

**A Fragile and Unsustained Miracle:
Analysing the Development Potential of Zimbabwe's
Resettlement Schemes, 1980 - 2000**

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Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economic History and
Development Studies**

School of Politics

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DECLARATION

I, **John Blessing Karumbidza** declare that

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The problem of mentioning names in any acknowledgement in something that took this long to come about is that the list can never be exhaustive. However, I will take the risk and make special mention of a few of those people whose support and generosity was invaluable in the whole process. Not necessarily because their help was the greatest but because although they did not understand the meaning of what I was doing yet they supported me because of what it meant for me. Others had no moral or material obligation to show any kindness to me and stood to gain nothing, yet they did and I wish to acknowledge that. This includes (but not limited to) in Mutare, Baba namai N. Maramba, Baba namai Nyambuya, Stella Mkiwa, Rufaro H. Pfupajena, Submission Sithole, Eddie Dube and Patience Nyambuya; in Harare, the Matemera family, Philip and Caroline Chiyangwa, Mr Milton Shumba, Baba namai Mutamba, Baba namai Sada, mukoma Itai W. Masuku, Aunty Caroline Maposhere, the Jekwa Brothers (Michael and Richard) and their families; in Oslo, Prof Siri Ericksen, Tuva Burge, Jenny

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Acronyms

ACOR	Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia
ARDA	Agriculture and Rural Development Authority
AFC	Agricultural Finance Corporation
AFDC	African Farming Development Company
AGRITEX	Agricultural Extension Services
ANC	African National Congress (South African)
AQ	Agrarian Question
AQL	Agrarian Question of Labour
AREX	Agricultural Research and Extension
AU	Africa University
BVBEA	Block Village Based Extension Approach
BSAC	British South Africa Company
CCF	Cold Comfort Farm
CCZ	Consumer Council of Zimbabwe
CFU	Commercial Farmers Union
CHOGM	Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
CIO	Central Intelligence Organisation
CONEX	Conservation and Extension Services
CNC	Chief Native Commissioner
CNO	Chief Native Officer
CSO	Central Statistical Office
DDF	District Development Fund
DERUDE	Department of Rural Development
DfID	Department for International Development
EEC	European Economic Community
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (Zimbabwean)
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FCTZ	Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe
FEWS	Famine Early Warning System
GAA	Germany Agro-Action
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoZ	Government of Zimbabwe
HDI	Human Development Index
HEA	Household Economy Approach
HPI	Human Poverty Index
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
LAA	Land Apportionment Act
LOM	Land Occupation Movement
LSCF	Large Scale Commercial Farm(er)
MEPD	Monitoring, Evaluation and Planning Department
MEU	Monitoring Extension Unit
MFEPD	Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development
MLR	Most Limiting Resources
MLRRD	Ministry of Land Resettlement and Rural Development
MMPD	Ministry of Manpower and Planning Development
MNC	Multi-National Corporation
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
MYGEC	Ministry of Youth, Gender and Co-operative Development
NAD	Native Affairs Department
NADA	Native Affairs Department Annual (Journal)
NFAZ	National Farmers Association of Zimbabwe
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NLHA	Native Land Husbandry Act
NPA(S)	Native Purchase Area (Schemes)
RAU	Rhodesia Agricultural Union
SACP	South African Communist Party
SAPEM	Southern Africa Political Economic Magazine
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes

SC UK	Save the Children UK
SGR	Strategic Grain Reserve
TTL	Tribal Trust Lands
TTLDC	Tribal trust lands Development Corporation
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence (Rhodesia)
UFP	United Federal Party
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UZ	University of Zimbabwe
VIDCO	Village Development Committee
WADCO	Ward Development Committee
WWI	World War One
WWII	World War Two
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic front
ZFU	Zimbabwe Farmers Union
ZFFHC	Zimbabwe Freedom from Hunger Campaign
ZNFU	Zimbabwe National Farmers Union
ZIANA	Zimbabwe News Agency
ZIMCORD	Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development
ZIMPREST	Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation
ZINISA	Zimbabwe Network for Informal Settlement Action
ZIPA	Zimbabwe People’s Army
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army
ZWB	Zimbabwe Women’s Bureau


Table 0.1: Currency Conversion, 1980 – 2000

<i>Year</i>	<i>Zim Dollar</i>	<i>US Dollar</i>
<i>1980</i>	0.6	1
<i>1985</i>		
<i>1990</i>	2.5	1
<i>1992</i>	5.1	1
<i>1995</i>	8.7	1
<i>1997</i>	12.1	1
<i>1998</i>	23.7	1
<i>1999</i>	38.3	1

Source: World Bank, 2001: 3

Land Units		
1 morgen	-	2.1 acres
1 acre	-	4047m ²
1ha	-	2.47 acres


Map 1: Zimbabwe's Agro-Ecological Regions



Source:

USAID, 2004

Map 2: Transport and Communication Network



Source: Dorman, 2001

Dedication

I dedicate this work to the masses of rural farmers of Africa and Zimbabwe who effectively feed the greater part of the African population through subsistence agriculture with very little support. Women endure the double bind of the often competing economic production and social reproduction with little institutional and policy support, sustaining society. While they do not own the land, cattle or their own labour, they are the key productive assets of this sector. They face the biggest hurdle in their daily struggle to carve out a place for themselves as citizens, producers and stewards of the family. My mother was one of them. She did it all, experienced it all and yet, through all that, I am here and she remained there.

My respect to you, daughters of the soil!

May this situation not be forever!

Abstract

Black farmers' contribution and percentage share of the marketed agricultural produce (especially maize and cotton) increased dramatically following Zimbabwe's independence, especially between 1982 and 1987. Almost unanimously, observers in government and diplomatic circles spoke of this increase as 'phenomenal', attributing it to being a direct result of the government's efforts to increase agricultural production, and calling it a 'success story' and 'agrarian miracle'. This 'miracle' description was adopted by the state controlled and independent media, international donor and 'development' agencies, alike. By 1992, the levels of production achieved in the mid-1980s would not be repeated and this was blamed primarily on drought and the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) adopted by government in 1990. The direct impact of ESAP was the further reduction of government capacity and resources available to support the resettlement sector. By 2000, Zimbabwe was embroiled in a rural upheaval that threatened, reversed and undermined all the gains of the 1980s. The miracle discourse disappeared and in its place agro-pessimism took centre space. The land question rose to the fore amid a heightened outcry of landlessness, Communal Area congestion, poor access to institutional support and declining livelihoods and food security, among other things. This renewed rural crisis raised questions about what had happened to the miracle, exposed the run-down economy, and deepened undemocratic tendencies and a polarised political, economic and social space. The thesis proposed here is that the Zimbabwean government failed to take advantage and expand on the potential for an increased role of the rural sector in the cash economy. What emerged from closer scrutiny of the so-called agrarian transformation package for African agriculture was a poorly designed, uncoordinated and under funded quick fix to rural development that hardly moved beyond the mere transfer of land. Notwithstanding the participation of rural communities in the war of national liberation and the high profile nature of the land question during the *Second Chimurenga*, the post-colonial state apparatus – dominated by an urban nationalist petit bourgeoisie on the one hand, and the weak lobby of the beneficiaries of land reform on the other - placed African agriculture into the back-seat of policy and political economic priorities. Evidence from Mayo Resettlement Scheme, the primary case study in this thesis, suggests that the argued institutional support and structural changes (basis of the miracle) were at best minimal, under-funded, crisis-averse, ad hoc and poorly coordinated, lacking the support of a concrete policy base, making the miracle at most fragile and in the final analysis unsustainable.

Introduction

Perhaps the central social and economic issue for Rhodesia [as Zimbabwe was called then] is the question of land. Land has always been an emotional topic and this is hardly surprising because it plays such a dominant part in the lives of most of the country's population.¹ Over 80 percent of the total population lives directly off the land while the health of the whole economy depends critically upon the health of the agricultural sector. Many Europeans have spent decades building up their farms and they have sunk all their savings on the land. European agricultural output has increased *twentyfold* since 1944. On the other hand, hundreds of thousands of Africans have been forcibly moved from their land; many now have no land while others are having to subsist on tiny plots quite inadequate for the fulfillment of basic needs ... in the European areas, an increasing amount of land is not being used at all and huge areas of land are severely under-utilised. In general, the land problem is one of land abundance side by side with land scarcity, growing poverty and marginalisation of subsistence cultivators ... (Riddell, 1978: ix).

One of the most visible demands and rallying point for the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe was the land question. This thesis provides a longitudinal view of Zimbabwe's agrarian history, juxtaposing the experiences of Africans under the colonial period and after independence to contextualise the rural explosion that marked Zimbabwe's history in the new millennium. The main point is to show that the potential for transformation and accumulation in African agriculture was squandered by poor levels of support and lack of social change in the rural sector. The transfer of land and the access to inputs and markets for African farmers led to increased contribution to the marketed crops by Africans, for a short period of time. By 1985 an estimated 2.1 million ha and an additional 450 000 ha by 1990 had resettled about 50 000 households, reaching over 3 million ha of land, resettling more than 72 000 families by 1996. In terms of regional standards, the Zimbabwean land transfer (over that period of time) was a success story in the history of independent Africa. This is in spite of ZANU PF continuously revising the targets upwards.

The background to the land question in Zimbabwe is the establishment of a settler society led by South African based capital with strong British links in 1890 under the auspices of the British South African Company (BSAC). By 1923, the control of Rhodesia was transferred to the local Rhodesian white community after a referendum vote in which the majority black population did not participate. The Rhodesian economy was largely a land based economy with the dream of a Second Rand having failed to materialise. A regime of land laws and the separation of the white settler economy from the African economy were mounted to buttress settler economic accumulation (subject of Chapter One). In the period after World War II, the

¹ This land occupied by a majority Shona (of a variety of sub-dialects in the North and East) and a minority Ndebele and Kalanga population to the south west was named Southern Rhodesia until 1923, then Rhodesia until the Federation, Southern Rhodesia during the Federation 1953 – 1963, thereafter Rhodesia under Ian Smith, 1965 – 1978, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia under the Muzorewa experiment, then finally Zimbabwe since independence in 1980.

British government became committed to decolonisation and by the 1950s the Colonial Office had an elaborate programme for African independence that would lead to a neo-colonial transition (from formal to informal empire) run by a western leaning African elite.

The end of the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland ushered in independence for Northern Rhodesia (renamed Zambia after independence) and Nyasaland (renamed Malawi). To pre-empt this process and ensure white supremacy in Southern Rhodesia, Ian Smith made a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965, renamed the country Rhodesia and hardened his racialist stance suggesting that Africans would not rule the country in the next thousand years (Moorcroft, 1979). This was in direct defiance of British plans for Africa for which sanctions were imposed. Africans continued to endure social economic conditions characterised by abject poverty, landlessness and congestion in the country of their birth. Massive discontent by Africans in rural and urban areas became a major source for the support of a liberation movement until 1963 organised by the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo. In 1963 a splinter group calling itself the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) under Ndabaningi Sithole was formed. The two parties were organised more along tribal lines. ZAPU had a working class appeal but retreated to a mostly Ndebele base, while ZANU appealed mostly to a Shona following thus having the long term impact of undermining the possibility of national unity building.² Ian Smith's reaction was to ban and incarcerate the leaders of both parties. However, a national liberation war was fought by ZANU and ZAPU which ended with the Lancaster House Conference in 1979 (discussed in detail in Chapter Two). Elections were held in 1980 which saw ZANU PF and ZAPU leading the first Government of National Unity and a land reform and resettlement programme being put in place (Chapter Three details the ideological and political basis for the land and agrarian reform).

This thesis focuses on the resettlement schemes as they were the flagship of ZANU's African agriculture policy. To have deeper insight into the resettlement sector, Mayo Resettlement Scheme, located in Manicaland province, has been used as a case study. The findings from the

² The inspiration for the liberation struggle in the 1960s and 1970s was taken from the early Shona-Ndebele resistance to colonial occupation in the 1890s led by Nehanda and Kaguvi. Academics and historians such as Terence Ranger (1967) were active in this process of articulating the existence of a Zimbabwean nationalism. Ranger (1967) saw in it the rise of African nationalism in Zimbabwe but J. Cobbing (1977) and D. N. Beach (1979) questioned the nationalist emphasis on these uprisings, challenging the exaggerated views of the extent of unity and popular resistance in that conflict.

research are used to clarify what was called the agrarian miracle in the 1980s. The potential for accumulation and sustained growth was stifled by poorly developed policies. The policies lacked coordination and adequate funding. The enthusiasm for production in the rural areas was not converted into a long term employment-generating economic sector. Rural people became despondent. Their efforts were not linked to the existing industrial economy and neither was the industrial sector aligned with agrarian reform possibilities. The agrarian crisis that gripped the country since 1999 is understood within the context of this failure and lack of government program for African agriculture – a ‘fragile and unsustainable miracle’.


Landlessness and lack of jobs in the urban colonial economy were linked to land alienation and the segregation policies of the minority regime. These issues influenced many young Zimbabweans who joined the liberation struggle (*Second Chimurenga*) and rallied rural support for the war which forced the warring parties to the Lancaster House peace talks that finally ended minority settler rule in 1980.³ Since then, the land question (a highly politicised discourse about land distribution and the inequalities of access and control between white colonialists and indigenous blacks) became an important theme in Zimbabwe’s development and transformation policy. After two decades characterised by contradictions between intense rhetoric versus administrative and political cold feet on the land question, a violent ZANU PF assisted a land reform process that plunged Zimbabwe into political and economic mayhem – completely negating the humble gains of the 1980s.⁴

In this discussion of land reform and agricultural policy in Zimbabwe, I note that the country is made up of largely poor land and low rainfall conditions. Land for agriculture is in short supply and there is high competition for the better land available.

³ The word *chimurenga* means a war of liberation against an invading force. The joint Ndebele-Shona resistance led by Kaguvu and Nehanda between 1896 and 1897 resulted in Cecil John Rhodes’ establishment of white settler colonialism and the subsequent land seizures. That war is now commonly referred to as the *First Chimurenga War* (Ranger, 1967, 1970). The war against Ian Smith’s Rhodesia Front in the 1960s which ended with the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement is now generally referred to as the second *Chimurenga*. Seeking mileage from these earlier wars, Mugabe called the attack on commercial farms and the displacement of white farmers which began in 1999 as the “third *chimurenga*”. A general guide to the war for independence would include; Kriger, 2006; Ranger, 1985; Lan, 1985 and Caute, 1983.

⁴ The analysis of the land reform process of the late 1990s as either a land grab or land occupation movement is dealt with below.

Map 3: Zimbabwe's Agricultural Regions



Source: Masst, 1997

Zimbabwe's land distribution pattern is important to understand as it addresses an essential part of the land question. Map Three (3) read with table 0.2 below provide a description of the land according to the agro-ecological regions and the rainfall distribution patterns. Zimbabwe had a very small part of its land in the regions I and II which means that the greater part is largely made up of poor soils and poor rainfall. The lack of good land with adequate rainfall is one aspect of Zimbabwe's land question that rarely gets emphasised.

Table 0.2: The Agro-ecological (Natural) Regions of Zimbabwe

<i>Natural Region</i>	<i>Area (ha)</i>	<i>%age</i>	<i>Characteristics</i>
<i>I</i>	613 233	1.56	1 050 mm plus rainfall per annum with some rain in all months of the year and relatively low temperatures
<i>II</i>	7 343 059	18.68	700 – 1 050 mm rainfall per annum with rainfall confined to summer
<i>III</i>	6 854 958	17.43	500 – 700 mm rainfall per annum with relatively high temperature and infrequent heavy falls of rain subject to seasonal droughts
<i>IV</i>	13 010 036	33.03	450 – 600 mm rainfall per annum and subject to frequent seasonal droughts
<i>V</i>	10 288 036	26.2	Normally less than 500 mm of rainfall per annum. Very erratic rainfall. Northern lowveld may have more rain but the topography and soils are poorer.
<i>The remainder</i>	1 220 254	3.1	Unsuitable for any form of agricultural use

Source: Nyamapfene 1991 and Chenje, 1998

The extent to which archival material could be used was limited by a number of factors, including the recent nature of the key period of focus (1980 to 2000). However, archival material was also used for the historical background section covering colonial agriculture policy (a subject treated exhaustively in secondary literature). Archival material in African peasant historiographies allows for building up an overall picture in a way that would be impossible from oral sources. It also has the advantage of constructing a narrative based on quantitative evidence (Ranger, 1978). In addition to funding and manpower problems, access to the National Archives of Zimbabwe was difficult during this period. Security paranoia and delays in issuing research permits affected access. This limited the possibility for using archival material for the period before independence. However, the main period under research (1980 – 2000) is ‘too recent’ and falls outside the thirty (30)-year rule that binds the National Archives of Zimbabwe.

The material under review is not yet archived which means that government departments are the major source and access point. Access to departmental documentation depended largely on the perceptions and attitudes of the officials in charge. The unwritten policy is that government documents are public documents and should therefore be readily available upon request. Yet officials can withhold access without explanation. In a situation where access depends on how officials interpret the merits of a research project, researchers are subject to a variety of responses. During the time of the research, Zimbabwe’s effort to resolve the land question was accompanied by an increasing emphasis on (or obsession with) state security as ZANU PF pursued a policy of silencing critical reports and commentary on issues relating to land and agrarian reform. In line with this crackdown, in numerous cases, my *bona fides* as a student undertaking academic research were questioned and regarded with suspicion.

Others questioned the wisdom of giving information for academic research which would not be fed back for the development of the country. An official at the Ministry of Lands and Agriculture justified not talking to me as a futile investment in his time as I was not studying in the local university where the result would be easily accessible. However, for others in the same ministry, the fact that I was studying through a South African institution was not a problem as the South African president Thabo Mbeki was perceived as being supportive of land reform. One supportive official suggested that South Africa was not getting it right with land reform and hoped my research would show South Africa the way to go. The economic crisis and shortage of foreign currency left many departments short of documents meant for

public circulation as Government Printers ran out of ink and paper. Government departments were advised to use their printing budget with discretion, which often meant only printing enough copies for official circulation. At Government Printers, a source for government policy and legislative documents, cost recovery mechanisms meant that users had to pay for documents, with waiting periods of as long as three months or more.

The Zimbabwean NGO world and civil society sector also had the potential for yielding valuable material but was also caught up in the web of fear and retribution that led to mixed reactions during the fieldwork. The fear of so-called ZANU PF militias and crafty intelligence operatives masquerading as researchers led to the need for caution. Suffice it to say that, in a more sober society at peace with itself, more documentation could have been accessed to create a much richer triangulation of data with far fewer gaps. The highly volatile and political nature of the land and agrarian issue in Zimbabwe during the time of the research became a limiting factor in terms of the amount of the information that could be yielded from interviews. This situation influenced the questions that one could ask and also limited the extent to which those brave enough to respond could engage with the issues.

There is a silver lining to this cloud however. The European Union, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, as well as other funders of the early 1980s land reform and resettlement programme, generated useful evaluation reports on resettlement schemes. However, the major weakness with these reports is that they are silent on the experiences of producers in the resettlement schemes and other land tenure systems rarely include the voices of the beneficiaries of the government programmes that they were evaluating. The lack of settler voice is a gap this research intends to bridge by bringing more beneficiary voices into the commentary on resettlement experiences. Mostly reports highlight the observations and interpretations of the government officials working in the schemes as well as their authors. They lack in consultation and consideration of the beneficiaries' voice. Beneficiary perceptions are important to reflect on how they experienced their new status and what worked or did not work for them. Complete dependency on government documents would have tied the thesis to official thinking about agrarian change and the gamut of excuses for its 'failed' ability to deliver the 'revolution' in African agricultural production. For these reasons, the gaps in official documents and archival material increased the importance of fieldwork and oral evidence becomes central in giving prominence to beneficiary voices, hitherto dominated by those of government officials, despite the problems outlined above.

Primary [First hand] interviews with key role players in the resettlement sector and Mayo in particular, was a key part of the research effort. In his review of *The Roots of Rural Poverty*, Terence Ranger (1978) pointed out that the picture would have been different “if the communal cultivator” had had the space to respond noting that “communal cultivators did not produce archives and were not reflected” in the archival sources. To avoid handling the settler response to government programmes and the market changes in a superficial way, the use of oral evidence was more mandatory than optional. As argued by Terence Ranger (1978: 117):

Fieldwork is perhaps the only way of making systematic sense of the African side of the multiple ‘intermediate’ positions between peasant and proletarian, and especially of the consciousness associated with them.

Intellectual and official discourse on rural change tends to concentrate more on making programmes fit within certain theoretical, ideological and analytical terminologies. Experiences of the communities involved which can only be gathered through oral methods tend to paint other pictures from those in a secondary literature review as well as official documents otherwise inaccessible.

By the nature of their social status and the nature of rural enterprise, rural producers did not keep production and marketing records. Even if extension officers encouraged the keeping of records for credit, inputs, production and sales, not all producers kept them and those that kept them did not store such records after they were checked by officials. This made it difficult to create a statistical body of information on the experiences of the farmers as kept and generated by themselves. Even the government officials, the Resettlement Officers and the Agritex operatives did not keep records religiously and their records rarely covered the whole resettlement scheme. The situational and periodical reports by these officials were not filed and kept properly, thus making them inaccessible for a systematic study production in the schemes. Experiences of farmers and their perceptions of change and improvement were therefore discussed in very general terms and again affected by immediate events. An attempt was made through structured questions in the questionnaire to reconstruct the statistical picture of production, marketing, inputs and output between 1980 and 2000 without success. The majority of respondents are not literate enough to keep such details. However in this thesis I demonstrate that farmers could easily recall successful and disastrous years and their contributions were useful in deciphering emerging trends.

I found it intriguing that questions about productivity and perceptions of development and levels of government support were often answered according to varying perceptions of my motive for the questions and my perceived organisation. In spite of clearly introducing myself as a University student carrying out academic research to write a thesis, I was still confused with an NGO representative, government official, opposition official, and many others, each of which created different patterns of responses.¹⁹ It is easy to understand why respondents' perceptions affected the responses as this was a factor of the fear of political reprisal as well as the fact that resettlement farmers feel that they have been over-researched due to the constant questionnaires they have had to fill out.

Other households simply refused to answer questions, justifying themselves as not wanting to waste time. Others required to be paid as some researchers carrying out field work were paying a time compensation fee for organising community appraisals. With my limited resources, the question of paying respondents was out of question. I therefore worked with those who were not reluctant. For this reason, I had to explain the purpose of the research and say that there was no financial reward offered and gave prospective respondents the opportunity to turn down my request.

A security related incident that took place when the research was being undertaken was a situation where one household had its houses torched because of suspicions that a meeting involving opposition MDC officials had taken place there and a rumor that a member of that family was a supporter and active foot soldier of the opposition party. It is important to note the troubled nature of the timing of this research (2002- 2005), a period replete with political upheaval and in a highly politicized district and ZANU PF strong-hold. Even if the period of study did not cover the period of the research, the responses were highly influenced by the public discourse of the time.

¹⁹ The average resettlement farmer does not know what post-graduate studies, thesis and academic research is all about. They cannot tell the difference between that and the numerous evaluations by government or information collected during a census exercise or by a donor agency or the like. This is with the exception of retired civil servants such as teachers – who are very few in Mayo and had mostly recently resettled and were not the most important sources of information on the historical or longitudinal production trends.

Table 0.3: Perceptions of Researcher and Influence on Responses

<i>Perceived organization</i>	<i>Common Response</i>
<i>Government official</i>	Respondents mostly praised the government for the resettlement schemes as a good move which set them in a better position than in the communal areas where they came from. When asked about the level of government support, their criticism was often guarded.
<i>ZANU PF representative</i>	Very few of the respondents were able to distinguish between government officials and party officials. However, retired civil servants – the most suspicious - were able to, and always sought re-assurance that the researcher was not a party operative and therefore were always guarded in their responses.
<i>NGO Official</i>	The assumption was that there would be seeds or other inputs that would be given or food parcels. This often led respondents to exaggerate the extent of their poverty, the number of dependents they had, especially those that had been orphaned by HIV/AIDS or required schooling but could not be supported to go to school. These would ask for ways to get donations or resources to send such children to school and to meet their nutritional requirements.
<i>Opposition Official</i>	Often the researcher was told about how difficult it was to talk and the need to exercise caution as some people were not good. Depending on the political inclination of the respondent, others wanted to know about the programmes of the opposition regarding support for agriculture in the schemes. They were concerned that if the opposition came into the government land would be returned to whites. They wanted to know how this would affect them given that the land they were farming on had been resettled soon after independence and there seemed to be no contest about it except from people from communal areas close to them such as Weya, Chendambuya and Makoni.

Choosing the Case Study

The case study was chosen from 52 schemes existing (see Map 2, above) for a number of reasons. A number of schemes were sampled from those established between 1981 and 1982 targeting those with more than 1500 beneficiaries. This left me with 15 schemes out of the original list of 52 meeting the above criteria; four in Manicaland, three in Mashonaland East, and two each in Mashonaland West, Midlands, Matebeleland North and Masvingo Provinces. The decision about which scheme or group of schemes to focus on, depended on the availability of resources and the question of access. Given the limited research budget, Manicaland and Mashonaland East provided the best options. Mashonaland East was later dropped due to access problems. Being close to Harare, war veteran and CIO vigilance was at its highest, making research a personal risk. This left Mayo, a Resettlement Scheme in Makoni district, and the choice case study. My personal family history is closely intertwined with Makoni families and district (my mother's migrant labourer father from Malawi had married a woman from the Makoni family, and she grew up among Makoni people in the care of her mother). Thus Makoni district had other incentives; it made economic sense as there were opportunities for saving on accommodation and food costs and more importantly some of the politically influential people could be my reference point, therefore guaranteeing my safety and protection. As it turned out, this was a very useful calculation which worked well in my favour. Through these connections, I was able to secure interviews with the ZANU PF strongman,

Didymus Mutasa, as well as Chief Makoni. Outside these considerations, Makoni came out to be the best choice given the amount of official reports generated on Mayo Resettlement schemes and earlier evaluations commissioned by the Makoni Rural District Council (Asch, et.al., 1998). Terence Ranger's *Peasant Consciousness* (1985) comes from this district while Norma Kriger's *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices in Zimbabwe* (1992) focuses on the neighbouring district of Mutoko. These became important secondary sources for this thesis.

Thesis Breakdown and Chapter Organisation

For ease of management of the information, the thesis is divided into three broad sections with at least three chapters each. The first section provides a background on African agriculture and the general development of Zimbabwe during colonial rule. The material on colonial rural development (agrarian) policy is handled in Chapter One. Chapter Two deals with the second *chimurenga* war and the ideological inclinations of ZANU while Chapter Three considers the theoretical and background issues concerning land and agrarian policies around the time of Zimbabwean independence.

Section II is devoted to the land and agrarian experiences of Zimbabwe following independence. Chapter Four sets out the changes in terms of land allocation and tenure systems. Chapter Five outlines the resettlement system focusing on the planning models as well as the beneficiary selection. The last chapter in the section outlines the institutional support and mechanisms as well as challenges facing resettlement in general.

The third section has three chapters that can be considered the main thesis chapters. Chapter Seven discusses the case study of Mayo Resettlement Scheme, demonstrating how the mechanisms outlined in the previous sections works. It also brings to the fore settler voices and experiences. Chapter Eight unpacks the 'miracle' concept and claim used in the title, establishing what the supposed miracle was about and articulates the basis upon which such a claim was made. Without disputing that something of a miracle existed in the 1980s, this chapter argues that the miracle was, however, fragile and owing to the lack of a defined programme of actions and adequate funding and political will, the miracle could not be sustained into the 1990s, Neither could it become the basis upon which African agriculture could compete with counterparts in the commercial sector. Finally, in Chapter Nine – the argument is made that, indeed, because of the failure to advance resettlement agriculture into a

vibrant commercial enterprise, the land question remained unresolved and contributed to the rural (land) crisis which started in 1999.

Section I

Background: Colonial Policy, the War of Independence and ZANU Policies

This section provides a well known story in Zimbabwe's political economy of land and agrarian reform. However, a story that should be retold to preface and ground the discussion of the aborted potential miracle in the rural sector is necessary. By starting with the colonial experiences of the African farmers, this section positions the African farmers at the heart of state-led underdevelopment and development policy, during the colonial rule and after independence, respectively. The chapter on colonial policies elaborates on how the African population was integrated into the settler colonial capitalist economy. The role of land and land alienation was crucial to the process of primitive accumulation mounted by the settlers. Through land alienation and land re-allocation, the settler society was also able to manage and redistribute the labour of Africans and thereby control the growth potential in the African sector. This placed the land question at the heart of anti-settler sentiments that characterised the rise of African nationalism in Zimbabwe.

Chapter Two considers the ideological inclination and utterances of the African elite that led the struggle against independence. With justification, the main focus is on ZANU and later ZANU PF which became the ruling party following independence in Zimbabwe. Its policies dominated the social, political and economic landscape in the period under review, 1980 to 2000. As such, it has been found important to understand the rise to power and the composition of this class of people who inherited the state system at 1980. In line with this enquiry, this group's policy choices are reviewed with the benefit of hindsight, considering why they pursued and prioritised certain policies over and above others?

The last chapter of this section (Chapter Three) continues with the focus on ZANU but this time, focusing closely on ZANU's ideology on the land and agrarian questions. Given the importance and association of land question with the national question by ZANU during the war, it is important to consider exactly what ZANU's intentions, if any were about land, its distribution, tenure and its development upon independence. This chapter allows for a review of the land and agrarian questions, generally, in their theoretical and historical context vis a vis the land and agrarian questions in Zimbabwe.

Chapter One

Colonial Legacy: The Land Question and African Development, 1890 – 1980

The history of African agriculture in Rhodesia may be summarised as a continuous battle between the steadily increasing pressures of a growing population on the restricted land resources, and the efforts of the Native Department to establish those methods which could check the soil erosion and human degradation which are the inevitable concomitants of the old system under the new conditions (Floyd, 1976: 13).

Introduction

This chapter serves as a background to matters central to this thesis and summarises the history of agricultural policy in Zimbabwe since the colonial land seizures in the early 1890s. While this is a well established story in Rhodesian/Zimbabwe historical and political economic scholarship, this summary is intended for two purposes; firstly to show how direct state intervention in agriculture during colonial rule led to a dual process of facilitating the development of white agriculture while undermining that of Africans and secondly to highlight what a serious state policy on agriculture can do to promote the sector. For more detailed analysis and coverage of the various aspects, Gray (1970) gives a historical account of this process, later very starkly and powerfully etched by Arrighi (in Arrighi and Saul, 1973) setting out the political economy of dispossession and control. Robin Palmer (1977) gives a succinct account of the way in which the settlers acquired most of the highveld land and consolidated it. I illustrate the themes of inequality in land access, policy-generated structural differences and the racial divide in rural and agricultural policy in their historical context. A chronological approach is chosen for ease of organisation over and above the possibility of using a thematic analysis.

The logical starting point in addressing the 20th century land question in Zimbabwe is the late 19th century as this is when colonial control was established on the territory between the Limpopo and the Zambezi. Following this colonial encroachment, the hundred year period from 1890 to 1990 became characterised by a plethora of legislative intervention of the people's relationship with, and access to, land. Regimes of land seizures followed by consolidation efforts were visited upon the African population facing removals to marginal areas (Arrighi, 1977, Palmer and Parsons, 1977; Riddell, 1978, Moyo 1984, Moyana 1986 among others). Since then, official agrarian concerns in the designated African areas were firstly, human survival on marginal land and secondly, environmental conservation under the

pressure of increasing human and cattle population. Instead of the European settler and African economies existing apart from each other, an exploitative relationship developed through which the rural sector and African agriculture, in particular, became the basis for accumulation that enhanced settler capitalism. The accumulation started with the African economy supplying cheap food, then later land and labour to kick-start a white controlled and dominated capitalist economy (Arrighi, 1970).

For the greater part of the early colonial period, 1890 to 1930, the Shona remained self-sufficient with smaller numbers working as wage labourers than the Ndebele.²⁰ As land shortage and its negative impact on the economy in general became more acute, colonial economic planners hoped that the expansion of the capitalist economy through white farms mining and manufacturing as well as the service sector would absorb the 'surplus' Africans through employment creation. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953-1963) generated an economic boom that led to the increased demand (albeit temporary) for more urban labour. This labour demand became the basis for the development of a permanent African urban population. As will be discussed below, the *Native Land Husbandry Act (1951)* partly had to deal with the idea of a permanent rural peasantry and a permanent African urban working class.

The Federation had contradictory developments in terms of labour management in Southern Rhodesia. On one hand, the Federation meant that Southern Rhodesian farmers, miners, manufacturers and other infrastructural employers such as the Rhodesia Railways and Kariba dam could access cheaper labour from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. On the other hand, the influx of the cheaper labour from the northern dominions meant that Southern Rhodesian Africans faced stiff competition for work. For those in need of hired hands, the availability of a pool of cheap labour was a welcome development, but for those looking to address the problem of African unemployment and relieve land pressure – this was a nightmare. Two important developments must be reiterated. Firstly, on the one hand the colonial capitalist economy did not generate enough capacity to accommodate and siphon off the 'surplus people' from

²⁰ The Ndebele are located in the much drier NR IV (see map and explanation of agro-ecological distribution above) and which do not always guarantee yields for farming activities. With the raids on their herds that led to the war of dispossession of 1893, their economic, social and political fabric was left vulnerable and they became a source of cheap labour for the European settlers. The Shona were able to hold out longer but started to react to the pressures on land from the combination of the *Land Apportionment Act of 1930* as well as the *Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951*. From World War II onwards, more and more Shona became proletarianised. For more details see Vambe (1972, 1976).

congested African areas. Secondly, the colonial land policy as it related to the African reserves refused the exchange of land for money among Africans. This effectively suppressed the rise of a land market in this sector and ultimately, cemented existing traditional relations of production (Phimister, 1977; Riddell, 1978).

Establishing the Colonial/Settler State Machinery and Economy

The Rhodesian state arose initially from the Administration of the territory by the British South African Company (later referred in short as Company Administration) and later handed over to a settler regime. This state played a central role in shaping the economy by intervention through resource distribution.²¹ Historically, states have intervened in the economy in important areas that influenced the development pattern and in protection of vested interests. Thus the state became a terrain of resource distribution and allocation in the interests of those that controlled it. The settler state positioned itself as an agent for the development of the white economy through policy creation and enforcement as well as the implementation of projects. It has been suggested that:

The historical development of the settler economies must, indeed, be seen as a process of mutual interaction between the economy and the political system, with the state of the economy (or its perceived state) playing part in determining policy and simultaneously being so much influenced by policy variables that a theoretical model which omits them often gives a picture which is the reverse of the truth (Mosley, 1983: 2-3).

The adoption of racial segregation as government policy led the settler state to become a 'developmental state' for the white community, while playing the 'robber state' for the African constituency. State intervention in any given historical case becomes "a question of which groups have power to intervene in the market and what kind of intervention they perceive as being in their best interests" (Mosley, 1983: 10). The monopoly over state power allowed the settler state to set in motion primitive accumulation and turn the majority of the indigenous people into 'subjects' and 'objects' of oppression through a master and servant relation of

²¹ As a settler state, Southern Rhodesia's development after Company rule was pushed by a settler class through an economic nationalist project. This was different from the classical imperialist model of underdeveloped countries whose economic policy and development were dictated by the needs of a European metropolis. Development needs and economic policy were subjected to political disciplining in the service of a local settler society seeking to accumulate in the context of racial segregation. In the case of Southern Rhodesia (as in South Africa, until World War II), European agriculture did not decline in relative importance as economic development proceeded, given the enclave nature of colonial capitalism. In fact, the share of white agriculture in national income was 15.1 percent but remained at 14 percent 30 years later in 1955 after years of rapid economic growth (See Mosley, 1983: 2 - 10).

production. The model of monopoly of state power was retained by the elite dominating the post-1980 state as will be discussed below.

The initial administrative and political management of the colony was entrusted to the British South Africa Company (BSAC).²² The fate of company administration was sealed by the 1922 referendum through which a close election result favoured responsible government for Southern Rhodesia over joining the Union of South Africa.²³ With an electorate of 18,810, the total number of votes cast was 14,763, a turnout of 78.5%. All but one of the electoral districts supported Responsible government and rejected Union with South Africa. The one district to support a Union with South Africa was Marandellas (now Marondera in Mashonaland East Province), and this was by a slim margin (See table 1.1 below).

Table 1.1: Voting Patterns on the Southern Rhodesia and South Africa Question

<i>Electoral District</i>	<i>Responsible Government</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Union with South Africa</i>	<i>%</i>
<i>Bulawayo District</i>	551	65.0	297	35.0
<i>Bulawayo North</i>	826	67.9	390	32.1
<i>Bulawayo South</i>	955	64.0	538	36.0
<i>Eastern</i>	711	57.5	526	42.5
<i>Gwelo</i>	582	57.3	433	42.7
<i>Hartley</i>	449	66.5	226	33.5
<i>Marandellas</i>	433	49.4	443	50.6
<i>Midlands</i>	550	51.9	509	48.1
<i>Northern</i>	741	60.3	487	39.7
<i>Salisbury District</i>	845	57.3	629	42.7
<i>Salisbury Town</i>	894	63.8	507	36.2
<i>Victoria</i>	626	51.7	585	48.3
<i>Western</i>	611	59.3	419	40.7
<i>Total</i>	8,774	59.4	5,989	40.6

Source: Lee, 1977: 73

Charles Coghlan was elected the first Prime Minister of the new Southern Rhodesia and after him came Godfrey Huggins who pursued the doctrine of separate development (following the

²² The BSAC was the pioneering and prospecting company led by Cecil John Rhodes, the Cape Town Based diamond and gold baron. They were tasked, first and foremost to establish control over the new territory on behalf of the Crown and immediately make profits for its shareholders in South African and London.

²³ An all white electorate voted 59.4% to 40.6% for responsible government as opposed to the other option of effectively joining the Union of South Africa and be administered from Pretoria. The results of the referendum decided the fate of S.R. See M. Elaine Lee, "An Analysis of the Rhodesian Referendum, 1922", *Rhodesian History* (1977), VII, 71-78.

example of the Milner and Pact governments in South Africa).²⁴ Huggins defended the policy of separate development arguing that:

A fundamental principle of our policy is that in the interests of the natives themselves, no less than in the interests of the Europeans, it is essential to recognise that the social and economic development of the native must follow different lines from those applicable to the European race (Rifkind, 1969: 51).

This policy established Africans' home in the reserves and townships while placing white homes in the urban areas as well as separated blocks of commercial farm land located away from Africans. According to Huggins, "the native is a visitor in our white towns for the purpose of assisting the white people who live there ... and no other native should be present unless of some assistance to the white people" (Palmer, 1968: 8). This policy became the pillar for social, economic and political relations between the blacks and whites in the country with the Minister of Internal Affairs echoing Huggins' words thirty-five years later arguing:

It is no good Africans flocking to the towns if there is no work for them there. They are very welcome if there is work and the European is doing everything in his power to increase job opportunities for Africans (Debates, 1973).

The Secretary for Internal Affairs had made it clear that it was government policy that "the African's political and economic development will, in the main, take place in the Tribal Trust Lands" (Nicolle, 1966). Even during the key reform period under the premierships of Garfield Todd (1953 – 1958) and Edgar Whitehead (1958 – 1962), the objectives for African development remained entrenched in this policy of apartness. According to J. J. Wrathall (Minister of Finance, 1963 – 1969), the objectives of African development were to:

... provide land for resettlement to cope with the increasing demand for land by tribesmen and to provide a livelihood for a growing African population which could not be absorbed in industry and elsewhere; to provide employment in Tribal Trust Lands for those who were without land or who had to supplement their agricultural earnings in order to subsist in times of drought or crop failure; and to assist, by means of settlement, in the control and eradication of tsetse fly, thereby opening up production and at the same time protecting areas which are being farmed properly (Wrathall, 1969: 27).²⁵

²⁴ Godfrey Huggins was the longest serving Prime Minister of Rhodesia (1933 – 1952) and is considered the godfather of segregation in Southern Rhodesia. However, by the end of his term he had come to realise that segregation as a development policy could not be sustained forever.

²⁵ J. J. Wrathall, the Minister of Finance in Southern Rhodesia from 1963 – 1969's speech was included in the NADA Journal's special edition of 1969 dedicated to African agriculture and development in African areas.

When the Company's dream of establishing a second Rand failed to yield expected results, attention was turned to the land and farming thus creating an agriculture dependent colony.²⁶ The Company soon realised that the development of Southern Rhodesia was only possible through a focus on agriculture. Such a policy shift would require more European immigrants for whom the Company provided cheap land and other settlement incentives (Murray, 1970). The hallmark of Company rule was its policy of selling land cheaply and quickly to attract white settlers (Kriger, 1992). This shift from mineral exploration to agriculture as the mainstay of the colonial economy placed land and its alienation at the centre of colonial control and colonial politics.²⁷

In 1907 the British South Africa Company (BSAC) established the Department of Agriculture and embarked on a campaign to attract immigrants to whom colonised land was sold at a pittance. The distribution of Crown land for settler farming became the central agrarian concern of the colonial state. A vital source of the state's growing power stemmed from the control the state gained over land use and manipulation of tenure during this process (Drinkwater, 1991: 37). Members of the Pioneer Column received payment in the form of land for their role in the conquest and occupation of Rhodesia. They were each awarded a 'permit of occupation' by the BSAC for 1500 morgen (3,150 acres) of land each, later converted to

²⁶ The expansion into Rhodesia was marketed on the basis of discovering a second gold bearing Witwatersrand and therefore building a mining based extractive machinery in 1890. The second Rand did not materialise and the military costs of penetrating the territory had exceeded original estimates. This required that BSAC administration engage an "emergency economic response to prevent complete loss and the territories from becoming a long-term drain on the colonial government. The chosen 'least-cost' means of forcing development was the grant of large-scale monopoly concessions of land to white immigrants and companies with British or South African base. The Company and subsequently the Southern Rhodesian state put in motion extractive capitalist machinery that exploited labour and land without transforming the traditional structure of the indigenous African population. The development of the settler agriculture sector and the underdevelopment of the African sector should be placed within the context of the broader economy as a whole. The economy of Southern Rhodesia has developed through cycles of crisis and booms in a generally diversified settler economy built on agriculture, mining and manufacturing. Its integration into world capitalist economy was through South Africa with which its genesis was tied through Cecil John Rhodes and the British South Africa Company (BSAC) until 1923 and then the British government's colonial office.

²⁷ During the period 1890 and 1896 alone a sixth of the country (16 million acres) had been taken away from the Africans. The alienation of land and dispossession of cattle sparked the first clashes between the white settlers and the inhabitants of the land. In 1893 a war of dispossession was fought by the Ndebele under Lobengula followed by a joint Ndebele-Shona resistance led by Kaguvi and Nehanda between 1895 and 1896, now commonly known as the *First Chimurenga War* (Ranger, 1967, 1970). However, Julian Cobbing (1972) and David N. Beach (1976) refute the notion that the 1895/96 war was inspired by nationalism and like the 1893 war, was just another knee-jerk response to the encounters with an invading force. Nonetheless, this African resistance was crushed ruthlessly resulting in whole villages annihilated and displaced thus giving way to the first land redistribution exercise in 1901 which saw 700 000 indigenous people allocated just about 8 million hectares while 12 600 settlers control more than 30 million acres. This figure rose to 21.5 million hectares by 1913. Initially land acquisition by companies rather than individuals was encouraged in order to avoid land being bought by under-capitalised individuals, establishing the land question in the country.

outright freehold. As the anticipated company rush to buy land did not exactly materialise, prices of land were made much lower so as to attract more settlers and to justify the extra journey across South Africa for newly arriving English seekers of fortune. Rhodesian land was sold very cheaply.²⁸ Africans were barred from participation in the land market and the provision of cheap land brought the company to clash with indigenous Shona and Ndebele native populations (Ranger, 1967, 1970, Cobbing, 1977; Phimister 1977).²⁹ The policy of settling European immigrants continued into the post WWII era in the face of increasing land shortage among Africans. Alois Mlambo (1998: 126) calculated that immigration was responsible for White population growth at the rates of 88% between 1901 and 1911; 28%, 1911 to 1921; 62%, 1921 to 1931; and 58% from 1931 to 1941.

The provision of land at ridiculously low prices was seen by the Company Administration as a necessary precondition for the future advancement of the colony. As explained by Mosley (1983: 14):

The offer of such generous ‘package deals’ – cheap land on easy development conditions with secure tenure – was seen, rightly or wrongly, as the minimum supply price which the colonial administrations had to pay in order to attract well-capitalised settlers, who *ex hypothesi* were already enjoying a comfortable standard of living and who needed inducements greater than those offered in Canada and Australia to compensate them for the climate and disease risks involved in agricultural pioneering.


Through this policy therefore, by World War I, a large number of individuals and companies had bought land and most of it was held for speculative reasons. After losing control of the land, Africans worked the land as labour tenants, a practice which was made illegal by the *Land Apportionment Act of 1930* which outlawed African use or purchase of designated European land. Native reserves were created in the most arid land and no monetary compensation for their loss of land was paid.

²⁸ ... a price of 1s.6d. per morgen (8.5d per acre) in Mashonaland and 3s. per morgen (1s.5d. per acre) in Matebeleland. Even in 1905 the ruling prices for land were 1s. 7d per acre in Bulawayo, 11d in Umtali (now Mutare) and 7d. in Salisbury (now Harare); this compared with 1904 average prices per acre of 16s.3d. in the Orange Free State, 15s.7d. in the Cape and 11s. 10d. in Natal (see Mosley, 1983: 14 for details).

²⁹ To reduce the competition for land from the African population, the first act of European administrative penetration in the settler economies was to restrict, indeed to outlaw, the market as the means by which land should be transferred into the hands of the incoming European colonists (see Mosley, 1983 for a detailed account).

If Map 4 below is read together with map 2 on page 3, it will be observed that the reserves were located in the poor regions IV and V while European land was in the regions I, II and III which were high rainfall as well as in the highlands free of tsetse. The land in this area was also highly fertile being rich in heavy clay loam soils. African reserves were concentrated in the Natural Regions IV and V which were low lying thus susceptible to tsetse, low rainfall as well as poor sand soils easily leached of their nutrients.

Map 4: Colonial Land Distribution in Zimbabwe



Source: Masst, 1997

Besides the indirect support through land, labour and legislation restraining African production, the BSAC was directly involved in the development of Rhodesian agriculture by establishing its own estates and engaged in large-scale farming of tobacco, fruit and cattle. The Company also built marketing organisations and established enterprises for processing farm products. The direct involvement of the Company in agriculture continued until 1907 when the commercial and governmental aspects of the Company were separated thus removing the farming, marketing and other commercial enterprises from the sphere of direct government control (Murray, 1970).

The Company government as well as subsequent regimes regarded agriculture highly. The importance of agriculture was reflected through strategic official appointments and budget

allocations. For instance in the first year of the post-Company government, departmental allocation of senior staff and budget was as follows:

Table 1.2: Staff and Budget Allocation in Key Sectors of Rhodesian Economy, 1924

<i>Government Departments</i>	<i>Number of Senior Officials Concerned with Sector</i>	<i>Budget Allocation</i>
Agricultural Administration	151	8%
Departments of Mines, Works and Geological Survey	52	0.2

Source: Compiled from Murray, 1970

This allocation of resources indicates the relative importance of agriculture for an economy in a colony established on the basis of the lure of gold.

The support for white agriculture can only be fully accounted for and discussed by considering the manner and deliberate measures that were made to undermine African production, as these two were sides of the same coin. An analysis of the emergence and growth of a white commercial agriculture sector in Southern Rhodesia as in Kenya and South Africa fits Karl Marx's description of primitive accumulation. The rise of white agriculture should thus be considered in the same breath as the destruction of African agriculture and the consequent undermining of living standards. Compared with systematic investment in white areas, the development in African areas was piecemeal. The following sections will show that through what was called 'development', white agriculture prospered while Africans became impoverished.

Huggins' administration nurtured relations with the colony's wealthy elites by introducing various strategies, including but not limited to:

...an aggressive public works programme geared largely to solving white unemployment. Parastatal industrial ventures, such as iron, steel and cotton spinning, were increasingly common. White farmers received hefty doses of state credit, subsidies and other supports. White miners were encouraged to operate small independent gold operations, as foreign companies' mineral rights were taken over. The railroad was nationalised. There were new anti-African labour laws and expanded race-based division and control of land (Phimister, 1977: 46).

Through a process of economic nationalism, Huggins was able to grow the economy by subsidising whites at the expense of Africans. According to Terence Ranger (1978: 99):

Alvord and Extension in African Areas

African reserves began to suffer immense pressure from population congestion and soil erosion in a fragile land mass that increasingly failed to support the food needs of the population. The colonial regime blamed deteriorating land and agricultural conditions on perceived poor African farming methods and a tendency to neglect land [tragedy of the commons argument]. Therefore a demonstration and extension service was established under Emory D. Alvord, appointed to be the Agricultural Demonstration and Extension Officer for Natives. Alvord, an American educator and agriculturalist of Christian faith by training, became a central figure in the history of modern extension and demonstration among Africans in colonial Zimbabwe. Alvord, the self-anointed agrarian missionary, saw himself as ordained to preach “the gospel of the plough” (Reid, 1978: 72). He “approached the task of modernising peasant agriculture with evangelical zeal” (Drinkwater, 1991: 50). In Alvord’s thinking it was essential to increase the instruction of Africans in scientific farming methods through demonstration sites. For him there was African farming methods had to be completely destroyed because they were not rational. He argued:

Every Native farming practise has reason. These reasons are based on tradition, superstition, and worship of the departed dead and fear of the unknown. They are guided by custom, without thought for cause and effect. In spite of this however, the Native sometimes displays considerable wisdom, and, when guided in the right direction, shows promise as an excellent agriculturalist (Alvord, 1930: 10).

Alvord’s ideas fitted squarely in the civilising agenda of colonialism and the belief that Africans required being directed to the path of modern existence.³² He encouraged the adoption of modern farming methods, the use of manure and fertilisers as well as the digging of contour ridges for the control of gulley erosion. He ran demonstration sites throughout the provinces, with the help of provincial and district staff. Within a couple of years of Alvord’s work, the Chief Native Commissioner for Umtali (now Mutare) complained that the widespread adoption of the plough for soil tillage was only increasing the land under tillage and not the intensity of

³² While acknowledging that for Africans agriculture was a way of life, he however, considered African farming methods as antiquated and set himself on the ‘agrarian civilisation’ mission arguing: “With only 15 857 “urbanised” on mines and in towns, the great majority of these people live on 89 Reserves scattered throughout the country. There people are essentially agriculturalists. For generations they have lived most entirely from the products of soil tillage. The economic structure of their social lives is closely linked up with this soil tillage and with the care of animals. Agriculture to the Native is not a trade or an occupation. It is a mode of life. And, because of the low type of agriculture around which their lives are centred, the economic and social standards of the Natives are low and primitive. They cannot be raised to a higher plane unless their agriculture is improved. They have defined practice spoken of by Europeans as ‘kaffir farming’. Their methods are wasteful, slovenly and unnecessarily ineffective, and if continued, will be ruinous to the future of Rhodesia (see E. D. Alvord, 1929 for more).

production, thus wasting soil (Alvord, 1930: 10).³³ Alvord's task involved "guiding agricultural teaching at government and mission schools throughout the country, and of organising and controlling the work of a number of potential demonstrators" (Reid, 1978: 4). Up until 1926, there had been no agricultural service aimed at African farmers. The Department of Agriculture had done very little with regard to African areas, and a few interested Commissioners had assisted African farmers to obtain improved seeds and breeding stock, mainly cattle and sheep, but in a very *ad hoc* manner.

Unfortunately, contrary to Alvord's interests, the Administration found in Alvord's schemes the possibility for controlling the African masses and containing them within the limited land of the reserves where they were expected to be self-sufficient. The state had no intention for more Africans than they could employ leaving the rural areas, and in any case the reserves were meant to subsidise white agriculture as well as the urban sector. Colonial policy for the control of Africans was always proposed in the language of development. When Africans resisted these policies, *compulsion* was used in place of *persuasion*.

By the end of his career, Alvord was convinced that it was a waste of resources to teach agriculture to "the superstition steeped African who attributed high crop to ... witchcraft charms and favour of the ancestral spirits." He instead favoured the training of black demonstrators, suggesting that, "the African must see things demonstrated on his own level ... by demonstrators of his own black skin and kinky wool" (cited in Drinkwater, 1991: 51). This led to the increased recruitment and training of black demonstrators. Alvord did not receive adequate funding to finance his modernisation plans as the results would have flown in the face of official plans for Africans in the economic scheme of things. After years of agonising and pressure from Alvord, the Department of Native Agriculture was finally established in 1944 and for the first time, there was significant up scaling of the status of extension services.³⁴ This 'high profile' status of extension officers was short-lived as it did not outlast Alvord who retired in 1949. The new Chief Agricultural Officer for African Agriculture separated

³³ Mutare is located in the eastern highlands of the country on the border with Mozambique. This region has most of the country's agro-ecological region I with the highest rainfall and good soils. However, it is the site of the Inyangani and Chimanimani Mountain ranges. Most of the land is located on very steep slopes that require that tillage must be kept as minimal as possible. The adoption of the plough in areas with steep slopes led to tillage related erosion. The inhabitants of the Inyangani Mountains are known to have practiced minimum tillage agriculture as well as erecting stone terraces to manage the soil.

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departmental functions between a slightly more favoured Native Economic Development and a low status and poorly budgeted Department of Native Agriculture to which the demonstration officers were relegated.

Considering that the purpose of advancing African development in the reserves was to contain the African population there, colonial extension services had the opposite effect. It led to an increased rural-urban migration as the rural population increased rapidly. It was noted that:

Successful farming very often leads to a loss of capital, and of the best of the human resources ... in other words successful extension and successful farming purely in terms of TTL development, are partly self-defeating. It seldom happens that educationally and economically successful people in other sectors invest their capital and expertise in TTL farming (Reid, 1978: 10).

The Ministry of Finance calculated that from the time of Alvord's appointment to the end of colonial rule (1926 – 1979), the number of people living in the Tribal Trust Lands rose from around 700 000 to over 3 million, with an estimated 700 000 to 1 million families living and relying on the land for their livelihoods in the 16 million ha of Tribal land. One million cattle in 1926 had trebled in number and production in gross money increased remarkably (Samasuo, 2003).

African traditional agriculture in place in the 1920s was suited for subsistence production. African farmers mixed and scattered the seeds of various crops together. They did not separate crops by row planting and on separate pieces of land as with commercial agriculture. All crops received the same treatment which was limited to a degree of weed control and manure application. This land was used for three or four years and when the fertility was depleted, it was abandoned and a new piece of virgin land was opened up. Under conditions of plentiful land and in reasonable climatic seasons, this system of agriculture was very well suited to traditional subsistence economies, but under pressure, either through a shortage of land or lack of rain, the system broke down. According to colonial extension officials, this system was not flexible and could not adjust to changing conditions thus remained unable to produce increased crops without tremendous increases in land and labour (Reid, 1978: 4).

The extension system established by Alvord was too disjointed, under funded and the approach of extension officers seemed to enlist resistance among the intended beneficiaries thus failing

to make attitudes change among the African farmers. This problem emanated from institutional constraints, for instance:

... lack of a permanent (institutional) home for the agricultural extension service and the changes in status and priorities led to a repeated process of building up and breaking down of the organisation, a repeated process of moving away from and back again towards being a true extension service. There has been an apparent lack of understanding and appreciation by policy makers of the value and role of an extension service and even more serious, ignorance of the meaning of extension (Alvord, 1944: 5).

The primary objective of extension should be education, stimulation and motivation of producers in adopting methods that improve productivity. As soon as the priority has shifted to land conservation, the process can by no definition be described as “extension”, even if personnel and methods are those used in extension. This led to what can be described as a “conservation trap”, affecting extension services throughout colonial rule. The institutions for agriculture demonstration and extension changed rapidly from increasing productivity to emphasising conservation. Most government officials spent time dealing with conservation related work such establishing contour ridges and policing stock levels (cattle stocks were felt to be overgrazing) which made them unpopular among cattle keepers.

The institutions and organisations responsible for overall African development in particular and agriculture since 1926 faced rapid changes and staff turnover, indicative of the lack of consistency and the trial and error method underscoring official thinking and approaches to African agriculture. The constant changes in institutions for African development had a disruptive impact and limited institutional development. Given the level of mistrust among the beneficiaries of extension, it was important for officials to develop familiarity and gain the trust of the farmers.

Up until the 1920s, the Shona had, by and large, managed to produce a surplus and thus avoid waged labour. Even people like Garfield Todd, who were considered among conservative whites, were irked by the Shona preference for remaining as cultivators.³⁵ Population growth

³⁵ For Garfield Todd, the future of Southern Rhodesia was in industrialisation which required huge external capital injections. ‘We do not want native peasants,’ Garfield Todd told Parliament: ‘We want the bulk of them working in the mines and farms and in the European areas and we could absorb them and their families (Arrighi, 1973: 362). Given the resilience of the Shona as farmers and their holding out to the demands for cheap labour in the service of white settlers, it became clear to the colonial regime that any development for Africans had to be located within African areas in consistence with the segregation policy. The aim of development for Africans was

became the official excuse for congestion in African areas. Wrathall cites statistical evidence of growing African population as key to development in African areas, suggesting that:

In 1911 the African population was estimated as being some 700 000 and at the end of 1967 4.400 000, of which 3,774 000 live in and depend on Tribal Trust Lands for their existence. The African birth rate is estimated as being 48 per thousand per annum with a death rate of 14 per thousand per annum, giving an increase of 34 per thousand per annum or 3.4 percent per annum compound-geometric progression. In basic terms this means quite simply that, at the present rate of growth, the African population will double itself in 20 years, and by 1988 the country will have to support a population of 9 000 000 Africans alone (Wrathall, 1969: 92).

Colonial development policy managed this population growth without releasing resources or allocating a political and administrative role to Africans. Separate development implied that Africans paid for the cost of their own development and subsidised the development and lifestyle of the European settlers. There was no intention for Africans to be entirely left alone to form a state within a state like the so-called 'self governing Bantustans' of apartheid South Africa. In the history of the colony there was a stage where the mobilisation of agricultural accumulation became both economically and politically necessary, especially during the depression period and post WWII era. This dual motivation for development of the rural economy is a prominent theme in the political economy of colonial rural development.

Alvord's agrarian crusade was overtaken by developments such as the *Land Apportionment Act of 1930* effective April 1931, which also gave birth to the Native Purchase Areas and the Maize and Cattle Marketing Acts of 1934. These had negative effects on Alvord's efforts. Robin Palmer (1977) described the LAA as a crucial defining moment in the history, the development path of the Rhodesian economy as well as the relations between the white and African sectors which vigorously followed the recommendations of the Morris Carter Commission set up in 1923 (it made its recommendation in 1925) and partitioned land into 'European Areas' and 'Native Reserves' thus bringing to life Huggins' policy of racial segregation and an official component of the social and economic history of the country. Since the 1930 Land Apportionment Act, numerous alternations were made to the distribution of the

to ensure that Africans made a living within the land allocated to them under the 1930 Land Apportionment Act and to avoid the reduction of land under white control. It can be concluded that during this period the reference to "African development" meant nothing more than a euphemism for sustaining land alienation and keeping Africans under check by providing "land and livelihood for a growing African population within the African Reserves" (Wrathall, 1969: 92).

total land in the country but did not necessarily change the principles of segregation as regards the African people's location in the country.

The new Act legislated that some 7.5 million acres of land would be set aside as African Purchase Areas or *matenganyika* (considered the Special Native Areas later included under the Tribal Trust Land by the Act of 1970) for aspirant African farmers wanting land outside the communal areas. By 1950 a further 15m acres were added to the Reserves and this was followed by a further 2m acres in 1962. Under the 1970 Land Tenure Act, the division of land into European and African areas was finalised “for all times” and the Reserves became known as Tribal Trust Lands. At independence, some 165 TTLs were scattered throughout the country, largely in drier low lying areas adjacent to European farming land, covering 40.2m acres. This led to a 50:50 division of land between Africans and whites, but a division unfair in the sense that the white half was more fertile and better quality and shared by a few thousand owner farmers while the lower quality half was populated by millions of people. It is important to note, however, that although the area covered by the Reserves doubled since 1930, the land allocated for this increase was characterised by poor rainfall, soil and altitude as well tsetse infested making it of little use for dry-land subsistence farming (Dunlop, 1972).

The land movements between each sector are crucial as they affected African agriculture and livelihood strategies. However, it is the nature, quality and amount of land available to Africans that influenced the extent to which they could farm productively. African reserves were established on land that was mostly “rocky, waterless and virtually unusable for agricultural purposes ...” (Mosley, 1983: 24). The use of land allocation to suppress African productivity was a clear government policy.

In the meantime, while the state went in full force to stifle African agriculture, every effort was made to develop and support European settler farmers. White agriculture was supported by a regime of subsidies while African agriculture was indirectly “discouraged” through an array of legislative impediments. Stereotypes of the “economically irrational African” versus the “economically efficient European” (Mosley, 1983: 23) were dominant. A wall was created between the African and the European sectors through an elaborate structure of subsidies and restraints on competition set up to protect white farming. By 1923 when the Company relinquished control over the executive to representatives of the settlers:

European farmers in Southern Rhodesia were satisfied by the contribution of the government to the development of European farming. These farmers were well organised – at least to represent their interests politically, if not to safeguard their economic position by controlling production, marketing and distribution - and the economic conditions of the colony during the 1920s led farmers to agitate for increased government intervention and assistance (Murray, 1970: 64).

The Rhodesia Agricultural Union (RAU)'s alliance of associations gave it a broad national and political status. Between 1923 and 1953, the government's remit *vis a vis* settler farmers went beyond research, collecting and disseminating information, giving advice and guidance, to making legal intervention in the area of labour and pricing among other things (Murray, 1970).

Colonial policies on land and segregatory policies in access to credit had sufficiently dealt with any possibility of African enterprise and participation in mining and manufacturing except as labourers (see Arrighi and Saul, 1973; Phimister, 1988; Palmer, 1977; Palmer and Parsons, 1977; and van Onselen, 1976) yet the threat of African competition in maize and cattle production was seen as huge by organised agriculture so they demanded the state to act. The practice was that if the production of something required some individual input, the exclusion of African producers from the market was particularly simple. Poverty, exacerbated by lack of credit facilities prevented Africans from buying inputs. At a secondary level, market forces were then left to work unhindered. Where this condition was not satisfied an "indivisible input could be *created*" [emphasis in original] by requiring producers of a cash crop to buy an expensive licence or by other administrative arrangements. These requirements would introduce a handicap into the African cost structure without the appearance of overt discrimination of a kind which might attract British Colonial Office intervention (Mosley, 1983: 40).

In practice, dealing with the control of African cattle and maize production raised complexities for policy makers given the opposing interests within the white economy. While rural white farmers were interested in curbing competition from the African producers, the mining sector welcomed cheap African maize and beef supplies (Van Onselen, 1976). As a result policy in such a context required the protection of the European producer against the competition of the African without hitting the African too hard. This was to create a balance as there were influential economic sectors for whom maize and cattle were inputs and who welcomed the African's cheap supplies (Mosley, 1983: 41).

Such contradictions in the white economy called for government response through compromises that did not give away much on the African side. White agriculture was clearly protected from any form of competition in the production of the most important export cash crops such as tobacco and tea.³⁶ As maize and cattle were already produced by Africans (and being key to their nutritional system) with vast know-how, control had to be placed at the level of marketing than production (in fact, poor land and location was already a huge production damper). The white cattle farmers benefited from localised quarantines and a policy making grants for farmers to erect dip tanks on their farms and then allowing them to recover the cost of dipping their cattle from Africans.³⁷ The local maize farmers had sold directly on the local market which fetched a higher price and then disposed of the surplus on the export market and in so doing, reducing their loss. The formation of the Maize Control Board subjected African producers to sell through unscrupulous traders at a much lower price than was being offered to European producers who could deliver directly to the monopsonic board.

Following the Great Depression, world market prices for beef and maize dropped. Access to the local market, previously shunned due to lower prices, became a matter of survival. The RAU's political influence ensured that white producers accessed the more lucrative market available. African farmers lacked an effective political lobby.³⁸ The protection of white agriculture from African competition by blocking African access to the market was justified as:

... critical for the survival of the entire European settler community, as maize growing and stock raising were seen to be among the few activities accessible to the small undercapitalised settler rather than the large international company ... thus perceived as both gateways to future settlement and keys to the land values

³⁶ Africans could not afford to buy tea and Virginia tobacco seeds. Without the support of the Agricultural Department made it difficult to grow cash crops. The export monopoly of white producer co-operatives excluded Africans from participation. The colonial native officials argued that Africans should refrain from cash crop production to safeguard their food self-sufficiency.

³⁷ Before the removal of Africans from white areas to settle in the reserves, most African cattle were dipped on white farms for which a fee was collected. Europeans bought African cattle at a very cheap price and then sold it on the urban market. In some cases, African cattle were confiscated for straying, for which they would be kept by the white farmer on whose land the cattle had trespassed. Physical force was used to relieve Africans of their cattle. It seems clear that Africans were forced to stand aside while their cattle were taken and a nominal payment for them was thrown on the ground, or persuaded that it was against the law for them to refuse to sell their cattle at whatever price offered (Mosley, 1983: 54).

³⁸ The Great Depression forced a shift in economic development whose implications were felt profoundly in Southern Africa. Because of extreme international overinvestment and financial bubbling during the late 1920s, the early 1930s witnessed roughly a one-third contraction of economic activity. Foreign markets for the colony's goods disappeared, exports quickly fell by 50% and as a result, imports had to be slashed from £7 million in 1928 to £3.1 million in 1932. Overall, Southern Rhodesia registered a draconian 30% drop in net national income during 1931 as a result of its vulnerability to an earlier 'globalisation'.

The economic and political power attained by whites was systematically used to change the terms of trade against the African cultivator; to expropriate his surplus by monopolistic trading, by the extraction of tax and rents and dipping fees; to undercut his production in the interests of an infant capitalist farming sector; and finally to proletarianise him into a migrant labourer when his cereals and cattle were no longer crucial to the interests of colonial capitalism.

The colonial penetration into Zimbabwe steered clear of transforming the African sector to function under capitalist relations of production. To ensure this dualism, the white sector fell under a private property regime administered by Roman Dutch law, while African society was administered through communal property thought to be consistent with 'native jurisprudence'. The combination of the colonial policies of indirect rule and separate development allowed traditional economic and social production systems in the African dominated rural areas to continue with little disturbance, while urban economies under white control operated under the Western capitalist relations of production.³⁰ This left a society operating at different levels, with the 'traditional' subservient to the 'modern' sector. Roger Riddell (1978) points out that the capitalist mode of production became dominant without the destruction of pre-capitalist modes of production and emphasises that:

Indeed what is particular about capital accumulation in Rhodesia is that right up to [independence] pre-capitalist modes of production exist[ed] side by side yet subservient to the dominant capitalist mode (Riddell, 1981: 2).

The administrative structure of African affairs differed from that, existing for whites. All African affairs were bundled under the Native Affairs Department prior to WWII as all African issues were considered as rural issues (as these were seen as their permanent home). Native Commissioners with the help of District Assistant Native Commissioners were responsible for maintaining law and order through chiefs.³¹

³⁰ Even where policies of assimilation were pursued, the attainment of 'provincial' status by colonies did not expunge the 'citizen and subject' differentiation between the European colonisers and the colonized African natives, respectively, see Mamdani (1999) for details.

³¹ The settler state created a paternalist polity for the guidance of blacks. A liberal system existed for whites where they would elect their leaders from a multi-party system. This was seen as too much for Africans who still required 'tutoring' into the art of management and civilisation. An elaborate system of consultation with African chiefs within the reserved land designed to serve not only restrictive functions. However, in the long run, the effectiveness of this system lasted as long as the legitimacy of the institution of chieftaincy did not shrink in its relevance in the eyes of Africans.

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The institutions and organisations responsible for overall African development in particular and agriculture since 1926 faced rapid changes and staff turnover, indicative of the lack of consistency and the trial and error method underscoring official thinking and approaches to African agriculture. The constant changes in institutions for African development had a disruptive impact and limited institutional development. Given the level of mistrust among the beneficiaries of extension, it was important for officials to develop familiarity and gain the trust of the farmers.

Up until the 1920s, the Shona had, by and large, managed to produce a surplus and thus avoid waged labour. Even people like Garfield Todd, who were considered among conservative whites, were irked by the Shona preference for remaining as cultivators.³⁵ Population growth

³⁵ For Garfield Todd, the future of Southern Rhodesia was in industrialisation which required huge external capital injections. ‘We do not want native peasants,’ Garfield Todd told Parliament: ‘We want the bulk of them working in the mines and farms and in the European areas and we could absorb them and their families (Arrighi, 1973: 362). Given the resilience of the Shona as farmers and their holding out to the demands for cheap labour in the service of white settlers, it became clear to the colonial regime that any development for Africans had to be located within African areas in consistence with the segregation policy. The aim of development for Africans was

became the official excuse for congestion in African areas. Wrathall cites statistical evidence of growing African population as key to development in African areas, suggesting that:

In 1911 the African population was estimated as being some 700 000 and at the end of 1967 4.400 000, of which 3,774 000 live in and depend on Tribal Trust Lands for their existence. The African birth rate is estimated as being 48 per thousand per annum with a death rate of 14 per thousand per annum, giving an increase of 34 per thousand per annum or 3.4 percent per annum compound-geometric progression. In basic terms this means quite simply that, at the present rate of growth, the African population will double itself in 20 years, and by 1988 the country will have to support a population of 9 000 000 Africans alone (Wrathall, 1969: 92).

Colonial development policy managed this population growth without releasing resources or allocating a political and administrative role to Africans. Separate development implied that Africans paid for the cost of their own development and subsidised the development and lifestyle of the European settlers. There was no intention for Africans to be entirely left alone to form a state within a state like the so-called 'self governing Bantustans' of apartheid South Africa. In the history of the colony there was a stage where the mobilisation of agricultural accumulation became both economically and politically necessary, especially during the depression period and post WWII era. This dual motivation for development of the rural economy is a prominent theme in the political economy of colonial rural development.

Alvord's agrarian crusade was overtaken by developments such as the *Land Apportionment Act of 1930* effective April 1931, which also gave birth to the Native Purchase Areas and the Maize and Cattle Marketing Acts of 1934. These had negative effects on Alvord's efforts. Robin Palmer (1977) described the LAA as a crucial defining moment in the history, the development path of the Rhodesian economy as well as the relations between the white and African sectors which vigorously followed the recommendations of the Morris Carter Commission set up in 1923 (it made its recommendation in 1925) and partitioned land into 'European Areas' and 'Native Reserves' thus bringing to life Huggins' policy of racial segregation and an official component of the social and economic history of the country. Since the 1930 Land Apportionment Act, numerous alternations were made to the distribution of the

to ensure that Africans made a living within the land allocated to them under the 1930 Land Apportionment Act and to avoid the reduction of land under white control. It can be concluded that during this period the reference to "African development" meant nothing more than a euphemism for sustaining land alienation and keeping Africans under check by providing "land and livelihood for a growing African population within the African Reserves" (Wrathall, 1969: 92).

total land in the country but did not necessarily change the principles of segregation as regards the African people's location in the country.

The new Act legislated that some 7.5 million acres of land would be set aside as African Purchase Areas or *matenganyika* (considered the Special Native Areas later included under the Tribal Trust Land by the Act of 1970) for aspirant African farmers wanting land outside the communal areas. By 1950 a further 15m acres were added to the Reserves and this was followed by a further 2m acres in 1962. Under the 1970 Land Tenure Act, the division of land into European and African areas was finalised “for all times” and the Reserves became known as Tribal Trust Lands. At independence, some 165 TTLs were scattered throughout the country, largely in drier low lying areas adjacent to European farming land, covering 40.2m acres. This led to a 50:50 division of land between Africans and whites, but a division unfair in the sense that the white half was more fertile and better quality and shared by a few thousand owner farmers while the lower quality half was populated by millions of people. It is important to note, however, that although the area covered by the Reserves doubled since 1930, the land allocated for this increase was characterised by poor rainfall, soil and altitude as well tsetse infested making it of little use for dry-land subsistence farming (Dunlop, 1972).

The land movements between each sector are crucial as they affected African agriculture and livelihood strategies. However, it is the nature, quality and amount of land available to Africans that influenced the extent to which they could farm productively. African reserves were established on land that was mostly “rocky, waterless and virtually unusable for agricultural purposes ...” (Mosley, 1983: 24). The use of land allocation to suppress African productivity was a clear government policy.

In the meantime, while the state went in full force to stifle African agriculture, every effort was made to develop and support European settler farmers. White agriculture was supported by a regime of subsidies while African agriculture was indirectly “discouraged” through an array of legislative impediments. Stereotypes of the “economically irrational African” versus the “economically efficient European” (Mosley, 1983: 23) were dominant. A wall was created between the African and the European sectors through an elaborate structure of subsidies and restraints on competition set up to protect white farming. By 1923 when the Company relinquished control over the executive to representatives of the settlers:

European farmers in Southern Rhodesia were satisfied by the contribution of the government to the development of European farming. These farmers were well organised – at least to represent their interests politically, if not to safeguard their economic position by controlling production, marketing and distribution - and the economic conditions of the colony during the 1920s led farmers to agitate for increased government intervention and assistance (Murray, 1970: 64).

The Rhodesia Agricultural Union (RAU)'s alliance of associations gave it a broad national and political status. Between 1923 and 1953, the government's remit *vis a vis* settler farmers went beyond research, collecting and disseminating information, giving advice and guidance, to making legal intervention in the area of labour and pricing among other things (Murray, 1970).

Colonial policies on land and segregatory policies in access to credit had sufficiently dealt with any possibility of African enterprise and participation in mining and manufacturing except as labourers (see Arrighi and Saul, 1973; Phimister, 1988; Palmer, 1977; Palmer and Parsons, 1977; and van Onselen, 1976) yet the threat of African competition in maize and cattle production was seen as huge by organised agriculture so they demanded the state to act. The practice was that if the production of something required some individual input, the exclusion of African producers from the market was particularly simple. Poverty, exacerbated by lack of credit facilities prevented Africans from buying inputs. At a secondary level, market forces were then left to work unhindered. Where this condition was not satisfied an "indivisible input could be *created*" [emphasis in original] by requiring producers of a cash crop to buy an expensive licence or by other administrative arrangements. These requirements would introduce a handicap into the African cost structure without the appearance of overt discrimination of a kind which might attract British Colonial Office intervention (Mosley, 1983: 40).

In practice, dealing with the control of African cattle and maize production raised complexities for policy makers given the opposing interests within the white economy. While rural white farmers were interested in curbing competition from the African producers, the mining sector welcomed cheap African maize and beef supplies (Van Onselen, 1976). As a result policy in such a context required the protection of the European producer against the competition of the African without hitting the African too hard. This was to create a balance as there were influential economic sectors for whom maize and cattle were inputs and who welcomed the African's cheap supplies (Mosley, 1983: 41).

Such contradictions in the white economy called for government response through compromises that did not give away much on the African side. White agriculture was clearly protected from any form of competition in the production of the most important export cash crops such as tobacco and tea.³⁶ As maize and cattle were already produced by Africans (and being key to their nutritional system) with vast know-how, control had to be placed at the level of marketing than production (in fact, poor land and location was already a huge production damper). The white cattle farmers benefited from localised quarantines and a policy making grants for farmers to erect dip tanks on their farms and then allowing them to recover the cost of dipping their cattle from Africans.³⁷ The local maize farmers had sold directly on the local market which fetched a higher price and then disposed of the surplus on the export market and in so doing, reducing their loss. The formation of the Maize Control Board subjected African producers to sell through unscrupulous traders at a much lower price than was being offered to European producers who could deliver directly to the monopsonic board.

Following the Great Depression, world market prices for beef and maize dropped. Access to the local market, previously shunned due to lower prices, became a matter of survival. The RAU's political influence ensured that white producers accessed the more lucrative market available. African farmers lacked an effective political lobby.³⁸ The protection of white agriculture from African competition by blocking African access to the market was justified as:

... critical for the survival of the entire European settler community, as maize growing and stock raising were seen to be among the few activities accessible to the small undercapitalised settler rather than the large international company ... thus perceived as both gateways to future settlement and keys to the land values

³⁶ Africans could not afford to buy tea and Virginia tobacco seeds. Without the support of the Agricultural Department made it difficult to grow cash crops. The export monopoly of white producer co-operatives excluded Africans from participation. The colonial native officials argued that Africans should refrain from cash crop production to safeguard their food self-sufficiency.

³⁷ Before the removal of Africans from white areas to settle in the reserves, most African cattle were dipped on white farms for which a fee was collected. Europeans bought African cattle at a very cheap price and then sold it on the urban market. In some cases, African cattle were confiscated for straying, for which they would be kept by the white farmer on whose land the cattle had trespassed. Physical force was used to relieve Africans of their cattle. It seems clear that Africans were forced to stand aside while their cattle were taken and a nominal payment for them was thrown on the ground, or persuaded that it was against the law for them to refuse to sell their cattle at whatever price offered (Mosley, 1983: 54).

³⁸ The Great Depression forced a shift in economic development whose implications were felt profoundly in Southern Africa. Because of extreme international overinvestment and financial bubbling during the late 1920s, the early 1930s witnessed roughly a one-third contraction of economic activity. Foreign markets for the colony's goods disappeared, exports quickly fell by 50% and as a result, imports had to be slashed from £7 million in 1928 to £3.1 million in 1932. Overall, Southern Rhodesia registered a draconian 30% drop in net national income during 1931 as a result of its vulnerability to an earlier 'globalisation'.

on which the bank's ability to lend for further development depended (Mosley, 1983: 43).

Agriculture and cattle marketing institutions and policies were also used to exclude Africans from rural commercial enterprise. The Native Commissioner for Mazowe wrote a telegram to the Native Affairs Department that traders in reserves were now in position of monopolists and dictated not only the price, but the medium with which to buy grain, which medium is trade goods only. He warned that difficulties in collecting native revenue would result as private consumers who used to buy grain from the reserve for cash were prohibited from doing so (Farquhar, 1973: 44). When the white cattle farmers needed to remove African competition, concerns about disease, weight and quality were used to discipline African production. Beef and dairy producers made calls for the culling of the African herd claiming the threat of the spread of disease.

The control of African maize and cattle production defeated the purpose of establishing Native Purchase Schemes for the encouragement of progressive African farmers (Mosley, 1983: 24).³⁹ The Land Commission of 1925 advocated for the provision of slightly bigger plots on individual tenure to 'hardworking Africans' to participate in the cash economy. This resulted from increasing demand for this kind of land among wealthier Africans (Table 1.3 refers).

Table 1.3: Uptake and Purchase of Plots in Native Purchase Areas

Year	Total African population	African population in reserves	African population in Purchase Areas	Percentage of total African Population	
				Reserves	Purchase Area
1936	1 081 000	719 000	54 000	66.5%	4.9%
1941	1 265 000	854 000	103 000	67.5%	8.2%
1946	1 533 000	1 084 000	135 000	70.7%	8.8%
1951	1 840 000	1 258 000	237 000	68.4%	12.9%

Source: Adapted from Paul Mosley (1983: 26)

The NPAs were also meant to decongest the reserves, an objective which was a complete failure. The allocation of land in Purchase Schemes was not on a big enough scale to reduce congestion in the reserves. Moreover, the majority of the Africans who took up land in the NP schemes came from the urban areas rather than the rural areas. Few reserve based Master Farmers were able to afford to buy the land in the Purchase Schemes. There was no fund established to assist incumbents who wanted to buy land in this sector. However, politically,

³⁹ The Land Commission recommended that Master Farmers should be given land outside reserves on lease hold. However, this land could not be in designated crown land so it had to be adjacent to the reserves in line with the racial separate development policy.

the NP schemes served another role. They creamed off the more progressive farmers from the reserves as well as providing an investment opportunity for wealthy urban Africans who still held a strong attachment to the land but felt that they did not really belong in the reserves. Wealthy Africans had demanded land in fertile areas occupied by whites (Riddell, 1978: 6). As indicated in table 1.4 below, most of the land in the Purchase schemes was as marginal as in the reserves.

Table 1.4: Agricultural Land in the Native Purchase Areas According to Natural Regions

<i>Natural Regions</i>	<i>Area in '000 Acres</i>	<i>% of Total Area</i>
I	18.0	0.5
II	622.7	17.8
III	1 324.2	37.9
IV	1 291.8	36.9
V	241.1	6.8
TOTAL	3 497.8	11.0

Source: Riddell (1978: 51)

It is clear from the information above that most of the land (about 81.8%) was in the drier regions of the country III to V.

The District Secretary for African Areas in the Natural Resources Board and former Director of Native Affairs, R. M. Davies was upbeat about plot holder performance in the Purchase Areas and wrote that: "The gap between the high standards applying mainly to the European farming sector and the farming activities in the Purchase Area is being significantly narrowed ... factors such as the lack of access to credit and the shortage of supervision and guidance which, in the past, seriously retarded the development of these areas are no longer obstacles to real progress" and insisted that "the economy of the Purchase Areas [was] emerging from the traditional pattern of farming practices towards the diversification or intensification to be found in the European areas. ... Here the systems of farming are more closely related to the natural suitability of the environment" (see Davies, 1969: 21).

Native Purchase Area plots became the basis for self-exploitation for Africans in the reserves. Those who pushed themselves hard in the harsh reserve conditions would be recognised for 'upgrade'. The NPA farmers however, suffered the same neglect that affected those in the reserves. The African Missionary Conference as well as the Bantu Conference argued that it was government's duty to support the Native Purchase Area farmers with implements, labour, seeds, fertilisers and cash loans. They urged those taking up land to be given a grace period

involving payments pointing to packages given to whites as reference. Another demand was for Purchase Area farms to become the property of the purchaser with all rights to dispose of it either to his [sic, i.e. never her] son, brother or relative (Ranger, 1995: 56). The Conference painted a grim picture of the Purchase Areas, pointing out that:

The efforts of the black man to produce to his potential are stifled by generalised shortages of all the necessary things required to run a commercial establishment. There is a sense to which the government expects the black man to perform wonders in terms of production and yet nothing comes in his way in the form of support. Reports and requests have been sent to the relevant departments and we always meet with promises, but nothing happens. All they do is to come to check for contours and cattle carrying capacity – these are the things that discourage us and limit our potential (Chairperson's Annual Report, 1969).

The purchase of land in the schemes did not resolve the tenure security problems faced by Africans in the reserves. Purchase Area farms remained the property of the Land Board as purchase only allowed for occupancy only. The implication was that when compared to reserves, tenure security in the Purchase Areas was more fragile as it depended on an administration in which the farmers had no means of leverage. In terms of production and the standards of living of the purchase area farmers, a substantial number were better off than the majority of those in the reserves. Throughout its life, the Purchase Area stake remained relatively marginal given that it covered 3.6 million acres, just 3.7 per cent of the total land area, holding no more than three percent of the population. This converted to only one percent of the country's farmers and it was responsible for only 2.3 percent of total agricultural production in the country at their peak (Riddell, 1978: 87).⁴⁰ The NP Schemes were far from a revolution in African development.

Southern Rhodesia was affected by the interwar depression but was able to survive economically it as the beginning of Self-Government had started disengaging from the South African and international economy, through a domestic oriented import-substitution process. The fate of Africans and African agriculture was tied to the rapidly changing context of the interwar period, at times pulling in contradictory ends. On one hand was the boom following World War One which increased demand and the Great Depression which led to a sharp decline in demand. The decline in demand resulting from the depression required that white farmers be protected from the African competition. The interest in Africans as farmers arose

⁴⁰ NPA farmers did not have an effective political lobby and could not effectively get their demands attended to. More research can be done in this area and also to ascertain what happened to them following independence.

again during WWII when the government could not ignore the role of Africans as producers of grain and beef necessary for the war effort.

By the 1940s, critics of government development policies highlighted the fact that African areas were becoming increasingly worse off. District Native Commissioners were particularly worried by the level of degradation due to overpopulation which led to the loss of soil fertility and increased erosion. The outcry about the African conditions was overtaken by bigger events. The beginning of WWII in 1939 had impacts on the Rhodesian economy which was integrated into the global capitalist economy. The need for increased production for the war effort however, led to a moment of opportunity for African agricultural production and also increased demand for African labour. Huggins announced a new *Native Policy* in 1941 in which he listed “advances desired and intended for the Africans ... and [promoted] a new representative structure for Africans” (Murray, 1970: 301). This policy did not mean any shift from the separate development policy. The Native Production and Trade Commission of 1944 (also known as the Godlonton Commission) entrenched the notion of the inferiority of African systems espoused by Rhodesian racism. The Godlonton Commission argued that:

Advanced people while preserving their settled economy have a duty by all reasonable and proper means to assist backward peoples to progress and for that purpose to enforce discipline without oppression. It is also the duty of forward peoples to adapt themselves to the presence of such backward peoples in their midst; it is the duty of the backward peoples to contribute to their own advancement to the limit of their powers and to observe proper discipline (cited in Drinkwater, 1988: 271).

The window of opportunity available to Africans during the war was closed. The recommendations of the Godlonton Commission were translated into the *Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA)* was signed into law in 1951.⁴¹ The Act was a technical response to the population pressure in the African areas and deteriorating agricultural conditions in designated ‘reserves’. It introduced a wave of compulsion without addressing land shortage, the major reason for poor yields and degradation (Machingaidze, 1991). The Act’s tenure reform focused on tribal control and power over land. Its architects were convinced that tribal control for land was the reason for the low productivity in the African reserves as farmers did not have security. The Commission asked: “How can a man be expected to conserve and build up the productivity of his land if he lives under the constant threat of dispossession at the whim of

peasant with 6 acres and a herd of 6 head of cattle could reap 10 bags per acre and expect a cash return of between £18 and £23 per annum after his subsistence needs had been met” (in Weinrich, 1975: 25).⁴² Resentment to the Act stemmed in part from the fact that some people were expected “to move away from their ancestral lands, to slaughter their cattle, virtually their only worldly asset, and subjected to a complete reversal of the traditional qualifications for those who were entitled to work the land” (Hudson, 1981: 204). The effect of the NLHA was to provide cheap labour for white enterprise from a captive labour force by denying migrant labour the right to return to land in the reserves. The registration of land to individual ownership destroys the security of traditional tenure forms and African farmers were in general hostile to official attempts to change their tenure rights (Payer, 1982: 239).

The Act received mixed reactions even within the Rhodesian government. The Chief Native Commissioner called the NLHA the “most important single piece of legislation put on the Statute Books of Southern Rhodesia since the country’s founding” (Robertson, 1969: 19). However, Noel Robertson, the Under-Secretary for Internal Affairs, had problems with the thinking that changing traditional tenure would solve all the rural problems in African areas and criticised the NLHA for trying to do more than addressing conservation issues.⁴³ Native development was limited to increasing African agricultural production while arresting soil erosion through a regime of community re-organisation. Thus, in the Natives Affairs Department:

The staff operated demonstration farms; distributed improved strains; engaged in publicity and education; and operated a system [trusting that] farmers could rise through the grades of co-operators and plot-holders to master farmers – at which point the farmers were entitled to purchase land in the native areas (Murray, 1970: 304).

The Native Affairs Department and the protagonists for African development were interested in influx control. They argued for economic growth based on agriculture. The NLHA and the policy of Native Community Development were in essence about population control.

⁴² This idea of an economic holding or standard holding as suggested by the Commission cannot stand up to scrutiny whether on an economic or technical basis especially in the Zimbabwean setting where land and agro-ecological conditions vary from place to place.

⁴³ Noel Robertson served as District Commissioner until he became the Under-Secretary for Internal Affairs by the time of the Ian Smith Regime making him one of the longest serving colonial officials in the Native Affairs Department.

some chief or Headman?" Lord Hailey had however already answered this question suggesting that "insecurity in the tribal African's right of occupation was feared most as coming from Government than tribal arrangements" (Hailey cited in Cell, 2002).

The colonial experience of traditional leadership changed from supportive to a period where they were despised and removed until the 1970s where there was an attempt to restore the institution. Initially, to reduce the cost of administration and to be seen to be involving the Africans by the British Colonial Office, the colonial authority administered their control through chiefs. To achieve this, they created the notion of the chiefs an all important traditional institution which furthered served the purpose of denying the need for voluntary and independent producer associations for Africans in the rural areas. The office of the traditional authority was thus re-designed to suit colonial interests and placed firmly under the control of the Native Affairs Department (NAD). The chiefs became salaried officials of the NAD and in return they had to administer the control of natives through native councils for the daily administration of rural areas. Tax collection and enforcement of conservation discipline now fell under chiefs, making them subject of popular disgruntlement.

Table 1.5: Land Allocation by UDI (1965)

<i>Land Categories</i>	<i>Size in 000 Acres</i>
Native Reserves	20, 859
Native Purchase Areas	8, 039
Special Native Areas	9, 712
European (Crown Land)	38, 650
European (Alienated land)	9, 415
Forest Reserve	3, 600
National Parks Reserve	3, 900

Source: Arrighi, 1967: 22

Prior to the Act Africans had purchased less than 10 000 acres and Europeans some 31 million acres (Arrighi, 1967: 22). The Act also intended to establish "economic holdings" which would be allocated and registered on an individual basis so as to provide security of tenure and hence maximize producer incentive for the industrious African farmers. The Commission also brought forward the question of what constitutes an "economic holding." According to Michael Drinkwater (1991: 67), an "economic holding" should be "evaluated in technical and economic terms, and its appropriateness in social terms." In its submissions, the Godlonton Commission defined an ideal economic peasant holding "Under optimum conditions of high rainfall, the practice of crop rotation, the use of manure, and proper marketing facilities, a

The NLHA failed to achieve its intended objectives for improved African agriculture and further marginalized African areas. According to Robertson:

The act ... was backed by millions of pound sterling, hundreds of tractors roared into action, camps for planners and conservation officers were set up under almost every tree in Tribal Areas and the exercise was rushed at breakneck speed and those who cautioned less haste were castigated as being laggards, but the truth of the matter was that too little time had been given to explanation and discussion with the persons most concerned, the tribesmen (Robertson, 1969: 19).

Robertson also noted with great concern that the NLHA did not bring about the generation of incentives to improve the productivity of land by Africans. The Act was passed to provide traditional authorities with powers to enforce conservation in the rural areas and to “control the occupation and use of Tribal Trust Land” (Robertson, 1969: 20). This had the net effect of turning tribal leaders against their own people.⁴⁴

One of the effects of the NLHA was the increase in the number of Africans seeking employment as rural conditions became even harder. The Rhodesia and Nyasaland Federal Economic Report (1959: 20) pointed out that in Southern Rhodesia “there were fewer African cultivators than there are Africans employed on European farms and elsewhere in the money economy – one third of Africans in employment work in European agriculture.” This was seen as indicating a general low involvement by the African population in reserve agriculture. This was a worrying situation in an economy where the majority of the African people lived in rural areas and depended on agricultural production for survival.

African population increase became the scapegoat for this situation and the NLHA was expected to resolve these problems. Officials stated:

During the ‘40s and ‘50s the pressure of the rapidly growing population on the land, together with inefficient farming (the land is particularly vulnerable to erosion), brought the threat of a food crisis in Southern Rhodesia. The problem has been tackled by raising the standard of African agriculture, limiting stock, checking fragmentation of holdings and encouraging individual tenure through the Land Husbandry Act, 1951 (The Federal Economic Report, 1959: 20).

The report pegged African cattle ownership at three-fifths of national herd, that is, over 2 million head of cattle in 1958. The Quinton Commission of 1960 advocated a total abolition of

⁴⁴ Interestingly, Mugabe also used the same approach to bolster his support in the face of crushing general support especially in the urban areas during the ‘Land Occupation Movement’.

the Land Apportionment Act together with the opening up of the Native Reserves (Hudson, 1981: 37). When the United Federation Party (UFP) of Edgar Whitehead endorsed the abolition of the Land Apportionment Act in 1961, the Rhodesia Front of Ian Smith rallied against the move seen as a threat to white privilege – winning the 1962 elections on the platform of “leaving the Land Apportionment Act alone and slowing the rate of African advancement” (Hudson, 1981: 38). In 1965, the conservative “farmers’ government” of Ian Smith added another six million hectares of land across the African sectors in an attempt to undermine the rise of African nationalism.⁴⁵

Whilst Southern Rhodesia was incorporated into the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland African agriculture was housed within the Ministry of Agriculture. However, this was short-lived as the break up of the Federation in 1963 led to the rise of Ian Smith’s conservative Rhodesia Front party which re-organised the extension services under the Department of Conservation and Extension Services (CONEX) in 1964. Under CONEX, extension services for white and African farmers were housed under one roof but in different departments which received unequal budgetary allocations. While large scale commercial agriculture received extension services and the bulk of the research efforts, African areas contended with the bullying of conservationists. As a rule of the thumb, whites took the lion’s share of any resource made available for development. To get around this, in 1942, Alvord had sought incorporation into the Native Affairs Department in the hope of obtaining a more generous resource provision than he had in the white-orientated Department of Agriculture. The periodic changes in terms of the institutional placement for African agriculture reflects a major contestation between professional control and administrative control of African development and how it was understood.

The placement of African agriculture under the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1969 eroded the gains of the previous decade, notwithstanding their limitations. Subjecting professional staff to control by administrative staffers led to serious erosion in staff numbers, morale and effectiveness. At every level agricultural staff was put under the control and direction of

⁴⁵ The resulting land allocation was such that 18.1 million hectares were allocated for whites, 18.2 million for the black indigenous population and 2.7 million set aside as state land. By this time the nationalists had also changed their mind about negotiated settlement with ZANU forming ZANLA, ZAPU forming ZIPRA and moving into armed resistance gear.

administrators, regardless of any other considerations, including experience, ability, qualifications and proven performance.

Table 1.6: Changes in Institutional Responsibility for African Agriculture

<i>Key Periods</i>	<i>Institutional Responsibility for African Agriculture</i>
1926 – Appointment of Alvord as CAONA	Native Economic Development and Department of Native Agriculture
1949 – Alvord’s retirement	Department of Conservation and Extension Services in the Ministry of Internal Affairs
1965 – Smith’s UDI	Reserves become Tribal Trust Lands and Department of Agriculture (DEVAG) established for both white and African agriculture in the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources
1978 – Abel Muzorewa	

Compiled from various sources

By the early 1970s, the guerrilla war was already under way. The pre-occupation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs shifted to security and gathering information from the rural areas for reconnaissance purposes and the protection of white farmers who were strategic to the economy, not the improvement of African farming. The implication was that professional extension officers found themselves more and more drawn into security related and having to report on security than on agriculture development. As such, those who remained steadfast to the agriculture cause, were rightly so, mistrusted.

Extension and Conservation in African Agriculture

Under the NLHA, extension services were diverted from ‘Alvordian’ concern with “instruction to the Native for agriculture” to “instruction to the Native for conservation.” Official support for extension concentrated on conservation instead of farming methods. M. G. Reid’s analysis of the achievements of the sector is indicative of this bias. He stated:

During these years a tremendous amount of soil conservation work has been carried out, and a flight over Rhodesia illustrates clearly the tens of thousands of kilometres of contour drain and other land protecting devices which have been constructed. Arable, grazing and residential areas have been rationalised. Irrigation projects have been established, and centres for demonstration, breeding and experimentation have been set up. The agricultural extension service started community development, forest plantations, farmer training schemes and working with rural youth ... (Reid, 1978: 9).

Through this emphasis on instruction, demonstration and extension, from 1953, the Master Farmer Certificate was made an essential pre-requisite for the purchase of a small scale commercial farm and to obtain loans. African farmers took up these instruction and

demonstration opportunities mostly as a means to “move out of the reserves and get preferential treatment as regards the loans” (Agritex, 1994). According to M. G. Reid:

Thousands of Purchase Area Farmers almost invariably started farming in the TTL where they received training by extension services. The same applies to many African businessmen, especially those in the Tribal Trust Lands. By farming successfully, they obtained the capital to go into business (Reid, 1978: 10).

This opinion about the role of extension in communal areas and the ability for “good and hard working farmers” to graduate to Purchase Area schemes is more than just a romanticisation of the role and contribution of the TTL to African economic growth but in this form it is misleading and untrue.⁴⁶

The benefit of extension services in African areas is difficult to quantify. Yudelman (1964: 237) showed that throughout the period 1900 to 1950, while cultivated acreage rose considerably (by 260 – 270%) owing to the increasing use of ploughs, the increase in grain output lagged far behind (at 140%), barely keeping in pace with rural population demand. This means that the rate of accumulation in African areas remained low and production barely met the immediate consumption needs of a rapidly increasing population. In fact, the adoption of new technology in the context of land shortage became another source of environmental disaster. Colonial extension failed to appreciate the African indigenous knowledge system and ability to rationalise. J. H. Farquhar (1969) blamed the lack of development in African areas on African ineptitude, suggesting that the significance of the soil had not been fully appreciated. He argued that:

... provided it gives mere subsistence, the cultivator is satisfied. A crop failure or a drought is ascribed to some infringement of a *taboo* or a hereditary custom. All this amounts to what has been termed a subsistence mentality. Conditions have changed with the advent of the European and the problem is to find some satisfactory method whereby the traditional thinking can be altered to adopt intelligently the causative and scientific thought patterns of the west (Farquhar, 1969: 1).⁴⁷

⁴⁶ The evidence available suggests that African owned businesses in African areas were started mostly by migrant workers who had saved from working in mines (sometimes in South Africa) or urban areas. In fact, a significant number of the Purchase Area farmers were educated South African immigrants. See Cheater, 1980 and van Onselen, 1976.

⁴⁷ The Native Affairs Department Annual (NADA) Journal was an important journal where African affairs planning and practice, as well as experiences were written and shared by the planning and implementing officials

The Under-Secretary for Internal Affairs, Noel Robertson, suggested that in Rhodesia, there was complete rejection of the demonstration system. He suggests that this was because “the African found these new methods arduous, time-consuming and so at variance with his time-honoured wasteful methods and tribal customs as to be quite unacceptable” (Robertson, 1969: 19). Colonial efforts for the development of the African areas ignored African indigenous knowledge systems. The scepticism of the African producers towards adoption of modern technology was seen as part of an “ultra conservative attitude and mental approach that was averse to change” suggesting that “there was so little in the traditional African structure to inspire greater effort, no public opinion to spur people on, no institutions to promote growth of output” (Robertson, 1969: 19).

More than anything, African agriculture subsidised white agricultural sector and the whole economy in general through the supply of cheap labour. N. Reynolds (1969) argues that reserves served as social security, mainly in old age, periods of unemployment and as homes of urban workers and their families when they had failed to obtain permanent homes and other forms of security at their place of employment. The general lack of conversion to western ways of farming was considered as a result of African ineptitude to modern production systems. Anecdotal evidence of African foolishness and failure to modernise taking advantage of readily available technology was used to prove that Africans were against change. The Secretary for Internal Affairs in 1967 thought it inconceivable that African farmers had refused the suggestion that they plant a shorter stalked, quicker maturing variety of sorghum in place of the older longer stalked and low maturing variety. Their reasoning was that:

The *tsumatsuma* insect would eat more of the short variety than of the long. This was because the *tsumatsuma* which is a slow moving cricket-like insect which only moves at night would take longer to crawl up and down the long stalk than the short stalk and would therefore have less time to eat (Wrathall, 1969: 96).

Yet this was a reasonable decision to make for African producers who had little access to insecticides. There is nothing amusing and stupid about the decision made by the growers of sorghum. Evidence from those who adopted the short-stalked variety vindicated those who decided to remain with the long stalked variety. Richard Mtetwa’s doctoral thesis (cited in Ranger, 1978: 110) built an elaborate picture of the successive activities of the *chibhakera*

as well as observers and academicians. It was the barometer for the thinking and attitudes towards Africans and perceptions on African development. The 1969 issue was dedicated to African agriculture.

agricultural cycle; the exploitation of a number of differently named soil types so as to spread out production over as long a period as possible; the different timings of crop types of arid low veld agriculture as contrasted to the more fertile and better watered highveld, where Duma agriculture constituted “the closest approach the Shona had to making agriculture an all-year enterprise” and as such any traditional conservative characterisation of this community would be misleading.⁴⁸ Colonial official thinking that emphasises the lack of change among Africans failed to consider the institutional environment for African agriculture. Economist Egon Kemezis (1970: 20) argued that “the rationality of farming in the frame of the traditional community is much more immediate and perceptible for the peasant, than the rationality of new modes of farming which present to them unknown risks.” This means that while Africans accepted the potential for productivity gains in new methods, the risks in adopting such methods were higher and therefore making adherence to tried and tested methods a rational choice.

The myth of Africans as mere consumers who lacked the motivation for accumulating surplus was necessary to hide the structural hurdles put in the way of African entrepreneurs seeking to better themselves. The Sadie (1967) study pointed to the fact that there was too little demand for consumer goods in African areas and the demand that was felt could be easily met by local goods, thus leaving no motivation for increased production. Those responsible with African development welcomed this report which had argued that the fundamental problem was to raise the marginal utility of income, and especially of money income, and thus to increase effective demand among Africans. The Government engaged Professor J. F. Sadie in 1967 to consult and provide advice on the future development of the country, more especially the African economy. The Sadie report, *The Planning and Development of Rhodesia*, reiterated the same racist thinking that had dominated Rhodesian colonial policy suggesting that the development of the modern sector of the economy should be left in the hands of the Europeans who had the ‘spirit of enterprise’ and that any efforts to advance the African areas should take note of the fact that “people living in those areas are satisfied with their existing standards”. Sadie suggested that there was a need to increase demand for consumer goods and women could be used to nag their husbands for more if production had to increase. Sadie argued:

⁴⁸ For more on the Duma People, see the work of R. M. G. Mtshwa (1978)

The degree of felt need in the rural African is far lower than in more civilised peoples. We all know that the desire to satisfy want is the mainspring of activity and it is the activation of this mainspring that we must pursue with vigour (Sadie, 1967).

This crusade ushered in the era of co-operative societies and trading stores so that as argued, the African would be able to observe in his neighbourhood the consumer goods that could be exchanged for his money. Mtetwa's research (cited in Ranger, 1978) on the Duma refuted this thinking, demonstrating that to the contrary, "the incentive to be rich was always available" and that the Duma taught that "any hard working individual was able to become wealthy." The notion of the lazy and uninspired African communal subsistence producer ignored the fact that, in asking for an improvement of rural roads and bridges, the Chief Native Officers had painted the picture of increased regular movements between the town centres and rural areas. Buses were often over-loaded with fresh vegetables and other rural produce and on their return goods were bought for use in the rural areas.

The 1950s saw a shift from mere demonstration and persuasion in fostering change in African agriculture. Alvord's report in 1944 indicated the shift in approach as he lamented the waste of time suggesting that Africans would never change without compulsion and control (Alvord, 1944). Alvord's report coincided with the Godlonton Commission which also reported in 1945 and laid the basis upon which the 1951 Native Land Husbandry Act was constructed. According to Roger Howman (1969a: 3) it is the Godlonton Commission that did the death knell to the 'era of persuasion' characterised by the work of Alvord who retired in 1944.⁴⁹ The Commission reported that:

Africans were "indifferent, suspicious or hostile"; that "an admirable scheme is being wasted"; that "benefits can only be obtained by compulsory planned production", and added that, "Government has a duty to enforce discipline to ensure progress without oppression" (Godlonton, 1945: Para 412).

The Godlonton Commission preferred commandist planning, and pushed for the compulsory planning of production, whereby a statutory body should be empowered to direct what crops,

⁴⁹ Roger H. G. Howman studied social anthropology and sociology specializing in race relations. He joined the Government Services of Southern Rhodesia in 1927 after obtaining a BA degree in Social Anthropology from South Africa. Between 1935 and 1939, he enrolled for post-graduate study in Sociology at the London University and later spent six months in the United States of America studying race relations. Upon his return he joined the Department of Native Affairs, rising up the ranks to Assistant Native Commissioner and Native Commissioner, Under-Secretary Administration Native Affairs Department until he became the Deputy-Secretary in the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1968. The cited speeches and contributions to Native Development (NADA) were made when he was Deputy Secretary and reflected a combination of academic and beauracatic zeal. His exposure to race relations in South Africa and USA made him more liberal than his government counterparts.

acreages and areas should be planted and what livestock should be kept (Godlonton, 1945: Para 630). The report therefore ushered in an era of compulsion which culminated in the enactment of the *Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951*, designed to enforce good husbandry conditions, and to control the distribution and marketing of the consequent products. The Godlonton Commission was interpreted to be desirous of a 'large-scale agrarian development scheme' which would 'transform agriculture in the African reserves.'

Notwithstanding the existence of the Native Purchase Schemes, the Godlonton Commission found a huge demand for land from richer African farmers whose efforts were constantly frustrated by land shortage as well as lack of access to resources. Irrigation Schemes as well as Co-operative Societies were established to address this demand for land and infrastructure. Part of Alvord's legacies in the development of African agriculture lies in the irrigation scheme sector.⁵⁰

In 1933, the first irrigation scheme was established on the Nyanyadzi River between Mutare and Birchenough Bridge and others followed gradually throughout the country. The Chisumbanje Irrigation Scheme started in 1937 grew to be the biggest by 1960. By 1968, there were around 50 irrigation schemes with an effective area of more than 9, 300 acres of land with a potential acreage of 21 000 upon full development. Matebeleland, in the driest region V was seen as prime for irrigation scheme development, however only the Tuli-Makwe, Silalabuhwa and Ngwezi schemes with a potential of 4 000 acres of irrigable land with handling capacity of about 2 000 families (Wrathall, 1969: 94) were established. Within official circles, some were critical and others optimistic about the irrigation schemes.

The economist A. F. Hunt's research on the oldest Manicaland Schemes in 1957 led him to conclude that the schemes were uneconomic and lacking markets. The study by Kelly (1972) compared white settler schemes at Mkwazine with the African schemes at Chisumbanje, both in the drier south eastern lowveld. Mudekunye (1980) examined the role of the state and

⁵⁰ The policy on irrigation in African areas has been studied by S. M. Makings who published a report in 1961. A. F. Hunt (1957) studied the oldest schemes in Manicaland following which Roder (1965) started a national survey from which the most comprehensive overview of the development of small holder irrigation during the colonial era until 1965 exist. Studies of irrigation after 1965 still depend a lot on Roder's work, and include among others, M. G. Paraiwa (1972), M. Rukuni (1984) and T. K. Zimunya (2001) among others. Subsequent work (Paraiwa, 1970, 1971, 1974, 1975 and 1976; Hughes, 1974; Kelly 1972 and Mudekunye) confirmed the findings by Reynolds and demonstrated that, generally there was an increase in farmer's income in irrigation schemes – when compared to those practising dry-land agriculture.

The Marketing and Pricing Policy of African Produce

In 1958 – the Co-operative Society movement was launched for the marketing⁵¹ of African produce in African areas and by 1969 there were 197 societies in operation. In his evaluation of the ‘so-called ‘success’ of the Co-operative Society Movement, Wrathall contradicted his earlier contention about the “apathy of the local population who, provided they had full stomachs and few cattle, were content to let tomorrow look after itself” and remarked that:

.... the first co-operative society was established in tribal areas only ten years ago and the growth of the movement itself is evidence of its success and acceptance by the ordinary tribesman. [Describing the co-operative society as a two way bridge over which traffic moves in both directions, he added:] Not only does a society facilitate the orderly disposal of its members’ products but it also opens doors to trade and commerce between the most humble tribesman ... (Wrathall, 1969: 93).

The African co-operative movement initiated in 1956 faced a plethora of snags, including; delays in payments to members, high operational costs, lack of funds, management inefficiencies, bureaucratisation and centralised control of primary associations by the co-operative unions and the state, through the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Yet independent reports indicate that as a general rule the co-operative movement was an important outlet for peasant producers in the 1960s which faced decline in the 1970s. Like many other initiatives, the co-operative movement generally failed to stimulate African commercial production beyond the African individual initiative. The Minister of Finance acknowledged this failure stating “what stands out like a gangrenous wound is that we are really little further forward in the development of a vibrant economy in the tribal areas than we were half a century ago” (Wrathall, 1969: 96).

It can be argued therefore that, the colonial period is littered with periods of complete efforts to destroy the African economy as well as efforts to restore African economic self-sufficiency within the context of the reserve. Paul Mosley gets it right where he argues that suggestions of complete destruction of African agriculture during the colonial period are not supported by the

⁵¹ The importance of a marketing network for the transformation of the African production system cannot be over-emphasised. A well balanced marketing system in the broadest sense of the word is an essential element in any development programme. The production of bigger and better crops is of little use if an outlet is not provided. Indeed, the production of bigger crops with no outlet could well lead to frustration and the loss of desire, achieved possibly after years of faithful persuasion, to reach the higher status of a cash crop production instead of simply a subsistence levels.

statistics on African produce. He uses aggregative data on African agriculture to suggest that the data:

...is not supportive of the more extravagant allegations of continuous agricultural decline made by commentators of the underdevelopment school: for example, Arrighi's reference to a 'progressive decline' in the overall productivity of the African peasantries ... and, most forthright of all, Palmer's statement that by the end of the 1930s 'the agricultural economy of the Shona and the Ndebele, like that of the Kikuyu and most South African peoples, had been destroyed (Mosley, 1983: 71).

The land alienation, the extraction of African labour and the extra-market measures embarked on to save white agriculture and white economic enterprise in general had a negative impact on the potential for growth of the African sector. The statistics provided by Mosley (1983) in table 1.7 below indicate that, even if there was no complete destruction of African production, such production was allowed to proceed only to the extent that it allowed for the white economy to benefit from the sector while not allowing it to become competitive. What is clear from the above table is that following the Land Apportionment Act (1930) there was a steady decline in grain production per head from 99 in 1931 to 75 in 1950. This is a reflection of the increasing population congestion in the reserves where production levels declined while population continued to increase. The share of African marketed crops also showed a steady increase from an "estimated £510 000 in 1951 to £2168 000 by 1961." This increase was mostly in grain crops (87.2% in 1951 to 97.8% in 1961), cotton (12.8 declining to 2.2% in 1961) and a very small proportion of Turkish tobacco (increasing from 0% in 1951 to 0.4% in 1961) which can be ascribed to the Native Purchase Schemes (Mosley, 1983: 74).

Table 1.7: African Agricultural Performance, 1900 to 1960

<i>Year</i>	<i>Total African population (000s)</i>	<i>Grain production (000 bags)</i>	<i>Cattle Population (000 head)</i>	<i>Estimated Grain Production per Head (1914 index = 100)</i>
1902	514	1676	55	112
1911	705	2190	330	107
1914	716	2070	406	100
1916	745	2248	491	104
1921	778	2799	854	124
1926	834	2770	1197	114
1931	986	2832	1623	99
1936	1088	2917	1547	93
1940	1224	2997	1718	84
1945	1473	3967	1911	93
1950	1755	3830	1832	75
1955	2145	6350	1900	102
1960	2475	5854	1953	82

Source: Adapted from Mosley, 1983: 72

The increase in grain crop share by Africans is complemented by a decrease in the African share of cotton which is an indication of a shift away from traditional crops on the local market to concentrate on export cash crops by the white sector. Cotton was sold on the local market to industry. The fact that by 1961, Africans were responsible for 57.8% of the marketed grain crops is very significant in terms of the post-independence claims to a miraculous transformation of the African agriculture sector (Mosley, 1983). A study of the colonial agriculture period indicates quite clearly that Africans had an upper hand (when conditions and market access allowed) in the production of grain crops. What is also clear from the performance of African agriculture above is the fact that it flies in the face of the myth of the African as an 'irrational economic being' not able to respond to economic stimuli. When conditions allowed, the African producer responded with enthusiasm and took advantage of the circumstances.

The differentiated support regimes for European and African agriculture became part of the inheritance by the Zimbabwe government following independence. African traditional agriculture was characterised by subsistence orientation, while the small scale commercial sector in the Native Purchase Areas commanded a quasi-commercial agricultural enterprise characterised by relatively low production and labour intensive operations. African agriculture was also insignificant in terms of national output share— as a result of colonial state policies (that limited access to land, credit and markets) as well as being environmentally degraded (UNCTAD, 1980). The danger of this generalisation is to blur the differing levels of productivity in the so-called African agriculture sector and to consider it homogenous. There were actually signs of commercially orientated enterprise within the limited possibilities that the system allowed but not on a scale that encouraged significant accumulation. However, the general picture can be painted that state policies engineered white privilege and wrought African impoverishment. As R. Palmer and I. Birch noted:

The Colony of settlers in Rhodesia aimed to ensure and perpetuate white privilege and control. They dominated access to all resources, such as land, education, health, training, the road and rail networks and loans for farming. Inequality was enforced by the settler-controlled parliament and reinforced by social segregation.

Conclusion

The Rhodesia Front government argued that Africans in the country had the highest standard of living in Africa and suggested that those who were poor were so because of their own laziness (*Debates*, 1969: 2314). Such posturing ignored the crisis caused by land scarcity in the reserves and the rise of African nationalism in response to hardships felt by Africans in both rural and urban areas. Policies for the 'development' of Africans were implemented without their involvement in the creation of such policies and turned out to be about restraining rather than development. Such policies, forced on Africans, were often resisted. Africa is littered with the wrecks of fine projects which were planned by outsiders to lead the advancement of the African, but led, instead, to advance the scope and activities of officials, who gained all the experiences (and the disillusionment), while the African cultivator lived on the fringes, or on the other side of the fence, in happy, or unhappy disregard of what was being done for him (Howman, 1969: 4).

Colonial development policies failed to develop economic policies that transformed the social structures of the African society. Intervention in African areas was built on assumptions about racial supremacy and the desire to 'civilise' Africans. The institutions and customs of the Africans were denigrated as barbaric. Little effort was invested towards understanding indigenous communities or to build upon them. Agricultural extension and technical methods for farming and development ignored Africans' history as farmers. The lack of political legitimacy of colonial regimes in the face of Africans also led to resistance of development interventions. The Rhodesian economy failed to grow enough to accommodate the growing African population and conditions in African areas had become even more desperate. For a five year period with the advent of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the industrial economy increased and with it the demand for labour slightly in excess of the number of school leavers, leading to a temporary stabilisation of the population in tribal areas (Federal Economic Report, 1959: 63).

The political climate changed significantly in the 1960s as Africans reacted to the pressure created by the NLHA of 1951. The number of school leavers exceeded the demand for workers creating more pressure on the tribal areas (Wrathall, 1969: 93). The assumption that everyone could feed themselves without an extra income was also no longer true. This was one of the key reasons why some marketed produce existed, probably even sourced from very poor people. The UDI period further cramped the potential growth of a middle peasant in the

Purchase Area farms. Poorer farmers abandoned farming completely and migrated to look for wage labour either on white owned farms or in the urban areas. With settler production being the major competitor for peasant production in the 1970s, the result upon the African peasantry was disastrous.

Over the period 1965 – 70 production for consumption by African rural households did not increase per capita but remained at \$17.9 in constant prices, while the incomes for sales fell, by a 25 percent margin. The share of sales of total African production was 18.4 percent on average for the period 1966 – 1970, compared with 32 percent for the period between 1955 and 1960. Mounting rural economic grievances and the escalation of the war were closely linked. Many landless and unemployed youth joined the stream of guerrilla volunteers leaving Rhodesia. The sharp fall in the African share of the agricultural market also influenced the reception of the guerrillas by rural masses in their attack on the regime (Birmingham and Ranger, 1983: 375). White farmers were encouraged to diversify production away from tobacco into maize, cattle and cotton. Their share in the local economy increased dramatically with the imposition of sanctions. This represented almost a repeat of the survival strategy used in the interwar period to survive the Great Depression. They were helped by subsidies and loans running at an estimated \$8000 per settler farmer compared to 60 cents each for the black cultivators. By the early 1970s white commercial agriculture increased its share of domestic food production from 30 percent at the start of the 1960s to 75 percent by 1979 ((cited in Phimister, 1987: 52).

African development policy represented the accommodation of Africans in reserves without releasing significantly more land and other productive resources. The stated official desire to convert the African economy into a cash economy was simply to the extent that Africans should not become a burden to the white economy. The idea was to make the African sector responsible for its own reproduction while subsidising the European sector through the release of cheap labour and the provision of cheap food. Read against colonial pricing and marketing bottlenecks created for African producers, the colonial development plans for Africa were used by politicians to salvage the legitimacy that was questioned at home and abroad, hence the sanctions.⁵² The complaints about a subsistence mentality by Africans, no matter how many

⁵² Development officers such as Alvord for instance were very sincere and hard-working but rarely willing to admit to the hard realities of political priorities in the old Rhodesia, full of paternalistic delusions and not very good at grasping Africans' ways of adapting to difficult conditions.

times it was repeated, was nothing more than a scapegoat for a problem created by the colonial regime itself and passed on from one administration to the next. As long as the colonial regimes refused to take responsibility for the structural problems they created, African areas were condemned to poverty and deterioration.

This chapter reviewed such efforts and the underlying motivations behind them with the objective of providing the historical context and space for comparison with the post-colonial efforts in developing African agriculture. By advancing knowledge on African agriculture and the policy recommendations and institutional support (theoretically) of the colonial regime, it becomes possible to appreciate the experiences of African agriculture in the 1980s and why the “success/miracle” thesis might be an exaggeration. In so doing, the chapter also set the basis for reviewing Clever Mumbengegwi (1986)’s notion that post-colonial agricultural policies are a terrain of “similarities and continuities” of the colonial policy as it applied to practice in African agriculture. To do justice to the differences in political orientation and complexities of the two periods being compared, the continuities in colonial and post-colonial policy and practice in African agriculture (in key areas such as poverty alleviation, land redistribution, provision of marketing infrastructure and comprehensive input facility) have to be placed in context. This chapter has articulated the genesis of the land question in Zimbabwe as we now know it. The next chapter will show how ZANU articulated the social, economic and political issues affecting Africans during the liberation struggle. The ideological claim to socialism and the highlighting of the land question created a sense of unity of purpose between ZANU and the rural folk.

Chapter Two

ZANU Nationalism, the Chimurenga, the 1980 Settlement: Socialist Rhetoric and the Emergence of a New Petty Bourgeois Elite

We know a great deal about the surviving and inherited apparatus of bureaucracy and army; about the burden of public debt; about the humiliating dependence on white controlled capitalist farming for the national food supply; about a constitution which makes compensation for land acquisition mandatory and an international environment which is not providing the funds out of which compensation can be paid. ... But on the other hand we know little or nothing about vital questions on the other side. What sort of ideological training have ZANU and ZAPU cadres experienced? What sort of interactions have ZANLA guerrillas had with the people and what kind of continuing structures have emerged from them? What were the expectations of rural voters in giving Mugabe his mandate? How far have they been radicalised by means of their own experience of the war, quite apart from any input of guerrilla ideas? Is there any tension between these various forms of radicalism (Ranger, 1980: 71)?

These questions raised by historian Terence Ranger in 1980 are still relevant in 2008 as they remain central to understanding the path and policy options chosen by ZANU PF since taking over the state machinery. Intellectuals and analysts have contributed to this debate, responding to these questions and many others, often coming to different conclusions about the nature of the war, ZANU's ideology and what informed ZANU's policy choices in government.⁵³ The ideological orientation of ZANU has been difficult to pin down given the disparity between its rhetoric and practice as well as its multi-class nature. ZANU was a nationalist and multi-class organisation which (from its own rhetoric), aspired towards Marxist-Leninist-Maoist transformation (Cliffe, 1982; Astrow, 1983 and Davies, 1988). The polarisation of views about ZANU is such that there is doubt about the bona fides and credentials of ZANU as the liberator of Zimbabwe. John Saul (1979: 107) for one, doubted ZANU and ZAPU's "desire and ability

⁵³ The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) was formed on 8 August 1963, as a splinter of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). Both ZANU and ZAPU formed military wings: the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) respectively to fight the struggle from neighbouring countries — ZANLA from Mozambique after the Portuguese withdrew, and ZIPRA from Zambia and Botswana. ZANU was inclined towards China while ZAPU had connections with the USSR. An attempt at joining the ZANLA and ZIPRA forces was attempted in 1975 by ZIPA but quickly collapsed as soon as the politicians regained control. In 1979 the two parties went to the Lancaster House Negotiations as a unity called the Patriotic Front (PF). However, in 1980 the parties fought the elections separately and later formed a unity government which broke down effectively in 1982. In 1987, after years of a civil war the opposition (ZAPU), still led by Joshua Nkomo its founding president, merged with ZANU to form ZANU PF in what seemed to be a move towards a one-party state. For the key debates and formulations of the approaches to the study of ZANU and the war of liberation see Ranger, 1980; Martin and Johnson, 1981; Sibanda, 1988; Phimister, 1988, Stoneman and Cliffe, 1988; Sylvester, 1990; Moore, 1991.

to lead ... socially transforming struggles.” Another approach acknowledges ZANU and ZAPU as having been the liberators of the country (Shamuyarira, 1976; Sithole, 1979; Ranger, 1980 and Yates, 1980).

The characterisation of ZANU in the 1960s suggested that it was “a faction of educated, middle class, rather elitist elements” (Arrighi cited in Ranger, 1980: 72). Another line of analysis places the transition of ZANU from a nationalist movement made up of a hotchpotch of class interest, to a hardened revolutionary movement as an historical process. This radicalisation thesis is advanced by historians and analysts such as Ranger, 1980, 1985; Yates, 1980 and Shamuyarira, 1976 who believed that, “the harder and longer the struggle against colonialism, the stronger the socialist element becomes.” Proponents argued that radicalisation affected ZANU as well as those rural masses through direct experience of the war. Ranger (1980)’s historicist line viewed the formation of ZANU, the leadership and acquisition of power following elections in 1980 as proof of ZANU’s superior revolutionary legitimacy. He however observed some caution in suggesting that “nothing in the careers and statements, anymore than in the careers and statements of their rivals, is a guarantee that Mugabe and his allies will succeed with or even persist in revolutionary transformation” (Ranger, 1980: 90). For Phimister (1987: 51) the ‘idealism’ or ‘voluntarism’ admired by those authors who argued that ZANU had been radicalised by the armed struggle was unpersuasive.⁵⁴ With hindsight, we are able to say that ZANU failed to pursue a revolutionary socialist agenda but chose an elitist and capitalist path.

This chapter locates ZANU in the second chimurenga war and the struggle against settler control of the state. Through establishing the “theory of ZANU” and “ZANU ideology” an understanding of what could be called the “ZANU tradition”, this chapter will underline the nature of policies and transformation in the rural and agrarian sector following independence. Political ideology can be defined as “more or less integrated system of values and norms noted in society, which individuals and groups project on the political plane in order to promote the aspirations they have come to value in social life” (Dion, 1959: 49). As political currencies, ideologies perform important functions for any movement. Through ideologies, those in power

⁵⁴ Phimister (1979, 1987), Ranger (1967, 1970, 1985) and Raftopoulos (1999), among others, have articulated the nature and character of the nationalist struggle pointing to a ‘nationalism-race-class triad’ which continued into the post-colonial period.

can articulate their intentions and the governed are able to decide which political formation best represents their interests. According to James McCain:

Ideologies lend meaning to political acts, elevate social conflicts and tensions to a more sophisticated plane of political dialogue, and contribute to the process of consensus of formation and, thus, to the normative integration of the polity in general. To the common man, ideology helps to make the world less jumbled and more coherent, understandable and secure. To African leaders, ideologies represent available instruments in efforts to inculcate populations with the values of the modern political culture and tools for effective governance (McCain, 1975: 61).

A single ideology can take various shapes depending on the belief and value system of the society, the circumstances and material culture of those applying it. ZANU preferred to think of and project itself as inclined towards socialism of the Marxist-Leninist type.⁵⁵ Fenner Brockway (1963)'s characterisation of African socialists of the Marxist-Leninist type describes ZANU perfectly. He suggests that:

These are prone to the use of authoritarian methods and demonstrate "flexibility, international neutralism, acceptance of aid from any nation without political encumbrances, retention of privately-owned industries within carefully circumscribed limits, religious tolerance, and their recognition that the traditional African social system must not be destroyed but encouraged to evolve into socialism (Brockway, 1963: 19).

Focus on ZANU's ideology places its discourse on land reform and agrarian transformation in a historical and theoretical context. To achieve this, the chapter is organised as follows: a discussion of the nature and approaches to understanding of the armed struggle based on a brief review of the literature on the subject; the nature of the liberation struggle in ZANU's own words; the critical realities of the hollowness of ZANU's socialist rhetoric and the importance of the failure by ZANLA guerrillas to win the war outright, leading to the Lancaster House compromise, the government realities and class compromises that laid behind the liberation movement; and finally, the early apparent success of change in the countryside that covered up the weaknesses that led to the abandoning of nation building and an organised accumulation project for state-building. This analysis lays the basis upon which the land and agrarian programme will be discussed and the claims by some of a miracle pursued.

⁵⁵ Fenner Brockway (1963: 19) identified four trends in socialist theory in Africa which can be summed up as Communism or Marxist-Leninism, African Marxism, African Pragmatic Socialism and African Democratic Socialism.

For white Rhodesia, conquest in the wars of the 1890s became the basis for justifying the alienation of African land. In the same vein, the liberation war, *second chimurenga* – was for the African people and politicians a point of reference for post-independence transformation, especially – the right to regain land lost due to colonial conquest. The major differences were that colonial conquest need not have been a justification for the alienation of African land. The war of liberation did not lead to an outright ‘victory’ on the war front but was concluded in a negotiated settlement. Thus while the war was fought for land, the war itself did not lead to the victory that could have justified wholesale land restoration. In the same vein, there was no need to fight a war to justify African claim to historic and ancestral lands. The focus on ZANU, ZANLA and Mugabe does not seek to undermine the role played by ZAPU, ZIPRA and Nkomo in the liberation of Zimbabwe. It is important to note that the Shona people (being 70% of the population) covered a bigger area of Zimbabwe than the Ndebele (only about 15%). Mugabe’s ZANLA forces (largely drawn from the Shona) were exceptionally active in the greater part of Zimbabwe while Nkomo’s ZIPRA (largely drawn from the Ndebele) had not managed to penetrate Zimbabwe from Zambia as deeply as the ZANLA forces had. The penetration by guerillas required communication and some level of co-operation with the rural people. Ethnic ties helped to facilitate such a relationship between the Shona villages and Shona guerillas, and between Ndebele villagers and Ndebele guerillas. The shared anti-colonial war and shared African nationalism and opposition to white rule failed to produce a lasting unified trans-ethnic guerilla force.⁵⁶

Brief Notes on Sources and Approaches in Studying ZANU

The post-war official history of Zimbabwe projects ZANU as the liberator and becomes an exercise in hagiography (Phimister, 1979; Ranger, 1997; Raftopoulos, 1999 and Moore, 2004).⁵⁷ Literature on the nature of the independence movements (Moore, 1989 and 1990; Sylvester, 1990) and the nature of the Zimbabwean transition (Astrow, 1983; Mumbengegwi, 1986; Mandaza, 1986) provides an important framework for understanding ZANU in government as an agent for change. A variety of writers introduce a whole range of concepts that helps to explore and elucidate the development of ZANU as a national movement. According to Sabelo Gatsheni-Ndlovu (2008) the liberation struggle became an ideological

⁵⁶ For more on the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe see Moorcraft, 1979; Cauter, 1983; Ranger, 1985; Lan, 1985; Sibanda, 2001; and Kriger, 2006.

⁵⁷ Brian Raftopoulos (1999) dismisses the work of Martin and Johnson (1981) as being “little more than hagiography for the ruling party – an unashamed apologetic justifying the coming to power of a section of the liberation movement.”

resource in itself (for ZANU and its allied veterans of the liberation war) through which the discourse of rights and restoration was framed and justified. Liberation historian and political economist David Moore (2004) takes an approach based on the conflicts among proponents of human, class, and sovereign 'rights'. He offers a Marxist analysis emphasising on the dialectical relationship that existed within the competing class interests in the nationalist movement, which liberal analysts failed to interpret.⁵⁸ Christine Sylvester (1991) is sceptical of the pursuit of an ideological enquiry of ZANU and attaching an ideological label to explain the complex terrain of policy and practice in the 1980s. She opted for a description of Zimbabwe in terms of policy and government performance, calling it "liberal-corporatist-populist-welfare economy" falling somewhere "between socialist and capitalist parameters." Incidentally, these descriptions are themselves based on ideology. The labels attributed to ZANU often mirror the class disposition and ideological inclination of the commentator.

The role and place of nationalism in ZANU and the liberation struggle has been subject to wide intellectual investigation. Josephine Nhongo-Simbanegavi (2001) talks of ZANU as espousing a nationalist ideology which was a mixture of modernity and tradition. ZANU was a "broad church" and its early social composition can be described as that of a broad liberation front based in a multi-class alliance of urban and rural interests (Meisenhelder, 1994). Terence Ranger (1985) suggests that ZANU's support base was the country's rural masses who had long resisted both colonialism and settler domination. The early nationalist leadership was mostly made up of educated petit bourgeois from the city. As a nationalist front, ZANU was fighting for political freedom and independence from white settler rule. This took expression in popular goals such as majority rule and regaining land lost during colonization. This ideology helped ZANU to organise Zimbabweans of various classes and backgrounds against minority rule (Meisenhelder, 1994). However, Ian Phimister (1987: 52) argues that the alliance of rural class forces underpinning the guerrilla struggle which eventually overthrew Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front was united in opposition to colonialism but little else. There was no shared vision of the future beyond the recovery of land lost to the whites and control of the state apparatus.

⁵⁸ Moore takes this position after consideration of post-referendum (1999) Zimbabwe. This subject has been articulated at length in Moore (2004 and 2005) along these lines. See also Bartholomew and Breakspear in Leys Panitch (2004) who assess the different ideas of 'rights' held by sovereigntists [sic], liberals and 'critical cosmopolitans.'

However, in the second Chimurenga period, ZANU had very little active urban support as opposed to ZAPU and what they had was ineffectual. Moore is neutral about the question of a base except to say it was rural as well as urban but he does not explore this question to any real degree. Kriger's 1992 book is a radical analysis that agrees with many conservative, pro-Rhodesian accounts in its adamant insistence that 'support' is hardly the word in any case, preferring coerced support. The weak urban base and strong rural orientation would have suggested a post-war emphasis on rural development and higher commitment of resources. Yet as Sections II and III of this thesis argue, this was not the case. Appealing to rural masses who had suffered land shortages and structural impediments to the agricultural market at the hands of colonial administrators (as articulated in Chapter One above) became the basis upon which ZANU and ZANLA enticed the rural masses. These masses (albeit disjointed and poorly organised, with not much of a politically co-ordinated voice) used their support for the war to justify and lend legitimacy to their post-independence demands and their expectation for government intervention in rural and agrarian development. The legacy of the liberation struggle left a deeper memory in the rural areas than in urban areas. "Memory of rural guerillas, in fact, are memories of ZANU as an emancipator. Shona peasants in particular were fully captured by ZANU nationalist liberation imagination" (Gatsheni-Ndlovu, 2008b).

Raftopolous (2008) suggests that the answer lies in the overwhelming elitist petty-bourgeois leadership of the liberation movement that dominated the party after independence. Lawrence Vambe (1972 and 1976) provided an insight into the urban social history of national politics, while Arrighi and van Onselen articulate the labour conditions leading to political contestation. The elite nature of the petit bourgeois leaders of the liberation movement tilted them towards urban biased policy choices and priorities once in power. At this time the vast mass of the African people was restricted to the rural areas and had little access to service and the commanding heights of the economy. A significant number of the first nationalists were educated at church and colonial schools which had been designed to create a tiny educated layer who would "lead" the black masses on behalf of the white minority. They later found work in intellectual occupations such as teachers (Mugabe), preachers (Sithole and Muzorewa), journalists, clerks, social workers and trade union officials (Nkomo). They found their role and space in this scenario as too restricted as they were also not spared by racial discrimination. They formed elite organisations to organise for better conditions within the system but found that the system was too rigid and began to organise for the total removal of racial discrimination and its replacement by a system of universal suffrage. Frantz Fanon's

Wretched of the Earth (1963) provides a general account of the colonial middle class and its articulation as well as how it would behave in the post-colonial situation.⁵⁹

Evidently ZANU was fighting for the removal of racial discrimination in the state system but it went far beyond this to adopt a “revolution speak” akin to that of its Chinese sponsors whose language inspired the land hungry masses. There was logic to this association with socialism given its insistence about property redistribution among those denied access.

Socialists are generally given, by the Zimbabwean people, a more serious hearing than defenders of other ideologies. Even aspiring capitalists within the national movement for liberation and independence find that they have to call themselves “socialists”. One discovers such dissemblers by both their practice and their intellectual opposition to the concept of class struggle. As history teaches us, if true socialists are not dominant in a national movement, the regime formed after independence by that national movement becomes an integral part of the international imperialist network. It will be neo-colonialist (Shamuyarira, 1976: 61).

According to Stephen O’Brien (2008) this socialist posturing was not unique to ZANU. It can be traced to the intellectual formation of many members of the 1950s and 1960s generation of nationalists. Terence Ranger (1985) argues that so many nationalists and liberation movements adopted Marxist-Leninist ideologies and the language of democratic centralism which amalgamated the domination of civil society by the state and top down modernising development. Moreover nationalist commitment to modernisation, whether socialism or not, inevitably implied a ‘commandist’ state.

To a huge extent, nationalism is just an empty ideology, into which the space is filled by politicians who have been left out of power by the old system. Their use of land recovery as a legitimating ideology therefore has to be treated critically. However, there is a case for understanding the role, extent and possibility of ideology as an analytical tool for societies in transformation. Here I suggest that it may be especially useful to consider the work of the Indian historian of nationalism, Partha Chatterjee. Chatterjee’s work (1986) on nationalism and the colonial world stressed that in India nationalism and socialism tended to reinforce each other. He argued that “the demand for a new social order characterised by majority rule were inspired in part by socialism and in turn fuelled parts of the nationalist movement” (Chatterjee, 1986: 40).

⁵⁹ However, for the formation of an elite class and its impact on Zimbabwean nationalism, see Astrow (1983) Phimister (1988b) and Ranger (1985).

Table 2.1: Characterisation of ZANU and its Component Orientations and their Implications for Social and Economic Transformation

<i>Characterisation and Component Elements</i>	<i>Implications for Post-War Transformation</i>
<i>Elitist</i>	People inclined to pursuing policies that favour the higher class than the poor lower class. As a class of educated people, they are expected to be modernisers and do not see the role of tradition-dominated masses in the development of the economy and society
<i>Petty bourgeoisie</i>	Capitalistic in orientation and at the very best social democratic.
<i>Nationalist</i>	Were determined to advance the national self determination of Africans in Zimbabwe and fought the war for national liberation
<i>Racialist</i>	Politics of race and revenge – the righting of wrongs is considered only as resolved when previous wrongs have been fully paid for.
<i>Tribalist</i>	Steeped in the politics of tribe and look to tribe and ethnicity for patronage
<i>Traditionalists</i>	Still much in the traditional mode and suspicious of change and the new.
<i>Social democrats</i>	Viewed as pragmatic
<i>Marxist-Leninists</i>	Can fully develop where there is a big working class and strong trade union movement pushing towards the dictatorship of the proletariat. They see capitalism as an immensely dynamic and progressive force compared to all kind of pre-capitalist social formations; they do not necessarily see capitalists as idle and not at all as parasitical but as governed by a logic of exploitation that prevents the fruits of development from allowing people a secure and desirable way of life—capitalism is chaotic; they contrast in this way with the ruling classes of pre-capitalist societies. These latter use religion or ‘tradition’ to justify their privileges while capitalists rely simply on the idea that market forces reward those who offer the most to the market. They hoped to place the capitalist machinery in the hands of workers.
<i>Liberal</i>	Opposed to the commandist and labour forms of politics, liberals believe in minimal state intervention in the economy and favour unrestricted opportunities for self-expression
<i>Moderate</i>	Believed in change but only as much as necessary. Otherwise, they would maintain a lot of the existing institutions
<i>Conservative</i>	The conservatives like moderates were expected to maintain the existing institutions and status quo
<i>Radical</i>	Expected to favour drastic political, social and economic reforms
<i>Welfarist</i>	A political system that places the welfare of people in such matters as health, education and housing is the remit of government rather than the market

Compiled by Author

Chatterjee (whose shift to focus on decolonization and nationalism was influence by the Maoist uprising which took place in India between 1969 and 1971) became critical of nationalism for being mostly a way for the elite to wrestle power from the colonialists ... and to fool the masses into thinking it might help them (Chatterjee, 2004). What makes Chatterjee’s work of interest to this thesis is his treatment of “the specific history of the emergence of the Congress Party and the way in which Congress had included the rural folk within the national movement, the emergence of, broadly speaking, movements of nationalism, but specifically, the kind of nationalism adopted by the Congress that found a base in rural areas by trying to organize peasants into the anti-colonial struggle” (Chatterjee, 1993: 6).⁶⁰ This interest led Chatterjee into

⁶⁰ Some of the influential works of Partha Chatterjee include *The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World* (Columbia UP, 2004); *Partha Chatterjee Omnibus* (Oxford UP, 1999); *A Possible*

the analysis of the role of nationalism in the decolonisation process. Granted, the relationship between ZANU and the rural masses in Zimbabwe is not similar to the organisation of the Congress Party in India. However, the frame of analysis adopted in Chatterjee's work provides promise for understanding nationalism as an ideology and how poor rural people get drawn into liberation struggles and are blinded by its emptiness as politicians peddle populist promises. Alexander, McGregor and Ranger (2000: 83) argue that, "in Zimbabwe ..., it almost goes without saying that a critical history of nationalism is essential as many of the fundamental issues which affect Zimbabwean society arise out of the promises, the disputed character and the failures of nationalism."

Nature of the Armed Struggle in ZANU's Words

The sources for ZANU's war time and post-war promises include speeches, pamphlets and documents. As propaganda, such material is not a very reliable measure of what ZANU stood for. Such sources give limited insight into what was involved and intended. At best, they project a rhetorical rendition on the part of ZANU cadres in offices of power and in the process of rewriting the history of Zimbabwe. However, they are still important as people supported ZANU for what it said. The founding president of ZANU, Ndabaningi Sithole, argued that nationalism was central to ZANU and what it stood for (Sithole, 1970).⁶¹ The war was being fought to liberate the country, placing land at the centre of the war fought in rural areas.⁶² The importance of this rural connection of the liberation struggle is that it provided a platform for expectations by the rural people and the hope that rural issues such as land reform would be given priority by a regime who highlighted its importance during the war. ZAPU emerged as a worker based party and drew its fighting forces from this class mainly, whereas ZANU "imbibed Maoist mobilization strategies of the 'fish and water' type (Sibanda, 2005; Gatsheni-

India: Essays in Political Criticism (Oxford UP, 1997); *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton UP, 1993) and *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?* (Zed Books, 1986).

⁶¹ Brian Raftopoulos (2005) suggested that this nationalism could be treated as the main ideological basis upon which ZANU policy and actions could be understood. Many scholars concur that this nationalism was qualified as "a nationalism ... of a racist order (Alexander and Ranger, 2002; Kriger, 2002; Bhebhe, 2004 and Chung, 2006). After independence this nationalism operated "in a traditional nationalist 'continuist' paradigm" (Gatsheni-Ndlovu, 2008: 7).

⁶² Rural in the sense of the physical space within which much of the confrontation between forces took place and also rural in the sense that the rural masses became very instrumental in the war drive, and land – a key rural issue was set in the forefront – as the cause of the war. The discourse of 'fighting for the motherland'; the invoking of the spirits of 'Nehanda and Kaguvi (the spirit mediums who had been martyred in the first Chimurenga and promised that "their bones shall arise" to continue the fight for the land); became a key inspiration.

Ndlovu, 2008).⁶³ ZANLA fashioned itself as a guerilla army compared to ZIPRA that modeled itself as a conventional military force that mainly left politics to rural nationalists in ZAPU (Ranger, 1985 and Kriger, 1992). ZAPU was also more accepting of assistance, if not full membership, of those who were not black.

ZANU's placing the land question as the main reason for the liberation struggle must be understood in terms of power politics and constituency building in a country where the majority of the people were found in the rural areas and the mainstay of the economy was land based. A ZANU pamphlet distributed in 1975, described ZANU as:

... the National Liberation Movement that is spearheading the national democratic revolution in Zimbabwe ... by the people of Zimbabwe out of the realisation that the independence of Zimbabwe would not come out of constitutional conferences, but through "direct confrontation" ... to further Chimurenga (war of national liberation) started by our forefathers in 1890 - (whose role was being) - the vanguard of the Zimbabwe Revolution; the supreme authority whose every decision and objective has to be carried out by the various organs in the revolution (ZANU, 1975).

The pamphlet described ZANU as "guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism" aiming towards "achieving a socialist revolution" qualifying that "before the achievement of such a socialist revolution, a transitional stage of national democratic revolution is necessary" (ZANU Archives, 1975). The pamphlet defined what ZANU understood the national democratic revolution to entail:

The national democratic revolution is the necessary preparation for the socialist revolution, and the socialist revolution is the inevitable sequel to the national democratic revolution. The deeper the national democratic revolution, the better the conditions for the socialist revolution. Our goal is true national independence and socialistic reconstruction of the motherland (ZANU, 1975).

ZANU's policies remained vague and avoided specifics, leaving room for future modification and position shifts without necessarily changing the rhetoric.⁶⁴

⁶³ In Maoist guerrilla war strategy, the rural masses became the sea within which the people's army survived and fought the expropriator. In the case of ZANLA, rural masses were both a cover and source of supplies and sustenance. Throughout the liberation struggle ZANLA used night vigils – *pungwes* – to politicise the masses and to win them over to ZANU thus creating the imagery of ZANU as a rural people's party. Those seen as betraying the guerrillas and exposing them to the Rhodesian security system were labeled sell-outs and subjected to public torture and disciplining to instill compliance among the masses.

⁶⁴ An example is ZANU's approach to citizenship. The war-time policy was pronounced in the objective to create a "self-supporting socialist economy in which all the means of production and distribution will be fully in the hands of the people of Zimbabwe as a whole" (ZANU Pamphlet, 1975). This all encompassing 'universal'

Different participants in the war were motivated by the racial discrimination that formed settler colonialism in general. Margaret Dongo, a war veteran and independent legislator, suggested that she was motivated by the ideals of the struggle and the desire to:

... remove the discrimination, the imbalances in terms of economy, in terms of land distribution, in terms of social life. ...we used to talk about oppression ... We were fighting against lack of equal access to education, lack of equal access to employment, lack of equal access to distribution of wealth. There are people who perished, people who fought a genuine fight, and people who wanted genuine change.⁶⁵

For people like Dongo, the genuine change included a lot more than land. In her analysis Dongo leapt from elite concerns to the vacuous concept of 'genuine' change. Her recollection shows the struggle between elite goals and welfare which seem to have dominated the liberation consciousness.

Some Critical Realities: The Challenges of Managing a Multi-Class Movement, the Hollowness of ZANU's Socialist Rhetoric and the Failure to Win the War Outright

The association of ZANU with socialism, Leninist-Marxism, Maoism and radical revolution is partly a product of the conditions and circumstances of the war against settler colonialism. Marxist-Leninist theory of proletarian revolution is the theory of the seizure of state power by revolutionary violence, the theory of countering war against the people by people's war. It seems fair to suggest that ZANU/ZANLA's Marxist-Leninism was limited to the use of coercion and violence to remove the settler regime. ZANLA employed the lessons derived from the people's wars in China. Chairman Mao's famous thesis that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" (Mao, 1965 as cited in Pradshad, 2003: 128) was adopted by ZANU. According to Mao:

The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution

citizenship was also extended in Mugabe's victory speech message which invited all Zimbabweans to a spirit of reconciliation. This is a clear break with his earlier line that suggested that the means of production should be placed in the hands of all – socialism (in effect nationalization) whilst in the latter he means that those who controlled the means of production, including the commercial farmers, should stay.

⁶⁵ A former female ZANU MP who parted ways with ZANU to become the first female independent candidate, becoming a celebrity opponent of Mugabe, following what she called frustrations with the self-censorship in ZANU as well as male domination and corruption. Dongo was not a socialist but rather a liberal, backed by the West and she consequently received a lot of publicity during her break with ZANU. She had a socially conservative interpretation of the 'revolution'.

holds good universally, for China and for all other countries (Mao, 1965 as cited in Pradshad, 2003: 128).

The ideal of “expropriating the expropriator” that dominated the language of socialism and its radicalism appealed to both urban workers and the rural masses. ZANU preferred a nativist discourse that bordered along racialism calculated to appeal to the rural population while having resonance with the aspiring black capitalists who had been denied access to participate in the capitalist economy. It positioned the land question as the sine qua non of the national question. The end of the war was seen as fulfilling the national democratic revolution. Indeed, the land question was a historical rallying point in peripheral capitalism where the agrarian and national questions were conjoined. However, ZANU did not become dominant because its leadership and articulation of the land question and the nationalisation of resources was more superior than ZAPU’s. As suggested earlier, ZANU dominance in the political competition compared to the rival movement ZAPU, arose mostly from the tribal appeal of both, given that ZANU’s Shona base was larger and more geographically spread than ZAPU’s Ndebele base.

The language of class war remained very largely subordinate to the discourse and interests of radical nationalism. Armed struggle was viewed as a means to dismantle the white settler colonial system and replace it with an African government and, at worst, as a pronounced way of pressurizing the British into convening a conference that would bring the belligerents to a negotiating table (Mandaza, 1986: 29). According to Phimister (1987: 56), “the involvement of landless young men, of women of all ages, and poor peasants in ways that were not totally passive, sharpened contradictions within the broad liberation movement.” Anxiety among the black middle class increased as it became clear in the late 1970s that ZANU would take over. Julie Frederikse (1982: 278) pointed out that as the black middle class realised that “the Patriotic Front will soon be ruling Zimbabwe [they wondered] what may be in store for them” (Frederikse, 1982: 278). The struggle period was therefore replete with anxieties within the liberation movement as well as the society across the colour, tribal and class lines.

The years after 1970 were a turbulent moment in ZANU characterised by internal strife described by Masipula Sithole as “struggles within the struggle” (Sithole, 1979). These struggles were tribal, ideological and tactical in nature and were often bloody. One of the manifestations of the struggles was the Nhari rebellion which occurred in December 1974

when ZANLA members in Chifombo (an area in Zambia on the border with Mozambique) rebelled against ZANU's central committee. Thomas Nhari led the rebellion (hence the name Nhari rebellion) with the support of veteran nationalists, Noel Mukono and Simpson Mutambanengwe, all from the Manyika tribe of the Shona raising the spectre of tribal solidarity overriding national unity (Chung, 2006: 9; Preston, 2004: 125). The rebellion followed Ndabaningi Sithole's dismissal as the leader of ZANU in what Mozambican president Samora Machel called "a prison coup" by Mugabe and others. The Rhodesian government claimed responsibility for the rebellion suggesting that Ken Flower, then head of the Central Intelligence Organisation sponsored it albeit with the initiative of "willing conspirators" (Sellstrom, 2002: 181; White, 2003). As White (2003) explains, some of the finer details of these events may never be fully known but their importance in triggering a chain of events with impact on history was significant.⁶⁶

Following the Nhari rebellion, many officials of ZANLA were arrested in Zambia. The assassination of Herbert Chitepo in March 1975 marked the peak of this phase of consternation.⁶⁷ ZANU was in dire straits and a leadership vacuum on the front emerged. Young radicals in the army took advantage of this vacuum to re-organise the party and ground the struggle along Marxist lines. This was a moment of ideological clarity – yet not sustained for long – except in rhetoric. Young radicals calling themselves the *Vashandi* formed the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) and sought to revive the armed struggle with a much increased tempo.⁶⁸ One of the aims of these radicals was to unify the liberation movement. They formed a joint command unifying the ZANLA and ZIPRA forces, a move towards the creation of a national liberation movement. The Liberation Front of Mozambique, better known by the acronym FRELIMO which had regarded ZANU's approaches as too militaristic and disturbed by the existence of two separate liberation armies (ZANLA and ZIPRA), rallied

⁶⁶ The Nhari rebellion should be seen as part of a chain of events starting with Sithole's dismissal from the presidency of ZANU by his colleagues in prison. This was communicated to all party structures, especially guerilla fighters, within and outside the country. Therefore subsequent seemingly landmark events, including the December 1974 "Nhari Rebellion", Chitepo's assassination in March 1975, the crossing into Mozambique by Tekere and Mugabe in April 1975, the October 1975 Mgagao Declaration and the letter of January 24, 1976 from the Dare reChimurenga signed by Josiah Tongogara, Kumbirai Kangai and Rugare Gumbo (For more in the Nhari rebellion, the struggles in the liberation movement and power jostling, see Moore, 1990; White, 2003, Sellerstrom, 2002; Preston, 2004 and Sithole, 1979).

⁶⁷ For more on the struggles within ZANU in this period see Masipula Sithole's struggle within the struggle; on the assassination of Chitepo see White (2002).

⁶⁸ *Vashandi* is a Shona word for workers – but as explained by Mhanda, this was meant to include the rural masses. The leading authority on the *Vashandi* (ZIPA) movement is David Moore. See Moore, 1989, 1990, 1992, and 1996 among other more recent articulations of this period and its impact on post-colonial ZANU ideological positioning.

behind ZIPA.⁶⁹ O'Brien (2008) points out that ZIPA's tactics were more influenced by theory than ZANU. Its fighters were not regarded as cannon fodder, lines of retreat and supply were secured, counter-offensives anticipated and strategic reserves made ready. Under ZIPA, fighters were relocated to more strategic positions (moving the army from Tanzania to Mozambique) with senior ZIPA commanders active on the war front.⁷⁰ ZIPA's aims went beyond antagonism to white racism towards revolutionary transformation of the country's social and economic relations.

According to Moore (1992), ZIPA made their "political education directly relevant to the struggle, so that Marxism could better direct the war of liberation." Mhanda (2005) argues that the adoption of the term *Vashandi* as the popular identity for ZIPA was meant to inspire worker consciousness but most importantly, the term took "a broader meaning as the revolutionary front for workers, students and peasants." In an interview (cited in Moore, 1992), Mhanda argues that ZIPA was necessitated by the fact that many of the old leaders were out of touch. Mugabe and Nkomo had been in jail for many years and had been overtaken by events such as the youth radicalisation and the Vietnam War. As such, the older generation remained steeped in the desire to fight merely towards the goal of negotiations that would usher in "one man one vote", while the ZIPA cadres had become motivated to fight "for the total transformation of the Zimbabwean society" (Moore, 1990: 309).

Yet we should also note Ranger's (1980) dismissal of John Saul's (1979) enthusiasm about the ZIPA project as naïve, asking:

Was it really sensible to put ideological faith in an army; especially built up as ZIPA was, out of very many recent and youthful recruits? Is there not a good deal to be said for the argument that these young volunteers needed teaching? Is there not a good deal to be said for the argument that ZIPA in itself could not possibly have handled the relationship with ZAPU which was maintained within the Patriotic Front? (Ranger, 1980: 89).

In practice, it was the formation of ZIPA and the failure of the détente negotiations of the time that paved way for a faction of more conservative nationalists led by Mugabe to wrest control

⁶⁹ This actually reflected events in its own history where a more committed set of Marxists did come to power.

⁷⁰ The Zimbabwe People's Army relocated its troops from Tanzania to Mozambique and in January 1976, 1000 guerrillas crossed into Rhodesia. The entire eastern border of Rhodesia became a war zone as the guerrillas launched coordinated and well-planned attacks on mines, farms and communication routes, such as the new railway line to South Africa.

of the liberation movement for them. Mugabe, for his part, allied with the recently released military chief Josiah Tongogara, and Solomon Mujuru. The nominal head of ZIPA, Josiah Mujuru had never really shared the strategic vision of his deputy political commissar Mhanda. He also tried to block a deal with ZAPU's Joshua Nkomo and his deputy Jason Moyo to create the Patriotic Front. Mugabe realised that political survival depended on strengthening the links with ZIPA and the army which had decided to carry on with the liberation movement in the absence of political direction – at a time when ZANU was in dire straits. In an address in London in 1976, Mugabe opportunistically came across as a supporter of the war intensified by ZIPA acknowledging that ZANU had for some time not been leading the revolution.

For the past 8 or 9 [sic] months there has been confusion. There has been a steady slowing down of the war effort. ... and only after the Army people had discovered that their top leadership is in fact going back on its earlier undertaking to lead the revolution have the army leaders decided to go it alone. ... The first thing I am interested in is an intensification of the war. The war must assume greater proportions than it has hitherto assumed and there must be awareness on the part of the leadership that unless the leadership itself has military knowledge the war cannot receive the necessary facilitation. The situation as it presents itself is a military one. It requires soldiers and the soldiers must be led by men with military knowledge ... the time has come, therefore, for everyone like me who has in the past regarded himself as a political leader to take upon himself the task which our military has taken, and identify with the struggle by participating in it (Mugabe as cited in Ranger, 1980: 82 – 83).

This posturing was an act in self-preservation and advancing himself as the politician with a military consciousness at a time when the army was disillusioned by the political leadership (also given that Mugabe had just crossed into Mozambique to join the military camps – even if he would spend a lot of the time in Samora Machel's prisons). By 1976, Mugabe had reached the highest position in ZANU and imbibed Marxist and Maoist rhetoric in order to connect with the fighting forces and the broader support base of the party, becoming the most eloquent champion of liberation of the country from colonial rule. By the time of negotiations held in Geneva in December 1976, ZANU had become confident and firmly in charge again. Kumbirai Kangai boldly asserted that “there is no question as to who controls ZIPA. As you know the military wing take directives from the political wing. The gun cannot lead the party; it is the party that leads the gun” (Kangai as cited in Ranger, 1980: 84). Mugabe also reinforced this through an interview reported in *Zimbabwe News* (December, 1977) that “ZANU is the vanguard of the Zimbabwean revolution. It is the supreme authority whose every decision and

objective has to be carried out.” Feeling firm and secure in his leadership, by 15 June 1979 Mugabe suggested that true membership in ZANU required loyalty and obedience.

Mugabe also noted that other leaders did not have Marxist ideological consciousness and suggested military training as an alternative. According to the *Zimbabwe News* (1977: 1) ZANU turned to rebuild the credibility of the guerillas and turn them into a people’s army through training in ideological, political and organisational awareness. In the March/April 1977 issue of the *Zimbabwe News*, ZANU was contrasted with other nationalist movements in the fashion of the radicalization thesis. It stated:

The realization that great hopes had been pinned on reformist policies ... but all to no avail, led the more far-sighted nationalists to re-examine their strategy of liberation. This resulted in the nationwide call for more positive and radical action against settler rule. The formation of ZANU ushered in a new era – that of direct confrontation ... ZANU came into existence with the eternal and all powerful slogan “we are our own liberators” which was a clarion call to the African population for armed resistance (*Zimbabwe News* cited in Ranger, 1980: 86).

By 1977 ZIPA had been dealt with and disbanded. Many of its leaders were either imprisoned or sidelined. ZANU regained full control of ZANLA. Peter Yates (1980: 86) suggests that the ZANLA guerrillas were “undoubtedly the nucleus and motive force behind the radicalization of ZANU (PF) itself and the rural masses in the areas they operated.” By making himself out to be one with the struggle, Mugabe sought to gain mileage among the fighters and rural masses as a radical and carve out an ideological space clearly different from that espoused by the right (as represented by Abel Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole, who were prepared to compromise with the regime). Following the suppression and purging of the radicals, the conservative nationalists, with Mugabe now safely in charge, maintained and stepped up the left discourse that had been popularized by ZIPA (Moore, 1990). At its Congress held in the Mozambican town of Chimoio in 1977, ZANU adopted ‘Marxism-Leninism-Mao-TseTung thought’ as its political organising motif. According to Moore (2001) this was “ultimately a disguise for classical authoritarian nationalism.” This view is supported by Fay Chung (2006), a participant, who suggested that the populism endemic to this doctrine appealed to the racist inclination of the conservative nationalists.

The idea of 'peasant consciousness' described by Ranger (1985) seem to suggest that all rural communities and farmers accepted and played a role in the struggle. However, Kriger (1992) has established that there was coercion in other areas to induce rural mass participation. In the urban areas and mining areas production and economic activity, seemed to proceed with little hindrance throughout most of the war. In the rural areas, those in the Native Purchase Areas were ambivalent about their role in the liberation effort. Class differentiation among African producers often led to different interests and divisions in the articulation of a joint African voice. Native Purchase Area farmers avoided the political rallies held in the reserves in support of the liberation war effort.⁷¹ Purchase Area Farmers petitioned release from 'protected' villages to run their businesses, making no mention of the difficulties faced by 'peasants' in producing their subsistence requirements under identical conditions (Cheater, 1984: 173). However, the situation of the Purchase Area Farmers was ambivalent as noted that:

... wealthier black farmers ... became vulnerable to attack from both Rhodesian security forces and guerrillas; because if migrant labour created that symbiotic relationship with urban workers which helped sustain the war, so also Rhodesia created a common objective agenda for black rural farmers involving the retention of economic structures periodically threatened by pro-war or socialist policies (Sylvester, 1990: 472).⁷²

One area that also received hollow rhetorical attention during the war and nothing more than lip service following independence was that of women's social and economic rights. Making the connections between socialism and feminism in Zimbabwe has led to the disappointing conclusion that the national struggle did not lead to the emancipation of women. Issues concerning gender are central in the discussion of rural development as they are the majority of the de facto farmers. For women, their involvement in the liberation struggle raised prospects and expectations of emancipation.⁷³ The armed struggle opened up the prospects of a revolutionary transformation of the land bringing questions around gender to the fore even though it accommodated conservative and patriarchal class forces (Phimister, 1987: 52). Enloe claims that women who "fought in the revolution expected that gender as well as racial order

⁷¹ The emphasis here is on the fact that the existence of this class structure among the Africans in the rural areas created the opportunity for contradictions and competition which could be used by the settler machinery to divide and rule them. During the liberation struggle, hundreds of African Purchase Area farmers who had taken up land in the 1950s after the state had removed peasant cultivators from designated areas, were themselves evicted by poor peasants and guerrillas (Astrow, 1983: 65; Ranger 1985: 284).

⁷² For more on working class (mining, plantation and urban) political concerns see, Lawrence Vambe (1972, 1976), Charles Van Onselen (1976), Ian Phimister and Van Onselen (1978) Duncan G. Clarke (1974 and 1976), Paul Harris (1974) among other labour history texts. See Ranger, 1985; Kriger, 1996 on the peasants and Moore 1989, 1999 and Raftopolous on the petit bourgeoisie.

⁷³ A distinguished example was Robert Mugabe's Ghanaian wife, Sally, who raised feminist issues systematically, see Tanya Lyons, 1993.

would be re-organised as a result of warfare and their participation in it (Enloe, 1993: 165). The Zimbabwean Women's Bureau realised that the participation of black women in the war would not translate automatically into emancipation as women suffered double oppression at the hands of their own male counterparts as well as from the economic system.⁷⁴

Women's participation in the struggle had no ingredients for transformation from the realisation of their equality but simply reflected a practical need to mobilize their labour for the war effort. Participation did not lead to progressive gender politics. The interest in women was limited to the part they played in assisting the war effort within the Maoist "fish-and-water" framework. Gann (1980: 101) suggests that "traditional gender roles were subverted as many women either voluntarily or were forced to join the war. He adds [matter-of-factly, that] women were essential to the survival of the troops, they prepared food and provided clothing and care." As such, feminist historians and sociologists, have come to the conclusion that, participation in the war did not necessarily generate women's emancipation (see Lyons, 1999; Enloe, 1999). Gender transformation seemed not to have mattered much to the leadership of the liberation movement except for a few sophisticated militants at the time. The miracle analysis (in Chapter Seven) and testing of the miracle by focus on the case study of Mayo (Chapter Eight) will demonstrate that, after independence, issues involving the citizenship of women remained largely secondary and their productive capacity largely untapped. War time talk about women emancipation remained in the realm of rhetoric, another form of revolution-speak.

Women's participation in the war has also been romanticized. Irene Staunton (1990: xi) argues that a "remarkable sense of persistence and acceptance: acceptance of war and the consequences of war, of situations over which they had no or little control, but which they continued to believe would, ultimately, bring a better life – freedom and independence for everyone" (Staunton, 1990: xi). In playing an active role in providing food for the guerrillas, the women are painted as having accepted the guerrillas as "our children, everybody's children

⁷⁴ The Zimbabwe Women's Bureau (ZWB) is a non-governmental member of the Natural Farming Network (NFN), a coalition of 10 national NGOs and government agencies that promotes improved agricultural practices and natural resource management. It was formed in 1978 with the aim of improving the socio-economic status of communities by means of providing training, information, financial and material support for sustainable development programmes to women. The emancipation of women was to be waged as a parallel struggle to the overall struggle against settler capitalism and its racist tendencies. Following independence, the Bureau engaged in an ongoing struggle for the emancipation of women which involved the reform of the structural aspects of oppression through legislative reforms (Lyons, 1999: 53).

The Lancaster House Compromise

The negotiated settlement at Lancaster House had a huge impact in limiting the options available for Zimbabwe after independence. Colin Stoneman proposed that:

... because of the circumstances of transfer of power at Lancaster House with Britain as mediator, a daunting range of constraints bound the new government: one of Lenin's main precepts – the need for a victorious revolution to smash the state apparatus of the old regime – was therefore violated from the start (Stoneman, 1988: 3).

The end of the war in Zimbabwe was decided in London by the nationalist elite leaders of the struggle without the attendance of their rural war-time collaborators who had accepted the authority of the elites. This wrought the marginalisation of rural communities to the extent that African farmers were not assigned any role in the decision-making processes aimed at the reconstruction of the new Zimbabwe despite their involvement in the liberation struggle. The need for land and better rural life was the basis upon which the nationalist-peasantry alliances were forged (Ranger, 1985) and continued to be the basis upon which the ruling party would extract political support. The deal was a necessity as neither ZANU nor the Rhodesia Front was strong enough to win the war outright. ZANU was also under pressure from key members of the Frontline States such as Tanzania and Mozambique to reach an agreement at Lancaster House and Mugabe was left with no choice and signed grudgingly.

ZANU's capitulation at Lancaster House can be explained by a number of factors including its own internal dynamics, regional and international political and economic forces. Britain was under immense pressure to ensure the resolution of the Rhodesian problem. Experiencing a weak financial and economic state of affairs, Britain's motivation at the Lancaster House Conference was to rid itself of the Rhodesian problem. The continued threat of the Communist support for ZANU and ZAPU also necessitated settlement. According to Lord Peter Carrington, the Rhodesian imbroglio had become a political and economic liability on Britain. He wrote:

To have recognised the 'internal settlement' at that time would have led to embargoes on British goods around the world, rejection of British counsel and influence because of Rhodesia; and within Rhodesia Nkomo and Mugabe would have done all in their considerable power to step up the insurrection – with

Soviet and Chinese assistance respectively. The internal settlement offered no solution. There had to be a better way (Carrington, 1988: 291).

Lord Carrington convinced a reluctant Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who favoured an internal settlement under Muzorewa instituted by Ian Smith, the rebel leader, about the need to resolve the Rhodesian question at any cost. The August 1979 Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference in Lusaka issued a communiqué conveying the agreement to hold a further conference of Rhodesian principals in London (Mushimbo, 2005). The communiqué:

... recognised that it was Britain's responsibility to bring Zimbabwe to legal independence; that the existing constitution was defective, though there should be safeguards for minorities; and that the independence government must be chosen through free elections supervised under British government authority, with Commonwealth observers present (cited in Mushimbo, 2005: 72).

Thus the fear of political and economic repercussions compelled Britain to act. British interests were not so much in the content and detail of the agreement but simply to get a resolution of the Rhodesian problem – at whatever cost. The achievement of majority rule, protection of minority rights and the land question were the major sticking points (Renwick, 1997: 24).

The PF's allies, Russia and China respectively, the Front Line states, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) were economically weak and only focused on the achievement of majority rule. The nationalists' determination to keep the land issue on the agenda led to three weeks of deliberation on the topic that almost derailed the talks (Renwick, 1997). The PF did what it could to get a settlement involving massive land transfers to Africans. There was a high resolve to make sure that a victory for land was brought back from Lancaster House. However, as suggested by Mushimbo (2005: 74), at Lancaster House, the PF was a party with a big agenda but little power. In his response to Lord Carrington's Address, Joshua Nkomo asked "What will be the future of the people's land?" (cited in Stedman, 1988). The Salisbury delegation led by Muzorewa and Smith pushed to have the internal settlement recognised. According to Stephen Stedman:

The combination of a desperate military situation for the Muzorewa regime and the leverage of what would be known as "the second-class solution" – the recognition of Muzorewa – provided an opportunity to solve the crisis. One final initiative by Britain would prove to the Commonwealth that the British had at least tried to bring in the Patriotic Front. If the conference failed due to rebel intransigence, no one could fault Britain. If the initiative failed, Thatcher would

get her preference, the recognition of Muzorewa, with lesser international penalties incurred. Britain would incur risk only in the unforeseen development that the Conference led to a settlement (Stedman, 1988: 6).

However, the capitulation of the nationalists at Lancaster House resulted from a combination of factors including a realistic reading of the odds as well as the regional pressure from the Frontline States and the OAU which seemed to think that majority rule would deliver economic justice and were desperate for a settlement.⁷⁶ The settlement did not allow for revolutionary change but it certainly wasn't racist; it represented a compromise with ZANU ideas about excluding whites, Coloureds and Indians very significantly.

Trends in the global political economy in 1980 also certainly influenced the settlement. Faced with the growing disinterest of China in Africa and the rapidly growing economic problems of African states, Zimbabwe's choices were narrowing. It was therefore forced to dream in both socialist and liberal terms and its political ideology was fragmented through simultaneous captivity to these antagonistic worlds. Britain and the US were to some degree accepted as tutors given their resources. Through the Lancaster House Agreement:

... the tutelage referring and supervision of Britain and USA made sure that radical Marxist ideologies that had been imbibed by the liberation forces and that advocated for the total smashing of the colonially constructed state and the building of a new socialist republic did not materialize ...[with the result that] at independence, Zimbabwe was born as a successor to the Rhodesian colonial state, rather than a new alternative to it (Gatsheni-Ndlovu, 2008: 26, See also Mumbengegwi (1986) and Palmer (1990).

By December of 1979 the Lancaster House Agreement had been signed by all parties involved against all expectations. It was agreed that land would be bought on a "willing buyer willing seller" for the majority black people with the financial support from Britain, Europe and the United States. It represented a commitment to liberal political and economic management with a time-phased 10 year reservation of a disproportionate number of seats for the white minority as a political safeguard.

⁷⁶ At this point, Zambia was in desperate straits. So was Mozambique.

Lancaster House was responsible for cutting off the possibility of a radicalization process which could have placed the Left in stronger position in a unified Patriotic Front (PF).⁷⁷ The Lancaster House Agreement specified that no party to the war had won, and left all the questions to be resolved later in a situation that might be more favourable to the national bourgeoisie and to imperialism (James, 1983: 2). ZANU (PF) repeatedly accused the British government as having compelled them through Lancaster House to sign a disagreeable and racist constitution and promised to change the constitution at the first available opportunity (Yates, 1980: 73). However, even after achieving a more than two-thirds majority in the 1985 general elections and indeed until the 1999 referendum on a new constitution, ZANU continued to run government under the auspices of the 1979 constitution.⁷⁸ There was also little interference with the inherited colonial judiciary system and its courts. Instead, “diplomatic and economic relations were quickly established with the western countries rather than with the socialist states ... while diplomatic ties with South Africa were severed, economic relations – transport, communication, import-export trade and tourism were retained” (Yates, 1980: 73). Charles van Onselen and Stedman (1994) argue that the two constituencies that lost most at Lancaster House were the landless rural masses and the guerillas. According to Moyo:

The ZANU PF led government, emerging from the negotiated Lancaster House settlement, thus ruled within neo-colonial state structures, buttressed by a pervasive neoliberal economic and liberal democratic framework, which placed constitutional restraints on radical transformation of state institutions and property rights. This restricted the resolution of the land question and other racial imbalances. State-civil society relations, ensconced with this framework, reflected critical contradictions in terms of political, class and racial alliances over structural issues, including wealth distribution and land reforms, citizenship and racial integration, as well as the ‘governance’ framework for development and politics (Moyo, 2004: 10).

The fact that land reform depended on funding from Britain and other donors with no specific figures tied to it and at a time that the cost of such resettlement programme had not been calculated – became the basis of future crisis in the reform process. Soon after the interest in

⁷⁷ This debate also exists in South Africa’s liberation where radicals such as Chris Hani would have wanted to fight the war all out but reformists such as Thabo Mbeki and Oliver Tambo had already started negotiations that led to a compromise agreement. For more on the South African transition see Bond, 2000; Gevisser, 2007, Gumede, 2007 and van der Westhuizen, 2008.

⁷⁸ One authority, Christine Sylvester (1991), insists that Lancaster House was not such an obstacle to transformation as there were other options Mugabe’s government could have taken to obviate the constraints placed by the Lancaster House Agreement.

inadequate pattern of income distribution and of benefits to the overwhelming majority of this country, stand as a serious indictment of our society (GoZ, 1981: 1).

However, in reality such observations were not followed with policies, projects and programmes for transformation. Mugabe's true colours as a capitalist in Marxist drag quickly showed. Those who believed that capitalism was the only way to develop an economy realised that while Mugabe did not drop his socialist rhetoric, in real life he embraced liberalism. Left-wing observers immediately accused Mugabe of betraying the revolution. However, Mugabe – the feared radical socialist – announced a policy of reconciliation and his commitment to a nation building exercise in which everyone had space. It is questionable whether Mugabe personally directed this or whether it did not reflect the ZANU—and ZAPU—leadership viewpoint more generally.

The 1980 Election Manifesto set the goals for a ZANU (PF) led government as “to reconstruct Zimbabwe's economy and evolve a socialist pattern in which the country's resources are fully tapped for the common benefit of all the people of Zimbabwe.” Following the 1980 election, Mugabe's victory speech outlined the guiding principles of his government as “reconciliation, reconstruction and resettlement.” The reconciliation project, which Kumbirai Kangai (then Minister of Labour and Social Services) defined as implying the establishment of a new political order based on democracy and majority rule was not followed through.

ZANU's economic plan relied on existing private production capacity and employment creation than expanding of the public and civil service. Mugabe, not without finding a sympathetic audience, defended deferring the reorganisation of society towards socialism as tactical and pragmatic.

Obviously, a socialist revolution cannot be achieved overnight in a country which is economically dependent on international monopoly capital for investment, trade, aid, markets, capital, technology, research and development which is dominated, controlled and manipulated by international bourgeois forces opposed to the new social order (Yates, 1980: 70).

As indicated earlier, the independence constitution rigidly entrenched the status quo. With the benefit of hindsight, we can conclude that the failure to mount a revolutionary transformation towards socialism was a result of a class compromise that lay behind the very nature and composition of forces within the liberation movement itself.

ZANU (PF) was a united front of various ideological and political trends ranging from feudal, capitalist, social democrats/liberals, to Marxism-Leninist. Its membership incorporates all social classes found in Zimbabwean society today (1980) – traditionalists, petty-bourgeois, the big capitalists, workers, peasants, revolutionaries and other sub-groups. Its leadership consists of the representatives of the petty-bourgeois: intellectuals, social democrats, traditionalists and a few Marxist-Leninists. The political line and programme of ZANU (PF) inevitably reflects the class interests of its leadership and general membership (Yates, 1980: 70).

This complex admixture of competing and contradictory class interests caused the ZANU PF policy to be contradictory to its espoused theory and stated objectives leading to a lack of clarity and precision in the articulation of the movement's general policies and programmes. ZANU (PF) refused to recognize its own internal contradictions and insisted that they arose from the inherited economy rather than from itself:

... the achievement of political power by the people will remain hollow in terms of their material development unless it can translate itself in quantitative and qualitative benefits deriving from their economy ... ZANU (PF) thus believes in the development of a socialist economy. But in working towards the socialist transformation of Zimbabwean society, ZANU (PF) Government ... recognises [the] historical, social and other existing practical realities in Zimbabwe. One of these existing practical realities is the capitalist system which cannot be transformed overnight. Hence, while a socialist transformation process will be brought about in many areas of the existing economic sectors, it is recognised that private enterprise will have to continue until circumstances are ripe for a socialist change (ZANU PF, Manifesto 1980).

ZANU PF's development strategy seemed to follow what James McCain (1963: 63) has described as the pragmatic approach in which the "state directs the process of development, but within a pluralistic social and economic order ...public services are expanded to improve general living standards, with capacity for a total mobilisation of society for the purpose of change."

ZANU remained a multi-class party and never actually transformed itself into a vanguard. Mugabe admitted to this in an interview in 1984 suggesting:

We are not a vanguard organisation yet; we are a mass movement. Not every member of the party is necessarily a socialist. We still have people with bourgeoisie [sic—bourgeois is the adjective, bourgeoisie is a collective noun

only and sic is the way you cite a quote that is grammatically wrong] mentality in the party and we have that element that is bourgeoisie [sic] (cited in Meisenhelder, 1994: 3).

Moreover, Ian Phimister (1987: 57) suggests that ZANU's later policies "accurately reflected the interests of rich peasants and farmers, business people and the educated petty-bourgeoisie, everyone in fact who stood to gain from policies which 'opened up' the state and capital accumulation to black advancement." The transition path chosen is consistent with the dominant class in ZANU's leadership, resembling:

... a democratic socialist *potpourri* composed of a little nationalisation of industries, a little influx of new foreign capital; a careful safeguarding of the commercial farming sector; an increase in public spending on education, health and housing; the establishment of local government committees, youth and women groups, and workers committees; a little land resettlement; and an age of majority bill giving women the same status as adults that men enjoyed in the law (Sylvester, 1991: 72).

Wilfred Mhanda suggest that the seeds for the miscarriage of the ideals of the liberation struggle should be found in the fact that "the workers and peasants hated the white settlers on account of their oppressive and exploitative system while the petite bourgeoisie was more concerned about being elevated to the status of the white settlers" (Mhanda, 2005: 3). Mugabe's justification of the insurgency into Rhodesia on the occasion of his first official United Nations meeting in New York confirms Mhanda's criticism. Mugabe admitted:

What we were struggling for was the restoration in Zimbabwe of human dignity, the achievement of justice and peace, the correction of past wrongs, one of which racism, inequality being another because of the racial system: inequitable distribution of land, inadequate educational facilities, health facilities, and the downgrading of the Africans through various forms of socio-economic pressures or discriminatory measures in the various fields which were meant to downgrade (cited in Pandya, 1988: 31).

The pressures and discriminatory measures Mugabe was complaining about were often embodied in various acts of parliament. The control of the state and all its apparatus for control and distribution of power and resources became an attractive basis for the reformation of these problems. For a typical member of this class such as Margaret Dongo, there was enormous excitement about the prospect of change as she conceived it in the early days after black majority rule was instituted:

As a former freedom fighter, there was a lot of hope and a lot of excitement. And people were willing to work toward rebuilding their country. One thing you need to understand is that in the early 1980s, ZANU achieved political power before any economic shift had taken place. If you look at the developments made by ZANU PF during the first five years, these early new economic developments are the ones that impacted later significantly. The first five years suggest an energetic party committed to change in the nationalist direction prefigured earlier. From 1980 to 1985, a number of changes came in - to the agriculture sector, the health sector, the education sector - in terms of black people, indigenous people coming into business. Above all, they built up their key base in getting rid of white civil servants who largely emigrated or retired and greatly increasing the number of bureaucrat-administrators from the ranks of black Zimbabweans (Bloom, 2004).

What could be emphasized is the fact that some gained and some did not; there are no universals here despite the nationalist mythos. For the classes that Phimister has identified, the early years of Zimbabwe's independence exuded a sense of new dawn with considerable international goodwill and domestic sense of purpose producing a new relationship between modernity and tradition, between continuity and change, which seemed to reconcile the need for pragmatism and the hallowed rhetoric of radicalism. Many exiled Zimbabweans had acquired higher education and in some cases academic doctorates. The number of highly westernized Africans who returned to Zimbabwe and assumed positions of power quickly in the early 1980s was well above the average on the African continent. With a surprising large number of senior civil servants with BAs and even higher degrees, the lifestyles and interests of these officials and ministers have been substantially conditioned already. Their contact with Western consumer culture became the basis for their understanding of the modernisation project. The ZANU PF led government of Mugabe was eager to sustain this new class and reluctant to see the level of capitalist development endangered.

Early Countryside Success that Covered up Weaknesses

The inheritance and legacy of settler colonialism plus the guerrilla war left the economy in many areas where the war had taken effect battered. Smith's notorious scorched earth military tactic called 'Operation Turkey' that was intended to deny guerrillas food by forcing rural masses into 'protected villages' while others fled to towns leading to massive disruptions of the rural economy.⁷⁹ Between one and two million people are thought to have migrated to towns

⁷⁹ Protected villages or 'keeps' as they were commonly called, were created by the Rhodesian authorities in 1973 to isolate the rural inhabitants from the guerrillas, to stop the guerrillas from politicizing and conscientising them and to prevent them from providing assistance to the guerrillas in the form of food, clothing and shelter. The Rhodesian authorities realized that ZANLA forces depended on their relationship with rural masses for their

(Yates, 1980: 69). The combination of the structural limitations imposed on the potential for African economic participation and the debilitating effect of the war meant that at independence, the baseline for transformation was very low. The Zimbabwean economy was performing far below capacity even according to the level of development attained. Legally recognised independence and a majority government was expected to change these circumstances. The ZANU-led government mounted a reconstruction and welfare programme.

ZANU PF prioritised the repairing, rebuilding and re-opening of socio-economic infrastructure damaged during the war in rural areas, for example, schools, clinics, dip tanks, roads, bridges, and administrative centres. In terms of policy, the government introduced a welfare programme that involved free education, and health service as well as packages of seeds, a credit line and fertiliser to the rural farmers. These required the expansion of the civil service leading to the availability of jobs for those who had the skills in the state sector. Free medical treatment for low income groups earning less than Z\$150 at 1980 levels as well as increased clinic access had a positive impact on infant mortality and the general health of the nation. Free education led to an increase in primary, secondary and university student enrolments. An ambitious adult education programme also extended literacy in a manner unprecedented in independent Africa. This brought about a sense of good times in many areas considered as marks of “success” and even as “miraculous” in the local, regional and international media coverage. The arrival of a spot in the world and particularly in Southern Africa, where the violence and oppression of apartheid persisted but now some good news could be reported had the net effect of covering up the weaknesses in the Zimbabwean transition.

ZANU embarked on a state-building exercise without the rigour of nation-building that would have helped to resolve the crisis of accumulation and entrenching democracy. The failure to unify the country’s liberation movement and forge a national consciousness was a deliberate process to assert ZANU control. Edna Masunungure (2007) argues that nation building remained unresolved, not that:

With the achievement of formal independence, the new black government faced two challenges. The first was building a new, united nation from ashes of colonial and racial subjugation and oppression. From the time of the country’s colonial occupation in September 1890, it functioned as a bifurcated society. It was two nations within one

survival. For more on this relationship and how ZANLA forces conducted their war see Paresh Pandya, *Mao Tse-tung and Chimurenga: An Investigation into ZANU’s Strategies*. Braamfontein: Skotaville Publishers, 1988.

territorial unit of rule. These two nations, one white and the other black, rarely saw eye to eye. The blacks did not constitute a homogenous society either (Masunungure, 2007: 5).

Masunungure defines state-building (as opposed to nation-building) as entailing:

... creating and strengthening the institutions necessary to support and promote long term economic, social and political development. ... state-building and nation-building are two overlapping but conceptually and historically different processes (Masunungure, 2007: 6).

The process of nation-building was aborted in preference to state-building. At independence, Zimbabwe inherited a functional (though weakened by war) state without a nation. The nationalists and settlers fought for the control of the state. The Lancaster House Agreement made it possible for the black majority to control the state, while leaving the national question unresolved. The reconciliation policy seemed to have extended from Mugabe and ZANU to Ian Smith and whites. Jonathan Moyo (1992: 24) concludes that:

While the objective of reconciliation were clear in so far as they related to reconciling races which had been at loggerheads politically and economically, the objectives were not that clear beyond ZANU (PF)'s desire to improve or otherwise introduce a one party state.

A programme of national unity within the context of multi-polar participatory political system for minority group participation was not developed. The limited transition project towards nation-building as well as a project of economic accumulation had a long term impact on growth beyond initial achievements associated with the coming of peace. As articulated by David Moore (2003), by the beginning of the 21st century Zimbabwe was still faced with a "triple crisis characterised by primitive accumulation, nation-state building and democratisation."

Meeting the rural demands for services by providing mass agricultural services proved to be a potent political tool for the consolidation of political power, which ZANU PF was to use repeatedly in subsequent elections. In spite of the war having been fought with the support of rural masses, ZANU's political organisational structures remained by any standard rudimentary in circumstances where party loyalty was more on a tribal or regional basis.⁸⁰

⁸⁰ Ahead of the first party Congress since independence, held in August 1984 resources had to be channelled towards the 'restructuring of ZANU to provide reliable linkages between the Central Committee and scattered

Provinces such as the Midlands and Matabeleland were more inclined towards Nkomo's PF ZAPU. ZANU PF failed to win a single seat in the PF ZAPU stronghold of Matabeleland ravaged by political dissent in the early 1980s. Some districts in Manicaland were strongholds of Ndabaningi Sithole's ZANU NDONGA. Some members of the rural elite had benefited from the conservative reforms of the Muzorewa regime. Now new forms of patronage were developed to the extent that it could be said that owing to this application of economic resources:

ZANU PF was able to increase its share of national vote from 63 percent in 1980 to 77 percent in 1985. By 1985 the party had solidified its base in the peasant farming heartland of Mashonaland and made its greatest electoral gains over opposition parties in the maize and cotton producing areas of the Midlands and Mashonaland West, which had benefited most from newly available smallholder services (Bratton, 1987: 199).

From this point on, the war time alliance between the 'comrades' and the communal farmers seemed consolidated and the party would refer back to this close alliance whenever the need arose. Through the patron-client relationship, government would pause as a benefactor for the poor as long as they worked within the framework and programmes it set. The evolution of independent institutions was seen as oppositional and voicing of concerns regarded as uncomradely. In this context the demand for autonomy from the party by local actors were seen as raising 'dissident' sentiments. As will be discussed below, this underestimated as well the impact of making inputs available to black farmers far more than previously and improving their conditions of market relations.

Mugabe hammered away on the reconciliation issue in his 1980 speeches at home and abroad. In a speech at Ahmadu Bello University in the city of Zaria, Nigeria (18 December 1980), he stated that as a result of the bitter experiences of the armed struggle Zimbabweans had learnt the importance of the weapon of national and international unity. Adding that:

Independence has formed the bond of unity for all the people of Zimbabwe who are prepared to accept the phenomenon of political change. With an

rural cells which had been dismantled soon after independence as stated earlier (see Bratton, 1987 for details). The establishment of village and ward committees in February 1984 and the announcement of a move to decentralise development responsibilities that was intended to follow had an impact on the development of institutions independent of the party and government as well as on gender. This attracted particularly older male residents of rural and resettlement areas intending to take over control from the younger guerrilla collaborators (*mujibas and chimbwidos*) who had taken over control of the rural space during the war (see Kriger, 1985 for more).

organisation and united people, no problem is insurmountable. National unity is, therefore, a devastating weapon in the hands of the toiling masses in bringing about the necessary changes and defeating their enemies, and resisting their manoeuvres (Mugabe cited in Yates, 1980: 72).

Two days after Mugabe's speech in Nigeria, Kumbirai Kangai reiterated that:

It is on the foundation of the principle of reconciliation that we are finding it possible to transform groupist [sic] objectives and inclinations into collectivist, popular and socialist objectives and aspirations ... our people as a whole are quickly transforming by accepting the principles of national unity and reconciliation (The Herald, 20 December 1980).

If anything, the reconciliation policy of Mugabe could pass as a tactical move to seek a temporary reprieve and breathing space while consolidating its hold on the state machinery and firmly establish itself amongst the masses by winning control and influence in the trade unions, education, cultural and social groups and the mass media.

However, in one area, Matebeleland, the toiling masses still rejected PF unity and supported ZAPU; they would be dealt with ruthlessly. It was not long until the civil war broke out in Matebeleland in 1981 and the PF ZAPU contingent was sacked from the ZANU PF led government. The key weaknesses emanating from the failure to invest in national building led to atrocities in Matebeleland, which at the time (to ZANU's benefit) was scantily reported about. The civil war led to the split in the Patriotic Front (PF) that had jointly negotiated at Lancaster House. According to a veteran of the liberation struggle (cited in James, 1983: 2), "by splitting the PF, the real aim is to divide and destroy the revolution in Zimbabwe. If we cannot unite ZANLA and ZIPRA, the revolution in Zimbabwe will be destroyed and we (the guerillas) will be used to destroy it." The sacking of Nkomo and the PF ZAPU contingent from Mugabe's government in 1982 was part of this crisis and lack of commitment to deal with the national question. This led to development dilemmas, for instance the difficulties in getting people to take up resettlement land with was more pronounced in Matebeleland (discussed in detail in Chapter Five) which can be understood from this issue of lack of national cohesion and Ndebele resistance to a Mugabe/ZANU and therefore Shona government.

By the end of the 1980s, land reform had not progressed as anticipated. The result as we shall see was a brief moment of increased production and contribution to the market for agricultural products whose saturation point was reached without transforming the relations of production

in the African sector. This theme of an unsustainable drive towards increased production and efficiency in African agriculture forms the key argument to this work and is developed in sections two and three below.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued that ZANU (PF)'s character as a church of competing and politically contradictory forces was the basis of post-independence weaknesses in the transformation project. I agree with Andre Astrow's (1983) argument that the nature of the ZANU PF led state in which the "petit bourgeois conductors of the nationalist movement derailed the revolution because they did not, perhaps could not, pay attention to their tasks as developers and mobilisers of militant masses". Carol Thompson (1985) warns against viewing the progressive state as the only necessary condition for transformation. She argues that "the control of the state is only a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for promoting political and economic transformations of peripheral capitalism" (Thompson, 1985: 7). In the case of post-independence agrarian experience of Zimbabwe, Mumbengegwi (1986)'s "continuities and change" necessitated by the need to balance the forces within ZANU PF's competing interests explain the stalling of the revolution. Ibbo Mandaza (1986) explains these continuities in terms of the "serious ideological deficiencies of the nationalist movement but also its limited military and political capacity when it came to dealing with the full weight of joint white settler and imperialist intrigue at the Lancaster House Conference." However scholars choose to characterise ZANU ideology, the previous pages have focussed on its failures to solve fundamental problems and notably in establishing a unifying project of economic accumulation.

The language used in post-independence ruling party and government discourse remained consistent with war-time promises thus sustaining the illusion that the "revolution was alive and well". Growth with equity was seen as an essential policy instrument for poverty alleviation. The language used in the transformation policies and framework documents could already be considered a flirtation with 1970s mainstream development discourse.⁸¹ Archie Mafeje (2003) points out that by the 1970s, the term poverty alleviation had already been

⁸¹ For instance, the language of basic needs, redistribution with growth, growth with equity, poverty alleviation and integrated development (among others) were in use by United Nations organs as well as the World Bank and the international development community (understood differently though). ZANU PF appropriated a language that looked respectable to those interested in social change even after the collapse of socialist alternatives internationally through borrowing this kind of discourse.

developed and was in use as a result of the disillusionment with 'trickle-down' theories of the 1960s. The early 1980s experienced shifts in thinking about post-colonial development going back to the 1960s. Zimbabwe did not embark on a serious industrial project of any significance. Mugabe's project preached socialism for the poor and a form of protected bourgeois capitalism for the elite while advancing the interests of the educated elite and the more successful black accumulators.

The chapter also highlighted the reasons for the course that ZANU PF took in practice, the class nature of the leadership of the movement, the difficulty of shifting out of a well-hewn growth path and the nature of the Lancaster House negotiations. The rhetoric developed during the armed struggle was far more radical and militant, even if vague, than the practice once ZANU took over the state system. This rhetoric did not ever disappear entirely but remained a tool by which the political elite continue to seek the vote and support of the rural masses. The following chapter uses this analysis to look into land policy options pursued by the ZANU PF government in more detail.

Chapter Three

The Political Economy of Land and Agrarian Reform

Introduction

The prospect of agrarian reform had an important bearing on the potential transformation of the Zimbabwean economy to meet the development and welfare needs of the people.⁸² The war-time participation of the rural people and the importance of the land question at Lancaster House meant that any post-war Zimbabwean government's success would be measured according to its success in the area of land and agrarian reform. This chapter starts with ZANU's war-time promises on land and agrarian reform. Following this it discusses the clauses of the Lancaster House Agreement that regulated how land would be accessed. The theoretical perspectives on the agrarian question and its contribution to development (rural, economic, and national) are raised in their historical context. The Zimbabwean options for agrarian transformation are raised. Finally a comparative exercise showing how other countries have benefited their economies through agrarian reform is provided.

Zimbabwe was a settler state in which agriculture was the mainstay of the colonial economy. The development of commercial agriculture and cash crop production under the control of the settler community while largely excluding indigenous African society had an enormous impact on how the two economies evolved. As such Hla Myint (1954)'s vent-for-surplus theory which argues that colonialism opened up opportunities for the expansion of African economies does not apply well to Zimbabwe. As indicated in Chapter One, the evolution of settler society led to the undermining of the African economy. Settler colonialism by 1980 left "a mature, self-conscious and powerful capitalism deliberately set out to manipulate African agricultural production in its own interest" in southern Africa (Ranger, 1978: 127). Dependency scholars have established how the integration of the African economies into the capitalist world economy led to the siphoning out of African produce for the development of the economies of

⁸² Agrarian reform can best be described by analysis of a set of interconnected factors that frame it. Bruce Moore approached it as a mathematical equation, suggesting that: Agrarian reform equals the combination of land tenure and support services multiplied by people's participation balance with the vested interests (divided by government inertia and landowner resistance. Put this way, agrarian reform is the process of defining who has the right to use which land, for which purposes, under which conditions and for how long (Moore, FAO, Rome n.d.).

Europe through in part the agency of their settler “kith and kin”.⁸³ The key challenge for post-colonial agrarian reform would involve the harmonisation, rationalisation and re-orientation of the two agriculture sectors, creating healthy linkages with, the manufacturing and other sectors of the economy. The table below demonstrates the advantages of a balanced economy in which agriculture, mining and industry were pursued together.

Table 3.1: Economic Performance, 1923 – 1997 (1924 to 1953 figures are based on nominal prices)

<i>Period</i>	<i>GDP Growth % p.a.</i>	<i>Per Capita Income Growth % p.a.</i>	<i>Development Strategy</i>
1924 – 1939	4.8	3.0	Export-led growth driven by primary product development in mining and agriculture
1939 – 1953	12.0	9.8	Strong agricultural growth allied with the development of manufacturing industry actively fostered by ‘state capitalism’ taking the form of economic nationalism. Growth stimulated also by heavy investment in infrastructure and high levels of white immigration
1954 – 1965	4.4	2.0	Steady economic growth fuelled by the creation of the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, placed Southern Rhodesia as the major economic beneficiary. Growth slowed in the early 1960s as it became clear that the Federation would be dismantled and as political uncertainty increased.
1965-1980	4.7	1.7	Growth driven by import substitution industrialisation along with some diversification in agriculture and mining. Economy went into reverse in the mid-1970s as the liberation struggle intensified and the economy suffered from exogenous shocks – mostly notably sharp increases in oil prices.
1980 – 1990	4.3	1.1	After a brief boom in 1980/81, the economy slowed in the face of adverse exogenous shocks – drought and depressed primary product prices. Import substitution lost momentum and increased government intervention and controls discouraged investment which was seriously constrained by inadequate foreign exchange. In the late 1980s export incentives were introduced in an effort to alleviate the foreign exchange crisis.
1990 – 1995	1.8	-1.3	Introduction of ESAP in 1991 led to reduction in real living standards despite increased investment and growth of non-traditional exports. Most micro-economic targets were missed, inflation accelerated, unemployment and poverty increased. A new economic reform programme, ZIMPREST ⁸⁴ was launched in 1996.
1996 – 2000	1.1	-2.3	The introduction of ZIMPREST and the extension of the Social Dimension Fund to mitigate the impacts of ESAP did not turn around the economy. In fact it continued to decline reaching lowest levels never experienced even during the depression between 1925 and 1935.

Source: CSO, National Accounts of Zimbabwe 1965, 1993, 1997, 2001

⁸³ Dependency theory however, has limited application in settler economies where the settlers became the agents for capitalist transformation and were interested in local development rather than shipping off resources to the metropole. Some of the influential dependency theorists include: Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. London: Bogle-L’Ouverture, 1973; C. Thomas, *Dependence and Transformation*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974; Samir Amin, *Unequal Development*. Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1976; Claude Ake, *A Political Economy of Africa*. London: Longmans, 1981 and Andre Gunder Frank, *The Development of Underdevelopment*. London: Longmans, 1984 – among others. Ironically, the ultimate settler society—the USA, rose to become the very core of global capitalism.

⁸⁴ Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation

Due to colonial land alienation, the post-colonial land and agrarian questions are intertwined and have to be considered together. The one could not be fully resolved without the other. The case of Zimbabwe can show that resolving the land question alone through repartition without following through with agrarian support is not a sustainable solution. It is therefore essential to underline land reform as only a basis for agrarian transformation. Land and agrarian reform loomed large on the transformation agendas of liberation movements as it was seen by both reformists and revolutionaries as one of the levers to modernization and structural change of “backward” societies (Sobhan, 1993: 1).⁸⁵ Central to the agrarian question sits the development and transformation of the relations of production and the bringing of a hitherto backward sector into the economic mainstream.

This relationship has been understood by the major authorities writing on Zimbabwe in particular. Ben Cousins defines the difference between agrarian reform and land reform as follows:

Land reform... is concerned with rights in land, and their character, strength and distribution, while... [agrarian reform] focuses not only on these but also a broader set of issues: the class character of the relations of production and distribution in farming and related enterprises, and how these connect to the wider class structure. It is thus concerned with economic and political power and the relations between them (Cousins, 2007).

Moyo (2007) views the land question as not only an agrarian issue but also a critical social one. Many people still depend on land based sectors such as mining and tourism, as distinct from agriculture. He argues that the narrow view of the land question as solely the agrarian question means that the other aspects of land, housing and so forth will be undermined in a solely agrarian based project. Land reform has tended to take on a narrowly economic importance in the literature; however, land as a source of identity and a symbol of citizenship is still important in Zimbabwe as in other African countries. According to Hall and Ntsebeza (2007: 9) focused on South Africa:

⁸⁵Agrarian reform can be successful when “the question of provisioning, just as effectively, the massive urban populations of the world, be considered the crucial aspect of the ... systemic notion of an agrarian question” (Bernstein, 2006: 13).

A core challenge in resolving the land question is the dissonance between land and agricultural policy and the implications of these for land reform. While debate has tended to focus on how land can be acquired and transferred, in truth this is only the starting point. For land reform to succeed, those getting access to land need to be able to use it in a way that contributes to improving their livelihoods.

Along similar lines, a 2003 World Bank report states:

...A key precondition for land reform to be feasible and effective in improving beneficiaries' livelihoods is that such programs fit into a broader policy aimed at reducing poverty and establishing a favourable environment for the development of productive smallholder agriculture by beneficiaries (World Bank, 2003).

According to Henry Bernstein (2007), the land question also needs to be historicized and periodised. During the rise and development of capitalism, the agrarian question was how to transform social relations of production while enabling agriculture to contribute to industrialisation. As the agrarian problematic of capital has been resolved on a global scale, Bernstein doubts that it is still possible today to return to this initial question. He argues that in the context of neo-liberal globalisation we now have the agrarian question of labour. This is called the agrarian question of labour as the thrust of agrarian reform is to resolve the crisis of employment creation in peripheral economies where the urban economies are not able to absorb more and more of the people finding their way to labour markets from and in rural and the urban areas (Bernstein, 2007: 44 – 52).

The agrarian questions as articulated by Bernstein (2003a) distinguishes between three aspects of the 'classic' agrarian question include; (i) the agrarian question that deals with the role of agrarian classes (different peasant classes, agricultural workers) in the struggles for democracy and socialism; (ii) the second question concerns the transformation of the social relations of production and development of the productive forces in agriculture in transitions to capitalism; and (iii) the third addresses how such transformations contribute, or otherwise, to the accumulation process of necessary industrialisation centred on the problematic of politics,

production and accumulation.⁸⁶ Bernstein suggested that a materialist political economy has the intellectual means to confront the realities, and to take on the challenges of recognizing, and assessing, how these apply, over a wide range of socially and environmentally diverse countryside (Bernstein, 2003b). This chapter therefore considers the agrarian question in Zimbabwe with reference to the issues raised above.

ZANU's War-time Promises and the Lancaster House Agreement on Land and Agrarian Reform

ZANU's land policy is that all the natural resources of Zimbabwe — land, minerals, water, and flora and fauna — belong to all citizens of Zimbabwe today and forever afterwards; and, therefore, there can be no private ownership of land and natural resources as they belong to the people as a whole. The State shall hold the land as administrator and trustee for the present and future generations. Landlordism and farms owned by capitalists will be abolished ... the maxim "land to the tiller" will be fully implemented in an independent Zimbabwe (ZANU Educational Pamphlet, 1975).

ZANU promised the rural masses that they would get land and that co-operative farms would be formed for the returning ex-combatants. The message was that white landowners would be displaced and the black masses' land rights would be restored. This position espoused by ZANU in 1975 proved impossible to implement upon coming to power. The Lancaster House Agreement ensured that this would not happen. Yet, even after the lapse of the Lancaster House Agreement clauses pertaining to land in 1990, ZANU PF did not move towards the nationalisation of land.

It is now obvious as well that ZANU never had the intention to pursue a socialist path for economic growth. The liberation movement in Zimbabwe did not generate a policy and a clear programme for dealing with African agriculture beyond nationalist and populist rhetoric suggesting that "land shall be owned by those who tilled it" and that those "holding land had stolen it from the ancestors and other surviving African people" (ZANU Pamphlet, 1975). As suggested in Chapter Two above, training camps did not go beyond the minimum sloganeering

⁸⁶ Henry Bernstein and T. J. Byres are in my opinion the leading authorities on the agrarian question having dealt with the issues for five decades (1970s to present). Their views are crucial for linking the 'classical agrarian question' as well as the 'peasant question' and its historical origin in Europe to third world political economy of development and transformation within a historic framework. Based at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, they are well-known for their work in establishing first the Journal of Peasant Studies and more recently the Journal of Agrarian Change.

and indoctrination required in the waging of a guerrilla war.⁸⁷ Thus the questions and modalities of agrarian transformation became subjected to trial and error strategies following independence.

The Lancaster House Agreement was written in the spirit of economic liberalisation which prioritised the interests of the rich landed classes of the colonial era as well as the emerging social and political elite. Through liberal democratic principles (property rights and the rule of law) the Lancaster House Agreement was able to protect these class interests. According to Creed Mushimbo (2005: 42):

The land policy established at Lancaster [House] was the result of a long-term political and economic decline on Britain's part both in Rhodesian and global affairs, limited political clout on the African nationalist side, and deeply entrenched white Rhodesian agro-industrial interests. At Lancaster House, the Rhodesian whites had the most solid and well established interests, while Britain was for the first time in the history of Anglo-Rhodesian relations trying to assert some authority. On the other side were the African nationalists challenging both British and settler hegemony. This, the land policy that emerged was a balance between the relevant parties' widely divergent interests and different degrees of political and economic clout.

The mechanism for accessing land had been defined by the Lancaster House Agreement. In terms of the funding of the land reform process, Britain remained circumspect and non-committal. During the conference Britain made it clear that they did not have the capacity to fund a programme that leading British and American experts had estimated to require between US\$1.5- 2 billion to implement. In his speech, Lord Carrington said:

We recognise that the future Government of Zimbabwe, whatever its political complexion, will wish to extend land ownership. The Government can of course purchase land for agricultural settlement, as we all have seen. The Independence Constitution will make it possible to acquire under-utilised land compulsorily, provided that adequate compensation is paid. ... The British Government recognises the importance of this issue to a future Zimbabwean Government and will be prepared, within the limits imposed by our financial resources, to

⁸⁷ The ANC-SACP in Tanzania and Mozambique had schools and centres engaging with post-apartheid policy, a luxury the Zimbabwean liberation experience did not have. For instance in 1987, Pallo Jordan and Helena Dolny ran Land and Agriculture research in Mozambique. The idea of research towards specific sectors of the economy demonstrated the maturity in the relative liberation movement, showing that they were forward looking and conscious of the fact that they were a government in waiting and by the time they come to power they need to have engaged with policy on key matters, having a sense of what to do. It is sad, though, in the South African case that the ANC accepted uncritically, the advice of World Bank and IMF supported think-tanks abandoning all the work of the liberation movement on land and agrarian reform.

help. ... The costs would be very substantial indeed, well beyond the capacity, in our judgement, of any individual donor country, and the British Government cannot commit itself at this stage to a specific share in them (Lord Carrington Lancaster House Speech, October 11, 1979 cited in Stedman, 1988).

Britain had no real desire to fund a programme that would lead to the dispossession of settlers. As Robin Renwick (1997) suggests:

The British were not prepared to finance a fund to buy out white farmers, as Julius Nyerere was suggesting. [For the Brits] what was required for food production in Rhodesia was to keep European farmers there, not to encourage them to leave, to allow for African commercial farming to develop (Renwick, 1997: 41).

The hesitancy with funding the Zimbabwean land reform is a stark contrast to British expenditures of not less than £70 million through the Swynnerton Plan meant to quell the Mau Mau Uprising (even if the circumstances and context were different). The Swynnerton Plan was intended to stabilise colonial Kenya at a time when independence was not yet contemplated; it was not a plan for post-colonial Kenya. It was also different in that it was about privatizing reserve land; there was no question of giving Africans any white-owned land involved. There was separate support linked to land reform in the White Highlands some years later that was attached to an independence bargain through which Britain paid US\$200 million to finance land reform.

Lancaster House detailed the manner through which land would be accessed. The Agreement listed all the public purposes for which land could be expropriated: defence public safety, public order, public morality, public health, and town and country planning. Only underutilised land could be expropriated for agricultural resettlement, any other land would have to be acquired on a willing-buyer-willing-seller basis. This provision would remain in place for ten years following which a two-thirds parliamentary majority could overturn it. Any *expropriatee* was guaranteed the right to access the High Court to determine the amount of compensation and to contest the expropriation notice.

As indicated in Chapter Two, the dominance of the petty bourgeois elite within ZANU limited the possibilities of a radical restructuring of the agricultural sector. The slow rate of land reform was explained in terms of the Lancaster House Agreement. While during the war, ZANU talked about the nationalisation of the land; three Land Commissions (Riddell,

Chavunduka and Rukuni) later, the structure of land distribution remained.⁸⁸ The Lancaster House Agreement's clauses pertaining to land effectively sealed for another ten years the colonial land policies that had ensured that Africans remain disenfranchised.

Theoretical (and Historical) Perspectives on the Land and Agrarian Question

In theory, agrarian reform can be an instrument for increasing the incentive of the rural masses to work their land more intensively in order both to enrich themselves and generate surplus to underwrite the industrialisation process (Sobhan, 1993: 1). As such, agrarian reform is arguably a growth-oriented intervention which would lay the foundations of the new social order needed to transform traditional societies into modern developmental states whether in a capitalist, alternatively socialist or mixed economy. Agrarian reforms can be inegalitarian with or without social transformation. T. J. Byres (cited in Bernstein, 2004: 191) reiterated that:

The emphasis upon unequal distribution of land, other productive resources and political power, and the preoccupation with egalitarian solutions, is archetypically populist; the stress upon factor market imperfections and 'efficiency' is quintessentially neo-classical.

For effective reform, the rural economy should be developed in conjunction with a planned expansion of the urban economy in mind. Agrarian reform cannot be an end in itself. It should be considered as part of an ongoing process with vertical and horizontal links with the industrial sector. It has been argued that:

The need for land reform is often spurred on by slow industrial development and insufficient employment opportunities. Unless carried out for a reason of moral or political ideology alone, what is generally crucial is that land reform should not only address issues of equity, but also productivity. If the nation's economic development is also a consideration, it is important that land reform works to improve and that sustainability of national output as well as internal food security also be maintained if not enhanced, rather than threatened. How best to achieve this is often a topic of considerable contention and debate (Bowyer-Bower and Stoneman, 2001:1).

What are the broader agrarian political economy and institutional arrangements that should be evolved to advance the economy and improve African agriculture? The classical agrarian question helps us understand the complex question of how labour is reproduced and how capital is accumulated. The original agrarian question was placed within the transition from feudalism to capitalist relations of production in agriculture, first and foremost, and how such

⁸⁸ See GoZ, The Riddell Commission of Enquiry into the Incomes, Prices and Conditions of Service, 1981

accumulation in agriculture fuelled industrial production. Marx's analysis was concerned with the original transition to capitalism in Britain and as such emphasised the role of agriculture. In this case, the transformation of agriculture was charted above all through the displacement or dispossession of peasant by capitalist farming ushered by the 'enclosure' system. Lenin identified classes of peasants and emphasized the possibility of the dissolution of the peasantry through the formation of distinct classes of agrarian capital and wage labour from its ranks (Bernstein, 2003b). In Lenin's scheme of things, the different classes of the peasantry fared differently, with the poorer groups subjected to a reproduction squeeze as capital or labour, or both, while the middle peasants were able to meet the needs of self reproduction, and the rich, to engage in expanded reproduction. Bernstein (2006) sees Lenin's class differentiation of the peasantry as another possible path of the formation of classes of agrarian capital and labour (a different route to proletarianisation).

The land and agrarian question need to be understood within the particular historical moment in which it is being resolved. Bernstein (2006) points out markers to this process in our day as including among other things: 1) the vanishing of predatory landed property as a significant economic and political force by the end of the 1970s (ending the agrarian question of capital on a world scale): 2) the implosion of the project of state-led development and the globalisation of agribusiness and the structural changes it entailed. Others have placed more interest in the absolute collapse of traditional peasantries. For Giovanni Arrighi (2001) and Immanuel Wallerstein (2000) one of the characteristics, for which the most dramatic changes took place in the second half of the 20th century, "which cuts us forever from the world of the past, is the death of the peasantry" which had formed the majority of the human race throughout recorded history. This 'death' has been attributed to the "revolution of the global society or global transformation". However, Bernstein argues that the 'death' is a metaphor of the experience of the peasantry and is somewhat exaggerated explaining that:

There is a persistence of the peasantry in the world of mature capitalism ... such persistence may be celebrated in various forms of agrarian populism as the effect of qualities of peasant resilience and 'resistance'. Or may be regretted, in both Marxist and bourgeois versions of modernization ... (also) the prediction may be maintained (regretted or welcomed) ... with recognition that the death throes are more protracted than once believed (Bernstein, 2003b: 3).

Changes in the global economy have forced the rural poor to pursue their means of livelihood/reproduction across different sites of the social division of labour: urban and rural,

agricultural and no-agricultural, wage employment and self-employment. Giovanni Arrighi and Jason Moore (in Albritton et. al., 2001: 75) suggest that “the underlying contradiction of a world capitalist system that promotes the formation of a world proletariat but cannot accommodate a generalized living wage (that is, the most basic of reproduction costs), far from being solved, has become more acute than ever.” Bernstein (2006) concludes that the crisis of labor is a crisis of reproduction, and is hardly unique to capitalism today, only that it has been intensified by its globalizing tendencies. It is in this case that he considers a ‘new’ agrarian question of labour, separated from its historic connection and subordination to that of capital and manifested in struggles for land against ‘actually existing’ forms of capitalist landed property and production. The land occupation movement in Zimbabwe starting after the 1999 referendum fits this scheme squarely. As observed in Moore (2003) an attempt at primitive accumulation, nation-state formation and democratization in Zimbabwe in the context of neo-liberal globalisation became a ‘triple crisis’ in conditions accentuated by what Arrighi and Moore (in Albritton, 2001) described as the “scarcity, and increasing scarcity, of employment in contemporary capitalism”. Such economic pressures were already in place by the mid-1980s in Zimbabwe (Bond, 1998) and had worsened following the adoption of the World Bank associated Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in the 1990s (Bond, 2003; Carmody, 2001 and Mlambo, 1997).

The theme of a shift in the agrarian question due to the pervasive transformation of the world economy through globalisation permeates Bernstein’s work since the late 1990s.⁸⁹ He underscored the changing nature of the issues and debates shaping the agrarian question, suggesting that:

At the core of the current debate about land reform are diverging ideas about productivity and growth in farming, rural poverty and its reduction; employment and employment generation in the countryside – and the links between these concerns as well as, to varying degrees, their (inter-sectoral) links with accumulation and growth in the wider economy (Bernstein, 2004: 190).

⁸⁹ Work on rural development and agriculture published in the new millennium tends to be either supportive of the ‘death or disappearing’ thesis or either recognising the resilience of the peasant sector as a factor in development planning. In 2001 Henry Bernstein presented a paper entitled agrarian reform after developmentalism in Manchester 2001 and a revised version in Cairo 2002. The shift from the *Journal of Peasant Studies* to the *Journal of Agrarian Change* also signaled a realisation of the context in which agrarian reform was taking place and perhaps what Bernstein (2003b) considered a ‘farewell to the peasantry’. Thus in 2004 Bernstein captures the agrarian questions and the politics of land in capitalism today as ‘changing before our very eyes’. See also Deborah Bryceson’s book *Disappearing Peasantries* (2000) in which she highlighted the pressures from a globalisation on resource poor farmers leading to a de-peasantisation process in which non-agricultural activities became increasingly important within the livelihood strategies for poor societies.

For Bryceson (2000), 'labour redundancy' is resulting from the changing political, economic and social fact of peasant existence. She argues that:

... peasants' relationship to the land [which] has altered under the influences of changing rural terms of trade, multi-occupational livelihoods, intensified labour mobility, straddled urban and rural residence and flooding urban labour markets. Rapid transformation of state and market contexts has impacted on peasant families and villages, to the point that coherent peasant communities are now more difficult to discern (Bryceson, 2000).

This fits Gibbon and Neocosmos (1985)'s description of the small scale (family, household or individual) production in capitalism as engaging in more or less specialised commodity production, and constituted by a particular combination of class places of capital and labour. According to Bernstein (2003b: 6):

Poor peasants are most likely to engage in wage labour and in the more marginal (and 'crowded') branches of non-agricultural petty commodity activity, in other words pursue 'survival' in conditions of extreme constraint; middle peasant households also typically diversify sources of income (including from wage labour) to reproduce their means of production (reproduce themselves as capital); rich peasants frequently pursue diversified accumulation strategies, with investment 'portfolios' in crop trading and processing, money lending, rural transport, tractor renting, and village shops and bars.

Due to globalisation, opportunities in urban and rural areas have dwindled and entitlements eroded. It is in this context that Bernstein's agrarian question of labour becomes a useful tool.

The structural source of the agrarian question (of labour) is the scarcity, and increasing scarcity, of employment in contemporary capitalism that can provide a 'generalised living wage (that is, the most basic of reproduction costs)'. To what extent, and in what ways, that scarcity generates struggles for land, by whom, and how (the modes of struggle), are issues at the core of *problematizing* (in original) agrarian questions of labour and understanding their specificities across a wide range of conditions (Bernstein, 2006).⁹⁰

In her comparison of the land question in South Africa and Zimbabwe, Allison Goebel (2005) asks whether land reform has a future while Gillian Hart's *Disabling Globalisation* (2002), focused on South Africa, suggests that there is need for land reform but defined beyond the question of land for agriculture. The idea of peasant engagement in non-agricultural activities

⁹⁰ For a different view which argues that small farms are efficient and ignores this view of contemporary change, see Moyo (1995) or Lipton (2001, 2004, 2005, 2006). Moyo has continued to argue that the tendency to view small farms as inefficient and large farms as more efficient in terms of yields per unit of land has mainly been constructed within the racial and class prisms of former settler countries.

as a way of sustaining themselves is hardly new. Even pre-colonial African societies (while not having experienced feudalism, as in the west) had mixed economies that included farming based and non-farming based activities. In Zimbabwe, in times of stress such as drought, “agriculture was the supplementary activity rather than the main activity” even for rural poor people, meaning that urban income remained important in terms of rural production and social reproduction (Drinkwater, 1988: 274).

Amartya Sen (1981)’s seminal work on poverty and famines already pointed out the need for a variety of land based and non-agriculture based endowments and entitlements if a contemporary poor rural community is to survive shocks and famine. This idea was further developed in his book, *Development as Freedom* (Sen, 1999) in which freedoms were defined as “both the process that allow freedom of action and decision, and the actual opportunities that people have, given their personal and social circumstance.” These Sen considered as the primary end and principal means of development. He articulated the instruments of freedom with “the way different kinds of rights, opportunities and entitlements contribute to the expansion of human freedom and thus promote development” (Sen, 1999: 37).

For as long as people cannot find work and sustenance in the urban capitalist economy, access to land will continue to be important. Such an analysis is not meant to create a damper on land reform as the basis for poverty reduction and improvement of livelihoods given the falling incomes of agriculture in the developing world. What it suggests is that land reform that only ends at the transfer of land without adequate institutional support will not resolve but even can accentuate rural poverty. The experiences in Zimbabwe that led to the “land grabs’ or Land Occupation Movement in Zimbabwe (following the failed referendum vote of 1999) demonstrate the importance of a sustainable urban economy to rural stability. Material differences amongst the rural people in Zimbabwe are also important as is the differential ability to manage farming and other non-agrarian activities necessary for survival, (Bryceson, 2000) also determined by intra-class differences and varied access.⁹¹ In the final analysis, as suggested by Bernstein (2003b:14):

Most poor peasants confront increasing simple reproduction ‘squeeze’, as indeed do the great majority of the poor in both South and North. Together with the landless rural proletariat, poor peasants form part of an expanding reserve army of labour in the countryside and in the cities and towns of large areas of the imperialist periphery, given

⁹¹ Amin (1999) articulates in more details the question of peasant differentiation in Zimbabwe.

the prevalence of rural-urban links which include regular migration in search of wage employment as footloose labour.

Thus Bernstein (2003b: 14) in considering a 'farewell to the peasantry' concentrates in the "theorization of an economic form – agricultural petty commodity production – constituted by the class relations (and contradictions) of capital and labour, and located in the shifting places of agriculture in the international divisions of labour of imperialism." For Zimbabwe, Moyo (2004) demonstrates how this changing nature of the global economy affects agriculture as to prevent accumulation through smallholder agriculture and leaves the smallholder in a state of continued destruction and why industrial accumulation through agriculture had been rendered impossible. He suggests that:

Policies which favour this 'merchant' class path to agrarian development not only notably discriminate against the middle and poor peasant classes, but also focus limited national resources (finance, water, land and other inputs), on maintaining the production of low export earning commodities, with limited domestic market and wider economic linkages. The skewed income distributions that this outcome produces thus limits the developing domestic markets and the broad consumption base that is critical to industrial development (Moyo, 2004: 77).

Furthermore, this has left most of the continent food insecure and with limited or lost agro-industrial production and employment opportunities, a process, which was accompanied by de-industrialisation of key agro-industries and food dumping since Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) were introduced in the 1980s. The poor peasantry has faced the brunt of this trajectory of land use and development (Moyo, 2004).

One of the key issues in Zimbabwean policy making is the question of the desirability and efficiency of large farm units versus smaller farm units. It will be argued that the main thrust of agrarian policy [despite some experiments with co-operatives] preferred larger units for the white sector and rich blacks while smaller units were considered better for the poorer Africans, assuming that all agriculture should be based on private individuated tenure. This subject is controversial; the World Bank advanced the argument that there is an inverse relationship between size of landholding and productivity in agriculture, and that small farms are efficient. Bernstein (2006), however, is critical of the World Bank's smallholder model, premised on the relative efficiency of small farms without wider changes in the political economy. An

ahistorical belief in models to reconcile equity and efficiency objectives he dubs ‘agrarian populism’.⁹²

Post-independence Zimbabwe land reform did not lead to assigning to the beneficiaries of land any significant role in the wider economy. There were no links between the resettlement sector and industry until late in the 1990s with the beginning of contract farming relations initiated by agri-business. Even the decision to keep some acquired large farms intact either as Model B collective schemes or under government farms (operated by ARDA) had nothing to do with establishing forms of production that could reap the economies of scale and development of the productive forces hitherto exemplified by capitalist farming (Bernstein, 2006) This policy option in Zimbabwe was informed by a belief in the superiority of larger farm units, reminiscent of the colonial agriculture structures. No agro-processing of any sort and no produce or input depots were established in the main co-operative or collective schemes.

The ZANU PF-led Government Policy on Land, Agriculture and Development

The Zimbabwean government policy on land and agricultural development has to be discussed in the context of the articulation of development by the ruling class. Bernstein (2006: 4) notes that:

Various attempts to address the complexities, tensions and contradictions, of these trajectories of historical and spatial extension of the agrarian question – and to do so through the formulation and pursuit of doctrines of development – were made both by classes of capital and by its opponents.

Different articulations of the agrarian question found their way into the post-colonial world as state-led development strategies by modernising regimes of varying nationalist complexions.

It has already been established that the land question formed the central part of the liberation discourse. Following independence therefore, the transformation of the agricultural sector and the restoration of land through an agrarian reform process was seen by the masses as the urgent business for which government had to exercise itself. However, the African nationalists were cautious about the need not to destroy the capitalist sector in the process of agrarian reform and missed an opportunity for introducing socialism in the rural sector. Instead, the compromise

⁹² The World Bank argument works much better for the colonial period and perhaps somewhat afterwards and for Asia rather than Latin America or Africa; a ruthless critic of this view, however, is Byres, who was an Indian specialist.

strategy involved introducing a new sector in African agriculture in which those made landless and destitute by colonial policies and the war could be allocated land in a resettlement sector. This approach did not have to interfere with existing and operational large scale farms but re-allocated land from those farms that had been left behind during the war. The government thought that by keeping the Large Scale Commercial Farm (LSCF)s intact, it would continue to reap the benefits of a developed agriculture sector and earn foreign currency, while expanding the rural productive capacity of the resettlement sector would improve food self-sufficiency. The system worked (as long as it could), because the LSCF brought in the foreign currency while the Resettlement Schemes and Communal Lands provided the food.

The post-independence priorities of the state seemed to coincide with the maintenance of the large scale farms. By the time of independence and the ZANU PF led government taking power, there was already an organised lobby of commercial farmers to retain a system in place that gave them maximum advantage and to enable them to continue 'business as usual'. The lobby of the large scale farming sector coincides with the interests and constraints faced by the nationalist elite in initiative a development programme based on agriculture and industrial investment. While more and more people dependent on jobs and there was no hope for major employment creation resulting from the agrarian reform, there was no industrial policy beyond the maintenance of unusually high protectionism instituted by the Smith regime for wartime security. In the mid to late-1980s, the black elite started to acquire land and enter commercial farming through the nationalist programme of 'economic indigenisation'. With their white counterparts, the black commercial farmers used their association and connections with the ruling elite to pursue policies that favoured them at the expense of the resettled African farmers on smaller land allocation. This historic resource concentration on large-scale capitalist farmers has had the effect of concentrating "commercial" production among elites, and has, in a self-fulfilling prophecy, served to legitimise the further expansion of large-scale farm land holdings and undermined redistributive land reform or land use policies in favour of the peasantry (Moyo, 2004).⁹³

⁹³ For a parallel in a situation where no anti-colonial guerrilla struggle took place, see the conclusions made by Kenneth Good about African agriculture in Zambia. According to Kenneth Good, "rural weakness in Zambia was not original, natural, or fore-ordained; it is the consequence of the fact that the Zambian state has chosen to align itself with, and to support economically, sectors and groups in the political economy other than small scale agriculture and the poor peasantry" (Good, 1986: 241).

Zimbabwe's resettlement schemes did not necessarily effect any structural change within the agricultural community, while affecting the relations of production only marginally, if at all. Redistribution of land took place but the fundamental cleavage within the agricultural community continued unabated. Instead of reforming existing unequal land ownership systems, the schemes simply introduced a new sector within the poorly resourced African contingent. Rahman Sobhan (1993: 13) suggests that the measure of agrarian reform should consider "its capacity to transform relations of production within agriculture by effecting a transition from one mode of production to another." Instead, land and agrarian reform in Zimbabwe reflects what he (1993: 19) characterises as "redistribution of power in favour of the exploited classes without disturbing the dominant class." Such an approach cannot be sustainable in the long run and makes the land and agrarian question come up more often, and with more violence, as it re-surfaces after each attempt to pacify demands through half-baked policies and schemes.⁹⁴ The land question in Zimbabwe needed to address the issue of employment creation as there was not capacity within the new state to increase employment beyond increasing the public service. The mining, manufacturing and service sectors were not the key growth sectors, given low capital formation. The infrastructure gap meant that new industries would continue to favour already developed urban areas which were on the existing energy, transport and communication grid.

In terms of rural transformation and agricultural development, two programmes were designed. The first one was the resettlement programme. Second and equally important was the re-organisation of communal areas through a villagisation and rationalization process that sought to place houses along grid lines, separate arable land and fence grazing land for livestock.⁹⁵ Technocrats in the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Land Resettlement and Rural Development were tasked with developing models through which beneficiaries of land would be resettled. The models and village plans designed seemed to have been guided by the

⁹⁴ Government documents referred to African agriculture as "communal and subsistence-oriented" and its market oriented segment as "small-scale" while the white farming establishment was described as "commercial." This demonstrates the psychological continuities underlining the government's lack of faith in the African sector and the expectation that it met subsistence requirements, rather than being commercial and market oriented. Jocelyn Alexander (1994: 331) argues that the assumptions embedded in these technical models "left unchallenged colonial myths about African farmers as subsistence oriented and inefficient, in contrast to market oriented European farmers." The land reform process was intended as the "neutralization of a looming crisis of expectation on the part of a land-hungry population" and in the end the "political need for land redistribution did not necessitate challenging the settler state's representation of black farmers as subsistence-oriented and inefficient, in contrast to their white counterparts" (Alexander, 2006: 111).

⁹⁵ For a detailed analysis of a case of attempt to restructure a communal area into a planned village see Donald S. Moore (2005)'s discussion of the Kaerezi village re-organisation programme.

thinking about African agriculture and life by colonial officials and as such bore a striking resemblance to Native Land Husbandry Act inspired and related projects, the only difference being that the new models allowed for a variety of choice (within limits) and were now implemented by a majority government and were backed up by the subsidization of inputs [extremely important in the viability of the 1980s and its later decline].

The land resettlement and agrarian transformation discourse on Zimbabwe emphasised economic and social upliftment; the stated goal was to eradicate rural poverty, reduce communal congestion, to reorganise the rural sector and secure rural livelihoods. This seemed to be a fair substitute for the far more sweeping claims during the Chimurenga period. Zimbabwe's land reform planning phase harked back to the post-World War II era of 'developmentalism' when the state loomed large designing projects meant to uplift society promoting the socialist objective of '*growth with equity*'. Government transformation strategy was publicized in two documents: *Growth with Equity* (1981) and *The Transitional National Development Plan: 1982/83 – 1984/84* (1982; hereafter TNDP). According to these documents, the principal aim was to move the country away from the capitalist socio-economic system inherited from the colonial regime to a socialist order better able to redress the extreme racial and class inequities of colonial rule.

Land reform and agricultural transformation had to proceed within the context of the outlines of these broader development goals. In the 1980s, most Third World countries were riddled with poverty and remained in a state of economic stagnation, structural atrophy, collapsing agricultural prices and incomes leading to growing deprivation which kept agriculture high on the agenda. It was widely accepted that the elimination of rural differentiation through a radical agrarian reform was central to the elimination of poverty, a wider diffusion of new technology, optimal utilization of domestic resources, both human and natural, and the development of the domestic market (see Sobhan, 1993). Urban bias was blamed by the World Bank and others for the failure of poverty programmes; there was an ideological reorientation to emphasis on rural issues. For the new regime in Harare, the imperative was to win over rural people to ZANU completely, some of whom had been enticed by the reforms of the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia experiment in the last phase of settler power from 1977. Land reform was tied to other virtues such as democracy and non-racialism. In a passionate plea, the first African Minister of Lands, Sydney Sekeremayi, highlighted the importance of land distribution at the Zimbabwe

Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD) fundraising conference, arguing that:

... failure on the part of government to meet these expectations (for land) could well degenerate into a cancer relentlessly eating away the promising foundation upon which all of us ... are trying to build a genuinely democratic, non-racial and egalitarian society in Zimbabwe (ZIMCORD, 1981).

It can be seen as central to the Zimbabwean government that land and agrarian reform met political objectives. The populist rhetoric was kept to maintain strategic relations with the masses whose votes were needed. However, Zimbabwe's agrarian reform did not go beyond welfarism as it did not pursue socialist nor capitalist relations. Generally, development strategies tend to express the interests of dominant classes and thereby, contains elements detrimental to subordinate classes (Arrighi, 1973). The Zimbabwean government paid lip service to the advancement of the poor but its implementation record was superficial and unsustainable.

Conclusion

Generally, post independence Africa can be characterized as having registered economic crisis at many levels. Africa has failed to achieve sustained growth. This failure underlines what can be considered as Africa's major failure: to formulate, debate, and publicise a compelling Africa-centered development paradigm which could be used by leaders and the business sector to move the continent forward. In the dearth of such home grown and Afro-centric development plans that take into cognizance Africa's aspirations, history and resources, leaders have been persuaded, if not almost forced, to adopt foreign developed paradigms characterized by neo-liberalism to the negation of the gains of independence.

The lack of a genuinely homegrown paradigm resulted in policy development in Africa proceeding in a worrying direction, which notwithstanding its numerous promises and successes elsewhere, lacks relevance given Africa's unique history. Adding to the lack of an appropriate development paradigm is the fact that at independence Africa continued to depend on development aid and loans from the former colonial masters or the international forces associated with power in the capitalist world. This automatically gave those forces leverage in terms of policy choices for the development of Africa and fitted the class interests of Africa's new masters! In a sense, the lack of development resources can be regarded as another aspect of Africa's development crisis. Africa has not been able to forge a revolution in agriculture and

its history of agrarian transformation is neither impressive nor convincing. For Zimbabwe in particular:

From the 1980s, under the influence of international finance and neo-liberal economics, state-led and interventionist land reform was removed from the development agenda and replaced by market-based land policies, pursuant of the privatisation of land and market based land transfers. This led to the abandonment of the project of integrating agriculture and industry on a national basis and the promotion instead of their integration into global markets, and resulted in decreased economic and social security, intensified migration to urban areas, and deepening mal-development (Moyo and Yeros, 2004: 3)

This chapter raises questions as a means of critiquing ZANU's ideology against the choices and possibilities for land and agrarian reform that theoreticians of the agrarian question have opened. With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to point out that ZANU's lack of ideological steadfastness left land reform with no guidance for a programme of action and its analysis. The agrarian question in Zimbabwe must be framed in these contours; control of economic resources, by who for what ends; the place of Zimbabwean (as a whole and especially African) agriculture in a neo-colonial global society in which capitalism is increasingly becoming more hegemonic and the organisation of economic sectors, even agriculture, coming under big monopoly conglomerates. The agrarian question would therefore have to address the challenge of positioning development in African agriculture in the context of what the struggle for independence and the negotiated resolutions at Lancaster House in 1980.

The arguments put forth by those like Bernstein who do not see development flowing from land reform in and of itself are clearly accurate in describing the present day. One cannot simply hope that accommodating poor farmers with land will create a better way of life for the country as a whole. The policies that ZANU adopted, flowing from its limited grasp of the agrarian question and the bargain made in 1980 are understandable and at first appeared relatively effective, indeed an apparent miracle to some, but the failure to widen the scope of rural development policy and to find resources to integrate the economy better would eventually overshadow this success and bring back the politically unpalatable aspect of the bargain with white farmers in a new and violent form. This scenario becomes clearer when one investigates the spectrum of theory on the agrarian question on a wider basis.

Section II

Land and Tenure Reform, Resettlement Schemes, Models and Institutional Support



One of the key issues in land reform involves the nature of tenure for beneficiaries. Tenure is linked to the investment and production potential of the beneficiaries. In considering the potential of the resettlement programme to transform the relations of production, the model design and institutional support made available for the beneficiaries are important. The resettlement scheme programme was designed with the assumption that each and every beneficiary will succeed and proceeded on the basis of highly centralized administration and rigid designs with limited flexibility in implementation. The selection of beneficiaries in the initial phase that emphasized impoverished and destitute people for settlement excluded the reliance on settlers' own investment from the growth equation. Farm sizes were equally not flexibly adjusted to skills, family labour availability and capital ownership (livestock) of the families (Kinsey and Binswanger, 1993). The policy premise for the resettlement programme was that African agricultural potential had been untapped because "they were previously denied and therefore lacked access to productive land, opportunities, and infrastructure and services that facilitate innovation, growth and development" (Akwabi-Ameyaw, 1990: 324). This section pursues these themes at greater length showing how they affected the potential for transformation in the resettlement agriculture sector.

Chapter Four

Land Policy and Tenure Reform after Independence

Introduction

The story of land reform in Zimbabwe since 1980 has been sufficiently tackled in the past. The land question and land transfer experience of Zimbabwe has been dealt with by many academics and practitioners. The figures and statistics are mostly undisputed while varying explanations have been given for the supposed success or otherwise of the programme. There is also a general perception that Zimbabwe's land transfer history, especially in the first decade of independence was impressive and historic.⁹⁶ The treatment of this subject here therefore, is meant essentially as a summary before looking at the specific issue of agrarian reform which depended on land transfer. It is common cause that the land question dominated negotiations that ushered in the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe. As we have noted, historical processes of uneven agricultural development, and desire to regain control over 'lost lands', had fuelled the flames of the liberation struggle. The inherited economic structure was characterised by a grossly unequal distribution of land (Weiner, 1988: 63). Upon taking power, the ZANU PF government of Robert Mugabe promised to reverse the historical inequalities in agricultural and general rural development. Following the Lancaster House Agreement and the ZIMCORD, pledges were made towards supporting a land reform and resettlement programme.⁹⁷ The 1981 ZIMCORD conference yielded close to Z\$800 million of a total development budget of Z\$1.2 billion pledged to agricultural development and land redistribution (Blackie, 1982: 151).

Development policies were often promoted in the name of establishing the new Zimbabwe on socialist terms. The rural development was said to be aimed at achieving '*Growth with Equity*' (GoZ, 1981). The government took land and agrarian reform as the primary sector for economic transformation compared to the mining and manufacturing sectors. The latter were considered as more complex and their dominance by foreign capital meant that tampering with their ownership structure could create capital flight. Land became the sector upon which the viability of transformation would be showcased as the basis of the revolution. The approach

⁹⁶ For more on land reform in Zimbabwe see Moyana, 1986; Moyo, 1986, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2002 and 2004; Cliffe and Stoneman.

⁹⁷ The ZIMCORD conference was called to organise various resettlement models were designed through which the landless, poor and displaced people as well as returning refugees, veterans and collaborators of the war of independence would be resettled.

was characterised by (mostly); a combination of poverty alleviation, rural population stabilisation, environmental sustainability and accommodation in the context of limited land resources and weak employment expansion. A number of reports on the subject of land resettlement were also produced by World Bank-related institutions and individuals. One key report was the Roth Zimbabwe Agriculture Sector Memorandum entitled an *'Analysis of Agrarian Structure and Land Use Patterns'* published in 1990. This was followed by three volumes of the World Bank Southern Africa Agriculture Operations Division report on the Zimbabwean agriculture sector, all published in 1991. The three volume sector memorandum of 1991 was a project involving key Zimbabwean, South African, British and American land and agriculture experts including John Cushworth, Michael Roth, Mandivamba Rukuni, Robert Christiansen, Ben Cousins and Bill Kinsey, among others. These volumes are used together with Bill Kinsey's work in Chapter Eight to evaluate the miracle.

Land Reform

The Lancaster House Agreement inserted a provision requiring that land could be acquired by the government only on a "willing buyer, willing seller" principle until 1990.⁹⁸ Notwithstanding this, the government continued to set a number of increasingly ambitious targets for resettlement. The same provision has been used to keep the best lands in white hands in South Africa, Namibia, Zambia, Botswana and Kenya (Moyo, 1992: 12). In real terms Lancaster meant that Mugabe's government could not acquire land "when" and "where" it wanted, because the white farmers were either unwilling to sell, or asked for higher prices than it could or would pay. In the 1980s, and indeed until 1997, the Zimbabwe government played by the Lancaster House rules, keen to gain international confidence and encourage 'reconciliation' with the white farming community (Palmer, 1990: 167). Table 4.1 below indicates the allocation of land at independence in 1980.

⁹⁸ At Lancaster House, the main contentious issue was the issue of land. Pressured by Rhodesian Air Force bombing of neighbouring countries while the USA, British and other European countries committed to provide financial aid for land purchase and resettlement, the Patriotic Front capitulated to this provision. Distribution of land had always been at the core of the civil conflict. The British proposals were ominously devious on this crucial issue. The land provisions' deliberately elliptical legal jargon seemed to allow the future government to be faced with astronomical bills from white settlers who were ready to emigrate and wanted the courts to award them prompt payment of compensation at the current going rates for land. Even at the depressed 1979 market prices, the land would have cost 732 million Rhodesian dollars. No Zimbabwean government could fund both the payment of compensation and resettlement schemes (Moto, February 1980: 5).

Table 4.1: Distribution of Land in Zimbabwe, 1980

<i>Tenure Category</i>	<i>Estimated Land Allocation (m. ha)</i>	<i>Proportion of Total (%)</i>
Communal Areas	16.4	41.41
Nat. Parks & Forests	6	15.15
State owned farms	0.3	0.75
Large Scale Commercial Farms	15.5	39.14
Small Scale Commercial Farms	1.4	3.53
Total	39.6	100

Notes to land allocation by region:


74 % of all communal land is located in region 4 and 5

75% of all small commercial land is located in regions 3 and 4

51% of all large commercial land is located in regions 1-3

Source: Cushworth, 1990: 19

Map 5: Colonial Land Distribution by 1965




Source: Land Apportionment in Southern Rhodesia in 1965

The 1980 target of 18000 households to benefit from land reform in the first five years was revised to 54000 in 1982 and thereafter 162 000 households. The 162 000 household figure became the benchmark against which the success or failure of the resettlement programme has been judged. There was no scientific basis for the 162 000 benchmark. It was a politically conjured up figure that was used to appease the landless. The government saw the resettlement programme as necessary to “neutralise a looming crisis of expectation on the part of a land hungry population” (MEPD, 1981: 124). Resettlement was seen as a political imperative which

ZIMBABWE

LOCATION OF RESETTLEMENT SCHEMES



LEGEND

BOUNDARIES

- Sub-national
- Provincial
- District
- Municipality

SETTLEMENTS

- Urban
- Rural

SCHEMES

- C.N. 1980 or Greater area
- Area A
- Area B
- Area C
- Area D
- Both contract farms & CFS
- Contract farms only (no CFS)
- Special reserve areas

Scale: 1:1,000,000
 Date: 1980
 Author: [Name]
 Project: [Name]

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT FUND
RESETTLEMENT SCHEMES
 Prepared by: [Name]
 Date: [Date]

would create stability and so promote economic growth. With the overwhelming majority of Zimbabwean people crowded in the reserves, renamed Communal Areas, Mugabe's government had to act fast on land redistribution. Besides the overcrowded communal lands, immediate pressure came from returning war veterans and displaced communities who demanded to be resettled. Some of those seeking land took the initiative to settle on abandoned land left behind by fleeing white farmers at the height of the struggle as the prospect of a black government became obvious.⁹⁹

In 1982 the Tribal Trust Lands had been renamed "communal areas" as contrasted with "commercial areas" for LSC farms, cementing a dualistic structure of the farming sector. In the two decades between 1980 and 1999, the Zimbabwe government played by the rules. It was driven by the desire to retain international confidence and encourage "reconciliation" with the white farming community (Palmer, 1990: 167). Resettlement agriculture was pursued outside a holistic rural development policy. The Chavunduka Commission warned that:

Regardless of land redistribution measures, the year 2000 will still see at least seven million people living in the existing communal areas, or nearly double the number living there at present. Unless urgent and effective action is taken to rehabilitate the communal areas ... there will be no hope of achieving the large increase in productivity necessary to enable these areas to support their inhabitants and to make a net contribution to the economy (Chavunduka, 1982: 4).

In response to this warning, the state adopted control measures reminiscent of the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 (similar to the Betterment regimes in the former Homelands in apartheid South Africa) (see Potts and Mutambirwa, 1997). The LSCF sector remained intact under the Ministry of Agriculture while African farmers were organised through the Lands and Resettlement Ministry.¹⁰⁰

While the objective of resettling 15 000 households per year was never realized, Zimbabwe's land transfer after independence remained very impressive in comparison to such processes elsewhere in Africa (Kinsey, 1988). The first five years of independence witnessed the highest land transfers to these categories of settlers (see table 4.2 below).

⁹⁹ It is estimated that tens of thousands of whites immigrated to South Africa and elsewhere.

¹⁰⁰ The first Minister of Agriculture was Dennis Norman (formerly a president of the Rhodesian National Farmers Union) giving organised agriculture better access to government, and a considerable amount of influence on policy development, price setting, and (behind the scenes) land reform policy, when compared to the Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU) which represented the less organized farmer-producers.

Table 4.2: Land Acquisition and Land Costs, 1979-1989

<i>Year</i>	<i>Land Purchase (ha)</i>	<i>Costs (\$)</i>	<i>Cost (\$/ha)</i>
1979/1980	162, 555	3, 104, 380	19
1980/1981	326,972	3, 616, 172	11
1981/1982	819, 155	15, 414, 248	19
1982/1983	807, 573	21, 414, 248	27
1983/1984	173, 848	4, 596, 078	26
1984/1985	74, 848	3, 062, 930	41
1985/1986	86, 187	3, 444, 610	40
1986/1987	133, 515	389, 335	3
1987/1988	80, 554	2, 889, 328	36
1988/1989	78, 097	7, 431, 575	95
TOTAL	2, 743, 304	65, 362, 904	24

Source: Cushworth, 1990: 19

By 1985 the government had settled 40 000 households on 2.2m ha of land. The figure attained some 52 000 households by 1989 and 2.7m ha (6%, of former commercial farmland) purchased. In 1997 the total amount was 71 000 households on 3.5 million ha of land (Cliffe, 2001: 37).¹⁰¹ However, the bulk of this land was in more arid regions (see table 4.3 below).

Table 4.3: Land Acquisition and Distribution by Natural Region

<i>Natural Region</i>	<i>Distribution of Acquired Land</i>	<i>Distribution of Commercial Land</i>
I	1%	3%
II	18	27
III	38	21
IV	25	26
V	19	23

Source: Cushworth, 1990.

Hevina Dashwood (2000: 190) argues that:

Certainly, until 1990, the provisions of the Lancaster House Constitution made the acquisition of land for resettlement very expensive; but even without that constraint, the strong resistance of members of the agrarian elite, and their ability to effectively lobby the government against extensive land redistribution, constituted a powerful deterrent for a government anxious to maintain the export levels of agriculture commodities from this sector.

On this scale, the land issue remained unresolved and urgent as the population grew fast. Land reform was also desired for employment creation (Chung, 1989: 8). Ironically, the demand for

¹⁰¹ A number of studies have followed the story of land transfer in Zimbabwe. For further reading on the subject see Drinkwater (1986), Moyo (1986, 1995), Kinsey (1983a, 1983b, 1999) and Mumbengegwi (1986).

land existed yet many resettlement schemes were not filled to capacity.¹⁰² Political interference distorted the land market.

Table 4.4: LSC Farms offered by Natural Region but not accepted, 1986-1989

<i>NR</i>	<i>No. of Offers</i>	<i>% Offers</i>	<i>Av. Asking Price/ha</i>
I	28	15	373
II	955	51	446
III	266	14	46
IV	560	30	52
V	47	2	20

Source: Cushworth, 1990: 21

Table 4.4 above indicates that these farms had been offered to government for sale by commercial farmers but refused and issued certificates of no present interest for the period 1988/1989 suggests that the asking price had been too high.

After the ten year grace period ended, the government attempted to increase the land transferred substantially. The Land Acquisition Act passed in 1992 listed 1 437 farms for compulsory acquisition. This sent a wave of fear and apprehension amongst the farming and business community. Non-Governmental Organisations and donors demanded that land reform proceed in a market-friendly environment (IFAD, 2001). At the end of the first decade land reform and resettlement were brought under review. The review focussed on how much land had been acquired and transferred from former commercial farmers. There was land on the market which the state could not buy and resettle for a host of reasons and yet the demand and hunger for land had not been satisfied. The state of distribution at the end of the first decade of independence (end of 1989) by use and Natural Regions are as shown in tables 4.5 and 4.6 placed side by side below.

¹⁰² This certificate was part of the agreement at Lancaster House that the government would be offered first priority to buy any farm placed on the market. If the government was not interested in the property, it would declare so by issuing a certificate which would allow the property owner to place the farm on the market for private buyers. Not all land that was placed on the market was taken up either by the government or private buyers of land. Prime land was scarce in the better farming regions and when it was placed on the market, it was often too expensive for private/individual buyers and too fragmented for government resettlement plans. The fact that there was land on the market became a bargaining point for organised agriculture which argued that enough land was available on the market to warrant any compulsory acquisitions (see Moyo, 1996). The context within which government policy on land and its ability to fund its development is that of its heavy dependency on aid which resulted in serious limitations.

Table 4.5: Distribution by Sector

Sector	(000 ha)	%
CA	6 355	41.9
LSCF	11 270	28.8
SSCF	1 400	3.6
RA	3 090	7.9
ARDA	884	2.3
NP	4 900	12.5
FA	977	2.5
Urban	196	0.5

TOTAL **39 072** **100.0**

Table 4.6: Distribution by NR 1989

<u>NR</u>	<u>CA</u>	<u>LSCF</u>	<u>RA</u>	<u>P&F TOTAL</u>	
I	135	416	14	100	705
II	1 270	3 890	670	27	5 857
III	2 820	878	902	690	7 290
IV	7 340	3 252	1 048	3130	14 770
V	4 790	3 314	456	1 890	10 450
T/L	16 355	13 750	3 090	5 877	39 072

During his speech on the occasion of the opening of the fifth session of the second Parliament of Zimbabwe on 27 June 1989, President Mugabe promised the acceleration of the resettlement process. He promised:

During this session, my government will be placing particular emphasis on programmes designed to accelerate the resettlement programme, communal re-organisation, livestock development, animal disease control and further development of the nation's irrigation potential. In its continuing efforts to alleviate land pressure in the communal areas and to re-distribute land to the landless, the government will set aside more funds for the resettlement programme. Emphasis will be put on the acceleration of planning and settlement of land that has already been purchased (Debates, 27 June 1989).

The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting held in Malaysia in October 1989 gave Mugabe the opportunity to revisit resettlement schemes and reflect on the Zimbabwean situation. It became clear that Zimbabwean resettlement planning could be improved. He also acknowledged that Zimbabwe had been too ambitious and unrealistic in its targets. Upon return from the trip, he gave a press conference during which he pointed out that:

For more than 40 years the Malaysian government has been clearing vast estates for resettlement purposes. It had during that period resettled on a systematic basis about 115 000 families. We had wanted to resettle 162 000 families within three years. It just proved impossible, because it was beyond, completely beyond, our management and our resources. And even if we had the resources we just do not have the capacity to do it (Herald, 27 Oct, 1989).

As planners went into the new decade, it had become clear that there was need for a new planning regime that emphasised proper resource provision ahead of settling people. Clearly impressed by the Malaysian example where beneficiaries found everything laid out for them, Mugabe had to ask for the Land Ministry to send a delegation to study the Malaysian system. The Malaysian case had been completely opposite to the accelerated

resettlement programme embarked on by the Zimbabwe government. The pace and detail in planning of the Malaysian schemes meant that the people with farming credentials and capacity to manage commercial production were also settled.¹⁰³ According to Mugabe:

They find homes already built, they find the roads there, the schools and the clinics. All this is costed [sic] very finely and accurately so that when a settler takes over he knows what he owes. Each resettlement unit cost an average of \$34 000 which was payable in reasonable time. So I think we should look into that and see whether we can also provide a total infrastructure and then settler owes the state and pays as he earns income from his estate (Herald, 27 Oct, 1989).

The Malaysian smallholders were commercial producers who could and did repay loans. They were different from those in Zimbabwe's resettlement who were mostly recipients of hand-outs from which they were not able to generate enough surplus at a level that allowed them to re-invest in production and break the dependency.

In Zimbabwe, even those who had accessed land were witnessing a huge reduction in productivity per unit of land. This can partly be explained by the changing macro-economic framework and the global economic configuration (discussed in detail below) as well as the recurring droughts of the 1990s. The land which had been transferred since 1980 was of poor marginal quality and required expensive inputs and investment in irrigation if it was to remain productive.

Critics and observers accused government officials of delaying land reform through corrupt practices that included hoarding and multiple ownership of land resulting from the culture of patronage which was on the rise. This problem of rampant corruption in land allocation persisted into the 1990s and got worse.¹⁰⁴ Opposition and Independent

¹⁰³ Malaysia is a richer country with good infrastructure and a very industrious, commercial minded peasantry with intensive family forms of exploitation. A major difference between Zimbabwe and Malaysia is that Malaysia had a growing industrial economy. It should also be noted that nobody in Malaysia gave away productive land yielding valuable export crops either.

¹⁰⁴ As early as 1982, the Deputy Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, Moven Mahachi railed against black land holders and government officials who were hindering the resettlement programme by approaching "friends in high places to prevent the Government acquisition of their property". In a notice published in the Herald (2 June 1982), he warned: "During the three year national transitional plan, the government wants to settle 162 000 people. It has not been said that only European-owned land will be needed. This is a vital scheme and everyone regardless of colour must contribute to make it a success. Those Zimbabweans who team up with their 'full-backs' in influential positions to try to defeat this cause are enemies of the people. They and their mentors have no interest in the public well-being and stability of

MPs led by Margaret Dongo (then only opposition MP), carried out an exercise that revealed the extent to which leading government officials converted land that was meant for the settlement of the landless poor to their own holdings.¹⁰⁵ The corruption extended to the loans from the Agriculture Finance Corporation (AFC) meant for poor farmers abused to acquire land from the private land market by public servants. A ministerial ruling made it illegal for individuals to use AFC loans to buy farms. According to Goebel (1998: 27) for example:

While government primarily blames lack of funds for land purchase on infrastructural development, other factors stalling the establishment of schemes to meet demand include the centrality of commercial agriculture to the Zimbabwean economy, pressure from multilateral institutions ... to protect commercial farming, government corruption through which acquired land is given to ministers and other government friends, and flagging commitment on the part of the black elite housed in government to the welfare of the poor masses.

The 1992 and 1997 Land Appropriation Acts promised sweeping land seizures by government without compensation. In the meantime rural communities felt that the government was taking too long to address the land question. Disillusioned, rural communities in Svosve (a village east of Harare in the Mashonaland East Province) invaded commercial land in 1998, starting a trend that subsequently spread to other provinces (Moyo, 2000; Sachikonye, 2003). When sporadic land invasions started in 1998, the government and donors organised a second 'ZIMCORD' to raise funds for and negotiate a new land reform that would be transparent and organised (IFAD, 2001). These invasions helped ZANU PF and government to emphasise the need for speedy land reform and more funding. It also hoped that the new Constitution that was being drafted would also be accepted without much resistance as it emphasised the need to redress the land question once and for all.

the nation and should be dealt with accordingly. Zimbabweans must always watch out of rebels against national unity. Some of these are the people who use their positions to serve cliques of relatives or friends at the expense of other Zimbabweans. Zimbabweans should not go to the dogs on account of their folly."

¹⁰⁵ The widely circulated Dongo Report on Corruption in Land Allocation listed the names of key government figures who corruptly benefitted from land reform at the expense of the poor.

Tenure Reform in Zimbabwe: Intentions and Practice

It must be noted by all concerned that Zimbabwe today has a capitalistically organised commercial farming sector and the government faces the task of converting it into a socialist system of agriculture. It must convert land ownership and tenure system from private ownership and uncontrolled land use permitting a high degree of exploitation of man by men, to either producer co-operatives spread over a substantial proportion of all rural land available in Zimbabwe and introduce reduced sizes of private holdings in the remaining portions of rural land. These changes will have to be accompanied by increased production (Mahachi, 1983).

Throughout the first decade of independence, the ZANU PF led government preferred the conversion of the various tenure systems in existence in line with its goals of socialist transformation. Considering that at the heart of the agrarian system in Zimbabwe was a differentiated land tenure system which translated into “polarized land property rights, differential access to state and private of land use technical and financial resources, and in the strict administrative regulation”, Moyo (1992) convincingly stresses that tenure reform was seen as central to the transformation agenda. The evolution of these differentiated trends can be traced from the advent of colonial rule in 1890 and the series of legislative enactments that partitioned the country into several forms of land tenure: that is, commercial, state and communal.

Through land tenure reform, the Government aimed at integrating the agricultural system to a point where the commercial, peasant, state-owned and co-operative farmers were working together according to uniform set of regulations and required the same policy intervention for their survival. However, in practice, government dragged its feet on tenure even after three Commission recommendations which reported tenure preferences directly opposite those of government. The government was therefore hindered by the strong private sector and international lobby for freehold tenure. This section elaborates on the treatment of tenure by government and how the competing economic and political lobbies played themselves out in the period under review. The first Minister of Agriculture (1980-85) was Dennis Norman, past president of the Rhodesian National Farmers Union. It is perhaps not surprising that the well organised and well resourced Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) had better access to government, and a considerable amount of influence on policy development, price setting, and (behind the scenes) land reform policy, when compared to

the Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU) which represented the less organized peasant producers.

Table 4.7: Population Growth and Resettlement in 000s per Year

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
<i>Total Popn</i>	4 054	4 183	4 317	4 451	4 589	4 731	4 878	5 029	5 185
<i>Resettled</i>	0	17	94	222	294	327	368	398	428
<i>Communal</i>	4 054	4 165	4 223	4 229	4 295	4 404	4 510	4 631	4 757

Communal Areas Populated Densities (People / km²)

<i>Unsettled</i>	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33
<i>Actual</i>	25	25	26	26	26	27	28	28	29

Source: Cushworth, 1990.

The issue of land tenure is an important aspect of the model design and rural transformation process. In resettlement schemes, plot holders of the Model A schemes (self-contained units of land of 12 acres each allocated to individual households on lease hold with a certificate of occupation and use) occupied their land under permits issued under section 6 of the Rural Land Act of 1982. By 1983, the government was still yet “to reach a decision on what form of tenure should in the longer term, apply to holdings in the resettlement areas” (GoZ, 1983a). The Lands Resettlement and Rural Development Ministry justified the delay in making a policy decision on tenure arguing that “it was a subject which required very careful consideration in the light of all factors having a bearing on the issues involved” (GoZ, 1983a: 9). Indeed, a Commission was set up to deliberate on the most appropriate tenure. ZANU PF’s preference for land nationalisation and that the Presidency reserve the powers to allocate and withdraw land from any user considered not productive left the Commissions and tenure consultation processes as time buying strategies. By 1990, of the 63 schemes established, 53 were Model “A” schemes implying that it was the most widespread.

Each agricultural sector was represented by a separate union as they saw their interests and needs as different. The LSCF access and ownership was governed by Roman/Dutch law of “freehold tenure” as stipulated by “the High Commissioners Proclamation of June 10 1891 – the law applicable to the colony of Good Hope in South Africa up to that date ...” the provisions of this Act were preserved by the Lancaster House Constitution. The SSCFs are the former Native Purchase Areas set aside under the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 for

black purchases from “the Crown of freehold farms.” Although the legal segregation was removed by the Land Tenure (Amendment) Act of 1977, the effective racial patterns persist and remain manifest in post-independence land systems. After some political arm-twisting, the Zimbabwe Farmer’s Union (ZFU) was formed to represent the interests of the whole range of African smallholder farmers located within communal, resettlement, and former purchase areas from the combination of the Zimbabwe National Farmers Union (ZNFU) and the National Farmers Association of Zimbabwe (NFAZ).¹⁰⁶ It was the government’s policy that the agricultural sector should be amalgamated to one industry and the Prime Minister (and later as President), Mugabe believed and re-assured the CFU that in doing so, the purpose was to develop a strong sector:

Government is aware of the existence of structural, technical and operational variations between various farming systems, and these will have to be married together to form the ultimate structure of the agricultural industry in Zimbabwe. Therefore, our efforts in restructuring the agricultural system should always be viewed within the context of these basic aims and principles (Mugabe, Addressing the CFU on 15 Feb 1985).

In confirming and organising tenure systems and the various sectors, the role of the state in landholding and allocation remained crucial – distributing land between rural masses, black small-scale and white dominated large-scale commercial farmers. The state acted as the estate agent or trustee over land, facilitating the administration of the various farming sectors under different tenure arrangements. A series of legislation shaped the destiny of the present communal areas (see table 4.8 below for some of these). The very definition of land tenure in communal areas and other areas not administered under the Roman Dutch law has been problematic, ranging from nebulous concepts such as “traditional” or “communal” to classical concepts of “usufruct rights”, “common property rights” and “open access” systems. In line with the nationalisation of land, the state would give leasehold to any land claimants. In communal lands, like other areas, leaseholds would be issued to co-operatives under the provisions of post-colonial law on land tenure. Under the new programme, conditions of land occupation and use would be as stringent as in other areas of the country where either freeholds or leaseholds were issued to private individuals, corporations and companies.

¹⁰⁶ This theme is pursued and discussed in detail in chapter six which deals with social and political organisation in the resettlement schemes.

Table 4.8: Land Legislation in Zimbabwe, 1890 – 2000

<i>ct</i>	<i>e</i>	
Commissioner's Proclamation on Land Tenure and the Lippert Concession Reserves Order in Council	settlers to acquire land rights from native Zimbabweans	buy concession and uses it as basis for land appropriation
Apportionment Act	native reserves in the face of mass land appropriation by white settlers	reserves created haphazardly in low potential areas and subsequently become Communal Areas
Apportionment (amendment) Act	allocate by law land between blacks and whites	high potential areas become white large scale privately owned farms
Land Husbandry Act	drive blacks in white areas	marginalisation of African farmers
Trust Land Act and Tribal Law Authorities established	enforce private ownership of land, destocking and conservation practices on black small holders	resistance to legislation fuelling nationalistic politics. Law scrapped in 1961
Trust Land Act and Tribal Law Authorities established	change the name of native reserves and create trustees for the land	international pressure led the TTLs to become degraded poverty homelands
Communal Areas (Control) Act	Law Authorities controlled land policy in the Communal Areas	
Land Apportionment Act	enforce the Land Apportionment Act of 1931 and finally divide land 50 percent white and 50 percent black	combined with the TTL Act, Rhodesia had the equivalent of apartheid
Rural Land Act	reorganise the administration of rural land and African affairs in line with the changing	establish Rural Councils that undermined Chiefs
Tribal Trust Land Act	rename Tribal Trust Lands and rationalise agricultural production in African areas and shifted authority to local authorities	reserves as African areas for subsistence production, mostly
Land Acquisition Act	enable government the first right to purchase excess land for redistribution to the landless	had a limited impact
Land Acquisitions Act	aimed to speed up the land reform process by removing the "willing seller, willing buyer" clause, limiting the size of farms and introducing a land tax. Farmers had recourse to Administration Court to negotiate gvt prices for acquired farms	had a limited impact. Opposition by farmers persisted
Reform and Resettlement Programme Phase II (LRRP II),	response to land invasions and the donor conference on land reform	much achieved, and the 1999 Referendum on Constitution led to hardening of hearts as ZANU's constitutional amendments were thrown out
Land Monopoly is the land and the Economy Campaign	Land is ment support land invasions	chaotic land reform process

Source: Compiled by the author.

The Government's view regarding land tenure was concerned with conditions under which land was held and though the phrase "land tenure" was often confused with land ownership, the term included both the concept of ownership and that of tenancy rights. Freehold and acquisition of freehold land would continue to be allowed, subject to certain restrictions, while leaseholds were expected to become common feature of land occupation throughout the country. Minister Mahachi elaborated that:

We recognise that those who have certain rights of interests in pieces of land owned by the State in the form of leaseholds, such rights will continue to be protected subject to the terms of individual lease agreements. The same will apply in cases where Government is purchasing commercial farmland at present for its resettlement programme (Herald, 1985).

It was the central part of the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ)'s plan that, in all case where these purchases were effected, title vested in the president and land would be allocated to settlers, on the basis of permits which would be converted into leases either as smallholders or as producer cooperatives, while some farms would be bought and converted into state farms. Settlers would be issued a temporary certificate of occupation for a short duration depending upon the kind of farming planned for an individual scheme.

If at the end of the initial period of say three or five years, the lands ministry finds that the settler/producer co-operative/state farm has a high probability of becoming and continuing as an efficient producer, a long term non-transferable lease would be issued. In the meantime, the issue of titles to people who are leasing state land will remain suspended while legislation on land reform is being generally considered and debated. In certain selected parts of the country, depending on the purpose for which particular areas are designated, decisions will be made on whether or not to issue title. However, as a general rule, there will be no issue of titles until a review which is being carried out and the land reform measures are completed.

However, because the ministry was fully aware that organisational structure would need to be created and necessary infrastructure developed, the ministry admitted that all these changes would not happen overnight.

The 1982 land acquisition legislation was intended to help in the redistribution of land, while the one on land tenure would usher in new conditions under which land would be held. The Minister also allayed the fears of the commercial farmers suggesting that:

The commercial farming sector in some areas will continue to be in the hands of private land ownership under the Roman Dutch law, subject to reduced sizes and improved productivity. ... Both measures were intended to achieve this and the commercial sector has a place in this country for the foreseeable future. Also, to be looked into would be the taxing of under-utilised land and the introduction of a new rural land transfer capital gains tax at the rate of between 60 and 80 percent. All existing statutes permitting the leasing of rural state land will either be repealed or amended (*The Herald*, 17 August, 1982).

The legislation was intended to give the president powers to acquire land compulsorily as well as the rights and power to resume ownership of any alienated land when necessary in terms of the conditions of title and the rights of first refusal as well as the power to take possession of under-utilised or derelict land under certain circumstances. It was intended to provide a comprehensive and single tenure system with non-discriminatory rights and obligations in the long term. It also contained two provisions relating to acquisition of land; the prohibition against foreign ownership of land in the future and the prohibition against further concentration of land ownership, the first would apply to a foreign national, corporation or company with more than 25 percent foreign shareholding, and the second would prevent a person who already owned a farm greater than 500 acres, from acquiring more rural land. This was considered a step by step approach towards socialism but was really a post-colonial African response and effort to reverse colonial property regimes and had nothing to do with socialism.

Government also set out to investigate the nature and extent of occupation of alienated land in terms of the Alienated Land Information Act. It had been considered desirable to promulgate regulations under the Act to ascertain the extent to which commercial farm land was being utilised and the possibility for the state to repossess any such land. The ultimate goal was to gazette a new set of regulations as part of the package of measures intended to achieve redistribution of land and achieve productivity and growth with equity. The Minister hoped that everybody concerned would co-operate with the government. Other measures included the designation of certain areas for resettlement purposes, consultation will take place between the ministry and interested parties prior to designation. Subsequently, the Minister of Lands gazetted the guidelines for:

The purpose of introducing a system of designating certain areas for resettlement and any other government or public purposes is to give farmers or any other concerned with land the opportunity of being able to plan their own future outside designated areas and to ensure that viable resettlement schemes are implemented in a block system. From now on, land acquisition will be based from the policy of designation as a framework within which, both purchases of land, on the basis of willing buyer willing seller and compulsory acquisitions will take place (GoZ, 1984).

By 1989 Minister Karimanzira announced that 51 000 households had been settled under the Intensive Resettlement Programme of 1981. The GoZ was not satisfied as it was still below the revised target of 75 000 families in the First Five-Year National Development Plan (1985-1990). According to Minister Karimanzira:

The main reasons for non-attainment of the targets have been, among others, the increasing non-availability of large tracts of high quality, reasonably priced land. The little land that is becoming available to Government is, more often than not, in agriculturally marginal areas where viability, even using modified resettlement models, is difficult to attain and sustain (Herald 23.02.1989).

The Riddell Commission of 1981 and Chavunduka Commission of 1984 recognised the importance of land reform, but made the case for rational planning and an emphasis on sound land husbandry etc., highlighting the supposed ills of the communal areas – communal tenure, overstocking, soil erosion, poor land husbandry, part-time farmers not committed to rising the ladder to full commercial enterprises.

An effective lobby against land reform existed following independence. Organised agriculture used the research generated by the Whitsun Foundation to argue that land reform would affect Zimbabwe negatively. It suggested:

If the present size of land is maintained and applied to the Government's target of 162 000 families for resettlement, over almost 10 million hectares will be needed to be taken from the commercial farming sector. This will not only destroy Zimbabwe's agricultural diversity and self-sufficiency, it will also outstrip most of the necessary supporting services. As land is a natural resource, it would be unwise to settle 162 000 families over 10 million hectares of land by 1985, until such a time it is proven that productivity and standards of resource conservation would not suffer (Whitsun Foundation, 1983: 13).

The Foundation insisted that:

The first step would be to encourage the people to identify with, develop and realise the limits of their own resources. For this to happen land units should be allocated to groups of people at a level where both physically and socially they can operate as an effective development unit. This unit should become the modular unit of development in the communal lands. It should be based on voluntary association, backed up by basic resource and socio-economic survey (Whitsun Foundation, 1983: 7).

These recommendations were based on the assumption that people did not 'comprehend their own circumstances', and that rural re-organisation programme through 'modular unit of development' would enable land allocations to be recorded, future land use to be planned, and surplus population to be identified before resettling. This was reminiscent of the colonial community development plans as well as the rationalisation programmes of the colonial Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951. The bottom line in these arguments was that there was enough land for Africans in the communal lands, it simply required to be re-organised and to be used efficiently.

There was also opposition to land reform for supposed environmental reasons, and also for the reason that not all people were poised to be farmers and this attempt to sustain the country by turning everyone to farmers was mischievous. As early as 1982, even before much land had been resettled and production had advanced at any scale, alarmist fears about environmental disaster emerged. The Natural Resources Board Chairman, Lance Smith's argument was based on his perception of farming as a vocation for a few, especially white, and the rest – blacks – needing to remain in their place as workers:

I am very disappointed about the methods being employed with the resettlement schemes that are being put on the ground and I cannot see how, in many cases, the farmers who are being settled on these farms are going to survive and bring up a family on a sustained basis on the sort of arrangements that are being made to settle them. I believe it is absolutely wrong for any government to allow the inhabitants of a country to believe that every single man in that country has a right to a piece of land. It is a wonderful concept ... but there is no country among the great producers where every man can expect to own and farm a piece of land. If everybody thinks he can be a farmer he is making a great mistake. Unless I am wrong, the way we are going at the moment is going to *boomerang* back in a few years' time and we are going to have a lot of discontented and semi-commercial farmers who are not going to be able to make a living. Some of them will have to sell their farms to a neighbour until they are consolidated

into a commercial unit that can support a family and give them the necessities of life (Herald, 06.11.1982).

Smith acknowledged that apart from the land there was no other source of wealth, but opposed resettlement of land without adequate support, saying that:

There is nothing that does not come from the land and there is nowhere else to turn to when we muck it up. Zimbabwe cannot afford to destroy the soil. If we are going on like this in 20 years' time we shall not be the breadbasket of Africa. We will be just as empty as anybody else and will have to import from overseas (Herald, 06.11.1982).

Lance Smith's outburst has stood the test of time and became true for most of the resettlement schemes two decades down the line. He emphasised the need for support as a duty to preserve the resource upon which the country's wealth was created. According to Lance Smith, the question of support for resettled farmers was neither here nor there, arguing:

... if you help them, you help yourselves and if you don't then they will be the tragedy that brings you down both in the communal and commercial farming areas. We have got to keep them up and the only way we can do this is to keep the conservation movement going and foster it in the communal areas by cooperation between us and them. Get them into your group if possible and hold out the hand of friendship (Herald, 06.11.1982).

He mooted the idea of conservation committees in the resettled areas. Non-constituency parliamentarians, Tony Read and Henry Elsworth, complained about the cutting down of trees by the newly settled farmers. A non-constituency member and veteran of the war of liberation, Lt. Col. Herbert Mahlaba dismissed the "accusations that farmers were cutting down trees and spoiling the country's natural resources [as] misrepresenting the facts" suggesting that the trees were cleared in the process of building homesteads and clearing arable plots of land which was normal (Herald, 11.03.1988, Debates, March 1988). Fay Chung (1989: 11) conceded that some resettled land was misused and underutilised but refuted the allegations that resettlement immediately spiralled land into "dust-bowls" as mischievous alarmism and exaggeration. For Fay Chung, productivity and land conservation in the majority of the cases remained satisfactory. What she had big problems with was the lack of beneficiary criteria. She argued that:

... this was caused by the Government's policy of giving the land to all who *need* it irrespective of their skills level or their ability to gather resources such as draught oxen, fertilizer, etc. The argument was that by favouring peasants who already have high skills levels and inputs, Government would be favouring the richer peasants at the expense of the poorer peasants. Whilst it would be certainly not to favour the rich at the expense of the poor, and access to land contributes substantially to a person's potential to increase his or her wealth, I think it is very wrong to confuse social welfare with economic productivity. While it is certainly Government's responsibility to look after the poor, it may be unwise to see the distribution of land, a scarce, valuable and non-renewable resource, as the way to do it (Chung, 1989: 11).

Farm workers certainly had the farming experience but would need management skills. People from communal lands made their living off the land; land reform simply required to be accompanied by enabling measures as had been made available to the first generation white settler farmers who had had no idea how to farm.

Towards the end of the 1980s, it was becoming clear that not only the white farmers were responsible for delays in land reform. Well positioned black Zimbabweans, in business, government, civil servants, the army and police had acquired farms either through the market or corruptly using their influence and positions. Some of these owned more than one farm with a major criticism being that these farms were among the worst managed, least productive of big farms, winning them titles such as 'telephone farmers'. MP Obert Mpofo accused politicians of "holding on to land and refusing to sell their numerous farms for the resettlement programme" (Debates, 12 December, 1989). He reported that:

Some politicians and community leaders at district and national levels owned numerous farms, which were lying idle and unproductive, while government was struggling to find land for its resettlement programme, as land could only be acquired from private owners on a willing-buyer-willing seller basis. The major culprits of hoarding land and farms are our politicians, not the white farmers. They are maintaining unproductive farms, when we need land for the people (Debates, 12 December 1989).¹

In terms of objectives to resettle the destitute and decongest communal lands, Mpofo, considered the "resettlement programme as having failed dismally, socially and politically and in need for overhauling." However, other analysts continued to describe the reform

¹ Non-constituent means that a Member of Parliament did not represent any specific constituency, and was appointed by the President.

programme as successful. In 2000, John Cushworth accounted for the positive rating of the programme arguing that the conclusions were in the wider context considering also that:

The programme had undoubtedly achieved its short run political objective of contributing to post-war reconstruction and stability. The fact that most of this resettlement was undertaken in a well organised and planned manner associated with heavy investment in social infrastructure indicated that this was an impressive achievement (Cushworth in Bowyer & Stoneman, 2000: 25).

The Lancaster House Agreement represented massive limitations of the settlement *vis a vis* the needs of the rural population more generally. The slow pace of land reform associated with Lancaster House Agreement and other factors raised above led to a situation where squatting and invasion of land by the landless became an order of the day. As discussed below, the squatting and occupation of land received varying responses from government over the period under review (1980 – 2000).

Squatting and Land Resettlement in Zimbabwe

One of the early 1980s challenges was to ratify the settlement of the schemes where people had settled themselves on to deserted land and in some cases productive land after independence. Where the land had been deserted, plans had to be made to ratify such settlements. The Lands and Resettlement Minister, Dr Sidney Sekeramayi was forced to publish a statement to refute that it was a government policy to let people resettle themselves in the name of independence in response to an interview by his counterpart, the Minister of Local Government and Housing, Dr Eddison Zvobgo, given to the Mozambican News Agency AIM.

Not wanting to upset the British government who had been promised that white owners of land would not be disturbed without due process and fair compensation, the Minister published a full page statement through the Herald (4 Nov, 1981), refuting the statements associated with Zvobgo. Dr Sekeramayi wrote:

There is no truth in the allegations that the Government has no money to buy land on which to resettle the people. The British government has granted the Zimbabwe Government funds for land acquisition, resettlement and development. It has been made clear to the British government that should the funds for land acquisition which they have granted proves inadequate, we

will expect them to increase the funds. The British are fully aware of the fact that if we do not have enough funds for land acquisition, we will be forced to expropriate. The government has embarked on a systematic programme of planned and orderly resettlement – with the provision of necessary physical and social infrastructure to make the resettlement schemes economically and socially viable. People are being dissuaded from moving into land randomly and it has been made clear that people moving onto farms under production will be evicted and that those meriting resettlement will be considered alongside others who have registered through the district councils. And to imply that the government encourages or condones random movement of peasant farmers on to farms is a falsification of the Government's principles and practices ... The Government is not trying to neutralise the Constitution by devious means. Should the government want to amend the Constitution for whatever reasons, the nation will be informed. It will not do so by cowardly indirect means (Herald, 04 November 1981).

Indeed after the £30 million pledged by the British government was exhausted by 1986, Robert Mugabe asked for more which he was given. When British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher visited Zimbabwe in 1987 more money was added for the acquisition of land and resettlement. In 1990, the British Minister for Overseas Development, Lynda Chalker signed a deal for another \$15 million to support the new resettlement programme. During the first decade, the Zimbabwe Government was very serious about protecting its relationship with Britain and a special police force for the eviction of squatters was put on stand by.

The Prime Minister's office released Circular 10 of 10 December 1981 which outlined what measures would be taken against squatters as well as giving powers to a police and army unit to deal summarily with squatters. This circular was to remain in effect until it was replaced by circular 160 of 1992, issued by the Senior Secretary for Local Government on Squatter Policy. Both circulars made it clear that the Government did not allow the unlawful occupation of land, public or privately owned, and that every effort should be made by local authorities to avoid squatting throughout Zimbabwe. The Squatter Policy provided for the creation of Squatter Committees from National, Provincial down to the District level represented by; Local Government, Rural and Urban Development; Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development (after 1990, Lands, Agriculture and Water Development); Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare; National Affairs, Employment Creation and Co-operatives (after 1990, Youth, Gender and Co-operative Development); Public Construction

and National Housing; Home Affairs (the Zimbabwe Republic Police) and Defence (the Zimbabwe National Army).

The policy also outlined standing orders or standard procedures for dealing with squatters in the urban and rural areas. In the event of squatters in the urban areas, in the first step was to identify all those employed and include them on a housing waiting list; secondly, among these, the destitute including aliens would be identified and referred to the Department of Social Welfare for assistance; and thirdly, to identify the squatters who would be taken back to their district of origin where they would be resettled following the normal resettlement procedures. This of course, often meant that people 'deported' back to the rural areas would find their way back to the towns as the waiting list for resettlement were often long. However, in the early 1980s with ample land and not many people interested with farming, this often meant coercing people to join resettlement schemes against their own will. It is such settlers who had problems as they did not have the basic infrastructure with which to start life on the land.

In the case of squatters being identified in the rural areas, the first step was to identify all those who should return to their home districts to be resettled. The second step involved identifying all those who were employed and ensuring that they have gone to their places of work as well as the normal places of residence, and as with the urban squatters to refer the destitute and aliens for social welfare assistance. The change in squatter policy announced through Circular 160 of 1992 signalled a major shift in thinking and tolerance of squatters. Part of the policy was informed by the huge resistance to the new Land Act announced earlier in the year in which white farmers vowed to challenge the government's intended move of acquiring land without paying for it, but simply compensating for the developments on it. As government entertained the war of words with farmers through the media, many landless people took the initiative to move into properties to test government's seriousness about resolving the land question "once-for-all." The state's response was to make it difficult for squatters to be evicted and also passed the responsibility for their eviction from government to the land holder. However, the land holder could only evict squatters after following a lengthy process in which they would have to satisfy the government and the squatters that they had followed all the steps. In terms of the reduced

funding for resettlement and the measures to cut government expenditure, the new policy allowed the state to rid itself of the burden of squatter removal.

If the 1980s could be seen in terms of squatter policy as having been the land owner's decade in terms of the eviction of squatters, the 1990s should be regarded as the age of squatters. During the 1990s, squatters had begun to be treated with kid gloves, to the extent of being begged. Land owners could be imprisoned for harassing the squatters. A lot of politicians provided support to squatters against land owners who were considered hostile to the land reform process. For a farmer to be assisted by local politicians they had to create a relationship with his African neighbours and workers which would buy him political sympathy in the event of squatting on his property. Some form of social credit against squatting. This credit had to become very useful during the Land Occupation Movement at the beginning of the 21st century from which land owners with higher credit held out longer with the support of their African neighbourhood and politicians.

According to Clause 5 of the revised Circular 160 of 1992, the "District Control Committee, did not have any legal powers to evict squatters from any land, and it became the duty of the land owner or land authority to evict squatters." The new procedures for eviction changed to include among other things, the fulfilment of certain requirements towards the squatters:

- (a) A person whose agricultural land is affected, he/she should employ as many squatters as possible and serve the rest including those who refuse employment with notices to vacate by a given date.
- (b) If any land authority is affected, he/she should give assistance as much as possible such as – accommodation, employment, and resettlement to help the destitute through social welfare department.
- (c) If people served with notices fail to comply, the land owner or land authority should approach the local authority for assistance.
- (d) If the local authority failed to solve the problem, it should approach its District Squatter Control Committee for assistance.
- (e) The District Squatter Control Committee will seek the assistance of the land owner and local authority and then use all persuasive methods to solve the problem.
- (f) The District Squatter Control Committee should thoroughly investigate the problems encountered, suggest the action to be taken and then consult the Provincial and National Squatter Control Committees.
- (g) If all these efforts fail, the person or authority affected should apply for an order of court to evict resisting squatters.

Some of the mechanisms adopted to reduce the impact on ‘squatters’ in the event of eviction was that each district was tasked to identify and assign a ‘destitute area’ for keeping squatters so that they would not be dumped on roadsides as the scenes of the 1980s had indicated. Mr J. B. Bodzo complained about the squatters at Kubatana cooperative in Chinyika who had been evicted on several occasions but refused to be resettled because there was no tarred roads near the resettlement area they had been allocated (Minutes, Extra-ordinary DSCC, 23.02.1993 at Makoni District Admin Offices). Mr Bodzo was advised that he should invite the Social Welfare to come to the Co-operative for vetting of the squatters. The meetings of the DSCC were reduced from monthly in the 1980s to once every two months after Circular 160 of 1992, with the Provincial and National Committees meeting even more spaced times. This meant that responses to queries affecting landowners could take a year or two to be resolved.

Makoni District called yet another extraordinary meeting of Council on 25 September where it was claimed that the soft handed approach to squatters was not helping. They agreed that the squatting had reached alarming proportions. Mr Bepete of the National Affairs department suggested that as Circular 160 was weak, they had no choice but to dump squatters at the bus stop and railway station where it would be easy to monitor them. It was also resolved that ex-farm labourers should be left to farm until such a time land for their resettlement is located and they would be priority on the list. Ex-co-operators on defunct model B schemes had remained on the farm growing crops for subsistence. The choice was to re-zone the schemes as Model A and then allocate them properly. It was suggested that in the failed Model B, land allocated be reduced from 12 acres to six acres so that the land could accommodate twice as much people as possible. The Committee suggested that a review of all Model B farms be carried out in the whole district to determine among other things the land size holding capacity and viability of the farming system.

In 1995, the District Administrator for Rusape argued that Mozambicans were taking advantage of the softness on squatting to get land in Zimbabwe. A joint seating of the district and provincial committees therefore resolved that the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) and the Home Affairs (IDs) should vet and deport Mozambicans already resettled in communal and resettlement schemes as well as those in squatter camp (Interview, Mr M.

Museredza. Manicaland Provincial Administrator, 2003). A crackdown on ‘illegal aliens’ started which created a diplomatic crisis between the two countries and required the intervention at presidential level.

According to the Provincial Administrator Manicaland the squatting problem had become a big problem. In September 1995, he invited the Minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban Planning to help with the situation at Chinyika Resettlement Scheme and other schemes in the province. The meeting was attended by the Deputy Minister and he was informed that 4 191 squatters had settled themselves in schemes, private land as well as communal land throughout the province. The distribution of squatters as reported to the Deputy Minister was as follows:

Table 4.9: Squatters in Manicaland Province

<i>District</i>	<i>Number of Squatters</i>
Buhera	Nil
Chimanimani	2 030
Chipinge	201
Makoni	1 114
Marange	Nil
Mutare	209
Mutasa	385
Nyanga	252
Total	4 191

Source: Report for the Deputy Minister on the Occasion of his Visit to Chinyika Resettlement Scheme on squatter issues by Manicaland Provincial Administrator, 5 September, 1995

The districts with the highest squatter lie in regions II and III where there is a high concentration of commercial farms as well as resettlement schemes coveted by communal lands dwellers. Squatters in town centres such as Mutare, Nyanga and Chipinge were mostly people seeking to position themselves close to urban areas for accommodation and employment scouting purposes. The Provincial Administrator qualified that:

Squatting in Manicaland province has been widespread in government owned farms with most of them in Model B and Model A resettlement schemes. Special mention is of Nyahode Resettlement Scheme (Chimanimani) a Model B resettlement scheme which has over 1300 families. This has led to problems in planning this Model B co-operative farm and Mayo and Chinyika resettlement scheme (Makoni) where there are over 300 squatters (PA Report to Deputy Minister, Sept 1995).

Squatting was often seen by opportunists as a process towards gaining access to land in the resettlement schemes. One of the reasons was because of the existence of districts such as Buhera, Marange among others that were very dry and yet densely populated due to the Land acts of the colonial period. A greater part of the province was mountainous and therefore could not support arable agriculture. As a result Manicaland was considered the most densely populated province in the country with 42.17 persons per square kilometres (Census, 1992). The workers of former farm owners which had been bought for resettlement had nowhere to go as they were mostly second or third generation foreigners from Mozambique or Malawi, making them naturalised inhabitants of the area – but not planned for in the course of planning the scheme.

The Provincial administrator blamed the infamous Circular 160 for rendering district and provincial committees' ineffective as well as political pressure for land which made politicians shy away from attacking the squatting problems head-on for fear of losing votes. Looking from the point of view of the resettlement programme, squatting was a direct indictment on the resettlement schemes, the model as well as the beneficiary selection process. On provincial basis, Manicaland had the highest number of people who had benefitted from the programme since 1980 with 26 resettlement schemes on land covering over 500 000 ha to about 14 000 families (Derude, 1996). However, the waiting list for the province was at more than 15 000 families with the children of those settled in the early 1980s beginning to apply for plots in their own right as subdivision was not allowed.

Besides the slow pace of the land resettlement programme, squatting also was a product of the capacity, coordination and management issues in the land resettlement programme. Nationally, land resettlement was constrained by the shortage of staff and transport. In Manicaland, between January 1995 and September 17 members of staff had retired. Long absenteeism from work was beginning to be a serious problem owing to the increase in HIV/AIDS related illnesses. A new District Development Fund (DDF) division was set up to be responsible for resettlement schemes only rather than to divide responsibility between dams, roads and the schemes as before. However, it took a long time before this change could be operationalised and the Resettlement Officers' office remained vacant for a long time. This gave the window of opportunity to chiefs to stamp their authority and appoint

loyalist headmen to run the show in the resettlement schemes and them started to allocate land illegally.

By the mid 1990s, poverty in the Communal Lands and the resettlement schemes was worsening and environmental concerns increasing as more congestion took place. Continued land shortage in the face of slow government delivery culminated in a wave of invasions started by the Mashonaland East communal farmers outside Marondera in Svosve rural areas in 1998. This was later joined by the war veterans in 1999 following ZANU PF's failure to secure a constitutional reform through a referendum vote. This wave of invasion became widespread as people demonstrated that the earlier land reform efforts had failed to de-congest communal lands, land hunger was increasing and poor people were getting frustrated and facing food shortages.

Conclusion

Land reform is an important basis for agrarian reform in Zimbabwe. This chapter has discussed how land reform proceeded in Zimbabwe. Welfare objectives seem to take precedence over economic considerations as the government did not have a concrete plan on what to do with land and how to facilitate production. The GoZ decided not to resolve the issue of land tenure preferring to continue with colonially created tenure regimes that differentiated sectors. As will be argued in the following sections, the differentiation of the tenures had impact on the evolution of capitalist relations of production as communal and resettlement tenure was not secure enough to allow for access to private finance. It can be concluded that the land question was not resolved during the period under review. However, it is the key argument of this thesis that the major failure was in agrarian reform and the facilitation of productivity on the land that was transferred during this period.

Chapter Five

Resettlement Schemes, Models and Beneficiary Selection

In this chapter, I suggest that there was an awareness of the problems with this insufficient, if not insubstantial, redistribution programme but little capacity actually to address real problems. Zimbabwe's post- 1980 resettlement strategy aimed to establish an egalitarian society, reduce rural destitution and settle ex-combatants of the liberation struggle. This had resonance with international thinking about development for the upliftment of underdeveloped areas.² The architects of resettlement models took the 'small is better' recommendations favoured in development practice of the 1980s consistent with the ascendancy of neo-liberal economic planning that reached dominance in Zimbabwe under Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in the 1990s. Resettlement Schemes were the key aspect of Zimbabwe's land and agrarian reform programme. The Principal Planning Officer, S. M. Jinya, reiterated that:

... the Resettlement Programme is by far the single most important strategy the independent government of Zimbabwe has embarked upon towards the evolution of a thorough going and systematic agrarian reform programme. In its design, the Resettlement Programme was also designed to help in the re-integration and rehabilitation of the war displaced (Jinya, 1990).³

The Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development highlighted its agrarian transformation policy in the '*Intensive Resettlement Policies and Procedures*' document published late 1981. The programme was a joint Zimbabwe/British commitment to a:

² In my opinion, international development policy was characterised by ignorance and arrogance regarding what should be done to redeem less developed countries from the cycle of poverty, and this was cemented by a crisis of accumulation. This harsh judgment at least requires a couple of references. In 1981 the World Bank published a report on rural development in Africa entitled *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Agenda for Action*, also referred to as the *Berg Report* after its principal author, Elliot Berg. Notwithstanding the report's explicit rejection of the notion that improved agricultural productivity can be achieved through the diffusion of practices and techniques developed on large-scale, capital intensive government farms, it proposed an extension model of the 'project approach' type. The Berg Report described the African smallholder class as the "essential basis for any workable strategy of agricultural recovery" while calling for minimal state involvement in the process. In the report, Berg did not suggest how smallholder producers would be able to develop capacity and increase production without support. However, Berg called for massive increases in aid once his prescriptions were in place...but of course they never happened.

³ S. M. Jinya "Experiences from the Zimbabwean Resettlement Programme' An unpublished paper given at the Regional Workshop on Clarification and Operationalisation of Namibia's Policies on Rural and Agricultural Development in Windhoek (30.08.1990)

... three year programme proposing to settle 18000 families on 1.1 million hectares at \$60 million” later revised and “redefined in the *Three Year Transitional National Development Plan (1982/83 – 1984/85)* which now called for the resettlement of 162 000 families on 9 million hectares over the plan period, subject to practical, financial and economic constraints (GoZ, 1983a: 2).

The programme had an estimated “capital expenditure of over \$500 million in contract prices”, this large sum qualifying it “for continuous monitoring and evaluation – with application of corrective action where necessary – to ensure that the programme is meeting its multiplicity of objectives for integrated development rather than mere settlement of people without development” (GoZ, 1983a: 2). This suggests that the state and its apparatus did not have the capacity to carry out their good intentions, not that they were just completely uninterested and reluctant officials.

The programme aimed to reverse Zimbabwe’s colonial agrarian legacy. In the policy’s foreword, the Minister “drew attention to the constraints facing the development of the peasant sector, the disruption caused by war, the plight of refugees and Government’s commitment to a land redistribution programme to redress the imbalances in past land allocation policies” and reiterated the need to make “every effort to maintain economic production” (GoZ, 1983b: 3). The specific objectives of the Intensive Reform Programme were as follows:

- a. to provide some relief of the pressure on over-populated land;
- b. to extend and improve the base for productive agriculture in the peasant farming sector; through individual, co-operative or state farms;
- c. to improve the standard of living of the largest and poorest sector of the population of Zimbabwe;
- d. to ameliorate the plight of people who have been adversely affected by the war and to rehabilitate them;
- e. to provide, at the lower end of the scale, opportunities for people who have no land and who are without employment and may, therefore be classed as destitute;
- f. to bring abandoned or under-utilised land into full production as one facet of implementing an equitable policy of land redistribution;
- g. to expand or improve the infrastructure and services that are needed to promote the well-being of people and of economic production;
- h. to achieve national stability and progress in a country that has only recently emerged from the turmoil of war;
- i. To alleviate population pressure in communal areas.

Source: (GoZ, 1983b: 3).

These objectives can be divided into two broad clusters, namely;

- (a) Those aimed at relieving land pressure in communal areas and at addressing the war's social impacts of displacement and overcrowding (a, d, h and i above); and
- (b) Those that dealt with improving the standard of living of African farmers through improved land management and transformation of the farming production process through infrastructure improvement (b, c, e, f, and g above).

The first cluster of objectives was welfarist in nature and intent. The second was production oriented and built on a modernisation model. This thesis argues that the focus of government was on the welfarist cluster which took it to the edge of its capacities at the expense of the production-oriented.⁴

The 1985 revision of the resettlement programme introduced the concept of 'integrated rural development' as a policy objective and strategy in the policies and procedures. Integration was applied here to mean the coordinated use of resources and infrastructure between resettlement areas and their neighbouring communal areas and between large and small scale commercial farming areas. The emphasis was on planned land use as well as the coexistence and progressive integration of various rural land patterns. A noble goal and objective, yet as it turned out the government did not have the institutional capacity to deliver on it, as ministerial and departmental functions for the three sectors remained separate.

The 1985 revision of resettlement programmes' objectives added Integrated Rural Development (IRD) as a strategic policy aim. IRD was conceived to integrate the use of resources and infrastructure between resettlement areas and other agricultural sectors. Technically planned land use took precedence with the aim of co-existence and progressive integration of rural land patterns. In reality IRD resulted from the increased lobby and demand for government attention by the communal area sector. This policy led to the re-direction of Resettlement Area (RA) resources to the Communal Areas (CA) and lumping the two sectors together. The cross-sector and shared resource plan was difficult to implement as it depended on the good will of farmers in the high resource sector to allow

⁴ The British Overseas Development Agency (ODA), the principal funder of the resettlement programme, criticised some of the objectives as being mutually incompatible, and equally incompatible with the attempt to maximise agricultural potential, suggesting that they were mostly a political statement of intent. See Cushworth and Walker, 1988.

those from the low resource sector to access existing surplus capacity. There was no mechanism for the operation of such a programme and the results only led to inter-sectoral conflict.⁵ It was finally abandoned as unrealistic. Expecting freehold title holders to give up part of their resources for poorer farmers was far fetched.

The Resettlement Models

It is important to explain how the resettlement schemes operated. The term ‘scheme’ connoted the spatial; that is, the acquired and redistributed unit of land, as well as the planning regime under which the land was allocated to beneficiaries. The ideal scheme was meant to be a self-contained village with services for agriculture and the pursuit of household livelihoods (a site of reproduction and economic production). From the agriculture side, the scheme should have a dipping tank, grazing area, a dam for irrigation and drinking water, as well as marketing facilities. As its social focus, a scheme should have schools, clinics, recreational facilities and shopping centres with retail outlets. The level of facilities should be considered according to population numbers and land size.

Schemes were either planned or accelerated.⁶ The planned Resettlement models proceeded in four stages agreed between the GoZ and the ODA as well as other funders. A planning and appraisal regime included:

- (a) Initial identification, valuation and purchase of land by the MLRR’s Land Acquisition section.
- (b) Planning of physical scheme layouts and agricultural production systems and initial scheme appraisal by Agritex section, Ministry of Agriculture.

⁵ The goal of achieving a harmonious resource use between resettlement and communal areas did not materialise as the resettlement sector protected their resources from the lower sector. Cattle from the resettlement schemes could not graze in private commercial holding in as much as communal lands cattle were considered stray in resettlement schemes and the SSCF sector. Commercial farmers claimed that African beasts would introduce disease and also degrade their pasture. Squatting legislation allowed commercial farmers to impound and fine any “stray animals” from the African sectors. Communal area farmers could also not graze their cattle in resettlement schemes which were fenced off. Numerous meetings were held by the resettlement schemes village heads and the Resettlement Officer (RO) with traditional authorities to address issues of communal people cutting fence to allow their cattle in access to resettlement area grazing land. Unlike the commercial farmers, the resettlement community did not have the capacity to fine the communal area people. In practice, IRD – understood as resource use integration-- did not materialise.

⁶ Planned meant that settlement proceeded after infrastructure had been established and accelerated meant that people settled first and infrastructure was developed when they were already there. Some schemes were settled by villagers ahead of the government programme, during cease fire and elections period. In the liberated zones the guerillas had encouraged settlement on land where the former white owners had fled the countryside or the country altogether. These schemes were re-organised and received infrastructure after settlement.

- (c) Consideration and amendment of Agritex scheme plans by the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Resettlement (IMCR).
- (d) Appraisal and approval of scheme plans by BDDSA advisers (Cushworth and Walker, 1988: 8).⁷

Both the planned and accelerated schemes were planned according to four models designed to organise resettlement and land use patterns among beneficiaries. Models were shaped by, among other things, the agro-ecological dictates of the country which determined the extent of productivity and support available/needed to assist transformation. The models were based on a number of technical calculations. It was hoped that income would be derived from both crop production and livestock. Cattle would provide manure, draught power and a store of wealth for farmers. However, stocking levels were to be consistent with good conservation practices. These technical assumptions and considerations were however not supported by the necessary funding and support. Many beneficiaries did not have the livestock and implements necessary for productive operations.

Of the four resettlement models, one provided intensive village settlements with individual arable and communal grazing areas (Model A Schemes), a second was based on co-operatives or collectives (Model B); a third based on intensive settlements combined with a centralised 'core-estate' in state farms run by the Agricultural Rural Development Authority (ARDA) with slight variations (Models C and D) and the fourth based on the re-organisation of communal homesteads into lines separating houses from block of arable land. The Lands Minister insisted that this multiple model approach would give "wider opportunity for every farmer to choose his own preferred type of resettlement" (The Herald, 13 February 1983).⁸ The government was aware of the likelihood of resistance from government programmes that did not give people choices. Having not consulted in developing the models, it became important that they provided wide options.⁹

⁷ The division of labour between the various ministries in the resettlement schemes is discussed in full in the following chapter on institutional support for the schemes.

⁸ Interview with Angus Shaw, in Herald 13 February, 1983

⁹ This idea had its limitation as some models were obviously only suitable for some regions; thus the extent of choice is highly debatable. Beneficiaries had no capacity to challenge the aspects of the programme that hampered productivity. In high profile schemes such as Chinyika intervention was justified as safeguarding the capital outlay. The level of intervention was such that settlers had little choice in many production decisions. They were told how much land to allocate to what crop, when and how to plant. They were more or less workers on their own land. As much as they controlled the product and the profit, this lack of autonomy was problematic for the seasoned Master Farmers who wanted a degree of freedom and choice. The resettlement programme was, under such circumstances, in the mould of colonial technocratic intervention in rural life and as such bred resistance. According to Jocelyn Alexander (1994: 332), "while perhaps the

The Self-contained Individual Plot Schemes, Model A

The most widespread and popular model among beneficiaries were the Model A schemes which offered self-contained individual plots of 6ha of arable land per household for crop production and in addition, access to communal grazing.¹⁰ A typical Model A scheme consisted of:

500 families in 15 villages linked by maintained roads, with three or four schools, six dip-tanks, a service centre, housing for a Representative Officer and staff, Agricultural Extension workers, a Co-op worker, Animal Health Assistant, clinic and staff (GoZ, 1983a: 11).

The model design was also in keeping with welfare objectives that dominated land reform in the early 1980s. The small size of the individual plots was a reflection of the lack of trust in African land holders' ability to manage them properly. Officially this was justified as necessary given the huge demand for resettlement by people from congested communal and slum areas, retaining refugees and those who were landless and destitute. Of the more than 71,000 households resettled by 1996, above 60% were resettled on Model A units (GoZ, 1996).

Table 5.1: Comparison of Model A Schemes with Competing Models

<i>Type of Scheme</i>	<i>Hectares</i>	<i>Families settled</i>
Model A	387 071	5 844
Accelerated Schemes	128 663	2 684
Co-operative schemes	21 449	954

Source: Compiled by Author

By the end of 1982, government was having more success in settling Model A Schemes than others. Technically, Model A was designed on a village basis with the idea of making the new settlement self-contained units which could promote sustainable production and reproduction. Standard minimum service requirements were set as a benchmark for

rhetorical gloss of development had changed by the 1980s (participation, for instance, be *de rigueur*), this was perhaps only skin deep: popular participation in planning was reduced to an exercise in convincing people that experts knew best." The EIU Special Report (1981) on Zimbabwean agriculture noted that standards set by planners were over-high and technically unfeasible. Settlers seemed to have been happy to produce enough for their daily survival and the production of surplus, a welcome eventuality but not primary. In more remote areas such as Dande, Spierenburg (2004) shows that traditional religious leaders were used in effect to sabotage these restrictions and people did much as they liked.

¹⁰ The popularity of this model as opposed to the government's preferred Model B – co-operative style schemes suggest that individuals wanted a level of choice, self-determination and household privacy. The government found itself a wide distance apart from the intended beneficiaries of its planning.

sustainable village and economic life. Guidelines for infrastructure provision in the schemes were set as follows:

- (a) borehole per village of about 25 families
- (b) 1 rural service centre per 500 families
- (c) 1 clinic per 500 families
- (d) 1 classroom and 1 teacher's house per 20 families
- (e) 1 dip tank per 1 400 herd of cattle
- (f) 1 co-operative depot per 500 families (only provided where settlers requested it).

The government also provided other services to facilitate production, including fencing material for village perimeters and grazing boundaries (each village would erect its own); materials for community woodlot boundary fences; and all non-locally available construction materials for the erection of 'blair' toilets for each family (GoZ, 1981: 16).¹¹

The Co-operative Unit, Model B Schemes

Model B schemes involved resettlement of people in groups of between 50 and 100 under communal living and co-operative farming. Where land was acquired from a farm or estate with high technological investment, the procedure was to keep infrastructure intact. In other cases, the Agricultural Rural Development Agency (ARDA), a state landholding and farming entity, would occupy the core-estate and then establish satellite co-operative schemes benefiting from ARDA's direction and assistance.¹²

The co-operative group was a registered legal entity. A government agency dealing with co-operatives was established, later to come under the ambit of the Ministry of National Affairs and still later the Ministry of Youth Gender and Co-operative(s) (MYGEC). As discussed previously, the co-operative Model B schemes were the political favorites for rural and

¹¹ Woodlots remained one of the mostly undeveloped aspects of the resettlement schemes. For instance in Mayo, as indicated in Chapter Six below, only one of a planned 1078 woodlots had been developed by 1995.

¹² In practice, this was not a widespread practice as ARDA did not have the capacity and capitalisation required to establish such ventures across the country. Where this happened, ARDA managed the farm and the co-operators became workers on a state farm. The schemes where ARDA was in charge, survived longer than other Model B Schemes in many regions. This however, was not because ARDA was a more efficient authority able to run the state farms as self-sufficient and economic units. Instead, they survived because they were able to draw more from government revenues in terms of subsidies as well as being bailed out by direct fiscal intervention. ARDA estates were riddled with mismanagement and corruption and the subject of opposition unhappiness. They were constantly in the media for all the wrong reasons. ARDA schemes, as with many of the government parastatals, were able to survive as they were seen as sources of employment. Not so importantly for the poor families that depended on them, but the large number of senior politicians to whom the government needed to extend gratitude and patronage.

agrarian transformation. This choice was dictated by presumed cost efficiency and affinity with the socialist ideals of collectivisation which was important to key government officials. One of the chief protagonists of the co-operative sector suggested:

Not only does the co-operative idea make good economic sense and provide the means of ending exploitation, but it is central to the ideology of ZANU. It embraces and modernises our traditional way of life, and I believe it is at the heart of the Prime Minister's call for rural development. It is the certain way for transforming our future (D. Mutasa in an interview with Rob Linden, Herald 9 February, 1982).

The co-operative principles of Model B schemes were based on the socialist transformation objectives of the post-1980 central government's agriculture policy (Tshuma, 1997: 72).

Model B schemes were based on the assumption that African people had experience working together as a community. The argument elaborated in a 2003 interview with Minister Didymus Mutasa¹³ was extended to the fact that, even on white owned commercial farms success was a result of cooperation between workers. The difference between cooperative schemes and commercial farms is that farm workers labour for the benefit of one individual or estate under supervision on a commercial farm. In planning the scheme, active government participation was anticipated as part of transforming the farm/estate into a functional cooperative system where well laid out villages replaced the colonial farm compound. Under this system, the farmhouse and associated central structures were earmarked to become a community centre, clinic or office for the cooperative administration. Mutasa was convinced that through proper management of this model, many difficulties such as poor conservation, bad farming methods and poor cooperative model take up could be overcome (Herald, 9 February, 1982). The Government favoured the Model B schemes as they saved costs. The settlers preferred Model A schemes which gave a sense of autonomy and security.

¹³ Didymus Mutasa, the Speaker of the House of Assembly during the time of this interview, was a CONEX operative during colonial rule before resigning to live at Cold Comfort Farm described below. His thinking about the re-organisation of African agriculture was influenced by Alvord's work and, the Native Development policies. Mutasa was also influential in the big-small debate when it came to how to deal with land size. Mutasa viewed big land sizes as more economic than subdividing land into smaller units.

By 1983, the government had acquired all farms with war-damaged infrastructure for resettlement. The Ministry started to acquire solid and operational machinery.¹⁴ Politicians argued that for these farms, the co-operative model was the most appropriate to keep infrastructure intact.¹⁵ Organised agriculture was against the acquisition of such farms, but the Minister, Moven Mahachi, defended the move as being in line with the transformation agenda of government, arguing:

This type of settlement is the most ideal in terms of meeting the Government objective of wanting to achieve a socialist transformation of the countryside. Apart from the obvious political and ideological reasons, there are sound economic arguments in favour of collective farming as opposed to any other form of resettlement. In co-operative farms more people are settled on a unit of land at a much lower cost of resettlement per family (Herald, 13 February, 1983).

Planners were also informed and influenced by the two co-operative schemes run by supporters of the armed struggle. The Cold Comfort Farm (CCF) located at St Faith Mission in Rusape was one such example which the government emulated. The CCF was an established co-operative operated by 300 families working 6000 acres of land in a planned and organised way, a community centre and trading store which paid out dividends to shoppers every year. As the former manager of the CCF project, Didymus Mutasa remained upbeat about its achievements, proudly recounting that:

The place really boomed and was very profitable. It is wrong to break up commercial farms acquired for resettlement. If you look at a good commercial farm, well planned, producing its magnificent crops and healthy profits, you must realise that you are in fact looking at a co-operative enterprise, the difference being that there is one owner and the rest are workers. What we want to establish is a situation where the profit is now shared among all who work the farm, without breaking it (Interview with D. Mutasa, 2003).

Model B schemes also required intelligent and effective educated management. Under those circumstances, Mutasa would be quite right. However, in practice this required that there

¹⁴ Multi-million farms and estates such as the biggest peach fruit production estate with export processing facilities in the country located in Rusape (Manicaland) and a coffee estate in Mount Darwin were acquired during this time.

¹⁵ A sad legacy of the Zimbabwe land story – political heavy-weights are known to have pillaged and plundered some of the movable equipment on acquired farms before settlement to use on their own – also illegally acquired farms. This often left resettlement schemes with malfunctioning systems or lack of equipment and infrastructure.

was a co-operative ethic among the cooperators. Model B schemes were conceived on the mistaken assumption that African communities had organised their society towards community rather than individual good. The notion that cooperative organisation was natural to African communities proved a fallacy [as Nyerere's Ujamaa experiment proved in Tanzania].

Resettlement farmers were expected to work the farm together under expert guidance and share the results equally to improve their standards of living. This way an acquired operational farm/estate was expected to continue production as well as increase productivity. The rationale was that once workers become owners, they would work harder and be willing to re-invest profits rather than pocket them. This assumption failed to recognise that the commercial unit was produced under the strict supervision of a whip wielding foreman with time being controlled by a bell. Absenteeism was punished by deductions on salary. Repeated offenders lost their jobs. Productivity of labour on the commercial farm unit did not proceed from a work ethic but a culture of fear, coercion and retribution that drove colonial economic production. The best that could come from this scenario was a work ethic where workers linked their efforts to improved wages.¹⁶ In the absence of work ethic, owner cooperators had limited disciplinary means and workers could not be easily controlled where equal share was not linked to equal effort.

The ideal candidates for Model B schemes were seen to be the ex-combatants, ex-detainees and political activists who had been arrested and placed in protected villages (the 'keeps') as well as war collaborators (and participants) of different descriptions. It was hoped that by placing anti-colonialists, activists and ex-combatants in cooperative schemes, they would apply themselves with the same commitment they had in fighting the Smith regime.¹⁷

¹⁶ If anything, colonial and capitalist management systems developed a proletarian ethic where workers laboured for a wage rather than because 'work for the sake of work' was valued. Another important factor was that the resettlement of farm workers was not the priority of government as farm workers were not listed among the priority list of the war displaced and those considered destitute. The fact that beneficiaries of the resettlement programme did not have a farming background had a double impact. Firstly, they did not have the knowledge of working systems of the specific farm and secondly, they had not been used to working together.

¹⁷ The peace agreement and the demobilization process also ensured that those blacks who had fought for the Rhodesian cause were not marginalized after independence. Most of them remained in the army and police and in civil service as they were already employed by government. This became a source of grievance for the nationalist veterans who felt that they should have been prioritized in landing government jobs.

The lack of political education and discipline during training for the liberation war among ZANLA cadres and the psychology of self-importance they carried for having fought in the war became a major problem in the co-operative schemes. Many ex-combatants were in poor physical and mental health, battling alcoholism and problems associated with social reintegration. Through a demobilization process, activists with educational qualifications were placed in various government departments swelling the civil service (seeds of a highly politicized civil service that was to work in Mugabe's favour and for his political survival many times over). The young "comrades" without formal education were encouraged to take adult literacy classes and advance themselves. Others were absorbed in the new Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP). It was mostly those found not fit for civil service and those who felt too despondent to go back to school, having sacrificed their education for the struggle, who entered different cooperative ventures including brick making, carpentry, sewing, construction and agriculture (Ministry of National Affairs report, 1983). Demobilized African soldiers received lower packages than demobilized white soldiers of the Rhodesia Army. Some could not prove their bona fides and became sidelined. Many became disillusioned and others developed psychological problems. The novel, *Harvest of thorns*, articulates the challenges faced and the distinction between those who found high paying jobs and lived in high standard and those who became destitute.

Planners anticipated that leaders of this Model would attend professional leadership and agriculture courses offered at national colleges such as Kushinga Phikelela Agricultural Institute. After the training, they would be placed at an operational and thriving co-operative scheme before moving to an acquired farm (Interview, S. M. Jinya, 2003). It was also hoped that participants in cooperatives would be chosen among people trained together and familiar with each other or a system where participants came together voluntarily rather than being grouped together by a government agent. The Ministry of National Affairs was given the responsibility of putting together participants' lists. The ideal approach would mean that resettlement would be much slower as college capacity was low and throughput slow yet politicians made high demands that resettlement move fast. Ardent supporters of socialist transformation and cooperative agricultural organisation such as Mutasa and Mahachi believed that people resisted change when what they are being asked to adopt was not proven as workable. They advocated for demonstration based extension services in each

district.¹⁸ However, this did not happen and on the balance of probabilities, Model B compared to Model A schemes were set for failure. It is therefore not surprising that more people chose the former.

The original list of Model B farms was based on farms/estates with equipment, however in other instances equipment was destroyed by war or leaving owners. Where equipment did not exist, the promised tractors, irrigation equipment and other agricultural inputs took a long time to be delivered which frustrated settlers (Interview, Jinya 2003). In fact, the first settler tractor scheme was launched in January 1989, almost at the end of the first decade of the resettlement programme. This scheme was made possible through funding from the Germany Agro-Action in conjunction with the Zimbabwe Freedom from Hunger Campaign (ZFFHC) at the Vuti scheme in Kariba as a response to the recurrent droughts of the 1980s.¹⁹ In the schemes where the farms were bought or occupied with substantial infrastructure, lack of service as well as improper handling and use made the equipment to fall out of use within the first couple of years. Due to shortage of equipment, especially that related to irrigation and ploughing, Mr Chidewu argued that:

As a result, water which is available for irrigation cannot be used, so is the land. This had demoralized many people, some of whom have left the schemes and gone back to their communal areas. As co-operators could not keep livestock on an individual basis on the scheme, some people had two homes (Minutes of the Midlands, Masvingo and Manicaland Seminar for District Administrators and, Agritex and Derude Officials).

From the early 1990s, no new Model B schemes were developed due to their poor showing and because the introduction of ESAP had reduced available resources. There was a general

¹⁸ According to Mutasa (1982) where people are forced and not convinced by facts and seeing for themselves and lack the belief in the change, people do not adapt (or do not innovate). He therefore argued that "Once we have set up a working communal farming system, we can then say to the jobless and underpaid in towns: Go to the land, it can provide you and the nation with all that is needed". It is interesting how this fits the policies of 20 years later very well except of course the lack of a good farm back up system.

¹⁹ The Germany Agro-Action organisation preferred to deal with and support specific schemes from the establishment of resources facilitation to capacity development. Vuti scheme was one such scheme chosen specifically due to the location in a drier area where people were struggling to grow food and keep livestock. Vuti is in a tsetse-fly region which did not allow for cattle survival for draught power thus forcing farmers to rely on donkeys for tillage (Herald, 12 January, 1989). Donkeys are weaker than cattle as tillage animals and at least four were needed in a span. Besides not being the preferred beast of burden, the fact that donkey meat is not eaten (openly), meant that they were not considered a store of wealth. This sealed their fate among farmers. The ZFFHC's tractor scheme was therefore a welcome and huge boost to the Vuti scheme. Some members of the scheme were sent to the Institute of Agriculture Engineering to be trained in handling the tractors.

rollback of Model B schemes country-wide as cooperators sub-divided among themselves and government started to bring in more people to address under-utilisation of land.

Model C and D Schemes

This set of models (variants of each other) was intended specifically for drier regions of the country, especially Natural Regions IV and V.²⁰ By design, the Model C and D schemes are mostly widespread in the lowveld area and Matebeleland province, as indicated in table below. Model C schemes have intensive individual settlement and arable land is centered on a state-owned core estate run by ARDA. The model has three variants, determined by the role of the core estate either as a producer or provider of agricultural services to settlers, or a processor of settlement products (GoZ, 1983a). To add value on Model C schemes, the Core Estate was encouraged to develop a collection depot and processing facility.²¹ Model D schemes involved the use of former commercial ranches for grazing purposes by farmers from adjacent communal areas.

Table 5.2: List of Model C and D Schemes

<i>Name of scheme</i>	<i>Area (ha)</i>	<i>Livestock units</i>
Kezi block	47 589	4 235
Shashani block	56 235	4 426
Wanezi block	20 507	1 664
Shobi block	47 092	3 423
Marula block	28 437	3 834
River ranch	16 779	1 276
Tjankwa	7 834	1 710
Wartrail & Kelvin grove	3 035	
	223 508	20 568

Source: DDF Resettlement Reports, 1995

All the above schemes are located in Matebeleland South. The Model D schemes were designed to make more efficient use of land in the drier parts of Zimbabwe through extending African participation in the beef export industry. This model did not necessarily require that beneficiaries re-locate from their original homesteads, but their stock had the capacity to access pasture from acquired white ranches in a managed rotational system. Each community accessed ranch once every three or four years during which time their own

²⁰ As such there is no Model C scheme in Makoni district or Mayo resettlement

²¹ This was added as an after thought in the resettlement procedure document and remained part of a wishful thinking. No plans were made for such agro-processing and I could not establish a scheme where this in fact became reality. Where ARDA took over dairy processing and abattoirs, these mostly were malfunctioning by the 1990s. ARDA Balu and ARDA Dorens located outside Bulawayo in Matebeleland North continued to produce milk and vegetables (respectively) but on a very low scale.

grazing land within the communal area could recover (GoZ, 1983a). This model did not address land shortage for agriculture which was the key priority for rural communities.

The Village Reorganisation Model

Government also hoped to rationalise the communal area homesteads into lines and set aside blocks of arable land and for grazing. The logic behind the village reorganisation, planning models and cooperative models was sound in theory. The argument for the model was that:

A village working together would find it much easier to raise loans, and government assistance, - roads, electricity, water, schools, clinics could be provided more cheaply and conveniently to a single unit than a scattering of individual holdings ... it is also far more efficient, quicker and more cost effective to plough, say, 80 acres at once than to prepare dozens of widely separated plots, which is a waste on resources (Interview with Mutasa, 2003).

This model required that those who did fall into the technically drawn linear settlement mostly pegged alongside roads would have to abandon their homesteads.²² The village reorganisation model had striking similarities with the forced removal aspects of colonial planning. This aspect of post-colonial resettlement was the most resisted as it revived colonial land-use planning. The return to imposed conditions, assumptions about improvement and spatial order attracted massive resistance (Moore, 2005: 80). Village

²² This scheme was not implemented in many areas and yet it received the most visible and at times violent resistance. In *Strangers, Spirits and Land Reform: Conflicts about Land in Dande, Northern Zimbabwe*, (Leiden: Brill, 2004) (based on the Mid Zambezi Project in Dande where government hoped to create space through 'development planning and rural re-organisation' to settle 3000 families), M. J. Spierenburg discusses how village organisation (called 'internal resettlement') led to popular resistance. The government pursued 'internal resettlement' – the improvement of "efficiency and intensification of land use in existing communal areas" in the hope that "they could alleviate pressure and reduce the demand for land in the former European areas" (2004: 3). This approach to addressing rural land and development needs is reminiscent to the approach advised by the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 which sought to improve land management in African areas as a solution to the Rhodesian 'Native' agrarian crisis (2004: 1). The Mid-Zambezi Project was also conceived as a pilot project, the experience from which would transform Communal Areas in the countries. Donald S. Moore (2005) *Suffering for territory: Race, Place and Power in Zimbabwe*, Durham and London: Duke University Press (399pp) tackled this subject in Kaerezi focusing on the contests between traditional and state institutions, local and international for the hegemonic control of the elusive goal of development and the resolution of its impasse and the crisis of accumulation. *Suffering for territory* deals with the differences in understanding development and how contesting parties (government and its technicist bureaucracy on one side and the rural communities on the other), relying on historically and traditionally tried and tested way of achieving livelihoods. In the case of Kaerezi, the high levels of politicization through its history of resistance to structured and centralised planning under the Smith regime makes them sensitive to anything that resembles colonial planning. This is the home of the heroic Tangwena people who believed that "they should have the freedom to choose their settlement patterns and land use practices" which government considered as degrading the soil (p41).

reorganisation proceeded on the basis of colonial thinking about social engineering as the way that could assist change rural relations of production (Spierenburg, 2004; Moore, 2005). Village reorganisation was meant to rationalise communal settlement. The aim being the “realigning of the spatial and temporal integration of agriculture, social reciprocity, and neighbourliness” to “raise the commoditizing of labour and the undermining of loose networks of social welfare” (Moore, 2005: 105). Once fully implemented in throughout rural Zimbabwe, the hope was transformation from subsistence to capitalist modes of production.

Officials thought that ‘consultation’ and ‘good faith efforts at participatory planning’ would result in rural communities accepting the development models they had rejected under colonial rule (Moore, 2005: 79). Village reorganisation was loathed by the officials tasked with the duty as it required the express consent of villagers to move (Interview, Jinya 2003). Consultation between the District Administrator (representing the Governor’s Office), government officials from all stakeholder departments that included; the District Development Fund (DDF), roads, water, conservation, lands, agriculture etc) and the villagers was compulsory and time consuming. The difficulty of having these meetings attended by all necessary parties meant that they often had to be postponed. Addressing the Agritex Annual Technical Seminar in 1989, then Minister for Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, David Karimanzira, complained that the planning process for communal areas reorganisation was very slow (with only 0.3 percent of the mapping completed), and suggested that at such a pace it would take a century to complete the exercise (Herald, 23.02.1989).

The resettlement programme concentrated more resources in addressing land shortage²³ and “continued to use criteria favouring dealing with landlessness and need, rather than prioritising productivity” (Moore, 2005: 64, 79). Lancaster negotiations regarding land were limited to the purchase of land and its resettlement and lacked a clear agricultural development plan. Also, as previously discussed, a productivity plan was not developed by the government.²⁴ Lacking a clear plan of action, agricultural support for the beneficiaries of

²³ Land shortage “emerged from land hunger and populist politics” (Moore, 2005: 64, 79).

²⁴ For instance, when compared to the Kenyan reform programme following independence which was supported and funded through the Swynnerton Plan to develop African landholdings, the Zimbabwean agreement did not go into the technicalities and funding of such a programme

resettlement land was reduced to an environmental determinism that reminded settlers of the Native Land Husbandry regime during the colonial era.²⁵ African farmers and traditional leaders, having been sidelined, found themselves at loggerheads with government bureaucrats over development.

Beneficiary Selection

The selection of beneficiaries is of interest in agrarian transformation. Where welfare criteria took precedence over productivity, the results led to the expansion of subsistence order economies. The resettlement process was pre-empted by people resettling themselves on land that had been abandoned by the white farmers towards the end of the war.²⁶ As part of land and agriculture reorganisation, the chaotic and disorganised settlement on former white land had to be addressed through rationalisation. The Deputy Minister for the MLARD acknowledged that until the Resettlement Policy had been concluded in 1981:

There was no settlement policy; no criterion had been laid down on how land could be apportioned. As a result all sorts of people with different aspirations were found on the schemes. In fact the people regarded the plots as being there to provide supplementary income. Plots were even given to salaried professionals, people with not time to work the land. In most cases, the permits were valid for one year which was a source of fear of insecurity of tenure (Debates, April 1982).

People targeted for resettlement who required land had to register with the Ministry of National Affairs, the Governors' Office, the District Administrator and with local

²⁵ By the end of the 1980s, grave concerns regarding the extent of environmental degradation which was increasing in both communal and resettlement areas led to an educational drive to address the danger caused by land degradation. A workshop targeted community leaders and other stakeholders with the aim of strengthening the lower tier structures in natural resources management. The initiative was adopted in recognition that effective long term management and use of natural resources are of particular importance given the high dependence of populations on agriculture for employment, incomes and food supplies. A participatory approach in natural resources management and identification of conservation projects was designed to develop a better understanding of the considerations and interests of various stakeholders. For sustainable interventions it was necessary to have participation of local people in the analysis of problems, identification of priorities, design of activities and implementation and monitoring.

²⁶ Liberated zones (mostly in Manicaland and Mashonaland East) had the highest incidence of farmers deserting because of the war. Guerrillas operating in these areas encouraged local communities to move into 'liberated farms' where the farmer had abandoned it. Mayo Ranch was one such liberated farm. After entrenching itself into power the ZANU PF government sought to bring order in the land and agriculture sector and announced in July 1981 that no more new un-official occupation of land would be permitted. After that date whoever would settle themselves on private or state land would be considered squatting and the police were given powers to evict such households from that land. In other areas also, Spierenburg (2004) found that when the government started to legislate for Dande, it was already full of new settlers.

representatives of the Ministry of Land, Resettlement and Rural Development. After targeting of political and war refugees, focus was shifted to those with Master Farmer Certificates seeking to increase their landholding or moving away from communal tenure (GoZ, 1983a: 21). One major characteristic of the resettlement household was that it was on average younger than the communal areas household, as “younger men, who became a new group of *hurudza* or land barons (who) ... accumulated cattle and engaged periodically in wage labour, [sought] to free themselves from the control of the old male patriarchs” (Drinkwater, 1988: 271). A number of factors influenced the profile of people who settled in the resettlement schemes. Freedom from tribal ties and the need to start their own lives attracted many young families from communal areas to resettlement schemes in the early 1980s. An important criterion for applicants was that they not be employed full time elsewhere or that they be willing to withdraw from such employment. The idea was to create a class of full time farmers separated from a class of full time workers, just as with the NLHA of 1951 (Machingaidze, 1991). The other requirement, which was not emphasised, was that applicants have a proven record of being farmers (this often meant having Master Farmer’s certificates).

The early beneficiaries were largely young families with no means to start farming or older families seeking to escape over-crowded rural areas as applicants needed to be unemployed. To achieve the goal of de-congesting communal lands, it was assumed that upon taking land in the resettlement schemes, applicants would relinquish any land they held in communal areas. The lure of *minda mirefu* (larger tracks of land) was also expected to attract those without land or with very small land units.²⁷ Finally, resettlement schemes became home to beneficiaries from varying backgrounds and such differences impacted on ‘community development’ as well as leading to differentiated economic accumulation in the schemes

²⁷ In practice however, those coming from communal areas did not completely relinquish their land rights. Using a system called *kuronzera* - the loaning of land and livestock, they were able to retain control over land. This system had become an entrenched land loan where a family leaving its allocated land would ask a family or stranger to look after their land and livestock as they try their luck in other sectors of the economy. This became prevalent in from the 1960s onwards as rural production was no longer enough to sustain families. Maintaining a foothold in the communal area was a security measure as there was a high level of uncertainty and suspicion about the extent of that state control in the resettlement schemes. Those with polygamous households left one wife behind. After all women did most or much of the work, so these beneficiaries would send one wife to the resettlement schemes while the other (s) remained in the communal areas. See the section on the role of women and children in agricultural production below

(differentiation is dealt with in detail in the chapter on the case study). According to Chief Mangwende:

I think I should also ask whether the problem of resettling people, is it only a problem of settling people who are Zimbabwean citizens? I do not think so. Mr. Speaker, the problem here is of resettling people of Malawi origins, people of Zambian origin and some other countries surrounding us. We always have that problem. The farms which are being bought by Government have people who have been staying there and who are still staying there. There was no arrangement on transferring them to any other place. So, when we talk of productivity at the farms, when referring to people of Malawian origins who are only working in order to get a payment, do you think they are going to work at all without any inducement? How many cattle do these former labourers have? How many ox ploughs do they have to use on the 12 acres that they were given? But Mr. Speaker, we are only asking them to produce by word of mouth (Debates, 11th October, 1994).

After a tour of the resettlement schemes in May 1988, Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development Moven Mahachi was disappointed with what he considered the under-utilisation and waste of land in many schemes. Given that it had been difficult to attract enough people to the schemes to justify the cost, he approached Parliament for powers to evict settlers who were not making good use of their allocated land. This request opened a can of worms, attracting sharp criticism from members who felt the schemes had not been planned properly in the first place and that beneficiaries had been set up for failure. He was accused of having presided over a programme that was disjointed and could not guarantee a better life for the settlers. The House demanded to know:

What criterion he had used in the first place to ensure that only the 'right' settlers got the land? And what he was doing to help those who were battling? [members charged that] if it is found in the end that many people with little or no agricultural knowledge have wormed their way through to fertile land, the economic consequences for Zimbabwe will be very grave. There is a need for proper ideological orientation, and imparting of farming knowledge by resettlement managers to those needing it (Debates, 23 May 1988).

By the end of its first decade, it had become clear that resettlement agriculture was not pulling its weight in terms of marketed output and the blame was placed on settlers. The lack of a skills base and infrastructure necessary to develop land was seen as the reason that schemes mirrored the majority of communal areas where production was mostly subsistence-based. The Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, David

Karimanzira, urged farmers at Chinyika resettlement in Manicaland to increase their productivity suggesting that their failure was bringing the government's resettlement programme under criticism. He acknowledged there was need for more government support for productivity to increase as:

Just about 20 percent of the settlers were productive farmers with a proven track record and the rest needed to work harder to compete with their counterparts [stating that as a result] in parliament, we answer criticism daily on why we resettle people who destroy the existing infrastructure on farms [encouraging them that] yet with adequate skills, you can grow cash and food crops to improve your living standards (*Ziana*, 13 October 1988).

Minister Karimanzira was confident that with the acquisition of greater skills, settlers could improve production and that extension officers would then take on a supervisory role. Moven Mahachi had promised that only competent people would take up land for resettlement:

It would be immoral on my part to let incompetent people take up land. We should tackle the problem without fear of political undercurrents. None of us has the moral right to own land they cannot effectively use. If we spend a lot of money on resettlement and if the return is not realised, the purpose of resettlement will have failed. We cannot allow people to sit on expensive land and not work on it. He who has land has power and he who has the economic muscle will balance the economic future of this country. If the government fails to give land to the people, then our political intentions will become questionable (Moven Mahachi, Interview with *The Herald*, 27 May 1983).

Almost a decade later, while touring the Muzvezve and Jompani resettlement schemes the Lands and Agriculture Minister, Witness Mangwende, castigated the "lazy and uncommitted farmers for contributing to the low level of production in some areas" and suggested that it had become Government policy to "screen all farmers intending to join resettlement schemes in order to ensure maximum use of land" (*The Herald*, May 16 1990). It had become clear that the welfarist basis for the resettlement programme had come to haunt resettlement agriculture and strengthened the anti-resettlement lobby. The ODA evaluation reported that:

By far, the majority of settlers selected under the programme, that is, over 85%, were previously communal area farmers with the remainder being made up of refugees, ex-farm labourers and ex-combatants. Most settlers could generally have been considered as representing some of the poorest people in Zimbabwe (Cushworth, 1993).

Besides communal area farmers, some settlers were drawn from the urban slum clearance programmes of the late 80s and early 90s. Such settlers lacked a farming background and no livestock or basic implements to set up homesteads on allocated land.²⁸ Many families taking up land could not afford to build decent houses. It was considered important that as part of the resettlement benefits, housing be provided so that settlers would start farming immediately. This also became important as way of encouraging higher resettlement uptake. The Ministry of Public Construction and National Housing through its Rural Housing Programme was given the mandate to assist with advancing housing loans, recoverable from farmers. The task of providing houses was managed jointly with the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development under which the District Development Fund (DDF) was controlled. Rural housing was not meant for resettlement areas only. There was also the priority of communal areas under the rural reorganisation programme that built houses for people who volunteered to be settled in grids and those moving from areas where dams or roads were being constructed. At 1985 the rural housing waiting list was 950 000 but failed to attract as much money as the urban housing programme. The budget for the rural housing programme which covered business centres, resettlement areas and communal lands remained marginal. Based on the resettlement target of 5 000 families per year and on the 1995 value of Z\$28 000 per core-house per family the government needed to invest not less than Z\$140 million per year exclusively for resettlement housing, which was clearly not available.

As with the Swynnerton Plan in Kenya, Zimbabwe's resettlement programme did not establish a settlement grant in order to ensure that beneficiaries would set themselves up for productive activity. According to the calculation of the Chief Agricultural Economist for Makoni District:

... the level of poverty and primary differentiation was ownership of cattle by families at settlement was slightly below national average as more than 35% of the households did not have cattle upon settlement as compared to 25% at national level. Of the 35% who did not have cattle, only seven% more were able to own cattle by the end of the first ten year period. Some of

²⁸ In preparation for the visit of the Queen of England during the Commonwealth Heads of States General Meeting (CHOGM) meeting in Harare in 1991, Mugabe ordered the clearance of all slums between the airport and the main conference and hotel venues where delegates would be housed. It was important to impress British loyalty and to demonstrate that independence had not led to a destruction of the English civilisation entrusted to Mugabe at independence as British conservatives had anticipated and warned.

these people did not even own a *panga* with which to clear the land and let alone build housing structures. Wherever these are settled, they lag very much behind and their level of impoverishment is proverbial (Interview with CAE Makoni, 2003).

Those who settled in the 1990s suffered from an even more depreciated support level as government was downsizing and implementing ESAP-related fiscal discipline. This meant reduced government subsidies for rural commodities prices, increasing prices and many other hardships. Revised resettlement guidelines of 1983 changed the beneficiaries to include people with farming ability (Cushworth and Walker, 1988).

Conclusion

What can be concluded from this section is that a number of factors including the nature of resettlement models, the amount of land allocated and the selection of beneficiaries impacted negatively on productivity, which could only increase under a well funded and organised programme. Not only were the potential beneficiaries of land reform far fewer than hoped but the take-up was smaller than was theoretically possible according to the state. The people themselves did not favour the kind of choices made available to them. The models were too limited and prescriptive. Even if they appeared many enough to provide choices, in reality the choices were too limited as model placement was decided at government level (central government in Harare). Each scheme was designed with a specific model in mind and the ability of beneficiaries to choose outside their district was limited as there was need to reduce transfer and location costs. The next chapter considers the support measures put in place to improve African agriculture in the resettlement schemes.

Chapter Six

The Institutional Environment for Resettlement Agriculture, 1980 - 2000

This chapter discusses the institutional and structural arrangements made for African agriculture in the resettlement. The levels of neglect in the African reserves (later Tribal Trust Lands) and the Purchase Areas left a huge gap in the infrastructure of the African sector. A post-independence programme for African agriculture would have to address this through vigorous infrastructure investment. African areas were characterised by poor road, rail, irrigation, storage depots and communication systems. New institutions were also needed to manage and transform the relations of production in the African areas. A comparison of unit capital investment per hectare of white land and that of the African sector bears testimony to the disparities that the new Zimbabwe government inherited.

Agricultural infrastructure does not consist only of farm based equipment and infrastructure even if this is crucial to production. Agricultural infrastructure includes the road network, the railway system, the input and output storage and handling facilities and the river systems and dams. Social infrastructure, such as the school and health system, is crucial to the capacity of a modern agricultural economy. The Rhodesian farmers numbering about 8500 around 1970 and down to about 5000 at 1980, with few exceptions had all the above. In clusters of service – shared river systems (and dams); a state subsidised Road and Rail Motor Service attending to distribution and delivery; hefty and long term low interest loans for the development of on-farm equipment for handling and developing the land – the Rhodesian farmers could afford to break into the local and international market and command an enviable standard of living.

The physical environment of Zimbabwe allowed for such farmers to be mostly located along the Great Dyke and the highveld, a very fertile strip stretching from west to east across the centre of the country. This was important for three important reasons. Firstly, this limited the agricultural activities that could be engaged in one area and had specific infrastructural advantages for ensuring increased productivity. It was therefore possible in drier areas to set up a shared dam, for instance Lake Kyle in Masvingo, and then service individual farm needs. Yet this dam would have been costly if it was built for farming only;

support. It was also important that the technical and theoretical basis of the models was sound and in keeping with economic planning adopted for the rest of the economy. The government needed to link and synchronise agriculture properly with the rest of the economy. This would facilitate beneficial horizontal and vertical integration of rural livelihoods with the economy as a whole. The quick fix solutions that characterised post-colonial planning in Zimbabwe would not yield any transformation.

The resettlement schemes were established on the margins of both the commercial and communal areas. The fact that schemes were carved out of the former LSCF gave government the false sense that resettlement schemes had better access to infrastructure than communal areas. Resettlement schemes faced more odds compared to the other competing tenure systems and land use in the agricultural sector notwithstanding that they were the government's flagship for post-colonial agriculture through which it intended to transform the sector. This makes it important to measure the seriousness of ZANU PF's transformation talk. By 1990 the expansion of the resettlement sector proceeded at a snail's pace as land being acquired after 1985 was channelled to elite resettlement. Once political interest and pressure for the resettlement programme ebbed, the beneficiaries of land in this sector became a forgotten constituency.

International and Donor Support for the Resettlement Programme

One of the key issues at Lancaster House had been the role of Britain in the colonisation process and the past exploitation as well as sustenance of imperial exploitation of Zimbabwe.²⁹ It is interesting therefore, to consider the role and part played by the international community to assist the newly independent state to achieve social, economic and political stability and further democracy. At the ZIMCORD conference held for donors in 1981 the new government emphasized resettlement as a significant cornerstone in fulfilling the promises of land made during the liberation struggle and financial votes in

²⁹ The British commitment to the Zimbabwean resettlement programme had been fully disbursed by the end of 1987. Mugabe approached the government of John Major in 1988 to ask for increased support as the programme had not been completed. Mugabe is on record suggesting that the British government reneged on its promises. This seems to be more a difference in semantics than in facts. As suggested earlier, the Kenyan Independence programme for Africanisation and economic transformation in the 1960s was funded. In the case of Zimbabwe, the Lancaster House Agreement was more a constitutional document than a development and transformation plan. It left a lot of issues, including land, to interpretation. As such it becomes difficult to fault either the Zimbabwean or British government as lying and distorting facts as they express opinions based on their calculations and interpretation of the facts.

grants and aid were made by various countries (Rukuni and Jensen, 2003: 248).³⁰ The combination of British and American promises at Lancaster plus ZIMCORD saw “the massive infusion of aid resources into Zimbabwe since 1980 – totaling about \$1.8 billion by October 1984” (Herald, 21.02.1985). By the end of 1986, more than 378 000 people had been resettled on 2, 06 million ha at a total cost of over \$100m. This placed settlers at three percent of the rural population on 6.8 percent of rural land. Among the external donors to the resettlement programmes were Britain, the African Development Bank, the Kuwait Fund, the European Economic Community and the US government (Report of the MLARD, 1987). The EEC co-funded 16 resettlement projects under two agreements namely the Intensive Resettlement Programme of 1980 and the Fifth European Development Fund of 1983. The British government had transferred a total of \$115 million of development aid money between 1980 and 1985, of which \$50 million went to land and resettlement related programmes.

The resettlement placement required that basic infrastructure be developed ahead of settling farmers. Table 6.1 below indicates the key areas of development aid usage. The level of investment required ahead of settlement also led to delays in the settlement pace. However, the increased targets for resettlement meant that development aid was split across many projects.

Table 6.1: Annual Expenditure on Infrastructure, 1989 Constant ZS'000

	<i>80/81</i>	<i>81/82</i>	<i>82/83</i>	<i>83/84</i>	<i>84/85</i>	<i>85/86</i>	<i>86/87</i>	<i>87/88</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>School</i>	51	519	5 031	7 535	2 247	4,724	2,294	11,387	33,788
<i>Clinics</i>	0	0	311	525	223	1 209	153	754	3 175
<i>Infrastructure</i>	955	3 492	8 941	9 921	5 322	16 126	1 661	17 110	63 528
<i>Land</i>	9 257	34 461	42 461	7 833	4 882	4 935	491	3 322	107 642
<i>Purchase</i>									208
<i>Total</i>	10 263	38 472	56 744	25 814	12 674	26 994	4 599	32 573	133

Source: Cushworth, 1990.

The British Lancaster House Agreement commitment of £20 million in grants supporting the land resettlement programme was increased to £30 million at the ZIMCORD conference in 1981. This money would be matched by the government of Zimbabwe on a fifty/fifty

³⁰ Notwithstanding the Leninist-Marxist reverse rhetoric, Britain the former colonial power and the USA, and not the USSR, China or other communist aligned states, were the major donors.

basis (Cushworth and Walker, 1998: 5). To allow for proper use of funds in a country that had not developed capacity and record for project management and grant absorption, a disbursement formula was established as follows.

Table 6.2: Grant Disbursement Pattern

<i>Year</i>	<i>Amount in £</i>
1980/81	1, 172 175.81
1981/82	1, 650 955.00
1982/83	4, 257 954.09
1983/84	1, 036 655.73
1984/85	1, 964 481.57
1985/86	1, 484 792.95
1986/87	1, 157 466.31
1987/88	922 000.00
Total	13, 646 000.46

Source: ODA, 1997: 23

According to the above table, the British government met its commitments to the resettlement programme co-funding the implementation of 70 resettlement projects. This was done under four agreements, namely; the UK Grant and UK Commodity Import Programme loan (1981); UK Commodity Import Programme Loan Development (1984); UK Commodity Important Grant (1985) and UK Commodity Import Program Grant (1989) to a total value of \$40.5 million (DDF, 1995: 17).

Table 6.3: British Support and Expenditure on Resettlement Schemes

<i>Grant</i>	<i>Value</i>	<i>Schemes and allocation</i>
1981		25 model A and 18 model B schemes and paid for 667 647ha to settle 12 660 settlers in Model A villages with \$20 million going to 50% of all expenditure including land acquisition
1984	\$10 million, linked to ZIMCORD	Infrastructure development for 12 schemes covering 309 705 ha for the resettlement of 4 928 families
1985	\$ 5 million	Infrastructure development for 20 schemes comprising of 295 056 ha in extent and catering for 5 377 settler families.
1989	\$2.5 million	Infrastructural development ONLY, on 13 schemes covering a total of 144 572 ha for 2 369 settlers

Source: DDF, 1995: 6

In line with the British preference for Model A schemes over the Model B co-operative alternative, by 1988 they had funded 44 individual schemes of which 37 were Model A and the remainder being the Model B schemes. The ODA retained the right to decide which of

the schemes in the programme it would fund through the established appraisal procedure.³¹ The Lancaster House and ZIMCORD £30 million had been spent by the end of the 1987 financial year. As President, following the Unit Accord with Joshua Nkomo's PF ZAPU and moving to the establishment of a Republic, Mugabe negotiated renewed and increased funding with the Thatcher administration and re-negotiated with the Major administration. The basis for demanding extra funding was the land resettlement programme had not been completed and had been more expensive than what had originally estimated.

The norm was that donors supported government programmes at a very broad level rather than for specific project but some high profile schemes received direct funding and support from foreign donors. The German Agro-Action (GAA) of the then Federal Republic of Germany assisted some resettlement schemes through the Zimbabwe Freedom from Hunger Campaign by supporting programmes for water supply, hand tools and agricultural inputs. The Germans preferred to support specific schemes on an ongoing basis to ensure sustainability. Through such funding, the Vuti Scheme received building materials as well as skilled labour and equipment for the scheme clinic, staff housing, workshop, two cars and a motor bicycle from the GAA (*Herald*, 25 April, 1986).

Zimbabwe's rate of aid utilization was considered "reasonable" while on some projects especially in the resettlement areas, aid absorption was seen as "fairly slow, and frustrating some donors" (*Herald*, 21 February, 1985). Prolonged negotiations between the Government and the donors also added to the delays in disbursement. The Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development (MFEPD), stated that "in a number of cases, some donors delayed in responding to our requests and proposals to utilize aid resources" (*Herald*, 21 February 1986). Donor aid conditions required that the government of Zimbabwe update them on the use of their money while others preferred certain

³¹ During the implementation, the ODA continued to offer support but also exerted influence over the elements of the programmes it supported by financial control; through the Annual Joint Review and also through its support for the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (MEU) within the MLRRD. Financial control was exerted through the disbursement procedure adopted under the terms of the Grant in Aid resettlement (ODA, 1988). The financing arrangements allowed the ODA to have oversight on expenditure through joint auditing and expenditure control with ARDA. By comparison this approach was preferred to the EEC system which required that EEC officials had to check expenditure details against receipts, bills and invoices. This was seen as intrusive by the GoZ. To ensure that expenditure was actually being used to achieve the expected and planned outputs, the joint GoZ/UK Annual Review of Resettlement was established, the first being in 1982. By 1986, the UK had ceased accepting new schemes prioritized the completion of existing programmes and by the 1987/88 the total UK funding and surplus funds had been fully committed.

programmes over others. A GAA report was critical of investment in African agriculture and resettlement as not necessarily leading to a significant shift in the living conditions of the African communities, unless done at a massive level. To ensure that donor aid was used appropriately, donors asked for involvement in the co-ordination and use of donor aid and demanded that:

The objectives of the development plan had to be translated into concrete programmes of actions and projects. The exercise always takes time for the implementing ministries to complete, and as a result there has not been sufficient numbers of pipeline projects for donors to consider (*The Herald*, 21 February 1985).

As interest on Zimbabwe in International donor communities waned, fewer resources remained available for capital projects. As early as 1984, the Belgian Government closed its aid division office in Harare and administered Zimbabwean donor activities from their Lusaka offices, blaming the Zimbabwean government for the slow rate of disbursement. The development attaché for the Belgian Embassy in Harare, Alain van de Straeten, complained that:

...There [seemed] to be a total lack of co-ordination in the government ministries and people keep on changing. I know they are trying to speed up things, but between trying and succeeding there is a big difference ... [citing a case where] the Belgian and Zimbabwean governments had for three years discussed the signing of a technical co-operation agreement that would bring Belgian experts to work in Zimbabwe” but never got to be concluded (*The Herald*, 21.02.1985).³²

He stated that while they had moved to Lusaka to cut administrative costs, it was the slowness in taking up and using donor aid that made the Belgian-Zimbabwean relationship frustrating. He also revealed that in one year only two out of 20 scholarships had been taken up while in another, the Ministry of Manpower Planning and Development (MMPD) as advertise scholarships in the local press well after the deadline for applications, was forced to leading the Belgian government to withdraw its scholarship programme from Zimbabwe.

³² Two issues had led to the negotiations collapsing with the agreement not having been signed, namely: the question of free housing for the experts to work in mining, agriculture and water resources development and the question of transferring the proceeds of the sale of experts' household effects and car, when emigrating. The Zimbabwean government felt that as the experts were going to be remunerated within the programme budget, it would be a burden on the bulk of the donor aid to be obliged to pay for housing and also to extend tax rebates to the levels demanded. This had the net effect of absorbing the bulk of the donor money to sustaining the experts' luxurious living standard at the expense of development.

One of the major donors to the Zimbabwe resettlement programme was the American Government through USAID. The American donor office however had a different experience and were generally pleased with the rate of donor uptake. Between 1980 and 1985 the US had committed about US\$316 million for which US\$190 million had been used considered satisfactory for a country emerging from war and running a small and inexperienced bureaucracy. The United States through its International Aid Agency helped to resolve the funding stalemate arising from the UK's insistence to pay its commitments to resettlement as claim on completed work. The US provided an advance package and also sourced funds from the European Economic Commission (EEC) for this purpose.

Some donors supported specific projects as cited in table 6.4 below. This allowed them to monitor the impact of their contribution on the recipient communities.

Table 6.4: Summary of Supported Schemes and Funding Allocations

<i>Scheme</i>	<i>Source of funding</i>	<i>Activities Supported</i>	<i>Value of funding</i>
Chinyika	African Bank	Development	113 752 ha
Mid-Zambezi Valley	African Bank	Development	Establish school, teachers' houses, clinic, dipping and farming facilities, toilet facilities for 4 800 families, 42 boreholes
Macheke-Wenimbe, Msasa-Maringa, Mushandike Dryland and Irrigation Capacity development	African Bank Commonwealth Technical Trust in conjunction with UNDP	Development	Rehabilitation of dip Fencing (scheme and village boundary) Woodlot development Rehabilitation of roads Water supply and clinic renovation Sanitation 30 Trainees per year involved in the resettlement in various capacities to be trained at the Ranch House College in Harare starting in 1983
Accelerated Resettlement Programme	European Community	Economic	The fast-track placement of people without infrastructure on acquired land
Health service centre	European Community	Economic	\$250 000 worth of health centre for the Mhondoro-Ngezi resettlement scheme of more than 500 families
Houses in RA	Germany Reconstruction (KFW)	Bank for	Initially established for gully reclamation on rural areas

The inter-ministerial nature of resettlement establishment and support meant that there would be delays in project planning, implementation and roll out. Aid for commodity import was absorbed more quickly than project and reconstruction aid – such as in

agriculture where environmental, planning and resettlement required inter-ministerial co-operation and stakeholder involvement. A diplomat explained that:

It is in the interest of the international development community that aid is quickly used up. For the donor country, disbursement is never quick enough because aid disbursed slowly is bad publicity back home because the tax payer will complain. The problem of aid absorption is a worldwide issue and not specific to Zimbabwe alone. It is a problem that cannot be blamed on the receiving country only, but also on the donor country (*Herald*, 21 January 1985).

For the donor countries it was worrisome that it was difficult to obtain detailed information on projects from ministries and in some cases it was impossible to obtain definite answers to queries, thus leading to low disbursement. However, a highly placed Government official in the Land Ministry felt that some demands for information meant that most of their scarce planning officers had to spend more time on report writing and updating rather than on project development and felt that in some cases the information requirements of the donors were too unreasonable. He argued that:

In some cases donor countries required a lot of documentation, project evaluations and other information and it took time for the recipient country to prepare the information required by the donor. This was made even more difficult by the shortage in skilled manpower that was acute soon after independence. Many educated black people were absorbed in the growing private sector, leaving government services in dire need for skilled development planners and professionals (Mr Jinya, Personal Interview, May 2003).

As the colonial system had developed bottlenecks in the education system, very few blacks were qualified to take up planning positions after independence. Many Rhodesians had opted to leave as they felt that their future was not guaranteed in spite of Mugabe's reassurances. This left a huge capacity gap in the state bureaucracy.

During the Three Year Transitional National Development Plan (1982 to 1985), 31 percent of the public sector investment plan (PSIP) went to rural development related programmes. The PSIP was financed by the budget, ZIMCORD loans and grants as well as revenue from public corporations to a tune of \$3 618 million over three years. While the rural development budget looks big, it was split over many priority areas such as land

resettlement, the construction of roads on acquired farms, bridges and schools, clinics, development of water supplies and agricultural extension services.

Table 6.5: Comparison of Rural Development Budget with other Service, 1983/1984

<i>Sector</i>	<i>Budgetary Allocation</i>
Rural development	31 %
Housing	21.9 %
Social services	19.5%
Transport and communications	17.3%
Energy and water development	10.5%

Source: Compile from 1983/84 Budget statement

Records indicate that under the resettlement and rural development programme funding was allocated for the development of effective methods to manage rural resources, the expansion of the co-operative movement with the establishment of a college at Domboshawa and depots and distribution/collection centres. Feasibility studies on special problems arising in resettlement schemes were established. Records of what was actually achieved are sketchy. In the 1990s government support for resettlement and communal farmers completely disappeared. MP Chipango of Harare West (*Debates*, 1994: 840) raised the problem of the withdrawal of subsidies which lead to the failure of vital services. He argued:

Amongst them was [sic] the subsidies on maize, which was scrapped, as was that on flour and milk ... we understand that in Europe the agricultural industry is heavily subsidised by the central government. Here in Zimbabwe we do not have any social services funds. When these subsidies were removed, we just deserted our people and this has increased a lot of suffering (*Debates*, 1994: 841).

Political and Bureaucratic Responsibility over Resettlement Agriculture

The responsibility for the resettlement schemes was subject to multiple ministerial agents. The resettlement drive was divided into component parts that were made responsibilities of different departments (agents) of different ministries. The administrative arrangements for the schemes proved difficult from a co-ordination point of view and left the operational capacity of the government overstretched. The complicated co-ordination requirements made the support for schemes a bureaucratic nightmare. Agricultural sector policy aimed to influence social and economic development with the aim of bringing the formerly neglected African section of the population aboard. This was outlined under the principles of reconciliation and egalitarianism which the newly elected ZANU PF government aimed to

achieve through the socialist path. Policy was used to set boundaries and parameters within which institutions, farmers, programmes and projects operated. The Agriculture Ministry's mission and functions included:

To promote and sustain a viable agricultural sector based on the implementation of sound agricultural policies which optimise productivity through the provision of appropriate technical, administrative and advisory services (GoZ, 1983b: 6).

Agricultural policy was built on four key pillars which were, namely; (i) the transformation of smallholder agriculture into a fully commercial farming system, (ii) achieving an average increase in total agricultural output that is significantly larger than the increase in population each year, (iii) to foster the full development of physical and social infrastructure in all the rural areas throughout the country, and (iv) the development of fully sustainable farming systems throughout the country which reverses current environmental degradation and social erosion (GoZ, 1983a: x).

The functions of the Ministry was to produce a viable agricultural sector policy in co-operation with all major players in the agricultural ministry, establish strategies and guidelines for the implementation of policy objectives through various Technical Departments and other players in the agricultural industry. Another level of functions included the provision of the necessary support services to all relevant institutions in the most appropriate effective and efficient manner. It seemed that the MLRD would carry out the implementation while the Agriculture Ministry would assess and monitor the impact of the National Agricultural Policy. The implications that went with stewardship of the Agriculture Ministry over the Land and Resettlement Ministry were disliked by officials in the latter (Interview, Jinya).

Table 6.6 below indicates a smaller role for Ministry of Agriculture in the resettlement programme, especially Model A schemes. The Ministry of Agriculture, through ARDA dealt with the state models, C and D. This released the Agriculture Ministry to deal mostly with the needs of the largely white owned large scale commercial farming sector.³³ Land

³³ Denis Norman was the first Minister of Agriculture serving from 1980 until 1992. He was the former President of the Rhodesia National Farmers' Union (which became the Commercial Farmers' Union after independence). He wrote a Foreword to *THE FARMER AT WAR* [Trevor Grundy and Bernard Miller, Modern Farming Publications, Salisbury 1979]: "This is a salute to our farmers — white and black farmers and their families who have been in the frontline of the terror war for more than a decade. The Farmer at War is also a

redistribution was a child of the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement. Infrastructure development fell under the District Development Fund (DDF) located in the Department of Rural Development (DERUDE) of the Ministry of Local Government, Urban and Rural Development. DERUDE was expected to coordinate all the 'rural development' projects in the context of 'integrated rural development. Extension services were provided by the Agricultural Extension Services Department (AGRITEX) of the Ministry of Agriculture.³⁴

Table 6.6: Ministerial and Department Responsibility Chart

<i>Area of Support</i>	<i>Responsible Department or Agent</i>	<i>Responsible Ministry</i>
Land acquisition and selection	Department of Land Resettlement and later assigned to provincial Governors (resident ministers)	Ministry of Land Resettlement, Ministry of National Affairs, Ministry of Local Development, Rural and Urban Planning
Water and road development	District Development Fund (DDF)	Ministry of Local Government
Schools and clinics	Department of Rural Development (DERUDE)	Ministry of Local Government
Loans and inputs	Agriculture Finance Corporation	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
Model B Schemes	Co-operatives Department	National Affairs then MYGEC
Model C and D support	Agricultural and Rural Development Authority	Ministry of Agriculture
Extension services	Agritex	Ministry of Land Resettlement and Rural Development

Resettlement Officers employed by DERUDE had the overall duty to develop and authority over the daily operation of each scheme. Agricultural extension officer were concerned with the agricultural specific activities of the scheme's life and operations in ensuring that the settlers obtained all the advice they needed to be fully productive. The Resettlement Officer was assisted by a team of staff including clerical staff as well as field orderlies. The Ministry of National Affairs, responsible for the welfare of ex-combatants and veterans of the liberation struggle drew up the lists of settlers, a function later placed under Provincial Governors. The Ministry of Youth, Gender and Cooperatives (MYGEC) was responsible for the Model B co-operative schemes.

tribute to those in commerce and industry who provide vital services to agriculture; a tribute to agronomists, extension and veterinary officers in both the public and private sectors; a tribute to the Police and Security Forces. Their combined contribution is incalculable. Foremost, however, this salute is to the women behind the men — the farming wives. In them lies the strength of our nation.

³⁴ Agritex was formed from the merger of DEVAG, the Department of Agricultural Development and CONEX in 1981, mostly a continuation in the thinking and approach of colonial policy. The biggest and only change was the increased number of extension officials servicing the African areas.

The political office charged with land transfer, was the Ministry of Land Resettlement and Rural Development (MLRARD). The idea was that land reform and resettlement would become the basis for rural development, agriculture being a separate and independent ministry. These complementing and yet competing departments lacked the rational, over-all management of the European agrarian economy and its links with the urban economy (Ranger, 1978: 123). The result was a programme in which different sub-programmes and functions were handled by agents of separate ministries. The lack of coherence and single structure co-coordinating resettlement agriculture was a result of differences among senior officials that often straddled from the personal to the political, suggested a senior political figure close to the process (Didymus Mutasa, Interview 2003). Planners continuously called for:

... a national umbrella organisation uniting all co-operatives, expanding existing communes for use as training centres, establishing two big co-operative resettlement schemes in each province to lead by example, attaching a full-time Agritex official on each project, to live and act as a manager, and halting the sub-division of commercial farms bought by the government, instead of resettling them as a unit (Mutasa, interview 2003).

These suggestions were not followed up as they threatened the power base and viability of ministries that also needed to access the resource made available for the resettlement programme by donors. The problem caused by the duties of the different ministries in resettlement schemes was still an issue as late as 1994 as suggested by the MP for Magwegwe, Mr Zikhali:

Mr. Speaker, you approach the Minister of Lands, he will tell you that, all he does is to give the Minister of Rural Resettlement land if he wants it. If he does not want it, the Minister of Lands does nothing. The Minister of Rural Resettlement appears to be saying nothing. It is as if people do not want land anymore. Why should Government develop cold feet? Why cannot Government acquire land and resettle people? What was the purpose of passing the Land Acquisition Act? It is now gathering dust on the shelves of Ministers. People are asking questions. They see what we are doing. We come here and make a lot of noise and then they say, Oh there is a man- for example, they can say Mr. Nyandoro is a man. Thereafter we retreat into our shells. We cannot go on like that. People want land and let us have it (Debates, 11th October, 1994).

A Monitoring and Evaluation Unit was established under the Ministry of Resettlement and Rural Development in 1984 with technical assistance from the ODA. In 1985 the first systematic and workable model for the evaluation was put in place by the M&E Unit which “set up an annual sample household survey across a range of Model A schemes which collected data on farm incomes and other socio-economic indicators” (Cushworth in Bowyer-Bowyer, 2000: 26). The Monitoring Unit became a major source of information and policy decisions. The 1988 ODA report as well as the 1991 World Bank reports drew heavily upon the work of this unit.³⁵

The responsibility for the land reform and resettlement kept on changing from one ministry to the next and various responsibilities were in ministries where the other ministry had no control over some parts of the process. A Joint Ministerial Committee on Resettlement was set up to co-ordinate the programme. In 1990, the MP for Makokoba, Sidney Malunga, asked for a separate land resettlement ministry arguing:

... a separate ministry should be established soon because we are going to have problems associated with land redistribution for the next 50 to 100 years ... also there is a lot of underhand dealing in the resettlement process. ...corruption, poor planning, poor co-ordination, lack of infrastructure and inadequate commitment to the land resettlement programme are the major causes of poor record in resolving the land question (Debates, 23 October 1990).

³⁵ The role and place of resettlement in the development of the economy was subject of contention even within government circles. For resettlement to achieve the objectives of agrarian transformation as well as the intended impacts on society it is necessary to have a clear programme and political will among those charged with its implementation and policy formulation. By the end of the 1980s clear divisions and lobby had emerged. While the ruling party continued with the transformation rhetoric evidence on the ground betrayed a big sense of fatigue. Organised commercial agriculture also brought in an important lobby in parliament casting doubt on the efficacy of resettlement programmes and its potential to advance the agriculture sector. On the other hand, technocists and conservationist elements within the bureaucratic circles as well as some academics questioned resettlement agriculture raising concerns about deterioration of conditions. Those questioning resettlement policy and implementation pointed to poor performance and conditions in the resettlement areas as reason why the government should re-consider the programme. Organised agriculture pointed to what was wrong with resettlement but did not offer to provide training to farmers contiguous to their operations. This is what Justice for Agriculture proposed as a way forward after the land invasions. Justice for Agriculture, a group trying to negotiate a deal between the hard line Government policy and hard line Commercial Farmers Union stance on challenging government re-possession of farms started to propose related regimes of support where new farmers would benefit from the expertise of experienced farmers forming a nucleus in an area surrounded by new farm owners after land subdivisions. The assumption was that organised agriculture opposed resettlement because of their desire to maintain the status quo in the agricultural sector.

The departments suffered from lack of skills and lost many of its enthusiastic workers to the private sector. By 2000 no such separate ministry with complete control over resettlement schemes had been created and coordination problems persisted.

Credit in Resettlement Agriculture

One of the key challenges to resettlement agriculture was the question of credit facilities. It was clear that, given their background, resettled farmers required credit and support to be successful as the situation of capital, resource and environmental degradation would stand in the way of sustainability. Existing financial institutions at independence were hostile to the extension of credit to the rural communities and the Agriculture Finance Corporation had to be mandated with designing a facility for this sector. It was considered desirable (by modernisers in government) to establish 'land banks' through which 'new capital' in the form of credit could be extended to the peasant farmers (Nabudere, 1989: 21).

The resettlement sector suffered huge financial problems (Bond, 1998; Amin, 1999). The allocation of loans and budgetary allocation to the resettlement sector remained very negligible in comparison to allocations to the LSCF sector (see table below). To begin with, the government did not create a new institution as a vehicle for addressing the loan and credit requirements of the new sector. The Agriculture Finance Corporation (AFC) was charged with the task of extending its service to cater for this new sector with very negative results. The relationship between the AFC and the resettlement farmers remained characterized by suspicion and accusations. African farmers were seen as a risky sector because of the high levels of defaults, while the AFC was accused of being insensitive to the conditions of these farmers.

According to Dan Nabudere (1989), the nature and extent of credit should be understood more critically and the thinking that cash injections would modernise and reverse the conditions of poverty among the rural poor is a myth. Credit to the white commercial sector took a wider form. The creation and maintenance of a black dependent subsistence sector supplying cheap labour to the white commercial sector was itself a major form of credit which facilitated primitive accumulation for white capitalist enterprise. In the case, the rural traditional sector became:

... the base for cheap labour and cheap raw materials and food. The low wage policy was based on traditional cheap subsistence policy which the African woman and child bore the brunt of (Nabudere, 1989: 22)

In the designing of the credit system for African agriculture therefore, there was need to calculate such credit beyond a simply inputs and technology transfer costs but a whole regime of other factors determining production. Such a formula needed to have borne in mind that for the white settler, the low wage was in fact the basis of the credit system considering that credit can only be advanced on the expectation that some valuable material goods or services will be produced. The low margin of surplus and profit in the resettlement sector placed the credit institutions in the place of agents of further impoverishment of the same people they were created to assist. When applied at a lower level that does not lead to surplus creation, credit can become a major constraint to growth. It has been suggested that:

The argument which then holds that the rural poor need agrarian reform in order to improve their own lot, but on the basis of credit which will enable them to improve their productivity and modernize production, has to be repudiated as a big lie! (Nabudere, 1989: 22).

The credit facilities made available for resettlement farmers after independence were maintained at the level of keeping beneficiaries going, as opposed to transforming them into independent producers. In 1982 the government set up the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) to advance loans to all farmers and especially the peasant farmers who could not access credit from private facilities as they did not have collateral. The Manicaland Provincial AFC started with a client base of 747 clients in 1982 following the establishment of the Mayo and Chinyika Resettlement Schemes in the province.

In 1985, between April 1 and October 31, the AFC processed 100 000 loans of which 97 000 went to farmers in the communal, resettlement schemes as well as small scale commercial farming sector. This meant a huge percentage of loans going to the African sector; however, measured in real economic and loan value measure, less than \$50 million out of a total of \$158 million disbursed to the 100 000 recipients went to African farmers. In terms of value per person, it means that 97% of the recipients shared about \$50 million while 3% of the recipients had about \$110 million between themselves. At 1979 only \$1.5 million had been allocated to the African sector, rising steadily to \$41 million in 1984. From

million in 1985. Commercial farmers' buying orders were withheld if they were not paying back previous loans; this was to encourage them to make arrangements to pay back the loans. Peasant loans are guaranteed by the Government but the AFC was duty bound to keep the bad debt as small as possible (AFC Financial Report, 1985).

Resettlement farmers were upset with the (AFC) as well as the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and the input supply unions for delays in supplying required services timeously and cheaply. The AFC and Ministry of Agriculture also traded blame with the resettlement farmers for not paying back their loans. Resettlement producers were accused of by-passing the marketing channels in order to avoid the AFC deductions on loans advanced. AFC loans were not interest free. For the first \$1000 a five percent levy was charged while for the next \$1000 a two percent levy became payable while the rest attracted 13 percent per annum. In a bad year, farmers had to negotiate the terms of payment to a longer period. This loan regime encouraged co-operatives to borrow less money than they really needed as more money attracted more interest repayment.

By 1988 the AFC had written off \$18.6 million in bad debt and non-recovered loans. This amount was recovered from the state.³⁶ According to Dan Nabudere (1989: 22), such a write-off, "ties the state in the debt-trap for in order to repay the banks it has to borrow more from them, making the state the agent of banks and monopoly capital in the impoverishment of the poor." It is important therefore that agrarian reform and credit provision does not become a counter-productive tool that has the effect of eroding the sustainability of the people the state seeks to improve. The level of credit was not so high and yet there were concerns that the money was being put to waste. A back-bencher alluded to the fact that he was aware of farmers who had used their money to pay lobola and for weddings (Herald, 04.02.1988). In the House of Assembly, Henry Elsworth complained that from the land bought for resettlement in the Midlands province:

A 150 000 herd of cattle had been displaced, from which the Government had lost \$7.2 million in beef exports to Europe and \$20 million locally. The loss on irrigated crops was about \$13 million and on wildlife, about \$3 million. In all the country had lost a total of \$43 million to resettlement projects in the province (Debates, 3 February, 1988).

³⁶ Not actually a very large sum given the number of loans and also indicative of the reality for agriculture anywhere which always needs this kind of support in one form or another

By 1988 the Estimates Committee was investigating ARDA and AFC for possible abuses of loans and equipment. The house heard that 35% of the loans given out by the AFC were bad debt that could not be recovered. This is despite a general decline in support extended to the African farming sector, especially from 1987.

The AFC report for Mashonaland Province indicates that in 1987 25 000 African farmers in the resettlement and communal sector received \$17 million in short term loans but by 1990 the figure had dropped drastically to 6 200 recipients of loans worth \$5 million only. This drop in the loans released had to do with the low recovery rate as many farmers increasingly failed to break even. The report added:

The AFC is finding it difficult to trace some of the farmers who got loans. The farmers get our loans and go into hiding. That is why we are having about \$3 million in unclaimed refunds. People do not want to come and get their cheques as they do not want to make good on what they owe (Mashonaland AFC Report, August 1990).

The Deputy Minister for Lands, Agricultural Resettlement and Rural Development (MLARD), Dr Swithun Mombeshora, addressing the beneficiaries of the Vuti Integrated Rural Development Programme, acknowledged this problem suggesting:

My ministry is aware of the problems in the area of credit, input supply and marketing that bedevil the peasant sector ... which takes the form of late delivery of inputs, inaccessibility to credit, lack of farm management skills, including inability to keep records and to follow book-keeping practices (Herald, 25.04.1986).

To solve these problems, Dr Mombeshora suggested that the Government was convinced that the formation of cooperatives would be a panacea for these challenges.

My Ministry in line with the national policy of growth with equity, implements programmes to expand the agricultural industry by equitable distribution of land ... and through these programmes raise the standard of living in rural areas and improve land and labour productivity. A good pricing policy and the provision of necessary technical services are among the factors that could ensure high productivity. Very much so before engaging in any agricultural enterprise, the farmer considers his technical ability to do so, agronomic conditions, production costs, potential yield and

return, and the government will do everything to ensure that all farmers, especially the peasant, maximize their income. Through monitoring and evaluation of the resettlement programme the Government could check if the best land use was being achieved by the settler (Herald, 25.04.1986).

The cooperative schemes were not the answer to these problems as most of the cooperative based schemes were failing. They suffered from poor management as well as poor support. Support for the farmers in the resettlement sector remained comparatively very low throughout the period being studied.

Infrastructure Investment for Resettlement Agriculture

Social services and infrastructure investment are essential in developing a sector, while credit can be seen as the life blood upon which an economy is constructed in a capitalist system. Some of the key challenges in resettlement schemes included those of the general lack of services such as clinics, school and shopping centres for consumer goods as well as hardware shops and agriculture supply shops. The problems in the resettlement schemes were brought to parliament for discussion (13 October, 1982). Mr Mangisi raised concern with “resettlement schemes without basic infrastructure ...” raising a debate “on agricultural extension services with a view to enhancing their productivity” Mangisi encouraged that infrastructure be provided before people were resettled.

Things such as water, clinics, roads and schools should be there before people are resettled. The reason is in some cases, people have to be resettled far away from areas they used to stay and that will mean that if they cannot go together with their school going children to the new area, it will be very difficult for those people, firstly to be resettled because they cannot do without their children. ... surely we cannot resettle people where there is no water and where there are no clinics. People cannot travel more than 30 km to a clinic. That is difficult. I urge government to put in the basic infrastructure before resettling people (Debates, 1982: 2766).

Addressing the Senate, Dennis Norman called for better services for emergent farmers and more productive land use. He argued that more services including road depots and dips were needed to ensure agricultural growth among the resettlement farmers. Arguing:

You cannot allocate and abandon emergent farmers. Financial provisions must be guaranteed. Change of land ownership had consequential effects on the agricultural industry such as a further decline in employment as

resettlement families tended to depend largely on family labour (Debates, 1984).

A variety of measures were put in place to facilitate production following settlement. Firstly, land was ploughed by DDF and beneficiaries were provided free seed packs and insecticides for the first planting season. From the second season, settlers became eligible for a resettlement loan fund, administered by the AFC, to buy inputs as well as contract tractors for ploughing as most farmers did not have draught animals upon settlement. Access to credit was one of the key services introduced for turning African agriculture to become productive.

Minister of Agriculture Moven Mahachi, had accounted for the low production in resettlement schemes by suggesting that “people who had been settled under the resettlement programme did not know how to farm” but the review team’s findings suggest that “the reason for the slow development of the full utilization of the land was not so much ignorance as that settlers did not have enough draught power” (*Herald*, 12 September 1982). The joint team recommended that the Agriculture Finance Corporation and the Cold Storage Commission should develop a scheme for resettled farmers to buy oxen. The team also established that ‘most of the land which has been bought so far is in areas of poor rainfall, making the establishment of settlements expensive’ (British-Zimbabwe Report, 1982). A survey on services in the resettlement schemes by the *Sunday Mail* in 1986 showed that many resettlement schemes had poor transport. Nyakavanhu established 40km outside of Chivu in Mashonaland did not have a regular bus since its establishment two years earlier in 1984 for instance.

Addressing the National Assembly in response to the President’s State of the Nation address, non-constituency Member of Parliament, Obert Mpofo demanded that the question of transport be dealt with quicker and with more seriousness. He argued:

The transport problem must be addressed urgently and in such a manner that the solutions had a profound effect on the entire population [asking], what is the use of buying aeroplanes, when we can’t provide buses for the common man? (Debates, 12 December 1989).

It took long for secondary education to be provided for resettlement children and where schools were made available, they were too scattered to serve many people conveniently. In the Nyakavanhu resettlement scheme outside Chivu, in an effort to provide education for their children, the resettled households established a school in a derelict crumbling old farm house building, obviously, a danger to the life of the children and those assisting them with learning (The Herald, 22 May 1985).

The widespread lack of resources was raised in parliament by R.M. Ndlovu (MP Bulilima-Mangwe North):

It is embarrassing when a Government project is not well funded and those people have to beg for certain facilities which are basic from their neighbours in the adjacent communal lands when it is supposed to be a model, a demonstration that Government has put a resettlement in a certain area. People must see the good of a resettlement without a school, clinic, good roads, water, is not a complete project. Where do those people get the facilities? They have to travel (Debates, 11th October 1994).

This scenario was observed in Mayo by the author where only one feeder road cut across the Scheme and there is no irrigation development. The lack of social services leads to more time being spent on non-agricultural activities by settlers. This helps to ensure that production never rises above a subsistence level.

It is difficult to give a generalized conclusion about the situation of schemes regarding the nature, quality and availability or otherwise of a mix of services and infrastructure as this depended on a number of factors.³⁷ The example of a resettlement schemes such as Ringa, situated 76km on the Harare/Chive main road had a good social and investment mix which allowed it to become a model scheme producing a good yield of food crops as well as cash crops. Schemes such as this were used to demonstrate “what a resettlement scheme could do

³⁷ Factors determining the mix of service and infrastructure include such factors as the location of the scheme in the country in general as well as the Natural Region. The extent of infrastructural development on the land before acquisition for resettlement as well as whether the scheme was an Accelerated Resettlement Programme, among other things, were important factors. There were also those schemes that because of the amount of capital outlay on establishment, they were therefore given as much support as possible and were as such expected to demonstrate the feasibility of the programme and its efficacy in rural development facilitation. This led to the existence of high profile and general schemes. Then there was also the regime of schemes that were attached to a specific donor interest and received constant support and infrastructural investment on an incremental and ongoing basis.

to change people's lives" (*Sunday Mail*, 13 March 1986). International visitors were often taken to visit successful schemes such as this one.

The Extension Services and Management of Resettlement Schemes

Agritex's mission was:

To service the needs of different farmer clientele by generating, providing and promoting agricultural programmes which enhance competitive and economically viable productivity on a sustainable basis.

In theory, extension services were expected to fulfil the following roles:

- a. executing all farm planning and farm divisions
- b. developing and testing agricultural machinery, researching and implementing all aspects of agricultural engineering including soil erosion research and irrigation technology
- c. planning, designing, constructing and managing small holder irrigation schemes so as to transform drought prone areas into productive lands
- d. promoting and establishing grazing schemes and fishing projects.

What was new in the resettlement agricultural extension was that it was expected to develop more effective strategies for servicing and encouraging small farmers to move towards the more high value commodities such as horticulture, tobacco and dairying enterprises. These activities are management intensive and often need hands-on experience in order to advise farmers effectively. In this form, extension services and inputs were infused with the intention of introducing 'modern farming methods' understood as including terracing of land, application of manure and fertilizers, fencing and hedging of agricultural holdings, provision of water and erection of farm buildings.

Agritex continued with the Master Farmer training programme which by 1990 had trained more than 40 000 graduates across the country in both Communal Areas and Resettlement Schemes.³⁸ The policy on Master Farmer training was set in 1982 and reviewed in 1983, 1986 and 1990. In the ten year period from 1980 to 1990, about 39 500 Ordinary and 7 200 Advanced Master Farmers had been trained. Moeletsi Mbeki, a frequent correspondent and interested observer of developments in rural Zimbabwe argued in a newspaper article that the success of the resettlement schemes to produce and manage crops differently from the

³⁸ The master farmer approach to agricultural development was developed during colonial rule by E. D. Alvord and was continued with minor changes after independence.

communal areas, depended on the management of science and capital (*Herald*, 20 July 1984).³⁹

Prior to land resettlement, it was expected that extension services would evaluate the land for the purposes of establishing which crops were suitable and its stock holding capacity. While frequency of extension visits was higher in Resettlement Schemes than in Communal Areas, there is no way of measuring whether this heavy reliance on extension led to improved productivity. Agricultural extension services to the African farmer is a very important area for analysis as it is not only measuring the manpower hours spent with settler farmers that is important but also the assumptions upon which such services are made available. As argued by John de Wilde:

The challenge of rural development, as perceived by innumerable professional experts and academic observers, was to complete the diffusion of modern agriculture ... the strategy adopted has generally been called the "project approach" and its hallmark characteristic is intensive research in such areas as new methods of husbandry, the development of new high yielding seed varieties, and the most economic method of implementing these improvements at the level of the individual producer (de Wilde, 1984: 2).

The extension officer became the new "high priest" in an agriculture-based rural development programme. The role of the agricultural extension officer was to lead the revolution from subsistence producer hooked on traditional farming methods to a new kind of commercial producer using modern and scientific methods. This transition has so far proven completely unattainable in the context of Zimbabwe where extension officers are faced with innumerable problems such as lack of resources and lack of institutional support from the government, which normally transforms into lack of motivation. In this context:

The operative idea underlying this strategy was that once peasant farmers had been made aware of the benefits to be derived from agricultural innovation, their traditional resistance to change would be overcome, and sweeping improvements in the process of increased agricultural productivity would take place (Lofchie, 1986: 13).

³⁹ Moeletsi Mbeki was one of the journalists who constantly referred to developments in the resettlement sector as 'miraculous' in his many contributions and coverage of the Resettlement Schemes when he was working for the state paper, *The Herald*.

Many of the approaches to extension rest upon highly questionable assumptions about the needs and nature of resettlement farmers; namely that peasant cultural conservatism was the principal obstacle to agrarian innovation. Surveys of resettlement communities by Bill Kinsey in Zimbabwe confirm the observation by Lofchie (1986) that African farmers are not bound by cultural constraints. African farmers are able to respond with alacrity to economic opportunity and financial incentives to increase their production for the market.

One of the underlying assumptions about African agriculture was that it was limited by a general lack of acceptance of modern methods of farming as well as the assumed lack of motivation to produce more than necessary to meet immediate household reproduction. Thus planning for African agriculture was geared towards initiating the desire to produce scientifically and to generate a tradable surplus. As such, the structural realities limiting African production were seen as easily rectifiable by the adoption of an extension regime. Resettlement farmers were encouraged to grow cash crops which would introduce them into the prime market economy while ensuring the production of traditional food crops to retain food security. The introduction of cash crops meant that Africans were faced with new crops for which they had no familiarity and no experience, so the provision of extension services was therefore mooted as a basic requirement for the modernisation of African agriculture. The notion that the increase in extension-to-farmer ratio would ensure the technology and know-how transfer sufficient for the modernisation project reigned supreme.⁴⁰

The expected huge welcome and enthusiasm of the beneficiary farmers proved hard to come by. Officers were hampered and frustrated by “the general failure of the agricultural extension and research organisations in Zimbabwe to address the agricultural problems in the form and at the time they are actually perceived and prioritized by different categories of farmers” (Drinkwater, 1988: 277). More than a decade after Drinkwater (1988)’s evaluation of the Agritex activities in which he concluded that “... despite widespread agreement on the weakness of Agritex’s current diffusionist extension approach, the actual change that

⁴⁰ The post-independence planners did not anticipate the resistance that faced colonial extension officials to persist among resettlement and communal producers under a new political dispensation. In essence, it can be argued that a prestigious extension system was developed but within important limits.

was occurring was minimal”, things had rather gotten worse in terms of extension contribution to productivity in resettlement schemes.

The link between technical and political considerations in the practice of agricultural extension under the control of Agritex was identified (Drinkwater, 1988) as a key factor in the ability of the agency to effect change. According to the Assistant Director for Agritex Field Operations:

While the services provided by extension workers to farmers were inadequate and unsatisfactory, the services and institutional support by the Unit remained relevant. [Adding that] ... worse still, when you see what research has to offer, it is totally bankrupt for natural regions III, IV and V. We are almost going to have to be generating appropriate technologies. So you don't know what to say ... (cited in Drinkwater, 1988: 279).

The existing research work upon which extension knowledge and technology transfer was based, was adopted from CONEX and DEVAG historical work which had been concentrated in regions and sectors pertaining to white commercial farming.

The post-colonial extension fraternity failed on many scores. Agriculture extension officers whose training was in agriculture did not emphasise economic diversification. In the planning and setting up of Mayo scheme, no non-agricultural economic ventures were organised for employment creation to help either the youth or the women. Non-agricultural activities were modelled into other schemes such as the Vuti resettlement scheme in Kariba where craft making was an important part of the scheme's activities especially during the dry season. The involvement of Vuti in craft is influenced by the location of the scheme closer to Lake Kariba and Victoria Falls, which are tourist attractions.

A new regime of post-colonial extension required to be built upon the establishment (in the resettlement sector, from scratch) an institutional knowledge base and appropriate technology specific to the conditions of the targeted groups. Existing knowledge needed to be streamlined to respond to resettlement schemes which required huge investments in research. There was no institutional knowledge on resettlement and more ground work was necessary to understand settler sociology as well as how the beneficiaries responded to the various stimuli for production. By comparison, research on African agriculture was limited

to commissions such as the Riddell (1981), Chavunduka (1984) and Rukuni (1994) enquiries, whose terms of reference were wide and general, rather than shedding light on production factors. Consequently, their recommendations covered policy wide issues affecting the whole agricultural sector as opposed to being targeted towards resettlement productivity increase. In most cases, the recommendations of the Commissions remained on paper and were not applied to achieve agricultural development.

The knowledge of production systems, social relation of production as well as the input factor for transforming the subsistence to commercial production and the environment interface in rural communities remains the province of academia and was not understood by the extension departments. Production intelligence, which could suggest why beneficiaries make the decisions they do and how they chose which crops to grow and their rate of plough back into the agricultural activities, were not part of the information captured in the RO and Agritex officials. The reports of the scheme RO and Agritex officials did not capture such information which could have enriched the planning process. The department responsible for the “development” of these areas did not have a database of the beneficiaries and did not update their files on the production by the beneficiaries. They depended on marketed crop and food aid agencies for estimates of production.

There is no adequate understanding of the behaviour and reasons why individual farmers make the specific production decisions they make; thus there is inadequate knowledge to inform intervention. Advice to large scale commercial farmers was specialised and scientific, being based on understanding of the nature of the land, the inputs, labour requirements and carry out cost benefit analysis of different crops against market wide scenarios. This kind of sophistication was not built into resettlement and African agriculture in general. The failure of sustained growth of the resettlement sector can also be accounted for a result of the lack of research and adequate support regimes. African farmers in the communal areas registered actual increases in productivity in the 1980s at more or less the same rate as commercial farm productivity. This productivity increase among the African farmers happened outside the resettlement sector which was the focus of government’s transformation policy. It is important to highlight that the productivity increase in the communal area – the miracle – also proved to be short-lived, unsustainable and fragile. Productivity increase was conditioned by land availability (whose ceiling was too low) and

the availability of hand-outs from government (as long as they lasted, and for those who were lucky to receive them). The problem with the miracle is a) that it was not caused by resettlement at all and b) that it petered out in the 1990s and c) that poor prices limited its benefits. But that is not to denigrate it entirely or pretend it never happened.

The importance of focused research cannot be overemphasised. For instance, in 1981 African agriculture could only produce a single tonne of maize per hectare of land as compared to more than 10 tonnes in the commercial sector. The development of a new high breed maize seed for the African areas called *Samanyika* in the 1990s led to a dramatic increase in production of maize per hectare, from a previous average of around 2.7 tonnes to 4.5 tonnes (Interview with AEO Makoni, 2003).

Table 6.7: Annual Growth Rates of Aggregate Indices in Zimbabwe, 1970 – 1990

Annual growth rate % by period	average % by	Output index	Input index	TEP Index	Productivity	
					Labour	Land
<i>Commercial</i>						
1970 – 89		2.86	-0.56	3.43	6.43	5.19
1970 – 79		4.42	0.53	3.87	3.38	4.20
1980 – 89		2.70	-1.24	3.98	7.52	7.42
<i>Communal</i>						
1975 – 90		7.32	2.56	4.64	6.95	6.94
1975 – 79		-0.57	1.45	-1.99	-1.60	-1.19
1980 – 90		7.46	2.98	4.35	7.26	7.80

Source: Thirtle, *et. al*, 1993: 476

According to these figures, the African sector was wasteful on land and labour⁴¹ as compared to the commercial sector dominated by the whites. Apart from the fact that African land was always inferior in quality in comparison with commercial land, part of the production lag can be explained by the general lack of uptake of more modern technology leading to poorer productivity figures measured both by labour and land usage. More labour intensive land usage and a denser mix of crops was a more suitable way of adapting to the land and labour shortage in the reserves. This means that, the changes brought about by access to acquired land, required that more appropriate technology and responses were developed. European farming was supported by a range of demonstration and research sites throughout the farming and cropping regions of the country. Resettlement schemes were not

⁴¹ Such evidence or statistical indications must be contextualized. Riddell (1978), repeated by Moyana (1984) and Moyo (1986) among others, showed that in fact, LSC farmers did not use all their land, and not all used their land efficiently as often thought. However, by way of general comparison, productivity on unity of used land remained higher on commercial land than on communal land.

supported by this kind of investment; in fact, extension officers were not demonstration officers as they did not have the sites upon which they could demonstrate. One settler in Mayo did put this concern quite clearly:

Then there were these young men employed to show us how to farm. These boys were coming straight from the colleges with no experience whatsoever in any form of farming in their own right. If encountered by a scenario which they had not seen in their books or study days, a farmer had to wait until they consulted with someone, perhaps a senior extension worker. This reduced the confidence we had in these young fellows (Interview, Nyamukasa of Village 12, May 2003).

In terms of productivity, Thirtle's calculations seem to point to the conclusion that the African sector required more input for less output than in the commercial sector. In planning for the resettlement schemes, it was hoped that some of these issues could be corrected by prioritizing extension services. However, any form of extension provisioning that does not put research and development at the centre fails dismally in the aim of transforming the social and economic relations of production in the African sector.

Except for the development of the maize variety Samanyika, investment in research and development of seed and technology suitable for resource poor farmers remained largely neglected. In some cases new technology and seed varieties were researched and developed without any attention to the local varieties that had acclimatized to the local conditions. It was also worrying that especially in the 1990s with the entry of agribusiness in the African sector, the proliferation of hybrid seed varieties affected resource poor farmers negatively, while increasing productivity among their commercial counterparts. The adoption of hybrid seed varieties reduced the capacity of rural farmers to retain and re-use seeds. The hybrid seeds also performed better with certain fertilizers and soil treatment with substances such as lime – which were beyond rural farming systems.

The extension officers on each scheme would then design specific rules and guidelines that were suited to the specific conditions and land qualities of the scheme. They were responsible for ensuring and enforcing string of rules and regulations such as “no indiscriminate cutting of trees, the homestead must be well maintained and ensuring that certain crops were destroyed by a certain date to contain pest and diseases by affecting their

natural cycles” (*Herald*, 20 July 1984). The Chavunduka Commission (1982) lamented the huge gap between the number of extension workers on the ground and the number required if standards of crop and animal husbandry were to be improved within a reasonable period of time. Instead of an ideal ratio of one extension worker for every 200 to 300 farmers, each extension worker serviced 800 or more farmers.⁴²

Extension officers also encouraged the spirit of competition which they saw as absent in communal production where many farmers did the same thing year in and year out. The resettlement schemes had the potential of becoming an important pillar for Zimbabwean agriculture. According to Moeletsi Mbeki:

In the resettlement schemes people from different areas, with different experiences and ideas were suddenly thrown together. They compete with one another and learn from one another. This is the shortest method to develop the country (*Herald*, 20 July, 1984).

Unfortunately Mbeki’s enthusiasm about the resettlement schemes becoming the pillar of Zimbabwean agriculture was misplaced. What could happen under the resettlement schemes was that settlers would meet their welfare and food needs. Beyond food self-sufficiency, the promises of accumulation through resettlement agriculture remained elusive and structurally unattainable. The adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1990 further undermined the potential of this sector as discussed below.

ESAP Constraints: The Fall of Government Extension and the Rise of Private Extension

The 1993 Edition of the Extension Strategies (GoZ, 1993) criticised the extension programmes for resettlement and communal areas in the immediate post independence period as donor-driven and tending to be sporadic and inconsistent in their demands and benefits. Extension has to be reviewed regularly as it operates in a changing environment. With the removal of subsidies, which used to cushion farmers, field staff needs to update farmers on making wiser choices. The use of more available soil-enriching substitutes for fertilizers should be encouraged. Farmers should seek the most recent marketing intelligence for the most profitable marketing of their produce. Agritex could not provide

⁴² Resettlement Scheme villages were more distant apart covering a little bigger average in terms of land per village while having fewer number of farmers per village making the extension-farmer ratio a bit problematic as it does not give the hidden picture of the amount of traveling included per sector per official.

these effectively. The field agencies felt helpless as they realised that farmers were becoming more and more demoralized as what they needed was not more general information about pesticides, but specific instructions on when to plant and such like.

There was increased demand for information about prices, about possibilities for marketing. People were worried that their next crop will not be bought by GMB because of the new marketing policy. The Grain Loan Scheme was also new to us and we did not have proper briefing about it and had to wait for senior officials to attend workshops about it at provincial level after which they would generate circulars with directives. This was a really frustrating time as we were not able to meet the information requirements of the farmers. Of course rural people are polite and would not tell you in your face that you are being helpless, but we could feel it. As we met and reported back on our field experiences – it became clearer that unless we changed the way we did things, our days were numbered. Yet there were other problems. Many of the farmers we dealt with were women as men became increasingly involved in migrant labour activities. These women would ask why there were no women extension officers. These were genuine issues. We relayed them back to the seniors and they in turn forwarded the concerns to province, but the problems were that there was no accommodation for women officers. Not many qualified women agreed to work in the remote areas. This was a big problem, acknowledged but not resolved (Interview with Chifamba, Mayo Agritex, 2003).

The inadequacy of government extension meant that farmers had to rely more and more on the agro-industry agents that were processing farm produce and looking to increase the amount of produce they bought from farmers. Many entered into contracts with farmers to ensure a constant flow of supply (discussed in detail below). In terms of farm mechanisation, appropriate technology needed to be encouraged and developed to promote movement away from dependency on tractors.

Table 6.8: Training of Master Farmers

<i>Year</i>	<i>Ordinary</i>	<i>Advanced</i>
<i>1981 – 1990</i>	39 500	7 200
<i>1991 – 2000</i>	12 600	3 210

The average provincial training per month of 395 Master farmers during the period 1980 to 1990, fell to below the same number per province per year during the ESAP decade.

Dr J. M. Makadho, writing to all Chief Agricultural Extension Officers and all heads of branches, stated:

Since independence we have been undergoing institutional and structural changes with the view to make AGRITEX more and more effective and efficient. Recently I directed that every cadre in Extension will reach the farmer with the view to narrow the gap between extension workers to farmer ratio hence making the services more effective. Recent developments in the public service will require that each department puts in place a dynamic way of assessing the performance of its cadres. I now would want to see that every CAEO or Chief Agric Specialist should produce a programme plan ahead of each financial year (File B/3/10 of 28 June 1995).

Some of the challenges upon the Agritex department as a result of ESAP included, among other things; the increasing complexity in both district and provincial structures and the ensuing programmes; the constant re-orientation; the frequent communication breakdown and the pressing need for decentralisation; the strain put on staff morale because of increased responsibility amidst dwindling operational resources; the ever-changing demands for services; the changing inter-sectoral relationship; and the increasing demands to help personnel keep up-to-date of rapidly changing legislation regarding agriculture, input schemes and marketing among others. According to MP Matchaba-Hove,

Extension services our farmers are currently receiving must radically improve to meet the increasing needs of our farmers. Our Agritex department is experiencing serious staff shortages and poor accommodation. There are even reports from Agritex extension officers living as lodgers at rural centres, at growth points. The department is experiencing lack of transport and lack of funds. There is a limit to which they can travel. I am reliably informed that they are given 400 kilometres a month, and once that range is covered you cannot move. This does result in immobilising our out Agritex staff and making them remain at one place, whereas their actual place, must be with farmers out in the fields. Extension services must of necessity be revamped if the target to increase production is to be realized (Debates, 5th October, 1994).

Individual extension under the ESAP constraints became difficult and the Block-Village Based Extension Approach (BVBEA) was adopted.⁴³ Meetings were held in each block or cluster of villages close to each other at different people's fields. The extension officer would

⁴³ It is unfortunate that post-independence extension was meant to be an on-going interaction in a manner that continued to maintain a tight extension worker-farmer control, maintaining the dependency of the farmer on the extension worker. A different form of farmer support programme would train and establish commercially oriented producers who would seek information as situations confronted them for which specialist knowledge was needed. Until this time, existing extension approaches were designed upon a mechanistic and fragmented contribution to farming with the sole motive of commercialised profit. Resettlement farmers (like communal farmers) cannot afford the high costs of various inputs needed and thus undermines their ability to become commercial farmers. An adoption of a farming system perspective with the purpose of grappling with the nature of farming as practiced by the communal/resettlement farmers themselves is necessary. Farmers see their farming in totality hence many farmers practiced mixed farming despite Agritex's recommendations.

advise on major issues according to the time of the year and spell out the expected rainfall as well as market prices for crops for the cooking season. During field days, officials from different government departments would be invited to address farmers on different aspects of issues and any new legislation and its possible impact on their activities. The approach also called for extension staff to begin to appreciate farmer innovation and not dismiss everything farmers did in their farming systems. Extension staff was called to realise and appreciate that farmers were realistic and rational producers who only required encouragement in what they did. It was noted that as a result of the constraints put on farmers by the removal of subsidies and the increasing costs of inputs, farmers had to complement seeding with organic manure. Mixed cropping came to be accepted, it having been acknowledged that farmers in smallholder areas could not afford the luxury of commodity specialization based on monoculture.⁴⁴ The labour shortage in resettlement schemes meant that planting crops separately increased the amount of land under cultivation and also demanded more fertiliser than in mixed planting systems.

The master farmer programme was tied closely to extension services as master farmers were seen as innovators applying modern farming methods in compliance with extension instructions. The master farmers were co-opted into the extension services by making them the first port of call for fellow farmers in a peer-farmers assistance programme. This worked where the master farmers had attended and mastered the courses taught. In some cases, a Master Farmer's card and certificate was a licence to access cheap raw materials, a credit line and market access. Some farmers in Mayo send their children or any literate person in the family to attend the course and the certificate would become a household asset, even if the holder of the certificate was not in any way involved in the day to day working of the fields. This way the master farmers' programme was undermined. As courses were held in residential blocks away from home, mostly, men attended such courses – but the majority of the farming work and planning of the day to day production was largely the work of women.

⁴⁴ Budget constraints exerted by ESAP on extension services seem to have led to the questioning of the modernisers' attitudes to African practices and systems by communal farmers. Indigenous knowledge systems in agriculture became prominent as means to achieve productivity and soil conservation. Yet another plus as farmers adapted to the new conditions by using indigenous technology and a return to mixed cropping or mixed farming as a soil enrichment and conservation approach. The advocacy of extension under conditions of the Most Limiting Resources (MLR) became prominent as ESAP reduced the options and alternatives open to farmers as it championed the removal of subsidies.

In 1994 Agritex designed a mission statement and departmental philosophy which aimed to take into account the new demands and conditions as determined by the state adopted liberalisation programme. The new departmental policy sought:

... to implement the agricultural policy of government through the provision of agricultural technical and extension services in order to stimulate the adoption of proven agricultural practices leading to increased, sustained and profitable production. Agricultural extension activities depend on exchange and sharing knowledge, skills and ideas between the farmer and extension agent and enables farmers to make decisions on issues that affect their well being (Department of Agriculture, 1994).

The mission statement read:

Agritex will serve the needs of different farmer clientele by generating, providing and promoting agricultural programmes which enhance competitive and economically viable productivity on a sustainable basis. The main function of Extension is to emphasise information transfer about practices and systems than about technologies. It selectively recommends or advocates user adoption of specific practices, systems and technologies. Practice transfer comprises passing information about the practice and the exercise of specific observations, judgements and behaviour. Extension is a dynamic process that will require adaptation and regular review as the environment within which it operates changes. *The tone and magnitude of promotion will vary according to sector and enterprises* (Department of Agriculture, 1994).⁴⁵

The department articulated the key area for the new Agritex vision as the provision of services and opportunities that develop human resource base such that the full agricultural potential of men and women, be they adults or youth, is realised and exploited. Influenced by the 1992 World Summit on Sustainable Development, emphasis was placed on the development and promotion of environmentally sound technologies and management practices that aim at preserving and conserving renewable natural resources for use by future generations, adopting the integrated extension approach by recognising roles than can be played by other agencies in agricultural development (Department of Agriculture, 1994).

The challenges and resource shortages of the 1990s created the need for further integration and cooperation and consultation among agencies of rural development and agricultural

⁴⁵ Italics, my emphasis.

facilitation. Networking and developing operational practices and systems became a key call. The role entailed the need to help users from a broad range of socio-economic levels and technological abilities to communicate their needs for improved technologies and practices. It necessitated co-ordination and co-operation with other entities toward generating a variety of technologies, particularly in the small-scale sector where technologies are scarce. Extension was called upon to play a catalytic role in checking against competition and duplication in the transitional period towards a market economy. Resettlement was seen as a socio-economic and political mutation from communal tenure system with partially privatized holdings under state control.

By the second decade after independence, it had become apparent that a policy had to be designed to consider the future of children born to families in resettlement schemes who were becoming young adults and had to be phased into the resettlement planning as well as in extension. The proportion of school leavers from resettlement schools qualifying for tertiary education in professional colleges and university education was very low. This called for an alternative growth path to be determined for the preparation of resettlement youth in gainful employment. The DAEO- for Manicaland, G. R. S. Mwapaura (Interview, May 2003) suggested that ZFU projects should be expanded to cater for and facilitate youth development. Addressing the regional meeting of extension officers, he urged that:

Since rapid changes have taken place since 1980 and it is imperative that we need a closer look at our agricultural development strategies in the district. It has become clear that droughts and prolonged dry spells are now the norm [rather] than the exception. These realities are coupled with changes on the economic front, that is, liberalisation of the economy through ESAP, removal of subsidies and dismantling of the monopolies of the marketing boards, all require that we change the way we do business. Gender issues must be highlighted during farmer training. The maxim 'farmers come first' will be followed to the letter in our farmer development strategy.

The workshop resolved that owing to reduced resource availability and staff capacity challenges resulting from ESAP, five areas will be prioritised. These areas included concentration on staff development, farmer development through village based extension, irrigation development, programme planning and conservation. It was expected that these five areas were adequate to sustain agriculture within the context of structural adjustment and economic liberalisation.

For this model to work, it was necessary that the farmer be more involved in the process and interaction with development staff. Extension services were also tasked to integrate with other rural development agencies working within the resettlement areas and to view its role as one of interdependence with other relevant agencies. According to the DAEO, the model required that:

Extension should base programmes on acute needs, and issues which concern society, the community, families and individual clientele. There is also need to create a knowledge base, staff motivation and organisational capacity required for a positive impact on those current or emerging needs and issues. We cannot sufficiently provide our service without sufficient linkages with grassroots networks (DAEO Interview, May 2003).

The rise of private commodity producer programmes in the wake of the removal of the monopsonic marketing boards threatened the survival of official extension services. During the 1990s, private companies buying and promoting tobacco, paprika, cotton and also maize became important players in resettlement schemes where they benefited from producers grouped in one zone thus making for easy of buying and distribution. This brought the government's extension services under the spotlight as critics argued that there was no more need for government to spend money in agriculture extension when the benefits were reaped by private buyers.

Women in Resettlement Agriculture and Rural Development

I acknowledge the fact that as in Communal Areas, women dominate as the de facto producers in the resettlement schemes. This place of women is a result of the same social, political and economic factors giving rise to female dominance of the African agricultural sector. Social scientists studying this place of women have also emphasised the fact that while women are the workers of the land, they do not own the land they work and have limited decision making capacity (Davison, 1988; Jacobs, 1991; Gaidzanwa, 1995; among many others). Allison Goebel (1997) suggests that in the resettlement schemes there was a sense that "here it is our land, the two of us" between husband and wives. Observers and critiques of gender power relations in this scenario however, argue that family based ownership is biased against security of tenure for women (Chenaux-Repond, 1993 and 1996). In this thesis, I deliberately avoid the specific focus gender but address gender issues

where I make a point about state support and state policy in facilitating production in the resettlement schemes. There is a huge body of literature on women's access rights and power relations on land in Zimbabwe and will not repeat it here.⁴⁶

It became standard practice in Zimbabwe for various groups to use the war of independence in articulating their grievances and play off different centres of power to their own advantage. According to Kriger (cited in Sylvester, 1990) oppressed groups in Shona society – women, youth and stranger lineages – used the war to openly express grievances and to manipulate the guerillas' agenda to their own advantage. Married women in particular are said to have used the war to gain some control over their husbands and end domestic violence. An internal social and political revolution developed out of the politics of opportunity and social differentiation in the countryside. Women farmers theoretically form the nucleus of a rural household economy because they were in the majority in communal areas during what Sylvester calls a “guerilla aligned, project-within-an anti-colonial-project” (1990: 472). This could not develop after independence because of traditional social structural arrangements that had land ownership and control of production and labour organized once again in a patriarchal manner.

People's economic relations to land are shaped by social relations. Economic relations of production, including the division of labour and allocation of resources, subsume social relations of production and reproduction. Looking at land alone will not explain what is happening to women's role in agricultural production nor will it explain how women's

⁴⁶ For more studies on women and land rights in general and in Zimbabwe see Haleh Afshar, *Women, State and Ideology: Studies from Africa and Asia*. New York: State University of New York Press, 1987; L. Brydon and Chant, *Women in the Third World: Gender Issues in Rural and Urban Areas*. Hants, England: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1989; Jean Davison [ed.], *Agriculture, Women and Land: The African Experience*. Boulder: Westview, 1988; Nici Nelson [ed.] *African Women in the Development Process*. London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd, 1981; Shahra Razavi, 'Engendering the Political Economy of Agrarian Change' *Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (January 2009): 197 – 226; Saturnino M. Borras, 'Agrarian Change and Peasant Studies: Changes, Continuities and Challenges – An Introduction' *Journal of Peasant Studies*. Vol. 36, No. 1 (January 2009): 5 – 31; Susie Jacobs, 'Land Resettlement and Gender in Zimbabwe: Some Findings' *Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol. 29, No. 3 (Sep. 1991): 521 – 528; Bina Agarwal, *A Field of One's Own: Women and Land Rights in South Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994; Shamin Meer, *Women, Land and Authority*. Oxford: Oxfam, 1997; Leslie Gray and Michael Kevane, 'Diminished Access, Diverted Exclusion: Women and Land Tenure in Sub-Saharan Africa' *African Studies Review*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Sep., 1999): 15 – 39; Donna Pankhurst, 'Constraints and Incentives in 'Successful' Zimbabwean Peasant Agriculture: The Interaction between Gender and Class' *Journal of Southern African Studies*. Vol. 17, No. 4 (1991): 611 – 632; Deborah Potts, 'Worker-Peasants and Farmer-Housewives in Africa: The Debate about 'Committed' Farmers, Access to land and Agricultural Production' *Journal of Southern African Studies*. Vol. 26, No. 4 (2000): 807 - 832

reproductive role, as perceived by different societies, shapes women's productive potential. For instance, who controls access to land and decides how it will be used at the compound and national levels of production? Are there similar factors influencing such decisions at both levels? Who are the beneficiaries of these decisions? Do such decisions increase or hinder food production? Do they take into consideration women's dual role as a procreator-producer? In making gender the focus, we can learn by concentrating on sets of relationships that affect land use and tenure. The assignment of labour tasks, the allocation of resources, and the control over decisions reflect gender relations of production. This thesis uses the suggestion by Susie Jacobs and Jean Davison (1988: 2) to use gender relations of production as a construct that encompasses both social and economic relations of production. These gender relations of production being those socio-economic relations between females and males that are characterized often by differential assignment of labour tasks, control over decision-making, and differential access to and control over the allocation of resources –including land and income.

One of the problems arising from the lack of autonomous institutions in the resettlement areas is the continued domination over women by men. As in the communal areas, also in the resettlement schemes, women comprise the majority of workers of the land as more men joined the search for employment following the relaxation of controls against seeking employment outside the schemes and against the background of reduced ability to sustain the family solely from agricultural output. According to the 2002 census, Manicaland had a total of 57.2 % women in rural areas and it is estimated that resettlement schemes had around 53.4%. This means that women are an important aspect of the production process in the schemes. According to a Report of the LRAD Ministry in September 1985:

The importance of women in the resettlement sub-sector cannot be over-emphasised. The women's role in rural development has also produced staggering results. The number of women co-operative groups has since topped 2 000 with a membership of 21 000 in task-oriented activities (*The Herald*, 13 September 1985).

Not only do women contribute to production but they are also responsible for all domestic chores. As in the communal areas, women still dominated in the day to day operation of the agricultural activities in the resettlement areas – resettlement life has not led to a significant liberation of women and improvement of their general conditions.

the economy which are too weak to lead but are historically central enough for the state to make use of their appeal. Adding that, the cross-cutting trends in consciousness, economic policy and state formation currently favour liberal to populist-authoritarian ends.

One area that an independent representative structure (which would most likely include some of the most hard working militant women from the women savings and credit clubs), would be the demand for a more gender conscious extension work by Agritex. The current male dominated Agritex team fails to take into cognisance these realities so that programmes will account for the multiple roles of women. Then Director of the Agritex Services (Dr J. M. Makadho), asked all Chief Agricultural Extension Officers in 1995 (following donor pressure on the matter) that all “efforts in extension should build on those activities traditionally performed by women, programmes that help to explore further areas of women endeavours will be supported.” A project funded by NORAD was tailor-made to “take full advantage of women roles in agriculture and environment” (Director’s Circular, B/3/10 of 28 June 1995). Communicating that circular to his subordinates, the Principal AEO for the Chief Agricultural E. O for Manicaland, J. B. Chivanze emphasised that:

There is need to afford women groups the recognition they deserve as they play a very big role in agriculture. Consideration to be given to all other roles played by women and recommendations to be provided by Agritex as they explore more on women’s roles in agriculture and the environment (Provincial AEO Circular to DAEOs, JA/4 9 August 1995).

These quotes indicate some grasp of the problem. However, given the experience from top-down good intentions about the improvement of the lot of women, it would be naïve to expect these well-meaning high-sounding orientations towards women’s advancement becoming sources for long term change. Women groups in the rural areas will be obliged to develop the structures through which they can articulate their issues rather than expect male bureaucrats to solve their problems. As we shall see with reference to my own fieldwork, the women’s clubs in Mayo however, seemed to be focused on the immediate social and economic survival issues and shunned playing any political role.

Women’s security of tenure in the Resettlement schemes is a cause for concern. Land was allocated to households through the name of the household head, the ‘*samusha or musoro wemba*’ – implying the male. Females applied for land under the Model B schemes but the

land was registered in the name of the co-operative not the individual women members. At the breakdown of a marriage, the Resettlement Officer would use his discretion to re-allocate land to the divorced female. In the event of death of the male head of household, the bereaved spouse would continue to operate the plot as the land was allocated in the household name – rather than individual – even if the name of the male head was documented on top. According to the Agritex Officer, in the two cases of divorce of which he was aware, the women involved opted to go back to their families who were in the communal areas (RO Annual Report, 1993). In resettlement schemes, widows did not lose access to land, whereupon in Communal Areas the security of their access to land was less reliable. Continued access for widows in communal tenure depended on a number of things such as her age and that of her children, if any. In the case of younger widows, there would be expectations that they would remarry into the family to protect their access to land.⁴⁷

Resettlement Officers versus Traditional Authority in Resettlement Areas

The ZANU government pursued an ambivalent and at times contradictory policy towards chiefs and traditional authorities in general. During the first decade of independence, the government continuously resisted the re-instatement of traditional authority over resettlement schemes.⁴⁸ However, in the 1990s as confidence in the success of resettlement began to dwindle and conflict with settler farmers increased, it began to be seen as necessary to restore traditional authority control in the resettlement scheme. Problems emanating in the schemes were thus regarded as coming from the fact that chiefs had been sidelined. The President of the Council of Chiefs, Chief Zephaniah Charumbira, complained that the land reform programme had failed to relieve land pressure in the communal areas because chiefs had not been involved to ensure that there was no double ownership of land (Debates, 10 July 1990). Chief Charumbira moreover argued that:

The farms which had been purchased for resettlement originally fell under the jurisdiction of chiefs and were grabbed by colonialists and turned into white farms. If the government was serious about restoration, it should

⁴⁷ Of course there were exceptions, differences and potential various abuses proceeding from this custom that was intended to make sure a male head would take care of the children being left behind.

⁴⁸ As will be seen in Mayo, they went to the extent of considering such chiefs as squatters and removed them. In the Kaerezi ranch district, after the death of Chief Rekayi Tangwena, the radical anti-resettlement hero, the government sought to destroy traditional authority control through a villagisation programme that set to “rationalise land ownership” and provide infrastructure for commercialization of production under the guidance of a resettlement officer (see Donald S. Moore, 2005).

demonstrate that by fully restoring the land to its original chiefly control (Debates, 12 July 1990).

The Chiefs were not happy with what they considered as being sidelined by the land resettlement planning mechanism which favoured district councils where appointed civil servants as opposed to traditional authorities called the shots. This means that the chiefs could not exercise their patronage powers over resettlement areas where the potential for making profit and increasing their political process was high, given government's focus in this area and the resource flow.

Mugabe created the offices of Provincial Governor for the political and administrative management of land in 1989. The Minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development, Enos Chikowore dismissed the petition by chiefs for resettlement areas to be administered by chiefs and for district councils to increase their jurisdiction over chiefs. Chikowore's argument was that "resettlement areas were on white-owned commercial farms outside the chief's jurisdiction and remained so, except that they were now occupied by blacks." Pressed to explain what he meant, the Minister reiterated that:

At the moment the Government feels that the change in colour of the occupiers alone is not sufficient to justify the increasing of the territorial jurisdiction of chiefs ... the schemes are established and operated under specific conditions agreed to between the Government and the donor agency or country. With the coming into being of the Rural District Councils Act, 1988, those areas will be under a given rural district council, but still categorised as 'resettlement areas' and not communal areas (*Debates*, 5 September 1989).

Chief Charumbira believed that the tension between resettlement scheme producers and their counterparts in the communal areas resulted from the fact that resettlement areas had been accorded a special status, thus creating enmity between the settlers and neighbouring communal farmers.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Members of Parliament (MP) for Makokoba, Sidney Malunga and Bhubi, Micah Bhebe raised the same argument in a different debate of resettlement areas and suggested a new and single ministry responsible for land resettlement in the same year, 1990. Bhebe argued that a new ministry was needed to deal with, among other things, "the social problems arising from the absence of chiefs and the lack of consultation between government and chiefs in the resettlement schemes" (*Debates*, 23 October 1990).

Resistance to the village re-organisation programme led by chiefs led the government to rethink the re-instating of chiefs so that they could be won over to the government's programme. The *Traditional Leaders Act [Chapter 29: 17] No 25 of 1998* was therefore promulgated to among other things:

...provide for the appointment of village heads, headmen and chiefs; to provide for the establishment of a Council of Chiefs and Village, Ward and Provincial assemblies and to define their functions; to provide for issues of village registration certificates and settlement permits; to repeal the Chiefs and Headmen Act, the Communal Land Act, and the Rural District Councils Act, and to provide for matters incidental to or connected with the foregoing.

Chiefs Naboth Makoni and Charumbira who had long advocated for chiefs' control of the resettlement process, welcomed the Act, regarding it as long overdue, especially as it restored the dignity of chiefs by giving them back the role of levies collection, land resettlement and adjudication in minor social disputes (Interview, Chief Naboth Makoni, Makoni Rural District Council, 2003). Under this Act, the powers to appoint a chief were placed under the Presidency in terms of Section 3 (1) which read, "the President shall appoint chiefs to preside over communities inhabiting Communal Land and Resettlement areas." Section 3 (3) allowed the President to "where he is of the opinion that good cause exists, remove a chief from office." This way the new Act reinvented the office of the Chief. Section 3 (4) of the Act legislated for an appointed "chief to be paid, from moneys appropriated for the purpose by Act of Parliament, such salary, allowances, gratuities and pension as the President may fix from time to time."⁵⁰

The appointment of a chief in the Resettlement Areas is a complex and often volatile process as many people come from different tribal and regional backgrounds where no single tribe could claim customary right to rule. Section 3 (2) (a) and (b) provided for an election process in terms of the:

⁵⁰ It is interesting to note that by 2000 no chief had received any of these payments and Tribal Councils, Tribal Courts and Offices were yet to be built. However, ahead of the 2002 election, the Government fast-tracked the implementation of the Act promising to enhance the powers of chiefs and upgrading their administrative capacity with an office, a salaried secretary, a vehicle with driver among other things. Training courses for chiefs were called for which amounted to nothing more than political schools during which chiefs were asked to deliver the rural communities to ZANU PF during the elections. Indeed, in Mayo resettlement scheme, which takes the bulk of the Makoni North electoral constituency and administrative district MP Didymus Mutasa brought in the highest percentage of 97% for ZANU PF in the 2002 Presidential election.

... administrative need of the communities in the area concerned, in the interest of good governance and where applicable, to appoint a person nominated by the appropriate persons in the community concerned ... provided that, if the appropriate persons concerned fail to nominate a candidate for the appointment as chief within two years after the office of chief became vacant, the Minister, in consultation with the appropriate persons, shall nominate a person for appointment as chief.

In many instances where the state had to intervene, war veterans and known supporters of ZANU PF or officials from the farmers unions would ascend to the chieftaincy amid bitter protest from established chiefs in the communal areas contiguous to the resettlement area. This brought the state in a collision course with many tribal authorities.⁵¹

The introduction of the office of Chief in the resettlement schemes had nothing to do with the revolution and neither would it yield the commercialization and modernisation of rural areas, it was a political survival strategy by ZANU PF.⁵² The chief replacing the office of the Resettlement Officer (RO), disused since DERUDE, failed to sustain it. Resettlement Schemes failed to raise the revenue to pay for their own governance at the local level. The practice from 1991 onwards was that when an RO post became vacant, it was frozen. The script of the duties of the re-invented chief might as well have been an adaptation and rehash of the Smith regime's take on chiefs.⁵³ Section 5 (1) (b) of the Act stipulated the duties of the chief as:

⁵¹ In Mayo, a bitter contest between the tribal authorities of Mutasa and Makoni chieftaincy was taking place over the legitimate control of the Mayo resettlement schemes.

⁵² What is clear in this change of heart concerning the government position on chiefs is the fact that the regime was grappling with the complicated demands for modernisation at a time where crawling back to 'traditionality' and cultural regeneration was the only means to extend its political survival.

⁵³ Tax collection and enforcement of conservation discipline now fell under chiefs, making them subject of popular disgruntlement. According to the Chief Native Commissioner (CNC) report of 1961 (as cited in Cousins, 1991: 51), chiefs became very important to colonial administration of rural areas. The Ministry of Internal Affairs patronised the African tribal systems to resolve the challenge of how social organisation could be the focus of development policy to initiate change among African communities. The Minister of Agriculture, G. W. Rudland, advocated for the co-opting of chiefs in the administration and control of rural populations. His motive was clearly about safeguarding white interests suggesting that "the understanding of our African people and related problems ... is of special importance to those of us who have been charged to promote and ensure the sound and productive use of land resources in Rhodesia. Here the tribal authorities have a vital key role to play and it is clear that the future well-being of the land and its occupiers in the African areas will depend on how the tribal authorities carry out their role, naturally with the support and guidance of Government." The wages of chiefs were raised to 420 pounds per year in 1965, considerably higher than the earnings of ordinary Africans. Chiefs also received seats in the Senate in the 1969 Constitution and had representatives in the House of Assembly (see Rudland, 1969: xi for more details)

Promoting and upholding the cultural values among members of the community under his jurisdiction, particularly the preservation of the extended family and the promotion of traditional family life; and (f) overseeing the collection by village heads of levies, taxes, rates and charges payable in terms of the Rural District Councils Act [chapter 29:13]; (h) preventing the unauthorized settlement or use of any land; (i) notifying the rural district council of any intended disposal of a homestead and the permanent departure of any inhabitant from his area, and, acting on the advice of the headman, to approve the settlement of any new settler in is area; (l) ensuring that the land and its resources are used and exploited in terms of the new law, and in particular, controlling – (i) over-cultivation; and (ii) over-grazing; and (iii) the indiscriminate destruction of flora and fauna; and (iv) illegal settlements; as well as general preventing the degradation, abuse or misuse of land and natural resources in his area.

The long list of the duties that had to do with land use and environmental conservation made them unpopular with people and they saw that the government was trying to pass the buck to them for controls that had historically caused tensions between the colonial state and the African producers.⁵⁴

ESAP and the Further Erosion of Government Support for Resettlement Schemes

The period from 1990 requires special attention as it was characterised by the further erosion of the government's ability to support the Resettlement Schemes due to the adoption of ESAP. Under conditions of deteriorating support, production and standards of living ebbed. The adoption of an Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1991 meant that Zimbabwe could not be exempted from the typical IFI ideas. The implementation of the World Bank and IMF supported adjustment policies, effectively reintroduced the effect of 'structural constraints' that colonial legislation had placed on rural production. Structural adjustment implied the privatisation of service institutions and marketing facilities which directly led to fall in productivity as small-farmers could not afford inputs.

⁵⁴ Donald S. Moore (2005) recently considered the contests between traditional and state institutions, local and international for the hegemonic control of the elusive goal of development and the resolution of its impasse and the crisis of accumulation. He dealt with the differences in understanding development and how contesting parties (government and its technocist bureaucracy on one side and the rural communities on the other), relying on historically and traditionally tried and tested way of achieving livelihoods.

The average land under cultivation per household in the resettlement areas dropped drastically to below half of the mid 1980s level. This is because agribusiness was interested in crops such as paprika in which resettlement farmers did not have existing knowledge. Another reason was because paprika was not used locally in any significant manner which means that it was not favoured over and above other crops such as soya beans (which could be used for bread, for instance). Once the innovators and risk takers adopted the crop, it was soon realized that the quality specifications of the crop were such that the farmers would not be able to determine their possible financial benefit. The World Bank was fully aware of the possible negative effects of its policies from its international experiences since the early 1980s and in fact its own evaluation on the implications of structural adjustment programmes on the economies of poorly resourced countries pointed to the fact that:

These policies aimed at restructuring production aggravated the plight of some vulnerable groups in the short-run and did not help alleviate the poverty of some groups in the long run (Heller, 1988: 33).

Indeed ESAP negated the key objectives for agrarian reform “to redress the imbalances in resource allocation and improve the livelihoods of the Africans” (GoZ, 1982). As a result, the humble gains of the 1980s were heavily eroded. The United Nations’ Human Development Report acknowledged that:

In the 1980s, there had been a phenomenal growth of extension services and credit to communal areas. These were drastically curtailed during the 1990s ... the nineties also saw a substantial reduction in the subsidies on farm inputs. The centralised crop purchasing system of the early eighties was gradually abandoned, and the farmers were left to locate their own markets (Tandon, 2000: 27).

Some leaders of the new government had been aware, critical and suspicious of the interests of the Bank. Towards the end of the war, Mugabe had noted in a speech that the Bank had been working with some white liberals to bring on board conservative blacks so as to create conditions for a neo-colonial transition at the end of colonial rule, a theme to which he would return twenty years later. He noted that:

In the wake of the escalating war and the flight of so many European settlers, an African petit-bourgeoisie is being formed very rapidly as Africans move into white farms, suburban homes and even jobs. In 1974, with the help of the

World Bank, local European businessmen launched a fund and a Foundation, called the Whitsun Foundation, to provide capital to the new black petit-bourgeoisie to buy property and to initiate a variety of economic studies. The national development plan proposed by the Foundation is a blueprint for neo-colonialism that militates against the freedom of the future independent State of Zimbabwe to embark upon programmes for socialist transformation (Mugabe, 1979: i).

Bond and Manyanya (2002) state that this agenda of the Bank was confirmed within the first months of World Bank and IMF post-Independence involvement in Zimbabwe, as Bank missions came to the country to push loans and advise on policy. These ranged across the entire spectrum of development, perhaps most notably land reform, where the Bank promoted the Lancaster House designed reform programme ensured retaining the status quo ownership relations mitigated by what turned out to be an unsustainable peasant credit scheme.

Notwithstanding his initial criticism of the Bank, as early as March 1981, Mugabe accepted a Bank loan facility worth nearly US\$700 million at high interest giving the Bank leverage into deciding development policy by playing “adviser” in projects of national economic strategy (Bond, 1998). Their initial goal was to ensure that the country limited its import substitution policy very strongly developed under UDI which had been largely sustained until ESAP by drawing Zimbabwe deeper into the world capitalist economy. Indeed in 1985, while Julius Nyerere called the Bank and the IMF a “gang of robbers”, Zimbabwe was worrying about the prospects of being cut off a US\$385 million credit line for having announced a budget deficit caused by the severe drought in the early years of independence.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ The drought gave the Bank another opportunity and excuse to advance another US\$85 billion in lending authorisation for Zimbabwe from its member countries from western capital markets at a price set by the USA’s Federal Reserve Board. As the Bank’s loans attracted high interests and paid in foreign currency, Zimbabwe was then advised to export more cash crops, cut wages and consumer subsidies and pressure on its social welfare spending increased. The global geo-political context of the 1980s including apartheid in South Africa, making the situation of Zimbabwe (as a crucial Frontline State) an important bargaining chip in Southern Africa’s geo-political game for the West. The Bank exploited the tenure of Dr Bernard Chidzero (Minister for Finance and Economic Planning) as the Chair of the World Bank-IMF Development Committee. At a time when many Third World leaders were complaining about the heavy debt repayment to the institutions, Chidzero limited his public statements on debt to calls for partial relief on highly concessionary terms as opposed to the debt cancellation called for by the likes of Nyerere (who was forced to leave office in effect at this point) and Fidel Castro (a Communist who avoided this kind of indebtedness for Cuba; virtually no one effectively held out. It was luck that enabled Zimbabwe to avoid an ESAP in the 1980s). For this *Euromoney* Magazine even named Chidzero the “Banker of the Year 1986.” Chidzero suggested in an interview with the *Herald* and *Moto* (1989) “... we have no problem with the IMF over (cutting) food subsidies ... we are spending disproportionately more money on what we call social services ... we have to try to balance the expenditure in the various sectors of the economy, we are trying to do so.”

ESAP introduced a regime of cost-cutting measures and the privatisation of services previously in the call of government. The removal of subsidies, inflation and the devaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar had immediate impacts on the production costs for farmers. Draught power charges skyrocketed from \$350.00 to \$4232.00 per hectare for the DDF operated tractor fleet between 1989 and 1992. The price was much higher for private tractor charges. Inputs such as fertilisers, seeds and insecticides became more available under ESAP but the prices were prohibitive. Farmer response was to use less unit of inputs per ha and the reduction of hectares under use, leading to a return to the fallow system of land use. The input deliveries by credit schemes such as the GMB were often late, making it difficult for the farmers to keep in pace with the changing rainy seasons. The trade balance of the Zimbabwean government suffered a lot from reduced exports as the production capacity of the country was undermined (see Appendix nine below).

The resource shortage issue became the centre of debate in the mid 1990s. Member of Parliament for Mutare South, Lazarus Nzarayebani a vocal Marxist, told the House that:

Government is virtually doing nothing. The District Administrators, Agritex officials and councillors are just there doing nothing because they have no money. There is nothing really in terms of a fund set aside to make sure the gullies are closed; to make sure the people are thoroughly resettled in those pieces of land and then to resuscitate, as it were, that land which peasants have been working on for quite some time (Debates, 11th October 1994).

The input credit system was also thrown into disarray. Those districts and schemes which were far from town or distribution centres were most affected as there was effort to reduce transport costs. The outsourcing of the distribution of these inputs meant that transport contractors preferred deliveries with shorter distances. Others refused to deliver in areas with bad roads – this meant that most rural farmers would not be reached. Coupled with this problem was the delayed payment of crops delivered to GMB making it difficult for farmers to buy inputs on time. Accusations of profiteering and corruption from the input schemes also contributed to problems with delivery.

In response to these hardships, the government introduced a Social Dimensions of Adjustment Programme (SDA) to mitigate the social costs of the programme.⁵⁶ The Poverty Assessment Study Survey (PASS) of 1995 reported a major increase in poverty since 1990 and found that 61% of the population was living below the poverty datum line. The prevalence of poverty was 72% in the rural areas compared to 46% in the urban areas. The demographic distribution of the population was also important in defining the nature and distribution of poverty and the possibility for economic growth. The population of the country continued to grow at an average above 3% even as economic growth fluctuated between 2 and 5 percent leading to an average per capita income growth of 1.1 percent in the period 1980 to 1990. Such income growth was very low to lead to any substantial social and economic transformation of the country. Currently the economy has declined dramatically and population growth has slowed down also, in large part through the prevalence of AIDS but also the non-availability of necessary drugs.

Table 6.9: Population Location by Land Tenure

<i>Land Sector</i>	<i>Proportion of Total Population [%]</i>
Communal Lands	51.4
Large-Scale Commercial Farms	11.3
Small-scale Commercial Farms	1.6
Resettlement Areas	4.1
State Land	0.4
Urban Areas	31.2
Total	100

Source: CSO, 1992 National Census Report, 1994

In response to this survey, a five year Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST), 1996 – 2000 was launched to replace ESAP (which ran from 1991 – 1995). The ZIMPREST was aimed at achieving a:

... sustained high rate of economic growth and speedy development in order to raise incomes and standards of living of all people and expand productive employment of rural peasants and urban workers (ZIMPREST, 1996: 2).

⁵⁶ The SDA was facilitated through the Social Dimensions Fund (SDF) established to coordinate the formulation and implementation of Poverty Alleviation Action Programmes (PAAPs). The PAAPs and the SDF remained largely inaccessible to rural communities who in fact were more hard hit by ESAP. The PAAPs and SDA involved a regime of safety net programmes covering assistance with school and examination fees, health fees and food programme (urban) and drought relief programmes in the rural areas. The PAAP was adopted in 1994 to broaden the scope of the SDA (1991) in dealing with ESAP induced poverty (see the Zimbabwe Human Development Report, 1998 for details).

Despite the mentioning of the “rural peasant sector”, both the ESAP and ZIMPREST programme continued with the urban bias and modernisation thinking that gripped post-colonial development policy. Also as the currency was losing value and the economy weakening given the failure of ESAP, the language was maintained as though it could be linked to some reality. The Chief Executive of the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI), A. J. Ross, was critical of increasing funding allocation to agriculture preferring that government resources be invested towards industrial growth as the basis for poverty alleviation. He argued:

Economic transformation world over has been led by industrial development or the process of industrialisation. Industrial development denotes the extent to which the country’s citizens add value to locally produce or imported raw materials. The value adding process is what creates wealth. Investment in wealth creation is what results in increased employment of labour and the creation of further opportunities such as services and distribution and imply that fewer and fewer people live in poverty (Zimbabwe Human Development Report, 1998: 11).

In real terms, this is no longer significant anymore in the late 1990s as industry was also in rapid decline. The crucial links between growth and poverty happen when growth is job creating, thus allowing poor people to sell their labour and be able to consume resources. The ESAP and ZIMPREST type of neo-liberal growth had the opposite effect. It was job shedding, thus increasing unemployment, urban poor hardships and reversed the rural urban migration with the result of increasing demand for land. Besides promoting job creation, economic growth has also expected to increase the capacity of the state to undertake public expenditure programmes that benefit the poor through programmes such as land reform as well as increased access to/and better quality health and education.

ESAP and ZIMPREST failed to meet any of the growth objectives. While the policy environment improved the investment response, growth remained elusive, and the situation rather worsened. According to the Human Development Report (1998: 31): the programme failed in two crucial respects:

(I) Not only were virtually all the macro-economic targets missed but the government also failed to meet a number of institutional targets such as the creation of a Monopolies Commission, the enactment of new banking legislation, and the establishment of a Securities Exchange Commission.

(II) From the broader perspective of poverty and human development ESAP undoubtedly had an adverse distributional impact.

Table 6.10: Summary of ESAP Objectives versus Impacts, 1990 - 1995

	<i>Planned Targets</i>	<i>Real Impacts</i>
<i>GDP Growth</i>	5% annually	
<i>Investment and job creation</i>	25% of GDP and increased job creation	Fewer jobs created; increased retrenchments and a major fall in real wages due to inflation and the devaluation of the Zim dollar. In fact most of the jobs created under ESAP were in the informal sector which saw a 29% increase – indicating a slow down in the formal economy.
<i>Savings Consumption</i>	25% of GDP 8% rise	Fell by 37 %, this increasing the group of people affected negatively and joining the poor – an ESAP created poor class
<i>Exports</i>	9% increase per year	
<i>Budget deficit</i>	Halved to 5% from 10.4%	By 1998 had only moved slightly to 9.8% which was still above the 1990 level of 9.3%
<i>Inflation</i>	Slow down to 10% from 17.7%	
<i>Civil service</i>	Reduction by 25%	Reduction in public spending on social services had a direct and immediate impact on household welfare. Doctors, nurses, teachers and other public services suffered major drop in real wages. Led to mass exodus of specialist skills needed to deliver efficient service with immediate impact on quality of service, especially in health and education
<i>Subsidies</i>	Reduction to Z\$60 from Z\$629	This, plus reduction in civil service led to decline in education spending by 30% and health by 18% ⁵⁷

Source: HDR, 1998; Botchwey & Gunning, 1998; Mlambo, 1997 and Carmody, 2001

Through the IMF's own admission, after the study and evaluation of Zimbabwe's experience with the ESAP programme, ESAP brought disastrous results on the country. The report noted that the reform programme:

Potentially changed distributional incomes both through its effect upon public service delivery (the downsizing of the state) and through its effect on personal incomes. ... whereas the programme envisaged that between 1991 and 1996 per capita private consumption would rise by around 8%, in the event it declined by 37%. This alone transformed the group of those who lost from a minority to a majority. Given the combination of the deregulation of the labour market and the decontrol of manufacturing, it was therefore reasonable to anticipate that both employment and wages would decline sharply in the manufacturing sector (Botchwey and Gunning, 1998).

⁵⁷ This is phenomenal given that the success of Zimbabwe's welfarist project had been based on the achievements in the health and education sector. It seems that the model was very much there in Zambia where the Kaunda regime was ousted by a labour leader who had in effect promised to do what the IFIs told him to do after ineffectual structural adjustment policies led by the one party state. Yet, the difference with Zimbabwe is the refusal of Mugabe to accept defeat and leave.

In the context of ESAP and ZIMPREST, parastatals were privatised, investors were given tax holidays as an incentive for establishing businesses. This coupled with poor tax collection and enforcement reduced government source of revenue and became increasingly pressurised to borrow. This means that the capacity for the state to provide services that would uplift the poor was highly impaired. A longitudinal (economic historical) view of the economic performance of the Zimbabwean economy since self-government in 1924 shows how growth in the economy did not necessarily lead to poverty alleviation among the poor. Instead, high economic growth was associated with an increasing income gap between the high earning and the low income groups (generally definable by race until 1980, and by class after independence). In fact the 1990s recorded weak growth.

Real wages remained low in the rural sector and instead of remaining static deteriorated in real terms. According to the Human Development Report (1998: 25):

Average real wages rose more than 20% immediately after independence, but for the 10 year period from 1980 they rose just 3%. In the lowest wage sectors of agriculture and domestic workers, wages increased above 1980 levels for most of the decade but did not reach the poverty datum line set by the Riddell Commission of 1981.

The freezing of wage increases in line with inflation was made possible by a state corporatist strategy developed in the first five years of independence under which a loose pact between the state, organised labour (crushed and re-organised by ZANU PF after the 1981 wave of strike action) and employers colluded to suppress strike action and viewed wage increases as having a deleterious effect on the economic in general and an inflationary impact on the finance of the country (Sachikonye, 1997).

One of the key areas affected by the adoption of structural adjustment programmes in the 1990s was that of extension services and research. It led to a withdrawal of government resources. Principal Chief Agricultural Extension Officer for Manicaland, C. J. B. Chivaze, had to propose that his officials only focus on critical areas. He dispatched a circular in which he suggested:

Under the current conditions of ongoing dwindling of resources, we will find ourselves having to limit ourselves to certain critical activities that the limited resources will allow (Circular JA/49 of 08.1995).

The province was asked to limit its focus and assistance towards activities such as village based farmer training, small-holder irrigation development, staff training, soil and water conservation, special crop development programme, on farm demonstrations, small stock and fodder development and development of appropriate technology. In addition to these critical activities, the province was asked to carry on with regulatory activities carried out within the increasing constraints, such as the agricultural recovery programme and water rights processing (later devolved to the Ministry of Water Resources and Rural Development, 2000).

In spite of these shortages of resources and the costs of land reform, President Mugabe called for a “revolutionary land reform programme to settle the 120 000 or so remaining families” from the 162 000 target of the land resettlement programme. According to Dan Nabudere (1989: 21):

This envisaged land reform ushers in a new era of social policy which clearly calls for new resources to be used to implement such a vast reform programme. At issue is not the matter of budget provision for the vast social and economic infrastructure that will be required to meet such needs as roads, schools, clinics and extension services, but more importantly, the basic issue of how these lands can meet the needs of the people.

While by the end of the 1980s, it had become clear that the high targets of land transfer and productivity were unrealistic, the politicization of the land and agrarian programme continued with the effect of polarizing the Zimbabwean citizenry. Such pronouncements like these ‘Independence Day’ speeches by Mugabe were forced upon civil servants who were ordered to translate them into actionable programmes. Without adequate resources to fund these grandiose and ill designed, if well-meaning plans, the resettlement sector remained marginal.

Resistance to Resettlement

Resulting from the combination of rigid models, weak institutional support and inadequate levels of support, resettlement was faced with some resistance among the beneficiaries. An exchange of accusations followed the slow resettlement pace. By 1983, land purchases outpaced the planning and appraisal procedures required for resettlement. The British had

committed as part of the Lancaster House deal to pay for part of the land reform process. The GoZ accused the UK of holding back progress by cumbersome procedures and demands, and initiated the 'Accelerated' resettlement procedure under which purchased land was settled with only the minimum amount of planning and with no provision for infrastructural development. The ODA insisted that slow implementation was due to the limited capacity of the implementing agency DERUDE, which could not establish approved schemes at the pace government expected. On one hand, DERUDE blamed the Ministry of Finance for delays in releasing resettlement funds. On the other, the Finance Ministry felt that DERUDE was not using available funds in a timely way. Each of these views seem justified at different points. It is not inconceivable that the cumbersome planning regime would slow implementation and the British government funded resettlement on the basis of the Zimbabwean government providing matching funds⁵⁸ (discussed in detail below). Initially, DERUDE lacked capacity and did not spend their allocated budget. As capacity increased resettlement picked up, but available funds became limited and required parliament to sanction increased allocations.

The rush for land to allow for completion of settlement and land allocation by 1985 did not occur. To the contrary, resettlement schemes took more time to achieve full occupancy. A partial cause was that people weighed the conditionalities of the schemes against the 'freedom' and familiarity of communal life. Resistance to resettlement was experienced across all the Natural Regions but was mostly acute in drier regions. In Matebeleland where land was most arid and farming conditions the worst, resettlement uptake was slowest, increasing from a meagre 2.7% by the end of 1981 to a marginal 13% by the end of 1984. Mashonaland West and Central situated on the prime farming land of Zimbabwe enjoyed a resettlement uptake of 43% to 62% compared with 31 to 51% for Manicaland in the period 1981 and 1984 respectively. The resistance to resettlement in Matebeleland was interpreted politically to imply resistance to ZANU PF development plans by a recalcitrant Ndebele minority. Dr Sydney Sekeramayi, the Minister for Lands and Resettlement suggested that:

We have a national people-elected Government, and no longer an imposed, colonial, sectional one, as in the past. It rules all the people irrespective of

⁵⁸ The Zimbabwe government funded the acquisition costs, planning and implementation of a total of 63 schemes. Fifty five schemes with a total of 55 273 hectares and a settler capacity of 8 065 families in Model A schemes while eight schemes with a livestock carrying capacity of 20 568 livestock units were in the three-tier Model C and D schemes.

colour, creed, class or party affiliation. It runs the entire broad spectrum of the nation's affairs on behalf of all the people in the country (Sunday Mail, 25 October 1981).

However, besides the difficulty of farming in regions with low rainfall located in low-lying tsetse-infested areas, there was also a civil war ravaging the rural areas of Matebeleland.⁵⁹ Minister Sekeramayi also alleged that poor response was related to die-hard customs among rural people who did not take to change quickly.

A team of government and party officials was set up to investigate resistance to resettlement. It learned that one of the reasons had been poor consultation with local authorities in designing and moving people to resettlement schemes.⁶⁰ As late as 1990, the government was still grappling with the problem of finding more people to complete the resettlement programme. David Karimanzira, then Lands Minister, encouraged an Agritex technical conference dealing with Model review to find a solution, suggesting:

There was no model that was perfect. Each model has its own demerits. However, you are expected to produce a workable model as people want to be resettled today, not tomorrow. There was need to work out a model for low lying regions as 200 000 ha of land bought in Matebeleland still remained unsettled and unused (*The Herald*, 2 March 1990).

The planners anticipated that settlers would earn Z\$400 per family per year from the land and investment on it. However by any measure a Z\$400 annual household income was far below the poverty datum line, and low income levels were exacerbated by the state policy stipulating that beneficiaries would not seek even temporary wage employment. The outcome was that resettlement potentially locked the new farmers into resource and poverty traps. According to Ranger (1985) and Kriger (1992:3) mobilisation and organisation in

⁵⁹ The civil war in Matebeleland from 1980 which ended with the signing of the peace accord between ZAPU and ZANU in 1987 increased the security risk in the rural areas. The Korean trained 5th Brigade battalion operating in this region was notorious for torching whole villages in the name of flushing out dissident elements (see the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (1999); Ranger and Alexander 2002; Sibanda, 2004 – among others on this civil war and its impact on post-colonial development in the region.

⁶⁰ The post-colonial government had not learnt from the colonial state's experiences and the resistance mounted by local communities against development projects that had not been designed in consultation with them. The case of the Tangwena people in Nyanga and the conflict over the development of the Kaerezi (written and pronounced Gaeresi by whites) Ranch is a good example of this scenario. Under the leadership of Chief Rekayi Tangwena, the people of this area fought and resisted forced removal by hiding in the mountains and feeding on roots and wild berries. The Smith regime had to employ intimidatory tactics, threatening the whole village with imprisonment, asking the people to abandon their chief and on 29 October 1970 confiscated their cattle. The Tangwena people were forced to leave Kaerezi for Bende Communal area which they fiercely resisted putting their lives in danger.

districts that experienced intense war involvement was expected to become more intense, based on the arguments of the radicalisation thesis.⁶¹ As suggested earlier, the scattered origin of the beneficiaries implies that Mayo falls outside such category.

The drive to increase resettlement uptake saw politicians criss-crossing different regions to encourage rural people. Addressing a gathering at Dotito (in Makoni district), Mark Dube, the Deputy Minister Lands Resettlement and Rural Development, urged the villagers to take up offered land while it lasted, asking:

How can you refuse the land that the Government has bought for you? Zimbabwe will not grow in size but the population and the demand for land is growing. The Government wants to ensure that there is equitable distribution of land and is buying farms to meet that goal. We are therefore surprised that people are insisting on accepting only the land of their choice (*The Herald*, 28 July, 1982).

In Matebeleland, Simon Pazvakavambwa, Chief Irrigation Officer, DERUDE was appealing to Chief Kayisa Ndiweni and his community in Ntabazinduna to consider resettlement which they had refused as “un-African”. Chief Ndiweni explained to the entourage of government officials (amidst applause from the villagers and councillors) that:

The people do not want resettlement. All they want is an extension of the communal lands to be able to give them more land. The Government should buy adjacent farms and then add them to communal lands (*The Herald*, 28 July 1982).

Pazvakavambwa explained to the Ntabazinduna gathering that instead of extending the communal areas, the ultimate objective of government was to phase out such land use through progressive commercialisation and rationalisation of rural land holding and organised settlement patterns to allow for ease of service delivery. By acquiring farms for resettlement:

The philosophy of resettlement was to give an opportunity to people who have never had a chance of earning a living through the land. That’s our first priority. We are seeking to relieve land pressure on the communal lands. At the same time we say the newly resettled areas must produce food for both local people and the markets. We are not keen to give land to people who are not likely to use it

⁶¹ The radicalization thesis assumed that the areas that faced intense guerilla penetration experience increased popular consciousness as well as experience a social revolution from traditional society.

productively. Even if a farm purchased was adjacent to a communal area it would be resettled according to government philosophy and will not be added to the communal lands (*The Herald*, 28 July 1982).

During this meeting a number of reasons came to the fore as to why people had resisted resettlement. Councillors told the government delegation that it was feared that by entering the resettlement schemes, people would lose autonomy and control of what they produced and how it was distributed. People had been told that in the schemes, government controlled process and would take everything and leave nothing for farmers, and that producers would have no say. The officials explained that this was part of an anti-government propaganda.⁶²

Meanwhile, Chief Makoni, a known supporter of ZANU agreed with the sentiment that the schemes were “un-African” and people would rather have increased allocations where they were than move. He wrote a letter to Provincial Governors and Resident Ministers in which he suggested that:

The population is growing everyday [sic] with people naturally divided into farmers, farm fellows, non-farmers in rural areas and many unclassifiable home seekers and disabled persons. Reserves have been used for over eighty years and become life for rural Zimbabwe. In this area I wish to persuade your minds to accept that Reserves are indeed homes for you and me and all indigenous families. I draw your sympathy towards developing this as well as a total Zimbabwe lifestyle and set up. Let us ask government to buy lands adjacent to Reserves and allocate for resettlement of the home seekers, the majority of whom are the squatters today. The land should be converted to Reserve type of land tenure. The reserves could be used for preparatory land and whosoever improves his land will be promoted to high levels of tenure ... (Chief N. N. G. Makoni, Correspondence to Governors, 1984. National Archives File: MNC 432G/S467G).

Such conditions for settlement, among others, became a major source of negativity towards resettlement. For instance the clause requiring that settlers relinquish employment was a major source of discouragement. This could be linked with the colonial legacies that led a good standard of living to be equated with urban employment. This means that household

⁶² The propaganda against ZANU co-operative schemes had a long history. The Smith regime had told rural communities that under a ZANU government they would lose their ownership and freedom under socialism – which they defined as meaning that land, cattle and even wives and children will be owned and controlled by the state. Abel Muzorewa’s Auxiliary forces during the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia period had also peddled the same anti-communist line. In Matebeleland and the Midlands provinces ZIPRA forces were also responsible for these scare tactics against ZANU’s rural development programmes.

sustainability came to be calculated in terms of access to a paying or salaried job. Thus, as much as land scarcity was acknowledged by many people in communal areas, there was general hesitancy in taking up occupation as many people's first option was to look for wage labour in nearby towns. The prospect of land and agriculture became a last resort. Julius Nyerere (1968: 341) observed that:

... most of all, there is an almost universal belief that life in the towns is more comfortable and more secure – that the rewards of work are better in the urban areas and that people in the rural parts of the country are condemned to poverty and insecurity for the whole of their lives.

For Nyerere (1968) it was of concern that people felt that they were better off in town than seeking to advance themselves through rural and land enterprise. It became clear that a combination of activities embracing both migrant labour in urban areas and rural production would better serve the majority of poor people. Nyerere observed in the case of Tanzania (which equally applies to Zimbabwe) that:

The vast majority of town dwellers live extremely poorly and in most cases they are on the whole worse off, both materially and in the realm of personal satisfaction, than the people in the rural areas could be. An unskilled worker in the towns or on the agricultural estates earns wages which are hardly sufficient to enable a family to eat a proper diet and live in a decent house (Nyerere, 1968: 341).

This interpretation of how a socialist economy should develop led to the notion that land beneficiaries ought not to migrate to town even on a short term basis. Indeed some of the people who made up the second wave of resettlement take-up included people fleeing urban squalor.⁶³

Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated that institutional arrangements for African agriculture were weak and suffered lack of budgetary support. The planning unit felt that the political legitimacy of the ruling party was enough to reverse the resistance to colonial “betterment” efforts which

⁶³ The team mandated with investigating the reasons for lack of uptake of resettlement advised that to attract more settlers increased investment in social and development facilities ranging from schools, clinics, water and roads at a more subsidized level would be necessary. With the increased hardships in the 1990s more people started to voluntarily take up resettlement. The LOM from 1999 onwards (see Yeros and Moyo, 2004 for details) also demonstrate the pressure for land created by this increased reverse migration from urban to rural areas.

were hampered by the fact that they were being forced on the Africans by a regime that lacked political legitimacy. This thinking was also reinforced by the Riddell Commission of 1981 and repeated by the Chavunduka Commission of 1982. These commissions commended the climate of political legitimacy of Mugabe's regime among the majority of Africans and made a strong case for rational planning, emphasizing sound land husbandry as the basis for good agriculture. In a manner reminiscent of colonial officials, they highlighted the supposed ills of the communal areas; overstocking, soil erosion, poor land husbandry, part time farmers not committed to becoming full commercial enterprises. On the basis of this criticism they followed the familiar pattern of encouraging the shift from communal tenure to private tenure as the only solution to the rationalisation of fragmented land holdings and the increase in productivity in the newly restructured rural areas which would now be populated only by serious and committed farmers. They represented a mood which saw the more progressive aspects of ZANU PF policies as ideological tinkering that had not delivered the goods; there are strong parallels in similar countries at the same time.

It can be safely concluded that some changes took place in the 1980s. If not exactly a miracle, they remained very fragile and the government of Zimbabwe failed to sustain it. The evidence on the ground best sustains the view that the government repeatedly used the land reform issue more as a rhetorical tool – as “a populist vote-grabber, a threat to its critics, a reward for its favourites; rather than as a means of actually making sound progress in helping the poor and landless, enhancing equality as well as productivity, without threatening the stability and sustainability of the land resource base of the country, and without damaging nation economy” (Bowyer-Bower and Stoneman, 2001: 3). As a result of the weak and disjointed institutional environment for agriculture, resettlement schemes and the settler efforts were not complemented. The following chapter considers the issues more closely by focusing on Mayo resettlement scheme. The evidence brought forward and the foregoing analysis supports the thesis that the germination of any miracle, were suffocated by the lack of state support. On the whole, there are contradictory policies that nonetheless showed some promise and improvement as well as good will towards the resettlement process in the 1980s. However, this depended on relatively generous pay-outs and credit that were in turn aid dependent and as a result, apart from their superficiality, were fragile and reversed when the going got tougher after 1990 and the West more mean-spirited in terms of dishing out development grants.

Section III

The Miracle Unpacked (Tested and Revisited): The Case Study of Mayo Scheme

Previous sections have established the background to changes in Zimbabwe's agriculture since colonial rule as well as the policy and institutional framework within which post-independence agricultural change took place. This section turns to address the experiences of African farmers in the resettlement sector since 1980. Section One dealt with the colonial background of African agriculture and rural development that created the high profile nature of the land question as well as the nature and context of the liberation struggle which meant that funding for agriculture took the back seat in post-colonial development planning. The resettlement programme became the only major rural development programme initiated by the government to effect change in the rural areas following independence. In the second year of the programme, Kinsey (1982: 92) reported that resettlement was the major rural development activity and the only sustained public sector programme in the country that had the potential to affect fairly immediately and significantly the economic welfare of large numbers of rural dwellers. The typical discourse on agrarian reform and a summary of the land and agrarian reform process in Zimbabwe through government's resettlement programme was elaborated in Section Two. The context for these reforms was post-colonial social and economic reorganization as well as political stability. This third and final section (Section III), evaluates the extent of such transformation and addresses the thesis topic as well as elaborating how the acclaimed agrarian reform miracle was "fragile and unsustainable." The basis for the analysis arises from the experiences of Mayo Resettlement Scheme.

The section is divided into two main chapters, Chapter Seven which outlines and unpacks the miracle as suggested. The work of Bill Kinsey and other influential commentators associated with various multilateral and development agencies are also provided and their judgments re-stated. Chapter Seven addresses the idea of the miracle and use the judgments of key authorities (such as Bill Kinsey) on resettlement agriculture and its performance will be weaved into the research findings to evaluate the nature of the miracle. Secondary literature, government reports as well as international donor community evaluation of

African agriculture informed the idea of a miracle and emphasises the successes that were realised. In doing so, the thesis seeks to clarify this notion of an “agrarian miracle” by spelling out the nature, extent and context of the miracle and the miracle “discourse” within the context of revisionism, national historiography and triumphalism that accompanied the euphoria of independence in a region dominated by a kind of neo-apartheid and continuing poverty. Chapter Eight tests the idea of the agrarian miracle on the basis of evidence and the testimonies of farmers and their perceptions of change. The argument is that a long term and sustainable agrarian ‘miracle’ would have deepened the transformation of the agrarian sector and established African farmers on a much firmer basis as commodity producers and competitors within the sector.

Methodological Considerations in Assessing and Evaluating Resettlement Schemes

The evaluation of development policy and development projects has been largely approached from a quantitative approach and a cause and effect relationship between inputs and impacts on intended beneficiaries. In the 1970s, policy analysts suggested the adoption of a methodological approach that moves away “from inductive statistics towards more building of deductive models whereby one can deduce policy effects from empirically validated premises” (Nagel, 1975: 10). However, this approach came under fire in the 1980s, with Michael Patton (as cited in Akwabi-Ameyaw, 1990) criticizing the dominance of evaluation research by this largely unquestioned, natural science paradigm of hypothesis based deductive methodology [which] assumes quantitative measurement, experimental design and multivariate, parametric statistical analysis to be the epitome of “good” science. Extending Patton’s suggestion, Akwabi-Ameyaw, 1990: 17) argues that the alternative of a paradigm derived from the tradition of anthropological field studies, ethnography. Ethnographic research promises “in depth, open-ended interviewing and personal observation ... qualitative data, holistic analysis, and detailed description derived from close contact with the targets of study [aimed] at understanding of social phenomena”. The research from which the arguments raised in this thesis are based focussed on government’s resettlement policy (design and support systems) and the responses of the farmers. A single case study (Mayo Resettlement Scheme) was chosen in which the ethnographic and qualitative methodologies were applied. Through this approach, farmers’ attitudes towards the resettlement programme, farm-level constraints, and agricultural performance were considered.

The assessment of the performance of land reform programmes and its beneficiaries depends largely on the focus of analysis. According to Deininger, Hoogeveen and Kinsey (2004) an analysis focusing on household and one on productivity per capita would yield different results in terms of success or failure. For instance, Kinsey, Burger and Gunning (1998) report how land reform households performed well as they accumulated large amounts of (livestock) assets. Gunning, Hoddinott, Kinsey and Owens (2000) show how, relative to 1983 – 1984, [by 2000] settler households increased their productivity tremendously. From other per capita performance criteria, such as nutritional status or per capita expenditure, land beneficiaries do not outperform non-beneficiaries (Hoogeveen and Kinsey, 2001; Kinsey, 1999). So from a per capita based analysis land reform households appear almost as poor as communal households.

In Deininger, Hoogeveen and Kinsey (2004) used the performance criterion that sought to find whether “in terms of economic returns land reform has been satisfactory ... whether the benefits accruing to land reform beneficiaries are at least as large as the opportunity cost of resources expended on them” (Deininger, Hoogeveen and Kinsey, 2004: 1698). The study by Akwabi-Ameyaw (1990: 323) found that “the comparison of the mean resettlement costs per family and the rates of economic returns is also quite illuminating in that the relatively expensive schemes are not necessarily the potentially productive ones, and vice versa”. In reviewing the miracle, this thesis uses the criterion that seeks to establish whether in the long term, there have been structural changes in the farming systems of African smallholders and whether the relations of production have changed since the establishment of the schemes.

The approach of this thesis is to evaluate the miracle claims on the basis of the objectives of the resettlement programme. Kofi Akwabi-Ameyaw (1990) places the land and agrarian reform programme of the GoZ in the context of economic transformation and evolution. He suggests:

The state sets out to tackle its problems of nation-building and economic development in part through the use of a rural development strategy that embraces various elements of both the transformationist and evolutionist approaches. The former involves the establishment of planned resettlement

schemes, while the latter consists of providing increased assistance to the country's inherited farming systems to ensure continuity, at least in the short to medium term, and to maintain higher farm output (Akwabi-Ameyaw, 1990: 320).

This thesis considers the objectives of the resettlement programme as the basis for the evaluation of the miracle claim and performance of resettlement agriculture and the supposed miracle. The objectives can be divided into two broad clusters, namely:

- (a) The objectives related to relieving land pressure in communal areas as well as addressing the social impacts of the war, displacement and the over-crowded communal areas.
- (b) The objectives that dealt with the improvement of the standards of living of the African farmers, land use management and the search for qualitative transformation.

The extent to which the cluster (a) objectives have been addressed impacts on the success of cluster (b) objectives. This chapter will give a brief overview of the cluster (a) objectives and concentrate on the cluster (b) development related objectives. The history of land alienation and the first steps in its reversal has been subject of earlier chapters. Post-independence Zimbabwe has had a relatively impressive record in terms of land transfer despite the continuation of the land question and its politicization by Mugabe's government. In comparison to the other British settler economies, Kenya and South Africa, Zimbabwe fell far short of Kenya while doing much better than South Africa [so far].⁶⁴

One of the factors complicating analysis of post-independence African agriculture in Zimbabwe is the tendency to bundle up statistics on African sectors (communal, resettlement and small scale commercial, that is, the former purchase area schemes) together. As such, some commentary overlaps these sectors and apply statistics on one sector over the others. This way, the clear picture affecting resettlement schemes for example become misrepresented. The research for this thesis, especially the field work in Mayo, is based largely on qualitative ethnographic methodology. The testimony of the community of beneficiaries about their own perception of life in the schemes is given

⁶⁴ In the first two years of independence Kenya had transferred more than three million ha of land in the Kenyan Highlands, a figure that took Zimbabwe up to the second decade of independence. In South Africa at the end of the first decade since the democratic transition less than 2 percent of land had been transferred from the large scale white commercial and other state sectors back to the rural African communities.

precedence over statistics. The time during which the field work was carried out (2001 – 2003) was also characterised by rural upheavals that made politically charged rural areas such as Makoni difficult to access and collect comprehensive statistical data. The interviews for this research (except those with senior government officials and former government officials who could not speak Shona) were carried out in Shona. I did all the interviews and translated the transcripts from Shona to English myself.

Chapter Seven

Unpacking the Miracle

Introduction

From the early 1980s into the mid-1990s Zimbabwe's agricultural sector was being hailed as a "success story" owing to "miraculous increases in productivity and farmer enthusiasm" (Chung, 1989: 9). The term miracle and the application of related terms used to underscore the success of African farmers can be understood at two levels. The first is one of surprise which is informed by an understanding of the odds that faced African households trying to make a living off the land. The other is an indictment of government support services. If government facilitation was poor, disjointed and where such support determines success, then the fact that there was increased productivity notwithstanding poor support suggests a miracle. The use of the term miracle (and related nouns) was in fact informed by these and other factors that will be discussed below.

A joint British and Zimbabwean team described the government's land resettlement programme as a "highly creditable achievement" albeit with "serious inadequacies" in support for the programme from government agencies. According to the team, the resettlement programme was "a highly creditable achievement in a scheme unprecedented in size and in the ecological difficulties it faced" (Herald, 12.09.1982). A panel survey of resettlement households started in 1983 by Kinsey showed clearly that resettled households' well-being improved dramatically since independence. In particular, he found that resettlement livestock wealth almost tripled and crop productivity increased significantly but did not consider structural change more holistically (Kinsey, et. al. 1998). It is claimed that even accounting for agro-ecological endowment, the income of resettled households during the period under review (1980 – 2000) was more than five times as high as that of communal households in similar areas (and their agricultural income more than six times as high). According to Sam Moyo (1998), the 70,000 households which benefited from land redistribution between 1980 and 1997, represent about "five percent of the peasant farmer population, but produce between 15 and 20% of the marketed output of maize and cotton, while also largely satisfying their own food consumption needs". Such market contributions form the basis of the miracle claims.

Key failures in areas of international development interest and investment under the command of the World Bank and the IMF as well as the development agencies of the liberal world led the changes in Zimbabwe in the 1980s to stand out as apparently miraculous. This thesis acknowledges moderate gains in the resettlement sector at the level of an improved welfare of the beneficiary households [during the 1980s at least]. However, it is skeptical of the use of the term miracle to describe these gains as the gains did not amount to the restructuring of the African agricultural sector and fundamental changes in the relations of production in agriculture as a whole. The description of changes in African agriculture have to be qualified and the use of the miracle recognize that such miracle was limited geographically, in time as well as in terms of its capacity to create sustainable economic growth and transformation of the rural space. The miracle was located in the 1980s and could not be extended into the 1990s. In the agriculturally suitable agro-ecological regions, the miracle could be considered to have lasted seven years at the longest with a national average of four years and the lowest region experience as low as two good years. In Mayo, the miracle can be considered to have lasted for at least five years.

The thesis moreover acknowledges the existence of seeds of a miracle, a huge potential for growth in African agriculture, hitherto constrained by institutional, racial and land constraints. However, poor planning and limited funding allocation sealed the fate of African agriculture which on its own could not sustain these advances. The neglect of the African agricultural sector by the nationalist bourgeoisie state pursuing a half-hearted modernising project with half-baked plans and minimal funding is responsible for what appears today [2008] to be an agricultural tragedy in lieu of the miracle. The premise upon which the miracle is evaluated is that a substantial and long term miracle would lead to the transformation of the relations of production in African land. It could only become possible with substantial transformation in social, institutional and political change in the countryside. Strategies that advanced the place of women in the African society and based on a 'Protestant ethic' rather than traditional values could create conditions where increased investment could change the relations to land.⁶⁵ Extension services, seed packs and fertilizer

⁶⁵ The Protestant ethic was not especially friendly to women except for expecting women too to know their Bible; it could be linked to effective, co-operative monogamous households where the man directed the labour of women and children but was considered to be headed by the male breadwinner who shouldered most burdens himself; it is to be associated with a strong sense of individual responsibility linked to the hunger for

subsidies working on the basis of such a transformed social base could be expected to yield more than opportunistic production increases.

Establishing and Unpacking the Miracle

Comments on the achievement of the Zimbabwe government in the 1980s, especially in agriculture showed a generosity of spirit. The general perception in southern Africa and most of the continent as well as international community was that Zimbabwe had become a major player in the global agricultural sector. Zimbabwe was singled out in the region as exemplary in transforming agriculture and was assigned a food security role in the then Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (Thompson, 1991). A regional meeting held in Harare in September 1985 to review African countries' agrarian reform hailed Zimbabwe as "a monumental success for all to emulate". The attendees heard that 36 000 families with 265 000 dependents had been resettled on two million hectares of land, of which 65 percent were from communal areas, with 56 percent of them in the highly productive regions II and III. The settlers from the communal areas had realised a per capita income rise from \$20 to \$400 a year. Government officials expected incomes to be higher under the co-operative sector of the scheme. According to the Zimbabwean team's presentation:

Agriculture Finance Corporation loans for communal farmers rose from 18 000 worth \$4.18 [million?] in 1981 to 64 000 worth \$30 million, while the resettlement sector which had started with nothing got 19 900 loans worth \$10.2 million in 1984. A total of 13 primary marketing depots each with a capacity ranging from five to 70 000 tonnes were established, together with 50 tertiary depots. Four more agricultural training institutes were set up to complement the two colleges (existing at independence), producing 300 graduates a year excluding output from 375 rural training centres and the University of Zimbabwe's manpower contribution. The extension worker-to-farmer ratio has been reduced from 1:1000 families to 1:400, while the target is 1:250 (Jinya, 1988: 6).

This increase in services to the African sectors was meant to translate into the transformation of the African sector and set it on a high production pedestal. The Zimbabwean team also reported that:

salvation, not to reliance on a government. Norman Long (2001)'s anthropological study of maize farming in southern Zambia emphasized the Protestant Ethic of the sectarian farmers who were quite successful in late colonial times.

Overall production resulted in a 468 percent increase in sales of principal crops by these sub-sectors from a total value of \$22 million to \$102.9 million last year (1984) in spite of the three years of drought. This contribution compares with a 188 percent increase in national crop sales whose value increased from \$372.2 million to \$699.7 million. While previously the smallholder sub-sector was delivering only 6 percent of the total value of the marketed crops, its share has since risen to 15 percent with maize and cotton deliveries increasing from 10 to 40 percent (Jinya, 1988: 9).⁶⁶

A correspondent to the *Sunday Mail* (06.04.1989) stated that communal farmers had shown that miracles on the farm do not depend on either good weather or a higher education. He reiterated the 'miracle' developments by suggesting that:

Ten years ago the communal people produced only 13 percent of the commercial harvest: a few white farmers made up the rest. In 1988, 400 000 black Zimbabwean growers and 200 000 cotton growers accounted for 50 percent of the commercial production of the two crops. This success story should encourage government to do something on the land issue for the peasants (Correspondent, *Sunday Mail*, 06.04.1989).

Responding to questions about the first ten years of Independence, Sir Garfield Todd (Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister, 1953– 1958) judged the performance of the new government in the economy in general as 'reasonable' and in agriculture as amazing, saying:

I think amazing things have been done. There is capital available to peasant farmers from the AFC for the production of crops. Professional advice is more easily available to the communal farmers. There are also more depots to which people can send their produce. I think these farmers have done extremely well and will do better (*Moto*, March/April, 1990: 6).

Todd also added that the level of disparities between the African and white sectors was too wide to resolve immediately.

Sylvester (1990: 473) argues that following independence, communal farmers out-produced white commercial farmers and thus formed a basis for a revolution, especially the transformation in the consciousness of post-independence communal farmers. According to

⁶⁶ This mostly referred to the situation in the established older Communal Areas – and yet constantly bundled up with the analysis of the resettlement sector.

Weiner, et.al (1985: 23) “in the late 1980s, the 57 percent of the Zimbabwean population in communal areas, most of whom are women, children and elderly, provided 35 percent of maize deliveries, up from 14 percent in 1980.” The miracle school used such figures to suggest that this increase in delivery from African areas challenged the myth that white agriculture is the indispensable backbone of the country. Sylvester (1990: 473) went to the extent of pondering whether:

... the state will use these performance figures to reduce the role of white farmers in the economy ... [further surmising] ... if it does, will this bourgeoisie enter the state to manage the economy, leaving communal farmers as potential bourgeoisies, or will it remain in the economy with smaller tracts of less desirable land, less privileged access to credit, and fewer subsidies?

If this was the case, one might expect the settlement schemes to have a very important role to play in particular. However, the situation in resettlement and communal areas had not evolved to a point where the economy could depend on these sectors. The communal areas indeed increased their output in response to the removal of constraints and improve access to the market and inputs. However, like the resettlement schemes the relations of production in these sectors remained largely non-capitalist in orientation.

Phimister (1987), is justifiably sceptical when he noted that what the local press was describing as the “peasant miracle” was not widespread but located in a small area of the country. During recurrent droughts (characteristic of the Zimbabwean climate), production fell back well below subsistence level and massive food imports were needed. By the time of the land occupation movement which started in 1999, subsistence levels attained in the 1980s and in good years could no longer be reached. A country that used to be a net exporter of food became a net importer of food with many of its poor people described as facing starvation. These and other factors inform the thesis that such a miracle was fragile and was not sustained.

The notion of the miracle served many purposes for various interests. From the point of the GoZ, the idea of a miracle in the rural African farming sector was a welcome vindication of the land reform programme that confounded critics of the resettlement schemes. Some government officials, such as Fay Chung, were optimistic but cautious about the agrarian


support and access to land suitable for crop production, the peasantry can be highly productive.

Before 1981, for instance, there were seldom more than 130 000 tons of surplus maize for sale from African producers or peasants. In 1981 the surplus generated by that sector was 324 000 tons rising to 400 000 the following year. While the peasant sector contributed just 26.5% of the total of 1.64 million tons of maize output in 1975 – 76 its share of the 2.0 million tons of maize being produced these days by Zimbabwe is around 58%. In cotton, sunflower seed and groundnuts they are doing even better (Akwabi-Ameyaw, 1990: 334).

This line of argument was directly aimed at conservative perspectives tied to the pre-1980 regime. For instance, George Kay (1970: 83) had portrayed rural African households as “primitive and ignorant” about agriculture. The Whitsun Foundation’s report on the state of agriculture in Zimbabwe also had suggested that Communal Area farmers were not putting enough into their crops and land. Miracle or success assertions are largely made on refuting the Whitsun Foundation and aligned thinking. Akwabi-Ameyaw (1990: 335) concludes that:

... there is perhaps no other country in Africa where smallholder family farms have so quickly and successfully turned their output and productivity around as in Zimbabwe today. There, smallholders in the Model A schemes are spearheading a revolution in national self-sufficiency and regional food security as well as in export agriculture.

Map 7: Research Sites for Akwabi-Ameyaw and Bill Kinsey Surveys



Source: Adapted from Kinsey (2004)

Table 7.2: Comparison of Selected Schemes

<i>Scheme</i>	<i>Mupfurudzi</i>	<i>Sengezi</i>	<i>Mutanda</i>
Province	Mash. Central	Mashonaland East	Manicaland
District	Shamva	Hwedza	Makoni
Natural Region	Iib/III	Iib/III	III/IV
Area (km ²)	345	84	439
Year settlement officially began	1980	1981	1981
No of settlement villages	18	8	29
Number of settler households	563	289	575
Main area available per household (ha)	61	29	76

Source: Kinsey, 2004

A better understanding of the situation of resettlement schemes should place comments about the levels of production within a particular time and place instead (Phimister, 1987). The Kinsey and Akwabi-Ameyaw (1990) surveys fit in this category. Akwabi-Ameyaw (1990) judgements that concluded that the schemes projected “positive social, political and economic outcomes” was based on the study of Mufurudzi Model A Scheme which was a high priority scheme – receiving \$1.3million in total project costs by 1985. According to the report of the Resettlement Officer who managed the scheme in the 1980s (as cited in Akwabi-Ameyaw, 1990: 326):

Mufurudzi scored consistently high in social motivation, agricultural performance, Agricultural Finance Corporation loan repayment, political participation, self help, youth activities, women’s affairs, Area Board leadership, co-operation with the Resettlement Team, compliance with resettlement policy, and long term prospects for the success of the scheme.

The scheme was considered to have achieved the stage of socio-economic development reflecting progressive attitudes about farm production, community formation, as well as the acquisition of consumption and production assets. According to Akwabi-Ameyaw (1990):

Maize and cotton are the major traditional and cash crops. Both are grown each year by almost all farmers who rotate them between fields in accordance with Agritex recommendations. In addition, tobacco and groundnuts (peanuts) are highly priced, although they are more demanding of labour and farm inputs such as fertilizer. ... there was also an increasing tendency among Mufurudzi farmers to utilize their arable lands fully by expanding the areas cultivated. ... in 1984 – 85 slightly more land was devoted to cotton than to maize and increasing productivity was another area the farmers were doing very well (Akwabi-Ameyaw, 1990: 326).

Akwabi-Ameyaw (1990)'s study of Mufurudzi end with 1989 figures and the post-1990 figures for the same scheme can be taken from the Kinsey Panel Data. The data provided by Kinsey confirms the trend that the diversification in production and increased productivity per unit of inputs experienced in the 1980s was not sustained in the 1990s. This is what makes the Kinsey surveys (considered in more detail below) superior as they focus at more schemes in different areas in time spans spanning across the 1980s and the 1990s.

The figures that form the basis of the miracle thesis are not systematic but random selections of different indicators on different schemes. The data does not disaggregate between the various sectors of African agriculture. The small scale commercial producers – a combination of former Purchase Areas producers and those who bought land under freehold during the Muzorewa Zimbabwe-Rhodesia liberal reforms as well as those who purchased farms soon after independence averaging 50ha; then there was the Resettlement Area category; plus the communal lands which are generally lumped together with others in the literature as either African farmers, African producers, and broadly communal producers.⁶⁷

Having attained independence after a relatively long period of international isolation and a protracted war, Zimbabwe had the urgent task of resettling and rehabilitating its displaced population and reconstructing its war-torn economy. Equally important was the task of embarking on the no less pressing tasks of eradicating poverty, disease and illiteracy. By February 1988, the MRLD stated that resettlement farmers had attained higher standards of living than before joining the scheme. According to the report:

Once ranked among the poorest people in the country because they had no land, the inhabitants of resettlement schemes have proved to be extremely

⁶⁷ A study by the Centre of African Studies at the University of Eduardo Mondlane in Maputo dubbed the *Rhodesian Question* (cited in Ranger, 1978) highlights the methodological challenge of reliance on statistics to make conclusions about growth. The starting and ending point of statistical analysis paints a picture in which there would be upswings and downswings for which when placed out of historical, and the social and political context of the time may be misleading. The Rhodesian Question places the collapse of African agriculture in the Rhodesia Front period, that is, after 1965. Previous attempts at 'disciplining' African agriculture had only managed to go as far as undermining its competition on the market but African production remained the most important source of food for Africans. Indeed, in high militarised zones, the war had a tremendous effect on African production. This affected areas such as Makoni, Mutoko and the Eastern Highlands (in general) mostly.

productive farmers. Today they contribute 11 percent to the national agricultural product. They have also proved to be very skilful farmers who use the land they acquired from commercial farmers **far more efficiently than previous owners**. The contribution of the resettlement programme to the national agricultural production has been increasing steadily since 1980 and now stands at about 11 percent. This shows that though more land is being acquired and therefore more small scale farmers set up under the programme, households in resettlement schemes appear to be entrenching themselves into the position of meaningful farmers **through improved managerial skills** (Ministerial Report on Resettlement Schemes, February 1988).⁶⁸

The report does not indicate what methodology its authors used to compare the two sectors and upon which they concluded that “resettlement farmers were using land more efficiently than their previous owners.” Even the fact that the resettled farmers were contributing 11 percent to the national agricultural product on its own is not an adequate measure of success against previous farmers as there is not information as to how much the previous land holders were producing on the same land or even what percentage of the rural population they constituted. It seems obvious that given the relatively larger land sizes of resettlement land (12 acres) in comparison to the average communal plot (three acres) the resettled households would produce slightly more than the communal counterparts, yet far less than those in the commercial sector. There is also the point to make that those fewer farmers in the communal areas with access to slightly more land were also able to sell surplus, especially when they had access to the input scheme of government. Figures to ascertain the rate of increase in productivity per unit of land, labour and other inputs for all the sectors does not exist.

The ministerial report suggested that resettlement schemes were producing “more efficiently than previous owners” and the “patrons entrenched themselves through improved managerial skills.” There seemed to be a deliberate and desperate effort to paint the situation in resettlement schemes in the brightest of colours.

The study attributes the results being achieved by resettled farmers to the relatively good quality land that they had acquired. Seventy percent of them have been settled in the high rainfall natural regions II and III. The farmers

⁶⁸ Emphasis mine. This contradicts the evidence given by the constituent members of parliaments about the state of schemes during the 1987 extended debate on Resettlement Schemes included in Appendix Four. A comparison of the LSCF and the RS is bound to be methodologically a nightmare and at best unrealistic.

have also been provided with an impressive infrastructure of access roads, boreholes and dip tanks, as well as with easily available expert advice from the country's extension workers (Ministerial Report on Resettlement Schemes, February 1988).

These figures suggest that the report was based on findings from certain high profile schemes such as Chinyika and Mufurudzi in Manicaland (Akwabi-Ameyaw, 1990). The positive picture of the schemes was also perhaps biased in aiming at donors at a time when the international support for Zimbabwean transformation in general was deteriorating and the resettlement programme was particularly losing support both locally and internationally. There is a level of inconsistency in terms of the land quality in official reports depending on the picture the report wanted to paint. Whenever the shortcomings of the scheme were discussed, the key argument raised was always the poor nature of the land and the unavailability of land in suitable regions. When progress in resettlement was being painted in a positive light, the schemes chosen were in regions where land was rarely unavailable. In fact, there simply isn't that much good land in Zimbabwe which could be used to justify making that land highly capitalised and export orientated.

The Report suggests that the range of crops be widened to include wheat, cotton and tobacco, alongside the traditional crops such as maize and small grains" (GoZ, 1988). In many schemes, resettlement households placed less and less land under cash crops compared to traditional grain and food crops. The expansion of the crops cultivated to include cash crops was only possible in schemes with irrigation systems. Irrigation allowed the possibility of a two cycle agriculture year where cash crops would be planted in one season and traditional crops in the other. Mayo is a completely rain-fed scheme and thus had less land allocated to cash crops in comparison to Nyamazura scheme in the same province, Manicaland. Nyamazura farmers allocated more land to cash crop production with very impressive results in flue cured tobacco.

In 1982, very few resettlements had been completed in terms of the establishment of infrastructure and the contribution of the sector as a whole is therefore justifiably minimal.

Table 7.3: Comparative Estimated Total Production of Selected Crops, 1982 to 1987

	<i>Maize</i>		<i>Sorghum</i>		<i>Groundnuts</i>		<i>Cotton</i>	
	82/83	86/87	82/83	86/87	82/83	86/87	82/83	86/87
<i>Resettlement</i>	6583	109 260	65	2600	164	3060	791	13500
<i>Communal</i>	279417	518430	43935	37794	22336	55328	31709	82800
<i>Commercial</i>	624786	465950	7556	11862	9152	20672	114021	147750

Source: CSO, 1988

By the year 1986/87, the resettlement schemes had been well established but still on a much smaller acreage of land as a comparison of the other sectors. In 1987, resettlement schemes covered less than five percent of the arable land mass while communal areas were more than 44 percent.

Table 7.4: Resettlement as Percentage of Total Production, 1982 - 1987

	<i>Maize</i>		<i>Sorghum</i>		<i>Groundnuts</i>		<i>Cotton</i>	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
<i>1982/83</i>	910786	0.72	51536	0.08	31652	0.5	146521	0.6
<i>1984/85</i>	2952268	3.9	133200	3.75	67998	5.0	239772	4.1
<i>1985/86</i>	2545600	5.8	84400	3.6	60710	5.8	256479	3.5
<i>1986/87</i>	51840	10	2600	5	3060	3.9	13500	4.7

Source: CSO, 1988

The cash crops peak and start to fall in the mid-80s by contrast to the food crops. The general increase in the share of the resettlement schemes when compared to the two main sectors, communal and commercial, is also commensurate with increase in land allocation as more farms were acquired and allocated, as opposed to increase of yields per hectare. However, the contribution of ten per cent to the total maize production and five percent for sorghum, 4.7% for cotton indicate very impressive results. It is important to underscore that this increased share in marketed crop came from the Mashonaland region with other pockets of high yields dotted about other regions. Again, agro-ecological distribution, access to support services and proximity to infrastructure, were critical factors.


Table 7.5: Resettlement Production as Percentage of Communal Production⁶⁹

	<i>Maize</i>	<i>Sorghum</i>	<i>Groundnuts</i>	<i>Cotton</i>
<i>1982/83</i>	1.9	0.14	0.73	3.2
<i>1984/85</i>	6.9	6.5	5.4	8.1
<i>1985/86</i>	11.1	18.0	6.8	8.4
<i>1986/87</i>	17.4	26.00	5.2	14.0
<i>1987/88</i>	19.2	26.2	5.8	15.2
<i>1988/89</i>	18.6	26.8	7.2	16.7
<i>1989/90</i>	18.2	25.1	6.7	21.3
<i>1990/91</i>	18.4	25.4	5.8	21.2
<i>1991/92</i>	15.4	22.0	4.1	17.4
<i>1992/93</i>	14.7	19.2	3.9	6.2
<i>1993/94</i>	8.3	17.2	4.1	6.1
<i>1994/95</i>	11.6	9.7	3.5	7.1

Source: CSO, 1996

The figures between 1984 and 1987 (apart from the groundnuts) support well the idea of a minor miracle, which begins to fade away into 1990, and gets further eroded as the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) comes in during the 1990s. This point is illustrated clearly by Figure 3 on resettlement maize production below.

Figure 1: Maize Production among African Farmers in Zimbabwe, 1979 - 1999



Mosley, 2002: 702

⁶⁹ No matter what circumstances, comparing volumes of production in commercial farms and communal areas and that on resettlement schemes does not seem fair and is like comparing apples to bananas. Even if the productivity on white commercial farms was not as rosy as the picture those against land reform tried to paint, resettlement schemes remained in the shadow of commercial agriculture, characterised by an emphasis on traditional crops and general avoidance of cash crops that required more capital injection. Such comparison can only be justified and useful as an indication of the general rise or otherwise, in contribution of the resettlement sector, considering the fact that the aim of resettlement agriculture was to develop a sector that would eventually unify the communal and commercial and establish a single agriculture industry, these figures become important as an indication of potential and capacity. An immediate conclusion as indicated by the continued existence, until the Land Occupation Movement (LOM) beyond 2000, is testimony to the lack of capacity and investment in the sector to facilitate this politically desired end.

Mosley (2002)'s calculations of the maize production figures (the key basis of the miracle claim) among African farmers shows that the rise and fall of the maize figures is in response to the drought years. However, during the early 1990s drought production figures rise steadily until the impacts of ESAP start to set in around 1993. Since then maize production fell down to the 1970s level and remained there until 1999. This fits the argument raised in this thesis that while drought played a certain part, it was the inability to subsidise production factors and farmer support which made gains unsustainable. The result being that the gains of the early years were reversed and no structural transformation took place in the African agricultural sector.

Table 7.6: Major Crops in Resettlement Schemes Compared to Commercial Production

	<i>Maize</i>		<i>Sorghum</i>		<i>Groundnuts</i>		<i>Cotton</i>	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
<i>1982/83</i>	631369	1.0	7601	0.85	9316	1.8	114812	0.69
<i>1984/85</i>	1366690	8.6	57200	8.7	9098	37.4	129772	7.5
<i>1985/86</i>	1345600	11.0	70400	4.3	12710	27.6	158479	5.7
<i>1986/87</i>	575210	19.0	11462	22.7	23732	12.9	161250	8.4

Source: 1988

The figures indicate that commercial farmers were moving away from the production of these traditional food crops to high value export crops and land use activities such as soya bean, tobacco, sunflower, eco-tourism, game ranching and sport hunting – among others. Given the relatively small size of resettlement scheme plots, by 1985 most resettlement farmers had achieved above 75 percent cultivation and 100 percent by 1990, but this was not sustained into the mid-1990s.

Table 7.7: Total Estimates of Resettlement Scheme Production, 1982 to 1987

<i>Crop</i>	<i>1982/83</i>	<i>1983/84</i>	<i>1984/85</i>	<i>1985/86</i>	<i>1986/87</i>
<i>Maize</i>	6583	56417	117000	148000	109260
<i>Sorghum</i>	65	1351	5000	4400	2600
<i>Mhunga</i>	23	299	2195	1919	860
<i>Rapoko</i>	156	1620	11000	12199	2600
<i>Sun-flower</i>	24	353	1065	2000	780
<i>Unshelled groundnuts</i>	164	979	3403	3510	3060
<i>Soya beans</i>	24	142	384	200	350
<i>Cotton</i>	791	5358	9772	9000	13500
<i>Tobacco</i>	52	296	109	133	245*

* includes flue cured and burley tobacco

Source: CSO (1983 & 1984); Crop forecast figures, Economics and Markets Department of MLARD (1984-1987)

It is important to follow this general analysis and random discussion of the numerous arguments of resettlement agriculture with the more guarded and thorough analysis by Bill Kinsey whose conclusions are positive about the social welfare benefits of the scheme.

Focus on the Kinsey's Survey Findings

The longstanding and popular analysis of the Zimbabwe resettlement scheme is based on the longitudinal study of Bill Kinsey (Kinsey, 1987, 1988, 1997, 1999, 2001) and the judgment he makes are important to this current analysis as they paint the schemes in a positive light. The basis of Kinsey's judgment is a longitudinal study which started in 1983 based on information collected from about 400 then recently (that is, for approximately two years) resettled households on a wide range of topics including:

crop production, yields and sales, agricultural practices and inputs, agricultural equipment, livestock inventories, sales and revenues, household composition and labour hiring arrangements, credit, extension services, child health, food and asset expenditures, anthropometrics, education,, etc. ... the households were revisited in 1987 and in every year during 1992 – 2001. Starting in 1997 an additional 150 non-land reform households were added to the survey (Deininger, Hoogeveen and Kinsey, 2004: 1699).

The Kinsey Data Panel is the best survey data available on resettlement schemes in Zimbabwe given that Zimbabwe's own monitoring and evaluation unit lasted only between 1984 and 1987. This data set became the basis for a lot of evaluations and analysis of the resettlement schemes with reference in numerous journal and book chapters, as well as academic and policy reports. Kinsey does not use the term miracle but some commentators relying on his work frame it in the miracle vein. However, by titling his paper "forever gained" Kinsey also suggests the permanence of the results and benefits of the resettlement programme. His work is at the cutting edge of the analysis in the sector but it reveals that modest gains were achieved by the programme.

Table 7.8: Comparison between Beneficiary Households and those Rejected for Resettlement

	<i>Land reform beneficiary</i>	<i>Rejected for resettlement</i>
Household income (Z\$ 1 995) of which:	7. 904	5. 337
Crop income	66.9%	38.4%
Off farm business revenues	9.9%	16.7%
Livestock produce	1.4%	0.4%
Livestock growth	10.7%	8.2%
Remittances	3.7%	18.5%
Female income	4.4%	4.9%
Off farm income	3.4%	12.8%
Average planted (of which):	8.1	4.6
Maize	56.5%	55.0%
Cotton	15.2%	17.5%
Groundnuts	12.4%	13.0%
Other crops	15.8%	14.5%
Maize yield per acre (kg)	846	554
Cotton yield per acre (kg)	169	167
Groundnuts yield per acre (kg)	463	215
	(Z\$ 1995)	(Z\$ 1995)
Household expenditures	7.561	4.926
Value of livestock	13.764	8.198
Value of capital stock	3.279	1.571
Real expenditure per capita	879	793
Household size	9.6	6.7

Source: Kinsey's Surveys 1997 and 1999

According to the survey results, resettled households had a much higher income than those denied resettlement (7, 904 compared to 5, 337). According to the survey resettled households are reported as being better off in each and every aspect they were evaluated on in comparison to their counterparts that they left in the communal areas. Given the agro-ecological conditions in the varying regions, an evaluation of the conditions and changes in African agriculture has also to consider the fact that different regions face different conditions. The Kinsey Survey also compared resettlement beneficiary households and those in communal areas of NRII. The results are tabulated in Table 7.9 below.

From the comparison of the two sectors in NRII, the Communal Areas households reported a higher non-agricultural and remittance based income than the resettlement households. This could be accounted for by the fact that the majority of the early schemes were populated by non-working households as it was a condition for being accepted. However, resettlement schemes tend to fare far better when it comes to agriculture related incomes.

Table 7.9: Comparison of Household Characteristics for Resettled and Communal Households Living in Natural Region II

<i>Means for 1996/7 – 1996/97</i>	<i>Resettled</i>	<i>Communal</i>
Total real household income	4442	959
.....real agricultural income	3771	546
.....real gross business revenue	197	36
.....real income from sale of livestock products	87	18
.....real remittances	151	270
.....real female income	189	99
.....real off farm income	46	30
Yield per acre for maize	765	420
Acreage of maize	4.6	2.7
Total acreage cultivated	8.9	4.1
Number of residents in the household	11.6	6.1
Head of cattle	11.5	6.2

Source: Calculated from Kinsey (1999)

Through the lobby of the ZFU which represented both communal and resettlement scheme farmers AFC loans and other resources were made available to both sectors. However, resettlement schemes received a more favourable extension officer to farmer ratio (1: 400) compared to 1: 1 200 for the communal areas throughout the period of the study (1980 – 2000).

Conclusion

There is no doubt that where circumstances allowed, resettlement household were able to meet the welfare objectives of land reform. In some cases, they were even able to enjoy economic benefits associated with marketing their surplus. However, this window of opportunity was a brief one as it depended on the ability of government to provide inputs and services. The idea of loans instead of grants provided by the AFC meant that the capacity of good farmers to reinvest in their land was constrained. Without such needed capital injection, the resettlement households became an extension of their communal area counterparts rather than reflecting the standards of production of the commercial farmers as intended by policy. This, bearing in mind that in terms of efficiency, the situation in commercial areas reported by Riddell (1978) remained unchanged as “large tracts of land remained un-utilised or under-utilised” (Cliffe, 1986). However, European farms with substantial investments remained vastly more productive and employed more people, a disparity that became much truer with ESAP as investments made in the 1990s paid off very well for this sector unlike for the industrialists. This only reinforces the point that no

transformation of smallholder agriculture could take place without significant inputs that had to come from the state.

Improvements were also made easier because the baseline comparison after years of fighting in many areas was very low. The Minister of Agriculture (1980 – 1992), Dennis Norman, while acknowledging the continuation of colonial agricultural policy dualism and the lack of change after independence, argued that:

The so-called increased production in the resettlement and African sector after independence was a result of the fact that the base line was low. The war time disruptions led to production stoppages as in many areas Africans were kept in security control camps called 'keeps' leaving land untilled (Interview, 2002).

David Gordon (1981) argues that due to land shortage, overpopulation and war, agricultural output in African areas had shrunk to the point that African peasants had to 'import' half of their food from the white farming sector. The environment of peace created by the end of the war and the removal of colonial time structural blocks to production and policies that limited African market access led to a temporary increase in production from the African sector. However, this increased production did not mean an increase in productivity per unit of land and input – which is one major characteristic of an agricultural revolution (Interview with Dennis Norman [Min of Agriculture], 2002). The ODA/UK (key partner in the resettlement programme)'s evaluation of the performance of resettlement at the end of the first ten years was positive, balanced but cautionary. The ODA concluded that:

It must be a source of satisfaction that such a complex politically oriented programme that was required to achieve a range of, in some cases apparently conflicting objectives, has not been in economic terms a waste of resources (ODA, 1990: 7).

This conclusion based on a cost-benefit analysis considered that the economic costs of establishing the schemes, could be expected to be comfortably exceeded by the net increase in the value of agricultural production by settler households in the long term, on the basis of already observed performance as of 1990. However, as with all economic analysis, the result is dependent on the assumptions made about the costs and benefits to be included in the analysis and their respective economic values. The ODA criteria included the cost of net

output foregone under the alternative use in LSCF (the opportunity cost); the value of crop production, adjusted to reflect a national economic perspective by counting crop output at international prices in local currency terms and an element reflecting production foregone by settlers due to resettlement, included in the average subsistence requirement of settler households. On the basis of that criterion, it was claimed that the resettlement schemes reviewed were achieving an above cost profit of 21% in the year 1988 which was an impressive achievement.

It can be argued that the miracle was for analysts a statement of evaluation and for government officials a propaganda tool that allowed the justification for further land reform. To some extent, the miracle was a reflection of the gains of a return to peace as Norman suggests and to some extent a genuine reflection of the benefits of government inputs into African farming on the best possible land available. However, this miracle was a short-lived one that was dependent on the removal of impediments but not deepened to allow for enough savings to be re-invested in farming. In reality, production gains fell short of changes in living standard that were better than marginal. In fact, beneficiaries measured progress and transformation more or less only at the level of welfare, access to education and health. From an agricultural (economic) point of view, settlers considered their success mostly in terms of their ability to feed their families rather than the monetary income they got from surplus produce. This perspective will be clear from the fieldwork conducted in Mayo in the following chapter. The following chapter that deals with the case study of Mayo provides a test case for the miracle claim. Using the evidence from Mayo (cross-referenced with the Kinsey panel data) limits are clear.

Chapter Eight

Mayo Resettlement Scheme: Establishment and Development, 1980 to 2000

In this chapter I present a case study of Mayo Resettlement Scheme to build on the previous section and provide a detailed picture of the Government's resettlement policy. The chapter is divided into three parts; the first introducing Makoni District as a whole from an ecological, historical and socio-political point of view. Part Two deals with the establishment of Mayo as a resettlement scheme and the support services and infrastructure made available for beneficiary households. The third part discusses the production and welfare circumstances of the Mayo settlers using the evidence from interviews with settlers as well as different government and local officials in and around the scheme. A brief historical background of Mayo area is provided to introduce the district and resettlement area and set out the context within which support and production proceeded.

The institutional support and levels of production in Mayo is spelt out paying attention to the two time periods within which agriculture is affected by the divergent ideological and economic framework of post-colonial Zimbabwe. These periods are 1980 – 1990 during which government claimed to pursue a socialist transformation agenda. The second period covers 1991 to 2000, during which the government openly and vigorously pursued neo-liberal economic policies under the watchful eyes and guiding hands of the IMF and World Bank. The voices of growers, key government officials located in Mayo, business people and other interest groups are given a central place. This is as much a methodological choice as it is a response to the lack of statistical information on Mayo (or any specific Scheme for that matter).⁷⁰ The snapshot nature of the research/field work upon which this analysis is based also dictated that farmer voices, experiences and perceptions of their situation be given central space.

⁷⁰ Except for those schemes in Kinsey's Data Panel Survey, very few schemes have been studied persistently enough to yield reliable continuous data set that could be used to paint a longitudinal view of its circumstances and conditions. Interestingly, other studies of resettlement areas have focussed on cultural gender and political issues rather than economic: Goebel, Mudenge, Spierenburg, Donald Moore – these are all cited in the bibliography.

Part I: Historical, Social and Agro-Ecological Background Makoni District


Mayo Resettlement Scheme is one of the earliest joint schemes of the then European Economic Union (EEU) and GoZ situated in Makoni district, in the north-western part of the Eastern Province (Manicaland) east of Zimbabwe (see Maps 1 and 2). It is in the same district as the Mutanda Scheme which formed part of Kinsey Surveys. Makoni Rural District Council (MRDC) administers the area since its formation in 1996 from the amalgamation of Makoni and Maungwe Districts. According to the 2002 census results, Makoni was home to 272 578 people on 8200 square kilometres of land.

Table 8.1: Population Distribution in Manicaland Province

<i>Area</i>	<i>1992</i>	<i>2002</i>
Manicaland Province	1,537,676	1,566,889
Buhera district	203,909	218,570
Chimanimani district	110,836	115,250
Chipinge district	339,893	283,671
Makoni district	242,611	272,578
Mutare district	336,775	389,988

Source: 2002 Census Report

Map 8: Location of Makoni in Zimbabwe



The town of Mutare is the provincial capital and fourth largest city in Zimbabwe located on the eastern border with Mozambique. Mutare district has an urban centre as well as a huge rural area. The district is characteristic of many districts in the country with four agricultural land use zoning ranging from Communal Lands (CL), Resettlement Areas (RA), Small Scale Commercial Farms (SSCF) as well as Large Scale Commercial Farms (LSCF).

Table 8.2 below shows the distribution of land within the Makoni District between the main land use and tenures as at 2000. Communal areas dominate the district (60%) with resettlement schemes having the second largest (20%). Makoni district is home to the highest number of resettlement schemes in any district. Makoni district and the areas

surrounding it have been recipients of increased scholarly attention that will also benefit this research.⁷¹

Table 8.2: Land Categories, Estimated Area and Population in Makoni District in 2000

<i>Land Category</i>	<i>Area (km²)</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>%</i>
<i>CL</i>	2713	33	153 305	60
<i>SSCF</i>	287	4	15 556	
<i>RA</i>	3000	36	51 864	20
<i>LSCF</i>	2150	27	31 900	12
<i>Town & Growth Ps</i>	35		19 943	8
Total	8200	100	272 578	100

Source: MRDC, 2003

The high incidence of resettlement schemes in Makoni district following independence followed from the large number of commercial farms developed in the region during the colonial period. The district is located in the middle to high rainfall region as well as being strategically located close to the road and rail-link between Harare and the eastern border town of Mutare.

Makoni District, taken as a whole is one of the poor areas of Zimbabwe. It covers an area of about 8200km square and as of the 1992 census had a population of 242 611 and 272 578 by the 2002 census making it the most populous rural district in Manicaland province. In 2003 Makoni District was described as the epicentre of HIV/AIDS in the province which is consistent with the fact that it is one of the most impoverished districts of the province.⁷² Calculations of Human Development Index (HDI) and Human Poverty Index (HPI) calculations in the Human Development Report (1998) also help to show Makoni district's

⁷¹ The location of the district close to the border with Mozambique, where the ZANLA guerillas received training and penetrated into Zimbabwe makes the area a highly militarized and politicised zone. This gives the region pride of place in the national historiography and political geography as it is one of the major sites of the liberation struggle. As a result, Terence Ranger's *Peasant Consciousness* (1985), based on Makoni district; Kriger (1987) researched in Mutoko; Spierenburg (2004) in Dande (while not so close to Makoni – it yields interesting comparisons) and Moore (2005)'s book on the Kaerezi community in Mutasa – are part of this tradition. Their work focus on the prospects for change through the war of liberation contrasted with the real outcomes.

⁷² HIV statistics are recorded from women attending antenatal clinic. Given the easy improved access to clinics for resettlement schemes when compared to communal areas, which could explain the high recorded prevalence rate in Makoni.

standing in terms of poverty measure in comparison to other districts in the country, the provincial and national averages.⁷³

Table 8.3: Selected District Human Development Index indicators for Makoni⁷⁴

	<i>Life Expectancy +</i>	<i>Adult Literacy</i>	<i>Average Years in School</i>	<i>Mean Adjusted Income</i>	<i>Life Expectancy Index</i>	<i>HDI</i>
National*	61	80.38	5.56	3819.91	0.60	0.72
Harare*	64	94.04	8.06	4613.17	0.65	0.79
Manicaland*	57	75.22	4.96	1204.54	0.53	0.47
Makoni	61	82.35	5.32	1245.80	0.60	0.51
Male	60	84.49	5.48	1512.46	0.58	0.54
Female	62	80.64	5.17	1008.55	.62	0.50

* The national capital (Harare) and provincial (Manicaland) indexes are provided in order to contextualise the situation in Makoni District.

+ Life Expectancy in Zimbabwe generally improved since 1980, stagnated around 1988 and started to reverse in the 1990s with ESAP, shrinking further and deeper after 1999

Source: Zimbabwe Human Development Report 1998

Manicaland is mostly rural and dominated by the farming sector. The average rural income is an indication of the nature of agricultural incomes compared to those in other sectors.⁷⁵ Rural households store their wealth and measure it in non-cash terms and generally rural areas are characterised by low cash flows. Adult literacy is higher for Harare than the national average because Harare is the capital city where there is intense competition for jobs and attracts higher skilled people. There is also a higher concentration of services such as educational, health and other social amenities. The residual impact of the creation of cities as dormitories of African labourers, implies that through rural-urban migration, the older, retired and infirm people tend to return to rural areas. As a rule of thumb, rural areas are populated by a much higher number of economically inactive people. Provinces such as Harare and Bulawayo (the second largest) would thus have a much younger and more literate population when compared to Manicaland (and indeed Makoni district). Makoni is a rural district dominated by agriculture and land based economic activities.

⁷³ The Human Development Index (HDI) is the arithmetic mean of three indices, namely the life expectancy index, the educational attainment index and the income level index. The educational attainment index is a weighted average of the mean years of schooling index and the adult literacy index with the later receiving a weight of one third. The Human Poverty Index (HPI) measures human poverty. This comprises three composite indices, namely the life expectancy deprivation index and an index for the deprivation of a decent standard of living.

⁷⁴ For a complete set of data sets on the district and the whole country, see the Zimbabwe Human Development Report (1998). The indices and data sets selected here are meant to give a picture of the social and economic standing of Makoni District in the country.

⁷⁵ Until 1999, agricultural employment was dominated by the large scale commercial sector. The Land Occupation Movement radically changed this situation, leading to a major drop in agricultural income.

Makoni district ranks 50 out of 77 in terms of HDI district rankings, but comes 35th in terms of HPI index listing. This difference between the HDI and HPI ranking has to do with the difference in terms of the factors used in the calculation. However, what is immediately clear is the fact that within the context of the province, Makoni is relatively better off than other districts. These figures are used as an indication of the social and economic status of the district. The ranking of Makoni as better-off can be linked to the increase in schools, clinics, roads and water availability as part of the resettlement schemes programme.

Table 8.4: Comparison of Makoni HDI Index with Top and Lowest Ranked Districts

	<i>Life Expectancy</i>	<i>Adult Literacy</i>	<i>Average Years in School</i>	<i>Mean Adjusted Income</i>	<i>Life Expectancy Index</i>	<i>HDI</i>	<i>Rank</i>
Gwanda Urban	65	93.40	7.69	6137.76	0.67	0.79	1
Makoni	61	82.35	5.32	1245.80	0.60	0.51	50
Kariba rural	55	59.17	3.43	550.61	0.50	0.36	77

Source: Zimbabwe Human Development Report 1998

The comparison of Makoni and Kariba, the worst-off rural district in Zimbabwe, indicates the role of agriculture as a source of income in the rural economy. In Kariba, located in much drier region V with poor soils and tsetse fly prevalence, rural communities have a reduced reliance on land. The HPI also paints a similar picture for the district.

Table 8.5: Comparison of Makoni HDI Index with National, Capital and Provincial Indicators

	<i>Illiteracy</i>	<i>Under-weight children</i>	<i>No access to clean water</i>	<i>No access to health care</i>	<i>Living standard deprivation</i>	<i>HPI</i>
National	46.50	14.1	25.56	7.0	15.63	34.92
Harare	5.96	10.7	1.54	7.30	6.50	9.73
Manicaland	27.67	11.4	0.58	7.30	6.41	20.60
Makoni	17.64	18.4	25.53	4.70	16.21	16.92

Source: Zimbabwe Human Development Report 1998

When compared to the whole country (national) the capital city (Harare) and the province (Manicaland), Makoni district only does well in regard to access to health care. While this has to do with the fact that more clinics were built in the numerous resettlement schemes, Makoni still reflects the characteristics of a typical rural area, average in some respects and worse off in others. As noted in the ODA Report (1998), one of the benefits of resettlement agriculture was that it led to notable advantages in the form of social investment. The

construction of clinics and schools was an integral part of the resettlement programme. Therefore, in regions and districts where there were many resettlement schemes, the average number of schools and clinics was higher than in communal areas. Unfortunately, the investment in education and health sectors did not generate an impetus for growth in the agriculture of the schemes.

Table 8.6: Manicaland Province HPI

	<i>Illiteracy</i>	<i>Under-weight Children</i>	<i>No access to clean water</i>	<i>No access to health care</i>	<i>Living Standard Deprivation</i>	<i>HPI</i>
Chipinge	46.50	14.1	25.56	7.0	15.63	34.92
Nyanga	32.09	10.6	38.05	9.50	19.39	25.13
Mutasa	21.64	11.7	50.60	5.70	22.67	22.09
Buhera	18.36	17.2	43.27	14.10	24.85	22.03
Chimanimani	25.86	1.7	34.73	15.70	17.38	21.50
Mutare Rural	17.48	3.8	30.45	12.50	15.57	18.72
Makoni	17.64	18.4	25.53	4.70	16.21	16.92
Mutare	5.91	12.0	0.12	4.30	5.47	11.97
Urban						
Rusape	6.56	4.0	0.07	14.0	6.02	7.73
National	19.62	14.7	36.50	7.0	17.05	17.93

Source: Zimbabwe Human Development Report 1998

Within the province of Manicaland, Makoni has a better HDI and HPI than the poorest districts. This can be ascribed to the agro-ecological and mixed economy practiced in the district. Also Makoni is located along the communication and transport network that services the eastern border town of Mutare from Harare.

Table 8.7: Comparison of Makoni HPI Index with the Top and Lowest Ranked Districts in the Country

	<i>Illiteracy</i>	<i>Under-weight Children</i>	<i>No Access to Clean Water</i>	<i>No Access to Healthcare</i>	<i>Living Standard Deprivation</i>	<i>HPI</i>	<i>Rank</i>
UMP*	50.79	8.7	51.58	7.00	22.41	36.64	1
Makoni	17.64	18.4	25.53	4.70	16.21	16.92	35
Rusape	6.35	4.0	0.07	14.00	6.02	7.73	77

* UMP stands for Uzumba Maramba Pfungwe in the Mashonaland East Province

Source: Zimbabwe Human Development Report 1998

In terms of a ranking of all districts in the country, urban and rural, Makoni comes at 35 out of a total count of 77. This middling ranking is testimony to the fact that Makoni district has a spread of all the categories of the economy. The large scale, small scale and resettlement sectors cover more than a third of the area of Makoni. These sectors including the town (Rusape) and Growth Points (Chendambuya and Chikore) have a high concentration of

social amenities such as schools, clinics and other services factored in the Human Poverty Index.

Table 8.8: Human Poverty Comparisons of Districts

	<i>Illiteracy</i>	<i>Under-weight Children</i>	<i>No Access to Clean Water</i>	<i>No Access to HealthCare</i>	<i>Living Standard Deprivation</i>	<i>HPI</i>	<i>Rank</i>
Zimbabwe	16.34	23.4	31.01	4.80	19.74	17.42	31
Mutasa	37.83	10.0	14.49	3.40	9.30	27.10	1
Makoni	20.37	21.5	17.48	13.50	17.50	19.15	24
Rusape	6.35	4.0	0.07	14.00	6.08	7.73	77

Source: Zimbabwe Human Development Report 1998


In terms of social infrastructure, Mayo had only four primary schools before independence and 41 schools were built with the number of clinics rising from 9 to 17. The colonial electricity grid had hitherto supplied only white farming and residential areas and been destroyed by the war was replaced by the rural electrification programme which started in 1999.⁷⁶ As part of the resettlement and rural development programme, electricity was supplied to the Growth Points and rural service centres. During the establishment of Mayo Resettlement Scheme, growth points such as at Chendambuya and Nyamazira, the Mayo Business Centre and other Rural Service Centres and strategic services such as the clinic, the police station and secondary schools were supplied with electricity. However, it took until the rural electrification programme of 2001 for the households to be linked to the electricity grid. Telephone lines remained very limited. In Mayo resettlement schemes there were about 173 telephone units, mostly in government and public offices, the rest in business centres and schools. Only 17 private residences had phones. For a population of more than 2200 households, this represented about six percent which was far less than the communal average of 17 percent and the district average of 24 percent.

One of the key themes in Zimbabwe's land reform is the redistribution of its land resources and agro-ecological regions. It has been established that Africans were overwhelmingly relegated to reserves located in the agro-ecological regions IV and V (Moyana, 1986). The agro-ecological and soil condition of Zimbabwe's land is one of the most important factors of the country's land question that is rarely given the emphasis that it deserves. Much of

⁷⁶ The Rhodesian colonial infrastructure grid in the service of the white population could be considered very good to good by East African standards and modest by rich South African standards.

Zimbabwe's land is of poor quality and the spread of optimum climate conditions very thin. Where land is poor, the climatic conditions are also mostly poor. This means that even where irrigation technology could be developed, there is still need for significant investment in soil improvement. These fragile and badly drained, or high leading, sand soils limit the crop range that could be planted in different regions.

Map 9: Makoni District Land Use and Natural Regions



Source: MRDC, 1997

Notes on Mayo Resettlement Area

Colonial historiography suggested that the Mayo area was more or less uninhabited until the arrival of the white farmers during and after WWII (an assertion highly improbable even at face value). Writing in the police magazine *Outpost*, Journing (1979: 22) suggested that:

Mayo ranch was in the 1940s largely uninhabited track of land teeming with wildlife of all kinds. Even in the early 1950s tribesmen in the Chikore Tribal Trust Land used to complain fairly about elephants from Mayo damaging crops. Around 1950, Mayo ranch was sold and split into farms. The new farms were occupied fairly rapidly although the new owners had to clear virgin bush. Tobacco from the Headlands area was very much in demand and everyone was anxious to cash in on the boom. Labour was in short supply but even so the setting up of farm compounds gave rise to the

inevitable problems of labour disputes, drunkenness, assaults and petty thefts. The wildlife was also a temptation to both farmers and labourers. Most of it was soon killed off, legally or otherwise.

The Makoni district was the site of a 'revolt' in the early years of European settlement that saw the patriarch, Chief Chingaira Makoni, being decapitated by British settlers (Ranger, 1988). Following the revolt, the area was annexed as Crown territory. Between the 1890s and World War Two (WWII), the land remained unused by the colonial regime, and African communities remained on the 'designated land'. Oral and archival evidence indicate that this area was inhabited by the Makoni, Maungwe and Manyika people who were forcibly removed to clear way for the farms established during the 1950s. According to Chief Makoni, Mayo area was home to the Chikore, Makoni and Mutasa related chieftaincies (Personal Interview, Chief Makoni, 2003).

The *Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951* made it possible for African communities to be moved to Chikore and Chendambuya. Tanda was set aside for Purchase Area farms. Chiefs Chendambuya, Mutasa, Maungwe and Gandanzara were opposed to this forced removal. The Rhodesian Police based at Headlands was brought in to enforce the move. Mafarakupa (about 87 years old) who is now resident in Chendambuya (since the forced removal) recounted how they were forced to move at the watch of the police:

I remember clearly how we left that place where Mayo is now. I had just got married when this happened and my father had allocated me a piece of land close to the river and completed my first house. My wife was expecting our first son ... luckily I was home and not at work in Rusape where I worked for the Post Office as an orderly. The soldiers and police arrived and said the land had been bought and the new owner wanted to stay so we should move to Chendambuya or Chikore where new stands had been organised for us. Some houses had already been torched as people resisted moving. We packed as much as we could and our things were loaded in the trucks and we were dumped where Chendambuya Growth Point is now. It took us more than a month to get land as the people in the area were not happy with us being forced onto their land. The land was better in Mayo and our cattle had enough to graze. Here we became too congested but there was nothing that we could do (Mafarakupa, Interview – April 2003).

Taking over Mayo Ranch was part of the regional economic development drive of the Rhodesia government. The post-WWII resettlement saw white war veterans being allocated land in this area. Mayo was settled in the late 1950s by a number of farmers who worked

together to form a block of cattle ranches that more or less operated as a unit (Ellert, 1993). The area where Mayo Resettlement was established in 1981 used to be operated under a consortium keeping beef and dairy cattle and breeding stock, trading as Mayo Ranch until it was abandoned due to the intensity of the war in 1978 (Interview, Agritex Officer Gudyanga, 2003).

Agriculturally, the district supported mixed farming operations (from stock breeding to crop farming) which allowed farmers to diversify and spread risk and as such became a favourite settlement area for white farmers. The town centre of the Makoni District is Rusape which is 170 km from Harare and 75 km from Mutare. The scheme is surrounded by rural communities: Mutoko, Weya, Tanda and Chikore. These were important sources of cheap labour to Mayo Ranch and other commercial enterprises. Following resettlement, communal area households continued to seek seasonal piecework jobs from Mayo resettlement scheme.

Agro-ecologically, Mayo area is more suitable for cattle than crop farming, a factor established by the research department of the Rhodesian agriculture department. This is why, upon its annexation for the settlement of WWII veterans, Mayo area was sold to people who wanted to engage in beef and milk production. Until its abandonment in 1977, Mayo remained primarily a cattle ranch. Maize production in Mayo was carried out in certain areas that had higher rainfall and this supplemented ranching activities in providing cattle feed. Other white farmers had wanted to pursue tobacco farming but expert advice discouraged it. The Chairman of the Tobacco Farmers Association, E. L. Dold, responding to Mayo farmers who wanted to explore tobacco farming, suggested:

I would like to point out that cropping north of the line through Uithoek, Mutiro and Shumba, appears to be less suitable for cropping than ever and an economy based on livestock appears to be the solution, unless some reliable water supply is made available through government assistance. The cattle population in the ICA appears to be on the increase not only among older cattlemen, but through farmers who have not in the past run cattle, now acquiring herds for breeding (Mayo ICA Newsletter, NO. 35 AUG/Sep, 1969).

Cattle ranching is not the most economic land-use in the natural regions I and II type of land and even in region III type with adequate water supply. Cattle ranching can be practised in

these regions if the soil is not good, the terrain of the land too steep to allow for intensive/extensive tillage. In these conditions mountain ranches were often characterised by the presence of citrus orchards as well as flower varieties that required minimum tillage. Mayo Ranch falls primarily in natural regions III (i.e., on the low side of water supply) and IV, with only a very small portion lying on NR II.

The workers in the Mayo Ranch had been drawn from the contiguous tribal areas such as Chikore, Chendambuya, Mutoko and Buhera. Mayo shares borders with Chikore Communal Land in the North and with Weya Communal Land in the south. The eastern part of Mayo adjoins Tanda Communal Land and Tanda Small Scale Commercial Farming Area (formerly Tanda Native Purchase Area) (see Map 9 above). Mayo is surrounded by three land use systems, namely large-scale commercial agriculture (during the time of the study this sector was under pressure from the fast track land reform programme), communal lands and small-scale commercial agriculture.

Geographically and historically, Mayo (located in the eastern highlands which was important as an entry and exit point to Mozambique) lay in one of the most intense war zones where the war had been more protracted than in most of the country (Kriger, 1992: 33). This gave the area a particular political and historical significance in the liberation war history of the country. Thus the district generates important information about rural involvement in the liberation war effort and the development discourse related to post-war transformation. Ranger, who subscribes to the radicalisation theory discussed in Chapter Two, chose this particular area as the site of his study of peasant consciousness, believing that the long involvement with the war had radicalised rural masses and therefore energised their political consciousness (Ranger, 1985).

While post-colonial Mayo residents seemed not to have a liberation narrative, the volatility of Mayo during the 1970s is attested by numerous accounts of the Headlands Police patrols. The subsequent establishment of Mayo Police Station in 1970 as well as the activities of the farm commandos were justified by the need to protect the small farming community. The Mayo Ranch farmers held out until the end of 1976 after an incident involving the poisoning of their cattle dip which led to the death of more than two dozen of their breeding stock (Journing, 1979). The opening pages of Grundy and Miller (1979) in *The Farmer at War*

sets out the conditions under which white farmers were subjected and became combatants themselves.

The Zimbabwe Rhodesian farmer is at war. He is in the frontline of this conflict, a top "soft target" for the externally-based, Communist-trained terrorists whose aim is to remove whites from the country and destroy their influence which in 89 short years has been the key to economic and social development unparalleled on the African continent. Terror tactics have operated on classic Mao lines — infiltrate and subvert the tribesman, disrupt the civil administration by closing schools, clinics and council offices. Violent intimidation of black farmers and the destruction of his crops and stock. The ruthless slaughter of whole kraals where villagers refuse to co-operate (Grundy and Miller, 1979: 6).

The African villages where the guerrillas found support were also turned into cross-fire zones as the liberation veterans and the government soldiers fought for control. The residents were not armed so they mostly succumbed to these attacks without defence. *The Police Outpost* (1978) refers to a Special Branch posting at the Mayo Ranch and the houses being used as a sub-military base. However, the structures were destroyed heavily in an intense battle and many of the workers were afterwards kept at the keep in Chikore.

However, as will be discussed in this chapter, beneficiaries of land in Mayo do not seem to have a narrative of the war participation different from other districts. In fact, Mayo was populated by people from various places with varying wartime experiences unlike other villages that articulated a history tied to the liberation, such as the Kaerezi for instance (Moore, 2004). After independence the Kaerezi villagers as discussed earlier, used their participation in the war to legitimise their struggle and resistance against government 'development' initiatives. In Spierenburg (2004)'s study of the Dande, there is similar resistance but no equivalent history. The Dande relied on a far longer tradition that centred around legitimacy as supported by spirit mediums. Mayo farmers embraced government development and rarely articulated their demand for government support in the language of betrayal. Mayo is populated by people from far and wide including Buhera, Mutoko, Mutasa, Mutare and Harare. Some of the farm worker families who resided in Mayo Ranch were displaced by the resettlement scheme but others were resettled.⁷⁷

⁷⁷ Resettlement proceeded village by village and the ex-farm workers from pre-1978 are located in their own village. They have been isolated and labelled as collaborators or having been irrelevant to the suffering of communal people.

The case of Mayo (as many other resettlement schemes in the country) cannot be compared easily to Donald Moore's Kaerezi which is unique in many ways that other resettlement schemes after independence are not.⁷⁸ In one well known case, Donald Moore's Kaerezi, a nationalist chief defied colonial rule, thus becoming entangled in liberation history (Moore, 2005: 5) and giving it high profile political space in post-colonial times (Moore, 2005: 53). Mayo, like many resettlement schemes made claim to political importance only in as far as they encompassed the government's development project for all rural areas and its limited but optimistic expectations of modernity made possible from the schemes. By comparison to Kaerezi, all the other schemes including Mayo, had limited historical agency in their individual right. Most schemes were mostly linked to the general historical memory limited to the colonial past where land formerly annexed to white farmers was now 'liberated' and 'redistributed' to resettle destitute landless African households (Karumbidza, 2006). There is a major difference in the fact that through the link to liberation history, settlers to the schemes saw their admissions into "smallholder schemes and resettlement land as a political reward for contributions to independence" while the Kaerezians felt that they were

⁷⁸ The institution of traditional authority in Zimbabwe has faced a turbulent history characterised by association to political projects masquerading as 'development' by changing regimes seeking to control and discipline the rural space in development and state politics. After independence the institution of traditional authority continued to be controlled by state and having power allocated or withdrawn as the state wishes. Not even Kaerezi which had a famous chief who had strong ties with the liberation struggle by virtue of having harboured Mugabe, making his tenure secure and high profile could be spared forever. After the death of Rekayi Tangwena, the new Chief found himself having to locate himself in that history and tradition for his legitimacy. As articulated by Moore (2005), this was due to the contestation for control, the right to deliver 'development' and its interpretation between a modernising state and chiefdom feeling threatened. A common thread throughout the histories of state intervention in rural administration has been a political project – either to contain and suppress the rise of mass politics (in the case of colonial rule) and to be seen as the benefactors of the poor and thus whip up support (in the case of ZANU PF after independence). The state officials often wanted to be seen as allies of the people, using the land question for populist purposes, constantly reviving the link between liberation war and the land question, thus highlighting the centrality of ZANU PF as the deliverer of that land, and war time alliances as essential for development. In this regard, Moore (2005) provides the basis for understanding Mugabe's use of land and his dealings with traditional authorities since independence and most recently in the wake of the Land Occupation movement politics. Through the Traditional Leaders Act No 25 of 1998, Mugabe had laid the ground for politicizing the questions of being, agency, identity and authenticity for rule and control of development (by chiefs), all encapsulated in the land and land politics married to liberation and nationality.

“returning to ancestral territory after the war in 1980” (Moore, 2005: 31). The important question is whether this had any important implication in terms of the way they viewed themselves as development agents.

Part II: The Establishment and Support Services in Mayo Resettlement Scheme

Mayo Resettlement Scheme is made up of about 80 villages of varying population compositions. The villages also display varying characteristics. One can talk of generally well off villages and those that are generally poor. The status of farmers was assigned on the basis of their own perceptions of well being. The original differences among beneficiaries were often difficult to bridge and tended to remain. The support regimes given to the settlers did not take into account their different backgrounds.

When compared with support given to white farmers during colonial rule, the support for African settlers was marginal and inconsequential. The colonial state played a crucial role in facilitating the take off and continued sustenance of the white agriculture sector (Phimister, 1972). This is not comparable to the negligible theoretical and practical support given to the beneficiaries of land reform in Zimbabwe after 1980. White agriculture in the colonial era was not built on a pool of agricultural experts from colleges, neither was it built on a class of people who had been farmers in Europe, but on institutional support from the state and involvement of the private sector.

Table 8.9: Model A Intensive Resettlement Schemes Completed by March 1982

<i>Scheme</i>	<i>Distinct</i>	<i>Total area (ha)</i>	<i>Number of Settlers</i>			<i>Average Holding</i>
			Planned	Allocated	Settled	
Sengezi	Wedza	8,420	289	289	289	29
Soti Source	Gutu	33,608	528	528	528	64
Mfurudzi	Shamva	34,515	563	549	537	64
Mukosi	Mushandike	44,326	657	657	657	67
Tokwe	Shurugwi	65,503	1,041	990	767	85
Mayo	Makoni	73,650	1,257	1,057	954	77
Mpudzi	Mutare South	14,700	225	225	215	68
Nyagundi	Odzi	7,829	165	165	165	47
Nyajezi	Nyanga	11,939	191	191	157	76
Inyamsizi	Mutoko	27,537	481	461	461	60
Vimvi	Gutu	5,157	93	93	85	61
Umguza	Nyamandlovu	36,010	253	225	225	141
Totals		363,194	5,743	5,460	5,070	
Average per scheme		30,266	479	455	423	
Mean Holding size (ha)			63	67	72	72

Sources: Compiled from GoZ, 1982a

By 2000, Mayo scheme had a population of over 2000 households spread over 82 villages. The support regime involved an Agritex staff complement of 10 officers, consisting of a Resettlement Officer (until 1996), and an Agricultural Extension Officer (AEO) with a team

of 7 extension workers. Members of Agritex worked according to a comprehensive monthly programme that was designed to suit the specific needs within the agricultural seasons. They also ran ongoing workshops on a village basis addressing issues of conservation, contour ridges construction, as well as the husbandry of specific crops such as tobacco or any new variety of cultivar relevant that was on the market. The working assumption of agriculture extension was that settlers already had some experience with farming from their previous roles in the communal areas or as farm workers. Thus the purpose of the extension was “to supplement the knowledge that the settlers already had as former agricultural workers and communal area farmers” (Interview with Mr Gudyanga, AEO Mayo, 2003). According to the mission statement of Agritex, “the purpose of extension was to raise production levels above the communal area levels to those close to production levels in the commercial sector.”

Table 8.10: The Uptake of Land in Mayo Resettlement Scheme, 1982 – 2000

<i>Year</i>	<i>No of Households Allocated</i>	<i>No of Villages Established</i>
1982	670	42
1986	1057	69
1992	1979	77
2000	2200	82

Source: Compiled from MRDC, 1997, 1999 & 2001

From an initial population of 670 households spread over 42 villages, by 1982 Mayo had grown to a population of 1057 households by 1986 in 69 villages and 1, 979 households living in 77 villages (CSO, Population Census 1992), and to 2 200 households in 82 villages in 2000 (estimates of the Makoni Rural District Council, 2003).

Out of 82 villages by 1997, only three were Model B schemes with an estimated 103 households accounting for less than five percent of the total Mayo population. This means that by 1997 when the Model B schemes in Mayo had completely disintegrated and were being re-zoned into Model A schemes, Mayo had only achieved 89% full occupancy. The number of Master Farmers who resettled in order to acquire more land was very small (five percent compared to destitute settlers, seven percent from slum clearance, nine percent returning combatants and collaborators, as well as seven percent former farm workers in the area). As already indicated, Model B schemes were not favoured. However, those without the basic implements to start farming and to set up households, who depended entirely on

government to provide shelter through the housing scheme and agricultural implements were placed in these co-operative style schemes (Interview, CAEO, 2003).

Table 8.11: Background of Mayo Settlers in the Model A Schemes

<i>Background of Beneficiaries before Time of Settlement Coming to Scheme</i>		<i>Estimated % From Settlers</i>
Former commercial farm workers on the farms before the farms were deserted and later bought for resettlement	Early settlers, mostly in 1980	7%
Returning combatants, war collaborators and landless people displaced by war who occupied land ahead of government programme	Early settlers, mostly in 1980 and 1981	9%
People escaping communal areas conditions who settled on the farms at the end of the war and their settlement later rationalised	Early settlers, mostly 1981 and 1982	7%
People coming from distant communal areas such as Buhera district	mixed as they had to wait for the bureaucratic process involved, mostly between 1982 and 1986	37%
Beneficiaries from Mutasa District having been displaced by the construction of Osborne dam	Among the latest to be moved arbitrarily against their will when the dam that supplies mostly commercial farmers and tourist ventures was completed in 1995	12%
Master Farmers seeking to get more land so as to increase their productivity	Mixed, early (82 – 86) and late (after 1990) settlers depending on where they were coming from	5%
Those coming from towns, especially Harare and Mutare during slam clearance operations ahead of the visit of the British queen	Late settlers, moved arbitrarily in 1991 to clear Mbare Musika for the British Queen's visit. They were simply loaded into lorries, with no explanations and choices given. Some of these people did not stay long while others turned to trading than farming	7%

Compiled by Author

The proportion of Model B participants was 28% by 1985 and did not increase thereafter. This means that a substantial number of Mayo settlers (about 28 %) could be classified as completely destitute upon settlement. The remaining 61% ranked from poor to well to do, leaving only 11% in the upper (better off) category. Such a scenario required that a properly funded and co-ordinated government support programme be established to improve the lives of these settlers. The level of differentiation can be seen in the statistics on ownership of implements required for agricultural production.

Table 8.12: The Ownership of Farming Tools by Settlers⁷⁹

<i>Tools</i>	<i>1985</i>	<i>1990⁸⁰</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>2000</i>
Hoe (<i>family average</i>)	8	15	16	10
Ox-drawn plough	12	45	42	36
Tractor	0	4	3	1
Trailer or scotch-cart	2	26	24	18
Granary	48	62	45	45
Shed/ tobacco ban	0	17	22	21
Planter	0	3	3	2

Survey Compilation, 2003

Many farmers did not have the basic equipment to operate a farming enterprise.

There are villages that are particularly poor as a result of the unique background of the settlers. Examples of such villages include (but not limited to) villages 1, 26, 29 and 34. Village 29 is largely made up of people who were removed from city slums ahead of the “extraordinary” visit by Queen Elizabeth II in October 1991 to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Harare. These former slum dwellers had no implements and agricultural capital with which to start a home, let alone farming. They were not even subsistence farmers. Further to this, these people did not have any farm implements nor did they have any cattle before settling.

The cost of settling for these people was far higher than those who were coming from communal lands. Those coming from communal lands brought substantial skills as well as farming implements such as hoes, axes and other important implements for land clearing and agriculture. As a result when village by village analysis, is done these villages rank very low in terms of wealth as calculated in terms of total number of livestock, total amount in hectares of land put under cultivation per year, the total value of equipment purchased for use in the communities and the types of houses. A livelihood standards test would also show that the majority of the people in these villages live at a very low monthly income and have the least external income flow.

⁷⁹ The table is derived from 68 respondents who were specifically asked the question of tools across 8 villages of the Model A schemes.

⁸⁰ The year 1990 seems to have the best figures as it falls in the peak period of resettlement agriculture, 1987 – 1991. The 1991/92 drought and the ESAP programme meant that until 2000 (final year of study) production levels in Mayo had not been able to recover to the 1990 level.

Village 29 has special characteristics. Village 29 is largely composed of the Vapostori sect.⁸¹ One major characteristic of the Vapostori sect in Zimbabwe is that they are traders other than farmers. Many of them depend on buying and selling crops and other goods and are indifferent farmers. As such, many Vapostori come from a non-farming background, have no cattle or the general know-how in farming. In a report explaining the difference between villages the RO singled out the village dominated by the Vapostori and described the Vapostori sect as:

... neither farmers nor people of a land based economy ... but ... dealers preferring to trade than the vagaries of production, with a tendency of marrying more wives than they could sustain ... Agriculture is not a vocation one goes into to make easy money (Report of Mayo RO, 1987).

The Vapostoris sect allows polygamy and encourages early marriages. While in the traditional society, more wives and more children have produced the benefit of more labour, in the case of resettlement the land was fixed and more dependents did not lead to an increase in land allocation. The RO complained that he felt that he could not tell them to stop marrying more wives but they expected more land to be allocated for each marriage. This means that for this group, more wives and children have increased the dependency ratio and put pressure on livelihoods. There was also a tendency for children of this group to drop out from school earlier than others. Secular education was viewed by this group as having a bad influence on the young children and making them rebellious. It was interesting to note that many government workers such as teachers, nurses and police officers who were renting out land from settlers, rented from the Vapostoris. After 1990 there was an increase in the incidence of land being rented out to government officials who could not acquire land in their own right as they could be transferred at any time. However, to meet their personal land needs for gardens and food production, government officials rented land

⁸¹ There are various sub-groups of the Vapostori sect in Zimbabwe that include (among others) the Johanne Marange, Johanne Masowe, Vabati vaJehova, the 12 Apostles (each with many splinter groups). One of the main characteristics is that they stay in concentrated village types accommodation where they await the second coming of Christ. They own as little property as possible as part of their belief in the immediate return of Christ and their economic mainstay is as traders. The role and place of religion in African political economy in general and in Zimbabwe has been subject to a long intellectual history. Some of the work in this tradition includes: Marshall W. Murphree, *Christianity and the Shona*. London: The Athlone Press, 1969; John Baur, *2000 Years of Christianity in Africa: An African Church History*. Nairobi: Paulines Publication, 1994; Mark R. Shaw, *The Kingdom of God in Africa: A Short History of African Christianity*. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1994 and David Maxwell, "Sacred History, Social History: Traditions and Texts in the Making of Southern African Transnational Religious Movement" in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. Vol. 43, No. 3 (July, 2001): 502 - 524

from those who could not use all of it. This became an increasing tendency from the 1990s onwards.

Another village that stood out was Village Three. Village Three was outstanding in terms of its production, its wealth and standard of living of its people. One of the major characteristics of this village is that people from the former Master Farmers programme are the majority of its settlers. Some of them are ex-combatants who came in with substantial training and money from their demobilization as start-up capital. This village is close to Mayo Growth Point, the main police station, clinic, schools and the main road cutting across the RA from Headlands to Mutoko district.

As indicated earlier, the dominant model in the resettlement schemes was Model A and this was also the case with Mayo resettlement scheme. As in other schemes, in Mayo the collective enterprise Model B units were out of operation by 1997 and deteriorated into haphazard settlements of poorly resourced households depending largely on temporary work in other villages and migrant remittances. Such households hardly produced enough on their land for subsistence, let alone to sell.

The Model B schemes established in Mayo during the early phase in 1981 were settled, dominated and led by ex-combatants and returning war refugees and thus not really locals. One of the social legacies of the liberation war was communities differentiated according to those who fought the war against those that fled, those that remained in the villages, and those that were placed in security camps called “keeps”, those who defined themselves as resisters versus those considered as collaborators and sell-outs. This had the immediate and long-term impact of limiting the potential of creating a wider “community”. And of course there was no organisation of war collaborators, albeit war participation was not a formal tool for legitimising settler demands. Those active in local village structures and the ZFU however were largely veterans or active collaborators with the Chimurenga.

Measured in terms of the ‘standard minimum requirements guidelines’ (see Chapter Five, above) Mayo can be considered under-serviced with seven primary schools and three secondary schools spread over 80 villages, one shopping centre with a rural service centre

outside the scheme at Chendambuya where the hardware, seeds, fertilizer and insecticides could be found.

Table 8.13: Summary Details of Mayo by 1990

<i>Item</i>	<i>Target No. of Units</i>	<i>Actual</i>	<i>Balance</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Demarcation and survey	1385	1355	30	Plans are under way for the 30 plots
Land preparation (plots)	1385	1385		
Woodlots establishment	1108	1	1107	Preparation underway for the rest of the woodlots
Dip tanks	14	14	14	Seven of the dip tanks had no boreholes to ensure water supply
Boreholes	108	101	7	14 boreholes are for dip tanks, others for schools and the rest for human water supply. The outstanding 7 are for dip tanks
Wells	19	19	19	Most of the wells had dried up by 1990
Fencing (boundary, km)	133	94	39	Fence continuously stolen
Fencing (village, km)	390	131	259	More fencing required
Gvt staff houses	Revised down from 29 to 20	20		Need for burglar bars
Teachers' house	58	46	12	More houses needed for secondary school
Blair toilets ⁸²	1385	561	824	Cement needed for 824 families
Clinic	3	2	1	One more clinic needed
Primary school classrooms	Up 66 from 63	66		Three more classrooms were constructed by parents
Secondary schools	3	2	1	One more secondary school needed

Source: DDF Report on EEC Co-funded Resettlement Schemes, July 1995⁸³

The location of the Rural Service Centre at Chendambuya where the GMB depot was also located is a result of the political lobby of Chief Makoni.

⁸² A design of pit latrines with ventilation pipes.

⁸³ By comparison with the Chinyika Resettlement Scheme, another high profile scheme in the Makoni district (established in 1983 on prime land; 63 893 ha in Natural Region II, 43 917 ha in Region II and 12 456 ha in region IV) Mayo can be considered as understaffed. Chinyika is one of the schemes in the country's most prime land. Chinyika was considered a model scheme upon which the government would defend the resettlement scheme programme from its detractors while lessons for other schemes would be drawn. Chinyika, being the largest scheme in the province, covering a total area of 121 275 hectares, with a total of 4 400 settlers; it had a staff compliment of 77 government workers in 1989. This figure includes workers from various ministries and departments that make up the joint resettlement planning unit. In addition there was also officers representing the AFC and GMB stationed at the Chinyika Rural Service Centre. Chinyika seems to be an exercise extravagance with eight rural service centres each with own clinic, 23 primary schools, six secondary schools and 77 government staff houses, 2 066 Blair toilets and 122 houses built under the Rural Housing Programme.

Table 8.14: Field Days and Shows

<i>Discipline</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Attendance</i>	<i>Areas of Thrust</i>
Crops	32	4 605	Management
Livestock	3	260	Management
Training	1	173	Master Farmer Certificate
Resource Management	1	56	Tree Planting

One of the problems in Mayo resettlement was the lack of access to services in general. The resettlement structure included a Growth Point with shops, schools, clinic, police station, dipping services and a government compound housing civil servants. Effort was made to put this centre at a central place.

However, for Mayo which covers an area as vast as 73 650 ha, one centre shared by 82 villages is inadequate. The lack of services within the scheme means that little money circulates within the local economy. Even the nearest grain marketing depot for maize was located outside Mayo in the Chiyendambuya Communal lands where inputs were sold. This created the need to travel to access services. A single feeder road links Mayo with the main Mutare-Harare road at Headlands centre (see Map 3 above). The road is serviced by buses proceeding to Mutoko district outside Manicaland province; this is not an all-weather road, creating problems of access during the rainy season.

Farmers in Mayo resettlement found the AFC credit system unsuitable for communal and resettlement farmers and felt that it had to be revamped if the AFC was to make a meaningful contribution to the development of small farmers (Interview, Mafa – ZFU Representative in Mayo, May 2003). As the value of the Zimbabwe dollar was devalued, the AFC loans lagged behind the cost of inputs and as such farmers could not meet all their input requirements to produce optimally. Many of my informants had not taken loans from the AFC since 1995. Prompted to suggest why (in a question that allowed for multiple answers), at least 65 respondents suggested that they had stopped getting loans because of poor communication by AFC officials, while 54 suggested that the money was not adequate and 45 thought that the money should have been in lump-sum grants rather than loans.

The administration of hundreds of thousands of small farmer households in remote areas of the country led to an administrative nightmare. Poor administration and bureaucratic bungling by the AFC also found paid-up co-operatives being disadvantaged. The case of

Mayo's Nyahambe co-operative which had to call in the Minister of Agriculture to intervene to avert disaster through last minute assistance in the 1985/1986 agriculture season is one case among many. In this case:

Twenty-one farmers belonging to the Nyahambe Co-operative were supposed to receive \$18 000 in a loan as promised by the AFC but were told in the last minute that they could not get the loan. During the 1984/1985 agricultural season, the co-operative had been given \$13 669 of which it had only used about \$9000. It sold six bags of sorghum and 457 bags of maize to the GMB and 16 bales of cotton to the CMB and the \$9000 was paid back to the AFC after crop sales. From this produce they managed to pay back the loan and retain a \$3 358 in profit (Records of the Co-operative Secretary, Lazarus Nyamukondiwa, 1986).

After asking for an explanation, the co-operative members were given conflicting explanations by various AFC officials. Some suggested communication breakdown while others suggested an assessment that concluded the project was not viable. However, given the fact that the Nyahambe co-operative had been able to pay back its loan in full and retain profit means that the problem lay with AFC accounting systems. It is also important to note that the level of loan dependency by co-operatives is an indication that the profit margins were not enough for members to share benefits as well as buy inputs for the following season and break away from loan dependency. According to Lazarus Nyamukondiwa, secretary of the Co-op, the loan would have allowed members to plant the whole 1 159ha farm on which they grew maize, cotton and sorghum.

Table 8.15: Reasons for withdrawing from AFC Loans

<i>Reasons</i>	<i>Choice out of 75</i>
Poor communication	65
Loan money not adequate for needs	54
Prefer grant at settling rather than loans	45
Cheques released too late into the planting season	35
Could not make enough to pay back	28
Fear of indebtedness	35

Transport was also one key challenge in Mayo which depended on a bus service linking Mutare, Rusape and Harare with Mutoko via the Headlands turn-off. The only vehicles seen in these resettlement schemes belonged to government departments or to government officials such as teachers, headmasters and other civil servants working in the area, who did sometimes transport farmers. In the 1990s, it soon became illegal for government officials

to carry passengers on government vehicles. Transport remained unavailable and very expensive for the resettled farmers and their families. The government appealed to bus operators to service the rural remote areas but the operators were not keen as the roads were bad, cutting into their profits. It was the government's duty to develop and service the roads so that communication and transport services would be improved. In areas where the government's Zimbabwe Union People's Company (ZUPCO) operated, the service was often not reliable. Further into the 1980s, the ZUPCO fleet became older and often broke down. In the 1990s, with structural adjustment this service was taken over by private companies which prioritized shorter routes with better roads to remain viable.

This continued poor infrastructure in the rural areas, especially in road and transport services, was in stark contrast to the roads in the commercial farming areas which were well linked with tarred roads and often were not too far from a rail service. Even when, in the 1980s, the Railway Motor Service (RMS) which transported commercial farmers' supplies started to deteriorate and be replaced by private couriers, the government continued to subsidize commercial farmers as the RMS was run by government and financed by taxpayers' money.

For the residents of Mayo, there was one shopping centre; while Chiyendambuya Growth Point was 23 km away from the centre. The nearest service centre was at the Headlands Turn-off, 35 km of dirt road away and the nearest town, Rusape was 89km distant from Mayo Centre. This means that the provision of foodstuffs, daily necessities and even farm implements and inputs which only could be sourced from bigger towns became even more expensive and beyond the reach of the rural poor as transport costs were prohibitive. Under white ownership, the ranch was supplied with water through boreholes but after 1980 users multiplied and the boreholes were not serviced; people started to share water with animals in the streams, rivers and wells.

Management and Control of Mayo

Mayo experiences constant squabbles with surrounding communal areas. In Mayo there existed a sense of friction between the resettlement scheme and communal area farmers in the Chikore area (see Map of Mayo and surrounding areas) particularly, characterized by accusations of stock theft and witchcraft. Communal area farmers were accused of stealing

cattle and goats that went missing in the resettlement schemes. Resettlement scheme farmers were accused of using witchcraft in their farming. The Agricultural Extension Officer for Mayo explained this friction in terms of jealousy, especially by the communal area farmers who envied their resettlement scheme counterparts (Interview with Mr Chidawo, 22 May 2003).

The Resettlement Officer (RO) dealt with cases of theft including, stock theft, 'poaching' grazing land demarcated village grazing areas and also incidences of squatting. A high profile case that ended up at the district courts involved Takesure Danga Bunjira, a son of a Mayo resident, who settled on land set aside for village 37 communal grazing and appointed himself chief of the Resettlement Scheme in 1995. Chiringa, the RO, wrote to the DA Makoni who sought counsel with the Provincial Office in Mutare and Head Office in Harare starting an interesting exchange of letters.⁸⁴ Bunjira claimed to be a descendent of the community that had been forcefully evicted from the areas in the mid 1950s.⁸⁵ Using this claim to justify his settlement, he vowed to defend himself before the court of law and said that he deserved land among his people on his ancestral land.

The village Chairman, Mr Nyamhere did not have powers of eviction and Bunjira dared him to touch him or any of his things, challenging him to bring the police. According to the minutes from one of the meetings held to resolve this matter, the Secretary of the VIDCO reported:

The culprit told the committee (village development committee – VIDCO) that he was doing this on purpose and that he claimed chieftainship to complicate things, but in essence he simply wanted land and to be left alone. He therefore instructed us to report to any office for he has got his own reasons for allocating this piece of land to himself, admitting openly that he was a squatter. We appeal to your assistance in solving this particular problem ... (Filed: May/MAN/RD/D4).

The administration of resettlement schemes changed many times between the inception in 1980 and 2000. Initially, Mayo fell under the administrative control of the RO who reported

⁸⁴ File: MAN/RD/D/4, held at Makoni RDC

⁸⁵ It is interesting to note that Bunjira chose to base his right to occupation on the basis of the eviction of the 1950s and not being a veteran of the war or having participated in it. He also did not make any claim to being a member of ZANU PF to legitimate his action – which was common among people demanding access to land.

to the DDF managed in the Ministry of Local Government. In the 1990s, this control shifted to the Agriculture Department and Mayo, like other resettlement schemes, fell under the control of Makoni North District Agricultural Officer who in turn reported to the Chief Agricultural Officer based at Rusape. The district had a staff establishment of one District Agricultural Extension Officer (DAEO), four Agricultural Extension Officers (AEO), three Supervisors, 30 Agricultural Extension Workers and seven administration staff. The main office was in Rusape. The Mayo centre had one supervisor and three extension workers. The operation of the Makoni North district was divided as follows; one cluster including Mayo, Tanda and Chikore area, secondly, the Headlands and Weya area, third – the Chinyika East area – itself a resettlement scheme and fourthly, the Chinyika West area.

The ever-changing structure of resettlement administration affected Mayo Resettlement Scheme in many ways. The establishment of the office of Governors (or Resident Ministers) meant that Mayo fell under the control of the constituency Member of Parliament for Makoni North as well as the Governor of Manicaland. In line with ESAP's best practice measures and restructuring of administration, Rural District Councils were established and brought resettlement schemes under the control of ward councillors. This was changed again in the late 1990s when the chiefs were 'resurrected' and 'revived' bringing schemes under tribal authorities.

People did not have to be returned to original land to feel that independence and redistribution was righting perceived colonial wrongs. Kaerezi's special background allowed Moore (2005: 18) to connect "history to place" which he acknowledges as "the condition of possibility for any social analysis." To assert this, Moore (2005: 18) emphasises that "post-colonial Kaerezi ... emerged from the specificity of Tangwena's anti-colonial prominence, memories of squatters defying white rule." The problem with this approach is that by emphasizing this place (geography) and agency (historically) of Kaerezi as having 'history' suggests that other areas that have no claim to such high class celebrity incidences, lacks history. In fact, in Mayo both those in Model A schemes and B schemes emphasised the link to the war for land and the need to demonstrate that they are now in charge of their destiny by increased productivity in response to the President and Minister's calls.

Cattle and Agricultural Production in Mayo

The basis of the thesis analysis of agricultural productivity and investment in the resettlement schemes is on crop production. While questions were asked in terms of number of cattle per household interviewed, not much focus was put on support for cattle production. However, it is important to say a word on cattle in the resettlement, given its central role in crop productivity as a major input (for manure and draught power) in resourcing poor farmers' activities (Barnes, 1978; Shumba, 1984; Cousins, 1987 and Samasuo, 2003 among others). Cattle forms an important aspect of the African social and economic system upon which the interactions between household economic objectives, ecological processes and lineage production organisation are integrated (Scoones and Wilson, 1988). Cattle are the most important input/endowment that creates differences among rural producers (Cousins, 1987). Even now the majority of these do not own cattle. Between 1983 and 1996, there were four drought relief programmes meant to restore the national herd; however, most of these heifers were distributed among farmers in the LSCF and SSCF sectors. Government officials and ZFU office bearers also helped themselves from these schemes.

Livestock, with no doubt, formed the integral basis for social and economic production and reproduction in African life and agriculture in Zimbabwe. Outside the dry south-west, the Zimbabwean peasant farming system is based primarily on the production of crops, with cattle playing an important role in providing inputs. Within the communal relations of production, the success of cropping output is highly reliant on access to cropping inputs of manure, draught power and transport. It is a pity therefore that many settlers in the resettlement schemes did not have cattle and yet the government did not embark on a livestock development programme to assist the farmers to meet their crop production objectives. Even after the 1992 drought that reduced Zimbabwean stock drastically, efforts to restock were minimal, under-funded and subject to corrupt and not-transparent distribution. Parliamentarians brought to parliament the issue of the impact of drought on livestock and expected the government to embark on a restocking programme:

The motion says "appeals to Government to adopt a deliberate policy to restock the herd in drought prone areas." It is well known that during the 1991/92 drought spell, many people lost their herds. In these resettled areas people have no herd of cattle. They are supposed to depend on them so that they can educate their children through selling their livestock to pay the

school fees. They are not supposed to go and look for employment somewhere because they have been given the land to till and earn their living from that land but alas, it is not easy to buy a beast today with the prices escalating as they are. These people have nothing and that is why this motion calls upon Government to adopt a deliberate policy in order to assist these people who are in that situation. They have the grazing but they have nothing which can graze in it. This encourages the communal farmers those who still have some few herds to bring their cattle in the resettlement schemes and problems arise from there (Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol.21, No.34 Tuesday, 11th October, 1994).

The situation in the resettlement schemes regarding cattle was much worse than the communal areas. Communal areas had problems with adequate grazing but resettlement farmers had low cattle ownership. A Central Statistical Office (CSO) survey in 1986 showed that less than 63% of communal households owned cattle nationally and of these, 70% owned less than six each. This compared even better for resettlement schemes which had a national average ownership of 42% with 85% owning less than four each.

Table 8.16: Inputs to Arable and Production Outputs (Figures as percentage (%) of total)

<i>Study</i>	<i>Draught</i>	<i>Manure</i>	<i>Milk</i>	<i>Sale</i>	<i>Slaughter</i>
<i>Dankwerts</i>	41.7	7.6	28.6	17.6	4.5
<i>GFA</i>	38.7	9.8	40.9	10.5	Na
<i>ARDA (iv)</i>	48.2	18.8	5.8	27.2	Na
<i>ARDA (v)</i>	36.7	32.1	7.0	33.2	Na
<i>Scoones</i>	29.5	2.7	38.3	11.5	Na

Adapted from Scoones and Wilson, 1988: 12

The cattle aspect of African production is also important in terms of environmental management. There was the colonial notion that Africans cared less of the environment and that the ecosystem deteriorated once they met their subsistence objectives. Ian Scoones and Wilson (1988) suggest that the economic carrying capacity of a system is determined by producer activities. According to Caughley, in the case of African producers:

Producers want to maximize the availability of animals for manure and draught per unit area. In beef ranching economic carrying capacity is determined by the objective of maximizing productivity in terms of meat output. This implies that the African communal production system would prefer high levels of stock, while the beef oriented market would prioritise quality per animal (Caughley as cited in Scoones and Wilson, 1988).

In a high use system, there is need to comprehend and support the long term ecological sustainability of cattle production. This sector remains by far the most neglected of the African agricultural activities in the resettlement sector.

Part III: Overview of Production and Women Issues in Mayo, 1980 – 2000

This section deals with the experiences of farmers and government agencies working in Mayo resettlement scheme in the two decades since the establishment in 1981 and is based on the perceptions, experiences and recollection of farmers. Women are in the majority as farmers, mothers and wives in the resettlement schemes. In assessing the experiences of farmers, attention was paid to this fact. The strength and importance of this section (and approach) to the thesis is that it allows the farmers greater voice in assessing their own conditions and measurement of levels of government intervention. Given the challenges raised in the introduction, the statistics compiled from the fieldwork are used only as an indication rather than a concrete measure of the situation in Mayo. Rural farmers do not keep and retain systematic production records by virtue of their activities falling somewhere between subsistence and a desire to increase market share. Where records are kept, this is often not for long. The generally low literacy levels means that fewer recording systems are adopted. Farmers talk about their production costs and levels in general terms, that is, high or low, reasonable or expensive, etc.

The information in this section came from speaking to three focus groups with women and men in Model A Schemes, separately and conjointly. The fourth was with both men and women in one of Mayo's Model B type village schemes. All in all, interviews with 75 household members representing six Model A villages and two Model B villages were administered using a structured questionnaire. More people were interviewed in the Model A scheme than the Model B scheme as the main focus is on the Model A scheme. Forty-two of the respondents were female while 33 were male, of which 58 represented male headed households while 17 female headed. The table below provides a breakdown of the distribution of the respondents in the key interviews.⁸⁶

⁸⁶ During the field work, I attended five field day meetings and I "shadowed" extension officials (both from government and the private sector) as they went about their business as an observer. During the 2002 election campaign and the 2003 post election period, I accompanied the MP for Makoni, Didymus Mutasa on his campaign trail in the district. Some of the political events I attended include the launching of the Rural Electrification Programme at Mayo Business Centre. This was attended by Manicaland Province political heavyweights as well as agricultural sector bureaucrats. These events were crucial in showing how government decisions were made and how politicians relate to the masses. The politicians made some commitments about delivery that were surprising given the economic climate. The bureaucrats also admitted (to me) that politicians often went around telling people what they wanted to hear even when they knew that from a budget point of view such promises were not possible.

Table 8.17: Distribution of the Key Respondents in Key Interviews⁸⁷

	<i>Model A</i>	<i>Model B</i>
Total	68	7
Male	33	2
Female	42	5
Youth	14	0

More interviews or discussions were held with other farmers and non-resettlement people from whom notes were taken but not in the form of the structured questionnaire. Almost all these interviews were held at their homesteads or the surroundings. Those met away from their homes that were willing to share their experiences did so without having to fill in the questionnaire. Observation of the homestead and the arable land was important as it reduced the possibility of understating or exaggerating certain aspects of welfare. The younger people were very elusive, seeming to show no interest in the goings on and the general rule of the thumb is that quite often their recollection of developments in the schemes was shallow. They hoped for a future in the towns rather than on the land. Many left as soon as they finished secondary school. Of the 68 Model A households interviewed, 17 were female headed. Of the 17 females in the survey, 11 had been widowed, three were divorced and the other two reported that their husbands just had not come back for more than seven years. The average household size was six, with the smallest being four and the largest 11. A large number of households had grandchildren, mostly born to unmarried daughters. Three of the households were child headed.

Household characteristics were important as they influenced access to labour, inputs as well as markets. Household composition was also important in the commanding of access to other livelihood options. In terms of labour allocation, less than half the interviewed reported that at the peak of production they were able to command sufficient labour. The table below indicates how farmers described their access to labour during the peak production years (1986 to 1991).

⁸⁷ The table indicates only the number of people or households who participated in the completion of the structured questionnaire with the researcher.

Table 8.18: Access to Labour in Selected Mayo Households

	<i>Self-sufficient</i>	<i>Hired More Labour</i>	<i>Hired themselves/members of family</i>	<i>out</i>	<i>Could not afford to hire more labour</i>
Male	18	21	12		26
Female	2	1	10		33

More female than male headed households found it difficult to meet their labour requirements for a number of reasons. Most of them indicated that it was difficult for them to command the labour of their children, especially young males, as soon as the latter felt grown up. In the women's focus group, participants complained about the rights that had been given to children, making it difficult for parents to control them. This was in reference to the Corporal Punishment Act of 1990 which controlled the use of corporal and other forms of punishment by teachers and parents. This Act also added the rights of the youth which had been benefited by the reduction of the age of majority from 21 years to 18 by the Legal Age of Majority Act of 1982. The male focus group indicated that while legislation made life difficult for parents, they would not tolerate any 'disrespect' from a child as long as they are still under parental care. This forceful approach obviously does not work for women, especially in respect of their sons. One farmer indicated that, since the death of her husband, her son had not been in the fields once. She explained:

My son has made life more difficult than easier. For some lucky people, the death of a husband where there is a grown up son is not such a "train smash". Unfortunately, in my situation, my son does not even plough our field with the oxen as his age mates others do. All he does is hiring out the span of oxen so he can get money to drink. Sometimes it is really an inconvenience because we also need to use the oxen. He threatens to sell them if I complain. My brother came to talk to him but he was disrespectful to him threatening to chase me off the plot. I had to report him to the police who issued a restraining order. He tore it to pieces and threatened me with eviction if I went to the police again. I live in constant fear of what he might do next (Mai Matanyaire, Focus Group Discussion April 2003).

The labour of women and children is very crucial to the operation of resettlement agriculture. Those that have other sources of income can hire more labour. Some households hired themselves out to well-off farmers. However, most of the hired labour used in Mayo came from the communal areas of Chendambuya and Chikore. Two other important factors were linked to commanding labour for agricultural production in the

resettlement schemes. These were access to migrant remittances (or any other forms of income – for instance from a rural trading store, grinding mill, butchery or bottle store) and ownership of cattle (Cousins, 1987).

Table 8.19: Cattle Ownership among Respondents

	<i>Nil</i>	<i>1-4</i>	<i>4-7</i>	<i>8-13</i>	<i>14+</i>
Male headed	14	7	25	7	4
Female/h	4	5	2	1	0
Total	18	12	27	8	4

Female headed households had at most a few cattle. Some never had owned a cow, even at the point of taking up resettlement, while others had to slaughter a beast unwillingly for the funeral of the male household head. One respondent argued that killing one of the oxen was not her idea. Relatives of the husband insisted that it was not respectable for a household head’s funeral not to have beef. So they slaughtered the ox against her wishes. This despite the need to meet pressing needs such as secondary school fees, to make peace with a neighbour when a son had impregnated a girl, added to that the drought of 1992-94 topped the list of how households lost their cattle. Three of the people who had more than 14 herd of cattle were business people. Two of them ran butcheries so they bought and fattened cattle. Having cattle meant that farmers could plough more land and apply manure.

During the peak years when labour became more scarce and expensive, some farmers bought cultivators and ridgers (see the table on the resettlement farmers’ inventory above). With these, labour demands were reduced and farmers with extra tools and labour capacity would hire out to others to make some extra money. Having access to other sources of income was important. Originally, resettlement planners had intended to settle only those farmers who were out of employment but in reality the great majority was employed, worked “informally” or had a child working. The table below indicates the various sources of non-agricultural income among the respondents.

Table 8.20: Alternative Sources of Income among Respondents

	<i>Full time job</i>	<i>Seasonal job⁸⁸</i>	<i>Beer brewing</i>	<i>Business</i>	<i>Child working</i>	<i>Trading</i>	<i>Hiring out own labour</i>	<i>Nil</i>
Male h/h	13	17	2	3	19	9	2	15
F/le h/h	0	2	5	0	2	1	4	3
Total	13	19	7	3	21	10	6	18

The owners of businesses in Mayo started out as entrepreneurs running businesses (bottle store, butchery, trading store) while they worked as government officials in the scheme. They finally applied for land and doubled as farmers and business people. These are the most well-to-do members of the scheme. They advance loans and levy interest to the community members. In some instances, they are paid in grain, goats and livestock which they sell at a higher price. Initially, brewing beer in the resettlement schemes was prohibited as it was thought to make men lazy and chase after alcohol. However, this meant that men had to travel long distances into the neighbouring communal areas where they found home-brewed beer in abundance. Thus instead of having alcohol in the scheme and drink after some hard work, looking for it became the “hard work” men had to endure. Ironically, a bottle store selling opaque (sorghum made African) beer and other brews from the state run National Breweries could be sold at the Mayo Business Centre. However, by 1990 a number of people had started to ignore the no brewing rule.

The withdrawal of the RO in the mid-1990s opened up space for increased instances of brewing. More female headed households brewed beer compared to male headed households. This was because more female headed households had no alternative sources of income. The non-brewing rule of the resettlement schemes coincided with the fact that men were against the idea of their wives brewing beer and it was easier for women who stayed alone to brew. Zhangazha, from the male focus group explained:

I would not like my wife to brew beer. We are not brewers but farmers. I would rather go and work to supplement the household income. A homestead that brews beer is not respectable. Anyone arrives at any time. People know all your affairs. I don't like that. The people sending around your wives and girls like that. No, I can't stand that. They become everyone's women. Many

⁸⁸ Seasonal jobs entailed working on commercial farms – which reduced labour availability. Those who engaged in this form of activity did so during the winter season when there was nothing happening in the resettlement schemes because they were not irrigated.

things end up happening. I will not allow it. If anything happens to my wife from hanging around drunks, I will feel like I have not been successful as a household head (Interview with Zhangazha, May 2003).

Even an economic activity such as beer brewing became subject to gender power relations subjected to male notions of control of female bodies and behaviour. Most of those who indicated trading as their main activities seemed with minor exceptions to be members of the Vapostori sect. These had settled with no implements at all and had come from Harare where they had gained experience as traders at the Mbare Market (the main primary goods market in Harare). Some of them confessed to never having farmed before. Madzibaba Mhizha recounted his experience in the combined focus group:

There are people who say Vapostori cannot farm. How can I farm when I do not even have a hoe and the experience with farming? Coming to the resettlement was not my choice, I see myself as a victim of government force. I am a trader because that is what I know best. I wish that government could also support us because we provide an important service to people in the schemes. I raised my initial capital from selling the extra seeds and fertilizer I could not use because I did not have enough tools to use them. I used my AFC loan to buy a Scotch-cart and donkeys. With these I bought and traded essential goods between the schemes and rural areas, as well as to commercial farm workers. I bought anything that could be sold. I do not owe any cent to the AFC. Now I own a second hand mini-van which I use to buy and sell. What I could get from the allocated piece of land is far below what I earn from being a trader. My wives grow enough for us to eat. They sell the surplus but I make more money from my trading than all the three of them combined. I am not trying to show off but to suggest that there are many ways the government can support people in the resettlement farms. I am able to buy fertilizers and pesticides for my wives. Throughout the drought spells experienced in the past, my family always had enough to eat (Mhizha, Mixed Gender Focus Group Discussion May 2003).

Agriculture alone would not easily sustain many resettlement households. Mr Mhizha said that he would never think of being a full time farmer on a 6ha piece of land which he justifiably considered too small for commercial agriculture.

The number of people hiring out more land from others with low capacity is an indication of the limitations posed by the 6ha land allocation. In some villages, some farmers illegally extended into grazing land to increase their land holding. The RO's Report (1989) indicated the increasing number of people "poached into communal grazing land to increase their land

holdings.” He asked if such people could be temporarily allocated more land where the village still had more capacity on the understanding that when other settlers came they would be willing to vacate. Towards the end of the 1990s, young families of first generation resettlement children were beginning to start their own families. These young families required their own pieces of land and were reluctant to work on their families’ land. One of the key issues raised during all three focus groups was the question of land for the children. The rules of the resettlement schemes did not allow for the sub-division of household plots. If allowed such sub-division would bring the land allocation to the same level of the communal areas and also affect the well-off farmers who were already experiencing land inadequacy.

Table 8.21: Land Utilization Pattern during the Peak Period

	<i>Less than 6ha</i>	<i>6ha and/or more</i>	<i>Hired out land</i>	<i>Hired more land</i>
Male h/h	18	38	4	22
Female h/h	9	3	6	0
Total	27	41	10	22

Increased land utilization was also a result of increased labour supply. As the children of the first generation settlers grew and joined the labour of the family, more land could be operated. However, with ESAP constraints deepening access to inputs, capacity to use land was reduced.

More female headed households hired out their land as they lacked the capacity to work it all. This relates to the table on labour access per household. However, labour was only one of the main factors determining the capacity of households to use their land. It is more important to note that no female household had the capacity to hire more land. Only three out of 17 were able to use the whole 6ha allocation of arable land during the peak production period. What is striking about these three households is that two had more daughters in the family whose labour could be accessed for production and they also had cattle. One of the homesteads had a married son who stayed on the resettlement with his family and thus shared in his mother’s farm production.

Discussions with farmers yielded interesting information on the measurement of well being. According to a focus group discussion being ‘well off’ is not the same as ‘well being’ even

if both were measured according to the number and quality of houses they owned, ownership of cattle, goats and sheep, (dogs and pigs for those who were not prevented from doing so by their religion) as well as tools. A participant in the mixed gender focus group described his perception of well being and understanding of poverty by saying:

We do not want handouts, we want to be able to make a living within our own environments ... anyone who wants to do something for us, should give us the means by which we can decide our own destiny through work. Working gives you dignity. It makes you feel useful in a society. You get the confidence that you are an important part of a country and gives you the sense that you belong. Handouts undermine one's personal dignity – depending on grants and the grace of other people is a very effective way of undermining anyone's dignity. I would prefer that the *chiefs* provide us with the inputs and develop a dam and irrigation for us, so we can manage our own lives (Baba Muzondidya, Village 3, June 2003).⁸⁹

The feelings expressed in the interview with Baba Muzondidya captures the community's understanding of poverty and desire for freedom from dependency on handouts. Not to work is something that is looked down upon. No wonder then that most people view employment creation as the only sure way to redeem them out of the punishing poverty to which they are currently subjected. Being rich or poor is not measured in terms of how much money they spend per day. Instead, they consider their situation according to basic indicators such as number and quality of meals per day, the ability to send a child to school, the type of house they stay in, ability to access energy, water, and a good crop harvest – among other things. Poor people view poverty at two levels. The first being physical lack at the level of material needs – as well as lacking in adequate nutritious food. The second level is that of the lack of capacity to articulate their own situation and be understood by those who have the powers over resources – who are mostly outsiders.

For the rural poor, well-being is also seen in the context of being part of decision making. There is an awareness and desire to participate in designing development projects and implemented them. Poverty is seen as a form of vulnerability and voicelessness. It is characterized by the lack of the capacity to bring to accountability those they elect to represent them. This they realise is a result of the fact that they are not as educated as the development leaders. A participant raised the complaint that office bearers and people in

⁸⁹ The term *chief* is used to refer to those in high government offices and sometimes also used interchangeably with comrade.

power sometimes use the English language even where there is no need, in order to confuse and alienate the poor from participating in the proceedings.

“We Were Almost Farmers”: The Honeymoon of Resettlement Production in Mayo, 1982 – 1990

We feel let down by the government. We took up farming in the schemes with great enthusiasm. My family had three and half acres of land in Buhera where we came from. The land in Buhera is mostly sand soil. It is a waste to use fertilisers as it is easily leached. The rainfall is also too patchy and unpredictable. Farming in Buhera is a nightmare. So coming to Mayo was like a great improvement for us, because the land was bigger. Think of it: we were coming from less than a four acre plot to a 12 acre plot and there was a lot of grazing for our cattle. The soil was much better and our cattle and goats thrived in this place. Yet, by 1988 we began to feel that the land was too small for us. We even got to a point where we used some of the land from our neighbours and the arrangement was that we would plough for them as they had no cattle. It was too much work for us as labour was scarce. The droughts also really made life difficult. We asked for a dam or windmill for water harvesting. We received promises but nothing happened. For three years in a row my family held the Master Farmer title for the village. The problem came in the 1990s; we could not use as much fertilisers because it became very expensive. By 1992 we could not use all of our own land. In 1993 there was a major blow. My wife died in childbirth. My daughter had to withdraw from school as I was also forced to look for a job. Just imagine: looking for a job in my late 40s. I had never kept a job even prior to coming to Mayo. I had no experience and my education was low. Fortunately, I got a job with a construction company as a manual labourer. I worked for two years and got retrenched. I came back here and faced the reality that the biggest task was to produce enough food for our survival. Most of our cattle died in the drought and government re-stocking programme benefited no one that I know. In the 1980s we were farmers. We produced enough for ourselves and sold the rest. We were able to pay off our AFC loans. We bought seeds, fertilisers and pesticides. They were really happy times. That is when we built this house. We were the first people to own a television set in this village. Many people came to watch and they would help us with sorting the maize and groundnuts, beans or whatsoever as they watched. Those were good times. But now, the government has forgotten about us (Extract of Interview with Baba Mutyambizi, Village 3 Mayo).

The extract above paints a picture repeated by many settlers in Mayo about the 1980s and the possibilities created by the Resettlement Schemes in comparison to life in the communal areas more recently.

The case of Mayo illustrates the limitations of the 1980 resettlement wave. Even in the 1980s, there were a few voices expressing an awareness of this. Already at a 1989 seminar convened for the Manicaland, Masvingo and Midlands bringing together the DA, Agritex and DERUDE, field officials argued that “some people were worse off than they were before going to the resettlement schemes” (Herald, 01.07.1989). Addressing the House of Assembly Chief Charumbira, then President of the Council of Chiefs, suggested that reports of success in the resettlement schemes were exaggerated and in some cases outright false. He encouraged Members of Parliament, Cabinet Ministers and government officials to tell the President the truth about the situation on the ground when they made their regular briefings and reports arguing that:

If ministers depended on information from civil servants alone, they were likely to be misled and have a distorted picture of what was happening, as civil servants would not give a negative picture for fear of reprisals (Debates, 10 July 1990).

This scenario became apparent in the 1990s when civil servants’ salaries became tied to performance evaluation exercises. Civil servants would report positively about their work as reporting failure would be translated to poor delivery on their part.

In fact, by the early 1990s, there was so much criticism of resettlement that supporters were on the defensive:

Despite evidence that small-scale farming can be a powerful source of growth in Zimbabwe, support to the sub-sector dwindled in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. (which he alleges to) a growing myth in political thinking, promoted by vigorous lobbying, that the beneficiaries of the land reform programme were the least productive farmers in the country and thus undeserving of the land they had been given (Kinsey, 1999: 174).

This chapter has intended to illustrate the point some others have made—that moderate advances in the 1980s proved unsustainable from the introduction of ESAP onwards. According to Nipul Amin (1999: 6), despite its limitations, agricultural and rural development policy in the 1980s helped to bring about some prosperity within the peasantry, a fact more evident when that experience is judged against progress achieved in the 1990s. Be that as it may, the levels of focused investment for African agricultural and

rural development after independence have remained very low, resulting in the poor showing of the settler sector. The daunting task of trying to provide support to tens of thousands of small holders was well meaning, but compromised on quality. As such, these became welfare oriented with no capacity to increase genuine domestic saving. The colonial sector provided support for only several thousands of landholders, on an incremental basis and in amounts and investment levels that allowed these with the entrepreneurial spirit to make meaningful and life changing developments. The key issue is what Rukuni (1992: 6) harps on when he writes:

In spite of the major successes scored after independence, small-scale farming areas still face severe development problems. These areas are in arid and environmentally fragile natural regions. The level of soil erosion, deforestation and land degradation is approaching crisis proportions and this needs priority attention. Physical and institutional infrastructure is poor and all these factors severely limit the possibility for further agriculture development.

It can be stated that, if anything, resettlement schemes allowed the government to meet political objectives of stability in the rural sector. As such, resettlement schemes reflected the situation of African agriculture in the Native Purchase Areas under colonial rule whose underlying objectives were limited to meeting political objectives of stability in rural areas rather than for rural development (Cheater, 1984). Secondly, post-independence support and transformation of the agricultural sector by promoting resettlement schemes was not accompanied by a shift in terms of agricultural policy and therefore failed to address the dualism in the sector (Mumbengegwi, 1986). The Chavunduka Commission (1982: 4) was concerned that the reference to the LSCF sector as ‘commercial agriculture’ while African agriculture was considered ‘communal agriculture’ betrayed assumptions that white agriculture was seen as market oriented, and African agriculture as communal and subsistence oriented. The government programme failed on two broad levels. Firstly, the new state demonstrated hesitancy in transforming or restructuring the LSCF sector which was viewed as ‘the goose laying the golden egg’. This means that agricultural transformation for the African sector was conceived in total isolation of the LSCF sector.

The levels of differentiation among settled farmers still reflect the initial differentiation in resources and ability to pool together resources by each individual household. The situation

in Mayo shows a complex picture of differing standards of living for different settler households reflecting their initial circumstances. The institutional support for these settlers has not been adequate to meaningfully affect their conditions of living as poverty persists unabated. There is a direct link between the ability of settlers to transform in response to external assistance (or the lack of it) and their background prior to resettlement. For this reason, the role and extent of state involvement in resettlement agriculture, in facilitating productivity and environmentally sustainable land use practices cannot be over-emphasised. Access to resources and the levels of investment in resettlement agriculture in Mayo indicates that African farmers who received land under the resettlement programme were set up for failure. The celebrated increase in African contribution to the national food basket in the 1980s can only be seen as a phase in response to the end of war and removal of colonial prohibitive legislation rather than resulting from a properly calculated investment policy of government. This phase also lasted as long as there were some inputs available on a subsidy basis when Zimbabwe was treated very generously by aid donors but this became less true after ESAP.

Agribusiness and Cash Crop Production in Mayo

Supporters and sympathisers of agribusiness-grower contract relationships argue that the contract relationship facilitates the transfer of capital into rural communities which are otherwise capital poor. From a practical point of view, the main reason for agribusiness to contract communities is that it makes economic sense. These advocates and proponents of contract farming fail to take into account the tense and conflict-ridden relationships which almost inevitably develop between companies and the out-grower constituency. In Mayo, farmers who had grown paprika were left with a product for which they did not have use for when the agents for the paprika company, Paprika Zimbabwe, did not turn up on time to collect. The perishable nature of paprika made the farmers lose on the produce as it was all given a low grade. No formal contracts had been signed between the companies and the growers. This means that the verbal contracts and promise to buy crops upon maturity was not followed through. Once more people adopted paprika growing, companies stopped advancing them with seeds and chemicals. This means that when companies could not take up all the produce from farmers, the risk was not shared between them and the growers. Thus the crop and relationship which had been hailed as the panacea to the problems of development in the resettlement scheme left the farmers in debt and poorer than they had

been. It is clear that there is need for these relationships to be regulated to protect the farmers from unscrupulous dealers.

The interviews and focus groups indicated a shift in land use towards the production of cash crops. This shift became clear after the drought spell and was in response to the new challenges and opportunities generated by ESAP.

Table 8.22: Land Allocation per Crop by Mayo Farmers for Selected Years, 1992 - 1997

<i>Crop</i>	<i>1992</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1997</i>
Maize	3ha	2ha	3ha
Cotton	1ha	0.5ha	2ha
Tobacco	0.5	1ha	2ha
Soya beans	2ha	2.5ha	3ha
Paprika	0	0.5	2ha

Maize doubled both as market crop but continued to be grown more to fill consumption needs. The soya bean crop was inter-cropped with maize so was not affected by the decline in production due to the drought, increasing cost of inputs as well as labour. Cotton and tobacco had a longer history of production by enterprising African farmers. They benefited from the privatisation of their marketing and the availability of raw materials through agri-business. However, the crop that seemed promising in the 1990s was sweet pepper, paprika. Paprika rose from 0 in 1992 to an average of 2 ha by 1997. However, by 1998/1999 growers started to experience problems with the buyers of paprika. As more farmers grew paprika, the buyers started to be more selective about quality, colouration and other things that made many poor farmers fail to meet the grade.

Table 8.23: 1995/1996 Crop Production in Mayo

<i>Crops</i>	<i>Area (ha)</i>	<i>Total production</i>	<i>Sales</i>
<i>Maize</i>	22 837	78 000	55 645
<i>Sorghum</i>	929	1 409	1 014
<i>Mhunga</i>	152	228	-
<i>Rapoko</i>	597	686	-
<i>Cotton</i>	139	202	202
<i>Sunflower</i>	5 937	11 604	10 756
<i>Edible beans</i>	1 507	754	103
<i>Groundnuts</i>	3 055	4 603	363
<i>Flue cured tobacco</i>	1 205	2 823	20 283

Source: Report of the District agricultural Extension Officer, Makoni North (Mr F. Mutemachimwe)

The evidence from Mayo confirms the argument that the resettlement programme in its form would not create commercial producers. The land offered individuals was too small and the institutional environment not sufficiently enabling for the transformation of relations of production in the African sector. The withdrawal of input subsidies exposed the fragile nature as well as that of the post-colonial state. By the mid 1990s, the majority of resettlement schemes had significantly reduced the land they cropped per year owing to production challenges related to ESAP conditionalities regarding government subsidies.

Chapter Nine

Reaping a Whirlwind: ESAP and the Illusory Promise of Cash Crop Production, 1991 – 2000

I cannot tell much about the 1990s. These were wasted years. Now the government is talking about a Land Bank and increased support for agriculture. I do not have the energy but also wanted to go get myself a bigger farm with the war veterans. But I am old. I am not getting any younger. I always say that the 1990s were like planting seeds in running water along a river. We were just throwing away our energy and resources. For many years there was the drought. When our cattle died, ploughing became even harder. It became expensive to buy fertilisers yet without cattle you did not have manure and you could not plough. Tractors were expensive to hire. Given the expenses in diesel and spares many people with tractors could not keep them functioning. The Marketing Board stop[ped] supplying fertilisers and they did not guarantee the purchase of our grain. We felt alone, left by our own government. It was like as written in the book [reference to the bible] – our farming became like seeds planted on the hard ground, on the rock and wayside for the birds and animals to just eat and destroy. We became helpless. *Takapupura mhupo* (we reaped a whirlwind). We want to forget the 1990s and we think the government could have helped us, but no one was listening. Everyone talked about budgetary constraints wherever you went (Interview with Mr Mutyambizi, April 2003).⁹⁰

The adoption of ESAP deepened the shortages that had started to set in during the final years of the 1980s. This was in the context of a reduced budget for rural development in general and agriculture in particular. The adoption of ESAP and its conditionalities among which was the removal of subsidies became a source of limitations and crisis for the African farming sector. This sector had been highly dependent on government handouts for its survival. Reduction in state expenditure also meant the reduction in state officials carrying out important development facilitation roles such as providing of extension services in the rural areas. This, coupled with the withdrawal of government inputs led to a major blow to the farming sector, more especially African farmers who had difficulties in shifting to other crops. As a result, the promise of the increased cash as a result of increased opportunity of marketing cash crops eluded the African farmers in the communal and resettlement sectors. These farmers by nature were net producers of traditional food crops such as maize,

⁹⁰ This interview – like many was done in Shona – the native language of Zimbabwe. I did most of the interviews and interpreted them myself. Some of the key interviews are in appendix six and have been interpreted as close to verbatim or the meaning of the interviewee as possible with very little abridgement. *Kupupura mhupo* – loosely translated as reaping the wind – is a deep expression of disappointment with the poor results of their efforts when compared to how harder they worked.

groundnuts, and other cereals. These are the crops in which they had a comparative advantage. Even in these crops such as maize which were favoured by African farmers (for food) were affected by the conditions of ESAP.

Table 9.1: Maize Production in Resettlement Schemes

	<i>1993</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>1996</i>	<i>1997</i>
<i>Scheme count</i>	176	190	195	203	194
<i>Area planted [ha]</i>	85 507	96 474	85 671	96 160	79 362
<i>Crop repeat tonnes</i>	178 220	150 043	67 253	167 741	128 687
<i>Yield [kg/ha]</i>	2 084	1 555	785	1 840	1 622

Source: CSO, Agricultural Production on Resettlements Schemes, 1999

The year 1993 can be seen as the last year of high productivity for those areas that were resilient to the early impacts of ESAP as well as the drought of the 1990s. Production figures from a scheme count of 176 in 1993 were much lower than production figures of a much higher scheme count in 1997. The yield measured in the kg of maize per hectare also decreased from 2 084 in 1993 to 1 622 in 1997. This drop in yield indicates the low use of inputs such as fertilisers and pesticides which were essential in accounting for the rise in productivity in the 1980s.

Table 9.2: Crop and Land Allocation in Selected Resettlement Schemes

<i>Crop</i>	<i>Tanda SSCA</i>	<i>Mayo Resettlement</i>	<i>Tanda and Chikore Communal lands</i>
<i>Tobacco</i>	12 ha	44 ha	Nil
<i>Maize</i>	400ha 30 tons	3960 ha 80 tons	4130 ha 40 tons
<i>Cotton</i>	35ha 40tons	130ha 170 tons	5ha 7 tons
<i>Groundnuts</i>	80ha 50 tons	775 ha 300tons	440 ha 600 tons
<i>Sunflower</i>	35ha 20 tons	176ha 100 tons	570 ha 300 tons

Source: CSO (various years)

A comparison of Zimbabwe and other countries such as Kenya, Malawi and Zambia (figure 4, below) indicates that Zimbabwe experienced a sharp drop in cereal production from a much superior position in the 1980s to a much lower status in the 1990s. This drop in maize production has been suggested to be stemming from the drought of the early 1990s (GoZ, 1997). However, the sharp fall in the second ESAP related five year plan, ZIMPREST can only be accounted for in terms of deepening economic impacts and shortages related to structural adjustment. While the supply of seeds and fertilisers had been privatised, their distribution and accessibility in the resettlement schemes and communal areas that dominated maize production became difficult.


This production drop in Zimbabwe can be explained partially by the early 1990s drought but more especially the biting of ESAP conditions from the mid 1990s onwards. Moreover, maize production generally began to stagnate apart from the erratic rains of the 90s. The 1994/95 drought led to a major reduction of the average yield of maize per hectare. However, by 1997 the area planted to maize had not recovered to the 1993 level. This was not because the planted area had been taken by other crops but there was a general reduction in area cropped at all.

Table 9.3: Comparison of Average Yield/ha of Hybrid and Ordinary Maize

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
<i>Hybrid seed</i>	2 086	1 557	784	1 841	1 626
<i>Ordinary seed</i>	1 084	739	1 082	1 110	441

Source: CSO, Agricultural Production on Resettlements Schemes, 1999

Figure 2: Regional Comparison of Cereal Production from Selected Countries



Mosley, 2002: 702

The experience with maize was that the traditional maize seed (the low maturing variety) provided a steadier yield per hectare which did not fall significantly during drought years. The adoption of high yielding varieties for the resettlement and communal sector led to yield loss. Within the context of reduced inputs under the ESAP programme, this choice was therefore ill informed.

By contrast, harder times have led to more dealings in cash. The production of traditional crops such as roundnuts (a variety of nuts grown in Zimbabwe), groundnuts, dried beans, maize, sorghum and millet had benefited from the development of the market for these crops in the 1980s. These crops were also preferred as they had a local as well as national market. During drought years, communal area farmers bought food from the Resettlement schemes. During the drought years, traders from the urban areas came to buy food crops, exchanging them with consumer imports bought from Botswana such as blankets, clothing items and even television sets and solar panels for the wealthier farmers.⁹¹ Trade liberalisation has also seen an increased entry into Zimbabwe of second hand goods, mainly clothing – *mazitye* – mostly through Mozambique and Zambia. These were sold in the communal and resettlement schemes by women traders from town and the Vapostori based in Mayo.

The ESAP reforms brought about significant changes in the provision of agricultural inputs. By 1995 all price controls on fertilisers were removed, though they are still managed via important permits. Moreover, liberalised markets are not without their problems: setting up marketing channels in rural areas is expensive and there is a lack of technical knowledge amongst dealers in these rural areas. The problems are especially acute for crops such as sorghum and millet grown in the drier areas. The impact of ESAP on profitability of fertiliser use among the small holder farmers has been most acute. This is a result of the dismantling to the package of measures that supported the sector in the 1980s which buttressed its celebrated gains and successes. The major droughts of the 1990s (1991-92 and 1994 – 95) worsened things especially for those small holders in drought prone drier regions. In the context of dwindling state support in the form of credit line, extension

⁹¹ Prior to the end of apartheid in South Africa (1994), Botswana was the favorite shopping destination for many of the region's petite bourgeoisie from Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The relative cheapness of the Rand as compared to the Pula with the advent of democracy in South Africa resulted in Gauteng becoming the regional shopping hub.

services, price controls and marketing boards – guaranteed producer prices and announcing them ahead of the farming season, the agro-processing industry entered into that gap promising a revolution for farmers. As will be argued below, the promise of cash crop production and rural advancement was not sustained. Smallholders withdrew to traditional food crops and failed to take advantage of new market opportunities.

The Rise and Fall of Cash Crop Production in Resettlement Schemes

At the end of the drought in 1994, the input schemes provided by the private buyers and agri-business became a major source of support and led to an increase of the land allocated to cash crop production. The rise in cotton and tobacco, and later on paprika, sunflower and soya beans, is a result of the relaxing of the monopoly of the marketing boards and the entry of private buyers in the marketing of crops. Resettlement producers also responded to lucrative producer prices offered for crops. The Cotton Marketing Board was converted to a private company, COTCO Zimbabwe Ltd. Together with the GMB, private companies such as Reapers, Paprika Zimbabwe among others – more players meant that farmers had a wide range of prices to choose from. Notwithstanding this development, resettlement farmers had major limitations that prohibited them from taking advantage of the possibilities provided by this new cash crop market. Productivity per hectare never went up much; instead what happens is the amount of land planted has increased⁹² The Famine Early Warning Network (FEWS NET) and Zimbabwe National Early Warning Unit (NEWU) reported 87% use of arable land in the resettlement sector by 2000.

The case of paprika is one of disappointed hopes. Paprika production in resettlement schemes began very late into the period under review. Its entry into the crop list of the resettlement had a quick rise and fall. Resettlement farmers who took up paprika production soon stumbled into the problems associated with relations between agribusiness and small farmers. As supply increased and market conditions changed, the growers bore the cost of those changes.

⁹² Another story not important in Mayo is the cotton story. Here there was a very healthy increase linked to industrial take-up in the '80s but industrial re-equipment in the 90s failed to find a market and the clothing industry in Zimbabwe lost out to South African competition more and more; the crop purchases fall away.

Table 9.4: Area Planted by Crop

<i>Crops</i>	<i>1993</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>1996</i>	<i>1997</i>
<i>Maize</i>	85 507	96 474	85 671	96 160	79 362
<i>Tobacco</i>	2 615	1 918	1 855	2 048	2 784
<i>Cotton</i>	14 898	22 932	14 048	16 849	18 685
<i>Sorghum</i>	3 845	3 559	3 218	4 789	3 925
<i>Wheat</i>	251	301	117	287	242
<i>Barley</i>	-	50	84	86	58
<i>Mhunga</i>	3 230	2 667	2 443	2 555	1 444
<i>Rapoko</i>	7 666	4 256	3 159	4 056	2 894
<i>Groundnuts</i>	6 278	11 836	11 889	12 476	13 919
<i>Round nuts</i>	1 396	2400	3 159	4 434	5 589
<i>Sunflower</i>	11 446	10 091	6 579	6 970	4 064
<i>Dried beans</i>	1 070	1 318	835	1 148	1 410
<i>Sweet p/toes</i>	29	49	48	120	140
<i>Potatoes</i>	54	75	65	77	70
<i>Paprika</i>	-	-	-	8	64
<i>Vegetables</i>	208	162	124	242	247

Source: CSO, Agricultural Production on Resettlements Schemes, 1999

The grower and buyer relationships with small farmers were not subject to any written contract. The highest contribution of the small holder sector remained in grain crops, cotton, groundnuts and sunflower. They noted that:

Of the total area planted in this sector, 67 percent has been planted to grain crops. Maize covered 52 percent of the area under crops followed by 16 percent and 12 percent in cotton and groundnuts.

This supports the argument that smallholder producers in the resettlement schemes were not able to take advantage of cash crops due to constraints relating to the resettlement conditions. New cash crops such as paprika failed to bring the resettlement schemes into the market as argued for by the agriculture department and the agro-processing companies. By the mid-1990s, it had become clear for agro-processing companies that their efforts received chances of better returns by working with larger farms than with smallholders.

As a result of ESAP the AFC could not help farmers who suffered from the 1992 drought spell, especially in Masvingo, Matebeleland and other affected areas in the lowveld to restock. MP Baloyi, for Chiredzi South reported:

There are so many people who would have liked to have cattle in order to restock but because the AFC has no funds, they cannot get loans. Many people have put applications with AFC but they did not get anything because of lack of funds (*Debates*, 1994: 869).

Table 9.5: Scheme Count and Planted by Crop

<i>Crops</i>	<i>1993</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>1996</i>	<i>1997</i>
<i>Maize</i>	176	190	195	203	194
<i>Tobacco</i>	81	70	68	67	71
<i>Cotton</i>	75	77	78	78	88
<i>Sorghum</i>	91	87	90	94	89
<i>Wheat</i>	8	15	12	15	11
<i>Barley</i>	-	1	2	2	2
<i>Mhunga</i>	62	65	62	80	61
<i>Rapoko</i>	105	109	107	116	105
<i>Groundnuts</i>	111	122	133	139	135
<i>Round nuts</i>	81	93	96	110	106
<i>Sunflower</i>	114	128	127	127	118
<i>Dried beans</i>	63	74	72	80	78
<i>Sweet p/toes</i>	9	17	17	21	17
<i>Potatoes</i>	21	21	16	17	17
<i>Paprika</i>	-	-	-	5	12
<i>Vegetables</i>	31	35	28	28	33

Source: CSO, Agricultural Production on Resettlements Schemes, 1999

The kind of agriculture practiced in the resettlement schemes, especially in the Model B Schemes, could not facilitate the development of capitalist relations of production and individual effort. The self-contained individual units (Model A) of not more than 6ha per household was also considered not big enough to allow for the scale of production that would lead to increased productivity beyond that possible in the communal areas. The calculations by Paul Mosley (2002) indicate that the 6ha land units allocated to resettlement farmers fall in the range where yields and productivity would be lower. At 1997 the major differences between the major farming sectors were as tabulated in 9.5 below:

Table 9.6: Comparison of the Major Agrarian Sectors⁹³

	<i>COMM</i>	<i>RESETT</i>	<i>SSC</i>	<i>LSC</i>
<i>Number</i>	1 000 000	56 794	8 500	4 832
<i>Total land (m/ha)</i>	16.34	3.29	1.38	10.74
<i>Share Agri land (%)</i>	50.8	10.2	4.3	33.4
<i>Average farm size</i>	18	58	162	2 223
<i>Average arable</i>	3-5	3-5	12	Very variable
<i>Population density</i>	32.6	12-8	12	10.8

Source: Zimbabwe's Agricultural Policy Framework 1995 – 2020 Ministry of Agriculture Harare 1997

⁹³ As already underscored, Zimbabwe has a total of 39 million hectares of land of which 33 million is agricultural land of varying types and located in varying geo-ecological zones.

The maize producer price was subject to fluctuations in response to swings in government policies. The above figures, when considered together with the increase in population in the communal and resettlement areas, demonstrate that growth and productivity in the economy lagged behind. This perpetuated rural poverty.

The 1996 Agriculture Export Report showed a major decrease in the export component of traditional crops such as maize and a rise in horticultural crops. The LSCF continued to dominate export crops as they shifted away from traditional crops such as cotton and maize when the controlled market they enjoyed was removed.

Table 9.7: Major Export Crops in 1996

<i>Product</i>	<i>Value (1996 Z\$' 000)</i>	<i>Share (%)</i>
Tobacco (various) ⁹⁴	7 246 456	65
Horticulture (more than half being flowers), citrus and vegetables	1 186 960	11
Sugar (raw and refined)	1 105 059	10
Cotton lint	663 366	6
Maize and maize seed	351 552	3
Coffee	263 486	2
Meat products and cattle hides	257 409	2
Tea	129 640	1
Total	11 203 928	100

The new opportunities promised under ESAP could only be harnessed by the LSCF sector as they were better positioned (taking advantage of economies of scale and access to private credit) to shift from one crop to another properly linked with to market demand. According to Sam Moyo (2002: 93):

The cost-price structure of horticulture and the intensity of land. Water and labour use required by it tends to “generically” direct farmers ... to undertake production on small areas of between less than a hectare and ... 50 hectares of open irrigated field production of vegetable.

The cost of establishing horticultural ventures was beyond the resettlement farmers given their situation discussed above. In other crops that did not require huge capital outlay to

⁹⁴ Flue cured tobacco, produced on LSCFs, accounted for 92% of this. Burley tobacco contributed just under 3%. Whereas, in 1980, almost all burley tobacco production was undertaken by LSCF, in the mid-1980s smallholder production levels caught up and then surpassed production by the LSCF sector, but dropped again in the 1990s.

grow such as paprika, buyers found that dealing with smallholder farmers was not as advantageous as they had thought. As suggested by an agronomist associated with Paprika Zimbabwe, it was not economic to do business with smallholders in the resettlement schemes. This was a result of the scattered nature of the small farmers involved in paprika production and the small sizes of land allocated to the crop. This led to a situation where they spent more time servicing very small farmers producing very little over long distances. The time and cost of fuel and transport in collecting such crops could not be economically justified.

Evidently, under ESAP conditions, it was difficult for resettlement farmers to take advantage of the availability of other market and input opportunities provided by private players.⁹⁵ Instead of a shift to cash crop production, resettlement farmers remained committed to crops in which they had developed competence. Maize in particular was chosen because it was also a staple food item upon which rural livelihoods depended. Those with extra (labour and capital) capacity preferred cotton to other cash crops because of the long history of small holder production of the crop as well as its resilience to drought and other harsh conditions. While consistent with the rise and fall theme, the production of maize and cotton has thus not completely eroded in the face of ESAP.

Table 9.8: Maize and Cotton Production on Resettlement Schemes Compared with Communal Areas

	<i>1991</i>	<i>1992</i>	<i>1993</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>1996</i>	<i>1997</i>
Maize in RA	127 572	18 374	178 220	150 043	67 253	167 741	127 687
Maize in CA	1 019 300	115 200	1 133 600	1 313 800	399 400	1 687 000	1 453 800
RA as % of CA	12.5	15.9	15.7	11.4	16.8	9.9	8.9
Cotton in RA	14 434	4 173	16 104	21 635	6 424	19 751	22 065
Cotton in CA	137 900	35 700	134 500	110 805	56 100	157 584	197 825
RA as % of CA	10.5	11.7	12.0	19.5	11.5	12.5	11.2

Source: CSO, 1997

While the percentage share of marketed maize crop in the resettlement scheme compared to the communal areas experienced a drop, the share of cotton remained mostly steadfast. Communal producers were primarily subsistence producers. In the event of a drought or any development that affected their ability to produce, it was non-food crops that were neglected first.

⁹⁵ A CSO production chart comparing communal and resettlement production between 1982 and 1987 point to a steady decline in production in these two sectors starting in 1991 because of the drought but never to be sustained at levels of the peak production years (1985 – 1987).

Table 9.9: Agricultural Production Per Capita in Communal and Resettlement Areas, 1982 – 1997

	<i>Real value of output (1990 Z\$M)</i>	<i>Real value of output Per Capita (Z\$M)</i>	<i>Maize Producer Price (Z\$mt)</i>	<i>Value of Output (mill. Maize tons equiv)</i>	<i>Value of output per capita (maize tons equiv.)</i>
<i>1982</i>	847.9	198.3	120	2.27	0.53
<i>1983</i>	543.0	123.2	140	1.20	0.27
<i>1984</i>	778.3	171.3	180	1.49	0.33
<i>1985</i>	979.1	209.2	180	3.38	0.72
<i>1986</i>	993.3	205.9	180	3.32	0.69
<i>1987</i>	739.1	148.7	180	2.27	0.46
<i>1988</i>	947.4	184.9	195	3.70	0.72
<i>1989</i>	846.1	160.2	215	3.25	0.61
<i>1990</i>	1061.0	195.0	250	4.24	0.78
<i>1991</i>	828.3	147.7	270	3.82	0.68
<i>1992</i>	623.0	107.8	550	1.06	0.18
<i>1993</i>	731.7	124.4	900	1.51	0.26
<i>1994</i>	1124.2	187.7	900	3.55	0.59
<i>1995</i>	403.9	66.2	1050	1.18	0.19
<i>1996</i>	1009.7	162.6	1200	3.39	0.55
<i>1997</i>	n/a	n/a	3000	1.82	0.29

Source: CSO (compiled from various years)

Communal production of cash crops, especially those without local food and use value within the local communal economy (with the exception of cotton) became a luxury of the richer farmers. This explains why food production remained constant while cotton production dropped in the face of ESAP and the drought years of 1992 and 1995. The maize producer price was subject to fluctuations in response to swings in government policies. The above figures, demonstrate that economic growth and agricultural productivity lagged behind population increase. This perpetuated rural poverty.

Conclusion

The macro-economic conditions established by the adoption of ESAP in 1990 made it difficult for sustained market production in the resettlement schemes. There are a number of factors that made resettlement agriculture even more constrained by ESAP. The poor nature of the resettlement farmers automatically excluded them from the new market for cash crops which required a major shift in terms of the crops produced, the quality and quantity that would make such ventures viable. The unresolved tenure issue also came to haunt and punish farmers. The fact that they did not have title for their land automatically excluded them from approaching other sources of capital. This was also at a time when the government had scaled down or almost completely withdrawn the loan services to the

farmers. The basis for agriculture restructuring under ESAP was the adoption of efficiency production measures, producing quality cash crops for exports. All these were beyond the reach of resettlement farmers. This means that the hardships of ESAP were in no way birth pangs for an efficiently functional restructure agricultural economy.

Postscript

As stated earlier, the central argument in the thesis is that political imperatives took precedence over economic planning after 1980 in Zimbabwe. Most decisions in the 1980s were about political expediency with departments run by and decisions taken by politicians rather than professionals. Policy decisions were premised upon political gain rather than long term economic sustainability objectives. This is a common trait in the history of Zimbabwe's agrarian history starting from colonial rule and inherited into the post-independence era. Rural and African sectors were treated to residual state experimentation with policy while commitments to commercial farming remained in place. On the whole, resettlement agriculture proceeded with minimal investment in research and development – the heart and cornerstone of colonial agriculture (Masst, 1996). For instance, until the late 1990s (when the *Samanyika* variety of the maize variety was developed for the drier areas where most resettlement schemes are located), there was no crop development done specifically targeting the conditions and agrarian development in the resettlement sector.

The paradox of the Zimbabwean land reform process is in the fact that it appears that resettled farmers are among the poorest in the farming population, in terms of their ownership of assets. The 1995 *Income and Expenditure Survey* found the prevalence of poverty to be highest among resettlement farmers (CSO, 1999). Kinsey's findings paint a different picture. The evidence from Mayo however does not support Kinsey, whose findings seem based on higher quality land than is typical of resettlement areas. There was not much available land in the II category where he seems to be making his point. While the data upon which these conclusions were based is suspect due to several technical shortcomings of the data set, the general conclusion is still not far off the mark.⁹⁶

⁹⁶ The data collection process significantly reduced its reliability for painting the correct picture of the area as the survey collected data on consumption only for a one-month period, creating the danger of picking up short-term fluctuations rather than longer-term trends. The timing of the data collection immediately after the drought which had a bigger impact on resettled than on communal households as resettled farmers rely less on off-farm employment can only reflect the impact of the drought as opposed to the general state of the sub-sector. This is in keeping with Amartya Sen (1981)'s thesis on endowments. Communal area farmers have more fall back mechanism than the resettlement farmers who are thin on mechanisms such as social capital, especially at this early part of the schemes' life. The survey concentrated on consumption and there is all the likelihood that resettled households reduced their consumption subsequent to the drought in order to avoid having to sell their animals and deplete their asset stocks at a very low price (due to the absence of buyers after the drought). Also, the calculation of the poverty line does not use an adult equivalence scale. This overstates poverty in general and in particular in resettled households which are bigger and have more children than communal ones. In the CSO study, children and adults are counted as if they consume equal amounts of income. Last, but not least, the survey questionnaire design is biased against consumption from home production, again resulting in lower consumption estimates – and apparently higher levels of poverty – among rural and resettled households.

The failure to sustain the gains by African growers in increased crop production and share of the market and transform from subsistence to market oriented agriculture in Zimbabwe after independence, should be laid squarely at the doorstep of government ineptitude and lack of political will despite the rhetoric. Any suggestion that that Zimbabwe experienced an agrarian miracle consistent with an agricultural revolution in the 1980s is an exaggeration based on false comparisons. Resettlement agriculture was theoretically meant to create commercial producers. Instead without exception the best farmers in the sector produced enough for consumption and marketed a surplus in good years. Comparing production figures with Communal Area productivity is therefore misleading. The numbers of producers and the land in the two sectors are too different for compare. This also applies to attempts to compare resettlement agriculture with commercial production on the basis of production figures. What is possible is to measure the productivity and level of investment of each sector. This kind of analysis demonstrates clearly that Resettlement agriculture mostly recreated communal style agriculture and remained far from the commercial success anticipated. In crisis, farmers did turn more and more to commercial activity but this reflected more the strains in their subsistence work than any new form of wealth emerging.

The so-called miracle was indeed nothing more than an unsurprising increase in production as rural people responded to the end of a protracted war fought largely in rural areas. The increase in figures was also largely from the Communal Areas rather than from the Resettlement Areas, without any change in the way people carried on the farming business. As discussed by Amin (1999: 11), the rural communities of Zimbabwe under colonial rule had long been very much part and parcel of the food production factor. The continued participation of Africans in food production was not so much a product of peasant resilience but also the work of deliberate colonial state machination. It was opportune for the colonial state to allow a window of opportunity for African producers, so as to allow the cheap reproduction of the rural economy for the benefit of the urban economy. Retaining this model was part of the thinking behind resettlement projects.

The resettlement schemes were for independent Zimbabwe a political and welfare strategy rather than an economic programme for agricultural development and sustainable development. Agricultural planning within the schemes came in as ad hoc plans on a scheme to scheme basis. The original planning was dominated by politicians, with minimal

inputs from agricultural specialists. The largest preoccupations for politicians were with the physical planning and scheme layout. The goals of achieving higher productivity and economic sustainability were wishful thinking for which there was no plan. This explains why many of the studies evaluating the success of the scheme do so positively, on the basis of the land transferred and the number of families resettled. Resettlement agriculture failed to compete with the LSCF sector as the mainstay for Zimbabwean agriculture pressing towards the political goal of 'growth with equity.' Not only did it fail to rise to a point where it could compete for space and recognition, completely failed to address the dualistic nature of Zimbabwean agriculture.

Rural dwellers did not form any part of the decision-making structures feeding into policy on the reconstruction of the new Zimbabwe. They lacked the political voice and yet did not have the economic muscle. This is in spite of the fact that the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe was fought by nationalists in alliance with rural people. The absence of an independent plot holder voice that could critique state programmes other than the ZANU PF-run Zimbabwe Farmers Union forestalled the development of an independent critical voice that could represent resettlement farmers' class interests. The need for land and a better rural life was the basis upon which the nationalist 'peasantry' alliances forged. Rural communities had formed an important part of the liberation machinery through their sustenance of the fighters. All this was conveniently ignored by the ruling elite who only remembered the rural masses during elections and used their rhetorical commitment to the land issue to get votes. Since 1980, Mugabe's government has consistently relied on the war time alliance with the rural people to win votes and most recently has turned to violence to achieve support when under threat.

The starting point of Western capitalist development path was the transformation of the rural economy, and of rural social relations; which led ultimately to the elimination of natural economy and the traditional peasantry; market relations emerged as a dominant factor in the countryside, linked to industry and manufacture in urban areas (Vilakazi, 2001: 34). In England, the classic case of transition from feudalism to capitalism, "the new mode of production was introduced by a revolution in agriculture" (Luxemburg, 1970: 241).⁹⁷

⁹⁷ This is a huge debate; for some great historians the last element comes first; exactly how big an impetus came from agriculture is the sort of thing that keeps medievalists going.

Africa has not experienced this socio-economic revolution which in Europe uprooted traditional rural economic relations and transformed land tenure. Capitalism in Africa came through colonization and did not transform the whole society but operated as a narrow enclave in a pre-capitalist scenario. Mamdani (1996) demonstrates how this imagined duality of a traditional society alongside a developed capitalist sector created 'citizens and subjects' in the African continent.⁹⁸

Africa's rural economy was not transformed at independence (or so far) into a mainly commodity-producing economy on the road to the successful rise of capitalism (Vilakazi, 2001). This has also stifled industrial development. In Zimbabwe, pre-independence advances in industrial development have tended to be negated; a product of many factors leading to the economic destabilization underlying the current crisis in the country. This spells the challenge for development policy to address and integrate the rural transformation process and industrial development policy. In Africa, the eagerness and anxiety to modernize, develop and industrialize the economy led to leaders ignoring the fact that the Industrial Revolution of the West was preceded by an Agricultural Revolution. Western policy advisers to African governments have scorned calls for an agricultural revolution to precede industrial development as equal to asking for Africa to re-invent the wheel. Africa needs to transform traditional rural institutions and the rural or traditional mode of production and improve the capacity of the rural economy to feed into the urban sector. There is ample evidence from all over the world that redistributive land and agrarian reform can reduce poverty, increase efficiency, and establish the basis for sustained growth. For instance, experts agree that land reforms in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, have made a major contribution to overcoming the legacy of colonial development (Herring, 1983). In addition to aggregate evidence on the positive poverty impact of land reforms in India (Besley & Burgess, 1998), tenancy reform in the Indian state of West Bengal is shown to have led to significant increases in productivity.

The need to level the playing field required the transformation of the traditional sector – yet African nationalists were always cautious about the need not to destroy the capitalist sector

⁹⁸ In fact, the capitalist sector in Africa operating (then) at the level of primitive accumulation was heavily subsidized by the traditional sector in many ways. But it can also be argued that this is also has limited its potential through its failure to transform this sector.

in the process. What would have been the opportunity costs of effectively destroying the narrowly based capitalist relations of production at the onset of independence and radically transforming the economy by widening the productive base and capacity of the society? Other answers were to replace the white settlers with collective farming, notably in Mozambique and in Algeria but this was a colossal failure under African conditions and is roundly criticised by observers of Machel's Mozambique uniformly.

Post-colonial Zimbabwe and post-apartheid South Africa have been hesitant in addressing this dualism. The Zimbabwe government thought that by keeping the Large Scale Commercial Farming sector intact it would continue to reap the benefits of a developed agriculture sector and earn foreign currency, while expanding the rural productive capacity of the resettlement sector would improve on food self sufficiency. This strategy broke down in the 1990s and threatened to bring the Mugabe government down with it. Instead, the state turned on and destroyed almost the entire LSCF sector. Zimbabwe, having witnessed the destruction of an efficient if narrow capitalist sector and not having built up the smallholder sector, is facing massive food shortages. From being the regional bread-basket, it has become a national "begging bowl". Some answers to why this is so, can be found from the record of agrarian transformation in Zimbabwe since independence. Commenting with hindsight, the ODA team led by Martin Adams (1996: 12) argued that on the whole:

... resettlement agriculture was an expression of government desire, but a fettered and foiled attempt to transform the social relations of production in the African agriculture sector. More directly, it was a compromise and desperation to modernise African agriculture at very low cost.

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Appendix One

Areas of Saving for White Agriculture

Area of saving	Legislative instruments
Cheap land prices	Pioneer column received as payment of conquest 1930 Land Apportionment Act
Establishment of the Ministry of Agriculture; Division of Agriculture responsible for agriculture development Veterinary Research Tobacco Research	
Infrastructure development; railway and road network dipping infrastructure veterinary services – which benefited whites only irrigation schemes dams	1912 – Agricultural engineer for water and irrigation development
Research and development; Soil, rainfall, water supply information new crops – tobacco, citrus fruits, dairy, cotton & new cattle breeds animal disease – research in the control of tsetse and rinderpest	1914 – citrus expert assigned
Enterprise and processing;	
Marketing development and price control; Maize pricing Cattle pricing	Maize Control Act, 1934 Maize Control Board
Labour provision through the disciplining of Africans and their production capacity;	Regimes of taxes to force them to seek employment; Hut tax, dipping tax, head tax, dog tax, etc
Rhodesian Agricultural Union	A creation of the BSAC, supplementary communication and information tool to the Rhodesia Agricultural Journal Company support with funding for the employment of full secretariat to run the affairs of the Union By 1920 Union had 46 Affiliated association and about 1200 members An important political lobby
Rhodesia Agricultural Journal	For communication of farming experiences, exchange of information among farmers in different fields and agro-ecological zone

Appendix Two
The Changes in Institutions for African Control and Development, 1926 to 1980

Department of Native Affairs	Department of Native Affairs
1926	Department of Agriculture (for Africans) established
1927	Department of Native Affairs
1929	Department of Native Development
1933	Department of Native Affairs
1944	Department of Native Agriculture
1949	Department of Native Agriculture (splits into two); One, a senior administrative section known as Native Economic Development and the second, Department of Native Agriculture responsible for the administration of African extension workers
1962	Ministry of Agriculture, Southern Rhodesia which housed African agriculture under the same roof as white agriculture for the first time
1964	Ministry of Agriculture, Rhodesia; The S. R. Ministry and the Rhodesian component of the ex-Federal Ministry of Agriculture were amalgamated. The extension services for all categories of farmers were unified in the Department of Conservation and Extension (CONEX)
1969	Ministry of Internal Affairs; All staff working in 'Tribal Areas', be it in agriculture, conservation, education, health, etc were all housed and incorporated into the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
1978	Department of Agricultural Development created to respond to African agriculture needs but nothing happened until independence, when agriculture and Land resettlement were separated.
1980	Ministry of Agriculture dealt mostly with the commercial agriculture, while the Ministry of Land Resettlement and Rural Development dealt with the resettlement sector

Appendix Three

Changing Responsibility for Land Reform and Resettlement Development

Sector	Ministry Title	Minister	
		Minister	Deputy
Land	Ministry of Land Resettlement and Rural Development	Dr Sidney Sekeramayi, 1980 - 85	Moven Mahachi
	Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement	David Karimanzira, 1986 -	
	Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement	Witness Mangwende, 1989 -	
	Ministry of Lands and Water Resources	1990	
	Secretary for Land and Resettlement	CHIKOWORE, Enos	
Agriculture	Ministry of Agriculture	Denis Norman, 1980 - 1985	Simba Makoni, 1980 - 1981
Lands and Agriculture	Deputy Minister of Lands and Agriculture	Olivia N. Muchena 1997-2000	
Rural Development	Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development	Mr. J.L. Nkomo, 1995	
Women & Development	Minister of Community Development and Women's Affairs	Joyce W. Mujuru 1980-85	
	Minister of State by the Prime Minister	1985-87	
	Minister of Community Development, Cooperatives and Women' Affairs	1988-92	
	Minister of Rural Resources and Water Development	1997-09	
Rural Administration	Minister of Local Government	Victoria F. Chitepo 1990-92	
MYGEC	Minister of National Affairs, Employment Creation and Co-operatives	Thenjiwe V. Lesabe 1996-2000	

Appendix Four

Phases of Inward/Outward Macro-economic Policy in Zimbabwe 1920s-present

period	Relevant policy	economic conditions
1920s	protection for local manufacturers and supply of cheap labour from the African reserves	beginning of industrial development and promotion of White agriculture
1930s-40s	relative isolation;	high growth and inward maturation of secondary industry and the protection of the maize and cattle production among white farmers from African competition
1950s	increasing financial and trade regulation	large inflows of foreign investment, but overproduction problems and unsustainable financial and trade relations
1960s-70s	heightened financial/trade regulation coincident with sanctions	initial dramatic recovery, followed by a crisis of overproduction and civil war
1980s	gradual loosening of financial/trade restrictions and strong export drive	enhancement of developmental state's human capital functions, yet uneven economic record
1990s	rapid liberalisation of finance and trade	dramatic volatility and vulnerability in many markets, deindustrialisation, underdevelopment
1997-present	uneven return to <i>dirigist</i> policies--e.g., exchange controls, a currency peg, luxury import tariffs (but followed by a regional free-trade agreement), foreign debt default, uncontrolled budgetary growth, negative real interest rates--under conditions of desperation and capital flight	deepening crisis across all sectors of the economy

Adapted from Bond and Manyanya (2002)

Appendix Five

Pillars and Context for African Agricultural Transformation since 1950

	1950-1979 Containing	1980 – 1990	1991 and beyond Commercialisation (ZAPF)
Land reform	Land reform objective of containing Africans in the reserves, supplying cheap labour and containing competition with white farmers. The key idea being not to increase land available to the Africans, but to improve the production capacity of their land considered imprisoned by African resistance to proper farming methods.	Meeting welfare (socialist) objectives under the policy of growth with equity. Land reform seen as essential for political stability. The key to poor African participation in the economy was seen as the land shortage. Increased access to land would automatically unlock the African potential and diversify the sector.	Land reform tied to poverty eradication, increasing productivity, tenure security and environmental prudence. Considering that a substantial amount of land had been transferred the focus should be turned at making that land productive and have the African sector play an increased role in the economy. This period also coincided with the age of economic indigenisation and land reform was seen as central to this process.
Technical support	Assumed reluctance of Africans to adopt modern technology and there serendipity to environmental abuse. So the Africans had to be encouraged where it failed, force could be justified.	Africans seen as blocked out of the technical support system due to colonialism and the widening of technical support; access to credit and extension services seen as an essential basis for the removing of the production bottleneck in the sector.	Focus on diversifying the production base including the production of food crops as well as a wide range of cash crops for the export market. The emphasis was on expansion and efficiency in production and in techniques such as irrigation. The upgrading of rural infrastructure was also seen as an important investment need to facilitate this process
Institutional	The policy of separate development among racial groups led to the justification of the lumping together of all aspects of African control (called development in euphemism) under a single Native Department whose role was wide and varied in a manner that did not support special attention to specific sectoral needs	An Inter-Ministerial Task Team (IMTT) was set up to co-ordinate various institutional support services offered by different ministries. The complex nature of the co-ordination under the circumstances of an over-stretched, under-resourced and poorly capacitated bureaucracy made the work of the IMTT, very cumbersome and insurmountable	More efficient and effective strategies to achieve ZAPF objectives through greater flexibility, innovative methods and improved collaboration between different support institutions
Marketing	Market access was either encouraged or discouraged according to the survival dictates of the politically robust white agriculture sector as well as the labour needs of the urban economy.	Marketing Boards, marketing depots and co-operative marketing societies were established as an answer to make market access easier for the rural sector	The focus was to develop marketing through agro-industrial development for value added process in the rural areas with the aim of increasing monetary circulation as well as job creation. Low cost technology would be applied in the production process to ensure the participation of smallholder farmers.

Appendix Six

Selected Parliamentary Deliberations on African Areas, 1950 - 1979

The Place of the African in Southern Rhodesia:

Page 15- 17: Advancing Standards in Skill and Education, By the Hon. R. S. Garfield Todd [Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia: 1956]

The Native Affairs Department was created in 1898 by Order in Council and was charged with the responsibility of advancing the African people, of changing their customs, their attitudes, their whole way of life. It has been proved possible to stamp out in a matter of a few years barbaric customs, such as the killing of twins, but it is a much longer and more arduous process to change the customs concerned with the care of children, the cultivation and conservation of the soil, the status and work of women, communal responsibility, and attitudes to authority. Government has endeavoured to preserve the good things in the African way of life while supplanting the bad – to compel only when compulsion is escapable, and generally to lead the African into a civilized way, but in doing so to keep his goodwill.

While there has been a move to the towns, there are about 300 000 registered peasant farmers who have lived through the years on land held on a communal basis. Problems of erosion and over-crowding both by men and animals have demanded a new policy. The Government has responded and is now in the second year of a five-year plan to give every man his own agricultural land, through grazing will still be communal. The results flowing from ownership by the farmers of their own land are most encouraging. Production per acre in some areas has more than doubled and a spirit of optimism prevails.

The National Convention Report, October 31 to November 5, 1960 at Salisbury

Page 28- 29: Land and the Land Apportionment Act

The majority of participants were of the opinion that certain protection under the Act must be retained for the time being, but that the ultimate goal must be to make land equally available to all races. There were many shades of opinion as to the methods and timing of repeal. It was agreed that the Reserves, which would not in any event be affected by the repeal of the Act, should be maintained for some time to come. It was recognized that to meet the demand by Africans for land, to prevent an overflow of Africans into the towns in search of work, and having regard also to applications by several thousand Africans for land in Native Purchase Areas, the protection in favour of Africans should also be extended to Native Purchase Areas and Special Native Areas.

Coupled with the problem of the Land Apportionment Act is that of the restrictive condition in many title deeds, which precludes persons not wholly of European descent from owning, leasing or occupying certain property. The Asian and Coloured communities are classified as European under the Land Apportionment Act, but this restrictive condition in title deeds constantly operates to their prejudice. The majority view of the Convention was that legislation is necessary to prohibit the inclusion of a restrictive condition would become artificially and unfairly inflated. A small minority of Europeans opposed this recommendation on the grounds that the proposed legislation would be an unwarranted invasion of the rights of the individual.

AN ADDRESS TO R.N.N.A ON 24th SEPTEMBER, 1971, BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE CENTRE PARTY, MR. T.H.P.BASHFORD

LAND TENURE REFORM

Central to the problem of developing African agriculture is the system of land tenure. Every African born thinks he has an indefeasible right to land in the TTLs. He needs to have too since the Land Tenure Act denies him the legal right to be anywhere else! The effects of over-crowding and over-stocking in some of our TTLs have to be seen to be believed. In the jargon of the economists it is impossible to achieve either the economies of scale or the division of labour needed for increased efficiency without fairly radical agrarian reforms. Further, the use of land as security for loans, is impossible under the existing communal ownership system. Nor is a man likely to undertake costly improvements to his land unless he owns it himself.

Debate on the Whitsun Foundation Report [An appraisal of Rhodesia's present & future development needs: 1979 [Whitsun Publication No: 03]

Page 3:

G. Kay claims the Tribal Trust Lands contributed about 8% to the GNP in the period 1960- 1967. See **Rhodesia, A Human Geography**. University of London Press, 1970.

Page 4:

Gross Domestic Product (1974- Provisional Data) \$1 681 Million

Manufacturing	25.2%
Mining and Quarrying	7.2%
Construction	6.0%
Agriculture and Forestry	11.2%
<i>European</i>	
<i>African</i>	5.6%
Other (Services)	44.7%

Source-Economic Survey of Rhodesia Ministry of Finance April 1975.

Page 9:

The Residual Sector

It is impossible to fully understand either the nature of the economy in the residual sector or the complex of pressure bearing on it without an examination of the historical process through which it has evolved. This is not the place, however, for such an examination. The focus in the exposition will be on the tribal trust lands (TTL) as presently designated under the Land Tenure Act, 1968, and Tribal Trust Land Act, 1969, (the successors of earlier legislation) and to some extent on the African Purchase Lands, though these do not fall strictly within the residual sector as we have defined it.

The economy in these tribal areas is one in which there s a tragic conflict between the tribeman's traditional way of living and new set of forces which have arisen and grown not only outside his instigation but often quite his perception. They are forces which, coupled with his traditional mode of working the land, are leading him to destroy it. This is serious not just for the tribeman and his family (some of whom, we have seen, may be working in the wage economy), it is also deadly serious from the national point of view since tribal land accounts for some 42% of the national total (i.e. some 16 million hectares).

Policy Options and a Development Strategy

Having described the principal structural features of the economy and having briefly examined how these may develop in the long term, the question now arises of what specific policy options there are in mounting a programme for the future. The Foundation's judgement, based on the evidence presented above, is that there are at least five principal components which a comprehensive strategy for the future should embrace, namely (a) a positive population policy; (b) a balanced investment mix between urban and rural development; (c) a programme of institutional reform; (d) a programme of manpower training, and (e) a programme for tribal area development.

It is not suggested that these elements are not already perceived and are not already reflected in Government and other programmes currently in operation. Nor is it suggested that the Foundation has the standing to instigate programmes involving public expenditures. However, in devising a programme and in selecting specific development projects which it will support, Whitsun considers it necessary to work within the framework of a cohesively defined strategy which may not coincide in all respects with existing national programmes.

Page 15: Balanced Investment for Development

It is often argued with some validity, that the surest way to alleviate problems in the tribal areas through capital application is to invest in the wage economy to create jobs which will draw people off the land and hence ease the pressures in the residual TTL's. This line of development, in the Foundation's view, ought to be the first goal of development planning since the ultimate development of the economy depends on the expansion and development of the wage sector. The wage sector has attracted and will continue to attract the overwhelming part of ll investment in the economy, and if investment rates of the past can be maintained or even marginally increased, employment opportunities for the additional 600-700 000 workers foreseen by 1985 may well be forthcoming. But it seems unlikely that the wage sector will grow rapidly enough for there not to be a growing number of people still dependent for their livelihood on the residual sector.

Also, unless the future growth of the wage sector is accompanied by a general advance in African earnings, by improved availability and security of tenure of housing and by social security provisions, wage sector expansion will in fact not fully transfer people off the land hence making it more urgent that resources are applied to the TTL's to increase their capacity to sustain the growing population without resource dissipation. This transfer process is critically dependent on an increased rate of urbanization accompanying wage employment growth. To achieve this will require the development of low cost modes of housing and amenities and the creation of urban centers in tribal areas.

The case for a more balance development programme arises from what appears to be a relative under -allocation of resource to the tribal areas given their size ,their contribution to the economy and the future population size that will likely reside there .Remembering that these areas presently comprise some 42% of the land area and 58% of population ,and that they contribute some 8% -10% to the GDP, they currently receive probably no more that \$10-15 million, or about 3% of total national investment each year. It is true that most of the capital investment in the tribal areas is from public funds

while the TTL's contribution to the fiscal revenues is minimal and certainly not commensurate with their 8-10% contribution to the GDP.

Page 16:

This product contribution, however, has been said to understate the full social contribution made by the TTL's through the various subsidies they afford to the wage sector, subsidies which are carried at very low level of income. The claim of these areas on the nation's resources, therefore, may be greater than their material contribution to the nation's product. Moreover, the capital needs of the sector are pressing. There is enormous resource dissipation in these areas which is nationally harmful and which will only be halted by public intervention.

It is well appreciated that, given the inherent lack of savings potential in the tribal areas and the lack of attractive opportunities for private investment, and the fact that standard macro-economic policies do nothing to stimulate growth and development in the tribal sector, the burden of achieving an increase in the tribal development will rest primarily with the direct intervention of Government. There is, of course, an excess demand for these funds and there are fiscal limits to the public revenues which fall far short of total development capital needs. Rural development, however, is now a major priority among the major multi-lateral and bilateral aid agencies and it would appear that in new political circumstances, funds from such agencies could well be a source of meeting the development needs of the tribal sector. In fact, the Foundations judgment, a large major of the farms from these agencies would be available only for rural development projects in tribal areas. This means that by mounting a major programme in these areas the country would receive a net addition to development capital available for this type of investment, an addition which would of course be in foreign currencies on long term. Considering that capital of some \$50-60 million a year would be available from these sources, capital, in fact, would not be the principal constraint to tribal development in such new circumstances. The real constraints would be in the organizing of effective large scale projects and the provision and training of people to execute them.

INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

With regard to land tenure there are serious problems facing Africans both in urban areas, where the Land Tenure Act and housing policy often inhibits freehold title to land, and in the rural areas where the Tribal system of communal tenure prevents individual ownership. These factors reinforce residential security in the urban areas, and restrict entrepreneurial initiative and on-farm investment in the rural areas. Without secure tenure, private development initiatives cannot be expected to flourish. Property i.e. tenure, after all, is the first prerequisite of the free enterprise system and access to property should, in such a system, be based on economic rather than other criteria.

P18: MANPOWER TRAINING

There are some fields in which needs are clear. In agriculture, for example, there is a shortage of all levels of qualified staff for farming itself, for teaching, extension and demonstration. Rhodesia has some 80% of its African population, over 4,8 million people, dependent on agriculture, yet produces on 30 African diploma graduates in agricultural year. Similarly, in management and administration there are very few Africans in senior positions. This is not just a matter of training but there is a specific shortage of Africans with suitable training to fit them for promotion to senior positions. Within the designated trades, there seems pressure on the capacity on the technical colleges in most courses (and Africans apprenticeship enrolment has expanded rapidly in the last three years). But it is difficult to assess the precise needs for expansion without further investigation.

TRIBAL AREA DEVELOPMENT

At the public level, the responsibility for development of the tribal areas is charged separately to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (which also administers these areas on behalf of the Government) and TILCOR, the Tribal Trust Lands Development Corporation, a statutory body set up in 1969 to develop profitable development projects in tribal areas. In the African Purchase Areas, which should be included in all general references relating to African rural development, the Development of Conservation and Extensions (Conex) of the Ministry of Agriculture oversees development programmes.

P19 Within the tribal areas as such, while both the Ministry of Internal Affairs and TILCOR have similar end objectives (i.e. development of the TTL's) their approaches are quite different. For its part, the Ministry works through its administrative hierarchy (District Commissioners and the chieftainships), with the Regional Authorities and Councils, to instigate, co-ordinate, partly finance and provide the required expertise for development projects which the local people seek to undertake. Some finance, which is found from the Ministry's budget and the ADF, is generally given as a grant to supplement resources mobilized by the local people. The Ministry has an agricultural development section with a field staff and extension service (highly experienced and dedicated but far too few in number) which tackles the process of tribal transformation through education and demonstration.

The provision of adequately trained staff to administer a rural development programme at substantially greater levels of investment than at present is clearly a constraining factor to the mounting of such a programme. Also, it would seem that the availability of supplementary development finance, such as that potentially available from external aid agencies would be a prerequisite to the launching of a systematic programme at levels of capital outlay some 2-3 times greater than at

present. Since such a programme will take considerable time to conceive, plan and train the administrative manpower for, the preparation stage itself should be thought of as a major exercise.

Appendix Seven

Selected Parliamentary Debates on Land Reform, Agriculture, Resettlement and Rural Development, 1980 – 2000

Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 12, No. 45 [Thursday, 10th April, 1986] Extend Debate on First Report of Committee of Public Accounts

Page 2110:

The Minister of Transport (Herbert Sylvester Musician): I am berated in this Report for having either discovered the truth or said the it. People are worried about Mr. Hilligan, hence the panic on how I came in possession of a certain document.

I do remember reading a document which I cannot find now and which revealed Hilligan's attempt to frustrate the utilization of funds for acquisition of land for resettlement. He salted away some \$7 000 000 but thanks to Black civil servants, matters came to a head in 1982 or 1983 when an internal inquiry was held and the money retrieved. This attempted fraud was done together with people like a Mr. Mark David. There are traces now left. All the people Mr. Hilligan worked with have conveniently left Zimbabwe. Mr. Hilligan also colluded with White owners of land and Government Land Evaluation Officers to set inflated or inordinately high prices for land which Government wanted to purchase. Mr. Hilligan, as the Ministry's Finance Officer, new of these machinations which he aided and abaited. He never allowed any Black Government official near him. Mr. Hilligan is described in a document as having gone to look for a job in Matanzima, in Transkei, in his efforts to eventually gravitate to South Africa. When in this field, he attempted and appears to have succeeded in having his contract with the Government of Zimbabwe renewed. He should left our service by 26th April, 1986.

Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 13, No 23 [Thursday, 21st August, 1986]

Financial Bill: Budget Debate

Page 954: Mr. Bhebhe (MP Lupane):

Whilst on this item of resettlement, I hope this will be raised more equitably with the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Resettlement, because I understand from my colleague, the hon. member, Mr. J.L. Nkomo, who spoke before me, that really the name resettlement attached to Agriculture should not have been linked here but it should have gone to the other Ministry – the Ministry that is in charge of resettling people, but I think that the acquisition of land is still within the ambits of this Ministry.

Having spoken about acquisition, we are quite mindful of an Act of Parliament that has become law, it went through this House very recently, where Government has said that land sold by individuals should first of all be made available to Government for purchase before any negotiations can be made between private individuals or the private sector. Now, I am not very happy and have never been happy, about that kind of Act, although, I along with many others, saw the need. Now, one wonders how much of this the Minister or this Ministry is making use of – this advantage of being given a priority when land is being sold, whether inhibiting and a disadvantage to those people who would like to buy land from private concerns.

Page 965: The Deputy Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement (Dr. Mombeshora):

The hon. member, Cde. Nkomo, started by quering about certain aspects of our resettlement, and he wanted to know the position- whether it is us or whether it is Local Government. The present position about resettlement is that the Ministry of Local Government is responsible for identifying potential persons or settlers, and then our Ministry is responsible for acquiring the land and also for the planning. The infrastructure is laid by the Ministry of Local Government and other relevant Ministries.

The hon. member also wanted to know what sort of land has been acquired. Well, it is difficult to give in specific terms a reply to this, but we have got land which we have acquired and on which we have resettled people. There is also land which has been acquired by Government and there are potential settlers for that. Some of this land is not lying idle and is being leased to individuals or groups of people. The hon. member also wanted to know about the question of overgrazing. I think that on my occasion we have brought that to the attention of farmers- both commercial and communal – that we are worried about the overstocking situation, and we would like farmers to co-operate with our Agritex officials when they tell them the correct stocking rates for different areas. The other way of trying to improve grazing systems which are coming up in he various parts of the country. We also think that with he reorganization in the Five Year National Development Plan, we can assist in reducing the problem of over-grazing.

Then he went on to the question of land acquisition and queried why the Vote was less. Well I would agree with him that land acquisition is an ongoing exercise and as we settle people, we will acquire more land and I think the hon. member might be aware that in terms of resettlement, under the Five Year Development Plan, there is a target of 15 000 people to be settled every year so we should be able to meet up with this considering that we have already acquired other farms and we have not settled people. So I do not think he should be pessimistic about the question of resettlement or acquiring more farms and also if there are questions of squatter problems, which I do not think should arise at the moment because I know that people who have got land pressure, and these would be identified by the Ministry of Local Government, and brought to our attention and so they can be settled. But I do not think we should encourage the question of squatters because it should not be an issue at the present time.

The hon.member, Cde. Senda asked on the question of the Agricultural Finance Corporation providing loans and his query was that there are quite a number of people who have applied for loans and have been turned down. Well, every loan is examined on its own merits. We do not just give a loan because a person has applied for a loan. A loan is applied for at the Agricultural Finance Corporation and the criteria for the granting a loan is whether it is going to be assisting a viable project. If it is to cause losses, we will have again the question on a person's being unable to pay what he has borrowed and we think we will actually be putting a man is not sure whether his loan application is for a viable project he should get assistance. The other question which was also raised, as to whether people are growing crops in all the areas, we have Agritex in every areas, certain types of crops can grow and certain types cannot grow and there is no point for a farmer growing crops which are not suitable for that area and we also advise that they should seek expert advice from our experts.

On the question of land acquisition, well I am not surprised about his attitude because he has always been negative about the Land Acquisition Bill and Act. But, the amount which is given here on Land Acquisition is not on land which is given here on Land Acquisition is not on land which is being acquired from compulsory purchases. If people are going to the Government so that they can sell, I do not see why we should object, if land is going to be used on a planned basis and it is going to be productive.

Dr. Mombeshora; I would like to thank Mr. Nyathi for his contribution. On the question of the National Farmers' Association, it is a farmers' association which was formed in 1980 and its purpose was to try and encourage the communal farmers to use the best method of farming and to form co-operatives and so-forth and the like. The only difference of why they are being given a grant like that one unlike the commercial farmers of the Zimbabwe National Farmers is that they do not have licences where they can raise funds. Their only way of getting funds is through this grant. The other question on the irrigation 3H, well, the 3H is not only on irrigation development. It is on specific irrigation schemes like the one in Nyamaropa. But I can come to your question in the drought-stricken areas on who needs irrigation. I am sure you are aware of the existence of the national farming irrigation fund which was established by Government and its main purpose is to assist farmers or co-operatives or whoever to try to get funding for irrigation.

Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 13, No. 7 [Wednesday, 9th July 1986] Presidential Speech: Debate on Address

Mr. Butler (MP Eastern):

We want to stabilize agriculture, we want to stop the desertification of our country, we want to stop the silting of the top soils in our country. We want to be able to build the Condo Dam. In my knowledge, that it will not silt in a comparatively short time and in that knowledge we can open up huge agricultural ventures down in the Sabi Valley and places like that. Where agriculture is successful, agriculture is possible, and with great respect to the people who are etching out an existence in the areas where silting is taking place, they would be far better if they were placed on a good sound irrigation farm in the Sabi or elsewhere, and it is a bridging period, that is the problem. What are we going to do get them off the land and stop the silting? That is where we need millions, not for a roof. We can continue in here quite satisfactorily, that is my contention, first things first Mr. Speaker.

Agriculture is an important thing in this country. There is not much good agricultural land and I believe that we are misguided by using the land for the purposes of appeasing or rather overcoming our problems with regard to unemployment.

Mr. Speaker, we want qualified and highly trained people to work on what land is available in this country and I will demonstrate this to you. I have said this before there is not much land available for agriculture and we would be quite wrong as I said earlier on to use the land, the resettlement of land for the purpose of appeasing or overcoming agricultural problems.

Page 201:

I brought something up in this House not so long ago and I decried the fact that the Land Inspectorate in Eastern Manicaland were restricted to 200 kilometres a month. A man who is supposed to be inspecting land was restricted to 200 kilometres a month. At a farmers' meeting in Mutare on Friday, the head of the Land Inspectorate there tells me his

allowance has been cut completely, and that he has no means at all to go up and see anything at all on the land and therefore this situation is critical.

I will tell you something more, Mr. Speaker, the certain individuals came to fetch the head of the Land Inspectorate and took him up to Vumba where there is a very flourishing and important, in my opinion, industry and the Government department, I name it, I think of Youth, Sport and Recreation had crowded on a cotton farm in Vumba and they had neglected it to such an extent that the neighbours of this farm were calling the Land Inspectorate and they were up in farms.

Page 210: Mr. J.M. Nkomo (MP Magwegwe):

Our resettlement programme is a selective one. You pick up 1 000 people out of the area, of a 1 000, say families, out of an area of 51 000 residents, by the time you finish moving these people to the resettlement area, more than 1 000 young people have turned the age of seventeen at the time you started moving are eligible so you have done nothing. The problem remains, you have done nothing. The people in the rural areas, when we started organizing, we told them that they were not going to remain in this environment that is what we told them. *Takavataurira kuti muchabva munzvimbo idzi.* Today are in power they are where they were. It seems they will remain there now and forever. The question in the heads is "who are these who are being resettled? *Vasina mombe, vasina basa, vasina ichi, vasina mbudzi, vasina zvese.*" You don't qualify here and *mombe* is too much here there will be cut down from seven to five then to three and they go on accounting for what you have got donkeys, *mbudzi* and other things they will come down to that. So these people will say *muri kuona* these people *vanga vachinyepa*. Now we are the people who must remain here. Yes, we have built schools for them; yes we have built clinics for them and so forth. But the previous Government can also claim that they also did that. Although we can claim that we are doing it faster than the previous government but they also did it in their small way. What did we do and what is the resettlement in a country like ours? I believe and I think and we believe that resettlement should have touched everybody; no man should be out of it. I say this because it is very positive the Minister of Natural Resources will have been very happy to know that the solutions to her problems of poaching and cutting down trees and so forth we have got to be blames, Cde Speaker we have got to handle the bull by its horns.

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We have to talk to or people and we were moving towards the end the war, we told them that no resettlement plan can succeed, on economic plan can succeed when they live in small separated little scattered families like that. We hear these people say we are doing to electrify the growth points. People do not live in growth point, they live in their homes. Are to going allover to get these villages in scattered places wells and electrify them? Is it possible? No it is not possible. Can you do it with water? Impossible.

What do we do? Most of you here had traveled. You have never seen any country with seated villages like we have today. Land does not grow. Many people say the population is growing so fast it must be controlled. I do not agree with that policy. The white people from Europe have controlled all the colonies. They were in Canada, in India, in Australia but we are not anywhere. So why do you want to cut yourselves down. What is required in this country is industrialization, working hard. The population is important as a local market, you cannot cut down on the local market. You have to work very hard we have got the minerals we have got everything in this country and therefore we have no business talking about family planning. *Anoda zve Family Planning anozivazvaanoita nemukadzi wake.* I say we have got to be brave and work hard. If you must succeed you have got to agree that Government put in villages and how we built them is important.

The communal areas cover huge acreages and some of it good land. Now, when you tackle these villages, you will free millions of acres and what do you do with them? You fence them, let them lie fallow for five years. The Minister of Tourism will be surprised at the number of trees which are there in Chihota. The trees are there and they can go there by helicopter and see them. If you travel and spend the night there and drink their water and eat their food, sleep there, and talk to the people.

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You cannot run African societies in this country just by filing something or signing a signature. Before you start filing, you have got to talk to the people and convince them that it is essential that they stay together in order to build up the land. Even in game ranching, you have to fence off the area. With townships and with people around they have the means of livelihood and you reserve huge areas the Government buys for *mombes*, for grain, for agriculture. If people remain in a village they have no fields there, and if we are not careful, this country will find itself without food.

Farmers are selling their land and their cattle as well, and lot of farms have been vacated and there us no cattle on them, and in another five years, there will be no cattle for slaughter. I know it is difficult to tell people to move but it will be more difficult in 20 years when you will have to destroy beautiful schools that have been built but badly placed, and if it was done earlier, there would not be this problem. You would not cry about unemployment; you work out a plan. There are mopani trees, so you get thousands of men go cut these mopani trees; you get hundreds of thousands of women cutting grass and that is a job. Let the others remain building dams. If you fly over this country and see the number of depressions that there are, which can be used to divert water. There is one near the border with Mozambique; there is a huge depression there, and there is the Monezi River just passing near it. If you divert that water to that depression you will have as much

water as Kariba with very little input. Some of these areas within 10 years will be like the reserves the people moved from, therefore, I say to this House that we should take the bull by the horns, whatever we have done, but let us consider this point very seriously. I believe quite honestly, that we should think about this plan very seriously in order to save our country.

Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 13 No. 15 [Wednesday, 23rd July, 1986] Oral Answers to Questions
Page 491: Prices of Land

Mr. Nzarayebani (MP Mutare East): asked the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement whether he is aware that whites who previously owned and still own small-holdings and farms are raising prices deliberately to hold back black Zimbabweans from acquiring land, which is the basic means of production in our economy; whether he is aware that the masses fought for land and won; why we have to buy land as if we lost the war; and if he will make a statement.

Page 492 - 493 The Deputy Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement (Dr. Mombeshora): Mr. Speaker Sir, I am sure the hon.member for Mutare East is aware that it was never our intention to buy our own land from our previous oppressors, as we fought the war of liberation which we were certain we would win as we did but, as part of a package deal, we agreed at Lancaster House to pay for privately owned land, out of funds which America and Britain promised to make available to us, in order to reach a settlement.

It is therefore, a constitutional requirement and one of the terms of the Lancaster House Agreement that we pay for land acquired by Government or the State either on the basis of willing seller/willing buyer or by expropriation, the latter involving the right, on the part of the land owner, to remit compensation paid, outside the country.

I am aware that land is the basic means of production in our economy. I am also aware that some land owners try to overprice their land in some areas but Government, as the main purchaser of land at present, has succeeded in keeping the price of land at a reasonable level.

As the hon. member may be aware, Mr. Speaker, this hon. House passed the Land Acquisition Act, 1985, which, *inter alia*, gives the Government, through me, the right of first refusal in respect of all rural land. In addition, it gives me the right to offer to pay a price lower or higher than the price an owner may be asking for.

It is therefore, one of my duties, Mr. Speaker, to ensure that only reasonably fair prices are paid for land that the Government buys from the private sector, but I should take this opportunity to make it clear that I have no control over land deals between private individuals.

Nonetheless, I am concerned that a lot of the less informed of our people are either misled or persuaded by unscrupulous land owners to agree to pay prices which are too high and which have no relation to the true value of the pieces of land that they buy. People should take advice before committing themselves to pay prices which are greater than the current value of the land they are buying and that would assist to ensure that the prices of land are not artificially pushed too high.

Mr. Speaker, I am aware that the masses of this country fought for land and won but they have to buy land from those who own it now, not because we lost the war, but because of the reasons I have given earlier.

Mr. Irvine: Mr. Speaker, would the Minister agree with me that all land bought and sold in this country is on willing buyer/willing seller basis?

Dr. Mombeshora: Mr. Speaker, that is what we would prefer but after passing the Land Acquisition Bill, the Government has a right to acquire land.

Mr. G. Smith: I am quite frankly amazed that this question even got on the *Order Paper*. With all due respect to the hon. member, this is the most mischievous, misleading question that I have ever seen. However, does the hon. member not... My question is, why was this question ever allowed to get onto the *Order Paper*?

Mr. Partridge: Mr. Speaker, arising out of the reply to the hon. member, Mr. Irvine's question – is the Minister not aware that during the course of the debate on the Land Acquisition Bill, when it was passed into an Act, the Minister gave assurances that Government acquisition would be on a willing-buyer-willing seller basis?

Dr. Mombeshora: During the debate which the hon. member is referring to, we did say that in terms of acquiring land, our first option would be first on a willing buyer/ willing seller basis, but should Government see the need to acquire a certain piece of land which the owner might not be willing to sell, then they should have avenues through which they can acquire that land and it is through this Bill.

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Mr Chinamasa (MP Mutasa) on agriculture –

Conscious of the fact that agriculture is the mainstay of our people, the President embarked on an agricultural recovery programme by issuing seeds and fertilizer to the people. This underlines his determination to restore our country's position as the bread basket of Africa. As we say "Man proposes and God disposes" we hope God will continue to give us rain until the season is over. His Excellency is great mobilizer. In the midst of drought he was able to mobilize the international community, the private sector, the churches and NGOs to add to Government efforts and it looks as if he was able to persuade the Almighty to give us rain after the distribution of seeds.

However, Mr. Speaker, the future progress in improving crops yields will

Depend in part on the development of a technology both genetic and cultural to withstand water shortage better than at present. The painful experiences from the drought has taught us many lessons which I believe will facilitate a re-adjustment in our mental attitude to change. Mr. Speaker, there is always the want and deficiency inherent in organic life. Sometimes the struggle for existence necessitates the repressive mortification of the instincts because of lack of sufficient means and resources for integral, painless and toiless gratification of instinctual needs.

People will always find it difficult to accept change exerted upon them by external forces. But our fellow citizens must accept changes ushered at independence and compromise on equitable land redistribution. Exogenous factors are so compelling that they will have to sooner or later quicken the pace of mental adjustment. With the rigours of drought having played havoc on agricultural output and livestock in particular, people have no choice but to accept change. Mr. Speaker, we should thank His Excellency the President for his steadfastness on the land issue.

The President has never wavered on the need to acquire land for our people on that objective he has the support of the masses. Despite disagreements over the manner in which the tenure and disposal of the acquired land, the principle commands nationwide support. Mr. Speaker, we are living in an epoch of rapidly developing agricultural techniques. But the fundamental contradiction of concern is the contradiction between the highly developed agriculture in the commercial farms and the system of ownership which remains almost medieval. Whilst commercial farms are heavily capitalized the communal farmers are starved of capital. There is no way out of this situation unless the system of land ownership is radically dismantled. The dichotomy is unattainable. The toleration or adaptation of the archaic structure to the new environment would mean another catastrophe and indeed an explosive change in the environment itself.

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Mr. Speaker, we are living in an epoch of rapidly developing agricultural techniques. But the fundamental contradiction of concern is the contradiction between the highly developed agriculture in the commercial farms and the systems of land ownership which remains almost medieval. Whilst commercial farms are heavily capitalized the communal farmers are starved of capital. There is no way out of this situation unless the system of land ownership is radically dismantled. The dichotomy is unattainable. The toleration or adaptation of the archaic structure to the new environment would mean another catastrophe and indeed an explosive change in the environment itself.

Thus the agrarian problem is one of the radically breaking up of the old form of land ownership both in the rural and commercial land. This has become absolutely indispensable in view of the backwardness of this ownership and disharmony between it and the whole system of the national economy and demographic changes in population growth. The disharmony is too great, the old is too old the disease too neglected. Racial bias cannot be adequately redressed unless there is land reorganization.

In other words, before us is the truly great ideology of a truly great people, capable not only of lamenting its age-long slavery and dreaming of liberty and equality but to fight the age-long oppressors of Zimbabwe. Land is what generations toiled for, fought and died for and they cannot accept the denial of their birth right under their own government. This fits well with the attitude of our people when the vast tracks of land owned by a handful of people whilst the real majority of people have strips on poor soil which is barely adequate for subsistence.

Mr. Speaker, the dichotomy in land ownership was not created by our people. The peasant holdings, small parcels, some of the far from each other and invariably distinguished by soils of the poorest quality, were not out of choice for our people. This was a deliberate colonial policy meant to place our people in some relation of bondage to colonial regime and therefore in a state of perpetual poverty and dependence on the settlers for employment.

Stemming from such a policy and state of affairs is the permanent rural migration to urban centres in search for work. The situation has created a psychological attitude where people do not regard work on the communal land as employment and direct cash is regarded as employment. I believe that the current problem about street kids and squatters is a long term

consequence of the evil colonial policy. This makes it imperative that the land issue be redressed as quickly as possible and we should urge all the people who love peace, stability and prosperity for our country to rally behind the President in solving the land distribution imbalances once and for all.

Before I leave the land issue, I should like to say that Zimbabwe is lucky to have a President and a people especially in rural areas who are endowed with the nobility and heroism fearless of the future, but believe in it and fight for it selflessly. A people that hate the past and knows how to cast off its dead the stifling decay.

ESAP: Page 3745:

Mr. Speaker, we were hatched from the womb of the oppressive system. Thus the embryonic cord has not totally dried which tied us to the colonial motherland and the Government has to do something to facilitate its ending so that we will be in position to economically decide and determine our own economic and social destiny.

Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 20, No.63 [Tuesday, 1st March, 1994]

Page 4425 - Page 4426: The Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development:

Mr. Speaker, if hon. members would go to the Zimbabwe Farmer's Union, you will get over 1 300 producers of tobacco who are black who come on the auction floors to sell their tobacco. The area where we do not have Blacks who are on the auction floors buying tobacco. Boka has a company that indirectly goes on to the auction floor. I did say in one of the meetings that we have six black merchants who have put applications to get licences to get on the auction floors, buy tobacco and compete with the eight multi-nationals that were referred to. It is correct there are eight big multi-national who are buying tobacco. We are saying, yes, leave them there but we also want to facilitate our own Blacks to get on the auction floors and buy tobacco. The issue being raised here, perhaps emanates from lack of understanding and appreciation of what this Bill intends to and how we are going to it.

Page 4432 - 4435

The hon. member, Mr. Nzarayebani, I would like to thank him for the encouragement he has given us in the Ministry to work on an issue such as this one, and the whole question of decolonization, which is really a problem to all of us. The question of land, the land acquisition law is there we have implemented it, it is a process and we continue to implement it. As I stand here right now, there people who are being allocated land. Move around the country, you will see that happening today, it is not correct to say the Land Acquisition Act is one of those which have been shelved, no it has not been shelved. We are implementing the Act.

The question of land, I have dealt with that. He made reference to the people that have the money, farmers have the money, that they enjoy money from the banks and that we should see to it that it is not only one group that continues to enjoy the fruits of the tobacco industry, that is really the intention of the amendments. The question of the reserve bank, yes to a certain extent they have some influence, but I do not believe they have the overall influence in the Reserve Bank because that is a Government institution but it also has its own powers. Whether we are going to put in any indigenous people on the board, I don't know who I can entrust with the responsibility of effecting the kind of the changes that we will want to see if we do not get some of our indigenous people who have the correct orientation in and whom we know have the business acumen to sit there and be able to direct that board. They should also be able to come to my desk and instructions as to what you want to achieve and to see that it is done. On that we can assure you.

The hon. member Mr. Mataure continues to refer to the question of graduates from agricultural college and so forth. We do have a settler scheme which we are launching now which addresses itself to the employment of graduates and former graduates of agricultural colleges, the University of Zimbabwe and those that have graduated from these other colleges. All our agricultural colleges are busy right now tracking down their graduates to find out exactly what they are doing and where they are. A list has been compiled. We have been discussing with the World Bank so that they can fund that programme and we seem to be getting some co-operation in that respect and so in due course, we will be launching that programme. It will create lots of employment and ADA is responsible for this project.

SIXTH STATE OF THE NATION ADDRESS BY HIS EXCELLENCY [THE PRESIDENT: DEBATE ON ADDRESS]

Page 4464 - 4465 Mr. Senda (MP Bulawayo South):

We have problems in the areas of housing, public transport, roads and communications, food security, industrial expansion, agriculture, and what appears to be difficulties of efficiency in management of many of our institutions more than ever before to curb inflation, to create a climate for increased foreign capital investment, which will lead to industrial and commercial expansion, which will bring about more jobs that can accommodate our many young men and women who now roam the streets of our urban areas and countryside, jobless. We must convince investors that it is absolutely safe for them to invest their capital here.

One also wants to touch on the question of growth points. Time is mature for taking stock of the Government – designated growth points. How much progress has been made to date? Which ones have not made such progress and why? We should by now Mr. Speaker, have most of these growth points showing a great deal of progress. Good development of all kinds benefit the nation as whole and the whole idea of growth points can benefit the whole country. Action must be deliberate to promote them. They are a useful step towards development and self sufficiency. Fraud and corrupt practice have increased, with no sign of stopping. The situation is even worse when government institution themselves are amongst the worst affected by mismanagement, inefficiency and fraud. This affect public morale with regard to the Government as the promoter of the people inclination to develop.

The Government's action in assisting small-scale farmers is a good one. However, some of this assistance does not reach a lot of these farmers, due to the wrong type of personnel involved and inadequate means to do so. These things have to be looked into specific measures taken. Heard of department must show more initiative and skill. Rotate and dismiss them as necessity of duty to the nation may demand.

Page 4471 - 4474 **MR.MUSHAKAVANHU;**

We formulate policies but could we just put them to the people before we actually seek to do so? I think we need to make a right about turn and try to make a bit of adjustment to how we are handling the issues at present, because, for example, if I come now to what we call the Land Acquisition Act which this House has passed. the Land Acquisition Act is a noble Act as it is put on paper. But now its implementation has resulted also in untold suffering and misery, where hundreds of people have been retrenched, farm workers, mine workers, commercial workers and industrial workers.

Some circles are saying the land reform programme was a noble and good idea, but its implementation has no vision at all. It looks like we have taken a contra...- [Mr. Marwodzi: A contraceptive]-It looks like we have taken a confrontational approach to this move instead of a persuasive approach. We aware that land is a need for all Zimbabweans. But we end up creating squabbles amongst ourselves because we are all Zimbabweans, the blacks and the whites the coloreds and so forth, could we not find a way to persuade each other to do our things harmoniously, to avoid unnecessary confrontations which are coming out from various quarters at the moment. We talk of resettlement, resettling the people. The people who need land to cultivate, need land to keep livestock, and need land to build houses. Then we say wait, we are still working on the principals of the Acquisition Act, we are still working on the principals of resettlement programmes, wait. They wait and wait. Since it was past in 1993 and now we are in 1994 we continue to persuade them to wait for the land to come but at the end of the day, they lose hope. They are still not getting shelter, they still cannot get the land to cultivate and worse still, we came up to say we are coming to resettle you, but before we resettle you, we need you to prove that if we give you land, you will work on it effectively. You need to have true records of your ability to manage the land, to look after the land. Of course, in this part we can say it something which is in line, it may be in line of course, in that we want to satisfy the principle that laid done in these resettlement schemes. But whom do you think of first? To protect the land or to satisfy the needs of the person who needs the land? Let me come now to the indigenization of the economy. It looks the whole programme is a flop. We lack funds to support the programmes because those who have the funds say - may be because of our policies, you bite the hand that feeds you as a result, they make unnecessary delays to release the funds. By the time these funds are released, the balance of payment will have been eroded by the devaluation of the dollar.

Page 4183 - 4186: Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 20 No. 59 [Thursday, 17th February, 1994] Sixth State of the Nation
Address by His Excellency The President: Debate on Address

Mr. Marongwe: First and foremost, I would like to echo the sentiments of the people in thanking the President for the seed and fertilizer packs, which they have put to use very effectively and as such have uplifted the level of living of our people. But I think in the real communal areas, something has to be done to help the communal people have decent and better houses. Some of the methods are similar to those that are used in the resettlement areas, where the resettlement farmers are given loans for building houses and these are loans for building houses and these are loans that last for 30-40 years. If this kind of scheme would apply to communal people, all our would have decent houses.

The other area I would like to touch is crop production and pricing. Many reports that go through the media to our farmers are confusing. For example, there has been a report quite recently that the GMB would buy only a few thousand tones of maize and after that it will change the prices to lower figure. That is very discouraging to the people. The pricing system must be steady so that farmers who sweat and work hard do not get demoralized. The inputs that they use are expensive and be told, when your crop is ready, that you cannot get a buyer s really suicidal to farmers. Whe we confuse our people on to what they must grow for the nation, sometimes we run short of food in the country. Yesterday we saw the GMB general manage who said they will not be able to provide grain bags to the people because they are not sure who will be buying. That will make maize rot in the villages because people have nowhere to take the grain. It is not always easy to have cash to go and buy new grain bags. The Government has to intervene to save the situation, to save the grain that they may lose because of such decisions.

Whilst on the GMB, I would like also to urge Government To be responsible for the section that maintains the strategic reserves of the nation in all kinds of grain, sorghum, rapoko, millet and maize, because during drought periods all seeds are

needed and the GMB is reluctant to keep these. It says it is expensive. Cotton production in Zimbabwe is decreasing owing to a similar reason and when this crop production is on the decrease, like it is, our textile industries are affected, oil processing industries are affected and the trend is going on unabated. The reason is the pricing policy of the CMB which is no longer straight forward. If this is not checked, by next year Zimbabwe will import cotton.

Many dairy farmers have abandoned the field. It is said to be no longer viable and yet our people, the Africans, they are very few who do dairy farming. The Government has to help through Agritex to make sure there is sufficient training given to our people so that we have sufficient milk in the country. I can foresee this country running short of milk in a foreseeable future unless the dairy industry is expanded to our communal people.

Page 4197: [Mr. R.M. Ndlovu]

I now move on to the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development. People have been waiting to know the problem regarding the designated farms. Ever since independence, there has been little progress in terms of grazing areas. Our region is region five, with very low rainfall and we are more of a live stock breeding area, but the area is congested and Government is aware of that. Government has designated farms since last year, but it has never been clearly stated as to how many are acquired and how many are already in use. We would like to know that from the Ministry.

Mr. Masiane (MP Gwanda South):

On agriculture, I thank Government for the provision for farming community through agricultural recovery programme. I thank Government for having seeds to the people, fertilizers and providing them with some tractors. But, I want to mention that there is a great problem. The problem is that the area is a very dry area. People have planted but unfortunately the crops are now wilting because the area is very dry and there is very little rainfall. I would therefore request the Government to help these people especially when it comes to the produce because they cannot produce any crops because the maize is not doing very well. I would also ask Government to mainly help this area when it comes to land designation, to-

Page 4206 - 4207:

Give them more land, and to make sure that at least each family is given enough land where they can rear at least fifty herd of cattle because this is the only way they can live. Agricultural production through planting maize is almost impossible. We have now gone for 11 years without getting anything and even now we are quite sure that we are not going to get anything. I therefore request that Government should try to help these people by giving them more land.

On beef industry, we were told through His Excellency's speech that there was a reduction of up to 32.5 percent in the beef industry. Now, I request Government to help these people who are living in these areas to help them re-stock their herds, their livestock. I am aware that Government through AFC is giving some loans but my worry is these loans have a high interest rate, 30 percent to 31 percent. You can imagine somebody who is living through drought relief and you give him a loan in order that he must raise his stock. Then you say out of that loan he must pay you 31 percent. This is really very hard. I am proposing that Government should help by reducing the interest rate up to seven percent so that these people are able to make a living because their only way of life is livestock. I therefore propose that Government reduce the loan to seven percent.

Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 21, No. 2 [Tuesday, 12th July, 1994] Presidential Speech: Debate on Address

Page 49: Mr. Mandaba (MP Gutu North) :

Mr. Speaker, Government has committed itself to indigenizing the control and has gone to the extending of encourage black people to this country to take up commercial farming as a way of entering into the mainstream of the economy. We greatly praise such efforts. From experience, I have seen that most of our emergent commercial farmers will take a very long time to compete on equal terms with the established ones, who are mainly whites. Established commercial farmers supported the Government of the day because they were given favourable terms in their business operations. These farmers were given loans which attracted low interest rates and I urge Government in its efforts to indigenize the economy to try and ensure that emergent commercial farmers get preferential treatment when they apply for loans as was done for their white counterparts in the past. By doing so, Government will find its task of indigenising the economy relatively easy. Indigenous commercial farmers also need to be given a similar facility mainly for agricultural purposes as business-men do for their commercial operations. Indigenous commercial farmers in this country need support from Government so that they can acquire the necessary machinery such as harvesters, tractors and other farming implements to enable them to compete on equal terms with their white counterparts. The farmers will also be responsive if Government were to direct them to concentrate on a particular crop in the event of Government wanting to maintain crop reserves for food security purposes.

Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol.21, No. 6 [Wednesday, 20th July, 1994] Presidential Speech: Debate on Address

Page 240 - 241: Mr. Malunga (MP Makokoba)

Moving on to Agriculture, despite the enactment of the Land Acquisition Bill, the land issue remains controversial. There are a number of things that are happening and it was only a few days ago that I resorted a motion which seeks to have clarification on the cancellation of leases on the *Order Paper*. I must be quick to observe that there is still a dark cloud

hovering over resettlement. Yet, it is true to say in some instances these are resettlements which have taken off the ground some of them quite successful. We would like to commend Government on those that have been successful, but there is still lack of clarity on this resettlement issue. As I listened to the radio, I heard that the CFU intends to have some pilot resettlement programme in the eight provinces implemented. They are seeking a way of going ahead to train people to do *abcd* and implement some pilot schemes. There is nothing wrong with that. I believe that there has got to be a think tank which feeds Government with whatever information, including information of an economic nature or even information relating to agriculture. My contention is that everything has got to be handled by the Ministry. It is Government that should handle everything that has to do with its own Ministry rather than shed off responsibility to numerous institutions. It will bring confusion once we do that. If the CFU has very noble plans of bringing about good resettlement, let them feed the Ministry of Agriculture and then the Ministry of Agriculture will use that particular institution or organization. But they should be the overall implementers. If we shed off responsibility, we are going to create confusion. Supposing the CFU brings about a successful resettlement programme, then the people in the country will turn around the condemn Government for its failures. So we have got to be very careful on that one. That is free advice and I am not even charging a cent to the Ministry of Agriculture. I will now move on to another very important critical area.

Page 242 - 243: [Ministry of Agriculture].

It was made abundantly clear according to the Land Acquisition Bill that the pieces of land that must be acquired first among others, land that belongs to absentee landlords, derelict land, under-utilised land and so on. There is information which has been circulating about some pieces of farms, huge farms in the Mwenezi area which are said to be in excess of 75 000 acres. It is said that these farms are being currently negotiated for. There is some deal which might be concluded this week or next week. Several people have come to me to say but the Bill is clear that some land that belongs to absentee landlords should be taken first. But here is some huge land or farms which are about to be sold to foreigners. The foreigners want to invest.

I took it upon myself the onus to try and contact the Ministry of Agriculture and find out whether in fact the information circulating is true. The official who replied me said yes, it is true that there are farms in Mwenezi which were offered to the Government as usual and Government after looking at the farms said no, they are not interested in these. Some of them are around the Devure Ranch and so on and so forth. Where there is water to enable people to be resettled, Government's Aid no, anyone could go ahead. There are about five pieces of land, I was told one of them is 3 798 acres, the other one is 2 700 acres and the other one is 20 000 acres, the other one is 7 000 acres, and the other one is 62 000. Now what I am told and what is circulating in the farming community is that there is a foreigner who is currently about to conclude a deal to buy these farms.

Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 21, No.5 [Tuesday, 19th July, 1994] Debate on address by the President

Page 150 - 151: Mr. Bhebe (MP Bubi) on :Adjourned debate on motion for an address in reply to the Presidential Speech.

The other issue that emanates from the President's Speech which is of importance to Government is thinking very deeply about asking Agritex staff mobile. By that I mean instead of Agritex staff sitting in their offices, they are urged to move onto the farmers and be available to them so that they can be of use to the farmers. The position is that in order to move forward in our agriculture and to improve the standards of production by the farmers who need more assistance will need to have Agritex staff getting more and more involvement with the communal farmers. It should be taken account of that communal farmers form the highest call of production in this country. We do have commercial farmers, I do not disagree but the communal farmer for many years has been described as someone who was not economically viable. Why? It was because the farmer was not assisted in the right way. I believe that as from the numbers given by the GMB, the statistics show that the bulk of our produce in grain comes from the communal farmer. I would therefore like to say this is a move in the right direction.

Page 152 – 159: The question of land tenure-

Presently the Land Tenure Commission is running around the country. The question of land in Zimbabwe remains far from being resolved. Government is making its efforts amidst a number of problems and objections by designating farms. When this was started, the momentum was very high and Government appeared to be moving forward. Now, because commercial farmers, some of them have made so much noise and Government has appeared according to me to be a developing cold feet. They have listened to stories and some of the stories are genuine and others are not. I cannot accept where a farmer who has as many as up to three to five farms and he contains that he cannot part with one of them. I believe that a farm whether it is in the eastern side of the country where we have rains that is Mashonaland or Matebeleland would be about 8 000 hectares even larger than that is nothing else but usurpation of other people's chances. I believe that this should not be allowed.

It is time Government come up with a policy to say you can be a farmer but you may not own more than X number of hectares or acres. Yes, I do admit that there are some commercial farmers who have excelled their production and show that whatever land they have, they are using it in full. Those I believe it will be unfortunate to refuse them production because they are being productive not for themselves but also for the country, this is advancement. But for many, it should be looked at and designation must go on as Government has planned so that once we have as many designated farms as



you have, then you plan as to what exactly and how exactly this land should be used. No-one should be left with a mistaken idea that Government is trying to abuse land. After all what was the war all about? We would have been stupid animals to go fighting for land and now that we have got the commodity somebody refuses us the right to distribute that land. It should be understood that I am not suggesting that there should be no commercial farmers. Commercial farmers will always be there in any country that is progressive. This commercialization must not only be seen as a prerogative of one community. It should be seen to be spread on all the peoples of this country, all the races of this country. Gone are the days when it was thought that with a black pigment were not as good as any other person. It is training that is paramount and it should be given to everyone. I think in this country there are many great people who do farming exceedingly well and even excel. These have depicted as better farmers. What is only needed is implements and assistance. What we need is capital and what you need is anything you venture in is capital. The question of poverty and other things that go with life in Zimbabwe is true of every country. There is no country that has not got a very large group of unemployed people. Even the highest kingdoms in this world have got some people who are unemployed. You find that those same countries do not stop helping what is called the third world countries, who are ourselves. They still have to give assistance, but it should be understood that with our poverty, we are not poor in resources. We are only poor in the fact that we have not been brought to viability by training. All what we need is to be trained, we will have to do the best there ever was.

I would like to welcome what came from the President's Speech, where reference was made to Government's policy to try to procure tractors which would assist mainly, the communal farmer. It is my hope that the farmers, especially the communal farmers, will realize that this is not a honeymoon that Government is giving them forever. It is just trying to keep them going so that they could be better farmers. It should not be like what is happening today, many people are not working hard because they know that the Government will help them in the event of them not having enough food. They still have food for work and that kind of thing. But I think this should become a thing of the past. Government has helped so far and it should not be seen to continue doing that.

Having said that, I would like to add that our Government must quickly and hastily change the curriculum in our schools. We have heard much about education with production. We have heard this long before, where the curricula in schools were geared in such a way that as you went up you caught up with agriculture, you caught up with carpentry and you caught up with all the professions that have something to do with production so that without being conscious of what you were doing you let these things and the women students catch up with handy work. They became productive instruments and prepare themselves to be housewives without them necessarily having to go and train. One wonders what type of community we are trying to create. Bookish knowledge is not education. Some people mistake education with high reading, you can read books and pass degree and still remain uneducated. Education means that you must be knowledgeable and you must be versatile you must be a man or woman of adaptability. This is vital and that is what the old folk who went through school, even if that education was not as good as that of today, they had to learn how to use their hands. Education with production must be adhered to help our children to use their hands.

May I come to items that are an eye-sore to me. The question of farmers having tenants on their farms, some of whose great grandfathers worked for the farmer now because the farmer wants to clear them away, they are just jettisoned. There is no place where they can go, they are just told to get out. I think the Government must look at this one. If the Government is worried about making sure that they are moved, they have a place to go to, why should the commercial farmers be allowed just to drive people out when they do not have a place to go to? I think Government must look at this one. I am of the opinion, if I may lend my advice and I must lend it be I am a member of this House. I believe that if a farmer has benefited from a group of people for all these years and has not taken the trouble to train them to be good farmers, he, the farmer must live with those people on his farm. They should not go anywhere. They are partners in his work, they helped him, he got cheap labour from them and if today he does not want them because they are expensive, then let him have it, that is what it is. He or any farmer must train these people to become viable so that in the long run there is no need of driving them out of his farm. They should be an asset to his farm.

Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 21 No. 16 [Wednesday, 17th August 1994] Page 816 - 821

CANCELLATION OF LEASES ON STATE LAND

Mr. Malunga (MP Makokoba):

Mr. Speaker Sir, it is my intention to wind up this important debate, and in doing so, I would like firstly to realize that when the President ordered that a cancellation on farm leases be effected, a very volatile and emotional situation has developed, and the situation precipitated, if it had not been for the intervention of the President would have been blown out of proportion. Following that cancellation, therefore, I moved a relevant motion which sought a number of answers from the relevant Ministry which had been accused of having been guilty of a number of things. There is no doubt that the motion generated a heated debate and I am happy to say that all the contributions were very objective.

Mr. Speaker, the list provided by the Minister is self explanatory. I would like believe that all hon. Members followed what the Minister listed down and studies it in order to give a good analysis of the land acquisition in respect of State lands. It therefore behooves me to mention that according to my observation, hon. members and other progressive patriots outside this chamber support the view point that a deliberate programme which enables indigenous farmers to be ushered into commercial farming is a must and it is long over due. But there is a provision to that, such land should not fall within the

Page 855: Mr. Marwizi: (MP Gutu East) on Resettlement Schemes.

There is one thing that I would like to talk about on the resettlement schemes. It is very good, but there is one thing I have observed. Those people who go to the resettlement areas probably go when they are only the two of them, with very small children. These children grow up and need land. When they are grown up, they have no land where they would have come from. Probably nothing is reserved for them in the resettlement areas. They will get no land anywhere. There will be problems. I think when we set up our resettlement schemes, we have got to put this into consideration.

Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol.21 No.18 [Tuesday, 23rd August, 1994] Presidential Speech: Debate on Address.

Page 881: **Mr. Mupfudza:** (MP Manyame) on Land Issue-

The first and foremost issue we must address, I think, it is that of the land hunger and this can be done by speeding up the resettlement programme. Whilst we are on the resettlement Mr. Speaker, I think we must re-look at the resettlement policy because at the moment, we had this policy where had resettled families without taking into cognisance that the father and the mother who had been resettled had children and these are growing up and need land. There is no provision for those off-springs when they grow up most of those who had been resettled together with their parents now find it very difficult to settle on the land because the land had been designed to cater for very few people. I think the Government should be urged to revise the resettlement policy such that we would provide more land for those who are born in the resettlement areas and have grown up.

Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 21 No. 19 [Wednesday, 24th August, 1994] Oral Answers to Question

Page 952:Mr. Nzarayebani (Mutare South):

Is the Minister aware that this is a situation where these people are creating a policy of survival of the fittest, eat or be eaten and who is being eaten here? The masses of our people. Is the Minister aware about this kind of situation where the masses of our people are exploited?

Population and Sustainable Development

Page 968 - 969: Mr. Gara (MP Mbare East):

What we need is to increase our productivity in order to sustain the nation. What we need is for the Government to quickly carry on this programme of land distribution and get people on the ground to work. What we need is to see more people in the manufacturing sector producing more goods. If we do that there will be no poverty, the kind of poverty we look at today. It is not the population, it is the other way. But because this economy is still very depressed, very backward, this is why we think that we are over-populated. We are not over-populated.

Page 975 - 978: Mr. Nzarayebani:

The economy of this country is not ours. There is nobody here who can say he owns any mode of economic production in this country. The whole thing that we call the economy is not ours. It is under those few white Zimbabweans if they have accepted to be Zimbabweans, but the majority of them celebrate UDI. They are still Rhodesians.

I want to submit very humbly that the North is battling with the South. They have failed politically and the whole of Africa, Latin America and Asia is politically free. It is the African administering politically the whole of Africa from Cape to Cairo. Are we administering ourselves economically? No. We are economic slaves of the North and they want to continue enslaving and exploiting us relentlessly and we attend these work shops. The North would want to create a puppet political party to rule Third World countries and this is why you see the Dumbutshenas and Muzorewas. It is a creation of western imperialist ideology. What is important now is not politics. As far as imperialism is concerned, it is the economy. Africa is very rich as far as raw materials are concerned. They want to exploit these resources right down and what would happen to our sons and daughters? We talk of employment creation to provide labour to allow these people to exploit both our labour and our raw materials.

We need a government which is politically alert and ideologically alert. We are a democratic society and we allow these kinds of workshops to go on but we must create also our own workshops to orientate our people about the machinations of western imperialism. Some of us who fought the war and who lived under the Marxist-Leninist framework of environment do not hesitate to tell this House – down with imperialism. We must be seen to fight an economic war because we are own liberators.

Mr. Vuma (MP Silobela): What is called sustainable development? Sustainable development is development that actually has to correlate the index of production and the index of birth. The index of production is also made viable by education of the population. The very best instrument of development is education is education of population. The dependence and viability of population also or prerequisite of an element which you can sharpen developing as a tool of development. As sustainable development of any society can never be without population, so, there is an emphatic need for a massive population growth in order to have at possible diverse element of education of different levels and different styles of technology.

Page 1018 – 1022 Mr. Nyikadzino (MP Kariba):

I also would like to the issue of tillage. In Bumi or in Omay, Hurungwe tillage is being taken as a thing which should please some civil servants or some officials. I am saying so because in my constituency we have very few people who got cattle or donkeys. So when tillage comes in the area it is only for civil servants. It is a pity that whenever we come to tillage very few people get the advantage of the tillage unit. N my area I have old people and very poor people -

Who still use to plough their fields. How many metres can a man dig in a day using a hoe, as if he is digging a garden? Even though these people are being given seed packs, they cannot even dig more than a hectare and we expect that person to harvest something that can make his family survive. So I appeal to the Ministry of Agriculture to see to it that priority be given to people in the rural areas. Today they are suffering. It is not because thy are lazy, they do not have the instruments or equipment for agricultural activities.

Page 1046 - 1047: Mr Masawi (Mbare West):

I would want to ask the Minister of Lands, for I have visited a few places and I was told that Zimbabwean meat and livestock is exported to Mauritius every fortnight, about 500 live cattle. Zimbabwe is depriving itself by not slaughtering and processing the meat here in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe is losing out on skins, hooves, horns, offal, manure *etc.* Both the Minister of Industry and Commerce and the Minister of Lands should explain to this House the value of exporting live animals to those countries I mentioned. Whilst on the same issue, I would like to ask the Minister of Lands when he is going to remove the monopoly of the CSC. The exporting of fresh meat is done under the Lome Agreement and it is only done by the CSC. I was of the opinion that some of our private abattoirs can quickly match the CSC at whatever level. They can do something is given the opportunity to do so. I am looking at the creating of employment and we should look at all areas and stop over protecting. The Minister has often spoken of ESAP and said it means competition, but now we seem to protect certain areas. I would wish the Minister reviews his approach on the issue.

**Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 21 No.21 [Tuesday,30th August,1994] Presidential Speech: Debate on Address
Page1068 – 1069 - Mr. Chafesuka: (MP Guruve) on Land Issue-**

I would like to look at the land sue. From time immemorial we know that the land issue was the main issue that sparked the whole lead that led to our independence. When the white man come into the country, they divided the country into regions. These are regions 1,2,3,4 and 5.They made sure that they occupied all the farms in region one where there was plenty rainfall and underground water and they allocated regions four and five farms to blacks. You find that regions one and two were allocated to whites and all the other regions were allocated to black farmers. The blacks were allocated those areas where there is poor rainfall, where malaria is and endemic, the dry areas. The areas were never meant for human habitation at all. Now that we are independent, I think we have failed to do justice to our own people. The Government today is still allocating those areas which are poor to black people. I think this is very unfortunate because we have not done anything good for our people. They have not managed to work on the soil because the areas are dry and are tsetse and malaria infested areas with fragile soils which can easily form gullies. We must look at this issue carefully and correct it. We must also consider giving land regions 1 and 2 to some blacks. I strongly believe that the farms in regions 1 ad 2 should be subdivided so that people in the rural areas could be moved from the dry areas to those good areas. If we do not do this it would mean that we have totally failed as a Government.

I would like to table my research papers to beef up my points on what the whites did to us on land distribution. I would like to say that the land issue is a problem areas. We have enacted the Land Acquisition Act, where farms have been acquired by the Government but we read in the paper day after day that the farms have been given back to their original owners. Those are the areas we should look at seriously Mr. Speaker. This brief presentation will cover the following aspects in broad terms covering Mashonaland Central Province:

1. Size of province and extent of land utilized by each farming sector.
2. Agro-ecology and proportionate land area per natural region farmed by different sectors.
3. Sector profile highlighting on land use and productivity levels.

For ease of reference a map has been prepared to illustrate the distribution of these arables.

Size and Farming Sectors:

The province covers an area of 2 834,7 square kilometers, or 2 834 700 hectares in extent. These are subdivided into the following broad uses:

Page 1070:

Use	Area(ha)	Total
Communal Farmland	1 546 728	54%
Resettlement	157 490	6%
Small Scale Commercial	112 188	4%
Large Scale Commercial	855 686	30%
Parks and Wildlife	128 358	5%
State Land	34 250	1%

Agro-ecology and proportionate land in each region: The province is one of better placed with respect to agro-ecology.

Natural Region	Area	Rainfall Range (mm)	%Total
11a	1 181 425	750-1 000	42%
11b	224 850	+750	8%
111	373 000	650-800	13%
1V	1 055 425	450-650	37%

Issues:

At least 63 percent of the province has a good agricultural potential if rainfall is taken as a critical factor of production. The low rainfall belt constituting 37 percent of the province wholly covers communal farming areas to the north of the province.

Percentage Distribution of Land by Sector by Agro-ecology Region:

Region	Communal	Resettlement	SSCF	LSCF
11a	27	4	3	65
11b	32	10.4	14	43.5
11	59	9	16	2.9
1V	91.6	Nil	0.6	Nil

The distribution of land favors LSCFA with respect to agricultural potential under rain-fed conditions.

It is adversely skewed against the communal sector where the bulk of land owned falls in natural regions 111 and 1V. This has obvious implications on productivity per unit area.

Sector Profiles and Productivity Levels: Communal Farming Sector:

Page 1071 - 1073:

-Estimated farm households earning their livelihood from agriculture ± 97 631.

-Average land holdings ± 8 hectares in sparsely populated areas (Rushinga, the Zambezi Valley).

-Major source of income – crop production. Maize, cotton, groundnuts, burley tobacco and small grains.

-Productivity often lower than potential and on average 40-60 percent for major crops.

-Livestock ownership in region of 35-55 percent depending on area. However, densely populated areas like Chiweshe, Upper Guruve, Kandeya for example are severely overgrazed.

-Major limitations to production are:

(i) Lack or inadequate inputs due to insufficient capital.

(ii) Unreliable rainfall for rain-fed farming.

2) **Resettlement Areas:** A total of 2 368 families have been settled in either Model A or B schemes. Generally production has not been as high as originally envisaged overall. However Model A settlers have fared better than their Model B counterparts. Individual accountability may be one of the reasons why this has been the case.

Farmers have gone in for crops like maize, cotton, tobacco. Productivity is also lower than anticipated. Reasons cited are:

- Lack of resources (financial) hence low input use.
- Initial application of a less stringent selection criteria
- Lack of labour

These have resulted in some arable land being left fallow over seasons.

3 Small Scale Commercial Areas:

There are four such areas with a total of 834 farms. Average land holdings plus or minus 120 hectares. Crop and livestock are major sources of livelihood.

About 40 percent of arables fully utilized. Productivity levels low on most farms and possible reasons are:

- Lack of capital
- Shortage of labour
- Inheritance problems hence old age

Resource conservation conscious

Large Scale Commercial Farming Areas:

Currently at total of 633 farms in this sector. Average land holdings plus or minus 1 500 hectares.

Major activities-diversified farming involving crops, livestock, horticulture and floriculture in some cases.

-Productivity in terms arable quite high. Access to irrigation facilities an added advantage.

-Bulk of these units situated in areas with favourable climatic conditions.

Still on the land issue Mr. Speaker, I would like to say that I am quite disturbed by the fact that the Government is giving food handouts to people who are staying in areas where there is plenty of water. I am looking at the Zambezi and neighbouring areas, why not train people and provide inputs and implements for irrigation so that these people feed the nation.

Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 21, No.23 [Thursday, 1st September, 1994] Presidential Speech: Debate on Address Page 1239 - 1240: Mr. Matchaba-Hove (MP Mwenezi) on Resettlement.

A number of hon. Members have spoken about resettlement. We are speaking about the same subject probably in different ways. There is an urgent need for more land resettlement for the people in Mwenezi. The last land allocation which took place in Mwenezi occurred 34 years ago. Today all the places have been reserved as pastures have now been turned into fields. Hence, when the most disastrous drought of 1992 came, it hit Mwenezi the hardest, resulting in the loss of more than 98 percent of our herd including donkeys. Peasant farmers in Mwenezi would also like to be resettled in regions 1, 2 and 3 where they can grow crops not only for their consumption but grow enough crops to sell and educate their children. This point, I think was also made by Mr. Chafesuka.

Currently, Mwenezi has got two resettlement areas namely the Wedza Block and the Wanezi Block o Section 8. Mr. Speaker, allow me just a few minutes to give the hon. House the background to these resettlement areas in order to illustrate my point; my suggestion that there is more land required for resettlement particularly in this region 5 area. In 1992, an original number of 115 families was moved from Mberengwa in the Midlands to the Wedza Block Resettlement Area. In 1985 these same people were moved from Mberengwa to Gwanda South under Matabeleland South and in July 1993 the same group was moved from Matabeleland South to Masvingo under Mwenezi, the third province in a period of 12 years. These people have had a host of problems like the lack of water, lack of schools, clinics, shops, roads, buses, food, you name it. Children were born in the Midlands, children were born in Matabeleland South and children are being born in Masvingo to the same parents. The acquisition of birth certificates and other essential documents to which Chief Musikavanhu referred a few minutes ago, has been and still a nightmare to these people.

Between October 1993 and to date, eight sites in the Wedza Block for boreholes were surveyed and only three yielded drinkable water because most of it is salty. At the moment, the rural service centre cannot be sited because there is no water. The three boreholes do not have enough water to justify the establishment of a rural service centre. The three villages, Village 1, Village 2, and Village 3 are plus or minus 12 kilometres apart. This situation obtains now, 13 years after they were moved to that place. True the DDF has succeeded in constructing a gravel road to that area and this has been a very great achievement indeed.

Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 21, No. 24 [Tuesday, 6th September, 1994] Presidential Speech: Debate on Address Page 1269 – 1270: Mr. Nyashanu: on Agriculture

Mr. Speaker, in agriculture, the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979, land for resettlement had to be acquired on a willing-buyer-willing-seller prices and the land sellers had been allowed to remit their money in any currency to any country of their choice. This arrangement limited the Government's possibilities for buying land since this would lead to the loss of foreign exchange which was necessary for investment in export-oriented industry and agriculture. This resulted in Government getting hold of poorly maintained farms which had been exhausted through tobacco farming. These ranches and farms were generally not suitable for intensive cropping. These are the farms on which most of the model A resettlement schemes for poor, displaced and war-battered peasants have been implemented.

Mr. Speaker, this is the context within which structural adjustment in agriculture has taken place. There has not been a significant departure from the export – orientation of the pre-independence economy. Neither has there been change in the class structure of the society. Instead there has been an expansion of the black bourgeois that is, the emerged minority of the majority.

Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 21 No.31 [Wednesday, 21st September, 1994] Presidential Speech: Debate on Address. Page 2232 – 2237 THE MINISTER OF LANDS, AGRICULTURE AND WATER DEVELOPMENT (MR. KANGAI):

Mr. Speaker Sir, it would appear to me that the issue of the performance of the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) is generally misunderstood by most hon. members. I therefore propose to give a comprehensive answer to the question posed by the hon. member for High-field West.

I made reference in my last two policy statements to the need to examine graduated pricing, seasonal pricing and regional pricing. My Ministry is also working on a criteria for evaluating GMB performance. There have already been consultations between my Ministry and the Board on the question of separating accounts into commercial and non-commercial accounts to ensure that only those specially approved by Government will be maintained, with the cost paid directly from the Treasury.

Let me assure hon. members that Government is quite conscious of the deficit problem. For this reason, my Ministry has decided that any further recommendations to Government on grain market liberalization measures will be based upon thorough studies of costs and benefits. Among the many studies my Ministry plans to undertake are:

- (a) The costs and benefits of maize self-sufficiency versus maize self-reliance.
- (b) The costs, benefits and possible modalities of graduated pricing.

As you are aware, the advent of reforms has started to develop a culture among farmers of responding to market signals in making production decisions. Weather and other factors permitting, farmers will tend to move towards production of crops that will also take into account the potential risks in terms of market availability and world price fluctuations. However, the opportunity costs of this resource shift for the sake of food self-sufficiency, needs to be quantified.

Secondly, you will recall that Government announced the intention to implement a graduated payments scheme for maize. Under this scheme, the prices paid to producers will be structured in such a way as to achieve the production target given normal weather conditions, while compensating producers for low yields in the event of poor seasons. This would also protect consumers and Government from excessive costs in the event of a good season. It is important for hon. members to remember that the twin objectives of liberalization and parastatal deficit reduction cannot be achieved simultaneously unless prices are brought in line with what would prevail in an open market system.

Other pricing scenarios to which I have already made reference in the past, are seasonal and regional pricing. For the GMB, the only real possibility for reducing deficits would seem to lie in the implementation of graduated, seasonal and regional pricing that take into account supply and demand situations. What we need to get from the studies is a clear plan on how graduated pricing can be implemented, to what extent it can stabilize the incomes of producers and consumer expenditures on maize meal, how it would affect the trading account of GMB overtime, the advantages for Government of relinquishing control over maize price determination. From the face of it, it seems logical that a price structure which reflects true economic costs would reduce the deficits of the Board. However, it is important to have an analysis that looks at social and economic implications. For us, it is important that the results of the studies should become a basis for the trimming and sequencing of various pricing scenarios during the process of liberalizing maize pricing.

Page 2238: MR. MUDARIKI: (MP Harare North)

I thank the Minister for his reply but would like to know from the Minister whether he has discussed with the Minister of Finance regarding the question of strategic stocks, because the question of strategic stocks...

MR. KANGAI: It is very easy to forget. We are all aware that the strategic reserves are the cause of the deficit. But we must know that if it does not rain in November and December, we will be in trouble. It even costs much more to procure a tone of maize from overseas to Zimbabwe compared to the money which we would pay when we service those stocks.

MR. MUDARIKI: May I know from the Minister whether he can assure this House that he is not going to liberalize the export of maize from this country by private people? We want that control otherwise maize will be shipped out of the country by people who would like to sabotage us.

Mr. Kangai: Under the reform programme, there is no agricultural product which will be exported or imported without the approval of the Ministry of Lands Agriculture and Water Development.

4. **MRS. CHINAMANO** Asked the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development to explain to the House why Government has neglected black small-scale commercial farmers for the past 15 years; to explain what steps his Ministry intends to take in assisting the said farmers in terms of securing loans, the provision of extension services, boreholes and dams; and if he can table the Ministry's policy document on the development of small-scale commercial farmers.

THE MINISTER OF LANDS, AGRICULTURE AND WATER DEVELOPMENT (MR. KANGAI): Mr. Speaker Sir, I wish to assure the hon. member, Mrs. Chinamano, that Government has not neglected black small scale commercial farmers for the past fifteen years. To put the first part of this question in proper perspective, perhaps I need to give a little bit of background and explain the role of my Ministry in this regard. You will recall that when the present Government took over in 1980, the agricultural sector was made up of a well developed large commercial sector comprising of about 5 000 from units on the one hand, and a poorly developed sector comprising over 700 000 communal farmers. In between, we had about 8 000 emergent commercial farmers in the former African Purchasing Farming Areas. These are what have been commonly termed as small scale commercial farmers who have lease or title to their farms and had very peculiar problems of their own. The immediate task of Government was to extend support services of research, extension, marketing and credit to the smallholder sector. This programme was a great success and farmers responded positively by producing surpluses of maize, cotton, sunflower seed and other crops.

The share of smallholder farmers to total production has increased significantly over the past decade as shown in the table 1 below. Before independence small holder marketed production was less than 50 percent of the total deliveries to the marketing boards for most agricultural commodities. However the current position is that the smallholder farmers account for 60 per cent maize, 70 per cent seed cotton, 95 per cent of sunflower and 85 per cent of groundnuts deliveries to the marketing boards and surplus that goes to localized trading.

Page 2245 - 2246: The responsibility of my Ministry is to address the problems of the agricultural sector as a whole which include lack of capital and adequate infrastructure including land, water, roads and irrigation resources, diseases control, lack of inputs, lack of knowledge because of the diversity of problems between large commercial farmers, resettlement farmers, commercial farmers and small scale farmers, my Ministry continues to implement a diversity of programmes designed to address the specific problems of each sub sector. In the communal sector for instance, the biggest problem is lack of water, inputs, reliable transport, suitable land and farming knowledge. The small scale commercial and resettlement farmers suffer from lack of capital to develop their farms, high marketing cost, and adequate managerial skills; while commercial agriculture is affected with mainly the higher interest rates and export costs as the major constraints. Government does not neglect any sector and in fact take due cognisance of the needs of the smallholder and small scale factor which have been previously disadvantaged

Mr. Speaker, the last part of the hon. Member's question is asking the Ministry to table a policy document on the development of small scale commercial farmers. I wish to assure the hon. member that the issue of agricultural development is being tackled in a number of aspects which include irrigation and water policy, commercial farm settlement, credit and extension policy, resettlement and land tenure, marketing policy, livestock development, training and environmental concerns. The Ministry has commenced an exercise to prepare a comprehensive agricultural sector policy framework which puts together the Ministry's policy on all aspects of its activities by crop, by sub-sector and by agro-ecological region. This is a mammoth task which will take time to put together; but it does not mean to say that our existing development programmes will be delayed. When that task is completed, I will be in a position to table the Ministry's policy document on agricultural sector, including the development of small scale commercial farmers.

Mr. Mudariki:

Mr. Speaker, the Minister is misleading the House. Is he aware that I speak from experience because I am a son of a native purchase area farmer. The Government for the past fifteen years, has done nothing to assist. The Government has failed to assist farmers in native purchase areas like Chitowa, Chitomborwizi, Marirangwe and those are languishing in abject poverty....

Page 2248 **Mr. Kangai:**

Mr. Speaker Sir, those areas were not provided of any extension services by Government. Immediately after independence, we sent our services to cover those areas. When we had the drought of 1982 we thought those areas were well covered, but when it became clear that those people also need assistance, we extended drought relief to those areas. Also, when we came up with the recovery programme, we have also extended that programme to those areas. This is why I said, it is incorrect to say Government has done nothing. We may have not done enough to alleviate the poverty which is common phenomena, because even in the communal areas, whilst we are doing quite a lot of work, we have not done enough to alleviate the poverty.

Mrs. Chinamano: Mr. Speaker, is the Minister aware that the Ruwa area has never been helped by Government? If he says he has helped small-scale farmers, it is not true. If the

Minister says they have helped the communal farmers, I will say yes-

Mr. Speaker: Mrs. Chinamano, what is your supplementary question?

Mrs. Chinamano: My supplementary question answering the Minister, they have never helped the small-scale commercial farmers, but they have helped the commercial farmers- [Mr. Kangai: Like yourself.] -Yes, like myself and others.

Mr. Kangai: Mr. Speaker, I have an awful amount of respect for the member and I sometimes vary from her contribution, but on this one I would like to vary from her contribution, but on this one I would like to say that the member is guilty of terminological inexactitude because the member...

Page 2249 - 2250

Mr. Marongwe (MP Gokwe East): Mr. Speaker, with reference to the mention by the Minister of funds available to Zimbabweans by loan or otherwise by drilling boreholes in the small-scale commercial areas, the farmers, through the ZFU are waiting to know what is causing the delay when the funds have been given to the Government of Zimbabwe already. It is taking almost over a year to distribute the funds so that the farmers can benefit from the drilling of boreholes...

Mr. Kangai: I think there is misunderstanding between the ZFU and my officials. We were not going to give money. What we are going to do is to go and drill boreholes at those farms and the responsibility is ZFU's, to draw up a list of these small-scale commercial farmers. There are 3 000 of them and they should be handed over to our Ministry and the Ministry will go and drill boreholes. We also had a problem with the Ministry of Finance on that one because it is a loan which has got to be paid. The Ministry of Finance will want to be satisfied of how that loan repayment is going to be done. So, that has raised a delay on this programme. What we have arranged is that we should be given a list of names of 3 000 small-scale farmers who need boreholes in their farms and then we will send our officials to go and drill boreholes.

Mr. Vuma (MP Silobela): Is the Minister aware that now 15 years after independence, there have been many farmers in the Native Purchase Areas who have been going unassisted?

Mr. Kangai: Every human being in Zimbabwe has got the right to exist by himself or herself. We as Government have to monitor and see whether some added Government assistance will improve the welfare of those people. The small-scale commercial farmers who have been referred in the past as purchase farmers really need assistance from Government. If we do not go out to assist them, there will not be any development in that area. So, it is important that Government has to assist them.

Page 2252 – 2253 RUWANDA FARM

5. Dr. Chavunduka (MP Makoni East) asked the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development to confirm or deny whether Ruwanda Farm near Baddley, owned by a Mr. Ray is unused or underutilized.

Mr. Kangai: Mr. Speaker, I cannot confirm or deny whether this particular farm is unused or underutilized since it is privately owned and not one of the state lands under my Ministry. However, since the hon. member for Makoni East has drawn my attention to the possibility of its being underutilized, I have instructed the derelict lands board to inspect the farm and submit a report.

Dr. Chavunduka: I am satisfied with the latter part of the reply. My supplementary is whether the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development could liaise directly with the Minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development with a view to resettling the landless and destitute people at Inyati Mine who have been abandoned since 1980.

Mr. Kangai: The two Ministries, when it comes to the question of resettlement, work very closely if the officials in the area and the district administrator in the area have identified that problem and brought it to the attention of the Minister of Local Government; we will do our best to try and resettle those people.

Page 2287 - 2292: Presidential Speech: Debate on Address [THE MINISTER OF LANDS, AGRICULTURE AND WATER DEVELOPMENT]

The hon. member, Mr. B. Hove, requested that consideration be given to the need to provide farmers with tractors to assist with land tillage. Members may wish to note that Government tillage units are jointly administered by the District Development Fund and the Department of Rural Development. Members may appreciate that the same tractors are also used for other rural development programmes.

With reference to the 64 per cent acre cited by the hon. member, may I advise that this charge is heavily subsidized as the commercial rate is about \$359 per hectare. I quite agree with the observation made by the hon. member for Bubi that the

mobility of Agritex staff is paramount in ensuring effective contact with farmers. My Ministry will therefore continue to do everything within its means to extend the present Agritex motorization project which is about the only best way to ensure that Agritex is able to serve the needs of all farmers especially communal farmers.

I heartily thank the hon. member Mr. Chipango for bringing to the attention of this House the poor housing conditions which some of my Agritex officers experience. While the Agriculture extension and Research Project funded by the World Bank facilitated the construction of houses for staff in the field, a good number are still living in houses which require repairs and decoration. Nearly all Agritex houses are not fenced and there are no burglar bars fitted. A good number of houses are not connected to water and electricity, even where the services are only a few meters away. My Ministry bids for these services annually under the PSIP programme, but to no avail.

As for the construction of grain depots in Makoni South, may I advise that grain silos in the country are being built in phases and in accordance with production levels of grain in a particular area. It is very important to note that the quantity produced in any areas must justify the expenditure involved in building these silos which I must say are very expensive to put up. However, if funds are available it would be ideal to build grain silos in such centers as Mutare, Gweru and Masvingo in order to ensure viability and easy transfer to the potential markets.

The hon. member, Mr. B. Hove, also raised the question of the indigenization of the agricultural sector and suggested that land be made available for the resettlement of graduates from our agricultural colleges. He further suggested that more land be allocated to peasant master farmers. May I inform hon. members that over 450 graduates come out of the agricultural institutions administered by my Ministry each year. Members will appreciate that soon after independence Government's priority was to improve the extension officer-farmer ratio in order to provide adequate agricultural extension services to all our farmers and ultimately increase agricultural production. It has now turned out, Mr. Speaker, that the job market for these agricultural graduates is fast becoming saturated due to the fact that the Government is not recruiting any more staff because of civil service reform programme. Members may also recall that priorities for resettlement were targeted at our landless people and at relieving population pressure in the communal lands. Therefore at the time there was no immediate priority to settle and create a cadre of elite black commercial farmers.

This has been the state of affairs up until recently when the drive to indigenize the economy has been adopted by the Government. Pursuant to this new policy thrust, my Ministry has been considering various options designed to bring agricultural graduates into direct farming. Members may be pleased to learn that my Ministry has proposed to implement a commercial farm settlement scheme. A board of trustees has been established to spearhead that project and draft document has been prepared for discussion and possible modification before being submitted for consideration by Government.

May I advise members that in the past, land designation was primarily targeted at under-utilized land and as such it was not always possible to identify this category of land where it was most needed for resettlement. Some constituencies may understandably feel ignored or left out in the resettlement exercise but this has not been the intention.

On the question of limiting the size of farms owned by individuals Mr. Speaker, Government is currently working on suitable farm sizes to enable the majority of people to have access to farming land. I accept the advice given by the hon. member for Harare West, Mr. Chipango, that we must make our farms smaller so that as many people as possible are allocated these farms. This House will recall that historically, our commercial farming sector was divided into two categories: small-scale and large scale sectors. We have now started allocating the large-scale commercial farms to our indigenous people and the practice in the past has been to allocate the old farm units as they were. However, my Ministry recognizes the necessity of making the farms smaller and we have adopted a two prolonged policy to achieve this.

I would like the hon. members to note however that the reason why a particular farm unit is of a certain size and shape has to do with its viability. Our land is not homogeneous, some areas are more fertile than others and some are mountainous or rocky while others are flat. If one unit is to produce the same minimum income as the next unit, then their sizes will be different because they will not be on the same type of soil. The enterprises possible in each area also determine the size of land required. The point I wish to make Mr. Speaker is that, while we recognize that farm units must be small, it is not possible to give maximum size because the size will depend on the farm's capacity to produce a certain minimum income.

Mr. Speaker, may I advise this House that the present Government policy restricts the sale of land to foreigners such that only in those cases where a major investment is being made in the country will land be sold to foreign nationals. Otherwise land is not readily available to foreigners regardless of their ability to pay for it.

On the concern expressed by a number of members with respect to procedural delays in acquiring land where it has already been identified, this House may wish to note that discussions are currently underway to rectify the limitations of the Land Acquisition Act, 1992 and streamline the procedures to facilitate speedy acquisition of land.

The hon. Member for Buhera North, Mr. Nyashanu is unhappy about the alleged red tape in the distribution of land under the lease-to-buy-scheme. I am not sure I understand this question or observation but I will try to answer it. Yes my Ministry

is going ahead with the leasing of farms and this House should have noticed our advertisement on 10th August, 1994 in *The Herald* inviting people to apply for farms. But let me assure this House that there has not been any bureaucratic bottlenecks in the system of allocating farms for leasing. I am aware that there are bottlenecks in the planning and allocation of land for resettlement but I would not say that is in any way caused by bureaucracy. If I am correct and the hon. Member is really talking about delays in resettling people, then the matter should be referred to my colleague the Senior Minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development.

**Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 21, No.33 [Wednesday, 5th October, 1994] Motion on Resettlement Schemes
Page 2456 – 2465 Mr. Chafesuka (MP Guruve):**

I move the motion standing in my name that this House notes with concern the establishment by Government of Resettlement Schemes without basic infrastructure; Urges Government to undertake thorough feasibility studies prior to resettlement; Encourages Government to provide agricultural extension services with a view to enhancing their productivity; Appeals to Government to adopt a deliberate policy to restock the herd in drought prone areas; and to extend the Campfire programme to the resettlement areas.

Mr. Chafesuka: In view of what the motion is addressing, today Africa is poorest part of the world's economy. From 1960-1990 Africa has moved from the position of food self sufficiency to a hungry, malnourished, impoverished and disillusioned continent. Hon. members will agree with me that food carries a heavy burden in the structure of the economy. This is because the majority of our people depend on agriculture that is for both employment and economic benefits. Therefore Government has a duty to improve the lives of the ordinary and average person in this country. Settlers have established a very profitable agricultural base based on the western pattern, which brought in land legislation which made black farmers squatters in their own mother land. Black farmers were seen as wage earners of the settlers, working for the settlers on their farms. In view of this, the settlers expelled blacks and put them in reserves and this sealed the introduction of the Land Apportionment Act. In 1969, as agreed upon in the Land Tenure Act, this country was divided into three categories by the white settlers. African area was 46.7 percent was declared national land.

This displacement of the black population into the reserves meant that there were put into areas where there was poor, unfertile soil which today are called communal lands. This was part of the settler policy. Despite what was embarked on, the resettlement scheme and situation has not yet changed, because 45 000 commercial settler farmers still have the bigger portion against the 10 million indigenous Zimbabweans. I think it is high time we redress this imbalance which was created by the settlers when they came into the country. When they divided this country into these regions, 1, 2, 3 were given to the settlers and part of region 3 was given to the indigenous people. But regions 4 and 5 were given to the indigenous people of this country. This is the imbalance that I am referring to which should be corrected now. In this region this is where there is poor rainfall and not enough underground water. Whites did not want to settle in these areas because they knew very well there is no water. So they put Africans to go into these regions because they wanted to create labour for their farms. So it is my appeal to you that this imbalance be corrected now. It surprises me that 14 years after independence, the hand of power is with us the indigenous people of Zimbabwe, but we have failed to correct this imbalance. Where are we going? Where are we coming from? When are we going to correct this and for how long are our people going to continue to be dependence of the Government? Is this the way we should distribute the economy of this country, by creating more dependency. This was introduced by settlers.

We have also embarked on the same system and we have not changed the system of resettling people in this country. We continue to resettle people in these semi-arid areas. Yet we are very much aware that the settlers have said there is no water there, where the settlers have said even the rainfall is erratic and yet we continue to resettle people there. How do we think we are going to make our people self-sufficient, make them have food security? So it is my appeal to the Government, through the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development to make sure that this imbalance is corrected. We have put people in areas which are mosquito infested, tsetse infested and have harsh climatic conditions. There is no ground water and yet we are leaving out areas where there is a lot of ground water. 46.5 percent of the land is controlled by the settlers.

I suggest that the present large scale commercial farmers be reduced so that we create good land for our people so that they also go and farm in those good fertile areas. I am hereby submitting my papers of research in order not to waste your time, to beef up what I have said. On the 16th of September, on Friday, the Senior Minister of Local Government was quoted as saying, Zimbabwe is not short of land to resettle people." I do not want to believe that the Senior Minister was referring to these semi-arid areas where we are busy resettling people. Well, if he was not referring to those semi arid areas, where do we get the land, because this is the only land which was left idle by the settlers. They knew they would never go and settle there, it is only we Africans who do. Worse, we continue to put people in these areas without putting in the necessary infrastructure so that our people can have water. In view of this Mr. Speaker Sir, I propose again that Government should now start designing areas with enough underground water. There is a report that I am also submitting, done by Professor Richard J. Owens of the University of Zimbabwe, which shows that there are areas with enough underground water, aquifer areas which were taken by white settlers are areas which we should be designating. When we designate, we do so in region five there is no water and without adequate infrastructure in terms of the provision of water so that our people can also enjoy the fruits of being liberated. We should not forget that this land issue was the cause of the liberations struggle.

This is what made most of us go to the liberation struggle, this is what made most of us die in this country. So it is my belief that we should designate, we should do so in the aquifer areas where there is enough underground water so that our people can also enjoy and be able to have food securities in those areas.

I also urge the Government to allow people, those residing along the rivers which are flowing day and night to use the river waters for irrigation, for example, people in Binga, Nyaminyami, Kanyemba, Guruve and down in Mukumbura. Why cannot people in those areas be allowed to use those waters for irrigation and produce food for the country and the nation? That means that there is something wrong with our planning system. So I would urge that the planning should take care of this so that people living along the rivers can make use of the waters and the nation. Water must be a priority if we are serious about food security in this country. I am not shy to say that Zimbabwe is a proud country because it is made up of farmers. Most Zimbabweans are farmers. Given the resources and the inputs they can deliver the goods. Why cannot we do that? Instead of digging shallow boreholes let us sink deeper boreholes because in these semi-arable areas only deeper boreholes can produce water. If we continue to dig shallow boreholes the result is that there will be no water. Sometimes the water is salty and not suitable for human consumption. So all this is referring to the imbalances created by the settlers when they took over the reins of the Government that is way back in 1890 when settlers took over as governors of this country.

Coming back to our communal farms, I propose that the Government do something in order to provide the input to our farmers so that when rains come, farmers will be ready to plough and be able to get something out of their activities. I am saying this because in most cases our rural farmers fail to buy inputs on time because they do not have money. When they go to ZFC or Windmill to buy fertilizer, some may be having money from January to March, when they go these companies they are told that this time we are only supplying farmers who are irrigating wheat, because they know very well that in the rural areas there is nobody who is irrigating wheat. With that excuse our people will not get the chance of buying fertilizer by that time, the prices will have gone up. This is why I am saying Government should provide the input. We have warehouses around the country which I think should be used to stock fertilizers before the prices go up which means these companies are only supporting the commercial farmers, ignoring our communal farmers.

Perhaps I should also take this chance to encourage the ZFU to come in and make use of all those warehouses all over the country to stock the fertilizers before prices go up so that when our people come to buy when they get money, they will not have the problem of being told that it has run out. Again this idea of not subsidizing this fertilizer— the manufacturing companies are saying that there is no nitrogen. I believe they know very well that there is a consignment to arrive in this country coming from outside the country, of urea, which is decontrolled. That one will be sold to the rural farmers because they will have no alternative that will be only fertilizer available. That means our farmers are going to be disadvantaged by buying the more expensive urea instead of the subsidized AN nitrogen. So it is also my wish that the ZFC should do something to make sure that fertilizers are brought to the people in rural areas.

We have our indigenous small-scale farmers who are heavily indebted and cannot pay back their loans. What are we putting in place to bail these people? I know some of them may not be good farmers, but some of them are good farmers who should be assisted. I think most of the hon. members will agree with me here in saying that most of these farmers were affected by the war. So they cannot be expected to repay their loans. I therefore propose that Government should stop the payment of interest on those loans, reschedule them and allow these good farmers a second chance under close monitoring where the money lenders would visit these people to see where the money is being put.

At times, if people are not monitored, they end up misusing the money. Instead of buying fertilizers they end up using the money to pay *lobola*. Such things happen. So in view of this monitoring that I have mentioned, I think our indigenous farmers will be able to make. Today, if you visit the small-scale farmers wherever they are, for example Guruve, in Gota, in Nyakapupu, in Chesa and in Karuyana. It took settlers to become viable in 40 to 50 years time, why cannot our people be given the chance a second time. In all these areas, the farmers cannot even produce. They have nothing. Through you Mr. Speaker Sir, the Ministry of Agriculture could do something to help these farmers so that they can in turn produce for the country. We hear that there are plans that Government has to take over the farms and resettle farmers. Yes, it is good, because the land is lying idle, but what are we going to do with that land? It is the Government again which will turn around and feed that same person to assist these people, it is the Government that will turn around and make sure that the person is surviving and his family also. What are we putting in place? I believe the Ministry will do something to make sure that our farmers are brought out of this mess.

On the Campfire proceeds to people in the resettlement areas and also in view of the fact that we now have amalgamated councils, we used to have district councils and rural councils and now they have merged to form one rural district council—the policy today of the Campfire project says the recipients of the proceeds wildlife pays 15 percent to the local authority, which today is the rural district council. But I am questioning the Minister of Environment and Tourism as to what it is putting in place that the two communities, the rural communities and the commercial farming communities all pay a levy to the councils because today it is only the rural communities in the rural areas that are paying to the council the 15 percent because they are producers of wildlife. Yet on the other hand commercial farmers are also producers of wildlife and they receive the same proceeds from wildlife.

The reason why I am raising this is that it is the same Act which gave the powers to the commercial farmer to be a recipient of the proceeds of wildlife, which also gives power to the rural communities to be recipients of the proceeds of wildlife. Why do we run the Government in two different ways? So it is my appeal to the Minister of Environment and Tourism to look at this and make sure that it is corrected because if only communal areas continue to pay the levy and the other community is not paying, then that is unfair. That means that only communal areas will be paying for the commercial areas. So I would want to see that corrected so that all the communities pay the same levy because they are all recipients of and producers of wildlife. At the same time we have other commercial areas which have been designated and given to farmers from the communal areas to go and reside there, in resettlement areas. Why cannot people in these resettlement areas also benefit from the wildlife resources? I can quote here Kenilworth in Bubi and Dobden and other resettlement areas which were former commercial farmers. Our people were put there but they are not recipients of the proceeds of their resources. It is my appeal to the Minister of Environment to look at this and correct it. I say so because it is the same law which gave power to the commercial farmers which today is benefiting our people.

In view of this I strongly appeal to the Government to redress this problem and also look at those areas where our rural communities are living to promote agricultural activities. These have to go together with pattern of resettlement in that area and perhaps to promote what grows best in the area, rather than send maize seed to areas where you know there is little rainfall or not. It is better if Matebeleland can grow *mombes* then we have to promote that. If Guruve can grow maize then we have to promote that because that is what grows best in that area. I will not say much, I will leave the rest for the others and seconder to debate-

Page 2466 -2475: MR. MATCHABA-HOVE:

I rise to lend support to my colleague the mover of the motion, Mr. Chafesuka, member of parliament for Guruve. Before I proceed with my brief comments, as part of my contribution, let me emphasise from the very beginning that my remark will concentrate almost entirely on resettlement schemes in natural regions 4 and 5. These are the areas that I am familiar with under which my district and constituency, Mwenezi, falls. It is also pertinent that I refer hon. members to Hansard Volume 21, No 23 of 11th September 1994 in which I gave a detailed account of the resettlement area, the Wedza block and Wenezi block in Mwenezi. My comments today will be cursory and general because I will try to cover a much wider area where resettlement schemes in the country natural region 4 and 5 are arid, semi desert areas- experiencing extremely low erratic rainfall throughout the year. These areas are unsuitable for crop cultivation although some drought resistant crops are being grown in these areas which some enterprising peasant farmers managing to produce not only enough to eat but also enough to sell, such drought resistant crops like millet, groundnuts, sunflower etc. These are some of the crops being produced in regions 4 and 5.

The current tendency by some of our farmers who live in these areas to grow maize has proved catastrophic on occasions when all crops have failed, plunging entire communities into famine. Natural regions 4 and 5 as we are all aware are most ideal for livestock and are extremely suitable for ranching, as long as water for animals is available. Therefore, the majority of communal farmers in these areas keep animals and my own areas Mwenezi, which is in region 5, is a good example where 83 percent of the district is occupied by commercial ranchers. It is vitally important therefore that Government bears in mind these climatic factors if it is trying to resettle people in region 4 and 5.

It cannot be over emphasized that Government in the past has moved entire families to regions 4 and 5 where there was not a single design of infrastructure, where there was not even a foot-path, not to mention a road, water pond, clinics, shop and school. This has been a very common practice, particularly in the so-called accelerated models. Roads, water points, clinics, schools, shops *etc*, in my view, very basic necessities which Government must provide as part of the infrastructure before would be settlers are moved to their new homes. To achieve this goal, it does necessitate that Government should carry out a thorough feasibility study of the areas to be resettled in order to map out suitable dam sites, borehole points and water points where settlers would get their water for domestic use, as well as for irrigation. Water, in my view, is a sine-quo-non requirement because other things like roads and clinics largely depend on the availability of water. Resettlement schemes in Bikita, Masvingo Central and Mwenezi and those parts of Masvingo which I have personally visited have been beset for years now, by this one problem, the unavailability of water, no reliable source of water.

Water is a very scarce commodity in our planet, without which there would be no life. There can be no life in these resettlement schemes as long as there is no water. It is crucial that the Government gears itself to a strategy of investing very heavily on the construction of small-medium to large dams and gears itself to the construction of boreholes so that there is a chance of capturing every drop of water that comes down and serve it for future use. The people in these arid areas sometimes consider themselves lucky. We have rivers with excellent dam sites, because I am aware that there are certain areas where you can hardly find a river, let alone a good site for a dam. We do have considerable reserves of underground water which is waiting to be exploited in order to adequately supply the needs of these communities. The mover of the motion made mention of this study of the department of Geology, which gives details of water belts in Zimbabwe which can be tapped to supply the needs of the communities in these areas. The survey on the hydrogeology in Zimbabwe conducted by the Department of Geology of the University of Zimbabwe gave a detailed account of the belts of underground water in the country, which reserves has yet to be tapped. Mr. Speaker, Government ought to take cognisance

of such reports on water so that it can take long term strategies to beat the country's water needs in future years, which period I believe will be characterized by industrial expansion and development.

Government is now paying heavily to provide the required infrastructure in these accelerated models. I am informed that Government is paying almost three times as much as it would have paid to put in place these basic infrastructures to begin with. It is now costing Government most heavily. The Triangle and Hippo Valley and the other arid areas in the Middle East should serve as a restoration to the Government to continue to propel to greater heights in search for more water. There is no doubt in my mind that natural regions 4 and 5 can become the nation's grain basket, if only the one missing ingredient, water, is made available. The Arabs and the Israelis have turned the wilderness into green lands, resulting in abundant life for all. We are no exception Mr. Speaker, if only we chose this straight course to continue to look for more and more water. We have to continue to work tirelessly until water is found. I believe this is the only way to resolve the problem that we have at the moment that is the shortage of water in these fertile areas.

As I have already said, these natural regions can be the nation's grain basket if water is found. Next to this we need extension services, as referred to by the mover of the motion. Our famers Mr. Speaker require all Government support services in order to boost their production and yields. Professor Rukuni of the University of Zimbabwe in his "*The Revolution of agricultural Policy-1890-1990*", a period of a century, categorises the areas in which the colonial Government assisted the white farmers to enable to sustain all the rigors of nearly a century which included two disastrous world wars followed by devastating economic depression, from 1890-1990. The colonial Government of the day, Professor Rukuni says, continued to give white farmers subsidies for land clearing, fencing, conservation works, boreholes etc, particularly during the very bad years from 1945-1956". This was a short in the arm of the farmers during those years. Professor Rukuni goes on to say, Agriculture as a sector survived the UDI period largely through Government support, and 1966 the colonial regime set an agricultural assistance committee to extend short term loans to white farmers to cover the cost of inputs, living expenses, higher purchase commitment, etc.

Extension services our farmers are currently receiving must radically improve to meet the increasing needs of our farmers. Our Agritex department is experiencing serious staff shortages and poor accommodation. There are even reports from Agritex extension officers living as lodgers at rural centers, at growth points. The department is experiencing lack of transport and lack of funds. There is a limit to which they can travel. I am reliably informed that they are given 400 kilometers a month, and once that range is covered you cannot move. This does result in immobilising our out Agritex staff and making them remain at one place, whereas their actual place, must be with farmers out in the fields. Extension services must of necessity be revamped if the target to increase production is to be realized. I now want to move to restocking, the topic says, "Appeals to the Government to adopt a deliberate policy to restock the herd in drought prone areas". In other words it says to restock the herds in natural regions 4 and 5.

Mr. Speaker, it has been stated in this august House time and again that the most disastrous blow the peasant farmer in these regions received as a result of the 1992 drought was the loss of the livestock. Farmers in these areas lost very close to 98 percent of their animals and to my knowledge the position is not changed much. Government's restocking programmes currently being implemented appear not to take into account the real plight of the peasant farmers in the areas. They are treated as farmers in regions 1, 2 and 3 who, although they lost part of their herd, they might have suffered perhaps a 25 percent loss of their livestock.

Yes, these farmers in regions 1, 2 and 3 must benefit from the restocking programme, but it is my earnest appeal that priority must be given to the areas hardest hit by the worst drought in living memory. What surprises me is that when the tillage units, seed packs and fertilizer packs are being distributed, preference is given to regions 1, 2, and 3. I understand from the agricultural point of view, they are likely to come up with something they can harvest at the end of the season, compared to regions 4 and 5. But, because these places are ideal for cattle rearing, that is regions 4 and 5. I am not very clear why these areas which have become natural habitat for animals should not be given preference because we live entirely on animals. People in these arid areas, as you are aware are without tillage units and have no drought power. How do we, as government expect peasant farmers here to survive? Survive they must and this is why I have made this earnest appeal that the resettlement programme must be a priority to these areas which are the most suitable for cattle rearing.

Unless and until the farmers lost herd is redeemed so that they can once again stand on their own feet, government will continue to pay heavily for the sustenance of the people's lives. There are now areas in Zimbabwe where the Camp Fire programme is being successfully implemented and the communities in those areas are benefiting from this innovative programme. But there are many parts in the country where activities in those areas are marked by stories of poaching, accusations and counter-accusations and strained relations between the communal farmers or resettlement communities and the commercial farmers. It is my appeal that efforts must be made to introduce a Camp Fire programme in communal areas and resettlement areas so that these people too can reap the benefits of this progressive programme. Currently, it is only the commercial farmers who are reaping enormous rewards at the expense of the indigenous neighbors.

Present press reports appear to indicate that commercial farmers are making a roaring business out of Zimbabwe's wildlife. Press reports would want us to believe that over 600 birds or parrots, as reported to have been captured from Mozambique

were destined for a family dish. TOPAZ and SHOC are currently engaged in a throat cut competition in the ostrich business as well as others involved in wildlife business which presently has proved to be extremely lucrative. The Department of National Parks and Wildlife and indeed the Ministry of Environment and Tourism must, as a matter of urgency, take a hard look at the operations and activities of its various departments involved in all forms of wildlife in order to preserve the nation's wildlife wealth. The whole system of resettlement is undergoing radical changes, I believe. Calls for such changes have been made in this House in the past, and it is my honest belief that these changes have not only been heard but also have been heeded. Unless government heeds calls to establish basic infrastructure in the resettlement areas before moving the new settlers in these areas, the areas will continue to look like grave yards as they are at the moment, where life is as described by George Orwell in *Animal Farm* where life can be described as topsy turvy world.

Allow me to recreate and relieve the scene which I visited Wedza Block Resettlement Scheme in July 1993 during a hand over and take over ceremony. The hon. Member, Mr. Masiane was present when the hand over and take over ceremony took place. Since depicted in Chinua Achebe's book, *Things Fall Apart* became a reality to me. In deed, all things in the resettlement scheme appeared at that time to be falling apart and as I say, unless and until government takes the infrastructure issues, things will continue to fall apart.

MR. VUMA (MP SILOBELA): Mr. Speaker Sir, I rise to support the mover and seconder of this very important motion, but this topic will only materialize if the members of this House take a serious feasibility study in their heads. When you say we must resettle people we have no land and you say we must make sure that conducive structures are in place – you know what it means. How many years will it take for you to acquire those infrastructures? It is necessary that people have to be resettled. It is necessary that we must understand what type of people must be resettled – people who have got no houses – people who have got no land and we must make sure that there are conducive structures. Where do you get that money to make those conducive structures when you cannot accommodate the people? It must be known to us that land is a structure by itself, give a man some land and he will cut a tree to make a structure for himself. The government will then follow to add to the resettlement and then I will say to myself the resettlement style must be one that is a reverse from the resettlement of yesterday, moving from good land to a drought stricken area. People must move from drought stricken areas to good land which has been acquired by our government and then we use the structure which has organic leadership, we use the chiefs.

The chiefs are given the land, give the message that chief so and so, take your people to such and such a land. They will create structures and then the government will come in to fill in the gaps, it will be faster and there will be no problem. Without a serious feasibility study we shall continue to talk about resettlement without success. I will never accept a theory which will tell me there can be schools, clinics before the resettlement because those things will be vandalized before people get there. They will not be supervised by anybody. The people must first be there and services must complement the requirement of the people. How will I create an infrastructure when I do not know how many people are going to use it. – (AN HON. MEMBER: What about toilets?) – You go behind a hill.

You know in 1944/45, after the Second World War when there was a massive movement to good land, our people were driven to the valleys of Zambezi and they had to create a very good resettlement, where we are today it was a settlement of the chiefs. Then the other type of resettlement which this House was desisting, it is the type of resettlement referring a person to the country side when he has never been to a country side. Somebody has never been to the country side and he is taken to be resettled in Silobela, like Shambambeva-Nyandoro. It is a serious crime, it is destruction of the land. So, I call for a serious feasibility study from Members of Parliament in order to be useful to the Government.

The Extension service is automatic. If you resettle people on good land you must give them the know-how. The extension services must be for the people that are being resettled. You will know how many extension services are required for a resettlement because you know the number of people that have been resettled there and you cannot send them before the families are resettled there. They must go together and they must follow the numbers, they must be proportionate to the number of the resettled people in an area.

MR. SITHOLE (MP Mutare Central): On a point of order Mr. Speaker. I have observed that the hon. member is debating to the House without people and I would want those people to come here and listen to the debate...

The Deputy Speaker: Order, you are not privileged to debate. Just say out your point of order.

MR. SITHOLE: My point of order is that there is no quorum Mr. Speaker.

Bells rung. Quorum formed.

Page 2476 - 2478 **MR. VUMA:** I was saying it is important that the extension services be provided to a group of people, because they are necessary. I was about to come to the stocking of herds in the drought prone areas. My consultation with the members concerned, they agreed that the term 'drought' is wrong, hence region IV and Region V. If we say prone, it means we can not stock for stocks to be destroyed, but we stock to service and to enrich ourselves. It is necessary therefore that the areas mentioned, region IV and V, do very well in cattle ranching. It is imperative in assisting those members to restock their herds in order for them to regain their economic power. It is very important.

The area which I believe is a thorny issue and a bone of contention is the area of the Camp Fire programme. Campfire yesterday was associated with the communal lands and there existed the district councils. Today we have amalgamated the rural and district councils. My argument is the animals belong to the people, like the minerals under the soil. The Act that operates on minerals must operate on animals in order for the society to benefit all. Today, mostly the white farmers and the emerging ones are also coming into the world of the people of Zimbabwe. You find today somebody owns a stretch of land housing birds and animals as his own and then you do not know how much you bought all those for. The previous speaker was saying they realize billions and billions of dollars from the natural resources given to Zimbabwe, but they are benefiting one percent. I am saying the Campfire programme must extend to commercial farmers so that the communal farmers become recipients as they pay a levy equally to the Government.

I know there are by-laws or acts that are existing protecting the commercial farmers, protecting that particular individual but this is a legislative assembly which must look into his problem and destroy the monopoly created by a selfish group of our society which is called commercial farmers. It is a God given – if I were to be a religious man – it is God given benefit of the people of Zimbabwe for those birds and animals to be here. Today they are being loaded out of Zimbabwe in millions and benefiting a few individuals. Why, this is as good as minerals underground, these animals above earth. They must be controlled equally and if ever the Campfire programme has to exist as an essential programme, it must extend its activities to cover the commercial lands. They must force the Ministers concerned to bring a Bill here. I believe this is serious for us today – somebody was telling me that there are programmes to come and teach me how to rear an ostrich. He has taken the ostrich away from me, it becomes a foreigner to me and when I am the owner. I must go again to try and understand my bird, this is terrible. You marry my daughter, later you tell me that I do not have a daughter and you must tell me how the daughter was born. This is a motion which this House must debate seriously understanding that we must settle people first before any structure is provided.

MR. VUMA: I have always complained that unfortunately a peasant chairman of a council sits in front of me. He disturbs me all the time. – He asks me to regress when I am progressing. I was saying the extension services must be provided as a compliment to the existing services because they must answer the requirements of the existing population. I am saying the Campfire Programme must extend to the commercial farmers and an Act must be created to ban individuals from owning birds and animals because they are property of the nation.

Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol.21, No.34 [Tuesday, 11th October, 1994] Resettlement Schemes, Seventh Order read: Adjourned debate on motion on the establishment by Government of resettlement schemes without basic infrastructure. Question again proposed.

2589 - 2590: MR. MUNYORO (MP Makoni South): I rise to thank the mover of this motion the hon. Member, Mr. Chafesuka and his seconder the hon. Member, Mr. Matchaba-Hove.

It is a progressive motion, but I tend to differ here where they are suggesting that Government must make feasibility studies. It is a waste of money and time according to my argument. We know where fertile land is in this country. It is already in the books and records are there to show. These are what we call delaying tactics, That the mover of this motion is trying to use, that we must waste time making feasibility studies, for what? We know where the fertile land is this is where we are not putting our people to settle. We know that fertile land is in Mazoe Valley and many other areas of Zimbabwe and no African has been resettled there in the fertile areas. All we look for semi- arid areas, that is where most people are being resettled, yet we know it is arid and unproductive. That is why we have these problems such as stream-bank cultivation.

It is because people go the streams for cultivation because they know that is where fertile and is, along the streams. That is why people go cutting down trees and we cannot avoid it. That is why there are veld fires, people will just burn grass because there is nothing at all for them, they might as well go for rates to have something for their relish the following night. All I want to say is to thank the hon. Members and to say that we know where the fertile land is. We should not be dillydallying at all, let us settle our people who are crowded in areas that are fertile rather than in semi-arid areas.

Page 2591 - 2594: MR. MAVHAIRE (MP Masvingo Central):

I Rise to join my members who have participated very well in this motion. I also want to support the mover and seconder of this motion. Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy of this country. It also publicly known national and internationally that our people, especially the black indigenous people have their survival based on land and that they have done their best to get a living out of the poor soil. We have to be extremely careful when we are aware that our people need the land and possibly we are the schedule of the demand of people.

At the same time, we must know that land is the final source and therefore we cannot monopolise it because the people are existing now, the future generation will live to use the same land. So there is absolute necessity for us to take time to plan the proper usage of this land. There is need for a special study, there is need for research if we want to have permanent solutions. Why I think this motion was put is the fact that whilst it was necessary for us to resettle people, we rushed into it

because people wanted land yet at the same time we did not have enough time to do research. We needed to buy land to resettle people without first putting enough infrastructure. There was no water, there were schools, there no clinics. People walked kilometer and kilometers to and look for water but the fertility is there. So it is the question of fertility and not necessarily fertile land in the Mazoe Valley. We need a little more effort to ensure that the resettlement is successful.

Secondly it is not the issue of giving people land, we have to decide as a nation whether we want people to occupy land for the sake of occupying land and that everybody will be able scratch anywhere in order to have a living. We are settling people on land not on the productivity of that land. Whether we might need as much land as we are talking about if we have the necessary equipment to till the land and possibly to plan for the best possible land, whether we need the land we are talking about, whether we are also not so sure, even if we have looked at the same land we are utilizing today in the various areas, given the chance that we have taken something, we can still resuscitate some of the areas they are staying in and we can produce even higher yields. I think we have to be objective.

On the politics of nationalism, of we want land now and land for the people, we should have the underlining factor that the land to be given to people must have the necessary infrastructure and must be given so that people are able to produce enough food for themselves and at the same time be able to export. If we go around and say go yeah and get land, how many of our areas have the best soils which enable the resettled people to keep a lot of cattle. But because we did not put in enough infrastructure, enough finance, even yesterday this land was valued at \$10 million. Anybody could go to the bank and get that money. Yesterday this land was owned by a group of people settled there as a resettlement area, it is now worth nothing. So I doubt the sincerity of anybody who does not want us to have studies on what we want to do with land- [MR. NZARAYEBANI: So what are you saying]- What we are saying is that we needed infrastructures to put in place before we start resettling people otherwise we will put people into problems. That is the point which we want to put cross.

The second point, Mr. Speaker, it is important that we need a restocking programme. Once again, we have been talking peace no clear thing has been said. How many cattle do we need in the country to do proper restocking? Do we have the money in the first place? If we are concerned about this, then we must invest in that field. If you look at the amount of money that has been released for restocking, it is peanuts and is that money going to be able to be raised by commercial farmers- I happen to be one of the commercial farmers. It is peanuts and it is not even possible to re-stock one area. Even if we look at our resettlement areas, compared to the amount of money given to the areas where there is only one person owning that place, it is peanuts.

Once they become resettlement farmers, it is not commercial. We have no commercial stands as soon as an area is declared a resettlement area. If we want that place to be more viable than what it was when it was owned by an individual, then our way of giving money is that we should double the amount that is given to a person. This is not what we are doing, possibly it is because of financial institutions that look at more people owning a property as a risk area and one person owning a property as profitable. It is a mentality and possibly Government can push in a policy paper. If we continue to acquire more land and those with the infrastructure ignore us- you can even realize that in some areas where there is land, our people do not have tillage units. If an individual has got a farm he is able to raise money and have the infrastructure on the same land. If you go about it as the security and say can we have land so that the people in resettlement areas are helped they will not even get a cent and will not be accepted. This is where we are saying if we can put some positive policy where we can still believe that this land is viable, when our people are given enough infrastructure, I think it is important to have an infrastructure first before we push our people there.

Page 2595 – 2596 **MR. GARA (MP Mbare East):**

I wish to thank the mover and seconder of this motion and wish to concur with most of the areas they have covered in the motion with the exception of where they say "that this House takes note with concern of the establishment by Government of resettlement schemes without basic infrastructure."

Mr. Speaker, I thought I should share my view but the rest I agree with totality. What I would like to say about basic infrastructure one should think that there are talking about roads, water and with that I have no problem. But things like schools, clinics, there are very important but let us be careful. Can you really get those things put in place first, considering the amount of vandalism that we find in this country? When those infrastructures are put in place and there is nobody to care for them it will cost the Government to repair the damages. I would like to see a situation where some of the infrastructure like roads, water, dip tanks – those can be put before people come into place. But things like schools and clinics which have been of concern to most members, I find that extremely difficult to put those things in place before the people have settled.

On the question of agricultural extension services, it is a must as some Hon. Members have already said. We do not wish to have resettlement programmes which will just be used as villages for people to have somewhere they can sleep, go out and drink etc. They must be committed to agricultural programmes. This question is extremely important once people have settled down. The question of re-stocking of herd is important and as the hon. Member, Mr. Mavhaire has just said, a country needs to know the policy of Government on this aspect. How many herds of cattle do we need to sustain the agricultural sector in this regards, both in terms of those in the commercial and in the rural areas? We also need to know at

what level is the herd at this point in time, so that when people talk of increasing the herd, we know exactly how many *mombes* we need.

The question of Campfire, it is hard subject and I know the mover has done a commendable job. It is important to see that this programme is not only limited to very few areas of the country. It must be spread over. It is important, because as you know, some communal people benefit from this and I hope that my contributions will help in the formulation of this programme.

Page 2597- 2598: MR. SITHOLE (Mutare Central):

Mr. Speaker I want to thank the mover and seconder of the motion for bringing this important motion to the House. I have a ,difficult with the contents of the motion, the motion appeared to have three motions in one and that means to some extend, it is comprehensive, like other hon. Member have said.

The first one is “that this House notes with concern the establishment by Government of resettlement schemes without basic infrastructure...”What is important, is the infrastructure or the people who are landless? Is it a question of being dogmatic or pragmatic?-I cannot see a reasonable Member of Parliament believe and think that resettlement should not be done without roads, clinics, *etc* because those infrastructures are meant for people and we cannot put them-[An hon. Member: *Iwe unorwara*]-Firstly, the hon. Member is asking the Government to spend a lot of money to do feasibility studies when people Porta Farm is a camp, Hatcliffe is a camp. I can name quite a number. Those people are there because they have nowhere to go, they have nowhere to live. If Government needs to resettle those people, because they have nothing to do or nowhere to be, and somebody is coming to say before resettling, you must find some money to put up the roads, clinics and everything that goes with it, that is being very dogmatic, because he does not seem t know or to see the gist of the matter.

The gist of the matter is the person whom we are concerned about, who should be resettled, who must have somewhere to stay. His health, even now, who is treating him? Where is he going to get the water?-[Mr. Bhebe: No latrine, cholera]-All those cholas you are talking about and whatever you may say, hon. Members, I am not in conformity with that because there are a lot of places which are not in resettlement areas where there are no toilets. There are blair toilets which are built everywhere by the people themselves and those people are can be urged to do the same, to build blair toilets where there going to be resettled. There is no need for Government to spend a lot of money in the bush. In fact it goes to the contrary, with the Act itself, the LAND Acquisition Bill. What does the Land Acquisition Bill say in regard to them when you acquire land? Make use of the land and do not leave that land derelict. In fact, we acquire derelict land to make use of it. You want to acquire land and leave it for decades until Government gets money to develop it, when that land is derelict who is going to use it in the first place? Why did we acquire it in the first place?

When we are debating here about the Land Acquisition Act I posed a question as to whether we have a plan in place after acquiring the land on how to make use of that land, because we have seen that the land is derelict and we must acquire it. The landlord is not there and no one is putting any effort to make god use of that land, so we want to acquire it. Fair and good. Now we have got the land, we want that land to be derelict without putting the people who were clamouring to get land. I do not see the logic.-[Mr. Bhebe: Acquiring and resettling are two different things.] -It is my concern, I am directing my speech to the Chair, I do not entertain interjectors. You may have your time to debate. I am directing my speech to the Chair. I would love Mr. Speaker to protect me from the howlers.

Page 2559 – 2601: Temporary Speaker: Order. You can do justice to your debate if you continue debating without listening to interjectors.

Mr. Sithole: I thank you Mr. Speaker, for that. I have said there are three motions in one. The first one I have dismissed it and I cannot go with it because there is a contradiction between the policy which came as a result of the enactment by this parliament to acquire the land, to give it to the landless people and to use that land because we believe the land was derelict and was not fully used to some extent. Hence we acquire it and we must put it to good use. If it mans resettling people they must be resettled and make use of that land. Above all, why was the fought? It was for the land. Why is somebody now saying because I have got where I am ploughing I have got my farm or whatever, and somebody who does not have it should not be resettled because he cannot use it fully. How do you determine, how do you happen to have your own land? Where did you get the skill in the first place? You were not only just fortunate to have it. I do not know.

The question of providing extension services, now this can only be applied where people are and here the first paragraph is saying people should not be resettled. On extension service, you can not extend the services where there are no people, what is the collaboration then, there feasibility study which is being undertaken and with feasibility study you extend the services to do what? I do see the logic there. I think the hon. Member could have done justice to this motion if he would have encourage Government to spread up the resettlement of people and hence extend the services after speeding up the resettlement because then the collaboration could come in. But only to extend the service in the bush, I do not see the logic in that.

The third paragraph which is encouraging Government to provide, to deliberately make a policy to re-stock herd, it is good, but it is not in line with where people are not settled. The herd cannot be re-build where there is nobody who is caring for the herd. Here we are saying to those who have farms, those who are resettled already, not those who are un-resettled today, that is where we can build up the herd. But where there is no resettlement we cannot talk of the herd. Who is going to care for the herd, because it will just be land, land without people [Mr. Bhebe: That is your own motion. The motion does not say that.]-That is what it says. Now to extend the Campfire Programme to the areas of resettlement, yes, when resettlement has already taken place then that is when you can extend the programme. But where there is no resettlement how are you going to extend the Campfire programme? Does the hon. member suggest that those areas or farms which have been acquired should be made nation parks instead of making use of animals without taking care of or cognizance of the people who are in need of land ?I think he will have done justice, like I said earlier on ,if he says resettle people and then extend the service of Campfire programme .But in this regard I do not see the reason ,I do not see the logic and lam say again this motion although it seems to have had support but I think hon. .members have deliberately cited the logic and deliberately ignored to make use of their own senses to read ,understand and carefully come up with the salvation to help the hon. member who suggested the motion . -[MR.BHERE: Put up your own]-If I were to put my own, I would which will be logical and not in this way.

I think with the few words that I have just said, I believe it is few and I believe the hon. member should have taken care of that. I also believe that the hon. House may gain some sense out of my great and reasonable debate of this motion in its proper perspective to encourage the resettlement, settle people and then perhaps the services will follow because we cannot give services where there are no people.

Page 2601 - 2605: MR. NZARAYEBANI (MP Mutare South): This motion has been on the *Order Paper* for the third time where a motion of this kind was brought before this august Assembly. What it simply shows is that hon. Members are quite concerned about this aspect n their political life and this is why the motion has been brought to this House again and again.

We want to hope that Government through the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development and also the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development will take very serious note of our deliberations in this august Assembly. I do not want to unnecessarily repeat myself because if research was anything to go by-I am on record as having articulated some of those salient features in this aspect of resettlement. I just want to zero in one aspect contained in this motion and that is to encourage Government to provide agricultural extension services with a view to enhancing their productivity-I am sure the productivity we are looking for here is productivity emanating from settlers. There is no doubt in my mind that there is need for agrarian reform. Land is the basic means of economic production in Zimbabwe. Our economy is agriculturally based. About 99 percent of our economy is agricultural. So, I would want particulary Government to take very serious note of this motion because once that was done, then Zimbabwe would have realised economic independence. Currently we are having to borrow, we cannot fund our own activities as Government because we have not taken serious cognisance of this very important ingredient in our economic endeavour. We are not speaking for the sake of speaking, all we are trying to do here is to encourage our Government, the Government of the people of Zimbabwe, by the people of Zimbabwe, for the people of Zimbabwe to take this very seriously and participate accordingly to the expectations of the masses of our people. I represent in this august Assembly a rural constituency. About 80 percent of my constituency is rural except Vumba and Burma Valley where you find commercial farming activities but the large part of the area is rural agricultural activity which is taking place. In my small, humble simplistic way of looking at the issue, looking at what could be done by the people of my constituency, Mutare South, what could they do to realize the implementation of a serious agrarian reform? There was no question in my mind that there was need for reclaiming the land that is being degraded, peasants do not know how to preserve land as a resource and so on and so forth.

There was once upon a time when the Government came up with a very important policy and this was villagisation.I am sure you all know if Government had put its feet right on the ground and say, this is the policy we would want the people of Zimbabwe to implement, then we would have ben somewhere by now. That land in our rural areas where the majority of us were born and bred – that land can be viably maximized to realize thorough and very serious production – there is no question about that.

I was unnecessarily wanting landless people here by wanting to acquire all the commercial land, resettle our people and all that. Land is finite commodity and once we do that it would simply mean the whole land will be completely devastated within a short space of time. There is need for real orientation on the part of Government and of course ZANU PF, to reorient the masses of our people on how bets to utilize our land resources. That is why there are gullies and all that. Government is virtually doing nothing. The District Administrators, Agritex officials and councillors are just there doing nothing because they have no money. There is nothing really in terms of a fund set aside to make sure the gullies are closed; to make sure the people are thoroughly resettled in those pieces of land and then to resuscitate, as it were, that land which peasants have been working on for quite some time. There is need for this conservation. We lose nothing, we must simply do that. It is our land. If we want birth control tablets to control the land, then all we need to do now is to reclaim that land which is being misused by us for that matter.

One thing I want to put across to this august House is that only one Ministry should be tasked with this responsibility for resettlement purposes. There is no need for the Ministry of Lands buying the land and then give it to the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development who cannot tell a B from a bull's foot on how to utilise the land. The Ministry of Lands where there is this Department of Agritex, these are the people who must be tasked with this responsibility to resettle the people and to make sure they stay with those settlers and to make sure they stay with those settlers and to make sure the masses are given the necessary agricultural orientation and in fact to preserve that land.

Right now in all our resettlement areas these settlers are cutting trees left, right and center. We have been telling Government here, they have the machinery, Parliament has no machinery. If I go there and tell the Agritex officer, do this or that or the District Administrator, they will simply say I do not take orders from Nzarayebeani and obviously they do not take orders from me. All I have to do is to try and persuade them and say look here Cde. Resettlement Officer, except if I were to tell the Minister concerned that this is what is happening the Minister will simply say do not interfere. Like what the Senior Ministers are currently engaged in, do not interfere when our institutions are breaking down. When our institutions are failing to meet our objectives and here are two Senior Ministers saying do not interfere...

The Temporary Speaker: Order, I hope the hon.member is not going to bring in the Mutare Council issue.

Page 2605 - 2608: Mr. Nzarayebeani: Yes, I will not do that Mr.Speaker. I want to also encourage Government, unfortunately, I do not see Government Ministers here but I know they are sometimes read the *Hansard* but the Attorney-General one of our most distinguished learned colleagues who is here with us. I have no doubt he will push this through Government.

There is need to resettle students from agricultural colleges. I thought Government would want to take a deliberate policy to send as many agricultural students to our colleges and local universities to train in this aspect. It is important to do that. If we did that yesterday, yesterday was already too late. Currently right now, we would be talking about something in right direction towards economic independence and economic self sufficiency. I do not want a nation of beggars. Right now we are now being twisted left, right and center by the IMF, the World bank and the other international financial institutions because we have not been able to maximize our endeavours here to capacity so that we realize economic independence. So why not that? Why are we in Government? Just to read the papers from civil servants about these movable assets, immovable assets this officer transferred to this office and furniture and so on? What a hail of a nonsense.

This is what Government must be doing and within a few months will be going back to the people to get that mandate from the masses of our people to run their public affairs once more. Really this is our message. Are we capable of doing that? Yes we can do that the masses of our people know that there is nobody else who can do better than us. This is why we are openly telling our Government to look into this aspect. I am simply saying the Minister of Lands must actually take everything to do with land resettlement than actually two Ministries doing it. When we were looking at them, they are about a dozen Ministers engaged in the activity. I think that is a distorting affair. We do not want Government to continue to do that kind of thing. Also there is this talk which I normally do not want to engage myself in. This talk about indigenization of the economy. I have already said or I have already told this august Assembly that about 99 percent of our economy is agricultural based. So if we are talking about indigenization of the economy, why not now deliberately make policies to resettle well oriented citizens of our nations, the Blacks who sincerely need land resettlement so that this issue was realized? The other thing we want to do is to deliberately engage ourselves in making medium sized dams so that irrigation schemes are deliberately done. I have no doubt that if you give water and you resettle people on one to three acre plots and there he or she could realize about three harvest a year, I tell you that will go along way in resuscitating the Zimbabwean economy.

I want to be bold here Mr. Speaker. We inherited a strong health economy. It would not augur well and not to the interest of Zimbabweans of any color if we did not work hard to keep that momentum and to make sure that the economy flourishes. To make sure that the economy can safe guard all Zimbabweans. Government again should be serious about this agrarian economic revolution. We have very good policies and we are saying it is the Rural District Council who must settle any would be settlers. What is happening is that Government, for reasons best known to themselves, are not arresting those areas and we are allowing that. We must be bold enough to say this is the policy of Government, this is lawful and this is unlawful. I want to hope that Government will take seriously our deliberations in this House because we represent the masses of our people and we are capable of thinking. All the suggestions which people have brought before this House have a lot to do with creating a health economic society which we are cherishing society. There is no question that the earlier we collaborate in this endeavour the more the goods for the entirety of our society. The struggle continues.-

Page 2608 - 2614: CHIEF MANGWENDE:I would like to clarify what has been said by the hon .member ,Mr Nzayerayebeani ,about the resettlement of people .There is a reason why people herd cattle , because if you have someone like myself who come from a rural area and know why people check whether there are any pastures for the cattle ,the reason why people settle in the pasture lands is because they do not have land to stay on .We hear stories of land being sold to the people by chiefs but there is nothing like that .The problem is that people who make these allegation do not understand how people stay in rural areas

What happens is that a chief is not a chief who stays in urban areas and advertises that he has plenty of land to settle people on, but it is urban workers who invite their friends to settle in those rural areas. Those very people are the ones who produce some inducement fee to thank the chief for having honoured their request, but in most cases, when they have settled well, they say they bought the land. Perhaps if there is another body which can give land free of charge, why is it that people chose to buy land when there are other bodies which give land for free. It is very important that hon. members who are making these allegations should get the truth on these issues. I thought I should clarify that point.

I would like to thank the hon. members, Mr. Chafesuka and his seconder for moving this motion that Government should provide infrastructure in resettlement areas. My opinion is that if we have a farm purchased by Government for resettlement purposes and there is somebody staying on the farm where there are boreholes and dams, I believe the idea of implementing a feasibility study would be a waste of time, when people are in desperate need of land. If the owner of the farm has been staying there it means that the farm is good for resettlement purposes and the only issue will be to demarcate the farm for pasture and residential purposes. All farms where resettlement is carried out for farms bought by the Ministry of Lands. I think it is important that we should have a Ministry which buys valuable land and hands it over to the Ministry which does not understand anything about agriculture.

I have yet to see any programmes being refused by the Ministry of Agriculture, because they accept everything. I think it is necessary to have one Ministry which should implement this resettlement programme. In this case we have the Ministry of Lands and the Ministry of Local Government. This resettlement programme has been going on for a long time now. Most children who were born during the first implementation are already of school-going age. They are now also talking about the problems being faced in the resettlement area.

If you look at the problem of Mutema and Zimunya areas, I do not understand why farms are being bought. There is always the talk that we want to have people resettled on farms. This debate of resettling people who are in poor areas has been going on for quite some time now. There has been debate that these people should be resettled according to their expertise and knowledge of farming. The problems of not having anywhere to stay have no consideration of whether you are educated or not. Whether you have the expertise or not, not being trained in agriculture is not a sin committed by our parents at all. Everybody has a right to live in Zimbabwe, to have a place to live and stay in Zimbabwe.

I think I should also ask whether the problem of resettling people, is it only a problem of settling people who are Zimbabwean citizens? I do not think so Mr. Speaker, the problem here is of resettling people of Malawi origins, people of Zambian origin and some other countries surrounding us. We always have that problem. The farms which are being bought by Government have people who have been staying there and who are still staying there. There was no arrangement on transferring them to any other place. So, when we talk at productivity at the farms, when referring to people of Malawian origins who are only working in order to get a payment, do you think they are going to work at all without any inducement? How many cattle do these former labourers have? How many ox ploughs do they have to use on the 12 acres that they were given? But Mr. Speaker, we are only asking them to produce by word of mouth.

We have also one other problem on rural resettlement. The Government is awarding citizenship to so many people from outside this country, particularly those of Malawi and Zambia origin. Where do we expect these very people to stay, in the air or on the ground? If they are going to stay on land, where are they going to stay? If they are coming to Chief Mangwende's area, has Chief Mangwende been informed that there are people coming to stay in his area? So, Mr. Speaker, most of the problems are self-created problems.

This idea of awarding citizenship has other secret ideas, I think it is different from somebody who attains British citizenship and somebody else who expects to be made a citizen of Zimbabwe. They have two different needs. As a Zimbabwean citizen, one needs land to settle on. These new citizens always wanted to be resettled. These very people also have ideas on being resettled. They always claim that when they want to be resettled but they first become squatters. They have their own tactics.

I think we should have always had this idea which was implemented by resident Chiluba of Zambia, who asked all those who were not citizens to move out. What he wanted as President of Zambia was to know who belonged where, no to accommodate those farm labourers as citizens. I think we should have planned that those people who came to this country had to be received as citizens under whatever conditions. We have some people who have stayed in transit camps for over 14 years. They were told to go to Chipinge. They were told that from this point you will be resettled at some place. You always find that such transit camps will always become deserts and when these areas become deserts, should we blame them for having done that? I think the blame is being apportioned to the wrong side.

We are being asked to say Campfire should be implemented in all areas. It would be a most noble idea if we had the forest land to put the animals in because as it is most of our children cannot tell the difference between one animal and the other. The only animal they know is cattle. But how does Campfire consider this Mr. Speaker? We have always left complaints from people who live around these Campfire projects undealt with. They complain about animals which eat their crops. I

think this is because this is because they are not getting the results which have always been preached about from these animals. I do not know how the hon. Member, Mr. Chafesuka, would explain this, because I was shocked to find an elephant coming to our lands in Mangwende. Does this not reflect on how these animals are being looked after in the forests, that they are running away from the forests? Some people were killed by these animals and this particular elephant I am talking about had killed some people. Maybe it was still looking for someone to kill again, but if we continue having money from selling produce from these animals, I think the people will receive the programmes well, but if the only thing about these animals is the killing of people and destruction of crops, people will always refuse to have such programmes implemented in their areas. It could only be those people who know that they have no where to put the animals who might accept this programme.

Lastly Mr. Speaker, I believe the hon. Member, Mr. Chafesuka's motion should be reconstructed to say "to enquire from the Government what programmes have been implemented amongst the programmes planned, because all this has been talked about for a long time. I think when the Government here hears what we are saying today and they will say we are talking about this because elections are around the corner and we might think that the people who have the love of the ordinary person at heart. I do not understand what you are saying when you are referring to the Government, when you are the Government. Are we trying to envoke the people in rural areas to come and consult the Government to implement these programmes therefore, we must ask Government to do that, to resettle people on the land. I am talking particularly of people who represent Mutema and Chipinge areas, because the people in these areas are having problems with wild animals like monkeys and baboons.

Page 2614 – 2618: MR. MARWODZI (MP Wedza): I want to foretell that I will cut the speech due to my lack of preparation. However, I stand to join my colleagues and I feel great joy when I stand to debate on anything that concerns land. You find that it has been so many times that this kind of motion is being debated but you feel that everybody has become more concerned when we talk of land. This is where, not only Africa, but every nation feels it has a place to rest. Land is an employer, a refugee, it is everything.

I want to thank the mover for bringing up this motion and the four points he raised are important. If you go back to our history in respect of the word resettlement, you will find that it meant to give land to the people who had no land. Our Government did that but on the practical work, we all know experience is the best teacher in every trade. The Government learned from experience, from our masses. This is why instead of simply settling people who have no land, it turns to people who are able to utilize the land. I think the hon. members will agree with me that in certain areas when people were resettled, they were given fertilizers, crop seed, etc. They opted to sell the fertilizer and when we went through in our respective areas, we found out that some have a history *yekusunza, haana kumborima*. So, we get them land but have nothing to do with that land.

So, this made the Government change its ideas and started to screen, this is very important because some of our people became idle. This is why there are stages. We may feel the Government is doomed, but it is not. It is making some contradictory policies towards development. The four points raised here are of paramount importance and I wish Government would constantly examine and put them into practice as expeditiously as possible. Feasibility studies- yes, when the Government decided to resettle people who are able to utilize the land, there was need for feasibility studies on a relevant land that could suit such people, opposed to the former idea of simply resettling people. You cannot peasant farmer who has been idle for years and put him on the land to do some farming. This is discouraging rather than encouraging. May I come to the point of the sale of land. I want concur very much with our chief who denies the idea of selling of land, but may I say to him the selling of land by the chiefs they maybe put in the same category because of their responsibility which is done by a kraal head or sub chief. Then automatically the chiefs will not be excluded. This is why people say chiefs sell land direct to their subordinates and they are deeply involved. Mr. Speaker when we talk of resettlement, in our culture, it never started today, it has never come to an end to resettle someone who has nothing to have something. It is almost like a father of family who has grown up boys who are becoming man. Surely they want to be resettled on their own land. So it is an on going thing, let the land diminish because of the population growth. So it is something that goes on and on which needs some decisive ideas in order to attain our land in a better way.

I want to thank the mover for this encouragement to Government to provide agricultural extension services for much more productivity. Yes, I wish it is done because now land is meant for food unlike before. During my young age as a boy, working in Harare I used to see Zimbabweans looking for employment. As from April to October they only came to town looking for clothing and would go back home for ploughing. But nowadays, land itself should be an employer and as source of getting our food. So by Government protecting our productivity, I think it will assist our masses in a such greater way. Also the idea of a deliberate policy to restock our herd, if we Zimbabweans have good stock, it will be less expensive for Government. It will be better one using four oxen for tilling, say 68 acres with your less expensive way of ploughing. What you get from GMB will be a lot more than what you will get if you have used a tractor. You will have to pay for hiring it. Hiring a tractor nowadays I am told it is \$120 per acre. So the idea of restocking our herd is of paramount importance to our masses.

Let me come to the Campfire. I think the mover was so wise in bringing this issue. His intention is to see things equal, uniform. It should be done in communal lands, commercial farms as well as in resettlement areas. We are of the same calibre, quality, colour and behaviour. So my final appeal in a most sympathetic way, I wish that after 14 years of independence that Government should now come to a proper way although it had some disturbances, but now it has come to a point to really know what can make our nation survive, what can make our people know the importance of land.

Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol.21, No. 37 [Thursday, 13th October, 1994] RESETTLEMENT SCHEMES

Page 2765 2767: Mr. Mangisi (MP Glen View):

The motion has got several items but I have decided to pick on three items to debate on. The first one is resettlement schemes without basic infrastructure. The second one is on agricultural extension services with a view of enhancing their productivity and the third one the extension of the Campfire programme.

Because of the problems the Government is facing, here I mean financially, there is need to have some basic infrastructure before people are resettled. Things such as water, clinics, roads and schools should be there before people are resettled. The reason is in some cases, people have to be resettled far away from areas they used to stay and that will mean that if they cannot go together with their school going children to the new area, it will be very difficult for those people, firstly to be resettled because they cannot do without their children. We need them to be moved with their children. I know some of these things are difficult but it is a necessity that some of the things be done before the people are resettled. Surely, we cannot resettle people where there are no clinics. People cannot travel more than 30 kilometers to a clinic. That is difficult. I urge the Government to put in basic infrastructure before resettling people.

On the extension services, I am of the opinion that we cannot restrict these to resettlement areas and communal areas alone, but these can be extended to urban areas. Our Government policy is that wherever people are, they must be productive. Life in urban areas is becoming very difficult. People used to say that when they come to urban areas, there were going where they were going to get bread and butter. But who, as I am speaking today can afford the bread and butter, let alone meat, which is very expensive. In today's paper there was something about mealie-meal going up.

Mr. Speaker, the Government should look at these and if need be some of these farms around urban areas could also be designated so that people can be given acreage where they can also farm so that they can have something to live on. The problem is that people cannot afford even the rentals, electricity bills, *etc.* If they can manage to farm, they can use the hammer mills for mealie meal and then they can struggle on other basic things. I know it is difficult because there are so many people in urban areas but the Government can use the same mechanism in resettling people. They should look at the ages of people and those who are interested in farming. I think if that is done, the Government would have alleviated some of the problems faced by people in the urban areas.

Let me also turn to Campfire. The Campfire Programme can be extended throughout the country but we must be very careful. We should also have a programme to educate our people on this. If we do not do that, at the end of the day, we will find that these things will be misused and we will have destroyed our natural resources. So we need to educate our people on what this is all about and how they are going to gain from the Campfire programme. I think with those few words, I would urge also the Ministry concerned to come up and help the people, especially those in urban areas.

Page 2627 – 2769: Mr. Hewlett (MP Zhombe)

Mr. Speaker, I would like to just touch on what I believe is one of the most important factors of our resettlement. We as Government have undertaken to resettle our people. We have heard from numerous speakers how Government must put into place certain structures. This is correct. This is what we have to try and do. But if the truth is known, Government has not got funds at the moment to put in the infrastructure that is expected in place. I believe that the resettlement is a very simple matter. I would like to ask Government to consider seriously the ownership of land. We must resettle our people, correct. We must then be able to give them their piece of land. They themselves will find methods of finding water. They will find ways of stocking their land. They will themselves find ways of getting the children to school. Members in this House have asked the Government to put in infrastructure. This might take 10 years, it might take 20 years. Meanwhile we have very capable farmers who know if given their own land, will hand it down to their children.-[Mr. Gara: How about peasant farmers who have not done anything about schools which they have had for many years?]

Mr. speaker the other important factor of having piece of land is that you can use it as security. Government cannot and will not just land people money at random. When they have a piece of land which they can call their own then they will be able to raise money, raise loans not necessarily from the bank but from private individuals which is happening all the time. I believe that government should seriously look at this situation. At the present time we also have certain areas where people have been resettled and have been given their own piece of land. They are doing very well bought to go ahead with. Chinjiri is one, Copper Queen. All these farmers have managed to develop their own properties, knowing that this is their own land and it will be given to their children in years to come. This is the only way that we ought to go ahead with any resettlement.

The other way that has been proposed by so many of our people will take too long, it will never get off the ground. You talk about finding water. If anybody knows, the cost of a borehole today is running to \$60 000-\$70 000. So do you say we will give every farmer a borehole? This cannot work. But he himself and his neighbors could get together and find a system of finding water and not turning to Government. I want to seriously ask Government to consider this type of resettlement.

Page 2769 – 2771: Mr. Chipango: Mr. Speaker, I would like to touch on one issue and not repeat what others have said. Resettlement is very necessary and resettlement must be done as soon as possible. It must be done speedily by the Government.

I wish to comment a little bit on what the previous speaker has said which seem to suggest that the Government must just move people to the areas, and forget about putting up certain infrastructure which is basic and necessary for the welfare of people. I don't think any sensible Government could do that. This is why perhaps the previous Government failed to do anything for the majority of its people because they failed. They must just look after themselves. People are left-you, they said give them mountain, they can go and feed in the mountain. It was not necessary for the past regime to provide them the welfare services which are necessary. Education is a must to every African child and Government has a duty to ensure that schools are provided where people are going to be moved to. What I wanted to say is that it has been the policy over the past 8 years when the resettlement programme started that Government just move people across the country—from Wankie to Mount Darwin, and from Mutoko to Kariba, like that. In the process people left behind very valuable property which could not be shipped across things like cattle, farming implements etc. That in my view is bad practice. I think people should not be moved very far away from their areas. It also destroys the cultural background in the country, because you have people resettled from say from Beitbridge to the Tonga in the Zambezi Valley and they have to with a completely different culture, which is very unfortunate. My view of my recommendation is that Government should look for farms near the people and make sure that people are moved together without disturbing their cultural background.

As regards such things as roads, of course I agree with the last speaker. Those can come later but the basic ones just have to be provided. Clinics, you cannot play around with. You cannot say people must build their own clinics because they do not have the means. They can mould bricks but cannot equip the clinic as suggested. It is true that Government can do that. Also, when one realizes the suffering that our people have undergone, especially during the liberation war where they lost completely everything, not that it was their fault, it was their birth right to fight the settler regime. In the process some of their property was destroyed. Now Government must take positive steps to ensure that these facilities which existed or should have been there in the first place are provided. We know some countries in Europe have got a social service scheme where basic health and education facilities are provided. That is what we are asking the Government to do. We cannot come up with different formula here in Africa, unlike what is happening in UK and some European countries where all these necessary basic social services are provided that we demand must be provided before people are resettled.

Page 2771 - 2772 - DR. B.R.M HOVE (MP Mberengwa West):

I want to welcome the debate on this matter but I am concerned at what has been suggested by one hon. member that the Government should confer ownership of land in resettlement areas. Of course, I represent a rural constituency where we are crying for more resettlement, more grazing areas and for Government to put in place basic infrastructure. It will be a very dangerous move for Government and I am sure it cannot do so, to be persuaded to confer ownership of pieces of land in resettlement areas because that will be a sure way of making sure that the farmer or settler loses his piece of land. They will borrow money and be compelled to use that piece of land as security and they will not be able to repay in time, certainly not to repay the bank at commercial rates over 30 percent. They will be toiling to lose their pieces of land. That must be opposed.

In any event, it appears to preempt the considerations and investigations of the Land Commission, which was set up, which I understand will be fully reporting before the end of this month. We would oppose that move.

Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 21, No.43 [Thursday, 27th October, 1994] Resettlement Schemes

Page 3039 – 3042: Fourteenth Order READ: adjourned debate on motion on the establishment of resettlement schemes without basic infrastructure. Question again proposed.

MR. ZIKHALI (MP MAGWEGWE): I want to thank the mover of this motion, the hon. Member, Mr. Chafesuka and his second for reminding Government of their basic responsibility to provide for the obvious requirements whenever they want to resettle people. Mr. Speaker, I want to say basic structures really are determined by the kind of economic activities that schemes may be envisaging. I am not quite sure whether without a thorough study for what is contemplated, one would come up with a specific basic infrastructure that would be required to set up in any resettlement scheme. It is very important, of course, that this feasibility study be done. I agree with this suggestion. Let me hasten to add that the basics how to be provided. With the kind of economic difficulties that we are facing in the country today and with Government being bombarded from all angles to reduce its expenditure, I think the rest of infrastructures really can be undertaken jointly by settlers and Government. That is the only approach to setting up such requirements. When this has to be done, a lot of education is required on the part of people to be resettled, otherwise, they may not appreciate the effort being made

by Government because they will tend to think that the Government is passing responsibility which should be undertaken by the State on their behalf.

Mr. Speaker, my main worry is that, there is no resettlement of any kind that is taking place at the moment. Government is equipped with the Land Acquisition Act. We will be expecting Government to find land and resettle people who are landless, but surely nothing is happening in that sphere. It is simply quite, yet people are mourning for land from all over the country. Although I represent an urban constituency, I have since discovered that we have in urban areas people who are very poor what may be termed as the urban poor. When their power to work has been expanded or when they fall victims of retrenchment as a result of ESAP, or for whatever reason, the only place to fall back on at that moment, before we have a meaningful national insurance scheme, is getting resettled somewhere in the rural area. They want to be resettled somewhere where life is going to be tamable as far as they are concerned. There are many places where people are overpopulated where meaningful economic activities cannot be undertaken. People want to be resettled and what Government is doing about it, I do not understand.

Mr. Speaker, you approach the Minister of Lands, he will tell you that, all he does is to give the Minister of Rural resettlement land if he wants it. If he does not want it, the Minister of Lands does nothing. The Minister of Rural Resettlement appears to be saying nothing. It is as if people do not want land anymore. Why should Government develop cold feet? Why cannot Government acquire land and resettle people? What was the purpose of passing the Land Acquisition Act? It is now gathering dust on the shelves of Ministers. People are asking questions. They see what we are doing. We come here and make a lot of noise and then they say, Oh there is a man- for example, they can say Mr. Nyandoro is a man. Thereafter we retreat into our shells. We cannot go on like that. People want land and let us have it.

Mr. Speaker, we are basically an agricultural oriented economy. If that is not improved, all the manufacturing sector we are talking about will come to nothing. Let us cry about the lack of rains but not cry about land when there is so much land in Zimbabwe. Let us have the land and then look at the infrastructure when people are resettled. Zimbabweans are very hardworking. When they are invited and they are convinced and made to appreciate why an infrastructure is needed, they will pull their efforts and work jointly with Government.

Page 3042 - 3045: MR.R.M. NDLOVU (MP Bulilima-mangwe North):Mr. Speaker, I would like to add my weight on the motion. I would also like to thank the mover and seconder of this important motion. The motion itself is explanatory and reasons are best known by those who are supposed to implement the requirements of the motion. We have had some few resettlement schemes in all areas that we come from. I happen to represent a rural constituency where there are few resettlement schemes, where unfortunately some of the basic infrastructure is needed badly these have been overdue for many years.

It is embarrassing when a Government project is not well funded and those people have to beg for certain facilities which are basic from their neighbours in the adjacent communal lands when it is supposed to be a model, a demonstration that Government has put a resettlement in a certain area. People must see the good of a resettlement without a school, clinic, good roads, water, is not a complete project. Where do those people get the facilities? They have to travel. Mr. Speaker, some of the resettlement are badly situated. They are too close to the communal lands and a result there is always some fights for grazing between the resettled people and the communal land farmers. Government must first of all plan very careful no to antagonize the adjacent people and try by all means to get the necessary infrastructure from the people. The problem is that our feasibility studies have been a talk for several times that feasibility studies are being carried out but they are not implemented. We do not know why.

Again we seem to have wasted a lot of money going outside the country copying from other countries what model they use. Why can we not have our Zimbabwean model of resettlement which attracts the interests of our own people here? Why can we not debate the way we would like to resettle our people rather than copying from other countries? People in resettlement schemes are suffering. Regions like Matebeleland where there is very little rainfall, there are dams where people could do some irrigation in order to earn their living. These are some of the infrastructure that Government must embark on before creating some resettlement in preparation for those people who will be coming in. When Zimbabwe attained independence in 1980, farms were bought on willing-seller, willing-buyer basis. We seem to have got quite a lot of land on those basis and many people have been resettled. A Bill was brought up in this House to give more teeth to Government to bite it- the Land Acquisition Act. Since the passing of that piece of legislation, no farm has been bought. Farms were designated and after some time when the owners complained they were given back to the owners. We do not know where we are. People want us to explain on what is happening to the Land Acquisition Act - we have no answer. Ministers have not told us how many farms have been bought. Two weeks ago there was a question on that and we were told all the farms were returned to their owners. So, where are we going?

We feel and believe that Government must take stock of itself and try and answer the needs of the people. The motion says "Appeals to Government to adopt a deliberate policy to restock the herd in drought prone areas." It is well known that during the 1991/92 drought spell, many people lost their herds. In these resettled areas people have no herd of cattle. They are supposed to depend on them so that they can educate their children through selling their livestock to pay the school

fees. They are not supposed to go and look for employment somewhere because they have been given the land to till and earn their living from that land but alas, it is not easy to buy a beast today with the prices escalating as they are. These people have nothing and that is why this motion calls upon Government to adopt a deliberate policy in order to assist these people who are in that situation. They have the grazing but they have nothing which can graze in it. This encourages the communal farmers those who still have some few herds to bring their cattle in the resettlement schemes and problems arise from there.

On the campfire- whilst I support the campfire project, but I would like to find out at the end of the day how much do the hunters earn from these animals that they kill from our campfire areas and little that goes to those people who actually have the know how of how much they spend, how much they earn, and how much they return. Do they train the local people to take their positions in case they decide to leave those areas so that people are left stranded? I believe that Government has a hand in these campfire programmes and it has to facilitate or know that this programme must continue if it has any help at all to the local people. They must train the people who will be the hunters in their own respective programme areas so that the programme goes on. Let me end up by urging Government to have a very keen eye to assist its people who are resettled and try and get land for the landless people who want to be resettled and do the tilling of the land.

Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol.21, No.45 [Wednesday, 2nd November, 1994] Policy on the indigenization of the national economy

Page 3128 - 3139: The planning commissioner, National Economic Planning in the President's office (Mr.R. Hove):

It is for this reason that Cabinet established a Task Force on the Indigenisation of the Economy a year ago and whose main task was to formulate policy measures whose aim is to create an environment that is promotive of small to medium scale enterprises through among others:

- changing some of the by-laws and regulations;
- availability of funds at concessionary interest rates and without need for collateral in most cases;
- expansion of entrepreneurship training programmes

The land acquisition and resettlement programme is indeed part of the indigenization of the economy process in that more land will revert to indigenous people. Commercial Farm Settlement Scheme: Government has designed a scheme whereby qualified indigenous people such as graduates of agricultural colleges and other qualified indigenous farmers would be settled on commercial farms. Details of this scheme will be announced soon by the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development.

Page 3139 – 3134: THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT, RURAL AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT [MOMBESHORA]:

The hon member for Makoni East appears to have been following very closely those matters to do with resettlement .He has now raised the question as to whether hundreds of people left landless and destitute at the lately closed Iyati Mine in Chimanyika Resettlement Scheme could be resettled on Ruwanda Farm. Yes, it is the responsibility of my Ministry to resettle people in need of land. I also want to take this opportunity to ask all hon members to limit their discussion with people on the farms which have not yet been handed over to my Ministry for resettlement purposes as this may raise false hope among the people when the farm may be bought for other purpose or even when the purchase deal may fall through.

Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 22 No. 1 [Tuesday, 2nd May, 1995] Meeting of Parliament

Page 5 [The President]

In the area of land acquisition, my Government will adopt speedier ways of acquiring five million hectares of land to reach 8.3 million hectares of land ear-marked for acquisition as spelt out in the National Land Policy. In addition, efforts are being made to indigenize the economy through the utilization of graduates from agricultural institutions and universities as well as more trained black farmers into the commercial farming sub-sector.

Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 22, No. 2 [Tuesday, 16th May, 1995] Presidential Speech; Debate on Address

Page 37 - 38: Mr. Chidawu (MP Kambuzuma):

Whereas I fully support Government's land acquisition programme .I feel there is need to look beyond simply acquiring land and resettling people as this will temporarily silence the problem.

The harnessing of water means the improvement of quality of life where there is irrigation. This would be our answer to migration that we have where people want to come and live in Harare. The lowveld is a very important area in our economic development, it is where sugar is. The Tokwe–Mukosi water should be shared in order to transform that region .The small scale cane farmers who are near Mkwazine have done well, demonstrating that given the opportunity and the resource, we can excel. Government should try increase the irrigatable hectareage for our people. These people are keen to go and we must let them go for it. Those waters must be equally shared by the people who live in the region, all those who want to go and settle there.

Allow me to thank our traditional leaders, the chiefs who we understand mooted this scheme. To me, really it was an act of great genius on the part of our traditional leaders. Perhaps, this is the reason why they are fast retaining their position in society. Perhaps, this is the reason why they are fast retaining their position in society. One positive aspect of the scheme is to provide continuous food supply to our hungry people, particularly if the scheme is properly administered. If you compare this against the drought relief scheme which has been supplying people with food intermittently, in most cases people were without food over long periods, this one will deliver.

Secondly, this scheme has better advantages, like I have already said, if properly handled. I note that a very comprehensive machinery has been established to ensure its proper administration. Let me hope that this machinery will not be found wanting as we progress, like has happened in respect of many other schemes. I am very confident that since the initiators of the scheme appear to be playing a vital role in the implementation, everything possible will be done to ensure that beneficiaries do benefit as intended.

I again note that this scheme will save Government a lot of money which has been going towards maintenance of grain in our silos. I understand Government spends a lot of money in maintaining grain in our silos. Indirectly, this responsibility is now being shifted on to the consumer, who after sometime will be expected to pay back the grain that he would have borrowed from the GMB, of course all that facilitated by Government.

Page 189 - 190: Mr. Tsimba (MP Marondera West):

On resettlement, His Excellency, the President indicated that Government would continue to pursue agricultural policy objectives which are designed to increase food production as well as improve the quality of living of all our people. He also spoke about the need to vigorously speed up the resettlement programme so that as many of our landless citizens as possible get settled. My Constituency, Mr. Speaker, is one of those that have benefited from the Government's resettlement programme since 1981. During that time, many people have been productively resettled in former commercial farms where their hard work and productive capacity in agriculture have made my constituency one of the principal food producers in the province.

On the subject of water resources, Mr. Speaker, the people of my constituency would like to register their thanks and appreciation to the Government, through the Ministry of Local Government, for their timely intervention that recently saved the Mahusekwa Dam from being emptied dry by commercial farmers down stream Mupfure River. By that action, which was spearheaded by the Governor of Mashonaland East, people living in and around the dam were saved from imminent disaster.

Page 190 - 196: Mr. Madiro (MP Hurungwe West):

I want to also thank His Excellency for his support in the communal and resettlement areas by providing seed packs and fertilizers, food for work, and now this grain loan programme. This is a leader with people at heart. Mr. Speaker, I take this opportunity to say that through the leadership of our First Secretary, His Excellency, the President R.G. Mugabe, most of the new Members of Parliament were not contested. The minority parties were afraid to contest the election and may these small parties be quite forever. The funding by Government of communal and resettlement roads under P1 and P2 is not pleasing. There is need to increase the District Development Fund allocation in my constituency. On the same note, may I request the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development through the District Development Fund to consider surfacing the Katenhe-Mudzimu road due to costly maintenance of the road which links Chidamoyo Mission and our Mudzimu depots. The road is being damaged by the big lorries transporting grain from the depots.

Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 22, No. 29 [Wednesday, 16th August, 1995] Irrigation Scheme

Whilst I also support giving land to graduate from agricultural institutions and universities, I believe we should give more opportunities to those already in the field, especially the black farmers such that we assist them to develop their full potential. If we are not careful we might end up with 80's situation of co-operatives and giving them the land to farm and when we knew in our hearts that it was not worth it, that it was just politics.

Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 22, No. 4 [Thursday, 18th May, 1995] Presidential Speech: Debate on Address
Page 103: Mr. Mutyambizi (MP Hurungwe East):

It is true that a number of commercial farms are either lying idle or under utilized. The majority of our people have no arable land at all, *vis-à-vis* the minority who own most of the arable land are failing to utilize it. I would like to call for a speedy programme of action which will enhance the land redistribution exercise taking into consideration all layouts given in the presidential speech.

Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 22, No. 7 [Tuesday, 30th May, 1995] Presidential Speech: Debate on Address

Page 189- 190: Mr. Tsimba (MP Marondera West):

On resettlement, His Excellency, the President indicated that Government would continue to pursue agricultural policy objectives which are designed to increase food production as well as improve the quality of living of all our people. He also spoke about the need to vigorously speed up the resettlement programme so that as many of our landless as possible get settled. My constituency, Mr. Speaker, is one of those that have benefited from the Government's resettlement programme since 1981. During that time, many people have been productively resettled in former commercial farms where their hard work and productive capacity in agriculture have made my constituency one of the principal food producers in the province.

Page 196 -197: Mr. Madiro (MP Hurungwe West):

Mr. Speaker, I wish to address the plight of people who need resettlement. The Government should change its attitude towards this goal as it now demands practical solutions. The 536 families in the Mkwichi area who were who displaced by the buffalo fence require urgent attention before the onset of the rains. I know these figures were supplied to the relevant Ministry, but it seems nobody is caring. This buffalo fence project is priority, given the data on the export of beef to the European Community. There is need to complete the resettlement of people who were affected by the construction of Magunje Dam. Some have not yet received their compensation money and are required to move out. While I appreciate the construction of the Magunje Dam, there is need to put in place plans to utilize the dam water through irrigation schemes at Kemureza, as the water is adequate for an irrigation scheme.

About 2 500 families have been identified for resettlement in the District of Hurungwe and the Government to work towards the purchase of resettlement places. Hurungwe is known as the breadbasket of the country and considering this, it requires major irrigation dams. Sites for irrigation dams were identified but these have not been put into plan by Government. The construction of such irrigation dams as these will alleviate the district's problems. There are rights for such dams at Mukorosviba in Piriwiri area, Badze in Rengwe area, Kanyati and Murereshi in Hurungwe area and Nyaodza in Nyaodza area. The majority of the boreholes are drying up and Government drilling of more boreholes in most of the affected areas is called for.

Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 22, No. 10 [Tuesday, 6th June, 1995] Grain Loan Scheme

Page 325 - 326:Mr. Gezi (MP Muzarabani):

We have talked about dam construction as a Government for a number of years and we have not moved out into the communal areas and provided the much needed water. Or people given the water and the tools to use will definitely produce their own food. Most commercial farmers have managed to produce maize for sale because they have an irrigation component on the farms. I hope that the new Ministry of Lands and Water Resources will vigorously pursue the idea of constructing at least one medium sized dam in every district as enunciated by the Ministry in a policy document last year. Some districts have had access to two, three dams constructed when other districts have virtually had no dam constructed at all. This is a very unfair situation. So I will call upon the Ministry of Agriculture that when they bid for funds from the Ministry of Finance they should now begin by Districts where no single dams exists. We as a Province in Mashonaland Central have not had dams constructed since 1980 any dams that have been constructed are something to do with white commercial farmers. This is a sad state of affairs Mr. Speaker.

On news during the past two three days, the President of the ZFU has been announcing that our small scale farmers face dangers in that their farms are going to be taken for having failed to repay their loans. If you look at the maize that is produced in the country and work out a figure that goes to the GMB, you will see that most of the maize comes from the communal areas and the resettlement schemes, including the small scale farmers. But these people have had very serious economic hardships. Now they have got to a stage where they cannot repay their loans. All these Mr. Speaker, is happening because our people have no access to resources like water. You can borrow money from the AFC, buy a lot of fertilizers and put it on the land. But if you do not have water to produce the crops you will not be able to generate any income and you will be unable to repay your loans. So I am calling upon the Ministry of Lands and Water Resources to move fast. If you can shelve some of the luxurious investments that we see in certain corners and take all that money and put it into dam construction, I am sure that Government will never spend a cent in a loan scheme of maize to our people in the next few years.

Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 21 No. 19 [Wednesday, 7th June, 1995] Oral Answers to Questions on Rural Development Policy

Page 359 - 360: The Minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development (Mr. J.L. Nkomo):

The role of my Ministry is largely a co-ordinative and supervisory one in the sphere of rural development. In saying this, however, I am mindful of the direct development role played by the District Development Fund and the Department of Physical Planning both of which fall under my Ministry. The District Development Fund's primary policy foundation is the District Development Fund Act Number 58 of 1981. The Act prescribes the Fund's mission as the development of communal areas and other areas which the Minister will have declared development areas for the purposes of the Act. Tied to this Act is the Policy and Procedures document on rural development which tackles the question of rural development as

it relates to the development and management of resettlement areas as well as the element of communal land re-organisation, both of which now fall under the District Development (DERUDE)

The Fund, in terms of these policy documents, concerns itself with infrastructural development in rural areas such as roads, bridges, culverts, dams, boreholes, clinics, schools, irrigation systems as well as the provision of tillage services to both communal and commercial farmers.

Mr. speaker, the Rural District Councils Act No. 8 of 1988 in terms of which all rural district councils are set up embodies, to a very large extent, my Ministry's policies on rural local authorities which exercise wide-ranging powers over land, general development, community and individual initiatives as well as economic and other forms of cooperation between rural district councils and partners such as the State, other local authorities within and without Zimbabwe, organizations and individuals. The Act further authorizes rural local authorities to engage in income generating projects for purposes of raising income for development. The control of residence and other utilization of communal land by its inhabitants is delegated by the State to rural local authorities through the Communal Land Act No. 20 of 1982 and development control is exercised directly by the rural local authorities. In line with this legislated policy position, the Rural District Council Act grants limited taxing powers to local authorities to finance the administration and development of their areas. Central government input takes the form of either direct grants to local authorities such as housing grants disbursed by the Ministry of Public Construction and National Housing, the education grants from Ministry of Education or Health grants from the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare.

Mr. Speaker, from the processes I have described, it is clear that my Ministry largely coordinates the functions of autonomous councils who in turn are serviced by various State, quasi-state and private organizations. On our part, we have decentralized development planning to rural district councils through their VIDCOs, WADCOs, rural district development committees (RDCCs) and Provincial Development Committees (PDCs) in terms of the Provincial Councils and Administration Act No.12 of 1985. All these bodies perform consultative and planning functions. At district and provincial level, they include representatives from sector Ministries and other organizations involved in rural development. With regard to decentralization, Government in general and my Ministry in particular are shedding off various roles to rural district councils. We, however, realize that there are several limitations and constraints facing the councils, among them being limited manpower capacities, lack of equipment to effect development as well as lack of financial resources to fund development plans. To counter these constraints, my Ministry and Government in general disburse grants and loans to local authorities as well as facilitate the secondment of skilled manpower to assist the councils in their development efforts.

Lastly, Mr. Speaker, may I say that apart from the then Prime Minister's directive and the *Policy and Procedures Document* on rural resettlement, my Ministry's comprehensive policies on rural development are contained in the various pieces of legislation I have discussed in this reply and these are available already to hon. members. The question as to whether these have been circulated to every hon. member, I want to confirm that all these documents were made available to all rural district councils and are still readily available at my offices.

May I, through you Mr. Speaker, table the *Policy and Procedures Document* and the directive before the House for its information and record. May I also record that once Government has studied and made its decisions on the *Land Commission Report* which was submitted to His Excellency the President recently, my Ministry will embark on the task of updating the *Policies and Procedures Document* in consonance with the new policy.

Page 542: Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 22, No. 13 [Tuesday, 13th June, 1995] Presidential Speech: Debate on Address

Mr. Matura (MP Gokwe South):

In the field of agriculture, Mr. Speaker, it is widely recognize that the district of Gokwe as a whole and my constituency in particular are famous for their high agricultural output. I confirm here that my people are very hard working and they realize very high yields in several crops, especially in maize and cotton. They therefore need support in their efforts, including more close Agritex attention. However, the main problem is to get transport to ferry their produce to the Grain Marketing Board and the Cotton Marketing Board for marketing. As earlier on highlighted, roads are in the main impassable and few transport operators who sacrifice their vehicles charge exorbitant rates that are really prohibitive. I call upon the Minister to attend to these problems in cooperation with his colleagues.

Page 577 - 581: Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 22, NO. 14 [Thursday, 14th June, 1995]

The Deputy Minister of Local Government:

At the end of the day, with the availability of water, we know very well that our people in Zimbabwe will indeed go to the fields. A lot of our people want to go to the fields but there is a question of land again which comes into play and I do not think I need to over emphasise that point. Also some farmers, particularly women are sleeping in the open when they come

from the various villages to sell their wares. Last year there were about three people who died during this period because of the cold and I wish to implore the authorities concerned to address this situation. Fifteen years after independence the economy should be by now in the hands of the indigenous people. When we talk about indigenization let us also talk about people who are striving to earn a living, like those in Siyaso Magaba, those who are selling vegetables in the streets and those who are having their own carpentry shops, welding *etc.*

Page 585 - 591:

Chief Maduna: ZANU PF is led by tested and tried leaders and is well-organised political party. It is a mammoth party which is composed of war veterans and ex-detainees. ZANU PF is a party that is very difficult to defeat in any election. I want to appeal to our Government to look after our war veterans and ex-detainees taking into account the contributions they made towards our total freedom which we enjoy in our country.

It is high time that our Government used the Land Acquisition Act to acquire more land for our landless people from the white commercial farmers who still own hectares and hectares of our land which they grabbed from our fore-fathers. We want our people to participate fully in agriculture and cattle ranching. Land is one of the resources from which our people can create wealth for themselves if it were made available to them. I therefore appeal to our Government to use the Land Acquisition Act as a weapon with which to acquire more land from the white commercial farmers for our landless people. These people own kilometers and kilometers of land. This is definitely a painful situation. I urge our Government to take swift action to correct this abnormal situation in our country.

There is much destruction of the environment taking place in the villages by villagers. The indiscriminate cutting of trees goes on in the villages due to the fact that there is no control. I am of the opinion that if traditional leaders have their powers restored kraal-heads should be given the responsibility of looking after our natural resources in the villages. I think they are the right people who could control the indiscriminate cutting of trees in the villages.

Chiefs' allowances should also be increased in order to raise their status in our society. I now want to talk about the Matebeleland South Province. The rainfall in this province is very unpredictable and erratic. The province is always hit by drought. More dams are needed for irrigation purposes. If enough water is made available, I am certain that our people would produce enough food to feed themselves. Mr. Speaker, to crown it all – I want to say to hon. members that we have not been elected to this respectable House for personal aggrandizement but to fulfil the aspirations and expectations of our people.

Mr. Mugangavari (MP Kadoma East):

The recommendations that I have on stock theft should contain these.

- (1) No conducting of a public sale without police presence.
- (2) No conducting a public sale of cattle without informing the police in advance
- (3) No conducting such a public sale other than where stipulated.
- (4) No slaughtering a beast without a clearance letter from the police.
- (5) No buying such meat from such owner with a certificate of clearance.
- (6) No failure to maintain stock cards.

Page 602: Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 22, No 15 [Thursday, 15th June, 1995] Suspension of Standing Order Number 100 and 101

The Attorney-General:

In terms of Standing Order Number 100, it is provided that when a non-adverse report is given on a Bill, the matter cannot be dealt with on that day. Standing Order **Number 101 also provides** that you cannot deal with all the stages of a Bill on the same day. The Minister of Finance would want to introduce and dispose of the Agricultural Finance Corporation (Debts Assumption) Bill in the course of this afternoon because Parliament is adjourning today to the 4th of July, which is the plan. It is considered that it would be very expensive for Parliament to come back next Tuesday solely to deal with this item only.

Accordingly, I wish to move, with leave of the House, that provisions of Standing Order Number 100 regarding the settling down of the second reading of a Bill on the next sitting day after the day on which a non- adverse report is received from the Parliamentary Legal Committee be suspended for today in respect of the Agricultural Corporation (Debts Assumption) Bill and that the second reading of the Day Number 2 and further that the provisions of Standing Order Number 101 regarding the stages of Bills be suspended for today in respect of the same Bill. In moving the motion, I want to solicit support of hon. members. Government set up on an Economic Reform Programme for parastatals and set itself some targets and the matter which is going to be before this House is urgent and I want to ask the indulgence of the House to approve this motion.

Page 603: Miss Mugabe (MP Zvimba South): I think we are doing injustice to Zimbabwe. First of all the introduction of the Bill – it seems that this is what we have been waiting for. Then it comes and we should think of what we should do agriculturally for our rural people after ESAP. So how can we refuse to pass it or to look at it?

Page 604: The Attorney-General:

The Bill before the House is that at present the AFC is owing liabilities to various creditors and that is a matter of fact. All that is going to happen here is for Central Government to assume those debts to itself, in a process to re-form our parastatals, to commercialise the parastatals. That is simple, it is either the Central Government or the AFC. The debts at the moment are with the AFC and all that is happening here is to move those debts from the AFC to Central Government. I cannot see what else or time the hon. member would require to look at it.

The urgency here, as I have mentioned, in that Government has itself certain stages by which these things were to be done and there are various components to the reform programme. This is one of them, the reform of the processes in the way of reforming our parastatals and it is a very straight forward matter. I am surprised that the hon. members of Parliament, Mr. Nzarayebani and Mr. Shambambeva-Nyandoro should raise an objection over a matter which is so simple and straight forward. I still insist that is not necessary and I think hon. members have other pressing duties in their constituencies. It is not necessary for them to come back next week or even to morrow to deal with a matter which is so simple and straight forward. With those remarks I still move that the motion be adopted.

Page 611 - 613: AGRICULTURAL CORPORATIONS (DEBTS ASSUMPTIONS BILL, 1995)

Mr. Zikhali (MP Pumula-Magwegwe):

Madam Speaker, we have to do it orderly. We have to do it in such a way that we do not create conditions that will bring about chaos. I think this is one of such conditions, but I am not very clear as to whether this short Bill is intended to enable Government to take an *ad-hoc* measure and thereafter and thereafter abandon these two agricultural enterprises to their fate. I am not very clear about that one.

I am very clear that Government wants – or rather this is not another way of continuing to subsidise these agricultural enterprises because they are expected to perform on a commercial basis. I wish to state one thing here. The price of maize meal has just gone up and this is hitting hard people who stay in the urban areas, the urban poor in particular. I am personally convinced that this is one of Government's responsibility, in spite of our wanting to improve the economic performance of the country and induce the would be investors from outside of our borders to come here and make some investment. I know that the whole idea is to ensure that ESAP delivers the goods, but to what extent? Why can we not have the Government continue, even after defraying the expenses which are listed on the schedule here? Let Government continue in future and in a way carry certain responsibilities which are discharged by these enterprises on behalf of the people so that we do not only become systematic in our application of ESAP, but we carry along the people with us. Systems are not what matters really in doing these things. The confidence of the people in what Government is doing is more than important. In fact, it is ore important than being systematic.

Madam Speaker, if we fail to carry along our people with us, we will not be able to be systematic. We can only do that if we win their confidence. If we convince them that what we are doing in the long run is going to be in their interests, then we will afford to be systematic. I want to plead with the Minister that such responsibilities as discharged by these agricultural enterprises, Government should continue and endeavour to assist in keeping the price of maize meal, in particular, at a reasonable level for the benefit of the poor.

Mr. Shambambeva-Nyandoro (MP Highfield): I just want the Minister to explain on this Bill. Privatisation, Government clearing all the debts, that is fine, but what I am worried about is the farmers and the banks. Now AFC will be running on commercial lines from day to day, what about the farmers, what will be the role of Government? Farmers all along, I think were protected by Government when they got loans from the AFC. Now that AFC is commercialized and they can just grab those farms because the farmers cannot pay back the loans, what will be the role of Government? What are they going to do to the majority of our farmers who cannot pay back these loans because of the drought?

Mr. Nzarayebani (MP Mutare South): I simply want to say that this is bad legislation. I say so because Government is back tracking and is unnecessarily doing so. The AFC no longer wants to fund farming activities to peasant farmers and the AFC is going to fund white commercial farmers.

Page 615: The Minister of Agriculture:

If I could just try and answer the point raised by the hon. member, Zikhali, this is not in any way an attempt to perpetuate the deficits of the marketing boards. On the contrary, it is a once and for all attempt to eliminate those deficits. These deficits have been accumulated because the boards were obligated and instructed to raise finance for the purchase of products, either from the farmers or through importation and in many instances these were then sold to the processors at a loss. So, the loss accumulated to the boards at no fault of their own. I know there is a question of occasional mismanagement from the boards but basically the losses occurred because they were used as a vehicle of acquiring the products which they processed and went through to the consumers.

The intention is, we will now, commercialise these questions, but in order to commercialise we have to clear up the balance sheets. We have to get rid of the overhang of debts and simple reason for bringing this Bill before Parliament is to clean up

those balances. Government will assume those debts and the interest which accrue from those debts and then with that behind them the marketing boards, we are talking of the CMB and the GMB, will have a clear balance sheet for which to go on a commercial operation. From then onwards, as the Deputy Minister indicated to the House, there is no more Government support. They perform on their own record, they are accountable, they go under and that is the end of the board.

617: The Deputy Minister of Finance:

The Government has not abandoned the people. The intention is not to abandon the people. The Government will still pay the public enterprises for any social activities they request where we feel that social interests of our people are suffering, the Government will come in. There is nobody who is not protected by the Government, whether you are in the private sector or not, even individuals or small businessmen. In the private sector they have been going to the Government to seek help as they are collapsing, and the Government has been running up and down trying to assist. So the idea that we are abandoning the people by commercializing the parastatals is not on. What we are saying is when the parastatals are operating on commercial basis, or as individuals, it must not be an obligation for the Government to have to bail out the inefficiency of parastatals. We continue asking the taxpayer to pay for the inefficiency of public enterprises and the Government is saying no, they must operate commercially. But as individuals they can still come to the Government and negotiate with the Government. We have to look at individual institutions and decide what action to take. It is not a question of just abandoning those institutions in the streets, no. The Government will still be very much involved. So Madam Speaker, I can only say in short, in reply to my colleagues that the Government is not abandoning anybody, it is not abandoning anything.

Page 619 - 622: The Minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development:

Madam Speaker, Zimbabwe has experienced severe spates of drought since independence in 1980. Records, since the turn of the century, also show that Zimbabwe goes through cycles of drought which have threatened the very livelihood of those who subsist primarily on agriculture. Since 1980, the 1991/92 drought was one of the severest in recent years, while 1992/93 and 1994/95 years brought us yet other droughts resulting in below average yields in agriculture and reductions in the livestock levels. The Government's response to these disasters was in the form of free food distribution and food for-work. Government was commended both at home and abroad for the drought mitigation measures it mounted which ensured and guaranteed that no Zimbabwean died through starvation. Accordingly, the Government remains committed to ensuring that no Zimbabwean shall starve to death, albeit against the spectre of persistent cycles of drought.

While this is so, the communal people, including traditional leaders, notably the chiefs, have approached Government with their own views. They have thanked Government for providing food to them during periods of drought. At the same time, the chiefs are worried that the continuation of free food hand-outs as well as the food-for-work programme would develop a culture of dependence among the able-bodied communal, resettlement and small scale commercial agricultural communities into colonies of destitutes without any capacity to help themselves. This would further reduce their self-esteem and dignity. Government took note of these views and decided on a programme that would make food grain available to the able-bodied whiled at the same time ensuring that the beneficiaries remained directly responsible and participatory in the procurement of their food grain requirements.

May I emphasise the fact that the achievement of political independence, and our practice of democracy would fail in their purposes if they do not go far enough to challenge all Zimbabweans to become active agents of their own economic independence and survival, whatever the adversities. Furthermore, the structural adjustment programme and its demands upon central Government to reduce and maintain expenditure in a balance that gives the private sector enough scope and resources to develop, requires that the tasks of economic development and survival be shared equitably between the state and the private sector. In this regard, private individuals too should fully participate in the betterment of their lives. Put simply, the people must fully participate in the purchase of the food they need in years of drought rather than wait for Central Government to give them free food. The old system of free food is no longer acceptable and the hon. members of this August House should rally behind the Government to ensure the success of the Grain Loan Scheme. More particularly, I appeal to hon. members to go back to their constituencies and explain fully the objectives and procedures of the scheme.

The Grain Loan Scheme is a programme in which able-bodied people in communal, resettlement and small scale commercial farming communities borrow grain during difficult seasons and pay back in grain during seasons of good harvest. To date, able-bodied people have been receiving food grain through the food-for-work programme. In some instances, a number of able-bodied people received free food handouts. This approach to drought relief has been reviewed and Government has decided to do away with the food-for-work programme as well as to remove able-bodied people from the lists of beneficiaries of free food handouts from the Department of Social Welfare. Following this decision, only the aged, the disabled, the destitute and infants, will remain on the lists of beneficiaries of the free food programme through the Department of Social Welfare, in the Ministry of the Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare and of course the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, in the case of the child supplementary feeding scheme.

I must soon turn to the Constitution and the administrative provisions of the Grain Loan Scheme. However, before I do so, I wish to point out another challenge posed by the Grain Loan Scheme. Under the scheme the people who borrow grain are

required to pay it back. This requirement to pay back the borrowed grain should challenge our rural farmers to think seriously about farming. It challenges them to plan their farming activities well in time and to start land preparation timeously. They can ill afford to farm haphazardly, because in addition to farming to meet their own domestic requirements, they should also farm to meet the repayment requirements of the Grain Loan Scheme. If all of us worked for one purpose, I have no reason to doubt this, then the scheme should provide the impetus towards a revolution in rural agriculture.

In this vein, I wish to take this opportunity to urge Government officials, especially District Administrators, Agritex officials and Veterinary Services officials to instill into our rural farmers a sense of responsible and purposeful agriculture as well as assist them follow proper agricultural practices in their farming. I do also urge all of us here in this hon. House as well as chiefs, headmen and rural district councils to emphasise to the borrowers under the Grain Loan Scheme their obligation to repay the loaned grain. On the part of Government, we will assess the results and the productivity of each agricultural season and will carry over the loan to the next season if the current season is adjudged to be a drought season. The scheme as well as the indebtedness of borrowers may be reviewed in the event of prolonged droughts. However, Government will require borrowers to pay back their loans during years of good rains. It is therefore important that I counsel against this one likely thing, the temptation to abuse the system for commercial purposes.

Page 1416 - 1417: Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 22, No. 25 [Tuesday, 25th July, 1995] Ministerial Statement

Mr. Norman: If a farmer sells maize to the GMB at \$1 050 and when he buys it back he will have to pay \$1 860. But it will be foolish of the farmer to sell at a lower price and buy it back at a higher price. I do not see it taking place because we have not got any grain. We have got only 40 000 tonnes. There have been very little deliveries taking place. As I said in a statement, I do not misunderstand the farmer's ability to read the market forces in this country. I think they are wide awake. They are already taking a great advantage of the system of marketing.

The second question was how it would affect the grain loan scheme. Let me go back to the grain loan scheme. It is a loan scheme. The way the system work is that maize is lent in volume terms to those who make a request and then it is returned in volume terms. If you borrow two bags then you have an obligation to return two bags. If you borrow ten bags, you will return ten bags. The only case where payment comes in is in the event that you cannot return the maize at all. GMB is not charging anything for maize in the grain loan scheme. It is a public obligation which we are servicing. We are supplying the maize on a loan scheme. We will have to carry those costs until next year's harvest and we will see what happens. If there are rains, the farmers will return the maize.

It is also interesting to note that the request for the grain loan scheme pays for the farmers. They were tired of hand-outs and they said, give us the chance and we will repay you. We saw that as an inspirational move on the farmers' part and that is exactly how it is operating. So there is no payment taking place at the moment. All we are doing is, on a requisition order, we supply the maize and we receipt what goes out and next year we will have to have a reconciliation of what will come back and what is left in the banks. That is the time when we will have a financial reconciliation and the Ministry of Finance is well aware of that obligation.

Page 1449 - 1450 [Grain Loan Scheme] Mr. N.K. Ndlovu (MP Insiza):

I would like to remind hon. members that the problem that we have seen in the introduction of the scheme – we had been informed this afternoon by the Minister and in fact it was a reminder that the scheme was introduced and it was supposed to have worked from May this year. But it has not really taken off. The argument is that we as constituent Members of Parliament, when we go to our constituencies, the information that they administer was that the scheme has already started. When they distribute the grain in measures of five kilogrammes – I am aware of anywhere where they distribute 10 kilogrammes but I was informed that they distribute 10 kilogrammes going down. The people are recorded as having started loaning grain to the extent that people loan five kilogrammes, 10 kilogrammes and one wonders how this would be determined at the end of this year. At the beginning of the next season people are beginning to pay back what they loaned, whether they will be paying back five kilogrammes or 10 kilogrammes. There is a serious breakdown of communication, whether deliberately or unintentionally. This is the problem that we are faced with. From the Ministries who are responsible for this grain loan scheme, I have in mind the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development who are responsible for the distribution of the food. In fact Minister Nkomo did mention here that the grain loan scheme would in fact not consider distribution in small quantities as five and 10 kilogrammes but that it will be measured in terms of what a family indicates is sufficient to feed or for the consumption of the family until such a time they will be able to cultivate or harvest sufficient maize. The Minister of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare Mr. Shamuyarira, who is the Minister responsible for sourcing this grain, he spoke to me and said that the scheme is not yet in place because they do not have the finances. What is happening now is the drought relief which they are giving to people is not recorded as being grain loan. So, this is what we are faced with when it comes to the scheme.

The Minister of Lands and Water Resources: Mr. Speaker, it will be recalled that on the 1st of November 1993, His Excellency the President appointed a commission of inquiry into appropriate agricultural land tenure systems under the chairman of Professor Mandivamba Rukuni to investigate and come up with a suitable tenure system to meet the present demands. The commission was composed of a very experienced and dedicated team of experts, which included farmers, chiefs, lawyers and agriculturalists.

Briefly, the objectives and terms of reference of this commission of inquiry were to examine existing tenure systems, inheritance system, land sub-divisions, communal area re-organisation, land rights, legislative and institutional arrangements; and in each case recommend appropriate changes.

The report is presented in three volumes. Volume One; the main report, contains the actual findings and the pertinent recommendations of the commission. Volume Two details technical reports or papers on the Zimbabwean agricultural economy, smallholder development, farm productivity issues, land administration and other technical issues which affect agriculture. Volume Three presents the methods, procedures and itinerary of the commission's work together with relevant appendices.

Oral Answers to Questions

Chief Musikavanhu asked the Minister of Lands and Water Resources when his Ministry will issue title deeds to the 46 settlers under the Agricultural Development Authority, Section 8, stage 3A in Chipinge North and to explain;

- (a) the circumstances surrounding the delay despite the agreed probation period of two years;
- (b) if he is aware that the disconted settlers have had to suspend plans to develop their dwelling for 11 years due to lack of title deeds.

Page 1509: Government Policy on Land Acquisition [The Minister of Lands and Water Development (Mr. Kangai)]:

Secondly Mr. Speaker. I would like to thank them for their continued support of the Government's policy on land acquisition and would like to assure them that as indicated in this House by His Excellency the President, Government will adopt speedier ways of acquiring five million hectares of land to reach 8.3 million hectares of land earmarked for acquisition as spelt out in the national land policy.

Turning the motion, allow me to inform the House that when we designate land for resettlement we do not designate land just for the sake of designating but we designate on the basis of need. This is done by the provincial land identification committees in every province and the Ministry of Local Government is also represented in these committees.

Page 1510 - 1512: Mr. Chigwedere (MP Hwedza): I observed, when hon. members responded to my motion- I was called out to the main desk and was engaged then for quite some time, so I was not able to listen to most hon. members. So I spent the weekend analyzing the responses of hon. members who contributed. I discovered no one argued that there was no idle mission land in the country and no one disputed that the land had been given to the missionaries free. Everybody agreed that more land was needed to resettle our people.

Several urged caution in the modalities. Several have urged a more sober approach that avoids confrontation. Several argued that the motion was premature in that we have not yet properly digested that land acquired from the commercial farmers and that the acquisition of mission land would cause more havoc and more confusion and less good at this stage.

Let me push you further to say what was granted by Lobengula is all right is also to condone the Rudd Concession which was signed by Lobengula and therefore it amounts to saying the whites have rights over the minerals because there were signed off by Lobengula. Then w push it further to say the other concession signed in 1981, signed away our land and was signed by Lobengula is also all right. I have withdrawn the motion but thought it was an eye opener, it was necessary for me to say it because I lok upon myself as an apprentice here, as an apprentice to the older hon.members because they know the ins and outs of the operations of this House and I have something to learn fro them. But if this s the way we approach things, no research, nothing and we say things for the sake of being heard or to be registered in the *Hansard*, then we have very little to learn from them. I withdraw the motion.

Page 1539 - 1548: Presidential Speech: Debate on Address [The Minister of Agriculture]

I wish to respond specifically to the issues raised in this august House in relation to agriculture and agricultural policies, food security, increased purchasing power among the rural folk, creation of employment and market development. As you are all aware, Zimbabwe now has a clear policy in relation to the pricing and marketing of agricultural products under the framework of the Government's economic reform programme. The special circumstances of agriculture have been given special consideration within the terms of the wider macro-economic policy; for example, in the provision of loan funds to the Agricultural Finance Corporation and the commercial bank. The agricultural component in external trade policy has

been given detailed consideration in the GATT negotiations and the agreement (that is with the European Union under the Lome Convention), while the agricultural aspects of exchange rate policy have been addressed in the decisions on exchange rate changes. Thus, while there are always opportunities for further inter-Ministerial consultations in a relation to the consequences for the agricultural sector of micro-economics policy adjustment, these global elements are now largely in place.

Our immediate task now is to develop a clear and specific agricultural production policy which welds together all the activities not only of the Ministry of Agriculture but also those of all the other relevant Government agencies into dynamic strategy for achieving efficient agricultural production in the country. The Government's economic reform programme calls for an increase in agricultural production of 3.2 percent per annum, and we now need to identify precisely the policies which are now required to meet this objective, the additional inputs that are necessary and outputs which will be produced as a result of this policy. Even though weather and other uncertainties may prevent the achievement of the target, our policy strategy must spell out how, under normal circumstances, a 3.2 percent growth rate will be achieved. It must set out the role to be played by each production policy component, in a coherent framework. Some policy aspects may take years to produce viable results, for example, agricultural research, but this is all the more reason for making policy decisions now, so that the agricultural industry can develop its full potential to the year 2 000 and beyond.

An important issue which has to be addressed is the need to incorporate the consequences of drought agricultural planning. Drought such as the one experienced in 1992, and again this year, has a direct impact not only on annual production and sustainability of our natural resource base, but also on stocks, prices, and immediate consumption and our aid requirements. By linking the factors that contribute to production surpluses and shortfalls, the performance of markets during drought and non-drought and the status of purchasing among both rural and urban people, we will be able to develop new initiatives that are crucial to the achievement of Government's agricultural policy objectives. My Ministry is currently working on the boundaries of agricultural production policy in the context of backward and forward linkages: backwards to the end costs and regular supply of farms inputs and forwards to the demand for and marketing of farm products. The policy aspects of backward linkages include the provision of crop pack schemes such as fertilizer, seed, crop chemicals and other inputs, the role of local warehouses, distribution centers, tillage services among others and the provision of special credit facilities.

The forward linkages involve the operation of marketing boards, health regulations, import and export regimes, subsidies to food consumers, and facilities to ensure food security for urban and rural population. I wish to emphasise that my Ministry is currently developing a long term production policy framework that will ensure more efficient resource allocation. While the policy framework of the 1980s was governed by detailed control over the pricing and marketing of agricultural products and services, it is neither feasible nor desirable in our more market led environment, to aim to 'control' all resources used in the production process in agriculture particularly in terms of efficiency and transparency. Efficient planning under a liberalized marketing framework requires all the key elements in agriculture are brought together to achieve a much more efficient use of all the available resources. Our approach must be sufficiently flexible to take account of changes in market requirements and production constraints as well as regional disparities in the provision of development resources and infrastructure.

A comprehensive national agricultural policy framework for Zimbabwe involves the articulation of clear objectives for the overall agricultural sector and the different sub-sectors, as well as the identification of specific projects and budgetary requirements. It is within this framework that we are now addressing many of the concerns expressed by hon. members. Our task from the outset involves all the stakeholders in agriculture in order to achieve success. In view of the importance of this exercise, my Ministry has been holding technical workshops and discussing the policy issues arising from inputs from different sectors. We are grateful for the assistance of the Swedish International Development Agency in funding the exercise. I am informed that so far, five sub-sectorial workshops have been held and that the completion of the policy document is due very shortly.

I wish to allay the fears of the hon. member for Mhondoro that this country's agricultural policy objectives might have changed. What has changed since the beginning of the Economic Reform Programme is the strategies for achieving our objectives, in order that they are attained more quickly and more effectively. An important example is our food security policy, both at national and household levels and even at the level of the individuals such as children under five, pregnant and lactating women. I agree with the hon. member that in tackling food security we must take into account the need to increase real income levels and thus purchasing power of the rural people. However, our programmes must also encompass the provision of nutritional and other requirements to enhance their quality of life. My Ministry has in place an internal technical committee responsible for the preparation of policy and strategies for achieving household, national and regional food and nutrition security. I can assure hon. members that the issues of market development and penetration will be addressed, along with income and employment creation. My Ministry will also address food and resource-use policy covering household, national and regional food security, water and irrigation development, farm mechanization and input delivery systems, as well as the financing of agricultural development, particularly in relation to the smallholder farming community. The hon. member of Hurungwe West, Mr. Madiro raised the question of dam water being effectively utilized by way of establishing irrigation schemes at Kemureza since adequate water is already available.

Magunje Dam provide water to irrigate 50 hectares. The design of the in filed irrigation infrastructure is in progress and is expected to be completed by August. However the implementation of new projects submitted by my Ministry for the 1995/96 PISP requires the approval of the National Economic Planning Commission, and this is now the critical issue. The hon. member for Chimanimani would like to see the vast water resources available in his constituency put to effective agricultural use. Mr. Speaker, I wish to assure the hon. member that considerable progress is being made in Chimanimani in terms of small holder irrigation development. The following irrigation schemes are under construction: Nenhwe Irrigation Scheme, which will service 120 hectares; Nyanyadzi Extension with a potential to irrigate 300 hectares and which has six boreholes already drilled; Mutambara Irrigation Scheme which will have 300 hectares in addition to as small schemes such as Chakohwa and Mandima, schemes which will have 40 hectares and 84 hectares respectively under irrigation. The upper reaches of the five rivers that finally drain into Save River are very steep and are not ideal technically for surface irrigation systems, which are most appropriate and manageable by small holder farmers. Irrigable lands are in the Save Valley. It is not "expensive" as the hon. member has been led to believe to take irrigation water from Save River. There is appropriate technology topump water from the Save River; all the schemes, including the ARDA estates and those mentioned above abstract from Save River.

Nor is it accurate Mr. Speaker, to say that little is being done to make irrigation water available to the various communities in Zimbabwe. In the past ten years, developed hectarage has risen from 2 500 hectares to 8 740 hectares and more could have been accomplished if the necessary resources had been made available to my Department of Agritex. My Ministry has plans to develop Zimbabwe's irrigation potential at the rate 2 000 hectares annually into the foreseeable future, but the implementation of these plans requires that we have the resources to do so.

The hon.member for Bikita is correct in saying that the Nyakunda small-scale farming area is very dry but can become productive if effective irrigation schemes are instituted. Mr. Speaker, my Department of Agritex will endeavour to develop design and supervise the implementation of both small and large scale irrigation schemes at the farmer's request in those areas. Farmers will be encouraged by Agritex staff to secure water rights whenever they are available. Since these are small-scale commercial farmers, they should be able to develop their own resources through borehole drilling and construction of small earth dams. Furthermore, Agritex will encourage the farmers to obtain breeding and pen fattening stock from such as the AFC and CSC.

The hon. member for Bindura, Mr. Dengu would like Agritex to be more responsible for production in communal lands through making available tools and inputs as a matter of priority. Mr. Speaker, Agritex strategies for agricultural production involve continual improvements on technology development transfer and utilization. Trails and demonstrations for various crops throughout the country are held on farmer's field days. More and more appropriate technologies on water harvesting will be used so that production can be increased during seasons of water shortage and in semi-arid areas. More effective approaches including training and visit systems, and the mobilization of farmers for production through group discussion and commodity meetings be put in place.

Agritex has a role to play in speeding the land acquisition exercise to ensure that communal farmers have access to good quality agricultural land. Through the chief agricultural extension officers throughout the country who are currently the chairpersons of the land acquisition committees, Agritex will, in close co-operation with the Ministry of Lands Water Resources ensure that Lands and Water Resources ensure that land is acquired for resettlement purposes to alleviate land pressures. The officers will establish close linkages with local authorities in communal lands in order to expedite the planning and implementation of land acquisition.

The hon. member for Hurungwe West raised the question of the plight of 536 families in the Mkwichi area displaced by the buffalo fence resolved before the onset of the rainy season and has expressed concern over beef exports taking precedence over resettlement of people. Mr. Speaker, let me assure this House that the export of beef to the European Community does not take precedence over the resettlement of people. Game fences are constructed to ensure that buffalo and cattle do not mix because of the threat of an outbreak of the foot and mouth disease. Before the erection of the game fence at Mkwichi started, my Department of Veterinary Services approached the Hurungwe District Council, who advised on the path the fence should follow and we have ensured that the fence followed the agreed path. It is true to say that when communal land cattle stray into commercial farms, the farmers load the trespassing stock on lorries and deliver them to the municipal pound. Communal farmers are forced to dispose of some of their stock to defray the pound fines and/or expenses. This is a complex problem which has in some cases been aggravated by some communal farmers cutting boundary fences of commercial farms in order to gain access to graze their cattle. As a result, law-abiding communal farmers are caught unawares. All stock owners have a duty to ensure that their stock do not stray.

In terms of the Stock Trespass Act Number 6 of 1991, if a person ho is in charge of any land outside an urban area, whether or not the land is fenced, becomes aware that any stock is trespassing on his land, that person can send the stock to the nearest pound. The Department of Veterinary Service is however, concerned that pounds in any parts of Zimbabwe, are few, which explains why cattle have to be moved very long distances to the nearest pound. Local authorities whose duty it is to construct and manage pounds have been approached by the Department of Veterinary services several times and asked

to construct pounds in areas where there are no pounds, but to no avail. The Department will however, continue to assist communal farmers in better husbandry methods to ensure that those farmers do not move cattle into commercial areas of grazing illegally.

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member for Mwenezi Central is correct when he says that the proper functioning of the Department of Veterinary Services is bedeviled by inadequate funding, which manifests itself in frequent disease outbreaks which are preventable. Good disease control and surveillance is essential to ensure that Zimbabwe remains free of major animal diseases and that there is no disruption to exports of livestock products. Transport problems are threatening to cripple disease surveillance and monitoring. Regular farm inspections which should be conducted at one or two month's intervals are now occurring at longer than annual intervals. Should an outbreak of a disease such as foot and mouth occur, Mr. Speaker, it would spread to several farms before it is detected; this would seriously threaten exports upon which the viability of the livestock industry depends. In 1994, beef exports earned over Z\$400 million, dairy exports over Z\$46 million and pork exports realized Z\$40 in foreign exchange. I am hoping that the oncoming budget will take serious cognizance of the urgent requirements of the Department of Veterinary Services.

May I, in conclusion again express my thanks to all members who have raised issues concerning the farming sector in this debate. There is much we still have to do, and the contributions of members of this House is immense value in assessing our achievements, our needs and our priorities.

Page 1551: The Minister of Lands and Water Resources

The said transfer of water requires change to the Water Act and so if this is approved by this House and becomes law, I think that there will be enough water to cater for smallholder farmers for many years to come. However, a major constraint to the development of these schemes is the lack of funding – without funding nothing can be done. When funds are allocated, I can assure you that my Ministry will implement the projects as quickly as possible. I am of a different economic school of thought, I do not believe that this is the time for cutting the budget deficit in Zimbabwe. This is the time to increase the GDP. You will leave the budget deficit where it is and increase your GDP, you will then be achieving your five percent of the GDP which you want.

Hon. members, Mr. Mataure, Mr. Mutyambizi, Mr. Saruchera and others expressed the desire to see dams constructed in their constituencies. It is Government policy to have constructed one medium dam per district since 1980. This project is an on-going programme. To date the situation is as follows. In Manicaland, out of seven districts three already have dams. Mhakwe (Chimanimani), Chako (Chipinge) and Nyahangare (Makoni) are complete.

Page 1662 – 1663: Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 22, No. 29 [Wednesday, 16th August, 1995] Seminar on Government and Financial Management Systems, IRRIGATION SCHEME

Miss S. Mugabe (Zvimba South): Is the Minister aware that I visited his office several times with a document drawn by his officers for irrigation? The irrigation could not take off the ground when I had already found the market two years ago.

Mr. Kangai (MP Buhera South): I am fully aware, the constraints I think I have already explained. I would like the hon. Member to appreciate that our major preoccupation is to see the standard of our people improved. There is no way of improving the standard of living of people in the rural areas apart from providing them with irrigation schemes, because agriculture is the back bone of this economy. So really the only means of improving the standard of living of our people within the rural areas, if we do not provide these facilities to the satisfaction of our people we should all bear in mind that it is really the constraints which are preventing us from doing that for example the financial one which I referred to.

I want to say that we are right now aggressively engaged in discussions with donor agencies and NGO's to raise resources for a programme which we have launched, called the mitigation programme. That programme is for dam construction followed by the establishment of irrigation schemes. I would like to appeal to hon members that whatever you get in contact with donor agencies and NGO's, that is the song you should sing so that we can assist our people.

Miss Mugabe: I am surprised that the Kutama irrigation schemes was not one of their priorities and yet they drew up the papers. I told them that we were going to have a chance last year, but they failed then this year they say they have failed again. I went to the extent of signing a contract for export – [Mr. Kangai: Pasina nemvura yose]
-But I was given water rights. What I just need is equipment.

It is a project involving 38 families who are on 10 hectares to irrigate for export. Now with the Government putting it inside what more do you want us to do in the rural areas.

Page 1687: Presidential Speech: Debate on Speech [The Deputy Minister of National Affairs, Employment Creation and Cooperatives]

Whilst my Ministry remains fully committed to the promotion project youth project throughout the country, we have been seriously constrained in this area as has already been highlighted above, in that no funding has been released by the

Treasury to support this project. Donor agencies like British ODA and Kellogg Foundation of Michigan State USA, have assisted my Ministry in youth development efforts.

Business of The House

Page 171 - 11714

Chief Makoni: Madam Chair, let me jump onto section 57 which says that the Minister may make regulations regarding anything which interms of the Act is required or permitted to be prescribed *etc.* Now when it comes to regulations, I think this is where we plead with Minister to use his influence when these regulations are being made. We have found it very common that people in communal lands from where they are right now are translocated to some unknown resettlement place. Before they are removed, I plead with the Minister to see that regulation are followed that they are not moved before a place is found for them and that people will only be moved when it is very necessary.

The other regulation I would like to plead with the Minister on is on revenue derived from the communal lands. These should be ploughed back into the communal lands. We need that money. Also a protective regulation should be made that no ornament or anything that is in the hills or in the forest should not be tampered with, removed or sold to tourists. These are some of the reasons why probably the climate is changing. I came into contact with people from the South who had come to ask for permission to buy snakes, lizards and other reptiles that they could find to take them away to their own countries and put them in their own museums. It is a way of making money but it is very definite way of losing our own heritage. We need our snakes and or lizards because that is our heritage. I want to tell you that after a few years if these snakes are taken to European countries, we will have to pay a lot of money fly them to go and see what a snake looks like .If you want to try and bring one back. you may have to spend a lot of money to buy it. I think protective regulation should be made so that w lose nothing .People should come and see what we have because we are proud of what of our fathers let us.

Mr. Chimutengwende(MP Mazoe East): I agree with the Chief, unfortunately some of the issue which he is raising do not come under my Ministry like resettlement or cultural objects which come under home affairs. On the question of export of snakes and soon, that also do not come under this bill. It comes under the National Parks Act and on that we only allow exports of any animals after a study has been done and we find that we have of what we need in the country.

Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 22, No. 33 [Thursday, 24th August, 1995] Main Estimates of Expenditure

Page 2064 -2069: The Minister of Local Government:

Somebody said resettlement areas are now havens for criminals and so on. These people will be responsible for that discipline at that level. Any other problems that befall the village, the headman will expected to be the person to explain what has happened. Above him will be the headman and above the headman will be the chief. So that traditional structure will enable us to involve the local population in discussing matters and determining the destiny of rural areas. We are proposing the establishment of village assemblies, where all people can meet under the leadership of a village head and discuss their problems within the village. There are many problems, some of them social and other economic. Then at the level of the headman we will have a ward assembly where you will have a development arm of that ward, chaired by the ward councillor. The ward assembly itself will be chaired by one of the headmen. Within a ward you have maybe more than one headman.

We are proposing that one of the two will be elected by the others to be the chairman of that ward – the councillor is a political figure and the councillor is also developmental, which is why the councillor will be the chairperson of the development and planning committee at that work level. So when this is done, then the council which is now an assembly of all the elected members, on the asis of the ward system will then be sitting to look at what has come from the various wards, having been chained up, inspected, examined, debated and scrutinized by ward assembly and refined submission to council. The council is the political authority and then it makes the decision. Those decisions will then be implemented or submitted to Central Government. So the chiefs and headmen are now going to be playing a very major role in the development process of our country. I believe that this is very progressive- Of course no system is perfect. We will continue to revise it and developments around you will force you to refine and continue to want to refine your system.

The hon. member, Mr. Mberi, you constrast those two. You want to know why Vote I.E.- maintenance of council land jumped fro m \$64 million to \$124 million and what the relationship is with I.K., where the allocation is \$55,5 million. The Vote relates to the DDF, for the maintenance of bridges, dams, airstrips, harbours and all infrastructure. These are lumped together with the salaries and wages of employees of DDF. The apparent large increase in the allocation takes care of salaries for former – you know we have merged DERUDE and DDF, for former DERUDE employees and maintenance of resettlement infrastructure. Similarly, the increase from \$35,7 million to \$55,5 million in item I.K., development also captures the allocation which should have been given to DERUDE, which , if it had been merged with DDF, would have a separate budget. So this merging and marrying of the two has caused the increase in the Vote allocation.

The hon. member, Chief Makoni, chiefs and headmen salaries, I have already said that we are in discussion with the representatives of the chiefs. The idea is to improve on this. For councilors, I have already said that you have already made submission to the Ministry of Finance. The question of resettlement areas, it is a question that has been bothering us also. In the amendment that we are going to be submitting to this House, we are proposing that every resettlement area should be covered by some chief so that tradition is not lost. But although they remain resettlement areas, there must be a chief over them so that there is some form of maintenance of our structures and direction given to those people.

The hon. member, Mr. Madiro, no surveyors. This afternoon I also informed this House that my Ministry and that of Lands and Water have agreed that for now we are going to recruit personnel from Tanzania and South Africa. In the meantime we are also trying to improve the conditions of service of these people. So we are quite aware of the shortage, but please bear with us. Measures are already being taken to quickly address this situation. Madam Chair, I think as I said, hon. members are in support but all are worried that we are not being insufficiently capacitated to respond to the demands of our developmental programmes. But I can assure you my colleague in the Ministry, the Deputy Minister and all staff members have been discussing these matters. We are looking at how best we can stretch the scarce resources that have been available to us to try and achieve that which we can achieve given these resources. But otherwise I want to thank for your support.

Miss Chikwinya (MP Harare North): The Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development is responsible for resettlement of squatters where in the budget is this being catered for and to what extent is the allocation purse? We are looking at squatter camps like Hatcliffe Extension and Budiro especially for their schools, clinics and so on because this is an immense problem the Ministry has.

Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 22, No. 66 [Thursday, 8th February, 1996] Eighth State of the Nation Address by His Excellency The President: Debate on Address

Page 3868 - Page 3874: Mr Mataure (MP Chimanimani):

Zimbabwe has been undergoing an economic reform programme which started in 1990 and what we have seen is that a lot was wished for but not as much was achieved. It is clear to me that while we had very noble ideas and very worthwhile goals towards achieving full economic growth or some measure of economic growth, a lot of work still remains to be done particularly in creating conducive investment environment. We still are very much behind in terms of amending the various statutes that would give rise to an investment stampede. We are still very far behind in ensuring that those who were disadvantaged by pre-independence regulations, statutes and practices also find some entry point the formal economy.

Why would we hesitate to give sufficient support? I am talking of sufficient as opposed to cosmetic or trickle down support. I am talking of substantial support that will be given in the form of guarantees, the expertise and in form of technical advice that could be used for people to move from the small scale that we always assign them to – small scale finance, small scale production, small scale ideas and we end up with small scale economic empowerment. We are therefore reduced to persons that are always finding themselves on the edge of the playing field. We can never be the main players in our own right. His Excellency went on touch on the field of agriculture. Agriculture has been in our country disadvantaged because of the successive droughts. Unfortunately, we do not seem to have learnt much from this problem. We continuously under-budget or under provide for the construction of dams and other investment that could be related to making efficient use of the water that comes down once every so irregularly. Perhaps this particular season is different in that we have received a generally good amount of rainfall. The same may not be said for next year or the year after that. It is important also that we begin under agriculture to bring about a new dispensation in terms of people addressing crops or putting down crops that give them a cash income. Only 1 800 commercial tobacco farmers will benefit from the bulk of the more than \$3 billion that is anticipated from this year's crop and yet we have over 800 000 families in this country who live in the communal lands, who will subsist. Perhaps this year they will call it a bumper harvest, but they already owe four to five bags to the grain loan scheme. The sum total is that they may break even, but they have not had the advice and the support materially and otherwise to put down next to their patch of maize, their patch of sorghum, millet, a cash crop that will help them to see the next season. We have difficulties now that are going to be faced because the GMB is no longer the residual buyer of our surpluses in grain. We have to compete with everybody else to find buyers. It therefore means that unless we come up with strategies to address large volumes that may be harvested, there is going to be a large amount of waste. There already is waste because we do not have suitable in all the districts around the country. It is therefore important that whenever we should address the issue of agriculture, we begin to promote people from the level of subsistence. We should begin to promote commercial undertakings. That does not require large tracks of land. It requires modern training techniques and it requires material support. People cannot be efficient farmers unless they are supported technologically, materially and unless they get an environment which allows them to practice farming as it should be.

Gone are the days when we simply ask for land to settle because we want to put a house or a hut for our families. It is now very important wherever people are settled, there is a means of living. A lot of our resettlement areas do not have the infrastructure to support the new settlers who go there. They start by trying to put up a school, a clinic, the road infrastructure and they are trying to build their own homesteads. At the end of which they should have a crop in the ground if they are to continue to subsist. It therefore means that we are lumping a lot of impossibles on people who have least means. We should begin, in fact we should have begun to move away from that in my view as far back as in 1985 because by that time it was clear that wholesale resettlement without support would not work.

Madam Speaker, I believe that it is important for this House at the next budget to make a concerted effort to ensure that- whilst we have such events as the All-Africa Game where the state invested \$450 million, this nation must become a sporting nation because of that investment. Similarly, if we want people to benefit from agriculture, we should be prepared to invest in a similar fashion. We cannot hope to do it by uplifting a person from region five and putting him in region one or two and hope that miraculously if we give him a bit of seed and provide tillage units, the person will make it. They need far more than that. We need to bring about a culture of efficiency, a culture of dedication to the soil not just in using the soil but in conserving it and conserving everything that goes with it.

Page 3997: Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 22, No. 69 [Thursday, 15th February, 1996] State of the Nation Address

Mr. Matchaba-Hove (MP Mwenezi Central):

Mr. Speaker, I want to move to resettlement. Mwenezi lies largely within the agro-economical region 5 and plus or minus 83 percent of that land is made up of commercial farms. It is a ranching area. The place therefore is not good for agriculture. We depend on *mombe*. Therefore, resettlement in Mwenezi *per se* is not a viable proposition unless and until water is made available so that people could irrigate their lands. Once water is made available, people can grow anything. The sort of resettlement that has taken place is not resettlement and people have been asked to move because a dam is going to be built there. People have been asked to move because a clinic or a school is going to be built there. There is therefore need for resettlement for people in that area who are very good farmers so that they can go to areas where they will use their energy to grow food not only for domestic consumption but for educating their own children as well.

Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 22, No. 70 [Tuesday, 20th February, 1996] Page 4035 - 4037: Periods of Severe Food Shortages Mr. Baloyi (MP Chiredzi South):

I would expect the Zimbabwean people to have the land so that they can fight the drought. That is one step to fight the drought. If we do not have the land, we cannot produce as much as we want. If we do not have land, we cannot fight the drought. I want to urge Government to take the land from those who have surplus. This is our mandate to the President, through these Presidential elections which we are sure he is going to win, for him to take the land from those who have it and give it to those who do not have the land. We are giving him the mandate today through these elections so that he can go ahead and take the land from those who have it. We are all aware that all the people who went to war because they wanted the land. We have been promising people that they should get the land. The land must be bought so that we can produce food for ourselves and many other things that we need in life.

Madam Speaker, I also wish to dwell on the area which is a problem as far as I looked at it and that is the movement of people who move around all over the country looking for areas to settle. That is why I think, the hon. member, Mr. Mberi, brought it as squatters. I do not think that these people are necessarily squatters. They are people who are looking for land genuinely. They are not squatters in that sense, but they are looking for land because they have no land on which to practice the farming that I have already mentioned. This movement must be curtailed. There are too many people who move around and this is not because they want to do so and it is not of their own making but there is a need which drives them to do that. That is because they do not have enough land. That movement of people must be regulated. I remember some time ago I brought up a motion in this House where I advocated for regulations of the movement of people. People move all over seeking for land and for them to get the land, the Government must get the land. There must be rules and regulations to allow people to get into certain areas properly so that we avoid a situation which we had recently where people from other districts or provinces have their property and other resources were burnt and they were moved. Yet they left their things to wonder about and that situation is not good. We are actually humiliating our people and we are making them people who cannot plan their things. That must be avoided. But if they are regulations to follow and then people are allowed to get into land are allowed to settle there permanently they would make progress. If people are left to wonder around, somebody will come to morrow and say you settled at a wrong place and so you must leave, if you do not, we will burn up your things. That is very wrong. These are human beings who must be treated properly and who must follow the proper rules that are laid down by our Government.

We cannot expect our people to be prosperous if they are nomads. They have turned into nomads and they have

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no permanent homes or dwelling places because they are on the move all the time looking for somewhere to settle. Actually we say they are abusing the land. That is not the right thing because they are genuine people looking for land on which to settle permanently and then start producing and progressing. These are some of the things which we must look at.

I also want to dwell on the land reform programme. The Government as early as in the 1980s brought up an idea of land reform. This land reform seems to have disappeared and it is no longer on our papers. Land reform, I believe is a good idea, but it must be taken on sound ground with proper laws coming up with the land reforms so that people know where to go and where not to go. This is a good thing because it will demarcate areas for arables for grazing and areas for development. If we let people do what they want, then we are also abusing the land in that way because they are no guidelines for them to follow. The land reform programme is one of the good things but it is not being taken seriously by our Government. This is why most of our people have fallen victims of problems just because we have not properly put up regulations that will guide and lead our people to produce and then become prosperous as human beings in Zimbabwe.

Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 22, No. 71 [Wednesday, 21st February, 1996] Oral Answers to Questions

Page 4116: Miss Zindi (MP Hatfield): Is the Minister aware that in general the living conditions of farm labourers is just deplorable? May he comment on that?

Mr. A.T. Mangwende (MP Murehwa South): I am aware that instances have been reported of appalling living conditions especially in commercial farming areas. The references should be made to housing. That responsibility really is for the Minister of National Housing and Construction and I am sure an appropriate question could be posed to him. But if you are talking about living conditions in relation to working conditions, then my Ministry is in the driving seat. We do have the Labour Relations Act which governs conditions of service in the private sector. We also have a very active farming union in the farming industry. The Farmers' Union itself is a member of the National Employment Council of Agriculture which takes into account representation by farmers in their capacity as representatives of the workers. It is at those fora that issues of working conditions including increases of salaries and wages are discussed.

Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 22, No. 74 [Wednesday, 28th February, 1996] Oral Answers to Questions

Page 4294 - Page 4296:

Mr. Mabodza asked the Minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development to clarify if the Nyaminyami people were evicted on tribal or regional grounds or not, and if not:-

(a) why these people were selected for eviction while others were allowed to remain in the area.

The Minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development (Mr. J.L Nkomo):

The Provincial Administrators, Mashonaland West, headed the team that went into the area to find out how many of the people in question they were, where they had come from, when they had got there, how they had got there and this was because of the report I had received to the fact that the chief in the area had been receiving monies from illegal settlers. A list of these was submitted to me and I directed that the information be made available to all the parties.

We then proceeded to replan the adjacent resettlement area in order to determine what sizes of plots we were going to allocate to individual sectors and we determined that we could only accommodate a percentage of the number of people who had settled in the Nyaminyami area illegally. In terms of our tradition in the Ministry, we then decided that since there was a recommendation that anybody who has settled in an area for more than three years should not be moved, we determined the cut off point was going to be 1993 and that all those who had illegally settled there after 1993 would be expected to go back to where they came from. There was no regional consideration for us. What was a stake was an unacceptable problem that had arisen in Nyaminyami.

We proceeded to settle some of these illegal settlers in the replanned areas as I said, we were only able to accommodate a percentage of the total number. We then persuaded those who we could not settle in the area to go back and amongst these were people who had come from various provinces and regions. The illegal settlers who had arrived after 1993 were told that they should go back to where they came from. There was no consideration of where you came from, province or region.

Page 33 – 37 Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 23, No. 2 [Tuesday, 9th July, 1996] Presidential Speech: Debate on Address

Mr. Manhondo (MP Seke): I grew in the country, I live in the country and I feel for the country, the communal lands. I am speaking from personal present practical experience. People must be resettled because they are able when they go to the resettlements. Otherwise, you will create deserts.

The people who must qualify for land, for resettlement on the priority list must be college graduates from all agricultural colleges. Let us not start talking about Chibero and start excluding other less privileged colleges. Young people with no jobs in towns but with a willingness to go to the lands must also be considered. Aspiring indigenous commercial farmers must be encouraged and empowered as well as enabled to carry on the business of farming. I am a vowed conservationist and naturalist myself but I am also sensible enough to know that humans come before animals. We have enough land for game parks in this country so much that conversion of land for game keeping cannot willy-nilly considered as productive usage of land when millions are squeezed in. I am referring to a very unfortunate development by our brethren in the commercial farming community where a deliberate policy of commercializing game animals is a ploy to frustrate Government's good intention of acquiring land for human beings – that is wrong. It is immoral, unacceptable, selfish and legislation must be put in place to stop it now.

If I can exemplify from my province, Mashonaland East, which is 3 223 000 hectares in expanse. That land is shared as follows:- Communal occupation 1.5 million hectares or representing 49.3 percent; the population of those communal lands is a little in excess of a million or so. The commercial farms occupies 1 066 722 hectares or 33.1 percent. By the way the 33.1 percent is really of very recent times because before then, the commercial farms occupied about 52.1 percent. When you talk of commercial farms, you are talking of the person who owns the farm, that is who you are addressing and all said, you are talking of 200 people owning title to 1 066 722 hectares of land while a million plus are cramped in 1.5 million. You are the mathematician, work out what that brings. The small scale resettlement and urban occupation occupied the remainder. If you want exact figures, you are talking of small scale farming areas of 3 000 or 5000 resettlement 260 035, urban 1 560. Is it any wonder at all that we have urban migration because at least when they are in town no one is asking them a lot of questions. On the farms the farmer says this is my place and I shall know how and where the people are coming from. So I think this must be addressed as a matter of urgency.

If what I have just described as obtaining in Mashonaland East is what is obtaining nationally, can we honestly sit here as legislators and say yes commercial farms let them occupy 33.3 percent of the land and the majority of the people 49.5 percent of the land? We can not do it. We could not justify our existence in the House. I wish to turn now to the aspect of conservation. As a Government, I think we are neglecting to quite some degree this very vital aspect. Agritex must shape up and get on with the job of protecting the land and making sure that productivity was enhanced and the environment was protected. Again here, I will give you an example of a place I know so well, Mudzi.

Just about every river in Mudzi district is choked and is full with sand, it is a disaster. The reason is stream bank cultivation which is the order of the day. Where is the council? Where is the Natural Resources Board? What are Agritex doing? What are the police doing? Look, independence comes with a big price. The price is called responsibility. I think at this point in time, as politicians, it is time we re-assert our sense of responsibility. When Mr. Coucillor wants to be elected, do not encourage people to stream bank cultivation. Do not fight a man doing his job to stop stream bank cultivation. I sincerely hope the Minister of Environment and the Minister of Lands and Agriculture will take this plight seriously and address this matter. I wish to turn briefly to a matter dear at my heart, rural electrification. According to the Electricity Act, I have discovered that rural electrification in so far it is to benefit the rural folk as implied by its name or term is to go to what are called rural service centers. Rural service centres are occupied by business people, people who have already set up shops, people who have already indicated that they have some means and in some instances they have even pulled the power of their own initiatives.

Page 3088 - 3090: Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 23, No. 48 [Thursday, 19th December, 1996] Ninth State of the Nation Address

The President: The agricultural sector has seen an increase in the production of most of the major crops and is expected to register a growth rate of 49 per cent. Grain crops made a significant contribution to this growth with maize production increasing from 839 000 tonnes in the 1994/95 season to 2 609 000 tonnes while wheat production increased from 65 000 to 250 000 tonnes. Other crops also registered significant increases. For instances, tobacco production rose from 198 000 to 209 716 tonnes. Government is now in the process of putting together an Agricultural Sector Investment Programme aimed at maximising the efficiency and benefits of investment in the agricultural sector. It is intended to enable the achievement of Government objectives in the sector by making more effective use of donor funds and national resources in a manner that will build local capacity as opposed to the creation of a dependency syndrome.

As regards the resettlement programme, over six thousand hectares were acquired and 4 000 families resettled during the period under review. In addition, 64 500 hectares of land were sub-divided into 90 farms units to be allocated to agricultural graduates. This scheme is designed to facilitate the entry of more indigenous farmers into the commercial farming sector. More importantly, decisions have been taken, and work is now under way, to accelerate the pace of the implementation of both land acquisition and the resettlement programme.

Page 984 - 985: Parliament of Zimbabwe Vol. 24, No. 18 [Wednesday, 3rd September, 1997] Presidential Speech: Debate on Address

Mr. Nzarayebani: May I also address the question of land. For years now, the land question has been discussed in this House many times over and as if to deliberately hoodwink the masses of our people, Committees have been set up to look into the question of land. But nothing materialized over such efforts. Today, as I am talking to you, there is a land instrument in place, the Land Acquisition Act. If that Act was put into use, the land question would have been a thing of the past. If that Act cannot work, why not strike it from our statutory books? Why not tell us in Parliament that instrument has to be reviewed? Government? Government, the Executive is making unnecessary excuses. We should designate and then acquire land. That is an Act of Parliament. I do not see why we should have committees after committees. We have the Land Acquisition Act and what simply ought to be done is to designate a piece of land. After designating that part of the land, we compulsorily acquire it and then we resettle the landless. I do not know, if we cannot do that and if there are reasons why can we not be told and why can we not put this Land Acquisition Act into force. I think we must be told. The question of land is a very serious one. If this is not done in time, then the nation should not be astonished one morning to find the ZANLA masses, the ZIPRA masses courageous and violently demanding and confiscating land.

We need land, we fought for land. All Zimbabweans fought for land which was confiscated from them by British colonialists. Government has done a commendable job giving seed packs, fertilizers to many peasant farmers out in the rural areas. But they were giving these seed packs and fertilizers to people without land. How can you do that? Giving billions of money in fertilizers and seed packs and losing billions of money to give to landless people? In my own constituency, where I come from, the land is seriously depleted. There is nothing to talk about. One day I said this Government has done a good thing by giving people seed packs and fertilizers but to do what? Why can that money not be used to buy land and then you resettle the people accordingly? Within a few months, those people will be able to sell their grain and will be able to buy their own seed packs and fertilizers. I think that is more sensible than actually giving seed packs to people without land.

Appendix Eight

World Bank Reports in the Chief Resettlement Planning Officer's Cabinet

AUTHORS	TITLE	SERIES
	Agricultural price policies and the developing countries.	A World Bank publication
Dervis, K., J. de Melo and S. Robinson.	Farmer education and farm efficiency.	A World Bank publication
Kravis, I. B. (et al.).	Electricity pricing : theory and case studies.	A World Bank publication
Bell, C., P. Hazell and R. Slade.	India's exports.	A World Bank publication
Tolley, G. S., V. Thomas and C. M. Wong.	Monitoring and evaluation of agriculture and rural development projects.	A World Bank publication
Jamison, D. T. and L. I.	Development strategies in semi-industrial economies.	A World Bank research publication
Munasinghe, M. and J. J. Warford.	Alternative routes to formal education : distance teaching for school equivalency.	A World Bank research publication
Wolf, M.	The transformation of urban housing : the experience of upgrading in Cartagena.	A World Bank research publication
Casley, D. J. and D. A. Lury.	Aspects of development bank management.	EDI series in economic development
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Ho, T.J.	Measuring health as a component of living standards.	LSMS working paper ; 15
Sullivan, J.M. Cochrane, S.H. Kalsbeek, W.D.	Procedures for collecting and analyzing mortality data in LSMS.	LSMS working paper ; 16
Grootaert, C.	The Labor market and social accounting: A Framework of data presentation.	LSMS working paper ; 17
Acharya, M.	Time use data and the living standards measurement study	LSMS working paper ; 18
Grootaert, C.	The Conceptual basis of measures of household welfare and their implied survey data requirements.	LSMS working paper ; 19
Perraton, H. (ed.).	Natural Rubber.	Sector policy paper
Strassmann, W. P.	Turkey: Industrialization and trade strategy.	World Bank country study
Diamond, W. and V. S. Raghavan (eds.).	Uganda: Country economic memorandum.	World Bank country study
Gittinger, J. P.	Technological effort in industrial development: An Interpretative survey of recent research.	World Bank reprint series ; no. 263

	The Role of self-help housing in low-cost shelter programs for the Third World.	World Bank reprint series ; no. 264
Balassa, B. et al.	Agricultural credit policy in developing countries Agar-kreditpolitik.	World Bank reprint series ; no. 280
	On the development of a general algebraic modeling system in a strategic planning environment.	World Bank reprint series ; no. 308
Dahlman, C. Westphal, L.	Adoption of interrelated agricultural innovations: Complementarity and the impacts of risk, scale and credit.	World Bank reprint series ; no. 206
Banberger, M.	Indigenous anthropologists and development-oriented research.	World Bank reprint series ; no. 208
Kehnert-Schaefer, W. von Pischke, J.D.	Risk assessments and risk premiums in the Eurodollar market.	World Bank reprint series ; no. 220
Bisschop, J. Meeraus, A.	The Economics of higher education in developing countries.	World Bank reprint series ; no. 225
Feder, G.	The Costs of Urbanization in developing countries.	World Bank reprint series ; no. 227
Cernea, M.	Share cropping and the interlinking of agrarian markets.	World Bank reprint series ; no. 229
Feder, G. and K. Ross	Managing adult literacy training.	World Bank reprint series ; no. 230
Psacharopoulos, G.	The Indus Basin model: A special application of two-level linear programming.	World Bank reprint series ; no. 232
Linn, J. F.	Operations research methods in agricultural policy analysis.	World Bank reprint series ; no. 234
Braverman, A. and J. E. Stiglitz	Economic reform in China.	World Bank reprint series ; no. 235
Noor, A.	Stagflationary effects of monetary stabilization policies: a quantitative analysis of South Korea.	World Bank reprint series ; no. 236
Bisschop, J. et al.	Technical change, labor use and income distribution in the Muda irrigation project.	World Bank reprint series ; no. 238
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Goldman, R. H. and L. Squire	General equilibrium theory, project evaluation and economic development	World Bank reprint series ; no. 242

Finger, J. M.	Total factor productivity growth, technological progress and technical efficiency change; Dimensions of productivity change in Yugoslavia, 1965-78	World Bank reprint series ; no. 245
Newbery, D. M. G. and J. E. Stiglitz	Education and parental decision making: A two-generation approach.	World Bank reprint series ; no. 247
Balassa, B.	A model of intraurban employment location: An application to Bogota, Colombia.	World Bank reprint series ; no. 249
Srinivasan, T. N.	From migrants to proletarians: Employment experience, mobility and wages in Tanzania.	World Bank reprint series ; no. 250
Nishimizu, M. and J. M. Page	The welfare cost of taxation: Its meaning and measurement.	World Bank reprint series ; no. 252
Birdsall, N. and S. H. Cochrane	Fostering technological mastery by means of selective infant-industry protection.	World Bank reprint series ; no. 253
Lee K. S.	On exports and economic growth.	World Bank reprint series ; no. 254
Knight, J. B. and R. H. Sabot	Labor market discrimination in a poor urban economy.	World Bank reprint series ; no. 262
Jetha, N.	Land in perspective: Its role in the structure of cities.	World Bank reprint series ; no. 292
Westphal, L. E.	Short-run macro-economic adjustment policies in South Korea: a quantitative analysis.	World Bank staff working paper ; 510
Feder, G.	The effects of population growth, of the pattern of demand, and of technology on the process of urbanization: an application to India.	World Bank staff working paper ; 520
Knight, J. B. and R. H. Sabot	State finances in India.	World Bank staff working paper ; 523
Ingram, G. K.	Women and the subsistence sector: economic participation and household decisionmaking in Nepal.	World Bank staff working paper ; 526
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Mohan, R.	Reforming the new economic mechanism in Hungary	World Bank staff working paper ; 534
Wallich, C., R.J.Chelliah, N.Sinha.	Decentralized renewable energy development in China: the state of the art.	World Bank staff working paper ; 535
Acharya, M., L. Bennett.	Economic return to investment in irrigation in India.	World Bank staff working paper ; 536
Colletta, N.J.	Testing for the direction of exports: India's exports of manufactures in the 1970s.	World Bank staff working paper ; 538

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Abbie, L., J.Q.Harrison, J.W.Wall.	The financing of investment in India, 1975-85: a sources and uses of funds approach.	World Bank staff working paper ; 543
Khanna, A.	Irrigation management in China: a review of the literature.	World Bank staff working paper ; 545
Dutcher, N. (prepared by)	The agricultural development experience of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia: a comparison of strategies for growth.	World Bank staff working paper ; 552
Neumann, P., M.A.Cunningham.	International adjustment in the 1980s.	World Bank staff working paper ; no. 485
Sarris, A. H. and I. Adelman	Incorporating uncertainty into planning of industrialization strategies for developing countries.	World Bank staff working paper ; no. 503
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Pinall-Siles, A., V.J.Ravishankar.	The Effect of discount rate and substitute technology on depletion of exhaustible resources.	World Bank staff working paper ; no. 516
Anderson, D. and F. Khambata	Financing small-scale industry and agriculture in developing countries: The Merits and limitations of 'commercial' policies.	World Bank staff working paper ; no. 519
Nickum, J.E.	Shadow prices for trade strategy and investment planning in Egypt.	World Bank staff working paper ; no. 521
Virmani, A.	The Nature of credit markets in developing countries: A Framework for policy analysis.	World Bank staff working paper ; no. 524
Cleaver, K.M.	Growth and structural adjustment in East Asia.	World Bank staff working paper ; no. 529
Joshi, V.	Improving irrigated agriculture: Institutional reform and the small farmer.	World Bank staff working paper ; no. 531
Farzin, Y. H.	Rural projects through urban eyes : an interpretation of the World Bank's new-style rural development projects.	World Bank staff working paper ; no. 532
Page, J. M.	The Global framework: An update.	World Bank staff working paper ; no. 533
Hasan, P.	Bureaucratic politics and incentives in the management of rural development	World Bank staff working paper ; no. 537
Bromley, D. W.	Industrialization and growth: The Experience of large countries.	World Bank staff working paper ; no. 539
Aksoy, A. M.	Structural aspects of Turkish inflation, 1950-1979	World Bank staff working paper ; no. 540

Tendler, J.	Adoption of agricultural innovation in developing countries : a survey.	World Bank staff working paper ; no. 542
Nolan, B.	Global modeling in the World Bank, 1973-76	World Bank staff working paper ; no. 544
Heaver, R.	Control, accountability and incentives in a succesful development institution : The Kenya tea development authority.	World Bank staff working paper ; no. 550
Chenery, H. B.	Using communication support in projects : The World Bank's experience.	World Bank staff working paper ; no. 551
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	Tribal peoples and economic development: Human ecologic considerations.	
	IDA in retrospect: The First two decades of the International Development Association.	
Sfeir-Younis, A. Donaldson, G.	Fishery.	

**Appendix Nine
Zimbabwe Trade balance**

Exports, imports and Trade balance 1965-1998 (in million US dollars)

Year	Exports	Imports	Trade balance
1965	452	355	97
1966	260	273	-13
1967	272	301	-29
1968	263	333	-70
1969	325	321	4
1970	370	375	-5
1971	404	456	-52
1972	515	475	40
1973	686	606	80
1974	663	665	-2
1975	832	892	-60
1976	691	703	-12
1977	877	710	167
1978	900	665	235
1979	1053	929	124
1980	1415	1445	-30
1981	1408	1596	-188
1982	1276	1539	-263
1983	1135	1205	-70
1984	1155	1098	57
1985	1113	1051	62
1986	1302	1132	170
1987	1427	1205	222
1988	1415	1445	-30
1989	1542	1623	-81
1990	1728	1547	181
1991	1632	2055	-423
1992	1445	2203	-758
1993	1568	1520	48
1994	1885	2241	-356
1995	2119	2660	-541
1996	2397	2517	-120
1997	2464	3065	-601
1998	2432	3029	-597

Source: UNCTAD, 2000, *Handbook of Statistics*, CD-ROM, UNCTAD, Geneva.

