Ethiopian Diaspora in South Africa:
Typology and Policy Implications

By

Gashaw Teshome Mengesha

Supervisor
Professor Oliver Mtapuri

Submitted in fulfillment of the Academic Requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Development Studies, School of Built Environment and Development Studies, Faculty of Humanities, Howard College Campus, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban

November 2016

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated W/O Tewabech Tessema, my mother in-law; Aba T/Haimanot Abebe, my uncle; and to W/T Dinblal Teshome, my young sister who did not make it to see my PhD accomplishments. May God Bless Your Souls!

DECLARATION

This research has not been previously accepted for any degree and is not being currently considered for any other degree at any other university.

This PhD Thesis contains my own original work, except where specifically acknowledged; it also represents the results of my own academic investigation on the types of Ethiopian immigrants in the specified research locations: Durban and Rustenburg.

Gashaw Teshome Mengesha,

Student No. 213573167

Signed……

Date……

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Primarily, I thank God for his blessing, forgiveness, and hope bestowed upon me in this difficult journey of life and academic endeavor. He has permitted people to choose between claiming that they 'evolved from Chimpanzee or ape like creatures' or believeing that they are created by him in his own image. I trust that my true wisdom lies not in obtaining my PhD, but in choosing, since my childhood, to believe two fundamental facts: 1) knowing that God is our creator and savor; and 2) knowing that he created all human beings equal in his own image. This suggests that God has *ecological image*, close to seven billion images, rather than a singular image. Without faith in his power, mercy and promise of a better tomorrow, I could have vanished from the battle grounds of life long ago, and would not have arrived at this landmark in my academic journey with my faith and hope intact. The Almighty God, Glory to you!!!

Coming down to earth, many wonderful people helped me reach the finishing line of the marathon of my PhD studies. I thank all those who positively contributed, and those who challenged, as their efforts made this work worthwhile. While space does not allow me to list all those that contributed, I cannot omit the people that made a direct contribution to the completion of my studies.

As always, my wonderful spouse, Mrs Meseret Lealem Birhanu and my two 'lion-cubs': Nahom Gashaw and Natan Gashaw, were the real forces behind this. Thank you for not only for bearing with me, but also for being my daily inspiration.

As an African I grew up in a family where a mother is the center of everything and head of the family. I thank my mother, W/O Emebet Abebe Dinku for teaching me strong values: fear of God, perseverance, and love for people. I highly revere my father Ato

Teshome Mengesha for being a good role model by holding our family together for 68 years with love and respect; for showing me discipline and hard work and not to give up even under the harshest and most difficult circumstance. Your amazing life philosophy enabled you to live without ever seeing a doctor for the past 98 years, still active and running around like young adult. You are an inspiration, especially after I witnessed the life and health situations in Europe.

This PhD monograph benefited from constructive and transformative comments from several intellectuals with a wealth of methodological, theoretical, and instructive knowledge. Some are within the School of Built Environment and Development Studies (BEDS) and some are outside of it. My supervisor, Professor Oliver Mtapuri is an amazing personality who enabled me to maintain high level performance even when I felt the challenges were insurmountable. Without his encouragement, wonderful approaches to make me dig deep, work hard, and continue to search as well as follow up and timely responses to all my submissions, the completion of this study would have been extremely difficult. His commitment to his students makes him a dream supervisor for students who aim to pursue post-graduate work in Development Studies. Professor Mtapuri, I cannot thank you enough for challenging me to use my potential, especially your guidance on methodologies will remain with me.

As an international student from Finland, support from University of KwaZulu-Natal's research and academic administration was crucial. Coming from outside of South Africa forced me to juggle with a number of procedures and rules across frontiers. I am indeed fortunate to have studied at the University and the College of Humanities under the exceptional caliber and leadership of Professor Cheryl Potgieter, Former Deputy Vice-Chancellor and Head of the College of Humanities, Professor Stephen Mutula, Acting DVC of Humanities, Professor Morojele, Research Dean of College of Humanities; Professor Betty Claire Mubangizi, Head of the School of BEDS, and Professor Pranitha Maharaj for providing me with solutions whenever I faced predicaments that called for their attention.

I also express my gratitude to members of the academic colloquium who participated during the defense of my proposal, namely, Professor Pranitha Maharaj for her sharp and concise comments that helped me to focus the research; Professor Richard Ballard for his comments and suggestions; Professor Brij Maharaj who also provided me with very useful guidance during the development of the PhD project; and Drs Myriam Velia and Dr. Shauna Mottiar, for their rigorous review of the proposal and constructive suggestions at different times. Mrs Catherine Sutherland assisted with research administration during the early phases of my studies. Professor Brij Maharaj was instrumental in my admission to the University by being willing to accept my initial proposal of 2012.

I am grateful to Dr. Kerry Vermaak, Dr. Mvuselelo Ngcoya, and Dr. Daniela who helped me to develop my proposal and acquainted me with the procedures for PhD studies at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. My thanks also go to my fellow PhD students: Ms. Vumbai was my true advisor in several ways and helped me understand procedural issues at the school. Mr Martin, PhD student in Development Studies, helped with printing and delivering copies of this thesis to the School on time. I am especially indebted to Mr Joseph at the Law Library for not only helping me with references on methodology, but also for being with me in Durban for the field work that helped me understand Zulu cultural contexts.

I thank all the external and internal examiners who gave their insightful and constructive criticisms that immensely improved the quality of the thesis. I am humbled by their recognition of my efforts in bringing original ideas into migration debates.

I express my gratitude to Professor Dennis Schaufer and Mrs Catherine Eberle for editing my thesis and offering constructive suggestions in terms of language. At University Helsinki, I thank Professor Juhani Koponen and Dr Mari Lauri, amanuensis of

the Department of Development Studies, for providing me with a letter of reference to the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Most importantly, I thank *International Migration Journal,* for putting the theoretical section of this thesis in the press. I acknowledge all those that contributed to theories on migration and diaspora discourse for creating the pool of migration knowledge from which I drew and added to.

The study participants who gave of their time and knowledge, the people who were instrumental in my 'chain-referral method' and my family who assisted me financially are the true owners of this PhD thesis. Specially, I thank my brother Biruk Teshome and my younger sister Serkalem Teshome for making my life easy in South Africa. God bless you and count your good deeds.

Finally, I am indebted to the following support staff: Mrs Priya Konan, Post-graduate administer in the School; Mrs Iris Gerber of the International Students' Office, and Mr Ludla and Mom Grace, from the Residence and Housing Section.

ABSTRACT

This thesis is the result of a qualitative study conducted in the field of the migration-development-nexus that focused on the Ethiopian diaspora in South Africa and the policy implications thereof.

The main objectives were to examine the characteristics of Ethiopian immigrants, with some reflection on their instrument of constituency development, remittances. To achieve these goals, the following questions were set: 1) what are the composition and profile of the Ethiopian diaspora in South Africa? 2) In what ways are the resultant relationships mediated in Ethiopia and South Africa? 3) What typology does the Ethiopian diaspora follow and how does this shape the nature of its remittances; 4) which analytical framework or model of migration can be developed based on the study? 5) How can the study's findings inform South African policy on migration?

The methodology was informed by a critical realist research paradigm, with interpretivist and constructivist tendencies. The approach combined textual research and field work that targeted migrant clusters in two cities, Durban and Rustenburg. These sites were selected for three reasons: availability of diverse participants, anticipation of quality data and the researcher's familiarity with the study locations. The textual research relied on the relevant literature while the field work employed various techniques to gather primary data. These included interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs), and non-participatory observation. In total 60 participants volunteered to take part in interviews and three FGDs were held to complement the data gathered from interviews.

Employing triangular synchronization between the realities of migration, the behavior of actors, and their public discourses, the study constructed original and distinct meta-analytical categories that can be regarded as extending the boundaries of migration knowledge. The new models are the Police Model, Meteorological Model, and the Ecological Model.

Contemporary public and academic migration discourses are dominated by the views of the Police Model held by powerful actors involved in migration policy and action. This study proposes a paradigm shift towards an Ecological Model as the main analytical tool to understand this phenomenon. This is the antithesis to the Police Model. For instance, the Police Model cites conservative cultural factors to resist 'South-North' movement of people and encourages 'North-South' movement. Moreover, it adopts negative views of migrants as poised to 'swarm the West' and consequently advocates for migration control using militarized methods. It has thus perverted ecological views on immigration and remittances as it establishes links between immigrants, terror, drugs, human trafficking, trans-boundary crimes, and so forth. These linkages are contested in the Ecological Model by using the positive multiplier effects of remittances or immigration.

The Ecological Model presents more inclusive views in that a) it sees Remitting Immigrants (RI) as intelligently development-conscious with practical experience of poverty reduction. They thus work in concert with state or non-governmental organizations as 'agents of development' in their home countries; b) the positive impact of immigrants' remittances is not limited to poverty reduction at household level but trickles down to provide various social-cultural, economic, development, environmental and other benefits in their own and host countries. This givescredence to the notion that immigrants shoulder state failure in many countries; c) the model regards immigration as the aftermath of political and economic crises that are caused by

developed societies through the application of 'double standards of democracy'. For instance, it blames the West for advocating for the values of democracy, yet supporting dictatorial regimes that stifle development and trigger out-migration; e) it regards remittances and immigrants from the broader perspective of North-South relations; f) the model calls for human-centered development and remittances and immigration are regarded as irreversible trends that developed societies should accept rather than seeking to violently reverse. The Ecological Model hence calls for better understanding of immigrants' role as development agents that deserve international assistance. It regards immigration as a desirable human phenomenon which is intertwined with human existence and should not be curtailed.

Besides these ontological propositions, the thesis also proposes epistemological ones with regard to a 'Diaspora-Host Complementarity Index' based on certain criteria. These could include colour, ethnic identity, religion and culture, or historical involvement in violence, be it colonial or ideological. By measuring these and other characteristics of the immigrant population, the host space could enhance its ability to promote social cohesion.

Key findings: The study found that classification based on state of origin does not provide sufficient information about a given immigrant community. Given that such communities exhibit different ethnic, linguistic, religious, occupational, income-based and transnational characteristics, blanket descriptions cannot be applied. For example, economic factors as determinants of out-migration were not found to be appropriate in the context of the Ethiopian prototypical diaspora. Instead, the study found that, hidden genocide perpetrated for the past 25 years by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), against non-Tigray tribes in Ethiopia was a major factor. The data revealed that persecution of the largest ethnic groups in Ethiopia (the Amharas and Oromos) caused out-migration. It was also found that Ethiopian immigrants created jobs, thus refuting the notion that migrants deplete employment opportunities in the host country.

The study concludes that: 1) to avoid victimizing already victimised immigrants, it is essential to study their typologies; 2) sound government policies and strategies could enable the diaspora stock in South Africa to enhance economic growth and human development; and 3) The Ecological Model could be a useful ontology for the phenomenon of migration as it neutralises the polarisation evident at the theoretical level.

Key words: Migration-Development-Nexus; Typologies; Ethiopian Diaspora; Ecological Theory; Critical Realism; Migration Policy; South Africa

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

PAGE

LIST OF FIGURES

PAGE

LIST OF MAPS PAGE

List of Photos page

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ANC:	African National Congress
AU:	African Union
AUIDFC:	African Union's Innovative Financing Conference
AUSAID:	Australian Agency for International Development
BBC:	British Broadcasting Cooperation
BRICS:	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CIDA:	Canadian International Development Agency
DA:	Discourse Analysis
DAT:	Diaspora's Allegiance Transience
DCT:	Diaspora's Cooperative Transience
DGT:	Diaspora's Geographic Transience
DMT:	Diaspora's Mobility Transience
ENB:	Ethiopian National Bank
EU:	European Union
FDI:	Foreign Direct Investment
FGD:	Focus Group Discussion
GNI:	Gross National Income
GDP:	Gross Domestic Product
GONGO:	Government Organized None-Governmental Organization
GTP:	Growth and Transformation Plan (Ethiopia's Government)
HIV:	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HLRM:	High Level Remitting Immigrant
INTERPOL:	International Police
IOM:	International Organization for Migration

LLRI:	Low Level Remitting Immigrants
MLRI:	Middle Level Remitting Immigrants

MTN:	Mobile Technology Network (South Africa)
NGOs:	None Governmental Organizations
OECD:	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
RI:	Remitting Immigrants
RIDA:	Remitting Immigrants Development Agency
OAU:	Organization of African Union
ODA:	Official Development Assistance
OLF:	Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF:	Ogaden National Liberation Front
REST:	Relief Society of Tigrai (GONGO for Tigrai)
SABC:	South African Broadcasting Corporation
SADC:	Southern Africa Development Community
SAMP:	South African Migration Project
SAP:	Structural Adjustment Program (of the World Bank)
SIDA:	Swedish International Development Agency
SSLM:	South Sudanese Liberation Movement
TDA:	Tigrai Development Association (GONGO for Tigrai)
TPLF:	Tigrai People's Liberation Front
UK:	United Kingdom
UKZN:	University of Kwa-Zulu Natal
UNCTAD:	United Nations Conference on Trade and African Development
UNDP:	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR:	United Nations Higher Commission for Refugees
USA:	United States of America

USAID:	United States Agency for International Development
USD:	United States Dollar

USDS:	United States' Department of State
USFATF:	United States Finance Action Task Force
WB:	World Bank
ZANUPF:	Zimbabwean African National Union Patriotic Front

xx

Preface

Description: Overall Structure of the Thesis

This study focused on typologies of immigrants which are referred to as diasporas. It aimed to examine the characteristics of Ethiopian immigrants with some reflection on their *development instrument* through a study of immigrant clusters (Berg, 2004) in two South African cities, Durban and Rustenburg. *

---

* 'Development Instrument' is a multi-disciplinary concept. In medicine, it implies hardware that helps medical clients to mitigate their limitations. Examples include hearing aids, therapeutic aids for the disabled, visionary aids, and so on. In international development studies, 'instruments' are associated with development grants to a third party with a view to fostering relations. However, aid dependency and patronage are sometimes associated with Development Cooperation Instruments (DCI). The 2006 Lisbon Consensus; EU-African Strategic Partnership, and the recent EU Agenda for Change are examples of instruments of cooperation. Poverty reduction, migration and asylum, the rule of law, human rights, good governance, sustainable development, tourism development, and so forth, are the main entry points for DCIs that inject financial aid, grants, and even investment into developing countries. Many argue, however, that Africa has yet to taste the fruits of half a century or more of development interventions as more and more people live in abject poverty; while capital flows back to Europe (Transparency International, 2016). As 'aid' is instrument for the European Union, and other Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations, immigrants' development or poverty reduction is their 'remittance' (Mengesha, 2011). (Also see www.ec/eurpa.eu.co; 'building partnership for change in developing countries', Finance/development instrument/); www.ec.europa.eu/ international cooperation and development/finance/DCI; last updated 04/04/2017; 'EU's Partnership Instrument for Cooperation for Third Countries'; available at, http//: www.welcomeurope.com, accessed 3.04.2017; at 14:09).

The main premise of this thesis is that, *enhancing the positive impact of the diaspora, or managing or controlling it, requires proper understanding of the typologies of immigrants and their characteristics*. Migration and diaspora-related issues are becoming increasingly relevant in contemporary international development, human security, peace and studies of ethnic relations, making this research timely and pertinent.

The study sought to match relevant ontological and epistemological traditions that are useful in studying migration. The synthesis of the realities of migration on the ground, policy actors, and protagonists of relevant theories produced new meta-models that can be regarded as the researcher's main contribution to knowledge. The new models are the *Police Model*, *Meteorological Model*, and *Ecological Model* and they are operationalized throughout the thesis (see Chapter 3).

The thesis is therefore, divided into three main parts. Part I sets the stage by presenting the problems associated with migration, diaspora, development, and the subjects of the study. It comprises the *textual part of the research* and is made up of four chapters. 'Textual' refers to literature and text-based research. This took more time than the field work. In this part of the thesis, the conceptual framework for the study is provided by contextualising 'diaspora'. This is followed by the second tier of the literature review, and the methodology and theories employed. Part II presents the results of the field research, with its corresponding analysis, operationalising the theories, and conclusions. Part III contains the study's overall findings and offers policy recommendations and topics for further study.

Chapter 1 presents the background to the research problem and discusses migration and diaspora in the public, policy and academic spheres. The aim is to unearth the debates, contestations, conflicts of interests and ontological and epistemological motivations for focusing on diaspora. Questions include: why do we study diaspora and Ethiopian immigrants? Why is the subject matter important? Can consensus be reached on appropriate development or poverty reduction strategies if we do not study migration and diaspora? What is this study's contribution to knowledge?

The chapter also provides an overview of migration flows into South Africa and discusses Ethiopian immigrants. Secondary data from the International Organization on Migration are included.

Chapter 2 presents a literature review on the conceptual genesis of 'diaspora' and documents discourses on this notion. It reviews the first portion of the body of literature consulted for this study. The remainder of the literature is discussed in Chapters 1, 2 and 4 that also cover different concepts and theories.

Chapter 3 focuses on the research methodology employed to conduct the study, including the research paradigms, the main research questions, the research design and data collection strategies, the location of the study, the target population and its representativeness, the advantages and disadvantages of the selected approaches, and ethical considerations taken into account in conducting the study.

The field work undertaken for this study comprised of interviews with 60 participants; 40 in Rustenburg and 20 in Durban. In a qualitative study, each person represents a universe of her/his experience; the sample size was thus sufficient. Selection of participants was based on their availability and the locations were chosen based on their appropriateness. Interviews were the primary method of data collection, whilst group discussions and personal experience in interpreting and understanding the data constituted 'tacit knowledge' (*Business dictionary*, 2016). Secondary data and the literature were used to analyse the inputs from the field. The web of participants was constructed through the application of a technique known as 'chain-referral sampling'. Every effort was made to select the most suitable sample and locations. Some degree of 'net-ethnography' was applied as data from the virtual communities were used to interpret the realities in the study locations. The limitation of the study is that, it is limited to the Ethiopian diaspora and the findings do not necessarily apply to all migrants in South Africa. Furthermore, the project was self-funded, leading to resource constraints. Thus, a broader or quantitative study was not possible.

Chapter 4 discusses the study's theoretical framework. Its contribution in this respect is that it systematizes the diaspora literature into ideological categories and binds them into new meta models. The construction of these models partly involved discourse analysis and interpretation of the arguments in different discourses. It also considered the views of influential players, including theoreticians, practitioners, and policy and decision makers. To date, much of the theory has neglected the significant role played by these powerful entities in theorization. Therefore, this thesis combines their roles of agenda setting and execution.

Chapter 5 presents the data from the field in relation to theoretical constructions and policy discourses. The theories employed influenced data collection, especially data on the taxonomies of the Ethiopian diaspora in both study locations. Major differences like tribal affiliation, income and remittance levels, gender and linguistic categories, religious typologies and other features of this diaspora are captured. The case studies of Rustenburg and Durban are explored using similar reference points to enable comparative analysis. One of the study's contributions is consideration of complementarity or a 'compatibility index'. This is an important discussion because it enhances the policy discourse. The migration discourse in the host space is relevant in considering the creation of a measurement for immigrants' compatibility with the host country. In other words, can we construct a matrix to evaluate immigrants' suitability to further integrate into South African society? This question goes hand in hand with the need to identify typologies of diaspora and helps to determine the developmental potential of the Ethiopian diaspora for the host society. As discussed in the background problem, there is a blanket notion of diaspora and immigrants which has undermined knowledge of this subject. Improved understanding can be gained by dissecting existing generalizations to identify typologies, leading to sound policies and practices.

Chapter 6 synthesizes the data analysis in relation to theories. The main argument is that, while South Africa accommodates diverse groups of diasporas, these communities' potential to promote mutual development may not be being optimally exploited. The primary challenge is this regard is a lack of institutional mechanisms to integrate immigrants into the host space. This could be due to the fact that there is a paucity of research on how immigrants can enhance economic development. Instead, the dominant notion is of 'illegality', 'invasion', and other similar articulations in the academic and policy domain. By studying the typologies of immigrants, policy and decision-makers can formulate effective migration management practices that would enhance the positive role of immigrants in local economic development. This is discussed in the context of the main features of the Ethiopian diaspora communities that live in two cities, and analysed in relation to existing debates on migration and diaspora theories or policies. For instance, developed countries have consciously sought to tap into the networking, trade, and knowledge transfer capabilities of resourceful diaspora. Many use immigrants as foreign policy tools to connect to their countries of origin (Tucker, Keely & Linda, 1990, pp.151-165). The aim is mutually beneficial development of the host country and

the state of origin. In line with this global trend, the chapter explores how the Ethiopian government attempts to mobilise its diaspora resources and the study participants' perceptions of this strategy. It is assumed that government mobilisation of diaspora in another country is not possible without a sympathetic diaspora network. The study hence aims to identify the typology of Ethiopian diaspora in the study locations that would enable the government to intervene in the lives of immigrants that live in the cities of Rustenburg and Durban.

Finally, Chapter 7 presents the study's findings and makes overall observations based on the information solicited from the Ethiopian diaspora in Rustenburg and Durban. It includes a postscript on the theoretical propositions that contribute to the body of knowledge in this field. The relevant documents used in the research are attached as appendices, as are the data collection instruments, the original tables and graphs developed for this study, ethical certification, and consent letters.

PART I: TEXTUAL RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

Across the globe, diaspora has received increased attention in development studies and in public, policy and academic discourses, calling for a more precise definition of its meaning. Part I of this thesis consists of four chapters that analyse this subject in the context of this research.

This study focused on two parallel yet interlinked tasks. The first was a rigorous textual literature review and the second was a field study based on individual interviews, group discussions and the researcher's decade-long experience of issues relating to migration in South Africa. Therefore, Part I focuses on texts and ontological debates on migration, diaspora and development. The first chapter sets out the background to this social reality and the justification for the project. It concludes with a discussion on the study's contribution to knowledge.

Chapter 2 presents the first of the literature reviews by examining the history of migration. It them discusses contemporary experiences of this phenomenon in Southern Africa and the regional and global levels. Chapter 3 discusses the research methodology employed for this study, including its aims, objectives, research questions, approaches and paradigms. It summarises the data collection methods and data analysis techniques. Chapter 4 presents different theories of migration, from the classical 'push' and 'pull' factors to the contemporary de-territorial diaspora, in which migrants' transnational characters have become focal points. The motivation for revisiting different theories is that this study adopted an ecological approach in order to ensure a well-rounded perspective of the subject. Singular stories of migration have been identified as one of the shortcomings of existing theories. The researcher thus opted for theoretical inclusivity. This section covers the *what* and *why* of the methods used and the literature reviews that run over three chapters, giving it features of textual research.

CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM

INTRODUCTION

Diaspora, migration and its development nexus is the subject of debate in three major spheres: a) at the public level, b) in policy discourses and c) in the academic or 'ontological' and 'epistemological' sphere. This chapter examines these debates and sets out the justification for this study on Ethiopian immigrants. It also highlights the study's contribution to knowledge on migration, diaspora and development. Questions addressed include: what factors triggered the resurfacing of migration and diaspora-related issues on the global stage, especially in the past decade? Despite being an age-old phenomenon, why do we still lack an emancipatory paradigm to resolve the social and human security problems associated with it? In other words, what are the limitations at the ontological and epistemological fronts? Are there static cause and effect relations in the migration phenomenon in the past or in recent history? Furthermore, are there methodological alternatives to construct theoretical models that could help to resolve the problems faced at the meta-theoretical level?

1.1.1. Policy Discourses: why diaspora became topical?

Debates on diaspora policy have intensified in the past decade for good reason. The global financial crisis forced poor countries to find innovative ways to finance local development as it diminished the funding capabilities of international multilateral institutions like the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and negatively affected the national budgets of governments that are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Consequently, migration or diaspora resources become important in cushioning the decline in Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) that used to pour into developing counties. The WB, IMF and OECD countries encouraged 'Third World' governments to approach their diaspora communities to raise finance for national development. Furthermore, migration crises across the world and their associated

human security and social problems draw global attention to the phenomenon. Syria seems to be the billboard for the recent Middle Eastern migration crisis, whilst in the Mediterranean, the Sahara Desert symbolises the magnitude of the African migration crisis (Baldacchino and Sammut, 2016), (Park, 2015).

Both negative and positive developments have resulted from intensified migration. The positive factors include migration's 1) development and poverty reduction nexus, 2) ongoing promotion of diaspora by different international actors ranging from sovereign entities and intellectuals to multilateral international organizations like the WB (2006) and the IMF (2001) (Black, 2004); 3) migrants' remittances direct link with poverty reduction. Migration thus became the subject of rigorous policy and academic appraisal (Sinatti, 2012), especially as the force behind mobility of goods and services across frontiers.

Recognition of the role of diaspora in development (see European Commission, 'Agenda for Change' 2017), led to a scramble to use the diaspora as a vehicle of socio-economic change in different parts of the world. Different agencies have sought to tap the trade, scientific, skills and technology transfer potential of immigrants, making them important *foreign policy* tools for influential countries in the West, especially OECD countries.

If harnessed by proper policy, diaspora can make up for shortfalls in the host space. The cultural mix, tensions, and competition can generate economic prosperity at macro-economic level (Mohan, 2002). As result, some highly advanced counties deliberately mix cultures by adopting balanced migration policies. The United States is the best example with its allocation of 50,000 Diversity Lottery Visas once year (Kentucky Immigration Authority, 2015)

Africa has long been making up the skills shortfalls in many European countries in the fields of health, education, and other sectors. The youth population deficit has also been addressed by migration from the South to the North. Migration is thus defined by *publicity and policy actions* and the new of role of diaspora as agents of development has made them the center of attention.

Another feature that renders diaspora and immigrants attractive is their acknowledged role in facilitating transnational capital flows and their capacity to create wealth and development in this regard. The WB notes that:

> *'…financial resources, mainly remittance-backed, have the potential to finance [national] projects, such as railways, roads, power plants, and educational institutions.' (World Bank Report*, 2013, pp. 36-37)

The Bank estimates that, developing countries could raise up to 400 billion US Dollars, of which African counties could hold an estimated 52 billion US Dollars from the sale of diaspora bonds alone. The report encourages governments of poor countries to try to convince one in ten members of their diaspora to invest at least $1,000 in their home country. This could generate up to 20 billion USD per year (World Bank, 2013, p. 36). Success will depend on the nature of the projects presented to the diaspora community. They need to be of interest to them, such as housing or infrastructure in their home communities, or schools, hospitals and other community-based projects. The WB recommends that member countries to do their homework by consulting their respective diaspora and providing information on the opportunities available to them (WB, 2013, p. 37). Diaspora could also provide resource through Financial Transition Taxes (from securities, derivatives, bonds, bank service charges, and so forth).

However, a number of challenges are associated with such strategies. These include misconceptions of immigrants that are partly due to media bias, as well as policies and academic discourses in host counties. These issues are addressed in the following section.

1.1.2. Public Discourse

The public discourse often associates diaspora and migration with human trafficking, cross border crime, health hazards, and conflict (Kraut, 1995). For instance, Lyon (2010) discussed the role of diaspora in prolonging or instigating conflict in their home countries. From the perspective of various host countries, diaspora compete for opportunities with locals. As discussed later, it is posited that migrants move to host spaces because of the lack of opportunities, and unemployment, and poverty in their countries of origin. They are thus regarded as a burden and may confront local resistance (Crush, 2013).

While some migrants, like other members of society, are involved in crime, and illegal or illicit activities, and could spread infectious diseases, this cannot be applied to all migrants. Russell King (2012) highlighted that anti-migration discourse often exaggerates the number of migrants, and prejudices public opinion against them by blaming them for different social vices and problems confronting their host communities. Furthermore, migrants that are involved in 'terror', 'conflict', and 'human-trafficking' and trade in banned substances do so hand in glove with local bureaucrats and agencies. It is difficult to counter such stereotypes without clarity on the typologies of immigrants. To avoid diaspora resistance by the host space that is detrimental to human security, development and peace, it is necessary to examine the typologies of diaspora for effective policy and action to optimize its positive contribution to society and development.

Table 1: **Migrant Stock (2016) and Arrival of African Origin Immigrants in South Africa (2011 annual census)**

Origin Country	Major Immigrant Stock	Percentage of Arrival in a year (2010)
Zimbabwe	475,406	39%
Mozambique	449,710	14.2%
Malawi	60,469	7.1%
Lesotho	350, 611	6.3%
Somalia	69, 688	2.8%
Ethiopia	44,891	2.5%
Swaziland	91,232	1.6%
Nigeria	17,753	1.3%
Congo	21,855	1.2%
DR Congo	70,077	1.2%
	Source: IOM Data (2016)	*(Source: Statistics South Africa Data)*

The challenges identified above are associated with 'out-migration', which tell only one side of the story. Nonetheless, in the context of 'away from home' spaces, the migration crisis manifests itself in targeted attacks on immigrants by host communities and vice

versa (Crush, 2008). In countries where host communities are living in economic deprivation with high unemployment and poverty rates and political discord, migrants become useful subjects of blame.

The social and print media abound with reports of physical violence, predatory behaviour and acts of hate being committed between people of the same race group, which is a form of a 'pseudo speciation' expressed through denial of their shared humanity (De Rivero, 2003), (BBC, '*Xenophobia'*, 2013). These human security problems are not restricted to the 'global South'; more developed societies are not immune to such vices (Darvas and Wollf, 2014). Indeed, intra-human speciation and conflict over spaces of belonging are on the rise, with detrimental impacts on development and poverty reduction. As noted earlier, multilateral financial institutions are of the view that immigrants' resources could be used to energize economic growth and drive poverty reduction in developing countries, (Hanson, 2011; Cortez, 2016). Furthermore, developed countries are scrambling to tap into such resources. However, African's self-hate and violence against immigrants undermines their contribution to local development in both the host country and the state of origin (Crush, 2008) and Ethiopians are not immune from such challenges. The uneven nature of public discourses on migration is reflected in policy and probably academic arenas.

The main reason for the *uneven nature of public discourses* on migration is its link to the host country's overall social and economic well-being. When the host community experiences different upheavals, there are negative reactions to migration and immigrants. Historically, economic crises induce resistance to strangers and war causes human migration. World War II followed the great depression of the 1930s and was also the time that Europe witnessed the rise of anti-Semitism (Richards, 2012). The Jewish holocaust is one example of the interrelationship among economic problems, internal upheavals and violence against foreigners.

The global economic recessions of the 1990s that followed the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War produced migration problems and conflict. These examples show that two important phenomena usually overlap: an exodus of people from their home countries due to war and conflict and increased resistance to immigrants by host countries (Kraut, 1995). World War II prompted Jews and other

European nationals to move to the USA, creating a new wave of migration that caused stigmatisation in the country of destination. The end of the Cold War also resulted in an unstable situation in the Balkans, with the subsequent exodus of immigrants from the former Yugoslav Republic, Kosovo, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, and so forth. Chechnya in the Russia Republic witnessed significant human movement. The war in the Middle East produced a huge number of immigrants from Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries while tyranny and tribal warfare drove people out of Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and so forth.

Receiving countries are confronted by internal division and political dilemmas: to accept or not to migrants. Divisions are often caused by nationalist sentiments and conservative views on immigrants. When immigrants add to the host space's worsening economic situation, human insecurity results among both groups. In developed counties, call for domestic economic efficiency go hand in hand with migration control (Calvita, 1996). Therefore, in some economically affluent countries, migration has been used as for political mobilization, especially among conservative forces. The recent presidential campaign in the USA is testimony to how migration issues are central to political debates. Some rightwing candidates with nationalistic leanings argue that migrants are negatively affecting the local economy and promise to fortify boundaries to prevent further human movement from the South (Trump, 2016). Therefore, addressing the problems associated with foreigners becomes high priority. To the frustration of most in the anti-migration camp, the by-product of economic turbulence is conflict and out-migration from different parts of the world. We thus find ourselves in a vicious cycle of migration and resistance to it.

However, migration is natural and unavoidable. Instead of trying to prevent it, we need to understand it properly and to turn the vicious cycle of migration-resistance-migration into the virtuous cycle of migration-cultural-enrichment, followed by development. Rational public policy on migration is a prerequisite for this to occur and it begins with knowing the types of diaspora involved. Africa could learn from the European Union that benefited from transboundary migration within Europe.

1.1.3. Academic Discourses: Ontological and Epistemological Problems

The study of international migration and diaspora is fraught with methodological and theoretical contestation. The quest for a unified, balanced diaspora and migration theory continues. This problem has ontological and epistemological (meta-theoretical) dimensions (Losifides, 2007). Historically, the methodological approach adopted in migration studies was an 'empiricist-positivist approach' and quantitative 'survey methods' were employed for most research in the field. This method corresponded with the early phase of the migration phenomenon which centered on the movement of labour from rural to urban environments within a country. However, international migration confronted the academic community with the dilemma of seeking the truth or fulfilling its emancipatory role. The limitations of quantitative methods in capturing aspects of migration thus became more apparent (Losfides, 2007).

Among the meta-theories discussed in this study (see Chapter 2) the Meteorological Model and the Police Model either adopt a nationalist approach or rely heavily on empiricist positivist research methods. What is lacking is an ecological perspective on the migration phenomenon, which Losifides (2011) refers to as 'critical realism in migration discourses' and which most scholars describe as a 'multidisciplinary' or 'multi-level' approach (King, 2012). In seeking to fill the lacuna in the theoretical and methodological spheres, the current qualitative study adopts critical realism and multi-dimensional approaches and suggests the Ecological Model as a new perspective to understand migration. Such a model is appropriate as it is capable of capturing more complexities than a quantitative method. Migration studies demand that one look beyond the numeric to the invisible power relations, processes, stories, decisions, policies, actors, environments, and human, and social aspects of the phenomenon which are its main features. Although the quantitative method is still relevant in limited areas of migration studies it has passed the baton to the qualitative methods that are used in most contemporary studies on migration. It is for this reason that international migration and development studies can clearly identify the roles and actors involved in this phenomenon. The qualitative aspects of migration include decision making at individual and national levels; identity formation; changing theories on migration; narratives on immigrants' experiences; the role of social capital; networks; migration's transnational character and racial discrimination, xenophobia and self-hate. Such issues cannot be

properly investigated using empiricist-positivist methods that rely on numbers, statistics, and econometrics. The Meteorological Model is characterized by over-reliance on numbers, while the Police Model draws heavily on nationalism. This study thus identifies the Ecological Model as a new meta-theory (ontological level) that employs a qualitative research method and uses a critical realist perspective (epistemological level) to construct its propositions.

Protagonists of the realist meta-theoretical framework, a qualitative method for studying diaspora and migration, Teodoros Losifides comments:

'*within realist frameworks, qualitative methods can become powerful means to investigate social reality in all its complexity and ontological depth and to enhance the causal-explanatory as well as the emancipatory potential of social science research method and social engaging in general'* (Losifides, 2007, p.30)

Most theories that employ empiricist, positivist, quantitative methods like those characterised under the Meteorological or Police Models (Chapter 4), articulate the phenomenon of migration from a top-down perspective, as outsiders to it, or from the perspectives and convictions of host and sending governments. They thus, focus on numeric issues, including how many immigrants are 'going out' or 'coming in' to host countries, the directions of migration flows, and how much migrants remit. Host and sending governments identify somewhat similar causes of migration and often see it from the angle of diplomatic correctness; poverty and unemployment thus become neutral and attractive explanations rather than the real issues that drive migrants out of their countries of origin. Poor governance, persecution and even genocide are overlooked or downplayed due to the consequences of acknowledging such for both sending and receiving states. Hence, these powerful actors ensure that they distance themselves from the discourse of migration. Popular views in migrant source countries and even in host states are contrary to what governments hold and represent a bottom-up perspective, which is referred as an 'emic view' by migration scholars (Berry et al., 1992).

As discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, the classical diaspora theory benefited from bottom-up, emic views, but immigrants' perspectives remain scarce in theorising migration.

There are two fundamental reasons for the top-down perspective in academic, public and policy migration discourses. Firstly, most of the existing literature is security-informed and designed to tackle diaspora and immigrants as an alien variable that the host needs to stand against. This is exacerbated by the lack of studies on the typologies of immigrants, be it to maximise their potential benefit for host communities or to identify which typologies should be excluded from protection within host countries. Ill-informed notions about diaspora obscure the potential benefits that immigrants could offer to the host country based on their knowledge and entrepreneurial skills. The second shortfall is the result of the focus on the volume and direction of diaspora and their remittances while their development agency is under-theorized, calling for an ecological approach. These two problems have created epistemological gaps that need to be filled with a bottom-up perspective in diaspora and migration knowledge. This was one of the motivations for conducting the current study.

1.1.4. Why Explore Ethiopian Diaspora?

This study aims to enrich the knowledge base on the composition of Ethiopians living in South Africa and explore their typologies. The South African migration management discourse could benefit from the perspective that this study brings to light. In contrast to the traditional stigmatization of diaspora, developed societies' experience shows that it can be an important resource for development. The rationale for engaging diaspora is thus to tap its significant potential for the development for both the host country and the state of origin. Faist (2010) and Burbaker (2005) note that, migrants' home countries promote the concept of diaspora to encourage remittances, investment and political loyalty among their economically successful expatriates.

India and Israel's success in raising 35-40 billion USD from the sale of diaspora bonds, and the experiences of countries like China, South Korea and others, in benefiting from remittances for their economic and technological advancement, highlight the diaspora as a factor of economic growth (Ketkar, 2007). Examples of national economies that experienced remittance-induced growth, on the one hand, and the global financial crisis, on the other, motivated the WB and IMF to encourage poor countries to exploit the potential of their immigrant communities abroad to their economic advantage (Ratha, 2006; Solimano, 2003).

Devan and Tiwari (2000) reviewed Chinese and Indian diaspora mobilization strategies and recommended that they adopt the engagement approach favoured by counties in the developing world. They noted that, 'most countries have done little to leverage their expatriate talent by developing a strategy that encourages the participation of migrants in the home country's development to mitigate the effects of brain-drain' (Davone, 2000, p.2). 'Circular-migration' (Kapur, 2006) was considered as one of solution to 'brain-drain'and this in turn gave rise to the Silicon Valley model. The silicon vally model suggests creating schemes through which poor countries create their own scientific centers and network with their foreign-trained nationals. The global financial crisis and the need for innovative financing prompted international, regional and global organizations like the AU's Innovative Development Financing Conference (2015) and the WB and IMF (*Financing Development Beyond 2015*, p. 31), to recommend that member countries engage their diasporas for remittances, direct investment, social capital, and purchase of sovereign bonds. Aggressive diaspora engagement strategies are thus being implemented by countries of origin in the developing world, although there is little clarity on who the diaspora is and how they are related to their countries of origin.

Developing countries like Ethiopia have followed the advice of multilateral organizations and have adopted diaspora polices and national structures to engage their diaspora. However, at this stage, the focus is more on political loyalty than on the migrants' role in poverty reduction at home. This promotes an exclusionary approach.

While most scholars would agree that despite different conceptions, the subject of diaspora has become relevant in international development studies and has been the subject of macro level analysis, a well-rounded micro perspective is lacking. If we do not study diaspora, we will remain unaware of the positive role they could play. Authors such as Gilroy (1994, pp. 207-212) have discussed the institutional methods employed by nation states to address diaspora, such as 'assimilation' that aims to dilute the distinct characteristics of migrants. Despite such efforts, diaspora has become a relevant transnational actor and is becoming an increasingly important subject in both academic and public discourses.

The study of typologies of immigrants is necessary due to the problems associated with the blanket application of policies relating to immigrants. In the eyes of global development funding agencies, the concept of diaspora is a monolithic one that refers

to the whole immigrant stock of a given country without verifying if the immigrants in that country identify with a given national state, while living in exile. For instance, most Ogden Somalis or Oromo migrants around the world do not consider themselves to be Ethiopians. A diaspora mobilization strategy that ignores tribal and ideological differences within the diaspora and treats them as monolithic group that traces its roots from a conventional nation state as understood by the WB and IMF, would be counter-productive (Ratha and Ketkar, 2007). Furthermore, efforts by the state of origin to mobilize its diaspora are often not well-received. Migrants sometimes find it difficult to relate to the structural and institutional predicaments of their home country. While they are urged to return to counter brain drain, working conditions back home do not compare to those that they enjoy in the host country. There is also a tendency to take practices at the international level and implement them wholesale in the state of origin, with insufficient regard for the uniqueness of the country's economic situation and work environment.

The evidence suggests that states of origin play on the nostalgia and patriotism of their scientific, business or other sections of the diaspora. However, the Ethiopian diasporic prototype is not officially allowed to re-enter the country once forcibly removed because they will then fall under the protection of the Geneva Convention (1951) that recognizes them on the basis of persecution. While campaigns aim to invoke homesickness within this group, should they return, they could face the wrath of the state for the very reasons that prompted their emigration. Such campaigns in Ethiopia are examined in Chapter 6. Disillusion and loss of hard-won savings are among the complaints of the diaspora that have returned home. This is due to discrepancies between the TPLF's government's exaggerated positive projections of the country as a 'developing' one that is ripe with opportunities and the reality on the ground. This creates expectations and could dampen enthusiasm to contribute to the country's development. Migrants often forget the history that caused their expulsion from their home state. Hence, upon return, many become disillusioned or suffer systematic abuse at the hands of the state that lured them home in order to exploit their financial resources. The state of origin focuses on migrants' remittances and ignores the needs of those that had issues with the state at the time of their departure. Persecution is one of the push factors for migration and while memories of such can become diluted over time, it continues to determine the strength of the migrant's bond with their home country (Galto, 2000).

When the Ethiopian government draws up a diaspora mobilization plan (see *Ethiopian Diaspora Policy* 2015), it does not specify its target diaspora community. Instead, the government prefers to use the concept of the Ethiopian diaspora as a blanket one as this enables it to exercise its authority over migrants who claim to have escaped its persecution. The diaspora community of Ethiopian origin is diverse and most do not avail themselves of the protection of the Ethiopian state. Studying their typology would help to identify which kinds of immigrants would be willing to do so and become involved in remittances and development projects back home, while living as diaspora in the host space. As Gebremariam (2014) points out, the Ethiopian government popularizes 'diaspora' in order to both control its immigrant population abroad and to mobilize its sympathizers for national development projects (*Ethiopian Gov. Diaspora Policy*, 2013). He argues that, the main aim is to diffuse political threats from opposition forces that reside outside of its jurisdiction. Such claims need to be scientifically verified, motivating this research on typologies of Ethiopian diaspora, the nature of their remittances, and the policy implications.

As stated earlier, attracting capital from migrants is major reason for home countries to woo their diaspora. Recent data show that Ethiopia received 3.7 billion USD in money transfers from migrants, which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed was bigger than Ethiopia's earnings from exports and the total amount of aid that came into the country in 2015 (APA, 2015). The same report indicated that the major source of remittances is the country's migrant population in North America, followed by the Gulf States, and Europe. The main channels were Money Gram and Western Union, which signed an agreement with the National Bank of Ethiopia in 2004. However, Ethiopia did not benefit from remittances to the same extent as Asian countries. For instance, in the same year, India received USD 70 billion in remittances. Countries that enjoy higher levels of remittances suffer fewer constraints in tapping the resources of their migrant communities. Among other factors, the status of their citizens abroad impacts remittances, skills transfer, investment and development in general.

While Ethiopia has a huge number of migrants in Africa, mainly in South Africa that is home to 44,891 people of Ethiopian origin (IOM, 2016), their level of remittances is low. This is attributed to the status of these migrants as most are illegal, and the lack of cooperation among banks. Informal money transfers undermine the benefits of remittances and their impact on development.

Ethiopia's *Diaspora Affairs Directorate General Report* of 2015 notes that the country planned to optimize the benefits from migrants' remittances by facilitating money transfer channels for illegal immigrants as well. Because of the way many diaspora were expelled by the Ethiopian state, they deliberately avoid sending money via agencies that are connected to government banks. Instead, they use interpersonal channels to reduce the government's access to foreign currency (Gebremariam, 2013). The number of Ethiopian migrants is comparatively small compared to total inward migration to South Africa, which the International Migration Organization puts at 3.14 million (IOM,2016). Namibia is one of the primary countries of origin of migrants in South Africa (at 133,282, which is not reflected in the data below). South African census figures show that, in just one year 188,598 people moved to South Africa (Statistics South Africa, 2011).

In addition to the movement of money and other non-monetary valuables, diaspora flow also takes place between developing countries, which is known as South-South migration or the South-South diaspora (Plaza, 2006). The IOM states that, 45 per cent of the global diaspora, which is estimated at 85 million people, is found in Africa. However, diaspora within the Pan-African framework has not received sufficient attention.

Furthermore, resistance to migration dominates the discourse, downplaying the benefits that African countries could gain by hosting diaspora of different kinds. The following data provide a picture of the state of the South-South diaspora flow at global level.

Hence, the motivation for this study can be briefly stated as: 1) the increasing relevance of South-South remittances and the link with the typology of immigrants; 2) the need to understand the specific typologies of migrant groups that become vehicles for the country of origin to intervene in the lives of its diaspora; and 3) the need to consider the policy dimensions of diaspora-remittance related issues.

Table 2: ***Cumulative Global Diaspora Flow (2005)***

Origin	**Destinations**			
	North	%	**South**	%
North	25 Million	14	8 Million	4
South	64 Million	37	87Million	45

(Source: IOM, 2005)

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

Diaspora is an opalescent concept that means different things to different people. Research on this concept thus needs to start by framing the discourses on the term itself (Laclau, 1996). This chapter commences by presenting different notions of diaspora in the literature from an historical perspective. The classical notion that highlights the genesis of the concept is presented, together with a discussion on some of its limitations. It is noted that some of these clarifications could also be regarded as theories and that there are overlaps between attempts to conceptualize diaspora and its theorization. While some of these studies date back decades, they are of paradigmatic significance in the migration discourse. The debates are presented chronologically from the old seminal works to the latest propositions. The work of the classical school such as Safran (1991), Cohen (1997), Armstrong (1976) and others is revisited. The post-modern school of thought in diaspora discourses represents a watershed in the conceptualization of the concept of diffusion. This is covered in the first segment of this chapter which concludes by providing an operational definition of diaspora in general as well as the Ethiopian diaspora.

The second portion of this chapter addresses writings on the diaspora, migration and development nexus which is pertinent to African migration. The literature is classified according to its regional and universal significance. The Cape Town-based South African Migration Project is a major organized regional discourse on diaspora and can thus be considered as primary literature for this study. Secondary literature sources with universal significance focus, on the one hand, on migration and its security-nexus and on the other, on its nexus with development. The third category of literary sources for this study consists of studies that assist the conceptual clarification of the Ethiopian diaspora. These represent the 'attic' views and include views held by the state of origin and the host country. The definition set out in Ethiopia's Diaspora Policy (2015) is adopted as the functional definition to describe this phenomenon. However, in comparison with global conceptions, it is limited in that it does not capture the bottom-up view of immigrants themselves (see the definition in the following section). The chapter ends with concluding remarks.

1.2.1. Literature on the Conceptualisation of Diaspora

1.2.1.1. The Classical Notion and its Discontents

There is no straight-forward, universally accepted definition of diaspora (Sideri, 2008). However, there is consensus among most ethnographers, anthropologists, and international migration scholars about its etymology and the Greek origins of this term (Anderson, 2002; Appadurai, 1995; Clifford, 1997; Cohen, 1997; Deleuze, 1983; Edwards, 2001, 2003; Lotard, 1984; Malikki, 1992; Safran, 1991; Toloyan, 1997). Russel King (2008) notes, that, diaspora's conceptual contours have become blurred due to on-going diversification of diasporas or migrants themselves (Stein, 1997; Demmers, 2002; Raveesh, 2013). Hence, the epistemological scope of the term is layered with competing (Sideri, 2008; Harutyunyan, 2012), and at times contradictory discourses (Schweid, 1984; Lily Cho, 2007). While we seem to have arrived at the stage where the original meaning of diaspora is rapidly waning, its pervasive usage continues unabated in both academic and policy forums, with all its opacity.

Numerous scholars have sought to define and analyse the concept of diaspora. The post-colonial perspective represented by, among others, Said (1992), Gayatri (2005), Hall (1990), and Gilroy (2004) gave impetus to the discourse on diaspora and to its conceptual construction by juxtaposing migrants' real-life situations with the notion of diaspora (Shakelton,2008). However, their classical predecessors laid the foundation for this discourse. Armstrong (1976) described diaspora in terms of three features: a 'collective identity', the existence of internal organization as distinct from 'host and origin state' and significant 'contact with homeland'. He identified the maintenance of boundaries through constructing diasporic walls of distinct cultural practices that do not include the host's cultural practices as of particular importance. Following Armstrong's definition, cultural assimilation was adopted as a strategy to dismantle such boundaries and much of the early 1980s diaspora discourse targeted immigrants and blamed them for not wanting to mix with locals. 'Multiculturalism' versus 'assimilation' was the dominant feature of these debates. The former term denotes the American model and the latter, the models followed in some European countries.

The discourse was further enriched by William Safran's work on four typologies of diaspora (Safran,1991), Bruneau's (1995) writings on the features of diaspora focusing

on transnational networking, Robin Cohen's analysis of global diaspora (1997) and his 'eight-typologies' of diaspora, and Tsagarousianou's (2004) work on the ethnic features of diaspora.

Safran's (1991) paradigmatic notion became the point of departure for most migration scholarship. A Jewish scholar, he made a significant contribution to the conceptual transformation of the term as a theoretical element and analytical category by viewing it through the lenses of the history of violent dispersions of Jews and discriminatory typologies. However, his propositions were widely contested, especially his discriminatory typologies of victims in the African diaspora (Safran, 1991, pp. 90-99). Safran portrayed diaspora as a monolithic concept arising from the bi-polar dichotomy of 'home' and away from 'home' with reference to 'a single, endogamous, ethnic group with fixed origin, a uniform history, a life style cut-off from citizens of the host and with strong aspiration to go back and perpetuate a given political system based on their original land' (Safran 1991, pp. 83-84). He also maintained that diaspora is associated with communal solidarity expressed by means of symbols, participation in nostalgic activities and a significant connection with home. In much of his work, diasporic marginalization by the host society was identified as the exogenous variable that intensified the quest to return home (Ruth, 2000; Cohen, 2008; Safran, 1991).

The concept of diaspora was initially used in exclusive reference to Jewish experiences of exile and their migration from their original home in Jerusalem to Babylon around 500BC. These migrants carried with them their imagination of home, their memories of the past and their victimhood through violent and genocidal expulsion (King, 2008:15). For Safran, the longing for the home country as 'lost' is central to the construction of the concept of a 'prototypical diaspora' as opposed to the 'hyper-real diaspora' that proliferated in later times (Cohen, 1997). The categorization of a distinct kind of diaspora has its roots in the Zionist movement's mobilization for statehood (Cohen, 1996). However, King's (2012) question as to why Safran preferred to use a Greek word instead of a Hebrew one remains unanswered. The Hebrew equivalent for diaspora is '*go 'la'* and '*galut*' that literally means 'banishment, exile' (Cohen, 2008, p 21). It carries the tacit meaning of a penalty imposed by God for previous sin and does not support Safran's premise of victimhood. It is possible that the term diaspora seems more innocuous than

the Hebrew *go'la* and *galut.* Alternatively, when Greek-speaking Jews in Egypt translated the Septuagint (the Jewish scriptures), particularly the Duets (28:25) that documented the life of Joseph and others who can be termed the first exiles, they might have used the Greek word 'diaspora' (Taylor, 2011:1). While Safran's efforts to connect diaspora to the Jewish experience alone were challenged even at inception, his contribution became the dominant discourse until the late 1990s. Exponential growth in migration exposed the limitations of such propositions and the concept was revisited to include the experiences of Armenian and African victims of slavery (Sideri, 2008; Fazal & Tsagarousianou, 2000, pp. 6-7; Glick, 2006, p. 24).

Cohen (1997) expounded the typologies of 'ideal diaspora' by adding four features to Safran's proposal, including 'voluntary dispersion'. In contrast, Safran considered involuntary dispersion as a distinguishing characteristic of diaspora. Cohen also noted that the question of being or not being a diaspora should be measured against a time frame. Thus, crossing a given socio-political boundary does not automatically render a given migrant stock a diaspora; rather, an extended time of stay in a foreign land is the qualifying feature. However, the time frame was not clarified.

While Safran's and Cohen's explanations of the concept of diaspora were useful starting points, debate continued. A Greek scholar that has published extensively on diaspora discourse, Eleni Sideri (2008: p. 34) argues, that the term has a double-edged meaning corresponding to its word roots: '*Día*' is a preposition which, when used in compound words, means division and dispersion; and '*Spiro*' literally means to 'sow' seeds, suggesting 'dispersion' on the one hand and 'plantation' on the other. This challenges the common notion of one-way dispersal from a 'lost center' to different geographic locations, and of being 'uprooted', because the word diaspora itself presupposes a sedentary and stable life in the host country. This interpretation is interesting because it proposes that the meaning of diaspora includes not only 'lost home land' but also the 'host country'.

Later scholars challenged both the bi-polarity of places in the conception of diaspora and the imagination of home, in which the imagined home was a 'lost' one but still existed, whereas the contemporary imagination of homeland involves a 'virtual home' or

a ‘de-territorial one’ (Stubbs, 1999). The classical conception was the precursor to the birth of a nation as experienced in the creation of a Jewish state (Friesel, 2006) and the ideological relationship between diaspora and Jewish nationalism. Boyarin and Boyarin (1993) stated that Zionism was predicated on the myth of autochthony and Jewish identity. Kedar (2003) and Safran (2005) observed that, the destruction of the Ottoman Empire inspired ambitions of sovereignty, and diaspora and exile were termed an unnatural condition that cannot (and must not) persist. Restoration of the ‘lost home’ is hence so relevant in terms of Jewish identity that it became a mobilizing strategy for statehood. This new conceptualization, that emerged at the turn of the third millennium presents ‘home’ as a fantasy of obtaining statehood (Dubnov, 2011). Such aspirations might not be restricted to a particular geographic location, as in the case of a ‘universal Islamic Uma’ (Akram, 2007; Awan, 2012; Ferrer-HIgueras, 2006; Laffan, 2013); or it may take the form of geographic ambition, for instance, the imaginations of the Kurds, Palestinians, Basks, Irish (Northern Ireland), and so forth (Alinia, 2004; Hear, 1998; Addis, 2012). However, Safran (1991) contended that diasporic groups with completeness of character should be regarded as a true diaspora typology, for instance the Gypsies, Black Americans, and so forth.

Another Achilles’ heel of the classical conception of diaspora was the notion that diaspora is a linear and uni-directional movement from the center of origin to a different peripheral destination. This notion was challenged for its incompleteness in explaining all diasporic flows. Hence, the new conception of diaspora focuses on ‘return migration’ with a dense network, knowledge, and material resources (Roullege, 1996; Kymge, 1996; Faist, 2000). It arose from the perception of diaspora as ‘transnational space’ or one that was ‘de-territorialised’ (Tölöyans, 1991) or when diaspora is a multi-polar reference to interconnection and tensions (Appadurai, 1996; Bash and Blanc-Szanton 2006). Such broad definitions led to diaspora being used to describe all the citizens of a country that live outside their home land. Fig. 1 below shows the conceptual genesis of ‘diaspora’.

Fig 1: Conceptual Genesis of ‘Diaspora’



1.2.1.2. Diaspora as a Concept: Signifying 'Immigrants' and' Transnationals'

Currently, the term seems to no longer signify a specific ethnic group and has instead become a description for a mobile multinational or cultural group that represents a specific kind of global space (Stuart, 1990; Tölöyans, 1996; Basch et al.,1994). It is estimated that more than 240 million people live outside of their countries. Were this population to be contained in a single geographic space, it would be the 5th most populous country in the world (King, 2012). In conclusion, initial conceptualisations of diaspora were expanded to include later rounds of victim diasporas (Africans and Armenians) and were further redefined to denote labor and business mobility, as in the case of China (Bhargava and Sharma, 2008); the Islamic Uma and the scientific diaspora (Barre, Hemadez, and Vinch, 2007); and more recently, a transnational social and cultural networked society that sometimes defies being delimited within a given state frontier, which implies high cultural hybridity (Bhabah, 1994; Mohan, 2006; Meyer, 1997; Werbner, 1997). Some scholars have introduced the notion of a universal horizon and a global society into the diaspora debate (Baker, 2006).

Most recent discourses on diaspora focus on migration. For example, King (2010) discusses the 'typologies of migration' rather than the 'typologies of diaspora'; this illustrates the diffusion of the original concept articulated by Safran 1991; Cohen 1997; and Sideri 2008. King's study focused on the manner in which a given migrant population moves into the host country and uses this to determine their topology, in sharp contrast to the classical works on diaspora (Armstrong, 1976; Safran, 1991; Cohen,1997; Ruth, 2000) that used the criterion of the 'manner of exit' or 'dispersion' from the original home country as a primary determining factor for a community to be called diaspora. King's discussion of migration can also be considered as a theoretical coordinate where the concepts of 'diaspora' and 'migrants' connect, signifying a similar category of population in each host space.

The notion of 'transnational communities' (Vertovec, 2003, 2004b) complicates the conceptual landscape of diaspora and even migration itself, particularly the suggestion that people can be considered as diaspora without migrating (King, 2012). This could provide a coup-de-grace to the concept of diaspora, and represents a maximum level in hallowing the meaning of diaspora, or it ceasing to be a signifier. The new characterization focuses on the reason for people's admission to a given host state. It proposes that migrants are 'outcasts of society' for reasons ranging from sexual orientation, to race, class, and the second generation of migrants born in the host space. Brubaker critiques this conception (as quoted in Cohen, 2008, pp. 9-10) as follows: 'if everyone is diasporic, then no one is distinctively so'. Furthermore, in the current diaspora debate, the reference to 'outside' or 'inside' a given territorial space is relative and is conceptually constructed, conveying a sense of unspecified place. This is because, some features of diasporas' transnational existence defy the conventional

---

Diaspora means 'different things to different people' and there is no uniform conceptualisation. Claude Levi-Strauss uses the term 'empty signifier' in semiotics to denote significations without referents, such as a word that does not point to agreement on meaning. Daniel Chandler defines the term 'floating' or 'emptying' as 'a signifier with a vague, highly variable, unspecifiable or non-existent signified'. Hence, 'emptying signifier' may mean 'different things to different people: they may stand for many or even anything signified; they may mean whatever their interpreters want them to mean'. Such a term carries 'symbolic value Zero'. Ernesto Laclau introduced the concept of a chain of significations that represent unsatisfied demand for meaning that creates subordinate significations normally resolved through hegemonic social interaction, anthropologists, and so forth. In the post-modern, post-colonial and transnational age, diaspora has become synonymous with immigrants. Thus, in this thesis, diaspora and immigrants are used inter-changeably to mean foreign-born communities in a host country. This is in line with the most comprehensive definition of diaspora provided by the United States' Department of State.

binary spatial dichotomy relative to a given static state boundary (Cohen, 2008; Hannerz, 1995). Despite their physical attachment to a specific place, diaspora's actions and activities occur in a de-territorialised virtual space and take an imaginary form, existing in a unitary-global-cosmos. Online participation and mobilization identities like 'universal Islamic Uma' are new trends that challenge the definition of diaspora based on space dichotomies. Diaspora as 'transnational moments' (Faist, 2004) is central to the post-

modernist notion of diaspora. We not only live in an age of migration but also in one where the concept of diaspora has 'escaped its cage' of specifically denoting a single, endogamous ethnic group. Furthermore, the concept has outgrown its disciplinary bank which in the main was the area of ethnographers, historians, and was part of most classical propositions of diaspora from Armstrong's work to Cohen (2008) and others' 'global diaspora'. It encompasses both the classical and the expanded notions that developed and is useful in analyzing the post-9/11 diasporic existence that could not have been captured by the conventional fields of anthropology, geography, ethnography or history alone. This definition does not neglect the academic dimensions of diaspora and migration, but does include the policy and practical aspects. Due to its functional benefits, it is applied to the Ethiopian diaspora community in South Africa, and reads as follows:

> *Diasporas are migrant groups that share the features of: dispersion, voluntarily or involuntarily, across socio-cultural boundaries and at least one political border; with a collective memory and myth about homeland alive through symbolic actions, carrying the constant desire to return, although not necessarily a commitment to do so: with common consciousness and its associated identity expressed in diaspora community media, the creation of diaspora association or organization as online participations.*
>
> (US Department of State definition, quoted in Ratha 2010, p.149)

1.2.2. Regional Migration and the Diaspora Literature

The diaspora and migration can be categorized in three levels in no formal order. The first is the primary literature on African and regional issues, specially, migration issues in Southern Africa. In this literature, diaspora is rarely cited as an analytical category; however, issues confronting immigrants are well articulated. Geographers, economists, and population scholars are the major contributors to migration discourse in South Africa. While the diaspora or immigrants nexus with development is the domain of the policy discourse of state agencies, it has received little attention in the literature. The secondary literature provides a global perspective on diaspora. Most of these aspects were discussed previously as well as the debates associated with them. Selected studies that have been pivotal in opening new debates, particularly in relation to migration, remittances and development will be briefly discussed here. At the third level is the migration diaspora literature focusing on the Ethiopian diaspora. This mainly comprises policy papers, articles and a few monographs.

1.2.2.1. *Primary Literature: Regional and South African Migration Discourses*

There is a rich body of literature on migration and other processes of diaspora formation in Southern Africa (Williams et al., 2005; Awil, 2003; Maharaj and Moodley, 2000; Posel et al., 2003; Rogerson, 1992; Godfrey, 2008; Maharaj and Kumar, 1997). Numerous publications by the South African Migration Project and the work by Crush (2011), under the title '*Diaspora of the South: Situating African diaspora in Africa'* provided an antithesis to the AU's perceptions, which basically consider the African diaspora as people of African descent who live outside of the continent and who are interested in helping Africa irrespective of their country of origin. This definition underscores the diaspora's willingness to participate in the development of the African continent and makes reference to African roots without necessarily tracing one's origin from a specific contemporary African state. The current study concurs with Crush's (2011) definition of the African diaspora. He regards Ethiopians living in South Africa as Ethiopian diaspora, rather than as internally displaced communities within the continent. Crush and his colleagues (2010a; 2005) also studied the impact of remittances and diaspora activities on local development and poverty reduction, by conducting a survey in a number of counties (Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique, Lesotho and Swaziland). The study established a link between remittances and poverty reduction at source. Crush

(2008) also documented the tensions around diaspora with specific reference to the 2008 xenophobic violence in South Africa. This study highlighted the policy dilemmas regarding migration and the need for rigorous re-appraisal of policy in light of this phenomenon.

Rogerson (1992, p. 2); Maharaj (2004); and Posel and Casale (2003) examined labor migration into South Africa and noted that this country has experienced a growing wave of African immigrants since 1991. As a result, it can be considered as a melting pot for African diaspora (Godfrey, 2008). The end of apartheid and the dawning of democracy in South Africa coupled with the existence of economic opportunities have been identified as attracting inward mobility. Crush (2005) problematised the institutional limitations of the human rights-based approach to migration in his discussion on mechanisms to control migration since the apartheid era. Although research has been conducted on migration and labour mobility, there has been limited investigation of the typologies of different migrant stock.

At the continental level Ifeanyi (2013) focused on the African diaspora and discussed how to build a global partnership for development. The study highlighted the different strategies adopted by African states to engage with the diaspora, starting from his native Nigerian experience. He focused on political and economic explanations for international migration and observed that, 'harsh economic conditions in Africa are responsible for the mass production of its diaspora' (Ifeanyi, 2013, p. 182). De Haas (2008) exposed the myth of (migrant) invasion and elaborated on the inconvenient realties of African migration to Europe. Enwerem, (2011); Bakewell (2008); Bridgewter (2003); Akinrinade and Ajigewa (2003); Larson (2007); Mbeki (2003); Shepperson (1968); Palmer (2000); Ogmo (2009) and many others have written on the issue of African diaspora and on partnering with it in the light of its crucial role in enhancing growth at home and within the host space.

1.2.2.2. *Secondary Literature with Universal Application*

The second category of literature encompasses works that analyzed diaspora, migration and remittance issues at the global level. The concepts of 'migrants' and 'diaspora'

originated from different angles and from different starting points. However, they seem to have arrived at denoting the same category of people: those who live outside of their country. Space does not permit an exhaustive discussion on the contributions made by different scholars on migration and diasporic issues, but a few are worth mentioning. Solimano's (2003) discussion paper on *Remittance by immigrants: issues and evidence* addresses remittances, capital flow, and development financing and highlights the importance of remittances in poverty alleviation. He advocates for international mediation to ease such transactions, opposes taxing remittances and government involvement and acknowledges the stability of remittances compared to other financial flows into the developing world. Using econometrics techniques to measure remittances, the study points to the need to bank 'unbanked' immigrants. Kraut's (1995) study focused on the health and immigration challenges confronted by immigrants as well as xenophobia against foreign-born nationals in the United States of America. He notes that Jews, the Irish, and Haitians were blamed for tuberculosis, cholera, and polio and AIDS, respectively and exposes the unscientific nature of such allegations.

Nyberg-Sonsen, Van Her and, Engburg-Pedersen (2002) explored the association between migration and poverty reduction and concluded that there were no direct links between poverty, economic development, population growth and social and political change on the one hand, and migration on the other. They thus suggest that poverty reduction is not in itself a migration reducing strategy. Widegren and Martin (2013) argue that migration management such as blocking its flow would not work and that the key strategy is dealing with problems in the source countries. This resonates with the French model of 'co-development' that was implemented with Malian immigrants (Galatowitshch, 2009). The authors argue that economic instruments like free trade reduce the scale of immigration due to economic motivation, while aid and international remittances help to reducing immigration. However, there is no assurance that this is a major emigration-reducing factor (Widegren and Martin, 2013).

1.2.2.3. *Literature on Ethiopian Diaspora and Migration Discourses*

The third category of work that relates to the Ethiopian diaspora is limited. However, Pillay et al. (2010) focused on Ethiopian immigrants in Durban, South Africa. The study

documented the challenges confronting immigrants in integrating into the host society due to perceptions-related problems. It is useful in mapping the settlement patterns of Ethiopian diaspora in Durban. Most of the literature that deals with Ethiopian immigrants is produced by Western authors, and normally focuses on the migration policies of host countries or international multilateral organisations. The most notable include regular publications of the WB, IMF, IOM, and 'think tanks' of developed countries. Terrence Lyon (2009) highlighted conflict-generated diaspora with reference to the violent expulsion of Ethiopian immigrants from their homeland; works on Ethiopian 'scientific diaspora' were edited by Jean-Baptiste Meyer and Barre (no date); and Rose C. Amzan of the University of Sydney produced, *Mobilizing the Ethiopian Knowledge Diasporas: Framing issues* (2008); and *The exemplary community of a transitional moment* (Faist, 2010). The themes included how immigrants work hard to cope with life in exile and contribute to local business and the importance of economic improvement in interpreting the experiences of the Ethiopian immigrants in South Africa and elsewhere, although the contexts vary.

1.2.2.4. 'Ethiopian Diaspora': Conceptual Clarification

As noted earlier, the overall definition of diaspora is contested and this is also true for the term 'Ethiopian diaspora'. In many cases, it depends on who is using it. For instance, the *Diaspora Policy* of the current government of Ethiopia defines diaspora as follows:

> *'Ethiopian Diaspora means Ethiopians and Ethiopian origins that live outside of Ethiopia'.* (Ethiopian Diaspora Policy, 2015, p. 3)

One can observe the conceptual similarity between this and Walker Connor's (1986) description of diaspora as a segment of a society living outside of its home country. The definition provided by the Ethiopian Diaspora Policy does not provide much room for conceptualization and it does not refer to typologies, the conditions that led to them leaving the home country, life in the host state, or their social, cultural, and ideological lineages, networks and modalities of transnational existence. It is much briefer than that proffered by the US Department of State and offers no insight into whether Ethiopian

diaspora can be categorized as a victim, business, or labor diaspora. The reality of diaspora in the Ethiopian context is much more complex than what the *Diaspora Policy* sets out. This is due to the fact, that, given the history of migration in Ethiopia, the phenomenon corresponds with most of the theoretical notions discussed earlier. Furthermore, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, the Ethiopian government does not treat all diaspora of Ethiopian origin equally. There were widespread allegations among the participants in this study that 'the government excludes people which [when] it categorizes[d]s them as political opposition[s] with [and they take an extreme stance against them] extreme stand'. They deny them their citizenship by withholding consular services that every national should receive around the world. Hence, according to the views of some study participants, double standards seem to be applied when it comes to the Ethiopian government recognizing the country's diaspora even though the policy paper states that all Ethiopians living outside the country are Ethiopian diaspora.

Historically, Ethiopia hosted different kinds of diaspora. For instance, as explained in the classical definition of diaspora, it has been destination for a global victim diaspora. Jews, Armenians, Jamaicans, Turks, Greeks, Arabs, and so on, have sought protection and refugee in the country (*Diaspora Policy*, 2015, p.4). Currently Ethiopia hosts a large number of migrants from neighboring countries like Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, South Sudan, North Sudan, and other African states. As a powerful force in anti-colonial struggles, the country also hosted several liberation movements. Ethiopia played a crucial role in the liberation of Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, and Sudan, and supported the anti-apartheid movement. It hosted ANC, ZANUPF, and SNLM fighters and members of similar organizations in African liberation struggles. The SABC (December 16, 2013) and other documentation notes that, liberation icon and former South President Nelson Mandela received his first military training in Ethiopia during the time of his Imperial Majesty, Emperor Haile Selassie, King of Kings of Ethiopia.

Apart from forced migration into Ethiopia, there were diaspora of prestige, like the Jamaicans and several American Black Consciousness movement members that traveled to and sought sanctuary in the country as they were inspired by its history of anti-colonial struggle. A place called 'Shashemene', in Southern Ethiopia, was reserved

for the return of victims of Atlantic slavery. It is regarded as a mecca of Black Conscious movements. Of interest to this group was the Adwa Victory of 1988, a victory of a black nation over a powerful Italian army. This created the theoretical base for 'Ethiopianism' and mobilization against 'Babylon' of the 20th century, including the partition of Africa, colonialism, racism, and slavery. Ethiopia's tradition of hosting different kinds of diaspora from all over the world was not accidental but has its roots in the belief systems of the kings and royalty that ruled the country for a number of centuries. The values and theories of migration, and attitudes towards the displaced held by successive royal houses are linked to the religious principles embedded in the country. Application of these principles led to King Negash, who ruled the northern part of Ethiopia around 619 AD, to give sanctuary to followers of the Prophet Mohamed. This historical migratory movement is commonly referred to as the 'first hegira' or first pilgrimage in Arabic tradition. While some returned to Mecca, others remained in Ethiopia, fostering religious pluralism. Today, around 45 per cent of its population is Muslim. However, while the work of classical theoreticians of diaspora (Safran, Cohen and other scholars) focused on the life of Jews in developed societies, there are few accounts of the life of Jews in Ethiopia.

After the overthrow of His Majesty Emperor Haile Selassie I, Ethiopia began to be a source of immigrants. Prior to 1974, almost no Ethiopian refugee or diaspora was found in the US or in European countries. The Ethiopian diaspora currently constitutes the eighth largest in the United States (*Diaspora Policy*, 2015). Globalization led to the adoption of a Structural Adjustment Policy (SAP) in Ethiopia that caused the loss of significant numbers of jobs. The introduction of tribalism as a political system inspired by the TPLF created another round of dislocation when it took measures to redress what it considered past 'imbalances' (Shah, 2013; Ogbimi, 2016; Bishop, 2012). These changes affected the bureaucracy, the military and the broader social architecture of the country. The transformation of the land tenure system that deprived some of land and extended ownership to others, systematic genocide, and tribal cleansing, political struggles and persecutions contributed to the mass exodus of Ethiopians in different directions, including South Africa from 1975 and particularly after 1991 when the TPLF seized power (see The Habesha Tube, 2015).

While the exact figures are not known, this exodus affected millions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia estimates that the United States, Europe and other countries are home to a total of around two million Ethiopians (*Diaspora Policy of Ethiopia*, 2015, pp. 4-5), with some independent scholars suggesting that the number could be three times higher. The Ethiopian diaspora policy document also states that in Africa, South Africa, Botswana and Guinea have become the latest destinations for Ethiopian asylum seekers and refugees. The exact number of Ethiopians living in South Africa is not known, with estimates in the range of 50,000 or more (*MTN,* 2012). While there is no comprehensive data on the types of occupations of Ethiopian diaspora in South Africa, observation reveals that some are employed in higher education institutions and other sectors like health and technology.

When we speak of the Ethiopian diaspora in South Africa, we take note of the history of migration in Ethiopia and at the same time count all those who are victims of genocide, dislocation, persecution, those who also enter as products of South Africa's migration strategy (by permission) and those whose composition, character and nature are not known. As noted earlier, immigrants of Ethiopian origin tend to be placed in a general category with no distinction as to cultural, religious, tribal and other differences. Apart from victim diaspora, there is also a type of diaspora that represents intergovernmental activities, like those who work for the current Ethiopian government by creating various socio-economic organizations within South Africa. This is further discussed in the analysis of the results of the field research.

1.2.3. Contribution to Knowledge

While this chapter provides a fuller account of this study's contribution to knowledge in the field of the migration-development nexus, other contributions are noted throughout the thesis. This section sets out this PhD study's contribution to new insights at the theoretical level and briefly discusses on-going debate in the literature on standard expectations of a PhD in terms of its contribution to knowledge.

1.2.3.1. What we know now

One of the objectives of qualitative research is to provide new insight into existing discourses on a social situation, problem, or a phenomenon. The main axes upon which the contributions made by this study can be gauged are the *ontological*, *epistemological* and *methodological aspects*. At an ontological level the new additions to existing knowledge are the *'models'* that are original to this study. These newly constructed models promote better understanding not only of the migration phenomenon and typologies of immigrants but also the characteristics of the powerful international actors in migration decision-making (See Chapter 2, *New Meta Models* for the actual models). The methods used to construct these models were based on the literature and the analysis of the discourses themselves, together with the analysis of the protagonists of different discourses in the migration-diaspora-development field. Scholars like Laclau (1996); Deride (2005); Strauss (2002) and so forth have used discourse analysis (DA) to develop social theories which some call Post-Marxism (Laclau, 1996). By studying written texts, discourses and other symbolic and linguistic expressions we can understand and characterise the actors in social phenomena. This method assisted me to re-organise the discourses of migration and diaspora issues into my own typologies of the theoretical constructs that exist in current debates.

Since so much has been said about migration and diaspora, the phrase 'new discoveries' is open to contestation. However, in this saturated academic and theoretical domain, one area that has largely been overlooked is the role of immigrants' perceptions in migration theories and in solving the social problems associated with it. One of this study's objectives was to provide new insight on the debate by systematising the main discourses in the existing literature and offering frameworks to consider the migration phenomenon. The new models developed focus on the belief systems and values of international actors, and policy and decision-makers in relation to the migration-development nexus in the construction of new propositions.

The migration discourse has faced several problems that are associated with a lack of comprehensive theories (King, 2012). This is because despite an abundance of knowledge, there is limited discussion on these players. As discussed in Chapter 2, top-down perspectives, which are etic views, and mono-perspectives that ignore the views of those involved in the everyday life of migration enable powerful players to dominate

theoretical constructions. For instance, immigrants' views, experiences and perceptions of the phenomenon of migration itself and what some scholars describe as the emic view, are in short supply in theoretical construction.

On the ontological and theoretical levels, this thesis suggests an Ecological Model of migration as a normative standard to view migration and diaspora issues. Besides offering its own framework, it also categorises existing migration theories under two meta-models: the Meteorological Model and the Police Model. These have never before been proposed and are, therefore, unique to this thesis. The method used to create these models, involved consulting secondary sources, a wide range of literature, and the use of intrinsic knowledge and observation of migration policies and practices in our everyday lives.

A further contribution to knowledge is the selection of the topic itself and including the issue of typology in the South African migration discourse amidst monolithic perceptions of immigrants, which are skewed towards negative narratives. This triggers a new epistemology by suggesting how migration and immigrant studies need to be approached. The study of typologies helps to identify legitimate immigrants that need to be protected in the host space and who could also be mobilised for local development. Simplistic and dismissive approaches yield little fruit compared to efforts to distinguish them. The introduction of typologies of Ethiopian immigrants offers new insight into dichotomising diasporas and provides fertile ground for rational migration policy. In particular, categorising Ethiopian immigrants' transnational features in three ways is original to this thesis. These are: Geographic Transience, Mobility Transience, and Cooperative-allegiance Transience (see Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion).

This addition to our cognitive knowledge on typologies is the foundation for analysis, communication and action on migration in South Africa, and the African continent. The study offers original ideas on how we can evaluate immigrants based on an *immigrant host compatibility index/matrix.* This represents a new epistemology that can help us to understand and identify the characteristics of the immigrants that can be easily integrated into a host society. This could also be used as a basis for recommendations to inform migration policy.

1.2.3.2. How a PhD can contribute to knowledge

Assessments of a study's contribution to knowledge might vary, particularly in relation to claims to discover 'new' knowledge. This is especially true of qualitative studies, where what a researcher might sincerely believe to have discovered in a particular place at a specific point in time might have been discovered by someone else in another place and a different time. We are limited by distance and connection. This thesis cannot be viewed in a vacuum; it is thus pertinent to consider the scholarly discourse on the role of a PhD in making new contributions to knowledge.

While every qualitative study is unique, its contribution to knowledge should be based on coherent and illuminating descriptions and perspectives on a phenomenon based on a detailed study of the subject matter (Ward-Schofield, 1993, p. 202). As Might (2010) illustrated, at PhD level, the research might reasonably be expected to extend the boundaries of existing knowledge, while not necessarily breaking the barrier. Nonetheless, the evaluation of new and original contributions to knowledge in a given PhD thesis remains contentious (Cray, 2014) due to the use of *generalized statements* rather than clear *point-by-point* articulation of an argument based on sound criteria. Furthermore, in social science, claims of original knowledge can be superficial, as such knowledge is often based on the perception of the beholder, constructed through various means that are embedded within one's cognitive and value systems. Heather Cray (2014) examined 'how to make original knowledge' and noted that 'attrition', lack of consensus and ill-defined standards might affect the evaluation of a particular study. He adds that evaluation might be biased in favour of 'pet theories'. Thus, a new contribution that challenges theories that the reader holds dear might be considered a deviation rather than an illuminating new addition. For instance, the Ecological Model is new proposition put forward in this thesis and the Police Model is a 'pet theory' of migration. The solution to this conundrum lies in establishing that the study builds on previous contributions, because it is rare that a paradigm shift occurs in social science. Therefore, new knowledge involves reconstruction of one's own or society's perceptions of a phenomenon.

Natural science appears to be closer to establishing some consensus regarding research results and has a greater chance of duplication (the repeatability of the findings by other researchers using the same techniques and measurements). However, even in such a case, one could ask whether we are discovering new things or simply our lack information about reality. The term 'original' is contextualized in the discourse of a study's contribution to knowledge. In social science, new perspectives can be gained on existing issues or social reality. As the variables are behavioral, and independent of human manipulation, originality may not equate to creating these variables, or bringing new variables into the system, to create something new. Instead, the researcher is able to offer a new interpretation of a theoretical construction that could assist scholars to see a phenomenon in a different light. The modest expectation of a PhD is that it adds something that helps to increase available information on the subject matter. This in itself could be regarded as an original contribution, as long as the new addition is the sum of understanding emanating from that particular academic exploration (Car, 2014).

Car (2014, p.1) argues that, '*a thesis can address small gaps within a saturated research area'*. Thus, it is expected that the study should make a discernible 'original contribution' to knowledge or understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. What does this entail and how can we measure originality in qualitative studies? There are no definite answers to these questions, as qualitative studies are always individualistic, and common sense should be applied as possible contributions can take different forms. Examples include new perspectives on a subject, bringing new light to bear on it, giving it a new form or substituting it with completely new ideas or discoveries, based on evidence. Other approaches may involve finding one's own niche within the existing discourse. In social science, it is rare that a researcher can claim to completely 'revolutionise' something. Instead, a PhD is about pushing boundaries. In his '*Illustrated guide to a PhD'*, Matt Might (in Cray, 2014) demonstrates the relationship between existing knowledge and the contribution of a given PhD. Pushing a boundary does not necessarily involve dramatic movement; a small addition to knowledge also matters.

1.2.4. Conclusion

This chapter showed that migration and diaspora-related issues are becoming increasingly relevant in contemporary international development, human security, peace

and ethnic studies. This investigation of the Ethiopian diaspora in South Africa is thus timely. The gaps in the literature on migration and diaspora were highlighted as a motivation for this study, which is based on the premise that, enhancing the positive impact of diaspora, as well as managing it effectively, requires a proper understanding of the typologies of immigrants and their characteristics.

It was noted that, despite its pervasive usage, the concept of diaspora has been the subject of erratic theorization and contestable notions. Its definition has thus gone through different stages. It has evolved from denoting a single 'endogamous ethnic community' to becoming synonymous with a culturally hybrid and transnationally mobile community representing both geographic and virtual space. This chapter thus placed this concept in perspective and identified operational definitions at two levels. Internationally, the definition provided by the United States Department of State was deemed relevant and at national level, the definition expressed in the Ethiopian Diaspora Policy is considered as having functional benefits in describing the Ethiopian diaspora referred to in this study.

The literature on diaspora and migration reveals a degree of bipolarity in interpreting this phenomenon. The discourse is skewed in favour of migration at global level, in developed countries that focus on international cooperation and development. The literature in this domain highlights the newfound role of diaspora as agents of constituency development back home; whereas, at the regional level, most of the literature on African migration seems to be preoccupied with the challenges and the negative impact of migration and diaspora. Therefore, there is a tendency to use 'socio-economic' explanations as causal variables. Some of this literature also includes proposals on how to reverse migration. This study attempted to balance the discussion by providing an all-embracing perspective on the issue at multiple levels. Some of these points were reflected at the literature review and theoretical tools for use in the discussion are proposed in chapters to come. It was noted that there is a lack of comprehensive and multi-level and multi-dimensional theories about diaspora and migration. The illusiveness of a universally applicable theory is partly due to methodological constraints, including over-reliance on the 'quantitative' approach to a

complex social phenomenon like migration and the omission of actors and players in the theoretical construction.

Therefore, the shortcomings noted in relation to migration and diaspora studies relate to the ontological and epistemological (meta-theoretical) dimensions (Losifides, 2007). Contemporary times are marked by a vicious cycle of migration and resistance to it. This is partly due to the lack of appropriate theories. The following chapter presents this study's distinct contribution to theoretical construction using a critical-realist inductive method. It also examines how existing mainstream socio-economic theories embraced migration as a subject and reviews their propositions in greater detail.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY, LOCATION AND RESEARCH APPROACH

INTRODUCTION

The chapter presents the main research paradigm employed for this study. It begins by reflecting on the nature, merits and demerits of the qualitative method used to study the typologies of Ethiopian diaspora in the cities selected. In doing so, it responds to questions like: what are the advantages of a qualitative paradigm and why is it preferable to a quantitative approach or mixed method to study migration? What is the world view, i.e., the philosophical or ontological orientation of this methodology? In providing answers to the last question, the multi-disciplinary, ecological approach is discussed as well as the uniqueness of the new proposition that does not follow a single exclusive method. In other words, despite the preference for a qualitative approach as the main method, this does not suggest methodological fundamentalism and purity. The methodological literature notes, that, a realist approach involves pragmatism in which a mix of approaches can be used without discounting the role of the main research paradigm that corresponds to an interpretivist approach in this study. The chapter also provides the justification for the descriptive statistical tools used to quantitatively analyse the qualitative data, because pragmatism is an unavoidable characteristic of social research. It explains the limitations of a positivist, empiricist approach to migration and diaspora. Numerical approaches are not sufficient to capture the actors, players, and the human dimension. In short the emancipatory and truth seeking potential of the research might be undermined by selecting a purely quantitative method.

The general discussion on the research paradigm is followed by the study's objectives that determined the choice of the research paradigm. At an epistemological level, the chapter elaborates on the research design and explains the main and secondary research questions, the data collection techniques employed to gather primary and secondary data, and the rationale for these techniques. The types of information gathered from individual interviews and FGDs and their advantages and disadvantages in examining the Ethiopian diaspora in Rustenburg and Durban are touched on. The chapter also provides a tabular presentation of the strategies used to answer the research questions. The target population is described in both locations, the criteria used

to select the sample are highlighted and its representativeness is discussed. The ethical considerations taken into account in conducting the study are discussed, as well as its limitations and opportunities and the strategies adopted to mitigate the former. The chapter ends by highlighting the validation techniques employed, including triangulation, which is appropriate in a qualitative study.

1.3.1. The Main Research Paradigm: Qualitative Method

'Qualitative analysis transforms data into findings. No formula exists for that transformation. Guidance, yes. But no recipe. Direction can and will be offered, but the final destinations remain to be unique to each enquirer, known only when- or if-arrived at'

(Parton, 2002, p. 432; in Morill 2000, p.332)

One of the distinct characteristics of a true truth seeking venture, be it in the real world or in academic work, is independence. The main threat to independence is the researcher's values that influence her/his decision-making in several ways. Neutral scientific research thus calls for independence from one's own belief systems. It is for this reason that researchers use the scientific method to build a firewall that protects the research from being contaminated by the researcher's opinions. Natural science has greater potential to be neutral as it is experiment-based. However, in the past century, there has been robust debate on how scientific research should be conducted. Social research can be considered as the underdog in the arena of methodology and at its inception it sought to emulate the approaches used in natural science. Empiricism and quantitative research were thus initially embraced in the belief that that would yield credible, neutral, objective and rational 'truth'.

The notion of science and scientific research formed the basis of the methods used in the natural sciences (Rosenberg, 1968, in Alasuutari, 1995). This is evident in the jargon associated with this field of research, including survey, sampling, standard questions, population, hypotheses-testing, units of analysis, cause and effect, and so forth. As noted earlier, in common with much social science research, migration studies initially adopted empiricism and natural science methods.

This is evident in the quest to determine the 'laws of migration' and to make predictions on how this phenomenon would play out. However, in reality, migration did not follow the laws prescribed. Instead, international migration emerged as a complicated phenomenon that could not be analyzed using quantifiers and did not follow predetermined sequences of events. Thus, in studying migration, reliance on a single method detaches science from reality.

Another area of contention in social research is 'subjectivity' versus 'objectivity' and the role of the researcher. Science aims to avoid 'subjectivity' by keeping the researcher aloof from the experiments s/he is engaged in. However, in social science the scientist's intrinsic knowledge and experience is as important as the other variables involved in the research. Recent approaches in social science thus recognize that the researcher is engaged in critical engagement with the phenomenon under study and also draws on their own knowledge.

While social science research uses methodological terminology similar to that in natural science, it has addressed the straightjacket approaches used in natural science by adopting a qualitative method to understand, interpret and resolve social problems (Wallerstein et al., 1998, in Fink 2010. p.3).

Losifides (2011, p. 38) proposes a critical realist perspective in migration studies. The author argues that, empiricism, which science is acclaimed for, 'reduces reality to surface, "sense data", through which knowledge of the social world is possible.' He adds that, 'it conflates ontology with epistemology and commits what the realist school in social research calls the "epistemic fallacy"'. This is due to the fact that, most social research studies deal with subjects with unpredictable and dynamic characteristics that are 'diachronic' in terms of time and 'synchronic' in terms of the role of actors and their interactions. It was thus logical for social science to develop a method that enables it to generate solution-oriented, valid, credible, truth-seeking and generalisable results. Thus, a qualitative method is a suitable research paradigm to analyse behaviours and dynamic variables that by their nature are abstract phenomenon.

This study employed a qualitative method informed by a critical realist perspective (Losfides, 2011). Losifides notes that, while a qualitative method is the most appropriate approach in migration studies, the researcher should adopt a degree of critical realism. This compensates for the shortfalls of methodological dualism by introducing the role of 'subjectivity' and integrates 'lived experience, at micro and macro level' (Losifides, 2011, p. 37) rendering it a powerful means to investigate social reality in all its complexity. Furthermore, it has causal and explanatory as well emancipatory potential (Porter, 2007, p. 80 in Losifides, 2011). The field work conducted in the cities selected for this study was designed to connect the reality to the notions proposed in contemporary migration theories and polices in order to gain a plausible perspective.

The research approach in this thesis also focuses on text as one of the main features of qualitative data collection and analysis (Merrill et al., 2000, p. 321). The literature review is textual research and constitutes the first part of the thesis. Since there is no single way of analyzing textual data in qualitative research, critical realism offers methodological dexterity (Morill et al. 2000, p. 32). Changes in ethnic categorizations and identities due to migratory movements; the formulation and implementation of migration policies at different administrative and spatial levels; social movements of immigrants and refugees; decision-making in migration; segregation; exclusion; immigrant networks, and so on are best studied by applying a critical realist approach within a qualitative research paradigm (Losifides, 2011, p. 33). It enables the researcher to use different techniques, such as quantitatively analysing qualitative data, observation, guiding questions, demographic data, and so forth, within the selected qualitative approach. The 'typologies of Ethiopian diaspora in South Africa' are best approached qualitatively and realistically, accompanied by a critical view of socio-economic explanations in the literature.

Critical realism's fundamental assumption is that, irrespective of ideologues and decision makers' perceptions, migration exists independent of our knowledge or our identification of it (Sayer, 1992). The migration experienced in South Africa which is the host, and Ethiopia that is source, depicts experiences of real life situations that exist independently and operate regardless of how we study or describe them. The aim of social research is to render the discourse truth-based and solution-oriented. With this in mind the critical-

realist qualitative method allows us to think outside of the box and apply dynamic tools that help test if migration is a global transformational phenomenon rather than a problem to be solved' (International Migration Institute, 2006 in Losifides, 2011, p. 33).

1.3.2. Aims, Objectives and Research Questions

1.3.2.1. Broad Aim and objectives

The overall aim of this study was to investigate the typologies of Ethiopian diaspora in South Africa, focusing on the cities of Rustenburg and Durban. This entailed determining the ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social, economic and national character of Ethiopian immigrants, as one of the major academic debates in the development-migration discourse has been the categorisation of communities. The movement of people across boundaries creates a dynamic social composition in the host space that is constantly changing. Therefore, studying typologies is motivated by the need to formulate sound migration policy, and promote decision-making and action that matches this internal dynamism within a given migrant community. The study employed a critical realist research paradigm and aimed to contribute a new perspective to the ongoing debate on the link between diaspora, migration and development.

In South Africa, there is a tendency to regard migration as a 'problem' to be solved (see, for example, Crush, 2008). As the saying goes, 'too much of one thing is good for nothing', and any argument in favor of migration can be challenged by the view that, without proper policy and action in the host society, asymmetries will prevail. Thus, while some scholars point to the benefits of migration for local development (Mohan, 2012), the challenge is how to make use of it and to determine where it begins. This study was based on the assumption that sound policy that aims to avoid the unwanted consequences of migration, should be based on proper understanding of the types of immigrants that live in the host territory. It is for this reason that it is necessary to examine typologies of diaspora, in this case, typologies of Ethiopians in South African.

In order to achieve this research objective, a qualitative method and a critical realist approach was adopted to determine the characteristics of Ethiopian diaspora in Rustenburg and Durban. This promoted triangular compatibility between the subject matter, migration, the research approach which is a qualitative method and a critical

perspective which is a flexible paradigm that is able to make sense of the shifting textual and field data.

1.3.2.2. Research Questions

The main research question is: *What are the characteristics, composition, and profile of the Ethiopian diaspora in South Africa; how do these elements shape the nature of their remittances and in what ways are the resultant relationships mediated in Ethiopia and South Africa?*

The sub-questions are:

- *What typology does the Ethiopian diaspora follow in South Africa?*
- *Which analytical model on migration can be developed based on textual research?*
- *What is the nature of their remittances to Ethiopia?*
- *How can the findings of this study inform policy?*

The overall data collection and reduction strategy addressed the above research questions with appropratie use of effective techniques for unearthing as much relevant information as possible.

1.3.2.3 Location of the Study

This study focused on Ethiopian immigrants who live in Durban and Rustenburg. These South African cities were selected due to their accessibility and the presence of a large enough target population. The settlement patterns of the Ethiopian diaspora in South Africa are not properly mapped and their numbers are not well documented. From Cape Town to Port Elizabeth; Durban to Johannesburg and Pretoria to Rustenburg and Mafikeng, most major towns in the country are home to Ethiopian immigrants. For practical reasons, it was not possible to include all these locations in this study.

The Ethiopian Embassy in Pretoria estimates that 40,000 Ethiopians are living in South Africa, while data extracted from MTN (2012) provides an estimate of more than 50,000. The IOM states that 48,571 people of Ethiopian origin live in South Africa. I attended the World Cup second round football qualifier between Nigeria and Ethiopia at the Royal Bafokeng Stadium in 2012. The stadium, which has a capacity of 90,000, was full and I estimated that Ethiopians occupied about 60 per cent of the seats. This suggests that

the data on the number of Ethiopians in South Africa is not accurate. Nonetheless, Durban and Rustenburg are considered to have the largest migrant clusters of Ethiopian origin after Johannesburg and Pretoria, in South Africa. Before discussing in detail why these locations were selected, some information is provided on these two cities as this is relevant in terms of the diaspora's preference for these locations, successful integration, and in defining these communities' survival strategies.

a) Rustenburg

Rustenburg's socio-economic features are analysed in relation to the typologies of diaspora under investigation. The ecological approach entails consideration of the variables and factors that relate to the subject of investigation: immigrants. These factors, including the economic, social, cultural, and historical characteristics of the location, influence the patterns of behaviour and activities of the communities in question. Most of the data presented below were drawn from the *South African Government's Portal on the City of Rustenburg*.

Rustenburg Municipality is located in the North-West province of South Africa at the foot of the Magaliesburg Mountains. The city's coordinates are 25 degrees 40'05'S, 27 degrees 14'19'E (Google Map, 2016) and it covers an area of 3,423.23 sq. km. The meaning of the word 'Rustenburg' is a 'place of rest' in Dutch. It was legally constituted as a township in 1851 and is 112 kilometers from Johannesburg. Rustenburg is part of the Bojanala Platinum District Municipality, and according to the 2011 census, the city has an estimated population of 549,575 (www.Rustenburg.gov.za). There are several platinum mining shafts in and around the area that is also home to two of the world's biggest platinum mines (Google Map, 2016). The economy is based on mining. The city's neighbour is the Royal Bafokeng nation five kilometers to the north.

While Rustenburg is home to migrants from European and other countries, no data is available on the number of recent immigrants to the city. However, the migrations of the 18th changed the demography of the area. These migrations were well-received and absorbed into the cultural mosaic of the city. No xenophobia was recorded at the time of the arrival of the first Europeans in South Africa, in general, and in Rustenburg. Despite differences of race and colour between locals and the foreigners of the time,

European immigrants were accepted and are now at the center of the economic, political, cultural and linguistic landscape of the city. In contrast, some European countries excluded certain ethnic communities for centuries. Romani Gypseys and Africans in European and other developed societies are good examples. Boers that trace their roots to the Dutch settled in Rustenburg during in the 18th century; indeed, it was the home town of Paul Kruger who became president of the Boer Republic of South Africa.

Following the end of the Cold War and the dawn of democracy in South Africa, Rustenburg experienced an increase in the number of immigrants from Africa and Eastern European countries. Yugoslavian, Algerian, Greek, and other European migrants have businesses in the city. However, no reliable estimates are available on the number of immigrants and it is unclear whether the Municipality has adopted a strategy to integrate these communities. Lack of information could hamper sound policy-making.

In terms of race, Rustenburg's population comprises 89 per cent Blacks, 9 per cent Whites, 1 per cent Coloured and 1 per cent Asians. The language breakdown is: Setswana (54 per cent), Afrikaans (10 per cent), IsiXhosa (10 per cent), IsiZulu (3 per cent) and English (5 per cent) (*Municipalities and Communities in Bojanala, North West Province, South Africa Portal* [online]. Accessed: 15 August, 2016: at 12:32).

b) *Target Population for the study: Ethiopians in Rustenburg*

Royal traditions around Pukeng influence life in Rustenburg. People are hospitable and interact with different cultures. There is observable growth in the number of African and East Europeans immigrants in the city. Ethiopians seem to be attracted by the many common traits that they share with the Setswana people. While accurate figures are not available, observation suggests that there is a significant number of Ethiopians in the city and that they are dispersed throughout the Municipality depending on their economic situation. Ethiopians live in the formerly white suburbs as well as mainly black locations like Thlabani, Meriting, Sunrise, Rustenburg Nord, Zeniavil, and in the city centre. These places are not only residential but are also places of work for Ethiopian diaspora.

Participants in the FGD in Rustenburg (2016) estimated that up to 15,000 Ethiopians are living in and around the area. Plein and Mandela Streets accommodate most of the semi-formal Ethiopian businesses, including shops, restaurants, and so on.

Observation revealed that there was a sufficiently large population to select a sample and that it represented the ethnic typologies found in the Ethiopian diaspora in South Africa. Sufficient information was obtained from participants representing the target population to investigate their relationship with the Ethiopian government, including the impact of this interaction on their livelihoods.

The sample selected was representative of the cultural groups found in the Ethiopian communities in Rustenburg. Obtaining a balanced sample for the individual interviews and FGDs was based on my intrinsic knowledge of Ethiopians in South Africa. I lived in Rustenburg from 1997-2004 and have visited the city for about three months every two years. I also have relatives and friends of Ethiopian origin in Rustenburg. As the research approach adopted for this study was a pragmatic one, my intrinsic knowledge of the Ethiopian diaspora was sourced from two perspectives: firstly as a member of the community and secondly by virtue of having lived and worked with this community for the past 19 years. This rudimentary intrinsic knowledge assisted me in understanding and interpreting the symbols, values, history, behaviour, and so on of the participants and the reality of migration itself (Losifides, 2011).

Therefore, my lived experience enabled me to make sound decisions on where to go and how to obtain relevant data for the study. Interpretation of cultural symbols, gestures and events was facilitated by the fact that I have a strong cultural connection to the Ethiopian diaspora. Based on this, the selection of participants was purposively balanced in terms of culture, language group, income level, and random selection. Major Ethiopian ethnic groups such as the Oromos, Amharas, Gurages, Kembatas, and so forth, were accommodated. In terms of belief systems, Christians, Muslims, and pagans were approached to participate in the study.

Both low- and high-income immigrants were selected. Voluntary participation was facilitated by visiting areas in the city where Ethiopians work. While deliberate attempts

were made to involve women in the study, few volunteered, and as the study was based on absolute voluntarism, the data reflects this absence.

As discussed earlier, the realist approach employs a mixture of techniques and this method was used in selecting the sample population from the Ethiopian community in Rustenburg. The numbers were adequate to enable analysis of typologies, remittances and the policy implications thereof. Fair and balanced recruitment makes for credible research and validates this study. Forty individuals from Rustenburg voluntarily participated in interviews and the two FGDs to generate in-depth qualitative data. The FGDs were constructed based on the three characterisations in the diaspora and migration literature. These are Prototypical Diaspora, Scientific Diaspora, and Conflict Diaspora. The FGDs involved Conflict Diaspora and Prototypical Diaspora. A Prototypical Ethiopian Diaspora FGD *was* formed for both Durban and Rustenburg as it relates to the study's motivation to minimize victimization of the already victimised Ethiopian prototypical diaspora. The Ecological Model suggests that the Prototypical Ethiopian disapora are driven from their original home for non-economic reasons, for example, escaping the violence perpetrated by the government or fleeing tribal genocide.

c) Previous Knowledge of the Location

The researcher himself was one of the sources of data used in this study. Information was also collected from participants in individual and group discussions. Secondary data on the city and non-participatory observation based on my intrinsic knowledge gained from living in the Ethiopian community in Rustenburg enriched this data. Observation of the composition of Ethiopians in the area depends on legitimate cultural knowledge. As a member of the community I was well-placed to identify the number of Ethiopian tribes and how to encourage them to participate in the study. This also helped me to frame my guiding questions. In short, tacit knowledge enables the researcher to raise the right questions during interviews. While, I remained neutral in objectively analysing the data, the thesis benefited from my knowledge of the local context and the social changes that I observed in the past 19 years. For instance, my long stay in the vicinity enabled me to determine how the demography of the immigrants as well as their settlement patterns had changed over time and their rise and fall on the social scale.

d) Durban

Many Ethiopian immigrants also live and work in Durban that is located at 29.8587º S and 31.02180ºE latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates. It is a port city in the province of KwaZulu-Natal and according to the 2011 census, has a population of 3, 442, 398, the third largest in South Africa after Johannesburg and Cape Town (online: www.Durban.gov.za, Accessed: September 2, 2016).

The socio-cultural and economic structure of the city manifests metropolitan features. The main economic sectors are manufacturing, agriculture, tourism, service and trade. As a port city, Durban is a major destination for tourists from the hinterland, as well as European tourists, though fewer than Cape Town. According to the *Durban Visitor Strategy*, plans are afoot to grow the tourism sector and generate up to 10 billion USD per year (*Durban Rising,* 2016). Direct flights to and from different destinations in Africa are expected to boost trade and the flow of goods and services from the city to the rest of the continent. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and Lusaka, Zambia, are among the new direct flight connections to Durban. This has implications for the movement of people and is a sign of the global transformation that is taking place in Durban as such connections transform the city from a local to an intra-African business center. The city's global connectivity is also on course, especially given South Africa's participation in BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). Industrialisation and development have boosted the visibility of the city at international level. Indian foreign direct investment in the city reached R3 billion in the past four years (*Durban Rising*, 2016). Durban has the second largest manufacturing sector in South Africa, with implications for the socio-economic movement of people and labour.

In Durban, employment activities are closer to the community than in Rustenburg where informal trading connects immigrants and local citizens. The economic structure of the city is related to migration but can also be a source of contention. For instance, the local community might seek to protect jobs and citizens' right of access to these jobs, which creates an 'hour glass relationship' between the rights of immigrants and locals in relation to employment. Most locals in the City of Durban are salaried workers. Logically, employment-based economies would be more susceptible to negative reactions to

migration. The conventional view on immigrants is that they cross borders in search of employment (macro and micro economic theories of migration); hence, municipal economies that are job-based would be more alarmed by the arrival of migrant communities than in a city economy based on business.

e) Target Group for the study in Durban

Durban has a relatively dense cluster of Ethiopian immigrants. As noted above, Ethiopians settle in the city because it offers a means of survival. Durban's economy is based on manufacturing and trade. Ethiopian immigrants are also self-employed in semi-formal trading businesses. The existence of a local population that earns salaries provided immigrants with the opportunity to sell commodities in the city. They have established social networks in other cities, like Johannesburg and Pretoria, where they buy commodities viable for Durban markets and make a living. As a result, significant numbers of Ethiopian immigrants are living in this city. While no census has been conducted, it is roughly estimated that close to 7,000 Ethiopians are living in Durban and its surrounding areas. Their major settlement pattern appears to be that they live close to work and in some affluent residential areas as well as in Berea, West Street, Victoria Street, Point, and the North Beach area.

While the Ethiopian scientific diaspora lives in the north of Durban around the airport, some immigrants live in the city center in a crowded and less clean environment with the risk of falling victim to crime and violence (own observation). The main activities that Ethiopians are involved in include owning clothing shops, restaurants, garages, small buildings and construction companies, while a few hold academic positions. They have established places of worship and there are at least two Orthodox Ethiopian churches, and more than one Protestant Christian church catering for Ethiopians. Durban also accommodates a large number of Ethiopian Muslim communities and these communities operate trading businesses around the Victoria Street area.

1.3.3. Position of the Researcher

‘Both by coding and analysing data the researcher uses his personal knowledge and experience as tools to make sense of the material.’
(Mc Cracken, 1988 in Fink, 2010)

The literature on ontology (the researcher’s view on reality) identifies four main typologies of philosophical positions: realism, pragmatism, positivism and interpretivism (Dudovikiy, 2016). The evolution of methodology has now reached the level where there is a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods. This complicates the use of a coherent method. Critical realism and pragmatism accommodate spill overs from other philosophical positions. Interpretivist and inductive approaches correspond to subjectivities in qualitative studies; however, subjectivities are problematic and should hence, be guided by positivism and objectivity, although objectivity corresponds to quantitative data. In this research, the ontological position of the researcher kept the ‘self’ away from a problematic subjectivity by relying on statistics from the field work. Hence, despite the fact that data can be interpreted, the original input or data collection attempted to be as realistic as possible and to relate to the facts on the ground. Denzin and Lincoln noted the following in relation to ontology:

> ‘Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set of interpretive material practices that make the world visible. These practices … turn the world into a series of representations that include: field notes, interview, conversations, photographs, recordings, memos to the self. At this level a qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative research studies things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of or to interpret the phenomenon, in terms of meanings people bring to them’.
> (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003, p. 3, in Snape and Spence, 2003, p.3)

My role as researcher in this study was not an elevated one. My views on the reality of migration were not important and the application of my intrinsic knowledge mainly concerned the research design where my knowledge about the demographic features of Ethiopian diaspora was used to shape the lines of investigation according to the research objectives. For most of the research component of this study, I let the research objective, research questions, realities on the ground or the data collected, and the information found in the literature meet objectively without much interference or pre-

judgement (Decartes, 1637, in Rachi and Lewi, 2003). At an analytical level the interpretation treated the facts as starting points and created linkages between levels, researcher and results, in an objective way, as can be seen from the main research paradigm and the approach of realism that corresponds to the main method. The ontological position of the researcher followed the ethical road of empathic neutrality by using personal insight without a judgmental stance; hence, the emic view of the participants was a goal in itself.

I lived in Durban for three years and have been travelling to the city since 2006, every other year on average, since then. I have acquaintances in the Ethiopian community in the city; this made the 'moral enterprise' in this research relevant in protecting the participants' anonymity. The nature of the research paradigm, the qualitative approach, imposes personal ethical standards and I ensured that the data remained confidential. As an Ethiopian myself, I used cultural knowledge to identify the tribal background of the research participants without much difficulty. This could have depended on the knowledge of an informer, but it provided an opportunity to correct some subjective information. Cultural knowledge about the communities under study helps to establish whether or not something is a relatively true representation of reality. Coding, analysis and documentation and data capture followed a positivist approach to ensure neutrality (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, in Fink 2010).

1.3.4. Research Approach

This research adopted a target-group focused research design to examine the Ethiopian diaspora living in Durban and Rustenburg in a naturalist way using flexible approaches. It is primarily qualitative research with a pragmatic approach. It involves an interpretive and to some degree, a constructive approach. The latter is used to put forward models at a theoretical level, and the former is useful to analyse the data from the field. Quantitative analysis was applied to analyse remittances and other demographic data, with the unit being the individual rather than a household. As such, the data from the field attempted to capture the overall detailed data regarding the situation of individual participants, including for example, family trees, and the economic standing of interviewees' relatives. In addition to individual interviews, some FGDs were held. The

overall strategy to gather data that would achieve the study's objectives is discussed below.

1.3.4.1. Individual interviews

The main data collection tool was individual interviews. This method has advantages and limitations. Interviews offer a chance to rectify misunderstandings that would be impossible to correct by means of a questionnaire or text-based feedback; they yield a substantial volume of in-depth information and, indeed, provide information that might not have been anticipated, as general and open-ended questions allow for free flow of the interviewee's ideas; and they are an intimate conversation between the interviewer and respondent that makes them collaborators, increasing opportunities to unearth additional information. For instance, a respondent might nominate a friend for an interview or recommend different research approaches. I benefited a great deal when respondents advised me to contact a person that could make a contribution to the study. Furthermore, the participants' original ideas and thoughts helped to build my knowledge. I learnt a lot from interviewing participants about the cultural variables that operate within the Ethiopian immigrant communities in Durban and Rustenburg.

The disadvantages of interviews include feelings of indebtedness, and managing the expectations of participants' who wanted something to be done to address their day-to-day problems and the possibility of being the target of an attack. Most of the interviewees indicated that, what would be of benefit to them would be to overcome their problems in South Africa. For instance, how would the research help them to protect themselves from xenophobia? Would it influence the local authorities to understand their plight and situation? I felt guilty that my research did not focus on what they wanted. However, as a neutral researcher, I needed to focus on the objective of the study, and with regret I had to explain that, my study was not about the relationship between immigrants and the South African social system, but instead on the immigrants themselves, their typologies, and what they do. If this were to improve their situation, it would be incidental, but the objective of the study was to fulfill academic requirements. I also explained that it was not a sponsored project and did not represent any particular interest group. The personal interviews put me face-to-face with the respondents, and I had to tell them that the project was a purely academic exercise. The experience thus challenged my internal

feelings. Despite these limitations, the interviews yielded rich information that was supplemented by the FGDs.

The empirical part of the study gathered data from 60 individual participants. The interviews were split between Durban and Rustenburg in line with the estimated size of the Ethiopian immigrant population in these cities and depended on their willingness to participate. According to my preliminary observations in the two cities, in 2006, 2012, 2013 and 2014, Rustenburg accommodates a larger Ethiopian migrant stock than Durban. However, at the time of the study, no scientific census had been conducted to prove or refute this. The participants' safety and the need to not disrupt their everyday activities were also taken into account in determining the sample size for individual interviews. In the end 40 participants were interviewed in Rustenburg and 20 in Durban. Two steps were taken to secure participation. I first sent out information on my project with a request for participation in the study as individual interviewees; to help with snowball sampling or what is known as 'chain-referral-sampling' of other participants; as an informant; as inter-mediators to gather participants for a group discussion or to participate in a group discussion. The second step was to set up appointments and for participants to sign the consent letter and confirm the date for the interview. Some participants signed the consent agreement before the interview date and some agreed to sign it before the actual interview.

'Chain-referral-sampling', which sociologists refer to as the snowball technique, is relevant in approaching people who operate in the informal sector and people whose social standing is outside the mainstream (Atkison, 2004). Therefore, it is the most appropriate technique to access hidden social networks that are not well-documented in the public arena. Despite having lived in both cities, there are networks and newcomers that I do not know, and chain-referral-sampling was useful in reaching these groups. Those that participated in the study were requested to provide the contact details of possible other participants who, in their opinion, had the characteristics required to fulfill the study's objectives. This was not used as the sole recruitment technique, but was combined with recruitment of acquaintances, and well-known personalities. This literature documents limitations and advantages of chain-referral-sampling techniques. The major problem is network bias, as people might nominate friends with opinions and

characteristics that accord with their own, thus duplicating themselves as variables (Morgan, 2008). This narrows the diversity, wealth, and thickness of the data.

To mitigate this problem, I used asymptotic approaches in sample selection, where, while moving from place to place, I directly requested individuals' participation. The other solutions were group discussions, and using intrinsic knowledge to request a participant to nominate another participant with specific characteristics. For instance, if s/he was from an Oromo tribe, I asked her/him whether she could nominate a friend from the Gurage tribe. In general, the problems that might have arisen from chain-referral-sampling were counteracted with the researcher's intrinsic knowledge and his understanding of the cultural context of the target population.

The data gained from the individual interviews was captured in two ways. On the one hand, I prepared text questions to capture the demographic data and personal details, to save time ahead of the actual interview. Once a participant had filled in the demographic data, they submitted this to me at the interview. This enabled me to gauge participants' level of enthusiasm and trust in me. Open-ended guiding questions (the guiding questions are annexed to this thesis) were prepared to capture the participants' experiences and views, and to provide additional information about themselves. I also recorded notes to capture the interviewees' narratives about their experiences and their responses to specific questions. The documentation included taking photographs and obtaining participants' contact details should there be a need for follow up questions. Field guides were used to identify potential participants and make preliminary inquiries into their background. I used people that I knew when I was living in South Africa and we met on several occasions to discuss the kind of participants that I needed for the study. They gave me their opinions on who could be contacted for voluntary participation. The field guide in Rustenburg had been living there for 16 years and has a great deal of information about activities and personalities within the Ethiopian diaspora in the city. After listing the possible participants, I sent him the 'participation request letter' and the letter of consent for them to complete and for confirmation of the dates of interviews. The field guide played an intermediary role during interviews and was present should I need help with elaborating ideas or confirming that participation was voluntary. However, the individual interviews were conducted on a one-on-one

basis. My contact in Rustenburg spoke three main languages, Amharic, Oromifa, and English. After the initial contact was established the ground was prepared to launch the snowball method.

The field guide was also part of the process for invitations and selection for the FGDs. The snowball method was preferred because remittance matters are of a sensitive nature. Due to security concerns, immigrants tend to discuss these matters only through the mediation of a trusted friend. I experienced the benefits of 'chain-referral-sampling' while I was conducting culture-based studies during my Master's programme. Hence, preliminary face-to-face contact with potential participants was established in order to obtain their consent.

The goal of the first contact was to present the study and leave potential participants to decide on whether or not they would voluntarily participate. Once the consent letter was signed and the ethical considerations were met data collection proceeded. Individual data collection focused on their personal profiles and details and their ethnic background. It then moved to their relations with money-sending agents, their personal records of remittances, their relationship with the Ethiopian government, and so forth. Policy documents and secondary data on the diaspora mobilisation programmes conducted by the Diaspora Directorate-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia were also analysed.

In Durban, most of the research was conducted in the West Street, Victoria Street and Point areas. These locations are known to host a relatively large number of Ethiopian immigrants. When one walks into these places one can observe a bustling Ethiopian immigrant group with their cars, lorries, and sedans either packing or unloading different consumer goods in the shops. You can smell the aroma of Ethiopian coffee, the appetizing 'Enjera' and Chicken stew and see Ethiopian symbols and sounds. Traditional restaurants, music shops, wholesale stores, furniture shops, tailor shops, computer schools and internet cafes, supermarkets, and food stores are run by Ethiopian diaspora who have become part of Durban's economic and business landscape. I walked through these streets with my contact person to conduct face-to-face interviews with participants recruited for the study in order to first, secure their

consent. In case, I ran into trouble with locals, I was accompanied by a friend from the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) who speaks a couple of local languages, Zulu and Xhosa and is familiar with local contexts.

1.3.4.2. Focus Group Discussions

The main technique used to complement the individual interview was FGDs (Gibson, 2016). There are various descriptions of this method, with scholars referring to it as 'organized discussion' (Kitzinger, 1994) and 'collective activity' (Powell et al., 1996). Some even regarded this as a social event or group interaction (Goss and Leinbach, 1996; Kitzinger, 1995). The group discussion that was used in this research is different from a 'group interview'. The study adopted the definition of an FGD coined by Morgan as:

> '*a group of individuals selected and assembled by research to discuss and comment on, from personal experience, the topic that is the subject of research'* (Morgan, 1997, p. 12).

My specific goal in using FGDs was to fill the information gap that could not be filled by solely using individual interviews, simple observation and the simple questions that I designed to gather data from the participants. For instance, attitudes, feelings, beliefs, experiences and reactions to the Ethiopian government's intervention in the lives of the immigrants in both cities and their collective understanding or reaction to it were obtained through this technique. The other goal was to probe issues that I did not predetermine in the questions for individual interviews. For instance, the group discussions provided me with a useful debate on the conception of Ethiopian diaspora and enabled me to identify the participants' major concerns for future investigation. My study aimed at identifying the typologies of the migrants but the FGDs revealed that xenophobia was a major concern. A degree of hypothesis creation emerged from the group interaction and I used this to suggest future lines of investigation. The advantage of using this method was that it produced a great deal of information that was not preplanned with questions.

Four focus groups were formed, with two at each location. Overall, 5-10 people participated in each discussion. The Ethiopian diaspora networks in Durban and Rustenburg were targeted to generate additional information to analyse different issues. For instance, Ethiopian community associations or organisations and tribal communities

like Oromo, Ethiopian-Somali, and so forth, were contacted, including interest groups such as sports clubs, professional associations like the Network of Ethiopian Intellectuals, and social, business and faith groups. I designed the focus groups in line with the categorisation of diaspora in the literature. I was interested in using concepts like 'prototypical diaspora' coined by Safran (1991) and King (2010) to differentiate the Jewish diaspora from the rest of the diasporic crowd. For them, diaspora was understood according to the traditional school of thought, as being directly related to victimhood and violent expulsion of the group. Therefore, I checked whether features in the Ethiopian diaspora projected a similar typology. I found some, and formed these people into one focus group, to capture some of their narratives and real life stories. Members of this group claimed that they came to South Africa as a result of dislocation due to on-going 'ethnic genocide' perpetrated by the Tigre tribe against a number of tribes like the Amharic speaking Ethiopians, Oromos, Anuaks, Konsos, and so on. The formation of a discussion group helped to document their collective memories about their removal from their original homes. Some were from the north-west of Ethiopia, especially Wollkait, Tegede, Setit, Homera, Dansha, Benshangul, Raya, and so forth. These were mainly Amharic-speaking. According to these participants, the Oromos from Bale, Arsi and other places were displaced to make way for a huge development project implement by the Tigre-led government of Ethiopia and firms owned by the Tigres who implement government outsourced agro-projects in Amhara and Oromo. The other concept I used to form a discussion group was Lyon's (2006) description of a 'conflict diaspora'. According to him, diaspora is responsible for supporting political uprisings and prolonging conflict in their original home. Safran (1991) identified similar the characterisations with the contemporary articulation of conflict diaspora, his sentences read:

> '… *diaspora communities pose a more serious challenge to host societies than do other minority communities; they test the efficiency of the process of integration and other limits of freedom of consciousness and, finally, the limits of pluralism…'*
>
> *(Safran, 1991, p. 97)*

I included in this category, different members of opposition groups that belong to organisations that are in conflict with the Ethiopian government, for instance, members or sympathizers of the OLF, Ogden National Liberation Front (ONLF); and the Ginbot 7

organisation that is regarded as a terrorist organisation by the Tigre-led Government of Ethiopia. The discussion group for conflict diaspora was not formally implemented as recruited members declined a recorded discussion. Instead they were willing to be individually interviewed to protect their privacy. These individuals play a very active role in virtual activism back home; hence, the method of data collection also involved 'virtual ethnography'.

I also convened an 'Ethiopian Scientific Diaspora' and 'Ethiopian Business or Development Diaspora' focus group discussions. Mohan (2012) highlights the development role played by immigrants and the need to formulate conscious policies to harness their potential in facilitating economic growth in both the host and origin states. However, it was established that the development diaspora has been pervasive and is a common characteristic of Ethiopian immigrants in South Africa. Hence, there was no need for a specific group to discuss the diaspora as agents of development (Mengesha, 2011). I proceeded with a group of 'Ethiopian Scientific Diaspora' that included participants engaged in scientific research in South African universities and research institutions. Almost all were either involved in doctoral studies or had completed their PhDs and were affiliated to UKZN and other higher education institutions. Their major fields are medicine, engineering and technology, education, information and social sciences. This group was made up of seven members and I met with them four times.

The 'Scientific Diaspora' and 'Prototypical Diaspora' were based in Durban whereas the 'Business or Development Diaspora' and 'Conflict Diaspora' were dispersed around all locations and were interviewed individually rather than as a distinct group. However, the data gathered in Rustenburg revealed that the majority of participants that could be referred to as 'Conflict Diaspora' were located in the Zeniavil section of Rustenburg, where Islamic affiliations and activities were observed. Somalis, be they Ethiopian or proper Somalis, Islamic Oromia organizations, Tigre-agents of the government that follow these groups of Ethiopian dissidents, and members of the Ginbot 7 organisation were active in this area.

As noted previously, I lived in Rustenburg for more than eight years, and in Durban for three years and have a good idea of both locations. As a non-participant observer, I benefited from tacit knowledge on the subject, which I used to structure effective lines of enquiry and gather as much information as possible. This answers the main research question on the typology of Ethiopian diaspora in identified diaspora clusters. My discussions at this level were motivated by my interest in establishing the types of faith groups; the tribal affiliations dominant within the Ethiopian diaspora in Rustenburg and Durban and the relevance of such typologies in understanding the migrants' activities. What are the operating variables in determining the size of a given migrant group in these clusters and what processes of diaspora creation are influenced by immigrants themselves?

Secondary data collection started with defining the analytical purpose and gathering articles, journals, and e-books from public sources, including the WB, the Ethiopian National Bank, the Ethiopian Embassy in Pretoria, the Ethiopian Diaspora Directorate-General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, money sending agents, and so forth. Some of the critical data for triangulating the claims of narratives of 'genocide stories' told by some of the participants, was obtained through 'virtual ethnography' **(**Binaisa, 2010, pp. 4-20) and information from online papers, socio-political commentary, blogs, and so forth. This was especially the case with regard to the genocide of the Amhara tribe that was hidden from the international community and academia, but which participants in Durban (2016) claimed, persisted 'for the last 25 years under rule of Tigre tribe'.

1.3.5. Validation and Reliability in Realist Research: Rigor and Credibility

Validity and reliability are common terms in quantitative research, but in recent times some social research scholars have adapted these concepts to qualitative research, while others have challenged the very notion of measuring validity because of the relative nature of 'truth'. The focus in quantitative research is the starting point of the research itself, or what is termed as 'hypothesis formation', and all other processes are geared towards testing a predetermined set of ideas, through which the consistency of initial propositions are gauged This entails experimenting using sampling and in the end duplicability. Repeatability of the result is essential, which means that, if another

researcher follows the same techniques and methods, the result should be the same. Scientific research in natural science or in a quantitative research project is gauged against the fact that, whether or not it replicates itself, it remains a fundamental way of determining validity and reliability. Denzin and Lincoln (1998) noted that, 'researchers who use logical positivism or quantitative research employ experimental methods and quantitative measurements for hypothetical generation (Hoepft, 1997), and they also emphasise the measurement and analysis of causal relationship between variables' (in Merriam, 1998, p. 3). In empiricist research, the focus is on numbers or the information is quantified in cause and effect relations in order for it to underpin statistical terminologies (Golafshani, 2003). In the main, this defines the characteristics of quantitative research, and its reliability can be externally validated or it can be extrapolated from the sample to the general. Therefore, validity and reliability-based experiments and proof of the initial idea of qualitative research within the realist perspective is about the journey and destination that is always unique to the individual researcher, making reliability, validity and quality measurement discursive rather than static criteria.

Much of the literature talks about the quality criteria of scientific research in a qualitative study. For instance, Healy and Perry (2000) focused on validity and reliability within the realist paradigm. According to them, there are six criteria to judge realist qualitative research that draw on three elements of scientific research: at ontological, epistemological, and methodological level. The first two criteria deal with the ontology of the study and evaluate its appropriateness and contingent validity; the third criterion helps to evaluate if the epistemological front accommodates the participants' multiple perceptions and those of the researcher, and so forth. The 4th, 5^{th,} and 6th criteria deal with methodological trustworthiness; they are useful in making generalisations that are representative of the realities, and what they called 'construct validity'.

Some authors used ecological approaches to quality measurement and differentiate between the 'internal' and 'external' environment of the research. 'Internal validity' points to 'reliability' and 'external validity' is concerned with 'generalisability' (Mariam, 1998; Guba and Lincoln, 1981; Patton, 1991). The main concern of this literature is the 'rigor' and 'trustworthiness' of the approaches and the results. Campbell and Stanley

(1963) and Cook and Campbell (1979) adopted a positivist way of validating research. Others have used 'different terms to certify research as valid and "rigorous" and have used terminology such as "representativeness" and "credibility"' (Agar, 1986, p. 58, in Meriam, 1998, p. 4).

The discourse on quality assurance in research is dominated by Guba and Lincoln (1981), who posed alternatives to the traditional way of determining validity. They identified four underlying points of comparison relating to credibility, dependability and transferability. Merriam (1998, p. 4) notes that, Guba and Lincoln stated that, three questions need to be answered when checking the 'internal validity' of a research: How congruent are the results of the study with reality on the ground? Are we measuring or observing what we claimed that we are measuring? And finally, is reality fixed and static as positivists believe, or interpreted and constructed as qualitative researchers understand it?

The dominant validity techniques in qualitative research are triangulation, member check, peer evaluations, researcher statement, and submersion. The first uses multiple sources and cross checking of data or information collected even at the beginning. The second technique is going back to the field and to the participants to establish whether or not they agree with what the researcher perceived as their perspective. This is useful in legal cases and in interviews that are not anonymous. Immersion and submersion deal with the position of the researcher, and peer evaluation obtained from publishing, especially in journals and other scientific outputs, as publication approval can be considered as a validity check in qualitative studies.

My reading of the literature on validation in the field of social research is that, the under-emphasised subject is 'legitimacy', the question of who should do the research and for what. Should the perpetrator tell the story of a violent incident or the victim whose perceptions might be emotional; or a third party who is not interested in the incident, but might become better informed after studying the case? In my opinion, migration studies are about immigrants, and culture is better understood by people who feel the same way in the cultural context under investigation. The literature suggests that the legitimacy of a research study is fundamental to validity, trustworthiness, and rigor. In general,

validation and reliability in qualitative research rest on how dependable and trustworthy the research is based on the legitimacy of the researcher him/herself in relation to the subject under investigation; and whether or not the data collected in the field is analysed and presented faithfully and honesty.

It is important that the researcher reveals his or her biases and assumptions as well as how the results were arrived at. In evaluating the trustworthiness of a study, its objectives should be revisited. I sought to determine if the ontology, epistemology and method came together to help the study to achieve its set plan. The purpose was to clarify and explore the typologies of the Ethiopian diaspora in South Africa in the two selected locations. The study also aimed to trace the evolution of conceptions of diaspora and the phenomenon itself; to apply a fresh approach to common problems, and finally to explore the possibility of producing a theory that could help to interpret the phenomenon.

Replicability is applicable in quantitative and positivist studies. 'Repeatability' is important in natural science, but it is not realistic to expect the variables to repeat themselves in social science. Since many people might be wrong and an individual might be right in a given situation (Scriven, 1972); repetitiveness is not a foundation for truth and the perceptions of many are not necessarily reliable. The magician and his/her assistant might know their tricks better than the audience that are captured by illusions (Mariam, 1998, p. 57). Qualitative research is not about establishing 'laws' about a phenomenon in which reliability and measurement are essential; instead, it seeks to understand the world from the perspective of those who are in it (Mariam, 1998, p. 58). Since there are different perceptions of the same reality, logically, there is no benchmark to validate it in the traditional sense (Merriam, 1988, p. 170); it is not standard to use a single measurement or perception. Thus, dependability or consistency might be a better term, than reliability (Guba and Lincoln, 1985, p. 288, in Merriam, 1998, p. 58). The main concern is rigor.

Internal reliability can be said to exist when the findings of the study reflect, to the best of the researcher's ability, the data collected. External reliability is how the findings are generalised. In statistics, this refers to the use of a sample to extrapolate the findings to the general population. 'Continuum of usefulness' (Wilson, 1975, p. 454 in Meriam,1998,

p. 50) is a better way to describe the generalisability of the result as this depends on those who would like to use the study rather than on the willingness of the researcher. External validity has four parameters. Thick description, that refers to the availability and extraction of a large body of information; multi-site design; (Glaser & Strauss, 1967); and the use of modeling and sampling components.

To ensure the rigor of the study, I triangulated (Guba & Lincoln,1994) the data; but 'member-checking' was not possible. In market research or in well-funded projects member-checking can be conducted in a series of meetings and confirmation is convenient. However, in PhD research without funding, member-checking within different time schedules is difficult. Instead of coming back to the field after editing the text of conversations, I preferred to confirm and validate the information they provided as theirs, and the participants signed their demographic data after reading the interview transcript. This was time-consuming, but was preferred because of efficiency in terms of time and resources. The main goal was to ensure that the views I captured in my notes represent the essence of what they told me.

The other approach was to cross-check notes that I collected independently from both intrinsic know-how and the literature and my own assessment of situations in Ethiopian migrants' cultural contexts, and by using the information that emerged from the FGDs. I also posed repetitive questions on two occasions, using formatted textual questions which participants responded to by filling in information that needed to be captured in text for analysis (demographic data) and repeating them during the interview. By raising the same questions, I evaluated the consistency of data. Where there were discrepancies, I cross-checked the interviews with informal discussion with other participants about general facts or issues, which provided indirect triangulation.

However, it should be noted that these discrepancies were not pervasive. The goal of observation includes relating the interviews to the reality on the ground. For instance, points raised and discussed regarding a migrant's' occupation during the interview or FGD was followed by observation of their day-to-day activities to verify their claims. This was done by visiting their work places (for example their shops, if they were self-employed). All participants granted full consent to take part in the interviews with full

awareness and understanding of ethical procedures. I also matched the interviews with evidence from documents and videos and by cross-checking them. All information obtained and documented was gathered in strict accordance with UKZN's ethical protocols.

A number of theories informed this study, especially in charting some of the features of the diaspora itself and in forming groups for discussion. I was able to use the concepts on typologies of immigrants discussed in the literature to form discussion groups. The study also benefited from the models provided in some multi-level analytical approaches in other disciplines. This study's contribution to the migration debate, the 'Ecological Model of Migration and Remittances', is discussed in Chapter 5 and was used to categorise immigrants by distinguishing between remitting and non-remitting immigrants (RI) (Mengesha, 2011). My Master's thesis dealt with migrants' remittances and the nexus with poverty reduction. I suggested, then, that immigrants or diaspora need to be identified with the acronym RI (Remitting Immigrants) on an equal footing with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Some of the theories of migration also overlap with theories of remittances, because the two are inseparable in development studies.

The Ecological Model was a useful methodology because instead of stigmatising the positive suggestions of the contributing theoreticians, it accommodates their valid arguments. The framework and model provided by Mohan (2007, p. 77) on the three interdependent development mechanisms: 'Development in Diaspora'; 'Development through Diaspora' and 'Development by Diaspora' is a case in point. I attempted to relate his proposition to the individual interviewees and used it as a basis for my agenda for the Ethiopian Business Diaspora.

1.3.6. Challenges and Opportunities of the Study

A number of challenges arose during the course of this study. The first was resistance from Ethiopian government-affiliated civic organisations of the Ethiopian diaspora in South Africa that tried to sabotage my efforts by suggesting that my work was being sponsored by the South African government to expose the internal functioning of the Ethiopian diaspora community in Durban and Rustenburg. As result I needed to make extra effort to assure them of my academic neutrality. At the beginning, especially during the sampling period, I needed to stroll around West and Victoria Streets in Durban requesting the participation of Ethiopian immigrants with whom I did not have any acquaintance. Some of the immigrants particularly from the Tigre tribe were not appreciative of my research. I remember a man who I approached while he was waiting for his friend to park his car in front of one of the shops in West Street. I introduced myself and asked him if he could give me a few minutes of his time. He nodded, with a degree of suspicion and approval. I told him why I was there and briefly informed him of the project. Before I finished, he interrupted me and asked, 'Are you a United Nations informer?' in Amharic it is: '*Le Te Baberut Mengistat New Yemitseraw?'* I replied 'No', but he continued to ask, 'Are you working for the South African government?' I responded: 'No, it is just academic.' I wondered why he did not also ask me if I was working for the Ethiopian government. After those questions, he did not participate in the study.

The second limitation was obtaining data from some of the authorities. In terms of data on the exact number of Ethiopian immigrants in Durban and Rustenburg, I checked with the Ethiopian Embassy in Pretoria using the internet if they had any data on the number of Ethiopians living in South Africa to no avail.

Thirdly, female participation is the study was very low. I attempted to secure women's participation through 'chain referral-sampling', but women felt insecure for two reasons. Firstly, culture dictates that the 'man knows best' and is responsible for the family's external relations. He is the one that should provide answers to the authorities regarding the household. Thus, many of the women I approached directed me to their husbands. Single women were also reluctant to participate. Thus, despite my desire to ensure a gender balance, this did not materialise.

The main opportunity arising from the study was the complementarity of the research objectives and methods. Individual interviews were made possible through the use of 'chain-referral-sampling', and the use of group discussions facilitated data collection. The participants were willing to take part in the study for three main reasons. Firstly, my initial own contacts were respected among their communities; secondly, some of the participants had known me for long time, were aware of my background and trusted that I was doing academic research and thirdly, newer immigrants hoped that participation would highlight the issues confronting them, and enhance decision-makers' understanding in the long run, even though the study had nothing to do with xenophobia and short range benefits.

As noted earlier, another factor that benefitted the study was my acquaintance with the situation which helped me to interpret the information gathered from secondary sources and to understand the messages concealed between the lines of most Ethiopian government policy papers.

Paradoxically, studying diaspora and conducting this research from outside of Ethiopia seems more convenient than doing it inside the migrants' country of origin. The researcher himself belongs to the South-South diaspora and has in-depth experience of South-North travel. As he has been living in Europe for more than 14 years as diaspora, this gave this research the required analytical depth.

1.3.7. Conclusion

In conclusion, the research approach was in line with the qualitative method. Methodological monism does not exist and various techniques overlap from textual research to field work. An interpretive approach was used that employed individual interviews to collect data, complemented by group discussions and non-participatory observation over a long period with residents of both selected cities. As a member of the community in question this was similar to ethnography. The study employed original and primary data as well as secondary data from the literature, information on online community websites, and so forth. It benefited from supervision of the project that has become part of knowledge in this thesis while combining it with intrinsic knowledge.

A mix of a limited application of different techniques is within the tradition of methodological pragmatism that is also evident in this study. As Losifides (2011) argues, the best way to study migration is to use a qualitative method and critical realism. This thesis' contribution is that it employed consistent theoretical and methodological approaches. At the theoretical level the philosophical world view is seen in the use of an ecological model which is constructed by using knowledge from mixed schools of thought in migration debates, and it is pragmatic without a rigid fixation with a certain ideology. The data analysis is interpretive which is consistent with a qualitative study, but interpretation was data driven. These synergies helped achieve the study's stated objective.

The research design was informed by the need for a rounded perspective on all aspects of the topic. The study was located in two cities to allow for comparison and to understand the realities of migration in different geographic locations in South Africa. The researcher sought a road map that avoided singular stories about migration.

The field work in the study locations also employed mixed approaches, including individual interviews, and group discussions as primary sources as well as secondary sources. The sample population was balanced to include representatives of the pre-existing 'cleavages' found in the Ethiopian immigrant community, and the method of 'chain-referred-sampling' also enabled the researcher to connect with possibly hidden networks among the participants. The researcher's intrinsic knowledge prevented bias that might have been created by the values of the informer (the first agent of reference for sampling the target population). The data was analysed qualitatively with the application of some descriptive statistics. This conforms to the traditions of ecological research methodology, which corresponds to the Ecological Model at an ontological level. The combination of applicable methods without methodological dualism or monism adheres to the principles of the ecological method at an epistemological level, and interpretation also encourages a well-rounded perspective.

CHAPTER 4: THEORIES

INTRODUCTION

Theory plays a fundamental role in humanities and social science irrespective of whether a qualitative, quantitative or mixed methods approach is adopted. Theories or models help a researcher to position her/his research in relation to existing knowledge, based on the epistemological routes followed and ontological positions held. Silverman (2000), quoted by de Benetti (2009), states that:

> *'…any scientific finding is usually to be assessed in relation to the theoretical perspective from which it derives and to which it contributes…'*
> (Silverman, 2000 in Benetti, 2009, p.4)

Thus, theory is as important to research as colour is to painting, because it is 'an idea or set of ideas used to explain a subject matter in the world or life, and it also contains the arguments and "opinion" of an individual or group of researchers regarding something which they think is true but for which they may "*not have proof*"' (Longman, 2003 in Benetti, 2009, p.3). In contrast to a 'hypothesis' in empiricist research, theory is not adopted in order to be disproved, although counter arguments and contentions can be levelled against it in critically comparing 'plausible generalisations' or the 'body of principles offered to explain a phenomenon' (Benetti, 2009, p.1).

While theory and models usually overlap, according to Kawulich (2016), models provide the overall framework for how we look at reality. There are different types of models. For instance, functionalism examines the functions of society, behaviourism defines all behaviours in society in terms of stimulus and responses; interactionist studies show how we attach symbolic meaning to interpersonal relations, and finally, the ethnomethodology examines people's everyday ways of producing orderly social interaction (Benetti, 2009, p. 5). In contrast, theories represent an arrangement of

concepts to understand and explain a phenomenon. This requires a plausible relationship between sets of concepts as well as individual ones that constitute the framework to critically understand a phenomenon and consider how that which is unknown can be organised (Silverman, 2000 in Kawulich, 2016). In a qualitative study, theory sets perspectives or provides a way of seeing realities that cannot be disproved. Therefore, this chapter considers the ontological position of this thesis. It also proposes its own migration models as a contribution to knowledge.

The chapter begins by examining existing theories in migration and development studies, focusing on those that are most relevant to this study. Historically, macro or micro economic theories were used to understand and predict migration. This section examines established generalisations on the causes of migration and how other social theories define this phenomenon. The modernisation, Marxist and world system theory and other schools of thought that explain migration are revisited and their limitations are briefly discussed.

Secondly, this chapter presents this study's new contributions to knowledge with regard to migration theory. New meta models are proposed to contribute to the migration debate. This section considers actors, players and policies as variables to form three models that systematise discourses on migration: the Meteorological Model, Police Model, and the Ecological Model. The latter is the researcher's ontological position, while the first two models describe, distinguish and systematise opposing ideas. All three models are original propositions to theorise migration from new and different perspectives that bring the roles of decision-makers, practitioners, and protagonists of migration policies to light. The three new meta-models categorise and typify contemporary views on migration and are discussed in detail.

1.4.1. Theoretical Cohabitation: Socio-Economic Theories on Migration

1.4.1.1. Migration and the Mainstream Theories of Political Economy

In today's world, migration has become a structural feature of developed countries as well as economically strong countries in Africa. However, there seems to be a lack of

unanimity at the theoretical level. Messey, Arango, Greame, Huge, et al. (1993, pp. 431-466) notes, that, at present, there is no single, coherent theory of international migration or diaspora. Instead, a fragmented set of theories has emerged largely in isolation from one another, sometimes segmented by disciplinary boundaries.

While ethnographers, anthropologists, and geographers, economists and others have contributed to the theory of migration, they have tended to propose general propositions on migration rather than contribute to specific diaspora debates. Among the many examples are the neo-classical 'macro-economic theory' that identifies differences in wages and working conditions between countries and migration costs as motivating people to move across political boundaries (Joaquin et al., 1993). Its roots lie in classical theories of migration and the 'push and pull' economic propositions that emerged in the late 19th century.

Ravenstein's (1988) laws of migration are an earlier form of this theory. Macro-economic explanations were influential in informing policy and political decisions in the decade after the end of World War II. They posit that if wage differences increase or cause migration, their elimination would put an end to this phenomenon. Hence, the protagonists of this theory advised political decision-makers that, if they wanted to control migration they needed to focus on its source rather than on its destination. I argue that this theory was influenced by the experience of west and central European countries vis-à-vis their southern and eastern counterparts. The movement of labour between Africa and Europe or Latin America and North America is the basis of the dependency theory that favours the Marxist explanation of the nature of capitalism over the neo-classical theory of migration. The European integration project seems to have used such arguments to advance its eastward expansion and convince many conservatives at home that economic development guarantees counter-migration within Europe.

The logic of the theory is that once economies and labour markets are standardised, motivation to migrate to other countries will diminish significantly. In terms of Europe-African migration, the theory provided the basis for the French approach of 'co-development' for Malian immigrants. The project aimed to return naturalised Malians to

their country through creating job opportunities. It is not clear whether or not this project was successful and co-development seems to have disappeared from the contemporary agenda. The macro-economic model of migration aims to equalise macro-economic development; hence, providing jobs for migrants in their home counties would be a drop in the ocean in seeking to reverse migration. As noted above, such policies were influenced by neoclassical economic theory. However, as Sörsen, indicated, it is not clear whether poverty reduction on its own would be sufficient to control migration.

The micro-economic model of individual choice (Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1969; Marusko, 1987) rests on individuals' cost-benefit calculations in making migration decisions. It argues that people choose a place where they become productive. Hence, migration as a process of diaspora formation is the result of conscious individual decisions that are made of their own volition. Such arguments influence local resistance to immigrants, and often result in pressure being brought to bear on immigrants with a view to inducing their reverse migration. It is also hoped that it will dissuade their fellow citizens from migrating. Xenophobic tendencies might be fueled by the notion that immigrants cross borders as a calculated choice rather than being forced to do so by conditions in their country of origin. This contrasts with the classical notion of diaspora and migration and globalism, social-cosmopolitanism and theories of economic integration that promote movement of goods and services as fundamental conditions for development and prosperity. While the argument is not entirely detached from reality, it cannot be conclusively said that migrants are the only ones who make individual decisions. The challenge facing this school of thought is thus to differentiate between voluntary and involuntary dispersion (Faist, 2008; Safran 1991). Therefore, examining the typology of immigrants is fundamental to a proper theory and practice of migration.

The other theoretical proposition is the new economics of migration which argues that migration is not the result of individual decisions to become more productive. Instead, it is a collective decision taken by the family or household (Stark and Bloom, 1985). The theory argues that households send workers abroad not only to improve their income in absolute terms, but also to increase their income relative to a reference household. This means that deprivation is not absolute but is measured in comparison to a given household that has sent some of its members abroad and benefitted from remittances.

However, this proposition overlooks adverse circumstances that undermine family units before a family makes migratory decisions. Most dislocations reflect a story of the systemic collapse of social order, including family units.

The dual market theory of migration argues that migration is not the result of an individual or group decision, but is the result of the intrinsic characteristics of the global capitalist economic structure (Piore, 1979). It posits that international migration occurred and will continue to occur because of the inherent divisions between a resource sending country and an industrial country. Labour is a necessary resource to maintain a dual global economic system; developing countries export not only their raw materials but also their skilled labour that could have been used to develop their own economies. Thus, for Piore, migration is not caused by voluntary-push factors but by demand for foreign workers in developed economies. These unending demands are the result of the characteristics of different global systems themselves that are set out in system theory, including social factors in Europe such as an aging work force. The socio-political architecture of the world system subordinates counties with abundant labour to industrially advanced ones, perpetuating migration and the diaspora.

Apart from these migration economics or systems-related theories, a number of schools of thought claim to be theories of diaspora. These explanations that were discussed in the first part of this thesis, could be termed incipient theories of migration. They include classical and extended views, and recent theories of diaspora. Safran's thoughts on the Jewish diaspora can be considered as classical, while Cohen's new typologies create voluntary migrants as a category and Faist's recent work on expanded notions of diaspora as networks and transnational actors can be termed contemporary diaspora theories. Clifford's work is regarded as an example of the application of post-modernism to migration theory (Sideri, 2008). While diaspora can be a subset of migration studies, all migration is not encapsulated by diaspora theory. Hence, there seems to be a difference between classical theories of migration and classical theories of diaspora. The latter was addressed earlier in this thesis. It focuses on victimhood and violent expulsion from one's ancestral land and refers to international movement of people from a given 'lost home'. Its main proponents are Safran, Cohen, etc. and most of these works have been published in the past three decades, while the classical migration models

mainly emerged in the late nineteenth century. The protagonists included cartographers and geographers who were concerned about internal migration, especially rural-urban movement. This is discussed in more detail in the following section.

There is no single theory of diaspora, no doubt due to its complex nature. On-going discourse is thus required on migration and other diaspora formation processes. The work of Safran (1991); Faist (2003); Cohen (2008); Clifford (1999); Aisha (1995); Russell and Anastasia (2009); De Hass (2005); and Toloyan (1991) is of interest in this regard.

Russell King (2012) discussed the above-mentioned theories, and many others, according to their historical moments of prominence. Apart from listing them chronologically, he notes their limitations in terms of being fully-fledged theories on migration. The major propositions he used to arrange the theories were the neo-classical migration theory and push and pull factors which are part of the macro-economic analysis of migration; the modernisation theory of migration; the Marxist historical-structural and political economy model of migration; the systems-networks theory; the new economics of migration and the transnational turn in migration. These are considered below.

In terms of King's classification, the neo-classical migration theory represents the propositions that dominated the early phases of migration discourses (1885, 1889). These ideas are dissimilar to those in the classical theory of diaspora discussed above and deal with population movement in general. Raven Stein's *Laws of Migration* was influential at this time. The main generalisations he offered were that: a) Migrants migrate over short distances; if they travel long distances their destination is industrial centers; b)The migration flow is from the agricultural periphery to industrial centers; c) Large towns grow not by means of organic growth, but due to the influx of migrants from other places; d) Migration increases with the development of industry; e) Each migration structure creates a counter stream; f) Females are more migratory than men; and g) The major causes of migration are economic. Ravens Tien, who supported this theory, was a cartographer in the British War Office and his generalisations about migration were widely accepted by geographers in the late 19th century. However, he was criticised for making economic factors the determining variable in migration in sharp contrast to

classical diaspora theories' identification of persecution and violent expulsion as factors that lead to people leaving their homeland (Samers, 2010, pp.55-56). The contemporary rational choice theory also identifies economic factors as the major cause of migration. The other paired-theory, the push-pull theory, has similar implications to the neo-classical economic proposition on migration and remains popular among contemporary migration experts. Factors cited as inducing out-migration include poverty, unemployment, landlessness, rapid population growth, low social status, political repression, and even poor marriage prospects. For its part, the beauty of the host country is identified as a factor that can determine in-migration or pull migrants. According to this theory, improved income and job prospects, welfare provision, and better education, land to settle on, a good environment, and freedom also influence migrants to move to another country. This thinking dominated the migration discourse of the 1960s.

Many of the pull factors resemble or are drawn from neoclassical economic theories (Messey et al., 1998, pp.18-21 in King, 2012, pp.13). The theory provides for macro and micro level analysis of the reasons for labour mobility. At a micro level utility maximisation and the rational choice of factor-price differentials between regions and countries are identified. Wage differentials, supply and demand for labour and comparative advantages are reasons for migration. It is posited that, when wage differentials are equalized and development is standardised between countries and regions, the incentive for out-migration will diminish. At the micro level, the rational individual makes decisions about the benefits that he/she could obtain by moving to a country that offers higher wages based on the flow of information about different options and the benefits of migration (Bojars, 1989; Sjaastad, 1962). As stated above, this line of thinking has been refuted for several reasons, including its economic determinism, functionalism and historicism. It is hence unworkable and does not reflect the reality of migration.

Arango (2004, pp.19-20 in King, 2012, pp. 13-14) maintains that, the weakness of the neo-classical economic narrative was its failure to explain why few people actually migrate, despite apparent incentives to do so; and why others with identical economic structural situations have a low migration rate. Its failure to consider personal, family or

socio-cultural factors or to acknowledge the political reality of multiple barriers to international migration, render this theory incomplete. It also does not consider the varied histories of colonialism that link certain countries together and not others, even continents whose economies and social systems are interlocked so that one remains dependent and underdeveloped in order to ensure the prosperity of the other (Lewis,1954). Russell King (2012, pp.13) noted that economic reasons are played as a card to violate the rights of migrants in receiving counties by focusing on exaggerated negative economic effects, like stealing jobs, crime, disease, etc. Such exaggerations are politically motivated and use stereotypical statements against migrants to instigate local resistance. These anti-migration strategies are systemic and represent ideological differences within the host space. King (2012, pp. 7) states, that, such misconceptions should be confronted head on through an analysis of the complexity and diversity of migrants as well as the phenomenon itself.

The neo-classical economic theories and the push and pull factors were followed by a period of theoretical fragmentation during the 1970s and 1980s (King, 2012, p.13). Thereafter, mainstream theories of a different kind emerged, including the Marxist political economic theory; historical development (modernisation theory); system theory and the new economics of migration as lenses through which to examine the issues of migration and diaspora.

Kindle Berger (1967, in King, 2012) proposes that Europe's post-war growth was driven by the supply of cheap 'surplus' labour from southern European and Mediterranean countries. The Marxist interpretation of capitalism and the structure of the world economy proposed similar arguments, with the forces of migration explained and embedded in macro analysis of the inherent nature of capitalism and labour exploitation (Marawsk, 2012, p.55).

1.4.1.2. Modernization Theory and Migration

Wilbur Zelinsky's hypothesis of mobility transition (Zelinsky, 1971, in King, 2012, p.13) associated migration with five stages of modernization that are similar to Rostov's stages of growth. According to Zelinsky, 'there are definite patterns in the growth of personal mobility through time and space… and this regularity comprises an essential component

of modernisation processes' (Zelinsky, 1971, p. 222). These stages are distinct levels of mobility that correspond to the stages of human modernisation. The first, which is the mobility or migration level, is associated with pre-modern traditional society and shows very limited migration. When it does occur, it takes place between adjacent localities. The second migration stage corresponds with early transitional society and is marked by mass rural-urban migration, settlement and colonisation. The third stream emanates from the social development level described as late transitional society and is characterized by reduced rural-urban migration and emigration centres, while the fourth corresponds with the advent of advanced society, with inter-urban migration motivated by economic and leisure factors. Finally, the fifth level of migration occurs in a super advanced society in which improved communication and delivery systems provide opportunities for high mobility and migration. The shortcoming of these propositions is that mobility or migration is associated with status and class, civilization and privileges and that they presuppose that being immigrant is being more modern and civilized. Migration and immigrants are thus represented as transnational actors in a specific kind of global space. However, the reality and life experiences of millions of immigrants do not support such a notion of modernity. These theories obscure the suffering of migrants that become targets of human trafficking, persecution or forced labour. Furthermore, they have limited capacity to explain migration, even in the most advanced society that they encounter. However, the argument that communication promotes mobility is valid.

1.4.1.3. Theories with Marxist Lineages and Migration

King (2012) maintains that, while the historical and structural models of migration are only remotely related, they are strongly bound by the Marxist interpretation of capitalism, under-development and global economic systems (Marawsk, 2012, pp. 55 in King, 2012). According to these schools of thought, the forces of migration are embedded within the macro-structural forces of capitalism and the economic power that shapes global capitalism has an inherent exploitative quality and disruptive nature. The dual and, segmented labour market and global system theory are part of the Marxist traditions that attempt to explain migration.

1.4.1.4. World System theory and Migration

Piore's (1979) *Birds of Passage* relates international migration to the architecture of the global capitalist system and its on-going demand for cheap labour. In the dual labour

market, secure, well-paid jobs are reserved for natives, while in the secondary labour market, low-skilled, low-wage and unpleasant jobs are given to immigrants. This perpetuates migration because the more migrants occupy these jobs, the more locals will develop distaste for them; the jobs become attached to a stigmatized segment, i.e., migrants. This creates a cycle where the state has to provide workers for distasteful jobs and does so by importing cheap labour from places like Africa, Asia and Latin America through a system of overt and covert recruitment. While the precise details of the mechanisms employed to secure such labour require more research, deliberate, direct and indirect intervention that disrupt the social strata in a given state or society might take place to trigger a mass exodus to feed labour demands in advanced societies. These interventions could take violent forms as happened in the past. Yugoslavia, Ukraine, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Mali, Nigeria, and so forth are witnessing an exodus of people. These are mainly young people that are responding to European demand for labour. However, it is not clear whether this represents voluntary migration or whether some manipulation is taking place to trigger it. Marxist thoughts on migration do not explicitly discuss the modalities of fulfilling unending demand for labour other than presenting them as general propositions. Piore and Sassen note the deliberate creation of a city of the rich and the poor that are connected like an hour glass so that the poor feed the labour demands of the rich's life style (Piore, 1988, in King, 2012, pp.13-15).

The world system theory also relates population movement and international migration to preexisting colonial ties between dominant countries and their subordinates. In contemporary global systems, historical migration is perpetuated to satisfy demands for both cheap and skilled labour (Marowski, 2007, p.3). Thus, French-speaking Congolese are working in Belgium and France; Mali nationals and the Senegalese in France; Ugandans in the UK; and Eritreans in Italy, etc. However, it is interesting that migrants also move to countries with which their home country has no colonial ties. Ethiopians are a case in point as they have settled in their millions in the USA and UK. In the case of the UK, this could be due to language issues and the tradition of royalty. As discussed later, these reasons were cited to explain why a given Ethiopian tribal group has settled in larger numbers in Durban or Rustenburg (see Chapter 5). The new economics of migration was touched on at the beginning of this chapter. The notion that migration is an individual decision overlooks the historical, structural, and exploitative nature of

global institutions in terms of cheap labour as the price to pay for escaping violence and social disruption.

King's presentation of different theories is very useful in compiling the major theories that are scattered across various disciplines. As this thesis adopts the ecological perspective, the intention is not to disqualify these theories because they lack comprehensiveness. Instead, I aim to build on their contribution by bringing bottom-up views to the discourse of migration, remittance, and the diaspora debate. Theories that match day-to-day encounters with the phenomenon of migration and solution-oriented egalitarian approaches that draw on the resources of both victims and policy-makers are in short supply. While conventional theories in different disciplines have thoroughly scrutinized migrants, the missing story is how migrants see the world in terms of their own life situations as well as how they perceive the powerful actors in global migration theory and practice. Therefore, in the face of the global 'migration crisis', explanations for this phenomenon are still required. Had the theoretical insights been more balanced, this crisis might not have come as such a surprise. The following meta-models represent the researcher's efforts to enrich theoretical discourses on migration and diaspora.

1.4.2. The New Meta Models of Migration, Remittance and Diaspora

Current patterns and trends in immigration suggest that a full understanding of contemporary migratory processes will not be achieved by relying on the tools of one discipline alone, or by focusing on a single level of analysis or theory (King, 2013). This calls for a multi-level and multi-dimensional approach which I term the ecological approach to migration. None of the traditions and theories, including the mainstream neo-classical (macro-micro) economic theories; modernisation theories; the world system; and so on, provide a complete explanation or are not theories of diaspora and migration in themselves. Rather, they co-opted migration discourses. The arguments advanced by typical diaspora and migration theories like classical migration and classical diaspora theories, including the post-modern and transnational ones have some merit, but once again do not comprehensively explain all features of the phenomenon. If a comprehensive /singular/ and consistently valid theory of migration is not possible due to the diversity of actors and the ever-changing nature of this phenomenon, the goal should be to seek a multi-dimensional and multi-level set theory.

This calls for an approach or model which accommodates the winning arguments of all the theories that have stood the test of time and space, instead of rejecting them for being incomplete. This new proposition will likely resemble a cluster of self-contained theories within a theory, combined with others within a larger category of the subject matter at hand. As a cluster bomb carries a bomb within a bomb, so the ecological model concentrates valid theories of the past in its compartment. It is thus argued that diaspora and migrations cannot be separated from their own history and genesis; hence, new arguments are partly validations rather than refutations of past theories. In interpreting the data from the field, all the above theories, models, propositions, ideas, etc. are operationalized to fit the realities of migration in the locations selected for this study.

The ecological approach is not a monolithic theory but a mix of facts, theories, and consideration of intentions, decisions, power relations, etc. in migration-related issues. Most of its ideas, in one way or another, were captured by different theories at different times that remain valid in the present. In short, the ecological approach can be characterised as a multi-focal theory that offers insight into various elements of the issue of migration. Various validities are observed when these different theories help us to interpret the data from the field in Part 11 of this thesis.

However, in terms of developing models, the study presents an alternative model of diaspora, remittance and migration issues. Most of the theories discussed above are attic views put forward by theoreticians who view migration from the outside to the inside and with top-down ontological positioning, apart from some of the classical theories of diaspora. The main preoccupations of the classical theories were the reasons for or causes of migration, and who migrants are or who diaspora should be. However, the discourses on the global regime and actors that deal with migration issues are not well cast. The focus of their research is the source of migration and the research is undertaken by northern countries or with their agency. The bottom-up view is less common. The discussion that follows is thus a kind of researching the researcher. After synthesising the work of these state and non-state actors, the discourses can be structured to create new models of migration and diaspora under the following meta categories: Meteorological Model, Police Model and Ecological Model.

1.4.2.1. Meteorological Model of Migration, Remittances and Diaspora

This term is coined to describe the influential international discourses and approaches to migration, remittances and diaspora. It generates its arguments from a synthesis of the analyses, outlooks and modus operandi of the players regarding diaspora and migrations issues, as well as their practical roles and how this affects these issues. This model was discussed for the first time in my unpublished master's thesis that dealt with 'Immigrants' remittances and its development nexus' (Mengesha, 2011). In the current study, the model is developed to interpret the ongoing debate on diaspora and typologies.

Recent public and academic discourses on remittances, immigrants, and diaspora are dominated by the tenets and actors of a Meteorological Model. These mainly emanate from the WB, the IMF (IMF), the IOM and other pillars of the global regime like the United Nations, and unilateral and multilateral organizations engaged in development in the South. One of the defining features of this school of thought is that it involves protagonists that are not mere academics that formulate theoretical propositions, but are themselves actors and discourse planners in today's migration issues, and are thus responsible for managing or influencing the fate of the global diaspora. The reference to a Meteorological Model arises for two fundamental reasons (Mengesha, 2011): Firstly, it acts as meteorological station that follows and predicts the remittance and diasporic movements' flow and direction, and consequently its mobility. It has also tasked itself with the duty of providing professional advice to sovereign and other powerful entities. Secondly, it sees remittances as transitional economic variables which require constant speculation and management. For instance, the WB's website focuses on the global outlook of remittances and is characterised by its speculative assessments. The main traits of the Meteorological Model are that: a) It applies quantitatively sophisticated methods but a simple approach to explain the qualitative issues of remittances and diaspora; b) it exhibits exploitative and hierarchical perceptions; c) its interest is limited to the economic value of immigrants and their remittances; d) the emphasis is on labour-related mobility and remittances; e) it sees remittance in isolation from other variables

and there is hence, less emphasis on the development agency of immigrants themselves. As a result NGO and state-centred analysis or policy is characterized by a technocratic approach; and a pro-control stance on diaspora and remittances. The opinions of these actors on what determines migration, keywords denoting their main arguments, and the list of protagonists involved in the on-going issues of diaspora are illustrated in the following table:

Table 3: List of Protagonists and theoretical Ancestors of the Meteorological Model

Meteorological Model

Topic	Main Arguments	Protagonists	Theoretical Ancestors
1) *Determinants of Migration and Diaspora Formation*	- Unemployment - Poverty - Disasters (Natural)	- National Governments - World Bank - Conservative Think Tank Groups (center to left) - Academics - OECD (Countries policy discourses on development financing)	Rostov *Stages of Growth* Neoliberal Economic Theories and approaches
2) *Determinants of Remittance*	- Family responsibilities - Altruistic Goals - Business bound		
3) *Impact of Remittances*	- Positive Impact on Poverty Reduction and Development		
4) *Position on Issue Development Agen*	- Considers a 'State' as main agent for development and main partner for development cooperation - Approves the implementing role of non-governmental organisations, and outsourcing development programmes to private players (Multinational corporations etc.)		
5) *Development Cooperation Policy*	- Sovereign States, Governments, are main stake holders in policy formulation and implementation together with WB, IMF, and other institutions of Bretton Woods		

The Meteorological Model as well as the Police Model focused more on remittances after September 11, 2001. The WB is the main proponent of this model, as are unilateral global actors (powerful states like the US and EU). Thus, their preoccupation has been to track or predict sources of remittances as well as flows and magnitude. The analysis

follows monetary movements through different global remittance corridors and approaches the issue meteorologically.

The analysis is based on official data gathered from the banks of different countries that have signed an agreement with Western Union, Money Gram, and other channels of liquidity transfer in relation to immigrant workers around the globe. The orientation is similar to the schools of thought on perceptions of development, i.e., the emphasis is on economic growth and there is a tendency to analyse development using income measures. To index living standards, it uses the formula of GDP/Population Size and comes up with figures that do not necessarily represent the actual income of any individual in a given country. The proponents of the Meteorological Model of remittance are not concerned with what happens to remittances, as long as they are not falling into the hands of 'enemies of the civilized world'. This points to the neo-liberal orientation of this model as the focus is on immigration and monetary aspects, and understanding immigrant-related issues. It is constrained by entrenched capital- orientated value systems, and usually regards immigrants as embodiments of labour. As a result, these agencies approach this issue with at best, indifference and at worst, they advocate maintaining a reservoir of immigrant labor that is detached their human rights. The meteorological approach acknowledges the need to substitute the aging population in the West, and recognises the need for immigration. Remittances are regarded as acceptable as long as they are overt and conform to managed immigration strategies.

The far right section of this model considers that remittances drain the opportunities of immigrants in host countries and could otherwise be used for local benefit or to finance the development of poor countries in order to relieve the burden of OECD countries. It projects the feeling of being exploited by immigrants in an unexpected way. The Meteorological Model considers the issues of remittances and migrants as a matter that concerns a segment of a society that occupies a low position in the hierarchy. As a result, there was widespread neglect of the issue until September 11, 2001. Even after this, the focus was more on knowing where migrants' remittances were going. Discussion on the meteorological school of thought is dominated by the financial aspects of the diaspora. Remittances are disconnected from other variables, and their permanent nature, link with livelihoods and stability and other features are neglected.

During the early stages of articulation of this model, remittances were studied as a phenomenon with less emphasis on their positive developmental impact. However, with the benefit of hindsight, global entities have realised the poverty reduction and development impact of remittances from immigrants. As a result, extensive efforts are being made to mobilise diaspora to support development with the support of the WB, UNCTAD, UNDP, and so on.

Data gathering and follow up of remittance flows relies on state and NGO-generated information and there is strong vertical solidarity among these players in terms of remittances and their use for various development purposes. For instance, the WB Bank works hand-in-hand with national governments to strategise on remittance issues and how best to make use of them. The IMF and WB also guide governments of different developing countries on how to exploit diaspora's remittances to enhance their domestic development agendas.

This approach excludes immigrants despite the fact that they are responsible for remittances, especially those I describe as prototypical diaspora in Chapter 5, that are beyond the scope of this discussion. Partnerships between the UN and multilateral financial institutions are inclined towards the state, overlooking the role of those that live in exile. Exile is another form of diaspora which is deeper than just being outside of home. Furthermore, the Meteorological Model uses quantitative jargon which limits access by ordinary people and employs complex techniques to analyse the rather straight-forward subject of remittances or diaspora finance. By doing so, it alienates commonsense and the applicability of remittance knowledge which is indigenised in immigrant issues or its human dimension.

The strength of this school of thought is that, in principle, it does not rule out some kind of global and national control over remittances and immigration; however, it focuses on the economic value and the trans-boundary nature of remittances and immigration. It became pro-control only after September 11, 2001. The neoliberal agenda does not completely reject the economic facilitating role of remittances (as part of global financial flows) as a requirement for globalisation and economic prosperity. Its main interest has

been in understanding, predicting and managing it. Therefore, in 2006, five years after September, 11, the relevance of remittances and its development nexus received much attention within the Bretton Woods institutions.

A 2006 WB report included data and outlooks that are characterised as meteorological and advised its preferred partners on the state of the issue. The Econometric or Meteorological Model has popularised the issue of the remittance and development nexus, though from a narrow perspective. For instance, the issue of people that flee genocide in their home country is not taken into account. The data and advice based on it is thus problematic. Through the advice of the WB and IMF's specialised departments the ghosts of the failed policies of Structural Adjustment /SAP of the IMF and WB, growth-driven economic perspectives, and other methodological and analytical problems are finding their way into policy on global remittances and the governance strategies of these entities. It is pertinent to recall the story of 'poachers as game keepers'.

Solimano et al.'s *Remittance by Emigrants: issues and Evidence* focused on remittances, capital flows and development financing. Other studies have approached these issues from an econometric perspective, for example, intra-household economics. Based on an examination of panel data, the Global Research Group (2007) and Krishnan and Decon (2009) concluded that the main factors driving income changes are relative price changes, resulting in changes in returns on land, labour, and human capital. On the other hand, research conducted in Zimbabwe found that remittances positively impacted poverty reduction (see Smita Wagh et al., 2007). These studies showed that remittances are a stable private flow that promotes financial development and suggested banking unbanked migrants to increase the benefits for both the host and receiving countries.

1.4.2.2. *Police Model on Migration, Remittances and Diaspora*

The Police Model takes a controversial stand in that it regards remittances and immigrants as a challenge to the establishment that requires constant surveillance and control. While this model has been around for a long time, control on the remittance side used to be less tight than on the immigrant side. This was due to lack of information

about remittances and their extent and relevance. Today, there seems to be a huge awakening on this issue. Furthermore, lessons about remittances as a concept and practice were taken from the history of Western civilisation and they were not as alarming for proponents of the regime or the Police Model as the issue of immigration. Besides, as explained above, the neo-liberal economic theory of the free market presupposed free and unhindered global financial flows; hence, remittances were not an alien concept. Moreover, immigrants are more visible than their remittances and the practice of controlling immigrants is age-old.

The Police Model is characterised by the following traits: a) it embraces conservative cultural variables that resist South-North movement of people, and instead encourage North-South movement; b) it is a security-oriented view of remittances and immigrants and it gives prime emphasis to the potential threat that migrants pose, to the extent of conjuring up images of migrants poised to 'swarm the West'; c) it proposes strict control of immigration and remittances; d) it relies heavily on the state to devise and implement universal control of immigration and remittances; e) it has a perverted ecological view on immigration and remittances as it establishes links between immigrants, remittances, terror, drugs, human trafficking, trans-boundary crimes, and so forth. In contrast, the Ecological Model points to the positive multiplier effects of remittances or immigration); f) it mainly uses defence or militarised strategies against immigrants and remittances; and g) it proposes high taxation or other measures to discourage remittance flows to developing countries.

Brajas et al. (2009) produced a working paper for the IMF under the title *Do workers' remittances promote economic growth?* Their findings suggested that at best, workers' remittances have no impact on economic growth. They also proposed a partnership for development that does not acknowledge the relevance of diaspora and instead reinforces the Monterrey Consensus on the importance of well-functioning domestic institutions. It hence encourages support for states and governments which are responsible for the creation of diaspora and immigrants owing to their inherent lack of democracy. This seems to be a self-contradiction in the Police Model. The protagonists and theoretical ancestors of the Police Model are summarized in the table below.

***Table 4**: List of Protagonists and Theoretical Ancestors of Police Model of Migration*

Police Model

	Topics	Main Arguments	Protagonist	Theoretical Ancestors
1)	*Determinants of Migration*	- → Seeking better life - Ulterior motives - Non-legal purposes	- Right Wing (Conservatives); Defense and Immigration State Agencies (Both in South and North); - IMF; Conservative think-thanks; - Institutions of Security Studies of different sorts - Interpol, and other global policing architectures - WB, Unilateral Government of the North - IMF, Most Institutes of Security Studies, Policy Makers of powerful unilateral governments in the West	- Push and Pull factors, - classical migration theories, - Classical theories on Diaspora, - Malthusian theory on population, - Spencer Model on 'evolution', - Darwinian Survival of the fittest; The new economic of individual choice -
2)	*Determinants of Remittances*	- → Shadowy Reasons - Terror sponsoring - Altruism - Non-productive Consumptions		
3)	*Impact of Remittance*	- → Negative impact on poverty		
4)	*On who is the right development Agent?*	- → Client states - Functionary NGOs of North		
5)				
6)	*Policy propositions*	- → Global Regulations and Tight control on Remittances, and Immigration or Diaspora; - Cooperation based on obligations and rules and enforcement; - Focus on 'friendly states' and functionary NGOs		

Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the US set up a Financial Action Task Force (FATF) that put forward an eight-point proposal on how to effectively control remittances and their agents. These included tightening control, including licensing, creating the state's own agencies through 'Money and Value Transfer Services' that assist with authorizing and clearing; and closely monitoring the identities of customers, the destination of remittances, and their possible use. Hence, legal and supervisory approaches were suggested. As noted earlier, the first action taken was to close a well-

known Somali remitting agency, affecting North-South remittances which were a lifeline for families in conflict-ridden Somalia. The Regime or Police Model thus consciously downplays the relevance of remittances for the economic growth or development of the poor. Maibo (2004) provided a critical overview of emerging strategies for oversight on remittances at a seminar on *Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Flow: the regulation and Supervision of Informal Remittance Systems.* The problem of defining remittances can be observed as it results in formal and informal dichotomies, which are part of the everyday life of the state and society. However, the arguments contained in this writing, with undertones of the Police Model, are a self-defeating theory of growth. Rostowe's theory of economic growth notes that capital formation is an essential ingredient for economic take-off. These liberal economic theories are central to the thinking of conservatives in the migration debate; indeed, most are proponents of liberal economic systems in developing countries. They advocate for the state to play a reduced role and for the private sector to be enlarged and for local investment opportunities to be created for multinational companies. However, when it comes to opening up investment opportunities for diaspora, the Police Model undermines the credibility of remittance finance by labeling it subversive and seeks to adopt protective measures with the help of the governments of developing countries. The model thus advocates a central role for the state in intervening in the lives of immigrants and in their remittances. However, remittances from immigrants provide the cash requirements for economic growth for both countries of origin and returning immigrants. They offer initial capital for everything from small households to big companies. If they were to be true to their economic development formulae, bodies that promote the Police Model would encourage migration and remittances. The roots of these notions are traceable to most classical theories on North-South encounters. However, attempts to regulate and control remittances and immigration have not been successful.

The philosophical and legal roots of the Police Model are embedded in the history of European state creation. The notion of the state as a sovereign entity, with defined territorial boundaries and jurisdiction over its territory emerged in the aftermath of the 30 Years' War and the subsequent signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The treaty allowed states to have a monopoly of violence in their sovereign jurisdiction. It also laid the normative ground for inter-human exclusion, by introducing the concepts of 'aliens'

and ‘citizens’. The culture of defining ‘others’ and ‘us’, with a tendency to regard all others as aliens that we do not share our common humanity with, is much romanticised by the Police Model with the implication of the use of physical and mental violence against those who are defined as others, even those who already exist within its boundaries but are excluded. Hence, the Police Model holds to the tradition of the ‘Westphalia System’, and considers the right of a given state as a sole arbiter of who it wants to admit to its territory and who to exclude as an inalienable one. This creates a moral hazard as protagonists of the Police Model hold Christianity as their spiritual guide. Christianity upholds the equality of mankind and the world being created for mankind irrespective of earthly qualifications. As the scriptures say, ‘God created man in his own image’. As noted above, the theoretical ancestors of the Police Model are theories that deny that people are created equal. This disqualifies the theory of evolution that categorizes humans between those that have completed their evolution and become human, and others that remain sub-human and are still undergoing the evolutionary process. From their faith’s moral perspective, stifling both remittances and immigration runs counter to their own ethical codes. The Police Model uses sociological theory to create a hierarchy between species of humankind, justifying mistreatment of other people within its territory when it defines them as ‘others’, and drawing legitimacy from the Westphalia Treaty and Spencer’s model/theory of evolution. The physical structures that are built to contain or block immigration are testimonies to the existence of a Police Model. Examples include the ‘Blue Curtain’ on the Mediterranean door to Europe, which aims to control immigration to Europe; the walls built in Monaco to prevent ‘sea-born’ immigrants; the towering concrete fences of Gaza erected by Israel against Palestinian and other ‘intruders’; the US’ tight control on immigration from south of its borders, and other similar blocking of human movement (De Rivera, 2002). The Police Model integrates all these features both historical and ideological, in its approach to remittances, diaspora, and immigrants. It thus constrains universal human-centered development that can only be anchored on free movement of people across the world. The literature that reflects the Police Model approach includes work by Pablo A. Acosta, Emmanuel K.K. Lartet and so forth. Mandelman referred to remittances as the ‘Dutch disease’, and Stahl and Wites (1982, p. 883), Chami Fulenkarp and Jahjahd (2003) and many more authors highlighted the adverse effects of remittances and migration. A detailed discussion on this literature is beyond the scope of this study. The following

section focuses on the Ecological Model that would allow us to achieve common ground for the sake of human security and development.

1.4.2.3. Ecological Model of Remittances, Diaspora and Immigration

The Ecological Model or analytical perspective regarding migration has not yet been fully developed. Hence, this study is an effort in that direction. However, some authors have used a similar approach in different disciplines, for example, Dahlberg (2002, pp.1-56) in Sociology; Bronfenbrenner 1979) in Development Psychology and scholars in Geography that used it to explain evolution and human interaction with its environment (Ellers, 2010; Johnson and Stinchcombe, 2007); and Honig et al. (1992) in Medicine. In the biological sciences Carlton (1996); Kareiva (1996); and Williamson (1996) explained the 'ecology of invasive species'. Some scholars in Banking and Finance have used an ecological approach to explain financial crises (Kelly, 2004). As the approach gains currency, it is difficult to ascertain which discipline is the pioneer in developing or using it. Scales and levels of analysis are common features of the models and analytical frameworks are applied across disciplines to understand and solve different problems. For instance, Urie Bronfenbrenner formulated the five systems model or ecological systems theory which is useful in examining individuals' relationships with their communities and the wider society in relation to child development. In international relations, systems theory (Buzan et al., 2000) can be considered a scalar perspective. Scales or levels such as local, national, regional or universal and their corresponding structures and institutions are common models of analysis, and one can assume that such perspectives have benefited from the ecological approach as the model provides perspectives from different angles. This study develops the Ecological Model as a framework to analyse different theories, phenomena, practices, policies, ideologies, and actors in migration, remittances and diaspora and is an extension of my Master's study. Although inspired by the multi-level analysis used by different disciplines, this study uses a framework of analysis which represents the original thinking of the researcher and seeks to fill the gap in theory in light of the need for a multidimensional approach to diaspora and remittances issues. The Ecological Model thus seems to be an established tradition, although it is given different names in many fields and a new approach can be devised to both theory and practice with the 'ecology of migration' at its centre.

As noted above, both the Meteorological and Police Models trace a sporadic connection between remittances and immigrants, thus only providing half the picture on these issues. They focus on remittances as financial flow, whilst the Meteorological Model also recognises their economic potential and development impact, mainly from contract foreign workers in receiving countries, using empirical evidence in the macro-economic setting.

A literature search revealed that, the Ecological Model on migration is not well-documented in the migration literature. It could have other names such as a call for a multi-level and multidisciplinary approach (Russel King, 2012). This study seeks to adopt a well-rounded perspective of diaspora, immigrants, and remittances. The main concern of the other models has been to contact foreign workers around the world, using data obtained from governments. However, these data are limited in explaining other aspects of diasporic and migration existence. For instance, data on people who are in exile due to violent expulsion and who cannot be formally integrated into the development schemes designed by the country of origin or by multi-lateral international organisations, is less evident. The Police Model treats remittances as growth-neutral at best, and regards them as an element of social and economic vice that calls for tight control. Both schools of thought are limited to figures and statistics in a technocratic way. Furthermore, multilateral intergovernmental bodies like the IMF and WB have become the main discussion forums and sources of policy on global governance of remittances and immigrants. The Ecological Model emphasises the need to connect all relevant factors and the issues behind remittances and immigrants, because they do not occur in a vacuum. It seeks to establish the links between the remittance-poverty reduction nexus and immigrants' development agency and calls for international cooperation. The Ecological Model treats remittances as a reflection of immigrants' strong sense of responsibility to their countries to reduce poverty.

The Ecological Model argues that regulation alone cannot prevent all possible abuses of the international remittance system, migration, or diaspora formation processes. The surgical approach to control or devise rules for remittances obscures the positive impact of remittances, as official banking systems around the world could deny financial services to immigrants for fear of mistakes. North-South remittances are particularly

affected by regulatory regime-based approaches. The Ecological Model rejects justifications contained in the Police Model to completely control remittances as overambitious and as an undesirable step, as they have crucial benefits for the economic-social wellbeing of the entire human family.

The model not only recognises the link between remittances and poverty reduction, which is the main thrust of development, but also elevates the role of immigrants to that of reliable development agents. Hence, it suggests an all-round view of the issue of remittances and immigrants. As stated previously, the Meteorological and Police Models rely on incomplete data; this can be observed from the fact that, South-South remittances and data are either omitted or under-emphasised. Hence, the Ecological Model is a southern perspective that balances the exaggerated North-South flow of remittances with evidence of South-South remittances playing a significant role in economic, social, and cultural development in developing countries. The main traits of the Ecological Model of immigrants' remittance are : a) it regards remitting immigrants as intelligent, development conscious people that have a better understanding of poverty and have experienced poverty reduction; they thus deserve the support of the international community; b) it places immigrants and state or non-governmental organisations on an equal footing in terms of acting as agents of development in their home countries; c) it posits that immigration and political and economic crises in source countries results from the double standards of democracy held by developed societies. It blames the West for advocating for the values of democracy, yet supporting dictatorial regimes that manufacture immigrants. The challenges that immigrants face in their countries or their host countries are the result of the deformed application of exogenous development interventions; d) the positive impacts of immigrants' remittances are not limited to poverty reduction at household level, but trickle down to various socio-cultural, economic, development, environmental and other benefits in their countries. This gives credence to the argument that immigrants shouldering the burden of state failures in most countries; e) it regards remittances and immigrants from the broader perspective of North-South relations; f) It emphasises human-centred development, and remittances and immigration are regarded as irreversible trends that developed societies need to make peace with instead of violently attempting to reverse. The Ecological Model hence, calls for better understanding of immigrants' role as development agents that deserve

international assistance, and regards immigration as a desirable phenomenon which is intertwined with human existence and should not be curtailed by regulation.

Some of the arguments presented in Ecological Models are shown in the table below. The table presents a list of protagonists that reflect similar positions, although none of these bodies are aware that they have been categorised in this way. It should be acknowledged that the divisions are not clean cut with clear ideological boundaries. The presentation is restricted to the macro level positions of the protagonists' models, and I propose a third way described as the Ecological Model.

Table 5: ***List of Protagonists with an Ecological View on Migration***

Ecological Model

	Topics	Main Arguments	Protagonists	Theoretical Ancestors
1)	*Determinants of Migration*	→ Bad Governance - Economic and Social Dislocations (some are results of foreign intervention programmes; like SAP (Structural Adjustment Policies of the 1990s) - Conflict, Land-Grab, etc.) Political persecution, war, some created by external interventions; - Economic, Cultural, historical, Social reasons	UNHCR; UNDP, WB, UN, etc. Amnesty International, NGOs, Civil Societies, etc. -Independent Scholars, Ordinary Citizens -Proponents of Human- Centred Development	Trans-nationalism cosmopolitanism post-modernism Neo-Classical economic theories, Classical theories of Diaspora Classical Migration theory dependency theory post-colonial theory System theory IR theories -Combined Valid and Applicable arguments.
2)	*Determinants of remittances*	→ - Investment, Social, and Economic Goals; - Cultural and Environmental Motivations		
3)	*Impact of Remittances*	→ - Strong Poverty Reduction Impact - Development Impact		
4)	*on Rightful Development Agency*	→ Remitting Immigrants (As Primary Agents of Poverty Reduction), - State - NGOs		
5)	*Positions on Development Cooperation Policy*	→ - Paradigm shift in policy of development cooperation; - Support remitting immigrants in OECD countries to be Development Agents in their home countries		

According to this school of thought, immigrants do not remit for the sake of altruism alone, but have a conscious and passionate commitment to progress and development in their families and society in general. In contrast, the Police Model argues that remittances do not have a developmental impact because most of the remitted money is either minimal or kept under the mattresses of ignorant recipients and squandered on non-investment consumption.

The major literature on the Ecological Model of remittances can be found in the work of Richard Adams (2005) and John Page, on the impacts of migration and remittance on development; Taylor, Mora, Lopez Feldman, Dustman, Kirchkamp (2002) and McCormick and Whaba (2001) on how 'savings accumulated abroad help overcome liquidity constraints…'; Choucri (1986); Russell (1996) and Mettero (2009), the WB's (2009) a report on the relationship between remittance and natural disasters and many more. While they do not claim to be ecological models, this is my reading of their contribution to discourses on remittance and diaspora projects.

In conclusion, the categorisation of diaspora and its actors appears to be the common denominator in most of the theories discussed. For instance, the classical schools used various standards to create a diasporic hierarchy with their main preoccupation being who should qualify to be part of the diaspora. Most are influenced by their ideological mentors such as Max Weber on 'ideal types'; Malthusian theories on the relationship between population, resources, and the demise of the weak as a natural way to balance it; and capitalist theories that provided moral insulation for being selfish and how to survive in a global chaotic space that cannot be neatly organised as different creatures are living in it (some look like humans but did not complete the evolutionary stage that made their European counterparts human), justifying the host's resistance to migration as part of survival of the fittest (in this case, the state). The survival of the fittest does not consider the other possibility of making the unfit survive (in this case, making immigrants equally human and acceptable to the system), but instead fortifies its position by adopting another dimension of the argument which favours self-interest above all

other interests. These modes of thinking lay the foundation for oligarchic capitalist accumulation amidst deprivation and human suffering. While the Police Model lacks inclusiveness and conceals objective realties that favour the disadvantaged, the theory occupies a crucial place in policy and action around migration across the world. It is for this reason that the global migration arena produces such tragic scenes and sad stories. Migrants die on a regular basis in the Mediterranean and Arabian deserts, and the significant number of migrant prisoners around the world demonstrates the ascendance of the Police Model. Moreover, the theory is insulated from morality due to its belief that controlling migration is necessary for the survival of the host state. Studies that suggest that there are different types of diasporas have met with resistance and counter arguments. While those that oppose the notion of ideal diaspora types have argued in favour of adding other types or characteristics of diaspora, they themselves are guilty of categorisation. The discourses that followed the conception of diaspora revolved around the need to democratise and ensure equitable categorisation that reflects the traumatic experiences of many that leave their homelands. Recognising the suffering of one and neglecting the suffering of others as a result of exile was an initial stage in the discourse of diaspora. The debate on who should be called diaspora continues, as does the one on who should be called human. According to the theory of evolution, the human race is divided between full humans and sub-humans. Social science has been silent on this denial of humanity for some and recognition for others. Denying a person's humanity creates the preconditions for violence. Genocide is an articulation of the dehumanization of a group of people. Unfortunately, these persist and are an undercurrent in some social discourse, as is evident in the Police Model of migration.

The other similarity between the Meteorological and Police Models is that, while they represent different ideologies, they both advance the interests of a particular segment of society. They also tend to discount diasporas' opinions and arguments. The Ecological Model seeks to fill this gap by presenting a bottom-up view of migration, remittances and diaspora.

1.4.3. Conclusion

The theories discussed in this chapter represent the dominant viewpoints in migration discourse. However, theorisation has been moving away from these global players and their ontological positions. This is because migration issues are articulated by discourse planners as an external issue, except in classical diaspora propositions, where the victims themselves contributed to the theorisation of diaspora. For example, Safran (1991), a Jewish scholar, formulated typologies of diaspora which was an 'emic' view. However, with the broadening of the concept of diaspora to refer to many types of immigrants, immigrants' emic views are in short supply. Migrants' perspectives bring the role of international decision-makers and other powerful players in the migration discourse into question. As noted in the discussion on the Police and Meteorological Models, the views that dominate these schools of thought emanate from law enforcement agencies, the security apparatus, international crime prevention networks and mechanisms, and so forth. The Meteorological Model also presents the views of international policy and decision-makers on migration from an economic perspective, but these agencies remain outsiders and thus offer an 'attic' perspective. The more balanced approach proposed in this PhD Thesis is the Ecological Model that seeks to view migration from all angles. It is a well-rounded perspective that brings together the opinions of immigrants, policy-makers, academics and host nations with a view to enhancing knowledge on migration-development as an emancipatory tool.

With these new three meta-models at the back of our minds, we now proceed to Part II of this research study that presents the field work or the empirical aspect. Part I focused on the textual research and covered conceptual clarification on diaspora and literature reviews. Other mainstream socio-economic propositions that attempted to explain migration were also examined. While there is no all-embracing migration theory, this thesis seeks to contribute to the creation of new theories that are realistic about migration. Part I also explained the methodology employed for this study and noted that this was a qualitative study that adopted a critical realist perspective. While Part I set the stage and laid the foundation for the research, Part II deals with the main content of this

thesis and covers the empirical study. The phrase empirical research belongs to the natural sciences, and in the humanities, we are accustomed to the use of words for which there are no equivalents in social research. Here, it is referred as field work or data collection from the field. Thus, Part 11 presents the data collected in the field and provides a critical realist discussion on the results.

PART II: FIELD WORK

Introduction

Part II of this thesis deals with the core themes of the research. Chapter 4 presents the primary data from the field on the typologies of Ethiopian diaspora, which was mainly gathered through interviews and FGDs; while Chapter 5 qualitatively analyses this data against the background of the theories, literature, and policy discourses as well as the researcher's intrinsic knowledge. It addresses the study's aim, objective and research questions and confirms the premises on which the study was based. It responds to the main research question and objective that seek to determine the typology that the Ethiopian diaspora reflects in its different characterization. While both Chapters 4 and 5 address this question and the main research objectives, the latter also addresses the study's sub-questions. At this point, it is relevant to restate the study's aim and research questions.

The aim of this research project was to explore the typologies of Ethiopian diaspora in the cities of Rustenburg and Durban. The objectives were to investigate the composition and characteristics, and to reflect on the development instrument used of Ethiopian immigrants to maintain contact with the home country and participate in constituency development. This instrument is widely known as diaspora remittances. Five basic questions were raised:

1. What are the types, composition, and profiles of the Ethiopian diaspora in the cities selected for the study?
2. How do these elements shape the nature of their development instrument?
3. In what ways are the resultant relationships mediated in Ethiopia and South Africa?
4. Which analytical model on migration can be developed based on textual research?
5. How can the findings of this study inform policy?

Chapter 4 responds to question 1 and part of question 2, while Chapter 5 addresses question 3 and part of question 2. The question on the analytical model that can be developed based on textual research was addressed in Chapter 2 by outlining new meta models of migration. The policy dimension is elaborated in Part III, and Chapter 6 offers clear recommendations and the suggestion for further study. It thus answers the research question on implications of the study's findings for future migration policy formulation.

CHAPTER 5: TYPOLOGY OF ETHIOPIAN DIASPORA

INTRODUCTION

This chapter addresses the taxonomies of Ethiopian diaspora. It begins with a brief discussion on typology and goes on to explore the major cleavages that exist in the Ethiopian communities in Durban and Rustenburg. The criteria for categorisation are tribal affiliation, the manner of expulsion from the home country, manner of admission to the host space, religious beliefs, occupational categories, and differentiations based on income levels. The presentation covers the data collected from a total of 60 participants, 40 in Rustenburg, and 20 in Durban. Three FGDs were also held. This chapter thus organises and presents the primary data and offers brief explanations, with the main discussion and analyses presented in Chapter 6.

The current chapter responds to the research question on the characteristics, composition, and profiles of Ethiopians in the study locations. It also presents the data on the instrument that enables them to contribute to local development in their country of origin. The data is presented using descriptive statistics, and tabular and textual analysis.

2.5.1. Discussion of Typology

Ethiopians in South Africa in general, and in the two cities covered in this study manifest the faith and cultural differences of their country of origin, as well as other cleavages that emanate from their expulsion from Ethiopia (Safran, 1991), the manner of their admission to South Africa (Russel King, 2012) and their general socio-political affiliation to entities in their home country (Lyon, 2012). Their typologies are also shaped by the nature of their existence in the host country, such as their status or income levels (Ratha, 2006; IOM/MP I, 2013, p.1). Skills, tribal background and the work ethics associated with it; their religion and overall social inclinations and propensity to integrate into the host space or the will to remit back home also define their typologies. However, there are also other ways to categorise them, including how these immigrants see themselves; how the host state regards them; and their country of origin's perspective. These categorisations and the discussion that follows are presented at an analytical level in which I operationalise the general typologies of diaspora identified in the diaspora

literature, and the specific characteristics found in the field work conducted in Rustenburg and Durban.

Features of diaspora based on thorough research are important because they provide an alternative perspective to perceptions that might have ideological and strategic currency. For instance, based on the nature of their remittances to the home country, the country of origin differentiates between what it calls 'loyal diaspora' or 'extremist diaspora', the latter reflecting what Terrence Lyon refers to as 'conflict diaspora'. However, the migrants categorise themselves based on political, tribal and religious cleavages created by the country of origin and the reasons why they left their homeland. On the other hand, perceptions and categorisations of members of the diaspora by a host state are often split between the realities of migration and the politics of this phenomenon. While the reality morally compels the host state to provide residence and legal status for people even though it might doubt their motivation, the political front is dominated by a monolithic discourse that characterises immigrants in a negative way through the use of descriptors with pejorative associations such as aliens, illegals, foreigners, or as people who compete for opportunities in the host space.

The distinguishing criteria or lines of dichotomisation on typologies of diaspora are further complicated by the views of international bodies, actors, global regimes, structures and institutions. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the unilateral big powers or multilateral governmental bodies' views on diaspora and migration are as diversified as the interests and types of the players themselves. The UNHCR bases its categorisation on migrants that fall within its purview. It uses international legal instruments like the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of refugees and Immigrants, and regionally the OAU, now the African Union's Convention on the Status of Displaced Persons of 1962. Humanitarian grounds and the 'responsibility to protect' is the main motivation. Hence, in order to differentiate among immigrants, the UNHCR uses the degree of security of the person and the legitimacy of the assumption that the person to be protected is a victim of religious, political, or tribal persecution. Those who fulfill this criterion are placed with the host state to receive protection. When the first country of asylum cannot guarantee such safety and security, another country is offered as a resettlement option.

Thus, the UN is concerned with refugees and the term diaspora is an alien concept to the UNHCR.

The mainstream categorisation of immigrants, especially by host countries, is dominated by the discourses and characterisations used by what I described as a Police Model, that attaches great importance to their involvement in security matters and its concerns are skewed towards the goal and purposes of their remittances that might have been used for terror and trafficking (Interpol, 2016). Some of these global structural positions were discussed as meta-models in Chapter 2, but just as this thesis does not dismiss theories which are relevant it also takes into account plausible viewpoints from such angles (*Ecological Model*, Mengesha and Mtapuri, 2016). Thus, characterisation of diaspora based on the nature or their remittances or their involvement in conflict and other trans-border activities is also valid, because, remittances are sometimes blamed for prolonging conflicts in countries of origin. Based on this argument, the diaspora can be associated with conflict or even terrorism. Although we cannot apply these characteristics to all, a few diaspora communities might manifest such features (Interpol, 2002). In order to make sense of the typologies of diaspora, the discussion needs to be grounded in reality in the way a critical realist perspective stipulates. In other words, the actual and discernable identities of the migrants themselves need to be explored. My interest in this chapter is to scientifically present the differences among immigrants, by making straightforward distinctions between them. Hence, I address the taxonomies of the Ethiopians living in Rustenburg and Durban by examining the data gathered from both locations. The data are presented in two separate parts. Firstly, I consider the different layers of Ethiopian diaspora categorisations based on five bases for differentiation that these migrants themselves use. These are tribe, religion, income, occupation, and residence status in South Africa. The last criterion combines the manner of expulsion and admission to South Africa. I also provide a brief background on the migration history of Ethiopians in the city of Rustenburg, where possible. Furthermore, their level of remittances is discussed in relation to their propensity to participate in home-government induced development activities. For instance, they are involved in bond buying, housing projects, networking, image building and tourist promotion of their country in line with different cycles of the diaspora mobilisation polices of the Ethiopian government since it came to power in 1991.

While the data from the field are presented in the five main categories outlined above, other characteristics identified in the literature are also be examined in the overall data analysis in Chapter 5 without prejudicing the typologies substantiated through data collection. For instance, categorisation of typologies based on the manner and ways of exit or expulsion from the place of origin, as posited by classical theoreticians such as Safran and others, are relevant. Hence, at the operationalising stage of the migration epistemology, my data interpretation is revisited by analysing the Ethiopian diaspora typology using the relevant theories and models discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. Keeping these in mind, I present the data gathered from Rustenburg and Durban consecutively, using a moderate analytical presentation that incorporates a comparative perspective reflected through graphs and tables with corresponding discussion of the individual categorisations.

2.5.2. Taxonomies of Ethiopian Diaspora in Rustenburg

General information on the target population in Rustenburg was presented in Chapter 3, where the justification for selecting this location and the Ethiopian immigrants is dealt in more detail. The current chapter examines the specific characteristics created for analytical purposes.

According to recent statistics from the IOM (2015), an estimated 48,571 Ethiopians live in South Africa. Ethiopians in Rustenburg represent one of the largest concentrations of immigrants in South Africa after Johannesburg and Pretoria. They can be differentiated in terms of five characterisations or criteria: 1) Tribal identity 2) Income levels,3) Religious affiliation, 4) Manner of expulsion from home and admission to South Africa using their current residence status and 5) occupation. Before exploring these characteristics using the field data, I examine the history of Ethiopian migration to the city and debates around the migrant stock in South African cities.

To date, no census has been conducted to determine the comparative size of the Ethiopian diaspora group in Rustenburg. The participants that were interviewed and those that participated in the prototypical diaspora discussion group were asked: ‘How do you compare the number of Ethiopians in Rustenburg to that of other cities in South Africa?’ There was consensus that Rustenburg can be regarded as the third largest cluster of Ethiopian immigrants in South Africa. While there was no absolute consensus,

the discussion group in Durban also noted that Rustenburg could be the third largest concentration. This is likely to be the case particularly when statistics are gathered from all the vicinities in this city like Thlabani, Nord, and all extensions of Meriting, Boitikom, Sunrise, Kanana, Pukeng and so forth. While I posed this question in order to compare the respondents' estimation with my own, this cannot be regarded as a reliable statistic; this could only emerge from a census conducted with the support of the relevant South African authorities and institutions. This is a limitation of the study and could be a topic for further research. For now, I briefly discuss the history of migration into Rustenburg as a first-hand witness of this phenomenon.

As my non-participant observation over the past 19 years suggests, in the late 1990s there were few Ethiopian immigrants in Rustenburg. I could say that I was part of the first batch of Ethiopians that arrived in the city in 1997. Few Ethiopians were travelling in and out in the city when I, and my two assistants, decided to do business in the city in December 1997. We sold different clothing items, shoes, and so forth that we brought from Chinese wholesalers to Rustenburg residents and to people visiting the city from the surrounding locations. There was much appreciation for our goods and locals were enthusiastic to buy from us. The Tswana people were so friendly and even though we used to sell on the streets, we were happy to interact with locals while making a living. Our customers never showed any sign of hatred or desire to attack us. It seemed that they were happy to see African business people who easily identify with them while buying what they preferred. At that time, few local people were engaged in commodity trading, like clothing.

The local vendors specialised in selling vegetables and fruits on the streets, including bananas, apples, tomatoes, cabbages, potatoes, and so forth. They also sold seasonal edibles like maize, grapes, mangos, avocados, and peaches. They rarely sold similar products to what Ethiopian immigrants were selling on the streets, such as T-shirts, belts, wallets, and so forth. In the 1990s, many Ethiopians were selling on the streets of Rustenburg, especially Plein Street that cuts the city into half and runs from Church Street down to the Rustenburg taxi rank.

The shops and supermarkets were initially owned by Indians, Portuguese, Greek, and Chinese business people. While shop owners complained about Ethiopian immigrants'

goods costing less than those they sold, the locals were happy to have an opportunity to obtain some commodities at a more affordable price. Blankets, curtains, summer shoes, sneakers, tracksuits, and so forth were all sold on the streets at relatively low prices.

The main reason for the amicable relationship between local Tswana people and Ethiopian street vendors was the differences in their line of business and cultural compatibility. Furthermore, both communities are less inclined to violence and mistreatment of others. It is also possible that the Tswana people's intercultural competence is so high that they are not intimidated by the presence of foreigners. Not only Ethiopians, but the street vendors and small tuck shops in the locations owned by Mozambicans or Zimbabweans operated without much violence against them.

Many factors might have contributed to the good relations between Ethiopians and their South African hosts. There was also mutual interdependence when it came to bartering. Ethiopians sometimes exchanged slippers for mangos or avocados for their meal after a hard day's work. People shared their happiness when business went well and departed peacefully, looking forward to another day. Ethiopians employed a number of locals for different business purposes, even when they were selling on the streets. Locals helped load the merchandise into their cars, helped them attend to customers, promoted their products, and some even lived together. Such mutual interdependence promoted harmony among street business. This was the situation up until 2003 when I was in Rustenburg.

However, much has changed. One of the biggest changes is that, almost 70 per cent of the shops previously owned by Indians, Chinese and Portuguese business people in Plain Street, have been taken over by the Ethiopian immigrants that used to sell on the street in front of these shops.

The number of Ethiopians has increased dramatically and it is estimated that 6,000 to 7,000 might be living in Rustenburg and its surrounding areas. In early 2000 the Rustenburg municipal authorities, especially the traffic office and hawkers watchdog, cleared away most of the Ethiopian immigrants that used to sell on the streets. This forced them to formalise their businesses and to rent shops or to move to locations mainly occupied by black residents to run their own businesses, particularly as Spaza

shop owners. While the reasons for the proliferation of immigrant tuck shops in the locations of Rustenburg are not clear, Ethiopians have been blamed for lowering prices and competing with local tuckshop owners in these areas. However, what pushed them was their eviction from street business during 2000 and 2001. Immigrants usually choose urban centers to settle in and make a living. When this becomes impossible, the locations are their only means of survival.

The way the Ethiopian immigrants live in Rustenburg and their degree of integration are factors that distinguish between types of immigrants. Those that are able to live in cities have financial resources and good networking skills, whereas those that are pushed to black locations struggle to fit into this way of life.

Therefore, the immigrant group under study not only manifested their own socio-cultural cleavages but also the differences that arose from the success or failure of their businesses in Rustenburg. Economic opportunities have created at least three layers of immigrant classes or typologies: 1) the high class Ethiopian business diaspora, 2) the middle level business diaspora, and 3) the lower level, vulnerable, self-employed migrant group. The first group is made up of Ethiopians that managed to grow from being street vendors to owning a chain of businesses and who mobilised millions of rand to set up business in Rustenburg. These included textile businesses, supermarkets, suppliers of building materials and spare parts, furniture shops, and wholesale and other general trading businesses. Most now use banks and own real estate. The majority returns to their country of origin and invest in their home country. A major characteristic is their capacity to create jobs for the local population and for their own country men and women, as do other business diaspora (like the Chinese or Lebanese). When they go home they become involved in farming, building and construction equipment and promote economic interaction between South Africa and Ethiopia in line with the spirit of the common market for eastern and southern Africa.

In and around Rustenburg, Ethiopian immigrants also engage in family chain businesses that offer different specialty items. According to data obtained from those interviewed for this study in 2016, they employ local people and their own relatives. Some employ as many as 30 family members, and provide job opportunities for up to 50 local workers. Their shops serve customers in various ways, including fixing their mobile telephones

and selling accessories. In many of the shops owned by the Ethiopian diaspora, a section of the premises is sub-let to Indian and Pakistani business people who specialise in businesses that do not require much space, such as cell phone repairs. This is a characteristic feature of the Ethiopian diaspora in creating opportunities for themselves and others. One interviewee stated that their family had shops that specialise in furniture, building materials, cosmetics, clothing, curtains and blankets. Up until 1999, the head of the family was selling shoes in Plein Street. When the Rustenburg traffic authorities and municipality completely banned street vendors in 2003, this forced them to rent premises, leading to a degree of formalisation of their businesses.

The second category encompasses migrant groups that run a business that provides them with a decent living. They are able to pay their rent and children's school fees, and have sufficient resources to mix socially and participate in leisure activities. They can afford medication when necessary and own at least two private cars per family. They live a comfortable life at home with all the necessary appurtenances. They also employ one or more locals to help them in their business. These migrants own shops in the vicinity of Rustenburg and some rent part of a shop from a compatriot with a big business or from other owners on the main streets like Plein or Mandela Streets in the city center. There are also those who make money from what is commonly referred as 'nostalgic trade'. They supply organic products, cultural artifacts, symbols and materials that are in demand among Ethiopian immigrants in Rustenburg. They are thus a good source of cultural exchange between Ethiopia and South Africa. Most people who own Ethiopian traditional restaurants fall under this category. While they might appear to be small businesses, they employ locals. The study found that a single woman that runs her own small Ethiopian restaurants in Rustenburg and Durban employ three to four South Africans to help her to run the business which is totally new and distinct from local opportunities. The workers help to prepare food and serve customers. I observed that there was significant cultural exchange: the locals learn how to cook Ethiopian food, and how to run their own business. The Ethiopians that operate at the middle level of business have a lower level of education or sophistication than the high-level business diasporas. Their social network is limited to their compatriots or to immediate local areas. They are partly unbanked and have more risk of bankruptcy than their higher earning counterparts. They are legally disadvantaged as they cannot afford to employ lawyers

to protect their rights and most do not understand the benefits of legal protection. Thus, they suffer violations of business agreements with landlords as well as other problems associated with their economic standing.

As noted previously, while the researcher sought to ensure balanced gender representation among the study participants by deliberately seeking female volunteers, this was not fully achieved as few women wanted to participate. Female immigrants preferred that their husbands respond to such kind of enquires. However, some were willing to participate. Among these was a woman with family in Rustenburg that runs a car wash business. She employs two South Africans to help with washing and logistics. She is equipped with technical knowledge. This enterprise motivates locals by demonstrating that a technical, automotive-based business can be created by a woman. This member of the Ethiopian diaspora belongs to the second category of business types that do not have access to banking and credit facilities, yet create jobs and provide for themselves rather than depending on the host state in terms of the provisions of the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees. She claims that she was persecuted at home and had to flee for her life.

The third category is immigrants who experience serious difficulties in integrating or adapting to the local situation. Most have been in the country for a long time, but have experienced a very sluggish rise on the social scale. They manage to earn a living and sustain life and have limited ability to remit to their home country; however, they find it difficult to cope when business is down or when it is disrupted owing to social or industrial action in the host state. In the main, these typologies are in very close contact with the locals and most live side by side with those of similar or lower economic status. They also reside in their tuck shops, or next to them, which are easily identified as a foreigner's house or shop. There is a high rate of intermarriage with locals in this category of Ethiopian migrant groups; however, few have legal status or obtain formal recognition for their siblings and children. When there is a robbery or other attack on these people it is usually physically harmful as the immigrants are usually available in their businesses which are the targets of such attacks. The majority of deaths occur among this category of Ethiopians that lives in the townships.

The field work in Rustenburg was based on questions that would assist in identifying the participants' typologies. The structured questions included the following:

What is your mother tongue in Ethiopia? What is your religious affiliation? How was your social network created or how did it take form? Why did you leave your country? What is your occupation and skill level? How is your interaction with your country of origin and do you contribute to state-sponsored development projects or are you involved in political activities back home, through supporting political movements? (See the detailed guiding questions annexed to this thesis)

The responses from individual respondents and from the FGD participants helped me to understand their typology. For instance, the first question on their mother tongue helped to unpack their tribal affiliation and identity. This made it possible to identify each respondent's tribal typology.

The reason for the tribe as a defining criterion of typology is the Ethiopian government's ethnic/tribal-based federalism, and social and economic system. There are more than 80 cultural groups or languages in the country. The current Tigre tribe-led Ethiopian government has constitutionalised tribe as a major identity reference point. Never before in the history of the country have people been forced to identify themselves as tribal members rather than as citizens. In pre-1991 Ethiopia, tribe was a taboo subject and seeking to name a person by his/her tribal identity was considered to be unpatriotic and neo-colonial in thinking. This changed with the coming to power of the Tigre government, which is described by the rest of Ethiopians as divisive and as neo-colonial agents that implemented 'tribal Bantuisation' in present-day Ethiopia.

Such descriptions of the current government are pervasive in social media and diaspora websites emanating from those who live outside of Ethiopia. According to most government agencies, all social interactions are designed based on tribal affiliations. Therefore, any attempt to understand the typologies of the Ethiopian immigrants in South Africa, needs to start from this fundamental criterion of tribal identity. For instance, instead of applying a blanket characterisation like 'Ethiopian immigrants' to describe this group in South Africa, one can identify them according to their tribal backgrounds although national identification is still a valid criterion for distinguishing them. It is crucial to establish which tribal group is facing genocide or persecution in Ethiopia and is hence subjected to violence.

Members of the Tigre tribe are highly favoured in Ethiopia and if they leave the country it is likely for economic rather than political reasons as their tribe holds power and they cannot be attacked based on their tribal affiliation. In this instance, the neo-classical economic theory or the individual choice theory is useful to understand the exodus of people who are favoured by Ethiopian government policy.

The Ecological Model does not dismiss the idea that people can move from to place in search of better opportunities. However, when the host space does not accept people who move to its territory to maximize their opportunities at the expense of locals, this kind of resistance needs to be matched with knowledge of which typology of immigrant manifests such propensity to leave their favoured position back home for better opportunities in South Africa. The fact is that members of the Tigre tribe migrate to maximise their job opportunities. Participants in the FGDs pointed out that migration to South Africa is costly in terms of air tickets, facilitators and agents, and so forth. Those that occupy favoured positions are able to afford such costs.

The study participants added that in Ethiopia, Tigres control employment opportunities and they can afford to migrate by paying traffickers. They thus raise the stakes for people who migrate because of persecution. Those who have favoured positions (members of the Tigre tribal groups as widely mentioned by participants) in their country and high economic status pay to exploit loop-holes in the official migration procedures.

Migrants that leave Ethiopia for fear of persecution that this study refers to as prototypical diaspora face the double challenge of limited resources at the source of migration, and hardship *en route* to South Africa. Due to the fact that they travel by land transport and cross many borders, their journey is riskier than those that migrate in search of a better life. According to the data emanating from a group discussion, Tigres tribal members among the Ethiopian diaspora have a high propensity to migrate based on 'job seeking' (Durban, Scientific Diaspora Discussion Session, April 2016).

It is very rare for Tigres to experience fear of persecution in Ethiopia under the TPLF government. If they migrate, it has less to do with being a Tigre and could be due to a conflict of interest, or they may have committed a crime. Logically, Tigres 'tribe' members in South Africa are economic refugees who would not face persecution should they return home. Hence, the South African government agency that specialises in dealing

with immigrants should filter migration to the country to curb the entry of criminals. The study participants stated that they should not be blamed for the economic migration of Tigres and other Ethiopian government supporters to South Africa. The South African authorities could use 'tribal' profiles to interpret or estimate the political, security, or personal safety of individuals that originate from Ethiopia and repatriate those that do not face persecution.

While tribal affiliation is thus one of the criteria that can be used to differentiate among immigrants, it is not sufficient to differentiate inter-tribal typologies. To clarify these differences, I asked another question: What is your involvement in conflict or development activities back in Ethiopia? This aimed to reveal the level of commitment to family support and development activities back home, and to evaluate the respondents' political participation in Ethiopia. Through this line of investigation, I determined whether or not there was a characteristic of 'conflict diaspora'.

This second question also helped me to categorise a developmental diaspora, or possibly a prototypical diaspora based on the immigrants' narratives and experiences of being displaced from Ethiopia. Some explain the root causes of their violent expulsion from their land of origin. In particular, the response to the question: Why did you leave your country? supplies a clue as to whether a respondent belongs to the victim diaspora or another diaspora type. I tracked the consistency of claims throughout the interview process and after the interviews through a level of triangulation from other members of the community.

As advocated by Russell King (2012), the reason for admission to the host space can also be used to determine the typologies of immigrants. In terms of Ethiopian immigrants to South Africa, the scientific diaspora was identified by enquiring about the type of visa they acquired from the South African government. I also tracked the occupation of some of the participants by seeking information on the names of professionals in Durban and Rustenburg. Religious affiliation, political outlook and tribal identities can relate to issues of displacement in Ethiopia; I hence used these factors to decide on their typologies as Ethiopian immigrants, notwithstanding their occupation and income level. The following section presents the data on the taxonomies of the Ethiopian diaspora in Rustenburg.

2.5.2.1. Tribal Typologies and Occupations among Participants in Rustenburg

a) Tribal and cultural differences

The data revealed the major tribal affiliation of the participants in Rustenburg data as follows: Oromos 37 per cent, 37 per cent Amharic-Speaking Ethiopians, Gurage 8 per cent, Haidya 8 per cent, 7.5 per cent Tigres, and 5 per cent Wolaytas (there is a margin of error those who speak Amharic or Oromifa, because they are of tribally mixed origin due to intermarriage). Although the sample size may not be absolutely representative of the general ethnic composition of all Ethiopians in South Africa, it reflects the tribal typology of Ethiopian immigrants in Rustenburg from whom data was collected.

Information on tribal categorisation was achieved by enquiring about the participants' background by means of a questionnaire that was filled in before the individual interview. All the participants from Rustenburg answered the question 'what is your mother tongue?' The mother-tongue directly relates to the tribal affiliation of the respondent. Instead of asking the participants 'What is your tribe?' which might be offensive to some, I preferred to determine this indirectly. Figure 2 below shows the tribal affiliation of the participants in Rustenburg.

Figure 2: Tribal Typologies of Ethiopian Diaspora in Rustenburg



The pie chart shows that, the majority of the participants belong to the Oromos and Amharas tribes. While there might be variations and the data cannot be generalised to the whole population, given the realities of the cultural composition of Ethiopians in the location, it appears to paint a plausible picture. The size of the Gurages and Tigres groups is similar to the total population. The large number of Amharic- and Oromo-speaking Ethiopians corresponds is due to political, economic and political exclusion they suffer in their country of origin. California State University's Political Science Professor, Almayehu Gebremariam describes Tigre tribal government as 'thugtatorship' (literarily meaning 'the dictatorship of tribal thugs'). The country is dominated by Tigres with the support of traditional Ethiopian 'enemies'. He notes that the European powers, specially, Fascist Italy engaged Ethiopia militarily on several occasions, beginning with Italy's defeat by the Ethiopian forces at the battle of Adwa, 1888-91, and during the Word War II. Adwa is a mountainous village in North Ethiopia where the first Italian invasion took place in the late 19th Century and was repelled by Ethiopians from all walks of life regardless of tribal affiliation. Ale Mariam (2016) notes that, these powers are still active in maintaining the minority tribal group to stay in power. They have teamed up to demoralise the majority tribes attempting to do business, or to participate in politics. Oromo and Amhara are persecuted. The Ethiopian government awarded the entire tender for the construction of the Gran Millennium Dam to an Italian company without opening the bid to other international companies. The quality of construction was also dependent on *maficratic* (Mafia) connections. This kind of issue supports arguments that portray the Tigres as agents of Fascism and neo-colonialism. While there are various views on this matter, it is undeniable that Tigres are a favoured tribe in Ethiopia and that the remaining tribes occupy marginal positions in all economic and political endeavours. This is causing an outflow of migrants from the rest of Ethiopia; hence, the large number of Oromo- and Amharic-speaking diaspora groups in Rustenburg is not surprising. Indeed, it reflects the reality of Ethiopian tribal politics that has been on-going for the past quarter of a century.

b) Occupation of Ethiopian Diaspora in Rustenburg

Ethiopians in Rustenburg are engaged in different kinds of economic activity. Depending on their success and ability to adapt, they have set up formal businesses and some

make a good living selling on the streets and in locations. The majority is self-employed and their businesses vary from simple clothing shops, to consumer goods wholesalers. In Zeniavil district within eastern Rustenburg, Ethiopians run automobile spares shops, garages, wholesale shops, Ethiopian restaurants, electronic and mobile shops, internet cafés, car dealerships, car-wash services, migration consultancies, and money transfer services. The interviews revealed that the immigrants' occupations do not follow specific typological differences, but some tribal typologies have similar occupations due to networking among themselves. The detailed data on individual participants' occupations is annexed at the end of the thesis for validity and triangulation purposes (See Table 11: annexure). Figure 3 below summarises the participants' occupations by tribal group.



The figure shows that none of the participants were employed by South African firms. Amharas predominate in terms of owning big businesses that use banking, licensing, and operating systems. Of the 15 Amhara interviewees, 12 stated that they run and own relatively big businesses in different parts of Rustenburg. Mandela and Plein Streets were among the areas where they were operating. Many of the Oromos that participated in the study run family chain businesses and employ their siblings in their shops. This is true of seven of the 16 Oromo participants, while six owned big businesses and three were self-employed which can be classified as a vulnerable group in terms of security and financial stability. Among the two to three Hadiya, Tigres, and Wolaitas that participated in the study, at least one was self-employed. While this data does not cover all the tribes resident in Rustenburg, it captures the typologies of the participants. It is likely that the proportion of Hadiya, Kembatas, and Gurages in Rustenburg might be greater than that reflected in the figure; however, this does not affect the distribution demonstrated above as Amharas and Oromos are numerous everywhere.

As noted earlier, none of the participants works for a South African firm. All are either self-employed run big businesses, or are organised along the lines of a family business. They also employ numerous South Africans in their shops, a fact that is seldom acknowledged in local media. Hence, these Ethiopians provide jobs for their hosts and do not compete for jobs with locals. This refutes locals' claims that 'foreigners are taking our jobs'.

The occupation of the migrants under discussion confers on them the status of Ethiopian business diaspora. However, they can be classified differently when it comes to how they were expelled from their original home. The case of the 'exemplary transitional society' (Fiast, 2008) can be applied to these migrant groups, as they are focused on doing business and building the economy of the host state. The literature notes, that, Jewish communities in the diaspora were hardworking and successful business entrepreneurs in their host countries, although they did not leave their countries in order to conduct business, but due to violent expulsion from their original homes.

Therefore, the study participants demonstrate a characteristic of the business diaspora when we view them from the host's perspective; but the emic view is that they are

prototypical diaspora when seen from the angle of their expulsion from their original home. These features are discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.

2.5.2.2. Income as a defining Parameter of the Typology of Participants

As in any social setting, income level is a measure of differentiation among people of Ethiopian origin in South Africa, because it provides a clear divide between the 'haves' and the 'have nots' or the rich and the poor. Logically, the study of the typology of the Ethiopian immigrants in South Africa starts by differentiating them based on their economic and income status in the host space. As explained above, this is one spectrum of typology. Tables 10 and 14 in the annexure present data on the information gathered on each participant's income level.

The Ethiopian diaspora in Rustenburg that participated in this study can be divided into three income levels. Level 1 is the lowest level and represents immigrants whose annual income is estimated at up to 100,000 ZAR (South African Rand); level 2 is up to R200, 000 and level 3 is an annual income of R200,000 and more. As noted earlier, the income measure of typologies rests on the fact that there are few immigrants in the highest level. Twenty-five of the 40 participants in Rustenburg fell into the low-income group, with three in the high income and 12 in the middle income groups.

Thus, despite running their own businesses, these Ethiopians can be considered as subsistence traders rather than highly capitalised business people. While some migrants mobilise significant financial resources and perform well in the market and are not fully covered in this study, the fact that only three of the sample of 40 fell into this bracket indicates what the number might be, were this figure to be extrapolated to the estimated five to six thousand Ethiopians in and around the Rustenburg area.

The other parameter to characterise Ethiopian diaspora in Rustenburg is religion.

2.5.2.3. Religion of Ethiopian Diaspora in Rustenburg

The classical notion of diaspora takes religion as a fundamental distinguishing parameter for prototypical diaspora (Safran, 1991; Cohen, 2008; Faist, 2010). The Jews lost their original home in biblical times and went into exile to escape persecution during Babylonian times and in the 20th century they were persecuted during the World War II.

Hence it is pertinent to view the composition of Ethiopian diaspora in both locations through the prism of religion. The data from the field is fairly representative of the reality in Ethiopia, except for Muslims that are one of the main religious groupings in Ethiopia. Most of the study participants in Rustenburg are members of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church or Protestant Christians, and only three Muslims were part of the study. As participation was voluntary, the sample was not as inclusive as it could have been. While 97 per cent of the study sample was Christian, there are virtually equal numbers of Muslims and Christians in Ethiopia. For instance, data from Ethiopia's *Main Treasures, 2016* shows that, Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and paganism are the main religions. According to the 2007 census, at national level, the Ethiopian Orthodox Christians makes up 43 per cent of those that subscribe to a faith, with Muslims constituting 33.9 per cent (http://www.csa.gov.et/pdf/Cen2007_firstdraft.pdf). The data also shows that there are some pagans and traditional religious practices that fall outside of the mainstream faith groups and are mainly practiced in southern Ethiopia. According to the 2007 census, an estimated 2.6 per cent of Ethiopia's population adheres to various traditional faiths (down from 4.6 per cent in the 1994 census). The largest numbers of practitioners of traditional religions are in the Southern Nations and Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR) with about 993,000 people and the Oromia region (895,000 people).

The data from Rustenburg shows that the small religious sects are not represented. For instance, 'Wake Feta' a religious belief system of the Oromos, was represented by paganism. Figure 4 shows religious affiliations of the study participants.



In Ethiopia, the major religions have lived side-by-side for centuries and there is no conflict between them. The Muslims almost all belong to a Sunni Muslim group, whereas the Christian population is predominantly Orthodox. However, with the advent of European missionaries, the south west of Ethiopia, which is mainly populated by the Oromo tribe, converted to Protestant Christianity. The German spy, Juan Craf, who operated as an evangelist missionary in Africa, especially in south West Ethiopia, advised his government on how to control East Africa and the Red Sea area bordering the Middle East, using the Oromo population. This development relates to the 'German strategy of creating an Oromo state with a protestant religion which could be a linchpin to dominate the Eastern part of Africa' (Juhan Craf, 1930). This plan was aborted with the eruption of World War II and the subsequent defeat of the Nazis and their surrender of East Africa influence to the British, Americans and Russians. However, the German influence remains visible in Tanzania, Kenya and south west Ethiopia where the Germans created the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) to help them create an independent Oromia. Offers of aid and charitable work in the south west of the country significantly affect the number of poor Ethiopians converting to the Protestant faith. The military government of Ethiopia banned German and or other Western religious penetration for most of the 1980s, not because it wanted to defend the Orthodox Church, but as a consequence of Cold War politics and its firm stand against the Western world and its

own communist atheism. However, the advent of the tribal political system introduced by the Tigre Government of Ethiopia in 1991 led to a resurgence of religious activity. Both Islam and Protestantism grew in terms of numbers and also became lines of dichotomies in society that define typology of identity, rather than the neutral Ethiopian nationalism.

The competition for followers also pits Protestant and Orthodox Christians against each other. Hate preachers from the Protestant side attempt to lure Orthodox followers. In response, Orthodox youth have strengthened their faith and religion has become a cleavage of identity and social belonging that was previously not the case in Ethiopia. These differences and tension along religious lines were evident in Rustenburg.

Although not many Muslims participated in this study, it is known that they teamed up with local Muslims of Indian origin and created Zeniavil, a place that, before 1998 was home to not a single other African foreigner. Business affiliations are thus based on religion and the spirit of 'Universal Islamic Uma' or solidarity.

The character and way of life of Ethiopian diaspora is also differentiated along religious lines. Most Oromo are Protestants and most Amhara are Orthodox, whereas other minority tribes also subscribe to the Orthodox religion. Muslims tend to interact with South African Muslims. I was told during an interview that; Muslim Indians offer credit and better service to Ethiopian Muslims and that there was discrimination against the Christians in these locations and in the wholesale businesses around Rustenburg. To overcome such challenges, some Christians go as far as using a Muslim name to get goods at a discounted price or to gain access to goods that are in high demand and short supply. Some owners of South African companies whose roots lie in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq or Egypt ask people if they are Muslim before they sell their produce at a certain price. Some study participants noted that differentiation along religious lines has become a common phenomenon, especially after talk of 'global terrorism' and reaction by the Muslim world. Some Ethiopians have converted to Islam in order to get along with the South African Muslim business community.

I was told that these converted Ethiopians are among the most successful immigrants in business. Some are said to have expanded to the SADC region. The Ethiopian typology

of immigrants is thus also determined by their religious affiliation because most manifest similar characteristics and a way of life as a result of their religious affiliations. Hence, any discussion of the Ethiopian diaspora needs to include faith and its associated issues. This is necessary as religious affiliations are directly connected to their reasons for leaving Ethiopia, their socio-political networks, and the way they conduct themselves in South Africa.

The blanket application of a singular migrant characteristic is challenged by the faith-cultural attributes of immigrants. For instance, if the interest is in investigating 'theft', be it financial or material, the propensity of a Muslim immigrant to indulge in theft is less likely than among some pagans. If the interest is in understanding religious fundamentalism, the focus needs to be on religions that are prone to this phenomenon. For instance, Islam is more likely to resist the global status-quo to which globally powerful countries subscribe than Christians. Hence, the starting point in creating a hypothesis for the research involves the characteristics and cultural variables that are important factors. Policy discourses that are willing to go deep into the profiles of immigrants to come up with rational policies would agree that immigrants are not monolithic in characteristics and composition; hence, a multi-faceted and multi-cultural perspective is relevant.

The other criteria selected for differentiation of typologies among Ethiopians in Rustenburg is the way in which they were expelled from their country of origin, and the way they were admitted to South Africa. Migration practices and management employ several categories to determine immigrants' residence status. Official practice thus also determines the typologies of immigrants. The following section considers the typologies that result from the issue of visas by the host state, and from the motive for emigration, or for reasons of social status (like being married to a South African citizen and so forth).

2.5.2.4. Typologies of Ethiopian Diaspora based on Status and Admission to South Africa.

According to Russel King (2012), the visas and residence permits granted to immigrants by the host space can also be used to study their typologies. Four categories of residence-based typologies were observed among the study participants (See Figure 5 below). The first is those referred to as asylum-seekers, a status that signifies a stage

in their application for recognition, based on the provisions of the South African Aliens Control Act (1998) and the Geneva Convention of 1951, which provides that 'a person who have genuine fear of persecution' can apply for protection in another country if they have proof of individual or collective persecution. The criteria include political views, ethnic or cultural background or similar reasons for persecution, or any threat to life that emanates from a person's position in government. For instance, if they were a member of a political party, or a diplomat, etc., this might provide the basis for individual persecution.

The second category is a work permit, and the data below show that 12 of the 40 participants interviewed in Rustenburg fall into this category, while 23 have refugee status. People who are using an Ethiopian passport and have small businesses in South Africa also obtain work permits. The data shows that none of the participants are employed by South African firms. Instead, the work permit refers to those who have positive relations with the Ethiopian Embassy in Pretoria, and have managed to obtain a passport with a South African work permit printed on it, but who normally run their own businesses.

The third category includes those who have a residence permit through other means, for instance, marriage to a South African citizen. The fourth is those who were recognised as refugees at a certain point and then obtained naturalisation or citizenship, based on their extended stay in South Africa. These are very few in number and the finding that 3 of the 40 participants in the sample fell into this category is remarkable. In the literature, migrants are commonly described as 'aliens', 'illegals', 'undocumented', and so forth. However, there is no clarity in the academic discourse on what these terms actually mean. Undocumented refers to migrants who, at the time of crossing the border, cannot prove their citizenship, or do not possess documents stating their origin. However, once they present themselves to the border authorities as asylum seekers, their illegality ends because 'asylum seeker' is a legal status that means someone who has lodged an application for asylum which does not presuppose illegality. However, this situation becomes complicated when immigrants proceed to the hinterland and stay illegally without reporting to the authorities; this is what 'illegal' refers to. None of the participants in this study wanted to take the risk of staying without 'asylum seeker' papers. Usually, they report immediately to the Pretoria asylum reception office at

Maraba Street, then acquire a Section 22 permit which allows them to work and study, pending the decision on their case. There seems to be a difference, however, between a ‘section 23’ and a ‘section 22’ permit. The section 23 permit is for immigrants who declare their intention to seek asylum at the time of crossing into South African territory; this might be at the border or the airport. However, there were very few people with section 23 in the sample for this study. Therefore, the data clearly indicates that the categorisation of migrations and the diaspora under study along ‘undocumented’ and ‘documented’ dichotomies, or for that matter ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ is not very useful and is detached from the actual status of Ethiopian immigrants. It can thus be considered as a non-applicable description for Ethiopians who live in Rustenburg, because almost all have a permit of some kind. I checked with the interviewees if they have appropriate documentation and the majority proved that they originate from Ethiopia and have acquired documents that prove their identities at the time of their arrival. Figure 5 presents a more detailed picture of the kind of permits and residence status of Ethiopian immigrants in Rustenburg. Column 1 depicts the different kinds of residence status along the tribal typologies used to differentiate Ethiopians in Rustenburg. More detailed data on individual respondents or on their typology based on residence status is provided in Table 12 in the annexure of this thesis.

Figure 5 shows the frequency of data in each category of residence status among the 40 participants in Rustenburg. Most are recognised refugees; few have permanent residence and only two have work permits. These are in the Ethiopian scientific diaspora, with some working for knowledge-based organisations.



The limitation of this data is that some Oromos do not want to be associated with the Ethiopian nation. Due to their grand statehood dream, they even go as far as referring to themselves as Oromos at the refugees' reception centers. Some Home Affairs officials ask them to show them on the world map where the Oromo state exists. As a result, they are forced to accept their Ethiopian identity for at least functional reasons. Such kinds of politically-motivated identities and affiliation to imaginary identities confuse the situation.

The other criterion in dispute is what Lyon describes as 'conflict diaspora'. In the data from Rustenburg there is some extremism among Ethiopian Muslims with an Oromo background that advocate for Oromo's violent withdrawal from Ethiopia (Jawar, 2015; 2016). This segment of the Oromo diaspora raises funds to finance a military uprising in Ethiopia for an independent Oromia state. Such typologies are noted in the literature, and in this study, they are included under the reasons for expulsion and the way immigrants are admitted to South Africa. Authors such as Lyon (2008) call them '*conflict*

diaspora', but this thesis prefers to categorise them in typologies that consider their claims of expulsion and narration of persecution. Hence, residence status as asylum seekers is a better category, though their claims may not necessarily be true or objective.

Most Oromos have claimed political asylum status in South Africa and have been granted 'asylum seeker' permits; this is reflected in the data. According to the narratives of Oromo participants, they were expelled from their home country as a result of their dream for new statehood (using the self-determination criterion that the Ethiopian government included in its Constitution in article 39). According to some of the respondents, the future Oromia state is to be created through a liberation struggle. The OLF aims to takes some territory from different east African countries, namely, southern Ethiopia, Kenya, and part of north-west Somalia. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. It should be noted that even for the Oromos who have 'de-territorial identity' (Bhabha, 2010) or a typology that militates against being confined to the present-day Ethiopian state structures, these typologies are included in residence and permit-based categorisations (as in the above figure). The classification of migrants along 'undocumented' or 'documented' lines seems lacking in strength based on the data collected in Rustenburg. All the immigrants interviewed for this study are in possession of a permit (be it Section 22, asylum seekers permit, business permit, or recognised refugee status certificates). Hence, 'undocumented immigrants', as a category of diaspora characterisation does not apply to the sample of Ethiopians who participated in the study in Rustenburg.

2.5.2.5. Remittances as a Criterion of Typology Formation

The other factor used to categorise migrants is the level of their remittances and their nature. This section revisits the definition and conceptual clarification I used in my unpublished Master's thesis (Mengesha, 2011). Following conceptual clarification, I present the data on remittance data from Rustenburg, and discuss the findings on individual remittances, channels and the constraints faced by migrants.

This data was gathered by means of the questionnaires that participants filled in before the interview. The questions were: 1) How much do you send to Ethiopia in a month? 2) What money transfer system do you use?

The interviews further explored the purpose of their remittances. (See the remittance data collection guiding questions attached as an annexure). This issue was central to the study.

The political economy of migration concerns remittances and several issues are associated with it. The migration-remittance-development nexus has been central to development studies. I dealt with this issue in my Master's study and hence limit this discussion to the criteria for categorisation of immigrants. Remitting Immigrants (RI), a phrase I coined to equate with NGOs, are important actors in international development discourse that have not received proper recognition. In this thesis, I argue that, as a propensity, action and behaviour of immigrants, remittances should give them status and recognition that differentiates them from other types of immigrants who do not have the propensity to remit back home. Remittance is revisited as a criterion in this thesis, rather than as a subject of academic exploration.

The focus of this PhD thesis is typologies in the migration-development nexus, not the remittance-development nexus which appears similar, but is very different. The following brief discussion on the concept of remittance contextualises this issue.

2.5.2.6. Discussion on Remittances: Conception

The semantic meaning of 'remittance' has changed over time and the word has undergone its own 'etymology-genesis'. For instance, the *American Heritage Dictionary* (2) defines it as, 'sending of money to someone at a distance'; and the *Century*

Dictionary (2) refers to it as ‘an act of transmitting money, bills, or the likes to another place.’ *GNU Webster’s* (1913(1) definition expands the meaning by describing it as ‘an act of sending money, bills, or the like, to a distant place, as a satisfaction of a demand, or in discharge of an obligation’. These dictionary meanings do not imply direction, inward or outward, but are based on distance. In the English historical literature, ‘remittance man’ refers to a person who went out on a mission, like participation in an official expedition or for study purposes. During personal communication with Professor Dennis, during the English edition of this thesis, I learnt that ‘it also refers to the disgraced son of a noble family who is sent abroad and in return gets monthly remittance if he agrees never to return to his country of origin’ (Dennis, 2016, per.com). Thus, simple dictionary meanings or descriptions of remittance do not offer the exact, implicit and direct meaning of the word in its contemporary sense. This is mainly because the term goes hand-in-hand with international migration that is symptomatic of the economic and demographic shifts in globalisation. According to its use in my Master’s thesis, remittance was regarded as a process of stocking up on money and goods by immigrants to send to relatives, families and dependents back home, for the purpose of productive or non-productive consumption. It is also seen as an instrument of social protection and local development back home and as a means of negotiation by ‘foreigners’, ‘illegal aliens’, and the ‘excluded’ within a given host society, which has become an object of concern and regulation in developed societies.

I used the word ‘remittance’ as a development concept or, in its broader meaning, as explained above. In light of past and present usage of the term using its narrow dictionary meaning without contextualising it will pose problems. For example, if one applies the definition provided by accountants to present day realities, one would regard all transfers to banks that are distant payments and categorise powerful states like the USA in the same category as remittance receiving poor Kembatas and Hadiya households in Ethiopia. Reducing every distance-based financial transfer to remittance is not tenable. The meaning of remittance also depends on power relations; if one uses ‘remittance men’ to describe African travellers to Europe, who receive money from their sponsors or family, the word would have a definite meaning. This hints at the fact that the meaning of remittance varies depending on by whom and for whom it is used.

The meaning of the concept also changes within interdisciplinary semantic fields. For instance, in law it implies, *'*sending money as an effort of removing an obligation'. In accounting, its meaning includes 'a sum of payments to clear debts', including paying 'government taxes' by sending cheques or other forms of payment. This definition puts powerful agencies of a society in the same category as remittance recipients of all kinds. The conception of remittance was expanded and deepened after it entered the sphere of development studies. The operational meaning is a reference to monetary and non-monetary values that are transferred to migrant source countries by immigrants. These can be mediated by money-sending agents or shipping and postal services for goods. Remittance also means non-pecuniary transfers like new or used goods from the host country to immigrant source countries.

2.5.2.7. Remittance Channels and General Constraints

The possible channels of remittances from immigrants include the Western Union money transfer service, MoneyGram, bank transfers, or different kinds of Hawalla that work independent of mainstream financial transfer methods employed by the bank or recognised money-sending agencies. The remittance channel that has been the focus of the Police Model of migration and diasporas has been Hawalla. Most Interpol and other unilateral government's safety and security agents have produced policies, rules and regulations to restrict the functioning of the Hawalla money transfer channels especially whenever there are security breaches or attacks on the civilized world in major global cities. We have seen reports of searches and blocking of money-sending offices in these cities (Interpol, 2016).

Three fundamental questions can be raised with regard to remittances: First, what are the common official money transfer channels? What other forms of remittance channels exist? How safe it is for the remitting immigrant to send his/her money through informal means and how safe is it for human security in terms of its end use?

Remittance channels can be divided into formal, semi-formal and informal types. Formal channels are used to transfer money from a country to another destination using internationally recognised banks at the local level, for instance, Standard Bank, City Bank and so forth. These include bank-to-bank official money transfers by customers and account holders, private, public and business; drafts, cheques, deposits and remittances of multinational companies that send their profit to the mother country or a company using official banks in the host country.

Semiformal money transfer occurs through channels attached to official state banks or a private licensed bank that provides money-sending services. The United States and other countries introduced money sending channels like Western Union, MoneyGram and so forth. The other channel is the informal transfer system that lies outside of the traditional banking system. Interpol, in cooperation with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, produced a paper on how remittances can be used to launder money. It describes Hawalla as 'a parallel remittance system' (Jost and Sandhu, no date, p.3) outside of the formal banking system.

The Ethiopian National Bank and the Ethiopian Commercial Bank have since inception provided a system that account holders can use to send money to distant relatives using written authorisation, while relatives use the local post office, telephone station or the local office of the Ministry of Finance to obtain their money, because they all operate under the state. Internationally, Hawalla, according to the Intrepol document, was developed to serve people who are beyond the reach of the formal banking system.

The Hawalla system appears to have been used in India before a Western banking system was introduced and is now highly diversified, with countless firms offering money-sending services. It has become one of the major money-transfer systems around the world. Hawalla involves dealers or money senders and receiving actors. It is a simple, less sophisticated way of sending that relies on trust, friendship and kinship. It is legitimate and is a well-known mechanism that is well networked around the world. The problem is that it is regarded by some of the powerful security and global policing agencies, and even unilateral governments' security agents as being prone to being used for money laundering. For instance, according to the document mentioned above, it can be used for money laundering or even to finance terror. As discussed with regard

to the Police Model, the first step taken by the then new Homeland Security Agency after 9/11 was to close a Somalian Hawalla office in the USA. It is less transparent than the official banking system where the reasons for and source of the money is well-documented and can be referred to when necessary. In Hawalla, these kinds of checks are difficult to make as financial management is not formalised at either the sending or the receiving end. The money-sending agents do not keep documents. Because of this, Hawalla has been regarded as part of the shadowy underworld of immigrants.

There are contending views on this system of money transfer that is used by the majority of immigrants from a Muslim background. This is due to the fact that most of the Hawalla non-pecuniary transfer systems under the Islamic culture do not charge interest. They do, however, have a high rate of exchange between currencies that they manipulate. However, the remittance-security nexus considers Hawalla to pose security risks that call for constant surveillance and follow-up. Thus, the Police Model dominates the literature and discourse on remittance.

The major constraint to Hawalla is the nature of the system itself. It relies heavily on mutual trust and effective communication between the actors. When one of these elements is breached by one of the agents or receivers, it becomes problematic. For instance, after an immigrant sends money, s/he needs to follow this up with the money-sending agent who handles a lot of customers. If the sender does not follow up, the agent might forget or the document might be mislaid. Some may also deliberately forget. Another problem is lack of communication between the sender and the receiver of the remittance. Most customers are from the countryside and have less communication access; this can also be disrupted by local situations in the receiving country. When communication breaks down, money can be delayed or even forgotten at the sending agent's office.

Global remittance control regimes are also a constraint to migrants' remittances. Large sums of money, in particular, alert banks and the secret services that operate in banks and law enforcement agencies due to the fact that remittances are regarded as a threat to global security. Thus, successful immigrants who make it in developed societies and have the capacity to send large sums of money are discouraged from doing so. Although terrorists can use such informal channels to finance terror, this is not the only feature of

Hawalla and migrants' remittances. The Global Financial Integrity organization notes that money laundering is rife among government officials in many countries who use official banking to perform their transactions. It notes that, billions of dollars sent to Europe and the USA are said to be rechanneled from aid to Third World governments. Compared to the illegal money transactions effected by officials at banks, Hawalla's capacity to handle extremely large amounts of funds is highly unlikely, as many countries place restrictions on the maximum amount that can be sent or received without clearance. In Ethiopia, the limit is 200,000 Et. Birr., which is equivalent to 10 thousand dollars. Banks are required to report larger sums to government security agents and an investigation follows (Negarit Gazeta, 2005).

2.5.3. Remittance data for Rustenburg

Most of the migrants under study remit at least some money to their original homes (for conception of remittance, please, see chapter 2). The goals of these remittances are varied and, at the same time, they have common features. Remittances sent from Ethiopians in Rustenburg and Durban support families, relatives and friends and are of a welfare nature. However, some are motivated by investment and development considerations. The development aspect arises when immigrants engage in manufacturing, technology transfers, and in the construction business in Ethiopia and move capital from their host country to their country of origin. Depending on their success in South Africa, some members of the diaspora also remit large amounts for other purposes like buying or building a house, or to invest in small or medium sized businesses and support development in their country of origin. Some go as far as supporting their favourite party to take power either through election or armed struggle. I categorise remittances into low level remittances, middle level and high level. These categories correspond to Low Level Remitting Immigrants (LLRI), Middle Level Remitting Immigrants (MLRI) and High Level Remitting Immigrants (HLRI). The data on remittances was obtained by asking the participants to state how much they sent to their country each year. This information was provided in response to the standard questions sent before I met them for an interview (the guiding questions used are appended at the end of this thesis). Figure 6 below captured the remittance data for the 40 participants in Rustenburg.

Figure 6 Categories of Remitting Diaspora by Level of Remittances (Rustenburg)



Like the income categories, the remittance categories differentiate three types of immigrants: The first is a low level of remittance and embraces those migrants who remit up to R20,000 a year. This small remittance supports families' livelihoods back home and is sent once or twice a year, depending on the situation and communication with families. Such remittances include holiday gifts and support for families to celebrate the Ethiopian Christmas or other social events.

The fact that 22 of the 40 study participants fall into this category reflects the status and effectiveness of RI in South Africa despite the fact that demand at the receiving end is still substantial, and immigrants strive to fulfill those demands.

The second category, moderate leve/ remittance represents up to R40,000 a year and there are 13 immigrants in this group. While this might seem low, depending on the exchange rate of the Rand, such an amount can sustain a decent livelihood in Ethiopia. Families that receive such amounts from their siblings, relatives and friends in Rustenburg open small businesses or improve their agricultural output.

The number of immigrants with a high remitting capacity (R40,000 to R160,000) consists of only five individuals. The participants that were interviewed explained the pecuniary

and non-pecuniary aspects of their remittances. For instance, some migrants have opened spare parts shops in Ethiopia that specialise in importing materials that are easily accessible in South Africa. Other businesses that rely on imports from South Africa include pharmaceutical and ceramics concerns. Some participants noted that they send non-monetary material from South Africa, including farm and construction equipment and blankets, clothing and shoes. Such remittances, which are neglected in the literature, nonetheless have significant value and, together with money transfers, boost the economy of the host state as well as the country of origin.

Neither the interviews nor group discussions produced evidence of individuals sponsoring terror and conflict in Ethiopia. However, in the group discussion, it was noted that several representatives of Ethiopian opposition parties have visited South Africa to raise funds for their political activities back home. An example is an Ethiopian stand-up comedian who claims to have sponsored political change in Ethiopia. Known as Mr Tamagn Beyene, he managed to raise R900,000 at a single event in Durban. He visited South Africa in the aftermath of the xenophobic attacks and raised an unspecified amount for himself and funding for the Ethiopian Satellite Television Network, a You Tube channel that promotes political change in Ethiopia through a propaganda campaign. These individuals are regarded as a terrorist group by the government of Ethiopia. Thus, while no direct evidence was found of remittances that fuel the political conflict in Ethiopia, the study participants did mention that they had participated in such shows. Their involvement is limited to paying entrance fees and buying food at the events. Nonetheless, they are aware of the background of the people who stage such shows.

A member of the scientific diaspora discussion group who is an Oromo stated that he had helped organize an event in Durban recently that was addressed by Jawar Mohamed, an Oromo opposition leader. An amount of R1.2 million was raised to support the Oromo uprising in Ethiopia.

I also interviewed an immigrant that is affiliated to the Tigre tribal group who claimed that Jawar is a Muslim extremist who wants to emulate the genocide perpetrated by Ahmed Gragn Mohamed who invaded Abyssinia (present-day northern Ethiopia) from 1531-

1541 (Pankhurst, 2003). Gragn Mohamed's ethnic background is contested, with some claiming that he was from the Harari and some saying that he was a Somali, from what is today Harare City in eastern Ethiopia. However, there is consensus that he was a Muslim warrior who was married to the daughter of the Zeilan king in Somalia, perhaps explaining his Somali roots. He led an armed insurrection that eventually controlled the territory up to the northern hinterland of Ethiopia during the Abyssinia-Adal war under the sultanate of Adal (1529-1543), which lasted until the first half of the 16th Century. In the Amharic language, 'Gragn' means 'left-handed', referring to Ahmad ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi, who rose to power somewhere in the region of present day Harer and had contact with the southern Somali Kingdom of Zillah (Zewde, 1989). He used members of the Oromo tribe to fight the Abyssinian troops of that time. With arms obtained from Portugal, the Ethiopian Emperor Libna Dingel defeated the Islamic Oromo expansionist force and Ahmed ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi was killed in 1941 (Trim Ingham, 1952).

This historical period is remembered as the 'great Oromo expansion from the South of Ethiopia that resulted in the burning down of a lot of churches and destruction of the Ethiopian culture' (Pankhurst, 2003). The current Tigre-led government accuses those like Jawar Mohamed of seeking to perpetrate genocide in Ethiopia with a view to creating an 'independent state of Oromia'. They even, claim that, 'He [Jawar] wants an Islamic State of Oromia that would unite all Oromo speaking people and the geographic location they occupy, from Kenya, Somalia and Southern Ethiopia' (Aiga Forum, 2017).

However, an interviewee stated that the government's statements are stealing their narrative from the popular uprising against the government of Ethiopia which is mono-tribal and dominated by the Tigres, who have become agents of colonialism in Ethiopia by dislocating people from the land and committing genocide themselves. He dismissed accusations against the Muslim Oromos as state propaganda. He also acknowledged reading articles with such arguments on the government sympathizers' website www.aigaforum.com. This could be considered as indirect support for banned organisations or support for conflict. In general, however, the nature of remittances from the Ethiopian diaspora in Rustenburg does not reflect direct links to conflicts in Ethiopia, but instead takes the form of interstate business facilitation or welfare financing.

2.5.4. Typologies of Ethiopian Diaspora in Durban: Taxonomies

Background on this location was presented in Chapter 3. This section discusses the different taxonomies of the Ethiopian immigrants who live in Durban, using similar criteria for differentiation as those used in Rustenburg. The fundamental criterion for typology is tribal difference. A total of 20 immigrants were interviewed in Durban and FGDs were also organised. Therefore, unlike the data for Rustenburg, all the data can be recorded in the tables. The other baselines for typology are religious categories, income levels, occupation, and remittance levels. The comparative analysis and discussion of the overall data from the field work follows in Chapter 5.

Many of the participants in Durban are from the city centre. Participant recruitment took different forms. On the one hand, I used a network referral chain for potential participants and I sent them a letter requesting their participation with comprehensive information about the project and myself as the researcher (this letter is included in the appendices to this thesis). On the other hand, I recruited participants by physically walking around in the shops and streets where Ethiopian migrant clusters are found. This approach avoids network bias and helps to access strangers via snowball sampling.

For this door-to-door exercise, I focused on three main areas in Durban: shops located in Victoria Street, an area called 'the Point' around South Beach, and West Street where a lot of Ethiopian diaspora operate. While some agreed to participate, most declined as they did not know me. Some were afraid of telling their stories to a stranger, while others agreed to be interviewed and participate in a group discussion despite not knowing me.

One of the people I approached said:

'I don't know you, but I know the issue, therefore, I participate and cooperate'.

(Volunteer participant, Durban, 2016)

There was a high degree of resistance to participation among women. While I was keen to obtain a gender balance in the sample, most women referred me to their husbands or partners. Thus, the data lacks gender balance despite my efforts to capture women's stories. As this study relied on voluntary participation, there is an obvious limitation of data representativeness. However, once the data was acquired, it was analysed and

presented scientifically. The task of recruiting participants was challenging, as most of those I approached were unsure how participation would affect their lives in the future, although I explained that this was a purely academic exercise. However, some participants were recruited by means of door-to-door visits and the snowball technique was effective as those with whom people were familiar were used to request an interview. The typologies of Ethiopian immigrants in Durban were determined by compiling demographic data from the individual face-to-face interviews, and by participants filling in personal information.

2.5.4.1. Tribal Typologies of Ethiopian Diaspora in Durban

The Durban data is interesting as it is dominated by participants from the Amhara ethnic group. The majority claimed to have faced ethnic genocide in Ethiopia. In the interviews, they recounted their traumatic expulsion from Ethiopia by the Tigre-based government. They emphasised that genocide against the Amhara has been ignored by the international community for the past 40 years, especially in the past 25 years (Yishaw, 2016; Tesfalem, 2016). The existence of a relatively large number of Amharas in Durban could be related to their cultural compatibility or the social tendencies of the immigrants under discussion with the local Zulu and Indian people.

KwaZulu-Natal is dominated by the Zulu culture that has a royal tradition. In Ethiopia, the Amharas have a 3,000-year history of different kingdoms. Ethiopia is the oldest independent polity in Africa, and is older than most of the present day European countries. The country was an imperial kingdom for many centuries. The 1974 communist revolutionary upheaval deposed the Amhara's last king who traced his roots to the biblical Solomon Dynasty that lasted 1,000 years. The last monarch, Emperor Haile Selassie I, was overthrown by the revolution that was ignited in the same way as the Arab Spring with the help of the international media, specifically, the BBC, French media channels and the Voice of Germany that actively supported the student revolution of 1974 that unseated the Emperor.

Most of the study participants expressed their regret that the revolutionary youth were uninformed of the Europeans' intention and the neocolonial agenda. The Amharas were

blamed and victimised by different kinds of revolutionary terror at various times, the last revolution being led by Tigre tribes from the north that fought the Dreg Government of Mengistu Hailmariam. The systematic, silent, and sustained genocide perpetrated by the two consecutive regimes of Colonel Mengistu Hailmariam and the present Tigre-led government led to the disappearance of up to five million Amharas. An investigative report to the Ethiopian Parliament (2007) that conducted a census in cooperation with Harvard University, estimated that, in the last purge, 2.4 million Amharas disappeared over a five-year period. The full video interview with the Ethiopian authority is posted by Zehabesh You-tube and can be accessed at: http://www..Zehabeshatube.com (accessed 12.10.2016). The discussion explains how this occurred and that, while the government does not provide an explanation, it accepted that the Amhara population had decreased.

Therefore, the presence of Amharas in the Kingdom of the Zulu has to do with the royal cultural and historical compatibility between the Zulu culture and that of the Amhara. Other reasons for the Amhara presence in Durban are explored in Chapter 5 where I discuss why some tribal groups are more inclined to live in certain places than in others. The Amharas represented 14 of the 20 people interviewed in Durban, and there were three Oromos two Hadiyas, the people who live in southern Ethiopia in the previous southern Shewa or Sidamo province of Ethiopia and one Tigre participant. As explained above, this is not a systematic census of the tribal typologies of Ethiopian immigrants in Durban, but is an attempt to classify the participants according to their tribal affiliations to render the data thicker. Figure 7 shows the tribal typologies found in Durban by cultural grouping. This presentation is in the form of a histogram rather than a pie chart because the data combine the dimension of gender.



Religious affiliation is also pertinent in determining the typology of Ethiopian immigrants in Durban.

2.5.4.2. Data on the Religious Typologies of Ethiopian Immigrants in Durban

The majority of the study participants in Durban were Orthodox Christians. As noted earlier, the sample for Durban was selected using non-probability sampling and visiting shops run by immigrants. Snowball sampling was also employed. Orthodox Christians made up 70 per cent of the participants. This is congruent with the fact the majority were from the Amhara tribe that belong to the Abrahamic Orthodox Church. Almost all the participants and almost all tribal members in their home country were originally from an Orthodox family. A fraction of new generation Amharas has shifted to Protestant churches, but they are far smaller in number than Kembatas or Oromos, whose Christian tradition is linked to European missionary activities in Ethiopia. The persecution of Amharas by the Tigre-dominated government, which they refer to as 21st Century Babylon, has dispersed many Amhara Orthodox from Ethiopia.

According to Tekle Yeshaw, the Moresh Amhara Wogene Organisation, Tigres, whose leaders are pagans and atheists because of their Maoist traditions, considered Orthodox Christianity as the Amhara's religion and targeted it as a competing culture against 'self-determination of nations and nationalities', in the terminology of the TPLF. Their religion was thus considered as a conservative culture that wanted to preserve the traditional Ethiopian polity that the TPLF sought to refashion. As a result of consistent attacks on these sects, large numbers arrived in Durban and other parts of the world.

The Tigre-led genocide against Amharas (Yeshaw, 2016) thus seems to be the reason for the large number of Amharas in Durban who subscribe to the Orthodox religion. In Ethiopia, a silent genocide has been perpetrated against many tribal groups, especially against the Amharas, resulting in widespread expulsion of Amharas, Oromos, Gambellas and other tribal groups. The Tigre-led parliament itself acknowledges that, 2.4 million Amharas vanished from the statistics during the five years before the report discussed above came before parliament. Indeed, the numbers could be far higher. By some estimates, the Amharas lost millions of people over the violent years that followed the fall of the late Emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia (Yeshaw, 2016).

As discussed earlier for the Rustenburg data, the main religions in Ethiopia are Orthodox Christian, Islam, other Christians like Evangelicals and so forth, pagans and traditional sects. Figure 8 presents the data on Durban participants' religious affiliation.



The Amharas are blamed for creating and maintaining an independent polity or monarchic system, for the past 3,000 years. This makes them a target for any plan emanating from Europe with the intention of dominating Africa. Ethiopia is a biblical black nation that existed well before most of the European states were created. It also occupies a strategic spot, Babel Mendeb, a sea route that is a passage for global trade and oil. The global powers thus intervened in the socio-political situation in Ethiopia, either to promote development or to protect their own interests. Italy, France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Russia, China, Turkey, and Portugal have historically had contact with Ethiopian society. While some countries helped one tribe, others resisted their dominance in the country. Amharas have never been favoured by the Italians due to their encounter in the Horn of Africa; colonial powers regarded the Tigre 'tribe' as more malleable for their foreign policy. Like Zulu King Shaka did, Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia, for example, managed to defeat the Europeans and he was claimed to be belonging to the Amhara 'tribe'. His successor, Emperor Haile Selassie also prevented Italy from colonising Ethiopia. The current pro-Tigre government of Ethiopia is accused of teaming up with the Italians and undermining Amharas and Ethiopia's independence. The European powers' silence on the undercover genocide against Amharic-speaking Ethiopians is not accidental, but is due to tacit approval of the TPLF's atrocities against the 'tribe' that fought colonialism and prevented Ethiopia, and

by implication, Africa, from coming under the yoke of direct colonialism. Amhara expulsion through violence and genocide perpetrated by the Tigre tribe continue without publicity and with the complicity of the big European powers. According to the narratives of the study participants, it would seem that the Amharas brought this on themselves through their anti-colonial stance and their history of resisting colonial expansion in Africa and Ethiopia.

On the other hand, the Oromos became a target of the Tigre-led government of Ethiopia because of disputes over farm land and the supposed historical argument that the 'Oromos are people who pushed into the Ethiopian hinterland from Northern Kenya and Somalia'. Thus, Tigres believe they took Ethiopia as a trophy for militarily defeating the former military regime which was led by Colonel Mengistu Hailmariam, in 1991. As a result of this thinking, they want the Oromos to go back to their original places or to accept the Tigre domination, even if it means that they lose the land they farm. The recent land grab has caused many Oromos to leave their country and seek refuge in African and other countries. Durban was one of their destinations. Although the majority is Muslims, Oromos also subscribe to Evangelical and some to Orthodox Christianity. Oromos in central Ethiopia are mainly Orthodox Christians. The other criterion used to categorise typologies of Ethiopian immigrants in Durban is their occupation and level of income.

2.5.4.3. Occupation and Income level: Bases for differentiation of Typologies in Durban

The data from the interviews revealed that the study participants are engaged in several socio-economic activities. The major sectors are nostalgic trade, culture-based small business, trading commodities, information and technology businesses, and academic and research fields.

While the business areas covered for the study varied, West, Point and Victoria Streets seem to accommodate most of the activities of the Ethiopian diaspora. The following photograph shows the researcher in West Street, during field work to interview participants that own businesses.

Photo 1: The researcher heading off to field work to conduct interviews in West Street, Durban, March, 2016

Nostalgic trade refers making a living by importing artifacts, goods and food from Ethiopia, which is a way of maintaining contact with their roots. Ethiopian's staple food is 'Enjera' that it is made from 'Teff' grain that only grows in Ethiopia. Some businesses import 'Enjera' directly from Ethiopia using Ethiopian Airlines flights to Johannesburg. This airline recently introduced direct flights to Durban, with the potential to increase the supply of goods for nostalgic trade. These shops in West Street sell different symbolic material. The target customers are Ethiopians, but also anyone interested in Ethiopian culture. This promotes tourism in Durban and cultural exchange between locals and foreigners, and contributes to locals' understanding of this culture. As victims of expulsion from their original home, members of the Amhara tribe keep memories of home in the host space through these kinds of businesses. As the Jews kept their culture alive outside of Israel, Amharas also prevent their culture from destruction.

Photo 2: Examples of shops that specialise in importing and selling Ethiopian artifacts representing nostalgic trade (Participant gave consent for the photograph to be used for the thesis; Durban April, 2016). Top: The owner of shop during an interview with me. Bottom: Ethiopian symbols, artifacts and hand-made goods on display and the owner and voluntary participant in the study Photograph by researcher.

While there are several shop-owners in Durban, the data does not include all of them. Table 6 combines income and type of occupation as bases for typologies.

***Table 6**: Occupations* and *Income Levels* of the Ethiopian Diaspora (Only for Participants of the Study in Durban)		
DIN & Code Names	Occupation	Income/Annum/ (ZAR)
1. Gnga	Nostalgic Trad	60,000
2. Mnu	Wholesale Sto	180,000
3. Else	Tailor Shop	360,000
4. Oste	Shop Owner	168,000
6. Ewew	Self-employed	120,000
7. Ewra	Nostalgic trade	360,000
8. Nuot	Butchery	180,000
9. Riam	Self-employed	240,000
10. Eteg	Restaurant Owner	480,000
11. Enne	PhD Student	132,000
12. Atye	PhD Student	204,000
13. Huli	Engineer/PhD	132,000
14. Saba	Electrical Engineer	150,000
15. Tuaw	Teacher	108,000
16. Akew	Self-employed	84,000
18. Etgu	Self-employed	120,000
19. Lese	Self-employed	240,000
20. Emme	Bag shop own	180,000



The three income levels used to categorise typologies in Rustenburg were also used in Durban. Figure 9 shows that the majority fall within the middle-income group, representing 11 of 20 participants interviewed. Seven fall within the high-income group and two in the low income group with earnings of up to R100,000 per annum.

The other parameter for defining typology is the manner of admission to South Africa.

2.5.4.4. Typologies of Ethiopian Diaspora based on Residence Status in South Africa: Durban

The figure below depicts both tribal affiliations and different types of residence permit. It shows that Amharas dominate in all categories of residence in the diaspora. The highest number of participants is recognised refugees, followed by those with study permits and residence permits based on marriage. There are permanent residents among the Amhara, and some have even acquired South African citizenship. One Oromo has a study permit and one has recognised refugee status. Finally, one Tigre has an asylum-seeker permit. As noted earlier, Tigres currently rule the tribally fragmented state of Ethiopia and do not appear to have been persecuted on the basis of tribal affiliation, which the Geneva Convention of 1951 cites as a reason for expulsion from the home

country and which makes them eligible for asylum. Chapter 5 touches on these and other residence-related issues in greater detail. The following section examines remittances as a distinguishing feature of diaspora among the participants in the city of Durban.



2.5.4.5. Remittance Data for Durban

Remitting Immigrants (RI) have been active development actors back home. However, all immigrants are not necessarily remitting to their country of origin. Before an immigrant becomes an RI s/he must weather the challenges of life in exile and adapt to the situation in the host space. Diaspora communities often experience psychological distress that

can prevent them from functioning effectively in the host country. In contrast, some become agents of development by earning enough to be able to save and then remit to their home country. Therefore, like income level, immigrants' ability to remit determines their typologies. Table 7 below details the amount of individual immigrant's remittances to Ethiopia.

Table 7: Annual Individual Remittances of Participants in Durbar			
DIN and Code Names	Annual Remittance (ZAR)	DIN/Code	Annual Remittance (ZAR)
1. Gnga	24,000	11. Enne	36,00
2. Mnu	36,000	12. Atye	12,000
3. Else	36,000	13. Saba	43,200
4. Oste	18,000	14. Tuaw	12.00
5. Osri	5,000	15. Akew	20,400
6. Ewew	21600	16. Umlu	15,000
7. Ewra	60,000	17. Etgu	24,000
8. Nuot	36,000	18. Lese	20,000
9. Riam	150,000	19. Emme	36,00
10. Eteg	84,000	20.Huli	12,000

2.5.4.6. Diaspora Typologies by the Nature of Exit from the State of Origin (Durban)

Three dimensions typify diaspora: the host perspective, the state of origin's perspective and the immigrant's perspective (an emic view) of themselves. The Ethiopian government typifies diaspora based on its strategies that involve overt and covert activities inside its territory beyond its boundaries. The covert position of the current Tigre-led Ethiopian government on diaspora is that anyone who has escaped its persecution and attempts to work from the outside to overthrow its rule is not considered as a diaspora (per a member of the Ethiopian scientific diaspora discussion group). In

this covert categorisation, diaspora is not related to being outside one's home country, but is dependent on the escapee's loyalty to the state.

Despite the fact that they are living in exile or outside their country of origin, immigrants are not regarded as diaspora if they do not support the government financially, and they are not reciprocated for these activities that the government of Ethiopia considers the mark of good diaspora. Hence, the covert categorisation of diaspora denies those who are labelled as a threat to its rule and takes away their citizenship and national identity by using its consular authority at its embassies around the world. Although the host system of migration administration categorises immigrants based on national origin, the intervening actions of the state means that all those that are at odds with the government lose their identity before they even become aware of it, and before the host understands this. This creates a floating identity which affects the status of the diaspora in host countries. Hence, the usual suspect tribes like Oromo, and Afar, Amhara, and Gurage to some extent, are accused of trying to subvert the home government from outside. As a result, the majority of those in the Ethiopian diaspora lack access to consular services that should be provided to all citizens without discrimination.

The researcher came across people who have been denied these rights by the Ethiopian Embassy in Pretoria, making the issue of belonging problematic among this diaspora in South Africa, and the migrants who live in the two cities selected for this study. Anyone who has an opposing view to that of the government is labelled by the Tigre government as a non-Ethiopian diaspora, and denied consular services by their country's missions. This is tantamount to having one's citizenship suspended. However, this situation is not obvious, and is obscured from the view of outsiders who do not understand the inner functioning of the Tigre-based government.

The diaspora that are denied services at Ethiopia's embassies for opposing the government back home, do not accept that they are non-Ethiopians. They acknowledge that loyalists are favoured with better service, but are not willing to avail themselves of the protection of the Tigre-based government in Ethiopia. The government's response to vocal opposition in the diaspora has serious implications and complicates the features of diaspora when it comes to determining the status of immigrants.

Most of the interviewees and participants in the FGDs felt that the Tigres tribal diasporas are favoured by the Ethiopian Embassy. They noted that the intelligence section of the embassy selectively assists and covertly organises the Tigre diaspora to carry out tasks that support the government so that they can continue to gain the lion's share of the economic benefits. They noted that the Tigres are well-organised in South Africa and receive the best consular services. This enables them to shuttle between South Africa and Ethiopia to conduct government-supported business and other activities, and compete with local big businesses in South Africa.

On the other hand, the participants claimed that, some Ethiopian immigrants who live in Rustenburg are viewed as extremists in opposition to the Tigre-led government and are hence not eligible for consular services based on citizenship. While these immigrants have not applied for citizenship in South Africa or any other country, they participate in political rallies or opposition activities and are thus not liked by the Tigre-led government in Ethiopia. The FGD participants alleged that members of the Tigre tribe take videos, and spy on Ethiopians who oppose their rule, and send them either to the embassy or to the Ministry of the Interior in Ethiopia. The embassy in Pretoria uses this to deny entry to Ethiopians, or to any other person who they consider to be opposed to the current government. These practices are a new phenomenon in Ethiopian history as there were not many immigrants outside Ethiopia during Emperor Haile Selassie's time. Ethiopian citizens were highly respected outside of their country of origin. They were considered the embodiment of black independence and pride because of their history of defeating a European power on African soil. Most countries were thus willing to provide safe passage and respected them.

Political persecution started during the communist regime and emigration became more common. However, all those that needed protection or services from Ethiopian missions abroad were accorded respect and there was no discrimination based on tribal affiliation or political position. The situation is different today. The new Tigre-led government of Ethiopia preempts any opposition activities outside the country and the main mission of its embassies is to follow the activities of the opposition, and take the necessary action to dismantle or cripple their organisations, or attack those opposed to its rule. Hence, the Tigre government in Ethiopia typifies the diaspora who do not conform to its rule as non-Ethiopians, and, as a result, they represent a floating identity that is not captured in

the postmodernist theory of transnational society. They are the wretched of the diaspora discourse. In South Africa, these people encounter problems as they are viewed as 'illegals' with no supporting documents from their national government. As most are not granted political asylum, it is difficult to formalise their stay in South Africa. Therefore, the majority resort to appealing to a third country and to international organisations like the UNHCR, which has its own refugee screening criteria, and end up rallying for their rights to be respected. This also pits them against most of the strong players in migration. They also forget that the UN is an organisation of the government, not the people, and are hence surprised by the UN's failure to take action against their country of origin for its bad governance and human rights abuses. Therefore, Ethiopian diaspora in Rustenburg are categorised and marginalised by their own country based on their political, social and tribal affiliation that become part of their character in the host space. The typologies of Ethiopian immigrants in Rustenburg or in any other place in South Africa can hence not be seen in isolation from the way their country of origin treats them in terms of their identity.

By the same token, the Tigre-led government of Ethiopia has adopted a strategy to mobilise diaspora in line with that advocated by the WB, IMF and OECD countries to finance its development. It has developed a well-orchestrated, elaborate system to tap into the resources of the Ethiopian diaspora. Its overt activities are thus in high gear. The definition of diaspora for its overt activities obviously excludes those discussed above that are considered as enemies of the state. The rest who are willing to participate in the development of the country and do not adopt any political position inside Ethiopia are encouraged to do business in the country and to invest their hard-earned money from the foreign country. The type of diaspora that the government of Ethiopia recognises is its sympathisers among non-Tigre tribes and naturally their own kind, namely, the Tigre diasporas. The non-Tigre diasporas are considered as a main source of government revenue as many are tricked into making high remittances, and paying high import duties and taxes. In contrast, according to participants in the prototypical focus group (Durban, 2016) Tigre are allowed to import without paying taxes. Hence, whoever is a non-Tigre and does not complain as diaspora is encouraged to participate in the development of Ethiopia and services are available to facilitate this at Ethiopia embassies around the world. Indeed, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has created a Directorate General to track

and screen what it calls its development diaspora from among Ethiopian nationals in South Africa.

In terms of the factors that drive out-migration, the Ethiopian government argues that:

> *'Even though human migration can be caused by war and related causes, the main factor has now become lack of job opportunities and low-level development in the developing countries and the presumed availability of conducive atmosphere and opportunities in the developed world…' (Diaspora Policy, 2015, p.3).*

This is similar to the Police Model's views on the motivation for migration.

2.5.5. Conclusion

This chapter determined the different typologies of Ethiopian diaspora in the cities of Rustenburg and Durban. The data covered the characteristics, composition, and profiles of the community in relation to their identities, social status, and the way they are perceived by the state. The emic perspective on typologies of Ethiopian immigrants involves violent expulsion from their original home, as described in most classical diaspora literature (for example Safran, 1991, Cohen, 1997). The main characterisation in the emic discourse is immigrants' own narratives of victimhood by the Tigre-led government of Ethiopia. Most of the interviewees in both locations attribute their typology to being violently expelled from their country of origin and as a result they consider themselves as political refugees that are persecuted along tribal/ethnic lines and require protection by the host state in line with the Geneva Convention of 1951. The attic view on typologies of immigrants is represented by the kind of residence permits that the South African Department of Home Affairs grants to the Ethiopian diaspora in both cities. This study ecologically combines the emic perspective, the attic perspective and the real characteristics that distinguish one immigrant community from another. The criteria employed were tribal affiliation, religion, occupational category, income level and residence-based typologies. These criteria of typologies are a contribution to knowledge in themselves as the discourse on immigrants and diaspora overlooks these classifications and uses blanket categorisation. In the case of the Ethiopian diaspora, blanket characterisation involves either describing them as 'foreigners' or country-based categorisation as 'Ethiopian Immigrants', a general name for everyone that comes from

the country without going into their specific characteristics and stories, and rendering migration policy and practice problematic. It is important to capture the narratives of tribal diasporas' expulsion from their original home, as well as their socio-cultural and religious differences. Considering such challenges from the perspective of immigrants, the new categorisation will help us to better understand the Ethiopian diaspora in South Africa.

CHAPTER 6

DATA ANALYSIS: OPERATIONALISING THE MODELS OF DIASPORA

INTRODUCTION

This chapter relates the diaspora discourses in the literature to the realities of the field work and offers additional perspectives to promote understanding of migration problems within the context of the Ethiopian diaspora in South Africa, specifically in Rustenburg and Durban. One way that the theories were operationalised in the field work was the use of the characteristics and types stipulated in the diaspora discourse to define and build different types of FGDs. These include the Ethiopian Prototypical Diaspora (Safran, 1991; Cohen, 2008), Scientific Diaspora, Conflict Diaspora (Lyon, 2010) and the Commerce/development Diaspora (Mohan, 2012). The chapter presents the narratives and experiences of participants of the group discussions that were analysed using non-participatory observation and independent interpretation.

In addition to the data analysis viewed through the lenses of theories and models presented in Chapter 2, the Ethiopian government's intervention in the lives of the migrants living in both locations were discussed in Chapter 5. The entry point for state-immigrant contact is the government's diaspora mobilisation strategy that is in full swing, not only in South Africa, but around the world where Ethiopian diaspora live. This chapter thus examines the different techniques adopted by the Ethiopian government to galvanise support for its development initiatives, including selling bonds; raising funds to build hydro-electric dams; housing cooperatives; evoking homesickness to encourage diasporas to shuttle back and forth between the home and host state; the sale of arable land to diaspora and so forth. The other dimension of diaspora mobilisation is diaspora's participation in building Ethiopia's image, tourism promotion, attracting investment to Ethiopia and following up on the activities of opposition political parties within the Ethiopian diaspora. The Ethiopian government's effort to win the support of its diaspora is viewed with mixed feelings by most of the diaspora because of the way they were expelled from their original homes. They oppose the programme of diaspora mobilisation. The global financial crisis and the decline of both FDI and Official Development Assistance to developing countries placed the concept of remittances from the diaspora in the spotlight. Developing Third World countries like

Ethiopia are now advised by the WB and IMF to engage their respective diaspora to tap into their resources, material, financial, knowledge and technology transfer and so forth, to compensate for lost aid and investment capital. The current Tigre-led government of Ethiopia has been proactive in dealing with its diaspora and it has adopted a series of diaspora policies since 2001, the latest being the 2015 Ethiopian Diaspora Policy.

This chapter also explores the state's national development agenda that benefited from the government's engagement with its diaspora, especially the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) that aims to put Ethiopia among the middle-income countries by 2020. The discussion will focus on the GTP's agenda that relates to Ethiopian diaspora resource mobilisation. The Hydro Electric Dam and other areas of clean energy development are discussed as the reasons for the sale of sovereign bonds for the Ethiopian diaspora by the government. Opponents to the construction of what the Ethiopian government called 'a millennium dam' regard it as a white elephant designed to evoke nationalist sentiments among the diaspora and broader Ethiopian population in a bid to save the government money that will be used to prolong the tyranny in the country (Alemayehu, 20012). The government aimed to raise hard currency from the diaspora to build the dam or even balance its national current account. The other reason to examine the Millennium Dam in this part of the thesis is because it is related to inter-state conflict between Ethiopia and Egypt, with these countries competing to capture the Ethiopian diaspora; the former to tap into its diaspora's financial resources for the construction of the dam and the latter to obstruct construction of the dam and even provoke a political crisis or popular uprising by supporting the Oromo tribal groups against the Ethiopian government. Recently, the TPLF government made an official remark that Egypt is behind Oromo protests in Ethiopia and that it was supporting a political organisation called Ginbot 7 which the government regards as a terrorist organisation. The following section starts the discussion by making the connection between mainstream views in the literature and the data from the field in Rustenburg and Durban.

2.6.1. Matching the Diaspora Literature and the Results of the Field Work

Chapter 1 dealt with the contextualisation of the term diaspora and its imperatives and concluded that the conceptions are very diverse. Without a proper perspective, the research project could have travelled in a universe without gravity. The history of the concept was also discussed. Chapters 2 and 3 reviewed the literature on the subject at different levels

of discussion, national, regional and global. Chapter 3 systematised the theories of migrations related to the subject matter at hand. It noted that there is a rich body of literature that articulates theoretical propositions on the concept of the diaspora. The Ecological Model draws on useful arguments in theories set out in the literature to interpret the realities around us, as all these theories offer strong points that are worthy of consideration. While the Ecological Model is the main theory embraced in this thesis and it is described as an eye-glass of multi-dimensional views, this chapter also discusses a few studies and theories that directly contribute to our understanding of the typologies of Ethiopian immigrants in South Africa in general and the cities of Durban and Rustenburg in particular. Based on the selected frameworks in the literature and theoretical propositions, I systematise the narratives of immigrants into four common characteristics. The first is, Ethiopian Scientific Diaspora, which represents high levels of skills by Ethiopian standards and PhD levels of education. The groups found in Durban and their features tally with the typologies of migrants in the scientific diaspora literature. The literature is very wide and diverse in its usage of the concept of knowledge or science as a signifier for specific types of diaspora from poor countries. In particular, the literature on the 'brain-drain' is repetitive and one-dimensional. Apart from the South African literature on the scientific diaspora, in which Brown (2000) used the term 'intellectual diaspora', others also use the prefix of the brain and all deal with issues relating to the learned section of migrants. This monolithic perception of immigrants disregards aspects of the diaspora's existence in the host space. A vast body of literature articulates different aspects of the same problem, for instance, international 'scientific mobility' (Baruffaldi, no date), the 'brain bank' (Agrawal et al., 2008), 'brain-gain' (Stark, et al., 2007), 'brain waste' (Brandi, 2001), 'brain-exchange' (Pellegrino, 2002), 'brain migration' (Vinokur, 2006), 'end of brain drain' (Wickware, 1999) and 'brain-circulation' (Saxenian, 2005).

The literature that is directly applicable is that which deals with Ethiopians and the Ethiopian government's attempt to engage the scientific diaspora to contribute to development in their country of origin. This has the potential to convert the phenomenon of 'brain drain' to 'brain-circulation' (Ackers, 2005; Thorn and Holm-Nielsen, 2006). While debate continues on losing or gaining from scientific mobility, the aim of this study is to provide a picture of the other features/characterstics of Ethiopian immigrants in South Africa, which is also scientific in nature. I use the description Ethiopian Scientific Diaspora based on the characterisations emanating from the use of the word in the migration, development and 'brain-drain'

discourses. Hence, I present the data gathered from the typology of the scientific diaspora group through an FGD and capture the participants' narratives on different issues that affect them in South Africa or Ethiopia.

The other characteristics of Ethiopian immigrants in Durban and Rustenburg relate to Safran's (1991) discussion on the Jewish experience and his characterization of them as a 'Prototypical Diaspora'. While he did not use the word 'prototype' to discuss Jewish typologies, he distinguishes between a victim diaspora and other types of diaspora, for example, ordinary immigrants. Victimhood and violent dispersion to one or more destinations is what renders the Jewish diaspora unique (Cohen, 1997). The distinction between prototypical diaspora and hyper-diaspora is based on victimhood, tyranny and ethnic cleansing which is sufficiently intense to cause emigration. Cohen notes that:

> *'… However, when we talk of a trauma afflicting a group collectively, it is perhaps possible to isolate a class of events characterized by their brutality, scale and intensity so as unambiguously to compel emigration or flight. Being shackled in manacles, being expelled by a tyrannical leader, or being coerced to leave by force of arms, mass riots or the threat of "ethnic cleansing" appear qualitatively different phenomena from the general pressures of over-population, land hunger, poverty or a generally unsympathetic political environment.'*
>
> (Cohen, 1997, p. 2)

In contrast to Safran's conceptual monopolisation, this thesis applies the characterisation of a prototypical Jewish diaspora to that of a prototypical Ethiopian diaspora in South Africa. This is due to the narratives of Ethiopian immigrants who claimed to have escaped the systematic genocide perpetrated by the TPLF government in present-day Ethiopia. Other literature that is relevant to the Ethiopian knowledge diaspora includes Rose (2008) and Terrence Lyon (2006).

Based on this and similar characterisations, I coined the group name 'Ethiopian Scientific Diaspora' in Durban that is similar to 'circular migration', 'brain-drain', 'interdependence and co-development' that can be gained from scientific mobility.

The features identified in Terrence Lyons' 'Conflict Diaspora' were also observed among some of the Ethiopian immigrants that participated in this study. While I planned a discussion group along these lines, this was practically impossible, as most potential candidates were not willing to be grouped or to have their ideas recorded in any form. However, they were willing to debate issues without any formal meetings. I thus engaged

in informal discussions and observation of those that could be described as conflict diaspora. This involved my informants and accidental participants engaging in discussion in cafeterias and places businesses. I would suggest provocative ideas and observe verbal reactions with the help of my informants. The other characteristic of the Ethiopian diaspora relates to Mohan (2012) three types of development activities, 'diaspora in diaspora', 'development through diaspora', and 'developing in diaspora'. Ethiopians who are properly configured in the South African business environment and have forced the TPLF government to accommodate their tribal differences and economic affluence, even though they left their country because of bad governance, have become investors and agents of development. These typologies were found in both Rustenburg and Durban.

I held in-depth discussions with a group in Durban on issues relating to the Ethiopian Knowledge Diaspora. The group was named the Ethiopian Scientific Diaspora Discussion Group. It was composed of people who were lecturers, engineers and education policy-makers and pedagogic planners in Ethiopia who happened to be in Durban furthering their education or are attached to Higher Education institutions (based on the researcher's intrinsic knowledge of the individuals concerned). Some are of Ethiopian origin with citizenship in the United States or European countries and some are South African citizens.

The University of KwaZulu-Natal seems to be a beneficiary of this Ethiopian scientific diaspora mobility. Dozens of PhD holders and professors are sharing their knowledge and experience at the university. Most if not all discussed their experiences with me on different occasions and were informed of my project. The rest of the participants in the group discussions, including PhD students, also have work experience as lecturers at national universities back home.

I created a seven-member scientific diaspora discussion group to capture their views on the issues surrounding migration and knowledge transfer. We held discussions and individual interviews were also conducted to capture personal experiences.

The other discussion group was the Ethiopian Prototypical Diaspora based on the degree of persecution these participants suffered and the fact that their expulsion from their home country was the same as that identified by Safran. The discussion group was formed in Durban following the individual interviews that revealed the existence of a group of Ethiopians that came to South Africa to escape tribal persecution. Throughout the discussions, the participants emphasised that, in Ethiopia, people are being attacked for

belonging to certain tribes. According to them, the perpetrators are the Tigres who currently control all the security, military, bureaucracy, foreign trade and foreign affairs apparatus. The participants made claims such as: ‘Tigres are not alone in creating widespread misery in Ethiopia and they are doing this in collusion with the country’s historical enemies, namely Italians with fascist party lineage’. The specific regions where genocide is perpetrated are in north east Ethiopia, namely, Wollkait Tegede, Setit Humera, Raya and Zebo, and the former Shewa province around Addis Ababa. The maps below show the geographic location of these places in Ethiopia.



Map 1: The **colored Parts shows the parts of Amhara annexed by the Tigrai Tribe since the coming to power of the TPLF**

Map 2: Tigrai's size now

Map3: Tigrai before 1991



Map 2: Current Tribal and Language Based Map of Ethiopia (under TPLF Rule),

Map 3: Provincial Map of Ethiopia (before 1991), based on Geography and Administrative Convenience

Source: Wolkait.com (URL= http:// www. Wlkait.com, accessed 18.11.2006, 11:11)

The colored parts of the map show the districts and regions taken by Tigre-led government of Ethiopia from the former provinces of Gondar and Wollo which are now 'bantu regions' as the Amhara region. The map used during Emperor Haile Selassie's time and that of Colonel Mengistu era shows that there was no region called Amhara but it was divided among the four provinces of Shewa, Wollo, Gojjam, and Gondar (see Maps 2 and 3 for comparison). Amhara is now decimated and most of its territories were taken by the Tigre and given to other tribes, like the Oromos, Benshangul, Afar, etc. to trigger ethnic conflict between Amharas and other tribes. This is another dimension of the genocide plan of the TPLF. It put Amharas in perpetual conflict with the TPLF and others that further diminishes the size of the population.

Achamyeleh (2016) and others have campaigned for recognition of the genocide that is being perpetrated against Amharas. This violence is regarded as a prelude to building a Tigrai Republic and connecting to outside world through Port Sudan, or in the future taking back the Port of Assab from Eritrea (Achamyeleh, 2016). The TPLF is accused of perpetrating hidden genocide for the past 25 years and more, to depopulate the indigenous Amhara people that have owned the land west of Tekeze River since time immemorial (Source: Wolkait.com URL= http:// www. Wlkait.com, accessed 18.11.2006, 11:11)

The discussion focused on the genocide perpetrated by the ruling Tigre tribe against other tribes and some of the participants belonged to the persecuted tribes. As the data from Durban clearly shows, the dominant diaspora in this city is from the Amhara tribe. These immigrants thus manifest the features identified in classical diaspora theories. Therefore, this section presents the findings from the main discussion groups, the scientific diaspora and prototypical diaspora, in Durban. In Rustenburg, I attended discussions with immigrants with other diaspora characteristics that are also found in the literature; these were conflict diaspora and business or development diaspora. The first is found mainly in Zeniavil (eastern Rustenburg), whereas the business and development diaspora is a trans-tribal characteristic that embraces all of the Ethiopian diaspora. The FGDs were thus organized in line with the three diaspora typologies found in the literature and in the actual lives of the immigrants.

2.6.1.1. Ethiopian Scientific Diaspora Discussion Group

The unique features and typologies found in Durban are associated with the concept of knowledge diaspora (Rose, 2008). Unlike in Rustenburg, there are a number of Higher Education Institutions in the city. Durban thus has a concentration of the Ethiopian learned community. In Rustenburg, economic activities are based on mining and involve more physical labour, making it conducive to the settlement of Ethiopian business or development diaspora. Durban attracts Ethiopian scientists, engineers and educators because its economy is mainly trade- and knowledge-based.

The University of KwaZulu-Natal is an internationally accredited university that has attracted a sizeable number of Ethiopian government-sponsored scholars and individual intellectuals. Some come from Western Europe and the United States. Thus, in Durban, I designed an Ethiopian Scientific Diaspora discussion group to capture their typology and experience in light of the development and diaspora mobilisation techniques adopted by the Ethiopian government. The group met twice and spent more than five hours discussing a number of historical and current issues in relation to the migration of Ethiopian intellectuals. Participants shared their personal experiences as diaspora and their interaction with their country of origin, the reasons for their migration, and the possibility of returning. This information was shared during personal interview sessions. Some of the group members were sideliners who did not participate in either the personal interviews or the FGDs as formal members but shared their opinions as observers. They mainly consisted of people in high profile intellectual positions at South African institutions. However, the informal exchange of ideas took place among the groups on random occasions, for example, when we met during coffee or lunch breaks.

The major topic for discussion was around the Ethiopian government's Diaspora Policy of 2016 and its implications for the Ethiopian scientific community who are already based in South Africa as well as those that will join them The Ethiopian Diaspora Policy (2016) discusses the need to attract the knowledge diaspora by creating the necessary mechanisms for facilitation. Most of the participants were familiar with the Ethiopian government's diaspora mobilization efforts. Some of the PhD students observed the phenomenon while they were in Ethiopia. 'Diaspora is a big issue in present day Ethiopia.

There is diaspora day, a diaspora village in Addis, a road named after diaspora, they are projected as saviours of the nation', exclaimed one of the group members in response to my enquiries as to whether they were aware of diaspora and its development nexus. It was established that the government did not develop this policy on its own, but was influenced by international donor agencies.

The TPLF is blamed extensively by educated Ethiopians for its negative attitudes towards the educated. The group recalled a discussion between the late Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, the then leader of the TPLF and the Ethiopian Prominent Scholars, and how the Prime Minister verbally attacked the professors in the televised meetings. From the outset, the TPLF clearly demonstrated that it regarded the educated as 'élites of the society and they belong to the Chauvinist camp'. This was stated during the televised meeting and the first media appearance of June 1991, where the late Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi featured with prominent Ethiopian University Professors (Hadush,1991) (video available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch). In attendance were Professors Mesfin and Eshete who continued to serve as President of Addis Ababa University and Professor Beshah.

After the difference of ideas at the meeting, two professors were purged from the University. Indrias Eshete, who accommodated the rebel leader's thoughts on many issues, was retained. Economics professor, Professor Beshah, died in exile in New York, while Professor Mesfin Woldemariam continued to be a vocal opponent of the government without any impact. From then on, the situation deteriorated. The educated Amhara became targets and thousands fled their country for the USA, Europe and elsewhere.

As time went on, the TPLF government realised that it could not lead a country by producing political cadres alone, whether or not they were from the Tigre tribe. The country needed skilled manpower to develop the economy in times of peace. As the Ecological Model set out in Chapter 2 stipulates, the cause of the 'brain drain' was the deformed application of the SAP by the TPLF. The WB prescribed the SAP in the early 1990s in an attempt to address overstretched unproductive sectors like the civil service and bureaucracy and render the economy more efficient.

The Ethiopian government turned the SAP that aimed to liberalise the command economy and make it more growth-oriented, into an historically unmatched witch hunt against

educated Ethiopians who were believed to represent the old school of 'Chauvinists'. For instance, in the name of cutting public spending and trimming the bureaucracy that was directly advocated by the major international financial institutions, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi dismissed thousands of educated Ethiopians to advance tribal cleansing. Universities and Colleges lost intellectuals of high academic calibre. The government tried to staff the vacancies with new graduates, but the quality of education suffered. A former lecturer at Addis Ababa University, now a prominent professor in South Africa, who experienced the great purges of the 1990s and who confided his story to this researcher stated:

> 'I was called, through the Ethiopian Embassy in Pretoria, to come back to Ethiopia and serve the country. However, I have suffered a lot to live the exile life and adjust to the dislocations I experienced owing to the "scientific purges" that were implemented during the time of the Transitional Government led by Tigrai Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF). I am serving in a country, South Africa, that respects and uses our rare skills, and I am in a conducive environment to make research, without fear of judgment from politicians. If I go back to Ethiopia, I will not get that academic freedom. Besides, I already changed my nationality to that of South African. So, it would be like asking a British national or any European to go and be Ethiopian and work at government offices for less pay. I think that does not attract anybody, except the people who are the government's loyal [followers] that might get other benefits than their mere salary. So, the way we were expelled from Addis Ababa University, has traumatised us, and for me it is difficult to trust this government again; you don't know what they plan for you… For that reason, I am not the one who can go back to Ethiopia to live and work again.'
>
> (Discussion Group, Durban, 2016)

In the early years of TPLF's ascendance to power, the WB intervened under the pretext of restructuring the command economy that was set up during the former military government. The SAP followed. International actors' involvement in the TPLF's policies is clearly evident; and even mobilising diaspora is implemented in consultation with the WB and support. SAPs generally cause much dislocation and loss of jobs as a result of cutting back the bureaucracy, retrenchments and so forth. This affects families and workers.

The new arrival to the Ethiopian throne, the TPLF, did not oppose the prescription of a SAP to restructure the bureaucracy and the economy. Instead, it made a strategic move, firstly, by accepting the advice given in order to impress the international community and secondly, by using the cover of restructuring to purge all Amharas and Oromos from their jobs. The

international community did not oppose these moves as they were regarded as evidence of the TPLF government's loyalty to the WB and the West in general.

Western donor countries did not realise that the Tigres were using the SAP to attack tribes which they considered a threat to their grip on power. In the conversation I had with the scientific diaspora community in Durban, they expressed strong views about what had happened to the nation and, in particular, discussed the use of the SAP to cleanse the whole bureaucracy, universities, research institutions, etc. of intellectuals, scientists and engineers who were termed 'Chauvinists' by virtue of being professionals and were accused by the ruling group of looking down on the Tigre militants who became the heads of influential agencies in every public office.

The first SAP programme was responsible for the mass exodus of Ethiopian intellectuals. While those who were able to travel permissions and visas went north, intellectuals who were less prepared to leave Ethiopia came to South Africa. It was noted during the group discussion that it was easier to obtain a visa to South Africa immediately after the democratisation of the country in the 1990s than it is now. During this time, many Ethiopian medical doctors moved to South Africa and helped out in public hospitals in Durban, Johannesburg, Pretoria and Cape Town. Of those that left their lectureships in Ethiopia at the time of the great scientific purges, I found more than three professors attached to universities in and around Durban. While they were well aware of the international debate on the crisis caused by Ethiopia's loss of its scientific community, and despite the fact that the Ethiopian government is seeking to mobilise the Ethiopian knowledge diaspora, the government's attitude to educated Ethiopians remains an obstacle. This is despite the fact that, at face value, the policy offers many incentives to return home.

Among the international pressure that made this possible, is the strategic policy advice offered by international organisations and global migration regimes. For instance, the Global Commission on International Migration (2006) encouraged countries of origin to 'establish an inventory of the skill base within the diaspora; develop a programme for transfer of skill and knowledge from the Diaspora to Countries of Origin for immigrants' (Seguin ed., 2006, pp. 1603). Various OECD governments have also raised the alarm with respect to the Ethiopian 'brain-drain', especially in the health, education and technology sectors. Some countries even competed for skilled Ethiopian manpower.

Rose (2009) from Sydney University notes that, Ethiopians rank first in the African brain drain, and many skilled people with PhDs emigrate from that country. Discussion on scientific diaspora overlook the underlying reasons why people leave their own country when they have achieved high education status and the typologies of migrants who flee is not touched on. They are pushed to leave their countries by bad governance. For instance, in 1993/4, immediately after the overthrow of the former Ethiopian dictator Mengistu, the new tribal politicians dismissed 50 highly educated university professors from Addis Ababa University in a bizarre show of hatred towards educated Ethiopians. One of the government's policy initiatives is knowledge and technology transfer (Diaspora Policy, 2016). It seeks to beef up the civil service, higher education, and research institutions as well as the health and medical sectors. The government not only seeks to attract diaspora to come home or help their country while they are outside it, it also sends people for training in other countries. Most of those who participated in the study in Durban were sponsored by the government to study at UKZN. Some also come from other parts of the world, but were of Ethiopian origin. With their high academic credentials, they serve the scientific community and research centres in South Africa, in general, and in Durban, in particular. These immigrants demonstrate the characteristics manifested in Faist's (2012) discussion on the 'transnational features of diaspora´.

The characteristic of 'transnationalism' is more evident in the Ethiopian scientific diaspora but is not unique to them. For instance, in Rustenburg, I met people who went to Canada through the United Nations Resettlement Program, which transfers victim diaspora to a safe third country where they can be protected and become integrated. Some of them that were familiar with South Africa returned to Rustenburg after obtaining Canadian citizenship. I encountered these people through the individual interviews with owners of retail businesses who are part of the business diaspora of Ethiopian origin that was discussed previously. Some of those in the Ethiopian knowledge diaspora also acquired multiple citizenship. This fits with Faist's global and transnational dimensions of diaspora.

The Tigre considered any intellectuals as 'chauvinists' and took this to mean that these people belonged to the Amhara tribes. Hence, while these professors did not lose out individually, as most went to Europe and became members of staff in the scientific communities, taught in universities and worked at NASA, and other knowledge-based

organisations, it cannot be denied that the Ethiopian scientific diaspora lost out collectively, by not serving their country to which they feel they owe a lot. Based on these and other suggestions, the Ethiopian government tried to woo the scientific diaspora who it considers loyal, or indifferent to its style of government, and who can quietly help the country, by encouraging them to participate in home development. The group that I constructed for the discussion was mainly concerned about good governance issues back home. Hence, upon completion of their studies, they are not prepared to go back. Some are even listed as 'wanted' persons because of their political opinions. In the discussion group, we raised the question: 'Do you see yourself as diaspora?" In response, one of the participants said:

> 'In my opinion, diaspora are those people who stayed outside of the country for a long time, whether they moved voluntarily or forcefully, and who remit money back home and who become successful in their life here in South Africa.'

The participant added that,

> 'These are the kind of people whom the Ethiopian government wants to come back home and invest, and they are considered high class when they go home. I think, we are just students not diaspora.'

Another participant contended,

> 'Even if we don't remit money or we did not stay long outside of our country we are responsible for knowledge exchange. We bring our experience in Science and Technology; as we learn we also contribute to a scientific knowledge base. So, I think we belong to the knowledge diaspora.' (Ethiopian Scientific Diaspora, FGD Member, Durban, 2016)

In terms of the projects they are engaged in, most indicated that they are involved in very useful scientific projects in South African universities and are supported by the National Research Foundation of South Africa. They also acknowledged the industrial or material benefits of the results of their research. Five of the seven participants are engaged in engineering projects that can have future innovative and marketable value to South African industry. Some are engaged in innovative approaches and problem-solving projects in

Wireless communication; wind farm technologies and materials design in aeronautical and mechanical usage.

Amazan (2008) discusses the need to mobilise the Ethiopian knowledge diaspora, focusing on the brain-drain. However, this phenomenon has been examined in terms of South-North movement and the South-South brain drain has not been properly scrutinised. However, South Africa is a logical destination for many Ethiopian scientists.

The tendency to characterize the Ethiopian diaspora as a monolithic group obscures the contributions made by such a segment of society. However, their experiences as immigrants, especially social xenophobia can discourage them. They might be tempted to leave South Africa for another country like Australia, Canada or the United States of America (USA). Amazan argued that, 'To tackle brain-drain the pathways have to be examined to mobilise the Ethiopian knowledge diaspora to offset the potential impact of the brain-drain'. Amazan's paper discusses the loss of social capital from the state of origin's perspective; however, there is little discussion on how the Ethiopian scientific diaspora benefits the Australian education system and the research sector. It criticises counter-measures like restricting financial flows, and control of immigration and repatriation as counterproductive tactics. A positive approach is instead required that offers incentives to those that are able to assist their state of origin. The initial concern in relation to brain drain was the flow of skilled labour to the US (Gaillard, 1997)

The late 1990s development discourse was dominated by the South-North flow of skilled manpower. However, in the case of Ethiopian scientific diaspora, they are migrating horizontally, from Ethiopia to South Africa, another African country. It is thus important that the theory of brain-drain address the issues surrounding the South-South flow of skilled manpower. Sethi (2000) estimated that, from 1980 to 1991, a mere 5,777 of 22,700 students who studied abroad (39 per cent) did not return to Ethiopia. Tefera (1997) notes that, at Addis Ababa University, 20 faculty members from the Physics department travelled abroad for training and never returned. A Ministry of Health (2002) report indicates that between 1988 and 2001, Ethiopia trained 2,491 public health specialists; however, a third left Ethiopia, leaving only 1,366 physicians. Political persecution is cited as the main reason. The Ethiopian government has attempted to mitigate the loss of academics by requiring

university instructors and others who leave for further education to sign a contract stipulating that they will return to work in Ethiopia for 12 or 15 years or pay 150,000 Ethiopian Currency Birr, close to 17 Thousand USD (Amzan, 2008, p. 20).

2.6.1.2. Ethiopian Prototypical Diaspora

Historically, religion and ethnicity were the reasons for the persecution and exodus of the Jews (Safran, 1991). In contemporary Ethiopia, Amharas have become the victims of systematic genocide in the same way that Jews were persecuted, by what most participants in the study described as 'Tigrai-fascism', which they consider to be like Tigrai-Babylon in Ethiopia, referring to the TPLF government that has been in power since 1991. The three typologies identified by Safran to define prototypical diaspora were: 'involuntarily expulsions as consequences of genocide from home, tribal identities distinct from local in the space of exiles and the longing to go home'. According to claims made by victims of these atrocities, in the 21st century, Ethiopians are experiencing the same kind of expulsions as a result of systemic and hidden genocide perpetrated against them by the agents of the new Babylon of 'neo-colonialism, racism, land and another resource grab in Ethiopia' (Achamyeleh, 2016, pp. 2-31; Yeshaw, 2014). In the Ethiopian diaspora media, there are countless stories of tribal persecution, murders and deprivation of ancestral lands. The tribal politics in Ethiopia created a winner and loser situation, where the supposed losers' tribes are made to suffer the consequences of defeat by being silently exterminated through various means (according to accounts in the group discussion and the literature that provides evidence of these realities in Ethiopia). Prominent individuals and intellectuals have written extensively on the genocide of Amharas (Tekle, 2016; Gebremdihin, 2016); that committed against the Anuwak tribe (Metho, 2005); and the expulsion of indigenous tribes in Omo valley and the Oromia tribal state (Global, 2015), to name but a few. This thesis takes seriously the stories of participants who reported that the Ethiopian government deliberately disseminated the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) in the localities of tribes considered too large in number (Prototypical diaspora discussion group, Durban, 2016). Logically, Oromos and Amharas would be direct victims of such an inhuman plan. The participants expressed fear that when the current Foreign Minister of Ethiopia, Dr Adhanom, was the Minister of Health, he 'might have devised the plan of spreading HIV among these communities to offset the demography'. Parliament confirmed the loss of 2.4 million Amhara (Population Census, 2007). This issue arose when we were considering the causes of migration. A lack of health

services can also cause people to migrate. Health facilities as a motivation for emigration are not covered in mainstream theories of migration.

While the prototypical diaspora is found in both Rustenburg and Durban, a discussion group was set up in Durban and two meetings that each ran for two hours were held. Most of these participants were unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of the Ethiopian government. They noted that tribal politics implemented by the TPLF government was the prime problem that drove them out of their country.

Some also emphasised the tensions that exist between the Amharas and Oromos. The reasons for persecuting each tribe vary. The tribe could be located in territory desired by TPLF, for example, productive agricultural land or land that is of strategic importance for the security of the Tigrai Republic. Persecution could also result from fear of a certain tribe's social capital and competition for power. The northern Gonder, northern Wollo, South Shewa, and southern and western Gojjam provinces were the target of TPLF genocide missions that caused a huge number of Amharic-speaking Ethiopians to flee the country.

The expulsion of the Oromos is mainly associated with the suspicion that a person may be a member of the OLF. Most people who oppose the government are labelled as OLF and are subjected to imprisonment, torture and even death.

Members of the prototypical diaspora face many challenges and these may become severe when their reasons for leaving their country are misunderstood by their host space owing to impressions created by the media that all Ethiopian immigrants come to South Africa because of economic reasons. While it is true that there are diaspora who engage in economic activities, not all are illegals and some do not come for economic reasons alone. This label reduces the acceptability of migrants in the host country and they are subjected to maltreatment including denying their status based on the provisions of the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees (1951). These measures further complicate their situation and even exclude them from the economic activities that are their means of livelihood.

Members of the group noted that most of them did not get the recognition that would enable them to become officially naturalised in the host space, even though they cannot return home unless the current government is removed from power. They also blame the Ethiopian government for deliberately stating that Ethiopians come to South Africa as job-seekers and

for a better life, in an effort to conceal the real internal problems that drive citizens from the country. The government's position is thus clearly a Police Model. Ethiopian diaspora policies drawn up at different times cite seeking a better life as a cause of migration from Ethiopia (Policy, 2005).

The Ethiopian government's articulation makes it difficult for immigrants to be recognized as asylum seekers. South African Home Affairs officials might argue that Ethiopia has a constitution and is a democracy; thus one cannot be a refugee. Most of the authorities are not willing to accept the narratives of asylum-seekers. However, as already noted, a huge number of genuine refugees come to South Africa due to persecution and genocide in Ethiopia by the TPLF government. When they confront xenophobic violence in South Africa, they experience two-fold persecution. When xenophobic violence broke out in Durban, immigrants that came from Ethiopia through the Ethiopian government received proper protection. The participants explained that the officials from the Ethiopian embassy visited Durban to request 'the Traditional Leader of the Zulu Tribe, to reconsider his comments on migration issues' and the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry in Addis Ababa cited this as a measure taken by the Ethiopian government to guarantee the safety of its citizens abroad. The discussion suggested that members of the Tigre tribe, who do not have a persecution problem, were protected by the government officials that came from Pretoria during the crisis. However, no individual from the prototypical diaspora received protection or help, as they are blacklisted for opposing the current government in Addis Ababa.

To protect their culture, these immigrants gather in Ethiopian Orthodox Churches and civic associations to pray for understanding with the locals and psychological comfort. They want to go home, but for many, the security environment does not allow this. They have many stories to tell about their individual problems and escaping torture and assassination. The longing for home is always part of their memories and they keep national symbols to comfort them. As noted earlier, the main customers of the nostalgic trade sector in Durban and Rustenburg are the prototypical diaspora.

Cohen (1997) stated that the 'emic' view of immigrants is problematic, and suggested that they should not be allowed to categorise themselves as diaspora. Everyone cannot and should not be considered diaspora despite their claims to this effect. The findings of this study suggest that immigrants of Ethiopian origin do not claim to be prototypical diaspora;

however, by listening to their stories and the evidence of genocide and violence expulsion they faced when they were uprooted from Ethiopia, they fulfil the criterion stipulated by some proponents of the classical theory of diaspora which underlined involuntary exodus. Therefore, I applied this concept to the Ethiopian prototypical diaspora. These are Amharas, Anuaks, Mursi, Afars and other tribes who are being persecuted by the Tigre-based government of Ethiopia whose characteristics match those identified by Safran and other authors as typologies of diaspora.

2.6.1.3. Conflict Diaspora

One of the authorities on the issue of conflict diaspora is Lyon (2009) who notes that, when migrants leave their countries due to conflict, they become an instrument to continue conflict at home by supporting the opposition forces' struggle for power. It emerged during this group discussion that members of OLF and other tribal-based political organisations, like the Ogaden National Liberation Movement, the Afar Liberation Movement, the Oromo First Organisation, and the Kerro-Militants and Ginbot 7 are among the active politically motivated armed groups that engage the current Ethiopian government in an organised manner. Immigrants who are affiliated to these groups explained that they contributed money and some are active in raising funds to be sent for use in political conflicts back home.

> 'The Tigre-tribe based government "Woyane" is the most dangerous agent of Italian colonizers, that is why you see all the dam construction projects are given to Salini, the Italian company without competitive bidding; you can see the issue of "Renaissance Dam" construction, even recently Salini company has signed a deal for more than 2.5 billion USD (Aigaforum, May 24 2016), they have divided the country along tribal bantu regions without the will of the people, they committed genocide against major tribes, they sold our land to Sudan, China, Pakistan, India, Turk, Saudi Arabia, etc. They talk about election and democracy but when they lose they don't want to leave power, instead they resort to killing and mass murdering, that is what happened in 2005. Therefore, we have decided to overthrow the government necessary.'
>
> (Information obtained from the Ginbot 7 organiser in Durban, who was willing to participate in the study)

According to these respondents, sending money to support people who are persecuted like them by the TPLF government is their moral responsibility as a community and the only chance they have of going home as victors. Although their contributions are not, in itself, a conflict-generating cause, when there is crisis that affects the livelihoods of those involved, the diaspora are normally called on to help. Several political figures have visited both Durban and Rustenburg to raise funds to support the struggle back home. The biggest event

was in Durban when a well-known Islamic Oromo individual visited to raise funds for the Oromo Uprising in Ethiopia that continued for more than six months. Oromos who lived in Durban were mobilised to attend his meeting at which there were musicians and stand-up comedians. The study participants that attended this event estimated that R1.5 million was raised.

2.6.1.4. Ethiopian Commerce/business/ Diaspora: Observation

The dominant characteristic of Ethiopian immigrants in South Africa and the two cities selected for this study is their tradesman-ship. All three diaspora features and others explained in different categories function as small business people. Even professionals at the scientific diaspora level are mainly engaged in money-making activities. The motivation is the lack of taxes on small businesses in South Africa, as well as the lack of comprehensive licensing and formalisation mechanisms for businesses. The other factor is the non-existence of a welfare system for foreign-born people in the country, which forces them to survive by opening their own businesses. Many individuals interviewed for this study are directly or indirectly involved in money-making activities. Some are employed full-time in such activities, but some do it on a part-time basis. Most run informal businesses without proper accounting systems. Very few are also involved in illegal white-collar activities. Some of these activities mentioned in the discussion group related to illegal support for their families to cross South Africa's borders or to bribe the authorities to obtain permits and residence. Based on these activities, generating an income is also considered in generalising the features of the migrant group under discussion.

There are, however, immigrants that have properly licensed businesses and are active in facilitating the circulation of commodities in South Africa. The Haidyas, Kambata, Wolaita, Gurages, Oromos and others demonstrate good entrepreneurship in South Africa. While Amharic-speaking Ethiopians tend to be more involved in the prototypical diaspora, they also run, as did the Jewish people in exile, successful companies and businesses in the host country. The rate of returning to Ethiopia is high among the rest of the tribal typologies of Ethiopian diaspora, whereas the Amharic-speaking diaspora seem to be stuck in South Africa because of their security situation in Ethiopia.

The Ethiopian government has an ethnographic approach to dealing with Ethiopian immigrants in South Africa which focuses on Kembatas, Hadiyas and other tribal groups

that it considers malleable for its diaspora mobilisation agenda. Despite Amharas and Oromos dominating the tribal groupings, the majority do not rally behind the Tigrai-led government's plan to engage its diaspora. This is because of the way they were expelled from their country and the break-down of trust between these tribes and the government. This is further observed in the appointment of the Ethiopian Ambassador to South Africa who is from the Kambata tribe to woo the tribes that dominate low-level businesses and who are prone to follow the advice of the Ethiopian government in its quest to mobilise remittances and development support. Some are business diaspora, but are not involved in government-sponsored development activities back home.

The main goals of the Ethiopian diaspora policy are preserving the rights and benefits of the diaspora and improving their involvement in economic activities, especially in their country of origin. However, in the eyes of most of the study participants, the government is only interested in their remittances.

2.6.2. The Diaspora Mobilisation Technique of the State of Origin: poignantly evoking homesickness

While the current Ethiopian government has been very active in mobilising diaspora for the development of the home state, the history of mobilising diaspora resources dates back to the creation of the TPLF. Three sources can be traced as foundations for the TPLF's monetary, military and political strength beginning from its inception as a guerilla force. These were: 1) direct financial support for its guerilla activities by Tigres who live in the diaspora; 2) humanitarian aid from the international community, for instance the United States Agency for International Development ((USAID); the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA); the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA); the Australian Agency for International Development(AUSAID,) and so forth during the 1984 famine; this became a form of social protection for the TPLF and has continued to this day, even after the TPLF took power in Addis Ababa; 3) development aid to the state from the IMF or WB in the name of the whole population of Ethiopia, which started in 1991 and has continued to this day.

The Tigre tribal guerilla group used military tactics to come to power in Ethiopia, which is unique in the contemporary history of power transition in the country. The TPLF relied on domestic and international remittances to finance its violence-based activities between 1974 and 1991. Tigres were promised that, if they financed the struggle, when the TPLF came to power, they would be rewarded. Its cadres and cultural groups evoked tribal patriotism through songs and dances performed around the world for Tigrai audiences, provoking them with gruesome pictures from the battlefield and romanticising the resistance with a view to making the diaspora pay more on the spot. Tigrai cultural music groups performed in European cities and raised huge amounts for the armed struggle (Barena People's Tigrai, 2016). They now draw on these experiences to raise funds for different development programmes or national plans. One of the participants in the prototypical diaspora discussion group wondered why 'the TPLF government was not only addicted to foreign aid but to the diaspora resources, as well. They create different stories to take our money'.

The year 1984 was unique in the TPLF's mobilisation of diaspora resources to finance its military operations against Colonel Monist's regime which was much distrusted by the West for its friendship with the Eastern bloc during the Cold War. Ethiopia suffered severe famine from 1984 to 1985. The TPLF distributed the majority of the food donations it received to people in areas that it controlled, mainly the Tigrai and northern Wollo provinces, and converted some to cash and buy ammunition and weapons for the escalation of its military invasion in the South.

The TPLF has experience of mobilising people in exile since the early 1970s when the majority of the revolutionary youth who overthrew the Emperor went into exile and became refugees in neighboring Sudan, Kenya, Somalia and elsewhere in the Arab world. At that time, mobilisation was for the purpose of raising funds to finance the rebel struggle. Many members of the Tigre tribe in different parts of the world helped overthrow the military government of Ethiopia that ruled the country between 1974 and 1991, by providing financial, material and other forms of aid in the name of famine relief. International donor agencies also contributed to the guerilla movement in a bid to unseat the presumably communist government of Colonel Mengistu Hailmariam.

However, the TPLF was not an ideologically different force to that of Mengistu. Indeed, some say they were worse as their policy combines 'Maoism' and 'Albanian Communism' as its

world view. The Tigrai Development Association started (TDA) life as the Tigrai Relief Association (Relief Society of Tigray, REST), not long after the 1984/5 famine. The TPLF received the majority of its funding from the food aid that was meant to be distributed to the famine affected northern regions of the country.

The Ethiopian government's diaspora mobilisation strategy is tightly fused with TDA activities abroad. This supposed NGO is considered as a clearing-house for war bounty won in the process of TPLF militia advances into the hinterland of Ethiopia. Confiscated public properties were transferred to REST and the TDA. This time, the government did not dissolve the organ that controlled the economy; instead, it transformed it into one of the richest African organisations engaged in profit-making and controlling resources. This experience informed the Ethiopian government in its efforts to mobilise diaspora resources for development. The current Tigre-led government has extensive knowledge of how to raise funds for a certain goal.

The Ethiopian government is the first among the African countries to understand and to utilise the benefits of mobilising its diaspora. Few African countries have focused on engaging their diaspora. For instance, Nigeria, has been engaging its diaspora by formulating policies and organizing Diaspora Day (The Voice News Magazine of Nigeria, 24, July 2016). Ethiopia has adopted much more aggressive techniques, especially since the decline in foreign aid and FDI. It thus looks to its own nationals who reside in foreign counties. The challenge has come from those that escaped persecution and have been very vocal in exposing the government's intent and obstructing its aggressive campaigns. The state thus has to compete with the opposition and its sympathisers in collecting funds outside of the country, and must negotiate with immigrants with more moderate views to participate in development activities in the country. For this purpose, the government has devised a very elaborate strategy for diaspora mobilisation.

The main technique to mobilise the diaspora is a national policy with an accompanying structure. According to the latest diaspora policy of the Tigre-led government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is entrusted with coordinates and deciding on diaspora matters. While no explanation is provided on why this agency was chosen, it is logical given that diasporas live outside of their county and represent interstate relations. Some are naturalised citizens of other countries; hence any involvement entails international relations between countries. Furthermore, diaspora mobilisation usually involves following-up possible threats from

Ethiopian diasporas to the government. Opposition activities are monitored by foreign intelligence, most of whom are stationed in Ethiopian missions.

The structure for diaspora mobilisation includes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the top, the National Diaspora Council, which is made up of representatives of various federal and regional officials and stakeholders that might be overt or covert bodies. The Advisory Council is made up of diaspora representatives and there are diaspora offices in all regional states with a forum to coordinate their activities. Finally, there is a body to monitor and evaluate overall implementation of the policy. Figure 11 below shows this structure.

Figure 11: Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilisation by the TPLF-Led Government of Ethiopia



Among the notable techniques the government uses to tap into the financial resources of the diaspora are:1) the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam; 2) the Millennium Bond; and 3) Land-selling and the phased Housing Cooperatives that are organised by the Ethiopian Embassy in Pretoria (housing in which diaspora is mobilised to build houses back home); and 4) Poignantly evoking homesickness among diaspora to travel home as Ethiopian-origin tourists and creating various events of socialisation to generate finance from diaspora communities aboard. The following section examines the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

2.6.2.1. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam

In the wake of the Arab Spring, the Ethiopian government drafted its national Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) under the stewardship of the late Prime Minister Mr Meles Zenawi. It aims to ensure that Ethiopia achieves middle-income country status by 2020. To ensure the plan's success, the people were called upon to rally behind the vanguard TPLF and its surrogate tribal parties. Most critical thinkers argue that the whole purpose of the plan and talk of middle-income status is simply an empty promise to avert political unrest in the country, which could arise owing to mounting resistance against genocide and tribal persecution. Hence the Grand Renaissance Dam was regarded by many as another 'white elephant project of the Tigre-led government in Ethiopia' (Alemayhu, 2016).

According to the Growth and Transformation Plan, resources will be attracted by transforming the country's energy sector. The cornerstone of the plan is agricultural-led industrialisation that will increase energy needs. Thus, different dams are planned to provide hydroelectric power. Ethiopia is blessed with abundant fresh water and the country is considered as the water tower of Africa because it has several under-utilized high-speed rivers. In the face of international opposition, the Ethiopian government has built a couple of dams for hydroelectric purposes, including Tekeze Dam on the Tekeze River that flows between the Tigrai and Amhara regions, with a capacity of 300MW; Gilgal Gibe I and II and an energy-generating capacity of 210MW and 420 MW (EEPC, 2016) as well as other new projects.

The government plans to generate income by selling electricity to countries such as Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya and South Africa, by building the biggest dam ever built on African soil.

According to information released by the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPC), the new grand dam is located in the former Gojjam province, now called Benshangul-Gumuz region, at a place called Guba, which is about 750 km west of Addis Ababa. The physical structure of the dam illustrates its size, with a length of 1780m and 145m in height. It has two main powerhouses which embrace 16 francize turbines with a synchronous generating capacity of 375 MW left and right. When complete, the dam is expected to generate 6,000MW. It is bigger than the High Aswan Dam in Egypt. The dam will affect the forests in the 1,680-square kilometer flood plain area. International Waters estimates that, it will be four times the size of Cairo at full reservoir capacity. It is expected to displace around 20,000 people who live around this forested area. The 70 billion cubic metres of water that the reservoir will hold is the equivalent of the overall annual flow of water in the Blue Nile bank. It will take five to seven years to fill the reservoir which will reduce the flow of the water up to a quarter of the present flow. Thus, irrigation farming will be affected in Egypt for those who depend on the River Nile, and there will be a 6 per cent reduction in the production of electricity at the Aswan High Dam (International Waters, 2016, p.4).

The resources to build the dam were expected to be provided by domestic sources. However, according to a diaspora-based water engineer, Asfaw Beyene, of California State University, statements about the dam and its capacity of the dam to generate electricity to the tune of 6000 MW are exaggerated. He noted that, 'It is only targeting the rainy months of June, July, and August in the Ethiopian wet season', whereas in dry seasons the capacity will not be more than 2000MW. Punting this dam as supplying the largest amount of energy in the world fits with the culture of political reporting in Tigre-led government structures. Another diaspora Ethiopian that wrote an article on *'The politics of Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam'* (Ejeta, 2016) said:

> 'While the plan to build any sound and useful infrastructure anywhere in the world, let alone a large dam in Ethiopia that will produce a meaningful amount of power for the country and the region, should be supported, its politicization is unfortunate' (Ejeta, 2016, p.2).

The development issues associated with the Growth and Transformation Plan, especially the inclination towards crony capitalism or a matrimonial capitalist state in which the

resources of the country are owned by those in the family trees of the veteran leaders of the TPLF, together with their development ventures in teaming up with China, have made people indifferent to what the government says and does. This is also complicated by democratisation and the quest of other Ethiopian people for unity, which has been affected by the openly tribal policies of the state. The 2005 TPLF government permitted different political parties to run for election without much constraint and to hold public rallies until the day of the election. The TPLF learned that it had suffered an overwhelming defeat before the election results were released to the public. The then Prime Minister, Mr Meles Zenawi, declared a state of emergency and protesters were massacred. Several people died. Thus, the TPLF refused to transfer power to those elected by the people. The genocide and witch-hunt that followed against those that rejected its rule enflamed the cleavages. Hence, the macroeconomic policy, coupled with the lack of good governance, which the government admits, as demonstrated by the level of talk in the state structures, demonstrates that the Growth and Transformation Plan is just another myth created to hypnotise society to sustain its tyrannical rule for years to come. As a result, the '2G' white elephant projects, the Grand Renaissance Dam and the Growth and Transformation Plan, should not be supported by innocent diaspora. Several Ethiopian diaspora intellectuals have been outspoken on this issue.

The concept of the dam is challenged by the lower stream countries, especially Egypt in light of the *International Waters: Peoples, Water, and Life* report. It raises the possibility that, by building a dam on the River Nile, Ethiopia will have full control of the Blue Nile waters which puts Egypt at the mercy of Ethiopia's willingness to regulate the volume of the water that flows downstream. This will affect power relations between Arab Egypt and the Black African country of Ethiopia. Egypt and its allies are not prepared to relinquish their favorable position in the *status quo*.

In the eyes of Ethiopian opposition politicians and scholars and those of Egypt, but for different reasons, the Millennium Dam is poorly planned. There were no pre-consultations between stakeholders and Ethiopia's declaration of the start of the construction of the dam was a surprise move that took Egyptian policy-makers and donor countries by surprise. Egypt argues the project planning was veiled in secrecy. Ethiopia proposed the creation of a ten-person panel of experts after it had started to mobilise resources from its people for the dam. All civil, military and other personnel are obliged to give one to two months of their

salaries towards the construction of the dam. The data supplied to the committee has serious deficiencies and important information is missing that could alter the whole picture. Egypt thus called for a neutral panel of experts and the negotiations were cancelled. Any unilateral action on the river is considered to violate colonial treaties between Britain, Egypt and Sudan that excluded Ethiopia, and allocated a 100 per cent share between them.

Egypt threatened to go to the UN Security Council which would take the issue to crisis level and might make it difficult for the major powers to take positions on this issue, since both Egypt and Ethiopia are strong allies of the West in the fight against Isis and another terrorist organisations. Once it goes to the UN, the issue will be divisive and Ethiopia's hope of emerging from poverty and the success of the Growth and Transformation Plan will be at stake. It thus prefers that the matter be resolved around the negotiation table between riparian countries, especially between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan. To counter diplomatic pressure from Egypt, Ethiopia organised the Upper Riparian Countries Commission which embraced most of the Black African countries. At the time of writing, the government of Ethiopia stated that construction of the dam was more than half complete (Semahegn, 2015).

However, the financing of the project is facing many problems. According to a report by Liam Stack in the *New York Times* (June 6, 2013), Egypt has also started to sabotage the realisation of this dream, by 'supporting Ethiopian dissident groups'. The OLF in particular is receiving support from politicians in Egypt; According to the mainstream thinking, Egyptian might take military action on the construction site or support the opposition who could overthrow the TPLF, or support the secessionist OLF who live in and outside Ethiopia as diasporas. The emergence of strong Muslim Oromo opposition groups and outspoken personalities relates to the conflict diaspora typologies discussed in the literature and the characteristics of the Ethiopian diaspora and the way they conduct themselves outside of the country.

Under the leadership of Her Excellency, Dlamini-Zuma, the AU seemed to support Ethiopia in its statement that, 'the colonial treaties should not govern the Nile case, which excluded Ethiopia from the ownership'. As Ethiopia is not a signatory to any treaty on the waters of the Nile, while being the source of 85 per cent of the waters of the Blue Nile, it has legitimate grounds to use its natural resources for the development of its people. Furthermore, it

envisages that the electricity that will be generated will be sold. The Ethiopian government launched two forms of fund-raising; on the local front, all civil servants were expected to pay a month's salary as a must, but could also voluntarily give two months' salary to the project. Business people were directly and indirectly influenced to buy bonds or to give donations. The Ethiopian diaspora abroad was also a target for mobilisation. For the Tigre-led government, paying for the Millennium Dam became a prime measure of loyalty and all embassies were commanded to work hard to raise funds for this grand project. Some of the migrants interviewed have made donations and bought diaspora bonds.

The Ethiopian diaspora in Rustenburg were more active in buying bonds, while some also did so in Durban. The case study shows that most of the business diaspora who use Ethiopian passports to travel home were indirectly forced to buy bonds or contribute to the construction of the dam. The majority stated that they were asked to show their bond certificates or donation receipt before they entered their country. It was noted during the prototypical diaspora discussion group that it was a public secret that the Ethiopian government used this tactic at all entry points to Ethiopia (at borders and Bole International Airport).

The overt methods of mobilisation cited in the diaspora policy are a day for celebration known as Diaspora Day which calls all members of the diaspora to come and celebrate at home. This is designed to ensure that, apart from their remittances, the diaspora send home spend foreign currency when they visit for to attend this well-designed celebration programme. The Ethiopian government has hosted a number of annual celebrations for the diaspora, and it is reported that they have amassed significant hard currency from the diaspora to balance the national current accounts. Various festivals are also organized in foreign countries where the diaspora live. This is usually done by mobilising the diaspora, or the Ethiopian community associations created with the support of Ethiopian embassies to organise the festivities and collect money from the events. The associations transfer this money to the national account. The Diaspora Policy notes that, the government rewards members of the diaspora that mobilise significant resources in the respective countries where they live, thus creating competition among them. The other well-researched and well-orchestrated campaign is to motivate the diaspora to build houses in the cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. This has resulted in increased real estate development in Addis Ababa.

A tacit tactic is to mobilise the diaspora by evoking homesickness through songs, drama, and films. The diaspora policy requires Ethiopian embassies around the world to promote communication through media such as radio, TV, online videos, YouTube channels, and websites to mobilise the diaspora to go return home and invest in the country, or spend their holidays back home. The system seems to have worked. After long denying the role and magnitude of remittances,, the Ethiopian government has now officially announced that the diaspora is generating national income of up to 3 billion USD per annum (Diaspora Policy of Ethiopia, 2015)

The sovereign bond is sold to the diaspora as well as European buyers. There are several incentives for buyers. The Ethiopian Embassy in Pretoria organised a series of public meetings among Ethiopian immigrants in Rustenburg and Durban. In Durban, officials met with resistance from Ethiopians who were displaced by the TPLF (*Durame News*, Oct.11, 2014). However, government sympathisers among the diaspora helped them organise meetings where they collected funds from immigrants in Durban through various activities. The study participants confirmed that they were briefed by Embassy authorities about the Millennium Bond that generates funds for the construction of the hydroelectric dam on the Blue Nile River. If they bought bonds, they were considered loyal to their country and the Tigrai-led government, although they might not be from the Tigre tribe. The government body which sells the bonds is the public Ethiopian Electric Light and Power Corporation. The interest rate on the bond is 5 per cent, and civil servants, peasants, investors and Ethiopians abroad are ordered to buy bonds and as many as possible. The bond is made available from 500 Ethiopian birr. The bond has raised significant funds around the world, and each Embassy organises regular events for bond buying, and for donations, as well as other activities that target the diaspora's remittances. A study participant that was a member of the committee that helped the Ethiopian government to raise funds from the diaspora confided that, the Ethiopian government raised around R20 million in South Africa, including Durban and Rustenburg. The participant added that the fundraising network is organised and supervised by the embassy.

2.6.2.2. Land Sales and Housing Programmes for Diaspora

The sale of urban land to the diaspora community is another major strategy to generate foreign currency. On the one hand, the government is able to obtain crude cash, and on the

other, it reaps economic benefits from the flow of capital into the country when there are numerous land-related transactions. In other countries, there is less concerted and state-orchestrated urban settlement and real estate development projects from outside. These domains are left to private real estate companies. However, the Ethiopian embassy organises different housing cooperatives and is directly involved in facilitating their activities back home. The real estate boom in Addis Ababa is the result of the consistent implementation of housing programmes throughout the world. The government has also set up its own real estate companies as private companies with favorable access to land. The Ethiopian diasporas in Durban and Rustenburg have been actively involved in housing programmes. However, some members of the prototypical diaspora are excluded from the government sponsored housing programme as they are not able to return home.

2.6.2.3. Evoking homesickness

The Ethiopian diaspora are known for their national feelings, traditions and love of their country. The migratory way of life magnifies homesickness, and most dream of going home to a better situation. The government uses this to generate income. The main tactic is demanding that artists sing a certain number of lyrics that motivate diaspora to come home, or which reinforce their homesickness. Songs were found to be the main method of persuading the Jewish diaspora to return home (Bohlman, 2011). Bohlman (2011) traced the connection between music and mobility and examined the 'aesthetic agency' and the multiple roles of music in articulating identity, mobilising for war and so forth. The Ethiopian government understands the power of this medium and uses art and music to evoke homesickness among the diaspora with the goal of them returning home with skills, finance and so forth.

The other method used is projecting the country as missing its children, and showing holiday festivals and other events that remind the migrants of missed life in Ethiopia. However, this conceals realities on the ground, and many that return are disillusioned. Nevertheless, the government's objective is achieved if the migrant physically arrives home. The study participants noted that the TPLF government encourages people to make a trip home, but in fact it does not want people to remain in Ethiopia because permanent return will affect the remittances that flow from immigrants. The aim of evoking of homesickness is to split

their sense of belonging between home and away from home, not necessarily to induce them to return permanently.

Section 6.1.1.2 of the Ethiopian government's Diaspora Policy states that, 'Information delivery mechanisms to the Diaspora both in hard and electronic media' (Radio, TV, websites, and so forth) will be established and Section 6.1.1.4 states that, 'Community Television and Radio stations would be proliferated in as many countries with many Ethiopian communities as possible; continuous programmes would be produced and transmitted to them to enhance their understanding of their home' (Ethiopian Diaspora Policy, p.18). Section 6.1.2.1 on Celebrating Diaspora Day notes that:

> 'The national diaspora day would be celebrated at home; and there would be forums as significant numbers of diaspora come home to celebrate culture and religious holidays. Establishing data bank on the list of diaspora associations and forming new ones under the guidance of the government.' (Diaspora Policy, 2015)

2.6.3. The Ecology of Diaspora Mobilisation in Ethiopia

Members of the Ethiopian diaspora are encouraged to commit financial resources to remittances; facilitate trade between Ethiopia and their host country; foster technology and knowledge transfer embodied in nationals abroad; enhance their participation in image-building for the country; promote good governance and democracy; and encourage philanthropy and development association; and participle in issues concerning image-building. It is noted that the policy cites image-building twice. Mobilising the diaspora for 'image-building and issues of image-building' implies that, on the one hand, government-affiliated diaspora need to disseminate exaggerated information of the economic, social and political atmosphere in Ethiopia, while on the other hand, sympathisers of the Tigre-led government are expected to follow those people whom the government accuses of tarnishing its image.

The second aspect of image-building which is stated as 'issues concerning image-building', relates to countering the opposition's efforts to publicise human rights abuses and on-going systematic genocide of the Amhara and other tribal groups inside or outside the country, or to protest against its human rights record and the concentration of wealth among party cronies. Ethiopia walks on the edge of famine and hunger every ten years but the

government disseminates false statistics that reflect economic growth, contradicting the day-to-day life of the great majority of Ethiopians. Despite this so-called economic development, the same media ask for foreign aid to avert the famine that is causing deaths in so many parts of the country. For the government, proactive image-building and counteractive image-building is necessary to prevent negative public perceptions of its performance.

The government uses five methods to mobilise the Ethiopian diaspora for home development, namely, 1) an information collection and delivery system; 2) fomenting competition among the diaspora so that they invest more; 3) organising the diaspora to participate in development back home; 4) creating an identification procedure by issuing 'yellow cards' or the 'Ethiopian origin card' and 5) assisting members of the diaspora (Diaspora Policy, 2016).

The Ethiopian Diaspora Policy does not deal with how its strategies and activities are synergised with international bodies. Since the TPLF government always wants to give the impression that it has creative social, economic and political policies and strategies in place, exposing its activities to international bodies might diminish its authority and it does not want to appear weak. For instance, the WB, the IOM and other UN agencies are pioneers of the notion that the diaspora can be officially mobilised for national development and they have an elaborate system to support governments on this front. However, the Diaspora Policy does not state how it works with global actors.

Nonetheless, a great deal of funding is received from the above-mentioned international bodies to facilitate technology transfer and for the movement of people with knowledge and skills that are essential for the development of their country of origin. For instance, individuals with high skills levels are paid by the UNDP to return home and serve in higher education institutions and the civil service and as consultants and so forth (MIDeth, 2007). Advertisements on government-sponsored websites like www. Aigaforum.com, call on such individuals to send their résumés so as to be recruited and sent home. On the other hand, the IOM supports returnees, and pays for their tickets and other moving expenses. The government of Ethiopia works with this body by implementing different projects to enable the diaspora to return home.

Through its experts, the WB is very active in giving advice to the Ethiopian government to use its diaspora resources for development; it also finances many of the government's

diaspora mobilisation agendas. The WB monitors how the government generates remittances and measures their level by working with the National Bank and sharing information with the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia. It is for this reason that, after many years of denying the role and magnitude of remittances, the Ethiopian government accepted the WB's estimate that Ethiopians remit around 3 billion USD annually. These measurements are made possible by the WB's insistence that the National and Commercial Banks of Ethiopia furnish data on remittances and formal transfers into the country.

The government estimates that around two million Ethiopians live outside their country (Diaspora Policy, 2016, p.5). Its report is biased towards North America and Europe, and neglects the South-South diaspora (DP, p.5). While South Africa is acknowledged as a new destination for different kinds of Ethiopian diaspora, Botswana and Guinea are regarded as mainly hosting the Ethiopian scientific diaspora.

Allowing the diaspora to open a foreign currency bank account is one of the visible tactics to attract the foreign currency flow that originates with them. The Diaspora Policy is implemented in tandem with national development strategies, policies and programmes. The Millennium Dam and a bond in its name are part and parcel of financing the national Growth and Transformation Strategy of Ethiopia which was drawn up seven years ago and which is now in its second phase.

However, the government does not elaborate on how it is going to protect the rights of its citizens abroad, nor does it provide information on the structures or the institutions in place for this purpose. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Labour and Social Affairs are facilitating agencies. The former has the authority to decide on diaspora issues and is the epicenter of the diaspora mobilisation strategy and action (Diaspora Policy, 2015). This is because such mobilisation involves foreign actors and international players, and due to the fact that some diasporas are foreign nationals. However, the selling of large volumes of Ethiopian labour outside of the country, is implemented through labour agreements between countries. Hence the two ministers work together to sell unskilled labor from Ethiopia, especially to the Middle East.

All the employment agencies that export Ethiopians, especially domestic workers to the Arab Middle East fall under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Tigre-led government of Ethiopia, led by Seyom Mesfin. During his tenure, the movement of labour to the Arab World has reached significant levels. It has been described as 'the greatest modern day slave

trade' in which the minority tribal government intentionally exposed Ethiopian girls and children to domestic abuse, slaughter and butchery in the streets of Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Lebanon, Libya, Kuwait and so forth (Anbese et al., 2009; Fernandez, 2010; Dessiye, 2010; Juredini, 2010). The media is saturated with gruesome videos and the ordeals of migrant workers in the Middle East. Never before in Ethiopian history have women and children been sold as domestic workers in foreign lands.

The diaspora are encouraged to become involved in imports and exports, tourist organisations, market intelligence, brokerage and sales. A reward system promotes the inflow of foreign currencies (for investment, or as remittances) through legal channels (DP, p.14). Section 5.4.3 of the Diaspora Policy states that 'strong relations with banks and other legal money-transfer service providers abroad would be established via all Ethiopian Missions abroad, and their reliable and speedy service provisions to Ethiopian Diaspora would be facilitated' (DP, p.15). Section 5.4.4 refers to 'an arrangement that would allow Ethiopian Diaspora to pay in foreign currencies for birr loans they will borrow from domestic banks and for federal and regional bonds they will buy to run domestically operated development projects' (Diaspora Policy, 2015, p.15).

2.6.4. Resistance to Origin-State Induced Diaspora Mobilisation

The diaspora mobilisation agenda of the Ethiopian government is highly resisted by diaspora in exile, especially those whose lives are at risk and have claimed asylum status in European and African countries. For instance, the Ethiopian Community Association in Johannesburg has demonstrated on several occasions against the Tigre-led government's heavy hand in their life in exile, with the intention of raising funds for its own development. Other intellectuals have exposed the government's manipulation of the innocent diaspora by evoking homesickness, housing programmes and different incentives. For instance, Professor Alemayhu Gebremariam, an outspoken intellectual, stated that, 'the Millennium Dam is the Tigre government's white elephant project' (Alemayehu, 2013). It is alleged that the Millennium Bond and other schemes are created to cheat immigrants abroad. The more the government saps the resources of the diaspora, the more the diaspora lacks the financial power to organise opposition abroad or inside Ethiopia that can unseat the government. Numerous intellectuals share Professor Almayehu's sentiments (Alemayehu, 2016). The main concern is that bond-selling, and even housing cooperatives, are government-sponsored scams designed to snatch resources from the migrant host

countries. The host countries are thus called on to restrict such government penetration in the economic life of people within their jurisdiction. In the US, the court penalised the Ethiopian government for selling bonds without permission and declaring them in the US. Members of the diaspora also highlight taxation issues and question the legality of diaspora mobilisation in foreign countries. As noted previously, Almayehu (2016) condemns the Millennium Dam and noted that the Egyptians consider that the building of a dam on the Nile River, be it for hydroelectric power or for direct utilisation of the river, will harm their share of the waters of the Nile. Hence, hence any attempt to upset the *status quo* will be met with fierce resistance from Egypt. He also recalled the speech by President Al Sisi of Egypt which equated the water of the Blue Nile with 'life and death'. He added that:

> 'I have confidence that my Ethiopian brothers they want to live and Egypt wants to live'.
> (President al Sisi of Egypt, 2016)

This implies that, if they want to live peacefully, or if they want to continue to rule Ethiopia, they should not harm Egypt's national interests by reducing the waters of the Nile by building the dam. Al Sisi added that if the TPLF-led government completed the dam without regard to Egypt's plea, Egypt have no alternative but to disrupt the use of the waters. Hence, per Ale Mariam, the 'dam is damned' and no money must be given for 'the damned dam'.

For Ale Mariam, the Renaissance Dam and the Millennium Bond that has been circulating within the diaspora is simply about collecting money to strengthen the repressive arm of the TPLF government and is a mechanism to financially weaken the diaspora that could otherwise have used their resources to liberate the country from Tigrai tribal tyranny (Ale Mariam, *Ethiopia: The Dam Nation by TPLF* (ECADF, 2016)).

The main complaints regarding the engagement of the diaspora rest on government relations with the TDA, EFFORT and the Relief Society of Tigrai (REST). As noted above, the TPLF raised a huge amount of money for its military operation in 1989, to finance the rebel movement in Ethiopia. After it came to power, it continued to invest in different economic sectors; hence any funds raised by the Ethiopian Embassy might end up in the coffers of the TPLF, or could be used to develop only the Tigrai regional state.

2.6.5. Conclusion

This chapter noted that, the Ethiopian diaspora manifest diverse features which are bases for typology formation and identities. These typologies are not dependent on a singular description, which is mainly state of origin-centric. The data showed that four additional features can be identified based on the Ethiopian immigrants' day-to-day existence in South Africa. These are, scientific diaspora, prototypical diaspora, conflict diaspora and development diaspora. These categories are also found in the migration literature. Those in the scientific field that include university lecturers, researchers, engineers, medical doctors, and so forth, are termed Ethiopian scientific diaspora and represent a good example how a host state can benefit from such knowledge diaspora. Prototypical diasporas are the concern of international humanitarian organisations and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The data from the Ethiopian diaspora in both Durban and Rustenburg showed that, that prototypical diaspora, are violently expelled from their original home and can be misunderstood as helpless. In actual fact, they contribute to the economy of the host country by being self-reliant and creating jobs for locals. As can be observed from Ethiopian history, TPLF members who have strong involvement in politics back home and other tribal groups like the ONLF and the OLF can be termed conflict diaspora.

The Ethiopian government uses several tactics to generate revenue from the diaspora abroad, including immigrants in South Africa. The Ethiopian Diaspora Policy (2015) identifies the status of the Ethiopian immigrants. They are not given legal status, which has hampered their ability to remit more. Therefore, in the future, the government aims to focus on how to increase remittances from South Africa. The methods of resource mobilization employed by the TPLF government around the world include raising funds for various projects that have symbolic significance such as the Grand Renaissance Dam; selling land to Ethiopian diaspora and to investors from India, Asia, Turkey, and so forth, and mobilising the diaspora to be tourists. To this end, it uses art, music, and other media to evoke homesickness to ensure a flow of immigrants that spend like tourists in their place of origin. This concerns those diasporas that are not violently expelled from their country; Tigres and other tribes are more prone to this kind of travel.

To implement this policy, the government designed institutional mechanisms to harness the potential of its diaspora as a source of foreign currency. The ecology of diaspora mobilization illustrated this process. However, the government's tactics are highly resisted

by immigrants that were violently expelled from their home country. Amharas in particular manifest the main characteristics of prototypical diaspora, which is like the exodus caused by the Babylon. The data revealed that most Amharas in South Africa do not appreciate the Ethiopian government meddling inside South Africa under the cover of diaspora mobilization. They feel insecure as the government extends its reach into South Africa through its tribal agents like TPLF members and sympathisers in the country.

The policy implication is that, the host country should proactively engage the country of origin on safe, legal ways of mobilizing financial resources from the host county. Some counties allow the TGLF to mobilise funds as long as it abides by tax regulations. In the USA, the government of Ethiopia was recently charged for selling unlicensed and undeclared bonds in the country in contravention of the law. It is not known if South African policy makers are aware of the unlicensed selling of sovereign bonds by the Ethiopian government in its territory that can deplete the host country's financial resources and hard currency.

PART III : CONCLUSION

CHAPTER 7 : POSTSCRIPT ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION

Mobility, always being part of human existence, still dominates migration debates. From early writings on 'the roving instinct' to the study on *Migration theory: understanding human mobility* by De Hass (2016) and the impact-making proposition by scholars of transnationalism, starting with Randolph Bourne (1916) and critics of capitalist transnationalism (Robinson, 2004) as well as many others, the literature has focused on diaspora characteristics that make them transboundary actors. Transnationalism and global human mobility is not without its problems. Capitalist states seek to erect physical barriers that block the free movement of people, ideas, goods, capital, services, and production that globalization presupposes. In terms of the concept of diaspora transnational characteristics, apart from their tribal, religious and behavioural typologies, all diasporas share a global typology (Asale, 2006).

This chapter thus explores the additional characteristics of Ethiopian diasporas. These typologies correspond to their three-main action-based features which are geographic transience; mobility transience and allegiance and cooperative transience. The chapter also cover new parameters that South African migration policy might consider, such as an 'immigrants-host compatibility/complementarity/ Index'. Examples of Ethiopian diaspora features that correspond positively to the host communities in the cities of Rustenburg and Durban are discussed as a spectrum of typologies. Most of these are the researcher's original ideas that could be further developed.

This part of the thesis also presents the study's overall findings and the main conclusions deriving from them. It considers the practical benefits of remittances for the livelihoods of the poor back home. It summarises the typologies of the Ethiopian diaspora in South Africa and their policy implications. Finally, it highlights issues for further investigation which arose during the field work, and presents an overall general conclusion.

3.7.1. Ethiopian Diaspora's Transnational Features

Transnationalism is the postmodern character of the diaspora. Driven by globalisation and improved communication technology, people's interaction has been fostered to the extent that distance no longer matters for many who are connected to these technologies.

The Ethiopian diaspora in South Africa engages in multi-faceted network and transboundary activities. These transnational features can be categorised based on four types of activities: *geographic transience; mobility transience,* and *allegiance and cooperative transience.* Geographic transnationalism is the most obvious because immigrants have experience of living or crossing more than one political boundary. Life in exile presupposes geographic distance from home and belonging to the global space.

Most of the study participants crossed more than one boundary to reach South Africa. Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Congo, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia and Malawi are among the geographic spheres that the immigrants roamed in one way or another. The mobility aspect of Ethiopian diaspora transnationalism deals with the features that Ethiopians draw on to move to another developed country, be it in Europe, America or Australia. The interviews and group discussions revealed that the Ethiopian scientific diaspora has a good understanding of global intellectual mobility and is aware of opportunities in other countries; hence, they demonstrate a high degree of transboundary interconnection and mobility. After completing their studies, most leave for an OECD country. While most movement was legal, illegal mobility also takes place.

Some of the respondents had plans to travel to the USA via Brazil, Colombia, or Mexico, and then to the US and Canada. Besides using airlines and drawing on those with connections in the airline and travel industries, the majority of the study participants that were interviewed claimed to know more than one person who had travelled to Europe using what can be said to be 'illegal means and connections'. Due to the rule of no deportation once you have landed in the UK, London has been a popular destination among immigrants of Ethiopian origin. Most people use a genuine passport and visa to reach European destinations.

Sweden, Germany, Austria, Ukraine, Greece and Italy are among the routes known to the participating immigrants. The Arab world and the Middle East also attract Muslim migrant groups, especially the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, which is an opportunity to travel and remain in the Arab or Gulf states. Such mobility is not curtailed by the weak legal status and lack of travel documents of the Ethiopian diaspora in South Africa. The transnational feature is not only created through illegal transition to a third country from South Africa, but transitory activities constitute a Ethiopian diaspora cross-boundary and transnational typology.

The other characteristic comprises cooperative activities with their own government or with the South African government. Some of the study participants have multiple nationalities between South Africa, Canada and Ethiopia. They either have multiple simultaneous partnerships or one state allegiance at a time, but move from one citizenship to another. Their transnational nature also rests on the fact that they can become agents of tourism, trade, and other economic activities. Some members of the diaspora are heavily involved in international commodity and monetary transfers on par with big financial institutions.



***Figure 12**:* Mobility and Transnational Characteristics of Ethiopian Diaspora *(Inter-geographic Transience)*

The orange arrows represent the transnational characteristic of circular mobility, in which naturalised Ethio-American or Ethio-Canadian diasporas move back and forth between South Africa and North America. Once they obtain American passports they achieve the legitimacy of international travelers. The green arrows show secondary level migration to a third country. This occurs when immigrants come to South Africa and then proceed to another third country where they hope to fulfil their dreams, or where they feel safer. These movements involve both legal and illegal ones. One of the legal channels is UN resettlement programme under the High Commissioner for Refugees that regularly relocates the vulnerable segment of the Ethiopian diasporas to the safest third country. Illegal mobility occurs when immigrants decide to move out of South Africa and head to another third country of asylum using means that are not in line with the visa and travel requirements of the destination country, or South Africa's exit requirements. Human traffickers sometimes play a role in these kinds of situations. Migrants pay huge amounts of money for illegal entry to developed countries. The major destinations are the US, the UK, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, Holland, and Australia. Does this mean that we are reaching the age of a post-boundary world in which more and more people cross boundaries which are meant to separate states and citizenship without proper authorisation?

The blue arrows represent the first linear migration from a state of origin to a destination, in this case from Ethiopia to South Africa. However, even this stage exposes immigrants to the experience of crossing several boundaries before they reach South Africa. The bigger arrows from the east and west represent global interconnection and human mobilities which are not necessarily migration-related. These are shorter trips made by immigrants with multiple citizenship those that carry a passport that is widely recognised. These might be for business and other movement that involves East Asian countries such as Thailand, China, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and so forth which are included in this transnational mobility.

After immigrants are naturalised, they face the problem of being confined to a given geographic space and hence confront challenges in belonging to the host space. This is further aggravated by their country of origin's on-going involvement in their life in exile. The nostalgic connections discussed in the previous chapter and the government's tactic of reinforcing homesickness so that the immigrants do not forget their roots makes their position complicated.

3.7.2. Diaspora- Host Compatibility Index

Cultural compatibility is often regarded as a starting point for positive social interaction and cohesiveness between a given host and its 'aliens'. However, multi cultural society diversity is necessary to promote social dynamism. Normative discourses on this issue have preoccupied social engineers for a long time. While the conservative elements within a given host-society demand cultural purity and distinctiveness and manifest fear of being consumed by a multi-cultural tide, or mixing with others; liberal migration thinkers and practitioners advocate for an open-border policy and intergeneric mixture. The quest for separateness and a distinctive social, economic and political base was very apparent during the apartheid era in South Africa, as it was for its rulers' European ancestors. European's dislike of immigrants emanates from their deep fear of being culturally invaded or swamped by immigrants from different cultures who undermine local cultural distinctiveness. Hence, resistance to migration and immigrants is the norm in these quarters. Some small European states experimented with cultural isolation until such time that their own scientists exposed the challenge of a weakening human genome owing to lack of interaction and hybridity. This resulted in birth deformities and mental challenges as well as less immunity to different kinds of diseases. Doctors thus advised social engineers to deliberately mix their society with migrant populations and new genes to avoid endangering the survival of the whole race (Samir, 2015). Centuries of inter-marriage in these small European states created a situation where the whole population became like an extended family with too similar a genetic makeup.

Despite hatred of foreign biology, the gene deficiency obliged social policy-makers to argue in favour of migration and controlled mixing with outsiders, enabling relatively large numbers of migrants to enter their countries. Sweden, in Europe, is the best example. Around 21 per cent of the total population, or close to two million foreigners have gained access to its territory since the 1990s (Sweden Online, 2016). Sweden now has a very dynamic social composition that matches that of old European countries like Holland, Germany, the UK and France (Vasileva, 2011).

In Africa, the bases for boundaries of identities are language and tribal affiliation although there are similarities of colour the poltics of belonging and difference follows no clear

formula unlike in developed societies. Colour of skin of human being is major defining line in Europe and America for drawing the boundaries of belonging and exclusions. As we hear and see from media it is fundamental distinguishing parameter in Europe between a local and a foreigner.

In the study locations, there are differences of culture among the locals themselves. For instance, Durban is the mainstay of the Zulus but the Asiatic population, namely the third generation of indentured laborers, or South African Indians (Maharaj, 1997) is concentrated in Durban. Other local tribal groups are also found, like the South Africans whose ancestors migrated from Europe four centuries ago, although they are confined to the northern part of the city. There is clear cultural dominance by the Zulus in the urban landscape of Durban. On the other hand, Rustenburg represents a more diverse cultural space. The local population is dominated by Tswanas, whereas in the townships, Xhosas, Zulus, Vendas, Sepedi, Sotho and other tribes from neighbouring countries came to the city to work on the mines. Therefore, when we talk of cultural compatibility, our basis for consideration would be Zulus and Indians as host cultures in Durban and Tswanas and White Afrikaners in Rustenburg. One, can, for instance, list the main characteristics of these endogenous tribes and then match them with the main features and typologies of the Ethiopian immigrant population to create the cultural compatibility index.

Like any other society, it is somewhat superficial to pinpoint a singular feature or characteristic of the given community or society. Therefore, it would probably be closer to reality if we ecologically select the most commonly observable features found in the host culture in and around Durban. For instance, for demonstration purposes, we can think of a Zulu dominant culture in Durban and note the common cultural traits that can be grasped from a lay observation. One will find the obvious cultural, religious, ideological and lifestyle orientations that can be taken into account include 1) Traditionalism, 2) Royalty, 3) Bravery and anti-colonial spirit; 4) Sedentary, 5) General way of life.

The Zulu nation has very elaborate cultural traditions which are visible to any outsider, including holiday customs, ways of dressing, celebrations and cultural dances and songs that are revered by locals and appreciated by outsiders. The Reed Festival and the culture of purity in girls and family pride, as well as the way the culture provides a central space to women, are fascinating. It is clear that there is a rich Zulu culture that is also practiced by

the new generation. We will examine if there are Ethiopian diasporas that match such traditions and who are compatible with Zulu traditionalism.

For now, let me relate the history of the Zulu nation in terms of exile. The online history of Shaka Zulu states that, he was born in 1787 and experienced a life of exile, including his mother, Nandi. His exile was believed to have been related to the sour relationship with his father, the King of the Zulus, Senzangakona, and he is said to have found refuge with Mthethua. King Shaka fought as a warrior under Dingiswayo, leader of the Whetham Paramountcy ('Zulu History', *South African History online* available at http:// www.anikefoundation.org, accessed May 15, 2015, at 11:45). According to some historical accounts, the South African bantus migrated from East Africa in the 11th century and the culture of royalty started in 1670, with the name of Zulu (which has an English translation synonymous with sky) denoting the ancestor who founded the Zulu royalty.

Therefore, along the matrix of culture and history, two variables can be used to measure cultural compatibility between the Ethiopian prototypical diaspora and the Zulu culture.

The outstanding factor is royalty and this fits with the tradition of the Ethiopian migrant community and royal lineages. Specifically, the Amharas and the Afar have a compatible history and culture with the Zulus. In Amharic-speaking culture, sexual abstinence of a woman before marriage and a high regard for virginity is common. Amharas even assign a boy who is going marry a girl as early as 9 or 13 years old. This is decided on the basis of royalty, status, tribal lineage and the level of intelligence and hard work. The couple is not expected to discover each other until such time as they are ready to establish an independent home. Until that time, the girl and the boy have the right to live among the boy's family; when they are physically ripe (17-18 years for the girl and 21 and above for boys), they are free to have children. However, this system has been diluted over time and it becomes an issue when girls fall pregnant at an early age by being exposed to untimely marriage. The underlying cause is the emphasis on virginity in the Amhara culture. Amharas have had a culture of royalty since Biblical times and the oldest kingdom in the world is found in Ethiopia (Nubia, Adolis, Aksum, Lalibella and so forth). Therefore, the migration of the Bantu from East Africa, which includes the southern part of Ethiopia, means that the historical, cultural, and racial connection with migration is part of Zulu-Ethiopian diaspora

history. Since migration to South Africa is not a new phenomenon, it becomes part of the tribal, ethnic and cultural make-up of the local Zulu culture in Durban.

The other common denominator between the Zulu and the prototypical Ethiopian diaspora is a history of anti-colonial struggle. The indomitable spirit of the Zulu warriors and their resistance to any form of domination is well acknowledged by historians. It has hence become one of the characteristics of Zulu people and their identity. Likewise, the Ethiopians resisted colonialism. After the Berlin Conference, the 14 European powers, including the representative of the US, planned the infamous 'partition of Africa'. Thereafter that, the African people were targeted for territory and resources. The then Emperor of Ethiopia, Menelik II, told conference participants that there would be fierce resistance to any attempts to colonialise Africa and Ethiopia. After negotiations failed, Menelik went to war with Italy, the biggest European power. In 1889, for the first time ever, an African black army defeated the huge, well-organised military force of the Italians without the support Europe or America. In the Second World War, Italy as part of the Axis powers, invaded the country with the help of flying machines, aeroplanes, tanks and a highly mechanised army supported by local *Askaris* from the Tigre-speaking part of Ethiopia (now ruling Ethiopia as the TPLF and causing significant emigration of prototypical Ethiopian diasporas, according to the findings of this study). The Italian Fascist army used banned chemical weapons and, after massacring hundreds of thousands of innocent and ill-equipped militants and patriots, the country was occupied for three years from 1933 to 1936. After the defeat of Germany and the Japanese surrender, Italy was once again defeated by the Ethiopian army with weapons supplied by the United Kingdom. Hence the Kingdom of Zululand (Shaka Land) and the Ethiopian prototypical diasporas that are the focus of this thesis share 80 per cent of the characteristics defined above in terms of history, culture, royalty, anti-colonial bravery and the general Bantu culture. The compatibility index could thus help the host state to accommodate people with similar cultural backgrounds.

The compatibility index in Rustenburg shows the basic social characteristics of the Tswanas and Ethiopian immigrants. The main common denominator is physical similarities and peace-loving, but the culture of Royalty and the host's intercultural competence and visible existence and interaction with others on a day-to-day basis could also be regarded as part of the measurement for the compatibility index. Rustenburg has a diverse local population and provides many choices for Ethiopian diasporas. For instance, the Muslim Indians live in Zeniavil, White South Africans live in the Western Rustenburg mountains and the

Tswanas live around Pukeng in the vicinity of Thlabani, Kheludpark and the new settlements west of Thlabani. Based on cultural propensity, the Royals have a very good relationship with Amharas and Gurages. The Muslims in Zeniavil accommodate Muslim Ethiopians from different tribal diasporas. The Ethiopian Ogaden Somalis, the Muslim Oromo and others have been well-accommodated in the Zeniavil business area. I touched on the new trends in the area where the Ethiopian diaspora trades in an earlier discussion.

The incompatible aspects of the host space are the conflict diaspora and some of the business diasporas that have a strong affiliation with the ruling TPLF. Some immigrants do not understand the implications of working for the Ethiopian government with a view to control their immigrants. Some, according to the interviewees, Tigre tribal communities engaged in money transfers to Ethiopia without following South Africa's rules and those of international law. For instance, Tigrai tribe members are granted asylum-seeker papers while they work for the Ethiopian government to mobilise the diasporas for development agenda for Tigrai regional state in Ethiopia. This violates the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees (1951). The discussions with immigrants showed that they are intimidated by this group of TPLF members in South Africa. These characteristics of the diaspora are incompatible with the host according to international migration rules.

Genuine immigrants and refugees, as exemplified in the victim Ethiopian diaspora or the prototypical diaspora are more malleable by the local population and are highly compatible with the host society. They are thus the people who the UN and international law protect. Hosting and protecting these kinds of migrants is compatible with the social system in South Africa and positively contributes to its social fabric.

3.7.3. Overall Findings of the Study

The main findings of this research study can be summarised as follows. The study found that conventional wisdom that migrants have monolithic characteristics is challenged by the data on the ground, as they have diverse backgrounds (Russel King, 2012). The Ethiopian diaspora in the cities of Durban and Rustenburg display tribal, religious, economic and other cultural differences, that are promoted by the tribal policies of the Ethiopian government and are carried into life in exile. It is as important to analyse these tribal identities as it is to examine national identities to understand the diasporic existence in a host country. Relying on a cosmopolitan national identity would not provide a proper understanding the inner functioning of each diasporic community in South Africa. Thus, a broader perspective would

facilitate better understanding of the causes of migration and solutions. Simplistic, generalised descriptions of immigrants based on their geographic origins will render the management of migration problematic.

The nature of their expulsion from their countries of origin, and the reasons for and means of admission to South Africa, are also important parameters in defining the typologies of immigrants. Residence status impacts immigrants' way of life, socio-economic performance and general acceptability in the host country. It thus lays the groundwork for characterisation of a given diaspora. Russel King's (2012) categorisations are valid in describing the Ethiopian diaspora.

The anti-migration school of thought believes that that 'migrants are stealing jobs from locals'. This was refuted by the scientific data gathered in the field. The data collected by means of interviews revealed that immigrants are often not only economically independent, but create jobs for others, including locals. None of the study respondents in Rustenburg and Durban are working for South African firms, and there is no evidence to suggest that they have caused any displacement of local employees. Job opportunities in South Africa are tied to citizenship and a national identity document. Furthermore, most of the respondents indicated that they have no plans to seek employment as they do not aim to work for others. Instead, they prefer to create jobs for themselves and, whenever possible, employ South Africans and other foreigners from the SADC region. They also employ fellow countrymen.

The documented/undocumented or legal/illegal dichotomy was not validated as an Ethiopian diaspora characterisation, as almost all of the study participants have some kind of document. Illegality is highly transitional and is difficult to use as a defining criterion for the Ethiopian diaspora. It is difficult to determine whether or not this could be generalised to the broader migrant population in South Africa.

Members of the Amhara tribe stand out in exhibiting many persecuted diaspora characteristics. The study found that their characteristics and method of expulsion from Ethiopia, match the violent dispersions identified as parameters for prototypical diaspora (as in the case of the Jewish exodus). There are widespread allegations that Amhara are facing a 'Tigre Babylon' and have become victims of violence and systematic genocide in Ethiopia. The respondents explained that systematic extermination of Amhara, especially in northern Gondar, northern Wollo, south and west Shoa and southern Gojjam, has been

on-going for four decades, but intensified during the past 25 years of Tigre-based rule. The study found that these typologies are visible in the cities of Durban and Rustenburg, and their characteristics correspond to those identified by Safran (1991), Armstrong (1976), Cohen (1997) and other classical theoreticians. According to the genocide watch and reports by the Moresh Amhara Wogene organisation (2016), the Amhara members of the Ethiopian diaspora are probably the most endangered species of humankind that are fast vanishing as a tribal group, yet little is known about their problems at the global level. The reason is partly the vicious cycle metaphor which postulates that the covert genocide perpetrated against this tribe has robbed Amhara intellectuals of the capacity to articulate their plight in the face of complacent European countries who have an interest in undermining the Amhara due to their resistance to colonialism (Adwa War, 1988). Some learned Amharas also share the blame for being silent. They are complacent for two reasons; firstly because they may have properties back home which requires them to travel to Ethiopia and secondly, because they fear reprisals by the government. As a result, genocide is a taboo subject and is only expressed in forms of public discontent. The recent Oromo and Amhara uprising is a manifestation of popular discontent with the TPLF government and the quest to survive its hidden genocide. At the time of writing there was no internet access in Ethiopia and the country was placed under an emergency decree that was set to last for a long time. Shutting down the internet is the government's usual way of hiding its crimes against humanity (Amnesty International, 2016/ Ethiopia/). Hence, while Rwanda eliminated tribal identification after learning from its experience of genocide, the Ethiopian government has made tribalism and tribal identities official, which makes it easy to continue with the killings. 'Because of such a lack of publicity in the world, the massive genocide of the Amharas continues without much talk in the Western media,' commented Mr Tekle Yeshaw, an Ethiopian historian. He added that:

'Amharas are suffering the genocide out by themselves and with their own "creator" in the face of systematic and hidden genocide which was concealed and done smartly by the Tigre-based current government of Ethiopia. The atrocities and the genocide were not even noticed horizontally, until recently that people started to talk about it openly.' (Yeshaw, 2006)

Protection of the prototypical diaspora that are referred as refugees in current terminology falls under international laws to which South Africa is a signatory. For instance, the Geneva Convention of 1951 on the status of refugees and persecuted persons stipulates that a host country has a moral and legal obligation to protect and safeguard the lives and properties

of prototypical diaspora that fall within its territorial jurisdiction. The host country also has the right to determine who genuine refugees are. This means that it can decide who to accept or reject. The question is how to differentiate between typologies which deserve protection and those that abuse the system. South Africa has the moral responsibility not to hurt already victimised diasporas after they arrive in the country. This makes the study of the typologies of a given diaspora relevant.

The Ethiopian diaspora is diverse in its nature; state identity is a weaker point of reference than tribal identity for the majority of the immigrants who participated in the study. Tribe is more important in building trust, partnerships and solidarity among the diaspora. Therefore, the typologies of immigrants in general, or the diasporas explored in this study, in particular, cannot be categorised within the description of state identity alone. State nationality has been the common reference point for the Ethiopian diaspora by concerned South African bodies; however, the monolithic conception of identity seems to have minimal functional benefits. The best way forward might thus be to conflate state-based identity with that of tribal identities within the box of national identity. This offers an ecological perspective on the identities of Ethiopian diaspora in South Africa.

The Ethiopian diaspora is engaged in commercial and small-scale business activities that facilitate the movement and circulation of goods, services and money. They enhance Black African entrepreneurship in South Africa and fill the gap created as a consequence of the apartheid system that impoverished the majority of citizens and rendered them economically less versatile. The proximity of migrant businesses to the autochthonous population has become an important channel for transmitting business knowledge to the local population. It was observed during field work that the Ethiopian diaspora in both cities contributed to the formation of the endogenous business community among the South African black population and the building of social capital in the country, more so than what was assumed to be the case at the beginning of this project. For instance, a small Ethiopian car-wash business employed South Africans, who later became partners in the business. These employees plan to start their own businesses and even partner with others. More South Africans are selling goods on the streets than ever before and, at the same time immigrants are forced to leave street business to emerging South African clothing vendors. This represents progress in that South Africans are fast learning to be self-employed rather than waiting for the government to solve their problems. Plain Street in Rustenburg and Victoria Street in Durban have been taken over by South Africans for street trade. While 10

years ago, no South African was selling clothing, either new or secondhand on the street, the researcher observed that the locals are closing these gaps, which has potential for future business and transfer of knowledge from the Ethiopian diaspora to the endogenous South African.

The transnational characteristics of the Ethiopian diaspora were evident in the field study in Rustenburg and Durban. Ethiopian immigrants are agents for development back home and are a bridge that links South Africa and Ethiopia (both members of the COMESA) for different purposes, including transfer of technology, knowledge and investment.

The Ethiopian government's strategy of mobilising its diaspora without the full cooperation of the host country is complicating the everyday lives of the immigrants. Most participants said that they feel intimidated by the penetration of Ethiopian agencies in South Africa. They are forced in one way or another to buy bonds or risk being regarded as unpatriotic, which causes another type of anxiety in their already unsettled lives. There is growing demand, through social networking, by origin state's government from members of the Tigre tribe to mobilise members of other tribes to give money for government projects (example: Millenium Dam). Therefore, Claims by several Tigres that they had been persecuted and who lodged asylum claims in South Africa, are refuted by their own actions that are caused by the demands of the Ethiopian government articulated by its underground operatives in South Africa. Hence, if the South African authorities were to decide on the mass deportation of members of the Tigre tribe who spy and work for the Ethiopian government's diaspora mobilisation project, this would be unwelcome to most of them. The other consequence is these demands drain migrants' resources and, at the same time, negatively affect the potential of the Ethiopian prototypical diaspora to employ local people in their businesses.

3.7.4. Practical Benefits of Remittances for Livelihoods back home

Remittances from immigrants reduce poverty at home. In Ethiopia, there is a huge gap between the handful of rich and the many people who live below the poverty line (an income of less than one dollar per day, UNDP). Ethiopia lacks a sound economic policy and political system. There can be no doubt that the economy is controlled by the Tigre-based tribal network that excludes other tribes from economic benefits. The country is experiencing high inflation and low levels of employment and in terms of governance, there are countless dislocations, persecutions, systematic tribal cleansing from property and land ownership and even systematic and hidden genocide, which is not known to the international

community and the outside world. Poor and marginalised Ethiopians are suffering in silence with no power to change their situation. Their only outlet seems to be emigration and the hope of basing a livelihood on what a relative or sibling can remit from outside. The push factors theory (Estain,1885) can be considered true in this sense, and the Ecological Model proposed in this thesis also agrees that economic and exclusion can cause emigration. However, it remains the by-product of the political system.

The study participants stated that they have to support their families in Ethiopia as a consequence of state failure. Support takes many different forms: some help their youngsters to go to school while others help their elders to access health care and most families depend on remittances for food. Although all the immigrants are not necessarily from poor family backgrounds, it is obvious that they dominate the remitting immigrants.

3.7.5. Typologies of Ethiopian Diaspora and Policy Implications

The discourse of diaspora in South Africa is dominated by the propositions of the Police Model that draws its ideological currents from theories that create a hierarchy between human species; even theories that propose the morality of depredation justify violence within the prisms of survival and self-interest. Creating boundaries between human species and highlighting racial differences are the main features of the migration discourse in Europe and the rest of developed society. Colour, facial features and cultural differences cause exclusion from normal life in the host society and 'blue eyes and blond hair is considered the center of the European identity, not only enjoying privileges and protection but also granted absolute right to exclude the other races. The Police Model's views on the African diaspora in South Africa seem to be contaminated by the same arguments held dear by anti-migration schools of thought in Europe against the blacks (who they refer as 'Negros'). Transferring European anti-migration rhetoric to the South Africa situation created the odd exclusion of one race against its own race, or 'black hating black', which is tantamount to the self-hate that Malcolm X referred to when he asked his audience, 'Who taught you to hate yourself?' (www.youtube/video/). It is thus recommended that the host space makes a distinction between its own agenda and issues from Europe's problems. Migration has been part of the building of society in South Africa.

The Zulu, Xhosa, Ndebele and other South African tribes have the same racial roots and their history is genetically and culturally identical to the African race. Borrowing the arguments of the anti-African and 'Black man' rhetoric and copying the rejection of black

people in Europe in South Africa, will contribute nothing to rational migration management in the host space.

Therefore, based on the theoretical and the research finding one can sugessest policy areas that can be more explored, some of these are: 1) providing better recgnition for immigrant communities as agents of development. Therefore, there is a need for shifting focus towards migration-development nexus in the public and academic discourses as opposed to the predominant migration-security-nexus. Besides, migration protectionism can also affect economic growth and job creation in South Africa, therefore new policy directions can be introduced to optimally benfit from migrant stock that South Africa hosts; 3) South Africa needs a migration philosophy and practice which is compatible with its own history and identity as a black nation – and as the rainbow nation. The spirit of *Ubuntu* is highly challenged by resistance to immigrants from Africa. The characterisation of immigrants using negative terminology, as the experiences of the majority of the immigrants showed, is not useful in promoting African economic prosperity and stability in South Africa. The more we use exclusionary rhetoric in relation to immigrants, the more South Africa's status as a democratic, prosperous and peaceful country will be negatively affected. 4) While some immigrants might engage in criminal activities, this is not their unique characteristic. Hence, instead of reinforcing stigmatisation, the best policy option is to acknowledge immigrants' internationally recognised role as agents of economic growth. 5) Therefore, South Africa could use its *migrant population to strengthen its trade, commerce and investment ties with the rest of Africa.* The evidence shows that Europe and America are benefiting from African migrants in terms of fostering trade and development with their countries of origin. As a result, Europe scrambles for diaspora to match the aggressive Chinese presence in Africa. South Africa could apply the same technique and use immigrants in its territory to build intra-African partnerships. Holding on to negative parts of the migration story lacks balance; and finally we need to examine migration from an ecological perspective without overemphasising the negative or positive aspects.

3.7.6. Suggestions for further Study

The research results suggest that the issue of xenophobia needs to be studied further, particularly migrants' perspectives on the subject, which is very important for the possible resolution of this problem. The term itself is questionable; as a study participant in Durban

put it: ‘African brothers are hating other Africans and who is a foreigner on the African continent?’ Therefore, the phenomenon of self-hate is an issue that should be rigorously appraised; if possible by African intellectuals.

Compatability Index is invention in this thesis and presented somewhat shallowlly. Migration study will benefit a lot if such kind of measuring tools further developed. Therefore, considering this project for post-doctoral research would be one possibility or any other further research could be built on the idea of exploring immigrant-host compatability.

3.7.7. Achievement of Research Objectives

This section examines whether the study’s research objectives were achieved. The overall aim of this study was to explore the typologies of Ethiopian diaspora in the selected locations. The objectives were as follows: 1) To explore the composition, profiles, and general characteristics of the Ethiopian diaspora in the locations selected for the study; 2) To develop analytical frameworks in migration discourse based on the textual research; 3) To determine the nature of the development instruments of the Ethiopian immigrants through which they maintain contact with their home country, including remittances and other pecuniary transfers; 4) To inform policy and suggest areas for future research.

The main objective which investigated the typologies of Ethiopian diaspora was achieved in Chapters 4 and 5. The concept of diaspora was broken down into different kinds of immigrant groups within the monolithic categorisation of Ethiopian diaspora. The main lines of categorisation were tribe, religion, occupation, income level and ability to remit and participate in home state development. Tribal affiliation is the strongest of these and seems to provide the foundation for communal solidarity among the tribal groups that make up the Ethiopian diaspora in South Africa. Religious identities are important lines of contact between immigrants and these are stronger between Muslims than among Christian immigrants. As observed during field work and noted in Zeniavil, Rustenburg, some immigrants’ religious affiliations provided a bond and trust amongst members of chain businesses and even access to financial resources and credit from South African Muslim communities. Chapter 5 noted that, a large number of Muslims from different parts of the world are living side-by-side in Zeniavil and attend mosque together. An overriding identity, Islam, has enabled Somalis, Oromo-Ethiopians (who in the main are Muslims), Pakistanis, Afghanis, Algerians, and Muslim Indians to live together in this area. The capacity to make remittances to the home country also creates a bond among immigrants as they cooperate

in sending money for one another. In the Rustenburg group discussion, it was noted that immigrants with contacts in the Ethiopian Embassy in South Africa, help their fellow countrymen to use the Embassy to send money to their families, or to finance development projects by buying state bonds. Remittances categorise immigrants in terms of three categories: poor, middle and high remitting and this characteristic corresponds to their income levels which follow the same typology among the Ethiopian diaspora.

An important objective of this study was to develop a model to analyse and interpret the data, and at the same time, to contribute to the ontology in migration discourses. This objective was achieved in Chapters 1, 2, and 3, particularly Chapter 2 that dealt with the original contribution of this thesis and the new meta-models. The Police, Meteorological and Ecological Models are considered convincing arguments and propositions that this thesis put forward as a contribution to knowledge and fulfilment of this objective.

The study also explored and analysed the Ethiopian immigrants' remittances. The constraints that hamper such remittances and the benefits of banking unbanked immigrants were discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, thus achieving this objective. The final objective of making policy recommendations was achieved in Part III. Areas for further study were also identified. In general, the introduction of the issue of typologies to the migration debate, as well as proper conceptualisation and the introduction of the Ecological Model of migration, which is arguably a better perspective, is a major achievement that paves the way for rational policy and migration action by those interested in migration in South Africa.

3.7.8. Overall Conclusion

The diasporic phenomenon has been a bone of contention on several levels. The ecology of these contentions and dilemmas begins with the individual and spreads to society, the nation state, to the cosmopolitan level and the global level. The last two dimensions are regional and global. Various explanations have been proposed for why an individual is not content in his/her original home. Some point to the human instinct to shift places of residence. Debates center on whether these individual decisions were of own volition or were influenced by something external to the individual. In the quest to understand the decision-making process at individual level, scholars from different fields have shifted from point to point. Initially, geographers, explorers and ethnographers were involved. The

fallacies of these early attempts begin with the focus of the disciplines and the subject matter they dealt with. Geographers seem to be structured to study human migration which is broader than that related to a specific individual and the same is true for sociologists and ethnographers. Despite the disciplinary orientation on the overall phenomenon, their conclusions and propositions were considered as laws. However, these early attempts were challenged by methodological limitations which they were not well-equipped to deal with in terms of studying the individual in an epoch where communalism was a way of life. With the modernisation of humankind, economic activities, competition for power and control over resources and even competition over who is a better human being caused large-scale conflicts among human species. Thus the focus shifted from human instinct and migration as a natural phenomenon, to economic explanations for migration. These included the movement of labour, imperial expeditions, commercial travel and competition among global powers, all of which hinged on factors which were externally induced. To this day, the question of the human instinct for mobility resonates in migration discourse like transnationalism, interconnectivity, the global village, migration for the sake of diversity and so forth.

The voluntary or instinctual aspect of the migration decision became diffused, and when international migration grew with competition among different actors and factors, the debate about the real cause of migration and its consequences intensified. With many protagonists supporting different propositions, the problem seems to be getting more complicated rather than simpler. Voluntary vs forced migration, the individual decision versus family or society, the demand for cheap immigrant labour and resistance to migrants in receiving states are all pertinent factors. The diaspora and migration still preoccupies scholars, even in new fields of study. Applied social science fields like Criminology, Social Work and Sociology are all concerned in one way or another with migration and diaspora because of their interest in immigrant networks. The same is true for Medicine, Genetics, Law, Politics, International Relations, Art and Culture. The goals of these disciplines in examining immigration, migration and diasporic issues vary, but the goal of development studies is well-intentioned and aims to use the study of migration for the benefit of human development.

Therefore, the overall interest in diaspora issues in this thesis was to consider the positive role that diaspora plays in development, be it in the country of origin or in the host space. What we need to focus on is how to harness the qualities of immigrants for the practical

benefit of the host country. Resistance to migration is not realistic, and as we have seen in Europe and North America, building walls will not solve what we perceive as the problems with migration. To maximise the benefit of having diasporic communities within a given host space, proper migration policy is required. Such policy needs to be based on a proper understanding of the characteristics, capacity and contribution of immigrants to the host country. The study of typologies of diaspora is fundamental to addressing the gaps in policy.

Therefore, the rationale for this study on Ethiopian diaspora in South Africa was to create better understanding between the host country and the diaspora themselves. This is not solely for the benefit of the immigrants, but is rather a contribution to the ongoing debate as it presents the factual features missing in the contemporary diaspora and migration discourse.

The study achieved its objectives by systematising the typologies of Ethiopian diaspora and their involvement in the country of origin's development through remittances. It brought to light different issues that affect Ethiopians outside of their country that are not covered in mainstream discourses. Genocide stands out as the main push-factor for the Amhara tribe; the study established that they are threatened with extinction by the TPLF government security forces and the military. The ongoing security crisis in Ethiopia resulted in the declaration of a State of Emergency. This was the result of the hidden genocide that the Tigre-based government committed against the prototypical diaspora which was one of the main points of focus in this study.

The key conclusions of the study are: a) the Ethiopian Diaspora that were studied are diverse along several parameters; b) Singular descriptions using national identities cannot depict the whole picture of the typologies of the Ethiopian diaspora; c) the host country can benefit from immigrants' financial resources by providing them with banking facilities and formalising their activities; d) If supported by proper policy and action, the Ethiopian diaspora can contribute further to the facilitation of the movement of goods and services in the South African economy; e) Culture and identities can be positively harnessed to mutual benefit and can generate interdependent revenue in the tourist sector. Ethiopian cultural history and traditions are similar to local cultures and should hence be used to embrace the whole African cultural mosaic by incorporating an age-old culture because the continent needs to retain its own values and cultural wealth. Ethiopian immigrants can offer much in this regard as they come from an ancient culture that most African people revere.

References

Abraha A. (2003) 'Christian Marriages in Ethiopia', URL= http:// www.ethiomedia.com. accessed 13.12.2016 at 12:52.

African Union, (2015) 'Conference on Financing for Development: Views from the South', Addis Ababa, April 2015

Anbese, L. (2009)'Migration and Mental Health: a study of low income Ethiopian women working in middle eastern countries. *International Journal of Social Psychiatry*, pp557-68 (Summary Adopted from Source accessed at http:// *Sage Journals*: key words: mental health, female domestic workers, Ethiopian, Middle East, Exploitations, cultural identity

Angel-Ajani, Asale (2006). "Diasporic Africa: A Reader". New York University Press. Bourne, Randolph: "Trans-National America" in *The Atlantic Monthly*,

#118 (July 1916), pp. 86–97, Boston, The Atlantic Monthly Group, 1916.

Armstrong, J.A. (1976). 'Mobilized and Proletarian Diaspora', *American Political Science Review*,Vol. 70, Issue 2, Cambridge University Press; DIO http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1959646, Published on line, 01 August, 2014

Atkinson, A. B. (ed) (2005) 'New Sources of Development Finance'; Oxford University Press; New York, pp. 2-72.

Appadurai, A. (1996) 'Global Ethnos capes: Notes and Queries for a Transnational Anthropology', Modernity *at Large* (1996), pp. 46-48

Meyer, Jean-Baptiste & Wattiaux, Jean-Paul (2006) 'Diaspora Knowledge Networks: Vanishing Doubts and Increasing Evidences', IJMS: *International Journal of Multicultural Societies, 2006* (8), no.1, pp. 4-24, UNESCO. ISSN 1817-4574

Baldacchino G. & Sammut C. (2016) 'The Migration Crisis: No Human Is Illegal', The Round Table, Vol. 105, 2, 231-233 available at http:// dx.doi.org/ 10.1080, 00358533.

Baker, G. and Chandler, D. (ed.) (2005) 'Global Civil Society Contested Features', *Routledge Advances in International Relations and World Politics*, Taylor l and Francis, 2 Park Square, Abingdon, Oxon OX 144N

Basch, Glick Schiller, N., and Szanton Black, C. (1994) 'Nations Unbound' International Project, Post-Colonial Predicaments and Reterritorialized Nation State. New York; Amazon Books.

Baubock, R and Faist, T. (2010) Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods'

Berg, L. Bruce (2004) 'Qualitative Research Methods for Social Silences', 75 Arlington street, Boston, Publisher: California State University Long beach, USA Berry, et. al. (1992) Cultural and Anthropological Studies, Forced Migration Online, University of Oxford, available at URL= http://www.fmo.com, accessed 20.10.2016, at:12:07

Bhabah, H. (1994) 'The Location of Culture' in Sura, R. (2000) 'Homes Abroad: Diaspora Identities in third space, Luciana State University, Shreveport,

Bhargava, K. and Sharma, JC (2008) 'Building Bridges: a case study on Indian diaspora in Canada', Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation, Center for Study of Democracy, Queens University Press, p. 144

Bohlman, B., V.P (2011) 'When Migration Ends, when Music Ceases', *Music and Arts in Action,* Vol.3, Issue 3, 2011, University of Chicago, USA.

Binaisa, N. (2010) 'African migrants negotiate 'home' and 'belonging': reframing transnationalism through a diasporic landscape', Sussex Center for Migration, Place of publication

Black, R. and King, R. (2004) Special issue: Transnational Migration, Return and Development in West Africa', *Population, Space and Place*, 10(2):75-174

Bronfenbrenner, U. (1979) 'The Ecology of Human Development', Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

Bruhn, J. and Rebach, H. (2007) 'An Ecological Approach to Multi-level, Multi-factor Problem Solving', University of Maryland, Eastern shore, Princess Anne, Maryland 21813, USA, pp. 165-174

Bruneau, M. (1995) 'Diasporas, Multiplier, GIP Recluses, in Berthomiene, W., no-Date, Diaspora: An overview of a concept at the crossroad of Nation-state and Transnationalism, University of Poitiers, pp. 24-28

Burbaker, R. (2005). 'The "Diaspora" diaspora', *Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 28. Issue 1., 10.1080, pp. 1-19

Buzan. (2014) 'The Idea of International System: Theory Meets History', *International Political Science Review,* June, SAGE, IPSA, pp. 127-40

Calvita K. (1996) 'The New Politics of Immigration: Balanced-Budget Conservativism' and Symbolism of Proposition 187

Christian Dustman and Joseph Mestres (2008) 'Remittances and Temporary Migration'; Journal of Development Economics, University of London, Volume 92, Issue1, May 2010, pp. 62-70.

Chambers D. B. (2001) Ethnicity in the Diaspora: The Slave-Trade and Creation of African 'Nations' in the Americans, *Slavery and Abolition,* Vol. 22, Issue 3, December 2001, Pages 25-39, published on line 08 Sept, 2010

Cohen, R. (1997) Global Diaspora: an introduction, London, UCL Press

Cohen. R.(2008a) Global Diaspora: Comparative Patterns, Routledge, Taylor and Francis.

Cohen, R.(2008b) in Eliezer (ed.) (2009) 'Transnationalism: diasporas and the advent of the new dis/order', the Netherlands, IDC Publishers,

Crush, J. (2011) "Complex Movements, Confused Responses: labour migration in South Africa", *SAM Policy Brief*, No.23.

Crush, J. (2012) “Diaspora Networks at Work in SADC”, Presentation to Conference, ‘*Africa New Frontier: Innovation, Technology, Prosperity’*, Ottawa.

Crush J., Sujata R & Pendekton. W. (2013) ‘Soft Targets: Xenophobia, Public Violence and Changing Attitudes to Migrants in South Africa’, After May 2008, *SAMP.*

Crush J. & McDonald, DA. (2001) ‘The Dark Side of Democracy: Migration, Xenophobia and Human Rights in South Africa’, *International Migration*, No. 38, pp. 103-133.

Darvas Z & G.B. Wollf. (2014) ‘Europe’s Social Problem and Its Implications for Economic Growth’, Brugel Policy Brief, April 2014, Issue 2014/3, Brussels

De Benetti, T. (2009) ‘Theory’s Role in Research’, *Research Gate*, PDF file sourced from Barbara Kawulich (2016), available at URL= http://www.researchgate.net/publication/201834276, University of West Georgia

de Haas, H. (2005) “International Migration, Remittance and Development: Myths and Facts”, *Third World Quarterly,* 26(8):1269-1284

de Hass, H. (2006) “Engaging Diaspora: how governments and development agencies can support diaspora's involvement in the development of origin countries”, A study for Oxfam, International Migration Institute (IMI), University of Oxford

De Rivero O. (2003) The Myth of Development, the ungovernable entities of 21 Century, David Philip Publishers (Pty Ltd.), 208 Werdmuller Center, Claremont, 7735, South Africa.

Dessie, M. (2010) ‘Trafficking of Ethiopian Domestic Workers into Lebanon: Navigating Through a Novel Passage in international maid trade’, *Berkeley Journal of International Law,* 1009 (Summary Adopted from Resource Accessed at http.scholarship.law.Berkeley.edu. /cgi/view content/article 1317, key words: Lebanon, Ethiopia, domestic workers, trafficking

Devan, R. and Tiwari, P. (2000) ‘Diaspora and Development’, Discussion Paper for Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Does not look complete.

Dominguez and Dos Santos (ed), (2003) ‘Migration as Source of Growth: The Perspective of developing country’, *Journal of Population Economics*, Springer, Vol. 16(1), Page 161175,

Edmund Murrugarra, Jennica Larrison and Macin Sasin (ed) (2009) 'Towards Better Future:
The Role of Migration in Poverty Reduction'; World Bank Publication, Nov. 2009

Eller, et al (same here) (2007) 'Behavioural Ecological Model of Lithic Technological Change During the latter Middle Stone age of South Africa', *Journal of Archaeological Science,* Vol.34 (10), 1738-51; in McCall. (2015) 'Before Modern Humans: New Perspective on the African Stone Age', pp. 391

Enawgaw, Mehari (ed.) (2013) "Triangular Partnership: the power of the Diaspora", 5th annual Global Ethiopian Diaspora Conference, Washington DC., 2013

Faist. and Bauböck, C. (2010) Diaspora and Transnationalism. What kind of dance partners? Amsterdam University Press, pp. 5-352

'*Federal Negarit Gazeta'*, of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. (2002) Proclamation No. 270/202/ Providing Foreign Nationals of Ethiopian Origin with Certain Rights to be Exercised in this country of Origin P. P. 170, Addis Ababa. Feb. 3, 2002.

Galatowitsch, Diane (2009) "Co-Development in Mali: A Case Study of a Development Phenomenon Exploited by Immigration Policy". *Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection.* Paper 737. http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/737

Gebremariam, A. (2014) 'Dam! Ethiopia's White Elephants in Ethiopia? http//www. ethiomedia.com/ April 22, 2014

Getachew R. (2013). 'Debunking Oromo Extremist Narrative', available on line on YouTube http:// www.youtube.com, accessed 14.10.2016, at 15:00, posted 24.6.2014.7

Gianmarco Leon and Valerie Koechlin (2007) 'International Remittance and Income inequality: An Empirical Investigations; Inter-American Development Bank Paper (4475)

Gilroy. (2004) 'Between Camps: Nations, Cultures, and the Allure of Race', Routledge, 2 Park Square, Milton park, Abingdon, Oxon Ox144 41 RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY10017

George Samuel (2003) 'Banking Unbanked Immigrants Through Remittances, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

Glick, S. et al, in Whaleback, O. (2002) 'The Concept of Diaspora as Analytical Tool in the Study of Refugee Communities, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*; and in Shafer, GG, (2006) 'Transnationalism and Ethno-national Diasporism''

Hall, S. (1990) ‘’Identity, Community, Culture, Difference”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, London, Lowrence and Wishart.

Hein de Hass, forthcoming,’ Migration Theory: Understanding Human Mobility’, Source: Pal graph MacMillan publishers, Publication date, 2015; International Migration Institute, Oxford Department of International Development, University of Oxford,3 Mansfield Road, OX13TB, 2016.

Hear, N.V. (1998) *New Diasporas: the mass exodus, dispersal, and regrouping of migrant communities*, UCL Press Limited, 1 Gunpowder Square, London EC4

Henry, U. (1996) Transnational Connections: Culture, People, Places, London and New York, Routledge, 1 edition

Honig, I. (1996) in Wayne, C. et al (2000) ‘The Application of Ecological Principles to Urban and Urbanizing Landscapes’, *Ecological Applications*, Vol.10, Issue 3, (June 2000), USA

J. Spencer Trimingham (1952). Islam in Ethiopia. Oxford: Geoffrey Cumberlege for the University Press.

Juredini, R. (2010) ‘Trafficking and Contact migrant workers in Middle East, Geneva: International Migration Organization (IOM), Vol.49. No. 4:142-63 (Summary Adopted from Source: Accessed at : http:// www.academia.edu/1206706/ Trafficking and contract-migrant-workers- Ray Juredini)

Kapur, D. and McHale, J. (2005) ‘Give Us Your Best and Brightest: the global hunt for talent and its impact on the developing world’, *Centre for Global Development*, 9/1/5, p.246

Jean-Baptiste Mayer (ed.) (2006) ‘Diaspora Knowledge Networks: Vanishing Doubts and Increasing Evidences’, *International Journal of Multicultural Societies*, UNESCO, Paris, 8(1); pp.4-24

Kerby, A. Miller(1988) Emigrants and Exiles: Ireland and the Irish exodus to North America; Oxford University Press, Paperback edition, 1985; Irish Historical studies 1991 Nov. 1:27 (108) pp383-4

Ketkar, S. L and Ratha, D (2007) ‘Development Finance Through Diaspora Bonds: Track Records ' World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 4311

King, R. (2012) in Richard, E (ed.) Theories and Typologies of Migration: An Overview and A Premier, Malmo Institute of Migration, Diversity and Wale fare, (MIM), 205 06 Malmo, Sweden, Service Pint Holmberg 2013.

Kraut, A. (1995) 'Silent Travelers: Germs, Genes and Immigrant Menace', Johns Hopkins University Press, 2715 North Charles Street, Baltimore, MD2118-4319

Levitt, P. (1998) 'Social Remittances: migration driven local level forms of cultural diffusions', *International Migration Review*, 32(4): 926-48.

Loren, T. (2010) 'Territory, Subjectivity and the Power of Movement, Provocation and Intersections with theory, the contribution of African Research to Migration Theory', ACMS, University of Witwatersrand

Lowell, B. Lindsay and Stefka G. Berova (2004) "Diaspora and Economic Development: state of knowledge", Institute of International Migration, Georgetown University 3307 M Street, NW, Suite 302 Washington, DC.20007

Lyon, T. (2009) 'Ethiopian Diaspora and Homeland Conflict', Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Ethiopian Studies, Trondheim.

Maharaj, B. & Moodley, V. (2000) 'Economic Refugees in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Assets or Liabilities? Implications for Progressive Migration Policies', *Geo-journal*, January 2002, Vol 56, Issue 1, pp. 47-57

Maharaj, B & Vadi Moodley, V. (2000) 'New African Immigration to the Durban Region', *Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol.* 34:1, 149-160.

Maharaj, B. (2004) "Immigration to Post-Apartheid South Africa", *Global Migration Perspective*, Geneva, Global Commission on International Migration, June 2004.

Mararks, J. (2006) "Expatriate Professionals as an Entry Point into Global Knowledge- Intensive Value Chains: South Africa", Report Prepared for the Knowledge for Development Progress, World Bank Institute, Washington DC

Matteo Bugmelli and Francesco Paterno (2005) 'Do Workers' Remittances Reduce the Probability of Current Account Reversal? Bank of Italy Rome, pp.1821-1838

Meyer, Jean-Baptiste & Wattiaux, Jean-Paul (2006) 'Diaspora Knowledge Networks: Vanishing Doubts and Increasing Evidences', IJMS: *International Journal of Multicultural Societies, 2006* (8), no.1, pp. 4-24, UNESCO. ISSN 1817-4574

Mohan, G. (2002) 'Globalization from Below: Conceptualizing the Role of African Diaspora in African Development', *Review of African Political Economy*,

Vol. 29, Issue 92, pp. 211-236

Negash, M. (2009) “Ethiopian Diaspora Investment Potential and EEPCO's Millennium Bond”, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. Available at: http://Ethiopian/2010/minganegash-ethiopia-diaspora-article-March,2009;

Nyberg, S., Her, V. and Pederson (2002) ‘Migration-Development Nexus: evidence and policy’, International Organization for Migration, Working Paper No. 8, pp. 136.

Okasha, Samir (2015) ’Population Genetics’, *The Standard Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2015 Edition) Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL= <http:// www.plato.standford.edu./archieves/fall2015/entries/population-genetics>

Parson, R. C. (2012) ‘Trade Migration-Nexus’, Policy Research Working Paper, World Bank. Place

Philip Martin and Gettried Zurchers (2005) ‘Managing Migration: The Global Challenges’; *Population Bulletin* 63, No.1, 2008

Pieter, K., Odonovan, M, Bauer, O., & Johuan V. Z (2003) Post-Apartheid Pattern of Internal Migration in South Africa, HSRC Publishers, Cape Town, South Africa

Piore, MJ. (1979) A General Equilibrium Model of Guest-Worker Migration: The Source Country Perspective, Cambridge University Press, London.

Plaza, S & Ratha, D ed. (2011) “Diaspora for Development in Africa’, World Bank, Washington DC

Posel, D. (2003) ‘Review of Current Literature and Recent Research on Migration in Southern Africa’, Economics, University of Natal, Southern Africa, *Work in Progress,* March 2002, pp. 1-27

Posel, D. & Casale, D. (2003) ‘What Has Been Happening to Internal Labor Migration in South Africa 1993-1999’, *The South African Journal of Economics*, 71(3), pp.455-479.

R. Tucker, Charles B. Keely, and Linda Wrigley (1990) Immigration and US Foreign Policy, Lehrman Institute of New York City, Westview Press, Inc., 5500 Central Avenue, Boulder Colorado, 80301pp, 151-165

Rainer B & Thomas Faist T. (2010) Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories, and Methods, Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press.

Ratha, D et al. (2011) 'Leveraging Migration for Africa: Remittances, Skills, and Investments', The World Bank, Washington DC.

Ratha, D. (2006) "Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration", 2nd International Conference on Migrants' Remittance, London, 2007

Richards D. (2016) 'Economic Crisis Set the Stage for World War II', http://www.heneryMakow.com; accessed September, 2016, at 15:33.

Richard H. Adams, Jr. and John P (2005) 'Do International Immigration and Remittances Reduce Poverty?' World Bank; Washington DC, USA.

Pankhurst R. (2003) The Ethiopian Royal Chronicle, Addis Ababa University Press, 1967, Published by Tsehai Publishers,

Rogerson. CM. (1982) 'The Geography of International Refugee Movement in Southern Africa', *South African Geographical Journal*, Vol. 64, 6, pp.125-137

Rogerson, M. (1989) 'Hawkers in South African Small Urban Centers: Planning and Policy', *Development South Africa*, 6, pp. 295-310

Ruth, M. (2000) 'Africa as an alien future: middle passage, Afro-futurism, and Post-Colonial Water worlds', *Journal of American Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 4., p. 174

Sahn, D.E. (1999) Structural Adjustment Reconsidered: Economic Policy and Poverty in Africa; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press.

Sideri, E. (2008) 'The Diaspora of the Diaspora: A Working Paper of a Definition', Cultures in Transition, *Journal of Global Cultural Studies,* 2008:4, pp.34-47

Solimano, A. (2003) Immigrants Remittance: Issues and Evidences", Innovative Sources of Development Finance, printed in the United Nations, Santiago, Chile

Stalker. P. (2008) 'The No-Nonsense Guide to International Migration', *New*

Internationalist 2008 Business and Economics. Vol pages

Stack L. (2013). 'With Cameras Rolling Egyptian Politicians Threaten Ethiopia Over Dam', *The New York Times,* June 6. 2013, available at: http:// lede.com, accessed 13.10.2016, at 13:35

Todaro, Michael. and Marusko, L. (1987) 'Illegal Migration and U.S. Immigration Reform: A Conceptual Framework', *Population and Development Review,* 13 (March 1), pp. 101-115, in Debin, F (1990) 'Undocumented Migration to United States', p.277

Toloyan, K. (1991) 'Rethinking Diaspora: stateless power in a transitional moment', in Demetrio. 'Diaspora Identities and the Political Processes', *Diaspora*, Vol.5, No. 1 Spring 1996, pp.7-30

*p. 173.*Tsagarousianous, R. (2004) 'Rethinking the Concept of Diaspora: mobility, connectivity, and communication in a globalized world', *Westminster Paper in communication and Culture*, 1(1), pp52-65

UNDP (2007) 'Mobilizing Ethiopian Scientific Diaspora for Development', Source: actual Project Document and singed protocol between UNDP, IOM in cooperation with the Government of Ethiopia, July, 2007, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Werbner, P. (1997) 'Introduction: the dialectics of cultural hybridity', in Werbner p. and Modood, T. (ed.), Debating Cultural Hybridity, London Zed Books, pp. 1-26.

Widegren and Martin, P.L. (2013) 'International Migration: Facing the Challenge', Population Reference Bureau, World Migration Report, pp. 1-40

Williams, Z & Mohan, G. (2002) 'Development in Diaspora: Global South in a Changing World', *African Diaspora Review*. Vol. 92: pp. 205-210

World Bank (2013) 'Migration and Remittance Flows: Recent Trends and Outlook, 2013-2016', WB Report No 24, October 2013, pp. 1-29

Vasileva, Katya, (2011) '6.5% of EU Population Are Foreigners and 9.4% are born aboard', *Euro Stats, 34/2011*, URL= http:// www.EC.Europa.eu/ Eurostat/2011, accessed: 17.10.2016

Vertovek, S. (2003) 'Migration and other Modes of Transnationalism: towards conceptual cross fertilization', *International Migration Review,* 37 (3): pp. 641-665

Vertovek, S. (2004b)'Migrant Transnationalism and modes of transformation,

International Migration Review, 38 (3), Fall 2004, pp. 970-1001.

Yossi, S. & Barth, A. (2012) 'Diaspora and International Relations Theory', *International Organizations*, Volume 57, No. 3., p.231

You tube videos:

'Bahrena People's Tigrai', available at http://youtube.com, accessed on: 18.10.2016, 14:00

Dictionary:

'Tacit knowledge'. BusinessDictionary.com. Retrieved October 17, 2016, from Business Dictionary. website: http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/tacit-knowledge.html; http://www.wordnic.com, 2010

Religious data: taken from '*Ethiopian Treasures'* available at, URL= htttp:// www.Ethiopiatreasure.co.uk/ religion/hit. Accessed on 27.10.2016, at 18:22

Annexure

List of Participants' CDIN (Coded Data Identification Names) and DIN (Data Identification Numbers)

Table 8: **List with Typology Ethiopian Diaspora Based on Religion**

(Data in Rustenburg)

1. Woaka	No Affiliation	21. Habo	Orthodox, Christian
2. Abtem	Protestant, Christian	22. Bray	Orthodox, Christian
3. Bitil	Protestant, Christian	23. Edes	Orthodox, Christian
4. Ktge	Orthodox, Christian	24. Shmu	Protestant, Christian
5. Bias	Orthodox, Christian	25. Frte	Orthodox, Christian
6. Dini	Orthodox, Christian	26. Geab	Orthodox, Christian
7. Joyi	Protestant, Christian	27. Tete	Orthodox, Christian
8. Seit	Orthodox, Christian	28. Ayha	Muslim
9. Daur	Protestant, Christian	29. Chki	Protestant, Christian
10. Bite	Orthodox, Christian	30. Kite	Orthodox, Christian
11. Yowo	Orthodox, Christian	31. Woad	Protestant, Christian
12. Memo	Orthodox, Christian	32. Adta	Protestant, Christian
13. Wote	Orthodox, Christian	33. Tata	Protestant, Christian
14. Hiyo	Orthodox, Christian	34. Anat	Orthodox, Christian
15. Birte	Protestant, Christian	35. Taad	Protestant, Christian
16. Lehu	Muslim	36. Gike	Protestant, Christian
17. Fefe	Protestant, Christian	37. Gear	Orthodox, Christian
18. Teto	Protestant, Christian	38.Shmi	Protestant, Christian
19. Gete	Muslim	39. Hebe	Orthodox, Christian
20. Daki	Orthodox, Christian	40.Epme	Orthodox, Christian

Table 9: **Occupation of Ethiopian Diaspora in Rustenburg**						
Tribes	Amhara	Gurage	Hadiya	Oromo	Tigre	Wolaita
Big Business Owners	12	2	1	6	1	1
Self Employed	2	0	2	3	1	1
Employed by Family	1	1	0	6	0	0
Employed by South African Firms *	0	0	0	0	0	0
***Emphasis none-existence of employment by SA Firms**						

Table 10: Residence Permits of Participants in the Study (Rustenburg)

DIN & Coded Names	Status in SA	Coded Names	Status in SA
1. Woaka	Asylum-seeker	21.Haba	Recognised refugee
2. Abtem	Recognised refugee	22.Bray	Recognised refugee
3. Bitil	Asylum-seeker	23.Edes	Recognised refugee
4. Ktge	Business work permit	24.Shmu	Recognised refugee
5. Bias	Asylum-seeker	25.Frte	Recognised refugee
6. Dini	Recognised refugee	26.Geab	Recognised refugee
7. Joyi	Asylum-seeker	27.Tete	Permanent resident
8. Siet	Recognised refugee	28.Ayha	Asylum-seeker
9. Daur	Asylum-seeker	29.Chiki	Asylum-seeker
10. Bite	Recognised refugee	30.Kite	Permanent resident
11. Yowo	Recognised refugee	31.Woad	Recognised refugee
12. Memo	Business permit	32.Adta	Asylum-seeker

13. Wote	Recognised refugee	33.Tata	Asylum-seeker
14. Hiyo	Recognised refugee	34.Anat	Recognised refugee
15. Birte	Recognised refugee	35.Taad	Recognised refugee
16. Lehu	Recognised refugee	36.Gike	Asylum-seeker
17. Fefe	Asylum-seeker	37.Gear	Recognised refugee
18. Teto	Recognised refugee	38.Shmi	Recognised refugee
19. Gete	Recognised refugee	39.Hebe	Asylum-seeker
20. Daki	Recognised refugee	40.Epme	Asylum-seeker

DIN= Data Identifier Number

Table 11: **List of Participants with Data on Residence Permits (Durban)**

DIN & Coded Names	Status in SA	Coded Names	Status in SA
1. Woaka	Asylum-seeker	21.Haba	Recognised refugee
2. Abtem	Recognised refugee	22.Bray	Recognised refugee
3. Bitil	Asylum-seeker	23.Edes	Recognised refugee
4. Ktge	Business work permit	24.Shmu	Recognised refugee

5. Bias	Asylum-seeker	25.Frte	Recognised refugee
6. Dini	Recognised refugee	26.Geab	Recognised refugee
7. Joyi	Asylum-seeker	27.Tete	Permanent resident
8. Siet	Recognised refugee	28.Ayha	Asylum-seeker
9. Daur	Asylum-seeker	29.Chiki	Asylum-seeker
10. Bite	Recognised refugee	30.Kite	Permanent resident
11. Yowo	Recognised refugee	31.Woad	Recognised refugee
12. Memo	Business permit	32.Adta	Asylum-seeker
13. Wote	Recognised refugee	33.Tata	Asylum-seeker
14. Hiyo	Recognised refugee	34.Anat	Recognised refugee
15. Birte	Recognised refugee	35.Taad	Recognised refugee
16. Lehu	Recognised refugee	36.Gike	Asylum-seeker
17. Fefe	Asylum-seeker	37.Gear	Recognised refugee
18. Teto	Recognised refugee	38.Shmi	Recognised refugee
19. Gete	Recognised refugee	39.Hebe	Asylum-seeker
20. Daki	Recognised refugee	40.Epme	Asylum-seeker

DIN= Data Identifier Number

Table 12: **Occupations and Income Levels of the Ethiopian Diaspora (Only for Participants in the Study in (Durban)**

DIN & Code Names	Occupation	Income Per Month	Annual Income (ZAR)
1. Gnga	Nostalgic Trade	5,000	60,000
2. Mnu	Wholesale Store	15,000	180,000
3. Else	Tailor Shop	30,000	360,000
4. Oste	Shop Owner	14,000	168,000
5. Osri	Clothing shop owner	15,000	180,000
6. Ewew	Self-employed	10,000	120,000
7. Ewra	Nostalgic trade	30,000	360,000
8. Nuot	Butchery	15,000	180,000
9. Riam	Self-employed	20,000	240,000
10. Eteg	Restaurant Owner	40,000	480,000
11. Enne	PhD Student	11,000	132,000
12. Atye	Lecturer/ PhD Student	17,000	204,000
13. Huli	Engineer/PhD/	11,000	132,000
14. Saba	Electrical Engineer	12,500	150,000
15. Tuaw	Teacher	9,000	108,000
16. Akew	Self-Employed	7,000	84,000
17. Umlu	Self-employed	30,000	360,000
18. Etgu	Self-employed	10,000	120,000
19. Lese	Self-employed	20,000	240,000
20. Emme	Bag Shop owner	15,000	180,000

Table 14 Typology Based on Residence Status (Ethiopian Diaspora (Only for Participants in the Study in Durban)

DIN and Code Names	Occupation	Status in RSA	Income Per Month	Annual Income (ZAR)	Undocumented Income
1. Gnga	Asylum-seeker	None			None
2. Mnu	Nostalgic Trade	Recognised refugee	5,000	60,000	"
3. Else	Wholesale Store	Asylum-seeker	15,000	180,000	"
4. Oste	Tailor Shop	Recognised refugee	30,000	360,000	"
5. Osri	Shop Owner	Recognised refugee	14,000	168,000	"
6. Ewew	Clothing shop owner	Citizen of South Africa	15,000	180,000	"
7. Ewra	Self-employed	Recognised refugee	10,000	120,000	"
8. Nuot	Nostalgic trade	Recognised refugee	30,000	360,000	"
9. Riam	Butchery	Recognised refugee	15,000	180,000	"
10. Eteg	Self-employed	Marriage / Permit/	20,000	240,000	"
11. Enne	Restaurant Owner	Marriage /Permit/	40,000	480,000	"
12. Atye	PhD Student	Study Permit	1,000	132,000	"
13. Huli	Lecturer/PhD Student	Study Permit	17,000	204,000	"
14. Saba	Engineer/Phd/	Study Permit	11,000	132,000	"
15. Tuaw	Electrical Engineer	Study Permit	12,500	150,000	"
16. Aken	Teacher	Study Permit	9,000	108,000	"
17. Umu	Self-Employed	Work Permit	7,000	84,000	"
18. Etgu	Self-employed	Recognised refugee	30,000	360,000	"
19. Lese	Self-employed	Recognised refugee	10,000	120,000	"
20. Emme	Bag Shop owner	Recognised refugee	20,000	240,000	"

Table 15 Religion and Tribal Affiliations of Participant-Diasporas in Durban

DNI and Code Names	Gender	Tribe/Mother Tongue/	Religion
1. Gnga	Male	Amharic	Orthodox
2. Mnu	Male	Hadiya	Protestant
3. Else	Male	Hadiya	Protestant
4. Oste	Male	Amhara	Orthodox
5. Osri	Male	Amhara	Orthodox
6. Ewew	Male	Amhara	Orthodox
7. Ewra	Male	Amhara	Orthodox
8. Nuot	Male	Amharic	Orthodox
9. Riam	Male	Amharic	Orthodox
10. Eteg	Female	Amhara	Orthodox
11. Enne	Female	Amhara	Orthodox
12. Atye	Male	Amharic	Orthodox
13. Huli	Male	Amhara	Orthodox
14. Saba	Male	Oromo	Muslim
15. Tuaw	Male	Oromo	Protestant
16. Aken	Male	Amhara	Orthodox
17. Umu	Male	Amhara	Orthodox
18. Etgu	Male	Tigre	Pagan
19. Lese	Male	Oromo	Muslim
20. Emme	Female	Amhara	Orthodox

Sample Letter of Informed Consent used before the interview commenced (Designed According to the 'UKZN Standard Form for Letter of Consent')

Mr/Miss/Mrs/Prof./Dr./ _____

Please accept my greetings,

My name is Gashaw Teshome Mengesha, a PhD candidate at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, in the discipline of Development Studies. I am doing a research study on 'Ethiopian Diaspora in South Africa: Typology, Remittance and Policy Implications'. The purpose of the research is geared towards academic qualification. My supervisor for this project is Professor Oliver Mtapuri, and can be reached at: mtapurio@ukzn.ac.za.

You are being invited to consider participating in the above indicated study that involves Ethiopian Diaspora in South Africa. The objectives of this research are to explore the nature, characteristics of Ethiopian immigrants in Rustenburg and Durban cities and their participation in development back home through the instrument of remittances. The study is expected to enrol 60 participants, and less than half of them will be from Durban and the rest from Rustenburg. It will involve the following procedures: face to face interviews, group discussions and the consultation of literature. The duration of your participation, if you choose to enrol and remain in the study, is expected to be 1-2 months and I would like to make it clear that the study is self-funded.

The study is expected to pose no risk to your personal safety as it only requires you to share your experiences as diaspora, however, all your information is strictly confidential and I assure you that it will not be passed on to a third party. We hope that the study will help the flow of information

to academics and policy-makers on migration issues in South Africa and will become an additional learning process for participants as well.

This study has been ethically reviewed and approved by the UKZN Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee (approval No. HSS/1646/015M).

In the event of any problems or concerns/questions you may contact the researcher Gashaw Teshome Mengesha, at 358 41 7042801 or e-mail at: gashawtm3@gmail.com. or the UKZN Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee which is stated below:

HUMANITIES & SOCIAL SCIENCES RESEARCH ETHICS ADMINISTRATION

Research Office, Westville Campus

Govan Mbeki Building

Private Bag X 54001

Durban

4000

KwaZulu-Natal, SOUTH AFRICA

Tel: 27 31 2604557 - Fax: 27 31 2604609

Email: HSSREC@ukzn.ac.za

With best regards.

Gashaw Teshome Mengesha,

PhD Candidate, UKZN

Declaration of Consent

I ----------; have been informed about the study entitled 'Ethiopian Diaspora in South Africa: Typologies, Remittances and Policy implications' that is being conducted by Mr. Gashaw Teshome Mengesha, a PhD candidate at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, for academic reasons.

I have been given an opportunity to raise questions about the study and have received satisfactory answers. Following explanation by the researcher, I understand the purpose and procedures of the study. I have been assured that my participation in this study is entirely voluntary, and that I may withdraw at any time when I reasonably feel I need to do so. I also concur that my signature

consenting to participation was made of my own volition and that I will not claim any remuneration for participating in the study.

I have been informed about the study being risk-free, but will be assisted with information on the available medical centres for treatment if injury occurs during an interview session only. If I have any further questions/concerns or queries related to the study, I understand that I may contact the researcher at gashawtm3@gmail.com or on his Phone: 00 358 41 7042801 or contact his supervisor Professor Mtapuri for any relevant investigation.

I hereby provide consent to participate as an interviewee and to be called for focus group discussions, if I am selected to be at such at any time during the progress of the research and permit the following

Use of my photographs for research purposes YES

---------- ----------

Signature of Participant Date_____ Signature of Witness _____

Date

Demographic Questions (To be filled in before interview)

1) Personal Details:

- Name

_____

- Year and Place of Birth

_____

- Gender: Male or Female
- Marital Status Married Single Widowed Separated
- No of Children _____ (Boys) _____(Girls) _____ (Transgender)_____
- Cultural Affiliation (Mother Tongue), (Tribal Identity), etc.

_____

- De-territorialised identity? Please Circle: Yes No 2) Structured Personal Data
- Income/ Month

_____

- Banked? Yes, Or No

_____

- Legal Status in South Africa (Please Underline)

a) Documented, b) Undocumented, c) Recognised Refugee, d) Work Permit e) Study Permit, f) Permanent Resident, G) Temporary Resident Permit (family related)

If other, please specify

_____

- Location of Origin in Ethiopia:

_____ Occupation in South Africa

_____ Contact:

Phone_____ E-mail Address:

_____

3) Data on Remittances /Channels/ (Please Underline)

Western Union: Daahabshi; Hawalla; Money Gram; Pay Pal; Bank Transfer; Personal currier;

Social	Description	Location
Religious	Description	Location
Cultural/ Mother Tongue/	Description	Location
Political	Description	Location
Business	Description	Location
Professional/ interest	Description	location

postal or money order

Other (please specify)

_____

_____

Annual Remittance

_____

(Detail will be discussed during interview)

4) Data on Types of Networks

5) Contacts of International Bodies: Example, UNHCR, IOM, Amnesty, etc. (Please Write)

_____

6) Family Tree in South Africa

No of Parents (_____)

Brother/s (_____)

Sister/s (_____)

Relatives (_____) (Residence can be discussed during the interview)

7) Travel Routes to South Africa:

- Port of Entry

_____ -

Countries Crossed to Reach South Africa:

_____

_____

Time spent in transit to

RSA_____

- Year of Admission to South Africa:

_____

- Status

_____

8) Legal Wise (please Underline)

a) Covered for Legal Protection

b) Not covered for legal protection

9) Involvement in Origin State-induced development projects back home: (please circle)

a) Housing program; b) bond buying c) knowledge transfer d) technology transfer; e) image building and tourism promotion; f) political

allegiance to origin state; g) Investment h) cooperation at international front,

Other

_____

_____

_____

10) Do you consider yourself as one of the following?

a) Diaspora; b) Immigrant; c) illegal alien; d) expatriate; e) job creator in South

Africa (Business investor); Other. Please indicate _____

Signature of Respondent _____

Thank you for your responses and participation in individual interviews.

End of Demographic Questions

_____ //_____

To be completed by Researcher

Interview Date _____

Category Code: _____

Group Participation: _____

Location of Data _____ Further enquiry: Yes / No

Some of the Guiding Questions used for Subject Interviews

1) To understand the 'pull factors' the following questions were raised:

- Why did you come to South Africa and why you don't live in your own country?
- What were the challenges and opportunities of migration: did someone or a group of people help you to come to South Africa?
- What were the means, methods and routes followed: air, land and sea transport?

2) Process of Indigenisation/integration/ within host space?

- What is your occupation and way of life in South Africa?

- Do you participate in integration plans in South Africa?
- What is your legal status?
- How is your interaction with the host society and opportunities and challenges?
- Do you help others, locals and your relatives, in terms of employment?

3) Nostalgic connections (homesickness and the symbolic connections)

- Do you plan to go home; when, why? What do you bring from home to the host?
- What do you want to do in Ethiopia based on the opportunities here?
- How do you keep contact with home?
- Do you participate in any activities in Ethiopia?
- How do you interact with the Ethiopian embassy in Pretoria?
- Do you participate in Bond buying from the Ethiopian Government, why, for how much?

4) On Remittance

- Do you send materials or money to families in Ethiopia?
- How much, how often, when was the maximum transfer, lower transfer, how many times a year?
- What channels you use, why?
- What are the challenges, and constraints for your remittance?
- Do you see a better way of sending these? What is your wish in this regard?

5) Contact with UNHCR, Home Affairs, Ethiopian Embassy, Ethiopian Community Civil organisations

- Do/Did you contact any one of the above? Why?
- How is the relationship?

6) Social Networks

- Do you have social networks, what, why, how?
- How is the interaction with the host community?

-

Note: First Cycle of Triangulation involved (repeating the questions on two occasions, first as structured questions, then during the discussion time of individual interviews)

Photo 3: Design of Millennium Dam,

Source: Aigaforum, URL= http:// www.aigaforum.com, accessed, June 2016. At 12:23

***Photo 4*:** Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Terrain Site. It relies on citizens' contributions and selling of Diaspora Bond, fund raising, and voluntary contribution from Immigrants *(**Source*:** Aigaforum; found in URL= http:// www.aigaforum.com/ pictures of Dam/

Photo 5: Construction Site: The Conflict over the Nile Waters has made the Ethiopian Diaspora the center of attention among different actors: the state of origin needs the diaspora's hard currency to build the dam and Egypt needs Ethiopian immigrants like Oromos, and Ogaden Ethiopians to subvert the completion of the Dam by keeping the Ethiopian government busy in domestic conflict.

(**Photo 5; Source**: www.google.com, www.internationalrivers.com www.saliniImpriglo.com and Aigaforum, 2016)

UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL

INYUVESTI YA KWAZULU-NATALI

17 December 2015

Mr GT Mengesha 213573167

School of Built Environment and Development Studies Howard College Campus Dear Mr Mengesha

Protocol reference number: HSS/1646/015M

Project title: Ethiopian Diaspora in South Africa: Typology, remittance and policy implications

Full Approval — Expedited Application in response to your application received 3 November 2015, the Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee has considered the abovementioned application and the protocol has been granted FULL APPROVAL.

Any alteration/s to the approved research protocol i.e. Questionnaire/interview Schedule, Informed Consent Form, Title of the Project, Location of the Study, Research Approach and Methods must be reviewed and approved through the amendment [modification prior to its implementation. In case you have further queries, please quote the above reference number.

PLEASE NOTE: Research data should be securely stored in the discipline/department for a period of 5 years.

The ethical clearance certificate is only valid for a period of 3 years from the date of issue. Thereafter Recertification must be applied for on an annual basis.

I take this opportunity of wishing you everything of the best with your study. Yours faithfully

[redacted]

.....

Dr Shenuka Singh (Chair)
Humanitities & Social Scinces Research Ethics Committee

/pm

Cc Supervisor: Prof Oliver Mtapuri

Cc Academic Leader Research: Dr Cathy Sutherland

Cc School Administrator: Ms Lindile Danisa

Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee

Dr Shenuka Singh (Chair)

Westville Campus, Govan Mbeki Building

Postal Address: Private Bag X54001, Durban 4000

Telephone: +27 (O) 31 260 3587/8350/4557 Facsimile: +27 (O) 31 260 4609 Email:
ximbap@ukzn.ac.za I snymanm@ukzn.ac.za /
mohunp@ukzn.ac.za Website: www.ukzn.ac.za

PostScript Evidence for Contribution to Knowledge: Appendix

1.Introduction

This postscript deals with the researcher's ontological position on migration discourse that guided the research. As discussed earlier, the study's main contributions occur on in both the ontological and epistemological fronts. The *epistemological* propositions were: the criteria for checking '*migrant-host compatibility or complementarity index'*, and using categories like '*Remitting Immigrants (RI*) as development actors. On the *ontological* front, the *Ecological Model* is the world view adopted by the researcher that represented a new perspective in the ongoing debate on the causes, consequences and possible solutions to migration-related problems by balancing the dominant top-down perspective on migration theory, with a rounded and more inclusive approach. Revisiting the tenets of the Ecological Model as the theme of this postscript reinforces *what we know now*, that we did not know before conducting this research.

The other reason for revisiting the Ecological Model is to conform to UKZN's rule that provides that materials put forward for publication can be added to the Thesis (Guideline of Masters and PhD Submission, 2015). In line with this, and for the sake of comparison, the postscript appendix is prepared to present a section of the article submitted to the *International Migration Journal*.

The article was much more extensive than what is presented below. It delved into existing theories, highlighted their limitations, identified the research gap, and proposed a new proposition on how migration should be viewed. In order to place this new addition within the discourse it was relevant to present an extended discussion. However, to avoid repetition, the focus of this postscript is the content of the *Ecological Model* itself. This part benefited from the

wealth of knowledge of my supervisor Professor Mtapuri and he was acknowledged in the article for 'a critique of socio-economic theory of migration'.

A CRITIQUE OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC THEORIES OF MIGRATION:
TOWARDS AN ECOLOGICAL MODEL

Abstract

Most debates in the field of migration overlook influential variables such as actors and decision-makers. For instance, the invisible people who manage migration, those who trigger migration and governmental and non-governmental stakeholders remain beneath the radar of the migration discourse. This could be because the actors who impact migration set an agenda far from themselves, knowingly or unknowingly, with consequent shortfalls in the theorisation that encompasses their characteristics.

This article argues that global actors and policy-makers' in migration have strong links with the phenomenon itself; hence their belief systems about migration deserve a degree of theorisation. It is also based on the premise that migration is historically hosted by mainsteam socioeconomic theories as a guest subject, limiting the depth of the analytical frameworks used in most academic and policy discourse. In light of this, this article introduces the Ecological Model as independent analytical category for migration, by taking into account the similarities of values and ideologies of influential players in global migration policies and practices. The socio-economic theories are the bases for most of the arguments presented in the contemporary Meteorological Model and partly for prepositions made in the Police Model. While this article chronologically presents some of the gaps in socio-economic theories (King, 2012), it limits itself to introducing the Ecological Model, among the newly-proposed three meta-models for migration, namely, the Meteorological, Police and Ecological models of migration. While these three models are dealt with in detail in chapter two of this thesis, the article selects the Ecological Model as the theme of its *ontological position*.

The thinking of protagonists of the Meteorological Model is rooted in neo-classical economic theories which project the following features: they view migration mainly from a quantitative perspective when measuring different factors like remittances and migration flows and so forth, and neglect the subjective aspects of diaspora experiences; they adopt an exploitative and hierarchical approach to migration by their over-emphasis on the economic value of migrants; valorise labour and its mobility and remittances; they detach remittances from the development agency of immigrants; adopt an NGO and state-centric analysis; they employ econometrics as they link migration to the economic growth of countries; they are pro-state controls of the diaspora and their remittances; and the protagonists belong to a major bloc of players in migration. In contrast to the above positions, the Ecological Model is a multi-dimensional perspective that avoids committing to a single story of migration. As a conceptual construct, the Ecological Model could be an alternative model that neutralises the polarisation in migration theories because it offers more rounded and accommodating perspectives in analysing the phenomenon.

2. THE ECOLOGICAL MODEL OF MIGRATION: A NEW ADDITION?

The Ecological Model or analytical perspective on migration is not yet developed; hence this is an attempt in that direction. Some authors have, however, used a similar approach in different disciplines, for example Sociology (Dahlberg, 2002, pp. 1-56); Development Psychology (Bronfenbrenner, 1979); in Geography to explain evolution and human interaction with its environment (Ellers, 2010; Johnson and Stinchcombe, 2007); and in Medicine (Honig et al. 1992). In the biological sciences, Carlton (1996); Kareiva (1996) and Williamson (1996) explained the 'ecology of invasive species'. Some scholars in Banking and Finance used the Ecological Model to explain financial crisis (Kelly, 2004). Since this approach is gaining currency, it is difficult to determine which discipline is the pioneer in developing or using the ecological theory. Scales and levels of analysis are common features of the models and analytical frameworks applied across disciplines as they strive to understand and find solutions to different problems. For instance, Urie Bronfenbrenner proposed the five system model or ecological systems theory which is useful in studying the relationship of 'individuals to their communities and the wider society' in terms of child development. In international relations, systems theory (Buzan et al., 2000) can be considered a scalar perspective. Scales or divisions such as local, national, regional and universal with their corresponding structures and institutions provide common models of analysis and one can assume that such perspectives have benefited from the ecological approach as the model provides perspectives from different angles. However, this study regards diaspora within the Ecological model by intensifying different frameworks of analyses in building a meta-theory.

Theories, phenomena, practices, policies, ideologies, players and actors in migration, remittances and diaspora settings are considered as variables by themselves.

Hence, though inspired by multi-level analysis in different disciplines, this study employed an original framework of analysis in light of the need for a multi-dimensional approach to diaspora and remittances. As noted above, the Ecological Model seems to be an established tradition in many fields and we can also devise the ecology of migration, as a new beginning.

As noted earlier, both the Meteorological and Police Models see remittances and immigrants as sporadically connected and this leads to a partial portrayal of the issues. The focus was on remittances as financial flows or labour. The recent Meteorological Model or classical socio-economic theories recognised the economic potential and development impact of remittances and labour, mainly from contract foreign workers in receiving countries, with empirical evidence in typical macro-economic settings. The other pro-control migration discourse termed the Police Model treats remittances as growth neutral at best, and at worst regards them as promoting social and economic vices. They should thus be tightly controlled. However, the model acknowledges the benefits of migrant labour. Both schools of thought are limited to figures and statistics that are used in a technocratic manner in line with the logic of bureaucracies, and multilateral intergovernmental bodies such as the IMF and WB which have become the main forums of discussion and source of policies for global governance of remittances and immigrants in a disconnected way. The Ecological Model emphasises the need to connect all the relevant factors and issues behind remittances and immigrants, because they do not occur in a vacuum. It is about establishing links between remittances and poverty reduction and recognising the agency of the immigrant in development, and it calls for a corresponding policy of international cooperation. The Ecological Model regards remittances as a bond where immigrants assume significant responsibility for the development of their home country by reducing poverty and supplying a multiplier factor in its socio-economic progress. It argues that regulation alone cannot address possible abuse of the international remittance system, and migration or diaspora processes. Supporters of a pro-regulation approach, link remittances to livelihoods only to a certain degree, leaving the issue unresolved. This undermines the positive impact of remittances and even obstructs their flow because doubts about migrant remittances resonate in official banking systems around the world. Financial services for immigrants are poor for fear of the misuse and abuse of the remittances. North-South remittances are easily affected by regulatory regimes based on the Police Model. The Ecological Model rejects justifications put forward by

proponents of the Police Model to totally control remittances as a misunderstanding of the crucial role played by migrants' remittances in the economic and social wellbeing of their families.

The Ecological Model not only recognises the link between remittances and poverty reduction which is the main thrust of development, but also elevates the role of immigrants to the level of reliable development agents. Hence it suggests an all-rounded view of remittances and immigrants. As previously stated, the Meteorological and Police Models rely on incomplete data; this can be observed from the fact that South-South remittances and related data are either omitted or underemphasised. In contrast, the Ecological Model is a southern perspective that balances the exaggerated North-South flow of remittances with evidence that South-South remittances play an equally significant role in economic, social, and cultural developments in developing countries. The main lines of argument of the Ecological Model are: a) it sees remitting immigrants as intelligent, development-conscious individuals who have a better understanding of poverty and have experience of poverty reduction; b) it confers on immigrants a similar status as that of state or NGOs as agents of development in their home countries; c) it regards immigration, and political and economic crises in immigrant source countries as resulting from the double standards of democracy held by developed societies. It blames the West for advocating for the values of democracy, and yet supporting tyrannical regimes that manufacture immigrants. The challenges confronting immigrants face in their countries of their origin are also precipitated by exogenous development interventions in the form of FDI that dislocate indigenous people from their land; d) it upholds the trickle down effects of migrant remittances to various social-cultural, economic, developmental, environmental and other benefits in their countries. It gives credence to the notion that immigrants shoulder the state's failure to take care of the people at home; e) it sees remittances and immigrants from the wider perspective of North-South relations of mutual benefit; f) it emphasises a human-centred development approach and acknowledges that remittances and immigration are an irreversible trend that developed societies needs to embrace. Hence, it calls for better understanding of immigrants' role as development agents who deserve international assistance. It sees immigration as desirable human movement and as a phenomenon which is intertwined with human existence.

3. Remarks

The legitimacy of theorisation is one of the challenges in migration development studies. The contest to control the narratives continues silently, but fiercely. Migration discourse has a layered structure, with different values and interests occupying the top, middle and bottom echelons. Most of the theories discussed above, like the socio-economic school of thought and the Police

Models, occupy the upper echelon as the major discourses in policy and practice, whereas the Meteorological Model represents the expert views of influential multilateral bodies and decision-makers who research migration from a neutral position. Nevertheless, these experts' class affiliation puts them in the middle category, and since their impact can be decisive, sometimes in in the upper level. The Ecological Model is antithetic to all these perspectives and includes the views of migrants themselves in constructing a theory. It represents a bottom-up view without neglecting the positive and valid points made by actors and players who occupy the upper and middle echelons of migration discourse. Therefore, the Ecological Model is a critique of the theories that cite social problems and economic deprivation as universal causes of migration and it emphasises political, tribal and even cultural reasons as causes of migration.

= // =

7 Woodlands Rd
GLENWOOD
DURBAN 4001
083 415 2531

15 November 2016

Reg. No. 2006/156780/23

Gashaw Teshome Mengesha

EDITING OF DOCTORAL THESIS OF GASHAW TESHOME MENGESHA

I have an MA in English from University of Natal (now UKZN) and have been performing editing services through my company for eleven years. My company regularly edits the research dissertations, articles and theses of the School of Nursing, Environmental Studies and various other schools and disciplines at the University of KwaZulu-Natal and other institutions, as well as editing for publishing firms and private individuals on contract.

I hereby confirm that Dennis Schauffer edited the research thesis of **Gashaw Mengesha** titled "*Ethiopian Diaspora in South Africa: Typology and its Policy Implications*" on behalf of *Word Weavers cc* and commented on the anomalies he was unable to rectify in the MS Word Track Changes and review mode by insertion of comment balloons prior to returning the document to the author. Corrections were made in respect of grammar, punctuation, spelling, syntax, tense, referencing and language usage as well as to sense and flow. The edit was reviewed

and moderated by me. There were many corrections made prior to the document being considered polished.

I trust that the document will prove acceptable in terms of editing criteria.

Yours faithfully

C Eberle

Catherine P. Eberle (MA: University of Natal)