”\(^{106}\). He added that the “chronic volatile militia and rebel situation and DRC’s

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104 An interview with a Congolese street barber in Durban
105 An interview with a Congolese street barber in Durban
106 An Interview with a Congolese professor in a Durban university.
conflict was posing a direct impact on the already complex South African refugee and national socio-economic situation”\textsuperscript{107}. As argued in the background to this study (chapter one), South Africa is the leading host to most refugees and migrants from war-torn African countries. According to Tereva (2013), most of the refugees and immigrants continue to face threats of violence and hatred from South Africans. Smit and Rugunanan (2015) adds that the ongoing deprivation of basic human needs to some disadvantaged South Africans is as a result of the increasing numbers of refugees and migrants from warring African states: competition for basic needs such as security, food and shelter between refugees and South Africans has been identified to be playing a role in xenophobic violence. As this study is being completed, the newly elected mayor of Tshwane Mashaba has been reported in the media arguing that he is going to arrest all illegal immigrants and foreigners in the Metro (ENCA, 2016). From Mashaba’s claim, it can be argued that there is a high influx of migrants in South Africa from war-torn countries like Sudan, DRC and CAR.

Mashaba’s view on immigrants in Tshwane re-affirms the findings of Langa and Kiguwa’s (2016) study on the perception given to immigrants by a section of South Africa. According to Langa and Kiguwa (2016), there are some South Africans who see refugees and other migrants from warring African countries as an external threat to South Africa’s socio-economic development. To be secure from the preceding threat, pro-SANDF Congolese refugees argued that the South African government has an obligation to militarily intervene in the DRC to avert the increasing numbers of Congolese asylum seekers. A similar pro-SANDF strategy was held by a number of former DRC Defense Force members. According to a former colonel in the former Laurent Kabila regime, “if South Africa is to resolve its refugees and migrant crisis, it needs to extend its search for a solution beyond its national borders”\textsuperscript{108}. Furthermore, the colonel added that the 2013 SANDF intervention in DRC was undertaken on the basis that the M23 was a launching pad for military attacks on government forces which was going to cause a continuous influx of refugees in South Africa\textsuperscript{109}. From the views of the former colonel, it can be argued that the armed nature of the DRC’s conflict since 1991 has caused the influx of Congolese refugees in South Africa. From a realist perspective, the effect of spill overs from war-torn countries (problem of refugees) is among some of the national interests of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC and

\textsuperscript{107} An Interview with a Congolese professor in a Durban university.
\textsuperscript{108} An Interview with a former colonel in the Laurent Kabila regime now residing in Durban.
\textsuperscript{109} An Interview with a former colonel in the Laurent Kabila regime now residing in Durban.
other war-torn African states. From the views of the pro-military intervention category of participants, at this point of the study, it can be argued that although South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC has not incorporated the Congolese refugees, it has some level of their support.

Furthermore, according to South Africa’s Department of Trade and Industry (2016), the DRC is a huge investment destination and market for South African agriculture, construction, energy, ICT, transport and retail companies. Still, South Africa exports over 21% of its exports to the DRC. One civil rights activist argued that the effects of the DRC’s conflict was impacting negatively on South African companies in the DRC. At the same time, the armed nature of the conflict was dwindling the market for South African exports in the DRC. According the activist, SANDF actions in the DRC were premised on protecting South African interests. According to the views of one informant, the main aim of SANDF in DRC is to create conditions for economic growth and prosperity so that most of the Congolese can go back home.110 From the preceding participants’ view, it can be argued that for the sake of its economic interest, South Africa has no option but to use its advantaged position to bring an end to incessant conflicts in the DRC.

Other pro-SANDF informants argued that there was a need for South Africa to protect the refurbished infrastructure (road and air) in the DRC. According to a Congolese student in a Durban university, rebels and militia in the DRC destroy road networks and other infrastructure so as to easily carry out their mission: controlling the mineral rich eastern part of the country. South Africa being one of the country that was a signatory to the Addis Ababa Accord that brought some relative peace in the DRC after 2004, agreed to help train Congolese military, refurbish military infrastructure, and in planning and implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process.111 Although SANDF actions in the DRC have been criticized for being partisan (supporting government forces), South Africa’s military intervention is premised on the needs of the MUNUSCO; to facilitate conditions favourable for disarmament, integration, dialogue and peacebuilding. The preceding Congolese views are re-echoed by Pillay (2013) who asserts that the positioning of the DRC within the Great Lakes region as neighbour to Uganda, CAR and Rwanda is a “trigger” of the metaphorical African gun. According to Pillay (2013), if South Africa cannot militarily

110 An interview with a Congolese businessman.
111 An Interview with a Congolese student at a Durban university.
intervene, the DRC risks probably becoming a safe haven for a number of both local and neighbouring countries’ militant groups. For Pillay (2013) the DRC’s stability is a key success of the SANDF peace operations in neighbouring countries. Put simply, the coercive methods are meant to affect the modus operandi of the political, military and even economic as well as social structures of the DRC by South Africa (Belloff, 1968).

Furthermore, among the pro-SANDF informants, a number of Congolese identified three major peacebuilding initiatives that South Africa was involved in. One of them was financial support to the Congolese government. One informant argued that “if it was not South Africa, the DRC government had no enough resources to fund the 2012 general elections”\textsuperscript{112}. In funding the general election, another informant argued that South Africa was interested in seeing Congolese exercising their democratic rights by choosing leaders that they would want to lead them\textsuperscript{113}. The second peacebuilding initiative that Congolese refugees identified was the support for a local and national reconciliation forum. For instance, a Congolese professor at a Durban university argued, “although reconciliation processes has involved the top conflicting political elites and rebel leaders, South Africa has been interested in reconciling the opposing parties in the DRC’s conflict”\textsuperscript{114}. In seeking reconciliation, South Africa has been seeking to mend the severed relationship and willingness to accommodate differences without violence in the DRC’s conflict (Ramsbothams et al, 2011). This is because negotiations and destruction of structural injustices are the first steps which must be taken towards reconciliation as the former opens door for settlement and the latter is a foundation upon which ending peace process can be achieved (Mani, 2002).

The third step that the pro-SANDF category of participants identified was South Africa’s logistical support for MONUC/MONUSCO. A number of informants argued that despite the fact that the interests of South Africa were unknown to them, South Africa was the highest contributor of forces to the MUNUC/MUNUSCO. Although in support of South Africa’s contribution to MUNUC/MUNUSCO, a civil right activist argued that the country’s efforts can do better if it would provide financial support towards dialogue at community level so as to avert tribal and ethnic antagonisms that breed the DRC’s war\textsuperscript{115}. Similarly, another informant conceded that the presence of SANDF facilitated MUNUSCO’s interests of

\textsuperscript{112} Interview with a Congolese civil rights activist in Durban
\textsuperscript{113} Interview with a civil rights activist in Durban
\textsuperscript{114} Interview with a Congolese professor in Durban
\textsuperscript{115} Interview with a Congolese civil rights activist in Durban
rehabilitating the DRC’s public infrastructure. The UN and other actors rely on this infrastructure. “Although SANDF actions in the DRC have not been “angelic”, their presence in the DRC has become an edifice for peace”\textsuperscript{116}. For instance, the large contingent of SANDF in the MUNUSCO was helping in the rehabilitation of and reintegration of ex-combatants as a post-conflict trajectory in areas that had been ridden with conflicts. According to Nabudere (2014), in the DRC, ex-combatants constitute a group that, if not managed properly, could easily orchestrate the recurrence of conflict. “By seeking to rehabilitate and reintegrate ex-combatants, the presence of SANDF was becoming instrumental in nurturing peace in the DRC”\textsuperscript{117}. From the views of the preceding participants, it can be argued that South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC were becoming more significant and important.

\textbf{6. 3.2. Anti-SANDF intervention in the DRC}

The informants who were anti-SANDF intervention argued that South Africa should prioritize a political route in finding a solution to the DRC’s crisis. Most of the informants in this category opined that despite the presence of SANDF, conflict continued to be unending and South Africa is still facing a need to grapple with the effects of the influx of Congolese refugees. A civil rights activist argued that the current actions of SANDF were exacerbating the armed retaliation and guerrilla tactics of the rebels and militant groups in the DRC. She argued, “the 2014 SANDF target of the M23 mutated the group into a guerilla one; it started to target unarmed locals, rape women, destroy crops as a way of striking a balance to the action of South African forces”\textsuperscript{118}. The foregoing activist’s assertion can be equated to Ramsbothams, Woodhouse and Curle’s (2011) view that the September 11, 2001 terror attack was a way of the Al Qaida striking balance between the fundamental Jihadist and the United States of America (U.S.A).

Instead of committing troops in the DRC, one Congolese lawyer\textsuperscript{119} argued the South African government must primarily take a diplomatic route in addressing the country’s conflict. The aforementioned Congolese lawyer criticized South Africa for seeking to use SANDF to boost South Africa’s widely reported but publicly undeclared hegemony and dominance in establishing its business interests in the DRC\textsuperscript{120}. The lawyer cited the report by International Crisis Group (2015) that in 2014 the SANDF were being used selectively to protect mining

\textsuperscript{116} Interview with a Congolese student at a Durban university.
\textsuperscript{117} Interview with a Congolese human rights lawyer in Durban.
\textsuperscript{118} An Interview with a Congolese rights activist in Durban.
\textsuperscript{119} An Interview with a Congolese human rights lawyer during the World Social Forum in September 2015.

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areas that had been earmarked for South African elites by the regime of Joseph Kabila. Thus the attack on M23 was a reward to Kabila for signing a number of business deals with South Africa and not to protecting the interests of the Congolese. This view was amplified by the South African government when it sought to arrest anti-Kabila activists in Limpopo accusing them of wanting to topple the current DRC regime (ENCA News, 2015). According to views of some informants during focus group sessions, SANDF intervention in DRC risks discriminating and alienating pro-Kabila from anti-Kabila supporters: as a result, it may fuel more ethnic tensions in the DRC.

Some of the views of the anti-SANDF Congolese refugees in Durban are well highlighted by Davies’ (2013) criticism of the presence of SANDF in DRC as a shadowy business deal of protecting business interests of ANC personalities and the now-regime of President Kabila. According to Davies (2013), there is no distinction between the SANDF duties in peacekeeping and the narrower interests of the ANC elites in the DRC. The leadership of the SANDF has been overtly politicized to protect private businesses in war-torn Congo. Davies’ (2013) views are further assailed by more anti-SANDF Congolese scholars who argued that by deploying SANDF in the DRC, South Africa was failing to learn from the Congolese history of conflicts. According to one scholar, most previous peacebuilding intervention efforts have failed because most interveners failed to understand the realpolitik of the DRC before committing their troops in the country. As argued earlier, conflict in the DRC has a foundation in colonialism, tribalism, ethnicity and questions of land, among others.

According to the views of Congolese refugees, the preceding factors are still the causes of war in the DRC. One of the causes of conflicts in the DRC is weak governance and corruption. A professor at another Durban university argued that due to divisive politics, tribalism and corruption, most post-colonial regimes have been unwilling to provide the essential human needs like adequate food, clean water, health care, and education. As a result, rebels and militant groups have taken control of some regions of the country so as to protect the collective and communal interests of such regions. This made the preceding professor to argue that for the interest of the Congolese, South Africa should learn from history and use a political route in addressing the conflict\(^{121}\). There are several current events that threaten to raze the DRC that South Africa needs to consider. One such event is the selected run-away

\(^{120}\) An Interview with a Congolese human rights lawyer during the World Social Forum in September 2015

\(^{121}\) An Interview with a Congolese professor in a Durban university.
massacre and rape that have targeted supporters of the opposition parties (BBC, 2016). This is threatening political tolerance that the DRC is struggling to build. Still, the current campaign and the agitation for referendum to increase the term of president Kabila is another cause of foreseeable political turmoil in the DRC. Due to the politics of ethnic benefit, communities that are affiliated to Kabila are pro extension of Kabila’s term while those that are affiliated to the opposition do not want any extension of the presidential two term limit.

Some of the views of anti-SANDF Congolese informants during the study desired constructive peacebuilding in the DRC. According Lambourne (2004), the desired goal of peacebuilding is to build and rebuild political, security, justice, social and economic fabric or institutions of a society in war. One way of doing this is to address the root cause of conflict. In the case of the DRC, one informant argued that, South Africa cannot use SANDF to promote socio-economic justice and institutions of governance and rule of law. From a realist perspective, by contributing the highest number of SANDF within the MUNUSCO, South Africa is showing an exercise of military power in Africa. In this context, some views of Congolese refugees in Durban are affirming that SANDF actions in the DRC are affirming the realist notion that military intervention is used to realize and achieve the national goals and the interests of the intervener and not those of the target state (Dougherty, Robert and Pfaltzgraff, 2000: 84).

By being anti-SANDF, most informants in this category termed South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions as insignificant. For instance, a business owner in Durban argued that “even if South Africa forces remained in the DRC to “eternity”, conflicts will continue to emerge unless a political route that recognizes the politically excluded ethnic groups, fights corruption and all structural injustices”. The argument here was the juxtaposition on what SANDF could offer with what the root causes of the DRC’s conflict were. Furthermore, another civil society activist argued that the activities of SANDF such as supporting the government in training DRC’s army who later thwarted Joseph Kabila’s dissidents were weakening peacebuilding processes.

In other words, the anti-SANDF informants argued that the use of military intervention in the historicity of the DRC’s conflict has rarely produced positive or transformative peace in the

122 An Interview with a Congolese human rights lawyer during WSSF in Durban 2015.
123 An interview with IT businessman in the Durban.
124 An interview with a Congolese civil society activist.
country. Rather than bringing positive peace in the DRC, it has straddled negative and status quo ante. External military intervention in the DRC has facilitated both peace and war at the same time. To sum up, another Congolese anti-SANDF informant argued, “Just like other military interventions have failed to bring peace, the SANDF as a South African peacebuilding strategy will hardly facilitate peace process but will continue to support peace process as well as weapons to the rebels or government”\(^{125}\).

From the preceding informants’ presuppositions (both pro and ant-SANDF), there is a need of an objective analysis of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. One clear critique is that South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention may become culpable in the DRC’s conflict just as other foreign military interventions have historically performed.

6.4 Conclusion
This chapter presented the analysis of the views of the Congolese refugees on South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. It was a further exploration of views of Congolese refugees that were presented in chapter five providing insights into the broader contextual perspectives of the study participants. This was against the backdrop of the main trends in peacebuilding intervention strategy and behaviours in conflict zones.

The chapter begun by presenting the root causes of war in the DRC from the perspective of the participants. During the course of this study, participants had identified poverty and inequality, weak government institutions and corruption, international actors and MNC’s greed for money and tribalism, nepotism and ethnicity as key triggers of the DRC’s war.

The chapter presented the characteristics, strategies and behaviours of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. Although there were a number of intervention behaviours, participants identified SANDF as a key strategy that South Africa was using in its interventions in the DRC’s war. South Africa’s interventions strategy elicited two opposing narratives among participants: those who were pro and ant-SANDF intervention in the DRC. The section discussed the rationale behind participants’ opposing view on the use of SANDF in the DRC.

\(^{125}\) Interview with a former M23 soldier in Durban

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The section also made some logical deductions on South Africa’s use of SANDF in transforming the DRC’s conflict. In doing so, the chapter has set a scene for the rationale and interest of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in addressing the root causes of the DRC’s conflict. Therefore, South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC’s conflict needs to be analysed within the tenets of cosmopolitan conflict transformation and realism. What, then, do the study’s findings suggest? The next chapter addresses this question.
CHAPTER SEVEN
LOCATING SOUTH AFRICA’S PEACEBUILDING INTERVENTIONS IN THE DRC WITHIN THE TENETS OF COSMOPOLITAN CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION AND REALISM

7.1 Introduction
Perusing through the review and comparison of literature in chapter two, theoretical and paradigmatic perspectives in chapter three and survey findings presented in chapter five and six, this study emphasizes the point that South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict require more than the use of SANDF and funding electioneering processes among other infrastructural projects. According to the tenets of CCTR, it can be argued that by not incorporating Congolese refugees (who were able to identify the root causes of conflict in the DRC), South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions fail to see refugees as party to the DRC’s conflict - as people who understand the dynamics of the conflict. Deliberating on why lack of inclusion of Congolese refugees within the South Africa’s interventions in the DRC poses threats to peacebuilding efforts in the DRC, this chapter analyses the rationale and interest of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions within the tenets of CCTR and realism from what the study’s findings suggest. According to this study’s findings, it emerged that a number of variables were responsible for precipitating the DRC’s conflict. While the so-called ‘ethnic or tribal’ factor plays a minimal role, other factors such as nepotism and corruption are said to have a strong bearing on the nature of the DRC; poverty and inequality, presence of natural resources (their social construction, geographic distribution, and revenue management system), the role of local, regional and global actors, and state deflation (including its associated variables for example weak state institutions, patronage and corruption) determine the success/failure of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in that country. Writing in the context of South Africa’s intervention in the DRC and Burundi, Hendricks (2015:27), states, “South Africa's engagement in conflict management has shown that in theory its approach is located within the human security paradigm and that this does filter into the peace agreements it brokers. In practice the implementation has been centred on warlord pacts and state-building, largely ignoring local level concerns, conflicts and Track Two and Three peacemakers and peacebuilders”. Therefore, this reality underscores a rethink of the South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC in particular, and the peacebuilding interventions thesis in general.
This chapter analyses South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC within the tenets of realism and CCTR. It reiterates the data presented in chapter five and its broader analysis in chapter six.

7.2 The role of peacebuilding interveners/interventions

As this study shows, a number of factors attract peacebuilding interventions in a conflict state like the DRC. According to the CCTR paradigm, ending war and transforming the conflict by bringing positive peace should be the bottom line of any peacebuilding intervention, be it local or external. However, although the need for restoring peace may be the intention of any peacebuilding interventions, the tenets of realism see factors such as satisfying the interest of the intervener - be they economic, social or political - over those of the locals as some key drivers of most interveners’ actions in a conflict. Historically, peacebuilding interventions in the DRC show that external interveners have been entangled in the country in the following ways: Firstly, some interveners with the support of local rebels and opposition launched their offensive powers in overthrowing the ruling regime. For instance, during the 1996 Congo war Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Angola backing Laurent Kabila launched an offensive overthrowing the then President of the DRC, Mobutu Sese Seko (Turner and Ngoy, 2007). Secondly, some interveners have used the DRC conflict as an exercise of their mediatory or diplomatic powers. For instance, during the first Congo war South Africa represented facilitated a first meeting between rebels and president Mobutu in Cape Town on 20\textsuperscript{th} February 1997. However, the initiative failed because South was faulted for being considerate of the two key conflicting parties - that is the Kabila and Mobutu forces - but failed to include the non-violent opposition, who were unarmed opposition as opposed to the rebels. Thirdly, depending with the ruling regime and the political economy, some interveners have decided to take up peacebuilding intervention in the DRC so as to benefit from the trade deals and agreements that come with such efforts. One interviewee argued that since 2012, the Zuma regime has been in the forefront supporting President Joseph Kabila’s government in the DRC because of the lucrative trade deals that South Africa is benefitting from in the process\textsuperscript{126}. The preceding views can be contradicted with the exit of South Africa from the DRC conflict in 2006 when the regime of Kabila decided to do business with China. As it was argued in chapter two, in 2006 South Africa’s hopes of benefitting from its participation in peacebuilding in the DRC were thwarted when “instead of doing business with South Africa, who had helped him to find peace, Kabila turned to China” (Tonheim and Swat, 153).

\textsuperscript{126} Interview with a Congolese Scholar at a Durban University.
2015:3). This made South Africa to withdraw from the DRC conflict. In 2009, South Africa contributed towards funding for the 2012 DRC’s general election and re-entered the peacebuilding scene. Since then, a number of bilateral deals between South Africa and the DRC have been signed: The Lake Albert Oil Blocks 1 and 2 (Moneyweb, 2010), the Inga dam project (African Business, 2012). Also, South Africa has maintained its cordial relationship with President Joseph Kabila at the expense of deteriorating its relationship with Rwanda which was once a key ally (Daily Maverick, 2011).

From this perspective, the role of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC - as findings suggest - is a significant factor in the escalation, prolongation and duration of the DRC’s conflict(s). For instance, historically, South Africa has been inconsistent in choosing whether to exit or remain relevant in the peacebuilding processes of the DRC. It is evident both in theory and practice - as shown in the findings - in situation where South Africa predicted some sort of trade deals, it chose to remain within the arena of peacebuilding interventions by responding to the ebbs and flows of the conflict through its deployment of the SANDF and funding of electioneering processes. On the contrary, in situation where South Africa lacked trading benefits from its peacebuilding intervention in the DRC, it chose to exit the conflict arena.

As this study argues, from a realist point of view, the level and the intensity of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC is dependent, not on the what conflict transformation entails - according to CCTR - but on a number of economic and political variables, including the number of bilateral deals that the former will benefit from its peacebuilding undertakings. From some of the views of the Congolese refugees in Durban, there exists a relationship between South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC and economic benefits that the latter offers the former. For instance, since 2009, South Africa has provided the regime of Joseph Kabila with SANDF, infrastructural resources and logistical support. In turn, Joseph Kabila has enabled unrestricted trading expansion of South African companies in the DRC. As such, South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC have typified the commercialization and economics of peacebuilding that does not burgeon the tenets of CCTR. In this case, South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC highlights the realist complicity in conflicts.
Despite search for economic and political interests in its peacebuilding interventions in the DRC, South Africa's contribution has facilitated a minimal peace environment that has enabled the DRC and other interveners to implement conflict sensitive programmes: programmes that can prevent or alleviate factors that continuously precipitate or exacerbate conflicts. By seeking a conducive environment for its companies to operate in the DRC, South Africa has contributed to the reduction of the magnitude of the DRC’s conflict. This has enabled programmes that support dialogue, disarmament and infrastructure development to be carried out in conflict-prone parts of the DRC. Although realist in their orientation, as the study depicts, the preceding programmes are consistent with the tenets of the CCTR.

In unpacking the role of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in Africa, the study emphasises its contradictory behaviour in the DRC’s conflict. South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions have overlooked the role of Congolese in re-building peace in a war-torn country. According to Schirch (2008:8), overlooking or underestimating any stakeholder in any peacebuilding initiatives is contrary to the objective of CCTR. Galtung (1996:112) says that peacebuilding should be an attempt of overcoming contradictions that lie at the root cause of conflicts. In the DRC’s case, research findings suggest that lack of inclusion of Congolese refugees residing in South Africa - who understand the root causes of the conflict - underpin the specifics of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. The fact that most of the DRC’s peace accords have failed before or within the first two years of their implementation highlights that there is need for any South African peacebuilding intervention to address the root causes of conflict in order to prevent its recurrence (Cannolly, 2012). Overall, the dialectics of its realist behaviour in the DRC’s conflict underscore a nuanced analysis and understanding of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention on the continent.

### 7.3. Peacebuilding intervention in mineral rich yet divided and poor society

According to the historical overview of peacebuilding interventions, different regimes with the help of external interveners have used different strategies to stamp their control over the DRC’s rich minerals from 1996 to date. Hence, the views of Congolese refugees support the notion that despite the abundance of rich natural resources, poverty, ethnicity, tribalism, nepotism, corruption and weak governance fuel the DRC’s conflict. While recognizing the existing methodologies and practices that South Africa has used in its peacebuilding interventions, one interviewee argued that there is a need for implementing sustainable
development programmes if the DRC’s conflict is to be averted. What is logical from the preceding view is the significance of South Africa as a “realist-seeking” peacebuilding intervener in the DRC’s conflict. One criticism of contemporary liberal peacebuilding interventions has been its exclusive focus on the top warring armed parties while excluding unarmed and non-state actors like refugees among others (Galtung, 2001; Knight, 2010; Ledarach, 1993; Fisher, 1997). According to Reychler & Colorado (2001), during peacebuilding processes most efforts involved the armed groups, political actors and civil society. The exclusion of non-state and unarmed actors such as refugees, women and children who bear the brunt of conflict may have unnoticed but decisive influence on ongoing or future conflict. In regard to the DRC’s conflict, the role of South Africa in recognizing non-state and unarmed actors could have a decisive and positive impact on the country’s peacebuilding process. So far, the realist perspective has been used to examine how South Africa can draw from the views of Congolese refugees so as to promote its economic, security and hegemonic interest. In doing so, South Africa could potentially reposition itself among global powerhouses in terms of addressing conflicts.

Given the role that poverty, ‘ethnicity’, ‘tribalism’, inequality, nepotism, corruption and weak governance play in abetting the DRC’s conflict, there is a necessity that South Africa incorporates Congolese refugees and their views and insights (residing in South Africa) in its peacebuilding interventions in the country. Drawing from the views of Congolese refugees in Durban, this study argues that although South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions display the tenets of realism, implementing strategies that can address poverty, tribalism, inequality, ethnicity, nepotism, corruption and weak government-structural violence - holds key towards attainment of positive peace in the DRC, this is what CCTR seeks to achieve.

From CCTR perspective, the views of the Congolese refugees in Durban see the efforts of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC to be concentrating on safeguarding its economic interests - deploying SANDF and signing of bilateral trade deals - other than eradicating structural violence - poverty, tribalism, inequality, ethnicity, nepotism, corruption and weak governance. When the preceding root causes of war are addressed (the wellbeing of all Congolese), they could reduce resource-related conflicts in the DRC. According to Schwarz (2005), when the structural injustices, security and people’s welfare are observed during peacebuilding interventions, there is no fear of citizens to involve themselves in any

127 An interview with a Congolese professor in a Durban University
political participation. As a result of freedom of participating in the political process, it will bring unity and peace amongst conflict ethnic communities in the DRC. By incorporating the articulated views of the Congolese refugees - as shown in the research findings - South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions will be able to identify mechanisms through which excluded Congolese locals can be engaged in resolving their country’s conflict. It is the focus of the CCTR that all concerned parties should accommodate each other in advocating for prevention, proactivity, human needs, and eradication of oppression and inequality in our societies (Lederach, 1995: a&b). It is tenable to suggest that by excluding the views of the Congolese refugees in its peacebuilding process, the motive of the South African government without any intention of oversimplification can be said to be spurred by South Africa’s economic and other interests and not those of the Congolese. One can draw from Hendricks’s (2015:11) view that countries in which South Africa has intervened sill remain “fragile and/or have relapsed into conflict”. This notwithstanding, Hendricks further emphasizes that South Africa still remains an important interlocutor. The failure of the South African government to bring about peace and the fact that it is a key regional and continental player should necessarily lead the country to explore other means – which could be the inclusion of refugees – in its bid to seek lasting peace. The negative effects of communal deprivation, poverty, inequality, nepotism, corruption and weak governance in the DRC and the deployment of SANDF as peacebuilding strategy by South Africa in resource-related DRC conflict could be considered as culminating into support of existing structural injustices that continue to sustain the perpetuation of the DRC’s conflict. Similarly, by not incorporating refugees, it could be argued that South Africa is failing to promote a collective initiative of peacebuilding intervention according to the tenets of CCTR.

This study argues that the quest for an abrupt end to violence in the DRC by South Africa may show a commitment in peacebuilding (Cannolly 2012). However, an abrupt end to violence may not be considerate to the complex reality of what structural injustices like poverty, ethnicity, tribalism, nepotism, inequality, corruption and weak governance play in precipitating the DRC’s resource-related disharmony. At this point, it can be argued that the non-inclusion of Congolese refugees within South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC does not sufficiently challenge the culture of structural injustices and violence that characterize the nature of the DRC - a country that is still suffering from inequality in distribution of national resources and politics of reward and seclusion. Therefore, this study sees the incorporation of Congolese refugees within South Africa’s peacebuilding
intervention as one of the variegated options for addressing the root causes of war in the DRC.

7.4. The character of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention and the nature of the DRC state

Peacebuilding in conflict-prone states relies on international actors as the providers of material support that facilitates a favourable environment for inclusive peace processes (DFID, 2010). Having said that, it is upon the political will of peacebuilding interveners to ensure that conditions are made favourable for addressing the root causes of war. There are three narratives that characterize South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC. Firstly, South Africa is intervening in DRC while at the same time hosting a large number of Congolese refugees. Secondly, South Africa’s interventions, as argued earlier, are in support of president Kabila and anti-Kabila dissidents. For instance, in chapter one, SANDF was blamed for training a Congolese battalion that was meant to thwart the 2012 post-election protesters in Kinshasa. Thirdly, South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC have facilitated the continuous signing of bilateral trade between Zuma and Kabila. The preceding contexts of South Africa raise a series of questions on the nature and the character of the country’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC. The views of scholars such as Santoro (1998), Hartley (1998), Liebenberg et al (1997), Cilliers (2013) and Oppenheimer and Nick (2014) that South Africa is using its peacebuilding intervention capability to expand its hegemony are re-affirmed in the preceding contexts, nature and character of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC.

Furthermore, the DRC, like many African states, is a product of European colonization. Colonialism is the occupation and control of a nation over another country, occupying it with settlers and exploiting it economically and politically (Thomas, 1994). It is the “conquest and control of territory and resources that belong to others” (Horvath, 1972: 49). Fanon (1961) argues that colonialism rarely exploits a country in its entirety. However, colonialism sharply focuses on natural resources that are extracted and exported to ensure that the necessities of the mother countries’ industries are fulfilled. This causes certain sectors within the colony to possess wealth, while the remainder of the colony follows a steep path of under-development (Fanon, 1961). According to Englebert (1997: 767), although independent, many African states “descends from arbitrary colonial administrative units designed as instruments of domination, oppression and exploitation”. Many states in Africa are “human community that
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Englebert, 1997: 767). The DRC is not immune to the foregoing assertion. Like most other African states, the DRC is a dubious community of heterogeneous and occasionally clashing linguistic, religious and ethnic identities. Like other African states, the attainment of independence in the DRC “did not fundamentally transform the structure of the African states. The political class that supplanted the colonial officers were committed to the protection of the ‘colonial legacy” (Olayode, 2005: 4). The DRC is a state that has retained its forceful and authoritarian colonial character and nature - serving the interest of the local elite. As argued in chapter six, most post-colonial regimes in the DRC have been synonymous with dysfunctionality and weakness. Due to politics of patronage, the history of the DRC has necessitated misappropriation of the country’s wealth by the ruling elite. The dysfunctionality, corruption, weak, ethnical, tribal and nepotism nature and other negative factors that have deprived the Congolese of the benefit of natural resources and basic human needs. Clearly then, as presently constituted, the Congolese state is severely handicapped in serving the needs of all despite its rich minerals. To-date, as participants of this study have narrated, it can be argued that most Congolese citizens have seen violence as the only possible means to upset this unjust status quo. According to Frantz Fanon (1967:27), to liberate a system that was put in place violently, violence is not only a justified but a necessary means. While this is but a basic or overly simplified understanding of Fanon’s position, the essential argument here is that resort to violence should be viewed as a necessary political tool for liberation from any form of oppression. In the DRC’s context, as argued in chapter six, the rise of most violent rebel and militant groups has been attributed to a desire for seeking liberation to inequalities, poverty, seclusion and corruption within the country.

Within the tenets of CCTR, the presence of SANDF represents an oppressive and violent way of addressing the root causes of war in the DRC. Contrary to the tenets of the CCTR, a simpler version of the presence of SANDF as South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC would look like this. 1: the causes of war in the DRC are violent rebel groups and not structural injustices (poverty, inequality, tribalism, ethnicity, nepotism, corruption and external actors; as identified in chapter six). 2: In order for South Africa to bring peace in the DRC, it has to use violent means - the use of the SANDF. Hence, South Africa’s intervention in the DRC is using SANDF - a violent strategy - as a necessary and justified means of peacebuilding. By not incorporating Congolese refugees within its intervention strategy in the
DRC, South Africa is in total disavowal of the tenets of CCTR which is an intervention perspective that seeks to necessitate transforming attitudes and relationship by incorporating all parties to the conflict (conflicting parties, non-combatants, civilian, refugees and IDPs by use of bottom-up and top-down strategies). By signing bilateral trade and supporting the Joseph Kabila regime while carrying out a peacebuilding intervention in the DRC, South Africa is in pursuit of its interests, objectives and policies which may include foreign, economic and security interests in tandem with the tenets of realism. The preceding is suggestive of the idea that the current trajectory of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention is upholding the current DRC’s status quo. The underlying assumption is that the support of the current regime would be a way of bringing about peace in a warring state like the DRC. However, the nature of the DRC state as argued in chapter four and six denies many Congolese their human personhood. The DRC is a state that has historically condoned inequality and poverty of masses at the expense of the few ruling elites. In its current support of the current DRC regime, South Africa is only giving more power to the rebels, militant and other disgruntled groups to further their violent means of seeking redress to a complex and multifaceted nature of the DRC’s conflict. Like other liberal peacebuilding interveners South Africa is vehemently “rubberstamping” reformation and opposing transformation; the former only serves as an affirmation and acceptance of the dehumanizing oppressive situation, whilst the latter changes an oppressive system from bottom up.

7.5. The political economy of the DRC’s Conflict
Arnson and Zartman (2005) and Hynes (2013) argue that war and economics is one thing. According to Arnson and Zartman (2005), war and economics is considered to be one and the same because most states normally go to war to protect their interests mainly in terms of the economy. Looking at both actor interests and behaviour in the DRC in the past decade, it has become obvious that the interests of some social and economic groups have changed considerably over time, prompting in some instances marked changes in behaviour toward state building and peacebuilding projects. Although the flexibility of interests in the DRC may present one of the most important opportunities for external actors seeking to promote peace and rule of law (Coulomb and Dunne, 2008:46), studies done by Owoeye and Amusan (2000), United Nations Security Council (2001a), Longman (2002), Moyroud and Katunga (2002), Rupiya (2002), Noury (2010), Lalji (2007), Guenther (2008), Cassimon, Engelen and Reyntjens (2013) and Usanov et al. (2013) reveal that most external actors have used the DRC war situation to exploit and traffic the country’s mineral wealth. In the historicity of
interventions in the DRC’s conflict (see chapter four), national armies, the political elite and corporate entities from sub-regional states, especially Rwanda, Angola and Uganda, have been implicated in illegal activities in the DRC. Extra-African actors such as MNCs through the support of their countries have also been accused of using the conflict to their advantage as a conduit for illicit resource trade. Thus, resource-extracting and resource-trading have made interveners’ to pursue the DRC’s natural wealth and not to bring lasting peace. In this case, it can be argued that South Africa being the continental powerhouse is using military capacity to reap the economic benefits (or ‘spoils of war’) from the war-ravaged DRC. As a result, South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions will make the continuation of war in the DRC an attractive proposition. Additionally, from the historicity of intervention, peacebuilding in the DRC has provided opportunities for enrichment of elites, MNCs and for states. Other than building peace, actors in peacebuilding have on the contrary become spoilers to peace processes. Therefore, as some informants claimed, beyond the national security concerns of South Africa’s peacebuilding, there are vested economic interests that an unstable DRC provides for South Africa.

As it was discussed in chapter four, most Peace Agreements signed in the DRC have failed to compellingly address two issues: one is ending illegal mining and exploitation of the DRC’s minerals by those who are considered “international peace brokers”. The second is the widespread illicit trade in mineral between DRC nationals and the neighbouring states such as Rwanda and Uganda. Similarly, South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention is yet to consider how to stop the exploitation of minerals in the DRC. Instead, South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions have increased its bilateral trade with the DRC government.

7.6. Does South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention hold any promise in the DRC?
After Nelson Mandela took over the presidency of South Africa, the ruling ANC party became determined to use its resources and influence to end violent conflict all over Africa. This was because of the suffering that many South Africans had experienced during the Apartheid regime. To date, South Africa is still using its resources especially through the SADC and the AU to end wars and conflicts in Africa especially the DRC. However, the findings of this study with reference to South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC suggest that South Africa has failed to incorporate all parties to the conflict. Still, the findings of this study have shown that South Africa’s intervention has demonstrated the ambivalence of peacebuilding in the DRC. In this case South Africa’s intervention may show its quest for
peace in the DRC. However, the lack of inclusion of Congolese refugees (residing in South Africa) in its peacebuilding intervention is inconsiderate of the sensitivity and complexity of what breeds war in the DRC. In this case South Africa will fail to foster national dialogue to overcome contradictions of tribalism, poverty, inequality, corruption and poor governance that were identified by Congolese refugees as key triggers of war in the DRC. The use of SANDF as a strategy of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention is inconsiderate of the fact that the DRC is still suffering from inequality in distribution of national resources and politics of reward and seclusion.

While the preceding subsections have discussed the role of Congolese refugees in South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions the DRC from the perspective of informants, it is also worthwhile to note a number of policy and practical issues arising from research findings. This subsection presents a prognosis for South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC.

As this study has shown, external actors’ complicity in the DRC’s conflicts had ramifications for other interveners is included to this category. Specifically, interventions of Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Zimbabwe and Burundi attracted international attention and damaged the reputation of most international peacebuilders in the DRC. At this point, it can be argued that the damaged reputation of the preceding interveners has probably harmed the stances of the majority of this study’s participants regarding South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions. Nevertheless, some participants still argued that South Africa was playing a significant role in building peace in the DRC through limiting the growth and the effects of M23, infrastructural rehabilitation, electioneering and funding key institutions. However, conflict transformation is a systematic, planned, methodical and inter-stakeholder conflict intervention strategy. This point highlights a key issue arising from South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC which has neglected the role of other stakeholders. At this juncture, Congolese need to see South Africa as being involved in actions that support conflict transformation, addressing the root causes of the conflict, re-building ruined relationships in the DRC and addressing psychological traumas to victims and perpetrators (Maiese, 2003). Other than deploying SANDF to the MUNUSCO and supporting the regime of Joseph Kabila, Mitchell (2012) argues that the focus should be firstly, on rebuilding, strengthening and promoting mutual non-violent relationships between the divided Congolese communities. Secondly, there is a need to urge conflicting political elites to engage in dialogue on how to address the causes
and the effects of unending war in the DRC. If the foregoing processes are not taken seriously by South Africa, this study warns that the existing conflicts in the DRC will persist and conflicting groups will continue to label each other as the self and the other (Hiebert, 2008:329) representing the other as the existential threat to the self; as inferior to the self; as a violator of universal principles; or merely as different to the self” (Diez 2005:628).

According to CCTR, peacebuilding interventions in any conflicting society has to be a non-violently and non-politicized processed and should address the need of the locals and not interveners. Truger (2001) adds that such initiatives need to be fluid, practical and should correspond with the sign of the times. Some arguments suppose that the presence of rich mineral wealth is the sole cause of violence in the DRC. The findings of this study argue that it does not happen in isolation: it is coupled with other forms of inequality. Since independence, violence has become a tool for political expediency of fostering ethnic and tribal disunity among the Congolese by the DRC elites so as to ascend to power. For instance, in 1996 the Banyamulenge tribe whom Mobutu had referred to as outsiders – Rwandese - opposed his rule and supported the Baluba tribe whose leader was Laurent Kabila and the AFDL. Kabila and his group AFDL later overthrew the regime of Mobutu (Turner and Ngoy, 2007). However, after Kabila ascended to power he neglected the Banyamulenge and organized new power networks that were based on his ethnic group the Baluba referring to the Banyamulenge as outsiders and asking them to leave the DRC. As a result, Kabila faced strong opposition from political elites from the disgruntled group - the Banyamulenge who later formed a rebellion Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD). Although he had the support of the AZN Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia (Arnold, 2005), the RCD had the support of Rwanda and Uganda. This led to Africa’s greatest war comprising of five external national armies and twenty-five armed groups within the DRC.

From the preceding paragraph, like in many post-colonial African states, to date all post-independent regimes in the DRC have practised politics of patronage, whereby communities affiliated to the president benefit at the expense of others. This has made violence in the DRC to be a result of socio-political and economic issues that are growing deeper and bigger. As this study is being carried the DRC’s wealth is gradually becoming a mechanism for promoting loyalty to the Joseph Kabila regime. This is a residue of Mobutu’s governance where all the his allies were rewarded with the minerals in the region. Congo continues to be a theatre for corruption, divide and rule politics and discrimination. This can be vindicated by
the current call by tribes, elites and political cronies that are affiliated to president Joseph Kabila to support his bid of extending his presidential term limit that is due to expire in December 2016. In this case, due to ascent to political power in the DRC, the Baluba community, Kabila’s cronies and other political elites have dominated the current regime in the DRC over other communities. As it happened during the first and the second Congo wars, in retrospect, as long as tribal politics of reward exercised by those in power continue as the measure of appropriating privileges and powerful positions - whether (or not) the South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions uses SANDF or supports democratic reforms without addressing the root causes of conflicts, war will still exist in the DRC.

Through the tenets of CCTR, there is a need to address the historical injustice and political convenience that has been practised in the DRC since its independence but mostly since 1996. However, instead of addressing the causes of wars in the DRC, by using the SANDF, election reforms and signing bilateral trade agreements with the regime of Joseph Kabila, South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention is using the DRC as a ground for its hegemonic, political and economic tussle. When analysed from the CCTR perspective, by not incorporating non-state actors like Congolese refugees (residing in South Africa) - who from their point of view have an understanding of what breeds war in the DRC - South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention is polarizing and fuelling inequalities, poverty, communal deprivation of some sections of Congolese communities and weak and corrupt governance in the DRC. Similarly, by not incorporating non-state actors whose understanding may point to under-researched root causes of war in the DRC, it can be argued that South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention is paying a blind eye to why majority of Congolese are refugees in South Africa. According to Vickers (2012), the interests of any particular intervening state are complex to be comprehended. This is because at times, what appears as interests of a state are interests of a dominant segment within a state (Laudati, 2013). Also, there are some segments within a conflict society and intervening states that benefit from wars (Weiss and Welz, 2014). However, within the South African policy on conflict resolution in Africa the interests of dominant South African state actors is to see a stable DRC (Hendricks, 2015). Therefore, the interests of the dominant South African state actors are in line with the interests of CCTR.

There are a lot of ways that South Africa can realise its interests of seeing a stable DRC. One of the approaches of protecting its national interest of having a stable DRC is for it drawing
from the views of non-state actors like the Congolese refugees. This may aid South Africa in advancing an all-encompassing peacebuilding strategy on the continent. This study is aware that the South African green policy on conflict resolution is aware of some factors that breed war in many African states ranging from foundations of colonialism, land issues, greed and weak systems of governance (Bentley and Southall, 2005). However, this does not rule out the fact that South Africa can harness more information on dynamics of war from non-state actors like refugees. For instance, South Africa’s contribution of the SANDF to MUNUSCO is a positive step. However, South Africa has to be aware that since the first DRC war several external military attempts have been made towards achieving sustainable peace in Congo without making much success (Habib, 2009). For instance, in 2008, despite the regime of Joseph Kabila accusing Rwanda for helping the rebel group CNDP that was led by Colonel Nkunda, DRC sought for its help. Rwanda helped and the two countries agreed to have a joint military force against rebel groups CNDP and FDLR. The joint initiative between Rwanda and the DRC led to the arrest of general Nkunda thus weakening CNDP and uprooting FDLR from Kivu. However, by not putting in place policies that could avert the root causes of conflicts- poverty, inequalities, tribalism, ethnicity and corrupt and weak governance - the remnants of the FDLR and CNDP continue to cause conflicts in the eastern parts of the DRC. From the history of peacebuilding interventions in the DRC, there is a need for South Africa to re-think its approach of peacebuilding interventions. From the views and insights of the participants of this study, it can be argued that non-state actors like refugees may be contributors to South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions.

Another peacebuilding intervention was a joint effort between the MONUC and the government of the DRC (Andersen and Ghimire, 2014). It was within the mandate of the MONUC to provide logistics and military to both the FARDC and the government forces. The primary objective of the operation was to protect the population; to put an end to the threat of the FDLR; and to re-establish the authority of the Congolese state (Froitzheim and Söderbaum, 2013). From this mandate, the joint operations overlooked the role of other stakeholders or conflicting parties in DRC’s war. As a result, the operation failed. For instance, in May 2012, the FDLR rebels killed a number of civilians that were supposed to be protected by MONUC near its base in Kivu. This made locals to protest against the presence of MONUC and preferred that FDLR and other militias protect them (Murphy, 2016 :). Similarly, in July 2013, the M23 attacked the city of Goma killing a few people under the
watch of the United Nations. This again led to a demand by the Congolese for the withdrawal of MONUC (Howell, 2016).

The failure of the preceding peacebuilding interventions in the DRC is attributed to their efforts of addressing the symptoms of the conflict without rooting out their causes. For example, the objectives of the foregoing operations were “to protect the civilians, remove negative forces from the population centres, re-establish authority in liberated areas and to restore state authority and re-establish state authority” (Copeland, 2012:12). Although, the foregoing peacebuilding initiatives were important in maintaining some relative peace for a specific period of time, according to CCTR, they targeted elimination of militant and rebel groups without addressing the root cause(s) of war which are the frustrated basic human rights and needs (Sandole, 2010:9). This can be likened to the initiatives of the SANDF that have helped to minimize the effects of the M23 rebel group. However, from the views of some participants of this study, it can be argued that inclusion of Congolese refugees - who the study showed to have some awareness of the dynamics of war in the DRC (like former soldiers were once involved or connected to rebel or government troops), may strengthen South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. This will mean that unlike former interveners, South Africa would have rethought its peacebuilding intervention strategy of including non-state actors.

7.7. The Economic Dimension of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC
According to Partridge (1963: 235), power is ‘the ability for one actor to do something affecting another actor, which changes the probable patterns of future events. This can be envisaged most easily in decision making’. From the study’s findings it is evident indeed that, like other interveners, South Africa has not incorporated all parties to the DRC conflict. For instance, by supporting the regime of Joseph Kabila while at the same time carrying out its peacebuilding interventions, one interviewee argued that Congolese from the eastern provinces of the Congo were dissatisfied with exclusionary politics of the current regime128. Therefore by deciding to support trade deals and sign bilateral agreements with Kabila, the presence of SANDF is partly responsible for prolonging the conflict129. Due to its privileged economic position, South Africa has had power to finance and to sign deals of putting in place high-end infrastructures like the Inga Dam project in the DRC. This has deepened

128 Interview with a Congolese Human rights lawyer in Durban
129 Interview with a member of Congolese civil right group in Durban.
South Africa-DRC economic relations. As a result, many South African companies have invested heavily in different sectors of the DRC economy (Daily Maverick, 2011). As a result, it can be argued that South Africa – through its peacebuilding interventions - is in a better position to use its economic and foreign policies to indirectly/directly maintain or extend its influence over the politics of the DRC.

The table below shows South Africa’s economic interest in the DRC in the form of imports and exports. The table covers eight years in which South Africa became extensively involved in peace keeping missions in the DRC. The figures in the table stand as numerical evidence of the extensive interest of South Africa in the DRC, adapted from Gbaya (2014:58)

**Table 11. Economic interests of South Africa in the DRC**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports to SA from DRC</th>
<th>Exports to DRC from SA</th>
<th>Total Trade Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>47 768 011</td>
<td>2 479 644 104</td>
<td>2 431 876 093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>54 034 126</td>
<td>4 369 539 310</td>
<td>4 315 505 184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>43 239 861</td>
<td>9 203 936 291</td>
<td>9 160 696 430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>72 354 386</td>
<td>4 829 931 726</td>
<td>4 757 577 340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>72 354 386</td>
<td>6 318 722 965</td>
<td>6 218 211 954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>106 500 768</td>
<td>8 040 664 774</td>
<td>7 934 164 006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>67 436 251</td>
<td>12 141 678 103</td>
<td>12 074 241 853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>94, 200, 010</td>
<td>12 142, 720 004</td>
<td>12 05 4 852 186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>100, 074 310</td>
<td>12, 335, 321, 012</td>
<td>12 235 710 00 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adopted by the Author from SA News Agency (2015)

By having economic power over the DRC and having its peacebuilding intervention in the very country, South Africa can arguably be said to be vindicating the Marxist assertion that the world is run by the ideas and construct of the powerful (Marx, 1956:26). With its increasing economic investments in the DRC and hosting a large number of Congolese refugees in Africa, there is no gainsaying that South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions...
have the capacity to force those who disagree with its strategies into submission. Due to ethicized and tribal political nature of DRC politics, South Africa’s support to the regime of Kabila is an implicit way of justifying ascendance to power by tribes and communities affiliated to Kabila’s presidency. As a result, a prejudice that communities that are affiliated to the president are superior to others is embedded within the minds of the Congolese. As it was shown in chapter two and from the views of Congolese refugees, ethnicity is a power that is used to form and run that country. Thus, instead of bringing about lasting peace, South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions is viewed as supporting the already existing “superior and inferior” tribal identity and inequality in the DRC (Mills, 1997). The current shift and realignment by the tribes, groups, cronies and elites affiliated to the presidency supporting the extension of president Joseph Kabila’s term limit is a justification of how in the DRC negative ethnicity is used to build patronage. As this study is being analysed (September 2016), there has been sporadic violence in Kinshasa - the capital of the DRC. This violence is between the supporters of President Kabila against those who are opposed to him. The current violence is a justification that in the DRC it is a given that supporters of the president - tribes, communities and elites affiliated to him - are leaders or holders of power while those in opposition should be ruled.

Having looked at the ethicized nature of DRC’s politics, there is no way that the current South African peacebuilding interventions that support the regime of Kabila without addressing the misuse of power and ethnic disharmony will be successful. One way of addressing this is by South Africa incorporating the views of Congolese refugees who according to chapter five and six have an understanding of the dynamics of the causes of war in the DRC. As argued by most Congolese refugees, South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention needs to facilitate the growth of political and economic access for all Congolese by advocating for good governance, democracy and inclusive economic development. More so, South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions need to concentrate on rebuilding the damaged Congolese ethnic and tribal fabric by reconciling the conflicting communities and leaders (Miall, 2004: 14). From the views of Congolese refugees in Durban, at the heart of the DRC’s conflict, is a fight for control of public resources due to inequality and poverty that are a result of exclusionary and divisionary politics in the DRC.

Most of the views of Congolese refugees contended that misuse of power, poverty, negative ethnicity and tribal identity has been at the heart of the DRC’s conflict which has been
assumed to be mineral related. For instance, after only four days of independence, there was an open conflict over political antagonism, tribalism, conflict for resources and geographical diversity (Alan, 1961). This led to an emergence of regional secessionist movements that were organised along tribal lines. When Mobutu took over power, he reignited the Belgian governing systems that promoted exclusion, corruption and ethnicity. He also exploited the Congo as if it were his personal property. Extreme disparities existed between Mobutu, his cronies, group and tribes affiliated to him and the rest of the Congolese communities. This prompted the growth of rebel groups that were dissatisfied with inequality and greed for power. Due to his exclusionary politics, the Hunde and Nande tribes ganged up against the Banyarwanda whom they considered as foreigners. As a result, the Hutu Banyarwanda reacted by initiating a campaign of resistance to Hunde and Nande political control. Although the 1996 Congo war involved a number of foreign actors, it was grounded in the need for the Banyamulenge tribe to assert their identity as Congolese and not Rwandese as they had been referred to by the regime of Mobutu. For this reason, the tribe identified itself with the rebel group AFDI led by Laurent Kabila. Similarly, the second Congo war was as a result of troops that were mainly of Tutsi whom Kabila had asked to leave the DRC. The Tutsi dominated group formed a rebellion known as Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD). From 2003, Weiss (2011) and Winter (2012: 56) argue that the DRC relapsed into war when President Joseph Kabila and Prime Minister Bemba sought to reward their cronies, tribeswomen and supporters with plum government jobs rather than seeking a lasting solution for peace. Although South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention - through SANDF - has managed to neutralise the efforts of rebel group M23, there still exists a number of organised militia and rebel groups. Most of the rebels and militias are backed by different ethnic and tribal communities to fight for their ascendancy to political power so as to liberate themselves from the existing inequalities, poverty and exclusion (Human Rights Watch, 2016). Although many scholars claim that the DRC war is mineral-related, from the preceding discussion, it is the use of power, negative ethnicity and tribalism in awarding privileges to communities that ascends to power over the other that are probable root causes of the DRC’s conflict. Having said that, in line with one of the research questions of this study - What contributions can the Congolese refugees make towards the South Africa’s intervention strategies in the DRC conflict? - by incorporating the views of refugees as this study has found out, among many impacts that South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention could avert is fuelling the already existing Congolese tribal disharmony and polarization further. It is for this reason that the
study argues that the views of Congolese refugees within South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC are insightful. While reaffirming the traditional tenets of negative-positive peace, CCTR highlights the importance of the locals in identifying the root causes of wars and in rebuilding broken relationships other than overemphasizing contemporary liberal’s conflict resolution methods (Galtung, 1969; Ledarach, 2003; Miall, 2004). In this context, it can be argued that it is the poor tribal and ethnic relationship between groups in the DRC that instigates attitudes that lead to unending violence in that country (cultural violence). Therefore, the identifying and addressing the root causes of conflicts and rebuilding broken relationships among the Congolese should be the core of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC. One way of doing that is by incorporating the views of the Congolese refugees residing in South Africa.

While it is true that South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions are crucial as an attempt of bringing lasting peace, its support of the current regime (one of the party to the conflict) and its ongoing bilateral trade with that country will leave a stratified and tribal social structure in the DRC. With the privileges that communities that are affiliated to the Presidency enjoy from any regime, it is a foregone conclusion that the support of Kabila by South Africa will make political elites not want to temper with transforming the system. This will keep the foregoing communities and elites more superior to those that have been denied access to political power. In the end, ethnic division, polarisation, politics of domination and seclusion, land injustices and poor governance will continue to linger on in the DRC. Therefore, competition for power to gain control by both the “ruling” and the “marginalised” communities and tribes in the DRC will implicitly legislate violence as a means. By doing so, a socially and politically constructed ethnic disharmony, polarization and division will be taken as essential in the DRC’s realpolitik. In this case, this study warns that as long as South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention does not revolve around addressing the root causes of war, the DRC’s conflict will continue.

If the views of the Congolese refugees as presented in this study are not incorporated on CCTR terms, the realist objectives of the South Africa’s peacebuilding initiatives will be a mere band-aid, a quick and impetuous solution to an intractable and convoluted problem in the DRC. This is because many Congolese amid enormous wealth remain poor and ethnically, socially and economically divided. By supporting the regime which most Congolese term as weak and corrupt, South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention is putting many Congolese in an
invidious position of claiming to seek lasting peace but still living under political, social, economic and ethnic inequality. By using peacebuilding interventions to seek its realist and economic hegemony in the DRC, South Africa is furthering divisions among Congolese. This is not the goal and the objective of CCTR.

At this point it is fitting to state that addressing peacebuilding in the DRC does not solely depend on the strategies and the interests of the interveners (depending solely on the intervener may imperil social cohesion- ethnic and tribal disharmony and polarization). As this study shows, there are other parties to the DRC conflicts as well as variables at the local, national and international level that shape the dynamics of that country. For the success of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC, this study strongly proposes the inclusion/incorporation of the views of the Congolese refugees as shown in chapter five and six. Fundamental to this, the contribution of Congolese refugees to South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention will aid in understanding the root causes of war in the DRC thus enabling South Africa to come up with a well encompassing peacebuilding intervention strategy. The role of the other parties to the DRC conflict - rebels, militias, unarmed groups like the opposition, religious leaders, women and children this regard cannot be overemphasized, as they bear primary responsibility for guaranteeing security and stability, which are the *sine qua non* for peacebuilding. For South Africa to strive towards effective peacebuilding in the DRC in the absence of these prerequisites is illusory. The potential salient contributions that other Congolese refugees residing in South Africa could make towards effective peacebuilding in the DRC suggest that South Africa has to realise and recognise the utility of involving locals in the peace process of their country. This underscores the need for complementarity of initiatives of both Congolese refugees and South Africa (interveners and the Congolese).

### 7.8 conclusion

This chapter presented and analysed South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC within the tenets of realism and CCTR. The pith of the chapter was a reiteration of data presented in chapter five and its broader analysis in chapter six. The chapter was cautionary in its manner in that it has given no reason for complacency in South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC. This is so because the mechanisms of successful peacebuilding intervention from South Africa are embedded in both political and social structures of the DRC and not the interest of South Africa. Through the tenets of CCTR, the chapter explored
that the inclusion of Congolese refugees within South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC holds key to unlocking the root causes of war in that country. Although CCTR did not tally with the interests of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC, realism underscored the quest for South Africa to use peacebuilding as a show of power and hegemony.

In its discussion the chapter based its arguments on the theoretical frameworks in chapter four, data presented and analysed in chapter five and six respectively. The logical deduction that were made are that the role of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC is a significant factor in the escalation, prolongation and duration of the DRC’s conflict(s). The section also discussed that from a realist point of view, the level and the intensity of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC is dependent, not on the what conflict transformation entails but on a number of economic and political variables. In unpacking the role of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in Africa, this chapter argued that there is contradiction in the behaviours of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC: South African peacebuilding interventions have overlooked the role of Congolese. This is against the research findings of this study that suggested that Congolese refugees, since they have run away from war, are aware of the dynamics of the root causes of war in the DRC. Identifying and addressing the root causes of conflict is the main goal of conflict transformation/peacebuilding processes. In this case, research findings suggest that lack of inclusion of Congolese refugees residing in South Africa underpin the specifics of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC.

One of the issues that emerged in this chapter is that although South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions manifest the tenets of realism, implementing strategies that can address poverty, communal deprivation, inequality, nepotism, corruption and weak government-structural violence- holds key towards the attainment of positive peace in the DRC. This is what CCTR seeks to achieve. In view of the stultifying effects, the non-inclusion of Congolese refugees within South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC does not sufficiently challenge the culture of structural injustices and violence that characterize the nature of the DRC - a country that is still suffering from inequality in distribution of national resources and politics of reward and seclusion.
According to this chapter, in its current support of the current DRC regime, South Africa is only giving more power to the rebels, militant and other disgruntled groups to further their violent means of seeking redress to a complex and multifaceted nature of the DRC’s conflict. As it was shown in chapter two, this chapter does not see the difference between South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention and other liberal peacebuilding interveners. As it was discussed in the history of DRC’s conflict, many interveners have vehemently “rubberstamped” reformation and opposing transformation; the former only serves as an affirmation and acceptance of the dehumanizing oppressive situation, whilst the latter changes an oppressive system from bottom up. Similarly, due to the political economy of the DRC conflict, South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention is yet to consider how to stop the exploitation of minerals in the DRC. Instead, South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions have increased its bilateral trade with the DRC government.

In this regard, the inclusion of Congolese refugees within South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention will be facilitated in unravelling the root causes of war in the DRC so that they may be addressed and be transformed thus fostering a conducive environment for peacebuilding in the DRC. Although this chapter was exclusive on locating South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC, it is also applicable to other interveners in different conflicting countries. It can be applied to the USA-Russia-China intervention in Syria where Syrian refugees can provide their views on the root causes of war. It can also be applied to South Sudan where interveners have paid less attention to the tribal identity causes of the conflict. Prior to 1994, this chapter could have been used as an early warning in averting the Rwandan 1994 genocide. Still, the chapter can aid interveners in the Central African Republic where refugees from that country could be used to identify the root cause of fundamentalist Christians who are violently campaigning for the excision of Islamic identities and influences.

The chapter concluded that effective South African peacebuilding intervention is possible in the DRC, subject to the inclusion of Congolese - in this case refugees residing in South Africa - who may aid in identifying and implementing strategies that can address poverty, tribalism, inequality, ethnicity, nepotism, corruption and weak government-structural violence. The next chapter presents a summary of the study and policy recommendations against the backdrop of the study’s findings.
CHAPTER EIGHT
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 Summary of the findings
This study interrogated the views, insights and attitudes of Congolese refugees towards South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. The focal point of analysis of this study is the role of refugees in conflict transformation - the role of Congolese refugees in South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict. Its primary analysis is from the views of participants who are Congolese refugees living in Durban, South Africa. Specifically, this study gained vital views, attitudes, insights and perspectives of Congolese in South Africa, in investigating what ‘aspired’/hopes for contribution they felt they could add to South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. Also, from the participants’ perspective, this study investigated some of the motivations that propel South Africa’s continuous peacebuilding interventions in the DRC’s conflict. In terms of methodology, the empirical nature of this study necessitated a combination of research methods and approaches. Therefore, it adopted historical and qualitative approaches in explicating the subject matter of the research.

The first chapter of this study was an introduction. The chapter introduced the study’s background and foregrounded its research problem. It also identified the research task and outlined the study’s hypothesis. The chapter presented the research objectives and corresponding research questions. Furthermore, the first chapter delineated the study’s scope and limitations. It highlighted the significance of the study, followed by a brief statement of the research methodology and research design. The chapter also noted that an empirical study of this nature is bound to grapple with certain methodological and practical limitations, which the chapter identified. A section of the first chapter was devoted to the clarification of the key
concepts that underpinned the study’s thematic concerns. The chapter concluded with a description of the structure of the study.

The second chapter was a review and comparison of relevant literature to the study. Most of the literature interrogated the interface between refugees and other migrants in conflict transformation. In the analysis, it was noted that the most of contemporary literature on conflict transformation are limited in narratives that either corroborate, modify or rebut the role of refugees in conflict transformation. Through a review and comparison of relevant literature, the second chapter highlighted that since refugees are considered as non-state actors, most intervening states do not integrate them into their peacebuilding intervention approaches. This a probable reason as to why scholarship (in the review of literature) on the role of refugees remains under-researched. However, to a certain extend it is true that marginalisation of any participant in peacebuilding is a ground for future conflict. Although under-researched, the review of literature re-affirmed the there is a significant link between refugees and the initiation, escalation, prolongation and duration of conflicts in their countries of origin. Given that refugees are also actors in an on-going or previous war, it can be argued that they need not to be side-lined from peace processes of their countries’ conflicts. Using the example of the role of Somalian, Palestinian and South African diaspora in their countries’ conflicts, the review of literature in this study established that refugees are linked either directly or indirectly to the dynamics of conflicts in their countries. By filling in the gaps and building on the already existing scholarship on the role of refugees in peacebuilding, this chapter emphasized that there is a need for a nuanced understanding of the role of refugees to voice their narratives as constructed, resisted, adopted and experienced by them in interveners’ peacebuilding interventions. This was the main aim of the entire study.

After reviewing and comparing literature on link between refugees and conflict transformation, the third chapter presented theoretical perspectives and research methods for analysing this study. Firstly, the chapter examined cosmopolitan conflict transformation and realism as the two relevant paradigms of explicating the views and insights of the Congolese refugees on South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. The chapter began by making a case for CCTR, due to relevance in peacebuilding interventions. It was noted that CCTR advocates for inclusion of all affected parties to the conflict in any peacebuilding processes. This in contrast to what many intervening states do. It was argued that it is due to
marginalisation of some parties to the conflict by intervening peacebuilders that sets grounds or fuels further conflict. It was argued that most contemporary approaches in peacebuilding interventions—also referred to as liberal peace approaches—serve the interest of the powerful and in maintaining the status quo in a conflict society. Other than eliminating the root causes of war, the liberal approach was faulted for creating favourable conditions that endorsed a culture of violence.

What distinguishes CCTR perspective from other conflict transformation theories is the idea that it emphasizes a need for orderly resolution of any conflict. In addition, CCTR advocates the replacement of structures and conditions that breed violence/war with those that build sustainable peace. It was argued that a number of interveners, negotiators and peacemakers in the DRC’s war tend to resolve conflicts by only dealing with conflicting elites (as it was done during the DRC’s first, second and third wars). As a result, many parties to the DRC’s conflict were marginalized. This can be the reason why the conflict is unending. As a new approach to the DRC’s conflict, through CCTR, this chapter argued that the insights and the views of the Congolese refugees (among other sidelined groups), can contribute tremendously and effectively to South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC.

Secondly, for the purpose of providing a holistic framework for understanding interest that shapes interveners’ peacebuilding interventions in a conflict state, realism is a relevant paradigm. It was noted that realism views peacebuilding interventions as a continuation of interveners’ foreign policies or national interests. This chapter acknowledged that national interests are difficult to conceptualise. In collectives and institutions, what appears as collective or institutional interest may be the interest of a segment within a state or a collective. Whilst literature on the interface between refugees and conflict transformation seems to be informed by realpolitik, the realist paradigm established that strong states take decisions to carry out peacebuilding interventions to serve their geostrategic and economic interests.

In this study, the realist perspective was utilized to examine how interests (economic, security and hegemonic) are the guiding compass for South Africa’s intervention in the DRC. The chapter argued that it was conceivable that there is a possibility of some segments of South Africa that are actually benefiting from the conflict in DRC. In this case, it can be argued that no one will ever be able to convince them otherwise. However, the study argued that the
dominant interest of the strong South African state actors is to see a stable and peaceful DRC. Some of the national interests of South Africa are to have economic relations with a stable DRC, to fight insecurity as a result of the neighbouring warring nations and to reduce the influx of refugees as a result of war. It is due to the foregoing reasons that this study argued that South Africa can draw from the insights of the Congolese refugees so as to bring an end to decades of war in the DRC. In this case, if South Africa is seen as a country that accepts the views of African refugees on peacebuilding it will earn continental respect (soft power). As a result, it will be able to use realist economic policies in order to further the interest of South African business segments.

The third chapter also presented the research design, methodology and methods of analysis that were employed during the study. By employing the use of the qualitative approach, this chapter was able to explore amongst other things the different components of the Congolese refugees residing in Durban in terms of gender, age, educational levels, marital status and their different political and ideological comportments and their views on South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC.

The fourth chapter was historical in its nature. It presented a historical background and established several factors that continue to trigger the DRC’s conflict. Among factors that were established are: the foundations of colonialism, land issues, greed and weak systems of governance, fights over resources, nepotism, favouritism, poverty and ethnicity. Other external factors were the influence and the presence of foreign troops and rebels from neighbouring countries like Rwanda and Uganda. This has become the edifice on which violence was laid for resolution of any of the DRC’s conflict. To date, rebel and militia groups continue to hold large parts of the country subjecting the civilian populations to prolonged instability and civil strife. The chapter also established that historically, due to pursuance of their interests, most peacebuilding interventions have played a role in the escalation of the DRC’s conflict rather than averting it. In relation to the study, the chapter established that South Africa became actively involved in the DRC conflict from 1996 to date. Also, the chapter established that South Africa has successfully used its peacebuilding intervention to create a trusting diplomatic relationship that has led to lucrative trade deals between the two countries. In the end, South Africa is the chief beneficiary of bilateral trade pact with DRC while at the same time seeking lasting peace. The chapter argued that probably it is because of South Africa’s interests as a regional hegemon that it finds itself in
conflicting positions in its peacebuilding intervention in the DRC’s conflict. While many efforts have been made in peacebuilding interventions in the DRC, the chapter established that Congolese refugees are yet to be incorporated in the peace processes of their country’s conflict. This set a focal point of this study and reason as to why South Africa’s peacebuilding may need to include their views.

A backdrop for explicating the attitudes of Congolese refugees in Durban (location of this study) towards South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC was set in the fifth chapter. Results from the qualitative data garnered in chapter five revealed that Congolese refugees are skilled and very heterogeneous. They survive from a wide range of economic activities in both the informal and the formal economy. From the sample obtained, it can be argued that most Congolese refugees in Durban possess a tertiary education and that a number of them are aware of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. In line with the study’s hypothesis, the fifth chapter underscored the idea that South Africa’s interventions in the DRC are not premised on assumption that peacebuilding is means of addressing the high influx of Congolese refugees. In doing so, this chapter contended that probably, South Africa can draw from the opinions, views and insights of the Congolese refugees so as to bring it respect as a country that respects the contribution of refugees in peacebuilding on the continent. This will earn it respect on the continent and in turn allow South Africa to use its realist economic policies in order to further the interest of South African political and business segments. Although the participants of this study are non-state actors, their views and insights on South Africa’s peacebuilding as presented in chapter five, engender a holistic understanding of conflict transformation. The data collected in the fifth chapter was explicated and analysed further in chapter six and seven.

The sixth chapter presented and analyzed data obtained in the fifth chapter framing it on South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC from the participants’ perspective. This was against the backdrop of the main trends in peacebuilding intervention strategy and behaviours in the DRC. The sixth chapter begun by presenting participants’ narratives on the root causes of war in the DRC. Among the causes of war in the DRC that participants narrated are poverty, inequality, weak government institutions and corruption, international actors and MNCs’ greed for Congo’s rich minerals, tribalism, nepotism and ethnicity.
The sixth chapter also presented the participants’ narrations on the characteristics, strategies and behaviours of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. Most participants argued that South Africa was contributing the SANDF in MUNUSCO, using diplomacy by urging conflicting parties to use peaceful means to end the conflict and funding infrastructure like transport network in the DRC. However, there is also a segment of participants that argued that South Africa was using its peacebuilding strategy as a means of increasing its business ventures in the DRC.

The contribution of the SANDF in peacebuilding in the DRC elicited two opposing narratives among participants. One section of participants was in support of the SANDF intervention in the DRC while the other, opposed it. The sixth chapter also discussed the rationale behind participants’ opposing view on the use of SANDF in the DRC. The chapter ended by making some logical deductions on South Africa’s use of SANDF in transforming the DRC’s conflict: setting a scene for the rationale and interest of the South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in addressing the root causes of the DRC’s conflict. As a result, South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC’s conflict had to be located within the tenets of cosmopolitan conflict transformation and realism in the seventh chapter of this study.

The seventh chapter presented and analysed the views and insights of the Congolese refugees on South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC within the tenets of realism and CCTR. The chapter was cautionary in that it gave no reason for the perceived complacency in South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC. This is so because the mechanisms of successful intervention are embedded in both the conflicting political and social structures of the DRC and the interest of South Africa. Through the tenets of CCTR, the chapter explored that the inclusion of Congolese views of the participants of this study in South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC may be one of the ways of bringing an end to decades of war in that country. Also, as argued in chapter five and six, the inclusion of the views of this study’s participants on South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions may be another approach of South Africa’s so called ‘soft’ power approach in promoting its economic interests in the Congo. According to Nye (2012) soft power is the ability to get what one wants by attraction and persuasion rather than coercion or payment. Great powers try to use culture and narrative to create soft power that promotes their national interests. For instance, China is spending billions of dollars to increase its soft power through aid programmes to Africa and Latin America. While chapter five and six insisted that inclusion of the views of
refugees in its peacebuilding interventions may earn South Africa respect on the continent, this chapter underscored that it is also one way of South Africa using its soft power and thus advancing its regional hegemon in peace operations and economic affairs in Africa. It can perhaps be argued that an inclusion of the views and insights of the Congolese refugees within South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention is an attractive and persuasive way of South Africa stabilizing the DRC and furthering its economic interest in the latter.

The seventh chapter also argued that the bilateral trade between the two countries is meant to boost the affected economies of both countries. However, the chapter cautioned that by entering bilateral business ventures while on peacebuilding intervention, South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention is to be viewed with some suspicion. As argued by some participants, participation of South Africa in DRC’s peacebuilding while pushing for economic relations with DRC can be termed as a predatory and exploitative way of the economics of the DRC’s war. For instance, the Inga Dam, agriculture and the abundance of mineral resources to which some South African companies own mining rights, further support the realists’ view that there is a segment of South Africa’s state and business actors who are actually benefiting from the DRC’s conflict. If this is the case, no one will ever be able to be convinced that South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions is founded on the tenets of the CCTR. This underscores a realist argument that any intervening state intervenes in a conflicting country in pursuit of its parochial interests (national or even elites). From the views of the participants of this study, the seventh chapter revealed that it is the economic, security and hegemonic interests that propel the guiding compass for South Africa’s intervention in the DRC.

The chapter concluded that one way of having an effective South African peacebuilding intervention in the DRC, is to draw from the views and insights of the marginalised non-state actors like the Congolese refugees. As narrated by the participants of this study, the underlying rationale here is the supposition that by including Congolese refugees in its peacebuilding interventions in the DRC, South Africa may undoubtedly be promoting its own prosperity: that it is advancing its quest to be a continental leader in peacebuilding which will earn it respect in Africa and the world. Also, by drawing on the views of the marginalised non-state actors like refugees in its peacebuilding interventions in the DRC, South Africa may fulfil its desire of avoiding spill-overs from the effects of the war in the form of the incessant
influx of Congolese refugees. Still, the views of Congolese refugees on South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC may be one of the way of having a stable DRC, thus, furthering economic interests of South Africa’s business segments.

8.2 concluding remarks

Based on the summary above in respect of the views, attitudes and perspectives of refugees in peacebuilding interventions, this study makes the following specific conclusions and suggestions with reference to the salient aspects of the DRC’s conflict. Firstly, with regard to the study’s main hypothesis – namely, that an interplay between refugees and conflict transformation (in peacebuilding interventions) underpin the strategic behaviour of peacebuilding interveners in any conflict zones – research findings suggest that in most cases - contrary to CCTR - interveners are motivated by maximization of their interests (be they economic, security or economic. As such, it is the interveners’ interests that underscore their peacebuilding interventions in any conflict. As the case study illustrates, a number of interveners’ interests have predated or have been subsequent to the onset of the DRC’s conflict. As argued in the chapter covering the history of peacebuilding interventions in the DRC, where the interests of an intervener predated the DRC’s conflict (the case of Rwanda and Uganda), an intervener may be forced to either “exit” or “remain” in the conflict zone. In this case, although Rwanda and Uganda have exited the DRC’s conflict zone, they continue to indirectly influence it. Decisions for many interveners to exit or remain in the DRC’s conflict zone can be argued to have been based on what the intervener will gain with either course of action. Therefore, although complex, South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC’s conflict – whether in the form of economic development, facilitation of peacemaking between conflicting actors or use of SANDF – is contextual and situated and should be understood and analysed from this prism (national interests of South Africa).

From these study findings however, there is a possibility that South Africa can draw from the hitherto marginalised insights and views of Congolese refugees on peacebuilding, to advance the interests of ending war in the DRC and promoting its national interests (whatever, they are). In this regard, it can be argued that, by drawing from the insights and the views of Congolese refugees on peacebuilding, South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC may be bolstered. As this study has established - with regard to the first research question – the participants’ level of awareness of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC was understandably high. The participants’ level of awareness of South Africa’s interventions,
led the research to seek to understand what participants considered as both the proximate and immediate causes of war in the DRC. The researcher established that the Draft White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy (2011) acknowledges that it is poverty and underdevelopment that hinders the attainment of sustainable peace in Africa. From the views of most participants in this study, poverty and inequality in mineral-rich eastern DRC were re-iterated as some of the root causes of war. For instance, most participants argued that mineral resources in the eastern DRC can economically take care of the needs of its locals. However, many participants argued that most indigenes of the eastern DRC were languishing in poverty amid presence of rare and rich minerals that the region is endowed with. Some participants argued that it was the increasing levels of poverty level and landlines among the indigenous eastern residents that promoted some actions of rebels and militia groups in causing conflicts.

Participants also identified the role of some local and international actors in fuelling the DRC’s conflict. At the national level, participants argued that the weak DRC government (the absence of state authority in mineral rich regions), corruption, nepotism and politics of reward (warlord politics) could be identified as some of the factors that abet war in the DRC. At the international level, the competition and demand for the DRC’s resources and the involvement of interveners (especially neighbouring countries) perpetuate the DRC’s conflicts. From the views of participants, this study established that most interveners undertook intervention strategies that continue to exacerbate and prolong conflicts: historically, most of their peacebuilding interventions have hindered conflict transformation in the DRC.

In answering the third research question - regarding the aspired roles of Congolese refugees within South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC’s conflicts - this study bears out the significance of the participants’ views and insight on South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC’s conflict. During the study, most participants narrated that most interveners failed to address the known root causes of causes of war in the DRC. Participants attributed laxity of interveners in addressing the root causes of war in the DRC to the pursuit of their own interests and not for lasting peace.

According to Manning (2003), the root causes that have to be addressed in some instances include weak institutions, endemic poverty and crippling debt (see Manning 2003). In this
regard, participants narrated that most interveners in the DRC’s conflict had failed to place more efforts on long-term perspectives of peace so as to avoid intractable conflicts, transforming protracted conflicts into tractable ones and reconciling former adversaries (Wolff and Yakinthou, 2011). It is for this reason that this study’s findings reveal that one way of addressing the root causes of war in the DRC is for South Africa to draw on different views, attitudes and perceptions of Congolese refugees (in Durban) on peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. The views and insights of participants of this study are opposed to historical simplistic or reductionist explanations of peacebuilding interventions that seem to have marginalized non-state actors like refugees.

There is no simple way of incorporating the aspired roles of the Congolese refugees within South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention. However, according to this study’s findings, drawing from their views of Congolese refugees will engender a holistic understanding of how an all-encompassing South African peacebuilding intervention will be another way of South Africa realizing its national interests in the DRC.

In most cases, many governments are reluctant to invite refugees and exiles to contribute to their foreign policy making. However, from this study’s findings, participants’ showed a high level of understanding of the dynamics of war in the DRC. In this case, they can be parties to conflict transformation that is embedded within South Africa’s foreign policy on peacebuilding in showing what works. For instance, they can help South Africa in building peacebuilding coalitions between local and international organizations in conflict areas on the continent. As this study has revealed, it can be argued that it is due to failures of many international interveners to build peacebuilding coalitions with Congolese refugees that continue to perpetuate the DRC’s conflict. Therefore, drawing from the views and insights of the Congolese refugees - as argued by participants - may not only be the means through which South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention can overcome the gap left by other interveners but also one way of creating a platform to build peace and reconstruct the DRC and other African countries that are ravaged by war.

Another question that this study was answering was in regard to the awareness of Congolese refugees of the national interests of South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention in the DRC and how their views may inform the South Africa’s national interest. To the foregoing question, this study argues that refugees are non-state actors and their inclusion in peacebuilding is a
relatively a new phenomenon. By utilizing the views and insights of the Congolese refugees on peacebuilding in DRC - as narrated by participants - South Africa will be recognizing the important contributions that some non-state actors can make towards building and nurturing peace in societies that are plagued by war. At a practical level, the inclusion of the views and insights of the Congolese refugees on South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC is one way of complementing other contributions of state and inter-governmental actors in conflict transformation. At the level of analysis, the inclusion of the views and insights of the Congolese refugees on South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC presupposes rethinking peacebuilding paradigms (which focuses on the warring parties and state actors).

From this study’s findings, the views and insights of the Congolese refugees on South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions calls for introspection, interrogation and analysis of contemporary conflicts through more encompassing frameworks that encapsulate the marginalised roles of non-state actors in peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. This paper recommends and stresses the need for studies to include the seemingly forgotten role of the subaltern transnational refugees in peacebuilding, by focusing on the refugees themselves. As the next subsection argues, this thesis recommends that South Africa should take cognisance of the roles played by non-state actors like Congolese refugees in producing specific outcomes that define the trajectory of conflicts and peacebuilding processes in the DRC.

8.3 Recommendations/Suggestions

Based on the research findings and issues that have emerged from participants, this study makes recommendations which include suggestions for further studies on the under-researched subject of refugees and their role in the intervener’s peacebuilding interventions.

8.3.1 Establishment of South African refugees’ resource centres

As this study notes, it is in the interest of dominant South African state actors to see a stable DRC and Africa as a whole. However, from its experience of peacebuilding in Burundi (Hendricks, 2015), South Africa has a limited approach in peacebuilding. According to Hendricks (2015) South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in Burundi focused on state actors leaving out non-state actors. As a result, some non-state actors developed into rebel groups fuelling further the Burundian conflict. Therefore, this study suggests that South Africa embraces new strategies and approaches to peacebuilding on the continent. As this study argues, many governments are reluctant to invite refugees and exiles to contribute to
their foreign policy making on peacebuilding. It was noted that, as presently constituted, South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions is severely encumbered with respect to understanding how poverty, inequality and underdevelopment abet war on the continent.

In its refugees Act, South Africa has earned respect continentally and globally for accepting refugees from most war-torn African countries. This author believes that central to ensuring that refugees rights are respected is the inclusion of their views within the framework of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions of their countries’ conflict. One way of actualizing the views and insights of Congolese among other refugees within South Africa is coalition with a number of organizations that the government can work with in order to generate peacebuilding policies. One organization that is potentially valuable as a policy site for future South Africa peacebuilding intervention that is informed by the views of Congolese refugees is the Jesuit Refugees Service (JRS). The Jesuit Refugees Service is a Catholic religious organization located in Yeoville, in the Gauteng province, that provides assistance to refugees in camps and cities, internally displaced persons, asylum seekers, and to those held in detention centres. The JSR has a large number of Congolese refugees whom it offers services to. Additionally, many activist Congolese are part of the organization. Another organization is the Muslim Refugees Relief Association (MRASA). Like the Jesuit Refugees Service, the Muslim Refugees Relief Association is a non-profit Islamic organization that seeks to uplift the religious, social, morale and academic standards of refugees and asylum seekers. They too have many Congolese refugees that they cater to. While the aforementioned organizations are broad and attempt to assist all refugees, the Cultural Orientation Center in Gauteng is more specifically a Congolese organization that provides basic information about Congolese refugee arrivals. In Gauteng, the Cultural Orientation Center acts as a background service provider to both new and old Congolese refugees. This organization is run by several Congolese activists and can potentially offer valuable participants for grounded South African peacebuilding policy that seeks to consciously include the perceptions and insights of Congolese refugees in South Africa.

Therefore, the establishment of the South African national refugees’ resource centres will be a way in which the government may harness the views of refugees on the causes of war in their countries and how they can contribute to peace. This will be a new approach of South Africa becoming a continental leader in mitigating the forgotten role of non-state actors in peacebuilding processes.
8.3.2 Clarification of economic interests of South Africa in the DRC

This study upholds that it is in the interest of dominant South African state actors to see a stable DRC. However, the character of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC has made it difficult to conceptualise what constitutes the national interests of South Africa. As narrated by this study’s participants, it is South Africa’s interests as a regional hegemon that has led to its conflicting positions in its peacebuilding interventions in the DRC. As this study has shown, one correlation between South Africa’s peacebuilding intervention and promotion of interest, hinges on a desire on the part of South Africa to end war and to further establish its economic interests in the DRC. South Africa has enormously contributed SANDF personnel to combat the actions of rebels in its desire to avert war in the DRC. At the same time, South Africa has used peacebuilding to promote the interests of South African companies in the DRC. In doing so, what appeared to be the collective interest of South Africa (peace interest) has become the interests of a segment of the South Africa and business actors (economic interest). Therefore, the conflicting interests of South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions leaves no doubt in arguing that there is a segment of the South African state and business actors that is benefitting from the conflict in the DRC. In this case, that segment will not see the need for ending the conflict. This is a case which proves that there is an endemic nature of ‘economics of war’ in the DRC.

In view of the above, it is recommended that although complex in orientation, South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions in the DRC should be anchored firmly on positive peace process as a guiding framework that aims to root out both direct and structural violence in the DRC and not as a tool for economic gain. Clarifying the interests of South Africa’s peacebuilding in the DRC requires much political will and leadership form the side of South Africa. Clear political and economic interest of South Africa should focus firstly, on ending war in the DRC. Secondly, on ensuring that there is good governance in the DRC, South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions should promote political participation of all, respect for the rule of law and the sustenance of accountable, responsible and responsive effective public institutions, and credible political leadership. As the study has argued, the preceding values have been lacking in the DRC.

8.3.3 Recognition of other non-state actors in DRC’s peacebuilding interventions

As this study has shown, due to pursuit of their realist interests, many interveners marginalize non-state actors in peace processes. From the chapter on the history of peacebuilding
interventions in the DRC, this study established that peacebuilding in the DRC has been characterized by signing of cease-fires and disarming armed groups. This is because most interveners have assumed that conflicts in the DRC are between either the DRC government versus the rebels and the DRC government versus other governments. This assumption has made peacebuilding interveners to not make conscious efforts of including non-state actors who bear the brunt of effects of war and human right abuse. Similarly, the foregoing assumption has made interveners to not link the needs of the Congolese on the ground to their peacebuilding interventions.

This study recommends that South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions should go beyond what has been the focus of many interveners; that is the cessation of war. Again, this study recommends that South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions should take into account the historical issues that inform the root causes of war in the DRC. One way of doing this is for South Africa to draw from the views of Congolese refugees as articulated in this study. Shifting away from peace processes that have tended to focus on location, parameters, contexts and content, paying particular attention of the intervener, this study recommends that South Africa’s peacebuilding interventions pay attention to the role and relationships of all actors (both state and non-state) in the DRC’s conflict. Marginalizing and neglecting the relationship of any actor in a conflict, will ensure that peace remains an illusion in the DRC.

8.3.4 Paradigm shift in the conceptualization of peacebuilding interventions in the DRC

As noted in this study, most interveners in the DRC’s conflict have tended to include an approach that has been used before, without reflecting on other issues that could not have been within the interests of the Congolese. Most interveners have been fixated on the shortest time of ending fighting between rebels and governments. Ending of fighting between key actors has become more important for interveners. This makes interveners celebrate their short term ‘achievement’ in media. This has made the conceptualization of peacebuilding as a process that is invested with many vested interests of the international community. These interests, coupled with the selfishness of interveners takes priority of peacebuilding in the DRC. As this study has revealed, the DRC conflicts requires not just strong institutions but locals without external interests involved in the peace processes. The peace processes require considerably more structural change than ending of wars.
Another new approach to DRC’s conflict is the need to align peacebuilding with bread and butter issues for the Congolese on the ground. While many peacebuilders are aware that lack of basic need is one of the key triggers of war in the DRC, this awareness is yet to be utilized. Therefore, there is a need for peacebuilding to shift away from just ending war but to further address the basic needs of Congolese on the ground.

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