



**TARGETED SANCTIONS AS A NEW POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN ZIMBABWE: A  
TRANSITION OR OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRACY FROM 2000 – 2013**

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
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## **DEDICATION**

I would like to dedicate my humble effort to my amazing mother Ruth Nyandoro and to my late father the reason to what I have become now.

## **ABSTRACT**

The main aim of the research was to critically analyse the potential impact of targeted sanctions in promoting or impeding democracy in Zimbabwe. The research was centred around the conflicting views on the use of targeted sanctions as a tool in coercing and dissuading the target governments pursuing retrogressive policies deemed undemocratic. The use of targeted sanctions is a fairly new discourse in international relations and the efficacy of which is highly debatable. Due to the failure to recognise and promote human rights and its covenants on economic, social and cultural rights, Zimbabwe has been under targeted sanctions for over a decade. Disputed elections, the chaotic land reform program, and poor monetary policies compounded the problem.

To understand democracy and sanctions, two theories were used, namely; the substantive approach to the theory of democracy and the institutional theory of sanctions. In order to achieve the objectives of the study, a triangulation was used where both qualitative and quantitative research designs were used. In depth interviews were conducted with key informants who were conveniently selected. Questionnaires were self-administered in order to achieve a high return rate. The researcher made use of thematic data analysis by examining themes and patterns emerging from the data. Furthermore, secondary data in the form of historical statistical data, journals, newspaper articles and government reports were used to complement the study. In total 85 usable questionnaires were returned, and eight interviews were successfully conducted.

The empirical evidence shows that generally, there is a negative perception with regards to controversial laws passed by the government in 2002 and 2004 respectively. Interviewees differed in their perceptions with regards to ZANU PF's repressive laws. However, there was consensus on the partial success of sanctions in aiding democracy in Zimbabwe. Suggestions are that, sanctions fuelled the party's quest for power and domination which had a negative domino effect on the economy and ultimately on the ordinary people. Ironically, the Government of National Unity formed in 2009 assisted in reversing some of the stringent policies, measures and laws passed by the Government in response to the sanctions. The study concludes that the use of sanctions as a protest action on undemocratic regimes

should consider the country's socio-political factors. Considering the above issues, for the country to be re-integrated into the international community, there is need to mend its diplomatic course for the sake of its citizens and transition to a more viable democratic system. This would aid in forging an appropriate sanction package without harming ordinary citizens both economically and socially.

## **PREFACE**

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the promotion of democracy has characterised American hegemony and sanctions continue to be used to promote democracy. International standards and international law are promulgated in adherence to democratic principles and values. These international standards entail the recognition and promotion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and covenants on economic, social and cultural rights. When a government in power contravenes extensively with these international standards, it deviates from the agreed norms and values of governing people. This usually results in intervention by the international community through sanctions or military intervention.

ZANU PF has been under sanctions for the past decade for supposedly contravening the above agreed norms and values of governing Zimbabweans. Currently, a series of the targeted sanctions against Zimbabwe are being removed as incentives for improvements towards ruling democratically with further supports from the MDC. The study therefore seeks to explore the links identified above in order to ascertain the effects sanctions have had on democracy in Zimbabwe.

The study is therefore important as it looks at how best democracy can be promoted in countries like Zimbabwe where individual rights and freedoms are violated. The study couples democracy and sanctions because the latter has become the most popular method for Western countries to promote democracy, therefore the study is relevant in investigating whether sanctions are a viable tool in promoting democracy.

## **ABBREVIATIONS**

APPA	All-Party Parliamentary Africa Group
AIPPA	Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act
AU	African Union
EU	European Union
GPA	Global Political Agreement
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MDC-M	Movement for Democratic Change Mutambara
MDC-T	Movement for Democratic Change Tsvangirai
POSA	Public Order and Security Act
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZDERA	Zimbabwe Democratic Recovery Act



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## CHAPTER 1

### 1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Sanctions have, for a long time, been used as a form of diplomacy to deter and dissuade against certain actions in the international arena. However sanctions have only recently been used in international relations by those pursuing to enforce democracy.

In its bid to police the world, the West has exploited the international political economy to impose economically crippling sanctions against statesmen or countries who have infringed on human rights and freedoms. However, it has refrained from incurring the costs and burden of active intervention in countries where human rights and freedoms are infringed upon. In addition, the West has capitalised on their position at the apex of that globalization pyramid. Globalization has facilitated international trade and financial interdependence and due to the West's influence on Globalisation, it has given the West the political and economic power to impose sanctions on other states. However, as highlighted, sanctions are fairly new in the international arena particularly as a tool for promoting democracy, and their effectiveness is still to be determined.

A case that may assist in determining the effectiveness of sanction in efforts of encouraging democracy is Zimbabwean. Zimbabwe has been under sanctions for more than a decade and it is therefore the aim of the study to investigate whether sanctions have been an aid or impediment to the democratic process in Zimbabwe.

## **1.1. SANCTIONS**

According to Baldwin (1985), sanctions are a coercive policy instrument used to influence the target state's behaviour. Sanctions have been identified as an alternative to military force used when the country imposing sanctions is unwilling to incur the cost of a military expedition to express their displeasure in the opposing state (Baldwin, 1985). Sanctions have been a tool of state craft for centuries, dating back to the Athenians when they used economic trade sanctions to dissuade other countries from trading with their closest rivals, Sparta (Crawford, 1999). However, according to Crawford (1999), there have been more cases of sanctions being passed than there has been of sanctions being successful. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, during the Cold War, only two United Nations mandated sanctions were passed against Rhodesia(now Zimbabwe) and South Africa, the latter being the only case where they were considered to show some results of success (Crawford, 1999) . According to Crawford (1999), other successful sanctions include those posed against Gaddafi and Libya in 1999 and against former Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic for his aggressive policies in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Johnson (1998) postulates that there are a variety of forms of sanctions which can be imposed against a country or statesmen and the most popular sanctions include economic and financial sanctions. Other forms of sanctions may be in the form of arms embargoes which block arms trade between official dealers and the sanctioned government and diplomatic sanctions which result in isolation from the international community. The use of the measure of sanctions has broadened under United Nations articles since 1990. However, Drezner (1999) is of the opinion that all the types of sanctions mentioned above are all-encompassing sanctions which tend to hurt the entire population. Drezner (1999) further comments that to mitigate the damage made by sanctions on the population, sanctions have taken the form of smart or targeted sanctions.

### **1.1.2. SMART / TARGETED SANCTIONS**

Smart sanctions are used to coerce particular individuals, political parties and companies which are part of lobbying for policies deemed undemocratic. Targeted sanctions are comprised of arms embargoes, asset freezes, travel bans and visa restrictions (Drezner, 1999). Another form

of sanctions which may be imposed is called selective sanctions and comprises of aid cuts and financial restrictions. These are more comprehensive than targeted sanctions, however selective sanctions and targeted sanctions are often used together under the appearance of smart sanctions as they are said to complement each other. According to Taylor (2010), arms embargoes are imposed to control military powers, particularly in cases where the sanctioned individuals and groups utilise state apparatus to undermine democracy and perpetuate conflict. The purpose of the arms embargo is to deprive military agents of weapons and equipment, however, Taylor (2010) notes that the result of the shortage in weapons often creates a financial interest where the gap in supply and demand causes price to increase and encourages weapons smuggling for profits. Furthermore it is suggested by Taylor (2010) that those who impose the arms embargo have the resources required to facilitate the smuggling of weapons. These individuals or countries therefore benefit from the sanctions motivating for the continuation of the embargo and sustaining the conflict; it is in such cases that the entire population is affected.

On the other hand, targeted travel bans and visa restrictions have minimal or no effect on the population of countries with sanctioned individuals. In the opinion of Taylor (2010) travel bans isolate the targeted individual from the rest of the world particularly to continents with important business interests. This proved to be a success when Milosevic and about six hundred other individuals were banned from travelling in Europe. However, Taylor (2010) further notes that travel bans and visa restrictions are not as effective as they represent a mere loss of privilege. It is noted by Taylor (2010) that the imposition of visa restrictions on the Zimbabwean Africa National Union Patriot Front (ZANU PF) has somehow affected the rest of population as it became difficult for Zimbabwean citizens to acquire visas to European countries despite not being banned. Taylor (2010) proposes that the seizure of foreign assets is another effective tool in coercing countries to abide by democratic principles. Taylor (2010) notes that although seizure of assets is still an effective way of forcing individuals and entities to comply, most undemocratic regimes hide their assets and money to secure a source of income to fund and sustain them or to flee the country and diversify investments. Identifying these assets has

proven to be a challenge to the sanctioning country, as ways of tracking and revealing these assets improves, so do the methods of concealing them.

As noted previously by Drezner (1999), targeted sanctions are only aimed at particular individuals and not the entire population. Portela (2013) reveals that, targeted sanctions are meant to indicate to the population that the sanctioning country is displeased with the targeted regime's behaviour and more importantly, that the sender wishes no harm to the rest of population of the receiving state. Portela (2013) further states that, unlike all-encompassing sanctions, targeted sanctions do not aim to have a significant impact on the economy or to cause a humanitarian crisis. Targeted sanctions are only meant to cut loyalty ties and support for the targeted regime isolating them domestically and internationally.

As highlighted before, sanctions may be in the form of diplomatic measures and targeted sanctions are an advantage to the sender as they are a refined form of diplomacy which can be regulated. According to Portela (2013), the regulations of targeted sanctions are accompanied by varying measures of imposition from stern measures to eased measures. This may be used to indicate the recognition of change in behaviour. This however requires extensive monitoring and deduction in a hostile environment where data collection may be difficult for foreigners and restricted to natives which may at times be unreliable.

However, Drezner (1999) notes that smart sanctions have proved not as effective and reliable as studies have shown. Despite being targeted at particular individuals, they result in the detriment of the population at large. As an example, Drezner (1999) comments that in Iraq, after the United States of America (USA) had passed smart sanctions against Saddam Hussein's repressive government in 2002, the sanctions had a resultant effect on the Iraq people as the government became more repressive.

According to Muller (1999), Western countries fail to take into consideration the internal political economy of a targeted state hence the citizens of the targeted country who are not able to shield themselves from economically damaging sanctions suffer from the targeted sanctions. Targeted sanctions are only a facet of the concept of sanctions which is still being developed, and therefore, the success or failure of sanctions still operated under trial and error.

However Galtung (1976) contends that if the elite are pressured by political disintegration the whole system will eventually collapse:

Galtung, (1976, 388) further notes that, “The idea is that there is a limit to how much value deprivation to the system can stand, and that once this limit is reached (resulting in a split in leadership or between leadership and people), then political disintegration will proceed rapidly and will lead to surrender or willingness to negotiate”.

However, taking into consideration the many factors that affect the imposition of sanctions, the above assertion seems naïve. According to Portela (2013), in the event that sanctions destabilize the economy and political base of the targeted state, the targeted elite can sustain themselves if there are alternatives. Despite sanctions imposed on Iran by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the USA and the European Union (EU), Iran has continued its nuclear enrichment programme. Through new alliances in Latin America and Africa, Tehran has managed to bolster new markets for its oil gaining funds which are channelled to its nuclear enrichment programme.

## **1.2. DEMOCRACY**

In the opinion of Peksen and Drury (2010), in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the promotion of democracy has characterised American hegemony and sanctions continue to be used to promote democracy. International standards and international law are promulgated in adherence to democratic principles and values. These international standards entail the recognition and promotion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and covenants on economic, social and cultural rights (Doxey, 1987). Pape (1997) postulates that when a government in power contravenes extensively with these international standards, it deviates from the agreed norms and values of governing people. This usually results in intervention by the international community through sanctions or military intervention. Peksen and Drury (2010) are of the opinion that sanctions may be viewed as “carrot and stick” diplomacy where a change in policy by the sanctioned government might result in rewards in the form of aid and loans, as a government pursues more democratic policies the international community offers more developmental aid, however deviating from the international standards may results in more punitive sanctions. Major Powers in the international arena are also increasingly using sanctions to achieve and advance their own international political agendas (Peksen and Drury, 2010).

Taking into consideration how the transition to democracy in Africa has been a slow and at times a regressive process, it can be argued that following international standards and norms is a Western way of implementing democracy (Breytenbach, 1996). Breytenbach (1996) further notes that Western countries constantly insist on elections and voting in Africa; however voting is merely a variable within the concept of democracy resulting in a situation where the population is involved only passively without proper participation in the democratic process. Breytenbach (1996) comments that without understanding the political economy of the targeted regime’s state, the advocating of Western countries for democracy becomes regressive considering that a multitude of other factors within the concept of democracy are undermined. A stable and viable economy for example is particularly important and to sustain a democracy. Breytenbach (1996) further contends that variables that make up democracy should complement each other for there to be a feasible transition to democracy. Therefore, when Western countries impose sanctions insisting on elections and voting there is a possibility

that it might result in regressive patterns as democracy is much complex more than just voting. The pursuit of democracy therefore becomes a complex issue as the idealized form of democracy being advocated for by Western countries might not be suitable for Africa.

### **1.3. ZIMBABWE'S TARGETED SANCTIONS**

According to Masunungure and Badza (2010), Zimbabwe has been under the rule of President Robert Mugabe and ZANU PF since 1980. Ever since Zimbabwe's independence until 1996, President Mugabe has competed in presidential elections largely unopposed until the emergence of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999. Zimbabwe had essentially become a one party state which gave ZANU PF the incentive to yield more power blurring the lines separating the power between the government, the judiciary, military and police, as these were used to further ZANU PF's political agenda (Maposa, Muguti and Tobias, 2013). According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012), the warning signs of an emerging repressive government in Zimbabwe had always been there but had been ignored by the West. An example of this was when the persecution and massacre of up to twenty thousand Ndebele people in the 1980's occurred and was ignored by the West and no sanctions were imposed against ZANU PF. It was only in 2000, after the controversial Fast Track Land Reform programme, with subsequent political instability and government repression, that the West imposed smart sanctions against Zimbabwe.

According to the APPA Report (2009)<sup>1</sup>, land in Zimbabwe has been a central driving force for the volatile political dynamics. In the Second Chimurenga (Zimbabwe's War of Liberation) land was a prominent motivating factor and even at the signing of the ceasefire of the Chimurenga war, President Mugabe was reluctant to sign the Lancaster House Agreement due to disagreements pertaining to land<sup>1</sup>. According to the HRW Report (2002)<sup>2</sup>, in the perspective of the ZANU PF, the Fast Track Land Reform programme was meant to correct the historical imbalances of land holding brought about by colonialism. However, the white Zimbabwean farmers saw this as a violation of their property rights as a large number of them were

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<sup>1</sup> All-Party Parliamentary Africa Group report. 2009. Land in Zimbabwe. (Ben Chigara, 2013)



Zimbabwean by birth. Moreover, ZANU PF implemented legislation which denied white farmers of the right to challenge the government in court over issues pertaining to land and this deviated from the agreed norms and standards under international law. The Fast Track Land Reform programme was one of the main issues which put Zimbabwe in the spotlight for human rights violations.

Moyo and Yeros (2007) are of the opinion that amidst all that was unfolding in Zimbabwe the MDC seized the opportunity to be the main opposition party to ZANU PF as the only dominant party in the country. MDC seemingly sympathized with the white farmers and tried to champion the human rights cause for white farmers against the ZANU PF government. Furthermore the MDC presented itself to Britain as a suitable and competent candidate to form a government if Britain's campaign of 'regime change' in Zimbabwe succeeded. MDC therefore filled the political vacuum of an opposition party to ZANU PF; however its emergence was unwelcome by ZANU PF considering the extensive impact the MDC had in the country. The MDC's close affiliations to trade unions proved to provide a useful source of supporters furthermore the civil society who rallied behind MDC for the promotion and protection of human rights in Zimbabwe.

Despite MDC contesting in both parliamentary and presidential elections, ZANU PF always maintained a majority in parliament and President Mugabe's remained president through elections that were always deemed flawed (Ferguson, 2005). According to Eckstein (1975) ZANU PF responded to the rise of MDC ferociously and sought to mitigate any challenge to its power and reign. All who challenged the party's power in Zimbabwe were labelled as dissidents and agents of the West. As a result ZANU PF developed the need to control the rise of rival (as indicated in the substantive theory of democracy which denotes that the central issue with dictatorships is control). This meant the control of ideas and the censorship of opposition which resulted in limitation of individual expression. (Eckstein, 1975) as indicated

Maposa, Muguti and Tobias (2013) are of the opinion that the labelling of MDC as dissidents and agents of the West was a way of controlling the manner in which the citizens thought and

acted. Once this was accomplished any actions against dissidents would seem justified. Therefore, in efforts to deal with the dissidents, a series of laws were passed in Zimbabwe to legalize law actions perpetrated by ZANU PF to maintain power in Zimbabwe. Maposa, Muguti and Tobias (2013) are further of the opinion that laws such as the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPA) passed in 2002 and enforced subjectively, form part of the repressive laws inhibiting freedom of speech, rights of assembly and association in Zimbabwe.

As a result of these laws, the ZANU PF faced pressure from the international community to answer to the several accusations of human rights and the civil society violations. Independent media were able to provide these answers, however, AIPA enabled ZANU PF to control and censor media information. In 2002 the Daily News, the then largest independent newspaper was shut down and journalists were arrested due to extensive criticism of the ZANU PF government. According to Magaisa (2009), the draconian legislation in Zimbabwe was passed under the guise of sovereignty and an anti-colonial rhetoric used as a disguise for all of Zimbabwe's shortcomings.

According to Maposa, Muguti and Tobias (2013), ZANU PF escalated their control and power and amended the Private Voluntary Organizations Act which governs Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in an attempt to control the organizations which dealt with human rights and governance. This was also a way to control organizations in the civil society that dealt with democracy.

Actions by ZANU PF were a clear repression of the human rights and freedoms of the Zimbabwean people. Their actions aimed to consolidate power which effectively undermined democracy in the name of sovereignty. However according to Bush and Szeftel ( 2002) it seems perplexing how genuine sovereignty can truly exist without democracy, when a government turns on its own people it ultimately loses its legitimacy and sovereignty allowing for humanitarian intervention. Therefore, the quest for sovereignty, by ZANU PF, at the expense of democracy appears to be self-defeating since sovereignty and democracy complement one another.

According to Moyo and Yeros (2009), in response to political crisis and human rights violations in Zimbabwe, Britain passed travel bans and froze the assets of high ranking ZANU PF officials and imposed arms embargoes against Zimbabwe as well. Since Zimbabwe is a former British colony Britain expressed more interest in Zimbabwe's affairs. Britain felt obliged to intervene so as to please a domestic audience who felt that had they had their kith and kin embroiled in battles with ZANU PF over properties and land.

Sims, Masamvu and Mirell (2010) comment that sanctions imposed by the EU on Zimbabwe were not mandated by the UN hence the continuous criticism by ZANU PF. However the legal framework used for passing sanctions on Zimbabwe adhered to the Common Foreign Security Policy which represented the EU's position on the political situation in Zimbabwe. Furthermore Zimbabwe was a signatory of the Cotonou Agreement which is a partnership between the EU and certain African and Asian countries. The agreement was spearheaded by the European Development Fund which gave it the legal right enforce punitive measures for not observing human rights and the rule of law.

In 2002 the EU then imposed sanctions against the ZANU PF regime which comprised of an arms embargo including non-lethal equipment as well as a ban on financial aid on any military related activity (Sims, Masamvu and Mirell, 2010). By 2011, travel bans were also imposed on up to one hundred and sixty three people and thirty one entities, all in connection to activities that undermined democracy and the rule of law (Sims, Masamvu and Mirell, 2010). The European Union also suspended aid for projects run by the government however; an exception was made for projects that directly supported the population (Sims, Masamvu and Mirell, 2010).

In 2001 the USA had imposed targeted sanctions against ZANU PF officials as well. Maposa, Muguti and Tobias (2013) note that besides the targeted sanctions, the United States Congress also passed the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery bill (ZDERA) which, not only harmed the ZANU PF, but the Zimbabwean population as a whole, since the funding of projects in Zimbabwe ceased and credit lines were cut which were significant in subsidizing key ministries such as health and education in Zimbabwe. The United States Congress passed

ZDERA under the claim that the people of Zimbabwe had been excluded from economic and political participation due to ZANU PF's economic mismanagement, undemocratic practices and the involvement of Zimbabwean troops in the Second Congo civil war (ZDERA, 2001)<sup>2</sup>. There was also the failure of the Zimbabwean government to pay its debts to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank resulting in the suspension of funding towards projects in Zimbabwe (ZDERA, 2001). ZDERA was also self-regulatory as the legislation passed by the US Congress implored the United States President to grant Zimbabwe economic aid and debt relief if the ZANU PF regime reformed. However if the regime continued to be repressive the legislation required the United States President to put in place more stringent sanctions against ZANU PF.

According to Grebe (2010), ZANU PF retaliated with increased repression especially towards the MDC who were labelled agents of the West. The same sanctions which were supposed to coerce ZANU PF and aid Zimbabwe towards a democratic path were used by ZANU PF to enact extensive repressive laws in the name of sovereignty. ZANU PF also embarked on rigorous sanctions devising schemes to give the elite alternatives from the West, diverting the nation's attention away from the democratic crisis and efforts of protecting the nation's economy from extensive damage. As highlighted previously, the anti-colonial rhetoric used by ZANU PF was meant to create a rally around the flag effect in which sanctions were often labelled as illegal and perceived as an act of war (Portela, 2013). This is so because sanctions open themselves up to exploitation by the targeted regime. In the Zimbabwean case the sanctions unwittingly gave ZANU PF pretext to enact repressive laws enabling extensive control over the people with state resources such as the police and army.

Furthermore, for sanctions to succeed, a united front from the international community is required. This was not the case with ZANU PF as it had the backing of Russia and China. This may be attributed to those countries tenuous attachment to democracy and because they vetoed against the United Nations Security Council sanctions on Zimbabwe (Bush and Szeftel,

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<sup>2</sup>"Full Text of S. 494 (107th): Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001". GovTrack.us. 13 December 2001. Retrieved 20/04/2014.

2007). This gave ZANU PF the precedence to call the sanctions illegal and blame them for all the country's problems.

Bush and Szeftel (2007) postulated that the lack of reproof towards the ZANU PF regime by African leaders and organizations did less to legitimise the targeted sanctions against ZANU PF. This was further aggravated by the fact that the former colonial master was spearheading the imposition of targeted sanctions and the anti-colonial rhetoric worked in ZANU PF's favour. Bush and Szeftel (2007) further comment that the targeted sanctions lacked support in Africa as African leaders continuously endorsed and congratulated ZANU PF on winning elections in Zimbabwe irrespective of how contentious they were.

It is suggested that it is the struggle of revolutionary parties in Africa of the need to hold on to power, mistrusting the new cosmopolitan world with globalization and the reform which represents a new form of colonization which suggests that African leaders would have to relinquish power and succumb to neo-liberal global principles, politically and economically (Bush and Szeftel, 2002).

Despite the illusion of appearing to inspire democratic process in Zimbabwe, targeted sanctions had the adverse effect of crippling the Zimbabwean economy. The targeted sanctions had a significant influence in destabilising the Zimbabwean economy. ZDERA encouraged international financial institutions to cut the aid to Zimbabwe in fear that it may be used to fund ZANU PF (Will, 2003). Furthermore, according to Will (2003), the sanctioning of the majority of the leaders of the party meant that the country could not be dealt with in the business world considering the extensive allegations of human rights violations. Zimbabwe became a pariah in the international community and international businesses distance themselves to protect their image and to maintain relations with sender countries as well which were usually more powerful. According to Will (2003) targeted sanctions resulted in the isolation of Zimbabwe thereby disadvantaging sectors of society benefiting from the international community, opposition parties and businesses.

The targeted sanctions suffocated an already ailing economy with a government which was committed to using the country's diminishing resources and channelling funds to maintain its

position of power. These actions left the country with less or no funds for economic recovery and damage control. According to Magaisa (2009), despite the fact that a collapsing economy was a common enemy to all Zimbabweans, ZANU PF managed to manipulate some aspects of the economy to effectively control, manipulate, segregate and garner support. The crumbling economy resulted in the increased scarcity of food where the ZANU PF started to politicise and hoarding food, thereby producing the same vile situation they should be repelling (Magaisa, 2009). Numerous allegations were levelled against ZANU PF for excluding people presumed to be of the opposition parties in the distribution of food. These allegations also included the sidelining of particular areas of opposition domination in the distribution of food aid.

Sanctioning Zimbabwe's leadership also resulted in their businesses being sanctioned, bringing the consideration of corruption to be explored in this study Magaisa (2009) proposes that the ZANU PF leadership and their position of power since independence of the country accumulated resources and control the country's major industries. This is supported by the evidence that individuals in the ZANU PF leadership directly or indirectly own some of the largest companies in Zimbabwe particularly after many of international companies left the country in 2002. Therefore once they were sanctioned the ripple effect of a failing major company was felt by the ordinary Zimbabwe. Therefore, the targeted sanctions against ZANU PF did not end with those targeted but the effects rippled down to the ordinary Zimbabweans.

The EU and the USA continuously reviewed the targeted sanctions against Zimbabwe. The reviews were conducted to assess the actions and responsiveness of the ZANU PF regime to the targeted sanctions and to determine whether tighter measures were required or not. According to Portela (2013) since 2002, the commission delegated by the EU to regulate the targeted sanctions imposed against ZANU PF had continuously tightened the sanctions. This was due to the lack of progress in the democratic process in Zimbabwe. Furthermore Ferguson (2005) after the imposition of targeted sanctions the ZANU PF government barred election observers from Europe and the USA from the 2002 and 2008 presidential elections, as well as the 2005 parliamentary elections. The EU concluded that the observers were banned because of electoral malpractice with voter intimidation and therefore the targeted sanctions were tightened.

According to Magaisa (2009) the inefficacy of sanctions against the ZANU PF regime until 2008 may be largely attributed to the ability of the ruling elite to shield themselves from the economic turmoil in the country. Furthermore the population had grown tolerant to the thriving black market in the country. Increased Chinese trade and cooperation also provided a buffer to the unprecedented collapse of the Zimbabwean economy. However, according to Magaisa (2009), in the March 2008 presidential elections where presidential candidate from the opposition party MDC Morgan Tsvangirai won but was prevented from taking up the presidency resulted in an escalation of tensions between the ZANU PF and MDC. The aftermath of the elections was bloody encounters between ZANU PF and the MDC. Even the ordinary citizens, who had been tolerant up to this point, expressed feelings of injustice (Magaisa, 2009). The country was marred by violence tantamount to a civil war which was further exacerbated by a crumbling economy, mass emigration of the country's most productive age group and professionals and by the tightened targeted sanctions which had a trickledown effect to the rest of the population (Magaisa, 2009).

The turmoil in Zimbabwe resulted in intervention by Southern African Development Community (SADC) and South Africa to foster a power sharing deal between the competing parties to save the failing state. According to Munjoma (2012), despite the multitude of contributing factors, Zimbabwe saw the formation of the unity government in Zimbabwe as a victory for the targeted sanctions. The unity government was formed by ZANU PF, MDC – M led by Author Mutambara and MDC – T led by Morgan Tsvangirai. Upon the appointment as Prime Minister, Tsvangirai was tasked with campaigning for the removal of targeted sanctions against ZANU PF officials and entities. This indicated that to some extent, the ZANU PF regime had felt the pressure from the sanctions.

According to Munjoma (2012) the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) and the formation of the unity government resulted in the easing of the targeted sanctions. This was due to the easing of some repressive laws by the unity government, particularly the freedom of media which Tsvangirai was very vocal about. Furthermore Breytenbach (1996) is of the opinion that the peaceful shifting of power in a country through free and fair elections can be used as an indicator of a transition to democracy. In the Zimbabwean case the willingness of the ZANU

PF regime to relinquish some of the power and share was considered as a step towards democracy with the view of total regime change, hence the easing of the targeted sanctions to reciprocate the assumed step towards democracy.

An examination of the impact of targeted sanctions on the democratic process in Zimbabwe gives contrasting views. It therefore solicits the question of whether sanctions aid or impede democracy. As discussed above, sanctions created room for ZANU PF to become more repressive and yet pressurised the same regime into making democratic concessions.

#### **1.4. RATIONALE AND RELEVANCE OF STUDY**

Munk and Verkuilen (2002) are of the opinion that with the inception of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, despite cultural bounds and differences, people are becoming more conscious and aware of gender equality, individual rights and freedoms which are best promoted under democratic rule.

The study is therefore important as it looks at how best democracy can be promoted in countries like Zimbabwe where individual rights and freedoms are violated. The study couples democracy and sanctions because the latter has become the most popular method for Western countries to promote democracy, therefore the study is relevant in investigating whether sanctions are a viable tool in promoting democracy.

Currently, a series of the targeted sanctions against Zimbabwe are being removed as incentives for improvements towards ruling democratically with further supports from the MDC. The study therefore seeks to explore the links identified above in order to ascertain the effects sanctions have had on democracy in Zimbabwe.

#### **1.5. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND KEY QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED**

The major objectives of the research study are to critically analyse the concept of democracy and the potential impact of sanctions in promoting or impeding it. The research is centred around the conflicting views of whether targeted sanctions are a useful tool in coercing governments towards a democratic path focusing on Zimbabwe.



## **1.6. OTHER RESEARCH OBJECTIVES WILL INCLUDE**

- To analyse the reasons that motivated the imposition of sanctions in Zimbabwe in 2000.
- To understand how Zimbabweans view democracy through their own experiences under the sanctions regime.
- To explore and draw attention to the implications and impact of smart sanctions on the democratic process in Zimbabwe.
- To explore the economic impact of sanctions on the economy and people of Zimbabwe from 2000 to 2013.
- To explore and draw attention to the implications and impact of smart sanctions on the democratic process in Zimbabwe.

## **1.7. QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED IN THE RESEARCH**

- What compelled the United States of America and the Europeans to impose sanctions against Zimbabwe?
- What was the impact of sanctions on the democratic process in Zimbabwe from 2000 to 2013?
- What was government strategy in dealing with sanctions economically and politically?
- What is view and position of political groups on sanctions?
- What is the civil society's view and position on sanctions?

## **1.8. LIMITATIONS**

The main limitations faced in pursuing this study were access to information, time constraints and release of a clearance form to conduct field research. The lack of clearance from the ethics committee derailed the project by a full semester this further had negative implications with the interview schedule and participants, resulting in the cancelation from participating by some.

## **1.9. SUMMARY**

The topic represents an opportunity to explore the efficacy of sanctions and the dynamics between North-South relations and the political global economic relations. Smart or targeted sanctions are a fairly new tool used in diplomacy hence the need to explore how they are used and the effect they have. The Zimbabwean case is ideal considering the human rights cases made against Zimbabwe's leaders and the prominence of such cases in international relations in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Smart sanctions have become the tool of choice for the West in dealing with such cases and targeted sanctions are preferred when a country is unwilling to actively intervene in another to promote or dissuade against particular actions. However there is a need to investigate whether these are an effective method in promoting democracy or whether they hinder the process.

Investigating the effects of targeted sanctions is integral to exploring their effect given that there are various forms of targeted sanctions which may be deployed. Seeking to understand the effects of each form will reveal whether or not they have aided the transition to multiparty democracy. Smart sanctions have gained a reputation for being not the smartest method to use in promoting democracy despite them being termed smart. Despite targeting particular individuals, when imposed, smart sanctions ended up harming the general populace. The West has recently begun withdrawing the sanctions packages imposed against Zimbabwe and the ZANU PF government at a time when Zimbabwe has just held elections and the results had ZANU PF taking full control of the government signalling the end of the government of national unity. This was deemed to be one of the successes of the sanctions regime. It is therefore imperative to first investigate reasons behind the imposition of sanctions against the ZANU PF government then the effects of the sanctions on the regime and more importantly, reasons behind the removal of the sanctions and finally, whether or not they have achieved their intended objectives.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK**

#### **2. INTRODUCTION**

The main aim of this study was to ascertain how sanctions imposed against Zimbabwe have impacted on democracy in the country. The study first analysed the state of democracy in Zimbabwe considering the statutes of democracy which the West deemed to have been undermined resulting in the imposition of sanctions. The two main focus areas of this study are democracy and sanctions. Therefore the substantive theory of democracy was used as a framework for the research as it focuses on the substantive principles of democracy which determine the country's level of democracy. The substantive approach also provides a measurement for democracy. The Institutional theory of sanctions was also used to investigate the sanctions for the purpose of this study to measure the Zimbabwean case in relation to democratic principles. The institutional theory of sanctions therefore connects the concepts of democracy and sanctions. The failure or success of sanctions was measured using the effects they have had on the leaders in the Zimbabwean regime with the country posing the sanction and the country receiving the sanctions as dependent variable

## **2.1. SUBSTANTIVE APPROACH TO DEMOCRACY**

According to Eckstein (1975) the substantive approach to the theory of democracy focuses on the continued competitiveness of elections in a country and goes further to include the rule of law and human rights. This approach uses the Polity Data Series which makes conclusions about a state's level of democracy by evaluating its electoral process, participation and competitiveness (Eckstein, 1975). According to Marshall (2012) the United States of America (USA) and Britain have higher scores on the Polity Data Series; therefore an investigation was carried out based on those democratic principles to determine what principles the Zimbabwe regime broke which would result in the imposition of sanctions. This substantive approach was also used to conceptualize the concept of democracy which will aid in determining Zimbabwe's position in respect to democracy. This theory is important because it conceptualizes and measures the level of democracy based on universal democratic principles.

Mecellem and Doherty (2012) comment that the elements of democracy highlighted by this theory stand as a prerequisite in establishing a democracy. It does not refer to the definitional terms for democracy. This approach's main purpose is to conceptualize democracy linked to a theory which is empirical and open to amendments with different approaches concluding at a common definition of democracy. This is therefore why there is less focus on definitional terms for democracy and more on what constitutes democracy. Substantive elements of democracy represent the core of the idea of democracy and have led to efforts of trying to enumerate levels of democracy through the Polity Data Series.

Another very important tenet of the substantive approach to democracy is that a transition to democracy should involve supplying outcomes that encourage equality amongst the population. This highlights how the substantive approach is not only concerned with the definition of democracy but the means needed to achieve democracy. The main premise of the theory to achieve the ends of democracy is social justice and therefore, the political participation of citizens in the governing of a country should yield equal socio-economic outcomes. Eckstein (1975) seeks to explain the substantive principles of democracy by exploring congruence. Eckstein (1975) reference to the term congruence claims that a regime is

only stable to the extent to which its authority satisfies the people's authority beliefs regardless of the type of regime. The claim seems to propose that substantive democracy has a supply and demand trend, in relation to democratic freedoms. The logic of the supply and demand trend is that the ruling elite institutionalizes and supplies substantive democratic freedoms to satisfy particular demands of these freedoms made by the people. This therefore implies that a strong correlation exists between institutionalized democratic freedoms by the regime and the desired freedoms by the population. The supply and demand trend of substantive democracy is encapsulated in a legitimacy framework as congruence moulds regimes by influencing the mass constituency support on which it can depend on and those constituents it risks antagonizing.

The belief in the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a regime sets the tone for the demand of substantive democratic freedoms. Democratic regimes supply ample substantive democratic freedoms which results in extensive support which stabilizes the regime. However, it is plausible that substantive democratic freedoms are not intrinsically valued in a democracy by the people, rather the public demands strong willed leaders akin to authoritarian rulers, highlighting a possible paradox with democracy (Eckstein, 1975). On the other hand, authoritarian regimes are under no pressure to supply substantive democratic freedoms because the threat of repression or the actual use of repression is possible, this ensures that the regime remains stable. The people under an authoritarian regime settle to conforming to the status quo and alter their preferences. Therefore, the threat or use of repression allows the regime to persist (Eckstein, 1975).

Huntington (1990) contends that authoritarian regimes are not always illegitimate, especially when the citizenry adapts to the conditions set by the regime and demand for substantive democratic reforms is subtle. Authoritarian regimes were once popular and enjoyed extensive support therefore, when opposing sentiments emerged they were not always shared and widespread; therefore, as long as there was ample support for the regime would claim some form of legitimacy.

However when opposing views become established, widespread and expressive, the consideration of the cost of repression by the authoritarian might prove to be too high. If the

opposition is grounded in their beliefs and the legitimate demand for substantive democratic freedoms, an authoritarian regime can possibly be overwhelmed and destabilized even with extensive use of repression which could work against the regime as it might yield more opposition (Eckstein, 1975).

The focus on the substantive approach is to highlight the commitment to democratic freedoms by the people in power and ordinary people. The powers which supply governance to the people show commitment to democratic principles through the promotion and respect for democracy through their daily use of power. Therefore, it can be argued that the supply of substantive democratic freedoms due to pressure from the international community does not indicate true respect and the promotion of democracy as it is done to gain favour from the international community and not to satisfy the demand from the people. A Leader in power should abide to the rule of law in order to show a commitment to democracy (Eckstein, 1975).

One indicator which shows a lack of commitment to substantive democratic freedoms is corruption. Embezzlement, nepotism and bribery are all indicators of the violation of the rule of law. On an extensive scale, corruption cripples democratic regulators in spending and recruitment. Undermining democratic regulators through corruption and violating the rule of law disempowers the civil society (Eckstein, 1975). Therefore, if the people are not empowered through democracy then that would relate to unsubstantiated democracy. It is therefore imperative that those in power respect and promote democracy in the daily use of power.

When considering the demand for a democratic rule, a country's citizens must appreciate the intrinsic value of democracy for the freedoms that define it in order to demonstrate commitment to democracy. Therefore, a demand for democracy in the hope for economic prosperity is not an intrinsic valuation of the substantive freedoms that define democracy but an instrumental valuation, a means to an end. The intrinsic value of an embedded ideal encourages expression and action by the individual, therefore, not having an intrinsic valuation of the substantive freedoms of democracy results in low expressive utility which ultimately leads to less action against an undemocratic regime. To be consistent and to be expressive, the demand for democracy should be coupled with a rejection of authoritarian rule, particularly

rule by the military. Democracy should be demanded for its emancipative and empowering values. The basic beliefs underlying the values of democracy include freedom of expression, an orientation of equality, self-determination and autonomy. These beliefs empower the people to achieve the ends of democracy.

Congruence has mechanisms which must operate in order to induce those in power to supply substantive democratic freedoms. The mechanisms within the demand system must work sufficiently enough to provide extensive pressure for a transition to democracy. The first requirement is that there has to exist a demand generating mechanism by which people develop an intrinsic valuation of substantive democratic freedoms. The second requirement is that a demand initiating mechanism which creates an, intrinsic valuation of substantive democratic freedoms must exist and early enough to enable the evolution towards expressive action by masses which affects those in power. Furthermore, since it is an intrinsic valuation it must withstand repression if the regime in question decides to use it a method of response.

The two main factors which affect the first demand generating mechanism are experience and utility. If one has been previously exposed to democracy and they hold an intrinsic valuation of substantive freedoms, it follows that they would reject authoritarian rule. Therefore, according to Rustow (1970), having had experience with substantive democratic freedoms and having an intrinsic preference for it is a demand generating mechanism as one would have an intrinsic valuation of the substantive democratic freedoms). The utility derived from being exposed to democratic freedoms therefore generates a demand for democracy if those in power become democratically regressive by enacting repressive laws.

However having had exposure to democratic freedoms is not the only demand generating mechanism. The second is the utility reasoning which is in contrast to the reasoning through experience as a demand generating mechanism.

Welzel (2008) contends that the idea of being able to exercise freedom to people who lack previous exposure to democracy and freedom can be intrinsically appealing is the idea of being able to exercise those freedoms. Furthermore, the increasing level of education in a society which has not been exposed to democracy widens the society's expressive repertoire along

with its awareness especially amidst repression. Therefore such a society becomes willing to stand up for ideals they are fully conscious of and believe in. Hence this desire is perceived as an actual utility and a demand generating mechanism for substantive democratic freedoms.

The demand initiating mechanism is dependent on whether the beliefs behind it are intrinsic or superficial. A society with a highly intrinsic belief system is moved more by the perceived utility to be gained from exerting its freedom; this therefore appropriates the perceived success or failure of immediate action for a transition to democracy. The need to attain substantive democratic freedoms remains constant despite immediate success or failure because it is intrinsically valued. Superficial demand for democracy is evident by ease through which the desire is abandoned at the face of repression or perceived failure in the transition to democracy. The demand initiating mechanism is when the demand generated translates to action and it can only persist if the demand is intrinsic and not instrumental.

The substantive democracy perspective is therefore helpful in understanding democratic transition and it gives insight on the Zimbabwean case by considering the supply side of substantive democratic freedoms by the ZANU PF regime and the response from the demand side by the Zimbabwean people.

## **2.2. INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF SANCTIONS**

The Institutional theory of sanctions was also a guiding theory within the study. Propounded by Lektzian (2007), the theory contends that economically punishing sanctions are less likely to achieve their intended objectives with an undemocratic regime than against a democratic regime. This is attributed to the reasoning that sanctions against undemocratic regimes increase the ability of the leader to increase rents thereby accumulating and consequently wielding more power. Because the undemocratic regime leadership is usually small, sanctions against such a regime which affect the entire population are unlikely to result in policy change as the leaders are not held accountable unlike in democratic states. The latter would be held accountable by the people and their constituents and institutions. Therefore all-encompassing sanctions according to the theory are more likely to be successful against a democratic state than an undemocratic state. Furthermore, sanctions are likely to succeed against an



undemocratic if targeted against the ruling government and its constituents. Identifying the regime type and the political dynamics at play in the targeted state is therefore critical in understanding the impact sanctions will have when imposed. Lektzian (2007) therefore proposes a conditional relationship between regime type and the costs that sanctions bring.

Lektzian (2007) proposes that the pressure to succumb to sanctions is dependent on who bears the costs brought by the sanctions. Therefore if the ruling government is cushioned from the costs the sanctions the sanctions are most likely to persist with no success. Broad sanctions in an undemocratic state are unlikely to have any political costs to the larger part of the population as they are not part of the regime's leaders. Measurements for success and failure of sanctions for the institutional theory of sanctions are based on a study by Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot (HSE) who studied 116 cases of sanctions since World War I, investigating the success or failure of sanctions in achieving foreign policy objectives (Lektzian, 2007).

The conditional relationship propounded by the theory highlights how democratic leaders are more likely to yield to broad sanctions leading to policy changes and how the paradox of how democratic states are less likely to impose sanctions on each other and when they do, it is because of competitiveness, as in the case of the American sanctions against Britain and France in 1956 with trade wars. Furthermore in such cases of competition, the population is more likely to support its democratic government than to clamour for policy change.

Lektzian (2007) initially explores the sanctions debate in which arguments about how best to bring success with imposing sanctions. The arguments can be put into three categories; the first category stresses punishment, the second considers vested interests and the third institutions. The idea behind punitive sanctions is to inflict extensive economic harm in order to pressurize and destabilize the population to the point where it turns and to disintegrate the political system. Therefore the targeted state is forced to comply with the demands of the sanctions. Economic punishment also stresses multilateral sanctions over unilateral sanctions as they remove alternatives and substitute suppliers for the target state thereby increasing chances of success. However another possible outcome as highlighted by Portela (2013) is the rallying

around the flag effect which instils nationalism in the population who then endure the punitive sanctions.

The vested interests argument contends that sanctions should carry a political benefit both domestically and internationally, success in this argument is evaluation is two – fold. Supporting domestic constituents and interest groups appealing for action in the form of sanctions against a particular foreign entity brings about political benefit despite the success or failure of the actions, merely taking action counts. Building on this preposition, one might argue that Britain imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe in order to appease a domestic white audience who had had their kin and kith abused and murdered during the Fast Track Land reform programme. The institutional argument has both elements of the punishment argument and the vested interest argument. Similarities of the institutional argument with the punishment argument are evident in the insistence of action in order to impose policy change and like the vested interest argument, the institutional argument places greater importance on politics on the domestic front. Domestic institutions include the kind of target or the sender regime which plays a major role in determining the success or failure of the imposition of sanctions. If a democratic state imposes sanctions, it is more likely to succeed in the international arena as it is able to call upon other states in order to cut out alternative suppliers. Furthermore states usually impose sanctions if there is extensive support for that particular action on the domestic front which reaps political rewards. In nondemocratic states however, there is low citizen participation in sanction imposition decisions, therefore whether the decision is popular and unpopular there is no political benefit domestically. Furthermore, actors in the international arena are unlikely to support an undemocratic sender of sanctions resulting in sanctions from a nondemocratic sender more likely to fail. The theory therefore seeks to explore the conditions in which sanctions are most likely to succeed particularly against nondemocratic governments.

On imposing sanctions and determining their success or failure, there are paramount factors to consider including the demands made by the sender, the political cost on the target's leadership and its constituents.

### **2.2.1. POLITICAL COSTS AND DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS**

With a nondemocratic target, the theory suggests imposing sanctions on the regime's leadership which is contrary to the traditional theory of sanctions which stresses economic harm on the whole population. A nondemocratic regime is dependent on its leadership to maintain power through developing coalitions and institutions which are important to maintaining power in a state. This then blurs the lines between government and state. The coalition and institutions also become dependent on the nondemocratic regime to acquire private goods and services. Another element that nondemocratic regimes use to their advantage is the distribution of goods and services. Constituents loyal to the regime receive more goods and services in order to keep them satisfied, this then ensures that the regime stays in power.

If the target of a sanction is democratic regime, it is held more accountable as it owes its position to more than half of the population which voted it into power. Institutions and state resources should work for the benefit of the people unlike in a nondemocratic state where they serve the needs of the regime. The premium placed by a democratic leader on a prosperous economy and successful policies is very high as this insures increasing political benefit and support unlike in a nondemocratic state where the leadership is only catered for. The nondemocratic regime does little to cater for the welfare and well-being of the rest of the population. A democratic regime will therefore pursue policies to supply public goods and services and a nondemocratic regime will pursue policies which supply private goods and services to its constituents. Because of the lack of accountability, a nondemocratic regime suffers little or no political costs due to economic failure caused by a sanctions regime because it is able to shield itself from the effects by manipulating available resources.

Economically punishing sanctions equip the ruling party in the sanctioned regime, especially under an autocratic regime, to search for financially beneficial opportunities which can be exploited. Economic sanctions which result in shortages present an opportunity for those in power to hike prices as they usually control the main producers within the state. A democratic leader however is unable to exploit and extort resources for financial gain from the citizens

because of the constraint of democratic institutions. Financial beneficial activities for democratic leaders are inconsistent with substantive democratic principles and going against them would reduce support from society. The lack of active democratic institutions in an autocratic state means the government can have excessive control over the economy and are able to easily manipulate resources to extract financial gains. This is done in the efforts to control and manipulate the economy which is also important to exercising political control over the whole population. The autocratic regime therefore politicises the economy while being able to shield itself economic harm and maintaining the support and loyalty from constituents .

### **2.2.2. SENDER'S DEMANDS**

Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott (1985) contend that the success of a sanctions regime depends highly on the intended goals of the sender. Heavy demands such as a regime change as imposed by Britain on Zimbabwe carry a heavy price to maintain. If an autocratic regime is willing to endure sanctions the sender also faces international political costs due to a defiant target. Sanctions are likely to be successful if the cost of defiance outweighs the costs of compliance. Heavy demands pressurise the targeted government however, if the demands are heavy, an autocratic government will likely endure to defend their position of power. Furthermore, an autocratic target is more likely to let its population suffer in order to maintain its hold on power. Democratic leaders are however more prone to yield to demands pertaining to adhering to democratic norms. International pressure is also often aided by pressure from domestic democratic institutions which results in compliance. A sanctioned autocratic target is also likely to suffer political costs from its coalition if it decides to cooperate excessively with a sender country. However this may result in the retaliation of the targeted leader to not yield to the foreign demands to maintain power and not show weakness. A sender will impose sanctions if economic interdependence between itself and the target is low. However, this may affect the severity of the sanctions where although credible they may have no impact because of the lack of interdependence. The target might therefore not yield to the demands. The opposite is also true, with high interdependence the sanctions would be severe but not only for the target but for the sender as well, the threat of sanctions and demands made would

therefore not seem credible. The type of demands made, amongst other variables discussed above, determines the success of a sanctions regime.

### **2.2.3. DETERMINING SUCCESS OR FAILURE**

Baldwin (1985) is of the opinion that as long as the target incurs damaging costs from being under a sanction, the sanction should be considered to be a success. However this assertion makes it almost improbable for a sanction targeted at a regime to fail. It is inevitable that a targeted state will incur some form of political or economic costs, even if minor, if sanctions are imposed against it and the target responds to the least demands made by the sender then the sanction can be considered a success. On the other hand, Pape (1997) postulates that sanction can only be considered successful if policy changes in the targeted regime are due to the sanction alone. . However, because sanctions are a foreign policy tool they are not usually employed alone, they are often insufficient to have an immense impact to effect policy change.

Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott (1990) highlight the multilateral variable in determining success or failure of a sanctions regime. International cooperation on imposing sanctions particularly against an autocratic regime helps ensure that there is no alternative support; increased pressure from the international community will most likely make a target yield to sanctions demand.

The institutional theory of sanctions enables the investigation and the measurement of the effects of sanctions in Zimbabwe in accordance with the concept of democracy. The conditional relationship between sanctions and the regime type postulated by the institutional theory of sanctions, allows the researcher to use both theories. The researcher therefore intends to use the substantive theory of democracy in conjunction with the institutional theory of sanctions to investigate the curious case of whether sanctions have aided the transition to multiparty democracy or impeded democracy in Zimbabwe.

## **2.3. LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **2.3.1. SANCTIONS**

Sanctions have long been used as a form of diplomacy by governments in a position of power politically or economically to express displeasure towards particular actions done by another government (Daoudi and Dajani, 1983). Peksen and Drury (2010) agree as they also put sanctions under coercive diplomacy as the mere threat of sanctions can urge a government to change its policies. The recurring theme with Daoudi and Dajani (1983) is how sanctions are employed as a foreign policy tool to further both domestic and foreign interests. Sanctions can then be used to dissuade targeted governments from pursuing certain policies. Daoudi and Dajani (1983) seek to explore mainly economic sanctions as a form of statecraft which can be in the form of trade sanctions which originates from centuries ago. An example of this is the Embargo Act of 1807 between Britain and France in the struggle to control European trade which resulted in trade wars. Economic sanctions also come in the form of financial restrictions and transactions. Daoudi and Dajani (1983) therefore highlight the aspect of political economy of sanctions.

Doxey (1987) brings to light another facet of how sanctions can be defined and employed. According to Doxey (1987), international sanctions are considered to be penalties threatened or imposed as a declared consequence of the target's failure to observe international standards or international obligations. These international standards and obligations entail the observation and protection of human rights by a government to its people. This has been the main area of contention where the Western countries express displeasure in imposed sanctions against Zimbabwe. It can be concurred that sanctions were initially passed to satisfy domestic demand and address fears and concerns of groups particularly in Britain, who had had property belonging to their kin and kith seized in Zimbabwe. However, the dire democratic situation was evident in the form of repressive laws, allegations of electoral fraud, opposition beatings and murders, nepotism and corruption which resulted in the imposition of sanctions.

With the inception of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, despite cultural bounds and differences, people became more conscious of gender equality, individual rights and freedoms which are best promoted under democratic rule (Munk and Verkuilen, 2002). Doxey's assertion of how sanctions can

also be used as an international law-enforcing tool is compounded by Munk and Verkuilen (200) who highlight the significance of using sanctions against autocratic regimes in order to promote democracy. Munk and Verkuilen (2002) highlight how consciousness of individual rights and freedoms is spreading around the world due to globalization, which is a common theme amongst authors on sanctions. In light of globalization, Pape (1997) views sanctions as ineffective alone, whether targeted or all encompassing. Pape (1997) argues that sanctions need to be complemented by another strategy such military intervention to make them effective. Pape's view was echoed by suggestions from Western countries who suggested that SADC and South Africa deploy military intervention in Zimbabwe. This suggests that they had realized that the sanctions alone were initially ineffective. Due to the interconnectedness of countries, brought about by globalization, countries under sanctions mitigate the effects if a sanction and easily find alternatives to the sender countries.

Kirshner (1997) further highlights how international organizations are in a position to also impose sanctions on other organizations and countries. International organizations such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization and the United Nations are also in a position to impose sanctions as they stand as gatekeepers to foreign aid, debt cancellation or forgiveness, loans and fundamental economic benefits (Kirshner, 1997). An area of contention however is how at times these gatekeepers have seemingly acted on behalf of more powerful states to further their interests since most of the organizations owe their existence and sustenance to the powerful countries.

The involvement of international organizations and their ability to impose sanctions in the international arena brings to light another theme under sanctions which is smart or targeted sanctions. Smart sanctions seek to avoid harming the rest of the population and only pressurise the ruling leaders and their constituents by imposing financial restrictions and bans in order to coerce them to change particular policies (Drezner, 2003). Because international organizations are gatekeepers and global drivers they are able to fine tune sanctions and target the elite. In discussing and analysing smart sanctions Drezner (2003), questions the intelligence of smart sanctions. This is in light of the extensive use of smart sanctions in the 21<sup>st</sup> century against countries exhibiting non democratic propensities without fully understanding the socio-politico-

economic dynamics situation in the country. This usually results in the misinterpretation of the root causes of a crisis and how best to address it. This gives rise to supposedly smart sanctions harming the rest of the population.

Lektzian (2007) as opposed to Drezner (2003) maintains that targeted sanctions against an undemocratic regime are more effective than all-encompassing sanctions as they deprive the regime of particular necessities, making it easier to coerce the regime towards democracy. In the Zimbabwean context, the targeted sanctions and the political dynamics within Zimbabwe forced ZANU PF into a unity government with the MDC and one of the major clauses in the Global Political Agreement (GPA) was the combined effort to campaign against sanctions highlighting the effectiveness of sanctions in coercing the Mugabe regime into a coalition (Munjoma, 2012). Drezner however contends that the general populace still suffer when targeted sanctions are imposed as the regime will feel threatened and in order to consolidate its power becomes more repressive. This was evident in the initial response by ZANU PF to the sanctions until the GPA (Drezner, 2003).

Drezner highlights the importance of a united effort by countries in passing sanctions against an undemocratic regime as the availability of alternatives can undermine their effectiveness. As an example, Zimbabwe increased trade with China after the imposition of sanctions and this has since been sustaining the Zimbabwean economy (Drezner, 2003). The United Nations Security Council failed to impose sanctions against Zimbabwe because Russia and China vetoed against the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe perhaps highlighting their own tenuous attachment to democracy.

### **2.3.2. DEMOCRACY IN ZIMBABWE**

Masunungure and Badza (2010) trace Zimbabwe's democratic record up to 1980 and postulate that Zimbabwe's democratic track record before the year it went under sanctions, 2000, was not at all since one would assume that Zimbabwe only failed to observe international standards in 2000. Masunungure and Badza (2010) highlight the fallacy of democracy which had existed in Zimbabwe before 2000. The ZANU PF regime had for years stifled opposition parties in order to maintain its hold on power. As an example, the authors highlight how allegations of



electoral fraud in the 1996 presidential elections were made by opposition candidates but were ignored by the international community. The reason sanctions were passed in Zimbabwe only in the year 2000 therefore becomes an intriguing case considering that before the year 2000, amidst allegations of failure to observe international standards, the same governments that passed sanctions in the year 2000 neither investigated nor passed sanctions then.

Maposa, Muguti and Tobias (2013) also do a similar analysis to Masunungure and Badza (2010) and contend that ZANU PF has been tightening its grip on power, marginalising and ousting anyone who challenges its position since 1980. The Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) party, which was as active as ZANU PF in the 1980s was marginalised by the latter. Their history against ZANU PF is similar to that of the MDC, which despite having some success, has currently just subsided after the Unity Government. Maposa, Muguti and Tobias (2013) highlight a trend in Zimbabwe's politics of maintaining a one party state which has been so since the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980. Ndlovu – Gatsheni (2010) also echoes the same sentiments shared by Maposa, Muguti and Tobias (2013) stating that social, political and economic power has been centralized amongst the Shona people of which the ZANU PF is largely made up of and the marginalization of other ethnic groups. Furthermore, Ndlovu – Gatsheni (2010) highlights the inconsistency with the international community in human rights watch. He highlights the incident where almost 20 000 Ndebele people were massacred in the 1980s by government forces and no sanction were imposed, however, when a handful of white farmers were murdered there was an outcry from Europe.

This inconsistency is also echoed by (Moyo and Yeros, 2007) who contend that Britain, being a former colonial master, wanted to continue exerting its influence in Zimbabwe especially with their regime change campaign, considering that their kith and kin had been murdered and their properties and land taken. Britain therefore had its own agenda and rallied other European countries to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe. The MDC, ZANU PF's biggest opposition, seized the opportunity presented by Britain to effect regime change in Zimbabwe. Not undermining Britain's concerns with Zimbabwe, but with the continued rise of MDC, a serious democratic crisis was looming in Zimbabwe. Maposa, Muguti and Tobias (2013) bring to light the extensive repressive laws that were passed by the ZANU PF regime in order to quell Britain's agenda and

the advances of MDC. The repressive laws included the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPA) both passed in 2002 (Maposa, Muguti and Tobias, 2013). The legislation passed infringed on the rights and freedoms of Zimbabweans.

Ferguson (2005) postulates that the substantive elements of democracy in Zimbabwe were being violated by the ruling elite and further discusses and analyses elections in Zimbabwe and highlights the extensive disparities in both parliamentary and presidential elections in Zimbabwe from 1996 to 2005. International observers have been banned from monitoring presidential elections and at times have been prevented from entering the country (Ferguson, 2005). Magaisa (2009) contends that the ZANU PF regime violated substantive elements of democracy in the name of sovereignty. Bush and Szeftel (2007) concur that ZANU PF, as the revolutionary party, used the anti-colonial rhetoric to pass controversial legislation in the name of sovereignty.

### **2.3.3. SANCTIONS IN ZIMBABWE**

In 2000, the European Union imposed smart sanctions against the ZANU PF regime, due to the continued interference by Britain about Zimbabwe's democratic situation. Portela (2013) makes an in depth investigation of the criteria used to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe and the type of sanctions imposed. The sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe were not endorsed by the United Nations therefore the European Union drafted the smart sanctions initially through the Cotonou Agreement. This agreement gave the European Union legal precedence to withdraw aid and other benefits to a signatory who did not promote democracy (Portela, 2013). However is affected all Zimbabweans as the aid which was restricted was for all Zimbabweans not just ZANU PF. This further validates Drezner's question of whether sanctions are really smart, (Portela, 2013) as well investigates the intelligence of smart sanctions.

Sims, Masamvu and Mirell (2010) like Portela (2013), trace the imposition of sanctions against Zimbabwe to the Cotonou Agreement. However, they extend their analysis to the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery bill (ZDERA). ZDERA was the USA's response to the Zimbabwean crisis in 2000 and, like the sanctions imposed by the European Union; it involved

travel bans on top ZANU PF personnel, aid cuts, arms embargoes and asset seizures. However as highlighted by Portela (2013) the European Union sanctions were open to revision on a more regular basis if there were improvements in the democratic situation in Zimbabwe unlike ZDERA.

#### **2.3.4. EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS**

##### **ECONOMY**

Will (2003) considered the numbers of Zimbabwe's deteriorating Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and how the sanctions have impacted negatively on an already derailing economy. Furthermore Will (2003) highlights how Zimbabwe was slowly being marginalized by international businesses and investors. Will (2003) further draws attention to the economic impact of sanctions on the country's economy as whole, despite the sanctions being targeted at the ZANU PF regime. On the other hand Magaisa (2009) explains that the response of the ZANU PF regime to the imposed sanctions on how that had consequences on the rest of the population, revealing that sanctions, even if targeted, can have a ripple effect on the rest of the population. Magaisa (2009) highlights how the ZANU PF elites managed to manipulate the economy in order to shield itself from the effects of the sanctions, this being a precise prediction from Lektzian's institutional theory of sanctions. The ZANU PF regime started a series of tactics to overcome sanctions. This highlights the need for a united effort in imposing sanctions as postulated by (Lektzian, 2007)

##### **DEMOCRACY**

Grebe (2010) explores how the ZANU PF regime responded to the imposition of sanctions and the rise of MDC, like (Bush and Szeftel, 2007) (Grebe, 2010) highlights how ZANU PF under the guise of sovereignty sought to maintain its hold on power at any cost. The violence in Zimbabwe was further exacerbated by a defiant opposition party and this put Zimbabwe on the brink of a civil war. Fortunately as (Munjoma, 2012) postulates the clashes led to peace talks instead of a civil war. Sanctions had contributed to putting Zimbabwe's economy into turmoil and amidst this crisis the Global Political Agreement was signed and a government of national

unity formed between the major competing parties. Accessing sanctions therefore and their impact on democracy is twofold, as ZANU PF initially responded by being repressive and later on resorted to negotiations and even forming a unity government.

### **2.3.5. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ACTORS**

Bush and Szeftel (2007) contend that the Zimbabwean situation put African leaders and organizations in a conundrum. Despite the evident undemocratic practices and human rights violations, the country which was mainly in conflict with Zimbabwe was Britain a former colonial master. Therefore regional leaders, having fought colonialism, felt compelled to support a fellow African leader than aid a former colonialist against a fellow comrade. The anti-colonial rhetoric therefore worked in ZANU PF's favour allowing regional electoral observers were allowed instead of international observers as observed by (Ferguson, 2005).

## **2.4. SUMMARY**

According to Mugari (2010), currently, a series of the targeted sanctions against Zimbabwe are being removed as incentives for improvements in democracy especially with the GPA, with support from the MDC as well to remove sanctions. The recent removal of targeted sanctions would lead to the assumption that they were successful, however even the MDC were in support of the removal of sanctions which were meant to aid democracy. The call by MDC for the removal of sanctions implied that even if they were targeted sanctions, they had a domino effect to the countries citizens.

The substantive approach to democracy will aid in identifying democratic statutes which were broken prompting the imposition of sanctions against Zimbabwe by the West. The substantive approach to democracy puts extensive focus on human rights and freedoms and the rule of law. The institutional theory on sanctions goes a step further in analysing the impact of the sanctions particularly against an undemocratic regime which makes the theoretical framework ideal for the Zimbabwean case.

The timeline of events in Zimbabwe shows a correlation between land reform before and after independence revealing that the acquired repressive character of the revolutionary party of Zimbabwe ZANU PF lead to the imposition of sanctions up to the introduction of a more democratic rule in Zimbabwe. The study therefore seeks to explore the linkages identified above in order to ascertain the effects sanctions have had on democracy in Zimbabwe.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.1 INTRODUCTION**

The purpose of this study was to establish whether or not sanctions are an effective tool in promoting democracy in countries like Zimbabwe where human rights violations are rampant. Establishing the efficacy of sanctions requires a close examination of their impact on the Zimbabwean political landscape and to the common Zimbabwean both socially and economically. Therefore, the study will utilise research tools that will explore the previously adumbrated concept of democracy in conjunction with sanctions. Data was collected using both structured and unstructured questionnaires.

#### **3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN**

This study used both a qualitative and quantitative research design using primary data in the form of interviews and questionnaires focusing on Zimbabwe but included studying and analysing existing data in the form of historical data, content analysis of past studies on this particular topic and numeric data. Qualitative and quantitative research design helped the researcher with insights on the strengths and limitations of the substantive approach to the concept of democracy as well as providing a platform to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the institutional theory of sanctions in assessing the effects of sanctions on democracy.

The research design empowers the researcher over deterrents and factors that affect the validity and reliability of the study. Therefore, the research design determined how the study was carried (Burns and Grove, 1997). The study utilised open ended interview questions with ward councillors which allowed for more flexibility. The quantitative questionnaire distributed to ordinary Zimbabweans had closed ended questions and participants had to choose an answer from a likert scale enabling the research to be themed and structured. The use of a questionnaire was the appropriate method to use considering the objectives of the study.

The use of both qualitative and quantitative methodology allowed the researcher to triangulate data collected with the intention of increasing reliability of the study. According to Delport

(2002) a study would be more reliable if there are multiple types of data which complement each other. This is what triangulation strives to achieve. Delport (2002) further comments that the triangulation method is the conscious mix of quantitative and qualitative methodology. Triangulation was therefore used for this study for combining data from interviews and structured questionnaires. Making use of triangulation enabled the researcher to have a comprehensive image of how sanctions have affected democracy in Zimbabwe. Combining the qualitative and quantitative methodology further enabled the researcher to partially surmount disparities from previous researchers and from differing research methods (Denzin, 1989).

### **3.3 TARGET POPULATION**

The research project sought to investigate if sanctions imposed by the West have aided the transition to multiparty democracy or impeded. . Therefore the manner in which the ordinary Zimbabwean is affected becomes important since it is the ordinary Zimbabwean who cast the votes for their leadership and is governed by the leadership and the one who lobbies the government for ideal policies. However the questionnaire requires that the respondent be literate and have some knowledge about the subject matter. As highlighted earlier, the study will target a sub set of the population in order to make a fair representation of the rest of the population. Using the Zimbabwe Democratic Institute's database, the researcher also sent out email questionnaires to respondents in other cities besides Harare.

For interviews, the research targeted individuals actively involved in Zimbabwean politics since the core of the research project pertains to democracy. Furthermore, to avoid bias, the researcher interviewed politicians from different political parties and independent political analyst.

#### **3.3.1. SAMPLING**

Since the entire population cannot be targeted, a subset of the population is targeted to make estimations about the population. Along the same vein, the research project targeted particular individuals for both the questionnaires and interviews. Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe, harbours the most political and economic activity in the country. Furthermore, population patterns are such that more people are migrating to Harare. This validates completing the study

in Harare as it will provide a fair representation of the entire population. Probability sampling was used to list targets using the Zimbabwe Democratic Institute's database with respondents who are not in a position of power since the study targeted ordinary citizens. A probability based sample was then made of the selected targets based on occupation as individuals occupying political positions were not selected so as to get survey ordinary Zimbabwean's view of the impact of sanctions. The randomly selected targets were then contacted by email and telephone in order to distribute the questionnaires.

### **3.4 DATA COLLECTION PROCESS**

The researcher focused on both primary and secondary data, using the former to supplement the latter. Previous research, similar to the topic being investigated, has been mainly based on secondary data. Secondary data employed included articles exploring sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe, policy documents, newspapers and internet articles.

#### **3.4.1 PRIMARY DATA COLLECTION**

Primary data entails the researcher venturing into the field to collect data through interviews, questionnaires and observations and building or comparing it with existing data. As highlighted earlier, research on this particular topic has been based mainly on secondary data and discussions on how sanctions have affected Zimbabwe have been limited to leaders and less on the ordinary Zimbabwean. Therefore, making use of primary data collection contributed to the extension of this area of research. Primary data collection also aided in unravelling whether sanctions have aided the transition to multiparty democracy or impeded democratic transition in Zimbabwe. The main limiting factors of the study were time and financial constraints as well as accessing the selected sample for this type of data collection. The researcher enlisted the Zimbabwe Democratic Institute to assist in targeting appropriate candidates for interviews and to assist with the distribution of questionnaires. The Zimbabwe Democratic Institute is a prominent player in research and public policy analysis in Zimbabwe for sustainable democracy.



### **3.4.2. THE USE OF QUESTIONNAIRES**

When conducting research on a fairly large scale, a questionnaire is more appropriate as a data gathering instrument and can be used alongside various tools in order to validate the findings. According to Bailey (1996), a questionnaire is a set of predetermined questions in a predetermined order and participants respond to the same series of questions.

The advantages to using Questionnaires include saving costs through time and money. Furthermore, a questionnaire can be completed by the respondent at a place and time of their convenience as opposed to interviews. If designed to be short, precise and easy to administer questionnaires could yield better results as respondents would be able to focus on completing the questionnaire and provide a fast inflow of data from many respondents (Bailey, 1996). However despite the advantages of questionnaires, their major flaws can render data irrelevant. Since they are self-administered, participants might give imprecise or deceptive answers and the researcher is not in a position to identify this whereas in a face to face interview the researcher can identify change in tone or body language to detect disparities in responses (Beed, 1985).

According to Gray (2004), despite having standardized questions on a questionnaire and considering their objective objectivity, questionnaires ultimately reveal the researcher's world view and even issues left out of the questionnaire reveal things the researcher's world view. The questionnaire designed for this study strives to capture the interests, perceptions and values of the respondents. The nature of questionnaires is such that they will be understood differently by different respondents and responses are unlikely to be standardized as well. The questionnaire however has been designed to be precise avoiding jargon and ambiguity.

The researcher gave out structured closed ended questionnaires to ordinary Zimbabwean citizens not in a position of political power. The questionnaires were randomly distributed through the Zimbabwe Democratic Institute's data and self-administered. Structured questions allow the researcher to test specific premises as data collected can be codified easily and without taking too much time. Since the audience was fairly large, using a questionnaire is fitting as it aided in identifying and exploring links between variables using a critical analytical

method. The questionnaire was three pages long and it was structured so that the themes of democracy and sanctions were dominant. These themes were then broken down with connecting sub themes.

The questionnaire was divided into three sections, the first section deals with demographics of the respondents highlighting age, gender, employment status and political affiliation. The next section dealt with democratic processes in Zimbabwe with items 5 – 22, seeking to draw out the perceptions of Zimbabweans on the main substantive principles of democracy and how they are carried out in Zimbabwe. The substantive principles which make up the sub-themes are democracy, political party relationships, public policy and institutionalization. From these themes, questions were designed to connect the above themes to probe the respondents on their perceptions of Zimbabwe's democratic process.

The third section with items 23 – 47 deals with the impact of sanctions on democracy in Zimbabwe, which was the focus of this study. The questions in the third section build up from the previous section questioning Zimbabwe's democratic process. This section also pertains to ways in which sanctions could have indirectly impacted Zimbabwe's democratic process. These elements include the impact on of sanctions on the Zimbabwean economy, on international relations and the respondent's own experiences with democracy in relation to sanctions.

The above issues were responded to by the respondent using a four-level likert scale from strongly disagree represented by 1 in the questionnaire to strongly agree represented by 4. This method of scaling is termed bipolar measuring as it measures positive or negative feedback. The four level-likert scale avoids a neutral option because participants, in the initial section, highlighted their political affiliation and to avoid bias the questionnaire neglected the neutral option.

### **3.4.3 IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS**

Interviews with open ended questions were held with primarily ward councillors from political parties and independent political analysts lasting between fifteen to twenty minutes. The researcher facilitated the interview process by guiding the interviews and following the theme

of the study, thereby identifying areas of contention. Permission to record the interviews with all the respondents was requested prior to each interview.

Considering that the issue of sanctions imposed against Zimbabwe was perceived strongly by most Zimbabweans interviews were found to be necessary since, in some cases where a questionnaire was used, participants were not given an opportunity to fully express themselves. Gray, (2004) postulates that Verbal and even non – verbal communication from respondents is important in deducing the feelings the respondents have about the subject hence, interview sessions gave the researcher an opportunity to probe for more information and clarity from the respondents.

However the main purpose of these interviews was to detect variables and their relationships on how sanctions have affected democracy in Zimbabwe focusing on whether sanctions have aided the transition to multiparty democracy or impeded democracy. Establishing those relationships will be based on the respondents' feelings, attitude, preferences and knowledge about the topic. The interviews also supplemented the questionnaire in order to get an in depth understanding of trends and variables revealed by the latter.

Although the researcher had a list of questions and issues to be explored, the interviews were semi structured to accommodate new variables and relationships that may arise based on the respondents' views and opinions. The topics and the themes covered in the interviews mirrored those in the questionnaires and were created from the objectives and key research questions of the study. The first theme that was covered was democracy which had sub-themes of the democratic process in Zimbabwe, the relationship between political parties, implementation of democratic principles and the independence of institutions. These themes were then merged with the main theme of sanctions, which had sub-themes of the impact of sanctions on the democratic process in Zimbabwe, impact of sanctions on the economy of Zimbabwe, sanctions and political situation in Zimbabwe and sanctions basting in Zimbabwe.

Semi structured interviews also allowed the respondents to explain their answers and the researcher to probe further over a matter of interest if it aids in meeting the objectives of the study (Gray, 2004). The researcher had to improvise when the interviewee strayed away from

the subject relevant to the study since the questions have been deduced from the research objectives. The researcher however tried to posit the same questions to all participants so as to easily sift variables and their relationships. Adhering to standardized questions to all participants also helped ensure their anonymity (Gray, 2004). The interviews were recorded with the respondents' consent.

The interviews were scheduled to begin from the 21st of April 2015 and the researcher anticipated concluding the interviews in mid May 2015. The researcher was solely responsible for costs incurred with the interviews which included travel costs and recording equipment. Since these were identified as possibly inhibiting factors, the researcher, with the aid of the Zimbabwe Democracy Institute, will target relevant respondents from different perspectives until a level of data saturation is attained and no new perspectives arise. The institute will also be advised on ethical issues with the interviews and others that may arise.

#### **3.4.4. SECONDARY DATA COLLECTION**

Secondary data is research which already exists in a subject area. Secondary data is important as it guides in finding gaps in researched areas and on how best to advance research in the area. Secondary data provides the background needed to contextualize different themes within a subject area. For this particular topic, the extensive research that exists is largely desk based research, therefore the inclusion of primary data would add to research and pave way for further research.

Considering that the Zimbabwean situation is quite recent limited literature exists on the subject. However, there are extensive compendia on the topic. Internet articles on the topic and on related topics from reputable scholars were used. Policy documents on legislation passed by the government of Zimbabwe and public policy documents from the ministry of finance of Zimbabwe were used to analyse if sanctions were an aid or impediment to democracy in Zimbabwe. These documents will be used alongside the data gathered and analysed from the interviews and questionnaires.

Data from pre-existing research has made up most of the circulating notions and theories about the imposition of sanctions against Zimbabwe and if that has had an impact if any on

Zimbabwe's democracy. Data gathered from primary sources will therefore also be used to test against these preconceived notions and theories on the impact of sanctions on Zimbabwe's democracy.

### **3.5 DATA ANALYSIS**

Data analysis entails identifying themes and to test hypotheses from data collected. Hubberman (1994) contends that there are three flows of action in data analysis which include reduction, displaying of data and drawing conclusions. Data reduction entails identifying, selecting themes and simplifying the data. Data displaying allows the researcher to link patterns and relationships within the data after reduction (Hubberman, 1994). Thereafter, conclusions can be made as the data analysis process was followed. Qualitative data analysis is therefore an incessant process. Data analysis for this study will begin the moment the first interview takes place.

The researcher used thematic data analysis, emphasizing examination and pattern / theme recording within data collected. Thematic data analysis involves going beyond recorded interviews by picking up explicit and implicit ideas in the interviews. A theme is not necessarily determined by continued reoccurrence or frequency, rather by prevalence within and across sets of data (Gray, 2004). With thematic data analysis, coding is very important as it allows the researcher to develop patterns through grouping and gathering data before interpretation, therefore, coded data makes up a theme (Hubberman, 1994). Connections between coded data builds up themes and connections between themes produce the final report.

The questionnaire sought to explore how sanctions have impacted on democracy in Zimbabwe and to what extent. Since the questionnaire was designed to allow the researcher to explore relationships, statistical analysis maybe employed its purpose being to determine trends. Therefore, despite being open to new information, the study will utilise a deductive approach in analysing the data, meaning data analysis is driven by preconceived notions and theories. Deductive data analysis seeks to test theories against data focusing primarily on aspects of the data which were preconceived (Hubberman, 1994).

### **3.6 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY**

The reliability and validity of a questionnaire is affected mainly by the questionnaire's design, a perplexing structure, question sequencing and the words used. The questionnaire for this study was designed directly from the objectives of the study so as to avoid questions not pertaining to the area of research and also to avoid irrelevant questions. As highlighted earlier, the questionnaire was designed to be precise and to avoid it being long.

According to Alford (1998), the reliability of a study is measured by its consistency over time, equivalence and multi-judge reliability. The administration of the questionnaire by respondents is also important for reliability (Alford, 1998). Data can be rendered null if respondents do not fill out a questionnaire as required. Therefore instructions on how to complete the questionnaire and what is required of the respondent should be clear.

The respondents targeted are experts in their fields and since the research project requires, to a larger, extent expert knowledge and experience, data collected is from the appropriate people. Furthermore, the designed questions are aligned to the research objectives to ensure that research tool is measuring what it is supposed to measure. The interview technique to be used seeks to build trust so as to allow respondents to fully express themselves (Alford, 1998). The interviewer's behaviour will also have to be standardized in order to avoid bias therefore despite the researchers own preferences and views.

The 'interviewer effect' is the consideration of the interviewer's behaviour and how it influences how the interview is conducted and whether the interviewer's behaviour had an effect on the results or not. Therefore to avoid and minimize bias the researcher will follow the same etiquette and will have a set of guidelines to aid the researcher in following the same modus (Alford, 1998). The guidelines will include asking all respondents questions exactly as they have been prepared; avoiding infuriating respondents if they happen not to answer particular questions, to accept refusal by respondents to respond without showing frustration and probing in an indirect way.

The interviews to boost the credibility of the study will be consistent with plausible informants and analysis. Furthermore, the analysis will strive to be accurate and be an unbiased representation of the respondents as the researcher strives for neutrality.

### **3.7 SUMMARY**

The research design chosen for this study was ideal as there was a need to get first-hand information of the experiences of ordinary Zimbabwean under the ZANU PF regime and the sanctions imposed on them. More importantly, it was crucial to investigate if the sanctions improved the political experience of the ordinary Zimbabwe as intended by the sanctions.

Therefore the use of questionnaires and interviews was ideal for the study, supplemented by secondary data already in existence.

The questionnaires sent out were themed, requiring respondents to respond on a likert scale. Respondents were required to rate statements regarding substantive principles of democracy and the democratic processes in Zimbabwe which included the electoral processes, rule of law and governance. This theme was then merged with the subject of sanctions, how sanctions have affected democratic processes in Zimbabwe and the impact of sanctions on the social and economic lives of Zimbabweans. This enabled the researcher to test the substantive theory of democracy on the Zimbabwean case on whether sanctions had aided or impeded democracy. There was sufficient accurate feedback from the questionnaires as 85 out of 100 questionnaires were returned unspoilt and completed.

Interviews were intended to be used to supplement data gathered through questionnaires. Unfortunately the researcher was unable to interview all intended informants. Due to the late issuing of field research clearance, the researcher was unable to carry out scheduled appointments with key informants who eventually declined participating in the study, However data gathered from informants who participated was sufficient in explaining and clarifying in the trends and relationships evident in the .

Data analysis was carried out for both the interview sessions and the questionnaires using thematic data analysis. During data collection, the data was themed with new trends and

relationships being integrated. Since the data collection tools were designed using themes, thematic data analysis was ideal for the study and the limited timeframe the researcher had to work with.



## **CHAPTER 4**

### **EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE**

#### **4.1 INTRODUCTION**

This chapter presents and analyses the findings of the research project. The source of the findings analysed under this chapter were the self-administered questionnaires supplemented by the interviews carried out with political analysts and ward councillors. The questionnaire was structured in such a way that there were thematic segments which integrated linking democracy and sanctions. There was a wide range of responses on how sanctions affected the transition to democracy in Zimbabwe. The interview sessions also revealed interesting perceptions on how sanctions directly or indirectly affected the transition to democracy. Furthermore, views on the course which Zimbabwe should take to enable the transition to democracy were also brought up.

##### **4.1.1 DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION**

A total of 100 questionnaires were distributed randomly with the assistance of the Zimbabwe Democratic Institute, 85 questionnaires were returned fully completed and unspoilt. Out of the 85, 46 were completed by males and 39 were completed by females. Both groups randomly selected were within an age range of between 22 and 54. The mean age of the participants was 33, median 31 and the mode was 26. Is any significance in this age group? Out of 85 questionnaires distributed, only 49 participants were willing to highlight their political affiliation, with 27 indicating that they were affiliated with MDC and 22 indicated that they were aligned to ZANU PF, and 36 declined to indicate their party affiliation. Almost half of the participants (42) indicated that they were employed and the 43 highlighted that they were unemployed.

## **4.2 DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN ZIMBABWE**

An observation which came from the questionnaires was that 49 participants out of the 85 fully completed and unspoilt questionnaires were willing to write the party they are affiliated to. This probably shows that fear and victimization still lurks amongst Zimbabweans with regards to political issues. To understand whether democracy exists in Zimbabwe, respondents were asked to rate the statements on a likert where 1 represent strongly agree, 2= agree, 3 = disagree and 4 = strongly disagree.

<b>Democratic process in Zimbabwe</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
There is no human rights monitoring and conscious	74 %	13%	5 %	8%
There are laws which are repressive and neglect human rights	41 %	29%	18 %	12%
The ruling party is using authoritarianism to remain in power	32 %	35%	8 %	25%
Citizens cannot freely express themselves without fear of condemnation	44 %	29%	21 %	6 %
There is no supportive political culture regarding democracy	39 %	31%	18 %	12%

*Table 1: Democratic process in Zimbabwe*

The above responses show that 74 % of respondents strongly agreed that there is no human rights monitoring and consciousness in Zimbabwe. A standard deviation of 9 highlights how the responses were extensively dispersed and distributed and the skewedness shows that the data was far from being normally distributed as the majority of respondents expressed the dire need for human rights in Zimbabwe. Consequently, there are laws which are repressive and neglect human rights (41 %) hence the responses were positively skewed. Even though the Government of National Unity in 2009 achieved normalcy on the political front, 35 % of respondents felt that there are still some grey areas since the ruling party is using authoritarianism to remain in power. The above evidence shows that there is a strong positive correlation between how

respondents view repressive laws in Zimbabwe and the increasing authoritarian nature of the government. A correlation coefficient of 0.8 shows that authoritarianism is exhibited by the government is done through neglecting statutes of democracy and the employment of repressive laws. Even after the adoption of the new constitution, there are still reports of people being persecuted which instil fear in people. This position is shown by 44 % of the respondents who highlighted that citizens cannot freely express themselves without fear of condemnation. Therefore, the use of repressive laws suggests that to date, there is no supportive political culture regarding democracy in Zimbabwe (39%). The low dispersion of responses, clustered around the latter responses with a standard deviation of 10.

#### **4.2.2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL PARTIES**

The following table shows the statements regarding the relationship between political parties where: 1 = strongly agree, 2 = Agree, 3 = Disagree, 4 = strongly disagree

<b>2.The relationship between political parties</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
There is multiparty political participation	35 %	41%	15%	9 %
There are cordial relationships between political parties	9 %	4 %	19%	68%
There is one party domination and limited government accountability	29 %	38%	26%	7 %
The constitution promotes multiparty competition and individual rights	12 %	18%	41%	29%

*Table 2: The relationship between political parties*

The continued growth in the number of political parties in Zimbabwe has changed the political landscape in Zimbabwe. The evidence presented above shows that a total of 41 % of the respondents agreed that there is multi-party political participation in elections. Of which special reference is attributed to the rise and prominence of MDC over and above other parties such as ZAPU, (mention other parties that have participated as well) since 2000 and even Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn which was formed in 2007(check the year the party was formed) has participated fully in elections. Although there has been a sturdy growth in the number of opposition parties, 68 % of the respondents were of the opinion that there was a lack of cordial

relationship between political parties. The evidence is supported by data with a low standard deviation of 9.4, with the data mainly clustered around the strongly disagree response. Hence there has been a long documented history of bloody clashes between Zanu PF and MDC factions.

Ever since independence, there is no party that has strongly challenged ZANU PF hence 38 % of the respondents agreed that there one party domination resulting in limited government accountability. The lack of accountability by members of parliament as according to interviewee Professor Masiya once commented “the new generation of politicians view public office as a means to an end, they view public office as an instrument for private accumulation”. The structures in place make it seemingly difficult politicians to fully account to their constituencies especially those aligned to Zanu PF. Furthermore, the domination of Zanu PF in parliament has continued to protect the party’s hold on power as evidenced in the implementation of the new constitution. Hence a 41 % of the participants disagreed that the constitution promotes multiparty competition and individual rights. To date the draconian laws such as AIPA and POSA continue to be used as tools to suppress opposition.

#### **4.2.3. IMPLEMENTATION OF DEMOCATIC PRINCIPLES**

Rate the following statements regarding democratic principles where: 1 = strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = disagree, 4 = strongly disagree

<b>3. Adherence to democratic principles</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
There are free and fair elections held regularly	6 %	12%	12%	70%
There are reported cases of deeply flawed elections	46 %	24%	23%	7 %
There is voter representation in parliament	27 %	36%	24%	13%
There is an independent electoral commission	12 %	20%	35%	33%

*Table 3: Implementation of democratic principles*

Although Zimbabwe has gone to elections when choosing Councillors, members of parliament, and the president, most (70 %) of the respondents indicated that they strongly disagreed with the notion that free and fair elections are held regularly. Furthermore 46 % of the participants

strongly agreed that there are reported cases of deeply flawed elections. Based on the above opinions, Zimbabwe’s entire electoral process is discredited. There are a number of reported cases where the electoral commission has demonstrated partiality in the electoral process, which has increased the distrust in the whole process, hence 35 % of the respondents disagreed that there is an independent electoral commission. However 36 % of the participants indicated that they agree that there is a fair representation in parliament. Considering the low standard deviation of 8.2, the responses were clustered between respondents who agree and disagree on the voter representation in parliament. Despite the existence of the electoral commission appointed in terms of the electoral act, the evidence shows that the commission has become subservient to the ruling party such that fair voter representation can no longer be guaranteed at any level of government.

#### **4.2.4. INDEPENDENCE OF INSTITUTIONS**

The following table shows statements regarding democratic institutions where: 1 = strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = disagree, 4 = strongly disagree

<b>4. Independence of institutions</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
There is clear separation of power between the executive, judiciary and legislature	25 %	10%	52%	13%
There are no institutions or mechanisms to hold government officials accountable	14 %	18%	34%	34%
Lack of democratic institutions has dissuaded foreign and domestic investment	41 %	24%	30%	5%

*Table 4: Independence of institutions*

The independence of state institutions is vital in any democracy. To achieve this there is need for clear separation of power between the executive, judiciary and legislature. The results show that 52 % of the respondents disagreed that there was a clear separation of powers; hence the evidence shows that the state and government have become a substitute of one for the other. The status quo has created an enabling environment for ZANU PF to tighten its grip on the political, economic and social fronts. As a result of lack of democratic institutions foreign and

domestic investment has been affected negatively (41 %). A strong negative correlation between the lack of democratic institutions and foreign direct investment exist, the value of R is negative 0.96 meaning that democratic institutions are needed to attract foreign direct investment.

#### **4.3 THE IMPACT OF SANCTIONS ON THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN ZIMBABWE**

To understand the impact of sanctions of sanctions on the democratic processes in Zimbabwe, the following table was used where: 1 = strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = disagree, 4 = strongly disagree

##### **4.3.1. THE IMPACT OF SANCTIONS ON THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN ZIMBABWE**

<b>The impact of sanctions on the democratic process in Zimbabwe</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
Sanctions are hurting the democratic rights and freedoms of ordinary citizens	9 %	17%	53 %	21%
Sanctions have stalled democracy in Zimbabwe	32 %	21%	35 %	12%
The citizens suffer in the court of international public opinion as a result of sanctions	47 %	28%	15 %	10%
Sanctions had a trickledown effect on the conscience of the people to take actions	57 %	21%	10 %	12%
Sanctions have on effect where there is no democracy	5 %	13%	31 %	51%
Sanctions have created room for government repression	45 %	25%	18 %	12%

*Table 5: The impact of sanctions on the democratic process in Zimbabwe*

The above evidence shows that 53 % of the respondents indicated that they disagreed with the notion that sanctions directly affect the democratic freedoms and rights of ordinary citizens. This diverged from a preconceived notion of this study that sanctions had an impact on some substantive statutes of democracy. Hence sanctions have not stalled any democracy in Zimbabwe (35%). Judging from the responses, it seems as though ordinary Zimbabweans understand that the sanctions imposed against Zimbabwe were targeted at particular individuals and institutions. However, in trying to deal with the democratic problem, ordinary

citizens have been caught up the political web and they have been made to bear the consequences (47%). As can be seen in other economic sectors that are based on perceptions such as tourism, the negative equity generated a huge part in affecting tourist arrivals and foreign direct investment in the country's economy.

As can be seen above, sanctions had a domino effect and affected the ordinary Zimbabwean in all spheres of life. The above notion was supported by 57 % of the participants who strongly agreed that sanctions had a trickle-down effect on the conscience of the people so that they take action. However, considering the extensive grip on power the government has, any action taken by citizens was quashed through the use of repressive laws discussed earlier. Consequently, 38 % of respondents disagreed that sanctions caused citizens to demand change from their government. The efficacy of sanctions against an undemocratic government is therefore questionable since the government can suppress any action by its citizens should they vie for a regime change agenda. Therefore, 45 % of respondents strongly agreed that sanctions created room for government repression. In this case sanctions were viewed as an impediment to democracy. Although 51 % of respondents strongly disagreed with the notion that sanctions have no effect where there is no democracy, their impact on the political arena was minimal. Considering that those sanctions were targeted on specific individuals and organisations, they ended up affecting the whole populace. Different schools of thought view sanctions differently; some may argue that sanctions were a missed opportunity for democracy to prevail since the time was ripe for change. As can be seen in the 2009 disputed elections, the ZANU PF government was forced into a Government of National Unity. Although this unity government did not persist for long showing, the opposition MDC did not fully utilise its advantage to instil democracy instead of putting pressure on the Government by insisting on minimum democratic standards, they become so engrossed with power and forfeited bread and butter issues.

### **4.3.2. IMPACT OF SANCTIONS ON ZIMBABWE'S ECONOMY**

Rate the following statements regarding the impact of sanctions on the Zimbabwean economy:

1 = strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = disagree, 4 = strongly disagree

<b>Impact of sanctions on the economy</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>SD</b>
The economic woes in Zimbabwe are a result of government mismanagement not sanctions	40 %	29%	21 %	8%	10
Sanctions are blocking economic recovery	34 %	27%	14 %	25%	11
Sanctions have an effect preventing access to international financial assistance	48 %	32%	13 %	7%	15.9
Economic suffering has weakened the civic society	47 %	32%	16 %	5%	15.6

*Table 6: Impact of sanctions on the economy*

Although sanctions had an impact on the economic front, when questioned about the causes of economic turmoil in Zimbabwe, 40 % of the respondents indicated that they strongly agreed that Zimbabwe's economic mayhem was largely due to government mismanagement. Despite the soaring debt the country has on the international financial institutions, the promulgation of sanctions cut off Zimbabwe from accessing financial bailout (48%). Consequently, 34 % of respondents were of the opinion that sanctions were blocking economic recovery. Since the country has been on targeted sanctions for over a decade, continued enforcement of sanctions has continued to cause untold suffering for businesses, civic society and citizens alike thereby impeding the smooth transition to democracy. Considering that positive change is led by the civic society, of which is unfortunately succumbing to the effects of sanctions (47 %). As can be seen from the above evidence, the use of sanctions contributed in crippling the economy which in turn deprived the civic society of resources to aid democracy.



#### **4.3.4. Sanctions and Political Situation in Zimbabwe**

Rate the following statements regarding sanctions and political situation in Zimbabwe where: 1 = strongly agree      2 = agree      3 = disagree      4 = strongly disagree

<b>Sanctions and Political Situation in Zimbabwe</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>SD</b>
Sanctions have led to tolerance and cooperation leading to democracy	18 %	12%	45 %	25%	15.2
Sanctions were used by opposition parties for regime change in Zimbabwe	33 %	25%	20 %	22%	4.7
Sanctions are no longer smart considering their effects	45 %	31%	14 %	10%	13.4
Sanctions have polarized the political situation	35 %	39%	18 %	8%	12.3
Sanctions were a deliberate ploy by the West to impose itself on Zimbabwe and Africa	39 %	34%	15 %	12%	11.4

*Table 6: Sanctions and Political Situation in Zimbabwe*

Although sanctions were meant to bring a conducive environment for democracy to prevail or force the government to adhere to democratic principles, 45 % of the respondents disagreed that sanctions have led to tolerance and cooperation. As can be seen from the literature, there is evidence of recorded clashes between the two main political parties as a result of the imposition of sanctions. ZANU PF has argued that sanctions were being used by opposition parties for regime change in Zimbabwe. Since opposition parties took advantage of sanction to campaign for regime change (33%), that led to them being labelled as detractors and dissidents who were aligning themselves with the West. Hence, a low standard deviation of 4.7 showed how the responses to this question were densely populated on respondents strongly agreeing that sanctions were being used by opposition parties for regime change in Zimbabwe.

Moreover, 35 % of the respondents strongly agreed that sanctions polarized the political impasse in Zimbabwe by pitting the main political parties against each other. A total of 39 % of the respondents strongly agreed that sanctions were a deliberate ploy by the West to impose itself on Zimbabwe and Africa. Hence they are no longer smart considering their effects (45%).

#### **4.3.5. CITIZEN'S PERCEPTIONS OF SANCTIONS**

Rate the following statements regarding perceptions on sanctions where: 1 = strongly agree 2 = agree, 3 = disagree 4 = strongly disagree

<b>Citizens' Perceptions of Sanctions</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>SD</b>
Sanctions did cause citizens to demand change from their government	24 %	21%	38 %	17%	7.4
General citizens suffered socially and economically from sanctions whilst intended targets escaped because they had power and opportunities	45 %	36%	11 %	8 %	15.5
Sanctions were used as an exaggeration to blame the West for the exclusive cause of the country's troubles	41 %	31%	21 %	7 %	12


*Table 7: Citizens' perceptions of sanctions*

The evidence above shows that sanctions did not cause citizens to demand any change from the government (38%). As discussed earlier, the failure to change was as a result of many other uncontrolled variables. From the above evidence, it is clear that any action against the government is perceived as a revolt. Whilst it is a constitutional right to strike, demonstrate, and or to openly express one's opinion, state institutions are not ready to embrace such actions. Respondents were of the opinion that the general citizens suffered socially and economically from sanctions whilst intended targets escaped because they had power and opportunities (45%). Consequently, 41 % of the respondents strongly agreed that sanctions were used as an exaggeration to blame the West for the exclusive cause of the country's troubles. One respondent pointed out that ZANU PF even went on to blame sanctions for the drought and other climate change related problems.

#### **4.4 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS**

The enacting of repressive laws resulted in Zimbabwe being classified under autocracies with a (-10 to -6) score. The Polity Data Series makes conclusions about a state's level of democracy by evaluating its electoral process, participation and competitiveness as shown in the figure 1

below (Eckstein, 1975). The polity data series is used as guideline for the substantive approach to democracy. Using the polity data series Zimbabwe’s valuation on electoral processes, participation and competitiveness is highlighted to be at critical levels. Respondents to the survey highlighted how the Zanu PF government has infringed on people’s rights and freedoms which make up the core of democracy as stipulated by the substantive theory to democracy. Respondents indicated how elections in Zimbabwe were deeply flawed which rendered competition null and void. Below is an objective measure of Zimbabwe’s authority trends based upon substantive principles of democracy and the assertions and conclusions made from it are compounded by the results of the survey carried out for this study.



**Fig. 1:** Authority trends, 1970 – 2013: Zimbabwe source: Eckstein, ‘August 2014, Review Paper’ *Perspective of Comparative Politics*.

Fig. 1 above represents Eckstein’s conception of authoritarian rule in Zimbabwe and level democracy in Zimbabwe. A negative score in the diagram represents decreasing levels

consequently representing increasing levels of authoritarian rule. This study mainly focused on the period from 1999 – 2013 which is relevant to this study and also to be used to support the findings from the empirical evidence. The period being discussed from 1999 to 2002 is very crucial because during this period the Land Reform programme was carried out, a new dominant party opposed to Zanu PF was formed which participated in two highly contested elections that is the 2000 Parliamentary and 2002 Presidential elections. All these events largely contributed to the imposition of sanctions against Zimbabwe from 2001 onwards by the United States of America and some members of the European Union.

Controversial laws such as the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPA) both passed in 2002 and the Interception of Communications Act of 2007 had a negative impact on democracy in Zimbabwe (Maposa, Muguti and Tobias, 2013). These laws applied even to civil society organizations hence the extensive number of respondents who highlighted that they cannot freely express themselves even though freedom of expression is embedded in the constitution.

The lack of a supportive political culture emanates from the previously highlighted authoritarianism of the government and repressive laws (Moyo and Yeros, 2007). Further substantive principles of democracy were analysed to confirm the erosion of democratic political culture in Zimbabwe. The authoritarian nature of the ruling party has eroded whatever minor democratic political culture developing in Zimbabwe, the majority of respondents highlighting how this is due to repressive laws which inhibit freedom of expression.

Despite the authoritarian nature of the government prior to 2002 Zimbabwe's level of democracy had actually risen in 1998; this was due to the rise of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by Morgan Tsvangirai. MDC was Zanu PF's first major opposition party since 1980 and it posed a formidable challenge (Moyo and Yeros, 2007). However Zanu PF unwilling to relinquish power used state apparatus to dissuade and to oust MDC, the majority of respondents highlighted how there was a blur between state and government due to the lack of a separation of powers which gave the Zanu PF government extensive power over the police, army and judicial system all used for Zanu PF's political agendas (Bush and Szeftel, 2002).

MDC was also dissuaded from participating in elections through repressive laws which either inhibited public gatherings or freedom of speech and whenever they did participate in elections there was always evidence of malice and electoral fraud (Ferguson, 2005). As postulated earlier respondents highlighted how there are deeply flawed elections in Zimbabwe and how the country lacks an independent electoral commission. This sheds light on a damning report called the Khampepe report made by an electoral observation team sent by former South African president Thabo Mbeki revealed how the 2002 Zimbabwe presidential elections were flawed (Ferguson, 2005). Thabo Mbeki at the time was one of President Mugabe's biggest allies however the Khampepe report would have worked against Zanu PF's political agenda and for twelve years the South African government did not publish the report; which was a clear indication to the malice involved in the 2002 Zimbabwe Presidential elections (Ferguson, 2005). Elections are a substantive principle of democracy which falls in line with the principle theory of this study. Elections as well were a principle factor in the United States and the European Union imposing sanctions against Zimbabwe.

According Lektzian sanctions against undemocratic regimes increase the ability of the leader to increase rents thereby accumulating and consequently wielding more power (Lektzian, 2007). Sanctions imposed against Zimbabwe were meant to target only members of the Zanu PF however some clauses in the sanctions packages targeted state institutions, government parastatal and companies belonging to government individuals which were essentially the backbone of the country since they own most of the country's wealth (Portela, 2013). The fall of these institutions and companies therefore had trickledown effect to the ordinary Zimbabwean. As the majority of respondents highlighted smart sanctions were not as smart as they ended up hurting ordinary citizens and those targeted escaped without harm as they had power and wealth to cushion themselves from the economic impact of sanctions.

ZDERA which was the sanctions package imposed against Zimbabwe had clauses in it which directly stipulated and affected public state institutions. Sections 4, part C and D of ZDERA have the following clauses which instruct the "... Secretary of Treasury and the United States executive director to each international financial institution to oppose and vote against:

- Any extension by the respective institution of any loan, credit, or guarantee to the Government of Zimbabwe; or
- Any cancellation or, reduction of indebtedness owed by the Government of Zimbabwe to the United States or any international financial institution” (ZDERA, 2001).

The bill passed by the United States Congress clearly intended to affect the common Zimbabwean aside from the travel bans and asset seizures of high ranking officials, the same restrictions were also followed up by the United States counterparts in Europe. Both the government of Zimbabwe and the sanctions had a hand in causing economic turmoil in Zimbabwe as (Portela, 2013).

Sanctions were costly to Zimbabwe’s economy respondents highlighted a negative attitude towards the mechanics of sanctions. This shows the sentiments ordinary Zimbabweans harbour as they continue to see high ranking Zanu PF officials flourish economically in a country with unprecedented levels of unemployment rates, a non-existent currency and business opportunities are such that only the richest survive who unsurprisingly are Zanu PF officials or closely aligned to the party. From this point of view it would seem that sanctions failed to convince the people to topple their government and bring about the transition to democracy.

Furthermore as highlighted by the institutional theory of sanctions the imposition of sanctions against an undemocratic state might result in the undemocratic government being more repressive in order to tighten its hold on power lest its citizens are easily swayed into action against it due to the political or economic impact of sanctions. The sanctions imposed against Zimbabwe resulted in the Zanu PF government implementing repressive laws in order to dissuade its citizens from conjuring up an uprising against the government. Therefore despite the sanctions being economically punitive Zimbabweans endured the sanctions regime because of fear of the consequences of rising up against the government (Grebe, 2010). The majority of respondents also highlighted how government mismanagement and the sanctions led to economic suffering which weakened the civic society therefore organizations responsible for standing up people’s rights were disabled and an uprising would have been futile.

The Zanu PF government also used a tactic predicated by the institutional theory of sanctions. The Zanu PF government tried to use the rally behind the flag tactic against sanctions as the government began blaming the country's woes on sanctions (Lektzian, 2007). Respondents even highlighted the same how the government tried to exaggerate the consequences of sanctions. However this was simply a sanctions besting tactic and Zanu PF employed it well particularly in rural areas where people might have been less informed about sanctions. Sanctions were just branded as a deliberate ploy by the West for regime change and indeed to some extent indeed it was; as postulated by interviewee Dr. Nyasvisvo "The rise of MDC being supported by a former colonial master had the makings of a new form of colonialism which brewed malignant nationalism and otherness, the laws were not seen as not repressive but actually necessary to guard against would be detractors, the others and neo-colonialism". The West wanted to impose itself and agenda on Zimbabwe however there was a serious a case of human rights violations in Zimbabwe which could not be dismissed by the well-articulated nationalist sentiments of Zanu PF.

#### **4.5 SUMMARY**

There was a fairly large pool of respondents and 85 out of 100 questionnaires were unspoilt which the researcher could use. This clearly showed how ordinary Zimbabweans were interested in the politics and economics that have disturbed their nation for the past decade. The respondents also seemed well informed about the topic, in terms of the questionnaire, judging from the responses, they did not appear to be random. The forty-nine participants who willingly revealed their political party affiliation aided the research in analysing the different opinions and perceptions of the different political parties in Zimbabwe on the sanctions topic. Ultimately as proven by the chi-squared test it is plausible that the majority of Zimbabweans despite political divides view sanctions as an impediment to democracy rather than an aid.

The interviews carried out were used to supplement the information gathered from the questionnaires. The interview questions being the same as the questionnaire questions followed a similar format and style and their main purpose was to get more insight on the information gathered and analysed from questionnaires. However, due to time constraints and

tight schedules of some interview candidates some of were not interviewed. However the interview questions were emailed to the candidates and they responded by writing down their thoughts and opinions on the questions sent.

The political impasse between Zimbabwe and the West span for over a decade and relations are still strained. With the recent 2013 elections the minor developments towards democracy became threatened as ZANU PF assumed full control of the government and the MDC factions were removed. It was therefore imperative to review the progress if any of the targeted sanctions imposed against Zimbabwe as the political and economic situation in Zimbabwe up the 2013 elections seemed more regressive rather than progressive and transitional.

The targeted sanctions it seems lacked the social, political and economic background and in depth knowledge of Zimbabwe in order to fully succeed. In some instances ZANU PF ended up free riding on the indignation towards sanctions which further sustained its hold on power therefore contrary to the topic of this research sanctions were aiding tyrannical rule. Sanctions aided ZANU PF's agenda to guard against colonial rule and influence, they further aided to the deterioration of the economy which brought more harm to the ordinary Zimbabwean hence Zimbabweans at large as reviewed by the data collected are indifferent towards sanctions.



## **CHAPTER 5**

### **CONCLUSION**

#### **5.1 INTRODUCTION**

The purpose of this study was to determine whether sanctions aided or impeded democracy in Zimbabwe. A series of themed questions were created and merged into a questionnaire to enquire, from the ordinary Zimbabweans, how sanctions have directly or indirectly affected them and more importantly, if democracy has progressed or regressed under the sanctions regime. The questionnaire provided the opportunity for respondents to express themselves as it enquired about their social, economic and political lives. This was to enable the respondents to reveal their experiences under the current government and how sanctions have affected the state of affairs in Zimbabwe.

The self-administered questionnaires were randomly distributed to 100 ordinary Zimbabweans with the assistance of the Zimbabwe Democratic Institute. Out of the 100 questionnaires distributed, 15 were returned spoiled therefore there were 85 unspoilt questionnaires which the researcher used. The questionnaires had closed ended questions and a four level likert scale on which participants had rate measuring positive and negative feedback.

#### **5.2. IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY**

The main limitations faced in pursuing this project were access to information, time constraints and release of a clearance form to conduct field research. The lack of clearance from the ethics committee delayed the project by a semester. This had negative effect on the interview schedule and participants. As a result, some participants cancelled their participation in the study. The survey instrument used for the study had a likert scale which measures positive or negative feelings; however, it does not probe deep into the respondents' attitude. It is also a possibility that respondent's feelings were influenced by previous questions in the questionnaire influencing the manner in which they respond to questions which followed.

Furthermore, people tend to avoid choosing extreme answers to avoid implications indicative of extremism and yet, in some cases, the extreme answer might be one that captures the

respondents' true feelings and attitudes. The researcher therefore tried to use a four level likert scale without the neutral option to try curb bias and not giving the respondents an easy answer on questions they would want to avoid. The assistance of the Zimbabwe Democratic Institute was crucial to overcoming the above mentioned hurdles especially with sampling and targeting the right candidates for the study.

### **5.2.1 THE EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS**

The sanctions package imposed against Zimbabwe clearly showed a lack of interest and understanding by the West considering that for more than a decade they were not refined to avoid doing harm ordinary Zimbabweans. In fact the sanctions were not repackaged even when it was evident that they were doing no harm to their intended targets were failing. This showed a lack of interest or need towards the alleviation of the Zimbabwean situation.

A new approach is needed with regards to imposing sanctions in order to improve their efficacy. Understanding the social, political and economic factors at play within a society is crucial when imposing sanctions. The sanctions imposed against ZANU PF clearly showed a lack of research and understanding of the Zimbabwean people and the situation as a whole. The crisis was taken at face value and not much research was taken to understand ZANU PF's power mechanics, including how and why it maintains power. This enabled the ZANU PF to label the sanctions as a form of colonialism by ZANU PF, especially in rural areas where it has a stronghold. As a result of this, sanctions were used to garner support in rural areas. The inability to understand such dynamics ultimately made sanctions fail. Sanctions were meant to appeal to the conscience of the people so that they rise up against ZANU PF, however, in rural areas it was predestined to fail as most people's livelihoods were dependant on ZANU PF remaining in power. In urban areas ZANU PF merely used fear and intimidation to maintain its power.

### **5.2.2. SANCTIONS AND REGIME CHANGE IN ZIMBABWE**

The imposition of sanctions coincided with an economic downturn in Zimbabwe. However the repercussion of the sanctions was the continuous detrition of the unprecedented economic crisis in Zimbabwe. The economic woes in Zimbabwe are mainly a result of government mismanagement and corruption not sanctions, but the latter have played a major role in blocking economic recovery. Clauses in ZDERA, the sanctions package imposed by the USA, specifically prevents access to international financial assistance to Zimbabwe. Furthermore it halted and blocks funding and assistance to public state enterprises like health and education which affect the ordinary Zimbabwean. General Citizens suffered socially and economically from sanctions whilst intended targets escaped as they had power and opportunity. This proves that sanctions were not smart considering their effects on the ordinary Zimbabwean.

Thirteen years later and still under sanctions, Robert Mugabe and ZANU PF were contesting in the 2013 presidential elections, denouncing the unity government with the two MDC factions as an unholy marriage and proclaiming the need to reclaim the Zimbabwe they fought for against the colonialists. The sanctions imposed against the ZANU PF regime in 2000 aided in derailing Zimbabwe's economic and political situation.

The minor successes of sanctions such as the Unity Government of Zimbabwe of 2009 are too few to render sanctions as having been successful in their quest for regime change and the transition to democracy in Zimbabwe. The Unity Government is now disintegrated The MDC formations which were once prominent supported by the West are slowly falling into the oblivion due to extensive in house fighting and defections. The extensive democratic reforms made under the unity government such as the freedom of the press considering have been reversed and can still be reversed since the same Zanu PF government which once trampled upon them is the same government which now has full control of government having ousted MDC in 2013. Sanctions therefore did not achieve what they set out to do in 2000 which was to aid democracy in Zimbabwe through regime change. Rather, sanctions created room for the ZANU PF government to get a better grip on power and to drive away any feasible opposition.

### **5.2.3 SANCTIONS BASTING**

Another important area to be addressed when imposing sanctions is the unity of the international community itself. The United Nations failed to impose sanctions against Zimbabwe because Russia and China vetoed against the resolution to do so. Sanctions imposed against Zimbabwe lacked adequate vigour since ZANU PF, after being alienated from the West still had good relations with the East. The East has sustained ZANU PF for the past decade and was extensively used as a sanctions basting tactic. If the West had managed to convince the East of the humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe and present a unified front it is possible that ZANU PF might have yielded to the demands of the international community of implementing democratic reforms.

Regional blocks such as the Southern African Development Community and the African Union were passive in addressing the Zimbabwe crisis. In light of the human rights crisis in Zimbabwe, regional blocks faced a dilemma on whether to support ZANU PF against the West or to oppose it. Supporting ZANU PF meant standing in solidarity with a fellow compatriot against a former colonial master however regional blocks also had their own interests and relationships with regards to aid and development they were unwilling to damage for the sake of Zimbabwe. Regional blocks should play an active role in mediating conflicts and affairs of member states whenever possible and when human rights are threatened considering that many of these organizations were created for furthering the rights of Africans during the colonial era. As of late however, due to lack of funding and commitment some regional organizations have become obsolete irrelevance.

### **5.3. THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN ZIMBABWE**

Zimbabwean politics is marred by uncertainty and is in crisis. The two largest political parties Zanu PF and MDC dealing with internal succession battles and struggles that stray away from attending to the political, social and economic woes facing the country. Democratic development lies addressing the social and economic problems facing Zimbabwe first, a radical change is required from politicians with regards to political culture with more focus on national interests rather than using public office for personal gain.

The uncertainty surrounding President Mugabe's successor does little in aiding the political situation in Zimbabwe. Of late progressive elements have arisen within Zanu PF and if a progressive candidate is chosen it could usher in a new phase in Zimbabwean politics and a transition to democracy. A progressive successor would have to tackle certain key areas for the transition to democracy; these include corruption, the rule of law and the separation of powers in Zimbabwe in order to re-establish trust and cooperation with international and domestic partners.

The West still has a major role to play in the future of democracy in Zimbabwe, a different approach and reengagement is required with both Zanu PF and MDC. With Zanu PF a form of carrot stick diplomacy is required, providing extensive economic support for progressive political reforms and implementing punitive measures for regressive political actions. A slowly progressive Zanu PF would be ideal for this type of reengagement with the West. MDC and other opposition parties need to revamp themselves in order to attract support and sponsorship from the West, of late opposition parties have a dented image with the West due to their own shortcomings.

The future of formidable political opposition in Zimbabwe also lies with the revival of the civil society which has over the years been eroded by repressive laws, economic meltdown and weak democratic institutions. The West to promote the transition to democracy in Zimbabwe needs to promote and strengthen democratic institutions responsible for advocating and monitoring human rights.

Regional blocs particularly SADC and AU need to take a tougher stance with aiding the transition to democracy in Zimbabwe. President Mugabe is currently chairing both and should be used as a platform for reengagement on Zimbabwe's democratic situation by encouraging transparency with regards to elections and the rule of law.

#### **5.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS**

The majority of respondents reacted negatively to the democratic processes in Zimbabwe. There is a serious lack of human rights monitoring and consciousness which emanates from the ruling party using authoritarianism through repressive laws which infringe on individual rights and freedoms. The current government has been ruling since 1980 has done so using fear and condemnation making it nearly impossible to have a supportive democratic political culture in Zimbabwe. The few political parties that have managed to emerge and challenge the ZANU PF have been removed using state resources from the police, judiciary and legislature. This is a further indicator of the authoritarianism used by the government. There is no clear separation of powers as state and government have been fused into one. The authoritarian nature of the government was a major factor leading to the imposition of sanctions.

The constitution in Zimbabwe does promote multiparty competition and individual rights however it is selectively enforced. There exists multiparty political participation and competition but only to a certain level. There is extensive evidence of flawed elections and voter intimidation rendering the elections not free or fair. Other political parties besides ZANU PF only exists up to this level to create a facade of a democratic republic, elections are usually predetermined due to the lack of an independent electoral commission hence the frustration of other parties. This has led to the lack of cordial relationships between parties. Furthermore, there are no institutions or mechanisms to hold government accountable for such injustices as highlighted. This is due to the lack of separation of powers, making it is difficult to contest elections.

Sanctions were not directly meant to hurt the democratic rights and freedoms of ordinary citizens. Sanctions were only meant to target and coerce leading members of ZANU PF and some institutions into making reforms that improve the lives of Zimbabweans. However smart

sanctions were not so smart; sanctions were intended to have a ripple effect on the conscience of the people to take action considering how opposition parties were encouraged by the West and used sanctions for regime change in Zimbabwe. This only polarized the political situation in Zimbabwe and did not lead to tolerance and cooperation leading to democracy. It however caused the government to be more repressive and sanctions did not cause citizens to demand change from their government for fear of condemnation. Sanctions were labelled as a deliberate ploy by the West to impose itself on Zimbabwe and Africa by ZANU PF which was one of their sanctions basting tactics moreover that sanctions were used as an exaggeration to blame the West for the exclusive cause of the country's troubles.