FROM GUNS TO DIALOGUE: THE ROLE OF THE CHURCH IN THE DEMOCRATISATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF ANGOLA

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2006
DECLARATION

I, Zeferino Teka, in conformity with University regulations, hereby declare that this dissertation, unless specifically indicated to the contrary in the text, is my own original work and has not been submitted in any form to another university.
ABSTRACT

This study set out to find a conceptual framework through which the church can respond to the democratisation process that Angola has been undergoing since the year 2002. In this regard, the study firstly posited that the democratisation process the country is undergoing presents an opportunity that Angolans can seize to exorcise the past of war and embark on the definition of a new national future. Secondly, it posited that the church does possess potential to contribute to the success of the democratisation process and positively influence the shaping of a new Angola.

To achieve this aim, the study was divided in three major parts. The first part surveys Angola’s socio-political and economic past from the beginning of the civil war in 1975 to its end in the early 2002. This survey is followed by an analytical discussion which attempts to ascertain the major challenges the past poses to the future. The second part of the study discusses the relationship between democratisation and reconstruction. This discussion revolves around the meaning and the relevance of democratisation for Angola, involves an evaluation of the framework that is guiding the democratisation process, a diagnosis of the current prospects of the democratisation process, and an evaluation of the church’s response to the process. The last part of the study outlines the Theology of Reconstruction as it has been posited in Africa. It discusses its paradigmatic value as well as its relevance to the current socio-political context in Angola. The study culminates with reflections on how a Theology of Reconstruction can inform the response of the church to the democratisation process in Angola and thereby to its reconstruction.

The study found that the pursuit of monopoly by the incumbent ruling party in Angola and the former armed opposition movement, with the complicity of foreign powers’ interference in national affairs, is the major factor that has fuelled Angola’s politico-military conflict in the past. This conflict has brought about destruction and hindered national development. The study also found that while the democratisation process is on course, there have nevertheless continued to be socio-political challenges from the country’s past. Lastly, the study found that the church’s response to the democratisation process has been anachronistic. While it had contextual cohesion in the era that preceded democratisation, it however proves to be redundant in the current democratisation and reconstruction challenge that the country is faced with.

By way of conclusion, the study suggests that the democratisation process that Angola is currently undergoing is the necessary stepping-stone for the country to move from the destructive past into a process of national reconstruction. It argues that the democratisation process avails space for the creation of legitimate and accountable political institutions and structures that can deter the absolutist and totalitarian politics of the past. In turn, the study suggests a primarily proactive, yet also resistant reconstruction theological framework for a church response to the democratisation process that Angola is undergoing. This framework is posited in view of the current socio-political state of affairs in the country and with a view to a decisive ecclesial influence in the making of a new Angola.
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<tr>
<td>AACC</td>
<td>All Africa Council of Churches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTSA</td>
<td>Action for Southern Africa campaigns for peace, democracy and development in Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADRP</td>
<td>Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEA</td>
<td>Angolan Evangelical Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>AHM</td>
<td>Angolan Health Ministry</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIA</td>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANGOP</td>
<td>Angolan News Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAA</td>
<td>United States’ Bureau of African Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPV</td>
<td>People’s Vigilance Brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Mixed Military Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCPM</td>
<td>Joint Political-Military Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEAST</td>
<td>Angolan Catholic Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>United States Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CICA</td>
<td>Council of Christian Churches</td>
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<tr>
<td>COIEPA</td>
<td>Inter-ecclesial Commission for Peace in Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EISA</td>
<td>Electoral Institute of Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELNA</td>
<td>Angolan National Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAA</td>
<td>Angolan Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>FALA</td>
<td>Angolan Armed Liberation Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAPLA</td>
<td>Peoples’ Forces for the Liberation of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDC</td>
<td>Democratic Front of Cabinda</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLEC</td>
<td>Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLEC-R</td>
<td>Renewed Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLEC-FAC</td>
<td>Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda Armed Forces of Cabinda</td>
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<tr>
<td>FNLA</td>
<td>National Front for the Liberation of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>GARP</td>
<td>Angolan Group for Reflection on Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoA</td>
<td>Government of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>GURN</td>
<td>Government of Unity and National Reconciliation</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
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<td>HRW</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced People</td>
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<td>IDR</td>
<td>Head of Families Expenditure and Revenues Survey</td>
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<td>IELA</td>
<td>Evangelical Lutheran Church of Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRIN</td>
<td>United Nations Integral Regional Information Network</td>
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Angola’s geographical situation within Africa

Source: www.world-gazetter.com
Angola: map of administrative divisions
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCING THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

This study falls under the domain of contextual theological praxis, which focuses on the intersection between theology and social issues. The topic of the study arises out of concern about the future of Angola in the light of the long twenty-seven year civil war that the country has experienced and the democratisation process that is now in course. The topic presupposes that the end of the war and the ushering in of a democratic political process in the country presents an opportunity which Angolans can seize to exorcise the past and embark on national reconstruction. To this end, the church, as part of society, can make a significant contribution by means of its various resources. Thus, the main question that this study sets out to investigate is how the church should respond to the democratisation process that Angola is undergoing. This research problem suggests that there is need for a conceptual framework to guide the church’s intervention. Such a framework should hold to a social vision that should serve as a reference for continual critical reflection on the church’s praxis.

1.2 Aims and methodology

The first aim of this study is to identify the ghost of the past that confronts the present process of building a new Angola. To this end, the study historically outlines Angola’s socio-political experience from independence in 1975 to the end of the civil war in the year 2002. From this historical survey the study analytically identifies issues that characterise the country’s past and which pose challenges to the future. The second aim of the study is to ascertain the importance of democratisation in the building of a new Angola. The meaning of democracy and the relevance of democratisation to Angola’s socio-political context are discussed. The third aim of the study is to diagnose the current prospects of the democratisation process in the country. It pursues this aim by surveying how the main political players are responding to the process, and especially the church’s
response. This is so as the study argues that the church should play a role in the democratisation process. However, the church’s response is not a historical account of how the church has responded to social issues in the past, as this is beyond the scope of the current study. The study focuses particularly on how the church is currently responding to the democratisation process. The response of the church is examined in light of the Inter-ecclesial Commission for Peace in Angola (COIEPA). This is a coalition of all Christian denominations in Angola and it represents the official voice of the Christian Church in the country. The final aim of the study is to provide a conceptual framework from which the church can respond to the democratisation process in Angola. This pursuit is theoretically guided by a reconstruction theological paradigm, to which we now turn.

1.3 Theoretical framework

Since the early 1990s, a theology of reconstruction has shared the African scholarship debate together with other forms of African contextual theologies, such as liberation, incarnation, inculturation, indigenisation, reconciliation theologies. The reconstruction theological paradigm has been introduced in Africa by the Kenyan theologian Jesse N.K. Mugambi and the South African theologian Charles Villa-Vicencio. These theologians have argued that reconstruction is the fitting paradigm for contextual theological praxis in Africa, following the change of the political context in the world and in [South] Africa.

Jesse Mugambi (1995; 2003) has argued that with the change of order in world politics, from Cold War to democratic dispensation, the challenge now facing Africa is to rebuild itself “out of the ruins of the wars against racism, colonial domination and ideological branding” (2003:128). He has posited that the Exodus theme, which has been the core theological motif in liberation theology, is only one among many “reconstruction and restoration” themes in the Old Testament. The Hebrews were motivated by various other themes toward the transformation of their “society and culture at different times in their history” (1995:24). Thus, Mugambi (1995:24) has questioned why the Exodus theme should “continue to dominate African theological thinking while Africa is longing for
other relevant paradigms and metaphors” (1995:24). Instead, he has proposed that African theology should shift its liberation paradigm to reconstruction in order to respond to the new challenge of rebuilding that it is now confronted with (Mugambi 1995:24).

Charles Villa-Vicencio (1992) has likewise suggested that with the change of the political situation in South Africa from apartheid to democracy, the church should move from liberation to a reconstruction theological paradigm (1992:7-9). Villa-Vicencio argues that this change of context obliges the church to move from “a theological no” to “a theological yes” (1992:1). While “a theological no” was an appropriate resistance against apartheid, “a theological yes” is now contextually appropriate to the new “unfolding process that could culminate in a democratic, just and kinder social order” (1992:1, 7).

Also significant to the reconstruction theology debate is Ka Mana’s emphasis on the ‘psycho-anthropology’ of the African mind. Valentin Dedji (2001:257-264) highlights that for Ka Mana, key to Africa’s reconstruction is the revitalisation of Africa’s “psyche” from the mental oppression that the West has implanted in it through colonialism and neo-colonialism, as well as revitalisation from Africa’s own “magico-fetishic mentalities”. Ka Mana posits that theology can reconstructively intervene by imparting to [African] society “a vision of God’s utopia” (Dedji 2001:257-264).

The reconstruction paradigm has not been without critics, who have responded to two aspects. Firstly, it is questioned whether a reconstruction theology offers a sufficient new value other than what earlier African theologies already do. Tinyiko Sam Maluleke (1994:247) has argued that Villa-Vicencio’s call for a shift from “a theological no” to “a theological yes” bears an “inherent hypocrisy”. This is because, Maluleke contends, the “inviters” seem to pretend that “they too have been involved in the same resistance theology” that has been fought. Maluleke also argues that the call for such a shift should

\[1\] “A theological no” means a resistant theological stance, as associated with the theology of liberation, whose aim was to debunk and destabilise apartheid theory, law, and practice. In turn, “a theological yes” means an open minded theological stance which would positively appraise opportunities availed by changing socio-political situations towards a constructive agenda (Villa-Vicencio 1992:7).

In reaction to Jesse Mugambi, Maluleke (1996:473) has argued that the proposal for a reconstruction theology to lead contextual theological praxis in Africa is "unclear" and not comprehensively developed. He contends that this proposal has not taken existing African theologies "seriously" as it has not sufficiently interacted with them (1996:473).

Secondly, there is concern regarding the use of biblical texts in the reconstruction theological metaphor. It is argued that the theological justification for reconstruction has not been based on sound biblical exegesis. Most prominently, Elelwani B. Farisani (2002:86) has argued that Mugambi, Villa-Vicencio, and other proponents of the reconstruction paradigm have used the Ezra-Nehemiah text 'uncritically'. They have overlooked the ideological problem contained in the sociology of the text, "bias against the am haaretz". Consequently, the text did not serve the common interest of all people that were involved in its socio-historical reconstruction context. Farisani (2002:86) posits that "if Ezra-Nehemiah is to be used in a theology of reconstruction it should not be read as representing the voice of only one group. The suppressed voices of the am haaretz have to be heard as well" (2002:86, 112, 297).

This study finds the critiques levelled against the reconstruction paradigm to be of significant value and consequence as far as the proposal's appropriateness and worth is concerned. For this reason, such critiques are dealt with more closely in the corpus of the study. It also contends that the reconstruction paradigm has nonetheless been widely welcomed in scholarly and institutional circles around the continent. This has been mainly due to the paradigm's strong contextual basis. The change in the political environment in [South] Africa has been indisputably accepted as warranting the reconstruction motif that a theology of reconstruction posits. For example, the theme of the All African Council of Churches (AACC) gathering in Nairobi in August 1994 was

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2 The am haaretz referred to the remnant of Jews who had not gone into exile to Babylon in 587 B.C. The returnees used this name to mean "enemies" or "adversaries" (Farisani 2002: 86)
“Democratisation and Development” (Pityana, quoted by Farisani 2003:84); and the theme for its 8th Assembly in Yaounde Cameroon in 2003 was “Come let us rise and Build – Nehemiah 2:18” (Mugambi 2003:210).

More concretely, the reconstruction paradigm offers the following values to the study. One is the reconstruction motif. This motif makes the paradigm particularly appealing to the current Angolan context because the political stage at which Angola is and to which the church is to respond seems to warrant for a reconstruction theological approach. Angola is currently undergoing a democratisation process following the end of the civil war. In this context the church is particularly challenged to participate in the defining and reconstruction of a new Angola. Thus, approaching the situation reconstructively would potentially enable the church to make the most effective contribution. The second value that the theology of reconstruction lends to this study is the element of social analysis. Considering the social realities with which the country is faced, the church is also challenged to engage with social issues that are both pertinent and defining of both the present and the future. This element directly underscores the third value that the theology of reconstruction lends to the study: the ‘interdisciplinary’ element. Through an interdisciplinary approach theology can exchange insights with social sciences, which is vital toward an adequately informed church response to social transformation. Though the reconstruction motif is the main guiding principle of the study, it is however not exclusive. The study will also draw on complementary values that other contextual theologies can offer to address relevant aspects within the study.

In the Angolan context, a theology of reconstruction is a new academic terrain. José B. Chipenda, an acclaimed Angolan-African theologian and former General Secretary of the All African Council of Churches (AACC), has been part of the reconstruction paradigm debate but only within the broader African context. He has not engaged the paradigm directly within the context of Angola. He co-authored the AACC’s publication, *The Church of Africa: Towards a Theology of Reconstruction* (1991), and has also published *The Mission-Responsibility of the Church in a Time of National Crisis* (1997). The argument in these works is posited within the broader African context without any
specific relevance to Angola. As such, it falls within the broader reconstruction argument posited by Mugambi, which will be discussed in the due course of the study. To the best knowledge of the candidate, it is only Abraham H. Malua who has attempted to engage with the theology of reconstruction in the Angolan context in his work *From Civil War to Development: A study of the contribution of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Angola (IELA) towards Reconciliation, Peace, Reconstruction and Development among the Ovambo*³ Community in Southern Angola (2003). As the title indicates, Malua’s work did not particularly focus on the theology of reconstruction. It is a multi-theoretical work, involving reconciliation, reconstruction, and people centred development theories. Among these, the study is dominated by the theory of people centred development, for which Malua uses David Korten’s understanding of *Development as social transformation, people-centred development vision, and sustainable development vision* (Malua 2003:4).

The outcome of Malua’s work is that ‘reconciliation and reconstruction’ are central and pave the way for the restoration/development of the Ovambo people, which should focus on the wellbeing of the people. Malua (2003:92) submits, with the end of the civil war, the first task at hand is to seek unity of the Ovambo people through “reconciliation and forgiveness” because the people are divided, especially along tribal lines, and filled with hurt, animosity, and a sense of revenge (Malua 2003:92). This task should be followed by reconstruction of what the war has destroyed i.e. infrastructure, economy, and social institutions. Such a process of reconstruction should have as priority the wellbeing of the people, who should be empowered towards becoming self-sufficient rather than remain dependent (Malua 2002:84-86). In turn, Malua (2003:89) posited, the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Angola (IELA) should contribute to the restoration of the Ovambo people by advancing the process of reconciliation through the inculturation of the Christian message with Ovambo’s “traditional reconciliation rites” in order for the process to be more meaningful to the people (Malua 2003:89-90). This submission is coupled with an outline of some practical ways IELA’s ministry among the Ovambo can follow, such as providing civic education, especially on HIV/AIDS,

³ Ovambo are the largest community in the Southern Angolan province of Cunene.
creation of income generating activities among the community, and speaking out against economic injustice (Malua 2003:90).

In terms of this current study, Malua’s work is limited on various fronts. Malua’s work does not discuss per se the reconstruction theological paradigm or its relevance to Angola as a nation. His work is dominated by the people-centred development theory. As far as the reconstruction paradigm is concerned, Malua’s engagement is merely referential. Based on a few uncritical quotes from Mugambi, Villa-Vicencio and Farisani, Malua surmises that following the end of the civil war in Angola and the destruction it has caused, there is a need to rebuild the economy, infrastructure, and institutions among the Ovawambo community towards their development. He also posits that there is need “to reconstruct” IELA from the tribal conflict which it has experienced in the past so that its ministry among the Ovawambo may not continue being a stumbling block. Lastly, Malua deals with reconstruction as a linear process that follows reconciliation and together they give way to sustainable development (Malua 2003:92).

This study distinguishes itself from Malua’s work, in that it engages intensely with the reconstruction theological proposal that has been posited to lead African contextual theology in the New World Order, and it particularly discusses the relevance of this proposal to the national context of Angola. This study also poses itself at the cutting edge context of democratisation that Angola is undergoing, to which Malua’s work does not at all allude. This discussion further tackles the subject of the role of the church at a national level in Angola and also, at a broader level, social issues of politics, economics, justice, human rights, freedom, reconciliation, and development. Within the context of this discussion, this study also takes a different line from Malua’s with regard to ethnicity. Unlike Malua (2003:92) who advocates for ethnic/tribal unity as a fitting approach to advance the development of the Ovawambo people, this study argues for recognition of ethnic diversity, and posits societal unity as a more pragmatic approach to advance common good.
The use of theology of reconstruction in this study is based on the praxis model as understood by Stephen B. Bevans. In his book *Models of Contextual Theology: Faith and Cultures* (2003) Stephen Bevans speaks of six models of contextual theology. They are “translation, anthropological, praxis, synthetic, transcendental, and counter cultural” models. Bevans posits that though no one model is per se better than another, in a given context however, one model has to be dominant as the situation or subject being studied dictates. But this does not imply exclusivity. While one model should dominate, use may also be made of other models on a complementary basis as is necessary in the course of study. However, borrowing of one model from another should be done with great caution in order to avoid muddling or methodological conflict (Bevans 2003:72).

The praxis model is concerned with the value and contribution of theology in social transformation. It finds its philosophical insight in the interface between the notions of “rationality and subjectivity”, which can be identified in the pensees of thinkers like Rene Descartes, Emmanuel Kant and Karl Marx. This interface predicates an epistemology based on ‘historical-critical method’. That is, knowledge is what comes out of critical analysis of history or experience rather than from mere ideas or, for that matter, ideals (Bevans 2003:71-72). Thus, a praxis model as a term refers to “a method or model of thinking in general, and a method or model of theology in particular” (Bevans 2003:71).

The praxis model finds its biblical background in the “prophet tradition” which views true not in terms of words alone but also action, as can be exemplified in prophets Isaiah and Amos. In the New Testament, ‘the close connection of the ethical behaviour with theological thought’ posits an inter-testamental continuity of the ‘prophet tradition’. This can be exemplified by the ‘dictum of the need not only to hear the word but also to do it’ (James 1:22) (Bevans 2003:71).

The praxis model is a way of doing theology that is formed by knowledge yielding from the intersection between “action, reflection and praxis” (Bevans 2003:76). In ‘action’, men and women of faith are called to recognise God’s revelation in history – in events of everyday life, in social and economic structures, in situations of oppression, in the
experience of the poor and marginalized. This revelation is signified by instances of reconciliation, healing, liberation, which show that God is at work in history. In the biblical text, this can be for example considered in terms of Jesus’ parable of the Sheep and the Goats (Matthew 25:31-46). In this parable, Jesus teaches that God’s presence and revelation in history is to be found in the needy person who is hungry, thirsty, a stranger, sick, unclad, and a prisoner. For this reason, men and women of faith are called to cooperate with God in God’s work of “healing, reconciling, liberating” society from ills. One lesson that Jesus drew from the Sheep and the Goats parable is that whatever is done for the needy is done for God (v.40) (Bevans 2003:75).

‘Reflection’ involves analysis of the [historical] context in order to diagnose the realities underlying a situation, and then relate it to the biblical text and/or tradition for fresh understanding (Bevans 2003:75). Together, the elements of ‘action and reflection’ result in praxis, which is a “committed and intelligent action” (Bevans 2003:76). This is quite a radical epistemological method for theology compared to what more traditional theologies have pursued. While the latter’s dictum has been that “faith seeks understanding”, the dictum of the former would be that “faith seeks intelligent action” (Bevans 2003:73). Meaning, instead of theology consisting of a set of “concrete, permanent, and printed” axioms, the praxis model conceives theology more in terms of “an activity, a process, and a way of living” (Bevans 2003:74). As a way of doing theology, the praxis model involves a “dynamic process”. It combines words and action, it is open to change, and looks to the future (Fabella, quoted by Bevans 2003:70).

As a process that takes social analysis seriously, the praxis model has also been associated with liberation theology. It has been referred to as ‘liberation model’ for having been extensively developed by political theologians like J. Moltmann, J.B. Metz, and by liberation theologians, particularly Latin American theologians (Bevans 2003:72). However, Bevans posits two distinguishing differences between the theology of liberation praxis method and the praxis model.
Firstly, unlike the liberation praxis model, the praxis model does not necessarily involve liberation themes. It may well be possible, for example, “to do theology with a particular context where structural injustice is not very rampant. One could still theologise by acting reflectively and reflecting on one’s actions”, which is more in line with the method of Practical Theology (Bevans 2003:73). Secondly, more clearly than the liberation method, the praxis model reveals itself not as a theme specific model, but as a particular method (Bevans 2003:73).

In the light of this exposition, making use of the praxis model predicates that the study will apply the reconstruction theological paradigm as a bridging theoretical principle. Through its medium the study will theologise on the role of the church in the democratisation process in Angola based on an interaction between Angola’s current social context, social sciences’ insights, and theological tools. This interaction will be guided by the reconstructive approach that the reconstruction paradigm proposes. As earlier observed, the study will also draw on values that other African theologies may complementarily offer according to relevant aspects within the study. However, the reconstruction paradigm will be the primary theoretical guide throughout the study.

1.4 Structure of the study

The study consists of six chapters. Chapter one introduces the study. It delineates the study and its scope, including aims of the study and methodology, theoretical framework, and structure of the study. Chapter two establishes the socio-political context of the study. The first section of the chapter looks at Angola’s geography and it historically outlines the civil war that the country has undergone leading to peace. The second section of the chapter analyses the first section and ascertains the major challenges that the past poses to the future. Chapter three discusses the relationship between democratisation and reconstruction. It looks at the meaning of democracy and the relevance of democratisation for Angola. Chapter four surveys the response to the democratisation process by the major players in Angola’s political arena, but particularly the church’s response to the process. The aim of the chapter is to diagnose the prospects that the
democratic process currently presents and to identify the strengths and weaknesses in the church’s response. Chapter five discusses the reconstruction theological paradigm as posited in Africa, and its value and relevance for a church response to democratisation in Angola. Lastly, chapter six discusses a conceptual framework from and within which the church can effectively response to the democratisation process that Angola is undergoing with a view to contributing to national reconstruction. Following this is a general conclusion of the study.
2.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to identify the main challenges that Angola’s past poses to the future and particularly to the democratisation process the country is currently undergoing. This past includes the country’s socio-political experience since independence in 1975 to the beginning of the democratic process marked by decisive events that took place in early 2002. The first section of the chapter is an historical background. It describes Angola’s geography, the landmarks of Angola’s political past, civil war, and society in general. The second section of the chapter is a socio-historical appraisal. It critically considers the account of the first section, ascertaining issues that prove to have been at the basis of the ordeal of the past. Through these two processes: historical account and analysis of Angola’s past, this chapter seeks to establish the socio-political and economic context of the study and the challenges it poses to the democratisation and reconstruction of Angola.

2.2 Socio-political and economic context of the study

2.2.1 Geographical background

The Republic of Angola is a southern African country situated on the south coast of the Atlantic Ocean. It extends to an area of 1,246,700 square kilometres, land bordering with Namibia on the south, Zambia on the east, and on the north with the Democratic Republic of Congo (see Map 1). The country has eighteen administrative provinces (see Map 2). The northern provinces are Bengo, Luanda (the capital), Malanje, Lunda Sul, Lunda Norte, Kwanza Sul, Kwanza Norte, Zaire, Uige and the enclave of Cabinda, which is separated from the rest of the country by the estuary of the river Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The central region provinces are Benguela, Bié, Moxico and Huambo. The southern provinces are Huila, Namibe, Kuando Cubango and Cunene. Most recent demographic estimates indicate that Angola’s national population rates at
13.5 million. 97% of the population is native African, 2% *mestiço* – of mixed European and African descent, and 1% European, mainly of Portuguese and Dutch origins. While the former group inhabits the whole country, the two latter are mainly found in urban areas of Luanda and Benguela provinces (World Fact Book 2006; AHM 2003:15).

However, despite being the majority the native African population is quite a diverse ethno-linguistic constellation. According to the World Fact Book (2006) and IRIN (2005), little over one third of the total population is Ovimbundu, who are mainly found in the central and southern regions of the country and speak Umbundu. The Mbundu are the second largest group, nearly two quarters of the total population. They are concentrated in the capital Luanda, in Malanje, and along the Kwanza valley in the centre to the north of the country. They are Kimbundu speaking. The third largest group are the Bakongo, who make up one quarter of the total national population. They speak Kikongo and they have historically dwelt the northern provinces of Uige and Zaire, though now they can also be found in large numbers in Luanda. There are also other smaller groups, the Lunda Chokwe, Nganguela, Nyaneka-Humbe, Heréro, Ambo, and Ovambo, plus about another one hundred sub-groups (World Fact Book 2006; IRIN 2005). The official language of Angola is Portuguese, which is spoken countrywide alongside national dialects. This is a result of Portuguese colonialism, which is outlined in the section below.

### 2.2.2 Liberation, political conflict, dialogue

European settlers first docked on Angolan shores in 1483. Following the Berlin Conference of 1883-1885, which is charged with the ‘scramble’ of Africa, Portugal steadily imposed its colonial power over Angola (Guimarães 2001:96). In 1961 the Angolan people embarked on a general anti-colonial struggle under the formal leadership of the Popular Movement of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Guimarães (2001:96) records that on 15 January 1975, Lisbon convened talks with the three movements in Alvor in south of Portugal and accords were signed for
independence. The items of the Alvor Accords settled for a transitional government made up of the liberation movements and the Portuguese High Commission in Angola. This included a troika presidency of the three movements' representatives, a Defence Council, democratic elections, and granting of independence to Angola on 11 November the same year. It was ratified that Portugal would grant independence to Angola through the party that would have won the elections. The transitional government was formed and mandated on 31 January 1975 (Guimarães 2001:96).

However, there was a change in the course of events soon after the transitional government took office. Conflict erupted between the liberation movements in government and the country plunged into war and became militarily divided. Guimarães (2001:111) points out that with support of Soviet Union weaponry and Cuban troops, the MPLA managed to expulse both FNLA and UNITA from the capital Luanda. But the latter galvanised immediately. The FNLA, supported by the United States and Zaire, put a stronghold in the northern region of the country whence it organised its warfare against Luanda. UNITA, also supported by the United States of America and South Africa, placed its siege lower in the south (Schubert 1999:407). On 10 November 1975, the Portuguese High Commission lowered Portuguese flag over Angola and began exit back to Portugal. This event prompted an exodus of about 90% of the Portuguese settler population from Angola (Guimarães 2001:111).

Having victoriously resisted FNLA and UNITA military campaigns to recover control of Luanda, on 11 November 1975 the MPLA declared Angola independent from colonialism Guimarães (2001:113), and proclaimed the “Peoples’ Republic of Angola”. In the central province of Huambo, FNLA and UNITA coalesced and declared a “rival” independence (Guimarães 2001:111-3). Benedict Schubert (1999:406) records that they proclaimed the “Popular Democratic Republic of Angola”. However, as Guimarães (2001:113) points out, it is the MPLA that was quickly recognised internationally. It was first recognised by member communist countries and some authoritarian regimes such as Brazil, then also by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in January 1976 (Guimarães 2001:113).
The MPLA government then went on to consolidate state control over most of the Angolan territory. Guimarães (2001:111) indicates that while the MPLA received a strong military reinforcement from the Soviet Union and Cuba, both the FNLA and UNITA weakened militarily. Their weakness was caused by suspension of American support on which they had mostly relied. Guimarães (2001:112-3) indicates that the United States Senate had cut American support on 11 December 1975 due to a Watergate scandal over US Congress's secret role in Angola's civil war. Also, Luanda and Pretoria had struck an agreement that resulted in South Africa withdrawing its military support from UNITA (Guimarães 2001:112-3). As a result, the MPLA government overpowered them militarily and consolidated its state sovereignty. Despite sporadic attacks that it later on came to launch after some recovery, FNLA was ultimately forced out into Zaire by the early 1980s (Birmingham 1992:82). It subsequently withered away leaving the politico-military dispute between UNITA and MPLA. While UNITA had been forced to retreat to the fim do mundo i.e. to the extreme southeast area of the country, it soon returned rehabilitated and supported by both the United States and South Africa to wage war against Luanda. This conflict continued until the mid-1990s (Birmingham 1992:82-84).

From its inception until the 1990s, the MPLA espoused Marxist-Communist values and ideals, which it formalised as its socio-political and economic ideology in the early 1977 (Cowley 1991:18). It renamed itself MPLA Workers' Party (MPLA-PT) and assumed “full control of society to lead the project of socialist reconstruction” (Cowley 1991:18). Subsequently, the MPLA-PT government banned civil assembly and association and democratic politics, and UNITA was outlawed as a rebel movement. The state also banned independent media and took control of national news agencies including television, radio, and newspaper (Faria 2003). Constitutionally, MPLA-PT became the sole legal political movement of the country. Inge Tevdten (1997:46) indicates, both the party and the state developed political institutions that reached down to the levels of provinces, districts, communes, villages, and city neighbourhoods. Eighteen provinces were created in the country, each with a Comissário (commissioner) as chief party and government representative. Each of Angola's 163 municipalities and 532 communes also had a party and government Delegado (delegate). All these institutions were directly
dependent on the central authority of Luanda for both decisions and operations (Tvedten 1997:46).

As Faria (2003) points out, later the state allowed NGOs to operate, but only in service to farmers, displaced, and shanty dwellers. However, even this space was monopolised by government or party agencies until the end of 1980s, with the exception of development wings of church organisations such as Caritas de Angola and the Angolan Council of Evangelical Churches (Faria 2003). Tony Hodges (2004:88) records that the first non-church NGO was the Angolan Action for Development, launched in November 1989 under patronage of MPLA political elites. This NGO became an alternative channel to northern donors besides government ministries. International donors’ programmes were channelled through it, based entirely on bilateral co-operation agreements, as no international NGOs were allowed into the country prior to 1991 (Hodges 2004:88).

Arlinda Coelho (2003) indicates that the Constitutional Law that the MPLA adopted after independence in 1975 ratified human rights and freedom. In practice, however, just like on the UNITA side, the MPLA regime was totalitarian. The ultimate source of power was the president, who was the head of the executive; the commander in chief of the Army; the head of the Council of Ministers and National Defence Council; and the head of the Council of the Republic (Coelho 2003).

There were a number of attempts at peace prior to the decisive events that took place in April 2002, which led to the end of the war and to the democratisation process that the country is now undergoing. The New York Accords were signed in December 1988 between Angola – MPLA and UNITA, Cuba and South Africa under the auspices of the UN. This was a security treaty whose items included withdrawal of the South African Defence Force (SADF), Cuban troops and expulsion of the African National Congress (ANC) guerrillas and South West African Peoples’ Organisation (SWAPO) from Angola, independence of Namibia, and deployment of an unarmed United Nations (UN) team to verify the withdrawal process. The UN team was called United Nations Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I) (Deng 1994:28; Knudsen et al 2000:9).
President Joseph Mobutu of Zaire hosted the *Gbadolite Encounter* between the MPLA government’s President José Eduardo dos Santos and the founder and leader of UNITA Jonas Malheiro Savimbi in June 1989. They signed a ceasefire on June 22 1989, which soon collapsed. From early 1990, the MPLA government began making political concessions. It maintained a one-party system but began looking at conditions for “decentralisation of responsibility and decision-making, legalisation of non-governmental civil institutions, and curtailment of some of the privileges of the elite” (Tevdten 1997:52). This led to the introduction of an amnesty law in 1989 to pardon and integrate supporters of UNITA and other rebel movements who gave themselves up to the authorities (Tevdten 1997:52). In July the same year, MPLA formally abandoned Marxism-Leninism in favour of ‘democratic socialism’, and in the early 1991 it also reviewed the Constitutional Law to permit multiparty politics (Tevdten 1997:52; Knudsen et al 2000:11).

From April 1990 MPLA and UNITA began talks in Bicesse in Portugal through mediation of the United States, Russia, Portugal and the UN, and on 31 May 1991 the *Bicesse Accords* were signed. The main items of the accords included democratic elections in September 1992; incorporation of UNITA’s Angolan Armed Liberation Forces (FALA) and MPLA’s Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) into one Force: Angolan Armed Forces (FAA); establishment of a Joint Political-Military Commission (CCPM) “to assure that the peace accords were applied thereby guaranteeing strict compliance with all political and military understanding and to make the final decision on possible violations of these accords” (Deng 1994:28). The CCPM was composed of representatives of MPLA and UNITA, with Soviet Union, USA, and Portugal as observers. Also, in accord with the CCPM, the UN Security Council Resolution 696 of 30 May 1991 created the United Nations Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II) to assist with the implementation of the accords (Deng 1994:28; Bicesse Text 1991).

In August 1992 the People’s Republic of Angola was renamed “Republic of Angola”. Polling took place on 29–30 September 1992 and both the legislative and presidential
election results were published on 17 October 1992 by the UN electoral body. The MPLA won 53.74% of the legislation vote against 34.1% of UNITA. MPLA’s candidate President José Eduardo dos Santos won 49.57% of the presidential vote against UNITA’s candidate Jonas Savimbi’s 40.07%. According to the then Electoral Law, a second round of presidential elections was required because a candidate could only absolutely win by gathering at least 50% of the total vote, which neither Dos Santos nor Savimbi achieved (Adams 1996:3; IRIN 2005). UNITA contested the results claiming “widespread systematic vote irregularity and fraud” (Adams 1996:3) and civil conflict resumed. The belligerents met again for talks after two years of war through UN mediation, first in the southwestern Angolan province of Namibe in November 1992, then in Addis Ababa in January 1993, and finally in Abidjan in April-May 1993. All these attempts were unsuccessful. The UN initiated a new round of talks in late 1993, and on 20 November 1994 the belligerents signed a new peace treaty in Lusaka Zambia.

The Lusaka Protocol (see appendix 119) included: for UNITA to relinquish the 60% territory it was then occupying back to government jurisdiction; UNITA to disarm its civilian supporters; a significant role for UNITA in the central government; autonomy of provincial administration; disbanding of the government’s riot police; and UN peace-keeping troops i.e. UNAVEM III to monitor ceasefire, disarmament, and the integration of the two armed forces into one national army (Knudsen et al 2000:15). Optimistic of the peace process the UN withdrew its troops in 1997, and in June the same year the Security Council set up a residual mission, the UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), with only 1, 500 troops from the UNAVEM III initial contingent of 7,000 troops (Hodges 2004:15). By May 1998 UNITA still controlled 60 localities, including its strongholds in the central highlands at Bailundo and Andulo where Savimbi’s headquarters were. The UN responded with a series of sanctions as UNITA was seen to have been delaying “the extension of state administration to many of the areas under its control” (Hodges 2004:16). When the head of MONUA and architect of the Lusaka Protocol Maitre Alioune Blondin Beye died in an air crash en route to Central Africa, the implementation process reached a stalemate. Hodges (2004:16) reports that at the MPLA’s fourth congress in December 1998 President Dos Santos stated, “The only path to peace was
war”. He called off the Lusaka peace process and MONUA’s withdrawal from Angola (Hodges 2004:16).

This move marked the resumption of full-scale war in Angola. Meanwhile, UNITA experienced two factions among its officials who were in Luanda, particularly occupying parliamentary seats and ministerial positions in the MPLA government. One faction broke away from Savimbi’s mainstream UNITA and formed UNITA-Renovada (New UNITA), and another faction rejected UNITA-Renovada, yet broke away from Savimbi and chose to stay in Luanda (Hodges 2004:16). On 22 February 2002 Jonas Savimbi died in a military confrontation against government forces. Antonio Dembo, UNITA’s second in command, also died soon afterwards. There were rumours that he was killed by fellow UNITA fighters because not being Ovimbundu made him an unacceptable choice as leader, but other reports claimed that he was diabetic and had lost his medication (Griffiths 2004:2). Within days following the death of Savimbi, the next ranking leaders of the mainstream UNITA began peace talks with government officials in Luena in the province of Moxico. The negotiations culminated in the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (see appendix II) between UNITA and the MPLA government, under the observation of Russia, Portugal, USA and UN in Luanda on 4 April 2002.

After the civil war between MPLA and UNITA ended in 2002, there was considerable increase in military tension between FAA and military wings of FLEC – Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda in the province of Cabinda. Cabinda is Angola’s northern enclave province and it is the most oil-producing province in Angola. Mabeko-Tali (2004:57) records that in 1963 the Movement for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (MLEC) joined force with other groups and formed FLEC. FLEC arose as a political voice for the independence of Cabinda (Mabeko-Tali 2004:57). However, Mabeko-Tali suggests that throughout its existence, FLEC has been marginalized and its political concerns ignored. It was banned from Angola’s political scene by Portugal in 1974 and it has not been part of Angola’s peace processes since late 1980s until the signing of the 2002 Luena Memorandum between MPLA and UNITA (Mabako-Tali
2004:60). It refused to partake in Angola’s first democratic elections in 1992, arguing that it was a process for Angolans not for Cabindans (Mabeko-Tali 2004:60).

FLEC has been a split movement. The main factions include FLEC-R (FLEC Renewed), FLEC-FAC (FLEC-Armed Forces of Cabinda), and FDC (Democratic Front of Cabinda) (Mabeko-Tali 2004). Mabeko-Tali (2004:57) submits that the military activity of factions has been capturing and kidnapping of oil companies foreign workers in Cabinda as well as recruiting young males into joining their military forces. They have called for a proper sharing of commercial revenues from the province on the one hand, and on the other hand they have called for the independence of Cabinda from the rest of Angola. They have even appealed for international intervention, especially from Portugal. Portugal has however maintained that Cabinda is part of Angola, and the MPLA government’s official stance has been that Cabinda is “an internal issue” (Mabeko-Tali 2004:60). Mabeko-Tali indicates that for a long while, the government argued that it could not talk with FLEC because it could not find a legitimate “interlocutor” among the FLECs with whom to deal (Mabeko-Tali 2004:60).

Under the auspices of the African Lusophone States Community, on 18 June 2006, after three days of negotiations between the government and the Cabindan Forum for Dialogue (FDC) in Guine Bissau, a peace deal was signed. ANGOP (2006) and IRIN (2006) report that the deal awarded FLEC “special administrative status” in Cabinda and amnesty. In turn, it stipulated the end of hostility, demilitarisation of FLEC, and reintegration of its personnel into the Angolan national life (ANGOP 2006; IRIN 2006). Despite rumours of tension within the FLECs regarding the legitimacy of FDC’s representation, the deal has thus far made good progress in terms of peace and stability in the province of Cabinda.

2.2.3 Economic profile

Angola’s warring past is quite intimately reflected in the economic situation that the country has experienced for the past three decades. Angola is one of the African countries with a great deal of natural wealth. As Alex Vines (1998:30) indicates, Angola possesses
many natural resources such as gold, zinc, lead, wolfram, vanadium, titanium, chromium, beryl, oil, bauxite, diamond, granite, iron ore, marble, salt, phosphates, magnesium, copper. Its industrial potential and activities include mining, petroleum refining, food processing, textiles, fishing, construction materials, brewing, sugar refining, tobacco products, hydroelectric resources. Its agricultural potential and products include coffee, sugar, bananas, cassava, maize, sweet potatoes (Vines 1998:30; BAA 2006).

However, after independence from Portuguese colonialism in 1975 and the beginning of civil war between MPLA and UNITA, the country’s economy relied mainly on oil and diamond alone (Hodges 2004:31). All other sectors continuously decreased and many ceased to operate completely. Because of war conditions, including planting of landmines throughout the countryside, agriculture was brought to a near standstill (Hodges 2004:31). Vines (1998:30) observes that only about 3% of the country’s 1,246,700 square kilometres have been cultivated as arable cropland. As a result, the country has had to import about half of its industrial foodstock. The industrial sector also declined soon after independence, as most nationalised and state controlled companies fell out of operation (Vines 1998:30; BAA 2006; Hodges 2004:31).

The MPLA government held a centrally planned economic system until the early 1990s under the portfolio of the Ministry of Planning (Hodges 2004:103). This economic approach was enacted in 1982 under the law 2/82 which assigned both economic governance and full economic execution to the state. “Financial programmes and policies, annual government budget, and foreign exchange-budget” were annually framed according to the Ministry of Planning’s vision for each year (Hodges 2004:103, 124). During the civil war, though the MPLA government was administratively represented in all provincial capitals of the country, economic enterprise was however limited to the coastal region around Luanda, where the government held its stronghold. The rest of the country was basically cut off and receded to a basic form of subsistence. Many of the government-controlled pockets in the hinterland were only linked to the coastal towns by costly air transport (Hodges 2004:103).
From 1987 onwards, the MPLA government began a process of economic reform aimed at transiting Angola’s economic enterprise from a centralised planning system to a ‘mixed-economy based on the laws of the market’ (Hodges 2004:124). The government launched about eleven successive short-term economic and development programs involving social projects, liberalised monetary and fiscal policies, privatisation, and outsourcing. The last of this series of programmes is PGG 2005/2006, Government General Programme for the Bi-Annual 2005/06. It was launched in October 2004. It aims to achieve two objectives: “fight hunger and poverty” and promote “social stability” (MINFIN 2006).

Unlike most African and developing countries, Angola’s economy was not funded nor regulated by the IMF and the World Bank, apart from unsuccessful experiments made for implementation of IMF staff-monitored programmes in the period between 1995 and 2005 (Hodges 2004:110). Angola has economically only dealt with individual countries, multinationals and transcorporations, with international market firms and export credit agencies. It has resorted to ‘oil guaranteed loan’ strategy to amortise its budget deficit and external debt owed to international financial and export credit firms (Hodges 2004:110). With its official debt to the Russian Federation written off in 1996, by 2002 Angola’s external debt only amounted to US$ 10,134 million (World Bank Report 2004). Portugal, USA, Germany, France, Japan, Brazil, and the Netherlands have been Angola’s main trade partners; USA being the main exports market, and France the main source of imports (Vines 1998:30; BAA 2006).

The MPLA regime has used Angola’s rich diamond deposits mostly for personal enrichment and conservation of power. For example, Hodges (2004) indicates, “the regime has accorded diamond concessions as a means of rewarding loyalty”. UNITA, on the other hand, controlled the most valuable diamond mining areas in the northeast of the country, which it explored and used the revenue to bankroll its war against Luanda. For example, between 1992 and 1997, UNITA was estimated to have marketed on average about $600 million worth of diamond annually (Hodges 2004:174). The third party that explored the diamond sector was the Garimpeiros i.e. practitioners of Garimpo, which is
an informal exploration and trading of diamond by civilians, both Angolans and foreigners (BAA 2006; Hodges 2004:190).

Alongside the formal economy, there have been parallel informal commercial initiatives by Angolan masses. In early 1980s, however, this parallel market was repressed by the state through a number of measures such as goods confiscation and jailing of vendors. The principal forms of such initiatives are Candonga i.e. retailing or buy and sell business, and Kinguila i.e. informal currency exchange business, dealing mainly with Kwanza and US dollar transaction (Tvedten 1997:70). Through Candonga a large number of informal markets have been created across the country with Luanda’s Roque Santeiro market being the biggest of them. These markets receive good supply from small-scale agricultural activities; from goods acquired through lojas do povo i.e. people’s stores, which are still used as distribution means for auto-consumo system; and through informal import (Tvedten 1997:72-73; Lopes 2004:34). Candonga has also been a main source of foreign currency for the Kinguila business besides cooperantes i.e. foreign personnel contracted by the State. The latter regularly trade in the informal market and Candongueiros need dollar for foreign good import.

2.3 Challenges to the future

2.3.1 Introduction

From guns to dialogue has indeed been a long journey for Angola. But in order for the dialogue to succeed, there is a need to entrench proper political and public institutions upon which the future can be pursued. Such institutions should possess potential to deter the factors that have fuelled conflict and destruction in the past. But before discussing

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4 *Auto-consumo* is a rationing system that was used in the centralized economy to subsidize public employees with mass consumption commodities at cheap price. Despite economic reforms, this system still continues to function to some extent. The *auto-consumo* system included two other layers of distribution besides *lojas do povo* that were designed for the general public: *lojas dos responsáveis* – stores for high-ranking people or the political elite, and *lojas francas* - free shops where goods were sold in foreign currency only (Tvedten 1997:73).

5 Candongueiros are the informal traders, the practitioners of the Candonga business. There are also Zungueiros i.e. ambulant vendors.
such an institutional remedy, it is first necessary to ascertain the factors that will have to be deterred. Hence, this second section of the chapter submits that the major factors that have been at the heart of Angola’s past experience and which pose challenge to the country’s future, include a politics of dominance, an economics of war, poverty, and other social realities such as land, exhaustive urbanisation and slums, HIV/AIDS, and a potential of ethnic tension. This deduction is drawn from a scrutiny of MPLA and UNITA’s past political behaviour, the country’s economic profile and public policy and service, and the Angolan people’s experience in general.

2.3.2 Politics of dominance

Angola’s political history seems to be overwhelmingly clouded by a politics of dominance. This political reality seems to have been the major factor behind the civil war, the failure of the peace accords that preceded the Luena Memorandum, as well as the instrument utilised to subjugate the Angolan people politically. It also proves to have had a double dimension, national and international.

At a national level, the politics of dominance seems to have been characterised by totalitarianism from both MPLA and UNITA. MPLA’s internal totalitarian system was presidential and can be traced back to its first president Dr. Antonio Agostinho Neto. Hodges (2004:52) records that Neto’s long years of exile and leadership in the anti-colonial liberation struggle through the MPLA acquired him “an aura and prestige of almost mythical proportions”. This ‘aura’ gained him great influence in the party, both among the rank and file and the leadership bodies, and after he died in 1979. His successor, president José Eduardo Dos Santos, inherited that presidential influence over both the party and government (Hodges 2004:52).

In the course of events, Dos Santos’ power grew increasingly stronger. Cowley (1991:8) submits that on account of factions that threatened the party and intensification of war against UNITA in the 1980s, the MPLA Central Committee decreed that the president should be in charge of the ‘regional military councils’, which had “sweeping powers”
over economic and political affairs. In April 1984, a Defence and Security Council chaired by the president were established and became the country’s top decision-making body instead of the Political Bureau (Cowley 1991:8; Hodges 2004:53). This ‘presidentialism’ that was increasingly growing, was consolidated by the second party congress in 1985, which adopted the thesis entitled The Role of the Leader in the Revolution, asserting:

His prestige, authority and the respect and admiration of militants and the People are becoming increasingly evident, owing to this consistency and honesty in respect of the principles of the revolution and his intelligence and modesty in analysing and solving the party’s central problems (ANGOP6, quoted in Hodges 2004:51).

Following these events, MPLA’s politics and governance became a one-man show, with the president calling all the shots. At his disposal and convenience, Dos Santos appointed and removed cabinet ministers, controlled government’s military conduct, and directly intervened in both administrative and economic policies of the country. Hodges (2004:54) submits, “Power had become increasingly personalized, with its base in Futungo de Belas, the presidential compound on the outskirts of Luanda” (Hodges 2004:54). This is a substantial move away from the constitutional provision that the movement had adopted in 1975 following independence. At independence, the constitution established “the primacy of the party and thereby also the pivotal role of its leading organs” (the Central Committee and Political Bureau). This was despite the fact that the party’s president held the roles of president of the country, head of the executive, and commander-in-chief of the armed forces (Hodges 2004:52). Power was balanced and shared among different offices.

MPLA government’s totalitarianism was also subjugating upon civil society. It outlawed political liberty and civil rights and forced allegiance to MPLA-PT’s communist politics and social vision. It was only with the coming of the Bicesse process in 1991-1992 that the Constitutional Law was substantially reviewed and there was a change in the state and

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6 ANGOP was/is a state controlled press agency, and this quote was first published on 13 December 1985.
civil society relationship. However, after the country returned to war in October 1992 and again in 1998 the MPLA government resorted to a “politics of dominance”. There were reports of use of extra-legal methods by the government to silence those it considered to be anti-state figures and suppress activities that threatened its sovereignty. Such actions often resulted in imprisonments and even murders, with the media being a special target (Mateus 2004:46). For example, in 1995 the government restricted political parties’ access to the airwaves, which hindered their political activity and interaction with the population through the major state-owned media outlets (Lopes 2004:33). The National Media Council established in April 1992 (law 7/92), which had a mandate to uphold press freedom and a code of conduct, ceased to function (Hodges 2004:95).

On the UNITA side, Savimbi had imposed “political totalitarianism” in the areas under his movement’s control (Hodges 2004:51). As Hodges (2004:51) submits, Savimbi tolerated no criticism and executed those UNITA officials who dared to question his leadership (Hodges 2004:51). This led to UNITA factions splintering off. Such was the case with UNITA-Renovada, the group of UNITA deputies and ministers that chose to break away from Savimbi and remain in Parliament in Luanda when war once again erupted following failure in the implementation of the Lusaka Accords in 1998-1999.

UNITA officials that deserted Savimbi from late 1980s, especially heeding to the amnesty for war crimes that the MPLA government passed in early 1989 (Tevdten 1997:54), criticized and accused Savimbi of excessive and atrocious dictatorship. One prominent case that raised severe criticism of UNITA and the personality cult surrounding Jonas Savimbi during the 1991-92 democratic era was a revelation that cropped up in the early 1992. It became publicly known that high-ranking UNITA leaders, Tito Chingunji and Wilson dos Santos and their families, had been executed only a few months earlier for having been found politically dissident. This was a last straw for the Democratic Group, and they broke away from Savimbi a few months afterwards.

In terms of peace accords, both MPLA and UNITA seem to have displayed a politics of dominance through, on the one hand, a predisposition to obtain an upper hand over each
other in negotiations and treaties, and on the other hand through a detectable lack of political will to commit to a democratic process. This inclination towards dominance falls short of a sense of “requitement” and seeking to find “a way out for each other” (Knudsen et al 2000:6). Knudsen et al (2000:6) posit that these elements are crucial for belligerents to display in order for a peace agreement to be successful. The belligerents should consider it ‘futile to continue with violent conflict’ (Knudsen et al 2000:6).

MPLA and UNITA, including FNLA, seem to have disputed power within the transitional government in 1975 because each side sought to take control of the country’s political scene. They disregarded the democratic road for independence that the Alvor Accords outlined. The accords had included the elements of ‘requitement’ and ‘a way out for each party’. They recognised each party as a legitimate political force by including them in the political process. After the elections each party could continue being part of the country’s political life, even with a possibility of someday having a majority electoral victory. Knudsen et al (2000:7) argues, as far as the three nationalist movements were concerned, the way to realise their ambitions was through the power of gun. This is because the fifteen years of “anti-colonial fighting against the Portuguese served to legitimate anti-state politics and guerrilla movements” in their eyes. Thus, though they themselves constituted the transitional government, they could still militate against it because they were not yet quite ready to requite with one another (Knudsen et al 2000:7).

The most fatal political outcome of the power contest that took place between the three nationalist movements was the establishment of a one-party regime, the MPLA-PT, which ended up suppressing civil rights and freedoms and left no space for political liberty. Consequently, the country experienced nearly three decades of devastating civil conflict as politico-military confrontation continued between MPLA and UNITA. UNITA continued to protest the legitimacy of MPLA rule over the nation while MPLA undemocratically declared UNITA as an unlawful political movement.

In relation to the Bicesse treaty, the parties seem to have continued to pursue dominance over requitement for each other. Their choice was for the “winner-take-all” electoral
model (Bicesse Text 1991; Bloomfield and Reilly 1998:16). The ‘winner-take-all’ model is the “plurality” electoral system based on territorial representation. This meant the party with most votes in the polls heads the government and the party that wins most ballots in a given electorate region forms that region’s constituency (Nthai 1993:23). What is particularly significant about this model in terms of the Bicesse Accords is its link with the constitutional presidentialism that the parties agreed upon. They had assented to the Constitutional Law that had been adopted by the MPLA government in 1995 that accorded superpowers to the presidency. The president was the head of the executive; the commander-in-chief of the armed forces; had ultimate power over parliament to approve or disapprove legislation; s/he was the head of the Council of Ministers and overruled the Judiciary. That is, the president was to appoint judges, in particular Supreme Court Judges and the latter were to be accountable to him/her (US State Depart. 2001; Lopes 2004:33; Bicesse Text 1991).

The terms of the Bicesse Accords seem to imply that no matter the medium, the parties were primarily concerned with winning and ensuring power rather than seeking durable peace and the wellbeing of the Angolan people. Although Namibia, Angola’s neighbour, had just had a successful democratic process about two years earlier, neither MPLA nor UNITA sought to emulate its example. Namibia had overcome its many ethnic, tribal and political differences by adopting a reconciliatory approach. In terms of power, it had separated the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary offices, which posed a helpful balance in the exercise of power in that country (Kandetu 1993:11, 13).

From both MPLA and UNITA’s responses to the different peace processes, there also seemed to transpire a significant lack of political will to commit to a democratic process. It appears that each party was more eager to engage in such a process when it suited their political interests. When the process required making concessions to other parties, there was procrastinated respond. For example, according to the UN Special Representative in Angola from 1991 to 1993, Margaret Anstee, the Namibe, Addis Ababa and Abidjan talks between UNITA and MPLA did not work out partially because Angola was on a “tragic seesaw...when one side (MPLA or UNITA) is up they do not want to talk and
when the other is up, they do not want to talk" (Paulo 2004:8). This qualification also seemed to be true of their responses to the Lusaka process. While talks took place in Lusaka, the parties continued military operations in the country. This attitude set a potential repeat of past failures because "each party’s willingness to negotiate and the subsequent presentation of demands depended on their ever-changing military position in the ongoing war" (Knudsen et al 2000:15).

Many interpreted the resumption of war after the Lusaka settlement as evidence that animosity between MPLA and UNITA and "corruption and greed" were major motives behind the Angolan conflict. This is because the Lusaka Protocol offered an accommodating and conciliatory political space for both parties. The Angolan Constitutional Law was amended to accommodate 'decentralisation and de-concentration of administrative power' into Executive, Legislature and Judiciary. It constitutionalised two vice presidencies, the first of which for the leader of UNITA Jonas Savimbi. The accords also agreed and resulted in the creation of a government of unity and national reconciliation (GURN) (Knudsen et al 2000:19; Tevdten 1997:61). Though the MPLA government also engaged in military action, there seems to be sufficient reason to deduce that it was however UNITA that in this particular instance seemed more reluctant to commit to the democratic process. UNITA had argued for more significant representation in the MPLA led transition government, despite the fact that the MPLA was the legitimate government in accordance with its victory in the 1992 elections. When it came down to the implementation of the accords Savimbi refused to assume the first vice president post, refused state administration in the 60% of the national territory it had militarily occupied, and many UNITA members abandoned their duties in parliament and in GURN not long after they had been sworn in (Hodges 2004:15-17).

As stated in the introduction of this section, the "politics of dominance" that characterised Angola’s political scene also involved an international dimension. This dimension was characterised by foreign powers’ interference in Angolan affairs, whose primary motive was geopolitical interests rather than the wellbeing of Angola and its people. The principal foreign powers that were directly involved in the Angolan conflict are the
Ties between Angola’s political movements and foreign powers began during the liberation struggle. Ernest Harsh and Tony Thomas (1976:39) submit, in the context of their project to liberate the country from Portuguese colonialism, the Angolan nationalist movements “were compelled to follow a policy of seeking material aid, including weapons, from any available source” (Harsh and Thomas 1976:39). This situation seems to have been opportune to foreign powers, especially USA and USSR, to seal alliances with local political movements, and thereby advancing their interests. Harsh and Thomas (1976:39-40) highlight that none among Washington, Moscow and Peking intended through their aid to allow Angola’s nationalist liberation struggle to achieve its ultimate goal of “ending of all foreign domination”. Knudsen et al (2000:8) submit that in addition to such geopolitical ambition, was interest in Angola’s unique natural wealth. Traces of these foreign powers’ domineering intent over Angola can be detected in the different peace processes that MPLA and UNITA have engaged in. According to Knudsen et al (2000:6), the role of foreign powers, including the UN, in Angola’s peace processes crucially lacked concern for the real causes that lay behind the conflict. Rather, they merely sought to have agreements signed (Knudsen et al 2000:6). This observation is evident in the Bicesse and Lusaka treaties. The outcome of these two processes did show a strong neglect by the UN and a meddling by foreign powers.

Alluding to the Bicesse process, George Chikoti, then Angola’s Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated in an open forum on Angola organised by the University of Cambridge, “With the end of the Cold War era, most of the West forced the Angolan government of that time not only to negotiate with UNITA but to hold elections in the shortest possible time-frame” (Hart and Lewis 1995:49). Furthermore, Chikoti declared that during the peace negotiations the American President, Mr. George Bush, insisted on the date that the elections had to take place stating, “The United States will not allow that elections be held in Angola beyond September 30, 1992” (Hart and Lewis 1995:49), which is the exact date that the elections actually took place.
On the one hand, Chikoti’s declarations show that as long as world politics remained polarised between USA and USSR, a peace agreement between MPLA and UNITA was difficult to strike. However, after the USSR and communism collapsed, the USA and the capitalist bloc that backed UNITA could force the MPLA to the negotiation table. This reality seems to show the extent to which Angola’s conflict was externally determined. A peace process should not be rushed, but rather focus on dealing with real issues behind the conflict (Knudsen et al 2002:6). Knudsen et al (2000:13) observe that the Bicesse protocol was “fragile, short on specifics and substance”, without a post-electoral provision. It did not guarantee that no matter who won, all would “still have a meaningful voice in governing the country” (Knudsen et al 2000:13).

UN Special Representative, Margaret Anstee, quoted by Manuel J. Paulo (2004:8), argued “the countries most closely concerned with Angola genuinely wanted peace to be restored, but they wanted a quick fix, particularly the two superpowers, the main protagonists of the Cold War...the result was an agreement flawed from the start, and a marginal role for the UN that was doomed to be ineffectual” (Paulo 2004:8). Anstee further complained, “The international community had tried to buy peace on the cheap”. UNAVEM II was staffed with 350 unarmed military observers, 90 unarmed police observers that later increased to 126, and 100 electoral observers that increased to 400 during the elections period. The initial budget was USS132.3 million and later increased to $18.8 million in recognition of its electoral duties. The UN also sought to use Angola as a case study in low-cost post-conflict management, building on its success in Namibia, where the budget and logistics were much higher. The total UN budget for the Namibian process was USS430 million, which made considerable difference. For example, only one observer was appointed for every 333 soldiers in Angola compared to one for every six in Namibia (Paulo 2004:7). Partially because of this, both MPLA and UNITA also managed to keep their forces “largely intact”. So when UNITA lost the elections, both sides had the means at hand to return to war (Knudsen et al 2000:13).

Alluding to the Lusaka Protocol, Tedvten (1997:42) observes that it took place within a new political setting when UNITA no longer enjoyed unilateral USA support. On May 19
1993, the USA had recognised and established diplomatic relations with the MPLA regime, as they had now adopted ‘social democracy’ for ideology, instead of communism. It was now UNITA that was dragged onto the negotiation table by international powers (Tevdten 997:42). On the other hand, however, Knudsen et al (2000:19) submit that the UN still failed to effectively carry out the various sanctions it issued against UNITA for lack of compliance with the stipulated accords. UNITA remained almost “unaffected and undiminished” to continue waging war. It maintained control over diamond rich areas, continued to trade diamonds in the black market, and continued to acquire arms (Knudsen et al 2000:19, 21). At the same time, Paulo (2004:11) submits, MPLA also continued to purchase more weaponry through oil revenue. This situation illustrates UN negligence, as it did not measure up to the supervisory task it had taken on.

In summary, the “politics of dominance” that characterised Angola’s political past proves to have been the major factor behind the twenty-seven year civil war that the country has experienced. It influenced the oppressive relationship that existed between the state and civil society in the country as well as UNITA’s dealing with people in areas it held under its control. It is this factor that has mostly defined the failure of the peace processes. In liaison with their international backers, both MPLA and UNITA first sought to have an upper hand over the other in the peace treaties, rather than seeking peace and wellbeing of the country. They imposed their political aspirations and agendas over against that of the Angolan people. Also, the conflict experienced considerable foreign interference that was primarily motivated by geopolitical interests. In turn, UN intervention often fell logistically short of the political mandate it was awarded in the peace processes, and its mediator role often lacked political neutrality. Thus, to divest Angolan politics of this past history is a major challenge facing future dialogue and development in the country.

2.3.3 Economics of war

As observed earlier, Angola’s past economic profile is a product of the political history of the past three decades. This situation seems to have given way to what is here considered
to be an “economics of war”. This economic situation is first and foremost an entrepreneurial reality. Angola’s economy was bi-mineral i.e. dependent solely on oil and diamond while other economic sectors such as agriculture and industry remained untapped. It is due to this situation that, for example, the country relied on imports for most of its food. As Hodges (2004:110) indicates, to finance such imports and to amortise its bilateral debts owed to ally superpowers, and to international financial and export firms, the government often mortgaged oil wells. Foreign companies (and countries) used this situation to exhaust the national oil wealth to their advantage (Hodges 2004:110). It is only recently, with the coming of peace and economic reforms by the government, that the economy has experienced some degree of diversification. For example, internally displaced persons (IDPs) that are returning to the land are engaging in small-scale agricultural activities and there has been some commercial agricultural development and a boost in the fishery industry (BAA 2006).

The economics of war is also an economic management reality. During the war there was no transparency in public finances (and resources). The government did not account for how much revenue it made from oil and diamonds or how such revenue was spent. This economic management crisis has continued to be felt even in the present. For example, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates in 2002, 31% of government expenditure was off budget. Between 1998 and 2002, off budget expenditure was 36% while 11% of budget expenditure could not be accounted for (Hodges 2004:26). It was mainly for this reason that the agreement between the government and IMF to experiment IMF staff-monitored development programmes (SMP) between 1998 and 2002 were suspended (Hodges 2004:26).

This lack of transparency about revenue, expenditure and debt has enabled corruption to thrive in the country. In its Manifesto for Peace published in 1999, the Angolan Reflection Group for Peace (GARP) stated, “there is no doubt that corruption as well as the policies of laissez-faire have always been in place, but they have gained much power during the last decade” (GARP 1999). This statement can be substantiated with fact. For example, in December 2000, French authorities arrested a Franco-Brazilian businessman,
Pierre Falcone, and Jean Christophe Mitterand, son of the former French president François Mitterand, on charges of arms trafficking related to an “arms-for-oil deal” with Angola in 1993. This affair became known as “Angolagate”, though the charges were later dismissed on legal technicalities (Hodges 2004:27). Despite this, in 2003 the Angolan government appointed Falcone, who was still under investigation and banned from France and the USA, as its representative to UNESCO (Hodges 2004:27-28). This move indicated government tolerance of corruption, if not affinity with it, since the government failed to break ties with a relationship that in the eyes of the law was potentially corrupt.

As Hodges (2004:28) reports, in 2002 there was a controversy around the use of “oil-guaranteed loans” in the restructuring of Angola’s bilateral debt to Russia. Suspicions regarding these transactions, through bank accounts in Geneva, prompted the Swiss judicial authorities to open an inquiry. The outcome of the inquiry revealed that hundreds of million of dollars had been paid into private bank accounts of senior Angolan officials, including the president, and foreign business people at the expense of the Russian and Angolan states (Hodges 2004:28). Corruption, most popularly dubbed as gazoza (literally soft drink), has “trickled down” and become an everyday practice between teachers and students, police and citizens, among meagrely paid public servants, as well as officials in high positions (Hodges 2004:28). This state of corruption in the country has been evidenced by empirical research. For example, Hodges (2004:28) records that Angola ranked 124th out 133 countries in Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index in 2003.

A third reality of the economics of war is related to resource distribution. The government’s primary areas of expenditure were the army (on war against UNITA) and bureaucratic operations. It only allocated a token provision for public services and subsidies for urban populations while most of the rural population increasingly had to survive on a basic form of subsistence. The government hardly invested in infrastructure and national development. This trend has continued up until today as defence and national security have continued to have budget priority, coupled with lack of
transparency in the management of public finances. Although the economy has continued to be largely bi-mineral, international donors have posited that given the scale of Angola’s current oil production and revenue, the government could do much more than it has done in terms of social development (BAA 2006).

As observed in the economic profile section (section 2.2.3), UNITA used diamond as a major source of bankrolling its war against Luanda, and in turn Luanda has used diamonds as a source of personal enrichment for its senior political officials and military officers (Hodges 2004:28). Moreover, the government has offered bounty to opposing politicians and granted privileged access to social benefits to elite urban families in return for their political allegiance. This practice has created a bourgeoisie class alongside the poor. Failure to attend to public needs, especially in mineral rich areas, has induced cessationist feelings (Hodges 2004:28). The FLEC campaign is one example. Besides historical, cultural and identity issues, economics and poverty largely influenced the FLECs towards an independent Cabinda. This is supported by the fact that after independence from colonialism their campaign initially became geared towards demands for proper sharing of commercial revenues from the province. However, after having been unheeded by Luanda, they became more vocal and active about complete separation of Cabinda from the rest of Angola (see section 2.2.2).

The situation of unequal resource distribution has continued in the context of the economic reforms that the government started in the early 1990s. There has been a strong presence of multinationals and transnational corporations in the oil and diamond sectors in Angola since independence. These corporations have partnered with the two major state-owned and controlled national companies, Sonangol (National Oil Society) and ENDIAMA (Angolan Diamond Enterprise). Foreign business is already expanding to other sectors of the economy. Meanwhile, the elite of yesteryear continue to dominate the formal sector of the economy. Besides the ‘patronage’ system, this elite took its upper hand after independence in 1975. Following the exodus of most of the colonial skilled

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7 ENDIAMA took over from DIAMANG (Angolan Diamond Company), which was dissolved in 1988 (Hodges 2004:171).
labour, this group virtually took monopoly in the leadership of the army and national police force, and administration and bureaucratic positions because of educational, political and societal advantages they enjoyed. From an ethno-linguistic perspective, most constituents of this elite group are Mbundu and *mestiço*\(^8\) because these groups were at the centre of the MPLA leadership during the liberation struggle and independence. After independence, however, the Mbundu, which President Dos Santos also is, asserted themselves over the *mestiços* through politics of nativity that arose within the MPLA. As a result, the Mbundu formed a new social elite (Birmingham 1992:101).

The political and army elites now possess formerly state owned sectors and companies that are being privatised based on two laws adopted in 1988 and 1991 (law 10/88 on economic activities and law 9/91 on state companies) (MINFIN 2006). Through these laws the government set out to restructure and privatise small state businesses for Angolan investors only. In the absence of an organised capital market such as stock exchange, the legislation provided for ‘public bidding, limited bidding and, in the case of small companies, direct negotiations with interested buyers’ (MINFIN 2006). This process has been far from transparent and open. Apart from being stronger bidders, the elite have monopolised it through *cunha*\(^9\). Hodges (2004:135) reports that by the end of 1996, 2002 companies from 545 state owned companies had been privatised, 73 had been liquidated and 16 had come under private management through management contracts.

*Furthermore*, access to land is another issue. Like many African countries, Angola inherited a “dualist” structure of land possession from colonialism that was based on two agrarian systems, “family and commercial agricultures” (Pacheco 2004:18). Pacheco (2004:19) records that the last colonial land statute, *Statute of the Portuguese Nations of the Provinces of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea*, was ratified in 1954. It ruled that land belonged to colonial jurisdiction. Besides commercial farming, which was practiced by the settler power, natives had a right to use land to live in and for subsistence, but without ownership rights (Pacheco 2004:19). After independence, the MPLA Communist

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\(^8\) See Section 2.2.1

\(^9\) Cronyism and connections
government became the landowner, nationalised previously. Portuguese owned commercial land and maintained the ‘dualist’ status. People were allowed to use land for subsistence agriculture and to live on but without ownership rights (Pacheco 2004:19; Hodges 2004:136). Moreover, the government did not enforce ‘land registration, identification or demarcation’ (Pacheco 2004:19).

In the context of these economic reforms, in 1992 the government passed the first post-independence Land Bill (law 21-C/92) that decreed for land privatisation in order to advance commercial farming (MINFIN 2006). Pacheco (2004:20) has argued that though this law provided some protection for rural communities’ interests, it still retained the “dualism without providing tools to overcome it”. It still left the ‘conflict between customary laws i.e. traditional and historical ownership and formal land tenure unresolved’ (Pacheco 2004:20).

In 2002 a new Land Bill was passed aimed at addressing some of the gaps in the previous legislation. But critics have argued that it does not resolve the existing tension between customary and formal laws, and it fails to make things any better for the poor majority. Rather, it facilitates the process whereby the “relatively well-off” secure property rights. As a result, well-connected and high bidding individuals aided by lack of organised and transparent legislation implementation, have continued to own more land while community rights continue to be ignored (Pacheco 2004:21). The migration issue has also been pertinent to the land situation. There has been conflict between former landowners who abandoned land because of the war and are now returning, and new owners that took their land over. This has been difficult to address because there was no land register in the past, and identification of ownership is now proving to be problematic (Pacheco 2004:21).

The urban version of the land crisis relates to property or estate ownership. After colonial property was nationalised in 1975, all housing in urban locations came under the jurisdiction of the State Secretariat for Housing (SMH). However, natives were allowed to occupy and use them at a nominal rent price to the SMH. With the economic reforms, the SMH has been privatising these [public] estates on the one hand and outsourcing
others to private management. The privatisation process is being done through public bidding under the law 10/88 and 9/91 (MINFIN 2006; Hodges 2004:137). As a result, many urbanites have also had to evacuate their housing.

As described in the first part of the chapter, the informal sector of the economy has been a source of survival for many Angolans. However, as Hodges (2004:31) indicates, this sector has mainly consisted of micro-scale activities, of a commercial rather than productive nature. Despite apparent dynamism, this informal, micro-entrepreneurial sector is at a low level of development “in terms of branches of activity, the size of businesses and the levels of capital invested” (Hodges 2004:31). Also, not everyone has had the same space for survival in this sector as it is mostly dominated by retornados i.e. Angolans who had fled the liberation war to Zaire and began returning to Angola following independence in 1975. David Birmingham (1995:93) submits that these returnees had “honed their commercial skills in the cut-throat capitalism of Zaire”. In the 1980s, “these retornados began to take over the role previously played by petty Portuguese traders” (Birmingham 1995:93). In the new situation of open market reforms, they have made shrewd use of export-import trade and asserted a relative monopoly over the informal economic sector (Birmingham 1995:93).

In conclusion, the “economics of war” is another major feature that has dominated the three decades of war that Angola has experienced. This feature has been camouflaged behind the atmosphere of war in the country, and through it political and army elites and a small section of the population have accumulated wealth. In the meantime, the country has continued to regress economically and the majority of the population have continued to experience increasing poverty. This reality challenges future dialogue to pursue economic policies that will ensure economic diversification beyond oil and diamonds, proper and transparent management of public resource, as well as its equitable distribution.
2.3.4 Other social challenges

As a result of twenty-seven years of war, the Angolan society is filled with innumerable human and social indicators that need to be addressed. IRIN (2006) estimates that about 1.5 million people were killed in the war, there are about 100,000 amputees as a result of mine related accidents, and about 10 million mines were planted throughout the country. According to IRIN (2001b), by 1997-1998 there were about 30,000 abandoned children/orphans. Moreover, Tevdten (1997:137) indicates that the war has disrupted family units as many have simply lost contact with their members as a result of abrupt scattering that the war often caused. In addition, most of the country’s infrastructure has been destroyed (Tevdten 1997:137). João G. Porto and Jenny Clover (2006:72) indicate that by the year 1991 there were about 800,000 internally displaced people and about 425,000 Angolan refugees in neighbouring countries. Only a fraction of these returned to their areas of origin. When the war resumed in 1992 and combat spread to major urban centres, between 1.3 to two million people fled their homes, mostly to provincial centres and to Luanda the capital. Porto and Clover (2006:72) indicate, in the four years of truce that followed the signature of the Lusaka protocol, very few displaced people returned because of “continuing insecurity and lack of confidence in the durability of the peace process”. Humanitarian agencies estimated that more than one million people were still displaced by the end of 1997 (Porto and Clover 2006:72). The situation worsened exponentially with the resumption of war at the end of 1998. Since then, an additional three million people (mostly young families, unaccompanied children, and the elderly) have been forced from their homes and been on the move almost continuously. By mid-2002, about 4.3 million people, a third of the population, were displaced (Porto and Clover 2006).

The concentration of displaced people in urban areas reached an estimated 60 per cent (Porto and Clover 2006). This situation of exhaustive urbanisation has resulted in musseques i.e. shantytowns where people are living in very harsh conditions. One of the effects of this condition is intense damage to the land and vegetation. Around Angola’s urban areas, forests have been largely depleted, water resources damaged, and land
overgrazed. In towns and cities, overpopulation has contributed to a further crisis of public health and hygiene systems of sewage, drainage, and the piling of rubbish leading to unsatisfactory conditions (Hodges 2004:28-31; Tvedten 1997:111).

In 2001 the Angolan government conducted a *Head of Families Expenditure and Revenues Survey* (IDR). The IDR defined the national poverty line at 392 Kwanza per month, which is about 1,7 US$ a day (considering an exchange rate of 77,7 Kwanza per 1 US$ in 2000, and 30 days a month) (AHM 2003:24). Extreme poverty was defined at 175 Kwanzas per month which is 0,76 US$ dollar a day. The IDR established that the poverty incidence was at 68% of the total population, urban poverty reaching 57% of family aggregate and rural poverty at 94% (AHM 2003:24). According to United Nations Development Programme Report (UNDP) in 2002, Angola’s Human Development Index (HDI) was at 0,398 in 1997, 0,422 in 1999, and 0,403 in 2000. Due to poverty and unemployment, violence and crime have become a way of survival for many, especially by demobilised soldiers most of whom have very little or no education at all or any professional skills (Tvedten 1997:137).

By 1997-98 there were about 50,000 disabled soldiers and war veterans needing to be reintegrated into society (Tvedten 1997:137). More than 1.1 million children have suffered from physical and emotional deprivations. An estimated 840,000 were considered to be in particular difficult circumstances with about 30,000 abandoned or war orphaned children in Angola (Tevdten 1997:112). The elderly have mostly suffered from a considerable degree of cultural disintegration as a result of migration. Many lost families in the war, and others have simply lost contact with their families. They lack a family safety net and support system that they would normally have had according to cultural norms of caring for the elderly (Tvedten 1997:112). Women have suffered from landmine accidents due to their responsibility to gather food, especially in rural areas. The number of female-headed households has increased as many women lost their husbands and sons in the war. This has also increased women’s workload (Ducados 2004:38-39).
Like the rest of Southern African countries, Angola’s future is also threatened by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. It is estimated that by 2003, 3.9% of the total population, about 240,000 people were living with HIV with a prevalence rate of 3.9% (UNAIDS 2004). Of this, women accounted for more than half of the infected population (59%) (UNAIDS 2004). The Angolan government’s IDR has identified Angola’s relatively lower rates of infection and prevalence compared to its neighbouring Southern African countries as a partial result of border closures during the war. However, with the end of the war and consequent increasing movement of people, there is now more of an infection threat (AHM 2003:15). Moreover, the country’s current demographic configuration also poses a bleak prognosis of HIV spread and its impact. It is estimated that about 50% of the population is between fifteen to twenty years of age. The government’s IDR deduced that though this age configuration lays a high level of responsibility upon the income earning population at present, in medium term, however, it poses a potential for “crescent workmanship supply”. But on the other hand, because the youth has been the most vulnerable to the virus infection, the prognosis could be adversely the opposite of the latter (AHM 2003:15). This means that the dominant population group is potentially at risk of death, and the future workforce and national economy are threatened. The IDR calculated that the rate of HIV prevalence in the country could reach between 12.5% and 18.8% by 2010. Numerically, this would approximately translate to 1.08 or 1.65 million people living with HIV/AIDS by 2010 (AHM 2003:59).

Lastly, Angola’s ethnic configuration also harbours potential for ethnic tension. This was one relatively influential factor in the post-colonial conflict on account of the fact that the three liberation movements had “different ethnic bases” from which they gathered most of their popular support and membership (Knudsen et al 2000:7). The MPLA had evolved out of the urban Luanda with a constituency made up mainly of assimilados\(^{10}\) and mesticos. On the other hand, though both FNLA and UNITA were mostly rural-evolved movements, the former was mostly Bakongo based while the latter was Ovimbundu based. Thus, as discussed earlier (see sections 2.2.2; 2.3.1), though political rivalry, filled

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\(^{10}\) Assimilados are native Angolans who were fairly educated, competent in Portuguese language, had economic independence through forms of white-collar jobs, and had adopted Portuguese culture and ways of life.
with greed for power and discriminate enrichment ambitions, later came to overshadow the conflict along the decades, initially ethnicity was a major factor that contributed to the conflict. Cowley (1991:12) argues that the importance of ethnicity as a reason behind Angola’s war should not be “over-estimated” because the liberation movements were not completely ethnically exclusive. However, Cowley (1991:12) also points out that the Angolan conflict nevertheless may have involved an “ethnic or regionalist dimension”.

Tevdten (1997:108) submits that ethnic identity in Angola has been significantly “blurred by urbanisation, cultural mixage with other ethnic groups and outside or Western influences, mixed marriages”, and other factors (Tevdten 1997:108-9). Moreover, she rightly observes that one dominant form of socio-cultural discrimination in the country has been found in the urban-rural relationship dynamics irrespective of ethnic background. Urbanites have tended to derogatorily discriminate against rural immigrants as Bantu or pessoas do quimbu, literally meaning bush people (Tevdten 1997:108). However, Tevdten (1997:108) also points out that the fact that Angolans still recognise which ethnic groups they belong to and can distinguish themselves through various characteristics, including stereotypes and languages, is an indication of “continued importance of ethnic differentiation and significance”. Ethnic identities may still be “mobilised for specific purposes” (Tevdten 1997:108). She notes that the 1992-94 period, during which Angola underwent its first democratic experience, is a case in point. She points out that political affiliation during this period was partially motivated by ethnic background. When the process reached impasse following UNITA’s contestation of the elections and the resumption of war, Ovimbundu and Bakongo people suffered some level of persecution in Luanda while Mbundu people and those associated with MPLA experienced similar fate in other parts of the country (Tevdten 1997:108-9).

These observations show that though ethnic impact in the thirty-year conflict was diluted in ideological differences, Angola’s ethnic configuration, however, still poses challenges to Angola’s future as it continues to harbour potential for divisions between groups and political formations.
2.3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has engaged with Angola’s socio-political history with a view to ascertain the challenges that this past may pose to the future and particularly to the current democratic process. The first section of the chapter looked at the country’s geographical situation and structure, outlined the history of the civil war and the past attempts made towards peace, and considered how the country functioned politically and economically during that war era. The second section of the chapter ascertained the major factors that have fuelled and protracted the war and political conflict in the country. A “politics of dominance” was identified as a primary factor. It involved political greed by the MPLA government and the armed movement UNITA and their preference for totalitarian leadership over commitment to democratic principles. Foreign powers’ interference and UN’s neglectful intervention in the country’s peace processes constitute the other dimension to the politics of dominance. This interference was motivated by their geopolitical interests in Angola, and the UN’s neglectful intervention was characterised by lack of political neutrality and incommensurable logistics.

An “economics of war” was another factor. This involved a bi-mineral economy, war directed expenditure, economic mismanagement and corruption, critical social policy and absence of development enterprise. While minerals were extracted from various parts of the country, the revenues thereof only served the coastal region, in particular Luanda. Public resources were also used for patronage i.e. to buy political allegiance of political and military elites and figures and allegiance of urban middle class population. The economic inequality entrenched by this economics of war is now effecting the current economics reforms. The experience of land and estate distribution and ownership crises, destitution, and increasing poverty is also part of the current socio-economic reality.

Further social realities that pose challenges to future development include a lack of infrastructure, poverty, vulnerable groups, HIV/AIDS, a potential for ethnic tension, population displacement, and exhaustive urbanisation. The latter has resulted in further crises such as musseques, health risks, environmental degradation, and crime.
These challenges establish the context in which the next chapter will discuss democratisation and reconstruction in Angola, and the significant link between these two processes.
CHAPTER THREE
SIGNIFICANCE OF DEMOCRATISATION FOR RECONSTRUCTION IN ANGOLA

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter engaged with Angola’s socio-political past and the major challenges that this past poses to the future. Such challenges include a politics of dominance, an economics of war, poverty, exhaustive urbanisation, environmental crisis, vulnerable groups, HIV/AIDS, and potential of ethnic tension. In the light of this context, this chapter discusses the link between democratisation and reconstruction in Angola. It posits reconstruction as the forward vision now facing Angola following the end of the armed conflict. However, for the process of reconstruction to become viable it is pivotal that Angolan politics be liberalised. The democratisation process that the country is now undergoing is the necessary stepping-stone in order for Angola to be able to move from its warring past to a reconstructing future and sustainable development. Therefore, the chapter discusses the meaning, value of democracy and the significance of democratisation for reconstruction in Angola, and finally the structure and value of the democratic framework that Angola is pursuing.

3.2 Understanding the value of democracy

Democracy is a fluid term to define with exactitude. This is because it is not monolithic. Rather, it is evolving as a concept and system of governance and it has been applied in various ways from one context to another. Philosophy and political science literature show that democracy has been part of political discourse since the classic age, 5th century C.E. In their political theories, Plato and Aristotle talk of democracy as just one option among other possible forms of governance. Miller (1992:192) asserts that for Plato, democratic governance should be limited to participation by representation rather than actual and equal participation of every citizen in the affairs of the state. This is because such a system would accrue to ‘mob rule’. In fact, Miller (1992:192) asserts that in Plato’s view, the ideal system was “aristocracy” i.e. rule by philosophers. This means
those who are enlightened with regard to “reality, truth, and goodness, and have emerged from the darkness of the cave and beheld the Good” (Miller 1992:192). On the other hand, Miller (1992:153) asserts that though Aristotle rejected ‘mob rule’, he however believed that an adequate form of governance must accommodate “the rank and file of the citizenry with its collective experience of god sense”. This is called politeia (Miller 1992:153). Though this term was referred to as democracy, Philippe Denis (1991:163) argues that what Aristotle really meant was “constitution...the best constitution one could have” (Denis 1991:163).

Denis (1992:16) argues that the classic meaning of democracy was quite different from its modern understanding (s). It was understood from a “communal” perspective rather than from an individual sense of human or personal rights. Government existed for the wellbeing of the nation, and seeking common good was good governance. Though it was believed to be applicable only in small states like Athens, compared to monarchy or aristocracy, however, democracy i.e. politeia was believed to have the advantage of providing “stability by giving power to a greater number of citizens” (Denis 1992:16). Johann Westhuizen (1991:173) notes that with the Enlightenment and subsequent humanistic revolution, liberal (or modern) democracy came to accentuate individual human rights over communal rights. Here claims were made for legal order, political institutions and economic systems to provide effective protection of “the individual’s rights to life, freedom of expression, freedom of religion, freedom of movement, freedom of association and assembly, and personal privacy” (Westhuizen 1991:173).

In this context, Denis (1991:164) asserts that democratic government has become particularly necessary in order to ensure everyone’s rights, since the only limit to individual freedom now is non-infringement of another person’s rights. Democratic government is also an affirmation of rule of the people, by the people, and for the people, which, for “practical reasons”, is exerted through representation rather than actual direct participation of every citizen in government. In some constitutions more power is accorded to the executive, while in others more power is accorded to the legislature. Today, democracy is considered to be the political system with the best tools to promote
and preserve the ideals of freedom, equality and justice, whereas in the classic age it was just one among other options (Denis 1991:164).

Westhuizen (1991:473) observes that in the course of ideological and political developments in the world, liberal democratic ideals have also been to some extent influenced by other values deriving from socialism/communism, especially as a result of discrepancies in socio-economic experiences between the so-called First and Third World (1991:473). He also asserts that from this multi-ideological encounter, further human rights categories have arisen in addition to the above-referred first generation rights (or blue rights), namely, second and third generation rights. The former is also known as red rights including “rights to employment, housing, education and health services”. The latter is also known as green rights including rights to “clean and decent environment” and a people’s right to “self-determination” (Westhuizen 1991:473).

In the light of this exposition, it can be deduced that democracy, despite its conceptual and structural fluidity, seems to posit a system of governance involving at least three key elements. Firstly, it ascribes power to the people, whereby ascension to democratic power is legitimated only through a public process of ballot casting. Publicly drafted law regulates this exercise of democratic power. Secondly, democracy is a liberal system. This means that institutions need to be transparent and accountable to society. Through such liberal institutionality power can “best be used for justice and restricted from its use for injustice” (De Gruchy 2002:147). Thirdly, democracy ensures “human agency” as well as control through rule of law (De Gruchy 2002:147). Through values of freedom, human rights, and suffrage, democracy provides favourable space for people to explore their individual potential and creativity, to claim their social due, and ultimately be able to exercise political rights and contribute to the future of society.

However, despite the rising democratic movement that has grown in Africa since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the democratic landscape on the continent has been largely problematic. As Laureti Magesa and Zablon Nthumaburi (1991:1) observe, most democratic processes on the continent have been characterised by the rejection of
electoral results by loosing parties, with the winners alienating their opponents. Literature on the subject records that this democratic malaise has been explained mostly in terms of three historical arguments. One is that democracy has not worked in Africa because of "adversarial" politics Africa inherited from colonialism (Magesa and Nthumaburi 1991:1; Prah 1996:16). Two, it is argued that democracy has failed to work in Africa because of continual Western meddling in African affairs by seeking control through those African leaders who do not oppose Western interests (Prah 1996:16). Three, it has been claimed that democracy is essentially a Western notion and does not suit Africa (De Gruchy 1995:50; Prah 1996:16).

Notwithstanding the repercussions that democratic failures have brought upon the continent and its peoples, the three major arguments levelled against democracy for Africa do not seem to sufficiently explain away the need for democracy on the continent. The argument of 'adversarial' politics seems to be true of most African countries owing to the one-party system that has dominated African politics since independence. Political, military, and civic groups have arisen on the continent because the one-party system has failed to deliver on its promises. As Saxena (2001:18) observes, African leaders that took over power after the departure of colonial powers claimed that one-party system would be a unifying structure against "regionalism and tribalism", and would provide stability instead of tribally based political rivalry. It was seen to advance economic development more efficiently than a multi-party system, because under one party decisions and policies would be made quicker than in a discursive multi-party context. They also argued that one-party leadership better fitted what they adjudicated to be a classless African society, thus the party would but serve communal interests of all people (Saxena 2001:18-26). However, experience has proved most of these arguments wrong. The one-party system has actually spurred a reverse reality to what was advocated, resulting in protest campaigns against nepotism, corruption, economic injustice and deterioration that this system has produced on the continent. Thus, the 'adversarial' political explanation for the democratic malaise on the continent indeed has a historical foundation. At the same time, however, it also seems to justify the value of democracy for the continent. In accord with De Gruchy (1995:51), what appears to be necessary is to perceive democracy
as more than just a four-year voting cycle or formality. It should be contextualised and developed according to specific needs, and construed towards an affirmation of "human equality, and ensure true freedom and justice for all" (De Gruchy 1995:51). Moreover, as Klaus Nurnberger (1991:304) argues, Africa needs more time. It is rather precocious to rule democracy out of Africa after only a couple of decades of experimentation. Not even in the West, was the establishment of democracy that easy. Nurnberger (1991:304) asserts that in Germany, for example, the first democratic process after the First World War failed, and the current system was only introduced after the Second World War (Nurnberger 1991:304). Thus, the present experience of 'adversarial' politics on the continent still does not seem sufficiently strong to outweigh the "inclusive, just and accountable social frameworks" that democracy provides (Bloomfield and Reilly 1998:17). These values still seem to be "the best effective means for peaceful handling of deep-rooted differences" (Bloomfield and Reilly 1998:17).

The explanation that Western continual interference in African affairs has borne effect on the much democratic malaise in Africa also seems to have a strong historical backing. Saxena (2001:29) states, "Foreign intervention, especially by the former colonial powers, was another important reason for the demise of democracy in Africa...they intervened either in support of the leaders who were pro-western or in support of the dissatisfied and disgruntled leaders who were trying to overthrow the government in power" (Saxena 2001:29). Nonetheless, only the democratic system seems to offer the possibility of stamping out foreign interference in local affairs. This is achievable when people become democratically empowered on account of franchise, freedom of speech and media to hold the leadership accountable for policy and its performance on various fronts, including foreign relations.

Lastly, the explanation that democracy is essentially a Western notion that does not suit Africa can likewise be challenged. Notwithstanding that democracy may be an imported concept; African scholars have argued that many of the values held in the democratic concept of governance are not strange to the African institutional past. This is not only because of their universal appeal, but also because of the ways that leadership was
practiced in Africa prior to colonialism. In pre-colonial times, there was the notion of council which existed at various layers of society. There were councils of elders, councils of mature men, tribal councils, and so forth. These spaces facilitated open discussion on matters of life in the community. They also facilitated interaction between the community and the leadership, thereby rendering leadership accountable to the community (Mandew 1991:321-324; Nurnberger 1991:307-8; Prah 1996:17). In addition, some argue that there were voting systems that were used in order to reach consensus (Prah 1996:17), as well as community court systems (Mandew 1991:329).

Mandew (1991:329) argues that although ascension to power i.e. kingship or chieftainship generally entailed a spiritual dimension that related to the African notion of ancestor and living dead, both the spirits and human leaders worked primarily for the wellbeing of the community (Mandew 1991:329). He argues that leaders were guarded from misconduct, especially because misconduct could often engender "factionalism and opposition" (Mandew 1991:329). Moreover, he submits that one major difference between traditional African forms of government and the tradition of modern democracy is that the former was more communal by seeking common wellbeing while the latter is more inclined towards individual concerns (Mandew 1991:329). On this account, many African scholars have refuted the myth (mostly from the West) that leadership or governance in pre-colonial Africa was arbitrary and dictatorial. Rather, it is generally argued that it was the Western presence in Africa that interfered with and dismantled traditional African social fabric and values (Mandew 1991:330).

In concluding this section, the discussion seems to suggest that democracy bears both universal appeal and value. The essentials of participation, plurality, consultation, accountability, freedom and equality in politics and community life pervade both time and space. Furthermore, a democratic system seems to be the best political and governance alternative to the one-party system that has prevailed in Africa since independence. This is because democracy bears the potential for mediating the establishment of adequate public structures for good governance and for advancing social
development. On this note the next section discusses the significance of democratisation for reconstruction in Angola.

3.3 Significance of democratisation for reconstruction in Angola

Following the end of the civil war, national reconstruction is the vision now facing Angola. While colonialism disrupted the people’s social fabric, took away their sovereignty, and eroded their dignity, the civil war has further exacerbated this scourge. This study has argued that the major factor behind these experiences is political. This reality implies that there cannot be reconstruction in Angola without Angola’s politics being disentangled from this past. All previous attempts to peace have failed because over and again the incumbent MPLA government and the former armed opposition movement UNITA have sought after supremacy over each other with almost total disregard for national wellbeing. Thus, in order to overcome this political complex, liberalisation of Angola’s politics seems to be pivotal to a process of reconstruction. As discussed in the previous section, democracy legitimates ascension to power only through public processes, it prescribes transparent and accountable politics and governance, and it proposes public participation in policy-making. These principles are underlined by democratic values of freedom, human rights and the rule of law, which would devolve power to the people from the oligarchic ambitions of the two major political groups.

In this light, democratisation and reconstruction are inclusive processes. Democratisation is the political path with potential to give way to the process of reconstruction as political absolutism would be invalidated and potentially deterred. On the other hand, once in progress, reconstruction would in turn enable democracy to flourish, because a restoring environment would equip people to be stronger democratic agents. Democratisation can enable the establishment of foundations of reconstruction and in turn reconstruction would provide the tools for democratic growth. Certainly the “politics of dominance” will continue being a threat to the country’s future at least at the initial stage of the country’s transition from the past to the future. However, democratisation is still the process with the most potential to empower people to take charge of the reconstruction process. On
this note, the next sections consider and evaluate the democratic framework through which Angola’s peace and democratisation are being pursued.

3.3.1 Path to democratisation: the road map for peace

After Jonas M. Savimbi, founder and leaders of UNITA, died on 22 February 2002, the leadership of UNITA began talks with the government in Luena capital of Moxico. The talks resulted in the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Luanda on 4 April 2002. The MoU was established both to end the hostilities and to serve as road map for the democratisation of the country. Despite being a new agreement, the MoU is a reification of the Lusaka Protocol that both the MPLA government and UNITA signed on 20 November 1994, which “was unable to experience the positive evolution expected for its definitive conclusion” (see Appendix II p. 125). Thus as a document, the MoU is an amendment clause to the Lusaka document. The clause includes annexes 3-6 of the Lusaka document, which are military, police and national reconstruction issues.

As a joint-document of the MoU and Lusaka documents together, the road map includes the following key points. It ratifies “ceasefire”, which means the end of military hostilities, dismantlement of UNITA’s army, integration of some into Angolan Armed Forces – FAA (one national army) and some into the Police Force, and the demobilisation of others and their reintegration into civilian life. It ratifies “national reconciliation”, which means guarantee of an amnesty law for all crimes committed within the framework of the twenty-seven years of armed conflict, forgiveness between Angolans, coexistence, fraternity, tolerance, right to belong, trust, common wellbeing, and economic justice. Moreover, it stipulates that UNITA is to be granted special portfolios in the ruling MPLA government during the transition to elections, thus creating a Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN). Also, the reconciliation framework stipulates that UNITA’s members of parliament elected in the 1992 elections are to resume their seats in parliament (see Appendix II p. 120).
In terms of democratic principles, the road map ratifies peace, political liberty and accountability, rule of law, human rights, and freedom of individual and of the media. In terms of governance, it ratifies power-sharing between a presidential executive, legislature and judiciary. Moreover, it ratifies a decentralised administration of the provinces. Every province is to be administered by the party that wins most constituencies in it in elections. It stipulates that the next elections should take place when conditions of safety, “free circulation of persons and goods and public freedoms throughout the national territory” are practical; when government administration is effectively extended throughout the national territory, including “the rehabilitation of communication routes and the resettlement of displaced persons” (see Appendix I).

In terms of the accords implementation, the road map distributes duties between different bodies and entities. For the monitoring of the ceasefire, demilitarisation and incorporation of UNITA forces into the single national army and police, the road map appointed a *Mixed Military Commission* (CMM) composed of representatives of the government, UNITA, and military contingents from Portugal, Russia, UN and USA. Moreover, Clause IX of the Lusaka document also grants the UN, USA, Russia and Portugal a further observatory role over political processes with power to sanction non-compliant parties (Appendix I p. 123). Lastly, the road map bestows onus upon the UN to oversee and certify when the conditions for holding elections as stipulated in the road map are met (see Appendix I p. 122).

### 3.3.1.1 Value of the road map

The Lusaka Protocol did not succeed because both the MPLA government and UNITA failed to comply effectively with the military resolutions, particularly UNITA, against which the UN Security Council issued a series of sanctions. These sanctions included the Resolution 1173, which aimed at denying UNITA resources to continue waging war. The Security Council banned the purchase of Angolan diamonds not accompanied by a government certificate of origin, and ordered states to freeze UNITA bank accounts.
Thus, the Luena Memorandum is important because it marked the end of the war and reifies the Lusaka Protocol.

However, there are points of concern with the road map that need to be noted. For example, looking at the way the memorandum came to be struck, it seems that the parties did not really enter into the agreement on even terms. The accords seem to have been agreed under a loser-winner situation. Aaron Griffiths (2004:1) argues that when the government called for talks with UNITA after the death of Savimbi, UNITA was “fractured and reeling”; facing much tougher choices than the government whose forces had already closed down on UNITA. The government’s position enabled it to either trash UNITA completely or “engage in some form of peace talks” (Griffiths 2004:1). Martin Rupiya and Jemima Njeri (2005:95) posit that when one victorious side manages a peace process, there is a danger of that victor taking advantage of the situation and advancing its unilateral objectives “at the expense of the defeated opponent”. Such a situation perpetuates the very causes of the conflict and potentially leads to a backfire (Rupiya and Njeri 2005:95). The fact that the government had unilaterally drawn the ‘Peace Plan’ that guided the talks leading to the signing of the memorandum can serve as evidence that indeed it had an upper hand over UNITA (Griffiths 2004:2). In counter-argument, however, it seems important to consider the value of the international observation of the process. While preliminary talks began in early March 2002, by mid-March the UN, USA, Russia and Portugal were also deployed in the negotiations (Griffiths 2004:2). Rupiya and Njeri (2005:96) note that the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was aware of the implications of a peace process under the control of a victor. Annan called for “a dignified end to the Angolan hostilities in which there would be no winners or losers” (Rupiya and Njeri 2005:96).

Another issue of concern relates to some of the stipulation changes that have occurred in the annexes 3-6 from their Lusaka document status to the MoU document status. One, the MoU determines 5007 UNITA personnel for incorporation into the Angolan new single army, the FAA, whereas in the initial Lusaka Protocol MPLA and UNITA personnel were to be incorporated into FAA based on proportionality. Two, the MoU stipulates...
forty (40) UNITA personnel for incorporation into the National Police Force, whereas in the Lusaka Protocol it was 5,500 UNITA personnel. Three, while the Lusaka Protocol bestowed it upon the UN to supervise the demilitarisation and demobilisation process, the MoU put this onus on the MPLA government, with the help of a technical group assisted by troika observers (see Appendix II p. 127; Appendix I p. 120).

A third issue of concern is the fact that, as with the previous peace processes, the process that culminated in the signing of the MoU also reflected an undemocratic character in that it refused participation to civil community. This is despite the fact that the government had pledged to work with civil society, especially the church, when it presented its unilateral ‘Peace Plan’ on 13 March (Griffiths 2004:2). Both UNITA and the government responded to public critique by suggesting that a civil voice would have jeopardised the process at such a delicate stage (Griffiths 2004:2). Griffiths (2004:7) argues that if the process were broader in terms of including civil society, perhaps it could have set “a better foundation for more profound democratisation and deeper reconciliation” (Griffiths 2004:7).

There is certainly much validity in the various critical points made above regarding the value that the road map may have for the country’s democratisation process. However, from a more pragmatic point of view, we are already faced with a legitimate document that we cannot get rid of but need to implement. This document has ended the nearly three decades of conflict. Moreover, it has more potential to succeed than any other document by the mere fact that it is post-Savimbi. More importantly, while the previous democratic accords were based on a winner-take-all model, the present road map is conciliatory and provides strong democratic foundations that provide a framework for the liberalisation of Angola’s politics from its violent, corrupt, and totalitarian past.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the relationship between democratisation and reconstruction in Angola. It has argued that democratisation and reconstruction are two related processes.
Since reconstruction is the vision now facing Angola following the end of the civil war, democratisation is necessary for sustainable development. This is because through democratisation Angola’s politics can best be liberalised from the political absolutism of the past toward open and publicly accountable politics. While absolutist politics has been the major factor behind the civil conflict, democratic politics provides an appropriate deterrent against such political pursuit. Because democracy can allow open politics, accountable use of power and resources, and human rights and freedom, which together provide the potential ground for effective nation-building.

In light of this discussion, the chapter has outlined the treaty of April 2002, the memorandum of understanding signed between the incumbent MPLA government and UNITA, and suggests that it offers a plausible framework for peace and democratisation in Angola. In this way, it sets a favourable foundation for reconstruction. Unlike previous accords, which were based on a winner-take-all democratic model, the Luena memorandum is conciliatory and ratifies power sharing and socio-economic justice. Thus, the next chapter explores the response to the road map, including that of the church.
CHAPTER FOUR
RESPONSE TO THE ROAD MAP

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the significance of democratisation for the reconstruction of Angola. It argued that democratisation is the necessary stepping-stone for reconstruction because it offers the best ground for political liberalisation in the country. Lack of political liberalisation was the mother cause of the civil conflict, which in turn hindered nation building and development. The chapter concluded that the road map for peace and democratisation signed in April 2002 presents a plausible foundation for democratisation leading to national reconstruction. Since the road map is the bridging contract between the past and the future, the present chapter explores the state of its implementation. It first looks at how UNITA, the government, and the international community have responded to it. The focus of the discussion then moves to the response of the church i.e. the Inter-ecclesi 1 Commission for Peace in Angola (COIEPA). This discussion aims to ascertain strengths and weaknesses in the church’s response to the democratisation process.

4.2 Response to the road map: UNITA

There was a rapid and full compliance with the military provision of the treaty. Ceasefire became effective from 18 March 2002 as soon as the negotiations began between the government and UNITA forces in the town of Cassamba in Moxico province (Griffiths 2004:1). It is estimated that about 85,585 UNITA soldiers presented themselves at designated quartering camps all over the country by July 2002, accompanied by their families. UNITA handed over about 90% of the total weaponry it possessed to the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA – the new single army) (Porto and Glover 2006:67). It was estimated that the remaining 10% were in civilian hands. As part of its “four layered military structure”, UNITA had used “village militia units, each averaging anything between thirty to sixty people. Their task was to hold ground and harass government
forces spending the night in their locations (Rupiya and Njeri 2005:98). The level of insecurity predicted as a result of the scattered 10% of UNITA's weaponry did not happen. The fear was that they would be used in "banditry and localised violence" (Rupiya and Njeri 2005:98). Because of this prompt response and cooperation, UNITA was praised by the UN, the troika observers, and the MPLA government. By August 2002, the process of quartering and disarmament was formally concluded and the 'Mixed Military Commission (CMM)', the process monitor, was dissolved. In its place, a Joint Political Commission (CCP) was established (Monitor 2004).

On the political front, UNITA initially experienced a struggle around legitimacy between its different factions: the mainline UNITA which after Jonas Savimbi and his deputy Antonio Dembo died came under the leadership of General Lukamba Gato; the overseas UNITA camp; and the New UNITA which had broken away from Savimbi and stationed in the capital Luanda. However, in 2003 all the factions came together and elected Isaias Samakuva, formerly head of the overseas camp, as new UNITA president. Following this process, the movement soon reunited as one (Griffiths 2004:3; Monitor 2005). Indeed, UNITA has transformed from a military movement to a political party. It has been active in the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN), in the National Assembly, in the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), and it has exacted its party activities politically. It has generally used the press, peaceful rallies, and alliances with other social players to make its case against what it has often viewed as government military harassment and political intolerance. For example, in March 2004 it joined thirty civil associations and other opposition political parties in an anti-government campaign. This campaign was not limited to the capital Luanda as there were also meetings and demonstrations in other provinces. The motto of the campaign was "at present, the exercise of liberties and rights is the greatest challenge facing the Angolan people" (Lopes 2004:36).

11 At the end of 2003, Angolan Police guesstimated that about 3-4 million small arms and light weapons were in civilian hands, the large portion of which was in possession of ex-UNITA militia as well as MPLA or FAA militia. These groups were not included in the program of demobilization (Monitor 2005).
4.3 Response to the road map: MPLA government

The peace treaty mandates the government, with the assistance of UNITA, the UN, and the troika observers, to oversee and cater for the demilitarisation and demobilisation of UNITA’s ex-combatants and their incorporation into the FAA, the National Police Force, and reintegration into society. The reintegration task also includes displaced populations. The government is moreover mandated to re-establish democratic instruments in the country and to facilitate preparations towards elections (Appendix II p. 127).

The government provided a basic assistance of US$100 social reintegration allowance, a kit of basic household items and tools, and identity and demobilization documentation to ex-combatants. However, only adult male ex-combatants were eligible to receive this package. Ex-combatant women could only receive humanitarian support as civilians. Child soldiers were not generally registered as combatants. As such, they were not eligible for official reintegration programmes either. Since humanitarian aid was distributed in terms of family unit, many families took in ex-child soldiers as members to increase their portion. But as the camps closed many ex-child soldiers went unaccompanied, ending up lost from the official register (Parsons 2004:14).

In April 2002, the government filed the amnesty treaty before the National Assembly, which quickly passed into law. On 14 November 2002, the government formed the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN). Three UNITA officials became provincial governors and four others were appointed as deputy provincial governors. Five UNITA officials were appointed Angolan ambassadors. Four ministerial posts and seven deputy ministerial posts were also allocated for UNITA (Monitor 2003). On 21 November 2002, the Joint Political Commission that had been established earlier in August, consisting of representatives of UNITA, government, the UN, and the troika observers was dissolved. At the closure, the representatives stated that the commission “had verified that the main tasks of the Angolan peace process had been completed and that the medium and long-term tasks will be dealt with bilaterally between the government and UNITA” (Monitor 2002).
The government has been criticised for the way it handled the demobilisation process. Conditions in some quartering camps where soldiers were accommodated during the process were extremely precarious, with high levels of malnutrition and famine, combined with excessive red tape, all of which made access to service much more difficult. This is despite the fact that the number of UNITA combatants and their families that presented themselves to the quartering camps exceeded the margin of 50,000 people that was estimated in the Memorandum (Parsons 2004:13). Parsons (2004:14) argues that though the government and the international community hailed the demilitarisation process a success on account of UNITA's compliance and that there were no criminal incidents, “its implementation reflects the government's military and political advantage and has failed at times to pay sufficient attention to the needs of the ex-combatants themselves” (Parsons 2004:14). Isaias Samakuva, UNITA leader, stated, “the closure of QFAs12, around April/May, has been premature...many people were forcibly removed from the quartering areas. Despite government denials, this is fact...many were simply put on trucks and dropped off in unknown locations” (Rupiya and Njeri 2005). It is also reported that UNITA complained that it was the government that called for the closure of the Mixed Military Commission (CMM) in 2002, that the closure was rushed because the CMM’s work was unfinished. UNITA feared that disbanding the CMM that early would “reduce incentives for the government to ensure proper completion of the DDR13 processes” (Parsons 2004:15).

With a view to consolidate peace and national reconciliation, in March 2004 the government launched an emergency programme called Public Investment Programme (PIP). It was envisaged that it would advance the rehabilitation of economic and social facilities, thereby creating more economic activity, providing medical assistance to the population, raising schooling levels, enabling movement of people and goods, creating better links between provinces, municipalities and communes, improving infrastructure and organizing and building the capacity of local administration. It was also aimed that the PIP would reinforce reintegration into society of orphans, disabled people, internally

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12 Quartering camps or family areas
13 Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
displaced people and refugees. In June 2004 the government launched the Angolan Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (ADRP) to facilitate the reintegration into society of 105,000 UNITA ex-combatants and their families and 33,000 government soldiers (to be demobilized to reduce the size of the army) (GoA 2004). The ADRP promised vocational/professional training and income generating activities. It aimed to provide equal rights, opportunities and assistance to specific groups in their localities of settlement. The total budget calculated for the ADRP was US$260 million, with the government contributing US$157 million, US$33 by the World Bank, and the remaining US$ 70 million from other international donors (Parsons 2004:16; GoA 2004).

The government reaffirmed the above programmes in its General Programme of the Government for the Bi-Annual 2005/06 (PGG 2005/6) launched in October 2004. This was the twelfth economic programme the Government has launched since it began economic reforms for a shift from centralized economy to a mixed economy in August 1987. The previous eleven programmes were short-term economic/development programmes. PGG 2005/6 is the long-term development programme the government promised on the occasion of the launching of the last short-term programme. The PGG 2005/6 has the years 2005/6 as target for medium-term objectives. Such objectives are establishing and strengthening the justice system, “administrative decentralization and de-concentration”, re-establishing state administration and communication roots countrywide, and preparing conditions for the realization of elections (GoA 2005).

However, UNITA and other political parties and civil bodies have continued to suggest that the government is deliberately delaying elections in order to consolidate political monopoly. In 2003, these groups called for elections to be held either in 2004 or 2005. They argued that it was legitimate that elections were held within that period so that the National Assembly would not extend its mandate without popular consent. They also argued that elections were the way “to bring an end to the autocratic style of MPLA and the President” (Lopes 2004:35). Early in 2005, members of the Constitutional Committee walked out of the Committee in reaction to government reluctance to advance the electoral process (Monitor 2005). This reaction forced the National Assembly to pass a
new national electoral law, the creation of the National Electoral Commission (NEC), and the scheduling of legislative elections for September 2006 and presidential elections for 2007. In late 2005 voter registration began under the supervision of the Ministry of Territorial Administration (IRIN 2005). However, in early September 2006, the government postponed the date of the legislative elections until 2007, giving the reason that “the conditions are not yet viable” (IRIN 2006).

Furthermore, the government has been criticised for autocracy, corruption and restricting and violating civil rights. Complaints have poured in concerning the state of the justice system in the country. Lopes (2004:32) has argued that “participatory democracy” is yet absent in Angola, which poses “a crucial challenge for construction and consolidation of peace”. She argues that there has been transfer of state property to political and army elites through privatisation, and that legal institutions have been politicised (Lopes 2004:32). Monitor (2005) reports that UNITA has consistently spoken of government “political intolerance and military attacks”. In early 2005, the leader of UNITA, Isaias Samakuva, said, “we have recently been witnessing a backward movement to one-party system by the MPLA trying to replace the State” (Monitor 2005).

There has been news of violent public reactions against government policies and abuse of authority such as dismantling of informal markets without replacement structures being built, as well as police theft from *kinguilas* and *zungueiras*. The government has also been accused of standing on the way of civil organisations’ work. For example, the government has refused *Rádio Ecclésia* “to extend its signal to the whole national territory unless it changes its editorial line, as demanded by the President” (JA 2005). In a 2005 report on human rights in Angola, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour observed experiences of “abridgement of the right of citizens to elect officials at all levels, unlawful killings, disappearances, torture, beatings and abuse of persons, harsh and life threatening prison conditions, corruption and impunity, arbitrary arrest and detention and lengthy pre-trial detention, an inefficient and overburdened judicial system, restrictions on freedom of speech, the press, and assembly, violence and discrimination on women and children” (HRW 2005). In March 2006, Amnesty International issued a
public statement to the government calling for the end of forced evictions and excessive use of force by police and security forces, which have left thousands of poor and other marginalized communities without shelter and access “to health and other basic amenities”. Amnesty International indicated that since the war ended in April 2002, demand for land in Luanda (and other parts of the country) for public and private developments, including high and middle-income housing, has increased. To facilitate such developments, the authorities have forcibly evicted innumerable poor families from their homes and lands. Amnesty International has shown concern that such evictions have been carried out without ‘procedural protection and due process as required under international standards’. This poses a gross violation of a range of human rights, in particular the right to adequate housing.

4.4 Response to the road map: International Community

The UN and the troika observers represent diplomatically the role of the international community in the peace process. But international states and civil entities have also been contributing to the process, including The United States Assistance for International Development (USAID), Amnesty International, Open Society Institute for Southern Africa, and the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA). The latter has received special funding from the governments of Belgium, Canada, Finland, Ireland, New Zealand, Denmark, Norway, UK, Switzerland, Sweden, USA, the European Union, and various branches of George Soro’s Open Society Organisations (Monitor 2005). The UN is also represented by its social assistance agencies including the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), World Food Programme (WFP), Humanitarian Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), Human Rights Watch, and so forth.

The UN Mission in Angola (UNMA) was only authorised by the Security Council in August 2002 under the Resolution 1433. This is after the process of demilitarisation and demobilisation was already formally completed. This also meant that the UN’s involvement in the Joint Political Commission only lasted from August to November.
2002 when the Commission was disbanded. From then onwards, the UN has continued to be involved mostly on a humanitarian assistance capacity through its different agencies (Monitor 2004). The UN has made a significant difference in terms of humanitarian assistance. It has provided relief and subsistence assistance to demobilised soldiers, returning refugees, and other vulnerable groups, and evolved various development projects ranging from agriculture to health, civic and human rights, education, and professional training almost countrywide. About one third of the Angolan population is surviving on food aid, particularly channelled through the UN (IRIN 2006). However, the Angola Peace Monitor has recently pointed out that humanitarian aid for Angola is dwindling. In its World Report 2005, Human Rights Watch warned “donor fatigue has resulted in cut-backs to humanitarian assistance in 2004 based on the rationale that now that Angola is at peace, it is a primary responsibility of the Angolan government to provide assistance for its people, albeit with support of international donors” (HRW 2005). This “donor fatigue” is shown in the decreased success of UN Inter-Agency Appeal for fund for Angola. Every year since 1993 this agency has appealed for international support for Angola from different humanitarian agencies in the world. But by October 2004, for example, less than 60% of its annual appeal of $262 million had been donated (Monitor 2005). Since last year, the UN has been coordinating its humanitarian activity through UNDP Assistance framework for Angola, with the UN Development Programme being the lead UN organisation inside the country. The OCHA closed in June 2004 and continued some of its functions through a smaller Transitional Coordination Unit (TCU) until December 2005 (Monitor 2005).

4.5 Church response to the democratisation process

During the civil war period, the Angolan church’s response was quite denominationally defined. The Catholic Church took a more non-partisan yet vocal political stance. Partially because of this Rádio Ecclésia, the Catholic Church Emissary of Angola that operated in Luanda since 1954, was banned by the MPLA regime in 1977 only to be re-established in 1997 (Hodges 2004: 96; Faria 2003). Furthermore, it was the Catholic Church that in the late 1980s began to arouse civic conscience in the country. It began to
speak out on human rights and justice, and became involved in campaigns of civic education and conflict resolution. For example, in November 1989 Roman Catholic bishops issued a radical letter calling on UNITA and MPLA to stop the war and hold free elections. It was also in the same year that the Angolan Civic Association, Angola’s first NGO without links with state patrons since independence in 1975, was created (Faria 2003). In the context of the period of late 1980s and early 1990s, this stance corresponds to the pattern that prevailed across Africa. The Catholic Church on the continent engaged a pre-eminent political action. To mention a few examples, Paul Gifford (1995:19) records that in Benin, Monsignor (Mgr) Isidore de Sousa, Archbishop of Cotonou, presided over the national conference, then as president of the Hault Conseil de la Republique (High Council of the Republic) overseeing the transition process for the thirteen months leading up to elections. In [Brazzaville] Congo, Mgr Ernest Kombo presided over the three month long national conference and then the active transitional process. In Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo), Mgr Laurent Monsengwo Pasyinya, Archbishop of Kisangani, was elected in 1991 to preside over the national conference (Gifford 1995:1, 19). Many have associated this political action with the spirit of the 1991 papal encyclical, *Centesimus Annus*, and its proclamation:

> The church values the democratic system in as much as it ensures the participation of citizens in making political choices, guarantees to the governed the possibility both of electing and holding accountable those who govern them, and of replacing them through peaceful means when appropriate (Ranger 1995:23).

The Protestant Church, however, was divided and a politically complex religious grouping. In the Popular Democratic Republic of Angola (RDP), which UNITA and FNLA proclaimed in the central province of Huambo in November 1975 in rivalry to MPLA’s People’s Republic of Angola in Luanda, the Congregational Church aligned itself with UNITA. In fact, as Benedict Schubert (1999:407) accounts, congregational ministers and other educated and professional personnel formed the *espinha dorsal* i.e. backbone of the education and health system of the RDP (Schubert 1999:407). As Humabo fell under MPLA military campaign of total control of Angola in its *segunda guerra de libertação* i.e. second liberation war, the Congregational Church was divided
in factions. One side followed UNITA in its retreat in fim do mundo i.e. end of the world or far southeast whence it re-galvanised itself, and the other side submitted to the victorious MPLA regime (Schubert 1999:407).

While the Evangelical branch of the Protestant Church limited itself to charity work under the MPLA regime through groups like Caritas de Angola i.e. Charities of Angola (Faria 2003), the Methodist Church on the other embraced the socialist vision of the MPLA regime, accepted MPLA’s interpretation of the recent historical events that had taken place in the country, and sought to find a theological consensus between Christianity and socialism (Schubert 1999: 409). Following a 1978 issue by the MPLA Political Bureau banning Women and Youth activities in the churches, the then Methodist Church’s presiding bishop Emilio de Carvalho wrote to the All African Council of Churches that the church’s defiance of the decree did not mean “conflict with the ruling party” because it was only those activities that militated against state law that were prohibited (Best 1979: 139). Ken Best (1979:139) reports further that bishop Carvalho also said that under the new circumstances the church’s prophetic ministry should also take a new approach, one of playing “a balancing role in society to ensure that the government works for the wellbeing of the people...why should the church speak against a government which is trying to help the people...we have to be careful that we are not labelled as counter-revolutionary, as a stumbling block to progress” (Best 1979: 144).

In the year 2000, the Inter-Ecclesiastical Commission for Peace in Angola (COIEPA) was formed. It was a coalition of the Council of Christian Churches (CICA), the Angolan Evangelical Alliance (AEA) and the Angolan Catholic Church (CEAST). CICA and AEA are umbrella organisations representing the major Protestant churches (Methodist, Baptist, Congregational, etc) (Comerford 2006). The commission began to take shape in 1998 when one of the severest wars in the country’s civil war experience broke, following impasse in implementation of the Lusaka Accords by both the MPLA government and UNITA. Amidst that crisis, each of the three church strands committed themselves to pursuing the two belligerents towards peace and ceasefire. They perceived that the war was causing an unprecedented toll on the population. Their first coalesced
action took place in July 1998. They organised a prayer day for peace, gathering about 40,000 Angolans from different Christian denominations. One of the main outcomes of that encounter was the issuing of a public statement on behalf of the church, which called for “extra efforts by all interested parties to avoid” the renewal of war and to stop human rights abuses (Faria 2003).

There are two other main events that paved way to the formation of COIEPA. In April 1999, a Protestant Church based peace initiative emerged. The movement was called Angolan Group of Reflection for Peace (GARP) which issued a Manifesto for Peace. It called for peace via dialogue and invited all of the civilian population “to take full responsibility for the solution of our problems” (GARP 1999; Faria 2003). The other event was a letter issued by Catholic Church bishops in early March 2000. The letter appealed for national reconciliation, advocating that the government of Luanda should not close “the doors on dialogue” with UNITA, and for the UN “to rethink policy” concerning Angola (Faria 2003).

After its formation in April 2000, COIEPA created a special body which it named Rede de Paz i.e. Peace Network. This network soon attracted a membership of over fifty different civic and religious groups and organisations to campaign for ceasefire and consolidation of peace in the country. Besides religious groups, members of the Rede de Paz range from NGOs, private media institutions, women’s organisations, a number of traditional authority figures and elders, including some of the Angolan kings (Comerford 2006).

COIEPA welcomed the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) or the road map in 2002. It congratulated both the MPLA government and UNITA for patriotism and efforts to reach a “conciliatory” consensus for the wellbeing of the nation, and appealed to all parties involved, including the international community, to assist in the implementation of the accords (Christian Aid 2002). However, COIEPA’s Executive Secretary, Ntoni Nzinga, called the MoU “relative peace”. He argued that the MoU “marks the beginning of a new era”, but “we want peace that means more than silencing
of the guns. There is need for a comprehensive political agreement that may enable us all to put behind the history of war and get rid of the culture of violence in the midst of our people and nation” (Nzinga 2002b).

COIEPA’s analysis of the Angolan war has ascribed its causes to “deep historical divisions within Angola’s nationalist movement” (Comerford 2006). It has argued that the “internationalisation of the conflict was due to the inability of the nationalist parties to overcome their differences and reach consensus” (Comerford 2006). Ntoni Nzinga, COIEPA’s Executive Secretary, has stated:

For the past twenty-seven years, Angolans of all backgrounds often justify the causes of our suffering and misery by pointing fingers at Portuguese colonialism, the apartheid regime in South Africa and the Cold War. We also accused tribalism and ethnic motives as serious threats to our political independence and stability. We also sometimes place responsibility for our conditions of life, including the tragedy we still face as a nation, on the dead…fortunately, the failed peace agreements of 1992 and 1994 taught us that there are many other reasons behind the protracted war, which helped build and sustain the culture of violence and survival for the majority of Angolans (Nzinga 2002b).

Comerford (2006) argues that because of this perspective, COIEPA insinuates that “internal rivalry and divisions predate the forging of international alliances” between liberation movements and superpowers. Also, this perspective seems to underpin COIEPA’s advocacy of “dialogue” as “the only means” to lasting peace in the country (Comerford 2006). COIEPA has understood peace as the ‘disarming of minds’. Ntoni Nzinga stated, “The end of the war does not mean the end of the conflict”, meaning that the war “is an expression of the frustration and other motives that are in people’s minds. That physical confrontation only takes place when confrontation within the mind no longer has space”. The silencing of guns is crucial, but it is only a stage to begin dialogue about the real issues that brought conflict between Angolans (Nzinga 2002b).

The church has also argued its understanding of peace more broadly. It has viewed peace as unity. For the church, peace as unity means that Angolans have to reach the awareness
that they belong together. Therefore, it is important that they overcome their differences by shifting focus from what divides them onto what is common. By focusing on commonalities, Angolans will begin to free themselves of a war mentality. Moreover, the church has argued that a lack of unity is at the root of the protracted war and the destruction that the country has experienced (Nzinga 2002a; Nzinga 2002b). The church has stated,

> From the times our people engaged in the liberation process, we remained divided in terms of movement and vision. This made us define peace in terms of effective control rather than participation of Angolans of all backgrounds and territory. But relying on the kind of relationship that maintains us in our transactions, be they economic or social, whatever transactions should be the security we need for our future. We need, therefore, a political and economic system that enables Angolans of all backgrounds and regions to participate in a just peace and sustainable development able to ensure prosperity for all (Nzinga 2002a).

In addition to unity, the church has also understood peace as transformation. It has argued that for peace to be lasting, Angolans have to take the rein of their destiny over against the mentality of blaming colonialist and foreigners for their conditions. Angolans need to embark on a process of economic transformation and care for the vulnerable in society (Nzinga 2002a; Nzinga 2002b). Moreover, the church has also conceived peace as participation. It has argued that peace should mean "solidarity" among Angolans irrespective of background. Such solidarity has to supersede political alliance. It should be anchored on national mutuality (Nzinga 2002b).

It is indisputable that the church arose as a pacesetter in the civil campaign against the resumption of war in the country in the period of 1998 to early 2002. It galvanised and conscientised civil society and together they lobbied for peace through dialogue instead of guns. The church displayed wisdom and great unity by coming together under COIEPA. This is particularly noteworthy because of the historical differences that existed between the different church strands that made COIEPA. That is why, some have argued, that they initially responded individually to the 1998 crisis (Comerford 2006; Schubert 1999:405-413).
The church’s peace vision is also commendably broad and has bearing on the current
democratic context. The church has argued peace beyond the silencing of guns to mental
renewal, togetherness, care and belonging of all Angolans. It has argued for Angolans to
take charge of the future by rising from the paralysis of blaming foreigners to becoming
masters of their own destiny. Equally important is the fact that the church’s peace vision
also captures the need for building political and economic structures that can enable
national transformation and social justice, especially for the vulnerable.

However, since the war ended and democratisation began, the church’s impact has been
mostly felt in humanitarian and social upliftment work. It has worked in liaison with
international humanitarian bodies. For example, it worked closely with the UN Food and
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) distributing seed and tools for agriculture to ex-
combatants in quartering camps. It has also continued to work in various relief and
development projects with USAID, American Friends Service Committee, and the
Canadian based Inter-Church Coalition on Africa. While humanitarianism is important,
its major weakness in the context of the democratisation process is its peripheral role.
Since the war ended, the church has not significantly featured in the centre of the
democratic dialogue. It has not influenced the various constitutional and institutional
changes that have and continue to take place. Politicians have decided such processes
alone, which undermines the church’s vision of participation, unity and transformation.
This is because it is ultimately constitutional and institutional instruments that will define
the country’s democratic future. Charles Villa-Vicencio (1992:277) rightly asserts that it
is institutions and laws that set the legal frame within which “the debate on human rights,
economics and culture building” is pursued (Vicencio 1992:277). At best, politically, the
church has been a source of acquiring credibility when politicians find it tactful to play
the democrat. For example, when opposition parties walked out from National
Assembly’s Constitutional Commission on 12 March 2004, President Dos Santos held a
series of individual consultations with civic groups on the subject, including COIEPA.
This consultation, however, was only with the Executive Secretary Ntoni Nzinga. It made
no significant difference in the course of the democratic process (GoA 2004).
The church’s peripheral approach also undermines the potential it has to make a difference in the political processes as well as to contribute in the transformation of the realities of economic injustice and human rights violations that are being experienced in the country. Besides international liaisons and status the church has reached on account of its role in the peace campaign, the church also maintains strong influence within urban and rural areas. This is “a factor which differentiates it from the majority of other civil society organisations” (Comerford 2006). If efficiently galvanised, such potential could be democratically channelled for advocacy on behalf of victims and vulnerable groups.

It seems to be a partial explanation that politicians’ ill will to concede space to civil society in decision-making processes justifies why the church has not been a centre stage player. In our view, a greater explanation seems to be that the church’s peace vision, within which premises the church has continued to operate, has turned anachronistic i.e. it is lagging behind the current state of affairs. The vision was formulated in reaction to the situation of resumption of war in 1998-2000, which was motivated by concern about the severity of the scourge of that war upon the nation. Essentially, the church’s message was one of ‘cease-fire and peaceful coexistence’. For this reason, with the coming of peace, the church’s work has receded to pacification and care, while being increasingly alienated from the political, constitutional, and institutional democratisation processes. But without exerting influence on the country’s democratic order, the church’s contribution to national reconstruction will hardly be decisive. The church needs to reclaim a more central role in the democratisation process in order for it to be able to influence the shape of the foundations being set for the future. It is such foundations that will define the direction of the process of national reconstruction that is on course.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has explored how the MPLA government, UNITA, and the international community have responded to the road map for peace and democratisation, and sketched the response of the church to the democratic process. It found that UNITA has commendably responded to the road map as it has irreproachably transformed from a
military movement to a political party. Likewise, the government has engaged with much of its tasks of reintegrating ex-combatants into society, creating democratic instruments in the country, and coordinating preparations for elections. However, the government has been criticised for a poor handling of the demobilisation and reintegration process, inefficient function of legal instruments and rule of law in the country, inadequate social action, unfavourable economic policies regarding the poor, and political procrastination regarding the realisation of elections.

The chapter has argued that the church’s response to the democratisation process does indeed offer visionary values in terms of its proposals for the future. However, practically, the church has been alienated from the constitutional and institutional democratic processes. This is mainly because its peace vision has lost contextual cohesion, lacking theoretical motive for the kind of reactive action it employed during the peace campaign. Thus, for its response to bear decisive effect on national reconstruction, the church should reclaim a decisive role in the democratisation process.

Up until this stage, the study has engaged with Angola’s social reality. It has looked at the country’s history of conflict, the current democratic state of affairs, and the challenges for the future. In terms of the praxis theological method that this study has adopted (see section 1.3), a theology for Angola must derive from the country’s actual experience. Thus, the social engagement that has been undertaken establishes the context that will define the conceptual framework for a church response to the democratisation process that this study pursues. On this account, this context is the determinant of the relevance of a theology of reconstruction for Angola, which the next chapter discusses.
CHAPTER FIVE
THEOLOGY OF RECONSTRUCTION

5.1 Introduction

Throughout the previous chapters, the study has engaged with Angola’s social reality. This engagement has established the context from which a theology for Angola must be developed. It has shown that following the experience of three decades of conflict, since the year 2002 Angola has been undergoing a democratisation process. The study has argued that this process is the necessary stepping-stone for Angola to move from its destructive past to a constructive future. This is because through the democratisation process the issues that have underlined the conflict can be openly addressed and foundations for a better future established. In light of this discussion, the last chapter looked at the state of the democratisation process, particularly the church’s response, and argued that the church should take on a more politically significant role if it is to decisively influence national reconstruction. This is because the church’s lack of participation in the political processes limits its contribution to the structural and institutional foundations being established for the future. Thus, chapter five discusses the theology of reconstruction as posited in Africa and its relevance for Angola.

5.2 Background to the theology of reconstruction

The pioneer and major proponents of the theology of reconstruction in Africa are the Kenyan theologian Jesse N.K. Mugambi and the South African theologian Charles Villa-Vicencio. Though Villa-Vicencio published his work first, *A Theology of Reconstruction: Nation-building and human rights* (1992), Mugambi began propounding the concept a few years earlier. Mugambi first introduced the concept through a paper he presented at the All African Conference of Churches (AACC) in Nairobi in March 1990. Later, in 1991, the AACC published it under the theme *The Future of the Church and the Church of the Future* (Mugambi 1995:5). His seminal work, which incited an unprecedented level of debate on reconstruction in African theology, was published under the theme *From Liberation to Reconstruction: African Christian Theology After the Cold War* (1995).
This publication is a refined collection of lectures he gave at Rice University, Houston Texas as the visiting Mellon Distinguished Professor in March 1991 (Mugambi 1995: vii). In 2003 he published a second edition of the same book, *Christian Theology and Social Reconstruction*, in which he articulates his argument with more acumen and detail.

Since then, the notion of theology of reconstruction has received mixed responses with some embracing the notion while others showing suspicion and reluctance. The most credible and original critics of Mugambi and Villa-Vicencio that this study has found are Tinyiko Sam Maluleke and Elelwani B. Farisani. On the other hand, the study has also found Ka Mana, a West African Francophone theologian, to be of significant relevance to the reconstruction discourse. This is because he has posited a reconstruction perspective with a slightly different note from that by Mugambi and Villa-Vicencio.

### 5.2.1 The reconstruction theological paradigm

Mugambi’s proposal addresses the broad African context, though he posits that as a concept, reconstruction can speak beyond the borders of Africa (Mugambi 1995:viii). Conceptually, Mugambi proposes a move from *inculturation* and *liberation* paradigms to a *reconstruction* paradigm. He discusses that inculturation and liberation have been the basic and dominant concepts for innovative African theology. He argues that the concept of inculturation is an “anthropological” theological approach that arose within Catholic Christian circles in the 1980s with a focus on relating [Christian] faith into culture (Mugambi 1995:9; 2003:27). He argues that though this theological enterprise may explore and value African culture and the African person, “there is need to go beyond theological anthropology into theological introspection” in Africa. Meaning, Africans need to start operating “from static to dynamic modes of thought, allowing us to be changed by circumstances in which we work, while we endeavour to influence those circumstances in turn” (Mugambi 2003:27). Mugambi posits that the reality that Africa has been “left desolate by forces of colonial domination, institutional racism, and ideological propaganda during the cold war”, calls for reconstruction, even beyond anthropological validation (Mugambi 2003:27).
However, Mugambi’s reconstruction argument is particularly developed in terms of a paradigmatic departure from the theology of liberation. He discusses that in Africa, the theological concept of liberation has been closely associated with Anglophone Protestant theologians. That it finds its origins in Latin American and African-American theologies. In Latin America, Mugambi argues, the liberation theme arose following the disillusionment that the United Nations Development Decade generated among the poor from 1955. This is because the project failed to achieve its goals in that part of the world, particularly at grassroots level (Mugambi 1995:2, 3). In North America, Mugambi argues, the civil rights movement of 1950-60s, with the notable leadership of Martin L. King and the theological articulations of James Cone, adopted the theme of liberation in response to segregation and discriminatory laws against blacks. He argues that it is after these trends that the theological liberation theme also reached Africa. That it is the struggle for independence that Africa was undergoing and then followed by struggle against neo-colonialism which made the concept appealing to Africans, while the experience of apartheid made it appealing to South Africans (Mugambi 1995:2-4).

Mugambi (2003:128) argues that with the change of order in world politics, from Cold War to democratic dispensation, the challenge facing Africa is to rebuild itself “out of the ruins of the wars against racism, colonial domination and ideological branding” (Mugambi 2003:128). He argues that with the end of the Cold War, even liberation theologians in Latin America shifted focus. They shifted from liberation to poverty, then to spirituality (Mugambi 2003:29). While the Exodus text was the main theological metaphor for liberation, Mugambi (1995:24) argues that it is necessary to review biblical themes and motifs afresh and suggests that in the Old Testament *Exodus* is only one theme among many which inspired the people of Israel. He states, “themes of reconstruction and restoration are also powerful and relevant concepts, they motivated the Hebrews to transform their society and culture at different times in their history” (Mugambi 1995:24). Among the various texts he cites, both from New and Old Testaments, Mugambi especially focuses on the Ezra-Nehemiah text in the Old Testament. He argues that this text’s social reconstruction episode, following Israelites liberation from the Babylonian exile, poses a valid reconstruction theological motif for
Post Cold War Africa. As with the Israelites, this text posits the need for reconstruction in Africa following the end of the Cold War and the ushering in of the New World Order (Mugambi 1995:24).

Mugambi argues that the parallels drawn between the Exodus and African decolonisation have been “rather contrived and far fetched”. Because for Israel the Exodus involved geographical movement from Sinai to Canaan, whereas Africans remain in the same geographical space in their independence struggle” (Mugambi 1995:15). On the other hand, the theme of reconstruction is attractive because it highlights “the necessity of creating a new society within the same geographical space, but across different historical moments” (Mugambi 1995:15).

Mugambi (2003:63) posits that reconstruction is not simply a different name for the same activity pursued through liberation theology. But there is a tangible methodological shift. Liberation theology requires “dialectics and logistics of war”, while reconstruction theology involves “dialectics and logistics of nation-building” (Mugambi 2003:63). That is, liberation presupposes “fighting, struggling, opposing, blaming, scape-goating” (Mugambi 2003:29). It involves “leaders and followers”, with the former as definers and articulators of the cause while the latter play the role of militants. After achieving liberation, leaders expect to be rewarded for their role in the struggle as leaders and architects of the new society, which has often resulted in power struggle in the new era (Mugambi 2003:168). Reconstruction theology on the other hand, focuses on “peace, decentralisation [of power], cooperation, safeguarding the freedom which has been won” (Mugambi 2003:61, 75). It encourages all members of society to direct their “energy and resources” towards nation building (Mugambi 2003:61). Moreover, the reconstruction method is interdisciplinary, “ecumenical and inclusive” in that it involves other disciplines other than theology and appeals to both former oppressors and oppressed to be subjects in the process of renewal (Mugambi 2003:30).

On this account, Mugambi (1995:16) proposes that reconstruction needs to occur at three levels. The first is personal reconstruction. He bases this level of reconstruction on
instances of Jesus’ teaching in the gospels when he requested individual change of heart from his listeners. He argues that this approach is the starting point for reconstruction in terms of Christian tradition. It allows for “appropriate disposition of individual members of a community concerned, especially its leaders”, to social transformation (Mugambi 1995:16). According to Mugambi, change of heart constitutes renewal of “motives and intentions” of an individual, which should be a continual personal preparation for “tasks and challenges ahead” (Mugambi 1995:15). He refers for example to the tax collector’s experience of change of heart in Mark 2: 13-17 in contrast to the Pharisees’ hardening of heart in Matthew 23:1-13. From this example he extrapolates that because of his change of heart, the tax collector was more ready for reconstruction than the Pharisees. The tax collector opened up to the new possibility of life that Jesus presented to him, while the Pharisees remained adamantly incredulous to the new prospect presented to them by Jesus (Mugambi 1995:15).

The second level is cultural reconstruction. Mugambi interprets culture as being the combination of all aspects of people’s activities in their endeavour to survive social and natural environments that surround them, including “politics, economics, ethics, aesthetics and religion” (Mugambi 1995:16). From time to time each of these components requires renewal and adjustment, without which culture can run out of tune with people’s real needs and cause “unease” which can erupt into unrest (1995:16). By economics he means “resource management”; politics refers to “management of social influence”; ethics refers to “management of value systems”, which should adjust to change in priorities “either to remind of forgotten politics, or to reorganise values hierarchy”; Aesthetics refers to the art of creating balance among all aspects of life; and religion he relates to provision of “worldview” which synthesises all conscious values (1995:17). The third level is ecclesiastical reconstruction: “ecclesial reconstruction should include management of structures, financial policies, pastoral care, human resources development, research, family education, service and witness” (1995:17).

Despite suggesting a paradigmatic move from liberation to reconstruction, Mugambi (2003:61) argues that liberation and reconstruction are “consecutive processes; they are
not mutually exclusive; rather complementary and related". That is, reconstruction follows after liberation, yet, while reconstruction may begin in liberated areas, liberation can continue in areas where captivity prevails (Mugambi 2003:61).

Like Mugambi, Charles Villa-Vicencio also anchors his reconstruction argument on change in the socio-political context. However, while Mugambi addresses the African context, Villa-Vicencio specifically addresses the South African context. He sees the 1991 political change that occurred in South Africa from apartheid to democracy as an opportunity the church should seize to contribute in the building of a new society. He argues that with this change in context, the new challenge facing the [South African] church was now different from that of the past. The complexities of a new South Africa required more than resistance. They involved the difficult task of saying, “yes to the unfolding process of what could culminate in a democratic, just and kinder social order” (Vicencio 1992:2, 7).

Villa-Vicencio indicates that the banning and restriction of political leaders and organisations prior to February 1990 had confronted the church with a challenge to fill the political vacuum. It had to provide a social and political space for resistance to continue against the different forms of oppression and discrimination that apartheid decreed. The church’s essential task had been to say “No” to apartheid (1992:7). In the new political situation, apartheid was no longer law and political exiles were returning home. Now the church was faced with “the task of breaking-down prejudices of race, class and sexism, and the difficult task of creating an all-inclusive – non-racial and democratic – society built on the very values denied the majority of people under apartheid” (Vicencio 1992:7). To meet this challenge, Villa-Vicencio says, requires a theology of reconstruction which would interface with “law, economics, political science and related disciplines in its approach” (1992:7). Since the task would now be one of reconstruction, Villa-Vicencio postulates that there is now a demand for post-exilic theology. A theology drawing on metaphors such as “the wilderness experience before entering the promised land, the exile prior to rebuilding Jerusalem and the return of the Babylonian exiles in the post-exilic period” (Vicencio 1992:6).
Like Mugambi, Villa-Vicencio’s argument also does not completely sever ties with liberation theology. But Villa-Vicencio makes a clearer theoretical argumentation than Mugambi in this regard. Mugambi only argues that liberation and reconstruction are “consecutive processes” yet can happen simultaneously. That is, though reconstruction comes after liberation, liberation can nevertheless continue to occur during reconstruction in places where captivity may still exist (Mugambi 2003:61). On the other hand, Villa-Vicencio discusses that ‘a theology of nation-building’ is dependent on praxis i.e. it derives its theology out of the social context within which it is located (1992:275). He adds that reconstruction theology is “a theology which is obliged to say ‘No’ to all that distracts from or counteracts the life giving and sustaining process...in some situations the ‘No’ will need to be bold and unequivocal” (Vicencio 1992:274). Nevertheless, Villa-Vicencio clearly posits that a theology of reconstruction is more than a theology of resistance. It is also about “facilitating, promoting and supporting such actions that make and sustain life in the best possible manner. It is a positive and constructive theology, concerned with social, economic and political structures” (Vicencio 1992:274). While liberation theology takes its point of departure from “liberatory events”, Villa-Vicencio posits that a theology of reconstruction takes its point of departure in “liberated events”. While the object of liberation theology is freedom, he posits that the object of theology of reconstruction is to safeguard the freedom obtained from liberation (Vicencio 1992:274). For this reason, Villa-Vicencio posits that a theology of reconstruction,

Needs to say ‘yes’ to that which promotes social justice and human dignity... it is obliged to keep alive the biblical (eschatological) vision which draws society beyond what can be accomplished at a given time, to new ideals and better goals. It is a theology committed to continuous social renewal and revolution” (Vicencio 1992:275).

Furthermore, Villa-Vicencio submits that at the centre of a reconstruction theology is “an ultimate vision which disturbs the status quo that emerges at any given time”. For this reason, such a theology should also promote “concrete proposals” providing “the best possible solution to the specific needs of the time” (Vicencio 1992:275).
Villa-Vicencio presents eight tenets that define a theology of reconstruction (1992:275). He argues that a theology of reconstruction must emerge from and in relation to the actual prevailing situation it seeks to address. That is, it must commit to social analysis. Through social analysis it must seek "to discover, clarify and explore what is going on in a given context" (Vicencio 1992:275). Though it must be fearlessly truth telling in its social analysis, such social analysis should not be ideologically guided in approach. Rather, it should commit to uncovering "the power relations, socio-economic structures and cultural values which are responsible for suffering; exploitation and social conflict", so that it may be able to identify "the underlying causes of suffering" (Vicencio 1992:275). Second, he argues that a theology of reconstruction has to have a theory or conceptual framework within which "political struggle, ethical endeavour and social renewal can and ought to be promoted". Such framework should allow action to complement reflection, and reflection to complement action (Vicencio 1992:176). Third, he argues that a theology of reconstruction is by definition an interdisciplinary exercise, since social analysis and a theoretical framework of reflection necessarily involves interdisciplinary work". It requires to be undertaken at the interface of the social sciences (Vicencio 1992:277). Theology should take seriously "the challenges and insights of other disciplines...while making own contribution to the process in a language that makes sense to and is understood by other disciplines". At the centre of this interface is the dialogue between theology and law, because the latter provides the legal framework within which "the debate on human rights, economics and culture building is to be pursued" (Vicencio 1992:277). Fourth, Villa Vicencio argues that since a theology of reconstruction seeks nation building within which people of different faiths share, it should refute the notion of state religion, while embracing cultural and religious tolerance and mutuality. Crucial to this endeavour is "inter-faith dialogue", which can facilitate cultivation of tolerance and exchange of faith values between various religions (1992:277). Fifth, a theology of reconstruction should be "open-handed". That is, it should involve "on going reflection, re-evaluation and self-critique" (1992:278). Its axioms are not binding for all time, but are "provisional definitions of the kind of society required to meet the challenges of the time" (1992:9), whose limitations for the future are transcendable and transformable. "Social renewal must be a continuing revelation within
which the concerns of the poor are continually employed as a lever to transform the structures of society to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged” (Vicencio 1992:278).

Sixth, Villa-Vicencio argues that a theology committed to continuing social renewal must be “constructive in its critique of the existing structures, proposal oriented, seeking realistic solutions, sharing in the nation-building process; it is to be the servant of the poor by promoting their interests, while seeking the common good of all people”. It should be committed to translating “the ideals of the gospel into constructive proposals” (Vicencio 1992:278). Seventh, he posits that a theology of reconstruction needs to be “a communal exercise that incorporates the perceptions of those who it has a special obligations to serve [the poor and oppressed], while being committed to the wellbeing of people in society” (Vicencio 1992:279). Lastly, he argues that a theology of reconstruction should be “participatory and democratic”. It should adopt a corporate approach, that is, it has to commit to making the voices of the “poor and marginalized” heard in the national debate, especially before the dominant strata and structures of a society. It is by empowering the poor and marginalized that its theology would be authenticated, because such would be “a radical affirmation of democratic participation, both in the struggle for social renewal and in the mental constructs that help shape the new society that is waiting to be born” (Vicencio 1992:279-80).

Besides Mugambi and Villa-Vicencio, who are the pioneer and major proponents of the reconstruction theological paradigm, Ka Mana has also written extensively on the concept of African reconstruction. But his perspective is slightly different from that by Mugambi and Villa-Vicencio. His excursus of a theology of reconstruction relies heavily on his introduction into Anglophone scholarship by Valentin Dedji whose work is entitled *The ethical redemption of African imaginaire: Ka Mana's theology of reconstruction* (2001).

Ka Mana was a guest theologian in the 1991 All African Council of Churches symposium in which Mugambi discussed reconstruction theology as a relevant and needed paradigm for African contextual theology beyond issues of identity and liberation. *Having listened*
to Mugambi’s presentation, Ka Mana did not appreciate the sense of “lineal evolution” that he perceived to have been insinuated in Mugambi’s argument. That there should be a complete breach with the past i.e. concerns of identity and liberation, which are reinforced by theological models of inculturation, acculturation and liberation (Dedji 2001:264).

Ka Mana is of the view that the reconstruction paradigm is “a larger circle that contains identity and liberation as the matrix of its development” (Dedji 2001:265). He construes his theological reconstruction perspective against the background of what he perceives as the two major crises Africans are faced with in their current existence. The first crisis is that Africans are embroiled in “magico-fetishic mentalities” which constitute a predominantly irrational approach to life, delirious trust in the “invisible”, and “lack of roots and landmarks for their existence” (Dedji 2001:265). Meaning, African existence is being dominated by a focus on transcendence at the expense of reality. That is why Africans have tended to face life tactlessly, displayed “political stupidity and fetishic Christianity” (Dedji 2001:260). This is a “dreamlike spirituality”, posits Ka Mana (Dedji 2001:258). The second crisis is that Africa’s imaginaire i.e. Africa’s imagination, the sense of self and aspirations is sick. This pathology came about as a result of foreign (Western) domination and hard rule over Africans, especially through colonialism and neo-colonialism. This created “inferiority complexes” and disintegrated and limited African creativity and horizons. Ka Mana calls this reality Western “stalking” of Africa’s imaginaire. It aggravated Africa’s “magico-fetishic” inclination to the point that Africans have come to believe that they are “predetermined by the fatality of contemporary social and political contingencies. We cut ourselves off from the principle of innovation and liberty…we abdicate in regards to the exigencies of a new beginning” (Dedji 2001:259). On this account, Ka Mana posits that catalyst to African reconstruction is the reform of Africa’s “psyche” (Dedji 2001:264).

According to Ka Mana (Dedji 2001:257), the reconstruction motif can find theological metaphor in les grands paraboles de l’humain dans la revelation biblique i.e. in grand parables of humanity in the biblical revelation. Some of such parables are, “the founding
crises of humanity – from chaos to Eden, Cain and Abel as a symbol of fraternal responsibility; Babel as the ruin of an isolated humankind; the flood as a dynamics for renewal” (Dedji 2001:257). He argues that such instances of humanity in the biblical revelation symbolise “new horizons and renewed opportunities which God continually offers individuals and societies to become empowered with a new sense of responsibility and creativity in order to reconstruct or invest new social structures for a better future for the human condition” (Dedji 2001:257).

However, the cardinal theological metaphor of Ka Mana’s project is Nehemiah’s call of “Let’s Start Building”, because that call is “a powerful symbol of pro-activity and hope amid full-scale human disaster” (Dedji 2001:258). He is convinced that this symbol, as well as the whole reconstruction paradigm, can only be fully appreciated today in line with the perspective of “all-encompassing abundant life inaugurated by Christ” (Dedji 2001:267). He argues that Christ’s incarnation stands as “a global reality destined to be made new” and as symbol that the church’s mission is “a permanent process to reconstruct human communities from chaos” (Dedji 2001:266). Moreover, Ka Mana posits that Christ’s incarnation also has implications for the reality of ethnicity in the continent. That is, it also stands as God’s vision and creation of “a new and all inclusive human race” which supersedes the principle of ethnicity by the notion of “elected race” (Dedji 2001:266).

Ka Mana presents four principles and their respective aims for African reconstruction. He posits the need to rebuild “the conscience of [Christian] builders who are themselves forged by a vision of God’s utopia and by an active faith in his world”. Two, a new spirit that “carries with it the energy that moves through people’s history” should be re-forged. Three, there should be reshaping of “an imagination capable of escaping from ethnicity and tribalism in order to live the faith in God in relationship with the whole cosmos”. Four, there should be a restructuring of “new institutions proportional to the dimensions of the conscience, the spirit and the imagination which our faith in God requires, in order to avert crisis” (Dedji 2001:265-266).
In the final analysis, Ka Mana’s theological perspective on African reconstruction postulates that Africa’s imaginaire or “creative forces” need to be reconstructed so that “the foundation of a new destiny beyond the determination of crises may be laid” (Dedji 2001:265). This can be done by re-integrating Africa into “the horizon of God’s creative and renovative Spirit” as a pre-condition for its revitalisation at all social dimensions (Dedji 2001:265). From that revitalisation “a new dynamic and a new perspective on God’s utopia” will flow (Dedji 2001:265).

5.3 Critique of the reconstruction theology: Maluleke and Farisani

The reconstruction paradigm also has its critics, most notably Tinyiko Sam Maluleke and Elelweni B. Farisani, whose critiques seem to embody each of the two aspects of the critique launched against the reconstruction proposal. On the one hand, it is questioned whether the reconstruction paradigm offers a sufficient new value that is different from what earlier African theologies already do. On the other hand, there is concern regarding the use of the biblical text. It is argued that the use of biblical texts for the reconstruction theological metaphor is problematic. This critique refers particularly to the use of the Ezra-Nehemiah text, which is the central theological source for the reconstruction argument by both Mugambi and Charles Villa-Vicencio.

Maluleke’s critique focuses particularly on the first aspect of the critique, though he also alludes to the other aspect. Maluleke commends Mugambi as a ‘passionate and good-willed’ African theologian, a “patriot of our times”, whose qualities come vividly across throughout his book From Liberation to Reconstruction (1995). He recommends the book to African readership (Maluleke 1996:473). However, he advances some major critiques on Mugambi’s proposal for a shift of paradigms from liberation and inculturation to reconstruction. Maluleke argues that Mugambi fails to fully develop the biblical and socio-political justifications that he posits as warrant for his reconstruction proposal. For this reason, Maluleke argues that “the shape and the potential” of Mugambi’s reconstruction paradigm remains “unclear” and ‘ineffective’ to replace the liberation and inculturation paradigms against which he operates (Maluleke 1996:473).
Maluleke (1995:473) contends that Mugambi’s proposal is quite theologically weak because he draws his theological arguments from only two sources: “the Bible and the fate and state of Africa in the new world order” while failing to acknowledge and much less engage with biblical hermeneutics developed in the liberation paradigm which also “consciously sought to transcend the exodus motif” (Maluleke 1995:473). Moreover, he argues that even Mugambi’s choice of biblical texts is random and theologically indiscriminate. That is, Mugambi only picks and chooses the passages without much significant exegetical consideration (Maluleke 1995:473).

Maluleke (1995:473) argues, despite being “much stronger” than his theological justification for the reconstruction proposal, Mugambi’s socio-political argumentation is also still “debatable”. This is because, Maluleke argues, Mugambi mistakenly views the New World Order and the African continent as “monolithic, neutral” or “given concepts or realities”. But these are not so. “They are highly differentiated and controversial” (1995:473). That is why, Maluleke adds, instead of discussing them in “reflective, probing concrete and open-ended terms”, Mugambi uses “normative” and “descriptive” terms (Maluleke 1995:473).

Lastly, Maluleke (1995:473) contends that Mugambi also fails to sufficiently and “seriously” interact with African inculturation and liberation theological “output” produced during decades of theological enterprise in the continent. Such ‘output’, Maluleke posits, has also been sensitive to “economic, gender, ecumenical, and broader Third-World issues”. Mugambi, in turn, dismisses them quite simplistically as “reactive” (1995:473). Maluleke submits that “until Mugambi has taken seriously that which he wishes to replace”, that is, African Christian theological paradigm of inculturation and liberation, “he will remain without expertise, right or authority to propound his theology of reconstruction”. Moreover, Maluleke argues that it is not possible to tell whether Mugambi’s proposal offers any whole new value than what existing African contextual theologies already do since he fails to take them “seriously” (Maluleke 1995:473).
In relation to Villa-Vicencio’s argument, Maluleke firstly opposes any claim by Villa-Vicencio of setting the pace for a reconstruction paradigm, either in South Africa or in Africa in general. Rather, he alludes to the African National Congress (ANC) and a general reconstructive mood in South Africa since early 1990s as having promoted the notion even before Villa-Vicencio’s work came out (Maluleke 1994:246). As far as Maluleke is concerned, Mugambi is the pacesetter of the reconstruction paradigm in Africa (Maluleke 1994:246).

Maluleke (1994:246) further argues that the notion of reconstruction is not an unfamiliar concept to most Third World theologies, either in South Africa or in Africa north of Limpopo. He argues that in South Africa, the reconstruction language was prevalent during the political transition from apartheid to democracy in the early 1990s (1994:246). It was embodied in the African National Congress (ANC) Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) both before and after the 1994 elections (Maluleke 1994:246). When the ANC won the elections it took central stage in government policies. Maluleke argues that this reality helped to entrench reconstruction as an important concept in “so-called progressive circles, including the churches”, though its real meaning and content remained inexplicit (Maluleke 1994:246).

Maluleke (1994:55) points out that in Africa north of Limpopo reconstruction has been implicit in social initiatives for renewal both within and without the church. For the context of the church, Maluleke refers especially to the 1991 All African Council of Churches Conference and to the publication entitled Towards a Theology of Reconstruction, with a special allusion to Jesse Mugambi’s contribution (1994:56). On this account, Maluleke postulates that if the protagonists of a theology of reconstruction had taken “Africa, her churches and her theologies seriously may be they would not be talking of a ‘new’ theology” (1994:256). What he exactly means with this comes more vividly across in his second point. Maluleke’s second argument against Villa-Vicencio’s proposal is a questioning of the genuineness of the proposal (Maluleke 1994:246). He argues that Villa-Vicencio’s proposal betrays links with the South African liberal theological tradition, which, in the context of the South African theological landscape,
has been historically “powerful and dominant” in the ecumenical and theological scene (Maluleke 1994:246-7). At the same time, Maluleke argues, this tradition has “largely ignored or even resisted home-grown black and African theologies” (Maluleke 1994:246). In the process, it has endeavoured to construct and adopt a third way theology, which has “overtly tended to eschew political involvement” (1994:246). But with the new political changes in South Africa, he argues, even this liberal theological tradition i.e. ‘third way’ theologies have been left with no alternative but “to confess political involvement” (Maluleke 1994:247). Therefore, since Villa-Vicencio’s proposal has “liberal theory” as its point of departure, his proposal would constitute yet another third way between “the revolutionary demands of poor blacks in a undemocratic dispensation and the revolutionary demands of poor blacks in a democratic dispensation” (Maluleke 1994:247). In this light, Maluleke (1994:253) argues that the call for a theological shift comes from “the centre to the periphery and not vice versa”, and this factor disqualifies it from being “a theology of the poor and the marginalized”. Rather, Maluleke argues, it seems to be a strategy by dominant theologies “to maintain their hegemony”. They are seeking ways to neutralise “peripheral or potentially antagonistic ideologies by roping them in” (Maluleke 1994:253).

Concomitant to the suspicion with which Maluleke meets Villa-Vicencio’s proposal, he also argues that Villa-Vicencio’s call for a shift from “a theological no” to “a theological yes” is ‘reductionistic’ and inherently ‘hypocritical’ (Maluleke 1994:247). He argues that the call is reductionistic because it assumes that all the various African contextual theologies were “basically similar (and equal) in approach” (1992:247). He posits that Liberation and Black theologies were negative and dissenting in the eyes of the dominant Western theology because the latter saw them as “marginal voices” that operated in the periphery. Conversely, the dominant theology considered itself positive and normal by virtue of its hegemony (Maluleke 1994:253). It is also on the basis of this assumption, Maluleke submits, that the call for a shift from “a theological no” to “a theological yes” is inherently hypocritical. Because “the inviters” seem to pretend that “they too have been involved in the same resistance theology” that has been fought (Maluleke 1994:247).
Third, Maluleke (1994:247) argues that the proposal for a shift from “resistance” to “reconstruction” must be understood in terms of “a sustained rejection of black and African theologies of liberation by liberal theologians” (1994:247). In this regard, he questions the validity of Villa-Vicencio’s social analysis that informed his proposal. He contends that the analysis is dominantly Western in background. That, though it may have relevance for South Africa, it emerges mostly out of a “dialogue” between [Western] theology and liberal democracy (Maluleke 1994:249). He posits that though such a dialogue may not be “altogether irrelevant for Africans, it is essentially non-African in character” (Maluleke 1994:250). Maluleke indicates that this is evident in the examples and sources that Villa-Vicencio uses in his work, which are much more western issues than African (Maluleke 1994:250).

Maluleke is also concerned that at the centre of Villa-Vicencio’s proposal is “the apparent global triumph of liberal democracy” (1994:249). Because of this factor, Maluleke contends that for some people like himself who do not happen to be as “enthusiastic to put our future on the altar of liberal democracy may still struggle to say a political yes, let alone a theological one” (1994:249). He argues that just because democracy is being widely aspired to in Africa does not mean that Western liberal democracy is “necessarily beyond reproach in relation to African situation” (1994:254). Quoting Kobia (1993:24), Maluleke surmises that “while the yearning for democracy is a universal one...its expression could be made to be more authentically African” (1994:254). He argues that the backbone of the political stability in Europe in these modern times is “monarchy and powerful economies” rather than democracy (1994:255).

Lastly, Maluleke (1994:245) contends that the ambiguity of the meaning of the word “nation” in the proposal for “nation-building” makes such a call “incomplete and incomprehensible” unless a clear meaning of this word is given (1994:254). In a philosophical manner, he argues that if South Africa were to be considered a nation in terms of all its legal citizens living in the area designated as South Africa, stretching between Messina and Cape Town, “there would be no need to build a nation”. Since there is claim for such a need, the concept of nation thus seems to be much more complex. It

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can create “havoc existentially, anthropologically, theoretically and theologically”. He therefore contends that “if one intends to build a nation one must have a fairly good idea of who or what that nation is”, because it does pose a problem (1994:154). In final analysis, Maluleke submits that from a black and African perspective, the proposal for a theology of reconstruction instead of or even alongside black and African theologies of liberation is “misplaced and unacceptable” (1994:256).

Contrary to Maluleke, Farisani does not contest the validity of the reconstruction proposal. Rather he agrees with both Mugambi and Villa-Vicencio. He views that the reconstruction paradigm is relevant for both South Africa and the continent of Africa as a whole (2002:97). Farisani posits that it is necessary to credit Mugambi and Villa-Vicencio for perceiving “how the African situation has changed over the last few decades and why this calls for some appropriate theological response from Africa’s theologians” (Farisani 2002:117). However, Farisani’s major concern regards the way in which proponents of the reconstruction paradigm have used the text of Ezra-Nehemiah for reconstruction theological metaphor. He remarks that both Mugambi and Villa-Vicencio’s use of the Ezra-Nehemiah text, among other texts, is ‘uncritical’ because it fails to isolate “the ideological agenda of the text” and it fails to identify “the group which is dominant in the text” (Farisani 2002:86).

Through a biblical sociological analysis of the Ezra-Nehemiah text, Farisani deduced that the text is biased against the *am haaretz*, which refers to the remnant of Jews that had not gone into exile to Babylon in 587 B.C. The returnees, led by Nehemiah, used the name *am haaretz* to mean “enemies or adversaries” (Farisani 2002:87). This means that in the socio-historical context of the Ezra-Nehemiah text, the project of reconstruction did not serve the common interest of all people that were involved in it. Rather, the interests of the *am haaretz* were superseded by the interests of the returnees, who were the leaders of the reconstruction campaign and the dominant group in that society. For this reason, Farisani (2002:86) argues that the uncritical use of the Ezra-Nehemiah text for reconstruction theological metaphor “may be counter-productive, in that, instead of supporting and elevating the cause of the poor and marginalized, it may further
marginalize the poor by continuing to enslave them with the revealed word of God” (Farisani 2002:86). This is because such a reading of the text “inadvertently” identifies reconstruction as “that which is driven by the returned exiles at the exclusion of the am haaretz” (Farisani 2002:86), making it “insensitive to the plight of the am haaretz” (2002:87). Moreover, Farisani (2002:86) argues that besides the Ezra-Nehemiah text, Mugambi and Villa-Vicencio also mention various other texts “from different socio-political contexts without doing a sociological analysis of any of them”. This is evidenced by the fact that they hardly develop or unpack what and how these metaphors could be used effectively (Farisani 2002:86, 112).

Farisani (2002:114) argues that both Mugambi and Villa-Vicencio’s proposals for a shift in theological paradigm are not totally exclusive. He argues that while Mugambi suggests a shift from inculturation to reconstruction, he still includes cultural reconstruction as part of his reconstruction theology. This continuity may indicate that the two theologies complement rather than exclude each other. Farisani argues that it seems necessary that the two theologies “join hands together” (2002:114). In agreement, Farisani quotes Pityana (1995:288) who asserts, “Theological discourse will continue to predominate in the shaping and construction of a new South Africa. Theology, therefore, must proceed from the social and religious pluralism of South Africa. Social critical tools will be necessary to analyse social dynamics. Culture is a critical element in that understanding of society. A critical and dynamic understanding of culture thus becomes essential for a meaningful theological discourse” (Farisani 2002:114). Farisani also indicates that though Mugambi argues that both liberation and inculturation are now “exhausted motifs for theologising in Africa”, it is widely argued that his methodological approach for a reconstruction theology still operates to some extent within the parameters of the old approaches. This is because, like liberation and inculturation theologies, in its methodology, reconstruction theology still entails the elements of theology and practice, context, creativity and action (Farisani 2002:120).

Likewise, Farisani (2002:119) posits that methodologically, Villa-Vicencio also still operates within the liberation theological design despite his call for a theological
paradigm shift. He points out that Villa-Vicencio maintains emphasis on the elements of *praxis*, the priority of social analysis, the interdisciplinary approach, and on the relevance of contextuality (2002:119). Hence Farisani deduces that there is a sense in which Villa-Vicencio’s theology of reconstruction is a “new type of liberation theology” (2002:119).

Farisani does not only detect similarities, but also differences between Mugambi and Villa-Vicencio’s proposals. He highlights the fact that unlike Villa-Vicenio, Mugambi engages in some detail with the liberation theological paradigm, against which background the reconstruction theology is posited. Mugambi also advances ample reasons as to why a shift of paradigms is necessary. Secondly, Farisani remarks that unlike the South African context that Villa-Vicencio appeals to, the whole of the African continent constitutes the context of Mugambi’s proposal (2002:112). In final analysis, Farisani (2002:86) posits that “if Ezra-Nehemiah is to be used in a theology of reconstruction it should not be read as representing the voice of only one group”. The text has to be de-ideologised first, and “the suppressed voice of the *am haaretz* has to be heard as well” (2002:86). However, he argues that the fact that Mugambi and Villa-Vicencio’s use of Ezra-Nehemiah is not based on a ‘solid literary or socio-historical analysis’ can be ascribed to the simple fact that they are not biblical scholars (2002:118). They approach the subject of theology from the point of view of systematic theology, and that “exegesis remains a primary concern for Biblical scholars” (2002:118). Thus, Farisani explains that the gist of his argument is not that Villa-Vicencio and Mugambi’s reading of the Ezra-Nehemiah text is “wrong”. His concern is that they fail to identify the ideology that underlies the text. Meaning that their reading of the text is “different” as it only listens “to the voice and concerns of one particular group within a conflict which involves two parties” (Farisani 2002:118).
5.4 Personal response to the theology of reconstruction and its critics

Africa has had many other contextual theologies prior to the reconstruction theological paradigm, such as inculturation, reconciliation, incarnation, indigenisation, enculturation, acculturation, and liberation. Each of these theologies did not emerge in a vacuum, but in response to a context and need. For example, the liberation and inculturation theologies, which are the background against which Mugambi and Villa-Vicencio have made the theology of reconstruction proposal, emerged from specific situations. Liberation Theology was appealing to the context of socio-political oppression that Africans were under and the need for freedom. Inculturation Theology on the other hand, emerged as a result of cultural alienation of the African by the West, and the need to retrieve African identity and integrate it with the new Christian experience acquired (Bediako 1996:426).

Likewise, since 1990s, Africa has experienced a socio-political change, which Mugambi rightly identifies. Since the Cold War ended, Africa has been experiencing regime changes, conflict resolutions, democratisation, and numerous development initiatives and projects. Certainly, colonialism ended in the 1960s. And while neo-colonialism experiences may still hover the continent, the 1990s phenomenon remains tangible and real. Africa has embarked on a process of transformation. Thus, Mugambi is right that the new is a post-exilic social context that requires a relevant theological paradigm that can enable the church to be contemporary and relevant in society. The reconstruction paradigm seems to have such contextual cohesion.

The critiques levelled against this proposal are not only founded, but also valuable to the theological contextualisation debate. Farisani’s am haaretz argument derived from his socio-historical analysis of the Ezra-Nehemiah text surely needs heeding, because it warns against sectarian and marginalizing reconstruction. Though it does not contradict this basic concern for inclusive reconstruction, Mugambi however alerts that the “real conflict” in the socio-historical context of the Ezra-Nehemiah text is not a group struggle, as Farisani posits. But it is a class struggle between the elites from the two sides, the
returnees and the *Wananchi*\(^{14}\) or people of the land. Mugambi argues that the elites coalesced and led the reconstruction project following their own interests at the expense of the poor from either side (2003:173). Either way, the point made by Farisani remains. Though the Ezra-Nehemiah text offers a strong theological metaphor for reconstruction, it simultaneously warns against exclusion and marginalisation of the less advantaged in a project of reconstruction. What Mugambi’s point adds to that is elitism. It further warns against elite based and led reconstruction. This poses the need for critical use of any text in theologising reconstruction.

Maluleke’s objection to the reconstruction proposal as “misplaced and unacceptable” seems to hang basically on his perception that the proposal means to reject black and African theologies of liberation (Maluleke 1994:256). This consideration, however, seems to be more relevant to the South African theological context than to Africa north of Limpopo. As he himself observes, post-colonialism and post-independence constitutes the *Exodus* whence reconstruction theology begins in Africa north of Limpopo (1994:255). In Africa, north of Limpopo, the liberation theological paradigm bore contextual cohesion during Western occupation and rule. With independence, liberation, and especially black theology, remained the domain of South African theology. South Africa continued fighting for liberation from apartheid oppression. In his excursus of African theology, the African theologian Kwame Bediako masterfully delineates this disparity between the theological landscape in South Africa and the theological landscape in the rest of Africa north of Limpopo (Bediako 1996:426).

Bediako (1996:426) argues that there are two different trends that emerged in African theological thought in the post-independence and post-missionary era from the 1950s to the late 1980s: Black Theology and Inculturation/Indigenisation Theology. Black Theology is a theology of liberation that emerged in the African setting as a product of struggle for social and political transformation of the conditions of inequality and oppression in South Africa. On the other hand, Inculturation/Indigenisation dominated the theological enterprise in the rest of tropical Africa. It consisted of a continual African

\(^{14}\) *Wananchi* means indigenous in Kiswahili, which is a sort of lingua franca in Eastern and Central Africa.
search for its pre-Christian roots in order to integrate its new Christian identity with African selfhood (Bediako 1996:426).

Maluleke (1994:255) also views that one mistake in Africa north of Limpopo has been “the common assumption that post-colonialism in Africa is the same as post-colonialism in the West”. He argues that most Africans have not been through “the advances” that westerners had prior to modernism and post-modernism. So he finds it somewhat curious that in an oppressive situation the poor were theologically encouraged to “resist and to demand and yet in an emerging democracy the poor are asked to be creative and constructive” (Maluleke 1994:255).

Maluleke’s remark still does not seem to affect the contextual cohesion of the reconstruction paradigm as far as Africa north of Limpopo is concerned. Mugambi makes a distinction between ‘pedagogy of liberation’ and ‘pedagogy of reconstruction’. He posits that pedagogy of liberation “focuses all attention on war against the oppressor, and demands every member of the community to be a fighter, even when non-violence is chosen as the strategy for liberation” (Mugambi 2003:74). Conversely, a pedagogy of reconstruction focuses on “encouraging all members [of the community] to direct all energy and resources to the task of rebuilding, vigilantly safeguarding the freedom which has already been won” (Mugambi 2003:61). Liberation is thus a paradigm for freedom in the face of oppression, while reconstruction is a paradigm for cultivating and maintaining freedom after liberation. That is why, in the context of the post Cold War Africa, reconstruction emphasises creativity and constructiveness over resistance and confrontation. At the same time this emphasis reckons that there may be instances when and where resistance or reaction may have to be applied.

Moreover, since colonial and Cold War oppression no longer have institutional and ideological hold over Africa, the new context self-evidently calls for commitment and efforts towards building African society anew. This implies safeguarding and expanding the freedom acquired through liberation. This is how Africa can develop itself, including, if necessary, making similar ‘advances’ that the West has made on its path to modernity
and post-modernity, which Maluleke (1994:255) seems to view as essential. There no longer seems to be a direct or formal enemy sitting on the throne of Africa in the post-independence and Cold War age against whom Africans should wage resistance. Rather, the space seems to be propitious for Africans to work together and tactfully invent their own new society. It is within such a space that Ka Mana’s ‘psycho-anthropological’ approach seems to be of a vital contribution. His argument for reconstruction as a larger paradigmatic circle within which “identity and liberation” theologies continue (Dedji 2001:265) does make space for existing African theologies to continue evolving, only now under a reconstructive priority. In this case, the priority Ka Mana posits is reconstruction of the African imaginaire, that is, revitalisation of Africa’s ability to envision, to plan, and to tap its human potential. In this way, Africa will be able to free itself from the legacy of colonial and postcolonial denigration, debasement, and development stagnation. Furthermore, as Ka Mana also posits, the church can contribute in this process based on its most unique resource, the “vision” of God’s utopia” (Dedji 2001:266).

From this perspective, Ka Mana does not contradict Mugambi. On the contrary, his views complement and reinforce those of Mugambi, though with a psychological and spiritualistic dose. In fact Mugambi also speaks of personal and cultural reconstruction. By which he means, respectively, acquiring of inner disposition towards reconstruction, and political, economic, moral, aesthetic, and religious renewal (Mugambi 1995:15).

In the context of the debate in South Africa however, Maluleke’s critique of Villa-Vicencio’s reconstruction proposals seems to have different bearings. Particularly, it seems to have an historical weight to it. This is specifically in view of Maluleke’s perception that Villa-Vicencio’s call could be a new form of third way theology (1994:247). The Third way theology, as explained by Anthony Balcomb (1991:3-4), emerged out of a liberal theological stream in the 1980s as a middle path theology. It stood between a State theology, which was the official theology of the Dutch Reformed Church and supported apartheid, and Black liberation theology, which was raged in resistance against apartheid by the liberation movements (Balcomb 1991:3-4).
Third way theology abhorred apartheid on moral grounds, yet it refused active part in the anti-apartheid struggle. This is because it associated both “power and conflict” with allegiance to [political] ideologies that fell outside the precinct of Christian truth/ideals. Instead, like political liberalism, Third way theology promulgated “reconciliation” as adequate antithesis to apartheid (Balcomb 1991:75). Balcomb (1991:4) has argued that since Third way theology “language and concepts” resonated with those of the liberal political ideology, it implies that its stance was in itself “a political choice” even though it overtly refused one. “And this choice is to do with the legitimation of centrist politics”, the politics of the State (Balcomb 1991:4). He adds that having become the dominant theology of the church, Third way was embraced by the status quo and then by the emergent De Klerk administration and its reconciliation reforms in the early 1990s (Balcomb 1991:4).

Against this background, Maluleke’s (1994:24) argument that Villa-Vicencio’s theology of reconstruction has “liberal theory” as its point of departure, therefore it is not clear to tell it from third way tendencies seems valid. For Maluleke, the call could be yet another third way attempting to discourage poor blacks from claiming their dues in a democratic South Africa. Also, Maluleke adjudicates, and therefore seems concerned that the Villa-Vicencio voice comes from the dominant theology of the past, which undermined and marginalized African theologies and voices during the freedom struggle against apartheid. Thus, he suspects that a call from such a source could be a new façade aimed at continual subjugation of African theologies even in the new democratic order (Maluleke 1994:247, 253). All these concerns seem valid. However, as Farisani (2002: 117) also observes, Maluleke cannot ignore the fact that even in South Africa, the socio-political context has shifted.

Certainly, one cannot presume to be entitled to speak to the South African liberation struggle as one who has no experience of it. However, the fact that there has also been an echo to Villa-Vicencio’s call within South African theological circles seems to show a recognition of the context change factor within the South African theological setting. Besides Farisani, there are other South African theologians that can be referred to. In an
article entitled *Adding a God-Dimension to the Struggle* (1993) Albert Nolan stated, “For a long time we have protested, criticised, condemned – but now we have to begin building a nation and a society” (1993:77). In his article *A Critical Review of Charles Villa-Vicencio’s A Theology of Reconstruction* (1995) James R. Cochrane posited, “Criticisms aside, Villa-Vicencio offers us significant insights because his discussion is concretely embedded in a specific national struggle...indeed, it should help anyone focus more clearly on the role of discourse in the construction of social reality, and of the place of religious discourse within that context” (Cochrane 1995:295).

Barney Pityana is another South African theologian who has advanced some counter critique to Maluleke. For example, he responds to Maluleke’s charge that Villa-Vicencio’s proposal’s contextual analysis engages less with African culture and issues than it does with Western liberal notions. He argues that, albeit Villa-Vicencio may have appropriated such notions with some degree of uncriticality, it does not however mean that “Africa should ignore what is under debate in Western scholarship or should this be an invitation to an uncritical, sentimental Africanism” (Pityana, quoted in Farisani 2002:84). Moreover, Pityana lists theology of reconstruction as a legitimate contextual theology alongside liberation, Black, and inculturation theologies. He observes that Villa-Vicencio’s theology of reconstruction can “hardly be interpreted as hostile to the liberation theology project”. However, the events that have taken place in South Africa dramatically alter the context in which contextual theologies have been undertaken, and Maluleke should take note of that (Pityana, quoted in Farisani 2002:83-84).

Farisani (2002:85) also adds his voice to Pityana’s counter critique. He gauges that Pityana’s critique of Maluleke is “valid” because, in questioning Villa-Vicencio’s “commitment to liberation” one should also consider his contribution in other works, which show his serious concern about liberation and the cause of the poor, and that theology of reconstruction is not “hostile” to liberation or inculturation theologies (Farisani 2002:83).
It seems that, besides Maluleke’s historical motives vis-à-vis Villa-Vicencio’s proposal in the context of South Africa, all other weaknesses found in the reconstruction paradigm are not stronger than the relevance that the paradigm holds contextually. These critiques seem, more than anything else, to lend more tools for a theoretical sophistication of the paradigm. As Mugambi has submitted, he has only set a “broad outline”, hoping that others will be able to supply “details with finer brushes and more varied colours” (Mugambi 1995:2, 7).

Therefore, for the pursuit of the current study, which is to establish the role that the church can play in the process of democratisation and reconstruction in Angola, a theology of reconstruction seems to be of monumental relevance. Because, as it has been discussed earlier (see section 3.3), since Angola’s twenty-seven years of war have ended the vision now facing the country is national reconstruction. The country is challenged to clear up the rubble of the war and start rebuilding society anew. However, catalyst to the reconstruction process is liberalisation of the country’s politics from the absolutism of the past into open and public politics. Within this socio-political setting, the church is urgently challenged to take on a decisive role in the democratisation process that the country is undergoing in order for it to be able to decisively influence the process of national reconstruction. This challenge poses a need for a relevant conceptual framework to inform and guide the church’s response in order for it to be able to reclaim a more significant role in the democratisation process. This is thus the task that the next chapter addresses. It discusses how the reconstruction theological paradigm that has been posited in Africa can inform the church’s response to the current socio-political context in Angola.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the theology of reconstruction as posited in Africa. The reconstruction paradigm arose as a result of change in the socio-political context in Africa, and finds its theological basis in post-exilic biblical metaphors, particularly in the Ezra-Nehemiah text. The theology of reconstruction calls for a paradigm shift from
liberation to reconstruction, a shift from biblical metaphors of captivity for freedom to post-exilic reconstruction metaphors. Critics of this paradigm have questioned its appropriateness to lead African contextual theology, as well as the use of biblical texts for a reconstruction theological metaphor.

In the final analysis, although the chapter has acknowledged the need for more theoretical development of the concept, it has, nevertheless, unambiguously affirmed the validity of the reconstruction proposal for the continent. This is because of the contextual cohesion that this paradigm yields with the transformation revolution that has been occurring in the continent since early 1990s. In this light, the chapter has argued that for the pursuit of this study, which is the role of the church in the democratisation and reconstruction of Angola, a theology of reconstruction is of momentous relevance because reconstruction is the immediate challenge that Angola is now faced with. However, reconstruction in Angola is interconnected with democratisation, because, for the country to embark on reconstruction, there is a need to free it from its absolutist political past, which has been the major factor behind the conflict and resultant socio-economic conditions. Thus it is essential for the church’s response to the current democratic process to be decisive. Through such a response the church will potentially be able to influence the future.

However, the church’s current response to the democratic process has been peripheral. This is due to the reality that the church’s peace vision has turned out to be anachronistic in the new democratic context. Therefore, the following chapter will seek to suggest a relevant conceptual framework from which the church can respond to the democratisation process and thereby contribute to the reconstruction challenge that the country is faced with. This engagement will be premised on the reconstruction theological paradigm as posited in Africa.
CHAPTER SIX
RECONSTRUCTIVE CHURCH RESPONSE TO DEMOCRATISATION IN ANGOLA

6.1 Introduction

This chapter is the culmination of the study. The study set out to find a conceptual framework from which the church can respond to the democratisation process that Angola is undergoing. This concern has arisen as a result of the accords for peace and democratisation that the Angolan government and the former armed opposition movement signed in April 2002. This event has been viewed as an opportunity that Angola can seize to move from the warring past and to define a new way for the future. The study argued that the church possesses potential to make a positive contribution to the success of the democratisation process and thereby participating in the carving of the national future.

Chapter Two outlined Angola’s socio-historical experience since independence in 1975 up to the ratification of the peace and democratisation protocol – the Memorandum of Understanding in 2002. The first section of the chapter described the main aspects of the conflict, including how it translated politically, economically, civilly, and socially. It told that the conflict broke as a result of both international interference and power struggle between the three Angolan liberation movements while in a transition government toward democratic elections. The elections were designed as the platform on which Portugal would have granted independence to Angolans through the winning party in November 1975. The second section of the chapter ascertained that the country’s past experience poses fatal socio-political challenges to the democratisation process that is in course and the country’s future. These mainly include a politics of dominance, an economics of war, poverty, human casualties and vulnerability, infrastructural wreck, musseques, environmental crisis, HIV/AIDS and other diseases, and a potential of ethnic tension.

Chapter Three discussed the relationship between democratisation and reconstruction. It argued that since the twenty-seven years civil war was fundamentally based on political
contest, democratisation is the necessary stepping-stone for the country to cross from belligerency to peace and thereby to national reconstruction. This is because democratisation allows for the introduction of political liberalisation in the country, civic and human rights, freedom, rule of law, and transparency. As such, democratisation offers the avenue for the setting of foundations that will encourage national reconstruction. Furthermore, the chapter argued that the road map ratified in 2002 presents a democratically valuable and credible framework to guide political liberalisation in the country. This is due to the protocols it ratifies, which include multiparty system, power-sharing, administrative decentralisation, institutional reform, freedom, equality, and socio-economic justice.

Chapter Four diagnosed the state of the democratisation process by discussing the implementation of the road map, and particularly evaluated the current response by the church to the democratisation process. It ascertained that the former armed opposition movement, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola – UNITA, has completely transformed from a military movement to a political party. On the other hand, despite the significant progress it has made in fulfilling the tasks it is charged with in terms of the road map, the government has been severely criticised. It has been criticised for political procrastination and intimidation, poor functioning of public institutions especially the justice system, widening economic inequality in the country, and of lacking reintegration process into society of ex-combatants and other displaced groups. Moreover, despite initial politico-military supervision and observation over the demilitarisation process in 2002, the role of the UN and the troika observers (USA, Portugal and Russia representatives), has been mostly humanitarian in nature for the past four years.

In the evaluation of the current church response to the democratisation process, the study found commendable the role that the church played in the civic peace campaign that took place in the period of 1998 to early 2002. But it also deduced that since peace arrived and democratisation began, the church has receded to the periphery. While it has been commendably active in community relief and upliftment work, it has however been
excluded and absent from the legal, institutional, and constitutional democratisation processes which are establishing the foundations for the country’s democratic and reconstruction future. Thus, the chapter found it necessary that the church claims space in the political process as a means of making its contribution in the reconstruction of a national future.

Chapter Five discussed the theology of reconstruction as posited in Africa. It looked at the projects of its two pioneer and major proponents, the Kenyan theologian Jesse Mugambi and the South African theologian Charles Villa-Vicencio. The chapter showed that these theologians have proposed a shift of paradigms in African contextual theology from liberation/inculturation to reconstruction. Mugambi poses his project in the context of the end of the Cold War and the ushering in of a New World Order in the World and especially in Africa. In turn, Villa-Vicencio poses his project in the democratic context of South Africa that ushered in 1991 following the end of apartheid. They argue that the change (s) in political context calls for a move from resistance to social reconstruction. That now is the time for “post-exilic theology” instead of “Exodus theology”.

The chapter also discussed the two aspects of the critique against the reconstruction proposal. One the one hand, there is objection to the validity of the call for a shift from liberation and other Africans theologies to reconstruction. On the other hand, it is critiqued that the use of biblical texts for a reconstruction theological paradigm is uncritical. This critique suggests that a more critical use of texts should be made so that exclusive and discriminating reconstruction may be avoided. This is particularly a warning against the use of the Ezra-Nehemiah text, which is the central source of the theological argument that has been advanced for reconstruction. The chapter concluded that, in terms of its relevance to the current socio-political context in the continent, the reconstruction proposal supersedes in value the critiques advanced. Moreover, such critiques rather offer tools usable for theoretical sophistication of the reconstruction paradigm. For the context of Angola, the reconstruction paradigm is of momentous relevance, because Angola is now faced with the challenge of reconstruction following the end of the twenty-seven year civil war that the country has experienced. In light of
this, chapter six concludes the study. It discusses a reconstructive church response to the democritisation process in Angola. This response is drawn from a reflection on the values and elements that a theology of reconstruction can offer, based on the current social reality in Angola.

6.2 A reconstructive church response to democratisation in Angola

Based on the socio-political context that has transpired in the course of this study, the Angolan church is challenged to take on a reconstructive theological approach that is primarily proactive, yet also resistant. Although both Mugambi and Villa-Vicencio posit that there may be a need for resistance in the process of reconstruction, they do so, however, on a paradigmatic level. They do not sufficiently discuss the importance of resistance in the process of reconstruction, nor how proactivity and resistance may concomitantly operate in a specific context. Thus, besides the quest for a conceptual framework for a church response to democratisation in Angola, the contribution of this study to the reconstruction theological discourse is the contextualisation of the paradigm to the specific context of Angola. Therefore, the values and elements that a theology of reconstruction can offer from and for the current Angolan context are as follows.

In terms of a proactive engagement, the primary value that a theology of reconstruction offers to a church response to the democratisation process in Angola is the recognition that space is now availed for the country to exorcise the past and embark on the definition of a new future. It is now opportune and feasible to address openly the major underlying factors to Angola’s war that this study has identified. Core among these factors is a struggle for political self-realisation and absolutism by MPLA and UNITA, which has also been woven in a tacit interference by international powers. While the past was laden with warring, it is now possible to work on peaceful co-existence of all Angolans. Since democratisation is the stepping-stone for transition from the past to the future i.e. to the process of national reconstruction, the church is challenged to adopt a more proactive political action. Instead of the peripheral engagement that the Inter-ecclesial Commission for Peace in Angola (COIEPA) has exacted, the church should claim a more decisive role
in the structural and institutional democratic processes undergoing in the country. This is because it is through these processes that a new Angola is being constructed. By being absent from these processes, the church is failing to make a decisive contribution in the process of national reconstruction.

This calls for a second value that a theology of reconstruction offers. While in the period of 1998-2002 the church was faced with a waging and destructing war that needed stopping, in the new context a theology of reconstruction posits that the church is faced with a damaged society needing reparation and renewal. Angola is physically torn, psychologically wounded, politically divergent, and parted in terms of future aspirations. This reality indicates that the nation, politicians and people in general, are still estranged to the notion of coexistence and mutuality. In response, a most constructive counsel that the church can offer society is a social vision that would potentially serve as a goad to direct both individual and corporate agents to pursue common good over self-realisation ambitions. This is because the church’s (or religion’s) unique asset and pursuit is humanum i.e. “fulfilment of true humanity” (Shutte 1993:173), which socially translates into “the spirit of our life in each dimension of society” (Shutte 1993:166). The church can draw such counsel on the ideal of “God’s utopia” (Ka Mana, quoted in Dedji 2005:265), which is biblically expressed through metaphors such as the kingdom of God, paradise, heaven, tsedekah, and shalom. With this counsel the church would also equip itself with ethical tools that can be useful in addressing various challenges in the course of national reconstruction, particularly constitutional, institutional, and structural idolatry, that is corruption, ethnic favouritism, discriminatory policy. Eventually, this would potentially earn the church the character and status of a conscience of society.

The church can most effectively propagate a humanum vision by firstly recognising that it needs to interact intelligently in the public sphere and with social issues. Thus a theology of reconstruction challenges theology/church to interact with other social sciences’ insights, particularly on democracy and democratic process, “law” (Vicencio

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15 Yahweh or God’s righteousness, thus “social righteousness and justice as the barometer of the health of society” (De Gruchy 1995:44)
16 “Healing, wholeness of human relationships” (De Gruchy 1995:22)
1992:277), and other social development matters. Such interdisciplinary interaction would enable the church to share its input in a manner that is understandable to other social interlocutors, and, consequently, make a more effective contribution to the democratisation and reconstruction process. Secondly, the church needs to recognise that it also has much potential to propagate its social ideals to most of society through its ecclesial space. The church is community rooted and has direct ecclesiastical access to over 50% of the country’s total population, which is Christian. In this relational context with community, the church wields considerable power over people’s thinking and values through ideas, rituals, and beliefs that it shares. The church can use this influence to advance its social ideals even beyond public space. With an effective use of its ecclesial space the church, more than any other social entity, can influence most of the country towards a constructive social responsibility.

A proactive reconstruction engagement also challenges the church towards an inclusivist perspective that is wider than the one it has exacted. By rising as a united Christian voice in Angola and cooperating with other civil institutions, COIEPA has embraced and modelled inclusion and unity. However, since the country’s social context is neither religiously nor politically monolithic but diverse, with over 40% of indigenous religious population besides Christianity, and with other ten active political voices besides MPLA and UNITA, a theology of reconstruction for Angola challenges for wider inclusivism. The church is challenged to mobilise the assets and agency of all entities in society i.e. individuals and groups towards a holistic and collective reconstruction. This approach highlights a major shortfall in liberation and reactive theologies, in which lines COIEPA acted during its 1998-2002 peace campaign. These theologies only utilise the agency and assets of one party, mostly the oppressed, in the fight against another party, mostly the oppressor. Also, the liberation and reactive theologies’ struggle is exclusivist because it

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17 According to the 2006 World Fact Book edition, until 1998 Angola’s religious configuration remained as follows: Indigenous beliefs 47% Roman Catholic 38% Protestant Church 15%

18 Besides MPLA and UNITA there are ten political parties represented in Parliament following the 1992 elections. However, according to the 1992 Supreme Court political party registry, there are about 126 legally recognized political parties, which registered in 1991-2. Though without concrete evidence, it is believed that many of these political parties have ceased to exist (Miranda 2006:49).
only focuses on the rights and needs of one party over the claims and ambitions of the oppressive party. Furthermore, the liberation theologies’ vision is narrower to the reconstruction vision; because the former’s major focus is structural liberation while the latter’s focus is reconstruction in all areas of life.

Thus on the religious level, a theology of reconstruction challenges the church to embrace inter-religious dialogue, since religious contribution to the process of democratisation and nation-building would be strengthened by a wider religious community effort. This is particularly so because all religions combined would have most constituents than any other social or political group in the country. The country is almost 100% religious (at least nominally). Through inter-religious dialogue, the church would be able to explore how religion together can contribute to the national cause based on common values without necessarily undermining individual theological convictions and beliefs. On the political level, the church is challenged to remain a non-partisan voice, according equal treatment to all individual and corporate political agents, because every voice is indispensable to the project of democratisation and nation-building. But non-partisanship also calls for righteousness. Being non-partisan should not necessarily mean neutrality. One way of politically entrenching humanum ideals and values would be to boldly withhold assent from undemocratic and unlawful action, while also being bold to legitimate democratically sound voices and actions (Nolan 1993:77).

A wider inclusivist approach further challenges the church to promulgate national reconciliation. Speaking on the subject of reconciliation in South Africa, Bishop Desmond Tutu said, “it is ultimately in our own best interest that we become forgiving, repentant, reconciling and reconciled people, because without forgiveness, without reconciliation we have no future” (Tutu 1999:127). For that matter, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was created in South Africa with a mandate to promote “national unity and reconciliation”. This included confession of past atrocities; identification of victims and their fate and recommendation of possible reparation; processing of application for amnesty and indemnity; and taking recommendations with regard to “measures necessary to prevent future gross human rights violations” (Farisani
2002:265-6). Farisani (2002:368) indicates that the TRC has been critiqued of various shortcomings. For one, it has been argued that its "expectations" in terms of uncovering "the whole truth" about the past was quite "unrealistic" as many people were disillusioned by it. They could not always obtain the bottom truth that they sought (Farisani 2002:267). Also, it is argued that the TRC was limited to dealing with "gross human rights violations", factor which failed it from addressing "deeper material [or economic] bases of injustice and their threat to the health of the whole society" (Farisani 2002:267). Despite such shortcomings, however, Farisani (2002:368) affirms, "...no one can deny the important role played by the TRC in beginning a process of fostering reconciliation in South Africa. With some improvements, the South African experience can be used elsewhere in Africa" (Farisani 2002:268).

While this process received State incentive in South Africa, the church in Angola can nevertheless take initiative despite what appears to be a political indifference on the subject in the country. However, as the purpose of the South African TRC mission seems to have been, in the current pluralistic context in which Angola is, reconciliation should not necessarily mean political consensus or blind denial of the extant diversity in the country's ethnic configuration. Rather, if anything, it should involve a therapeutic purpose in which the church can play the mediator as its South African counterpart did. In the political community, it is especially important that this process be facilitated between the former war belligerents: MPLA and UNITA, so that they may deal with their hurt, resentment, and spirit of revenge, which they appear to continue harbouring towards each other. This process would lend significant value to political stability and democratic prospects for the country. In terms of ethnicity, reconciliation should not necessarily mean cultural homogenisation or identity dilution, which Abraham Malua (2002:92) posits as necessary for the development of the Ovawambo people in Angola's southern province of Cunene (see section 1.3). Particularly because, as the study has argued (see section 2.3.4), in the country's experience, ethnic tensions have been mostly politicised i.e. incited by political differences and ambitions and by unequal resource distribution rather than by purely cultural and identity motives. In fact, attempt to do away with ethnic diversity seems impractical and a waste of energy because it is human tendency to
cling to what is familiar and to what defines one’s identity (Uzodike 2004:308). Rather, it seems more realistic and constructive to acknowledge diversity and try to extract the best out if. Thus ethnically, reconciliation should rather constitute a process of mutual healing, “psycho-social welfare” as Carlinda Monteiro (2004:49) puts it, with a view to assisting the different people groups in the country to embrace the vision of societal unity, coexistence and national reconstruction.

Lastly, a proactive engagement challenges the church to adopt a self-funding approach. Comerford (2006) observes that though COIEPA still reveals, “the presence of important national capacities committed to building a more peaceful and just society”, it has, however, been heavily dependent on international financial assistance (Comerford 2006). While Comerford’s observation on the one hand indicates a positive picture of the church’s potential to continue being an influential power in the new social context, on the other hand, however, it also shows a significant deficiency. The church has lacked ability to generate funding apart from international sponsorship. This is not a safe ground from which to launch a serious reconstruction mission. Considering the longevity of a nation-building process, the church crucially needs future planning regarding material resourcefulness. As observed earlier in the study (see section 4.4), even humanitarian agencies operating in the country are currently experiencing effects of “donor fatigue” in their missions. Thus, for an effective reconstructive engagement, the church is also challenged to embrace a self-funding approach if it is to realise its social role with constancy without financial setbacks. It does not seem constructive to rely on foreign sponsorship alone, because it can be belying; neither does it seem exemplar for the church to remain aid dependent while talking national reconstruction. Thus the church is challenged to develop the ability of generating material resource besides donor support.

Although proactivity is the primary and guiding value that a theology of reconstruction offers to a church response to the democratisation process, the current socio-political context in Angola also challenges the church to take on a concomitant constructive liberating stance. This stance is posited in the light of the realities of political malaises and economic and regional injustices that have prevailed in the country. Such stance
should involve two aspects: advocacy and a hermeneutical privilege of the vulnerable. On the one hand, the church is challenged to embrace an advocacy stance owing to the need to challenge reconstruction unfavourable policies regarding issues of the rule of law, economic management, resource distribution, HIV/AIDS, the process of reintegration of ex-combatants into society and internally displaced peoples and refugees back into the country. This stance would enable the church to make a valuable contribution in the advancement of fair participation of all Angolans in the process of national reconstruction. For example, the church has to take seriously the threat that HIV/AIDS poses to the country's future by critically engaging with the public policy for the combat against this pandemic. Therefore, through an advocacy stance the church can keep a watchdog over public policy and its impact on the process of national reconstruction.

On the other hand, the church is likewise challenged to embrace a hermeneutical privilege of the vulnerable. This stance is justified by two concrete realities in the current Angolan society, which, as a matter of course, attribute to this stance a twofold approach. The first reality is the intensifying and widening economic gap between the rich and the majority poor population in the country. While in the past the political and military elite and a minority bourgeoisie class maintained economic monopoly in the country, peace and the economic reforms being implemented by the incumbent MPLA government have not only failed to create economic balance between the poor and the rich, but they have also become a new platform favouring elitist expansion. The new capitalist economics has mostly benefited the elite of yesteryear, who are enlarging their economic (and subsequently social) monopoly further. While being promised public development programmes, the poor are in the meantime being evicted from land and property and are being relegated to second-class citizenry. Thus, in view of a humanum vision which posits true humanity as the measure of social health, the church should ascribe privileged concern to the cause of the poor, the majority of the population who are economically vulnerable. By being a favourable voice and platform for the defence and promulgation of the interests of the poor majority, the church would potentially contribute to advance [economic] justice in the country. A second approach of a hermeneutical privilege of the vulnerable is the challenge to ascribe additional concern to those groups in society that
are not only part of the poor majority but also less privileged even among the poor. This is in light of this study’s social analytical apprehension that children, women, and the elderly are the most affected groups among the vulnerable. This hermeneutical emphasis is not an innovation on Jesus Christ’s pro poor stance (Luke 4:18-20 cf.), but a relevant contextualisation of Jesus’ stance for fair justice in the current Angolan situation. While 70% of the Angolan population is poor, this study has deduced that the situation of women and children is much worse. Alongside the elderly, women and children comprise the most vulnerable groups in society than men. Even more critical is the fact that current public policies have not been specific to these social and gender disparities. In the light of such disparities even among the vulnerable majority, the church would do well to be additionally concerned about the most vulnerable groups in society in its response to the democratisation and national reconstruction process. Through this approach the church’s pursuit of social justice would potentially be spared from the pitfall of contributing to uneven emancipation where some groups would have more privilege over others.

In conclusion, it is hoped that this study will lend value to church social mission in Angola, especially within the current crucial stage in the life of the country. Moreover, considering the reality of scarce Christian literature on Angola, with which situation this study has been considerably challenged, it is finally hoped that this work would helpfully serve as reference for future research on Christian social theology in Angola.
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APPENDICES

This section contains two appendices which together form one treaty: the framework for peace and democritisation of Angola. The first appendix is the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which was ratified in April 2002, and the second appendix is the Lusaka Protocol that had been ratified in November 1994. While the Lusaka Protocol failed to experience success, with the ratification of the MoU it was reified. The MoU was ratified as an addendum clause to the Lusaka Protocol's annexes 3-6, which are military issues that caused impasse in the Lusaka treaty because they failed to be implemented. By re-ratifying these annexes, MoU enabled the re-opening of the political process for peace and democratisation that had been ratified under the Lusaka Protocol.

The appendices are not the complete versions of the documents in question because of their length (about fifty pages long together). Here are presented the official summaries of these documents. The complete versions can be accessed on Angola's official website. Despite being brief, these summaries do fairly contain and reveal the essential content of the complete versions, including their purpose and structure.

The source from which these summaries have been accessed is the same as the source from which the complete versions can be accessed. This source is the footnoted official website of Angola.

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APPENDIX I

Key points of the Lusaka Protocol

Lusaka, Zambia, 15 November 1994

The Government of the Republic of Angola (GRA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), with the mediation of the United Nations and in the presence of representatives of the Observer States of the Angolan peace process (United States of America, Russian Federation and Portugal) are mindful of the need to conclude implementation of the Bicesse Accords, enable the smooth functioning of institutions resulting from the 1992 elections and establish a just and lasting peace within the framework of national reconciliation.

They accept as binding the following documents, which constitute the *Lusaka Protocol*:

**Annex 1: Agenda of the Angola Peace Talks between the Government and UNITA**

The agenda lists the order in which issues are discussed in the negotiations, which is subsequently reflected in the sequencing of the annexes to the agreement.

**Annex 2: Reaffirmation of the acceptance by the Government and by UNITA of the relevant legal instruments**

The Government and UNITA reaffirm their acceptance of the relevant legal instruments, namely the *Bicesse Accords* and the relevant Security Council resolutions. The Government's position takes the form of a letter to the UN's Special Representative, Alioune Blondin Beye.

**Annex 3: Military Issues – I**

The annex covers three issues: re-establishment of a ceasefire; withdrawal, quartering and demilitarization of UNITA military forces; and the disarming of civilians.

The definition and general principles indicate that the ceasefire constitutes the cessation of hostilities between the Government and UNITA and that it should be total and definitive throughout the whole territory. It indicates that UN will be responsible for the overall supervision, control and verification of the ceasefire.

Specific principles include: the bilateral nature of the ceasefire and the establishment of verification and monitoring mechanisms by the UN; the withdrawal and quartering of UNITA forces as per UN Security Council Resolution 864; provision of information to the UN by both parties on the composition, armament, equipment and locations of their forces; FAA disengagement from forward positions to allow UN verification and monitoring; the repatriation of all mercenaries; free circulation of persons and goods; collection, storage and custody of UNITA armaments by the UN within the framework of
a selection process of personnel for the FAA; collection, storage and custody of armaments in civilian hands; and the release of civilian or military prisoners detainted or withheld as a consequence of the conflict, under the auspices of the ICRC.

The modalities relating to these principles are listed in sequence.

A timetable for the bilateral ceasefire modalities is outlined. Phase One consists of five steps to be taken by both sides within 45 days of the initialing of the Protocol. Phase Two consists of six further steps.

**Annex 4: Military Issues – II**

The annex relates to the completion of the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), including demobilization.

General principles include the aim of completing the formation of one single, national, nonpartisan armed forces, under the verification and monitoring of the United Nations. The composition of the armed forces will reflect the principle of proportionality between the Government and UNITA forces agreed in the *Bicesse Accords*. Excess military personnel will be demobilized and integrated into civilian society, within the framework of a social reintegration programme.

Specific principles outline the decisions regarding the process and sequencing the integration of UNITA forces into the FAA, their training and the UN's role in verifying compliance. It details the establishment of a Joint Commission comprising the Government, UNITA, the UN and the observer countries.

The modalities are outlined in three phases. Phase One details the establishment of a working group of the Joint Commission, which will monitor aspects of the completion of the formation of the FAA, including selection criteria, size and composition of the FAA. This working group is dissolved in Phase Two and a new working group established to oversee the planning and implementation of the process. Phase Two also sees the initial movement of selected UNITA personnel to be incorporated into the FAA and of members of the FAA and UNITA who will be demobilized. Phase 3 incorporates the selection and integration of UNITA military personnel into the FAA, selection of those to be retained, total demobilization of excess personnel and final verification by the UN.

**Annex 5: The Police**

The annex covers the role of the Angolan National Police, the functions and scope of the Rapid Reaction Police and the incorporation of UNITA members into both bodies.

General principles outline the role of the Angolan National Police as an organ of the Angolan state administration, governed by current legislation and the relevant provisions of the *Bicesse Accords* and *Lusaka Protocol*. Its activities shall not restrict citizens' exercise of their political rights to favour any political party. As a non-partisan institution
it shall be an instrument for reinforcing national reconciliation. In accordance with the
*Bicesse Accords*, a significant number of UNITA members shall be incorporated into it.

Specific principles include the role of the UN in monitoring the activities of the police and the independence of the police from the FAA. The functions and scope of the Rapid Reaction Police are outlined. All other surveillance or policing organs are forbidden.

The modalities indicate the specific numbers of UNITA members to participate in the Angolan National Police and the Rapid Reaction Police, and the sequencing of their incorporation.

**Annex 6: National Reconciliation**

The annex refers to the specific tasks and processes envisaged to pursue the imperative of national reconciliation, including the role of the mass media, the implementation of administrative decentralization and deconcentration and the roles of the Provincial authorities. It also indicates provision for UNITA participation in government and state institutions.

The general principles of Annex 6 indicate the will of the Government and UNITA to live together within the Angolan constitutional, political and legal framework, reaffirming their respect for the will of the people expressed through free and fair elections and the right to opposition. They include provision for the participation of UNITA members at all levels and in the various institutions of political, administrative and economic activity. They imply the administrative decentralization and deconcentration of the country, and condemn the use of violence to settle disputes. They identify the role of the mass media in supporting a process of coexistence and democratic consolidation. They refer to the granting of an amnesty for crimes committed during the conflict.

With regard to specific principles, it is agreed that the Government and UNITA will conduct a public awareness campaign to promote tolerance, coexistence and trust. The freedom of speech, association and organization, as well as press freedom are guaranteed. The right of access to state press, radio and television is guaranteed to all political parties complying with current legislation.

Radio Vorgan, UNITA's radio station, is allowed to broadcast for nine months after D-Day, at the end of which it will have completed its transformation into a non-partisan radio station.

Administrative decentralization and deconcentration will be carried out, so that provincial authorities have their own powers in the fields of administration, finance, taxation and economy (including the power to attract foreign investment), under the terms of existing legislation. In accordance with the law and with Annex 5 of the *Lusaka Protocol*, the Provincial Commands will bear responsibility for the Police at the level of the province, in matters of administration, coordination and supervision of its activities. Office holders
of local government organs shall be elected in accordance with legislation to be passed under the provisions of the Constitution.

The President of UNITA shall be granted special status. The first 70 deputies elected on the lists of UNITA candidates in the 1992 elections shall be installed in the National Assembly and shall constitute the UNITA parliamentary group. Appropriate security will be granted to high-ranking members of UNITA who do not enjoy special status by virtue of their posts.

Those Angolans prevented from exercising their labour rights by circumstances prior to the Lusaka Protocol shall be given due consideration by state institutions.

The principle of the participation of UNITA members shall be implemented through their incorporation into appropriate professional functions, as far as possible and with due consideration to their technical and professional skills.

Social welfare and reintegration programmes shall be implemented throughout the national territory. A National Entrepreneurial Support Fund will provide assistance and encouragement in the establishment of private enterprises.

The Government shall undertake the management of all state property in the conditions in which it is found. All property belonging to UNITA shall be returned to UNITA in the condition in which it is found.

UNITA will be allocated adequate party facilities and appropriate residences for its leaders.

The fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens are guaranteed through the independence of the judiciary.

The revision of the symbols of the Republic of Angola shall be considered important within the framework of the competent institutions.

The modalities outline the practical responsibilities of each of the parties with respect to the implementation of the principles. They contain three distinct documents, relating to the security guarantees for UNITA leaders; UNITA's participation in local government and diplomatic missions abroad and the norms of participation of UNITA members in the government of national unity and national reconciliation.

Annex 7: Completion of the Electoral Process

This annex refers to the process for completion of the second round of the presidential elections and the roles of the state institutions, the candidates and the UN.

The general principles indicate the importance of citizens' participation in choosing the country's leaders and the necessity of concluding the 1992 elections with a second round
of presidential elections. These will be held once the UN has declared that the requisite conditions have been met. Angolan state institutions will organize the elections, with UN verification and monitoring and the participation of international observers.

Specific principles refer to the relevant legislation for the elections and the role of candidates and their agenda in controlling the conduct of the elections. The National Assembly will decide the time frame for the elections once the UN has determined that the requisite conditions have been fulfilled. The conditions are described as being guarantees of safety and free circulation of people and goods and public freedoms; effective guarantees of the functioning of the State administration; and normalization processes such as the rehabilitation of communications and the resettlement of displaced persons. State resources, including finances, shall be used equitably during the process. Polling officers will be afforded protection by the National Police and through UN verification and monitoring. Publication of elections results shall be in accordance with national legislation. Within 48 hours of the declaration of the national results, the UN shall issue a statement regarding the free and fair nature of the elections.

Modalities describe the UN’s role and functions in the process, including the verification and monitoring of the preparation of voting material and the preparation of the electoral registration rolls. It also refers to the conduct of a civic education campaign on the objectives of the second round of the presidential elections.

Annex 8: UN mandate and the role of the Observers and the Joint Commission

A. The United Nations Mandate

The general principles refer to acceptance by the Government and UNITA that the successful completion of the peace process is primarily their responsibility, and that they undertake to cooperate fully with the UN to this end. They invite the UN to play the role outlined in the Bicesse Accords and the Lusaka Protocol, including chairmanship of the Joint Commission.

The specific principles provide details of the UN’s functions in relation to 1) Military issues; 2) Police activities; 3) National reconciliation activities; and 4) Completion of the electoral process. Each of these sets of tasks is referred back to specific agenda items and annexes of the Lusaka Protocol.

B. The role of observers in the implementation of the Bicesse Accords and the Lusaka Protocol

The Governments of the United States of America, the Russian Federation and Portugal are the observers of the peace process and sit on the Joint Commission in this capacity.

Their functions are to attend meetings, monitor implementation of outstanding provisions of the Bicesse Accords and provisions of the Lusaka Protocol. Decisions at all meetings shall be taken after hearing the opinions of the representatives of the observer nations.
C. The Joint Commission

The Joint Commission shall comprise the Government and UNITA, with the UN acting as chairperson and the Troika attending as observers. Its function is to watch over the implementation of outstanding provisions of the Bicesse Accords and all the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol. It shall monitor implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions and make final decision on possible violations. Its headquarters shall be in Luanda. The Joint Commission shall establish its own internal regulations and take decisions by consensus. It shall take office on the day of the signing of the Lusaka Protocol. Once the Joint Commission is satisfied that all relevant provisions of the Bicesse Accords and Lusaka Protocol have been implemented, it shall dissolve itself.

Annex 9: Timetable for the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol

The timetable maps out the sequencing of activities from D-Day (the signing of the Lusaka Protocol). It outlines 10 stages, each designated a specified period of days during which tasks should be accomplished. At the final stage (D-Day + 455) a number of tasks are outlined for completion. It is observed that the detailed timetable will be worked out by the Joint Commission, that no task shall be initiated until the previous one has been concluded, and that, where conditions permit, the timetable can be brought forward by agreement between the Government and UNITA.

Annex 10: Other matters

The Lusaka Protocol shall be signed on 15 November 1994 at Lusaka, Zambia.

Signatories

The Lusaka Protocol was initialled on 31 October 1994 by the heads of the Government and UNITA delegations, Fernando Faustino Muteka and Eugenio Ngola "Manuvakola" and by the United Nations Special Representative, Mr Alioune Blondin Bey. It was subsequently approved by the competent constitutional bodies of the Republic of Angola and the competent UNITA authorities.
APPENDIX II

Key Points of the Luena Memorandum of Understanding

Addendum to the Lusaka Protocol for the Cessation of Hostilities and the Resolution of the Outstanding Military Issues under the Lusaka Protocol

Preamble

The Delegation of the Angolan Armed Forces, mandated by the Government of the Republic of Angola; the Delegation of the UNITA Military Forces, mandated by its Leadership Commission; in the presence of the United Nations and the Observer States;

Considering that the Lusaka Protocol, the legal and political instrument for the resolution of the Angolan conflict, was unable to experience the positive evolution expected for its definitive conclusion;

Considering that, the growing and pressing need to secure peace and national reconciliation in Angola has become imperative and urgent, and calls first of all for the cessation of the armed conflict between UNITA and the Government, promoting, to this end, appropriate initiatives for the definitive conclusion of the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol;

Conscious of the fact that, the end of the internal conflict leads to peace and national reconciliation and constitutes a challenge for which a determined commitment needs to be made for the benefit of the Angolan people;

Inspired by a will to confer on their relations a new and positive dimension, sustained by the fact that in the spirit of reconciliation, all Angolans need to pardon and forget the grievances resulting from the conflict and face the future with tolerance and confidence;

Accordingly, in order to implement their commitments and obligations under the Lusaka Protocol, hereby adopt the Memorandum of Understanding, in the following terms:

Object and principles

Object

A commitment by the parties to a ceasefire, the resolution of military issues and, subsequently, the definitive resolution of the armed conflict.

The resolution of the negative military factors that blocked the Lusaka Protocol, and the creation of conditions for its definitive conclusion.
Fundamental principles

Respect for the rule of law, the democratic institutions in Angola, the observance of the Constitutional Law and of other legislation in force.

Unequivocal acceptance of the validity of the legal and political instruments relevant to the peace process, in particular, the *Lusaka Protocol* and the UN Security Council Resolutions.

A recognition that respect for democracy is essential for peace and national reconciliation.

**Agenda of the memorandum of understanding**

**National reconciliation**

*Amnesty*

The Government guarantees approval and publication of an Amnesty Law for all crimes committed within the framework of the *armed conflict*.

*Cessation of hostilities and pending military issues under the Lusaka Protocol*

*Ceasefire*

The parties reiterate their commitment to comply scrupulously with all their commitments and obligations relative to the task of re-establishment of a ceasefire (in the spirit of Annex 3 of item II.1 of the Agenda of Work – Military Issues I of the *Lusaka Protocol*). Parties will issue and comply with a declaration of the re-establishment of the ceasefire. This task includes:

The definitive and total cessation of military actions throughout the national territory and the non-dissemination of hostile propaganda.

Not conducting force movements to reinforce or occupy new military positions, and not undertaking acts of violence against the civilian population and the destruction of property.

The regular reporting on the situation of positions the units and other paramilitary structures of UNITA military forces in areas of possible military tension.

The guarantee of protection of persons and their property, of public resources and property, and the free circulation of persons and goods.
**Disengagement, quartering and conclusion of the demilitarization of UNITA military forces**

The parties reiterate their commitment to comply scrupulously with their commitments and obligations relative to the task of quartering and conclusion of the demilitarization of the UNITA military forces in the spirit of Annex 3 of item II.1 of the Agenda of Work – Military Issues I of the Lusaka Protocol.

In this regard, the Joint Military Commission, with the support of the General Staff of FAA, will proceed to quarter and demilitarize all units and paramilitary structures of the UNITA military forces. To include:

a) The reporting, by the High General Staff of the UNITA military forces, to the Joint Military Commission, on all data relative to the composition and location of the units and paramilitary structures of the UNITA military forces.

b) The establishment of monitoring mechanisms of the demilitarization process of the UNITA military forces.

c) The identification of the units and the paramilitary structures of the UNITA military forces, the establishment of quartering areas for the same.

d) The definition of the respective itineraries and means of movement and the conduct of the military units and paramilitary structures of the UNITA military forces and paramilitary structures to quartering areas.

e) The disengagement and the movement of the UNITA military forces and paramilitary structures to quartering areas.

f) The reception, accommodation and feeding, and the registration of the personnel of the UNITA military forces in the quartering areas.

g) The handing over and the collection, storage and destruction of the entire armament and equipment of the military units and paramilitary structures of the UNITA armed forces.

**Integration into FAA of UNITA military personnel**

The Government will proceed to integrate UNITA military personnel into the FAA, in accordance with existing structural vacancies. This process will include training and commissioning.
Integration into the National Police

The Government will proceed to integrate some UNITA Generals and Senior Officers into the National Police, in accordance with existing structural vacancies. This process will include training.

Demobilization and extinction of the UNITA military forces

The parties reiterate their commitment to comply scrupulously with their commitments relating to the demobilization of the UNITA military forces and their extinction in the spirit of Annex 4 of item II.1 of the Agenda of Work – Military Issues II of the Lusaka Protocol.

The Joint Military Commission, with the support of the United Nations, shall proceed with:

The individual demobilization of the excess personnel from the UNITA military forces.

The formal and definitive extinction of the UNITA military forces.

The placement of the demobilized personnel of the ex-UNITA military forces at the administrative dependency on the General Staff of FAA, through the FAA Military Regions and Operational Commands.

Social and vocational reintegration of demobilized ex-UNITA military forces

The parties reiterate their commitment to comply scrupulously with their commitments relating to social reintegration of the demobilized personnel in the spirit of Annex 4 of item II.1 of the Agenda of Work – Military Issues II of the Lusaka Protocol.

In this regard, the Government through the General Staff of FAA and with UNITA participation and with the assistance of the international community, shall proceed with the reintegration of the demobilized personnel into civil society, within a program of vocational reintegration.

To include: the protection, accommodation and feeding of ex UNITA military personnel in the training centres; the professional training of ex-UNITA military personnel to capacitate them for the labour market, through a program of special and urgent social reintegration.

Coordination and application of the memorandum of understanding (MoU)

Coordination of the MoU

The institutional structures of coordination:
Joint Military Commission

Composition and Management:

Executive Member and President: Military Representative of the Government

Executive Member: Military Representative of the UNITA Military Forces

Permanent Observers: the Military Representative of each of the USA, Russia, Portugal and the UN

Functions:

To promote and oversee the application of the MoU

To analyze and resolve issues likely to impede the application of the MoU

Rules of operation:

To decide, by consensus of the parties, adopting recommendations binding on the parties

To assume duties on the day of signing of the MoU and cease operation when all provisions of the MoU have been complied with

To establish its headquarters in Luanda, and being able when necessary to hold meetings in other locations of the national territory.

Technical Group

Composition and Management:

Military experts of the FAA and of the UNITA military forces (up to 20 for each of the parties).

Military experts of the UN (up to 10) and of the countries of the Troika of Observer States (up to 10 for each).

Functions:

To assist the Joint Military Commission in the performance of its duties

To oversee the application of the provisions of the MoU

To organize ad hoc meetings of the military experts to study the causes of possible difficulties blocking the execution of the MoU or other issues considered to be of interest by the Joint Military Commission
To draw up a detailed timetable and define activities to be executed as part of the application of the MoU

Rules of Operation:

To meet periodically to prepare the meetings of the Joint Military Commission and, any time such a meeting is deemed necessary, to meet to analyse issues emanating from the Joint Military Commission

At the regional level, to meet daily under the chairmanship of a FAA military expert

**Timetable of application of the memorandum of understanding**

The timetable consists of 7 distinct phases, beginning with D-Day and continuing until the completion of the final phase after 262 days.

**Final provisions**

Differences of interpretation of application of the MoU shall be submitted to the Joint Military Commission for resolution, in a spirit of friendship, tolerance and understanding.

**Signatories**

On behalf of the delegation of the Angolan Armed Forces: General Armando da Cruz Neto, Chief of General Staff of the Angolan Armed Forces

On behalf of the delegation of the UNITA military forces: General Abreu Muengo Ucuathcitembo Kamorteiro,

Chief of High General Staff of the UNITA Military Forces

On behalf of the United Nations:

Chief of the UN Mission in Angola

On behalf of the Observer States of the Peace Process:

Ambassador to the USA in Angola

Ambassador of Russia in Angola

Ambassador of Portugal in Angola

**Annexes**

1: Quartering of the UNITA military forces
The annex provides details of general points on the quartering, and specifically on the structure, management and location of the Quartering Areas.

1/a: Quartering, disarming and repatriation of foreign military forces within areas territory under UNITA control

The annex recognizes the existence of foreign military forces in UNITA-controlled territory and indicates how the parties will proceed to quarter and disarm the forces.

2: Integration of UNITA military personnel into the FAA in accordance with the existing vacancies

The annex provides a military staffing list to guide the incorporation of 5007 UNITA military personnel into the FAA.

3: Integration of UNITA Generals and Senior Officers into the national police in accordance with the existing vacancies

The annex provides a National Police staffing list to guide the incorporation of 40 UNITA military personnel into the National Police.

4: Vocational reintegration of demobilized ex-UNITA military personnel into national life

The annex addresses the vocational reintegration of demobilized ex-UNITA military personnel and the guarantees and methods required for the task.

5: Considerations regarding the conditions for the conclusion of the Lusaka Protocol

The annex considers that conditions have been created to guarantee the continuity of UNITA participation in the process of conclusion of the implementation of the *Lusaka Protocol*,

and recommends to UNITA the need to rapidly establish the necessary internal consensus to participate in this process.

Annex 6: Considerations relative to special security under the Lusaka Protocol

The annex records that the parties consider valid and applicable the provision in the Document Relative to the Special Security Regime guaranteed to UNITA leaders, in application of paragraph 3 of the Modalities of National Reconciliation of the *Lusaka Protocol*.  

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