

**THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE GENOCIDE AND CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN RWANDA: CASE STUDIES OF THE TOWNS OF
BUTARE AND CYANGUGU**

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DECLARATION

I, Alphonse Gahima, Registration Number 204001473, hereby declare that the dissertation entitled:

“The socio-economic impacts of the genocide and current developments in Rwanda: Case studies of the towns of Butare and Cyangugu”

is the result of my own research and has not been submitted in part or full for any other degree to any other tertiary institution.


A Gahima

Date

DEDICATION

To the dear members of my family: Gashugi, Cansilde, Hyacinthe, Seraphine, Blandine, Bruno, Aimable and Christine who lost their lives during the genocide and my dear sisters who are still alive: Agnès, Rose and Rosette, I hope you will never see another genocide in your lifetime.

I also dedicate this project to all other unfortunate people who passed on during the genocide and to those who still suffer from the varied and multiple impacts of the genocide.

May the Lord keep you well!

ABSTRACT

World history has been punctuated by cycles of violence, regardless of time, region or race. Genocide, which is the worst form of violence, has always led to horrible impacts of a social, economic and environmental nature. The last decade of the 20th Century was the most turbulent Rwanda has ever seen. The country was ravaged by civil war, genocide, mass migration, economic crisis, diseases, return of refugees and deforestation. Almost all Rwandan families were affected wherever they were and at multiple levels, by outcomes such as death, disease, disability, poverty, loss of dignity and imprisonment. Fortunately, the people of Rwanda have chosen the path of peace, but are still faced with a huge task of dealing with the impacts of the genocide and prior conflicts in the region.

This dissertation attempts to investigate the socio-economic impacts of the genocide on current development in Rwanda using primary and secondary data obtained from fieldwork undertaken in Cyangugu and Butare Towns. The conceptual basis for the study was the Geography of Conflict. The general conclusion reached was that the causes and consequences of the Rwandan genocide are multidimensional. The Rwandan genocide did not originate from the “ancient hatred” between Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups, but from the manipulation of history and bad leadership. Also, the main impacts of genocide in Rwanda are the destruction of human resources, social and cultural structures in the country, especially the relationship between the Hutus and Tutsis ethnic groups. In the same way, the genocide resulted in destruction of infrastructure, development facilities and natural resources. However, the effort for reconstruction and development undertaken after the genocide, shows that reconciliation is possible in long term despite what happened. The lasting solution for Rwanda is definitely national reconciliation and its success will depend mainly on good governance, human resource development and poverty alleviation.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFB	Association des Femmes d’Affaires de Butare
ARAMET	Association de Recherche et d’Appui en Aménagement du Territoire
AVEGA	Association des veuves du génocide (widows’s association)
BARAKABAHO	Orphans’s association in Butare
CELL	The smallest administrative unit in Rwanda
CERAI	Centres d’Enseignement rural et artisanal intégré
CGC	Centre de Gestion des Conflits
COOPEC	Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit
CUEA	Catholic University of Eastern Africa
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DUHARANIRE-KUBAHO	Orphans’s Association in Butare
DUHOZANYE	Widows’ association in Butare Province
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FAR	Rwandese Armed Forces (ex-FAR: former Rwandese Armed Forces).
FARG	Fond National pour l’Assistance aux rescapés du génocide et des massacres au Rwanda
GACACA	Traditional courts in Rwanda
GIS	Geographic Information Systems
HIVI/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
IGIKAKARUGAMBA	Aloe in English. Most aloes have some medicinal or commercial value but the most commonly known is the aloe <i>barbadensis</i> better known as Aloe vera.
IMIDUGUDU	Grouped habitats in Rwanda, initiated after the genocide
INRS	Institut National de Recherche Scientifique
INTERAHAMWE	Hutus militia who implemented the genocide in Rwanda
IRST	Institut de Recherche Scientifique and Technologique

IRSAC	Institut de Recherche Scientifique en Afrique Centrale
KINYARWANDA	Rwandese language
KYMERS ROUGES	Red Cambodians
MINECOFIN	Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances
MINITERE	Ministère des Terres (Department of Land).
MORHINGA TREE	Medicinal plant grown in Rwanda
MRNDD	Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie et le Développement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEPAD	New Partnership of Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NUR	National University of Rwanda
ONAPO	Office National de la Population
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RWANDATEL	A telephone Company in Rwanda
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RWFR	Rwandan Francs
UKZN	University of KwaZulu-Natal
UMUGANDA	Community service in Rwanda
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda
UNISA	University of South Africa
URWIBUTSO	Memorial (in Kinyarwanda).

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION ✓

1.1. PREAMBLE

Known poetically as the "Land of a Thousand Hills" due to its relief, Rwanda is a tiny country, a landlocked republic lying South of the Equator in East-Central Africa (World Bank, 2003:20). It lies between the southern latitude of 1° C 20' and 2° C 50' and the longitude of 28° C 50' and 30° C 55' (Mesar and Kanimba, 2003:9). Physically, Rwanda is bounded on the West by Lake Kivu and the Rusizi River; on the South by the Ruhwa and Akanyaru Rivers; on the East by the Akagera River; and on the Northwest by a chain of volcanoes. Rwanda neighbours are Uganda to the North, Burundi to the South, Tanzania to the East, and Democratic Republic of Congo located on the West and Northwest. The country enjoys a mild tropical climate with two rainy seasons and two dry seasons. It has an average daily temperature of 21° C and an annual rainfall of 1188 mm at Kigali (Centre-North), 1523mm at Gikongoro (South) and 1249mm at Kamembe (South West) (MINICOFIN, 2002:344). With an area of 26,338 square kilometres and an estimated 318 inhabitants (Gross density related to the total surface in 2004) per square kilometre, Rwanda is now one of the most densely populated countries in Africa with about 49 percent of its population below the age of 15 years. The pressure of people on scarce land has posed a constant threat to social harmony and the physical environment (World Bank, 2003:20).

Rwanda marked the 10th anniversary of the genocide in 2004 in which human lives were lost and natural resources destroyed at national and regional levels. The last decade of the 20th Century was the most turbulent Rwanda has ever seen. The combination of economic crisis, civil war, genocide, internal displacement, mass emigration, political transition and return of refugees ravaged the country. Every Rwandan household was affected by at least one of these events (Verwimp & Baval, 2004).

Figure 1.1: Location of Rwanda



Source: Encyclopædia Britannica, 2007

The genocide resulted from the deliberate choice of modern elite to foster hatred and fear to hold onto power. A small group of politicians, used the State, its machinery and authority to carry out the slaughter, which “atrocities caused the death of 937 000 people, mostly Tutsi and some moderate Hutus” (OPJDR, 2005). Melvern (2000:227) pointed out the silence of the international community stating that:

The failure of the international community to act while one million people in Rwanda were slaughtered is one of the greatest scandals of the Twentieth Century.

The impact of the genocide was the disintegration of the nation and the destruction of social relationships between the Hutu and the Tutsi ethnic groups. Moreover, the environmental degradation exacerbated by the massive population displacements caused

vast economic losses to the country. The government's effort to re-settle people left biodiversity and other natural resources destroyed. Despite substantial international assistance and political reforms, the country continues to struggle to boost investment and agricultural output and to foster reconciliation. (CIA, 2002)

In addition to genocide related issues, Rwanda struggles, as do other African countries, with all the environmental constraints associated with a third world developing country, which include according to Friend (2003):

- (i) Lack of education, both general and environmentally associated;
- (ii) Informal settlements and associated problems with clean water, air pollution through the use of coal-fired cooking and heating applications, effective sewage treatment and waste management; and
- (iii) Insufficient resources, both human and financial, for effective enforcement of environmental legislation.

In such a situation of post-genocide in Rwanda where human and material resources has profoundly deteriorated because of conflict, it is not an easy task to promote viable development. In other words, there will be no integrated development in Rwanda without peace, justice, reconciliation and poverty alleviation.

Although studies on the Rwandan genocide have been undertaken since 1994, most of them focused on the historical and political description of events that occurred in the country. Scholarly publications reviewed in the literature went beyond the simple description of the genocide in Rwanda as a consequence of ancient hatred between Hutu and Tutsi (African Rights, 1995; Glover, 2001; Karekezi, 2003; Keane, 1995; Nyankanzi, 1999; Prunier, 1995; Staub, 2003). In the same way, other researchers such as Adejeji, 1999; Buhaug, 2004; Mamdani, 2001; Melvern, 2000; Moser & Clark, 2001; Muberanziza, 2004; Pottier, 2002 and Verwimp, 2003 to cite a few, have been conducted. However, much has yet to be done on the socio-economic impact of the genocide on people's daily lives, their attitudes and perceptions of present and past

experiences, environmental impacts and the question of access to services, facilities and resources. This study attempts to go beyond simple description of the genocide in Rwanda by exploring intensively what communities have experienced during and years after the tragedy in 1994.

The purpose of this research is to improve the study of the socio-economic consequences of the genocide in Rwanda and to stress its ongoing impact on development. As always, ethnic factors involve geography and demography: this research is situated in the sub-discipline of Political Geography with a focus on the two semi-urban areas of Butare and Cyangugu towns in Rwanda. These case studies were chosen not only because of their particular history before, during and after the genocide but also because of their heterogeneous population and physical landscape.

It is hoped that this study will make some contribution to the integrated development of Rwanda in the post-genocide era. It will for instance attempt to evaluate progress made in the implementation of the key socio-economic components of the Millennium Development goals and Vision 2020 Goals as contained in the “Rwanda Development Indicators” (Appendix 3; MINECOFIN, 2002:7-11).

1.2. AIM AND OBJECTIVES

This study aims to investigate the socio-economic impacts of the genocide that occurred in Rwanda in 1994 and the present developments that are taking place in the country. It will identify social relationships, the impact of genocide on the spatial distribution of the population, and the infrastructure just more than a decade after the genocide. The study also attempts to provide strategies to address challenges that the country faces in terms of sustainable development. Specifically, the objectives of this study are:

- To determine the nature and quality of social relationships among the sampled population;
- To determine what has affected people most in their daily lives and how these issues challenge future developments in the country;

- To investigate how the displacement of people (migrations) during and after the genocide affected the infrastructure and the lifestyle of households;
- To assess the coping strategies of the people and their leaders with the impacts of the genocide and
- To make suggestions and recommendations for sustainable development in the country.

1.3. CHAPTER SEQUENCE

The study is organised into six chapters that contain the following aspects: Chapter 2 outlines the conceptual framework for the study. Chapter 3 focuses on the literature which is an overview of genocides which occurred in the Twentieth Century with particular emphasis on their socio-economic causes, impacts as well as mechanisms and means deployed for reconstruction in the genocide aftermath. Specific attention will be given to Rwanda, covering the past ten years to determine historical and environmental causes and consequences of the genocide of 1994. Chapter 4 discusses the methodology that was employed in conducting the research. While socio-economic assessments have often been carried out on a large scale in the country, the purpose of this research is to focus attention on an area consisting of four Cells, the smallest administrative units in Rwanda. The penultimate chapter 5 deals with an analysis of the primary data from interviews and secondary data from public sources and others institutions. Chapter 6 encompasses an evaluation, conclusion and recommendations for the reconstruction of the country and for further research studies to address negative impacts as well as adopt policies to mitigate the impacts of the genocide in Rwanda.

1.4. CONCLUSION

This study is an attempt to make genocide in the world in general, and in Rwanda in particular, much more understandable in terms of its causes and socio-economic

impacts. The case studies of the Butare and Cyangugu towns are an illustration of what social and economic consequences can emerge from genocide. However, this study does not pretend to answer all the complex questions and issues surrounding genocide. It is only a partial attempt to address certain aspects that are deemed important, given the scope of this research.

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. INTRODUCTION

As stated by Groom (1993), a specialist in conflict resolution, “we cannot think without a theory: facts do not speak for themselves, we impose meaning on them. We need theories to be able to make statements about human behaviour in conflict and war” (1993:71-72).

Most research on genocide and other conflicts (African Rights, 1995; Burton and Dukes, 1993; Glover, 2001; Keane, 1995; Prunier, 1995 and Staub, 1989; 2003) have concentrated on moral and socio-historical aspects of conflicts and their related paradigms. They failed to acknowledge the relevance of geography and the interpenetration of social relations and spatial structures due to genocides, generally, and especially in Rwanda. In the context of this work, the conceptual framework guiding the analysis of genocide in Rwanda and contributing towards shaping the study is based on multiple aspects, mostly the spatial, economic and social (Fig 2.1).

The phenomenon of conflicts and wars and their approaches are complex and multidimensional (Adejeji, 1999; Buhaug, 2005; Karekezi, 2003; Mamdani, 2001; Melvern, 2000; Pottier, 2002; Toff, 2004). Despite the existing studies of conflict in the past, it was only in the 20th century that conflict was systematically studied (Schellenberg, 1996). The number of disciplines that the systematic study of conflict draws on is large. This includes the full range of the social sciences and the humanities, as well as mathematics and biology. Thus, multidisciplinary research and a comparative understanding of conflicts need to be promoted (Semelin, 2005).

The present study, assessing the impact of genocide in Rwanda, is framed within the context of political geography, more specifically, the geography of conflict which includes ethnic violence, genocide and other type of conflicts. However, it should be noted that conflict zones are no longer exclusively the subject of political, historical, social and military studies. This broad area of study underlines how geographical factors are involved in history and politics and how history and political factors are involved in geography especially how geography interacts with conflicts and vice versa (Groom, 1993; Obara, 1988; Semelin, 2005).

Among various paradigms highlighted in the literature review, the study of the impacts of genocide can best be dealt within the anthropological, international relations and historical approaches to the phenomenon of conflict. These approaches focus on the infrastructure, structural and superstructural dimensions of a conflict. In the same way, the cultural materialism approach set out by Marvin Harris, inspired research methods applied by the study (Harris, 1979). Thus, data collection was largely the product of the interactions between a sampled population within a particular culture and geographical circumscription (Harris, 1979).

Furthermore, in the researcher's attempt to fully assess the socio-economic impacts of the conflict, a comparative approach with reference to other cases of genocide in the world guided the research design. This was specifically for understanding, collecting, analysing primary and secondary data as well as in making suggestions and recommendations.

2.2. POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

Geography as a multidisciplinary science has become critical to understanding international relations and for achieving national goals. Geographical base data and tools are changing the way people address issues. Additionally, geography, especially political geography, has proved its relevance in how societies organise and make

decisions about their environment. Besides cartography and other classic tasks, geographers study interactions between natural and societal/cultural systems (Wood, 2001).

“The German geographer, Friedrich Ratzel, who lived between 1844 and 1904, is generally regarded as the founder of political geography in the modern sense and his book, *Politische Geographie*, published in 1897 is considered as the first modern treatise on the subject” (Boateng, 1980:3).

Political geography is a field of human geography that is concerned with politics. It is closely related to geopolitics, which is seen as the strategic and governmental application of political geographers. It is also closely related to international relations. Boateng (1980) pointed out that “the study of international relations has now become a very important aspect of political geography, and consequently organisations like the United Nations, which are concerned with containing, reducing or eliminating conflict and promoting harmonious relations between different states and nations, must necessarily engage the attention of political geographers” (Boateng, 1980:10).

Political Geography has been also promoted by structuralist and realist geographers in Britain because of their research on the relationship between the state, the economy and society (UNISA, 1994: 14-17). This group of geographers see political processes as a direct result of economic processes. Additionally, political geography is concerned with the constraints on the behaviour of individuals which are imposed by the organisation of society as a whole and by the activities of powerful group and institutions within it. At its broadest level, political geography looks to political science for its explanatory concepts. It focuses on the idea of power and conflict as the main determinant of locational behaviour and resource allocation (Obara, 1988). Due to the present study's focus on society, its structure, infrastructure, customs and beliefs, the use of political geography was appropriate given the context.

2.3. GEOGRAPHY OF CONFLICTS

“The geography of conflicts, a sub-discipline of political geography, called also the geography of war, is a field of research that combines elements from geopolitics, political geography, history, human geography, social geography and conflicts studies” (Vehnamaki, 2002:50). It is a discipline which deals with how geographical factors are involved in politics and how political factors are involved in geography. Focus is also on how geography interacts with conflicts and vice versa (Obara, 1988: 4-7).

The geography of conflict assists in approaching and understanding crises and tragedies. Several studies have been inspired by its methods, example are: the geography of war in the DR Congo and Sierra Leone (Vehnamaki, 2002), the geography of ethnic violence (Toft, 2004), the geography of armed civil conflict (Buhaug, 2004), armed conflicts and political violence (Moser and Clark, 2001), the general consequences of war (Ferguson, 1994), comprehending and mastering African conflicts (Adejeji, 1999) and the environmental consequences of war (Adley and Grant, 2004).

Genocide in Rwanda, “a country still reinventing itself in some ways” (Lacey, 2005) could be better understood from the perspective of the geography of ethnic violence. Due to the complex problems that the country has faced such as justice and rehabilitation of infrastructure, little has been done about socio-economic and geographic causes and consequences of conflict in the country. The geography of conflicts through its multiple dimensions for the analysis of ethnic violence goes beyond simple political and historical approaches that have been used previously by scholars (Buhaug, 2004).

Vehnamaki (2001) argued that, ethnicity in itself does not directly cause war or genocide. It, however, reflects other outcomes of social, economic and historical injustice. Writing about conflicts in Africa, he pointed to a variety of “push” and “pull”

factors which include political hardship, political history, political inequalities, quest for security, natural resources, land ownership, and involvement of foreign countries (Vehnamaki, 2001, 52-53). Similarly, as outlined in the literature review, there were many pull and push factors in all genocides which occurred in the world and in Rwanda in particular in 1994.

2.4. CULTURAL MATERIALISM THEORY FOR UNDERSTANDING THE GENOCIDE AND ITS IMPACTS.

The phenomenon of conflicts, genocide and war are multidimensional (Toft, 2004; Adejeji, 1999; Pottier, 2002; Groom, 1993; Staub, 1989; 2003), so are theories and conflict analyses. The review of the themes and school of thoughts of conflict theory reveals a broad variety of psychological, anthropological theories and models for understanding conflicts (Anstey, 1999; Cunningham, 1998; Ferguson, 1994; Furlong, 2005; Groom, 1993; Harris, 1979; Mann, 2005; Robarchek, 1990; Staub, 2003; Shwartz, 1993; Toft, 2004). Despite this, there is still no grand theory of human conflict that could be applied to all kinds of conflict (Cunningham, 1998). Therefore, the present study on the socio-economic impacts of the genocide can best be dealt within cultural materialism.

Cultural materialism is a scientific research strategy that was first introduced in 1968, "The rise of Anthropological Theory" of Harris (Frank, 2001). It prioritizes material, behaviour and ethical processes in the explanation of the evolution of human socio-cultural systems. It was promoted by Ferguson (1994) in his study of the "General Consequences of War." Toft (2004) in "The Geography of Ethnic Violence", Anstey (1999) in his work "Managing Change, Negotiating Conflict". The theory of cultural materialism played a key role in the explanation of conflict, genocide and war through infrastructural, structural and superstructural factors. The theory relates to demography, the organization of work and interactions with the natural environment. According to


Harris (1979), the three factors cited above “shape structural patterns of kinship, economics and politics”(Harris, 1979:56).

Anstey (1999) in the same way, the **infrastructural factors** explain why wars and conflicts occur in the absence of the scarcity of essential material resources. With population growth, resources become scarce and this prompts remedial action. Conflict between competitors for scarce environmental resources has frequently been identified as the underlying cause of war. The **structural factors** include kinship, economics and politics. For the latter, war parties have been organised according to existing kin structures and the immediate family. A large circle of kin are the context not just for biological and social reproduction, but the basis for organising and co-operative efforts (Anstey, 1999:30-47). Individuals choosing sides in a conflict are influenced by the strength of kinship ties (Anstey, 1999). Additionally, economic factors may generate a demand for labour and political groups may reflect the various divisions of social structures and their interests. The **superstructural factors** consist of relating war patterns to some aspect of culturally patterned beliefs and attitudes. Attitudes are products of social circumstances. According to superstructural factors, individuals will express the cultural values as their motives in war (Anstey, 1999).

According to Lim (2005), cultural materialism is not only a theory but also a research methodology. It combines in its epistemology quantitative methods and “natives and “observers” views and feelings in collecting or interpreting data (Lim, 2005). Moreover, cultural materialism has made important achievements with respect to many important arenas of human social life but it failed with respect to other arenas such as the socio-biological. There is, therefore, a need to take cultural materialism to a deeper level (Sandton, 2002). In the light of the above, the present study was also partially inspired by other schools of conflict which similarly explored the three dimensions of structure, superstructure and infrastructure. In this regard, works cited were Groom’s (1993) three approaches to conflict, Cunningham’s (1998) theoretical framework for conflict resolution, the different models to approach conflicts of Furlong (2005), the conflict management concepts of Avruch and Black (1996), (Fry, 1997) and Mann’s theories of

political power relations as the origin and escalating of ethnic cleansing (Mann, 2005; Suzuki, 2005). "Ethnic cleansing is modern because it is the dark side of democracy" (Mann, 2005:110). Additionally, ethnic cleansing (genocide) is the outcome of four interrelated sets of power networks: ideological, economic, military and political (Mann, 2005; Suzuki, 2005). To understand ethnic cleansing stated Mann (2005), "we need a sociology of power more than a special psychology of perpetrators as disturbed or psychotic people-though some may be" (Mann, 2005:9).

Figure 2.1 Conceptual framework for understanding genocide



2.5. CONCLUSION

This chapter provided the conceptual and theoretical framework of the study. As genocide is complex and multidimensional, the study was multi-paradigmatic and multidisciplinary. However, the socio-economic impacts of the genocide in Rwanda were specifically conducted within the geography of conflict, a sub-discipline of political geography. As stated above, political geography is critical to understanding interactions between societies and natural resources but, it needs other disciplines to achieve its goals (Reyna and Downs, 1994). Within these disciplines, specific theories are selected to describe or explain phenomena. Among the theories identified in this chapter, the cultural materialism approach of Harris appeared to be the most suitable for this study. The latter has the advantage to analyze conflict by simultaneously exploring several dimensions and more specifically to understand conflicts through the lens of infrastructure, structure and superstructure.

However, it is evident from the literature review that there are limitations to the different approaches mentioned above, including the main approach to the study. Given these limitations, this study advocated the use of an integrated and holistic perspective that recognised the multiple and complex factors related to personal, economic, social and political causes. Therefore, the reduction of conflict situations and the improvement of the quality of life of individuals and communities necessitated a multi-pronged approach that targeted the complex and interrelated causes of societal problems. A review of the above perspectives indicated that each approach contributed substantially to a greater understanding of genocide and its impacts on communities.

CHAPTER 3

LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1. INTRODUCTION

English, *et al.* (2002:195) stated that “the fundamental view of researchers is that the more you know about other people’s work in your field, the better you can approach your own research”. In this respect this chapter is an overview of how genocide studies shifted from a mono-political and historical study to multidisciplinary studies including geography, and from individual studies to collective and comparative studies of genocide. The discussion will make an attempt to bring together theories within the research that has been conducted thus far, describe events and show how the phenomena of genocide has been understood by scholars. The review will also be guided by comparisons with incidents of genocide in the world to “determine both areas of fundamental commonality and of significant differences” (Huttenbach, 1998:89-90).

According to Glover (2001), some wars and massacres seem primitive. Between neighbours this hostility is so common that it seems to be the human condition. Some of these hostilities are contained and others flare up into wars, massacres and/or genocide. The issue of genocide is more complex than just two ethnic groups attacking each other. With regard to this, Keane (1995), an Irish BBC journalist with specialised knowledge on Africa and Rwanda in particular rejects the widely held perception that Rwanda’s slaughter was the simple consequence of tribal antagonisms. Similarly, Glover (2001: 141) argued that the origins of African tribal wars, genocide and massacres “are more complex than the ancient hatred account allows”

Despite this genocide has been described as indescribable, unbelievable, beyond comprehension, unfathomable and a mystery (Totten, 1998:59-81), educators and

researchers have tried to assist people today and those of future generations to gain an understanding (Totten, 2002).

However, recent literature on genocide has emphasised the political and historical aspects and much is still left undone about social, economic and environmental dimensions (Buhaug, 2004). In the countries where genocide occurred, particularly in Rwanda, the role of the media, land, resources and the political, social and psychological factors that played a part in shaping the genocide, have been given little attention (Adelman, 1999; Gasana, 2001; Keane, 1995; Utterwulge, 1999). For instance, during the genocide in Rwanda “not everyone at the State Department (USA) agrees that the hate broadcasting Radio Television des Mille Collines (RTLM) played a key role in the genocide” (Adelman, 1999:104).

This chapter attempts to understand the concept of genocide as previous scholars defined it, its causes, where it occurred, its impacts on different people and their environment. It will also present alternative solutions which were provided to societies in the aftermath of genocides. As conflicts arise from political, economic, social and environmental issues, the methods of conflict resolution and reconstruction have often sprung from the causes of such conflicts. By eliminating the causes people can eliminate the effects (Adejeji, 1999).

According to Nyankanzi (1999), some genocides were more racial, ethnic (Armenians, Tutsi, Jews) and others not. The communist system created a new type of genocide of the political and social kind where victims belonged to the same racial group as their killers. Genocides were also aimed at eliminating a real or potential threat, spreading terror, acquiring economic wealth (the most universal form used by European expansion) or implementing a belief, a theory or an ideology. People have killed in the name of Christ, Allah, Hitler, Stalin and Mao have been directly responsible for pogroms. The most immediate consequence that ensues from the very nature of

genocide was the disappearance of people, the exodus and social, economical and cultural degradation (Chalk *et al.*, 1990; Mann, 2005; Nyankanzi, 1999).

The chapter begins by looking at the definition of the genocide and its variables as provided by the United Nations in 1948 and scholars of the Twentieth Century. It will then deal not only with the real causes of genocide in the Twentieth Century (Appendices 1 and 2), but also their impacts and the way societies have recovered from them. This will be done using a multidisciplinary comparative approach. In addition, the review of the literature on genocide in Rwanda will go beyond the classic political and historical aspects by focusing more on the underdeveloped socio-economic aspects which either influenced planning or implementing the genocide.

3.2. GENOCIDE IN THE 20TH CENTURY

Genocides have been in the world, from the beginning of civilizations. From Antiquity massacres to the European witch-hunt in the Middle Ages, genocide extended to the 20th Century. For about 300 years, during the late Middle Age and Renaissance Period, the Christian church was directly or indirectly responsible for the arrest, torture and execution of persons believed to worship Satan or express heretical religious ideas (Robinson, 2005). Unfortunately, history repeated itself. Ancient atrocities against American and Australian aboriginals continued into the 20th Century which witnessed many cases of genocide. Genocide occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Namibia, in Cambodia, in China, USSR, Turkey, Germany, Poland, and recently in Rwanda to cite a few countries (Destexhe, 1996; Prunier, 1995; Robinson, 2005).

For some historians, the first genocide of the 20th Century was the one of Hereros in Namibia by Germans between 1904 and 1907 (Robinson, 2005; Chalk *et al.*, 1990). For others it was more Euro-centric. It was rather the Armenian genocide which claimed 1.5 million victims between 1915 and 1922 (White, 1998). Though genocide has been in the

world since the early ages, the concept has only come into use quite recently (Chalk *et al.*, 1990).

3.2.1. Review of definitions

The term 'Genocide' was coined by a jurist named Raphael Lemkin, a Polish Jewish Scholar in 1944 by combining the Greek word 'genos' (race) with the Latin word 'caedere'(killing)(Destexhe, 1996;Chalk *et al.*, 1990; History Place,1999).

Genocide as defined by the United Nations in 1948 “means any of the following acts committed with intend to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, including (a) killing members of the group (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group(e)forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” (Chalk *et al.* 1990; Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2007; Destexhe, 1996: 5; The History Place,1999).This definition of the United Nations Convention on the prevention of punishment of the crime of genocide has not changed so far.

The definition above has been from time to time reviewed and enriched and even subjected to controversies by historians of genocide. It has been shown that all mass murder or massacres are not necessarily genocide (Staub, 2003) but also one can conceive genocide where there is no murder (Sidney & Shirley, 2003). Genocide according to McCullum (1995:105) is deliberate murder born of the myth that one ethnic group, race or creed is superior to another and that it is thus legitimate to eliminate that “other” to gain power. It is the most notorious crime against humanity recognised by international law. The massacres of the 1990s in Rwanda, according to Carvocoressi (2005:656) were the clearest instances of genocide since the adoption in 1948 of the genocide convention by the United Nations (UN).

Recalling Raphael Lemkin's definition of genocide, Muberanziza (2004) argues that one of five acts is sufficient to constitute genocide. However, one or other of these acts qualifies as genocide when it is committed with the intention to destroy a group. Genocide is committed with the intention to destroy a group in all or in part. It is probably the most decisive element in the qualification of genocide. Acts directed against a state do not constitute genocide. Some crimes against humanity and crimes of war must not be confused with acts of genocide if they do not enter into the definition of this concept. For genocide, it is necessary that the authors of crime have the intention to destroy the targeted group in all or in part. The number of victims does not matter. According to Destexhe (1996), "the specificity of genocide does not arise from the extent of the killings" (Destexhe, 1996:4). In this regard, Ervin Staub (1989; 2003) changed the classic definition with his contrasting definition of mass killing. For him, the notion of mass killing is no longer enough to define the genocide. On the contrary, declarations as the one that affirmed that the Tutsis in Rwanda had to be wiped out, in a manner that the future generations would wonder how a Tutsi looks like, rather denote the intention to destroy the whole group (Muberanziza, 2004:6).

Genocide is committed against a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. The crimes against humanity that would be committed against a group of tourists or travelers would not be qualified as genocide (Muberanziza, 2004). According to the juridical definition of genocide, the targeted group is a national, ethnic group, a racial group or a religious group. For instance, allied bombers in World War II did not commit genocide (Staub, 2003). In this regard, Melvern (2000:250) stated that, genocide can be illustrated by the words contained in Adolf Hitler's order to his commanders in August 22, 193: "Thus for the time being I have sent to the East only my "Death's Head Units" with the orders to kill without pity or mercy all men, women, and children of Polish race or language. Only in such a way will we win the vital space that we need. Who still talks nowadays about Armenians?"

Genocide can consist or not in murder. The only intention to destroy a group in all or in part, gives to the murder an element that makes the murder a crime of genocide.

Genocide can consist of a serious attack against the physical and mental integrity of people. One can conceive genocide where there is no murder although all genocides combine murder and other acts such as rape and acts of torture. Therefore, acts of genocide need not kill or cause the deaths of members of a group (Sidney & Shirley., 2003). Torture, persecution, political rape, displacement, deprivation, threats of death and various other actions are also included in the definition of genocide. Genocide may comprise of purposeful submissiveness of the group to conditions of existence leading to total or partial physical destruction. The deprivation of food and health care can be seen as an act of genocide because starvation leads to the destruction of a particular group in whole or in part (Butler, 2007; Mann, 2005; Mubenziza, 2004).

Genocide consists of measures aimed at hindering births or the transfer of children of one group to another group. Rapes and sexual tortures are attacks to physical and mental integrity of victims. Also, by transferring children from one group to another, they acquire another familial identity and the victim group loses its members and the risks of dying out (Mubenziza, 2004).

From time to time the definition above has been reviewed and enriched and even subjected to controversies by historians of genocide. For Chalk *et al.* "although the United Nations definition of genocide marked a milestone in international law, the UN definition is of little use to scholars" (Chalk *et al.*, 1990:10) and he added that "the lack of rigour in the UN definition is responsible for much of the confusion that plagues scholarly work in the field" (Chalk *et al.*, 1990:11). Genocide according to McCullum (1995) is a deliberate murder born of the myth that one ethnic group, race or creed is superior to another.

Some scholars have underlined the role of the state in implementing genocide and that of the international community's responsibilities (Karen, 1996; McCullum, 1994; Nyankanzi, 1999; Semelin, 2005). Nyankanzi (1999:1-7) defined genocide as "the promotion and execution of policies by a state or its agents that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a group". Karen (1996) defined it as a "distinct and particular form of mass violence and, as such, concerns not only the region it might occur in at a particular point in time, but also the international community and all its constituent parts." However, other scholars (Sidney & Shirley, 2003; Staub, 2003; Verwimp, 2003) singled out a number of problems with the definition of genocide. It was for instance shown that all mass murder or massacres are not necessarily genocide (Staub, 2003) and also one can conceive genocide where there is no murder (Sidney & Shirley, 2003). Researchers have the choice of limiting their use of the word "genocide" to the very few cases in which there is absolutely no doubt that this word applies (i.e. Nazi holocaust, Bosnia, Rwanda) or broadening its use to cover large-scale massacres and take the risk of losing the power of the word. One can argue that the term has power when it is used to define just those events (such as the holocaust) that seem different from other large-scale massacres (Verwimp, 2003; 2007).

3.2. 2. Evolution of genocide studies

Genocide studies, which belong to a broad study of conflicts, evolved from socio-historical studies to multidisciplinary studies. This considerably improved theories of genocide and has made it more understandable. Hence, causes of genocide are not merely the ancient hatred among ethnic groups. Genocide as well as other conflicts is multidimensional, this is why scholars in the 20th Century approached conflicts, especially genocide through multiple paradigms including the geography of conflicts and geography of ethnic violence (Toft, 2004; Wikipedia, 2007).

Conflicts have been defined as a natural and inevitable part of all human social relationships. They occur at all levels of society-intrapsychic, interpersonal, intragroup,

intergroup, intranational and international (De Dreu, 2007; Hamburg, 1993). For Laue (1993:256), conflict is defined as “escalated natural competition between two or more parties over scarce resources, power and prestige.” Parties in conflict believe they have incompatible goals, and their aim is to neutralise, gain advantage over, injure or destroy one another (Laue, 1993:257). Conflict is relational and cultural since we all are part of various groups with specific cultures (Lebaron, 2003). However, according to Fry et al. (1997), conflict although inevitable, is not inherently pathological, sick behaviour or always dysfunctional. Some conflicts are harmful but in some cases, conflicts may improve society and social relations on a long-term basis. Conflict can be a constructive force in social life (Fry et al., 1997). Some multiethnic relations become extremely ethnic cleansing while other do not (Mann, 2005).

Scholars in the 20th Century improved the understanding of genocides and went beyond the simple description of the ancient hatred as their main cause (Mamdani (2001); Melvern (2000); Naimak (2001); Nyankanzi (1999); Pottier (2002) Prunier (1995); and Staub (1989; 2003). The work by Nyankanzi for instance (1999) showed that all genocides were not ethnic or racial. According to Karen (1996), there is no common cause of genocide. Naimak (2001) attributed the roots of the European ethnic cleansing to the nationalism of the late nineteenth Century. In his publication “When victims become killers, colonialism, nativism and the genocide in Rwanda” Mamdani (2001: 9-13; 19-20) attempts to understand the dynamics behind the slaughter by exploring the difference between settlers and natives. His theory has made genocide in general and in Rwanda in particular more understandable. In a special way, the works of Linda Melvern (2000) and Johan Pottier (2002) contributed to the best understanding of the causes of genocide in Rwanda and its aftermath of genocide as a tragedy. Rwandan politicians manipulated the history and wrongly considered Hutu ethnic group as natives and Tutsi as settlers.

Other scholars such as Toft (2004) and Gasper (2004) approached the issue of conflicts and genocide in particular within the paradigm of the geography of ethnic violence. For

them, conflicts are complex phenomena which are either the result of socio-political, and economic disintegration. The studies of Gasper (2004), Guillebaud (2002) and Moser and Clark (2001) emphasise for instance the world market and massive poverty as one of the causes of genocide in addition to the colonial legacy and the indifference of Western ruling classes. Similarly, it was found that one of the causes of genocide in many parts of the world has been the extension of the vital space (Chalk *et al.*, 1990; *The History Place*, 1999). Elsewhere, quoted by Hinton, Maybury-Lewis describes how genocide atrocities aimed at “progress” and economic motivations in the USA. He mentions Theodore Roosevelt’s justification of the West ward expansion of the United States by arguing that his real ambition was the land (Hinton, 2002).

The theoretical link between geography, society and conflicts was highlighted by Ferguson (1994) when he states that genocides have always negative consequences on infrastructure, structure and superstructure. Inspired by the cultural materialism approach to conflict of Harris (1968: 1979), Ferguson (1994) argued that the most obvious potential infrastructural consequence of war is the acquisition of territory. In the same way, Toft’s (2004) theory of the indivisibility of the territory in his work *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests and the Indivisibility of Territory* (2004) showed the relevance of geographical elements in the understanding of conflicts.

Besides the shift from a socio-historical study to multidisciplinary studies, another important evolution came from the comparative approach promoted by scholars in the 20th century. Comparative genocide studies refers to other incidents of genocide declares Huttenbach (1998: 89-90), “to determine both areas of fundamental commonality and of significant differences.” This scholar of the holocaust thinks that the study of other genocides increasingly raises questions not yet posed by scholars of the holocaust, and challenges some of their fundamental assumptions (Huttenbach, 1998). The comparative approach helps also to fight the temptation to consider genocides as more than human:

“The more one studies other instances of genocide, the temptation to treat them as more than a human act tends to weaken. Seen singly, the individual genocide

raises the same seemingly unanswerable questions: How was it possible? and What on earth does it mean? Placed alongside other genocides, the 'uniqueness' of the isolated event quickly diminishes as basic commonalities are unearthed. The human capacity to carry out extermination becomes less exceptional and more quotidian...Seen collectively, genocides automatically demystify themselves and become all too human, far less pathological and much more 'normal' in the course of human history and in the context of the 20th Century" (Huttenbach, 1998:92).

Thus, the causes and impacts of the genocide in Rwanda will be reviewed with comparison with other genocides (Jews, Russian, Armenian, Bosnian, and Cambodian) which occurred in the 20th century. From these genocides, the ideas and plans in implementing Rwanda's genocide may probably have been found.

3.2.3. Causes of genocide

As stated above, there is no common cause of genocide; it all depends on the different historical contexts of each country and how perpetrators define the group and how they determine who is a member (Karen, 1996).

Scholars differ considerably in their opinions about the causes of genocide. The explanation of genocide as a simple ethnic conflict is generally linked to those who tend to give prominence to the "essentialist" identity explanation while others tend to present the genocide as the result of an "instrumentalised" political manipulation (Karekezi, 2003). The essentialist school of thought centres on the ethnic conflicts in Africa, "an uncompromising and antagonistic dimension of identity" (Karekezi, 2003). It stresses the often spontaneous and popular character of ethnic confrontation. The instrumentalist school of thought considers ethnic antagonism as the result of a fight between different political groups which manipulate the people using ethnicity or identity as a pretext for mobilising them for their own interest. These conflicts are invariably caused by the manipulation of the elite in their struggle for the control of economic resources, political power and centuries of hatred and predation. The instrumentalist school has been used to

explain why and how genocide and most conflicts occurred in the history of mankind (Karekezi, 2003).

Recent conflict studies (Gasana, 2001; McCullum, 1994) revealed that genocide was generated from socio-economic problems and the way they are managed by states and political leaders. The losses of livelihood resulting from environmental scarcities of arable land and water have led to conflicts including genocide (Ohlsson, 2001). In Kosovo "scarcities, by way of loss of livelihoods, merely provided opportunistic political forces to mobilize people made vulnerable by poverty into atrocious acts" (Ohlsson, 2001). It has been shown that if young men are unable to find alternative livelihoods in the cities or in other sectors besides agriculture, they are extremely easy to mobilise in one or another movement or even the militia. This is particularly so if they are promised land, livelihoods or even looting. This was one of the factors which enabled the "genocidaires" of Rwanda to mobilise a large part of the population as perpetrators (Ohlsson, 2001).

In Europe, the main causes of conflicts and genocide were the disintegration of former empires in the Central and East-Southern regions in the late 19th Century and the need for their restoration by Nationalists in the early 20th Century. In his book *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe*, Norman M. Naimark (2001) argues that ethnic cleansing is rooted in the European nationalism of the late nineteenth century and found its most virulent expression in the Twentieth Century as modern states and societies began to organise themselves by ethnic criteria. The first genocide of the 20th Century was the genocide of Christian Armenians during the World War I (1915-1918) in Turkey, situated in the South East of Europe commonly called "The Balkans". Between one and two million people were killed by the Political Party "The Young Turks" who exploited religious, cultural, economic and political differences to exclude Armenians from the empire (Chalk *et al.*, 1990: 251-285).

Jewish genocide, in Europe, was carried out during World War II (1939-1945). The “Holocaust” was the culmination of Centuries of European anti-Semitism and the rise of ethnic nationalism in Eastern Europe. Hitler wanted to extend Germany’s borders by creating a pure German Empire, the ‘Greater German Reich’. Jews were victims of expansionist politics and they were especially targeted because they promoted liberal political parties and they had great businesses in Europe. Most Jews in Germany lived in cities and were grossly overrepresented in trade and the professions. Jews made up 13% of doctors, 16% of all lawyers and 40% of all metal dealers. They owned one fifth of all private banks and four fifths of all department stores (Steinberg, 1991). In Vienna (Austria), of the doctors and dentists, 51.6 percent were Jewish, as were 62 percent of the lawyers (Chalk *et al.*, 1990). However, according to Browning (2000) two factors distinguished the Nazi holocaust from other genocides. One was the totality and scope of intent i.e. the goal of killing every last Jew, men, women and children throughout the Nazi Empire (Fig 3.1). Second was the means employed i.e. the administrative, bureaucratic and technological capacities of a modern nation-state and western culture.

Figure 3.1: Concentration and Deaths camps in Central Europe in 1939.



Source: Rosenberg, 1990. Accessed online on October 4, 2005 at <http://www.history1990.about.com/library/holocaust/b/maps.htm>

Genocide occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina, one of the former Yugoslavian Communist Republics in the south-east of Europe between 1990 and 1995. The creation of a new and vastly expanded Serbian Republic, a 'Greater Serbia' out of the ruins of the Old Yugoslavia (Federation artificially created after World War II), was the main cause of genocide in Bosnia. "Ethnic Cleansing" was the process of creating ethnically pure Serbian regions through systematic murder and expulsions. The genocide in Bosnia is often presented by historians as a religious conflict between Muslims, Catholics and Orthodox Churches. Alain Destexhe (1996) thinks otherwise. "The war in Bosnia has been concerned with control over territory rather than over the inhabitants (Destexhe, 1996:19). The latter also argued that "The Serb's initial objective was to repossess what was considered to be Serbian territory by removing all non-Serbs" (Destexhe, 1996:19).

On the Asian continent communism as a socio-political and economic doctrine was the context in which the genocide took place, notably in Cambodia, Russia and China (Destexhe, 1996). During the regime of Pol Pot, leader of the Communist Khmer Rouge (1976-1977), Cambodia experienced one of the worst human tragedies of the last Century. As in Nazi Germany, the Khmer Rouge (Red Cambodians) communist leaders combined extremist ideology with ethnic animosity and disregard for human life to produce repression, misery and murder on a massive scale. In some other Asian countries such as Russia and China, communism was a paradigm that created a new relationship between people and power on the one hand and people and the economy on the other hand. This culminated in conflicts including genocide (Chalk *et al.*, 1990)

In Africa, the notion of genocide in the pre-colonial period was relatively alien. However, certain tribes may have practiced limited human sacrifices to satisfy their gods (Nyankanzi, 1999). Nonetheless, Africa is the continent that has suffered the most from genocide. The first genocide in the 20th Century was one of Hereros in Namibia (Robinson, 2005). In 1904, The German colonial policy implied brutal massacres and ruthless deportation of native Hereros and the violence necessary to achieve it. The Hereros were deported into the desert. Poisoning water holes ensured the death of most

of the survivors. "By 1911 only about 16,000 Hereros out of the 60,000 to 80,000 population of 1903 were left. Only about 2,000 of them were men" (Mann, 2005:105). In Africa as well as in Australia and the Americas, genocide and the strategy of dividing people in colonies was used to conquer the power and then to exploit human and natural resources (Semelin, 2005). Nyankanzi (1999) observed that the 1960s marked the end of colonialism in most African countries and the beginning of a form of neo-colonialism in which self-styled, western-educated elite became the instrument through which a neo-coloniser exploited and enslaved the local people. Additionally, Nyankanzi (1999) believes that the behaviour of today's African rulers is no different from that of the Seventeenth Century African kings who sold their people into slavery to control the political and economic power.


3.2.4. Socio-economic impacts of genocide

The socio-economic impacts of genocide in the Twentieth Century were basically the destruction of human lives, socio-cultural disintegration, destruction of macro-economic and institutional infrastructure, the displacement of people through exile and refugee movements, the lack of models in the society, the degradation of rural economies and spreading of disease. Genocide has also had moral effects on the international community (Herman, 2006; Karen, 1996; Prunier, 1995:336-355)

From a social and psychological point of view, the most outstanding effect of the genocide was obviously the loss of life and post-genocide trauma. For example the enormity of loss in human lives has affected Jews socially, psychologically and economically. Unlike survivors who left Europe for the new nation of Israel in 1948, others remained on the physical and emotional soil of countries where they grew up as refugees or second class citizens (Browning, 2000). Due to genocide, half million were killed and another six hundred thousand were deported to neighbouring countries (Chalk *et al.*, 1990:270). Cambodia lost a big number of its population (2million) and 630,000

people left the country (Appendix 1). Radical social reform resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands of Cambodians through mass executions and physical privation (See Fig.3.2 for the distribution of killing fields in Cambodia). The survivors of genocide have suffered extreme psychological trauma that requires special attention from mental health professionals. In Cambodia the Khmer Rouge implemented a policy of forced migration of the entire population to the countryside. This genocide contributed to the break up of Cambodian families and social life as almost all Cambodian families lost relatives during this period. Educational institutions (education, health care, law) were decimated by the targeted killing of all intellectuals and “people wearing glasses”. The “old society”- the educated, the wealthy, Buddhist monks, police, doctors, lawyers, teachers and former government officials were eliminated (Chalk *et al.*, 1990; The History Place, 1999).

Figure 3.2: Provincial killing fields in Cambodia.



Source: Yale, 2004. Accessed online on October 6, 2004

at http://www.Yale.edu/cgp/maps/maps_7579.html

According to Robinson (2005), in Australia, between 1910 and 1970, between one in three and one in ten indigenous children were forcibly removed from their families. As a result, people were uprooted culturally and were placed with white families in order to

absorb “these people” into the general population. All genocide survivors experienced dispossession, vulnerability and nostalgia which have had psychosocial effects, within the country and in the diaspora (Gakavian, 2001; Realechange, 2001). The denial of genocide by countries and individuals such as Barnes ‘the father’ of post-war holocaust deniers, Arthur R. Butz, James Madole, Paul Rassinier and David Irving to cite a few (Neville, 1999; Wikipedia, 2007) reinforced divisions, hatred and resentment among populations affected. In the great lakes region, the denial contaminated the sub-region with the genocidal ideology. The denial of genocide by perpetrators is another issue which slowed down reconciliation after the genocide. The current and past government of Turkey have denied that the genocide actually happened (Robinson, 2005). Japan denied the Nanking Massacre in China in 1937 and the war conflict left a legacy of distrust, which even today tarnishes relations between Japan and other countries of East Asia. The Japanese government has maintained that the death toll is greatly exaggerated. Some politicians have even claimed that it never happened (Robinson, 2005). In Rwanda, instead of condemning what perpetrators did, many scholars are more interested by theories of the “double-genocide” thesis. The latter argue that the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) committed killings among Rwanda’s Hutu population before, during and after 1994 (Verwimp, 2003: 424).

On the neighbouring Rwandan borders with Congo, Burundi and Tanzania, the continuation of the genocide plan through guerrilla action and terrorism cost the lives of hundreds of civilians. This action obliged the government to maintain costly security action in terms of human and financial resources. In other words, the destabilisation of the whole region was not the least problem (Adejeji, 1999).

Another negative socio-cultural impact of genocide has been the lack of trust as genocide has been planned by state officials and other leaders. The planning and the implementation of the Nazi Jewish Policy was carried out by German Police (The Gestapo), individuals of the bureaucracy, the business community, medical and legal professions and even the German Churches (Steinberg, 1991). In Bosnia, the “ethnic

cleansing” was planned by intellectuals, political and religious authorities especially Orthodox Churches (Bassiouni, 1994).

The main characteristic of countries in the post genocide era is the destruction of infrastructure and the collectivisation and appropriation of the land. In Cambodia conflicts arose when displaced peasants returned to their former home to find that others had appropriated their land in their absence (Vickery, 1986). The same situation was prevalent in Rwanda when refugees returned from exile between 1994 and 1995. In East Asia, while many other countries have enjoyed decades of growth, Cambodia remains under-developed socially and economically. Cambodia's industrial development has been slow because of a lack of technicians and competent personnel. Most of the people returned to agriculture and former qualified persons who lost their privilege or those who did not accept the change fled abroad. All moveable pumps used in irrigation were looted by the returning population or by departing forces to prevent their use. In addition there was insufficient raw material and insufficient power (Vickery, 1986).

Migrations and refugees are one of the most important impacts of genocide. Besides deaths, helpless refugees are forced into camps where they live in appalling conditions with tens of thousands lacking access to proper shelter, food and water. They lose their dignity because they have to exist on handouts and are never left long enough in one location to produce and sell (Sidney & Shirley, 2003). Approximately 50% of Bosnia-Herzegovina's pre-war population of 4.3 million were displaced during the 43 months of war. Over 1 million of the displaced persons remained within the country while another 1.5 million were dispersed throughout 25 host nations (Wubs, 1998). Bosnians were subjected to mass deportation while Serbians started a systematic resettlement in Bosnia. Bosnian homes, businesses, cities and villages were destroyed. Serbians appropriated and looted properties of Bosnians and this led Bosnians to dispossession and loss of dignity (Griffiths, 2006). In most African countries, displacement combined with extreme poverty was always accompanied by epidemic diseases especially malaria and

HIV/AIDS. The high rate of HIV/AIDS infection in countries which suffered from genocide is due mostly to rape and poverty (Garrett, 2005; Hamilton, 2000).

The genocide affected the International Community and it showed the world's weakness to prevent it and punish perpetrators. It is in fact difficult and impossible to identify all murderers, for the mere reason that many witnesses were either killed or were hidden during the genocide (Aguillar, 1998). In this regard, Souleyman Seyfi Ogun, a genocide analyst states that the relationship between historical events and the law is still vague. The gap between victims and perpetrators and the difficulty of personalising crime has had a traumatic effect on Western moral life and caused a "holocaust-obsession syndrome" which has led Western nations to seek new examples of genocide in the world to ease the permanent moral pressures (Ataov, 2001:241). This explains the silence of Western countries during several genocides.

One of the main issues after genocide adds Souleyman (cited in Ataov, 2001) is the inability to personalise the crime because it is clear that such cases involve the complex interference of various institutions, which seem hard to personalise. In other words, it is difficult to identify the murderers and those who gave them the orders. Indeed many participants who took part in the murder have defended themselves by saying "we were only obeying orders" (Ataov, 2001:240). In Addition, the scale of crime, for example the number of the victims, is so large that even the most rigorous investigation will not satisfy the public conscience (Ataov, 2001).

Genocide is different from war; the destruction of the physical environment is minimal compared to social and economic destruction. During war, opponent forces are fighting, whereas in the genocide, defenceless victims undergo mass killings (Shaw, 2003). However, environmental impacts have been registered in the history of genocide mainly air and water pollution and ecological disturbances. Weapons used during the war in Bosnia by NATO, especially bombs (depleted uranium) have been harmful and have killed both soldiers and civilians according to Kurykin (2001) and Comkfor (2004).

People died of leukaemia; they contracted respiratory illnesses and deformities associated with radio-activity. The destruction of industrial complexes both chemical and petrochemical has had perilous consequences for human, plant and animal life. Protected areas, forests, landscapes and soil were seriously damaged. The Danube River for example had its flora and fauna destroyed and despite its poisoned water provided drinking water to some 10 million people in the region (Kurykin, 2001; Comkfor, 2004). Devastation to forests and biodiversity argued Adley and Grant (2004) are consequences of modern warfare including genocide. These environmental catastrophes are aggravated by the fact that ecological protection and restoration become a low priority during and after conflicts. The threat to the biodiversity increased after displaced persons returned to the already overpopulated country. Faced with no space to live, they had little option but to inhabit the forest reserves (Adley and Grant, 2004).

In Africa, genocide was the source of extreme poverty amongst a large number of refugees. Genocide left refugees, displaced persons, widows, orphans, disabled and unaccompanied children. Genocide in Africa reinforced divisions and hatred among social groups. Africans were victims of murder, starvation, exhaustion and diseases (The History Place, 1999). It also had devastating effects on agriculture and the rural economy, health delivery systems and education.

In Rwanda, the massive displacement, new human settlements and land-use led to the destruction of physical landscapes and infrastructure. New human settlements have exacerbated environmental problems (Tiemessen, 2004). Post-genocide Rwandan villagisation (*Imidugudu*) required a great deal of deforestation to find space, wood for construction and fuel. This led also to soil erosion in many parts of the country. The risk to the already endangered population of mountain gorillas and animals in the national parks from the violence was of minimal concern to perpetrators and victims during the genocide. In Cambodia, the war and the genocide brought ecological disturbances. The impact of genocide resulted in the destruction of 35% of forests and the contamination of water not only in the country but also the whole region. In addition, land mines

utilised during the war made the country dangerous for farming, grazing and tourism purposes (Adley and Grant, 2004).

3.2.5. Socio-political reconstruction after the genocide

Government and private policies have been made in various fields to cope with genocide impacts. Countries basically concentrated on national unity and reconciliation, agriculture, settlement, education and infrastructure (Ataov, 2001).

National unity and reconciliation has been a hard task for people and governments and so far some antagonists are still looking forward to revenge. For others, the way to reconciliation is a fact. For this purpose, international trials for genocide perpetrators were set at Nuremberg in Germany for the Nazi genocide, Arusha in Tanzania for the Rwandan genocide and The Hague in Netherlands for the Bosnian genocide (United Nations Institute of Peace, 1995). According to official figures released by the National Service of *Gacaca* Juridictions, in Rwanda, 4 162 people were judged between March 2005 when the trials began and October the same year. Of the number, 496 (12%) were acquitted (Hirondelle News Agency, 2006:2).

Education has been the other great hope for societies recovering from the genocide. Ataov (2001) and Ndolimana (2003) have underlined the key role of education in the reconstruction of countries from genocide. The pedagogical principle of “linking general knowledge to practice, learning to production and school to society” (Ataov, 2001) was applied in Cambodia to achieve national reconstruction through education. The starting point was to ensure school attendance by all children of school age and to eradicate illiteracy. In the same way, Ataov (2001), a Turkish historian states that, how two peoples mutually throttled each other is useless, but the knowledge of how we lived in peace is priceless. He added that we should not forget that co-coordinated reasoning of civilian histories has generated much more positive results than one-sided political

judgements” (Ataov, 2001:261). Additionally, Ndolimana invites all Rwandans and those who assist in its reconstruction to invest in the education of the youth (Ndolimana, 2003).

3.2. 6. Economic reconstruction after the genocide

Agriculture and rehabilitation of basic infrastructure have been the key for economic and environmental reconstruction. The key, to both Cambodia’s economic recovery and its cohesion as an independent state, have depended on agricultural recovery and development. The state, via its banks, also loaned money to the agricultural sector for purchase of animals and equipment. Loans were given to fishing groups, handicrafts and the provincial commercial office for the purchase of rice. In addition, agricultural producers were organised in “solidarity groups”(Vickery,1986). In Rwanda, despite poverty and insecurity in some parts of the country between 1994 and 1998, farming has taken a new turn especially towards cash crops such as coffee and tea in the reconstruction effort. Rwanda has before and after the genocide a predominantly agricultural economy which supported over 90% of the Rwandan labour force involved in agriculture mainly in subsistence (Murenzi & Hughes, 2006).

In order for societies to organise agriculture, States such as Cambodia used a participative approach by refusing to intervene in favour of the former land owners and urged that the matter be settled amicably through discussion between the parties and mediated by the local authorities (Vickery, 1986). The same strategy was applied in Rwanda but for many who refused to hand over property of others, the government was obliged to intervene in house and property retribution.

3.3. THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA: APRIL-JULY 1994

The genocide of the Tutsis in 1994 started when the President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda was assassinated on 6 April, 1994 at 8.30pm. As his private plane from neighbouring Tanzania approached Kigali airport, three missiles were fired at it. Two of

them exploded and the plane crashed in the grounds of the Presidential Palace (Aguillar, 1998). Aboard too were the President of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira and some officers of Rwandese government-all travelling from a crucial meeting where implementation of a power-sharing agreement has been discussed and finally signed. After the crash, an interim government consisting of Hutus extremists used its position to instigate the militia, the army, the Presidential guard and all levels of society against the Tutsis.

Although people link Habyarimana's death to genocide, there is evidence that the extermination of the Tutsis and opposition Hutu was planned well in advance. During 1992 and 1993 period and even before, there were campaigns for the genocide through media, songs, speeches and public rallies throughout the country. Politicians urged people to massacre the Tutsis. Fleeing Tutsis gathered in public places where they were massacred by government soldiers and militia armed with sticks, grenade, guns, spears, swords and machetes (Aguillar, 1998).

In 1994, Rwanda experienced the worst tragedy in its history. Numerous social scientists have written about the genocide (Braeckman, 2004; Mamdani, 2001; Melvern, 2000; Prunier, 1995). According to them the genocide was a carefully planned and executed exercise to annihilate Rwanda's Tutsis population and moderate Hutus. The genocide started in April 1994 and ended in July 1994 after the successful military take over of the country by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the establishment of the control of safe zones by troops provided by the United Nations. Despite the "never again" statements made after the acts perpetrated by the Nazis and after the "killing fields" of Cambodia, genocide occurred in Rwanda. None can say with certainty how many Tutsi were killed between April and July 1994. Estimates vary from one author to another. The figure of a million is often heard of in the media: Gerard Prunier gave between 800,000 and 850,000 (Prunier, 1995); Mamdani: between 500,000 and a million (Mamdani, 2001); a million was mentioned by African Rights, (1995:25), Braeckman (2004:20), Jennings, (2001:65) and Melvern (2000:4). estimates 937,000. The figure of 937,000 cited by Wikipedia (2002) from Districts Census seems to be closer to the reality.

Conflict in Rwanda had much more complex roots than just deep ethnic hatred (IRIN, 2002; Keane, 2005; Melvern, 2000; Pottier, 2002; Utterwulghe, 1999). The main causes of the genocide are socio-political and rooted in the manipulation of history of Rwanda by both colonial and post-colonial leaders. However, socio-political causes often cited by scholars are not enough to explain the genocide which took place in Rwanda in recent years. There are also economic factors which shaped and worsened the effects and the extent of the genocide. Utterwulghe goes further indicating other remote causes such as the different predisposed psychological and cultural tendencies of the people (myths, mistrust and fear)(Utterwulghe, 1999). The discussion in this section is pertinent because no reconstruction, reconciliation can be achieved in Rwanda without a coherent understanding of the roots of the genocide.

3.3.1. Socio-political causes

The political causes of the genocide in Rwanda are both external and internal. The history of Rwanda was manipulated before independence by Western colonisers (Germany and Belgium) and after independence by inefficient local leadership (Moser and Clark, 2001; Sellstrom *et al.*, 1996). In addition, the international indifference and the involvement of some Western countries in the genocide made possible the genocide in Rwanda (Pottier, 2002).

Rwanda was colonised first by the Germans from 1894 as part of German East Africa then by Belgians who occupied the country after World War I. The main ethnic groups, who are actually very similar, speak the same language, inhabit the same areas and follow the same traditions, were given identity cards classifying them into three ethnic groups. This is the time when the seeds of division were sown. In 1933, writes Melvern (2000: 10), “the Belgian administration organised a census and teams of Belgians bureaucrats classified the whole population as either Hutu or Tutsi or Twa. Every Rwandan was counted and measured: the height, the length of their noses, and the shape of their eyes. Everyone was classified; the Tutsi were taller, the Hutu were shorter and

broader, although for many Rwandans it was not possible to determine ethnicity on the basis of physical appearance. This group classification on national ID Cards facilitated the speed and magnitude of the 100 days of mass killing in Rwanda (Fussel, 2001). In addition, Belgium controlled both Rwanda and neighbouring Burundi from the end of the First World War until independence in 1962. Belgian colonialism in Rwanda and Burundi as well as the Belgian Congo was marked by brutality and incompetence and many accuse the Belgian system of leaving its colonies unprepared for independence. This is the reason why all three countries had violent histories since their independence (Thompson, 2007; Wikipedia, 2005).

The recent violence in Rwanda has been wrongly described in some western literature and media as a traditional tribal war between Hutus and Tutsis, rooted in many centuries (Jennings, 2001). The roots of violence in Rwanda are “more complex than most people had imagined” (Jennings, 2001:65). A close examination of Rwandan history shows that the terms Hutus and Tutsis were largely constructed social categories representing differing socio-economic positions within Rwandan society rather than objective biological or cultural differences. As mentioned earlier, those so-called ethnic groups were not tribes. They shared the same language (Kinyarwanda) same culture and lived in the same villages (Melvern 2000:7). She also illustrates this as follows: “For if I learned anything in Rwanda it is that a ‘pure’ ethnic divide is a myth. In southern Rwanda in particular there was extensive intermarrying between Hutu and Tutsi and, as I shall detail later, there is a long history of people exchanging identities. The leader of the Interahamwe militia, Robert Kajuga, was a Tutsi whose father had succeeded in changing the family’s identity to Hutu” (Melvern, 2000:11). Pastor Guillebaud, a former Anglican Missionary in Rwanda stated that Robert Kajuga was ‘the youngest son of Pastor Eustache and Marian. He was an extremely good footballer, and when he left Kibogora School, he was invited to join the Presidential football club. There was a closeness between the members of the club which led to them being called ‘*interahamwe*’ or those who act together. Soon he was the leader of the club who later

implemented the genocide because gradually during 1990 and 1991, the footballers were becoming mixed up in politics' (Guillebaud, 2002:206-207).

The foreign media have simplified the ethnic cleansing to a mere conflict between Hutus and Tutsis. Such a simple explanation, argues Aguillar (1998), is not sustainable any more. The issue is more complex than just two ethnic groups attacking each other, in this case several times over in their recent history. According to Keane (1995), the political, social and psychological factors that played a part in shaping the madness have been given little analysis. For example much of the coverage of Rwanda in the early days neglected to mention the role power and money played in the calculations of those who launched the genocide. Keane (1995) also rejects the widely held perception that Rwanda's slaughter was a simple consequence of tribal antagonism (Keane, 1995).

According to Melvern (2000), before the growth of central power and colonial domination, the boundaries between the Hutus and Tutsis were fluid but with the growth of pre-colonial state power, Tutsis and Hutus became important political categories. According to Jennings (2001) 'The harmony of the three different groups changed at the end of the nineteenth century when white men arrived' (Jennings, 2001:76). Germans and Belgians ruled through the traditional Tutsis Kings and gradually when Tutsis asked for independence, the Belgians supported Hutus to eliminate all Tutsis elements from the political arena. This was the beginning of the massacre in Rwanda in 1959. Large numbers of Tutsis were killed or forced into exile and others remained in the country. After independence, hatred for the Tutsis was continuously cultivated among Rwandese by the new leadership and mass media. The publication of The "Ten Hutu Commandments" (Appendix 4; African Rights, 1995:42-43) by a local newspaper is an eloquent illustration. Every crisis in the country was attributed to the Tutsis. Massacres occurred in 1963, 1967, 1973, 1990 and the genocide in 1994 (Destexte, 1996; Nuit Rwandaise, 2001). The killing of Tutsis in 1963 was already qualified by the British philosopher Lord Bertrand Russel (cited in Melvern, 2000:17) as "the most horrible and systematic extermination of a people since the Nazi's extermination of the Jews".

Mamdani (2001) explains that it was Belgian reform of the colonial state in the decade from the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s that constructed Hutus as indigenous Bantu and Tutsis as alien Hamites. He argues further that the Hamitic hypothesis explained away every sign of civilisation in tropical Africa as a foreign import. Hutu and Tutsi are political identities. The origin of the violence is connected to how Hutu and Tutsi were constructed as political identities by the colonial state, Hutu as indigenous and Tutsi as aliens (Mamdani, 2001). Moreover, political ruling authorities have always preferred to attribute economic problems such as famines to natural disasters whereas their causes were the result of specific military stresses and especially the failure of different governments. At several points in Rwanda's history, serious famine occurred in 1916 (7); 1928 (9); 1943(4); 1991 and 1994 (African Rights, 1995:15).

Rwandan genocide "was not a simple matter of mutual hatred between tribes erupting into irrational violence" (Keane, 1995:7). There is ample documentary evidence to prove that the killings were planned long in advance by a clique close to President Habyarimana himself. This clique that included members of the president's immediate family and his in-laws bitterly resented the prospect of power-sharing with the Tutsi minority (Melvern, 2000; Keane, 1995). "According to Pottier (2002:9) "Rwanda's bloodbath was not tribal. Rather it was a distinctly modern tragedy, a degenerated class conflict minutely prepared and callously executed." He adds that most of the world failed to see it that way, and continued to think of the conflict in terms of African century's old tribal warfare (Pottier, 2002).

A very good analysis of Rwanda genocide has been done by Mamdani (2001:7-9) using two approaches: three silences that academic or popular suffer from and two types of genocidal impulses from colonialism. In his attempt to understand Rwandan genocide, he elaborated on a "synthesis between history, geography and politics". The first silence concerns the *history* of genocide: many write as if genocide has no history or precedent. The second silence concerns the *agency* of the genocide: academic writings have

highlighted the design from above and explained little the participation from below. Genocide is a state project but it has a subaltern and popular character. The third is the *geography* of the genocide meaning that Rwanda's genocide has been confined to the Rwandan State boundaries whereas it was spread to neighbouring countries (Congo and Burundi). This also underlines the international aspect of the genocide in Rwanda (Mamdani, 2001).

Mamdani (2001) then argues that the Rwandan genocide needs to be thought of within the logic of colonialism through two types of genocidal impulses: the dialectic of the *settler* and the *native*. The first type was the genocide of the native by the settler and the second was the native impulse to eliminate the settler. The first was aimed at land deprivation, occupation and pacification of "American Indians" and Namibian Hereros is the violence of yesterday's victims, a kind of anti-colonial resistance and fighting for independence. Mamdani (2001) continues his argument by stating that the dialectic of the settler and the native did not end with colonialism and political independence. According to him it is in this context that Tutsis and all groups privileged during colonisation have been identified as settlers therefore non-natives or another race. Since then Hutu were made into a native identity and Tutsi came to be settlers (Mamdani, 2001). This phenomenon of "nativised" majority opposed to several non-natives minorities existed in other countries. In Zanzibar, this opposition targeted Africans against Arabs and Asians or just British. In Rwanda it targeted Hutus against Tutsis and not just Belgian power (Mamdani, 2001:34-35)

Moser and Clark (2001) noted four socio-economic factors which shaped the extent of genocide and these were: (i) the abrupt drop in the price of coffee, the principal income source for 60 per cent of Rwandan families, coupled with 40 percent currency devaluation in 1989 and rapid inflation after 1990. (ii) a structural adjustment programme that reduced social services and introduced charges for health care, schooling and water, combined with a drought in the southern regions which turned into a famine, (iii) from 1990, the war in the north drained government resources and led to

rapid army recruitment and which created huge refugee camps in the north of Kigali, (iv) the “paradox of democratisation in Africa” which caused opposition to the already embattled government (Mosser and Clark, 2001: 57-58).

Finally, a number of scholars wrote about the shocking failure of the international community. They demonstrate powerfully that where geopolitical interests are absent to western, morality was nowhere to be found. The international community should have stopped or even prevented the genocide. However, it remained either passive or an accomplice. Johan Pottier (2002), Melvern (2000) and Ndolimana (2003) underline the role of nations such as France, Canada and Egypt. France gave for instance military and diplomatic support to the dictatorial regime and trained government forces who implemented the genocide. According to Adelman (1999), the French launched humanitarian military mission to Rwanda in June 1994 was perceived by the RPF as an attempt to create a haven for the *Forces Armees Rwandaises* (FAR) or at the least, cover the escape of the killers (Adelman, 1999). Within the framework of Francophone interests against Anglophone neighbouring countries of Rwanda, Canada was accused of helping the dictatorial regime (Pottier, 2002). Besides few accomplice countries there was total international indifference. Glover (2001) argues that events like those in Rwanda are caused partially by a tribal psychology but also by the rest of the world which has not created the means to prevent it. In other words, genocide succeeded in Rwanda because of the world’s passivity and indifference. The UN lacked the ability to act without the support of its members notably the United States which wanted to avoid repetition of its unsuccessful intervention in Somalia some time before 1994 (Glover,2001).

3.3.2. Environmental factors.

As stated previously, Rwanda is a small country, with the highest population density in Africa (African Rights, 1995). Each square kilometre of agricultural land has to support an average of over four hundred people. There is no doubt that Rwanda’s overpopulation and poverty problems somehow lay at the heart of increasing ethnic

tensions. The government played on the preoccupation of western donors with “overpopulation” to get aid and to argue that there was no room for refugees to return home. This led to the war of 1990 between the RPF and the government (African Rights, 1995:15). The overpopulation which is a fact was however used as a pretext to incite violence.

Not much has been written about the socio-economic and environmental factors which amplified, shaped and contributed to conflicts in Rwanda. Though economic and environmental factors are not the main cause of the genocide, they must be taken into consideration because their role determined food insecurity and poverty in the country which led to violence. Rwanda’s population soared from 1.887.000 people in 1948 to more than 7.500.000 in 1992, making it the most densely populated country in Africa with more than 400 inhabitants per square kilometre (IRIN, 2002).

Demographic problems led to soil sterility and then to food insecurity. Poor farmers were forced to occupy marginal lands where cultivation resulted in severe erosion. In addition, firewood as a source of energy caused massive deforestation and farmers were forced to use crop residues for fuel and this destroyed soil fertility. All of these factors led to a shortfall in food production and extreme poverty, especially in rural areas. An increasing rural population was forced to farm progressively smaller parcels of inherited land. As the population grew, the land got smaller and many people were unemployed. As a result people were easily encouraged by political leaders to kill the Tutsis so that they could take possession of their land. This is well illustrated by African Rights (1995) who state that “the men who planned and implemented the genocide, called upon the population to loot the property of Tutsis, the people marked out for extinction as a principal strategy for encouraging mass participation in the slaughter” (African Rights, 1995:6).

Furthermore, Toft’s theory of territory as a divisible and indivisible could partially explain Rwandan ethnic violence (Toft, 2004). Territory according to him is an object

physically divisible but at the same time it is intractably indivisible. Nothing becomes easier than communities that agree to share land. However, the same land or territory due to political or religious ideologies sometimes becomes indivisible. They, therefore, become objects of lasting conflict including genocide, from which elite manipulation and hatred takes place (Toft, 2004).

As stated above, the problem of small land is not enough to explain atrocities which took place in Rwanda because countries such as Belgium, Swaziland, Gambia and others are as small as Rwanda but they never knew genocide. Pottier (2002) explains that in situations of acute poverty, and both Rwanda and Zaire hit extreme levels of poverty in the late 1980s, "institutionalised confusion becomes a weapon that power-hungry politicians wield to significant personal advantage and with deadly accuracy" (Pottier, 2002:10).

Just before 1994, poverty, overpopulation and unemployment are not the determinant causes of the genocide in Rwanda (Semelin, 2005:26-30) but are among factors which facilitated the recruitment of militias among young people, who had nothing to lose. They were trained to implement the genocide. According to African Rights (1995), there is a temptation to blame poverty, overpopulation and the environmental crisis for the killings in Rwanda. Ethnic violence could be seen as a response to the economic crisis. This is a superficial analysis and an analysis that suits the perpetrators of the genocide very well. There are very real economic tensions in rural Rwanda, but such tensions do not, on their own result in genocide. Reasons have to be found within social structures. It is political manipulation that transforms them from a source of resentment and despair into an engine of violence. This violence is misdirected against those who are not responsible for the economic crisis (African Rights, 1995). To illustrate this, African Rights states that "as the big issue in Rwanda was land for rural Hutus, the extremists told farmers that the RPF was coming to take their land and also promised people that if they killed their Tutsi neighbours, their land would be available" (1995:23-24).

Briefly, the roots of the Rwandan genocide lie in the country's colonial legacy and other indirect factors such as the working of the world market, massive poverty, class divisions within Rwandan society, and the cynical indifference of the Western ruling classes (Gasper, 2004; Melvern 2000). However, some researchers on the Rwandan genocide such as Utterwulghe still believe that: "material interest and propaganda do not explain genocide" (Utterwulghe, 1999). Although the immediate causes (extremism, overpopulation, and colonisation) must be taken into consideration to explain the genocide in Rwanda, effort must be undertaken to examine the remote psychological and cultural causes. This is essential to understand, in depth, why people who lived together for centuries started slaughtering their neighbours.

3.3.3. Socio-economic impacts of the genocide in Rwanda

Ferguson's terminology quoted by Reyna and Downs (1994:85-105) states that genocides have negative consequences on infrastructure, structure and superstructure. The infrastructure encompasses the ecological, demographic, technological and labour characteristics of a society. For Ferguson, the most obvious potential infrastructural consequence of war is the acquisition of territory. Structural consequences are economic, social and economic organisations. The superstructure concerns perceptions, beliefs and dispositions of societies after conflicts (Ferguson, 1994: 85-105).

In the same way, "in classical Marxism, the social formation is analysed into the components economic structure (determinant in the last instance) and relatively autonomous superstructure (state and ideology). Althusser clarified this by dividing it into the structure (economic practice) and the superstructure (political life, state organisation, ethics and ideological practice)" (Althusser, 1969: 240-241; 255-256).

The assessment above will take into account components inspired by the cultural materialism theory of Harris exposed above (Fig.2.1).


Rwanda is classified among the 45 poorest countries in the world. The genocide of 1994 worsened an already deteriorated economic situation. The GDP per capita passed from 376 USD in 1990 to 237 USD in 1999 (FAO, 2004). The genocide transformed the social, political and economic landscape of Rwanda. It has also profoundly affected the existing political and cultural institutions. But above all, it has undermined the social trust that binds people together. Just as the Holocaust redefined Jewish identity, so has the Rwandese genocide left a profound impact on the psyches of both Tutsis and Hutus (Hamilton, 2000; 2005). The genocide also retrenched Hutu and Tutsi as salient political identities (Mamdani, 2001). The dilemma of post-genocide Rwanda is on the one hand the struggle for Tutsi survivors for justice and Hutu calls for amnesty on the other hand. This makes reconciliation a big challenge.

The brutal nature and extent of the slaughter, along with the ensuing mass migration, swiftly and profoundly destroyed Rwanda's social foundation. In other words its structure and superstructure was destroyed. Vast segments of the population were uprooted, thousands of families lost at least one adult and tens of thousands of children were separated from their parents. The essential trust in social institutions was destroyed and replaced by pervasive fear, hostility and insecurity because neighbours, teachers, doctors and religious leaders took part in the carnage. The survivors are the most vulnerable group of Rwanda. They lost their properties, moved to other regions especially to urban areas. Like many other countries after wars or genocides (Bosnia, Japan), Rwanda has failed to provide compensation to victims for their loss (Amnesty International Canada, 2005).





The genocide altered the country's demographic composition so radically that women and girls represent now the largest component of the population. There is a predominance of females with a 54% proportion of women in the whole population (MINECOFIN, 2002: 266; Appendix 3). More men than women died. Studies by Moser and Clark (2001:58) showed that there was 100 women for every 87 men and more women are head of households (35% in 1998) as opposed to 21% in 1992. Half of all

women are widows and most were brutally raped by men infected by HIV /AIDS. As polygamy is not recognised by the constitution, widows are frustrated and exposed to prostitution (Mamdani, 2001).

Plate 3.1: Mass graves and memorial sites in Rwanda after the genocide



Source: Yale, 2004. Accessed online on September 12, 2004 at <http://www.yale.edu/gsp/Rwanda.html>

-  The national border
-  Memorial sites
-  Mass graves
-  Resistance sites

Orphans are another characteristic feature of the demographic makeup of Rwanda after the genocide. The orphanhood rate in Rwanda among children aged 7-14 is estimated at nearly 40 percent. The high prevalence of orphanhood has obvious implications for the education system. Orphans are either head of households and cannot attend school or have few or no means to invest in their schooling (World Bank, 2003:22).

As one of the 45 poorest countries in the world, the genocide of 1994 worsened an already poor economic situation. The GDP per capita decreased from 376 USD in 1990

to 237 USD in 1999 (FAO, 2004). The genocide and the war had a particularly devastating effect on agriculture and the rural economy. The economy of Rwanda has been overwhelmingly agricultural, with coffee exports accounting for more than 70 percent of its foreign exchange and tea for more than 10 percent. Inadequate subsistence agriculture, however, has been the dominant feature of the economy, with heavy infusions of foreign aid required to meet food shortages (Encyclopaedia Britannica CD, 1999). The new regime would have to pay money borrowed from international financial institutions and money spent to implement genocide. In November 1995, the Egyptian Office of Military Intelligence wrote to The Rwandan government to demand one million dollars, due at the "Credit Lyonnais" Bank in London, part payment for weapons under the arms contract signed in March 1992. This debt was eventually paid (Melvern, 2000:225)

3.3.4. Socio-economic reconstruction in Rwanda.

The challenge of reconstruction in Rwanda has been a major task. The economy of the country was ravaged, the society divided and a huge number of refugees and guerrillas in the North increased the difficulty of reconstruction (Hamilton, 2000).

The reconstruction of Rwanda after genocide has been undertaken by Rwandans, helped by the international community. From April 1994, through to the end of that year, the international community focused on helping to save lives by providing food, shelter and medical and sanitary services. Rehabilitation and reconstruction began in September 1994. During this second stage, the international community provided support for economic and public sector management, assistance to agriculture and vulnerable populations, rehabilitation for the health and education sector. They also engaged in psycho-social healing, promoting human rights and building a fair justice system. Additionally, the international community assisted in the return of refugees and internally displaced persons (Underigsministeriet-Danida, 1995).

In its effort towards reconciliation and social reconstruction, new leaders set up a government of national unity, a forum of political parties, a national committee of unity and reconciliation and Gacaca courts. They also involved women in reconstruction of the country, invested a lot in education and attempted to re-integrate the *ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises* (FAR) into the national army (Izabiliza, 2007; Vesperini, 2004). The government of national unity was sworn in just after the genocide according to the Arusha Accords on power sharing (Prendergast, 1999). It comprised the representatives of all political parties apart from the *Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie et le Développement* (MRNDD). Twelve of the eighteen Ministers were Hutu (Melvern, 2000:222).

The political parties forum was set-up as a conflict resolution strategy and preventive diplomacy (Rusagara, 2004:7). According to article 56 of the constitution: the forum is mainly responsible for facilitating the exchange of ideas by political organisations on major issues facing the country; consolidating national unity; advising on national policy; acting as mediators in conflict arising between political organisations and assisting in resolving internal conflicts within a political organisation upon request (Rusagara, 2004:7: 20). This is complemented by debates on national unity which comprises of discussion sessions among leaders of different political parties with civil society participation. Topics during discussion are national unity, justice and history (Adejeji, 1999).

The Rwandan government has established a National Committee of Unity and Reconciliation. The Committee is complicated by the fact that Genocide survivors speak of the need for justice before reconciliation and for the prosecution of the crimes of genocide that took the lives of nearly a million people. Survivors stress that forgiveness is only possible if the author of the crime is willing to admit that there was a crime. However, many of the perpetrators of the genocide who are still at large deny the existence of the genocide (Hamilton, 2000). This task differs from the process in other countries. For example, reconciliation has been possible in South Africa because of

recognition of guilt and because of the possibility of the Nuremberg-style process. In Rwanda by contrast, recognition of guilt and prospects for reconciliation have been minimal. The effort towards reconciliation included also the introduction of new ID cards without mentioning ethnicity which was an important step towards reconciliation (Adejeji, 1999).

Concerning the difficult road to reconciliation and forgiveness, Rwanda also established popular tribunals "The Gacaca", a traditional process which could help to decrease the big number of prisoners. Facts on what happened during the 1994 genocide regardless of social status are provided through *Gacaca* tribunal courts. *Gacaca* courts are taking place currently in Rwanda. As the judicial system had collapsed completely, the only way to resolve the problem of prison overcrowding for the Government has been the *Gacaca* tribunals, despite their limitations (Nuwamanya, 2005).

Despite the legacy of the 1994 genocide the government has been investing a lot in education. A remarkable recovery has been made, numerically and qualitatively, particularly at the primary level. Rwanda envisions a key role for education in the government's efforts to improve the social and economic well-being of the population (World Bank, 2003). In 1998, the government set up a national fund to mobilise resources to provide systematic financial support to the survivors of the genocide. A census has been conducted which gave the number and the socio-economic description of the group comprising mainly orphans to obtain a better knowledge of their needs (Adejeji 1999). The fund was established by law and is capitalised by an allocation of 5 percent of domestic revenues. The first disbursements were made in 2000 to about 33,000 students (World Bank, 2003: 24). However, this fund supports mainly orphans in secondary school. In 2001-2002, the education sector made good progress in terms of access with a 2.7% increase in gross enrolments in the primary education, a 19% increase in secondary education and a 17% increase in higher education (MINECOFIN, 2002:305). The aim and objectives of the education policy is poverty reduction, human resource development and national unity and reconciliation (MINECOFIN, 2002). To

illustrate the key role of education in reconciliation, authorities preferred to suspend the teaching of history of Rwanda to avoid controversies due to different interpretations (Miser, 2004).

As causes of genocide are different so are alternative solutions after they occur. This is illustrated by Mamdani (2001:39):

“The Nazi Holocaust breathed life into the Zionist demand that Jews too must have a political home, a nation-state of their own; few have argued that the Rwandan genocide calls for the building of a Tutsi-land in the region. While Europe ‘solved’ its political crisis by exporting it to the Middle East, Africa has no place to export its political crisis”.

In coming to terms with what happened in 1994 where many Rwandans lost everything and live in abject poverty, Rwandan society still has a big challenge (Miser, 2004: 15).

One of the earliest proposals for socio-economic reconstruction was the “Rondoval plan” proposed by the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) to the Secretary General and the Security Council of the United Nations (Teckle, 1999:125). It proposed measures for national reconciliation and the creation of conditions for the return of displaced persons to their homes. It expressed the need for donors to support the Rwandan Government and asked the government to ensure respect for human rights. It also contained the need to establish an International Tribunal to try those alleged to be responsible for the massacres and genocide in Rwanda and support the government in the establishment of a land commission to get the country back to normality.

In terms of development and services, Rwanda has an annual publication which provides empirical data that can be used by policy-makers and analysts to monitor Rwanda’s development in Rwanda, poverty reduction and progress towards a range of goals set by various UN summits. It also encompasses Rwanda’s own targets for Millenium Development and Vision 2020 with the goal to “exit the category of least developed country by the year 2020” (MINECOFIN, 2002: 5) .The main aim of

Millennium development and Vision 2020 goals is to help Rwanda come out of underdevelopment and poverty by achieving both the economic growth goals and the objectives related to the social indicators. In this regard, the Finance Ministry has adopted what is called The Poverty Reduction Strategies Papers (PRSP) (Bugabo, 2005:2). It was finalised and endorsed by all internal and external stakeholders in 2002. In 2003 and 2004 annual progress reports were published. It is an important progress marker in Rwanda's long term vision to reduce the proportion of Rwandans living below the poverty line from 60% to 25% and raise per capita incomes from \$250 to above \$1 000. Areas to be tackled urgently in order to meet its major goal of fighting poverty and accelerating economic development include: rural development and agricultural transformation, human development (education and health), economic infrastructure development, reinforcing institutional capacity, private sector development and good governance (MINICOFIN, 2002: 2).

Rwanda launched a national programme of house building in 1995. Houses built in villages have the objectives of changing the dispersed habitat in the country and equipping villages with basic infrastructure. One of the criteria of settlement in those villages is multi-ethnicity (Adejeji, 1999). In other areas of development and reconstruction, a network of telecommunication systems and road is being developed for the whole region (Miser, 2004).

In the reconstruction of Rwanda, the humanitarian assistance is focused on vulnerable groups, especially women. Women are central to reconstruction (Hamilton, 2000). NGOs and donors have recognised the potential benefits of groups of women in reconstruction and development and have assisted to create new ones. The number of women in relation to the whole population is elevated in Rwanda because of the greater number of men killed during the genocide and war, and absence of male groups of ex-soldiers and "genocidaires" who have fled to Congo (Choices Magazine, 2004; Izabiliza, 2007). Women now shoulder a greater burden of economic activity and reconstruction activities in Rwanda. This is aggravated by the fact that many adult men

are in the army and 15 000 men are in jail awaiting trial. From ages 15-64, the proportion of women raises significantly to 56, 3% women. Excluding children ages 15-19, the percent of women rose to 57% in the 20-44 year age group, and to 58% in the 45-64 year age cohort. In the 25-29 year age group, there are only 69 men per 100 women. Rwanda has the highest percentage of women in the lower House of Parliament in the world (48, 8%) followed by Sweden (45, 3%) and Denmark (38%) (Sunday Times, 2005:2).

The role of women in peace-building and reconciliation is important (Hamilton, 2000). Women have a particularly important role to play in reconstructing the social and moral issue of Rwandan society. Fifty percent of the adult working population aged 20 to 44 years old are female and women produce up to 70% of the country's agricultural output. In addition, the genocide had a disproportionately strong impact on women, as rape and genocide survivors, widows, heads of households and caretakers of orphans. Also the recent political reforms increased the voice of women in the public arena. Before the genocide, widows and their female children had no right to inherit the land they used to farm on, as it was controlled by the male relatives of deceased husbands (Choices Magazine, 2004). The situation above has changed nowadays. The creation of the Ministry of Gender and Woman promotion in 1999 with a mission of promoting equality and equity of gender in line with the Rwandan agenda has added pace to development (MINECOFIN, 2002:277).

Many other actions towards political and social rehabilitation were implemented. The ex- Rwandan armed force members were integrated into the national army, the organisation of an international conference were organised on the genocide in 1995 and the organic law on the persecution of crimes of genocide was promulgated in 1996. The government organised also solidarity camps which gathered different sections of the population: students, teachers, doctors, soldiers to discuss questions of national unity and the country's history.

3.4. CONCLUSION

The literature review undertaken above indicates clearly that genocide is a complex phenomenon which has attracted a large number of scholars. Their research reveals that besides socio-political factors often identified as causes and consequences of the genocides, there are also economic, environmental and cultural factors. Behind ethnic, religious and racial discrimination, there has been, in all cases hidden ambitions to implement socio-political and economic ideologies. This has been illustrated by the comparative studies of some genocides in the twentieth century. There is agreement among most scholars that the causes and consequences of genocide must be fully investigated to avoid its repetition.

Conflicts in Rwanda, Bosnia, Armenia, Cambodia and the Nazi holocaust have evoked the most vivid emotional responses from victims and perpetrators. Genocide destroyed civil society and caused economic decline not only within the concerned countries but also within regions and at the international level. The literature review showed that conflicts, especially genocide arises from immediate causes such as economic and environmental causes to remote causes such as culture and psychological predisposition of groups. Besides approaches to understand genocide, practical efforts undertaken to promote lasting reconstruction at national and international levels were underlined by the research.

However, there are still several facets of genocide which require in depth research. This includes the inability of the international community to prevent genocide, the issue of true reconciliation between antagonists and the total absence of reparation for victims. The catastrophe in Rwanda as well as in other countries in the early 1990s demonstrated the inability of the UN system to prevent genocide. Unfortunately, the political, economic, and social conditions that provoked such conflicts are likely to persist. In this regard Gonzalez (2004:19) stated:

“The genocide in Rwanda has not been the first genocide in the African continent and if prevention mechanisms and proper conflict management are not set on the continent, it may not be the last one” (Gonzalez, 2004:19).

CHAPTER 4

STUDY AREA AND METHODOLOGY

4.1. INTRODUCTION

The present chapter focuses on a description of the study area and the methods and techniques employed in obtaining primary and secondary data. Both quantitative and qualitative methods were utilized. The chapter begins with a description of the areas in Rwanda in which the research was undertaken and then progresses to a discussion of the instruments used for data collection and analysis. The survey instruments comprised questionnaires, formal and informal interviews as well as photographs and remotely sensed images that give a visual insight of the extent of material and human destruction during the genocide. An attempt is then made to describe the location, history, climate, topography and biodiversity of both case study areas. Thereafter, the methods of data collection viz. sampling techniques, interviews, questionnaires, primary and second data and ethical issues are clarified. The final two sections deal with the methods used in data analysis and limitations of the study.

4.2. STUDY AREAS

To avoid generalisation and to ensure reliability and validity of data, a case study of two different historical and geographic areas was chosen. These were the semi-urban towns of Butare and Cyangugu. The choice of urban areas was dependent on easy accessibility to the areas, the heterogeneity of the resident population and the semi-urban characteristics of areas.

Butare was chosen as a case study due to the large number of people killed there during the genocide. The other area studied was Cyangugu which was an environment according to Ndolimana (2003) that was most affected by the genocide in the country


and an area where killings lasted longer than anywhere else in the country. A more detailed description of these areas will be provided during the discussion of these towns below.

4.2.1. Butare town

4.2.1.1. Location

Butare town is located in Butare Province (South-Centre: 2° 35'50''S/ 29° 44' 22''E) (Fig 4.1). It had the largest number of genocide victims of any area in Rwanda (206 000 out of a population of 934 000 or 22, 1%) (Ndolimana, 2003). Butare is the second largest town in Rwanda and is situated 135 kms south of the capital Kigali. It is the intellectual and cultural heart of the nation. Butare town has Rwanda's National University and the National museum which houses the finest ethnographic collection in Rwanda and in East Africa.

Figure 4.1: Location of Butare Town



Source : MINITRACO-UNR/CGIS ; « Carte Administrative du Rwanda » ;2004/ Africover.

4.2.1.2. Physical features

The relief of Butare town is basically constituted of hills and valleys, characteristics of the central plateau to which it belongs (Plate 4.1). On the physical plan the city of Butare is divided into two parts by the Rwamamba River .The town occupies the summits of the hills with an average altitude of 1700m. In its Western part, the town rises and culminates at more than 2 000m at the summit of Mount Huye. The valleys surrounding the town average 1 650m.The site of the town is characterized by a succession of hills separated by talwegs (steep descents) that drain the waters of the town. Of the 89, 44 square km surface of the town only 33% is urbanised or being urbanized (PEGU, 2004: 7-8; Commune Ngoma, 1990:4-6).

Plate 4.1. View of Butare-Ville on the central plateau



Source: The author (2005)


Butare has a sub-equatorial moderate climate, with the average annual temperature of 20° C and an average rainfall of 1 160 mm (PEGU, 2004:8). As with the whole country,

the climate is characterised by four very distinct seasons: the small rain season of mid-September to mid-December (*Umuhindo*), the small dry season of mid-December to January (*Urugaryi*), the big rain season of February to May (*Itumba*) and the big dry season of May to September (*Ieyi*) (Mesar and Kanimba, 2003).

The hydrography comprises of streams crossing the valleys of Rwabuye, and they merge themselves in the river Akanyaru at the border of Rwanda and Burundi. The river Akanyaru empties itself to the Akagera, one of the tributaries of the Nile River. The hydrographic network of the city is drained by 3 rivers. The Kadahokwa in the West, the river Rwamamba in the centre that links the north to the south and in the East, the river of Rwasave - Kihene that also moves from North to south.

Soils are basically poor and formed from the granite rock to form argil-sandy soil on the hills. The valleys (770 ha surface) are characterized by humid and rich soil with organic material. Presently, the natural vegetation has disappeared and has been replaced by anthropic vegetation (PEGU, 2004; Commune Ngoma, 1990).

Figure 4.2: Butare Town Landcover



Source : MINITRACO-UNR/CGIS ; « Carte Administrative du Rwanda » ; 2001, MINECOFIN/ SNR ; 2004/ Africover.

4.2.1.3. History

The town of Butare belongs to the Butare Province which encompassed the Gikongoro Province until 1960. It has the second highest urbanisation rate in the country (18.4%) and a population density of 388 inhabitants per square kilometre. Ninety percent of its population depends on agriculture (PEGU, 2004:6). During colonisation, the town of Butare had been planned as the administrative capital of Rwanda-Burundi Territory because of its strategic position between Kigali (Rwanda), Bujumbura (Burundi) and Bukavu (Congo) in front of the actual town of Cyangugu (Plate 4.2). The Province of Butare where the town is situated has its situation on the crossroads of 3 international road axes which constitute the "North Corridor" that joins Rwanda to the Congo in the West, to Burundi in the South, to Tanzania in the East and Uganda and Kenya in the North.

The main phases of growth of the city of Butare show how the present urban area has grown since the colonisation by Europeans and then by Asians and local Blacks (PEGU, 2004). The city of Butare (Astrida) was created in 1917 by the Germans. The Assistant Officer Defane, under the advice of Father Hunsiger of the Catholic mission of Kansi founded the station of Rango with the goal of gathering the indigenous carriers that had to be sent to Tabora. This project collapsed when World War I occurred and resulted in the expulsion of the Germans and brought the Belgians to Rwanda. After the first war Belgians created their station at Save Hill. In 1923 this station was transferred to Butare by M. Dardenne. He chose four hills: Kabutare, Ruhande, Mamba and Buye. In 1928, the town was baptized Astrida, to honour Queen Astrid of Belgium who had married Prince Leopold. The town was chosen as the capital of the territory of the Rwanda-Urundi the same year. On December 13th, 1929, the administrator of the Rwanda-Urundi erected the urban locality of Astrida. The colonisers undertook the planning of the urban center following the laws, at that time, that were based on the creation and the

separation of the white and black city (PEGU, 2004). Nteziyaremye (2000) outlines five stages of the evolution of Butare town:

i) The period 1928-1950

It is the period of the construction of the white city on the four hills and the black city on the hill of Ngoma. During this period a large forest was created to constitute a zone separating the dwellings of the blacks from the white zone. Some facilities were constructed on the site of Kabutare. These were administrative, education and religious facilities. People were allocated plots for settlement and house construction. A commercial zone 'Icyarabu'(Arabs) was constructed and the activities were driven by the Asian community (Nteziyaremye, 2000).

ii) The period 1950-1963.

This period was marked by the construction of infrastructure and facilities: the bituminisation of the central avenue from the Asian District to the bus station; the setting of waters and electricity networks in the downtown area; the foundation of the research institute 'Institut de Recherche Scientifique en Afrique Centrale' (I.R.S.A.C), today Institut de Recherche Scientifique and Technologique (I.R.S.T); the veterinary laboratory and the construction of the social school of Karubanda.

iii) The period 1963-1977

The period was marked by the founding of the National University of Rwanda in 1963 on the hill of Ruhande. The university crystallised the scientific function of Butare at the national level. The schools and the University attracted a lot of people. Immigrants moved to surrounding areas and new districts appeared: Tumba, Cyarwa and Matyazo. The white city grew rapidly on the hills of Ruhande and Mamba.

iv) The period 1997-1994

During this period, the city expanded southwards with the new agglomeration of Rango and the high growing population density of the peripheral districts of Tumba, Cyarwa and Matyazo. The University extended to the hill of Ruhande. As in the previous

period, the development of the city during this period was essentially due to the extension of the National University of Rwanda (Nteziyaremye, 2000).


v) The period 1994-2004

After the genocide of 1994, the habitat were extended in and around the former urban centre with new informal settlements and farming features appearing in the Butare-Ville Sector and in Ngoma. The new type of *Imidugudu* (grouped habitats) appeared in the suburb Sectors of the town such as Musange, Matyazo, Rwabuye (PEGU, 2004). As stated above, the Sectors of Butare-Ville in the downtown of Butare and Musange in the suburbs are the case studies of this research.

The present town of Butare is one of the urban Districts created by the new law code No 11/2003 of 20th of May 2003 officially gazetted in the Official Gazette No 12 of 15th June 2003 redefining the district's and town's new boundaries (Ministry of Infrastructures, 2004). With a surface of 89,44 square kms, it is located in the centre-south of the Province of Butare and has 18 administrative Sectors. It has borders with the following Districts: District of Kibingo in the South, Maraba in the North, Save in the East and Nyakizu in the West (Fig. 4.3) (Commune Ngoma, 1990).

Butare was specially targeted during the genocide and resulted in the loss of many lives. This is well illustrated by Pottier (2002:37) who stated: "In 1994, Rwanda's south paid for its aspirations when the presidential guard and INTERAHAMWE death squads closed in on Butare. The south had shown too great a willingness to share power with the RPF". It is thought that 100 000 people were killed in Butare (Melvern, 2000:171). Human Rights Watch (1999) collated evidence to suggest that in Butare, the killing was faster than anywhere else. In several places thousands of people were killed; in health clinics, in schools, on playing fields, in churches and markets (Human Rights, 1999:456; Melvern, 2000:171).

Figure 4.3: Sectors of the Butare town and population density



Source: MINITRACO-UNR/CGIS; « Carte Administrative du Rwanda »; 2001, MINECOFIN/ SNR; 2004.

Plate 4.2: Butare business centre in 2005



Source: Hargrove, 2005

4.2.2. Cyangugu town

4.2.2.1. Location

Cyangugu town is situated in the Cyangugu Province which is in the South West of the country ($2^{\circ} 26' 16''$ S/ $28^{\circ} 55' 20''$ E) (Fig 4.4; Fig 4.5). The town is the administrative headquarters of Cyangugu Province. In the North East, it shares borders with the Impala District. In the Southeast it borders the Gashonga District, while in the West it shares borders with the Democratic Republic of Congo, separated by the Rusizi River and Lake Kivu. In the East lies the Bukunzi District. Cyangugu town occupies a surface area of 34,94 square kilometres with an average altitude of 1 600 m above sea level (Ministry of Infrastructure, 2004).

Figure 4.4: The location of Cyangugu town in Rwanda



Source: Lonely Map, 2007. www.lonelyplanet.com/maps/africa/rwanda (09/30/2007).

The town is well linked with the capital town Kigali and the regional and international towns by bituminised roads. The road Cyangugu-Butare connects to Kigali, the road Cyangugu-Bugarama connects to Bujumbura town (Burundi) and Uvira town (South DRC), and lastly the road Cyangugu-Bukavu connects to the Eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo through two border posts of Rusizi I and Rusizi II.


Cyangugu has a temperate tropical climate with an average temperature of between 21° and 22° C. The average annual rainfall is 1 450 mm. Like the rest of the country it has four seasons, broadly described as dry and rainy seasons; short rains: September to December (*Umuhindo*); short dry season: December-January (*Urugaryi*); long rains: February to mid May (*Itumba*); long dry season: mid may to September (*Icyi*) (Mesar and Kanimba, 2003).

The landscape of Cyangugu town is characterised by a chain of plains whose average altitude is 1 600m. The hilly nature of the terrain poses serious challenges to human activities and imposes limitations on physical development. Uncontrolled agricultural activities are widespread on the hilltops and slopes and this has resulted in serious land degradation (Ministry of Infrastructure, 2004:18). In general, the soil of Cyangugu town is fertile.

Beside Lake Kivu, water resources are dominated by the Rivers, Cyunyu, Gatandara and Kadasomwa. The River Rusizi, one of the country's big rivers which join Lake Kivu with Lake Tanganyika has its mouth here. Lake Kivu is a fresh water lake with important natural resources and aesthetic qualities ideal for tourist attraction, water sport and swimming (Ministry of Infrastructure, 2004:19).


The vegetation consists of savannah bush land, thorny trees and ferns that are common in acidic soils. There is also some papyrus and other water plants along the river mouths Cyunyu, Gatandara and Kadasomwa. These provide some of the richest and most diverse ecosystems of Cyangugu influencing fisheries and other social economic activities. The animals in Cyangugu town are mostly domestic. The wild animals consist of reptiles, birds and wild dogs (Ministry of Infrastructure, 2004:19).

Figure 4.5: Map of the Cyangugu town



Source: Ministry of Infrastructure, 2004

Figure 4.6: Sectors of Cyangugu town



Source: Annual report of Cyangugu town, 2005

4.2.2.2. History

The history of Cyangugu town was well described by the Ministry of Infrastructure (2004:19). Cyangugu town has a very recent history. Situated in the natural region of Kinyaga, there has been no reference of a pre-colonial period. It developed like all other urban centres in the country (Ministry of Infrastructures, 2004). The first colonialists arrived in the Cyangugu region in 1896 and settled in Shangi, 40 km from Kamembe,

along Lake Kivu. In 1920 they built on the islands of Karambo and in 1927 they built two roads namely Cyangugu-Bukavu and Airoport-Bukavu as well as the first bridge called Rusizi I. In 1930, the airport of Kamembe was built to serve as a regional link between Rwanda, Congo and Burundi. During this same period, Indian and Pakistani traders settled in Kamembe. During the colonial period, the town did not develop much. There were some residential buildings made of durable materials next to the airport and on the airport-Bukavu road and as well as in the Muslim neighbourhoods (Ministry of Infrastructures, 2004:20). From 1962 to 1994, the urbanised part of the district of Kamembe embraced the Kamembe area (Fig 4.3). The growth of the town has been very slow with gradual development of residential buildings for workers, the construction of the prison, cathedral and some administrative buildings in the Mont Cyangugu area. Killings and destruction during the genocide lasted longer in Cyangugu then elsewhere in the country due to the "Operation Turquoise": Cyangugu was protected by French troops, which, however, did not stop massacres and looting and destruction of the town. After the genocide of 1994, there was massive return of native refugees to Cyangugu who settled in the Kamembe area, the most urbanised and secure area at that time. This resulted in the emergence of grouped resettlement (Imidugudu) in all the areas of Kamembe, particularly on Mont Cyangugu, and in Gihundwe (Ministry of Infrastructures, 2004:23).

The town of Cyangugu has evolved as a commercial and new administrative entity, created under the law code No 05/2001 of 18th January 2001 of establishment and administration of urban authorities in Rwanda (Fig 4.6). The town consists of three Sectors of the former Kamembe District (Muhali, Kamembe and Gihundwe A); three Sectors from the former Cyimbogo District (Mururu, Mutongo and Gihundwe B) and one Sector from the former Gisuma District (Shagasha). All of them are mainly rural.

Plate 4.3: View of Kamembe in the Cyangugu town (Umuganda Cell).



Source: The Author, 2005

4.3. METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION

4.3.1. Sampling techniques

The relevance of sampling techniques in any research is highlighted by Omotosho (1994) who argues that a sampling frame contains the basic details of all members of the population from which samples are drawn. A sample is always preferred to the entire population because analysis based on a sample is as precise as that based on the entire population. It is time saving and cost minimising.

Sampling districts, sectors and cells subdivisions to visit in the study took into account the last territorial restructuring of the country in 2001. Rwanda was divided into 12 provinces and 106 districts of which 22 are semi-urban and 84 rural. The study was conducted in two Districts. Based on their spatial distribution and backgrounds, a case study of two different historical and geographic areas was chosen. The semi-urban towns of Butare and Cyangugu were purposively selected. Butare was chosen as a case study due to the large number of people killed there during the genocide, and Cyangugu because its environments were most affected by the genocide in the country and it was an area where the killings lasted longer than anywhere else in the country.

In both areas, a representative sample of 100 respondents was drawn from the population by using multistage sampling techniques. As the research dealt with heterogeneous populations with varying economic and social status and different backgrounds (former refugees, new settlers and former settlers), stratified random sampling was the most appropriate for this study. Within each selected town, a stratified sample was drawn. Stratified sampling consisted of dividing the population of Butare and Cyangugu into two subgroups (strata) according to the spatiality (geographical location) and the socio-economic characteristics. The downtown (1) was basically

occupied by people of high income and the suburb (2) by semi-urban people with low incomes, modest housing and poor infrastructure. Within these two subgroups, 2 Cells were selected randomly, and then within these 2 Cells, 25 households were selected randomly using a list of house numbers and a random number table. The second questionnaire was administered at the local authority level and to the leaders of the cells in each district. Both case studies were semi-urban and administrative units of Provinces.


Plate 4.4: Gatovu Cell in Cyangugu



Source: The author, 2005


All households belonging to Cells selected were already numbered according to the past census of the population and 25 households were selected randomly from each cell, to be interviewed (Fig 4.7).

Figure 4.7: Representative sampling from the Butare and Cyangugu towns



The towns of Butare and Cyangugu were selected because of the reasons given above. The first lost the biggest number of human lives during the genocide and the second suffered the most physical damage. These towns offer the opportunity for comparing on one hand the urban-rural relationships and on the other the gap that exists between urban and rural lifestyles. Despite the 130kms distance between the two towns, they were also selected because of their accessibility, this reduced time and travel expenses as they are linked by a good tarmac road. In addition, towns offer easier accommodation facilities than remote rural areas. Most importantly, the two different towns were chosen not only for comparative purposes but mainly to obtain a representative sample of Rwanda generally. Thus the results from the study should be applied to the entire country.

Figure 18: Administrative organisation of Rwanda since 2002



Source: Journal Officiel, 2002; MINECOFIN, 2002:338

Within Butare town, two Sectors, Musange and Butare-Ville, were randomly selected, one among downtown sectors and another within suburb Sectors. The same was done in Cyangugu where the Mururu and Kamembe Sectors were selected. Within those four Sectors, four Cells were selected randomly, with a sample of 50 households from each being selected. Those four Cells are Gatovu (semi-urban) (Plate 4.4) and Umuganda (urban) in Cyangugu town (Plate 4.4; Table 4.1). Buye (urban) and Akubutare (semi-urban: 262 hectares) in Butare town (Plate 4.5; Table 4.1). The two semi-urban Cells were new settlements to shelter people who lost their houses during 1994 or former refugees from neighbouring countries. The two downtown Cells were characterized by old houses which were destroyed or rehabilitated and new houses built after 1994.

Plate 4.5: View of Akubutare Cell of the Butare town

Source: The author, 2005

In Rwanda, Provinces were governed by Prefects, District (Municipalities) by Mayors, Sectors by Co-ordinators or Consellers and Cells by Responsibles. However, between data collection and the presentation of the results of the analysis, Rwanda has initiated new administrative units. For more decentralisation, the twelve existing Provinces were restructured into five new units called Regions and consequently Districts and Sectors became bigger (Imvaho, 2006).

Table 4.1. Demographic profile of the case studies

Towns	Pop.	Sectors	Pop.	Cells	Pop.
Butare	77.217	Butare-Ville	17.914	Buye	2.278
		Musange	1.574	Akubutare	696
Cyangugu	59.070	Kamembe	25.464	Umuganda	3.749
		Mururu	7.060	Gatovu	1.295

Source: Butare Ville, 2006; Cyangugu Ville, 2006

4.3.2. Primary and secondary data

The research collected primary and secondary data. Secondary data was a review of studies on the genocide in the world, and in Rwanda in particular. In this regard, substantial works of Mamdani, (2001), Melvern (2000), Pottier (2002) and Staub (2003), were the major references. In addition the research has benefited greatly from the following reports: (i) The Rwanda Development Indicators: an annual publication which provides data for monitoring Rwanda's development progress since 1994 (MINECOFIN, 2002); (ii) The 3rd General population and housing census of 2002 (ONAPO, 2002); (iii) Publications from the Conflict Management Centre of Butare (N.U.Rwanda) and (iv) Formal and informal interviews at the household and community level.

Data was also gathered from libraries mainly: the UKZN Library, the National University of Rwanda Library, CUEA Library (Nairobi-Kenya) and the Centre de gestion des conflits in Butare (Rwanda). Other public and private institutions also provided information (NGOs, the Department of Land and Environment and Districts and Provinces Annual Reports. In addition to formal and informal interviews at the household and community level, internet sources were an important tool for articles, and other materials such as maps and photos. However, in Butare and Cyangugu towns, most data was lost during the destruction and pillage of offices and other buildings in 1994. For this reason, data before 1994 was rarely found.

Primary data consisted of interviews held in sampled households, using a questionnaire. A representative sample of 100 respondents was drawn from the population of both Butare and Cyangugu towns. Two questionnaires were implemented, one to heads of households, another to the cell leaders who were chosen purposively. Additionally, photos/ remote sensed data were analysed to determine the change in the Rwandan landscape.

4.3.2.1. Questionnaire

Two semi-structured questionnaires were administered. One was administered at the household level (Appendix 5) and the other to community leaders (4 Responsibles of Cells) (Appendix 5). These Cell leaders were selected because they were closer to members of households. In addition, informal interviews and contacts were made with another four leaders viz. the Executive Secretary of the Cyangugu Province, Mayors and Sector Co-ordinators of Butare and Cyangugu towns. Questions to household heads were basically semi-structured whereas those of leaders were totally open-ended to allow for an indepth exploration of the range of issues affecting communities (Appendix 5). The researcher conducted all interviews.

The questionnaire for heads of households comprised of the following sections: attitudes, perceptions and experiences of infrastructure/ services and goods before and after the genocide, social economic and demographic characteristics, cultural background of respondents and social interaction patterns.

The first part of questionnaire elicited information on demographic characteristics of respondents such as gender, age, marital status, education, languages, and demographic effects of the genocide on the households regarding migration, income and disease. In the second part, respondents were asked about housing structures including material and availability of services, means of transport, information and communication and sources of fuel. In the third part, questions were posed regarding households' relationships with neighbours before and after the genocide, in other words their leisure, conflicts, disabled people, religion, marriage, cultural disintegration and the current level of reconciliation (Appendix 5)

The questionnaire for leaders (Appendix 5) comprised three parts: the respondent's background, the management of socio-economic issues after the genocide and the infrastructure and environment management in their administrative units. To complete

the information on the household case studies at the two locations, semi-structured interviews were conducted with public servants, NGOs and authorities outside the locations. In addition, other quantitative data was found in documents received from the public administration, both local and national, of projects and private enterprises as mentioned earlier. In addition to the questionnaire, informal interviews were undertaken with people from the sampled areas to relate their tragic stories about their experiences during and after the genocide.

However, although the researcher considered the methods and techniques to be strong, there were certain limitations. Questions developed in English had to be translated into Kinyarwanda because many people spoke only one language, i.e. Kinyarwanda, during interviews. Translated questions sometimes lost their true meaning. It was also difficult to meet people who worked during the day. Interviews took more time than expected. It was also difficult to capture qualitative data with the questionnaire during interviews. However this problem was overcome with the thematic informal interviews.

4.3.2.2. Interviews schedule, observation, duration of data collection

Before any contact with people in the Cells, local authorities had to be informed and the research had to comply with the requirements of political authorities to obtain permission for investigation (Appendix 6 and 7). Unexpectedly, this took one third of the time allocated for the research. When permissions were received from the Province and Municipal Authorities, visits to households were done in two steps. During the first visit the researcher was accompanied by the Coordinator of the Cell for introductory purposes, to explain the aim of the research and to arrange appointments. This was complicated because some heads of households work by day and then by night they go to study at the University. Most of them were available only at weekends. This explains why appointments were often delayed. Sometimes heads of households delegated another person in the family, very often their wives to answer questions.

The second step was the interviews, which took between one to two hours. This depended on the openness of people. Two kinds of interviews were used namely one for leaders, and another for heads of households, all of them investigating the identification of households and the socio-economic issues in the past ten years (Appendix 5). Four local authorities were the last to be interviewed to avoid the researcher being influenced (Appendix 5). Informal discussions also took place with Coordinators of Sectors and Mayors of Municipalities. Despite permission obtained from the provincial local authorities, suspicion, fear and indifference were still observable amongst some households. Also some leaders were not at ease during interviews fearing that the researcher was evaluating their performance. However, interviews were completed within two months.

4.3.2.3 Ethical clearance

In order to comply with the academic requirements of the University of KwaZulu-Natal, the research design exhibits a concern for others and adopted good ethical practice in addition to concerns for using the correct research techniques to conduct relevant research. During the data collection process, the researcher tried to understand, accept and respect the rights respondents had as participants. It ensured that respondents were: willing participants who had given their informed consent to be interviewed, that they maintained their self respect and their privacy was protected. Additionally, the researcher informed the participants that they had the right not only to refuse to participate but also to withdraw from the research interview at any point and in this way respected individual autonomy. Respondents were also informed that the interview process was confidential. To prevent social stigmatization and secondary victimization no names of respondents or exact residential location was part of the questionnaire. After the data collection process the confidentiality of data has been preserved.

4.4. DATA ANALYSIS

The analysis of the socio-economic impact of the genocide and current developments processed results from the questionnaire. This was enriched by data obtained from informal interviews and observations from the field work and other existing written documents.

Analysis and interpretation of findings from closed-ended, semi-structured and open-ended questions were both quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative analysis consisted of computation of descriptive statistics. It was conducted using the Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) and Microsoft Excel. Thus, data recorded was tabulated and results processed by computer to draw statistical insight using graphs, histograms and charts.

Qualitative data from semi-structured questions and open-ended responses was analysed using content analysis and thematic analysis. After interviewing households and leaders, open-ended responses were collected and pertinent points were analysed. Depending on the different questions, a coding unit was selected with reference to concepts, words or themes. While content analysis aimed to “know” data, the thematic analysis aimed to “understand” data and attempted to obtain greater depth and more description. In addition, this type of analysis is illustrated by the use of quotations, photographs and remote sensed images to determine the extent of infrastructural degradation. In most instances data is displayed in such a way that there is comparability between the situation that was prevalent before and after the genocide.

4.5. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The issue of genocide which deals with race and ethnicity is a very sensitive one, especially in Rwanda where people are still recovering from mental and physical trauma subsequent to genocide. In other words, the researcher and the respondents were

challenged by certain contents of the questionnaire. The researcher, a Rwandan citizen, must admit a certain level of subjectivity when undertaking the study. Moreover, when discussing the causes, nature and impacts of the genocide, an attempt was made to avoid rude comments on any ethnic group and this may have resulted in omission of some useful information that could otherwise be relevant to clarify under discussion. Similarly, belonging to a specific ethnic group may have biased some responses and posed a challenge to respondents from the other ethnic group. To overcome these limitations, information was collected from various respondents, households' heads, civil servants as well as community leaders. Moreover, the researcher endeavoured to assess different views on controversial issues and pointed out objectively, their strengths and their weaknesses.

4.6. CONCLUSION

The aim of this chapter was to provide tools for understanding what people have concretely experienced a decade after the genocide in Rwanda. It described the two areas of study and showed how secondary data was obtained and primary data gathered. The research used both quantitative and qualitative methods for gathering, and interpreting data. Although primary and secondary information was successfully gathered, limitations to the study were found during the process. In the aftermath of the genocide, documents such as maps, statistics were not available for consultation as they were simply destroyed. Besides personal challenges experienced during the research, permissions for investigation and interviews took much more time than expected. Also, as people are still suffering from the consequences of the genocide, it was still too early to inquire about some sensitive questions about one or other ethnic group that were involved in the struggle.

CHAPTER 5

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

5.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the findings from interviews, observations, remotely sensed images and informal discussions with respondents from the various areas investigated. It also attempts to close the gap between the past literature on Rwanda and the real-life situations of households more than a decade after the genocide. Both quantitative and qualitative techniques are utilized in the discussion of the findings. A hundred heads of households and administrative leaders were interviewed. Data is presented and interpreted by means of tables, charts, and plates. All primary and secondary data was collected according to the three components of the cultural materialism theoretical framework used in this study. This framework highlights infrastructure, structure and superstructure in studying the roots and consequences of conflicts. Thus, they relate to the social, economic impacts of the genocide and their implication on current development in Rwanda; i.e. what affected people in their relationships with the community, the physical landscape and above all the impact on infrastructure

Data from leaders based on open-ended questions was analysed using content and thematic analyses. Results from the leaders consisted basically of demographic characteristics which were limited to gender, age, education, languages spoken and marital status. Discussion with leaders focused on socio-economic and political relationships which consisted of the quality of relationship among households after the genocide, their income sources, diseases and environmental problems affecting vulnerable people in the Cells. Formal interviews were conducted with co-ordinators of Cells and the Mayors and informal interviews with such leaders such as the Executive Secretary and Directors of Units at the Provincial level. From the leaders, information

was collected about community members' relationship after the genocide, income, religion, diseases, vulnerable groups, kinds of tension and conflicts, settlements, services and facilities and environmental issues. Findings from leaders combined with those from household surveys were useful to enrich information collected from different sources.

5.2. BACKGROUND OF RESPONDENTS (IDENTIFICATION AND CHARACTERISTICS).

An understanding of the background characteristics of the households interviewed in the survey and of the individual respondents is essential to the interpretation of the data. Information on sex, household characteristics, sources of information and other items collected are presented in this section.

5.2.1. Size of households

The most frequent number of members in the households (62%) is between 4 and 7 persons with a significant proportion (22%) of households having 8 to 11 persons and 16% having very few members (1 to 3) (Table 5.1). On average, the surveyed households contained 5.7 persons with urban households having more persons than their suburban counterparts. According to the 2002 census (ONAPO, 2002), the average household population size in Cyangugu town was 6.3 persons and 5.3 in Butare. What this indicates is that despite the genocide, household size is still fairly large. However, all household members were not necessarily related as Table 5.2 below indicates. Households in Butare and Cyangugu towns are no longer normal families of a husband, a wife and children. Instead, after the genocide, households have encompassed also relatives, former refugees or other needy people who could not find a shelter elsewhere. Households are large and complex, nephews, nieces, uncles, aunts, children of household heads and orphans of former neighbours.

Table 5.1: Household size (n=100)

Size (Nr of members)	Frequency	Percent
1	4	4.0
2	5	5.0
3	7	7.0
4	17	17.0
5	14	14.0
6	19	19.0
7	12	12.0
8	8	8.0
9	6	6.0
10	6	6.0
11	2	2.0
Total	100	
Min	1.0	
Max	11.00	
Mean	5.7100	
Std Dev	2.37961	

5.2.2. Relationship within households

All members of households are not related. Table 5.2 shows that only 73.6% are but 16.6% are simply relatives and the other 9.8 % are not related at all to households. The latter are workers, baby-sitters, watchmen, cooks, servants or orphans of neighbours and poor people provided for by households after the genocide. The high rate of workers and servants was explained by their opportunity to find a shelter. The wages they earn in both Butare and Cyangugu towns were basically low (less than 1 US dollar per day) and many of them were paid according to the household's income.

Table 5.2: Relationship within household's members (n= 561).

	Frequency	Percent
Husband	67	11.9
Wife	99	17.6
Child	247	44.0
Relative	93	16.6
Others (workers, orphans..)	55	9.8
Total	561	100.0

5.2.3. Sex composition of households and household's heads.

Data from Table 5.3 shows that the majority of households' members are males (56.5%) against 43.5% of females. This contradicts the well-known fact that the 1994 genocide targeted males in particular and therefore females predominate everywhere in number. The explanation given was that in both towns, many members of households were in town for jobs, study purposes and almost all watchmen, cooks were male. The larger proportion of males in the household's population is in harmony with what the results of the 2002 census demonstrate which indicates 53% males in Butare and 58.3% in Cyangugu (ONAPO, 2002). At town level males predominate because of large barracks and central prisons mainly occupied by males, situated within those administrative units.

In regard to household heads, it is clear that males (64%) are in the majority with females representing only 36%. Generally, in both towns, there are more males than females for the reasons given above. Moreover, there were more male heads in the suburb Cells of Musange and Gatovu as compared to the downtown Cells of Buye and Umuganda, in Butare and Cyangugu towns, respectively. The proportion of women head of households (36%) remains relatively high compared to the situation before the genocide (6.5%) (ONAPO, 2002).

Table 5.3: Sex composition of households (n = 561).

	Frequency	Percent
Male	317	56.5
Female	244	43.5
Total	561	100.0

Table 5.4: Sex composition of households' heads (n = 100)

	Frequency	Percent
Male	64	64.0
Female	36	36.0
Total	100	100.0

5.2.4. Age composition of households and household's heads

The household population is very young as more than half are under 25 years (Table 5.5). Most members are aged between 15 and 19 years (18.7%). The youth including teenage is represented by a frequency of above 59.7%. Groups of members aged between 10 and 14 years (10%) represent a small proportion. According to the World Bank (2003), this group was impacted by the under-five mortality rate which has deteriorated by nearly 30% since 1991. Those in age category 29 years and above form a significant proportion (40.03%) showing that this group had a better survival rate 10 years ago.

Children born after the genocide represent 16.9%. It is apparent that after the genocide, births increased to compensate losses during the genocide. The cultural belief that a lot of children give honour and prestige to the family is strong. Economically active population (between 15 to 65 years) is 71.6% and the dependent population 28.4%.

Table 5.5: Age of household's members (n=561).

	Frequency	Percent
<10	95	16.9
10-14	56	10.0
15-19	105	18.7
20-24	79	14.1
25-29	48	8.6
30-34	51	9.1
35-39	35	6.2
40-44	31	5.5
45-49	19	3.4
50-54	15	2.7
55-59	13	2.3
60-64	6	1.1
65-69	2	.4
≥70	6	1.1
Total	561	100.0

Table 5.6 indicates that the age of household's heads ranged from as low as 15 years to over 60 years. The average age of household's heads was 37 years. The majority of household's heads are aged between 40 years and 44 (21%). Generally, a high proportion of households representing 71% are between 25 and 49 years old (Table 5.6). There are very few households headed by elder persons (Table 5.6).

Table 5.6: Age of household's heads (n =100)

	Frequency	Percent
15-19	1	1.0
20-24	3	3.0
25-29	13	13.0
30-34	14	14.0
35-39	13	13.0
40-44	21	21.0
45-49	12	12.0
50-54	9	9.0
55-59	7	7.0
60-64	4	4.0
≥70	3	3.0
Total	100	100.0

5.2.5. Marital status of household's members and household's heads

Table 5.7 reveals that the majority of household's members are single (62%) followed by a significant proportion of married persons (23%), then widowed (8%) resulting from the genocide and people living together (1.6%). Single people including single mothers are more prominent in downtown Cells. There are other people whose marital status was not too clear (3.2%) especially those women from refugee camps who were uncertain whether their husbands are still alive. According to the information collected in the area, some families from exile left their spouses to manage properties, or they remained in the country of exile because they did not want to lose their jobs or did not return. Divorce cases (1.8%) are rare either before or after the genocide. There were 9 cases of unmarried people living together. According to interviewees, they did so because they could not afford the dowry which usually consists of a cow.

Table 5.7: Marital status of household's members (n=561)

	Frequency	Percent
Married	131	23.4
Single	348	62.0
Divorce	10	1.8
Widowed	45	8.0
Living together	9	1.6
Other	18	3.2
Total	561	100.0

More than half of household's heads (60%) were married. Besides married members who lead the households (60%), table 5.8 shows also good numbers of widows (27%), divorcees (7%) and single household heads (6%). The reasons for this are obviously because of people widowed during the genocide. Because of poverty, ethnic reasons, and imprisonment many couples in the area divorced after the genocide, especially those who were mixed (Hutu and Tutsi). This was confirmed by the Jane's statement (2000) that: "the traditional Rwanda family structures have been transformed through necessity. Today 34 percent of households are led by women and 28,000 households are headed by children, girls between 12 and 18 years old". Referring to the matrimonial status, it appears that women head of households were mainly widows, about 80% (MINECOFIN, 2002:266). In addition, there are a lot of females whose husbands are in prison.

Table 5.8: Marital status of household's heads (n=100)

	Frequency	Percent
Married	60	60.0
Single	6	6.0
Divorce	7	7.0
Widowed	27	27.0
Total	100	100.0

5.2.6. Level of education of household's members and household's heads

The level of education represented by Table 5.9 and 5.10 is quite informative. Despite the destruction of the education infrastructure and 2/3 of teachers who either fled or were killed, basic literacy is still very high in the urban area sampled, with 83.6% of members of households and 96% of heads of households having completed primary school. This is because of the free education policy and no age limit for attendance at primary school being instituted just after the genocide. Most of the population interviewed expressed the need to complete their primary and secondary schooling. The number of private and Public Universities and High schools increased after the genocide but there are still a low number of persons with secondary and tertiary education. The main problem is that there is a lack of scholarships, and the Government can only provide this to a few people. Not many members completed secondary school (22.8%). Secondary and University candidates face a lack of sufficient funds for higher education. FARG (The Rwandan government funding for survivors) only pays for those who are high achievers.

Table 5.9: Level of education of household's members (n = 561)

	Frequency	Percent
no formal education	92	16.4
Primary	261	46.5
Vocational Training, TC	46	8.2
Secondary	128	22.8
Tertiary	34	6.1
Total	561	100.0

The majority of household's heads completed secondary education (36%) and primary schooling (34%), others tertiary education (11%) and Vocational Training-CERAI (15%) which are vocational skills and technical training centres. Many children left primary school 11 years ago to bring up families and they lost their chance for

secondary school education. This is the reason the government is setting up those centres to train youth in plumbing, tailoring, carpentry, masonry and hairdressing to allow them to compete for jobs and earn an income. Nonetheless some heads of households (4%) have no formal education at all. These include especially, children, cultivators, low-labour workers and marginalised people from Cells. Most of the respondents with tertiary education come from Butare town, an intellectual town with the biggest University in the country. In addition the level of education was higher in Butare town than in Cyangugu. However the level of education is lower compared to the national level: 88% Primary, 7.7% Secondary, and higher than 0.8% Tertiary (ONAPO, 2002).

Table 5.10: Level of education of household's heads (n=100)

	Frequency	Percent
No formal education	4	4.0
Primary	34	34.0
Vocational Training	15	15.0
Secondary	36	36.0
Tertiary	11	11.0
Total	100	100.0

5.2.7. Languages spoken by households and household heads

Overall, the official languages of administration in Rwanda are French, English and Kinyarwanda. But people communicate in the common national vernacular Kinyarwanda and as lingua franca for business Swahili and Lingala.

At the national level, Kinyarwanda is the most spoken language. Table 5. 11 shows that nearly all members (96.1%) speak Kinyarwanda while few speak French (23.6%), Swahili (12.2%) and English (8.4%). French comes second because Rwanda was colonised by Belgium, a French speaking country. However, it is spoken by people who attended secondary or tertiary education. A large number of Swahili speakers are from Cyangugu town, at the border with the Congo where the language is spoken. English

speakers are former Rwandan refugees from English speaking countries and some members who completed secondary and tertiary education. Other language speakers (3.9%) are people from exile, especially infants who still speak languages from where they lived mainly Lingala and local languages from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Kirundi from Burundi. More than 20 percent of people speak at least two languages.

There is a relationship between education and languages spoken, and between the languages spoken and the exiled background of people. People, who completed their secondary or tertiary education in Rwanda, speak Kinyarwanda and French whereas those from exile in English speaking countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and others African countries speak Kinyarwanda and English. It was rare to find people who spoke foreign languages without having completed a Secondary education before the genocide. In contrast to other African countries with many tribes and languages, all Rwandese have the same language and that is why they have not been stimulated to learn other languages. However, the results of this survey show that some children born outside Rwanda during the genocide cannot speak Kinyarwanda at all. They speak other African languages: Lingala for those from Western Congo (DRC), and Kirundi for those from Burundi (Table 5.11).

Table 5. 11: Languages spoken by household's members (n=561) (Multiple responses).

	Frequency	Percent
Kinyarwanda	539	96.1
French	132	23.6
Kiswahili	68	12.2
English	47	8.4
Other (Lingala, Kirundi.)	22	3.9

As for household's members, there is a relationship between languages spoken by household's heads and the level of education. People who completed secondary and tertiary education speak more than one language as English and French were compulsory at school. Besides Kinyarwanda spoken by all respondents (100%), 42% household heads speak French for reasons given above. In both Butare and Cyangugu

towns, relatively few people speak Swahili (25%) and English (13%). At the national level Kinyarwanda is spoken by 99.4%, French (3.9%) Swahili and English (1.9%) (ONAPO, 2002).

Table 5.12: Languages spoken by heads of households (n=100) (Multiple responses).

	Frequency	Percent
Kinyarwanda	100	100
French	42	42
Kiswahili	25	25
English	13	13

5.2.8. Ethnic affiliation of household's heads

It is important to note that in Rwanda children belong to their father's ethnic group. In the same household one could find both ethnic affiliations. As people were still traumatized by the genocide and distrust one other, ethnicity has not been used in official parlance but it has been present in daily life. The research found it difficult but necessary to collect data about the ethnic affiliation of heads of households.

Findings showed that 62% of household's heads in the sample were Tutsis and 38% were Hutus. Although the exact proportion of Hutus and Tutsis are not known and are not the priority of authorities in Rwanda, data above contrast with the general statement that the Hutu ethnic group represents the majority of people both in rural and urban areas, before and after the genocide. Figures from scholars show that in the country Hutus make up about 85% and 90.4% of the population, 15% and 8.2% for Tutsis (Doug, 2003; Prunier, 1991; 1995). The large number of Tutsis household's heads is due: first, to the insecurity which prevailed in rural areas after the genocide which pushed survivors to migrate into towns and second, the suburbs settlement "Imidugudu" mainly occupied by widows and orphans from genocide and former Tutsis from exile.

Table 5. 13: Ethnic affiliation of household's heads (n=100)

	Frequency	Percent
Hutu	38	38.0
Tutsi	62	62.0
Total	100	100.0

5.2.9. Background of leaders

It was found that the majority of leaders of sampled areas were not living in the same towns before the genocide. In Butare town leaders who lived in the country before the genocide represent only 25% whereas in Cyangugu they represent 50%. Although, the majority of residents are males, most units are led by females (Table 5.14). Leaders were predominantly females (62.5%). Males represent only three-eighths (37.5%) in leadership of areas of study (Table 5.14). Except for one leader aged over 60, others were middle-aged with age between 30 and 49 years. All leaders were married. The reason given was that married people were more stable, therefore deserved more confidence in management of society. Cases have been reported just after the genocide where new single managers fled the country with the municipality's cash.

Table 5.14 shows that all of leaders completed at least secondary education (75%) and 25% tertiary education. Although leaders were democratically elected, there was a minimum of secondary education required for Coordinator and Mayors' posts. In addition, urban areas where most settlers are educated need leaders who have a sufficiently high standard of education.

As most leaders have a high level of education, 87.5% speak French, 37.5% English and 87.5% Kiswahili. The education level added to the fact that the majority of leaders interviewed was living abroad before the genocide, explains also their fluency in speaking several languages especially Kiswahili and English. This is an advantage for leaders to communicate with members of different administrative units from various backgrounds.

Table 5.14: Background of leaders (n=8) (Multiple responses).

	Frequency	Percent
Sex:		
Male	3	37.5
Female	5	62.5
Age:		
30-34	2	25
35-39	4	50
45-49	1	12.5
60+	1	12.5
Education level:		
Secondary	6	75
Tertiary	5	25
Languages spoken:		
Kinyarwanda	8	100
French	7	87.5
English	3	37.5
Swahili	7	87.5
Marital status:		
Married	8	100

5.3. IMPACT OF THE GENOCIDE ON INFRASTRUCTURE

The infrastructure consists of modes of production and reproduction determined by the combination of ecological, technological environmental and demographic variables. Thus, the main factor in determining whether a cultural innovation is selected by society lies in its effect on the basic biological needs of that society (Murphy, 2001).

5.3.1. Income

Potentially more damaging to the economy in the long term in Rwanda is not the physical destruction of resources but the fact that most of the skilled population either was killed or fled the country in 1994. This had a catastrophic effect on productivity, even the basic functioning of the already limited private and public sectors. Lack of human resources continues to impact on the economic functioning of the country. In addition to livestock and crops which were decimated during the genocide, the economic legacy of the genocide is perhaps also expressed most crudely in the large number of women and child-headed households (Rugumamu & Gbla, 2003).

5.3.1.1. Households income sources before and after the genocide

According to leaders interviewed, the majority of people living in the cells were classified as poor. The average individual income per month was about 5,000 Rwandan Franc (below 1US \$ a day). Very few said people were completely without any job or income. Few workers are full-time employees paid on a monthly basis. The informal sector has grown larger as the formal sector of employment has slowly collapsed over the last few years. People sell food, clothes, charcoal, car parts; others are carpenters, tailors, shoemakers and very few of these businesses have permanent structures or locations and most of the kiosks are located on the veranda of the owner's house or on the roadside. That is why leaders find it difficult to fight against the informal sector in town.

Leaders also stated that before the genocide all households from the suburbs of Butare (100%) were living on farming and related activities and after the genocide more than 90%. The only difference is that daily worker activities increased after the genocide due to lack of land for those who migrated to town. More than 90% in downtown areas live from salaries and commercial activities. In contrast there is not much difference between households from downtown and those from suburbs in Cyangugu. In both areas about 80% of people live from agriculture combined with commerce. These sources of income were the same before the genocide. Only the quality decreased after the genocide. More than 95% of livestock were eaten during the genocide. In addition the high inflation of the local currency after the genocide worsened the quality of life in the whole country.

Three main income sources identified by heads of households were subsistence agriculture, salaries and informal activities (Table 5.15). Household farming was the most important source of income before the genocide (75%) and after the genocide (57%) showing a decrease after the genocide. This decrease is due to households not having land for cultivation when they moved from the rural areas. The growth of towns of Butare and Cyangugu after the genocide increased unemployment and people were forced into subsistence agriculture and informal activities (MINITERE, 2001). Subsistence agriculture was undertaken in areas surrounding houses and on the outskirts of the city. Household farming income was the value of all crop production, livestock and beer sales (banana and sorghum beers) (MINITERE, 2001).

Although farming activities have predominated before and after the genocide, Table 5.15 shows a growth of off-farm income after the genocide for example, the informal activities from 18% before to 36% after the genocide. Informal activities included craft making, selling goods in kiosks or the local market, bicycle taxis and other activities that did not require an education qualification. Business comprising of commerce predominated in Cyangugu town and increased from 6% to 23% in 2005.

It is clearly evident that salaried employment dropped significantly after the genocide. Salaries as off-farm income decreased from 17% to 12% and Pensions and social welfare from 4% to 2% due to the disappearance of many enterprises during the genocide. Other sources of income, mainly agricultural wage-labour from 9% to 21% are also reported.

Agricultural wage labours are often reported in Musange Sector of Butare town. Those engaged in agricultural wage labour are most often hired to clear and till the soil or to weed and otherwise maintain fields of crops on the farms of their neighbours. Some are engaged to maintain landscapes and fields at institutions such as the University and numerous schools of Butare town. Households consume a higher proportion of their agricultural output on-farm and sell a lower proportion.


The first aspect to be noted is that in the semi-urban areas unemployment is a central issue in both Cyangugu and Butare towns (problems are equally distributed). Besides the formal sector of the economy, there exists a vast informal sector. A person who does not find a "normal" job has to find any other possible form of income. This informal sector of the economy seemed to be a concrete alternative for many people, and unfortunately did not help the process of reducing the unemployment rate. Yet a distinction must be made. The word 'informal' does not necessarily mean "illegal". Most informal jobs are termed illegal in the way in which the activities are run. In the informal sector people do nothing illegal in terms of criminal activity, but they may be doing it in an illegal way. Although poor people benefit from it, the informal sector does not comply with financial and economic regulations of the country.

Table 5.15: Household's income source before and after the genocide (n= 100) (Multiple responses)

	Frequency before 1994	Frequency after 1994
Household farming	75	57
Own business	6	23
Informal activities	18	36
Salaries	17	12
Professional activities	2	4
Pensions, social welfare	4	2
Other	9	21

5.3.1.2. Increase or decrease of household incomes after the genocide

Figure 5.1 clearly shows that household incomes decreased after the genocide and almost all households (89%) reported to be poorer than they were before the genocide. Very few (11%) declared income increase notably lecturers at the University in Butare and also business persons in Butare and Cyangu. It was found that food takes the highest proportion of income allocation of households in Gatovu and Akubutare Cells, followed by school fees, rent and health care.

Figure 5.1: Income after the genocide

5.3.2. Housing and settlement

In Rwanda, during the genocide, houses were burnt or destroyed, with a higher proportion in Cyangugu Province where material was looted. This left the country with a severe housing problem. As thousands of Rwandans returned home in the years following the killings, the government helped by NGOs, had to help by providing shelter, especially for poor people in urban as well as rural areas.

5.3.2.1. Housing before and after the genocide

Table 5.16 shows that eighty-five percent of respondents changed their homes because their previous dwellings were either destroyed during the genocide or for other reasons. Only 15% still live in the same house. More significant was the fact that beyond the material destruction, the destruction of homes implied the loss of important symbols of privacy, identity and a safe place which fostered family union. This is why many people never rebuilt houses where they lived before the genocide.

Table 5.16: Residence before and after the genocide (n=100)

	Frequency	Percent
Same house	15	15.0
Different house	85	85.0
Total	100	100.0

5.3.2. 2. Reasons for moving to another house

People moved to another house for different reasons. Sixty-one percent changed because their houses were destroyed (Plate 5.1), those from exile (3.5%) live in different houses but also some households (25%) moved for psychological reasons as they could not bear to live in the same house where their relatives were killed. Other households (10.5%) fear living close to neighbours who they know participated in killing their family members (Table 5.17).

Table 5.17: Reasons for moving to another house (n=85)

	Frequency	Percent
House destroyed	52	61
Killings took place in the house	21	25
Fear of neighbours	9	10.5
Other (Exile)	4	3.5
TOTAL	85	100

Plate 5.1. Residential buildings destroyed in Cyangugu town during the genocide

Source: The Author, 2005

The majority of households (78%) built their houses and many with the help of the government. Those living in grouped habitat called *Imidugudu* were the most in need (Plate 5.2). These are small and fragile houses constructed in straight lines located in the suburbs of Musange Cell in Butare and Gatovu Cell in Cyangugu (Plate 5.3). This is interesting for many as they are too poor to pay rent. Fourteen percent of households bought their houses. This latter ownership predominated in downtown areas of Buye and Umuganda with renting (8%) for non-permanent residents such as students and lecturers at Butare University and businesspersons both in Cyangugu and Butare towns (Table 5.18).

Plate 5.2. Regrouped habitat *Umudugudu* of Gatovu Cell in Cyangugu town



Source: The author, 2005

Table 5.18: Types of present dwelling ownership (n=100)

	Frequency	Percent
Buy	14	14.0
Rent	8	8.0
Build	78	78.0
Total	100	100.0

As shown by Table 5.19 the cost of dwellings after the genocide increased for all types of house ownership. All households declared that expenses in housing were higher after the genocide than before due to lack of accessibility to materials but also the inflation-devaluation of the money. For instance a piece of wood for construction which cost 40 Rwandan Francs before 1994 currently costs 400 Rwandan Francs.

According to leaders interviewed, the average monthly rent for a house was about 10,000 Rwandan francs (17 \$US) in suburbs and 50.000(84 \$US) Rwandan francs in downtown areas (Table 5.19) depending on the location, quality of the structure,

location to transportation or nature of neighbours. Location was the most important factor in determining the amount of rent demanded

Table 5.19: Rent by month (n=8)

	Frequency	Percent
5000-15000	5	5.0
15000-25000	3	3.0
Total	8	8.0
Do not rent	92	92.0

5.3.2.3. Material used for building

The most common building materials for houses were adobe bricks and tiles in Butare and wood, mud and iron roof in Cyangugu. In Cyangugu town the majority of households were built with wood and sheet iron because of the poor quality of the soil for making tiles while in Butare they used adobe bricks and sheet iron or tiles as the soil is more suitable for bricks and tiles. In Cyangugu a large number of households used timber, thatch or plastic sheetings for kitchens, sanitation facilities and livestock shelter outside the main house, except for plastic sheeting for roofing brought to Rwanda by the UNHCR after the genocide, the same material was used before the genocide in Cyangugu town contrary to Butare where sheet iron was rare before 1994.

The observations made above are well illustrated by table 5.20 which shows that houses are built of adobe bricks and sheet-iron (26%), and wood, mud and sheets of iron (17%) predominate. This is because adobe bricks or wood and tiles/or sheet- iron were the cheapest material even after the genocide and the aid given for construction and rehabilitation by NGOs or the Government consisted of sheet- iron. Other materials that were used in both towns were as bricks and tiles (14%), wood and sheet- iron (12%), bricks and sheets iron (12%) adobe bricks and tiles (10%), and timber with thatch or plastic sheeting (9%).

Table 5.20: Type of materials used to build present house (n =100)

	Frequency	Percent
Adobes bricks+sheet iron	26	26.0
Wood+mud+sheet iron	17	17.0
Adobes bricks +tiles	10	10.0
Wood+sheet iron	12	12.0
Timber+thatch or sheeting	9	9.0
Bricks + tiles	14	14.0
Bricks and sheet iron	12	12.0
Total	100	100.0

There was a significant difference between housing in suburbs and housing downtown. Bricks and tiles or bricks and iron were found especially in downtown areas in both areas. In addition, most structures were clustered into compounds that were demarcated by a fence made out of plants, metallic materials or bricks to preserve privacy. In downtown areas bricks and tiles or sheet iron were compulsory when building. They were very expensive and only accessible to rich households.

In the suburbs, people lived in grouped habitats called “*Imidugudu*” where the common building material was wood, timber, mud and iron sheets in Cyangugu and adobe bricks and iron sheets in Butare. The mud-bricked homes under the *imidugudu* initiative were built for people whose houses were either destroyed or burnt during the genocide. They were built during the emergency period and lack proper infrastructure and facilities. The Rwandan government introduced the national human settlement policy, known as *Imidugudu*, in 1996. Since the policy focused on group settlement, the government hoped to solve the problem of land scarcity at the same time. The concept was seen to group and offer advantage to the population. However, the government did not seek the opinion of the local population before embarking on this project and as a result many of the present occupants were forced into these group settlements. In fact, for economic and cultural reasons, Rwandan people were used to settle in the fertile area but they did not form villages, each family being surrounded by its own fields.

The most repeated complaint about housing in suburb (*imidugudu*) was the small size. “It is common to have mature sons and daughters sharing a bed let alone one room” commented a head of household in Cyangugu. People complained about a complete lack of privacy and peace in the *imidugudu* settlement for people mostly from rural areas. The lack of land for farming was strongly mentioned by poor people in Butare and Cyangugu suburbs as they were forced to move kilometres away to access land for cultivation.

Plate 5.3. Houses built under the Rwandan housing scheme known as *Imidugudu*



Source: Irin, 2004. <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=51581>

Indeed, these houses were built on sites chosen by the government. Designs also came from the government and NGOs and people used to live in properties where fences were uncomfortably settled at the same site with houses without fences, with few and tiny rooms to shelter them.

Finally, another negative aspect of the housing process mentioned by leaders and heads of households in both areas was its affect on the environment. Large areas of forests were simply destroyed for settling households.

5.3.3. Services and facilities

In Cyangugu, all schools, hospitals, health centres, water and electricity supplies and other facilities were destroyed during the genocide (Plate 5.5). After the genocide, most of them were rehabilitated and new facilities were rebuilt especially schools and churches. Four new secondary schools, a kindergarten and an Anglican church were built. In Butare for instance, facilities were mainly looted. Equipment was stolen from hospitals, schools, water and electricity supply departments. Few were completely destroyed as in Cyangugu. However, the rehabilitation was not enough. Towns experienced lack of personnel as teachers and doctors died or fled. Thus, three quarters of secondary school teachers in Cyangugu and Butare were Congolese. The reason is that, the period between 1994 and 1996 called the 'Emergency Phase', foreign NGOs went back and there was no person qualified to replace them. The following still helped within the health care sector in Cyangugu: MIMISA, Care International and MSF Belgium.

However, new facilities had negative effects on the environment. Forests were destroyed in some areas to create new facilities, and this led to soil erosion (Plate 5.4). For as the Butare and Cyangugu case studies are concerned, interviews and observation showed that the small natural forest and woodlands decreased considerably after the genocide. Causes highlighted were: resettlement, fuel purposes, commercial purposes, and construction. As also reported above, the main construction material after the genocide was wood. Timber and other wood products for construction for buying /selling contributed to deforestation in the whole country. Butare and Cyangugu areas included. Similarly, as the main sources of fuel were and remain wood and coal, deforestation has been aggravated by households seeking sources of energy.

Plate 5.4: Deforestation in Gatovu Cell in Cyangugu



This is a training school built by Jesuits to provide craft skills to people who could not complete secondary school.

Photo: The author, 2006

Plate 5.5: Infrastructure destroyed in Cyangugu during the genocide.



Source: The author, 2006

5.3.3.1. Availability and distances to services and facilities before and after the genocide.

The majority of households (67%) declared that distance to services and facilities have increased against 28% who found that distance to services decreased. Few households (5%) reported distance to services changing. All of this depended on the background of each household and the type of facility. For instance, distance to water, market, bus station and internet-café decreased for households that came from rural areas but distance to land for cultivation increased. Table.5.21 shows how distance to fetch water from less than 1km shifted from 66% of households to 71%, market from 11% to 34%, bus station from 9% to 25% but land for cultivation from 56% to 29% and the internet from 8% to 26% of households. The problem of long distances travelled by households

was most remarkable in the Musange Sector of Butare which has many migrants from the rural area of Nyaruguru.

Table 5.21: Increase or decrease of distance to services after the genocide (n=100)

	Frequency	Percent
Increase	67	67.0
Decrease	28	28.0
Same distance	5	5.0
Total	100	100.0

Nevertheless, short distances to services and facilities after the genocide did not always mean effective availability of those services. As Tables 5.22 and 5.23 indicate, the availability of water decreased from 67% before the genocide to 64% after the genocide. However, the quantity of water decreased remarkably and the cost increased for reasons to be explained later. Similarly, the lack of financial means did not allow people to benefit from the stadium and other facilities which seemed to be closer than before the genocide. New facilities which appeared in the Cells in which the survey was conducted are the internet, a new means of communication which did not exist in Rwanda before the genocide and new places of worship for religious sects which flourished everywhere just after the genocide.

Table 5.22: Availability of services and facilities before 1994 (n=100)

	Frequency	Percent
Water	67	67.0
Market	8	8.0
Stadium	5	5.0
Land for cultivation	5	5.0
District office	8	8.0
Primary school	7	7.0
Total	100	100.0

Table 5.23: Services and facilities after 1994 (n=100)

	Frequency	Percent
Water	64	64.0
Market	8	8.0
Stadium	10	10.0
District office	6	6.0
Primary school	4	4.0
Place of worship	3	3.0
Tel-internet	5	5.0
Total	100	100.0

5.3.3.2. Means of transport before and after the genocide

The common mode of transport for households before and after the genocide was the taxi-bus which decreased slightly from 70% to 68% (Table 5.24). There has also been an increase in the use of the taxi-motobicycle from 21% of users to 32% and the taxi-bicycle from 12% to 14% because both means of transport are cheaper. Car owners decreased from 36% to 29% as income decreased for the majority of households. The number of households who walk has, however, remained high before and after the genocide and are almost the same 73% and 69%, respectively. This was attributed to poverty and lack of income generating activities before and after the genocide (Table 5.24).

Table 5.24: Transport before and after the genocide (n=100) (Multiple responses)

	Before 1994 (%)	After 1994 (%)
Bus	70	68
Motobicycle	21	32
Bicycle	12	14
Car owner	36	29
Walk	73	69

5.3.4. Means of information before and after the genocide

According to Table 5.25, twenty-seven percent and twenty-four percent of respondents, respectively, before and after the genocide declared not having access to any of the three mass media channels investigated: radio, TV and newspapers/magazine. However, the majority of households had radio before the genocide (74%) and after (61%). TV owners increased from 9% before the genocide to 26% after the genocide. Newspaper subscriptions decreased as the number of newspapers decreased after the genocide. Suburban residents have poorer media means than downtown residents. It was found that TV and newspapers were means of information for mainly intellectuals and people living in downtown households. Their accessibility is very low in the suburbs.

Table 5.25: Means of information before and after the genocide (n=100) (Multiple responses)

	Before 1994	After 1994
Radio	74	61
TV	9	26
Newspapers	17	4
None	27	24

It can be mentioned that the chief means of information, the radio –television have been owned and controlled by the State until recently. Since the genocide, private radio and television stations have sprung up but have little impact on the people (Table 5.25). Radio was used as a propaganda tool before and during the genocide and has been the main source of information before and after the genocide. Due to the poor education status of most respondents, information obtained from the radio was and is still taken as the truth. It is still common to hear people stating “it is true; we heard it from the radio”.

5.3.5. Means of telecommunication before and after the genocide


The main means of communication before the genocide was post-mail (57%) and telephone land line (53%). Post-mail was and still is (43%) the common means of communication of poor households in the suburbs of both Butare and Cyangugu towns whereas land-line telephones have been used by downtown households. However, cell phones and internet which appeared in Rwanda after 1994 are used by the majority of households in downtown areas as well in suburban households. Another 62% of the

respondents have at least a member who has a cell phone mainly for personal calls and SMS. In contrast, according to RWANDATEL service in Cyangugu the number of land line subscribers has decreased after the genocide and has never reached the pre-genocide level until 2005 (Figure 5.2). In this matter, figures were not available in Butare as documents were either destroyed or looted in 1994.

Table 5.26: Means of communication before and after the genocide (N=100) (Multiple responses)

	Before 1994 (Percent)	After 1994 (Percent)
Telephone land line	53	37
Cell phone	-	62
Internet	-	41
Post-mail	52	43

Figure 5.2: Landline telephone subscribers in Cyangugu town between 1993 and 2005



Source: Rwandatel-Cyangugu (2006)

5.3.6. Sanitation before and after the genocide

Sanitation is a prerequisite for sustainable economic and social progress and contributes to a better quality of life in a country. Regarding sanitation in the case studies in both Cells, it was found that all households interviewed had sanitation either inside (36% before the genocide and 32% after the genocide, or outside the main house (64% before the genocide and 68% after the genocide) (Table 5.27). Only households with access to water had sanitation inside. Sanitation outside often consisted of simple pit latrines which also served as a bathroom for the households. In both Butare and Cyangugu, even

in the whole country a large campaign for good sanitation had been made already before the genocide. This was not a big concern for households.

Table 5.27: Kind of sanitation available for household before and after 1994 (n=100)

Before	Frequency	Percent
Inside the house	36	36.0
Outside	64	64.0
Total	100	100.0
After		Percent
Inside the house	32	32.0
Outside	68	68.0
Total	100	100.0

5.3.7. Services and facilities most desired to improve quality of life

Table 5.28 highlights needs of households to improve the quality of life. Water and electricity scored relatively high 64% and 22%, respectively. Electricity supply (64%), land for cultivation (28%) and water supply (22%) were services most needed by households. Then came health centres (6%), places of worship (6%) and telephone-internet (5%). Water is a big problem for households as they have to buy this commodity or to fetch it when it becomes more and more scarce. The whole country faced a shortage of electricity after the genocide for two demographic and environmental reasons. First, the population in towns increased considerably and demand surpassed supply. Second, the level of water of hydroelectric power dams on Ntaruka River, in the North of the country, decreased due to drought and agricultural irrigation. This affected the country where, in Butare for instance, households have on average of three hours electricity and water connection per day. Cyangugu town is still the only exception to provide power and water because of its position near the DR Congo which has a hydroelectric dam on the Rusizi River between the two countries.

By and large, land was the most needed by households especially in suburbs. Households in Musange Cell in Butare that moved from rural areas for security reasons were looking forward to peace and stability in their former settlement to go back for agriculture and livestock. On the other hand, electricity, internet and telephone were needed by urban households. This information was confirmed by leaders at all levels.

Table 5.28: Service most needed by households (N=100) (Multiple responses)

	Frequency	Percent
Water	22	22
Health centre	6	6
Land	28	28
Place of worship	6	6
Tel-internet	5	5
Electricity	64	64

5.3.7. Energy

Concerning the major combustibles used for cooking and lighting, it emerged that after the genocide, most households in Butare and Cyangugu towns use wood or wood coal (75%) and paraffin (82%). Fifteen percent prefer to use electricity and only two households thatch and gas (Table 5.29). In Cyangugu, the average fuel expenses by households per month increased from 3.410 Rwandan Franc (RWFR) before the genocide to 14.400 RWFR after the genocide that is four times as much. There was not much difference between downtown settlers and suburbs. In Butare town, household expenses on fuel for cooking was 2.348 RWFR before the genocide and 7.800 RWFR after in downtown areas and 74 RWFR before the genocide against 300 Rwfr after the genocide for settlers in suburbs.

Table 5.29: Fuel the most preferred by households (n=100) (Multiple responses)

	Frequency	Percent
Wood and wood coal	75	75
Paraffin	82	82
Electricity	15	15
Gas	1	1
Thatch	1	1

5.3.7.1. Fuel/power for cooking before and after the genocide.

Although households used wood and/or coal before the genocide, the accessibility to wood decreased after the genocide from 84% to 67% but coal increased from 28% to 49%. Wood became scarce and expensive because of the government's environmental policy to protect forests from destruction by people using firewood and timber for cooking and building. Coal consumption is difficult to control by the government. The two latter sources of fuel are cheaper than other combustibles and it is accessible everywhere. Electricity is too expensive for people with low incomes and it became rare for people in the town, especially in Butare town. There is another type of fuel for cooking consisting of all kinds of dry thatch or crop residues (dry banana leaves, vegetation waste,) used by the poorest in the Cells. Table 5.30 clearly indicates the increase in coal use and the decreased use of wood and electricity for cooking purposes. There is a dilemma about sources of fuel in the country. On the one hand, the government discourages wood and coal consumption for households and on the other hand there are no alternative sources of fuel available for cooking.

Table 5.30: Source of fuel/ power for cooking before and after the genocide (N=100) (Multiple responses)

	Before 1994	After 1994
Wood	84	67
Coal	28	49
Electricity	12	9
Gas	9	-
Thatch	7	11

5.3.7.2. Fuel for lighting before and after the genocide

Multiple sources of fuel used for lighting included electricity, paraffin, wood, thatch and candles. Owing to poverty, 68% of households could not afford electricity for lighting after the genocide. Regarding the electricity supply, a great effort is still to be made in this area as households were supplied only a few hours per day. Compared to Butare, Cyangugu town has a better supply of electricity.

After the genocide, most of the households (75%) used paraffin and candles (41%). This use of candles and paraffin had significantly increased. Few people (45%) used paraffin before compared to those after especially because electricity became rare. Also the use of candles increased from 26% before the genocide to 41% after the genocide. The decrease of wood and thatch consumption was a result of the government policy to protect the environment. Other sources represented by 4% before and 7% after the genocide are cow-dung used in some suburban households and a range of gadgets using batteries (Table 5.31).

In Cyangugu town, the average lighting fuel expenses increased from 2.462 Rwandan Francs per month/household before the genocide to 9.780 RWFR after the genocide, which is about 4 times. In Butare Town lighting expenses rose from 1.780RWFR before the genocide in downtown households to 6.300 RWFR and from 47RWFR to 370 RWFR in the suburban households.

Table 5.31: Source of fuel for lighting before and after the genocide (n = 100) (Multiple responses)

	Before 1994	After 1994
Wood	29	14
Paraffin	45	75
Electricity	36	22
Candles	26	41
Thatch	17	13
Other (cow dung, batteries)	4	7

Asked how they coped with the problem of energy, leaders relied on the *Electrogaz* plans to produce electricity from the methane gas of Lake Kivu with a capacity of between 200 to 700MW. There was also a plan for building another hydroelectric dam on the Nyangabo River to be shared by Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. With regard to services and facilities, the most wanted was water, electricity and health centres in both Butare and Cyangugu especially in Butare. The main problem of water and electricity supply is both technical and demographic. The population of towns grew faster than the provision of services.

5.3.8. Other things purchased by households

Although the majority of households buy everything, answers to this item could be biased because some poor households expected from all interviews a way of asking for material help. That seems to be the reason for the majority of heads of households (87%) stating that they preferred to buy everything. Most of households sampled have vegetable gardens; therefore they do not buy everything. The majority of households, 78% interviewed, said that they purchased everything after the genocide. Some small home-based industries such as brewing of banana wine and sorghum beer no longer exist. Households from rural areas suffer the most from this situation. However, 22% of households do not buy everything and this proportion decreased after the genocide. Products not purchased included crops which are grown by some households around the house or outside the town where they rent plots. There is also meat from chickens, goats, eggs as well as liquor brewed by households (Table 5.32).

Table 5.32: Things purchased by household after 1994 (n=100)

	Frequency	Percent
All items	87	87.0
Some items	13	13.0
Total	100	100.0

5.3.9. Health

Health services deteriorated considerably in Rwanda after the genocide. Health infrastructures was rehabilitated or new ones built by the public and private sector. However, these facilities did not benefit households due to poverty and affordability of services and the lack of qualified personnel. The average life expectancy which was 53.1 years in 1991 (Prunier, 1995) dropped to 49 years in 2002 (MINECOFIN, 2002).

5.3.9.1. Health facilities before and after the genocide

The death of qualified personnel and the migration of health personnel, especially nurses and doctors to Europe and other first world countries in search of better pay and improved working conditions crippled the government's ability to provide public health care to the population. In addition, most of the health facilities destroyed in 1994 have been rehabilitated. Sixty-four percent of households reported having a clinic which, however, decreased (83%) compared to the situation before 1994. The number of health centres and dispensaries increased slightly from 13% to 14% and from 3% to 4% respectively but households who go to traditional healers increased from 1% before the genocide to 9%. Indeed, due to poverty, people started using traditional health services and private pharmacies (7%) (Table 5.33). Medicinal plants such as the ' Morhinga Oleifera tree' known for their efficiency in healing (Plate 5.6) were grown in both towns of Butare and Cyangugu.

Table 5.33: Availability of health services and facilities before 1994 (n=100) Multiple responses.

	<u>Before</u> Percent	<u>After</u> Percent
Clinics	83.0	64.0
Health centre	13.0	14.0
Dispensary	3.0	6.0
Traditional healers	1.0	9.0
Pharmacies	1.0	7.0
Total		100.0

Poor health problems, an inefficient health system in the country and other social linked problems were also frequently mentioned: "Because of poverty, our children can no longer go beyond the primary school education level and we can no longer afford medicine for malaria" claimed one head of household in Butare.

longer go beyond the primary school education level and we can no longer afford medicine for malaria” claimed one head of household in Butare.

Plate 5.6: *Moringa Oleifera* tree



Source: The author, 2005

5.3.9.2. Distance, time and cost of health services before and after the genocide

The distance and time to health services decreased as health facilities were first rehabilitated in towns just after the genocide. For example, 25% of households travelled less than 20 minutes by walking to reach health facilities before the genocide against 40% of households after the genocide. Distance to services and facilities decreased for all people who migrated from rural areas. However, the quality of services decreased and the cost as well.

Small private health facilities (health centres and dispensaries) are more accessible within the 4 Cells sampled. People who need to go to the hospital or clinic average between 20 minutes to more than 2 hours, depending on the means used and the distance from households. After the genocide, many poor households seldom go to private hospitals e.g. Gihundwe Hospital in Cyangugu and Hopital Universitaire in Butare. For minor medical matters, most people seek medical services in private pharmacies without

towns because most of them do not advertise and they are not recognised by the government. People interviewed said they visited traditional healers because they are cheaper than modern doctors. This information was confirmed by a survey of the Master Plan of the Health Development of Cyangugu: "Poverty (50%), high cost (19%) and lack of finances (18%) are three main obstacles for people to have access to health facilities" (PSDSC, 2004:60). Thus, it was found that people suffered more from financial accessibility than geographical affordability and accessibility.

Table 5.34: Time to health services and facilities before and after 1994 (n=100)


	Percent Before	Percent After
-20 minutes	25.0	40.0
20-40 minutes	15.0	9.0
40-60 minutes	20.0	19.0
60-80 minutes	9.0	7.0
80-100 minutes	3.0	4.0
100-120 minutes	9.0	11.0
> 120 minutes	19.0	10.0
Total	100.0	100.0

5.3.9.3. Diseases before and after the genocide

Information for this section was collected from households, leaders, public and private institutions. Figure 5.3 shows that the number of diseases is increasing from year to year, except between 2000 and 2001. The main causes are poverty and poor environmental management. In 2000 and 2001 households had good harvests, according to leaders. As heads of households mentioned, the most common diseases in both towns are malaria, respiratory diseases, worms, diarrhoea, typhoid, pneumonia, skin diseases and HIV/AIDS (Table 5.35). Many diseases are opportunistic infections due to

people were uncomfortable saying whether they knew people in their Cell who were infected with HIV, as there is a strong taboo about discussing the issue. Many diseases are caused by poor environmental situations such as open refuse, inadequate pit latrines and inadequate water. Skin diseases, upper respiratory tract infections, and pneumonia were caused by dust and poor air quality both inside and outside the home as many houses in the suburbs areas have either small or no windows. A new problem of sterility was reported after the genocide. More and more couples got married but spent 3 to 4 years without children or are still waiting to have children. This probably can be attributed to the unbalanced mental health due to genocide (mental trauma).

Figure 5.3: Patients at Gihundwe Health Centre between 1999 and 2004



Source: Gihundwe Health Centre statistics, 2005

Table 5.35: Diseases before and after the genocide (n=100) (Multiples responses)

	Before	After
Malaria	73	96
Worms	45	44
Influenza	27	46
Typhoid	-	10
Other diseases	34	82

Interviews with leaders confirmed data from households and they insisted on concerns about the high rate of malaria, typhoid, HIV/AIDS, respiratory diseases and cases of sterility. Asked about alternative solutions, leaders were encouraging people to subscribe to health insurance.

Malaria has now become evident at high altitude such as Cyangugu and other areas where previously the disease was not a public health issue. Most leaders reported that after the genocide, malaria posed a significant problem with serious consequences for much of the population. Apart from Cells interviewed, statistics show that it is the leading cause of morbidity and mortality in the country. The disease was the most dangerous disease for children under the age five with 40% of deaths. (Kamugisha, 2005:3).

Malaria has expanded as the population movement has spread malaria to new regions and also resistance to Chloroquine (previously the most common malaria drug) has been observed. Leaders revealed that poverty associated with poor management of the environment is another cause of the spread of malaria. Fluid and solid waste from households, and public facilities (markets, schools, prisons) were described as the breeding ground of mosquitoes, worms and typhoid. This information was confirmed by the report of the health Master Plan of Cyangugu 2006-2009 in which poverty has been identified to be the main cause of poor health in the Province, instead of lack of hospitals (PSDSC, 2004).

Typhoid in Cyangugu town and HIV/AIDS in both Butare and Cyangugu were reported to have intensified after the genocide. Typhoid which affected households regularly in Cyangugu was mainly brought by refugees who fled to the Congo in 1994. HIV/AIDS intensified due to rape during the genocide. Leaders attributed the increase of HIV/AIDS to the return of people from refugee camps and also to poverty in the country which led women to prostitution. A major consequence of the mass rapes and forced displacements perpetrated during the genocide was the dramatic spread of HIV/AIDS (11% in 2004, 1.3% in 1990) (Madre, 2004). Although no household interviewed declared having a member suffering from HIV/AIDS, the majority of leaders reported there were many cases in Butare as well as in Cyangugu. There was still a stigma regarding HIV/AIDS in the country.

As measures of preventing HIV/AIDS, people especially couples, were encouraged to go for voluntary Counseling and Testing (VCT) and measures had been taken to prevent the spread of the disease. For instance an HIV negative certificate was compulsory for couples before any religious or civil marriage.

People were encouraged to obtain health insurance. This was recently introduced in the country as the cheapest solution for the poor to obtain medical care. Health services were insufficient to deal with the high population. Public hospitals had to offer most of the services to people who were not in an economic position to pay. The population who could afford medical aid and preferred to go to private pharmacies. Health institutions often did not have enough qualified personnel because many nurses and doctors either died or fled the country. Some fled because of the genocide and others due to non-competitive salaries. The poor quality of water was also mentioned as a big problem for households. Water is not as pure as before 1994 because of old infrastructure (material) and lack of treatment. The high rate of malaria and respiratory diseases were attributed to hard conditions encountered during the genocide, especially life in the bush and equatorial forest wetlands in DRC for many months and even years in some cases.

Concerning facilities urgently used by people in case of illness, health centres came first followed by private pharmacies and then places of prayer and traditional healers.

Data obtained from Gihundwe Health Centre and the NGO "PSDSC" confirmed the information above from households and leaders. Diseases registered by the Centre were ranked as follows: (i) Malaria ; (ii) Respiratory diseases; (iii) Intestinal parasites and diaorrhea; (iv) Skin diseases; (v) Physical trauma (wounds and bruises); (vi) Gynecology diseases (vii) HIV/AIDS (Gihundwe Health Centre Stastics, 2005). The survey by PSDSC in 2004 stated that at District level: "Every household registered at least 5 cases of malaria" (PSDSC, 2004:62).

5.3.9.4. Illness before and after the genocide


The most common illnesses identified were: trauma, skin diseases, headaches, backaches, diarrhoea and vomiting, influenza, asthma and wounds (Table 5.36). For these illnesses, people often go to traditional doctors or try some well known traditional medicine available in the area. Before and after the genocide, if someone was sick, it was usually that person's relatives or neighbours who provided assistance, brought them food or prayed for them. Leaders often mentioned many cases of trauma especially among children, women and youth and sterility among couples was revealed as a new disease. The post trauma syndrome disease due to the genocide was the most frequent trouble reported. These troubles were often related to mourning during the commemoration of the genocide in April every year and others are visible during meetings such as Gacaca jurisdictions. Leaders were also concerned about the high rate of sterile couples in their areas after 1994. This was attributed to mental disorder due to the genocide.

Table 5.36: Illness before and after the genocide (n = 100) (Multiple responses)

	Before	After
Headache	62	71
Vomiting	26	4
Diarrhoea	36	77
Trauma	-	35
Other	14	

From Figure 5.4 it is clear that there was a change in illness patterns. Ninety-four percent of households reported a change in illness patterns and there were several new illnesses in both towns with same particularities. The majority of households declared a new kind of illness after 1994 especially, mental trauma (77%), frequent headaches (71%) and other illnesses such as poison which killed many people in Cyangugu town.

Figure 5.4. Change in illness patterns



The psycho-social and medical programme of AVEGA Association (2004:16-18) in Cyangugu reported all kinds of mental troubles they received after the genocide: the post traumatic syndrome disease, family problems, rape and AIDS cases, depressive troubles, chronic headache, insomnia, sorrow and other psychiatric problems (Table 5.37). The increase of poor mental health was also confirmed by the Pan African News Agency Report which stated in April 2004 that: “Rwanda is experiencing a dramatic increase in mental disorders as a result of the 1994 genocide, particularly among orphans and widows” (UK Home Office, 2004). The increase of poisoning was due according to households to jealousy among neighbors and also people who want to eliminate witnesses of genocide perpetrators while the traditional court *Gacaca* is taking place.

To sum up, the towns of Butare and Cyangugu recorded destruction from the genocide with regard to infrastructure. Services and facilities that were needed by households were water, electricity and health centres with qualified personnel in both Butare and

Cyangugu. The main problem of water and electricity supply was technical, environmental and demographic. The population of towns grew but facilities did not and this has resulted in water and energy shortages.

Table 5.37: Troubles reported to AVEGA trauma counsellor in Cyangugu(2003 -2004)

2003		2004	
Troubles	Number of clients	Troubles	Frequency
PTSD	18	PSTD	37
Sadness	400	Sadness	24
Depression	13	Depression	23
Psychiatric problems	44	Psychiatric problems	17
Family problems	17	Family problems	12
Rape and HIV	49	Rape and HIV-AIDS	26
AIDS AND HIV	15	Education problems	4
Rape	30		
Anxiety	3		
Total	589		143

Source: Avega-Agahozo Region Sud: Rapport 2003 and 2004. (Association of Widows).

5.4. IMPACT OF THE GENOCIDE ON STRUCTURES

The structure is characterised by the organisational aspects of a culture consisting of the domestic economy and political economy (Murphy, 2001). This encompasses the system and relationships in which the society is organised.

Structures of Rwandan society profoundly deteriorated due to the loss of family members through violent death, rape, disease, hunger, loss of dignity, loss of property, loss of land, internal and external migrations, imprisonment and betrayal during and after the genocide.

5.4.1. Household losses during the genocide

5.4.1.1. Household deaths

From a social and psychological point of view, the most outstanding effect of the genocide was the loss of life. From the 100 households in the sample, two out of three had lost one or more members during the genocide (Table 5.38), 53 households (53%) lost 4 or more members. A considerable proportion of respondents reported the loss of at

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From a social and psychological point of view, the most outstanding effect of the genocide was the loss of life. From the 100 households in the sample, two out of three had lost one or more members during the genocide (Table 5.38), 53 households (53%) lost 4 or more members. A considerable proportion of respondents reported the loss of at least one member of their immediate family as a result of the genocide. The presence of mass graves in the areas confirmed reports (Plate 5.7; Plate 5.8; 5.9).

The majority of households (74%) (Table 5.38) lost members of their household during the genocide. The average number of persons lost was 3 members. One to three members were lost in 21% of households and this was followed by the loss of 4-6 members in 20% of households. Twenty-six percent of households did not lose any members. However, on the other end of the spectrum was the loss of more than nine members by some households (17%). Loss of members of families left survivors traumatised as one member of household sadly reported, “after the genocide, you walk like you are alive but you are already dead inside.”

Plate 5.7. Massgrave site in Cyangugu town



Source: The author, 2006

Table 5.38: People who died during the genocide (n=74)

	Frequency
None	26
1-3	21
4-6	20
7-9	16
+9	17
Total	100

5.4.1.2. Households' injuries during the genocide

Table 5.39 shows cases of injuries suffered by persons in households. As genocide was well planned by the government at a high level, killers were organised, well armed with all kinds of weapons and the victims defenceless. Thus, 53% of households had serious injuries among members with the majority (45%) having two to four persons being injured. Five percent had between 4 and 6 persons and three percent of households had more than nine persons injured. According to other studies (ONAPO, 2002), Butare Province (12%) where the sampled households were drawn had the highest proportion in the country of people with genocide-related physical injuries.

Table 5.39: People who are still alive but injured (n=53)

	Frequency	Percent
1-3	45.0	45.0
4-6	5.0	5.0
+9	3.0	3.0
Total	53	53

5.4.1.3. Types of injuries during the genocide

The type of injuries that were sustained ranged from cuts and bruises (100%) to head injuries (53%), loss of limbs (33%), loss of arms (16%) and body injuries (6%) (Table 5.40). In addition, multiple rapes and mutilations have left many survivors with various kinds of physical injuries, difficult to treat. Most of these injuries are treatable in the

country but for others, physical surgery can only be accessed abroad for fortunate people. According to people interviewed, head injuries and cuts and bruises predominated because killers were mainly trained to kill by cutting parts of the body, especially the heads of victims.

One victim of a head injury in Cyangugu town commented:

“ they hit me on the head with a machete. I fell down unconscious and do not know when they mutilated me, but when I woke up I had four machete scars on my head.”

Table 5.40: Types of injuries (n=63) (Multiple responses)

	Frequency	Percent
Cuts and bruises	63	100
Head injuries	34	53
Loss of an arm	10	16
Loss of a limb	21	33
Body injuries	4	6

5.4.2. Migration and mobility

During and after the genocide, killings were accompanied by unprecedented migration inside and outside the country. This situation destroyed Rwanda's socio-cultural and economic foundation and the environment.

5.4.2.1. Number of persons who left the country from households during the genocide

The majority of households (49%) declared not having relatives abroad: twenty-six percent of households have 1-3 members in other countries, and twenty percent have between 4 and 6 and five percent reported between seven and nine. The average number of persons who left households was calculated to be two. Descriptive statistics show a mean of 1.8300 and a standard deviation of .9646 (Table 5.41). The standard deviation indicates that values are close to the mean. Therefore the average number of persons who left households is rather consistent.

The results for this item as shown on Table 5.41 are probably biased due to political reasons. This is because some members of households living abroad are either still hiding for crimes they committed during the genocide or are members of rebels at the borders with the DRC and Burundi. Heads of households were therefore afraid to declare their relatives living in other countries and preferred to declare them dead.

Table 5.41: Members who left the country from households during the genocide (n=100)

	Frequency	Percent	Mean	Std Deviation
none	49	49.0	1.8300	.9646
1-3	26	26.0		
4-6	20	20.0		
7-9	5	5.0		
Total	100	100		

5.4.2.2. Effects of migrations on families

The main effects of migration on families reported have been poverty (39%), loneliness and fear for members who stayed in the country (13%). Most of the people who fled far away were basically educated or had financial means to do so. Therefore, households lost sources of income for families. Other negative effects (48%) signaled were members who came back from exile with diseases mainly HIV-AIDS from refugee camps, typhoid and other physical and psychological illnesses (Table 5.42). Although those diseases and illnesses existed, the number of cases increased after the genocide.

Table 5.42: Migration effects on family (n=100)

	Frequency	Percent
Valid Poverty	39	39.0
Loneliness	13	13.0
Other (fear..)	48	48.0
Total	100	100.0

5.4.2.3. Proportion of households who lived in the area before and after the genocide

By and large, households are new in the Cells (76%) whereas only 24% of households sampled lived in the same area before and after the genocide (Table 5.43). These households who stayed at the same place before and after the genocide are basically from the Hutu ethnic group who were not targeted by killers during the genocide. However, few people from the Tutsi ethnic group remained in the same place before and after for the reasons given by one head of household,

“ Although I lost everybody here, this town (Butare) remains my home and the soil of my ancestors”.

Table 5.43: Proportion of households who lived in the area before or after the genocide (n=100).

	Frequency	Percent
Before the genocide	24	24.0
After the genocide	76	76.0
Total	100	100.0

Many houses were destroyed during the genocide. This forced people to migrate, to or from other provinces (20%) and rural areas to towns (16%). Similarly, the majority of people from exile (40%) preferred settling in towns just after the genocide because of access to facilities and for security purposes. People from rural areas especially rare Tutsi survivors moved to urban areas for security reasons but also because rehabilitation schemes after the genocide started there mainly in Kigali and other towns across the country. This explains the high number of Tutsi ethnic affiliations in the sampled population.

Table 5.44: Place of residence before the genocide (n= 100).

Place	Frequency
Same area	24
Another Province	20
Rural area	16
From exile	40
Total	100

5.4.2.4. Movement to another place if given opportunity

The majority of household heads (64%) expressed their wish to emigrate to inside (45%) or outside of the country (19%), basically for employment and educational reasons. Traumatized by the genocide they imagine other countries better. The majority amongst this group wished to go back to their previous settlement inside the country (25%) and others elsewhere in the country where they could get higher incomes (20%) (Table 5.45). This is the case of the Cell of Musange in Butare town living from agriculture, where almost all members wanted to go back to the Nyaruguru District where they were before the genocide. Also former refugees returning from neighbouring countries wanted to go back for employment and security reasons to these countries. Thirty-six percent of households did not want to move. Other reasons for moving were not expressed by households, such as the fear for presumed perpetrators of genocide afraid of traditional courts which are currently judging all people suspected of genocide. "Whoever killed or betrayed could not escape the *Gacaca* traditional courts" commented one head of household.

Table 5.45: Moving inside or outside the country if opportunity given (n=64)

	Frequency	Percent
Previous settlement inside the country	25	39.0
Elsewhere in the country	20	31.0
Outside the country	19	30.0
Do not move	36	56.0
Total	100	100.0

5.4.2.5. Socialising with neighbours before and after the genocide

After the genocide, 16% of households did not socialize at all with neighbours. Former close social relations (100% before the genocide) became weak for reasons given above.

For 84% of households, socialising was often very superficial according to leaders interviewed (Table 5.46).

Table 5.46: Socialising with neighbours after the genocide (n = 100)

	Frequency
Yes	84
No	16
Total	100

People stopped socializing or socialize superficially for several reasons, for example: shock, being traumatized and upset by killings and massacres committed by close neighbours (95%); were still suspicious of neighbours who were unknown within the new resettlement (75%). Other reasons were that households found it hard to build new relationships in new residential environments (53%) or they were afraid that the genocide would start again (69%) (Table 5.47).

Table 5.47: Reasons for not socialising after the genocide (N=16) (Multiples responses).

Reasons	Percent
Massacre by close neighbours	95
Suspicion	75
Safer to be individualistic	53
New location (do not know neighbours)	53
Hard to built new relationship	50
Afraid of new killings	69

Table 5.48 shows circumstances for socialising which did not change very much before and after the genocide, except for weddings and worshipping. The main circumstances for socialising were funerals/mourning (76% before and 73% after), weddings (96% before against 31% after) and bars and pubs (66% against 59%). Weddings become

more and more a matter of close family members. Places of worship became an important opportunity for socialising within congregations after the genocide (34%). This was because many religions were promoting unity and reconciliation among believers. Birthday parties were reported by very few households from downtown as an occasion for socialising.

Table 5.48: Circumstances for socialising before and after the genocide) (N=84) (Multiple responses).

Circumstances	Before (%)	After (%)
Weddings	96	31
Funerals/mourning	76	73
Bars and pubs	66	59
Worshipping	10	34

5.4.2.6. Socio-political relationships of households

Relationships which were basically very good before the genocide are at present good (50%), satisfactory (27%) and 23% very good according to households (Table 5.49). However, relationships are still characterised by suspicion. It was reported for example that young orphans do not socialise with children whose parents are in prison for participating in the genocide.

Table 5.49: Socio-political relationship after the genocide (n = 100)

	Frequency	Percent
Very good	23	23.0
Good	50	50.0
Satisfactory	27	27.0
Total	100	100.0

Before 1994 there were very few problems with neighbours. There was respect for elders from any ethnic group and the children's education was the task of each member of the Cell. The communities knew those people who could be trusted. People trusted their neighbours and the people they did business with

After the genocide, everything changed. The neighbourhood changed. People, especially in downtown areas do not even know their close neighbours because of different backgrounds. In Cyangugu town for example, only a quarter was in the town before and after the genocide. Because of the problems of daily life, people are too busy to visit or to be visited. People became too individualistic declared all leaders interviewed. Social inequalities were also mentioned as a source of poor relationship quality within the Cells. As one proverb was cited:

“ arms with different lengths cannot greet each other” (amaboko atareshya ntahoberana).

However, many young people had a different perspective and feel their relationship with neighbours is positive. Concerning people of other ethnic groups, the youth had fewer prejudices and feel they were well integrated with each other. Young people agreed that social relationships between the Hutu and the Tutsis ethnic groups have improved considerably as one young man explained:

“ At this time we find ourselves together during festivities and other occasions, speak to one another, carry the sick one for others as it was before the genocide”.

Most young people agreed for example that they were free to marry anyone they wanted even if it was a person from a different ethnic group. This was a good sign for the country's future reconciliation.

To manage socio-political relationships, formal and informal, means were reported at all administrative unit levels. At a District level, the administration encompassed the Mayor, the District Counsel (Njyanama); delegates from Sectors; the District executive Committee; the Mayor and 4 Secretaries (Economic issues, Youth and sport, social issues and Gender). At Sector level there was a Coordinator, a Secretary and other members in charge of security, development, education, social relationships, finances, youth and sport, gender and culture. Cells had the same organisation as Sectors. Other

means reported to reinforce relationship were the *Gacaca*, the community service (*Umuganda*) and new elected “mediators” in the reconciliation process called *Abunzi*. Relationships were characterised by suspicion. However, the most important quality in the leadership reported by many was the sensitivity to people’s problems.

5.4.2.7. Economic relationships

The economic relationships were good in general and better in Cyangugu town compared to Butare. The Kamembe District business Centre in Cyangugu town has been famous for commercial activities due to its position near the D.R.Congo and Burundi. However, the continuing tension and conflict in the Congo and Rwanda linked inextricably through cross-border insurgencies, cross-border ethnic linkages and especially cross-border economic ties destroyed economic activities in the area. Many businessmen had become bankrupt since 1994. In both towns, leaders reported the devaluation of local currency which affects households. The US Dollar which equalled 350 Rwandan Francs was 590 RWF in 2004. In the same way prices increased while salaries did not and this negatively affected the household quality of life. In Butare, economic relationships were not as good as in Cyangugu, it was reported that for some people in the Cells, goods are sold or bought by/from preferably people from the same origins.

Employment was a central issue. After the genocide the problem of employment became acute. Besides the formal sector of the economy, there existed a vast informal sector. A person who did not find a job had to find any possible form of income. In the informal sector of the economy, a person could find almost unlimited possibilities of income, even though this was generally quite low. This informal sector seemed to be a concrete alternative for many people. Economic relationships were improved within associations which took place after the genocide and at places of work.

5.4.3. Sources of leisure/recreation before and after the genocide

Before the genocide people relaxed with sports, prayers, outings, visits upcountry and pubs. The main sources of leisure were relatives visiting (88%) and outings (50%), followed by places of worship (46%), sport (24%) and pubs (3%). After the genocide the main type of leisure according to heads of households, has become prayer and worship. The proportion of people seeking leisure in worship increased up to 60%. Engaging in sport, outings and visiting relatives also showed decreases. This could be interpreted to mean most people prefer non-cost leisure activities. Families became poorer and do not have money to pay for alternative leisure activities like going out to hotels for drinks or just lodging somewhere away from home. In addition people were too dispersed to visit each other frequently. Moreover, even those who did not engage in leisure before the genocide proportionally increased from 3% to 5% (Table 5.50). The findings on leisure are crucial because even after ten years, the community was still battling to survive and did not have the time to engage in leisure activities except for seeking solace in prayer and worship. It would take a long time for this situation to change in both towns of Butare and Cyangugu, even in the whole country. For 2%, watching films was their leisure time after 1994. However, five percent of households had too many problems to allow themselves any leisure activities.

Table 5.50: Sources of leisure before and after the genocide (n=100) (Multiple responses)

	Before	After
Sport	24	14
Outing	50	20
Relative's visiting	88	31
Worship	46	60
Film		2
None	3	5

5.4.4. Conflicts

5.4.4.1. Type of conflicts and tensions with neighbours

Table 5. 51 shows that the main sources of conflict were ethnic conflicts (66%) and land ownership (55%). This was confirmed by leaders interviewed who stressed that ethnicity was the primary stimulus to non-open conflicts between people (Table 5.51; 5.52). There was no trust among families, victims of the genocide on the one hand and perpetrator's shame on the other hand. Relations were still superficial. Ethnic conflicts include mainly tensions between victims of genocide (Tutsi) and perpetrators (Hutu) over traditional courts in progress across the country. Property and land delimitation conflicts were common to both Hutus and Tutsis households. As people lost papers during the genocide, it was easy to grab property by cheating one's neighbour or even one's relatives.

Other sources of conflicts were, according to heads of households, less significant: waste- management (6%), conflicts over water (3%), sewage system (6%), noise, witchcraft and socio-economic inequalities. Waste management and sewage system consist of households who simply let dirty water or deposit solid waste in a neighbour's compound. In the same way, tensions arose between households when rainwater not collected flows straight into lower neighbouring compounds. The issue of land and properties was as strong as before the genocide because of the high density of the population. In addition, this kind of conflict affected not only neighbours but also relatives from the same households. Also when the quantity of water decreased on the Cell's tap, fighting among children sent to fetch water affected households. Other sources (14%) represented various conflicts such as jealousy between neighbours with different income levels or whose children were more educated and others not and the problem of witchcraft (poison). Witchcraft was a big issue in Cyangugu town as people are poisoned, even during weddings and other public celebrations. In suburban areas, households complained about loud noise from music from neighbours during the night especially.

Table 5.51: Source of conflicts (n =100) (Multiple responses)

	Frequency	Percent
Land	50	55
Waste management	6	6
Ethnic conflicts	66	66
Water	3	3
Sewage system	6	6
Other (noise, poison,)	14	14

Table 5.52: Leaders' opinion on type of conflicts and tensions (n = 8) (Multiple responses)

Conflicts and tensions	Frequency	Percent
Ethnic	7	87.5
Land and properties	6	75
Witchcraft (poison)	5	62.5
Waste management	4	40

As nobody complained about bad leadership, one could hope that reconstruction and reconciliation is possible. Commenting about the situation before the genocide, bad leadership was repeatedly pointed out as the cause of all problems as one elder man in Cyangugu said.

“ They (Tutsis) were our friends and good neighbours, but we have been taught propaganda about them by bad leaders and we started discriminating them”.

5.4.4.2. Type of conflicts resolution

Responses from households about conflict resolution procedures (Table 5.53) indicated that households actively participated in decision making with their leaders. The most frequent conflict resolution procedure at Cells level consisted of the *Gacaca* courts (70%) followed by that of Cell leaders to meet parties involved (12%). Only 9% of households resolve their conflict by meeting all Cell members or dealing with only the parties involved (Table 5.53). As relationships were not relaxed yet, people still needed

leaders to intervene in conflict resolution. The main tools for conflict resolution reported by both heads of households and leaders mainly included formal meetings in the Cells with a range of penalties such as money to be paid or services to be provided to the community. Heads of households and leaders unanimously mentioned the “Gacaca” implemented at the whole country level as being the most efficient in conflict resolution.

The Gacaca system is a community-based model of conflict resolution which existed even before the genocide. As defined by Webley (2003), the word “Gacaca” is etymologically derived from the Kinyarwanda word for “lawn” or “grass”. The origins of the Gacaca system as a community-based model of conflict resolution originally used within local Rwandan communities as an informal means of resolving dispute about issues such as land rights, theft, marital issues and to property damage. In their current form, however, although the Gacaca courts still quite literally take place “on the grass” of communities across Rwanda, the Gacaca system currently being implemented in this small country is a combination both of this traditional participatory model and of classical legal precepts. To renew trust and solidarity among Rwandan people, it was held weekly in 10,000 local jurisdictions nationwide. It involved 250,000 popularly elected “judges” as well as the collective participation of all community members as witnesses and as jurors.

Table 5.53: Conflict resolution procedures (n=100) (Multiple responses)

	Frequency	Percent
The Cell's leader meets parties involved	12	12.0
Gacaca courts	70	70.0
All Cell's members meet	9	9.0
Within the parties involved	9	9.0

Table 5.54: Leaders' conflict resolution procedures (n=8) (Multiple responses)

	Frequency	Percent
▪ The Cell's leaders meet parties involved	4	50
▪ Gacaca	8	100
▪ All Cell's members meet	5	62.5
▪ Informal meeting with parties involved	3	37.5

5.4.5. Opinion on categories of people who suffered the most from the genocide

The genocide caused an initial population displacement of 1.7 million Hutus, left 400,000 widows, 500,000 orphans and 130,000 prisoners (Tiemessen, 2005). Particular issues affect vulnerable groups from the tragedy of 1994. The main victims were orphans, women, youth, elders and disabled people mainly from the genocide (Tables 5.55; 5.57).

According to households interviewed, orphans (73%) and widowed (55%) have suffered most from the genocide. Table 5.58 shows also that elders, children and women in general have suffered the impact of the genocide more than anyone in their Cells. Young orphans faced many challenges on a daily basis. A major challenge for many was to find steady employment as many did not go beyond primary school due to poverty. Families who cared for orphans had little social relief or nothing from the government. Some households declared that their orphans were among the most undisciplined at school. For psychological reasons, in addition, orphans were vulnerable in their relationships particularly as it related to HIV/AIDS. In Butare town, it was reported that the majority of people dying from AIDS were orphans. Despite an increase in AIDS awareness among young people, young orphan girls were forced into prostitution to survive. This was attributed to the high level of unemployment and idleness. Also young men have refused to marry, as they found themselves unable to buy or build a house or to take care of a family. They had no self-esteem and some resorted to drugs and alcohol.

Besides orphans, households expressed the suffering of widowed people. Some lost their spouse with all the children. They are psychologically destroyed and pessimistic about their future. Widows often took care of six, ten or more children. Very few re-married after the genocide. As finding a husband remained difficult after the genocide, many were sexually frustrated and prostituted themselves. Worst, among those raped and infected with HIV/AIDS during the genocide, some were impregnated by perpetrators and had their children.

In traditional Rwandan culture, elder people were revered, honored and helped by the youngest. It seemed the opposite was true in both towns. Because of extreme poverty for households, elders in large part were unfortunately seen as a burden to the families and the community as expressed by heads of households. As noted in the size of households, which were basically very large, it was difficult to care for elders who needed particular care. As in all war and conflict which have occurred in the history of mankind, children and women in Rwanda have so far been among the people who suffered most from the impact of the genocide (Table 5.55).

Other people mentioned by a few households (3%) were former young soldiers demobilized, who fought to stop the genocide (some were under 15). Their re-integration into society after the genocide has been difficult. Some refused to go back to school as they spent a lot of time in the guerrilla movement, so it was difficult to reintegrate them into civilian society. Leaders, however, were financially limited in assisting all of those groups due to lack of resources from households and the government.

5.55: Households' opinion on categories of people who suffered the most from the genocide (n=100) (Multiple responses)

	Frequency	Percent
Orphans	73	73
Elders	39	39
Widowed	55	55
Children	26	26
Women	7	7
Other	3	3

5.4.5.1. Orphans

Rwanda became a nation of orphans after the genocide as many parents were killed. Most young families lived without any practical support and love from their mothers and fathers. As stated by heads of households, leaders expressed lots of concern about orphans from the genocide. Some orphans were still homeless either because of the destruction of their parents' home or because of their reluctance to go back to their parents home due to continuing insecurity. Worse, Rwanda has many children as a consequence of rape and some of them are HIV positive. Some orphans in the Cells interviewed were heads of households. Most orphans had no family to turn to, whenever they needed support, at a social, economic and psychological level. They needed education and counsellors. Many were abandoned by their relatives and the responsibility of keeping the family unit together fell to the eldest surviving child. Bernard is 19 years old and head of a household in Butare. He takes care of his 15 year old brother Felix and 13 year old sister Catherine. He carries his family and domestic responsibilities in extreme poverty as he explained.

"life is very bad, we live by begging from neighbours. We cannot go to school because we cannot afford the 300 Rwandan Francs (50c US dollar) per term, school uniforms and buy books". Another orphan noted,

"I feel always depressed, discouraged and unhappy with life. I cannot even concentrate at school as I developed ulcers and stomach problems after the genocide. Despite this, as the oldest in the family, I have to calm down and to take care of my young brothers and sisters. I cannot take the place of my parents but I try to do most things that my parents would do to us."

Orphans were often in conflict with their neighbours or relatives over the management of assets left by their parents. It has been reported in Cyangugu town that older orphans have been poisoned by younger ones because of their strict style of managing the households. Those assets were mainly land and houses. They were neither children nor adults. In order to survive, young children hired themselves out as labourers and they were paid half the wages given to adults. Girls particularly had little prospects of moving on from their situation. They often did not marry for fear of leaving their young

brothers or sisters or few men did not want to marry them and look after their younger brothers and sisters. Some orphan girls entered prostitution to buy food and pay for school fees or medicines. Sometimes they gave themselves to old men to live under their protection and this led to unwanted pregnancies and /or HIV/AIDS.

Poverty and unemployment have caused psychological problems and have led some orphans to drugs and alcohol addiction. In regard to what was done by leaders and the government to manage the situation, only a few orphans were helped by The National Funds for Genocide Survival (FARG). Every Rwandan was supposed to contribute 100 RWAFR (Rwandan Francs) every year to these Funds. As there were many orphans in the country, all of them were not helped by the Funds. Besides, several associations such as BARAKABAHO and MWANUKUNDWA provided material and moral relief to children heads of households in the town of Butare but they are still economically limited.

5.4.5.2. Women

Women and children were the first victims of genocide. Despite being considered as the pillar in the family because they took care not only of the education of children and preparing the future of the entire community it appeared that women have been the most marginalised after the genocide.

Leaders stressed the particular struggles of single mothers particularly widows. Single mothers complained that they were not respected in communities and easily harassed. They felt that they were looked down upon in the community. The traditional roles of men and women in communities no longer existed and more duties have been falling to the women. As many were unemployed and lived from gardening, they had difficulty in providing children with food, clothes and school fees, sometimes for large households. In addition there was neither counselling nor framework for most women to discuss their problems openly with one another. Widows also faced big challenges of having to come to terms with the loss of their husbands and their dearly loved ones, and raising

their children alone. They had to meet these people who have been released from prison, coming and telling them how they killed their relatives including their husbands. This was like opening up wounds that were beginning to heal.

Another issue for women was about those whose husbands have been jailed for more than 10 years. In 2005, Butare prison had a population of 19,718 in 2003 and 10,876 in 2005, 9,710 genocide suspects and 3,034 had confessed their genocide crimes in 2005 (Nuwamanya, 2005:5). These prisoners were awaiting trial and in the meanwhile their wives had neither time nor income to provide food for their husbands in prison (Table 5.56). One woman commented,

“Life became hard and we have no other income than farming. However, the soil is no longer fertile. In addition, I no longer have time for farming activities and my children have to leave school to take food to members of family in prison”.

As most of the women were jobless, prostitution seemed to be a solution to obtain money. All of these problems made women the most vulnerable group in Rwandan society.

Women were organised in associations. More than half of 13 existing Associations in the Sector belonged to women (Butare-ville, 2004). They were basically agricultural craft, small trade and saving Associations. Above all, leaders thought that people needed leaders or people who understood their suffering and emotions, not just providing food and shelter.

Table 5.56: Number of prisoners by Province in January 2003

Province	Prisoners
Kigali-City	17 141
Kigali-Rural	6 925
Gitarama	17 228
Butare	19 718
Gikongoro	4 794
Cyangugu	5 799
Kibuye	6 884
Gisenyi	2 477
Ruhengeri	1 346
Byumba&Mutara	3 430
Kibungo	15 727
TOTAL	110 469

Source: Klaas de Jonge, 2003

More helpful for women was that the Parliament voted the right for women to inherit land and property from their families. This right was denied before the genocide. Widows and their female children had no right to inherit the land they used to farm, as it was controlled by the male relatives of deceased husbands. Women could not inherit land, but a woman, married or not might receive land as a gift (*urwibutso*) from her elderly father (Pottier, 2001:190-191).

To address the hardship of life, women were organised into associations. More than half of 13 existing Associations in the Sector belonged to women (Butare-ville, 2004). They were basically agricultural craft, small trade and saving Associations. Above all, leaders think that people needed leaders or people who understood their suffering and emotions, not just providing food and shelter. At the national level Butare Province has the highest

rate of widows (17%): 32 604 females and 18 455 males (ONAPO, 2002) and many women's associations. The effort of the associations DUHOZANYE in Save, DUHARANIRE KUBAHO, LUMIERE ZIRIKANA and AVEGA to empower widows in both Cyangugu and Butare are completed by community services commonly called "Umuganda". They are organised every last Saturday of the month for helping vulnerable groups in building houses, maintenance of roads, town cleaning and so on.

5.4.5.3. Youth

Leaders have defined youth as men and women aged 15-30. They made up over 60% of the population as we saw in Table 5.5 above. Not only are they in the majority, they made up a distinct group in the Cells with their own culture, behaviours and social challenges. Among this group were young soldiers demobilised after the war and the genocide. The major challenge for many young people was unemployment and problem of integration for former young soldiers.

Almost everybody has completed primary school and some secondary but few were employed. The majority did not complete secondary school because they had no school fees. Some of them could not carry on because they had fragile mental health. Young people were the most vulnerable in their relationships particularly as it related to AIDS. Leaders revealed that AIDS was a major threat to the lives of the youth as the majority of people dying from AIDS in the administrative units were young people. The reasons were that, due to displacement and poor or no housing, to sexual promiscuity from refugee camps, children were exposed to sex at a very early age. High rate of AIDS among youth was also a result of loneliness aggravated by high levels of unemployment and idleness. Leaders were struck by the fact that more and more girls were hanging out and becoming idlers these days while before the genocide it was primarily young men.

Asked about how they faced these youth challenges, leaders reported the problem of limited or no financial resources to help the youth. However, youth were encouraged to be creative and regroup in associations and cooperatives. They were also regularly

instructed about dangers of HIV/AIDS by organising conferences on the subject. Leaders suggested offering youth social or volunteer work to help them occupy their time and to add something positive to their lives. Supportive counselling could be offered in communities. Leaders thought also that job skills should decrease youth problems.

Table 5. 57: Leaders' opinion on vulnerable groups (n=8) (Multiple responses)

Groups	Frequency	Percent
Elders	4	50
Orphans	7	87.5
Women	8	100
Disabled people	3	37.5
Youth	7	87.5

5.4.5.4. Elders

It is a fact that there were few elders in Butare and Cyangugu, in the whole country as well. A visitor to Rwanda, argued African Rights (1995:623),

"is immediately struck by the relative absence of elderly people among the survivors. They have not been spared in the killings and massacres. Many never made it to the first port of refuge-churches, hospitals, schools and the bushes. Unable to run, they were murdered in their homes".

However most of the few elderly people who survived mainly suffer from loneliness and poverty as there is no family or government structure to help them. In the words of one leader,

"it was very hard for old people to cope with life in the aftermath of the genocide".

In traditional Rwandan culture the elderly were revered and honoured. They were viewed as wise teachers, responsible for upholding the culture. Because of poverty and destruction of cultural values, leaders commented that for many families, the elderly were more and more seen as a burden to the families and community and there were no proper structures for that vulnerable group.

5.4.5.5. Disabled people

One of various long term challenges brought by the genocide was an increase in the number of the disabled. Physically and psychologically disabled were reported by leaders to be a legacy of the genocide. In a country with an economy that was just recovering from the genocide, life was difficult and most of the disabled, severely traumatised by events they experienced do not benefit from any support. Physically-disabled were described as many people who were wounded and maimed. Those who lost the use of hands were severely damaged by machetes during the genocide. Also, many more lost their limbs to exploding landmines. Many of the former soldiers demobilised, those who put an end to the genocide lost arms and legs. Moreover, physical disabilities impacted on people's psychology. Thus, many people were declared being absent-minded most of the time (especially children and students at schools and colleges) or were suffering from the "survivor syndrome", a result of the genocide which reflected the continuing relevance of disability. Leaders insisted also on the difficulty of former soldiers to re-integrate into civilian life.

Many disabled people live from begging. The increased number of beggars after the genocide was quite striking in Cyangugu and Butare towns. They were so many in the streets; most of them are beggars, with little hope. The absence of a single disability organisation at national level to represent all the interest of people with disabilities in the country has exacerbated disabled people's suffering. However, all disabled did not live in misery; few of them live from money change in Cyangugu town and others were successful businessmen in Butare, despite their disabilities.

The role of the government in helping this vulnerable group was still insignificant. Former soldiers received aid for their re-integration into civilian society.

Also disabled people have got a representative in the Rwandan national assembly. Similarly, where communities or relatives found financial means, amputees without prostheses were helped to obtain artificial limbs from Kigali.

Plate 5.8: Massgrave and memorial site of Cyarwa in Butare town



Source: The author, 2006

5.5. IMPACT OF THE GENOCIDE ON SUPERSTRUCTURE

The superstructure is the symbolic or ideological segment of culture. Ideology consists of a code of social order regarding how social and political organisation are structured (Murphy, 2001). This section is very important as cultural values were eroded during the genocide and one of the major challenges in Rwanda society will be to rebuild them besides the infrastructure and structures.

5.5.1. Attendance at places of worship


Rwanda has been predominantly a christian country with more than 90% being Christians before the genocide and 85.6 % after the genocide (Prunier, 1991; ONAPO, 2002). However, attendance at places of worship decreased (54%). Many Christians changed congregations as the majority of households interviewed were Roman Catholics before the genocide. Households were upset by the participation of some Catholic Church ministers collaborating with and taking part in the genocide. Catholic churches lost many believers due to some of its leaders involved in genocide. Heads of households and leaders interviewed agreed with Marc Lacet who stated that

“Many people disgusted by the role some Catholic priests and nuns played in the genocide, shunned organised religion altogether, and many more have turned to Islam and other new religions. People left their churches or joined new ones because some of their former leaders were actively involved in the mass killing” (Lacet, 2004).

Thirty percent of households declared their attendance to have increased after the genocide. This group believed that it survived because of divine intervention and belonged to new congregations which flourished in both Butare and Cyangugu towns as well as in other Provinces. Charismatic Christian sects were enjoying growing popularity eroding the influence of established churches. The majority left the Catholic Church religion completely or changed from other well-established religions such as Protestant, Adventists to smaller ones (Restoration Churches, or other) and Islam. According to 1991 Census, only 1% of Rwandans were muslim but after the genocide, they made up to 3.7% (Prunier, 1995).

Only 16 percent declared no change before and after the genocide (Figure 5.5) and still belonged to the same congregations as before the genocide. After the genocide, prayer became for some a solution to many problems and for others a refuge.

Figure 5.5: Attendance at place of worship (n=100)



Reports from leaders contrasted with responses of households concerning the decrease of attendance at places of worship. Leaders reported the increase (62.5%) and they could be trusted as they told according to statistics contrary to head of households whose responses were more subjective. Another explanation is that head of households were evaluating the situation individually and not the whole situation related to other religions. In this matter, leaders could be trusted. According to leaders motivation of increase in worshipping were rather various and not always pure. On the one hand, people practise religion in gratitude to God who they believe saved them from the genocide and refugee camps. Religion became also a source of consolation from all sorts of sufferings endured, especially loneliness in the aftermath of the genocide. On the other hand, religion became a refuge for perpetrators who were traumatised by the fact that they killed people during the genocide. The government was obliged to close some places of worship in both towns of Butare and Cyangugu as they became a refuge for criminals and uncontrollable in terms of security. Sects found a fertile field in the country after the genocide.

Table 5.58: Leaders' opinions on attendance of people at places of worship (n=8)

	Frequency	Percent
Increased	5	62.5
Decreased	2	25
No opinion	1	12.5

5.5.2. Attitudes to marriage across ethnic boundaries after the genocide

This was a complicated issue but it was significant in terms of the struggle for reconciliation between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda. By the late 1980s, 40% of the population had inter-married and in some regions, this figure rose to 75% (Moser & Clark, 2001).

In terms of marriage, 51 percent still had a positive attitude towards marriage across ethnic boundaries (Table 5.59) but 12 percent were completely against it and 37 percent preferred not to comment on this matter. This question, with one of ethnic affiliation seemed to be very sensitive and confusing for interviewees. It was clear that people who during interviews refused to comment were against inter-ethnic marriages. No opinion was an indirect way to say “no” as in the culture a straight no is disrespectful, offensive and impolite.

Although there were a significant proportion of intermarriages as mentioned by Moser and Clark (2001), the situation in Rwanda seemed to be changing. People have been affected by the family killings during the genocide. More specifically, there were many cases of Hutu husbands being obliged by the militia to kill their Tutsi wives or Hutu wives killing their Tutsi husbands and children. In the last mentioned case it should be noted that in Rwanda Tutsi children from mixed marriages belong to their father's ethnic group. Another more complicated issue in Rwanda was that children from mixed marriages had a problem of identity because they were really neither Hutu nor Tutsi.

Table 5.59: Opinions about marriages across ethnic boundaries (n=100)

	Frequency	Percent
For	51	51.0
Against	12	12.0
No opinion	37	37.0
Total	100	100.0

5.5.3. Opinions on national reconciliation

The survey data suggests that despite the suffering and disintegration of social cohesion that resulted from the genocide, Rwandans were gradually moving beyond the horrific genocide experience. The majority of the respondents (56%) believed that reconciliation is possible but in the long term (Table 5.60). Eighteen percent stated that it was impossible and 26% refused to comment on this issue. Once again, the 26% “no opinions” should have been understood as a denial rather than an agreement. The above responses indicated that the prospect of reconciliation between the two ethnic groups in Rwanda was a distant prospect even though ten years have elapsed since the genocide. One head of household noted,

” I can have my Hutu friends again but I have lost my trust in all Hutu. It is going to take generations of healing to regain that trust and true reconciliation”. Another more pessimistic person said,

“Forgiving or not, it does not matter, as nobody will resuscitate my family members”.

The most important way reported to achieve reconciliation was: respect of human rights, good governance, truth and forgiveness. People thought the solution should be for perpetrators to confess their crimes (guilt), and victims to forgive. Socialising and care for vulnerable people were also reported to be the solution. The obstacles were poverty, uneducated people and selfish leaders. Once again interviewees, as with the previous question on marriage, respondents were confused and uncomfortable with the question of reconciliation.

Socialising and care for vulnerable people were also reported to be the solution. The obstacles were poverty, uneducated people and selfish leaders. Once again interviewees, as with the previous question on marriage, respondents were confused and uncomfortable with the question of reconciliation.

Table 5.60: Opinions on national reconciliation (n=100).

Opinion	Frequency	Percent
Possible in the long term	56	56
Impossible	18	18
No opinion	26	26
Total	100	100

5.5.4. Opinions on aspects of culture destroyed during the genocide

The overwhelming majority agree that three broad areas of Rwandese culture were destroyed: family traditions (84%), family solidarity (87%) and above all respect for life (91%) (Table 5.61). According to respondents the above had so deteriorated that it would take a long time to rebuild them. For example intra and extra familial solidarity was destroyed because of the killings and hardships of life which created individualism and struggle for survival within families. Additionally, respondents mentioned that few elders remained alive and this resulted in the discontinuation or complete disappearance of previously held family traditions. The death of elders also resulted in weakening intra and extra familial solidarity. In the terms of “respect for life”, respondents stated that the family killings and massacres in addition to societal killings at large made it seem to them that human life was “worthless”. Other cultural values cited to be destroyed were: solidarity, visiting between families, marriage across ethnic boundaries and sharing gifts among families. One elder man said,

” They (Tutsis) were our friends and good neighbours, but we have been taught propaganda about them by bad leaders and we started discriminating them”.

Monogamy and fidelity between couples and the high rate of prostitution mentioned by households were due to poverty, promiscuity in grouped habitat “Imidugudu” the presence of people from many backgrounds and many parts of the world after the genocide.

Plate 5.9: Mass grave in Butare town containing more than 40.000 people.



Source: The author, 2006

Table 5.61: Opinion on aspects of culture destroyed during the genocide (n=100) (Multiple responses).

Aspects	Frequency	Percent
Family's traditions(arts, marriages,..)	84	84
Family's solidarity (intra and extra)	87	87
Respect of life	91	91

5.6. CONCLUSION

The genocide of 1994 in Rwanda had multiple negative effects on infrastructure, structures and superstructure in both Cyangugu and Butare towns. Much of the physical and social infrastructure has still to be rehabilitated or replaced. Findings from heads of households and leaders from two different towns showed that the extreme lack of human and financial resources in the country as a result of the genocide, indistinctively affected social and economic households' lifestyle. Only 15% of people still live in the same house as of before the genocide. Eighty five percent households moved to another house

either because their houses were destroyed or for psychological reasons. The rising level of poverty and loss of access to resources increased diseases, illnesses, marginalisation and destruction of the environment under multiple aspects. Malaria was still the leading cause of morbidity and mortality before (73%) and after the genocide (96%). Also, new physical and psychological illnesses (trauma, sterility, frequent headaches) were found as a result of genocide. Except for cell phones as new means of communication, all services and facilities which were weak before 1994, experienced dramatic deterioration during and after the genocide. Limited financial means of the government were insufficient to satisfy people's basic needs. Also private initiatives promoted by the government are difficult to apply in poor suburban areas. New settlement structures or grouped habitats known as 'Imidugudu' combined with surviving on the cash economy challenged peasant farmers who had formerly lived in the Nyaruguru rural area. Deaths, migrations and despair led to community disorientation characterised by suspicions, bad relationships among people, loss of family traditions and religious values and a difficult road towards reconciliation.

Thus, professional and trained people are needed in many sectors, sociologists, psychologists, economists and environmentalists and so on. Particularly, new diseases and illness need specific attention. In this regard, trauma counsellors trained should urgently be a priority for local authorities planning to face the big number of people suffering from post traumatic syndrome disease and other new illnesses. As most of the people in Rwanda belong to congregations, trained and well educated religious leaders are needed to rehabilitate the superstructure aspect of the society. Similarly, policies should be made to address the needs of vulnerable people living in all towns especially orphans and widows. However, as urban settlers are heterogeneous so are their needs. More particularly, the wish from households in Akabutare suburbs for land for cultivation strongly expresses that their sustainable development should be preferably found in their former settlement in rural areas as soon as the region becomes secure.

Overall, the solution to these big challenges above is the common task of all stakeholders, that is: household members, government leaders and the international community.

CHAPTER 6

EVALUATION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

6.1. INTRODUCTION

The objective of this study, an example of the dynamic impacts of genocide, was to assess the socio-economic conditions of communities more than a decade after the genocide, the quality of relationships and reconciliation among people and the way people and their leaders coped with the post-genocide era. This chapter provides a synthesis and evaluation of the study and attempts to draw meaningful conclusions and also to provide suggestions and recommendations and in some small way assist policymakers in the rebuilding of the country. In addition, other areas of research that could improve the quality of live of Rwandans in the aftermath of the genocide will be suggested.

6.2. EVALUATION

Although genocide has been described by scholars as a mystery (Fotten, 1998), the primary and secondary sources of the present study show otherwise. Genocide in Rwanda, “the most rapid and complete genocide the world has ever seen” (Mann, 2005:430), was “highly organised by Hutu radical elites” (Mann, 2005:442). It was not a spontaneous act (Keane, 1995; Mann, 2005:471; Prunier, 1995). Findings from the case studies of Butare and Cyangugu confirmed that the genocide in Rwanda was carefully prepared by political leaders. This is illustrated by the extent to which the Tutsis ‘ethnic group’ and some moderate Hutus were slaughtered, the methods by which the people were killed, the wide variety of weapons used to kill, and the extent of the socio-economic and environmental destruction, still observable in the country. This was done in 11 weeks time (Mann, 2005:430), when soldiers, paramilitaries and ordinary Hutus used machetes (that killed 38% of victims), clubs 17 percent and

firearms 15 percent (Ndolimana, 2003:229; Mann, 2005:461) to systematically eliminate the Tutsis community.

The genocide perpetrated in Rwanda, which resulted in socio-economic and environmental disintegration was a result of the ideology of violence and hatred perpetuated by bad leadership. During and after colonisation this ideology was reinforced by economic and environmental problems. The deep analysis of its causes through the literature showed that the so-called "ancient hatred between Hutus and Tutsis" was not enough to explain why it occurred (Keane, 1995; Mann, 2005; Melvern, 2000; Pottier, 2002). People enjoyed a good life before the genocide. The Hutus and Tutsis had interacted well till 1994, but after the genocide, the relationships were reported as 23% very good, 50% good and 27% satisfactory (Table 5.49). Causes such as poverty and resource scarcities (Gasana, 2001; Mann, 2005:439) to cite a few were rather immediate and purely secondary. Many factors, especially bad governance, poverty and the indifference of the international community made it possible. Therefore, explaining the outbreak of the genocide in Rwanda or analysing its impacts by one factor will always be biased.

The literature review synthesised some of the theoretical viewpoints of social scientists in the field and from which the main paradigms used in the present study was selected. Besides the comparative approach which dealt with similarities and differences between the Rwandan genocide and other genocides of the twentieth century, the dominant paradigm in which the study was conducted was the cultural materialism of Harris (1979) which highlights the infrastructure, structures and the superstructure in studying conflicts.

Though genocides took place in different contexts, they have presented similarities and differences. From the literature review conducted in Chapter 2 it became clear that all genocides that occurred in the Twentieth Century had the following in common with the

genocide in Rwanda (Mamdani, 2001 ;Mann, 2005 ;The History Place, 1999 ; Pottier, 2002).

- (i) They developed from socio-economic or environmental problems: poverty, problem of territory;
- (ii) They aimed at eliminating a real or potential threat;
- (iii) They were more complex than just ethnic groups attacking each another;
- (iv) They were carefully planned by leaders, mainly political leaders who manipulated the population;
- (v) They had devastating effects on infrastructure, socio-economic structures and on superstructure (culture and belief);
- (vi) They generated - besides death- migrations and refugees which are one of the most significant results of the genocide;
- (vii) They differ from war: though war generates destruction of the environment, it is however minimal compared to the psycho-social destruction from genocide; and
- (viii) All reconstruction after the genocide faced issues of ownership of the land and properties, unity, justice and reconciliation, reparation from perpetrators.

However, the Rwandan genocide has its particularities (Adejeji, 1999; Human Rights Watch, 1999, Mamdani, 2001; Melvern, 2000; Ndolimana, 2003; Pottier, 2002; Prunier, 1995):

- (i) The antagonists in the Rwanda conflict belong to the same nation and culture and also inter-married;
- (ii) The number of victims compared to means utilised in killing people in a short time, shows the extreme speed in its implementation;
- (iii) The silence and passivity of the international community and the UN despite modern and updated means of communication and the commitment of the UN to prevent acts of genocide;
- (iv) The genocide in Rwanda spread to neighbouring countries: in Burundi and the DRC where Tutsis ethnic groups was killed

by refugees:

- (v) The migration and large numbers of refugees who were perpetrators of the genocide;
- (vi) Intense pressure on land and destruction of forests to settle people after the genocide;
- (vii) A very big number of prisoners (more than 100 000 people in 2004) and
- (viii) Trials of genocide perpetrators, combining modern and traditional courts called "Gacaca" in the aftermath of the genocide.

The peculiarities mentioned above was another motivation for the present study the purpose of which was to identify the social conditions of the communities after the genocide in Rwanda: to examine how the genocide affected the spatial distribution of the population, the infrastructure, beliefs and culture. To achieve these objectives, the study was conducted within the ambit of the geography of conflict, a sub-discipline of political geography. The latter is a science which borrows from other disciplines such as history, anthropology, politics, and philosophy to achieve its goals (Daniels et al., 2001:1-3; Semelin, 2005:20; Vehnamaki, 2002).

To assess the socio-economic impacts of genocide in Rwanda and current developments, the cultural materialism approach of Harris (1979), which has the advantage to analyse conflict by simultaneously exploring several dimensions, appeared to be the most suitable. Marvin's theory of cultural materialism has played a key role in the explanation of conflicts through infrastructure, structure and superstructures. The socio-economic impacts of the genocide in Rwanda were explored through three dimensions of structure, infrastructure and superstructure which shape kinship, economics and politics in every society (Anstey, 1999). Cultural materialism of Harris guided the research in a way to assess, past and present interactions between natural and societal/cultural factors between Rwandans more than a decade after the genocide. In the context of cultural materialism, the quality of infrastructure was particularly investigated as well as socio-cultural and economic interactions among Rwandan communities. Primary data

collection and analysis, combined with secondary data generated the findings discussed below.

6.2.1. Demographic characteristics

Despite deaths due to the genocide, the study showed that the size of households is larger (5.7) compared to that before the genocide (5.3) in Butare and (6.3) in Cyangugu (ONAPO, 2002). The reason is that normal families were replaced by families which encompassed relatives and orphans from the neighbourhood and the return of former Tutsi refugees of 1959 who were living in the Diaspora. The findings showed also that despite killings which targeted males, the majority of household members were males (56%). Because the present study was conducted in urban areas, the majority of people were either working or job seekers and some of them left their wives in the countryside. However, 36% of heads of households were female, which contrasts with the situation before the genocide, where almost all heads of households were males. The population of the households was very young: more than half (59.7%) was under 25 years of age. This is because many adults were killed during the genocide. In his survey in Central and Southern Rwanda, Verwimp found that 88.7% Tutsis were killed (Verwimp, 2003) and according to Des Forges, between 75 and 80 percent lost their lives due to genocide (Des Forges, 1999:15).

After the genocide, Rwanda had a heterogeneous population consisting of people coming from different regions. A big number came from Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi and Tanzania. It was found that 43% of household members and 74% of heads of households interviewed spoke more than one language. This is a result of migrations which took place in the history of the country, in particular during the genocide of 1994.

Finally, socio-demographic factors had strong implications on the environmental degradation and poverty motivated people for killing their neighbours. Between 1995 and 1998, Rwanda registered the rate of deforestation never reached before 1994.

6.2.2. Infrastructure

After the genocide, social and economic infrastructure was in a state of collapse. The judicial, educational and financial infrastructure had either been damaged or destroyed. Infrastructure such as water, electricity and telephones were not available or functioning.

In Butare and Cyangugu towns, it was found that most public and private houses were burnt or destroyed, especially in Cyangugu. The majority of respondents (85%) changed their houses because their previous dwellings were either destroyed or killings took place there (21%). The cost of housing, both to buy and to rent increased considerably due to lack of accessibility to materials for construction. The monthly rent for a house increased from 5,000 RWF before the genocide to 25,000 RWF after the genocide in suburban areas and from 10,000 RWF to 50,000 RWF in downtown middle class housing (Interview with local leaders). As a solution to housing problems, the government, helped by NGOs, initiated a new housing design for poor people living either in suburbs of towns or in rural areas. This type of habitat is called *Imidugudu* and is part of Butare and Cyangugu towns' landscape, consisting of small, fragile houses constructed in straight lines in the suburbs.

Generally, it was found that urban infrastructure in both towns was entirely inadequate to meet the needs of the population.

6.2.3. Households losses

The results from interviews showed that two thirds of households lost one or more members during the genocide and the average persons lost was 3 persons. In terms of injuries, 53% of households had one or more members injured. The type of injuries that were sustained ranged from cuts and bruises (62%), head injuries (31%), loss of limbs (17%), loss of arms (9%) and body injuries (4%). This had socio-economic and psychological negative effects on families, especially elders, orphans and widows who consequently suffer physical injuries, trauma and other mental diseases.

6.2.4. Migration and mobility

Killings in Rwanda were accompanied by unprecedented migration either inside or outside the country. It was rare to find a member of a household who never moved from his Cell (24%). Forty-nine percent of households declared having more than a member abroad but this figure could be higher. Because of the ongoing trials of genocide perpetrators, people were afraid of declaring members of families living abroad.

Migration had negative effects on families and on the environment. Members of families who fled abroad were often the best educated and therefore the bread-winner. Thus, households suffer poverty, loneliness and insecurity due to the loss of members. Migrations during and after the genocide, was always accompanied by the destruction of the environment especially the deforestation in areas such as Cyangugu.

In terms of migration, findings showed that due to poverty and lack of employment and personal reasons, 64% of households expressed their wish to emigrate to inside (45%) or outside the country (19%) if they had the opportunity. This was strongly expressed by former farmers from Nyaruguru area now living in the Musange Sector, the suburb of Butare town. Indeed, the hardship of life after the genocide motivated people to seek a better life elsewhere. As the country became peaceful, many people from suburbs of towns such as Butare wished to go back to their former rural settlement in the Nyaruguru District.

6.2.5. Quality of relationships and reconciliation

Data analysis from case studies of Butare and Cyangugu towns showed that the legacy of the Rwandan genocide is still heavily present. Today, Rwanda presents new categories of people in connection with the genocide and its consequences. Rwandan society consists of those who escaped the genocide, the prisoners, the perpetrators of the genocide and two categories of refugees who went back after the genocide.

between Hutus and Tutsis ethnic groups (66%) and conflicts over land and properties (50%).

Despite suffering and dispossession, Rwandans are gradually moving beyond the tragedy of the genocide. The majority of respondents (56%) believe that reconciliation is possible. This is also illustrated by 51% of people who are still positive about marriage across ethnic boundaries.

However, despite the government's commitment to create ethnicity and reconciliation, to improve social solidarity by eliminating ethnic references on identity cards and purging direct mention of ethnicity in most public discourse, the wounds are still deep and healing difficult on both sides. Thus, there are no magic strategies. Communities in Rwanda, besides a good leadership, need more time to heal emotional wounds.

6.3. RECOMMENDATIONS

This study has shown that the Rwandan genocide is complex. For this reason, it is not easy to find effective solutions. These depend on combined efforts from leaders (political and religious), the people themselves, NGO's and the International Community. In addition, solutions to Rwandan problems should mainly spring from the causes of such problems. By eliminating causes, effects would be eliminated. For this purpose, despite spectacular socio-political and environmental transformations Rwanda has achieved in more than ten years since the genocide, attention should still be paid to the following issues. A number of strategies in the context of the Harris Marvin's theory, focusing on infrastructure, structures and superstructures are therefore proposed to deal with the challenges identified in the study. The strategies include:

6.3.1. Reducing poverty

Reducing poverty must be addressed by leaders, victims and perpetrators. The Rwandan crisis in the 1990s was in part aggravated by the poverty of the people. People participated in looting properties or land. However, land without input is useless. Also, malaria, worms, HIV as well as other communicable diseases reported in the study are multifactor diseases often associated with poverty and under-development. In addition, the gap between the rich and poor creates an additional challenge in uniting a divided society (Lonzi, 2005). Thus, the main factor that needs to be addressed is poverty. Tensions and conflicts will be greatly reduced when poverty is alleviated. Fighting poverty will erase prostitution, swindling and conflicts over properties, common in Rwanda. People should liberate themselves from poverty and automatically, reduction of mortality due to malaria and other diseases will ensue as has been proven with most other infectious diseases.

For these issues above, the Rwanda government should keep on applying its international commitment through the millennium development goals, regional commitment via NEPAD and the national policies through the 2020 Vision, the Poverty Reduction Policies and the “7 Years Government Programme” to reduce poverty. From the data analysis above, alternatives solutions should be land occupation and housing reform, investing in education, access to micro-credit and micro-finance. Grouped habitat “Imidugudu” should be revised and rethought to address the issue of land availability with the participation of all stakeholders. The present occupation of land in dispersed habitats in Rwanda makes it difficult to access services and facilities in rural areas. Similarly, as the country does not have many natural resources, however, it is rich in population. Investing in education and human resources should be a long term alternative solution.

However, education may have its pitfalls and could be a dangerous tool for leadership as UNESCO states:

“ Education is a political asset, and can be used as a stabilising factor on which to build a new post-conflict society although it can be also used to alienate groups from each other” (UNESCO,2004).

The experience of developing countries has shown that education helps to reduce poverty and strengthen the civil institutions that support sound economic and social policies (UNESCO, 2004). As the findings show, the majority of people lacked knowledge and skills to be economically productive. Thus, education should promote community development and solve many health problems stemming from ignorance. To recall the words of Adedeji (1999:23):”Development is central to conflict reduction and sustainable development depends to a large extent on an economically enabling environment for investment”. The success in the past decades of micro-credit and micro-finance in reducing poverty and serving the poor by access to credit at reasonable terms in many developing countries should inspire fighting poverty in Rwanda. Existing co-operatives (COOPEC) with safe means of saving, access to micro-insurance and other financial services countrywide should be encouraged by leaders. The main source of household income being the agriculture and the informal sector, the latter should be recognised, restructured, monitored, encouraged and adapted to new technologies instead of being over-taxed by fiscal authorities. The Rwandan economy depends heavily on agriculture, which presently contributes about 45% of GDP (2003), employs more than 90% of the active population and contributes more than 80% of total foreign earnings (Bugabo,2005: Supplement II). Efforts could emphasise the importance of increasing agricultural productivity and raising rural incomes.

In addition to Rwandan efforts in fighting poverty, the international community should play a role in Rwanda’s fight against poverty by cancelling unconditionally its debt as it is known that Rwanda inherited an enormous debt contracted and diverted to the war effort between 1990 and 1994. The international community did nothing to stop the genocide before it started. In addition to this, the literature showed (African Rights, 1995; Melvern, 2000; Pottier, 2002; Prunier, 1995) that the government who implemented the genocide was allied with several rich and developed countries where weapons such as machetes and grenades were bought. Therefore, today’s survivors must

not refund banks for credits used to buy weapons used against them by the former government.

6.3.2. Promoting national reconciliation

As questions about reconciliation and marriages across ethnic boundaries are still sensitive to everyone interviewed in sampled towns (many refused to comment on them), it is clear that hatred and resentment from the genocide needs to be carefully managed. Time gives distance not necessarily healing. Ten years seems to be a long time but survivors and perpetrators think otherwise. The first are waiting for justice and the second for trials. Thus, reconciliation remains a painfully slow process in post genocide Rwanda. However, it will remain problematic until Rwandans move beyond their grief and shame to a position where they can dialogue and forgive. Reconciliation is not an easy task given the psycho-social impact of the 1994 genocide and the complex histories of grievances that led to its occurrence. For survivors and victims of the genocide what happened is very hard to bear. However, the best and lasting solution for Rwanda is definitely national reconciliation. Rwandans must build on issues that they share like language and culture as uniting factors, instead of centring on artificial matters created by colonisers to divide the community.

As education and media was used to turn neighbours against each other, leaders should promote the same means of communication to promote peace, reconciliation, environmental development. For instance, through informal education, adults and parents should be careful about what and how they share history with their children. Similarly, history teachers should help students to be more human and for them understand the value of history and see it as a way of avoiding history repeating itself, although this is a big task.

To avoid seeing history repeat itself, the onus for justice lies with Rwanda, Africa and the International community to make certain the will and resources are available. For this purpose, the classical judicial system has proved ineffective in resolving the

problems associated with the genocide suspects and ensuring speedy trials. In an attempt to speed up the trial of genocide suspects, timely justice should be ensured, reconciliation should be promoted amongst the various groups in the country to foster a vibrant and peaceful post-genocide society (African Rights, 2001; Ciabati, 2000). At the Gacaca Courts, perpetrators have the opportunity to confess their crimes and ask for forgiveness and this creates new possibilities for social interaction. Victims and victimisers meet to give testimony of what they did, ask for forgiveness from the relatives of the people they have wronged. Gacaca should be among alternative approaches to conflict resolution promoted by Utterwulghc (1999) who indeed considers that “the subjective perspective lowers the psychological barriers between antagonists”.

Activities such as worshipping, sports and cultural folklore which gather many people regardless of ethnic group should be a tool for creating new possibilities for personal reconciliation and social reconciliation. As Rwandans remain worshippers from diverse congregations, old and new, their role in national reconciliation should not be underestimated. Instead of claiming their innocence during the genocide, congregation members should recognise their responsibilities, ask for forgiveness and then actively participate in promoting truth and national reconciliation. For this purpose, political and religious leaders should play a key role in the process.

Although in a different context, Rwanda should learn from processes initiated in other countries. For instance in South Africa, at a reconciliation table, people rooted in the African way of forgiveness, were able to carry South Africa across the abyss (Marks, 2000).

6.3.4 Providing solutions to the energy shortage

Writing about the quest for energy as a cause of war, Carneiro (1994) argues that

“With the exception of food, of all the natural resources nations require, energy is the most basic ... Energy is not only the motive force that brought culture to its present high

level, it is also essential to its continued functioning at that level, to say nothing of its future" (Carneiro, 1994:21-22).

Also, it is commonly known that a country cannot develop without sources of energy. The shortage of energy which impacts on water and biodiversity in the country is a big issue for Rwandan development. Rwanda has important natural sources of energy according to FAO that consists of biomass, hydroelectricity, peat, methane, sun, wind etc...The country has 107 sites favourable to the installation of hydroelectric microcentrals, 55, 000, 000, 000 m³ of methane and 4.5 kw/m² from sun (FAO, 2004). In this regard, I agree with Nduwayezu (1990), Byuma Safari (2005:18), and MINECOFIN (2002) that the methane gas (NM3) from Lake Kivu should be a long term alternative solution to the energy shortage and therefore to the protection of the environment. Lake Kivu contains a large quantity 55 billion m³ of which 40 billion m³ could be economically exploitable. This resource is renewable (extendable) at a rhythm of 100 to 150 million m³ per year and could satisfy the energy needs of the country for at least one century (MINECOFIN, 2002).

The government should of course carry on its ongoing policies on re-forestation across the country and educate people about environmental issues.

6.3.5. Remembering the genocide (memorial)

Quoting Carol Bellamy, Kamonyi argued that the genocide is not just a historical event but an inescapable part of daily life, today and tomorrow (Kamonyi, 2004:16). Thus, it is to be commemorated by Rwandans, victims and perpetrators as well. During April of every year, Rwanda remembers the genocide (Plate 6.1). For some it contributes towards healing and reconciliation and for others, it encourages re-traumatization and even ethnic hatred. Both widows and orphans have suppressed their traumatic memories by launching themselves into work, becoming too busy trying to make ends meet that they have no time to revisit their memories. However, the memory project has proved therapeutic, giving the opportunity to survivors to speak out and to deal with their past. Despite being a controversial issue inside and outside the country, remembrance remains

an incredible awareness. In my opinion, Rwandans should continue to honour the victims every year, by the local and national memorial. However, initiatives and creativity should come from both, leaders and communities (Plate 6.2). For many survivors, nothing is more important than memory and “forgetting”, said Simon Norfolk (Margareta, 1999), is the final instrument of genocide.

Plate 6.1: A family remembering relatives a decade after the genocide



Source: The author, 2006

Plate 6.2: The Mibirizi memorial site in Cyangugu



Source: Author, 2006

6.3.6 Promoting good governance

The Rwandan genocide was planned by bad and incompetent leadership. Reconstruction and prevention of genocide should come from good leadership. In this regard obstacles to good governance have to be acknowledged and then fought: extremism on sides (Hutus and Tutsis), long trials, corruption of some judges and unwillingness of perpetrators to ask for forgiveness. All strategies need good leadership to be implemented efficiently. That is why the responsibilities of leadership should have been taken by educated people democratically chosen for their integrity, honesty and good conduct. Strengthening good governance is a critical priority for Rwanda owing to its history. It is also a key variable in poverty reduction and sustainable economic growth. It is in this regard that reforms undertaken to put in place and prioritise good governance such as the NURC (National Unity and Reconciliation Committee), GACACA systems, National Human Rights Commission and Ombudsman's office. All these must be seen in the context of democratic culture installed through the newly voted constitution.

6.4. SOME RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

Variables considered in the study brought up some interesting findings on the socio-economic impacts of the genocide on developments in Cyangugu and Butare. Conclusions from this sample should reflect what the entire country has experienced from the genocide. Nevertheless, it is evident that such studies can involve a vast and complex domain that could be approached from several angles. There are, of course many unexplored issues and unanswered questions which was beyond the scope of this study. It is, therefore, suggested that the following areas of research which could impact on the quality of life of Rwandans after the genocide be undertaken:

- (i) The role of GACACA courts in conflicts management in Rwanda;
- (ii) The role of political and religious leaders in the reconstruction of Rwanda;
- (iii) The integration of vulnerable groups (orphans, disabled, widows) into development programmes;
- (iv) The overpopulation, energy and protection of the environment in Rwanda and
- (v) The role of the International Community and the countries of the Great Lakes Region in the reconstruction of Rwanda.

6.5. CONCLUSION

The people of Rwanda have worked extremely hard to recover from the devastation of the genocide. However, there is a long way to go. The task is still enormous as indicated in this study. The genocide seriously damaged social relations between Hutus and Tutsis, economic infrastructure and the environment. The legacy of the 1994 tragedy will live on in Rwanda for long.

Nevertheless, whatever the ideological manipulation, Rwandans have huge opportunities to be re-united by a common language, culture, and above all destiny. Therefore, young generations from whatever origins, helped by intellectuals, political and religious leaders should learn from the mistakes of people who planned and implemented the genocide

generations from whatever origins helped by intellectuals, political and religious leaders should learn from the mistakes of people who planned and implemented the genocide and work for lasting peace and reconciliation. Thus Rwanda, the country of “a thousand hills” and “thousand problems” should transform into the “country of a thousand solutions.”

If not, history will give reason for Gonzalez’s wise statement that:

“The genocide in Rwanda has not been the first genocide in the African continent and if prevention mechanisms and proper conflict management are not set on the continent, it may not be the last one” (Gonzalez, 2004:19).

Appendices: Appendix 1: The 30 or so worst bloodlettings of the Twentieth Century

Rank	Death Toll	Event	Dates
1	55,000,000	Second World War (Some overlap w/Stalin. Includes Sino-Japanese War and Holocaust. Doesn't incl. post-war German expulsions)	1937/39-1945
2	40,000,000	China: Mao Zedong's regime (incl. famine)	1949-76
3	20,000,000	USSR: Stalin's regime (incl. WW2-era atrocities)	1924-53
4	15,000,000	First World War (incl. Armenian massacres)	1914-18
5	8,800,000	Russian Civil War	1918-21
6	4,000,000	China: Warlord & Nationalist Era	1917-37
7	3,000,000	Congo Free State (n 1)	(1900)-08
8	2,800,000	Korean War	1950-53
8	2,800,000	2 nd Indochina War (incl. Laos & Cambodia)	1960-75
10	2,500,000	Chinese Civil War	1945-49
11	2,100,000	German Expulsions after WW2	1945-49
12	1,900,000	Second Sudanese Civil War	1983-(99)
13	1,700,000	Congolese Civil War (n 1)	1998-(99)
14	1,650,000	Cambodia: Khmer Rouge Regime	1975-79
15	1,500,000	Afghanistan: Soviet War	1980-89
16	1,400,000	Ethiopian Civil Wars	1962-02
17	1,250,000	East Pakistan: Massacres	1971
18	1,000,000	Mexican Revolution	1910-20
18	1,000,000	Iran-Iraq War	1980-88
18	1,000,000	Nigeria: Biafran revolt	1967-70
21	917,000	Rwandan Genocide	1994
21	800,000	Mozambique: Civil War	1976-92
23	675,000	French-Algerian War	1954-62
24	600,000	First Indochina War	1945-54
24	600,000	Angolan Civil War	1975-94
26	500,000	Decline of the Amazonian Indians	(1900)-(99)
26	500,000	India-Pakistan Partitions	1947
26	500,000	First Sudanese Civil War	1955-72
29	450,000	Indonesia: Massacre of Communists	1965-66
30	365,000	Spanish Civil War	1936-39
31	>350,000	Somalia: Clans	1991-(99)
31	>400,000	North Korea: Communist Regime	1948-(99)

- Source: White, M. 1998. <http://www.users.erols.com/mwhite28/maildrop.htm>

Appendix 2: The Genocides in the World (Nyankanzi, 1999: 99-105).

1. Selected Chronology of genocide in Europe

Country	Date	Perpetrators	Victims	Estimations nr
Melos	146 bc	Athenian army	Melians	Unknown
Carthage	146bc	Roman army	Carthagians	150.000
Ottoman empire	1915-22	Ottoman army	Armenians	1m
Soviet union	1932-37	Soviet army	Ukrainians	10m
German	1939-45	Nazi army	Jews,Gypsies*	6m/50,000

2. Selected chronology of Genocide in Africa

Country	Date	Perpetrators	Victims	Est.number
Namibia	1904	Germans	Herero	65.000
Sudan	1952-94-2004	Regular Army	Black animists	Unknown
Angola	1961	" "	Unita	"
Rwanda	1959-1994	"and militia"	Tutsi	1million
Congo K.	1964-1965	"	Lumumbists	Unknown
Nigeria	1966-70	"	Igbos	3million
Burundi	1972	"	Hutu rebellion	Unknown
Uganda	1976-1978	"	Opposition	50.000
Mozambique	1975-1994	"	Renamo	Unknown
Ethiopia	1984-1985	"	Opposition	"
Somalia	1988-1989	"	Opposition	"
Liberia	1990-1994	"	Rebels	"

3. Selected Chronology of Genocide in the Americas.

Country	Date	Perpetrators	Victims	Estimations nr
COLONIAL AMERICA	1492	Spaniards British French Portugese	Indians	Unknown
USA	1789	Regular army	"	"
PARAGUAY	1962-1972	"	"	9000
GUATEMALA	1966-84	"	"	60.000
CHILE	1963-76	"	Leftists	30.000
ARGENTINA	1976-80	"	"	30.000
EL-SALVADOR	1980	"	"	70.000

4. Selected chronology of Genocide in Asia.

Country	Date	Perpetrators	Victims	Est. number
China	1211-34	Ghengis Khan, Mongols	Chinese Muslims	Unknown
Iraq	1959-75	Army	Kurds	"
Indonesia	1965-67	Indonesian arm	Communists	600.000
Vietnam	1965-72	Us army	Viet cong	?
Bangladesh	1971	Pakistan army	Bengalis	3M
Cambodia	1975-79	Khmer Red	Old Regime	2M
Afghanistan	1978-79	Regular Army	Rebels	?
Iran	1981-90	"	Kurds Bahai- Mujaeedin	20.000
Sri Lanka	1983-1987	Indonesian Army	Tamil	10.000
East Timor	1975	Indonesian Army	Tomolese	100.000

Appendix 3: Main indicators of Rwanda Vision by the year 2020

Indicators	Current situation	2020 goals
Rwanda population	8,300,000	14,000,000
Literacy (%)	48	100
Life expectancy at birth(years)	49	55
Women fertility(o/oo)	6.5	4.5
Infant mortality rate(o/oo)	110	30
Maternal mortality(o/oo.000)	810	200
Infant malnutrition (weight insufficiency in %)	30	10
Population growth	2.9	2.2
Enrolment net rate in primary education (%)	72	100
Transition rate from primary to secondary education (%)	42	80
Net enrolment in secondary education (%)	7	20
Qualification rate of secondary schools teachers	20	100
Attendance rate in tertiary education (o/oo)	1	6
Gender equity in tertiary education	30	100
Gender equity in decision-making positions (F %)	10	30
Rate of AIDS prevalence	14	5
Mortality caused by malaria	51	25
Medical doctors/100,000 inhabitants	1.5	10
Population in good hygienic state (%)	20	60
Nurses/100,000 inhabitants	16	20
Lab.assistants/100,000 inhabitants	2	5
Poverty (% less than US\$/day)	64	30
GDP average growth rate (%)	6.2	8
Agricultural sector growth rate	9	6
Industrial sector growth rate (%)	7	12
Services sector growth rate		
Gini coefficient	0.454	0.350
Epargne nationale brute (saving) (%)	1	6
Gross domestic investment (FBCE %)	18	23
GDP per inhabitant in US \$	220	600
Urban population (%)	19	30
Farmers (%)	91	50
Modern agricultural techniques (%)	3	50
Use of fertilisers/ha (kg/year)	2	15
Financial credits to agricultural sector (%)	1	20
Access to pure water (%)	44	80
Food production kcal/inhab./day (%)	1612	2200
Availability of protein /inhab./day (% of needs)	35	65
Roads (km/km2)	0.54	0.60
Annual consumption of electricity (kwh/inhab)	30	100
Access to electricity (% of population)	2	10
Land protected against soil erosion (%)	20	100
Firewood energy in the national energy stack (%)	96	60

Source: MINECOFIN (2002-7-8)

Appendix 4: The Hutu Ten Commandments (*African Rights, 1995:42-43*).

1. Every Muhutu should know that a Mututsi woman, wherever she is, works for the interest of her Mututsi ethnic group. As a result, we shall consider a traitor any Muhutu who-marries a Tutsi woman;-befriends a Tutsi woman;-employs a Tutsi woman as s secretary or a concubine.
2. Every Muhutu should know that our Hutu daughters are more suitable and conscientious in their role as woman, wife and mother of the family. Are they not beautiful, good secretaries and more honest?
3. Bahutu women, be vigilant and try to bring your husbands, brothers and sons back to reason.
4. Every Muhutu should know that every Mututsi is dishonest in business. His only aim is the supremacy of his ethnic group. As a result, any Muhutu who does the following is a traitor:-makes a partnership with Batutsi in business;-invests his money or the government's money in a Tutsi enterprise;-lends or borrows money from a Mututsi;-gives favours to a Batutsi in business (obtaining import licences, bank loans, construction sites, public markets...).
5. All strategic positions, political, administrative, economic, military and security should be entrusted to Bahutu.
6. The education sector (school pupils, students, and teachers) must be majority Hutu.
7. The Rwandese Armed Forces should be exclusively Hutu. The experience of October (1990) war has taught us a lesson. No member of the military shall marry a Tutsi.
8. The Bahutu should stop having mercy on the Batutsi.
9. The Bahutu, wherever they are, must have unity and solidarity, and be concerned with the fate of their Hutu brothers.-The Bahutu inside and outside Rwanda must constantly look for friends and allies for the Hutu cause, starting with their Bantu brothers:-They must constantly counteract the Tutsi propaganda:-The Bahutu must be firm and vigilant against their common Tutsi enemy.
10. The social revolution of 1959, the referendum of 1961 and the Hutu ideology must be taught to every Muhutu at every level. Every Muhutu must spread this ideology widely. Any Muhutu who persecutes his brother Muhutu for having read, spread and taught this ideology, is a traitor.

Published in Kigali, 10 December 1990.

Appendix 5: Questionnaire for heads of households and leaders

UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL (Westville Campus)

ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

ALPHONSE GAHIMA

REG: 204001473

Title of the Study: The Socio-Economic Impacts of the Genocide and Current Developments in Rwanda: Case Study of the Towns of Butare and Cyangugu

Questionnaire 1 (For heads of households).

A. HOUSEHOLD LOCATION

Province:

District:

Sector:

Cell:

Household No:

Name (Optional):

B. SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS

1. Respondents' identification

Codes

Members	Relationship	Sex	Age	Marital status	Education	Language	Ethnic group
Person 1	1 Husband	1 Male	1 1-10	1 Married	1 No formal education	1 Kswanda	1 Hutu
Person 2	2 Wife	2 Female	2 10-14	2 Single	2 Primary education	2 Swahili	2 Futsi
Person 3	3 Child		3 15-19	3 Divorce	2 Primary	3 French	3 Other
Person 4	4 Relative		4 20-24	4 Widowed	3 IC	4 English	
Person 5	5 Others		5 25-29	5 Living together	4 RAI	5 Other	
			6 30-34	6 Other	4 Tertiary		
			7 35-39				
			8 40-44				
			9 45-49				
			10 50-54				
			11 55-59				
			12 60-64				
			13 65-69				
			14 70+				

Identification

	Relationship	Sex	Age	Marital status	Education	Languages	Ethnic group
Person 1							

1.2. How long have you been living in the Cell?

1.3. Were you here before 1994? ... If no, where were you living?

1.4. How many people died during the genocide in 1994 in your family?

1.5. How many people are still alive but were injured?

1.6. What type of injuries?

Type	Code
Cuts and bruises	1
Head injuries	2
Loss of an arm	3
Loss of a leg	4
Loss of a limb	5
Body injuries	6
Other (totally disabled/specific)	7

1.7. How many of your family left the country from households during the genocide?

Persons	Age	Sex	Relationship

1.7. What effect did this have on your family?

1.
2.
3.
4.

1.8. If you were given the opportunity to move inside or outside the country, would you move?

Yes	1
No	2

1.8.1. If yes, where would you choose to move?

.....

1.8.2. Why would you decide to re-settle on the new location?

.....

2. Income

2.1. Sources of household income before and after 1994: multiple responses

Principal sources	Code	Before 1994	After 1994	Decreased	Increased	No change
Household farming	1					
Own business	2					
Informal activities(craft, brewery)	3					
Salary	4					
Professional activity	5					
Pensions, social welfare grants, etc	6					
No source of income	7					
Other (specify)	8					

2.2. If income decreased, what are you doing to increase income?

Needs	Code
Credit from the Government or NGOs	1
Education and qualification	2
Land for farming	3
Off-farm activities	4
Other(specify)	5

3. Housing

3.1. Have you been living in the same house. before and after the genocide?

Yes	1
No	2

3.2. If No, where did you live before? Area...../Sector..... ..Rent or owners?

Did you build/rent/buy present dwelling?

Compared to previous dwelling, is dwelling adequate for needs?

3.3. If rent/built did price of dwelling increased or decreased after the genocide?.....

Yes/No

3.4. What caused prices to increase or decrease?.....

3.5. What type of materials is used to build present house?

Type of material	Code
Adobes bricks+ Sheet iron	1
Wood+ mud+ sheet iron	2
Adobes bricks + Tiles	3
Bricks + Tiles	4
Wood +sheet iron	5
Thatch	6
Other (specify)	7

3. If rent, how much do you pay? (In Rwandan Francs:RwF)

4. Services and facilities.

4.1. What facilities/services among the following were available for your household?

Services and facilities	Before 1994	After 1994
Water		
Market		
Stadium		
Land for cultivation		
District office		
Primary school		
Place of worship		
Bus station		
Tel-Internet		
Other (specify)		

4.2. How far away were you from the following services and facilities and

How long did you need to reach them before and after 1994?

Did distances increased/decreased?

Services and facilities	Dist. Before (Kms)	Dist. After (Kms)	Time before (minute)	Time After (minute)	Increased	Decreased
Water						
Market						
Stadium						
Land for cultivation						
District office						
Health centre						
Primary school						
Place of worship						
Bus station						
Tel-Internet						
Other (specify)						

4.3. What kind of sanitation is available for your household?

Before 1994	After 1994

4.4. What service mentioned above or other not mentioned do you think is the most needed for your household?

.....

4.5. Means of transport used before 1994? Multiple responses

Means	code	Before 1994	After 1994
Taxi-bus	1		
Taxi-motorecycle	2		
Taxi-bicycle	3		
Car owner	4		
Walk	5		

4.6. What are your information sources? Multiple responses

Sources	Code	Before 1994	After 1994
Radio	1		
TV	2		
Newspapers	3		
Other(specify)	4		

4.7. Means of communications before 1994?

Means	Code	Before 1994	After 1994
Tel. land line	1		
Cell phone	2		
Internet	3		
Other(specify)	4		

5. Energy

5.1. What are the primary sources of fuel for cooking and lighting for the household?

Sources	Code	Cooking	Lighting	Before 1994	After 1994
Wood	1		X		
Paraffin	2				
Coal	3		X		
Electricity	4				
Gas	5				
Generator	6				
Candles	7	X			
Thatch(Grass)	8				
Other(specify)	9				

5.2. What is the cost before and after the genocide?/month

	Before 1994	After 1994
Cooking		
Lighting		

5.3. Which source of fuel do you most prefer?

Sources of fuel	Code
Wood	1
Coal	2
Electricity	3
Paraffin	4
Gas	5
Thatch(Grass)	6

5.4. Why do you prefer the source of fuel identified above?

.....

5.5. Do you purchase everything or you have any home-based industry?

Shopping	Code	Before 1994	After 1994
Everything	1		
Home-based industry(craft, brewery)	2		

If you have a home based industry, specify which kind.....

6. Health

6.1. What health services and facilities do you have access to in your Cell?

Availability of services and facilities	Before 1994	After 1994
Clines		
Health centre		
Dispensary		
Nr Doctors and Nurses		

6.2. Distance, Time and cost of health facilities

	Before 1994	After 1994
Distance		
Time		
Cost		

6.3. What diseases affected household before and after the genocide?

Diseases before 1994	Number	Diseases after 1994	Number

6.3.1. Do you think there was a change in disease patterns?

Yes	No

6.3.2. What was the change?

6.3.3. If disease increased give reasons

6.4. What illness affected household before and after the genocide?

Illness before 1994	Number	Illness after 1994	Number

6.4.1. Do you think there was a change in illness patterns?

Yes	No

6.4.2. What was the change?

6.4.3. If illness increased give

reasons

C. SOCIO-CULTURAL PROFILE

1. Relationship

1. Did you socialise with your neighbours?

Opinions	Code	Before 1994	After 1994
Yes	1		
No	2		

If Yes, in what way?

1.1. How was relationship before the genocide?

V Good	Good	Satisfactory	Poor

1.2. Has your relationship changed after the genocide?

Change in relationship	Code
Yes	1
No	2

If so, how has it changed?

1.3. How would you rate the relationship amongst the people in your Cell?

Rating	Code
Good	1
Fair	2
Sometimes bad	3
Bad	4
Don't know	5

2. Leisure

What source of leisure did/ do you have in the family?

Source of leisure	Code	Before 1994	After 1994
Sport	1		
Outings	2		
Relatives' visits	3		
Worship	4		
None	5		
Other(specify)	6		

3. Conflicts

3.1. What types of conflicts and tensions do you often have in your neighbourhood?

Type of conflicts	Code	Specify
Land and properties	1	
Water	2	
Sewage system	3	
Waste management	4	
Ethnic	5	
Other (specify)	6	

3.2. What types of conflict resolution procedures are used?

Conflicts resolution	Code
The Cell's leader meets parties involved	1
Goanna courts	2
All Cells' members meet	3
All household heads meet	4
Within the parties involved	5
Other(specify)	6

3.3. Which category of people do you think has suffered the most from the genocide?

Categories	Code	Why?
Orphans		
Elders		
Widowed		
Children		
Women		
Other(specify)		

4. Culture

4.1. Has your attendance at church/mosque/temple decreased or increased after the genocide?

Decreased	1
Increased	2
No change	3

Explain.....

4.2. What do you think about marriages across ethnic boundaries?

Opinions	Code
For	1
Against	2
No opinion	3

Explain your position.....

4.3. What do you think are the main things in Rwandan culture values that were destroyed by the genocide?

4.4. What does national reconciliation mean to you?

.....

4.4.1. What are opportunities for it to be realised?

.....

4.4.2. What are obstacles?

.....

4.5. What do you think should be improved in your cell regarding the welfare of each member?

Questionnaire II (For Leaders).

Province: Butare & Cyangugu Tow

District:

Sector:

Cell:

RESPONSIBLES OF THE CELLS (4)
(Local Authorities)

Date:

Name: (Optional).....

A. RESPONDENTS' BACKGROUND**(Open- ended questions).**

Gender.....

Marital status

Age

Level of Education ... Pr/2. Sec/ 3. Tert./4. No formal ed....

How long have you been living in the Cell?

As leader?

Language (s) spoken ?.....

B. MANAGING SOCIO-ECONOMIC ISSUES AFTER THE GENOCIDE

1. How often and where do you meet the people of your Cell?

Formally? Informally?.....

2.1. How many people do you think are:

New in your Cell?

Fled from the Cell and did not come back?

.....

- Left the country and came back?
- Were there before and are still there after the genocide?
- How many were killed?
- 2.2. What are: (How can you describe the..)
- Social relationships in your Cell?
 - Political relationships?
 - Economic relationships?
3. Which strategies do you use to manage those relationships
- Social
 - Political
 - Economic
4. What was/ is the principal source of income in your Cell?
- Before the genocide? After the genocide?
-
5. To what religion do you think most the of people belong?
- Before the genocide? After?
6. What particular problems affect the following groups of people as a consequence of the genocide and how do you cope with them (strategies)?
- Women?
- Strategies?
- Youth?
- Strategies?
- Elders?
- Strategies?
- Orphans?
- Strategies?

Disabled?

Strategies ?.....

7. What kind of conflict, tensions do you often meet in your Sector/ Cell?

.....

7.1. What type of conflict resolution procedures do you use?

.....

7.2. What results do you often obtain?

.....

C. MANAGING INFRASTRUCTURE

1. What type of materials are most used for building houses? Iron sheets? bricks?

Adobe bricks? Tiles? Mud? Wood?

Why that preference?

2. What services below existed before 1994, were destroyed, rehabilitated or are new?

Service	Existed	Destroyed	Rehabilitated	New
School				
Hospital				
Water supply				
Electricity				
Shops				
Market				
Place of worship				
Telephone				
Bus station				
Other				

3. What are the causes of the informal settlement in your Cell?

.....

3.1. How do you think that problem should be solved?

.....

.....

4. What service is most needed by your people and

4.1. Which assistance should help to realise that?

5. Was disease less prevalent before the genocide? Yes or No?

Before 1994 ? After 1994.....

What type?.....

5.1. If diseases have increased what strategies are employed to control them.....

.....

6. In your administration unit, are you supported by any NGO? In what activities?

.....

.....

Appendix 6: Permission from the Province of Cyangugu Town

REPUBLIC OF RWANDA
 PROVINCE OF CYANGUGU
 TEL/FAX: 537200/537254
 E-mail: provincecyangugu@yahoo.fr
P.O.BOX.19 CYANGUGU

Cyangugu July 11th, 2005
 NO 938/07.16/01

To Mr. Br. GAHIMA Alphonse
 University of Kwazulu-Natal
 C/O Marist Brothers Mururu
CYANGUGU

RE: Reply to your letter

Dear Sir,

Following your letter of April 11th, 2005k, requesting permission for research in the Municipality of Cyangugu, I hereby agree that the required permission has been granted.

Could the Mayor of Cyangugu Municipality assist you in obtaining data that you require in order that you may successfully complete your project.

Sheikh Mussa Fazil HARERIMANA
 Prefet of the Province of Cyangugu
P.o. MURAGWA Vincent (Executive Secretary)

Copies to:

- The Executive Secretary of the Province of Cyangugu
- The Director of the Environment and development Unit-Cyangugu
- The Mayor of the Municipality of Cyangugu

(Original in *Kinyarwanda* on the next page)

REPUBLIKA Y'U RWANDA

Cyangugu, kuwa 11/07/05

N°...938...../07.16/01



INTARA YA CYANGUGU

TEL/FAX:537200/537254

E-mail:provincecyangugu@yahoo.fr

B.P.19 CYANGUGU

Bwana Brother GAHIMA Alphonse
University of Kwazulu-Natal
c/o Frères Maristes Mururu
CYANGUGU

Impamyu: Gusubiza ibaruwa yawe

Bwana,

Nshingiye ku ibaruwa yawe yo kuwa 11/04/2005 wanyandikiye usaba uburenganzira bwo gukora ubushakashatsi mu Mujyi wa Cyangugu;

Nkwandikiye nkumenyeshya ko wemerewe gukora ubwo bushakashatsi mu Mujyi wa Cyangugu. Mboneyeho kandi gusab umuyobozi w'Umujyi wa Cyangugu mpaye kopi kuzagufasha muri ubwo bushakashatsi. Gira amahoro.

UMUKURU W'INTARA YA CYANGUGU
Sheikh Mussa Fazil HARERIMANA

Bimeneshejwe:

-Bwana Umunyamabanga Nshingwabikorwa w'Intara ya Cyangugu

CYANGUGU

-Bwana Umuyobozi wa Unité y'Iterambere ry'Ubukungu n'Ibidukikije

CYANGUGU

-Bwana Umuyobozi w'Umujyi wa Cyangugu

CYANGUGU



Appendix 7: Permission from the Municipality of Butare Town

REPUBLIC OF RWANDA
PROVINCE OF BUTARE
MUNICIPALITY OF BUTARE
P.O.BOX 35
Tel.530362
E-mail: villebutare@yahoo.com

Butare, April 25th, 2005
No.399/07.14/01

To Coordinators of Musange and
Butare-ville Sectors

RE: Permission for research to
Br.GAHIMA Alphonse

Dear Sir/Madam

Please be informed that the student Br.GAHIMA Alphonse is conducting research in your Sector.
Could you please assist him in obtaining the data he requires.

KALISA Clement
Mayor of the Municipality of Butare

Copies to:

- The Director of Finances and Development Unit
 - Br. GAHIMA Alphonse
- (Original in *Kinyarwanda* on the next page)

REPUBLIKA Y'U RWANDA
 INTARA YA BUTARE
 UMUJYI WA BUTARE
 B.P. : 35
 Tél. : 530362
 E-mail : villebutare@yahoo.com

Butare, kuwa 25/04/2005
 N°399/07.14/01

Bwana na Madamu
 Umuhuzabikorwa w'Umurenge wa
 Musange n'uwa Butare-VIIC

Impamvu : Korohereza mu bushakashatsi
 Bwana Fr. GAHIMA Alphonse

Bwana,

Mbandikiye uru rwandiko ngirango
 mbasabe gufasha uyu munyeshuri witwa Fr GAHIMA Alphonse ukorera ubushakashatsi
 mu murenge mubereye umuhuzabikorwa w'Umurenge wa Musange n'uwa Butare-VIIC.

a.

Musabwe kumworohere


na Butare

Umuyobozi w'umujyi
 KALISA Clément

Bimenyeshejwe:

- Umuyobozi w'Umujyi
 Wungirije ushinzwe ubukungu
 n'amajyambere

✓ Fr GAHIMA Alphonse



Appendix 8: Rwanda: Population taken by census (000 people)

Group	1978				1991				1996				2001			
	1 st Population Census				2 nd Population Census				Socio-demographic survey				Local administrative data			
	M	F	Total	M/F %	M	F	Total	M/F %	M	F	Total	M/F %	M	F	Total	M/F%
Total	2.364	2.569	4.832	96	3.488	3.671	7.156	95	2.854	3.306	6.162	86	3.748	4.352	8.104	86
0-04	486	503	989	97	647	654	1.300	99	500	520	1.020	96	620	645	1.265	96
05-09	380	393	773	97	585	598	1.183	98	483	503	986	96	559	597	1.157	94
10-14	311	323	634	97	451	468	919	96	497	521	1.018	95	604	644	1.249	94
15-19	256	365	520	97	350	363	713	97	333	361	694	92	538	615	1.153	87
20-24	208	215	423	97	283	302	585	94	194	274	468	71	319	386	705	83
25-29	168	174	342	96	261	269	530	97	143	209	352	69	202	273	476	74
30-34	135	140	275	96	242	242	483	100	150	197	347	76	167	217	384	77
35-36	108	113	221	96	178	183	361	98	135	166	301	81	162	209	371	78
40-44	86	90	176	95	117	127	244	93	108	141	249	77	146	217	363	67
45-49	68	72	139	94	77	98	175	79	73	95	168	76	134	148	282	91
50-54	52	57	109	92	73	101	174	72	54	83	138	65	87	121	208	72
55-59	39	44	83	90	62	73	135	84	44	60	103	73	61	82	143	74
60-64	28	32	60	87	56	71	127	80	42	59	102	71	49	70	119	70
65-69	19	23	41	83	39	45	84	87	37	41	78	89	37	50	86	73
70-74	11	14	26	79	33	41	74	83	28	37	66	76	30	40	70	73
+75	9	12	21	72	34	36	69	94	33	39	72	86	34	39	73	88

Source: MINECOFIN, 2002: 270

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