

**A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF POLICY ON EDUCATOR POST  
PROVISIONING IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS WITH PARTICULAR  
REFERENCE TO SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN KWAZULU-NATAL**

**by**

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**DATE SUBMITTED: November 2005**

## **DECLARATION**

I declare that this thesis titled, **A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF POLICY ON EDUCATOR POST PROVISIONING IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN KWAZULU-NATAL** is my own work and that all the sources that have been used or quoted, have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

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## **ABSTRACT**

Historically, educator post provisioning in South African public schools has been a contentious issue. Informed by the apartheid ideology, the staffing of schools was skewed both quantitatively and qualitatively in favour of the white population group. In contrast, the schools catering for the black population had to contend with high learner-educator ratios and poorly qualified educators. With the coming into power of the first democratically elected government in 1994 there was growing optimism that equity, redress and social justice would prevail in all spheres of society, including education. In the education arena there were significant attempts at addressing the inequity that prevailed in terms of educator distribution.

This study which is grounded in the field of policy analysis, critically analyses the policy on educator post provisioning in public schools in KwaZulu-Natal in the post apartheid era. It focuses on the ideological underpinnings of policy on educator provisioning, the evolution of policy on educator post provisioning and the impact of policy on educator post provisioning from a social justice perspective. The views of the implementers of policy on educator post provisioning, namely, the school principals are also elicited.

A combination of both the quantitative and qualitative research paradigms was employed in order to gather data in this study. A survey questionnaire was administered to principals in order to elicit their views on educator provisioning. Semi-structured and unstructured interviews were also conducted with principals and teacher union officials, respectively. An extensive study was also made of documents relating to educator post provisioning. The data gathered from these data sources was analyzed using critical theory as an over-arching analytical framework. Neoliberalism, managerialism and RAMs were also used as analytical tools in this study.

The conclusions arrived at indicate that we are far from attaining equity in educator distribution. The state's preoccupation with neoliberal 'managerialist' reforms in the education sector is in fact exacerbating inequity in educator distribution. Principals also view the state's policy on educator post provisioning with much negativity.

## **DEDICATION**

For my children, Kreevin and Leasha.

May this study serve as a source of inspiration to you.

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<b>ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS</b>	
ANC	African National Congress
APEK	Association of Professional Educators of KwaZulu-Natal
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DBSA	Development Bank of Southern Africa
DNE	Department of National Education
ELRC	Education Labour Relations Council
EMIS	Education Management Information Systems
FET	Further Education and Training
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEAR	Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy
GNU	Government of National Unity
HOD	Head of Department
KZN	KwaZulu-Natal
KZN DEC	KwaZulu-Natal Department of Education and Culture
KZN ELRC	KwaZulu-Natal Education Labour Relations Chamber
MDM	Mass Democratic Movement
MEC	Member of the Executive Committee
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
NAPTOSA	National Professional Teachers Organisation of South Africa
NP	National Party
NSSF	National Norms and Standards for School Funding
NUPSAW	National Union of Public Service and Allied Workers
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PPM	Post Provisioning Model
PPN	Post Provisioning Norm
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
REQV	Relative Equivalent Qualification Value
SACE	South African Council for Educators

SADTU	South African Democratic Teachers Union
SADTU KZN	South African Democratic Teachers Union KwaZulu-Natal
SAFCERT	South African Certification Council
SAIRR	South African Institute of Race Relations
SEM	Superintendent of Education Management
SGB	School Governing Body
TLSA	Teachers League of South Africa
VSP	Voluntary Severance Package

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **BACKGROUND AND ORIENTATION TO THIS STUDY**

#### **1.1 INTRODUCTION**

Prior to 1994, education in South Africa was structured along racial lines in keeping with the apartheid ideology of the National Party government. Separate education departments catered for the needs of the four principal racial groups in South Africa. This resulted in the creation of nineteen education departments catering for the educational needs of Whites, Indians, Coloured and Africans on a separate and grossly unequal basis. This education system prepared learners in different ways for the positions they were expected to occupy in the social, economic and political life under apartheid.

Apartheid education was characterized by wide-ranging imbalances and inequities. Some of the more notable input inequities in school-based education were the disparities in the per capita expenditure, the learner-educator ratios, the qualifications of educators and physical resource allocation (Naicker 1996:11). The *Education White Paper 2* highlighted these disparities by pointing out that the former racially and ethnically organized departments of education embodied substantial inequalities in per capita spending, the largest disparities being accounted for in the 'skewed' distribution of teacher qualifications, inappropriate linking of salary levels to qualifications, and disparities in learner-educator ratios (South Africa 1996b:29). Thus under apartheid, educator provisioning at public schools, in terms of both their quantitative and qualitative distribution, was a contentious issue and was one of the major contributory factors to the differences in output of the public schooling system of the four race groups in the country.

The coming into power of South Africa's first democratically elected government in 1994 heralded the introduction of a major reform process in education. This reform process

commenced with the creation of a single national ministry of education together with nine provincial education departments which were to cater for the needs of the nine newly formed provinces (Gilmour 2001:6, Soudien 2001:34). Further, the newly elected government committed itself to the elimination of inequalities in the provision of education (Steyn 1999:67). It was the intention of the government to ensure an equitable, efficient, qualitatively superior and financially sound school system for all its learners. The *Education White Paper 2*, therefore, advocated that funding must ensure both equity and redress in funding from public (budgetary) resources, in order to achieve a fair distribution of public funds and the elimination of backlogs caused by past unequal treatment. It further alluded to prioritizing efficiency in resource allocation, utilization and expected outcomes (South Africa 1996b).

Since the Government of National Unity (GNU) came into power in 1994, volumes of policy documents were produced. The majority of these policies were aimed at the transformation of the South African society. Some of the national policies aimed at social transformation were the *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 108 of 1996*, the *Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)* and the *Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR)*. These policies set the general context for the development of policies that were more specific to particular sectors such as education. The general policy context promoted the principles of redress, equity, nation building and democracy (Harley, Bertram & Matson 1999:15).

Historically, the learner-educator ratios favoured the White population group. African education was characterized by extremely high learner-educator ratios. The *National Teacher Education Audit*, commissioned by the Department of National Education (DNE) noted the following inequitable learner-educator ratios in 1994.

Table 1.1: Average learner-educator ratios by race and phase, 1994

<b>RACE</b>	<b>PRIMARY SCHOOLS</b>	<b>SECONDARY SCHOOLS</b>
White	23:1	16:1
Indians	27:1	16:1
Coloureds	27:1	20:1
Africans	43:1	31:1

Source: SAIRR (1996:23)

The learner-educator ratios by province in 1994 further reveals the inequity that prevailed.

Table 1.2: Average learner-educator ratios by new province and race in 1994

<b>PROVINCE</b>	<b>AFRICAN</b>	<b>COLOURED</b>	<b>INDIAN</b>	<b>WHITE</b>	<b>AVERAGE</b>
Eastern Cape	45:1	25:1	23:1	19:1	41:1
Free State	35:1	28:1	-	18:1	31:1
Gauteng	35:1	26:1	24:1	21:1	29:1
KwaZulu-Natal	40:1	24:1	21:1	22:1	35:1
Mpumalanga	35:1	31:1	23:1	18:1	33:1
Northern Cape	35:1	27:1	-	18:1	27:1
Northern Province	38:1	30:1	22:1	19:1	37:1
North West	35:1	31:1	22:1	19:1	33:1
Western Cape	41:1	23:1	13:1	19:1	24:1

Source: Gilmour (2001:7)

The above tables (table 1.1 and table 1.2) illustrate the inequity that prevailed in terms of educator distribution. Therefore, as a matter of priority the DNE set about addressing the issue of the differences in learner-educator ratios through negotiations in the Education

Labour Relations Council (ELRC)<sup>1</sup>. Strongly influenced by World Bank studies which maintained that a learner-educator ratio of 35:1 was appropriate for schools in developing countries, the ELRC in late 1995 passed a significant resolution setting uniform national learner-educator ratios of 40:1 and 35:1 in primary and secondary schools respectively. These norms took effect from January 1996. Further, the *Education White Paper 2* pointed out that these ratios did not stipulate exact class sizes, but instead provided parameters within which each provincial bargaining chamber could negotiate educator provisioning scales for its schools. This was seen as a major step towards equity in the provision of educators to all public schools in the province (South Africa 1996b:29). Notwithstanding these pronouncements to enable the provinces to move towards an equitable distribution of educators within 5 years, there were serious setbacks to this plan (DNE 1998:62).

Given the government's macro-economic policies which focused on financial austerity in terms of spending on social services such as education, serious tensions were created in the provinces in terms of what was affordable and what was needed in terms of educator provisioning. Consequently, many of the provinces as a cost saving measure did not increase their human resource base but instead looked at a more equitable distribution of the existing human resource pool. Further, with the introduction of a decentralized budgetary process and the delegation of educator provisioning to the provinces since 1998, numerous problems were experienced in almost all provinces in attaining national guidelines in terms of learner-educator ratios. Provincial education budgets just weren't large enough to employ additional educators in order to meet the dictates of national guidelines.

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<sup>1</sup> The ELRC is a registered bargaining council for educators. It is made up of two main parties viz. the employer (the state) and the employee (educators, through their representatives which are registered trade unions or organisations).

## **1.2 PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY**

The purpose of this study is to critically analyze the policy on educator post provisioning in ordinary public secondary schools in the province of KwaZulu-Natal.

## **1.3 CRITICAL QUESTIONS**

This study seeks to answer the following critical questions:

- What are the ideological underpinnings of the policy on educator post provisioning?
- What changes has policy on educator post provisioning undergone in order to meet the needs of schools?
- What impact does policy on educator post provisioning have on issues of equity and redress?
- What are the views of school principals with regard to policy on educator post provisioning and its implementation?

## **1.4 RATIONALE FOR THIS STUDY**

Collectively, the following factors provide the rationale for this study:

- The apartheid policies of the National Party government in education have resulted in an inequitable distribution of educators on racial lines to public schools.
- The socio-political change that occurred in 1994 heralded the dawn of the pursuit of transformative policies in education. These policies were underpinned by values of social equity and redress. In terms of educator post provisioning, the goal was equity in educator distribution in public schools.
- The implementation of policy on educator post provisioning has proved controversial and is fraught with problems. There are frequent reversals of policy decisions, postponements of implementation dates and ambiguity in the interpretation of policy documents.

- From the researcher's experience as an educator and member of a school management team (SMT) the following observations were noted:
  - The efforts by SMTs to ensure the delivery of quality public education as well as to ensure effective and efficient schools is being seriously undermined and compromised by the indecisiveness of the KwaZulu-Natal Department of Education and Culture (KZN DEC) with regard to educator post provisioning.
  - The annual announcement of the post provisioning norm for schools together with the prospect of redeployment of educators declared in surplus to their institutions has created tension, bitterness and conflict among educators at public schools. Further, it has led to low morale and a reduction in educator productivity.
  - The movement of educators whilst the academic year is in progress has serious implications for sound school organization and administration.

### **1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STUDY**

This study is significant in that it will:

- add to the scholarly research and literature in the field of educator post provisioning.
- draw the attention of policymakers to the tension between the development of policy on educator post provisioning and the challenges of implementation.
- provide information to policymakers with a view to improving policy on educator post provisioning.
- sensitize both policymakers and education authorities to the views of principals on educator post provisioning.
- inform education authorities of the incongruence between policy intentions of educator post provisioning and practice.

## **1.6 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM**

According to Motala and Mungadi (1999:7), the formation of post apartheid education policies is largely shaped by a macro-economic framework rooted in globalization. They contend that the quest 'for equity, redress and social development' as a policy vision in education is seriously 'being constrained by demands for fiscal restraint and curbs in social spending'.

Given this scenario, the problem to be studied in this envisaged research is whether educator provisioning in a province is 'needs driven' or 'market-driven'. In terms of needs, does prevailing policy ensure equity and redress in educator distribution? Inevitably, this raises questions about the country's macro-economic policies and the ideology or set of ideologies underpinning it.

## **1.7 DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY**

This study is confined to educator provisioning in the post 1994 era when a democratic order was installed into power in South Africa. It is specifically limited to the Province of KwaZulu-Natal.

Given the constraints of time and finance, it was not possible to focus on all school sectors in the Province. Hence, this study is confined to educator post provisioning in the ordinary public secondary school sector in the Province. Notwithstanding this limitation, the researcher is confident that this study has significance for the other eight provinces in South Africa as well as the other public school sectors.

## **1.8 DEFINITION OF TERMS**

In order to facilitate understanding, broad explanations of the key terms associated with this study are provided.

### **1.8.1 POST PROVISIONING MODEL (PPM)**

The PPM is a resource allocation model (RAM). Once the educator pool of a province is determined by the MEC for education in the province, the PPM is used to distribute that pool of educators to public schools. The PPM takes various factors into account which has a bearing on a school's educator post provisioning needs. It is extremely technical and has a number of formulae built into it. It was first used as a RAM in 1999. Owing to growing discontent with the PPM, minor revisions were effected to it in 2002.

### **1.8.2 POST PROVISIONING NORM (PPN)**

The outcome of the application of the PPM is the PPN. The PPN refers to the total number of state paid educator posts allocated to an institution regardless of their post level. It includes classroom-based educators (level 1) and management staff (Education Specialists, Deputy Principal/s and Principal). A PPN report is given annually to all public schools which stipulate the number of state paid level 1 and management posts the school is entitled to.

If a school's staff establishment is above the declared PPN for the year, then that school must declare those posts that are above the PPN as 'surplus'. Educators who are deemed 'surplus' are redeployed through compulsory temporary transfers (CTTs) to schools where vacancies exist. On the other hand, if a school's staff establishment is below the declared PPN for the year, then the school has vacant posts. These posts may initially be filled by educators who are 'surplus' in other schools through a compulsory temporary transfer (CTT) or through the appointment of a temporary educator. The vacant post can only be filled in a permanent capacity through advertisement in a provincial vacancy bulletin.

### **1.8.3 LEARNER-EDUCATOR RATIO**

The learner-educator ratio refers to the ratio between the total number of enrolled learners and the number of state paid educators in the province. It includes educators employed in management posts such as education specialists, deputy principals and principals. It indicates on average the number of learners to be taught by one educator.

In practice, the learner-educator ratio is not a true reflection of class size. Class size is reflected by the learner-classroom ratio. Owing to educators in management positions carrying lower period loads than their post level 1 counterparts, the class size is increased so as to accommodate the reduced period load of management members. In large secondary schools the class size can be as many as six to eight learners above the learner-educator ratio.

### **1.8.4 PUBLIC SCHOOLS**

The *South African Schools Act, 84 of 1996* categorizes all schools in the country as either public schools or independent schools. Public schools refer to the category of schools which, in theory, are almost entirely funded by the state with just minor contributions by the users of the service. In contrast, independent schools are almost entirely funded by personal or private funds of individuals or organisations with the state making only minor contributions or no contribution at all. In South Africa, by far the vast majority of learners attend public schools. The independent schools are the privilege of an elite few.

### **1.8.5 EQUITY**

Equity refers to ‘leveling the playing field’ with no group being privileged in a transformed system (Motala & Mungadi 1999:13). It refers to fairness and justice. Justice may require providing special support to those who were disadvantaged in the past. Equity would ensure that those who were more favoured in the past would receive less, while more will be given to those who were disadvantaged. Therefore, equity may mean that individual persons, even groups of people are treated unequally.

### **1.8.6 REDRESS**

Redress refers to the correcting of past inequalities in policies and practice. In the South African context it refers to a commitment to shift the balance of power in favour of those who have been disadvantaged by apartheid. It is about correcting historical imbalances (Harley, Bertram & Mattson 1999:55).

### **1.8.7 POLICY**

Some simplistic definitions of policy include ‘policy as a general expression of general purpose or desired state of affairs’, ‘policy as specific proposals’, ‘policy as decisions of government’, ‘policy as formal authorization’ and ‘policy as a programme’ (Taylor, Rizvi, Lingard & Henry 1997:23). Ball (1990:3), however, refers to policy as, ‘statements of prescriptive intent’ and ‘as operational statements of values’. Haddad (1995:18) defines policy as an explicit or implicit single decision or group of decisions which may set out directives for guiding future decisions, initiate or retard action, or guide implementation of previous decisions.

Policies are made by, for example, national and provincial governments, municipalities and schools. The policies made by national and provincial governments and implemented through state bureaucracies (central and provincial) are usually referred to as public policy. Social policy, which covers aspects such as health, welfare and education, is one type of public policy. Thus, education policy is a part of social policy (Claassen & Van Wyk 1999:5).

### **1.8.8 IDEOLOGY**

Ideology refers to a set of beliefs and values which coheres together in a more or less systematic way and can, therefore, be differentiated from other such sets. An ideology is held by a group of people, for whom it explains the nature of the reality they experience, and it also has the power to commit them to action (Ashley 1989:2). Zvobgo (1997:49)

defines ideology as a system of thought based on related assumptions, beliefs, and explanation of social movements and policies.

## **1.9 REVIEW OF LITERATURE**

The literature that was selected for review was obtained from a comprehensive search of national data bases such as the NEXUS data base on current and completed research in South Africa and international data bases such as ERIC and EBSCO. The majority of the books and journal articles on the political economy, public management, policy analysis and educator provisioning was obtained from the libraries at the former University of Durban-Westville and University of Natal (Durban) and through inter-library loans. Further, literature on policy issues was obtained from the Education Policy Units at the University of Natal and Witwatersrand.

In addition, literature with regard to educator post provisioning, was obtained from national and provincial ELRC proceedings and annual reports from the DNE and KZN DEC. Circulars issued by the KZN DEC were also surveyed. Memoranda, minutes of meetings and communiqués issued by the teacher unions and associations such as SADTU and APEK were also utilized as a source of information. Information was also obtained from educator publications such as *The Educators Voice* and *The Teacher*. The various newspapers available in KZN were also used as sources of information. Intergovernmental fiscal reports, policy documents on educator provisioning and the relevant legislative Acts were surveyed.

## **1.10 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

A summary of the research methodology employed in this study is presented.

### **1.10.1 OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH PLAN**

In order to address the first critical question namely, what are the ideological underpinnings of the policy on educator post provisioning?, the researcher consulted the

following data sources: the Growth Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR) policy document, the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), the national Norms and Standards for School Funding (NSSF), ELRC deliberations (minutes and reports) and the Intergovernmental Fiscal Review reports. These documents were critically analyzed with regard to its relevance to ideology and educator post provisioning.

The second critical question, namely, what changes has policy on educator post provisioning undergone in order to meet the needs of public schools?, was addressed by consulting the following data sources: *ELRC Resolution 3 of 1996*, *Government Regulation R.593/4 of April 1998*, *Government Regulation R.1676 of December 1998* and *Government Notice R.1451 of November 2002*. These data sources were critically analyzed in terms of the incremental changes that policy on educator post provisioning has undergone.

In order to address the third and fourth critical questions, namely:

- What impact does policy on educator post provisioning have on issues of equity and redress? and
- What are the views of school principals with regard to policy on educator post provisioning and its implementation?

survey questionnaires and interviews (unstructured and semi-structured) were used to gather data. The data obtained from the survey questionnaires were analyzed using a statistical package (SPSS). The interview data were subjected to content analysis by grouping the data into themes and categories.

### **1.10.2 METHODOLOGY**

Based on the critical questions and the available data sources, this study employed both the qualitative and quantitative research paradigms. The researcher saw both the paradigms as complementing each other in this study where the quantitative data was

used to provide ‘breadth’ and the qualitative data was used to provide ‘rich descriptions’ in support of the quantitative data. Further, by combining both methods the researcher was able to ensure that some form of triangulation of the data occurred which in turn enhanced the validity of this study.

### **1.10.3 INSTRUMENTATION AND DATA COLLECTION**

A questionnaire, which was largely quantitative, was used to gather data from principals based at ordinary public secondary schools in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. The questionnaire was the researcher’s primary data gathering tool. Qualitative data was also gathered using semi-structured as well as unstructured interviews in order to corroborate the data gathered from the questionnaire as well as to provide depth. The principals of ordinary public secondary schools were used as informants for the semi-structured interviews and provincial negotiators of educator unions serving on the staffing committee of the ELRC were used as informants for the unstructured interviews.

The qualitative paradigm was also used in the study of documentary sources owing to the fact that the data is largely qualitative. In the study of documentary sources, the researcher sought primarily to describe and secondarily to critically analyze its contents. The study of the documentary sources was integrated into the literature review.

### **1.10.4 SAMPLING PROCEDURE**

Being aware of the fact that it was not possible nor practical to survey the views of the entire population of principals in the province, the researcher opted for selecting a representative sample of principals. In selecting the sample, the stratified systematic sampling technique was used. All 306 principals who were part of the sample were requested to complete the survey questionnaire.

In selecting the informants for the interviews, the purposeful sampling technique was used. Nine principals were selected for the semi-structured interviews and three

provincial negotiators serving on the ELRC Staffing Committee were selected for the unstructured interviews.

The documents selected for study were chosen using the purposeful sampling technique based on their direct or indirect relevance to educator provisioning.

### **1.11 CHAPTER OUTLINE**

This research study is divided into six chapters.

**CHAPTER ONE** provides a general background and overview of the key aspects of this study. The study is introduced by pointing out the inequity that prevailed in educator distribution during the apartheid era and the subsequent transformative initiatives undertaken in the education arena since the advent of democracy in South Africa. The purpose of this study, the critical questions, the rationale for this study, the problem statement as well as the definition of key terms is then presented. A brief outline of methodology employed in this study brings this chapter to a close.

**CHAPTER TWO** points out the intricacies of the policy process by showing the interconnectedness of all social policies and its impact on educator post provisioning. It commences with a discussion on the macroeconomic framework of the country by outlining the essence of the GEAR strategy and its impact on education. The financing of education in terms of overall provincial budgets as well as personnel and non-personnel expenditure trends is also explored. A brief outline on the policy framework for schools is discussed with specific emphasis on the *South African Schools Act* and the role of school governing bodies (SGBs). An account of the private financing provisions of the *Act* is then presented. A study with regard to state policies on educator provisioning is then explored.

**CHAPTER THREE** presents the chosen theoretical frameworks and concepts. It commences by grounding this study in the field of policy analysis and provides a justification for employing critical theory as an over-arching analytical framework in this study. The concept of ideology is then explored with particular reference to neoliberalism. Linked to neoliberalism, managerialism is increasingly being adopted as a mode of governance in the public sector in many societies. Therefore, an account on managerialism and the emergence of a new institutional culture called New Public Management (NPM) is presented. As a consequence of managerialist approaches, the use of resource allocation models (RAMs) are employed to raise efficiency. An account on the characteristics of RAMs, the potential problem areas in the use of a RAM and the equity considerations in using RAMs is then presented.

**CHAPTER FOUR** outlines the methodological approach and methods used to gather data. A justification for combining quantitative and qualitative methods in this study is presented. A description of the survey questionnaire, trialling of the questionnaire the sampling framework and distribution of the questionnaire is outlined. An account on the interviews conducted and documents studied is then presented.

**CHAPTER FIVE** presents the data gathered in response to the critical questions. The questionnaire data which is largely quantitative is presented followed by the qualitative data obtained through interviews. An analysis and discussion of the interview and questionnaire data as well as the document study using the theoretical and conceptual frameworks namely, critical theory, policy analysis, neoliberalism, managerialism and RAMs is then presented.

**CHAPTER SIX** presents the main conclusions and the pertinent recommendations. Conclusions are drawn on the basis of the empirical findings and the relevant recommendations are made.

## **1.12 SUMMARY**

This chapter has provided an introduction and broad orientation to this study. The purpose of this study, critical questions, rationale for this study, statement of the problem and the significance of this study have been clarified. Further, key terms used in this study have been explained. The research methods employed in this study have also been described. This chapter concludes with an outline of each of the six chapters in this study.

The next chapter explores the intricacies of the policy process with regard to educator post provisioning.

## CHAPTER TWO

### THE INTRICACIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS: THE CASE OF EDUCATOR POST PROVISIONING

#### 2.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter outlined the background and orientation to this study. This chapter commences with a discussion of the macroeconomic *Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR)*. The GEAR's impact on the budgetary process as well as its link to the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) is highlighted. The financing of education in terms of overall provincial budgets as well as personnel and non-personnel expenditure trends is also explored.

A brief outline on the policy framework for schools is discussed with specific emphasis on the *South African Schools Act, 84 of 1996* and the role of school governing bodies (SGBs). An account of the private financing provisions of the *Act* is then presented.

A study with regard to state policies on educator provisioning is then explored. The impact of ELRC *Resolution 3 of 1996* as well as ELRC *Resolution 6 of 1998* on educator provisioning is outlined. A discussion as well as commentary on the first nationally approved educator post distribution model as well as the revised post distribution model is presented. This chapter concludes, mainly for illustrative purposes, with an account of how the implementation of policy on educator post provisioning has unfolded in KZN in 2004.

#### 2.2 THE MACROECONOMIC FRAMEWORK

In outlining the macroeconomic framework in South Africa, the essence of the GEAR, the RDP and the GEAR and the GEAR's impact on education is presented.

### **2.2.1 THE ESSENCE OF THE GEAR**

The GEAR represents the considered strategy of government to rejuvenate the South African economy within a framework of economic policies designed to provide a stable environment for long term growth and development. According to the document, the key elements of the vision of the GEAR relate to:

- A competitive fast growing economy which seeks to create jobs for all work seekers.
- The redistribution of income and opportunity in favour of the poor.
- A society in which health, education and other services are available to all, and
- An environment in which homes are secure and work places productive (South Africa. Department of Finance 1996:3).

The document points out that notwithstanding the considerable progress made since the successful democratic transition in the country in economic development, job creation, which is a primary source of income redistribution, remains inadequate. It adds that the present growth trajectory of approximately 3% per annum:

- Fails to reverse the unemployment crisis in the labour market.
- Provides inadequate resources for the necessary expansion in social service delivery; and
- Yields insufficient progress towards an equitable distribution of income and wealth (South Africa. Department of Finance 1996:1).

Consequently, the GEAR argues that in order to attain sustained growth on a higher plane, transformation towards a competitive outward orientated economy is essential. The document claims that the GEAR strategy will attain a growth rate of 6% per annum and job creation of 400 000 per annum by the year 2000 (South Africa. Department of Finance 1996:1).

Pampallis and Motala (1998:7-8) point out that the key argument of the document seems to be that high levels of growth are essential for the delivery of social services such as education and for attaining equity. They add that the GEAR asserts the need for human resource development and for the effective training of managers and workers to enhance

productivity. In keeping with Levin's (1998:131) postulation that education is a key component of a country's ability to improve or maintain their economic welfare; the GEAR regards education as an important determinant of long term economic performance and income redistribution. The sustained improvement of the public education system is a high priority as is the growth in student numbers and improvements in mathematics and science education.

According to Weber (2002:274), the GEAR plan hopes to reduce the budget deficit to 3% of GDP within four years and hopes to achieve this by cutting government spending amongst others. Therefore, careful management of the overall government wage bill is central to the GEAR strategy. Affordability considerations, maintenance of public services and macroeconomic consistency are considered paramount. Right-sizing of the public service is considered key to the management of the government wage bill (South Africa. Department of Finance 1996:8). In terms of government consumption expenditure the GEAR projects the following scenario:

Table 2.1: Integrated scenario projections, 1996-2000

MODEL CHARACTERISTICS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	AVERAGE
Real govt. consumption (% of GDP)	19.9	19.5	19.0	18.5	18.1	19.0
Real govt. investment growth	3.4	2.7	5.4	7.5	16.7	7.1

Source: South Africa. Department of Finance (1996:7)

According to Nicolaou (2001:66), from the GEAR projections it is evident that government consumption expenditure is declining making it likely that allocations to education will continue to decline in real terms, thereby implying a decrease in the wages and salaries component to civil servants. Moreover, it is evident that government investment expenditure is expected to increase dramatically especially in year 2000 to more than double. Nicolaou (2001:67) adds that these projections are only possible given a 6% growth rate. The smaller the growth rate the more detrimental the effect on the government budget and its components.

### **2.2.2 THE RDP AND THE GEAR**

The RDP was drafted, in the main, by organisations associated with the Mass Democratic Movements (MDMs) of the country, mainly COSATU. Hence, it articulated the concerns of the masses and was aimed at addressing the needs of the previously disadvantaged people of South Africa. The RDP assigned a pivotal role to the government in that it was to play a leading and enabling role in guiding the economy and the market towards reconstruction and development. It cautioned that policies aimed purely at economic growth would accentuate existing inequalities and perpetuate mass poverty (Terreblanche 2002:108).

Terreblanche (2002:109) points out that the merits of the RDP were that it clearly and comprehensively described all the distortions and injustices that had become part of South African society during apartheid. More specifically for education it stressed the need to redress the inequalities prevalent in the education system and as such was a policy designed to attain equity.

The GEAR on the other hand was an efficiency policy drafted by economists. In essence, it was a financial strategy aimed at stimulating financial growth in the country. It represented government's strategy to revive the South African economy. The key argument of the GEAR was that high levels of economic growth are essential for the delivery of social services such as education and the attaining of equity (Pampallis & Motala 1998:7) In other words, equity would result as a spin-off from economic growth.

### **2.2.3 THE GEAR AND ITS IMPACT ON EDUCATION**

The GEAR forecasts that it could create jobs and increase GDP by 6% per annum. Since the economy's national income cannot be controlled directly by the government, the government budget becomes the only variable that can be controlled. According to Nicolaou (2001:69), if the growth rate is 3% instead of 6% then the government's budget needs to decrease dramatically since less revenue has been generated. As the government budget declines so does state expenditure on civil service salaries, social investment etc. She adds that in reality the annual growth rate has been declining since 1996 with only

1.7% in 1997 and 0.1% in 1998. With declining growth rates, the smaller national income implies large decreases in government expenditure. The total education budget highlights this trend. Mabe (1998:12) therefore adds that the great irony is that the GEAR document notes that progress in education is vital for economic performance, redistribution and long term transformation of this country but then simultaneously calls for a cut in government spending on education.

According to the GEAR, emphasis is placed on education reform in a context of fiscal constraint, a focus on decentralization, cost saving and cost recovery (through user fees) and a shift of financial responsibility for education from public to private sources (Vally & Tleane 2001:180). This, according to Nicolaou (2001:68), implies that the market system, through user fees, will create an unequal educational process resulting in an elite group of highly educated individuals who attend excellent schools on the one extreme and a mass of poorly educated individuals from public schools on the other. Further, as more services are provided privately (or not at all) the exclusion principle becomes more dominant. Mabe (1998:13) adds that the problem with this is that impoverished communities do not have the means to pay. Consequently, education may become a rare commodity afforded by only the rich. Learners from disadvantaged communities will not be able to attend better and more successful schools. Therefore, the GEAR objectives will in fact increase inequality between the races, gender and provinces (Nicolaou 2001:70).

According to Mabe (1998:12), the GEAR shows many similarities to structural adjustment programmes which reversed the gains made by many African states in the immediate post colonial era. Harber (1988:248), therefore, questions the extent to which educational policy in the new South Africa reflects the educational priorities usually associated with structural adjustment programmes. He adds that countries with structural adjustment programmes have typically undergone the following educational experiences:

- Cuts in the education budget
- A decline in the value of teachers salaries
- Stagnation and reduction in teacher employment
- A slowdown in progress towards education for all

- An increase in the learner-educator ratio
- A decline in enrolment rates
- A reduction in expenditure on teaching materials such as textbooks
- A shift from public finance of education to private finance
- A decline in access for the poor (Harber 1998:248).

## **2.3 THE GEAR AND THE MEDIUM-TERM EXPENDITURE FRAMEWORK (MTEF)**

The manner in which budgets are put together (centralized or decentralized) impacts on the autonomy of the provinces in determining their expenditure on education in general and educator personnel in particular. Hence, a discussion follows on the South African budgetary process and budgetary reform as well as a link between the GEAR and the MTEF.

### **2.3.1 THE SOUTH AFRICAN BUDGETARY PROCESS AND BUDGETRY REFORM**

The *Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, 108 of 1996*, officially adopted in 1997, changed the way budgets are put together in the country. The new budget process is much more decentralized, giving provinces a greater amount of choice in determining expenditures on health, education, welfare and the public service. The new budget process is much more complicated than the old one. In the past only one budget was produced for the whole country. Now, the national government and each provincial government must produce a separate budget – a total of ten budgets instead of one (Heintz 1998:5).

The new thinking focuses on budgets as a tool or operational plan to achieve government's stated objectives. This means that a budget should be driven at all times by substantive policy norms. The net result is that budgets are now viewed as vehicles to produce specific outputs. In South Africa, budget reform is directed by the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and the *Public Finance Management Act*. The MTEF is simply a planning tool that enables spending agencies to project the cost of existing

policies over the medium-term (3 years) and to plan for the incorporation of new policies by requesting extra money over the ceiling that rolled over from the previous year or by identifying potential savings (Wildeman 2001:1). Thus the introduction of MTEF in 1998 resulted in an expansion to the budgetary process. Instead of creating only a budget for one year, the national government and the provinces now have to produce budgets for the next three years (Heintz 1998:5).

The MTEF creates a mechanism for resolving the conflict between what is affordable (a top-down approach) and delivery needs (the bottom-up approach). This conflict is one of the basic tenets of economics – resources are limited but needs are not. However, it must be borne in mind that the final choice over resource allocation and policy remains a political one. The MTEF merely provides the mechanism with which policy can drive budgeting within the limits that the economy can afford (Walker & Mengistu 1999:27).

Chabani Manganyi (2001:34) the former Director-General of Education poignantly notes that the MTEF had a profound impact on the department's understanding of the education system as a whole. He adds that the framework and its review processes made it possible for the Ministry of Education to examine its policy priorities by determining the main expenditure drivers in the system.

### **2.3.2 THE LINK BETWEEN GEAR AND THE MEDIUM-TERM EXPENDITURE FRAMEWORK (MTEF)**

The MTEF is considered an offspring of GEAR. According to the Department of Finance, the purpose of the MTEF is to contribute to achieving consistency between the governments macroeconomic, developmental, social and other commitments. The macroeconomic and fiscal policy targets of GEAR were to serve as the point of departure for the development of strategies and objectives regarding government expenditure. Both the MTEF and GEAR exert similar forces on the government and education budgets. According to Nicolaou (2001:74), the only difference between the two is that the MTEF is a medium-term policy tool which through strategic planning dictates the size of state spending for several years.

The fact that budgets are predetermined for the next three years within the context of fiscal discipline and expenditure saving leaves very little room for flexibility and hence does not allow for needs driven budgetary adjustments.

## **2.4 THE FINANCING OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA**

In the South African context, ordinary public school education is financed from two main sources, namely, the state and from private sources (SGBs through user fees - school fees, donations and fund raising activities). In terms of state financing, approximately 90% of the education budget of a province is spent on personnel costs and approximately 10% of the budget is spent on recurrent<sup>1</sup> and capital costs<sup>2</sup>. The post provisioning model (PPM) distributes in the main the 90% of the budget allocated for personnel to public schools (see section 2.4.2, page 26) and the national Norms and Standards for School Funding (NSSF) distributes the 10% of the budget allocated for capital and recurrent costs to public schools (see section 2.4.3, page 27).

### **2.4.1 PROVINCIAL BUDGETS AND EDUCATION EXPENDITURE**

In countries which consciously promote their own development, expenditure for education and training tends to increase. According to Tesfaye (2002:10), in developing countries the large number of children who reach school age cause a considerable expansion of the demand for education services and a corresponding expansion of expenditure. He adds that owing to the increased expenditure the number of educators tends to increase because of the following considerations:

- The number of hours they work tends to diminish
- The learner-educator ratio tends to fall
- The salaries of the educator staff tend to increase in order to attract the best elements to the profession.

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<sup>1</sup> Recurrent costs apply to physical supplies that are consumed in the educational process within a single budget year.

<sup>2</sup> Capital costs relate to more durable items (land, buildings, equipment) that render useful services over a period of years if properly maintained.

Developments in South African education, however, do not resonate with Tesfaye's pronouncements. Table 2.2 (see below) shows that education expenditure as a percentage of the provincial budgets has been consistently declining. Bot (2003:25) confirms this by pointing out that in 2002/03 the provinces allocated on average approximately 37% of the budget to education as opposed to 40% in 1999. This has, consequently, had a negative impact on educator numbers in the system as well as the above mentioned three considerations identified by Tesfaye.

Table 2.2: Education as a percentage of provincial expenditure.

PROVINCE	ACTUAL			MTEF ESTIMATES		
	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06
Eastern Cape	39.6	40.1	38.6	35.5	36.4	35.5
Free State	40.2	38.6	36.2	36.4	36.3	35.9
Gauteng	37.6	36.0	33.9	32.7	31.5	29.7
<b>KwaZulu-Natal</b>	<b>37.5</b>	<b>37.0</b>	<b>35.7</b>	<b>36.1</b>	<b>34.8</b>	<b>33.8</b>
Limpopo	44.0	42.6	40.0	39.8	38.6	36.9
Mpumalanga	42.7	39.4	40.4	39.8	39.3	39.3
Northern Cape	36.2	34.4	33.6	33.2	32.5	33.1
North West	40.1	40.1	38.2	36.1	35.7	34.8
Western Cape	34.9	34.6	32.9	31.3	30.9	29.9
<b>Average</b>	<b>39.1</b>	<b>38.3</b>	<b>36.7</b>	<b>35.6</b>	<b>35.1</b>	<b>34.0</b>

Source: South Africa. National Treasury (2003:53)

According to the GEAR, roughly 20% of the budget allocated to education was too high. Weber (2002:287) notes that while increasing nominally, education spending has declined in real terms in recent years. On average the education budgets as a percentage of provincial expenditure has declined from 39.1% in 2000/01 to 36.7% in 2002/3. Moreover, in terms of the MTEF estimates, this trend is set to continue and reach 34.0% by 2005/06. In KwaZulu-Natal the actual percentage of the budget allocated to education has always been lower than the national average. From 37.5% of the budget in 2000/01,

expenditure on education over the MTEF is set to decline to 33.8% of the provincial budget in 2005/6.

#### **2.4.2 PERSONNEL EXPENDITURE**

Delivery of education is one of the most personnel-intensive public services. Educators are treated as an input with a cost to the economy equivalent to the value of their salaries (OECD 1970:78). Given the labour intensive nature of education, it stands to reason that personnel costs will consume a large percentage of the education budget. According to Coombs & Hallak (1972:86), 60-90% of the total education costs is often accounted for by staff costs. Spending trends on education personnel in South Africa shows a progressive decline in relation to the education budget. On average the actual spending on education personnel declined to 86.7% of the budget in 2002/03 compared to 90.9% in 2000/01. Bot (2003:26) notes that since 2000, personnel expenditure has gradually been brought under control. Bot reasons that this can be attributed in part to a reduction in the number of educators. Over the MTEF period the percentage spending on educational personnel is set to decrease even further to 82.7% of the education budget. KwaZulu-Natal also shows a similar trend with the percentage spending on personnel declining consistently over the years in relation to the education budget. However, compared to the national average, KwaZulu-Natal expends a larger proportion of its budget on personnel. The declining expenditure trends on personnel costs have serious implications for educators.

Table 2.3: Provincial education personnel expenditure as a percentage of the education budget.

PROVINCE	ACTUAL			MTEF ESTIMATES		
	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06
Eastern Cape	94.2	91.1	88.6	86.1	85.9	83.3
Free State	90.1	88.2	86.6	84.1	81.3	80.9
Gauteng	84.9	83.2	81.8	77.0	77.3	78.2
<b>KwaZulu-Natal</b>	<b>93.2</b>	<b>89.1</b>	<b>88.9</b>	<b>84.2</b>	<b>83.6</b>	<b>83.3</b>
Limpopo	92.2	91.8	89.7	87.0	86.4	87.3
Mpumalanga	93.0	88.9	83.1	81.5	81.4	81.9
Northern Cape	84.1	84.6	81.0	79.8	79.9	78.3
North West	92.1	90.9	89.6	86.5	83.1	82.2
Western Cape	88.7	85.7	83.8	84.3	84.7	84.4
<b>Average</b>	<b>90.9</b>	<b>88.6</b>	<b>86.7</b>	<b>83.7</b>	<b>83.1</b>	<b>82.7</b>

Source: South Africa. National Treasury (2003:57)

### 2.4.3 NON-PERSONNEL EXPENDITURE

The national Norms and Standards for School Funding (NSSF) which came into effect on 1 April 1999, spells out how non-personnel expenditure (capital costs and recurrent costs) will be funded. Capital cost allocations are based on ‘need’ which is defined as:

- Lack of schools in an area, or
- Overcrowding of existing schools.

Based on ‘need’, funds are allocated for the construction of new schools or additional classrooms (South Africa 1998e:sec. 91-95).

In terms of recurrent cost allocations, funds are disbursed to schools based on a resource targeting list. Two equally weighted factors are used to rank schools from poor to least poor, namely:

- The physical condition of the school, facilities and crowding – condition of the school infrastructure, learner-classroom ratio etc.

- The relative poverty of the community around the school (South Africa 1998e:sec. 101).

The rank list of schools are then divided into quintiles which determines the per learner allocation in terms of the resources targeting table. Provinces are not restricted to the grouping of schools into quintiles. The NSSF allows for further sub-divisions. KwaZulu-Natal for example has opted for ten divisions (deciles).

Apart from the distribution of recurrent costs, the resource targeting table is also 'built into' the revised post provisioning model which came into effect in January 2003 (see section 2.6.10.2, page 43). The resource targeting table is used as a distribution tool for the redress component in the revised post provisioning model.

#### **2.4.4 THE NSSF AND PERSONNEL EXPENDITURE**

Whilst the NSSF does not deal directly with personnel costs in provincial education departments, it does set certain policy targets for schools. It spells out the Ministry of Education's personnel policy for schools which include the following key principles:

- Schools must be supplied with an adequate number of educator and non-educator personnel
- Such staff members must be equitably distributed in accordance with the pedagogical requirements of the schools, and
- The costs of personnel establishments must be sustainable within provincial budgets (South Africa 1998e:sec. 24).

The NSSF notes that personnel costs as a percentage of a provincial education department's budget is approximately 90% and points out that this leaves very little in terms of per learner spending on non-personnel costs. According to Vally (1999:10), the consistent reduction in non-personnel expenditure has resulted in parents having to make larger financial contributions to schools. Therefore, as a policy target, based on both local and international evidence, the Ministry of Education declared that personnel:non-personnel expenditure in ordinary public schools should be of the order of 80:20. The personnel:non-personnel expenditure split in provincial education department's budgets

has been the subject of intense scrutiny and analysis by the MTEF Education Sectoral Review Teams, both in 1997 and 1998. The Review Team pointed out the lack of capacity of provincial education departments to manage in particular, personnel provisioning and funding. The consequent result is that high personnel expenditure totally dominates education expenditure and undermines the ability to provide non-personnel resources (Chisholm 1998:6). Given realistic assumptions, the Review Team's 1998 Report pointed out that the 80:20 split advocated by the Department may take many years to achieve and, therefore, recommended that an 85:15 split between personnel and non-personnel expenditure be achieved by 2005. Provinces were, therefore, directed towards meeting this target and their MTEF estimates had to reflect a commitment towards attaining this target (South Africa 1998e:sec. 25-28, DNE 2000:124).

#### **2.4.5 COMMENTARY ON THE NSSF**

In terms of equity and redress, the NSSF acknowledges that existing funding provisions which allow SGBs to improve the quality of education by raising funds for additional resources have mainly advantaged middle class learners in already well-resourced schools. Consequently, the NSSF has been welcomed owing to the fact that recurrent cost allocations will be addressed through schools being targeted for resources on the basis of need (Motala 1998:7).

Motala (1998:8) observes that for the first time school funding and poverty are related both in terms of the paucity of school resources and the socio-economic status of the community in which the school is located. It aims to improve the quality of education by not only redistributing resources, but also redistributing the conditions of learning so as to increase the possibility of attaining 'cognitive equity' amongst all learners in South Africa.

The success of the policy intentions of the NSSF, however, rests on finance. Given the need for fiscal austerity imposed by the GEAR no new funds were going to enter the system. Provinces were to reduce personnel costs in order to finance greater budgetary

allocation for recurrent and capital costs. How personnel costs are going to be reduced without widespread retrenchments is unclear.

NUPSAW (2002b:7) notes that the manner in which schools were classified into the relevant quintiles/deciles was rather unscientific. No *in loco* inspection was done of schools in order to establish the poverty levels of the school community or the school infrastructure. The basis of the classification was the *School Register of Needs* compiled in 1996. They note from a survey conducted that some farm schools were placed in quintile 4 alongside some advantaged schools. They add that some dubious criteria were used in the classification of schools such as tiled roofing of the homes surrounding schools in certain areas and the number of parents that had cars in a particular area. They reasoned that the placement of schools in a particular quintile was dictated by economics: the fewer the schools in quintiles 1, 2 or 3 (the poorest), the less money the education department would have to disburse (NUPSAW 2002b:8).

According to Rademeyer (2004:1), Professor H. Davies of the South African Foundation for Education and Training argues that the financing of schools based on their location and condition of their buildings is no longer a reliable indicator. He stated that the government's model for allocating funds did not take into account the demographic changes to schools since 1994. Therefore, Davies together with the Federation of School Governing Bodies called for individual learners rather than the school as an institution to be funded.

## **2.5 THE POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR SCHOOLS IN SOUTH AFRICA**

Since the installation of a democratic order in South Africa in 1994, the education system has experienced numerous policy changes. The focus and content of these changes have varied over time and among different organs of the educational system. Yet almost all have been overtly driven by principles of equity and redress. Motala and Mungadi (1999:9) also note the impact of global influences on educational reform in South Africa, such as the trend in many developing countries to less directly interventionist state policies which emphasize education growth in a context of fiscal restraint, a focus on

decentralization and cost saving, a re-emergence of human capital approaches to economic growth, a shift of financial responsibility for education from public to private resources and a growth in the notion of partnerships and volunteerism. The policy framework for schools, however, was only established in 1996 with the promulgation of the *South African Schools Act, 84 of 1996*.

### **2.5.1 THE SOUTH AFRICAN SCHOOLS ACT**

The enactment of the *South African Schools Act* heralded a major change in the landscape of school governance in South Africa. Sweeping away the many and varied school categories from the former departments, the *South African Schools Act* provided for only two types of schools, namely public and independent schools. At the core of the *South African Schools Act* was the provision for the establishment of statutory School Governing Bodies (SGBs) entrusted with the task of school governance (South Africa 1996c:sec.16). The SGBs were to comprise the principal (*ex officio*), elected representatives of parents, educators and non-teaching staff and, in secondary schools, learner representatives. The Act further decreed that the number of parent members must comprise one more than the combined total of other members (South Africa 1996c:sec.23). This, according to Fleisch (2002:77), stacked the voting power in favour of the parents.

SGBs were granted considerable powers to manage their own affairs. However, what was abundantly clear in the *South African Schools Act* was the intention of the state to decentralize school governance. This intention was clearly articulated in the *Draft White Paper on Education and Training in South Africa*: ‘the Ministry of Education believes strongly that schools must be owned by the communities they serve’ and ‘schools must increasingly come to manage themselves’ (South Africa 1994:50). Steyn and Squelch (1997:1) note that in recent decades there has been a growing trend towards decentralizing the way schools are managed, with calls for more autonomy at the school site. This is in keeping with school governance trends internationally. Levin (1998:132) points out that many countries have taken steps to move more authority to individual schools and to strengthen the role of parents in governing schools. Therefore, Steyn and

Squelch (1997:1) add that in terms of the changes taking place in South Africa as a whole and in education in particular, more emphasis is now being placed on decentralized management. A new concept has thus gained currency in the governance of schools in South Africa – that of self-managing schools.

### **2.5.2 THE SOUTH AFRICAN SCHOOLS ACT AND PRIVATE FUNDING**

An area of serious concern arose in the area of funding in the *South African Schools Act*. As Fleisch (2002:78) notes: ‘for its critics, the core of the *South African Schools Act* was the radical financial provision’. Given the economic policies of the state, it was unwilling to commit huge additional funds to education. Consequently, the only option was to allow parents to supplement the state’s contribution. Weber (2002:285) agrees with Fleisch by stating that in line with the GEAR market forces will determine the provision of education. On the advice of international school finance consultants working for the DNE it was recommended that SGBs be given the right to set and compel (even by processes of law) the collection of school fees based on the consent of the majority of parents in each school. This provision has created a situation where wealthy parents are able to provide better resources for the schools their children attend. Consequently, Weber (2002:285) notes that the quality of a good education is correlative to the price that is paid. Education is thus, fundamentally, reduced to a commodity. Fleisch (2002:80), however, notes quite alarmingly that the notion that most parents would be expected to pay something for their children’s schooling, in some cases a substantial portion of their disposable income, surprisingly with very little opposition became part of the *South African Schools Act*.

Critics have pointed out that the inevitable consequence of a differentiated school fee structure would mean that some schools could peg school fees at a high level, while poor and working class communities could feasibly expect to levy only extremely modest fees. This would inevitably lead to the continuation of uneven per capita expenditure. They also point out that this was a departure from the ANC education manifesto that was interpreted by many to mean free education for all (Fleisch 2002:79). Weber (2002:285) adds that a likely outcome is that, in the long run, there will be systematic inequality

between a small number of rich schools for whites and middle class blacks and a majority of poorly resourced schools catering mainly for blacks. He adds that in China the devolution of central funding to local levels, as a part of decentralization of education, has widened disparities between rich and poor regions. Class differences have similarly widened in Russia, Australia and New Zealand.

According to the DNE's review on public school finance, schools raise an estimated R3.5bn to R5bn a year from fees and other sources, which represents 8-12% of the cost of public schooling (DNE 2003). Bot (2003:34) notes that although schools in poor communities charge relatively low fees, many parents cannot afford these. Therefore, she adds that it is not surprising that since the imposition of school fees, the issue has been contested because it imposes an additional burden on poor parents and contradicts the right to free, compulsory education. The former national Minister of Education, Professor Kader Asmal has agreed that the payment of school fees remained one of the obstacles hindering universal access to education, but emphasized that fees were necessary as government did not have sufficient resources (Bot 2003:34).

Soudien, Jacklin and Hoadley (2001:81) point out that within the context of resource efficiency as a discourse in South African education, baseline levels of provision of personnel, equipment and materials are assumed to exist in terms of which learning and teaching are presumed to be possible. Beyond these baselines, communities and individuals have the right to exercise their individual tastes by resourcing schools above the baseline provision by the state through user fees. Through granting schools the right to set user fees, Soudien, Jacklin and Hoadley (2001:82) argue that the state is instituting financing practices which embody the principles of consumer choice. This, they add has the effect of locating individual schools within a market which differentiates schools according to the degree to which a particular parent body is able to supplement public provision with additional private funding. TLSA (1999b:2) notes that the education policy strategies of the state are promoting privatization, in that, to an ever increasing extent the funding of schools is being shifted onto parents and other stakeholders as part of a general process of the privatization of all aspects of life in South Africa.

In terms of educator provisioning, the *Education Laws Amendment Act, 100 of 1997*, which amended the *South African Schools Act*, made provision for schools to appoint educator staff in addition to those employed and paid for by the state. The appointment of such staff, the Act deemed, would be the responsibility of the SGB and would be paid for out of school funds raised by parents (SAIRR 2000:176). Consequently, the NUPSAW (2002a:2) notes that schools located in advantaged communities, which have the financial means, can employ the extra teachers they need. The TLSA (1999a:12) notes that at many schools there was acrimonious debate when SGBs were forced to create ‘SGB posts’. Since the educators paid by the education department were insufficient to meet the needs of schools, SGB’s had to find the money to employ the necessary educators. These SGBs, however, were accused of being agents of privatization. The accusation was that in using school funds to pay for additional educators, SGBs were implicitly condoning the states abdicating its responsibility to pay all the educators a school needs. However, when some SGB’s refused to employ additional educators, they were accused of playing politics while children’s education suffered.

SGBs are increasingly being called upon to hire additional educators owing to the decline in the number of state paid posts allocated to a school. Motala (2002:11) has noted that nationally, the number of state paid educators decreased from 97.1% in 1996 to 91.8% in 2000 and educators paid by school governing bodies increased from 2.9% in 1996 to 8.2% in 2000. Given the high learner-educator ratios prevalent in KZN (see section 2.6.11, page 61), Ramrathan (2002:40) notes that schools are being forced to employ educators through their school budgets to support the number of learners in their schools. He further notes that employment trends suggest that there will continue to be an increase in demand for privately paid educators as this market begins to increase.

A research study conducted in the Western Cape has shown that schools that can afford to appoint or keep additional educator staff perform better in key subjects such as mathematics. On the other hand, schools that charged school fees of between R0 – R 200, had very few learners taking subjects such as mathematics (Rademeyer 2004).

## **2.6 DEVELOPMENTS WITH REGARD TO EDUCATOR PROVISIONING**

According to House (2000:13) no government in liberal democracies can survive without economic expansion. However, the concern for economic growth is manifested in a drive for greater efficiency and this has special implications for education. In most countries educational policies appear to be formulated primarily with regard to the national economy and without sufficient regard for educational practice. Government budgets, therefore, constrain educational spending and hence educational policies are frequently formulated to reduce costs and increase the productivity of schools (House 2000:14).

The impact of economic concerns on education manifests itself in what Lam (2001: 347) terms ‘finance-driven’ reform and is characterized by the following:

- Shifting public funding from higher to lower levels of education thereby giving more students greater educational opportunity.
- Increases in school fees to bridge the gap between the actual cost and subsidies.
- Reducing school expenditure by holding down salary bills and increasing class sizes.

In the South African context, however, ‘finance-driven’ reform, through the neoliberal GEAR macroeconomic policy has, however, been coupled with ‘equity-driven’ reform. The ‘equity-driven’ reform aims at providing basic education and greater educational opportunities to the disadvantaged populations through the redistribution of resources within the educational system.

Given the inequity that prevailed on racial lines in the distribution of educator posts, the major task that faced the new government was that of ensuring a fair and equitable distribution of educator posts. However, the need for fiscal austerity meant that equity was to be regulated using policy mechanisms for redistributing the existing pool of educator posts both between and within provinces. The idea was that all schools would be subject to a uniform set of learner-educator ratios, the result of which would be that most advantaged schools (formerly White, Indian and Coloured schools) would lose educator posts, and many disadvantaged schools (formerly African schools) would gain educator

posts. For the system as a whole, however, the total pool of educators would remain the same (Fleisch 2002:42).

### **2.6.1 RESOLUTION 3 of 1996**

After protracted negotiations between educator unions and the state at the national ELRC, *Resolution 3 of 1996* was adopted. *Resolution 3 of 1996* provided for the right-sizing of the educator corps and spelt out a programme by which posts at education institutions will be redistributed to give effect to the policy of equity in educator post provisioning. According to *Resolution 3 of 1996*:

The phasing in of equity in the funding of education between provincial education departments will result in the provision of educator personnel increasing in some departments and decreasing in others. However, it is not envisaged, that the total educator personnel provision in the country will be reduced. In order to manage the process of attaining equity, excess educators in education departments or components thereof will be redeployed (ELRC 1996: sec. 1.3).

It was pointed out that right-sizing of the educator force must be seen as a process and not a single event. Therefore, agreements in the national ELRC identified April 2000 as the date by which equity must be achieved. Notwithstanding national time frames for the achievement of equity with regard to educator distribution, the provincial ELRC of KZN was of the view that equity should be achieved as soon as possible and a time span of initially two years which was later readjusted to two and a half years was agreed to in its management plan. Thus, KZN envisaged achieving equity in the distribution of educator posts by April 1999 (ELRC 1996: sec. 1.2; KZN DEC 1996: D 2.2 – 2.3).

#### **2.6.1.1 DETERMINATION OF STAFFING NORMS**

Given the ANC government's stance that education expenditure, as a percentage of the overall budget would not increase because of the assumption that government expenditure on education was already high (24% of expenditure and over 4% of GNP), financial modeling revealed that the country could not afford learner-educator ratios below 35:1 (Fleisch 2002:46-47). Given this scenario, nationally, ratios of 35:1 were adopted for secondary schools and 40:1 for primary schools. It was also stated that these

ratios would also be applicable for the 1997 school year but added that the ratios may be amended in the light of research to be conducted into, *inter alia*, the workload of educators and the functions of Deputy Principals and Heads of Departments (ELRC 1996:1.4; KZN DEC 1996: D2.4-.7; DNE 1996:56).

In order to distribute educator posts to schools on an equitable basis, a staffing norm (a formula by which posts are allocated to schools) developed by the KZN DEC was used. The norm was to be an interim staffing norm. It took no account of the different post levels, for example Heads of Departments, Deputy Principals and Principals. It only stipulated the total number of educator posts a school qualified for including management personnel. The formula basically had four components, as follows:

- a *basic allocation* based on the number of learners and an optimal class size for each phase.
- a *non-contact allocation* to enable educators to have non-contact, or non-teaching time.
- a *management allocation* to allow for the management of the school.
- an *additional allocation* for schools offering certain technical or agricultural subjects and music (as an examination subject) (KZN DEC 1996:F2).

Based on the above, an interim staffing norm for schools was determined and schools were categorized within the framework of agreements and procedures into three different categories:

- schools which are less favourably staffed than the agreed norms of 40:1 and 35:1
- schools which are more favourably staffed than the agreed norms of 40:1 and 35:1, but less favourably staffed than the interim staffing norm; and
- schools which are more favourably staffed than the interim staffing norm.

A three step process was then planned to attain equity. The first step which was to have been completed at the beginning of 1997, involved the shedding of posts at schools which were more favourably staffed than the interim staffing norm and the redistribution of these posts to schools that were less favourably staffed. After completion of step one it

was envisaged that there would be just two categories of schools, namely, schools that are less favourably staffed than the agreed norms of 40:1 and 35:1 and schools which are more favourably staffed than these norms. Step two entailed the shedding of posts from the more favourably staffed schools to the less favourably staffed schools. By April 1998, it was envisaged that a final staffing norm will be introduced and the final step, step three, will be set in motion. Step three was a move to finally bring all schools to equitable staffing, except where the staffing norm differentiates on the basis of, for example, the inclusion of technical subjects (KZN DEC 1996:D).

#### **2.6.1.2 IMPLEMENTING *RESOLUTION 3 of 1996***

*Resolution 3 of 1996* had the backing of the educator unions and the unions committed themselves to supporting the actual process of right-sizing in schools. Within the education departments, however, Fleisch (2002:48) notes that there were two competing conceptions of school right-sizing. For the old guard, right-sizing was simply a technical activity in which schools would adjust their educator establishments to comply with the new formula. The activist-bureaucrats, in contrast, viewed the right-sizing process as a political instrument of deracialisation and redress. These managers saw school right-sizing as opening the way for white educators to move into historically black schools. It was part of the greater project of social transformation.

In practice, the right-sizing process only commenced late in 1996 (Steyn 1999:68). However, early in 1997 it was realized by the national and provincial education departments that the process of right-sizing of educators had not progressed according to plan and had not had the desired effect. Steyn (1999:69) advances the following reasons for this:

- The incapacity of most provincial education departments to manage this very complicated process efficiently.
- The lack of co-operation and co-ordination between the provincial education departments to redeploy educators across the provincial borders.
- The redeployment scheme proceeded from the assumption that educators could simply be moved from one part of the system to another. They did not bank on the

reluctance of educators to be redeployed. In some cases, for a variety of good reasons, redeployment of specific educators was impossible or very problematic. Although some 24 000 redeployment opportunities had been gazetted nationally, Duncan Hindle, the then Director of Human Resources in the National Department of Education, said that only 5 000 educators had been redeployed (SAIRR 1998:156).

- The fierce opposition to the process by educator organizations despite earlier commitment to the process. Motala (1996:9) notes that some of the signatories to the agreement, especially NAPTOSA, have come out to criticize plans to redistribute educators.
- The unexpectedly high numbers of educators in all provinces who applied for the voluntary severance packages (VSP's). This was most likely because many educators felt insecure about a future in teaching. According to SAIRR (1998:157), in KZN, 3 200 educators applied for the VSP and 3 100 applications were granted. Nationally, by April 1997, more than 19 000 educators applied for the VSP, and close to 16 000 packages were granted (SAIRR 1998:156). In August 1997 a provincial review report found that most provincial education departments had drained themselves of vital skills and expertise by the granting of VSP's (SAIRR 1998:157).
- Decisions made by some provincial education departments (e.g. KZN) to accelerate the process to reach the national learner-educator ratio goals well before the year 2000 (see section 2.6.1, page 36).

Owing to budgetary constraints, several provinces announced in November 1997 that the services of temporary educators would be suspended in 1998 (DNE 1998:63). The SADTU estimated that some 48 000 educators would be effected by this suspension, many of whom had been in the employ of the state for several years. Thulas Nxesi, the SADTU General Secretary, claimed that the state was now prepared to abolish educator posts rather than transfer them to areas of need. This, he added, amounted to downsizing in education rather than rightsizing. He, therefore, reasoned that rightsizing was no longer on the state's agenda, but education cutbacks were (Geyer & Skinner 1998:3). The

NAPTOSA declared that provinces were in reality not overspending on education. The NAPTOSA argued that the problem was that the provinces were provided with totally inadequate funding to meet their educator needs. Duncan Hindle, however, maintained that temporary educators had fixed term contracts and provinces were simply honouring those contracts by allowing them to expire (SAIRR 1998:158).

### **2.6.1.3 TERMINATION OF THE NATIONALLY DRIVEN RIGHTSIZING PROCESS**

Given the failure in the implementation of the rightsizing process, the then National Minister of Education, Professor Sibusiso Bengu announced in December 1997 that the department had abolished national guidelines on learner-educator ratios as well as the educator rightsizing programme. Provinces would, henceforth, decide how many educators they could afford to employ and then set their own learner-educator ratios based on their individual budgets. Professor Bengu added that these measures were necessary as the Minister of National Education no longer had a say in the provincial education budget allocations owing to changes in the budgetary process and current measures for educator provisioning do not necessarily harmonize with the new budgetary measures (SAIRR 1998:159; DNE 1998:62-3).

### **2.6.1.4 RESOLUTION 3 OF 1996 AND RIGHTSIZING**

The Department of National Education noted that the rightsizing process had a valid principle: the attainment of equity in the distribution of human resources to schools. As the major resource input to schools, the rightsizing process was viewed as a significant step towards greater equity in education (DNE 2000:44). However, the government conceded that its policies had failed. Cost cutting had become more important than promoting equity. Weber (2002:289) notes that what started off as redeployment and redistribution of educators, ended up as retrenchment when thousands of educators left the system. Weber adds that the rightsizing of educators between 1996 and 1998 failed to equalize learner-educator ratios or to cut costs.

Motala and Pampallis (2001:5) note that whereas provinces recognized the importance of the redeployment of educators to disadvantaged school communities, the process of implementing such redeployment policies was overtaken by the need to rationalize aggregate numbers of educator personnel in the system as a whole. They add that this was done largely, if not entirely, in response to the demands of the states fiscal policies.

Fleisch (2002:59) contends that the rightsizing process failed dismally in its attempt to produce a leaner, more efficient and productive public service. Based on information from a senior department official, he claims that rightsizing failed because of poor planning. In Fleisch's view, the architects of the plan did not have reliable information on medium-term educator demand and supply, overestimated provinces' capacity to undertake large and complex processes less than one year after their establishment and failed to anticipate educator reactions (Fleisch 20002:60).

Minister Kader Asmal, in acknowledging expectations of educators of stability and job security, noted the 'unwished-for side-effects' of the rightsizing process by declaring that many educators have been demoralized by the uncertainty and distress of rationalization and redeployment (DNE 2000:41). Further, Gilmour (2001:13) adds that the process of rightsizing has divided schools, generated learner protests, continues to create a political furore, and places intolerable pressure on principals who have to oversee the process. Soudien (2001:38) notes that at schools affected by the rightsizing process, educators in unison speak of increased incidences of stress from having to deal with increased learner numbers, overcrowded classrooms and larger teaching and marking loads.

With the large number of educators having taken the voluntary severance packages (VSPs), there was a stripping of expertise from the system, both at the managerial level and at the level of classroom specialization. This was largely because there was no restriction on the eligibility of those who may wish to leave. Further, the granting of VSPs came at a huge financial cost to the provincial education departments and many provinces were plunged into financial crises due to the granting of VSPs. In order to 'balance the books' the reaction of most of the provinces was to cut non-teaching

professional services (such as counselling and special education) and reduce expenditure on non-personnel items (Gilmour 2001:13).

### **2.6.2 SHOWDOWN BETWEEN EDUCATOR UNIONS AND THE STATE WITH REGARD TO EDUCATOR PROVISIONING**

In KZN, in order to keep within the allocated budget for personnel expenditure, the KZN DEC issued *Circular HRM 1 of 1998* which stated that the services of temporary educators occupying substantive posts will be terminated at the end of February (KZN DEC 1998a:1). In a subsequent Circular, *HRM 4 of 1998*, the department explained its stance on the non-renewal of contracts of temporary educators. It advanced that it 'was constrained to adopt certain austerity measures as a result of the severe cut-backs in its budget' (KZN DEC 1998b:1).

In March 1998, KZN dismissed all temporary educators (7 000 educators). The SADTU accused the KZN department of education of being inconsistent in the selection of educators for dismissal and not acting in the spirit of national ELRC agreements which stipulated that only educators employed after July 1996 would be considered temporary. Instead, the department dismissed educators employed before this date. The department then planned on selectively re-employing certain temporary educators based on curriculum needs in the schools. The Provincial Secretary of SADTU KZN, Ndaba Gcwabaza, declared that the re-appointment process was chaotic with some temporary educators being re-employed on a month to month contract basis whilst other educators were given contracts until the end of December 1998. Moreover, he added that Superintendents of Education Management (SEMs) were moving into schools and shifting educators around wily-nily. In some instances SEMs shifted educators to schools with full staff complements and ignored understaffed schools (The Educators Voice 1998b:14).

In the absence of nationally agreed norms and standards on educator provisioning, the SADTU argued that no rationalization or retrenchment should be taking place. The effects of the retrenchment of the temporary educators on the school system in KZN was

pointed out, namely, large class sizes due to the compression of classes and permanent educators taking on the additional workloads of the retrenched temporary educators (Naidoo 1998:5). The SADTU then tabled a proposal at national ELRC which included the following:

- A rejection of retrenchments of temporary educators and called for redeployment.
- A call for national norms and standards for post provisioning, arguing that provinces should not be given the power to decide these ratios.
- An indication that provinces did not have the capacity to deal with increased budget control.
- A statement that equity and redress would not be achieved if this was made dependent on each provincial department's budget (Geyer 1998:2).

The state's failure to respond to these proposals led the SADTU to declare a formal dispute with the state at national ELRC. Notwithstanding the SADTU's proposal and dispute with the state, the National Minister of Education, Professor Bengu, went ahead and published regulations supporting the states proposals on educator provisioning (Geyer 1998:2).

The National Minister of Education noted that in terms of the *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa*, 108 of 1996, provincial legislatures are empowered to determine the funding of a provincial education department and the *Labour Relations Act*, 66 of 1995, provided for rationalization linked to operational requirements. The Minister, therefore, promulgated legislation (*Government Regulation 593 and 594 of 1998*) declaring that the following regulations will apply in respect of future post provisioning and rationalization processes:

- A Member of the Executive Council (MEC) must, after the provincial department of education's budgetary allocation has been approved, and after the department has determined what proportion of the budgetary allocation should be allocated for the creation of educator posts in that province, determine the total educator establishment of such a department.

- The head of a provincial education department must allocate from the provincial pool of educators, educator posts to educational institutions and departmental offices, taking into account guidelines determined by the National Minister.
- In the event of a change in the number of posts created in a department or allocated to an educational institution or departmental office, the position of educators affected by such change must be dealt with in terms of the *Labour Relations Act*, 66 of 1995 (South Africa 1998b; South Africa 1998c).

These regulations meant that the provincial education budgets would form the basis for determining the provincial pool of educators. Further, the regulations would also devolve post provisioning norms to provinces. By divesting itself of the responsibility for determining national norms for educator provisioning, the National Department would force unions to negotiate with provinces individually. From the unions' point of view the prospect of negotiating nine separate agreements was problematic, opening up the potential of splitting the organization in nine parts, thereby diluting the strength of the union (Fleisch 2002:57).

The new regulations led to a showdown between the National Minister of Education and educator unions. The SADTU was of the view that devolving powers to the provinces would fragment education and create nine different departments with different transformation agendas (Geyer & Skinner 1998:3). The matter eventually went to mediation. Given the tremendous pressure that was brought to bear on the state, the state at national ELRC was forced into an agreement with educator unions which included the following:

- The national minister will determine national norms and standards for educator post provisioning by endorsing this policy in the *National Education Policy Act*.
- The minister will enter into consultation with educator unions in the ELRC with a view to reaching an agreement on policy before it is determined.
- Temporary teacher contracts be extended until teachers can be redeployed.
- The withdrawal of *Regulations 593 and 594* as well as the opening of negotiations on new regulations to replace *Regulations 593 and 594* (Geyer 1998:2).

The agreement between the state and teacher unions culminated in the signing of *ELRC Resolution 6 of 1998*.

Fleisch (2002:57) points out that the unions had won a key victory, although they conceded some points. Whilst the condition that the provinces could determine the size of their educator post pool based on their budgets, the minister would set national learner-educator ratio targets.

At national ELRC, provinces were required to make submissions as to what learner educator ratios they could afford. Based on these ratios, the state set national norms and standards at a ceiling of 39:1 and a target of 37:1. Duncan Hindle (Grey 1998:2), Chief Director of Education Human Resources, argued that this was ‘an extremely favourable ratio’, representing ‘an abstract ceiling’ above which no province is allowed to go. He pointed out that many provinces had proposed ratios that were substantially below this ceiling. The only province to come in close to the ceiling of 39:1 was KZN. Hindle pointed out that the national average ratio was a manageable 35:1. The unions were far from happy with these norms. Their dissatisfaction stemmed from the fact that these norms do not represent actual class size. Edwin Pillay, Deputy President of SADTU added that class sizes may be as large as 55:1. The SADTU remained steadfast in its position that the national norm should be 32:1, and believed that the state’s proposal threatened the job security of educators and created the platform for retrenchments. The union vowed to continue to consult at a political level with regards to national norms and standards in order to influence policy (The Educators Voice 1998a:2; Grey 1998:3).

The DNE acknowledged in its *Annual Report of 1998* that educator post provisioning was indeed a contentious issue and consequently it was seeking solutions to the problem. They added that the department had engaged in a study of ‘appropriate proportions’ of resource inputs to education. Through an extensive process of consultation, research and piloting, the Department announced that it had developed a policy driven model for the distribution of educator posts. This model, the department claimed, allowed for educators

to be provided according to the complex curricular needs of each school. The model, it claims, was tested in all provinces and was to be implemented in 1999 (DNE 1998:68).

### **2.6.3 PERSONNEL COSTS**

The Education Sectoral MTEF Review Team had identified a major problem with educator personnel costs which had risen dramatically since 1995/96. A new process had to address the question of equity in the distribution of educators as well as responding to the financial pressure on provincial personnel and non-personnel budgets. The Minister was, therefore, obliged to issue a new set of regulations, which gave MEC's the responsibility for determining educator establishments within their budgetary allocations. Budgetary allocations for personnel, however, had to be scaled down. The 1998 MTEF Review set a target of 85:15 split on personnel: non-personnel costs in order to permit an increase in funding on learner resource materials, educator development and other qualitative inputs (DNE 2000:124).

### **2.6.4 THE *EMPLOYMENT OF EDUCATORS ACT, 76 OF 1998* AND EDUCATOR POST PROVISIONING**

The *Employment of Educators Act, 76 of 1998* had a significant bearing on educator post provisioning. In terms of section 3(3b) it was now legislated that for the purposes of creating posts, the MEC in charge of education in a province was deemed to be the employer of educators in service in that province. Further, in terms of determining educator establishments, the *Act* stipulated the following:

- The MEC for education shall determine the educator establishment of a provincial education department.
- The Head of Department of education in a province shall subject to prescribed post provisioning norms allocate posts to schools (South Africa 1998a:sec. 5).

### **2.6.5 THE CREATION OF EDUCATOR POSTS AND THE NEW POST DISTRIBUTION MODEL**

In keeping with provisions of the *Employment of Educators Act, 76 of 1998*, the Minister of Education introduced measures in terms of *Government Regulation No. R.1676* for the

creation of educator posts in a provincial department of education as well as the distribution of such posts to schools.

The Regulation was quite explicit on aspects of educator post provisioning and contained the following important provisions:

- In determining the post establishment of a provincial education department, the MEC must consult with trade unions in that province which are members of the ELRC and governing body organizations which are active in that province.
- In the creation of posts, the MEC must take into account the budget of the provincial education department; the effect the post establishment will have on the employment security of educators; the need for redress in the implementation and promotion of curriculum policy; the fact that the division between expenditure between personnel and non-personnel costs in the budget should be educationally and financially justifiable and in accordance with national policy.
- In determining the educator post establishment, the MEC must take into account the terms and conditions of employment of educators that may be affected by the post establishment, including provisions for leave, substitution and remuneration related issues (South Africa 1998d:1a-d).

The *Regulation* also spelt out the post distribution model (a resource allocation model) to be used in determining educator posts at schools. An important factor to be taken into account in the distribution of educator posts was the need for redress in the implementation and promotion of curriculum policy. The head of a provincial education department was tasked with the responsibility to determine an annual programme in this regard after consultation with trade union parties to the ELRC and governing body organizations which are active in that province (South Africa 1998d:2b).

#### **2.6.5.1 THE POST PROVISIONING MODEL (PPM)**

The PPM was the brainchild of the Department of National Education. According to Motala (1998:9), the main motivation for the development of a post provisioning model was that educator posts need to be allocated optimally, and the creation and distribution

of posts must be in line with the funds available for this purpose. It was a significant shift from earlier policy guidelines where a uniform learner-educator ratio was set down. The PPM was workshopped, debated and amended to the fairest possible option at national ELRC before implementation.

The PPM determines the relative need and priority, in respect of post provisioning, of each school and distributes the total pool of available posts to these schools in accordance with the relative needs and priorities. The norms according to which the needs and priorities are determined are based on the following factors:

- Educational and organizational requirements in respect of class size.
- Whether or not more than one language medium is used.
- The number of school phases provided for.
- Disabilities of learners.
- The size of the institution.

A school's share of the total pool of educators in a province is determined by the weighting of all learners in accordance with their relative post provisioning needs, after which the available posts are divided among the schools *pro rata* to their weighted number of learners. Apart from the posts distributed to schools through this model, provision should also be made for *ad hoc* allocation of posts to institutions where specific circumstances necessitate such additional allocations. A limited, but sufficient number of posts, therefore, need to be retained in a central pool for this purpose (South Africa 1998d: Annexure 1).

An important acknowledgement in the *Regulation* is that although a public school's curriculum has a bearing on its post allocation, the inequities that exist among schools with regard to curriculum offerings are not taken into account by the PPM. Heads of education departments were, therefore, empowered to address separately these inequities. The annual programme according to which the department will address these inequities should include the retention of posts in a central pool for the allocation thereof to schools

where these subjects are introduced and which, therefore, qualify for additional posts in terms of the PPM (South Africa 1998d:Anexure A).

### **2.6.5.2 WEIGHTING NORMS**

Different weighting norms were applied to the design features of the PPM. The weightings were applied as follows:

#### **Public Schools:**

- A learner in grade 1, 2 or 3 is counted as 1.15 weighted learners based on the need to have smaller class sizes during the formative phase.
- A learner in grade 4, 5, 6 or 7 is counted as 1 weighted learner.
- Learners in grades 8 and 9 are weighted in terms of study fields based on the need to have smaller class sizes in certain subjects (usually those with a practical component).
- Learners in grades 10 to 12 are weighted in terms of all their subjects. The weightings that apply to these subjects are based on class size requirements. In respect of each learner the relevant weightings applicable to his or her six examination subjects are accumulated plus provision for non-examination subjects.

#### **Special provision for schools with more than one language medium of instruction**

- Schools offering instruction in an additional language medium will have the number of weighted learners being taught in the additional language in each grade increased by 15%.

#### **Combined schools**

- If a school offers education to learners in the primary as well as the secondary section, an additional educator post is allocated to the school.

### **Learners with special educational needs**

- Learners who have special educational needs as a result of severe disabilities are weighted in terms of their disability category.
- Learners who are mildly to moderately disabled are weighted in terms of the curriculum they follow and not in terms of their disability.

### **Formula**

- The number of posts to be allocated to a school is determined by means of the following formula:

$$P = \frac{wl}{twl} \times (p - c \times Inst) + c$$

Where  $wl$  = total number of weighted learners at the school

$twl$  = total number of weighted learners in the provincial department

$p$  = total number of posts to be distributed to all schools

$Inst$  = total number of schools to which the posts need to be distributed

$c$  = a constant value that determines the extent to which the formula will benefit smaller institutions

### **2.6.6 IMPLEMENTATION OF *RESOLUTION 6 OF 1998***

In terms of educator provisioning all provincial education departments were to implement *ELRC Resolution 6 of 1998* which set out to:

- Entrench principles of redress and equity in educator provisioning.
- Provide clear directives to provinces on procedures to be followed in determining educators surplus to an institution as well identifying vacancies. Through the process of redeployment, educators deemed to be in surplus at an institution were to be moved to institutions where vacancies existed.
- Protect educators from victimization.
- Ensure the participation of educator unions at all levels of the process (Geyer 1999:2).

The PPM was to be used as a tool to facilitate the implementation of *Resolution 6 of 1998*. According to Geyer (1999:2), all provincial education departments were to verify

the statistics of the number of educators they had on their records and develop management plans indicating the number of educator posts they could afford. The PPM was then to be used to distribute the educator posts to institutions. Provinces after determining the post establishments of institutions, issued a post provisioning norm (PPN) report (see example of PPN report on page 52) to schools indicating the number of educator posts the province will fund at the school. Based on the PPN report, institutions were to engage in the process of identifying educators surplus to the institution or declare possible vacant posts that may exist. In order to identify educators deemed to be surplus or possible vacancies that may exist at an institution, a comprehensive procedure manual, to guide the process was issued to institutions.

Serious problems were encountered in the implementation of *Resolution 6 of 1998*. Some provinces had problems verifying the number of educators on the payroll. In some provinces there were serious problems with computer software and they lacked the technological capacity to assist them in applying the PPM to determine the post provisioning norm (PPN) of schools. Another problem was the lack of basic data in some provinces. This led many schools to question the correctness of the PPNs supplied to them (The Educators Voice 1999:3).

In KZN, two circulars were issued, *HRM 51 of 1998* and *HRM 1 of 1999* (procedure manuals for the implementation of the PPN), as well as the PPN Report for each school, in order to manage the process of rationalization and redeployment of educators. However, many schools questioned their PPNs. The APEK advised its members to check their PPNs as some schools had detected errors which were eventually corrected by the department. Organized labour pointed out the problems regarding the programme used to calculate the PPN to the Department (APEK 1999:2). The Department thus declared that ‘pursuant to queries and complaints with regard to the staff allocation, the department in consultation with the national department of education deemed it necessary to apply an amended programme.’ The amended programme resulted in some schools gaining posts while others lost posts. Further, serious problems were experienced in interpreting Circulars *HRM 51 of 1998* and *HRM 1 of 1999*. Thus, in order to address the many queries

**KWAZULU-NATAL DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION**  
**POST ESTABLISHMENT OF 30 MARCH 1999**

EMIS NO.	297554	NAME OF SCHOOL :	
REGION :	DURBAN SOUTH		
DISTRICT	PINETOWN		
CIRCUIT :	KWADABEKA		

■ LEARNERS: GRADES 1-7

Number of learners at this level:

Gr 1-3	0	1.15	0.00	Gr 4-7	0	1.000	0.00	Special	0	2.000	0.00
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■ LEARNERS: GRADES 8-9

Number of learners at this level:

Art	0	1.30	0.00	Electrician wk	0	1.35	0.00	Technika Electric	0	1.35	0.00
Bricklaying	0	1.35	0.00	Music etc.	0	1.65	0.00	Technika:Electr	0	1.35	0.00
Welding	0	1.35	0.00	Electronics	0	1.35	0.00	Fitting/turning	0	1.35	0.00
Hotelkeeping	0	1.25	0.00	Motor mech	0	1.35	0.00	Technical T/P	0	1.35	0.00
Woodworking	0	1.35	0.00	Workshop Pr.	0	1.35	0.00				
All Other	469	1.18	553.42								

■ LEARNERS: GRADES 10-12

Number of learners at this level:

Agric. science	0	0.215	0.00	Biology	488	0.188	91.74	Computer St.	86	0.215	18.49
Animal husb.	0	0.421	0.00	Field husband.	0	0.421	0.00	Appl. agric.	0	0.512	0.00
Art	0	0.361	0.00	Home econ.	70	0.301	21.07	Bricklaying	0	0.421	0.00
Electronics	0	0.421	0.00	Metalwork	46	0.301	13.85	Electrician	0	0.421	0.00
Maths	536	0.188	100.77	Music	0	0.502	0.00	Fitting/turning	0	0.468	0.00
Motor mech.	0	0.421	0.00	Needlework	0	0.301	0.00	Hotel cater.	0	0.361	0.00
Music perf.	0	0.502	0.00	Science	200	0.188	37.60	Motor body	0	0.421	0.00
Plumbing	0	0.421	0.00	Speech/drama	61	0.361	22.02	Tech. draw.	0	0.237	0.00
Technika	0	0.421	0.00	TV and radio	0	0.421	0.00	Typing	69	0.215	14.83
Welding	0	0.468	0.00	Woodwork	0	0.301	0.00	Woodworking	88	0.421	37.05
OTHER EXAM	2640	0.172	454.08	NON-EXAM.	714	0.172	122.81				

■ TOTAL LEARNER ENROLMENT			<input type="text" value="1183.00"/>
■ TOTAL WEIGHTED LEARNER ENROLMENT			<input type="text" value="1487.73"/>
■ MEDIUM OF INSTRUCTION	<input type="text" value="0"/>	<input type="text" value="0.150"/>	<input type="text" value="0.00"/>
■ ADJUSTMENT FOR COMBINED SCHOOL			<input type="text" value="0.00"/>

■ CALCULATION OF POSTS

Posts = (Weighted learners x 0.0219) + 0.5

= (  x 0.0219) + 0.5

■ TOTAL NUMBER OF POSTS SCHOOL ENTITLED TO: (Rounded to nearest whole)	<input type="text" value="33.00"/>
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■ STATISTICS AS PER EMIS : ANNUAL SURVEY 1998

**MM MOODLEY**

DIRECTOR : HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

and misinterpretations of circulars on rationalization and redeployment a detailed clarification document was sent to schools under cover of Circular *HRM 10 of 1999*. Owing to the problems around the interpretation of documents on the implementation of the PPN, the department had to consequently, amend its management plan and time frames for the completion of the process (KZN DEC 1999b:1).

The KZN DEC announced that of the 6 779 educators declared surplus, over 4 000 educators were placed in vacancies. The Department then envisaged completing the process by March 2000, a date nine months later than projected in its management plan (KZN DEC 2000:2). However, in the Department's *Annual Report on Activities for 2000*, an amended figure of 7 340 educators surplus to their institutions was quoted. Further, it was announced that the success rate of placement of educators deemed to be surplus to their institutions PPN was 92.2 % (KZN DEC 2001a:28).

#### **2.6.7 EDUCATOR POST PROVISIONING SINCE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF *RESOLUTION 6 OF 1998***

Pardesi (2004:2) observes that the implementation of *Resolution 6 of 1998* has not benefited rural schools. In the main these schools remained with very few educators. She adds that in the years since 1998 the issues of post provisioning became very complicated and it was clearly noticeable that it was the vehicle used by the department of education to downsize the number of educators being employed on a permanent basis. This coincided with global trends to casualise labour, including educators. There were increasing numbers of temporary educators in the system. Vacancies were not advertised nor filled resulting in many educators receiving no benefits.

NUPSAW (2003:5) notes that the net effect of the rightsizing process was the downsizing of the educator complement at schools. They postulate that ten years into the unitary system of education most secondary schools that had staff establishments of between 40 and 50 educators now have establishments of between 20 and 30. But the numbers of learners have remained constant or have increased. They further note that the process of

reducing the number of educators at many schools takes place against a background of other upheavals in schools:

- There are already fewer educators because of earlier retrenchments
- Class sizes are larger
- The teaching loads of individual educators has increased
- There are major changes in curricula and syllabi (OBE)
- There are many educators who are uncertain of their futures because they are in temporary posts (on contract).

At many schools, problems were experienced in deploying educator staff to cover their existing curriculum offerings. Schools which did not have the financial means to employ SGB paid educators to meet their curriculum offerings had no option but to rationalize their curriculum packages. The TLSA (1999a:11), therefore, observes that the direct result of the educator rationalization process was the phasing out of subjects like art and music in many schools.

#### **2.6.8 THE TIMING OF THE RELEASE OF THE PPN**

The process of attaining equity in educator distribution to institutions is on-going. The provincial education departments, based on MTEF estimates and deliberations at provincial ELRCs, each declare on an annual basis the number of educator posts they can afford. Provinces then, based on the PPM, release the PPNs to institutions which then engage in identifying surplus educators for redeployment or vacant posts that may exist.

The timeous release of PPNs is vitally important in terms of human resource planning. In some schools, SGBs appoint additional staff to supplement those provided by the state. In terms of the *South African Schools Act*, any funds to be utilized for staff appointments by the SGB of a school, must be ratified at an annual budget meeting involving the general parent body (South Africa 1996c: sec. 20(4), 20(9), 38 (2)). Annual budget meetings are normally held in September or October in order to ratify budgets and set school fees for the forthcoming school year. Thus, if schools are not aware of their PPNs for the forthcoming year as dictated by policy, the budgeting for additional educators by the

SGBs will amount to guess work. In KZN, the SGBs of eleven schools in Pietermaritzburg obtained an interdict against the MEC and Head of the Education Department, preventing them from implementing the 2004 PPN due its late release. According to papers filed in court, these schools had not contemplated the department reducing its PPN and, therefore, did not budget for the hire of additional educators to fill the posts that may be lost due to a decrease in the PPN (The Mercury 2004b:1).

Mdlalose (2003:73) asserts that if the PPNs are released too late in a school year it does not allow for proper planning and seriously undermines strategic planning efforts. It is therefore, not possible to deploy educators properly for a particular year. He further adds that the late release of PPNs has a negative effect on educator work satisfaction. It would ensure that institutions whose PPNs have increased get the additional educators timeously in order to ease their duty workloads.

### **2.6.9 DISSATISFACTION WITH THE PPM**

Since the introduction of the post provisioning model (PPM) in 1999, there has been growing discontent with regard to the impact of the model on issues of equity and redress.

One of the key problems associated with the PPM is that the supply of teachers is fixed by the budgets of the provincial education departments. Thus, the model is limited in the sense that it could only allocate posts to schools given the supply of educators determined by the budget. The poorer provinces with larger learner numbers will suffer as their needs outstrip their educator supply (Motala & Pampallis 2001:93).

The weighting of subjects is fundamental to determining the number of educator posts to be allocated to a school. In this context, Madisha (2001:5), the President of SADTU, commented that the PPM tends to favour schools with varied subject offerings and is, therefore, a source of inequity. However, the DNE takes a different view on this. According to the Department, a major benefit of the PPM has been the rationalization of the curriculum offered in schools, since post provisioning is now linked to an approved

set of offerings by an institution. It adds that departments now regulate the curriculum offered in each school through the PPM (DNE 2000:45).

The PPM's capacity to affect curriculum redress has been questionable. Pardesi (2004:2) observes that in all provinces there is a serious demand for curriculum redress. Whilst the PPM makes provision for a province to set aside posts for curriculum redress and in turn to allocate these posts to schools so that they may offer a varied curriculum, in practice many provinces made no provision for this.

### **2.6.10 THE REVISED PPM**

Dissatisfaction with the PPM largely as a result of pressure from educator unions led the National Minister of Education to promulgate new regulations with regard to the creation of educator posts in provincial departments of education and the distribution of such posts to educational institutions. The new regulations which took effect on 1 January 2003, included a revised PPM which the Department claimed, 'addressed the issues that the previous model did not address'. However, educator unions were dissatisfied at the manner in which implementation of the revised model took place. They assert that implementation had been poorly managed resulting in chaos in the provinces and at school level. They argued that the parties to the ELRC should have discussed the model after the testing of it in the various provinces before implementation (ELRC 2003a:5).

#### **2.6.10.1 DETERMINATION OF EDUCATOR POST ESTABLISHMENTS OF A PROVINCIAL DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION BY THE MEC**

In determining the post establishment of a provincial department of education, the MEC must consult with trade unions in the province who are members of the ELRC and governing body organizations which are active in the province. The MEC must also take into account the following:

- The budget of the provincial department of education
- The effect that the post establishment will have on the employment security of educators

- The need for redress in the implementation and promotion of curriculum policy in keeping with the basic values and principles set out in section 195 of the Constitution
- The fact that the division between expenditure on personnel and non-personnel costs in the budget should be educationally, administratively and financially justifiable and in accordance with national policy that may exist in this regard
- The terms and conditions of employment of educators that may be affected by the post establishment, including provisions for leave, substitution and remuneration related issues (South Africa 2002: Schedule 1c-d).

In determining the educator post establishments of schools by the head of a provincial department of education, the revised post distribution model must be applied by taking into account:

- The post establishment of the provincial department of education
- The need for redress in the implementation and promotion of curriculum policy. The head of a provincial education department was tasked with the responsibility of determining an annual programme in this regard after consultation with trade union parties to the ELRC and governing body organizations which are active in that province (South Africa 2002:2b).

#### **2.6.10.2 FEATURES OF THE REVISED PPM**

The revised PPM is based on the principle that available posts are distributed among schools proportionally to the number of weighted learners. The concept of ‘weighted learner’ instead of actual learner is used to enable schools to compete on an equal footing for posts. As some learners and some learning areas require more favourable post allocations than others, each learner is given a certain weighting that reflects a learners relative need in respect of post provisioning (South Africa 2002: Annexure 1(1-2)).

The model takes into account the following educational and administrative factors that impact on the post provisioning needs of learners:

- The maximum ideal class size applicable to a specific learning area or phase.

- The period load of educators.
- The need to promote a learning area. By providing a more favourable learner-educator ratio in respect of a learning area in grades 10 – 12, schools can be motivated to promote such a learning area.
- The size of a school.
- The number of grades.
- More than one language medium of instruction.
- Disabilities of learners (LSEN).
- Access to the curriculum. In order to ensure fair and affordable access of learners to the curriculum, the number of learners that are fully funded in respect of subjects that are more expensive to offer need to be regulated. This measure, it was envisaged, will lead to redress in the implementation and promotion of the curriculum.
- Poverty. In order to compensate for the negative impact that poverty has on learning, the poverty grading of a school is taken into account.
- Level of funding. Policy may require that different phases be funded at different levels. Currently, all grades are set at 100% level of funding while grade R is set at a funding level of 0.
- *Ad hoc* factors. Certain factors that are not considered above, such as an unexpected growth in learner numbers, may exist at a certain school and may justify the allocation of additional posts to such a school (South Africa 2002:Anexure 1(3)).

### **2.6.10.3 WEIGHTING NORMS**

Different weighting norms were applied to the design features of the revised PPM. The weightings were applied as follows:

#### **Grades 1 to 9**

- Based on the principle that uniform curricula apply to learners in schools in all phases up to grade 9, the following formula is used to determine the weighting of a learner:

$$w = c/m/l \times f$$

- Where
- c = 40 (the highest ideal maximum class size in relation to the others)
  - m = ideal maximum class size
  - l = average period load
  - f = funding level

### **Grades 10 to 12**

- In view of the variety of learning areas, each learner is weighted separately in terms of his or her curriculum. A subject-learner weighting (slw) is determined for each subject taken by a learner by means of the following formula

$$slw = c/m \times p/l \times f/7$$

- Where
- c = 40 (the highest ideal maximum class size in relation to the others)
  - m = ideal maximum class size
  - p = promotion factor
  - l = average period load
  - f = funding level

- The promotion factor in the table is set at 1. Should provision be made in policy that a certain subject should be promoted by, say 7%, the value of 1 would become 1.07.
- Each learner is allowed to take 6 examinable subjects.
- All non-examinable subjects are grouped and given the same weighting as 1 'ordinary' examinable subject.
- A total number of weighted learners is then determined by adding the total numbers of examinable and non-examinable weighted learners together.

### **Size of the School, Number of Grades, Language Medium of Instruction**

Provision is made by adding a certain number of weighted learners to a school's weighted enrolment linked to each recognized language group (maximum of two language groups) and each grade provided for at the school. The following values apply:

- A base number of weighted learners are added to each school. Any value from 10 - 20, in accordance with a department's needs will apply.

- Additional weighted learners must be added in respect of each grade in which learners are enrolled. If learners in a particular grade are taught in more than one language medium, a further additional weighting will apply in respect of that grade.
- In respect of a combined school, the base number of 10 – 20 weighted learners is granted in respect of both the primary school phase and secondary school phase.

### **Poverty**

- The total number of weighted learners in each school is then adjusted in terms of its poverty ranking. The head of a provincial department of education must set aside a certain percentage of its available posts (top-sliced from the total pool of educators) for poverty redress. The minister may from time to time set the maximum percentage that provincial departments may use for this purpose. Until this limit is revised, it is set at 5%.
- Redress posts are to be distributed to schools based on the relative poverty of the learners of a school using the framework of the indices utilized by the province in the national Norms and Standards for School Funding.

### **Distribution Formula**

After the total number of weighted learners of each school is determined, the number of posts to be allocated to a school (PPN) is determined using the formula:

$$\text{Post} = \text{total number of posts available} \times \frac{\text{total weighted learners of school}}{\text{Total weighted learners in province}}$$

An example of a PPN report, based on the revised PPM is given on page 61.

#### **2.6.10.4 AN ASSESSMENT OF THE REVISED PPM**

The DNE in a press statement highlighted that the key feature of the model is based on the Ministry's determination to respond to the negative impact of poverty on education. It is a known fact that poverty is the most significant barrier to learning in South Africa and that learners who come from economically deprived backgrounds need to be given



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Reference: 297554

11 March 2004

**STAFF ESTABLISHMENT CS EDUCATORS - MARCH 2004**

Region ETHEKWINI

District: Pinetown

Circuit: CITY OF DURBAN

School Name:

Emis No: 297554

This is your official staff establishment with effect 15 April 2004. The Department retains the right to recalculate the staff establishment if any information is found to be incorrect.

	GrR	Gr1	Gr2	Gr3	Gr4	Gr5	Gr6	Gr7	Gr8	Gr9	Gr10	Gr11	Gr12
Leerlinge Learners	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	235	217	284	268	192
Gewig Weight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.23	1.23	1.38	1.36	1.39
Weighted Learners	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	288.8	266.7	392.8	364.9	267.5

Main Language	15
Alternative Lang	0
School weight	15
Combined	0
Redress	0

Learners (l)	1196
Weighted Learners	1580.746
Constant Weight (a)	30
School Weight (w)	1610.746
Raw Posts	34.7663
Posts	35
Total Weighted Learners(TotW)	3405488.98
Pool	73504


$$\begin{aligned} \text{Posts} &= \frac{(\text{School\_Weight}) * (\text{Pool})}{(\text{Provincial\_Weight})} \\ &= \frac{(1610.746) * (73504)}{3405488.98} \\ &= 34.7 \end{aligned}$$

**Management Post Allocation**

Principal: 1  
Deputy Principal: 2  
Head of Department: 5

Subject	Weight Factor	Grade 10		Grade 11		Grade 12	
		Learners	Weight	Learners	Weight	Learners	Weight
Accounting	0.179	106	18.974	159	28.461	86	15.394
Afrikaans	0.179	87	15.573	143	25.597	192	34.368
Biology	0.179	182	32.578	176	31.504	152	27.208
Business Economics	0.179	121	21.659	101	18.079	42	7.518
Computer Science	0.243	56	13.608	59	14.337	28	6.804
Economics	0.179	76	13.604	83	14.857	27	4.833
English	0.179	284	50.836	268	47.972	192	34.368
Geography	0.179	97	17.363	66	11.814	43	7.697
History	0.179	38	6.802	58	10.382	73	13.067
Home Economics	0.283	31	8.773	24	6.792	22	6.226
Mathematics	0.179	158	28.282	169	30.251	137	24.523
Physical Science	0.213	56	11.928	61	12.993	55	11.715
Speech And Drama	0.567	38	21.546	37	20.979	42	23.814
Technical Drawing	0.252	49	12.348	21	5.292	24	6.048
Typing	0.243	69	16.767	17	4.131	11	2.673
Woodwork	0.272	59	16.048	41	11.152	24	6.528
Zulu First Language	0.179	197	35.263	125	22.375	0	0
Other Subjects	0.179	0	0	0	0	2	0.0000000
Non-examinable Subjects	0.179	284	50.836	268	47.972	192	34.368
TOTAL		1988	392.788	1876	364.94	1344	267.51

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER :Prof.CRM Dlamini



focused attention by the state. The model is designed to cater for this priority by providing relatively favourable learner-educator ratios in respect of publicly funded posts to schools that cater for the poorest learners. Therefore, the most significant revision brought about by the revised model is that schools catering for poor learners may gain one or two additional posts on account of poverty-targeting introduced in the revised model (DNE 2002:1).

Though the revised PPM pays greater attention to curriculum redress, cognizance must be taken of the fact that the model merely allocates a number of educator posts to a school. How the educators are to be deployed in terms of school time-tabling is still left to the discretion of the school principal. For example, the school might qualify for curriculum redress posts in order to promote subjects like music and dance but the deployment of the educators appointed for this purpose is still largely left to the discretion of the principal. Therefore, the revised PPM merely gives a number of posts to the school with no compulsion on the principal on how to deploy the allocated posts.

Whilst the revised PPM stipulate maximum ideal class sizes for different subjects, the post provisioning task team of the national ELRC has noted that this was not the actual situation that prevails in terms of class size at schools. The department in its response noted that it was very difficult to determine the correct norm for class sizes. They add that the values used in the revised PPM were based on ‘inputs received from a number of resources’. However, they concede that it was not scientifically determined. According to the department the subject class sizes are constrained by the pool of posts the school qualifies for in terms of the PPN (ELRC 2003a:3).

#### **2.6.11 POST PROVISIONING AND LEARNER-EDUCATOR RATIOS**

Provincial learner-educator ratios are determined largely by the provincial education department’s budget for personnel expenditure. The total number of learners at all institutions within a provincial education department is divided by the total number of full-time equivalent educators that is affordable in terms of the budget for personnel expenditure (Mdlalose 2003:12).

The learner-educator ratio is one of the factors that affect the quality of education provided in schools. World Bank studies indicate that learner-educator ratios of 25:1 and lower are important for learner success (Vadi 1998:9). Moreover, given the urgent need to improve the quality of education in disadvantaged schools, trends from overseas studies show that disadvantaged learners reap the most benefit from smaller classes and their results improve the longer they stay in classes of less than twenty (Noonan & Doherty 2003). Vally and Spreen (1998:8) note that recent research conducted on class size expressed the view that small classes are likely to improve the achievement of learners from disadvantaged backgrounds. Further, small classes are also likely to produce the greatest gains in achievement in mathematics, technical subjects and reading in the first four years of schooling. However, due to policy advice that expenditure on personnel is too high in relation to the education budget (see section 2.4.2, page 26); the policy strategy of many of the provincial education departments was to reduce the salary bill by keeping learner- educator ratios consistently high. Consequently, in KZN (see table 2.4 below) there has not been much change to the learner-educator ratios since 2000.

Table 2.4: Learner-educator ratios in KZN

YEAR	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
LEARNER-EDUCATOR RATIO	35.7:1	36:1	36.1:1	35.7:1	35.4:1

Source: KZN DEC (2003a:2; 2002e:2; 2002c:2; 2001b:2)

It must be pointed out that the learner-educator ratios are averages and in no way an indication of class size. Given the fact that school management teams (SMTs) have far reduced scheduled teaching hours and classroom- based educators carry a teaching load of between 85% and 92%, the actual class size is well in excess of the learner-educator ratio (South Africa 1999:sec. 3.3, Vadi 1998:9).

The unions in KZN consistently and in unison always rejected the high learner-educator ratios in the province. In 2002, the SADTU in opposing the 36.1:1 ratio, called into

question the commitment of the MEC and the CEO for education in improving class sizes as well as improving learning and teaching through the provision of more educators. The union consequently campaigned for a three year agreement to be reached, the basis of which should be the national average ratio of 32:1 (SADTU KZN 2002:1-2). From the department's point of view, however, the principal issue was the ability to reconcile the high learner-educator ratio with the need to reduce personnel expenditure to 85% of the total budget and simultaneously increase the strength of the supporting components so that they can deliver services effectively (KZN DEC 2002a:22). In reconciling these apparently conflicting demands the only option available was to maintain the high learner-educator ratios.

Compared to the other nine provinces (see table 2.5 below), KZN has always had the highest learner-educator ratio. Moreover, the learner-educator ratios have been well above the national average.

Table 2.5: Learner-educator ratios in South Africa

PROVINCE	1996	2000	2002
Eastern Cape	36.3	31.5	31
Free State	30.1	31.9	29
Gauteng	29.2	30.9	31
<b>KwaZulu-Natal</b>	<b>37.1</b>	<b>35.7</b>	<b>36</b>
Limpopo	36.0	34.8	32
Mpumalanga	30.2	30.6	34
Northern Cape	33.9	33.5	30
North West	30.2	30.3	28
Western Cape	32.9	30.7	32
<b>Average</b>	<b>33.7</b>	<b>32.7</b>	<b>32</b>

Source: South Africa. National Treasury (2003:69, 2001:35)

## **2.6.12 PROCEDURES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POST PROVISIONING NORM (PPN) AT SCHOOL LEVEL**

The implementation of the PPN at school level is the responsibility of the school principal. In keeping with national guidelines, procedure manuals are developed by provincial education departments in consultation with educator unions for the implementation of the PPN. These manuals together with the PPN report are sent to schools for the attention of the principal and chairperson of the school governing body and spell-out the following:

### **2.6.12.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE PPN IMPLEMENTATION**

The objectives of the PPN implementation are as follows:

- To provide a fair and transparent basis for the staffing of schools
- To identify educators ‘additional’ to the staff establishment
- To identify vacant posts in accordance with the given post provisioning norms (PPN).
- To facilitate and expedite the movement of educators ‘additional’ to the establishment and displaced educators to vacant posts
- To achieve equity in educator staff provisioning (KZN DEC 2003a:2; 2001b:2).

### **2.6.12.2 MAIN PRINCIPLES**

In terms of the main principles, it is incumbent on principals as implementers of the PPN at school level to fully apprise the staff at a formal staff meeting of the implementation procedures. Further, the full compulsory curriculum as required by national policy must be accommodated within the allocated staff. Under no circumstance must a school reduce or exclude non-examination subjects on the grounds that the allocated staff is insufficient to cope with the full curriculum. Principals are asked to use creative management strategies to deliver the full curriculum (KZN: DEC 2003a:2; 2001b:2).

### **2.6.12.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PPN**

In implementing the PPN, the manual spells-out the role of the principal as follows:

- The SEMs apprise principals on the criteria for the determination of educators ‘additional/surplus’ to the staff establishment and implementation procedures.
- Immediately on returning from the briefing meeting with the SEM, principals apprise staff at a formal staff meeting of the allocated staff for the year and the criteria and implementation procedures related to the PPN.
- The principal must identify those posts that are vacant and those that are surplus on the basis of the curricular needs of the school.
- Inform staff on the procedures for determining educators ‘additional/surplus’ to the staff establishment and the effect it will have on their respective staff establishments. Union shop stewards located at the school should be present at the staff meeting (KZN: DEC 2003a:3; 2001b:3).

#### **2.6.12.4 IDENTIFICATION OF EDUCATORS ‘ADDITIONAL/SURPLUS’ TO THE STAFF ESTABLISHMENT**

- Permanent educators are classified according to the main subject or subjects/group of subjects (secondary school) or phase (primary school) to be taught. In the Junior Primary and Senior Primary Phase, an educator is expected to teach all subjects except where an educator is unable to teach a specific language.
- Considering the approved curricular needs of the school, the principal allocates the permanent educators in terms of the main subject or subjects/group of teaching subjects into the relevant subject/s or phases.
- Should two or more educators compete for the same post after taking into account the curricular needs, the principle of last-in-first-out in the service of the department based on current years of continuous service, must be applied.
- The principal after consulting with the educator staff may recommend that educators who may be declared ‘additional/surplus’, be absorbed in vacancies that exist or will exist in the near future (not longer than six months) (KZN DEC 2003a:3-4; 2001b:3).

#### **2.6.12.5 MANAGEMENT PLANS**

An integral part of the procedure manual is an elaborate management plan spelling out time frames and identifying individuals responsible for the carrying out of certain duties related to PPN implementation. Duties such as matching educators declared in ‘surplus’ to vacancies, issuing letters of placement, identifying resultant vacancies and the advertising of resultant vacancies are spelt out (KZN DEC 2003a: Annexure G; 2001: Annexure B).

#### **2.6.12.6 COMMENTARY ON PPN IMPLEMENTATION**

The procedure manual on PPN implementation has been the subject of much debate among principals. Principals are at the forefront of the PPN implementation. According to Mdlalose (2003:50), they are unfortunate to be (by virtue of their position) always expected to be leaders in the implementation of changes and policies which at times they don’t even understand. Consequently, principals would not possibly be expected to have all the answers to questions educators have regarding the implementation of the new PPN.

When an educator is declared ‘surplus/additional’ to the staff establishment, Mdlalose (2003:50) has noted that the affected educator would unreasonably conclude that the principal has personal problems and differences to settle with the educator. Moreover, Mdlalose (2003: 51) points out that some staff members may sympathize with affected colleagues and wish that the principal had taken steps to protect them whereas in reality the principal cannot do anything. He/She has to implement policy. Failure to do so may result in disciplinary action taken against a principal who fails to implement national or provincial policy as stipulated in the *Employment of Educators Act*. This state of affairs strains the trusting, supportive and harmonious relationship that should exist between principals and educators (Mdlalose 2003:51).

#### **2.6.12.7 PPN IMPLEMENTATION AND SCHOOL ORGANISATION**

School organization is regulated by policy. Policy stipulates that admissions, educator allocations, educator workloads and timetables must be finalized before the first school

day so as to ensure that teaching and learning is not disrupted at the start of the new school year (KZN DEC 2003b:5). Thus, the timeous communication of the PPN to schools is an imperative for proper school organisation.

An increase in the PPN at a school brings with it a whole host of problems because the vacant post/s at schools must either be filled on an interim basis by compulsory temporary transfers (CTTs) of surplus educators at other schools or by the employment of temporary educators before the vacancy can be filled permanently through an advertisement in a departmental vacancy list. The filling of posts through compulsory temporary transfer can take weeks to materialize and this consequently, leads to classes being left unattended and learners being denied their constitutional right to an uninterrupted education. If the post is not filled through compulsory temporary transfer then a temporary educator is employed to fill the vacant post (KZN DEC 2004b:1).

However, the filling of posts by temporary educators does not guarantee the immediate appointment of the educator since the department stipulates that a set procedure needs to be followed. Only after approval from the District Manager, can a temporary educator assume duty (KZN DEC 2004b:1-2). This procedure once again leaves classes unattended for a period of time. A further problem is created in that temporary educators are employed on a term by term basis. As a result the contracts of temporary educators are terminated at the end of each term and in some instances their contracts are only renewed on a month to month basis (KZN DEC 2004d:1). Given the uncertainty and job insecurity experienced by the temporary educator, as well as delays in the payment of salaries of temporary educators – in some cases educators have not been paid for up to eight months - the temporary educator often does not return in the new term in the event of his/her contract being renewed (The Rising Sun Chatsworth 2004:12). This then sets into motion once again a new cycle in the appointment of a temporary educator with its attendant problems.

The appointment of substitute educators also carries with it a whole host of problems. Substitute educators are appointed when a permanent educator proceeds on

accouchement leave (in this regard prior approval must be obtained) or sick leave in excess of thirty days (KZN DEC 2002d:1). The same procedure as that for the appointment of temporary educators is followed when it comes to the appointment of substitute educators. (KZN DEC 2004b:1-2). Moreover, the number of substitute educators budgeted for is totally inadequate to cater for the number of educators who proceed on sick or accouchement leave. This, then puts added financial pressure on SGBs to pay substitute educators for state-paid permanent educators who are on official leave. The TLSA (1999a:12) notes that if SGBs cannot raise the necessary funds to pay the salaries of substitute educators, they are accused of being incompetent and are unfairly contrasted with SGBs that have greater fund-raising skill and potential. The pity of it all is that the anger of school communities is turned mainly inward against SGBs. It should indeed be directed against those responsible for school policies based on economic imperatives, instead of on educational and ethical considerations.

Pardesi (2004:2) avers that there is, in most provinces, insufficient allocation in terms of the MTEF processes for substitute educators in relation to the number of educators on leave. Lewis (2002:1) at a conference on *HIV/AIDS and the Education Sector* highlighted the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on educator productivity and, therefore, called for a review of policy on substitute educators.

### **2.6.13 THE UNFOLDING OF THE 2004 PPN DEBACLE IN KZN**

The process of educator provisioning has always been a contentious issue in KZN. With educator provisioning being devolved to the provinces, subject to national norms and standards, the KZN department of education as an implementing agency of National ELRC and Provincial ELRC agreements often found itself in conflict with educator unions.

In KZN matters came to a head in the declaration of the PPN for 2004. Consultation on the PPN with educator unions before declaration is regulated by legislation. However, unions party to the provincial ELRC claim that full consultation had not run its course and, consequently, the KZN DEC in declaring the 2004 PPN was acting unilaterally and

not in the spirit of national agreements. As a matter of fact similar allegations were leveled at the KZN DEC in the declaration of the 2002 PPN. Owing to mounting dissatisfaction by the unions that the learner-educator ratio for 2002 was in no way an improvement on the previous years ratio, the SADTU and the National Teachers Union rejected the PPN pending further negotiations (Mdlalose 2003:25). However, the department argued that in terms of its budgeting system there was no extra money that could be used to employ more educators over and above the already declared PPN and, therefore, the declared PPN stands (KZN: DEC 2002c:1).

In terms of the *MTEF Consultation Report* tabled at national ELRC, the first meeting to begin consultation on the PPN for 2004 was scheduled for April 2003, but owing to the unavailability of accurate statistics and petty bickering as to whose responsibility it was to call the consultative meetings, deliberations on the PPN only began in September of that year (ELRC 2003b). The KZN MEC pointed out that the MTEF budget provides for three years guaranteed funding and hence, the figures for 2004/5 and 2005/6 were already known. Consequently, provinces were expected to work within the baseline figures and, therefore, it was not possible to obtain funds above that which constituted the baseline. The MEC pointed out that the MTEF allowed for the employment of 74 000 educators which translated to a learner-educator ratio of 35.4:1. The unions were far from happy with this situation and tabled a proposal that a ratio of 30:1 be considered for 2004. The MEC pointed out that a ratio of 30:1 was unaffordable and urged the unions to work towards a ratio of 32:1 for 2004/5. The department claimed that they projected a decrease in the learner enrolment for 2004 and consequently the number of learners would decrease the ratio. The unions disputed this and further argued that education in the province should be funded at 40% of the budget and not 35%. They added that given the underfunding and no provision being made for curriculum transformation posts, their demand for a ratio of 30:1 was not unreasonable. Further, the unions questioned the accuracy of the statistics on educator and learner numbers presented by the department. The MEC pointed out that his was a political office and in terms of post provisioning regulations he was obliged to consult on the creation of the posts and, therefore, would

not venture into the administrative domain. The MEC added that the process of consultation had commenced and may well continue (KZN ELRC 2003a:1-5).

Whilst the consultative process was still in progress, the KZN DEC in November 2003 issued *Circular HRM 83 of 2003* which declared PPNs for 2004. The unions pointed out that the final consultative meeting with the MEC had not taken place, therefore, *HRM 83 of 2003* was premature. The SADTU argued that 'you cannot distribute posts before the MEC creates posts' (KZN ELRC 2003b).

The MEC at the MTEF Consultative Meeting scheduled for December argued that he was aware of the release of the PPN by the department which was necessary for planning for 2004. Unions indicated that they were unhappy with the consultation process thus far and believed negotiations in the KZN ELRC were in bad faith. Whilst the unions were discussing the PPN, the officials from the department were implementing the PPN. The unions, therefore, called for an immediate withdrawal of *HRM 83 of 2003*. They argued that the PPN process for 2003 first be concluded and the 8 000 vacancies that that existed must first be advertised and filled before implementing the 2004 PPN. The unions pointed out that in August, agreement was reached in the filling of vacancies but the department did not honour the agreement. The unions indicated that they were prepared to agree to the 2003 PPN for the commencement of 2004 and consult further on improvement in the PPN. The Department though was not prepared to compromise. The unions expressed their disappointment at there being no agreement especially since they were not consulted on the PPN circulars that went out to schools (KZN ELRC 2003b:1-6).

In terms of *HRM 83 of 2003*, before schools closed for the year the PPN was to be implemented. Educators declared in surplus were to be identified as well as vacancies that may exist. In terms of the department's management plan, surplus educators were to be matched to vacancies over the December holidays and moved to their new schools on the first school day of 2004. Resultant vacancies were to be advertised in February 2004 (KZN DEC 2003a: Annexure G).

When schools reopened, the department failed to complete the process of moving educators declared 'additional/surplus' to their schools to vacant posts. The SADTU in the meantime informed its membership of the controversy surrounding PPN for 2004 and called on its members to protest against the forceful implementation of PPN 2004 by the department (SADTU KZN:2004a; 2004b;2004c). Union members engaged in a protest march in Durban and vowed to extend their demonstration to other regions in the province. SADTU spokesperson, Mbuyiseni Mathonsi said that teachers were calling for the suspension of the PPN because the process was flawed (The Mercury 2004e:2).

The need for accurate and up-to-date data on learners and educators is paramount to educator post provisioning in any province. In KZN, there has always been controversy over the statistics presented by the department of education with regard to learner and educator numbers. The department has often been accused of presenting unreliable statistics as well as carrying 'ghost' learners and educators on its database. Owing to accusations from the unions that the department had no verifiable statistics on learner numbers, the department in the meantime engaged in a mammoth exercise to verify learner numbers submitted by principals. Department of education officials engaged in a headcount exercise which ran for two weeks. The audit found that many schools had manipulated their enrolment figures so as to qualify for an improved PPN. The MEC thus declared that he had doubts that the province had 2.5 million learners. He added that more than 70% of the 505 schools visited had inflated their numbers and had given frivolous reasons for the mismatch. The MEC indicated that the count would have a big impact on the learner-educator ratio (The Mercury 2004d:1).

Based on the schools' 10<sup>th</sup> day enrolment statistics, verified figures from the headcount and queries raised by various schools regarding their PPN calculation, the department issued *Circular HRM 28 of 2004* which entailed the issuing of a final PPN report (based on a learner-educator ratio of 34.4:1) to schools as well as an amended management plan for the implementation of the PPN. In terms of the management plan, educators declared 'additional/surplus' to their schools were to be moved to vacancies on the first day of the new term (KZN DEC 2004c:1/ Annexure). The action by the department was once again

a unilateral one. Educator unions were not consulted which should have happened in terms of provisions of the *Employment of Educators Act, 76 of 1998* and collective agreements in the national ELRC. The SADTU vehemently opposed the implementation of *Circular HRM 28 of 2004* and argued that it won't be party to its implementation. The union informed its members that it was seeking legal advice on the viability of interdicting the department from proceeding with the implementation of *Circular HRM 28 of 2004*. Further, the union indicated that it had sent a memorandum to the MEC, Narend Singh outlining its demands on the PPN issue (SADTU KZN 2004b:1).

The MEC in an attempt to resolve the stand-off over the PPN issue called a meeting of all educator unions. The meeting, however, was not fruitful in offering anything new, except by way of increasing the number of substitute educators in the system. The SADTU in the meantime outlined its programme of action against implementation of the PPN which included a provincial march to the Pietermaritzburg legislature as well as a total shut-down of schools (SADTU KZN 2004c:1). The SADTU also called for the resignation of the MEC as well as for the department's CEO, Prof. C. Dlamini to be fired. The National Teachers Union (NATU) as well as the Parents Association of KZN was far from happy with the final PPN. They argued that whilst the provincial norm was 34.4:1 the actual class size will be far in excess of this (The Mercury 2004a:5).

The first term of 2004 was brought to a close with educators who were declared 'additional/surplus' being issued with letters indicating the new schools they were to report to in the new term. Further, the contracts of temporary teachers were terminated.

In the province, the PPN issue was becoming a political one. The country was in the midst of its third democratic national elections. The KZN province was under the rule of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the MEC belonged to the IFP. The SADTU, on the other hand, was aligned to the African National Congress (ANC) which was the ruling party in the national government but was an opposition party in KZN. The SADTU overtly canvassed in the province for the ANC in the April elections. The MEC, just prior to the elections, placed full page advertisements in the main provincial newspapers

outlining events around the PPN issue. The advertisements accused the SADTU of ‘turning education into a political football for purposes of vote-catching’ (Post 2004a:16). The SADTU in reaction to the MEC’s advertisements also bought space in provincial newspapers and explained its view on the PPN issue as well as attack the MEC and his political history (Daily News 2004:6).

The SADTU took the PPN issue a step further by making a High Court application for a court interdict. This led to the implementation process being halted. The halting of the implementation process of the PPN midway through the process resulted in chaos at schools. The educators who were moved to vacancies were unsure as to whether they should return to their previous schools. Moreover, the Department released vacancy lists (*Circulars HRM 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41*) and called for applications to these vacancies. In order to prevent confusion the department issued Circular *HRM 54 of 2004* which indicated that surplus educators who have been placed and moved to new schools must remain where they are and not return to their original schools. Further, applications for advertised posts will continue to be received by the department but no further processing will be done (KZN DEC 2004e: 1).

In the meantime the outcome of the 2004 general election saw a shift in political power in KZN from the IFP to the ANC. The SADTU in a communiqué to its members pointed out that the results of the 2004 general elections ‘have brought about the possibility of an immediate solution’ to the PPN problem (SADTU KZN 2004d:1-2). The appointment of the new MEC for education, Mrs Ina Cronje towards the end of April brought some respite to the PPN debacle. The SADTU then engaged in a meeting with the MEC and called for:

- All processes relating to the 2004 PPN be reversed
- An audit of all educator posts in the province be done
- The immediate filling of all educator posts created in terms of the 2003 MTEF and PPN
- Meaningful consultation on PPN 2004

- The provincial ELRC be convened for the development and determination of the 2005 PPN to enable the MEC to finalize the process of consultation as required by law by 15 June 2004 (SADTU KZN 2004e:1-2).

The MEC committed herself to resolving the PPN debacle. She called for a fresh round of consultations with all stakeholders. Consequently, the MEC in terms of *Circular HRM 54A of 2004* called for the ‘staying of’ PPN 2004 and all other processes related to it (KZN DEC 2004f:1).

The MEC after consultation with educator unions in June 2004 declared that ‘the 2004 PPN has been nullified because it was the product of a process that did not comply with the provisions of the *Employment of Educators Act* and related regulations’ (Post 2004b:3). This declaration by the MEC meant a reversal of the PPN process for 2004. Consequently, educators who were transferred to schools based on the 2004 PPN had to return to their former schools (KZN DEC 2004g:1). The net result of the nullification of the PPN, however, meant that schools were to operate outside of a PPN for 2004. The unions pointed out that this is in fact good news in the sense that schools will benefit if their educators who were declared surplus return to them, because they will be getting more educators (Post 2004b:3). Further, the schools affected due to the withdrawal of educators are not jeopardized because they are permitted to employ temporary educators in place of those educators who have moved to their former schools (KZN DEC 2004g:1).

## **2.7 SUMMARY**

This chapter has highlighted how the state’s macroeconomic policies in the form of the GEAR have constrained spending on education. The resultant effect of the GEAR on policy on educator post provisioning was explored in terms of its effects on the affordability of the educator pools of provincial education departments as well as the distribution of educators to schools in terms of the PPM. The impact of state policies on educator distribution in terms of equity and redress was also highlighted.

The next chapter focuses on the theoretical orientation and the analytical tools used in this study.

## CHAPTER THREE

### THEORETICAL ORIENTATION

#### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter outlined the inter-connectedness of all social policies (educational, economic and political) as well as its impact on educator provisioning. This chapter focuses on the theoretical orientation to this study. It commences by grounding this study in the field of policy analysis and employs critical theory as an over-arching analytical framework. An account on ideology with reference to neoliberalism is presented. The concept of managerialism is then explored with specific reference to a new institutional culture called 'new public management' which has arisen in the public sector. A brief account of managerialism in education is focused on, as well as the consequences of pursuing managerialist policies in education.

This chapter concludes with a discussion on the use of RAMs in education. Specific reference is made to their characteristics, why they are used, possible problem areas in their use and finally equity considerations in their use.

#### 3.2 POLICY ANALYSIS

Policy analysis according to Codd (1988:235) is a form of enquiry which provides either the informational base upon which policy is constructed, or the critical examination of existing policies. The former is called analysis *for* policy, whereas the latter has been termed analysis *of* policy.

Taylor, Rizvi, Lingard and Henry (1997:36) view analysis *for* policy as referring to the policy research conducted within educational bureaucracies in the process of policy production and evaluation. Analysis of policy can take two different forms, namely:

- *policy advocacy* which has the purpose of making specific policy recommendations; and

- *information for policy* in which information and data is provided to policy makers to assist them in the revision or formulation of actual policies.

Taylor *et. al.* (1997:36) view analysis of policy as a more academic task. Analysis of policy can also take on two distinct forms, namely:

- *analysis of policy determination and effects*, which examines the inputs and transformational processes operating upon the construction of policy and also the effects (impacts and consequences) of such policies on various groups; and
- *analysis of policy content*, which examines the values, assumptions and ideologies underpinning the policy process.

The thrust of this study is, in the main, the analysis **of** policy with regard to educator post provisioning rather than the analysis **for** policy with regard to educator post provisioning. Further, the researcher takes a critical stance in the analysis of policy on educator post provisioning and uses critical theory as an over-arching analytical framework in this study.

### **3.2.1 CRITICAL POLICY ANALYSIS AND CRITICAL THEORY**

Critical policy analysis includes looking at how policy processes are arranged, what the content of the policy is, whose interests the policy serves, how it is implemented and what the outcomes are. In doing critical policy analysis, exploring the values and assumptions which underlie the policy, in whose interests is the particular policy initiative and who are the winners or losers, become an integral part of the analysis. Therefore, critical policy analysis is, ‘a value laden activity which explicitly or implicitly makes judgments as to whether and in what ways policies help to make things better’ (Taylor *et al.* 1997:37).

In engaging in a critical analysis of policy on educator post provisioning, the researcher

viewed the analysis from a conflict<sup>1</sup> rather a functionalist<sup>2</sup> perspective and has, therefore, drawn on the work of a theoretical tradition called critical theory in analyzing policy on educator post provisioning. According to Gibson (1986:44):

Critical theorists in education have three things in common. They begin from a concern to map the inequalities and injustices of education. Next, they claim to trace those inequalities and injustices to their source, showing the educational processes and structures by which they are maintained. Finally, they seek or propose remedies to those injustices.

In using critical theory the researcher has chosen to focus on the following aspects of this paradigm: critique of ideology, critique of instrumental rationality, enlightenment and emancipation.

### **3.2.1.1 CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY**

Ideology is not a neutral concept. For critical theorists it is considered a very powerful concept. Ideologies are formed by the social practices and beliefs of the powerful in society and they penetrate everyday life, familiar assumptions and beliefs (Higgs & Smith 1997:186, Gibson 1986:11). McLaren (2003:79-80) asserts that ideology serves both a positive and negative function. It is to the negative function that he focuses where he links ideology to a theory of domination. Owing to asymmetrical power relationships, some groups are privileged over others. These privileged groups sustain their domination through ideology by maintaining a breach between ‘ideas and reality’ and ‘words and deeds’ (Held 1980:183). In interrogating and deconstructing policy on educator post provisioning, the researcher explores how state ideology, in the form of neoliberalism has impacted on educator provisioning at public schools and has resulted in some sectors of the population maintaining their privileged position whilst simultaneously subverting the principles of equity and redress as espoused by policy.

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<sup>1</sup> A conflict perspective is based on the premise that society is in continual conflict with some groups dominating others and that everyone competes for power (Claasen & Van Wyk 1999:22).

<sup>2</sup> A functionalist perspective is based on the assumption that society is an orderly self-regulating whole in which incremental changes take place to ensure stability and consensus (Claasen & Van Wyk 1999:22).

### **3.2.1.2 CRITIQUE OF INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY**

Critical theorists view instrumental rationality as the dominant feature of the modern world. Instrumental rationality represents the preoccupation with *means* in preference to *ends*. It focuses on *how* things can achieve goals, rather than whether the goals are worthwhile. It is concerned with method and efficiency rather than purpose – the most efficient means to a given end (Gibson 1986:7). Critical theorists question ‘efficient in terms of what?’ and why such a value is considered more worthwhile than others. According to Jones (2003:74), such reasoning in modern society is a consequence of capitalist activity, where a preoccupation with new and ever more efficient means of achieving productive ends becomes the be-all and end-all. This concept of instrumental rationality is useful in this study in analyzing the tension between economic efficiency on the one hand and equity on the other. Are these two terms compatible or are they mutually exclusive from a social justice perspective?

### **3.2.1.3 ENLIGHTENMENT**

Enlightenment consists of the disclosure of the true interests of individuals and groups. It aims to point out who the true beneficiaries are of particular practices and policies. Young (1989:40) contends that through enlightenment, oppressed groups can ‘select strategies and tactics’ and engage in political action and struggle in order to set themselves free from the forces of oppression. In terms of educator post provisioning, the researcher aims, through critical reflection, to expose the needs and concerns of the different stakeholders in the education system. More importantly, it aims to point out whether policy on educator post provisioning addresses the needs and concerns of all stakeholders. If not, it aims to expose whose interests are served by the current policy on educator post provisioning.

### **3.2.1.4 EMANCIPATION**

Critical theory attempts to reveal those factors which prevent groups and individuals from taking control of or even influencing those factors that affect their lives (Gibson 1986:5, Young 1989:58). Rush (2004:9) asserts that critical theory is not merely descriptive but rather a way to instigate social change by providing knowledge of the forces of social

inequality that can, in turn, inform political action aimed at emancipation (or at least at diminishing domination and inequality). By such revelations it aims to set people free from the dominating and repressive structures of society. In other words, it is emancipatory. Thus, critical theory has a very clear agenda – to transform society (Bertram 2003:116).

In terms of educator provisioning, the emancipatory nature of critical theory will be used to reveal if policy on educator post provisioning has contributed to reproducing inequality and thereby disadvantaging certain groups in society. Through such revelations, it is hoped that this study will galvanize those groups disadvantaged by prevailing policy on educator post provisioning into action for change. Further, this study in itself attempts to serve as an agent of change because at the end of this study the researcher makes certain recommendations in order to improve policy on educator post provisioning.

### **3.2.2 WHAT IS POLICY?**

The word ‘policy’, is used in many different contexts to refer to diverse sets of phenomena. Harman (1984:13) asserts that policy is sometimes used in a very narrow sense to refer to ‘formal statements of action’, while others use the word policy as a synonym for words such as ‘plan’ or ‘programme’. However, he uses the word policy to refer to courses of purposive action being followed or to be followed in dealing with a recognized problem or matter of concern, and directed towards the accomplishment of some intended or desired set of goals.

Codd (1988:235) avers that policy is taken to be any course of action (or inaction) relating to the selection of goals, the definition of values or the allocation of resources. Fundamentally for Codd, policy is about the exercise of political power and the language that is used to legitimate that process.

According to Kogan (Ball 1990:3), policy is clearly a matter of the authoritative allocation of values. They are the operational statements of values and are statements of prescriptive intent. Ball (1990:3) adds that values do not float free of their social context.

Therefore, the question arises as to whose values are validated in policy and whose are not. Thus 'the allocation of values' draws attention to the centrality of power and control in the concept of policy.

Ranson (1995:440) contends that policies are statements which are typically expressed both in utterance and in textual form. They have a distinctive and formal purpose for organizations and governments: to codify and publicize the values which are to inform future practice and thus encapsulate prescriptions for reform. Policies are thus orientated to change and action, providing intent of transforming practice according to ideal values. Policies, therefore, systematically challenge the taken for granted assumptions and practices in organizations or the state. Ranson (1995:440) adds that the form (orientation to change) and substance (the value orientation) of policy challenge the practice and traditions of organizational working in way that can generate conflict. Agreement about change and values is not a given; they are likely to be 'essentially contested' within organizations as much as the polity as a whole, as different interest groups struggle to acquire influence over purposes and resources.

Policy on educator post provisioning encapsulates all of the above conceptions of policy in the sense that it:

- Represents formal statements of action that seek to address the contentious issue of educator distribution.
- Challenges existing practices of educator distribution and as a result it has the potential of bringing the different stakeholders, namely, educators, department officials, politicians and unions in conflict.
- Results in the publicizing of the values that inform educator provisioning.
- Is simply not received and implemented by the policy recipients but is contested at every level.

### 3.2.3 TYPES OF POLICIES

Policies, according to De Clercq (1997:128), vary in their purpose, complexity, target groups, distribution of costs and benefits and location of their impact. The following types of policies are distinguished:

- *Procedural policies* which spell out who is going to take action and through which structures and processes such action should be taken (Harly, Bertram and Mattson 1999:18).
- *Material/Distributive policies* which provide real resources to some interest group.
- *Symbolic policies* which remain rhetorical about needed changes. According to Harly, Bertram and Mattson (1999:17), symbolic policies create a vision of the ideal situation. They state that there is a danger that this vision will remain simply a vision if the policy documents are not supported by practical rules and regulations.
- *Regulatory policies* refer to the laws and rules that policies introduce and enforce. They may limit the behaviour and actions of certain groups and individuals. Success of regulatory policies, according to Hargrove (Hill 1984:132), may often rest upon the extent to which they have redistributive consequences.
- *Redistributive policies* which shift the allocation of resources or rights among social groups. Hargrove (Hill 1984:132) posits that redistributive policies are harder to implement than distributive ones.

Policy with regard to educator post provisioning can be categorized as all of the above. It is a procedural policy because it spells out the roles of individuals, such as the MEC in the creation of educator posts in a province and the Head of the Education Department in the distribution of such posts. The fact that this policy provides human resources to schools, qualifies it to be a material/distributive policy. It is also a symbolic policy in that it creates a vision of the ideal situation at public schools where equity will prevail in terms of educator distribution. Further, it also spells out the laws and rules for educator distribution which makes it a regulatory policy with possible redistributive consequences.

### **3.2.4 POLICY MAKING**

According to Ganapathy (Dyer 1999:45), in developing countries policy making is seen as more prestigious than implementation and it is to the formulation of policy that attention is paid. With regard to policy on educator post provisioning this was the case. The policy actors focused their attention more on the formulation of the policy. They neglected implementation issues owing to the fact that implementation was a provincial function. Haddad (1995:19) notes that there are two essential dimensions of policy formulation: the how? (The process) and who does it? (The actors).

#### **3.2.4.1 THE POLICY MAKING PROCESS**

In terms of the 'policy process', Evans, Slack and Shaw (1995:2) contend that the policy process shows two distinct views. The first view depicts policy making as a set of stages or steps which follow a logical order (functionalist perspective). The second view depicts policy making as a messy, fluid process which cannot be reduced to a simple linear model (conflict perspective). It emphasizes the unpredictability of the policy process. Instead of seeing the stages as rigidly sequential, each one is viewed as a challenge to be faced at some point in the process of policy formulation and implementation.

#### **The Policy Process as Discrete Steps and Stages**

Harman's (1984:16) view of the policy process is based on the notion that the handling of policy by any department or agency generally involves a series of sequential stages or phases. Each stage is different, both in terms of what happens to the policy actors and their policy efforts, and their results. He identifies the policy process as comprising of four stages, namely, emergence and problem identification; policy formulation and authorization; implementation; and termination or change.

De Clercq (1997) and the Centre for Educational Research and Innovation (CERI) (1995), agree that this is one view of the policy process. De Clercq (1997:29), however, labels the four stages differently, namely, policy initiation; policy formulation; implementation; and evaluation. Both De Clercq and Harman conceptualize policy formulation and implementation as two separate and distinct activities. This top-down

(bureaucratic process model) approach, according to Bowe, Ball and Gold (1996:274), creates the perception that policy 'gets done' to people by a chain of implementers whose roles are clearly defined by legislation.

### **Policy Making as a Fluid Process**

In practice, the elements of the policy cycle do not take place as a series of discrete steps but are experienced as a continuously interactive process ('bargaining and conflict' model). Some stages may be skipped and others may be concurrent or follow a different order, depending on the nature of the policy itself (De Clercq 1997:129).

According to Evans, Slack and Shaw (1995:4), at all stages, affected stakeholders seek to make changes which address their concerns. In this sense, the formulation of policy options is not something which happens only at the beginning of a cycle, but is continuous, with important inputs being made even after the adoption of a particular policy option. Thus, even well into the implementation stage, powerful actors can and will seek to influence the translation of policies into regulations and actions. Given the large number and variety of factors and forces involved in policy making, 'pure rationality' should not be expected as the policy process 'is fluid, even messy, but still largely understandable'.

Policy making in respect of educator post provisioning was in fact a messy and fluid process and did not follow the neat and discrete steps and stages as identified by Harman (1984) and De Clercq (1997). The policy initiation and formulation stage was fraught with problems. The National Minister of Education after unilaterally initiating and formulating policy was forced to withdraw such policy owing to pressure from educator unions. The Ministry of Education was, therefore, forced to go back to the drawing board and consult with trade union organisations on the formulation of policy. Notwithstanding the attempts by educator unions to influence the policy formulation process to suit the needs of its membership, the state officials stood firm in their proposals and ensured that their concerns were articulated in policy. Despite the unions attempts to campaign at a political level to influence the policy formulation stage, this was not fruitful.

The implementation stage was not without problems either. This stage posed the greatest challenge because whilst policy was formulated nationally, implementation of policy was driven provincially. At provincial level there was constant policy re-contextualisation and re-creation. Further, the capacity of officials to implement the educator post provisioning policy was often called into question.

#### **3.2.4.2 THE POLICY ACTORS**

The question of who participates in the policy process is an important one. Ranson (1995:441) reasons that this is dependent on how policy is generated. In other words, is policy generated and controlled ‘top-down’ or is involvement a democratic process in which representatives take part in all or some stages of policy? Or is involvement a political process dependent upon power and ownership of ‘resources’? Policy generation with regard to educator post provisioning was supposed to be a democratic process with representatives from the state sector and employee sector participating in the process at national ELRC. However, the manner in which policy generation unfolded was reminiscent of a ‘top-down’ approach with the state officials using their power to ‘push through’ policy.

According to Harman (1984:18), the actors involved with education policy fall into two groups: the official and non-official. The official actors are individuals or organizational entities which have legally-based responsibilities such as:

- Actors from levels of government (president, ministers, members of parliament)
- The Education Ministry and their senior officials – While Ministers hold formal authority, in practice a great deal of authority is delegated to senior officials.
- Government agencies outside the education portfolio which play a part in developing and implementing policy

The main non-official actors are interest groups, political parties and the media. Of the interest groups, the key players are educator unions and parent associations. The major educator unions are important because at any time they will be exerting pressure about a wide range of topics at a variety of pressure points. In trying to influence policy on

educator provisioning, the major educator union, the SADTU used mass action as a tool to get state officials to re-negotiate aspects of the policy which was not in the interests of the educators and the learners.

Which policy actors are particularly important depends on the context, the nature of the policy being considered and the stage of the policy process. In the South African context everyone - from the World Bank to the trade unions – was involved in shaping education policy. However, not all actors have to participate equally at all stages of the policy process.

The policy actors involved in generating policy on educator provisioning were the parties to the national ELRC *viz.* the state officials and employee representatives (trade unions). These policy actors, in theory, were expected to canvass the views of their representative constituencies and table mandated positions on educator provisioning. The extent to which this did or did not happen, however, is a subject of debate. In the unfolding of policy formulation on educator post provisioning, it is important to note that the policy proposals were in fact formulated by the state officials. With the state officials comprising fifty percent of the bargaining council, all the state needed was one other employee grouping to side with its proposals in order to get the policy adopted. Because the unions are not homogenous entities, driven by the same values and beliefs, they could not find common ground on a collective employee position on educator provisioning. This weakened the unions as a collective in the bargaining process. Consequently, this strengthened the state's position and they were able to get the policy adopted at national ELRC.

### **3.2.5 POLICY IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS**

In terms of this study, data was gathered with regard to implementation of policy on educator post provisioning at school sites. Therefore, policy implementation analysis will be used as a framework to analyze data on the implementation of policy on educator post provisioning.

Van Meter and Van Horn (Hill 1984:129) define the implementation process as ‘those actions by public or private individuals (or groups) that are directed at the achievement of objectives set forth in prior policy decisions’. According to Lane (1993:91) ‘implementation refers to the bringing about, by means of outputs, of outcomes that are congruent with the original intention. He adds that implementation has a double meaning: ‘to give practical effect to’ or execution on the one hand, and ‘fulfill’ or accomplishment on the other.

In the policy arena, there has often been the erroneous, implicit assumption that once policies are adopted, full implementation would follow naturally. This assumption, according to De Clercq (1997:129), is based on the view that the translation of policy into action or practice is an unproblematic and smooth process which requires strong controls to ensure that the bureaucracy executes faithfully the directives of the political bosses. The policy, according to Dyer (1999:47) is seen as paramount and resistance to it tends to be seen as irrational, and a barrier to implementation. When a discrepancy develops between intended policies and implemented policies, it is attributed to the lack of institutional and resourcing capacities of the state bureaucrats or inadequate control systems over the bureaucrats.

McLaughlin (De Clercq 1997:129) problematises the implementation process in order to explain the inevitable gap that develops between intended and actual policies. For him, implementation is not about automatic transmission but is a process of bargaining and negotiation between the various local and national actors. Just as policies are not made in a vacuum, they are not carried out in a vacuum. According to McLaughlin, the implementing bureaucrats will always put their own interpretations and meanings to the intended policies and in the process, will use their power or discretion to subvert or transform the original goals of the policy. In recognizing the power of the implementers, policy implementation analysts argue that effective policy making should reckon with and anticipate implementation problems in order to strategize accordingly and influence or constrain the agents of the implementation process.

Pressman and Wildavsky (Hill 1984:30) postulate that in order to ensure successful implementation, the degree of co-operation between agencies in the implementation chain has to be very close to one hundred percent if a situation is not to occur in which a number of small deficits cumulatively creates a large shortfall. They thus introduce the concept of 'implementation deficit' when enacted policies are not fully implemented due to a lack of synergy between agencies in the implementation chain.

Craig (1990) in his study titled *Comparative African Experiences in Implementing Educational Policies* highlights certain factors which influence policy implementation. These factors will be used as benchmarks in analyzing the implementation of policy on educator post provisioning.

### **3.2.5.1 THE POLICY MESSAGE**

Craig (1990:24) identifies three fundamental components of a policy message, namely, the substance of a policy; the means specified for putting a policy into effect; and the way in which the substance and the means are communicated.

With respect to substance of a policy, the issue is one of realism. Among those who maintain implementation failures can be traced back to unrealistic policies, there are two general positions which have a bearing on policy on educator post provisioning:

- In terms of the problem addressed by the post provisioning policy, to what extent is there a need for social and attitudinal changes?
- In terms of the policy message and objectives, to what extent does implementation of the policy result in undesirable consequences for the recipients?

The means specified for implementation could also be a constraining factor. For any given policy there may be numerous possible approaches to implementation. Taking into account the resistance any innovative policy is likely to confront, it is important that policy makers because of their familiarity with the policy goals select and if necessary, institute an appropriate implementation strategy. With regard to policy on educator

provisioning it is important to note that the formulating agency and implementing agency are two separate entities. Therefore, consultation of individuals involved in implementing policy would be an imperative in order to institute an appropriate implementation strategy.

The way in which a policy is communicated can have important effects on the prospects for implementation. Implementation is more likely if a policy is straightforward and if its goals and mechanisms are expressed precisely and explicitly. Harman (1984:25) contends that an ideal policy is one that is clear with unambiguous goals. Gunn (Hill 1984:131) adds that there must be a complete understanding of, and agreement upon, the objectives to be achieved; and these conditions must persist throughout the implementation process.

In terms of implementing policy on educator post provisioning it is, therefore, vitally important that all role players in the implementation chain are *au fait* with the goals and objectives of the policy and mechanisms involved in implementation. The lack of clarity and openness, and incoherence or vagueness can leave implementers without much needed guidance and provide openings for those bent on obstruction of policy.

### **3.2.5.2 THE BUREAUCRATS AND THE ADMINISTRATORS**

Within the African context, and more specifically within education ministries, there is a lack of experience and poor training of administrators and school inspectors. Officials have been criticized for the inadequate delivery systems that have been instituted, for their lack of interest in seeing projects through to completion and their inability to work in harmony with those in other agencies (Craig 1990:50).

In terms of implementation of policy on educator post provisioning at school sites, the role of the SEM is pivotal. The extent to which they are able to provide strong leadership and reliable support to principals when they confront unanticipated problems and resistance from those who oppose policy is vital for implementation success.

### **3.2.5.3 THE EDUCATORS**

Educators are sometimes seen as an obstacle to the implementation of policies. They may doubt that putting such policies into practice is worth the effort. They may believe that particular policy objectives cannot attain the intended goals. They may reject the theory used to justify the reform or may just rationalize that a particular policy will just not work. Educators also view new policies with a certain degree of suspicion. They may reason that a new policy will mean increased workloads without additional compensation (Craig 1990:52). Therefore, in terms of policy on educator post provisioning, the extent to which the outcomes of the implementation of the policy have positive pay-offs for them will be the deciding factor as to whether they oppose implementation or embrace it.

Further, the educators usually denied input when policies are formulated, compensate by concentrating their energies on transforming policies while efforts are being made to put them into effect. They may engage in a campaign to neutralize a distasteful policy (Craig 1990:56). This has often been the case with policy on educator post provisioning where educators, after mandating their unions, engaged in mass action which often culminated in teacher strikes. These actions were used by educators to pressurize the state into reviewing policy on educator post provisioning. This resistance by educators has been partially successful in derailing policy implementation.

### **3.2.6 POLICY TOOLS**

There is an array of motivational devices found in policy content that gets people to act in concert with policy objectives. Schneider and Ingram (1990:512) have distinguished between five broad categories of policy instruments according to the behavioral assumptions on which they are based, namely, authority tools; incentive tools; symbolic and hortatory tools; capacity tools and learning tools. However, with regard to policy on educator post provisioning the following policy tools are relevant:

#### **3.2.6.1 AUTHORITY TOOLS**

Authority tools are one of the most common tools used by government to achieve policy aims. These are simply statements backed by the legitimate authority of government that

grant permission, prohibit, or require action under designated circumstances. Authority tools are mainly used within hierarchical systems of government to guide the behaviour of agents and officials, but seldom extend to target populations. These tools assume agents and targets are responsive to the organizational structure of leader-follower relationships and that the lower level agents usually will do as they are told (Schneider & Ingram 1990:514, Bleiklie 2000:107-108). With regard to educator provisioning, it is the National Minister of Education that authorizes provincial education departments, through policy, to create and distribute educator posts. Provincial MEC's and Heads of Education Departments, through implementation manuals, in turn, authorize department officials and principals to implement post provisioning policy. Failure to implement policy by these officials may result in disciplinary action being taken against these officials.

### **3.2.6.2 CAPACITY TOOLS**

Capacity tools provide information, training, education and resources to enable individuals, groups or agencies to make decisions or carry out activities. These approaches assume incentives are not an issue, but their may be barriers stemming from lack of information, skills or other resources needed to make decisions or take actions that will contribute to policy goals (Schneider & Ingram 1990:517, Bleiklie 2000:109-110). The use of capacity tools in ensuring policy relevant behaviour is paramount when it comes to policy on educator provisioning because of its highly technical nature.

### **3.2.6.3 SYMBOLIC AND HORTATORY TOOLS**

Symbolic and hortatory tools assume that people are intrinsically motivated and decide whether or not to take policy related action on the basis of their beliefs and values. Individuals bring into decision situations cultural notions of right, wrong, justice, individualism, equality, obligations and so forth. The idea here is that target populations are more likely to comply with behaviour desirable from a policy perspective if they themselves find the behaviour to be consistent with their beliefs (Schneider & Ingram 1990:519, Bleiklie 2000:110-111). Policy on educator post provisioning appeals to the values and beliefs of educators with its notions of social justice in educator distribution.

Consequently, educators moved by values of equity and social redress will support policy on educator provisioning.

### **3.3 THE NEOLIBERAL IDEOLOGY**

It is important to note that policies are ideological texts which have been constructed within a particular context. Therefore, a brief account of the concept ideology is presented followed by a discussion on the state's political ideologies.

#### **3.3.1 THE CONCEPT IDEOLOGY**

The concept ideology through time has acquired many different meanings. Leatt (Ashley 1989:3) views ideology as an action-related system of ideas and institutions, intended to change or defend an existing socio-economic order. Stilwell (2002:389) on the other hand advocates that ideologies are a system of beliefs. They embody particular value judgments about the economy and society and commonly give legitimacy to a particular socio-economic order e.g. neoliberal ideology as a justification for 'free market' capitalism.

In the Marxist tradition of social thought, ideologies are conceptual structures created by the ruling class to justify their position. It is seen as a system of distorted or misleading ideas which are based on illusions, and which serve the interests of those who rule society. Marx saw ideology as an instrument of dominance used by the ruling class over the working class (Ashley 1989:2). For Marx ideology is a consequence of, and not the cause of, something that happens in society. He believed that something such as ideology (without any physical properties) could not have an influence on something material. Only material things could be causal agents. Thus, Marx argued that ideology expresses fundamental conditions in a society and that it has no influence in a society. In other words, ideology is a by-product of social activity (Enteman 1993:15).

In the South African context ideology has played a prominent role in the political, economic and social sphere. The dominant political ideology that shaped South African society pre-1994 was that of the apartheid ideology which led to the stratification of

society on the basis of race. With the coming into political power of the democratic movements in 1994 a new political ideology, neoliberalism which is largely economic in orientation has gained ground.

### **3.3.2 THE ESSENCE OF NEOLIBERALISM**

According to Bourdieu (1998:2), the neoliberal discourse is not just one discourse among many. Rather, it is a 'strong discourse' because it has on its side those forces which dominate economic relationships such as financiers, the owners and managers of large corporations as well as government officials and politicians. These individuals sanctify the power of the market in the name of economic efficiency, which requires the elimination of administrative or political barriers capable of inconveniencing the owners of capital in their quest for the maximization of profit. According to Stilwell (2002:21), the core belief of neoliberalism is that by giving freer reign to market forces more efficient economic outcomes will result. Therefore, in many industrialized nations there has been a push, in the couple of decades, for deregulation, privatization and the liberalization of trade and capital movements.

Neoliberalism argues that the private sector is the most important force in any economy – guarantee increased profits for the private sector and everyone will benefit – according to this approach. If the profits of business increase they will be re-invested, there will be economic growth, more jobs, more goods will be produced and bought and we will have continuous prosperity (Pape 1998:1).

Central to this ideology is the push towards a lean and mean state. According to neo-liberal economics, the state's main objective should be to promote the profitability of business. A lean and mean state is neither a producer nor a deliverer of services. Government owned companies and many government services must be privatized under neo-liberalism. In addition, with a lean and mean state, the government has to practice fiscal discipline – spending less in order not to compare with the private sector. Ultimately a lean and mean state is not a force for redistribution and development but an ally of business (Pape 1998:2). According to Weber (2002:265), neoliberalism concerns a

retreat from democratic practice in public policy. It is characterized by privatization of education, decentralization in education governance, fiscal austerity in social spending and the advocacy of cost recovery (user fees, student loans).

Key to neoliberalism is competition. The neoliberal approach supports competition at all levels – between workers, between countries and to some extent between companies. Becoming internationally competitive and export orientated is vital – produce more for the world market and sell these goods at competitive prices and use the profits to further expand industry. Delivery to the local market is not a priority (Pape 1998:2).

In order to become globally competitive added pressure is exerted on bosses and workers. Higher quality of goods must be produced at lower prices. Workers must work harder – longer hours, more tasks, and fewer holidays. Employers must spend less money on health and safety, benefits and wages. These practices often lead to outsourcing, the replacement of workers by new technology, the hiring of employees on fixed term contracts and casualisation of labour (Pape 1998:2).

### **3.3.3 SOUTH AFRICA'S COMMITMENT TO NEOLIBERALISM**

The South African society, under apartheid rule of the National Party (NP) government, was considered according to Marais (2001:7) as one of the most unequal societies on earth. By the World Bank's calculations, the poorest 40% of its citizens earned less than 4% of the income circulating in the economy. The wealthiest 10% pocketed more than 51% of the income. Given such a vast inequality coupled with the need for economic growth and job creation in order to address rampant unemployment, South Africa needed an innovative macro-economic strategy to address these problems.

The African National Congress (ANC) which formed the first democratically elected government in South Africa in April 1994 articulated its first economic policy in the form of a 1990 '*Discussion Document on Economic Policy*'. Central to this document was the restructuring of the economy. The overriding theme though was 'growth through redistribution', a formula in which redistribution acts as a spur to growth and in which the

fruits of growth are redistributed to satisfy basic need. The 'growth through redistribution' approach was severely censured by mainstream economists and in the media because of its strong socialist undertones. The 'growth through redistribution' strategy was deemed unsustainable and such thinking within ANC circles quickly withered (Marais 2001:124-126).

Since the 'growth through redistribution' strategy, economic thinking within ANC circles began to take on precepts of neo-liberal dogma. According to Viv McMenamain (Marais 2001:130), an ANC economist, thinking within the ANC had come to reflect a shift away from policies which were considered morally and politically correct, but will cause strong adverse reaction from powerful local and international interests. Its draft policy guidelines released in 1992 made no mention of restructuring or regulating the financial sector and mooted the possibility of privatization in the public sector.

The ANC's economic policy platform, released just prior to the April 1994 election, was revealed in two documents: *The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)* and *Making Democracy Work: A Framework for Macro-economic Policy in South Africa*. The RDP, however, was stated as official ANC policy. Although the RDP reflected the issues such as housing, training, services, and jobs that were considered important to the ANC's base constituency, the ANC's macroeconomic policies after the April 1994 elections were characterized as both moderate and business friendly. Nelson Mandela, South Africa's president, stated at the World Economic Forum in 1994 that the ANC government would adhere to western economic policies rather than the socialist policies the ANC advocated as a banned liberation movement (Hanson & Hentz 1999: 498). This was seen as a major shift in the ANC's economic policy since in 1990, with the unbanning of the ANC, Nelson Mandela declared that 'the nationalization of the mines, banks and monopoly industry is the policy of the ANC and a change or modification of our views in this regard is inconceivable' (Marais 2001:122).

According to Hanson and Hentz (1999:499), the culmination of the government's move to neo-liberal orthodoxy was signaled by the apparent demise of the RDP on 28 March

1996 and its replacement with a new economic blueprint, the *Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR)* strategy in June 1996. The GEAR was the ANC's first comprehensive economic plan since its election in 1994. According to Bond (2000:78), the GEAR was based on the Reserve Bank's model, along with models developed by the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), World Bank and Stellenbosch Bureau of Economic Research. All these models were extremely orthodox, with biases that favoured neo-liberal policies that treated markets as fairly reliable and well functioning institutions. Notwithstanding strong labour opposition to the GEAR, Trevor Manuel the Minister of Finance contended that the GEAR strategy was 'non-negotiable' in its broad outline. The models collectively predicted that if the desired policies were adopted, South Africa would reach 6% sustainable growth and create 400 000 new jobs a year by the turn of the century (Bond 2000:78).

### **3.3.4 FROM A NEOLIBERAL TO A DEVELOPMENTAL STATE**

Recently, there has been some tension in government circles with regard to its thinking on its economic policy. The new trend is for some of the government ideologues to refer to the South African state as a 'developmental' rather than a neoliberal state. A developmental state is viewed as one that is able to manage the delicate balance between growth and social development. In a developmental state, poverty alleviation is key, expanding economic opportunities and fighting social deprivation is critical and providing public services and facilities to the poor is paramount (South Africa. Ministry of Finance 2004:3). Thus, in a developmental state, improving the access to education and the quality of education for the disadvantaged communities is considered a priority. This would, therefore, mean diverting more funds to disadvantaged schools so that both the quantity and quality of its educator pool could be improved as well as its physical infrastructure and material resources

### **3.4 MANAGERIALISM**

According to Fitzsimons (1999:1), one of the features of contemporary Western society is the tendency under neo-liberal philosophy to define social, economic and political issues, as problems to be resolved through management. This has consequently paved the way

for the introduction of managerialism as a new mode of governance in the public sector. Managerialism according to Turner and Hulme (1997:14) is the adoption by the public sector of private sector management practices. It is driven by the application of public choice theory and neo-classical economics to public sector management. Neo-classical economists are of the view that the public sector is inefficient and ineffective. Big government had not been effective government and it was time the principles of the market were allowed to operate. Reducing the size of the state and restricting the operations of the state would bring considerable savings. Programmes to increase bureaucratic capacity and efficiency and to encourage private sector growth through market mechanisms would then ensure that development would take place (Turner & Hulme 1997:18).

In the search for better performance in the public sector, Mok (1999:2) notes that some fashionable terms such as ‘excellence’, ‘increasing competitiveness’, ‘efficiency’, ‘accountability’, ‘devolution’ and ‘self-managing schools’ have been introduced in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public services. Given South Africa’s commitment to the neoliberal dogma, reforms in the public sector to reduce state involvement in the provision of public goods became part of the state’s agenda. In education, devolution of powers to the provinces and to the schools themselves has become a reality. Schools are considered as ‘self reliant’ and ‘self managing’ entities. In terms of finance, as this resource becomes scarce, the buzzword at all levels is that of efficiency.

### **3.4.1 THE PARADIGM SHIFT TO PUBLIC MANAGEMENT**

Mok (1999:2) notes that in the past two decades there has been a fundamental change in the philosophy of governance from a ‘big government, small individual’ to a ‘small government, big individual’ creed. Intending to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector, governments have begun to engage themselves in transforming the way that services are managed. Moving away from the traditional public administration paradigm to the ‘new public management’ (NPM), a more transparent and accountable public sector, as well as a more effective control of work practices are stressed.

### **3.4.2 THE DOCTRINES OF NPM**

Different commentators and advocates of NPM have stressed different aspects of the doctrine. From a survey of the NPM package advocated by Hood (1991:4-5), Boston (Fleisch 2002:162), Bardill (Fleisch 2002:163) and Martin (2002:130) the following key features can be identified:

- Devolution of management control (towards what is often referred to as the doctrine of self management).
- A shift from large scale bureaucracies to quasi-independent agencies.
- A shift towards contracting out services and outright privatization.
- The use of short-term labour contract.
- A general stress on cost saving and efficiency. This may involve cutting direct costs (reducing state expenditure) by downsizing of personnel.
- Raising labour discipline and resisting union demands.
- Greater transparency in resource allocation and the use of resources in new ways so as to heighten efficiency and effectiveness.
- ‘Hands on’ professional management with managers given the freedom to manage.

The data gathered in this study, will be analyzed using the above features of NPM.

### **3.4.3. MANAGERIALISM AND EDUCATION**

An account on an international perspective of managerialist policies in education is presented followed by an exposition on some of the drawbacks of pursuing managerialist policies in education.

#### **3.4.3.1 AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE**

Within education, as in other public services such as housing, health and welfare, it is possible to identify a new institutional culture which has been termed ‘NPM’, ‘new managerialism’ and ‘corporate managerialism’. In various parts of the world there are increasing numbers of attempts to restructure and regulate state schooling. Central to these initiatives are moves to dismantle centralized educational bureaucracies and to

create in their place devolved systems of education entailing significant degrees of institutional autonomy and a variety of forms of school-based management and administration. In many cases, these changes have been linked to enhanced parental choice or an increased emphasis on community involvement in schools. Such policy initiatives often introduce a 'market' element into the provision of educational services even though they continue to be paid for largely out of taxation. This may involve 'privatizing' them, both by involving private sector providers and by handing over to individuals and families decisions that were previously a matter of public policy. Most often, it entails making public services behave more like the private sector. The term 'quasi-market' is increasingly being used to characterize attempts to introduce market forces and private decision-making into the provision of education (Whitty, Power & Halpin 1998:3, 51).

Simkins (2000:317) points out that the concept of managerialism is becoming an increasingly important part of the discourse about public sector reform in the UK. In England and Wales, after promulgation of the *Education Reform Act* of 1988, there is a trend to devolve education provision to local communities. Schools could opt out of Local Education Authority (LEA) after a parental ballot and choose to run themselves by a governing body as a grant maintained school with direct funding from central government. By opting for grant maintained status it gains increased powers in relation to admissions, finance and staffing. Schools could also opt for institutional autonomy through the Local Management of Schools (LMS) policy. LMS grants governing bodies of schools that remain within LEA's increased control over their own budgets and day to day management. These schools receive funds according to a formula which ensures that 85% of the LEA's budget is handed down to schools and 80% of each schools budget is determined directly by the number and ages of its learners. The funding formula includes teacher salaries and teachers are now *de facto* (though not *de jure*) employees of the governing body (Whitty, Power & Halpin 1998:18-19).

Similarly, education reforms instituted in New Zealand was largely shaped by a government which embraced NPM. The *Picot Report* (1988) and the government's

*Tomorrows Schools* prompted reforms that led to a shift in the responsibility for budget allocation, staff employment and educational outcomes from central government and regional education boards to individual schools. Schools were given boards of trustees (comprising parents and members of the business community) who could opt for bulk funding – granting of 100% of their funding including teacher salaries based on a predetermined learner-educator ratio (Whitty, Power & Halpin 1998:21).

In the Australian context, given its federal constitution, education provision is mainly the responsibility of the six states and the Northern Territory. Devolution has been a feature of government reforms since the 1970's. The concept of self-managing schools has gained popularity and various state education departments are remodeling schools on these lines. Since 1989 New South Wales has been implementing its decentralization programme which promoted devolution and choice – not only restructuring school management along corporate principles but deregulating school zones to stimulate competition between schools. The state of Victoria, however, is a leading proponent of devolution. By 1992 all schools were governed by a school council which had control of all items except teaching staff salaries. Further, reforms have seen Victoria's schools being granted full control over budgets and even personnel. The school council recruits the principal, who then takes responsibility for staff and resources. Odden (Whitty, Power & Halpin 1998:23-24) claims that these reforms represent one of the world's most comprehensive, well-designed, promising and professional approaches to decentralized management of schools. These reforms need to be seen against a background of sharp reductions in the level of resourcing from the state. Further, during the mid 1990's six hundred schools were closed and there was a reduction of 20% in the number of teachers employed as a result (Whitty, Power & Halpin 1998:23-24).

Similarly, the South African education system has not been immune to the education reforms taking place internationally. Since the democratization of the education system in 1994 there has been significant reforms consistent with NPM. In education, the concept of decentralization has been used increasingly has a tool to enhance managerial authority, improve economic and managerial efficiency and effectiveness and enhance better

governance. One of the primary modes of decentralization used by the government in education reform was that of deconcentration.<sup>3</sup> With regard to educator provisioning deconcentration has translated into the DNE giving the provinces greater autonomy with regard to setting their own learner-educator ratios, determining the size of the provincial educator pool, determining substitute educator numbers and policy with regard to the employment of temporary educators. Devolution<sup>4</sup> has also been used as a mode of decentralization where communities have been granted powers to participate in the process of school governance through democratically elected SGBs. With regard to educator provisioning, SGBs have been empowered to augment the state's allocation to schools through the appointment of SGB paid educators in order to improve efficiency in service delivery and improve responsiveness to learner needs. A third form of decentralization used by the government in education is that of delegation.<sup>5</sup> In terms of delegation SGBs have been granted powers to set user fees (school fees) and thereby reduce the financial burden of public schools on the state. The setting of fees by SGBs has, however, allowed some privileged groups to effectively 'privatize' schools within the public school system through the levying of exorbitant fees.

#### **3.4.3.2 THE COSTS OF MANAGERIALISM**

The adoption of mechanisms and principles from the private sector can enhance efficiency of educational services delivery. But what is also true is that the emphasis on economic rationalism and the practice of 'strong management' in running public sector services might have unintended consequences. Displacing costs elsewhere and shifting responsibilities from the state to individuals, local communities and other non-state sectors, the particular 'efficiencies' of certain services may be increased at human and social costs. As Rees (Mok 1999:118) points out, 'costs endured by those subjected to managerialist practices include unemployment and associated poverty; part-time work and accompanying insecurity; stress anxiety and loss of morale among employees....'

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<sup>3</sup> Deconcentration is the passing down of selected administrative functions to lower levels or sub-national units within government agencies or departments.

<sup>4</sup> Devolution is the granting of decision making powers to lower authorities or managers and allowing them to take full responsibility without reference back to the authorizing government.

<sup>5</sup> Delegation is the transfer of specific authority and decision making powers to organizations that are outside the regular bureaucratic structure and that are only indirectly controlled by government.

As a result of English reforms, educators face increased workloads, attempts to use them more flexibly to counter the effects of budget restrictions, divisive approaches to performance related pay and the replacement of full-time, permanent, qualified and experienced staff by part-time, temporary, less qualified and less experienced and therefore less expensive staff. A report by the *National Foundation for Educational Research* confirms that many of these trends have accelerated since the introduction of local management of schools particularly in those schools adversely affected by the use of average staffing costs in the funding formula. Ozga and Soucek (Whitty, Power & Halpin 1998:71) suggest that the reforms in England, Wales and parts of Australia have served to reduce the core of established and costly teachers and enlarge the more flexible and less expensive peripheral labour force. Blackmore (Whitty, Power & Halpin 1998:71) adds that given the position of women in the peripheral labour market, they are likely increasingly to be disadvantaged and exploited. Indeed, in many classrooms, parents predominantly mothers were being used as unpaid substitute teachers.

Mok (1999:118) makes a valid point in that education, unlike market commodities is a human service and a public good. Therefore, conceptualizing it solely as a market commodity may marginalize issues to do with morality and ethics as well as doing justice to ensure goals such as equity.

Mok (1998:118) in pointing out effects of managerialism on higher education asserts that 'doing more with less' and 'working smarter with fewer staff and less resources' has become the norm. He notes that in the past few years there has been a general increase in academic teachers' workload, from a staff-student ratio of 1:12 to a ratio of 1:20. In the midst of budget cuts, short-term appointments and part-time teaching have become a very popular survival strategy.

As result of managerialist reforms in South African education the workloads of educators has increased quite considerably over the years. The learner-educator ratios in the various provinces remain extremely high and the period load of educators has increased. Moreover, SMTs carry larger teaching loads which leave very little time for management

duties. The number of temporary educators in the system is also considerably high because provincial education departments view the employment of temporary educators as a less costly option. Further, parents are being exploited by increasingly being called upon to volunteer their services as substitute educators owing to the demand for substitute educators far exceeding supply in the provinces.

### **3.5 RESOURCE ALLOCATION MODELS**

As a consequence of managerialist approaches to education, tools that heighten allocative efficiency are employed by public sector organisations. A RAM is an example of one such tool. A RAM is a means by which resources are distributed according to preset criteria represented by a number of formulae and variables. A RAM is normally computerized making it relatively easy to calculate the financial implications of alternate assumptions of key variables (Field & Klingert 2001:83). RAMS are widely used in education to distribute human resources, material resources and finance. The PPM is a RAM that is used by provincial education departments to distribute state paid educator posts to schools. It takes into account numerous factors that have an influence on educator requirements at schools and uses a number of formulae to determine a school's post entitlement (PPN).

Field and Klingert (2001:83) point out that with shifts in many governments from line item budgeting to lump sum budgeting as well as from central control towards decentralization, the use of RAMs have gained prominence. They argue that without these developments in government policies the use of RAMs would be meaningless. Further, with increasing limits being placed on expenditure by governments, the use of a RAM stresses flexibility in the distribution of scarce resources. In South Africa, the change in the budgetary process from the 1997/8 financial year onwards towards decentralized control resulted in provinces drawing up their own budgets. Further, with lump sum budgeting by the various ministries in the provinces, as well as the introduction of the MTEF in order to project expenditure for the next three years in accordance with policy priorities, the introduction of the PPM by the department of education has proved to be an invaluable resource allocation tool.

### **3.5.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF A RAM**

A RAM is not neutral. It contains a number of basic assumptions regarding what is important and what is not. In other words it consists of 'systematized subjective opinions'. Similarly, the PPM is based on a number of factors and variables with regard to what is considered important with regard to educator provisioning. However, in deciding on particular factors and variables, micro-political activity can be a strong influence on decision making and be subject to sub-unit power, a factor which is likely to increase in times of financial constraint. Thomas (1999:185-186) has noted in his study that during the process of devising a RAM, its details were influenced by micro-political activity and the priority and preferences of the main change agents. Although the rhetoric was of rationality, the way in which the details of the formula were agreed upon was subject to the influence of powerful individuals.

It must be stressed that RAM's are constrained by budgets. A RAM does not decide on budgets, decision makers do. Therefore, a RAM does not eliminate the politics of the budgetary process (Field & Klingert 2001:84). It is, therefore, important to note that the PPM does not create educator posts. It can only distribute educator posts. The provincial education budget allocated for personnel expenditure creates educator posts. The determination of the size of the provincial education budget is in fact a political activity with provincial legislatures determining education expenditure.

Key to a RAM is the principle of greater transparency, consistency and rationality (Thomas 1999:183). A RAM such as the PPM should, therefore, make explicit what resources are available and how they will be allocated. The extent to which the implementers of the PPM are able to ensure transparency, however, is a moot point. Field and Klingert (2001:87), therefore, posit that if there is less than total transparency there seems little point in having a model.

A RAM should give organizations a reasonable degree of certainty that the resources allocated will also be the resources available during the financial year and provide them with some measure of stability over the relevant period (Field and Klingert 2001:87).

### **3.5.2 WHY USE A RAM?**

The introduction of a major management tool such as a RAM is usually the result of some kind of pressure. This pressure, according to Field and Klingert (2001:85), normally stems from perceived inconsistencies or unfairness from the user constituency. Dissatisfaction with dysfunctionalities of existing methods of resource allocation among the interested parties might cause a demand for new methods. Inconsistencies between criteria used by the government in distributing resources and those used at the institutional level might also be conducive to the introduction of the use of a RAM. The PPM was introduced owing to pressure from educators and educator unions. This pressure was largely as a result of claims of unfairness in educator distribution to schools from the educator constituency. However, from the point of view of the education department, the PPM was seen as a major innovation in terms of its strategic and operational planning initiatives.

Thomas (1999:184-185) contends that trends towards formulaic approaches have two principal aims: to change the culture of organizations towards a more entrepreneurial approach by reflecting the pressures of the external environment; and to bring a more rational basis to the allocation of resources. Further, he adds that demands for rationality in the allocation of resources and for strengthening of the planning process have placed considerable emphasis on the need to provide consistent data for decision making at a strategic, tactical and operational level. Abhilak (2000:2) commenting on the application of the PPM, therefore, makes a valid point that effective implementation of the PPM is dependent on accurate data. Educator unions have consistently challenged the department on the accuracy of the data used in determining the PPN of schools. They consistently maintain that the PPNs of schools are flawed owing to the lack of correct statistics in the department's database.

### **3.5.3 POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS IN THE USE OF A RAM**

Wildavsky (Thomas 1999:185) notes that the initial introduction of formula-based models for resource allocation may imply a radical redistribution of resources compared with previous historic patterns of allocation. Therefore, when a RAM is introduced,

agreement amongst all stakeholders to its implementation is of paramount importance. When the revised PPM was introduced in 2003, educator unions were far from happy at the manner in which it was implemented. After field-testing of the revised PPM, the unions accused the state officials of not consulting them with regard to the results of the field testing. Consequently, without approval of the unions the revised PPM was implemented.

In most cases, a RAM will in itself change the outcome of the institution's resource allocation processes. There will be winners and losers. Economic theory suggests that if losers can be compensated this should reduce the resistance to the adoption of such a model. In a survey conducted by Field and Klingert (2001:86) they found that this was an important issue. Two thirds of respondents reported some level of disagreement (signing up to the model does not necessarily mean that people are happy with it), although several were very relaxed about it. However, there are always winners and losers when the 'pot' is constrained. The losers will be unhappy. The winners, however, are frustrated because they cannot get their hands quick enough on the resources that the RAM suggests they are entitled to. The data generated in this study aims to identify the institutions and groupings that are 'winners' and the institutions and groupings that are 'losers' when the PPM distributes posts to schools.

A RAM is not regarded as a fixed and static entity. Therefore, it is important to accept that a RAM may change over time – there may be minor revisions each year. These may be the result of inconsistencies or changed priorities due to the 'changing environment', but in all cases there should be agreement amongst all stakeholders to the revisions. Field and Klingert (2001:87) note that when a RAM is first introduced, perfection is highly unlikely and will, therefore, need regular review owing to changes in external circumstances and internal politics. However, they advocate that when changes are made to a RAM, the basic features should be kept for as long as possible to maintain predictability. The PPM was revised in 2002 owing to dissatisfaction with the original PPM. In revising the model, the core of the model was kept intact and new design features were added to the model.

In Field and Klingert's (2001:87) study, a member noted that RAM's seem to degenerate over time as concessions to special interests at institutions are incorporated. When this happens it damages the very transparency that the RAM was supposed to achieve. Further, over time, the insidious growth of new features or calculations can lead to a situation where very few people understand the model anymore. This can lead to users of the model becoming totally perplexed and may call into question issues of transparency of the RAM. The PPM and its subsequent revision have resulted in the model becoming quite complex. The various formulae and calculations make it difficult for principals to verify their educator establishments manually.

### **3.5.4 EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE USE OF A RAM**

Equity considerations are important when it comes to resource distribution. It is, therefore, necessary to look at the different conceptions of equity.

Broadly speaking, the concept equity is commonly equated with 'fairness' and 'justice'. Simkins (1995:222), however, makes the distinction between 'procedural' and 'distributive' equity – the former concerning fair treatment in terms of rules and procedures, the latter concerning fairness in the distribution of resources and opportunities. The PPM, for example, can be argued to be more procedurally equitable in that it is based on objective criteria (in the sense that the criteria are set out as common rules and not determined by administrative discretion). More challenging and complex questions are raised, however, when the issues of distributional equity are addressed with regard to the PPM.

When dealing with distributional equity, Simkins (1995:222) raises the following pertinent questions:

- What does 'equal treatment' mean? Does it mean 'identical' or 'equivalent' for example?
- Should it be conceived in terms of access to resource provision, of the nature of the educational experiences which the resources provide, or of the outcomes or benefits which result for the individual?

Given the above dilemma, the researcher chose to look at distributional equity from two perspectives in this study, namely, equity in terms of the quality of educators as resource inputs and equity based on the outcomes educators as a resource are intended to contribute.

Simkins (1995:224) advances that if we assume that there is a fixed quantity of resources to be allocated and that learners have different capacities to benefit in terms of learning from a given level of resourcing, then there is a clear choice available. We can attempt to maximize the total learning gain by directing resources to those whom we expect to gain the most or we can direct resources to those whom we judge to be the most disadvantaged. In terms of redress, the PPM in principle directs additional human resources to disadvantaged schools owing to the assumption that by directing additional resources to these schools smaller class sizes will be created which in turn may enhance educational quality. However, it should be noted that for any resource distribution to schools to have any positive effect on learning a full analysis of the existing resource position of individual schools should be done. This should include the quality of the resources a school has and can attract in terms, for example, of teacher qualifications or teacher experience. Such information is important so as not to exacerbate inequity from a distributional equity perspective.

### **3.6 SUMMARY**

This chapter has focused on the theoretical and conceptual tools used in this study. An overview on policy analysis with critical theory being used as an over-arching paradigm in policy analysis was presented. An account on neoliberalism as well as managerialism which is informed by the neoliberal ideology was then presented. The use of RAMs in education was then elucidated upon.

The next chapter focuses on the research design employed in this study. The methodological approach, as well as the data collection tools and techniques employed in this study are presented.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY**

#### **4.1 INTRODUCTION**

The previous chapter focused on the theoretical orientation to this study by outlining the chosen theoretical frameworks, concepts and models. The focus of this chapter is on a discussion of the methodological approach and methods used to generate data, namely, the survey questionnaire, interviews and document analysis.

After presenting a brief discussion on the methodological approach, information on the survey questionnaire which is the primary data gathering tool employed in this study is presented. Issues including the construction and design of the questionnaire, piloting of it, the sampling framework as well as the techniques involved in data analysis are presented. The interviews, which was a secondary data gathering tool is then presented with a specific focus on the rationale for the interviews, the selection of informants, the nature of the interviews, trialing of the interviews and techniques involved in the analysis of interview data. This chapter then concludes with a brief account on the document study.

#### **4.2 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH**

In order to obtain data on the issues related to the critical questions formulated in chapter one, the researcher chose to use both the qualitative and quantitative paradigms in order to investigate and address the research questions. Quantitative research refers to attempts to collect data that can be presented in the form of numbers and which represent some measurement or the other. This approach is generally used when breadth is required. Qualitative research, on the other hand, refers to the collection of data that reflects the quality or nature of a particular phenomenon in the form of description (Uys 2003:118). Therefore, in order to ensure sufficient 'breadth' in this study the researcher employed the quantitative paradigm to gather data. Further, so as not to compromise 'depth' and to enhance the validity of the findings of this study the qualitative paradigm was also used.

Whilst the researcher was cognizant of the fact that mixing methods was both time consuming and requires sufficient expertise by the researcher, Merriam (1988:2) argues that by combining qualitative and quantitative methods a form of triangulation results which enhances the validity of one's study. Further, the two approaches are not mutually exclusive and can complement each other (Remenyi, Williams, Money & Swartz 1998:192).

The concept of triangulation is based on the assumption that any bias inherent in particular data sources, investigator, and method would be neutralized when used in conjunction with other data sources, investigators, and methods (Creswell 1994:174). In other words, triangulation is based on the principle that it is better to look at something from several angles than to look at it in only one way (Neuman 2000:124). Although triangulation is an important reason to combine qualitative and quantitative methods, Creswell (1994:175) advances the following additional reasons for combining methods in a single study:

- Complimentary, in that overlapping and different facets of a phenomenon may emerge (eg. peeling the layers of an onion)
- Developmentally, wherein the first method is used sequentially to help inform the second method
- Initiation, wherein contradictions and fresh perspectives emerge
- Expansion, wherein the mixed methods add scope and breadth to a study.

Merriam (1988:69) contends that the rationale for this strategy is that the flaws of one method are often the strengths of another, and by combining methods, observers can achieve the best of each, while overcoming their unique deficiencies. Further, Neuman (2000:125) adds that a study using both methods is fuller and more comprehensive.

Thus, in keeping with the reasoning that a combined methods study is one in which the researcher uses multiple methods of data collection, the researcher in this study combined the following methods:

- Survey questionnaire (largely quantitative)

- Interviews (qualitative)
- Document study (qualitative)

### **4.3 THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE**

The survey questionnaire was used as the primary data gathering tool because surveys are attractive as a means for probing research questions for two major reasons:

- Firstly, they are much more efficient in cost benefit terms than would be a study of the whole population
- Secondly, surveys are sometimes more effective in that it would take too long and require too many researchers to contact the whole population (Anderson 1990:195).

Cohen and Manion (1980:75) assert that the survey method enables the researcher to collect information from a smaller group or subset of the population in such a way that the knowledge gained is representative of the total population. Further, Leedy (Booyens 2003:127) adds that the best way to obtain data on attitudes, feelings or reactions of people is to use a questionnaire. Owing to the fact that one of the critical questions in this study centred around gaining information on the views of principals on educator post provisioning, the researcher found the questionnaire the most suitable data collection instrument.

#### **4.3.1 CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE**

Whilst questionnaires are a popular way of obtaining data, O'Sullivan and Russell (1999:230) caution that poor questionnaires may result in low response rates, unreliable or invalid data, or inadequate or inappropriate information. They suggest that quality questionnaires require well-worded questions, clear responses and attractive layouts. The researcher kept this in mind when designing the questionnaire.

The questionnaire employed in this study had largely closed-ended questions. Closed-ended questions typically ask the respondent to make choices from a set of alternatives. Only one question was open-ended. The open-ended question allowed the respondents to

answer the question in any way they chose. It allowed respondents to openly and freely express their thoughts and opinions (Schumacher & MacMillan 1993:345). Remenyi *et al.* (1998:15) point out that the type of question chosen has implications for the type of evidence that can be obtained and, therefore, on the method of analysis of the evidence.

Martins, Loubser and Van Wyk (1996:219) advise that proper sequencing of questions will enable the researcher to improve the level of understanding achieved by the respondents and also induces ‘...a harmonious flow of thought in the questionnaire.’ With this in mind, the questionnaire (see Annexure D, page 268-273) was divided into six sections:

- Section A: Biographical and General Information
- Section B: Economic Status of the School
- Section C: The Post Provisioning Model
- Section D: School Organisation and Administration
- Section E: Implementation of the Post Provisioning Norm
- Section F: General Comments

Sections A to E of the questionnaire contained closed-ended questions requiring either a categorical response, rank order response or a scaled response. The majority of the questions required a scaled response and was of the Likert-type (see example below) which allowed respondents the latitude to indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with a variety of statements. Section F of the questionnaire consisted of one open-ended question which gave respondents the opportunity to comment on any aspect of educator post provisioning not covered by the questionnaire.

**STATEMENT**

STRONGLY AGREE		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>		STRONGLY DISAGREE

Anderson (1993:34) states that the Likert scale is widely used in questionnaires where the researcher wants to assess views from respondents. It was developed by Rensis Likert to measure the direction and strength of an individual's opinion. According to Hawkins and Tull (1994:297) the Likert scale is simple and easy to construct, and is also useful for mail surveys since the instructions can be easily understood. However, Zikmund (1994:372) cautions that the major disadvantage of the Likert scale is its inability to quantify and adequately explain a single score.

#### **4.3.2 MEASUREMENT**

With regard to measurement, questionnaire responses were quantified by assigning numbers to the responses. Uys (2003:118) defines measurement as allocating numbers to objects or events according to certain rules. Measurement can be done on different levels, depending on the nature of the measurement.

##### **Nominal Measurement Level**

According to Uys (2003:119) people can be divided into different mutually exclusive categories according to this measurement. The people within a particular category are then similar to one another according to the characteristic that is measured, and differ from those who are placed in another category.

##### **Ordinal Measurement Level**

Ordinal scales are used when the respondent is asked for responses in the form of a ranking order. The evidence is again put into categories and the numbers assigned indicate the ordering of the categories. Each successive category thus has more of the relevant characteristic than the previous category (Uys 2003:120).

##### **Interval Measurement Level**

Uys (2003:120) points out that in interval measurement there are equal intervals between the different categories. Numbers are allocated in such a way that the distance between the numbers corresponds to the difference in the degree to which the characteristic is present. In addition to the fact that the measurement and the ranking of the measurements

are distinguishable, interval measurements thus also have the characteristic of equal intervals.

### **Ratio Measurement Level**

The ratio measurement has the same characteristics as interval measurement except that it also has an absolute zero value. In this case the amount indicated by the numbers corresponds to the amount of the particular variable that is present. An absolute zero value means that the zero represents the total absence of the variable (Uys 2003:120).

### **4.3.3 PRE-TESTING AND VALIDATION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE**

A measuring instrument is valid to the extent that it is accurately able to measure that which it intends to measure. Thus, in order to ensure validity of the questionnaire as a measuring instrument, a pilot test of the questionnaire was conducted. Booyens (2003:140) contends that pre-testing is a non-negotiable part of questionnaire design.

Anderson (1990:217) suggests that a good method of pilot testing a questionnaire is to assemble a group of six to twelve respondents. Being cognizant of Anderson's suggestion, the researcher administered the questionnaire to seven principals based at ordinary public secondary schools in the Pinetown District of the eThekweni Region of the KZN DEC. The intention was to determine possible flaws in terms of ambiguity, layout, language and structuring of the questions.

The pilot study established that the questionnaire was understood by the respondents and their responses showed enough variation for the envisaged analysis to be conducted. Two principals were questioned verbally a day after completion of the questionnaire. This was done in order to determine whether the researcher and respondent were on the same wavelength regarding the information the questionnaire proposed to obtain. It was established that the questionnaire was able to hold their interest to fully complete it. One principal remarked that it took him approximately fifteen minutes to complete the questionnaire. This was an important comment since one of the key factors affecting

response rate to a questionnaire is the length of the questionnaire. Burgess (2001:7) states that questionnaires perceived as long will deter respondents.

#### **4.3.4 SAMPLING FRAMEWORK**

Often it is not practical or even possible to acquire information from all the people about whom we want to make inferences. The solution to this problem of not being able to study all the people is to select a number of people who have the characteristics in which the researcher is interested. This process of selecting part of a group under study is known as sampling.

##### **4.3.4.1 DEFINING THE POPULATION**

According to Anderson (1990:156) the first task is to define the group of interest or target population since the interest in sampling is to generalize to this target population and one cannot pick a suitable sample unless the target population is fully described. Most often, there are restrictions on membership in the target population and it is important to understand who belongs so that the researcher knows to whom the results can be generalized. Uys and Puttergill (2003:109) contend that a population is theoretically conceptualized and is a collection of cases that the researcher wants to study. They add that the boundaries of this population must be clearly marked off.

The target population for the purposes of this study is ordinary public secondary school principals in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. A public school as defined in the *South African Schools Act, 84 of 1996* is a school established by the Member of the Executive Council (MEC) from funds appropriated for this purpose by the provincial legislature. An ordinary public school is distinguished from a public school for learners with special education needs (LSEN). The justification for focusing on ordinary public schools in this study is that the staffing of these schools is the competence of the MEC for Education in that particular province.

The population is also limited to principals of secondary schools in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. A secondary school is defined as a school offering grades eight to twelve. Secondary schools were chosen for two reasons:

- Firstly, because the diversity of courses offered in the Further Education and Training (FET) Band makes specific demands on human resource needs and;
- Secondly, the subjects/learning areas offered make specific demands on class size.

The KwaZulu-Natal Education Management and Information Systems Directorate (KZN-EMIS) was contacted in order to establish the number of ordinary public secondary schools in the province. According to Patrick Buthelezi, a Senior Manager in this Directorate, 1 453 schools fall into this category. Thus, the population size for the purposes of this study amounts to 1 453 principals.

#### **4.3.4.2 DRAWING THE SAMPLE**

According to Uys and Puttergill (2003:109), when developing a sample, a distinction needs to be made between probability and non-probability sampling. In probability sampling the aim is to select cases of the population which will provide representative information about the population. Anderson (1990:198) states that a probability sample is a miniature version of the population to which the survey findings are going to be applied. In non-probability sampling one attempts to define the sample in ways which over-represent groups with certain characteristics. Accurate representation of the population is not always possible, or lists of the population being studied are not available. Since the researcher was able to obtain a list of all 1 453 ordinary public schools in the province, the probability sampling technique was employed.

More specifically, the researcher adopted the stratified systematic sampling technique. According to Babbie (2001:201), stratified sampling is a method of obtaining a greater degree of representativeness by decreasing the degree of sampling error. In terms of sampling theory, sampling error is reduced by two factors in the sample design:

- Firstly, a large sample produces a smaller sampling error than does a small sample and;

- Secondly, a homogenous population produces samples with smaller sampling errors than does a heterogeneous population.

Stratified sampling is based on the second factor in sampling theory. Rather than selecting a sample from the total population at large, the researcher ensures that appropriate numbers of elements are drawn from homogeneous subsets of the population. According to Babbie (2001:201) the ultimate function of stratification is to organize the population into homogenous subsets (with sufficient heterogeneity between the subsets) and to select the appropriate number of elements from each. The choice of stratification variables should be primarily related to variables the researcher wants to represent accurately. In selecting the elements from the population a systematic sampling strategy was used. In a systematic sampling strategy the cases are chosen in an ordered manner by, for example, selecting each third or fifth case in the population. This, according to Uys & Puttergill (2003:111), is called the  $n^{\text{th}}$  case.

In terms of this study, the researcher considered the geographical location of secondary schools an important stratification variable. In KwaZulu-Natal public schools are grouped into regions and districts. In order to ensure representivity, the two stratification variables of regions and districts were chosen. In KwaZulu-Natal there are four regions, namely, eThekweni, Umgungundlovu, Ukhahlamba, and Zululand. Each region is further subdivided into three districts each (see table 4.2, page 121).

#### **4.3.4.3 SAMPLE SIZE**

According to Anderson (1990:199), the most perplexing question to a researcher is the question of sample size. From the literature reviewed by the researcher on sample size, the researcher noted that there was no fixed measure or guideline in determining sample size. The sample size suggested by scholars ranges from 10% to about 22%. The researcher, therefore, decided to note the comments made by Anderson (1990:199) with regard to sample size. He identifies four major principles governing sample size:

- Variability of characteristics being estimated – the greater the variability in the characteristics being estimated among the units, the greater the number required to obtain a precise estimate of this characteristic.
- Level of confidence – the laws of statistics deal in probabilities which means that although a sample will reflect the target population, different samples will vary from one another. The larger the sample the more alike on average it will be to other such samples that could be drawn.
- Tolerance for sampling error – How precise do we want the sample to be? The more precision we want the greater will be the sample size requirements.
- Sample size versus proportion – a statistical fact is that the size of a sample and not the proportion of the population is the major determinant of precision. Thus, one can have a small sample with an infinitely large population and still get acceptable results. In general, the major gains in precision are made steadily as sample sizes increase to 150 or 200 after which gains in precision are much more modest.

Sekaran (1992:253) developed a table for determining the sample size from a given population (see table 4.1 below).

Table 4.1: Table for determining sample size from a given population

POPULATION SIZE	SAMPLE SIZE	POPULATION SIZE	SAMPLE SIZE
10	10	1 100	285
20	19	1 200	291
50	44	1 300	297
100	80	1 400	302
150	108	1 500	306
200	132	1 600	310
250	152	2 000	322
300	169	5 000	357
500	217	10 000	370
1 000	278	100 000	384

Adapted from: Sekaran (1992:253)

Taking into account the guiding principles advocated by Anderson, and noting the comments by Gilham (2000:14) that a typical response rate to a questionnaire is between

30% to 50%, the researcher opted for a larger sample size as possible. Therefore, the researcher chose to go with the guidelines developed by Sekaran. The researcher, based on a population size of 1 463 (rounded off to 1 500) arrived at a sample size of 306. The researcher thus chose to sample the principals of 306 ordinary public secondary schools in KwaZulu-Natal.

Owing to the fact that the researcher was able to obtain the number of ordinary public secondary schools in each region and district from the KZN EMIS database, a proportional selection of schools from the various regions and districts as suggested by Uys and Puttergill (2003:112) was done. In order to determine the number of ordinary public secondary schools to be sampled in each region, the proportion of schools in the region relative to the number of ordinary public secondary schools in the province was determined using the following formula:

$$\text{Proportion of schools in Region} = \frac{\text{No. of schools in Region}}{\text{No. of schools in Province}}$$

The proportion obtained was then multiplied by the sample size to yield the number of schools to be sampled in each region.

Similarly, in order to determine the number of schools to be sampled in each district, the proportion of ordinary public secondary schools in each district relative to the number of ordinary public secondary schools in the region in which they are located was determined using the formula:

$$\text{Proportion of schools in District} = \frac{\text{No. of schools in District}}{\text{No. of schools in Region}}$$

Table 4.2: Sampling framework

REGION	NO. OF SECONDARY SCHOOLS	PROPORTION RELATIVE TO POP. SIZE	NO. OF SCHOOLS RELATIVE TO PROPORTION	DISTRICT	NO. OF SECONDARY SCHOOLS	PROPORTION OF SECONDARY SCHOOLS RELATIVE TO NO. IN REGION	NO. SAMPLED RELATIVE TO PROPORTION
eThekweni	373	0.26	80	iLembe	112	0.30	24
				Pinetown	125	0.34	27
				uMlazi	136	0.36	29
Umgungundlovu	313	0.22	67	Kokstad	55	0.17	11
				Port Shepstone	134	0.43	29
				Vulindela	124	0.40	27
Ukhahlamba	266	0.18	55	Amajuba	52	0.19	10
				Othukela	108	0.41	23
				Umzinyathi	106	0.40	22
Zululand	501	0.34	104	Empangeni	185	0.37	39
				Obojeni	134	0.27	28
				Vryheid	181	0.37	37
						<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>306</b>

(Source EMIS:2004a)

The proportion obtained was then multiplied by the number of ordinary public secondary schools sampled in the respective region to yield the number of schools to be sampled in each district.

#### **4.3.4.4 SELECTION OF SCHOOLS**

In order to determine the schools that will be selected as part of the sample, the researcher wrote to the KZN EMIS Directorate and requested lists of ordinary public secondary schools together with their postal addresses arranged in terms of region and districts. These lists constituted the sampling frame.

The schools that were sampled were then selected from the sampling frame using the sampling interval formula. According to Babbie (2001:198) the sampling interval is the standard distance between elements selected in the sample and is calculated using the formula:

$$\text{Sampling interval} = \frac{\text{population size}}{\text{sample size}}$$

The sampling interval for this study thus worked out to as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Sampling interval} &= \frac{1\ 463}{306} \\ &= 4.78 \text{ (rounded off to 5)} \end{aligned}$$

Thus, every fifth school was sampled in each district from alphabetically arranged lists of ordinary public secondary schools in each district. Babbie (2001:197) suggests that the first element in the sample should be randomly selected to prevent any possible human bias. Thus, the researcher selected a random number between one and five. This worked out to be two. Consequently, every second ordinary public secondary school from the

lists per district was included in the sample, plus every fifth school following it. The schools were thus selected in the following sequence: 2, 7, 12, 17, 22, 27...

#### **4.3.5 ADMINISTERING THE QUESTIONNAIRE**

Prior to the distribution of the questionnaire permission had to be sought from the Department of Education for administering the questionnaire at schools falling under their jurisdiction.

##### **4.3.5.1 PERMISSIOM FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION**

The researcher wrote to the Head Office of the KZN DEC (see Annexure A, page 265) requesting permission to conduct research at public ordinary secondary schools falling under its jurisdiction. Permission was granted by the Research, Strategy, Policy Development and ECMIS Directorate (see Annexure B, page 266).

##### **4.3.5.2 DISTRIBUTION OF QUESTIONNAIRES**

All 306 questionnaires were mailed to the principals of the schools sampled. A one page covering letter (see Annexure C, page 267) was enclosed together with the questionnaire which elucidated the following:

- The purpose of the research questionnaire.
- An assurance that the responses will be treated in the strictest of confidence. The researcher felt that this was the best way of obtaining responses that would be honest.
- Return information. Although self addressed stamped envelopes were enclosed for the return of questionnaires, Burgess (2001:7) suggests that return information should be included.
- Contact information should the respondent need to contact the researcher with queries or questions.
- The need for a prompt response.

### **4.3.6 ANALYSIS OF DATA**

The data was analyzed by using a computer based analysis system (SPSS – Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) to obtain both descriptive and inferential statistics.

#### **4.3.6.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS**

Descriptive statistics ‘include both specific numbers and ways of presenting data in tabular form in order to make the information succinct but clear to the reader’ (Harris 1995:6). In essence, descriptive statistics involve transformation of raw data into a form that would provide information to describe a set of factors in a situation. This is done through ordering and manipulation of the raw data collected (Sekaran 2000:395). The most popular tools of descriptive statistics include frequency distributions, measures of central tendency and measures of variability.

#### **4.3.6.2 INFERENCE STATISTICS**

Researchers place great importance on being able to explain the relationship that exists between different variables or between two or more groups. Further, researchers would also like to draw conclusions about a much larger population from results obtained by studying the sample group. To achieve these objectives, researchers will need to utilize inferential statistical techniques. Inferential statistics concerns the use of those statistical techniques that allow researchers, ‘to draw inference from a sample that can be applied or generalized to the population from which the sample came’ (Harris 1995:218). Some of the popular inferential statistical tests used in the analysis of data in this study are the T-test, Chi square test and Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficient.

## **4.4 INTERVIEWS**

### **4.4.1 RATIONALE FOR THE USE OF INTERVIEWS**

In order to triangulate the data obtained from the questionnaire and to seek greater depth to the issues surrounding educator post provisioning, the researcher considered interviews to be the ideal data gathering tool. Owing to the fact that questionnaire data tends to be ‘thin’ by offering more breadth than depth, interviews were helpful in the sense that it

helped the researcher to gather more information on specific items in the questionnaire which was worthy of closer scrutiny. Gilham (2000:10) contends that the positive feature of interviews is the richness and vividness of the data that it turns up. It enables one to 'see' and to understand what is reflected rather than more abstractly in other kinds of data such as statistical summaries.

The researcher was of the view that by posing open-ended questions to selected informants, the informants could be encouraged to express their opinions to the questions. Further, by asking supplementary questions (probes), informants could clarify or extend their responses.

#### **4.4.2 INTERVIEW INFORMANTS**

Two sets of interviews were conducted. The first set of interviews was conducted with nine principals from ordinary public secondary schools. The second set of interviews was conducted with three union officials who are provincial negotiators serving on the staffing committee of the KZN ELRC.

#### **4.4.3 SELECTION OF INFORMANTS**

In selecting the informants for the interviews, the purposive sampling technique was used. Purposive sampling according to Bertram (2003:12) means that the researcher makes specific choices about which people to include in the sample. The informants selected, however, do not represent the wider population, namely, all ordinary public secondary school principals in KZN or all union provincial negotiators in KZN. Bertram (2003:71) contends that the selected respondents simply represent themselves.

The principals that were selected as interview informants were selected on the basis of convenience. Convenience sampling simply refers to choosing a sample which is easy for the researcher to reach (Bertram 2003:71). All nine principals were from the eThekweni Region of KZN and were selected in terms of the following criteria:

- Three principals were selected from poorly resourced schools.

- Three principals were selected from schools that had a mediocre level of resources.
- Three principals were selected from well-resourced schools.

In terms of the selection of union officials, three provincial negotiators who serve on the staffing committee of the KZN ELRC - one each from the South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU), the Association of Professional Educators of KwaZulu-Natal (APEK) and the Suid Afrikaanse Onderwys Unie (SAOU) - were selected.

#### **4.4.4 NATURE OF THE INTERVIEWS**

In terms of interviews the main dimension of difference is the extent to which the interview is structured and the degree to which the interviewer is allowed to 'lead' the content of the interview. The researcher was of the view that a structured interview would be too restrictive in the sense that one has to adhere rigidly to a pre-planned interview schedule without having the freedom to prompt and probe further or encourage the informant to elaborate or reformulate a given response. Given this limitation, the researcher opted for both semi-structured and unstructured interviews as data gathering tools because of the latitude it offered the researcher in the use of probes and prompts in order to obtain depth into the issues on educator post provisioning.

The semi-structured interviews were used in interviewing principals. The researcher considered this type of interview suitable for interviewing principals because although it has more structure it is very open in style (Gilham 2000:7). Based on the responses of principals from the questionnaire the researcher developed a set of questions (see interview schedule – Annexure E, page 274) which were put to the nine principals.

Unstructured interviews were used in interviewing the three union officials. A single question (main question) was posed to each of the three union officials (see Annexure F, page 275). Thereafter, probes, prompts, and follow-up questions which pursued the implications of answers to the main question were asked.

#### **4.4.5 TRIALLING OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS**

Possible interview questions for the semi-structured interview were trialled with senior members of the management staff at a secondary school. This exercise enabled the researcher to:

- Get some sort of feel for the interview process.
- Determine which questions were key questions.
- Ascertain questions that needed rethinking.
- Make decisions as to questions that need to be omitted.

It was not possible to trial the question of the unstructured interview owing to the small population size in terms of union provincial negotiators serving on the staffing committee.

#### **4.4.6 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS**

Prior to the commencement of both the unstructured and semi-structured interviews the informants were briefed on the purpose of the study and were assured that any information furnished by them would be used solely for the purposes of research. Further, they were assured that neither their names nor the names of their schools or unions would be quoted.

#### **4.4.7 ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEW DATA**

The nine semi-structured interviews and the three unstructured interviews were audio tape recorded. Each interview was then transcribed *verbatim*. After the transcription process the researcher had to engage in minor editing in order to increase the readability of the transcript. The transcripts were then subjected to qualitative content analysis by identifying key substantive points in the transcript and then grouping them into themes and categories.

#### **4.5 DOCUMENT STUDY**

In order to seek answers to the first two critical questions the researcher engaged in an in-depth study of the following documents in order to ascertain its impact on educator post provisioning.

- Intergovernmental Fiscal Review Reports
- Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR)
- Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF)
- National Norms and Standards for School Funding
- ELRC deliberations (minutes/reports)
- *Regulation No 24077* of November 2002
- *ELRC Resolution 3 of 1996*
- *Regulation No 593/4* of April 1998
- *Regulation No 1676* of December 1998

In analyzing the contents of these documents, the researcher integrated the salient features of these documents into the literature review and then went on to provide a critical review of these documents.

#### **4.6 SUMMARY**

This chapter highlighted how the research design was planned and executed. A detailed discussion with regard to the data gathering tools was presented. The sampling techniques employed, issues concerning validity as well as data analysis procedures were discussed.

The next chapter deals with the presentation, analysis and discussion of the data.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF DATA

#### 5.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter outlined the research design and methodology employed in this study. This chapter focuses on the presentation, analysis and discussion of the data gathered from the 134 survey questionnaires and interviews with principals and union officials. An account of the trends emerging from the document study is also presented.

In order to address the following two research questions formulated in chapter one, namely:

- What impact does policy on educator post provisioning have on issues of equity and redress? and
- What are the views of principals on educator post provisioning and its implementation?

the data from the questionnaire which is largely quantitative is presented. This is then followed by a presentation of the qualitative data obtained through interviews. An analysis and discussion of both the questionnaire and interview data using the theoretical and conceptual frameworks presented in chapter 3 on policy analysis, neoliberalism, NPM, RAMs and critical theory using a thematic approach then follows in a section entitled 'emerging trends and patterns'. A summary of the main findings from the data is integrated into the 'emerging trends' section.

With regard to the critical questions related to the document study, namely:

- What ideology informs and underpins policy on educator post provisioning? and
- What changes has policy on educator post provisioning undergone in order to meet the needs of schools?

an account of the emerging trends and patterns from the literature review together with the main findings is presented.

## 5.2 PRESENTATION OF THE QUANTITATIVE DATA

In presenting the quantitative data the researcher has made use of both descriptive and inferential statistics. In order to make the data more comprehensible the data is organized and summarized using frequency distributions and bar graphs followed by a factual description of the data. In certain instances, inferential statistical techniques are used in order to make predictions about the sample of principals surveyed in comparison to the population of principals in KZN.


### Section A: Biographical and General Information

#### Question 1: What is your experience as principal?

Table 5.1: Frequency distribution of years of experience as principal.

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 0-3 years experience	37	27.6	27.6
4-6 years experience	37	27.6	55.2
7-9 years experience	23	17.2	72.4
10 years and over	37	27.6	100.0
Total	134	100.0	

Figure 5.1: Bar graph depicting years of experience as principal.




In terms of experience as principal there is a fair distribution of respondents. An equal number of respondents are noted in the 0-3 year, 4-6 year and 10 years and over category. The 45% of principals who have 7 and more years of experience would have been implementers of policy on educator post provisioning since its inception in 1996.

**Question 2: How would you classify the geographic location of your school?**

Table 5.2: Frequency distribution of geographic location of schools.

		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Urban	56	41.8	41.8
	Suburban	35	26.1	67.9
	Rural	43	32.1	100.0
	Total	134	100.0	

Figure 5.2: Bar graph depicting geographic location of schools.



This question establishes the locality of the schools surveyed. For the purposes of this study urban schools are schools located within a radius of 0–20km from the city centre. Suburban schools are schools located within a radius of 21-50km from the city centre and


would include ‘township’ schools. Rural schools are schools located within a radius of more than 51km from the city centre. A fair distribution of schools in terms of urban 56 (42%), suburban 35 (26%) and rural 43 (32%) responded to the questionnaire. The location of schools is an important factor in determining the educator post provisioning needs of schools. One of the factors taken into account in determining the post provisioning needs of schools is the poverty grading of a school based on criteria stipulated in the national Norms and Standards for School Funding. The location of the school is one of the criteria used in determining the poverty grading of the school.

**Question 3: Does your school have a functional school governing body?**

Table 5.3: Frequency distribution of functionality of SGB.

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid yes	130	97.0	97.0
no	4	3.0	100.0
Total	134	100.0	

Figure 5.3: Bar graph depicting functionality of SGB.



In keeping with NPM reforms, namely, the corporatisation of schools in order to achieve greater efficiency, cost savings and service quality improvements, the *South African Schools Act, 84 of 1996* makes it mandatory for all public schools to have democratically elected SGBs. These SGBs are considered to be the ‘strategic apex’<sup>1</sup> of schools and are charged with the responsibility of school governance. From the principals that responded to the questionnaire an overwhelming majority of schools, namely 130 (97%), claim to have functional SGBs. Only 4 (3%) of the respondents indicated that their schools do not have functional SGBs.


### Section B: Economic Status of the School

**Question 1: In terms of the Norms and Standards for School Funding (NSSF) how is your school classified?**

Table 5.4: Frequency distribution of classification of school in terms of funding.

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid advantaged	72	53.7	53.7
disadvantaged	62	46.3	100.0
Total	134	100.0	

Figure 5.4: Bar graph depicting classification of school in terms of funding.



<sup>1</sup> The ‘strategic apex’ of schools, namely the SGBs are delegated certain powers through the *South African Schools Act* and can potentially be seen as a major power source in reshaping schools along strategic lines.

In terms of the NNSF, all public schools are classified into quintiles. However, in KZN all public schools for the purposes of funding are grouped into deciles with the poorest schools being classified in decile one and the least poor schools in decile ten.


Notwithstanding this classification it is common among educators to use the term advantaged and disadvantaged when referring to schools. It is generally understood that schools falling within deciles one to five are termed disadvantaged and those falling within deciles six to ten are termed advantaged. From table 5.4 and figure 5.4 it can be seen that 72 schools constituting 54% of the schools that responded classify themselves as ‘advantaged’ and 62 schools constituting 46% of the schools that responded classify themselves as ‘disadvantaged’.

**Question 2: What is the annual school fee payable per learner?**

Table 5.5: Frequency distribution of annual school fee payable per learner.

		classification of school		Total
		advantaged	disadvantaged	
R1 - R 200	Count	3	54	57
	% within classification of school	4.2%	87.1%	42.5%
	% of Total	2.2%	40.3%	42.5%
R 201 - R 500	Count	16	6	22
	% within classification of school	22.2%	9.7%	16.4%
	% of Total	11.9%	4.5%	16.4%
R 501 - R 1000	Count	40	2	42
	% within classification of school	55.6%	3.2%	31.3%
	% of Total	29.9%	1.5%	31.3%
R 1001 - R 3000	Count	1	0	1
	% within classification of school	1.4%	.0%	.7%
	% of Total	.7%	.0%	.7%
R 3001 - R 5000	Count	3	0	3
	% within classification of school	4.2%	.0%	2.2%
	% of Total	2.2%	.0%	2.2%
above R 5000	Count	9	0	9
	% within classification of school	12.5%	.0%	6.7%
	% of Total	6.7%	.0%	6.7%
TOTAL	Count	72	62	134
	% within classification of school	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	53.7%	46.3%	100.0%

Figure 5.5: Bar graph depicting annual school fee payable per learner.



The *South African Schools Act, 86 of 1996* empowers SGBs of public schools to levy school fees so that they may be able to ‘supplement the resources supplied by the state in order to improve the quality of education provided by the school to all learners at the school’ (South Africa 1996: sec. 36). From table 5.6 and figure 5.6 it can be seen that of the 72 advantaged schools, 9 schools (13%) charged school fees above R 5 000; 3 schools (4%) charged fees between R 3 001 and R 5 000; 1 school charged fees between R 1 001 and R 3 000; the majority of schools, namely 40 schools (56%) charge fees between R 100 and R 501 and only 3 schools (4%) charge fees of between R 1 and R 200.

The fee structure in the disadvantaged school cohort shows that of the 62 schools surveyed the overall range of schools fees levied is between R 1 and R 1 000. The majority of the disadvantaged schools, namely 54 schools (87%) levied schools fees in the range R 1 to R 200. Only 6 schools (8%) charged fees between R 201 to R 500 and 2 schools (3%) charged fees between R 501 and R 1 000.

Table 5.6: T-test for equality of means between advantaged and disadvantaged schools in terms of annual school fee payable.

classification of school	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
annual school fee per learner advantaged	72	3.17	1.300
disadvantaged	62	1.16	.451

	t-test for Equality of Means				
	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference
annual school fee per learner Equal variances assumed	11.558	132	.000	2.01	.174

A comparison of the mean school fee payable between advantaged and disadvantaged schools reveals that advantaged schools levied higher school fees, namely a mean of 3.17 (R 501 – R 1 000) compared to disadvantaged schools with a mean of 1.16 (R 1 – R 200). Moreover, the variability of the scores about the mean, namely the standard deviation is higher in advantaged schools (1.3) compared to disadvantaged schools (0.451). This indicates that the spread in terms of school fees levied is larger (1.3 away from the mean of 3.17) compared to disadvantaged schools which is smaller on average (0.451 away from the mean of 1.16). Further, the t-test reveals that the mean difference in schools fees levied of 2.07 between advantaged and disadvantaged schools is significant at the 5% level of significance. Therefore, it can be presumed that advantaged schools charged significantly higher school fees than disadvantaged schools.

**Question 3: What percentage of parents of learners at your school actually pay fees?**

Table 5.7: Frequency distribution of percentage of parents who actually pay school fees.

		classification of school		Total
		advantaged	disadvantaged	
90 - 100%	Count	3	6	9
	% within classification of school	4.2%	9.7%	6.7%
	% of Total	2.2%	4.5%	6.7%
70 - 89%	Count	27	13	40
	% within classification of school	37.5%	21.0%	29.9%
	% of Total	20.1%	9.7%	29.9%
50 - 69%	Count	25	22	47
	% within classification of school	34.7%	35.5%	35.1%
	% of Total	18.7%	16.4%	35.1%
40 - 49%	Count	6	16	22
	% within classification of school	8.3%	25.8%	16.4%
	% of Total	4.5%	11.9%	16.4%
below 40%	Count	11	5	16
	% within classification of school	15.3%	8.1%	11.9%
	% of Total	8.2%	3.7%	11.9%
TOTAL	Count	72	62	134
	% within classification of school	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	53.7%	46.3%	100.0%


In terms of the actual payment of school fees by parents in the advantaged school cohort, the majority of respondents, 55 (76%) indicated that they have a school fee recovery rate of 50% and above compared to 41 (66%) of the respondents from disadvantaged schools. Moreover, 21 (34%) respondents from the disadvantaged cohort indicated less than 50% of parents pay fees compared to 17 (24%) respondents from advantaged schools.

**Question 4: How would you classify the socio-economic status of the community from which the school draws the majority of its learners?**

Table 5.8: Frequency distribution of the socio-economic status of the community from which the school draws the majority of its learners.

		classification of school		Total
		advantaged	disadvantaged	
advantaged	Count	2	0	2
	% within classification of school	2.8%	.0%	1.5%
	% of Total	1.5%	.0%	1.5%
average	Count	14	3	17
	% within classification of school	19.4%	4.8%	12.7%
	% of Total	10.4%	2.2%	12.7%
disadvantaged	Count	35	53	88
	% within classification of school	48.6%	85.5%	65.7%
	% of Total	26.1%	39.6%	65.7%
combination of the above	Count	21	6	27
	% within classification of school	29.2%	9.7%	20.1%
	% of Total	15.7%	4.5%	20.1%
TOTAL	Count	72	62	134
	% within classification of school	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	53.7%	46.3%	100.0%

Figure 5.6: Bar graph depicting the socio-economic status of the community from which the school draws the majority of its learners.




The advantaged communities for the purposes of this study are the communities where there are high levels of employment, formal housing with a ratable income of above R300 000 and superior infrastructure. The disadvantaged communities are communities where unemployment levels are high; informal settlements and low cost housing; and poor infrastructure. From table 5.8 and figure 5.6 it can be seen that 53 (85%) of the respondents from disadvantaged schools indicated that they draw the majority of their learners from disadvantaged communities. However, a substantial number of respondents from the advantaged school cohort, namely 35 (49%) respondents indicated that they draw the majority of their learners from disadvantaged communities.

**Question 5: How would you classify the material resources available in the school?**

Table 5.9: Frequency distribution of the material resources available in the school.

		classification of school		Total
		advantaged	disadvantaged	
more than adequate	Count	4	0	4
	% within classification of school	5.6%	.0%	3.0%
	% of Total	3.0%	.0%	3.0%
adequate	Count	23	3	26
	% within classification of school	31.9%	4.8%	19.4%
	% of Total	17.2%	2.2%	19.4%
mediocre	Count	24	10	34
	% within classification of school	33.3%	16.1%	25.4%
	% of Total	17.9%	7.5%	25.4%
not very adequate	Count	21	44	65
	% within classification of school	29.2%	71.0%	48.5%
	% of Total	15.7%	32.8%	48.5%
useless	Count	0	5	5
	% within classification of school	.0%	8.1%	3.7%
	% of Total	.0%	3.7%	3.7%
Total	Count	72	62	134
	% within classification of school	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	53.7%	46.3%	100.0%

Figure 5.7: Bar graph depicting the material resources available in the school.



From table 5.9 and figure 5.7 it can be seen that 27 (38%) of the respondents from the advantaged school grouping considered the material resources at their schools to be adequate or more than adequate compared to just 3 (5%) of the respondents from the disadvantaged school grouping who considered their material resources to be adequate. No respondents from the disadvantaged school grouping indicated that their material resources were very adequate. Whilst 21 (29%) of the respondents from the advantaged school grouping indicated that their material resources were not very adequate and no respondents indicated that their material resources were useless, an overwhelming majority of respondents, 49 (79%) from the disadvantaged school cluster indicated that the material resources available at their schools was either not very adequate or useless.

Table 5.10: Pearson’s product moment correlation between annual school fees paid and material resources available in the school.

		annual school fee per learner
material resources available in the school	Pearson Correlation	.663**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
	N	134

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).


A computation of the correlation between the annual school fee payable per learner and the material resources available at the school reveals a high positive correlation of 0.663. This indicates that schools that charge high school fees, which are largely the advantaged schools, have an adequate level of material resources at the school, whereas schools that charge a low amount in school fees, which are largely the disadvantaged schools, have an inadequate level of material resources.

**Question 6: How would you classify the general infrastructure (classrooms, laboratories etc) of the school?**

Table 5.11: Frequency distribution of general infrastructure of the school.

		classification of school		Total
		advantaged	disadvantaged	
more than adequate	Count	7	0	7
	% within classification of school	9.7%	.0%	5.2%
	% of Total	5.2%	.0%	5.2%
adequate	Count	31	5	36
	% within classification of school	43.1%	8.1%	26.9%
	% of Total	23.1%	3.7%	26.9%
mediocre	Count	24	13	37
	% within classification of school	33.3%	21.0%	27.6%
	% of Total	17.9%	9.7%	27.6%
not very adequate	Count	10	41	51
	% within classification of school	13.9%	66.1%	38.1%
	% of Total	7.5%	30.6%	38.1%
useless	Count	0	3	3
	% within classification of school	.0%	4.8%	2.2%
	% of Total	.0%	2.2%	2.2%
Total	Count	72	62	134
	% within classification of school	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	53.7%	46.3%	100.0%

Figure 5.8: Bar graph of general infrastructure of the school.



From table 5.11 and figure 5.8 it can be seen that 38 (53%) of the respondents from the advantaged school cluster considered the physical infrastructure of their schools to be adequate or more than adequate. Only 5 (8%) of the respondents from the disadvantaged school cluster considered their general infrastructure to be adequate. Moreover, no respondent from this grouping considered their infrastructure to be more than adequate.

Whilst 10 (14%) of the respondents from the advantaged school grouping considered their general infrastructure to be not very adequate, no respondents classified their general infrastructure as useless. An overwhelming majority of respondents, namely 44 (71%) of the respondents from the disadvantaged school cohort, considered their general infrastructure to be not very adequate or useless.

Table 5.12: Pearson’s product moment correlation of annual school fee paid per learner and general infrastructure of the school.

		annual school fee per learner
general infrastructure of the school	Pearson Correlation	.657**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
	N	134

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

A computation of the correlation between the annual school fee paid per learner and the general infrastructure of the school reveals a high positive correlation of 0.657. This indicates that schools that charge high school fees, which are largely the advantaged schools, have a general infrastructure which is adequate to more than adequate, whereas schools that charge a low amount in school fees, which are largely the disadvantaged schools, have a general infrastructure that can be considered not very adequate or useless.


### Section C: The Post Provisioning Model (PPM)

#### Question 1: Were you consulted with regard to the design of the post provisioning model (PPM)?

Table 5.13: Frequency distribution in respect of consultation with regard to the design of the PPM.

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid yes	13	9.7	9.7
no	121	90.3	100.0
Total	134	100.0	

Figure 5.9: Bar graph depicting consultation with regard to the design of the PPM.




An overwhelming majority of respondents, namely 121 which translate to 90%, reported that they were not consulted with regard to the design of the PPM. Only 13 (10%) of the respondents indicated that they were consulted with regard to the design of the PPM.

**Question 2: If yes, by whom?**

Table 5.14: Frequency distribution indicating the consulting agency with regard to the design of the PPM.

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid not applicable	121	90.3	90.3
department of education	13	9.7	100.0
Total	134	100.0	

Figure 5.10: Bar graph depicting the consulting agency with regard to the design of the PPM.




Of the 13 principals who were consulted with regard to the design of the PPM, the department of education was the agency which elicited their views. No principal indicated that she/he was consulted by the unions on the design of the PPM. The unions comprise fifty percent of the bargaining council for educators (ELRC). These unions, at national ELRC made inputs on the design of the PPM and its subsequent revisions.

**Question 3: Were you workshopped on the formula used to calculate the post provisioning norm (PPN) of a school?**

Table 5.15: Frequency distribution with regard to whether principals were workshopped on the formula used to calculate the post provisioning norm (PPN).

		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	yes	42	31.3	31.3
	no	92	68.7	100.0
	Total	134	100.0	

Figure 5.11: Bar graph depicting whether principals were workshopped on the formula used to calculate the post provisioning norm (PPN).




Only 42 respondents, which translate to 31%, indicated that they were workshopped on the formula used to determine the PPN of a school. The overwhelming majority of respondents, namely 92 which constitutes 69%, indicated that they weren't workshopped on the formula used to determine the PPN of a school.

**Question 4: If yes, by whom?**

Table 5.16: Frequency distribution of the agency that workshopped principals on the formula used to calculate the PPN.

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid not applicable	92	68.7	68.7
department of education	40	29.9	98.5
union	2	1.5	100.0
Total	134	100.0	

Figure 5.12: Bar graph depicting the agency that workshopped principals on the formula used to calculate the PPN.




Of the 42 (32%) respondents who indicated that they were workshopped on the formula used to calculate the PPN of a school, 40 of the respondents constituting 30% of the total number of respondents indicated that the department of education was the agency that workshopped them. Only 2 respondents comprising just 2% of the total number of respondents indicated that the teacher union workshopped them.

**Question 5: Has your school qualified for the appointment of educators from the redress pool?**

Table 5.17: Frequency distribution showing educator distribution in terms of redress.

		classification of school		Total
		advantaged	disadvantaged	
yes	Count	8	18	26
	% within classification of school	11.1%	29.0%	19.4%
	% of Total	6.0%	13.4%	19.4%
no	Count	64	44	108
	% within classification of school	88.9%	71.0%	80.6%
	% of Total	47.8%	32.8%	80.6%
TOTAL	Count	72	62	134
	% within classification of school	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	53.7%	46.3%	100.0%

Figure 5.13: Bar graph showing educator distribution in terms of redress.



Overall, only 26 (20%) of the 134 schools surveyed qualified for poverty redress posts. Of the 62 disadvantaged schools, only 18 schools comprising 29% of the schools in the disadvantaged cluster, qualified for redress posts. In the advantaged school cohort, 8 schools out of 72 constituting 11% of the schools qualified for redress posts.

**Question 6: The following are some of the factors used in determining the post provisioning needs of schools. Rank them from 1 to 5, with 1 being the most important factor. (Use a number once only)**

**Poverty grading of a school**


Table 5.18: Frequency distribution showing rank order of poverty grading of a school.

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid one	49	36.6	36.6
two	24	17.9	54.5
three	32	23.9	78.4
four	18	13.4	91.8
five	11	8.2	100.0
Total	134	100.0	

**Mean: 2.39**

**Overall Mean Ranking: 2**

Figure 5.14: Bar graph showing rank order of poverty grading of a school.



With regard to the factor poverty grading of a school, the majority of the respondents, namely 73 constituting 55%, considered the poverty grading of a school an important factor by either ranking it one or two from the five factors/variables listed. The overall mean ranking of this factor was 2.

Table 5.19: T-test for equality of means between advantaged and disadvantaged schools in terms of the factor poverty grading of a school.

classification of school		N	Mean
factor - poverty grading of a school	advantaged	72	2.36
	disadvantaged	62	2.42

		t-test for Equality of Means			
		t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference
factor - poverty grading of a school	Equal variances assumed	-.254	132	.800	-.06

A computation of the independent samples t-test indicates that the 72 respondents from advantaged schools had mean of 2.36, the 62 respondents from disadvantaged schools had a mean of 2.42, and the means do not differ significantly at the 5% level of significance. It can therefore not be presumed that respondents from the advantaged school cohort considered this factor a significantly more important factor than respondents from the disadvantaged school cohort and vice-versa.

### Need to promote particular subjects/learning areas


Table 5.20: Frequency distribution showing the ranking of the factor the need to promote particular subjects/learning areas in schools.

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid one	27	20.1	20.1
two	39	29.1	49.3
three	38	28.4	77.6
four	22	16.4	94.0
five	8	6.0	100.0
Total	134	100.0	

**Mean: 2.59**

**Overall Mean Ranking: 3**

Figure 5.15: Bar graph depicting ranking in terms of the need to promote particular subjects/learning areas in schools.



A substantial number of respondents ranked this factor either two (29%) or three (28%). Overall, the average mean ranking of this factor was three compared to the other four factors/variables. On closer scrutiny, a different picture emerges when one considers the responses of the respondents from advantaged and disadvantaged schools separately.

Table 5.21: T-test for equality of means between advantaged and disadvantaged schools in terms of the factor the need to promote subjects/learning areas.

classification of school		N	Mean
factor - need to promote	advantaged	72	2.86
subjects/learning areas	disadvantaged	62	2.27

		t-test for equality of means			
		t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference
factor - need to promote	Equal variances assumed	3.012	132	.003	.59
subjects/learning areas					

A computation of the independent samples t-test indicates that the 72 respondents from the advantaged schools had mean of 2.86, the 62 respondents from disadvantaged schools had a mean of 2.27, and the means differ significantly at the 5% level of significance. This would suggest that on average the respondents from the disadvantaged school grouping ranked this factor significantly higher than the respondents from the advantaged school cohort.

### Maximum ideal class size of specific subjects/learning areas


Table 5.22: Frequency distribution showing ranking of the factor maximum ideal class size of specific subjects/learning areas.

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid one	45	33.6	33.6
two	45	33.6	67.2
three	25	18.7	85.8
four	11	8.2	94.0
five	8	6.0	100.0
Total	134	100.0	

**Mean: 2.19**

**Overall Mean Ranking: 1**

Figure 5.16: Bar graph depicting ranking of the factor maximum ideal class size of specific subjects/learning areas.



The class size for the different subjects/learning areas is considered a very important factor by the respondents. Overall, 90 respondents constituting 68% of the total number of respondents ranked this factor either one or two. In terms of the overall mean ranking, this factor was ranked one in comparison to the other four factors/variables.

Table 5.23: T-test for equality of means between advantaged and disadvantaged schools in terms of the factor the maximum ideal class size of subjects/learning areas.

	classification of school	N	Mean
factor - maximum ideal class size of subjects/learning areas	advantaged	72	1.97
	disadvantaged	62	2.45

	t-test for Equality of Means			
	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference
factor - maximum ideal class size of subjects/learning areas	-2.415	132	.017	-.48

A computation of the independent samples t-test indicates that the 72 respondents from advantaged schools had mean of 1.97, the 62 respondents from disadvantaged schools had a mean of 2.45, and the means differ significantly at the 5% level of significance. This would suggest that on average the respondents from the advantaged school grouping ranked this factor significantly higher than the respondents from the disadvantaged school cohort.

### Having more than one language medium of instruction


Table 5.24: Frequency distribution of the ranking of the factor more than one language medium of instruction.

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid one	4	3.0	3.0
two	4	3.0	6.0
three	24	17.9	23.9
four	49	36.6	60.4
five	53	39.6	100.0
Total	134	100.0	

**Mean: 4.07**

**Overall Mean Rank: 5**

Figure 5.17: Bar graph showing the ranking of the factor more than one language medium of instruction.



The majority of the respondents ranked this factor either four (37%) or five (40%) making this factor one of the least important factors of the five. Only 8 respondents comprising 6% of the respondents ranked this factor either one or two. Overall, the mean rank of this factor was 5 compared to the other four factors/variables.

Table 5.25: T-test for equality of means between advantaged and disadvantaged schools in terms of the variable language medium of instruction.

classification of school		N	Mean
factor - more than one language medium of instruction	advantaged	72	4.17
	disadvantaged	62	3.95

		t-test for Equality of Means			
		t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference
factor - more than one language medium of instruction	Equal variances assumed	1.266	132	.208	.22

A computation of the independent samples t-test indicates that the 72 respondents from advantaged schools had mean of 4.17, the 62 respondents from disadvantaged schools had a mean of 3.95, and the means do not differ significantly at the 5% level of significance.

### Learners with special educational needs (LSEN)


Table 5.26: Frequency distribution showing the ranking of the factor learners with special educational needs.

		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	one	10	7.5	7.5
	two	20	14.9	22.4
	three	16	11.9	34.3
	four	34	25.4	59.7
	five	54	40.3	100.0
	Total	134	100.0	

**Mean: 3.76**

**Overall Mean Ranking: 4**

Figure 5.18: Bar graph depicting the ranking of the factor learners with special educational needs.



Overall, 88 of the respondents constituting 65% ranked this factor either four (25%) or five (40%). In terms of the overall mean ranking, this factor was ranked four compared to the other four factors/variables.


**Question 7: To what extent, do you believe the following factors/variables should be taken into account in determining the PPN of schools?**

**Qualification level of educators at a school**

Table 5.27: Frequency distribution showing the factor qualification level of educators at a school.

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid strongly agree	30	22.4	22.4
agree	46	34.3	56.7
disagree	30	22.4	79.1
strongly disagree	28	20.9	100.0
Total	134	100.0	

Figure 5.19: Bar graph showing the factor qualification level of educators at a school.



With regard to the factor, qualification level of educators at a school, 76 respondents which translate to 57 % indicated that they agreed to strongly agreed that educator qualifications should be taken into account when determining the post provisioning needs of schools. In contrast to this, 58 respondents constituting 41% disagreed to strongly disagreed that educator qualifications should be taken into account in determining the PPN of schools. Whilst the majority of the respondents believed that the qualifications of educators at a school should be taken into account, it is interesting to note the responses of the respondents from the advantaged and disadvantaged school groupings.

Table 5.28: T-test for equality of means between advantaged and disadvantaged schools in terms of the factor qualification level of educators at a school.

	classification of school	N	Mean
factor - qualification level of educators at a school	advantaged	72	2.69
	disadvantaged	62	2.10

	t-test for Equality of Means			
	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference
factor - qualification level of educators at a school	3.390	132	.001	.60


A computation of the independent samples t-test indicates that the 72 respondents from advantaged schools had mean of 2.69, the 62 respondents from disadvantaged schools had a mean of 2.10, and the means differ significantly at the 5% level of significance. It can therefore be presumed that the respondents from the disadvantaged school cohort agreed to a greater extent that the qualification level of educators at a school should be a variable for consideration.

### Learners admitted from disadvantaged communities

Table 5.29: Frequency distribution of the factor learners admitted from disadvantaged communities.

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid strongly agree	84	62.7	62.7
agree	37	27.6	90.3
disagree	9	6.7	97.0
strongly disagree	4	3.0	100.0
Total	134	100.0	

Figure 5.20: Bar graph showing the factor learners admitted from disadvantaged communities.



An overwhelming majority of respondents, namely 121 which translate to 91% of the respondents agreed to strongly agreed that the number of learners at an institution admitted from disadvantaged communities needs to be taken as a factor when determining the post provisioning needs of schools. Moreover, 63% of the respondents strongly agreed that this factor should be taken into account. Only 13 respondents, constituting 9% disagreed to strongly disagreed that this factor should be taken into account.

Table 5.30: T-test for equality of means between advantaged and disadvantaged schools in terms of the factor learners admitted from disadvantaged communities.

	classification of school	N	Mean
factor - learners admitted from disadvantaged communities	advantaged	72	1.44
	disadvantaged	62	1.56

		t-test for Equality of Means			
		t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference
factor - learners admitted from disadvantaged communities	Equal variances assumed	-.919	132	.360	-.12


A computation of the t-test for the equality of means indicates that the mean difference of 0.12 is not significant at the 5% level of significance. Therefore, it cannot be presumed that the respondents from the advantaged school cohort responded differently to those in the disadvantaged school cohort.

### Learners who are second language speakers of English

Table 5.31: Frequency distribution of the factor learners who are second language speakers of English.

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid strongly agree	52	38.8	38.8
agree	55	41.0	79.9
disagree	22	16.4	96.3
strongly disagree	5	3.7	100.0
Total	134	100.0	

Figure 5.21: Bar graph showing the factor learners who are second language speakers of English.



An overwhelming majority of respondents, namely 107 constituting 80% of the respondents, agreed to strongly agreed that the number of learners who are second language speakers at a school should be taken into account when determining the PPN of a school. Only 27 respondents, constituting 20% disagreed to strongly disagreed that this should be taken into account as a factor in determining the post provisioning needs of schools.

Table 5.32: T-test for equality of means between advantaged and disadvantaged schools in terms of the factor learners who are second language speakers of English.

	classification of school	N	Mean
factor - learners who are second language speakers	advantaged	72	1.81
	disadvantaged	62	1.90

		t-test for Equality of Means			
		t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference
factor - learners who are second language speakers	Equal variances assumed	-.680	132	.498	-.10


A computation of the t-test for the equality of means indicates that the mean difference of 0.10 is not significant at the 5% level of significance. Therefore, it cannot be presumed that the respondents from the advantaged school cohort responded significantly differently to those in the disadvantaged school cohort.

**Question 8: The incremental revisions made to the post provisioning model have resulted in an equitable distribution of educators to schools.**

Table 5.33: Frequency distribution showing whether the incremental revisions made to the PPM has resulted in equity in educator distribution.

		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	strongly agree	6	4.5	4.5
	agree	16	11.9	16.4
	undecided	28	20.9	37.3
	disagree	28	20.9	58.2
	strongly disagree	56	41.8	100.0
	Total	134	100.0	

Figure 5.22: Bar graph showing whether the revisions made to the PPM has resulted in equity in educator distribution.



#### PPM as resulted in equitable distribution of educators


The majority of the respondents, namely 84 which translate to 63%, disagreed to strongly disagreed with the statement that the revisions made to the PPM has resulted in an equitable distribution of educators to schools. Only 22 respondents, which translate to 16% agreed to strongly agreed with the statement.

**Question 9: The post provisioning model tends to favour schools with diverse curriculum offerings.**

Table 5.34: Frequency distribution of classification of school and curriculum diversity.

		classification of school		Total
		advantaged	disadvantaged	
strongly agree	Count	13	25	38
	% within classification of school	18.1%	40.3%	28.4%
	% of Total	9.7%	18.7%	28.4%
agree	Count	16	17	33
	% within classification of school	22.2%	27.4%	24.6%
	% of Total	11.9%	12.7%	24.6%
Undecided	Count	9	5	14
	% within classification of school	12.5%	8.1%	10.4%
	% of Total	6.7%	3.7%	10.4%
disagree	Count	12	5	17
	% within classification of school	16.7%	8.1%	12.7%
	% of Total	9.0%	3.7%	12.7%
strongly disagree	Count	22	10	32
	% within classification of school	30.6%	16.1%	23.9%
	% of Total	16.4%	7.5%	23.9%
TOTAL	Count	72	62	134
	% within classification of school	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	53.7%	46.3%	100.0%

Figure 5.23: Bar graph of classification of school and curriculum diversity.



PPM favours schools with diverse curriculum offerings

Overall, 71 respondents comprising 53%, agreed to strongly agreed with the statement that the PPM favours schools with diverse curriculum offerings. Further, 49 respondents comprising 37%, disagreed to strongly disagreed with this statement. However, it is interesting to note the responses of the respondents from the advantaged and disadvantaged school cohort separately. A substantial majority of the respondents from the disadvantaged school cohort, namely 67% agreed to strongly agreed with this statement compared to 40% of the respondents in the advantaged school cohort. In contrast, 24% of the respondents from the disadvantaged school grouping disagreed to strongly disagreed that the PPM favours schools with diverse curriculum offerings compared to 46% of the respondents in the advantaged school grouping.


#### **Section D: School Organisation and Administration**

**Question 1: The number of state funded educator posts allocated to my school caters for the curriculum needs of my learners.**

Table 5.35: Frequency distribution showing whether the number of state paid posts caters for the curriculum needs of learners.

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid strongly agree	13	9.7	9.7
agree	14	10.4	20.1
undecided	23	17.2	37.3
disagree	32	23.9	61.2
strongly disagree	52	38.8	100.0
Total	134	100.0	

Figure 5.24: Bar graph depicting whether the number of state paid posts caters for the curriculum needs of learners.



#### PPN takes care of curriculum needs of learners


Only 27 (20%) of the respondents agreed to strongly agreed with the statement that the number of state funded educator posts allocated to their schools caters for the curriculum needs of their learners. The overwhelming majority of the respondents, namely 84 (63%), disagreed to strongly disagreed with the statement.

**Question 2: Does your school governing body allocate funds in their annual budget for the employment of additional educators?**

Table 5.36: Frequency distribution showing whether the SGB allocates funds for the employment of educators.

		classification of school		Total
		advantaged	disadvantaged	
yes	Count	59	13	72
	% within classification of school	81.9%	21.0%	53.7%
	% of Total	44.0%	9.7%	53.7%
no	Count	13	49	62
	% within classification of school	18.1%	79.0%	46.3%
	% of Total	9.7%	36.6%	46.3%
Count		72	62	134
% within classification of school		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
% of Total		53.7%	46.3%	100.0%

Figure 5.25: Bar graph depicting whether the SGB allocates funds for the employment of educators.



SGB allocates funds for employment of additional educators

An overwhelming majority of respondents from the advantaged school cohort, namely 59 (82%), indicated that their SGBs allocate funds for the appointment of additional educators. Only 13 (18%) of the respondents indicated that their SGBs do not allocate funds for the appointment of additional educators. For schools in the disadvantaged cluster, the reverse holds true. Only 13 (21%) of the respondents indicated that their SGBs allocate funds for the employment of additional educators. The majority, comprising 49 or 79% of the respondents from the disadvantaged school cluster indicated that their SGBs do not allocate funds for the employment of additional educators.

Table 5.37: Chi-square test of classification of school and allocation of funds by SGBs for the employment of additional staff.

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	49.823 <sup>b</sup>	1	.000
Continuity Correction <sup>a</sup>	47.401	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	134		

a. Computed only for a 2x2 table

b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 28.69.

The computation of the Pearson Chi-square test indicates that there is a significant relationship (at a 95% level of significance) between the classification of schools (advantaged/disadvantaged) and the allocation of funds by the SGBs for the employment of additional staff.

**Question 3: If yes, how many educators have they employed this year?**

Table 5.38: Frequency distribution depicting the number of SGB paid educators employed.




Figure 5.26: Bar graph showing the number of SGB paid educators employed.




Table 5.38 and figure 5.26 indicates that of the advantaged schools, only 13 schools comprising 18% do not have SGB appointed educators compared to 50 (81%) schools from the disadvantaged school cluster. Moreover, 59 (82%) of the respondents from the advantaged school cohort indicated that their SGBs employed 1 or more educators this year compared to just 12 (20%) respondents from the disadvantaged cohort.

Table 5.39: Pearson’s product moment correlation between annual school fee payable and number of educators employed by the SGB.

		number of educators employed
annual school fee per learner	Pearson Correlation	.877**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
	N	134

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).


A computation of the correlation between the annual school fee per learner and the number of educators employed by the SGB yields a very high positive correlation of 0.887. This indicates that the higher the school fee levied per learner at a school, the larger the number of educators employed by the SGB of the school.

**Question 4: The education department’s timing of the announcement of the PPN leads to effective school organisation?**

Table 5.40: Frequency distribution showing whether the education department’s timing of the announcement of the PPN leads to effective school organisation.

		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	strongly agree	7	5.2	5.2
	agree	5	3.7	9.0
	undecided	6	4.5	13.4
	disagree	10	7.5	20.9
	strongly disagree	106	79.1	100.0
	Total	134	100.0	

Figure 5.27: Bar graph depicting whether the education department’s timing of the announcement of the PPN leads to effective school organisation.



An overwhelming majority of respondents, accounting for 116 or 86% of the respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that the timing of the announcement of the PPN leads to effective school organisation. An alarming 79% of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement. Only 12 (9%) of the respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement.


**Question 5: Substitute educators<sup>2</sup> are appointed timeously by the education department.**

Table 5.41: Frequency distribution showing whether substitute educators are appointed timeously by the department.

		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	strongly agree	4	3.0	3.0
	agree	4	3.0	6.0
	undecided	11	8.2	14.2
	disagree	21	15.7	29.9
	strongly disagree	94	70.1	100.0
	Total	134	100.0	

<sup>2</sup> Substitute educators are appointed by the department as replacements for educators who are away from school for 30 consecutive schooldays or more owing to ill-health or other forms of leave approved by the department.

Figure 5.28: Bar graph depicting whether substitute educators are appointed timeously by the department.



Appointment of substitute educators


The majority of the respondents, numbering 94 which translate to 70% strongly disagreed with the statement that substitute educators are appointed timeously by the education department. In addition, a further 21 (16%) of the respondents disagreed with the statement bringing the tally of those who either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement to an overwhelming 86%. Only 8 respondents which translate to 6% either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement.

**Question 6: Vacancies are filled timeously by the education department.**

Table 5.42: Frequency distribution showing whether vacant posts are filled timeously by the education department.

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid strongly agree	4	3.0	3.0
agree	1	.7	3.7
undecided	9	6.7	10.4
disagree	20	14.9	25.4
strongly disagree	100	74.6	100.0
Total	134	100.0	

Figure 5.29: Bar graph depicting whether vacant posts are filled timeously by the education department.



The majority of the respondents, namely 100 which translates to 75% of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement that vacant posts are filled timeously by the education department. In addition to this, 20 (15%) of the respondents disagreed with the statement bringing the tally of the respondents who disagreed to strongly disagreed with the statement to an overwhelming 90%. Only 5 (4%) of the respondents agreed to strongly agreed with the statement.


**Section E: Implementation of the Post Provisioning Norm**

**Question 1: Principals are consulted on issues of implementation of the post provisioning norm.**

Table 5.43: Frequency distribution showing whether principals are consulted on issues of implementation of the post provisioning norm.

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid strongly agree	8	6.0	6.0
agree	12	9.0	14.9
undecided	10	7.5	22.4
disagree	23	17.2	39.6
strongly disagree	81	60.4	100.0
Total	134	100.0	

Figure 5.30: Bar graph showing whether principals are consulted on issues of implementation of the post provisioning norm.




An overwhelming majority of the respondents, namely 104 (77%) of the respondents, disagreed to strongly disagreed with the statement that principals are consulted on issues of implementation of the PPN. Of this grouping of respondents, 81 (60%) strongly disagreed with the statement. Only 20 respondents which translate to 15% of the respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement.

**Question 2: The education department sets clear directives as to how the post provisioning norm is to be implemented.**

Table 5.44: Frequency distribution showing whether the department of education sets clear directives as to how the PPN is to be implemented.

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid strongly agree	12	9.0	9.0
agree	18	13.4	22.4
undecided	28	20.9	43.3
disagree	26	19.4	62.7
strongly disagree	50	37.3	100.0
Total	134	100.0	

Figure 5.31: Bar graph showing whether the department of education sets clear directives as to how the PPN is to be implemented.




The majority of the respondents, totaling 76 or 56% of the respondents disagreed to strongly disagreed with the statement that the department of education sets clear directives as to how the PPN is to be implemented. In contrast to this, only 30 (22%) of the respondents agreed to strongly agreed with the statement.

**Question 3: Documents on implementation of the post provisioning norm are clear and unambiguous.**

Table 5.45: Frequency distribution showing whether the documents on the implementation of the post provisioning norm are clear and unambiguous.

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid strongly agree	9	6.7	6.7
agree	22	16.4	23.1
undecided	26	19.4	42.5
disagree	34	25.4	67.9
strongly disagree	43	32.1	100.0
Total	134	100.0	

Figure 5.32: Bar graph showing whether the documents on the implementation of the post provisioning norm are clear and unambiguous.




With regard to documents on the implementation of the PPN, the majority of the respondents, namely 77 which accounts for 57% of the respondents, either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement. In contrast to this, 31 respondents comprising 23% of the respondents agreed to strongly agreed with the statement.

**Question 4: Members of staff are fully apprised of the objectives and processes of the post provisioning norm implementation.**

Table 5.46: Frequency distribution showing whether members of staff are apprised of the objectives and processes of the post provisioning norm implementation.

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid strongly agree	19	14.2	14.2
agree	44	32.8	47.0
undecided	28	20.9	67.9
disagree	18	13.4	81.3
strongly disagree	25	18.7	100.0
Total	134	100.0	

Figure 5.33: Bar graph showing whether members of staff are apprised of the objectives and processes of the post provisioning norm implementation.




A plurality of respondents, namely 63 which translates to 47% of the respondents agreed to strongly agreed with the statement that members of staff are fully apprised of the objectives and processes of the PPN implementation. It is also noted that 43 (32%) of the respondents disagreed to strongly disagreed with the statement.

**Question 5: Staff members fully support the process of implementation and participate actively in the process.**

Table 5.47: Frequency distribution showing support for and participation in the process of implementation.

		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	strongly agree	4	3.0	3.0
	agree	14	10.4	13.4
	undecided	16	11.9	25.4
	disagree	32	23.9	49.3
	strongly disagree	68	50.7	100.0
	Total	134	100.0	

Figure 5.34: Bar graph showing support for and participation in the process of implementation by staff members.



Support for the implementation process by staff members

An overwhelming majority of respondents comprising 100 or 75% disagreed to strongly disagreed with the statement that staff members fully support the process of


implementation and participate actively in the process. Moreover, just over half of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement. A small minority of the respondents totaling 18, which translates to 13% of the respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement.

**Question 6: Site stewards<sup>3</sup> participate actively in the process of implementation.**

Table 5.48: Frequency distribution showing participation of site stewards in the implementation process.

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid strongly agree	13	9.7	9.7
agree	22	16.4	26.1
undecided	24	17.9	44.0
disagree	27	20.1	64.2
strongly disagree	48	35.8	100.0
Total	134	100.0	

Figure 5.35: Frequency distribution showing participation of site stewards in the implementation process.



<sup>3</sup> Site stewards are union representatives who are democratically elected by members of a particular union in a school. They serve as a link between the union and members in a school.


With regard to the participation of site stewards, 75 (56%) of the respondents which constitutes the majority of the respondents, indicated that they either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that site stewards participate actively in the process of implementation of the PPN. Only 18 respondents, constituting 13 % of the respondents agreed to strongly agreed with the statement.

**Question 7: Adequate support is provided by the department of education *via*. SEMs to assist principals with implementation.**

Table 5.49: Frequency distribution showing support provided by the department *via*. SEMs with regard to implementation.

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid strongly agree	9	6.7	6.7
agree	27	20.1	26.9
undecided	24	17.9	44.8
disagree	31	23.1	67.9
strongly disagree	43	32.1	100.0
Total	134	100.0	

Figure 5.36: Frequency distribution showing support provided by the department *via*. SEMs with regard to implementation.



The majority of the respondents totaling 74 and comprising 55% of the respondents disagreed to strongly disagreed with the statement that adequate support is provided by the department of education *via*. SEMs to assist principals with implementation. In contrast to this, 36 respondents which translate to 27% either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement.

## **Section F: General Comments**

### **MULTI-TERM PPN**

Eleven respondents commented that rather than declaring a PPN on an annual basis, a multi-term PPN would be welcomed as it would lead to greater staff stability at schools. Proposals by principals as to what a suitable term would be ranged from two years to five years.

### **LEARNER-EDUCATOR RATIOS**

Principals indicated that the average learner-educator ratio in the province was misleading and was in no way a measure of the actual class size. Seventeen principals made the point that there needs to be a decrease in the learner-educator ratio in the province. There seems to be support for a ratio of between 30:1 and 32:1, whilst a few principals suggested that 28:1 would be an ideal ratio.

### **WORKSHOPS ON FORMULA**

Seven principals made the point that the application of the PPM and its related formulae was a highly technical process. They strongly believed that there should be greater advocacy as well as transparency as to how the model together with its related formulae is used in determining the PPN of schools. Two principals were of the view that the secrecy surrounding the entire process was creating the impression that the PPN was being manipulated by department officials. These principals were, therefore, of the view that there needs to be workshops for principals on the issue of educator provisioning. They believed that they need to be capacitated on how the model is applied. This they believed will enable them to verify their PPNs when it is declared by the department.

## **CRITERIA USED FOR REDRESS ALLOCATION**

A plurality of respondents from advantaged, urban and suburban schools commented that the criteria used to determine qualification for posts from the redress pool seriously disadvantages them. They believed that the current criteria, namely, condition of the physical infrastructure of the school and poverty of the community around the school without taking into account actual learner demography counts against them from qualifying for educators in terms of the poverty redress factor built into the PPM. With advantaged schools admitting large numbers of learners from disadvantaged communities from the neighbouring townships and informal settlements, they stated that learner poverty should be one of, if not the sole criterion in determining qualification for posts from the redress pool.

## **TIMING OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PPN**

Twenty principals commented on the inappropriate timing of the announcement of the PPN. They made the point that the implementation of the PPN whilst the academic year is in progress undermines effective administration and leads to a breakdown in the organizational culture of schools, especially when class units have to be compressed, workloads redistributed and timetables reworked. Moreover, the movement of staff across schools whilst the academic year is in progress impacts negatively on curriculum delivery.

## **SUITABLE RELEASE TIME**

Some principals commented that the PPN needs to be released by the latest in September so that schools can engage in meaningful planning for the forthcoming academic year. Further, any movement of staff resulting from the implementation of the PPN should take place on the first school day. They commented that if such practices are observed it will lead to a smooth start to the school year and will ensure minimal disruptions to the functionality of schools.

### 5.3 PRESENTATION OF THE QUALITATIVE DATA

The qualitative data presented below was gathered from the semi-structured interviews conducted with principals and unstructured interviews conducted with union officials. The interviews were primarily used as a secondary data gathering tool in order to triangulate the data generated by means of the questionnaire as well as to provide ‘thick description’<sup>4</sup>.

The data generated from the interviews is presented thematically using *verbatim* quotations in order to ensure that the voices of the informants and not just that of the researcher is heard. Further, where informants made similar points the data is quantified. In the case of the semi-structured interviews, at the end of each quotation *nom de plumes* for the informants are used in order to give some indication as to the nature of the institution where the informant is based whilst simultaneously protecting the identity of the informant.

#### 5.3.1 TRANSPARENCY IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF EDUCATORS

Seven principals quite emphatically disagreed that issues around educator post provisioning is sufficiently transparent. They contended that important information on the workings of the post distribution formula as well as the relevant statistics that are factored into the formula are not made transparent to them. All the department officials do is to hand the PPN report to principals and instruct them to implement it. Consequently, they commented:

*‘... there is not enough transparency...Normally we get summoned to a meeting and they call out all the names [of schools] and you get your piece of paper [PPN report] and then everyone has a whole lot of queries.’* [G Smith]

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<sup>4</sup> ‘Thick description’ is a term used in qualitative research to refer to the depth or ‘thickness’ of the description that a researcher needs to report.

*'No sir not [transparent] ... they push this form [PPN report] into your hand at a very quick meeting... and then you look at these funny formulas... no one really explains to you... your own SEM tells you he has read it and he can't understand it'.*

[Ms van der Westhuizen]

*'No, definitely [not transparent]... We are called as principals to a meeting. [A] highly secretive meeting for whatever reason and then we are issued these statements of the PPN... there isn't sufficient transparency telling us how they arrived at the PPN... they need to start putting all the facts and figures on the table... But the way in which it is done is very high handed. It is just presented to you at a meeting. You are required to sign for it and take it away'*

[P Moodley]

### **5.3.2 WORKSHOPS ON POST PROVISIONING**

Given the lack of transparency, principals made the point that there needs to be workshops on the issue of educator post provisioning so as to empower and capacitate principals on how the entire process of educator provisioning works. This is reflected by the following comment:

*'... I think there needs to be more advocacy as to how this thing works... I am in the dark as to how it is applied every year.'*

[D Gibson]

Further, the weightings of subjects were changed when the revised PPM was implemented and principals indicated that they were not briefed on the revisions to the model. The principal's, therefore, made the following points:

*'... some of the weightings have changed and most of us weren't aware that some of the weightings have been changed...no one was actually advised.'*

[G Smith]

*'...I'd like them to explain things to me ...my lack of clarity [on the formula] will indicate to you that we weren't fully... briefed on this thing.'*

[P Moodley]

### 5.3.3 CRITERIA USED FOR THE ALLOCATION OF REDRESS POSTS

One principal, whose school is classified in decile ten (advantaged) in terms of the national Norms and Standards for School Funding and whose learner population comprises 87% of learners from disadvantaged communities, strongly believed that his school should have qualified for educators from the redress pool. He stated that:

*'...we need to become more conscious of the fact that redress is ensuring that communities of people who were disadvantaged [in the past] are advantaged and somewhere in the model we have to take race into account. I believe that firmly, based on the different population groups that obviously the black community was disadvantaged to a large extent... we need to take this into account so it becomes a factor'.* [D Gibson]

Another principal from a mediocre-level resourced school was quite scathing in his criticism of the criteria used by the department to distribute the posts allocated for redress. He believed that by only taking into account the condition of the schools infrastructure and neglecting learner poverty, seriously disadvantages his school. He commented:

*'In terms of the description that the department affords to [my school] we are an advantaged school. Unfortunately that classification has been based on just the infrastructure and not really who we are catering for. We've got two informal settlements just below the school that draws in over 150 children... that is not taken into account. They can hardly be termed advantaged children'.* [P Moodley]

The union officials also seem dissatisfied with the criteria used in distributing poverty redress posts. They seem to concur with the view articulated by some principals that learner poverty should be looked into as a factor in distributing redress posts. One union official commented:

*'... this is where our problem lies [as a union] because the criterion that indicates the level of poverty or how disadvantaged a school is... does not really look into the factor of*

*learner poverty... [it] does not take into account your entire learner poverty index'*

[Union A]

She went on to further illustrate her point by commenting:

*'... you may have a so-called advantaged school in the heart of Durban... but your learner poverty index would be great by the mere fact that it is schooling learners who cannot pay school fees.'*

[Union A]

In contrast, principals from well-resourced schools and drawing a large number of learners from advantaged communities believed they had no right to expect to qualify for educators from the redress pool.

The union officials were also very critical of the department's attempts at redress. They take the view that redress should be looked at holistically and consequently, believed that the department has a very short-sighted approach to redress by only looking at it from a human resources perspective. One union official therefore, commented:

*'...it's not just human resources... it's the whole learner support materials... your physical infrastructure... all of that needs to be taken into consideration.'*

[Union B]

Another union official went on to explain how limitations in the physical infrastructure at disadvantaged schools affects the deployment of educators in terms of redress:

*'... if you distribute posts to a school in the heart of a rural area where you don't have many classrooms... you might find that you are sending teachers who cannot be accommodated in that school simply because there is no classroom facilities.'*

[Union A]

Union officials also commented that whilst the redress allocation is supposed to benefit the disadvantaged schools in terms of lowering the class sizes it in fact does not. Owing to limitations in their physical infrastructure, class sizes are not reduced. One official, therefore, commented:

*'You have a PPN which tells you 1:36... When you go to these schools you find 1:50, 1:60, 1:70... the PPN, because of a lack of classrooms, does very little to lower the class size'*

[Union B]

### **5.3.4 SCHOOL CURRICULA**

The data on school curricula is presented under the categories; PPM and curriculum diversity, promotion of subjects, and curriculum diversity and its demand on specialists.

#### **PPM and Curriculum Diversity**

Four of the nine principals agreed that the PPM tends to favour schools which offer a diverse curriculum. They point to the higher weightings allocated to subjects which in turn increases the total weighted learners of the school in terms of the PPN formula. This increased weighting then allows such schools to lay claim to more posts from the provincial pool of educators. Some of the comments made by these principals are as follows:

*'I have looked at those weightings and ... if you are doing Dance your weighting is like 0.45 or something like that against teaching physical science who may get... 0.185 for every learner...'*

[D Gibson]

*'I know of schools that are bigger [larger enrolment] than ours but seem to have a lower PPN...I think it can only really be accounted for the fact that we offer such a wide variety of subjects... I think that we have something like twenty one different subjects and so a lot of those are in the specialist category for which you qualify for additional weightings.'*

[G Smith]

The union officials were also in agreement that schools offering a diverse curriculum seem to be advantaged by the PPM. One union official commented:

*'... the number of educators in a school is going to be determined by the type of curriculum you are going to offer... and you discover in advantaged institutions... where*

*you have subjects like computer science... technical skills subjects... the weightings of subjects are quite high [and] you discover that you qualify for quite a few educators.'*

[Union B]

The union official went on to explain the situation at disadvantaged institutions. He pointed out that because of the subjects that they are forced to offer - because of inadequate physical and material resources and a lack of adequately trained personnel – their overall subject weightings are small which results in a reduction in their entitlement to educator posts. He commented:

*'If you go to the rural schools, they don't teach those [science and technical skills] subjects. They teach the social subjects and the weightings [of these subjects] is low and will [therefore] always qualify for lesser [smaller number] teachers.'*

[Union B]

Four of the principals, whose institutions offer a diverse curriculum, were of the view that by promoting curriculum diversity they are in no way being advantaged by the PPM. They argue that whilst some of the subjects they offer do carry a higher weighting in terms of educator post provisioning this in no way compensates for the additional number of periods created through splits and combination classes as a result of timetabling. These principals therefore commented:

*'No, that's not quite true though on paper it does look that way... You are going to have more splits and you are going to need more manpower and the PPN does not allow for that... you will [therefore] need to supplement what you are getting from the state.'*

[G Hendricks]

*'The PPM seriously disadvantages schools with a diverse curriculum... At the beginning of 2004 as a result of all the splits that we had to create... in fact we created an additional 130 periods. If you had to really translate that into teacher requirements that would mean three teachers. The department should actually be giving me three teachers... for the splits that we created but... that is not considered.'*

[P Moodley]

*'I don't believe that it favours them. I believe that it does not even cater for splits... schools with [a] diverse curriculum have splits and this thing [the PPM]... has total disregard for the splits'* [B Mkhize]

Principals whose schools do offer a diverse curriculum point out that they have to increasingly rely on their SGBs to fund the additional posts created as a result of the splits and combination classes. One principal commented:

*'These [splits and combinations] are now becoming very expensive... The only way we are able to do that and we continue to be committed to it is because of the commitment of the parents [on] the SGB to provide the additional educators. So the additional three educators as a result of the splits... the GB is actually funding that'.* [P Moodley]

### **Promotion of Subjects**

The PPM makes provision for the Head of Education in a province to promote particular subjects in schools in line with its curriculum transformation agenda. Therefore, there is expectation among principals at disadvantaged schools that new subjects would be introduced at their schools. This, however, does not seem to be the case. The principals from poorly resourced schools were adamant that the department of education is not doing enough to promote curriculum diversity at their schools. One principal commented:

*'They [the department] must give an indication that we would like to advertise a post like this [computer studies] ... can you check with your SGB. I mean who is going to say no to computer science... My belief is that the PPN... model is a disguise not to develop your school into what an ideal school should be like.'* [B Mkhize]

Another principal from a poorly resourced school commented that as a school they simply do not have the necessary financial resources to promote certain subjects. Their state allocation and school fees are not substantial enough for them to fund new subjects in the curriculum. He commented:

*'The money we get from the department... for this year it is R 50 000 for the first time [and it] is enough to pay for electricity and water. Not much for anything else. The fees that we get here are very small and the money comes in dribs and drabs.'* [S Nkosi]

### **Curriculum Diversity and its Demand on Specialists**

Principals made the point that by offering a diverse curriculum they often experienced problems in recruiting suitably qualified staff. When highly specialized subjects are offered, schools have difficulty in filling educator posts in these subjects. Consequently, they commented:

*'... diversity [makes] a big demand on specialists... today to find a TD [technical drawing] guy [teacher], a drama teacher, to find an art teacher is like finding gold in dust. It is very difficult'* [D Gibson]

*'... it is very difficult to get teachers...[in] maths, physics and the commerce subjects.'* [G Hendricks]

Moreover, they point out that help from the department of education in locating specialist educators is not always forthcoming.

*'... once you start to offer that [a diverse curriculum] you will find that you require particular personnel that the department has difficulty in providing.'* [P Moodley]

### **5.3.5 CLASS SIZE**

The principals indicated that the maximum ideal class sizes as stipulated in the PPM did not materialize in practice. They added that by reducing the class size to the ratio stipulated by the PPM, the resulting balance of the learners has to be carried by some other educator. This, they argued, has the resultant effect of increasing class sizes in other subjects substantially above both the average learner-educator ratio of the province as well as the ideal maximum class size for those subjects as indicated in the PPM.

Moreover, the physical infrastructure at schools may not be conducive to large class sizes for certain subjects. By reducing class sizes in these subjects, it impacts on the other educators in the school. Two principals, therefore, commented:

*'We had woodwork and our woodwork class can take a maximum of 30 learners... our current classes are 50-55 learners. To create a class of 30 learners' impacts on other teachers... so we rather do without the woodwork class'.* [G Hendricks]

*'You got to have a manageable number [in your workshops] but very little provision is made to cater for that. You got ten workbenches times two - that leaves you with twenty. Someone is carrying that burden of the balance of the pupils that supposed to be in that class'.* [P Moodley]

Given the specific needs of certain specialist subjects, smaller class sizes are an imperative. However, the PPN of schools does not lend itself to smaller class sizes in these subjects. Consequently, some schools are forced to violate legal prescripts in the offering of certain subjects. The following comment illustrates this point:

*'...certain subjects require specialized work... [it demands that] the educators comply with the Occupational [Health] and Safety Act [and therefore] require smaller classes. The woodwork class and metalwork classes are currently sitting at 36. At matric level metalwork in terms of occupational safety that is not on. It should be sitting at a maximum of 24. But you cannot split the classes into 18 and 18 because it does not make economic units and our staffing does not allow for that'.* [P Naidoo]

### **5.3.6 LEARNERS WITH SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS**

Principals were of the view that the PPM discriminates against ordinary public schools by not taking into account the learners they have admitted with barriers to learning. Whilst they believed that they are promoting inclusivity by admitting learners with barriers to learning, they pointed out that the PPM does not compensate their schools by granting

them additional educator personnel to cater for the pedagogical needs of these learners. They therefore commented:

*'It [the PPM] should account for that but it doesn't. What I am doing is stop gap remediation by getting outside agencies and outside institutions to actually take the problem away from me and not solve the problem'.* [D Gibson]

*'I'd say there are about 100 to 150 learners that do require special care for various reasons... maybe slow learners, hard of hearing, defective sight. They are just lumped in with mainstream learners because there is no provision that can be made for them. There is no one to give them that special attention, particularly those with attention deficits and so on. The PPN does not make any provision whatsoever for them...'* [P Moodley]

### **5.3.7 ADMISSION OF LEARNERS FROM DISADVANTAGED COMMUNITIES**

Five of the nine principals pointed out that whilst their schools are located in advantaged areas, their schools in no way catered for learners exclusively from advantaged communities. They are increasingly admitting learners from disadvantaged communities. They believed that this factor should be taken into account in educator provisioning. These principals commented as follows:

*'Although [my school] is situated in an advantaged area... this is considered advantaged because of tarred roads and lighting... we have a fairly large group from disadvantaged backgrounds'.* [P Naidoo]

*'In terms of [the department] we are considered advantaged. We have tarred roads; lighting [and] flushing toilets [but] almost 80% of our learners are from disadvantaged communities. Most of our learners come from the surrounding informal settlements... and that is not taken into account'.* [G Hendricks]

### **5.3.8 SECOND LANGUAGE SPEAKERS OF ENGLISH**

Five of the nine informants indicated that their schools cater for a large number of learners who are second language speakers of English. Because English is the LOLT at their schools, they assert that these learners need added pedagogical support in English and would benefit most if the PPM took this factor into account. One principal from a well-resourced school indicated that it was unfortunate that the PPM does not take this into account and, therefore, had to turn to his governing body for help in this regard. He made the following comment:

*‘Our governing body employs the second language [specialist] amongst the governing body employed staff... [the] second language specialist gives extra English [lessons] to some of the kids that struggle particularly with English’.* [G Smith]

Another principal made the comment that besides English being a second language to the majority of learners at his school, the specific language of many of the specialist subjects which he calls a ‘third language’ severely disadvantages learners. He commented:

*‘You know whilst he is doing it [the specialist subject] in English, it becomes another language because Maths has got its own language, Physical Science has got its own language and that can be seen as a third language. Whilst he may be doing it in his second language English, he has to come to grips with the specific language of that subject... it’s a very serious barrier and it’s only proficiency in the language that can unlock the real knowledge in many of these subjects’.* [P Moodley]

### **5.3.9 EMPLOYMENT OF SGB PAID EDUCATORS**

Union officials pointed out that the PPM cannot regulate the employment of SGB paid educators. The appointment of SGB paid educators is left to the discretion of individual SGBs. Consequently, schools that have the financial resources engage in hiring SGB paid educators. The union officials commented that the hiring of SGB paid educators has the effect of reducing the learner-educator ratios as well as the educator workloads at these schools:

*'... no doubt the employment of extra educators or SGB appointees does lessen the load to a large degree. There are schools that are sitting with 25:1.'* [Union A]

*'If the state is failing to improve on the learner-educator ratio... as parents they take it upon themselves to try to improve that.'* [Union B]

Further, the union officials pointed to the fact that parents who have the financial means are simply exercising their rights within the legislative framework in improving the quality of education received by their children:

*'...it is simply the question of the rich providing a better quality [education]'*. [Union A]

*'...their justification is that they are improving the quality of learning and teaching.'* [Union B]

### **5.3.10 RELEASE OF THE PPN**

The data on the release of the PPN is presented under the categories; timing of the announcement of the PPN, impact of the release of the PPN on school organization and suitable release time of the PPN.

#### **Timing of the Announcement of the PPN**

Principals were unanimous in their disapproval of the release dates of the PPN. All 9 principals were of the view that the timing of the release of the PPN has been inopportune and has had a negative impact on school organization and service delivery. They also pointed out that the late release of the PPN is not a once-off occurrence but has been something historical. Some of the comments made by the principals were as follows:

*'... [it] presents major problems... Teaching starts here on the first day and we cannot do that and we have not done that in the last two years because of the delay in the PPN...'* [D Gibson]

*'...it's not ideal... to get your final 2004 PPN three or four months into the year must make life extremely difficult.'*

[G Smith]

*'...it's been horribly late...As far as I know, from my seven years as principal this department has never been on time or has never ever disclosed the PPN at an appropriate time. It has always been so inconvenient and caused so many disruptions.'*

[P Moodley]

### **Impact of the Release of the PPN on School Organization**

Eight of the nine principals spoke of the negative impact the inopportune timing of the release of PPN has on school organization and administration. More specifically, they were extremely critical of the impact of the timing of the release of the PPN on school planning, teacher allocations and timetabling and the resultant effect this has on the culture of learning and teaching at their schools. These are some of the comments made by the principals:

*'...it's not good for organization... I believe in good administration... I am particular about administration. It is really frustrating to be in [this] set-up... We normally give teachers their allocations before they leave in December. In the last few years I have not been able to do that simply because I am not sure how many teachers I have on the permanent staff...'*

[D Gibson]

*'They [the department] have to understand that schools operate in an organized fashion. Much of the planning is done in the year prior to it starting... we are actually doing allocations without being certain of our PPN...so it upsets the arrangement.'*

[P Moodley]

*'Last year we had planned... we made allocations... but it [the PPN] changed. Then we had to change the timetable and allocations and that goes against the call for starting lessons on the first day.'*

[S Nkosi]

Further, a principal from a poorly resourced school spoke of the impact the late release of the PPN has when there is a reduction in the number of posts. He pointed out the difficulty in getting SGB paid educators appointed after the completion of the budgetary process. He commented:

*'...the reduction of posts sometimes would imply a certain subject cannot be taught. You might require SGB [appointed] educators... The budget has [already] been ratified. Where are you going to get more money?'* [B Mkhize]

### **Suitable Release Time of the PPN**

The majority of principals were in agreement that a suitable time for the release of the PPN would be in the month of September. They believed that if the PPN is released during the month of September they will be able to engage in proper human resource planning for the forthcoming year. One principal commented:

*'...in September it [must] be given to you...so that your planning can take place.'* [B Mkhize]

Two principals were at pains to point out that the current situation cannot be allowed continue because of the detrimental effect it has on planning in general and the culture of learning and teaching in particular. One principal therefore commented:

*'The buck is got to stop somewhere and the education department needs to be punctual about the way in which they hand this PPN to schools...If they give it to me in September, I've got my budget meeting in October and then we do our planning in terms of staffing and so on in the month of October and November. Before teachers depart for the holiday they should have a rough idea of their timetable, their allocation... that would be a fair arrangement.'* [P Moodley]

### 5.3.11 FILLING OF VACANT POSTS

The data on the filling of vacant educator posts is presented under the categories; temporary filling of posts by substitute educators, 30 day policy for the qualification of substitute educators, filling of posts through compulsory temporary transfers and filling of posts in a permanent capacity.

#### **Temporary Filling of Posts by Substitute Educators**

Principals spoke of the difficulty in recruiting substitute educators because they are becoming a scarce resource. They believed that the fact that the department does not have a database of substitute educators adds to their woes. In instances where principals were able to identify suitable substitute educators, they were cautioned not to employ the educators until Departmental approval is given. They therefore commented:

*'...it becomes very difficult... for us to find a substitute. The department does not have any substitutes.*

[Ms D van der Westhuizen]

*'In the seven years that I have been here [as principal] the department has not found a single substitute educator... they don't even have a database of people that they can locate... Yet the department has the temerity to send out a circular cautioning principal's that they are not employers and should not engage in employing staff. If principals follow that circular there [will] be large numbers of learners that will be sitting without educators.'*

[P Moodley]

Further, the principals were extremely critical of the procedure to be followed in the filling of posts by substitute educators. The lengthy process that needs to be followed, results in classes being deprived of an educator for a substantial period of time. One principal commented:

*'... the problem is you have to advertise... wait for applications... [do] shortlisting and [then] interview... this thing [process] takes place over a two [to] three week period...*

*what happens is that a class is without a teacher for quite a considerable period of time.'*  
[B Mkhize]

Another principal spoke of the problems experienced in getting departmental officials to approve the appointment of the recommended substitute educator. Department Officials often procrastinate in approving substitute appointments. He commented:

*'It causes untold problems... we are told not to employ before the district manager signs and they take their time... you have to call them many times [for] a response and the delay causes problems... [In the meantime] the classes remain unattended.'*

[S Nkosi]

### **30 Day Policy for the Qualification of Substitute Educators**

Principals indicated that the policy on substitutes, namely, that school's will qualify for a state paid substitute only if an educator was going to be away from school for more than 30 consecutive schooldays was highly problematic. They believed that when educators are away from school for less than 30 consecutive schooldays, the Department's policy on substitute educators compromises the education of children. Hence they commented:

*'[It] does not help us in the school situation because an educator may be absent for 28 or 29 days. This means that [in terms of department policy] a class must be without an educator for 29 days. Now what about the provision of quality education here? Learners are compromised severely.'*  
[P Naidoo]

*'What happens is that teachers are absent for a week or two weeks... learners are left without [a] teacher in [the] classroom. Learners are left unattended and this denies them their basic right to [an uninterrupted] education.'*  
[T Shezi]

They added that in many instances educators are away for three to four weeks and the fact that there is no state paid substitute, schools are forced to put in place contingency

plans. These contingency plans are sometimes not pedagogically sound. They commented:

*We [have] GB members who are generous with their time and they come in to baby-sit the class’.* [G Hendricks]

*‘... the school will either try to use parents or say to somebody just come and fill in for two weeks and we will pay you an X amount out of GB funds...’* [D Gibson]

### **Filling of Posts through Compulsory Temporary Transfers<sup>5</sup> (CTTs)**

Principals were extremely critical of the manner in which substantive vacant posts are filled at their institutions by the department by way of CTTs. Principals were of the view that in the filling of vacancies by the department through CTTs, sound educational principles are compromised because the department’s main concern is meeting its operational requirements rather than meeting the pedagogical needs of the child. Not much thought goes into the matching of available personnel to the vacant posts. These principals commented:

*‘[The] CTT in many cases do not even fulfill the curricular needs. They are just asked to move there... and just occupy space. The movement of educators from a primary school... to a secondary school... is highly problematic... the type of instruction that happens in primary school is extremely different to that in the high school.’* [P Naidoo]

*‘CTT [is]... used as an instrument to sort out the departments worries rather than meet the specific needs of schools... Let me give you an example. This is a high school. We made a request for an IsiZulu educator... staffing [department] should understand that we are talking about somebody who is schooled in the didactics of IsiZulu. [The department] finds someone who talks IsiZulu... They found a lady in a primary school and sent her here to teach IsiZulu in Grades 10 and 11.’* [P Moodley]

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<sup>5</sup> Compulsory Temporary Transfer (CTT) refers to the movement, by the department, of an educator who is surplus at one school to another school where there is a vacancy.

### **Filling of Posts in a Permanent Capacity**

All nine principals were unanimous in their dissatisfaction with the department regarding the delays in the filling of substantive vacant posts in a permanent capacity. There is no urgency to fill the posts. Time frames and management plans for the filling of posts are constantly revised resulting in staffing uncertainty at schools. The vacancy bulletins are often inaccurate resulting in addendums. These principals commented:

*'...you do all your paperwork... only to find there is a new HRM [human resource management circular]... coming out with an amended date. [The department does not] stick to the management plan and it makes it very difficult for us as a school. You can't really plan. You have to re-plan all the time.'* [Ms D van der Westhuizen]

*'... for the last eight years not a single management plan... went on track in terms of the original circular that was sent out. There are always amendments to circulars, amendments to management plans. Posts that were supposed to get filled in the first term get filled in the fourth term. This affects service delivery. It adversely affects the organizational culture of the school as well as the morale of educators.'* [P Naidoo]

*'They don't [stick to the management plan]... It is historical. They just seem to be making the same mistakes. They are not learning from their mistakes.'* [G Hendricks]

### **5.3.12 DOCUMENTS ON IMPLEMENTATION**

Six principals made the point that the procedure manual on PPN implementation is not clear and subject to alternative interpretations. There is no uniform understanding of the manual. Principals, Department Officials and Union Officials have their own interpretations with regard to what the manual enunciates. Consequently, this sometimes results in conflict among the stakeholders. The principals, therefore, commented:

*'I think most people don't even have the foggiest idea [of the manual]. This is evident in the type of questions that come up in the [principals] meeting.'* [G Smith]

*'That has to be a categoric no... different sections in the department have been doing different things... the SEMs sometimes tell you go ahead and do a particular thing... next thing the district office sends all those forms back.'* [P Moodley]

*'If it was clear there would not be so many squabbles [disputes] after people have been identified [surplus].'* [S Nkosi]

### **5.3.13 SUPPORT FOR AND PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCESS OF PPN IMPLEMENTATION**

The data on support for and participation in the process of PPN implementation is presented under the stakeholder categories; members of staff, site stewards, SGBs and SEMs.

#### **Members of Staff**

Principals pointed out that staff members are generally supportive of the process only when the school's declared PPN is above the current staff establishment. In other words, when vacancies are to be declared staff members participate in the process.

*'...I would say yes [they are supportive] because we never had a surplus... We've never had to declare people in excess.'* [G Hendricks]

*'...if they know... that nobody is going to be declared in surplus you get full support... because they all will like to fight about where the new [vacancy must] be introduced.'*

[B Mkhize]

However, when the declared PPN is below the current staff establishment and consequently, surpluses have to be declared, staff members are not very supportive of the process. One principal whose staff is highly unionized spoke off the vehement opposition of members of staff to the implementation of the PPN. He stated:

*'...we are working in a highly unionized environment. The moment you have policies and procedures in place that affect staff and their colleagues who are union members it is natural and normal that they will close ranks... So you get no support. In fact the staff is openly hostile.'*

[P Moodley]

### **Site Stewards**

Principals pointed out that support and participation of site stewards in the process is dependent on how highly unionized the institutions are. The principals from schools where there is not much union activity, which generally tended to be the well-resourced ex-Model C schools, indicated minimal interference from site stewards.

*'...we don't have a very highly unionized staff... most of them [staff] belong to one particular union... She [site steward] tends to be very supportive.'*

[G Smith]

However, principals whose institutions are highly unionized indicated that site stewards tended to side with their union members and were not co-operative when implementing the PPN. Any policy which threatens the job security of its members is bound to be opposed by the site stewards. They commented:

*'Well the site stewards have to support their members... it's fashionable to oppose policy of the... employer especially if it prejudices the employee.'*

[P Moodley]

### **SGBs**

Notwithstanding the fact that circulars from the education department on educator post provisioning are addressed to chairpersons of SGBs, principals indicated that SGBs do not understand the PPN process and most often than not do not get involved in the process. However, if they do get involved in the process it is largely to seek approval for the funding of posts from school funds for replacement educators not catered for in the PPN. These principals therefore commented:

*'...they do not have adequate knowledge [of the process]... they get involved [when] replacements are needed.'*

[P Naidoo]

*'The SGB... quite frankly, they don't understand this thing.'*

[B Mkhize]

*'They don't understand it. They don't understand the PPN. So they don't participate...'*

[T Shezi]

### **SEMs**

The majority of principals pointed out that the role of the SEMs in the process is merely that of handing the PPN circular to them. Eight of the nine principals were quite emphatic in voicing their dissatisfaction at the lack of support from SEMs when implementing the PPN. One principal very emotionally stated:

*'...that particular category [SEMs] one needs to get angry and upset with... there is no support at all...'*

[P Moodley]

Moreover, they indicated that when queries were raised with them they were unable to provide assistance. They thus questioned the extent to which SEMs understand the process. They therefore commented:

*'...these guys [SEMs] don't even understand this thing. That's the problem they don't understand it.'*

[B Mkhize]

*'Some of them I don't think even understand how this whole process works because if you have technical queries they are often unable to answer them... I'd imagine when you are in that position you must make it your duty to be familiar with all those kinds of issues.'*

[G Smith]

*'...when you query the calculation of the PPN, I was told... we can't handle [it] at this level. You must write to so and so in Ulundi.'*

[P Moodley]

### **5.3.14 MULTI-TERM PPN**

Four principals supported the view of a multi-term PPN. They believed that a multi-term PPN will lead to greater stability in schools and improve school planning. They, therefore, commented:

*'...PPN should be kept constant for at least three years. [This would ensure] stability and [enhance] school planning and the delivery of quality education.'* [P Naidoo]

*'...the PPN should stretch over three years. It should be reviewed after every three years. It will ensure continuity in schools.'* [T Shezi]

## **5.4 EMERGING TRENDS AND PATTERNS FROM THE DATA**

After a thorough study of both the quantitative and qualitative data, the emerging trends and patterns from the data is presented.

### **5.4.1 EQUITY CONCERNS**

*Finding: The vast majority of principals do not believe that the PPM distributes educator posts equitably to schools.*

From a distributional equity perspective the PPM does not cater for fairness in the qualitative distribution of educators. In noting that educator quality can in part be judged by the qualifications of educators (Krige & Scott 1995:57), the PPM does not take this variable into account when distributing educators to schools. This means that the inequalities in terms of educator qualifications that existed prior to the formation of a unitary system of education with the disadvantaged schools having a substantial number of educators, who are underqualified or poorly qualified, will continue to be a part of the education system. Jansens (1995:134), therefore, makes the point that those learners who study at well-resourced schools *viz.* the advantaged schools with qualified teachers experience the curriculum in ways different from children attending disadvantaged schools such as township schools even when these schools use the same syllabus. This in turn is bound to impact on the nature of the educational experiences which educators as a resource are able to provide to their learners and may in turn impact on the outcomes for

individual learners. Servaas van den Berg (The Mercury 2004c:3) incisively points out that the inequalities in the output of the current schooling system is in part attributed to the differences in qualifications of educators in the various schools. A cause for concern is that this inequity is bound to continue because there are insufficient incentives for educators to upgrade their qualifications. Mdlalose (2003:41) points out that educators have become reluctant to upgrade their qualifications because the state, in order to prune government expenditure (as part of its neoliberal GEAR package); have de-linked educator salaries from educator qualifications. Thus, apart from the PPM contributing to the inequity in the qualitative distribution of educators, the state's ideology of neoliberalism is further contributing to this inequity by de-linking educator salaries to qualifications and thereby not providing sufficient incentives for educators to upgrade their qualifications.

Given Bot's (2003:35) comments that schools in the disadvantaged category have less highly qualified educators compared to schools in the higher quintiles (deciles in the case of KZN) which have highly qualified educators, principals from these schools believed to a greater extent than principals from advantaged schools that educator qualifications should be a variable for consideration in the PPM (see section C, question 7, page 157).

From a procedural equity perspective, the PPM in theory should ensure fairness i.e. fair treatment in the distribution of educators in terms of rules and procedures because it is based on objective criteria (the criteria are set out as common rules in terms of legislation and not determined by administrative discretion). Whilst this may be the case, principals are not convinced that the PPM results in procedural fairness in the distribution of educators. This is largely due to the highly secretive and high-handed manner in which the entire issue of educator post provisioning is handled by the department. In noting that key to any RAM is the principle of transparency, the fact that there is a lack of transparency on the workings of the post distribution formula as well as the relevant statistics that are factored into the formula has led principals to believe that the PPM of schools are being manipulated by department officials. If there is less than total transparency there seems little point in having a resource allocation model such as the

PPM. After all, the PPM was introduced in order to bring about greater rationality and fairness in the allocation of educators to schools.

*Finding: The linking of curriculum offerings to educator posts has further contributed to the inequity in educator distribution.*

Schools that offer a diverse curriculum are advantaged in terms of the distribution of posts by the PPM. The schools in the disadvantaged cohort increasingly believe that the greater the number of subjects offered by a school, the greater the learner weighting of the school and hence, the greater their entitlement to posts in terms of the PPM. Given the fact that schools that classify themselves as disadvantaged do not have the necessary material resources (see section B, question 5, page 139), the physical infrastructure (see section B, question 6, page 141) nor the financial resources (see section B, questions 2 and 3, pages 134 and 137) to offer broader subject offerings, including subjects which carry higher weightings in terms of the PPM, they will continue to be disadvantaged in terms of their entitlement to educator posts. Therefore, from a critical theory point of view one needs to ask the question as to whose interests are furthered by the PPM. The PPM most certainly does not further the interests of schools in the disadvantaged cohort. Moreover, even if schools in the disadvantaged cohort do find the means to offer new subjects they cannot do so because policy on educator post provisioning as stipulated in the procedure manual on PPN implementation precludes them from introducing new subjects. The PPM as a resource allocation tool thus serves to perpetuate the inequalities in educator distribution to schools.

*Finding: The PPM does not compensate schools which offer a diverse curriculum for the additional periods created as a result of split and combination classes in terms of timetabling.*

The principals from the advantaged school cohort indicated that the advantage gained by offering a diverse curriculum in terms of the PPM is illusory. The additional staff gained as a result of curriculum diversity comes at a price in that more staff is required to cater

for split and combination classes<sup>6</sup> in terms of timetabling which is not funded by the PPM. Consequently, they point out that they have to increasingly turn to their SGBs to fund the additional posts created as a result of the splits and combination classes. This shifting of costs from public (state) to private sources (SGBs) is part of the NPM reforms which not all schools can afford.

*Finding: The employment of SGB paid educators favours the wealthier schools and results in numerical educator inequity at schools.*

Based on the income a school is likely to generate in a school year, SGBs as the ‘strategic apex’ of schools often make decisions as to whether they are able to supplement the baseline educator provisioning of the state by way of funding governing body appointed educators. The provisioning of educators from school funds favours schools in the advantaged cohort. The fact that they levy higher school fees, their SGBs are able to employ more educators (see section D, questions 2 and 3, pages 168 and 170). In some advantaged schools the SGB is a bigger employer of educator staff than the state. In 2004, the number of SGB paid educators accounted for 7% of all educators employed in the public school sector in KZN compared to just 2% in 1998 (EMIS 2004b). This growing trend in the appointment of SGB paid educators is evidence of ‘creeping privatization’ in the public school sector which is in keeping with NPM reforms (Murphy 1996:15). Whilst supporters of the notion of a ‘self-reliant school’ would see this as a positive trend, the stark reality is that schools that do not have the financial resources will continue to be disadvantaged. In contrast, the advantaged schools, as pointed out by the union officials, will be able to lower their learner-educator ratios and educator workloads and thereby improve the quality of education provided to their learners. If this trend is allowed to continue, this will further exacerbate the inequalities in output between the advantaged and the disadvantaged schools thereby justifying the views of critical theorists that schools exist to reproduce the social, economic and cultural order of capitalist societies.

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<sup>6</sup> Split and combination classes refer to the additional instructional time created as a result of, for example, 10A combining with 10B for History, Accounting and Mathematics would require three educators and not two had there been no splits and combinations.

### 5.4.2 REDRESS CONCERNS

*Finding: The distribution of posts set aside for poverty redress, is not in keeping with policy pronouncements.*

In terms of the ‘levelling’<sup>7</sup> approach to redress which is pursued by the state in terms of educator provisioning, the poorer schools, namely, those schools from deciles one to five, should have qualified for poverty redress posts. The data, however, does not indicate this to be the case. Further, whilst rural schools qualified for educators from the poverty redress pool, this in no way assisted them in reducing their classroom-educator ratio. The fact that they do not have sufficient classrooms, as pointed out by the union officials, results in class sizes remaining high. The educators granted to them in terms of redress, do not in anyway benefit the learners because the educators granted to the school either cannot be accommodated at the school because of a lack of classrooms, or if they do remain at the school, all that happens is that the period load of the existing educators is reduced. From a critical theory perspective, the instrumental rationality that prevails in the distribution of redress posts represents a preoccupation with *means* rather than *ends*. The department of education in its preoccupation with effecting redress has not given sufficient thought to the consequences of its redress policy because the intended beneficiaries of redress, which should be the learners, receive no advantage at all. The granting of poverty redress posts should be done in tandem with other factors that impact on learning. It should be accompanied by physical infrastructure development and the provision of material resources if the granting of poverty redress posts is to have any impact on learner outcomes.

*Finding: The principals as well as the union officials were extremely critical of the criteria used in distributing the poverty redress posts.*

Whilst the poverty grading of a school was ranked the second most important factor in determining the post provisioning needs of schools, the criteria of taking into account the condition of the physical infrastructure of the school as well as the location of the school to determine the poverty grading of the school for the qualification of posts from the

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<sup>7</sup> In terms of the ‘levelling’ approach to redress, resources should be distributed so that the least advantaged are favoured most so the variances in learner achievement is minimized.

poverty redress pool seriously disadvantages many schools. With school admission policies no longer restricting schools to admitting learners solely from the immediate feeder area, parents from disadvantaged communities (the townships and informal settlements) are increasingly seeking admission for their children to schools in the advantaged cohort (see section B, question 4, page 138). Consequently, learner demography at schools, more especially the advantaged schools, has changed quite considerably over the years. This is evidence consistent with NPM reforms and quasi-market mechanisms in education that parents are increasingly exercising their right as to where they choose for their children to be educated. Given the change in learner demography, there is strong support for the learner poverty index of a school to be used as a criterion in distributing the poverty redress posts rather than the existing criteria of the poverty grading of a school which takes into account the condition of the physical infrastructure of the school and the location of the school (see section C, question 7, page 159 and 5.3.3, page 186). From a critical theory perspective, it is important to note that the criteria for determining the distribution of posts set aside for poverty redress was determined by individuals with power in society, namely, the officials from the department of education. NUPSAW (2002b:8) has noted that the placement of a school in particular poverty grading category is dictated by economics: the fewer schools in the poorer quintiles (deciles in the case of KZN) the fewer redress posts the department would have to distribute. The current criteria, therefore, definitely does not serve the interests of the poor and is in need of urgent revision. In noting that a RAM is not a fixed and static entity, revisions may, therefore, need to be made to the PPM owing to the changing learner demography at schools.

#### **5.4.3 CONSULTATION OF PRINCIPALS ON POST PROVISIONING ISSUES**

The emerging trends and patterns from the data on the consultation of principals on post provisioning issues are presented under the categories; design of the PPM and implementation of the PPN.

## **DESIGN OF THE PPM**

*Finding: There has been an almost total disregard in the consultation of the principal constituency on the design of the PPM.*

The principals, as human resource managers of their institutions, should be considered key role-players on issues of educator provisioning. After all, they are at the ‘chalkface’ and consequently, ideally placed to articulate how different factors inside and outside of the school environment impact on learning and consequently, on educator provisioning. Therefore, they should be allowed to influence and participate in the determination of decisions which affect their institutions. Given Hall and Loucks (1982:135) criticism that many policy actors have limited experience in actually working in school settings either as educators or as administrators, or if they do have experience, it typically occurred long ago, the policy actors involved in framing policy on educator post provisioning should have, therefore, ensured wider consultation of principals on the design of the PPM.

Whilst noting that the consultation of principals by the department of education is totally inadequate, of concern is the role of the educator unions in seeking mandates from principals who are also an important sector of its membership. It seems as though that the labour unions represented at ELRC are not consulting with and obtaining mandates from principals on their views on educator post provisioning.

In noting that the introduction of a RAM is the result of perceived inconsistencies or unfairness associated with existing methods of resource allocation, there should have been wider consultation of principals on what they considered unfair in the existing methods of educator distribution to schools and what criteria they would consider important in determining the educator establishment of schools. Further, the credibility of a resource allocation model such as the PPM is dependent on the assumptions on which it is based. The fact that there was not wider consultation of the opinions of a very important stakeholder grouping on educator provisioning, namely the principals, by both the department of education and the educator unions, one needs to question from a critical theory perspective as to whose views, interests and opinions were validated in deciding on the design features of the PPM. It is abundantly clear, that the opinions and

interests of those in authority, and hence, with power *viz.* officials from the department of education were taken into account in the design of the PPM.

## **IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PPN**

*Finding: There has been an overwhelming neglect in the consultation of principals on issues of implementation of the PPN.*

Implementation of the PPN is handled in a very high handed and bureaucratic fashion. According to Apple (2001:416), principals are seen as individuals with power in self-reliant schools. However, when it comes to PPN implementation principals are rendered powerless. They are not consulted on implementation issues. The department officials by virtue of their positions stamp their authority on principals by instructing them to implement the PPN at their schools. The views and queries principals may have are not entertained. In some instances, principals were threatened with disciplinary action if they did not implement the PPN at their schools.

Principals, as implementers of the PPN at school sites are considered to be the most important link in the implementation chain of policy on educator post provisioning. In noting that policy on educator post provisioning is not a popular policy among educators; and being cognizant of Craig's (1990:24) comments that for any given policy there are numerous approaches to implementation, consulting principals on issues of implementation may bring to light possible obstacles to the chosen implementation strategy of the department. By being aware of these obstacles to implementation, the department of education could then put in place the appropriate policy tools in order to ensure that the policy recipients act in concert with the objectives of the post provisioning policy of the province.

### **5.4.4 WORKSHOPS ON THE POST PROVISIONING FORMULA**

*Finding: There has been an almost total neglect in capacitating principals on the workings of the formula used to calculate the PPN.*

Given the highly technical nature of the formula as well as the incremental revisions made to PPM, Field and Klingert (2001:87) make the point that it could lead to a

situation where very few people understand the model and could lead to users of the model becoming totally perplexed and may, therefore, call into question issues of transparency of the model. Both the department of education as well as the educator unions are guilty of not doing enough to capacitate and empower principals on the workings of the formula. The need to capacitate principals on issues around post provisioning is further demonstrated by the fact that many of the principals were unaware that the PPM had been revised in 2002. Principals were still referring to the old post distribution formula and the constants used in that formula.

The fact that principals were not capacitated on the workings and application of the formula means that they do not have the knowledge base to verify the PPN of their schools when it is declared. Those with the knowledge, namely, the high ranking department officials and union officials who determine policy with regard to educator post provisioning are denying principals access to important information which could lead to their empowerment on educator post provisioning issues. In 2003, at the level of the national ELRC, educator unions pointed out that the formula used to calculate the PPN of a school is quite technical and not user friendly. The department in its response agreed that it was very technical owing to the variety of factors that had to be taken into account in determining a school's staff establishment. They subsequently indicated that they were in the process of developing user manuals to assist principals in using a computer programme to calculate the PPN (ELRC 2003:4). These user manuals are, however, yet to reach schools.

#### **5.4.5 RANKING OF FACTORS IN THE PPM**

The emerging trends and patterns from the data on the ranking of the factors in the PPM is presented under the categories; maximum ideal class size of specific subjects, promotion of particular subjects/learning areas, learners with special educational needs and language of learning and teaching.

## **MAXIMUM IDEAL CLASS SIZE OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS**

*Finding: The maximum ideal class size of specific subjects was considered the most important factor by principals and had an overall mean ranking of one. Further, principals from schools in the advantaged cohort ranked this factor higher on average than principals from schools in the disadvantaged cohort.*

Certain subjects require smaller classes than others for reasons such as safety, access to equipment and for more intensive guidance. Consequently, principals considered the class sizes of specific subjects a very important factor in determining the post provisioning needs of schools. The fact that the schools in the advantaged cohort generally offer a wide range of curriculum offerings such as metalwork, woodwork, art, dance, speech and drama and music which demand smaller class sizes compared to schools in the disadvantaged cohort which generally offer the ‘straight six curriculum’<sup>8</sup>, could account for the higher mean ranking ascribed to this factor by advantaged schools.

Notwithstanding the importance of this factor, principals indicated that in terms of timetabling it was not possible to give effect to policy provisions on class sizes. It is only when a policy evolves towards practical application, do distortions to its successful execution become apparent (Mahomed 2001:105). In practice, to reduce the class size in one subject means that the balance of the learners from that particular class has to be carried by another educator. This has the resultant effect of increasing the overall period load of the school which in turn creates the demand for additional personnel which the PPM does not provide. Consequently, schools which cannot afford the appointment of SGB paid educators, do not offer specialist subjects but rather opt for offering the ‘straight six’ curriculum. Thus, this factor favours the schools in the advantaged cohort because they have the financial resources to employ SGB paid educators which enables them to offer subjects that demand small class sizes.

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<sup>8</sup> The ‘straight six’ curriculum refers to a curriculum package comprising two languages and four stipulated subjects. There is no choice offered to the learner.

## **PROMOTION OF PARTICULAR SUBJECTS/LEARNING AREAS**

*Finding: The need to promote particular subjects/learning areas at schools was given an overall mean ranking of three. Further, the principals from the disadvantaged school cohort ranked this factor significantly higher than the principals from the advantaged cohort.*

The disadvantaged schools generally offer a restricted curriculum *viz.* a ‘straight six’ curriculum. Even critical subjects such as mathematics and science may not be offered (Madisha 2001:13). Further, they do not have the material resources nor the physical infrastructure (see section B, questions 5 and 6, pages 139 and 141) to offer certain subjects/learning areas. This could, therefore, account for the higher on average ranking of this factor by disadvantaged schools compared to advantaged schools which offer a wide range of curriculum offerings owing to the superior material and physical resources they possess, the quantity and quality of their human resources and the might of their financial resources.

Although policy on educator post provisioning makes provision for the Head of Education in a province to promote particular subjects at schools in line with its curriculum transformation agenda, in KZN there has been no strategic plan put in place to effect curriculum transformation despite the strong demand for curriculum redress at schools.

Curriculum transformation has been handled in a rather haphazard fashion in the province. From 2000 to 2002 the number of curriculum transformation posts created by the MEC was extremely limited. Mdlalose (2003:35) notes that the allocation of these posts was not properly controlled, indicating that a markedly new approach should be taken if the need for curriculum transformation in the province is to be addressed.

With the introduction of the revised PPM in 2003, the creation of curriculum redress posts by the department of education has not improved. Notwithstanding the revised model’s leanings towards the promotion of particular subjects/learning areas at schools, the department of education has failed to use this component of the model to effect

curriculum redress, all because of its preoccupation with financial stringency. Consequently, the inequities of the past in terms of access to the curriculum continue to be perpetuated. Whilst the *Constitution* of the country guarantees learners equal access to schools, the curriculum choices available to learners remain unequal.

### **LEARNERS WITH SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS**

*Finding: The factor learners with special educational needs at schools was given an overall mean ranking of four.*

As part of the state's cost-cutting initiatives, only schools designated LSEN qualify for this factor to be taken into account in determining the post provisioning needs of schools. Therefore, it is not surprising that principals from ordinary public secondary schools ranked this factor lower down the order. This, however, is cause for serious concern in the light of *Education White Paper 6 of 2001* and the emphasis being placed by the department of education on inclusive education.

*Education White Paper 6 of 2001* emphasizes the need to minimize barriers to learning and maximize participation at ordinary public schools. From a critical theory perspective, the integration of learners with barriers to learning into mainstream education is seen by Gibson (1986:144) as a positive emancipatory development. Currently, many of the ordinary public schools admit learners with mild to moderate disabilities. Statistics extracted from the EMIS database indicate that in 2003 there were 2 972 learners with special education needs in ordinary public schools (EMIS 2004b). Given the fact that these learners need additional pedagogical support, the PPN of an ordinary public school should take this into account. By not including this factor in determining the post provisioning needs of ordinary public schools, SGBs may covertly refuse admission to learners with special education needs.

Bartlett and Le Grande (Whitty, Power & Halpin 1998:117), suggest that schools may engage in what is called 'cream skimming' as part of its efficiency drive which involves favouring the admission of those learners who will bring the greatest return for the least investment. This in turn could lead to discrimination in the admission policy of ordinary

public schools against more expensive users of the school system such as learners with special educational needs. Consequently, Bartlett and Le Grande advocate that sufficient incentives need to be provided to schools to admit learners who are more expensive users of the school system such as the allocation of an extra educator or two.

### **LANGUAGE OF LEARNING AND TEACHING (LOLT)**

*Finding: The factor 'having more than one LOLT' was considered the least important factor.*

The fact that the overall mean ranking of this factor was 5 (least important factor), and the means for schools in the advantaged and disadvantaged cohort do not differ significantly, is indicative of the fact that insufficient incentives are being provided to schools to offer more than one LOLT. The additional weighted learners granted to schools offering more than one LOLT is relatively small and is not attractive enough to schools as an incentive to offer more than one LOLT. The capital outlay in terms of learning resources and the administrative inconvenience in terms of timetabling far outweigh the incentive of, at most, gaining an additional educator. In reality the gaining of the additional educator may in practice not be an incentive at all because by offering more than one LOLT the number of split and combination classes created in terms of timetabling may increase and this may create the need for additional educators which the PPM does not provide for. Schools, therefore, are forced into offering a single LOLT because of the state's policy on educator provisioning. This clearly runs counter to the state's policy that learners have the right to access education in the language medium of their choice at schools.

For critical theorists, language is one of the most important factors influencing the degree to which learners are able to access the school curriculum (Jansens 1995:134). The fact that schools do not use IsiZulu or SeSotho as the LOLT means that learners who are IsiZulu or SeSotho speakers do not experience the curriculum in the same way as learners whose mother tongue is similar to the LOLT of the school. Further, language is more than communication; it is about the values, traditions and culture of particular groups (Jansens 1995:134). The fact that schools, more often than not, adopt only one LOLT

which invariably turns out to be English (see below), results in schools elevating the values, traditions and culture associated with English whilst subordinating the values, traditions and culture of other language groups.

*Finding: The PPM should take into account learners at schools who are second language speakers of English.*

Whilst the PPM makes provision for dual and multi-medium schools it makes no provision for learners who are second language speakers. Given the fact that the vast majority of schools do not offer instruction in more than one of the official languages, a World Bank study has noted that many African countries generally adopt the language of the former colonial government as the LOLT in the formal education system (The World Bank 1988:43). This has been the case in South Africa. Notwithstanding the country's progressive language in education policy of additive multilingualism, the majority of schools in the province of KZN have adopted English as the LOLT owing to parental demands for instruction to be in English as they recognize the gateway status of English (APEK 2004c:3). English, to the vast majority of learners in KZN is, however, regarded as a second language and becomes a serious barrier to learning for these learners. Peliwe Lolwana, the chief executive of *Umalusi*<sup>9</sup> attributes the poor performance of learners in the matric examinations to learner's low proficiency in English. Lolwana makes the point that some learners, especially those in remote rural areas are functionally illiterate in English. She adds that proficiency in English is a greater challenge to our schools than mathematics and science (Joubert 2004:1-2). Further, Jansens (1995:134) incisively points out that most black learners tend to experience the curriculum differently from most white learners even when they attend the same school because classes conducted in English would favour white learners whose first language may be English compared to black learners for whom English may be a second or third language.

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<sup>9</sup> Umalusi is the name given to the former South African Certification Council (SAFCERT).

#### **5.4.6 THE PPN AND THE CURRICULUM NEEDS OF LEARNERS**

*Finding: The PPN does not address the curriculum needs of learners at schools.*

The provision of educator posts to schools must be seen within the context of the NPM reforms taking place in the public sector in general and in the education sector in particular. In order to make the education sector more efficient, the core theme of the NPM agenda is that of 'getting more for less' (Ferlie, Pettigrew, Ashburner & Fitzgerald 1996:11) or as Hood (1991:5) puts it, 'parsimony in resource use'. In terms of educator provisioning this has translated into the progressive trimming (downsizing) of the number of permanent educator posts created by the MEC for distribution to schools in the province. This has had the resultant effect of reducing the number of state funded posts at schools. Consequently, the majority of the principals indicated that the PPN does not cater for the curriculum needs of their learners. Pollit (1990:139) therefore, incisively points out that often drives for 'efficiency' and 'value for money' translate into input pruning (downsizing of the number of educators) rather than output improvement.

From a critical theory perspective, the type of instrumental rationality with the main focus on *efficiency* rather than *purpose* (to what end) has a negative impact on poorer schools. When schools are faced with the situation where the number of state paid educators cannot cover the curriculum offered by the school, SMTs and SGBs are left with two possible alternatives. The first is for SGBs to appoint SGB paid educators who are remunerated from school funds raised largely through school fees. This option is a costly one and not all schools have the financial resources to pay for governing body appointees. The second alternative is to streamline the curriculum and simultaneously compress class units. Many of the disadvantaged institutions which cannot afford alternative one, are forced into alternative two. The resultant effect of this alternative is large class sizes for the learners at disadvantaged schools and the streamlining of the curriculum which results in the narrowing of the career opportunities of these learners due to the restricted curriculum that they offer. Even within their streamlined curriculum their PPN often results in non-specialist educators teaching a crucial subject like mathematics.

Further, it is important to note that the PPM is severely constrained by the human resources that are available in the province. Whilst in theory it allocates a block of educator posts to a school, in practical terms it cannot guarantee the allocation of specialist educators. Specialist educators are fast becoming a rare commodity and consequently, schools which offer diverse curricula are finding it increasingly difficult to secure the services of specialist educators. This has prompted the national minister of education, Naledi Pandor (APEK 2004b:1) to declare as a crisis the need for educators in several critical areas such as mathematics, science and the technical and creative disciplines.

#### **5.4.7 TIMING OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PPN**

*Finding: The timing of the announcement of the PPN does not lead to effective school organisation.*

The timing of the announcement of the PPN is not in keeping with statutory requirements. In terms of policy pronouncements, schools are supposed to receive their PPN in the month of September of the year preceding implementation. This, however, historically has not been the case (see table 5.50, below).

Table 5.50: Annual release dates of the PPN

YEAR	PPN RELEASE DATE
1999	30 March 1999
2000	02 August 2000
2001	10 August 2001
2002	11 June 2002
2003	22 November 2002
2004	24 November 2003 (Provisional) 11 March 2004 (Final)

Source: KZN DEC (1999b, 2001b, 2002c, 2002e, 2003a, 2004c)

Schools are often handed their PPNs towards the end of the year preceding implementation or whilst the academic year is in progress. These inopportune release

times often leads to the breakdown in the organizational culture of schools especially when the movement of staff takes place whilst the academic year is in progress.

If principals as managers of their institutions are to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of their schools as organisations as a whole, the timeous release of the PPN is an imperative in order to facilitate strategic planning. The late release of the PPN does not allow for proper human resource planning and allocative efficiency<sup>10</sup>. Consequently, it may not be possible to deploy educators optimally in a particular school year. This may in turn contribute to productive inefficiency<sup>11</sup> at schools.

#### **5.4.8 FILLING OF EDUCATOR POSTS**

The emerging trends and patterns from the data on the filling of educator posts are presented under the categories; substitute educators and vacant substantive posts.

#### **SUBSTITUTE EDUCATORS**

*Finding: Substitute educators are not appointed timeously by the department.*

The delay in the filling of substitute educator posts by the department is largely due to two factors. Firstly, the demand for substitute educator posts at schools far exceeds the number of substitute educator posts in terms of the budget. Pardesi (2004:2) makes the point that there is insufficient allocation for substitute educators in relation to the number of educators on leave. From 2002-2004, KZN only budgeted for 320 substitute educator posts per annum. At the level of the provincial ELRC, the educator unions have consistently pointed out that this figure was unrealistic and national policy would dictate that approximately 3 000 substitute educator posts be budget for (KZN ELRC 2003a:4). However, given the strong emphasis in the province on tighter control over civil service spending and the desire to reduce public expenditure and to make what expenditure remains go as far as possible, the province cannot afford the dictates of national policy, although the MEC, Ina Cronje agrees that a large number of substitutes are required as a

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<sup>10</sup> Allocative efficiency refers to the allocation of resources to their best and highest uses.

<sup>11</sup> Productive inefficiency occurs when more inputs (labour, material resources, energy) are used than necessary.

result of illness and absenteeism of educators related to the HIV/AIDS pandemic (APEK 2004a:1). The MEC has intimated that for the 2006 school year she plans to increase the number of substitute educators in the system by some 1 167 educators (The Mercury 2005b:9). Whilst this may translate to a dramatic increase in the number of substitute educators, this number pales into insignificance when compared to an HIV/AIDS infection rate of 19% among educators in KZN (The Mercury 2005a:3).

Secondly, if a school does qualify for a state paid substitute, the procedure to be followed in the filling of the post is a highly bureaucratic one. It is often a time consuming process and results in delays in the filling of the post because the department does not have a pool of substitute educators which affected schools can draw from. Consequently, schools have to advertise the post, shortlist candidates, interview candidates and make recommendations to the department for the appointment of the preferred candidate.

From an NPM perspective, if power has been devolved to the level of the school, why should schools have to follow this highly bureaucratic time-consuming process. SGBs should be granted the power to appoint a substitute educator and the department could retrospectively approve the appointment. This will ensure that a learner's constitutional right to an uninterrupted education is not compromised.

*Finding: The qualification period imposed by the department for the appointment of state paid substitute educators often disadvantages poorer schools in that they may have to resort to educationally unsound measures and leave classes unattended.*

As part of the public service's cost cutting exercise, the imposition of the '30 day policy' for the qualification of a state paid substitute educator runs counter to the MEC's pronouncement that no class should be without an educator. Schools which do not have funds to make short-term SGB appointments to cover for educators who absent themselves for less than a thirty day period, which is largely the schools in the disadvantaged cohort, are caught in a fix. They are forced into situations where sound educational principles and values are compromised. They simply leave classes

unattended or they have to resort to what Murphy (1996:24) calls volunteerism<sup>12</sup> where parents have to take care of classes. Critical theorists view this as exploitation of parents as a replacement for waged substitute educators. Such practices run counter to the *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 108 of 1996* which guarantees learners an uninterrupted access to education. Thus, the thirty day policy for the qualification of a state paid substitute educator does not serve the interests of the disadvantaged schools who have to resort to educationally unsound practices and violate constitutional provisions.

### **VACANT SUBSTANTIVE POSTS**

*Finding: Vacant substantive posts are not filled timeously by the department.*

The filling of vacant posts by the department is often characterized by lengthy delays in the advertising and filling of posts in a permanent capacity. These delays in the filling of posts in a permanent capacity results in large numbers of temporary educators in the system who are employed on a contract basis. Pardesi (2004:2) asserts that this practice coincides with global trends in the public sector to casualise labour. This is in keeping with the NPM philosophy of downsizing the number of educators employed permanently and increasing the number of temporary educators in the system which is a less costly option. Whilst this practice may serve the interests of the state, it in no way furthers the interests of schools because temporary educators are employed on a three month contract basis and the uncertainty of having their contracts renewed impacts on the quality of service they render at school.

*Finding: The filling of vacant substantive posts by way of CTTs<sup>13</sup> often results in sound educational principles being compromised.*

When posts are filled by the department through CTTs not much thought and effort goes into the matching of the requirements for a post to the personnel that are available. It seems as though that the department's main priority in the filling of posts through CTTs

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<sup>12</sup> Volunteerism is where individuals are recruited to work for government institutions without remuneration and is viewed as a move towards privatization.

<sup>13</sup> Compulsory Temporary Transfer (CTT) refers to the movement by the education department of an educator who is surplus at one school to another school where there is a vacancy as a result of the declared PPN for that particular year,

is that of meeting its operational requirements rather than meeting the human resource needs of schools. This mismatch between the requirements of the vacant post and the qualifications of the transferred incumbent has a negative impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of the school as an institution. This compromising of the qualitative inputs in the teaching and learning situation is, therefore, bound to impact on learner outcomes and achievement.

#### **5.4.9 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PPN**

The emerging trends and patterns from the data on the implementation of the PPN is presented under the categories; directives on implementation, documents on implementation, capacitating staff on the process of implementation and support for the implementation process.

#### **DIRECTIVES ON IMPLEMENTATION**

*Finding: There is a lack of clear directives from the department of education as to how the PPN is to be implemented at school level.*

The dissemination of clear directives from those in authority is a core ingredient for success in policy implementation. The department of education has, however, failed in this regard. There has been constant reversal of policy decisions, tardiness on the part of the department to stick to its management plan on implementation and gross incapacity on the part of officials in giving firm directives to principals on implementation. This, consequently, has impacted negatively on the smooth running of schools. In the absence of clear directives from the department on PPN implementation, a level of uncertainty prevails amongst principals with regard to their staffing establishments. This in turn has impacted on a principal's 'freedom to manage' his institution.

#### **DOCUMENTS ON IMPLEMENTATION**

*Finding: Documents on PPN implementation are often unclear and lends themselves to multiple interpretations.*

It is important to note that just as policies are not made in a vacuum, so to they are not implemented in a vacuum. Implementers and recipients will always put their own

interpretations and meanings to intended policies. Bowe, Ball and Gold (1996:286) make the point that in the arena of practice, policy is simply not received and implemented rather it is subject to interpretation and then recreated. Given the ambiguity prevalent in the procedure manual on implementation, the department of education is in fact encouraging alternate interpretation. Incoherence or vagueness can perplex implementers and provide openings for those policy recipients bent on obstruction (Hill 1984:131). Consequently, at the level of the school, the different interpretations of the documents on implementation of the PPN become a matter of struggle. Different interpretations are contested as they relate to the interests of individuals or groups.

### **CAPACITATING STAFF ON THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION**

*Finding: A substantial number of principals are unclear of their role in the process of PPN implementation and are therefore not fulfilling their roles as dictated by policy.*

The procedure manual on PPN implementation explicitly states that it is the task of the principal as the implementer of policy at school level, to point out to educators as the policy recipients, the objectives and the processes involved in the implementation of the PPN. Given the fact that the PPN may necessitate changes in the staff establishment, communicating the objectives and processes involved in implementing the PPN is vitally important. Tylczak (1991:26) makes the point that in managing change, it is incumbent on the manager to be open and continuously tell people what has happened, what is happening and what is going to happen. He adds that managers should at all times give employees all available information. However, it is abundantly clear that many principals are not informing staff members of the objectives and the processes of PPN implementation.

### **SUPPORT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS**

*Finding: Members of staff do not support the process of implementation and only participate in the process when the declared PPN is above that of the current staff establishment and consequently there are vacancies to be declared.*

Policy on educator provisioning is in fact an unpopular policy among educators because educators view this policy as having undesirable consequences for them. For those

directly affected by the downsizing (by being identified surplus or additional to a schools needs) it means a period of uncertainty – the possibility of being transferred from one school to another. For those indirectly affected by the downsizing (the educators that fall within the PPN) it means increased workloads without additional compensation. With such policy consequences there is bound to be resistance from educators. Therefore, the majority do not support this policy. However, when there are vacancies to be declared educators view the policy pay-offs to be to their benefit because it will lead to a decrease in their workloads. Consequently, they support the policy and participate in the process.

*Finding: At schools where the members of staff are highly unionized, site stewards are not co-operative in the implementation process and oppose the process.*

Key to the implementation of NPM reforms is that of rejecting union demands because public sector unions in promoting the interests of its members often campaign for better conditions of service for their members which invariably translate to increased public sector budgets. Unions at the level of the ELRC often seek to increase the number of educator posts in the province. This has often brought the state officials and unions in conflict with each other and has often resulted in countrywide protest action by unions when the number of educator posts created in the province threatens the job security of its members. Given that the implementation of the PPN may result in the downsizing of the number of educator posts at school sites and, consequently, may mean an intensification of the workloads for those educators who fall within the PPN, site stewards side with their rank and file membership and do not participate in the process of PPN implementation and may in some instances overtly resist policy implementation. Notwithstanding the lack of support for the implementation process, principals are expected to implement the PPN sometimes in a climate where there is conflict, resistance and opposition to its implementation.

*Finding: SEMs do not provide adequate support to principals in the implementation process.*

The SEMs are considered an important link in the implementation chain. In terms of implementation of the PPN, the SEMs as ward managers are supposed to monitor the

process of PPN implementation by principals in their wards and provide support to principals when they are faced with unanticipated problems and resistance from educators and site stewards when implementing the PPN. However, this is not the case. The SEMs are providing very little support to principals when it comes to PPN implementation.

#### **5.4.10 MULTI-TERM PPN**

*Finding: Principals support the introduction of a multi-term PPN agreement.*

The budgetary reform process adopted by the state, namely, the MTEF lends itself to the introduction of a multi-term PPN agreement. Since expenditure in the province in general and in education in particular is known for the forthcoming three years, engaging in a three year PPN agreement makes sound planning sense. The president of APEK, Brian Manuel (2004c:3) concurs with principals that a three year PPN agreement would increase stability in schools. He advances that if the formula is constant for a three year period it would then free finances for other resources. Moreover, it would remove the negativity, hype and time-consuming debates and negotiations associated with the year-on-year PPN.

From a managerialist perspective, knowing that your staff establishment is going to be more or less fixed for a three year period enhances strategic planning initiatives. In self-managing schools there is a flat management structure where the majority of educators are assigned some management responsibilities and knowing that that these educators will be part of the staff establishment for the period of the multi-term agreement, makes it possible for principals to assign management responsibilities in terms of school development planning initiatives which may run over a two to three year period. Further, it will grant principals the latitude to use their human resources in innovative ways so as to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of the school as an organisation.

## **5.5 EMERGING TRENDS AND PATTERNS FROM THE DOCUMENT STUDY**

The emerging trends and patterns from the data on the document study which was integrated into the literature study are presented.

### **5.5.1 DECENTRALISATION IN EDUCATOR PROVISIONING**

*Finding: The responsibility for the provisioning of educator posts has been devolved to the provinces.*

In terms of legislation, namely, the *Employment of Educators Act, 76 of 1998*, the responsibility for the creation and distribution of educator posts which was originally the function of the DNE was passed on to the provinces. This passing on of the administrative functions with regard to educator post provisioning to the provinces was intended as a move to make the education sector more efficient. This trend is in keeping with NPM reforms where there is a tendency to shift administrative functions to lower levels or sub-national units. Whilst provinces may have some autonomy in terms of the creation of posts, the DNE plays a monitoring role through the PPM by making it compulsory for all provinces to use the model in the distribution of educator posts.

### **5.5.2 TRIMMING OF EDUCATION BUDGETS**

*Finding: There has been a consistent decline in education expenditure in the provinces. The average expenditure for the country as a whole shows a similar trend.*

The decline in both the provincial as well as the national average expenditure on education must be seen in the light of the states neoliberal, macroeconomic framework called GEAR. Based on assumptions that the public sector was ‘wasteful’ and excessive, and state expenditure was an impediment to economic growth because it tended to ‘crowd out’ private investment (Terreblanche 2002:116), the state has chosen to cut public sector budgets.

### **5.5.3 DOWNSIZING OF EDUCATOR POSTS**

*Finding: There has been a progressive downsizing in the number of state-paid permanent educator posts and a corresponding increase in the number of state-paid temporary educator posts.*

The trimming of the education budget together with MTEF policy priorities to increase non-personnel expenditure has meant that the provincial budget on personnel expenditure has had to be cut progressively over the years. This has translated into an NPM trend of downsizing the number of permanently employed educators in order to keep within the budget for personnel expenditure. The table below reflects the progressive decline in the number of educators employed permanently in the public school sector in KZN.

Table 5.51: State paid educators employed in public schools in KZN

YEAR	2001	2002	2003	2004
State-Paid Permanent Posts	73 360	65 640	67 614	65 518
State-Paid Temporary Posts	n/a	3 816	5 908	8 904

Source: EMIS KZN (2004b), SADTU KZN (2004f)

Congruent to the downsizing of the number of permanently appointed educators in the system is the trend of increasing the number of temporary educators in the system. This casualisation of labour, in keeping with the neoliberal NPM reforms is seen as a cost saving measure by the department.

#### 5.5.4 PRIVATELY PAID EDUCATORS

*Finding: The number of privately paid educators at public schools is on the increase.*

In keeping with neoliberal trends of cost recovery (through the levying of school fees) and NPM reforms in school governance, SGBs have been thrust into the role of employers in order to augment the states resourcing of schools. This has consequently, translated into creating a situation where SGBs have become the employers of privately paid educators. The table below indicates that this sector of privately paid teachers is on the increase in the public schooling sector.

Table 5.52: State and SGB paid educators employed in public schools in KZN

YEAR	1998	2000	2002	2004
State-Paid Posts	76 193 (98%)	70 578 (94%)	69 456 (94%)	74 422 (93%)
SGB Paid Posts	1 639 (2%)	4 768 (6%)	4 312 (6%)	5 498 (7%)

Source: EMIS KZN (2004b), SADTU KZN (2004f)

## **5.6 SUMMARY**

In this chapter the data obtained from the questionnaires was presented. This was then followed by the presentation of the data obtained from the interviews with principals and union officials. The emerging trends and patterns from the data and the document study were executed using the theoretical and conceptual frameworks, namely, policy analysis, critical theory, neoliberalism, NPM and RAMs.

In the next chapter the main conclusions of this study are presented and certain pertinent recommendations are made.

## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **6.1 INTRODUCTION**

In this chapter the main conclusions and recommendations are presented. After careful consideration of the literature study and the data that emerged from the questionnaires, the semi-structured interviews and unstructured interviews certain clear conclusions emerge about educator post provisioning in the public school sector in terms of the critical questions generated in chapter one. On the basis of the findings and conclusions of this study, pertinent recommendations are made.

#### **6.2 CONCLUSIONS**

In South Africa, the change in political power in 1994 was seen as the panacea by the majority of its citizens to the rampant inequity that prevailed in the country. There was widespread optimism that the new democratic government would transform all components of society including the education system. In the education arena, there was growing confidence that a fair and just education system, underpinned by the values of equity and redress, would be the order of the day. However, over the past decade hard lessons were learned that changes in government do not necessarily mean radical changes in the provision of public goods and services such as education.

All governments hold certain beliefs and espouse particular values as to the fundamental principles on which the social, political and economic order of society is based. With regard to this study, it has become abundantly clear that ideology has played a significant role in shaping policy discourses on the thorny question of educator distribution in the country in general and in KZN province in particular. Neoliberalism as state ideology, as expressed through the macroeconomic GEAR framework, has informed and underpinned policy on educator provisioning. One of GEAR's many neoliberal pronouncements of trimming government consumption expenditure has meant a progressive decline, in real terms, of state allocations to education. Owing to provincial education budgets becoming

smaller, the amount available to be disbursed in terms of personnel costs has consequently declined. This in turn has had a ‘domino effect’ in terms of what the provinces could afford in terms of educator personnel. In KZN this has translated into the number of permanently employed state paid educators progressively declining over the years.

In keeping with the neoliberal dogma of displacing costs from the state to private individuals and the advocacy of cost recovery, public schools are levying school fees in order to supplement the baseline resourcing of the state. In terms of educator provisioning, schools that service wealthier communities charge higher school fees and, consequently, have the financial resources to hire a larger numbers of SGB paid educators. Trends in educator employment show that the proportion of privately paid educators in the education system is increasing whilst the proportion of state paid educators is decreasing.

The changes educator provisioning has undergone over the years is consistent with the neoliberal ‘managerialist’ trends termed NPM which is responsible for public sector reform in the UK, Netherlands, Australia and New Zealand. Informed by the doctrines of NPM, the responsibility for educator provisioning has moved from central control (i.e. the DNE) to the provinces. In keeping with the NPM agenda, this decentralization in educator provisioning has translated into giving the respective provinces greater powers in determining their educator pools. However, in the determination of the educator pool the principal driving factor is fiscal austerity. The central government, through the DNE, merely plays the role of facilitator rather than a controller and employer. As a facilitator, the DNE oversees the process of educator distribution through the introduction of a RAM known as the PPM. All provinces in terms of legislation have to use the PPM to distribute educator posts in order to bring about a transparent, fair and rational basis to the allocation of state paid educators to public schools.

From a social justice perspective, policy on educator provisioning raises some serious questions. With regard to equity in educator distribution, the PPM does not ensure

distributional equity with regard to qualitative factors such as teacher qualifications. Given the historical qualitative maldistribution of educators in terms of qualifications with schools in the poorer deciles (disadvantaged schools) having less highly qualified educators, whilst schools in the upper deciles (advantaged schools) having educators who are highly qualified, the output which educators as a resource is able to contribute may result in unequal outputs between advantaged and disadvantage schools.

The linking of curriculum offerings to the number of educator posts serves the interests of schools in the advantaged cohort. They have the resources to broaden their curriculum choices and hence, will qualify for more educators in terms of the PPM. This clearly works to the detriment of schools in the disadvantaged cohort because of their limited curriculum offerings and consequently, a smaller educator entitlement in terms of the PPM.

Policy has also contributed to a numerical maldistribution in educators. The state's preoccupation with economic efficiency has resulted in exacerbating inequity in educator distribution. The employment of SGB paid educators favours the advantaged schools. Given their financial resources (through school fees), they are able to employ a substantial number of privately paid educators which results in schools in the advantaged cohort having far lower learner-educator ratios than schools in the disadvantaged cohort, who simply cannot afford hiring SGB paid educators. Whilst this trend may serve the interests of the neoliberals in government, the impact it has on the delivery of quality education is bound to widen the gap in output between advantaged and disadvantaged schools.

Attempts at redress by the state with regard to educator provisioning is, in fact, farcical. The additional educator/s gained often does not benefit the learners because most schools that qualify for the redress posts do not have the physical infrastructure in terms of classrooms to accommodate the additional educators. Consequently, class sizes remain high. Further, the criteria used to distribute redress posts have not taken into account changes in learner demography. Schools no longer admit learners from the immediate

feeder areas. With admissions policies being more relaxed, schools in the advantaged cohort are increasingly admitting learners from disadvantaged communities. However, these learners receive no benefit with regard to redress because of the criteria used in allocating redress posts.

The use of the PPM as a resource allocation tool is met with much negativity from principals. The fact that they had no hand in the design of the model; calls into question who's views were validated in the design of the PPM. Given the fact that the PPM has resulted in a radical redistribution in human resources, consultation of all stakeholders with regard to factors that should be considered in determining a school's PPN, should have been an imperative. In noting that perfection in any resource distribution model is highly unlikely, regular reviewing is important. The factors currently used in determining the PPN do not lead to the promotion of curriculum diversity as well as curriculum redress at disadvantaged schools. Consequently, there is the belief that the PPM is biased towards schools in the advantaged cohort. Principals believed that the PPM does not promote the introduction of more than one LOLT because the additional educator/s gained, if the school offers more than one LOLT, is insufficient to cater for the needs of learners. The PPM also discriminates against mainstream schools by not taking into account the learners admitted who have special educational needs. Given moves in South African education towards inclusivity, this is indeed a retrogressive step. With a view to improving the model, so that the model remains relevant to the needs of the schools, there are calls for the model to take into account the qualitative maldistribution that exists with regard to educator qualifications. In addition, there are also calls for the learner poverty index to be used as a basis for distributing redress posts. A strong case was also made out for language as a barrier to learning to be factored into the model.

There has also been a lack of use of capacity tools in order to ensure that principals are *au fait* with policy on educator provisioning. Principals were not capacitated on the workings of the post provisioning formula and even important statistics that were factored into the model were not made transparent to principals. The secrecy surrounding the entire process of educator provisioning has contributed to principals viewing the

entire process with suspicion and believing that department officials were manipulating the entire process.

The downsizing of educator posts at schools has resulted in principals experiencing grave difficulty in satisfying the curriculum needs of learners. Whilst the downsizing of educator posts contributes to economic efficiency and thereby serving the interests of the state, it in no way benefits the learners. The wealthier schools may get away by hiring SGB paid educators to satisfy the curriculum needs of its learners but schools serving poorer communities are caught in a fix. They cannot afford SGB paid educators and therefore, resort to streamlining their curriculum.

From an organizational point of view, the timeous release of the PPN is important for human resource planning. However, PPNs are communicated to schools very late in the year preceding implementation or in the year of implementation. This late release of the PPNs has contributed to a breakdown in the organizational culture of many schools. Further, the year on year PPN has contributed to staff instability at their schools and hampers planning.

Policy on the filling of educator posts has contributed to sound education principles being compromised because of drives for economic efficiency. The cost saving measure of appointing state paid substitute educators only when an educator is going to be away for thirty consecutive schooldays works against disadvantaged schools. They cannot afford SGB paid substitute educators and often have to resort to leaving classes unattended or use parents to 'baby sit' the classes. Further, the number of substitute educators budgeted for by the department is totally inadequate to meet the demand for substitute educators. The delays in the filling of educator posts on a permanent basis have resulted in large numbers of temporary educators in the system. Whilst this is a cost saving measure from the department's perspective it does not serve the interests of the schools. Having temporary educators, employed on a term by term contract basis adds to staffing instability at schools.

The implementation of policy on educator provisioning at school sites is fraught with problems. This is largely as the result of policy formulation being separated from policy implementation. At the formulation stage very little attention was paid to implementation issues. Implementation was left to the provinces. In KZN very little attention has been paid to implementation issues. Principals as implementers of the PPN at school sites were not consulted on implementation issues. Consequently, department officials are unaware of implementation problems at the school sites. Moreover, directives on implementation are vague and documents on implementation are ambiguous. Staff members are generally hostile to implementation especially when posts are to be downsized. Site stewards also tend not to support the process of implementation. Even the SEM's who are supposed to be the custodians of department policy cannot support principals in the implementation process because many do not understand the process themselves and lack knowledge on workable solutions.

### **6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS**

The following recommendations have implications for:

- The Department of National Education
- The Provincial Education Departments
- SGBs
- Unions
- Departmental Officials
- The ELRC and its provincial chambers

#### **RECOMMENDATION ONE**

Given the neoliberal reforms in educator provisioning, mechanisms need to be put in place to protect the learners of disadvantaged communities from policies that may exacerbate inequity. The fact that the advantaged schools levy higher school fees, employ a large number of SGB paid educators and offer a wide range of curriculum choices to its learners, the quality of education offered by these schools tends to be of a higher standard. Therefore, wealthier parents will be able to exercise choice and purchase education of a better quality for their children by sending them to schools in the

advantaged cohort. In contrast, poor parents who lack the financial resources to participate meaningfully in the 'education marketplace' are restricted for choice. Their children are, therefore, forced to attend schools in the disadvantaged cohort where school fees are low and who consequently have to rely solely on the baseline resourcing of the state. To protect the children of the poor from such inequity, the state needs to intervene in order to protect the interests of the poor for whom *de facto* choice is non-existent because they do not have money. The state, therefore, needs to provide a funding safety net for children from disadvantaged communities. A mechanism needs to be put in place where, based on a particular income threshold, the state funds learners whose family income is below the stipulated threshold. The parents of these learners by virtue of funding by the state (through bursaries or vouchers), will consequently be able to exercise choice as to the schools they want their children to attend.

#### **RECOMMENDATION TWO**

Though the PPM has been revised in 2002, it does not distribute educators equitably in terms of qualifications. In other words, it is a tool for the quantitative distribution of educators. Therefore, any human resource distribution to schools should be preceded by a full audit of the existing educator resource position of schools, more especially that of educator qualifications, so as not to exacerbate inequity. Where schools lack a reasonable number of qualified educators, sufficient incentives need to be provided by the state to attract educators with qualifications over and above the minimum REQV 13 qualification required by SACE to teach at South African public schools. When a school's declared PPN is above its staff establishment, state intervention in providing the incentive will assist SGBs in recruiting educators with adequate relevant qualifications to disadvantaged schools.

#### **RECOMMENDATION THREE**

In noting that the assumptions on which RAMS are based are not static and constant entities, the drivers (factors) of the PPM may, therefore, need to be reviewed in order to be relevant to changing needs of public schools. However, in reviewing the PPM, this must be a participative, all-inclusive and democratic process. Consultation with principals

should be a definite requirement because they are at the cutting edge of PPN implementation.

The following factors need to be reviewed:

- The criteria used in determining the qualification for poverty redress posts needs to take into account the changes in learner demography. Consequently, using the learner poverty index of a school rather than the equally weighted factors of the condition of the physical infrastructure of the school and location of the school will be a more relevant criterion. Further, if SGBs are aware that they will be compensated by way of being granted additional educator posts for admitting learners who hail from disadvantaged backgrounds; this may serve as an incentive to advantaged schools to admit more learners from disadvantaged backgrounds.
- The PPM also needs to be reviewed in the light of the number of learners at schools who are second language speakers of English. Given the fact that the PPM offers very little incentives to schools to offer more than one LOLT, this invariably results in schools adopting English as the LOLT. This, results in learners who are second language speakers being at a distinct disadvantage compared to learners whose home language is English. Consequently, this may lead to differences in the way the curriculum is experienced by first language speakers of English and second language speakers of English. The PPM, therefore, needs to compensate schools that have large numbers of learners who are second language speakers of English by granting these schools an additional educator or two to deal with this barrier to learning.
- The PPM needs to pay sufficient attention to curriculum redress at disadvantaged schools. The disadvantaged schools offer a restricted curriculum and from a social justice point of view, is source of inequity when compared to the schools in the advantaged cohort. Whilst the PPM is geared towards curriculum redress, the province has not made use of this facility in effecting redress. The provincial

education department in its MTEF planning needs to build curriculum redress into its list of priorities. The province's strategic plans should reflect this. Further, by ensuring redress and equity in curriculum offerings between advantaged and disadvantaged schools, this will ensure that schools will compete on an equal footing for educator posts owing to the fact that the number of educator posts granted to a particular school is partly linked to the curriculum offerings of the school.

- The mainstreaming of learners with special educational needs is truly an emancipatory move. However, in order to ensure that ordinary public schools are not discriminated against in terms of admitting learners with special educational needs, the PPM must take this factor into account.

#### **RECOMMENDATION FOUR**

For the allocation of redress posts to have any meaningful pedagogical impact on learners by way of creating smaller class sizes at disadvantaged schools, an audit must be done of the school's physical infrastructure capacity to create these smaller class sizes. If schools do not have the classrooms to accommodate the additional educators granted to them because of poverty redress, it is pointless granting these schools the additional posts. The allocation of poverty redress posts must, therefore, be done in tandem with classroom availability. If classrooms are not available, it is incumbent on the provincial education department, in terms of its capital costs planning, to build the additional classrooms.

#### **RECOMMENDATION FIVE**

Given the highly technical nature of the process involved in determining the PPN of schools, the DNE, the provincial education departments as well as educator unions should as a matter of priority engage in a massive campaign to capacitate principals on the application of the PPM and its related formula. It is abundantly clear that most principals are not aware of the processes and procedures involved in determining the PPN of a school. Workshops to capacitate principals on the PPN and related issues will ensure that a fair measure of transparency exists in the distribution of educator posts.

## **RECOMMENDATION SIX**

The annual PPN consultative process in the province has in the past been bathed in controversy. There is too much hype around the process. Criticisms have often been levelled at both the employer and employee parties with regard to bad faith negotiations. Given the fact that historically, agreement between both the employer and employee parties on the creation and distribution of educator posts in the province has often not occurred, this has consequently, resulted in the delay in the release of PPNs to schools, which in turn has impacted negatively on school organisation and administration. If the department is serious about organizational and allocative efficiency practices at schools, the timeous release of the PPNs is imperative. The consultative process needs to take place much earlier. Further, in the true spirit of transparency and inclusivity, the employee parties should be part of the budgetary process where real decisions are made as to what is affordable with regard to educator costs. By involving unions at the level where budgets are determined is actually negotiating in good faith and may result in the entire process of educator provisioning proceeding much more smoothly. The consultative process must be over by July and schools must be handed their PPNs by September for implementation in January the following year.

## **RECOMMENDATION SEVEN**

Linked to recommendation six, a much more progressive step would be for employee parties to enter into a multi-term PPN agreement with the provincial education department rather than the declaration of a year-on-year PPN. The MTEF is ideally suited to a multi-term agreement. Owing to the fact that expenditure in the province for the forthcoming three years is already known, engaging in a three year PPN agreement makes sound planning sense in that it will lead to staffing stability at schools and it could be used as a strategic planning tool in progressively lowering the overall learner-educator ratio in the province.

## **RECOMMENDATION EIGHT**

Whilst being a cost-saving measure to the department, the inadequate allocation for substitute educators together with policy stipulations that an educator needs to be away from school for thirty consecutive schooldays in order for the school to qualify for a state paid substitute educator, results in schools having to resort to educationally unsound practices. In order to ensure that service delivery at schools is not compromised when educators are away from school, the department needs to increase the pool of substitute educators in the province. This pool of educators needs to be distributed on a *pro rata* basis (based on learner enrolment) to the circuit offices throughout the province. The circuit offices need to compile a database of available substitute educators. If it is known that an educator is going to be away for any length of time, schools must be able to access a substitute educator from the circuit office with minimal loss of instruction time to the learner.

## **RECOMMENDATION NINE**

The policy where schools have to wait several months or sometimes in excess of a year to fill a vacant substantive post permanently, creates staffing instability at schools. Whilst having a large number of temporary educators in the system serves the department's interests in that it is a cost saving measure, it in no way benefits the schools. The schools as self-managing professional organizations should be granted the authority to fill a vacant substantive post when it arises. The SGBs should be allowed to advertise and fill the post without having to wait for the highly bureaucratic and time-consuming process followed by the department to fill the post. Once the SGBs have advertised, shortlisted and interviewed candidates for the post, the SGBs should be empowered to make the appointment on a probationary basis until the department retrospectively approves the appointment.

## **RECOMMENDATION TEN**

Success in policy implementation is partially dependent on strong leadership and the selection of an appropriate implementation strategy. Therefore, if the implementation of the PPN at schools is to meet with success, principals as implementers of policy must be

consulted on issues having a bearing on implementation. They will be able to inform policy with regard to possible obstacles to implementation which can then inform a suitable implementation strategy. Departmental officials need to provide strong leadership throughout the implementation process. The SEMs must intervene timeously and decisively in instances where principals are faced with obstacles in implementation.

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ANNEXURE B



PROVINCE OF KWAZULU-NATAL  
ISIFUNDAZWE SAKWAZULU-NATAL  
PROVINSIE KWAZULU-NATAL



DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE  
UMNYANGO WEMFUNDO NAMASIKO  
DEPARTEMENT VAN ONDERWYS EN KULTUUR

HEAD OFFICE		INHLOKO HHOVISI		HOOFKANTOOR	
ADDRESS: IKHELI: ADRES:	EX-DURBAN COLLEGE OF EDUCATION CNR. NICHOLSON ROAD AND QUEEN MARY AVENUE UMBILO	PRIVATE BAG: ISIKHWAMA SEPOSI: PRIVAATSAK:	X05 ROSSBURGH 4072	TELEPHONE: UCINGO: TELEFOON: FAX:	031 2744921  031 2744922
ENQUIRIES: IMIBUZO: NAVRAE:	P.T. ZUNGU	REFERENCE: INKOMBA: VERWYSING:	Permission: Research	DATE: USUKU: DATUM:	20 February 2004

TO: Inba Naicker  
7 Rameshvar Drive  
Harinagar Township  
QUEENSBURGH  
4039

RE: PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH

Please be informed that you have been granted permission to conduct research with the following terms and conditions:

- That as a researcher, you **must** present a copy of the written approval from the Department to the Head of the Institution concerned before any research may be undertaken at a departmental institution bearing in mind that the institution is **not obliged to participate** if the research is not a departmental project.
- Research should not be conducted during official contact time, as **education programmes should not be interrupted**, except in exceptional cases with special approval of the KZNDEC.
- The research is not to be conducted during the fourth school term, except in cases where the KZNDEC deem it necessary to undertake research at schools during that period.
- Should you wish to extend the period of research after approval has been granted, an application for extension must be directed to the Director: Research, Strategy Development and ECMIS.
- The research will be limited to the schools or institutions for which approval has been granted.
- A copy of the completed report, dissertation or thesis must be provided to the: RSDE Directorate
- Lastly, you must sign the attached declaration that, you are aware of the procedures and will abide by the same.

  
B.H. MTHABELA  
RESEARCH, STRATEGY, POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND ECMIS

ANNEXURE C

7 Rameshvar Drive  
Harinagar Township  
Queensburgh  
4093

03 April 2004

Dear Principal

I am conducting a research study on educator post provisioning in public schools. It would be appreciated if **you** could kindly complete the attached questionnaire as soon as possible and forward it in the self-addressed stamped envelope.

Kindly note that the necessary permission from the KwaZulu-Natal Department of Education and Culture has been obtained.

Please be assured that you will remain anonymous and responses will be treated with the strictest degree of confidentiality. It would therefore be appreciated if you could respond candidly to the questionnaire.

Your co-operation and assistance is highly appreciated.

Many thanks



**INBA NAICKER**  
(Researcher)

**Telephone:** (H) 031-4095707  
(W) 031-7110401  
(C) 0823775253

**e-Mail:** inbanaicker@telkomsa.net

Note:

- It would be appreciated if you could respond promptly – if possible within **seven days** of receipt of this questionnaire. This would greatly facilitate the data collection and analysis process.
- If for some reason you are not in a position to complete the questionnaire, kindly return it to the researcher.

## ANNEXURE D

### QUESTIONNAIRE

**TOPIC: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF POLICY ON EDUCATOR POST PROVISIONING IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN KWAZULU-NATAL**

Place a tick in the appropriate block

#### SECTION A : BIOGRAPHICAL AND GENERAL INFORMATION

1. What is your years of experience as a principal?

- |                   |                          |   |
|-------------------|--------------------------|---|
| 0 – 3 years       | <input type="checkbox"/> | 1 |
| 4 – 6 years       | <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 |
| 7 – 9 years       | <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 |
| 10 years and over | <input type="checkbox"/> | 4 |

2. How would you classify the geographic location of your school?

- |   |                          |   |
|---|--------------------------|---|
| Urban (0km - 20km from city centre)     | <input type="checkbox"/> | 1 |
| Suburban (21km – 50km from city centre) | <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 |
| Rural (51km + from city centre)         | <input type="checkbox"/> | 3 |

3. Does your school have a functional school governing body?

- |     |                          |   |
|-----|--------------------------|---|
| Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> | 1 |
| No  | <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 |

#### SECTION B: ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE SCHOOL

1. In terms of the Norms and Standards for School Funding (NSSF), how is your school classified ?

- |               |                          |   |
|---------------|--------------------------|---|
| Advantaged    | <input type="checkbox"/> | 1 |
| Disadvantaged | <input type="checkbox"/> | 2 |

2. What is the annual school fee payable per learner?

R1 – R200	<input type="text"/>	1
R201 – R500	<input type="text"/>	2
R501 – R1000	<input type="text"/>	3
R1001 – R3000	<input type="text"/>	4
R3001 – R5000	<input type="text"/>	5
Above R5000	<input type="text"/>	6

3. What percentage of parents of learners at your school actually pay fees?

90 – 100%	<input type="text"/>	1
70 – 89%	<input type="text"/>	2
50 – 69%	<input type="text"/>	3
40 – 49%	<input type="text"/>	4
Below 40%	<input type="text"/>	5

4. How would you classify the socio-economic status of the community from which the school draws the majority of its learners?

Advantaged	<input type="text"/>	1
Average	<input type="text"/>	2
Disadvantaged	<input type="text"/>	3
Combination of the above	<input type="text"/>	4

5. How would you classify the material resources available in the school?

1	2	3	4	5
More Than Adequate	Adequate	Mediocre	Not Very Adequate	Useless
<input type="text"/>				

6. How would you classify the general infrastructure (classrooms, laboratories etc.) of the school?

1	2	3	4	5
More Than Adequate	Adequate	Mediocre	Not Very Adequate	Useless
<input type="text"/>				

**SECTION C : THE POST PROVISIONING MODEL**

1. Were you consulted with regard to the design of the post provisioning model (PPM)?

Yes  1  
 No  2

2. If yes, by whom?

Department of Education  1  
 Union Official  2  
 SGB Organisation  3  
 Other  4

If other, specify \_\_\_\_\_.

3. Were you workshopped on the formula used to calculate the post provisioning norm (PPN) of a school?

Yes  1  
 No  2

4. If yes, by whom?

Department of Education  1  
 Union  2  
 Other  3

If other, specify \_\_\_\_\_.

5. Has your school qualified for the appointment of additional educators from the redress pool?

Yes  1  
 No  2

6. The following are some of the factors used in determining the post provisioning needs of schools. **Rank** them from **1 to 5**, with 1 being the most important factor. (Use a number once only)

	FACTOR	RANKING
1	Poverty grading of a school	
2	Need to promote particular subjects/learning areas	
3	Maximum ideal class size of specific subjects/learning areas	
4	Having more than one language medium of instruction	
5	Learners with special education needs (LSEN)	

7. To what extent, do you believe, the following criteria should be taken into account in determining the post provisioning norm of schools:

- 1- Strongly Agree
- 2- Agree
- 3- Disagree
- 4- Strongly Disagree

	FACTOR	1	2	3	4
1	Qualification level of educators at a school				
2	Learners admitted from disadvantaged communities				
3	Learners who are second language speakers				

8. The incremental revisions made to the post provisioning model has resulted in an equitable distribution of educators to schools.

**STRONGLY AGREE**

1	2	3	4	5

**STRONGLY DISAGREE**

8. The post provisioning model tends to favour schools with diverse curriculum offerings.

**STRONGLY AGREE**

1	2	3	4	5

**STRONGLY DISAGREE**

**SECTION D : SCHOOL ORGANISATION AND ADMINISTRATION**

1. The number of state funded educator posts allocated to my school caters for the curriculum needs of my learners.

**STRONGLY AGREE**

1	2	3	4	5

**STRONGLY DISAGREE**

2. Does your governing body allocate funds in their annual budget for the employment of additional educators?

Yes 

--

 1  
 No 

--

 2

3. If yes, how many educators have they employed this year?

1 - 3	<input type="checkbox"/>	1
4- 6	<input type="checkbox"/>	2
7 - 9	<input type="checkbox"/>	3
10 - 13	<input type="checkbox"/>	4
14 and above	<input type="checkbox"/>	5

4. The education departments' timing of the announcement of the post provisioning norm leads to effective school organization.

<b>STRONGLY AGREE</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<b>STRONGLY DISAGREE</b>				
-----------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------

5. Substitute educators are appointed timeously by the education department.

<b>STRONGLY AGREE</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<b>STRONGLY DISAGREE</b>				
-----------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------

6. Vacancies are filled timeously by the education department.

<b>STRONGLY AGREE</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<b>STRONGLY DISAGREE</b>				
-----------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------

**SECTION E : IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POST PROVISIONING NORM**

1. Principals are consulted on issues of implementation of the post provisioning norm.

<b>STRONGLY AGREE</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<b>STRONGLY DISAGREE</b>				
-----------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------

2. The education department sets clear directives as to how the post provisioning norm is to be implemented.

<b>STRONGLY AGREE</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<b>STRONGLY DISAGREE</b>				
-----------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------

3. Documents on implementation of the post provisioning norm are clear and unambiguous.

<b>STRONGLY AGREE</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<b>STRONGLY DISAGREE</b>				
-----------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------



## ANNEXURE E

### INTERVIEW SCHEDULE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS WITH PRINCIPALS

1. What variable in the post provisioning model advantages your school?
2. What variable in the post provisioning model disadvantages your school?
3. What other variable/s peculiar to your school should be taken into account in determining the post provisioning needs of your school?
4. There is the assumption that the post provisioning model favours schools with diverse curriculum offerings. What are your views?
5. Do you believe there is sufficient transparency in the distribution of educators to schools?
6. How has the timing of the announcement of the post provisioning norm affected your school from an organizational point of view?
7. How does policy on the filling of vacant posts (substitutes/temps/CTT/permanent) impact on school organization and service delivery?
8. What level of support did you receive from the following groupings when implementing the PPN?
  - Staff
  - Site stewards
  - Department of Education/ SEMs
  - SGB
9. Do you believe that all stakeholders have a common understanding of the procedure manual on the implementation of the post provisioning norm?
10. Do you wish to make any other comment with regard to educator post provisioning not covered by this interview?

## ANNEXURE F

### UNSTRUCTURED INTERVIEWS WITH UNION OFFICIALS

What impact does policy on educator post provisioning have on issues of equity and redress?

- Quantitative distribution
- Qualitative distribution
- Access to the curriculum
- Class sizes/ Physical infrastructure
- Educator workloads
- Extra-mural programme
- Poverty of learners
- Material resources
- Employment of SGB paid educators