

**UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES**



**A POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE LESOTHO
HIGHLANDS WATER PROJECT FOR RURAL COMMUNITIES IN LESOTHO:
A CASE-STUDY OF COMMUNITIES AFFECTED BY THE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE KATSE AND MOHALE DAMS**

BY

FRANK TSOTETSI MAKORO

**A THESIS SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF
PHILOSOPHY IN POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES IN THE
COLLEGE OF HUMANITIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL,
PIETERMARITZBURG, SOUTH AFRICA.**

SUPERVISOR: DR. SUZANNE FRANCIS

NOVEMBER 2014

Abstract

This thesis analyses the policy and implementation of the Treaty reached between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the Republic of South Africa to construct two dams, the Katse and Mohale dams, to supply water to the Province of Gauteng in South Africa, in 1986. The nature and intention of this study is to contribute to knowledge since these dams were constructed for socio-economic development in Lesotho and in the Republic of South Africa.

The main purpose of the thesis is to investigate the extent to which the construction of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project has benefitted resettled and relocated households in the areas where they now live. The study focuses on how seven of the socio-economic development programmes of the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority, namely Infrastructure, Compensation, Resettlement, Relocation, Capacity Building, Rural Development and Tourism, have been understood and implemented during the construction of the Katse and Mohale dams. In this study a more detailed empirical approach of how the Treaty and Compensation Policy for resettlement and relocation of affected communities in two regions of Katse and Mohale is understood and applied in the Katse area and Maseru District (one urban, in the Maseru suburbs, and the other rural foothills of the Machache mountain range of Ha Theko in Nazareth).

The thesis identifies contributions made to social and economic development brought about by the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. Political structures that governed this project are interrogated, as well as the management structures that were given the responsibility to supervise the administration and operations of this project. This resulted in more than 50 households resettled in the Katse dam region and more than 80 households resettled in urban areas, the outskirts of Maseru City, and more than 100 households relocated to Ha Theko area. The Lesotho Highlands Development Authority was satisfied with the policy implementation in this regard, but little benefit is seen amongst people affected by the LHWP in their resettled and relocated places.

The attempt here is to show how the implementation of seven socio-economic programmes of the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority has really contributed to the betterment of affected communities who were involuntarily displaced by LHDA. The thesis also reveals the importance of women in taking household leadership positions, in which issues of resettlement, employment, health, building of healthy relationships with host communities and capacity building, have been their major responsibilities and functions.

In the Treaty, the intention of the project was that the resettlement programme should be organized in such a way that the standard of affected communities by the construction of Lesotho Highlands Water Project, in particular those resettled and relocated, should not be below the level they were before their resettlement and relocation. Four main areas of focus, namely the nature of the project, the governance of the project, management and policy implementation, and the situation and current consequent conditions of affected communities, are critically analyzed in this study.

Declaration: Plagiarism

I, Frank Tsotetsi Makoro, declare that:

- (i) The research reported in this dissertation, except where otherwise indicated, and is my original work.
- (ii) This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.
- (iii) This thesis does not contain other persons' data, pictures, graphs or other information, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other persons.
- (iv) This thesis does not contain other persons' writing, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other researchers. Where other written sources have been quoted, then:
 - (a) their words have been re-written, but the general information attributed to them has been referenced;
 - (b) Where their exact words have been used, their writing has been placed inside quotations marks, and referenced.
- (v) Where I have reproduced a publication of which I am an author, co-author or editor, I have indicated in detail which part of the publication was actually written by myself alone and have fully referenced such publications.
- (vi) This thesis does not contain text, graphics or tables copied and pasted from the Internet, unless specifically acknowledged, and the source being detailed in the dissertation and in the References sections.

Student: Frank Tsotetsi Makoro

Acknowledgements

To my wife, Thelma, without whose encouragement and support this project could not have been completed. Equally important is the contribution of my children Batlokoa, Lerato and Kweqana and the rest of the family, especially my father and mother, who saw fit for me to go this far, I say to you all, thank you. To Prof. Ralph Lawrence (initial supervisor), Dr Alison Jones (brief transitional supervisor) and Dr. Suzanne Francis (final supervisor) of the University of KwaZulu Natal who excellently and courageously supervised this project and to the many other distinguished scholars at Edinburgh University in Scotland, the late Prof, Alistair Kee and Prof. Marcella Althuas-Reid, both of whom encouraged me to define myself through my own culture, faith and commitment for development of my people, thus strengthening my African identity. I salute you.

My appreciation goes to all participants who warmly agreed to be interviewed and gave their time to talk to me, without whom this project would not have been possible. Among them are the chiefs of researched communities, headsmen, retired government officials who spent their time talking to me and the current management staff of the LHDA who agreed to be interviewed. I do not ignore contributions made by the heads of NGOs who participated in this study, they strongly maintained their position regarding the role of the LHWP for social betterment and the affected individuals who fearlessly spoke from their hearts and also introduced me to the members of their households showing me the actual life in which they lived after disturbance. You were honest and determined to share your feelings about this project and your expectations of it. I salute you.

I do not underestimate the support I got from the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority's librarians, Kuena Lerotholi and Makali Kali. They showed good spirit throughout my documentary research. Lenka Thamae of the Transformation Resource Centre, who selflessly directed me to many contacts and sources, I owe you. To scholars at the National University of Lesotho, and the very humbled Basotho who showed me love and eagerness for this research to succeed, and to my clan, Botsotetsi Ba Lebaka, I say, *Grace and Peace*.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Abstract-----	ii
Declaration: Plagiarism-----	iv
Acknowledgements-----	v
Table of Contents-----	vi
List of Tables-----	x
List of Figures-----	xii
List of Maps-----	xiii
Abbreviations-----	xiv

Part One

Chapter 1

General Introduction

General Introduction-----	1
1.1 Project Background-----	1
1.2 Context of Investigated Communities -----	2
1.3 Aims of the Research-----	4
1.4 Principal Theories upon which this research is based-----	6
1.5 Review of Literature-----	12
1.6 Methodology-----	18
1.7 The Plan of the Thesis-----	22

Chapter 2

The Political Background, Treaty and Nature of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project

Introduction-----	24
2.1 The Origins of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project-----	24
2.2 The Political Background of Lesotho during 1986-----	26
2.3 The Political Background of South Africa during 1986-----	33
2.4 The Treaty and Its Provisions -----	35
2.5 The Nature of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project-----	43
2.6 Conclusion-----	55

Chapter 3

The Governance and Management Structures of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project during Project Implementation

Introduction-----	57
3.1 Bi-National Governance Structure of Lesotho Highlands Water Project-----	57
3.1.1 The Lesotho Highlands Water Commission on Planning and Conflict Resolution-----	58
3.2 The Governance of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project within Lesotho-----	59
3.2.1 The Form and Style of the Military Council Policy-----	59
3.2.2 Chieftainship in Governance during the Construction of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project-----	61
3.2.3 The Governance of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project during Multiparty Democracy 1993- 2002-----	64
3.3 The Management Structure of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project-----	65
3.3.1 The Structure of the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority-----	65
3.3.2 The Decision-Making Functions of the Board-----	66
3.3.3 Project Administration-----	67
3.3.4 The Framework Agreement Procedure -----	73
3.4 Conclusion-----	73

Part Two

Chapter 4

Implementation of Socio-Economic Programmes by the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority

Introduction-----	75
4.1 Implementation of Socio-Economic Programmes in the Katse Dam Region-----	75
4.2 Implementation of Socio-Economic Programmes in the Mohale Dam Region-----	91
4.3 Conclusion-----	103

Chapter 5

Commentaries from Government and Non-Governmental Organizations' Officials about LHDA's Socio-Economic Programmes

Introduction-----	105
5.1 Commentaries from Government Officials-----	106
5.2 Commentaries from Non-Governmental Organizations' Officials-----	118

5.3 Whether the Officials felt that Compensation has fulfilled Promises made to Displaced Communities-----	127
5.3.1 Summary of the Officials' Views about Benefits that came to Affected Households as a Result of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project-----	132
5.4 Conclusion-----	133

Part Three

Chapter 6

Findings: Report of Researched Communities on

The Effects of the LHDA's Socio-Economic Programmes on Affected Katse Dam Region Communities

Introduction-----	135
6.1 Background Information-----	136
6.1.1 Scope of Research-----	137
6.1.2 Economic Factors-----	137
6.2 Resettlement Programme in the Katse Dam Region-----	140
6.3 The Nature of Agreement Reached Between Lesotho Highlands Development Authority and Resettled Communities -----	173
6.4 Perceptions about Replacement Houses-----	175
6.5 Perceptions about Cash Compensation-----	179
6.6 Relocation Programme in the Katse Dam Region-----	188
6.7 An Overview of the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority's Socio-economic Programmes in the Katse Dam Region-----	199
6.8 Conclusion-----	200

Chapter 7

The Effects of LHDA's Socio-Economic Programmes on Affected Mohale Dam Region Communities

Introduction-----	203
7.1 Background Information-----	203
7.2 Resettlement Programme in the Maseru Urban Area-----	205
7.3 The Nature of Agreement Reached with LHDA over Resettlement-----	226
7.4 Perceptions about Replacement Houses-----	227
7.5 Perceptions about Cash Compensation-----	230

7.6 Relocation Programme in the Nazareth Area-----	240
7.7 An Overview of LHDA’s Socio-economic Programmes in the Mohale Dam Region---	262
7.8 Conclusion-----	263

Chapter 8

Final Analysis

The Consequences of the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority’s Socio-Economic Programmes for Development of Displaced Communities

Introduction-----	264
8.1 Consequences of Resettlement Programme in the Katse Dam Region-----	264
8.2 Consequences of Relocation Programme in the Katse Dam Region-----	267
8.3 Consequences of Resettlement Programme in the Maseru Urban Area-----	268
8.4 Consequences of Relocation Programme in the Nazareth Area-----	279

Chapter 9

Conclusion to the Study

9.1 Conclusion to the Study-----	282
9.2 The Potential Role of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project in Poverty Alleviation--	288
9.3 Theoretical Development -----	291

<i>Appendix 1</i> -----	293
--------------------------------	------------

<i>Appendix 2</i> -----	295
--------------------------------	------------

<i>Bibliography</i> -----	297
----------------------------------	------------

List of Tables

	<i>Page</i>
Table 1: Area and Categories of Respondents-----	21
Table 2: Characteristics of Lesotho Highlands Water Project-----	54
Table 3: Project Construction Timeline-----	55
Table 4: Katse Region Compensation Register-----	79
Table 5: Compensated Villages for Forests-----	80
Table 6: Compensated Villages for Reeds-----	81
Table 7: Compensated Villages for Arable Land-----	81
Table 8: Compensated Villages for Garden Land-----	82
Table 9: List of Katse Region Resettlement Villages-----	84
Table 10: Mohale Region Compensation Register-----	92
Table 11: Compensation for Maseru By-Pass Road-----	93
Table 12: Compensated Villages for Arable Land-----	93
Table 13: Compensated Villages for Mountain Road-----	94
Table 14: Compensated Villages for Dam Site-----	95
Table 15: Compensated Villages for Kraals/Stables-----	96
Table 16: Compensated Villages for Trees-----	96
Table 17: Compensated Villages for Disturbance-----	97
Table 18: List of Compensation Items-----	100
Table 19: Views of Government Officials about LHDA's Programmes-----	106
Table 20: Satisfaction Level over Policy Implementation-----	114
Table 21: Views of Government Officials on Compensation Adequacy-----	116
Table 22: Views of NGOs Officials on Socio-economic Programmes-----	119
Table 23: Views of NGOs Officials on Policy Implementation-----	125
Table 24: Adequacy Level of Compensation-----	126
Table 25: Fulfilment of Promises made by LHDA for Katse Region-----	128
Table 26: Fulfilment of Promises made by LHDA for Mohale Region-----	130
Table 27: Level of Benefits for Affected Households-----	132
Table 28: Resettlement in Ha Lejone-----	141
Table 29: Knowledge about Meetings-----	145
Table 30: Resettlement in Ha Lepaqa-----	151
Table 31: Resettlement in Ha Sepinare-----	160
Table 32: Fulfilment of Promises to Ha Sepinare Community-----	162

Table 33: Resettlement in Manganeng-----	167
Table 34: Agreement reached between LHDA and Affected Households-----	169
Table 35: Level of Satisfaction about Replacement Houses-----	177
Table 36: Fulfilment of Promises made to Resettled Households-----	178
Table 37: Views on Cash Compensation-----	179
Table 38: Views on Disturbance Compensation in the Katse Region-----	181
Table 39: Views on Compensation for Kraals/Stables-----	183
Table 40: Views on Outbuildings Compensation-----	184
Table 41: Views on Garden Land Compensation-----	185
Table 42: Compensation about Trees/Forests-----	186
Table 43: Bokong Hillside Relocation Programme-----	189
Table 44: Level of Satisfaction about Replacement Houses-----	195
Table 45: Views about Cash Compensation-----	196
Table 46: Views about Garden Land Compensation-----	197
Table 47: Overview of LHDA Programmes in the Katse Dam Region-----	199
Table 48: Participation of Resettled Households in the Maseru Urban Area-----	204
Table 49: Effects of LHDA’s Socio-Economic Programmes on Ha Thetsane Resettlement -----	206
Table 50: Meetings Held with LHDA over Compensation-----	209
Table 51: Effects of LHDA’s Socio-economic programmes on HaTsolo Resettlement-----	214
Table 52: Effects of LHDA’s Socio-economic Programmes on Ha Matala Resettlement---	220
Table 53: Level of Satisfaction about Replacement Houses-----	228
Table 54: Views on Compensation for Disturbance-----	230
Table 55: Views on Compensation for Arable Land-----	231
Table 56: Views on Compensation for Kraals/Stables-----	233
Table 57: Views on Compensation for Outbuildings-----	234
Table 58: Views on Compensation for Trees/Forests-----	235
Table 59: Views on Compensation for Grain & Pulses-----	236
Table 60: Whether Promises made to Resettled Households were Fulfilled-----	238
Table 61: Participation of Relocated Households from Mohale Dam Region-----	240
Table 62: Relocation in Ha Ntsi-----	241
Table 63: Knowledge about Meetings with LHDA-----	243
Table 64: Relocation in Ha Phaloane-----	246
Table 65: Relocation in Ha Sekete-----	249

Table 66: Views on Compensation for Disturbance-----	252
Table 67: Views on Compensation for Arable Land-----	253
Table 68: Views on Compensation for Kraals/Stables-----	255
Table 69: Views on Compensation for Outbuildings-----	256
Table 70: Views on Compensation for Trees/Forests-----	258
Table 71: Views on Compensation for Grain & Pulses-----	259
Table 72: Overview of LHDA Socio-Economic Programmes on Households Relocated from Mohale Dam Region-----	262
Table 73: Consequences of Resettlement in the Katse Dam Region-----	265
Table 74: Consequences of Relocation in the Bokong Hillside -----	267
Table 75: Consequences of Relocation on Communities in the Nazareth Area-----	279

List of Figures

	<i>Pages</i>
Figure 1: Annual Royalties Payment to Lesotho -----	42
Figure 2: Muela Hydropower Development-----	44
Figure 3: Tunnelling Operations-----	45
Figure 4: Tail Dam Point-----	46
Figure 5: Outlets Valves-----	47
Figure 6: Malibamatso Bridge-----	48
Figure 7: Katse Dam-----	49
Figure 8: Katse Intake Tower-----	50
Figure 9: Mohale Dam-----	51
Figure 10: Example of Resettlement Houses-----	53
Figure 11: Improved Latrines -----	54
Figure 12: Lesotho Highlands Water Commission Structure-----	57
Figure 13: Governance Structure of LHWP-----	61
Figure 14: Chieftainship Ruling Structure -----	62
Figure 15: Multi-Party Democratic Governance Model-----	64
Figure 16: Lesotho Highlands Development Authority Structure-----	65
Figure 17: Budget for Phase 1A-----	68
Figure 18: Budget for Phase 1B-----	69
Figure 19: Framework Agreement Procedure-----	73
Figure 20: Katse Region Resettlement Programme-----	83
Figure 21: Horses used for Travelling-----	88
Figure 22: Shepherds and their Flock-----	88
Figure 23: Katse Dam Village-----	90
Figure 24: Katse Botanic Garden-----	90
Figure 25: Organic Food Security Project-----	102
Figure 26: Katse Region Crops-----	138
Figure 27: Katse Region Livestock-----	139
Figure 28: Figures of Agreement with LHDA-----	174
Figure 29: Typical Rural House Model-----	175
Figure 30: Ha Makhalanyaane Resettlement Houses-----	176
Figure 31: Improved Latrines for Rural Communities-----	176
Figure 32: Ha Thetsane Replacement House Model-----	208

Figure 33: Ha Tsolo Replacement House Model-----	215
Figure 34: Ha Matala Replacement House Model-----	221
Figure 35: Maseru Urban Resettlement Agreement Level-----	226
Figure 36: Example of a Typical Rural Hut-----	227
Figure 37: Example of Replacement Houses in Urban Maseru-----	227
Figure 38: Pre-Disturbance Family Leadership Structure: 1992 Households Heads-----	
-----	269
Figure 39: Post-Resettlement Family Leadership Structure: 2010 Household Heads -----	
-----	270

List of Maps

	<i>Page</i>
Map 1: Kingdom of Lesotho-----	3
Map 2: Map of LHWP Areas -----	3
Map 3: Map of Affected Villages -----	3
Map 4: Map of Lowlands Resettlement Plan-----	4
Map 5: Map of LHWP -----	35
Map 6: Water Delivery Map to South Africa-----	38
Map 7: Phase 1A Geographical Map-----	43
Map 8: Location of Matsoku Tunnel & Weir-----	52
Map 9: Resettlement Areas for Mohale Region Communities-----	98
Map 10: Location of Inundation in Mohale Basin-----	99

Abbreviations Used in This Study

ADB	African Development Bank
ANC	African National Congress
ALC	Area Liaison Committee
AZAPO	Azanian People's Organization
BCP	Basotho Congress Party
BNP	Basotho National Party
CALC	Combined Area Liaison Committee
CBO	Community Based Organization
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CUSA-AZACTU	Council of Unions of South Africa Azanian Confederation of Trade Unions
DFID	Department for International Development
DAP	Development Action Plan
DBSA	Development Bank of South Africa
DSC	Displacement Support Counselling
EAP	Environmental Action Plan
EPP	Emergency Preparedness Programme
EIB	European Investment Bank
EFF	Extended Fund Facility
FBO	Faith Based Organization
FOT	Field Operation Team
IPA	Interim Political Authority
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISAS	Institute of Southern African Studies
JPTC	Joint Permanent Technical Commission
LCD	Lesotho Congress for Democracy
LEC	Lesotho Electricity Co-operation
LLA	Lesotho Liberation Army
LHDA	Lesotho Highlands Development Authority
LHWC	Lesotho Highlands Water Commission
LHWP	Lesotho Highlands Water Project
LPMU	Lesotho Para-Military Unit

NUL	National University of Lesotho
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
PoEE	Panel of Environmental Experts
PMU	Police Military Unit
PC	Project Co-ordinator
RDP	Rural Development Programme
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
TCTA	Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority
TRC	Transformation Resource Centre
TBM	Tunnel Boring Machine
UN	United Nations
UNRSP	United Nations Refugees Scholarship Programme
WB	World Bank
WCD	World Commission on Dams

Part One

Chapter 1

General Introduction

The intention of this study is to investigate the policy carried out during the implementation of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) Scheme for the construction of Katse and Mohale dams, after the 1986 Treaty was signed between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the Republic of South Africa, to supply water mainly to the Province of Gauteng in South Africa. This study questions whether or not the Treaty and its Compensation Policy advanced the welfare of displaced and affected households in areas covered by roads and dams. This study will seek to understand the consequences of the LHWP for the development of affected communities.

In this chapter, in the section on the background to the project, I indicate the reasons for the Treaty. This is followed by a definition of the context of the affected communities under an investigation. I set out the aims of the research and the principal theories upon which this study is based. I provide a methodological reflection and outline the plan of the thesis and the key arguments offered.

1.1 Project Background

The LHWP came about as a result of South Africa's dire need for a sustainable water supply to expedite the growth of the economy in Gauteng Province, which is the industrial capital and the most populated province in South Africa. Water forms an integral part of the South African economy. Farming communities, mainly in the Free State and Mpumalanga provinces, have immensely benefitted from the Treaty of 1986, which paved the way for the construction of two large dams, Katse and Mohale dams in the Kingdom of Lesotho.

The background of this project is the physical nature of Lesotho which harbours great volumes of water during the rainy season. This water escapes to the sea without a long-term benefit to the farmers and industries, particularly in South Africa. Evelyn Baring, who was the British High Commissioner in the 1950s, realized the water potential that Lesotho had for South Africa and assigned investigators to assess the extent to which Lesotho could benefit economically from water resources found in abundance in the land-locked country. It was from this premise that Chief

Leabua Jonathan, who was the Prime Minister of Lesotho for two decades (1966-86), invited experts to assess the possibility of the water project being sold to South Africa. The rationale for this investigation was that the Lesotho government realized the desperation of South Africa for water resources and needed to ascertain that need. A model would be developed that would help Lesotho sell water to South Africa sustainably, with the right amount of royalties, and Lesotho managing and controlling the process. However, Jonathan was overthrown by Major-General Justine Metsing Lekhanya in January 1986, before the investigations were completed. Six months after the Military Council signed a Treaty with South Africa to build Katse and Mohale dams in Lesotho, the operations started.

The implementation of the project was based on the Treaty (LHDA 1986), which was drawn up by experts. Three authorities were established, namely the Joint Permanent Technical Commission (JPTC), composed of three delegates per country, with authority to formulate policy and jointly manage project implementation through the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority (LHDA), representing the Kingdom of Lesotho, and the Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA), representing the Republic of South Africa. The content of the Treaty included the following issues that form a part of this study:

- a. that the Lesotho government would develop the Muela Hydropower Station to supply the necessary electricity for construction of Phase 1A & 1B dams.
- b. that the South African government would be responsible for debt management and give compensation to households, individuals and communities that would be displaced or negatively affected by the construction of roads and dams
- c. that Lesotho would get royalties for the water transferred to South Africa and that the royalties would be reviewed from time to time to accommodate inflation.


1.2 Context of Investigated Communities

The context of communities which are investigated in this study is that of people who managed their lives through subsistence farming, migrant labour and livestock farming, under rural life settings. These communities lived in the Katse and Mohale areas, along the valleys of the Malibamatso, Matsoku, Senqunyane and Senqu Rivers. Katse dam (Phase 1A) is 185m high, in the district of

Thaba-Tseka, and Mohale dam (Phase 1B) is 145m high and located in the Maseru district. Two maps of Lesotho, below, depict the areas where these two dams are located.




Map 1: Source- LHDA 1994.



Map2: Source- LHDA 1994.

It is important to show the rural geographical settings in which these communities lived before they were disturbed by resettlement and relocation, as Map 3 shows.



Map 3: Map of the villages affected by Phase 1B of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) showing villages in the inundation area and ones which were likely to be resettled.

Map 3: Source- Devitt. P and R. Hitchcock 2010.

Following the resettlement plan, which was later implemented by the LHDA the villages shown in Map 3 were affected by inundation and had to be resettled elsewhere, between the foothills and the lowland areas (see Map 4).




Fig. 8. Map of the foothills and lowlands Resettlement Receiving Area for Phase 1B of the LHWP.

Map 4: Source- Devitt. P & R. Hitchcock 2010.

1.3 Aims of the Research

Housing 3 112 households in more than 300 villages affected by relocation and resettlement, as a result of the construction of Katse and Mohale dams, became a big task for the LHDA. In the Katse area, 75 displaced families were relocated up-slope, but remained in the vicinity. In the Mohale area, 1 900 people from 14 villages with 321 households were resettled in different places. The conditions of these people warranted an investigation. One of the key questions in this work is: to what extent has the construction of the LHWP benefitted the citizenry of Lesotho, particularly the displaced and resettled individuals, households and communities almost 20 years after its inception? This study attempts to discover how this master plan has benefitted affected households after implementation. The LHWP created a gulf between the traditional style of living and the modern compensation particularly housing which affected displaced communities. It is in this context that I investigate and

analyze how the policy that constructed the Lesotho Highlands Water Project to sell water to South Africa brought about consequences for rural communities in Lesotho. A case-study will be made of communities affected by the construction of the Katse and Mohale dams.

It is important to try and understand participation of the resettled communities in matters pertaining to their removal from their original settlement areas, the contents of the agreement which they reached with the LHDA prior to their removal, their expected future as informed by compensation policy and the skills development plans that were prepared mainly for affected people. This includes the work of the World Bank in managing fiscal policy, advising the Lesotho Government on financial management and the role of the LHWP in poverty alleviation.

To some people, this project brought about hope for a better life. The present work attempts to see how much of their dreams and expectations have become a reality in their lives. Some people were disturbed, moved to higher places, and promised a better future by the LHDA. Others were completely uprooted from their places of birth and relocated many kilometres away, amongst unfamiliar people and a strange economy, to start life all over again. Many of these people had relied on subsistence farming and animal rearing, which formed the backbone of their economy and development. Although the concept of this project did not originate from among the Basotho people, its projected objectives for social betterment and economic growth attracted many. Therefore, in that context, such a concept needed broader consultation with the entire society, so that the actualization of this significant goal was understood and embraced by all.

While many people acknowledged the importance of this initiative, it is equally important for the purpose of this study to find out at which stage the Basotho people as a whole became involved in the life of this project? Surprisingly, no treaty was reached during the term of the late Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan, despite his grip on power for over 20 years. It was only after the military took over power that the treaty with the South African regime was signed six months after taking over government and project implementation started. It is ironic that the then Prime Minister could have turned a blind eye to such an important income-generating project without just cause. The feasibility study was delayed unnecessarily and considerable time was wasted. The truth of the matter in this case has yet to be revealed.

The role played by the World Bank is important in this context, as it gave loans for the construction of dams and supplied expert personnel to supervise the financial administration of the LHDA. It trained local staff on effective and efficient financial management of the project.

Looking at the politics of water in Africa for instance, the Kariba dam constructed between 1955 and 1959 to supply hydro-electric power to Zambia and Zimbabwe since 1960 has not been able to compensate displaced communities fully to the level which their livelihoods improved as a result of resettlement compensation. The Maguga dam constructed in Hhohho on the Komati River in Swaziland as well was constructed between 1998 and 2002 aiming to provide hydro-electric power and to promote agriculture in Swaziland, but prolonged drought in the region prohibited the success of the project leaving many peasants partly compensated for the loss of their assets. In this given regional context, the role of the LHWP in socio-economic development is critical.

1.4 Principal theories upon which this research is based.

1.4.1 Policy Formation and Implementation Theories

This study is grounded in the field of policy analysis and development whereby policy formation process and implementation theories of modern community development scholars such as Sabatier (1986); Hood (1976); March & Oslen (1976); Wildavsky (1978); Hjern & Porter (1981); and Hill (1998), who argue for different approaches and models in the process of implementation, seek policy outcomes. Hill (1998:297) stresses that there is a distinction between implementation as a process and implementation as an outcome, confirming the theory of Sabatier's implementation analysis. In his top-down model, where obedience and compliance are part of system of management values, Sabatier (1986) shows how hierarchical control defines implementation having set of objectives; assigning responsibilities, monitoring performance, and making internal adjustments that can enhance the attainment of organizational goals. Parsons (1995:461) defines implementation as a study of change: a study of the micro-structure of political life; how organizations inside and outside the political system conduct their affairs and interact with one another. Brinkerhoff & Crosby (2002); Fischer (2003); Kiln (1997) and Kingdon (1995) have developed theories of policy formation and implementation which are central in the analysis of this study.

1.4.2 Definition of a Public Policy

Frank Fischer (2003) defines policy as a political agreement on a course of action or intention designed to resolve or mitigate problems on the political agenda. Here we are introduced to two most important characteristics of the nature of a public policy, namely; political agreement which involves the members of the society and the administration (political team and bureaucracy) of their choice to implement that agreement. In this theory, the agreement is reached by all parties to address a particular social problem. It is the responsibility of the elected political leadership to establish systems that will bring a solution to the problem identified. It is also the responsibility of political appointees to ensure that the state machinery is capable of solving that particular problem(s).

Kiln (1997) interprets public policy as the result of interaction between various actors trying to influence the policy process in a direction favourable to them. In this process, there are many players who try to influence the policy agenda and processes to go their own way. These include policy communities and entrepreneurs that have skills and abilities to draft proposals after identifying a social problem, and having connections through oiling the wheels of bureaucracy they wait for policy windows to open so that their agenda items can find an opportunity to be discussed by policy makers in favour of their alternative. Cohen, March and Oslen (1972) as an example had earlier set out the theory of the garbage can model, stating that a decision comes as an outcome of several independent streams within the organization, termed 'organized anarchy', meaning, the identification of problems, finding solutions, identifying participants and choice opportunities. Kingdon (1995) refers to the outcome as, a function of the mix of garbage (problems, solutions, participants, and the participants' resources) in the can and how it is processed.

1.4.3 The Process of Policy Formation

In the process of policy formation, there are different forces which play a part. Kingdon (1995) emphasizes that policy formation is about choosing amongst the alternatives. This process is very complicated as it has to be justified by urgency, budget allocation, expertise or knowledge of implementing a chosen action plan, and above all political will. In pursuit of the action plan there are policy entrepreneurs who pursue their own interests as well. Kingdon (1995:182) suggests that

policy entrepreneurs hook solutions to problems, proposals to political momentum, and political events to policy problems, so that their perspective is accepted by policy makers.

The top-down approach as suggested by Sabatier (1979, 1980) is suggestive in this study, as Lesotho became under the military dictatorship rule prior to the implementation of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project policy. Unlike in a democratic environment where dialogue is open to every interest party in the process of policy formation, in this context, political symbolism took a centre stage (Hill 1998) and public gatherings were banned. Hence, the implementation theory forms a critical part in showing how the policy of the LHWP was carried out.

i. Policy Windows

Kingdon (1995:181) shows that policy entrepreneurs have useful qualities of softening up the system. In his discussion of political streams, he argues that experts, researchers and academics working together with interest groups lie in wait for a window to open. In the case of Lesotho, one would argue that the border blockage by South Africa opened the windows for new proposals to come forward. Two days after the blockage Major General Metsing Lekhanya took over power and formed a military government. What we may not really know at the moment is; who were policy entrepreneurs who benefited out of the coup which followed two days after the border blockages?

Policy windows do not remain opened for a long time, which is why Kingdon (1995) emphasizes that policy entrepreneurs must develop their ideas, expertise, and proposals well in advance for the time when windows open. Kingdon also argues that without softening up bureaucracy, policy entrepreneurs cannot benefit when the window opens. In the case of the new military administration coming to force in Lesotho, the platform for public opinion is questioned where, four important social aspects of development, namely, environmental care, economic growth, social development and political stability are concerned. It will be the attempt of this study through this theoretical framework to provide a clear understanding of the issues of development of the affected communities brought about by this project.

ii. Policy Alternatives

The change of administration in Lesotho in 1986 came about at the time of high tension in the international relations between South Africa and Lesotho. Whether the military personnel acted alone or were influenced by other political parties, pressure groups, policy community and entrepreneurs or backed by the South African government, political decision to form a new government took place. This process might have been reached for the following reasons:

a. Firstly, South Africa had blocked its borders with Lesotho as there was a political disagreement with the Prime Minister of Lesotho, the late Dr. Leabua Jonathan. The blockage greatly affected the Lesotho economy as this country is entirely surrounded by the Republic of South Africa, as well as depending on its economy. Migrant labour at the time was responsible for bringing money into Lesotho, and this situation was unbearable to the Basotho who were working in South Africa as well as those who had their investments in South Africa. Some had to lobby for a political decision alternative that would address their problem urgently.

b. Secondly, both countries were at loggerheads and blaming each other at the time for terrorist attacks as they had both harboured what was called freedom fighters. Lesotho had harboured ANC, PAC, and AZAPO members who were seen as dangerous for Botha's administration. At the same time Jonathan's administration blamed South Africa for having given LLA (Lesotho Liberation Army) bases from which they carried attacks into Lesotho. In that context, the military personnel in Lesotho were vulnerable for manipulation, and an alternative policy had to be formed.

The Report of Lesotho Highlands Development Authority (2002) on the socio-cultural impact of the project raises risk management issues indicating that the most powerful and far-reaching impact wrought by LHWP would be on the traditions, customs, culture, economics and way of life of the local inhabitants. The socio-cultural change would impact value-systems that would affect attitudes on almost every aspect of life, including land use."¹ With this in mind, the current conditions of resettled communities are central to this research, and it is intended to find these communities, engage them on the benefits they received during their relocation, and of course to find out if things

¹ Loxton, Venn & Associates; Lesotho Highlands Development Authority- Final Report, Baseline Biological Survey, Fauna and Flora; Lesotho Highlands Water Project Phase 1A, Contract No: 75, Vol 1; September 1993

have indeed turned out the way they had expected and in line with what they understood to be promised by the authorities. The role which these communities played in policy implementation is crucial.

1.4.4 Policy Management

Policy management derives from policy administration in which public management is central. Reflecting on the nature of public management, Walter (et al., 1997) shows a difference between governance and management. In their work, governance refers to directed influence of social processes, while management on the other hand refers to conscious and deliberate actions undertaken by public actors to influence a policy process. Walter (et al., 1997) stresses that governance covers all kinds of guidance mechanisms which are connected with the public policy process, since public policy comes as a result of interactions between public and private actors.

As Tsikoane (1991) shows, the LHWP was implemented during a period of change management in Lesotho; meaning, a change of guard from the civilian authoritative style to a military regime. He indicates that change administration has some consequences. The military government introduced a number of orders through which policy decisions were followed. One of those policy decisions was the implementation of the Treaty to construct Katse and Mohale dams in 1986. During this time, new systems of monitoring policy implementation were introduced and controlled by military agencies within and outside public administration structures. For instance, the Military Intelligence Agency was given a central role in monitoring policy implementation and ensuring that political stability was achieved. That is why as a result, several heads of ministries were changed and policies in most areas of governance were reviewed, altered or even scrapped. Implementation theory here is that of a closed top-down dictatorship. This model will be interrogated throughout this study.

i. Implementing Governmental Agenda

John Kingdon (1995) takes the argument of agenda setting further by suggesting three streams of processes: problems, policies and politics. These processes have origins from the social identification and the means by which certain values are upheld. It is in the context of minimal social interaction that this study looks at how LHWP implementation was carried out. This enquiry includes the identification of the means by which Lesotho government officials learned about conditions that eventually became the government agenda which resulted in the construction of the

big dams in Lesotho. In answering as to why some problems take precedence in the agenda of government officials, Kingdon (1995) argues that the answer lies both in the means by which those officials learn about conditions and in the ways in which conditions become defined as problems. He further defines means as indicators, focusing events and feedback.

Problem recognition in this theory is critical in agenda setting. But the first question to raise here is; who recognizes the problem? There is also a distinction between a condition and a problem. A condition can refer to the situation or environment in which a particular course of action takes place, but a problem occurs when the situation or environment clashes with upheld norms or values of the society. The problem is not desired and as soon as it is identified it has to be addressed. Then with reference to LHWP one question that is worthy of consideration is was the intention of the project, its origins and nature of the agreement based on a sound policy agenda and decision taken?

Taking this point further; what about a developmental paradigm? In the case of LHWP we need to find out if the consensus was built in the political mainstream by bargaining more than by persuasion. I put this argument forward because the LHWP is an opportunity project aimed at improving socio-economic conditions of people living in Lesotho and to supply water to South Africa. We need to differentiate between a political and economic development agenda. Each discourse should have its own approach and models to accomplish goals. There are also areas where the two are coupled in order to maximize participation from political and professional cycles.

1.4.5 Implementation as Development Activity

Toye (1987) describes development during the Keynesian revolution of reconstructing shattered Europe: social objectives in the 1940s as a cure for mass unemployment where no one else seemed able to. Thirlwall (1989) defines development as change. He argues that the concept of development is an objective which embraces the major economic, social objective and values that societies strive for. According to Thirlwall (1989) the major objective of development must be to raise people out of poverty and provide basic needs. This has to take root within the community where change is desired. However, top-down development activities have a history of being decided and controlled by financiers rather than beneficiaries. Implementation as development is a model which Hill (1998), Hajer & Wagenaar (2003), Simon (1997) and Parsons (1995) advocate for, and it is a vehicle

through which policy can result in a life changing experience for people who depend on state intervention.

Hill (1998) argues that policy formulators may not be the initiators of policy, therefore, implementation theory should accommodate legitimate concern of what has been decided upon, making the implementing agency to become accountable and trustworthy to the people. Hood (1976) suggests implementation as perfect administration which has a unitary system with a single line of authority and being coordinated to achieve predetermined objectives. Sabatier & Mazmanian (1979) emphasize implementation as policy management, showing the responsibility of managers in ensuring that policy objectives are achieved.

1.4.6 Implementation Analysis.

Hill (1998) further defines implementation analysis as the development of public administration whereby policy execution is expedited by evaluation research. Hill looks at what happens after a policy has been enacted, and goes beyond assessment to evaluate the implementation itself. This particular process leads to implementation judgment of whether implementation was successful or whether it has failed to meet its objectives. In the context of this study, I shall attempt to follow the process of implementation analysis.

To conclude this section of policy implementation theories applicable to my research, a few approaches have been discussed to show a pool of options available for policy formulators, especially those observing democratic principles. I have tried to position the military dictatorship implementation as a forced process to accomplish the will of the few, disregarding socially upheld sentiments of the rule of law, denial of justice and denying freedom to citizenry. The government agenda as set by those in the inner circle of dictatorial rule will be interrogated in this study so that the implementation process that was followed during the LHWP is brought out and understood. This research will also attempt to find out relevant policy implementation systems that will best interpret the action taken in the implementation of LHWP by government. The theories mentioned here will form a backbone for later analysis.

1.5 Review of Literature

In this review of the literature I focus only upon the literature that has a very direct bearing on this study and upon which I lay the foundation of this study. Located in the field and discourse of policy analysis and development I look at the contributions made by different scholars who interrogated resettlement issues involving big dams construction. Some have investigated the role of the World Bank in project implementation and compensation of affected persons and their communities. The scholars whose works are reviewed in this study include Devitt & Hitchcock (2010), Hildyard (2002), Pottinger (2007), TRDC (1996) Braun (2010), McDonald (2002), Thabane (2000) and Molaoa (2007).

Devitt and Hitchcock (2010) provide an excellent assessment in their work of *'Who Drives Resettlement?'* This work explores the displacement of more than 500 families from the Mohale Basin to give way to the construction of the Mohale Dam Phase 1B of the LHWP. Displaced communities chose to resettle at Ha Theko and other areas of the Maseru District. In this assessment, most large dams that are built to provide power or water to people are associated with governmental negligence of failing to put the well-being of the affected people before profit (Devitt and Hitchcock 2010). Devitt and Hitchcock locate their assessment in the grander scale of development projects. "Large dam projects are often regarded by governments to be in the national interest and therefore take precedence over any local interests" (Devitt and Hitchcock 2010: 57). It appears that governments pursue the creation of bigger projects despite the many human sacrifices these entail. In this case, resettlement and compensation of those resettled are regarded an awkward necessity to be undertaken at the lowest possible cost (Devitt and Hitchcock 2010).

According to Devitt & Hitchcock (2010) management of the Mohale dam construction of Phase 1B was refined after the Katse dam Phase 1A faced some challenges relating to poor policy performance that had resulted in disruptions of local communities and their resources. Hence, a new dedicated organization team to implement and manage effectively was employed. Resettlement planning which had started in the remote Senqunyane Valley in 1995 was carried out by Hunting-Consult 4 Joint Venture for three years (1995-97) and produced a detailed implementation plan for those affected by the Mohale dam resettlement programme. Among the issues planned for development was a compensation and rehabilitation policy for affected people which needed to be carried out according

to the prescriptions of the World Bank standards and procedures (Hunting-Consult 4 Joint Venture 1997).

Housing became the major project within the LHWP as more than 20,000 people had to be resettled across the country. The “LHDA’s legal obligation was to ensure that members of local communities affected by flooding, construction works, or other similar project-related causes maintain a standard of living not inferior to that obtaining at the time of first disturbance” (Devitt & Hitchcock 2010: 71). This directive was supported by the Order of 1986 (Government Gazette). The compensation package policy of 1997 consisted of replacement houses and other facilities (e.g. kraals, livestock pens and latrines). The policy required that house plans should be designed by the LHDA in agreement with affected people who should chose new resettlement places themselves (LHDA 1997). The policy further gave an option to affected people of “taking cash equivalent and build their own new houses or get annual payments for 50 years”. (Devitt & Hitchcock 2010:71). Cash compensation was given to every affected household for loss of arable land, forests/trees, environment and disturbance while compensation for grazing land was given in a form of fodder. Devitt & Hitchcock (2010: 72) confirm that “a top-up payment of US\$0.16 in September 2006 (M7, 5558.80 at 2005 rates) was given to each household to ensure that each affected household remained above the threshold level.”

Hildyard (2000) discusses precautionary measures that need to be put in place in order to guard policy implementation from corruption. He states in his work, *‘The Lesotho Highlands Water Development Project - What Went Wrong?’* how big international institutions flouted guidelines and anti-corruption regulations. This practice was done by offering bribes to decision-makers, such as in the case of Lesotho where the chief executive officer was sentenced to 15 years in prison for taking bribes from a French construction company. This work raises important questions on how best can decision-makers be protected against corruption, and implementation be protected from corruption. Policy implementation ethics need to be developed alongside the enforcement of the WCD guidelines and procedures for compensation standards applicable for resettlement of displaced communities that are forced out of their places to give way to big dam construction projects (Szablowski 2002).

Szablowski (2002) advocates for the improvement of regulations because of daily institutional practices that actively “encourage the flouting of existing development guidelines and anti – corruption regulations” (Szablowski 2002: 2). He further suggests opening up decision-making to public participation and scrutiny, as corruption and bribery are inherent in the Third World. This is the new way of thinking more broadly about policy implementation. Qualified experts, are the ones who should be given responsibilities by the state to design and manage resettlement. His experiences in Peru where communities were displaced to give way to a mine (which was supported by the World Bank) has influenced his approach to using directives (WCD Policy on Resettlement) as benchmarks for a successful policy implementation strategy (Szablowski 2002). The directive that those who were resettled (through Peru’s Compania Minera Antamina land acquisition process) to enjoy a similar or better standard of living afterwards is similar to the Compensation Policy of 1997 which was implemented in Lesotho.

Policy implementation is about carrying out tasks, to accomplish the given tasks and fulfilling assigned responsibilities (Hill 1998). It is a process of engaging policy action to ensure that participants in the process commit to a similar discourse with a hope of reaching a specific outcome. Browne and Wildavsky (1983) modelled implementation “as an endless learning process where the implementers through continuous search processes come up with improved goal functions and more reliable programme technologies” (Hill 1998: 302).

Governance as a form of policy supervision is interrogated further in this study. Peters (2001) defines it as a scarce commodity. “Governments have created a vast array of institutions designed to exercise collective control and influence over the societies and economies for which they have been given responsibility” (Peters 2001: 1). While governments of Lesotho and South Africa put the Treaty in place, other regulations to control policy implementation like compensation framework were the responsibility of the LHDA so that best approaches to achieve the objectives of the Treaty were met timeously and successfully. However, civil servants sometimes resist or change policies in the process of implementation, especially if processes threaten their positions. Failure of the LHDA to apply compensation policy as designed caused misery to the majority of affected households.

1.5.1 Water in Africa

The International Finance Corporation (IFC) which is the World Bank Group's private sector investment arm (furthering economic growth by promoting sustainable development through private sector initiatives in developing member countries) recommended compensation standards rates to be applied consistently throughout the life of the project for resettled communities. Hence, in the Lesotho Water Highlands Project the compensation period for affected households in Lesotho legally (according to Compensation Policy of 1997) covers a period of 50 years. According to the IFC (1990), international rates for resettlement compensation are as follows; maize -US\$40 (M400)² per hector, crop land- US\$273 (M2730) per hector and structures- US\$164 (M1640) per square meter. The LHDA paid resettled households M809 per 3854 sq. m structure, M677 per sq. m outbuilding, and M343 per 11 perimeter area for kraals / stables. For grain and pulses the LHDA gave 70kg of maize for 1056sq m and 3kg packets of pulses for 300 sq. m (LHDA 1997). The figures given to Katse and Mohale dam displaced households are far less than what the World Bank prescribed. This violates international standard rates for compensation of resettled communities as prescribed by the World Bank. In this thesis I explore this further and the perceptions of communities about this.

Pottinger (2007) writes about the development of dams in countries like Tanzania, Uganda, Swaziland, Zambia, South Africa and Lesotho. For my study, Pottinger's evaluation of policy implementation of two dams, one in Tanzania and another in Uganda is most important. In Tanzania, 20000 people were affected by the construction of Lower Kihansi Dam in Kihansi Gorge, built to produce 180 MW electricity. The dam is located in the Kihansi River before the convergence with Ulanga River in Southwest of Dar Es Salaam. The dam is 25 m high. Its main engineering work started in 1995 and it was completed in 1999, officially opened by the President Benjamin Mkapa on 10 July 2000. This hydro-electric project provides 13% of the total electrical power in Tanzania with three turbines operated by Tanzania Electricity Supply Company. The project cost US\$36million.

Pottinger (2007) draws attention to the failure of policy planners for not conducting sufficient investigations to find out the impact of the dam on downstream species, ecosystem and livelihoods

² 1 Maluti is equivalent of 1 South African Rand, and about 10 Maluti to a 1 US Dollar.

before the dam was constructed. “A rare endangered frog and other species were only discovered in the project area after construction had started” (Pottinger 2007: 36). When the project started running the flow of the Kihansi River was reduced by 75% “greatly harming the habitat of the endemic Kihansi Spray Toad and at least two endangered plant species, including a type of wild coffee that grew only in the waterfall spray zone. The spray zone of the falls turned out to be the only habitat of the toad, which now is perilously close to extinct in the wild” (Pottinger 2007: 36). The consequences of the construction of Kihansi dam were disastrous to wild life and ecosystems. This had then urgently required a full and extensive environmental impact assessment. A short-term breeding programme to recreate the spray zone was undertaken. But restoration of the toad to a healthy population failed.

The failure of project planning in the area affected the integrity of the project. When realizing the impact of the project on wildlife, ecosystems and the environment, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) which was one of the funders decided to review its role in the project. When the project was completed in 1999 the ecosystem and environment were seriously harmed. The WCD as a result called for the formation of policies that could protect endangered species from extinction. Pottinger (2007) argues that there is a need for policy reform in order to avoid further negative impacts on the endangered species “and respecting the provisions and guidance of relevant international treaties” (Pottinger 2007: 36).

In Uganda, Bujagali Dam which was built in 2007 to supply electricity and it cost over US\$ 800 million to complete. Pottinger (2007) indicates that funders and donors for this project included the World Bank, EIB and the African Development Bank. It was developed by Bujagali Energy (a Joint venture between US-based Sithe Global Power and Kenya-based Industrial Promotion Services. Pottinger (2007) portrays this project as one of most contested projects where there was substantial protest, yet was funded by multi-national institutions. Ugandan activists protested for many years over the construction of the project which they claimed would have a substantial negative impact on the economy and substantially undermine protection for endangered fisheries (Pottinger 2007). The dam was seen as having the potential to harm Lake Victoria and to increase already high energy prices which, to many ordinary Ugandans, would not be affordable. Pottinger here points to lack of policy communication between policy makers and beneficiaries. The question of affordability and

the negative impact of the dam on Lake Victoria which has endangered fisheries was a concern to many people. Consultations between environmentalists, government and private businesses were lacking, resulting in mass protests from people whom objected to the implementation of the policy (Devitt & Hitchcock 2010). The impact of this project on affected communities is that people were left poorer than they were before resettlement. They were not given legal title to their new lands and their problems were left unresolved for years (Pottinger 2007).

1.6 Methodology

In this research project I adopted a qualitative methodology grounded in an interpretative social sciences meta-theory and the field of policy analysis. The language of preference for the questionnaires was Sesotho, but responses were translated into English, being the reporting language for the dissertation. I adopted the methods of documentary study and interviews for the study.

Documentary Study

The documentary study focused on the LHDA progress reports. The 2002/2003 annual report highlighted the work done on all project areas, including the completion of Mohale dam. Consultancy fieldwork reports, workshops and public meeting reports of different local NGOs, faith-based organizations and journals of different scholars were assessed. The World Bank provided loans and financial management consultancy, and the reports of the Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA), being the representative body of the Republic of South Africa, were studied. The Treaty and compensation policy documents, in particular, were critically analyzed to understand the policy formation and workings of JPTC, LHDA and TCTA, in building Phases 1A & 1B of Katse and Mohale dams, the Muela hydropower project, the Matsoku reservoir and other infrastructures, including construction of access roads. Attached to these operations was the implementation of the compensation policy for affected and resettled communities. Equally important, the work looked at the form and style of the Military Government, which not only authorized the signing of the Treaty with South Africa, but practically ruled Lesotho by decreeing orders during their eight years of dictatorship.

Field Work
Communities

After communicating with chiefs and community leaders in areas where this research was conducted, several meetings with community leaders, individual households and different community structures were held, first at Ha Lejone, Ha Lepaqa, Ha Sepinare and Manganeng in the Katse Dam Region, followed by Ha Thetsane, Ha Tsolo and Ha Matala in the Maseru Urban Area and, later on, at Ha Phaloane, Ha Sekete and Ha Ntsi in the Nazareth relocation area. In one-on-one interviews, only heads of households in 10 villages answered the questionnaires, which were prepared mainly in Sesotho and 80 people were interviewed. The heads of the households were interviewed to understand how they agreed on compensation with the LHDA and what they had received and achieved thus far.

Women (mostly above 45 years old) formed the highest number of household heads per village. They were randomly chosen, according to the level of compensation they received, their age, community status, education level, size of the family, acquired skills and their economic conditions. All the people interviewed vividly remembered their interaction with the LHDA and verbal compensation promises given to them in exchange for their displacement. About 25 participants were men and were found mostly in Ha Matala, Ha Thetsane, Ha Theko and Ha Lejone, with an average age of 35 years. Most of these men were young during the construction of LHWP in the early 1990s, some in school and others looking after family livestock. In this research, women were primarily targeted and 45 of them were interviewed, as they were left to look after families when men went to urban areas and to South African mines and industries in search of jobs, during the LHWP implementation.

For villagers who are able to write, a questionnaire was given to them to answer questions and to express their feelings, ensuring openness and allowing their own individual interpretations. For those who were illiterate, they were helped by their children, mostly daughters-in-law, as literacy is higher among females than males. As for those who had nobody to write for them, the author helped record their responses. This is in keeping with the strong oral tradition of people in the rural areas. The use of a tape recorder met resistance from interviewees, as they suspected that their voices would be taken to LHDA officials to hear them, since they had a pending case against LHDA for refusing to

compensate them properly. Their matter was concluded by a Government Ombudsman in 2009. LHDA were ordered to compensate affected individuals and households according to the terms of the original compensation policy without further delay, but that order has not yet fully been complied with.

The questionnaire was written in Sesotho, to ensure that interviewees clearly understood the questions and could use proper expressions. The sample of the questionnaire, showing the questions, category of the target group, areas, district, and names of villages, but without proper names of interviewee, was translated into English and is attached as Appendix 1. The interviews took more than two months, due to floods that occurred in Lesotho and South Africa.

Government Officials and Experts

Further to the interviews conducted among the affected households in new resettlement areas, former and present government officials who participated in policy decisions, organization and implementation of this project were also interviewed. Three retired government officials who were directly involved in the formation of the policy, and seven others who managed project implementation, were visited for interviews. Three of the current LHDA officials who were approached for comments decided to withdraw from the interviews at the last minute for fear of victimization. A sample of their questionnaire is attached as Appendix 2.

In addition, four officials from organizations that participated in raising questions about the policy of the LHWP and had demanded answers on South Africa/Lesotho relations for the formation of this project, concerning partnerships and the position of displaced communities, were interviewed. They were asked to respond mainly to the questions relating to policy formation, compensation and resettlement of affected households. However, only three officials attended interviews, one withdrawing. Organizations that participated included the Transformation Resource Centre, the Council of Churches of Lesotho, and a consultancy firm (which asked not to be named). Table 1 shows areas where participants in this study originally came from and where they are residing at the moment, including their categories and numbers.

Table 1: Areas of Origin, Current Residence, Categories and Number of Participants

Original Region where participants came from	Resettled/Relocated Areas	Categories of Participants	Number of Participants
Katse Dam Region	Ha Lejone, Ha Lepaqa, Ha Sepinare, Manganeng and Bokong Hillside	Men	16
		Women	11
Total			27
Mohale Dam Region	Ha Thetsane, Ha Tsolo, Ha Matala, Ha Ntsi, Ha Phaloane, and Ha Sekete	Men	16
		Women	27
Total			43
Government Officials	LHDA Field Offices	Current officials	4
		Retired officials	3
NGOs Officials	NGOs Officials: Operating from the capital, Maseru	Consulting firm	1
		Christian Council	1
		Transformation Resource Centre	1
Total			10
Grand Total			80

Table 1 shows that 16 men and 11 women, making a total of 27 participants, originally came from the Katse Dam Region. Sixteen men and 27 women interviewed originally came from the Mohale Dam Region, making a total of 43 participants from this region. Ten other participants (seven from Government service and three from NGOs) were included in these interviews. The gender category for officials is deliberately not mentioned to ensure anonymity of participants. The grand total for participants in this study is 80.

Data Analysis

The method of data analysis used in this study included thematic and content analyses. Thematic analysis was suitable here, as it is a useful tool in understanding and explaining issues emanating

from discussions. Content analysis became useful as the author statistically coded participants to avoid the use of their real names and any loss of information.

The following steps were carried out in analyzing data:

- Organization of data
- Categorization (e.g. similarities, differences, importance)
- Establishment of topics/themes
- Understanding the meaning and cultural interpretations
- Writing reports

1.7 The Plan of the Thesis

In Part One, Chapter 1, I discuss the background to the study, which involves the purpose of the LHWP, issues to be investigated, introduction to the communities of Katse and Mohale areas, the aims of the research, and the methodology. Chapter 2 starts with the origins of the LHWP, followed by the political backgrounds of Lesotho and South Africa during 1986. The Treaty and its provisions are followed by the nature of the LHWP and the conclusion. The focus of this study is on Lesotho water, making special reference to affected households who were relocated or resettled elsewhere, as a result of the construction of the Katse and Mohale dams. This investigation tried to reveal what happened to these communities in relation to promises made to them, and to find out what they are doing now. The specific roles played by South Africa will also feature.

Chapter 3 looks at the governance and management structures of the LHWP during project implementation. These include the Lesotho Highlands Water Commission and its functions, the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority and the Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority and its functions. Thereafter, the author will look at the governance of LHWP within Lesotho and the form and style of the Military Council Government. The system of chieftainship governance will be examined, followed by an investigation into the nature of project governance during the multiparty democracy from 1993 onwards. Here the structure of the LHDA and its administrative functions will feature.

Part Two of this study is Chapters 4 and 5. They look at the implementation of seven socio-economic programmes by LHDA, in an effort to promote development in Lesotho, and comments of officials interviewed about project policy and implementation. The programmes are as follows:

infrastructure development, compensation of affected communities, resettlement and relocation of families to give way to construction of Katse and Mohale dams. Other programmes included capacity building, rural development and tourism. Here the focus will be on what is known about these programmes, what was done and not done. The presentation of these programmes in this study is given separately for Katse and Mohale dam regions. Katse Dam Region is leading the discussions, followed by Mohale Dam Region within the theoretical framework of these seven socio-economic programmes of LHDA. The views of government officials and independent consultants/leaders of non-governmental organizations who became involved in LHWP activities have been questioned on matters relating to compensation policy implementation. This will be followed by a conclusion.

Part Three of this study starts with Chapter 6, which investigates the effects of LHDA socio-economic programmes for resettlement, particularly concentrating on affected households in the following resettlement areas: Ha Lejone, Ha Lepaqa, Ha Sepinare and Manganeng. Bokong Hillside will also be investigated, as some households were relocated there by LHDA's relocation programme. Chapter 7 will follow the same trend of enquiries, but will focus on the Mohale Dam Region. Resettlement areas that will be investigated include Maseru Urban (Ha Thetsane, HaTsolo and Ha Matala), while relocated areas are at the foothills of Machache Mountain Range in the area of Ha Theko (Ha Ntsi, Ha Phaloane and Ha Sekete). These areas fall within the District of Maseru.

In chapter 8 I explore in depth the consequences of resettlement and relocation programmes for development of affected households. In chapter 9 I provide a conclusion for the dissertation in which I consider the potential role of the LHWP in poverty alleviation and discuss the theoretical developments that emerge from this dissertation.

Chapter 2

The Political Background, Treaty and Nature of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project

Introduction

Chapter 2 will commence with the origins of this project. The political context which prevailed in the Kingdom of Lesotho, particularly in 1986, will then be examined, as the Treaty to build Katse and Mohale dams was signed on 24 October 1986. This will be followed by a description of the political situation in the Republic of South Africa during the same period. At this time South Africa was faced with widespread protests from black communities against discriminative policies from within the country. A number of attacks were carried out by members of the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO) against targets in South Africa, from outside the country. South Africa was internationally condemned for its apartheid policy and isolated. Lesotho was at this time under a military dictatorship. I discuss the Treaty and its provisions followed by the nature of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project.

South Africa's need for water brought these two countries together in a Treaty. Lesotho developed the hydropower station, and in return, South Africa agreed to pay royalties as well as compensation for affected households. Despite regional tensions which prevailed between these two countries during the time of the Treaty, the focus to undertake this mutually agreed project was carried out without protest.

2.1 The Origins of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project

Water is the main focus here and the reason that South Africa asked Lesotho for water was a water shortage due to prolonged drought in the region which had become a serious concern to the South African government. South Africa had known as early as the 1950s about water shortages in its territory. The British Representative, Sir Evelyn Baring, who administered Lesotho for Britain, suggested that Lesotho had the potential for water harvest. South Africa pursued Lesotho towards this end, especially after it became clear that Britain had decided to grant independence to Lesotho. It was then that the original idea of collecting water in Lesotho to sell to South Africa became a sustainable economic plan. The Treaty to construct two dams in Lesotho was signed at Maseru

Stadium on October 24, 1986, by Colonel Thaabe Letsie, who represented the Kingdom of Lesotho and Mr. Pik Botha, who represented the Republic of South Africa. Both representatives were foreign ministers of their respective countries at the time.

The circumstances under which the treaty was signed were grounded on compensating the affected communities who had to be relocated and resettled elsewhere as a result of construction of Phase 1A and 1B of the project. Compensation was financed by the South African Government, while the Kingdom of Lesotho was responsible for the Muela hydropower development in the Butha-Butha district. Funding for construction of the Katse and Mohale dams was sought in the form of loans from different international funding organizations, such as the World Bank and African Development Bank. Some of these loans were to be repaid by the Republic of South Africa (funding is discussed later in the thesis).

The signing of the Treaty was handled as a secretive operation on the side of Lesotho. Tsikoane (1991: 119) insists: “The Lesotho Highlands Water Project has been effected without ever being opened for a national debate, contrary to public utterances and promises made by King Moshoeshoe II in the post-1986 era.” Although this project was seen as beneficial for affected communities, their participation in designing and implementation was minimal. The political background to the project during the time of the Treaty, starting with Lesotho, will now be examined.

2.2 The Political Background of Lesotho during 1986

Lesotho has a population of approximately two million people. It is completely surrounded by the Republic of South Africa. The first pre-independence elections to introduce democratic rule in this Protectorate Territory³ took place in 1965, in order to pave the way for independence, which Britain had prepared for Lesotho to become a democratic country. Chief Sekhonyana Nehemiah Maseribane of the Basutoland National Party became the first Prime Minister after the 6 May 1965 general elections, as his party had a slim majority win. Chief Joseph Leabua Jonathan, who was the founder of the same party lost his seat in Kolonyama, his home constituency. As a result, the Basutoland National Party put his name up again for re-election, which he won during the by-elections of 7 July 1965. As a result, Chief Joseph Leabua Jonathan became the first Prime Minister of independent Basutoland (later called the Kingdom of Lesotho), after it was given independence by Britain on 4 October 1966.

Chief Leabua Jonathan, as the Prime Minister, moved a motion for constitutional monarchy in Lesotho, something that was later supported by parliament. Mothibe (1998:3) elaborates:

In the pre-independence general elections held on the 29th April 1965, the Basotho National Party (BNP) led by Chief Leabua Jonathan won a narrow majority of 31 seats against the combined 29 seats of the opposition. The BNP government thus stood in constant jeopardy of being voted out of power in the event that its members fell below 29. This situation was compounded by King Moshoeshoe's open hostility to the independence constitution which relegated him to a constitutional monarch without executive power.

After Jonathan won by-elections on 7 July 1965 and the British government transferred executive powers to him to form a government, King Moshoeshoe II became a constitutional monarch and head of state. This constitutional monarch system of governance is similar to the Westminster British form of investing executive powers in the Prime Minister, while the Queen remains a symbolic authoritative figure only. However, in Lesotho the monarch tried to put forward his interest in having political power, but it was suppressed by Jonathan, who wanted executive powers to be his alone.

³ Basutoland was a Protectorate Territory of the British Government inside South Africa in the mid 19th century against the attacks of the Boers who intended to conquer it.

Jonathan, like other regional front line states' leaders of Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Angola, did not enjoy good relations with South Africa, as the regime there imposed its apartheid policy. Nkiwane (1997:5) pointed out: "South Africa throughout the 1970s systematically used the threat or the actual use of force and economic sanctions as foreign policy instruments in the South African sub-region." Lesotho, as a neighbouring state, was accused by South Africa of harbouring members of the ANC, PAC and AZAPO, who opposed the racist minority rule and engaged in an armed struggle, attacking some targets in South Africa.

Jonathan had a similar charge against South Africa for harbouring the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) that was responsible for attacking targets in Lesotho, with the full knowledge of the South African government. Makoa (1991:175) states: "playing on the political divisions, Pretoria used the LLA to destabilize Lesotho." In spite of these political problems the opportunity of getting water resources from Lesotho was prioritized by the regime in South Africa and given full support by the parliament of South Africa.

Jonathan approved the assessment and feasibility study to be carried out, after being consulted by the South African authorities. The study was carried out to find out the best way in which environmental care could be upheld, before any construction of the dams was approved. The study started in August 1983 and was undertaken by Lahmeyer MacDonald Consortium (German- British origin). Tsikoane (1991: 113) stressed that the "Lesotho Highlands Water Project is at the centre of Lesotho and Republic of South Africa relations." He added that the Lesotho Highlands Water Project was not only about Lesotho's economic development, but also about changing the political environment in southern Africa.

The National Assembly of Lesotho reported that there was an internal political crisis in August 1985. Jonathan's party, the BNP, was the only one that went to the polls, after all opposition parties had refused to participate. The National Assembly Report (1998:4) stated that other political parties were "citing the government's refusal to publish the electoral roll." The report revealed that, in all 60 seats, only BNP candidates went ahead for nomination in August, after which the government declared that elections went ahead and BNP candidates were elected unopposed. This step led to the brewing of tensions between government and political parties, churches and non-governmental

organizations in Lesotho, as most people in Lesotho saw the elections as illegitimate. Jonathan's administration had enemies within and outside the country.

Despite the on-going feasibility study of the potential of building dams to supply water to South Africa, the apartheid regime imposed a month-long (November 1985) blockade, denying Lesotho nationals entrance and free travel to South Africa and frustrating business efforts made by Lesotho companies. Matlosa & Pule (2001) claim that the blockade opened a window for a policy alternative, in which Major General Lekhanya and his colleagues secretly held talks with Pretoria concerning conditions under which the South African regime would re-open the borders with Lesotho. Some of those conditions were to oust Jonathan from power, expelling ANC, PAC and AZAPO cadres who repeatedly attacked South African targets from Lesotho and to agree on the implementation of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. Eldredge (1989) had earlier indicated that Lekhanya was not only pressurized by Pretoria, but also by the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), which was formed by the Basotho Congress Party, which opposed Jonathan's rule. This military wing was led by the Leballo faction, which was determined to end Jonathan's rule by force, as they also attacked Lesotho. LLA had its base in QwaQwa, just across the Butha-Buthe northern district of Lesotho. It inflicted losses in the Lesotho army, panic and fear in society and constant attacks on targets in Lesotho.

Meanwhile, the BNP youth brigade were alleged to have acquired dangerous weapons from North Korea and, being armed, were planning a coup. They conducted roadblocks on the main roads from Maseru, the capital, and the police seemed to have been reduced to nothing, as politically the BNP youth had the Prime Minister's support for terrorizing people. Eldredge (1989:20) says:

When the coup occurred, it was staged by the Police Military Unit (PMU) against the Youth League which was under the influence of two of Jonathan's ministers. Jonathan, himself influenced by these ministers, had refused to curb the activities of the armed BNP Youth, and the power of the PMU was distinctly threatened.

When the news of the military coup emerged Eldredge (Nov 1989: 20), explained: "the timing of the coup on 19 January 1986 is said to have been in response to knowledge that the BNP Youth League were themselves planning a coup for the following day". This meant that the military acted swiftly to frustrate the plan of the youth league, as it was not clear whether they planned a coup against Jonathan or against forces planning to overthrow him. Although the military was blamed for the

coup, it is alleged that their action was a response to the potential threat of the BNP youth brigade. Pitso (1986:20) describes the fear that had crippled the nation:

A magistrate who could not be named for professional reasons, said he was happy that the Jonathan government had been overthrown. He told us that after 20 years of fear under the ruthless rule of the old government, people could at last return to a normal life.

Jonathan's government at the time was well aware that the LLA's attacks into Lesotho were being carried out from neighbouring South Africa. This strained Lesotho-South African relations even further. Looking at the situation, Makoa (1991:175) said: "Playing on the political divisions, Pretoria used the LLA to destabilize Lesotho until Jonathan was overthrown by a military coup on January 20, 1986". Nkiwane (1997:4) refers to the determination of Jonathan in defying the apartheid regime:

Leabua tried to diversify the sources of Lesotho's economic and political support outside the country in defiance of South Africa. This led to a 28 day long blockade of Lesotho by South Africa in December 1985. This blockade prompted a military coup in January 1986.

Here Jonathan is portrayed as a hero, who was not only looking for self-determination of his landlocked country, but also demonstrating his intention of joining other freedom fighters in the campaign against apartheid. As Lesotho was dependent on South African trade, employment, international travel and food supply, the blockade became unbearable, especially because geographically Lesotho is entirely surrounded by South Africa. The business community suffered the most, while emergency health services from Lesotho seeking better-equipped hospitals in the Free State were hampered. Frequent crossing of Lesotho miners working in South African mining industries became badly affected. Economically, Lesotho at that time generated surely either gross or net profit from South Africa, making it dependent on South Africa in many ways. Nkiwane (1997: 4) attested that: "Lesotho historically has relied on South Africa for employment, particularly in the mines, and remittances by Lesotho's migrant labourers account for approximately 40% of its GNP." This made it clear that in January 1986 Lesotho still got 40% of its GNP from income of migrant labourers hired in South Africa.

As a result, Lekhanya ousted Jonathan. His Military Council expelled South African freedom fighters of the ANC, PAC and AZAPO and closed their bases in Lesotho soon after assuming office. To confirm that South Africa was behind the coup in Lesotho, and had put its political instructions on the Lesotho military table, Makoia (1991:180) stated: “this view was strengthened by the expulsion of hundreds of the African National Congress cadres soon after the military takeover.” Some of these cadres were working and connecting to the world through Lesotho, or studying. The conditions were fulfilled without sparing those who were pursuing their studies at the National University of Lesotho in Roma and were expelled from the country, some without completing their studies. This is why Tsikoane (1991: 117) has emphasized: “With this treaty one can say the Military Council sacrificed the spirit of comradeship that was aspired by Leabua for deporting South African liberation movement activists from Lesotho.” Nkiwane (1997:5) confirms that, afterwards: “Lekhanya restored close relations with South Africa and adopted a power-sharing arrangement with King Moshoeshoe II, who had been reduced to a figurehead by Jonathan”.

Meanwhile, commotion occurred in the barracks during the coup which resulted in the death of two top military commanders who were loyal to Jonathan’s administration. One of these was Brigadier Matjota Ramotsekhoane, who was the second-in-command of the Lesotho Para-Military Unit (LPMU). Ramotsekhoane was a potential threat to Lekhanya and the regime suspected that he would be leading the protest against the coup leaders as “he appeared sympathetic to Jonathan’s rule” (Business Day, March 11, 1986). He was announced dead in custody a day after he was arrested by the military, who claimed that he had suffered a heart attack, a natural death (Business Day, March 11, 1986)

Mothibe (1998) narrates the events which occurred during the coup, whereby another top military official called Colonel Sehlabo Sehlabo, was blamed for mutiny against the coup. Sehlabo was based at the Makoanyane barracks, where the major armoury was located and at the time commanded a battalion of the commandos who handled superior arms. Sehlabo is also said to have died of a heart attack whilst in custody. These two officials were amongst Jonathan loyalists and they both died in custody. Matlosa & Pule (2001) insist that after these events military rule was strengthened in Lesotho.

Mothibe (1998: 7) stated: “Following the coup, the military, through its Order No. 1, vested nominal executive and legislative powers with King Moshoeshoe II who was advised by a six-man Military Council”. This was the formation of the government which Lekhanya was heading. In this political arrangement, the King was allowed to appoint a council of ministers, while the military installed its own officers to head ministries, and this military-monarchy government suspended political activities. Mothibe explains the intention of the power-sharing regime as, “to suspend all party political activities until such time as the goal of national reconciliation shall have been achieved and a new constitution shall have been agreed upon and for connected purposes,” (Mothibe 1998:7). This became the state of affairs in Lesotho.

The change of guard, as far as decision-making positions were concerned, paralyzed administration, because most senior officers who had aligned themselves with the BNP government in terms of political ideology could not be trusted by the military regime. As a result, a change of administration leadership occurred and the King appointed his brother to the list of new ministers, as well as giving him the responsibility of reviewing constitutional matters. Thabane (1998:41 clarifies:

The Ad-Hoc Committee was chaired by the king’s brother, Chief Mathealira Seeiso, who was also minister of Interior and Chieftainship Affairs.

With the lack of skills within the military ranks, it became imperative for the junta to employ and lobby others whom they could trust to help in policy engineering and good governance. As a result, Motsoahae Thabane was engaged by the military regime as a strategist to assist in organizing the administration, thanks to his skills in the previous government:

Thabane served as Principal Secretary for Health under Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan and then served in the government under the military regime that overthrew Jonathan⁴.

Kelebone Maope was also recruited and given top posts under the military regime:

As a member of the BCP, Maope served as attorney-general and minister of justice under the military regime that ruled Lesotho from 1986⁵.

⁴ Biography of Motsoahae Thabane from the Wikipedia website. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/tom_thabane, 18 January 2012

⁵ Biography of Kelebone Maope from the Wikipedia website, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/kelebone_maope, 18 January 2012

To end the account of Lesotho's political context it is worth indicating that the effects of the coup had a negative impact on Jonathan's health. He became sick and, after being kept under house arrest for a year, died of a heart attack the following year, on 5 April 1987. After presenting this political background, we can now proceed to look at the political events in South Africa during the period of the Treaty.

2.3 The Political Background of South Africa during 1986

South Africa during this time was widely condemned by the international community for its apartheid policy and violence against African communities. The Commonwealth Conference of October 1985 had sent “a team of highly placed Commonwealth ‘eminent persons’, who had been charged by the October 1985 Commonwealth conference to try to seek a solution to the South African impasse” (Readers’ Digest 1988:481). This team included Australian Prime Minister, Malcom Fraser, and Nigerian military ruler, Olesegun Obasanjo, who had several meetings with South Africa, but their attempts failed to produce the desired result of the end to apartheid and the release of all political prisoners. Instead of the South African government moving towards this proposal, its commandos attacked alleged ANC operational posts in Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe on 19 May 1986.

The answer was devastating: a three–prolonged raid on alleged ANC bases in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Botswana, on the very day that the Eminent Persons Group arrived in South Africa for a final round of negotiations (Readers’ Digest 1988:481).

These attacks not only upset the Commonwealth and Southern African Development Community (SADC), but also intensified high racial tensions in South Africa, where serious attacks were carried out in South Africa by freedom fighters who opposed the racist minority regime. Combatants from the ANC and PAC had assembled outside South Africa, receiving military training, academic development and enjoying diplomatic recognition and financial support from other countries around the world to fight the regime. In South Africa, people were living under a State of Emergency. Santho & Sejanamane (1991) stated that when South Africa was negotiating with Lesotho to sign a treaty to construct the dams, it was also at the same time attacking smaller countries like Lesotho which opposed to its apartheid policy. A state of emergency in South Africa was meant to silence the oppressed masses, and to deny them freedom.

Commenting further on South African government’s resistance to political reform and terrorization of neighbouring states, Readers’ Digest (1998) indicates that Archbishop Desmond Tutu made a presentation to the United Nations Assembly in New York on 16 June 1986, asking the United Nations to isolate South Africa further because of its apartheid policy. The United Nations Security Council approved this proposal on 18 June 1986, prohibiting members of the United Nations from trading with South Africa, putting economic sanctions against South Africa and political isolation in

force. Schweizerischer National fonds (2000.1) confirms that “in 1986 –about 40 years after the beginning of Apartheid- South Africa’s most important trading partners (the USA, the EC, and Japan) imposed economic sanctions.” The frontline states (Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe) in addition, became vociferous for the liberation of African communities in South Africa as well as agitating for democratic rule.

It was during this political turmoil that South Africa signed the treaty with Lesotho over the supply of water. But in order for its loan application to succeed, Lesotho covered up by pretending to be a borrower from international agencies like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, European Development Fund, African Development Bank and other funding agencies around the globe. Tsikoane (1991: 112) says:


It was the Lesotho Kingdom that was introduced to multi-national finance institutions as direct beneficiary of LHWP, although Republic of South Africa undertook to become a guarantee and commitment to service the loan should Lesotho fail.

With this political background, we can now move on to look at the Treaty and its provisions.

2.4 The Treaty and Its Provisions

Here we shall focus on what is it that was agreed upon by the Lesotho and South African governments, i.e. to successfully supply water to reach Gauteng province via the Vaal Dam in South Africa. See Map 5.

LHWP - PROJECT MAP



Map 5: Source –LHDA 2002.

The purpose of the Treaty was to safeguard the interests and intentions of both countries, since South Africa needed water from Lesotho and Lesotho expected a reasonable payment for its water, so that it could start on its socio-economic development programmes and electricity needs. Article 8 (vii) of the Treaty (1986) referred to the ownership of the project, and here it is categorically clear that “ownership remains with the party in whose territory the facilities are built.” In pursuit of this goal, the morning of 24 October 1986, which was less than a year of Military Council rule in Lesotho, saw the Treaty being signed in Maseru, after being drafted by two teams (one from South Africa and another from Lesotho). The participants involved in designing and formulating the treaty included legal experts, consultants and engineers from both countries. The following were key provisions on which the LHWP Treaty between these two regimes were grounded:

- a. Technical bodies for project implementation
- b. Infrastructure and hydropower development
- c. Environmental action plan
- d. Socio-economic development
- e. Funding and finance
- f. Royalties for Lesotho

(a) Technical Bodies for Project Implementation

Looking at what was agreed upon by both countries, three technical bodies were established as part of the Treaty, to supervise the implementation of the project. The first was called the Joint Permanent Technical Commission (JPTC), which had three representatives each from both countries. When commenting on the role of the JPTC, LHDA (May 1990: 6) stated that: “The Joint Permanent Technical Commission is established to ensure that the obligations are fulfilled and to protect the rights of each country.” On successful implementation of the strategy, this commission changed its name to the Lesotho Highlands Water Commission (LHWC), before Phase 1A of this project was completed. Other functions and the authority of this body are presented in sub-heading (i) below.

The Lesotho Highlands Development Authority (LHDA) was the second body established by the Lesotho Government under the Treaty as the implementing arm of the Lesotho Government. Third was the Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA), as well as the operational arm of the Government of South Africa. The functions and powers of these two bodies are explained separately in sub-headings (ii) and (iii) below.

(i) The Legal Functions of the Lesotho Highlands Water Commission

Starting with the LHWC, after the project had successfully started rolling in 1989, LHDA (2001: 2) suggested that it was during the implementation phases that the project review team on its assessment decided under Protocol V1 to revise the governance of the project “to reflect its true nature,” (LHDA 2001:2), as well as changing the name to that of the LHWC, in September 1996.

During the course of the project’s implementation, certain changes to its governance became essential. This protocol changed the name of the Joint Permanent Technical Commission to the Lesotho Highlands Water Commission (LHWC), endorsed its responsibility for the success of the project and recognized the changed role of TCTA

beyond the auspices of the LHWP (LHDA 2001:2).

This bi-national body had been vested with the powers to design, monitor and assess the performance of the project and to make decisions leading to good governance and successful international relations between these two countries. It also had advisory responsibility to these countries on the best technical ways of accomplishing the objectives determined for the LHWP. This means the team of six persons continually assessed the performance of the project against the treaty and other implementation policies formulated for the smooth running of the project. Each management or technical committee has its own time-table for consultations and monitoring, in order to draw up a comprehensive report for both governments when such a report is needed.

In addition to its mandate, the LHWC is expected to advise the LHDA on tender procedures, the keeping of documentations/records, allocation of costs and financial arrangements, which include budgeting and cash flow forecasts. This is confirmed on LHDA (2001:5) Report of the LHWP that “LHWC has a monitoring; advisory and approval function with regard to the project implementation in Lesotho.” This body is also entrusted with ensuring effective and efficient financial administration of the project. It is not only limited to resources administration, but as a referee in times of disputes, meaning that any complaints about payment or meeting agreed standards, as well as safety, are handed over to this body to solve.

(ii) The Legal Functions of the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority

The functions of the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority are statutory by nature. This body has been formed by the Government of Lesotho and given decision-making powers to manage and control this project successfully. Roberts (*et al.*, 1995: 5) confirm that “the LHDA has responsibility for the technical and engineering aspects of the project, together with the social and environmental aspects which are the responsibility of the Environment Division”. Its primary role is to manage the project within Lesotho, meaning the operations and maintenance of all dams, infrastructure and tunnels power stations. In addition, LHDA is to plan and supervise social programmes of compensation, resettlement, rural development and sustainable livelihoods, especially for affected households. Detter (1994: 9) explains:

LHDA is an autonomous statutory parastatal body and is entrusted with the implementation of that part of the LHWP which is located within the boundaries of Lesotho. It is responsible for arranging the necessary funding and implementing project plans as well as the design, construction, operation and maintenance of the project facilities in Lesotho.

(iii) The Legal Functions of the Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority

The third institution is The Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority, as an operational arm of the Republic of South Africa, with a similar legal and operational mandate to oversee the successful transfer of water into South African territory. Working in collaboration with LHDA, this body facilitates all the necessary tools for water to reach its destination, namely Gauteng province, through the Ash River. See Map 6.



Map 6: Source- LHDA 2002.

This is what the LHDA Public Relations office said about the functions of the TCTA:

The Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA) takes care of the delivery tunnel transporting the water over (or rather, under) the border (the Caledon River) to the Ash River, as well as all structures required to integrate and control the flow of Lesotho water in the river (LHDA 2001:1).

The interrelationship between the TCTA and the Lesotho Highlands Water Commission (LHWC) concerns operations and maintenance issues, but for other matters pertaining to the project this body is accountable to the South African Government.

Now that we have discussed the legal functions of LHWC, LHDA and TCTA, the operational functions of LHWC and LHDA appear in the next chapter. Now what was actually agreed upon for this project to include will be discussed.

(b) Infrastructure and Hydropower Development

The first requirement to pave the way for construction of the dams in Lesotho was to put proper infrastructure in place. By infrastructure is meant the construction of roads and bridges to reach the intended dam sites. It also refers to the building of hospitals, clinics, houses, schools and shops, which were needed for contracted personnel and their families during the period of their work in the area. LHDA (1990:22) confirms that “one advantage of improving roads in Lesotho is providing new or improved access opportunities for many isolated communities.” Secondly, a hydropower station to supply electricity during the construction was needed and this project was planned to be built at Muela, in the northern district of Butha-Butha. Construction in the Katse region was classified as Phase 1A, while construction in the Mohale region was classified as Phase 1B. These activities are further discussed at length in Section 2.5, where the nature of the project as a whole is discussed.

(c) Environmental Action Plan

The Environmental Action Plan remains a major provision in the Treaty, as many people affected by resettlement or relocation had to be compensated before the project could be implemented. Two main objectives, namely Social welfare (including health care) and environmental care are central in this agreement. That is why the Compensation Plan, Public Health Care, and Rural Development are explicit in the Treaty. They are briefly shown below, but discussed at length in Chapter 4. In the Phase 1A dam areas, about 83 villages, with an estimated 916 households, were to be surveyed. In the Phase 1B dam areas about 46 villages, with more than 600 households, were to be surveyed, for either resettlement or relocation.

(i) Compensation Plan

Compensation to families directly affected by this project was agreed upon in Article 15 of the Treaty (1986) whereby South Africa was responsible for providing money to compensate surveyed families for their losses. LHDA (1994) in its report confirmed that “the approved compensation policy makes provision for the compensation of both individuals and communities for the loss of houses, commercial premises, grazing or arable land” (LHDA 1994:10). The implementation of the compensation policy is discussed in detail, in Chapter 4.

(ii) Public Health Care

Public health care formed part of the Treaty under the environmental action plan. LHDA (1990:22) clearly stated: “the nature of construction and the size of the workforce will inevitably lead to serious accidents.” Therefore arrangements had to be made before the start of construction to prepare for handling accidents and sickness that could occur as people moved around project areas.

(iii) Rural Development

Still under the same Treaty, rural development, which included range management, was accommodated under this scheme. LHDA (1992: 22) cautioned: “One of the most serious effects of the LHWP on the local population is the loss of land.” A total area of 4 720 hectares was going to be lost and affected rural communities with less than 15% of Lesotho’s land suitable for cultivation would meet undesirable consequences if the Treaty did not attend to this matter. More details on rural development are given in Chapter 4.

(d) Socio-economic Development

In Article 15 of the Treaty the welfare of affected communities is cardinal, in that agriculture, income restoration and tourism become some of the main sectors to improve socio-economic conditions of affected communities, as confirmed in the Resettlement and Development Programme (LHDA 1997:6):

The development programme should be regarded as an integral part of the total compensation package. It is intended to benefit, in order of priority, the affected households and villages; the host communities and those remaining in the Scheme Area; and the whole population of the region in which the Scheme Area is located.

This programme is accommodated in the Treaty in order to ensure that economic conditions of affected households do not deteriorate to a level lower than where they were before their displacement. Hence, LHDA was expected to design this kind of a programme to address socio-economic needs of affected households, prior to project implementation. The implementation of this programme is discussed at length in Chapter 4.

(e)Funding and Finance

According to the Treaty, the availability of funds formed the backbone for the construction of this project. Hence, the Treaty insists that South Africa is taking the responsibility of paying for water transfer into its territory, while Lesotho incurs costs for hydroelectric power and ancillary development, as stated by the LHDA (1986:1):

Importantly, the Treaty also defined the responsibility of each country as concerns payment for the project. South Africa was to pay for everything relating to the transfer of water, including the implementation, operation and maintenance costs of all facilities involved, as well as compensation for displacement of individuals and communities.

The provision for financing the construction of both Katse and Mohale dams required loans and the Republic of South Africa guaranteed to pay back loans, even though Lesotho would be introduced as a borrower to financial institutions. This is how financial planning under this scheme would be carried out. Tsikoane (1991: 112) confirms:

It was the Lesotho Kingdom that was introduced to multi-national finance institutions as direct beneficiary of LHWP, although RSA undertook to become a guarantee and made a commitment to service the loan should Lesotho fail.

Further details on funding and finance are given in Chapter 3 under the sub-heading 3.3.3, Project Administration.

(f) Royalties for Lesotho

Article 12 of the Treaty (1986) explains how royalty payments (in financial terms) are to be given to Lesotho in exchange for water delivered to South Africa. “All royalty payments and payments in terms of paragraph (18) shall be deposited in a special account designated by Lesotho at the Central Bank of Lesotho” (paragraph 26 of Article 12). Paragraph 18 is important in that it shows the first term of this agreement, which expires on 31 December 2044, making it a 50-year contract, starting in January 1995, when water was expected to be delivered to Gauteng province in South Africa. The figure below shows LHDA’s projected income between 1995 (for Phase 1A) and 2002 (for Phase 1B), when the completion of both dams was expected. Therefore, royalties for Lesotho for the first seven-year period under the treaty was expected in 2001 to reach the amount of \$12.5 million.




Figure 1: Source- LHDA 2002.

According to the agreement, the process of claiming payment for South Africa is that the Lesotho Government issues a monthly invoice to the South African Government, which must be settled within thirty calendar days, failing which six percent interest is added per annum. The Lesotho Highlands Water Commission has powers to manage any disputes arising as a result of no, or delayed, payments, states the LHDA 1986:66:

Any dispute in respect of royalty payments and payments in terms of paragraph (18) as invoiced by the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority shall be settled by the Joint Permanent Technical Commission.


This concludes the provisions of the Treaty and we now move on to look at the nature of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project itself, in the following section.

2.5 The Nature of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project

In this section I focus on the nature of the project, meaning what is done and known about it. Lesotho, through Katse Dam Phase 1A, delivered the “first LHWP water to South Africa on January 8th, 1998,” according to the LHDA (2001:33) in a celebration which officially opened water delivery by King Letsie III and President Nelson Mandela, at Muela. This was followed by another official opening of the Muela Hydroelectric Power Station on 22 January 1999, by the Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili. Phase 1B, which is the Mohale Dam, was completed in 2001, making this whole project fully operational by 2002, when the completion of LHWP was celebrated by Lesotho and South Africa. The following is the story showing the nature of this project as a whole.

Katse Dam-Phase 1A

The very essence of this Phase 1A project was three-fold. Firstly, the 72 MW Muela Hydropower Development was located in Butha-Buthe district near Oxbow, north of the Katse dam, and nearly 80 km of tunnels running through the Lesotho highlands, delivering water from Muela Dam into the Ash River in South Africa. Secondly, the construction of the northern access road passing through Katse reservoir, which is connected to the main Katse Dam. And thirdly, the construction of the Katse Dam itself. The tunnels connect Katse reservoir, Katse dam, Mohale reservoir, Matsoku diversion weir and Mohale Dam in the south. Katse dam is situated in the Thaba-Tseka district, as shown Map 7.



Map7: Source-LHDA 1994.

(a) Muela Hydropower Development and Tunneling

The work here started in 1989, with the generation of hydroelectricity. The construction of Muela dam and tunnelling operations ran concurrently. It was hoped to finish them by 1997, but there was a two-year delay. The construction of new or upgraded roads (shown later) for easy access to the Katse dam, and upstream tunnelling sites in the mountains, were joined in this Phase 1A, as well, as stated by LHDA (1994:2):

Phase 1A was designed to deliver 18m/s of water to South Africa and to generate 72MW of hydroelectricity for Lesotho. It includes construction of two dams (Katse and Muela), excavation of 82 km of tunnels about 5m in diameter, and construction of an underground power-station.

(i) Muela Hydropower Development

The Muela hydropower station (see Figure 2) became a cornerstone for construction, in terms of generating the required power for tunnelling, construction and providing electricity needs for Lesotho.




Figure 2: Source –LHDA 1994.

This hydropower development was the sole responsibility of the Lesotho Government after the signing of the treaty, to ensure that enough and reliable power was generated during the tunnelling and other construction work. The power supply covered areas of Matsoku weir, Katse reservoir and Muela dam. The Muela hydropower station was seen as very important for the project, as “it will be able to provide almost all of Lesotho’s electricity needs, reducing the dependency on imports,” emphasized LHDA (1990:5).

The 72 MW underground power station (intended to be improved to 120 MW) is designed in such a way that extensions for any future phases can be added. This means the power station in Figure 2 will be able to handle any electricity needs for construction of additional dams in Mashai, Mokhotlong, or anywhere future projects dictate. Caswell Tlali (Dec 2012: 3) adds: “The Katse and Mohale dams transfer more than 40 million litres of water into the Vaal River system a day and generate 72MW of electricity for Lesotho.”

Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Training became critical in this project, as staff responsible for operating and maintaining Muela hydropower station had to meet specific standards. For example, South African Eskom offered to train LEC personnel that would maintain the station, while the European Union offered training opportunities in European institutions in the form of scholarships and short-term training (LHDA 1994). These efforts helped Lesotho to train its own people for operations and maintenance of the Muela electrical project. Figure 3 shows where the tunnels are built.

(ii) Tunnelling Operations




Figure 3: Source-LHDA 1994.

Tunneling operations were central to the Muela Hydropower Development, as all aspects of the LHWP had to be accessed and supplied with electricity. This is why nearly 80km tunnels through Butha-Buthe district had to be constructed. (LHDA 1994: 7) explains that “a tunnel system of nearly 80 km was excavated to create a conduit for water from Katse intake across the border between Lesotho and South Africa to the Ash River Outfall.” Referring to the design of the plan LHDA (1994:7) emphasized that: “a more than 200 m differential head allows the water to gravitate over

this distance. The tunnel conduit drops nearly 100 m at the Muela Hydropower site,” allowing a 45 km Katse dam transfer tunnel, 15km southern delivery tunnel from the Tail Pond Dam to the Caledon River and a further 22km to the Ash River in the Eastern Free State, to successfully transfer water to the intended destination.

Figure 4 shows the 55m high, 6 million cubic metre capacity tail-pond dam, built on the Nqoe River, to provide the headwater for continuation of water delivery into South Africa.




Figure 4: Source- LHDA 1994.

In essence, the Muela hydropower project helped Lesotho to reduce power dependency on South Africa, as indicated during the reporting of LHDA activity plans that: “Lesotho currently imports all its electricity requirements from South Africa. But, by late 1997, the Muela hydropower complex should be able to provide the major part of Lesotho’s electricity needs, reducing the dependence on imports,” (LHDA 1994:5).

Katse reservoir is linked to the dam by two separate transfer tunnels for water to flow out of Lesotho into the Ash River in the Eastern Free State, something that attracts tourists to the area, (LHDA 2000:2):

The Ash River outlet, near Clarens in the Free State, has become a popular tourist site, offering displays and information on the LHWP. Here, the sparkling water from the LHWP reservoirs surges from the tunnel outlet into the Ash River and onwards to quench the thirst of Gauteng.

Figure 5 shows that there are two outlet valves, allowing 50% of the water to be diverted down the Caledon River to the Welbedacht Dam, so that it flows through to the eastern central Free State.



Figure 5: Source- LHDA 2002.

It was with the help of hydropower development that infrastructure for accommodation, offices, recreation facilities, schools and clinics were built in Butha-Buthe, Katse Village and in Clarens, South Africa, where a total of nearly 6 500 people were employed on the project. In the Leribe district, the hospital was upgraded to handle casualties (serious injuries) and sicknesses, and this was strengthened by the reliable power supply from the Muela source. LHDA (1994: 3) confirms that, “at all these sites, water and electricity were important commodities and often had to be supplied over long distances and rough terrain. An amount of R80 million was spent on the supply of electricity”. Phase 1B includes Mohale and Matsoku Diversion Dams that are connected to the Katse reservoir by tunnels. The construction of the northern access road will be described in the next section.

(b) Construction of the Northern Access Road

The construction of nearly 426 km of access road from Pitseng and penetrating right into the highland areas where the building of the dams was planned, started in 1989. Several bridges, to allow the crossings of many rivers and streams, were constructed on rivers like Malibamatso (85m being the highest bridge of the project), as shown in Figure 6. Engineering work carried out brought credibility to engineering companies that worked here, as the road from Pitseng, passing over Mafika Lisiu Pass, 3 090 m in altitude, to Katse Dam won the award of the best engineering achievement in

1990 from the South African Institute of Civil Engineering. Equally remarkable was the Madibamatso Bridge that won the Fulton Award for Outstanding Civil Engineering in Southern Africa, in 1991.



Figure 6: Source- LHDA 1994.

Other bridges were built to cross rivers of Matsoku, Senqunyane and Senqu, making mountain areas accessibility an important achievement of this project. This road construction project, for the first time in history, brought isolated communities closer to each other and made transportation and telecommunication services between villages easier. The construction of the road was followed by the construction of Katse Dam.

(c) Construction of Katse dam

The construction of Katse dam started in 1993. In order to assist with easy movement between South Africa and Lesotho, the border posts of Maseru, Ficksburg and Caledonspoort were upgraded, to handle the increased traffic flow caused by the construction of Katse Dam. They were opened 24 hours. With this plan in place, border crossing and travelling between these two countries was made easier, by giving people six months cross-border permits. In 1998 the Katse dam was completed and started delivering water to South Africa (see Figure 7).



Figure7: Source- Wikipedia 2011.

The dam is 185m high and its double-curvature arch wall is the highest in Africa. It is located in the Thaba- Tseka district. It allows 100 m (or more) depth to be contained and transferred towards the hydropower station.

The engineering skills displayed in this mega-project became the greatest to be demonstrated in southern Africa. For instance, dolerite and basalt were crushed to produce fine concrete and coarse sand for a strong foundation. A German (Lahmeyer) and British (MacDonald) consortium supervised a 45 km transfer tunnel, as well as a 15 km southward delivery tunnel undertaken by Lesotho Highlands Project Contractors (LHPC). There were many other companies contracted for specialized tasks; in drilling, dam construction and mountainous road construction such as Impregilo of Italy, Batignolle of France, LTA of South Africa and Kvaener Boving of Sweden, to mention a few.

Outstanding work was done by SDEM of South Africa and Neyrpic of France, who engineered the steel lining for the under-river crossing in the delivering tunnel, in partnership with Krohne Altometer of the Netherlands. It is expected that more advanced skills will emerge during the next phases of the anticipated Mashai and Tsoelike dams, covering over 200 kilometres of interconnected tunnels during the next 15 years. The interconnected tunnels are the ones leading to Mohale dam, so that the project gets properly connected to achieve its goals. Figure 8 shows the Katse intake tower, which is the entry point to transfer water to South Africa.

Katse Intake Tower



Figure 8:Source- LHDA 2008.

This is what constituted Phase 1A of the Katse dam project. However, the communities living along the banks of the dam were affected by some engineering problems which included the earthquake that caused panic in the area, especially to Mapaleng community confirming their vulnerability next to the dam.

Mohale Dam-Phase 1B

(d) Construction of Mohale dam

The Mohale dam is 145m high, is located south of Katse dam in Maseru district, and its work started in 1998. The following year “The Muela Hydroelectric Power Station was officially opened on 22 January 1999” LHDA (2001:34). The work on the Mohale Dam was supervised by the Mohale Consultants Group (MCG), “comprising SMEC (Snowy Mountains Engineering Corp) of Australia, BKS Inc, Mellis & Du Plessis and Stewart Scott of South Africa, Harza Engineering of the USA and Nippon Koei Co of Japan”⁶ (see Figure 9 of the Mohale Dam).



Figure 9: Source- Wikipedia 2011.

A team of contractors worked together on this construction. “MCG supervised Mohale Dam Contractors, a joint venture of Impregilo of Italy, the lead contractor, with Hochtief of Germany and Concor of South Africa. Concor Engineering and ATB joint venture were subcontracted to undertake mechanical and engineering activities.”⁷ Within this partnership, a 32 km long interconnecting tunnel to Katse dam was constructed at the same time, for delivery of water from Mohale to the Katse dam reservoir. It is here where a number of local people were employed as supporting staff and labourers, as had happened with roads and housing construction, and the Katse dam. The roads leading to Mohale dam and other necessary facilities were constructed under the supervision of

⁶ www.lhwp.org.ls website on the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. p. 3.

⁷ www.lhwp.org.ls, p. 3.

Lesotho (GIBB)/South Africa (BS Bergman), while designing engineers were LTA/Group 5 Joint Venture.

The excavation of the 5.6 km Matsoku tunnel connected to Matsoku diversion weir to transfer water to the Katse reservoir, is shown in Map 8. It was constructed in such a way that water transfer to Katse reservoir is carefully controlled, to avoid damage to the walls during impoundment of the reservoir. This gave the project the highest engineering standard.



Map 8: Source- LHDA 2004.

However, tunnelling in this area was two years behind schedule, due to lack of management and organization of the Tunnel Boring Machine (TBM) crews and support team: “In light of the continued poor performance of the TBMs at both headings, LHDA (February 2001) notified the contractor at Mohale Dam that the impoundment could not take place as scheduled in October 2001,” suggesting that a more realistic time would be September 2003. This delay did not affect the Treaty or reduce the quality of work, as the Katse dam had enough water to be transferred to South Africa, should the need arise. The dam construction costs on the Mohale project increased, as was reported by the World Bank (2001:4):

Another issue associated with the Mohale Tunnel delay is the claim submitted by the Contractor for a time extension of 1 018 days and M617 971 661 in compensation in his third submission. In his fourth submission, dated December 2000, the Contractor increased his claim to M771 000 000 and extension of time for 601 days at the Intake and 691 days at the Outlet, respectively [one maloti equals one rand].

It has been acknowledged that in the process of re-organisation to improve the efficiency of the operation, Mohale Tunnel Contractors (MTC) general foreman quit and a qualified, experienced

replacement took some time to find. “In addition, lack of experienced personnel to carry out critical TBM operation activities such as drivers and frontline foremen, as well as rolling stock maintenance personnel, have negatively impacted the organisation of the work force and consequently TBM production,”(World Bank 2001:4). Furthermore, there appeared a crack in Mohale Dam which caused consternation in both upstream and downstream communities. This turn of events caused panic to relocated communities in the vicinity and the LHDA had to reassure them about their safety in the area.

Alongside major construction of roads and dams, improved housing for resettlement plans were carried out throughout the foothills and lowland areas, where affected households chose to resettle, as well as the provision of latrines that were built for disturbed communities along the main roads. See Figures 10 and 11.

Figure 10: Example of Resettlement Houses



Figure 10 shows an example of modern houses built for resettled households at Ha Makhalanyane in the Maseru district. The roofing style enables water collection into the big water tanks during the rainy season, as water is not adequate in some places The Ministry of Water & Energy (2002) confirmed in its report that some resettled households lacked connected water supply as services were expensive for some unemployed resettled people.

For communities affected by road construction, such as Mantsoyane, the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority improved health facilities by building latrines for every household in the area, as shown in Figure 11.

Figure 11: Improved latrines for disturbed communities



Table 2 is a summary of the characteristics of Katse and Mohale dams. The construction of Katse and Mohale dams took a total of 11 years.

Characteristics of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project

Table 2⁸

Description	Area	Distance & Capacity
Outfall to RSA	Ash River	Outlet structure for water delivery to RSA. Started operating in January 1998
Transfer Tunnel	Katse	45km, 4,35 diameter, linking Katse dam to Ash River outfall in RSA
Hydropower Station	Muela	45km/ 3x24MW turbines
Dam	Muela	6 mil-m cubic/55m high
Intake Tower	Katse	16km/99m high
Delivery Tunnel North	Katse	22km
Dam	Katse	38,5kmsq/1,950mil-m cubic/185m high
Mohale Tunnel	Mohale	31km /4.5m diameter linking Mohale dam to Katse dam.
Matsoku Wier	Mohale	20m high weir/2m cubic per

⁸ Where the primary source is not mentioned in the table, it means the author has created his own.

		second transferred to Katse reservoir
Matsoku Tunnel	Mohale	5.6km tunnel to join weir to Katse reservoir
Delivery Tunnel South	Mohale	15km
Dam	Mohale	145km / 950mil-m cubic Completed in 2002

Table 3 shows the construction timeline of the project..




Table 3: Source –LHDA 2002.

2.6 Conclusion

To conclude, I reiterate that water is the main issue here. The origins of this project came from the British Representative, who proposed that Lesotho water be sold to South Africa, with the hope of improving Lesotho’s socio-economic conditions. This proposal appealed to government authorities in both countries, resulting in the agreement reached in 1986, out of which the Treaty was signed. We saw which political conditions prevailed during this period both in Lesotho and South Africa. Despite unfavourable political conditions that prevailed in both countries, the intended feasibility studies about the viability of LHWP were concluded and the project got under way.

The Treaty had some provisions as a foundation on which the LHWP activities were based. Among them was the establishment of technical bodies of the Lesotho Highlands Water Commission, composed of three delegates per country, to design project policy and set guidelines and procedures for project implementation. The Lesotho Highlands Development Authority was the operational arm to implement the policy for the Kingdom of Lesotho and the Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority represented the government of South Africa for transferring water into South Africa. Programmes associated with the Treaty, showing the intention of Lesotho and South Africa, are highlighted. Above all, the nature of the project itself is discussed, showing what was actually done and known about the Muela hydropower station, the construction of roads, bridges and dams in the areas of Katse, Muela and Mohale, which today have resulted in a successful and continuous chain of water supply to the province of Gauteng, particularly.

The construction of LHWP's access roads and connecting bridges between mountainous and lowland areas is realized to have created efficient and reliable telecommunication services in the country. Other programmes implemented under this scheme are aimed at improving the socio-economic conditions of affected people. Policy implementation for the LHWP was based on the political agreement which the Kingdom of Lesotho and the Republic of South Africa signed. Political will was necessary in the implementation of the project. Socio-economic betterment was expected by the affected communities in Lesotho. Industrial and agricultural development was a key focus of South African government. The World Commissions on Dams (2001) produced a framework for decision-making processes which guided countries on the best methods and practices in the implementation of policy involving big dam projects. Thus big dams' construction must be seen as not only as a commercial project to be privatized, but most importantly, as a vehicle by which human development can be achieved.

In the next chapter, I examine the structures that were governing and managing the implementation of this project.

Chapter 3

The Governance and Management Structures of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project during Project Implementation

Introduction

In this chapter I examine the structures which governed and managed the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. Governance here refers to the sphere of political leadership, while management refers to the administration of the project as it was carried out. Firstly, I look at the structure which was responsible for operational functions of the Lesotho Highlands Water Commission on planning and policy formation. This will be followed by structures associated with the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority as the implementation arm of the Treaty in its management responsibilities. The structures of these two authorities are important for this study, as they were mandated and trusted to design policies governing the implementation of this project, as well as ensuring that daily administration is geared towards achieving predetermined objectives of completing this project on time.

3.1 Bi-National Governance Structure of Lesotho Highlands Water Project



Figure 12: Source-LHDA 2001.

Figure 12 shows the structure of the Lesotho Highlands Water Commission, being a bi-national authority responsible for policy formulation. The important role played by this body is connecting these two countries together in honouring the terms of the Treaty. Its functions are spelt out below.

3.1.1 The Lesotho Highlands Water Commission on Planning and Conflict Resolution

Figure 12 shows how the TCTA and LHDA are connected together in the assignment of being efficient and effective for the Lesotho Highlands Water Commission as a bi-national governance structure to accomplish its tasks, because “the LHWC has the responsibility for the success of the project,” (LHDA 2001:5). This structure is a six-member (three from each country) body vested with powers to formulate policies governing the implementation of LHWP, of which LHDA and TCTA are both implementers. The LHDA (2001) shows that the mandate of the LHWC included the following: project planning and designing, and dispute resolution and arbitration.

(a) ***Project Planning and Designing:*** This involves policy formulation (encompassing funding and compensation to development), structuring of administration and management systems suitable for policy implementation, so that the administration tools and procedures are properly placed and followed, resourcing finance capital or expertise needed to accomplish the objectives of the project, and monitoring of implementation systems to ensure effective and efficient application methods to reach a desired target within specified timeframes, as well as an evaluation strategy to assess the success and manage impediments to the project (LHDA 2001).

(b) ***Dispute Resolution and Arbitration:*** The Treaty (1986) provided for a dispute resolution and arbitration mechanism under this scheme, to be carried out by the Lesotho Highlands Water Commission as well. Where disputes arise from royalties or any dissatisfaction regarding the aspects of the Treaty between the two governments the LHWC intervenes (LHDA 1986:73). This body is expected to manage conflict and handle arbitration processes and procedures. It is stipulated in the Treaty (1986) that, in the case of dispute over payment of royalties to Lesotho, or any matter directly related to water transfer to South Africa, the LHWC will speedily handle all matters towards an amicable solution. This role therefore gives the LHWC an advisory responsibility to the members of the TCTA and the LHDA. (LHDA 1986:73):

In the event of a dispute arising, either Party or the Parties jointly or the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority or the Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority, may request the Joint Permanent Technical Commission to conduct an investigation and to present a written report containing its recommendations to both Parties, the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority and the Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority. (LHDA 1986: 73)

Should this body fail to resolve the dispute between the parties, LHWC will hand over the report of the dispute to the Arbitration Tribunal, composed of three independent arbitrators. “Each party shall appoint one arbitrator and the third arbitrator, who shall be the President of such Tribunal, shall be appointed by agreement between the two arbitrators appointed by Parties” (LHDA 1986:74). The decision of the Arbitration Tribunal shall be in writing, given to both parties and signed by members. If there is an award given to another party, it shall be binding also to the other party. Such a decision will be final (Treaty 1986).

The LHWC, by virtue of becoming a two-handed body to serve South Africa and the Kingdom of Lesotho equally, has an opportunity to engage other stakeholders in a policy formation conference, from which a policy draft can emerge. The important task in this inclusive practice is to ensure maximum participation of civil movements and other interest parties to engage in debates embracing project activities.

3.2 The Governance of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project within Lesotho

By examining the governance of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, this study seeks to show how policy decisions were supervised in order to achieve the desired goals. The implementation process of this project ran through the military council dictatorship between 1986 and 1993. The second dispensation was that of the multiparty democratic order, which governed this project from 1993 until its completion in 2002. We shall start by looking at the form and style of the military council governance. Later we examine how the democratic system of the then Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle, governed this project, particularly from 1993, throughout the rule of Pakalitha Mosisili after the 1998 general elections and under whose political administration the LHWP was completed.

3.2.1 The Form and Style of the Military Council Governance

After the coup, the King formed the Military Council, composed of six members who ruled in consultation with the monarch. The King, as the Head of State, suspended the Constitution and vested political powers in himself, acting in accordance with the advice of the Military Council. Order No 1 of 1986 stated:

- 4 (i) The legislative and executive authority in Lesotho is vested in the King and may be exercised by him either directly or through officers or authorities of the

Government of Lesotho (Government Gazette, Order No.2, 1986).⁹

Afterwards the King established the Military Council to form the government under Order No.2 of 1986:

- 4 (2.a) the Commander of the Lesotho Paramilitary Force, who shall be Chairman; and
(b) such other members as may be appointed by the King on the advice of the Chairman (Government Gazette, Order No.2, 1986).

In this arrangement, the Chairman could delegate any of his powers to any member of the Military Council, hence the appointment of five other military officers into the council. Under the same Order, No. 2 of 1986, the civilian council of ministers was formed to be accountable to the Military Council Chairman. Its function was to assist the King in the general administration of Lesotho:

9. (1) The executive and legislative authority in Lesotho is vested in the King and may be exercised by Him either directly or through the Military Council or the Council of Ministers or other officers or authorities of the Government of Lesotho.

The Military Council issued about 180 Orders in total in 1986, which they demanded compliance (Lesotho Government Gazette 1986). Makoia (1991:179) indicates that “the King hailed the coup as a victory for the nation and christened his military kingdom the ‘New Lesotho’ of peace and without politics.” Figure 13 shows the structure that governed Lesotho during the military regime.

⁹ The Government Gazette Order No.2 of 1986 was issued after Order No.1 vested powers on the King. The King with the advise of the Military Commander instituted the Military Council to govern the country while the Constitution was suspended.

Governance Structure of the Military Regime
Principal Government Officials in 1986-1990




Figure 13: Source-LHDA 1990.

3.2.2 Chieftainship in Governance during the Construction of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project

Chieftainship, as explained in the LHDA (1990), forms part of the institution of governance in Lesotho. Twenty-two principal chiefs, 84 area chiefs, 371 chiefs, 800 headmen participate in governance in different forms, such as dispute resolution, land allocation, maintenance of community order and supervising traditional and cultural events. Figure 14 shows the chieftainship structure.




Figure 14: Source-LHDA 1990.

This traditional governance structure is common in all villages around Lesotho (as in many other parts of Africa – such as Zambia). Chiefs form an integral governance structure as a community-based authority. Their activities continued, even under the military dictatorship. The above structure shows how seniority of leadership and authority derives from headmen on the ground, through the Ministry of Home Affairs, where governance policies are sealed. The main intention of showing this structure is to indicate that, historically, governance in Lesotho has been in the hands of 1 277 traditional leaders, whereby issues of dispute are handled by 800 headmen around the country. Vusi Mashinini (2010:4) states:

“Before the advent of the LHWP, the chiefs and the lekhotla elders played an important governance role in the communities.”

Difficult matters to settle are referred to 371 chiefs in different districts, who report to 84 area chiefs, accountable to 22 principal chiefs, who take seats in the Senate/Parliament (they still had their seats under military rule). This structure falls under the Ministry of Home Affairs and Chieftainship. It is the closest form of governance to people in rural areas and offers free services in social welfare, land tenure and traditional courts.

To complement this traditional authority governance structure at community level, a Western system of governance runs parallel legal structures in maintenance of law and order, to handle


serious crimes of rape, murder, assault, fraud and theft. These courts are run by magistrates and high court judges and are regarded as superior to traditional courts. Looking at the status of chiefs in governance, Francis Makoa (1991: 178) explained: “Chiefs are rural bureaucrats dependent on state salaries. This is the major source of their weakness. They are vulnerable to government pressure and highly susceptible to manipulation by the rulers.” The next section will discuss how the governance of LHWP took shape during multiparty democracy.

3.2.3 The Governance of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project during Multiparty Democracy 1993- 2002

Lesotho returned to multiparty democracy on 2 April 1993, when Ntsu Mokhehle became Prime Minister after winning the general elections (Matlosa 2001). He was ousted on 17 August 1994 by King Letsie III, but through the intervention of the Southern African Development Community was restored on 14 September 1994. He was succeeded by Pakalitha Mosisili as Prime Minister on 28 May 1998, who inherited the construction of the LHWP (Matlosa 2001). The governance structure of this project during the multiparty democracy is shown in Figure 15.

The Governance Model - Multiparty Democratic Government

Figure 15: Source -LHDA 1998.



The governance structure shown in Figure 15 took precedence after democratic rule took root in Lesotho (LHDA 1998), particularly because of the lack of clear governance structures during

military rule. The structure given above became fully operational in 1998, when the Basotho Congress Party of Ntsu Mokhehle formed the government. This is the structure which carries forward the governance of the LHWP, liaising with LHDA and TCTA on matters of governance (LHDA 2002).

This concludes the section on structures that governed the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. In Section 3.3 the management structure of the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority will be discussed.

3.3 The Management Structure of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project

The management of this project was in the hands of the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority as the legal authority for project implementation based in Lesotho (LHDA 1986). Figure 16 shows the senior management level of the structure under the leadership of the board. The board is composed of seven people appointed by the government. It has decision-making powers on matters pertaining to policy implementation of the project within Lesotho. It is accountable to the parliament of Lesotho (LHDA 2003).

3.3.1 The Structure of the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority

Organizational Structure – Senior Management Level




Figure 16: Source- LHDA2003.

The LHDA (2003) Annual Report presented its activities to the Ministry of Natural Resources through the leadership of the board of directors, who were six Principal Secretaries of the following ministries: Water, Energy & Mining (who was given the responsibility of Chairman); Finance;

Communications; Industry, Trade & Marketing; Home Affairs and Defence. The Chief Executive formed part of this body, as enshrined in Order No. 23 of 1986:

7(1) There shall be a Chief Executive of the Authority who shall be appointed by the Minister on such terms and conditions as the Minister may determine. 8. The Chief Executive shall be responsible for the execution of the policy of the Authority and the transaction of its day to day business.¹⁰

The role of the board in this regard was, among other things, to lead policy implementation and oversee the smooth running of operations and general management of the LHDA, ensuring that activities are in accordance with the dictates of the policy (LHDA 1995).

3.3.2 The Decision-Making Functions of the Board

Part IV of the Order No. 23 of 1986 referred to the composition, functions and other related decision-making procedures pertaining to transparent and corruption-free undertakings by the Board. Only two members of the Board, being the Chairman and the Chief Executive, were given permanent seats, while others were elected for only three years.

The Board was expected to meet and discuss the Authority's business not less than four times in each financial year. The CEO was responsible for reporting on all activities under this scheme, including project reports, financial reports, administration reports, human resources management reports and corporate services reports. Five members of the Board formed a quorum for deliberations and decision-making. To avoid conflicts of interest, all members of the Board were prohibited from taking part in any business relating to storing water, supplying water, or in any electrical work being done by the Authority. Article 16 of Order No. 23 of 1986 of the Military Council, concerning the Board states that:

16. (3) A member shall not, while he holds that office, purchase, take or become interested in, for his own benefit, any shares in any undertaking, storing or supplying water or in any electrical undertaking.

¹⁰ Government of Lesotho, *The Laws of Lesotho Volume XXXI*, 1986.p. 432. The Order here established the office, appointment and the functions of the Chief Executive of the Authority on whom the implementation of the policy was placed. He was appointed over a period of five years, according to this Order, and his appointment had an opportunity of serving for the second term in office. His appointment came from the Minister of Water, Energy and Mining, with the Principal Secretary of the same Ministry being the Chairman of the Board.

It became difficult to obtain an organogram which the LHDA was using between 1986 and 1993. Figure 16 shows the one that was operational during 2002/2003 being the year of completion of Phase 1B in the Mophale dam area. The middle management, involving administration, co-ordination, safety, logistics, human resources, infrastructure and maintenance, fell directly under group managers' level, as supporting departments. This is how the management of LHDA was organized during the period of this study. Article 7:32 of the Treaty clarified the standard of required personnel:

- (32) All managerial and professional staff positions of the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority shall be filled by personnel in possession of appropriate qualifications and experience for such appointments (Treaty 1986)

Having discussed the formation of the Board of Directors and their functions with regard to decision-making, we now look at the office of the Chief Executive Officer, its administration functions and the professional management of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project.

3.3.3 Project Administration

The office of the Chief Executive was given the administrative responsibility of this project and a budget to recruit personnel and implement the policy, as determined under Article 7 (35) of the Treaty which stipulates: "Lesotho shall appoint a Chief Executive who shall have appropriate qualifications and experience for such appointment." The Treaty further states that "The Chief Executive shall implement the policies laid down by the Board of Directors of the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority." General operations of the LHWP were carried out by the LHDA personnel, in close co-operation with the Ministry of Water, Energy and Mining. As a result, five departments, Corporate Services, Finance & Commercial Services, Engineering Services, Operations & Maintenance Services, and Environmental & Social Services, shown in Figure 11, were created and each was led by a group manager under this scheme.

Firstly, Corporate Services included general administration, logistics, planning of recruitment and human resources development, external services and interaction with strategic stakeholders for development of LHDA and its objectives (LHDA 2001). This group has a legal department, advising on all corporate matters. Provision of appropriate technology, infrastructural maintenance, planning, project co-ordination and development plans are monitored and managed by this sector.

Secondly, Finance & Commercial Services included financial administration, budgeting, fundraising, marketing, preparation of loan applications and other organizational development initiatives that could help LHDA to be financially sustainable (LHDA 2001). Figure 17 shows how the budget for Phase 1A-Katse of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project construction was designed. The LHDA (2001) Report indicated that an amount of US\$1,37 billion (R11 billion) was required to complete this phase. According to this report, 65% of the budget would go for construction itself, which is the hydropower station development for R1,3 billion, expected to be raised by the Kingdom of Lesotho. Water transfer construction costs, which amounted to R9.7 billion, were expected to be met through financial aid grants from international agencies and loans which the Republic of South Africa committed to repay over a certain period of time (LHDA 2001). A third (33%) of the overall budget was needed for finance costs, while only 2% of the budget would come from royalties, which was anticipated to be contributed by South Africa, when water transfer at Phase 1A started operations around 1998, to complement total budget (LHDA 2001).




Figure 17: Source- LHDA 2001.

Phase 1B-Mohale required an amount of \$0,81 billion (R6,5 billion) to complete. As Figure 18 shows 57% of the budget was needed for construction itself, while 39% of the budget would cover finance costs and 4% of the budget was estimated escalation (LHDA 2001).




Figure 18: Source-LHDA 2002.

The total costs to build two dams and the hydropower station amounted to \$3,5billion (LHDA 2001). Available funding from South Africa and Lesotho sources only amounted to \$2.18billion, showing a short-fall of \$1,3billion to complete the whole project by 2002. This short-fall necessitated that loans and grants of US\$1, 3 billion should be sought from international funding bodies through the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority, as mandated (LHDA 2002). As a result, applications for loans and grants were planned in advance to be sent around the world to raise the required budget to complete the project. The LHDA (2001) and the World Bank (2002) emphasize that the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority has been responsible for project financing since the inception of this project. Funding strategies that include entering into loans with international bodies like the World Bank, African Development Fund, European Investment Bank, Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) and the commitment made by the Republic of South Africa through TCTA were all managed in this sector.

The World Bank played a major role in providing a loan of \$150m and other financial guarantees to complete this project, and took the responsibility of overseeing financial management. “The World Bank got involved at the invitation of the Government of Lesotho, primarily to strengthen the latter’s hand in negotiations of the Treaty and appointment of consultants, but most importantly to ensure that the benefits occurring from the project are well managed for the good of all the citizens of the country” (Treaty 1986).

The World Bank played a co-ordinating role of funds administration in order for other banks to have confidence that their contributions or loans would be properly handled. As a guarantor, the World Bank mobilized financial support for the Kingdom of Lesotho, while at the same time appointing its

own consultants to manage the funds of the project (LHDA 1990). In addition, the World Bank's expertise in big projects enabled it to be trusted with the responsibility of overseeing, tendering and contract award procedures, thus providing guidance for proper project management and accountability. The World Bank was expected to guide Lesotho on how best the loans should be serviced over an agreed period.

South Africa, in similar manner, accepted the involvement of the World Bank as an important partner to bring about project credibility and confidence to other banks. South Africa established the Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA) to design a policy that would manage debt service payments related to the project. With its own better financial muscle (as compared to Lesotho), South Africa was able to get funding organized to fulfil this commitment. "The Development Bank of Southern Africa and other local finance institutions made approximately R550 million available for the creation of infrastructure for Phase 1A" (LHDA 1994:3).

South African banks also provided commercial loans and export credits in support of their country's efforts to successfully complete the project. Since South Africa at the time was under international sanctions, Lesotho appeared as a borrower in order for this project to get international support, but in fact South Africa was responsible for repaying the loans. Hildyard (2002:11) elaborated:

When the project finance was agreed, South Africa, which will receive all the water from the project was subject to international sanctions. To avoid the difficulties of international financiers openly aiding the then apartheid regime, LHDA's financial advisers Chartered West LB set up a London based trust fund through which payments could be laundered.

Lesotho's contribution in financing the hydroelectric power component of Phase 1A project in Muela to generate power for construction and meeting electrical needs of the country through loans and grants from multinational agencies and different government aid programmes succeeded (LHDA 1995). The British Commonwealth Development Corporation provided \$36 million. Banque Nationale de Paris gave a loan of \$19.7 million. Credit Lyonnais in France provided a loan of \$17 million and a \$15.8 million loan came from German Dresdner Bank (LHDA 1994).

The government approached international agencies and governments with whom they worked in partnership for grants and loans towards the hydropower station. ODA (British government for

International Development) made a financial grant of 4.7 million pounds towards installation of generators and turbines, while the European Union gave substantial financial aid (LHDA 1999). In total, Lesotho raised about US\$100 million from Western European Financial Institutions and partners for the Muela Hydropower development project (LHDA 2001).

Thirdly, Engineering Services brought expertise into investigative studies and construction itself. It was the work of this group that determined timeframes and related costs to bring this project to completion. Engineering services were intensively supervised and closely monitored to ensure high-quality work and were well guarded against corruption. It is this department which exposed corruption in the tendering system that led to the Chief Executive being convicted and sentenced to jail for taking bribes. Makoa (1991:181) stated:

The Lesotho Highlands Water Project's Chief Executive was sentenced in 2002 to 15 years in prison for bribery. Two officials were accused of taking LHWP-related bribes from the German engineering consultancy Lahmeyer International.

Fourthly, Operations & Maintenance Services looked at efficient and effective project implementation strategies, with the safety of people and the maintenance of operational tools being the priorities. It was the function of this department to ensure that timeframes were met and that a desired work standard was achieved in every phase of the project's life. They focused on water deliveries, electricity generation and rehabilitation of access roads to LHWP sites, ensuring safety and security and managing royalty revenue (LHDA 1998).

Operations and maintenance services can be described as a field-focused group in dealing with the interaction with communities on the ground and monitoring risk control measures of the LHWP. In order to achieve its community engagement activities, this group held awareness campaigns and public education from time to time, to bring people on board, as well as ensuring that there was no damage to LHWP assets or any injuries caused by criminal elements. These departments worked closely with law enforcement agencies:

A high-level EEP coordination workshop involving senior government officials, commanders of national security agencies, the Disaster Management Authority (DMA) and LHDA executive members was held with the aim of developing strong partnerships and agreeing on pragmatic implementation strategies for an effective EPP

programme to be in place.¹¹


Fifthly, Environmental and Social Services looked into issues of compensation, environmental care and development. Compensation was composed of relocation and resettlement in terms of land tenure, and cash payment for grazing & arable land, forests and disturbance. Environmental care concentrated on geographical improvements, protection of dam areas, livestock improvement, fishery and agricultural projects, and tourism (LHDA 1997). Development services included capacity-building skills, income-generating projects, and educational programmes offered with the intention for livelihood sustainability. In order to achieve these objectives, LHDA management was guided by the Compensation Policy of 1997: “The Policy will be effective from 1 April 1998 for 1A and from 31 July 1997 for 1B, subject to the provisions contained in Section 3” (Compensation Policy LHDA-1997:1). The same policy further states “LHDA’s legal obligation to the people and communities affected by the project works, upon which this Policy is based, are contained in the following document: The Treaty on the Lesotho Highlands Water Project.” (LHDA 1997:1). The implementation of socio-economic programmes is discussed at length in the next chapter.

Figure 19 shows the structure responsible for policies and procedures formulation used by the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority for the governance and management of procurement, budgeting, planning and operations processes undertaken in this scheme.

¹¹ LHDA, Treaty, p. 23. The implementation of the Emergency Preparedness Programme (EPP) is made available to constantly monitor the stability of dam walls, amongst other things, in order to have well-prepared rescue missions around in times of disaster or other eventualities.

3.3.4 The Framework Agreement Procedure

Figure 19: Source- LHDA 1998.



3.4 Conclusion

Governance and management form vital aspects of the process of implementation in this study as the intention is to investigate how political leadership and bureaucratic implementation practices and culture impacted on the development of displaced communities which gave way for the construction of Katse and Mohale dam. Johnston (2012) indicates how 40-80 million people in the world have been forcibly removed from their traditional places in order for governments to build dams for commercial purposes. In her theory of water, cultural diversity and global environmental change she advocates for sustaining diverse forms of human sociocultural life which are important for policy implementation success. The form and style of the military rule has impacted on the outcome of the LHWP construction which has changed social structures, cultural practices and economic conditions of the Basotho (Thabane 2000) that were affected. McDonald (2002) advocates for environmental

justice in the process of planning and implementation of a development programme. He insists that development should start with the intended beneficiaries first, before talking about profit. This is the approach which this study is taking.

Governance in terms of political leadership was exercised by the Military Council and the Monarch during military rule. The form and style of the military council governance has been described. During the period thereafter of multiparty democracy, governance was put in the hands of the Board, which is accountable to the Parliament of Lesotho, through the Ministry of Natural Resources. The Lesotho Highlands Water Commission, as a bi-national body, was established to lead in policy formation, dispute resolution and arbitration during the implementation of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. The Lesotho Highlands Development Authority became an operational arm to implement the Treaty on behalf of the Lesotho government, while the Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority represented the government of South Africa. In terms of South Africa's democratic transition, the new government took over the project and adhered to the Treaty as it was agreed upon by the apartheid administration. At the completion of the construction of the dams, the water flew into South Africa according to agreed terms and royalties began to be paid to Lesotho.

Management of this project is in the hands of the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority, whose mandate is to implement the policy in terms of compensation, relocation, resettlement and development of affected communities. Its role is to ensure that all the activities and programmes, operations and systems designed for smooth running of this project take place. Central to management responsibility of the LHDA is the development of affected persons and their communities, especially in their new areas of resettlement. The LHDA is closer to people on the ground and its responsibility include implementing programmes leading to capacity-building of communities affected by the construction of Katse and Mohale dams, in a manner that the livelihoods of affected individuals and their households do not deteriorate from levels before their displacement. Compensation was given to individual households and communities for communal assets like sports grounds and parks.

In the next chapter I explore the way in which the socio-economic programmes were carried out by the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority.

Part Two

Chapter 4

Implementation of Socio-Economic Programmes by the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority

Introduction

The Lesotho Highlands Development Authority's intention was to achieve socio-economic and environmental improvement in Lesotho, through the construction of the Katse and Mohale dams, that brought royalties and tourists to Lesotho. Chapter 4 concentrates upon the particular plans LHDA implemented for socio-economic betterment of displaced and resettled communities, after they lost their assets to the construction of dams. The author reports on what is known about this project in terms of infrastructure, compensation, resettlement, relocation, capacity building, rural development and business and tourism programmes undertaken to benefit affected communities. This forms a framework, as I emphasize what was done and not done in the Katse and Mohale regions separately, and by which bodies, looking in particular at the period between 1992 and 1998, when compensation was carried out by the LHDA.

4.1 Implementation of Seven Socio-economic Programmes in the Katse Dam Region

a. Infrastructure Development Programme

Article 12 of the 1997 Compensation Policy states that “the general rule for buildings and other infrastructure for which there is no market is that compensation is based on the principal of ‘equivalent reinstatement’(LHDA 1997:8),” making such an infrastructure a national asset. The infrastructure development programme in the Katse dam region is noticeable in the form of the northern access road from Pitseng in the Leribe district, cutting through the mountains into the Katse dam region, and connected by well-engineered bridges. This is one of the developmental milestones of this project, and this is what Detter (*et al.*, 1994: 15) said about infrastructure development:

Due to the construction of the Northern Access Road Ha Lejone and Ha Mensel got connected with the Lowlands of Leribe by tarred road. As a consequence of this road public transport became available which is regarded to be positive.

The construction of this road itself has significantly added value to easy and smooth travelling in this region, especially along the road where new independent resettlements are taking place on a yearly basis as people are now adapting to an entrepreneurial lifestyle. Hence, LHDA (2002: 10) points out: “provision of infrastructure for development (roads, electricity, telecommunications, etc) in Lesotho and towns in the eastern Free State became major development achievements of the LHWP.” In the region, economic growth is being speeded up by infrastructure development. Despite the increasing commodity prices of equipment, tools and fuel businesses are growing, as a result of good roads, electricity and telecommunications. LHDA (2002: 38) adds: “Roadside food stores have mushroomed with the Project. The army of constructors and consultants moving up and down from the Highlands to the Lowlands needs to be fed. While roadside snacks fight immediate hunger pangs, formal meals are available at restaurants and lodges.”

School buildings were improved and renovated, while others were erected from scratch to accommodate an increased number of learners, where relocations and resettlements have taken place in the region. These schools have been properly equipped, so that teachers are provided with the necessary teaching tools, to make their work easy and to enable learners to achieve better results (LHDA 2002). Therefore the infrastructure development programme has not only benefitted affected persons, but has also boosted the rural economy and improved the quality of life in affected rural areas.

b. Compensation Programme

The Compensation Policy of LHDA (1997: ii) clearly states: “Compensation is the restitution of losses sustained on account of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP).” It was critically important that all affected persons, households, communities and structures disturbed by the project be adequately compensated for their losses, before the completion of Phase 1A in 1998. This step could guarantee that LHDA was serious about the wellbeing of displaced households and help them towards sustainability. Furthermore:

Article 17 of the Lesotho Constitution “requires the prompt payment of full compensation for compulsory acquisition. The aim of revised Compensation Policy is to fulfill this obligation. Full compensation for individuals, households or communities will be made at least annually according to the approved rates.”¹²

¹² *Compensation Policy, Article 3.4.*

Section 44(2) of LHDA Order No. 23 of 1986 also emphasized that affected individuals, families and communities would be compensated for losses and LHDA would:

Ensure that as far as reasonably possible, the standard of living and the income of persons displaced by the construction of an approved scheme shall not be reduced from the standard of living and the income existing prior to the displacement of such persons.

The term “disturbance” in the context of this study is used to define the mainly involuntary displacements of affected households through the process of relocation and resettlement enforced by the LHDA. Article 8 of 1997 Compensation Policy further clarifies eligibility for compensation, as follows: The compensation programme is directed primarily at affected households and communities (LHDA 1997).

Affected households will be eligible for compensation for loss of:

- a. individual-owned fixed assets, including buildings, trees and graves;
- b. production from arable and garden land;
- c. rights and access to communal assets, including grazing, brushwood fuel, useful grasses and medicinal plants;
- d. access due to project works such as flooding of existing feeder & access roads (LHDA 1997 Article 8).

The Compensation Policy was implemented by the LHDA on behalf of the Lesotho Government. The Policy covered what people were compensated for, how the processes were carried out, and when and how much compensation was given to individuals, households or community structures. Compensation was given to household heads after the LHDA had audited the assets of each household or shared community assets, and in consultation with resettlement teams to confirm ownership. But, “the Compensation Policy itself has no legal status. It serves as a set of guidelines to assist LHDA in the implementation of its compensation programme and provides the basis for the Compensation Regulation” (LHDA1997:5-2).

The following tables are developed from the *LHDA Compensation Register for Katse Region (1998)*, indicating the names of villages and the number of households compensated, their districts, the item compensated for, an amount, in case of cash, and the number of bags in the case of grain or pulses. The date of compensation is given, as compensation periods differed from 10 years (forced removal/

disturbance) to 15 years for fodder, arable land and trees, while maximum compensation for grain is 50 years. The Katse region will be investigated first and then the Mohale region will be examined.

(i) Katse Region Compensation

Bond and Ndlovu (2010: 3) stated that “as many as 3 357 households, averaging between 5 to 6 members, lived within the main Katse impact areas.” This meant about 152 villages were affected in the Katse and Muela catchments between 1987 and 1997. Affected people are given food (grain & pulses) on an annual basis, as compensation for losses relating to their fields. This form of grain compensation is expected to last for 15 years, while grazing land compensation coming in a form of fodder for the livestock is given for five years, only, and once a year. Forests/trees, reeds, arable land and garden land are compensated by cash to individual households. Cash payments differ according to the size of property lost and are paid in maluti. Disturbance compensation, which was supposed to be paid to these people in the form of cash, was not yet fully paid during the time of this study (and to date no other study has suggested otherwise). But, as stipulated in the policy, it is supposed to be paid for a period of between 10 to 15 years. The food compensation register is shown in Table 4, in which all households had to benefit not later than 1998, after the policy for relocation and resettlement compensation was revised, approved and implemented.

Katse Region Food Compensation Register

Table 4: List of Beneficiaries

Name of Village	Number of Beneficiaries	District	Grain (70 kg) Bags	Pulse (3 Kg)
Kosetabole	57	Leribe	348	3698
Mpeli	23	Leribe	106	223
Paepae	26	Leribe	192	405
Seshote	110	Leribe	524	1 072
Theko	118	Leribe	894	1 936
Tsepo	30	Leribe	220	485
Beresi	23	Thaba-Tseka	62	128
Bokong	270	Thaba-Tseka	2 026	6 185
Khoanyane	11	Thaba-Tseka	27	59
Khohlontso	42	Thaba-Tseka	281	553
Khomoliileng	2	Thaba-Tseka	4	9
Laka	22	Thaba-Tseka	66	134
Makhangoa	30	Thaba-Tseka	289	624
Nkokana	84	Thaba-Tseka	969	2 085
Noko	5	Thaba-Tseka	9	20
Ntaote	7	Thaba-Tseka	96	129
Rasebate	2	Thaba-Tseka	11	23
Sekhohola	26	Thaba-Tseka	81	181
Soai	24	Thaba-Tseka	55	114
Suoane	114	Thaba-Tseka	4 898	2 429
Tsieng	7	Thaba-Tseka	20	41
Total	1 033	-	11 178	20 533

Source- LHDA, Compensation Register for Katse Region 1998.

Table 4 shows 21 villages (six in Leribe district and 15 in Thaba-Tseka district) and 1 033 households to benefit from grain and pulses compensation in 1997. A total of 11 178 bags of grain (70kg per bag) and 20 533 bags of pulse (3kg per bag) compensation was distributed amongst displaced and resettled households alike, depending on the size of the field each family had lost when they gave way to roads and the construction of Katse dam. Beneficiaries were identified by a Compensation and Resettlement Task Team (CRTT), as explained in Article 3.3 of LHDA (1997):

Where a land for land option has been chosen, the household will be informed by the Compensation and Resettlement Task Team (CRTT), how much land it is eligible to receive based upon the cadastral records.

This detail is necessary, as compensation became a platform on which relocation and resettlement programmes were based.

Katse Region Compensated Villages for Forests

The following villages in the Katse Region were compensated for forests as their primary sources of firewood, roofing material and agricultural tools. Six villages benefitted in the Leribe district and nine in the Thaba-Tseka district (LHDA 1998). A total of 97 households in 15 villages received an amount of M67 790 (US\$8473.75)¹³ between 1993 and 1996 under this scheme. See the Table 5.

Table 5: List of Beneficiaries

Name of Village	Number of Beneficiaries	District	Date of Payment	Amount in maluti
Kosetabole	7	Leribe	1994	3145
Mpeli	2	Leribe	1994/96	1 948
Paepae	2	Leribe	1994	822
Seshote	4	Leribe	1993/94	1 651
Theko	12	Leribe	1993/94	6 424
Tsepo	12	Leribe	1993/96	11 332
Beresi	5	Thaba-Tseka	1993/94	3 528
Bokong	16	Thaba-Tseka	1993/95	19 147
Khoanyane	8	Thaba-Tseka	1993/94	3 390
Khohlontso	4	Thaba-Tseka	1993/94	1 429
Soai	1	Thaba-Tseka	1993	268
Laka	8	Thaba-Tseka	1993	1 780
Makhangoa	3	Thaba-Tseka	1994	2 054
Nkokana	6	Thaba-Tseka	1994	8 086
Suoane	7	Thaba-Tseka	1994/96	2 786
Total	97	-	-	67 790

Source- LHDA, Compensation Register for Katse Region 1998.

¹³ The exchange rate between the maluti and the US dollar during 1997 was \$1= 8 maluti.

Katse Region Compensated Villages for Reeds

There was also cash compensation for reeds in the Katse Region, as shown in Table 6. Reeds are useful for rural communities as they are used for fencing yards, building kraals and stables, and for general roofing purposes. An amount of M2 262.00 was shared among 34 families in six villages in 1996 in the district of Leribe (five) and Thaba-Tseka (one).

Table 6: List of Beneficiaries

Name of Village	Number of Beneficiaries	District	Date of Payment	Amount in maluti
Kosetabole	3	Leribe	1996	904
Mpeli	1	Leribe	1996	123
Paepae	2	Leribe	1996	190
Bokong	4	Thaba- Tseka	1996	752
Theko	12	Leribe	1996	244
Tsepo	12	Leribe	1996	50
Total	34	-	-	2 262

Source- LHDA, Compensation Register for Katse Region 1998.

Katse Region Compensated Villages for Arable Land

Table 7 shows cash compensation given to villages for arable land in the Katse Region. This is where the highest cash compensation for arable land was noticed, as a total of 451 households in 17 villages in the districts of Leribe (four) and Thaba-Tseka (13) received an amount of M1 688 993 between 1990 and 1996.

Table 7: List of Beneficiaries

Name of Village	Number of Beneficiaries	District	Date of Payment	Amount in maluti
Paepae	3	Leribe	1996	438
Seshote	105	Leribe	1996	374 130
Theko	40	Leribe	1990/96	961 942
Tsepo	5	Leribe	1996	7 752
Beresi	18	Thaba-Tseka	1991/94	5 299
Bokong	80	Thaba-Tseka	1990/96	275 619
Khoanyane	8	Thaba-Tseka	1990/94	3 266
Khohlontso	16	Thaba-Tseka	1990/94	6 002

Soai	64	Thaba-Tseka	1990/94	19 129
Laka	29	Thaba-Tseka	1990/94	9 109
Makhangoa	4	Thaba-Tseka	1990/94	1 509
Nkokana	22	Thaba-Tseka	1990/94	6 598
Suoane	10	Thaba-Tseka	1996	2 521
Sekhohola	27	Thaba-Tseka	1990/94	8 494
Ntaote	1	Thaba-Tseka	1993	343
Tsieng	12	Thaba-Tseka	1990/94	4 548
Noko	7	Thaba-Tseka	1990/94	2 295
Total	451	-	-	1 688 993

Source- LHDA, Compensation Register for Katse Region 1998.

Katse Region Compensated Villages for Garden Land

There was also a cash payment made for compensation of garden land in the Katse Region, as shown in Table 8. Most households grew vegetables in their yards and could feed their families throughout the year. A total of 145 households in 15 villages received an amount of M241 487 as compensation between 1989 and 1996 in the districts of Leribe (three) and Thaba-Tseka (12), under this programme (LHDA 1998).

Table 8: List of Beneficiaries

Name of Village	Number of Beneficiaries	District	Date of Payment	Amount in maluti
Seshote	9	Leribe	1992/94	41 461
Theko	20	Leribe	1990/94	58 934
Tsepo	3	Leribe	1996	5 448
Beresi	5	Thaba-Tseka	1992/94	6 606
Bokong	44	Thaba-Tseka	1992/94	85 441
Khoanyane	1	Thaba-Tseka	1993	3 645
Khohlontso	13	Thaba-Tseka	1992/94	17 439
Laka	4	Thaba-Tseka	1992/94	1 737
Noko	1	Thaba-Tseka	1994	496
Nkokana	1	Thaba-Tseka	1994	2 125
Soai	4	Thaba-Tseka	1992/93	7 795
Sekhohola	2	Thaba-Tseka	1992	5 048
Ntaote	1	Thaba-Tseka	1992	382
Suoane	35	Thaba-Tseka	1989/96	2 786
Tsieng	2	Thaba-Tseka	1994	2 145
Total	145	-	-	241 487

Source- LHDA, Compensation Register for Katse Region 1998.

This region was compensated for fruit and non-fruit trees, ranging from M130.50 per fruit tree to M65.02 for a non-fruit tree; 120 households were compensated for fruit trees and 237 households were compensated for non-fruit trees in 17 villages between 1990 and 1996 in the districts of Leribe (four) and Thaba-Tseka (13). For fruit trees, the highest paid household got M4 437.00. This was paid to Nkuebe Tau, who had 33 trees in Seshote, Leribe. For non-fruit trees, the local development council of Thaba-Tseka was paid the highest amount of M25 617.88, for the 394 trees this council owned in Bokong (LHDA 1998).

c. Resettlement Programme

Compensation Policy (1997: iii) states: “Resettlement refers to a move over a greater distance, with significant, but not necessarily complete, severance of social and economic ties with the old environment, and relinquishment of their existing land rights.” Resettlement programmes in this study follow compensation. Affected communities who were resettled had several engagements with LHDA to identify new places for resettlement and this consultation was done with Area Liaison Committees, representing resettlees. We shall start with the Katse Region resettlement plan.

(i) Katse Region



Figure 20: Source- LHDA2009.

Katse Region is located within three districts: Leribe, where Leribe hospital is located and where the northern access road starts in Pitseng; Butha-Buthe, north of Leribe, where the Muela hydropower station, Muela dam and a tunnel transferring water into South Africa is located; The Katse dam itself

is built right in the mountain district region of Thaba-Tseka; about two hours drive from Leribe town of Hlotse (90 km). See Figure 20.

Seventy-one households were resettled (46 voluntarily and 25 compulsorily) in the Katse Region. At the same time, 75 households chose to be relocated uphill, within the vicinity. Mashinini (2010: 4) confirms that “the Katse and Muela dams led to the loss of about 1 900 hectares of arable land jointly, which affected some 2 345 households.” He adds “150 new houses were constructed for 87 households in 32 villages affected in the same period.” See the example of villages affected by resettlement due to inundation and construction of roads in the Katse Region in Table 9.

Table 9: Source- LHDA 1996.

Name of Village	Number of Households	Number of People
Ha Maphutseng	5 – Resettled	11
Mphorosoane	6- Resettled	13
Ha Ramokoatsi	5- Resettled	12
Ha Sepinare	4- Resettled	8
Ha Theko	7- Resettled	15
Bokong	46- Resettled/Relocated	270
Pelaneng	14- Resettled	89
Ha Machaha	6- Resettled	58
Ha Lejone	267 – Relocated	1 600
Ha Mensel	96- Relocated	438
Ha Nyakane	18- Resettlement	106
Total	474	2 620

Some villages from Bokong hillsides, Ha Lejone and Ha Mensel, relocated to higher ground as they moved along with their livestock. Resettlement was not an option for them due to lack of pastures in identified resettlement places (LHDA 1997). Most of these villages were living along the Malibamatso river valley, where there were adequate pastures, water and food security (TRC 1995). A total of 474 households from 11 villages were built replacement houses by LHDA, to resettle 2 620 people affected by Phase 1A (LHDA 1998).

d. Relocation Programme

As Compensation Policy (1997:3) states: “relocation denotes the removal of a homestead from its present place to one within the Scheme Area, the members remain as part of their old social and economic environment, and they do not relinquish their existing land rights.” About 75 households were relocated uphill, as they chose not to leave their vicinity despite losing their fields, forests, rivers, properties and their graves. LHDA (1997) suggests a total of 1 872 households lost 89 hectares of arable land and about 60 hectares of grazing land. Some 239 households were relocated due to the construction of high electricity lines in the area (LHDA 1997).

The Human Sciences Research Council (HRSC: 1995), in its study comparing differences in income between severely affected and moderately affected households, conducted a number of impact studies for the LHDA. In one of these studies they concluded, concerning Phase IA:

Relocated households in the Katse area have higher income levels, than is the case for non-relocated households. It should be remembered that relocated households were living closer to the river and many of them had fields that were of greater fertility than those people upslope who did not have to move. Thus if one is to consider the fact that they now have higher incomes than non-relocated people, their base income before disturbance was higher in many cases than was the case for households not directly affected by the dam (p. 5).

e. Capacity Building Programme

The Compensation Policy (1997) emphasized that LHDA should provide training in business promotion and entrepreneurial development, especially to those people that operate their business within their villages in the project area. In that regard, Ha Lejone Training Centre was built around 1995, for the express purpose of harnessing skills and building capacity of affected communities towards self-reliance and improving employment opportunities for individuals affected by the construction of Katse Dam. Three thousand three hundred participants were trained in handiwork (e.g. sewing, weaving, knitting, building and wiring), maintenance of roads, tunnels & dams, general construction and entrepreneurial skills (LHDA 2001). Technical training regarding range management and environmental care was given to affected farmers in the region, as Ramaili & Cloete (2008: 121) explained:

The LHDA deemed it necessary to improve the quality of livestock - to assist the rural Basotho, who generally perceive possession of a large number of livestock, especially cattle, horses, donkeys, sheep and goats, as an indicator of wealth - while at the same time

decreasing their numbers, to ease the pressure they exert on the environment.

However, the lack of funding prohibited a long term plan for development of this programme in this area which eventually faced closure in less than five years of operation (LHDA 2002). Now let's look at Mohale skills training centre as well.

f. Rural Development Programme

Rural development in terms of the Treaty, in Article 15, states that:

The parties agree to take all reasonable measures to ensure that the implementation, operation and maintenance of the project are compatible with the protection of the existing quality of the environment and, in particular, shall pay due regard to the maintenance of the welfare of persons and communities immediately affected by the project (Treaty 1986).

Land use planning, livestock and range management have become important components for rural development. That means the project designers undertake to improve the environment, wildlife and livestock which, in return, would be for the betterment of the entire population of the mountain region.

The animal husbandry and range management report recommended that Pelaneng livestock improvement centre should be relocated to Ha Lejone and communal range management areas be created throughout the local catchment of Katse reservoir.¹⁴

The natural environment and heritage plan of LHDA (1990) feature predominantly in this programme, as mountain horticulture, field crops and forestry undoubtedly add value for tourist attraction and employment creation among rural community members living in these areas. "A fisheries development project has been initiated in dam areas under this scheme for rural community members to become involved in a fishing programme, so that they can build fish markets to increase their income" (LHDA, 1990:26). Rural electrification, mainly sourced from the Muela Power Station, started taking place after 1999 to supply electricity to specific communal places and government offices in the mountain region, in order to reduce power dependency on South Africa. The intention of this project is to electrify the whole mountain region by 2025 (LHDA 2002). Rural skills training and capacity building in most needed areas are put in the Development Action Plan, stating that: "the specific targets for development include benefits to all affected communities, both directly affected in the inundated area and host communities" (LHDA 1990: 26). As a result,

¹⁴ LHDA, *LHWP*, 1990, p.26.

handiwork projects started at Ha Ratau Skills Centre, Ha Lejone, Thaba-Tseka and Katse Village, for capacity building and skills development (LHDA 1997). These initiatives help to improve the skills of individuals in the affected rural areas.

Concerning rural development, the LHDA (April 1997: 6.4) explains:

The development programme should be regarded as an integral part of the total compensation package. It is intended to benefit, in order of priority, the affected households and villages; the host communities and those remaining in the Scheme Area; and the whole population of the region in which the Scheme is located.

In this case, all affected individuals within different communities had reason to believe what LHDA promised, in terms of improving their livelihoods and environment.

According to Ramaili and Cloete (2008), the Rural Development Programme (RDP) was particularly designed by LHDA as a long-term compensation strategy to improve the standard of living of the people affected by the LHWP. They insist: “To realize the goal of the LHWP that the standard of living of all the affected people should not be compromised and, where possible, improved, the RDP generally aims to maximize opportunities created by the implementation of the LHWP for sustainable development of the highlands area”(Ramaili & Cloete 2008:121). They state that the Rural Development Programme has four objectives:

- a. To enable families directly and indirectly affected to recover their ability to earn an income
- b. To provide facilities and infrastructure for the villages and communities in the project area
- c. To provide training and advice to affected communities to enable them to augment income through both farming and non-farming activities
- d. To improve the nutritional status of the poor.

In these objectives, an ability to earn income, the provision of infrastructure, training and improved nutrition for affected communities summarized the intentions of LHDA.

Effective range management became another priority for the government to improve livestock, especially horses being used for travelling and hired to expatriates, as shown in Figure 21.



Figure 21: Source-www/amphibackpackers/images/Lesotho 2011.

Horse-renting in the Katse region generated income for horse owners Detter (*et al.*, 1994:20): “It is common that horses are rented out mainly to expatriates from the respective camps and their families. Quite astonishing is the fact that the prices for renting a horse in Ha Mensel double those in Ha Lejone.” The reason why Ha Mensel horse rental was high is due to the fact that this village was “closer to the dam construction site” (Detter 1994: 10), where many constructors were based and many horse riders were thus attracted. Ha Lejone is about 25km from the dam construction and it is a bigger village, with many activities such as offices, shops, restaurants, schools and a police station.

Other useful livestock in the area were cattle, goats and sheep (see Figure 22). They are used for income generation, feeding and in traditional ceremonies such as funeral slaughtering and marriage (payment of bride price).



Figure 22: Source-www/amphibackpackers/images/Lesotho 2011.

Donkeys and mules are also essential in the rural life economy, as they are used for carrying goods, and hence the importance of effective range management development.

Overgrazing has always been a challenge in Lesotho, due to geographical conditions and soil erosion (HSRC 2005). Fodder production, range rehabilitation and decreasing the number of livestock, to ease the pressure they exert on the environment, became one of the LHDA priorities. This led to LHDA facilitating the training of farmers in this regard. This training helped farmers to manage reduced grazing land more effectively. Animal husbandry continues to sustain rural communities and mountain horticulture and crop production are emphasized in training farmers.

As agriculture is the main source of livelihood in the LHWP area and the Lesotho highlands in general, its development is perceived to be the main tool towards enhancing the lives of the people. Production-oriented programmes are therefore geared towards improving agricultural production through the provision of extension services and the introduction of agricultural inputs, technology and modern farming methods (Ramaili & Cloete 2008: 121).

g. Business & Tourism Programme

Tourism to the Lesotho Highlands Water Project and the Katse dam attracted more tourists to the area because of the enormous size of the dam and its closeness to the Eastern Free State, where the outlet delivery channel is based. As a result, business opportunities were planned to run alongside tourism, so that benefits from this programme could reach affected people. TCTA also helped, as it “facilitated the development of fixed exhibitions and information centres on the project in Clarens and Ladybrand” (LHDA 2002: 38), so promoting tourism in the region.

Mafika–Lisiu Pass is on the way to the Katse dam, along the nature reserve which attracts many tourists for being “the highest nature reserve in Africa accessible by motor vehicle.”¹⁵ Next to it is the spectacular Lepaqa Waterfalls, attractive to many observers (LHDA 2000). In this case, touring from Ha Lejone and Motebang villages bring tourists to the Katse dam wall and is boosting income of businesses in the area, including hotels such as Maliba lodge, Likileng lodge and Katse Orion Hotel, which is built above the dam, as shown in Figure 23 (LHDA 2002). At least 15 000 tourists visit Katse dam every year, contributing about \$450,000 to the economy (LHDA 2002).

¹⁵ LHDA, *Experience the Lesotho Highlands Water Project*, 2000, p. 5.



Figure 23: Source- LHDA 2002.

Ecotourism attractions include Bokong Nature Reserve, with its well-known variety of flora and fauna. This visitors' centre is built to educate visitors about the Kingdom of Lesotho's ecology, and has facilities for hiking, a 45- minute interpretive trail and full-day walks down to Tsehlanyane national park and along the alpine plateau (LHDA 2002).

Katse botanic garden is another ecotourism attraction for Sesotho medicinal plants, mountain wetland species, *Stapelia flavirostris* and other high altitude (2 229 m) plant species, as this garden is the highest in the southern hemisphere (LHDA 2002). See Figure 24.



Figure 24: Source-LHDA 2002.

These are seven socio-economic programmes which the LHDA implemented for the betterment of affected people in the Katse Dam Region. Section 4.2 will look at how these same programmes were implemented in the Mohale Dam Region.

4.2 Implementation of Socio-economic Programmes in the Mohale Dam Region

a. Infrastructure Development Programme

In the Mohale Dam Region, a southern access road of more than 80 kilometers from Nazareth to the Mohale dam area has improved travelling and increased business opportunities for rural communities. Senqunyane Bridge was built to connect villages like Ha Tsiu, Ha Takatso and Ha Koporale. LHDA (1996:27) noted that construction of this access road “will have significant influence upon people’s preferences regarding possible relocation.” In terms of enabling travelling amongst community members, this particular road is currently being extended and is cutting through the Drakensburg Range to connect Lesotho to KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa. This achievement will improve telecommunication between these two countries, since electrification of this region has improved the livelihoods of communities and the business sector, something that Setsabi and Mashinini (2006: 141) indicate should happen:

Positive livelihood outcomes are closely associated with more income, increased well-being, reduced vulnerability, improved food security and sustainable use of the natural resource base.

b. Compensation Programme

The compensation programme for resettled and relocated households from Mohale region was handled by the LHDA. Tables 10 to 17 show exactly how affected people were compensated and for what. The following tables have been created from the LHDA source, the *Compensation Register for Mohale Region (1998)*. Regarding the compensation term, 15 year compensation of Phase 1A was changed to 50 years when the compensation policy for Phase 1B was put in place. This change of compensation term was caused by strong objections from the affected households claiming that their fields were the source of their livelihoods (see.p.275). We shall start with the compensation register mainly for resettles who moved out of Mohale region to live in Maseru district.

Mohale Region Food Compensation Register

Table 10: List of Beneficiaries

Name of Village	Number of Beneficiaries	District	Grain (70 kg) Bag	Pulse (3 kg)
Matela	3	Maseru	16	8
Ntsi	8	Maseru	124	55
Phaloane	2	Maseru	22	10
Boitsietso	2	Maseru	12	5
Khama	5	Maseru	62	22
Mafotholeng	1	Maseru	25	12
Mohale	1	Maseru	27	13
Motloang	5	Maseru	87	41
Ramohope	7	Maseru	86	40
Seipati	5	Maseru	52	24
Setibing	1	Maseru	8	4
Teri	2	Maseru	16	8
Koporale	4	Thaba-Tseka	24	10
Sebili	7	Thaba-Tseka	53	24
Tsiu	11	Thaba-Tseka	67	31
Total	64	-	681	307

Source: LHDA Compensation Register for Mohale Region 1998/99.

From Table 10, a total of 64 households from 15 villages in the districts of Maseru (12) and Thaba-Tseka (three) received 681 bags of grain and 307 packets of pulses as compensation, between 1998 and 1999.

Compensation for Maseru By-Pass Road

In the Maseru district, some households were affected by the construction of the urban Maseru By-Pass Road, where their yards were cut and structures demolished to give way to this road. As a result, the following 120 households in 12 villages, all in the Maseru district in 1996 were compensated for an amount of M2 303 920 as shown in Table 11.

Table 11: List of Beneficiaries

Name of Village	Number of Beneficiaries	District	Date of Payment	Amount in maluti
Abia	22	Maseru	1996	314 162
Hoohlo	1	Maseru	1996	80 000
Mapetla	18	Maseru	1996	289 030
Masianokeng	1	Maseru	1996	54 368
Maseru	3	Maseru	1996	81 365
Mokhalinyane	1	Maseru	1996	44 600
Ntsirele	5	Maseru	1996	110 873
Penapena	20	Maseru	1996	396 058
Shelile	7	Maseru	1996	162 143
Tikoe	7	Maseru	1996	81 665
Tsolo	34	Maseru	1996	664 257
Upper Thamae	1	Maseru	1996	25 400
Total	120	-	-	2 303 920

Source: LHDA Compensation Register for Mohale Region 1998/99.

Mohale Region Compensated Villages for Arable land

Compensation given to families resettled from the Mohale Region included cash payment for lost arable land, as shown in Table 12. An amount of M52 350 was distributed amongst 82 resettled families in 12 villages in the districts of Maseru (nine) and Thaba-Tseka (three) between 1995 and 1996.

Table 12: List of Beneficiaries

Name of Village	Number of Beneficiaries	District	Date of Payment	Amount in maluti
Boinyatso	1	Maseru	1996	144
Khama	12	Maseru	1996	5 663
Koporale	5	Thaba-Tseka	1996	4 623
Mohale	5	Maseru	1995/96	5 592
Motloang	12	Maseru	1995/96	5 472
Piti	1	Maseru	1996	1 846
Sebili	3	Thaba-Tseka	1996	5 041
Seipati	7	Maseru	1995/96	5 402

Sekokoaneng	4	Maseru	1996	4 109
Setibing	5	Maseru	1996	3 223
Teri	3	Maseru	1996	1 879
Tsiu	24	Thaba-Tseka	1995/96	9 357
Total	82	-	-	52 350

Source: LHDA Compensation Register for Mohale Region 1998/99.

Mohale Region Compensation to Villages for Mountain Road

In regard to the construction of the mountain road into the Mohale Region from the lowlands, 133 households in 18 villages in the districts of Maseru (15) and Thaba-Tseka (three) were compensated with an amount of M122 175 between 1995 and 1998, for being affected by construction. See Table 13.

Table 13: List of Beneficiaries

Name of Village	Number of Beneficiaries	District	Date of payment	Amount in maluti
Matela	3	Maseru	1995	757
Ntsi	14	Maseru	1995/97	11 148
Phaloane	4	Maseru	1997	2 085
Boitsireletso	12	Maseru	1997/98	10 708
Khama	10	Maseru	1996	7 462
Mafotholeng	14	Maseru	1997	20 011
Mohale	5	Maseru	1996/97	6 066
Motloang	2	Maseru	1995/96	1 954
Ramohope	30	Maseru	1996	36 538
Setibing	2	Maseru	1997	945
Teri	3	Maseru	1996/97	1 332
Koporale	6	Thaba-Tseka	1996	2 899
Sebili	3	Thaba-Tseka	1996/97	2 236
Tsiu	12	Thaba-Tseka	1995/98	6 659
Sekokoaneng	5	Maseru	1997/98	4 898
Ralejoe	2	Maseru	1997	814
Molengoane	3	Maseru	1997	912
Maseru	3	Maseru	1996/97	4 750
Total	133	-	-	122 175

Source: LHDA Compensation Register for Mohale Region 1998/99.

Mohale Region Compensation to Villages for Dam Site

At the Mohale dam site, 73 households in eight villages were paid M71 216 in the districts of Maseru (seven) and Thaba-Tseka (one), as compensation for giving way to dam construction. Compensation was received in 1998. See Table 14.

Table 14: List of Beneficiaries

Name of Village	Number of Beneficiaries	District	Date of payment	Amount in maluti
Mohlabane	2	Maseru	1998	2 124
Piti	14	Maseru	1998	8 018
Sekokoaneng	13	Maseru	1998	11 721
Boitsireletso	7	Maseru	1998	6 583
Teri	5	Maseru	1998	3 519
Mafotholeng	4	Maseru	1998	5 545
Mohale	18	Maseru	1998	22 661
Tsiu	10	Thaba-Tseka	1998	11 044
Total	73	-	-	71 216

Source: LHDA Compensation Register for Mohale Region 1998/99.

Mohale Region Compensation to Villages for Kraals and Stables

Compensation to families was paid towards kraals and stables, as indicated in Table 15. The villages affected here are given numbers, as they were grouped together. A total number of 134 households in nine villages between the lowlands (four) and the highlands (five) in 1998 received an amount of M259 058.

Table 15: List of Beneficiaries

Village Number	Number of Households	Destination	Date of Resettlement	Amount in maluti
57	33	Lowlands	1998	37 191
58	52	Lowlands	1998	67 627
70	7	Foothills	1998	83 396
71	1	Foothills	1998	11 721
79	18	Foothills	1998	31 326
80	14	Lowlands	1998	17 042
145	1	Lowlands	1998	3 321
209	3	Foothills	1998	2 036
380	5	Foothills	1998	5 399
Total	134	-	-	259 058

Source: LHDA Compensation Register for Mohale Region 1998/99.

Mohale Region Compensation to Villages for Trees

Compensation for trees in the Mohale region shown in Table 16 was paid to 136 households in 13 villages. This amounted to M281 105, between 1998 and 1999. Compensation for fruit trees was M130. 50 (\$16.00) each and M65.02 (\$8.13) was paid as compensation for each non-fruit tree.

Table 16: List of Beneficiaries

Name of Village	Number of Beneficiaries	Type of Tree	Date of payment	Amount in maluti
Maetsisa	45	Fruit & fuel	1998/99	111 145
Tsapane	40	Fruit & fuel	1998/99	73 346
Piti	5	Fruit & fuel	1998/99	10 715
Sekokoaneng	4	Fruit & fuel	1998/99	10 708
Teri	3	Fruit & fuel	1998/99	2 269
Ralifate	15	Fruit & fuel	1998/99	12 839
Mafotholeng	1	Fruit & fuel	1998/99	4 731
Mohale	6	Fruit & fuel	1998/99	21 307
Mamokoluoa	7	Fruit & fuel	1998/99	17 502
Koporale	3	Fruit & fuel	1998/99	10 704
Lebusa	3	Fruit & fuel	1998/99	13 659
Letsatseng	1	Fruit & fuel	1998/99	676
Tsiu	3	Fruit & fuel	1998/99	5 164
Total	136	-	-	281 105

Source: LHDA Compensation Register for Mohale Region 1998/99.

Mohale Region Compensation to Villages for Disturbance

Disturbance compensation was paid during a two-year period to the villages mentioned in Table 17, some for resettlement and others for relocation. TRC (2007) insists that the majority of resettled and displaced communities were still not fully compensated for disturbance as of 2006 (as well as during the time of this study in 2012-3); 98 households in nine villages were paid an amount of M751 253 between 1998 and 1999 in the Mohale region.

Table 17: List of Beneficiaries

Name of Village	Number of Beneficiaries	Status	Date of payment	Amount in maluti
Maetsisa	32	Resettling	1998/99	458 262
Maetsisa	3	Relocating	1998/99	16 297
Tsapane	27	Resettling	1998/99	102 284
Tsapane	8	Relocating	1998/99	44 791
Piti	4	Relocating	1998/99	22 395
Ralifate	11	Relocating	1998/99	61 587
Mamokoluoa	3	Resettling	1998/99	20 477
Mamokoluoa	6	Relocating	1998/99	25 159
Lekhhera	4	Relocating	1998/99	22 395
Total	98	-	-	751 253


Source: LHDA Compensation Register for Mohale Region 1998/99.

Disturbance compensation paid in 1998 in the Mohale region to each household for relocation amounted to M3 264.00 and M6 526.00 for resettlement. In 1999, compensation for disturbance per household amounted to M2 334.85 for relocation and M4 669.70 for resettlement. That means relocation compensation in 1999 was decreased by M929. 15, resettlement compensation was decreased by M1 856.30 per household.

Compensation for garden land was given to villages of Mafotholeng, where one family was paid M6 440.00. In Sekokoaneng a family was paid M4 095.84 for their garden, while in Setibing 10 families received a total of M36 245.08 for garden land. These payments were made by LHDA for disturbance in 1996, where a total number of 98 households in 12 villages benefitted, and received an amount of M751 252.50 in total (LHDA 1999).

c. Resettlement Programme

Areas shown in the Map 9 were earmarked for resettlement of families removed from the Mohale Region; where 1 900 people from 14 villages, with 321 households, were resettled. The LHDA (1998) confirms that some people out of their own choice, chose to live in the Maseru urban area of Ha Tsolo, Ha Lira foothills, Ha Mohale new settlement and Ha Tsiu mountain foothills. No family was forced to any new area. Devitt & Hitchcock (2010) show the map where affected communities resettled. About 510 houses were built to resettle affected households in Phase 1B (LHDA 1999).



Map 9: Source- Devitt. P & R. Hitchcock, July 2010.

Patrick Bond and Molefi Mafereka Ka Ndlovu (2010: 2) emphasized the negative impact of the LHWP. Concerning the Mohale dam construction, they pointed out that:


An estimated 700 households in 84 villages lost 725 hectares of arable land, with the project reducing grazing land, including the most valuable winter grazing, by approximately 1635 hectares.

Non-governmental organizations like the Lesotho Council of Churches, Transformation Resources Centre, Coalition of NGOs Lesotho, civil society groups and political parties demanded to see resettlement being fairly and speedily carried out (TRC 1995), so that affected households could be

stabilized, as some were concerned that, “approximately 2 300 hectares of grazing land will be lost due to the project, affecting 2 600 households,” (Susan Butler 1997:34).

d. Relocation Programme

In the Mohale dam area, people were also relocated. However, the Mohale region had fewer villages relocated, compared with the Katse region. Here, 425 households were relocated to allow a 30km long tunnel construction, which was to be connected to Mohale dam. The consequence of this move was that people lost 760 hectares of deep and fertile soils to the project (Devitt & Hitchcock 2010).



Map 10: Source-Devitt P & R. Hitchcock, July 2010.

Map 10 shows the Mohale Basin where inundation took place. It is here where Senqunyane Bridge is built to allow easy travel between relocated communities. Devitt & Hitchcock (2010: 67) elaborate:

Prior to inundation the economy of the Mohale Basin was adequate to sustain its inhabitants in a modest traditional style. There were few signs of conspicuous wealth, but equally few of poverty. In this regard the people were significantly better off than most rural Basotho, whose fields produced a poor and unreliable supply of food and little surplus for sale.”

By February 2006 people had moved out of this area altogether. Deep and fertile soils covering 760 hectares gave way to the dam that had reached full capacity supply level. Devitt & Hitchcock (2010:67) show: “the site of Mohale Dam, and its reservoir, lies at an altitude of some 2500m, with surrounding slopes and peaks reaching up to 3500m. At this height winters are severe and snow is common in winter.” In this context, this area was now too risky for people to inhabit.

In summary, Table 18 shows numbers of beneficiaries from the LHWP compensation scheme, both in the Katse and Mohale region. In the table, the nature of the compensation for which they qualified is also shown.

Table 18: Source-LHDA 1996.

Description /Item	Katse Region Number of households	Mohale Region Number of Households	Nature of Compensation
Arable land	2 900	500	Grain, pulses & cash
Trees (fruit & fuel)	357	136	Cash
Forests (fuel & construction)	97	13	Cash
Reeds	29	13	Cash
Garden land	144	12	Cash
Outbuildings	68	12	Cash
Kraals & Stables	357	136	Cash
Disturbance	1 039	98	Houses & cash
Tunnel Intake	9	18	Cash
Rangeland/ pastures	2 800ha	3 434ha	Fodder & cash

e. Capacity Building Programme

The training centre for affected communities in the Mohale region was built in the Thaba-Tseka district around 1996. Fourteen hundred participants were trained in various skills, ranging from brick-laying, dressmaking, plumbing, carpentry, leather works and handicrafts. Mashinini (2010: 4) confirms that:

The institute had trained 157 participants in basic literacy, 75 on brick making and laying, 43 on sewing, 31 on knitting, 39 on weaving, 67 on poultry, and 69 on village water minding.

Although most skills acquired at the centre would not guarantee income generation for rural communities, opportunities for self-employment or working in factories in other parts of Lesotho were created for these people. Ramaili & Cloete (2008:124) emphasize the importance of this centre for rural communities:

The Thaba-Tseka skills training centre was thus established to impart artisan and construction training to works from 1990 to 1992. Thereafter the facility was

converted into a rural development centre to impart new skills and develop existing skills of individuals from the affected communities free of charge.

The lack of income generation for this centre was problematic for growth and sustainability and as a result the centre closed down. “After a lengthy series of impact assessments it was decided that the skills acquired at the centre did not necessarily generate large income opportunities for the beneficiaries. Hence the centre was closed down in 2002.” (Ramaili & Cloete 2008: 124). To conclude this section, Ha Lejone skills training centre in the Katse region also failed to reach its full potential, due to lack of funds and the training centre changed into something else. The result of these failures negatively affected communities that were planned to benefit from training in the regions of Katse and Mohale alike. In less than five years of the inception of this capacity building development programme the centres closed down.

f. Rural Development Programme

Ramaili & Cloete (2008:121) refer to rural development programs, in that “production-oriented programmes are geared towards improving agricultural production through the provision of extension services and the introduction of agricultural inputs, technology and modern farming methods.” This includes the mountain horticulture and crop production needed to improve the rural economy.

A range management programme was introduced in the Mohale project area to capacitate farmers to understand the best ways of managing overgrazing, degradation and soil erosion (LHDA 2004). Improved livestock production to sustain their income was central in this initiative. “Livestock owners, through the established grazing zones, manage the range management, including the production of broilers, layers, pigs and dairy animals,” add Ramaili and Cloete (2008:124). This is how LHDA handled the programme of rural development to accommodate not only affected communities, but to meet the basic needs of the rural population as a whole.

Agriculture remains critical for most households, as they depend on subsistence farming (see Figure 25). While most affected households were relocated and resettled, the farming tradition continued, despite the loss of fields to the dams. “Share-cropping has since increased between host communities and those resettled in various places” (Thamae 2003:8).



Figur 25: Source- LHDA 2002.

Education of shepherds in this area is another aspect of the rural development programme, in that shepherds are taught to count, read and to write (CCL 2005). This programme has been identified as essential. Ramaili & Cloete (2008: 121) point out that:

The majority of young boys and men in the highlands grow up as shepherds and miss out on formal education as they are groomed to be livestock farmers.

The next section describes how tourism formed part of the socio-economic programme of the LHWP.

g. Business & Tourism Programme

The tourism programme was promoted, as it was seen as useful for economic growth, since many visitors come to see Mohale Dam throughout the year. Tourists bring money into the country when they visit the dam. Mohale Dam is constructed more than 2000 metres above sea level, with highly engineered bridges. The nature of this project attracts many people, not only from southern Africa, but beyond the continent, to see the beautiful nature of the project. That is why “an adventure resort is built at Ha Mohale with M22.16 million cost and has employed 80 people to serve about a hundred tourists each day” (LHDA 1997:6).

LHDA (2000:8) specifies: “The construction of Mohale Dam required a huge mass of basalt rock to span the Senqunyane River; a large basalt hill inside the dam basin was blasted and crushed to provide the material required. At 145m, it is the highest concrete-faced rock fill dam in Africa,” making it one of the most attractive sights in the region for tourists.

In terms of meeting a high standard of accommodation for tourists, the Mohale Village and Orion Mohale lodge offer spectacular accommodation for tourists and travellers passing by on a daily basis. This area is perfect for exploring the Maloti Mountains, valleys, waterfalls and rivers, as well as making available boating services for those interested in touring the dam or even fishing. Horse riding also attracts many people who enjoy mountain climbing (LHDA 2000).

Tourism in this area includes visits to the 145 metres high rockfill dam of Mohale. A 20 metres high Matsoku Weir connects to the 31 km Mohale tunnel, linking Mohale and Katse dam together, as well as the Matsoku tunnel of 5.6 km, transferring water to the Katse region. At least 9 000 tourists visit this dam each year, bringing about \$350 000 into the country (LHDA 2000). It is important to emphasize that prices of touring in this area are much cheaper compared to other prices in the country (Ministry of Tourism, Lesotho 2001).

4.3 Conclusion

The implementation of the socio-economic programmes in the regions of Katse and Mohale were explored in this chapter where infrastructure, compensation, resettlement, relocation, capacity building, rural development and tourism were presented as programmes undertaken by LHDA for the development of communities affected by the LHWP. I have shown what programmes were carried out by the LHDA, and what compensation was given to affected households which according to the Treaty (1986) should have improved their livelihoods after displacement. The LHDA (2002) indicates that affected households were satisfied with the compensation packages. However, affected households show a different picture and one of dissatisfaction over the policy implementation processes, starvation and complaints of poor communication to the extent that in some areas they claim that they did not know when they would receive compensation. International standards on compensation rates recommended by the World Bank were not disclosed to affected persons which raises the question of integrity of the LHDA officials as to whether their intention of policy implementation was free of corrupt practices and a possible lack of transparency in the process.. Thabane (2000) agrees that the World Bank was worried when it became apparent that the displaced Molika-like communities were not given their compensation within the timeframe prescribed in the

policy. This is one of the obvious failures of policy implementation by the LHDA which I continue to analyze in this study.

In the next chapter I discuss the views of government officials who worked for LHDA during the policy formation and implementation stages of the LHWP (some have already retired, while some still work for the LHDA) in line with the programmes of the LHDA. I also include the views of other independent officials from NGOs who scrutinized the policy implementation of the LHWP.

Chapter 5

Commentaries from Government and Non-Governmental Organizations' Officials about LHDA's Socio-economic Programmes

Introduction

In this chapter I examine the perceptions of the former and current Lesotho Highlands Development Authority officials who worked in the policy implementation of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. I consider seven socio-economic programmes of the LHDA. This will be followed by commentaries of NGO officials who scrutinized the LHWP policy implementation. The perceptions of these officials of their experiences of policy implementation, particularly compensation policy, will be discussed in light of the socio-economic programmes of LHDA for the development of affected communities. Keketso (2003) argues that separate development does not provide good socio-economic results, as any attempt to develop the affected communities in isolation from other communities could be disastrous. This has a substantial bearing on the LHDA's implemented socio-economic programmes.

Johnston (2012) raises an important aspect of the practice of policy implementation. She argues that administrative procedures call for the participation of different stakeholders interested in the performance of the policy agreement, but this call for participation does not have a sufficient guarantee of equal participation. Bond (2003) emphasizes that the LHWP Phase 1A & 1B had many stakeholders in the process of implementing the Treaty and Compensation policy but participants were not equal, and they were not treated equally. The LHDA took decisions without necessarily consulting the affected communities on issues affecting their livelihoods and their future (TRC 1996). Hence, the situation of poverty, among resettled communities, escalated after disturbance. Poor treatment and discrimination of female household heads tarnished the image of policy implementers and the policy implemented, and the closure of skills training centres in 2002 undermined the whole intention of an effective and efficient rural development programme.

5.1 Commentaries from Government Officials about Implementation of LHDA's Socio-economic Programmes.

The questionnaire was prepared for government officials who participated in policy formation which was implemented by the LHDA. Seven people agreed to be interviewed, but all insisted on anonymity. Three of these have since retired from the public service and are running their own independent projects, but four are still working for the government in different departments. We interviewed two women and five men, between the ages of 52 and 65. All of them possessed relevant tertiary qualifications in different fields. They were given interview reference numbers 73 to 80 to protect their real identities. Their responses are recorded below. Some of these seven officials were involved in compensation policy formation and implementation. They were asked questions pertaining to the implementation of the Compensation Policy. These were whether they knew about the compensation policy; how the policy was implemented; whether they were satisfied with the implementation of the policy; whether compensation was adequate for displaced communities; and, finally, if they felt policy implementation has fulfilled promises made to displaced communities. The interviews took three weeks to complete, as the officials had different commitments to attend to and some trips to take before they could attend to interviews. Their views are summarized in Table 19.

Table 19: Views of Government Officials on LHDA's Socio-Economic Programmes

	Infrastructure Development Programme
<i>Officials' Expectations of LHWP</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The construction of schools in the new settlement areas for learners affected by the LHWP scheme. - Construction of clinics/hospitals to provide improved health care and emergency services in affected areas of the LHWP. - Well-constructed connecting roads to reach project areas and improve telecommunication services.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Schools were built to accommodate affected learners in new settlement areas. - Clinics were built and hospitals were renovated as well as being equipped with better tools for emergency services. - The main Northern Road between Leribe and Katse dam was constructed. Another main road between Nazareth and Mohale dam was constructed.
	Housing Programme
<i>Officials' Expectations of LHWP</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Replacement houses of acceptable standards to affected households to be given (LHDA 1995). - Cash compensation to be given for other assets like kraals, stables and outbuildings.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Replacement houses were given to affected households. - Cash compensation was given for kraals, stables and outbuilding structures.
	Compensation Programme
<i>Officials' Expectations of LHWP</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cash compensation to be given for assets (buildings, forests, trees, reeds, arable land and garden land) and disturbance. - Compensation of grain and pulses to be paid to affected households annually. - Fodder compensation for affected livestock to be given to farmers annually.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - LHDA decided to give cash compensation to qualifying household heads for 15 year period only as follows; M1 per square metre (sq m) for forest, M65 for 1 non- fruit tree, M130 for 1 fruit tree, M10 per 10sq m for reeds, M11 per 17sq m arable land, and M39 per 6sq m garden land. - 70kg bag of grain (maize) for 1056sq m arable land and 3kg packet of pulses for 300sq m were given to affected

	households. -Bales of fodder were given to farmers for livestock depending on a number of animals owned over five years.
	-LHDA paid cash compensation mainly after resettlement in this way; M809 per 3854sq m for compound, M677 per 3sq m for outbuilding, M343 per 11 perimeter area for kraals /stables.
	-First payment of M3 264 for disturbance was made in 1997 to each household, and the second payment of M2 335 for disturbance was made in 1998.
	<i>Capacity-Building Programme</i>
<i>Officials' Expectations of LHWP</i>	-Different capacity-building and skills training activities to improve employment opportunities for displaced people in resettlement areas. -Capacity-building training that could enable affected communities to be self-sufficient and create own businesses.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	- Capacity-building Skills Training Centres were built in the Katse and Mohale dam areas for skills development training of affected people, to increase their employment opportunities in the labour market.
	<i>Rural Development Programme</i>
<i>Officials' Expectations of LHWP</i>	- LHDA planned to start new agricultural projects near resettlement areas for food security recovery. -Breeding of improved livestock and animal husbandry for relocated farmers was envisaged by LHDA. - Effective Range Management Programme to improve environment, safety measures and nourishment of livestock and people in the highlands got the government's support.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	- Pilot projects in agricultural activities were intended to start as soon as resettlement and relocation programmes were completed.
	<i>Business and Tourism Programme</i>
<i>Officials' Expectations of LHWP</i>	-Businesses and tourism to create employment opportunities and improve businesses for affected people before completion of LHWP.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-Tourism programme started in Katse and Mohale dam regions. As hotels were built, sight-seeing places were prepared and easy travelling services were established (LHDA 2000).

Source: LHDA 1997.

On infrastructural development, government officials were instrumental in liaising with affected communities (LHDA 1997), interpreted compensation policy and reached agreement with communities to move to other places for resettlement. As illustrated in the table above, they expected LHDA to build schools for resettled communities, clinics/hospitals to access health care and emergency treatment, together with connecting roads and improved telecommunication services. LHDA provided the expected infrastructure.

On the housing programme, officials expected replacement houses to be provided for every affected household not to be inferior to those which they had built themselves (LHDA 1995). Cash compensation was expected to be given for other structures like kraals, stables and outside buildings which could not be rebuilt by LHDA in new areas of settlement. Replacement houses and cash compensation were duly given for structures.

The compensation programme included cash to be given to every affected household or community group whose assets (arable land, reeds, trees and garden land) were affected by resettlement and relocation. Cash compensation was expected to be given to affected households for disturbance.

There were two other forms of compensation given to disturbed families; food and pulses were provided over a period of 15 years and fodder for livestock over five years (LHDA 1996).

In the capacity building programme, training activities that could build the skills of displaced people in the fields of handiwork (sewing, knitting and weaving), technical skills (carpentry, bricklaying and electrical work) and entrepreneurial skills were planned in the Katse and Mohale regions. These training activities were planned to build the capacity of rural communities to sustain themselves within their new areas of settlement. Affected people were enabled to develop business and technical skills for self-reliance and creating their own employment opportunities (LHDA 1996). LHDA promised financial support for these activities. However, financial support for training lasted for few years as skills training centres in Thaba-Tseka and Ha Lejone shut down less than five years after project inception, with the LHDA claiming not to have enough funds (LHDA 1998).

The rural development plan was designed by some of the interviewed officials. The process of design embraced the theory of Fischer (2003) in which his definition of policy implementation as a political agreement designed to resolve problems brings political teams and the bureaucracy together not only to plan a course of action but also to choose an effective implementation strategy to achieve desired goals. Here, consultation with relevant stakeholders such as the chieftaincy structures in affected areas, district administrators, donor organizations, civil society organizations and affected individuals was paramount to ensuring a clear understanding of the envisaged development plan, particularly to benefit affected people (LHDA 1995). The project areas designed to uplift displaced communities included animal husbandry, effective range management (including pastoral improvement), safety and environmental care of rural livelihoods and advanced agriculture were amongst the top priorities LHDA designed for implementation in the highlands region (LHDA 1990). Yet, the majority of people at the grassroots level (chiefs, community structures and affected people) were not clear about the nature of the activities and the consequences of the construction for their livelihoods, since most of them are not educated and the LHDA did not put enough effort into explaining issues plainly to them (Makoa 2003).

Business and tourism were seen as opportunities for economic growth. Tourism to the largest constructed dams at high altitudes (2500m above sea level) could attract many tourists, from all over

the world (LHDA 1990). In this case, hotels for accommodation, locally based products and transport facilities were improved to enhance the rural economy and development. This programme was designed to benefit rural communities where tourism activities take place. Areas of tourist attraction were identified, planned and arranged to take place within areas of new settlement. Furthermore, businesses around such areas were improved so that affected communities participate in rural economy, thus strengthening their business opportunities (LHDA1990).

An Analysis of Government Officials' Views on LHDA's Socio-Economic Programmes

Here the views of government officials on programmes implemented by the LHDA for the betterment of affected households, as was promised by the LHDA are analyzed. Participants themselves indicated during this study that the LHDA was expected to fulfil its promises to affected households and create an environment of economic and social development, particularly for displaced people.

i. Infrastructural Development Programme

Although infrastructure development of school buildings, clinics, roads and telecommunication facilities were carried out by LHDA, the betterment of individual livelihoods the development of and their households development have, to date, not been noticed. "I had expected to see most of the resettled and relocated people living in better standard by now as compensation policy had categorically stated that affected people should have their lives improved through adequate compensation. But what I have witnessed so far is seeing affected households getting poorer and poorer (Int.80)."

ii. Housing Programme

As for the housing programme, replacement houses are built according to measures determined by the LHDA management. LHDA (1990) confirmed the appointment of constructors to build houses for resettled and relocated families, in different areas, between 1990 and 1992. One participant confirmed that "affected households were supposed to have participated in the housing planning to decide on areas of their choice and types of houses they needed to replace most of the huts in which they lived before disturbance. But when LHDA realized that people could not agree on one particular model, LHDA due to time pressure decided on particular house plans to be built across

resettlement areas” (Int. 79). Some people consequently saw replacement houses for the first time on arrival at their new resettlement area. “One old man did not want to take possession of the new house as he argued that the house was cold at night and there was no fire-place. He emphasized that the LHDA failed to bring them to see the houses before displacement” (Int.78). This response shows that resettled families had a limited role in designing replacement houses or expressing their preferences. The Ecumenical Water Network (2009) confirms that there was dissatisfaction in resettled communities over the size, type and conditions of replacement houses provided by LHDA.

iii. Compensation Programme

Compensation was the cornerstone on which resettlement and relocation were based. Affected households reached an agreement of cash compensation (without actual amounts) with the LHDA for their fields, gardens, trees, outbuildings and disturbance. Table 19 has shown the amounts of money which the LHDA was prepared to pay for compensation of each item. This study learned that those amounts for compensation were determined by the LHDA, despite standard rates for compensation given in US dollars for resettlement programmes by the world (World Bank 1982). There is no recorded proof of affected individuals and communities agreeing on a specific rate, apart from the rates presented to them by LHDA as standard rates based on the size of the assets to be compensated. South Africa was responsible for compensation hence the rates are given in Maluti (equivalent to Rand) and not in any other foreign currency (LHDA1996). There is no record either showing communities wanting to know about standard rates given by the World Bank as it is involved in financing big dam projects around the world (e.g. Guatemala, China, Zambia). This lack of information disadvantaged the affected communities and perhaps the LHDA staff who implemented the compensation policy without adequate information on principles applied across Africa in particular “We were instructed by top LHDA management to put forward amounts of money for compensation of each item as they came to us already decided upon and there was no room and time for negotiations with affected people as the project had to start the soonest in order to deliver water to South Africa before the end of 1998,” commented one participant (Int.74). Another complained: “the period of 15 years for food aid, 10 years cash compensation for disturbance and five years fodder compensation were all determined by the LHDA without any consultation with affected communities/households” (Int. 73). Unlike in Zambia, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Swaziland where similar dams were constructed (with the support of the

World Bank and the IMF) in which the World Commission of Dams provided standard compensation rates for affected communities in Lesotho, the LHDA failed to provide such information to affected communities (WCD 1980). Hence, the problem of inadequate compensation arose.

iv. Capacity-building Programme

The capacity building programme became very useful for skilling affected people in the dam region, in order to prepare them for self-reliance and the creation of their own businesses and self-employment in areas of scarce job opportunities. Hence, the LHDA established skills training centres in Ha Lejone for communities that came from the Katse dam region and another in Thaba-Tseka, for communities displaced by the Mohale dam. A capacity-building programme, which entailed bricklaying, sewing, knitting, handiwork and weaving training was implemented by LHDA, solely for improving the economic conditions of affected rural communities. Development of the market for locally based products was central to this programme. One participant said, “bead-work and handcrafts were produced for tourists coming into the country and for outside markets, while bricklaying was to create housing market locally,” (Int. 76). This initiative aimed at improving the livelihoods of affected people by increasing business opportunities for them.

v. Rural Development Programme

The rural development programme took environmental care, animal husbandry, improved agriculture and education of rural communities into consideration. Environmental care included safety measures for communities living on the bank of the dams and an understanding of climate change caused by water shortages for rural communities, due to construction of dams in the area. Animal husbandry referred to livestock improvement by raising animals that would survive in this changed environment, while improved agriculture had to address the problem of reduced arable land as a result of the dams in the highlands, in which, despite limited available space, farming activities and the desired agricultural products had to be increased in the area. LHDA (1998) alludes to government’s intention of implementing a Rural Development Plan (RDP), to stimulate food production. One participant indicated that “we expected to see improved livestock and fisheries development benefitting most people affected by the construction of LHWP” (Int.77). However, livestock improvement and fisheries development projects did not take off from the ground. The

failure of the LHDA to actualize these promises led to distrust about development projects. “Affected people lost trust about LHDA promises as they failed to provide tools, equipment and other resources to start such projects” (Int.77).

vi. Business and Tourism Programme

Business opportunities through tourism activities encouraged many people who lived in the highlands, as the LHDA presented its proposal for action plan to them. “Many people were encouraged when we brought the news to them that construction of the LHWP would bring them tourists to see these mega dams and that would require them accommodation and touring guides, which of course goes along with buying local traditional products,” contributed one participant (Int. 75). LHDA (2000) confirms that hotels at Katse, Mohale and Tsehlanyane botanic gardens were established for tourism purposes and created jobs for local people. “For the first ten years of Katse and Mohale dams completion, an estimated \$2m was brought into Lesotho by tourists” (Int. 76). However, displaced and affected communities in the areas of Katse and Mohale dams remain poor, despite hotels benefitting from tourists throughout the year. “In comparison, what local people got from the sale of their handicrafts to what hotels benefitted is far less than what LHDA had indicated” (Int. 76).

a. Whether the Government Officials knew about the Existence of a Compensation Policy

Seven government officials were asked whether or not they knew about the existence of a compensation policy for the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. Their perceptions are shown below.

One hundred percent (n=7) of participants indicated that they knew about the existence of a policy for the compensation of resettled and relocated households. “Yes, The Laws of Lesotho Volume XXXI of 1986, passed as Orders by the Military Council, did have Order No.23 establishing the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority to construct Lesotho Highlands Water Project” (Int. 76). Another participant indicated further that “Under the same Order No. 23 of 1986, Part IX refers specifically to Compensation,” (Int. 75). Government of Lesotho (1986: 62) states:

44. (1) Compensation in respect of rights or interests in land, servitude, wayleaves, fisheries, fishing rights, water rights or other rights whatsoever shall be paid by the Authority in accordance with the laws of Lesotho.

Still another participant (Int.80), said: “The Laws of Lesotho Government (1986:62) state that The Authority shall:

- a. ensure that as far as is reasonably possible, the standard of living and the income of persons displaced by the construction of an approved scheme shall not be reduced from the standard of living and the income existing prior to the displacement of such persons.”

b. Whether the Government Officials knew how the Compensation Policy was Implemented

Participants were asked whether or not they knew how the compensation policy was implemented; 71% (n=5) indicated that ‘yes’ they knew how the compensation policy was implemented. One official indicated that LHDA 1997 Policy Document gave “LHDA staff authority to implement the policy of compensation amongst all affected areas” (Int.79). Twenty-nine percent (n=2) of participants indicated they did not know how the compensation policy was implemented. Compensation policy implementation is crucial in this study as I try to find out at what stage of the project life the LHDA officials participated in a project affecting the lives of their people, as well as what model(s) they used in the process. The response of some people (bigger group) knowing about the implementation of compensation policy is an indicator that most people were aware of the project and had some expectations of the project. These expectations included a belief that there was active participation in decision-making and the project intended that there would be employment opportunities to be created by the construction of infrastructure and dams for affected communities. The twenty-nine percent of participants who did not know how the policy was implemented were not in decision-making positions during the implementation phase.

c. Whether the Government Officials were Satisfied with the Implementation of the Compensation Policy

Officials were asked whether they were satisfied with the implementation of the compensation policy. Their perceptions are shown in Table 20.

Table 20: Satisfaction Level of Government Officials about Implementation of Compensation Policy

Region	Implementation of Compensation Policy for	Military Regime 1986-93		Multiparty Democracy 1993-2002	
		n	%	n	%
Katse Dam Region	Resettlement & Relocation	7	100	7	100
	Very Satisfied	1	14	1	14
	Satisfied	4	57	4	57
	Not Satisfied	2	29	2	29
Mohale Dam Region	Resettlement & Relocation	7	100	7	100
	Very Satisfied	1	14	-	-
	Satisfied	5	72	4	57
	Not Satisfied	1	14	3	43

All interviewed participants acknowledged that the compensation policy was implemented during the military regime (1986-93) and also during the multiparty democracy in 1993, throughout the completion of both Katse and Mohale dams in 2002 (LHDA 2002). One participant indicated “very satisfied” about the carrying out of the resettlement and relocation programmes during the military rule, “as some of us engaged the chiefs and affected communities in the Katse region prior to disturbance. We were convinced that uprooted households would be adequately compensated” (Int.73). Fifty-seven percent (n=4) of government officials were satisfied about how compensation policy for resettlement and relocation programmes for the Katse region during the military rule in 1993 was carried out, as they witnessed people moving out of their areas in exchange for the adequate compensation promised to them by LHDA (LHDA 1996). Twenty-nine percent (n=2) of participants were not satisfied about policy implementation, one of them stressing that “no guarantees were given to affected households about the level of compensation by LHDA” (Int. 76). The trend of perceptions for participants was the same during the period of the military regime and multiparty democracy.

In the Mohale region, one participant was “very satisfied” about policy implementation that compensated resettled and relocated communities; 72% (n=5) of participants indicated satisfaction with the implementation of the compensation policy. “We appreciated the work that was done by

resettlement committee which co-ordinated resettlement and relocation arrangements well in consultation with chiefs of affected areas and representatives of affected communities” (Int.77). Another participant was not satisfied about policy implementation, pointing out that, “as many as 20 households in 1992 alone came to my office complaining about compensation” (Int.75).

The views of officials changed during the multiparty democracy, where 57% (n=4) showed satisfaction about policy implementation (decline of 15 %). One participant commended “ the attitudes of people affected by LHWP and the public in general changed under democratic principles, as people were then free to express their feelings about the Treaty and Compensation Policy” (Int. 78). The number of dissatisfied participants concerning the implementation of the compensation policy had increased to 43% during the multiparty democracy, as shown in Table 20. The significance of officials’ satisfaction over policy implementation during the two terms (military dictatorship and democratic rule) is informed by freedom of expression towards policy design and implementation. During the military dictatorship people were afraid to express their opinion about the LHWP, but most participants had hoped that compensation would be implemented in such a way that the livelihoods of affected communities would not deteriorate (Treaty 1986). Whereas during the multiparty era people were free to express their views about the project, even criticizing the processes followed during policy formation.

d. Whether Government Officials believed that Compensation was Adequate for Displaced Communities or Not.

Participants were asked their views on whether they believed resettlement and relocation compensation given to affected households in the Katse and Mohale region was adequate or not. Four participants were decision-makers during the implementation of the LHWP and have indicated that policy formation was done in consultation with the South African regime rather than with policy reference to the World Bank standards (Int.76). The World Bank standardized compensation packages were not applied by the Military regime in Lesotho (TRC 2001). Their perceptions are given in Table 21.

Table 21: Views of Government Officials about Compensation Adequacy

Region	Compensation for Resettlement	Number of participants	Percentage
Katse Region	Adequate	6	86
	Inadequate	1	14
	No comment	0	0
Total		7	100
Katse Region	Compensation for Relocation		
	Adequate	4	57
	Inadequate	3	43
	No Comment	0	0
Total		7	100
Mohale Region	Compensation for Resettlement		
	Adequate	6	86
	Inadequate	1	14
	No comment	0	0
Total		7	100
Mohale Region	Compensation for Relocation		
	Adequate	4	57
	Inadequate	3	43
	No Comment	0	0
Total		7	100

Starting with the Katse Region, 86% (n=6) of participants believed that resettlement compensation was adequate during the time of policy implementation. One participant disagreed: “Compensation was inadequate as I heard affected families complaining about the quality of houses and related payments given to them prior to their departure from their original villages” (Int. 77). Concerning relocation compensation, 57% (n=4) saw compensation as having been adequate. One participant indicated, “Compensation for relocation was adequate as these households’ livelihoods were not totally uprooted but relocated some few kilometres away” (Int.74). However, forty-three percent (n=3) complained that compensation for relocation was inadequate for affected households: “looking at the costs of relocation, the money offered by LHDA was far less to meet basic needs of those people” (Int.79).

Comments of the officials in the Mohale Region were similar, in that 86% (n=6) felt resettlement compensation was adequate for affected households. One participant felt that compensation was inadequate: “When people arrived at new settlement areas most of them complaint about the size of houses and lack of garden land to grow vegetables” (Int. 80). On relocation compensation, 57% (n=4) indicated that compensation was adequate. One participant stated: “some of relocated families were given bigger pieces of land under new chieftainships” (Int.74). Forty-three percent (n=3) felt relocation compensation was still not adequate, as communities involuntarily were pushed out of their original areas. One participant was of the opinion that: “LHDA should have compensated these households in such a way that their economic conditions would not deteriorate due to displacement” (Int.75).

The reasons for different levels of satisfaction over relocation and resettlement are that relocation took place within the local vicinity where families were familiar with the environment, whereas with resettlement people were totally uprooted to live in a new environment and “among the unknown people” (Int. 75). Therefore participants believed that relocation would cost less money as compared to resettlement. In fact, relocated families were given less cash compensation compared to resettled families and that is the reason for high levels of dissatisfaction among them (LHDA 1995). On resettlement, participants opinions were informed by promises which the LHDA had made to resettled communities during their term in office, but these were not what they received. They also failed to enquire in detail if indeed displaced people received what was promised to them. The analysis here shows that government officials perceptions were based upon incorrect information about the compensation given to displaced communities, and whether it would be adequate or not.

e. Whether Cash Compensation for Resettled and Relocated Households was Adequate or Not

Participants were asked whether cash compensation given for different items to resettled and relocated households was adequate or not. One participant acknowledged that cash compensation given to affected households was adequate. However, 72% (n=5) showed a different view, stating that cash compensation given to Seriously Affected People (SAP) in the country was inadequate (TRDC 1996). “Cash compensation which LHDA gave to affected people was too little to survive on. I have seen how some of these communities are suffering to an extend of pushing young girls to

quit school and become prostitutes, while young men have resorted into smuggling dagga and other drugs into South Africa, risking their lives for a better pay,” (Int.79). Another participant did not comment at all. These perceptions of government officials are significant for the study as they help with a foundation to understand how the LHDA carried out policy implementation as far as compensation was administered, and the many hurdles that were not attended to because of a lack of knowledge. Implementation theory is crucial for understanding the form and style of the military regime under which a forced top-down system was applied in a development programme (Tsikoane 1991).

5.2 Commentaries from Non-Governmental Organizations’ Officials about LHDA’s Socio-economic Programmes

Three officials from NGOs were interviewed in this study. What follows is what they said about the implementation of LHDA’s socio-economic programmes in the Katse Dam Region and in the Maseru district. More than 2000 households were scattered across highlands and lowlands, others ending up resettling in Maseru City and the Nazareth Foothills, mainly from the Mohale dam region (more details are given in the next chapter). The three participants came from the Transformation Resources Centre, the Christian Council of Lesotho and the Institute of Southern African Studies (one participant from each organization). They were given reference numbers from 8B to 10B, to protect their identity. Data was collected and analyzed to show whether compensation for resettlement and relocation has left affected people better off or worse off where their economic conditions and income were concerned. Table 22 shows their views about LHDA’s socio-economic programmes.

Table 22: Views of NGOs' Officials on LHDA's Socio-Economic Programmes

Infrastructure Development Programme	
<i>Officials' Expectations of LHWP</i>	- The construction of access roads, schools, clinics, trading and help centres in the new settlement areas for affected communities by LHWP scheme.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-Schools were built to accommodate affected learners in new settlement areas. -Clinics were built and hospitals were renovated, as well as being equipped with better tools for emergency services. - Access roads linking new settlement areas to the main roads were constructed.
Housing Programme	
<i>Officials' Expectations of LHWP</i>	-Replacement houses of acceptable standards to affected households were expected to be given by the LHDA. -Cash compensation was supposed to be given for other related assets like kraals, stables and outbuildings before disturbance.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-Replacement houses were given to affected households. -Cash compensation was given for kraals, stables and outbuilding structures.
Compensation Programme	
<i>Officials' Expectations of LHWP</i>	- Cash compensation to be given for assets (buildings, forests, trees, reeds, arable land, and garden land) and disturbance. -Compensation of grain and pulses was to be paid to affected households annually. -Fodder compensation for affected livestock was also to be given to farmers on an annual basis.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-LHDA gave cash compensation to qualifying household heads for a 15 year period, as follows: M1 per sq m for forest, M65 for 1 non-fruit tree, M130 for 1 fruit tree, M10 per 10sq m for reeds, M11 per 17sq m arable land, and M39 per 6sq m garden land. -70kg bag of grain (maize) for 1 056sq m arable land and 3kg packet of pulses for 300sq m were given to affected households. -Bales of fodder were given to farmers for livestock, depending on the number of animals owned over five years. -LHDA paid cash compensation mainly after resettlement in this way: M809 per 3 854sq m for compound, M677 per 3sq m for outbuilding, M343 per 11 perimeter area for kraals/stables. -First payment of M3 264 for disturbance was made in 1997 to each household, and the second payment of M2 335 for disturbance was made in 1998.
Capacity-Building Programme	
<i>Officials' Expectations of LHWP</i>	-Capacity-building and skills training activities were to be facilitated to improve employability of affected people in resettlement areas or to be able to start own businesses.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	- Capacity-building Training Centres were built in the Katse and Mohale dam areas for capacity - building training of affected people.
Rural Development Programme	
<i>Officials' Expectations of LHWP</i>	- LHDA to start agricultural projects near resettlement areas for food security recovery. -Breeding of improved livestock and animal husbandry for relocated farmers. - Effective Range Management Programme to improve environment, safety measures and nourishment of livestock and people in the highlands.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	- Pilot projects in agricultural activities took place (LHDA 1998).
Business and Tourism Programme	
<i>Officials' Expectations of LHWP</i>	-Businesses and tourism to create employment opportunities and improve businesses for affected people.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-Tourism programme started in Katse and Mohale dam regions, as hotels were built, sight-seeing places prepared and easy travelling services were established (LHDA 2000).

Infrastructural development which was inspected by participants included the construction of primary and secondary schools in the Katse dam and Mohale dam regions. Some clinics were built from scratch and hospitals were renovated, if not built afresh, to accommodate project workers and highlands communities (LHDA 1995). Access roads from resettlement areas joining the main North Road were constructed from Pitseng to Katse Dam and beyond. At the same time, the construction of the roads took place in the Southern Mohale Route to Mohale dam, passing through the Thaba-Tseka district. Clinics, trading centres, service delivery and health care centres were built to accommodate Mohale dam regional inhabitants.

To the NGO officials, the housing programme implemented by LHDA did not adequately consider the number of huts/outbuildings demolished or left behind by resettled and relocated households. One participant said that: “households members expected to be compensated a number of houses equal to those they owned before disturbance” (Int. 8B). The refusal by the LHDA to rebuild outbuildings was seen by some of the officials as a violation of the Treaty and the Compensation Policy. “The Treaty clearly said compensation should be given to everyone affected by construction and that every affected item should be compensated in consultation with the affected party” (Int. 10B). The nature of structures, small front house gardens and smaller properties, compared to what people had before, was attributed to a scarcity of land to resettle everyone (LHDA 1996).

Compensation was given in the form of cash for arable land, garden land, trees, reeds, forests, outbuildings and for disturbance. Cash payments were expected before resettlement and relocation of affected communities. Amounts paid are shown in Table 22. Again, grain and pulses compensation was given to affected households to compensate them for lost harvests which, in this case, was supposed to be given over a 15-year period. Fodder was provided for the livestock over a period of five years, in which a rural development plan had anticipated that improved pastures would have been created for relocated farmers before the completion of the project (LHDA 1995).

A government capacity-building programme prioritized skills training for affected people in the region. Rural communities were developed to run their own businesses, without relocating to other areas. LHDA had planned this programme to create an environment for employment opportunities for affected communities, as well as for promoting businesses that could strengthen their

sustainability. LHDA built several skills training centres in affected regions for the empowerment of affected people (LHDA 1997). More than 300 participants were trained in the areas of craftwork, plumbing, carpentry and bricklaying which enabled some participants to get employment in the project and other areas in Lesotho, as well as enabling them to start their own businesses (LHDA 2002).

On the rural development programme, LHDA established a unit to conduct animal husbandry, ecotourism, fishery development and advanced agriculture, to harness food security and fishery development projects (LHDA 2002). This unit was given roles to identify potential trainees that included farmers, trainers and other stakeholders, who could facilitate rural development (LHDA 1995). Environmental care & safety and breeding of improved livestock to tolerate a new environment were part of this project, which was piloted in 1998.

On the business and tourism programme, affected communities were promised by LHDA that they would be given opportunities to run tourism projects “as they knew topology and traditional values upheld in the area” (Int. 9B). The involvement of affected people in this programme was seen in the light of guiding tourists, producing handcrafts that are unique in this area and the identification of sites of interest (LHDA 1996). Host communities were expected to receive cash for providing these services and for marketing their own products to tourists (LHDA 2002).

An Analysis of NGOs Officials’ Views on LHDA’s Socio-Economic Programmes

i. Infrastructural development programme

The development of infrastructure remains critical for the construction of dams and telecommunication services. Non-governmental officials have acknowledged that infrastructural development has happened in the areas with the construction of schools clinics/hospitals development, training centres for skills development and access roads linking resettled and relocated communities to the main roads leading to Katse and Mohale dams. However, one official asked whether “infrastructural development could be extended to cultural/traditional venues that needed to be included in the development of Basotho Cultural Centres, which should entrench traditional leadership capable of building leadership skills amongst youth” (Int. 9B). Infrastructural

development remains the catalyst of the high engineering standards exhibited in the highlands of Lesotho in the 21st century. This has made the LHWP a meaningful development plan for Lesotho and the region.

ii. Housing programme

The housing programme received criticism from many affected families, in that replacement houses fell short of what original houses/huts could accommodate e.g. harvest, visitors, youth groups (females separated from males), and storage for equipment and instruments. “People were perplexed when they arrived at resettlement houses only to find a two or three roomed house with little garden space or none altogether. This was in sharp contrast with the manner in which they lived and were accustomed” (Int. 10B). The size of replacement houses was interpreted as smaller in comparison to the type of houses/huts people owned in their original areas. Most elderly people felt uncomfortable sleeping under one roof with their children. Traditionally, elders do not sleep under one roof with the children, but LHDA’s housing programme compelled this situation to prevail” (Int.9). The intention of the LHWP was not only to supply water to South Africa or for Lesotho to get royalties, but it also included an aspect of social development in which culturally acceptable norms needed to be preserved.

iii. Compensation programme

On compensation, officials believed that budget allocations for compensation were supposed to meet the basic needs of affected people, as well as fully paying for their losses. The present study established that families were uprooted from their original homes to new settlement places without first being paid cash compensation, as promised by LHDA. One participant complained that “the current cash payment given for assets and disturbance per each household is less than M25 000 in total per year, which makes it difficult for any family under current economic situation to survive on. At least LHDA should have budgeted for each household to be given at least M50 000 cash compensation per annum” (Int.8B). The LHDA used their own rates to compensate the affected households (not standardized compensation packages approved by the World Bank). Food aid was delayed most of the time, making families suffer unnecessarily. One participant said, “grain and pulses reach people very late in the year instead of reaching in July when we all know to be harvest time in Lesotho” (Int. 10B).

Fodder compensation came “in poor conditions most of the time with poor type of grass which most farmers claim their livestock does not like it. Furthermore, bales of fodder came from South African farms with lots of weeds which caused livestock to get sick” (Int.8B). Another issue regarding fodder compensation was the late delivery of fodder to the farmers. The fodder “sometimes came late in November when the new grass has already grown, instead of July/August which is a dry season” (Int.9B). These perceptions indicate the failure of the LHDA to implement the policy accordingly, and within agreed timeframes. Furthermore, the health conditions of affected livestock faced deterioration and untimely deaths.

iv. Capacity-building programme

The capacity-building programme concentrated on skills development, to enable rural people to acquire the skills necessary for employment. However, this study discovered that a sizeable number of affected people who were supposed to benefit from training in different skills were illiterate. “Hence, LHDA opted for handiwork skills training rather than academic training so that every learner is given an opportunity to learn trade using her/ his own hands” (Int. 8). Another area of development was around entrepreneurial skills training where, if possible, affected people could be prepared to start their own businesses and be able to manage their growth properly (LHDA 1997). Affected communities had expectations beyond compensation. They expected the LHWP to bring about opportunities for them to develop technical skills which could help them with permanent employment in the dam region as emphasized by another participant, “people were promised advanced skills to administer and technically work at the dam” (Int.10B).

v. Rural development programme

The rural development programme was applicable mainly to highland areas, where animal farming and fishery projects from both Katse and Mohale dams could be run alongside agricultural practices in the new lake environment. LHDA (1995) acknowledged a need to learn new ways of growing crops in a colder environment, as well as raising livestock that could survive in the new lake environment. One participant commented that “Our role in rural development programme was limited as we depended on external experts to introduce suitable methods that could help with food security recovery plan” (Int.9). The dependency of officials on external experts caused some delays

in the implementation of animal farming and fishery projects, compounding the challenges that led to failure of the projects. Training costs associated with these projects were too high to bear (LHDA 2001).

vi. Business and tourism programme

The business and tourism programme was hailed by LHDA as a milestone for economic growth (UNDP 1999). In its 2002/2003 annual report, LHDA lauded the successes of the tourism programme, whereby an ecotourism botanic garden had increased the attraction for tourists to visit the Bokong Nature Reserve. Participants confirmed that tourism in the highlands water project had the potential to contribute to the economy. “We found out from hotels in the area that in 2010 alone more than 5 700 tourists visited Katse and Mohale Dam and contributing not less than \$120 000 to the economy” revealed Interviewee 8B. Businesses promoted by tourism in the dam region did not really benefit the affected communities as the LHDA had expected when issues of resettlement and relocation were packaged for compensation and the highlands development programme (TRDC 1996).

a. *Whether Officials knew about the Compensation Policy and Agreement LHDA Reached with Affected Households*

Three non-governmental officials were asked questions about their experiences of the LHWP. The first question that was asked was whether they knew about the existence of the Compensation Policy associated with the implementation of the LHWP. All three of them indicated ‘Yes,’ they were aware that resettled/relocated communities had reached an agreement with LHDA on compensation. “We have copies to that effect” (Int. 8B). The Compensation Policy of 1997 of the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority has clearly stipulated what can be compensated for, to whom, for how much and for how long.

b. *Whether NGOs officials knew how the Compensation Policy was Implemented by LHDA*

Officials from the NGOs were asked whether or not they knew how compensation policy was implemented by LHDA; 67% (n=2) of participants knew and one of them indicated that “compensation was given only to male household heads, if a family did not have a male head, a close male relative was expected to take leadership of such a family in order to claim compensation

for affected household,” (Int.10B). This gender biased compensation was criticized by affected communities themselves, chiefs and NGOs which advocated for non-sexist compensation (TRC 1995, CCL 1996 & ISAS 1997). Despite many protests against gender biased compensation, based on male household head the LHDA continued with the gender-bias, thus violating their human rights and entrenching patriarchal notions of gender. The LHDA (1998) confirmed a list of household heads that received cash compensation for resettlement and relocation all of which were males. One participant did not know how the compensation policy regarding compensation for resettled and relocated communities was carried out, “except from what I was told by affected people themselves,” (Int.9B). The views of the officials on the implementation of the policy are shown in the Table 23. Thus not only was failure evident in terms of an absence of standards on compensation packages, but there was failure to respect the human rights of the affected individuals who were women.

c. Whether Compensation Policy Implementation was Satisfactory or Not

Officials were asked whether the implementation of the compensation policy was satisfactory. Their views are shown in Table 23.

Table 23: Views of NGOs Officials on Satisfactory Level of Policy Implementation

Region	Implementation of Compensation Policy for	Satisfaction level	
		n	%
Katse Dam Region	Resettlement & Relocation	3	100
	Very Satisfied	0	0
	Satisfied	1	33
	Not Satisfied	2	77
Mohale Dam Region	Resettlement & Relocation	3	100
	Very Satisfied	0	0
	Satisfied	0	0
	Not Satisfied	3	100

One official showed satisfaction over policy implementation in the Katse dam region; 77% (n=2) were dissatisfied in the Katse region. One of them said that “affected communities have waited for too long to be compensated, this delay constitutes poor policy performance” (Int. 10B). Concerning policy implementation for Mohale dam region, all three participants complained that policy

implementation was unsatisfactorily: “the majority of the displaced Mohale families are complaining about unpaid cash and food compensation. We see them where they live and we bear witness of their suffering” (Int. 9B).

NGOs were generally not satisfied over the system of policy implementation. One reason was that the Military Government failed to provide the public with the Treaty and Compensation Policy documents for scrutiny before the signing of the Treaty with South Africa in October 1986 (Tsikoane 1991). Only those companies which could afford to pay expensive prices were able to buy the Treaty document (Tsikoane 1991). Ironically, the Treaty document was given free in South Africa to the public (Rand Water 1986). This is the reason why Table 23 above shows disparity between levels of satisfaction of government and NGOs officials. The ability of ordinary people to access the documentation depended upon their ability to pay for it.

d. Whether Compensation given to affected households was adequate

NGOs officials were further asked whether they believed compensation given for resettlement and relocation was adequate for affected households. Their perceptions are given in Table 24.

Table 24: Views of NGOs Officials about Compensation Adequacy

Region	Compensation for Resettlement	Number of participants	Percentage
Katse Region	Adequate	2	67
	Inadequate	1	33
	No comment	0	0
Total		3	100
Katse Region	Compensation for Relocation		
	Adequate	2	67
	Inadequate	1	33
	No Comment	0	0
Total		3	100
Mohale Region	Compensation for Resettlement		
	Adequate	2	67
	Inadequate	1	33
	No comment	0	0

Total		3	100
Mohale Region	Compensation for Relocation		
	Adequate	2	67
	Inadequate	1	33
	No Comment	0	0
Total		3	100

When coming to the question of the adequacy of compensation, the opinions of NGOs changed. Sixty-seven percent (n=2) indicated that ‘yes,’ compensation was adequate as far as the information they got from LHDA was concerned. This opinion was not based on affirmation from displaced families on what they had received from the LHDA. However, 33% (n=1) thought that compensation was inadequate and shared doubts about the ability of compensated households to repair replacement houses, as most of them were unemployed. “The scale they used to compensate these families was not based on a long-term development model. They built small houses in comparison and provided not enough space for gardens or future development plans,” (Int. 8B). Another participant indicated “TRC (2007) concluded that LHDA’s compensation given disempowered affected communities from Katse and Mohale dam regions” (Int. 10). Still another official concluded that “Looking at the cost of living in Maseru Urban in particular, these communities will suffer immensely. Everything needs cash in the city. In their homes they farmed and were content, but here they have started suffering” (Int.9B). Participants had the same views in both regions.

5.3 Whether the Government and NGOs Officials felt that Compensation has Fulfilled Promises made to Displaced Communities

Perceptions of participants from Government and NGOs are now brought together in a summary, where they were asked their views on whether they felt LHDA fulfilled its promises made to affected households, and their perceptions, starting with the Katse Region. See Table 25.

Table 25: Fulfilment of promises made by LHDA to affected households about compensation

Region	Promises Fulfilled :	Number of participants	Percentage	
Katse Region	Resettlement	Yes	2	20
		No	6	60
		No comment	2	20
Total		10	100	
Katse Region	Relocation	Yes	3	30
		No	6	60
		No Comment	1	10
	Total		10	100
Katse Region	Cash Compensation	Yes	4	40
		No	6	60
		No Comment	0	0
	Total		10	100

i. Katse Dam Region

The Government and NGOs officials were asked if, in their opinion, the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority had fulfilled the promises made to affected communities in Lesotho concerning the construction of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. The promises made communities from the Katse dam region about the Resettlement Programme will be dealt with first.

Resettlement Programme

Twenty percent (n=2) of participants indicated that ‘yes,’ LHDA had fulfilled promises made to affected people; 60% (n=6) denied that, saying LHDA had not fulfilled promises made to affected people. “LHDA promised people good health and prosperity in new areas of resettlement. But what they are experiencing now is isolation, hunger, sicknesses and alarming death rate amongst their resettled members” (Int.9B). One participant indicated why resettled families came to live in Maseru, “It was to enjoy the said promises” (Int.75). Another 20% (n=2) of participants did not comment.

Relocation Programme

Regarding relocation compensation, 30% (n=3) of the participants saw LHDA having fulfilled its promises to relocated families, as they managed to relocate uphill without a problem, and have eventually settled down well (LHDA 2000); 60% (n=6) of the participants indicated that promises made to affected households by LHDA were unfulfilled. One participant decided not to comment.

Cash Compensation

Whether or not promises of cash compensation to affected households were fulfilled, participants had mixed feelings; 40% (n=4) of participants felt promises concerning cash payment were met, “even though not to the level of their expectations” (Int. 74). 60% (n=6) of participants indicated that cash compensation given to affected communities confirmed that LHDA failed to fulfil promises made to affected families. “For example, no family in Maseru can survive on M4 000 per annum without getting financial support elsewhere. The money given to these families, some with about eight household members, was too little” (Int. 78). Another official raised a concern about non-payment for disturbance and inadequate cash payments for arable land, trees, outbuildings, kraals, garden land and medicinal plants to affected people, saying:

“I read in the newspapers that some communities have taken LHDA to Ombudsman due to none payment of their compensation. How could LHDA default on paying these people, as the budget was available for them?” (Int. 9B)

ii. Mohale Dam Region

Concerning the fulfillment of promises made for cash compensation to resettled and relocated families from Ha Mohale, Government and NGOs officials were asked their opinions. Their perceptions are shown in Table 26.

Table 26: Fulfillment of Promises made to Affected Households from the Mohale Dam Region.

Mohale Region	Promises Fulfilled : Resettlement		
	Yes	0	0
	No	8	80
	No comment	2	20
Total		10	100
Mohale Region	Promises Fulfilled : Relocation		
	Yes	2	20
	No	6	60
	No Comment	2	20
Total		10	100
Mohale Region	Promises Fulfilled: Cash Compensation		
	Yes	3	30
	No	7	70
	No Comment	0	0
Total		10	100

Resettlement Programme

As many as 80% (n=8) of participants agreed that promises made about the resettlement programme were not fulfilled: “people were unhappy about the size of houses, type of structures and the fact that they had to start paying for water, electricity and other services without a strong income base,” (Int. 9B). Twenty percent (n=2) of participants reserved their comments.

Relocation Programme

Concerning the relocation programme, 20% (n=2) of the participants saw the LHDA as having fulfilled its promises, by building houses in different locations for resettles, while 60% (n=6) of participants indicated that promises made to people about relocation were not fulfilled. “Some of these people arrived here for the first time with children and everything they had only to be disappointed when they realized that houses were small, some joined together and without enough space to keep everything they had together in the same yard” (Int.10B) . Another 20% (n=2) declined to comment.

Cash Compensation

Thirty percent (n=3) of participants indicated that cash compensation associated with the assets of affected households was properly paid, according to the LHDA compensation policy (LHDA 1997). This means that the LHDA fulfilled promised made to these communities. Seventy percent (n=7), however, indicated that LHDA kept on promising people that their outstanding cash payments for disturbance and assets would be paid to them without delay. “But eight years today, these people have still not been compensated fully” (Int. 9B). Another participant said:

“We feel sad to learn that most of relocated households have not received compensation promised to them. We regret that their lives are facing difficulties because of the construction of these dams, but hope LHDA or Government itself should take drastic measures to address the plight of these people” (Int. 77).

Participants in this study acknowledge the failure of the LHDA to properly implement the compensation policy. The affected households have been deprived of their rights of compensation. Thus, they are faced with difficulties and alarming poverty levels (Thamae & Pottinger 2006). The Treaty was not implemented accordingly as compensation was not carried out in a manner to that would ensure the wellbeing of affected households was not inferior to that which they had before disturbance (Treaty 1986).

5.3.1 Summary of the Government and NGOs Officials' Views about Benefits that came to Affected Households as a Result of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project.

Table 27 shows the summary of all officials' perceptions from Government and NGOs on how they believed Lesotho Highlands Water Project has benefited affected communities.

Table 27: Level of Benefits for Affected Households

Region	Levels of Benefits for Affected Households	Formation of Compensation Policy		Implementation of Compensation Policy		Resettlement Programme		Relocation Programme	
		n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Katse Region	Officials	10	100	10	100	10	100	10	100
	Very Beneficial	2	20	3	30	0	0	0	0
	Beneficial	8	80	7	70	4	40	8	80
	Not beneficial	0	0	0	0	6	60	2	20
Mohale Region	Officials	10	100	10	100	10	100	10	100
	Very beneficial	4	40	2	20	0	0	0	0
	Beneficial	6	60	8	80	4	40	3	30
	Not beneficial	0	0	0	0	6	60	7	70

As the findings indicate, the livelihoods of disturbed communities depended on handouts given by LHDA after resettlement and relocation. They moved out of their original homes with promises of adequate (the term will be explained further in the next chapter) compensation from LHDA and with the assurance that their livelihoods would not deteriorate from the standard they were before their disturbance (LHDA 1997). One official, who indicated that he had worked in the budgeting department of the LHDA during the project design, revealed:

I was part of the team that designed funding budget for this project in 1986 July. Chiefs of affected villages were approached as well and they overwhelmingly supported total relief for their people, not only for shorter-term but a longer term as this displacement was undesirable to people and involuntarily (Int.76).

Another official stressed:

The agreement assured everyone affected by Lesotho Highlands Water Project to be adequately compensated for losses as well as the social development planning department which promised to start capacity building training for affected households in order to get jobs or become entrepreneurs, and to avoid undesirable consequences (Int.73).

Despite the discussed seven socio-economic development programmes implemented by the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority for the betterment of affected communities, the majority of these communities remain poor.

5.4 Conclusion

In this chapter I discussed the perceptions of government and non-governmental officials on socio-economic programmes which the LHDA implemented for the development of communities affected by the construction of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project in the Katse and Mohale regions. These officials were asked specific questions about how the policy that implemented the LHWP was carried out. Their views have confirmed the existence of an agreement between LHDA and affected communities that were later resettled and relocated to different places in the country, as they gave way for the construction of roads, the Muela Hydropower Development and Katse and Mohale dams.

They commented on how they expected the compensation policy to be implemented and what, in their opinion, was delivered by the LHDA to resettled and relocated households. They confirmed that replacement houses were built for affected households, cash compensation was given for the loss of assets, grain and pulses were given to compensate harvest that was lost while affected households started a new life in different places, and fodder compensation was provided to farmers for their livestock. Government officials have explicitly indicated their knowledge of the Treaty of 1986 to implement the LHWP. They state that they knew that the compensation policy for the affected households clearly indicated that cash compensation for assets and disturbance were approved to be paid before resettlement and relocation took place. But, the LHDA failed to implement the policy as prescribed. Again, the patriarchal assumptions of gender based privileges whereby the compensation policy was distorted and women were sidelined from receiving compensation which was due to their families has caused a shift in the relationships between women and men who were affected. This is a violation of their human rights. This marks the failure of policy implementation by entrenching negative cultural tendencies and stereotypes that under-develop the families.

Non-governmental officials overwhelmingly condemned the exclusion of women from receiving their family compensation. Braun (2010: 461) confirms that “women affected by the LHWP did not receive compensation directly for their work as providers for their household or as farmers”. They also remarked that compensation rates were inadequate for families to survive on. Proving a point that the LHDA did not really take the economic future of displaced communities seriously, as food aid and fodder delayed to arrive and with full knowledge of the government officials, people were still not paid their full compensation either. Thus, the LHDA failed to implement cash compensation as prescribed by the policy. They failed to adhere to international compensation standard rates for resettlement. They failed to provide the affected families with food aid and fodder for their livestock at the time of need. Yet, despite these failures, many officials expressed satisfaction with the implementation.

In chapters six and seven I explore what the affected communities have to say about their own experiences, which clearly demonstrates the incongruence in the perceptions of implementers and affected.

Part Three

Chapter 6

Findings: The Report of Researched Communities on

The Effects of LHDA's Socio-Economic Programmes on Affected Katse Dam Region Communities

Introduction

In this chapter I focus on the effects of six socio-economic programmes of the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority, namely, infrastructure development, housing, compensation, capacity-building, rural development and tourism on resettled and relocated households. The report of the experiences of resettled communities about the LHWP from the Katse and Mohale dam regions is separately examined, starting with the Katse Dam Region background information, in Section 6.1. I investigate the participation of affected resettled communities and what they received from LHDA's six socio-economic programmes in Ha Lejone, Ha Lepaqa, Ha Sepinare and Manganeng. I consider the nature of the agreement reached between affected households and the LHDA. I focus upon the perceptions of resettled households on replacement houses and on cash compensation, which they received from the LHDA. I then turn to consider the relocation programme in the Bokong Hillside, investigating the experiences of affected relocated people from socio-economic programmes of the LHDA, as well as from relocation itself and then provide an overview of these programmes in the Katse region.

This study examines the extent to which six socio-economic programmes of the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority successfully improved the livelihoods of displaced communities affected by the construction of Katse and Mohale dams. The implementation theory which was employed is used to guide my analysis in this interrogation. The perceptions of the community reveal that the socio-economic programmes were not successfully implemented.

6.1. Background Information

I conducted research in the four resettlement villages mentioned above and Upper Bokong Hillside, where some of the affected households were relocated to. The study in that region intended to discover to what extent socio-economic programmes implemented by LHDA benefitted the affected people. LHDA (1992) had regarded 46 households in the Bokong Valley as Seriously Affected People because their residential places and fields were going to be inundated by the dam. These households were therefore the first to be put on the resettlement programme list, followed by other villages along the banks of the dam, as well as those whose houses were affected by road construction (TRDC 1996). Twenty people who were interviewed in the four new settlement villages were resettled far away from their original areas. The other seven people interviewed in this study were relocated within the local vicinity of less than 10 km, in Upper Bokong Hillside. All five researched villages which will be discussed in this chapter had some expectations from the Lesotho Highlands Water Project and they actually received compensation from the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority (as elaborated further, later on). This chapter is structured village by village and it explores how each village was affected by the six socio-economic programmes and what their perceptions were regarding them. I take a critical look at the implementation of the LHWP Resettlement Programme which those socio-economic programmes influenced, and in particular the economic factors for affected people. An analysis of each village is given.

The villages from which researched people originated before resettlement included Pelaneng, Boshobatho, Machaba, Ha Theko and Lower Bokong. These communities moved out of their original villages during 1988 until 1990, when some ended up in Ha Lejone, Ha Lepaqa, Ha Sepinare and Manganeng. The other group of people (mainly those who wanted to stay with their livestock) chose to relocate to Upper Bokong Hillside, within the same vicinity. Mashinini (1998: 3) clarifies that “Phase 1A affected 133 villages in the Katse and Muela local catchment. As many as 3357 households, averaging between 5/6 members lived within the main Katse impact areas.” According to the Principal Chief of that region, the villages around Ha Lejone area consisted of about 2 300 people” (TRDC¹⁶-1995:8). TRDC (1996:3) confirms that “forty–six households in the Katse catchment area have been identified by LHDA as being those most critically affected by Phase

¹⁶ Training and Rural Development Consultants (Pty) Ltd (TRDC), a Joint Venture between John Addis and Associates, and Loxton, Venn and Associates. This group worked together with local consultants like Sechaba Consultants that took part in a number of feasibility studies contracted by the LHDA for the project.

1A of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project after those directly affected by the shoreline.” These households are among those that were targeted in this research.

6.1.1 Scope of Research

Research in this region was divided into two sections. The first villages that came under investigation were four villages which are now known as foothills resettlement villages, namely Ha Lejone, Ha Lepaqa, Ha Sepinare and Manganeng, where 20 out of about 420 were resettled households, with an estimated population of 2 100. Fifteen women aged between 45 and 75 years were asked questions and five men who were between 55 and 70. A few women were able to fill in questionnaires for themselves, but most men were illiterate and they asked their children to fill in questionnaires for them. Interviews took place in five villages, over a period of four weeks.

The fifth village (Upper Bokong Hillside) was investigated separately, as newly arrived households were affected by relocation within the same vicinity. Seven participants whose families had relocated to Upper Bokong Hillside were asked their views about the project and relocation. These seven participants came out of about 40 relocated households from the estimated population of 200 who had relocated uphill, but within their vicinity of less than 10km (their responses will be discussed later). TRDC (1996:13) comments that thirty-two households were moved within the Category 2 relocation from the upper Bokong reaches of the Katse Dam. In terms of gender, five men between ages of 55 and 70 were interviewed and two women between 45 and 60 years shared their views about the project’s relocation programme. Their average standard of education was between Standard 2 and 7. Some were able to write but others were not. Those who could not write asked their grandchildren to write for them. A total of 27 participants were interviewed in the Katse dam region between the foothills and the highlands.


6.1.2 Economic Factors

The main intention here is to explore the viewpoints of those relocated on whether the seven socio-economic programmes of LHDA have indeed improved the livelihoods of resettled and relocated households. Communities discussed ways of managing and building their own economy in this region prior to the LHWP. Later in this chapter what these people are saying about their current economic situation will be discussed. Some of the factors that had created sustainability amongst

these communities were successful farming, income from migrant labour, sales from the livestock, wool & hides, and other local businesses, including the sale of diamonds and marijuana. Figure 26 shows percentages of farming activities with types of crops on which affected communities depended in the area. The crops were traditionally grown in the Katse dam region by inhabitants before the construction of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project.

Diagram showing crops grown in the Katse Region

Figure 26: Source-LHDA 1998.




The sustainability of these communities depended on agriculture. Before their disturbance, maize was the staple food of 95% and was grown by every household in the area. Vegetables were the second highest percentage, with 90% growing vegetables in the family gardens and back yards for subsistence. Wheat was grown at the rate of 55% and sorghum at 35%. These crops grew throughout the mountain region and they formed a strong economic base for rural communities, accompanied by the sale of livestock, wool, hides and fish. One of the Manganeng resettlers who had a vegetable business in Boshobatho, TRDC (1995: 16) states: “In May 1995 this household sold about M3 000 worth of the crop.”

Figure 27 shows the types of livestock which these communities were successfully rearing before their resettlement and relocation. The sale of the listed livestock generated money for families to support themselves and contributed to the growth of the rural economy before they were disturbed by the project.

Diagram showing livestock reared in the Katse Region

Figure 27: Source-LHDA 1998.



Rural communities sold most of their animals for cash, especially when they needed to send their children to school, or to buy clothes or to finance other family needs. As shown in Figure 27 cattle were raised in 87% of the researched villages. The main reason for this is that traditional ceremonies of conducting funerals and payment of bride price (*bohali*) are best performed through cattle slaughtering or exchanging live animals. In the second position of 75% we see that sheep were mostly used during traditional festivals, with the goats at 58% and horses (mainly for transportation) at 42%. There were other animals like donkeys and mules that were used to carry goods, pigs and chickens for food supply, which do not appear in the figure given below, but which were important features in the rural economy.

Next will be discussed what affected people have to say about their experiences of the project, putting more emphasis on the resettlement programme and compensation.

6.2 Resettlement Programme in the Katse Dam Region

Resettlement in the context of this study refers to involuntary displacement of individuals, families and communities from their places of origin, to be settled outside the vicinity of more than 10 kilometres. Resettled communities in the four researched villages of the Katse Dam Region had some expectations from the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. Some of their expectations were met by the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority and some were not. Six socio-economic programmes associated with resettlement were implemented in the construction of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project for the betterment of the affected communities. Details of the expectations of affected communities and what was delivered to them by the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority are given below, village by village, starting with Ha Lejone resettlement village. They are analyzed at length in this chapter. LHDA (2002) confirms resettlement of more than 120 households in Phase 1A.

a. Ha Lejone Resettlement

Ha Lejone resettlement village is located about 20km along the Northern Access Road, between Pitseng in the Leribe district and Katse Dam. “It is the largest of the villages located astride the tarred Katse-Leribe Road” (TRDC 1995:8). The estimated resettled population here is around 130. Six participants (four men and two women) were asked to share their thoughts on the effects of compensation. Their education level was the primary, between Standard 4 and 7. As already indicated, women had a higher education level than men and they were able to complete questionnaires themselves, while some old men asked their grandchildren to write for them. Starting with the definition of compensation, one participant said, “by compensation I understand the term to mean paying back for what has been lost in different forms not only limited to cash payment, in a cause of action whereby the affected person had no intention for such an action” (Int. 2). According to TRDC (1995), the households moved involuntarily and had no option but to resettle.

Table 28 shows the socio-economic programmes which were implemented alongside the resettlement of affected households in Ha Lejone. Table 28 has recorded what affected communities indicated in their responses to have been their expectations from these programmes, after they had reached an agreement on resettlement with LHDA. It is also elucidated here what was actually

delivered to them by the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority, on behalf of the Lesotho Government.

Table 28: LHDA's Socio-Economic Programmes Associated with Resettlement in Ha Lejone in the Katse Dam Region

	<i>Infrastructure Development Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	- The construction of two primary & two secondary schools in the area to ease overcrowding of learners in the local schools. -LHDA to build a well-equipped clinic to provide improved health care and emergency services in the area.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-One primary and one secondary school were built in the area. -Two clinics were built and equipped to provide improved and emergency services.
	<i>Housing Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Discussions on replacement house plans and approval by affected households before LHDA could start building houses. -Replacement houses not to be less than the quality & quantity of those demolished or left behind (TRC 2006). -Replacement of kraals, stables and outbuildings.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-LHDA did not consult affected households for the acceptance of replacement house plans before houses were built. -Replacement houses were not built according to the number of houses/huts demolished or left behind. -In some areas where households had two or three huts, a single house with rooms equal to those huts was built (LHDA 2002). -Houses were not only built with mud, stones and grass as before, but cemented mortar, bricks, metal roofing and windows were provided for building replacement houses. -LHDA did not rebuild kraals, stables and outbuilding structures, but chose to pay compensation for them.
	<i>Compensation Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Adequate cash compensation for assets (forests, trees, reeds, arable land and garden land). - Assets and displacement compensation to be paid in cash before resettlement. -Compensation of grain and pulses to be paid annually. -Fodder compensation for affected livestock to be given to farmers annually.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-LHDA decided to give cash compensation to qualifying household heads for a 15 year period only, as follows: M1 per sq m for forest, M65 for 1non-fruit tree, M130 for 1 fruit tree, M10 per 10sq m for reeds, M11 per 17sq m arable land, and M39 per 6sq m garden land. -70kg bag of grain (maize) for 1 056sq m arable land and 3kg packet of pulses for 300sq m were given to affected households. -Bales of fodder were given to farmers for livestock, depending on number of animals owned. -LHDA paid cash compensation mainly after resettlement in this way; M809 per 3854sq m for compound, M677 per 3sq m for outbuilding, M343 per 11 perimeter area for kraals/stables. -First payment of M3 264 for disturbance was made in 1997 to each household, and the second payment of M2 335 for disturbance was made in 1998.
	<i>Capacity-Building Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Construction of Rural Development Centre in resettlement area.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	- Rural Development Skills Training Centre was built in Ha Lejone.
	<i>Rural Development Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	- LHDA to start agricultural projects to speed up food security recovery in the area. -Breeding of improved livestock and animal husbandry. - Effective Range Management Programme to improve environment, safety measures and the nourishment of livestock.

<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-No such projects were created. -LHWP did not offer help to resettled farmers to realize those goals. -LHDA failed to fulfil those promises.
	<i>Business and Tourism Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Businesses and tourism to create employment opportunities and improve businesses in the area.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-Tourism programme has not really benefitted resettled people as was anticipated in this area.

Source: LHDA 1997.

Table 28 shows that the resettled community of Ha Lejone expected from the infrastructural programme to receive four schools; two primary and two secondary schools, to avoid overcrowding of learners at the existing local school (LHDA 1996). As a result, the LHDA renovated the existing school and built two other schools; one primary and one secondary school in this newly resettled area. The resettled community had expected the LHDA to build two clinics for better health care services. LHDA did, indeed, build two clinics to provide improved health care and emergency services from which patients with serious illnesses were able to be transferred to Leribe hospital (LHDA 1996).

Concerning the housing programme, resettled households expected the LHDA to consult them with plans for replacement houses before any construction could start. They wanted those houses not to be of lower quality to those they had built themselves (HSRC 2007). They also expected to be compensated with an equal number of houses/huts that they had possessed before their displacement. However, the LHDA failed to consult affected households to discuss and approve plans for replacement houses and unilaterally built houses for purported resettlement (LHDA 1997). One chief indicated that no one in his village was asked about the type of housing that they preferred (Int. 1). “Even as a chief I was not aware that replacement houses would be so different from our traditional houses” (Int.1). There was insufficient consultation about the type of replacement houses. The absence of local councilors and the chieftaincy structures in consultations to challenge the decisions of the oppressive regime put affected communities in a vulnerable position (Thabane, et al, 2004). The LHDA came up with a different housing plan of its own to accommodate affected families in their housing needs and determined the size of a plot for each house. Most houses built were under one roof, as allocated plots were not as big as what resettled families had owned before. LHDA improved the quality of structures, in that cement, bricks, iron roofing and bigger windows were used in building replacement houses and improved latrines were supplied (Musasa: 2000). As for

other additional structures such as kraals, stables and outbuildings, these were not restored to many of them (LHDA 1997).

The significance of these findings is that they demonstrate how poorly the housing programme for displaced communities was carried out by the LHDA. The affected communities claim that replacement houses were designed and built without their input (TRC 1998), while the LHDA on the other hand argue that people were satisfied with replacement houses (LHDA 1997). This lack of correlation in viewpoints can only be attributed to poor consultation processes about the practical aspects of implementation.

On the compensation programme, the resettled community expected adequate cash compensation for arable land, forests, trees, reeds, garden land and for disturbance (involuntary move). The amounts of cash given for compensation for every item were given to male household heads, not female household heads. This might be a socio-cultural practice among segments of the Basotho; that male decisions for the family are taken with a male representative (Thamae & Pottinger 2006). Yet, this is hardly in keeping with international human rights standards and norms on socio-economic development. Discrimination of female household heads (who were forced to get male relatives to represent them in compensation transactions) not only undermined the authority of female household heads but also exposed them to different forms of abuse. This abuse included placing them at risk of losing cash compensation to male figures, as well as being controlled by such relatives on how to spend their money, trickery over money received. Those female headed households became vulnerable and in employing this practice the LHDA violated their human rights.

Grain and pulses compensation was expected by this community every year during their harvest period (July). LHDA decided to compensate affected households for a period of 15 years only, indicating that the Rural Development Programme that was also a longer-term plan to improve agriculture which could have been measured as sustainable 10 years after resettlement (LHDA 1996). On the other hand, displaced communities argued that the move was involuntary, therefore some wanted at least a fifty-year compensation package equal to the terms of the Treaty between South Africa and Lesotho (TRC 1998).

Fodder compensation was expected to be provided by LHDA to farmers for affected livestock every year for a fixed five year term when the LHDA had expected the mountain range development programme to be well established and providing sufficient pastures for displaced livestock in those five years (LHDA 1998). The LHDA was responsible for pastures development in affected areas. But this plan did not materialize. Fodder compensation was received during the winter period, when pastures are normally dry. LHDA provided cash, grain & pulses and fodder compensation to the resettled community in Ha Lejone, but not as much as resettled households had expected.

Concerning the capacity-building programme, resettled communities expected a training centre for skills development to be built for them in their new area of resettlement to increase their employment opportunities. This request was honoured by LHDA which built a skills training centre in Ha Lejone, as well as financing the project (TRDC 1995). Mafereka (2008) refers to the intended capacity-building training which the LHDA intended for economic growth of the highlands region and its inhabitants affected by the construction of the Katse and Mohale dams. More than 300 participants benefitted from knitting, sewing, weaving, plumbing and carpentry training. Some got jobs in the project areas, some elsewhere in the country, and others started their own businesses (LHDA 2000). The training was facilitated and financially supported by the LHDA while community committees selected participants for training.

According to Scudder (2006), the rural development programme brought about expectations from resettled communities that LHDA would support and facilitate agricultural projects to secure food security in their areas, as well as assisting them with breeding improved livestock, animal husbandry and help to manage rural environment more effectively, ensuring the safety of communities living near the dam areas. However, LHDA was unable to meet most of the expectations of the resettled households as a shortage of resources hindered them from implementing the programme (Mashinini 2010).

In terms of the business and tourism programme, resettled households expected to benefit from tourism activities by guiding tourists and selling locally based handicrafts. However, this programme did not benefit resettled households that much, as they lacked capital (cash to buy material for handicrafts and to buy passenger vehicles) for investment and marketing of their products to tourists

while in their area (LHDA 2000). Although, the ministry of tourism had agreed with the LHDA to promote emerging businesses, no funding was secured from the banks to support them (Ministry of Tourism 1998). Rather, tourism in the area benefitted established businesses and lodges (Mafereka 2008) which did not really have coordinated partnerships with resettled communities.

An Analysis of Ha Lejone Resettled Community Socio-Economic Programmes

During the interviews, six participants in Ha Lejone resettlement village were asked about their perceptions on meetings they held with the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority about the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. Their responses are given in Table 29.

Table 29¹⁷: Knowledge about meetings with LHDA on LHWP

Village	Number of Participants	Whether meetings took place or not?	Percentage %
Ha Lejone	4	Yes	67
	1	Only heard about meetings	17
	1	Did not know about meetings	16
Total	6		100

As shown in Table 29, 67% (n=4) of participants resettled at Ha Lejone agreed that meetings were held in their original homes of Pelaneng, Boshoabatho, Machaba and Ha Theko, where LHDA staff introduced a new plan of building roads and a big dam in their area before resettlement. They could no longer remember the number of meetings held in preparation for their resettlement, but estimated that about four to six meetings were held with LHDA over LHWP, between 1998 and 1990. The chiefs called village meetings, which were attended by inhabitants, in particular the household heads. They remember that, among things discussed, the possibility of compensation for those that would be seriously affected by the project was raised. Although no detailed information was given at the time, the planning unit was going to plan further on the best action to be taken, in consultation with community representatives. One participant said: “Ramoetsi told us the government had sent them to tell us about water project which was coming to our area” (Int.1). One person indicated that

¹⁷Where the primary source is not mentioned in the table, it means the author has created his own table.

although he was not physically present at those meetings, he heard of few meetings which his father told him were taking place in the community about a big dam project coming to their area, which could cause them to resettle elsewhere. Another participant did not know anything about meetings held with the LHDA. It is concluded that displacement awareness was made available by the LHDA through several meetings where timeframes and new settlement areas were discussed with the affected communities. However, the depth of awareness appears to have been lacking.

What follows is an analysis of the encounter of resettled households with programmes implemented by the LHDA for their development and the views of affected household members on promises made to them by LHDA, to show the impact these programmes contributed to their current socio-economic conditions. Participants themselves indicated during this study that LHDA failed to fulfil promises made to them, despite what was noted in the LHDA's reports. "We were actually amazed to read from LHDA's 2002 Annual Report that Phase 1A & 1B project of LHWP was successfully implemented and completed while we were still awaiting our cash compensation to be paid for resettlement" (Int. 2). These socio-economic programmes exhibited both positive and negative effects on this community, as revealed below.

i. Infrastructure development programme

The location of Ha Lejone resettlement village, placed along the main northern road and about 20km away from the Katse Dam, has improved telecommunication services. It was observed during the present study that businesses were booming in this area, as well as hearing from participants that government services had been brought closer to them. "Communities are able to travel to different places such as Hlotse Town in the western Leribe district (driving for one hour over 40km), reaching the Butha-Buthe Town in the north at the distance of about 70 km in two hours driving, and reaching the Maseru City in two hours (80km) and returning home in one day" (Int.3). LHDA's Annual Report (2002) states that easy travelling between the highlands and the foothills has been achieved by infrastructure development in the area, while schools, clinics and businesses built in the area have improved the economy and the livelihoods of the people there, by creating employment opportunities in road maintenance and telecommunication services.

ii. Housing programme

The decision taken by the LHDA to unilaterally decide on the plans of replacement houses for resettled households without the input of affected people targeted to benefit from the resettlement programme, caused dissatisfaction among the affected families. Traditionally, rural households build separate huts for boys, girls, parents and visitors to manage control, for socially acceptable morality, and to maintain order in the family. This arrangement is attached to the culture and grooming of young men and women into responsible and respectful adults of integrity. One participant emphasized: “It is wrong for children and parents to sleep under one roof in our tradition” (Int. 3). Building a single house to accommodate all these groups is thus seen as a grave cultural blunder by some of the interviewed participants. This action was seen as undermining Basotho culture by one old man who has resided in this area. He stated: “Boys and girls must be taught proper ways of association and socially acceptable conduct so that their marriages are stable and without infidelity” (Int.4). The failure of LHDA to restore kraals, stables and outbuildings for affected households, as was expected, has been condemned by many affected families.

The LHDA ignored the basic principle of youths and adults sleeping in different huts in rural settings. According to Interviewee 4 culture here was not considered by the LHDA. “I expected to be given four separate huts of the same size with the ones I owned, one for my wife and I, another for boys, another one for girls and also another hut for visitors (Int.4). Perhaps the LHDA should have consulted the affected household heads (males and females) about the number of separate houses/huts they would need for family settlement. But this was not done (Ecumenical Water Network 2009). Here the problem of policy communication in the process of implementation is apparent (Hill & Hupe 2002).

iii. Compensation programme

Compensation in terms of what was compensated for and how much compensation was to be given to affected households was determined by the LHDA, without consultation with affected communities. Whereas the World Bank has set internationally recognized compensation standard packages for resettlement (that were used in African countries like Zambia, Rwanda and the Democratic republic of Congo) in the case of Lesotho, these were not followed. Hence, displaced communities started complaining about resettlement compensation packages even before

resettlement was complete. (Bond 2004). The military dictatorship in Lesotho ignored international standards of compensation for resettlement and imposed their own decision on how much to compensate displaced communities (Sibolla 1995). Many people saw the payment of compensation to male household heads as unfair to widows and single mother parents: “how could women as owners of families be discriminated on the basis of gender whereas they are the one who have built prosperity for their homes? No, this is wrong and it has to stop. Compensation must be given to any family representative regardless of gender,” one participant complained (Int.3). Patriarchal practices of putting men before women fed into the LHDA policy implementation process whereby women were treated as inferior and were denied their rights to own properties or take family decisions. This cultural practice has since been challenged by many scholars (Makoa 1996, Thamae 1997, and Tsikoane 2001) as oppressive and denying women their fundamental human rights to own properties. Devitt & Hitchcock (2010) raise important issues about managing policy implementation, and in particular to ensure that the best implementation method accommodates affected people in resettlement, regardless of gender.

Resettled households were dissatisfied with cash compensation more than any other form of compensation. Participants indicated that they never agreed on any specific amount of money with LHDA for compensation, “apart from what they told us we would get enough money to look after our families,” insisted one participant (Int. 6). Resettled households indicated further that the first year’s payment they received from LHDA “disappointed and made us to worry about the future of our families” (Int.2). Another participant said, “This money they give us is very little compared to what we owned before they pushed us away” (Int. 5). Resettled families, as a result, felt they have been cheated by LHDA from the beginning, since they were never told how much they would get in cash compensation for each asset. The majority of these families saw cash compensation for every item as inadequate for survival. This study also established that the period of 15 years’ compensation for arable land, harvest (grain & pulses), disturbance and measurements for a fodder for five-year period were decided upon and implemented by LHDA without the input of affected people themselves or their representatives, thus ignoring internationally best regulated practices around the world. One participant said, “How could we have agreed to 15 year compensation whereas our fields and environment are our lives and the lifetime of our children? No we were forced into this

merciless scheme. Our fields and gardens produced enough food for us throughout the year and we are very unhappy about little grain & pulses compensation they give us very late in the year” (Int.1).

Another participant protested, “How could LHDA decide to provide fodder for our livestock for only five years and once in the year? Our livestock has been sustained by grazing land here for generations, and where is their promised Effective Range Management Project of improving pastures and livestock? It has not taken place even now” (Int. 3). Still another participant indicated that, “this fodder is very little to feed our livestock especially in winter season and that type of grass is not nutritious to our animals as they do not like it at all” (Int.6). Although the LHDA had promised adequate compensation policy to affected households, the implementation of such a policy left most affected households worse off compared to the economic situation they were in before their disturbance. Even disturbance cash compensation was still not paid in full to affected households during the time of this study. The TRC (2001) confirms that cash compensation which the Ombudsman had instructed the LHDA to pay to affected households “without further delay” (Ombudsman 2007/0175: 13) is still not paid yet.

iv. Capacity-building programme

The capacity-building programme which was planned to offer skills training in handiwork, as suggested in LHDA (1997), showed how bricklaying, carpentry, sewing & knitting and mechanical trainings as a result of the construction of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project would benefit affected people in the area of the Ha Lejone Skills Training Centre. However, this project ran out of funds and closed down in 2002 (LHDA 2003). The closing down of the skills training project due to a lack of funds demonstrates poor policy planning and maladministration on the side of the LHDA, as the LHDA was expected to fund this project. Skills training was part of the agreement reached between the LHDA and the affected communities so that the self-sustainability of these communities was guaranteed (Treaty 1986 & Compensation Policy 2007).

Another theoretical argument here is the lack of good governance of the side of the military government and the impoverishment of disturbed communities by the construction of the LHWP, which Hitchcock (2010) has questioned in the case of Mohale Dam. The failure to train the affected people means the LHDA failed to keep their promises to these people and this has subjected them to

abject poverty and exposed them to hardships and unnecessary deaths (Thamae & Pottinger 2006). Out of more than 2000 participants who had applied for training in different skills, only about 600 people got trained in the fields of handicraft, carpentry and bricklaying (LHDA 2001) Those who were trained started their own businesses around the country and some were employment elsewhere (LHDA 2003).

v. Rural development programme

The rural development programme did not materialize after its planning stage. Participants indicated that they did not participate in such a programme or training in the region. “There was no such a training held to improve our livestock, environment or our livelihoods in the area,” insisted one participant (Int.4). The LHDA failed to implement the rural development programme earmarked for highlands development despite the programme having been budgeted for by the Parliament (Compensation Policy 2007).

vi. Business and tourism programme

Business formed an integral part of the tourism programme, as the main intention was to generate income for the country. However, people interviewed in this study lacked skills to fit in to the business sector and did not have technical employment skills, as most of them only had primary school education. This study has established that businesses are growing in this area, but leaving resettled households unemployed and poorer (TRC 2001). The result is that “many young men engage in crime and in diamond and drugs smuggling that lead them to jail after being convicted, while young women have engaged in prostitution, targeting tourists and business men in particular” (Int. 5).

The tourism programme, to a certain extent, benefitted other community members of Ha Lejone, who had lodges, transport (e.g. horses for rental to tourists or vehicles for hire) and established businesses, other than resettled households. But there was no integration of the resettled communities into the existing business opportunities of the resettlement areas. Nor, given the closure of the capacity building centre can those resettled hope to achieve these skills to enable them to participate in this tourist economy in the future.

b. Ha Lepaqoa Resettlement

Ha Lepaqoa village is located within 10 kilometres of the Katse dam area and has a population of about 250, with an estimated 45 households. Six families who resettled in this village originally came from Pelaneng. Four participants (two men and two women) in this study were asked their perceptions of the meetings with LHDA staff in preparation for the LHWP and their resettlement compensation. In preparation for their move, LHDA implemented the programmes shown in Table 30, so that their livelihoods and rural economy were protected and would not deteriorate from the level they were before the project started.

Table 30: LHDA's Implemented Programmes to benefit Ha Lepaqoa Resettled Households in the Katse Region

	<i>Infrastructure Development Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Free access to already existing community infrastructural development. -Passing-by road through the village to be upgraded and connected to other areas. -Provision of clean piped water, sanitation services and electricity. -Post office, police station and improved health services to be brought nearer.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Resettled learners were accommodated in nearby primary & secondary schools. -Host community shared existing infrastructure with resettles. -LHDA upgraded a nearby passing road connecting to other places. -Improved water and sanitation services were provided. -Postal, policing and improved health care services were implemented by relevant government departments in the area.
	<i>Housing Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Discussion on replacement house plans and approval by affected household heads. -Replacement houses not to be less in quality & quantity of those demolished or left-behind structures. -Replacement of kraals, stables & outbuildings or cash compensation.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -LHDA did not consult affected household heads for acceptance of replacement house plans before houses were built. -Replacement houses were not built according to a number of houses/huts demolished or left behind. -In some areas, where households had two or three huts, LHDA built a single house with rooms equal to those huts. -Houses were not only built with mud, stones and grass, as before, but cemented mortar, bricks, metal roofing and windows were provided for building houses. -LHDA did not rebuild outside structures as anticipated, but chose to pay cash compensation.
	<i>Compensation Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Adequate cash compensation for assets (forests, trees, reeds, arable land and garden land). - Assets and displacement compensation to be paid in cash before resettlement. -Compensation of grain and pulses to be paid annually. -Fodder compensation for affected livestock to be given to farmers annually.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -LHDA decided to give cash compensation to qualifying household heads for a 15-year period only, as follows: M1 per sq m for forest, M65 for 1 non- fruit tree, M130 for 1 fruit tree, M10 per 10sq m for reeds, M11 per 17sq m arable land, and M39 per 6sq m garden land. -70kg bag of grain (maize) for 1 056sq m arable land and 3kg packet of pulses for 300sq m were given to affected households. -Bales of fodder were given to farmers for livestock depending on a number of animals owned. -LHDA paid cash compensation, mainly after resettlement in this way: M809 per 3 854sq m for compound, M677 per 3sq m for outbuilding, M343 per 11 perimeter area for kraals/stables.

	-First payment of M3 264 for disturbance was made in 1997 to each household and the second payment of M2 335 for disturbance was made in 1998.
	<i>Capacity-Building Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	- LHDA to financially support and facilitate skills training in handiwork, entrepreneurial and community development projects.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	- LHDA built a Rural Development Skills Training Centre in Thaba-Tseka, to empower affected people of the Katse dam region.
	<i>Rural Development Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	- LHDA was expected to start agricultural projects to speed up food security recovery in their area. -Resettled farmers expected to breed improved livestock and animal husbandry with the help of the LHWP. -Effective Range Management Programme to improve the environment, safety of people and nourishment of livestock.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-No such projects implemented. -LHWP did not offer help to resettled farmers to realize those goals. -LHDA failed to implement the programmes to realize those objectives.
	<i>Business and Tourism Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	- Tourism programme was expected to create employment and business opportunities for the area.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-Tourism programme has not really benefitted resettled people, as was suggested before.

In this resettled area, visible infrastructure was a tarred road passing near the village to Thaba-Tseka in a southerly direction and Leribe in a westerly direction. The infrastructural programme which resettled households expected to receive from LHDA included free access to already existing community infrastructures and services at the host community, clean piped water and sanitation, electricity (to be free if households could not afford payment), admission of their children to nearby schools, as well as having an efficient postal service network, police station and improved health service centre in their area. In response, LHDA, in consultation with the relevant government departments, ensured that resettled learners and their family members were given a smooth welcome by the host community and schools were willing to accommodate learners (LHDA 1999). According to the LHDA Report (1999), the primary school was upgraded to accommodate a larger number of learners and a secondary school was built nearby.

Concerning the housing programme, the resettled households had also expected the LHDA to consult them about plans for replacement houses, before any construction started (Thamae & Pottinger 2006). These families had expected houses not smaller than what they had before and not to find themselves without extra space for gardens and storerooms. They also expected to be compensated with equal numbers of houses/huts they had owned before their displacement. LHDA

failed to consult affected households to discuss and approve plans for replacement houses and unilaterally built houses for purported resettlement (LHDA 2000). LHDA came up with a different housing plan of its own, to accommodate affected families in their housing needs and determined the size of a plot for each house (Molaoa 2007). On the positive side, LHDA improved the quality of structures in that cement, bricks, iron roofing and windows were used in building replacement houses and latrines. This community also experienced the same issues as the ones discussed about Ha Lejone. Structures such as kraals, stables and outbuildings were not restored but were compensated for in cash (LHDA 1998).

Coming to the compensation programme, resettled communities expected adequate cash compensation for arable land, forests, trees, reeds, garden land and for disturbance. Grain and pulses compensation was expected by this community every year during harvest time, as LHDA had promised (TRC 1997). LHDA decided to compensate affected households for a period of 15 years for their assets. Cash compensation was given to male household heads. Fodder compensation was expected to be provided by LHDA to farmers for affected livestock every year, mainly during the winter period, when pastures are normally dry. In addition, the LHDA decided to offer fodder compensation for only five years (LHDA 1998).

The capacity-building programme for a resettled community was expected to take place with the support of LHDA training affected persons in areas of carpentry, handiwork, bricklaying, environmental care, fishery, entrepreneurial skills and project management. LHDA decided to build a skills training centre in Thaba-Tseka, where affected people could choose to train there or Ha Lejone, depending on their preferred area (TRDC 1995).

The rural development programme appealed more to these people as a result of the shrinking farming and grazing land. Resettled communities had expected LHDA to support and facilitate agricultural projects to secure food security in the area, as well as to assist them with breeding improved livestock. However, the LHDA was unable to meet those expectations.

The business and tourism programme, which was expected to benefit these resettled communities, did not have the desired results, as tourists hardly visited their villages, except those who came to

study environment issues related to the project (Sechaba Consultants 1997). It was noted during discussions that people who came here were mainly from the government, or researchers who asked about their new life in this place, rather than engaging in business or tourist activities (HSRC 1998).

An Analysis of Ha Lepaqa Resettled Community Socio-Economic Programmes

Five participants in this village were asked about their views on the LHWP and their resettlement. All responded that LHDA officials indicated to them, as early as 1988, that the construction of Muela hydropower station, Muela dam and Katse dam were soon going to be constructed in that area, as decided by the Government. Therefore they would need to resettle elsewhere. According to these participants, resettlement became a clear directive from the Military Government and they had no power to challenge the decisions or negotiate a different alternative plan. Their chief remembered that the Government had promised compensation for resettlement. Further analysis of socio-economic programmes, starting with infrastructure development, will now be examined.

i. Infrastructure development programme

The resettled community of Ha Lepaqa arrived at this place supported by the Government and the Principal Chief of the area (LHDA 1999). They had access to all community facilities, including the local school, clinic, graveyards and springs, as well as sharing grazing land with the host community. The TRDC (1995) suggested that the host community members were given assurances by the LHDA that the arrival of additional people in the area would attract economic development and create job opportunities and community development projects, from which they would benefit. Examples were the building of new schools, clinics, bigger stores and other government structures to bring services closer to people. However, a need to request a police station from some of the resettles was caused by some elements of resistance over the sharing of pastures which they noticed during their arrival in the area and for fear of stock theft. “When we arrived here some shepherds did not want to share pastures with us complaining that grazing land was not enough for all of us” (Int.7). Another participant said “My family lost three cattle in the first month of resettlement here and we have never found those cattle” (Int.9). Police promptly responded to the request of the resettled households, by conducting frequent patrols in the area and liaising with relevant community leadership to manage disputes and control stock theft. Thus there were challenges of integration in

the resettlement community faced by resettled families who needed the law enforcement department to provide protection to them.

ii. Housing programme

The types of houses built by the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority were not really appreciated by resettled households in the area. People complained that “these houses are small compared to what we had before, and they do not have fireplaces inside as we are used to cook from the floor. We need to warm ourselves all times when it is cold, but these new structures are not built to accommodate that,” said one participant (Int. 8). Another participant (Int. 9) said “we do not need all the houses, especially the huts to have these big windows as they make houses colder in winter. Metal roofing they gave us is also causing houses to be colder in winter and sometimes water leaks in where roofing is not properly done.” Unlike the previous community, this community was dissatisfied with the building materials used in the construction of houses as insufficient for the weather conditions in the area.

Although replacement houses were built with outside latrines for better hygienic purposes, some participants complained that at times those latrines smell badly and they are not given chemicals to destroy the smell. One participant asked, “When these latrines are full who will empty them and how?”(Int.10). The standard construction of outside latrines was common with those of host communities, but some of resettled households did not have them in their places of origin. Some people used to relieve themselves in the forest or in dongas (LHDA 2000). Community orientation in as far as communication being part of implementation strategy needed to have been provided by the LHDA, but this did not happen. The resettled community needed to be familiarized with urban issues on sanitation and health care. There was a general dissatisfaction over the quality and quantity of replacement houses/huts among resettled households, as the issue of privacy was also raised by older men in this area who, like the previous community, did not like to share single-roof houses with their children.

iii. Compensation programme

Participants received compensation of cash, grain & pulses for food aid and fodder for their livestock, which was for a period of less than 15 years in total. However, Hildyard (2002: 17)

confirms that “In 1997, the villages were told that the implementation period for compensation would extend over 50 years.” Poor performance of some of the socio-economic programmes of LHDA, including the implementation of the compensation policy to improve the livelihoods of resettled households, were noticed, TRC (2004: x) added that “there is also some emphasis on the failure of the LHDA to keep to the agreements made with communities.” LHDA did not have back-up plans to remedy delayed cash compensation payments, delayed grain and pulses delivery to resettled areas and even delayed fodder compensation for affected livestock. TRC (2004: xi) again added “There is also the problem of delays in payment of compensation”. This failure to implement the compensation policy efficiently resulted in some families complaining to the World Bank and the Ombudsman about the failure of the LHDA to properly implement the policy. As a result, resettled communities were plunged into serious problems of poverty, sickness, and loss of livestock, family brake-downs and untimely deaths. One participant stated, “I was 42 years in 1988 when my father asked me to attend those meeting about the big dam construction. We were told by LHDA officials that the Government had decided to build the dam in the area so that the water of that dam could be sold to South Africa. In return we were promised jobs, other replacement houses at the areas of our choice and some money to support our families, and fodder to look after our livestock while better grazing land was being identified by LHDA and developed” (Int.8).

One participant confirmed, “We wrote to the World Bank office in Maseru asking them to intervene and to ask LHDA when they would pay our money for compensation and when they would deliver grain and fodder to us? (Int.7). The World Bank through its negotiation and consultation structures attempted to raise this matter with the military government but without success, as the affected communities were not paid their money by the LHDA (Thamae 1998). The military government did not observe international standards for compensation and the recommendations of the World Commission on Dams for resettlement packages. Resettled households indicated that the first year’s payment they received from the LHDA was inadequate, especially as “most of the people said their fields were measured in their absence” (TRC 2004: xi). The most common and acceptable practices of taking the measurements when one wants to *sell* his/her field in Lesotho is that the chief or his/her representative takes the measurements of the field with the owner and thereafter, the owner decides on the price associated with the measurements of the field in question (Int.7). Although, the measurements were taken (in some areas without the owners), but the owners of the fields were not

asked to put their prices forward to the LHDA. Nor were international best practices standards used in the process of measuring fields or deciding on rates of compensation. Instead, the LHDA came up with its own standard determining prices per square meter (TRC 2004). As a result, some affected households claim they failed to send their children to school in the following year due to lack of funds. Another participant said, “From what LHDA officials promised us, we really did not expect so little money. What can a family of six people do with M4 560 per annum? At least payment of M60 000 per annum for each resettled household would make sense to all of us” (Int.9). In the present study, complaints from participants about cash rated the highest. The seconded most complained-about factor was the poor quality of the houses provided.

iv. Capacity-building programme

The capacity-building programme earmarked for affected people did not take place at this particular village, but participants were expected to attend training in the distant places of Ha Lejone and Thaba-Tseka training centres. Lack of funding for affected people became a hindrance for them to undertake such training. Hildyard (2002) recorded, that villagers felt that the LHDA “came and destroyed everything that was important to families and had started to become poor” (p.17). One participant in this study indicated that the “skills training centre is far from here and we do not have either time or money to go there as we are busy trying to adjust here” (Int.8). One might conclude that the project failed because of a lack of funds, training that was arranged far away from participants and without catering for their travelling costs, as well as training organized when people were busy. This points to poor planning and coordination. Brinkerhoff & Crosby (2002) emphasize that development is a process which rests on partnership. The theory is that the government cannot act alone in policy implementation. The argument goes further to indicate that “one of the key features of policy implementation is that it is multi-organizational”. This statement shows that the LHDA, training centres and participants needed one another to successfully plan the determined objectives. In this case those objectives were to build the capacity of affected persons to increase their job opportunities or to start their own businesses.

Peters (2001) mentions policy reforms where implementers encounter policy acceptance challenges. Here two processes of reform are put forward for consideration. First there is policy adaptation which requires political or bureaucratic will to absorb the political agenda and carry out required

functions in a manner to achieve desired goals. This is the model which the LHDA officials could have benefitted from. The second process of reform relates to policy implementation ‘in a sense of the word’. If this theoretical framework was applied by the LHDA there would have been policy adjustments based on a more flexible approach. And, the WCD (2000) international policy on compensation rates and values for resettlement would have been applied accordingly.

As most people here were subsistence farmers, they chose to put their efforts into reviving their farming activities and searching for new pastures for their livestock. Women are culturally expected to look after homes. As a result of new resettlement they were faced with the onerous task of establishing their homes and firmly getting their families rooted in the new resettlement environment, rather than attending training. Another participant said, “I cannot leave my family behind to rebuild the household without me” (Int.8). The designing of training did not take the reality of new settlement challenges into account by offering training far from resettlement places. This is an indication of a top-down dictatorial decision-making style. Female participants in particular would not be able to start the new settlement and at the same time be expected to start training in far away places, especially when some of them were pregnant or lactating (Hildyard 2002). They were forced to consider their immediate basic survival in their new location rather than expend their meager resources on an uncertain future by travelling to the capacity building centres, which seemed far removed from their day to day existence.

v. Rural development programme

Some of the affected household members easily adjusted to a new resettlement environment, but had the challenge of finding suitable pastures for their livestock. This study established that those who managed to cope in the new settlement areas had some of their family members working and bringing financial support from other sources. Pottinger (2007: 30) points out that “too many other programs designed to help them restore their lives have failed.” Some of these families struggled to buy additional fodder for their livestock and to pay for share-cropping in other areas. One participant indicated, “although the government helped us to move to new places of settlement our livestock started suffering right away as there were not enough pastures for them in this new area and shortage of water” (Int. 21). Fishery, effective range management and animal husbandry projects which were promised by the LHDA did not materialize. The policy implementation process lacked the honesty

of implementers to reveal the challenges that faced them. This is one of the values required for effective, efficient and accountable leadership (Devitt & Hitchcock 2010).

vi. Business and tourism

The business and tourism programme promised resettled households business opportunities ranging from guiding tourists, marketing of locally based handiwork products, running bed & breakfast accommodation and a booming business in their area. However, all participants in this area denied having benefitted from this programme. “Tourists do not come to us they go to better hotels in Katse and the buy things there not from us” emphasized one participant (Int.24). There was no tourism programme that benefitted resettled households in this area as their village was remote and lacked attractions for tourists. Therefore, any of their handiwork products could not be seen from their village, unless they took them to the Katse Village or Ha Lejone tourist centres. The challenge here was also transport costs for them.

Villages like this one would need another form of development rather than tourism due to its geographic nature and isolation from vibrant tourist places along the banks of the Katse Dam. What succeeded in the community was integration and partnerships which the chief of the place impressed on his people, who warmly accommodated resettled families into their community activities and agreed to share-crop with them. But, successful business opportunities associated with tourism activities failed.

c. Ha Sepinare Resettlement

Ha Sepinare resettlement was the third village in which this study took place in the Katse region. This village has a population of about 180, with about 38 households (four resettled from Machaha and Ha Theko Village). TRDC (1995: 12) portrays Sepinare village as “a relatively small village situated near the confluence of the Malibamatso and Bokong rivers across the valley from Katse village.” This village is accessible on foot or by horse, as there is no proper road construction in the area. In a similar way, these four researched households expected to receive something from the six socio-economic programmes of the LHDA. Their expectations of these programmes and what they received from LHDA are shown in Figure 31.

Table 31: LHDA's Implemented Programmes to benefit Ha Sepinare Resettled Households in the Katse Region

	<i>Infrastructure Development Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-A secondary school to be built in the new resettlement area. -Road passing through their village to be upgraded and connected to other areas. -Clean piped water & sanitation services and electricity to be provided.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-LHDA built a secondary school in the area -LHDA upgraded a nearby passing road connecting to Katse Dam. -Improved water and sanitation services were provided.
	<i>Housing Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Replacement house plans to be agreed upon before structures are built. -Replacement houses not to be less than the quality & quantity of those demolished or left behind. -Replacement of kraals, stables & outbuildings to be similar and of the same size.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-LHDA did not consult affected households for the acceptance of replacement house plans before houses were built. -Replacement houses were not built according to a number of houses/huts demolished or left behind. -In some areas, where households consisted of two or three huts, LHDA built a single house with rooms equal to those huts. -Houses were not only built with mud, stones and grass, as before, but cemented mortar, bricks, metal roofing and windows were provided for building houses. -LHDA did not rebuild those expected outside structures, but paid compensation.
	<i>Compensation Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Adequate cash compensation for assets (forests, trees, reeds, arable land and garden land). - Assets and displacement compensation to be paid in cash before resettlement. -Compensation of grain and pulses to be paid annually. -Fodder compensation for affected livestock to be given to farmers annually.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-LHDA decided to give cash compensation to qualifying household heads for a 15- year period only, as follows: M1 per sq m for forest, M65 for 1 non- fruit tree, M130 for 1 fruit tree, M10 per 10sq m for reeds, M11 per 17sq m arable land, and M39 per 6sq m garden land. -70kg bag of grain (maize) for 1 056sq m arable land and 3kg packet of pulses for 300sq m were given to affected households. -Bales of fodder were given to farmers for livestock, depending on the number of animals owned. -LHDA paid cash compensation mainly after resettlement in this way: M809 per 3 854sq m for compound, M677 per 3sq m for outbuilding, M343 per 11 perimeter area for kraals/stables. -First payment of M3 264 for disturbance was made in 1997 to each household and the second payment of M2 335 for disturbance was made in 1998.
	<i>Capacity-Building Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Resettled households expected LHDA to financially support and facilitate their skills training in handiwork, entrepreneurial skills and marketing of their products. -Resettled people expected LHDA to give them fishing training and licences to fish in Katse dam.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	- LHDA provided Rural Development Skills Training Centre in Thaba-Tseka district for advanced training. -LHDA did not give such training or licences for fishing in the Katse dam.
	<i>Rural Development Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Resettled households expected LHDA to start agricultural projects to speed up food security recovery in their area. -Resettled farmers expected to breed improved livestock and animal husbandry with the help of the LHWP. -Resettled households expected an Effective Range Management Programme of the LHDA to improve their environment, safety and nourishment of their livestock and rural communities.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-No such projects were created. -LHWP did not offer help to resettled farmers to realize those goals. - LHDA failed to implement that programme.
	<i>Business and Tourism Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	- Resettled people expected tourism to create business and employment opportunities for them in the area.

<i>Delivery by</i> LHDA	-Tourism programme has not really benefitted resettled people in this area.
----------------------------	---

The Ha Sepinare community benefitted from a tarred road passing near the village to Katse Dam. Infrastructural programmes which resettled households expected to receive from LHDA included a secondary school for their learners to receive education near home. They also expected clean piped water and sanitation to be provided by LHDA, together with affordable electricity. LHDA, in consultation with the relevant government departments, provided what the resettled community was promised in terms of infrastructure development in the area.

Housing the affected households became the responsibility of the LHDA, to make sure that replacement houses would satisfy resettled families. These families had expected better houses than those they had built with mud and grass. They also expected to be compensated with an equal number of houses/huts they had owned before their displacement. However, LHDA failed to consult affected households to discuss and approve plans for replacement houses and unilaterally built houses for purported resettlement as they saw fit for each environment. In this case, LHDA came up with different housing plans to suit the environment. LHDA improved the quality of structures in that cement, bricks, iron roofing and windows were used in building other replacement houses and latrines.

Concerning compensation, resettled communities expected adequate cash compensation for arable land, forests, trees, reeds, garden land and for disturbance. This community expected grain and pulses compensation equal to what they harvested each year. Again, LHDA only provided grain and pulses compensation to affected households for a period of 15 years, in far lower amounts than those anticipated by resettled households. As for fodder compensation, LHDA again decided to offer fodder compensation for only five years, but delayed providing it to farmers.

The capacity-building programme for resettled communities was expected to take place with LHDA training affected persons in carpentry, handiwork, bricklaying, environmental care, fisheries, entrepreneurial skills and project management. Such training was planned to be managed through the Community Development Committee, which chose which people should be sent for training with financial support from LHDA. However, LHDA was unable to finance individual capacity-building

training. The rural development programme appealed more to these people, as a result of the shrinking farming and grazing land. Resettled people had expected LHDA to support and facilitate agricultural projects to secure food security in the area, and to assist them with breeding improved livestock. LHDA was unable to start this project. The tourism programme failed to improve the income of resettled households at Ha Sepinare, as tourism activities happened far away from them.

Four participants (three women and one man), who were resettled here from Machaha and Ha Theko villages, were asked whether or not the LHDA had fulfilled promises made about the resettlement programme. See Table 32.

Table 32: Percentages of whether promises made by LHDA over resettlement were fulfilled or not.

Resettlement Village	Number of Participants	Number of Resettled Households	Fulfilment of Promises	Percentage
Ha Sepinare	4	10		
	0		Fulfilled	0
	4		Not fulfilled	100
	0		Do not Know	0
Total	4	10		100

All participants in this resettled community agreed that the LHDA had failed to fulfil its promises to them, which included adequate cash compensation, employment creation and rural development activities to embrace fishing training and fishery businesses to supply urban markets in Maseru and other districts. During the time of this study none of the people interviewed was employed. They were, in addition, all depending more on other sources of support than on LHDA compensation.

An Analysis of Ha Sepinare Resettled Community Socio-Economic Programmes

i. Infrastructure development programme

The construction of a secondary school in the area brought about hope to resettled communities and their hosts. However, this study established that the year following that of resettlement school fees were increased. The fees increment negatively affected some of the resettled households. One participant said: “The next January of our arrival at Ha Sepinare, school fees for my two children were increased from M1 800 to M2 200 per child as the School Board intended to raise more money

for infrastructure development, meaning that I needed to pay M4 400 for school fees that year” (Int.13). This means the effects of displacement were felt by affected families, as the consequences of resettlement brought about a negative impact on their livelihoods and in the future of their children. The LHDA did not have a policy of providing bursaries for high school learners affected by displacement.

Resettled households, together with the rest of the host community, were provided with piped water, improved sanitation and latrines, some of which needed monthly payment. Most resettled households had a problem with making payments, for two reasons: firstly, cash compensation from the LHDA was paid very late in the year (October) and it was inadequate. Secondly, community members protested about paying for water delivery, claiming that, as a natural local resource, they had never paid for water to anybody before. “We receive water from the rain, and for centuries and generations, we never paid for water from our springs or from the river to the government. So, why should we pay for it after building the dam?” questioned one participant (Int.12). All four participants insisted that LHDA should carry the costs of water and electricity delivery to make their lives easier, and as further benefit from the Lesotho Highlands Water Project Scheme, which had taken place in their area. When most families defaulted on the payment of monthly bills, some infrastructural services faced disconnection and discontinuation. Consequently, some infrastructural development initiatives collapsed in the area.

ii. Housing programme

Resettled households at Ha Sepinare were offended by the decision of LHDA to confirm replacement house plans without their input in the process. One participant said “The houses were planned for us, so it was proper for LHDA to ask us whether we liked those plans or not, especially when they built different structures from what we had altogether” (Int.11). Two old women, who seemed to be between 72 and 75 years of age, were helped by their grandchildren to write their responses. Although one could not remember vividly how agreement was reached, the other indicated that she sent her son three times to represent her at the resettlement meetings. “LHDA promised us enough money and good houses if we agreed to move here”, insisted one of the participants (Int.11). This study realized that some houses were indeed smaller and could not accommodate the size of some of the families, especially one family that had eight members, who

could not sleep comfortably in two huts. “We heard that in Ha Lejone LHDA had started building modern houses for people and we also wanted the same here” (Int.11). As already indicated, rural households build separate huts for boys, girls, parents and visitors to manage control, socially acceptable morality and to maintain order in the family. This arrangement is attached to culture and the grooming of young men and women and it is still practised throughout the highlands region, today. Therefore the introduction of a foreign practice, without following procedure for cultural change in community structures’ leadership, became a disappointment to many affected households. “This community was further disappointed by the refusal of LHDA to restore their kraals, stables and outbuildings as expected,” insisted one participant (Int.14).

Another participant, a woman of about 57 years, told us that the government officials from Maseru promised that Katse dam was going to be constructed in their area and they would be built better houses away from the dam: “I was happy when I was promised a nice house and money to live on. As a result, I started making plans to identify which business I could start in Maseru to support my family here” (Int. 14). This lady was among those who felt that the LHDA had misled them by not keeping their promises. Simmon (1997) insists on administrative behavior that assists towards the realization of predetermined political goals. Ha Sepinare community appeared to have been the most dissatisfied of all four interviewed communities in the area of Katse region.

iii. Compensation programme

Compensation took a centre stage when resettled households were asked their perceptions about the LHWP. Resettled households complained about cash compensation more than any other form of compensation. All four participants indicated that cash compensation was highly inadequate if the cost of living was taken into consideration. “My family can hardly pay for school fees of our daughter and to maintain her at the boarding school. She had to be assisted by her brother who is working in South Africa. But this was not a problem when we supported ourselves before the project displaced us” (Int. 11). Resettled households indicated that cash compensation for most families, combined for all compensated items, did not exceed M6 000 per annum, making it very difficult for a family of about five people to survive on such a meager income. In reality, most of resettled households which did not get any external support, apart from the LHDA compensation became worse off than before the resettlement (TRC 1998). One participant stated that “My brother is now

selling marijuana and sometimes smuggles diamonds to South African markets which pay better. With the money he makes we are able to supplement what LHDA gives us and meet our family needs” (Int. 13). Thus, these families have had to create alternative forms of income because the resettlement has not fulfilled one of the core objectives. Hence, one of the basis tenets of the resettlement programme – that families should not be worse off than before – has failed.

This study has established that the period of 15 years compensation for arable land, harvest (grain & pulses), disturbance and measurements for fodder for a five-year period, as decided upon and implemented by LHDA, did not have the support of affected people. Hildyard (2002:17) confirms that “villagers were told that the period for compensation would extend over 50 years.” Resettled households then called on the LHDA to review the compensation period, which was coming to an end in 2012, to be extended further for an unspecified term, until the problems caused by the LHWP forced removals were properly addressed. The affected people also called for review of cash compensation in order that adequate compensation for the losses they incurred could be addressed fairly. One participant reiterated, “at least 15 bags of maize, six bags of wheat and a monthly fresh vegetable supply would be a better compensation as we had fresh vegetables throughout the year from our garden land” (Int. 13).

iv. Capacity-building programme

The capacity-building programme, which was planned to benefit resettled people in the area, did help about five people, who went for sewing, knitting and bricklaying training in Thaba-Tseka development centre. According to the LHDA (2001) more than 2 000 participants in the Katse region were provided with training in their new areas of settlement or at nearby training centres, with the support of the LHDA. One participant complained that “although some of us attended such trainings we did not benefit much as we did not have money to start our own businesses or co-operatives to run” (Int. 11). Thus in terms of implementation, the longer-term needs to make implementation successful were not provided. Implementation thus remained a short-term process without any thought about the longer term consequences of failing to provide the adequate resources to turn that capacity-building into tangible livelihoods.

v. Rural development programme

The rural development programme was planned for animal husbandry, effective range management and related environmental care projects, which participants were promised to be considered for by the LHDA during the implementation, but activities like fisheries and grazing land improvement did succeed. A man about 75 years old indicated that he was one of the committee members talking with LHDA staff for his community members. He estimated that “about six meetings took place before we could leave Ha Machaha. We were promised many things by LHDA. But as soon as we arrived here those people who were behind our move disappeared” (Int.12). Ramaili and Cloete (2008) confirm the existence of the programme on rural development, which was intended to be implemented by LHDA during the construction of the dams in Lesotho to benefit affected communities. In their conclusion, they indicate that a rural development programmes has the potential for affected communities’ betterment if it is well implemented.

vi. Business and tourism programme

Resettled households did not get business from tourism in their area, as they were far away from areas of interest for tourists. “Our village does not have good roads or anything of interest to attract tourists. If we have something to sell we go to Katse village where tourists go, but there is no business there as we tried for many times to sell our handwork without much success” (Int.13). Thus the business and tourism programme failed as it was unviable and unsupported.

d. Manganeng Resettlement

The Manganeng resettlement is located not far from Ha Sepinare village in the Katse dam area and they share many things in common. It has a population of not less than 300 in about 60 households, amongst which 10 households were earmarked for resettlement. Six households out of the resettled 10 who originally came from Boshobatho were interviewed. I found representatives of these families (four men and two women) and they were willing to answer my questions as presented in this section, to find out how much they have benefitted from the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority Programmes.

Table 33 shows how affected households benefitted from LHDA's socio-economic programmes.

Table33: LHDA's Implemented Programmes to benefit Manganeng Resettled Households in the Katse Region

	Infrastructure Development Programme
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Resettled households expected to have free access to already existing infrastructural development in the host community. -Resettled households expected a road passing through their village to be upgraded and connected to other areas. -Clean piped water & sanitation services and electricity were expected to be provided by the LHDA.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-Resettled learners were accommodated in nearby primary & secondary schools. -Host community shared existing infrastructure with resettles. -LHDA upgraded a nearby passing road connecting to other places. -Improved water and sanitation services were provided.
	Housing Programme
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Resettled households expected to discuss replacement house plans and approve them before LHDA could start building those houses for them. -Resettled households expected replacement houses not to be less than the quality & quantity of those demolished or left behind. -Resettled households expected replacement of their kraals, stables & outbuildings.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-LHDA did not consult affected households for the acceptance of replacement house plans before houses were built. -Replacement houses were not built according to the number of houses/huts demolished or left behind. -In some areas, where households had two or three huts, LHDA built a single house with rooms equal to those huts. -Houses were not only built with mud, stones and grass, as before, but cemented mortar, bricks, metal roofing and windows were provided for building houses. -LHDA did not rebuild outside structures but paid compensation.
	Compensation Programme
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Adequate cash compensation for assets (forests, trees, reeds, arable land and garden land). - Assets and displacement compensation to be paid in cash before resettlement. -Compensation of grain and pulses to be paid annually. -Fodder compensation for affected livestock to be given to farmers annually.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-LHDA decided to give cash compensation to qualifying household heads for a 15- year period only, as follows: M1 per sq m for forest, M65 for 1non- fruit tree, M130 for 1 fruit tree, M10 per 10sq m for reeds, M11 per 17sq m arable land, and M39 per 6sq m garden land. -70kg bag of grain (maize) for 1 056sq m arable land and 3kg packet of pulses for 300sq m were given to affected households. -Bales of fodder were given to farmers for livestock, depending on the number of animals owned. -LHDA paid cash compensation mainly after resettlement, in this way: M809 per 3 854sq m for compound, M677 per 3sq m for outbuilding, M343 per 11 perimeter area for kraals/stables. -First payment of M3 264 for disturbance was made in 1997 to each household, and the second payment of M2 335 for disturbance was made in 1998.
	Capacity-Building Programme
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Resettled households expected LHDA to financially support and facilitate their skills training in handiwork, entrepreneurial and community development projects.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	- LHDA provided Rural Development Skills Training Centre in Thaba-Tseka district for advanced training.
	Rural Development Programme
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Resettled households expected LHDA to start agricultural projects to speed up food security recovery in their area. -Resettled farmers expected to breed improved livestock and animal husbandry through the help of LHWP. -Resettled households expected an Effective Range Management Programme of the LHDA, to improve their environment, safety and nourishment of their livestock and rural communities.

<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-No such projects were created. -LHWP did not offer help to resettle farmers to realize those goals. - Resettled people did not see those promises fulfilled by LHDA.
	<i>Business and Tourism Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Resettled people expected tourism to create employment and business opportunities for them in their area.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	- Tourism programme has not really benefitted resettled people as was suggested in this area.

Manganeng resettled community benefitted from a tarred road passing near the village to Katse Dam. Infrastructure development, which resettled households expected to receive from LHDA, included one primary school and one secondary school, to avoid over-population at the local school. They also expected clean piped water, sanitation and electricity to be provided by LHDA. LHDA, in consultation with the relevant government departments, proposed that the Manganeng community be upgraded so that improved services could be provided at the cost of people seeking such development, with additional financial contribution coming from the LHDA.

Housing the affected households became the responsibility of LHDA, to make sure that replacement houses would satisfy resettled families. These families had expected houses better than those they had built with mud and grass. Resettled households also expected to be compensated with an equal number of houses/huts they had possessed before their displacement. LHDA, however, unilaterally built houses to accommodate resettled families as they saw fit for each environment. LHDA applied different housing plans to suit the environment and improved the quality of structures by using cemented mortar, bricks, iron roofing and windows and latrines outside every house in the area (including host families). However, LHDA did not restore outbuildings, kraals and stables, as expected by affected families in the resettled area.

Concerning compensation, resettled communities expected adequate cash compensation for arable land, forests, trees, reeds, garden land and for disturbance. This community expected grain and pulses compensation not to be less than what they used to harvest every year. As in the other communities, LHDA provided grain and pulses compensation to affected households for a period of 15 years. This decision made many people unhappy (TRC 2000). Again, fodder compensation for livestock was to be given for a period of five years only. But affected farmers complained that LHDA delayed providing them with fodder and that the term of provision also needed to be extended.

Concerning the capacity-building programme, resettled families expected to be trained in different fields such as entrepreneurial skills, handiwork, improved agriculture and food security, so that their livelihoods would be improved by the LHDA socio-economic programmes. They also expected to be given a chance for fishing and selling the fish in the area, to improve their income levels. For them to succeed in these plans, LHDA was expected to provide money for training and for equipment which these people would need to start the fishery project. However, LHDA did not provide money for such projects. The rural development programme was seen by many affected families as having the potential to improve their livelihoods, only if plans that the LHDA had promised had financial and personnel backing. Most people in this village expected to participate in training that could develop their environment and livestock, but LHDA was unable to start this project. The tourism programme failed to improve the income for resettled households at Manganeng.

Six participants from resettled households at Manganeng were asked their perceptions of the agreement reached for resettlement with LHDA. Table 34 shows their responses. Clarity on agreement reached between affected households and LHDA with regards to the resettlement programme was necessary, in order to understand why affected household members complained about the poor quality of replacement houses.

Table 34: Percentages of agreement reached with LHDA over resettlement.

Resettlement Village	Number of Participants	Number of Resettled Households	Agreement for Resettlement	Percentage
Manganeng	6	10		
	0		Very Clear	0
	4		Clear	67
	2		Not Clear	33
Total	6	10		100

Four men and two women from 10 resettled households were asked their views about resettlement programmes; 67% (n=4) indicated that the resettlement programme was indeed discussed with them and that an agreement meeting was co-ordinated by LHDA staff and the members of the Village Development Committee, formed from affected community members. “Yes, we had meetings with

LHDA staff discussing about the compensation we should get before we could leave our properties and fields behind. Our chief was there with us and she emphasized that the project should build proper houses for us,” commented one of the participants (Int.15); 33% (n=2) indicated that, although several meetings took place they were still not clear of how they would be compensated. No one amongst those interviewed said that they were very clear about the agreement for resettlement.

An Analysis of Manganeng Resettled Community Socio-Economic Programmes

i. Infrastructure development programme

The Manganeng resettled households, together with host families in the area, benefitted from the mountain road which was passing by, to improve the transportation of goods and improve easy travelling in the area. One participant enthused that resettling near the main road to Katse village had made travelling “easy for us as well as getting goods quicker” (Int. 17). Another participant said, “This road formed part of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project infrastructure development, together with this clinic and few shops that are available in this village” (Int.16).

ii. Housing programme

The housing programme in the area looked similar to that implemented by the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority. Affected households expressed their dissatisfaction about house structures, which, according to one of the participants, “replacement houses are much colder than the huts we had built ourselves. Again, we no longer have enough fire wood as our forests and trees are now gone” (Int.19). One participant, who had nine family members before resettlement, was given a temporary construction job at the project and his son described this to say about his experiences of resettlement in Manganeng: “As a family of nine people, affected by resettlement programme, we had to separate so that others could get jobs elsewhere or live in town, since the replacement house was small for all of us” (Int. 16). The breaking up of a family due to the small size of the family house is one of the most significant failures of the LHDA’s housing programme.

In this study I tried to find out from the LHDA managers why the affected households were not given a choice of their own house plans and could not participate in the construction of each household, as affected people would have liked. The tension arose between LHDA officials and the

affected household heads over the size of plots given to them and the nature of house structures. The author was shown some houses that had cracks and others without roofs, as the wind came and blew two houses away. Affected households said that the message had been sent to the LHDA headquarters, informing them that some houses needed to be repaired, “but we have not heard from them yet; it is now four months since the roofs of those houses went off,” said another participant (Int. 16). No answer or explanation was volunteered by LHDA managers. Despite many complaints from resettled people about problems they were encountering with replacement houses, LHDA continued with its implementation of replacement house plans until all affected families were housed.

iii. Compensation programme

The complaints of resettled households in this area over compensation were heard by the LHDA and the Principal Chief of this area, but not much was done to address their grievances. The resettled households complained that cash compensation was inadequate for family support: “the money they give us cannot be enough to live on, to pay for school fees of our children and to do things which we used to do before this forced removal,” protested one participant (Int.20). An old lady indicated that she was denied cash compensation for her fields, on the basis of her gender: “The project people refused to pay cash compensation to me for my three fields as they wanted a male figure to receive cash compensation on my behalf. They were told that my husband had died and I was only living with my three daughters. But still, they demanded a male figure to come forward for compensation of the family. Then, I was advised by my chief to call one of our male relatives to represent us. It was only after our cousin came in that our claim was processed.” In the midst of so many complaints about cash compensation LHDA still did not consider issues raised by affected households, including urgent help for those who had no male household heads to stand on their own. We again see how patriarchal tendencies and practices discriminated against women on the basis of their gender and fed into the programme to detrimental effect. “The policy however, had no mentioning of compensation to be received only by male household heads” stated one government official interviewed (Int. 77). The implementation process advocated the compensation of affected households in an equitable manner, but affected communities claim that the bureaucracy changed the policy from that which was intended. The implementers of the LHDA changed the compensation policy from its intent through their own patriarchal assumption and belief systems. This is in keeping

with Lipsky's work on street-level bureaucracy. In exercising discretion in the awarding of compensation to only male-headed households or male representatives, the LHDA made policy (c.f. Lipsky 1980) As a result, the affected female population has suffered a triple burden. They were disempowered through resettlement, and then disempowered again through gendered compensation. Finally they were disempowered by the very institution that was supposed to protect them. Complaining about delayed fodder compensation, one participant said, "I had to sell three of my cattle for fear of losing weight as time passed by without LHDA giving us fodder they promised for our livestock" (Int.20). This is another area of the failure in policy implementation.

iv. Capacity-building programme

There were no substantial projects implemented by LHDA in this area towards capacity-building of resettled households. Although LHDA (1997) had a capacity-building plan to be implemented in different areas where resettlement had spread, one of the participants told us that "LHDA has still not implemented that project in our area because of lack of funds. Maybe the project will start next year" (Int.19). Resettled households indicated to the author that, as soon as they realized that LHDA was failing to fulfil promises made to them about resettlement and cash compensation, their priorities changed into focusing on their own development, to start co-operatives and sharecropping in the area for food security. "We realized that we will have no food the following year after waiting for more than six months for LHDA to bring food compensation to us. As a result, we stopped worrying about promises made by LHDA and started concentrating on how we could improve agricultural opportunities right where we lived by partnering with other farmers who had some fields to produce more crops and have better harvest later on" (Int.15). Hence, had the population not done so, they might have starved the following year. Thus any success in terms of agriculture must be attributed to the entrepreneurial abilities of the community, rather than to the implementation of the compensation policy.

v. Rural development programme

The rural development programme, in terms of LHDA's effective range management designed to improve animal husbandry, advance agricultural techniques and environmental care activities, which were planned to start alongside the construction of Katse dam project, failed to take off. LHDA (1998) showed that a delay in completion of both Muela hydropower station and some water tunnels

in the region increased costs for the project and therefore no additional funding was available for rural development projects. The World Bank Report (1998) confirmed a two-year delay to complete tunnelling because of poor tunnelling machinery and related equipment problems. “These delays negatively affected the implementation of some development projects in the area,” stated the World Bank Report (1998:27). Thus the desperately poor, and those the compensation and development package was supposed to help, became those who suffered as a consequence of delays in implementing the completion of the power stations.

vi. Business and tourism programme


The tourism programme in this area did not really boost local businesses, due to its remoteness and lack of attractions for tourists. “We saw visitors passing our area to other places with guides from Katse village or from Ha Lejone and returning to town the same day. None of them stayed at our area,” (Int. 18). LHDA (2002) showed areas where tourists preferred, in areas like Muela power station, the intake tunnel, the delivery tunnel and Katse dam. This village was not mentioned. The present study established that most trips to these places were arranged, in advance, by different agencies which made all the necessary travelling and touring plans and booked accommodation for their clients at the Katse Dam Village or other lodges along the main northern access road. Thus, as in many regions of Africa where cultural tourism is held up as the solution for job creation, a lack of real demand coupled with poor understanding by policy implementers about what is required to create and sustain this means that in reality such projects fail, or never get off the ground.

6.3 The nature of the agreement reached between LHDA and resettled communities

This section will combine the perceptions of all 20 participants, in all four interviewed resettled communities, and analyze their views on resettlement, and compensation in particular. This will be followed by a discussion of the views of seven relocated households from the Bokong Hillside, which is the fifth community studied in this programme. The reason why Bokong community is separated from the other four affected communities is that this community was not uprooted to resettle far away and among different new host community members, but they were moved to a distance of within ten kilometres uphill, within the same vicinity and to an area that was known to people in the area.

Figure 28 shows percentages of people who had reached an agreement with LHDA on the resettlement programme, those who denied that an agreement was reached and those who did not know whether the agreement was reached or not.

Figure 28: Percentages of agreement level reached with LHDA over the resettlement programme



Twenty participants in total were interviewed about resettlement in this region; 75% (n=15) said ‘yes,’ there was an agreement reached, referring to seven socio-economic programmes which were planned by LHDA towards their sustainable livelihood. However, the implementation of those programmes failed to reach the desired result for affected people, as “LHDA failed to honour the agreement they reached with us in full,” attested one participant (Int. 11). Fifteen percent (n=3) claim they did not know much about agreements, as some of them were young at the time and took no part in the decision-making process, while 10 % (n=2) denied that any formal agreement was entered into with LHDA about resettlement.

The resettlement programme remained critical, as it changed the environmental landscape, negatively affected the health of those people and the demographic identity that had characterized them for generations. On the basis of the imminent forcible removal, one participant regarded their move to a new place as “gambling with their future and hoping the better one would follow” (Int. 10).

6.4 Perceptions about Replacement Houses

Participants were taken a step further and asked their views about the replacement houses. Replacement houses were different from the typical rural housing style, like the hut shown in Figure 29.



Figure 29: Source LHDA-1990.

The picture of the hut in Figure 29 comes from Bokong valley, before the area was flooded. With its artistic nature, plastered with colourful soil mixture and built from trees this house is facing east, as a traditional way of building houses in this area so that the rays of the sun are able to enter the house to provide warmth. The hut has thatched roofing, with two medium sized windows (one on each side) on the sides of the hut towards the doorway. This structure is warm throughout the year and it is built from locally based resources (mud, stones, trees, wooden door and window frames). Only the glass in the windows is bought from the stores.

In contrast, Figure 30 shows new house structures that are built in the foothills and urban areas to replace houses/huts left behind by resettled communities. This particular picture (Figure 30) was taken at Ha Makhalanyane. More than 500 modern houses were built for resettled families affected by the construction of the LHWP in the Maseru district. Figure 30 shows examples of two houses: one is a two- roomed house planned for households who owned two huts and the other is a three-roomed house for a family that owned three huts. House plans are similar throughout resettlement villages.



Figure 30¹⁸: Resettlement sample houses at Ha Makhalanya.

In the highlands and foothills traditional houses were renovated and some built from scratch, so that people lived in the type of houses they had been used to. This study established that even though rural communities were given modern houses, in some areas they still made their own efforts to build traditional huts themselves, as their traditional huts were based on a sense of connection to a past way of life, which they were comfortable and familiar with. The LHDA provided additional funding for each household to build hygienic septic latrines for each family in the area, as shown in Figure 31, taken in the Lepaqa area.



Figure 31: Example of Improved Latrines given to the Community along the Northern Road to Katse Dam.

a. Whether affected households were satisfied with replacement houses or not

Responding to whether affected households were satisfied with replacement houses, participants showed their feelings, as shown in Table 35.

¹⁸ Where the source is not given in the figure, the picture was taken by the author himself.

Table 35: Level of satisfaction about replacement houses

Katse Region	Number of Participants	Number of Villages	Feelings about Replacement Houses	Percentage
	7		Satisfied	35
	11		Dissatisfied	55
	2		No Comments	10
Total	20	4		100

Thirty-five percent (n=7) of participants responded that they were satisfied and liked the new house structures, as “they have piped water inside the house and outside nearby, making our lives as women easier than when we had to take long journeys to fetch water from springs at Katse” (Int.5). The majority of people who commented in this way were women, who did not have many houses destroyed by the project. A few of them had lost about two houses, while most of them lost one or none, but were covered under this scheme, which made it possible for them to own houses for the first time. Fifty five percent (n=11) of participants who owned four or more previously, expressed dissatisfaction about the size, structure, quality and quantity of houses given to them. Others complained about the plan of two to three rooms joined together under one roof, “which has not been the culture for parents and children to sleep under one roof” (Int. 2). Most of the complainants in this regard were old men aged between 60 and 75 years. Ten percent (n=2) of participants did not comment on the matter.

b. Whether housing compensation fulfilled promises made by LHDA to resettled households

Based on the perceptions of the participants about the resettlement programme, the author asked if promises made by the LHDA to these individuals and families were fulfilled. Table 36 shows the views of affected participants concerning promises made to them by the LHDA over housing.

Table 36: Percentages level of fulfilment of promises made to resettled households about housing.

Katse Region	Number of Participants	Number of Villages	Promises made about housing	Percentage
	0		Highly fulfilled	0
	7		Fulfilled	35
	13		Unfulfilled	65
Total	20	4		100

Table 36 shows that 35% (n=7) of participants interviewed in the Katse region indicated that promises made to them, particularly about resettlement houses, were fulfilled. One widow said, “We left our village in the mountains believing that life would be better for us here. Then with that attitude we are satisfied for now” (Int. 16). Another participant gave a different picture about promises made by the LHDA concerning replacement houses: “My family and I were disappointed firstly by the small size of houses and very small yards they offered to us. Not knowing that further disappointment about the amount of cash compensation was still coming. We feel devastated and hopeless because of LHWP” (Int. 21).

Sixty-five percent (n=13) of participants have been dissatisfied with LHDA’s socio-economic programmes. In particular, compensation and resettlement failed to meet the objectives of Article 15 of the Treaty, whereby the economic conditions of disturbed communities were not expected to decline as a result of their displacement. Instead, these people feel that their socio-economic, health and cultural conditions have deteriorated as a result of the LHWP and promises made by LHDA to them are unfulfilled.

6.5 Perceptions about Cash Compensation

Participants were first asked whether cash compensation for arable land was adequate or not. See Table 37.

Table 37: Views on Cash Compensation – Katse Region

Resettlement Village	Compensation for Arable land	Number of participants	Percentages (per village)
Ha Lejone	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	5	83
	No comments	1	17
Ha Lepaqa	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	4	100
	No comments	0	0
Ha Sepinare	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	4	100
	No comments	0	0
Manganeng	Adequate	1	17
	Inadequate	4	67
	No comments	1	17
Total		20	400

The author questioned the meaning of ‘adequacy’ from participants and found that most of them meant to have sufficient money and food aid to look after their household members throughout the year, as they used to do before resettlement. One participant said, “Firstly, compensation for our assets should be in line with how much wealth each household had acquired and cash payment must be done in accordance with market value of each asset. Secondly, grain & pulses compensation should be provided according to how much harvest each household used to gather per year and over 50 year period, being the same period of the Treaty between Lesotho and South Africa ” (Int.3). Although this view sounds in line with best practices on resettlement and equitability of compensation, as advocated by the World Bank, the affected people were not paid compensation in line with that practice. They were highly underpaid (Selinyane 1998). According to participants, these two measures would constitute fair compensation for them. The present study found that participants expected at least M1000 per 10 sq m for arable land, not M11 per 17sqm offered by LHDA. There is nowhere in the world where the World Bank recommended compensation of \$US1 for an area of 17sqm. This is the exploitation of the poor by those who have the monopoly of power

(Bond 2007). This participant's definition will be applied throughout this report, in reference to adequate cash compensation for arable land which resettled households expected from the LHDA.

When considering measures of adequacy, compensation to affected families was not satisfactory to the majority of them, because LHDA unilaterally decided how much to compensate these families without a properly agreed audit (with assets owners) and assets evaluated to determine actual value which each family deserved (Int.4). "It would have been proper if independent evaluators were contracted by the Government and assets owners themselves to objectively conduct asset valuations, (not the LHDA) in affected areas before displacement, and for all cash compensation to be paid up front before the relocation of families" (Int. 4).

Table 37 shows the responses of participants in four villages concerning cash compensation for arable land. Starting with Ha Lejone, 83% (n=5) of participants resettled there told the author that, compensation was inadequate and only one participant did not comment. All participants (100%) from Ha Lepaqa (4) and Ha Sepinare (4) stated that compensation for arable land fell short of their expected income. One of them stressed that "we wanted money that would enable us to look after the needs of our families, education of our children, and to pay for medical treatment when we got sick" (Int. 9). In Manganeng, 67% (n=4) of participants showed that cash compensation for arable land was inadequate. However, one of the two participants here (17%) indicated that cash compensation was adequate as it helped her to start a business – by providing her with vital start-up capital, whereas another participant (17%) did not comment on the matter.

a. Whether cash compensation for disturbance was adequate or not

Participants were asked their views on whether or not compensation given to them for being uprooted from their places of origin to settle elsewhere was adequate. Their responses are given in Table 38.

Table 38: Adequacy level for disturbance compensation-Katse Region

Resettlement Village	Compensation for Disturbance	Number of participants	Percentage (per village)
Ha Lejone	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	6	100
	No comments	0	0
Ha Lepaqa	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	4	100
	No comments	0	0
Ha Sepinare	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	3	75
	No comments	1	25
Manganeng	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	6	100
	No comments	0	0
Total		20	

LHDA gave each affected household an amount of M3264 for being disturbed by the LHWP in 1997 and another compensation of M2335 for the same disturbance in 1998, making a total of M5599 disturbance compensation given to each household in two successive years. All Ha Lejone participants (100% n=6) believed that compensation for disturbance was inadequate, despite two payments made to them by LHDA in 1997 and 1998. One participant emphasized, “resettlement was involuntary, therefore we need at least M75 000 per household for disturbance to be paid every two years” (Int. 4). Another participant said “My family would be satisfied if at least M70 000 can be paid to us every two years” (Int.6). Most participants indicated that an amount not less than M75 000 for disturbance per family for a two-year period would be considered by them to be adequate. The figures proposed by the affected families actually fall within standard compensation rates applied by the World Bank in other parts of the world (World Bank 1992). They are actually lower than the rates that are being paid for equal properties in South Africa (c.f. Ballard et al, 2006).

Similarly, 100% (n=4) of participants from Ha Lepaqa expressed a view that payment for disturbance was inadequate: “looking at how well we lived at Ha Suoane, with fish abound in the Malibamatso river, good harvest from our fields, good money from the sale of our livestock and marijuana. We really do not deserve money as little as M2 335 per annum, at least they should give

us M40 000 per year,” insisted a man of about 70 years (Int.8). Ha Sepinare participants indicated that cash compensation for disturbance was inadequate, most participants indicating that at least M25 000 should be paid to every affected household per year, considering the increased cost of living in their area of resettlement. Moreover, 75% (n=3) of them expressed a concern that they still had not received a full payment by 2012, which was supposed to be the final year for disturbance compensation, after 10 years of compensation. “As we speak we are still waiting for LHDA people to pay for disturbance,” commented one participant, who did not want to mention his name (Int. 11).The majority of people here wanted the term for disturbance compensation to be extended by another 10-year period. Concerning to Manganeng resettlement on the same issue, 100% (n=6) said that cash compensation was very low for them. Most participants indicated that LHDA should at least give each household M28 000 per year, so that they would be able to send their children to school and afford to meet other basic family needs. Individuals came up with different figures depending on how much wealth one had accumulated, the nature of the soil they inherited to produce good crops, the geographical area where one lived and the quality of pastures that sustained the livestock. This community focused on their greater needs like the improvement of classrooms at the nearby local school to accommodate their children and improving longer term food security measured. This community had a better geographical setting conducive for agricultural activities and better range management for the pastures of their livestock (c.f. LHDA 2001).

b. Whether Cash Compensation for Kraals/Stables was adequate or not

Participants were asked their views about compensation for kraals and stables. Their views are shown in Table 39.

Table 39: Opinions on Cash Compensation for kraals/stables-Katse Region

Resettlement Village	Compensation for Kraals / Stables	Number of participants	Percentage (per village)
Ha Lejone	Adequate	2	33
	Inadequate	3	50
	No comments	1	17
Ha Lepaqa	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	3	75
	No comments	1	25
Ha Sepinare	Adequate	1	25
	Inadequate	2	50
	No comments	1	25
Manganeng	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	6	100
	No comments	0	0
Total		20	

Participants were asked their opinions about compensation they received for kraals/stables; 33% (n=2) showed compensation to have been adequate at Ha Lejone, saying that M343 per 11 perimeters which LHDA provided was better than nothing. However, 50% (n=3) indicated it was inadequate. They suggested that, at least M800 per 10 perimeters would be adequate. One person chose not to comment about it. In Ha Lepaqa, 75% (n=3) thought that compensation for their kraals and stables was inadequate, most them saying at least M900 per 10 perimeters would be adequate. One person (25%) did not comment. In Ha Sepinare, one person said compensation was adequate, while 50% (n=2) saw it as inadequate, suggesting that at least not less than M750 per 10 perimeter would be better.

One participant did not want to comment. Arriving at Manganeng, participants there were angry with the LHDA. One old man said, “These people promised to build us better kraals or to give us money that would be enough to replace what we had built at home. But, they have not kept their promises and the money they gave us is very little” (Int. 19). All (100% n=6) participants said cash compensation for kraals/stables was inadequate. They wanted not less than M850 for compensation per 10 perimeter kraals. All these amounts were regarded as market-related prices for land in this region.

c. *Whether Cash Compensation for Outbuildings was adequate or not*

Participants were asked their perceptions about cash compensation for outbuildings. Their responses are summarized in Table 40.

Table 40: Adequacy level for cash compensation for outbuildings –Katse Region

Resettlement Village	Compensation for Outbuildings	Number of participants	Percentage (per village)
Ha Lejone	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	4	67
	No comment	2	33
Ha Lepaqa	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	4	100
	No comment	0	0
Ha Sepinare	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	4	100
	No comment	0	0
Manganeng	Adequate	1	17
	Inadequate	5	83
	No comment	0	0
Total		20	

Participants were asked their perceptions about compensation for outbuildings, and the following were their responses: 67% (n=4) in Ha Lejone indicated that compensation in their area was inadequate. LHDA compensated affected households M677 per 3sq m for outbuildings. However, most people here suggested an amount of not less than M2000 per 3sq m would be adequate for compensating their lost outbuildings, considering the value of their demolished assets or those left behind. Their suggested figures estimated the costs of rebuilding such structures again. One hundred percent (n= 4 each village) of participants in Ha Lepaqa and Ha Sepinare expressed similar views, that cash compensation for outbuildings was inadequate, proposing that an amount of between M2500 to M3000 per 3 sq m would be a fair amount. Only one person at Manganeng indicated that compensation for outbuildings was adequate, but an overwhelming majority of 83% (n=5) in the same village took the view that compensation was inadequate and suggested not less than M2000 per 3sq m should have been paid to them by LHDA. Outbuildings formed part of the compounds lost by resettled households. These outbuildings were used for storage of harvest, to keep farming equipment, special tools or even to accommodate guests. Outbuildings were important aspects of rural wealth where the harvest was kept for the family for the entire year and was used for the safe

keeping of farming equipment. In addition, some portions of the structures were used to accommodate even visitors (Int. 12).

d. Whether cash compensation for garden land was adequate or not

Participants in this region were asked their perceptions about the cash compensation for garden land. Their responses are given in Table 41.

Table 41: Adequacy level for garden land compensation-Katse Region

Resettlement Village	Compensation for Garden Land	Number of participants	Percentage (per village)
Ha Lejone	Adequate	2	33
	Inadequate	3	50
	No comment	1	17
Ha Lepaqa	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	2	50
	No comment	2	50
Ha Sepinare	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	3	75
	No comment	1	25
Manganeng	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	5	83
	No comment	1	17
Total		20	

In answering whether or not cash compensation for garden land was adequate, 33% (n=2) of participants from Ha Lejone agreed that compensation was adequate, but, 50% (n=5) felt that compensation they received for garden land was inadequate. LHDA gave them cash compensation of M39 per 6sq m. “Garden land to us is as equally important to the fields as it is here where we produce our daily food. The money they gave us, as little as M2320, is very little for me to buy vegetables to feed my family for the whole year,” complained one participant (Int.7). Many participants suggested that LHDA should consider paying them at least M100 per sq m, and that would be adequate. One participant declined to comment. In Ha Lepaqa, 50% (n=2) of participants claimed that compensation was inadequate, one participant said, “why can’t they pay us at least M5 000 per 5sq m? (Int.11). Two (50%) participants in the same village did not respond. Coming to Ha Sepinare, perceptions of people about garden land cash compensation show 75% (n=3) of participants believing compensation to have been inadequate, showing that their livelihoods depended on their fields and gardens, and therefore suggesting not less than M1200 per sq m. Only

one person (25%) declined to comment. Eighty-three percent (n=5) of Manganeng participants saw compensation for garden land as inadequate and suggested that LHDA pay them M900 per sq m, instead of M39 per 6sq m. One participant refused to comment.

For participants that we interviewed, resettlement packages were signed by each individual representing their household. Some of the chiefs were present on those occasions, although most of the discussions took place between the LHDA and affected communities. The LHDA (1995) indicates that affected communities were told about the arrangements to move them out of their original homes and to resettle them in places of their choice. The issue of cash compensation for garden land was a sensitive one, as the households' livelihoods depended on garden vegetation produce on a daily basis, but no clear compensation rates were agreed upon before displacement. Households grew spinach, cabbage, onions and other vegetables in their gardens, which sustained them throughout the year. But, they started suffering after resettlement as they had lost their traditional means of survival.

e. Whether Cash Compensation for trees/forests was adequate or not

The question about cash compensation for trees and forests was put forward to participants. See Table 42.

Table 42: Adequacy level of cash compensation for trees/forest-Katse Region

Resettlement Village	Compensation for Trees / Forests	Number of participants	Percentage (per village)
Ha Lejone	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	6	100
	No comment	0	0
Ha Lepaqa	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	4	100
	No comment	0	0
Ha Sepinare	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	3	75
	No comment	1	25
Manganeng	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	5	83
	No comment	1	17
Total		20	

One hundred percent (n=6) of the participants in Ha Lejone indicated that compensation was inadequate. LHDA compensated an amount of M1 per sq m of forest, M65 for one non-fruit tree, M130 for one fruit-tree and M10 per 10sq m reeds. These rates are not in line with the World Bank best practice as they fell short on reasonable assessment on the importance of trees to rural communities. Trees are used for roofing, construction, ploughing, boating, fruits and firewood which is the backbone for rural economy after the fields and river resources (HRSC 1999). Participants indicated that trees and forests were important to them as they were used for firewood, carpentry work, agricultural equipment and building houses.

The majority of participants suggested a minimum of M300 per sq m forest, M200 for one non-fruit tree, M400 for one fruit tree, and M100 per 10 sq m reeds. These sentiments were also expressed by Ha Lepaqa participants, where 100% (n=4) of them said compensation was inadequate, differing with Ha Lepaqa participants for about M50 to 100 less on items mentioned, but generally suggesting similar amounts for compensation. In Ha Sepinare, 75% (n=3) of participants indicated that cash compensation was inadequate and they suggested an amount of M200 per tree, regardless of type and not less than M100 per 10sqm reeds. One participant refrained from commenting. In Manganeng, 83% (n=5) of participants claimed that compensation was inadequate, citing the fact that trees formed an important component of their lives and therefore at least M200 per sq m forest, M150 for one non-fruit tree, M250 for one fruit tree and M200 per sq m reeds would be adequate for compensation. One participant did not comment.

f. Whether grain & pulses compensation for resettled households was adequate or not

Participants were asked whether or not grain and pulses compensation was adequate. LHDA gave farmers 70kg bag of grain (maize) for 1056 sq m arable land and a packet of 3kg pulses per 300 sq m as compensation for harvest. Responses were the same in all four villages, where people complained that it was inadequate, stating that they did not lack anything where they lived before. Most participants suggested adequate grain and pulses compensation would be between 15 and 20 bags of grain for 1 000 sq m of arable land and at least 10 packets of pulses (different varieties) per one 70kg bag of grain for 100sq m of arable land.

One participant insisted that “this grain and pulses compensation they provide cannot feed our families for the whole year. It is of poor quality and comes here very late in the year (October or November). Whereas, at home, we were used to autumn harvest where we got plenty of fresh corn and green vegetables were available everywhere for every household. We have lost that fresh harvest for good” (Int.22). This represents the general opinion of participants from Ha Lejone, Ha Lepaqa, Ha Sepinare and Manganeng about grain and pulses compensation. Fresh vegetables are important part of healthy diet.

6.6 Relocation Programme in the Katse Dam Region

Relocation in this context refers to the allocation of an alternative piece of land to anyone, household or community structure, affected by LHWP, to continue living within the same vicinity of less than 10 kilometres radius. A total of seven participants in this area were interviewed about relocation. Five men between 58 and 70 years of age and two women between 55 and 65 years were interviewed in the Bokong Hillside. Four were able to write, with at least Standard 3 education (although not clear, and two had reached at least Standard 7 education and were able to write better, while the other participant was illiterate and asked his grandchild to write for him. LHDA (1998) indicates about 1 033 households, with an average of about 5 165 persons relocated within the Katse Region, coming from villages like Bokong Valley (Ha Suoane and Ha Makhangoa villages), Pelaneng, Boshobatho, Ha Machaha and moving within the Ha Theko area. However, the concentration here is to look at the perceptions of seven participants who relocated to Bokong Hillside.

a. Bokong Hillside

Bokong Hillside is composed of relocated villages uphill in the region of Katse dam. More than 30 households were removed from the Lower Bokong Valley of Ha Suoane and Ha Makhangoa onto Bokong Hillside, with a population of about 200. These communities were amongst those who were better off before the construction of the LHW, as they lived in a fertile valley with forests and had successful agriculture, good pastures and healthy livestock. They had income generated from the sale of their livestock, grain and even from marijuana or dagga (although not allowed by law). LHDA (1992) alludes to the fact that these communities did not depend on government handouts, employment or relief donations from donor organizations before LHWP construction. Against this

historical economic background, participants were eager to respond to questions and even indicated they would like to give us their petitions to the Government. However, the author clarified his position to them, in that his role there was to study their new conditions of life after being relocated, but had no connection with the Government.

In this relocation area, seven households were interviewed concerning their experiences of LHDA's socio-economic programmes, as shown in Table 43.

Table 43: Experiences of Bokong Hillside Relocated Households about LHDA's Socio-economic Programmes in the Katse Dam Region.

	<i>Infrastructure Development Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Two secondary & two primary schools, clinic/hospital and other services.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-LHDA built a secondary and primary school in the area.
	<i>Housing Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Consultation over replacement house plans before construction started.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-LHDA implemented different housing plans in the area without the approval of affected households
	<i>Compensation Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Adequate cash compensation for assets (forests, trees, reeds, arable land, and garden land). - Assets and displacement compensation to be paid in cash before resettlement. -Compensation of grain and pulses to be paid annually. -Fodder compensation for affected livestock to be given to farmers annually.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-LHDA decided to give cash compensation to qualifying household heads for a 15-year period only, as follows: M1 per sq m for forest, M65 for 1non-fruit tree, M130 for 1 fruit tree, M10 per 10sq m for reeds, M11 per 17sq m arable land and M39 per 6sq m garden land. -70kg bag of grain (maize) for 1 056sq m arable land and 3kg packet of pulses for 300sq m were given to affected households. -Bales of fodder were given to farmers for livestock, depending on the number of animals owned. -LHDA paid cash compensation, mainly after resettlement, in this way: M809 per 3 854sq m for the compound, M677 per 3sq m for an outbuilding, M343 per 11 perimeter area for kraals/stables. -First payment of M3 264 for disturbance was made in 1997 to each household, and the second payment of M2 335 for disturbance was made in 1998.
	<i>Capacity-Building Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Financial support for skills training in handiwork, improved farming and business.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	- LHDA provided Rural Development Skills Training Centre in Thaba-Tseka.
	<i>Rural Development Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Agricultural projects to speed up food security recovery in the area.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-Food security agricultural project was not implemented as designed.
	<i>Business and Tourism Programme</i>
<i>Households'</i>	- Tourism to create employment and business opportunities in the area.

<i>Expectations</i>	
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	- Tourism programme has not really benefitted the relocated people in business.

Source: LHDA 1998.

The relocated community of Bokong Hillside expected from the infrastructural development programme to receive four schools: an additional two primary and two secondary schools, to avoid the overcrowding of learners at the existing local school. LHDA was able to build two schools, one primary and one secondary, in the area. The relocated community also wanted two clinics and a hospital to be built in the Bokong area. The LHDA managed to provide an improved health care centre and emergency services in which patients with serious illnesses were able to be transferred to Thaba-Tseka or St. James Hospital. Other social services such as electricity supply, sewerage, sanitation, road construction and clean water supply were reported to be under discussion, to be brought closer to people during the period of this study.

Housing for relocated people was handled differently in some areas, as other affected people negotiated land with the chief for their livestock and to till land on which they could produce vegetables and other foodstuff. In that process, some people were able to build new huts and kraals themselves. This meant LHDA's housing programme continued alongside relocated households' initiatives, aiming to settle quickly in the new area with their livestock. In some areas people complained about the size of land allocated to them. The chiefs were instrumental in negotiating with affected households to take what was made available and continue with other developments, themselves. Some families insisted that plans for replacement houses, before any construction could start, were supposed to have been agreed by all parties. They wanted these houses not to be of lower quality than those they had built themselves. They also expected to be compensated with an equal number of houses/huts they had owned before their displacement. However, LHDA implemented housing plans as the contractors were assigned. LHDA improved the quality of structures, in that cement, bricks, iron roofing and windows were used in building the replacement houses and latrines. As for other additional structures such as kraals, stables and outbuildings, these were not restored to many relocated families.

On compensation, relocated communities expected adequate cash compensation for arable land, forests, trees, reeds, garden land and for disturbance. The amounts of money given for compensation

for every item, as indicated in Table 43, were given only to household heads. Grain and pulses as compensation were expected by this community every year during their harvest period (July). As elsewhere, LHDA decided to compensate affected households for a period of 15 years only. Fodder compensation was expected to be provided by LHDA to farmers for affected livestock every year, mainly during the winter period, when pastures are normally dry. In this case, like all the others, LHDA decided to offer fodder compensation for only five years. LHDA provided cash, grain and pulses and fodder compensation to the relocated community in Bokong.

The capacity–building programme brought hope for training in different skills so that people could get better jobs or be able to start their own businesses. However, the majority of relocated people were unable to attend the training of their choice as they had to pay for such training in other areas themselves. LHDA did not provide funding for most of the training activities. On rural development, relocated households had expected LHDA to support and facilitate agricultural projects to secure food security in the area, to assist them with breeding improved livestock, animal husbandry and to help to manage the rural environment more effectively, as well as ensuring the safety of communities living around dam areas. However, LHDA was unable to meet those expectations. Business and tourism programmes were expected to benefit the community when tourists came to the area but these programmes produced little income, as guides and those selling handicrafts did not benefit much, because of the lack of capital for investment in, and marketing of, their products.

An Analysis of Bokong Hillside Relocated Community Socio-Economic Programmes

i. Infrastructure development programme

Relocated households in Bokong needed a different infrastructure, compared to other places where affected households resettled. LHDA (2001) confirms that the road which connected this place to other highlands areas with improved health services had become a top priority for the LHWP. The main road that passed by to Katse Dam and the health service centre that were brought closer to people improved travelling, telecommunications and the health of the rural community in the Upper Bokong area (LHDA 2001). The possibility of building a skills training centre which affected people had expected to enhance their potential and acquire necessary skills for job opportunities or self-employment, was explored. The construction of a primary and secondary school in the area helped

relocated learners to afford to study near home and, as a result, the costs of studying in far places were saved. “Studying at home has helped my daughter not to need money for travelling or accommodation” (Int.23). This is a substantial benefit which relocated families got from the LHDA and one which is a tangible longer-term socio economic investment.

ii. Housing programme

The housing programme was implemented in such a way that traditional houses were still retainable, even when modern structures were adopted. It became clear from the information collected from participants after the interviews that even if LHDA had followed the tradition of using locally available resources of stones, trees, mud and grass to build houses for relocated households, the extent to which that material would be needed would not be enough to build more than 300 houses in one year. Therefore an agreement of building modern housing to replace traditional houses in the peri-urban and rural settings was needed to come from affected people. Instead the LHDA took a unilateral decision on which building material should be used. One participant said “I was allocated on a rocky land, but when I complained to the chief, he promised an additional piece of land nearby” (Int. 26). This additional allocation of land by the chief shows the good relationship which was built between resettled communities and the host community in the area. This incident is isolated as relocated families were given specific land allocations by the chiefs in consultation with the LHDA. The chief considered this particular request as the ground was rocky and the resettling family was willing to clear the land themselves. It would appear, however, that the potential neative impact of the relocation for this family was only mitigated by the chieftaincy structures, and not the LHDA.

iii. Compensation programme

Compensation took centre stage in Bokong Hillside, as relocated households were asked their perceptions about the LHWP. Relocated households complained that they waited for a long time to receive cash compensation from LHDA. One participant said “We waited more than nine months before we received partial payment for assets from LHDA” (Int. 22). The delay resulted in some of their businesses closing down or some of the parents failing to pay school fees for their children. “When you look at the cost of living today, M5890 which they give to my family for a year is not

enough” (Int.25). Thus in policy implementation, the speed at which implementation takes place has an effect on the communities it is intended to help.

iv. Capacity-building programme

There were no substantial plans implemented by the LHDA in this area towards capacity-building of relocated households. According to TRC (1999), households realized a year after relocating to Bokong Hillside that LHDA was failing to fulfil promises made to them. These concerned the quality of houses, adequate cash compensation, farming assistance and training programmes in fishery development and sales, acquiring skills in sewing, knitting, bricklaying, weaving and mechanical work, which in total could create better employment opportunities for relocated families in the area. One participant said “Our priorities changed when we saw LHDA failing to bring training they had promised us, and we started looking for other means of survival in the area, while young people left for the cities in search of jobs so that they could support their parents back at home” (Int.26). Relocation also brought dislocation of the family unit, something that the LHWP was never intended to do. Poor policy implementation can thus have unintended outcomes that can be disastrous for the intended beneficiaries.

v. Rural development programme

The rural development programme also did not happen as promised by LHDA to relocated households. Animal husbandry, an improved grazing land project and effective range management that included improved agriculture where arable land had shrunk as in the case of the Bokong relocation area, were expected to happen soon after displacement of these families, but still had not happened during the time of this study. Affected communities are now no longer talking about the rural development programme, as it has not benefitted them. Thus one area of the policy was not implemented. One participant protested, “LHDA people assured us that the government would help us with some money for development, better livestock and pastures, and businesses for some of us so that our new settlement area is well developed. But to date, we see nothing of a sort happening” (Int. 26).

vi. Business and tourism programme

The tourism programme benefitted very few people who went to sell their handiwork products at the Katse Village to tourists. “My son was fortunate to get contacts for a company buying diamonds in South Africa from one of the tourists who came from Gauteng. Since, then my son has managed to get about M12 000 from diamond sale which has helped us” (Int.27). This study found that some relocated people used the opportunity of meeting tourists to market marijuana to them and further engage in the smuggling of diamonds out of Lesotho. The risk here is that some people go to the Katse dam and surrounding villages under a pretext of being tourists when they are actually drug dealers and diamond smugglers. Their real intention of visiting the area is discovered only when they get arrested for illegal trading in diamonds and the selling of marijuana. One of the participants revealed, “I met one man from East London who was looking for 10 bags of marijuana at the Katse Dam Hotel at the price of M 1000 per 50 kg bag. I managed to organize him four bags in three months and he paid my money” (Int. 26). The present study realized that the tourism programme in Lesotho is not only positive, but can also be negative when drugs and diamond smugglers are able to access poor rural people and entice them into criminal activities by paying them money. The consequences of smuggling diamonds and marijuana out of Lesotho causes misery to many families when their members get arrested and end up in South African prisons, serving long-term jail sentences. The failure to implement all that was expected led to some members of the community engaging in criminal activities as a means of survival.

Seven participants were asked about their views on relocation to the new site: 71% (n=5) of participants indicated that LHDA staff convinced them that their lives would improve and they would have better schools, a hospital and bigger shops in the area that would create jobs for them. “Yes schools are built but other promises are still not fulfilled,” said one participant (Int.24). Twenty-nine percent (n=2) stated that they really did not trust LHDA people, as they failed to provide money for relocation transport as they had promised. “Some of us had to travel a long journey with our livestock to a new settlement area, despite their promises that trucks would be sent to assist loading animals and our stuff to Bokong Hillside” said one participant (Int. 22).

One of the old men shed tears as he responded to the question about his relocation experiences. He said:

I am still very unhappy for being here. The military government took away our fields, our pastures, rivers and our freedom only to give them to South Africa. My wife died two years after arriving here. I am left with my daughter-in-law as her husband works in Maseru coming home end of the month. The cattle I had were stolen when we arrived here and my horse also became sick and died. There is nothing to praise relocation about (Int.21).

A lady of about 60 years commented:

We were happy to hear about building Katse dam in our area when we had lost hope about the future. The people of Ha Suoane stole our cattle and sheep and after that my husband died in bitterness. The project has revived us by relocating us somewhere else, to start life afresh (Int.25).

These two views differ based on their different experiences. One participant shared his successes before relocation. He indicated how content his family was with produce from their fields, fertile pastures for the livestock, lots of free running water and freedom which they experienced as people. Another view reflects on a loss which diminished the appetite of living in Ha Suoane where members of the community are alleged to have stolen family livestock. The latter, appreciates moving out of a traumatic area to a new place where they could start life again.

6.6.1 Satisfaction about replacement houses

Participants were asked whether or not they were satisfied with replacement houses. Their responses are shown in Table 44.

Table 44: Percentage levels of satisfaction about replacement houses in the Bokong-Katse Region

Name of Village	Number of Participants	Satisfaction about Replacement Houses	Percentage
Bokong			
	0	Satisfied	0
	7	Dissatisfied	100
	0	No Comments	0
Total	7		100

In their responses, all seven participants (100%) expressed dissatisfaction about the replacement houses which LHDA built for them, giving a number of reasons, such as small sizes of houses,

different plans from which they were accustomed, small yards, lack of water and modernized structures with no privacy. One participant said:

“My family has nine members, four adults and five children. We expected five huts as we left them behind so that we are comfortable and have privacy to which we were used before. Children slept in two separate houses one for boys and another for girls, and we had a store house and visitors house as well. I am totally unhappy about this arrangement” (Int.26).

Another respondent said:

“We expected houses as good as ours with chimneys so that we are able to make fire inside as this place is colder than where we come from. We also no longer have sources for fire wood as our forests are now gone. We are unhappy about this entire situation” (Int.23).

6.6.2 Whether cash compensation for kraals/stables was adequate or not

Participants were asked whether, in their perception, cash compensation for kraals and stables was adequate or not. Table 45 shows their responses.

Table 45: Opinions on cash compensation for kraals/stables-Katse Region

Name of Village	Number of Participants	Compensation for kraals/stables	Percentage
Bokong			
	0	Adequate	0
	5	Inadequate	71
	2	No Comments	29
Total	7		100

Participants were asked whether cash compensation for kraals and stables was adequate or not. LHDA paid cash compensation of M343 per 11sq m area for kraals and stables; 71% (n=5) thought that cash compensation for kraals/stables was inadequate. One man stated, “They gave us little money which cannot even complete a 5sq m kraal. My kraal at home was about 12sq m. Now I have to see how I can build a bigger kraal myself” (Int. 25). The average amount which participants wanted was M650 per10 sq m of kraals or stables. Another old man, who had to build a stable for his horses, said “I needed a higher stable for my horses as the measurements which LHDA people had proposed were shorter and my son had to give me more money to build a higher stable here. I have spent M18 500 to put another stable back” (Int. 21). Twenty-nine percent (n=2) of participants chose not to comment about compensation for kraals.

a. Whether cash compensation for outbuildings was adequate or not

Participants were asked their perceptions about cash compensation they received for outbuildings. LHDA paid M677 for 3sq m outbuilding and 100% (n=7) of participants indicated their unhappiness, claiming cash compensation for outbuildings was inadequate: “despite some of us who had more than eight outbuildings that could be valued at higher prices, LHDA gave me only M18, 360. I expected at least M85, 000 for two big stores, a workshop and a guest room” (Int. 27). Participants stressed that outbuildings helped them as they were used for cooking and keeping children warm. A fair and market related price would therefore have been appreciated. Some proposed M1 300 per 5sq m and others reached a maximum of M1 700 per 5sq m. This study established that, to most people in this area, relocating uphill needed some adjustment to lower temperatures, as the new area was colder than the valley where they lived before, meaning that relocated households would need more cash to warm themselves throughout the year.

b. Whether cash compensation for garden land was adequate or not

Participants were asked their opinion about the compensation they received regarding garden land. Their responses are shown in Table 46.

Table 46: Adequacy level for garden land compensation –Katse Region

Name of Village	Number of Participants	Compensation for Garden land	Percentage
Bokong			
	1	Adequate	14
	4	Inadequate	57
	2	No Comments	29
Total	7		100

One participant said that cash compensation for garden land was adequate, indicating that “compensation of M39 per 6sq m given by LHDA is not bad when considering that we no longer had any active garden at home” (Int. 23). Although the LHDA (2002) report had indicated that relocated households from Bokong Valley were satisfactorily compensated for garden land in 1996 up to M6 440 per household, relocated households have disputed that claim; 57% (n=4) disagreed by saying compensation for garden land in their area was inadequate. One participant said, “They only

paid me M1 320.20 for my garden, which produced enough vegetables for my son and me throughout the year. The money they gave us lasted for less than a month and yet my garden is gone for good” (Int.23). The majority of participants suggested that at least M180 per sq m would be adequate cash compensation for garden land; 29% (n=2) of participants did not comment as they were not aware of how much money LHDA paid to their parents, who were already dead by the time of this study.

6.6.3 Whether compensation fulfilled promises made about relocation

Participants were asked whether compensation fulfilled promises made to them by LHDA about relocation. All (n =7) participants who participated in this question overwhelmingly denounced promises made by the LHDA on compensation for relocation as mere talk, and insensitive to their livelihoods, claiming that replacement houses were of poor quality and undesirable. Cash compensation given for each item was very little compared to what affected families deserved. One participant pointed in the direction on the dam and said “This dam is a hindrance to us, separating us from our relatives or making our travelling very difficult around the dam. The journey in which I used to take one hour through the valley now takes the whole day walking around the dam to reach to my other relatives if I do not have money for taxis” (Int. 24). According to this participant, LHDA broke its promises to us “even before we started relocating here as they promised us good money, good life and plenty jobs, but none of those things materialized”(Int. 24).

On being asked this question, another interviewee (26) stood on his feet and responded:

“Can you see that village on the other side of this dam? In that village my parents live. I came in this region 10 years ago after getting married, so that I could cultivate more land for my fields and get better pasture for my livestock. Before this dam was built, I used to take only one hour walk to reach there. But today it takes the whole day to go around the dam before I can reach home. My wife and children have to take a taxi to go and see my parents, as walking has become impossible for them. But these taxis are expensive. Where do I get R10 for each person’s return trip?”

Thus, one of the factors that people have experienced is a negative effect on family life. Some families have experienced their members being forced into the migrant labour system to provide cash for the household, or doing illicit trade in diamonds and drugs or, as in the case above, being unable to visit family members on the other side of the dam.

6.7. An Overview of LHDA's Socio-Economic Programmes in the Katse Dam Region

The following summary, given in Table 47 is the overview of how the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority, through the implementation of its six socio-economic programmes, attempted to develop 27 participating households, with a total of about 190 family members, amongst families who were resettled/relocated by LHDA in that region.

Table 47: LHDA Programmes in the Katse Dam Region

<i>Name of Village</i>	<i>Number of participants</i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Housing</i>	<i>Compensation</i>	<i>Capacity-building</i>	<i>Rural Development</i>	<i>Business and Tourism</i>
Ha Lejone	6	-LHDA built two schools to help resettled community in the area.	LHDA built houses to resettle about 30 people from six researched households in this village.	Affected households were compensated by cash, grain, pulses and fodder for livestock.	Skills training activities were arranged by LHDA to benefit the affected community.	Rural development programme did not succeed as planned.	Tourism did not really bring expected business to the area.
Ha Lepaqa	4	-Two operational schools have benefitted resettled community. - Improved health care facilities are built. -Village water supply services & sanitation were improved.	LHDA built houses for about 25 people from four researched families here.	Affected people were compensated by cash, grain, pulses and fodder for livestock.	Skills training activities were arranged to benefit affected community members.	LHDA's rural development projects did not materialize.	Tourism to the area was very minimal.
Ha Sepinare	4	-Secondary school was built in the area. A road connecting to Katse dam and other areas was upgraded. -Water supply and sanitation services have been improved in the village.	Four researched families were given replacement houses.	Affected people were compensated by cash, grain, pulses and fodder for livestock.	Skills training activities were arranged to benefit affected community.	LHDA rural development projects did not materialize.	Tourism did not create business opportunities here.
Manganeng	6	-LHDA upgraded a nearby passing road connecting to other places.	LHDA built houses to resettle about 45 people from six	Affected people were compensated by cash, grain, pulses and	Skills training activities were arranged by	LHDA rural development projects did not materialize.	Tourism did not really benefit resettles here.

		- Rural water supply services took place in the area.	researched households in this village.	fodder for livestock.	LHDA to benefit the affected community.		
Bokong Hillside	7	-LHDA built a secondary and primary school in the area. -Clinic was upgraded with better facilities and equipment to handle emergencies.	LHDA built houses to accommodate about 60 people from seven researched families here.	Affected people were compensated by cash, grain, pulses and fodder for livestock.	Skills training activities were arranged by LHDA to benefit the affected community.	LHDA rural development projects did not materialize.	Tourism did not really benefit resettles here.

6.8. Conclusion

In conclusion, in this chapter I have presented the perceptions of resettled and relocated households in the Katse region, with regard to their experiences of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. Generally, other people benefitted more in terms of both housing and cash compensation, as people were compensated on the basis of what they had before displacement, rather than on the basis of need. Opinions of participants have been different in each village throughout the process of this reporting, which shows how open and free participants were in expressing their personal views in this study.

Participants have articulated what they expected out of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. One requirement was good infrastructure in their new areas of settlement, whereby their standard of living after resettlement and relocation was expected to be better off than before. These communities expected better replacement houses and a conducive environment for real human development; with good schools for their children, including clinics, shops, post offices, police stations, training centres, running water & sanitation, electricity and plenty of job opportunities accompanying tourism. In terms of cash compensation given by LHDA, however, participants received far lower than the expected cash payment (to be able to sustain themselves and their families throughout each year).

Participants have also expressed that what they received from LHDA as compensation was far from their expectations. They have complained that what LHDA has given to them as compensation is a cause for impoverishment. They further reason that, since they were forcibly removed by the

military regime and never intended to move out of their area in such a large group, LHDA has an obligation to ensure that their demands are met (in much the same way that communities forcibly removed under the apartheid regime in South Africa received restitution), Although these communities received replacement houses on arrival at resettled places, which some of the people had not visited before displacement, some families were amazed by the type of resettlement houses that were built for them by LHDA, despite their having given their family statistics to LHDA to arrange appropriate housing for them. Some families found houses kept for them to be too small, without enough garden and some being a hall with three or four rooms attached together and thus not in line with cultural practices they were used to.

As for compensation for their fields which produced a harvest each year, most of the affected households felt that cash compensation given to them by LHDA was inadequate, on the basis of how much they had harvested in the past. That is why they were all not satisfied with the grain and pulses compensation. Farmers had lost their vast grazing lands (more than 125 900 hectares) with rich minerals, grass and warmer topology. The farmers claimed that the type of fodder compensation they received was of a poor quality and came to them very late in the year, whereas their agreement with LHDA was to send fodder to affected farmers at least in the month of July, when pastures were dry.

As to whether cash compensation for all other different items was adequate or not, the overwhelming majority of interviewed people indicated that they felt that it was inadequate, compared to how much wealth they had accumulated before disturbance and also considering the degree of disturbance they had suffered as a result of the construction of the Katse Dam in their region. Participants raised the issue that they never intended to leave their homes, assets or their environment. The LHDA, however, promised them a better life with the construction of the dam in their area. They further concluded that LHDA had failed to fulfil promises made to them about the LHWP.

Educational developments like the construction of schools were obviously very good for the communities and they have a longer term impact on sustainable and socio-economic development. Compensation becomes a contested terrain because the affected households were not given cash compensation according to the standards prescribed by the World Bank for resettlement. Indeed this is a very subjective item. The question becomes whether the state implementers followed world best

practice protocol or not. Often the private sector resettlement drivers rigidly stick to the best practice guidelines for fear of critique, whereas when the state is involved many of these best practices fall away. The question of gender is a significant one and it will be reiterated in the conclusion of this study as to how patriarchal assumptions fed into the compensation process to negatively affect women headed households. Braun (2010) refers to the plight of affected women more broadly, “men receive the money by policy - as legal heads of households - and women will not have much, if any, access to that money” (Braun 2010: 457).

In the next chapter I examine the effects of similar LHDA socio-economic programmes on communities affected by resettlement and relocation programmes in the Maseru district. These communities originated in the Mohale Dam Region.

Chapter 7

The Effects of LHDA's Socio-Economic Programmes on Communities Resettled and Relocated in the Maseru District from the Mohale Dam Region

Introduction

In this chapter I investigate the effects of six socio-economic programmes of the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority, namely infrastructure, housing, compensation, capacity-building, rural development and business and tourism on resettled and relocated communities (that originally came from the Mohale Dam Region) in the highland areas of Maseru district, and have now resettled in the foothills and urban areas in the district. I explore the effects of LHDA's socio-economic programmes on resettled communities and how they participated in those programmes as they moved to Ha Thetsane, Ha Tsolo and Ha Matala, in the Maseru district. I examine the nature of the agreement reached between affected households and LHDA. Moreover, I consider the perceptions of resettled households about their replacement houses and cash compensation which they received from LHDA. I then investigate the participation of relocated communities of Ha Ntsi, Ha Phaloane and Ha Sekete in the Ha Theko area, where they share their experiences about the socio-economic programmes of LHDA and then provide an overview of these programmes, as they affected families that came from the Mohale dam region.

In this region, more than 100 households were relocated to start their farming livelihoods afresh after being relocated from their fertile valley for the construction of the Mohale Dam. The experiences of this community in terms of the implementation of the policy and how it contributed towards their development is crucial. Fischer (2003) defines policy implementation as a means to apply political agreement to resolve problems. In this analysis, relocated families left the Mohale region hoping to improve their lives further. In this chapter I explore the real experiences of these people and how some of them became poorer than they were before. Thus I show the failure of the LHDA's relocation programme.

7.1 Background Information

I explore the participation of 30 resettled households now living near Maseru City (later referred to as the 'Maseru Urban Area'), but originally coming from villages along the fertile valley of Senqunyane, Bokong, Likalaneng and the Jordan River called Ha Lekhera, Seotsa, Tsapane, Molika-

liko, Maetsisa, Phoofolo, Mokhathi and Limapong. These households were displaced from their original villages between 1990 and 1992 to resettle in different places in the country. The focus of this study in the urban resettlement is limited to 30 participants (10 from Ha Thetsane, 10 from Ha Tsolo and another 10 from Ha Matala resettlement), whose families were affected by the resettlement programme. I investigate the expectations of resettled communities from the Lesotho Highlands Water Project and what they were offered by the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority as compensation. Thirteen participants (eight from Ha Ntsi, three from Ha Phaloane and two from Ha Sekete), now residing in the foothills of the Machache Mountains under Chief Khoabane Theko, were asked to share their views about relocation to the foothills and their experiences of the implementation of the LHDA's socio-economic programmes. The total number of participants who were interviewed in this district is 43 (15 men and 28 women).

7.1.1 Scope of the Research

Participants who had resettled in the Maseru Urban Area and those who relocated in the Ha Theko Foothills were given interview numbers, as their real identities are withheld. This research of communities that were displaced from the Mohale dam region was limited only to the areas mentioned above. Table 48 shows the number of resettled households at Ha Thetsane, Tsolo and Matala, with estimated age and education levels of those who participated in this research, per suburb and gender.

Number of participants interviewed in the Maseru Urban Area

Table 48: Information about Participants in the Maseru Urban Area

<i>Maseru Urban</i>	Number of Participants	Age Group	Educational level	Gender		Number of Resettled Households
				Males	Females	
<i>Ha Thetsane</i>	10	25-68	Std 3- Grade 10	3	7	11
<i>Ha Tsolo</i>	10	25-70	Std 3- Grade 10	4	6	15
<i>Ha Matala</i>	10	22-65	Std 3- Grade 10	5	5	20
<i>Total</i>	30			12	18	46

Participants at Ha Thetsane were between 25 and 68 years old, those at Ha Tsolo ranged between the 25 and 70, and Ha Matala participants were between 22 and 65 years of age. Their education levels ranged between Standard 3 to Grade 10. Out of the total of 30 participants interviewed in these three resettlement areas, 12 were men and 18 were women. The total number of resettled families in the Maseru Urban Area is 46 households (but only 30 were interviewed). All participants came from the Mohale region of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, Phase 1B.

7.1.2 Economic Conditions of Affected Communities Before Resettlement and Relocation from the Mohale Dam Region

Communities affected by this Phase 1B of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project were successful in agriculture and in animal rearing, because of rich pastures in their area. Devitt and Hitchcock (2010:62) confirm that:

Prior to inundation the economy of the Mohale Basin was adequate to sustain its inhabitants in a modest traditional style. There were few signs of conspicuous wealth, but equally few of poverty. In this regard the people were significantly better off than most rural Basotho, whose fields produced a poor and unreliable supply of food and little surplus for sale.

The LHDA (1995) revealed that a total of 1 900 people in 321 households and in 14 villages were affected by the LHWP in this region. Bond and Mafereka (2010) expand the number of affected households: “an estimated 700 households in 84 villages lost 752 hectares of arable land, with the project reducing grazing land, including the most valuable winter grazing, by approximately 1 635 hectares” Bond and Mafereka (2010: 3). LHDA (2002) indicates that, in this region, 226 families were resettled in more than 20 villages around the country, while 99 families were relocated in the foothills to about 10 villages.

7.2 Resettlement Programme in the Maseru Urban Area

Thirty participants from 46 households, with an estimated 340 people, resettled in this area. These people originally came from the Mohale Dam Region; some of their original villages have already been mentioned in the background information given above. This section investigates how the socio-economic programmes implemented by LHDA for development of affected communities helped resettled households to realize their expectations of LHWP, as well as establishing what they

received from those programmes and what they did not. The investigation will be done village by village, starting with Ha Thetsane resettlement.

a. Ha Thetsane Resettlement

Ha Thetsane resettlement is located about five kilometres south of Maseru, the capital of Lesotho. This suburb is well developed and has the necessary social services needed by an urban community. Eleven households resettled here, with about 60 household members. Ten participants were asked their views about resettlement and other programmes of the LHWP. This section will reveal how these resettled households benefitted from the socio-economic programmes of the LHDA. This community resettled more than 80km away from their original places and whatever compensation they got from LHDA was spent in the new settlement area. Although they had moved out of the region in 1992, where most of LHDA socio-economic programmes were planned to be implemented, these people still had some expectations from the construction of LHWP Phase 1B, which caused their displacement. They received compensation which will now be investigated.

Table 49: LHDA's Socio-Economic Programmes Implemented for Resettled Households from Mohale Dam Region at Ha Thetsane in the Maseru District.

	<i>Infrastructure Development Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Resettled households expected to benefit from existing infrastructure, together with the host community. -Resettled households expected their children to be accommodated in local schools.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-Resettled households enjoyed similar benefits as the host community. -Learners were accommodated at local schools at specified fees at secondary & high school levels.
	<i>Housing Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Resettled households expected to discuss replacement house plans and approve them before LHDA could start building houses for them in Ha Thetsane. -Resettled households expected replacement houses of a higher quality than what they had built themselves.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-LHDA did not require the input of resettled households about replacement house plans. -In cases of households that had two or more huts, LHDA built a single house with rooms equal to those huts. -Modern houses meeting urban housing requirements of water supply, electrification, & sewage services and installed geysers were provided by LHDA to this community.
	<i>Compensation Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Resettled households expected adequate cash compensation for the assets they owned before resettlement. -Resettled households had expected assets and displacement compensation to be paid to them in cash before their resettlement.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-LHDA decided to give cash compensation to qualifying household heads for a 15-year period only, as follows: M1 per sq m for forest, M65 for 1non- fruit tree, M130 for 1 fruit tree, M10 per 10sq m for reeds, M11 per 17sq m arable land and M39 per 6sq m garden land.

	-70kg bag of grain (maize) for 1 056sq m arable land and 3kg packet of pulses for 300sq m were given to affected households. -Bales of fodder were given to farmers for livestock, depending on the number of animals owned. -LHDA paid cash compensation mainly after resettlement, in this way: M809 per 3 854sq m for compound, M677 per 3sq m for outbuilding, M343 per 11 perimeter area for kraals /stables. -First payment of M3 264 for disturbance was made in 1997 to each household and the second payment of M2 335 for disturbance was made in 1998.
	Capacity-Building Programme
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Resettled households expected to be afforded skills and entrepreneurial training by LHDA, so that they could get jobs or start their own businesses in the resettled area.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	- Skills and entrepreneurial courses were offered by colleges at specified fees in the City. LHDA had no budget for individual development programmes.
	Rural Development Programme
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Resettled households did not expect any benefits from the rural development programme in their new area of settlement.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-No such projects were created in Maseru. "This project was only applicable to highlands communities," (Int.33). LHDA (1997) confirmed that the rural development programme was designed for rural communities.
	Business and Tourism Programme
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	Resettled people did not expect any benefit from the tourism programme in their new area, as tourists spent most of their time in the dam areas at Mohale. "We did not have any benefits from tourism as we had no facilities to accommodate tourists or transport them to the highlands where Mohale Dam is located" (Int. 31).
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-Tourism programme has not really benefitted resettled people in this area. LHDA (1997) confirmed that tourism was mainly planned for Katse and Mohale dam areas, where specific touring plans and accommodation were put in place.

Source: LHDA 199.

Table 49 shows a shift of expectations from this resettled urban community compared to resettled communities in the foothills of Katse dam. For instance, the resettled community of Ha Thetsane did not worry much about infrastructure as they were going to be accommodated within an area that had existing infrastructural development.

On housing, resettled households expected replacement houses of higher quality, with urban benefits of running water in the house, electricity and sanitation. Most of them expected separate houses, as they had before, but LHDA implemented a house plan of providing a number of rooms equal to the number of huts each household had previously. An example of a replacement house built by LHDA for resettled families at Ha Thetsane, on the outskirts of Maseru City, is shown in Figure 32.



Figure 32

This is a modern house with a kitchen, sitting room and two bedrooms, given to resettled families at Ha Thetsane in the Maseru district. Some houses have three bedrooms, depending on how many houses/huts were left behind by resettled households. Ha Thetsane replacement houses were fitted with geysers, while Ha Tsolo and Ha Matala replacement houses were not. All properties are fenced and outside toilets are built for every family. Every household is, however, responsible for paying municipal services such as water delivery, refuse removal and electricity.

Concerning compensation, resettled communities had expected cash compensation for arable land, forests, trees, reeds, garden land and for disturbance before being uprooted to Ha Thetsane. Their expectations in terms of the compensation payment timeframe were not fully honoured by LHDA. This community expected grain and pulses compensation equal to which they used to harvest each year to be given to them during July, which was harvesting period, but LHDA delayed in giving them food aid until the end of October and November the year following their resettlement in the Maseru area.

The capacity-building programme which resettled households needed related to skills development for employment or starting small businesses of their own. The LHDA was expected to arrange different training programs according to the educational level and understanding of resettled community members that would attend such training. However, most of this desired skills training was not free and LHDA did not have the budget to finance individual's training needs.

Regarding the rural development programme, LHDA had only designed this programme to benefit communities that were still living in the highlands areas. In the same way, the business and tourism programme was designed for tourists who would visit the site of Mohale Dam. By virtue of living in the Maseru area, this community did not benefit from this programme.

An Analysis of Ha Thetsane Resettled Community Socio-Economic Programmes

Participants of Ha Thetsane were visited during the month of December, when floods had affected many houses in the area. It took three days to interview 10 household heads in this area, as resettled houses are built close to each other. What I noticed when we arrived in this village was a flooded stream without any bridge connecting this settlement to nearby textile firms that have employed many people in the area. People in this settlement were unable to cross the river and they had to connect to other routes leading to the City in a different direction.

Participants were asked about their meetings with LHDA which resulted in an agreement reached with them to resettle in Maseru. The results are given in Table 50.

Table 50: Percentages of participants agreeing to the meetings they held with LHDA about LHWP

Maseru Urban	Number of Participants	Whether meetings took place or not	Percentage
Ha Thetsane	5	Yes	50
	2	No	20
	3	Do not know	30
Total	10		100

In Table 50 50% (n=5) of participants agreed that they did have meetings with LHDA to talk about the “Lesotho Highlands Water Project and a need for us to resettle at a safer place” (Int. 35). Participants confirmed that their meetings with LHDA took place at the villages of Tsapane, Maetsisa, Seotsa and Mateboleng, although they could no longer remember the number of meetings they had that resulted in their departure from the highland region. Twenty percent (n=2) denied having been invited by LHDA to discuss LHWP issues and resettlement, as they had taken their

cattle to cattle-post, away from home, for a longer period. “I went to Lihlabeng where my livestock used to get better pastures and did not hear about such meetings when I returned home” (Int.37). Thirty percent (n=3) did not know of any meetings that happened between their community and LHDA, as they were at school in Maseru during the period of resettlement. One of the ladies, who was the household head at Ha Thetsane, said, “Many things happened at home while I was studying in Maseru High School, perhaps meetings took place, but I do not know. I was not there” (Int. 39). I further analyze these programmes, in details, in the following sections.

i. Infrastructure development programme

Urban infrastructure is different from settlement settings, norms, by-laws, urban culture, as well as a different economic system of relying on cash rather than harvest from the fields and livestock, which resettled households were used to. The impact of living in a regulated infrastructure brought about negative consequences on the livelihoods of most of these resettled households at Ha Thetsane resettlement (TRC 1995). This study established that most resettled households were ignorant of the demands of urbanization, in which households are required by law to pay for social services rendered to them by the municipality and for ground rental. These households were not aware of these payments before they chose Maseru Urban Area as their preferred resettlement destination. One participant attested, “we heard for the first time that we were supposed to pay for water, electricity connection and usage, refuse collection and even land rental to government every month, when most of us were applying for connections. When we asked LHDA people about these payments, they told us that every household is responsible for paying for services it gets. Some of us were devastated and started regretting the choice we made of coming to Maseru City area” (Int.30). Another participant said, “When we made a decision with LHDA about resettlement to this place none of these requirements were brought to our attention. Otherwise, we could have chosen other areas for resettlement. We did not know that infrastructure in this area is maintained by us” (Int. 33). The LHDA did not give people the information they needed about their obligations once they were to arrive in the urban areas. They were not told about the municipality by-laws compelling every household living in the urban areas about service delivery payments due to the municipality on a monthly basis (CCL 1997). This lack of communication by the LHDA meant that people were not able to make informed choices about their future when they chose to move to the urban areas. In exercising the decision to move to urban, rather than rural, areas these people assumed that they

could create a better future through better employment prospects but had little idea about the long-term costs of this decision.

ii. Housing programme

Some families complained about the small size of their houses and lack of privacy in the area. One old man said, “There is no privacy in the house, as children are everywhere in all three rooms we share. Outside as well, there is no privacy, as neighbours are too close to us and even hear when I am quarrelling with my wife in the house” (Int. 36). People like this reasoned that LHDA failed to consult them when they designed the houses or show them house plans, until most of them saw houses for the first time when they arrived at Ha Thetsane. Other areas where there was discontent included the garden yards which were small and on rocky ground, which made it difficult for many families to grow vegetables. Another participant said, “We arrived here without the money that was promised to us by LHDA hoping that on arrival they will pay all outstanding balances to each family. But still payment was not done on our arrival here” (Int.29).

This is a community which moved to live in a different urban setting, where animal rearing was banned and where the economy is based on cash. There were no fields to live on here or free water and wood which this community used to have during their life in the Mohale region. This sudden change of life style and financial demands of urban life brought about disastrous consequences to them.

iii. Compensation

According to participants, LHDA was supposed to pay them cash compensation for their assets before leaving their homes, so that they could start making new settlement arrangements with cash in hand when they arrived at Ha Thetsane. However, LHDA did not give these people the money they needed prior to resettlement, but instead LHDA persuaded these families to move out of their areas without full compensation being paid to them. One participant described this as “a well-organized strategy to cheat people” (Int. 37). By the time money was paid to affected households, many of them complained that it was inadequate, “They gave us only M10 500 for three big fields that we have left home, no, at least they should have given us M35 000 as that money would be equivalent to the harvest we used to get per year,” insisted one participant (Int. 42).

The study discovered that people were moved out of their villages around 1992, but only received first disturbance compensation five years later (1997). The failure of LHDA to compensate affected people on time has significantly contributed to the deterioration of their economic conditions and other problems, such as failing to pay for the school fees of their children, which resulted in most of them dropping out of school, while some even turned to prostitution to make a living. Grain and pulses compensation was received at the same time as other affected communities around the month of October each year. No household in this village was allowed to bring livestock along and therefore they were not eligible for fodder compensation.

iv. Capacity-building programme

The capacity-building programme which the affected people expected here did not take place, as no plans for such activities were formulated by LHDA. “As a resettled community we were never invited to any skills training programme or given any workshop about urban life,” insisted one participant (Int.34). This study did not get any record/report confirming that capacity building training to empower resettled communities with skills development courses to help them become better trained small entrepreneurs or acquire desired market skills took place in this area. One participant said “my son helped his sister by sending money from his work in South Africa so that she could attend a course on hair dressing in the City” (Int. 32). Thus communities were moved to urban areas away from the rural farming lifestyle they had enjoyed before and without the provision of any skills based capacity building to prepare and equip them for their new urban environment.

v. Rural development programme

LHDA (1995) maintained that the rural development programme was designed to benefit people still residing in a rural environment. There was no form of rural development project which this community could receive when residing in the urban environment. The LHDA Final Report (1998) did not give any information regarding the rural development programme that has benefitted resettled communities in the urban settlement areas. One participant said, “We did not get any form of training from LHDA to improve our economic or financial conditions once we had settled here” (Int.33).

vi. Tourism programme

A tourism programme was designed by LHDA to take place in the big dam's areas, where tourists were attracted to visit the Mohale dam-site and spend some time there, so that the region could earn money to help the rural economy to grow. Nothing was planned to benefit resettled households at Ha Thetsane resettlement. One participant indicated that "we see no opportunity for business in tourism here as we have no capacity or necessary resources to accommodate tourists at our homes" (Int.36). It would appear that the community that was moved was not provided with any resources to enable them to flourish in a modern urban economy, far away from the rural lifestyle they had previously enjoyed.

b. Ha Tsolo Resettlement

Ha Tsolo resettlement is located about 3 km south of the Ha Thetsane resettlement, within 5 km of Maseru City centre. One part of this community is under municipal control, while the other is under Ha Tsolo/Tikoe chieftianship. Ten participants from 15 households that resettled here, with an estimated population of 80, fell under chieftainship jurisdiction. These households were visited to ascertain how much they benefitted from the implementation of LHDA's socio-economic programmes. Their expectations from the LHWP, especially from the resettlement programme, and what was actually delivered to them by LHDA, are shown in Table 51.

Table 51: LHDA's Socio-Economic Programmes Associated with Resettlement in Ha Tsolo in the Maseru District (Urban).

Infrastructure Development Programme	
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Resettled households expected to be provided with running water, graveyards, and a clinic in the new resettlement area. -Resettled households expected their children to be accommodated in local schools.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-Resettled households enjoyed similar benefits as the host community. - Running water, clinic and graveyard facilities were prepared by LHDA prior to their resettlement. - Learners were accommodated at local schools at specified fees at the secondary & high school levels.
Housing Programme	
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Most resettled households requested replacement house plans that would help to generate income for sustainability in the new area. - Resettled households expected replacement houses of a higher quality than what they had built themselves.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-LHDA built house structures that met the requests of affected families to generate income as well as resettlement. -Replacement houses were not built according to the number of houses/huts demolished or left behind. -In cases of households that had two or more huts, LHDA built a single house with rooms equal to those huts.
Compensation Programme	
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Resettled households expected adequate cash compensation for the assets they owned before resettlement. -Resettled households had expected assets and displacement compensation to be paid to them in cash before their resettlement.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-LHDA decided to give cash compensation to qualifying household heads for a 15- year period only, as follows: M1 per sq m for forest, M65 for 1 non- fruit tree, M130 for 1 fruit tree, M10 per 10sq m for reeds, M11 per 17sqm arable land and M39 per 6sq m garden land. -70kg bag of grain (maize) for 1 056sq m arable land and 3kg packet of pulses for 300sq m were given to affected households. -Bales of fodder were given to farmers for livestock, depending on the number of animals owned. -LHDA paid cash compensation, mainly after resettlement, in this way: M809 per 3 854sq m for compound, M677 per 3sq m for outbuilding, M343 per 11 perimeter area for kraals/stables. -First payment of M3 264 for disturbance was made in 1997 to each household and the second payment of M2 335 for disturbance was made in 1998.
Capacity-Building Programme	
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Ha Tsolo resettled households expected to be afforded skills and entrepreneurial training by LHDA, so that they could get jobs or start their own businesses in the resettled area. -Secondly, this community engaged the host community to share-crop with them, as there are many unattended fields in the area and needed LHDA to support their cause.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	- Skills and entrepreneurial courses were offered by colleges at specified fees in the City. LHDA had no budget for these individual programmes. -Some resettled households made share-cropping agreements with host families, without any financial backing from LHDA.
Rural Development Programme	
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Resettled households did not expect any benefits from the rural development programme, here.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-No such projects were created in Maseru. LHDA (1997) confirmed that the rural development programme was designed for rural communities only.
Business and Tourism Programme	
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	Resettled people did not expect any tourism business benefit in their new area, as there were good hotels and transport service providers in Maseru for tourists.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-Tourism programme has not really benefitted resettled people in this area. LHDA (1997) confirmed that tourism was mainly planned for the Katse and Mohale dam areas, where specific touring plans and accommodation were put in place.

Table 51 shows that resettled families at Ha Tsolo expected the LHDA to provide running water, graveyards and a clinic for them, before their resettlement to the area. They also expected local schools to accommodate their children in advance. LHDA provided for each of these needs.

Concerning the housing programme in this area, the affected households at Ha Tsolo resettlement were given different types of house structures, as shown in Figure 33. Most resettled households here rented out rooms to generate income. This study found that these families had requested LHDA to help build them rental rooms as a means of long-term income generation for sustainability. These four double rooms thus paid M250 each per month, bringing M1 000 to the property owner every month.



Figure 33

Looking at the replacement house shown in Figure 33, the structure is different from those built at Ha Thetsane resettlement. This one is a simple block structure of lower cost, and with inferior building material, compared to houses of their counterparts at Ha Thetsane, which are built with a higher quality material of Loti bricks.

Compensation took centre stage here, as resettled people arrived in this area were hoping that the LHDA would give them full compensation without further delay. However, they remained for a long period in this area without compensation. Some families who had left their livestock in the mountain region decided to sell them, so that they could have some money to live on. Compensation for affected communities was the same for all households that originally came from Ha Mohale region, regardless of where the communities chose to resettle.

The capacity-building programme which LHDA had implemented in other areas of the project did not bring about the desired results at Ha Tsolo resettlement, as people were unable to finance any training on their own. However, on their own initiative, resettled households approached some of the local fields' owners for share-cropping, as many of them had farming skills. Some of them resumed farming in this area, with the help of their family members that were employed. The rural development programme in the same way did not benefit resettled households in this area, nor did the tourism programme, which was planned to take place mainly in the dam area.

An Analysis of Ha Tsolo Resettled Community Socio-Economic Programmes

Participants were asked if they still remembered meetings they held with LHDA about LHWP and what was agreed upon. Eighty percent (n= 8) of participants said 'yes,' they attended a few meetings with LHDA to prepare for resettlement, as they were told that the dam would cover their area. Another participant mentioned that agreement with LHDA included replacement of houses, enough money to live in Maseru and to pay for the education of their children for those who did not have working family members. "They also promised us training in trade and other skills so that we could get jobs easily" (Int. 41). Twenty percent (n=2) indicated that they only heard about these meetings when they came home from South African mines, where they were working at the time of preparation for resettlement. The author analyzed the effects of implemented programmes on affected resettled households at Ha Tsolo, starting with the infrastructural development programme.

i. Infrastructural development programme

The first point that was noticed with Ha Thetsane and Ha Tsolo resettlements was that the former was located within the municipal area, while the latter was located in the village controlled by the chief. This is why the infrastructure differed in these two resettlements. Ha Thetsane infrastructure was better than Ha Tsolo infrastructure. Ha Thetsane resettlement had water systems running in the houses, but Ha Tsolo resettled households only had water pipes connected in the yard. Some of Ha Tsolo resettled households drew-up their own house plans for the sole purpose of renting out rooms to generate more income. They were charged higher service fees for electrical and water connection, on the basis that some of their structures were business related. "The Lesotho Electricity Company quoted me M7 800 for electrical connection of my rental house, while for my residential house I was

only quoted M3 200 as connection fee,” emphasized one participant (Int.47). This study found, on inspection, that the houses in this area were not fitted with geysers and some were not fenced at all, but still had latrines outside. One participant commented, “As you can see our houses are incomplete compared to those that are given to Ha Thetsane households. We asked LHDA to explain why this discrimination on housing programmes? They indicated that those who resettled at Ha Thetsane benefitted more as they were included amongst families whose houses were affected by road construction in the Maseru urban areas and therefore they are put under a different project scheme” (Int.40). Educational facilities such as schools and clinics are equally shared in the community.

ii. Housing programme

Ha Tsolo resettlement was inferior to the one at Ha Thetsane, but most of the houses here were planned for income generation. This is the only community in the whole resettlement programme that was able to engage LHDA to build their own structural plans and they succeeded. Some of the Ha Tsolo resettled households added more rental rooms to their structures from the income they received from LHDA for compensation, in order to maximize their income. This study discovered that some of the Ha Tsolo resettled households still had livestock in the mountain posts, and they had left their livestock with their relatives or hired shepherds in the highlands, where pastures were better. “I have 15 of my cattle and 25 sheep with my relatives to look after them as I was not really sure of what my coming here with the children would become. Now that LHDA is unable to pay our outstanding money, we are still fortunate to fall back on our livestock for survival” (Int. 50). It became clear that most families paid for services and improvements to their replacement houses from the income they accrued elsewhere, including the sale of their remaining livestock. Rental houses helped most families to get about M150 per room per month. Hence, through diversification these households tried to ensure that they had sufficient resources to fall back on if the relocation was not successful. As such they became straddled across the rural and urban economies in ways that the other communities were not. Their survival strategies were not as a result of a successful implementation of the programme, but rather as a consequence of their own resourcefulness.

In Ha Tsolo resettlement which was constructed later, the households had realized what was happening to Ha Thetsane community and they decided on the rental type of housing so that they could earn a monthly income to supplement the compensation received from the LHDA. This

community evaluated the implementation of the programme in other areas and developed their own coping strategies for when implementation failed.

iii. Compensation programme

Compensation in all forms was slow in reaching this community. The reason was that construction of houses and infrastructural development took a longer time to start here, as this area falls out of municipal jurisdiction. Spatial planning and development had to be negotiated with the chief of the area and this took some time to reach a final resettlement agreement between the chief of the area and LHDA. Cash compensation and actual transportation of people to this new resettlement thus took place after other communities had resettled. When resettled households received compensation they all complained that the cash which LHDA gave them was very little compared to the economic challenges they were facing in the city area. One Participant said “What can I do with M7 500 for the whole year? We pay for water, electricity, food, clothes, school uniforms & fees for my three children, and for share-cropping. These expenses need at least M25 000 per year. It would be better if LHDA could give each family here M40 000 per annum for compensation” (Int. 46). This study established that indeed the cost of living for this particular household was way above their means. This was confirmed by one of the family learners, who came back from school at about 11:00 on the day of the interviews, claiming that the principal of her school had sent her back home to get outstanding school fees, which had not been paid for four months. One participant told us how they were surviving: “My father sent me to my uncle who had kept his cattle in the highlands to sell two of them and bring money to the family at Ha Tsolo. My uncle managed to get M7 000 from the sale of two cattle which I took home” (Int. 48).

iv. Capacity-building programme

Ha Tsolo households found their own ways of building their capacity as they approached the owners of the fields that had not been used for many years in the area, either to sell them the fields or to engage in share-cropping. “I was amongst six farmers resettled in this area that saw a potential of uncultivated fields around here and we approached the owners about share-cropping or possible purchase of such fields” (Int. 45). Most families who owned fields in this area were found to be willing to sell their fields, so that they could invest their money in housing development projects or starting other businesses, as one participant revealed, “one field owner wanted M40 000 for his two

acres” (Int. 42). This study discovered that some of the resettled households that still kept livestock managed to sell their livestock and with the money bought pieces of land, either for agricultural purposes, or for build rental houses in the area. The LHDA capacity-building programme was a total failure for resettled households in this area. One participant said “LHDA people do not even come to meet us or answer our letters when we asked about capacity-building training they promised us while we were still at home” (Int.44). Instead, their future livelihoods are a result of their own endeavours and not that of the LHDA capacity-building programme, which failed.

v. Rural development programme

The rural development programme was not expanded to this urban resettlement. Activities that were planned in this programme were targeting highland communities and environmental development in the dam areas, where landscape disturbance had occurred. LHDA (1998) showed the intention of this programme as livestock improvement, environmental care, safety measures for communities living on the banks of the dams and pastures rehabilitation and development.

vi. Tourism programme

The tourism programme did not generate any business for the resettled community in this vicinity. As one person claimed, the “majority of tourists travelled to the dams in the highlands and it was there where they stayed during their visit to LHWP areas” (Int.49).

c. Ha Matala Resettlement

Ha Matala resettlement is located 5km east of Maseru and it is here where the other 20 households with about 200 members from the Mohale dam region chose to resettle. Ten participants were interviewed from this group. Most people who chose to live in the Maseru suburbs had few animals or none at all. This community had some expectations of LHWP. I shall explore their expectations and find out what they received from the LHDA’s socio-economic programmes. See Table 52.

Table 52: LHDA's Socio-Economic Programmes Associated with Resettlement in Ha Matala in the Maseru District (Urban).

	Infrastructure Development Programme
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Resettled households expected to be provided with running water, graveyards and a clinic in the new resettlement area. -Resettled households expected their children to be accommodated in local schools.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-Resettled households enjoyed similar benefits as the host community. -Learners were accommodated at local schools at specified fees at secondary & high school levels.
	Housing Programme
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Resettled households expected replacement house plans that would help to continue their culture & tradition in the new area. -Resettled households expected replacement houses of a higher quality than what they had built themselves.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-LHDA built replacement houses suitable for the needs of affected families, without necessarily looking at their cultural preferences. -Replacement houses were not built according to the number of houses/huts demolished or left behind. -Modern houses meeting urban housing requirements of water supply, electrification & sewage services were provided by LHDA to this community.
	Compensation Programme
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Resettled households expected adequate cash compensation for the assets they owned before resettlement. -Resettled households had expected assets and displacement compensation to be paid to them in cash before their resettlement.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-LHDA decided to give cash compensation to qualifying household heads for a 15- year period only as follows: M1 per sq m for forest, M65 for 1 non- fruit tree, M130 for 1 fruit tree, M10 per 10sq m for reeds, M11 per 17sq m arable land and M39 per 6sq m garden land. -70kg bag of grain (maize) for 1 056sq m arable land and 3kg packet of pulses for 300sq m were given to affected households. -Bales of fodder were given to farmers for livestock, depending on the number of animals owned. -LHDA paid cash compensation, mainly after resettlement, in this way: M809 per 3 854sq m for compound, M677 per 3sq m for outbuilding, M343 per 11 perimeter area for kraals/stables. -First payment of M3 264 for disturbance was made in 1997 to each household, and the second payment of M2 335 for disturbance was made in 1998.
	Capacity-Building Programme
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Resettled households expected to be afforded skills and entrepreneurial training by LHDA, so that they could market those skills or start their own businesses in resettled areas.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	- Skills and entrepreneurial courses were offered by colleges at specified fees in the City. LHDA had no budget for individual development programmes.
	Rural Development Programme
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Resettled households did not expect any benefits from rural development programme in their new area of settlement, since the programme was designed for highlands communities.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	- LHDA (1997) confirmed that the rural development programme was designed for rural communities, not those resettled in urban areas.
	Business and Tourism Programme
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	Resettled people did not expect any benefit from the tourism programme in their new area, as tourists spent most of their time in the dam areas at Mohale and Katse, where handiwork products were sold.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-Tourism programme has not really benefitted resettled people in this area. LHDA (1997) confirmed that tourism was mainly planned for Katse and Mohale dam areas, where specific touring plans and accommodation were put in place.

The resettled community of Ha Matala expected to be provided with water pipes in their yards, accessible graveyards and a clinic nearby. They also expected local schools to accommodate their children. LHDA, in collaboration with relevant municipal and government departments in the area, made the necessary arrangements to provide the same basic social services needs for the resettled Ha Matala community, as were provided for the members of the host community (LHDA 2000). Social services were provided, with costs to resettling households. School fees were expected for secondary and high school learners. Only primary school learners did not pay school fees if they attended public schools (LHDA 2001).

Concerning that housing programme, resettled households expected to bring their values and culture to the urban environment, so that their traditions would not be changed by a more liberal Western-rooted culture that had been adopted by many modernized communities living in the city. One participant said “We need to teach our children about our roots and where we come from so that they are guided into the future” (Int.54). That is why most resettled households were not pleased with the housing structures that were erected for them in the area. They expected separate houses/huts to be built in the area and to be given garden sites where they could grow vegetables (TRC 2005). Instead, LHDA built houses that were joined together with a number of rooms equivalent to the huts they owned in their original settlement. In terms of the size of houses, this community was given bigger houses in all three resettled communities in the Maseru Urban. The building materials used for replacement houses here was similar to the ones used at Ha Tsolo resettlement. Each replacement house had a fence around it and a latrine in the yard. A replacement house built for a Ha Matala resettled family is shown in Figure 34.



Figure 34: Example of replacement houses in urban Maseru.

Ha Matala resettled households were given bigger houses than any of the urban resettles. The reason given for this was that these families had many properties before they resettled in Maseru, so their housing compensation was in line with the agreement reached (LHDA 2001) which was more than in other areas. Families like this, in Figure 34, used only one room and rented out the rest (two or three rooms) to tenants to generate income.

Compensation given to this community included cash for arable land, garden land, outbuildings, trees/forests, reeds, kraals/stables and the disturbance. This community exhibited the best negotiation skills through their representatives who managed to get a better compensation deal than others, “especially, because we had lost the best fertile valley in the Mohale region” (Int. 53). Hence, they also won a case which their team took against the LHDA to the ombudsman in 2007 (Ombudsman 2009). The affected community expected compensation mentioned here to be paid to them in full, prior to their resettlement, but they were only given partial payment for relocation by the time they arrived at Ha Matala. Compensation for the resettled community at Ha Matala was eventually given to them at this new settlement area by LHDA staff (LHDA 1999).

Concerning the capacity–building program, the Ha Matala resettled community expected LHDA to provide them with skills training in areas of business management, handiwork such as bricklaying, electrical wiring work, knitting, sewing and poultry. The main challenge that this community faced was that the desired training was not offered free. LHDA would have to send them to a particular skills training centre or agricultural college and would cost a lot of money, which was unavailable soon after their resettlement. The rural development programme did not benefit resettled households in Ha Matala, as they lived in an urban environment. The tourism programme did not benefit this community as most tourists preferred to visit the dam area in the Mohale region.

An Analysis of Ha Matala Resettled Community Socio-Economic Programmes

i. Infrastructure development programme

According to LHDA (1998), this resettled community enjoyed developed infrastructure which they found in place when they arrived at Ha Matala suburb. Their houses were properly fenced, with running water and electricity connected. They were provided with outside latrines. Several schools were nearby, amongst which every family had a choice to register learners without problems. A

graveyard was close-by, with several private and public clinics in the vicinity as well. This study learnt that the Ha Matala resettlement community had their houses grouped together. As for social services and benefits being made available by the municipality, these people were accommodated.

ii. Housing programme

The Ha Matala resettled households noticed preferential treatment of the Ha Thetsane resettlement, in that it was given better structures and facilities than its counterparts at Ha Tsolo. “Our houses were built with inferior material like the ones used at Ha Tsolo compared to material used at Ha Thetsane” (Int.59). This community asked why their houses were not fitted with geysers (TRC 2001). During the study I realized that the silence of the LHDA over the issue of Ha Thetsane resettles being given better houses than their counterparts in the area caused unhappiness amongst resettled communities. At the same time, Ha Matala resettled families did not know that the Ha Tsolo resettled community managed to influence LHDA to build their own house plans for maximum benefit (LHDA 1996). This realization shows that the Ha Tsolo resettled community became more assertive and business-thinking than their counterparts at Ha Thetsane and Ha Matala. At the level of personal relationships, Ha Matala residents thought that the other two resettlement areas in Maseru were favoured over them. “We had a feeling that our welfare was less important to LHDA as we witnessed Ha Thetsane residents being given better serviced houses than us and Ha Tsolo residents being provided with rental houses” (Int.56). Ha Tsolo residents managed to get share-cropping opportunities in their area, while Ha Matala residents got no opportunity for development at all.

There is a clear paradigm shift in terms of policy implementation theory as some of resettled communities of Ha Matala managed to influence and to engage the LHDA to adjust and change their their stance in implementation, while other affected communities failed to negotiate compensation packages with the LHDA. Furthermore, this community used the legal framework which managed the implementation of the LHWP as determined in the Treaty (1986). The Ombudsman made some recommendations for them to be compensated as stipulated in the Treaty and Compensation Policy (Ombudsman 2009). In this context, we see uneven development taking place among communities that are all affected by the same construction of Mohale Dam. Toye (1987) raises important issues about the dilemmas of development where development theory is scrutinized for its applicability and

relevance in areas of conflicting realities. The phenomenon of uneven development often leads to uprising and social unrest. But, in the case of resettlement compensation policy in the Maseru urban area, disparities were managed better by the representatives (who had the benefit of later relocation and thus experience) and by the LHDA which justified why the Ha Matala resettled community were given bigger compensation properties than the rest of the affected communities of the LHWP.

Further to their successful negotiations over replacement houses, this community evaluated their economic situation and found themselves starving. This desperation over economic betterment caused the Ha Matala resettled community to follow a legal route. They took the LHDA to the Ombudsman over non-payment of their compensation. What these households did not understand was why there was discrimination on the housing programme, as they were all affected by LHWP displacement and were “coming from the same villages/region?” (Int.60). The Ha Thetsane community had their houses fitted with geysers while others who had resettled at Ha Tsolo or Ha Matala did not have geysers in their houses. This study found that LHDA did not want to debate this issue with the resettled Ha Matala community, so no meetings to clarify this issue were honoured by the LHDA. This amounted to a top-down implementation practice where the views of benefitted community members were regarded as secondary to those of the policy formulators and implementers.

iii. Compensation programme

Compensation for affected households was based on the 1997 Compensation Policy. Ha Matala resettled community raised the same questions as those raised by other resettled communities in the area. The majority of resettled people felt that LHDA compensation did not seriously consider their previous economic successes, before resettlement. Resettled households at Ha Matala saw compensation in all its forms as inadequate. One participant stated that, “Compensation was supposed to relieve us from problems of resettlement, moving to unknown environment and living amongst strangers in the name of development, but inadequate compensation which we have received from LHDA has confirmed that we agreed prematurely with LHDA to surrender our environment to the dam” (Int.57). Another participant said “we were given some money for relocation only to help us with travelling and transporting our stuff to this place, and promised to get remaining payments when we are here” (Int.51). Despite the affected communities asking LHDA to

compensate them, their plea fell on deaf ears, as LHDA only responded almost a year later (LHDA 1998).

iv. Capacity-building programme

According to the LHDA Report (2000), the programme of capacity-building brought about hope to many resettled people, as most of them lacked desired skills. LHDA formulated the plan of capacity-building, particularly to empower affected people to acquire skills that could help them to secure employment or create their own employment. Thamae (2006) indicated that the resettled community members of Ha Matala demanded support for capacity-building training from the LHDA. These people had anticipated that the promised empowerment programme would help them to acquire skills, not only for employment opportunities, but also for starting their own businesses (Makoa *et al.*, 1998). This study established that, although some of the LHDA capacity-building programmes in the highlands were organized at the cost of the LHDA, for urban resettlement there was no commitment made by LHDA for capacity-building training in Maseru urban. Whatever training that was organized to empower the resettled community in the area would need other funders to support it, as the resettled community in no circumstances would be able to afford to pay for their own training. Thus, none was forthcoming and this aspect of the programme was a failure.

v. Rural development programme

There was no project related to this programme in the Ha Matala resettlement, since this resettlement was located on the city outskirts. One participant indicated that “we were told by LHDA people that rural development programme was designed to develop rural inhabitants and their environment only” (Int.53). LHDA (1997) acknowledged that the rural development programme would be implemented in the highland areas where affected people still lived.

vi. Business and tourism programme

There was no benefit for resettled households from this programme in the resettled Ha Matala area, as most tourists who came to Lesotho to experience the splendour of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project visited and stayed in hotels near the dams. “Most of them came to Lesotho with organized transport such as buses or private vehicles allowing them to tour the area as a group” indicated one participant (Int.51). TRC (2005) confirmed that the resettled community of Ha Matala did not have

the benefits enjoyed by their counterparts that had chosen to relocate to highlands areas. However, it seems that even those located near the dams and in the highlands barely benefitted from tourism.

7.3 The nature of the agreement reached with LHDA over resettlement

This section collates the perceptions of all 30 participants who resettled in the Maseru urban area. Questions were asked of them about their experiences of the LHDA socio-economic programmes, in particular the resettlement programmes. Their views are analyzed below.

Participants were asked about the content of the agreement they made with LHDA over resettlement in the Maseru Urban Area. One hundred percent (n=30) of the participants indicated that they had an agreement with the LHDA about resettlement in the Maseru Area, but none of them produced any document supporting their claim. One participant answered “LHDA staff promised us good houses here, enough money to meet our basic needs and to start some businesses as we would be compensation for our assets, food aid during harvest time and fodder for those who have the livestock. Above all, we were promised that we would get training to start businesses or to get skills that could help us get jobs easily” (Int.57).

Participants were asked if, in the absence of any documentation supporting their agreement claim about resettlement, they still remembered what it was that they agreed upon with the LHDA. Their responses are shown in Figure 35.

Figure 35: Percentages of agreement level reached with LHDA over resettlement programme in Maseru Urban.




Figure 35 shows that 70% (n=7) of participants agreed that there was an agreement reached with LHDA about their resettlement to Ha Thetsane, Ha Tsolo and Ha Matala suburbs, with related compensation. Ten percent (n=1) disagreed, saying that he did not know about the meeting where an agreement for compensation was detailed. “I heard about LHWP meetings when I came from the

mines in South Africa, but I did not see any written commitment from LHDA about details of compensation for us” (Int. 52). Twenty percent (n=2) of participants did not know about the meetings which took place in the Molika-liko valley, as by that time they were studying, away from home.

7.4. Perceptions about Replacement Houses

Historically, participants came from a rural environment, where each household had enough land to plough and suitable types of housing to keep them warm throughout the year. Figure 36 shows a typical hut which people in the highlands used for cooking and relaxing, as it was warm throughout the year, and appropriate to their environment. But LHDA implemented different structures, as seen in Figure 34 and 37.



Figure 36: Source-[www/amphibackpackers/images/Lesotho](http://www.amphibackpackers/images/Lesotho) 2011.

The reason was that LHDA was bound to follow the urban housing policy and meet the requirements set by the municipality. This meant different housing plans to fit the urban environment and flushing toilets or improved hygienic latrines to control diseases and to better utilize land by accommodating as many families as possible in the area.



Figure37: Example of replacement houses in urban Maseru.

a. Whether or not participants were satisfied with the quality of replacement houses

Participants in all three resettlement areas in Maseru were asked whether or not they were satisfied with replacement houses. Their responses are shown in Table 53.

Table 53: Level of satisfaction about Replacement houses

Maseru Urban	Replacement Houses	Number of Participants	Percentage
Ha Thetsane	Satisfied	3	30
	Dissatisfied	7	70
	No Comment	0	0
Ha Tsolo	Satisfied	4	40
	Dissatisfied	6	60
	No Comment	0	0
Ha Matala	Satisfied	0	0
	Dissatisfied	8	80
	No Comment	2	20
Total		30	300

Ha Thetsane Resettlement

Participants were asked their opinion about replacement houses. Starting with Ha Thetsane, 30% (n=3) of participants were satisfied with replacement houses, one participant stating that “at least the project has brought us near the City. This move has helped us as now two of my daughters are employed at the factories down there” (Int.34). The LHDA (2002) has acknowledged that some of the resettled people have been employed at local factories in Maseru and Maputsoe. An old lady had mixed feelings:

“I did not have any animals, but my brother provided milk and some meat for us whenever possible. He also shared harvest with us as we assisted by uprooting some weeds to improve harvest with his family. Being alone and without the family support now is too much to bear. My son has gone to look for a job in Maseru so that at least we can have a way of surviving. But as for this *morero* [referring to LHDA], we are still waiting for our money. The only thing I like here is this house” (Int. 38).

The proximity to urban environment provides families with potential job opportunities, but this is not as a consequence of successful implementation of the agreements reached with the

implementers. Rather this is as a simple consequence of choice of location by the affected communities.

Seventy percent (n=7) of participants were dissatisfied with the structure and quality of the houses and the poor soil texture: “where the houses are built, it is rocky and we cannot make a garden,” insisted one young man about 20 years old. Not far from that house, another participant, who was an old widow (about 67 years old), showed us the ceiling of her house which was leaking, the walls had cracks and the geyser was not working. She said to us: “These cracks, leaks and geyser need repairs, but I do not have money” (Int. 33). There was no participant who seemed satisfied with the replacement houses at Ha Thetsane.

Ha Tsolo Resettlement

Participants from Ha Tsolo suburb were also asked whether or not they were satisfied with the resettlement houses. Forty percent (n=4) of participants here were satisfied with houses, indicating that they have already started their own businesses of selling food in town, as LHDA had delayed the payment of compensation. “We pay M5 to City Council for a stand to cook food from and when we come home we bring at least M100 which helps to look after the family and save some for school fees” (Int. 40). TRC (2005) showed how women had to start their own small businesses to escape economic hardship and prostitution. Sixty (n=6) of the participants expressed dissatisfaction over the houses given to them. They stated that they did not approve the house plans that LHDA had implemented.

Ha Matala Resettlement

Participants of Ha Matala overwhelmingly disapproved of the replacement houses that were given to them by LHDA; 80% (n=8) of the participants stressed that some of them had between four and eight houses in their original homes and the idea of building houses with attached rooms (3 to 4) and another small one outside, without enough land for gardening, was bad. Interviewee 42 said “This big house needs electricity every day and the water outside needs money to flow. I am unemployed and my wife is sick, so we really need help from government.” Twenty percent (n=2) of participants here chose not to comment. This suburb is the only one which did not have any resettled participants showing satisfaction about replacement houses.

7.5 Perceptions about Cash Compensation

a. Whether Cash Compensation for Disturbance was Adequate or Not

LHDA gave each affected household an amount of M3 264 for being disturbed by the LHWP in 1997 and another M2 335 for the same disturbance in 1998, making a total of M5 599 disturbance compensation given to each household in two successive years.

Participants were asked their views on the disturbance compensation given to them for being uprooted from their places of origin to settle elsewhere. Their responses are shown in Table 54.

Table 54: Adequacy level for disturbance compensation-Mohale Region

Resettlement Village	Compensation for Disturbance	Number of participants	Percentage (Per village)
Ha Thetsane	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	8	80
	No comment	2	20
Ha Tsolo	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	9	90
	No comment	1	10
Ha Matala	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	10	100
	No comment	0	0
Total		30	

Eighty percent (n=8) of Ha Thetsane participants showed that disturbance compensation was inadequate, one suggesting that “at least LHDA should have given each household M50 000 per annum not what they gave us last year” (Int.29). Twenty percent (n=2) of participants in the same village chose not to comment about disturbance compensation. At Ha Tsolo resettlement 90% (n=9) indicated that compensation for disturbance was inadequate. One of them said “What these people are doing to us is not good. They forced us out of our places to mock us here. They promised things which now they cannot fulfil. We want to go back home” (Int.33). Still another participant said “We did not volunteer to come here. LHDA forced us here without an option, so we expect them to look after us” (Int.29). One participant in this suburb did not comment about disturbance compensation, but what we saw in the eyes of the old lady were tears.

In Ha Matala, all participants felt that compensation was inadequate. One of them said “First they gave me M6 526 in 1998 and later on gave me M4 669 in 1999. That is all the money I received from the Project. No one can survive on such little money with the family of five for the whole year. I am very disturbed as I speak to you right now” (Int. 68). One participant, who claimed to be the chairperson of the resettled community in Ha Matala, showed how the Transformation Resource Centre¹⁹ helped them by challenging the LHDA for failing to pay disturbance compensation to families, despite their being resettled and relocated for almost 10 years. “Resettled and relocated communities demand to know why their disturbance payments were not been given to them before leaving their villages” (TRC 2002:5). The outcome of the challenge by the TRC was encouragement and legal support which enabled the affected communities to successfully lodge their dissatisfaction with the Ombudsman over the delaying of their compensation payments by the LHDA. This application was successful (Ombudsman 2009).

b. Whether Cash Compensation for Arable Land was Adequate or Not

Participants were asked if the cash compensation they received was adequate. In the Katse Dam Region cash compensation was given for immovable properties such as arable land, kraals/stables, outbuildings, garden land, forests and for disturbance. Here participants were asked whether or not cash compensation for arable land was adequate. Table 55 shows how they responded.

Table 55: Views on cash compensation for arable land

Resettlement Village	Compensation for Arable Land	Number of participants	Percentage (Per village)
Ha Thetsane	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	8	80
	No comment	2	20
Ha Tsolo	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	9	90
	No comment	1	10
Ha Matala	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	10	100
	No comment	0	0
Total		30	

¹⁹ The Transformation Resource Centre is an independent non-governmental organization advocating for good governance, maintenance of law and social order, respect for human rights and fostering socio-economic and political development in Lesotho.

Eighty percent (n=8) of participants who resettled at Ha Thetsane told us that compensation for arable land was inadequate. Mosala, who was working in South African mines during resettlement operations, said: “I came home knowing that very soon we would move to Maseru. But I did not know that LHDA would give my parents so little money [M4 916 for 7 556sq m]. How do you give such amount of land for so little money?” (Int.36). Many participants shared the same sentiments with Mosala, as they expressed their discontent about cash compensation for arable land. Thamae (2004) pointed out that land is very important to the Basotho nation, as it gives meaning to their survival. When approaching participants further, 20% (n=2) refrained from commenting on compensation about arable land. The LHDA (2003) claimed that compensation given to resettled communities of Ha Thetsane was adequate.

At Ha Tsolo, 90% (n=9) of participants believed that cash compensation for arable land was inadequate. At this stage we were taken to three houses nearby, where we saw for ourselves three disabled children who were between eight and 10 years old. These children (as we enquired) had not set foot in school because their parents did not know of an inexpensive school where they could take them. Private schools for disabled learners were too costly for the affected families. Confronted by this situation the parents of these children were advised to approach a local Roman Catholic priest for possible help from their schools for disabled children in the district. One person showed no interest in commenting on the matter. Hildyard (2002) indicated that resettled households had numerous complaints and objections about cash compensation.

In Ha Matala, participants were asked if cash compensation given to them by LHDA for arable land was adequate. All participants indicated that LHDA had not given resettled households adequate cash compensation “to survive even for a year,” commented one old man (Int. 53) at his home.

c. Whether Cash Compensation for Kraals/Stables was Adequate or Not

Participants were asked their opinions about compensation they received for kraals/stables and whether they felt compensation for kraals/stables was adequate or not. Their responses are given in Table 56.

Table 56: Views about compensation for kraals / stables

Resettlement Village	Compensation for Kraals/Stables	Number of participants	Percentage (per village)
Ha Thetsane	Adequate	2	20
	Inadequate	6	60
	No comment	2	20
Ha Tsolo	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	7	70
	No comment	3	30
Ha Matala	Adequate	3	30
	Inadequate	6	60
	No comment	1	10
Total		30	

Ha Thetsane households responded in this way: 20% (n=2) of participants felt that compensation for kraals/stables was adequate, confirming the LHDA Compensation Report of 1999. Sixty percent (n=6) felt that compensation was inadequate. One participant commented “It is true that we left our kraals behind and we do not need them here anymore, as some of us sold our cattle, sheep and horses before coming down here, but to give me less than M10 000 for three kraals that carried 18 cattle, 34 sheep and three horses is unfair” (Int.30). The remaining 20% (n=2) could not comment as it was understood they had no kraals at home.

At Ha Tsolo, when participants were asked whether or not cash compensation for kraals and stables was adequate, 70% (n=7) felt it was inadequate. One family that had resettled in this suburb had about 18 cattle that the author saw and some sheep. The chief of this village had allocated him a portion of land where he lived with his family and the shepherds. He was worried about stock theft and told us that if the LHDA had given him enough money for kraals he would build new kraals at the new venue. Thirty percent (n=3) of participants were unable to comment, as they had no livestock or kraals.

In Ha Matala, 30% (n=3) of the participants believed that compensation for their kraals and stables was adequate. Most people who were regarded as poor by rural community standards or those who did not have livestock or fields of their own found LHDA’s compensation adequate. But, 60% (n=6) indicated that compensation given to them towards kraals and stables was very little, “as we look at

the importance of having kraals and stables in the community. They help keeping thieves away from the livestock, and to protect sheep (especially lambs) from foxes” (Int. 56). One person had no comments about compensation for kraals/stables.

d. Whether Cash Compensation for Outbuildings was Adequate or Not

Participants were asked their views about compensation for outbuildings. Table 57 shows how they responded.

Table 57: Adequacy level for cash compensation for outbuildings

Resettlement Village	Compensation for Outbuildings	Number of participants	Percentage (per village)
Ha Thetsane	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	10	100
	No comment	0	0
Ha Tsolo	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	8	80
	No comment	2	20
Ha Matala	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	10	100
	No comment	0	0
Total		30	

Ha Thetsane participants were asked if the compensation for outbuildings was adequate. All participants answered that compensation which LHDA gave towards outbuildings was inadequate. One old man complained: “we needed our outbuildings to be replaced here as well, but LHDA people did not agree. The money they gave to those who had outbuildings is very little to replace those buildings even if they had space” (Int. 31).

At Ha Tsolo, 80% (n=8) of participants believed that the cash compensation for outbuildings was inadequate. The TRC (2005) has advocated for adequate compensation for communities affected by the construction of the dams in Lesotho. These communities include Ha Tsolo resettled families. 20% (n=2) of participants in this village did not comment on the question.

In Ha Matala, participants were asked about their perceptions of whether the compensation for outbuildings was adequate. All participants living in this suburb agreed with each other that

compensation given by the LHDA for outbuildings was inadequate. One participant emphasized that the TRC (2008) questioned the development nature of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, after which affected communities became impoverished by government efforts, rather than improving their economic conditions. Another participant referred to the LHDA Report (2003) on achievements of the LHWP and, in particular, the impoundment of the Mohale Dam, which started in September 2002, without making reference to economic problems faced by resettled families.

e. Whether Cash Compensation for Trees/Forests was Adequate or Not

Participants were asked for their perceptions about compensation for trees and forests. Their views are shown in Table 58.

Table 58: Adequacy level for cash compensation for trees/forests

Resettlement Village	Compensation for Trees/Forests	Number of participants	Percentage (per village)
Ha Thetsane	Adequate	2	20
	Inadequate	6	60
	No comment	2	20
Ha Tsolo	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	8	80
	No comment	2	20
Ha Matala	Adequate	2	20
	Inadequate	7	70
	No comment	1	10
Total		30	

Participants at Ha Thetsane were asked their opinion about cash compensation for trees and forests. Twenty percent (n=2) felt that compensation for trees and forests was adequate; 60% (n=6) of participants felt that compensation was inadequate, “since here they are not supplying us with free electricity or firewood” (Int. 35). In the same suburb, 20% (n=2) of participants did not comment on the matter at all.

Participants of Ha Tsolo were asked whether or not cash compensation for trees/forests was adequate. Eighty percent (n=8) indicated that compensation was inadequate. One woman commented, “As we live near the fields and Mohokare River we always look for any form of wood for cooking, even to get to the river to collect firewood. We do not have electricity here as it is very

expensive to connect” (Int.49). Another participant indicated that at home they had plenty of trees which they used for roofing houses, “but here everything needs money” (Int.50). In the same village, 20% (n=2) of the participants did not comment.

When participants in Ha Matala were asked whether compensation for trees/forests was adequate, 20% (n=2) said that compensation they got for trees/forests was adequate. The LHDA (2002) showed how Village Development Committees co-ordinated the resettlement of families to their areas of choice and ensured proper compensation for them. This community was well organized, more than others as their village development committee was actively engaging government structures, the LHDA, TCTA, LHWC and the World Bank about policy issues that needed to be clarified about their compensation. Interaction with different structures and stakeholders enabled community to become a model for policy interrogation resulting in an efficient and effective policy implementation strategy (c.f. Hitchcock 2010). Hence, 70% (n=7) of participants in the same village felt that compensation was inadequate, while one participant did not comment.

f. Whether Grain & Pulses Compensation for Resettled Households was Satisfactory or Not

Participants were asked their perceptions about cash compensation for grain & pulses. Table 59 shows how they responded.

Table 59: Satisfaction level of grain & pulses compensation

Resettlement Village	Compensation for Grain & Pulses	Number of participants	Percentage (per village)
Ha Thetsane	Adequate	3	30
	Inadequate	5	50
	No comment	2	20
Ha Tsolo	Adequate	2	20
	Inadequate	7	70
	No comment	1	10
Ha Matala	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	8	80
	No comment	2	20
Total		30	

Ha Thetsane participants were asked if they were satisfied with compensation for grain and pulses. Thirty percent (n=3) of them expressed satisfaction over grain and pulses that came late in the year.

They indicated that food under their circumstances had to be appreciated. “Attitudes cannot help our situation as what we need at the moment is to raise our children and pay for their school fees. These four bags of grain and 12 pockets of pulses per year still help as we spend the little money they gave us on other things as well without much pressure on food” (Int. 35). Fifty percent (n=5) of participants here saw the compensation of grain and pulses as inadequate and they were not satisfied. “At home we harvested not less than fifteen bags of maize every year. We also harvested wheat and potatoes, and our cattle produced enough milk and meat whenever necessary. Our current situation here is undesirable” (Int.35). Twenty percent (n=2) of the participants did not comment.

In Ha Tsolo 20% (n=2) of participants believed that compensation for grain and pulses was satisfactory. One participant indicated that her two fields of maize only produced five bags of harvest a year before her departure, “but the Project has given us eight bags which are better” (Int.37). But 70% (n=7) of participants at Ha Tsolo denied that compensation for grain and pulses was satisfactory. They showed compensation given to resettled households was very low and unsatisfactory (Thamae: 1999). One person amongst those interviewed did not comment on this matter. In Ha Matala 80% (n=8) of participants in this suburb indicated that cash compensation for grain and pulses was inadequate. Mashinini (2010) alludes to the discontent of communities affected by the Lesotho Highlands Water Project over grain and pulses compensation. Here 20% (n=2) did not comment about compensation for grain and pulses.

g .Whether or not Compensation Fulfilled the Promises Made to Resettled Households in this Area

Participants were asked whether compensation had fulfilled the promises made to them by the LHDA about resettlement in Maseru Urban. Their responses are shown in Table 60.

Table 60: Fulfilment of promises about resettlement

Resettlement Village	Promises on Resettlement	Number of participants	Percentage (per village)
Ha Thetsane	Fulfilled	3	30
	Unfulfilled	7	70
	No comment	0	0
Ha Tsolo	Fulfilled	2	20
	Unfulfilled	8	80
	No comment	0	0
Ha Matala	Fulfilled	0	0
	Unfulfilled	10	100
	No comment	0	0
Total		30	

At Ha Thetsane, 30% (n=3) indicated that the promises made by LHDA about resettlement were fulfilled. “Yes, promises are fulfilled. You see, I am now staying in this house with my children, which is mine. LHDA had built us a house, an outside latrine, connected water for us and have fenced the yard as well” (Int.31). there is a higher percentage of respondents here who were satisfied. This can be explained because most of them were given better houses by the LHDA for being affected by the Maseru By-Pass road construction. The majority of recipients here were already living in the Maseru City. Hence, better developed properties were given to them (c.f. LHDA 2001). LHDA (2001) acknowledged that resettled households from the Mohale Dam region had been provided with houses in the three suburbs or outskirts of Maseru: Ha Thetsane, Ha Tsolo and Ha Matala. However, 70% (n=7) of participants were not impressed with the fulfillment of the promises by the LHDA, some claiming that the promises were not fulfilled. “They failed to fulfil what they promised us; good life, good wealth, and successful businesses. Where are they now?” asked Interviewee 39.

In Ha Tsolo, 20% (n=2) of participants felt that the LHDA had fulfilled their promises to them whereas 80% (n=8) of participants from the same suburb felt that whatever promises were made by LHDA were not fulfilled. One participant criticized LHDA for taking too long to give them money, taking too long to give them fodder for their livestock, building small houses without proper gardens, “and still not paying for disturbance until now” (Int.40).

All participants (n=10) from Ha Matala resettlement agreed that the LHDA had not kept their promises to them. They claimed that the majority of resettled families lived below the poverty line, as LHDA's resettlement programme had impoverished them. One participant said 'we would not be in this pathetic situation if this project had not deceived us' (Int.51). Most participants in this suburb indicated that it was only the families whose members were able to secure jobs in Maseru, or those whose family members work elsewhere, were able to live better, as the LHDA income was too little for sustainable livelihoods. Resettled communities did not anticipate late payment of their compensation money as some of them were wholly depended on compensation. Municipal rates, water sewage and waste removal services needed some monthly payments to avoid additional charges or power / water disconnection. Delayed compensation of inadequate rates of compensation had frustrated many household heads, which inflicted depression, family separations, sicknesses and criminal activities taking place within the community (ISAS 1999). Delayed implementation of compensation contributed to family disunity, prostitution and other community ills (Sibolla 1995). The respondents felt that the "structural" provisions (e.g. the houses) were okay to some extent, but there was deep unhappiness about the implementation (e.g. too long for payment)

One participant here commented on the research done by Thabane (2000), which indicated that resettlement and relocation of people from the Mohale Dam region disturbed their livelihoods and farming practices upon which they had depended for generations. The present author was, shown The Ombudsman's Report (2003), in which this particular resettled community complained against the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority for failing to pay their compensation, as stipulated in the Treaty (1986). The Ombudsman made the following recommendation: "That LHDA complies with Regulation 5 (2) of the Compensation Regulation 1990 which requires LHDA to ensure that a replacement residential land includes a cultivable area of similar extent to that of a garden so acquired. This should be effected within four (4) months on the receipt of this report" Ombudsman (2003:136). Compensation Regulation 5 expected adequate cash and land compensation to be given to disturbed and affected individuals, families, communities and organized structures.

To conclude this section, although the South African government had made compensation money available through its Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority and monitored by the Lesotho Highlands Water Commission, nonetheless the affected households did not get adequate cash compensation for

their assets as decided by the LHWC. The LHWC nonetheless decided on the low compensation rates for arable fields and other losses. This state of affairs raises a question about the role of the South African government in good governance and in assuring that displaced communities get adequate compensation. In next section, I will investigate the relocation programme in the Nazareth area, at Ha Ntsi, Ha Phaloane and Ha Sekete villages.

7.6 Relocation Programme in the Nazareth Area

Nazareth is situated in the foothills of the Machache Mountain Range, near Roma, in the Maseru District, under the Principal Chief of Thaba Bosiu Khoabane Theko. This area has a population of about 20 000 people, with an estimated 5 200 households. The area has good soil texture, fertile land and is known for its good pastures. The LHDA (1998) relocated more than 250 households in this region alone, from different villages of Ha Mohale and Molika-liko. Many households with livestock chose to relocate to Ha Theko, “because the chief of the area had promised that some of the Molika-liko residents might find some crop land,” explained Thabane (2000:651). The LHDA (1996) stated that 746 households, with 321 villages and about 2 500 people, were relocated from the Mohale dam region.

7.6.1 Background Information

Relocated households were researched in the villages of Ha Ntsi, Ha Phaloane and Ha Sekete (LHDA 1995). Thabane (2000: 651) clarifies relocation motives to this area. “The majority of residents chose to move to the foothills which fell under the jurisdiction of their present Principal Chief Khoabane Theko.” The focus here will be limited to 13 households that are relocated to Ha Ntsi, Ha Sekete and Ha Phaloane in the Nazareth area (see Table 61). Thamae & Pottinger (1998) confirm the relocation of more than 100 households in this area.

Table 61: Participants in the Maseru Urban

<i>Ha Theko Foothills</i>	Number of Participants	Age Group	Educational level	Gender		Number of Resettled Households
				Males	Females	
<i>Ha Ntsi</i>	8	35-60	Std 3- Grade 10	5	3	26
<i>Ha Phaloane</i>	3	45-70	Std 3- Grade 10	1	2	9
<i>Ha Sekete</i>	2	38-72	Std 3- Grade 10	0	2	6

Total	13		6	7	41
--------------	-----------	--	----------	----------	-----------

Relocated families were visited in their three villages and asked about their relocation experiences. The education levels of researched communities ranged from Standard 3 to Grade 10. Most women between 35 and 60 years old had a higher education standard than men. The majority of men were aged between 48 and 62 years old and had reached Standard 3. Eight participants (three men and five women) were interviewed at Ha Ntsi, three participants (one man and two women) were interviewed at Ha Phaloane and the last two participants (both women) were interviewed at Ha Sekete. The period for field work was during the month of December, when families were together and those working in other areas, including South Africa, were on holiday at home with their family members. In December, Lesotho was covered with water and these places were battered by floods as well. All participants came from the Mohale region of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project Phase 1B, as acknowledged by the LHDA (1997).

a. Ha Ntsi Relocation

Ha Ntsi relocation is within five kilometres of the Nazareth area in the Machache foothills and about 25 kilometres from Maseru. It is here where eight participants were interviewed about LHDA's socio-economic programmes, which included their relocation to this new place. Affected households had some expectations of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (see Table 62), as well as showing what they actually received from LHDA for relocating to the Nazareth area in the Maseru District.

Table 62: LHDA's Socio-Economic Programmes Implemented for Relocated Households from Mohale Dam Region at Ha Ntsi in the Maseru District.

	<i>Infrastructure Development Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Relocated households wanted accessible roads, clinics and hospitals at the new settlement area. -They also wanted gardens with a water supply and electricity. -Enough schools for their children to continue with education.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-Community relocated along the main road to the highland district of Thaba-Tseka, towards Mohale Dam. -Water supply and electrification services were in progress in December 2011 -Learners were accommodated at different local schools.
	<i>Housing Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Relocated households expected replacement houses of higher quality than what they had built themselves.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-Modern houses of bricks, cemented mortar and metal roofing were built by LHDA. -In cases of households that had two or more huts, LHDA built a single house with rooms equal to those huts.

	<i>Compensation Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Households expected adequate cash compensation for the assets they had before relocation. -Households had expected assets and displacement compensation to be paid to them in cash before their relocation. -Households expected grain & pulses compensation for food and fodder compensation for their livestock.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-LHDA decided to give cash compensation to qualifying household heads for a 15- year period, only, as follows; M1 per sq m for forest, M65 for 1non- fruit tree, M130 for 1 fruit tree, M10 per 10sq m for reeds, M11 per 17sq m arable land and M39 per 6sq m garden land. -LHDA paid cash compensation mainly after resettlement, in this way: M809 per 3 854sq m for compound, M677 per 3sq m for outbuilding, M343 per 11 perimeter area for kraals/stables. -70kg bag of grain (maize) for 1 056sq m arable land and 3kg packet of pulses for 300sq m were given to affected households. -Bales of fodder were given to farmers for livestock, depending on the number of animals owned. -First payment of M3 264 for disturbance was made in 1997 to each household, and the second payment of M2 335 for disturbance was made in 1998.
	<i>Capacity-Building Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Households expected to be afforded skills and entrepreneurial training by LHDA so that they could get jobs or start their own businesses in the area.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	- Skills and entrepreneurial courses were offered at Rural Development Training Centres provided in the region.
	<i>Rural Development Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Households expected improved livestock, advanced agricultural methods and other benefits associated with rural development programme in their new area of settlement.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-LHDA (1997) confirms the implementation of rural development programme designed for the betterment of rural communities affected by the construction of dams.
	<i>Business and Tourism Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	Relocated people expected to benefit from tourism programme in their new area by selling different handiwork products to tourists on their way to Mohale dam areas. "We have a small town in this area along the main road where we sell our handiwork products to tourists on their way to Mohale Dam and on their return" (Int. 62).
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-Tourism programme benefitted some of the relocated people who showed interest in the business. LHDA (1997) confirmed that tourism was mainly planned for Katse and Mohale dam areas, where specific touring plans and accommodation facilities were put in place.

Source: LHDA 1997.

Relocated households of Ha Ntsi expected better infrastructure in the form of roads, clinics, hospitals and schools in their new settlement area. These were provided by LHDA and other relevant government departments (including the acceptance of learners in privately owned schools). The LHDA (1998) suggests that more than 100 people lived in this new settlement. The housing programme, in terms of the type of houses was of a higher standard compared to the kind of houses, in which they lived in the Mohale region. Houses were built with better construction material (bricks, cement, ceiling, and metal roofing and window frames) that could last longer, before any repairs were needed. Each household was given a house with two or three rooms, depending on how many houses/huts were left behind. Outside latrines were built for each household. Successful

construction of educational facilities and integration of schooling systems became one of the long-term socio-economic achievements brought about by the LHWP.

On compensation, relocated households had expected to be fully compensated for their assets before they arrived at Ha Ntsi, but they were partially compensated by cash prior to arriving at the new site to relocate their belongings (LHDA 1999). Grain and pulses as food compensation were given to relocated households once a year. Fodder compensation was given for livestock. They received other forms of cash compensation when they were already relocated at Ha Ntsi. Regarding capacity-building programmes, relocated people were prepared to undertake skills training opportunities offered by the LHDA in different training centres in order for them to acquire other skills needed for survival. The LHDA facilitated training opportunities for affected people in handiwork, weaving, sewing, knitting, bricklaying, carpentry and house electrification. Concerning the rural development programme, relocated households saw an opportunity for learning more about advanced agriculture, as they had lost their arable land and were planning to consider share-cropping with the host community. Environmental care and animal husbandry would be useful for relocated households, so that they could develop skills for efficient and effective range management which in return would improve their livelihoods and sustainability. Regarding the business and tourism programme, this community produced few handiwork products that were marketed to tourists and the public at large, to generate income. These initiatives assisted community members who participated in skills training to acquire the desired skills for employment.

An Analysis of Ha Ntsi Relocated Community Socio-Economic Programmes

Eight out of 20 relocated household heads were interviewed at Ha Ntsi. Participants were asked if they remembered when first they met with LHDA staff to talk about the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. Their perceptions are shown in Table 63.

Table 63: Participants' meetings with LHDA about LHWP

Ha Theko Area	Whether meetings happened or not	Number of Participants	Percentage
Ha Ntsi	Yes	5	63
	No	2	25
	Do not know	1	12
Total		8	100

Sixty-three percent (n=5) of participants agreed that they had held meetings with the LHDA about the LHWP. One participant confirmed that “The meetings were about seven in all, where LHDA people explained that we were going to be affected by construction of Mohale dam and the roads. Therefore the government had decided to relocate us away from the dam area,” (Int. 60). A quarter (n=2) denied having had any meetings with the LHDA about the LHWP. One participant did not know about meetings held with the LHDA to discuss the LHWP. More analyses continue below, starting with the infrastructural development programme.

i. Infrastructural development programme

The provision of infrastructural development in the form of supplying water and electricity to this residential area was in progress during the author’s field work. I believe it is now completed. A clinic was located within 3 kilometres. The nearest hospital was at Roma within 20 kilometres. One participant confirmed that “we attend clinic at Ha Ntsi where we get medicines free or at affordable rates. There is also St. Joseph’s Hospital at Roma for serious accidents or illness” (Int.65). Improved medical care became a substantial improvement, as far as policy implementation in the area was concerned. This infrastructure helped the community to settle easily in the area, despite the housing challenges observed during this study.

ii. Housing programme

Relocation houses at Ha Ntsi are built mainly on a plain area, surrounded by fields. This study realized during the interviews that most houses built for relocation were actually built in a swamp. One participant showed us water running through the house and the walls had cracked, “This is the kind of life which the LHDA has brought us to, we have reported to them about this swamp problem but they have still not showed up in three days” (Int.66). More than 10 houses in this area were affected by the same problem, as this study took place in December, during the rainy season. This situation shows the poor planning and insufficient investigation about the suitability of building residential houses in the area. It does not seem that there was any form of assessment of this land prior to their relocation.

iii. Compensation programme

Compensation of grain and pulses was given to supplement cash, which was needed for almost everything related to relocation. However, many relocated households complained that the money given to them was very meager, compared with the new economic challenges associated with relocation. “Travelling needs money, food needs money, medication needs money (at private clinics and hospitals), house maintenance needs money and children need more money for school fees,” commented one participant (Int.68). Another participant felt that cash compensation would be adequate if each household could be given at least a minimum of M50 000 per annum.

iv. Capacity-building programme

Skills development was desirable to all relocated people. One participant said, “We were excited as we heard LHDA talking about our empowerment, so that after training some are able to get jobs and others could start their own businesses” (Int.63). Skills development in agricultural projects was also provided by a local co-operative body, which guided farmers on improved agriculture (LHDA 1998). Another participant said, “I have started a poultry project here so that I can generate income and expand my business” (Int.69). The present study found that two hotels were located within five kilometres distance. These hotels could boost the marketing of local products to tourists and businesses. Indeed many promises were implemented and the implementing body, through so doing, made a substantial impact.

v. Rural development programme

Relocated households had a potential for development. The LHDA (2000) confirmed that more than 30 women were identified for handiwork, and piggery and poultry business training in this region, so that food security and healthy nutrition, especially amongst children and vulnerable people, were not compromised. Most farmers were interested to learn about animal husbandry, fishery development, advanced agricultural systems and environmental care projects. However, the LHDA failed to implement the project.

vi. Business and tourism

Tourism in this area was one of the best business opportunities, as there are two hotels along the busy main road to Mohale dam. The shops along the road sell a variety of products which can appeal to tourists if well marketed. However, most people interested in handiwork did not have enough capital to start and strengthen their handiwork business. “If we could get good market place for our products and a little bit of cash for transport, our business would improve,” said one participant (Int. 67). The capacity building training would be more sustainable if those trained were then assisted with start-up capital (and possibly mentorship) through the early stages of their business creation. This would help to improve the long-term chances of a successful business.

b. Ha Phaloane Relocation

Ha Phaloane is located about three kilometres north of Ha Ntsi relocation, within the area of Nazareth. Here three people (one man and two women) were interviewed regarding their experiences of LHDA’s socio-economic programmes. Their views are given in Table 64.

Table 64: LHDA’s Socio-Economic Programmes Implemented for Relocated Households from Mohale Dam Region at Ha Phaloane in the Maseru District.

	<i>Infrastructure Development Programme</i>
<i>Households’ Expectations</i>	-Relocated households wanted accessible roads, clinics and hospitals at the new settlement area. -They also wanted gardens with water supply and electricity. -Enough schools for their children to continue with education.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-Community relocated near the main road to the highland district of Thaba-Tseka, towards Mohale Dam. -Water supply and electrification services were in progress in December 2010 (during this study). -Learners were accommodated at different local schools.
	<i>Housing Programme</i>
<i>Households’ Expectations</i>	-Relocated households wanted more suitable houses than those they had in the Mohale basin.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-Modern houses of bricks, cemented mortar and metal roofing were built by LHDA. -In cases of households that had two or more huts, LHDA built a single house with rooms equal to those huts.
	<i>Compensation Programme</i>
<i>Households’ Expectations</i>	-Households expected cash compensation for the assets to sustain them. -Households had expected assets and displacement compensation to be paid to them in cash, before their relocation. -Households expected grain & pulses for food and fodder compensation for their livestock.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-LHDA decided to give cash compensation to qualifying household heads for a 15- year period only, as follows: M1 per sq m for forest, M65 for 1 non- fruit tree, M130 for 1 fruit tree, M10 per 10sq m for reeds, M11 per 17sq m arable land and M39 per 6sq m garden land. -LHDA paid cash compensation, mainly after resettlement, in this way: M809 per 3 854sq m for compound, M677 per 3sq m for outbuilding, M343 per 11 perimeter area for kraals/stables.

	-70kg bag of grain (maize) for 1 056sq m arable land and 3kg packet of pulses for 300sq m were given to affected households. -Bales of fodder were given to farmers for livestock, depending on the number of animals owned. -First payment of M3 264 for disturbance was made in 1997 to each household, and the second payment of M2 335 for disturbance was made in 1998.
	<i>Capacity-Building Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Households wanted their children to be afforded skills and entrepreneurial training by LHDA, so that they could get jobs or start their own businesses in the area.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	- Skills and entrepreneurial courses were offered at Rural Development Training Centres provided in the region.
	<i>Rural Development Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Households expected improved livestock, advanced agricultural methods and other benefits associated with the rural development programme in their new area of settlement.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-LHDA (1997) confirms the implementation of the rural development programme designed for the betterment of rural communities affected by the construction of the dams.
	<i>Business and Tourism Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	Relocated people expected to benefit from a tourism programme in their new area by selling different handiwork products to tourists on their way to Mohale Dam areas. One participant said, "But we stay by the road and we do not have stores to keep our stock on a daily basis, which makes it difficult for our business to succeed" (Int.70).
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-Tourism programme benefitted only one person from this community as s/he sold handiwork products at the local hotel. "Sometimes I sell my crafts and make about M200 per weekend" (Int.72).

Source: LHDA 1999

Infrastructure development was still in progress during the fieldwork for this study (but it has now been completed), as the Department of Roads was busy upgrading connection roads which passed near this village. The ground was dug for water piping and some of the houses had connected solar panels for energy power. The government was in the process of providing electricity to local villages in the area. This appears to be a positive developmental undertaking in this community which will have further long term socio-economic benefits for the community.

Concerning housing development, all the houses visited were built on rocky ground and seemed firm, without any sign of cracks in the walls. These households also had bigger gardens, where vegetables and medicinal herbs were grown. Nobody here complained about the size of the house or their location. The houses here were built in the rural area where there was plenty of land, whereas in the urban areas the land was under the local government with a different regulatory framework. On compensation, nobody among relocated household members had any idea of what adequate compensation is, as they openly accepted what LHDA gave them as compensation. However, all three participants agreed that the term for expiration of compensation, which was just over two years by the time of this study, should be extended, as the government delayed in paying them compensation. Regarding capacity-building, this community did not have anybody attending any

training, as the members of the households present were three ladies and an old man who looked after his livestock in the village. The training which was designed by LHDA for skills development did not appeal to the members of this resettled community as they were old and looking after their grandchildren. A rural development programme would benefit young people in this community, but most of them had gone to school or were working elsewhere. Business and tourism did not benefit any of these families, as they were in a remote area.

An Analysis of Ha Phaloane Relocated Community Socio-Economic Programmes

Three out of eight relocated households in this village were asked if they had had meetings with LHDA to discuss the LHWP. All three participants said, 'yes' and they agreed that in about five meetings they held with LHDA, discussions concerning their relocation took place. "A relocation committee was established to facilitate all the necessary arrangements needed for smooth relocation in consultation with the Chief's office" (Int. 69). The involvement of the chieftaincy in monitoring policy implementation became very useful for this community as their farming, pastoral and housing needs were quickly facilitated and the challenges managed. The chieftaincy in this regard became an organ of real representation against the LHDA failures, rather than the LHDA protecting the interests of the affected. Thus in this case it may be argued that the chieftaincy became a gatekeeper in this process to protect the affected vis-à-vis the state (which is supposed to act on their behalf).

The LHDA (2000) contracted some local and outside firms to survey areas that were earmarked for building replacement houses. One participant was excited about his/her house and said, "I feel happy that my house will also get electricity and water soon" (Int.71).

In terms of infrastructure development, these relocated households were put into a community infrastructure programme that was already in the pipeline. Water supply pipes and electricity supply cables were already being prepared to reach Ha Phaloane village, so that all community members, including relocated households, could benefit (Dept of Water Affairs 2010). The housing programme was affected by heavy rains, which caused some water leaks in the houses in the area. The compensation programme amongst these families was beneficial to them, as food aid helped them and some were able to save the money they got from the LHDA (LHDA 2000). The reason for this stress-free outcome was that most old people were now living in the lowlands. One participant said

“We are near clinics, shops and schools. Travelling is also not as difficult as it was in the mountains” (Int. 70). Capacity-building and rural development programmes would benefit the entire community, should LHDA decide to implement such programmes in the area (TRC 2001). But, these programmes did not materialize. The business and tourism programme was not really appropriate to this area because of its remoteness and very little could be attributed to the LHWP. “We are in a remote area where tourists do not often come” (Int. 72).

c. Ha Sekete Relocation

Participants from this relocated village were asked their views about their experiences of LHDA’s socio-economic programmes. They indicated what their expectations of LHWP were and what they received from LHDA (see Table 65). Ha Sekete is located about three kilometres north of Ha Ntsi relocation, within the area of Nazareth. Here two people (both women) were interviewed regarding their experiences of LHDA’s socio-economic programmes and their views are found in Table 65.

Table 65: LHDA’s Socio-Economic Programmes Implemented for Relocated Households from Mohale Dam Region at Ha Sekete in the Maseru District.

	<i>Infrastructure Development Programme</i>
<i>Households’ Expectations</i>	-Relocated wanted clinics, shops and churches in the new settlement area. -They also wanted gardens with a water supply. - Schools for their children to continue with education.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-Clinics were within reach, same as shops and churches. -Water supply and electrification services were in progress in December 2010 (during this study). -Learners were accommodated at different local schools.
	<i>Housing Programme</i>
<i>Households’ Expectations</i>	-Relocated households wanted comfortable houses with proper protection and safety measures.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-Modern houses of bricks, cemented mortar and metal roofing were built by LHDA. -In cases of households that had two or more huts, LHDA built a single house with rooms equal to those huts.
	<i>Compensation Programme</i>
<i>Households’ Expectations</i>	-Households wanted compensation for the assets to sustain them. -Households had expected assets and displacement compensation to be paid to them in cash before their relocation. -Households expected grain & pulses compensation for food and fodder compensation for their livestock.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-LHDA decided to give cash compensation to qualifying household heads for a 15- year period, only, as follows: M1 per sq m for forest, M65 for 1 non- fruit tree, M130 for 1 fruit tree, M10 per 10sq m for reeds, M11 per 17sq m arable land and M39 per 6sq m garden land. -LHDA paid cash compensation, mainly after resettlement, in this way: M809 per 3 854sq m for compound, M677 per 3sq m for outbuilding, M343 per 11 perimeter area for kraals/stables. -70kg bag of grain (maize) for 1 056sq m arable land and 3kg packet of pulses for 300sq m were given to affected households. -Bales of fodder were given to farmers for livestock, depending on the number of animals owned.

	-First payment of M3 264 for disturbance was made in 1997 to each household, and the second payment of M2 335 for disturbance was made in 1998.
	<i>Capacity-Building Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Households wanted their children to be afforded skills and entrepreneurial training by LHDA, so that they could get jobs or start their own businesses in the area.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	- Skills and entrepreneurial courses were offered at Rural Development Training Centres in Maseru.
	<i>Rural Development Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	-Households expected improved livestock, advanced agricultural methods and other benefits associated with rural development programme in their new area of settlement.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-LHDA (1997) confirms the implementation of rural development programme designed for the betterment of rural communities affected by the construction of the dams.
	<i>Business and Tourism Programme</i>
<i>Households' Expectations</i>	Relocated people expected to benefit from tourism programme in their new area by selling different handwork products to tourists on their way to Mohale dam.
<i>Delivery by LHDA</i>	-Tourism programme did not really materialize here because of the remoteness of the place and very few relocated families in the area.

The infrastructure development of this relocated community was attached to that of the entire community, as the Department of Public Works was already busy bringing services closer to people. Water, sanitation, electricity and improved roads were starting to show indications of implementation during the time of this study. The housing programme was successfully done in this area but the capacity building programme was not attended to, due to the absence of affected people who were interested in the programme. On compensation, just like the other compensated families of Ha Phaloane, this community had no objection to the amount of compensation each household deserved, as they had no information about what would be fair and adequate compensation measures. They accepted what the LHDA presented to them as compensation. This is not in line with internationally acceptable best practices. Communities that are becoming affected by relocation should be informed of their rights and the consequences of their decisions before they commit themselves to any agreement (c.f. WCD 1994). On capacity-building, rural development and tourism development, these two households did not benefit from this scheme. One of the participants said, “we are old and have no time to take those trainings. What we want LHDA to start is a nursery school here for our grandchildren.” (Int.74). In this case, a community-based needs assessment carried out with the communities might have been a good idea before implementation began or as part of the early stages of implementation. This includes community participatory project planning and implementation of policy with the active role of beneficiaries in the process (Devitt & Hitchcock 2010).

An Analysis of Ha Sekete Relocated Community Socio-Economic Programme

In Ha Sekete, the author found six relocated families and interviewed two (both of them were women between 50 and 73 years old) representatives of these families. Participants were asked whether they had meetings with the LHDA to discuss relocation. Both participants agreed that the LHDA held meetings with them to prepare for their move, “although we did not agree to come to this place until we get some money” (Int.71). The situation of these families, needing help for relocation, was addressed by the LHDA (1999) and transport was provided for them. One of the participants complained that the LHDA decided on the plans and sizes of the houses without first asking for their input on the matter.

As you can see, there is water running through the house. This house is built in a swamp. The cracks you see make us afraid of sleeping in this house with the children, fearing that it might collapse whilst asleep. We talked to LHWP people but they have not come. We are being accommodated by our neighbour (Int.72).

Thus, there appears to be little in the way of an evaluation of the project by the LHDA and thus a lack of consideration of the needs into the future of these people. This means that if implementation failed to reach the target people in the manner in which it was prescribed, these families seem to have little recourse.

All participants agreed that they had had a meeting with the LHDA, where final arrangements for their departure were made, in consultation with their Principal Chief’s office (LHDA1998). One of the old ladies said “We were told by LHDA people that we shall be given houses, food, money and be trained in business” (Int.71). Table 66 shows the perceptions of participants asked whether or not an agreement was reached with the LHDA about relocation in three villages.

This group of participants was integrated into a community development plan which the government was already implementing through its social development projects that included roads, electrification, water and sanitation services. Most of the LHDA’s socio-economic programmes planned for affected communities during the construction of Katse and Mohale dams were also put in place at this community level development plan.

7.6 .2 Perceptions about Cash Compensation

The LHDA (1998) has shown that 98 households were relocated to the foothills from the Mohale Dam region, with an estimate of about 2 500 people who qualified for disturbance compensation. The relocated communities of Nazareth area, under the jurisdiction of Chief Theko are included in this number. Participants were asked their perceptions about the relocation programme. Table 66 shows how they responded.

a. *Whether Cash Compensation for Disturbance of Relocated Households was Adequate or Not*
 Table 66: Views on compensation for disturbance of relocated households

Relocation Village	Compensation for Disturbance	Number of participants	Percentage (per village)
Ha Ntsi	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	8	100
	No comment	0	0
Ha Phaloane	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	3	100
	No comment	0	0
Ha Sekete	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	2	100
	No comment	0	0
Total		13	

Starting with Ha Ntsi relocation, 100% (n=8) of the participants responded that cash compensation for disturbance was not adequate; 100% (n=8). One participant said: “The project pushed us out of our homes and environment, so we expect lifelong disturbance compensation from LHDA,” (Int.62). The LHDA (2000) reports that “the total of 297 households has registered their complaints in the order of 186 households in the foothills and 111 households in the highlands,” making disturbance compensation the most unpopular form of compensation amongst relocated households. This raises the question of whether disturbance compensation would ever be considered an adequate compensation for the involuntary re-location of groups of people, and whether it indeed should be seen as such. It further raises the question of who gets to be prioritized, who should be prioritized by the state when there is a larger development or conservation need to be considered. It thus becomes a question of rights - the rights of households who don’t want to be moved against the larger rights of multiple communities in need of water.

All Ha Phaloane, participants responded similarly to their counterparts from Ha Ntsi, that compensation for disturbance was inadequate. One participant referred to Thabane (2000: 645), in affirming that “the welfare of highland inhabitants who were affected by the construction of dams and related infrastructure is covered under Article 7 of the Treaty and in the Military LHDA Order of 1986.” Therefore an explanation was needed for relocated households why they were not given full cash compensation for disturbance before their relocation.

Participants of Ha Sekete relocation were asked their views about compensation for disturbance. The views of participants were that compensation was inadequate. “How can we accept such a low compensation when we have lost so much to make LHWP a come-true story?” (Int.73). Despite the accomplishment of the LHWP, where, under contract LHDA of 2009, “A major achievement for the Mohale Dam was the commencement of impounding which occurred on the 1st of November 2002”(LHDA 2003:13). Ha Sekete relocated people had still not received their disturbance payments by December 2010.

b. Whether Cash Compensation for Arable Land was Adequate or Not

Participants were asked if cash compensation they had received from the LHDA for arable land was adequate. Their responses are shown in Table 67.

Table 67: Views on Cash Compensation

Relocation Village	Compensation for Arable Land	Number of participants	Percentage (per village)
Ha Ntsi	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	8	100
	No comment	0	0
Ha Phaloane	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	3	100
	No comment	0	0
Ha Sekete	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	2	100
	No comment	0	0
Total		13	

All Ha Ntsi participants believed that cash compensation was inadequate. The TRC (2004) refers to a call they received from relocated communities in the country about inadequate cash compensation over their arable land. As result of this call, “In 2001 and 2002 TRC, with Panos, gathered interviews with villagers, in order to gain greater understanding of their experiences in their new locations, several years after resettlement.” TRC (2004: 3). They witnessed the plight of relocated/resettled households, mainly in the urban and lowland areas, who called the Lesotho Highlands Water Project ‘*The Irony of the White Gold*’, in their publication both in Sesotho and English, in 2004. One participant said “we lobbied TRC, the Christian Council of Lesotho, Political Parties and Organization of Non-governmental organizations, as well as interest groups in the country, to show them our plight and gather their support” (Int.62). The consultative forum resulted in the sharing of information about the conditions of affected communities in Lesotho.

From Ha Phaloane, all participants shared the same sentiments as those of Ha Ntsi relocated households, that cash compensation was inadequate. One of the committee members who looked into relocation matters, including suitability and quality of houses, water services, partnerships with host community members, health care and general welfare of relocated people, said: “The problems we have on relocation are mainly caused by LHDA’s inability to compensate affected households as per Article 15 of Compensation Policy stating that affected people should be adequately compensated for their losses timeously, to avoid declining standard of living”(Int.70).

In Ha Sekete, participants expressed disappointment concerning the manner in which cash compensation was administered (TRC 2001). All those interviewed at Ha Sekete felt that compensation for arable land given to them was inadequate. “We need sustaining income, at least M80 000 per house hold per year” (Int. 74). On realizing the challenge about inadequate cash compensation for families already uprooted from the Mohale region, Ramaili & Cloete (2008) sought to assess the role of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project on poverty alleviation: “The factors indicate that although development is vital for a proper functioning of society, it also has a variety of weaknesses and negative implications for its recipients” (p.120). Ha Sekete participants, like those who were relocated at Ha Ntsi and Ha Phaloane, demanded a quick response from LHDA about inadequate cash compensation for arable land (Ombudsman’s Report 2003). Notwithstanding the

previous points made about rights- perhaps had compensation been paid on time there would have been less negative feelings.

c. Whether Cash Compensation for Kraals/Stables was Adequate or Not

Participants were further asked whether cash compensation for kraals/stables was adequate. Their responses are recorded in Table 68.

Table 68: Views on Cash Compensation for Kraals/Stables

Relocation Village	Compensation for Kraals/ Stables	Number of participants	Percentage (per village)
Ha Ntsi	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	6	75
	No comment	2	25
Ha Phaloane	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	1	33
	No comment	2	67
Ha Sekete	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	2	100
	No comment	0	0
Total		13	

Seventy-five percent (n=6) of participants in Ha Ntsi indicated that they believed that compensation for kraals/stables was inadequate, while 25% (n=2) decided not to comment. One of the participants who thought that compensation was inadequate said that, “our fields, gardens, stores and kraals showed who we were, peasants. Our livelihoods were ground on our land. To remove us from our land and fail to honour promises is a total betrayal of these families” (Int. 66).

In Ha Phaloane, one participant also thought that cash compensation for kraals/stables was inadequate. Sixty seven percent (n=2) decided not to comment on the question. The reason why two participants out of three decided not to comment on this question is due to the fact that they had no kraals /stables demolished or left behind. The attitude of participants towards the question whether cash compensation for kraals/stables was adequate or not seemed to be less important than that of compensation for land (Hildyard 2002).

Two participants at Ha Sekete (a different village) responded that cash compensation for kraals/stables was inadequate. They told me that they were widows living with their grandchildren, as their children had to go to Maputsoe (the nearest industrial area in the district) to look for jobs in the factories. Another participant said: “my son is now selling *dagga* in order to get money for us as he could not get a job, but I am worried all the time as he might get arrested” (Int. 71). The LHDA (1995) acknowledged that the growing and selling of *dagga* in the mountain region of Lesotho significantly contributed to the rural economy, as an estimated amount of M400 000 was easily raised through the illegal selling of *dagga* by Basotho in the country and in South Africa, prior to the development of the LHWP (TRDC 1995). Thus, for some families, the consequences of the LHWP are now a life of crime.

d. Whether Cash Compensation for Outbuildings was Adequate or Not

Participants were asked about their views regarding compensation given to them for outbuildings. Their responses are given in Table 69.

Table 69: Adequacy level about compensation for outbuildings

Relocation Village	Compensation for Outbuildings	Number of participants	Percentage (per village)
Ha Ntsi	Adequate	3	37
	Inadequate	5	63
	No comment	0	0
Ha Phaloane	Adequate	1	37
	Inadequate	2	63
	No comment	0	0
Ha Sekete	Adequate	0	0
	Inadequate	2	100
	No comment	0	0
Total		13	

Thirty seven percent of Ha Ntsi participants felt that compensation for outbuildings was adequate. One of the three said “We did not really value outbuildings the way we admired our houses. So the money they gave us is fine as far as I am concerned” (Int.61). Sixty three percent (n=5) of participants said that the cash compensation for outbuildings was inadequate.

Participants at Ha Phaloane village also showed mixed feelings, as one person indicated that compensation was adequate, while 67% (n=2) of participants felt that cash compensation for outbuildings was inadequate (LHDA 1999). The people of this village appeared to be helping relocated households with a number of issues, such as helping them with water and food or counseling them, while some were helping them financially. One of the participants stated that they did not understand why they should suffer, because the government had promised them enough money to survive. Article 17 of the Lesotho Constitution required prompt payment of full compensation for compulsory acquisition.

In Ha Sekete, all participants indicated that compensation was inadequate. One of them explained that she had a chicken pen, from where 10 chickens were sold every month at a price of M40 per chicken, earning her M400 per month. As a result of relocation her chicken business had collapsed. “The project is paying for the structure, but not to compensate for the loss I have gone through. This is unjust,” commented Interviewee 71. The LHDA only considered compensation for this participant for the structure, but not for the contents inside, as the chickens were not covered by compensation. Thus not only did the LHWP resettlement fail to fully establish businesses, those who had businesses prior to the relocation were unable to sustain them.

e. Whether Cash Compensation for Trees/Forests was Adequate or Not

Participants were approached and asked their views about cash compensation which the LHDA had given to relocated households for trees/forests. Responses were given in three different villages that were visited in Table 70.

Table 70: Views on compensation for trees / forests

Relocation Village	Compensation for Trees/ Forests	Number of participants	Percentage (per village)
Ha Ntsi	Adequate	1	37
	Inadequate	5	63
	No comment	2	0
Ha Phaloane	Adequate	1	37
	Inadequate	2	63
	No comment	0	0
Ha Sekete	Adequate	1	50
	Inadequate	1	50
	No comment	0	0
Total		13	

One participant at Ha Ntsi felt that compensation for trees and forests was adequate (LHDA 2000) but 63% (n=5) had the opposite view, that it was not adequate. One participant confided how they approached the Principal Chief's office to register their concerns about the failure of the LHDA to provide them with adequate cash compensation. "The Chief is aware of the promises made to us by LHDA before we arrived here" (Int. 65). The LHDA (2004) commented about the meetings the LHDA management held with the Principal Chiefs of areas affected by the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, whereby compensation of displaced communities was confirmed. Principal Chiefs are senior to local chiefs and headmen. They sit in Parliament and are accountable to the King. They do not get involved with local issues as that is the role of local chiefs or headmen at the grass-roots level. Compensation packages should have been discussed with all spheres of chieftainship including local chiefs and headmen where the affected households are accountable. Twenty-five percent (n=2) of participants at Ha Ntsi preferred not to comment about compensation for trees/forests.

One participant at Ha Phaloane was of the opinion that compensation was adequate. "I had four peach trees which LHDA paid me M2 640 and I used this money to buy a bed and a cooking stove" (Int. 68). The TRC (2008) organized a conference in Maseru in April 2008 to assess compensation implementation and possible challenges facing the LHWP. It was established at the conference that some relocated households were still waiting for cash compensation for trees/forests.

One participant from Ha Sekete felt that compensation for trees/forests was adequate. “Here there is no need for trees or forests as the government has already built a house for us. The money they gave us has helped to buy food and to pay school fees for the children” (Int.72). Another participant gave a different view, that compensation was inadequate. “We cannot afford to buy agricultural equipment, but the trees would be useful as we manufactured our own hoes from the trees and roofed our huts without paying for anything” (Int.71).

e. Whether Grain & Pulses Compensation for Relocated Households was Satisfactory or Not

Participants in three villages which this research covered were asked if grain and pulses compensation for relocated households was satisfactory. They responded as shown in Table 71.

Table 71: Level of satisfaction over grain & pulses compensation

Relocation Village	Compensation for Grain & Pulses	Number of participants	Percentage (per village)
Ha Ntsi	Adequate	1	12
	Inadequate	5	63
	No comment	2	25
Ha Phaloane	Adequate	2	63
	Inadequate	1	33
	No comment	0	0
Ha Sekete	Adequate	1	50
	Inadequate	1	50
	No comment	0	0
Total		13	

One participant from Ha Ntsi thought that grain and pulses compensation for relocated households was satisfactory. “The reason is that in the last harvest, we went through drought and had to be given food aid by government. We were not sure that this time around we will have harvest” (Int. 60). The UNDP (2005) suggests that the World Food Programme responded to the appeal made by the Government of Lesotho to help with food aid. However, 63% (n=5) of participants felt us that grain and pulses compensation for relocated households was not satisfactory. One old man told us that the “LHDA gives us grain and pulses very late [October] in the year. Our harvest time was always in July and therefore the month of October is far. They also forgot that we had vegetable growing

throughout the year from our gardens” (Int.67).25% (n=2) of participants did not comment about compensation for grain and pulses. Thus, one of the factors that comes up again and again in the implementation of the agreement is the timing for the provision of food aid. The LHDA failed to take proper decisions as to when should they order food aid to reach beneficiaries on time. This suggests poor management and the LHDA’s inability to assess the public priorities in economic circles (c.f. Welmer & Vining 2005).

In Ha Phaloane, 67% (n=2) of participants complained that grain & pulses compensation was not satisfactory. One of them elaborated to the author:

“Pastor, when my parents arrived here they were promised a lot of money. However, my father could only be paid M17 000 per annum which was very little as compared to what the wealth he had created at home. After being disappointed by LHDA his life deteriorated. He became sick and died after three years of resettlement here. Soon afterward my mother started complaining about chest pains. We tried to send her to private clinics after Queen Elizabeth II being a government hospital was closed down, but the costs there were too high. She finally passed away two months ago, and I am left with my children” (Int.69).

All Ha Sekete participants indicated that grain and pulses compensation was not satisfactory. Molaoa (2007) raises issues of economic development, concerning which poverty alleviation is critically important. Relocated households needed food aid or cash compensation, as the government had promised them a higher standard of living in the new relocated settlements (LHDA 1992). Their continued plight reached the ears of advocacy groups like the Transformation Resources Centre that took their misery to the LHDA for answers (TRC 2000).

f. Whether Compensation Fulfilled Promises made to Relocated Households

All participants (n=13) in three villages of Ha Ntsi, Ha Phaloane and Ha Sekete indicated that the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority failed to fulfil promises made to them about the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. The Public Eye Newspaper (October 16, 2009) commented about ‘*compensation victory for displaced villagers*’, that had eventually taken the LHDA to the Ombudsman over the failure of the LHDA to compensate the villagers adequately. Molise (2009:8) writes:

Taelo Motseki had very reason to wear a broad smile despite the afternoon chill. His family along with 21 others displaced by Phase1B of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project at Ha

Mohale had won a decade-long struggle seeking compensation.

Thamae (2006) investigated the implementation of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project and, following thorough research, found that “after resettlement, the poverty of communities affected by the Lesotho Highlands Water Project has worsened” (p.10).

7.7 An Overview of LHDA's Socio-Economic Programmes in the Mohale Dam Region

The summary in Table 72 is an overview of how the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority, through the implementation of its socio-economic programmes [the resettlement and the relocation forming part of the housing programme] attempted to develop 43 participating households, with a total number of about 2 000 family members, who were resettled/relocated by the LHDA in the Mohale dam region.

Table 72: LHDA Programmes for communities who came from the Mohale Dam Region

<i>Name of Village</i>	<i>Number of participants</i>	<i>Infrastructure</i>	<i>Housing</i>	<i>Compensation</i>	<i>Capacity-building</i>	<i>Rural Development</i>	<i>Business and Tourism</i>
Ha Thetsane	10	-Community used an existing infrastructure.	Replacement houses were delivered to relocated families.	Households compensated by cash, grain, pulses and fodder.	Skills training activities arranged for affected households.	Rural development programme (RDP) not designed for urban residents.	Tourism did not really bring expected business to the area.
Ha Tsolo	10	-Community learners were accepted in local schools.	Replacement houses were delivered to relocated families.	Households compensated by cash, grain, pulses and fodder.	Skills training activities arranged for households.	RDP not designed for urban residents.	Tourism to the area was very minimal.
Ha Matala	10	-Local clinics provided health care services.	Replacement houses were delivered to relocated families.	Households compensated by cash, grain, pulses and fodder.	Skills training activities arranged for households.	RDP not designed for urban residents.	Tourism did not create business opportunities here.
Ha Ntsi	8	-The main mountain pass road connecting to other places was here.	Replacement houses were delivered to relocated families.	Households compensated by cash, grain, pulses and fodder.	Skills training activities arranged for households.	LHDA rural development projects tried.	Tourism benefitted few people.
Ha Phaloane	3	-Water supply and electricity work was under way.	Replacement houses were delivered to relocated families.	Households compensated by cash, grain, pulses and fodder.	Skills training activities arranged for households.	LHDA rural development projects tried.	Tourism benefitted few people.
Ha Sekete	2	-Water supply and electricity work was under way.	Replacement houses were delivered to relocated families.	Households compensated by cash, grain, pulses and fodder.	Skills training activities arranged for households.	LHDA rural development projects tried.	Tourism did not benefit anyone here.

7.8 Conclusion

In conclusion, I have shown in this chapter what participants affected by resettlement and relocation programmes said about their experiences, since their displacement from the Mohale dam region some 20 years ago. I determined what affected households had expected out of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, as well as what they received from the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority. Their perceptions about resettlement and compensation were gathered around Ha Thetsane, Ha Tsolo and Ha Matala in the Maseru Urban. Further interviews about relocated households now living in the Nazareth Area were conducted at Ha Ntsi, Ha Phaloane and Ha Sekete. The perceptions of relocated participants, as well as about compensation, have been highlighted in this chapter. Despite six socio-economic programmes which the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority implemented more than 20 years ago, displaced communities remain poor and sometimes even poorer than before.

In the next chapter, which is the final analysis of this study, I explore the consequences of the resettlement and relocation programmes as implemented by the LHDA.

Chapter 8

Final Analysis

The Consequences of the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority's Socio-economic Programmes of Resettlement and Relocation for the Development of Displaced Communities

Introduction

In the two previous chapters I put the conditions in which resettled/relocated communities are now living into perspective. In this chapter, I provide a final analysis of the consequences of the resettlement and relocation programmes as implemented by the LHDA. I consider the consequences of the resettlement programme in Ha Lejone, Ha Lepaqaqa, Ha Sepinare and Manganeng, in the Katse dam region, followed by the consequences of the relocation programme for affected households of Bokong Hillside. I examine the consequences of resettlement for affected households now living in Maseru, in Ha Thetsane, Ha Tsolo and Ha Matala and then for those now in the Maseru foothills of Ha Theko (Ha Ntsi, Ha Phaloane and Ha Sekete). I further explore the potential role of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project in poverty alleviation.

8.1. *Consequences of the Resettlement Programme in the Katse Dam Region*

The final analysis is informed by commentaries from officials, reports of researched communities and the author's observations during the course of this study. The World Council of Churches (2009) showed that the construction of the LHWP had both negative and positive consequences for the affected communities. This was confirmed by officials and affected individuals themselves, when their experiences of the implementation of socio-economic programmes by the LHDA were investigated. See Table 73 showing the consequences of the resettlement programme in the Katse dam region.

Table 73: Consequences of the Resettlement Programme in the Katse Dam Region.

Ha Lejone	
<i>Resettlement Programme (Housing)</i>	-Replacement houses were built for resettled households in the new areas to accommodate the number of houses/huts demolished or left behind (LHDA 1998). - Different building material (metal) was used and outside latrines were built, for better hygienic conditions.
<i>Consequences</i>	-Each resettled household accommodated all its household members in one structure (LHDA 1998). -The cultural practice of boys and girls sleeping in different huts, away from their parents, was compromised (Int.2). -Some outside buildings which affected households were not rebuilt by LHDA, limiting spaces for more activities (Int.8). -The size of plots in which replacement houses/huts built was smaller compared to the original plots (Int.10). -Farming activities were reduced, compelling households to seek other ways of survival (Int. 13). -Poverty level increased amongst resettled households (TRC 2001).
Ha Lepagoa	
<i>Resettlement Programme (Housing)</i>	-Urban-based housing model was adopted in this area, reducing reliability on traditional rural housing structures (LHDA 1997).
<i>Consequences</i>	-Some recipients of replacement houses were exposed to the cold environment, resulting in sicknesses (TRC 1998). -Housing construction for rural people became expensive, due to change in building material (Rapley 1996).
Ha Sepinare	
<i>Resettlement Programme (Housing)</i>	-Modern housing was introduced in this area, with improved latrines to improve health conditions (LHDA 1998). -Necessary health services, schools and business centres were built alongside housing programmes (Int. 14).
<i>Consequences</i>	-Affected households were responsible for meeting the costs of the services they needed, including payment of school fees for their children (Int.17). -LHWP construction decreased economic output amongst affected rural communities (Akindele & Senyane 2004). -Poverty level increased amongst resettled households (TRC 2001).
Manganeng	
<i>Resettlement Programme (Housing)</i>	-Houses built in this area accommodated families under one roof, or smaller in size, if separated. -Garden land, if available, was provided far away from houses (Int.23).
<i>Consequences</i>	-Some families in this area migrated to urban areas in search of jobs (Conningarth Economist 2004). -Insufficient grazing land, lack of farming land and lack of employment opportunities increased poverty amongst families in the area (Tsikoane 1991).

Starting with Ha Lejone, the consequences of resettlement are shown in Table 73. One structure was provided, in which all family members had to live under one roof. This practice is not in line with the Basotho culture of separating boys and girls, away from their parents (Int.2). The failure of the LHDA to replace demolished outbuildings caused problems for people, as they had to rebuild such structures themselves. “Most resettled families were unable to restore outbuildings, as they lacked space and funding for that” (Int. 21). Farming activities were limited, as families had lost most of

their fertile, arable land and this problem increased poverty among resettled households in the area (TRC 2001).

In Ha Lepaqa, the use of metal roofing instead of grass and wood affected some of the families, as the environment changed due to dam construction and caused temperatures to drop beyond the normal level of -3°C in winter and 24°C during summer (HSRC 2006). One participant said “In this modern house we cannot make fire on the ground as we used to in our huts, because the house becomes dirty. Again, the cement floor is very cold causing children to become sick most of the time” (Int.28). The advent of new housing structures in the highlands caused resettled families to incur more costs in building materials. “I have paid a lot of money to buy heating equipment and painting the house since the leaking of water has damaged the walls” (Int. 25). Although the LHDA built replacement houses for affected communities, the maintenance of such houses (which did not use local resources) became an unintended cost on the side of displaced families.

In Ha Sepinare, replacement houses (as happened in other places) were built together with the clinic, school, and improved latrines. The LHDA (1999) attested to the construction of replacement houses and other necessary infrastructure to improve education and rural livelihoods. Most of the services brought to Ha Sepinare by the government expected the property owners themselves to take responsibility for paying for further services. One participant argued, “but our economic conditions after disturbance have deteriorated to the level where we are unable to pay for schools fees of our children, buy family clothing, and to pay for medical costs as our traditional source of income which was our fields have now disappeared” (Int. 20).

Manganeng resettled community has faced the obstacles of lack of grazing land, lack of farming land and lack of employment opportunities. These have resulted in many people leaving the village to search for jobs in other parts of the country. “My son is now working in Maputsoe after struggling for work in this area for years” (Int.28). In order to curb poverty, some families sought additional land which they could cultivate and grow food, even if it was far away. This study found evidence of people who had approached other chiefs in the area for grazing land and fields. According to participants, the life of people who resettled in this village from Bokong Valley was inferior, compared to how they lived before. One participant lamented that “at home we grew plenty of

maize, sorghum, wheat, potatoes, beans and a variety of vegetables as the valley was very fertile. We also sold part of our harvest to other neighbouring villages and made a lot of money for school fees and clothing of our children” (Int. 26). Despite what the participants in this study told us about their experiences of the LHDA’s socio-economic programmes, the LHDA’s Annual Report (2002) insisted that the LHWP was successfully completed and the project had developed more than 4 000 rural households whose members were affected by the resettlement programme.

8.2 Consequences of the Relocation Programme in the Katse Dam Region

The consequences that are given in Table 74 have resulted from policy implementation that constructed the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, which involved seven socio-economic programmes of the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority, and in particular, the relocation programme.

Table 74: Consequences of Relocation Programme in the Katse Dam Region.

	<i>Bokong Hillside</i>
<i>Relocation Programme (Housing)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Replacement houses were built for relocated households to accommodate the number of houses/ huts demolished or left behind (LHDA 1998). - Different building material (metal) was used and outside latrines for better hygienic conditions were built. -LHDA did not rebuild outside buildings, but rather paid cash compensation for them (LHDA 1999).
<i>Consequences</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The size of plots on which replacement houses/huts were built were smaller compared to original plots (Int. 25). -The cultural practice of boys and girls sleeping in different huts, away from their parents, was compromised (Int.27). -Poverty level increased among relocated households, due to poor farming and lack of funds (Mashinini 2010). -Some families had to incur additional costs to build other structures afresh, to meet their domestic or farming needs (TRC 2005).

Bokong Hillside relocation programme accommodated people who had been forcibly removed from their rich soil in the valley, to start a new life in the highland area, where farming land was poor and in short supply. Meanwhile these affected people had lived comfortably, enjoying sufficient harvest and surplus to sell to other communities in need in the region (Sibolla 1995). Thamae (2006) records that affected communities were promised a better life and a prosperous future by the LHDA, through the implementation of its socio-economic programmes. “However, the implementation of those programmes did not improve the livelihoods of affected people in the area” (Int. 8B).

Table 74 shows some negative consequences of the relocation programme, in which affected households exchanged bigger properties for smaller ones. The cultural practice of separating boys from girls to promote self-control and leadership qualities (Int. 48) was eroded. Mashinini (2010) alludes to poverty increasing among affected households, due to poor farming facilities as a result of LHWP disturbance in the area. The TRC (2005) shows the failure of the LHDA to rebuild outside structures for affected households. These had to be rebuilt by the owners themselves, so that their activities could continue and their important equipment could be protected. In this case, affected households experienced economic decline as a result of being displaced from their original homes by the LHWP (Musasa 2000).

8.3 Consequences of the Resettlement Programme in the Maseru Urban Area

Resettled communities which this study interviewed in the Maseru district started with communities that resettled in the Maseru Urban Area involving 30 households, with an estimated 1 500 people, mainly from the Mohale dam region. LHDA (2008) confirms the resettlement of families in the areas of Ha Thetsane, Ha Tsolo and Ha Matala. The following issues appear to have been important areas of concern, not only to officials or participating household heads, but which featured more frequent in interviewees' responses, indicating how people living in these areas were regarded. They are presented here according to the preferences of most interviewees.

a. Family Structures

When resettled households took possession of replacement houses at Ha Thetsane, Ha Tsolo and Ha Matala in the Maseru Urban Area, they found that water and electricity services were not free and that they would need to budget for water and electricity bills on a monthly basis. This new paradigm shift resulted in a serious worry among many household heads who had to provide for the needs of their immediate family members. As a result, resettled people had to look for jobs, as it became obvious to them that cash compensation from the LHDA was inadequate. However, their lack of skills and low standard of education disadvantaged most of them in their search for jobs. Even those who had brought a few livestock with them could not get pastures in the Maseru Area and they were forced to sell their remaining livestock.

The inherited male-headed household structure that had dominated social structures for generations was now confronted by the demands of a different economic system, whereby money was more desirable than the rearing of livestock and dependence on subsistence farming. Figure 38 shows the leadership structure of households which resettled in the Maseru Urban around 1992.

Pre-disturbance Family Leadership Structure




Figure 38: Source- LHDA 1995.

Figure 38 shows that when the LHWP was implemented in Phase 1A in 1992, before the resettlement plan for displaced families, mainly from the Mohale areas, where Phase 1B of the dam was implemented in 2002, strong traditional values of patriarchal leadership kept families united. For instance, Figure 38 shows that 65% of families in disturbed areas were headed by males. Women household heads represented 35%, in which the majority were widows, responsible for managing their own families. They were assisted by male relatives in the absence of mature males in their families. The policy of LHDA on compensation insisted that each family should be represented by a male figure, putting widows and other single women parents who had taken supervisory roles in their respective homes, into a predicament (LHDA 1997). Some female-headed families thus sought the support of their male relatives to represent them in compensation payouts and house allocations (TRC 1997). Thus patriarchy fed into the implementation of the policy to the detriment of women, and in a manner that was opposed to the best practices on resettlement. Communities at this stage were rooted in a traditional rural life setting, depending on subsistence farming, rearing livestock and

on income from migrant labour. Contrary to international best practice, men were regarded the heads of the families in those areas.

However, in the post-resettlement era, household leadership shifted towards female household heads as some of the male household heads got sick and died, without male successors. Traditionally, succession is connected to livestock and the inheritance of fields, in which a male head would till the land and raise animals to support the family. In the context of urbanization, however, livestock rearing and agricultural practices are not feasible. Therefore the mindset of resettled communities was bound to change. Figure 39 shows the percentages of female household heads in the Maseru Urban resettlement in 2010.

Post-resettlement Family Leadership Structure




Figure 39

Figure, 39 shows that 58% of household heads in the resettled communities are now women, an increase of 23% within nine years of resettlement. Households headed by males have decreased from 65% in 1992 to 42% in 2010. The majority of men who entered the compensation agreement with the LHDA left their respective original places at an average age of 55 and those that are still alive are now about 68 years old, making it difficult for them to get employment to support their homes, in the absence of agricultural activities, which had been their culture (TRC 2001).

b. Housing

Many resettled households had complaints about the structure of houses they received from the LHDA, the size of houses built and the lack of garden space (LHDA 2003). According to resettled

people in the Maseru Urban, the structures of replacement houses were not discussed with them and they did not approve them. Resettled people claim that the LHDA decided on house plans and contracted companies to build the houses, without consulting them for input. Most resettled households had three to four separate huts where they lived. They are not accustomed to a big house with separate rooms, as adults normally sleep apart from young people, “to maintain respect and order”, explains Thamae (2006:8).

The sizes of houses given to them became another concern for resettled families. At their original villages they built bigger houses as they had enough land to expand. The standard plot size in the village is about 30sq m per family, allocated free of charge by the local chief. The sizes of plots given by the LHDA in Maseru were smaller than 20sq m for each family, demanding annual or monthly fees for refuse collection and sewage services. In their original villages most people who lived close-by were relatives or neighbours, whom they knew very well, but still at a distance of about 40 metres apart.

Some families were concerned that they were given very small areas for gardens and sometimes rocky ground which they could not till at all. The main challenge here was that the livelihoods of these families were tightly connected to agriculture and livestock farming. The resettlement programme of the LHDA did not really take this important aspect into consideration before making Maseru Urban an alternative resettlement destination.

c. Economic Circumstances of Resettled Communities

Research has revealed that resettled families have, for the last two decades, depended on grain and pulses compensation and cash compensation from the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority. Some have also benefitted from the national food aid scheme, made available in food-for-work projects. Another income supporting these households comes from their own family members working in Lesotho or outside the country. Very little support comes from the relatives that are farming in rural areas not affected by the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, as the mountain region is often affected by drought (HSRC 2007).

Lori Pottinger (2007: 30) pointed out that, “While many affected people have benefitted from improved roads and sanitation, too many other programs designed to help them restore their lives have failed.” According to Pottinger, economic conditions of resettled communities are appalling. She continues, “These problems have complicated determination of project impacts on Highlands communities and the extent to which the Treaty provisions have been met” (p.30). Mashinini (2010) stresses that the situation in which some of these communities find themselves goes beyond what has been reported, as findings on the ground have established that some families have disintegrated or died out, i.e. become extinct. The cause of the extinction of some displaced households is due to very harsh economic realities that confronted individuals in a state of hunger and despair, which, when associated with the HIV/AIDS pandemic, resulted in some couples and youth dying. Thamae and Pottinger (2006:14) stated: “Socially, the resettlement in LHWP areas has disturbed family structures and other structures within the affected society, which had been built over decades. Some members of a family may be relocated far away from their relatives where they are forced to begin a new life with different people. And communities that have been together for many decades are suddenly torn apart.”

Research has established further that resettled communities living in the area of Maseru Urban have become even poorer than their counterparts living in other areas of resettlement. These communities live under continuous stress and hopelessness. In elaborating the economic circumstances of resettled households, Thamae and Pottinger (2006:14) put forward the Matala community as a case in point:

This community had to endure terrible vicissitudes because the host community could not understand them; they were prohibited from burying their dead in the local cemetery, a painful experience that happens in the land called the land of peace. They were insulted by the host community as stingy, noisy, and ill-mannered.

The TRC (2010) indicates that, in essence, the LHWP resettlement plan and its implementation strategy appear to have underdeveloped and impoverished the majority of resettled households, to the extent that some family members, especially the youth, dropped out of school, while some girls opted for prostitution. The claim is that the standard of living for affected communities has dropped.

Thamae (2008:3) summarizes:

A number of studies, including those commissioned by TRC, reveal that the standard of living for communities affected by LHWP has deteriorated. One cause of this is the loss of land for these communities. Before resettlement, communities had access to land, but after

resettlement they have none, or where it is little they have to crop-share. Speaking for themselves in the *Irony of the White Gold booklet*, communities have a feeling that their standard of living is indeed lower than before resettlement; they say their life before resettlement was better than their life after resettlement because they were getting free access to clean water; they were getting fresh produce all year round. From pieces of land they had they produced pumpkins, peas, beans, potatoes, etc.

Molaoa (2007), drawing a parallel analysis of the socio-economic impact of the LHWP resettlement programme at Makhoakhoeng, in particular, established that there were both positive and negative impacts of the LHWP for development of displaced households. A clearly positive impact is in education, access to schooling provides long-term socio-economic benefits. There are also other positive impacts such as industrial development, the creation of employment opportunities and improved infrastructure. However, these positive impacts have really no bearing on improving the economic situation of a single household if such a family is not be able to earn income regularly. The negative impacts include the lack of skills of the resettled people that makes them unemployable and a lack of capital to start their own businesses. “Having income derived from compensation is insufficient to ensure that a household’s well-being has been restored to the point where it was before first disturbance” (Inambao 2007:16).

d. Comparison of Life Experiences

Comparing resettlement life experiences to how they lived in Molikaliko, one participant, a 62-year-old woman, who was the community leader in Molikaliko during displacement, had this to say about her new life in Ha Tsolo:

Life at ha Tsapane was very good because a person could use soil as they pleased. The life that we are going through here is life without good soil. The soil at Ha Tsapane was fertile and produce there was in abundance. I miss fire made with cow dung. I miss the pastures for our animals. Our animals were feeding on *lesuoane*. They were producing a lot of milk. We were also getting fresh produce before harvest. But resettlement does not take all these into account.”

The participant reflects on the qualitative aspects of life that made it meaningful in the Molikaliko valley where they had food in abundance and their livestock grazing on nutritious grass to produce the best milk and beef. There is a wish that past positive experiences could be reproduced through relocation. But this can no longer happen under the current LHDA’s socio-economic programmes. The provision of a standard of living equal to the one that the community had before could never include the memories or qualitative aspects that were part of the familiarity of the community.

Chief Matsapane referred to the absence of farming land or grazing land in the urban areas where some of her people chose to resettle. She added that, even for those families that had resettled at Ha Montsi, they would lack land fertility, as would those who had chosen to settle in Maseru. She said that, “poor soil texture would undoubtedly reduce their produce, making their life inferior to that which they had before disturbance.”²⁰ The LHDA compensation policy prohibits a deteriorating life standard for resettled households (LHDA 1997). As a community leader, she is not stating her dissatisfaction alone, but expresses her disapproval of the new economic conditions under which her community has now been subjected, namely an “inferior standard of living,” which the Chief emphasized.

Another important point is that at Molikaliko there was plenty of cow dung, from which they could make fire and cook their food. Being organic, cow dung had fewer health hazards than burning coal, as was done in urban areas. Furthermore, cow dung is free. It is collected by people owning cattle in their home kraals and those without cattle alike, as it can be collected in the fields or pastures. In contrast, in the urban areas, electricity is used for cooking and it is very expensive to install (about M6 500 per house) and additional usage charges amount to at least M10 per day. The economic situation in which these resettled families were placed into by the resettlement programme of the LHDA was unaffordable to them – which in itself means that the new standard of living was not equal to that previously.

The Chief and resettled farmers at Ha Tsolo made a comparison with life before resettlement. In the resettled areas they were worried about the future of livestock, since the pastures they had at home were now covered with water, while their livestock was removed from the region and exposed to hunger and thirst, without proper fodder and water compensation. *Lesuoane*, as they put it, is the most nutritious grass enjoyed by animals, with its minerals making them healthy, to help produce more milk and resist diseases. The production of plenty of milk, which they used to have as a community, is no longer available. Fresh produce had also disappeared, leaving them hungry. Matsapane emphasized that the LHDA, through its resettlement and compensation policies, did not seriously consider the wealth her community members had before disturbance, “as compared to

²⁰ An interview with the Chief of Ha Tsapane in the Molikaliko area from where about 18 families chose to resettle in the Maseru Urban. The Chief was being asked to compare the life of her community members before and after disturbance.

resettlement compensation which lacks in many aspects to match the quality of life we had before displacement,” (Int.45). It is clear from the findings that farming activities for resettled households had drastically declined, and with them, access to many of the free benefits associated with this lifestyle.

Musasa (2000) acknowledges that during his study of reviewing the environmental assessment undertaken for Phase 1A and 1B of the LHWP, many people complained and expressed their dissatisfaction about compensation. “It is within this context of complaints and dissatisfaction with the LHWP that a field trip was undertaken to record perceptions and engage the local communities about these complaints and project concerns”(p.65). The concerns related to grain and fodder compensation, were to be received for only 15 years, whereas people had lost their land and their inheritance that was supposed to have passed on to the next generation. Musasa (2000:64) records that:

According to Meissner (1999), it is the displacement of local people, their loss of agricultural land, broken promises, poor resettlement programs and environmental degradation that cause much resentment in hearts of those affected by the LHWP.

Resettled communities strongly felt (and still feel) that assets like land and houses were not supposed to be compensated for by 15-year, short-term material support, but rather a longer term of at least 50 years compensation period, which would be better for them and ensure that their living standard was improved.

We were born and bred in the mountain region. We know no better environment in which to cope than mountain region. Therefore, any plan to change our lifestyle must cater for us over fifty years, so that we do not transfer poverty to the next generation. The Government must prioritize on our skills development, family economic development and sustainability.²¹

Fodder compensation of five years only was even worse, according to the affected households, as Thamae & Pottinger (2006: 66) attest:

The project authorities also realized early on that initial intention to provide grain compensation for 15 year period to households losing fields, and fodder for a five

²¹ The Minutes of the Community Meeting held at Seshote on the 15 March 199, over possible relocation and resettlement of families caused by the construction of roads and dams. In this meeting, the majority of people expressed their support for displacement and resettlement, provided that their lives would not deteriorate after the LHDA compensation programme. Affected families needed assurances before they would move. But tangible assurances were not provided and, as a result, people were forcibly moved out of their places to make way for construction.

year period to those losing grazing, were insufficient.

This point is also acutely connected to perceptions of the future and the ability of families to pass on some form of inheritance to their children. That inheritance was lost, through displacement. The present study has revealed that the majority of those resettled in the foothills and on the outskirts of Maseru are suffering, and feel that their livelihoods are not at the same standard as they were before their displacement. Despite the provision of educational facilities, these communities are finding it difficult to raise money for school fees for their children, who are at secondary and high school levels. In essence, the interviewed people have regretted taking their families to Maseru Urban for resettlement.

e. Employment

This study found that the resettlement programme did not really have a precise plan to create employment opportunities for the resettles, to be absorbed in government service, or to liaise with the private sector to employ them. It has been established that, in view of the fact that the resettles lacked skills desirable for employment, there was no practical effort done to train these people for capacity-building or skills development, after resettlement. Parsons (1995) insists that implementation is a study of change, where organizations inside and outside the political system interact with one another to bring desired change within the society. In this analysis, community-based policy implementation whereby all the affected members of the communities are given an opportunity and platform to design and implement projects in the process of enriching their own future (Hitchcock 2010) would have been most appropriate to bring about the desired change.

Communities of Ha Matala, Ha Tsolo and Ha Thetsane opted to start their own small businesses to survive on their own. The majority of men sought employment from security companies and became watchmen, while women who could not get domestic work took to the streets to sell food and other items to the public.

f. Relationships between Resettled Communities and Host Communities

Before examining the relationships between resettled and host communities, how the LHDA first treated resettled households in the three suburbs of Maseru will be considered. I have established in this study that Ha Thetsane resettlement houses were of better quality, with expensive bricks,

geysers provided, improved latrines built outside and properties well fenced. Ha Tsolo resettlement houses were of a lower quality, without built-in geysers and some of the houses were still unelectrified or unfenced. Most houses built here were rental rooms, for families resettled there to rent them out for income generation, whereas houses built for Ha Matala resettles were mainly residential, bigger in size, but still had the same quality of building materials as Ha Tsolo resettlement. Houses here did not have geysers either, but were provided with better outside latrines and bigger plots, compared to those given to Ha Thetsane and Ha Tsolo residents. The TRC (2008) saw this unequal treatment of resettled communities as improper and having the potential to cause conflict between resettled communities. “This is clear discrimination for people who have been affected the same way, but who are separately treated” (Thamae 2008:3). What this shows is that the level of negotiations differed from community to community. Some, based on the knowledge they had accumulated about the communities that were relocated earlier, were able to negotiate a little more effectively. This, for example, is demonstrated in the larger houses provided to the community that wished to rent out rooms as compared to the earlier relocations. The chieftaincy played an important role of restoring hope to affected families when their houses were flooded and falling apart. This policy negotiation strategy has strengthened the position of the affected communities in pursuing a common goal within the policy framework of community development.

Concerning relationships which resettled households had with host community members, it is important to know that resettled households expected to have access to communal services, access to land to plant crops, access to graveyards and possibly to fields, for sharecropping. Resettled communities had difficulties getting access to land for planting. For those who negotiated sharecropping, “host populations wanted to charge high prices for the land or were reluctant to allow resettles to sharecrop” (HSRC 2007: 17). Resettled residents suffered discrimination from host community members, as they were seen as coming to reduce job opportunities for urban residents in the City and, in particular, at textile factories, which are 200 metres away from Ha Thetsane resettlement. They were even denied access to graveyards to bury their dead (Thamae 2008).

Some community members who hosted resettles indicated their concern over soil erosion, as the livestock that was brought to the urban areas would destroy their soil conservation project of filling up dongas to control soil erosion and preserve water for agricultural purposes. Some of the

community members felt that it was unsafe to have animals moving around in the suburb with their children. They asked who would take responsibility if their children were injured by the animals. The present study got the impression that the influx into Maseru made host communities feel that their available land (which was not sufficient for them, anyway) was now being given to strangers.

The LHDA (1998) revealed that the chiefs /headmen in resettled areas had to manage conflicts between host and resettled communities over a number of issues, including fights over water that resettled communities were giving to their livestock from community water pipes, instead of asking the LHDA to give them water for the animals. Some community members of Ha Matala accused resettled members of stealing from them. They said the resettled people were ill-mannered, stinky and noisy. These accusations had created a gap between resettled households and Ha Matala residents, but traditional leaders intervened and good relations between resettled families and host community members have since been achieved (Thamae and Pottinger 2006). The role played by LHDA in conflict management is minimal in this regard, as the chiefs became key players in restoring peace among community members, elevating the relevancy of the chieftaincy in efficient policy implementation above the administrative role of the LHDA. Policy communication is central to implementation theory (Fischer 2003).

8.4 Consequences of the Relocation Programme in the Nazareth Area

Relocated families in the Ha Theko area of Nazareth in the Maseru district were interviewed at Ha Ntsi, Ha Phaloane and Ha Sekete in the foothills of the Machache mountain range. A total of 13 people participated in this research. Table 75 shows the consequences of the relocation programme in the Nazareth Area.

Table 75: Consequences of Relocation Programme on Households that came from the Mohale Dam Region.

	Ha Ntsi
<i>Resettlement Programme (Housing)</i>	-Replacement houses were built for resettled households from the Mohale region (LHDA 1998). - Small plots and outside latrines were provided for each household.
<i>Consequences</i>	-The size of plots on which replacement houses were built were smaller compared to what most people had had before (Int.61). -Farming activities were limited to those who were share-cropping with host farmers (Int. 63). -Poverty level increased amongst resettled households (TRC 2001).
	Ha Phaloane
<i>Resettlement Programme (Housing)</i>	-Urban-based housing model was adopted for relocated families in this area and the water supply project was initiated by the government (LHDA 1997). -Electrification plan was put in place to improve the life of relocated households (LHDA 1998).
<i>Consequences</i>	-Urban housing required relocated households to pay for water and electricity services (TRC 1998). -Travelling and Western medication in the new relocation area needed more cash (Int.76). -Majority of relocated people were unemployed and lacked skills for development (Int.9B).
	Ha Sekete
<i>Resettlement Programme (Housing)</i>	-Replacement houses with two/three rooms were provided for households in the area (LHDA 1998). -Necessary health services, schools and business centres were available nearby (Int.71). -Water supply and sanitation was improved in the area to accommodate relocated families (Int.77).
<i>Consequences</i>	-Relocated households were responsible to meet the costs of the services they needed, including maintenance of their houses (Int.72). -Most of the replacement houses were built in a swamp, where flooding occurred during the high rainy season, which caused cracks to many houses in the area. -Relocation of people to this area reduced their economic status, as most of them did not work or have the livestock or fields to live on. As a result a poverty situation became obvious (TRC 2001).

As table 75 shows, relocated households at Ha Ntsi complained about the small size of houses and gardens given to them by the LHDA. One participant complained that “Whatever they gave us, houses and gardens cannot sustain us as cash compensation is inadequate to cater for annual households’ budgets” (Int.62). Another participant lamented that “small replacement houses have inconvenienced most relocated households as parents have to share same houses with their children which is not in our culture” (Int.63). Most people seemed to be satisfied with the construction of outside latrines, as they did not have them before. This study established that not many people succeeded in share-cropping with the host community, as the latter charged high prices for share-cropping (about M500 payment per hectare or 50kg of harvest per hectare). “Ha Ntsi farmers agreed

with us to pay M500 per hectare or give them 50 kg bag of harvest per hectare, even though we had to prepare the soil and buy some seed” (Int. 61). As a result of these conditions, the economic status of relocated households declined (TRC 2001).

In Ha Phaloane, the move to modern housing in the area brought about unexpected and expensive consequences, as piped water, sanitation and electrification services required that each household to contribute money for service delivery. “Most of us cannot afford the payments needed, as our lives are disturbed and our source of income [agriculture and marijuana] no longer exist” (Int.75). The supply of traditional medicine (natural herbs and practices) suffered, as modern medicine and clinics were introduced by the government, which also established a base for consultation in rural areas. Very sick patients were sent to hospitals in Thaba-Tseka or Leribe for advanced treatment (LHDA 2001), leaving traditional doctors and their trade in limbo. “Most of our healers disappeared as their healing centres like Malibatso River, Bokong Valley and distinctive caves were inundated, leaving us alone” (Int.80). The majority of relocated people of Ha Phaloane lacked skills for employment, either in public or private sector services (LHDA 1999). One official confirmed that “their desperate economic and health situations left more families more vulnerable and poorer than they were before” (Int.9B). Another participant said, “Historically, we could pay our healers with livestock, but the modern medicine needs cash each time you are sick, something which most of us do not have. As a result, most of our relocated compatriots died” (Int. 78).

In Ha Sekete participants were placed in a swampy area. This was confirmed by my study, because water was seen running through some of the houses. Walls were cracked and some houses had already fallen down and house owners were being accommodated by neighbours. Unfortunately, affected households were responsible for maintaining their houses and paying for related service delivery. Most of the affected houses in this area belonged to relocated families. Electrical poles were lying down ready for installation. Interviewed participants in this area indicated that their livelihoods had declined since their arrival at Ha Sekete, due to lack of agricultural opportunities and delayed cash compensation from the LHDA. “We did not know that we would get as little as M15 000 per annum to supply the family of 20 people” (Int. 73). In general, the TRC (2006) states that economic conditions of relocated families in the area deteriorated from the positions in which they were before their disturbance. To sum up, affected households in the three areas became poorer than

they were prior to relocation – and moreover had little in the way of agriculture to mitigate the effects of their poverty.

The consequences of the relocation programme for families originating from Ha Mohale dam region have been assessed. The ways in which the Lesotho Highlands Water Project could make a positive contribution to poverty alleviation will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 9
Conclusion to the Study

The study is a policy analysis of the consequences of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project for rural communities in Lesotho: a case study of communities affected by the construction of the Katse and Mohale dams. The backdrop to this is a Treaty which the Kingdom of Lesotho and the Republic of South Africa entered into in 1986 to build two dams in Lesotho with the intention of selling water to South Africa. The LHWP affected more than 20,000 people in the region of Katse and Mohale dam with about 3000 households who were later displaced. This, and the context of the affected communities were discussed in chapter one. In chapter two I examined the political background of both Lesotho and South Africa during the time of the Treaty. Leabua Jonathan who had been a Prime Minister in Lesotho for almost 20 years was overthrown by General Metsing Lekhanya in a coup in January 1986. The treaty and its provisions which included the establishment of technical bodies (the LHWC, LHDA and TCTA) were agreed on and put in place for effective and efficient policy implementation and management. In this chapter, a detailed account of components of the agreement and the nature and functions of the Katse and Mohale dams was provided. The political circumstances under which the project was born in 1986 has influenced the nature of governance and management which implemented this project for over ten years. Despite conflicting domestic institutional arrangements and foreign policies in the apartheid (then democratic) South African state and the military dictatorship regime in Lesotho (which then returned to multi-party democracy), the LHWP plan continued undisturbed. This clearly demonstrates the importance and significance of water in the socio-economic and political life of both states.

In chapter three, I examined the governance of the project and the management structures that were put in place to run the project. These included the Lesotho Highlands Water Commission which was composed of three representatives from each country responsible for policy formation and dispute resolution. Then, the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority which was established by the Lesotho Government to run the project within Lesotho (this body had its own Board of Directors accountable to the Minister of Natural Resources). The Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority was the third technical body established under the Treaty of 1986 by the Republic of South Africa to run the affairs of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project on its behalf. I further explored the form and style of

the military government and the role played by the chieftaincy. It was during this period, before the project was completed, that Lesotho returned to multi-party democracy in 1993 and South Africa elected its first democratic government in 1994. The form and style of the military regime in Lesotho during its eight years in power (during Phase 1A of Katse dam and Phase 1B of Mohale dam) meant that a top-down policy, non-inclusive and non-participatory policy environment was a central feature of the administration. Every sphere of government, the structures of policy administration and rural chieftainship structures were to comply with military orders. This arrangement hardly gave consideration to any participatory framework of implementation. Despite this, both states moved to a democratic system prior to the compensation policy of 1997, which should have created the possibility for a more inclusive participatory approach for those affected by the dam.

In chapter four I established what is known about this project, what the affected people received as compensation, what was done and not done in terms of the 1986 Treaty and 1997 Compensation Policy. In the Mohale dam construction, additional costs were incurred and water transfer to South Africa was behind for two years. All communities affected by the dam were supposed to benefit from seven socio-economic programmes without comparing their situational and geographic circumstances to determine the chances for success. These programmes were infrastructure development; compensation of affected households; resettlement; relocation; capacity-building of those affected; rural development and business and tourism. I have shown what programmes were carried out by the LHDA, and what compensation was given to affected households which according to the Treaty (1986) should have improved their livelihoods after displacement. It was discovered that relocation cash compensation was less than resettlement cash compensation for reasons decided on by the LHDA, and not in line with international standards. Affected households provided a picture of dissatisfaction over the implementation of the policy. Poor policy implementation and lack of skills among the implementation team caused delays and administrative problems for the project. Communities were not provided with their compensation within prescribed timeframes indicated in the policy. A lack of communication and transparency raised questions about the integrity and ability of the LDHA. The picture painted by those affected is one of a failure of policy implementation.

In chapter five I provided an account of the perceptions of the governmental officials and non-governmental organizations about the implementation of the LWHP. Two substantial questions were

considered. First, whether compensation given to affected households was adequate or not? Second, whether the LHDA fulfilled its promises to the affected communities? Compensation in general terms included resettlement houses, cash, and fodder and food aid. Another form of compensation (though informal) can be skills development training that was designed for displaced people, rural development programme (grazing development, fishery development, animal husbandry, environmental care and ecosystem development) and business and tourism programme. The majority of government officials were satisfied with the process and believed that compensation was adequate for resettled communities. They discussed tangible factors that they considered successful. These included replacement houses that were built for affected households, cash compensation that was given for the loss of assets, grain and pulses provided to compensate harvest that was lost while affected households started a new life in different places, and fodder compensation which was provided to farmers for their livestock. These government officials had specific knowledge of the Treaty to implement the LWHP and of the Compensation Policy which clearly indicated that cash compensation for assets and disturbance were approved to be paid before resettlement and relocation took place. But, the LHDA failed to implement the policy as prescribed. In fact, patriarchal assumptions of contested societal constructions of gender roles and right were fed into the compensation process by the LHDA. The compensation policy was distorted as women were sidelined from receiving compensation and their human rights were violated. By entrenching negative cultural tendencies, in a manner that is not in keeping with the policy, the LHDA contributed to the under-development of the affected families. Non-governmental organizations overwhelmingly condemned the exclusion of women from receiving their family compensation. Moreover, they were critical of the LHDA and pointed to the failure of the LDHA to implement the cash compensation as prescribed, to ensure food aid and fodder arrived as it should for their livestock. Despite their satisfaction with implementation, government officials have never visited resettled households to see how the compensation had made an impact in their lives. Despite understanding the policy, and not implementing it as prescribed, they were satisfied. Herewith a clear policy implementation gap, where the policy as prescribed was not implemented.

In chapters six and seven I explored, through extensive interviews, the perceptions of the affected communities who were relocated and resettled. I provided a discussion of the economic factors which characterized the rural economy before displacement and discussed the resettlement

programme as it was implemented by the LHDA. In chapter six, I discussed the resettlement and relocation programmes, through the viewpoints of the affected communities that were displaced from Katse and Mohale dam regions. In chapter seven, I provided an account of the effects of the LHDA's socio-economic programmes for communities that chose to resettle in the Maseru urban areas of Ha Thetsane, Ha Tsolo and Ha Matala, through the eyes of those communities. This was followed by a similar account of communities that chose to relocate to Nazareth foothills of Ha Phaloane, Ha Sekete and Ha Ntsi in the Maseru District. For communities that were displaced from Katse and Mohale dam regions. I also discussed the relocation programme for communities displaced from Katse and Mohale dam regions. Participants felt deceived by the LHDA because of the lack of payment of their outstanding compensation, which never came. Many of the household heads who took their families out of original homes to new resettlement areas died and never experienced the fulfilment of the promises that were made to them by the LHDA. Most of their failures were blamed on ignorance and lack of skills. Participants have also expressed that what they received from LHDA as compensation was far from their expectations. Moreover, what they did receive is perceived as a cause for impoverishment.

Despite six socio-economic programmes which the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority implemented more than 20 years ago, displaced communities remain poor and sometimes even poorer than before. Many of the programmes that were meant to bring a new form of livelihood did not materialize in some communities, and were closed down in others. Families affected by resettlement and relocation have been partially compensated by the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority. Compensation came in different forms, such as cash, grain and pulses, replacement houses and fodder for livestock. Throughout this research the affected communities have overwhelmingly showed their dissatisfaction over cash compensation they received from the LHDA. They complained that cash compensation was drastically inadequate and given without considering their economic standard before disturbance. They maintain that problems they are having now are a result of LHDA's unfulfilled promises. Replacement houses in all areas where this study was carried out did not satisfy families. Some families wanted the same house structures they had left behind, with an accurate number of huts. They were prepared to compromise on outbuildings, provided adequate cash compensation to rebuild such structures was given by the LHDA. Most people did not approve the modern plan of having two or four rooms under one roof, as they wanted privacy. Some

houses were smaller in size (compared to what resettled families had expected) or built on rocky ground, where families were unable to make gardens. Water, sanitation, rates and electricity costs for resettled households in the urban areas became the responsibility of each household. With inadequate cash compensation, however, some families have failed to meet these costs.

I explored the consequences of the LHDA's socio-economic programmes for the development of displaced communities in chapter eight. Many of these were not implemented effectively. The positive consequences of the project include the obvious infrastructural development that has occurred, better schooling (which is a longer term socio-economic factor), improved telecommunications and the completion of the construction of these dams, which are now bringing revenue into Lesotho. In the light of the economic situation of the researched communities, the negative consequences outnumber the positive ones. Instead of uplifting the affected resettled individuals and their households, the programmes and practices employed during the implementation of the LHWP policy have left the majority of these people even poorer. International best practices on the compensation of assets, disturbance and grazing land were flouted by the LHDA. The recommendations of the World Commission on Dams, of not reducing the standard of living of affected communities below that before disturbance, were not adhered to. As a result, the implementation of the policy by the LHDA has actually impoverished resettled communities. Despite many positive reports made by the LHDA, the resettled communities continue to struggle, feel disgruntled and remain poor. The majority of founding resettlement household heads (mostly men) have since died and women and children have taken the struggle forward, not knowing if their dreams of a more prosperous future will ever come to fruition. At the moment, unemployment is high among affected people, as the majority of them do not have any technical skills needed in the urban or industrial environment. As a result, prostitution among girls, especially those who dropped out of school, has become common, increasing the prevalence of HIV and STD infections in the country. Women and children who were unable to continue with their education due to lack of financial resources were found to be the most affected by these unfavourable economic circumstances during the time of this study. Some of the young men facing similar poverty resorted to the smuggling of diamonds and selling dagga. The practice, by the LHDA, of awarding compensation to male household heads or male representatives further disempowered women in this

process and was a direct violation of the policy and the rights of these women. This is a clear example of how street-level bureaucrats can change policy in the process of implementation.

Despite international best practices standards that state otherwise, the affected communities have received uneven levels of compensation and development. Relocated households who came from the Katse dam region received lesser rates of cash compensation compared to resettled households that went to faraway places. A comparison of the economic conditions of resettled communities from Katse region and those who resettled in the Maseru urban areas reveals that those who lived in the Maseru urban areas are now worse off than those who resettled at Ha Lejone, Ha Lepaqa, Ha Sepinare and Manganeng. Municipality by-laws in urban areas included service delivery charges which the displaced communities have difficulty paying. Some communities, as a result of their own negotiating skills and, in some cases chieftaincy structures, and the benefit of later displacement, were able to negotiate better conditions than those who were displaced earlier.

The main argument that has been presented throughout this investigation is that the Treaty and the Compensation Policy have not been implemented as agreed upon between the governments of Lesotho and South Africa by the LHDA officials. The LHDA failed to implement compensation rates as prescribed by the World Bank. The LHDA failed to impart a broader consultative process. The standard of living for resettled and relocated families has deteriorated since their resettlement and relocation, some 20 years ago. Some families have disintegrated, been divorced, separated and are faced with acute hardship that has resulted in domestic violence, hopelessness and untimely deaths. Despite the differences between them, affected households in the three areas became poorer than they were prior to relocation – and moreover – now had little in the way of agriculture to mitigate the effects of their poverty.

9.2 The Potential Role of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project in Poverty Alleviation

The main reason why Lesotho entered into the treaty with South Africa for the LHWP was to sell water to South Africa and, in return, to receive royalties to boost the economy of the country. As stated by Ramaili and Cloete (2008:117). “The Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) has been one of the biggest socio-economic undertakings of the twenty-first century that Lesotho has been involved in.” They focused on the impact of the LHWP in addressing poverty, with particular reference to the Rural Development Programme (RDP) in Phase 1B of the project.

In describing the Rural Development Programmes designed to uplift displaced communities, Ramaili and Cloete (2008: 120) clarified:

To realize the goal of the LHWP that the standard of living of all the affected people should not be compromised and where possible improved, the RDP generally aims to maximize opportunities created by the implementation of the LHWP for sustainable development of the highlands area.

The RDP was seen as a long-term compensation strategy to curb poverty in rural Lesotho, through education, infrastructure and production development. Ramaili and Cloete (2008:120) outline the following objectives within the strategic framework of the programme:

- i) to enable families directly and indirectly affected to recover their ability to earn an income;
- ii) to provide training and advice to affected communities, to enable them to augment their income through both farming and non-farming activities;
- iii) to improve the nutritional status of the poor;
- iv) to provide facilities and infrastructure for the villages and communities in the project area.

Article 4 (1) of the Treaty (1986:3) refers to the purpose of the project:

To enhance the use of the water of the Senqu/Orange River and its affluents in order to effect the delivery of specified quantities of water to the designated outlet point in the Republic of South Africa and by utilizing such delivery system to generate hydro-electric power in the Kingdom of Lesotho.

The Treaty stated that each country would pursue development programmes in its territory as a result of this project, including:

- (i) the provision of water for irrigation, potable water supply and other uses;
- (ii) the development of other projects to generate hydro-electric power; and
- (iii) the development of tourism, fisheries and other projects for economic and social development.

The LHDA development plans included four main sectors, as recorded in its April 1997 (Volume 2) of the Final Report. These are infrastructure, agriculture, tourism and income restoration. It is stipulated in the report that:

The development programme should be regarded as an integral part of the total compensation package. It is intended to benefit, in order of priority, the affected households and villages; the host communities and those remaining in the Scheme Area; and the whole population of the region in which the Scheme Area is located (LHDA 1997:4-24).

The infrastructure created by the LHWP remains as a permanent benefit for Lesotho. It has made travelling less difficult between villages which has thus boosted the taxi industry. The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry in South Africa, when commenting about the social benefits created by the LHWP and other achievements of the Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority, including tourism stated:

Tourism has benefited largely as a result of the LHWP. The hitherto inaccessible Lesotho hinterland has been opened up. With the increase of traffic flow through the upgraded border posts, the tourism industry has flourished, with a growing number of Basotho people selling their arts and crafts to tourists and visiting business people (Dept of Water Affairs, 1994:12).

In their dealings with affected individuals and households, however, the management of the LHDA lacked a broader consultative approach with these people to shape their own future. Without the participation of affected individuals in the capacity building programmes and rural development plans of the LHDA, social betterment and economic growth could not be realized in Lesotho. This substantial blunder has to be corrected, notably at a community level. It therefore requires unwavering engagement from the government, so that sustainable socio-economic development plans, leading to poverty eradication, are realized. I thus suggest two proposals to be considered for the development of displaced families living in the Maseru urban areas.

The first proposal relates to revenue (royalties) received from South Africa on a monthly basis. Here it is proposed that the LHDA (monitored by parliament) should qualify and quantify the desired skills of the resettled communities by providing them with training to enable them to earn their own income and be able to look after their families. Any required expenses for such a project must be financed under that budget, from the royalties. After doing this, the LHDA should step aside and allow affected communities themselves to design their own empowering projects (assisted by qualified technical, agricultural, economic and socio-economic development specialists) to be paid for from the revenues coming from water royalties for Lesotho. The bigger question of rights needs

to be addressed. In engaging in a process of involuntary resettlement, the rights of the larger community (socio-economic development for all Basotho and South Africans) are considered as extremely important. Whereas the rights of the many (to socio-economic development) is a noble cause, this does not have to be at the expense of the rights of those displaced to socio-economic development.

My second proposal concerns the proper utilization of abundant fields, to increase agricultural activities. Resettled communities are used to tilling the land and are proven and experienced farmers. I propose that they be allowed to engage in farming near the southern town of Mafeteng, where the land has potential for successful wheat farming. They should also be afforded the opportunity to farm in the northern districts of Teyateyaneng and Leribe, where maize farming is successful. The government, through the Ministry of Agriculture, should explore this opportunity, provide the budget and encourage these farmers to increase food production. In so doing, hunger problems could be mitigated and opportunities for self-reliance among the resettled communities could be created. The utilization of the farming skills of resettled communities would contribute to the economy in Lesotho. The terms of reference for this farming engagement should be designed in consultation with targeted farmers and their aspirations, opinions and preferences should be respected.

Real development does not undermine social values or destroy traditional life by imposing, without consultation, strange ideas or norms detrimental to the wellbeing of local people. Neither does it disempower or marginalise people based on local outmoded prejudiced societal constructions of gender roles.

Many local partnership schemes already exist in Lesotho amongst many community-based structures, including workplaces, where workers have set them up. Societies are useful for grocery and burial partnerships. Individuals join a group saving scheme in order to get help when the contributor loses a family member by means of death, to buy groceries at the end of the year, and to procure loans from the society, at a minimal interest rate. Each contributor is given a specific amount of money when confronted by one of these challenges. These successful savings examples have been tested and their operational strategies are given to communities that need to better their own lives. The national government provides the means of production resources and training, to enable

participants in the process of self-reliance to achieve their economic goals. These could be encouraged and supported more widely in rural areas.

Despite these many challenges facing the resettled communities, the fact is that there is potential for socio-economic development in Lesotho. The revenue generated from the sale of water to South Africa, and better-trained public officials, provide the basis of this. I thus argue that if the Rural Development Programme is properly implemented, the socio-economic betterment of Basotho people can be realized.

9.3 Theoretical Development

In this study I drew on a number of aspects of implementation analysis. First, I considered implementation analysis where the development of public administration in the execution of policy is expedited by research evaluation (Hill 1998). In this theory, the implementation judgment is left for stakeholders and beneficiaries. Second, I drew upon the concept of implementation as a development activity. This was helpful in considering the top-down policy formulation and implementation style that was apparent. The situational analysis helped to determine how implementation analysis and implementation as development strategies could best be fused together in defining what the Lesotho Highlands Water Project Treaty and Compensation policy were intended to achieve, but eventually failed to do – which was to empower the affected communities.

The key failure was not to be found in the policy as such, but rather in the process of implementation. There was no close monitoring system to ensure that the policy was implemented as it was intended in order to meet the policy outcomes with regards to affected persons. Policy implementers therefore exercised their “discretion” to the detriment of the communities under study. Initially this was within a top-down system of governmental authority, but even when Lesotho moved to multi-party democracy (and thus the path was open for more consultation with those affected) it was still apparent.

As such, I recommend as a new model for the management of development projects in Lesotho. This draws together a more consultative community dialogue with the need for the monitoring of implementers. - a community-based monitoring policy implementation theory. This would enable communities the power to plan a project, mobilize resources, monitor the implementation process

and evaluate the implementation indicators to check if policy is indeed carried out as planned to achieve predetermined objectives. They could be supported by technical, economic and socio-economic development experts. The community should be empowered and enabled to adjust policy implementation systems and make policy changes where there is a need to do so, as the projects progress and in line with the monitoring results.

In pursuit of this model the work of McDonald (2003) is useful for Lesotho, which advocates for environmental justice in the quest to eradicate poverty while ensuring that the natural environment is not destroyed. This should eradicate environmental sexism, an injustice in which female household heads suffered in the hands of a patriarchal society. The successful application of this framework will assist in the transformation of policy implementation practices that are detrimental to social development. The protection of vulnerable members of the society can be enshrined in both the policy and the implementation process and practiced at the project levels.

Thabane (2000) has raised a scenario of fear and suspicion which had grabbed many displaced communities as they saw their displacement as an act of dictatorship rather than socio-economic development. Devitt & Hitchcock (2010) convincingly argue in their theory of community engagement that any development project should embrace beneficiaries in all stages of the project life: in planning, implementation and evaluation. My recommendation for community-based monitoring policy implementation, where the community have a direct role in the monitoring of the implementation serves as an expansion of their theory for transparent policy implementation. Hajer & Wagenaar (2003) agree that implementation as development should become a vehicle through which policy results in a life changing experience for people who depend on state intervention. This should be the intention of policy reform where women not only get protection from environmental sexism which violates their fundamental human rights, but whose lives are empowered and transformed through the reform. Without adequate and sustainable compensation for *all* affected people, Lesotho will have difficulty in talking about development in the future.

Appendix 1

Questionnaire A

This questionnaire was prepared for household members in relocated and resettled areas, and it was written in Sesotho, but for the purpose of research proposal was presented in English.

Lesotho Highlands Water Project – Phase 1A & B
Questionnaire

Name of Interviewee-----
Address-----
Village-----Chief's Name-----
District-----Date-----
Age:----- Gender-----M / F
Highest Education level-----

1. Are you the head of the household?----- Yes / No
If not what is your position in the family? – a). Child b). Spouse c). Relative
d). Other (Specify)-----

2. How old were you when the LHWP started? -----

3. Did you have any meetings with the government to discuss LHWP?-----

4. Did you have any agreement with government? Yes / No-----

If yes, what was the nature of the agreement?-----

5. Did you receive any compensation?-----

6. Did you receive any compensation for losing property or livestock? Explain-----

7. How much compensation did you receive (e.g. grain, cash)? -----

8. Were you satisfied with compensation? 1- Very Satisfied
2- Satisfied
3- Dissatisfied
4- Other (specify) -----

If satisfied, explain-----

If dissatisfied, explain-----

9. What did you do with the compensation?-----

10. For how long did you receive compensation or are you still expecting something? Explain-----

11. Was compensation enough? Yes / No
Explain-----

12. Did you or any member of your household work for LHWP? Yes / No
If yes, explain your tasks-----

13. Did your family have livestock? Yes / No
If yes, tell us the type of livestock you had?-----

What happened to your livestock when you went to live in another place?-----

14. Are you happy with your new place of settlement Yes / No
If yes, explain-----

If no, explain-----

15. What do you do now? -----

16. What achievements have you made in your new settlement area?-----

17. What more do you think needs to be done?-----

18. Is there any member of your family working? If yes, where and how much does she /he earn per month? -----

19. Any other comments:-----

Interviewer:_____

Appendix 2

Questionnaire B

This questionnaire was prepared for former / present government officials who participated in policy formation and independent consultants / NGOs representatives who had interest in implementation of this project.

Lesotho Highlands Water Project- Policy Decision & Management
Questionnaire

Name of Interviewee-----

Work Address-----

District-----

Age:----- Gender-----M / F

Telephone No-----Date-----

Highest Education level-----

1. What is your position at work?-----

2. What are your key responsibilities?-----

3. For how long have you worked in this capacity?-----

4. Were you involved during the negotiations for the construction of LHWP?-----

5. What was introduced as a major intention of this project?-----

6. What role did you play in those negotiations?-----

7. What was the nature of the agreement with the South African government?-----

8. Did you know as to when and how the LHWP originate? Yes / No

If yes, please explain-----

9. Did you know the circumstances in which the LHWP arose? Yes / No

If yes, explain-----

If no, what do you think was the reason?-----

10. How were decisions taken?-----

11. Was there any agreement reached with communities affected by LHWP? Yes / No

Bibliography

References: Primary sources

Government of Lesotho, *The Laws of Lesotho Volume XXXI*, Maseru, 1986.

_____, Order No. 23, *Lesotho Highlands Development Authority*, November 1986.

_____, Order No. 17, *Lesotho Defence Force Volume XXXVIII*, March 1993.

_____, Order No. 4, *Government Gazette Extraordinary Volume XLI*, August 1996.

Government Ombudsman, *Qeto Ea Monamoli: Bafallisuo Ba Ha Matala V. Morero Oa Metsi a Lihlaba*, Maseru, Loetse 2009.

Lesotho Highlands Development Authority, *Annual Report 2002/ 2003*.

_____, *World Bank Supervision Mission*, Maseru, Lesotho, 2001.

_____, *Implementation of New Governance Model*, Lesotho, 1998.

_____, *Resettlement and Development Study, Final Report Vol 5, Compensation Manual, April 1997*.

_____, *Resettlement and Development Study, Final Report, Vol 3, April 1997*.

_____, *Resettlement and Development Study, Final Report Vol 2, April 1997*.

_____, *Phase 1B Resettlement and Development Implementation Programme, 1997*.

_____, *Response to Ombudsman, Maseru, 1996*.

_____, *Compensation Policy, 1997*.

_____, *Affected Villages: Categories and Location, Maseru, 1996*.

_____, *Caring for Environment, Maseru, 1990*.

_____, *Monitoring Impact of Compensation from 1988 to December 1989, March 1990*.

_____, *Lesotho Highlands Water Project: Environmental Action Plan, May 1990*.

_____, *Treaty on LHWP Between the Government of the RSA and the Kingdom of Lesotho, 1986*.

Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority, *Lesotho Water Conservation Projects*, Pretoria 1987.

_____, *Lesotho Water Periodicals, 1987*.

_____, *Lesotho Water Resources Development, 1987*.

UNDP & International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Lesotho: Study on Water Resources Development: Inventory Report. 1972*.

_____, *Lesotho: Study on Water Resources Development: Inventory Report Vol.1, Hydrology*. 1972.

_____, *Lesotho: Study on Water Resources Development: Inventory Report Vol. 2, Geology*. 1972.

_____, *Lesotho: Study on Water Resources Development; Inventory Report Vol.3, Soils*. 1972.

_____, *Lesotho: Study on Water Resources Development; Inventory Report Vol. 4, Irrigation*. 1972.

_____, *Lesotho: Study on Water Resources Development: Inventory Report Vol. 5, Town Water Supplies*. 1971.

_____, *Lesotho: Study on Water Resources Development; Inventory Report Vol. 6, Village Water Supplies*.

Van Zyl, J, *Findings of a Series Surveys Conducted in the Upstream Areas of the LHWP*, August 2007.

_____, *LHWP Monitoring and Evaluation Survey, 2005/06 Household Questionnaire*, 2005.

Relevant Published Research

Articles, Pamphlets & Periodicals

Akindele. F & R. Senyane (eds.), *The Irony of the White Gold 1st Edition*, Transformation Resource Centre, Morija Printing, 2004.

Alsbaugh. A & S. Sporseen, *Preliminary Investigation of Water Resources on the Makhaleng, Senqunyane, Maletsunyane and Little Caledon Rivers of Basutoland*, United Nations. New York 1965.

Bildhaeuser. S, *Institutions of Water Management and Conflict Resolution in Lesotho on Local Level : An Empirical Study of Displacement Areas of the LHWP*, Microcon Research Working Paper 22, Brighton, March 2010.

Butler. S, *The Development and Impact of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project*, BA Honours Dissertation, University of Natal, Department of Historical Studies, 1997.

Carter. C, *Basutoland as a Source of Water for the Vaal Basin*, Civil Engineer in South Africa, Vol.7, Oct. 1965.

Conningarth Economists, *Impact Study of Phase 1 B on the Lesotho Economy*, LHDA, 8 April, 2004.

Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, *Lesotho Highlands Water Project*, Communications Section, South Africa, October 1994.

Detter. A (et al.), *Transformations Caused by the LHWP Phase 1-A with Focus on Ha Lejone and Ha Mensel in Katse Local Catchment*, Maseru, 1994.

Devitt. P & R. Hitchcock, *Who Drives Resettlement? The Case of Lesotho's Mohale Dam*, Department of Geography, African Study Monographs, 31(2): 57-106, Michigan State University, July 2010.

Dogget. R, *A Macroeconomic Analysis of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project*, LHDA, May 1996.

Draper. J (ed.), *Bulletin for Contextual Theology in Africa: Religion and Public Policy*, Volume 6, No1, School of Theology, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, March 1999.

Ecumenical Water Network, *Let Justice Roll Down Like Waters: Faith-Based Advocacy and Water for All*, World Council of Churches, Maseru, May 2009.

Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, *From Military Rule to Multiparty Democracy, Political Reforms and Challenges in Lesotho*, 2003.

Electoral Institute of Sustainable Democracy in Africa, *Lesotho: Military Rule (1986-1993)*, March 2007.

Hildyard. N, *The Lesotho Highlands Water Development Project-What Went Wrong? The Corner House*, July 2002.

Human Sciences Research Council, *The 2005/2006 Monitoring and Evaluation Survey in the Phase 1A and 1B Project Areas of the LHWP*, August 2007.

_____, *Community Services and Infrastructure in the LHWP Phase 1 project areas: Findings of the 2006 Monitoring and Evaluation Survey. Vol IV*, LHDA October 2007.

_____, *Downstream Social Monitoring Study: IFR reaches: IFR 1, 2, 3,7 & 9*. LHDA 2007.

_____, *Findings from the Nutrition and Epidemiology Component of the Study, Vol 111. Phase 1A and 1B: Katse, Matsoku, and Muela Survey*, 2007.

_____, *Socio-economic Monitoring of the Downstream Areas of the LHWP: A Preliminary Review*, 2006.

Ka Ndlovu. M, *All Arise in Court: The Battle Against Cooperate Profiteering, Corruption and Dispossession: Lesotho and Johannesburg at a Legal Cross Roads Over Water*, 2002.

- Kee. A (ed.), *Studies in World Christianity Volume 13 Part 1*, Edinburgh University Press, Scotland 2007.
- _____, *Studies in World Christianity Volume 12 Part 3*, Edinburgh University Press, Scotland 2006.
- Lesotho Government, *Hydrological Data to September 1970: Hydrological Survey*, Ministry of Works and Communications. 1971.
- _____, *Meteorological Data to December 1970: Hydrological Survey*.
- LHDA, *The Economic Impacts of Phase 1 of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project*, March 2005
- LHDA, *Lesotho Highlands Water Project-Partners for Life: Preparing the Way*, Public Relations Branch, 1997.
- _____, *Muela Hydropower Project Lesotho, 1995*.
- Loxton, Venn & Associates, *Final Report: Lesotho Highlands Water Project Phase 1A, Vols. 1-8*, South Africa, September 1993.
- Makoa. F (et al.), *Voters and The Politics of Elections in Lesotho*, Volume 4, Number 2, 2000.
- Mashinini. V, *The Lesotho Highlands Water Project and Sustainable Livelihoods: Policy Implications for SADC*, African Institute of South Africa, Policybrief No.22 – June 2010.
- Matlosa. K & N. Pule *The Military in Lesotho*, African Security Review, Volume 10, No. 2, 2001.
- Molaoa. M, *The Socio-economic Impact of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project Resettlement Programme at Makhoakhoeng*, PhD thesis, University of the Free State, Department of Sociology, November 2007.
- Morojele. M, *Lesotho Social Life and Customs Fiction*, University of Witwatersrand. 2006.
- Musasa. N, *A Review of Environmental Assessments Undertaken for Phases 1A and 1B of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project*, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2000.
- Nkiwane. T, *My Brother's Keeper: The Lesotho Crisis in Perspective, Vol 1 No:3*, AAPS, Zimbabwe, 1997.
- Pottinger. L, *Raising the Bar on Big Dams*, CEE Bankwatch Network, Grafokon, Prague, November 2007.
- Ramaili. L & F. Cloete, *The Role of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project in Poverty Alleviation in Lesotho*, Africa Institute of South Africa, Africa Insight Vol 37(4)-March 2008.
- Rand Water, *Lesotho Highlands Water Project*, Department of Water Affairs & Forestry, Communication Section, Pretoria, Oct 1994.

_____, *Technical Information on Water Purification*.

Shand. N, *Report on the Regional Development of the Water Resources of Basutoland*, Cape Town, Feb 1956.

Tsikoane. T, "Towards a Redefined Role of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project" in *The Post-Apartheid South Africa, in Southern Africa After Apartheid*," S. Santho & M. Sejanamane (eds.), SAPES Trust, Zimbabwe, 1991.

Thabane. K (et al.), *'This Dam is Cruel': Women's lives and the Lesotho Highlands Water Project* , UNIFEM, March 2004.

_____, *Women's lives and the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, UNIFEM 2004*

Young. B, *Projected Hydro-electric Schemes in Basutoland: Journal of Geography (USA)*, Vol. 60. pt. 5 May 1961.

Thamae. L, *Dams in Lesotho A Developmental Challenge*, Transformation Resource Centre, Maseru, April 2008.

Thamae. L & L. Pottinger (eds.), *On the Wrong Side of Development*, Transformation Resource Centre, Morija Printing, 2006.

The Ponos Institute, *Voices from the Mountain: Oral Testimonies from Lesotho Highlands*, London, 2002.

Relevant Unpublished Research (dissertations/theses)

Davidson. P, *The Making and Unmaking of the Politics of Exceptionality: Studying Processes of Securitisation and Desecuritisation in the Orange and Okavango River Basin*, Master of Comparative Politics Dissertation, The University of Bergen, November 2006.

Devitt. P, *Lesotho Social Life and Customs*, MSc Degree Dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, 1969.

Lekhase. T, *The Impact of Lesotho Highlands Water Project on Lesotho-South Africa Relations*, MSc Degree Dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, 2000.

Letsala. T, *Lesotho Sustainable Agriculture*, 2004.

Makoro. F, *Theology in Community Service Delivery: A New Model for Development and Reconciliation in South Africa. A challenge to the Baptist Convention and the Baptist Union of South Africa*, an MTh Degree Dissertation, Graduate School of Theology and Development Studies, University of Edinburgh, New College, Scotland, September 2000.

Matli. M, *The Social Impacts of a Large Development Project: Lesotho Highlands Water Project*, MSc Degree Dissertation, Department of Geography, University of Free State, 2005.

Petersson. L, *Lesotho Structural Adjustment Economic Policy*, 1990.

Sibolla. H, *Role of Lesotho Highlands Water Project in Rural Development and Environmental Protection*. University of Witwatersrand, 1995.

Books

Ballard. R (*et al.*), *Voices of Protest: Social Movements in Post-Apartheid South Africa*, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, Scottsville, 2006.

Bardach. E, *Getting Agencies to Work Together: The Practice and Theory of Managerial Craftsmanship*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1998.

Botes. P, *Aspects of Supervision: A Guide for the Contemporary Public Manager*, Southern Book Publishers, Pretoria, 1994.

Brinkerhoff. D & B. Crosby, *Managing Policy Reform*, Kumarian Press, USA, 2002.

Butler. M & R. Greenstein (eds.), *Sustainable Livelihoods: Towards a Research Agenda*, CASE, November 1999.

Casalis. E, *The Basutos, Morija Museum & Archives*, Lesotho, 1997.

Chambers. R & G. Conway (ed.), *Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: Practical Concepts for the 21st Century*, University of Sussex, Brighton, IDS Publications, 1992.

Chowdhury. C & C. Kirkpatrick (eds.), *Development Policy and Planning: An Introduction to Models and Techniques*, Routledge, London, 1995.

Cohen. J & S. Peterson (eds.), *Administrative Decentralization: Strategies for Developing Countries*, Kumarian Press, 1999.

Cohen. S & W. Eimicke (eds.), *The Effective Public Manager 3rd Edition*, John Wiley & Sons Inc, 2002.

Colebatch. H, *Policy 2nd Edition*, Open University Press, Philadelphia, 2002.

Collison. R (*et al.*), *World Bibliographical Series: Lesotho Vol. 3*, Clío Press, Oxford, 1980.

Conroy. C & M. Litvinoff (eds.), *The Greening of Aid: Sustainable Livelihoods in Practice*, Earthscan Publications, London, 1988.

Conyers. D & P. Hill (eds.), *An Introduction to Development Planning in the Third World*, John Wiley, Chichester, 1984.

- Feldman. D (*et al.*), *Policy Studies Review Vol.16:1*, The University of Tennessee, Energy, Environment & Resource Centre, Spring 1999.
- Fischer. F, *Reframing Public Policy*, Oxford University Press, 2003.
- Giddens. A, *Studies in Sociology: Power; A Radical View*, Balliot College, Oxford.
- Gill. S & P. Ntsekhe (eds.), *Macro-Economic Factors Impacting on Poverty in Lesotho*, Sechaba Consultants, Maseru, 1999.
- Grindle. M, (ed.), *Getting Good Government: Capacity Building in the Public Sectors of Developing Countries*, Harvard Institute for International Development, 1997.
- Hajer. M & H. Wagenaar, *Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Network Society*, Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Hill. M, & P. Hupe (eds.), *Implementing Public Policy: Governance in Theory and in Practice*, SAGE Publications, London, 2002.
- John. P, *Analysing Public Policy*, Pinter Publishing, London, 1998.
- Kickert.W (*et al.*), *Managing Complex Networks: Strategies for the Public Sector*, SAGE Publications, London, 1997.
- Khaketla. M, *Lesotho 1970: An African Coup Under the Microscope*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1972.
- Kingdon. J, *Agenda, Alternatives, and Public Policies 2nd Edition*, Harper Collins College Publishers, 1995.
- Kuzwayo. E, *Call Me Woman*, Picador Africa, South Africa, 2004.
- Lebow. R, *The Art of Bargaining*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1991.
- Lipsky. M, *Street-Level Bureaucracy*, Russel Sage Foundation, New York, 1988.
- Lukes. S, *Power: A Radical View 2nd Edition*, British Sociological Association, 2005.
- Lyons. T & R. Hamlin (eds.), *Creating an Economic Development Action Plan*, Praeger Publishers, USA. 2001.
- Magau. T, Lesotho: 'The Uphill Journey to Development', *In Vocational Education and Training in Southern Africa*, HSRC Press 2005.
- Maisela. L, *The Empowered Native*, Sizwe Publishing, Sandton, 2007.
- Mandell. M, *Getting Results Through Collaboration*, Quorum Books, London 2001.
- Marsden. D & P. Oakley (eds.), *Evaluating Social Development Project*, Oxfam, Oxford 1990.

- Maser. C, *Resolving Environmental Conflict: Towards Sustainable Community Development*, St. Lucie Press, USA, 1996.
- Maynard-Moody. S & M. Musheno (eds.), *Cops, Teachers Counselors: Stories from the Front Lines of Public Service*, The University of Michigan Press, 2000.
- Molaoa. M, *Monitoring Impact of Compensation for 1988 to December 1989*, LHDA Environment Division, March 1990.
- Morss. E & D. Gow (eds.), *Implementing Rural Development Projects*, Westview Press, USA, 1985.
- Munck. R & D. O'Hearn (eds.), *Critical Development Theory*, Zed Books, London, 1999.
- Neefes. K, *Environments and Livelihoods: Strategies for Sustainability*, Oxfam, Oxford, 2002.
- Ntsebeza. L, *Democracy Compromised: Chiefs and the Politics of Land in South Africa*, HSRC Press, Cape Town, 2006.
- Nyerere. J, *Freedom and Development*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1973.
- Parsons. W, *Public Policy*, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, London, 1995.
- Peters. B, *The Future of Governing 2nd Edition*, University Press of Kansas, 2001.
- Pfeffer. J, *Managing with Power: Politics and Influence in Organisations*, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 1999.
- Powell. I & P. Wellings, *The Lesotho Woodlot Project: Progress, Problems and Prospects*, University of Natal-Durban, Working Paper No.5, 1983.
- Rapley. J, *Understanding Development: Theory and Practice in the Third World*, Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc, 1996.
- Roxborough. I, *Theories of Underdevelopment*, Macmillan. London, 1979.
- Sabatier. R & H. Jenkins-Smith (eds.), *Policy Change and Learning*, Westview Press, Oxford 1993.
- Sachs. W, *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power*, Zed Books. London 1992.
- Sanneh. L, *Encountering the West*, Orbis Books, New York, 1993.
- Santho. S & M. Sejanamane (eds.), *Southern Africa After Apartheid*, SAPES Trust, Zimbabwe, 1991.
- Sargent. F (et al.), *Rural Environmental Planning for Sustainable Communities*, Island Press, USA, 1991.
- Seaman. M & J. Van As, *The Environmental Status of the Orange River Mouth as Reflected by the Fish Community*, WRC Report No: 505/1/98, University of the Free State.

Simon. H, *Administrative Behaviour 4th Edition*, The Free Press, New York, 1997.

Skidmore. D, *The Ideology of Community Care*, Chapman & Hall, London, 1994.

Thirlwall. A, *Growth & Development, 4th Edition*, Macmillan Education, London, 1989.

Thompson. L, *A History of South Africa*, Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg, 2000.

Toye. J, *Dilemmas of Development: Reflections on the Counter-Revolution in Development Theory and Policy*, Basil Blackwell Ltd, Oxford, 1987.

UNDP –World Bank, *Rural Sanitation in Lesotho: From Pilot Project to National Program*, Washington, 1990.

Verhelst. T, *No Life Without Roots: Culture and Development*, Zed Books Ltd, London, 1987.

Welmer. D & A. Vining, *Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice, 4th Edition*, New Jersey, 2005.

Young. G (et al.), *Women at the Centre: Development Issues and Practices for the 1990s*, Kumarian Press, USA, 1993.