

**UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL**

**The State and Ethno-religious Violence in Plateau State:  
Developing a Peace-building Framework as a Conflict Prevention Strategy**

**By**

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**A Dissertation submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy (Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies)  
in the School of Social Sciences at the University of KwaZulu-Natal.**

**Supervisor**

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**March 2015**

## DECLARATION

I, Dorcas Ettang (student number) 212561023 declare that:

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Signed.....

Date.....

## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this work to the inhabitants of Plateau state and to all those who in one way or another continue to strive to see peace and security return to it.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It has been a very interesting journey for me as I have come to the end of this significant chapter in my life. I would not have made it to this point without the encouragement, prayers, support and love of some very important individuals. I would like to express my deep gratitude and appreciation to them.

Firstly and most importantly, I would like to thank God for giving me life, grace and strength from the beginning to the end. He is my source and foundation. Without Him, this would have remained a distant dream. You deserve all the glory, praise and adoration.

Secondly, I am indebted to my supervisor Dr Alain Tschudin. Thank you for your guidance, your encouragement and your support every step of the way. Your extensive expertise and knowledge as a scholar brought great value to my work. Thank you for letting me dig deep and for asking the tough questions throughout this process. It was also a pleasure working with you and learning from you under the Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies (CTPS) Programme.

I would like to thank my wonderful husband Dr Enwongo Ettang for your support, encouragement and help throughout this process. Thank you for your prayers and your love through it all. I love you. To my two amazing children, Jeremiah and Elizabeth Ettang, thank you for your distractions when I needed it and for allowing mummy to “disappear” for various amounts of time. You now have my full and undivided attention. Know that you can achieve anything you set your mind to and that all things are possible. I would also like to thank my wonderful parents, Jonathan and Charity Onigbinde who asked for constant updates, prayed for and with me, and encouraged me during the challenging times. I would not have achieved this without you. I love you so much. Words cannot express how much you mean to me. To my second family, Engr. and Dr. Mrs Ettang, God bless you for your support and prayers. To all my siblings, Timothy Onigbinde, David Onigbinde, Susan Onigbinde, Idongesit Ettang, Gloria Ettang, Ifiok Ettang, Samson Omale and Imabong Ettang, thank you for your

prayers and for believing in me. You kept me going and saw the light at the end of the tunnel even before I did.

I would like to thank Kemi Ogunsanya for her contribution as I contextualised the proposal and for constantly believing in me. Special thanks go to Nobuhle Bhengu and Seun Ayanniyi, who always checked in and gave me advice during the toughest times. My thanks to my research assistants, Danjuma Jise and Chrisantus Lapang, who assisted during the data collection process. Thanks go to Michelle Chendai for your assistance as I made sense of the data. Special thanks to Deanne Collins for editing my work.

Gratitude goes to the senior staff at the School of Social Sciences at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, it was a pleasure to work with you and learn from such great scholars. Thank you to Professor Uzodike for reading through my thesis and providing significant historical, analytical and theoretical insights. Special thanks goes to all my fellow PhD colleagues including Andrew Okem, Sola Ogunnubi, Meron Okbandrias, who always encouraged me and never hesitated to share their insights and answer my many questions, it was extremely useful and valuable through this personal journey. My thanks also goes to the School of Social Sciences for the opportunity to teach and supervise research at the undergraduate, Honors and Masters Level. Thank you to all the students of POLS203, POLS301, POLS312, CTPS701, CTPS703, CTPS803 and CTPS805 that I taught and supervised. Thank you to Ms Nancy Mudau and Mr Nqobizwe Memela for helping me through the administrative process in getting to this point. Space does not allow me to mention everyone who assisted, encouraged, prayed and supported me through to the completion of this project, but I want to sincerely thank you all.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge the National Research Foundation (NRF) for awarding me a scholarship with which to complete this project in record time.

## ABSTRACT

Contemporary states continue to battle with inter-group tensions, resulting in violent conflict. Ethno-religious violence in Plateau state in north central Nigeria is a case in point. While violent conflicts of an ethnic and religious nature have long existed, since 2004, conflicts in this state have become increasingly violent, more frequent and more deadly, calling for a comprehensive and strategic response. Academics and practitioners have identified peace-building as a potential response to resolve violent conflict in divided societies. The United Nations has relied on comprehensive peace-building frameworks to provide a holistic and strategic response to violent conflict and its causes. Guided by conflict transformation theory, this study aims to contribute to the debate on how peace-building can resolve sub-national complex identity conflicts by addressing their root causes and preventing direct violence. It develops a comprehensive and strategic peace-building framework for Plateau state as it grapples with high levels of ethno-religious tension and violent conflict between warring identities. While peace-building frameworks generally have a national focus, this study develops a framework with a sub-national focus. This is due to the fact that peace-building efforts tend to be centralised and focus on the national level and capital cities, while neglecting sub-national and local entities. The study will contribute to on-going research and practice on how peace-building can be practically applied to sub-entities or federating units within countries and what this implies for the design and implementation of peace-building processes at these levels.

In pursuing this broad objective, the study mainly utilises conflict transformation theory. This theory broadly focuses on reducing violence, addressing injustices and rebuilding relationships in societies experiencing protracted conflict. Using focus group discussions and semi-structured key informant interviews with a wide range of actors and institutions, both at the top and grassroots levels in Plateau state, the study identifies relevant programmes, policies and institutions in the framework and avenues through which the state as the primary actor can address the underlying causes of the conflict and reduce violence. It also responds to the gaps in literature on the relevance and applicability of conflict transformation theory in Africa. The conclusions of this study can be summarised in two broad statements. Firstly, a peace-building framework is required to design and implement peace efforts that specifically target subnational levels. Secondly, peace efforts in Africa need to be decentralised and inclusive in identifying the most appropriate responses for conflict transformation.

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## ACRONYMS

AG	-	Action Group
ANPP	-	All Nigerian People's Party
AQIM	-	Al-Qaeda in the Islam Maghreb
BAA	-	Berom-Anaguta-Afizere
CAN	-	Christian Association of Nigeria
CAR	-	Central African Republic
CECOMPS	-	Centre for Conflict Management and Peace Studies
CEPID	-	Centre for Peace Initiative and Development
CLO	-	Civil Liberties Organisation
COCIN	-	Church of Christ in Nigeria
CPA	-	Centre for Peace Advancement
CSO	-	Civil Society Organisation (s)
DAC	-	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	-	Department for International Development
DRC	-	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS	-	Economic Community of West African States
ECPF	-	ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework
EU	-	European Union
EW-ER	-	Early Warning-Early Response
FAO	-	Food and Agriculture Organization
FCC	-	Federal Character Commission
FEDECO	-	Federal Electoral Commission
FG	-	Federal Government
FGD	-	Focus Group Discussion (s)
FOMWAN	-	Federation of Muslim Women's Associations in Nigeria
GIZ	-	German Federal Enterprise for International Cooperation
GNPP	-	Greater Nigerian People's Party
HRW	-	Human Rights Watch
ICCPR	-	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICG	-	International Crisis Group
IRIN	-	Integrated Regional Information Networks
ISA	-	Identity Structure Analysis
JNI	-	Jama'atu Nasril Islam

KII	-	Key Informant Interview (s)
LGA	-	Local Government Area (s)
LGMC	-	Local Government Monitoring Committee
LTIE	-	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MNC	-	Multinational Corporation
NAPEP	-	National Poverty Eradication Programme
NCNC	-	National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons
NGO	-	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIIA	-	Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
NIPPS	-	Nigerian Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies
NPC	-	Northern People's Congress
NPP	-	Nigerian People's Party
NRN	-	Nigeria Research Network
PBSO	-	Peacebuilding Support Office
PLASIEC	-	Plateau State Independent Electoral Commission
OCHCR	-	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OECD	-	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIC	-	Organization of the Islamic Conference
OPEC	-	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PRP	-	People's Redemption Party
SAI	-	School of Advanced International Studies
SFCG	-	Search for Common Ground
STF	-	Special Task Force
UN	-	United Nations
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	-	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	-	United Nations Children's Fund
UNRISD	-	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
UPN	-	Unity Party of Nigeria
USAID	-	United States Agency for International Development
USIP	-	United States Institute for Peace
WANEP	-	West African Network for Peace-building
WB	-	World Bank
YACP	-	Young Ambassadors for Community Peace

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**POLITICAL MAP OF NIGERIA SHOWING 36 STATES AND CAPITAL CITIES**



Source: Maps of World

Website: <http://www.mapsofworld.com/nigeria/nigeria-political-map.html>

Accessed: March 13, 2015.

**MAP OF PLATEAU STATE SHOWING LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREAS (LGA)**



Source: Zaccheus Onumba Dibiaezue Memorial Libraries  
Website: <http://zodml.org>  
Accessed: 14 November 2014.

## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Ethno-religious divisions and violence are an on-going feature of the global landscape. Countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina (Berkley Center, 2009), Indonesia (Wilson, 2008) and Sri Lanka (Berkley Center, 2011), provide insight into the dynamics and impact of ethno-religious violence. Africa has had its share of ethnic-related conflicts in countries such as Ghana<sup>1</sup>, Kenya, Senegal, Nigeria, and Rwanda. A widely observed trend in these global and continental cases is that ethnicity and religion become a source of conflict when they pervade the political space to mobilise support for or promote specific ethnic, political and economic agendas. Authors such as Osaghae and Suberu (2005, p. 6) have established that identities such as ethnicity and religion become the foundation for conflicts when they are politicised.

With an estimated 400 ethnic groups largely divided among Christianity, Islam and traditional religions<sup>2</sup>, Nigeria offers an interesting case of ethno-religious dynamics and violence. The control of state power, resource allocation and issues of citizenship, in a society divided by religion and ethnicity, have defined its political context. These identities and related tensions emerged during the colonial period and more prominently after independence. Colonialism led to the joining of units with little or no commonalities into an amalgamation of northern and southern protectorates by Lord

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<sup>1</sup> For Ghana's experience of ethnic conflicts particularly in its Northern region, see Pul, H.A.S. (2003) Exclusion, Association and Violence: Trends and Triggers in Northern Ghana's Konkomba-Dagomba Wars, *The African Anthropologist*, (10) 1, pp. 39 – 82; Jonsson, J. (2007) The Overwhelming Minority: Traditional Leadership and Ethnic Conflict in Ghana's Northern Region. CRISE Working Paper No. 30. News articles include: IRIN (2008) Ghana: Conflict in North could threaten elections, 27 June 2008. Available at: <http://m.irinnews.org/report/78993/ghana-conflict-in-north-could-threaten-elections#.VOMDrYZZfCR>, Accessed February 17, 2015; and BBC News Africa (2010) Ghanaians flee violence for northern Togo. 25 May 2010. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10152302>, Accessed 17 February 2015.

<sup>2</sup> There is a lack of consensus on how many ethnic groups there are in Nigeria. Mustapha (2003, p.1) asserts that “nobody knows the real figure and estimates vary widely on the criteria used”. He adds that this confusion is due to challenges with classification and data gathering and the “tendency for ethnic segments to coalesce or differentiate in the face of economic or political developments” (Mustapha, 2006, p.1). Ethnographers suggest that there are approximately 250 ethnic groups in the country (Jekayinfa, 2002). Bangura (n.d.) estimates the number at over 400, while Oti (Mustapha, 2003, p.1) puts the figure at 374 groups. In their account of ethnic and cultural diversity in Nigeria, Okechie-Offoha & Sadiku, (1996, pp. 5-6) argue that “differences in the definitions of ethnic group” has led to the characterisation of Nigeria as being home to as many as 350-450 ethnic groups and as many as 450 ethno-linguistic groups.



Lugard in 1914. In their account of the genesis of ethnic identity conflicts in Nigeria, Osaghae and Suberu (2005) identify colonialism as the single most important factor that brought identities and identity conflicts to life. A seemingly incompatible set of ‘nations’ was brought together in a single experimental state craft called Nigeria, sowing the seeds of discord that was to persist for decades and probably more.

While many types of conflicts (inter-ethnic, intra-ethnic or inter-group clashes) characterise Nigeria’s history, Osaghae and Suberu (2005, p.19) cite ethno-religious conflicts as the most violent. According to Fawole & Bello (2011, p.211)<sup>3</sup>, conflicts of this nature became a permanent feature of the country as far back as the 1980s. More than 50 years after independence, competition among ethnic and religious groupings for political and economic control has continued at the national level. One expression of these tensions has been intense competition for the position of the President, as this determines access to political power and the allocation of economic resources. Various post-colonial military regimes and civilian governments have contributed to the deepening of ethnic divides and increased violence by engaging in power contestations, inter- and intra-party conflicts, seeking support by speaking to ethnic or regional orientations, and sometimes employing violence (Jinadu, 2010 and Ibrahim, 2007).

While competition for political power between various ethno-religious groups takes place at the centre, this and related violence has trickled down to some of the 36 states as local groups compete for political control and access to resources like land. In his analysis of inter-group relations in the north central region of Nigeria, Agaba (2006, p. 506) highlights contestations for political power and increased related violence between groups in states like Nassarawa (Bassa/Gbayi versus Ebira groups), Plateau (Berom-Anaguta-Afizere and Hausa/Fulani groups), and Taraba (Tiv and Junkun groups). Osaghae (1998, p. 250) provides an extensive account of the cause, nature and impact of the religious riots and Muslim-Christian clashes that occurred in northern Nigeria and other parts of the country between the late 1980s and early 1990s. These include Ilorin in 1986, Kafanchan, Kaduna, Katsina, Funtua, Kano and Zaria in 1987; and Bauchi in 1991. Conflicts such as those in the state of Kano in October 1982, showed that “religion was fast becoming a political resource to be manipulated in furtherance

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<sup>3</sup> Fawole & Bello (2011) provide a detailed list of ethno-religious violent conflicts in Nigeria.

of the objective of politicians and political parties" (Osaghae, 1998, p. 132). Although inter group conflicts have taken place to contest political decisions and influence candidate selection processes, they were not as violent and serious as other forms of inter-group conflicts between Christians and Muslims that erupted across the country (Osaghae, 1998, p. 249) due to the politicisation of religion and its impact on inter-group relations.

While ethno-religious violence has occurred in Borno, Kaduna, Kano and Kwara states, this study focuses on Plateau state as a unique case of ethno-religious violence in Nigeria. Although conflicts of this nature in the state date back to the 1940s (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005, p. 16)<sup>4</sup>, the levels of ethno-religious violence have increased since 2001. Another interesting dimension in Plateau state is the indigene<sup>5</sup> versus settler dynamic. It is argued that indigenes (BAA) and settlers (Hausa/Fulani) are on an unequal footing, with the latter subjected to discriminatory acts and excluded from opportunities, including access to land, educational benefits and participation in political institutions controlled by the 'indigenous' state governments (Isa-Odidi, 2004, p.19; Krause, 2011, p. 25-26, Osaghae and Suberu, 2005, p.22). Outside the capital city of Jos, power contestations and ownership claims have pitted the Gamai against the Jarawa, and the Tarok and Muslims in the Shendam and Wase local government areas (LGA) respectively.

Reflecting on Nigeria's history, political and economic factors explain the conflicts in Plateau state, although they have been described as religious and ethnic. This is because

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<sup>4</sup> Violence erupted in Jos, Plateau State between Igbo and Hausa migrants in 1945 over residential and trading opportunities.

<sup>5</sup> In the context of Nigeria, an indigene refers to "the original inhabitant of a place" while settlers are "people who cannot trace their roots back to earliest times" (Sayne, 2012, p.2). These two concepts have become key factors in defining rights and opportunities as "officials use this slippery term to limit access to public resources, such as land, schools, and government jobs" (Sayne, 2012, p.2). The idea of indigene versus non-indigenes (settlers) has created a practice that excludes perceived migrants and settlers and denies them access to the resources, rights and privileges of the state (rights that perceived indigenes benefit from). These rights range from access to government jobs, and scholarships or cheaper fees for state-owned institutions (HRW, 2005, p.8). Although the term, "indigene" is engrained in Nigeria's socio-political history and was formerly regarded positively as a way to identify one's ethnic identity or home of origin, it gives rise to negative connotations and feelings as it has not only divided groups, but also marginalised and excluded them politically, economically and socially. As the above examples show, it has become highly contentious and negative as it now determines access to resources or opportunities.

the conflict, although channelled as ethno-religious and xenophobic in nature and motive, underscores the political and economic factors that drive and shape its outcomes (Best & Rakodi, 2011, p. 2; Higazi, 2011, p. 7; and Kaufman, 2006, p. 49). As discussed in more detail in Chapter Four, these factors include: controversies over indigene and settler rights; accusations and fears of religious domination; dissatisfaction with political representation and political processes; unfair laws and policies; land ownership and control issues; and unfavourable citizenship rights (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002; Fawole & Bello, 2011; Ibrahim & Toure, 2003; Kwaja, 2009; Salawu, 2010; and Sampson, 2012).

The following is evidence of mounting conflicts across Plateau state and their intensity:

- a) **Frequency:** Conflicts have become more frequent occurring in 2001, 2002, 2008, 2009, and 2010, with smaller skirmishes in between (ParaMallam, 2011, p. 1). According to the International Crisis Group (2012, p.2), there were more than 80 episodes of violence involving the Berom, Anaya and Afizere groups (BAA) and Hausa-Fulani communities between 1999 and 2004. Violence occurred in Bokkos LGA and Langtang South LGA in March and June 2013, respectively (Daily Trust, 2013) and in Riyom LGA in January 2014 (BBC, 2014).
- b) **Scope:** Violent conflicts are widespread and occur outside the capital city of Jos. A report by Human Rights Watch in 2005 (p. 6) noted that there had been violent attacks in Jos and in eight of the 17 local government areas (LGA) in Plateau state. Gofwen's (2011, p. 11) historical overview of ethno-religious conflicts in Plateau state notes that conflicts had taken place in key LGA like Jos-North LGA (1994; 2001; 2002; 2008; and 2010), Jos-South LGA (1998 and 2010); Wase LGA, (2002-2004), and Shendam LGA (2002). The LGA of Barkin Ladi, Riyom, and Qua'an Pan also experienced violent attacks and areas such as Langtang North, Langtang South and Wase were hardest hit (HRW, 2005, p. 6). Violence such as that in Yelwa, Shendam LGA in 2004 spread to other LGA like Langtang North, Langtang South and Wase.

- c) **Increased Casualties and Displaced Persons:** The increasing number of casualties from five people in 1994, to six in 1997, 1,000 in 2001, 700 in 2002-2004, more than a thousand in 2008 and more than 400 in 2010 (Gofwen, 2011, p. 54). There have also been thousands of displaced persons, especially in 2002-2004 and 2008.
- d) **Organisation:** According to the International Crisis Group (2012, p.2), the violence has become more “deadlier and frequent” since 2001. Furthermore, organised violence emerged more prominently in 2001 with larger attacks, showing a high level of “organization, forethought and planning” (HRW, 2005, p.6). Ethnic groups' ability to organise is bolstered by access to various forms of technology including print media and mobile phones (Blench et al., 2006, p. 65).

Period	Event/Conflict	Affected LGA	Casualties	Cause
1994	Jos Riots	Jos North (Jos Township, Gada Biyu, Jos Main market)	Death toll: 5. Properties destroyed. Part of Jos Main market burned	Appointment of a Muslim as sole administrator of Jos North. Indigenous groups reject appointment
1997	Gyero Road Crisis	Jos South	Death toll: 6	Clash between Hausa-Fulani and Berom after Berom killed by Hausa farmer for picking fruit without permission
September 7 -13, 2001	Jos Crisis	Jos North Jos South Reprisal attacks in other LGA in the State	Death toll: 1000. Destruction of property and places of worship never experienced before	Muslims versus Christians. Indigenous groups reject appointment of Muslim as NAPEP coordinator
May 2002	The Eto-Baba Ward Congress Crisis	Jos North (Angwan Rukuba, Eto Baba, and Nasarawa Gwom)	Death toll: At least a 100 people killed. Properties destroyed	Political competition between indigenous groups versus Hausa-Fulani
June 2002	Yelwa Crisis	Shendam LGA (Yelwa)	Death toll: Many. Destruction of property: numerous churches and mosques. Thousands displaced to neighbouring states and LGA	Political competition, contestations over traditional leadership and ownership of Yelwa, unrest in Jos and insecurity in the senatorial zone
2002-2004	Wase Communal Clashes	Wase LGA (Wase Town, Kardarko and other communities in LGA)	Death toll: Hundreds	Contestation over ownership of the LGA, competition over land and traditional leadership between Tarok, Boghom and Hausa-Fulani
May 2004	Yelwa Crisis	Shendam LGA (Yelwa). Violence spread to other LGA: Langtang North, Langtang South LGA and Wase	Death toll: 700. Destruction of most houses, thousands displaced. Yelwa becoming a ghost town	Political competition, contestations over traditional leadership, spill over from crisis in Jos. Between Gamai, Tarok (predominantly Christians) and Hausa-Fulani (predominantly Muslims)
November 2008	Jos 2008 Crisis	Jos North, Jos South and environs	Death toll: More than 1000. Destruction of numerous homes, properties, places of worship, vehicles, thousands displaced	Unresolved issues of indigeneity and ownership of Jos, political competition. Between the BAA and Christians in general versus the Hausa-Fulani
January 2010	Jos 2010 Crisis	Jos North and Jos South	Death toll: More than 400	Unresolved issues of indigeneity and ownership of Jos, political competition. Between the BAA and Christians in general and the Hausa-Fulani
March 2010	The Dogo-Nahawa Massacre	Jos South (Dogo Nahawa, Zat and Rasat villages)	Death toll: Gruesome murders of 300 people including women and children	Berom Christians versus Hausa Fulani. Political and economic contestation for control of Jos between the indigenes and settler community claiming indigene status
December 2010	Jos Christmas Eve Bombing	Jos North	Death toll: More than 80 people in bombing and subsequent riots	Between Muslim fundamentalists and Christians. Feelings of animosity as a result of previous conflicts in Jos

**Table 1.1: Critical Episodes of Violence in Plateau State (1994 – 2010)**

**Source: Adapted from Gofwen (2011)**

## **1.1. Purpose of the Study**

Various authors (Conciliation Resources, 2012; Danfulani and Fwatshak, 2002; Kwaja, 2009; Kwaja, 2011; Mohammed, 2004; Sampson, 2012), have offered recommendations on what is required to build peace and prevent future ethno-religious violence in Plateau state. These include political, security, economic and social measures, such as: extensive land ownership reform; building legitimate and effective public institutions; strengthening the security sector to improve prevention efforts and enhance security; ensuring solid early warning and response mechanisms; robust disarmament initiatives; building employment and entrepreneurial opportunities; and, very importantly, eliminating the indigene/settler dynamic in all sectors.

While such recommendations are useful, there is a gap when it comes to how they can be operationalised and implemented to successfully address the structural causes of the conflict and reduce violence. This gap exists due to:

(a) The failure of the Nigerian state, on the one hand and the Plateau state government, on the other to acknowledge and address the structural causes of the conflict and implement such recommendations. This can be attributed to the ethnicisation of politics through the consolidation of power by certain ethnic groups in Plateau state such as the Berom at the expense of other groups (both indigenous and non-natives) and the realisation that the implementation of these recommendations will change the current political system.

(b) Nigeria's federal system of government where most decisions are made at the centre.

(c) The state's focus on security responses, rather than the longstanding, structural causes of the conflict.

(d) A lack of clarity and focus on how these recommendations can be translated into relevant programmes, policies and institutions. This is important, because peace-

building can only be effective when implemented through such avenues.

This study seeks to fill these gaps by:

(a) Sharpening previously outlined recommendations, and in so doing, establishing what is required to transform them into action,

(b) Developing a strategic peace-building framework, guided by conflict transformation theory, that defines and crafts relevant programmes, policies and institutions to achieve these recommendations,

(c) Examining the usefulness and relevance of these programmes, policies and institutions in the context of Plateau state, and

(d) Providing clarity on the implementation of these recommendations and the role of the state in doing so.

Although national peace-building frameworks have been developed and applied to post-conflict countries like Burundi, Liberia and South Sudan, this study examines the development of such frameworks below the national level. A focus on the sub-national level is important because national peace-building efforts tend to be centralised and, while progress is evident at the national level, it fails to take account of the specificities and particularities inherent in various subnational contexts. Peace-building should be grassroots oriented while being holistic, inclusive and bottom-up.

## **1.2. Research Hypothesis**

Ethno-religious violence has persisted in Plateau state due to the lack of a comprehensive and strategic peace-building framework to shape and guide state intervention aimed at reducing direct violence and addressing the structural causes of the ethno-religious violence.

### **1.3. Research Objectives**

In addressing the gaps outlined in the previous section (section 1.1), the objectives of this study are as follows:

- a) To assess the need for a peace-building framework to address the structural causes of the ethno-religious violent conflict in Plateau state and prevent its recurrence in the future.
- b) To interrogate state capacity, and the limitations and challenges for peace-building and conflict transformation.
- c) To explore and determine the necessary programmes, policies and institutions that should be developed by the state to resolve the structural causes of the ethno-religious violence in Plateau state and to propose how these can be developed.
- d) To contribute to the literature on how conflict transformation theory can be applied to address the structural causes of the ethno-religious violence in Plateau state.

### **1.4. Research Questions**

The study will unpack the following key questions:

- a) How can a peace-building framework address the structural causes of the ethno-religious violence in Plateau state and prevent its recurrence in the future?
- b) How can the challenges and limitations faced by the state in peace-building and conflict transformation be addressed?
- c) What programmes, policies and institutions need to be developed by the state to resolve the structural causes of the ethno-religious violence in Plateau state? How can these be developed?
- d) How can the theory of conflict transformation be applied in addressing the structural causes of the ethno-religious violence in Plateau state?

### **1.5. Research Methodology**

The nature of this study called for qualitative research as it deals with views, perceptions and experiences. The scope of the study also spoke to the need for qualitative research. This is because the issues, actors and perspectives are real and the



conflict situation is constantly evolving. Qualitative research also allows for fluidity and flexibility as it creates the space for unanticipated findings and altering research plans in response to new developments (Bryman, 1984, p. 78).

This study is situated in peace research, an approach which Bangura (2007) notes is useful in analysing conflict in order to ensure its prevention and resolution. In line with peace research, this study also focuses on action that can contribute to or induce social change. Peace research is linked to peace and conflict studies, a field that goes beyond other fields like political science, communications, sociology and psychology (Bangura, 2007, p. 32). Peace and conflict studies focus on the specifics of peace and conflict resolution, while these fields focus only on certain aspects (Bangura, 2007, p. 32). Wallensteen (2011, p.31) notes that peace research has created a space where policy issues like the “causes of war, conflict theory, confidence building, conflict resolution, democratic peace, targeted sanctions, conflict prevention and peacebuilding” have gained scholarly relevance.

This study relied on both primary and secondary sources. Secondary sources that ranged from scholarly journals articles, to books, chapters in books and academic papers were useful in setting the contextual and theoretical framework for this study. Authors who have written extensively on peace-building, conflict transformation, ethno-religious violence and state capacity were consulted. Reports from local news agencies, grassroots organizations and commissions of inquiry on the violence constituted primary data sources. In addition to these reports, focus group discussions (FGD), and semi-structured in-depth interviews also formed part of the data collection process.

### **1.5.1. Data Collection**

The data collection process enabled the researcher to engage with practitioners and experts as well as ordinary citizens to understand their views and perspectives on concepts like peace, peace-building and conflict transformation within the context of Plateau state and a peace-building framework for action. The data for this study was obtained using FGD and Key Informant semi-structured Interviews (KII). Focus groups are moderated, small group discussions aimed at unpacking a topic. They offer

a quick and convenient way to obtain data from participants. Their flexibility in discussing unanticipated issues and the space they allow to access a larger sample size at one time make focus groups a useful form of data collection (Bangura et al., 2007, p.189-193). Focus groups are particularly useful when conducting research in cross-cultural contexts and with ethnic minorities, as group norms and values are highlighted (Kitzinger, 1995, p.300). Furthermore, they provide an opportunity for the actors to engage and interact on their experiences and explain their perspectives. In accordance with peace-building and conflict transformation, any discussion on efforts to ensure sustainable peace and prevent future violence requires a holistic process that is inclusive of all sectors. Focus groups are therefore useful in bringing different actors, from different sectors and levels of society, together around issues that affect them. When combined with other qualitative methods of data collection such as in-depth individual interviews, this is an accurate and useful data collection method (Morgan & Spanish, 1984, p. 254 and Morgan 1996, p. 134).

Interviews are primarily useful in providing robust and in-depth individual perspectives and accounts of experiences (Polkinghorne, 2005, p. 142; Marshall & Rossman, 2006, p.56). They also offer the opportunity to obtain data rapidly and guarantee opportunities for follow-up and clarification. This study utilised in-depth semi-structured interviews with individuals from relevant groups. This broad selection of participants actively informed the study and enabled rich analysis. A wide range of interviews also allows for varying perspectives, thereby contributing to objective research. The rationale for using interviews as a key data collection method was that this study sought to uncover and understand the views of participants on various events, obtain their input in identifying priority areas and benefit from their expertise in the design of a peace-building framework. In-depth interviews with relevant stakeholders were particularly useful in providing a space for them to express their opinions freely. Semi-structured interviews allow for flexibility and for new questions.

In line with the research objectives, the researcher used a pre-prepared checklist of guiding questions. The questions were semi-structured so that there was space to explore key issues in more depth. Follow-up questions emerged as the discussions took place. Furthermore, the responses to some questions reached the point of saturation and

it was thus necessary to switch to a different set of questions in order to maximise the time spent with the respondents. The researcher conducted fieldwork in Plateau state during the months of December 2013 and January 2014 starting with the FGD, followed by KII.

Their level of involvement in peace efforts, the relevance of the issues to their work and that of their organisation and their knowledge of the subject matter were among the criteria used to identify respondents for the FGD and KII. These respondents also interacted extensively with citizens during and after various episodes of the conflict and were able to bring their rich experience and wide understanding of the conflict to bear. The data collected emanated not only from their perspectives and experiences as individuals working on peace and conflict issues but as long-term residents of the state. For the KII specifically, citizens were selected bearing in mind the need to ensure adequate age, gender, ethnic, religious and geographical representation.

Respondents in the FGD and KII were given a form to record the following information: age, gender, place of birth, length of stay in the state, ethnic group, religious affiliation, occupation and organisation. They also completed an informed consent form. Each form had a unique code to identify the respondents. The information on the forms was later entered into a computer in an excel spread-sheet. The researcher used a digital recorder and additional notes to capture key issues.

#### **a) Focus Group Discussions**

Ten FGD were conducted with one held per day between 9 am and 3 pm. The respondents included key stakeholders from women's groups, youth groups, federal government, state government, the security sector, media, inter-faith organisations, civil society, the justice sector, and academic institutions. Table 1.2 below presents a breakdown of the respondents that took part in the FGD and their gender and religious affiliations. Seventy-nine respondents participated in the FGD, with 59 men (75%) and 20 women (25%) and 49 Christians (62%) and 27 Muslims (34%). Table 1.3 presents the number of respondents in each FGD.

<b>Breakdown of Focus Group Discussions</b>	<b>Numbers</b>
Total number of respondents	79
Total number of male respondents	59
Total number of female respondents	20
Total Number of Christians	49
Total Number of Muslims	27
Total Number of Other Religion	3

**Table 1.2: Breakdown of respondents in Focus Group Discussions by gender and religion**

<b>Focus Groups</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>
Focus Group One	15 Respondents
Focus Group Two	7 Respondents
Focus Group Three	6 Respondents
Focus Group Four	11 Respondents
Focus Group Five	8 Respondents
Focus Group Six	7 Respondents
Focus Group Seven	4 Respondents
Focus Group Eight	9 Respondents
Focus Group Nine	7 Respondents
Focus Group Ten	5 Respondents

**Table 1.3: Number of Respondents in Focus Group Discussions**

Respondents were coded according to their focus group and their number. Table 1.4 presents the codes and their translation.

<b>Code</b>	<b>Translation</b>
FG1	Focus Group One
P1	Participant One
FG1-P1	Focus Group One – Participant One

**Table 1.4.: Coding and Translation of Focus Group Discussions**

## b) Key Informant Interviews

KII were conducted with 53 individuals, 31 males (58%) and 22 females (42%), and 38 Christians (72%) and 14 Muslims (28%). Table 1.5 shows a breakdown of the total number of respondents that took part in the KII as well as their gender and religious affiliation.

<b>Breakdown of Key Informant Interviews</b>	<b>Numbers</b>
Total number of respondents	53
Total number of male respondents	31
Total number of female respondents	22
Total Number of Christians	38
Total Number of Muslims	14
Total Number of Other Religion	1

**Table 1.5: Breakdown of respondents in Key Informant Interviews by gender and religion**

Ordinary citizens at grassroots level took part in the KII at the initial stage. It was important to not only target individuals within the capital city of Jos, but in outlying LGA. At this stage, there were visits to eight of the 17 LGA in the state and KII were conducted with five residents in each LGA. The number of violent conflicts and the power contestations in these areas determined their selection as it was important to collect data on potential solutions. These LGA fall under the northern, central and southern zones in Plateau state. Table 1.6 provides a breakdown of the LGA in which KII were conducted.

<b>Northern Zone</b>	<b>Central Zone</b>	<b>Southern Zone</b>
Jos North	Bokkos	Shendam
Jos South	Mangu	Wase
Barkin Ladi		Langtang South

**Table 1.6: Zonal and Local Government Area Representation in Focus Group Discussions and Key Informant Interviews**

High-level stakeholders also took part in the KII based on their involvement in shaping the discourse on the issues and in designing and implementing solutions. This provided an opportunity to engage with them in more detail on specific issues related to the study's themes. In similar vein to the FGD, Table 1.7 translates the codes in the order of the number of the interview and their location.

<b>Code</b>	<b>Translation</b>
KII	Key Informant Interviews
P1	Participant One
JM	Jos Metropolis
SZ	Southern Zone
CZ	Central Zone
NZ	Northern Zone

**Table 1.7: Coding and Translation of Key Informant Interviews**

A hundred and thirty two respondents took part in this study (Table 1.8). Respondents were drawn from the three senatorial zones of the state and represented key religious and ethnic orientations. Ninety male and 42 female respondents were involved in this study. It was very difficult to ensure parity because men held key roles in many organisations. Efforts to include women included consciously approaching them in the KII with ordinary citizens and informally requesting organisations to provide women to engage in the FGD. The respondents represented a broad spectrum of individuals from government, to academia, research institutes, civil society, media, business and service industries. They had lived in Plateau state for various lengths of time, some from birth and some for as little as six years.

<b>Respondent Breakdown</b>	<b>Total Number of Respondents</b>
Total number of respondents	132
Total number of male respondents	90
Total number of female respondents	42
Total Number of Christians	87
Total Number of Muslims	41
Total Number of Other Religion	4

**Table 1.8: Total Number of Respondents for Focus Group Discussions and Key Informant Interviews**

### **1.5.2. Data Collation and Vetting**

The data from the field work is collated under three main areas: First, a conceptual analysis where the key concepts are unpacked and contextualised; and secondly, a programmatic and policy analysis which maps and outlines key programmes, policies and institutions that should be part of a peace-building framework that addresses the structural causes of the violence and prevents direct violence. In some instances, these programmes, policies and institutions already exist but require strengthening. Finally, a thematic analysis of what should be included under the four key components of the peace-building framework (political, economic, psycho-social and security) is undertaken. The data also focused on determining the state's efforts thus far in order to identify its capacity for peace-building and transformation, the challenges and limitations it confronts and ways of overcoming these.

It was common for respondents in both FGD and KII to focus more on discussing the causes of conflict even though many of the questions were forward looking and focused on how to achieve sustainable solutions. They had to be steered by the researcher to focus more on responses, recommendations and actions geared towards conflict transformation. In the data screening, the focus was on identifying responses, recommendations and actions that are relevant for the peace-building framework and for conflict transformation.

### **1.5.3. Data Analysis**

The data analysis presents and summarises the data in order to identify the necessary and practical steps for building peace and positively transforming the conflict. It sought to determine what programmes, institutions and policies could address the causes of the conflict in Plateau state. It was also important to identify the political, economic, psycho-social and security needs and priorities as well as the common and recurring themes emerging from the FGD and KII.

## **1.6. Research Orientation**

My interest in Plateau state stems from the fact that I was born and lived there until I left to pursue my undergraduate and graduate education in Canada. Although I was born in Jos, I am from the Yoruba ethnic group in Oyo state in south western Nigeria. Taking into account the group dynamics in the state, I am a settler. It is helpful to note this in order to avoid potential and unwitting researcher bias. Despite having left Jos in 2001, it is still my home in Nigeria. I have personally experienced the peace and stability that once existed in the state and hope that through my research and thereafter, I can contribute in some way to restoring peace, stability and coexistence.

## **1.7. Profile of Plateau state**

Described as a mini-Nigeria with its mosaic of more than 50 indigenous ethnic communities, 100 linguistic groupings and 40 spoken languages (ICG, 2012, p.1), Plateau state offers a clear example of the identity dynamics and related tensions and violence that have swept Nigeria's political past and present. Geographically situated in Nigeria's north central region, Plateau state lies between Nigeria's largely Christian south and its largely Muslim north. It is surrounded by Bauchi state to the north east, Kaduna state to the north west, Nasarawa state to the south west and Taraba state to the southeast.

Plateau state is home to diverse groups from across the country due to the availability of fertile land for agriculture; its temperate climate; the presence of water and pasture for pastoralists; its status as a favourable destination for tourists; its central location that links the northern and southern regions of the country by various modes of transport; and its vibrant commercial sector (Mohammed, 2004, p.1). As a result of these conditions, Plateau state has become a home of choice for migrants from the north, south, and west of the country.

Plateau state is one of 36 states that make up Nigeria. It was created in 1976 after the military regime of General Murtala Mohammed divided Nigeria into 19 states from its previous 12 states. It is important to note that Nigeria was divided from three to four



regions during the colonial period to 1963, 12 states in 1967, 19 states in 1976, 21 states in 1989, 30 states in 1991 and 36 states in 1996. The progressive restructuring of the country from three regions at independence to the current 36 states was a political response to “appease minority groups who felt underrepresented and economically deprived in national and regional affairs” (Okehie-Offoha & Sadiku, 1996:5) and desired territorial control of their affairs. Currently, Nigeria is a federal republic with a three-tier system of government with its political capital in Abuja and its economic capital in Lagos (ICG, 2012, p.32). Its 36 states are further divided into 774 LGA (ICG, 2012, p.32).

Geographically and administratively, Plateau state is divided into 17 LGA that are managed by council chairpersons or councillors (Modibbo, 2012, p.4). The LGA include Barkin Ladi, Bassa, Bokkos, Jos east, Jos north, Jos south, Kanam, Kanke, Langtang North, Langtang South, Mangu, Mikang, Pankshin, Qua’an Pan, Riyom, Shendam and Wase. These LGA are further divided into districts, wards and villages. According to the official website of Plateau state Government House, the state Executive includes the Governor, Dr Jonah David Jang, and the Deputy Governor Ambassador, Ignatius D. Longjan, as well as the Office of the Governor and the Cabinet<sup>6</sup>. The Cabinet is composed of the Deputy Governor, Commissioners, the Secretary to the state Government, and Special Advisers to the Governor<sup>7</sup>. The House of Assembly, tasked with enacting laws to ensure peace, security and governance, is made up of 24 members<sup>8</sup>. Fourteen state government ministries are responsible for different areas ranging from education and health to justice and women’s affairs and social development<sup>9</sup>.

In addition to these formal state structures, traditional leadership institutions are extremely important in Plateau state as they are regarded as, “custodians of the grassroots” and are generally welcomed and respected by the people (Blench et al.,

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<sup>6</sup> Official Website, Plateau State Government House,  
<http://plateaustategovernmenthouse.org/government/executive/index.php>

<sup>7</sup> Official Website, Plateau State Government House,  
<http://plateaustategovernmenthouse.org/government/executive/index.php>

<sup>8</sup> Official Website, Plateau State Government House,  
<http://plateaustategovernmenthouse.org/government/executive/index.php>

<sup>9</sup> Official Website, Plateau State Government House,  
<http://plateaustategovernmenthouse.org/government/executive/index.php>

2003, p.63). They take two forms: (a) the Plateau state Council of Traditional Rulers (comprising all first level chiefs, emirs and chieftom chairmen) headed by its President, the traditional leader, Gbong Gwom Jos; and (b) Local Government Councils of Chiefs who are second level chiefs and are composed of District Heads, Senior Ward Heads and Village Heads (Moddibo, 2012, p.4). These traditional institutions and leaders are involved in mediation and arbitration and manage relations in cases of disputes among their subjects (Blench et al., 2003, p. 64-65).

As Nigeria's 12<sup>th</sup> largest state, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) estimated Plateau state's population at 3,899, 856<sup>10</sup> in 2013. It is home to about 40-50 ethno-linguistic groups, divided between the major religions of Christianity and Islam. Blench & Dendo (2003, p.86) note that there is no numerically dominant language or ethnic group in Plateau state. Ethnic and religious identities are closely linked. The indigenes (Berom, Mwaghavul, Ngas, and Tarok among many others) mostly practice Christianity and their various traditional religions, the Hausa-Fulani are predominantly Muslim, and the Yoruba subscribe to Christianity, Islam and traditional religions while the Igbo subscribe to Christianity and traditional religions. The key warring ethnic groups mainly subscribe to different religions; the Berom, Afizere and Anaguta (indigenes) are mainly Christians and the Hausa-Fulani (settler) groups practice Islam. While accurate statistics are not available and there are differing views by both Christians and Muslims on which group constitutes the majority, a report on Plateau state by Human Rights Watch released in 2005, states that Christians make up the majority while Muslims are a large minority group (HRW, 2005, p.7).

According to Higazi (2011), Muslims feel politically excluded based on their ethnicity and religion while Christians are of the view that Muslims dominate them culturally and religiously. Historically regarded as Nigeria's most peaceful state, and popularly known as the "Home of Peace and Tourism" and a religiously tolerant state, ethno-religious tensions and violence across the state from 2001-2012 significantly changed these perceptions (ICG, 2012, p.1; Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p.243).

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<sup>10</sup> [www.nigeria.unfpa.org/plateau.html](http://www.nigeria.unfpa.org/plateau.html)

## **1.8. Outline of Study**

This study is divided into eight chapters. The current chapter introduces this study. It also presents the purpose of the study and its key research objectives and research questions. The research methodology, data collection, vetting and analysis processes are discussed. It presents a profile of Plateau state and outlines its administrative, political, ethnic and geographical characteristics. It also situates the state geographically within Nigeria as a whole.

In Chapter Two a literature review unpacks and links the study's key concepts. It begins by examining concepts such as ethnicity, religion, and the role of the state in perpetuating or exacerbating ethno-religious violence. This chapter also discusses the influence of class divisions on ethnicity and religion, the concept of "ethno-religious", the motivations behind this and the implications for societies. Furthermore, it examines global cases of ethno-religious violence. The chapter concludes with a discussion on peace-building and the role of the state in preventing ethno-religious violence.

Chapter Three reviews and discusses theories relevant to this study. The discussion focuses on conflict transformation theory and political economy theory as the theoretical foundations for this study. These theories are not only relevant in the field of peace and security and conflict studies, but also useful in understanding the structural and root causes of conflict and how it can be resolved. The chapter goes on to examine and discuss both conflict management and conflict resolution in light of conflict transformation theory in order to highlight the relevance of the latter. It also examines the expansion and evolution of conflict transformation, particularly its linkages to peace-building processes, transitional justice, and human rights.

Chapter Four begins by setting the broad context and background of identity tensions in Nigeria. It then unpacks this in Plateau state from 2001 to 2012<sup>11</sup>. This is done through a historical overview of identity struggles in Nigeria and Plateau state, followed

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<sup>11</sup> As noted earlier, there was an increase in the nature and frequency of violence from 2001-2012 even though the causes of the violence and violent clashes predate this period. 2001-2012 has been described as the most violent and deadliest periods of ethno-religious violent conflicts in the state.

by a synopsis of key episodes of ethno-religious conflict in Plateau state, and an in-depth examination of the causes of the conflict, viewed through the political economy lens. As stated earlier, identity dynamics and longstanding tensions at the national level have trickled down to states like Plateau state. It is important to understand this dichotomy and its impact on national level politics down to the state level. Furthermore, this chapter presents a stakeholder analysis that identifies the key stakeholders involved in the conflict, the impact of the conflict and the future prognosis.

Chapter Five presents and analyses the data on the peace-building framework with the main aim of preventing the recurrence of ethno-religious violence in Plateau state. This entails defining and understanding the various issues, solutions and responses embedded in a peace-building framework and the ingredients necessary to develop such a framework for Plateau state. Furthermore, it discusses what programmes, policies and institutions are important in this framework, based on the views and perspectives of stakeholders on the ground.

Chapter Six presents and analyses the data on the state and peace-building. It focuses on the Plateau state government and through perspectives and views on the ground, discusses its role and existing capacities as well as its limitations and challenges. State officials were included in the FGD and KII in order to give them an opportunity to contribute to the discussions, specifically on their efforts thus far and the challenges they have faced. This will contribute to an understanding of the nature of the conflict and the structural challenges that political actors confront in peace-building.

Chapter Seven discusses four key themes in response to the research questions and assesses the validity of conflict transformation theory in Plateau state. This chapter engages in a robust discussion on whether conflict transformation is useful in bringing about nonviolent change in an African context such as Plateau state. Based on perceptions and views from a wide range of stakeholders, it brings forward African narratives and views on conflict transformation. The chapter also presents the limitations of the study, its implications for policy and practice and areas for further study.

Chapter Eight concludes the study with relevant recommendations for policymakers, based on the discussions and analysis. The recommendations are for the short, medium and long term and take into account political, economic, psycho-social and security components. The chapter concludes with some final thoughts for reflection and action.

## CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

### 2.1. Unpacking Ethnicity, Religion and the State

This chapter examines key concepts like ethnicity and religion and discusses the literature on ethno-religious violence. It also discusses class-based conflicts in relation to ethnic and religious dynamics and also examines the term “ethno-religious” and how this is understood and applied within the broader conflict discourse. This exercise is important in order to understand the rationale for these forms of violence and helps to build the contextual framework for this study. In addition to the above, this study also examines existing literature on peace-building as a response to ethno-religious violence and the role of the state in contributing to or preventing this form of violence. This discussion is relevant in understanding how peace-building can be utilised to address the proximate and underlying causes of such violence and the role of the state in prevention. Before discussing these concepts, it is important to shed light on the religious and ethnic dynamics in Nigeria as a whole.

According to the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations (UN), Nigeria’s population was approximately 170,901,000 as at July 2013<sup>12</sup>. Mustapha (2012, p.4), acknowledges that the percentages and numerical size of each ethnic and religious group in Nigeria’s large population are highly controversial amongst the majority and some of the larger minority groups. In the case of Plateau state, according to Moddibo (2012, p.4), estimating the percentage of Muslims in each LGA would be very difficult and highly contentious. Bearing in mind differing views on the exact number of ethnic groups in Nigeria<sup>13</sup>, the politically and numerically majority ethnic groups are the Hausa-Fulani in the north, Yoruba in the south-west and the Igbo in the south-east (Mustapha, 2006, p.1). Politically and numerically smaller groups that are economically and administratively disadvantaged include the Ijaw, Kanuri, Edo, Ibibio, Nupe and Tiv groups (Mustapha, 2006, p.1). According to a document released by the World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous peoples in 2007, the main religions in Nigeria are Islam (50%), Christianity (40%) and traditional

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<sup>12</sup> Food Agricultural Association – United Nations  
<http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/index/en/?lang=en&ISO3=NGA>

<sup>13</sup> See Footnote 1, page 1

religions (10%) while in 2010; the Pew Research Centre Forum on Religion and Public Life estimated the Christian population at 49.3% and Muslims at 48.8% of the total national population<sup>14</sup>. While it was difficult to obtain recent statistics, sources show that both religions are dominant in Nigeria.

### **2.1.1. Ethnicity**

Authors such as Fox (2002), Egwu (1999), Smith (1988), Glazer and Moynihan (1975), Campbell (1998), Fearon (2003) and Fenton (2003) have contributed significantly to unpacking the concept and application of ethnicity. In simple terms, ethnicity is perceived as a form of identity and is linked to the idea of having a common history and ancestry. Individuals within a specific ethnic group share a common identity, history and values. Fearon (2003, p.201) identifies the following six features of a “prototypical” ethnic group:

- (a) Membership is reckoned primarily by descent by both members and non-members,
- (b) Members are conscious of group membership and view it as normatively and psychologically important to them,
- (c) Members share distinguishing cultural features such as common language, religion and customs,
- (d) These cultural features are held to be valuable by a large majority of members of the group,
- (e) The group has a homeland, or at least "remembers" one,
- (f) The group has a shared and collectively represented history as a group. Further, this history is not wholly manufactured, but has some basis in fact...

Egwu (1999) characterises ethnicity as: exclusive by eliminating others and building a feeling of oneness with others in the same group; a tool for competition and conflict within societies; a political tool linked to the state; closely interacting with concepts like religion and class making it difficult to distinguish between the three; and used to determine group actions and decisions.

Beyond these definitions and ideas, society and culture have shaped how ethnicity is perceived and applied. Fenton (2003, p.3) notes that ethnicity is the result of socially constructed ideas of “descent and culture”. Osaghae (1992) and Fawole and Bello (2011) also highlight the role of social formations, specific cultural practices and a

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<sup>14</sup> Pew Research Centre Forum on Religion and Public Life  
<http://features.pewforum.org/grl/population-percentage.php>

unique set of symbols and cosmology in defining and shaping ethnicity. These social factors, specific practices and symbols help to distinguish ethnic groups from one another.

Horowitz (2001) writes that ethnicity has dominated politics in various countries, has been a source of international tensions and has created hindrances to state cohesion. Ethnicity has been highly influential in shaping the actions and responses of individuals and groups. According to the instrumentalist view, ethnicity is seen as a 'resource' that enables individuals from a specific ethnic group to unite and mobilise (Campbell, 1998), while the constructionist lens views ethnicity "as a response to particular circumstances" (Campbell, 1998, p.88). Ultimately, ethnicity does not exist in isolation but becomes significant, especially when it is ignited by various social and political factors. Esman (1994, p.14) writes that ethnicity becomes relevant in a "relational" context where it is influenced by "catalysts and constraints". As an example, ethnic and cultural associations in Jos, Plateau State provide a source of belonging and support to members. As these members come together under their ethnicities, associational forms are developed through the sense of belonging, socio-economic and psychological security that all members share (Adetula, 2005). This is what Osaghae (1994, p.7) has described as "organization-based ethnicity"- which derives from the ethnic group or category, but does not have to be located in the ethnic territory".

While ethnicity is identified as a significant element of the African reality that provides individuals with a sense of self (Ake, 1993), it has become a somewhat negative factor in the political arena from the colonial era to the post-independence period. Mamdani's (1996, p.24) analysis of ethnicity in the context of colonial control, points out that indirect rule and the colonial state supported "ethnically bound institutions of control" making ethnicity "the form of control over natives and the form of revolt against it". He (Mamdani, 1996, p.24) also adds that the colonial state was designed either on ethnic or religious foundations, with the result that most revolts and uprisings in the colonial era were based on religion or ethnicity. During the period of indirect rule in Africa, natives and non-natives were also distinguished from one another with the former belonging to ethnic groups, and the latter having no ethnicity and defined by race (Mamdani, 2001, p.654). Europeans (whites) were at the top of the hierarchy, followed by coloureds, Asians and Arabs, with the Hamites at the bottom; this was



accompanied by the notion that races were civilized while ethnic groups were not (Mamdani, 2001, p.654).

As the case of Nigeria shows, while colonial leaders distinguished between natives and non-natives and created different laws for each, this spilled over into the post-independence African state as indigeneity was used to determine one's rights, justice and entitlement (Mamdani, 2001, p.657). In addition was the dual use of both the colonial-led customary law with African tradition (Mamdani, 2001, p.657). This led to the emergence of a native-settler dichotomy particularly at the local level, where indigeneity provides some with rights and entitlements that others cannot have. It is for this reason that Mamdani (2001, p.659) observes that "while the population on the ground is multi-ethnic, the authority, the law, and the definition of rights are mono- or uni-ethnic", something which can only be solved by rethinking the "institutional legacy of colonialism". In addition, this can be solved by challenging the idea that Africans "must define political identity, political right and political justice first and foremost in relation to indigeneity" (Mamdani, 2001, p.664).

It can therefore be concluded that from history, ethnicity remains a salient factor in a political context, for instance, when political actors represent the interests of certain specific ethnic groups and when other groups are excluded from the political process because of their ethnicity. Ethnicity has been particularly salient in contestations over resources and privileges. Here, ethnicity is used for the purpose of "contextual discrimination by some members of one ethnic group against the others in the process of competition for national resources" (Fawole & Bello, 2011, p. 213). It then becomes an organisational channel through which individuals compete to gain access to state power (Wimmer et al., 2009). Ethnicity has also become a strong tool in gaining political advantage. In this case, ethnicity or religion is used to mobilise large sections of the population during elections in order to secure votes. As with other cleavages like region, religion, clan or family, ethnicity is also at the core of politics in divided societies when it determines the allocation of resources and access to political control. Ethnicities also emerge through ethnic and cultural associations, as these associations are key players in urban politics and are channels for competition, opportunities and resources (Adetula, 2005). When such cleavages are the focus or determinant of shared resources and access to political control, this becomes a major problem.

Authors like Collis (1970), Parkins (1978), Cohen (1974), Joseph (1987) and Nnoli (1978) have extensively examined and discussed ethnic identity, particularly within Nigeria's political context. Ethnic identity was dominant in Nigeria even before the colonial era. Collis (1970, p.4) states that Nigeria was "not a nation either racially or geographically, but a conglomeration of ethnic groups, three predominating". In the context of post-colonial Nigeria, Joseph (1987, p.6) cites Parkin's (1978) definition of ethnicity as a "political phenomenon" which emerged from an "intensive struggle between groups over new strategic positions within the structure of the new state". This evolved to include struggles over resources like employment, funds for development, education and political positions (Cohen, 1974). Based on these views, it can be argued that in Africa, and particularly in Nigeria, ethnicity is intrinsically linked to the state and politics. Given its linkages to the state and politics, ethnicity comes alive due to the "keen nature of the struggle for power and resources in a context of scarcity, insecurity, and a lack of confidence in official norms and regulations" (Joseph, 1987, p.7). Therefore, ethnicity was not born as a result of primordial feelings, but arose due to "modern electoral politics" (Joseph, 1987, p.47).

Joseph (1987) asserts that in contemporary times, ethnicity has become exclusive, is dictated by political interests, trumps class divisions, defines competitive interaction and has resulted into an us/them dichotomy. In the context of Nigeria, Nnoli (1978, p.7) states that ethnicity is expressed through "inter-ethnic discrimination in jobs, housing, and admissions into educational institutions, marriages, business transactions or the distribution of social welfare services". Joseph's (1987, p.84) study of the Nigerian civil service bureaucracy cites the view of Habibu Sani (a former bureaucrat in the administration of Kwara state), that people's "primary consideration in any bargaining process is the extent to which the members of their ethnic or cultural group stand to gain or lose in the societal allocation of scarce resources". Lewis (2007) notes that a survey found that Nigerians are more likely than almost all other Africans to define themselves ethnically. This is the case in Plateau state where the salience of ethnicity and religion is intensified within the context of politics (Higazi, 2008). The discussion above has shown how integral and significant ethnicity is in Nigeria. The significance of ethnicity is reflected in the political, social, economic arenas thus pervading all of

Nigerian society even to this day. The next section examines how religion factors into this dynamic.

### **2.1.2. Religion**

At its core, religion is regarded as a belief system and a way of life. Religion can also be used to reinforce group identity and unite populations within a specific territory (Berkley Center, 2009). It has become a powerful tool to mobilise groups as it appeals to both individual emotions and is able to gain broad-based support. When applied and intertwined with ethnicity, religion becomes even more significant in group mobilisation and political engagement. In the relationship between religion and ethnicity, Gurr (1993) defines the former as being significant to ethnicity when groups see it as a key factor that distinguishes them from another group.

In Plateau state and Nigeria as a whole, religion is so important that people have an “emotional attachment” to it (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p.244). While, as noted in the previous section, Lewis (2007) highlights the fact that Nigerians are more ethnically conscious than most Africans, a survey conducted by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life found that religion was more important to Nigerians than their ethnic, national or African identities (Ruby & Shah, 2007). Furthermore, a poll conducted for the BBC (2004) noted that more than 90% of Nigerians said they believed in God and would die for their beliefs. While religion is important to Nigerians, it is not clear whether they care more about religion or ethnicity. However, it is clear that both are strong identities that cannot be downplayed or taken for granted. Furthermore, Aitken (2007, p.250) points out that religious identities can also be used to politicise ethnic identities.

Gunn (2002) argues that translating religion to the state arena and politics makes it a social and cultural force that binds communities together and distinguishes them from others. For Fox (1999), religions are extremely useful in legitimising grievances and mobilising efforts that are sometimes non-religious in nature. People therefore gain legitimacy and credibility for their actions (violent or not), if they are undertaken in the name of religion. Religion becomes significantly negative when it is seen as a symbol of the opposing side, especially between warring groups (Berkeley Center, 2011). It

can thus shape or contribute to ethnic divisions, leading to ethnic conflict (Berkeley Center, 2011). In Bosnia for instance, the use of “historical myths and cultural symbols associated with religion” have reinforced group identities, unified groups, and been used as a tool to mobilise them (Berkeley Center, 2011, p.4). As discussed below, these views and ideas on religion are valid in the case of Nigeria.

Archbishop Teissier of Algiers described Nigeria as “the greatest Islamo-Christian nation in the world” (Jenkins, 2002, p. B10). Onaiyekan (1992, p.48) notes that there is no other nation where so many Christians and Muslims live side by side. The dominance of both religions is evident in the political environment. Islam has a strong grip on politics despite of the existence of the state (Je’adayibe, 2006, p.588). The Sharia’ah Law<sup>15</sup> (a set of laws or legal framework based on Islam and the Qur’an) has become a symbolic issue when it comes to religion in Nigeria (USIP, 2011, p.40). Although recognised by the Constitution purely for personal and customary matters like marriage and divorce, Muslims have defined it as “superior to the Nigerian constitution” (Akinade, 2002). It could be argued that the precedence of the Islamic Law over the Constitution of the country might weaken the power of the latter if some citizens do not respect it. It also shows the strength of religion over even the state itself.

Religion plays a major role in mobilisation and symbolism and in determining group action during episodes of violent conflict. For example, during the 2011 presidential elections in Nigeria, 350 churches were reportedly burnt during riots (Sayne, 2012, p.6). In Plateau state, although the victims and perpetrators of violent conflicts were from different ethnic groups, one thing they had in common was their religion, as they subscribed to either Islam or Christianity (HRW, 2005, p.22). Thus, religion seemed to be more prominent than ethnicity in the use of violence (HRW, 2005, p.22). “Religiously motivated operations such as protecting or destroying places of worship” have become common practice in Nigeria (Best and Kemedi, 2005, p.31).

As a form of symbolism, religion has become a political tool for mobilisation. Ousman (2004, p.77) argues that the rise of Sharia is a new tool for northern Muslim leaders to

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<sup>15</sup> Twelve of Nigeria’s 36 states in Nigeria have adopted the Sharia law and efforts by Muslim dominated states to make it national law have been opposed by Christians in Nigeria.

mobilise the masses around “Islamist rhetoric” in achieving their political ambitions and maintaining power. Islam has therefore become a tool of political struggle in Nigeria (Ousman, 2004, p.96). The terrorist group Boko Haram has called for the “strict adherence” to the Sharia’ah Law as it is seen as offering a better future for Nigeria’s impoverished Muslims and the northern region of the country (Maiangwa et al., 2012, p.50). Christianity is also a tool of political struggle that is used to garner votes and sway public opinion. In his study on Plateau state, Ostien (2009:30) notes that a respondent stated that pastors were telling church members not to vote for Muslims during the local government elections of 2008. There have also been reports of “religious militancy” by both Muslims and Christians in the state as mosques and churches have been used to store weapons (Higazi, 2011, p.19).

Broadly speaking, religion can be seen as both a source of conflict and as a “surrogate” for other factors like ethnic conflict, ethnic divisions or economic inequality and ensuing resentment between groups (USIP, 2011, p.4-5). In the case of Nigeria, the symbolic use of religion to incite sentiments of loyalty within the context of a predatory state has become the foundation for Christian-Muslim interactions and engagement at the level of civil society (Akinade, 2002). This is linked to the politicisation of ethnicity and religion, a concept captured by a growing number of authors.

Jinadu (2007), Kwaja (2009), and Ostien (2009) among others, have written on the conflict in Plateau state while unpacking its ethnic and religious dimensions. For instance, Jinadu (2007) and Kwaja (2009) explain that in many African countries ethnicity and religion become politicised, especially within the state and its political structures, such that these two factors feature in the allocation of positions in the political, educational, public and private sectors. As an example, the fact that most key positions in the Plateau state government and the LGA are filled by Christians, contributing to feelings of marginalisation and resentment on the part of Muslims (HRW, 2005, p.7). It could be argued that this has exacerbated the problems in the state and could explain the militancy of Muslims especially if the choices of Christians for these positions are seen to have been determined by their religious affiliation. In the case of Plateau state, Ostien (2009, p.8) notes that, during elections, Christians stated that the larger aim of the Hausa in the state and in Nigeria is to Islamise Jos, Plateau state and the country as whole (a claim which the author feels is not very convincing

but which has nonetheless been effective, especially in national politics and in the reassertion of indigene claims). Ostien (2009) therefore notes that while the Plateau indigenes march under the banner of Christianity, Islam mobilises the Hausa. While religion has not always featured in indigene and settler disputes in this state, it has become a strong tool due to its strength as a mobilising tool, its ability to whip up emotions and its effectiveness in reaching a wide range of people from various ethnic groups (HRW, 2005, p.9-10).

An example of the use of religion in the political sphere is the use of “religious rhetoric and prejudice” amongst many local communities and at the national level (HRW, 2005, p.10). Considering the ethno-religious violence and tensions in Plateau state, “religious rhetoric and prejudice” is prevalent, even among Christian and Muslim leaders (HRW, 2005, p.10). Ethnic groups are now divided along religious lines, further complicating an already complex problem. Thus, ethnic allegiances have weakened in the face of heightened religious allegiances where ethnic groups are divided based on religion (HRW, 2005, p.10). According to Krause (2011, p.13), religion continues to reinforce the divide between the mainly Christian indigenes and the Muslim Hausa and Fulani in conflicts. The prominence of religion is evident in direct attacks on both mosques and churches and their occupants in 2001 and 2008. Borrowing from Akinade (2002), these actions can be described as the “combative dimension in Christian-Muslim relations in Nigeria”, something which he attributes to the “cynical manipulation of religion by the Nigerian state.”

While inter-religious tensions and violence have emerged, positive working relations between both Muslims and Christians have existed in the state and continue to exist in various ways. These have occurred through economic collaboration, inter-religious dialogue, youth engagement, and peace-building efforts. Higazi (2011) notes that, Christians and Muslims in northern Nigeria have co-operated and engaged peacefully with one another despite the violence across the region. It is also important to note that religion has taken centre-stage in Nigeria because the state has failed to meet the needs of the population<sup>16</sup>. Thus where the state has failed in terms of accountability and

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<sup>16</sup> See, for instance, Ufo Okeke Uzodike and Ayo Whetho, “Exhausted Nationalism, (Mis) Governance and Ascendant Pentecostalism in Nigeria,” *Loyola Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. XXV (2) Jul-Dec 2011.

responsibility to its citizens, religious leaders have emerged in the political space, as individuals and groups look to these non-state actors to provide assistance to impoverished citizens, gaining their loyalty in return (Maiangwa, et al., 2012, p.43). It is clear from the discussions above that like ethnicity, religion is a dominant identity in Nigeria and has reinforced ethnic divisions further. This adds a level of complexity to group dynamics within the political arena and society as a whole. The following section discusses class-based conflicts in relation to ethnic and religious dynamics before discussing other key issues that underpin this study like the role of the state in the context of ethnicity, religion and ethno-religious violence.

### **2.1.3. Class-based influences on Ethnicity and Religion**

In addition to ethnicity, region and religion, class-based identities are a major source of division in societies and in many instances overlap and cross cut others such as ethnicity or religion. Authors like Egwu (1999), Jeong (2009) and Osaghae and Suberu (2005, p.6, p.22) note that ethnicity and religion cannot be understood independently of other identities like class and in the case of Nigeria, class as a non-territorial identity is captured within territorial identities like ethnicity, region and religion. Jeong (2009) also notes the linkages between both racial and ethnic divisions on the one hand and class divisions on the other, resulting in a complex society. In countries like Northern Ireland, Lebanon and Malaysia, political and economic power imbalances linked to ethnic and racial distinctions and a lack of personal economic growth contribute to disenfranchisement and social disharmony (Jeong, 2009). The political and economic superiority of the Protestants led to resentment by Catholics in Northern Ireland, in the Lebanon, the economic dominance of Christians caused resentment among Muslim communities and in Malaysia, the Chinese control the economy while ethnic Malays dominate the political arena (Jeong, 2009).

Class-based identities have an impact on the emergence of resource conflicts. Class strongly determines inter-group relations that result in tensions and violence, while ethnic and religious conflict could be a cover for class divisions. Thus, Rigby (1996, p.246) argues that the Rwandan conflict was “a contemporary, thoroughly modern class conflict over land, wealth and power”. It could thus be argued that the ethnic divisions

in Rwanda were more about competition between groups for economic power and upward mobility in the post-colonial period.

Nigeria presents somewhat of a different case. Osaghae and Suberu (2005, p.13) acknowledge that while class identities have divided the population into two groups, the dominant class/elite and the masses (the urban poor, working class and peasants)<sup>17</sup>, both groups are further divided along ethnic, regional and religious lines. This has limited the growth of class forces and working class awareness in the country (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005; Otite, 1979). Otite (1979, p.93) thus posits that, “the attachment to the exclusive symbols of ethnicity weakens class cultures as well as elite organization and occupational collegueship”. In addition, the numerous ethnic and cultural associations in Nigeria are made up of individuals united by common cultures, ethnicities or languages, yet they belong to different social classes (Adetula, 2005). This does not deny the fact that labour groups have been able to mobilise workers against government programmes and policies and demand better working conditions (Ihonvbere, 1997). Using a different example, Jeong (2009) notes that Muslims in Northern Nigeria feel deprived due to the economic prosperity of the Christian Igbos in Northern states, thus bringing forth the dominance of ethnicity over class.

In concluding this section, class based divisions, mixed with deep ethnic or religious polarisation create a very complex conflict situation. It is important that states are aware of these complexities and realise the impact they have on group relations. While class-based divisions do not feature strongly in Plateau State, it remains a very complex case of identity conflicts as Chapter Four will show. The next section focuses on the state and its role in divided societies.

#### **2.1.4. State**

Hall and Gieben (1992, p.87) offer a sociological definition of the state as a:

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<sup>17</sup> Osaghae and Suberu (2005, p.13) add that while analysts like Osoba (1977), Graf (1988) and Sklar (1963) refer to the existence of a middle class made up of the educated, bureaucrats and technocrats, others like Jega (2000) and Olukoshi (1993) argue that this group does not exist due to the period of structural adjustment and authoritarianism.



political apparatus, distinct from both ruler and ruled, with supreme jurisdiction over a demarcated territorial arena, backed by a claim to monopoly of coercive power, and enjoying a minimum level of support or loyalty from their citizens.

Based on their definition, a state is within a specific geographical territory, backed by the legitimacy of its citizens, has executive power-making decisions and can use force where necessary. A definition of the concept 'state government' provided by the Organisation of Economic Development (OECD, 2001) is applicable to Plateau State.

State governments are:

institutional units exercising some of the functions of government at a level below that of central government and above that of the governmental institutional units existing at a local level. They are institutional units whose fiscal, legislative and executive authority extends only over the individual "states" (often referred to as provinces") into which the country as a whole may be divided (OECD. 2001).

Situated within a federal republic and a three-tier (federal, state and local government) system of government in Nigeria, the Plateau State government is responsible for financial and legislative matters within their geographical territory with executive authority over key issues under its jurisdiction.

Contrary to this notion, Kukathas (2008) notes that governments and states are different entities as the latter can exist with or without the former. Consequently, states can exist with many governments, like the cases of Australia and Canada, while other states have existed without governments, like Somalia functioning without a central government (Kukathas, 2008). A government, which includes officials and all relevant institutional mechanisms of governance within a specific territory, can therefore exist within a state. Similarly, Kukathas, (2008) defines the government as an individual or individuals, who rule, govern or administer a political community or a state. This individual (s) include those with executive level power, legal and judicial seats of power, relevant ministries and government agencies. Within the confines of this study, a state is more suitable as it gives attention to the territorial and geographical dimensions of politics in Nigeria and the fact that state governments have key powers of authority. Borrowing from Kukathas (2008), governments became more relevant with the emergence of the state as the latter has to manage clearly defined or demarcated geographical spaces and the peoples within it.

The state plays a core role in providing security, efficiently and transparently managing public resources and providing basic goods and services for the population. A number of authors (Rotberg, 2003; Maiangwa et al., 2012; Holsti, 1995; and Azar, 1990) have discussed the various significant roles the state plays in serving citizens as well as its failures and weaknesses. Rotberg (2003, p.2) notes that the state has the responsibility to respond to, address the legitimate demands, and meet the basic needs of its citizens. It is also responsible for providing “a decentralized method of delivering political goods to persons living within designated parameters of the state” (Maiangwa et al., 2012, p.42). The state can easily and quickly contribute to conflict within its territory based on its failure or lack of capacity to carry out the above-mentioned roles and responsibilities. According to Kofi Annan (2002, p.137), “at the centre of virtually every conflict is the state and its power – who controls it and how it is used”.

A further examination of the domestic structures and politics of the state is necessary in order to locate the origins of armed conflict (Holsti, 1995). In line with Holsti (1995), Azar (1990) notes that a state can contribute to protracted social conflicts, by depriving groups of resources or failing to meet their basic needs. In addition, the state can perpetuate divisions and fuel ethnic tensions through policies and decisions that favour specific groups over others. Coyne and Pellillo (2011) write that poor political and legal institutions could contribute to the competition for resources between different ethnic formations. In the same vein, a state characterised by the “lack of ability to monopolize force, maintain order within its territory and generate resources to provide public goods” can contribute to conflict (Ballentine & Nitzsche, 2003, p.4). These gaps and challenges weaken its legitimacy and authority and render its capacity to contribute to good governance ineffective (Ballentine & Nitzsche, 2003). Francis (2008) notes that bad governance and the mismanagement of Africa’s vast resources have led to low life expectancy, poor access to water sources, high external debt and low levels of development, all of which have debilitating effects on efforts to restore peace and stability.

The dynamics of ethnic competition, political marginalisation and unaddressed grievances within the state system emerged more strongly post-1945. This period saw an increase in intra-state armed conflicts, which Holsti (1995) attributes to weak states,

the colonial legacy and divisions within the state. Weak states offer fertile ground for ethnic divisions and tensions as they lack the infrastructure, policies and programmes required to manage divisions and conflicts between groups. According to Holsti (1995, p. 331-332), these weak states are characterised by:

governance contestations; inequalities between ethnic groups and minorities; the control of government by one ethnic group coupled with the systematic exclusion of minorities; the lack of state legitimacy; and the state's inability to deliver basic services and provide security.

Citing Sebastian von Einsiedel (2002), Ballentine and Sherman (2003, p.9) note that weak or failing states (characterised by a loss of legitimacy and ineffective governance) can incite conflict by “unleashing security dilemmas or by revitalizing ethnic and communal competition”. Glazer and Moynihan (1975) note that the strategic use of ethnicity to assert claims is in response to the governments use of ethnic categories to determine rewards. States are also weakened by internal violence and their failure to respond adequately to the security, economic, social and political needs of their citizens (Rotberg, 2003, p.1). Ake (1991, p.38) notes that the weakness of the Nigerian state is clearly illustrated by the fact that it has little control over the lives of its citizens in rural areas and that development has taken place in these rural areas, “not because of the state but in spite of it”. The state's weakness is revealed by how it prevents conflict. In some cases, it is not associated with conflict prevention, resolution and transformation in communal conflicts. Instead, it has become the norm to associate state systems with the initiation and protracted nature of violent conflict. The state contributes to and exacerbates violence in various ways by promulgating unfair policies, using resources to support particular groups and failing to prevent violence.

Introducing Nigeria's ethnic and religious dynamics into this discussion, authors such as Jinadu (2007), Kwaja (2009), Mohammed (2004), Salawu (2010), and Ibrahim and Toure (2003) discuss the role of the Nigerian state and institutions in perpetuating and embedding ethnic divisions and tensions in the country. Kwaja (2009, p.110) cites Jinadu (2007) to explain that the state and state institutions:

are ethnicised and immersed in clientelist ethnic and religious networks and in ethnic/religious based struggle to implant and entrench ethnic or religious ‘gatekeepers’ in critical, key positions in the bureaucracy and educational institutions,

and in other public sector institutions and even in the private sector, which in many African countries relies heavily on the public sector.

These views tie in with Chabal and Daloz's (1999) observation that in a patrimonial state where kinship, factions or communal groups take precedence over citizenship, control of the state is the ultimate prize for all political elites. The Nigerian state has been linked to this patrimonial system. Mohammed (2004, p.2) points out that, through its control of decision-making, distribution of political spoils, and economic patronage, the state has contributed to competition, to the "level of a vicious struggle" between groups. Salawu (2010) argues that the failure of institutions such as the political system and law enforcement agencies have accelerated ethnic and communal conflicts. He adds that since the colonial rule, the government has sown the seeds of ethno-religious conflicts (Salawu 2010). Ibrahim and Toure (2003) also note that complex processes of subjugation and marginalisation are at play in the story of the Nigerian state.

Returning to a more general discussion, the role of the state can be viewed in the context of direct and structural violence (Galtung, 1996; Lederach, 1998; Coyne and Pellillo, 2011; and Ballentine and Nitzsche, 2003). Direct violence occurs through physical harm (death, injury, or maiming) of innocent civilians through violent attacks. In some cases, the state becomes an active participant in the violence, using the security sector to engage in violent attacks against its citizens. Galtung (1996, p.2) concludes that in structural violence, the role of the state is visible through repression and exploitation. For Coyne and Pellillo (2011), the repression of citizens is an avenue that the state uses to maintain and consolidate power. Borrowing from Ballentine and Nitzsche (2003), citizen repression and exploitation could emerge through corruption, the mismanagement of funds, patrimonial systems of rule and the political and socio-economic exclusion of ethnic groups, all of which could lead to separatist and non-separatist conflicts. In contrast, Aapengnuo (2010) notes that the ability to negotiate and manage (rather than exploit, repress or disregard) the different interests and needs of various ethnic and religious groups will determine the level of identity conflicts. In the case of Nigeria, Osaghae and Suberu (2005) argue that identity conflicts have emerged from the failure of the state and its weak management of inter-ethnic relations. The entrenchment of these practices and norms can contribute to longstanding political and economic grievances, which greatly weaken the state's credibility and legitimacy.

Key political elites play a significant role in propagating ethnic divisions and instigating ethno-religious violence. Leaders could engage in conflict with the aim of strengthening and consolidating their hold on power (Coyne & Pellillo, 2011). The state apparatus also becomes a medium to promote the interests of these leaders and their group (Azar, 1990). Leaders have also utilised and exploited ethnic and religious allegiances to crush opposition and garner support. Using propaganda, as “political entrepreneurs”, political leaders can contribute to ethnic polarisation in societies (Coyne & Pellillo, 2011). This conforms to the notion of state-sponsored ethnicity when the state plays a significant role in “allocating resources based on ethnicity; creates distinctions between ethnic groupings; and politicizes ethnicity” (Fenton, 2003, p.99). It also negatively affects the ‘so-called’ democratic process, where voters are motivated to vote for individuals from their ethnic group rather than on party platforms and agendas.

Frantz Fanon’s work highlights leaders’ failure to uphold a national identity after independence (Fanon, 1961). In his application of Fanon’s discussion on national versus social and political consciousness in Africa, Taiwo (in Lewis et al., 1996, p.258-259) notes that the failure to uphold a national identity in the name of seeking office has propelled leaders to exploit ethnic and religious differences. It was for this reason that Nigerian writer, Chinua Achebe observed that the problem with Nigeria was “simply and squarely a failure of leadership” (1983, p.24).

Newbury (1998, p.7) argues that ethnic cleavages in Rwanda were politicised to the point of hate speech, genocide and the extermination of the Tutsi by the Hutu-dominated government. The colonial environment in Rwanda contributed significantly to this dilemma by rating the Hutu second-class citizens and limiting their opportunities to attend school, while extending access to Tutsis. In the early 1990s, ethnic sentiments were as strong as during the 1950s as wealthy and powerful Tutsi occupied high-level government positions (Newbury, 1998, p.14). Thus a number of authors (Ntampaka, 1997; Mamdani, 2001; and Aapegnuo, 2012) conclude that the conflict in Rwanda was not about ethnicity but conflicts among groups for control of the state with ethnicity mainly being a cover for political ambitions and power-seekers.

Coyne and Pellillo (2011), Maiangawa et al. (2012) and Ousman (2004) note the impact of the loss of state legitimacy on peace and security in society. Once the state loses legitimacy, this opens the way for instability and insecurity. Coyne and Pellillo (2011, p.25) write that, “state repression or endemic corruption could prospectively catalyse the creation (or strengthening) of insurgent groups, rioters, terrorists, and others that oppose the ruling political elite”. Maiangwa et al. (2012, p.43) observe that citizens begin looking to other “responsive authority figures” like religious or traditional leaders and even become terrorists to fill the vacuum left by the state. Ousman (2004, p.77) argues that the rise of Islamism in Nigeria was the outcome of decades of military dictatorship and other factors including poverty, political repression, economic mismanagement and corruption. He adds that these religious channels gained popularity and followers as they were used to air grievances with the idea that “Islam will bring greater justice and economic well-being (Ousman, 2004, p.77).

Successful peace-building and conflict prevention require the involvement of the state and political actors. For Kwaja (2009), the state is therefore central and plays a critical role in how conflicts are constructed and deconstructed in society. This study recognises the state’s role and relevance in contributing to peace and stability and will later discuss its role in prevention.

### **2.1.5. The term “Ethno-religious”**

It is crucial to discuss the term “ethno-religious” and consider its implications on inter-group relations before examining ethno-religious violence in the following section. According to Kadayifci-Orellana (2008, p.265), many contemporary identity conflicts are defined along ethno-religious lines. The term “ethno-religious” resonates strongly in cases like Nigeria where religion and ethnicity are a major source of identity for groups. Furthermore both ethnicity and religion define and shape their beliefs, interactions and political engagement. Borrowing from Kadayifci-Orellana (2008, p.265), this notion of “ethno-religious” identity in Nigeria is closely linked to “how one fits into social groups and society overall and is closely tied with culture and religion”. Simply defined, ethno-religious groups are composed of individuals from a specific ethnic group that share the same religion. Rougiers (2000, p.88) defines ethno-religious

identity as one's self understanding of their past ethnic and religious experience with their future ethnic and religion aspirations.

In unpacking the term "ethno-religious", three key considerations are presented. First, we might consider if there is a consistent definition of the term "ethno-religious" that applies universally. Fox (2002) suggests that this is not the case due to the fact, that, not all ethnic conflicts have a religious dimension and while religion means much to some (as in Nigeria), for others it means very little. Furthermore, the importance of religion and the priority it is given is determined by the group's perceptions (Fox, 2002, p.70). Citing Lewins (1978), Rougier (2000, p.73) notes that religion is "likely to reinforce ethnic identity to a varying extent depending on the particular ethnic group". Applying this to the case of Plateau state, groups have given such priority to the idea of religion that it cannot be distinguished from existing ethnic divisions. People and religious centres are attacked based on their religion, and feelings of marginalisation and exclusion are based on one's religious beliefs and their ethnicity. Noting Lewins' (1978) study on the interaction between religious organisations and the ethnic identities of migrant Italians and Ukrainians in Australia, Rougier (2000, p.73) notes his conclusion that it is "highly misleading to simply assume that religion will function in similar ways in all circumstances and with regard to all ethnic groups".

The understanding of ethno-religious identity differs within the same religion as the case of the clergy in Ireland North and South show. This view is shared by Rougiers (2000, p.8) main argument that one's definition and understanding of ethno-religious identity is based on one's "denominational affiliation and one's geographical location" from her study on ethno-religious identities amongst clergy in Ireland North and South. These differences in denominational views is clear when:

Protestants' choice of 'nationality' and definition of their homeland, their patterns of identification with both their own and the other ethno-religious community, their actual contacts with the Catholic clergy and willingness to engage in cross-community ventures, their informal ideology, self-perception, and overall identity state vary, sometimes significantly across denominations [which demonstrates] that the generalized perception of the Protestant community as a monolithic and homogeneous entity... is unsubstantiated and misleading" Rougiers (2008, p.355).

In another view, the incidence of large scale conflict between similar ethnic groups in Somalia has shown that just because groups share a common history, language, culture, and religion does not mean that there will be unity and loyalty between them (Khalid, 2004).

Consequently, it is clear that there is no one definition of the term ethno-religious violence especially when it comes to its application. Because ethnicity itself does not have a universally accepted definition (Khalid, 2004), automatically speaks to the challenges in trying to proffer a uniform definition to the term “ethno-religious”. Rougiers (2000) comes to this conclusion by noting the complexities involved in the concept of ‘ethno-religious’ and warning against simple definitions and interpretations of the concept. The complexity of such a concept according to the identity-structure analysis (ISA)<sup>18</sup> requires that the “characteristics of the religious environment, the history of the groups’ relationships and the idiosyncrasies of individuals’ experiences and circumstances” are taken into account in conceptualising ethno-religious identity (Rougiers, 2000, p.368). In addition, this view is substantiated by the fact that, “not all ethnic groups are religiously homogeneous and not all religions coincide fully with a particular ethnicity” (Fox, 2002, p.26).

Secondly we consider whether conflict is always motivated by ethnicity, religion or by both. The complexity of that relationship and the influences of these concepts over the other is one that needs some examination. Fox (2002) agrees with this notion as he notes that the relationship between ethnicity and religion is complex and should be examined taking the specifics of each conflict case into account. He (Fox, 2002, p.71) also argues that the question of religion’s relationship with ethnic conflict is not an easy one to answer because ethnic conflicts are in themselves very complex as they involve political, economic, and cultural issues and factors such as systems of government (democratic or autocratic), international actors and external influences (ethnic minorities in other states).

An important point to consider is how to put aside ethnic and religious identities in a conflict if the underlying issues are truly political, social, and economic in nature.

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<sup>18</sup> Identity Structure Analysis is an approach which focuses on the “comprehensive understanding of the entire identity structure of the individual” (Rougiers, 2000, p.7). ISA also provides theoretical ideas and definitions concerning “identity definition and change, and with methodological tools to explore these processes” (Rougiers, 2000, p.7).



Kalyvas (2003, p.476) notes that while many identify ethnic actors in an ethnic civil war and call it ethnic violence, civil wars are “a perplexing combination of identities and actions”. It is therefore difficult to ascertain the true motives underlying conflicts. In noting these complexities, Appleby (2000, p.61) argues that these two forms of identity are “intertwined and mutually reinforcing”. Rougiers (2000, p.88) also agrees that clearly separating both religion and ethnicity is “empirically far-fetched and even potentially misleading” since both components are deeply linked that they should not be conceived separately.

As noted in earlier discussions on ethnicity and religion, one can argue that in the case of Plateau state, the majority of residents fall within the main lines of contention, that is, Hausa-Muslim and BAA-Christian. However, this is not true for the whole country. For instance, for some ethnic groups like the Yoruba, ethnicity accords more importance than religion, while for the Hausa, religion holds more weight than ethnicity.

Thirdly, we consider how the media, society, the government, military and ethnic leaders have shaped, influenced and applied concepts of ethnicity and religion within the broader conflict discourse. This manipulation of ethnicity and religion can be seen through *ethnicism*, a practice that Afigbo (2005, p.409) views as “the deliberate manipulation of cultural differences between the member peoples of a state for the purpose of gaining either political, economic or social advantage or all three”. Fayam (2006, p.443) describes *ethnicism* as the “structural fragmentation which once it begins in the political realm tends to occur in other realms of forming national life”. This is in line with Rougiers (2000) argument that within the theoretical and empirical conceptualisation of ethno-religious identity, ethnicity is not solely a group of characteristics passed down from generation to generation, but a concept that has been interpreted and redefined repeatedly by individuals to fit into their historical, socio-cultural or real circumstances.

It could be argued that multiple motivations, influences, fears, inter-group dynamics and external factors shape how people engage in conflict. In arguing that the Rwandan conflict was a political one, Uvin (1998) notes that the West defined it as ethnic due to the racial coding allocated to groups. In the case of Bosnia, Malcolm (1994) and Zizek (1990) are of the opinion that the war in that country was used as a cover for political

aspirations and as a “convenient ideology for rationalizing seizure of power and property”. These sentiments are shared in Kenya’s case; Mukoma Wa Ngugi (2008) argues that ethnicity is manipulated and that the underlying issues are defined as competition; a notion embraced by the global media. Citing a religious leader Alhaji Garba Yusuf (2008), Karatzogianni and Robinson (2002, p.247) note that the conflicts in northern Nigeria are based on factors like politics and poverty and the need to loot for survival rather than religion. Authors like Harrison (2002), who writes that youth exclusion and disillusionment in urban areas in northern Nigeria explain the violence, support this argument. Borrowing then from Khalid (2004) the situational character of ethnicity (and religion) shows that group definitions, solidarity and associations are fluid and are based on what is at stake, the resources available, and the best strategy that is of benefit to groups.

The instrumentalist and functionalist schools of thought are of the opinion that “ethnic political activity is explainable by the desire for political and material gains and any invocation of ethnic identity is really a method to achieve those gains” (Fox, 2002, p.70). Fox (2002, p.70) cites Gurr (1993, p.124) and Gurr and Harff’s (1994, p.79) who argue that “while an instrumental desire for political gain may involve ethnic political action, it is far easier for ethnic group leaders to make use of such motivations if a strong ethnic identity... already exists”. In Nigeria then, the presence of strong ethnic attachments and solidarity has created the opportunities for political leaders to use it for their advantage. Ethno-religious movements can therefore be explained in the context of “patronage politics and resource wars not primarily as outgrowths of ideational constructs” (Karatzogianni and Robinson, 2010, p.245).

The fact that based on various factors or influences (like leadership) individuals align themselves with one group or switch between ethnicity and religion is problematic in finding solutions to conflicts of this nature. It becomes even more problematic when individuals and groups can be manipulated to engage in violence. While this section sought to understand the motivations, intentions and factors that fuel the notion of “ethno-religious”, a detailed analysis lies beyond the parameters of this thesis.

## 2.2. Ethno-religious Violence

Campbell (1998, p.85) notes that violence is generally perceived as, a “surface expression of a deeper cause”, while ethno-religious violence can be defined as, “violence by groups which are ethnic or religious or have features of both” (Rapoport, 1996, p.6). Based on both these definitions it can be deduced that ethno-religious violence is a reflection of deep-rooted causes and usually involves individuals and groups that subscribe to different ethnicities or religions. According to Fox (1999), ethnic violence can be considered ethno-religious if the two major warring groups subscribe to different religions. Religion therefore becomes a symbol for each group and forms a basis for cohesion and mobilisation. The importance of religion in fuelling conflict is shared by Kadayifci-Orellana (2008, p.265) who defines conflict of this nature as:

conflicts which involve parties that are defined along religious lines in societies where religion is an integral aspect of social and cultural life and where religious institutions represent a significant portion of the community and possess moral legitimacy as well as the capacity to reach and mobilize adherents throughout the community.

This implies that, when religion is central to a people’s way of life, religious institutions hold much weight in society, have a significant physical presence in the community and are a moral compass. This creates an environment where groups are easily mobilised and conflicts emerge rapidly and easily.

Citing Feldman (1991), Campbell (1998, p.85) notes that violence “...begins in grievance..., moves to expression and in the absence of redress” emerges more strongly. In the case of Plateau state, the violent clashes in the past decade emerged because long-held grievances are still unaddressed. Borrowing from Sayne (2012, p.7), the emergence and continuing occurrence of ethno-religious violence is based on the premise that “identity as a tool for mobilising violence is not going away” (Sayne, 2012, p.7). As the brief examination of the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina below shows, ethno-religious identities are longer lasting than other “ideological indoctrinations” like Communism and can be “re-interpreted and popularized to mobilize entire populaces to war” (Berkley Center, 2009, p.1).

Ethnicity and religion are very significant influences in mobilising and propelling groups to use violence. This desire to retreat to one's ethnic or religious formation and employ violence is fuelled when there is an established or perceived threat to one's wellbeing, livelihood and safety. This is in line with Schirch's (2008) view that violence of an ethno-religious nature emerges when structures contribute to social and economic inequities and to the systematic exclusion of ethnic or religious groups from participation in public policy decisions. Also taking Gurr's (1970) model of relative deprivation approach to explain the occurrence of ethno-religious violence, it can be argued that the discrimination of a minority group leads to grievances, these grievances lead them to mobilise for action and thirdly, the stronger the mobilisation, the more active the group becomes in political activities like protests and rebellions.

The forms of violence could range from riots to assassinations and secret killings. Violent clashes among different and competing ethno-religious groups could quickly escalate from small skirmishes and pockets of violence to large-scale ethnic cleansing (Andreas, 2004; Time Magazine, 2014). Ethnic cleansing involves a "deliberate, organized, and usually violent expulsion of people from an area on the basis of their perceived ethnic, communal, sectarian, or religious identity" (USIP, 2011, p.21). Violence is further fuelled by the formation and activities of armed factions, informal security apparatus and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Ethno-religious violence has grave impacts on the economy and society and leads to high levels of insecurity. Citing Babangida (2002), Kwaja (2009, p.108) identifies the "waste of enormous human and material resources..., threats to security of lives and properties and the heightening of the fragility of the economy and political process" as some of the dire consequences of ethno-religious violence in Nigeria.

While tensions and clashes between ethno-religious groups are well accounted for, it should be acknowledged that Christians and Muslims have come together in solidarity in many instances. For instance, Christians formed a human chain to protect Muslims while they prayed and fulfilled their religious obligations, in the midst of anti-government demonstrations in Nigeria (Gambrell, 2012) and Egypt (Daily Mail, 2011). While Egyptian Christians have protested along Muslims in Egypt's Tahrir Square (Ali-Karamali, 2011), Christians hid Muslims during violent attacks to protect them from being killed in Nigeria (HRW, 2013, p.54).

### 2.2.1. Global Cases of Ethno-Religious Violence

As the following cases demonstrate, ethno-religious violence is not limited to the African continent. Cases like the flare-ups between Buddhist monks and Muslims in Myanmar (Fuller, 2013), the protracted conflict between Israel and Palestine (Reiter, 2010) and tensions between major ethno-religious groups in Iraq (Wimmer, 2003 and Snyder, 2014) show that ethno-religious violent conflict is a phenomenon that is of global concern. It has featured in power contestations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, tensions between indigenous and migrant groups in Indonesia and struggles between majority and minority ethnic groups in Sri Lanka. These cases also support the notion that religion and ethnicity become symbols for mobilisation and are intensely politicised to the point of violent conflict.

#### a) **Bosnia-Herzegovina (*hereafter referred to as Bosnia*)**

Bosnia's experience of ethnic conflict has been unpacked by authors such as Andreas (2004), Campbell (1998) and Cohen (1995). Andreas (2004, p.30) describes Bosnia as the "quintessential example of contemporary ethnic conflict", that is known for popularising the term ethnic cleansing. The Catholic Croats, Orthodox Serbs and Muslim Bosnians in Bosnia have mixed ethnic and religious differences with nationalist claims (Berkley Center, 2009). Despite centuries of positive interactions between these ethnic groups, political leaders fuelled the mobilisation of groups into what was described as a "deadly struggle for power, resources and survival" (Berkley Center, 2009, p.1). Campbell (1998, p.67) describes these acts as the "manipulation of nationalism" by political leaders.

Bosnia emerged as one of the six republics<sup>19</sup> of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, by declaring independence in 1992. Religion was dominant in the former Yugoslavia as Islam, Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity all emerged at various stages in its history. The eventual division of the country and the creation of new states were the result of secessionist campaigns and demands for autonomy by

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<sup>19</sup> The other republics were Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia

various groups, leading to the creation of new countries like Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia (Berkley Center, 2009, p.3).

Home to three religious groups, Bosnia was an example of religious coexistence and inter-marriage for centuries, although there was no shared national and unified identity (Berkley Center, 2009). Furthermore, most major groups affirm the strong links between their nationality and religion (Berkley Center, 2009, p.6). Even with the creation of the new and independent state, groups and political elites within Bosnia have engaged in contestations for political power and for the promotion of nationalist claims. Andreas (2004) notes that the brutal war from 6 April 1992 to 12 October 1995 was the result of clashes and struggles between the Bosnian Serbs on the one hand and the Bosnian Croats and Muslims on the other. Economic challenges and the failure of Communism to win broad appeal were utilised by the elites to reinforce ethno-nationalist agendas and to use religion to unify their respective groups, maintain power and debase their rivals (Berkley Center, 2009).

Cohen (1995, p.246) writes that, while political leaders contributed to inter-ethnic animosity and intolerance, large numbers of members of each ethno-religious group also embraced “programs of aggressive nationalism”. The presence of “ethnic heterogeneity exacerbated by religious and political claims by both parties” deepened and broadened the conflict in the country (Berkley Center, 2009, p.7). Ethnic tensions were heightened not only by these political and religious factors but also by economic factors. Economic pressure, including poverty, competition for resources (between the Serbs and Muslims) and economic decline (after President Tito’s death) contributed to worsening ethnic relations and eventual war (Berkley Center, 2009).

Essentially the conflict was a product of “antagonistic group history, manipulative politicians, and economic crisis and transition” (Andreas, 2004, p.33). The ensuing conflicts have been defined by the Bosnian Serb Community as a civil war and struggles between ethnic groups “who cannot and do not want to live together” (Campbell, 1998, p. 44). These conflicts and struggles have fuelled the desire of these ethno-religious entities to live in their own territories (Campbell, 1998).

Campbell (1998) notes, that for the Serbians, religious symbolism played a major role

in the fighting. Beyond the Muslim-Bosnian link, the link between religion and nationalism has been widely pronounced by the Serbs with their use of the Serbian Orthodox cross with the support of the Orthodox Church Patriarch Pavle (Campbell, 1998, p.45). The violent conflicts have had a major impact on communities but most importantly have resulted in ethnically divided communities and families.

#### **b) Maluku, Indonesia**

Indonesia has experienced widespread ethno-religious violence as the case of Maluku province demonstrates. Clashes between Makians (a predominantly Muslim indigenous group) and the Kaos (predominantly Protestant Christians and long-term migrants) on 18 August 1999 set the stage for protracted and widespread conflict (Wilson 2008, p.2). This conflict further divided the north Maluku community along religious lines and saw the violence spread across the region as well as the islands (Wilson, 2008, p.2). Some attribute the cause of the conflict to the growing tensions between the Makians and the Kaos. The reasons include the emergence of Malifut as a centre of struggle between Christians and Muslims, perceptions of inequality, and jealousy and inter-ethnic tensions due to the migrants' economic success. Other reasons were the Christians' view that the local district government was attempting to stall the expansion of Christianity by relocating the Makian community; the presence of a large goldmine in the area, further igniting competition for control; and competition for political control (Wilson, 2008, p.5).

Wilson (2008) therefore concludes that the violence centred around two key factors: control of territory and government partiality. He further concludes that although religion is not a primary cause of violence, it is sometimes used to ignite and exacerbate inter-religious tensions (Wilson, 2008, p.192). What this case also shows is that religion has been used to justify violence and provide a motivation for war. This rings true in the case of the Spanish Conquistadores where religion was used to conquer lands and subdue groups, all in the name of God. These groups came in the name of true religion to defeat the New World empires while following their "dreams of instant wealth" (Engstrand, 2000, p.12). In this case, the vulnerability of "God's name" is evident, as

it is used to commit acts of violence.

### **c) Sri Lanka**

The conflicts in Sri Lanka between the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamil group have been due to “historical inter-ethnic imbalances” between both groups (Ballentine & Nitzsche, 2003, p.10). Although other identities exist like the Muslims, the Roman Catholics and the Moors, the Sinhalese and the Tamil are considered the key stakeholders in the conflict. De Silva (1987) writes that while relations between ethnic groups have been peaceful for the most part, the relations between the Sinhalese and the Sri Lanka Tamils are an exception.

Although the conflict is not religious, religion plays a symbolic role and the links between religion and ethnicity are strong (Berkley Center, 2011, p.2). Tambiah (1986) notes that the Sinhalese are identified by their Sinhalese language and Buddhist religion, while the Tamils are known for their Tamil language and their Hindu religion. The cordial relations between Hindus and Buddhists in the past have been threatened by the “rise of Sinhalese-Tamil ethnic tensions” (De Silva, 1987, p.7). According to the Berkley Center (2011), religion as a symbol surfaced with the targeting of worshippers, clerics and houses of worship.

The tensions between the Sinhalese and Tamils are a product of the twentieth century, with a shift towards “an increasing ethnic mobilization and polarisation previously unknown” (Tambiah, 1986, p.7). According to De Silva (1987), Sinhalese fears of domination by the Tamils in districts where they are numerically superior, restrictions on Tamils’ voting rights, and Sinhalese dominance in the legislature have all fuelled tensions between these groups.

The conflict between the Sinhalese and the Tamils was shaped by the departure of the British and actions taken by the Sinhalese majority to not only make Sinhalese the sole official language, but to prioritise Buddhism as the official national religion and promote policies that excluded and marginalised the Tamil minority group (Berkley Center, 2011). It is important to note that although the elite from both groups cooperated in the lead-up to independence, this weakened in the following decade, especially as



both sides were divided on the subject of the national language (Da Silva, 1987). These factors had major implications for the country as the change to Sinhalese as the sole official language meant that institutions of learning and government jobs required that one understand this language (Berkley Center, 2011). Ballentine and Nitzsche (2003, p.10) write that the Sinhalese's attempts to promote Sinhalese cultural policies represented an effort to revise the "disproportionate favouring of the minority Tamil by former colonialists". Eventually, the Sinhalese rejected the Tamils' request for the "equal official status" of the Tamil language (De Silva, 1987, p.14).

Within this context, politicians have promoted ethnic sentiments and mobilised their various groups in an effort to promote and sustain their demands. After Sinhalese became Sri Lanka's sole official language, "extremist politicians" use the opportunity to incite the two groups against each other (De Silva, 1987, p.15). Furthermore, the promotion of Sinhalese identity in the form of "religion, culture, and language" contributed to the dissatisfaction felt by the Tamil and their use of terrorism and insurgency (Berkley Center, 2011, p.2). This saw a shift from nonviolent tactics to violence led by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The relationship between the groups worsened with the Tamils bidding for secession (De Silva, 1987) and an independent, mono-ethnic Tamil state (Ballentine & Nitzsche, 2003).

The civil war of 1991 and other clashes have contributed to the instability in Sri Lanka. These clashes have resulted in the loss of human lives and properties and the displacement of many citizens. The economy has also suffered.

### **2.3. Peace-building as a Response to Ethno-religious Violence**

The previous sections have established that religion and ethnicity are two widely shared identities, are strongly used to motivate and mobilise groups to utilise violence, and are used to pursue political and economic agendas. It is therefore important to understand how peace-building can be used in a situation where ethnic and religious identities feature in a highly competitive and violent economic and political climate.

## **Peace defined**

Understanding how peace-building can prevent and reduce ethno-religious violence requires an understanding of peace. There are various perceptions and definitions of peace. For some, peace is defined as the absence of violence, while for others it entails the achievement of justice and social stability. Yet others locate peace in economic well-being and basic freedoms (USIP, 2011). It therefore goes beyond the absence of mere violence, to include the absence of the underlying drivers of conflict and forces that perpetuate violence. For McCandless (2007), peace in the African context is measured in terms of individual and communal physical, material and spiritual wellbeing (McCandless, 2007). According to Aapengnuo (2010), achieving peace requires the following key elements: addressing the social and political imbalances between the leaders and the people; changing behaviours, attitudes and relationships; transforming systems of inequality to power sharing and more democratic structures; dialogue, reconciliation, and training; reducing prejudice and stereotypes; and peace education as a tool to achieving peace. These various views are reflected in peace-building discourse and practice.

## **Evolution of Peace-building**

Peace-building emerged as a response to a change in the actors, context and impact of violence in many societies. The rise of subnational and intra-state conflicts, the increased role of the state as an oppressor of its people, and gross human rights violations have required a shift from traditional peacekeeping and UN Charter Chapter VII peace enforcement missions to broader and more complex peace interventions (Warnecke and Franke, 2010). Factors such as the fluidity of actors (both state and non-state) that perpetrate violent acts and complete state failure have also contributed to this shift (Warnecke and Franke, 2010). Peace-building has thus expanded beyond ending violence and restoring infrastructure to include human rights protection and the rebuilding of relationships between individuals and communities (Curtis & Dzinesa, 2012, p.5).

The conceptualisation of peace-building as a tool for conflict resolution and sustainable peace emerged in the 1960s through the work of Johan Galtung. He proposed three

approaches to resolve conflict namely: peace-keeping, peace-making, and peace-building (Galtung, 1975). UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali adopted this approach in the early 1990s and identified the three 'Ps' as a formula to achieve the sustainable transformation of conflict structures. He stated that:

**preventive diplomacy** seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out; **peace-making** and **peace-keeping** are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. If successful, they strengthen the opportunity for **post-conflict peace-building**, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).

### **Definitions of Peace-building**

Before unpacking peace-building as a response to ethno-religious violence, it is important to provide key definitions. The UN states that, peace-building as a key mode of intervention, is the “promotion of institutional and socioeconomic measures, at the local or national level to address the underlying causes of conflict” (Goodhand and Hulme, 1999). Lambourne (2004, p.3) defines peace-building as “strategies designed to promote a secure and stable lasting peace in which the basic human needs of the population are met and violent conflicts do not recur”. For Schirch, (2008, p.7) peace-building is “preventing, reducing, transforming and assisting people in recovering from violence in all forms (including structural violence) that has not yet led to massive civil unrest”. In the UN Agenda for Peace, Boutros Ghali (1992, p.16) defined peace-building as activities that aim to “identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”. In terms of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (2008, p.9), peace-building is “the development of the requisite multi-actor institutional capacity to design, implement and monitor initiatives aimed at checking the deterioration of social and economic conditions during hostilities, and strengthening the peace fabric of post-conflict countries over a long period of time in order to prevent a relapse into conflict”. Akerlund (2001, p.52-53) writes that peace-building is composed of three major components:

the creation of norms that contribute to reinforcing and consolidating peace in areas of crisis and conflict, development of an institutional framework with the same purpose,

and the counteraction of structural causes.

Based on the aforementioned definitions, it can be deduced that peace-building involves addressing the root causes, meeting basic economic needs, institutionalising peace, ensuring development and guaranteeing security with the end goal of preventing future violent conflict.

### **Human Security and Peace-building**

Human security is a central component of peace-building efforts and helps to define and understand peace-building interventions. Human security emphasises the security of the individual rather than the security of the state, and shifts the focus from the state and state institutions to local groups and individuals within their communities (Curtis & Dzinesa, 2012, p.6). Human security therefore shifts from the state as the main referent of security and looks inward where various forms of conflict take place. In this case, the state is sometimes the main perpetrator of violence or cannot guarantee the security of its people.

According to Conteh-Morgan (2005, p.70-71), any conceptualisation of human security must therefore involve the individual (hate crimes, lootings), institutional (state repression, oppression) and structural/cultural (poverty, avoidable inequalities, unemployment) sources of human insecurity. He observes that human security at the personal, institutional and structural-cultural levels can be achieved using peace-building if it takes into account a bottom-up approach, removes problems of marginalisation, acknowledges the importance of socio-cultural contexts to peace-building and human security and employs long-term efforts (Conteh-Morgan, 2005, p.70-71). Consequently, while it is important that the role of the state in contributing to violence through embedding inequality, marginalisation and insecurity is acknowledged in peace-building, responses should go further to include the views, needs and perspectives of individuals, groups and communities at the grassroots.

### **Peace-building Activities**

In terms of conflict transformation theory, peace-building is comprehensive and long-

term, and addresses the direct and structural causes of the violence. It also encompasses a wide range of activities. In practice, this ensures that marginalised and excluded groups are included in decision-making processes and are involved in defining the future development of their communities and society (Merav, 2001, p.15). For ECOWAS, peace-building involves initiatives like “humanitarian assistance, restoration and maintenance of economic and social infrastructure, restoration and reform of governance institutions (political, economic socio-cultural and security), justice, rule of law, reconciliation and reintegration; and conflict-sensitive development” (ECPF, 2008, p. 9-10). This shows the broad spectrum of peace-building activities and the multiple focus areas that peace-builders have to work in to restore peace and stability to post-conflict contexts.

### **Key Features and Characteristics of Peace-building**

Despite the many broad and varied definitions of peace-building, there seems to be consensus on some of its key features and characteristics. The following six characteristics can be distinguished:

(a) **Peace-building involves responses to economic, social and political issues:** The literature recognises that peace-building creates an environment where social, economic, and political institutions can flourish and prevent violent conflicts (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000 and Ryan, 1990). Its aim then is to “create the conditions necessary for a sustainable peace in war-torn societies” (UN, 1999, p.12). Many causes of conflict are broadly political, economic and social in nature; therefore, effective peace-building addresses these root and proximate causes and similarly develops political, economic, and social responses to them. In addition to these, peace-building also addresses insecurity and psycho-social needs.

(b) **Peace-building is not a one-time event:** Peace-building does not have a precise beginning and end but involves long-term processes that occur before, during, and after violent conflict (Goodhand and Hulme, 1999). Most importantly, peace-building should not be defined by projects or bound by timeframes, but should be based on political and social change, processes which take a considerable amount of time. In removing structures that contribute to conflict, peace-building must therefore go

beyond short-term functions like monitoring a ceasefire, demobilisation and disarmament and monitoring competitive elections (Conteh-Morgan, 2005, p.72) to longer term measures like reconciliation, security and judicial reform.

**(c) Peace-building demands an in-depth conflict analysis and assessment exercise:**

In order to produce positive and relevant results, there must be sufficient analysis of the context and the causes of the conflict in order to devise adequate responses to transform it (Ackermann, 2003). Ackermann (2003) establishes a strong linkage between conflict analysis and an effective preventive policy, noting that “any conflict analysis that informs an effective preventive policy must examine the proximate or direct causes of conflict, as well as its underlying roots”. Failure to adequately analyse the nature, causes and dynamics of intra-state conflict could lead to a lack of effective preventive responses, and result in incorrect or insufficient policy decisions and poorly thought-out solutions (Ballentine & Nitzschke, 2003, p.2).

**(d) Peace-building intervention should be context-specific:**

Beyond understanding the nature and causes of conflict, peace-building must be context-specific. For instance, in the context of Africa, Francis (2008, p.115) notes that the ultimate goal of peace-building is the “rebuilding of relationships, asserting communal responsibility and solidarity”. This means that responses to resolve and transform ethno-religious violent conflicts require an understanding of the context and the environment in which the conflict is taking place. In the same way, peace-building responses needs to be participatory and must include the views and perspectives of those who are involved in the conflict. Accordingly, stakeholders, beneficiaries and implementing partners must be fully and regularly engaged.

**(f) Good governance is inherent in sustainable peace-building:**

Good governance is a requirement in addressing the underlying causes of ethno-religious violence and in achieving success in peace-building. A publication by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights defines good governance “as the exercise of authority through political and institutional processes that are transparent and accountable, and encourage public participation” (OHCHR, 2007, p.2). It goes on to establish a link between good governance and human rights, stating that the latter require that good governance promotes public participation, provides services and goods to the public,

develops and implements legislation, and establishes anti-corruption measures (OHCHR, 2007, p.2). These measures, approaches and actions will contribute greatly to the success and sustainability of any peace-building process.

A resolution (2000/64) passed by the former UN Commission on Human Rights (UNHCR), identified transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation, and responsiveness (to the needs of the people) as the key attributes of good governance. Good governance impedes corruption, and ensures the delivery of services to all citizens in a society. Fisher & Zimina (2009) identify economic injustice and the lack of public participation in policy decisions as key triggers of violence. Good governance can address this by not only devising avenues for justice for groups, but through political, economic and social change. For Merav (2001), it is essential that peace-building also recognises the right of groups to assert their rights and claims while also giving others the opportunity to do so. The denial of rights, impediments to participation and unfair policies all contribute to the underlying causes of conflict, which good governance can resolve.

### **Peace-building and Prevention**

Authors like Cutter (2005), Ryan (1990), and Doyle and Sambanis (2000) have noted that peace-building is a means to prevent further conflict. In other words, peace-building activities and efforts must not only resolve conflicts but address their underlying causes with the aim of preventing them from occurring in the future. In achieving prevention, peace-building is a “strategy which most directly tries to reverse destructive processes that accompany violence” (Ryan, 1990, p.61). In including conflict prevention, peace-building not only prevents the recurrence of violence in the future but also encompasses conflict management and post-conflict recovery (USIP, 2011). Doyle and Sambanis (2000, p.779) thus refer to peace-building as the “frontline of preventive action”. Peace-building and prevention should be concurrent processes as they both attempt to address the deep-rooted causes of a conflict while trying to ensure that it does not recur or worsen in the future. Furthermore, although peace-building can begin at any stage of the conflict cycle, there is value in early action as it reduces the human and financial costs (EW-ER Handbook, 2013). In totality, these two key

processes will lead to conflict transformation in the long term and the sustainability of stability and security.

### **Peace-building as a response to structural and direct violence**

This study argues for the importance of peace-building as a response to ethno-religious violence and in reorienting the state to resolve the underlying causes of such violence. This can be achieved by devising responses to direct and structural violence. In tackling direct violence, peace-building must tackle the agents of insecurity by developing structures that can prevent physical violence and ensure citizens' security. These structures must be able to act early and prevent violence before it occurs. In achieving this early warning information and reliable intelligence is readily available and accurate. In tackling direct violence, structures should identify perpetrators, and ensure that they come before the courts and are tried in a fair manner. This also requires that prisons are available, in good condition and that the rights of perpetrators are respected.

In responding to structural violence, peace-building challenges and resolves systematic inequalities and addresses the *root* and *proximate* causes that have led to violent conflict. *Root causes* are also defined or referred to as the structural and underlying causes of conflict. These are “necessary but not sufficient causes of violence, and are mostly static, changing slowly over time”. Examples include “poor governance, absence of the rule of law, lack of respect for fundamental rights, ethnic diversity, and colonial history” (EW-ER Handbook, 2013).

On the other hand, *proximate causes (triggers or immediate causes)* “accentuate and make more severe the underlying causes of conflict” (EW-ER Handbook, 2013). They “support or create the conditions for violent conflict, are time-wise closer to the outbreak of armed violence, and may change over time” (EW-ER Handbook, 2013). Proximate causes can also be defined as accelerators, as they are “feedback events and processes that progressively worsen the impacts of structural factors” (ECPF, 2008, p.8). Examples include the “collapse of educational systems, repressive security apparatuses and curtailment of freedoms, corruption, religious/ethnic discrimination, and worsening cost of living” (ECPF, 2008, p.8). Other examples of proximate causes



include “poor personal security, the availability of weapons, and increase in the poverty level” (EW-ER Handbook, 2013).

### **Peace-building Challenges**

Peace-building comes with its own challenges. Based on lessons from Burundi, Liberia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Central African Republic (CAR) and Sierra Leone, the challenges to peace-building include the lack of a shared vision for peace and long-term development, the difficulty of balancing short- and long term objectives, and poor strategic communication between actors and institutions (OECD, 2010, p. 59-60). Lederach (1999) also identifies three gaps that pose significant challenges to peace-building progress and success: *interdependence*, *justice*, and *process-structure* gaps:

a) **Interdependence gap**: In the interdependence gap, there is more focus on horizontal than vertical relationships. Vertical relationships are relationships between groups with different levels of power, while horizontal relationships are between groups with similar levels of power. The gap Lederach refers to concerns groups with different power levels. In this scenario, there is no top-down or bottom-up interaction between the elite and the grassroots. As noted by the OECD (2010), in post-conflict countries, peace-building and state-building processes are challenged by little or no citizen participation. These processes and any efforts at conflict transformation can only be successful when groups are included in devising appropriate responses. There is also the challenge of how (and if) all relevant stakeholders can be involved and included in such a complex process.

b) **Justice gap**: Lederach (1999) writes that structural causes are not addressed even though there is a reduction in direct violence. The focus has been on the practice and methodology of reducing direct violence rather than transforming structural violence. In a post cease-fire environment for instance, expectations of social, economic, religious and cultural change are rarely fulfilled. Long-held grievances of exclusion, marginalization and inequality are never fully addressed. Thus, the justice gap emerges when peace-building fails to produce social and economic justice. Similarly, UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon (2009) acknowledges that peace-building goes

beyond the ending of war to establishing the right institutions and responding to the calls of war-ravaged citizens for the restoration of basic services, establishment of security, recapacitating government and reviving the economy. Lederach (1999) notes that the need to increase the capacity of government and nongovernmental peace-building actors' to integrate the building of social justice and jointly reduce direct violence.

c) **Process-structure gap:** According to Lederach (1999), peace-building sometimes lacks a process-structure approach. Lederach (1999) states that peace is both a structure and a process; thus it is adaptive, dynamic and responsive. The use of structures and processes helps to transform violent relationships “into constructive and cooperative patterns” (Lederach, 2001, p.846-847). Peace as a process-structure therefore focuses on building relationships within a particular context, increasing accountability between individuals, and attempts to instil a desire within all for changing the status quo. Peace-building and conflict transformation both become stronger as they change the very thing that causes division in order to build something desired by all. This requires changes in organisational, political and economic structures but also in the relationships and needs that exist in a specific environment.

### **Peace-building Framework**

Peace-building requires a framework, infrastructure, and a plan in order to ensure its implementation (Lederach, 1995, 1997; Reychler and Paffenholz, 2001; and Smith, 2004). Lederach (1997, p.84) posits that the infrastructure of peace-building is “generated by the need to move from stagnant cycles of violence toward a desired and shared vision of increased interdependence”. According to the UN Peace-building Support Office, (PBSO, 2007, p.1), peace-building strategic frameworks focus on “building inclusive national capacities to tackle the root causes of conflict that impede sustainable peace”. These frameworks have been used to provide a holistic platform to address peace-building challenges in Burundi (OECD, 2010, p.27). Essentially a peace-building framework is designed to provide a foundation for providing common responses to common problems. Such a framework helps to coordinate the responses of key actors in peace-building.

Consequently this infrastructure must be rooted in the conflict setting (Lederach, 1997, p.84), as responses must address the causes. To borrow from Reychler and Paffenholz (2001), a peace-building framework “addresses all the major components of the conflict; fixing the problems, which threatened the core interests of the parties; changing the strategic thinking; and changing the opportunity structure and the ways of interacting”. Lederach (1995, p.202) is of the opinion that a comprehensive framework is also important for conflict transformation as it shapes responses in situations of conflict and involves “integrating perspectives for short and long-term transformation, establishing an infrastructure for peace, and building a peace constituency”. According to Smith (2004, p.11), a peace-building framework is useful in “formulating peace-building intervention strategies”.

Based on these views, a peace-building framework is useful for Plateau state as it will address the underlying causes of the conflict and offer avenues for collaboration and cooperation amongst various actors and institutions. The framework identifies the key priority areas and outlines the necessary capacities for building long-term peace. It can also be used to identify short, immediate and long-term goals and offer solutions in building the right attitudes, capacities and institutions for peace. In mapping out programmes, policies and institutions, a peace-building framework will also provide a platform for engagement between the state and other actors like civil society and the security sector and identify spaces and avenues for conflict transformation.

Strategic peace-building frameworks have been applied nationally in countries in transition such as Afghanistan, the DRC, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Iraq, Kosovo and Sudan (PBSO, 2007, p.1). These frameworks prioritise security, the rule of law, regional integration and security (OECD, 2010). While most of these countries continue to experience pockets of violence and instability in key regions, those like Liberia and Sierra Leone have shown positive signs of stability. It could be argued that the challenge is not with peace-building being the wrong prescription for these contexts, but that various factors such as a lack of resources, absence of political will and hostile relationships between groups contribute to the failure of peace efforts.

Various components (priority areas or pillars) of a peace-building framework have emerged (Cutter, 2005; Smith, 2004; Ramsbotham et al., 2011). Cutter (2005) briefly

outlines the four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction described in a report by the US Bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction. The four pillars, namely, security; justice and reconciliation; economic and social well-being; and governance and participation provide a framework and clarify tasks for peace-building (Cutter, 2005). Citing Smith (2004), Ramsbotham et al. (2011) talk of the peace-building palette, which identifies four key themes: security; the political framework; socio-economic foundations; and reconciliation and justice. Writing about peace-building from below, Ramsbotham et al. (2011), identify the following four areas: economic-social; psycho-social; political-constitutional; and military-security. The UN's (2006) *Peace-building Capacity Inventory* identifies security and public order, justice and reconciliation, governance and participation, and social and economic well-being as four distinct sectors associated with social reform and peace-building activities. Lederach (1998) also highlights four key areas in post-conflict peace-building in developing a framework that is relational and transformational. Citing Lederach (1998), Botes (2003) writes that these are “social-psychological (issues regarding identity, self-esteem, emotion, trauma and grief); the socioeconomic (providing financial aid, retraining, employment and development); social-political (matters pertaining to demobilization, disarmament troop integration and professionalization); and the spiritual (concerns about healing, forgiveness, and mutual acknowledgement)”. Based on the perspectives presented above, there is consensus that a peace-building framework should broadly cover political, economic, psycho-social and security components.

Guided by these views, the priorities of the peace-building framework in Plateau state will be divided into the following key areas: Political, Economic, Security and Psycho-Social. In responding to the underlying causes of the conflict (see Chapter Four), this study provides a peace-building framework that examines these four components. In acknowledging the view that the decline in the incidence and intensity of war can be attributed to greater competence and capacity to operationalise peace-building (Ramsbotham et al., 2011), it is critical to understand the practice of peace-building in Plateau state in order to prevent the recurrence of violent conflict. Consequently, beyond peace-making and efforts to keep the peace, efforts to lay the foundations for a peaceful society need to be intensified.

## 2.4. The Role of the State in Preventing Ethno-religious Violence

Within conflict cycles or peace-building processes, there is a range of primary, secondary and external stakeholders, all with different roles. These stakeholders represent the interests of specific groups that either want to sustain the conflict or build peace (EW-ER Handbook, 2013). In most cases, the state is a primary stakeholder and depending on the case, it is committed to either sustaining the conflict or its cessation.

Before embarking on a discussion of the state and its role in preventing ethno-religious violence, it is important to unpack prevention as a conceptual framework. Lund (2002), defines conflict prevention as:

any structural or intersectoral means to keep intrastate or interstate tensions and disputes from escalating into significant violence and the use of armed force, to strengthen the capabilities of parties to possible violent conflicts for resolving their disputes peacefully, and to progressively reduce the underlying problems that produce those tensions issues and disputes”.

From this definition, prevention requires the use of a wide range of institutions, actors and mechanisms to quell tensions before they escalate to full fledged violence. These can be achieved through the use of non-violent and peaceful processes and addressing the reasons for why the conflicts emerged in the first place.

What is very important and valuable about prevention is it does not only take place before the conflict escalates but throughout the peace process. Boutros-Ghali (1996, p.18) therefore notes the role of prevention at various stages when he states that “preventive diplomacy is the use of diplomatic techniques to prevent disputes arising, prevent from escalating into armed conflict (...) and prevent the armed conflict from spreading. The aim of preventive action then is to “prevent the emergence of violent conflict, prevent ongoing conflicts from spreading and prevent the re-emergence of violence” (Carnegie Commission, 1997, p.xviii). According to the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (2008, p.9), prevention could be either operational or structural. Operational prevention is when measures are applied in the context of imminent crisis (preventive deployment, mediation, and conciliation), while structural prevention is when measures are applied to prevent its future recurrence (political and institutional reforms).

In shifting from definitions to the practice and art of prevention, effective prevention requires that preventive policies and strategies be institutionalised, enhanced over time and become routine (Ackermann, 2003, p.344). Prevention will therefore require a process of “learning lessons from the past in the anticipation and prevention of its recurrence” (Lederach, 1997, p.81). It also involves, “identifying the factors that precipitated the violence, helping the affected society prepare to better handle such situations in the future and disseminating to other societies the lessons of what went wrong and what went right” (Lederach, 1997, p.81). Borrowing from Cousens and Kumar (2001) argument, lasting peace can only be realised when tensions and disputes are managed before the eruption of violent conflict.

From the views outlined above, in preventing conflict, the state must ensure that its underlying causes are addressed in a timely and continuous manner. Furthermore, it should establish, improve upon and regularise programmes, policies and institutions that can address the causes of conflict. It is also responsible for ensuring that these programmes, policies and institutions meet the economic, psycho-social, security and political needs of the various groups within its territory. The role of the state in prevention is significantly enhanced by working closely with civil society to identify and develop the right responses to conflict. It also needs to be transparent and accountable in its efforts to effectively build peace and prevent future violence. Furthermore, political will and commitment is important in preventing violent conflict. This rings true in Plateau state, as the perpetrators of conflict remain free due to “official indifference and complicity” (Sayne, 2012, p.7). Furthermore, public expressions of grievances and tensions were not accorded sufficient importance by the state, which has contributed to late response and weak prevention efforts.

In the case of Plateau state, Danfulani and Fwatshak (2002, p.255), emphasise that a conflict prevention strategy needs to be devised by the state. Furthermore, it should utilise a “more sensitive and responsive approach to security reports, security threats and security matters” in improving prevention (Danfulani and Fwatshak, 2002, p.255). The past failures of political institutions and security agencies should not be repeated as, according to Salawu (2010, p.348), they played a major role in deepening and exacerbating ethnic and communal conflict. The state should address unemployment,

poor social and economic conditions, abject poverty, and corruption, factors that directly or indirectly contribute to violent conflict in the state (Danfulani and Fwatshak, 2002, p.255). All these efforts will ensure that it is seen as credible and will help to address long-held grievances and prevent tensions from escalating.

It can therefore be deduced that while the state is important in achieving sustainable peace and effectively managing diversity, it needs to build its capacity to respond in a more preventive than reactive manner. While ethnic and religious diversity might restrict political integration, their impact can be limited and reversed so that mutual understanding is developed between groups and the root causes of the conflicts between them are addressed. The state is well-placed to lead this change.

### **CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

The previous chapter demonstrated that the marginalisation of groups, competition for resources and political power, and the politicisation of ethnicity and religion are the underlying causes of ethno-religious violence. It also demonstrated how the use of preventative measures, peace-building and the state can address direct and structural violence. Conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation have emerged as key theories that shape how peace can be achieved and violent conflict prevented. Conflict transformation theory will be discussed in lights of its evolution and its relationship to peace-building, transitional justice and human rights. Political economy theory contributes to understanding the causes of conflict and devising appropriate responses for prevention. As theoretical frameworks applicable in peace and conflict studies, both conflict transformation and political economy will be utilised to understand how the structural and root causes of conflict can be addressed.

Before discussing these theories and their responses to conflict, it is important to discuss the nature and rationale of conflict. For Coyne and Pellillo (2011, p.3), conflict occurs when “two (or more) parties resort to violence as a means of dispute resolution”. They posit that the reasons for these disputes are clashes over economic resources or opportunities, ideological factors, ethnic or religious tensions, or disagreements over politics and borders (Coyne and Pellillo, 2011). Carpenter and Kennedy (1981, p.65) note that conflict can easily and quickly shift from disagreements over issues to “bitterness between parties, hardening of positions, development of more extreme positions, and a desire to win regardless of the consequences”. They posit that the worsening of such disagreements make the conflict situation much more complex as differences become harder to resolve (Carpenter and Kennedy, 1981, p. 65).

Social conflict has been used to define the nature of clashes between various groups. Coser (1967, p.232) defines social conflict as a “struggle over values or claims to status, power, and scarce resources, in which the aims of the conflict groups are not only to gain the desired values but also to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals”. Furthermore, social conflict emerges when “particular structures of domination make struggles over values and scarce resources likely” (Oberschall, 1978, p.292). As Burton (1997) rightly asserts, conflict arises because of unmet needs. According to Upreti (2004), it emerges



from feelings of unfairness, injustice, mistrust and suspicion and is increasingly expressed through violence. Conflict occurs between individuals, groups, organisations, and communities and could divide groups along the lines of race, class, religion or ethnicity.

While conflict has negative outcomes, it can also be “creatively transformed to ensure equity, progress and harmony” (ECPF, 2008, p.7). Hence, conflict in itself is transformation as it could destabilise existing structures of inequality and produce fair systems and processes. This is why Homer-Dixon (1994, p.6) emphasises that “social conflict is not always a bad thing: mass mobilization and civil strife can produce opportunities for beneficial change in the distribution of land and wealth and in processes of governance”. Consequently conflict as a “driver of social change can be considered to be constructive if the conflicting parties acknowledge the legitimacy of different interests and the needs of all actors involved” (Berghof Foundation, 2012, p.11).

Conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation have been devised as responses to address conflicts. The distinctions between these responses are discussed below as these determine the correct responses to different kinds of conflicts. This comparative exercise also strengthens the relevance and utility of conflict transformation theory. Thereafter, conflict transformation theory is presented and discussed.

### **3.1. Conflict Management**

Black (1990, p.43) defines conflict management simply as “the handling of grievances”. It focuses on how to “control, handle and mitigate an open conflict and how to limit the potential damage caused by its escalation” (Berghof Foundation, 2012, p.18). Another definition of conflict management sees it as “efforts to prevent, limit, contain, or resolve conflicts, especially violent ones, while building up the capacities of all parties involved” prior to undertaking peace-building (USIP, 2011, p.15). According to Bar-Siman-Tov (1994, p.75), conflict management means “controlling, limiting, and containing conflict behaviour in such a way as to make it less destructive or violent”. The Conflict Management Toolkit (SAIS-CM, 2000) states that, conflict

management aims to “prevent the eruption of destructive conflict, facilitate a move from violent to spoken conflict, and enable a transformation from conflict to lasting peace by addressing the root causes and effects of conflict”.

Conflict management aims to bring an immediate end to conflict by bringing the relevant parties to the table. It does not eliminate the causes of the conflict, but provides an environment for conflict resolution (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1994, p.75). It tries “to contain a conflict or, at best, reach a compromise, without necessarily resolving it” (Berghof Foundation, 2012, p.18). This is closely linked to peace-making, a process embarked upon to reach peaceful agreements and settlements between warring parties in order to create an environment for longer-term peace-building. According to Carpenter and Kennedy (1981, p.67), conflict management is useful in providing a wide range of options to stakeholders that will meet their needs. The focus here is on the elite and top-level leadership and bringing them to the negotiating table.

Borg (1992) identifies the five types of conflict management discussed by Black (1984) which include “self-help, avoidance, negotiation, settlement, and toleration” (Borg, 1992, p.265). Mediation is also a tool for conflict management (Quackenbush and Venteicher, 2008). According to Frazier and Dixon (2006), conflict management techniques and systems could range from mediation, to adjudication and military intervention, all of which contribute to achieving a settlement amongst the parties. According to Greig and Diehl (2005), peacekeeping is an important conflict management tool especially at the international level, but it is not sufficient in settling disputes between groups. Bercovitch, Diehl and Goertz (1997) divide conflict management approaches into three main methods: unilateral, bilateral and multilateral, with deterrence, negotiations and mediation/peacekeeping as the most common means used, respectively (Greig & Diehl, 2005, p.623).

In managing conflict, direct violence and war come to an end, which creates a largely stable foundation on which long-term conflict transformation efforts can be built. As outlined by Schirch (2008, p.9), reducing direct violence involves “restraining perpetrators of violence, relieving the immediate suffering of victims of violence, and creating a safe space for peace-building activities...that address the root causes of the violence”. When the parties are unwilling or not ready to resolve their conflict, conflict

management is used to manage and mitigate further violence (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1994, p.75-76). Essentially, conflict management focuses on bringing about a short-term solution to violent conflict. While Greig and Diehl (2005) maintain the need for conflict management, they note that it is simply not enough until the reasons for the conflict are successfully addressed and settled, and the seeds of future recurrence are dealt with. It is this gap that conflict transformation theory attempts to fill.

### **3.2. Conflict Management versus Conflict Transformation**

While conflict management focuses on short-term political settlements that fail to address the root causes and transform violent conflict (McCandless, 2007, p.89; Schirch, 2008, p.8-9), conflict transformation is a long-term process that involves building relationships and resolving the underlying causes of the conflict. This does not downplay the importance of conflict management as its focus is on reframing the positions and views of stakeholders to reach an amicable outcome (Miall, 2004, p.3-4). It is thus a useful process in curbing immediate violence.

While conflict transformation emphasises the inclusion of grassroots individuals and groups (Mitchell, 2002), Borg (1992, p.265) notes the assumption that “a specific conflict management strategy is enacted either by the ruling officials of a particular nation or by members of an unofficial group in the name of its country”. Input from critical stakeholders is therefore often missing in interventions developed and applied by policy makers and social elites in conflict situations. Concentrating solely on these actors and military and foreign interventions and contributions can weaken conflict intervention efforts (Berghof, 2012). Thus, conflict management’s elitist approach is detrimental to peace efforts. Peace agreements have failed partly because of this lack of grassroots involvement and engagement.

Conflict management fails to “address structural elements and assumes that the process (alone) can bring peace” (McCandless, 2007, p.92). In terms of this line of thinking, peace settlements, as an outcome of conflict management processes, have failed because they do not provide practical and useful ways through which the root causes of violent conflict can be addressed or consider how peace can be sustained. This dichotomy is seen in the comparison between peace-making (conflict management) and

peace-building (conflict transformation). Peace-building goes beyond the signing and implementation of peace agreements, which are at the core of peace-making, to involve processes and efforts before, during and after the signing of agreements (Lederach, 1997). Furthermore, peace-building involves processes and efforts to transform conflict towards more peaceful and sustainable relationships.

### **3.3. Conflict Resolution**

Conflict resolution gained prominence at the end of the First World War (1914-1918) and with the emergence of the League of Nations and the rise of pacifism (Kriesberg, 1982). Cortright (2008) writes that the impact of the war resulted in renewed efforts to develop institutions that could address the causes of war and provide an avenue for collective security. Contemporary conflict resolution was further shaped by the creation of the UN and efforts to strengthen collective security and encourage reconciliation between member states. By the early 1970s to the late 1980s, conflict resolution practices had expanded around the world within institutions, non-governmental organisations, governments and even in academic circles (Kriesberg, 1982, p. 22). Furthermore, training in conflict resolution, mediation and dialogue became more prominent (Berg, 2001).

According to Bar-Siman-Tov (1994, p.75), conflict resolution involves “the reconciliation or elimination of fundamental differences and grievances underlying a conflict”. He (1994, p.81) defines conflict resolution as a:

developmental process, which includes the absence of violence, the removal of the sources of the conflict situation, the changing of attitude and the emergence of the readiness to give up some of the goals in the conflict in order to accomplish others.

For Kriesberg (1982, p.15), conflict resolution refers to various approaches that end conflict through joint and mutual efforts and agreements. It has therefore shifted from merely halting violence to “building the conditions of peace including post-violence reconciliation, enhancing justice, establishing conflict management systems, and many other issues” (Kriesberg, 1982, p.17). Another definition sees conflict resolution as involving “efforts to address the underlying causes of a conflict by finding common interests and overarching goals” (USIP, 2011, p.15). In the case of Nepal, conflict

resolution approaches ranged from formal practices like courts and semi-judicial organisations to informal practices like reconciliation, public apologies, and low-level negotiations (Upreti, 2004).

In resolving a conflict, a favourable outcome occurs when the interests and needs of the different groups are successfully met through approaches such as mediation, negotiation, arbitration and facilitation, sometimes by a third party. Thus, it requires “a face-to-face exploration into the needs of the opposing parties and the ways and means of satisfying them” (Azar & Burton, 1986, p.38). Furthermore, conflict resolution emphasises “the role of external intermediaries in the ending of conflicts” (Kriesberg, 1982, p.16). However, Tidwell & Lerche (2004) note that a third party could introduce issues that further complicate or negatively impact the outcome of conflict resolution efforts.

According to Davidson and Wood (2004), the conflict resolution model is about a win-win solution. It has four stages, which are “developing expectations..., defining each party’s interests, brainstorming creative options, and combining options into win-win solutions” (Davidson and Wood, 2004, p.7). Within these four stages, interactions should be based on cooperation and achieving mutually exclusive conclusions, focus on needs and interests and not positions, collectively provide options that address these needs and interests, and select the final and best ideas to address most if not all of the needs and interests (Davidson and Wood, 2004). Citing Gordon (1970), Davidson and Wood (2004, p.11), identify six steps for conflict resolution which include “defining the problems in terms of needs, generating possible solutions, evaluating the solutions, deciding on a mutually acceptable solution, implementing the solution and evaluating the solution at a later date”. Different elements or contents of conflict resolution have emerged, including transformational conflict resolution. Byrne (2001, p.4) introduces the concept of transformational conflict resolution which he defines as “peace concepts, methods, norms, parties, practices, and processes that ethnic communities together use to transform underlying structural issues in the process of post-conflict peace-building”.

In Daley’ (2006) view, conflict resolution models tend to “tribalise” conflicts instead of taking into account that the use of ethnicity in conflicts is merely an instrument for political goals and personal agendas. After extensive fieldwork on conflict resolution

systems in Nepal, Upreti (2004) acknowledges the seeming lack of evidence on the effectiveness of conflict resolution's top-down approach, as only the elite and powerful benefited from the process. The focus of conflict resolution on short-term and immediate goals and on the elites in the system is a gap conflict transformation acknowledges and finds a solution to.

### **3.4. Conflict Resolution versus Conflict Transformation**

A wide range of authors has discussed the distinction between conflict resolution and conflict transformation. For Daley (2006), the fact that peace has extended to include reducing direct violence and fighting social injustice requires a shift from conflict resolution models to a transformational approach. Lederach (1995, p.201) writes that conflict resolution is not "sufficiently concerned with the deeper structural, cultural and long term relational aspects of the conflict", areas that are central to conflict transformation discourse. In another discussion, he adds that conflict resolution attempts to solve specific problems, while conflict transformation focuses on constructive change (Lederach, 2003, p.4). Citing Diamond (1994), Botes (2003) points out that while conflict resolution activities might focus on discovering and resolving the root causes of a conflict, conflict transformation seeks to address and change the conditions that produce these underlying root causes. Citing Hansen (1988), McCandless (2007) notes that conflict resolution depicts conflict as something to be removed or resolved, while it fails to alter or change the social and material factors that gave birth to tensions and violent conflict.

Conflict transformation is also not about the "mere elimination or control of conflict" as outlined by conflict management and conflict resolution, but is about transforming "the dynamic of the conflict and the relationship between the parties" (Lederach, 1995; Botes, 2003, p.5). Mitchell (2002) notes that the need to positively change structures and relationships is more pronounced in conflict transformation than in conflict resolution efforts. Another distinction made by Diamond (1994) is that conflict resolution covers activities like problem-solving, training, research, peace-building and inter-group dialogue while conflict transformation processes include reconciliation and social transformation.

According to Lederach (1999), conflict transformation is the preferred term as it shows that something undesirable is changing and taking on a new form, while resolution shows that the goal is to end something that is not desired. Furthermore, conflict resolution assumes that conflict ends, while conflict transformation acknowledges that it is an evolving process (Galtung, 1995, p.51) that requires the constant evaluation and assessment of responses (Miall, 2004, p.2). Clements (1997) thus posits the notion that conflict transformation is not an attempt to get rid of conflict but to use it for positive change.

Returning to a discussion on the three theories, challenges have emerged in defining and distinguishing between conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation. Botes (2003) notes that conflict transformation and conflict resolution have sometimes been used interchangeably and questions if the former is merely a reformulation of the latter. However, he (2003) argues that there is a definite shift towards conflict transformation. Ramsbotham et al. (2011) discuss the central difference, namely that conflict resolution assumes a final settlement whereas conflict transformation acknowledges bi-directionality – that we can move from conflict to peace or from peace back into conflict.

Botes (2003, p.3) states that authors like Diamond (1994), Kriesberg (1997), and Ramsbotham et al. (1999) have unpacked conflict transformation “in the context of a continuum, which generally begins with conflict settlement then conflict management to conflict resolution and conflict transformation”. For Clements (1997), conflict transformation might require conflict management and conflict resolution approaches<sup>20</sup> like mediation, negotiation, facilitation, and other methods as a form of intervention when conflict escalates. For Warnecke and Franke (2010, p.78), conflict transformation is all-encompassing as it requires a combination of peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building.

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<sup>20</sup> According to the Berghof Foundation (2012, pp. 49 – 50), negotiation can be broadly defined as “a face-to-face discussion for the purpose of reaching an agreement on a situation that is perceived as a problem or conflict”, while mediation “aims to reach agreement among the parties through negotiation processes”, but with the help of an additional party “who is responsible for directing and supporting the flow of communication” and facilitation is the same as mediation but with “the presence of the ‘third party’ who is responsible for the communication process.

From these views, one can safely deduce that there are different views and perspectives on the content and applicability of these theories. According to the Berghof Foundation (2012), these different understandings and views, particularly of conflict management and conflict resolution have made the task of differentiating the two theories rather difficult. Through the presentation of the theories and the discussion below, some light will be shed on these issues.

### **3.5. Conflict Transformation**

Conflict transformation arose from the realisation that social conflict “moves through certain predictable phases, transforming relationships and social organization” (Boulding, 1962, p.17) and that social conflict has become protracted in nature (Azar, 1990). Clements (1997) writes that this increased focus on conflict transformation arose from the need to not only address direct violence but also the social structures that contribute to structural violence. As a response or replacement for violence, Rupesinghe (1995) sees conflict transformation as a flexible and comprehensive process that replaces cultures of violence and barbarism with non-violent cultures of negotiation and accommodation. These views present arguments for the evolution and growth of conflict transformation as a theory that recognises the ever-changing conflict spectrum, the importance of relationships in any conflict context and the focus on structural violence as opposed to direct violence which receives more attention.

Beyond the presentation of conflict transformation as a theory and as a discourse-shaper, it has also been used to shape practice and design training approaches. It has also become institutionalised, has influenced public discourse, and has strong links to systemic change and peace-building (Botes, 2003; Kriesberg, 2011; and Wils et al., 2006). Examining the applicability of conflict transformation theory is important because, as suggested by Reimann (2004, p.14), the ultimate test of a theory is determined “in the degree of its usefulness and technical ability as it seeks to guide and orient policy towards given ends, such as the settlement of conflict”. Conflict transformation theory has evolved and been applied to a broad section of society including academic institutions, government and practitioners.



## **Conflict Transformation in Training Approaches**

Conflict transformation theory has provided significant resources for training peace-building practitioners and training future trainers in nonviolent action and conflict transformation. Recipients of such trainings mainly include people actively involved in nonviolent conflict transformation from conflict areas, future trainers in conflict transformation and people actively working in conflict zones such as international staff of donor agencies, the UN and other third party intervenors (Schmelzle, 2006, p.2).

These trainings, such as the European Union-funded *Training of Trainers in Nonviolent Conflict Transformation* pilot course conducted in Slovakia between September 2005 and November 2006, focused on preparing participants to successfully promote nonviolent conflict transformation by imparting the right skills, knowledge, behaviours and attitudes to do so (Centre for Training and Networking in Nonviolent Action, 2007). Topics covered in this course include conflict analysis, conflict transformation and mediation, and conflict within the context of the individual and society (Centre for Training and Networking in Nonviolent Action, 2007, p.14-15). While the case of Slovakia provides an example of the content of conflict transformation training, there is a wide range of other topics that are included. These usually include conflict analysis as conflict transformation focuses on understanding the underlying/root causes of the conflict. Citing Francis (2002a, 2002b), Schmelzle (2006, p.6), content include:

conflict phases of latent conflict, open conflict, settlement and conflict prevention...awareness raising, group formation and communication, preparation for and implementation of dialogue, negotiation, mediation, reconciliation and monitoring, reconstruction and community re-building.

At the international level, capacity building for conflict transformation can focus on modules on advocacy, fundraising, proposal writing and media relations (Wils and Zupan, 2004).

In conclusion, conflict transformation training brings value to peace-building work in general and enhances the work of peace-builders and those involved in conflict work. Conflict transformation training is beneficial for these actors as it can “sensitise for conflict causes and dynamics in the environment in which one works; strengthen skills

for dealing with conflict and the sensitivity for intended and unintended consequences of specific activities” (Schmelzle, 2006, p.8). For Lederach (1995), training in conflict transformation across all cultures must not only transfer techniques but aim for “personal and systemic transformation and change”. Therein lies the sustainability of any peace process – personal and structural change.

### **Systemic Conflict Transformation**

While an extensive discussion is presented on the linkages and relationships between peace-building and conflict transformation in a later section (section 3.6), conflict transformation in the context of systemic change is briefly examined here. Successful conflict transformation requires a focus on systemic change (Botes, 2003) as it enables an examination of how conflict transformation is implemented in practice. Ropers’ (2008, p.12) article on systemic conflict transformation (SCT) in Sri Lanka, defines it as the “application of systemic thinking to basic challenges in conflict transformation, and a reflection of field practice from a systemic perspective”. Coleman et al. (2006) note that while systemic thinking has been applied to conflict analysis, it has not been used to transform and resolve conflict. SCT emerged from the realisation that conflict systems are highly multidimensional and very complex especially when it comes to identifying the drivers and triggers of conflict and designing appropriate responses and interventions. It therefore focuses on tackling and reducing this complexity (Wils et al., 2006, p.iv). SCT attempts to fill performance gaps in conflict transformation by taking into account:

the heightened complexity, dynamics and longevity of protracted conflicts and their external parameters, weaknesses in strategic planning and coordination of the various actors engaged in peacebuilding; managing asymmetrical conflict structures and considering the specific roles of non-state armed groups and state actors in scenarios of state failure; and taking account of the needs and interests of, and relationships between, all conflict actors, including spoilers (Wils et al., 2006, p.iii).

It is argued that systemic conflict transformation helps both internal and external actors to understand the complex conflict environment they are dealing with, helps to develop efficient and effective responses in conflict environments, and focuses on the changes that take place within the conflict environment (Berghof Foundation, 2003, p.3). Simply put, SCT focuses on three key elements: “observing the environment, working

with and within the system and evolving along with the system” (Berghof Foundation, 2003, p.5). This creates an opportunity for all stakeholders to learn through the conflict transformation process, and share this learning with one another in order to improve their contribution and efforts to the process. The five core elements of systemic conflict transformation thus involve:

systemic conflict analysis and conflict monitoring, strategic planning of systemic interventions, engagement with stakeholders, mobilization of agents of peaceful change and creativity in the imagination of sustainable solutions” (Berghof Foundation, 2006, p.5).

Essentially, SCT provides a contextual framework for conflict transformation by enhancing intervention efforts and developing the right approaches to successfully transform conflicts. It also ensures that conflict transformation efforts are based on in-depth analysis, collaboration focused on strategic change, and room for innovative and sustainable solutions to conflict.

For example, in Burundi, while efforts by a wide range of organisations to transform the conflict led to multiple programmes including training politicians, promoting human rights, teaching the culture of peace, sponsoring dialogues, working with elders and reintegrating the displaced; there was no focus on other significant transformational tasks like “integrating Hutus into the state structure, training the police and judiciary and most significantly, curbing the violence” (Lund et al., 1998, p.72). The reasons include the lack of NGO capacity to take on the task, a lack of coordination and implementation and the absence of a coherent policy to curb violence and instability in the country (Lund et al., 1998). SCT as a response then ensures that all dimensions are taken into account when trying to transform conflict, that groups are working and partnering together and that the triggers for violence are curbed effectively.

### **Institutionalisation of conflict transformation**

In addition to the application of the systemic approach to conflict transformation, the theory has evolved and expanded to the academic, government and NGO sectors. Kriesberg (2011) writes that the institutionalisation of the field of conflict transformation is evident in its inclusion in academic programmes and in governmental

institutions, thereby increasing its popularity and relevance. This is reflected in degrees at the Masters and Ph.D. levels in academic settings, in the internal roles and external operations of government and the application of conflict transformation ideas and practices by non-government organisations (Kriesberg, 2011).

Returning to the broader discussion on conflict transformation, while John Lederach is the most visible modern day proponent of conflict transformation and the author that provides the “greatest specificity” on conflict transformation theory (Botes, 2003), he is not the only one. A wide range of authors have used the term transformation and a wide range of views exist on how transformation occurs and at what levels it can be achieved (Burgess and Burgess, 1997; Botes, 2003; Vayrynen, 1991; Harrington and Merry, 1988; Burton, 1990; Kriesberg et al., 1989; Augsburg, 1992; and Miall, 2004). Harrington & Merry (1988) and Burton (1990) observe that, transformation occurs in societies when “fundamental social and political changes are made to correct inequities and injustice to provide all groups with their fundamental human needs”. Citing these authors, Botes (2003) also points out that transformation is defined “as the restructuring of social institutions as well as a redistribution of power from high-power groups to low-power groups”.

For Kriesberg et al. (1989), transformation is a “fundamental change in the relationship between parties and a change in recognising each other’s ethnic and national aspirations”. In another development, transformation focuses on the individual; with Bush and Folger (1994) proposing the term “transformative mediation “which changes “the consciousness and character of human beings”. Galtung (2000, p.2) goes further to present the idea of *peaceful conflict transformation* as “developing perspectives through dialogues with the parties, on peaceful transformation toward acceptable, sustainable, autonomous, and participatory outcomes”. This flows from his notion of the Transcend method with its central thesis that violence can be prevented and a positive outcome from conflict can be achieved only through transformation (Galtung, 2000).

There is thus a wide range of definitions of conflict transformation. As defined and proposed by its main proponent, Lederach (2003, p.14), conflict transformation seeks:

to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human relationships.

Another definition sees conflict transformation more broadly as:

a complex process of constructively changing relationships, attitudes, behaviours, interests and discourses in violence-prone conflict settings ... addresses underlying structures, cultures and institutions that encourage and condition violent political and social conflict” (Berghof Foundation (2012, p.23).

According to McCandless (2007, p.89-90), a review of conflict transformation literature identifies the following key characteristics:

... it seeks to transform structures and bring about systemic change; it develops within particular cultures and draws upon cultural resources; it requires ownership of the process at all levels by the participants and stakeholders; it emphasizes the role of economics and development issues; it stresses the role of identity issues; it seeks to address directly past and present injustices, grievances, and traumas; it requires the participation of communities and sectors at all levels in the design of peaceful social, economic, and political processes and institutions; and it emphasises the development of nonviolent conflict transformation and prevention mechanisms.

Flowing from these definitions and perspectives, Miall (2004, p.2) writes that conflict transformation proposes a shift from “theories of conflict to theories of conflict in context”. This means that as a response, it is significantly shaped by the context it is applied in and takes the needs and specificities on the ground into account in designing interventions and responses. It not only focuses on the conflict but on the environment in which that conflict takes place (McCandless, 2007). Essentially, peace that is transformative addresses the power differences within economic and political structures in divided societies and the economic and political policies that divide and destroy relationships. In addition, peace-building and conflict transformation must together ensure that the “original structural sources (economic, social, political, military, and cultural) of the conflict have been changed in some way or other” (Clements, 1997).

At the core of conflict transformation theory is its focus on extensive, comprehensive and multi-level engagements. In designing programmes to manage conflict, conflict transformation focuses on efforts that “work simultaneously at governing elite,

community leaders and grass-roots perspectives” (Sisk and Risley, 2005, p.5). According to Sisk and Risley (2005, p.5.), another important dimension of conflict transformation is its “design of programs that address short-, medium and long term objectives that are reinforced and sustained over time”.

Conflict transformation has a profound impact and leads to change at various levels (Lederach, 2003; Galtung, 2000; Augsburg, 1992; Miall, 2004; and Vayrynen, 1991). For Galtung (2000, p.3), in principle change can happen at the global, social and inter/intra-personal levels. In another view, Augsburg (1992) notes that conflict transformation occurs in three key areas: attitude transformation where negative attitudes and perceptions are changed, behaviour transformation and finally conflict transformation which identifies and removes imbalances and incompatibilities between groups.

In arguing for transformation, Vayrynen (1991) identifies four ways in which transformation happens, namely, actor transformations, issue transformations, rule transformations, and structural transformations. Citing Vayrynen (1991), Botes (2003) notes that actor transformations bring about changes in the major parties and introduce new actors to the conflict while issue transformations lead to a change in the agenda, subject or cause of the conflict. Rule transformations have to do with reviewing the norms of interaction or terms of engagement that the major parties use and structural transformations focus on changes within the conflict system or environment and go beyond the actor, issue and rule transformations which are limited in scope (Botes, 2003).

Building on Vayrynen’s approach (1991), Miall (2004) identifies five types of transformation or transformers: context transformations, structural transformations, actor transformations, issue transformations and personal/elite transformations. Context transformations deal with changes in the context of the conflict and its impact on the perceptions and motives of the major parties involved. Structural transformations have to do with changes in the structure of the conflict, which include “the actors, their issues, incompatible goals and relationships, or the society, economy or state within which the conflict is embedded” (Miall, 2004, p.9). In this form of transformation,

particular attention is paid to the “unbalanced and contested” relationships that must be resolved before transformation can take place. (Miall, 2004, p.9).

Actor transformations include decisions by key actors to change their goals, and their approach to the conflict, as well as changes in leadership in order to achieve the successful transformation of conflicts. Issue transformations deal with how the positions of major parties to the conflict are reformulated or changed in order to achieve compromise or resolution (Miall, 2004). Personal elite changes deal with changes in the mind-sets or views of key decision-makers and the benefits this has for conflict transformation efforts (Miall, 2004, p.10). Table 3.1. presents the various forms of transformations discussed above and the one by Lederach below.

Lederach (2003) identifies four dimensions that require transformation, namely, personal, relational, structural and cultural (Lederach, 2003). The personal deals with changes for the individual; the relational deals with changes in human relationships; the structural deals with the changes in the underlying causes of conflict and social structures, organisations and institutions, and the cultural refers to changes in group life patterns and cultures.

At the personal level, conflict negatively affects the individual physically, mentally and spiritually; therefore, conflict transformation calls for avenues to reduce situations that cause these negative outcomes (Lederach, 2003). The relational mode deals with how communication and interactions in relationships are affected by conflict and focuses on improving these by building understanding and improving communication between groups (Lederach, 2003). The structural mode examines the systems that gave birth to the conflict, the violent patterns and behaviours that are expressed in that system and identifies the underlying causes in order to reduce these violent patterns and behaviours (Lederach, 2003). The cultural mode identifies the changes in group patterns as a result of the conflict and finds avenues through which these cultural resources can be used to handle conflict in a non-violent manner (Lederach, 2003). Conflict transformation thus offers an integrated approach to peace-building that focuses on producing long-term and constructive changes in these four dimensions (USIP, 2011).

Beyond these four areas, Lederach (1998) identifies three levels that need to feel the impact of conflict transformation efforts or a framework. These are the top level leadership, particularly at the level where negotiations for the cessation of conflicts take place, leaders from key sectors including professionals and intellectuals who can benefit from training in conflict resolution and problem solving, and finally local leaders in local and grassroots NGOs and other organisations, where training will have a positive impact.

These four modes are useful in the context of Plateau state as individuals, communities, groups of ethnic and religious orientations and the structure as a whole have been negatively impacted by the conflict. Despite the negative outcomes, it is noteworthy that these four modes can still provide avenues for positive change. Lederach's prescriptions are extremely useful as a starting point as he identifies key actions like addressing the underlying causes of the conflict, shifting from violent patterns and poor communication, building and improving interactions, and examining the resources groups have for non-violent conflict resolution, as key steps on the path to transformation.

<b>Vayrynen</b>	<b>Miall</b>	<b>Lederach</b>	<b>Augsburger</b>	<b>Galtung</b>
Actor transformations	Context transformations	Personal	Attitude	Global
Issue transformations	Structural transformations	Relational	Behaviour	Social
Rule transformations	Actor transformations	Structural	Conflict	Inter/intra personal levels
Structural transformations	Issue transformations	Cultural		
	Personal/elite transformations			

**Table 3.1: Levels of change in conflict transformation by Vayrynen (1991), Miall (2004), Lederach (1998) and Augsburger (1992)**



A review of Table 3.1 shows that transformation has to do with the individual as all the authors identify actor transformations, and personal and elite transformations as a critical area for change. This is in line with attitudinal and behavioural change which Augusburger (1992) highlights, key factors that will contribute to sustainable peace. This also resonates strongly with the bottom-up approach that is a central element of conflict transformation. The need for transformation in relationships is also emphasised by Galtung (2000) and Lederach (1998) while most scholars agree that the context or the structure in which the conflict takes place is a key area where transformation must be achieved. While it has been established that transformation can occur through various entry points and levels, its three ultimate goals are to reduce violence; increase justice; and restore fragile relationships (Lederach, 1995, p.23).

### **3.5.1. Reducing Violence**

In reducing violence, one can utilise Johan Galtung's three forms of violence: direct, structural and cultural and focus on how these can be reduced in the context of conflict transformation. In reducing violence in all these forms, the issues, content and underlying patterns and causes of the violence need to be resolved (Lederach, 2003). In addition, conflict cannot be transformed unless its root causes are addressed (Berghof Foundation, 2012). This also requires examining the proximate triggers for violence and addressing them.

Clements (1997) notes that the focus of conflict transformation and peace-building should be to switch stakeholders' attention from using violence and destructive methods to more peaceful and nonviolent approaches. Conflict transformation research should therefore identify the "conditions, strategies and policies for sustaining patterns of non-violent behaviour amongst conflicting parties, particularly in protracted social and ethno-political conflict" (Berghof Foundation, 2012, p.65). In achieving non-violent behaviour patterns, it is important that individuals are educated on non-violence and are exposed to various non-violent approaches to resolve tensions. This must instil the view that non-violent approaches are always utilised as a first option in place of violence. A culture of non-violence must also be built and embraced by members of society.

### **3.5.2. Increasing Justice**

Noting that in peace processes, the focus is more on reducing direct violence than on transforming structural violence (Lederach, 1999) notes that attention must be given to structural violence. On that note, increasing justice is at the core of transforming structural violence. In increasing justice, people should have access to political processes and institutions that make policies and decisions that could positively or adversely have an impact on them (Lederach, 2003). In increasing justice then, people must actively participate in the political process and have the space to voice their opinions on the issues that affect them (Mischnick, 2007, p.60). Conflict transformation theory involves “engaging with and transforming relationships, interests, discourses and if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict” (Miall, 2004, p.4). Based on this, conflict transformation takes into account every facet of society including the rules, laws, policies, and interactions between groups that fuel and maintain violent conflict. In this context, structural violence as the systemic and underlying economic, cultural, social and political structures that affect individuals, groups and communities, requires more attention. This is in line with Johan Galtung’s (1990) account of positive peace, which calls for the absence of structural violence and the need for social justice.

According to Daley (2006), social justice is achieved when policies are developed that address the structural causes of the conflict, address the political systems that limit the active participation and inclusion of citizens in governance processes, and tackle inequalities linked to access to state resources and avenues for peace-making. Clements (1997) thus writes that conflict transformation essentially requires a broad-based approach that includes a wide range of actors including citizens, policy makers, and faith-based and social organisations. Their definitions, views and perspectives on justice can be included in designing adequate responses to societal issues and concerns. Borrowing from Botes (2003), conflict transformation focuses on transforming the “very creators of the conflict”, a key aspect in increasing justice.

### **3.5.3. Restoring Broken Relationships**

According to Lederach (2003), relationships are at the foundation of conflict transformation. He (Lederach, 1995, p.26) emphasises this point when he states that, “relationship is the basis of both the conflict and its long-term solution”. Warnecke & Franke (2010, p.79) also note the need for the “reconsolidation of the social fabric” of societies. Like peace-building, conflict transformation focuses on rebuilding relationships in the longer term (Schirch, 2008, p.8, 9). It also examines the deeper relationship patterns in the conflict context (Miall, 2004; McCandless, 2007). It envisages a framework that addresses the content, context and structure of these relationships (Lederach, 2003, p.12). This becomes the basis for finding creative responses and solutions. In achieving this, conflict transformation engages the structures and systems where relationships are built (Lederach & Maiese, 2003; McCandless, 2007). In this study, the state is a key structure/system through which different individuals and groups with different ethnic and religious affiliations interact and relate. Responses should therefore examine how the state has created poor and broken relationships between groups and how it can refrain from worsening these relationships.

Reconciliation is a key approach to restoring relationships. Citing Galtung (1996), Berg (2001, p.7) writes that reconciliation is a “locus that brings people together to repair and restore the relationship, to address past injustices and trauma, and to heal and bring closure”. Conflict transformation therefore means taking into account and improving “mutual perceptions, attitudes and relations among conflicting groups” (Warnecke & Franke, 2010, p.77). In building relationships within structures and systems, it is important that reconciliation be established based on the key principles of mercy, justice and truth (Lederach, 1997; Lederach, 1999). Dialogue is also a very important tool in rebuilding relationships. A focus on the issues at stake and a neglect of the relationships that underpin this will most likely reverse progress in peace-building efforts and hinder the conflict transformation process.

### **3.6. Conflict Transformation and Peace-building**

While the previous section unpacked the goals of conflict transformation, this section builds a stronger argument for conflict transformation in peace-building processes. The links between peace-building and conflict transformation have been established by authors like Lederach (1997) who sees the former as the long-term transformation of a system of war to a system of peace. Clements (1997) describes peace-building as the “foundational base of conflict transformation”. This is in line with Reimann’s (2004, p. 10) view that conflict transformation refers to “outcomes, process and structure oriented long-term peacebuilding efforts which aim to truly overcome revealed forms of direct, cultural and structural violence”. This section examines the relationships between peace-building and conflict transformation.

It is important that peace-building, as with conflict transformation efforts, takes into account the structures and institutions that contribute to violence. These structures and institutions are characterised by corruption, neo-patrimonial systems, and clientelist networks where some groups are marginalised. For conflict transformation to occur through peace-building efforts, processes, programmes, and policies that benefit certain groups over others should be “challenged and changed” (Clements, 2004, p.14).

In relation to the above and borrowing from Clements (2004, p.14), conflict transformers should identify avenues to build the capacities of citizens and societies so they can “transform violent relationships and ensure that economic, political, and social institutions are developed [...] so as to minimise the prospects of violence in future and guarantee these processes through time”. Citing Paris (2004) Kriesberg (2011, p.55) writes that constructive conflict transformation can be strengthened by the creation of “political structures and other shared institutions that provide legitimate ways to manage conflicts”. Kriesberg (2011, p.55) cites Lyons (2005) and notes that while elections replace bullets, they fail to stop on-going violence and do not address the exclusion of some groups and the dominance of others. A possible response would be to ensure that the minimum rights of all are protected. (Kriesberg, 2011, p.55).

Borrowing from Kriesberg (2011, p.55) and Clements (2004), exclusion from political participation, discrimination, and fear of violence must be addressed. Peace-building

processes must focus on redressing systems and institutions that have caused injustices to specific groups and challenge the imbalances in societies. This study focused on identifying such institutions, presenting their weaknesses and identifying how they can be developed and improved. Within this peace-building context, conflict transformation calls for more than negative peace to include Johan Galtung's positive peace. In order to achieve positive peace, it is important that conflict transformation efforts focus on issues of justice.

For conflict transformation to effectively take place in peace-building processes, it is important that there is multi-level engagement, from the elite to the grassroots. Kriesberg (2011, p.55) notes that for conflict transformation to be deeply embedded in societies there is a need for "engagement of many levels". Reimann (2004, p.11) agrees that conflict transformation must engage Track III actors (local grassroots organisations and local development agencies, human rights organisations and organisations providing humanitarian assistance) for peace-building to be successful. Groups at these levels are most affected by the outcomes of violent conflict and neglecting them can result in protracted violence and hatred.

While peace-building has been criticised for focusing on change at the leadership level, conflict transformation fills this gap by advocating for the voices of the masses and grassroots to be heard in order to avoid "uneven peace" (Atashi, 2009, p.6). Botes (2003) cites Lederach's (1998) vision of transformational peace-building as "the inter-party or inter-group politics of the post-conflict phase which occurs with an open system that encourages participation from a broad base of participants from all levels of the affected societies, and not only from a narrow group of leaders at the official bargaining table".

Miall (2004) writes that NGOs have paid the most attention to conflict transformation theories by pushing for sustained and prolonged engagement, understanding the deeply rooted causes of conflict, collaborating closely with parties inside and outside the conflict parties, creating spaces for dialogue and sustaining local engagement and interaction on peace, development opportunities, peace-building, and relationship and institution building. Miall (2004, p.5) cites Rupesinghe's (1995, 1998) view that advocates for a:

comprehensive and eclectic approach to conflict transformation that focuses on multiple levels of interventions by building peace constituencies at the grassroots level and across parties at the civil society level . . . , and also creating peace alliances with any groups able to bring about change, such as business groups, the media and the military.

In his discussion on conflict transformation and peace-building, Clements (1997) writes that conflict transformation should have the following necessary elements:

- a) Change conflict to something that is constructive and nonviolent that is used for positive and generative change.
- b) Conflict transformation is achieved with the ending of violent conflict or conflict is expressed in non-violent ways and the sources of the conflict (political, social, economic, military and cultural) have been changed.
- c) Conflict transformation can be achieved through singular efforts, or in collaboration with third parties, and must include a broad range of society at all levels. This lays emphasis on the fact that causes and solutions to conflict are not only political but also economic and social in nature, thus requiring the involvement of all of society.
- d) Conflict transformation includes actions at the preventive level through early warning and other preventive measures; at the escalatory level of conflict through efforts like crisis management and interventions like conciliation, mediation, negotiation, arbitration and collaborative problem-solving processes; and actions such as reconstruction and reconciliation after the eruption of violence.

Based on the above, conflict transformation efforts are critical and go hand-in-hand with peace-building efforts as both are geared towards reconstructing societies. Conflict transformation goes further to challenge and change the sources of the conflict and emphasises the need for nonviolent and peaceful approaches to resolve conflict.

Conflict transformation is also in line with peace-building efforts like mediation, promoting and sustaining democratic processes and institutions, and the protection of human rights including those of minorities of an ethnic, religious or gender nature (Kriesberg, 2011, p.61). A reconstruction post-conflict peace-building strategy includes the following six elements:

jumpstarting the national economy, decentralized community investments, repairing key transport and communication networks, demining where relevant and linked to other priority investments, demobilization and retraining of ex-combatants, reintegration of displaced populations (Holtzman, 1996).

All of these strategies cannot be successful without processes that restore trust between parties, rebuild avenues for open and free communication, support individuals in moving from past hurt and enmity, find accurate solutions to problems and identify new avenues for interaction between these groups (Clements, 1997). Conflict transformation brings into focus the relationships between the warring groups, the breakdown of trust and presence of hatred, as well as finding ways to build dialogue and reconciliation. Thus, collaborative endeavours between developmental efforts and conflict resolution efforts are important for successful of peace-building and the transformation of hostile relationships.

In the words of Dayton and Kriesberg (2009, p.5), sustainable peace-building requires “transformation across multiple fronts including changed attitudes and perceptions, changed behaviours, and changes to the structural inequalities that provide uneven benefits within political systems”. Peace-building efforts can benefit from this added dimension.

### **3.7. Conflict Transformation and Transitional Justice**

In many cases, peace-building processes have to adopt transitional justice procedures. According to the International Center for Transitional Justice (2009), transitional justice responds to the massive and organised nature of human rights violations by identifying opportunities for peace, reconciliation and democracy. For the UN (S/2004/616, para. 8), transitional justice is the “full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation”. It includes judicial and non-judicial processes and mechanisms like “individual prosecutions, repatriations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof” (United Nations, S/2004/616, para. 8). These non-judicial elements focus on “neo-traditional and other locally grown approaches to making amends after conflict” (Kayser-Whande and Schell-Faucon, 2008, p.11).

Transitional justice has evolved from its emergence during the Cold War to conflicts that are more complex on the global stage. It has thus had to contend with the new dynamics of conflict, multiple actors, the multiple levels introduced by contemporary global conflicts and the state as a gross violator of human rights.

There is an increasing overlap between conflict transformation and transitional justice as both focus on achieving sustainable peace (Kayser-Whande and Schell-Faucon (2008, p.13). Both also recognise the relevance of trauma and trauma work in post-conflict peace-building processes (Kayser-Whande and Schell-Faucon, 2008, p.28). The close linkages between these concepts are illustrated by Lederach's (1995, p.20) view that justice involves "the pursuit of restoration, of rectifying wrongs, of creating right relationships based on equity and fairness". He adds that the pursuit of justice has to do with "advocacy for those harmed, for open acknowledgement of the wrongs committed, and for making things right" (Lederach, 1995, p.20). Lederach goes on to state that reconciliation is a process that identifies and acknowledges past truths and efforts to right the wrongs of the past and forgives those who committed these wrongs. It is therefore important that transitional justice processes take into account the structural causes of violence, which requires long-term engagement in its processes so that lingering frustrations and dissatisfaction do not fuel another conflict.

### **3.8. Conflict Transformation and Human Rights**

Human rights are defined simply as a "threat to the very existence of an individual or group" (Dudouet and Schmelzle, 2010, p.9). Baehr (1991, p.9) defines human rights as "internationally agreed values, standards or rules regulating the conduct of states towards their own citizens and towards non-citizens". Borrowing from GIZ (2010, p.21), conflict transformation and human rights can contribute significantly to tackling "poverty, injustice and violent conflict". Furthermore, both "seek to support and facilitate non-violent approaches of social change towards just and sustainable peace, characterised by conditions in which individuals and groups are protected against abuse, can actively shape their life and the society around them, live in prosperity and where mechanisms exist for handling conflict constructively"(GIZ, 2010, p.45).



Historically the relationship between conflict transformation and human rights has been distinct, with the former focusing on restoring trust and understanding in rebuilding the relationships between the parties to the conflict while the latter has focused on the impact and consequences of conflict (International Alert, 1998, p.20). However, there has been increased discussion on the relationship between human rights discourse and conflict transformation and the fact that human rights can be part of conflict transformation processes and provide insight into conflict transformation work (Dudouet and Schmelzle, 2010; Pia and Diez, 2007; Juma, 2012; and Parlevliet, 2012).

According to International Alert's (1998, p.20) code of conduct, human rights and conflict transformation organisations are increasingly collaborating as they have realised that they share the similar goals of "sustainable peace and social justice". Juma (2012, p.2) maintains that it is impossible to disconnect conflict transformation and peace building from the human rights agenda while Parlevliet (2010, p.25-34) is of the view that "understanding and applying human rights and conflict transformation improves both the analysis and practice involved in moving from violence to sustainable peace". For development agency GIZ (2010, p.9), the combination of human rights and conflict transformation enhances development cooperation efforts. These fields have much in common as their practitioners and organisations work in the same environments, have common concerns and goals and both aim for justice and challenging unequal and unbalanced power relations through the use of nonviolent action (GIZ, 2010, p.9).

This complementary relationship has emerged due to the overlap between transitional justice and reconciliation processes in post-conflict environments (Dudouet and Schmelzle, 2010, p.6). In terms of this relationship, the focus of human rights discourse is softer rights such as "cultural, economic, and social rights" thereby going beyond political rights. There is a need to go beyond direct violence and look at the cultural and structural aspects of conflict; this is a critical element of conflict transformation. Human rights discourse is therefore central to the conflict transformation approaches that Lederach, Galtung and others propose. Viewed from another dimension, International Alert (p.20) highlights that conflict transformation organisations have contributed significantly to the promotion and protection of human rights merely by bringing about a peaceful and just settlement of conflict.

In introducing the human rights dimension of conflict transformation efforts, Parlevliet (2010, p.22-23) identifies: four areas that should be considered:

- (a) human rights as rules which “legally recognize human rights and institutionalise respect for them through the adoption, implementation and enforcement of relevant legislation” (p. 22)
- (b) human rights as structures and institutions which focuses on addressing “the underlying causes of conflict, and to examine the structures in society that govern issues of power, resources, identity and security and that determine access to and decision-making over such assets”. This means that conflict transformation must also focus on the “development of legitimate, independent and capable institutions to support the realization and orderly expression of rights and secure remedies” (p.22).
- (c) human rights as relationships which means that relationships (between the state and its citizens, and among individuals and groups in society) must be guided by rights, must be constructive, and non-violent, and allow for the “recognition of humanity in others”. (p.22-23). In relation to conflict transformation, human rights also relate to both vertical and horizontal relationships, which are at the core of conflict transformation (p.23).
- (d) human rights as a process which focuses on how “issues of access, protection and identity are addressed”; thus, the peace process must not be flawed or contaminated to affect its legitimacy and sustainability (p.23). This will mean integrating key human rights values and principles like “dignity, participation, inclusion, protection of marginalised or minority voices, accountability” into conflict transformation processes at multiple levels in society (p.23).

Juma (2012) argues that, human rights values like respect for human dignity, socio-economic well-being, freedom and equality, and the respect for culture are transformative in content as they “help restore the fractured fabric of society by intimating goals that are consistent with the people’s aspirations, such as economic welfare and development, restoration of human dignity, freedom and liberty, and of course, peacefulness” (Juma, 2012, p. 20). Juma (2012, p.20) concludes that these values can be used by conflict transformers in prevention, conflict escalation and post-

conflict efforts. Human rights also complement conflict transformation in a myriad of ways. For example:

the knowledge of human rights strengthens conflict analysis; ...integration of human rights standards, values and principles can benefit conflict transformation interventions by highlighting legal entitlements of right-holders and obligations of duty-bearers as well as questions of capacity and issues related to accessibility, transparency, accountability, non-discrimination and participation (GIZ 2010, p.9).

On the reverse side, conflict transformation is complementary to human rights work as “human rights-focused development practitioners can benefit from conflict transformation lessons and tools, such as conflict analysis, facilitation and negotiation techniques, conflict sensitivity, and the design and implementation of dialogue processes” (GIZ, 2010, p.10).” Parlevliet (2010, p.7) identifies five implications for conflict transformation from the established relationship between human rights and conflict transformation. These are:

- a) Focus not only on the immediate symptoms of conflict but the structural conditions.
- b) Understand the “changing nature” of the state, empower others (smaller parties, the people) to challenge the status quo, and work closely with civil society while not neglecting the government. This goes beyond capacity development and technical skills development to focus on “communication patterns, institutional culture and values and perceptions”.
- c) Provide support to the state with the main aim of enhancing its capacity but not to lend support to “undemocratic forces, attitudes and beliefs”.
- d) Find a balance between “conflict intensification and conflict sensitivity” such that conflict analysis is used to “anticipate tension, resistance or outright conflict” and develop strategies like “nonviolent strategic action, non-adversarial advocacy and employing different tactics at different points”.
- e) Clarify roles and the division of responsibilities in organisations in order to avoid resistance or rejection.

Human rights are therefore integral to the success of conflict transformation and vice versa. According to Parlevliet (2010, p.8), applying a human rights perspective brings “conflict transformation closer to its aims by forcing greater emphasis on changing

structural conditions, especially tackling the role of the state, systems of governance and issues of power”. Furthermore, the human rights perspective draws attention to the state’s role in creating and escalating conflict and highlights issues of power as in conflict transformation the focus is more on bottom-up involvement, building relationships and civil society processes (Parlevliet, 2010).

However, conflict transformation organisations face the dilemma of how to include individuals and groups who have violated the human rights of others in constructive dialogue and how to ensure that their engagement with these groups is not interpreted as approval of their actions and methods (International Alert, 1998, p.20). The GIZ project titled “Facilitating Local Initiatives for Conflict Transformation” (FLICT) in Sri Lanka in 2003 focused on conflict transformation through “encouraging a more inclusive cultural identity; enhancing links between different ethnic and religious group in Sri Lanka” and increasing civic participation in governance (GIZ, 2010, p.21). However, it was criticised by local human rights organisations for paying insufficient attention to human rights concerns and the bilateral agreement between the government and GIZ was called into question since the former had engaged in numerous human rights abuses. In response, GIZ began supporting human rights work in the area of civic participation by allocating funds to “human rights monitoring, reporting and strengthening the networks between human rights and conflict transformation practitioners” (GIZ, 2010, p. 21).

This case study is in line with Parlevliet’s (2010, p.399) view that human rights within a conflict transformation approach leads to “combining state-building and institutional reform with relationship-building...and of combining a focus on the responsibilities of the state with a focus on the responsibilities of citizens”. In order to address the issue of human rights, conflict transformation organisations need to publicly state their values, principles and mode of operation; adhere to international human rights standards; and educate their members and society on relevant human rights instruments and how they can contribute to sustainable peace (International Alert, 1998, p.20).

In conclusion, the relationship between conflict transformation and human rights is a solid one that is beneficial to peace processes as it enhances the work of both groups of practitioners. Thus in addressing human rights dimensions in conflict transformation,

legitimate governance, the division of key resources (powers and opportunities), and the development of constructive processes to manage conflict can be achieved (Parlevliet, 2010 p.399). On the other hand, the human rights have added depth to conflict transformation efforts as it has required that the latter examine and focus on issues of justice, power and significant reform in peace and conflict efforts in addition to its traditional focus on dialogue and inter-group engagement (GIZ, 2010, p. 46). Human rights in return can benefit from the perspectives, methods and approaches of conflict transformation like “conflict analysis, non-violent communication, strategic non-violence, facilitation, mediation and negotiation techniques, design and implementation of dialogue processes and conflict sensitivity” (GIZ, 2010, p.46). This creates a win-win solution.

### **Critique of Conflict Transformation**

Bottlenecks and gaps do exist in conflict transformation theory. Although very useful, conflict transformation is a long-term process and the benefits may not emerge immediately. Furthermore, according to Körppen et al. (2008, p.11), even though it has emerged as a useful theory in addressing violent conflicts, there is still a significant gap in terms of what conflict transformation approaches are capable of delivering. Others have referred to it as “value laden and idealistic” in its meaning (Lederach, 2003, p.4), while some scholars propose that conflict transformation be used as a “guiding notion rather than a fully implemented programme...while others propose that it prioritise in the midst of all these issues and areas it focuses on” (Berghof Foundation, 2012; p.27). It could also be argued that the fact that it calls for such an in-depth and broad “change in the social fabric of society”, may in a sense “actually intensify conflict in the short run by proposing a disturbing process of change which touches (and threatens) beliefs, relationships, power, positions and status” (Berghof Foundation, 2012, p.26-27). While not a critique, Kriesberg (2011. p.63), points out that not much is known about the use and application of transformation in the context of large-scale protracted conflicts with high levels of violence.

Although Lederach’s comprehensive review of conflict transformation emphasises the need to include all levels of society in conflict transformation efforts, he does not focus sufficiently on the “autonomous processes of change that transpire within the political

system of the conflict-affected society” (Miall, 2004, p.6-7). It should be acknowledged that, in many instances, the state is committed to constructive change and working towards the positive transformation of conflicts and therefore should be included in change processes. For the current study, this means that citizens must understand that conflict transformation and peace-building should include all sectors of society including political actors and the political system.

In conclusion, conflict transformation sees conflict as having the potential for constructive change and as an opportunity for growth. It focuses on underlying relationships and social structures. Conflict transformation does not focus on quick solutions but on creating platforms that address deep-seated issues in order to bring about change. The failure of previous efforts to build peace in Plateau state has been attributed to the use of short-term and quick fixes for complex and long-standing problems. Conflict transformation is different from this as it focuses on changing the established structures that have broken relationships, divided communities and sustained long-held grievances. As the conflict in Plateau state is ever evolving and fluid, conflict transformation also provides the space to reflect on changes and adapt accordingly. In addition, as conflicts increase in scope and violence, conflict transformation becomes a relevant tool for response (McCandless and Bangura, 2007), a view that resonates with the case of Plateau state. The protracted violence in Plateau state and the increased violence require a conflict transformation approach. In pursuing a deeper understanding of conflict transformation theory in contexts like Plateau state, this study will on the views of a broad section of society. As noted by the Berghof Foundation (2012, p.66), conflict transformation research “does not encompass a grand theory, but generates theory elements from field research and from close interaction with practitioners and the conflicting parties themselves”. They form an important part of the transformation process.

Although there is widespread consensus amongst authors on the usefulness of conflict transformation theory in transforming violent societies, there is a paucity of research on its relevance and applicability in an African context. This study addresses this gap by applying the theory to the case of Plateau state where ethno-religious violence has persisted for the past decade. Using the three core goals of conflict transformation theory, this study will determine how to reduce direct violence, address injustice and

transform relationships in Plateau state. It will unpack and operationalise these three goals in the context of Plateau state. Furthermore, it will interrogate how these can be realised and achieved through the development of a peace-building framework. In doing so, this study will contribute to on-going discussions on the relevance and applicability of conflict transformation theory in a real and evolving case study in an African context.

In addition to conflict transformation theory, this study also finds the political economy theory relevant. This is because the complexity of the conflict, its history and evolution speak to the merging of politics and economics. Furthermore, the conflict transformation literature acknowledges the political and economic drivers of conflict (McCandless, 2007; Clements 1997; Holtzman, Elwan and Scott, 1998; Hampson, 1996; and Lederach, 1998) which enhances the complementarity between the theories. Drawing on McCandless (2007, p.89), both conflict transformation and political economy emphasise the role of economic and development issues, address past and present injustices and grievances and ensure the participation of communities and groups in designing peaceful economic processes and institutions.

### **3.9. Political Economy Theory of Conflict**

The causal analysis of the ethno-religious violent conflicts in Plateau state is situated within the political economy discourse. In understanding the causes and outcomes of armed violence, numerous authors (Cramer, 1999; Coyne & Pellillo, 2011; Ballentine & Nitzschke, 2005; and Collier & Hoeffler 1996) have examined the political economy of conflict. Cramer's (1999) review of the literature on economics and political economy concludes that these disciplines are significant in developing responses and preventing conflicts with immense humanitarian and economic consequences. These views reflect widespread consensus that complex and violent intrastate conflicts can be understood within political economy (Clements, 2004; McCandless and Bangura, 2007; Miall, 2004). Therefore, conflicts should be analysed not only through the political identity or socio-cultural lens but also in terms of the economic drivers of violence.

Cramer (1999) tracks the evolution of the economic dimensions of conflict in Africa from discussions on the economic costs of war (UNICEF, 1998; Green 1991; Stewart

1993), to the economic analysis of the dynamics of wartime (Azam et al., 1994; Chinongo, 1995) and the causes of conflict through the economic or political economy lens (Collier and Hoeffler, 1996). These published works have greatly contributed to shaping our understanding not only of the linkages between politics and economics but how they cause and contribute to violent conflict. This study focuses on the third area, which looks at the causes of conflict through the political economy perspective.

Scholars have unpacked the elements of the political economy theory of conflict from different viewpoints. Cramer (1991, p.15) notes that Homer-Dixon (1991; 1995) and Wolf (1969) argue that grievances are the result of a combination of resource scarcity, social inequality and human rights abuses. Cramer (1999, p.15) is of the view that violent struggles are a result of “perceptions of unfairness as from absolute shortages”. Collier (1999, p.1) presents the view that economic agendas and opportunities rather than grievances are the likely causes of civil war; the true cause of civil war is not the “loud discourse of grievance, but the silent force of greed” (Collier, 1999, p.8), as some groups gain from these conflicts. These opportunities for gain manifest as societies become opportunistic in nature, criminality is on the rise, trade becomes monopolistic and rent-seeking increases (Collier, 1999, 8-9). This explains the use of terms such as “conflict merchants” who gain from conflict by engaging in criminal and profit-seeking activities or those who use various organisational fronts to obtain funds for personal gain rather than for peace work.

While it is true that groups can benefit in times of conflict, the theory of greed rather than grievance as the cause of conflict has been criticised as inadequate and too simplistic to understand the complex nature of conflict. Van Doorn (2012) notes that the theory is limited by the fact that conflicts are highly complex processes and those social, historical and regional contexts must be taken into account. Richards (2003, p. 8,20) notes that the focus on greed as a cause of conflict simplifies and downplays the long-held grievances (like lack of access to education) of those involved in Sierra Leone’s violent and brutal conflict. Keen (2012) adds that the focus on greed instead of grievances has led to more attention being paid to rebels than states, thus failing to give due diligence to abusive states that use political violence to maintain their hold on power. Ballentine and Nitzsche (2003, p.3) write that conflicts or insurgencies are not just the outcome of rebels’ desire for self-enrichment, but are used to “finance



insurgencies driven by socio-economic and political grievances”. They add that groups use rebellion as a response to “horizontal socio-economic or political inequalities” (Ballentine and Nitzsche (2003, p.3). In Plateau state, feelings of inequality, and socio-economic and political grievances are common themes when the causes of the conflict are identified. These long-held grievances have fuelled tensions and resulted in violence.

Ballentine and Sherman (2003, p.6) highlight the need to explore a combination of economic factors as well as other potentially significant political, ideological, ethnic and security factors. Van Doorn (2012) writes that the concept of longstanding grievances was evident in the case of Libya because of vertical inequalities (“economic grievances, lack of political rights”) and horizontal inequalities (regional and tribal differences). In the case of Bosnia, causes of ethnic or nationalist struggles included “economic deprivation, virulent nationalism or political manipulation” (Campbell, 1998, p.85). Having examined cases like Sri Lanka, Burma, and Kosovo, Ballentine and Nitzsche (2003, p.12) concluded that “self-enrichment, loot-seeking and economic opportunities” were not the only reasons for separatist or non-separatist conflicts. They note that a mix of the following factors sparked these conflicts and insurgencies:

economic motives and opportunities with long-standing grievances over poor economic governance (particularly the inequitable distribution of resource wealth), exclusionary and repressive political systems, inter-ethnic disputes and security dilemmas further exacerbated by unaccountable, weak states (Ballentine and Nitzsche, 2003, p.12).

Bringing the ethnic and religion dimension into play, David Lake and Donald Rothchild’s rational choice theory notes that “ethnic conflict like all human interaction is the result of individuals’ rational pursuit of universal interests such as wealth, power, and security” (Kaufman, 2006, p. 49). In the same vein, the instrumentalist approach explains ethnicity as a “tool used by individuals, groups or elites to obtain some larger, typically material end...ethnicity is primarily a label used for political advantage” (Kaufman, 2006, p.49). The ethnic competition model posits that ethnic divisions gain momentum in environments and processes of marginalisation and inequality (Vermeersch, 2011). According to Merav (2001), inequalities and injustices manifest in material resources and opportunities but also in exclusion from participation in decision-making.

Using the political economy approach and the views expressed above, the root causes of the conflict are analysed beyond the mirror of ethnicity and religion. It is therefore important to understand the role of uneven development, political exclusion and economic marginalisation in the political setting of a country and within the broader conflict discourse. Furthermore, conflicts cannot be solved by focusing on political factors, but must also critically examine and analyse the economic factors that drive and sustain violent conflict. More specifically, the role of the state in ethno-religious violence can be examined through the political economy discourse as states create economic disparities by excluding minorities and groups from resources. Using Plateau state as an example, feelings of economic marginalisation and political exclusion by the state has greatly weakened citizens' trust and their view of the state as legitimate. Addison (2005, p.406), establishes this link between the state and ethno-religious differences by stating that "a society that achieves economic growth and a rising standard of living for everyone is far better placed to manage the political trade-offs that inevitably arise in balancing the interests of competing, and potentially antagonistic, social groups." While Ballentine and Nitzsche (2003) note the need for more research and policy discourse on understanding and unpacking the role of the state as a core stakeholder in the political economy of armed conflict, Addison (2005, p.409) states that the task of merging politics and economics in peace-building work is much more difficult than states and donors might like to think.

In conclusion, it should be reiterated that persistent economic and political marginalisation is a recipe for violent conflict. Violent conflict will continue to occur when legitimate grievances exist in a context of longstanding and unmet needs. Borrowing from Aliyu et al. (2011), ethno-religious violence has negatively affected sustainable peace and development, jeopardised human security and contributed to impoverishment in Plateau state. It therefore comes as no surprise that the conflict has reached its current potent state despite the widely shared view that it was Nigeria's most peaceful state for a long time.

## CHAPTER FOUR: UNPACKING ETHNO-RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN PLATEAU STATE (2001-2012)

Graf (1988, p.1) contends that Nigeria is "anything but homogeneous", with a population divided across distinct yet blurred cleavages like ethnicity, religion, language, class and region<sup>21</sup>. Joseph 1987 highlights the dominance of ethnic cleavages (p. 49); he notes that the "*ethnicizing*" of Nigerian society is due to competition for wealth and control of the state. In addition to ethnicity, factors like religion<sup>22</sup>, region or language<sup>23</sup> also come to the fore in confrontations over resources and political control (Joseph, 1987, p. 49). Based on the statistics and cases discussed in Chapter Two, ethnicity and religion are the most pronounced identities in confrontations over resources and political control. Salawu (2010) maintains that Nigeria is one of the best cases of ethno-religious conflict.

In order to understand the context of ethno-religious violent conflict in Plateau state, it is important to understand Nigeria's political context. With independence and the emergence of the post-colonial state, mistrust between ethnic groups has become Nigeria's major problem as groups continue to compete with each other for political control and for resources. The failure to address power contestations at the national level has contributed to the carrying over of these issues to the sub-national level. This has contributed to the ethno-religious dynamics and violence in areas like Plateau state. Beyond examining the national dynamics and their impact on Nigeria's political terrain, this chapter presents an in-depth analysis of the conflict in Plateau state by presenting an historical overview as well as outlining the key stakeholders, and the causes of the conflict. It also examines the nature of the violence and its impact and offers a prognosis.

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<sup>21</sup> According to Sayne (2012, p.2), Nigeria is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world which has implications for the economy, security and social cohesion.

<sup>22</sup> Nigeria is also divided in terms of religion as the population is divided according to Islam, Christianity and traditional religions.

<sup>23</sup> Linked to ethnicity is language as ethnic groups subscribe to different languages (Graf 1988, p.5) that symbolize their identity. With over a 100 indigenous languages and many more dialects, language has added to divisions in Nigeria as the "existence of many indigenous languages hampers inter-ethnic understanding, detracts from a feeling of national identification, and remains a constant latent source of friction" (Graf, 1988, p.5).

#### 4.1. Nigeria's Colonial Influences

The drawing of geographical boundaries and the bringing together of diverse ethnic groups under one territory and one system of government are at the crux of Nigeria's identity crisis. The boundaries drawn by the colonial powers did not take differences in language, culture and systems of governance between these groups into account. Graf (1988, p.7) asserts that under the British colonial administration, Nigeria was not created from "people's shared historical, economic or social experiences, but merely by the arbitrary amalgamation of a number of disparate ethno-cultural units". Oyovbaire (1979, p.83) observes that, "all the colonial rule did in the context of national unity was to amalgamate and divide for its own purposes of domination and exploitation". This is why Sir Ahmadu Bello (1962), the first premier of northern Nigeria referred to the amalgamation as "the mistake of 1914". The merging of identities, irrespective of boundaries and differences, was sustained by the British colonial administration using the divide and rule method.

According to the ICG (2012, p.3), the British colonial administration was firmly supportive of the "ethnic concept of citizenship" and post-colonial governments have done little to "fundamentally change this policy". Sir Hugh Clifford's<sup>24</sup> discussion on nationality in Nigeria stated that nationalism was impossible, as the country did not have a common language, origins or religious beliefs (Coleman, 1958, p.193). He further emphasised the incompatibility between Nigerian nationalism and the different self-governed and mutually independent territories that made up the new Nigeria, territories that were separated by different histories, tribal, religious, political and social barriers (Coleman, 1958, p. 193-194).

As the sole colonial power in Nigeria, British formal control commenced in 1861. By the early 1900s, Nigeria was divided into separate colonial entities – the Protectorate of northern Nigeria and the Protectorate of southern Nigeria, each with independent administrators reporting to the United Kingdom. On 1 January 1914, Lord Lugard (Osaghae, 1998, p.2) amalgamated the Protectorate of northern Nigeria, the Colony of

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<sup>24</sup> Sir Hugh Clifford was a British colonial administrator. He served as the Governor of Nigeria from 1919 to 1925.

Lagos and the Protectorate of southern Nigeria. Osaghae (1998, p.1) notes that Nigerians express their dissatisfaction with the power challenges and the allocation of resources by referring “to the mistake of 1914, i.e. the decision to amalgamate the north and south whose groups had nothing in common”.

Regardless of the merger, both protectorates had independent administrative processes, officials spoke different languages (Hausa in the northern Protectorate and English in the southern Protectorate), and policies were implemented differently. The northern protectorate called for “distinct and separate development of the north, even to the point of suggesting that it be cut off from the south” (Coleman, 1958, p.47). These differences attest to the fact that, according to Coleman (1958, p.47) Nigeria was “never effectively united”.

The Second World War further divided Nigeria into four administrative units with previous regions renamed as the colony (Lagos), the eastern provinces, the northern provinces and the western provinces. The Constitutions of 1946, 1951 and 1954 expanded the powers of the provinces (changed to regions in 1954) eventually granting them autonomy. The revised Constitution of 1954 gave birth to a quasi-federal system with the three regions and Lagos (as the federal capital). The provinces were accorded more powers and were delegated more functions to such an extent that the three main areas developed individually (Coleman, 1958, p.47). Each region developed a constitution as an addendum to the national Constitution. The regions were autonomous and were given substantial powers to create a civil service and judicial systems.

The Littleton Constitution of 1954 led to about two-thirds of the country and its population being allocated to the northern region by Lord Lugard (Collis, 1970, p.84), the first Governor-General. The Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba were the dominant ethnic groups in the northern, eastern and western regions, respectively. Nigeria’s early federal structure gave impetus to ethnic identities and alliances by sharing control of the nation among these three majority ethnic groups (Sayne, 2012, p.6). The territory that is Plateau state was included in the northern (largely Muslim) region.

As was characteristic of many former colonies, calls for liberation and independence emerged more strongly amongst the elite across the regions. Although the educated

elite of early Nigeria called for a united West African nation, it was not clear how it would be governed. The National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) and its leader, Nnamdi Azikiwe<sup>25</sup>, called “for a federal commonwealth of Nigeria made up of ‘eight protectorates’ whose boundaries roughly followed ethnic lines” (Coleman, 1958, p.324). However, this changed in 1951 when they called for a unitary form of government, shifting from “divisionist tendencies” (Coleman, 1954, p.324). Although he partly accepted the ideas of regional governments, in 1947 Obafemi Awolowo<sup>26</sup> opposed the idea of a unitary system, noting that the creation of the three regions was to “suit administrative convenience” (Coleman, 1958, p.324). He added that a “true federal system would require the adjustment of the boundaries so that each group, however small is entitled to the same treatment as any other group, however large” (Coleman, 1958, p.324).

With independence looming, it was clear that the main issue was whether to pursue a unitary federal system or continue with decentralised and autonomous territories. Regional actors were very reluctant to relinquish control and power over their regions for a “unitary state that would brew suspicion and fear of domination or hegemony” (Fawole & Bello, 2011, p.215). These sentiments carried over into independence.

Although Nigerians united to speak out against European colonialism in the lead up to independence, this unity did not last long. The NCNC was a nationalist movement that bridged the divide across all ethnic groups in the country and brought them under one umbrella. It was led by Herbert Macaulay and later by Nnamdi Azikiwe, from the Igbo ethnic group. This united front was short-lived. The NCNC was dissolved and offshoots were created that were aligned to ethnic, religious and regional factors, including the Action Group (AG) under Obafemi Awolowo of the Yoruba ethnic group in 1951 and the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) representing the northern region of the country dominated by the Hausa-Fulani majority ethnic group that was formed in 1949. The three dominant groups were now engaging politically under ethnic umbrellas. This was a critical factor in the emergence of ethnic politics and ethnicity as a central element of Nigeria’s political arena.

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<sup>25</sup> Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe was the Premier of Nigeria’s eastern region and the first President of Nigeria from 1963 to 1966.

<sup>26</sup> Chief Obafemi Awolowo was the Premier of Nigeria’s western region

## 4.2. Post-Colonial Era

By 1963, Nigeria had progressed from being a three-region federation to a four-region federation and a mid-western state. It was further divided into 12 states in 1967, 19 in 1976, 21 in 1989, 30 in 1991 and 36 states in 1996. The decisions by various military regimes and civilian governments to divide the country along administrative lines emerged in response to requests by minority groups for autonomy and access to national resources. However, according to Ostien (2009, p.9), this has further “localised and multiplied political skulduggery and violence”. Sayne (2012, p.2) writes that it has failed to manage diverse interests and demands and instead has created new demands for political control and resources. It has also amplified ethnic and religious divides and made the indigene versus settler dynamic much more salient as ethno-religious dynamics, power struggles, and violent conflict are more pronounced at lower levels.

Mutual suspicions and tensions have not always existed between the major ethnic groups in Nigeria, particularly when the regions were autonomous. Afolabi (2006, p.142) notes that, in the pre-colonial era, identities were defined by lineage, clan, the chief and cultural practices and not ethnicity as a form of exclusivity. According to Bah (2005, p.102), the autonomous regions were given the power to make their own laws. Each had a constitution, civil service, police force, an independent judiciary and a large degree of independence in managing their affairs. Given this independence, inter-group challenges and political wrangling were less salient. However, a shift from autonomous regions to one entity and the centralisation of control and resources resulted in competition between regional and ethnic identities for resources and control. The stakes associated with political control also increased drastically between groups.

While tensions and rivalries also exist at the national level between the major ethnic groups and minority groups remain discontent, tensions and rivalries between the northern region of the country and the rest of the country also emerged (HRW, 2005, p.7). For instance, when the British divided the country into three regions, the first Governor General, Lord Lugard allocated about two-thirds of the country and its population to the northern region (Collis, 1970, p.84). Furthermore, northerners were largely in control of political institutions, thus giving rise to negative sentiments among

other groups (HRW, 2005, p.7) that endure to the present. While these tensions existed, this does not suggest that there was ever a coherent north. Wada (2006, p.540) notes that while colonialism brought together many northern ethnic groups under one political unit, indirect rule and native administration generated grievances between groups. These tactics poisoned inter-ethnic relations between the Hausa-Fulani and other groups in northern Nigeria (Wada, 2006, p.540). To this day, there is no coherent north. The 1967 Biafra War<sup>27</sup> attests to the challenges of inter-group relations as it mainly pitted northerners and the federal government against the Igbo-Easterners (Osaghae, 1998, p.67), and was a response to the prospect of “continued northern hegemony” in Nigeria (Akintunde, 2002). A religious dimension surfaced as the Biafran population was predominantly Christian and the conflict was seen as a Christian-Muslim conflict, pitting the Muslim north against the Christian south.

Group struggles for political control increased as a result of the dominance of petroleum in Nigeria and the immense wealth accrued from its production. During the 1980s, oil accounted for 85-90% of state revenue and it is still a major source of income for the country. (Joseph, 1987, p.56) observes that the struggle for oil resources was mainly for “personal advancement and group security”. Borrowing Harold Lasswell’s (1936) expression, Joseph (1987, p.73) notes that as petroleum is the state’s major source of revenue, it determines “who gets what, when and how”. The struggle for resources in Nigeria is heavily centred on the question of the beneficiaries of the allocation of such resources. Tensions are further exacerbated by struggles over access to resources controlled at the federal, state and local government level (Ostien, 2009, p.3). While political leaders have benefited from the oil wealth, the communities where the oil is extracted from remain politically and economically marginalised and are considered the poorest regions in the country (USIP, 2011, p.38). Multinational corporations (MNCs) who entered Nigeria before independence and who are involved in sectors like banking, manufacturing and oil further sustain the state’s benefits from oil.

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<sup>27</sup> The Biafra War of 1966 – 1967 claimed a million lives and lasted for almost 30 months. In 1966, the massacre of Igbos in the north and the collapse of Nigeria’s First Republic were largely the result of “believed oppositions, of dissent and distrust” (Kirk Greene, 1971, in Joseph, 1987, p.50).



As the examples below show, MNCs like Shell have fuelled power divisions and supported the government in power. They “create alliances between international capitalist and domestic capitalist elite” and “encourage the emergence of authoritarian regimes in host countries (Osugwu & Obumneke, 2013, p.365). Corruption on their part has resulted in poor economic development. MNCs have paid bribes and other incentives to the political elite in order to ensure that they land lucrative contracts and obtain a reduction in taxes and custom charges (Otusanya et al., 2012, p.37 and Osugwu & Obumneke, 2013, p.367). In addition, these MNCs have used security teams from the national security agencies, and motivated and armed them to protect their facilities and intimidate indigenes (Ikelegbe, 2005, p.225). This is because MNCs are driven solely by profit maximisation and the accrual of wealth to develop their home country rather than the host nation (Osugwu & Obumneke, 2013, p.359). MNCs are therefore seen as part of “the problem of inequitable treatment, neglect, disinheritance and deprivation” (Ikelegbe, 2005, p.220).

Another interesting dimension of the role of state actors in oil exploration is that it is alleged that highly placed serving and retired military personnel and senior members of government are some of many actors involved in the illegal oil economy (Ikelegbe, 2005, p.224). State repression and corporate violence have contributed to the state of lawlessness, chaos and insecurity, especially in the Niger Delta (Ikelegbe, 2005, p.208). This is reflected in the “inequitable sharing of oil revenues by corrupt and oppressive governments, as well as negative environmental and social impacts of extractive operations” which have incited grievances amongst communities and fuelled ethno-political tensions in resource-rich areas (Ballentine & Nitzsche, 2003, p.5). In more extreme cases, it could push groups to call for their own independent state through secession, as in the case of Biafra.

Shifting to Nigeria's political parties, they have also contributed to the unification of individuals under ethno-linguistic (Joseph, 1987, p.62) or ethno-regional umbrellas. Thus, it has become the norm to link specific political parties to specific ethnic groups like the Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo (Joseph, 1987, p.62). In the 1980s for instance, the Hausa ethnic group was linked to three different political parties - the People's Redemption Party (PRP), the Greater Nigerian People's Party (GNPP) and the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), with the NPN winning the national elections, which led to a

Hausa/Fulani becoming President (Okehie-Offoha & Sadiku, 1996, p.58-59). With the ban on political parties removed in 1978, key major parties like the Nigerian People's Party (NPP), NPN, PRP and Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) were backed by groups along ethnic lines with the NPP and UPN heavily supported by the Igbo and Yoruba groups, respectively (Joseph, 1987, p.44). Individuals "do not belong to parties in any random fashion, as they are either linked to an ethno-linguistic identity" (Joseph, 1987, p.62). Even though current political parties are mixed ethnically and religiously in terms of membership and candidates, ethnicity and religion are factored in to their selection processes.

Although the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) deemed the five registered political parties national rather than regional and ethnic organisations during the period 1978-1979, they became regional and ethnic in nature especially during the election campaign (Whitaker, 1981, p.17). Sayne (2012, p.9) notes that ethnic identification is pronounced during election periods (Sayne, 2012, p.9). While the views presented above show that civilian governments, political parties and MNCs have contributed to entrenching ethnic divides and increasing the competition between groups for economic resources and political power, military regimes have further entrenched this state of affairs.

The links between political control, access to resources and the use of ethnic or religious alliances to attain these has been prominent in elections, even leading to electoral violence. Whether with a civilian or military type of regime, Graf (1988, p.13) states that breakdowns or conflicts in the form of "constitutional crises, political immobilism, coups d'état or civil war," in Nigeria's political context, have occurred along ethnic lines. Similarly, violence has erupted during and after presidential and state elections (Sayne, 2012, p.6). This is why Danfulani and Fwatshak (2002, p.255) assert that violence linked to ethnicity and religion might become a thing of the past when "politicians no longer fight each other for political power but rather are able to transit from one democratic regime to another".

Nigeria's long experience of civilian administrations has been interspersed with episodes of military rule since it gained independence. While military regimes came into power mostly through violent take-overs with the idea that they would govern

differently from the inefficient and corrupt civilian administrations, they have continued these practices while fortifying the centralisation of power, deepening ethnic cleavages in the country and fuelling the embers of competition for power and resources. They have continued the patterns of “partisan political competition, the sharpening of ethnic and regional identities and the abuse of office through corruption” (Joseph, 1987, p.69, 75). As with some civilian governments, the military was “not an accountable body and could therefore not restrain the inevitable abuses of office” (Joseph 1996, p.196). Osaghae (1998, p.311) writes that the system of prebendalism (“the conversion and exploitation of state offices into instruments of private accumulation both for self and for constituent and kin groups”) was designed and perfected by civilian governments and utilised by military regimes. Citing Lewis (2006), Maiangwa et al. (2012, p.50) note that this legacy of wealth accumulation resulted in “a depleted treasury, a huge debt overhang, dilapidated public institutions, endemic corruption, simmering social antagonism and ethno-religious violence”. The dominant political culture of corruption, abuse of power, political competition, lack of accountability, and partisan politics was passed down through civilian and military governments and was embedded in Nigeria’s political environment. The result has been violent conflict.

Graf (1980, p.13) concludes that “faulty integration” in Nigeria characterised by factors like ethnic competition, and social diversity has resulted in protests, riots, even massacres, civil war and coercive military rule. In terms of Simpson and Weiner’s (1989) definition of integration as “the bringing into equal membership of a common society groups or persons previously discriminated against on cultural grounds”, integration in Nigeria is indeed faulty. Aspects of the country’s history have contributed to this faulty integration.

Firstly, the colonial era created a shaky political foundation for inter-group relations by using a divide and rule system of governance. Okpeh (2006, p.19) argues that colonial actors were “aware of the fact that the unity and combined efforts of the natives would militate against its interests”. He adds that they played ethnic differences and different cultures in Nigeria against each other and “disrupted a previously organic process of interdependence between them” (Okpeh, 2006, p.20). Borrowing the words of Osimen

et al. (2013, p.79), faulty integration in Nigeria can be attributed to the idea and application of amalgamation. Thus, they write that:

the amalgamation of these peoples, who are ethnically, religiously, culturally, and idiosyncratically different, coupled with the fact that structurally the emergent regions before the amalgamation were practically of unequal sizes, unequal population... created the historical antagonistic centrifugal forces that have always worked to the advantage of the originators of the amalgamation (the colonialist) (Osimen et. al, 2013, p.79).

While colonialism was largely to blame for these shaky foundations, the evolving Nigerian state contributed to the process in the post-colonial era. As discussed in previous paragraphs, civilian governments interspersed with military regimes contributed to weak integration by further Balkanizing the country in order to please minority groups (Okpkeh, 2006, p.23). Basse et al. (2013, p. 241) note that the creation of states and local governments did not result in “mutual sympathy, mutual respect and consideration” among the various ethnic groups in Nigeria, instead it resulted in more groups calling for more states to be created within their ethno-cultural territory. Integration therefore did not occur with a stepped increase of states and LGA, as creating more of these would only create new majorities and minorities and not eliminate minority fears of domination by the majority (Basse et al., 2013, p.242).

The Nigerian state and the political elite’s exploitation of ethnic and religious differences have further hampered integration. It should be borne in mind that the mere existence of ethnicity or class and the competitive processes associated with it do not necessarily cause conflict and violence as attested to by the experiences of countries like Ghana, Cameroon, Tanzania, India, Brazil, Canada and the United Kingdom.

Apart from ethnicity, issues of a religious nature have created tensions in Nigerian politics. For instance, the adoption of the Sharia Law by 12 states in northern Nigeria has alienated the Christians who have lived in these areas for a long time (USIP, 2011, p.39). The creation of a federal Sharia court of appeal, which was meant to deal only with issues related to Islamic personal issues, divided the country particularly during the late 1970s, with Christians calling for its relegation to the subnational level (USIP, 2011, p.40). Other examples of brewing tensions and the links between politics and religion include allegations of a significant Muslim presence in Bihari’s regime when

he was the Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (Osaghae, 1998, p.249). Christians in Nigeria publicly voiced their dissatisfaction when Nigeria became a registered and full member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) under the regime of General Babangida (a Muslim). According to Osaghae (1998, p.250), this led to an explosion of discontent such as: “the viewing of most actions, policies, and appointments through the lens of religion, balance of religious propaganda in educational institutions, allocation of air time on radio and television; a fair balance between Christians and Muslim public holidays; and the religious composition of the armed forces”. On the other hand, Muslims were angered by the revival of full diplomatic relations between Nigeria and Israel in 1973, an action welcomed by Christians (USIP, 2011, p.39). It is clear that religion (even as the face of something deeper) could no longer be delinked from the political arena. The political elite have contributed to the dominance of religion. For example, while the elite ignore and do not adhere to religion most of the time, they use it, particularly during elections and for political gain (Berkley Center, 2010)

Joseph (1987, p.30, 47) asserts that despite changes in regimes and governments, there has been a “continuity of ideas, problems, even of political personages” as the “politicizing of ethnicity did not turn out to be a temporary phase in the process of nation-building”. What has become common is the precedence of “private interests and national and regional elite fractions” over the state fulfilling its obligations to its citizens (Mu’azu, 2011, p.11). The relationship between the state and its citizens has deteriorated, with citizens lacking trust in the government, due to decades of ineffective and dysfunctional military and civilian rule.

### **4.3. Indigene and Settler Dynamics**

In addition to the ethnic and religious dynamics, indigene-settler divides, particularly in Plateau state, contribute to the deepening of identity-based divides and vice versa (Sayne, 2012, p.3). Indigenes and settlers can be divided along the lines of ethnicity, language or religion (Sayne, 2012, p.2). For example, in Plateau state the main warring groups, Hausa and BAA, largely subscribe to different religions, cultures and languages.

The indigene and settler dynamic emerged through the system of regionalism during the colonial era. This notion of regionalism is distinct from political science's understanding of regionalism. Osaghae (1998, p.5) characterises it as "a system in which citizens who are not originally from a region are discriminated against, and are excluded from, the provision and enjoyment of public goods". The practice whereby "the government of the region makes public goods exclusive to citizens whose origins are from the region" gained momentum and became prominent in the post-colonial Nigerian state (Osaghae, 1998, p.7). Regionalism now features strongly in contemporary Nigerian politics due to the indigene-settler dynamic. However, the indigene-settler divide is not always about people who do not belong in the state. Important aspects of the conflict and violence often involve groups of people who belong to the state but are deemed to come from a different part.

The division of Nigeria into 12, 19, 21, 30 and 36 states has not done away with regionalism. According to Osaghae (1998, p.7), it has further established regionalism with a "more particularistic form of discrimination – statism". Citing Suberu (1996), Ogbogbo (2006, p.564), notes that states were created to satisfy the economic interests of the major ethnic groups and were used as "mere conduit pipes for Federal economic and political patronage rather than an instrument of spreading development to the grass root communities". Furthermore, states are now practicing exclusivity based on an individual's origins.

The issue of indigeneity has become a significant problem in Nigeria, pitting indigenes of a particular state against non-indigenes, the latter being "people who cannot trace their ancestry to the original inhabitants of an area" (HRW, 2012). Indigeneity is therefore based on one's place of origin (HRW, 2005, p.8). Citing, Bach (1997), Higazi (2008, p.114) writes that indigeneity is defined by group ancestry and customary land. He adds that it affects political and social rights and is ethnically contested (Higazi, 2008, p.114). Historically in Plateau state, indigene certificates were certificates granted by local authorities to "non-indigenes" or "settlers" to grant them privileges such as access to scholarship opportunities at state schools, discounted school fees, government employment and political positions (HRW, 2005, p.8). This practice has changed as individuals who were born and have only ever lived in Plateau state have not been accorded the status of "indigene" and have had these privileges withdrawn

(HRW, 2005, p.8). According to the 167-page report on the Plateau Peace Conference of 2004, issues with indigeneship included the “perceived discrimination and denial of rights – politically and socially” (Ostien, 2009, p.15). At the conference, claims made by the Jasawa for the status of indigenes and for indigene certificates were “decisively rejected”; thus, they did not endorse the conference report (Ostien, 2009, p.15). The only concession granted to them was the right to contest elected positions (Ostien, 2009, p.16).

The rationale for indigeneity and the indigene certificate is weakened by the fact that many groups have lived in other states for generations (Ostien, 2009, p.9). Overall, the indigene issue has been detrimental as it has made it difficult for Nigerians to obtain equal rights anywhere in the country (Ostien, 2009, p.10). In addition, “many people born and brought up in a particular area are not accorded that status, even though they may have never lived in any other part of Nigeria” (HRW, 2005, p.8). The indigene principle or indigeneity factor means that, “some groups control power and resources in LGA while others – who have migrated for different reasons – are excluded” (ICG, 2012, p.i). In this context, “national citizenship appears to have been abrogated by both ethnicity and ancestry” (ICG, 2012, p.i). Human Rights Watch states that this concept is discriminatory and fails to respect the articles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (HRW, 2005, p.8). Kwaja (2011) suggests that indigeneity certificates be done away with, particularly because of their negative consequences such as the conflict in Plateau state.

Interviews conducted by HRW (2005, p.11) in Plateau state in July, 2004 revealed that many attribute the conflicts in the town of Yelwa and the LGA of Shendam to the actions of traditional leader Long Gamai in stopping the granting of indigene certificates to Muslim groups like the Borghom and Pyem. According to the report, the conflicts in the state stem from competition between “indigenes” and “non-indigenes” (HRW, 2005, p.8). The indigene-settler dynamic has resulted in violence, especially when land, political appointments and development funds benefit some groups at the expense of others (Sayne, 2012, p.2). Disputes between settlers and indigenes have mainly been over political positions, the use of land and conflicts between Fulani cattle herders and the indigenous pastoralists (HRW, 2005, p.9). Cattle grazing, another dimension of the conflict has created conflicts due to the presence of Fulani cattle

herders who allow their cattle to graze and destroy the land owned by indigenes. This has led to a recurring cycle of cattle rustling by the indigenes, revenge attacks by the Fulani and counter attacks by indigenous communities (HRW, 2005, p.9).

Returning to the broader discussion, various authors note that the Nigerian Constitution has contributed to the indigene-settler dynamic, even though Section 42 of the Constitution outlaws discrimination based on place of origin<sup>28</sup>. Its contribution to this dynamic is that it entrenches ideas of ethnicity and place of origin (Osoba and Usman, 1976; Ostien, 2009). This is evident in the Constitution's definition of citizenship (section 25.1.a), in its federal character (section 14.3), and in ministerial appointments (section 147.1.3)<sup>29</sup> (Ostien, 2009, p.5). It does not define or clarify the concepts of indigenes, place of origin or settler, even though the word indigene is used (HRW, 2005, p.8 and Sayne, 2012, p.3)<sup>30</sup>. According to HRW (2005, p.8), there is "no official document or legislation that defines these categories precisely or sets out clear criteria as to how a person's indigeneship is determined". Sayne (2012, p.3) writes that, "most state and LGA lack guidelines for defining who an indigene is". In 1995, the Federal Character Commission (FCC) was created and mandated by the Constitution<sup>31</sup> to define the "indigene of a state<sup>32</sup>". It defined an indigene of a local government in a state as a person whose parents or grandparents were or are an "indigene of the local government concerned; or who is accepted as an indigene by the local government"<sup>33</sup>. This definition remains vague on how indigeneity is determined especially if the local government still does not recognise one as an indigene.

The problem with the Constitution is so significant that numerous authors have called for it to be amended. Some have stated that the Constitution prioritises citizenship over indigene rights (Krause, 2011, p.61), or that it replaces indigene and settler rights with "residential rights" (Isa Odidi, 2004). Kwaja (2011) suggests that the Constitution and all legal codes should be reviewed and that all aspects promoting indigeneity should be

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<sup>28</sup> <http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm>

<sup>29</sup> <http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm>

<sup>30</sup> <http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm>

<sup>31</sup> Part III, section C: <http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm>

<sup>32</sup> See <http://www.placng.org/new/laws/F7.pdf> [Section 17.2.k]

<sup>33</sup> See <http://www.placng.org/new/laws/F7.pdf> PART II, Section 1



removed. This will require the possible elimination of indigeneity certificates. These authors suggest that actions such as this will positively transform ethnic relations and contribute to peace and security.

The Constitution mandates Nigeria's state and local governments to have "free rein to pick who is an indigene", therefore allowing state and local officials to "hand out public goods in line with their decisions" (Sayne, 2012, p.3). While the Constitution could have been stronger and clearer on issues of residency and indigene-settler dynamics, this problem is as much the responsibility of political elites who used its relative silence on the issue to interpret the law in a conveniently parochial manner. The failure of the political elite to "address and resolve key issues such as citizenship, identity and political inclusion" has also worsened the situation (ICG, 2012). What has emerged is a political environment characterised by struggle (in many cases violent) for control of land, political positions, and access to and ownership of economic resources. Political elites have fuelled tensions arising from these struggles and have politicised indigene-settler rights.

The protracted conflicts in Jos, Warri, Kaduna and Benue have "elite political malfeasance at their roots" and this is evident through their role in "election rigging, divisive use of identity politics, land grabs, or high-level organized crime" (Sayne, 2012, p.7). They have incited violence and intolerance through remarks and public statements (Sayne, 2012, p.7) and they are the creators of ethnic militias that promote ethnic agendas and attack innocent civilians (Wada, 2006, p.544). They have also instigated violence by manipulating idle and marginalised youth (Berkley Center, 2010). While political elites have played on these divides, they are not held accountable as they are never prosecuted (Sayne, 2012, p.7). According to Ostien (2009, p.7), the problem of indigeneity therefore requires a constitutional solution that must be adhered to and reinforced by political leaders.

#### **4.4. Synopsis of Ethno-religious Violence in Plateau state**

Ethno-religious violent conflict has affected most of Plateau state. While numerous reports have been published on clashes between ethnic and religious groups across the state (HRW, 2005; ICG 2012; Ostien, 2009), this study focuses on four key episodes.

These are 7 – 12 September 2001, February – May 2004, November 27 – 28 2008 and 2010 – 2012. With the state as the focal point of this study, its role in preventing and contributing to violence will be central to the discussion. A synopsis of these key cases and an analysis of the stakeholders involved will shed light on the role of the state government before, during and after the violence. Furthermore, it will contextualize the scope, nature and intensity of the violence and examine its impact.

#### **4.4.1. 7-12 September 2001**

According to Danfulani and Fwatshak (2002, p.244), the crisis of September 7 – 12 2001 can be explained by examining the tense relations between the Hausa-Fulani and other Jos Plateau communities. These tense relations were fuelled by the rejection by Christian youths (mainly from the BAA) of a Jasawa (Muslim), Mallam Muktar, as the Jos North Local Government Director of the Federal Government’s Poverty Alleviation Programme (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p.248). The youth opposed his appointment for two reasons: his former indictment and eventual removal from office during his tenure as a former chairman of the LGA for the “falsification of birth records, perjury and falsehood” and the appointment of a “person from the minority Jasawa group to head such a sensitive office as that of Poverty Alleviation” (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p.248). Furthermore the appointment of “another settler” by President Olusegun Obasanjo as chairman of the Local Government Monitoring Committee (LGMC) for the council (ICG, 2012, p.10) contributed to the violent clashes.

Other causes were the “application of Sharia in twelve northern states, prompting a Hausa-Fulani section in Jos to demand its introduction in Plateau state; and the street blockage for Friday prayers”<sup>34</sup> (ICG, 2012, p.10). By mid-August 2001, tensions were running high between the Muslim Jasawa group and the indigenous groups. Communication between the state government and the Hausa/Fulani groups on the one hand and between the state and the indigenous groups on the other hand was unsuccessful as none were willing to “make any concessions” (Para-Mallam, 2011, p.18). These tensions were expressed in the form of threats, inflammatory messages

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<sup>34</sup>Prayers are held on Fridays every week at key mosques across the state. Streets close to the mosques are blocked during these prayers, thereby limiting traffic.

and insults, all of which led to the violence on 7 September 2012. The immediate cause of the violence was an altercation between a young woman and Muslims gathered for Friday prayers as the latter refused to allow her to pass through a road blockade (Paramallam, 2011, p.17).

Danfulani and Fwatshak (2002, p.249) write that the violent action was planned as the crisis started at the same time, right after Friday prayers in major mosques<sup>35</sup> across the capital city of Jos. Violence spilled over beyond Jos to rural areas (Higazi, 2011, p.2). Danfulani and Fwatshak (2002, p.248), refer to 07 September as “Dark Friday” due to the nature and outcome of the violence that started at 2:30pm and continued “unhindered” into Saturday 8 September. In the aftermath of the conflict, it was confirmed that students and staff members from the state university had been killed and injured and young girls had been raped. Both Christians and Muslims were killed (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p, p.250). Local hospitals and clinics did not have enough facilities to cater for victims and the Red Cross offered its support (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p.250).

The violence did not end on the 8<sup>th</sup>. There were reports of secret killings of Christians in Angwan-Rogo, Angwan-Shanu, and other Muslim ghettos in town on Sunday 9 September (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p.251). This led to retaliations and reprisal attacks by Christians in places like Bukuru, Dilimi and Heipang and LGA like Pankshin, Langtang, Mangu and Garkawa (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p.251).

It seemed that the 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> of September brought some peace and stability in the state. However, this was short-lived as Muslims disguised in military gear attacked a village in Barkin Ladi LGA, attacking its largely Christian population and killing nine of them (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p.251). Wednesday 12 September saw a recurrence of violence on a greater scale than the previous events. Throughout this period, the security agents responded in a heavy-handed fashion, with a joint unit of soldiers and police using maximum force to halt the riots. According to Danfulani &

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<sup>35</sup> The crisis started in mosques in the following areas: Masalacin Juma’a, the Yan-Taya Dilimi mosque and other Juma’a Friday mosques.

Fwatshak (2002, p.251), these acts by the police and the violent clashes led to high casualty rates.

#### **4.4.2. February – May 2004**

Large-scale attacks occurred in Yelwa town in the Shendam LGA of Plateau state between from February – May 2004. The ICG's report on the violence maps the attacks, beginning with the killing of Christians in February, followed by reprisal attacks against Muslims in May (ICG, 2012, p.12). A thousand people were killed with the majority, approximately 700, killed in two days of violent clashes (ICG, 2012, p.12). According to a HRW report (2005, p.12), both these events involved deliberate attacks and the majority of victims were Christians and Muslims. According to Human Rights Watch (2005, p.12), respondents gave different accounts of the violence, with Muslims describing the incidents as attacks by Christians and vice versa. The report adds that, "hardly anyone was prepared to admit that members of their own community had initiated violence, or had attacked unarmed people" (HRW, 2005, p.12).

Yelwa and Shendam are both towns located in Shendam LGA. As a major commercial town in Plateau state, Yelwa is home to a wide range of ethnic groups with the majority being Muslim (HRW, 2005, p.11). On the other hand, Shendam and its surrounding villages are home to a large Christian population (HRW, 2005, p.11). The conflict in Shendam LGA has mainly been between the Gamai, the majority ethnic group in Shendam and the Jarawa, a predominantly Muslim group. Based on interviews conducted by HRW, the conflict (dating back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century and early 20<sup>th</sup> century) only turned more violent in recent times because of the "competing claims to the status of 'indigeneship', disputes over the selection of traditional chiefs, and more recently, political rivalry in the context of the local elections of April 2002 (HRW, 2005, p.10-11).

The causes of the conflict in the 19<sup>th</sup> century stemmed from the fact that both groups laid claim to the town of Yelwa, with the Jarawa claiming to have found it way before British colonisation while the Gamai claimed it was their settlement and that it was flourishing before the Jarawa settled in the area (Egwu, 2011, p.63). Other causes include the incessant local struggle for power and the indigene/settler divide as the

Jarawa accused the Gamai of using their control to define them as settlers and deny them indigene certificates (Egwu, 2011, p.64). Apart from these remote causes of the violence, HRW (2005, p.14) noted that respondents referred to the violent clashes of 26 June 2002 as the “genesis of the crisis... and a warning sign of the potential for further violence”<sup>36</sup>.

In February 2004, the violence spread to the town of Yelwa triggered by clashes between Muslims and Christians in the village of Yamini on 21 or 22 February (HRW, 2005, p.14). Muslims killed individuals from villages in Langtang South in retaliation for the theft of their cattle while Christians killed several individuals, including the local chief Sa'adu, (a Muslim Gamai), and burned many houses in Yamini, Lakushi, Sabon Layi and Ajikamai (HRW, 2005, p.14). This set the stage for the catastrophic events of 24 February 2004.

At approximately on 24 February, Yelwa was attacked and fighting continued until 3 or 4pm (HRW, 2005, p.15). Again, each side blamed the other for starting the conflict; however, according to research by HRW, the majority of victims were Christians (HRW, 2005, p.15). Several churches like COCIN 1 were destroyed and at least 78 Christians were killed inside and outside the church compound (HRW, 2005, p.15). In this calculated attack, men, several women and at least two children aged about ten were killed (HRW, 2005, p.6). According to accounts by witnesses, the attackers included Muslim residents of Yelwa, young men between the ages of 20 to 40, and younger boys aged 12-15 (HRW, 2005, p.18). A wide range of weapons were used including “machetes, axes, long double-edged sword-like knives known as “*barandami*” or sickles, and firearms” and victims had their limbs amputated, were mutilated, suffered gunshot wounds and were burned alive (HRW, 2005, p.18-19).

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<sup>36</sup> The violence of 26 June 2002 was triggered by two factors: (a) the stabbing of a security officer guarding a Mosque in the Angwan Galambi (Congo) provoking Muslim youth in the town, and (b) according to Muslims, the taunting and threatening of Muslims by various ethnic groups following a Tarok parade through the Yelwa town (HRW, 2005, p.13). During this time, Muslims emerged from their homes, and confronted the parade and violence began, after “they noticed a mosque on fire in the Angwan Pandam area and another building burning in a different area” (HRW, 2002, p.13).

Eventually the military intervened and curbed the violence within several hours; however, the police were absent throughout the attack (HRW, 2005, p.19). There were varying reports on the number of deaths: Muslim residents put Muslim deaths at 15 to 190, while police representatives in Jos stated that approximately 78 people were killed, and a local government official from Shendam claimed that 265 were killed including 20 who were missing but not confirmed dead (HRW, 2005, p.19).

In May 2004, violent attacks on Yelwa occurred on a larger scale, in two phases and lasted for two days. Large groups “surrounded the town from different directions and blocked all the main roads leading out of Yelwa” (HRW, 2005, p.22). A wide range of weapons were used including “firearms, Kalashnikovs, G3s, machetes, knives, cutlasses, bows and arrows” as victims were shot, burnt alive, mutilated and amputated (HRW, 2005, p.23). This phase lasted from 8am to 7pm on 2 May. The attackers returned on 3 May from 7am to 11am (HRW, 2005, p.24). They “cornered many Muslims into several compounds in the Angwan Galadima area of Yelwa” and it was clear that they “specifically targeted the Muslim population of Yelwa” (HRW, 2005, p.25). Men, women and children were killed (HRW, 2005, p.25). Defensive attacks by Muslim youth were foiled as the Christian attackers were so “numerous and well-armed that they quickly overpowered even those Muslims who had weapons” (HRW, 2005, p.25).

Estimates of the number of Muslims killed on 2 and 3 May totalled 660 according to Muslim residents (HRW, 2005, p.25). The number of Christians who died during the two day violence is not known; however, the Plateau state Chairman of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) “claimed that there had been 70 Christians among a total of 250 people killed on May 2” (HRW, 2005, p.25). The military only intervened by 3 May between 11am and 12 noon, leading to the violence stopping and the attackers retreating (HRW, 2005, p.34).

In response, the President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo announced a six-month state of emergency, suspended the governor of Plateau state, Chief Joshua Dariye for six months and replaced him with a former military officer, General Chris Alli (ICG, 2012, p.12). Furthermore, the police and army were deployed from Abuja (HRW, 2005, p.38). By July 2004, security had been beefed up in Yelwa and Shendam with the deployment

of 120 mobile policemen to provide reinforcements for the normal police force and about 50 soldiers (HRW, 2005, p.40). The response in this instance was again reactionary and not preventative.

#### **4.4.3. 27-28 November 2008**

In November 2008, violence occurred after the local government council elections in the Jos North LGA. On 27 November, local council elections in the 17 LGA were deemed peaceful and credible; however, violence was triggered by “what appeared to some Hausa-Fulani as an attempt by the Plateau state Independent Electoral Commission (PLASIEC) to alter the votes in favour of the ruling PDP” (ICG, 2012, p.12). The PDP candidate, an indigene was declared the winner although he was “reportedly trailing his All-Nigerian People's Party (ANPP) opponent” a settler (ICG, 2012, p.12) earlier in the day.

According to the ICG (2012, p.12), the attacks began even before the final results were announced. Citing the Bola Ajibola Commission of Inquiry report (*hereafter referred to as the Ajibola Commission*), news that the results were favouring the indigenes spread, leading to violent attacks (ICG, 2012, p.12). As with other attacks from February – May 2004, evidence pointed to “large scale preparation” in planning these attacks (ICG, 2012, p.12). The crisis, which started in Angwan Dalyop Pam Osumenyi, a neighbourhood slum of Ali Kauzaure on the early morning hours of 28 November, was “apparently orchestrated mainly by residents of the slum and Gangare, including over 200 Hausa-Fulani youths and children” (ICG, 2012, p.12). According to the Ajibola Commission, they were armed with cutlasses, swords, machetes, clubs, bows and arrows and guns (ICG, 2012, p.12). Efforts by the attackers to enter the collation centre were foiled as they were held back by the police; however, they were successful in “maiming and killing non-Muslims in areas such as Laranto, Nasarawa Gwong and Angwan Rogo” (ICG, 2012, p.12), areas where the attackers live in large numbers. Members of the BAA and other settlers were “apparently caught unawares” (ICG, 2012, p.12).

Beyond the destruction of lives and churches, the attackers destroyed the homes of their Christian neighbours (ICG, 2012, p.12). In Tudun Wada, Christian youths retaliated by

burning down Muslims' businesses and houses in the area (ICG, 2012, p.12). According to the ICG report, over 200 people died but an additional 130 were victims of randomised "extra-judicial killings by soldiers going from house to house" (ICG, 2012, p.12). The Ajibola Commission found that the death toll was 312 with 323 injured (ICG, 2012, p.12).

#### **4.4.4. 2010 - 2012**

In addition to the increased frequency of attacks, the period 2010 – 2012 saw the emergence and frequent use of bombs in Plateau state. These include the suicide bombings on 24 December 2010 killing 80 people and 25 December 2011 killing 50 people (ICG, 2012, p.14)<sup>37</sup>. President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in Plateau state on 31 December 2011 in order to "reduce the excesses of Boko Haram terrorism and checkmate the illicit activities of similar groups and those sympathetic to the sect's ideology" (Maiangwa et al., 2012, p.53). Other attacks in Dogo Na Hawa village (a Berom dominated area) in the outskirts of Jos South LGA occurred over four days in January 2010 leading to over 500 casualties (ICG, 2012, p.13). This led to retaliatory attacks by the BAA leading to the loss of lives of Hausa-Fulani in the LGA of Barkin Ladi, Jos South and Riyom (ICG, 2012, p.13). Another attack occurred two months later with an estimated 80 individuals killed in an overnight attack organised by the Hausa-Fulani community (ICG, 2012, p.13).

The year 2011 was described by the ICG (2012, p.14) as a "bloody year" with hundreds of people killed in the first six months. In addition, 150 victims were killed between 15 August and 12 September, estimated at about 50 deaths a week (ICG, 2012, p.14). A violent clash between Christian and Muslim gangs also led to the loss of "an unidentified number of lives in Barkin-Ladi" (ICG, 2012, p.14). In 2012, attacks and reprisal attacks killed and injured people and destroyed properties and homes (ICG, 2012, p.15).

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<sup>37</sup> Although Boko Haram claimed responsibility for these attacks, there is no "conclusive evidence that it is responsible for all the attacks" (ICG, 2012, p.14). For instance Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attacks against 14 rural communities in the Barkin Ladi and Riyom LGA on July 8, 2012; however the police claimed they were attacks from local Fulani herdsmen due to land disputes (ICG, 2012, p.15).



Responses to these attacks between 2010 and 2012 included the creation of “*Operation Sweep and Search*” by the Special Task Force in order to identify and bring forward perpetrators, imposition of 24 hour curfews, banning of motorcycles<sup>38</sup>, and the immediate deployment of the Chief of Defence Staff, Air Vice Marshal Oluseyi Petrinin to manage the security situation (ICG, 2012, p.14-15).

#### **4.5. Causal Analysis of Ethno-religious Violence in Plateau state**

Ownership of Jos is mainly disputed between the three main indigenous groups, the BAA on the one hand and the descendants of Hausa-Fulani settlers on the other (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p.245). According to Danfulani and Fwatshak (2002, p.244) these disputes are also over “who founded and established” the capital city of Jos. These contestations are supported by two key perspectives. According to the Jasawa (made up of the Hausa-Fulani settler group), “they were the first settlers in the area when it was virgin land, and that they used their wealth to buy plots of land in Jos which they developed” (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p.246). This view is supported by their claim that the name Jos was derived from the Arabic word “majas”(pagans), a term used by the early Hausa-Fulani settlers in the area (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p.246).

The BAA they claim they have legitimate rights to Jos because they own land in the area, although “they have over the years sold a great deal of their traditional land, largely to people from Nigeria’s three dominant ethnic groups, such as the Yorubas, Igbos and the Jasawa (who seem to have the lion’s share)” (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p.246). The indigenes refer to Jos as Gwosh, the former being a British mispronunciation of the latter (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p.246). Citing Morrison (1982), Ostien (2009, p.8) writes that most of Plateau was defended against an attempted effort at a Jihad from the neighbouring state of Bauchi in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. The resistance and fighting off the Hausa-Fulani in Plateau state was stopped by British colonial conquest, thus opening the way for them to settle in large numbers across the state but particularly in the capital city of Jos (Goshit, 2006, p.482). This history of armed resistance by Plateau indigenes against the Hausa, although disrupted by the

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<sup>38</sup> Motorcycles were increasingly used in attacks because they ensure a speedy escape.

British during its colonial administration, has surfaced more recently in the fight for indigene rights (Ostien, 2009, p.8).

Before the British occupation of Nigeria, the Hausa-Fulani and the Jos Plateau indigenous communities interacted through “mutual trading links” (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p.245). With the British occupation and the discovery of tin, the need for labourers to work the British managed tin mines led to an influx of Hausa-Muslims into Jos (NRN, 2013, p.2). Indigenous groups like the Berom, Anaguta, Afisare, Buji, Irigwe, and Bache refused to work in those mines, thus the reliance on Hausa-Fulani (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p.245). This led to Hausa-Fulani colonies in Plateau state and the settlement of large numbers of Hausa-Fulani (Goshit, 2003, p.474; Ostien, 2009, p.8). The Hausa “thrived, acquired property, and grew wealthy” (Ostien, 2009, p.8).

Citing a British colonial administrator C.G. Ames, Danfulani & Fwatshak (2002, p.245) write that the “influx of Muslims took place during the establishment of the British protectorate”. They add that though the Hausa-Fulani existed in Jos prior to the British administration, they settled in large numbers after the arrival of the British (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p.245). Citing Egwu (2009), Ostien (2009, p.8) writes that the British gave the Hausa power, appointing “twelve successive persons as ‘*Sarkin Jos*’<sup>39</sup>, who were of Hausa/Fulani origin. In more recent times, they have called for the reinstatement of this position even calling for the creation of the position of “Emir of Jos” just as the indigenous groups have the “*Gbong Gwom Jos*” (Paramount Ruler of Jos) (Ostien, 2009, p.8).

Within this context, the ethno-religious violence in Plateau state can be broadly attributed to contestations between “indigenes” and “settlers” over power, resources and land. Religion and ethnicity have further promoted these divisions. Consequently, the causes of the violence in Plateau state are economic and political factors. This is because settler groups, particularly the Hausa-Fulani, feel that they are marginalised from the political process and do not benefit from a wide range of services. The politicisation of ethnic and religious identities emerged when education, government

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<sup>39</sup> Sarkin means Chief, meaning the individual in this position holds a leadership role.

jobs, and land ownership only benefited indigenous groups. In pointing out the enormity of the indigene-settler problem in Jos, Ostien (2009, p.11) notes that the indigene-settler dynamic has been further aggravated by the following key factors:

the widespread illiteracy, un-or under-employment and poverty that still plagues Nigeria; the large numbers of rootless jobless young men of all ethnic and religious background present everywhere to loot and destroy and kill; the increasing availability of arms of every description; the venal, petty-minded and short-sighted politicians who never hesitate to stir trouble by playing on ethnic and religious sentiments; pervasive and unchecked corruption of public office resulting in pervasive corruption of elections and widespread electoral violence; and the sheer incompetence of many public officials, elected and appointed, compounded by ingrained habits of autocratic, arbitrary, secretive, and unaccountable rule.

A few key examples attest to the political causes of the violent ethno-religious conflict. According to HRW (2005, p.7), the fact that Christians occupy influential political positions within the state has contributed to feelings of marginalisation by some Muslims, while Christians have spoken out against the dominance and monopoly of economic activities by Muslims in some areas of the state. In his survey of political positions in Plateau state, Moddibo (2012, p.5) writes that “the incumbent Governor and his Deputy are Christians, the 21-member House of Assembly has only 4 Muslim representatives, there are 2 Muslims out of 17 elected Local Government Chairmen, the Executive Council which consists of 18 commissioners has two Muslims, out of 28 Permanent Secretaries in the various Ministries and Parastatals, only 2 are Muslim, all three of Plateau’s senators are Christians, and there are six Christians out of eight of its Representatives”. He adds that key traditional positions such as the Local Government Council Chiefs and members of the Plateau state Council of Traditional Rulers are filled and dominated by Christians (Modibbo, 2012, p.4).

In other instances, contestations over the ownership of Yelwa town contributed to violent clashes in the area and its environs (HRW, 2005, p.35). In addition, placing Yelwa (a Muslim dominated area) under the authority of Shendam (a Catholic dominant town administered by a Goemai - indigene) in May 2002, is an example of the power struggles between the groups (Higazi, 2008, p.115). This accorded all political authority to the Goemai paramount ruler Long Goemai, and gave him the rights to determine and formally install the chief in Yelwa (Higazi, 2008, p.115). This caused divisions along religious lines because for Muslims, the idea of owning their district was a critical step

towards creating a LGA, providing financial opportunities for its elites and raising the profile of Yelwa in Plateau politics (Higazi, 2008, p.115). These factors contributed to the violent attacks in Yelwa in 2004.

Politically, power contestations are very strong between the Jasawa and the BAA. Although the Jasawa constitute a minority group in Plateau state, they are a strong political force in the Jos North LGA and they are much more “politically enlightened” write Danfulani and Fwatshak (2002, p.247). This stems from the fact that in the last local government elections in Jos North, they controlled “six electoral wards in the fourteen wards in the LGA” while the Igbos and Yoruba’s controlled two each and the BAA controlled one (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p.247). Despite their dominance in the LGA, they were unsuccessful in electing one of their own to the position of executive chairman, a position held by a Christian from the Anaguta ethnic group (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p.247). This led to the Jasawa holding the view that “Christians simply used their majority population to vote in a Christian candidate as Chairman” (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p.247). Voting along the lines of religion also occurred during the local elections of April 2002 in the Yelwa town of Shendam LGA (HRW, 2002, p.11). Danfulani and Fwatshak (2002, p.247), note that the continuous practice of voting along religious lines could greatly weaken the chances of Muslims winning elections for the position of Jos North chairmanship.

Economically, there has been competition and ensuing violence over land for economic sustenance. Cattle grazing by the Fulani cattle herders (mainly settlers) have caused land degradation thus affecting the pastoralists (mainly indigenes) in their efforts to cultivate and sell agricultural produce for their economic livelihood. This has resulted in conflicts and violent clashes between herdsmen and farmers (Associated Press, 2013). Historically, conflicts occurred between farmers and herdsmen in the 1940s and 1970s in Plateau state. An example is the conflict between the Tarok and the Fulanis, which involved cattle rustling as a response to the destruction of land by Fulani cattle, and a series of counter-attacks by Fulanis and indigenous communities. Since 2005, these conflicts between the Fulani (mainly Muslims) cattle herders and the indigenes who are mainly farmers and pastoralists have increased. This led to a high incidence rate of cattle rustling. Religion and ethnicity have again become covers for indigene and settler squabbles and clashes (HRW, 2005; Blench, 2003).

In conclusion, the conflict in Plateau state has various dimensions. Over and above indigene and settler disputes over political positions, the ownership of land, and the withdrawal of indigene status and the benefits accompanying it, another sub-conflict is that between Fulani herdsmen (Muslim) and the indigenous communities who are mainly farmers. Religion has increasingly been fused with these conflicts as most Fulani are Muslim and they have been lumped together with other Muslim (mostly Hausa) “enemies” by indigenous Christian groups.

#### **4.5.1. Jos North LGA**

For decades, Jos North LGA has been at the centre of the power contestations in Plateau state between the BAA and the Hausa-Fulani. Episodes of violence in the state like the 1994 crisis, the 7 – 13 September crisis in 2001, the May 2002 Eto-Baba Ward Congress Crisis and the November 2008 crisis occurred as a result of the power struggles in this LGA.

Jos North was created in 1991 out of the former Jos LGA. The division of the old Jos LGA into Jos North and Jos South meant that the indigenes were no longer dominant in Jos North (Ostien, 2009, p.9). The division of the LGA by the administration of General Babangida (a northern Muslim) was intended to “favour the Hausa community in Jos”, even though it was vehemently opposed by the Plateau indigenes (Ostien, 2009, p.9). After this division, the indigenous groups were located mainly in Jos South LGA while the Hausa-Fulani enjoyed dominance in Jos North LGA (Gofwen, 2011, p.14). Since then tensions have erupted in violence especially when Muslims have been appointed to positions in Jos North. For instance, a major cause of the crisis of 1994 was the selection of a Muslim (Alhaji Mato) as sole administrator of Jos North (Gofwen, 2011, p.49). The appointment of Alhaji Muktar (a Muslim) as the coordinator of NAPEP in Jos North greatly contributed to the crisis in Jos, which lasted from 7 – 13 September 2001 (Gofwen, 2011, p.50). These examples and other conflicts in Jos North LGA such as the 2008 LGA elections reveal the causes of the conflict in the form of contestations over the ownership of Jos, political competition and the indigene versus settler clashes. These lingering issues and the failure to resolve them also contributed to related clashes.

#### **4.6. Stakeholder Mapping**

Beyond political elites, other individuals and groups play an important role in exacerbating or preventing violent conflicts. In the context of Nigeria, Joseph (1987, p.50), writes that the individual “in a context of competitive group interaction, enters into a system of sectional oppositions from which it is usually impossible to opt out”. These sectional oppositions are solidified when “individuals seeking to advance materially and socially establish ties of a dependent nature with well-placed members of their ethnic or regional group” (Joseph, 1987, p.61). They then rely on their ethnic or in some case religious groups to be assured of protection or gain access to various opportunities. In order to understand both individual and group needs, interests and dynamics, the different relevant stakeholders in this study are presented.

##### **4.6.1. Berom – Anaguta - Afizere “Indigene group” (BAA)**

The key indigenous groups in Plateau state are the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere (BAA) groups. The Berom define themselves as the indigenous ethnic group of the Jos Plateau. They are mainly situated in the following LGA in Plateau state: Jos South, Jos North, Barkin Ladi and Riyom. The Anaguta are a tiny ethno-linguistic group found in the northern and eastern part of Jos city (Isichei, 1991, p.35). Most are Christians while others follow traditional religions (Isichei, 1991, p.39). Blench (2006, p.1) writes that the Afizere people (known as Jarawan Dutse by Hausa speakers) are mainly found in Jos North, Jos East and Mangu LGA in Plateau state and in Tafawa-Balewa and Toro LGA of neighbouring Bauchi state.

Due to tin mining and the influx of immigrants to Jos Plateau, Goshit (2006, p.476) notes that the BAA worked as semi-skilled labourers. They lost their farmlands to the mine and were forced to work to be able to pay their taxes. The BAA argue that they “should be recognized officially” as the indigenes of Jos (WANEP, 2011, p.6). Their dominant discourse is “reclaiming their rights as the indigenous peoples of Plateau state...against their perceived ancient oppressors” (ICG, 2012). Indigeneship is at the core of the conflicts and needs to be resolved (WANEP, 2011, p.66). They are in contestation with the Hausa-Fulani settlers over right to land, power and resources and

the protracted nature of the conflicts in Jos is the result of long-held grievances on these issues (ICG 2012). The current governor of Plateau state, Da Dr. Jonah David Jang, is from the Berom ethnic group.

#### **4.6.2. Muslim, Hausa-Fulani “Settler” group<sup>40</sup>**

The Muslim Hausa-Fulani “settler” are also are involved in the claims/contestation over rights in Plateau state. These groups (that largely refer to themselves as Jassawa) make a “proprietary claim” to the capital city of Jos<sup>41</sup> (ICG, 2012, p.i). They also claim to be seeking a “fair share of the benefits that should accrue to them by virtue of their citizenship of Nigeria and the long-standing existence of their community in Jos” (Ostien, 2009, p.9). They maintain that their claim to Jos - based on the fact that they have lived there for a long time and have contributed to the “development of the socio-economic and political life of the state”, is as important as the claim of the BAA (Ostien, 2009, p.10). In his work titled *Economics, Politics and Ethno-religious Relations in Jos Plateau*, Goshit (2006, p.171), writes that while it is not known exactly when Hausa and Fulani traders first migrated to Plateau state, it is clear that they migrated in the early decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Despite this, it has been difficult for some of them to obtain indigene certificates from any LGA (Ostien, 2009, p.9). Overall, the Hausa ethnic group has been and continues to be the dominant political force in northern Nigeria, and has been involved in Nigeria’s political evolution both before and after independence (Okehie-Offoha & Sadiku, 1996, p.58).

Hausa is both the name of the ethnic group as well as their language. These linguistic groups can be found in large numbers across the northern part of Nigeria in states like Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Plateau and Sokoto. Beyond Nigeria, they can be found in countries like Benin Republic, Ghana, Niger and Togo (Okehie-Offoha & Sadiku, 1996, p.380). According to Moddibbo (2012, p.4), the Hausa make up the majority of Muslims in LGA like Jos North and Jos South. In Plateau state, they are largely referred to as the Jasawa, with their descendants settling in Jos as traders and tin miners

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<sup>40</sup> The Fulani are also known as Fulbe or Fula.

<sup>41</sup> Some make a distinction between the Jassawa, - those who make ownership claims of Jos and have lived there for generations - and others who arrived recently from other states in the north. They are both Hausa-Fulani in ethnic orientation and practice Islam.

(Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p.246). They have settled in areas like Bukuru, Barkin Ladi, Mangu, Pankshin, Shendam, Yelwa and Langtang in Plateau state. With their presence in Jos, came the infusion of the Hausa language, and their dress, trading activities, development of mosques and Islamic schools in the state (Goshit, 2006, p.482).

The Fulani, a nomadic ethnic group originating from the valley of the Nile, overthrew the Hausa population in northern Nigeria, and settled in large numbers in the north while taking up roles as Emirs (Collis, 1970, p.87). They have also inter-married in large numbers mainly with the Hausa (Collis, 1970, p.87). These two groups have coexisted peacefully even though the former conquered the latter in the past (Collis 197, p.87; Goshit, 2006, p.484). The Fulani live both sedentary and nomadic lifestyles with the nomadic Fulani known for cattle rearing and pastoral activities and the sedentary Fulani who have merged with the Hausa since at least the 15th century (Graf, 1988, p.3), thus the term Hausa-Fulani. Many authors like Okehie-Offoha & Sadiku (1996, p.58) note that Nigeria's more recent political context has grouped the Hausa and Fulani into one group.

The majority of the Hausa-Fulani practice Islam (Whitaker, 1981, p.3; Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p.244). Muslim Fulani abide by Islamic beliefs, rites, and “virtually every aspect of their life (economic, political and social) is controlled by Islamic tenets (Okehie-Offoha & Sadiku, 1996, p.31). Although they are predominantly Muslim, they are diverse internally particularly in terms of their clans, pastoral practices and Islamic beliefs (Higazi, 2008, p.112). Less than 0.5% of the Hausa population practices Christianity or animism (Okehie-Offoha & Sadiku, 1996, p.41).

#### **4.6.3. Yoruba and Igbo “Settler groups”**

Although home to various other “settler” groups such as the Yoruba, Igbo and Urhobo, the Hausa-Fulani community are the only ones who claim they are indigenes in Jos (ICG, 2012, p.2). These three settler groups, and the Hausa-Fulani, make up about half of Plateau state's population (ICG, 2012, p.1). Although they are excluded from governance processes and the benefits that come with indigeneship, they have not contested for political control or the benefits of indigeneship (Ostien, 2009, p.10).



However, they have felt the impact of the violence as they have lost lives and properties during the various violent attacks (ICG, 2012, p.2). During violent clashes, these groups, even the Muslims amongst them, are grouped with the indigenes by the Jassawa (Ostien, 2009, p.10).

With the capital city of Jos becoming an administrative headquarters during the colonial era, these groups, comprising skilled labour, civil servants, clerks, traders and artisans migrated to Plateau state from other regions of the country (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p.246-247; Goshit, 2006, p.476;478). A distinction is made here between the Hausa-Muslims in Jos who “shunned western education for fear of being converted to Christianity” and other settler groups that “experienced western education and were likely to be Christians” (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p.247).

Largely dominant in the western region of Nigeria, the Yoruba are present in substantial numbers in Plateau state. In Nigeria, the Yoruba are divided fairly equally between Islam and Christianity (Graf, 1988, p.6; Whitaker, 1981, p.3). Large numbers of Igbos, who are numerically dominant in the eastern region of Nigeria (Whitaker, 1981, p.3) live in Jos. Christianity is more dominant amongst the Igbos than Islam (Okehie-Offoha & Sadiku, 1996, p.72). Apart from the Hausa-Fulani, these communities and other ethnic groups mainly subscribe to Christianity (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p.244).

#### **4.6.4. Plateau state government**

On a positive note, the Government of Plateau state has been involved in various peace-building and conflict prevention efforts by creating peace/reconciliation committees; inter-religious committees; peace summits and conferences; media campaigns and promoting peace and tolerance (Krause, 2011, Best, 2007). The Inter-religious Council set up by the State Governor has been instrumental in creating spaces for dialogue for various stakeholders. Local governments have also taken the initiative and conducted peace processes in their areas (Krause, 2011, p.50). The Plateau state Relief Committee on Refugees has also assisted victims of the conflict (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p.253). In addition, according to official reports, 800 police officers (mobile and regular police) were deployed from outside the state to the southern zone of Plateau state, particularly to areas like Yelwa, Shendam, Wase and Kadarko (HRW, 2005, p.40).

Despite these efforts, as the following examples show, the Government of Plateau state has contributed to the protracted crisis in the state. On the one hand, it comes across as favouring indigenous groups and failing to resolve discriminatory policies in aspects of education and employment (ICG, 2012, p. ii). In 2000, most non-indigenes in the public sector were fired, which the government blamed on the “debilitating effects of Nigeria’s long history of economic decline” and “a necessary response to rising levels of unemployment (ICG, 2012, p.4)”<sup>42</sup>. On the other hand, State Governor Jonah Jang (2013) has publicly denounced the violent attacks in various speeches and official statements, stating in one of those occasions that religion should be used to show love, respect for others and the dignity of the human being.

During interviews conducted by Human Rights Watch (2006, p.40) with Hausa teachers, assistant headmasters, and parents, all living in Jos North LGA, they complained that the “local government systematically diverted resources and infrastructure away from schools whose student body was primarily Hausa, with the result that predominantly Hausa schools were consistently the worst schools in the LGA.” The report also noted that, in terms of state policy, non-indigenes in Plateau state are ineligible to compete for academic scholarships, face discriminatory university admissions policies, and are made to pay higher school fees than indigene students at the tertiary level (HRW, 2006, p.36). On another note, local communities have complained of a lack of information from the state on its efforts to improve security and prevent further violence (Krause, 2011).

According to Danfulani and Fwatshak (2002, p.248), an analysis of the events of 7 – 12 September 2001 shows that the state could have acted more proactively in terms of early warning and response even with the early warning information it obtained. Two key warning signs were available: (a) it received petitions signed by elders of the Muslim community in the state (b) it was aware of threats made by various Muslim youth and their sponsors to incite violence if a Jasawa Muslim was removed as the Director of the Jos North Federal Government’s Poverty Alleviation Programme. The

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<sup>42</sup> See ICG (2010) Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict, Africa Report. No.168. 20 December, p.11 and Ploch, L. (2012) “Nigeria: Current Issues and US Policy”, Congressional Research Service (CRS), 18 July 2012, p. 10.

state's response was to call for reconciliation talks between the Plateau state Council of Elders' Forum (Danfulani and Fwatshak 2002, p.248). This weak response led to the events of 7 – 12 September 2001. Uhumwuangho and Epelle (2011, p.11) note that the government response to civil unrest has comprised of three key approaches, namely, “deployment of huge security operatives, peaceful dialogue amongst religious groups, and setting up of probe panels”. Other responses include declarations of “states of emergencies” by the President, reinforcing local police with military task forces and disarmament exercises, all of which offer few lasting results (Sayne, 2012, p.8).

At least 16 commissions have been set up to examine the violence in Jos alone, with five announced after the 2008 violence (Sayne, 2012, p.7). The three most publicised were the Fibresima Commission on the 1994 crisis (the report was only released in 2010) the Niki Tobi Commission on the 2001 riots, and the Ajibola Commission on the 2008 clashes. However, these commissions have no powers to enforce justice and are limited to an investigative role where they provide the causes, nature of conflict, damages, list of perpetrators and offer recommendations for formal prosecution (Sayne, 2012, p.7). Apart from accusations of biased members and subjective findings, their findings were not available to the public for years (Krause, 2011; Fwatshak, 2006). Furthermore, in a speech Governor Jonah Jang (2012) noted that the recommendations arising from investigations into the crisis could not all be implemented because some fall under the responsibility of federal agencies. These examples mirror the lack of accountability, transparency and political will required to support the peace process. Furthermore, the creation of commissions of inquiry tasked with investigating and reporting on these violent clashes have failed to prevent and positively transform the conflict (Salami, 2010; Uhumwuangho and Epelle, 2011; Kwaja, 2011). The recommendations of the various reports have yet to be implemented.

In the light of the failure of the state to contain the violence, Higazi (2008, p.109) questions its effectiveness and whether it is indeed impartial in the course of events within its territory. This question brings to light the fact that the majority of government

officials in the state, including the President are Christians and are members of the various indigenous groups in the state<sup>43</sup>.

#### **4.6.5. Security Sector**

According to the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC), the security system is composed of:

core security actors (armed forces, police, paramilitaries, intelligence and security services, etc.), executive and legislative authorities with security management and oversight responsibilities, justice and law enforcement institutions, and non-statutory security forces (OECD, 2007, p.22).

In Plateau state, this would broadly include the police, the military, and the court system. Security agents have been involved in containing the tensions and tackling the associated violence in Plateau state. After the eruption of violence, in 2001, 2004 and 2011, the state deployed riot police and the military to control the crisis, implemented dusk to dawn curfews, and used force when necessary. They have also been successful in detonating bombs planted near the student hostel on the University of Jos campus and at two other locations in the Tudun Wada area in the city (ICG, 2012, p.15). However, their efforts have been hampered by “poor intelligence training, institutionalized corruption, lack of hardware, and divided loyalties to the federal and state governments and to private bosses” (Sayne, 2012, p.8).

The response times of security agents have been dismal. The state government and state police have been known to respond to the violence after it has erupted, despite early warning information by civil society organisations (HRW, 2001). As a result, the security organisations have failed to serve as a credible deterrent to continued violence. There have also been reports of police brutality; the arrest of innocent individuals, arbitrary arrests without trial, arrests made based on religious or ethnic alignments and arbitrary killings (Sayne, 2012, p.8). Furthermore, the security sector has been ethnically divided and partial in their responses and attitudes to victims (HRW, 2005,

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<sup>43</sup> See Modibbo, M.S.A. (2012). Survey of Muslim Groups in Plateau State of Nigeria. NRN Background Paper No. 4. Oxford Department of International Development.

p.38). The credibility of security actors have been brought into question as reports of the use of fake security uniforms by non-security personnel during violent attacks have surfaced (Krause, 2011).

The Special Task Force (STF), created in 2008 is tasked with peacekeeping efforts in Plateau state. Their presence in the state has ensured calm and security through activities such as patrols and weapons checks. Although these efforts have been helpful, they are short term, weak and ineffective strategies, which are not adequately addressing the structural causes of the conflict. Furthermore, there have been failures in intergovernmental coordination and weak information sharing channels between the executive arm of the state government and high-level members of the security sector (Kwaja, 2011). The challenges relating to the state and security sector, insecurity, poor disarmament programmes and the widespread circulation of weapons have led to the emergence of informal security organisations, such as neighbourhood vigilante groups acting in self-defence (Krause, 2011). Currently there are discussions at federal level to develop the state police's capacity and devise a national security strategy.

The security sector failed to protect communities, particularly in terms of bomb attacks across the city of Jos in 2010 - 2014. Overall, security across the state is lacking as many communities and villages have been attacked with no defence of any kind. In the violent attacks of February and May 2004 in Yelwa, there was no police or military presence and the small police force stationed there had "left the town completely at the end of April", even though the state police command in Jos denied this (HRW, 2005, p.36). Furthermore, the security services have not produced a sufficient response to the widespread circulation of weapons across the state. Arms disarmament processes, particularly after the 2004 crisis, saw the handing over of only 300 different types of weapons in exchange for cash (Best and Kemedi, 2005, p.36). Fears by many of future attacks have weakened their resolve to disarm and corrupt security officers have hired out their weapons for short periods (Best and Kemedi, 2005, pp.36-37). It was also claimed that there was a "complete lack of concern for the injured" on the part of some police and local government officials (HRW, 2005, p.38).

The Ajibola Commission's report of the attacks of 27-28 November identified members of the police and army amongst the alleged list of individuals, groups of persons and

institutions that were directly responsible for the unrest (ICG, 2012, p.12). Witness accounts stated that many of the attackers in the Yelwa violence were soldiers and police officers or were dressed in military and police gear, while others stated that police and military identity cards were found at the scene of the May 2004 attacks (HRW, 2005, p.24). In the February 2004 violent attacks, perpetrators dressed in military gear were mistaken as soldiers coming to protect innocent civilians (HRW, 2005, p.16). HRW was not able to verify these reports; however, the common practice of stealing current or retired security personnel's uniforms could explain why these attackers had access to these (HRW, 2005, p.24). It could also be argued that these were attempts to set security officials up as culprits. It is possible that identity cards were duplicated just as uniforms were sometimes duplicated to give the appearance of security force involvement while masking the identities of some of the main culprits. Both Muslims and Christians have complained about the low number of arrests of individuals who organised or participated in the violence (HRW, 2005, p.55). In cases where there have been arrests, the police have been accused of bias or targeting specific ethnic groups (HRW, 2005, p.56). Actions like these weaken the credibility and legitimacy of the police and the military.

There are gaps in the justice sector as “no one was held to account” for all the crimes committed and for the names identified in the various Commissions of Inquiry (ICG, 2012, p.13). Administrator Chris Alli set up special courts, specifically after the Yelwa attacks, but even after hearings began in mid-July 2004, information on the progress of the courts were not publicly available (HRW, 2005, p.54). A response by the Elders' Council of Plateau state quashed a public statement released by the police on 3 June 2004 that 79 individuals had been charged in court in relation to the Yelwa attacks (HRW, 2005, p.54). According to the Council, only four individuals were being charged (HRW, 2005, p.54-55). Furthermore, two individuals directly responsible for the violence in 2002 were also identified as playing the same role in the 2008 crisis (ICG, 2012, p.13), thus raising the question of why they were not arrested in 2002. Where presumed perpetrators have been arrested, they have not been prosecuted (Kwaja, 2011), sometimes due to lack of evidence.

According to a HRW report (2005, p.56), a major challenge in obtaining justice is the absence of “a formal structure among the perpetrators and the difficulties in identifying

the organizers of the violence” (HRW, 2005, p.56). Arrests have therefore targeted young men who participate in the attacks while the masterminds who plan the conflict remain free. The failure to arrest key organisers of the attacks speaks to poor investigative mechanisms and the failure to respond rapidly before and after the conflict to identify and arrest perpetrators. This could also be because in some instances, the perpetrators of the violence cannot be clearly identified, as they do not maintain a visible presence in the periods between the fighting, and their political sponsors cannot be identified (HRW, 2005, p.6-7). The gaps in the security system greatly threaten future peace and stability and will inhibit progress in transforming the conflict.

#### **4.6.6. Civil society organisations**

Civil society organisations, including interfaith organisations, have actively intervened in the hope of preventing and halting the violence through peace-building activities. They have embarked on conflict resolution workshops; peace marches; sports events; seminars; conferences; multi-stakeholder dialogue sessions; and bridge-building initiatives; and have even developed early warning systems. Examples of these various activities abound. For instance, the Centre for Peace Initiative and Development (CEPID) has organised radio and television announcements and workshops in an effort to promote peace and tolerance amongst groups (HRW, 2001); the Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO) has visited security agencies to improve communication between the security sector and grassroots leaders and the Centre for Peace Advancement (CPA) has been involved in workshops, community engagement and training. Intergender has conducted advocacy visits to local government officials, community leaders and security forces (Ityavyar, 2004). Organisations such as the Nigeria Red Cross Society have assisted displaced persons, particularly after episodes of violence conflict (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p.253). Through its Peace in Jos project, the Institute of Governance and Social Research (IGSR) has conducted camps for youths across the conflict divide with the aim of changing their mind-sets about the violence while teaching them the necessity of nationalism, tolerance and a culture of peace (IGSR, 2012). It has also developed the youth’s skills to enable them to make a living and has conducted capacity-building initiatives for security agencies, empowered women, and provided trauma counselling (IGSR, 2012). Search for Common Ground (SFCG) has provided training support, opened spaces for dialogue, produced media programmes,

and carried out community outreach while working with a range of local actors including representatives from media, community members, teachers, and women and youth (SFCG, 2013, p.3). SFCG has also brought Muslim and Christian groups together to work on conflict resolution, rumour management and joint community initiatives (SFCG, 2013, p.27).

Some civil society organisations have not only launched independent teams to investigate the crimes in Jos but have also put pressure on government to rebuild institutions like the security sector. This is because citizens are forced to rely increasingly on non-state actors, like civil society for protection, humanitarian support, and reintegration programs (Kwaja, 2011). Civil society efforts are, however, stifled by the following: the lack of coordination amongst organisations; ethnic alignment and the partisanship of civil society; and the incitement of violence by churches and mosques (Krause, 2011). The media has also become sensationalist and partisan in its reports (Krause, 2011).

Inter-faith groups have contributed significantly to peace in Plateau state. They have been involved in dialogue efforts, like the Inter-Religious Council set up by the state to foster dialogue amongst groups. On a broader level, the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and Jama'atu Nasril Islam (JNI) as Christian and Muslim organisations, respectively have been involved in bringing groups together across the religious divide to take part in activities like peace rallies and dialogue. The Federation of Muslim Women's Associations in Nigeria (FOMWAN) which has offices across the country including Plateau state, has been involved in interreligious cooperation with Christian organisations on women's and children's health as well as dialogue forums that promote peace and tolerance (Berkley Center, 2010). FOMWAN has collaborated with other Christian women's organisations that are linked to the Catholic Church and the Evangelical Church of West Africa (Berkley Center, 2010). The Dogon Karfe Abattoir Women's development association created the "Women without Walls" initiative, an interfaith women's group brought together by Search for Common Ground (SFCG) to work on peace-building activities (SFCG, 2013, p.26). Through the Women without Walls and the Plateau Muslim Sisters for Peace, relationships have been strengthened between Muslim and Christian women through their joint collaboration on various projects (SFCG, 2013, p.29).



Apart from interfaith organisations, religious leaders have made significant contributions to peace by leading interfaith dialogue and reconciliation processes, and imparting conflict resolution techniques (USIP, 2011, p.3). According to the HRW (2005, p.6), some organisations focus on protecting the broad interests of specific ethnic groups and communities, but do not call for violence. While some religious leaders should be recognised for their efforts, others have been involved in inciting violence particularly through their words and exhortations. Both Christian and Muslim religious leaders have used religious rhetoric and prejudice in their conversations and actions (HRW, 2005, p.9).

Youth organisations have also been involved in various peace initiatives. For instance, the Young Ambassadors for Community Peace (YACP) have organised initiatives, including a peace march for youth from different religious backgrounds. The Muslim-Christian Youth Dialogue Initiative was set up by two youth leaders from CAN and JNI to facilitate dialogue and exchange between the youth.

#### **4.6.7. Other stakeholders**

Apart from the aforementioned relevant stakeholders, a wide range of other important groups is examined below either for their active participation in the violent conflicts, in peace-building or as victims of attacks. These include unemployed youth, women, children, ethnic militias, foreign mercenaries, other ethnic groups across the state, the federal government and international organisations.

Unemployed youth, who make up a large proportion of the population of Plateau state, have become perpetrators of violence. In many instances these responses are spontaneous and the youth are easily provoked to engage in violence such as that witnessed during the violent episode of 2001 (Ginifer and Olawale, 2005). Longstanding economic, social and political neglect, has led youth to invest in “armed violence -related skills” (Ginifer and Olawale, 2005, p.11). Youth without access to economic opportunities are open to other sources of economic livelihood, which could involve joining rebellions or contributing to violence for compensation. In the 2008 attacks, Muslim youth, Berom youth and the Tudun Wada Christian Youth Vanguard

were identified as groups allegedly responsible for the unrest in the state (ICG, 2012, p.12). The Almajiris (street children) have also become targets for training in violence.

Women and children have incited and participated in violent attacks. Some women have encouraged their sons and husbands to participate in violence and provided them with weapons. Both Christian and Muslim women have cheered their men on, have carried petrol used for setting fires, and have stoned others. For example, during the attacks in January 2010, women in Kuru Karama allegedly carried the containers of petrol used to set fire to Muslims and their houses (HRW, 2013, p.53). Witness reports stated that women carried out violent acts like beating a small boy to death and setting an old man on fire after he was beaten by the mob (HRW, 2013, p.53). Children from the ages of 12-15 have been involved in attacks in Yelwa (HRW, 2005, p.18). More than 200 Hausa-Fulani youth and children were involved in the crisis in November 2008 in Jos North LGA (ICG, 2012, p.12).

Women and children have also suffered greatly from the violent episodes. According to reports, a minimum of “300 women and children were murdered allegedly by Fulani Herdsmen and their surrogates” in the Berom dominated Dogo Na Hawa village in January 2010 (ICG, 2012, p.13). Pregnant women, children and an entire family were killed in the violence of 2011 (ICG, 2012, p.14). During the Yelwa attacks of February - May 2004, women were abducted and repeatedly raped by their captors and some were kept as wives, and used for labour (HRW, 2005, p.40). Furthermore, the police conducted no serious investigations into sexual abuse related to these attacks (HRW, 2005, p.43). Children as young as eight months were abducted and the older ones were forced to work for their captors by working on farms, fetching water and caring for livestock (HRW, 2005, p.40-41). Some of these women and children were released after various amounts of time (HRW, 2005, p.42).

Ethnic militias have been involved in carrying out violent attacks (Sayne, 2012, p.2). Almost all ethnic groups residing in volatile areas in Plateau state have formed armed militia or community defence groups that are trained by members with previous military experience (Best and Kemedi, 2005, p. 30). According to Higazi (2008, p.107), vigilante groups have switched their focus from vigilance as a response to criminality to vigilance against attacks by “opposing groups or militia defining themselves in

religious or ethnic terms”. This increases the focus on the religious and ethnic face of the conflict and, coupled with a weak security sector, creates a highly unsafe environment.

Foreign mercenaries have reportedly carried out a wide range of attacks. Local ethnic communities like the Taroh, Gamai and Berom have claimed that the Fulani have funded mercenaries from Chad, Niger, Cameroon and other countries to fight with them, although there is no hard evidence to back these claims (Best and Kemedi, 2005, p.31). According to the Guardian (2012), suspected perpetrators are foreign nationals who “are believed to be camped in the hills and mountains of Riyom and Barkin Ladi local council areas where they launched coordinated, deadly raids on unsuspecting villagers”. Media reports on the links between internal actors and foreign actors have focused on the strong relationship and coordination between Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda (Ajani, 2014; Soriwei, 2013; Connors, 2011). According to these reports, Boko Haram has established links with the Algerian-based headquarters of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) with the latter providing contacts, training and support. This link is further established by Maiangwa et al. (2012, p.42), who note that Boko Haram’s policy of violence is focused on inciting ethno-religious violence in Nigeria.

Other ethnic groups are key stakeholders in the crisis in Plateau state. Prominent among these are the Tarok and Gamai. In the violence of May 2 – 3 2004 in Yelwa, eyewitnesses reported that the attackers included the Tarok, Gamai, and Berom in addition to other groups (HRW, 2005, p.21). About 50% of the Tarok population subscribe to Christianity and others to traditional religions while some subscribe to both (Higazi, 2008, p.111). The Tarok are the largest non-Muslim group in Wase LGA; however, there is debate as to which group is the majority between them and the Fulani (Higazi, 2008, p.113). Before the crisis the Fulani and the Tarok coexisted peacefully in spite of their different religious beliefs, and were closely linked economically and socially (Higazi, 2008, p.113; Blench, 2004, p.94). Even though both groups inter-married and the Tarok converted to Islam, they were forced to flee with little warning from their Muslim attackers during violent episodes (Higazi, 2008, p.113).

The role of the Federal Government has been important but questionable. As the examples in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria and Plateau state attest, the Federal

Government has taken short-term steps to curtail violent conflict but has failed to develop long-term steps to prevent its future occurrence. Its efforts have included imposing a state of emergency, deploying security operatives and implementing curfews. Furthermore, the relationship between the state and federal governments has not been positive. For instance, efforts by former President Olusegun Obasanjo to create the Plateau state Reconciliation Commission after the attacks of Yelwa in 2004, failed to receive approval in the Plateau state National Assembly (Sayne, 2012, p.9). The relationship has also been hampered by poor coordination and weak information sharing as leadership at both state and federal levels initiated their own individual responses to the conflict.

International organisations and donor countries continue to support peace-building and conflict prevention initiatives in Plateau state. For many CSOs who are doing admirable intervention, donor funding is important. Key players in this category include the European Union (EU), DFID, Action Aid, GIZ and the World Bank (WB) who provide small and large grants to non-state actors depending on their capacity. The UNDP has been working with the state's Operation Rainbow Unit to develop an effective and rapid early warning and early response system.

#### **4.7. Outcome and Impact**

It is safe to say that the violence in Plateau state has had an impact on most of the population regardless of their ethnicity, religion or political affiliation. In just one period, between June 2002 and May 2004, no fewer than six of the 17 LGA were affected in the southern and central senatorial zones of Plateau state (Higazi, 2008, p.109). In addition, more than a hundred villages in the lowland areas like Shendam, Yelwa, Langtang, Wase and Dengi have been damaged or destroyed in violent attacks (Higazi, 2008, p.109).

The most glaring impact of the violent conflict has been the loss of human lives, despite varying reports of the number of deaths. It can be concluded that thousands of lives have been lost in violent clashes across Plateau state. Linked to this have been the secret killings that continue to take place with the victims unaccounted for (ICG, 2013, p.14; Sayne, 2012, p.6). Furthermore, there have been reports of bodies not recovered in

places like Kuru, Angwan Murtala and Motor Park as the victims were thrown into wells, or in their efforts to escape, jumped into wells and were shot dead (Higazi, 2011, p.21; HRW, 2005, p.27). Top government officials have also become victims of these ethno-religious clashes. For example, gunmen killed Senator Ayang Dangtong and Majority Leader Gyang Fulani in a stampede, while a state lawmaker, Simon Mwadkon was injured (ICG, 2012, p.15). The silent and unaddressed impact has been the trauma left in the wake of the violence due to the loss of lives, property, and livelihood sources and having to readjust to a new life after the violence (SFCG, 2013, p.30).

Uhunmwuango and Epelle, (2011, p.110) term the attacks as being “synonymous with senseless violence.” The brutality of these violent attacks, the attacks on the young and the elderly, and the involvement of the security sector as perpetrators worsens the situation. The identification and murder of citizens has been based on religion and ethnicity. Bomb blasts in public and crowded areas, overnight attacks on unsuspecting victims, and attacks by Fulani herdsmen on villages have been catastrophic. The rapid spread of the violence from the capital city of Jos where competition is the most visible and tense to the communal and rural areas has been alarming.

The violence has negatively affected the economy. According to Mohammed (2004, p.1), the conflict has limited key-income generating activities including agricultural production, livestock production, commerce, shelter and transportation. Furthermore, properties and businesses have been destroyed as owners have been killed, and markets and businesses burnt down. For instance, post-election violence in 2008 led to the destruction of the Igbo-controlled largest timber market in Jos, the Hausa-controlled grain and yam markets, and car dealerships belonging to Hausa car traders as well as other businesses (ICG, 2012, p.12). A government report concluded that from 7 September 2001 to 18 May 2004 at least 25,000 houses had been razed to the ground and some 1,300 herds of cattle had been slaughtered (IRIN, 2004). Citing a July 25 report in Nigerian newspaper, *Punch*, the ICG stated that more than 180 billion dollars’ worth of property had been destroyed since 1994 in Plateau state (ICG, 2012, p.2). In his report after the crisis in Plateau state, President Obasanjo noted that the Federal Government and the state had had to spend considerable sums of money in an attempt to manage the conflict and the destruction it caused to the state’s political and socioeconomic structures (HRW, 2005, p.12).

Institutions of learning have also been disrupted. Mosques and churches have been attacked and deliberately destroyed, demonstrating the religious dimension of the conflict (HRW, 2005, p.12). It has halted neighbourhood facilities and led to the scarcity of public services (Aliyu et al., 2011, p.256). A study on the impact of violent ethno-religious conflicts on public utilities, facilities and services in the Jos Metropolis of Plateau state concludes that areas that experienced high levels of violence have limited access to essential neighbourhood facilities such as electricity and water, which are essential for habitable environments (Aliyu et al., 2011, p.261). Vandalism and the destruction of public services and utilities limited the efficient supply of government services and goods. These factors have further entrenched inequalities amongst groups and increased unemployment and economic vulnerability in various areas (Aliyu et al., 2011, p.256).

After the conflict of September 2001, Danfulani and Fwatshak (2002, p.247), wrote that the conflicts could cause groups to “live in religiously monolithic enclaves” and increase the likelihood that “religious affiliation will continue to affect the future voting patterns of the inhabitants of Jos” (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p.248). This did indeed occur, as religious segregation within the state is stronger. After the conflict of 7 – 12 September 2001, specific groups were purged and evicted from particular areas in town based on their religion and many were not able to return to their homes. According to Aliyu et al. (2011, p.256), this “social and spatial segregation” has fragmented society. In areas which they were dominant or had more control, Muslim and Christian fanatics pushed for the expulsion of the other<sup>44</sup>. The attacks in Yelwa in February and May 2004 saw an exodus of Christians and Muslims to areas where their groups were dominant (HRW, 2005, p.44). This communal segregation will also impede efforts at reconciliation if groups are not able to engage each other on how to move forward.

Displacement of persons and the case of missing persons within and beyond Plateau state has had a major impact on the conflict. According to Human Rights Watch (2005,

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<sup>44</sup> The Muslim youths refer to Muslim dominated areas as the “sharia line” and the Igbo and the Plateau state ethnic groups refer to the areas they dominate as the “New Jerusalem” (Danfulani and Fwatshak, 2002, p.253).

p.44), “each of the major attacks in Plateau state has resulted in large movements of population”. After the attacks of May 2004, Muslims fled in large numbers to the neighbouring states of Nassarawa and Bauchi (HRW, 2005, p.44) After the ethno-religious violent conflict of 7 – 12 September 2001, camps were set up all over town to assist thousands of displaced persons (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p.251). Family members were not reunited and there were cases of missing individuals who were not confirmed dead (HRW, 2005, p.34).

The insecurity and violent conflict has resulted in increased criminal activities. Conflict merchants who profit from the on-going violence will inhibit any form of progress in peace efforts. These “conflict merchants”, are engaging in criminal activities including robbery, kidnapping, and smuggling (Sayne, 2012, p.2). They have also engaged in the sale of munitions and relied on young men to keep the conflict going (SFCG, 2013, p.30). On another note, the violence has provided cover for Boko Haram to carry out their attacks including bombings of churches in Jos (Sayne, 2012, p.2). Cattle theft and rustling increased drastically during the conflict and has further aggravated tensions (Best and Kemedi, 2005, p.33).

Reprisal attacks have contributed to the cycle of violence. The violence has spread to through counter attacks that seek revenge (HRW, 2005, p.7-8). Communities have attacked others from a different religion, even if they are of the same ethnic group (HRW, 2005, p.7-8). Beyond Plateau state, the conflict has expanded to include other ethnic groups and other states in Nigeria. For instance, 11-12 May riots in Kano state against Christians were in retaliation for the 2 – 3 May attacks against Muslims in the Yelwa area of Plateau state. The massacre of Christians from southern Nigeria residing in Plateau state led to reprisal killings of Muslims in southern Nigeria. A direct response to the violent conflict of 7 – 12 September 2001 in Jos was “reprisal attacks on persons of northern extraction” in southern Nigeria (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p. 253). These attacks focused specifically on "any people who are known to have come from the north, notwithstanding whether they are Muslims or Christians" (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p.253). The justification for war or the idea that groups are fighting a just war as they defend or fight to protect their own group is problematic in rebuilding relationships.

The events in Plateau state have had an impact on national unity as the country is more divided than ever before. Attempts to build national unity have been crippled by these ethnic and religious cleavages as groups align more strongly with their various groups. Since 7-12 September 2001, “suspicion, fear, and even open resentment between some Muslims and Christians in Jos town” is evident (Danfulani and Fwatshak, 2002, p.254). Furthermore, the “trust and confidence that used to exist between Muslims and Christians during the peaceful times is no longer there” (Danfulani & Fwatshak, 2002, p.254). There has been a major migration of Nigerians back to their “ethnic” homes or states of origin due to the insecurity they face. Actions like this further divide the country into specific ethnic units.

#### **4.8. Future Prognosis**

Beyond the economic and social impact of the conflict, its emotional aspects are monumental. Communities, groups and individuals are still struggling to deal with the damage the conflict has caused in their lives. Due to the conflicts, a culture of tolerance has been replaced with a “survivalist, us-versus-them mind-set and destructive behaviour patterns” (Sayne, 2012, p.6). Retaliation killings and murders under the cover of night without any obvious triggers are characteristic of these patterns (Sayne, 2012, p.6). Danfulani and Fwatshak (2002, p.254) rightly argue that, the wounds of “ethnic hatred, religious arrogance and fundamentalism” will take time to heal. This will be a difficult and uphill task as protracted conflicts in Plateau state have not only destroyed relationships but the conflict has left an imprint on future generations. This could lead to a recurrent cycle of violence and a culture of intolerance.

Plateau’s geographical location has had an impact on the insecurity and instability in central and northern Nigeria. Plateau is one of five states<sup>45</sup> in the north central region that links Nigeria’s more Christian and traditionalist south to the more Muslim north. Because of this, the region has remained one of the most “ethnically diverse and one of the most violent regions in Nigeria” (Sayne, 2012, p.2) Because of its geographical location, the crisis in the state has regional implications as its instability will contribute to further instability in the central and northern regions of Nigeria. It has also created a

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<sup>45</sup> The other four states are Benue, Kwara, Kogi and Nassarawa states.



ripple effect across the country as religious groups have turned on one another due to the events in Plateau state.

The crisis has further divided Nigeria across religious and ethnic lines and with on-going clashes in the nearby states of Sokoto, Kaduna and Yobe, it has the potential (if not addressed) to create an opportunity for religious fundamentalism to take root in Nigeria and West Africa (Alozieuwa, 2010, p.18). Boko Haram has already taken advantage of this insecurity to carry out violent acts against innocent civilians. At a stakeholder's peace meeting convened by the Police Commissioner of Plateau state, Muslim leaders in the state expressed their concern and their pain concerning the attacks inflicted on Christians by Boko Haram (SFCG, 2013, p.11). It can thus be argued that unless proper action is taken, these conflicts could intensify, further deepening the national divide along the main ethnic and religious cleavages and threatening to destroy Nigeria's already fragile stability.

It is important to envisage the worst-case scenarios if the causes of the ethno-religious violence are not addressed. Secessionist attempts by groups, total anarchy in Nigerian society, and civil war are possible outcomes if urgent priority and attention is not given to the crisis. While Akintunde (2002) offers solutions such as a federal solution based on autonomous regions or discarding the colonial borders and creating new units, it is important that peace-building and conflict transformation efforts are multiplied and intensified, focusing specifically on the root causes and impact of the violence. Beyond this, other actors such as the UN, civil society organisations and the international community must work together to address Nigeria's fragile peace before it is too late.

## **CHAPTER FIVE: DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS: PEACE-BUILDING FRAMEWORK**

This chapter and the one that follows present and analyse the data from the fieldwork conducted for this study. Chapter Five presents and analyses the data with regard to the peace-building framework, while Chapter Six presents and analyses the data on the state, its role in peace-building and its limitations and challenges in this process. This chapter unpacks the data in three main areas. It begins with a conceptual analysis where peace and conflict transformation is unpacked in the context of Plateau state while examining the indicators and dividends of peace for the state and its residents. Secondly, the chapter presents a programmatic and policy analysis that maps and outlines key programmes, policies and institutions that should be part of a peace-building framework and can address the structural causes of the violence and prevent direct violence. In some instances, programmes, policies and institutions already exist and need to be strengthened. Thirdly, a thematic analysis is presented of what should be included under the four key priorities of the peace-building framework (political, economic, psycho-social and security).

A few key issues and observations from both the FGD and KII should be noted. While most respondents agreed on specific issues and gave examples to support their views, there were instances where there were differing views. Respondents offered their opinions and views, while sharing their personal experiences and dissatisfaction with the indigene-settler issues and the impact on them or their family members. Others were vocal about the fact that settler groups were just visitors and did not own the land or should not be allowed to have access to or own land or fill political roles. The level of honesty was good in the FGD and even stronger in the KII.

It was clear that many Christians and Muslims do get along, as was shown by the interactions with the respondents and their air of collegiality. Some interacted with each other in their personal and professional capacities. There was very little tension and respondents in the FGD listened to the views of others. Some Christians noted that they are still able to move into certain Muslim areas, have Muslim landlords, and engage with Muslims in various ways. This suggests that there is a positive environment for continued peace efforts.

It was interesting to learn that while the two key groups (the BAA and Hausa-Fulani) are on opposite spectrums, there is some internal contention. For instance, some respondents noted that, with regard to indigenous groups like the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere, the last two groups are excluded while the first was more dominant in key areas like politics. Citing the views of a Professor from the University of Jos, Human Rights Watch (2006, p.36) noted that:

getting civil service employment is a real privilege now. So even within the indigene communities there is always grumbling about which indigene group is getting more employment than another.

In addition, it was noted by some that there was a need for a distinction to be made between the Jassawa (individuals who are predominantly Muslim and claim ownership of Jos,) and the Hausa-Fulani (also Muslims) from other states. These sentiments add to the complexity of the conflict and the various stakeholders as inter-group and intra-group tensions clearly exist side-by-side.

Some respondents noted the blurring of religious lines in the state. A few alluded to the fact that in one household comprised solely of indigenes, one can find cousins or other family members that subscribe to Christianity and others that subscribe to Islam. This has most likely contributed to the positive relationships that exist in various forms across the state. Many respondents stated that they had grown up and lived closely with Muslims for a long time and are hurt, and disturbed by the turn of events.

The bringing together of individuals of different religions, ethnic groups and from various organisations was particularly useful for the following reasons: respondents had the opportunity to more extensively debate and discuss issues while sharing their opinions and learning from one another; networks were established and relationships were built between different individuals and organisations; and it was clear that the respondents saw beyond the nature and impact of the conflict by being exposed to the viewpoints and perspectives of others.

Before presenting and analysing the data, the codes and translations used to identify respondents are once again presented.

<b>Code</b>	<b>Translation</b>
FG1	Focus Group One
P1	Participant One
FG1-P1	Focus Group One – Participant One
KII	Key Informant Interviews
CZ	Central Zone
JM	Jos Metropolis
SZ	Southern Zone
NZ	Northern Zone

## **5.1. Thematic Presentation and Discussion of Data**

### **5.1.1. Perceptions and Views on Peace in the Context of Plateau state**

For the majority of respondents, peace was not just the absence of conflict (i.e., negative peace) or the absence of fear of being killed, harassed or intimidated; it was a broad concept that included the provision of justice, creating infrastructure, good governance, addressing issues of human insecurity, and creating access to opportunities and basic necessities like food and shelter (positive peace). These views and perceptions are reminiscent of Johan Galtung’s (1990) perspective on negative and positive peace and the absence of direct, structural and cultural violence. Respondent FG2-P1 shared that “structural peace” focuses on society, infrastructure, good governance, the absence of corruption, and employment, all of which guarantee stability.

A few respondents also noted that inner peace was necessary for achieving communal peace. For respondent FG2-P5, elements of peace in the state would include freedom of movement, a vibrant and active social life, flourishing economic activity and the absence of fear. The respondent added that peace could be sustained through mutual respect for the opinions of others, consensus on a uniform description of rights, continuous dialogue and peaceful co-existence.

Respondent FG1-P11 stated that many in the capital city of Jos feel that the whole state is fragile and in a phase of negative peace. For respondent FGI-P1, there was no peace in the state as a whole because markets, places of worship and residential areas were segregated. According to respondent FG2-P1, hate, segregated settlements, issues of underdevelopment, poverty, death, the presence of orphans and widows, expulsion of students from schools and trauma were some of the effects of the violent conflict, all of which affected peace in the state.

### **5.1.2. Dividends of Peace**

In order to understand the end goal of any peace-building process, respondents were asked to reflect on what the dividends of peace would look like in the state. According to most respondents, peace would bring about improved economic activity and greater development and would contribute to stronger integration while reducing high levels of polarisation in the state. Many emphasised that peace would lead to freedom of movement across both Muslim and Christian dominated areas. A sign that peace has not returned to the state is that many areas in the city have been segregated along religious lines and it is not safe for people that subscribe to other religions to move into these areas. According to respondent FG3-P6, peace will bring about mutual coexistence without fear and ethnic or religious bias. The respondents noted that, in a peaceful Plateau state, individuals would not be seen through the lens of religion or ethnicity but as human beings that are united irrespective of these identities.

Some of the respondents were asked to identify what the possible “indicators” of progress in peace-building efforts would be. According to respondent KII-P15-JM, the indicators for progress in Plateau state include a violent free society, peaceful coexistence, and the presence of love and mutual respect where differences are managed and interactions are enhanced. According to respondent KII-P3-NZ, a clear indicator of peace is when residents can go to any part of the state without worrying about their safety and when people are relaxed and can leave their businesses open until very late. For respondent KII-P4, an indicator of peace would be a reduction in no-go areas, freedom of movement, and inter-marriage.

### **5.1.3. Perspectives and Views on Conflict Transformation**

In order to gain some perspectives on conflict transformation, respondents were asked what this meant in the context of Plateau state. According to Respondent KII-P12-JM, conflict transformation entails conscious efforts to mobilise a path to peace. This respondent also noted that dialogue, discussion and mutual agreement on key steps would result in conflict transformation. For respondent KII-P23-JM, conflict transformation requires identifying lessons from the past in order to avoid conflict in the future. It also means that the factors responsible for the conflict are addressed. Respondent KII-P4-JM noted that, in the context of Plateau state, conflict transformation entails regarding conflict as an opportunity to move from things that have caused pain to things that can cause joy. In addition, it means recognising that conflict is not a negative thing but a strength, and not seeing the perpetrators as criminals but as people that should be able to express their points of view, but no one has listened. This respondent also noted that conflict transformation will require changing one's mentality from a "them versus us" scenario to one that sees everyone as "one". Key themes emerging from these perspectives include mutuality; oneness, unity, dialogue and the fact that conflict creates a space for outcomes that are more positive and lead to change.

### **5.1.4. Utility and Limitations of a Peace-building Framework**

Most of the respondents agreed that there was a need for a peace-building framework for the state. According to respondent FG2-P1, the lack of a strategy for peace efforts called for a peace-building framework. The respondent noted that the framework must have a design for the state, take the context of the conflict into account, and must be cross-cultural and thus work for citizens. Furthermore, the respondent noted that the framework should identify programmes for each group and for different segments of society. According to respondent FG3-P3, the state has the capacity to implement a peace-building framework but sustained efforts are required to achieve success.

In terms of addressing the root causes of violent conflict, the respondents agreed that a peace-building framework or peace architecture must be bottom-up. Respondent FG1-P2 said that the framework should focus on the grassroots and community level.

Respondents FG2-P1 added that a successful peace-building framework requires that communities work together in all peace engagements. According to respondent KII-P1-NZ, the programmes, policies and institutions outlined in the framework should reflect the people's wishes, should involve the people in all processes, and should be inclusive, decentralised and represent the genuine interests of the people. Respondent FG4-P4 said that it should take the needs of all groups into account. According to respondent K11-P15-SZ, it is important to consult with the youth and women. Thus, respondent KII-P5-JM stated that such a framework should propose and recognise the equality of all residents.

Respondents generally noted that all groups must own the peace-building framework, by focusing on what binds communities together and adopting common goals and ideas that cut across religion. For respondent KII-P3-NZ, a peace-building framework can be relevant only if it is founded on bringing people from different ethnic groups together, involves a lot of dialogue with the youth, and addresses the root causes of the problem and seeks solutions. Respondent FG2-P5 commented that diverse groups with different interests and different experiences of the trauma and psychological impacts of the conflict would limit the success of the peace-building framework. The respondent noted that the peace-building framework could work if Muslims and Christians were able to move freely.

#### **5.1.5. Programmes, Policies and Institutions in the Peace-building Framework**

Respondents were asked to reflect on and identify relevant programmes, policies and institutions that should be included in a peace-building framework with the aim of addressing the root causes of the violence and preventing direct violence. Table 5.1 below presents these programmes, policies and institutions. Some respondents noted that some existing programmes, policies and institutions need strengthening, including the National Human Rights Commission, Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development, the National Orientation Agency, the Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR), and Operation Rainbow while some do not exist and need to be created. Table 5.1 shows that, a few other existing institutions like the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), the Poverty Alleviation Programmes and programmes targeting Maternal and Child Welfare exist but need to be strengthened

particularly when it comes to implementation. In addition, existing policies on anti-corruption, electoral norms and standards need to be adhered to and applied.

While Table 5.1 provides an extensive list of existing and new programmes, policies and institutions, a select few (highlighted in bold) are unpacked in more detail in Chapter Seven. The discussion in Chapter Seven focuses on how these can be developed and implemented by drawing on global cases. Table 7.1 identifies the actors responsible for implementation and the critical steps to be taken in their development and implementation. The required resources, approximate timeframes and potential challenges are also presented in Table 7.1.

Returning to the discussion on existing programmes, policies and institutions, the respondents identified the reasons for their failure. Respondent FG9-P5 noted that implementation was poor; thus, there was need for state-led research to ensure that programmes are better implemented. Respondent FG9-P6 argued that new institutions were not needed; rather existing ones needed good administration and sufficient funding. Respondent FG9-P2 noted that even though programmes to improve poverty alleviation and increase access to education were government-led, these were not tailor-made to meet the needs of communities. Instead, these programmes were uniform, and did not involve the community, and there was corruption in the form of political patronage in their implementation. Respondent KII-P15-JM noted that, although the National Human Rights Commission has an office in Jos, many are not aware of this body and that they can lodge complaints.

Respondent KII-P4-SZ noted that there are very good existing institutions such as the National Orientation Agency and Operation Rainbow in the state but implementation is usually very poor. According to Respondent KII-P8, there was no contact with the government until the creation of the Office of the Special Adviser on Peace-building. The Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development does not have the capacity or presence to support women, there are issues of mismanagement and its impact is not being felt (Respondent FG1-P10). While the state-created body, “Operation Rainbow”, has offered training to the youth and women to build their capacity to engage in income generating schemes and improve their livelihoods, it has not been effective in community early warning and early response as it has not been able to quell the triggers



of conflict, particularly at the lower levels (Respondent FG1-P7). Respondent FG1-P15 noted that the state Electoral Commission needs to increase its presence in the LGA so that people feel part of the solution.

In summary the wide range of challenges and gaps include poor implementation, unmet expectations, weak enforcement of policies and laws, poor administration, insufficient funding, political patronage, corruption, a lack of engagement with the grassroots, mismanagement, insufficient human capacity, poor or little citizen engagement and weak visibility. These challenges and gaps have limited the success of various programmes, policies and institutions and this raises concerns for new ones that need to be set up.

**Table 5.1: Programmes, Policies and Institutions in Plateau state’s Peace-building Framework**

<b>Programmes</b>	<b>Policies</b>	<b>Institutions</b>
<b>Civic education programmes</b>	Policy and legal framework based on meritocracy and not identity in political appointments	<b>Ministry of Peace-building</b>
<b>Peace clubs</b>	<b>Clear separation of the church and state</b>	Human Rights Office in the Department of Education
<b>Compulsory orientation programmes for political leaders</b>	Policies to encourage patriotism and a national identity	<b>Increase the capacity of customary courts</b>
<b>Reform of the police and justice sector</b>	Inclusion of women in all peace efforts and enforce quotas across all sectors and institutions	<b>Active and effective community level early warning and response mechanisms</b>
<b>Compulsory peace education programmes and curriculum</b>	<b>Policy on peace education</b>	<b>Institutions for Peace Education</b>
<b>Radio programmes</b>	Policies that address at risk youth (drug addicts, prostitutes)	Creation of a rotational municipal council in Jos North with representatives from key groups
Maternal and child welfare programmes	<b>Stricter enforcement of anti-corruption laws</b>	Creation of inclusive sports academies and sports tournaments
<b>National reorientation programmes for security actors</b>	Policy of equality through quotas in political appointments and setting up of state committees	<b>Trauma assistance and anger management units</b>
Dismantling of slums	<b>Anti-discrimination policies</b>	Develop a research and think-tank arm
Adequate compensation programmes	Electoral reform policies	Regulatory body to monitor the actions and speeches of religious leaders
<b>Psychological debriefing and trauma-healing programmes</b>	Policy to implement laws on violence against women	Strengthening the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and Social Development
Comprehensive conflict mapping (SWOT) analysis	<b>Formalisation and regularisation of town hall meetings</b>	Systematic structures to build dialogue and community cohesion at the grass-roots level
Political education and sensitisation at all levels	Strengthening the power and efficiency of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA)	Resettlement Commission in every city
<b>Job creation and mentoring programmes for at risk youth</b>		<b>Security Committees at the Ward and Village Level</b>
Strengthening Poverty Alleviation Programmes		Special Tribunal with an investigative arm
Inter-school competitions across the religious divide		Ministry of Religious Affairs
<b>Peace Education Programmes and Curriculum</b>		<b>Collaboration between the Special Adviser on NGOs and the Special Adviser of the Governor on Peace-building</b>
<b>State-wide infrastructural development programmes</b>		<b>Develop alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (ADR)</b>

## **5.2. Peace-building Framework to Prevent Ethno-religious Violence in Plateau state**

Based on the literature review in Chapter Two, the Peace-building Framework for Plateau state will address four components: political, economic, psycho-social and security. The data collected has been categorised under these four components. Furthermore, attention was also given to women and peace-building and cattle rustling as special areas of interest (See Table 5.2). These views and perspectives have fed into the Peace-building Framework (See Table 7.1 to 7.4) and the final recommendations provided in Chapter Eight.

### **5.2.1. Political component**

It was clear from the data collected that the political components of the conflict are very important and central to the success of any peace-building framework. This is in line with Conteh-Morgan's (2005, p.72) view that peace-building can improve human security by transforming the social and political environment that "fosters intolerable inequality, engenders historical grievances, and nurtures adversarial interactions". This lends credence to respondent FG2-P6's view that the crisis has a "political face" due to the power struggles that lead to violent conflict, elections that threaten peace (FG2-P2), and the ways in which the question of political control (FG2-P2) and the ownership of Jos (FG2-P6) are fundamentally contributing to the violence. According to respondent FG1-P9, it is important that the political system is legitimate. This can be achieved by providing infrastructure and investigating attacks on the lives and properties of citizens. Below are some of the key solutions identified by respondents.

#### **a) Strengthening community-based structures**

According to respondent FG2-P1, community-based structures are central to the peace-building framework; thus, it is important that they are strengthened and used more. Respondent FG3-P6 noted that sensitisation programmes, policy changes, budget formulation, implementation, and agenda setting require community involvement and advocacy. A community and grassroots peace-building approach is based on the argument that since war involves and affects most of the masses (grassroots people), it is important that they are involved in peace-building and

efforts to improve human security (Conteh-Morgan, 2005, p.79). According to respondent FG3-P5, the government has to work hand-in-hand with the community and traditional institutions and leaders because they know the community and can effectively sensitize citizens. Respondent KII-P6-JM stated that community-based peace-building committees require government support as they carry out responsibilities that the government is ordinarily supposed to fulfil. The government should finance these grassroots institutions, provide resources like community halls, and equip them through workshops and training. The necessary human, financial and technical resources should be provided to district heads so that they can effectively carry out their mandate and responsibilities.

It was clearly established that community engagement and involvement are important steps in restoring long-term security. According to respondent FG10-P2, community-based, community-enforced and community-engaged security should be at the core of addressing security gaps.

#### **b) Strengthening traditional institutions**

Respondent FG2-P4 stated that traditional institutions should be strengthened and included in policy formulation. The respondent added that these institutions must be free from political interference. Respondent FG2-P1 noted that, in contributing to security, traditional institutions and offices should provide lists of potential recruits for the national army from among their constituents.

While most respondents recognised the importance of traditional leadership institutions, respondent FG4-P7 noted the need for a total overhaul of traditional leaders because many have accepted bribes, neglected early warnings, and abandoned their duties for vices such as drinking and in many cases were not selected based on merit. Respondent FG2-P1 stated that traditional leaders should be held accountable and liable for peace in the areas that they govern and should be removed from office when there is a crisis in their area of jurisdiction. This would make them more willing to identify the perpetrators.

### **c) Resolving indigene and settler claims**

The question of who owns Jos and the claims to ownership have been very contentious and for some, this lies at the very root of the violence in the state. According to respondent FG2-P1, the history of the capital city of Jos has been distorted. Thus, there is a need to establish the true historical facts and to avoid distortions passed down to younger generations. However, the question of who owns the city is a complicated one as different versions of history assert different groups' ownership of the state. A wide range of solutions were offered by respondents with some supporting the removal of indigene versus settler rights, others proposing an accommodation between both groups, and yet others pushing for the protection of indigene or settler rights as the case may be. Some conclusions presented by respondents include:

- i. Politics should be separate from indigeneship. Anyone (regardless of whether they are defined or perceived as a settler or indigene) should be allowed to contest political power (FG2-P1) and whoever wins the election should be allowed to rule since it is only for a specific term (FG10-P2).
- ii. Spaces to accommodate other groups can be created while other groups can still own the state (FG2-P1). In this sense, residence rights could be differentiated from citizenship rights.
- iii. The creation of a municipal council in response to the conflicts related to the ownership and political leadership of Jos North LGA (Respondent FG2-P5). The respondent further suggested that such a municipal council consist of selected representatives of the ethnic groups living in the LGA. Council membership should be on a rotating basis.
- iv. Long-term residents and citizens should be given equal access, but settlers should be encouraged to invest their wealth in the state rather than moving it back to their places of origin (respondent KII-P4-SZ). For respondent FG3-P2, individuals who have established themselves in the state by either owning land or investing in the state should not be removed.
- v. According to respondent KII-P4-SZ, citizens should be educated and informed on the Constitution because their ignorance and lack of knowledge and understanding of it has created the space for manipulation by political actors. Some respondents felt that the issue of indigene/ settler is a national question that should be properly addressed via constitutional review and

amendments. Respondent KII-P2-SZ added that such amendments should be applied across all states of the Republic.

- vi. A return to the status quo where those entitled to indigene certificates are issued with these documents (FG10-P4). Respondent KII-P15-SZ noted that settlers, who mainly came for farming or business purposes should not meddle in the affairs of indigenes like politics or land issues but should concentrate on the economic reasons that brought them to the state. According to some respondents, this is a prerequisite for peace.
- vii. Allowing visitors to contest councillorship or chairmanship positions but not to run for traditional office (respondent KII-P3-NZ).
- viii. Adopting a one-language policy and in doing so help to reduce the cleavages of religion and ethnicity and allow a shift from numerous ethnic groups and languages in the state (respondent KII-P7-NZ).
- ix. The abolition of the indigene-settler dynamic as it is an engine of conflict, and a form of racism and discrimination that violates the Constitution in its entirety (respondent KII-P5-JM).

#### **d) Separating religion from politics**

A few responses were presented on the question of how to deal with the close links between religion and politics in the state. Some respondents called for the secularisation of the state. Most agreed that religion was a personal realm and not for the political arena. Respondent FG2-P1 suggested that the legislature and education should trump religion or ethnicity as religion is a personal philosophy between oneself and God. Respondent FG3-P3 suggested that those who utilise religion and ethnicity during elections should be disqualified. In addition, religious leaders like pastors and imams should be disqualified from running for political office (FG10-P2).

Respondent FG3-P5 offered the view that religion as a platform of mobilisation will lead to extremism. Furthermore, religious leaders should refrain from inciting violence and should not influence members on who to vote for based on ethnicity or religion. While inciting violence is already a long-standing offense in Nigeria, the fact that it is still occurring speaks to the need for stronger and harsher consequences so that leaders of groups would be mindful and desist from such acts.

As reiterated by Respondent FG3-P6, censorship of religious organisations is required to stop giving people a cover to peddle conflict.

**e) Delinking political appointments from ethnic allegiances**

According to respondent FG2-P7, political appointments should not be based on political patronage or political party affiliations.

**f) Fair and Transparent Political Parties**

There was broad consensus on political parties as an important priority. Political parties should provide and popularise their party platforms and agendas, political freedom should be accorded to political actors so that they can contest elections, there should be internal democracy within political parties, such that party leadership is barred from imposing candidates, and independent candidates should be encouraged (Respondent FG2-P1). Respondent FG2-P7 suggested that political parties should be mobilised around ideology and not ethnicity or religion. Opposition parties should therefore focus on poverty eradication and equity instead of engaging in ethnic or religious attacks against the party in power (Respondent FG2-P7).

**g) Electoral reform**

According to respondent FG3-P6, there is a need for major electoral reform so that popular consent characterises the election process and pressures candidates to be accountable to the people. Respondent KII-P15-JM noted the need to ensure election transparency, credibility and fairness. There is also a need to strengthen confidence in the election process (respondent FG3-P6). Respondent FG3-P3 noted that the government should provide an enabling environment for successful elections by emphasising civic education. Conflict will be greatly reduced when people do not vote according to ethnic or religious affiliations (respondent KII-P2-SZ). These views allude to the fact that the existing policies and rules surrounding elections need to be enforced and the police and other law enforcement agencies need to be strengthened to become more effective in enforcing them.

#### **h) Increasing the participation of all groups in policy-making**

Most respondents supported the view that the public participation of all groups in the political process was paramount. In order to achieve this, the following points were raised:

- i. Citizens need to understand the government's policy direction, focus and priority areas (FG3-P6). Each LGA has an information unit saddled with the responsibility of sharing information and educating the communities about government programmes; however, there is a funding gap. Funding should be provided to these units and community representatives should be held accountable if information is not provided.
- ii. Voter education must be provided to all citizens.
- iii. Conscious efforts must be made to include already disenfranchised groups like women, children, men, the aged, and the physically challenged by factoring their interests into all policies and government actions (FG3-P3). Respondent FG2-P1 suggested that proportional representation should be adopted and the legislature should be "coloured" so that various groups like the disabled are represented and can have their say in the legislative process.
- iv. The fact that individuals of Berom origin (the same ethnic group as the Governor of the state) hold most positions in government needs to be addressed to ensure equal representation of groups (respondent KII-P4-NZ).

#### **i) Protection of the rights of all groups**

Plateau state is diverse with various ethnic groups calling it home. A point of convergence for many respondents was that peace and stability will only be achieved when the interests of ethnic and religious groups are protected and they are treated equally by the state. According to respondent KII-P15, not all ethnic groups can be on an equal footing since they are numerically different, however inequality can exist in terms of how groups are treated by government. Although this is not an easy task, the state must show through words and action that it is committed and active in protecting all, not some or its interests. In achieving this, it must:



- i. Listen to the specific demands of all groups rather than specific associations and break all links with ethnic umbrella associations.
- ii. Bring the population together and engage with all of them on what the common priorities and needs are in their areas and how solutions can be provided (FG3-P3). Needs should be identified based on community demands.
- iii. Decentralise development, distribute amenities on an equal basis, impose the death penalty as the punishment for corruption, and ensure a police and military presence across the state and in villages. Respondent KII-P6-JM identified the provision of basic needs and social amenities to social groups as inherently protecting the rights of minorities.
- iv. Address allegations that the governor is developing only Du and the Berom land. These acts would not feature in a situation where the government respects all ethnic groups and gives equal opportunities to all Plateau citizens and all religious and ethnic groups (respondent KII-P2-SZ).

**j) Strengthening the Human Rights Commission**

While there is a National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and it has an office in Plateau state, some respondents questioned its relevance and effectiveness. This led to a discussion on the idea of a Human Rights Commission for Plateau state with the specific mandate of focusing on the violence in the state. Some welcomed this idea while others questioned its usefulness.

Respondent KII-P5-JM argued that a state HRC is needed to investigate violations and oversee the conduct of military and law enforcement personnel. While respondent FG10-P4 noted that the HRC is needed to investigate violations, the respondent added that its work should not favour various groups. Respondent KII-P4-NZ stated that citizens need to be sensitised about the HRC, its services, location and availability. Respondent KII-P7-NZ added that the government should adopt a hands-off approach to the HRC because the feeling among people is that once the government is involved in it, it will not work. Respondent KII-P5-JM proposed that members of the commission should be selected based on merit and that it should be adequately representative of religion and ethnicity.

### **k) Creating a Truth and Reconciliation Commission**

There were varying views on the need for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), with some respondents calling for it while others stated that it was not necessary. Respondent KII-JM noted that the TRC should be a precursor to forgiveness, not judgement, after which the government should build trust by treating all communities and groups fairly and inclusively by providing basic needs and infrastructure. For respondent FG10-P2, the TRC is necessary because sharing experiences goes a long way in resolving a situation. Exposing the public to the barbaric nature of the conflict would offer a curative solution, providing psychological transformation and healing, and propelling change.

For respondent KII-P5-JM, a TRC would be cathartic as the objective is not primarily retributive but compensatory justice. The government should only provide funding; pressure groups can nominate members of this commission, and its reports and recommendations should be dealt with by incorporating non-criminal elements and forwarding criminal elements to the relevant security agencies for further investigation or criminal action (FG10-P2). Respondent FG10-P3 commented that a TRC is not part of Nigerian culture<sup>46</sup>; funds should rather be diverted to healing trauma. This respondent noted that genuine love could only be achieved through trauma assistance units, not through a TRC.

### **5.2.2. Economic component**

Most respondents agreed that the economic component of the peace-building framework mainly has to do with development and that development will limit the need to resort to conflict. The merging of development and peace-building is also established in the UN Nations High-level Panel Report (HLP, 2004). The following recommendations emerged from the field:

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<sup>46</sup> According to respondent FG10-P3, Islam does not see a TRC as necessary as confession is not an attribute of Islam and northerners are mostly introverts, thus a TRC would not succeed. A TRC is centred on Christian ideas like confession. The introduction of a TRC “by accident” would require that all groups tolerate it.

**a) Redesigning settlements**

According to respondent FG2-P2, a framework for redesigning settlement patterns should be applied to the city of Jos, as there is a relationship between city planning and peace. The respondent noted that slums are a problem in any society due to high levels of drugs and prostitution, and gave the example of an area in Jos known as *Filin Satan* (translated as “Satan’s field”) where drug addicts, prostitutes and alcoholics reside and where occasional violence has erupted. Government should allocate land to decongest the city centre and dismantle slums (FG2-P2; FG2-P1). Respondent FG2-P1 proposed that compensation be paid for properties when groups have to relocate, and that they be resettled comfortably and in safe areas.

**b) Creating inter-religious economic ventures**

Inter-religious business and economic ventures should be encouraged. Respondent FG2-P5 cited the example of the organisation <<Inner Peace>> which brings Christian and Muslim women together to work.

**c) Addressing the needs of the youth**

Most respondents reiterated the need to focus on and engage with the youth as key stakeholders in the conflict, particularly because they are mobilised and used for violent conflict. The following recommendations were made:

- i. To address idleness, the state must address the problem of *almajiris* (street children) as they are being mobilised into armies (respondent FG2-P1). In addition, the state should multiply efforts and increase resources for job creation ventures for the youth, a view widely shared among respondents. The employment of university graduates should be based on merit in order to reduce their availability to be used as conflict peddlers (respondent KII-P12-SZ). The youth should also be encouraged and empowered to participate in farming as it remains a profitable sector (respondent KII-P8).
- ii. Educational institutions should be standardised to ensure that quality education is provided to students from primary to tertiary institutions and sub-standard schools should be closed (respondent FG10-P3). As noted by Léonce (2005, p.10), the goal of an education system is to develop human capital, which involves “achieving the highest

enrolment ratios or mass literacy and (ii) providing the highest quality of education or sophistication”. Based on these views, education and training is integral to transforming the conflict in Plateau state.

- iii. Politicians should refrain from providing weapons to young people so that they can kill or intimidate people during elections (respondent KII-P7-SZ).

#### **d) Decentralising development**

Many of the respondents felt that the government has become too centralised in its approach, focusing its development projects on major towns and the capital city of Jos while neglecting other parts of the state. This has resulted in much dissatisfaction, as people feel disenfranchised by the state.

- i. As a solution, respondent KII-P12-SZ recommended that the state engage with the grassroots, particularly in identifying their needs before policies are implemented and projects are conceived. Projects must also be supervised.
- ii. Most respondents reiterated that the state should build infrastructure (roads, schools) and provide resources (water, electricity) across communities regardless of the identities of the groups residing in an area. They stated that this would help to address uneven development across the state especially as these are needs common to humanity, irrespective of identity.

#### **e) Victim compensation**

The respondents shared the view that victim compensation is unrealistic and difficult to achieve due to the high costs involved. Compensation could therefore be provided in the following forms:

- i. Respondent KII-P6-JM reiterated that the government should provide relief and assistance to help victims restart their lives. In cases where resettlement is required, the government should provide victims with food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and education before the full process of re-settlement is completed. For respondent KII-P15-JM, the

state should only help with some relief assistance, skills and vocational training, and provide employment opportunities.

- ii. Compensation does not have to be financial (respondent FG10-P4) and could involve creating the space to show empathy (FG10-P4) or mutual love (respondent FG10-P3).
- iii. Other forms of compensation could include building religious institutions (churches and mosques) in Muslim and Christian dominated areas, respectively (respondent FG10-P3).
- iv. Compensation could be in the form of assisting groups to relocate and resettle (FG10-P2).
- v. Respondent FG10-P4 noted that it would be a challenge to differentiate between genuine/real claims and fake claims. Respondent KII-P5-SZ noted that the process of handing out relief materials should not be politicised. According to respondent KII-P7-NZ, the government should be removed from any discussions on compensation as it already provides social amenities, security and education.

**f) Provide accessible roads**

Accessible roads must be created to allow farmers to transport their goods and to ensure that security actors can gain access to these areas when required (KII-P8-SZ). Inaccessible roads are a challenge even during times of peace as farmers are not able to access fertilizers or farm machinery. Farm produce has perished because there are no good roads to transport it to market especially during the raining season. If the structural causes of violence like poverty are to be addressed, an issue such as accessible roads is important and should be prioritised.

**g) Develop partnerships with the private sector**

The state should collaborate with other funding institutions like the World Bank to develop and implement community projects, which can build the capacity of the youth while constructing much needed infrastructure like roads, wells and boreholes (respondent KII-P6-JM). Furthermore, it should collaborate and exchange information and personnel with actors from Korea, China and Dubai, in order to learn methods and avenues through which communities can develop and can convert state endowments to increase resources (respondent FG10-P3).

Respondent FG10-P2 commented that the government should have no business in the economic sector and that it should rather be private sector driven; however, it can liaise with the private sector and provide an environment in which it can flourish.

**h) Reinstate markets and rebuild integrated markets**

A few respondents noted that the main market, once the largest market in Jos that served most of the state should be rebuilt to encourage economic activity. Furthermore, the segregation of markets should be done away with. For example, the satellite market in Rukuba should be open to members of the Hausa-Fulani community and new markets should be built for Muslim dominated areas like Angwan Rogo and Bauchi Road (respondent FG10-P5).

**i) Inculcate a culture of meritocracy and equality**

When it comes to scholarships, employment and admission to educational institutions, the focus should be on merit and competence rather than identity (respondent KII-P6-SZ). Respondent FG3-P1 noted that admission is currently granted based on one's name (which is a good way of establishing one's ethnic or religious background). All groups, whether settler or indigene should have the right and opportunity to be employed by the state (respondent FG10-P3). In a meritocracy and an open society, employment by state agencies should be determined by who scores the highest (respondent KII-P5). This is line with Aitken's (2007, p.263) view that ethnic quotas should not be included in constitutional arrangements in order to avoid the institutionalisation of ethnicity in post-conflict situations.

Rights should be based on residency and not on indigene versus settler dynamics; there should be equal access to political positions, education and work opportunities and all residents should pay the same amount of tax (respondent KII-P4-SZ).

### **5.2.3. Psycho-Social component**

For many respondents, the psycho-social impacts of the conflict have been the most neglected and the least addressed by the state. Key points emerged on how these can be prioritised and addressed:

#### **a) Build coexistence**

Many respondents regarded building coexistence as an important part of peace-building. According to respondent FG3-P2, coexistence existed amongst earlier inhabitants of the state; no one was regarded as an enemy and religion or ethnicity did not define how one interacted with or accommodated others. There is therefore a need to change mind-sets and orientations in order to build coexistence (respondent FG2-P6).

#### **b) Develop a culture of non-violence**

The respondents offered the following suggestions on how to achieve a culture of non-violence in Plateau state:

- i. Respondent FG2-P6 noted that this would require reform of the security sector so that it protects and promotes the rights of individuals. The respondent added that as long as citizens have to take their security into their hands and the culture of impunity is not abolished, a culture of violence would persist.
- ii. Psychological debriefing programmes for the youth would assist in addressing the culture of violence (respondent FG2-P1).
- iii. Respondent FG2-P1 suggested that the practice or use of violence should be punished in order to limit its use.
- iv. Respondent FG3-P1 noted that violence would only bring about more violence in the community and suggested state education programmes to instil a culture of non-violence. Such programmes would enlighten people on the best ways to get their views across peacefully. Elisabeth (2005, p. 904-905) argues that schools and the curriculum are both important elements in the “construction, mobilization and politicisation of ethnic divisiveness”. If it can do this, it can also rebuild divided societies.

- v. A few respondents agreed that public enlightenment programmes could be used to encourage the public to embrace non-violence and refrain from violence. The state can benefit from already existing educational programmes led by civil society organisations.

**c) Support for trauma healing**

Most respondents regarded trauma healing as extremely important even though some time has passed since most of the violent clashes. Leatherman (2007, p.64) writes that the end of violent conflict does not signal the end of the horror of the conflict as individuals; particularly women and children have to live with the physical and emotional trauma of their injuries. Respondent FG3-P3 pointed out that research has shown that people do not let go of the past and that trauma contributes to recurring violence, while respondent KII-P6-JM noted that this is the most neglected aspect by the government. Respondent FG3-P3 further noted that it is important that victims of trauma are identified and are taken through a healing process where they accept the past, reconcile and forgive.

Some respondents welcomed the use of trauma assistance units. However, respondent FG10-P1 noted that these units should not be partisan or biased towards a specific group, and made available at the LGA, while maintaining a head office in the capital city of Jos. There was a shared view that professionals in trauma support and NGOs, rather than the state, should manage these units. According to respondent FG3-P3, the role of the state should be limited to a financial role to cover aspects like training personnel. Respondent KII-P6-JM highlighted the fact that there are professionals such as social workers, psychologists, sociologists, doctors and medical personnel who can counsel and advise traumatised victims. Representatives of the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), CSO, Nigeria Medical Association (NMA), and religious and non-religious organisations should also be involved in these units, and be well coordinated. Designated hospitals in each of the state senatorial zones should be equipped with doctors and nurses to handle trauma management and there should be trauma experts in each LGA (respondent KII-P24-JM).



Respondent KII-P6-JM suggested that the state should create and fund a department that focuses on trauma so that victims are properly taken care of. Respondent KII-P7-NZ noted that private groups could provide trauma assistance, as there is currently much dependence on the state for financial support.

**d) Rehabilitation**

Respondent KII-P1-NZ noted that the most urgent priority in the state was to rehabilitate victims psychologically and economically. Psychological rehabilitation means identifying whom they are, and providing them with access to resources for individual rehabilitation, while engaging them in economic activities as compensation for their material loss. However, it is feared that the involvement of the state will lead to a biased and partisan process; and the fact that it is a culprit in the violence requires that it is not involved in rehabilitation (respondent FG10-P1).

**e) Decentralise dialogue structures and processes**

There was a widely shared view that inter-religious and inter-ethnic dialogue should engage the grassroots and must refrain from being elitist. Dialogue efforts should take place at local government, district, ward and village levels and not just in the capital city of Jos. There is a need for workshops at community level on good neighbourliness. According to respondent KII-P7-JM, there is a need to create and inform citizens of dialogue centres across the state where they seek professional assistance in resolving conflict. The respondent added that the state was working hand in hand with the Catholic Church to expand this initiative, as only one centre existed in the state.

**f) Instil a culture of forgiveness and tolerance**

Trauma healing should be provided concurrently with the idea of forgiveness particularly at the grassroots level (respondent KII-P2-SZ). All stakeholders including women, elders, the youth and traditional rulers must undergo this value reorientation process. Religious leaders should promote a culture of forgiveness among their congregations (respondent FG10-P2). Initiatives to build tolerance are required to integrate Christians and Muslims in the state (respondent KII-P2-SZ).

**g) Encourage inter-ethnic and inter-religious engagements**

In order to bridge social divides, respondent FG10-P5 proposed that inter-marriage should be encouraged, parents should be discouraged from sending their children to schools that cater for a specific religion, and churches and mosques should be built in Muslim and Christian areas, respectively. In shifting from segregation to inclusivity, adequate security should be provided in both Christian and Muslim areas (respondent FG10-P5).

**h) Build a culture of allegiance to the state rather than identity**

Respondent FG10-P3 felt that there should be a focus on building a Plateau culture, which binds all groups together and is unique to the state. In developing such a culture, commonalities should be explored. For respondent FG10-P2, a Plateau state culture would be secular and cosmopolitan in nature, where opportunities are based on merit and what one contributes.

**5.2.4. Security component**

The data collected showed that security is fundamental to limiting direct violence and creating an environment for structural and developmental reforms. Respondents affirmed the need for reform of the security sector as an urgent and critical priority in turning around the conflict environment and reversing the climate of impunity and fear in the state. According to respondent KII-P1-NZ, there are high levels of impunity; certain people have been arrested but no action has been taken against them. Some individuals publicly brag about their role in the violence.

Respondent KII-P7-SZ called for a total overhaul of the security sector by the state. Respondent FG2-P1 stated that in areas like Angwan Rogo (a Muslim dominated area), the police could not effect arrests and in some cases police have removed their uniforms immediately a crisis breaks out as they are not equipped to handle this form of violence. This shows that the police are not equipped to handle a sudden outbreak of violence and cannot be relied on to ensure citizens' security.

Insecurity is not restricted to violent attacks and killings between groups. Crime rates have also increased particularly in Barkin Ladi where non-indigenes are the main

targets (respondent KII-P3-NZ). Security actors must address crime. In order to understand the motivation and actions of security officials in the state, respondent FG10-P5 distinguished between three types of security officers in Plateau state: ethno-religious security officers, patriotic security officers, and materialistic security officers. According to respondent FG10-P5, ethno-religious security officers were enlisted through religious and political channels; they are thus biased and cannot perform effectively. Materialistic security officers enrolled in security outfits to make money and in some instances collaborate with robbers to make profit, while patriotic security officers are enrolled through the right systems and processes. Clearly, the first and second types of security officers pose a major threat to the effectiveness of the security sector as a whole as their identity or desire for wealth guides their actions and interactions with the public.

According to respondent FG2-P1, the relationship between the military and the Fulani is such that the Fulani carry weapons with the support of the military and they have been known to rear cattle for soldiers. This clearly shows the bias and lack of neutrality on the part of the military. This does not suggest, however, that all military personnel side with the Fulani. Nonetheless, this alliance has resulted in indigenes not having confidence in the military (respondent, KII-P3- NZ). Due to these factors, citizen trust and confidence in security actors is either waning or is non-existent (KII-P3-NZ; KII-P7-SZ). The respondents made the following suggestions:

**a) Investigations into the conduct of security forces**

Many respondents argued that there should be an immediate investigation into the role of security forces, particularly the military, in killing innocent civilians. The respondents commented that the military, tasked with protecting the population, has assisted armed groups and even been directly involved in the violence requires. The state should not only publicly denouncement such behaviour, but take action to prevent or punish it.

Respondent KII-P6-JM noted that the ill-treatment of innocent civilians by the security sector should be punished, and when caught red-handed killing civilians, they should be prosecuted. Security actors should also refrain from harassing innocent civilians (respondent KII-P7-NZ). Their superiors need to constantly

monitor their actions to ensure they focus on citizen protection and are not violating human rights (respondent KII-7-NZ). This requires a shift towards the idea that security is not just a political or military idea but one of freedom “from those elements which threaten one's existence in any way” (Harbottle, 2004, p.193). In order to do away with bad elements in the security sector and rebuild citizens’ trust, investigations should be conducted to determine how rifles and police uniforms are obtained and used to attack communities (respondent KII-P2-SZ).

#### **b) Strengthen community-based security groups**

According to respondent FG2-P1, community-based security groups, also known as vigilante groups, must be strengthened since their communities establish them and residents trust them. The respondent also noted that communities that truly desire peace are willing to give up perpetrators. While it seems that there is widespread support for vigilante groups, research has shown that vigilantism in Nigeria is not always helpful, particularly in situations where these groups engage in violence, undermine the rule of law, and protect specific state, political or ethnic interests. Governors and local leaders are known to use vigilante groups and youth associations to promote their own agenda (Babawale, 2002, p. 3-5). These vigilante groups could also be aligned along the lines of religion, ethnicity, and other common identities (Nolte, 2004, p.61), which could be problematic as they carry out violent acts against others of a different identity group. The following views were put forward:

- i. Respondent KII-P15-JM proposed that retired security personnel be recruited for community-based vigilante groups, trained, and be remunerated for effective service to their communities.
- ii. According to respondent FG2-P5, community vigilante groups want peace in their communities even though they are sometimes biased and ignorant. Thus, the state can step in to provide training which would help members of groups to overcome their ignorance and bias.
- iii. Including the youth in security by training them to respond actively to violent conflict would be effective because they know and can identify visitors and perpetrators in their communities (respondent KII-P7-NZ).
- iv. Respondent FG3-P6 highlighted the benefits of structured community policing units while noting that the state security outfit, *Operation*

*Rainbow*, had become elitist and would fail to meet community-policing objectives. Respondent FG2-P2 suggested that there should be a blend between the military (who oversee official roadblocks) and vigilante community initiatives (that oversee unofficial roadblocks). This will require training to build synergy between the groups (FG2-P2). In addition, there is a need for joint training for vigilante groups across the various divides (respondent FG2-P5).

- v. Respondent KII-P6-JM stated that security agencies should work with communities to set up security committees where they will consult each other on proper security measures.

**c) Timely and publicised judicial processes**

There was consensus among the respondents that justice must be dispensed as and when due. Offenders should face justice in a timely manner, evidence must be provided and efforts should be stepped up to stop the imprisonment of innocent individuals (who in many cases have no funds to obtain legal representation). Respondent KII-P7-NZ noted that guilty offenders should be punished irrespective of status, religion or ethnic affiliation. In addition, there needs to be more support to develop investigative mechanisms in the justice system to provide timely information on the actions of perpetrators of violence. This will ensure that innocent individuals are released instead of being held indefinitely for crimes they did not commit. Personnel in these investigative roles must refrain from being partisan or biased. A few respondents noted that perpetrators are prosecuted outside the state, and the judicial processes are not publicised. Respondent KII-P7-NZ suggested that perpetrators should be tried in the state where they committed the crime.

**d) Create alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (ADRMS)**

Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms (ADRMs) are needed to fill the gap between the courts and the people. ADR courts should be set up in police stations, and ADR training should be made available to police, making them the first point of legal resort (respondent KII-P5-JM). This would contribute to the achievement of rapid and timely justice.

**e) Streamline and coordinate all security actors**

Security agencies should be streamlined under a common framework. This will reduce the duplication of roles within the security sector (State Security Service, Civil Defence, Road Safety and others) and will limit each arm from benefitting financially from bribes (respondent FG2-P1).

**f) Create more safe zones**

It was agreed that people should be protected before and particularly during the conflict to avoid the loss of life. This can be achieved by rapidly transporting them to military barracks and police stations (FG10-P3), and by building more security barracks and neutral points near volatile areas (FG2-P1) so that individuals can access these points, especially during violent clashes.

**g) Financial compensation for military personnel**

There needs to be adequate compensation for military personnel, which will inhibit them from engaging in terrorist activities (FG2-P1), or economically benefitting from the violence. Furthermore, respondent KII-P3–NZ noted that the security actors should be rotated on a regular basis because after they have been stationed in a particular place for some time, they are easily bought off. A few respondents noted that security officials are benefitting from the conflict due to the allowances that they are paid; according to respondent FG10-P2, they are getting rich as a result of the conflict situation.

**h) Decentralised and accountable security**

Two respondents from the southern Zone (KII-P3; KII-P8) alluded to the fact that citizens are left to fight and defend themselves with no state security support to prevent violence or defend villages. The situation was described as “organised crime” by respondent KII-P3-SZ as traditional leaders, police and politicians benefit from the wealth obtained from rustled cattle. People’s distress calls need to be rapidly responded to (respondent KII- P10-CZ); thus security must be decentralised to respond to security threats particularly in the LGA and villages. Respondent KII-P8-SZ noted that farmers could not stay on their farms because of fear of attacks. Decentralised security must go hand-in-hand with creating accessible roads to these areas as the poor state of these roads hampers security

interventions. Security forums, which have been created at the zonal level, should be created and established at ward and village levels (respondent KII-P8-JM).

**i) Curb the sale and transfer of arms and drugs**

A strong security response is required at local government level to curb the presence of guns by arresting and imprisoning those responsible for their sale. Security actors must work closely with traditional institutions and customs and immigration should step up its efforts at the borders to stop these arms from entering the state (KII-P15-SZ). Surveillance should be mounted at national borders and across states in Nigeria to control the inflow of arms and drugs. Furthermore, there is a need for stricter measures against drug and arms traffickers when arrested (respondent KII-P8-SZ). Laws should be passed that allow the apprehension of both buyer and seller and individual possession of guns should be prohibited (respondent KII-P4-NZ).

Investigations and intelligence are required to track the networks of those selling illicit drugs (respondent FG10-P3). For respondent KII-P9-JM, unemployment is not the reason why the youth are engaged in killing; drugs are to blame, as they have had an adverse effect on the youth even causing mental problems. According to respondent KII-P4-JM, the government should withdraw drugs used for self-medication like cocaine and codeine.

**j) Disarmament**

The state should set up a disarmament scheme whereby individuals are given amnesty and other incentives for handing in non-registered guns (respondent KII-P4-JM). For respondent KII-P4-JM, it is important that the taking away of guns go hand-in-hand with the provision of security. There should also be no bias and no one should be above the law in these disarmament efforts (respondent KII-P8-SZ).

**k) Reduce the polarisation of security personnel**

The respondents noted that the polarisation of security personnel along religious and ethnic lines should be addressed. This can be achieved by means of value reorientation and creating awareness among security personnel. Respondent KII-P15-JM noted the need to inculcate in security personnel that their primary focus is national unity and the maintenance of law and order. Furthermore, recruitment

processes should be based on merit and equality in the training and composition of personnel rather than on personal connections (respondent KII-P4-NZ). Community leaders should also be made responsible for checking the excesses and biases of security actors in their communities (respondent FG10-P5).

What came out strongly in most FGD and KII was that ethnicity and religion have been used to define the actors and the violent conflict in general. According to respondent FG2-P1, the fact that there are ethnic and religious armies has removed any loyalty to the state as an institution; this needs to be addressed.

#### **l) Capacity development**

The police need to be strengthened with training and resources in how to deal with mob violence and the sudden outbreak of violence. Because they are ill-equipped, they run away when violence suddenly erupts (respondent KII-P7-SZ). According to respondent KII-P6-JM, security personnel with clean records should be provided with vehicles, communication gadgets, and logistics to ensure a rapid response. Furthermore, these vehicles should be fuelled and maintained at all times. There needs to be more recruitment and training of security personnel as there is not enough staff to manage the population (respondent KII-P5-JM).

#### **(m) A code of conduct for security actors**

Respondent FG9-P2 noted that there is no code of conduct for the police and security officials. As a result, they shoot randomly and most of the deaths during violent clashes are due to police bullets (FG9-P2). They must be made aware of procedures and follow them. Respondent FG-P2 argued that, instead of setting up checkpoints where security agencies intercept weapons, they mete out corporal punishment or constantly threaten citizens.

### **5.2.5. Special Areas of Interest**

#### **a) A Peace-building Framework and Women**

There was consensus that while women have been victims of the conflict, they have also been involved in the violence.



Women have been victimised in various ways since the episodes of violence in Plateau state began. Respondents noted that women are victims of the conflict when their breadwinners are killed. Respondent KII-P9-JM noted that women have suffered premature delivery of their babies due to the stress caused by the crisis. Their husbands flee in the midst of violent clashes or the families of their deceased husbands do not want to support them (respondent FG4-P3). According to the respondents, rape, sexual slavery, blame for their husbands' deaths, and intimidation of both single and married women by security personnel are some of the ways women have become victimised.

Women have also been involved in promoting peace through marches to publicly denounce the conflict (respondent FG4-P4). As mothers, women have also played a major role in tracking the whereabouts of their children and in influencing them to refrain from using violence (respondent KII-P3-NZ). Respondent KII-P4-JM stated that women have an important role to play in passing down an understanding of a Nigerian identity and Nigerian citizenship to their children. According to respondent KII-P6-JM, women have benefited from state support in the form of relief material in state-created camps, skills development initiatives and grants to start small businesses.

Respondents offered the following suggestions how a peace-building framework can address the needs of women:

**i. Protection**

Protecting women requires that the state should provide them with justice and ensure that conflict is prevented (respondent FG10-P3). This means avoiding crises (respondent FG10-P4). Respondent KII-P5-SZ argued that job creation and skills acquisition would go a long way in protecting women.

**ii. Participation**

Women should be involved in policy formulation, implementation and monitoring (respondent KII-P7-SZ). Respondent KII-P2-SZ stated that women should be included in policy formulation and peace processes so that their views

and special needs are taken into account. The selection of these women should be based on merit and adequate representation without any form of discrimination based on religion or ethnicity. Women should also be given leadership positions in state committees.

### **iii. Empowerment**

Respondent KII-P7-SZ stated that compensation for victims should place more emphasis on women. Respondent KII-P12-SZ commented that widows should be supported in educating their children. According to respondent KII-P24-JM, opportunities should be created for widows to prevent them from becoming radicalised. While some efforts by the state have led to the training and gainful employment of women, according to respondent KII-P24-JM, more needs to be done to reach larger numbers.

### **b) Cattle Rustling**

Cattle rustling and destruction of farmland by indigenous farmers and Fulani herdsmen respectively have been another dimension of the ethno-religious violence in Plateau state. Wase LGA provides a case study of cattle rustling between the Tarok (indigenes) and Fulani (non-indigenes). According to respondent KII-P8-SZ, the Tarok areas have been invaded, they have been attacked, their houses have been burnt and produce has been stolen from their farms while the Fulani allow their cattle to graze on their farms. The Tarok retaliate through cattle rustling, as cattle are of immense value to the Fulani, who do not have houses and farms due to their nomadic lifestyle.

The solution is to empower and strengthen traditional institutions so that they can identify and punish criminals. Respondent KII-P15-SZ commented that the state should place responsibility on the leaders of groups like the Ardos and the Tarok for conflict in the areas that they control. Peace will be achieved as leaders will ensure their constituents are accountable. According to respondent KII-P8, traditional rulers know their constituents. The respondents added that the youth who mainly carry out cattle rustling are willing to listen to traditional leaders, who can pressure them to desist from violence. According to respondent KII-P7-NZ, cattle farmers should be given empty land to graze their cattle so that they do not

destroy farmlands. Respondent KII-P8-JM noted that a distinction needs to be made between international and local grazers and that grazing reserves and the creation of punitive laws can help to stop cattle raiding.

Table 5.2 below provides a summary of the aforementioned findings and data. As noted at the start of section 5.2, these findings fed into the final recommendations for action in Chapter Eight and into the Peace-building Framework in Table 7.1.

**Table 5.2: Political, Economic Psycho-social and Security components of peace-building in Plateau state**

<b>Political</b>	<b>Economic</b>	<b>Psycho-social</b>	<b>Security</b>	<b>Special Areas</b>
Strengthening community-based structures	Redesigning settlements	Build coexistence	Investigations into the conduct of security forces	<b>Women</b>
Strengthening traditional institutions	Creating inter-religious economic ventures	Develop a culture of non-violence	Strengthen community-based security groups	Protection
Settling disputes over political ownership of Jos	Addressing the needs of the youth	Support for trauma healing	Timely and publicised judicial processes	Participation
Separating religion from politics	Decentralize development	Rehabilitation	Create alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (ADRMS)	Empowerment
Delinking political appointments from ethnic allegiances	Victim compensation	Decentralize dialogue structures and processes	Streamline and coordinate all security actors	<b>Cattle Rustling</b>
Fair and transparent political parties	Provide accessible roads	Instil a culture of forgiveness and tolerance	Create more safe zones	Empower and strengthen traditional institutions
Electoral reform	Develop partnerships with the private sector	Encourage interethnic and inter-religious engagements	Financial compensation for military personnel	Grazing land for cattle rearers
Increasing the participation of all groups in policymaking	Reinstate markets and rebuild integrated markets	Build a culture of allegiance to the state rather than identity	Decentralised and accountable security	Creation of punitive laws
Protecting the rights of all groups	Inculcate a culture of meritocracy and equality		Curb the sale and transfer of arms and drugs	
Strengthening the Human Rights Commission	Replace indigene with residence rights		Disarmament initiatives	
Creating a Truth and Reconciliation Commission			Reduce polarisation of security personnel	
			Capacity development for security actors	

## **CHAPTER SIX: DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS – THE STATE AND PEACE-BUILDING**

In addition to the data collected on the components of a peace-building framework (see Chapter Five), data was obtained on the state and its contribution to preventing ethno-religious violence in Plateau state and in positively transforming the conflict. This chapter presents and analyses the data on views and perceptions on the state's role in peace-building in Plateau state, reviews the state capacities (or lack thereof) for peace-building and conflict transformation and outlines the limitations and challenges.

### **6.1. Existing State Capacities for Peace-building and Conflict Transformation**

Broadly composed of political institutions and political elites, the state plays a major role in peace-building. It is for this reason that Aitken (2007, p.253) writes that in terms of peace-building, political institutions will “enable tensions to be managed, prevent a return to violence and create the conditions for sustainable peace... and rests on the acceptance by the population of the legitimacy of the system.” Wallenstein (2007, p.11) defines a good state as one which can “constitute a local capacity to deal with conflict and be an expression of a “conflict carrying society”. Wallenstein (2007, p.11) adds that the decline of state institutions raises the notion that states are “not merely law-and-order providers, but also bestow an element of redress, even justice”. In the case of Plateau state, political institutions and actors must have the capacity to prevent further conflict by managing tensions before they become full-blown violence, and providing the ingredients for peace in the long-term. This also means that it is accepted as legitimate across the state, it addresses systems of injustices and ensures security and order.

There was consensus amongst most respondents that the state has the capacity to prevent and sustainably transform the ethnic and religious violent conflicts in the state. This capacity takes the form of security personnel in the capital city and its environs, the weapons carried by security officers, the facilities and resources it uses to organize dialogue sessions, and its power to influence or enforce certain decisions. Furthermore, the state has the power to make laws and mete out justice in a rapid and timely manner. For many the state has sufficient funds to provide basic infrastructure to every LGA

and villages without any special considerations since water, roads, electricity, health, clinics and hospitals are major needs of all humankind. However, respondents noted that it has failed to do so due to the siphoning of funds to private pockets.

Respondent KII-P15-JM noted that the state has conducted advocacy programmes, workshops and conferences under the office of the Special Adviser to the Governor on Peace-building and its Operation Rainbow project has been successful in creating neighbourhood watch units (respondent KII-P2-SZ). The respondents noted that the state has also created the Inter-Religious Council, which has done much work in organising inter-religious dialogues between Christians and Muslims. The Special Adviser to the Governor on Peace-building has held communal celebrations where Christians and Muslims youth come together under the same roof during their respective religious celebrations. In the views of respondent KII-P7-NZ, the state-sponsored dialogue sessions and programmes have been successful in changing the negative views groups have of each other while underlining the need to accommodate each other.

Other respondents noted the state's efforts in building peace in Plateau state. For respondent KII-P1-SZ, the state provides security but on a temporary basis and it does not provide security for all. The respondent added that security exists at people's residences, but not on the way to them; security cannot cover all areas. Respondents also noted that violence had been eradicated in the state except in some LGA like Riyom. Respondent KII-P8 stated that Muslims hated the government but this changed to positive perceptions of the state after it allocated tricycles and buses fairly. According to Respondent KII-P8, the government is closer to the people as the Office of the Special Adviser on Peace-building is located at a central location where the youth can access it. In this new location, youth from highly tense areas have been brought together and have confessed their actions and made peace with one another. A wide range of joint initiatives has been conducted. Relations have improved as Christians and Muslims are invited to have breakfast together; these gatherings are organised by the Office of the Special Adviser for Peace-building.

According to respondent KII-P2-SZ, while the government has organised seminars, workshops, sporting activities, and value reorientation and reached out to affected

communities by providing relief materials, these have reduced but not transformed the conflict. The state has been successful in reducing violence by deploying the police and military forces, and has engaged in peace talks and dialogue (respondent KII-P15-SZ); however, this is the sum total of its efforts. Respondent FG4-P1 argued that the state is seen as enforcing peace but not doing what is required to prevent conflict. Respondent KII-P8-SZ noted that the Office of the Special Adviser has not been effective because its workshops do not engage the grassroots (the real targets of the violence) and are only held in the capital city of Jos. Respondent KII-P7-SZ argued that the state did not have the capacity to prevent conflict. For this respondent, capacity meant that the justice and security sectors are viable and performing their constitutionally assigned roles. Incapacity is evident in the failure to provide justice and the inferior weapons and logistics equipment used by the security sector.

In understanding the gaps in state capacity, most respondents cited a lack of political will, high levels of corruption and partisan sentiments as reasons for the state's failure to sustainably transform the conflicts. Respondent FG9-P2 noted that the state has not provided an equitable distribution of social amenities, as Muslim communities have not felt its impact. Until recently, refuse was not collected and markets, clinics and schools in Muslim areas were neglected. Respondent FG1-P14 stated that Muslim dominated areas like Nassarawa and Angwan Rogo have been excluded and marginalised in the reconstruction of infrastructure like roads and access to water. In the respondents' view, the state has promoted uneven development.

Respondent KII-P3-SZ argued that religious bias is pronounced, adding that the state is unfair to the Muslim community. This respondent noted that Muslims caught committing crimes are arrested and imprisoned rapidly while guilty individuals from other groups are not apprehended at all. In contrast, respondent KII-P2-SZ noted that although the state does not treat all ethnic groups equally, it is not discriminating because of religion.

A few respondents identified programmes and projects undertaken by state officials in their personal capacity to support victims of violence. These ranged from financial support for students, to providing access to clean water and food and clothing to widows (respondent KII-P12-SZ). While this should be the responsibility of the state, because

of its failure to do so, individuals have taken a private approach. While these actions are laudable, respondent KII-P7-SZ observed that politicians could assist further by refraining from providing youth with arms and drugs, inciting, and manipulating them, especially the jobless and illiterate youth. Furthermore political actors need to stop sponsoring thugs to cause conflict during elections, should actively provide basic amenities when they enter political office and stop stealing public funds for private enrichment, all of which paint a bad picture of leadership (respondent KII-P6-JM). This is in line with a statement by Governor Jonah Jang (2010 at the Inaugural Peace-building Conference on Peace in Jos that fellow politicians should not endanger lives and destroy property in the name of aggressive religion or ethnicity.

In addressing the state's absence at grassroots level, respondent FG3-P2 noted that most communities have existing structures that act as gatekeepers like the Paramount Rulers and Ward Heads (who are responsible for households) on whom the state can rely and work with when it wants to engage at the community level. Respondent FG3-P1 noted that youth leaders are also able to coordinate youths at community level. Despite the presence of these institutions, respondent FG3-P3 noted that gatekeepers like the Paramount rulers and Ward Heads are paid by government to act as key informants and to manipulate the youth.

In terms of the way forward, according to respondent FG2-P6, the state should embrace all people, be a neutral arbitrator and cultivate the political will for policy implementation. Sincerity on the part of government is also important (respondent KII-P5-SZ)<sup>47</sup>. For respondent FG10-P2, the state should be accountable, people-oriented, prudent, reflective, unbiased and focused on what the people want.

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<sup>47</sup> The issue of sincerity was raised by quite a few respondents. There is a need for sincerity in the views, perceptions, needs and interests of the state, security actors, by groups during peace talks and even within groups (Respondent FG10-P2). According to respondent FG10-P2, without sincerity of purpose, the conflict will not end. Furthermore respondent KII-P8-SZ noted that religious leaders must with all sincerity educate their followers on what religious books and norms teach, ensure they understand it and strive to follow it to the letter.



## **6.2. Limitations and Challenges for the State**

There was consensus among all respondents that the state can do much more to improve the security situation in Jos and in addressing the structural causes of the conflict. According to respondent FG2-P1, the state has abdicated its right to govern as many areas are underdeveloped and there is inequitable distribution of resources. Equitability (meaning justice, fairness) should be a political priority (respondent FG10-P5). The same respondent noted that a sign of government's weakness was its decision to postpone the upcoming 2015 elections in the Jos North and Wase LGA in the state. Respondent FG2-P2 noted that the state did not want to hold elections because of the possibility of violence. One could therefore argue that the state's presence and power is weak in these areas. Respondent KII-P8-SZ described the area of Kadarko in Wase LGA as a state of anarchy characterised by zero effort on the part of government, as people are left to defend themselves in the midst of attacks and counter attacks of burning, killing and cattle rustling.

Ethnic discrimination by the state is a major cause of the conflict and remains a challenge to the state's peace-building and conflict transformation efforts. Some respondents expressed the view that the Governor of the state was partisan and loyal to his ethnic group, the Berom, to the disadvantage of other indigenous and settler groups. According to respondent KII-P12-SZ, the government is protecting the interest of the Berom group in terms of employment, appointments, and projects. Claiming that the current government was the most ethnocentric of all governments in the state, respondent KII-P7-NZ noted that other indigenes were not satisfied with its actions. It is therefore important that the Governor establish cordial relationships with all groups (respondent KII-P9-CZ). All groups should be accommodated (respondent FG3-P5).

Challenges confronting the state include its weak presence in key areas, lack of political will, partisanship and the appropriation of funds for personal use. According to respondent FG2-P2, the government's lack of political presence is exemplified by the fact that some areas in the state have become states on their own, as the government does not control these areas. Its absence and inability to intervene has thus created anarchy in some areas. In ceding part of its territory, a lawless society has emerged (respondent FG2-P1). Respondent FG10-P2 noted that based on his actions and work,

Governor Jang was acting more like the mayor of the capital city of Jos rather than the Governor of the whole state. Development projects like new roads are only being carried out in Jos. The state is absent in many LGA, leaving most of the population at risk of attacks.

Respondent KII-P8 –SZ noted that inter-religious dialogue is elitist and centred in the state capital and respondent KII-P15-SZ stated that state security personnel are absent from the LGA. Furthermore, the state has solved problems by means of trial and error (respondent FG2-P1). According to respondent KII-P15, the failure to decentralise development efforts is also due to the theft of government funds. According to respondent FG10-P3, the state does not have capacity because its actors are partisan, not in favour of their groups or ethnic groups, but for political ambitions. Respondent FG10-P2 noted that even though there is a will on the part of the state, it has no legal framework and no capacity to function.

Respondent KII-P12-SZ noted that a lack of leadership was the reason for the current situation in Plateau state. The state's failure to tackle the root causes of the conflict is the main cause of the instability and violence (KII-P5-SZ); this could be addressed by means of effective leadership. Due to the neglect of LGA in terms of security efforts, inter-religious dialogue and developmental projects, progress in peace-building and conflict transformation in Plateau state is limited.

It was clear from the discussions that the government has failed to engage and work closely with CSOs. Apart from regular meetings with its Special Adviser on Peace-building, there has been no systematic or regular system of coordination and collaboration on various peace-building efforts. Respondent FG3-P3 noted that CSOs/NGOs have created and built relationships with the youth, something which the state cannot do. Thus, it is important that the state engage with CSOs to benefit from this engagement. A common view emerged that although a state is a critical actor in peace-building, it is not the only actor. Other institutions and groups like CSOs have had to step in to perform its role and so it has to collaborate with them and coordinate their joint efforts to ensure success and sustainability.

Some respondents noted that the Federal Government's interference has significantly limited the capacity of the state government. Respondent FG2-P3 noted that the state government is excluded from or misinformed about many processes initiated by the Federal Government, and that the state and federal governments proposed different responses during the crisis. Although the State Governor is the Chief Security Officer of the state in terms of the Constitution, it was noted that, in many cases, he cannot act without the go-ahead from the President. The Governor of Plateau State, Jonah Jang (2010) acknowledged this in a speech, noting that even though he holds the position of Chief Security Officer of the state and chairs the States Security Committee, he has no control over security agencies as they are commanded at the federal level. For instance, active security actors like the Commissioner of Police and the State Security Service (SSS) are not answerable to the state governor (FG10-P2). Respondent FG2-P2 noted that differences of opinions between the state and federal governments impact security as there is a high degree of polarisation between security agents of the state and the security agents of the federal government deployed to the state. According to respondent FG2-P2, the lack of synergy and harmony at both levels has been an impediment to overall peace efforts. Respondent KII-P2-SZ acknowledged that the idea of a state police is a good one; however, respondent FG10-P2 noted that the creation of such a body would lead to partisan actions on the part of the state. In terms of the way forward, according to respondent FG10-P3, the role of the Federal Government should be to advise, moderate, and maintain honesty, especially when the state leadership is partisan or has failed. For respondent KII-P9-JM, if the state fails to control the crisis, the Federal Government must step in. Governor Jang (2010) noted that the challenge with the centralisation of security agencies is that the state government is held responsible by its people for its failure to manage violent conflicts.

## CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION

The results of this study suggest that a peace-building framework is a medium through which the causes of the conflict can be addressed in Plateau state. Furthermore, the peace-building framework is useful in supporting specific programmes, policies and institutions that can transform conflict and prevent its future occurrence. In grounding this research, conflict transformation theory is useful in determining how the peace-building framework can reduce violence, address injustices and rebuild relationships. This study aimed to bring structure, regulation and focus to what has emerged as ad-hoc, uncoordinated and weak peace-building efforts in Plateau state. This has led to the failure to prevent violence and address the underlying causes of the conflict. Tables 7.1 – 7.4 set out a structure for peace-building efforts to become better organised, more focused and better coordinated. This peace-building framework outlines and identifies relevant programmes, policies and institutions to address political, economic, psycho-social and security needs on the ground. This exercise speaks to the idea that “the multidimensionality of the drivers of the conflicts, also implies that addressing them requires a multidimensional approach that spans the development, political, security and justice areas” (PBSO, 2012, p. 4).

This study is important because conflicts such as the ones experienced in Plateau state have increased in intensity and frequency since the year 2000. With the impact of the conflict in Plateau state and the instability in other parts of Nigeria the peace is fragile, hence its resolution requires urgent attention. It is also important not to focus on short-term preventative measures alone but those that will address long-held grievances and that can prevent future violence. While previous studies have examined the causes of the conflict and provided a wide range of recommendations, this study provides a coordinated, detailed and more comprehensive response. It also emphasises a multi-actor, multi-level and multi-approach to the peace-building process. Tables 7.1 - 7.4 outline the priority areas, actors and institutions responsible for action, key steps for implementation, required resources, approximate timeframes and potential challenges to the implementation process.

While the theory of conflict transformation has been applied to contexts outside the African continent like Sri Lanka (Saravanamuttu, 2008) and Israel/Palestine

(Mikhelidze & Pirozzi, 2008), this study seeks to fill the gap in the literature on the relevance and application of the theory in African societies that are culturally heterogeneous and have experienced extreme forms of violence. It is concluded that conflict transformation is an appropriate theory for this study, as it not only focuses on limiting direct violence but on rebuilding relationships while addressing the injustices that led to the conflict in the first place. The more detailed discussion below (section 7.14) contributes to on-going research on the feasibility and validity of conflict transformation in bringing about nonviolent change in an African context.

The results of this study speak to existing views that there is a strong relationship between peace, security and development. Simply put, development and security are prerequisites for peace and without both, sustainable peace cannot be achieved. The respondents emphasised the importance of development in various ways and the need to prioritise it in efforts to achieve peace. What emerged strongly from the data was that development must be achieved through decentralised processes that focus on job creation, skills development, improving literacy rates, building infrastructure, and providing funds for small businesses. Borrowing from El-Fouly and Moursi (1975, p.90), economic development will meet needs for nourishment, good health, clothing, and housing and establish “social and cultural development, justice and integration.” Based on these views, development will bring about a sense of stability for individuals, result in just systems, ensure self-improvement, meet basic desires for economic security and produce unified and secure societies. Development must therefore be included in peace-building as it incorporates elements like economic opportunities, individual well-being, capacity development and inclusion (Krause and Jutersonke, 2005, p. 454).

Moving from development, security was also identified by many respondents as an urgent priority and the primary responsibility of a state towards its citizens. Without a secure environment, opportunities for economic growth are stifled or destroyed. Security also provides space for development to take root in societies and communities. Within the confines of this study, security requires decentralised processes that guarantee the protection of citizens, their property and sources of income. Flowing from this, it ensures the prevention of gross violations of human rights by enforcing strong laws and punitive measures. Various respondents identified the need to curb the threat

of small arms and light weapons and drugs and the need to address the reintegration of perpetrators into society as key avenues through which security needs can be met. As outlined by the UNDP (1994, p.24), a secure environment is required to prevent conflicts between groups and protect them from the threats of crime, drugs, and arms as well as other threats like hunger, disease and poverty.

This chapter begins with a review and brief discussion of the hypothesis and research objectives. It then presents four key themes in response to the research questions. These themes are supported by primary data and secondary research. The results obtained in the field are further discussed to shed light on how adequately the research questions have been addressed. After an extensive discussion of the four key themes, the chapter examines the limitations of the study, presents its implications for policy and practice, and identifies areas for further research. The results of this study hold merit because it is evidence-based and individuals who have seen and felt the impact of the violence provided the data.

## **7.1. Discussion of Themes**

This study's hypothesis is that the ethno-religious violence in Plateau state has persisted due to the absence of a comprehensive and evidence-based peace-building framework to shape and guide how the state can reduce direct violence and address the underlying causes of the ethno-religious violence. Following from this, the study has achieved the following:

- a. Determined what should be included in a peace-building framework for Plateau state by identifying and unpacking key programmes, policies and institutions in response to political, economic, psycho-social and security needs.
- b. Explored and interrogated the work and the capacity of the state in peace-building and conflict transformation efforts, and the challenges and limitations it faces.
- c. Provided evidence-based policy recommendations for peace-building supported by the views of residents of the state and secondary research.
- d. Contributed to the evolving literature on how conflict transformation and peace-building can lead to the nonviolent transformation of violent

conflict.

The four key themes that emerged in response to the four research questions are outlined below.

**7.1.1. On-going peace-building efforts in Plateau state will benefit greatly from a comprehensive and evidence-based peace-building framework that sets out the programmes, policies and institutions required to meet the political, economic, psycho-social and security needs on the ground.**

This study has argued the need for a peace-building framework for Plateau state. The study aimed to explore if a peace-building framework can guarantee more engaged focus and success. As will be discussed later in this chapter, the study has shown that a peace-building framework is important for Plateau state on condition that it identifies appropriate programmes, institutions and policies to address the structural causes of violent conflict, and provides a detailed plan of what the state should be doing to transform the conflict and guarantee peace. While addressing the more complex structural causes will take years and probably decades, there are actions the state can take starting from now. A peace-building framework provides timeframes for action in the short, medium and long-term.

In more broad terms, a peace-building framework is useful for a wide range of reasons. It provides a platform to resolve the conflict, as it identifies responses to political, economic, and psycho-social and security priorities in the state. Furthermore, it highlights areas that require coordination and identifies avenues for collaboration among the state and other actors. A peace-building framework can also be used as a basis to monitor progress and determine benchmarks for success. Ultimately, peace-building and conflict transformation efforts will fail to make an impact if there is no framework in place.

As outlined in the synthesis of seven multi-stakeholder consultations on peace-building and state-building priorities and challenges held in 2010, strategic frameworks for peace-building have been developed to facilitate a more “holistic approach to the broader peace-building challenges” (OECD, 2010, p.27). These strategic frameworks were also created to complement national plans while focusing on peace-building objectives (OECD, 2010, p.27). For the purpose of this study, a framework will help

the state and other stakeholders with a strategic document that offers responses that capture the multiple actors, multiple issues, and the multi-faceted approach in peace-building. While some respondents noted the utility of a peace-building framework as a response to the lack of a strategy for peace efforts, others noted that it was useful in ensuring the success and sustainability of peace efforts. A few noted that the success of the peace-building framework depended on it being inclusive and representative of the interests and groups in the state.

While peace-building is a useful prescription in divided and fragile societies (Zelizer, 2013; Curtis & Dsineza, 2012; Anuradha, 2007) implementation is complex due to the multiplicity of actors, the wide range of interests and priorities and the deep-seated issues in these societies. Aitken (2007, p.247-248) notes that although international peace efforts and peace processes emphasize peace-building and reconciliation they have failed to resolve the ethnic differences that have plagued many post-conflict situations like Iraq, Kosovo, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. As noted in Chapter Two, this does not mean that peace-building is the wrong prescription for these contexts, as other factors inhibit its success such as a lack of political will and commitment or even highly antagonistic groups.

Despite these gaps and complexities, peace-building frameworks have been developed in conjunction with local actors and utilised by the UN in countries like Burundi and Guinea-Bissau<sup>48</sup> to rebuild these countries after conflict. Relative success stories like Liberia and Sierra Leone speak to how useful peace-building frameworks are. This study therefore argues that a peace-building framework is necessary to rebuild Plateau state into the “Home of Peace and Tourism” that it once was. Although peace-building frameworks have been used nationally, they are a useful tool to shape and implement peace-building at the sub-national level.

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<sup>48</sup> See UN documents PBC/1/BDI/4, PBC/3/GNB/3 for strategic frameworks for peace-building for Burundi and Guinea-Bissau, respectively



**7.1.2. Despite its efforts at peace-building, the government of Plateau state faces a wide range of challenges and limitations concerning its capacity, resources and political will and commitment. These can be addressed through various approaches and strategies.**

The bulk of the responsibility for peace-building efforts lies with the government of Plateau state. The findings of this study show that the government is not having the anticipated impact on peace-building efforts. The field data describes its efforts as weak, ad-hoc, disorganised, and out of touch with the grassroots while state officials were characterised as biased, partisan, and mainly focused on obtaining power and wealth.

State officials have described their efforts as progressive and successful as they have improved relations between groups, provided necessities like buses and tricycles to improve the economic livelihoods of Muslims, and trained and empowered women and the youth. They also noted their collaborations with NGO, civil society and the UN in the areas of dialogue, early warning and response and skills development. The state has engaged groups through dialogue sessions and peace conferences, provided relief materials to victims after episodes of violence and brought Christians and Muslims together to celebrate religious holidays. It was acknowledged that not much has been done in the area of truth and reconciliation as this might re-open old wounds. It was also noted that the state is not able to carry the financial burden of the violence and despite its efforts has failed to establish security committees at lower levels due to a lack of communication.

The data shows that a lack of funds has been a major impediment in dealing with the conflicts and controlling the outbreak of violence. There is also a belief that these violent attacks are planned from outside the state because they always occurs unexpectedly, leaving little time for rapid response. A major challenge for the state government is jurisdiction as perpetrators are tried in the federal capital, Abuja and not the state where they committed their crimes. Respondents noted that some criminals were never tried and that this has reduced citizens' confidence in the state. The fact that justice is not visible to the people makes them question the legitimacy of the state, especially if they are not aware of jurisdictional challenges.

While the state's efforts are noteworthy, these are not sufficient to address the structural causes of violence. Furthermore, its capacity to transform the conflict and build peace has come into question. A possible argument is that the state possesses the resources, security personnel, and the judicial structures for conflict transformation and peace-building; however, this is insufficient for the enormous task. It has not addressed key issues like development deficits, infrastructural gaps, insecurities in communities, the polarisation of groups and the segregation of societies. While there are some programmes in place like the Poverty Alleviation Programme and institutions like the Ministry of Women's Affairs and Social Development, the former has failed due to corruption through political patronage and bureaucratic challenges, while the latter has been limited by insufficient human capacity and budgetary constraints. Both these examples call for stronger checks and balances to ensure that the state is accountable for its actions. It is also important that state actors are individually accountable and that sufficient political will can be garnered for conflict transformation and peace-building. These factors also suggest the need for an in-depth review of state resources and capacities. Gaps and limitations in state institutions and amongst state actors should be identified and addressed so that its efforts result in more meaningful success.

A first and critical step in overcoming these limitations and challenges is that the state is non-partisan, unbiased, fair, transparent and involved. This applies to both state actors and state institutions and could be achieved in various ways. It is important that the state is primarily seen as fair to all groups within its territory. In its statements and its actions, it should not be deemed biased or partial to a particular group. Furthermore, it needs to participate in widespread infrastructural projects and carry out decentralised programmes to improve security, ensure development and increase community cohesion. In addition, the state should play a central role in bringing key sectors together to develop adequate short, medium and long-term responses that address the root causes of conflict. It also needs to involve and inform the population on its efforts and projects.

Another important step in overcoming the state's limitations and challenges is to collaborate with actors like civil society, the private sector and academic institutions. It also needs to engage extensively with women, the youth, the disabled and the elderly and must engage with all stakeholders at all administrative levels and senatorial zones

across the state. This is because some state actors might lack experience and understanding of issues relevant to peace-building; thus, it can benefit from a wide range of partners. In Plateau state, CSOs are already hard at work in many areas like skills development, dialogue sessions, inter-religious activities and community awareness; the state can collaborate with and support these efforts. Civil society organisations are extremely useful because they can provide support for early warning and prevention measures, they are resourceful in identifying and addressing the root causes of conflict and they can help to address misconceptions and improve intra-community relations. This collaboration and engagement should focus on developing and implementing relevant responses to key economic, political, security and psycho-social issues and understanding the needs of grassroots communities.

A peace-building framework is another important strategy that the state can utilise to assess its efforts and determine progress in the peace-building process. A framework is useful in identifying areas of synergy and collaboration between the state and other actors like civil society. It is also useful in overcoming limitations because the state can use the framework to initiate annual or biannual reviews and identify new and emerging challenges. The state also benefits from this framework by setting out timelines to track the implementation, and monitor and evaluate the overall peace-building process. In the case of Burundi for instance, the government collaborated with national and international stakeholders to review its Strategic Framework for Peace-building in order to “assess progress made, to consider outstanding peace-building challenges and to renew their commitments in addressing those challenges” (Peace-building Commission, 2011, p.1).

Beyond having a peace-building framework that can drive implementation and measure progress, the state must be equipped and capacitated to manage both processes. This requires strengthening state institutions and state actors through institutional and human capacity development. State capacity can be enhanced through the process of state-building. State-building is defined as an “endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations (OECD, 2008, p.3). Furthermore, “positive state-building processes involve reciprocal relations between a state that delivers services for its people and social and political groups who constructively engage with their state” (OECD, 2008, p.3). At the core of state-building

is strong and positive citizen and state engagement through various channels at different levels. State-building promotes inclusivity in political processes so that the state is continuously and constructively engaging with its citizens and remains legitimate (OECD, 2010, p.22). Based on respondents' calls for more state-citizen engagement, a policy to formalise and regularise town hall meetings between citizens and their elected officials and regular radio programmes has been included in the peace-building framework as one way to improve that relationship (see Table 7.1). State actors also need to be educated on values like tolerance, human rights, and respect for others and be prepared to serve all groups regardless of their ethnic or religious orientation (BELUN, 2009). Based on this view and the primary data, compulsory reorientation programmes for political leaders is included in the peace-building framework in an effort to instil these values (Table 7.1).

While state-building is a decades-long process it should not limit current efforts. Furthermore, measures can be taken in the short and medium term that will increase the state's capacity to meet the demands of its citizens, enhancing its legitimacy and improving its relationship with society. Short-term measures include building the civil service's capacity for tolerance, adherence to human rights and respect, increasing its engagement with citizens, and rebuilding citizens' trust in the state through continuing dialogue efforts, and inter-religious social and economic activities. In the medium term, it can improve service delivery and strengthen avenues for open and constructive citizen engagement. It can also undertake low cost projects that benefit communities and, very importantly, engage in grassroots needs-based assessments to determine and prioritise needs for the long-term.

### **7.1.3. In partnership with other actors and in consultations with the grassroots, the Plateau state government can develop and implement the necessary policies, programmes and institutions outlined in a peace-building framework.**

This study argues that with the right programmes, policies and institutions in a peace-building framework, the state can resolve the structural causes of ethno-religious violence in Plateau state. As Tables 7.1 – 7.4 show, these programmes, policies and institutions have been grouped under political, economic, psycho-social and security components. The following sections unpack what these key programmes, policies and institutions will achieve.

## a) Programmes

The respondents identified some essential programmes to turn the tide from violence to peace in Plateau state. These include radio programmes, justice and security reform programmes, inter-community dialogues, sports activities, mentoring programmes and adequate compensation for the victims of conflict. Others called for the strengthening of poverty alleviation programmes and maternal and child welfare programmes. Psychological debriefing programmes and trauma-healing programmes were also identified as useful in reorienting individuals back into society.

The following programmes are discussed:

- i. **Civic education programmes:** Civic education is a path to citizenship, a collective identity, stability and peace (Levine, 2010, p.1-2). It is therefore useful in a context like Plateau state where the idea of the collective and citizenship is missing. Ethnic and religious enclaves and sentiments have replaced, or define ideas of citizenship and belonging. Civic education is also important for Plateau state as it can enhance citizen participation in peace-building efforts. It can increase all groups' participation in policymaking, increase citizen pressure for electoral reform and build a culture of allegiance to the state rather than ethnicity or religion. According to Browne (2013, p.2.), civic education programmes must be participatory and interactive as these are "best-received and appear to deliver better, longer-term results".

In civic education programmes, active participation can utilise role-plays, discussions and community projects (Levine, 2010, p. 3-4). It could focus on developing skills to shape public policy as was done in Thailand, impart citizen rights and duties like in Sierra Leone, or role-play mock elections as in Nepal (Browne, 2012, p.4-8). In Iraq, civic education programmes were offered to higher education institutions and civil society actors including journalists, activists and political party staff (Levine, 2010, p.8). The lessons learned in Sudan showed that civic education could be used to improve relationships between stakeholders like the police and civil society leaders (Levine, 2010, p.14).

Taking these examples into account, the development of a civic education programme can be carried out in a collaborative way by higher learning institutions like the Department of Political Science at the University of Jos and relevant civil society organisations, coordinated by the Ministry of Education (See Table 7.1). The recipients of these programmes should include political parties, police and citizens through various avenues (workplace, religious institutions, neighbourhood, or community forums).

- ii. **Peace clubs in schools:** Peace clubs are “an effective method of providing positive behaviour models for children” (GMSA, n.d.). Membership provides a “sense of security and belonging, and gives members an alternative set of accepted values and behaviours to emulate” (GMSA, n.d.). Through a wide range of activities like drama, debates and peace sensitisation seminars, peace clubs can be used to educate young people on the subject of peace (Peacetalk, 2010). They can also be educated on their rights (Save the Children, 2008, p.21). Peace clubs have helped to build a culture of peace and community involvement, develop positive communication skills, and teach peer mediation skills with the goal of peacefully resolving disputes (GMSA, n.d.).

In Plateau state, peace clubs are useful for interaction, debate and in carrying out projects in the community. In cities like Chandigarh and Panchkula in India, where more than a 100 “Peace Clubs’ have been formed in major educational institutions, the clubs are started with a membership of 35-40 students at schools and colleges (Sharma, 2013). The organisers request schools to allocate a 40-minute slot to the peace club every two weeks (Sharma, 2013). In the case of gender clubs in Ghana, the state representative (the District Director of Education) plays an important role in encouraging and supporting formal education institutions to develop these clubs (Gregory, 2011, p.11). As the Ghanaian case shows, the state can also provide resources, carry out monitoring and evaluation visits, and acknowledge the work of facilitators and other stakeholders involved in the clubs (Gregory, 2011, p.11). In Plateau state, relevant officials from the Ministry of Education could collaborate with relevant CSOs to develop and implement a rollout plan for the creation of peace clubs

across the state (see Table 7.3). CSO are also a useful resource in developing relevant exercises, content and projects that could be used in these contexts. Teachers could be identified to oversee and coordinate the clubs' activities. It is important that principals and teachers buy in to this process and ensure that students are committed and involved.

- iii. **Compulsory orientation programmes for political leaders:** The respondents suggested that orientation programmes for political leaders are important in order to replace their biases with a focus on excellent service and meeting the needs of all citizens. These programmes could be used to educate senior political leaders on their role, and sensitize them to conflict issues and how to implement the peace-building framework. This could be provided through training, workshops, and leadership forums. Borrowing from Timor-Leste, orientation for newly-elected officials could emphasise the importance of “equal access to opportunity to combat prejudice” (BELUN, 2009, p, 12). Furthermore, these orientation programmes can provide modules related to “developing human rights responses for state-citizen relationships, respect for differences, tolerance and national unity” (BELUN, 2009, p.12). Higher education institutions and CSOs (Table 7.1) can carry out the development of content in Plateau state collaboratively. The content could be delivered by a pool of trainers from CSOs and the Department of Political Science and the Centre for Conflict Management and Peace Studies at the University of Jos. It should target all arms of government, and leadership at all levels of the state. Thus, the state Human Resources Unit and the Ministry for Local Government, and Chieftaincy Affairs must monitor and ensure the participation of political actors.

iv. **Reform the security sector:** Much work is needed to rebuild citizens' confidence in the security sector. Reform of the security sector is premised on the contract between the state and society and requires a high level of legitimacy (OECD, 2008, p.39). Borrowing from Ayoob (1995), programmes that focus on security reform must target "issues of limited capacity and those of potential illegitimacy". This is reiterated by Sisk and Risley (2005, p.2.) who identify the capability and legitimacy of security actors as a significant priority in security reform (Sisk and Risley, 2005, p.2). This is in line with the point raised by the respondents that security actors lack the capacity and legitimacy to deal with security threats in Plateau state. These gaps can be addressed in the following ways:

Firstly, the active recruitment of personnel to increase their numbers is important in responding to needs of all citizens, improving security across the state and ensuring rapid and sufficient responses to any skirmishes before they escalate. Screening of potential recruits should focus on their "educational, professional, medical and fitness qualifications, as well as prior history with regard to human rights abuses" (Fayemi, 2005, p. 176). Furthermore, they need to be well trained before being deployed in the field. The police in particular need to be trained so that they can respond effectively to mob violence and sudden outbreaks of violence.

Secondly, improving the legitimacy of these institutions is a very important issue. This will require that they refrain from attacking innocent civilians and focus on rebuilding citizens' trust. Their involvement in corruption has to be curtailed through stricter disciplinary measures in order to restore their legitimacy. Trust and legitimacy can be restored through close engagement with local populations. Borrowing from Sisk and Risley, (2005, p.10), trust and legitimacy can be restored through partnerships with a wide range of local institutions like schools, religious institutions, leaders of minority groups and human rights monitoring groups. Human rights abuses by police forces must be eliminated (Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2005, p, 7). Measures should also be put in place to investigate human rights abuses by security actors through the use of ad-hoc boards of inquiry and a Human Rights Commission (HRW, 2014) or



through the creation of a specialised independent police investigatory body (HRW, 2012). As in the case of Kosovo, legitimacy could be restored through the inclusion of a wide range of ethnic groups in the security sector and the use of multi-ethnic community patrols (Sisk and Risley, 2005, p.20).

The data collected for this study reveal that security sector reform will lead to increased recruitment of the right security personnel, enhance their understanding of human rights issues, abuses and standards of behaviour, and equip them in intelligence gathering, and obtaining security information, all of which will require funding (see Table 7.4).

- v. **National reorientation programmes for security actors:** These programmes are useful in rebuilding the relationship between security actors and communities. This entails sensitizing them to their missions and objectives, and inculcating the principles of accountability and respect for human rights (Fayemi, 2005). These programmes can sensitize police officers on the need to “overcome their bias towards certain parts of the population; (and how) police must serve the entire population, without preferences” (Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2005, p, 7). Such programmes should be made mandatory for all security personnel and formalised (Table 7.4).
  
- vi. **Compulsory peace education programmes and curricula at primary and secondary levels:** In post-conflict contexts, education is useful in building “social cohesion and stronger resilience to conflict” (World Bank, 2005, p.3). Peace education is defined as:

the process of promoting the knowledge, skills, attitudes and values needed to bring about behaviour changes that will enable children, youth and adults to prevent conflict and violence, both overt and structural; to resolve conflict peacefully; and to create the conditions conducive to peace, whether at an intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup, national or international level (Fountain, 1999, p.i).

Education in these contexts should contribute to the prevention of conflict and conflict transformation as it instils a culture of non-violence and builds positive views of other groups. As stated by Fountain (1999, p.i), peace education is an “essential component of quality basic education”.

At the tertiary level, peace studies is premised on the idea that human beings can learn and be educated on how to respond to or deal with conflict in less expensive and more effective ways (Harris, 2010, p.296). It also emphasises the importance of conflict transformation and the rebuilding of relationships between parties (Harris, 2010, p.298). On this basis, peace education becomes particularly significant in a case like Plateau state where suspicion, mistrust, bias and negative views of the other has polarised groups. Citing Salomon (1997) Gawrec (2006, p.449) identifies the four goals of peace education as:

accepting the other’s narrative as legitimate; critically examining one’s own group’s acts and contribution to the conflict; feeling and showing empathy for the other’s suffering while building a trust of the other; and finally, being inclined to get involved with nonviolent activities.

The definitions, content and goals of peace education presented above are useful starting points in developing curricula and materials, especially in schools. Experts will be engaged in curriculum development as well as key actors in the education sector, the peace and conflict sector and research institutes (Table 7.3). A module on conflict resolution has been made compulsory at the University of Jos. The Centre for Conflict Management and Peace Studies (CECOMPS) at the University of Jos in Plateau state is already providing full postgraduate programmes in conflict management and peace studies. In Kenya, the Ministry of Education developed a peace education programme in response to the post-election violence of 2008. The programme is streamlined into subjects like Life Skills, Religious Education and extracurricular and informal activities like Music and Drama (Kangethe, 2013). It promote a culture of peace through participation, the prohibition of all forms of violence and the adoption of anti-bullying activities (Kangethe, 2013).

vii. **Radio programmes:** With communication networks, radio programmes can reach a wide range of people and are a useful medium for the state in communicating with constituents and in sensitizing groups. President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia used weekly radio messages to give hope to constituents and build faith in the longer-term process of peace-building (Mukendi, 2010, p.11). For Mukendi (2010, p.12) this is not sufficient unless it trickles down to all levels of society through a clear communication strategy. This is particularly useful in building confidence and trust in the state especially in situations where progress in the peace-building process is immediately apparent. Through weekly radio messages, citizens are informed of the progress of peace-building efforts and the role of the state (Table 7.3). These messages can also focus on encouraging dialogue, promoting civic education and calling for reconciliation. It is important that the media sector collaborate with the state to publicise this information and sensitize groups.

The above discussion reflects the broader role that all forms of traditional media (radio, television, and print including public broadcasting) and new social media platforms play in strengthening peace-building mechanisms. While challenges exist in using social media such as the absence of technology, electricity and networks in rural areas as well as high levels of poverty, traditional media can stand in and support peace-building processes. Some respondents noted that since “social media are due to personal and individual interests, the information probably does not reach groups without interest in social and political issues”. Thus, while social media is useful to connect people and mobilise groups behind a cause, it is not the only way (Ndangam and Lee, 2012, p.5).

Broadly speaking the media plays a wide range of roles in conflict prevention and peace-building like:

providing information with regards to one’s environment, expose unknown stories, provide feedback to the local population, provides objective views in some instances, act as a platform to present policy issues, determine the policy agenda, used to relay messages between groups, promote peace and build confidence, and build positive relationships between groups (Bratic and Schirch, 2007, p.9-11).

As an example of traditional media, Afghanistan's media success in the post-Taliban regime was due to the broad spread of local radio, increased efforts and commitment on the part of the government to communicate with its citizens and support from international media (Bajraktari and Parajon, 2008, p.1). In another example, efforts to mitigate and prevent the violence between nomad pastoralists and settled farmers in Mali were supported by Radio Douentza, as it (a) developed public service announcements reminding both these groups to collaborate and utilise restraint; (b) reported incidents in a timely manner so that the local administration could intervene before the conflict escalated; and finally, (c) encouraged farmers to inform herders when they had finished harvesting using radio so the latter could move across their fields (Adam and Holguin, 2003).

New media are a significant resource in violent conflicts and humanitarian emergencies. They range from social media tools (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Blogs), to mobile phone technology, and mapping violent hotspots of conflict from crowdsourcing. Social media tools have benefited from advancements in technology such that conflicts are now quickly reported globally and communication between individuals and groups across the world has become easier and faster. Furthermore, "digital technologies and social networks facilitated by access to both the internet, to mobile telephony and to satellites have enabled many people around the world to establish virtual networks and online communities" (Ndangam and Lee, 2012, p.2).

The downside of this is that terror networks such as Al Qaeda, Boko Haram and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) have used these virtual networks and communities for their benefits. These groups to recruit new members, radicalise individuals and raise funds for their cause have used social media. In addition to gaining support through these forms of media, terrorist groups also use it to obtain tactical information on how to make bombs, mix poison, ambush soldiers, carry out suicide attacks and how to hack into systems (Weiman, 2011). ISIS has used YouTube, Twitter, Instagram, Tumblr, internet memes with amateur images and videos uploaded by members with over 40,000 tweets sent during its march into Mosul in northern Iraq (The Telegraph, 2014). Al Qaeda has used Twitter since 2011 and according to the Czech Military

Intelligence; the terrorist group uses social media to spread its ideology to Muslims across Europe (The Telegraph, 2014). Boko Haram has officially launched its Twitter feed on 18 January 2015 promoting propaganda and several videos (BBC News, 2015). It must be noted however that global hackers such as Anonymous have shut down hundreds of ISIS Twitter accounts in opposition to their actions. In countering ISIS, Twitter has also suspended over 1,000 accounts suspected of terrorist links (The Telegraph, 2014).

The benefits and values of social media have strong implications for peace-building efforts. For instance, Ndangam and Lee's (2012, p.4) surveys showed that social media has potential in promoting a culture of peace and social transformation by "facilitating dialogue, to promote the ready exchange of information and ideas, and to mobilize collective action". In Kenya social media relating to peace campaigns had a positive impact on reconciliation efforts in the post-election violence of 2007/2008 and it has been used to promote peace in Peru (Ndangam and Lee, 2012, p.4).

As Bratic (2006) notes, media information can bring a level of security to citizens as they are informed of threats and the levels of violence and are aware of what support is available particularly during and after violent episodes. These examples suggest that it is important that media houses and journalists in Plateau State do not fuel the conflict as they play a pivotal role in enhancing or hindering peace-building efforts. As Adam and Holguin (2003) propose, they need to be cognisant of any efforts on the part of the state or key actors to manipulate and be informed and knowledgeable of the impact of their reporting on the conflict. In encouraging them to continue to use various forms of social media: twitter, Facebook and others, media houses and journalists are well placed to make a positive contribution to peace-building efforts.

viii. **Psychological debriefing and trauma healing programmes:** Both of these programmes are useful in dealing with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) especially for victims of torture, rape and other violent acts (Kaplan et al., 2001, p.824). Psychological debriefing can be defined as “a crisis intervention designed to relieve and prevent event-related distress in normal people who are experiencing abnormally stressful circumstances” (Kaplan et al., 2001, p.824). Borrowing from research on countries like Mozambique, Rwanda, and South Africa, trauma centres could be set up in central areas to service outlying communities (Kelly & Fitzduff, 2002, p.2). In Chile, the state established a small unit within its Ministry of Health that provided “general medical care, social services, psychological counselling and other services free of charge” to the family members of victims (Kelly & Fitzduff, 2002, p.2). In Rwanda, the Ministry of Health created the Trauma Recovery Programme and a National Trauma Centre at Kigali, which offers psycho-social and trauma recovery interventions (Kelly & Fitzduff, 2002, p.36).

Based on these findings, the Ministry of Health in Plateau state could create a unit focused on trauma healing and psychological debriefing, which can be led by suitably qualified professionals (Table 7.3). This unit can spearhead a state-wide programme that targets communities and works with other non-state actors. Psychologists, psychotherapists and relevant mental health professionals can be identified to provide services through short-term community outreach and campaigns. Furthermore, it is argued that the quick resumption of schooling helps children to “re-establish a sense of normality that helps children and youth deal with psychosocial trauma” (World Bank, 2005, p.4.) On that note, psycho-social support should be provided to students through their schools.

In addition, community leaders and activists could be trained to provide general counselling. As the cases of Cambodia and Mozambique have shown, a lack of funding from the state might require that it share the financial load with international agencies and the voluntary sector to provide psychological support (Kelly & Fitzduff, 2002, p. 10).

- ix. **Job creation and mentoring programmes for at risk youth:** According to the Chairman of the UN Peace-building Commission, job creation for youth in post-conflict settings is a critical component of peace-building (UN News Centre, 2012). This is important because rebellions rely on young men and they have an inclination to violence and its possible recurrence (Collier, 2007). An effective strategy to reduce the risk of youth involvement in violence is to address youth unemployment (Collier, 2007). Any solution has to take into account that these young people are idle and poorly trained; a challenge experienced across the globe (UN News Centre, 2012).

Any efforts at job creation for youth need to “capitalize on what exists in the communities” (World Bank, 2005, p.3.). Applying this to the case of Plateau state requires that “a comprehensive mapping of the livelihoods, assets, and resources of affected communities including youth, should be a starting point” (World Bank, 2005, p.3). Some respondents identified the agricultural sector as a sector that provides possible employment opportunities for the youth.

In addition, skills development will equip the youth to thrive in their employment or livelihoods available in their communities. The case of Sierra Leone provides some best practices. In 2001, a Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace (YTREP) programme brought together over 46,000 adults in about 2,000 locations and trained them in conflict resolution, civic participation, literacy and math skills, agriculture and health (USAID, 2003, p. 40-41). Subsequent successful programmes included the Skills Training and Employment Promotion Program (STEP) and the Skills Training and Employment Generation Programme (STEG) where values like trust, cooperation and mutual trust are taught and applied. The “collaboration on community rehabilitation projects and the development of micro-enterprise groups show tangible dividends” (USAID, 2003, p.12). Programmes such as these could be used for at risk youth involved in drugs and prostitution as well as those who have engaged in violence as a way of reintegrating them back into society.

Furthermore, mentoring programmes supported by established entrepreneurs from various sectors and through state and civil society partnerships can be used to prevent the youth from being easy targets for violence and assist them to transition into entrepreneurial opportunities or the workforce (Table 7.2).

- x. **State-wide infrastructural development programmes:** In addressing causes like marginalisation and inequalities, a peace-building framework needs to level the disparities between groups especially in the area of infrastructural development. This is largely supported by the assertion that a just society is achievable when there is greater access to resources (DESA, 2007). In line with this is the view shared at the 1995 World Social Summit, that a “people centred approach to development must be based on the principles of equity and equality, so that all individuals have access to resources and opportunities” (DESA, 2007) A state-wide infrastructural development programme is required. This caters for two key areas: the LGA and the villages and wards within it, and secondly, Muslim-dominated areas (see Table 7.2) neglected by the state, according to some respondents. A large-scale development programme would include providing good roads, developing health facilities and social amenities and providing government services in these areas. For farmers in rural areas, this would mean creating links between rural roads and major roads, thereby creating access to new markets. Infrastructural development should not focus on only public funds but identify a wide range of funding options with development partners, and the African Union and energy sectors (African Monitor, 2012, p.15).

While the aforementioned programmes could be potentially useful for Plateau state, challenges and limitations come to mind taking the context of the state into account. Tables 7.1 – 7.4 provide a list of challenges and limitations in the implementation of specific programmes, policies and institutions. These include a lack of political will, limited resources, prioritising amongst the many needs and demands, and trying to meet long-held expectations while dealing with the potential for more violence. For instance, the final programme in Table 7.2 that calls for infrastructural development presents its own limitations in that it cannot be carried out automatically and immediately for every community. Limited funds could also result in this being a long-term process. In



general, governments often operate with limited resources and careful attention must therefore be paid to prioritising their activities.

## **b) Policies**

Public officials that seek to influence behaviours in order to reach an expected outcome (McGinnis, 2010, p.13) use policies strategically. Kriesberg (1989, p.219) notes that, in situations of intractable conflict, policy discussions must be clear on the timelines for policy implementation even to the point of being specific on how many days, weeks, months, years or decades it will take. A wide range of policies on political appointments based on merit, the separation of church and state, and peace education were identified as necessary to respond to the root causes of the conflict and to transform it. These policies must focus on removing bias, discrimination and inequality while introducing a system of meritocracy and the true representation of all interests. Some of these key policies are discussed below.

- i. **Clear separation of church and state particularly in political processes:**  
This policy should define and shape the nature and extent of state interaction with religious institutions. It should ensure that all state action “has a secular (i.e. non-religious purpose), does not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and does not foster excessive entanglement between government and religion” (Oberbauer, 2006, p. 6). The policy must ensure that the religious orientations of state actors do not determine their actions and decisions and that religious platforms are not used to push political agendas particularly during elections. While some respondents identified the need to develop a Ministry of Religious Affairs, this might be problematic as it creates a space for the state to intervene in religious matters, which could easily become political. Some respondents suggested that the government stop funding citizens’ religious trips to both Mecca and Jerusalem in order to separate the state and religious activities.

While McGinnis (2010) notes that faith-based organisations can shape policy and contribute to policy discourse on health, education and social services, this

study argues that it should have no impact in the political sphere. Such a policy would ensure that religion does not determine political appointments, and that churches and religious leaders refrain from promoting political agendas. This requires that the state does not favour one religious group over another in statements, in funding its activities, and in any other form of close relationship. The secularisation of the Nigerian Constitution needs to be upheld and acknowledged in the development of such a policy. The policy should outline the extent of religious involvement in state affairs, the limitations of such engagement and the consequences of not complying. This policy should be promulgated with relevant religious institutions and monitored through the Ministry of Peace-building (Table 7.1). The development of such a policy should engage other groups and sectors of society.

- ii. **Peace education:** A policy on peace education is useful for Plateau state, as it will shape how peace education is promulgated across the state. This policy will outline the responsibilities of key stakeholders and specific goals and identify peace education activities. In Sri Lanka, a national policy and a comprehensive framework of action on education for social cohesion and peace was created as one response to the instability in the country. The Social Cohesion and Peace Education Unit of the Ministry of Education coordinated this policy document. In the initial stage, the unit had to “conduct a situation analysis and draw up a matrix of all the various existing activities and agencies involved in social cohesion and peace education” (SCPE, 2008, p.31). It also held a workshop with these stakeholders and many of the ideas discussed became part of the policy (SCPE, 2008, p.3). In the second stage, a three-day workshop was held with experts from the Ministry of Education, schools, and the National Institute of Education (NIE) to finalise a framework which was then sent to a wide range of actors from the state, NGOs and the private sector and school teachers and students (SCPE, 2008, p.3.).

Another starting point for developing a policy on peace education is to utilise key UN policy documents that are relevant to peace education. These include the Plan of Action of 2005-2007 which promotes human rights and respect; the Declaration of the 44<sup>th</sup> Session of the international conference on education

which focuses on improving curricula, textbooks and developing innovative strategies to educate people about peace; and the UNICEF peace education document which defines peace education and calls for more systematic research on peace education programmes (GPPAC and ECCP, 2007). This policy development process should engage primary, secondary and tertiary schools, the Ministry of Education, and the Centre for Conflict Management and Peace Studies (Table 7.3). Its main goal should be to build coexistence and develop a culture of nonviolence, forgiveness and tolerance in formal institutions.

- iii. **Stricter enforcement of anti-corruption laws:** Corruption will remain an impediment to peace-building efforts, as it will take resources away from social programmes and development initiatives. This calls for measures to improve accountability. Accountability can be defined as “the obligation of public officials to explain and justify their behaviour to society and/or face sanction” (OECD, 2008, p.36). Political actors need to face sanctions of different kinds if they fail to be inclusive or are biased as public officers. Possible options could include suspension from office and the repayment of funds stolen or even prosecution. In addressing corruption at the state level, an anti-corruption outfit could be set up to monitor key areas like “revenue collection, expenditure control, government procurement practices and granting of concessions” (Mukendi, 2010, p.8). This policy also applies to security officials involved in corruption (Table 7.4). Civil society and the media need to expose these acts and to put pressure on the state to enforce these measures.
  
- iv. **Anti-discrimination policies in political appointments and in the creation of committees:** It is important to achieve fair representation in all government offices. As proposed for Timor-Leste, this policy should highlight that state actors must be inclusive in their statements and actions with regard to ethnic and religious groups and that opportunities are open to all groups (BELUN, 2009, p. 13). In addition, meritocracy and transparency should shape selection processes (Table 7.1).

- v. **Formalisation and regularisation of town hall meetings:** While such meetings occur across Nigeria, some respondents from outside the capital city of Jos noted that state actors or political leaders interact and engage with them only during elections. As discussed in the previous chapter, a respondent noted that the state's programmes on poverty alleviation are not tailored to the needs of the people, thus suggesting that it does not engage them. These formal processes are therefore useful in bridging the gap between the government and the people, increasing all groups' participation in the political process and contributing to the transparency and accountability of the state. Borrowing from the case of Timor Leste, this could be achieved through "formalizing community outreach and holding regular public meetings and hearings for specific constituencies" (Sisk and Risley, 2005, p.27).

Mukendi's work on leadership and change in post-conflict contexts (2010, p.3) shows that political leaders can bring about change in Plateau state by managing the expectations of their constituents while building trust and legitimacy. This requires "inclusive and participatory processes to achieve desired collective outcomes" (Mukendi, 2010, p.3). Liberia's President has held town meetings across the country and used every available public opportunity to listen to citizens (Mukendi, 2010, p.3.). These processes are particularly useful in determining infrastructure needs across Plateau State and in addressing the needs of these communities. This requires the cooperation of Local Government Chairmen and District, Ward and Village heads (Table 7.1).

### **c) Institutions**

The state needs to develop and strengthen key institutions that will reduce violence, address injustice and transform relationships. This could be achieved through the creation of a Ministry of Peace-building or strengthening the capacity of customary courts so that they can address conflicts at the lower levels. Their development is discussed below.

- i. **Ministry of Peace-building:** It has been proposed that countries set up national ministries for peace-building in order to solidify and institutionalise peace efforts and establish a culture of nonviolence (Suter, 2004, Mwanza, 2006). This is premised on the idea of organisational change where “it is very difficult for an old institution to create and implement new policies” (Sutter, 2004, p.173). Furthermore, the numerous and complex tasks involved peace-building require that it is not left to other government bodies who have their own mandates and responsibilities (Harris, 2008). While the focus of previous authors is the national level, this study suggests that a Ministry of Peace-building be set up for Plateau state so that there is a concerted focus on peace efforts in the state (Table 7.1). This ministry would focus on promoting peace-building activities and supporting their expansion, and working with other institutions (the Ministry of Education, academic institutions, and CSOs) on various projects (Mwanza, 2006). The creation of such a body requires the development of a vision, mission, strategies and targets (Mwanza, 2006). In conclusion, long-term infrastructure for peace can be used to increase the focus on peace and how to achieve it.
  
- ii. **Institutions for Peace Education:** Two institutions are significant in promoting peace education in Plateau state. The first is a Peace Education Unit to focus on peace programmes and drive the development and implementation of a peace education policy situated within the Ministry of Education. The second is an Institute for Peace Education to help streamline peace efforts.

Under the state Ministry of Education, a unit that focuses on peace education can be used to bolster peace programmes. Borrowing from the mandate of the peace education programme in Kenya, this unit can develop a state-wide strategy in collaboration with stakeholders at local government level. It can liaise with various partners, identify gaps in peace education programmes in Plateau state and coordinate activities at state level (Kangethe, 2013). Furthermore, Ministry of Education officers at local government level could also become focal points for the unit by being responsible for collecting relevant data, coordinating peace education programmes and coordinating partnerships at that level as in the case of Kenya (Kangethe, 2013). It can also monitor state-

wide peace education processes in both the formal and informal sectors and oversee a peace education campaign in communities.

Through an Institute of Peace Education, a culture of peace and non-violence can be fostered in Plateau state. Borrowing from Sri Lanka's National Institute for Education (NIE), this institute can carry out activities in "peace education, conflict resolution, conflict transformation, and more recently, in life competencies, citizenship education and governance" (SCPE, 2008, p.8). It can also help to develop a peace education curriculum for schools and teacher training and can work with experts from civil society, the Ministry of Education, representatives of the peace education unit, think tanks such as NIPS and the university CECOMPS for curriculum development (Table 7.3). In line with the approach used by UNESCO's Institute for Peace, this body can promote research on innovative strategies to achieve peace.

- iii. **Develop alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms and increase the capacity of informal courts to address grassroots conflicts:** Alternative Dispute Resolution refers to a variety of "non-judicial dispute resolution processes ranging from arbitration, mediation, negotiation, minitrials, and private judging" (Malhotra, 2008, p.2). They are also referred to as "a set of mechanisms a society utilises to resolve disputes without resort to costly adversarial litigation" (UNODC, 2007, p.16). They have become a viable alternative to the judicial processes because of their value in the "saving of monetary, time and emotional costs, preservation of privacy and confidentiality, and the party's control over the resolution process" (Malhotra, 2008, p.2.). This resonates strongly in the case of Plateau state, as the judiciary is weak; judicial processes are extensive and often ineffective, and relying on these formal processes requires financial resources. ADRs could be set up across the state. As outlined by a training manual on ADR by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (2007, p.19), ADRs offer the important advantage of "increasing access to justice for the poorest disputants..., preserves, improves or restores relationships among disputants", two key advantages that hold weight in the case of Plateau state.

A few cases offer examples of how ADRs can be set up in Plateau state. The Lok Adalat (LA) mechanism in India obtained parliamentary backing in the form of “The Legal Services Authorities Act of 1987”, with amendments in 1994 and 2002 (Islam, 2012, p.35). This Act mandated the LA to “arrive at a compromise and settlement” which was final and binding on the parties in the dispute and could not be appealed in any court (Islam, 2012, p.35). The panel comprised of three members, usually a social worker, a lawyer and a retired justice from the state court or a sitting judge as the chair (Islam, 2012, p.35). One of the respondents suggested that ADRs be set up at police stations in order to facilitate access to justice and quickly resolve clashes. Mediators who are “either volunteers or paid professionals, but work directly for the local or national courts” (UNODC, 2007, p.20) can work in these ADRs. Furthermore, they can work with local authorities including the police, community courts, and religious leaders to refer cases (UNODC, 2007, p.20).

Cases like Rwanda have illustrated the importance of decentralised and widespread informal and non-state judicial systems. The Gacaca courts in Rwanda offer a “local conflict-resolution process in which the perpetrator and victim go before a group of elders, there is an acknowledgement of the harm done, and a determination on the punishment of the perpetrator and compensation for the victim is decided” (Kelly & Fitzduff, 2002, p.37). There were plans to create about 11,000 of these grassroots courts with training provided for some 300,000 elected judges (Kelly & Fitzduff, 2002, p.38). There has been increased reliance on these institutions particularly because of the limits of the formal justice sector and the state’s control of this sector (Decker et al., 2005; Carothers, 2003). As in Rwanda and Timor Leste (BELUN, 2009, p.6), religious and traditional leaders that are respected elders in the community can help to resolve conflicts at lower levels in Plateau state (Table 7.4). Elders and traditional religious leaders are important actors that can work together in ADRs because they wield a lot of influence and are recognised in their communities. These individuals can stand in, in situations where the state does not have these mechanisms. The communities that select them can hold these individuals accountable.

iv. **Community-led early warning and early response mechanisms:**

Community-based approaches are critical in peace-building efforts in Plateau state. They seek to empower local community groups and institutions by giving the community direct control over investment decisions, and project planning, execution and monitoring, through a process that emphasises inclusive participation and management (Haider, 2009, p.4). In the context of early warning and early response, communities have to work together to develop appropriate mechanisms for conflict prevention. Community watchdogs can be created with the support of peace and security committees as was done in Ituri in the DRC by the IKV Pax Christi and their local partner, ‘Commission Diocese de Justice et Paix (CDJP)’ – Mahagi/Nioka (Multipart, 2010, p. 79). These units operate as a:

community based security system, organising activities such as listing all visitors to the community, denouncing criminals and setting up at local level an early warning alert. They are active in the monitoring of potential new rebel insurgencies and could also function as an interface between the population and the state, army and police (Multipart, 2010, p. 79).

Such mechanisms are important in meeting the need for decentralised and accountable security. It is expected that they would be made up of known community members. These mechanisms could be set up at the ward or village level in Plateau state to make the process as decentralised as possible. This will require collaboration with the Permanent Secretary of State on Security, and cooperation from Local Government Chairmen as well as District, Village and Ward Heads (See Table 7.4).

v. **Security committees at ward and village levels:** Response to security threats should include the creation of security committees at ward and village levels and the strengthening of checks and balances on community vigilante groups.

Borrowing from Sisk and Risley (2005, p.10), local security committees could be used to “investigate instances of violence, manage public gatherings such as protests and campaign rallies, and foster dialogue among community leaders, the police and political parties”, as was done in South Africa during the transition from apartheid to democracy (Sisk and Risley, 2005, p.10). Similar to



community policing, this process brings the police, civil society and local communities together to jointly devise solutions to insecurities and ensure the safety of its members (Haider, 2009, p.5). In Haiti, multi-sector local security committees were organised by women's groups in response to sexual violence. They were composed of local authorities and representatives from different sectors like police, education, health, magistrates, religious leaders, voodoo and church leaders (DFID, 2013, p.22). These groups met monthly to "track progress of cases, plan prevention and awareness raising activities, and liaise with regional Women's Rights Organisations (WROs)" in an effort to combat sexual violence against women (DFID, 2013, p.22).

These structures are important in strengthening community security. Setting them up will require that their roles and responsibilities are defined (Table 7.4). They should be designed based on the community's security needs. This requires collaboration between the police, community-based organisations and local communities. These security committees could meet weekly and in cases of emergencies. Success will require the support of relevant Ward and Village Heads.

- vi. **Stronger collaboration between the Office of the Special Adviser on NGOs and the Special Adviser on Peace-building:** Peace-building efforts will benefit greatly from stronger collaboration between the Special Advisers on NGOs and Peace-building. This would also strengthen relationships between the state, NGOs and civil society in developing and implementing components of the framework. Such collaboration will improve the monitoring and oversight of these bodies by the state, as evidenced in the case of Liberia (Mukendi, 2010, p.23). In addition, it will help to ensure that the right organisations are involved in the implementation of the peace-building framework.

This institutional collaboration will benefit from regular and more systematic interaction through weekly meetings (Table 7.1). This can focus on a wide range of issues including activities and projects that both offices can jointly coordinate. Respondents also noted the need for frequent meetings between CSOs, NGOs and the state. Monthly meetings between both offices and these

organisations can be useful to discuss progress in the implementation of the peace-building framework, share challenges, and identify avenues for further collaboration.

**Table 7.1: Political Component of Peace-building Framework outlining actors and institutions responsible, implementation, timeframes, resources and challenges**

POLITICAL							
		Priority Areas	Actors/Institutions	Implementation	Timeframes	Resources	Challenges
Programmes	<b>Civic Education</b>	Increase participation of all groups in policy making Build culture of allegiance to state	Ministry of Education, CSOs, Department of Political Science, University of Jos	Develop methodology and content for delivery in informal settings To run as a 1/2 day programme Train CSOs/community leaders to deliver content	6-12 months	Experts to develop content, printing costs, training community leaders to deliver content	Lack of resources Failure of parties to participate Lack of political will
	<b>Compulsory orientation programmes for political leaders</b>	Separate religion from politics Electoral reform Inculcate culture of meritocracy and equality Delink political appointments and ethnic allegiances	University of Jos, State Human Resources Unit, CECOMPS, CSOs, Ministry for Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs	Develop methodology and content. Content focus: roles/responsibilities, conflict issues, human rights, state-citizen relationships, respect for differences, national unity, tolerance, 1-2 days (conducted annually)	6-8 months	Experts/trainers to develop and deliver content, facilities to conduct programme	Resistance to orientation programmes by political leaders, Absenteeism or poor participation Lack of right and unbiased instructors Lack of measures in place by the state to ensure attendance
Policies	<b>Clear separation of church and state particularly in political processes</b>	Separate religion from politics Build culture of allegiance to state	The state, religious leaders, CSOs, NIPPS, University of Jos, Department of Political Science and Faculty of Law	Conduct FGD in developing policy Policy shared with religious institutions, political parties and citizens	6-12 months	Funds for policy development, finalisation and promulgation	No funds, poor citizen understanding of policy process, determining the consequences of non-adherence, weak enforcement processes
	<b>Anti-discrimination policies in political appointments and in the creation of committees</b>	Inculcate culture of meritocracy and equality Fair/transparent political parties Strengthen the HRC	The state, Local Government Chairman and Ward and Village heads	Policy focus: transparency, inclusivity, meritocracy in selection processes, Conduct FGD in developing policy	15-18 months	Funds for policy development, finalisation and promulgation	Differing views and inability to reach agreement, lack of access to information, failure to engage certain groups in the policy process, lack of political will
	<b>Formalisation and regularisation of town hall meetings</b>	Strengthen community-based structures Increase participation of all groups in policymaking Decentralize dialogue structures and processes	Local Government Chairmen and District, Ward and Village heads	Create systematic/ formal mechanisms for citizen-state interaction, improve accountability and transparency, build trust and legitimacy, community outreach to inform/engage communities once a month, measures to ensure groups are heard and state delivers in a timely manner	3-6 months	Funds for policy development, finalisation and promulgation	Insufficient resources, failure of leadership to commit, failure to engage some groups, possibility of bias
Institutions	<b>Ministry of Peace-building</b>	Encourage inter-ethnic/inter-religious engagements Strengthen community-based structures	Governor (in calling for the creation of this body), Special Adviser to the Governor on Peace-building, CSOs, other relevant state ministries	Role: coordinate and expand peace-building activities, develop annual work plan based on needs, develop mission, vision, strategies, target groups and outcomes, recruit staff	6 months	Personnel to fill new positions, salaries, resources for expanded office space, and other costs	Lack of political will, insufficient resources, state not seeing the necessity of such a structure, politicised process based on the appointment of staff
	<b>Stronger collaboration between Special Advisers on NGOs and Peace-building</b>	Decentralize dialogue structures and processes	Office of the Special Adviser on NGOs and Special Adviser on Peace-building, CSOs	Weekly meetings to discuss new developments, and new programmes, monthly meetings with CSOs on PB	1-3 months	Meeting space, personnel	Lack of political will, numerous responsibilities of both offices, lack of timely communication

**Table 7.2: Economic Component of Peace-building Framework outlining actors and institutions responsible, implementation, timeframes, resources and challenges**

ECONOMIC							
		Priority Areas	Actors/Institutions	Implementation	Timeframes	Resources	Challenges
<b>Programmes</b>	<b>Job creation and mentoring programmes for at risk youth</b>	Addressing the needs of the youth Victim compensation Creating inter-religious economic ventures Develop partnerships	Private sector, Ministry for Youth, established entrepreneurs in society, civil society, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Commissioner (Youth and sport), Ministry of Youth Development	Comprehensive mapping of the livelihoods, assets and resources in conflict-affected communities starting at the LGA level Skills development in critical areas: agriculture, entrepreneurship, Training programmes in conflict resolution, civic participation, literacy, math skills in as many locations as possible Mentoring programmes Peer mentoring programmes	6-12 months to conduct needs-based assessment, identify recipients and partners and run programmes	Training facilities, equipment for services (hairdressing, crafts, agriculture, carpentry, fabrication, accounting), micro-credit soft loans, computers for training, resource persons	Competing needs, lack of resources – mainly financial, challenges with prioritization, failing to meet expectations
	<b>State-wide infrastructural development programmes</b>	Decentralize development Provide accessible roads Victim compensation Develop partnerships with the private sector Reinstate markets and rebuild integrated markets	Ministry of Water Resources and Rural Development, Ministry of Works, Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, Private sector, development partners, African Union, energy sectors	Target Groups: LGA and districts and wards within it Conduct needs-based consultation with communities to determine their needs in order of priority; needs must be met according to priority.	Timeframes determined by the context and resources needed for each priority Implementation should be within the calendar year (12 months from identifying priority areas)	Team to conduct needs-based assessment, identify priority areas, financial and budgetary exercise, identifying projects and conducting tender processes	Competing needs, prioritization of these needs, lack of political will

**Table 7.3: Psycho-social Component of Peace-building Framework outlining actors and institutions responsible, implementation, timeframes, resources and challenges**

PSYCHO-SOCIAL							
		Priority Areas	Actors/Institutions	Implementation	Timeframes	Resources	Challenges
Programmes	Peace clubs in schools	Develop and instil a culture of non-violence, forgiveness and tolerance	Ministry of Education Heads of primary/secondary schools, teachers, CSOs	Develop and roll out plan for implementation Develop content and methodology Run one-day workshops to equip teachers assigned to run these clubs	12 months	Funds to develop content and methodology, costs of training teachers	Lack of resources, Lack of political will Inability to access all parts of the state
	Compulsory peace education programmes and curricula	Develop a culture of non-violence, forgiveness and tolerance Support for trauma healing	Ministry of Education, principals of primary and secondary schools, CECOMPS	Engage experts in developing content and methodology, conduct research on existing peace education programmes, finalise content and test pilot programmes	24 months	Experts to develop curriculum, printing and distributing materials	Lack of political will, poor communication, lengthy bureaucratic processes
	Radio programmes	Build coexistence Increase participation of all groups in policy Encourage inter-ethnic and inter-religious engagements	Media Houses (TV and Radio), Ministry of Information and Communication, CSOs, inter-faith organisations	Weekly radio programmes to all areas Content: progress on peace-building efforts, citizen engagement, civic education, reconciliation and social cohesion. Use panel discussions	1-2 months	Payments to media houses to allocate slots for programmes, per diems for guest speakers, funds to improve radio communications across the state	Lack of political commitment and lack of funds
	Psychological debriefing and trauma healing programmes	Trauma healing Rehabilitation Develop a culture of non-violence	Ministry of Health, public and private hospitals psychologists, psychotherapists and relevant mental health professionals Community leaders, Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs	Development of trauma centres and mobile trauma units, develop small unit within the Ministry of Health that provide free psychological counselling and general care Create a Trauma Recovery Programme and a State Trauma Centre, experts to provide services through short-term community outreach and campaigns, and student trainees to volunteer	15 months	Vehicles, office space, hiring of relevant experts, salaries	Staff with limited training in trauma management Insufficient resources to develop facilities, poor transportation facilities, lack of political will
Policies	Peace education	Build coexistence Develop a culture of non-violence, forgiveness and tolerance	Ministry of Education, CSOs, CECOMPS, primary, secondary and tertiary schools	Creation of a state policy and a comprehensive framework of action on education for social cohesion and peace Conduct an analysis and mapping exercise of existing programmes, actors involved in peace education	6-12 months	Vehicles to transport key officials to engage communities, policy promulgation processes through print	Lack of understanding of the policy-making process by communities, lack of resources
Institutions	Peace Education Unit, Ministry of Education and Institute of Peace Education	Develop a culture of non-violence Instil a culture of forgiveness and tolerance	Ministry of Education, Special Adviser on Peace-building, CECOMPS, CSOs	Coordinate development of a state-wide strategy for peace education, develop peace education curriculum for schools, conduct research on peace-building	8 months	Additional staff, office set-up costs, financial costs	Lack of political buy-in, lack of resources

**Table 7.4: Security Component of Peace-building Framework outlining actors and institutions responsible, implementation, timeframes, resources and challenges**

SECURITY							
		Priority Areas	Actors/Institutions	Implementation	Timeframes	Resources	Challenges
Programmes	<b>Reform the security sectors</b>	Disarmament initiatives Capacity development for security actors Curb sale/transfer of arms and drugs Increase financial compensation Investigate conduct of security forces Streamline/coordinate all security actors	Permanent Secretary for Security, police, border services, National Intelligence, Corrections, Ministry of Justice United Nations	Focus: build capacity and restore legitimacy Active recruitment, training and developing key units for bomb detection, investigations, intelligence gathering, stronger disciplinary measures for attacking innocent civilians and corruption, improving security and citizen relationships, mechanisms to investigate human rights abuses	24-60 months	Vehicles to conduct recruitment drives across the state, Funds to conduct trainings, hire experts to develop and deliver training manual on human rights, citizen engagement, and related content, developing screening processes, training on various tactics and to improve skills	Highly politicised process Requires huge financial resources
	<b>National reorientation programmes for security actors</b>	Reduce polarisation of security personnel Capacity development for security actors	CSOs, Police and Military Heads, Permanent Secretary (Security)	Compulsory sensitization sessions for security personnel, run by experts, mandatory attendance.	6-12 months	Expert trainers, compensation for them Cost of training facilities and training materials	Lack of commitment, insufficient resources, absenteeism
Policies	<b>Stricter enforcement of anti-corruption laws</b>	Investigation of security forces Delink political appointments from ethnic allegiances Inculcate culture of meritocracy/equality	Justice sector, media, CSOs	Creation of state anti-corruption outfit Develop policy through FGD with citizens, Policy will identify measures to address corruption	3-6 months	Vehicles, personnel, policy promulgation through print, community engagement processes	Lack of resources, poor access to information, lack of political will
Institutions	<b>Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms/increase capacity of informal courts to address grassroots conflicts</b>	Create alternative dispute resolution mechanisms Timely and publicised judicial processes Strengthen traditional institutions	Police stations, CSOs Ministry of Justice, local authorities, community courts, religious leaders, community elders, Ministry of Justice	Focus on mediation, mini-trials and private judging, set up across the state, situated in police stations	12-15 months	Experts to fill key positions, financial costs for set-up, personnel, resources,	Corruption, lack of political will, insufficient resources
	<b>Community-led early warning and early response mechanisms</b>	Strengthen community-based security groups	Community watchdogs, Heads of Villages, Wards, LGA Chairmen, police, military, Permanent Secretary (Security)	Mechanisms set up at the ward or village level coupled with security committees	12 months	Rapid response capacities (mobile phones), sufficient and timely response mechanisms, personnel to be part of these mechanisms	Lack of political will, poor commitment from community, no transparency, abuse of position by members
	<b>Security committees at ward and village levels</b>	Decentralised and accountable security	State, police, Heads of Districts and Wards, Chairmen of LGA	Can also be responsible for early warning and response at community level Identify roles and responsibilities, Collaborate with police, CBOs and local communities, weekly meetings but can meet in cases of emergency	15-20 months	Rapid response capacity, vehicles, mobile phones, personnel	Lack of experienced personnel to be members, corruption, abuse of position by members, possible bias in selection of members

**7.1.4. The three goals of conflict transformation, namely, reducing violence, addressing injustice and rebuilding relationships are relevant for Plateau state as they provide responses to the underlying causes of the conflict and direct violence.**

One of this study's objectives was to understand how conflict transformation could be applicable to the case of Plateau state. To shed more light on conflict transformation, this study adopts the view of UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon that peace-building is useful as a tool for transformation as it is not just about "bricks and mortar – it is a transformative process involving changing attitudes about how to manage conflict" (Ki-moon, 2008, p.2). Following this definition and examining the data from the field, conflict transformation requires that individuals and societies be equipped with not only the right attitudes but also the relevant skills and knowledge to manage and respond to conflicts non-violently. Furthermore, it requires changing their views and perceptions not only of their so-called "opponents" but also on how they relate to them (Ki-moon, 2008). Their attitudes, views and perceptions should be shaped by a desire for peace and seeing conflicts resolved peacefully.

Similarly, John Lederach (2003) notes that conflict transformation is only possible when the root causes of conflict are addressed and violent tendencies are corrected in an effort to avert the recurrence of conflict. Conflict transformation requires that the causes of the conflict be eliminated. In the case of Plateau state, this will mean that the marginalisation, exclusion and inequalities that have worsened relations between groups need to be removed. It also means that the inclination or motivation to use violence is removed in order to avoid future conflict. The major root causes will have to be addressed or else violence will merely be suppressed and will erupt at the slightest provocation. Conflict transformation can be achieved when all stakeholders make concerted efforts to address the root causes and commit themselves to embrace and use non-violent approaches to resolve conflict. This requires patience from all parties before the gains can be widely shared and seen. Efforts to correct violent tendencies, avert the recurrence of conflict and address the root causes of such conflicts are lengthy. Lederach makes a strong argument that identity and relationship are two root causes of social conflict (Lederach & Maiese, 2003). Identity therefore shapes relationships and how conflict is expressed. Thus, in designing programmes that will transform conflict in Plateau State, it is important to understand social perceptions of how identity is

linked to power and address changes in the systems to ensure access and participation as proposed by Lederach & Maiese (2003).

Based on this brief discussion, conflict transformation offers strong elements that can shape peace-building responses to the instability in Plateau state. These are discussed further by applying its three goals of reducing violence, addressing injustices and rebuilding relationships (Lederach, 2003).

### **a) Reducing Violence**

While reducing violence is an important goal of conflict transformation, it is also a significant precondition for peace-building (OECD, 2010, p.31). Reducing violence requires that the issues and contents of disputes, conflict patterns and root causes are addressed (Lederach, 2003). This can be achieved in a few ways in Plateau state.

Firstly, reducing violence requires that the right mechanisms be in place to prevent its sudden eruption. These mechanisms must also prevent the need to resort to violence as the first response option. The mechanisms focus on alternative dispute resolution, dialogue, and community engagement where citizens (irrespective of their religion or ethnicity) can resolve conflicts in a timely manner. This calls for a decentralised, involved and non-biased state that engages its citizens frequently and in a timely manner in order to respond to grievances and issues. This ensures that grievances are not left to fester as they are given attention and are resolved.

Secondly, the security sector under the direction of the state needs to create an enabling environment for conflict transformation by protecting human life and preventing violence before it occurs. In the case of Plateau state, violence can be reduced when the safety of neighbourhoods is guaranteed, security agencies have the capacity and resources to protect citizens during the sudden outbreak of violence, regular and timely security checks are conducted, and strong intelligence and investigation units are created. Similarly, violence is reduced when there are credible and timely judicial processes. This means that perpetrators are caught and prosecuted in a timely manner and that they face the consequences of their crime.



Biased and corrupt security actors will impede efforts to reduce violence and continue to inflict suffering on innocent individuals in the name of security. They need to face disciplinary action and be given the opportunity to return to work. They should also be trained in human rights and citizen engagement to equip them for their role. In cases where they have been disciplined repeatedly and there is no change, they should be dismissed and offered alternative positions. This would increase people's confidence in the security apparatus so they do not have to take justice and security into their own hands thereby leading to a recurring cycle of violence. Furthermore, security needs to be decentralised which means that security actors need to work with security committees at grassroots level. Stronger security measures are needed particularly in LGA that have experienced the most violence. Community-based security structures need to be well-equipped and resourced to track suspicious activities and develop better early warning and early response mechanisms.

Thirdly, violence can be reduced by building a culture of non-violence that promotes alternatives like mediation, problem solving, discussion and dialogue. In this environment, individuals and communities are "valued and able to participate" and there is no fear of violence (IFRC, 2011, p. 3-4). In creating a culture of non-violence, it is important that all major ethnic groups enlighten their youth to stop using violence. Children should also be taught about peace and mutual coexistence from a young age. It could be argued that if people can use violence, they can also be socially reengineered to embrace peaceful approaches through awareness raising, sensitisation, and being taught non-violent approaches and tools to resolve conflict.

#### **b) Addressing injustice**

Frustrations and anger against the state surface when people are denied justice (Mattinuddin, 2009, p.995). In the case of Plateau state, injustice occurs when people are denied access to opportunities and benefits because they are of a different religion or ethnicity. They are also excluded from political processes and development and infrastructural projects because of their geographical location or identity. These injustices, marginalisation and exclusion can be addressed in the following ways.

Firstly, improving the participation of all groups in policymaking is important so their needs are determined and they can propose solutions to the issues that affect them. Participation can be improved through civic education, the formalisation of town hall meetings, and including people in determining infrastructural needs in their communities.

Secondly, it is important to meet the needs of the vulnerable in society. This involves establishing healing centres for victims of trauma, identifying appropriate ways to compensate victims and provide them with skills acquisition and employment opportunities and empowering women, particularly widows, and the youth. It also means meeting the development needs of communities whether they are predominantly Muslims or Christians.

Thirdly, it requires creating a level playing ground for all groups where merit is at the core of recruitment and promotion processes. Ethnocentrism and nepotism should not be tolerated. This will require efforts to redress the injustices of the past and reverse entrenched and systematic inequalities. This can be achieved by ensuring that certain groups do not dominate political appointments in Plateau state. It also calls for the effective implementation of government policies and the creation of programmes devoid of bias and discrimination. Skewed political appointments where members from the Berom ethnic group head all lucrative ministries send a message to other groups that they are not important; this should be reviewed to become more inclusive. The equal treatment of citizens and ethnic and religious groups will help build confidence in the state. In addition, stronger enforcement of anti-discrimination policies is necessary. Borrowing from Mattinuddin (2009, p.995), efforts to address injustice require that security actors treat citizens and perpetrators with dignity and uphold their human rights; perpetrators should be prosecuted irrespective of their ethnic or religious affiliation, and judicial mechanisms should be timely in their execution of justice particularly in cases relating to ethno-religious violence.

A transparent and visible state is important in addressing injustice. Many respondents, particularly in the LGA were not aware of any government programmes and initiatives to address and resolve the conflict. This is because they have seen little or no economic improvement or infrastructural development in their areas. Other respondents were

aware or obtained very little information on the government's role in development projects or inter-group dialogue efforts in the capital city of Jos. In response to this dilemma, the state should provide basic services in a transparent, accountable and inclusive manner while understanding local needs are and building relationships at the local level (Sisk, and Risley, 2005, p.2).

Linked to this is the importance of timely communication in removing perceptions of bias or favouritism. Timely communication and transparency will also reduce the possibility of misconceptions, rumours, and perceptions that the state is disconnected. The government should inform citizens of the services that will be provided in their areas after consulting them on their needs. This is an example of detailed and in-depth engagement by the state – a situation where citizens are involved in policy-making and implementation through consultative processes at various levels. In being transparent, groups are involved in policy decisions, from conception to finalisation.

### **c) Rebuilding relationships**

Relationships have been soured in Plateau state due to long-held grievances and the impact of the violence. This has resulted in segregated societies, polarised opinions and tensions that have triggered violence at various instances. Relationships are at the core of peace-building efforts and determine its failure or success. Citing Kelman (1999), Gawrec (2006, p.443) notes that transforming relations should involve “communities’ mutual acceptance, cooperative interaction, a feeling of security, space for human dignity, the institutionalisation of a mechanism for problem-solving and finally broad reconciliation”. In Plateau state, these concepts speak to the need for groups to mutually respect one another, cooperate to resolve the common security threats that affect them, and trust and treat one another with human dignity. Furthermore, trauma healing is essential in transforming relationships as it creates an environment where individuals and groups can move forward from the past, communication channels are opened and interaction and dialogue create spaces to start building relationships.

Tolerance of differences and orientation on the need to live in peace is very important. Individuals need to be enlightened about peaceful coexistence and groups need to become aware that they cannot live in isolation. Some respondents noted that conflict

transformation requires patience and love. Belligerents are brought together to talk to one another, love one another, heal victims' trauma and create an avenue to engage the youth. Transforming conflict and building relationships requires honesty, openness, and the rapid resolution of disputes with love and sincerity of purpose. The relationship between the state and its citizens needs to be rebuilt. Trust must be re-established between the parties. The fact that the state is seen (or perceived) to be biased against specific religions or ethnic groups is a major problem for conflict transformation and needs to be addressed.

The data revealed that conflict transformation involves moving forward from conflict, not seeing it as a negative but as a positive force for change, and not regarding the perpetrators as criminals but as people whose views and needs have been neglected. Conflict transformation can be achieved by changing one's perception from a "them versus us" mentality to regarding everyone as "us". This will require the government and society to create avenues for listening and building mutual trust. There is also a need to remove the need for retaliation or vengeance.

*Dialogue* was identified by the respondents as a key ingredient in transforming relationships. In Plateau state, the state has used dialogue to bring actors from across the divide to share their views with one another and make peace.

Some of the lessons learned include the need for neutrality on the part of government during dialogue, ensuring that dialogue processes are not elitist focusing on actors that wield much influence, and creating avenues and spaces for both formal and informal dialogue processes at all levels (districts, wards, villages, and local government). Fisher (1997, p.121) argues that useful dialogue is one in which ideas "can be fruitfully fed into the policymaking process". Thus, conflict transformation calls for two forms of dialogue, dialogue for addressing grievances and building relationships and dialogue for finding policy solutions to the underlying causes of violence. Kuttab (1988, p.89) cautions that, if dialogue is substituted for action, this will create a double negative scenario where:

it assuages the conscience of members of the oppressor group to the point where they feel they do not have to do anything else...and for the members of the oppressed group

it becomes a safety valve for venting frustrations. This leads to a reinforcement and perpetuation of existing oppression (Kuttab, 1988, p. 89).

Dialogue processes should not occur only after violent episodes or be merely used to fulfil obligations. Structures should be established for regular and on-going dialogue. Dialogue cannot exist in a vacuum; the root causes of the conflict need to be addressed while efforts are made to restore trust and build relationships.

In conclusion, conflict transformation provides a multi-pronged approach to resolving conflict. The three goals of reducing violence, addressing injustices and rebuilding relationships, provide an appropriate foundation for peace-building. It also brings particular focus to the relationships that underpin the conflict, not just at government, but also at grassroots level.

## **7.2. Limitations of the Study**

A major limitation of this study was the unavailability of high-level state officials and security personnel to participate even though they were informed in advance. Appointments with state officials were rescheduled a number of times and eventually did not take place. In some cases, appointments had to be rescheduled on numerous occasions due to unexpected developments. Efforts to reach out to security officials on duty in the streets were rejected because they had to follow protocol and only their top officials could speak on behalf of their institutions. The researcher was able to engage with other mid-level state officials and security officials that made themselves available during either the FGD or KII.

Another limitation was that the study could not cover all the LGAs in the state; this might have provided the opportunity to access new data that was not raised in the FGD and KII. Furthermore, only five respondents were selected from each LGA. However, it was clear that saturation<sup>49</sup> point had been reached towards the end of the FGD and

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<sup>49</sup> In the National Centre for Research Methods Review (2012), a wide range of experts provide advice on what numbers are sufficient for qualitative interviews. Adler and Adler (2012:9-10) suggest between 12 and 60 interviews (with a mean of 30) in order to avoid difficulties such as endless data gathering and time constraints. Ragin (2012:6) suggests 20 for an M.A. thesis and 50 for a PhD dissertation; however these require an in-depth interrogation of the purpose of the study. Bryman (2012:18) cites the work of Gerson & Horowitz (2002:223) that suggests that

KII. In addition, this study initially aimed to obtain equal participation of men and women. However, this was not possible and more men were interviewed. It was very difficult to achieve parity because men held key roles in many organisations. Efforts were made to include women in the data collection process by consciously approaching them in the interviews with ordinary citizens and by informally requesting organisations to provide female personnel to engage in the FGD. To fill this gap, male respondents were asked to give their views on issues that affected women and possible solutions.

This study has shown that the conflict in Plateau state is very complex as it deals with land issues, cattle grazing, and possible links with Boko Haram. These areas emerged in the fieldwork but go beyond the scope of this study. While they were not unpacked, other important programmes, policies and institutions were examined by identifying the goals, outcomes, and actors responsible for implementation, the timeframes, resources required and challenges/limitations. These programmes, policies and institutions focused on specific political, economic, security and psycho-social priorities (See Tables 7.1 – 7.4). The unexamined areas offer opportunities for further research on how these can be included in the peace-building framework.

### **7.3. Implications for Policy and Practice**

A few key findings that could be relevant for policymakers and practitioners emerged from this study. These are useful in designing and shaping responses for long-term peace and conflict transformation efforts.

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fewer than 60 interviews are insufficient to provide solid conclusions and that more than 150 produces excessive information that cannot be efficiently and expeditiously analysed. Becker (2012:14) concludes that the number of interviews will change daily as more is learnt and ideas are revised. Brannen (2012:16) suggests that the number of qualitative interviews depends on the type of research question to be addressed and the proposed methodology. Guest et al. (2006) conducted interviews with women from two West African countries and saturation was achieved after 12 interviews due to the specificity of the topic and the homogeneous nature of the women studied. Francis et al. (2010:1234) also note that interviews were halted when, after 10 interviews and three further interviews, the absence of new themes was defined as the point of data saturation. A study of PhD studies showed that the most common sample sizes were 20 and 30. Citing Ritchie et al. (2003), Mason (2010) identifies factors such as the types of data collection methods used; budget and available resources; multiple samples within one study and the number of selection criteria as affecting the potential size of the sample.

Conflict transformation theory advocates for a multi-entry approach to resolving conflict (Berghof Foundation, 2012 and Lederach, 2003); thus, it is important that states utilise its ideas to develop long-term and sustainable responses to conflicts in their territory. This study has shown that conflict transformation theory can have a major impact and can influence the practice of peace-building, as it not only takes into account the political environment or the security situation but also prioritises relationships and principles such as non-violence and tolerance. Success can be achieved when states subscribe to conflict transformation especially in situations where conflict has become frequent and deadly. Going a step further, the three goals of conflict transformation, namely, reducing violence, addressing injustice and restoring fragile relationships can provide starting points for dealing with the political, economic, psycho-social and security components presented in this study (see Table 7. 5 below).

**Table 7.5: Matching Political, Economic, Psycho-Social and Security Components in Plateau State to Conflict Transformation Goals**

<b>Reducing Violence</b>	<b>Addressing Injustice</b>	<b>Rebuilding Relationships</b>
Streamline and coordinate all security actors	Redesign settlements	Build coexistence
Develop a culture of non-violence	Create inter-religious economic ventures	Support for trauma healing
Strengthen community-based security groups	Timely and publicised judicial processes	Instil a culture of forgiveness and tolerance
Address the needs of the youth	Decentralize development	Encourage inter-ethnic and inter-religious engagements
Capacity development for security actors	Victim compensation	Build a culture of allegiance to the state rather than identity
Create alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (ADRMS)	Decentralize dialogue structures and processes	Rehabilitation
Create more safe zones	Provide accessible roads	
Decentralised and accountable security	Reinstate markets and rebuild integrated markets	
Financial compensation for military personnel	Inculcate a culture of meritocracy and equality	
Disarmament initiatives	Replace indigene with residence rights	
Curb the sale and transfer of arms and drugs	Investigations into the conduct of security forces	
Reduce polarisation of security personnel	Develop partnerships with the private sector	

It is also important to note that while security, fair and legitimate political systems, and economic development are important factors in restoring peace and stability, psycho-social issues also require sufficient attention. Unaddressed psycho-social issues can limit long-term peace and security. These mental, emotional and psychological issues are even more salient in fuelling a cycle of violence and limiting societies from moving forward peacefully. There is a need for intense policy discourse and analysis on how trauma healing and a culture of non-violence can be regularised and systematised. Aspects such as trauma assistance, psychological debriefing and general counselling need to be examined particularly in the context of Plateau state. This study suggests that relevant programmes, institutions and policies be developed to successfully provide such assistance.

The data from this study revealed challenges relating to compensating victims, particularly how to determine adequate compensation, and how to ensure that everyone receives compensation as it is a very expensive process. Some of the respondents felt that the state does not have sufficient resources to offer compensation. If the state is made responsible for compensation, the probability of it working to prevent violence will be higher. This is because the cost of compensation will be extremely high; conflict prevention is a better alternative. Furthermore, it might increase individual commitment on the part of state officials to the peace process. For the individual and the collective, this might help in the development of community-based rehabilitation and compensation programmes, which will foster unity and corporate responsibility. It is also very difficult to measure adequate compensation, especially in situations where lives have been lost. While some governments cannot handle the financial burden of compensation, they should at best provide necessities, improve amenities and provide opportunities for skills development and economic empowerment. Furthermore, the state should collaborate and work with the private sector to identify appropriate compensation mechanisms.

While peace-building at the national level is complex and national peace-building frameworks are extensive and multi-faceted, this complexity also manifests itself at the sub-national level. This study has illustrated the challenges associated with managing relationships between the centre and subnational units in peace-building and conflict prevention. The Nigerian state and the government of Plateau state must complement



rather than compete with each other in peace-building. Clear lines of communication, strong information networks, and stronger coordination is needed to ensure that peace-building efforts are not stifled or duplicated. As the government that is closer to the grassroots, state governments need to be given more control and resources to promote peace-building and security measures.

The data further revealed that the different components of the peace-building framework are linked. Success in the political components will determine success in the economic, security and psycho-social components. For instance, job creation (Table 7.2) will limit the involvement of the youth in violence as their skills and entrepreneurial abilities are enhanced. In another example, creating alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, community-led early warning and early response mechanisms and security committees at the ward and village levels will improve and decentralise security (Table 7.4). Looking at Table 7.1, providing civic education will improve citizen participation during town hall meetings as well as their engagement with government. Thus, while political, economic, psycho-social and security needs are different, they are “interdependent and you cannot solve one without solving the other” (PBSO, 2012, p.4). According to the World Bank’s World Development Report on Conflict, Security, and Development, “military-only, justice-only or development-only solutions will falter” (World Bank, 2011). The linkages are also seen between actors as they need to work together in order to achieve success.

In Nigeria, there is significant reliance on political office as a source of wealth and it is regarded as one of the quickest ways to unearned riches. Through control of political power at the federal level or even at the state or local government level, one is able to access resources for personal gain, to develop one’s community or advance the interests of one’s group. On behalf of their groups, “politicians, other individuals, and groups with enormous economic and social power, privilege, and other resources see politics as the gateway to controlling the vast economic resources of the land” (Smah, 2008, p.79). As a result of the “obscene display of opulence by public office holders and ostentatious living of many politicians, [the public perceive] that every elected or appointed public officer is amassing wealth from the public treasury” (Ojo, 2008, p.119). There is therefore a need to check these excesses of power more strongly by enforcing punitive measures. It is important to develop and identify other sources of

wealth and encourage an entrepreneurial spirit. Private sector investment should continue to be encouraged.

This study has also shown that the shift from the politicisation of ethnicity and religion to a meritocracy-based system will not be easy. While some respondents called for the removal of ethnic or religious sentiments and their delineation from the political space, others pointed to the need for quota systems and the equal representation of ethnic and religious groups in various political institutions and appointments. The question is whether a merit system will be fair, as some groups might not have a chance to hold key political positions or gain employment because of poor education or lack of experience. Striking a balance is important yet complicated in a complex society like Plateau state. While it is practical to put aside religious and ethnic identities in all spheres, especially politically, it seems unrealistic. Nonetheless, a meritocracy is achievable and will bring about positive results. It would not only improve efficiency, as highly skilled individuals would perform key duties, but also enhance transparency and reduce the religious and ethnic divides that have become entrenched in the state.

#### **7.4. Future Research**

A few areas for further research are presented below. This would help to strengthen some of the arguments put forward in this study and enhance the success of the peace-building framework.

Future research could examine the role of other key actors like the Federal Government, international organisations, civil society and the security actors in peace-building and conflict transformation and how the gaps and challenges they experience can be overcome. It is also important to further unpack how equality can be achieved in a multicultural society like Plateau state and how some of the programmes, policies and institutions can achieve a level of equality that is accepted by at least a majority of the population.

Further research could be conducted on other local case studies in Nigeria and from other countries particularly subnational peace-building efforts. These cases might reveal a different set of solutions to conflict and good practice or lessons can be learned.

In terms of the areas not covered in this study, future research could focus on any of the key peace-building priorities (political, economic, psycho-social and security) and unpack them in further detail.

Insecurity is a major problem that requires further investigation through understanding and mapping the different security actors and their role within Plateau state as well as identifying areas for collaboration and recommendations for action. Future research could also focus on the dismantling of slums in Plateau state and how this can contribute to peace and development; consider the creation of a truth commission and assess how this would function and contribute to peace and stability; and assess how a system of meritocracy could be developed and sustained.

Peace-building beyond the state level is essential to conflict transformation. Borrowing from Gawerc (2006), future research could examine grassroots peace work and people-to-people activities in order to determine the applicability and relevance of conflict transformation in Plateau state. John Lederach (2006) emphasises the importance of the grassroots in conflict transformation; peace-building thus calls for bottom-up approaches to gain widespread support and avoid failures in the peace-building process. The lessons offered by communities and traditional institutions in relation to conflict transformation could also be explored.

## **CHAPTER EIGHT: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION**

Before concluding this study, a list of recommendations is provided below. This provides key points for action by the state as it continues to engage in peace-building efforts in the short, medium and long term. These recommendations also identify the required conditions for ensuring the successful implementation of policies, the development of institutions and the creation of new programmes where necessary. These will contribute to the success of peace efforts. Appendix B presents these recommendations according to the short, medium and long term.

### **8.1. RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **8.1.1. Political recommendations**

- a) Engage in research on the effects of a functional federalism for Plateau state and how it can be effective in this system.
- b) Remove discriminatory policies, increase citizen engagement, and remove bias within the state coffers, as the equal treatment of all by the state, regardless of religion or ethnicity, is essential in bringing about sustainable peace.
- c) Undergo a governance review to remove all aspects of marginalisation and to replace the concept of indigenisation with ‘Nigerianism’. In this regard, governance systems must refrain from pandering to the needs of a particular ethnic group in the state, which causes dissatisfaction among other groups.
- d) Engage with communities on an on-going basis, particularly before bills are released or taken through the legislature.
- e) Collaborate with CSOs to tap into existing programmes in which they are involved.
- f) Provide the state Office of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) with sufficient resources to carry out its mandate. It is important that its presence and responsibilities are made public and that security officers ensure confidentiality in their engagements with those lodging complaints about violence or abuse in the state.
- g) Engage in a broad decentralisation campaign that focuses on security, development and dialogue. This should involve direct engagement with the population at local government, district, ward and village levels. A needs-

assessment approach could be used to ensure broad-based and bottom up engagement. Obtaining first-hand information from the grassroots ensures that responses meet people's needs. The state must inform and update citizens on government projects and activities in their areas.

- h) Expand the Office of the Special Adviser to the Governor on Peace-building into a fully-fledged Ministry of Peace-Building. This will involve a shift from the usual ad-hoc and short-term government projects to more long-term, inclusive and comprehensive peace-building engagement. This will require that peace-building and conflict sensitivity is entrenched in the government's three pillars of Education, Health, and Human and Capital Development.
- i) Hold an annual or bi-annual workshop with representatives of each ethnic group to discuss common societal challenges rather than indigene-settler issues. The findings from these processes would be developed into a report for implementation. Progress made would be evaluated against the recommendations of these reports.
- j) Ensure that political actors take responsibility and work together with those in leadership positions to bring peace to the state. Politics and confrontation should not replace collaboration and cooperation amongst the political elite.
- k) Modify the structure of the Jos North LGA to make the Local Council more representative of the desire of all the communities to foster a sense of community and belonging.

### **8.1.2. Economic recommendations**

- l) Commit efforts and resources to end the high numbers of strikes in tertiary institutions and multiply efforts to provide job opportunities for the youth, as idle youth are more susceptible to drugs and engage in other social vices like crime and other violent activities.
- m) Ensure that political leaders refrain from being partisan or favouring specific ethnic groups and instead focus on how to develop the whole state to benefit all groups.
- n) Identify and develop the resources in each LGA, and build the capacity of the youth in these administrative areas so that they contribute to developing their local governments while improving their economic livelihoods.

- o) Practice true federalism where the state can live and sustain itself on its resources and by taxing its residents.
- p) Roll out a variety of state-wide skills acquisition programmes to encourage the youth to develop their capacities in various skill-sets.
- q) Redesign the current setting of urban slums to decongest crowded areas and through intervention programmes such as subsidies and addressing urban poverty.
- r) Reinstate key markets like the Jos Main Market and provide spaces for inter-religious markets with proper security.
- s) Develop a policy and culture of meritocracy at all levels especially for political appointments and the civil service. Avenues should be created for skills development for government staff particularly in conflict transformation and peace-building.
- t) Prioritise state-wide infrastructural development projects including access to good roads across the state.
- u) Partner with the private sector to create jobs for unemployed youth
- v) Act against discrimination in education and employment opportunities between indigenes and settlers in the short term while a long term national solution is in the making. All forms of exclusion by political players must be avoided.

### **8.1.3. Psycho-social recommendations**

- a) Eliminate policies that promote allegiance to ethnic or religious groups and replace them with policies that focus on Nigeria as a whole.
- b) Create trauma assistance units, train and deploy personnel who can provide rehabilitation and trauma support, and provide sufficient funds to implement the above.
- c) Create avenues for public discussions on the necessity, nature and work of truth commissions and the Human Rights Commission as part of resolving the legacy of the past. These can take place through various public forums – schools and community meetings, through various forms of media and through engaging specific sectors of society in these spaces.
- d) Roll out peace education programmes at primary, secondary and tertiary institutions in order to inculcate non-violent methods of conflict transformation among this group and in communities, and to limit any radicalisation processes amongst these groups. Furthermore, the Ministry of Education should coordinate, not influence, the development and implementation of a state-wide peace education curriculum and programme across both the formal and informal education sectors. The Ministry of Peace-building should also work with community-based organisations and key community actors to teach people about peace.
- e) Encourage and coordinate frequent multi-level, inter-ethnic and inter-religious engagement through sports, dialogue, joint celebration of religious holidays and inter-school engagements.
- f) Develop awareness of non-violent methods and approaches to conflict resolution.
- g) Systematically and regularly spread ideas of tolerance, love, mutual respect, humanity, *Ubuntu*, and forgiveness through various mediums.

#### **8.1.4. Security recommendations**

- a) The Federal Government should accord the powers of Chief Security Officer to the State Governor. The state government should be given full responsibility and have the final say on responses to security threats and situations of insecurity. The Federal Government can act as a check and balance to ensure that the state government does not abuse this power.
- b) Train and equip the police and other security actors in counter-insurgency and intelligence approaches to fighting terrorism, such as bomb detection, managing mob violence and providing support in resolving disputes through the creation of ADRMs at police stations.
- c) Address human right abuses and end the culture of impunity.
- d) Introduce and strongly enforce strict sanctions and punitive measures for gross professional misconduct among security personnel and other categories of public servants.
- e) Disqualify and ban any politician found supporting violence, drug abuse or providing weapons in an effort to contest or occupy any public office.
- f) In reducing reliance on the national police force, create a state police outfit, which should be adequately monitored for abuse of the population. Efforts and resources should focus on training police who focus on the national interest rather than specific individual or subjective interests, and who are willing to perform their duties with no fear and with fairness. These individuals need to be trained, effectively organised, and well-disciplined and should be held accountable when they fail in their duties. In addition to increasing the number of state police, adequate resources must be provided for compensation. This would hopefully deter them from accepting bribes.
- g) Increase the numbers of security personnel particularly in the outlying LGA. While it can be argued that the city of Jos is relatively secure, the same cannot be said of communities outside the capital city. The state should therefore deploy security officials to LGA, particularly hotspots like Wase and Bokkos. It is important that community-based security structures (representative of all groups) work together with deployed officials to improve security. Improve the networks of communication from the capital city of Jos to other LGA, districts,



wards and villages, particularly in the area of security. The state must also develop a comprehensive communication strategy to educate and inform the population about peace efforts and progress.

- h) Ensure transparent and public recruitment processes for the state police and other relevant positions. Individuals should be recruited through public and open processes and not through personal connections or highly politicised and religious channels.
- i) Improve and strengthen early warning and response units in order to improve security and prevent violence. Citizens must be informed of government efforts and developments in this area.
- j) Create a State Tribunal to address the violent conflicts in the state. This would ensure that justice is adequately and rapidly meted out. The Tribunal should have an investigative bureau attached to it and it must work hand-in-hand with the Human Rights Commission.
- k) Strengthen inter-agency coordination among security agencies and strengthen existing agencies including the state-led “Operation Rainbow” through capacity building, increased funding and joint collaboration on key projects.
- l) Provide safe zones and security posts in strategic areas within the Jos metropolis and its environs in order to prevent civil unrest. This strategy has proven effective in Kaduna state.

## **8.2. CONCLUSION**

This study explored the concept of a peace-building framework as a response to the ethno-religious violence in Plateau state, Nigeria. It sought to identify the key programmes, policies and institutions that are required, and the political, economic, psycho-social and security components that should be included in the peace-building framework. While much has been written on the causes of conflict, this study is forward looking and prescriptive, while undertaking a visioning exercise of what a peaceful Plateau state could look like and how this can become a reality. The study has shown that ethno-religious violence in Plateau state has persisted due to the absence of a comprehensive and evidence-based peace-building framework to shape and guide the state’s intervention in reducing direct violence and addressing the underlying causes of

the ethno-religious violence. It employed conflict transformation as a critical tool in contributing to a peace-building framework.

This study was divided into eight parts. Chapter One introduced the research hypothesis, research objectives, research questions, and the purpose of the study. It unpacked the problem statement and its relevance while introducing the research methodology. In Chapter Two, a literature review unpacked and linked the key concepts employed by the study. It also set the contextual framework by examining concepts such as ethnicity, religion, the state and ethno-religious violence. Chapter Three presented a review and discussion of conflict transformation theory and political economy theory as the theoretical foundations for this study. These theories are useful in understanding the structural and root causes of conflict and how it can be addressed and prevented. Chapter Four began by setting the broad context and background of identity tensions in Nigeria and then examined these dynamics and the ensuing violence in Plateau state from 2001 to 2012. The findings from the data collection process were divided into two chapters. Chapter Five focused on key components and relevant programmes, policies and institutions that need to be included in the peace-building framework, while Chapter Six analysed and discussed the role of the state and the limitations and challenges confronting it. Chapter Seven presented and discussed four key themes that emerged from this study and examined the validity of conflict transformation theory in Plateau state.

States, civil society and citizens themselves need to pay more attention to the ethnic and religious cleavages and resulting conflict that continue to occur on the African continent. Efforts need to be stepped up to resolve these identity conflicts that result from extreme marginalisation, injustices and gross violations of human rights. The theories employed by this study are useful in understanding the relevance of a peace-building framework, the priority areas in peace-building efforts and the institutions, policies and programmes required to achieve long-term, sustainable peace. Conflict transformation theory suggests that the achievement of sustainable peace is made possible through three main goals: reducing violence, addressing injustice and rebuilding relationships. This study argues that if a peace-building framework focuses on achieving these three goals, future conflict can be prevented. Political economy theory advocates for the importance of politics and economics in understanding the

causes and responses to conflict. Conflict does not function only in a political space; economics has a significant impact. This pattern is consistent particularly in societies where identities feature in political and economic competition and marginalisation. This study focused on finding solutions to conflicts of this nature particularly at the subnational level, an area that is widely understudied.

In conclusion, the following points are emphasised:

***Conflicts remain not about ethnicity, religion or identities in general but about the marginalisation, exclusion and inequalities that are associated with them.*** These identities are superficial and act as a façade for deep-rooted issues. Identities are part of life, and for many they provide a sense of being and belonging. Since identities will always be part of human relationships and society in general, governments and societies need to embrace these differences, but not at the expense of the peace and security of communities, societies and nations.

***Peace-building solutions need to be decentralised, inclusive and based on the needs of grassroots communities.*** This is because these communities are at the core of the conflict and their members have both been victims and perpetrators of the violence. While peace-building is of the utmost importance in restoring peace it should be decentralised and should address the economic and developmental needs of groups in all areas of the state. While not the only actor, the state plays a critical role in contributing to inequalities between groups and in carrying out violence. The pivotal role of the state in resolving the root causes of the conflict and in finding long-lasting and sustainable solutions for transformation at the lowest levels cannot be overemphasised. In a federal system, the national government should be willing, if necessary, to wield more control over subnational units (states and provinces) to improve peace-building responses. It can act as a check and balance in order to avoid their abuse of power.

***A peace-building framework provides a structure and a roadmap for how the complex process of rebuilding societies is achieved.*** As shown in the previous chapter, a framework outlines the programmes, policies and institutions required for peace-building and conflict transformation, the actors and institutions responsible for

implementation, the steps involved in implementation, the estimated timelines, necessary resources, and the possible challenges that might emerge. It is a useful way to measure progress, identify gaps and build avenues for collaboration. It also brings about a coordinated and sustained response to the peace-building process.

***Peace-building requires financial resources.*** Launching a wide range of programmes, developing new policies and creating new institutions is a significant undertaking that requires substantial resources. In finding and accessing resources, high levels of corruption must be curbed. This can be achieved more rapidly through stricter enforcement of anti-corruption laws, making the public aware of government expenditure, providing transparent audit reports and mandatory jail terms for corrupt officials. Increased public pressure is also important in publicising corruption and calling for harsher responses. The continuous use of state funds for corrupt means will deplete resources for social programmes and infrastructural development. In addition, the state needs to strengthen its taxation laws and efficiently monitor how finances are used in order to avoid waste. Furthermore, it is important for Plateau state to find ways to increase its revenue and not solely rely on federal allocations.

***Peace-building is more effective in a decentralised and truly federal system where subnational units are experiencing rapid population growth.*** Given the continuously growing population and the need for quicker responses to the security threats and economic needs of constituents, states need to play a stronger role and be given the power to make key decisions on security matters. A paper by Beasley (2006) on job creation in post-conflict societies notes that, decentralisation is necessary for sustainable development and long-lasting job creation, two ingredients that are essential for peace and stability. It is also important because peace-building requires on-going engagement with the grassroots. The closer the state is to the grassroots and the more authority it has to implement key programmes, policies and institutions, the more rapidly it can move the peace-building process forward and ensure the security of its people. To avoid state abuse of such power, parliamentary oversight must be strengthened, and the federal government, the media and CSOs can act as stronger checks and balances on the state to perform effectively. There is also a need to build the capacities of local government authorities and curb their excesses.

This study is significant because it contributes to the body of knowledge on ethnic and religious competition and crisis, a major occurrence in Nigeria and other countries like Iran, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. Conflicts with an ethnic and religious face continue to plague many societies, especially in Africa and this study has contributed to the debate on how this longstanding form of conflict can be resolved in the long-term. It has also examined peace-building at the sub-national level. Although peace-building has traditionally gained attention at international and national levels, more needs to be done through sub-national peace-building efforts. This study examined what this entails and investigated what is required in a complex political context like Plateau state. It concluded that conflict transformation can provide proactive and peaceful solutions in such cases and represents a promising avenue for further exploration.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX A

#### **Guiding Questions for Focus Group Discussions and Semi-structured Key Informant Interviews**

**Objective 1: a) To assess the need for a peace-building framework by examining structural causes of violent conflict.**

##### **General Guiding Questions for Focus group Discussions:**

- a) What does peace mean in the context of Plateau State?
- b) What will peace bring to Plateau State?
- c) How can peace be achieved in Plateau State?
- d) What is the most important step in collectively achieving peace?
- e) Beyond the direct violence, what do you think are the causes of the ethno-religious violence attacks in Plateau State?
- f) What is your vision for a peaceful Plateau?
- g) How can a peace-building framework address the (a) direct, and (b) structural causes of violence in Plateau State?
- h) Is a peace-building framework useful in preventing the future reoccurrence of violence in Plateau State, how?
- i) What should a peace-building framework for Plateau State look like?

##### **Questions for Semi-Structured Interviews:**

- a) As (insert sector/organisation here),
  - a. What do you see as the peace-building priorities for Plateau State?
    - i. Politically
    - ii. Socially
    - iii. Economically
    - iv. Achieving Justice
    - v. Security
- b) How can a peace-building framework address the needs of women?
- c) What is required to achieve peace in Plateau State?

**Objective 2: b) To interrogate State capacity and challenges for peace-building and conflict transformation.**

**General Guiding Questions for Focus group Discussions:**

- a) Currently, what capacities does the state have for peace-building and conflict transformation?
- b) Do the relevant state actors and institutions clearly understand the root causes of the conflict?
- c) How can peace-building be implemented at the state level?
- d) What role should the state have in state-level peace-building efforts?
- e) Should the responsibility for conflict transformation and peace-building in Plateau
- f) State fall on the state or federal government?
- g) What should be the role of the Federal government in building peace in Plateau State?
- h) What are the ingredients for successful peace-building efforts at the state-level?

**Questions for Semi-Structured Interviews:**

- a) As (insert sector/organisation here),
  - a) Whose interest does the state seek to protect in terms of access and opportunities, why?
  - b) Do you think that currently, the state possesses the capacity to prevent and sustainably transform ethnic and religious violent conflicts, if yes or no, why?
  - c) In what ways have efforts by the State reduced or heightened the violence?
  - d) Has the State done enough in building peace and transforming conflict?
  - e) Are there any initiatives in place by the State to address the root causes of the conflict? Have these initiatives been successful? Why or Why not? What are these?

- f) Are you aware of policy frameworks and strategies that have been developed by the state to successfully prevent the future eruption of violent conflicts? What are these?
- g) Are you aware of any policy frameworks and strategies have been developed by the state to successfully transform the conflict?
- h) What has been the role of female government actors in transforming the conflict and preventing future violence?
- i) What should be your role in conflict prevention, peace-building and conflict transformation?
- j) Which of the ethnic or religious interests does the state seek to protect or obstruct, why?<sup>50</sup>
- k) Has the state failed in building peace in Plateau State? If yes or no, why? How?
- l) Do you think the majority of the population view the state as legitimate and credible? If yes or no, Why?
- m) How can the state's capacity be built to transform ethnic and religious violent conflicts?
- n) How can the capacity of the state be transformed in guaranteeing durable peace, security and stability?<sup>51</sup>

**Objective 4: c) To provide evidence-based policy recommendations for positive peace-building**

**General Guiding Questions for Focus group Discussions:**

What (a) institutions (b) policies (c) programmes should be developed by the state to:

- a) Develop a culture of non-violence
- b) Ensure public participation of all groups in the political process
- c) Protect the interest of all ethnic and religious groups
- d) Ensure equal access and opportunities for all groups

**Questions for Semi-Structured Interviews:**

- a) As (insert sector/organisation here),

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<sup>50</sup> Questions a-b (above) are culled directly from Kwaja (2010)

<sup>51</sup> Question f culled directly from Kwaja (2010).

- a) Do you think that all ethnic groups are on an equal footing in Plateau State, if yes or no, why? How can these inequalities be addressed through a) policymaking b) programmes c) institutions?
- b) What efforts have been utilised by the State to protect women?
- c) What policy frameworks and strategies should be developed by the state to successfully prevent the future eruption of violent conflicts?
- d) What policy frameworks and strategies should be developed by the state to successfully transform the conflict?
- e) How can long term and sustainable peace be achieved in Plateau State?
- f) How can the indigenous/settler dynamic be resolved in Plateau State?
- g) How can you work with government in resolving the direct and root causes of violence? And preventing future violence?

**Objective 5:**

**To contribute to evolving literature on how conflict transformation and peace-building can lead to the nonviolent transformation of violent conflicts.**

**e) To contribute to peace-building knowledge production**

**General Guiding Questions for Focus group Discussions:**

- a) In your own words, what do you understand by Peace-building?
- b) How can peace-building reduce and prevent direct and structural violence?
- c) What do you understand by Conflict Transformation?
- d) What do you need for the effective and sustainable transformation of conflicts?
- e) Can conflicts be transformed?

**Questions for Semi-Structured Interviews:**

- a) What does peace mean to you? To your specific ethnic/religious group? To government?
- b) What will a peaceful Plateau State look like?
- c) Can ethno-religious differences and violent conflicts be prevented or limited in Plateau State?
- d) How do you transform relationships and address injustices in Plateau State?

## APPENDIX B: Political, Economic, Psycho-social and Security recommendations according to short, medium and long-term priorities

	SECURITY	POLITICAL	ECONOMIC	PSYCHO-SOCIAL
<b>Short Term</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Accord the powers of Chief Security Officer to the State Governor.</li> <li>• Train and equip the police and other security actors in counter-insurgency, bomb detection, managing mob violence and ADRMs</li> <li>• Introduce and strongly enforce strict sanctions and punitive measures for gross professional misconduct among security and public servants</li> <li>• Improve and strengthen early warning and response units</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Engage with communities on an on-going basis, particularly before bills are released or taken through the legislature.</li> <li>• Partner with CSOs to tap into already existing programmes in which the latter is involved</li> <li>• Provide the state Office of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) with sufficient resources to carry out its mandate</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Commit efforts and resources to stop the high numbers of strikes in tertiary institutions</li> <li>• Ensure that political leaders refrain from being partisan or favouring specific ethnic groups</li> <li>• Roll out a variety of state-wide skills acquisition programmes</li> <li>• Partner with the private sector to create jobs for unemployed youth.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Create trauma assistance units, train and deploy personnel who can provide rehabilitation and trauma support, and provide sufficient funds to implement the above</li> <li>• Create avenues for public discussions on the necessity, nature and work of truth commissions and the Human Rights Commission as part of resolving the legacy of the past</li> <li>• Encourage and coordinate frequent and multi-level inter-ethnic and inter-religious engagement</li> </ul>
<b>Medium Term</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Disqualify and ban any politician found supporting violence, drug abuse or providing weapons</li> <li>• Increase security particularly in the outlying LGA.</li> <li>• Address human right abuses and end the culture of impunity</li> <li>• Strengthen inter-agency coordination among security agencies and existing agencies including the state-led “Operation Rainbow”</li> <li>• Provide safe zones and security posts in strategic areas within the Jos metropolis and its environs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Engage in a broad decentralisation campaign</li> <li>• Expand the Office of the Special Adviser to the Governor on Peace-building into a fully-fledged ministry</li> <li>• Undertake an annual/bi-annual workshop with representatives of each ethnic group to discuss common societal challenges</li> <li>• Modify the structure of the Jos North LGA to make the Local Council more representative of the desires of all communities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop a policy and culture of meritocracy at all levels especially for political appointments and the civil service</li> <li>• Multiply efforts to provide job opportunities for the youth</li> <li>• Reinstate key markets like the Jos Main Market and develop inter-religious markets</li> <li>• Prioritise state-wide infrastructural development projects</li> <li>• Take measures against discrimination in education and employment opportunities between indigenes and settlers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Eliminate policies that promote allegiance to one’s ethnic or religious group and replace them with policies that focus on Nigeria as a whole</li> <li>• Roll out peace education programmes at primary, secondary and tertiary institutions in order to inculcate non-violent methods of conflict transformation among this group and in communities, and to limit any radicalisation processes amongst these groups</li> </ul>
<b>Long Term</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Create a state police outfit which should be effectively trained and adequately monitored for abuse</li> <li>• Ensure transparent and public recruitment processes for the state police and other relevant officials.</li> <li>• Create a State Tribunal with an investigative bureau</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Engage in research on the effects of a functional federalism for Plateau state</li> <li>• Remove discriminatory policies, increase citizen engagement, and remove bias within the state coffers</li> <li>• Undergo a governance review to replace concepts of indigenisation with ‘Nigerianism’.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identify and develop the resources in each LGA, and build the capacity of the youth in these administrative areas</li> <li>• Redesign the current setting of urban slums to decongest crowded areas and through intervention programmes such as subsidies and addressing urban poverty</li> <li>• Practice true federalism where the state can live and sustain itself on its resources and by taxing its residents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop awareness and skills in non-violent methods and approaches to conflict resolution</li> <li>• Systematically and regularly spread ideas of tolerance, love, mutual respect, humanity, <i>Ubuntu</i>, and forgiveness</li> <li>• Create an Institute for Peace Education to inculcate development, peace-building, conflict transformation for peace training</li> </ul>