THE HUMAN SECURITY PARADIGM AS A CHALLENGE FOR THE
AFRICAN UNION IN PROMOTING PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA: A
CASE STUDY OF THE SUDAN/DARFUR CONFLICT

BY

DORCAS ADJELEY YOBO
Declaration

I hereby declare that this dissertation is a result of my own research work except for the literature cited, which served as a source of information. This work is in no way a reproduction in part or in whole of any work ever presented for the award of a degree or published papers. I further confirm that works by other authors, which were used as references and resource information have been duly acknowledged.

Dorcas Adjeley Yobo

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Signature
Dedication

This work is dedicated to my beloved dad, Mr Joseph Sackey YOBO and Mum, Deborah Amene YOBO. Thank you for your continuous love, support and belief in me, especially when I felt I had lost all hope. THANK YOU.
Acknowledgement

‘I will praise you, Lord, with all my heart and tell about the wonders you have worked’… my enemies face you and run away and stumble and are destroyed because you have taken your seat as judge, and your fair decisions has proved that I was in the right. (Psalms 9,1vs4) I am not conceited, Lord, and I do not waste my time on impossible schemes, but I have learnt to feel safe and satisfied in your word. Praise be to God.

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Authorization

This work is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Masters of Arts in the school of politics; Faculty of Humanities, Development and Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal Pietermaritzburg 2008

Approved by: Prof. N. Okeke Uzodike

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Signature and Date
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Abbreviations

AI
Amnesty International

AFICOM
United States African Command

ACJ
African Court of Justice

AU
African Union

AMIS
African Mission in Sudan

APC
Armored Personal Vehicles

ART
Anti Retroviral Treatment

ASF
African Standby Force

CAR
Central African Republic

CMR
Crude Mortality Rate

CEWS
Continental Early Warning Systems

CMCA
Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration

CPA
Comprehensive Peace Agreement

CFC
Ceasefire Commission

DPA
Darfur Peace Agreement

DRC
Democratic Republic of Congo

ESD
Executive Secretariat of Defence

ECOSOC
Economic and Social Council

ECOWAS
Economic Commission for West African States

GNU
Government of National Unity

GOSS
Government of Southern Sudan

HROs
Human Rights Organizations

HRW
Human Right Watch

IFPRI
International Food Policy Research Institute

IPDs
Internal Displaced Persons

IGADD
Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development

ISS
Institute for Security Studies

ICC
International Criminal Court

JEM
Justice and Equality Movement

MSF
Medicins Sans Frontieres

MCPMR
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MILOBS</td>
<td>Military Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Native Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Economic Partnership for West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization for African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAP</td>
<td>Pan African Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTA</td>
<td>Parents Teachers Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECs</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLM/A</td>
<td>Sudan Liberation Movement/Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>United Nations-African Mission in Darfur</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCHR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN/OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDHR</td>
<td>Unilateral Declaration of Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
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Executive Summary

Using the Sudan/Darfur Conflict as a case study, this work seeks to address how and why the human security paradigm is a challenge for the African Union in its effort to establish long-term peace and stability in Africa. The purpose of the study is to assess the extent to which the human security model provides a realistic option with regard to the AU’s efforts which are aimed at enhancing peace and security in Africa. The key issues to be appraised include the extent to which AU’s policy framework for intervention in crisis situations emphasizes the need to protect the most vulnerable population groups such as non-combatant women and children, IDPs, and refugees; the parameters of the AU’s intervention framework and how effective the organization has been in addressing human security issues in Darfur; the challenges faced by the regional military forces and key development stakeholders in carrying out initiatives that will alleviate human suffering and simultaneously create conditions conducive to conflict resolution and a long term peace building process in Darfur; and proffering new prospects of action to ensure human security in armed conflicts.

The emergence of deep ethnic conflicts, the rise of rebel groups, and new and ambitious security initiatives have made regional efforts at establishing peace more daunting than before. The AU has started putting human beings more and more at the centre of its management of peace and security issues, but it remains severely constrained by financial and logistical problems. As a result, its success has been dependent on foreign contributions, something its predecessor (Organization of African Unity) always fought against. This study highlights the fact that AU efforts to ensure peace in Africa continue to be constantly frustrated due to the failure of African leaders to address the root threats to human security. Their failure to do so has in fact worsened the human security situation on the continent.

The paper focuses on challenges faced by the AU specifically in the Darfur region, and explores whether the AU can be an actor in the promotion of human security. The main argument here is that the AU’s ownership approach to peace and security in
the African continent, which emphasizes that African problems need to be solved by Africans, is fundamentally correct. However, for this to be successful Africans need to stop asking for whatever they think they can get from the international community and focus on what they really need. This does not deny the importance of promoting a strong global political will to assist African peacekeeping efforts, especially in terms of logistics and finances. Rather, the challenge for the AU is to use donor support strategically and to continue to employ a conflict preventive approach, one which places great emphasis on the significance and need for African leaders to start addressing human security issues from their root causes—whether social, economic or political. With the collaborative efforts of nongovernmental organizations, sub-regional organizations and the civil society, the AU could establish ‘AU alert institutions’ which will aim at ensuring that minority groups have a political voice, thus not only reducing the chances of ethnically based conflicts but also ensuring that sustainable development projects are implemented by tackling the root causes of conflict.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Some of the major issues that continue to bedevil Africa in the twenty first century include persistent economic crises and the failure of the on-going political liberalization processes to establish democratic nation-states with institutions that promote economic development and consolidate political harmony. The failure of governments to guarantee political, economic and social security has caused long-term civil unrest in countries such as Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda and Uganda. This sort of internal instability has further created other threats to human security such as the failure to provide basic necessities and rehabilitation to victims of gender oppression and sexual abuse, and the presence of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). In 2002 alone, protracted wars in Angola, Sudan and DRC produced a total of more than 10 million IDPs making up more than three quarters of IDPs on the entire continent (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2003: 25). With the assistance of a foreign (Canadian) bilateral programme, a country such as Mozambique has succeeded in stabilizing its post-conflict environment by consolidating democratic institutions and encouraging broad based participation in their development process (United Nations Resident Coordinator, 2003). There is indeed considerable aid (especially in terms of humanitarian assistance for war-torn regions in Africa) from the international community. However, the question of Africa’s over-dependency on assistance in order to establish peace and address long-term African developmental goals calls for concern given the growing occurrence of African intra-state conflicts.

Surveys from international organizations working with refugees show that some African countries are still at war and the mass incursion of refugees and IDPs reflects the worsening of armed conflicts in Africa. For instance, between 2001 and 2007 the number of internally displaced persons in Africa increased from about 1,000,000 to 6,000,000 (that is about a 600% increase) (see Appendix 1). Besides the issue of refugees and the IDPs crisis in war-torn areas, international organizations such as the African Union (AU) and non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International (AI) are faced with other challenges such as protecting victims of war
from severe and widespread threats of violence, rehabilitating victims of sexual abuse and establishing long-term peace agreements – in essence, human security issues. Prominent leaders, institutions and scholars such as Thabo Mbeki, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Robert Calderriisi (2006) and Joram M. Biswaro (2004) have made suggestions on how international organizations could best address crises (especially in relation to human security issues) within war-torn regions. For instance, Biswaro (2004) has highlighted the views of African ‘optimists’ who have warned that it will be difficult for the AU to meet additional responsibilities such as the need to address the refugee crisis unless there is an attempt to eradicate the institutional weakness the AU inherited from the OAU.

However, the mere existence of escalating human security issues within intra-state conflicts and the prevalence of civil tension\(^1\) in Africa reflects the serious challenges faced by different stakeholders in their efforts to ensure peace and security. These challenges revolve around the need to protect the most vulnerable people in war torn regions and the need to address the root causes of African conflicts.

1.1 Africa before the OAU and the rationale for regional Security in Africa

In the 1960s, African states were divided into three main political groups: the Casablanca group\(^2\), the Monrovia group\(^3\) and the Brazzaville group\(^4\). Some of the

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\(^{1}\)For instance, there is growing political instability in Cameroon due to efforts aimed at permitting the current President, Paul Biya (who was 85 years in 2008) to go on ruling until 2018. Some observers fear that Cameroon might replicate the troubles of Ivory Coast and Kenya (Smith, 2008). The recent resumption of war in the Northern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo is also another example.

\(^{2}\)The name ‘Casablanca group’ was used to describe the participants at the conference of Casablanca convened on the 3\(^{rd}\) January 1961 by King Mohammed V of Morocco and attended by representatives from Egypt, Libya, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and the Algerian national government. Nigeria Tunisia, Ethiopia, Liberia, Sudan, Togo and Gambia were invited but declined to attend. The most important result of the Casablanca conference was the adaptation of the ‘African Charter of Casablanca’. It affirmed the determination of its signatories ‘to promote the triumph of liberty all over Africa and to achieve its unity’. Louis B Sohn (ed.), Basic documents of African Regional Organization, (New York: Oceana Publications, 1971 vol, 1, p.42 cited by Cervenka, 1977:191).

\(^{3}\)The Monrovia group owes its name to the Monrovia conference held on 8-12 May, 1961, and attended by delegations from twenty African states. Amongst others, the major states represented were: Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey (Benin), Ethiopia, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Liberia. The participants agreed on the following five principles, which were later embodied in the ‘Lagos charter’: the absolute equality and sovereignty of African states; the right of African states to exist and without fear of annexation by another: the legitimacy of only voluntary unions of one state with another: and non interference in the internal affairs of other African states.
reasons for this division were related to the issue of African unity. The Casablanca group was convinced that political unity was a precondition for the integration of African economies while the Monrovia and Brazzaville groups maintained that African unity should be approached only through economic cooperation (Cervenka, 1977:1). The relationship between the Casablanca group and the Monrovia and Brazzaville states was strained because of the support the Casablanca states gave to Morocco, which was contesting the legitimacy of the independent existence of Mauritania, by then a member of the Monrovia group (Cervenka, 1977:1).

Despite their differences, these political groups shared the same views regarding issues of decolonization, racial discrimination, the maintenance of world peace and the urgent need for economic cooperation. Due largely to the shared ideals and objectives, there was a sustained and general desire to unite all independent African states. To that end, each party made attempts through diplomatic channels to end the tensions or appearance of hostilities between them (Cervenka, 1977:1).

The rationale for the establishment of the OAU in 1963 was as a result of African leaders seeing the need for member states to have common objectives. According to Article II (I) of the OAU Charter, the purpose of this organization was to promote the eradication of all forms of colonialism in Africa, and co-ordinate and intensify cooperation efforts of member states to achieve better life for the people of Africa. It also emphasized the need to protect international cooperation with due regard to the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Cervenka, 1997:12). To achieve this aim member states pledged themselves to coordinate their policies in specific areas such as politics and diplomacy, defense and security, science and technology, health, sanitation and nutrition, education, culture and economics (Cervenka, 1997:13).


4 The Brazzaville twelve was formed in October 1960 at Abidjan at a meeting of heads of state for former French colonies, initiated by President Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast who wanted the French speaking African states to mediate in the Algerian conflict without alienating France. The group included states such as Senegal, Mauritania, Upper Volta and Niger. They all shared a desire to remain on the best of terms with the ‘ancienne mere partie’, France, and strongly opposed any kind of communist presence in Africa.
In regard to security issues, it is important to note that the OAU Charter did not initially emphasize the need for a collective security in the sense that member states were legally obliged to come to the assistance of another member state in the event of aggression. The quest for a collective security was only adopted in 1973 at the OAU summit at Rabat. It basically made recommendations on special measures to be adopted concerning the process of decolonization, the struggle against apartheid and racial discrimination. For instance, member states were expected to make themselves available to states who requested their support and to provide modern equipments and military assistance (Cervenka, 1997:13).

1.2 Impact of the rationale for regional security on the international community

The desire to set up a common defense mechanism created much fear and anxiety among many African leaders as they were very sensitive about their sovereign rights and the possible implications of outside interference in their internal affairs. Consequently, they refused to enter into such obligations as they believed international laws to be vague and their implications to be uncertain (Cervenka, 1997:65). They viewed the rules of international law as the outcome of the practice of western states and not necessarily reflecting the interests of African states. In other words, they believed that their vital interests would be threatened by the establishment of a defense mechanism (Cervenka, 1997:66). Another central reason why the OAU felt that international law was questionable was the strong support of its membership for the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. Outside intervention was feared amongst African regimes because it was viewed as jeopardizing Africa’s influence in world politics. Outside intervention was also regarded with suspicion because of the reluctance of some African leaders to be held accountable by their peers for their policies and actions (Walraven, 1999:269).

As a result, the OAU’s machinery for peaceful settlement was based on the employment of negotiations rather than the rule of law. This was mainly because governmental policies in the immediate postcolonial African state were largely determined by the leading personalities. Therefore, issues such as inter-state conflict prevention and resolution were easier to settle through the mediation efforts of Heads
of States or a group of Head of States who would simply form an adhoc mediation or reconciliation body. An example of this was the Moroccan-Algerian border conflict which was resolved by the mediatory efforts of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and President Modibo Keita of Mali in October 1963 (Asante, 1987:127). In the 1970s, Emperor Haile Selassie also presided over the OAU Adhoc Special Mediation Commission that tried to reconcile Nigeria on the one hand and Ivory Coast, Tanzania and Zambia on the other over the Biafra war. Also there was a successful mediation of the border dispute between Mali and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) by President Sekou Toure of Guinea (Cervenka, 1997:67). However, these leaders were cautious in their involvement in highly tense conflicts, especially those concerning secessionist claims such as the Nigerian civil war (Asante, 1987:127).

The above instance reveals that African leaders such as Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, President Sekou Toure of Guinea and General Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria played instrumental roles in resolving African conflicts and rallied behind the OAU’s policies such as those which called for action against South Africa’s ‘outward policy’. However, some of these leaders did not keep their loyalty and promises to their countries. This was the case of General Yakubu Gowon who failed to keep his promise of returning his county (Nigeria) to civilian rule and as a result was overthrown in 1975.

One could argue that the contemporary recognition of the need for African leaders to create African solutions for African problems could be derived from what they once believed in, that is, the creation of an African framework for peace which excludes internal interference. Perhaps this is also why western countries are reluctant, or may have only made modest financial and logistical contributions to maintain peace on the African continent. In the case of the Sudan/Darfur conflict, by the time the United States (US) eventually acknowledged the severity of the situation, the crisis was beyond control. Nevertheless, the fact remains that African leaders from the 1990s saw the need to strengthen their own efforts to tackle conflicts in Africa. Current threats emerging around issues of national, regional and global security are largely humanitarian based. This makes men, women and even children the referent subjects
in any given security problem. Such humanitarian based crises are indications that what should be addressed in conflict resolution contexts are the root causes to the crises. This is because the crises cause and are caused by conflicts and wars and, thus, their alleviation in a sustainable manner will reduce the level and extent of conflict in the continent.

1.3 The creation and performance of the OAU’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution 1993

The creation of a more robust response on the part of the OAU to different forms and phases of conflict was initiated in 1993 when African Heads of State made a declaration which led eventually to the establishment of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR). The MCPMR was a concrete step towards the implementation of the objectives of African leaders had in the 1970s. In adopting the declaration, African leaders were reaffirming their commitment to work together towards a peaceful and speedy resolution of all conflicts. It was also recognition that one of the most serious impediments to Africa’s development is the scourge of conflict. The functions given to the MCPMR were as follows:

- to anticipate and prevent situations of potential conflict from developing into full-blown wars;
- to undertake peacemaking and peace building efforts if full blown conflicts should arise;
- and to carry out peacemaking and peace building activities in post conflict situations (Asante, 2005).

According to Bisworo(2005:52), the OAU mechanism during the 1990s was involved both directly and indirectly in many initiatives aimed at managing African conflicts. These efforts resulted in transforming the OAU into an organization that had more impact, increased visibility and an elevated profile in the conflict management field.
This visibility is partly due to the fact that unlike in the pre-mechanism era when Africa was involved in liberation struggles and the proxy wars of the Cold War era, member states have been living in an environment that is less affected by external intervention. This allowed the OAU to move from an adhoc approach to conflict management that characterized the pre-1993 phase to a more systematic and mechanical approach.

Although the establishment of the OAU conflict resolution mechanism should have moved the OAU to the center of conflict management in Africa, the performance of the mechanism was not all that impressive. Authors such as Asante (1987), Amoo (1992) and Parlboosing (1999) have presented studies on the ‘failure’ of the OAU as a continental peacemaker. According to Asante (1987), the flaw of the OAU was revealed in the failure of its efforts to prevent foreign intervention in African disputes. It was unable to address this challenge at the OAU summit meetings at Libreville in July, 1977 and Khartoum in July, 1978 because its members were deeply divided on the central issue of foreign military intervention (Asante, 1987: 128). On the other hand, Amoo (1992) and Parboosing (1999) argued that the OAU’s inability to advance the cause of peace in Africa stemmed from the lack of resources and political divisions among its members. According to Amoo, this problem was intensified because members of the OAU played different roles and had different interests in African conflicts. As a result, early decision making that could deter or address potential major conflicts became problematic for the organization to overcome (Amoo, 1992). However, it is imperative to understand that the weakness of African leaders to successfully wipe out instability in Africa does not only stem from their inability to achieve have adequate funding and a collective strategy but also from the fact that the Cold War era had complicated Africa’s effort to manage and resolve conflicts on their continent.
1.4 The Cold War in Africa-implications for conflict management and resolution

For almost five decades from the late 1940s until the formal demise of the Soviet Union in 1990, the Cold War defined the main contours of the international landscape. At its core was an ideologically charged confrontation between the West (the United States and its allies) and the East (the Soviet Union and its satellites). A number of academics such as Alao (1998), Isike (2003), Oyebade (1998) and Ravenhill (1995) have written extensively on some of the implications the Cold War had for Africa with regard to managing and resolving conflicts. The main implications involve the legacy of militarization and deep ethnic divisions.

1.4.1 Legacy of militarization

Isike (2003) highlights that there is a new source of threat to global security; the legacy of militarization bestowed by the Cold War. He states that although the excesses of military confrontation that characterized the Cold War era are of the past, it has left behind a massive array of weapons, postures and attitudes that have fueled conflicts around the world. He argues that it is from this legacy that one can understand the origin of the proliferation of arms of mass destruction and their consequences for guerilla warfare, and domestic crimes which are claiming lives on a daily basis especially in developing countries. He further argues that “these sources of potential conflict threaten global peace and security as they all have acquired political dimensions and in some cases threatened state boundaries or weakened them or brought them down completely” (Isike, 2003:47). At the same time the north-south conflict of Sudan developed into an endless war of attrition, the government in Khartoum, with the support of the West and the conservative Arab states, allowed the Eritrean nationalist movements to menace the Ethiopian regime as long as it maintained friendly relations with the USSR. Also, the Sudanese government got US$300million in Chinese arms from Iran and training from Iranian military advisers, that enabled the government to launch a major offensive against rebel groups in 1992 (Guy, 2005:652).
1.4.2 Deep ethnic divisions as a heritage from the Cold War

Before embarking on a discussion of the Cold War era and its legacy, it should be noted as pointed out by Martin and O’Meara (1995:146) that “many of the ethnic and regional cleavages which plague contemporary Africa had their roots in the administrative politics of the colonial era, which favored certain traditional authorities, regions, and ethnic groups over others” (Martin and O’Meara, 1995:146).

Alao and Olonisakin (1998) explain how Cold War politics which underlined most global conflicts were set to play a primary role in influencing Africa’s ethnically tainted conflicts. They point out that one of the characteristics of ethnic conflicts during the Cold War was the influence of political and/or religious factors. For example, one of the declared reasons why France supported the Biafran cause was that the country saw the Ibos as fellow Christians facing persecution from the Muslim north. This can also be seen in the Sudan conflicts where the Saudis supported movements fighting for the preservation of Muslim interests (Alao and Olonisakin, 1998:124).

In addition to the above they stress that another prominent characteristic of the Cold War ethnic conflict was that in most cases it was expressed along the desire for self-determination, which was manifested in territorial terms. This was usually manifested by groups of people experiencing perceived persecution within the existing state framework. In most cases alleged victimization could be highlighted at the expense of hidden considerations. Thus, ethnic victimization is perceived as influencing Cabinda’s desire to secede from Angola (Alao and Olonisakin, 1998:124).

1.5 The post Cold War era - new challenges for African security

Although the Cold War structure of the international political system had a profound influence on the ability of African countries to settle their own differences, it is important to note that the superpower rivalry that characterized the period not only fuelled prevailing tensions, but also constrained regional efforts in the management of conflicts. For instance the role of the United States and the former Soviet Union in
the Congo showed how external actors could manipulate an African crisis and render it almost unmanageable. Also the United States’ anti-communist response to the Soviet presence in Southern Africa through an arms build-up delayed the restoration of peace in that region. The fall of communism brought about the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. There are two principal post-Cold War developments that have emerged and have had significant implications regarding conflict resolution in Africa: the western disengagement from Africa and the emergence of new initiatives and greater flexibility to address African conflicts (Oyebade, 1998:166).

1.5.1 Western disengagement from Africa

Some major powers of the western world (France, Britain and the United States) have re-defined their strategic interests in African conflicts since the end of the Cold War. Africa was no longer a priority for these western nations. This was evident during the Liberian war when the United States developed a disinterested attitude towards its once ‘informal empire’ (Liberia) with which the superpower had once shared strong historical and sentimental links. (Oyebade, 1998: 165).

In addition, the failure of many western led peacekeeping missions in Africa has also limited their commitments in conflict situations especially where there is no apparent compelling strategic importance. In October 1993, Somali fighters, who had already killed peacekeeping troops from other countries, attacked and killed 18 American soldiers and dragged their bodies triumphantly through the streets. This convinced Washington of the general futility of involvements in African local conflicts (Oyebade, 1998:166) – a factor, which may account for the slow response to the Rwandan and Darfur crises. Indeed, western governments now seem more likely to work toward the resolution of African conflicts by providing support for African conflict resolution initiatives rather than through direct intrusion.\(^5\) Indeed, explicit US policy has sought to help the OAU/AU to develop a credible capacity to plan, coordinate and supervise efforts in crisis management by increasing first hand

\(^5\) Of course, some of the reluctance may be informed by the increased sensitivity shown by Africans for external intervention in African crises situations.
humanitarian, financial and technical aid to the region. Furthermore, the unilateral way in which the proposed United States African Command (AFICOM) is to be established has created much suspicion about the US’s genuine interests in establishing economic and political prospects on the African continent. According to Isike, Uzodike and Gilbert (2007:35): “AFRICOM is a US attempt to curb international terrorism and also is a far-reaching American response to the growing (and potentially hostile) Chinese challenge in Africa”.

1.5.2 New initiatives and greater flexibility to address African conflicts

On a more positive note, more than ever before, African countries have come to appreciate the need to look more inwardly for African solutions to crises on the continent. This has given rise to a number of new conflict resolution initiatives. An example of this is the mandatory role the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) has played in some African conflicts such as Somalia and Sudan. One of the most important initiatives to date is its determined effort to establish a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution. A major problem that constrains this initiative is as a result of some disagreement over the modalities for the creation of a force and its deployment mandate.

Although African governments have made efforts to create a stronger collaboration at the regional level, to strengthen their conflict resolution initiatives and also to re-democratize, intra-state and inter-state conflicts have proliferated since the late 1970s. This is mainly because in the milieu of the 1960/70s, the OAU was only able to focus on eradicating some of the worst forms of racial discrimination, slavery, colonialism, minority rule and apartheid. During this period, Africans had fought for

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7 AFRICOM is aims not only to strengthen US security cooperation with Africa but also to create new opportunities to strengthen the capability of African states to deal with threats to their stability and security. AFRICOM has four official objectives: to bolster security on the continent, to prevent and respond to humanitarian crises, to improve cooperative efforts between the US and African nations in order to stem trans-national terrorism and to sustain enduring efforts that contribute to African unity, with a central focus on preventing wars rather than fighting wars (Isike, Uzodike and Gilbert, 2007:21)
8 The IGADD is a sub-regional organization with members from seven states in East Africa and the Horn. Originally it was founded as an economic community to deal with environmental problems but it later took on an additional role in conflict resolution (Oyebade, 1998:166).
independence in the hope that it would usher in freedom, equality, democracy, justice, peace and security, stability and prosperity. Unfortunately that was not to be. Rather, many African countries have instead witnessed autocracy, conflicts, poverty and dictatorship. Towards the end of the 1990s, well-intended African leaders began to ask what went wrong and why the OAU appeared incapable of intervening in and resolving the serious political, economic and social malaise afflicting the continent. Therefore, following the second wave of democratization on the continent, the OAU was scrapped to pave way for the African Union in 2002. Although there were still divided views among those who wanted a strong central government for the African continent, there were those who wanted something less dominant, the declaration adopted in Sirte, Libya, reached a consensus document, unanimously accepted by all the African Heads of States and governments present. Subsequently the Constitutive Act of the AU was formulated and negotiated by the member states of the OAU (Biswaro, 2005:112).

1.6 Objectives of the African Union

In general the African Union objectives are different from and more comprehensive than those of the OAU. The role and objectives of the African Union is clearly reflected in their mandate. As contained in the Constitutive Act these objectives are to:

- Achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa;
- Defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its member states;
- Accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent;
- Promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples;

Examples of such discussions were the two meetings of legal experts and Pan-African Parliaments which were held prior to the convening of AU ministerial conference in Tripoli, Libya from the 27th to the 29th May, 2000. It should be noted that one of the major issues faced by the OAU in line with the Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution was that it kept on creating machineries that were inactive. An example of this was the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (CMCA). This commission was the sole organ of the OAU specifically and exclusively assigned with conflict resolution. However, this commission was dormant. In addition, the OAU mandate was limited to inter-states conflict resolution and not conflict prevention (Muyonga and Vogt, 2000: 6-7).
Encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

Promote peace, security, and stability on the continent;

Promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance;

Establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations;

Promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels as well as the integration of African economies;

Promote cooperation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African peoples;

Coordinate and harmonise the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union;

Advance the development of the continent by promoting research in all fields, in particular science and technology; and

Work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent (African Union, 2003).

The transformation of the OAU into the AU has generated debate among academics, social scientists and others. Two schools of thought seem to have emerged. On one hand are the pessimists who believe that the transformation of the OAU to the AU is nothing other than putting old wine in a new bottle. For them, it is not a qualitative change, but just a change of name (Sturman, 2002:5 cited by Biswaro, 2005:112). On the other hand, the optimists believe that the transformation is a qualitative one. They contend that the material conditions in which the OAU was founded were significantly different to those of the AU. More importantly there are differences when one closely revisits the provisions of both the OAU Charter and the Constitutive Act of the AU. For example, Article 3 (2) of the OAU Charter provides for the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of Member States while the Constitutive Act Article 4(h) provides for the right of the union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision by the national assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (Biswaro,
In addition, Articles 7 and 14 of the Abuja Treaty provided for the establishment of the Pan African Parliament (PAP). The creation of this organ illustrates the importance of engaging the populace through a parliamentary process. Ultimately, the PAP could be seen as a major regional force for democracy. Furthermore, the AU is systematically engaging the civil society through the establishment of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (Biswaro, 2005:115). This is a very vital forum that could influence various conflict prevention and resolution programmes on the continent.

However, these optimists are concerned with how the AU’s additional responsibility will be met, given the institutional weakness it still has (Biswaro, 2005:112). Certainly, there are some weaknesses that were inherited from the OAU such as the lack of funds and logistics, and the AU needs to address this issue properly, for example by strategically lobbying for the little aid that comes from western countries. Besides, a reformed OAU (AU) has prompted a new round of debate about Africa’s problems, its prospects of regional integration, cooperation and development strategies in the light of globalization and its struggle for sustainable development.

1.7 Problem statement

For decades, Africa has made several attempts to consolidate peace through good governance and regional cooperation. Although African countries have experienced some improvement in the quality of governance since 1990, African leaders still need to strengthen their efforts in enhancing peace and development throughout Africa. According to the United Nations Development Programmes’ Human Development Report of 2005, countries such as Burundi, Congo, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and Sudan have experienced armed conflicts and have caused nearly 40 percent of human suffering taking place in Africa. According to the report, more people in these conflict areas die from diseases and malnutrition than from bombs and bayonets. For instance, the report found that in the Darfur region of Sudan, child mortality rates are three to six times higher than in the rest of the country (United Nations, 2005). In light of this, the AU needs to strengthen its strategies towards regional peace and security. These should highlight the importance of new security concerns and the
need for African states to integrate them in the conceptualization and implementation of their peacekeeping missions.

Besides the need to establish a robust AU standby force to intervene in crisis situations in Africa, the AU needs to take into consideration the need to address the root causes of issues at hand which usually surround the quest for human security. These include socio-economic issues in particular. In some ways, the AU’s future may depend not only on how well it continues to gain the political and financial assistance of external donors but also its ability to develop its own common security strategy for Africa.

The severity and magnitude of the Darfur crisis,\(^{10}\) which is the case study of this thesis, has presented many challenges to the AU and its partners. Despite the deployment of the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) since 2004 aimed at finding a durable political settlement, the AU has had only a limited number of small successes due both to the lack of logistical and financial support and inadequate force size (Appiah-Mensah, 2005:1). Also it is important to note that an influx of modern weaponry has helped to intensify raids or attacks from government-backed Janjaweed militia fighters which are often carried out on communities suspected of aiding or sympathising with the rebels. The humanitarian impact of these attacks is therefore at the heart of the present human security crisis in Darfur (Youngs, 2004). The continuous trend of not being able to bring all belligerents to the negotiating table, the influx of arms and weaponry to the warring factions, insufficient logistical support to protect every vulnerable person even in refugee camps is ample reason to explain why the conflict is persisting in Sudan/western Darfur. The most obvious concern is that

\(^{10}\) This conflict is mainly between the Janjaweed (a government-supported militia recruited from local Arab tribes) and the non-Arab people of the region. The conflict which began in February 2003 has been described variously by the western media as “ethnic cleansing”, “genocide” and one of the “world’s worst humanitarian disasters”. According to an Amnesty International report the number of internally displaced people who were fleeing attacks by armed groups had risen from about 600,000 thousand people in 2004 to 1.8 million in 2005 (Amnesty International, 2005).
the AU’s protection force\textsuperscript{11} is too small and could be overstretched and, as such, may be ineffective in responding to future challenges (Solomon and Swart, 2004:9).

1.8 Hypothesis

The basic assumption underlining this study is that the African Union will be more effective in ensuring peace and security in Africa if it employs a conflict prevention approach that takes into account a human security paradigm.

1.9 Aim and Objectives

Using the Darfur conflict as the focal point, the aim of this research is to assess to what extent the human security model provides a realistic option in regard to the AU’s efforts aimed at enhancing peace and security in Africa. In this regard the study will focus on the following objectives:

- To what extent does the AU’s policy framework for intervention in crisis situations emphasize the need to protect the most vulnerable population groups such as non-combatant women and children, IDPs, and refugees?
- Using the parameters of the AU’s intervention framework, how effective has the organization been in addressing human security issues in Darfur?
- What are some of the challenges faced by the regional-led military forces and key development stakeholders in carrying out initiatives that will alleviate human suffering and simultaneously create conditions conducive for conflict resolution and a long term peace building process in Darfur?
- In view of past experiences and lessons, what new prospects of action can be suggested to ensure human security in armed conflicts?

1.10 Research methodology

The research methodology that will be used in this study will be based on a ‘qualitative research paradigm’. This involves accessing and analyzing a variety of

\textsuperscript{11} With a total of 7000 troops the AU is expected to address the needs of more than four million (that is more than two thirds of the Darfur population) people who are affected by the Darfur conflict. (African Union, 2005)
literature such as books, journals, articles, newspaper reports and internet information published by specialized institutions and organizations.

According to Babbie and Mouton (2001) almost anything that exists is measurable, or can be evaluated. The main purposes of an evaluation should be based either on judgment of merit, to improve programme/policy framework, to generate knowledge which intends to clarify a programme model or to underline the importance of a specific theory.

The assessment of this research work will be based on two evaluation studies:

- **The evaluation of need:** This seeks to answer questions such as what are the particular unmet needs of a target population with respect to the type of programme being considered or parameter within a policy frame work (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:340). This research technique serves as a guideline in response to the research question: “Is the AU’s policy framework for intervention in crisis situations conceptualized and designed in such a way that it addresses the real needs of the intended beneficiaries?” In this case, it will be relevant to explain that Articles 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) provides for “the right to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”. Therefore, what instruments have been put in place to implement this?

- **The evaluation of outcome:** Once there is some form of implementation according to a plan, attention shifts to the intended outcomes of the plan of action. With regard to the Darfur crisis the body formed by the AU to intervene is the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Based on specific parameters within the AU’s policy framework, the evaluation of outcome will be based on measuring three main variables:
- **The protection and empowerment of the vulnerable:** This aspect will focus firstly, on providing statistics from reports and surveys on the mortality rate start of the conflict started until the intervention of the African Union. Secondly, it will be vital to assess the level of human rights abuses against vulnerable groups such as non-combatant women and children. Thirdly, this aspect will examine how AMIS protected humanitarian and human rights officials from combatants who tried to prevent food and other health care facilities from reaching those who needed them.

- **Level of displacement:** This aspect will focus on providing statistics from reports and surveys on the number of people who have been displaced since the conflict started until the African Union intervened.

- **Public safety and security:** The focus here will be to assess to what extent AMIS was able to disarm combatants and simultaneously train, equip and deter uncontrolled combatants from committing hostile actions.

### 1.11 Limitations of the study

The main limitations of this study are the inadequate or scarce data on the refugee situation in the Darfur conflict. It is extremely difficult to acquire large scale and consistent data on issues like mortality, causes of mortality and violence from the conflict area. Most agencies working within the area have limited access and are therefore not able to conduct wide ranging surveys in all refugee camps within the conflict zone. Data acquired mostly covers very short periods of time, for example six months and are not current.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

There is a large and diverse body of literature on the AU’s strengths and ability to promote peace and security in Africa. This section will focus on evaluating that body of work and will attempt to assess the literature critically with a view to finding ways in which the AU can play a leading role in maintaining continental peace in a sustainable manner. Much of the existing literature on the AU’s leading role in maintaining regional peace have two main emphases, firstly on strengthening the AU’s strategies and secondly on the AU’s role in African conflicts such as the Sudan/Darfur conflict.

2.1 The development of AU enforcement strategies for peace and security in Africa

2.1.1 The establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC).
As a response to the ineffectiveness of the OAU’s conflict prevention and resolution mechanism, African leaders decided in May 2001 to devise a new security regime to operate within the framework of the nascent AU. In its objectives, the Constitutive Act (CA) was set out to promote peace and security and to promote and protect human and people’s rights (Article 3, (f) and (h)). Article 4 commits the AU to the principles of creating a common security and defence policy; to pursue peaceful resolution of conflict among member states; to prohibit the use of force or threat of use of force among member states; to pursue the principle of non-interference by any member state in the internal affairs of another; and to encourage the peaceful co-existence amongst member states and establish their right to live in peace and security (Bergholm, 2004:4)

In December 2003, the AU replaced the OAU’s central organ for conflict management - the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution - with the Peace and Security Council (PSC). The most significant aspect of this change was that AU became more sensitive to human rights issues and focused more on establishing a durable and collective security approach for the African continent
(Solomon and Swart, 2004:10). The rationale for its establishment came through a mutual concern expressed by the Heads of States and governments and members of the AU to develop a common defense policy that would enable Africa to avoid reliance on the international community and to create a multi-national African armed force that would serve as a standby peacekeeping force ready to intervene in armed conflicts (Kent and Malan, 2003:72).

2.1.2 AU’s Continental early warning system (CEWS)

Apart from the multilateral role of the PSC, the AU envisaged a number of peace and security structures (for example, an African Standby force (ASF), a Peace fund, and a Continental Early Warning System) meant to contribute towards a new strategy that would facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts in Africa. The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) seeks to link the AU commission in Addis Ababa with the various Regional Economic Communities (RECs) such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), as well as research institutes and civil society organizations.

Early warning systems are rooted in new human security thinking about the responsibility of leaders to protect ordinary people and have traditionally been located within technical agencies that forecast food shortages and within the non-governmental sector where they found wide application among humanitarian relief agencies. By definition, early warning systems use open source material and generally aim to serve human security, not national or state interest (Cilliers, 2005:1).

This system requires cooperative effort at the international, regional, national and local level. In this sense, no single state or organization can act alone or retain a monopoly over it. Therefore, CEWS highlights the importance of conflict prevention, democracy and good governance and is appealing to an intergovernmental organization such as the AU that would have great difficulty in accessing individual state intelligence systems (Cilliers, 2005:1). However, critics have argued that although the emergence of PSC and CEWS could be emblematic of the AU’s commitment to peace and security in Africa they are merely thoughts, which might be far from being a reality. According to the G8, these strategies are far too ambitious.
and expensive. Rather, regional security should be seen as a gradual process which requires the identification of key building blocks which have the political will to enhance capacities to undertake peace operations (Kent and Malan, 2003:72). Once this is done, African leaders could instigate the confidence required to galvanise sufficient international support to address crises (Cilliers and Sturman cited by Kent and Malan, 2003: 7).

In reality, however, confidence building will be an uphill battle for a number of African leaders, given the neo-colonial character of many African states. African leaders (such as former President Charles Taylor of Liberia and Paul Kagame of Rwanda) are themselves implicated in intrastate and interstate conflicts that have rocked the continent since independence. In their quest for survival and capital accumulation, they have sponsored and fanned the embers of conflict and violence within and outside their states. In the case of former President Charles Taylor, United Nations experts and senior Liberian officials say he embezzled nearly one hundred million dollars of his country's wealth, leaving it as one of the poorest nations on earth. He is said to have spent government money on houses, cars and sexual partners and illegally diverted many millions in government revenues to buy weapons in defiance of an international arms embargo (Weiner, 2003). In view of such challenges, it is vital for one to question how the AU has performed in terms of reactive conflict management and in the context of this study this question will be looked at with regard to the Sudan/Darfur Conflict.

2.2 Efforts of the AU, sub-regional organizations and international actors to address African conflicts

2.2.1 African Mission in Sudan/Darfur (AMIS)

A recent argument for the AU’s progress in enhancing peace and security in Africa is reflected in its role in the Sudan/Darfur conflict. In 2004, the AU deployed an African Mission in Sudan/Darfur (AMIS) and in spite of major constraints (lack of logistical support), numerous efforts have been made to resolve the conflict through peaceful negotiations. For example, given the magnitude of the conflict in Darfur,
especially in terms of the growing humanitarian crisis, the AU commission undertook a series of consultations aimed at supporting negotiating efforts facilitated by Chad. On the 8th of April 2004, under the auspices of President Deby and the Chairperson of the AU commission and in the presence of international observers and facilitators, the Government of Sudan (GoS), the Sudan Liberation Movement /Army (SLM/A) and the Justice Equality Movement (JEM) signed a Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on the Darfur Conflict and a Protocol on the Establishment of Humanitarian Assistance in Darfur (African Union, 2005). In May 2006, AU mediators as well as senior United States and British officials in Abuja, Nigeria, pushed through a new Darfur peace agreement that sought to end the three years of violence in western Sudan. The highlights of this peace agreement are as follows:

- Security agreements which require complete verifiable disarmament of Janjaweed and other armed militias by mid-October 2006, and defined principles for integration of rebel forces into the Sudanese Armed forces,
- Power sharing aimed mainly at establishing democratic processes for the people of Darfur to elect their leaders and determine their status as a region,
- Wealth sharing aimed at creating funds for Darfur’s reconstruction and development, provide compensations to victims of the conflict and create a transparent process that can track the flow of grants and monies from Khartoum into Darfur (African Union, 2006).

Does this ‘new peace deal’ address the root causes of the Darfur conflict? If so, can regions affected by severe crisis have a chance of lasting peace? How can deep-rooted structures of violence be transformed to enable a successful and forward-looking development to take off and simultaneously facilitate socio-economic welfare, political participation as well as peaceful co-existence despite cultural differences? In addition to the above, is the imperative question of whether the AU and its instruments such as the PSC have the capacity to monitor the implementation of the new peace agreement by all stakeholders, the problem of how to make operational ‘the responsibility to protect’ is crucial when it comes to assessing the
new\textsuperscript{12} role peacekeepers play in resolving African conflicts. These questions will constitute part of this research task and hopefully, answering them will constitute the significance of this study.

2.2.2 The peacekeeping role of sub-regional organizations - SADC and ECOMOG

The formation of regional and sub-regional structures in Africa has always been seen not only as a way of bringing about co-ordination efforts and coherence in approaching crisis situation in particular regional setting but also as a way to address the issue of ‘Africa’s strategic irrelevance\textsuperscript{13}. The creation and strengthening of sub-regional organizations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have both served as vehicles for progress in the area of conflict management, peace and security in Africa. For instance, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) grew out of the ECOWAS summit in Banjul in May 1990, to adopt a Nigerian suggestion to establish a Standing Mediation Committee to deliberate on possible solutions to African crises (Furley and May, 1998:222). Since 1990, ECOMOG has intervened militarily in three sub-regional conflicts; first in Liberia, then Sierra Leone and most recently in Guinea-Bissau. Looking at the experience of ECOMOG in Liberia, it is apparent that one of the most persistent problems it faced was the legitimacy of its force and its mandate for action. According to Cleaver, this problem is evident in the Francophone/Anglophone split within ECOWAS and also the fear of a growing Nigerian regional (West Africa)

\textsuperscript{12} As opposed to the traditional peacekeeping role in which military forces monitor a ceasefire between nations and the use of force only in self defense, peacekeepers today are propelled into the midst of civil wars and called upon to protect civilian populations, among them internally displaced persons uprooted from their homes and often the most vulnerable targets of abuse (Cohen, 2006:1 cited by African Union, 2006).

\textsuperscript{13} This view holds that since the early 1990s, with the demise of the Cold War, developed countries or the North, no longer saw Africa as an important partner in international affairs and they therefore started to withdraw substantially from the continent (the Rwandan genocide in 1994 is one of the cases that shows this disengagement approach by the west). The humiliation of American soldiers in Somalia in 1992 sounded the death knell for Africa since it marked the beginning of the north’s apathy towards the African continent. It is this withdrawal that caused African states to look else where for solution to their security challenges (Ngubane and Solomon, 2004:102).
hegemonic ambition as it contributes the largest share to ECOMOG both in terms of manpower and finance (Cleaver, 1998: 223).

Although sub-regional organizations such as SADC and ECOWAS have a common objective of ensuring regional peace and stability on the African continent, their task often seems overwhelming as most of their strategies, which should aim at addressing regional conflicts, are not always agreed upon. In essence, this means that most sub-regional organizations would have very diverse and complex ways of evolving their common security architecture because the individual member states do not agree on a common procedure which would make it easier to work at regional level (Ngubane and Solomon, 2004:103). For instance, all efforts at a sub-regional level under the auspices of SADC, have failed to steer Zimbabwe out of the abyss of destruction. It is for this reason that the country currently has a poor economy with an unstable political relation between the opposition and the ruling party. The simple fact that they can resist calls for change poses a challenge to the objectives of having a sub-regional committee with shared values (Ngubane and Solomon, 2004:103).

Given that the most likely scenario for future peacekeeping operations on the continent is one of African forces operating under the mandate of either the AU or a sub-regional organization such as ECOWAS, it is imperative for African leaders to construct a collective security system. Many ad-hoc committees at national, sub-regional and regional levels need to be integrated into a common exercise of how to contain and resolve conflicts across Africa. In doing so, any problem of overlapping duties and antagonisms could be resolved (Inter Africa group/Justice Africa, 2005). However, it is still vital for the AU to continue creating useful links and a very close working relationship with sub-regional organisations as such bodies have in some cases been relatively successful in managing the sharing of information, harmonizing legislation, implementing measures and running awareness-raising programmes and lobbying governments to implement their commitments. This will definitely assist the AU in enforcing their early warning systems for conflict prevention.
2.2.3 Contributions from international actors

In addition to the role of sub-regional organizations, a number of Western countries such as the United States have designed programmes to develop African peacekeeping capabilities such as the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). Although they have provided training, equipment or finances to African countries either directly or through African regional organizations (Berman and Sams, 2002:25), many analysts such as Agubuzu et al. (2004), Ngubane and Solomon (2004), Berman and Sams (2000), Inter Africa Group (2005) and Appiah (2005) have stressed the need for African countries to strengthen their own efforts in promoting peace and security in Africa. Berman and Sams (2002) argue that African states must place emphasis not only on staffing their organizations with sufficient personnel but also assume new responsibilities, focus on making incremental progress and resist the temptation to jump from one ambitious plan to another without effect. For their part, Ngubane and Solomon argue that the prospects for the AU in promoting peace and security in Africa do not lie in its ability to build upon an already existing mechanism; rather, it will be vital for the organization to evaluate critically past failures and challenges posed by African regional and sub-regional organizations (Ngubane and Solomon, 2004: 106). It is not only important for the AU to learn from its own mistakes but also imperative for African leaders to learn from successes and failures of similar institutional activities elsewhere (Western Europe, Northern America and Asia).

Institutions and scholars, such as Africa Action (2005), Berman and Sams (2002) and Keller (1995) anticipated that top donors, especially members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), will need to provide greater logistical support to African led missions as well as African contingents in UN peacekeeping operations. The basis for this argument is that as a young organization, the AU is not equipped to respond to major conflicts, and Western countries such as the United States could rather intervene using their superior logistical capabilities such as satellite intelligence systems, which could track government forces, militant activities and the movements of displaced persons in conflict regions (Africa Action, 2005:3). However, Berman and Sams stress that although the needs of African countries are well known, bilateral western capacity-building initiatives respond mainly to their own domestic political
concerns and not African issues and needs. For instance, Reinforcement of African Peace-Keeping Capacities (RECAMP) owes its origins in large part to France’s intention of simultaneously withdrawing many of its troops stationed in Africa while achieving cost savings and retaining its influence in the region (Berman and Sams, 2002:20).

Nader and Grande (1997) also present criticisms of the United State’s Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) formed in the 1970s. This was aimed at managing conflicts and maintaining peace in “African and other communities”. They believe that these sets of mechanisms and techniques cannot be effective in resolving conflicts in Africa but rather cause more harm than good because the framework does not fit into the given context, the power structure is not effectively analyzed and lastly the role of politicians, businessmen, missionaries, arm dealers, ethnic groups and victims are never taken into consideration. Within the African context, internal African structures and the negative role the media plays in explaining the causes of conflict should be taken into consideration. Their emphasis here is that, the main problem with the “ADR initiative” in Africa is that it weakens “local self-management and customary law”. Often locals desire to have control over their own people. Negotiations and mediations are not seen to be effective in all circumstances because they is based on power. In this case weaker states are known for favoring mediation whereas negotiation processes are more amenable for powerful states (Nader and Grande, 1997:13).

Again, this situation presents it as a challenge not only for African leaders to develop and encourage their own cooperative institutions through a collective political will for sustainable peace and security, but also to examine the extent to which foreign aid has promoted good governance or development in African countries.

2.3 Theoretical framework – the human security paradigm

From all the arguments put forward on how the AU can enhance its role in promoting peace and security in Africa, the missing link seems to be the role of African people in ensuring continental security. Like most development planning in Africa, a top-
bottom approach to collective security that does not recognize the role of ordinary people in ensuring the promotion of regional and continental security is likely to fail. The traditional perception of security, which emerged during the 17th century, was based on how a state would monopolize its rights and means to protect its citizens. State power (and the associated security) was established and extended in order to maintain peace and security.

In the 21st century however, the challenge to security has become very complex, as states remain the fundamental purveyors of security but despite this dominant role, states often fail not only to fulfill their security obligations but also may become sources of threat to their own people. This is the main reason why there has been a new shift from the security of the state to the security of the people - human security. This shift provides the conceptual angle on which this study seeks to anchor itself theoretically. Although the human security paradigm remains mired in definitional controversy, its lack of definitional precision does not take away from its importance and growing popularity as a viable alternative to the state-centered security focus.

Campbell (2002:8) defines the theory of human security as one which “… retreats from the concept of might, one that validate all citizens, men and women, Africans, Asians, Indians and all peoples. This new theory informs a foreign policy that is based on demilitarization of the planet, reversing environmental degradation and ending crimes against humanity such as the genocide against the first nation peoples and the peoples of Africa and African descent” (Campbell 2002:8 cited by Isike, Uzodike and Gilbert 2007:25) Some of the major aspects of human existence that need to be protected are as follows:

- **Economic security**: Individual need for a basic source of income either from a productive and remunerative work or from a publicly financed safety institution

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14 Credit for the human security model goes to security intellectuals such as Barry Buzan (1991) and Mohammed Ayoob (1995). Barry Buzan, for example, argued that the traditional state-centric perspective of security did not take into account how state security was often purchased at the expense of human security, specifically in developing countries. Therefore, it was imperative to rethink the concept of security as one in which people are regarded as the prime factor as opposed to the state.
• **Food security**: Having physical and economic access to food.
• **Health security**: Protection from diseases and unhealthy ways of living
• **Personal security**: To protect people especially women\(^\text{15}\) from physical violence either from the state or external states as well as from groups within states.
• **Environmental security**: Protecting people from the short and long-term ravages of nature and man-made threats to nature.
• **Community security**: Protecting people from the loss of traditional relationships and values and from sectarian and ethnic violence.
• **Political security**: Political security is concerned with whether people live in a society that honors their basic human rights. Human rights violations are most frequent during periods of political unrest.

The idea of human security is also concerned with violent conflict as it advocates for humanitarian intervention which focuses primarily on protecting refugees and IDPs from critical threats and situations. These threats vary from gender based violence to sexual abuse and other human rights abuses such as torture, genocide and destruction of property (UNCHS, 2003).

The following figure shows the human security conceptual model upon which this work is based. The human security model exists at the intersection of the fundamental freedoms/rights of human beings and the means of security these freedoms/rights are affected within conflict situations.

\(^{15}\) The feminist theory of security argues that security has been viewed in highly masculine military terms and the inequality that exists around the world in terms of economic status and power. According to Tinkner (1992), international politics with its focus on state security has always been a greatly gendered activity simply because foreign and military policy-making has largely been conducted by men (Tinkner, 1992:4 cited by Lawson, 2003:87). Feminists have argued that this fact cannot be simply discarded as irrelevant because besides HIV/AIDS, persistent economic crisis and environmental degradation, the uneven distribution of resources usually occurs on the basis of gender, class, ethnicity and religion which are major security issues to be addressed by international organizations.
2.4 Contemporary Africa and the challenge of human security

Africa has traditionally followed an expansive approach (i.e. looking at external threats from colonizers etc.) to the concept of human security but her state systems face greater dangers emanating from non-traditional sources of security. Authors such as Deng (1998), Ihonvbere (1999), Mbaku (1999), Tshitereke (2003) and Uzodike (1999) have pointed out that 21st century Africa is facing new global challenges such as population explosion, refugee crisis, poverty, economic crisis, environmental degradation, HIV/AIDS, ignorance and intra state conflicts. Uzodike argues that the “production and exchange patterns” during the colonial period were geared towards the development of metropolitan states, the unequal distribution of available resources and the struggle for control of resources by African politicians. The corrupt nature of such bureaucrats and their employment of ethnic loyalty and patronage cause tension and often lead to some African conflicts. He further points to cultural diversity more broadly as the basis for ethnic, racial, inter-state, religious, regional and communal conflicts in Africa. Additionally, political upheavals over the past decades also increased the level of conflicts and often internal issues result in a
“societal disturbance”, which then tends to have a negative impact on the domestic markets, external investments and above all intensify the challenge of refugees for receiving countries (Uzodike, 1999). Security related issues are thus complex and multi-faceted in twenty-first century Africa.

For the purpose of this work it will be vital to highlight the nature and extent of some of the social, economic and national political issues that pose as sources of insecurity in Africa.

2.4.1 Social sources of insecurity in Africa

2.4.1.1 Unequal distribution of resources and the quest for control over resources

According to Nef (1995), the social source of insecurity can be regarded as those that affect the quality of social life within a nation or between nations. In most cases the sources are as a result of a combination of factors existing in a society, which leads to mutual hostility and vulnerability between states, population growth, migration, refugees and internally displaced persons. Other sources of social insecurity originate from competition over land, resources and growing inequality among people and communities (Nef, 1995 cited by Isike, 2003:25). In support of this argument Tshitereke (2003) also argues that conflict occurs in Africa when the social contract between states and citizens fails. He says people will only accept state authority as long as states equitably deliver services and provide suitable economic conditions such as housing and employment. Therefore this means that, the absence of a stable economic condition will result in instability (Tshitereke, 2003).

According to the United Nations Commission on Human Security, wars between states, internal conflicts and transnational terrorism pose a major risk to people’s survival, livelihood and dignity and thus to human security. Their statistics show that in the 20th century an estimated 190 million people were killed directly or indirectly as a result of the 25 largest violent conflicts. Often these wars are in the name of religion, politics, ethnicity or racial superiority. During conflicts, groups may engage in gross violations of human rights and war crimes including torture, genocide and the
use of rape as a weapon of war (UNCHS, 2003:12). The first United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) office in sub-Saharan Africa opened in Burundi in 1962 because of the Rwandan conflict. In 2000, statistics showed that some 28% of the world population of refugees, estimated at about 11.5 million people and about 59% of persons displaced within their countries, are found in Africa. Towards the end of 2000 alone, an estimated 12,000 Angolans entered Zambia between September and November (UNCHS, 2005:1).

At the core of the crisis within Africa’s war-affected countries and regions is the desire to acquire power and secure resources from one group of elites or one ethno-national group at the expense of others. In Cote d’Ivoire for example, the country has become virtually split in half, with government and armed resistance movements on opposite sides. This issue of identity has been mixed up with cultural heritage and the control of economic resources to create a cauldron of political tension and violence. In Nigeria, grave harm has been done to the environment due to the oil exploration in the Niger Delta region.

While Igbo and Yoruba zones are politically cohesive, the south-south, including large Edo-, Efik-, and Ijaw- speaking nationalities among others, shares little with those other zones beyond their common grievances against the Nigerian central government and the international companies. The groups of the south-south aspire to gain control of the oil and the gas industry and thereby realize benefits that will compensate them for the destruction of their traditional economies by pollution and environmental degradation (Sklar, Onwudiwe and Kew, 2006:103).

2.4.1.2 The HIV/AIDS pandemic
The HIV/AIDS epidemic represents one of the greatest challenges of our times. In 2001, Sub-Saharan Africa harbored 23.2 million HIV positive people; accounting for 70% of the total number of cases worldwide (Heinechen, 2001:12). At the end of 2004, Sub-Saharan Africa had just over 10 percent of the world’s population, with about 60 percent of the people living with HIV (that is about 25.4 million). HIV/AIDS is not the principal cause of death overall in most countries, but has taken a significant toll on the economically active population. By the end of 2004, young people between the ages of 15-24 years (that is about an estimate of 6.9 percent of
women and 2.2 percent of men) were living with HIV (UNAIDS, 2004 cited by UNCHS, 2005:34). By the end of 2006, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/Aids (UNAIDS) and the World Health Organisation estimated the number of people living with HIV to be 39.5 million worldwide. While just about 10 per cent of the world’s population live in sub-Saharan Africa, a vast majority of 64 per cent of all people living with HIV lives in this region, 77 per cent of which are women. While “HIV prevalence has declined in some countries – Uganda in the 1990s and, more recently, Zimbabwe, Kenya and urban parts of Burkina Faso – overall prevalence levels in southern Africa remain high at between 10 and 20 per cent with countries like Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland showing even higher rates. Levels of infection in other parts (North and West Africa) vary from between 1 to 5 per cent among adults (ages 15–49)” (South Africa, 2007 cited by Isike, Uzodike and Gibert, 2007:28).

This has huge implications for the stable future stability of the region and the continent at large because “good health is both essential and instrumental to achieving human security. It is essential because the very heart of security is protecting human lives. Health security is at the vital core of human security”. Good health is not only the absence of disease but it is a positive state of physical, mental and social well-being. Consequently, good health is directly related to human dignity, the ability to exercise choice and lose fear of the future (UNCHS, 2005:35).

2.4.2 Economic sources of insecurity in Africa

2.4.2.1 Africa as unattractive international trading partner

During the 1950s and the 1960s, the people of Africa were united by the common struggle against foreign domination. The overriding goal was total independence from colonialism and enemies were foreign powers, which were seen as not only as dominating the people of Africa but also exploiting the continent to their own unfair advantage (Deng, 1984:7). In reaction to this, during the immediate past-independence era, many African governments implemented socialist economic policies. According to the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
(UNIRD), a country such as Tanzania made enormous changes in its economic policy approach in the immediate post-independence era. When Benjamin Mkapa became president in 1995, he laid to rest Tanzania’s Ujamaa\textsuperscript{16}, one of the many variants of ‘African socialism’. With this change in policy making approach, the country’s image among donors improved sharply.

From being the ugly duckling that implemented reforms reluctantly and only when pressed, the country is now being lauded by the entire donor community for meeting ESAF (Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility) benchmarks, for rapid and consistent implementation and for showing a willingness to reform and a thorough understanding of the need for drastic change of economic policies. Now Tanzania is no longer looked at as the ugly duckling. Now she has transformed into a beautiful swan, a keen reformer who actively and enthusiastically participates in reform negotiation, suggesting even more drastic measures than donor organizations do (Danielson and Skoog 2001:148-149 cited by Mkandawire 2006:11).

However, a number of authors such as Abutudu (1997) and Mbaku (1999) still argue that some independent African countries are faced with a continuing reliance on the major export of primary products such as oil from Nigeria, cocoa from Ghana, diamonds from Botswana, tea and coffee from Tanzania and tobacco from Zimbabwe and Malawi. The blame for Africa’s developmental and security crisis is thus largely placed on Africa’s position in the world economy\textsuperscript{17}. With globalization, state capacity has been severely eroded and nations must comply with exigencies of global market forces or get marginalized. This loss of sovereignty is expected to be compensated for by higher levels of growth. Failure to achieve high rates of growth in the era of neo-liberalism is perceived to be evidence of failure of internal economic policies. Thus the marginalization of whole continents and the persistence of national problems such as high rates of unemployment are blamed on the failure of policy

\textsuperscript{16}Ujamaa was the concept that formed the basis of Julius Nyerere’s social and economic development policies in Tanzania just after it gained independence from Britain in 1964. In 1967, President Nyerere published his development blueprint titled the Arusha Declaration, in which Nyerere pointed out the need for an African model of development and which formed the basis of African socialism. Ujamaa comes from the Swahili word for "extended family" or "familyhood" and is distinguished by several key characteristics, in particular that a person becomes a person through the people or community. Thus, Ujamaa is characterized by a community where co-operation and collective advancement are the rationale of every individual’s existence (Internet Source 3).

\textsuperscript{17}This dependency theory argues that poor terms of trade of primary commodities and low levels of industrialization left African governments chronically short of funds to finance development projects. The current view is that often international financial flows and the rapidity of transport and communications further weaken the capacity of African states to effectively manage their economies competitively in the world markets (Cillers, 2004:32).
makers. In the same way, a whole range of policies that states have pursued in the name of social welfare, national cohesion or development are associated with distortions and rigidity (Mkandawire 2006:21).

2.4.2.2 Mismanagement and less feasible economic policies

Africa’s economic malaise has also worsened over the years due to national economic mismanagement, corruption and primordial politics. According to Mbaku, after independence, many African countries came up with new development models and political systems to revive the African continent but even after the last thirty years Africa still faces ‘high levels of political instability’ and a generally worsened living standard. He stresses that in the 21st century African leaders are still faced with the same challenges. They must therefore revisit the choice made at independence and come up with an appropriate political system, bearing in mind that the main source of the continent’s continued economic and political problems originates from the new opportunistic leaders who make policies to enhance their own lives rather than those of their citizens. He therefore suggests that “the most effective way for Africans to deal with these problems is to engage in state reconstruction through proper constitution making and provide themselves with appropriate laws and institutions”. If these institutional reforms were conducted properly Africans would avoid the problems of the past (especially corruption) and rather define an appropriate role for the state in social and economic development (Mbaku, 1999).

2.4.3 Political source of insecurity in Africa

Governance issues are closely linked to the empowerment of people and communities. Without effective governance, people are not empowered; and unless people and communities are empowered to let their voices be heard or to participate in decision-making, governance is not feasible (UNCHS, 2003:35).

Insecurity from the sphere of national politics includes a wide range of issues which when put together, make up a collective threat to a state and its people’s security. According to Nef (1995), the post Cold War security order has led to a profound change in the view and functioning of the state as a mechanism for conflict.
management and for the authoritative allocation of resources. He argues that this has resulted in the emergence issues that simultaneously undermine the state and the security of its own people. These issues include the spread of sub-national or low intensity conflicts as well as the decline in the rule of law, which results in high crime rates and a strained relationship between civil society and the state (Nef 1998, cited by Isike, 2003:26). The decline in the rule of law exposes the states and its people to all sorts of criminal activities like drug trafficking, small arms proliferation and terrorism. Accordingly,

State security in most of Africa, is not threatened by conventional threats of armed attack by the countries but by more insidious measures many of which flow from the very weakness of the state and its absence of control over its own territory. Other factors contributing to insecurity include resorting to extra-legal measures to gain and retain political power such as the support to armed factions in the neighboring countries favoring to its own domestic demands (Cillers 2004:9).

In western Uganda armed rebellion by the Allied Democratic Force (ADF) would not have not been possible without the sympathetic support of the government and their ability to access arms and supplies. Similarly, the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) has being able to execute its campaign in the northern Uganda and southern Sudan with the all necessary supplies (including food, fuel, arms, ammunitions, training, clothing and medical supplies) and to operate with impunity across boarders, which are in any case unregulated and uncontrolled (Cillers 2004:11).

2.4.3.1 The Neo-patrimonial nature of African leaders

Contemporary African politics is best understood as the exercise of neo-patrimonial power. As a consequence of systematic clientelism, the reliance on the award of personal favors in return for political support and the use of state resources for this purpose, neo-patrimonial regimes demonstrate very little developmental capacity and do not provide security. As a result of this, real institutions of politics in Africa are the formal relations of allegiance and patronage established between ‘big men’ and their personal followers. The unconstitutional structure of neo patrimonial politics “shapes the decision of leaders, engender compliance from citizens and pervade the performance of bureaucratic organizations” (Cillers 2004:28). According to Sklar,
Onwudiwe and Kew (2006), Nigeria serves as a veritable example of a society characterized by persistent patronage networks. This is a situation whereby a given political landscape is dominated by powerful “godfathers” who sit and enjoy the privileges of vast patronage networks at the local, state and federal levels of a state. In most cases the political outcomes of such practices are primarily a struggle between distinguished politicians and magnates, who bargain among themselves – and at the expense of the impoverished greater public – within a political context of multi ethno religious division (Sklar, Onwudiwe and Kew, 2006:101).

Africa’s fragile state structures, weak law enforcements and economies are incapable of addressing a wide range of human security issues and as such lead to the culture of ethnic insecurity\footnote{This is when one ethnic group’s apparent political gain is viewed by others as a potential loss. During the post independent eras in Nigeria three major political parties existed and were formed along regional and ethnic lines. For example, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) was dominated by the Hausa Fulani (Sklar, Onwudiwe and Kew, 2006:102).} which makes life more unbearable for its people. Thus, the failure of most African states to provide effective political leadership, eradicate ethnic insecurity and allocate resources appropriately greatly undermines the state and its ability to provide security for its people.
CHAPTER 3
THE HISTORY AND DYNAMICS OF THE CURRENT DARFUR CONFLICT

More than thirty years of civil war and tribal conflicts have caused tremendous anguish for the civilian Sudanese population and has generated one of “the worst humanitarian and human rights catastrophes in the world” (African Union, 2005). In order to understand the current Darfur conflict, it is important to locate its region geographically, identify key groups, its history, and some of the socio-economic background that has shaped the livelihood of its inhabitants.

The Darfur region is situated in the western part of Sudan with an estimated population of 6 million people. It shares boundaries with Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic. Since 1994, this region has been divided administratively into three states (North with its capital as Al Fasher, South with its capital as Nyala and West Darfur with its capital as El-Genaina) with each state governed by a governor (United Nations, 2005) (see Figure 2).

The origin of the current conflict in Darfur has been analyzed from different perspectives by a number of scholars and institutions such as Ouach (2004), the European Sudanese Public Affairs Council (2005), the United Nations (2005) and Hiole (2007). They have all applied different approaches to analyze and understand the Darfur conflict. For the purpose of having a good understanding of this conflict, it is important to first discuss the nature of the Fur sultanate regime from the 1650s to 1870s when the Fur sultanate lost its highly traditional system to the colonial regimes. It is imperative to note that the current conflict in Darfur was triggered by both remote and immediate causes. The former include: deep political polarization and the search for identity, the New Land Act of 1970 and population pressure, and drought and desertification; while the latter are: the political and the economic marginalization of Darfur, the emergence of armed rebel movements and failed peace talks, and certain external factors.
Most significantly, the colonial era and its legacy gradually led to the transformation of the traditional laws of Darfur, which brought about many tribal conflicts. Further,
these already existing tribal tensions/conflicts became aggravated when many Darfurians felt that their basic socio-economic and political rights had become non-existent. This impelled some tribal groups to form armed rebel groups to reclaim their rights, and the situation spiraled out of control when the government of Sudan decided to seek support from Arab tribesmen to fight against rebel groups.

Although the conflict is believed to center around the continuous struggle for power and socio-economic development between Sudan’s central government and other provinces, regional relations with Chad and Libya also had serious implications for Darfur. This fast growing structural violence eventually exploded into severe physical conflicts and genocide campaigns from February 2003.

3.1 Darfur and the fur dynasties

According to a report from the UN International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, the Darfur region is inhabited by numerous tribal and ethnic groups who could be divided into livestock herders (mostly Arab speaking) and farmers (who are bilingual and perceived to be Africans). Some of the predominant tribes within this region are the Furs, the Barnis, the Tama, Jebel, the Aranga and the Massaalit who are mainly agriculturalists. On the other hand are the Zaghawa sedentary cattle herders and other nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes which include the Taaysha, the Habaneyya, the Beni Helba and the Mahammed (United Nations, 2005). Figure 3 shows the distribution of these tribes within Darfur. Arabs dominate the population in the northern part of Darfur while the Furs and Africans remain the majority in the southern part.

According to the Encyclopedia Britannica (2005), the northern inhabitants of Darfur were related to the predynastic peoples of the Nile River Valley. It further notes that from about 2500 BC, Darfur lay along the route of the Egyptian caravans that traded

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19 The Fur people live mostly in the Sudan, in the Darfur province which is named after them. The Jebel Marra is an area in Darfur which is considered to be their traditional home. Darfur, the name of their area today, means the Homeland of the Fur (Anderson, 2004:1) or in Arabic “House of the Fur” and historical region of the Bilad as-Sudan, which in Arabic means “Land of the Blacks” (The New Encyclopedia Britannica, 2005).
southward from Aswan. Darfur’s first rulers were the Daju (or Dagu) who traded with ancient Egypt (during the New Kingdom) and with the cities of Napata and Menroe in the Kingdom of Cush/Kush, (presently in Northern Sudan). The Daju were apparently appear to have been the dominant group in Darfur within this period but little is known of them except for a list of their kings. Traditionally, it is believed that the Daju dynasty was displaced by the Tanjur (which is when the recorded history of Darfur began with the establishment of the Tanjur sultanate). The Keira dynasty was the ruling clan from 1640 to 1916 and is considered to have been founded and ruled by Suleiman (Sulayman/Solon in Fur epithet) Solongdungo\textsuperscript{20} (c.1660-c.1680).

During this period the term Fur was thought to have been used to refer to the negroid inhabitants who had accepted both the Islamic rule of the Daju and Tanjar and the rule of the Keira Dynasty. The Keira Dynasty progressively became negroid and its members became known as the Fur (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2005).

Historically Darfur was an important center for trade, which was a central contributing main factor that contributed to the expansion and internal consolidation of Darfur sultanate. Sultan Sulayman Solongdungo was in command of the central area of the region (this was the richest area in terms of soil and water) whose growth and expansion was achieved by a combination of peaceful and force incorporation of territorial and ethnic groups. It is important to note that some of these tribes extended into Chad, central Africa and Libya and as a result, Darfur for many centuries was a region of inter-ethnic marriages that blurred many ethnic differences. However, certainly there was a trend of individual allegiances to specific tribal groups, as well as the desire to expand the Darfur dynasties\textsuperscript{21}. An example of this is the 7th sultan of Darfur, Mohammed Tayrab, who extended the Fur Sultanate to the Nile by conquering the Funj province of Kordofan between 1785 and 1821 (O’fahey and Tubiana, 2006).

\textsuperscript{20} Some records put his reign between c.1596 to c.1637 but a period of c.1650 to c.1680 is more plausible.
\textsuperscript{21} The above information sums up the “Daju dynasty” which had its political centre in the southeast of Jebel Marra; and ruled from about the 13th century to the 16th century; the “Tanjur dynasty”, whose centre of power lay north of Jebel Marra and ruled over Darfur up to the 17th century; and the “Keira dynasty” whose capital was in Turra in Jebel Marra and later in El-Fasher. (Internet source 4).
Besides the desire to create an expanded trade network, the Darfur sultanate in the 17th century systematically encouraged immigration into Darfur to meet up with the pressing need for manpower. Some of these immigrants came from West Africa and
the Nile valley, and others such as scholars (*Ulama*), holy men (*Fuqara*), travelling merchants (*Jallaba*) as well as poor immigrants came from Borno. Darfur’s sultans also believed in assimilating and acculturating the people as this was a simple way of incorporating other groups such as the Berti, Mine, Daju, Berdig and Dading who traditionally practised sedentary farming (Internet Source 4).

According to Burr and Collins (1999), assimilating immigrants into the Darfur traditional system created very important regional trade routes such as “the famous *Darb al Arbain* or the Forty Days Road beginning at Kobbei (25 miles north of El Fasher) in Darfur to and from Egypt. The route passed through Jebel Meidob, crossing the Libyan dessert through Bir Natrun, and on to Laqiyya, Salima, al Shaff, Kharja to Asyut in Egypt”. This route specialized in trading ivory and slaves between Chad, Darfur and Egypt for more than 1000 years (Burr and Collins, 1999).

**3.1.1 Land rights and the *hakura* system under the Fur sultanate**

Historically land ownership was considered as a collective asset to all inhabitants of a tribe. This basically meant that each tribe in Darfur obtained for itself a large territory of land which was regarded as the property of the whole tribe while the chief of the tribe was looked upon as the custodian of the property. Land was subsequently distributed to every member of the tribe for cultivation purposes but any unused land was considered as a resource to be used by all visitors (mostly immigrants) who were mainly nomads. Most of the nomadic tribes do not possess land and have traditionally transited through land belonging to the other ethnic groups. This system was instituted by Sultan Ali Dinar (the last sultan of Darfur who ruled between 1898-1916) and it was accepted by all tribes. The traditional division of land into homelands (referred to as “*dar*”) was important as it gave individual tribes a historical claim to land, which was essential in their self-perception (United Nations, 2005A, 20).
Examples of land owned by tribal groups are the northern parts of West Darfur; and some western parts of North Darfur which form the homeland of the Zaghawa (Dar Zaghawa). On the other hand, the south of El Geneina (within West Darfur) is the homeland of the Masaalit tribe (Mohamed, 2006:58). Though the name Darfur generally denotes the “homeland of the Furs”, their area is located around the Jebel Marrah, in the center of the Darfur region (United Nations, 2005A, 20).

Under the rule of Sultan Ali Dinar, land was given more significance as he introduced the *Hakural “Haquru”* system (recorded land estates). The reason for introducing this new system regarding land rights was that prominent state officials and army commanders were not given regular salaries. Therefore, under the *Hakura* system the Sultan granted state officials large estates as an incentive to collect taxes and dues from cultivators. Some prominent figures and religious men were also granted estates as a means of obtaining their support. These changes played an important role in shaping tenure arrangements as land, during this period was used as a political bargaining tool and also to win favors from prominent tribal chiefs and influential men (United Nations, 2005A, 21). The International Food Policy Research Institute (2007) also notes that under the *Hakura* system the village chief (sheik) had the authority to give out parcels of land to individuals and that such land handed out from generation to generation were regarded as properties of the same family.

### 3.1.2 The administrative system under the Darfur Sultanate

The expansion of states from the 1820s led to the emergence of a ‘quadrant based system of administration’ (four provinces, each divided into a number of districts). “The South-Western Darfur, predominately Fur, was ruled by a line of title holders and the *aba diimang* (*Ar Dimanqawi*), who traced their descent back to immigrants from Borno. The South Eastern Darfur was ruled by the *Uumo* at Kidinger while Northern Darfur was ruled by the Takanawis. Lastly Eastern Darfur was ruled by the *Shaykh Daali* who was the head of the slave administrative hierarchy and generally the most powerful officials after the Sultan” (O’fahey and Tubiana, 2006).
All districts within these provinces had a system of government whereby people were ruled largely by their own chiefs. According to this system the administrative duties were the responsibility of the *shartayas*. Some of the larger *shartayas* had chiefs called *sembi* who acted as agents for the *shartayas* to control the *dimliji*. The *shartayas* was regarded as another representative of the sultan who had the sole responsibility to ensure that taxes were collected. They were also responsible for the direct administration of land and justice, tax collection, the settlement of small disputes and all ceremonial activities concerning the upper level of the administrative system (Internet Source 4).

This highly traditional system ended when the Darfur sultanate lost its independence from 1874. The period thereafter was marked by a series of new colonial regimes/policies (Turco-Egyptian rule\textsuperscript{22} 1874-1883 and the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium rule\textsuperscript{23} of 1899-1955) that had very little regard for the traditional systems many Darfurians were used to (Internet Source 4).

\textsuperscript{22} The Keira sultanate maintained its independence until it was overthrown in 1874 by the Ottoman Empire (Turco-Egyptian rule), which had invaded and occupied the northern part of Sudan by 1821. This sudden change sparked off periodic revolts by the Furs and the turbulent Baggara tribes. The cause of this revolt was because the system of exploitative taxations left them disgruntled (Internet Source 4). This as a result reduced the significance the Darfur region as a source of income and as such marked the beginning of Darfur’s marginalization by the Khartoum government. Although Darfur under the leadership of Ali Dinar was able to liberate itself in 1898, this freedom was short lived mainly because Darfur at that time was experiencing severe famine and was characterized by massive population, localized disturbances and unrest. This therefore made it easier for an Anglo-Egyptian army under the leadership of Kitchener to re-conquer Khartoum. In 1916 Britain annexed Darfur by force by killing Sultan Ali Dinar (United Nations, 2005)

\textsuperscript{23} Just like in many other African countries, the Anglo Egyptian rule of Sudan was mainly concerned with economic development. The colonized was therefore to serve the economic interests of the colonial economy. A new Khartoum under the British rule basically recruited labor (slaves) and exploited resources such as cotton, oil and spices from the south and western regions. The expansion of trade in cotton for instance a central focus and, therefore, Britain did very little to improve the conditions of many millions of small farmers. As a result peripheral provinces like Darfur experienced complete neglect. This can be seen in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Out of around 1,170 development projects suggested by the post colonial government schemes none were in Darfur. By 1947 Darfur had no provincial judge, education officer or agriculturalist (Internet Source 4). The Anglo Egyptian regime in Sudan ended with the a coup when on General Ibrahim Abboud launched a coup, which he justified on the grounds that political parties and parliamentary democracy had gone for good in Sudan. In the mid 1990s Abboud handed power back to the civilians and marked the end of Anglo-Egyptian rule in Sudan (Guy, 2005)
3.2 Long-Term Causes of Darfur Conflict

3.2.1 Political polarization within Darfur and the search for identification

Besides effort by the Fur sultanates to incorporate or assimilate more immigrants into their kingdom, the population of Darfur was originally drawn from more than eighty tribal and ethnic groups. This led to extensive inter-tribal marriages and socio-economic interconnectedness which made it very difficult to demarcate tribes within separate from homelands (United Nations, 2005A). During the 1980s tribal clashes emerged between the Fur and Arab nomadic tribes. In order to attain their objectives, they organized themselves into two main groups. On the one hand an alliance called the “Arab Gathering” was formed by the Arabs, while on the other hand the Fur tribe created a group called the “African Belt”. The conflict between these two groups emerged when Arab tribes claimed that they represented the majority in Darfur and were marginalized as Arabs. The Arabs therefore made a formal complaint to the central authorities to address this issue but received no response. The Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit, felt that this was an ultimate attempt to undermine their rule and to create deep ethnic division in Sudan, would further eliminate them totally from their land. A counter accusation from the Arabs was that these tensions began in the late 1970s when the Fur started to talk about “Darfur being for the Fur” and that the Arabs were foreigners who should leave. This resulted in fierce fighting that led hundreds of Fur to flee their villages in the Wadi Salih (Quach, 2004).

The impact of such divisions and tensions misunderstanding between the Fur and the Arabs dominated Darfur up to late 1980s. The Arab/African distinction was always more of a passive distinction in the past, but today racial identity has become strongly. The central government worsened this civil conflict when they brought Sudan under Islamic law. This helped Arabs to retain “legitimacy” and power over the country as legally it meant that Muslim Arabs were allowed to dominate the state and impose brutal punishment on any challengers to the state’s authority, especially black Africans who were considered as “slaves” (United Nations, 2005A). Also Arab Sudanese were able to consolidate their power because the ideology of Arab
supremacy grew within northern Africa, as well as many other Arab nations (United Nations, 2005A).

3.2.2 Land tenure and land acts of the 1970s

IFPRI (2007) states that two regulations formed the basis of colonial laws on land tenure. The first regulation was the 1899 Title to Land Act which recognized private property in cultivated areas in the extreme North and Central Sudan while completely disregarding the rest of the country.

The Land Settlement and Registration Act, which was introduced in 1925, provided for the registration of land in the name of particular owners. It set criteria for land registration and stated that all land that was not registered would be considered as government property. Section C of the document stated that “All waste, forest, and unoccupied land shall be deemed to be the property of the Government until the contrary is proved”. This law effectively brought most Sudanese land under governmental jurisdiction. IFPRI (2007) affirms this by stating that “In practice, this Act was essentially meant to affirm government claims to urban and agricultural land around the Nile and in the north of the country”. In the period between 1925 and 1970, very few parcels of land were registered (IFPRI, 2007 cited by University of Helsinki 2006:25) as “few communities and tribes took advantage of this opportunity to demonstrate their entitlements partly due to lack of information about the legislative process and registration mechanisms and partly to the difficulty of demonstrating entitlements for communities practicing mobile forms of land use” (IFPRI, 2007:29).

During the 1970s the Sudanese government began regulating land by a series of ordinances which opposed the traditional communal ownership of land. These new land laws only recognized three forms of land tenure: government lands with community rights, government lands with no community rights and the Hawakir – (tribal or individually owned land) and leased lands). The passing of the Unregistered Land Act of 1970 furthered the colonial concept of the ownership of unregistered land as “all land of any kind whatsoever, whether unregistered, shall be the property of the
state and shall be deemed to have been registered as such”. Crucially, however, those
who did not have land had to show allegiance to the government in order to register it
(El Mahdi, 1971).

According to the 1970 Act, all lands are the property of the government, but some
cultivators, particularly migrants, refused to give it up willingly. Section 7.1 of the
law stipulated that all registration processes pending from the 1925 Land Settlement
and Registration Act were to be ceased upon the 1970 Act becoming effective. It did
not offer landowners any transitional period during which they could have sought to
get their properties registered nor did it offer any legal window through which
customary title bearers could seek to legitimise their claim as stake holders in any
future agricultural projects on their land.

Again the law did not offer any compensation to customary title holders for loss of
their land. Rather the law authorized the use of “moderate force” where customary
title holders had to be evicted from their land. The law thus “empowered the state at
least formally to take control over land in rainfed areas, and the state had a
developmental incentive to actually do so wherever it found environmental conditions
favourable to the establishment of mechanized farming schemes” (IFPRI, 2007. pg
30, University of Helsinki 2006. pg 25). All the people who owned their lands by
customary law, did not have the right to keep their lands anymore. The consequences
of these acts are felt up to today. These polices on land use have generated conflicts
between land users such as farmers and pastoralists because of the approach
ownership.

The abolition of Native Administration\textsuperscript{24} gave this attitude further momentum and
helped to disrupt the long established customary system. Land disputes were taken to

\textsuperscript{24} The Native Administration (NA) was an authority system that evolved on the basis of customary
tribal institutions under British colonial rule. The main responsibilities of Native Administrative
authorities were at the time related to natural resource management, conflict management and
resolution, and more generally local governance in rural areas not central to the colonial economy in
Sudan. It was intended as a mechanism to assert authority over vast areas of rural Sudan, where the
colonial government had neither the ability nor a strategic incentive to establish a direct presence.
(IFPRI, 2007; pg 14, 35)
civil courts to be resolved. The 1983 Civil Transaction Act was passed into law and amended in 1990. The act basically reaffirmed the state ownership of all non-registered land but also acknowledged the customary rights and thereby reopened possibility of registering these rights. However in practice the 1983 Civil Transaction Act was not easy to apply. Though the 1970 Unregistered Lands Act was superseded by the 1983 Civil Transaction Act, courts still upheld the by-rules of the 1970 Act, resulting in procedural confusion. Again though the act reaffirmed the state as the main owner and manager of all unregistered land, the state still lacked the legitimacy to effectively carry out such a responsibility (IFPRI, 2007. pg 31).

3.2.3 Population pressure, drought and desertification

According to Fadul (2006), the population of Darfur has increased substantially over the last fifty years. This increase in population has resulted in the overuse and misuse of natural resources due to a large increase in population density (see Table 1). In turn, ecological conditions deteriorated with declining rainfall, drought and desertification (Fadul, 2006:12). De Waal, 1989:5 notes that

> With the desert have come the people of the desert; feared Bideyat camel men and others come south and prey on settled communities, and pastoralists bring their animals to cultivated places. They have penetrated further south than physical evidence of the desert. With ecological change has come an insecurity of community identity and relations (De Waal, 1989:5 cited by Fadul, 2006:12)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Density (Persons/Km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>1,080,000</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1,340,000</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>5,600,000</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>6,480,000</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Fadul: 2006:12)

The extent of drought especially in the 1970s and 1980s forced many Darfurian tribes to change their nomadic lifestyle and seek settlement in lands other than theirs.
Decades of drought led to the migration of more nomads into Darfur in search of water and grass. This led to fights for scarce resources which brought more tension between agriculturalists and cattle herders who were in search of water and pasture and as such invaded other agricultural land. By the 1990s there were major land related tribal conflicts between the Fur and Arabs in Jabal Marra, the Zogwas and Rizigat in Northern Darfur and Arabs and Masaleet in western Darfur, which contributed to the displacement of at least 86,000 people in Darfur (SudaNews, June 2005:2). It should also be noted that the process of land tenure was further complicated by drought and desertification and by the movement southwards of numbers of migrants looking for agricultural land and pasture for their livestock.

Although the state tried to resolve some of these conflicts, their attempts made the situation more complex as it was no longer seen as neutral mediator. This was because the administrators of the new political structures were appointed by the central government who had executive and judicial powers. Even though tribes continued to informally resort to the tribal system, the system was significantly weakened as local leaders were chosen on the basis of their political loyalty to the Khartoum regime. These local leaders were often financed and strengthened particularly through the state security apparatus which meant that the state had to step in to address or resolve traditional conflicts because the traditional systems had been so badly undermined (Fadul, 2006:22).

25 In the western most region of Darfur, many people resented control from Khartoum and tension between Fur farmers and the Rizaiquat Arab cattle herders escalated in 1984-5 as drought forced the nomads to encroach upon cultivated land. The Fur were angry that the central government let Libyan troops deploy into northwest Darfur and permitted rebels from Chad to camp inside Darfur, where they joined with Zagawa tribes men to raid Fur villages. As a result 57 villages were burnt in the Wadi Saleh agricultural district, where nearly 400 were killed and 42,000 displaced (Mosely Leash 1998:91 cited by United Nations 2005A:21)
3.3 Immediate causes of the Darfur conflict

3.3.1 The new government of Sudan: the political and economic marginalization of Darfur

Although Sudan gained independence in 1956, it has remained unstable not only because of constant conflict between rival groups\(^{26}\) either concerning political or identity ideologies, but also because colonial government policies created regional disparities, which severely affected Darfur in particular. An example of the economic neglect of the Darfur by the colonial government is the limited number of development projects that occurred in the region (see Table 2). The only two development projects financed by international organizations in Darfur are namely, the Western Savannah Development Project and the Jebel Marra Rural Development Project came to a complete halt when their administration was transferred to regional governments rather than the central government and as a result poverty increased intensely in Darfur.

### Table 2. Disparities in Regional Income between 1967-1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Income 1967/68</th>
<th>Income 1982/83</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle (including the Blue Nile)</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern (including Port Sudan and Kassala)</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kordofan (including South Kordofan)</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Region</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darfur</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Standard Deviation</strong></td>
<td><strong>44.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>57</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Internet Source,4)

According to Quauch (2004) the inception of the current authoritarian government was a critical landmark of the struggle for power inside the Sudan. This government, which was ruled by an Arab-led party, had characteristics of a “predatory” state.

\(^{26}\) Two major Islamists parties an Umma party (UP) and National Unionist Party (NUP) (Khatmiya Followers with Egyptian historical links).
This means that the state was “entirely patrimonialized by political elites whose sole aim was to make personal profits” (Castells, 1998:96-105 cited by Quauch, 2004:6). In such a situation, the members of the state apparatus became corrupt and aggressive in order to maintain their positions of power and wealth. As a result, it produced exploitive, discriminatory practices and violent confrontations that killed thousands of people (Castells, 1998:96-105 cited by Quauch, 2004:6).

While governmental authorities and agencies thus contributed to the disintegrating situation in Sudan, especially in Darfur, the opposing rebel groups were certainly not blameless. Although rebel groups claimed to be acting to address Darfur’s marginalization and underdevelopment, they have repeatedly attacked key development and infrastructural projects. For example, in March 2003, rebels attacked the school examination center in Tina and stole examination papers which adversely affected tens of thousands of school students and families. In 2004 the rebels attacked and stopped water supply projects in El-fasher (SudaNews, June, 2006). Perhaps this is one of the reasons as to why many parties including mediators and international organizations are unable to resolve the Darfur crisis.

3.3.2 The Implications of the North-South civil war and peace process on Darfur

The establishment of a national government based in Khartoum, which included representatives from the North and South, was said to be a major step towards a final agreement on wealth sharing, southern regional autonomy and power-sharing as agreed during the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) reached on the 9 January 2005. The power-sharing agreement for instance provides for a largely autonomous government for Southern Sudan as well as a share in the government of national unity (GNU). The CPA provided a framework for resource allocation and sustainable decentralization. It identified a comparative under-development and war-affected status as key criteria for revenue allocation. Therefore, while giving the south a share of total national revenue, the agreement also grants the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS). The rights to collect additional domestic revenue mobilize external support and set up its own banking system, albeit within the framework of the Central bank of Sudan (Samasuwo and Ajulu, 2006:1). It is crucial to note that, the CPA
identified and accepted the North and South as the most important regions in Sudan and due to that the national political plan gave preference to these regions. Therefore, this procedure marginalized the Darfur region despite its long and rich history of being an autonomous political entity.

The Sudanese peace process, especially in relation to developments that led to the signing of the CPA in 2005, should thus have taken this imbalance into consideration and considered the possibility of granting regional autonomy and a vice-presidency to the Darfur region. Rather the peace process progressed towards national reconciliation between the North and South while conflict continued to ravage the Darfur region.

Samasuwo and Ajulu (2006) have recommended the strategic policy objectives of the GOSS to reverse the history of institutionalised under-development and repair the damage caused by more than two decades of civil war and establish a politically stable and an economically viable development state. They further argue that, there is not only a need for the GOSS to declare a moral liberation war against religious prejudice, intolerance and racism but also they should play a central role in establishing a home-grown developmental agenda that involves its own rules of engagement with external partners which include donor countries and other new international economic players such as China because:

With no external debt to talk about, and with no rigidly structured or “socially engineered” colonial-type model of development to inherit, Southern Sudan will be more or less free to learn from 50 years of Africa’s post-independent economic experience. Therefore, an opportunity exists to explore new thinking on developments strategies that have worked elsewhere, such as those adopted by the “Asian tigers (Samasuwo and Ajulu, 2006).

In view of these opportunities, it is particularly regrettable that the Darfur region has been neglected in the CPA process.

3.3.3 The emergence of well organized armed rebel groups

Tribal conflicts between Arabs and Massalits in western Darfur, and the Mallaya and Rizigat in south Darfur were still evident in early 2002 and 2003. Although such
conflicts were mediated by governments and local tribal leaders, tension remained and clashes between these tribes continued and spiraled into one of the world’s worst humanitarian disasters. The reason why such already existing tribal conflicts turned out to be a “well organized, well armed and well financed” civil war is because of the emergence of armed rebel movements who gained support amongst certain tribes. In 2001-2002 there were two major rebel groups: Sudan Liberation Movement/Army – (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement – (JEM)

Their main aims are: a) standing in opposition to the Khartoum government in which they demand more equal participation in the government by all groups and regions of Sudan and b) seeking for equality in the distribution of power and wealth. Even though there was a positive peace negotiation between the government and the SPLM/A rebel group this has created the space for others to form more rebel groups with ruthless demands (United Nations, 2005A:13).

In 2002/2003 rebel groups whose requests were not being attended to began to attack local police offices, looting government property and weaponry. According to the UN Commission of Enquiry on Darfur:

> The government was taken by surprise by the intensity of the attacks, as it was ill-prepared to confront such a rapid military onslaught. Furthermore, the looting by rebels of government weaponry strengthened their position. An additional problem was the fact that the government apparently was not in possession of sufficient military resources, as many of its forces were still located in the South, and those present in Darfur were mainly located in the major urban centers. Following initial attacks by the rebels against rural police posts, the government decided to withdraw most police forces to urban centers. This means that the government did not have de facto control over the rural areas, which was where the rebels were based (United Nations, 2005A:22).

In response, the government called on Arab tribes\(^\text{27}\) to assist them in fighting against the rebels and this intensified the already existing tension between tribal groups. These Arab militias are known as the Janjaweed. Attempts to resolve the conflict began in 2003 when President Idris Debby of Chad convened a meeting between

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\(^{27}\) Arab nomadic tribes without traditional homelands responded to the call of government for back up. The Sudanese government used state funds to offer gifts and grants to leaders within the Arab Nomadic tribes. Their gifts depended on their effort made and how many people they provided to the government.
representatives of the government and rebel groups in Abeche, but this effort failed as JEM rebel groups refused to join the talks because they considered the Chadian mediation to be biased.

3.3.4 Failed peace talks, the role of external factors in Darfur conflict and its implication for regional peace

One of the numerous attempted peace deals was signed on the 5th of May 2006. The Sudanese government signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in Abuja, Nigeria with a faction of the SLA (headed by Minni Minawi). However, two rebel movements (the JEM and the SLA faction led by Abdulwahid Mohammed Nour) refused to sign, putting the DPA in jeopardy. The DPA was rejected by many for diversified reasons. For instance, rebel leaders rejected the DPA on the basis that it failed to sufficiently address key issues including power sharing, rebel representation in government and the disarmament of the Janjaweed militias (Internet source 4). Many IDPs also opposed the DPA partly because they claimed that it did not provide them with adequate protection from militia groups that have targeted civilians in the past. Although the AU peacekeepers were assigned to oversee the disarmament process, displaced persons distrusted the AU’s ability to protect them and demanded a UN protection force. Regardless of the signing of the DPA, the conflict has intensified with a huge impact on regional peace.

The implications of the Darfur conflict on regional peace are of concern to the AU as it has further destabilized large areas of the continent. Sudan’s neighboring countries such as Chad, Ethiopia, and Eritrea are affected by and play a role in this conflict. Bilateral relationships between Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea have not been good because they supported the Sudanese rebel movements in their struggle against the Khartoum regime. The Khartoum government responded by closing its borders with the two countries in 2002. They remained closed until the late 2005 when the Government of National Unity (GNU) was established in Sudan. (Rankhumise, 2006:7).
The aftermath of the Darfur conflict also had a direct impact on Chad. According to the Human Rights Watch (2006), some 300 people in eastern Chad have been killed in attacks on more than 70 villages leaving more than 100,000 IDPs in Chad and close to 200,000 refugees from Darfur have settled in Chads territory along the border (UNHCR, 2006). Concerned with the potential spill over of the conflict into its territory, Chad assumed a key role in mediating the conflict in Darfur that culminated in the Abeche and N’djamena ceasefire agreements. Unfortunately, Chad’s role as an honest and impartial peace broker in the Darfur conflict was affected when its army’s deserters sought refuge in parts of western Darfur and in conjunction with other Chadian rebels, launched cross-border attacks aimed at overthrowing Chadian President, Idris Debby. As reported by the BBC and other media, Chad openly “accused Sudanese militia of making daily incursions, stealing cattle, killing innocent people and burning villages on the Chadian border”. The Chad government’s blaming of the Khartoum administration for supporting the rebels led to tension between the two states and compromised Chad’s role in the Darfur conflict, which nevertheless had pertinent implications for its own national and human security. Unless contained, the deteriorating relations between Chad and Sudan have the potential to regionalize the conflict (Rankhumise, 2006:10).

Libya’s leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi has also been involved in the region by backing efforts by various Arab groups across the Sahel, but especially in neighboring Chad, to create an “Arab Belt.” Not only were guns imported to Darfur, but also an increasingly racist ideology of Arab supremacy. Janjaweed leaders are among those said to have been trained in Libya. As discussed previously, this ideology, fuelled by weapons and ever diminishing resources due to an ongoing drought, has heightened the racial/ethnic dimension of the conflict. As De Waal notes, “Darfur’s complex identities have been radically and traumatically simplified, creating a polarized ‘Arab versus African’ dichotomy that is historically bogus, but disturbingly powerful.” He argues that the US’ calling the government’s actions “genocide” by Arabs against Africans, as well as the use of the labels by journalists, humanitarian workers and outside politicians, has only encouraged this dichotomy which leaders of both communities have turned to their own advantage, further cementing the divide” (De
Waal 2005, cited by Human Rights Watch, 2006). The 2006 Human Right Watch reports confirm the passive approach to the conflict by the Arab League:

Sudan is a member of the Arab league and currently serves as its president. The Sudanese government has historically close relations with Egypt as well as with other Arab league members. […] The Arab league has yet to publicly condemn or criticize the massive human rights abuses that have been taking place in Sudan. The Arab League summit of March 28-29, 2006 was held in Khartoum and not only failed to condemn the Sudanese government’s atrocities and the ongoing policy of impunity in Darfur, but awarded Sudan with the Arab league presidency (Human Rights Watch, 2006).

From a historical perspective, it could be argued that the Darfur conflict goes back to the 1870s. It began when the colonial powers gradually changed the traditional laws of Darfur and when their policies and divisive structures and economic systems led to many tribal conflicts because many tribes were benefiting at the expense of others. Their quest to maintain their previous traditional values developed into extreme violence and hatred towards different races and ethnic groups. With regard to the Darfur conflict the crisis remains far from a resolution as long as there is not a clear understanding of the needs of all rebels groups. What makes the Darfur conflict even more complex is the role the Khartoum government and external actors such as Chad and Libya have played in fuelling the civil unrest. At this level, the only hopeful way out for many Darfurians is for the AU to understand the plight and needs of the various factions of rebel groups and to negotiate agreements for a peaceful settlement and the return of displaced persons. With an increased AU military capacity and more technical assistance from western countries, an AU/UN hybrid force should aim to minimize the escalation of conflict and provide humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable members of the population, in order words to ensure basic human security.

Based on the history of intensified civil wars in DRC, Ethiopia, Liberia, Rwanda and Sudan it would be ridiculous to say the African Union is not aware of the repercussions of the failure to ensure the observation of civil rights in African countries. Indeed the AU has as one of its objectives to cooperate in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African people. The obvious question is, is it really doing so by simply coming up with new initiatives that are never implemented? For a continent such as Africa that has remained unstable and
vulnerable to external factors and blocs, there is a need to develop and implement already existing paradigms, concepts and attitudes to increase institutional aptitude and make progress toward the goals of stability and prosperity. Therefore, an African agenda on issues of stability, integration, human security, socio-economic development and democratization must evolve within the overall framework of collective African solidarity, which is represented by the AU.
CHAPTER 4

THE POPULATION OF CONCERN AND THE NATURE OF HUMAN SECURITY ISSUES FOR THE AFRICAN UNION IN DARFUR

I was living with my family in Tawila and going to school when one day the Janjawid came and attacked the school. We all tried to leave the school but we heard noises of bombing and started running in all directions. The Janjawid caught some girls. I was raped by four men inside the school...When I went back to town; I found that they had destroyed all the buildings. Two planes and a helicopter had bombed the town. One of my uncles and a cousin were killed in the attack. A 19-year-old woman, describing the attack on Tawila February 2004 (Amnesty international, 2004)

According to international agencies and scholars such as the Amnesty International (2004), Human Rights Watch Africa (2004), Deportere and Checchi et al. (2004), Medicins Sans Frontieres (2005) and Rankhumise (2006), women, children, the disabled and the elderly have been among the victims of the military confrontations between the government of Sudan and rebel groups since 2003. Actual figures of those who have been affected (especially the mortality rate) are disrupted and difficult to come by mainly due to the lack of access to particular geographical regions. As a result this has impacted on the data’s quality and created data gaps.

For the purpose of this study, a discussion on the extent and nature of human rights abuse is presented in order to understand the reason why the Darfur crisis needs international intervention. Although the mortality rate in Darfur between 2003 and 2007 is not a determining factor in deciding if the large-scale killings constitute genocide, it is relevant as it presents the magnitude of what the population has suffered and its impact on the international community. The subsequent paragraphs will therefore assess three main aspects: the projected mortality rate between 2004 and 2007, level of human rights abuse in Darfur between 2003 and 2007 and the magnitude of refugee and IDP crisis between 2004 and 2007.
4.1 The projected mortality rate between 2004 and 2007

Among the first figures presented in the media on the number of people killed since the Darfur conflict started in 2003 was 50,000 people. According to Reeves, such figures were just ‘shamefully irresponsible journalism’ (The Los Angeles Times [editorial] January 17, 2005); But a British parliamentary report of 2005 stated that about 300,000 people have died in Darfur (Internet source 1). This figure is far from what the International Coalition for Justice (2005) says in regard to the number of people who died in Darfur in 2005. According to them, approximately 15,000 people died each day in Darfur (International Coalition for Justice 2005). Some of these statistics might not be considered credible on the grounds that they do not provide a time frame within which these events occurred.

Figures of how many people have died as a result of the Darfur conflict are still based on approximations. This is because many people have died as a result of hunger and starvation, health reasons, exhaustion and violent attacks from rebels. Due to the complex nature of the conflict and the lack of accurate statistics on the mortality rate in Darfur, the most precise statistics available are based on statistical reports from prominent international organizations such as Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF), the World Health Organization (WHO) and Amnesty International (AI). The parameters and methods used in the mortality surveys carried out by these organizations vary widely and thus it might be inappropriate to directly compare them. This is because the sampling frame used especially by the MSF and WHO ranged from large scale studies done in Greater Darfur to several state-wide surveys and a combination of IDP camps and/or towns to individual IDP camps or towns. Nevertheless, these surveys give important insights on mortality rates in camp situations within the Darfur region.

The first serious mortality survey was carried out by MSF between April and June 2004 in four IDP camp sites (Zalingei, Mornay, Nertiti and El Geneina) which together sheltered 215,400 people (Table. 3). The MSF study provides us with an estimate of violent deaths in the pre-camps period of these IDP’s lives and it indicates
that 5% of their total number had been killed before they were able to reach safety. According to Prunier, if the deaths caused by disease, lack of food and water on the way and exhaustion were to be added up we would arrive at a Crude Mortality Rate (CMR) of 7.56 per 10,000 a day (Rankhumise, 2006:11).

Table 3. Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF) IDP camp mortality, April - June 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Institution</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>People of Concern</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>% Death</th>
<th>Total of People Who Died During This Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(MSF)</td>
<td>April-June 2004</td>
<td>4 IDPS CAMPS</td>
<td>215,400 people</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10,770</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Muthee, large scale studies done in Greater Darfur by the WHO between 2004 and 2007 provide insight about mortality rates in camp situations in Darfur. For instance, according to the WHO mortality study of 2004 that “in spite of the intensity of humanitarian interventions in Darfur by most of the leading humanitarian aid organizations, mortality rates among displaced people in North Darfur, West Darfur and in some camps in South Darfur (e.g. Kalma Camp) remained high and above emergency thresholds” (see Table 4), which was indicative that some of the communities continued to live an emergency phase (Muthee, 2007:15).

Table 4. Mortality in Kalma Camp

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>KALMA CAMP</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Muthee, 2007
In 2004, mortality attributed to injury or violence was relatively high (see Table 5). For instance, the WHO study in September 2004 reveals a CMR of 1.5 and 2.9 persons dying per 10,000 per day in North and West Darfur respectively.

### Table 5. Crude Mortality Rate (CMR) in Camps and Areas as in 2004 and 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp/Area</th>
<th>(CMR)/persons/10,000/day</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Darfur</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>September 2004</td>
<td>WHO study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Darfur</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>September 2004</td>
<td>WHO study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalma camp</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>September 2004</td>
<td>WHO study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zalingei</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>October 2003–April 2004)</td>
<td>MSF study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murnei</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>October 2003–May 2004)</td>
<td>MSF study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ElGeneina camp</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>39 day recall period) in May/June 2004)</td>
<td>MSF study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North, West and South Darfur</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>September 2005</td>
<td>WHO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from Muthee, 2007:25-27

Though the study was never completed in South Darfur due to insecurity, the CMR in Kalma camp was 3.8 deaths per 10,000 persons per day. Though adequate figures are hard to come by, data obtained such as that by WHO in its 2005 study (Table 5) and described by Muthee 2007 in Figure 4 portray a drop in CMR after 2004, and probably after foreign aid agencies stepped into the conflict zone.
4.2 Human Rights Abuses between 2005 and 2008

In addition to a high mortality rate, the violation of international humanitarian law (inhuman detention conditions, rape and taking hostages – including humanitarian aid workers) by rebel groups (i.e the SLM/A and JEM) continues to be an issue in Darfur. A number of periodic monthly reports especially from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and International Group Crisis have examined actively issues of human rights abuses specific to Darfur. The subsequent paragraphs will highlight some of the violations of civilian rights between 2005 and 2008.

4.2.1 Sexual and gender based violence by government forces

Numerous women and girls have been raped during the conflict and the number continues to rise. A September 2005 study carried out by United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) found that nearly all the women and girls across the three Darfur states interviewed knew of other women or girls who had been raped or sexually abused. These women and girls have been raped in front of the male members of their families and were beaten and forcibly restrained.
by the attackers. In some cases the girls were raped in ceremonies known as the ‘initiation to womanhood’ by armed militias (UNHCHR, 2006).

As the number of IDP camps grew, women had to leave their camps to search for firewood, grass for thatching, food for their remaining animals and even provisions for themselves. For many women, firewood collection is the main income generating activity but these activities being disturbed by militias who roam in areas outside the camps, with the aim of attacking women and girls who are unaccompanied by men. For instance, Fatouma, a 15 year-old from West Darfur, had an all too common story. After leaving her IDP camp to look for firewood to both sell and cook with, a group of Arab militia who strayed freely on the camp border chased her and her companions. They held her overnight and gang-raped her repeatedly. The next day she found her way back to the camp, bleeding and dazed. Nine months later she gave birth to a light-skinned, soft-haired baby girl (UNHCHR, 2006).

In its July 2005 report “Access to Justice for Victims of Sexual Violence” in Darfur, the UNHCR assert that rape and gang rape continues to be perpetrated by armed elements in Darfur, some of whom are members of law enforcement agencies and the armed forces but the government appears either unable or unwilling to hold them accountable (UNHCHR, 2005).

Between August 2004 and May 2005, Human Right Organizations (HROs) in Western Darfur monitored and followed up on 39 incidents of rape, attempted rape and physical assault involving a total of 82 victims. Half of the incidents included more than one victim. The range of age of the victims was 7 to 60 years. In 15 cases, the victims were between 5 and 12 years old, while in 17 cases, the victims were between 12 and 18 years old and in 50 cases, the victims were over 18 years of age. The perpetrators were described in the majority of cases as armed men wearing khaki uniforms or pro-government militia members, often with their faces covered. In most cases, the crimes took place on the outskirts of IDP camps (UNHCHR, 2005). The reporting patterns also show that many victims were too intimidated to report the crime, or lacked faith in the authorities. In 16 of the 39 incidents monitored by
HROs, the victims did not lodge a complaint with the police or wish to pursue legal action. In six cases the prosecutor in Western Darfur filed complaints against unknown perpetrators. In 18 of the incidents, complaints were lodged at the police station, but no action was taken. The police furthermore refused to provide information on those cases and denied having them on record. In eight cases, the police or prosecutor allegedly refused to investigate the complaint, despite medical evidence. In only two of the cases were the perpetrators prosecuted, convicted and sentenced. Both cases involved the rape of female minors by juvenile male offenders (UNHCHR, 2005).

Female victims of sexual crimes in Darfur are further victimised by often cumbersome, contradictory and discriminatory proceedings within the legal justice system. For example, legal aid for victims is rarely available and only provided to victims during investigative procedures if they are less than 18 years of age according to the Sudan Child Act of 2004. Until recently, a victim had to first get the signature of a medical examination by a certified doctor, although medical staff are desperately lacking. Victims must provide proof of age and are sometimes subjected to forced “medical exams” to determine their eligibility to a guardian, welfare officer or legal representative during police questioning. Such questioning is often re-victimising for survivors and can result in prolonged periods of detention. As in other countries practicing Sharia, or traditional Islamic law, if an unmarried woman or girl is pregnant and cannot prove that she was raped, she can be charged with the capital crime of adultery. To convict a man of the same offence, a confession or the testimony of four witnesses is required. For all these reasons, perpetrators are rarely held to account. At the time of writing, only one conviction for sexual violence had been prosecuted in Darfur since the crisis unfolded in 2003, despite reports of many thousands of rapes (International Rescue Committee, 2007).

Based on the above reports, rape and other forms of sexual violence to date have remained prevalent in the Darfur conflict. Those who bear the brunt of such maiming and misery are very young girls who and women who in most cases are infected with sexually transmitted diseases. Those who managed to survive are keeping their misery and pain to themselves mainly because they are too frightened to speak out or fear to be charged with the capital crime of adultery. Clearly the motive of these perpetrators is to render these women helpless and worthless. This in future could have a very severe impact on the possibility of ensuring a long lasting reconciliatory peace in Sudan.
Again the fact that most of these abuses can not be reported reflects a general mistrust of police and government authorities. An example is a case from Sisi in West Darfur which occurred in September 2007, where a member of the Central Reserve Police shot and killed a woman when she tried to protect her daughter from being sexually assaulted in her house (Human Rights Watch, 2008: 18). If important figures and government officials can act in such a manner it becomes very difficult for one to talk of enhancing human security in Darfur.

4.2.2 Human rights abuses by armed militia and the government’s failure to protect its population

One of the key problems as to why the situation in Darfur is deteriorating especially between 2004 and 2006 is because the Sudanese government has continued to follow a policy of supporting ethnic militias, coordinating or tolerating attacks on civilians (especially IDPs) and also permitting serious violations of international law (such as attacks on AU forces and humanitarian aid workers and their convoys) to go unpunished. According to the UNHCHR, these attackers were most often armed men riding horses or camels who wore military uniforms (described as “khaki” or “camouflage” uniforms), jallabiya, or civilian clothes. Sometimes the perpetrators had their faces covered with a scarf and they usually traveled in groups. During attacks it was common for perpetrators to make racially or ethnically derogatory remarks. Victims and witnesses reported that attackers said: “kill all the Nuba”; “we have killed all the slaves”; “Fur are slaves”; and “we will be back and we will sexually assault you and so you will have Arab blood.” Solely with regard to acts of violence against women and girls, HROs have documented over 60 incidents (involving over 130 victims) perpetrated by members of armed militia between June and November 2005. Such forms of large scale attacks on civilians by Government forces apparently encouraged the militia to execute other abuses with impunity (UNHCHR, 2006).

Besides the issue of constant torture and victimization of the people of Darfur, reports from humanitarian agencies and international media also confirm that the situation in Darfur has affected the humanitarian aid workers and the AU peacekeeping force in
Darfur. On October 31st, 2006, Michael Bociurkiw of the U.N. Children’s Fund said "Our biggest concern right now is that our hard-won gains could be easily lost if the situation continues. The situation is extremely difficult for aid workers and insecurity often prevents us from being able to access people." (Brickhill, 2007)

The “unimpeded access” promised by President Omar el-Beshir was largely a mockery. For example travel permits for Darfur would be issued to NGO workers but made valid only for three days; then the beneficiaries were told that they had to give seventy-two hours’ pre-flight notice before going, meaning that their permits would have expired by the time they were to be used. When they protested the Ministry of the Interior answered: “That is your problem, not ours (Brickhill, 2007).

While such pretence of “unimpeded access” drove humanitarian communities to extremes of frustration, AU soldiers operating within this region were frequently attacked and killed by the Janjaweeds. In October, 2005 the AMIS force suffered its first casualties where four soldiers and two civilian drivers were murdered in an ambush. “We are like sitting ducks” an army captain from Zambia told the Washington Post, saying he hoped for more armored personnel carriers and more ammunition (Cohen and O’Neill, 2006). Recently, Steve Bloomfield (Africa correspondent in Darfur) reported the nature in which AU soldiers had been killed.

Five African Union (AU) soldiers operating in Sudan’s Darfur region have been killed in the worst attack on the peace-keeping force since its deployment in 2004. The five Senegalese soldiers were fired upon while guarding a water point near the Chad border. The attack came the day after a helicopter carrying the AU’s deputy commander was fired upon while traveling from Zalengi in Western Darfur to the AU mission’s headquarters in El-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur (Bloomfield, 2007).

4.3 The Level of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 2004-2007

Accurate numbers of displaced individuals, refugees and war affected members of the population have also been difficult to estimate, partly because the Sudanese government places formidable obstacles before journalists attempting to cover the conflict. Therefore, to ensure the use of reliable data, statistics here will be based on selected reports and ‘official figures’ published by key institutions which have tried to address or carry out a survey on the situation in Darfur between 2004 and 2007. The
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) gives a very high priority to developing effective responses to protracted refugee situations. Some of their main objectives are to provide shelter and a protective environment in refugee camps, to promote the principle of voluntary return in safety and dignity, and to supply technical expertise to the government and other UN agencies (UNHCR, 2006).

With regard to the Sudan/Darfur situation many of these surveys were taken at different times and places and such it will be inappropriate to directly compare them. In 2003, 138,163 refugees, and 484 asylum seekers were attended to by the UNHCR in Sudan28 but these figures increased in 2005 to 147,256 refugees and 4425 asylum seekers (Figure 5), with an additional 18,525 returned refugees and 841,946 IDPs 29.

As of mid January 2005, there were also IDPs present in some areas in Western Darfur (Figure 6). There were about 1,861 IDPs in Kounoungo, 2,500 in Goundo 4,007 in Borota, 15,000 in Dogdore, and 6,441 in the Goungour area (UNHCR, 2006).

![Figure 5. Sudanese Refugees and asylum seekers, 2003 and 2005](image)

Source: UNHCR, 2006

Besides the responsibility to protect refugees in Sudan, the UNHCR in 2005 was still faced with catering for the needs of another 210,000 Sudanese refugees in 12 IDP camps in Eastern Chad (UNHCR, 2006). As of October 2006, there were 223,600

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28 UNHCR Global report 2003
29 UNHCR Global report 2005
refugees in Chad (UNHCR, 2006). APPENDIX 2 shows the IDP camps located within Darfur.

![IDPs in Displaced Camps](image)

**Figure 6. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) in selected camps in Darfur**

Source: UNHCR, 2006

According to the 2004 report of Amnesty International, Darfur had 600,000 IDPS by 2004 (Amnesty International, 2004:80) but in their 2006 report AI states that more than 1.8 million people were displaced in Darfur (Amnesty International, 2006:242). A recent 2008 report by Amnesty International states that there are now more than 2.3 million IDPs in Sudan (Amnesty International, 2008:1) (see Table 6).

### Table 6. Total number of IDPs in Darfur

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name Of Institution</th>
<th>Number of IDPS in western Darfur, 2004</th>
<th>Number of IDPS in western Darfur 2006</th>
<th>Population Increase Between 2004 and 2006</th>
<th>Population Increase Between 2004 and 2006(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>1.8 million</td>
<td>1.2 million</td>
<td>200%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Amnesty International, 2004:80
4.4 The World Food Programme (WFP) and the Darfur Crisis, 2004-2007

The WFP is a United Nations frontline agency in the fight against global hunger. It aims at saving lives in refugee crises and other emergencies, improving nutrition and the quality of life of world's most vulnerable people at critical times in their lives, and also enabling development by: (a) helping people build assets that benefit them directly; and (b) promoting the self-reliance of poor people and communities.

With the Sudan/Darfur crisis, close to 1.2 million people were considered as being among the food-dependent population in June 2004 (Reeves, 2004) but in 2005 up to 3 million people needed food. However, the World Food Program announced that a drastic funding shortfall would force them to cut food rations by one-half for one million Darfurians.\(^30\). Out of 6 million Darfurians, 3.7 million were conflict affected in 2006 with 2 million living in IDP camps and reliant on food aid. As much as 70 percent of the conflict-affected population in Darfur, (2.65 million people) remain food insecure and were in need of food assistance\(^31\). It was further projected that a total of 85,000 refugees, 1,950,000 IDPs, and 680,000 returnees\(^32\) would need WFP food assistance in 2007.

4.5 The legal basis for the African Union’s intervention in the Darfur conflict and the establishment of AMIS

The norm underpinning the AU’s Constitutive Act and the Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and the Security Council are the pro-sovereignty doctrines which assign high priority to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its member states. For example, Articles 4 (f) of the Protocol advocates “non-interference in the internal affairs of another”. In addition, Article 3 (b) of the Constitutive Act states that the core objective of the AU is to “defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its members”. However, it also put strict curbs on sovereignty, basing it on the willingness and capacity of a member state to protect its citizens (PSC Protocol, Articles 3 (b) and 4(f)). The Constitutive Act also stresses the responsibility

\(^{30}\) Statistics on the crisis in Darfur, from the American Jewish World Service – April 2005

\(^{31}\) Emergency Food Security and Nutrition Assessment (EFSNA) mission of October 2006.

\(^{32}\) Projected 2007 needs for WFP projects and operations in Sudan.
of a member state to protect its citizens. However, it bestows upon the AU the right to intervene, including through multilateral military force, “in respect of grave circumstances namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” or situations that pose a serious threat to legitimate order to “restore peace and security in a member state” (Constitutive Act, Articles 4 (h) and (j). The AU underlines military intervention as the last resort but stresses non-military measures such as dialogue and peaceful resolution of conflicts as the best solution to conflict. Paradoxically, the Darfur crisis has had an overstretching impact on Africa’s security system and this has given the AU more reason to give much weight to the military capabilities (Kingebiél, 2005 cited by Kagwanja and Mutahi 2007:5).

Clearly the AU has a duty to intervene in African conflicts where there are severe situations of crimes against humanity. But one thing the AU’s Constitutive Act fails to state is how soon they should respond in any conflict situation where there are severe crimes against humanity. Even if there is a will to respond early enough it is still questionable whether the AU has the capacity to address the crisis. Again there are other concerns as to how severe a situation should get before there is any form of intervention from international organizations.

From this, the need to address human security issues in Africa from its root causes becomes clear. With regard to the Sudan/Darfur situation the issue that arose revolved around the question of respecting Sudan’s sovereignty in relation to the AU’s presence and troops. This became a sticky issue as there was a proposition for the United Nations mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to replace AMIS.

The problem that arises here is: should there be a question of sovereignty when there is a dire need for humanitarian intervention? There is a clear need for the AU to state under what circumstances issues surrounding sovereignty should be ignored. With the Darfur conflict, two agreements signed between the AU and Khartoum helped clarify the issue of sovereignty. The first agreement for the Ceasefire Commission on the modalities for establishment and the deployment of observers in Darfur were signed on the 28th of May 2004 and the second agreement signed on the
4th of June 2004. The two pacts cleared the path for the smooth deployment of AMIS in Darfur (Rankhumise, 2006:8).

4.6 From AMIS to UNAMID: the strength and aptitude of the AU/UN force in Darfur 2004-2007

As an observer mission AMIS was composed of 80 military observers and a protection force of 600 troops. At the 17th Peace and Security Council meeting in July 2004, the mission was enlarged to make provision for a staff of 3,320 (with a budget of 220 million dollars). On October 20th, 2004, the AU further enhanced AMIS by including assistance for confidence building, protection of civilian and humanitarian operations and the observance of all agreements signed since the N’djamena Agreement of 8th April. Thereafter, it gradually deployed 6,171 military personnel and 1,560 civilian police by April, 2005 (at a cost of over 450 million dollars). Besides having an increased armed force, the AU has an aviation unit consisting of 2 fixed wing aircraft and 24 civilian helicopters (African Union, 2005).

![Country Troop Contribution to AMIS](image)

**Figure 7. Troop contributions to AMIS by African Countries**

Source: African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, 2005
African countries such as Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal and South Africa also contributed significant numbers of troops to strengthen the AMIS military personnel. For instance, in 2004, Olusegun Aremu Obasanjo (then President of Nigeria) offered two thousand and forty Nigerian troops as part of the AU body (African Union, 2005). Figure 7 shows the number of troops contributed by some African countries by the end of 2005.

As at 2007 the AU still had a force of about 7000 troops which was expected to meet the needs of more than two million Darfurians scattered across an area of some 493,180 square kilometers that is largely an arid plateau with some mountainous areas. Given the magnitude of the Darfur conflict, especially the human security issues, the AU would need five times its force (that is about 35,000 troops) to secure the affected population in Darfur. It was for this reason that the African Union/United Nations hybrid force in Darfur (known as the United Nations - African Mission in Darfur, or UNAMID) was approved on the 31st July 2007. With an approved budget of $1.28 billion (July 2007 - 30 June 2008) the strength of the AU/United Nations hybrid force as of 2008 stands at 9,237 total uniformed personnel, including 7,393 troops, 128 military observers, 1,716 police officers and supported by 405 international civilian personnel, 730 local civilian staff and 134 United Nations Volunteers. Figure 8 shows the deployment of UNAMID forces in Darfur as at April, 2008.

The proposed African Union/United Nations hybrid force was to have well over 20,000 personnel in 2007. One of the overall objectives is to liaise with UNMIS, the African Union Liaison Office for the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and to “contribute to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and to facilitate the voluntary and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their homes” (UNAMID, 2008).

33 The hybrid forces Though its authorized strength according to the UN security council resolution S/RES/1769 of 31 July 2007isfor it to have up to 19,555 military personnel; 6,432 police, including 3,772 police personnel and 19 formed police units comprising up to 140 personnel each; and a significant civilian component. Source: UNAMID-http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamid/facts.html. (Accessed 3rd September 2008)
It is evident that there is a remarkable improvement in the strength of the AU force in Darfur. The most obvious difference between AMIS and UNAMID is that AMIS was a donor-driven observer mission, but now UNAMID requires all contingents to be self-sustaining according to United Nations standards, including with regard to food.
Another difference is the size of the peacekeeping force. In 2006, AMIS had a total of 7000 troops in Sudan to address the Darfur crisis but this figure increased with the establishment of the African Union/United Nations hybrid force in 2007 which has well over 20,000 personnel. Therefore, there was an increase of approximately 200% in terms of troops and officials deployed to Sudan to address the Darfur crisis. The budget also increased from 450 million dollars to 1.28 billion dollars. This probably means that there is more determination among both African leaders and the international community to resolve African disputes; it also highlights that Africa remains heavily dependent on these external forces. This leads to lengthy delays. For example, the UNAMID force was approved in July 2007 but only started to be operative in December 2007.

4.7 Achievements of the AU as AMIS and UNAMID

According to Rodolphe Adada, the UN/AU Joint Special Representative for Darfur the changes and new contributions described above have yielded some positive results:

UNAMID has made a tangible difference on the ground in areas related to its primary mandate; the protection of civilians. More protection is being provided to vulnerable groups, especially in IDP camps through community policing and raising awareness on issues related to gender-based violence. In the last three months, the UNAMID Police has registered and trained 287 IDP volunteers in community policing, 30 of who are women (UNAMID, 2008).

UNAMID has had some successes. It has resumed night patrols of the camps around El Geneina, arrested a handful of Janjawid raiders and now escorts women as they collect firewood – all activities that the morale-sapped AU force abandoned after becoming a target for rebels and government-backed militias alike (United Nations, 2008A).

With the protection being provided by AMIS and the new AU/UN, force many international humanitarian agencies such as the UNHCR and the WFP have been able to attend to other vital contributions that directly address human security issues in Darfur. Some of the assistance provided by World Food Programme between 2004 and 2006 are as follows:
a) In 2004, a number of special emergency operations were carried out in Sudan, one of them being the “10339.1 EMOP-SDN-Asst. to affected People-Darfur”. This project supplied a total of 569.2 thousand tons of food (with a budget of $524,781.1 thousand dollars).  

b) In 2006, the WFP reached close to 3 million Darfurians at the peak of hunger in camps and rural communities.

c) The WFP and cooperating partners provided 2,387 tons of food to 210,910 beneficiaries in various locations in West Darfur. In Darfur, the general food distribution (GFD) rationed 450g of cereals, 50g of pulses, 30g of vegetable oil, 10g of salt and 30g of sugar per person each day.

d) The WFP organized a meeting for the parent teacher association (PTA), steering committee and community members to discuss the implementation of FFE (school feeding) in El Geneina. The community and PTA members agreed to assist FFE with the provision of cooks, firewood and any additional support needed.

Some of the assistance provided by the UNHCR are as follows:

- **Shelter and other infrastructure:** 3,300 refugees who were transferred to Um Shalaya camp from the border area were given materials to build 1,200 shelters. The UNHCR provided IDPs with construction materials to build 9,700 shelters, particularly for families with special needs (UNHCR, 2006).

- **Transport and logistics:** The UNHCR provided transport for more than 3,000 Chadian refugees from the border to new refugee camps in Um Shalaya (UNHCR, 2006).

- **Water and sanitation:** The UNHCR also constructed 36 wells in Western Darfur, trained IDPs to use and maintain them and formed committees to run the water supply systems. About 300 latrines were built for returnees and activities to promote hygiene were organized in 85 villages (UNHCR, 2006).

- **Health and Nutrition:** In coordination with NGOs, more than 3,000 older IDPs and those with special needs were treated for cataracts, glaucoma and trachoma. About 120 serious cases were referred to the state hospital in El Geneina. Lastly, they provided 1,000 elderly were provided IDPs with mobility aids and local clinics were supplied with medicines (UNHCR, 2007).

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34 World Food Programme in statistics, 2005.
35 WFP Emergency Report no 43, 2006
Despite the apparent progress made in Darfur since the arrival of UNAMID, the question remains whether the increase to 20,000 personnel will be able to provide adequate protection to the more than 2.3 million IDPS scattered in the vast area of Darfur. This excludes those seeking refuge in Chad. Rodolphe Adada, the UN/AU Joint Special Representative for Darfur, argues that “logistical challenges remain one of the biggest problems, with the Mission lacking the infrastructure at the moment to house the thousands of staff expected at full deployment”. He also maintains that UN and AU officials are working hard to try to accelerate deployment and to make the most of the available resources including fresh water in the parched and landlocked region. He further warns that it will be disastrous if the high aspirations of the established UNAMID, especially regarding the responsibility to protect millions of innocent Darfurian civilians who are still living in fear, are unmet.

In order to determine ways in which the AU will be able to promote peace and human security in Africa, it is vital to present some of the challenges the AU faced in their mission in Darfur (UNAMID, 2008A).

4.8 Challenges Faced by the AU as AMIS and UNAMID

In May 2007, the AU declared that AMIS was at the point of collapse. According to authors such as Appiah-Mensah (2006), Brickhill (2007), Sharamo (2006) some of the challenges faced by the AU’s in Darfur are as a result of financial and logistical constraints, fragmented international assistance and donor rigidity. For instance Sharamo argues that

The union inherited a US$42 million debt from the OAU and cash flow problems have been endemic. One major challenge has been the lack of timely voluntary contributions from member states. As of December 2004, the AU Commission’s budgetary allocations had grown from US$43 million to US$158 million (of which US$75 million is allocated to the PSC). It was estimated that the member states will contribute US$63 million, while US$95 million is hoped to be sourced from additional discretionary payments by member states and western governments (Sharamo, 2006:53).

In August 2005, an AU official stated that the AU would only be able to run AMIS
for the next three months. The official reported that the mission was in financial crisis as only US$79 million had been pledged, leaving a critical shortfall of US$173 million. As a result, countries such as Rwanda and Senegal warned that they would withdraw their forces if UN member nations did not live up to their commitments in terms of funding and supplies. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN/OCHA), the following major organizations had budgets to meet in order to address the Darfur crisis since September 2003 (Table 7). The figures are calculated in US dollars, and the totals do not balance exactly because of other funding sources.

Table 7. Commitments of Funding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Chad refugees budget</th>
<th>Darfur budget</th>
<th>Total in US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>362,000</td>
<td>2,042,000</td>
<td>2,404,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>39,167,000</td>
<td>3,300,000</td>
<td>42,467,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>2,960,000</td>
<td>16,647,000</td>
<td>19,608,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>23,196,000</td>
<td>138,385,000</td>
<td>161,580,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>17,290,000</td>
<td>6,524,000</td>
<td>6,541,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Sub-total</td>
<td>65,752,000</td>
<td>174,582,000</td>
<td>240,335,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO Sub-total</td>
<td>11,707,000</td>
<td>42,573,000</td>
<td>54,280,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total</td>
<td>85,675,000</td>
<td>301,013,000</td>
<td>386,688,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although the international community has acknowledged the need for adequate humanitarian assistance in Darfur, John Predergast of the International Crisis Group noted that, “the big money problem is that the Americans and the Europeans promised over the last decade that as long as the Africans are deployed in these kinds of situations, we would pay for the soldiers and equip them. And we haven't done it” (Internet Source 1).

According to Bot (2006), communication limitations severely restricted AMIS's ability to conduct operations. The mission lacked the capability to transmit critical
data such as operational orders or intelligence in a safe, high speed way. Communications are mostly passed from headquarters to units via voice transmission "in the open" or hard copy messages, which are liable to be intercepted by the Sudanese government or the militia. In addition AMIS did not have an intelligence equipment or collection capacity and did not actively analyse or disseminate intelligence. It was, therefore, unable to give critical information to sector commanders that would permit them to take timely measures, even though intelligence gathering and the monitoring of government, militia and rebel forces are two key responsibilities granted to it under the Abuja Security Agreement of November 2004.

Troop mobility is also constrained by “inadequate ground transport and air assets. AMIS had no large troop transport vehicles, though it did have approximately ten Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs), some with heavy machine guns, and a limited number of light armored vehicles. Its numerous light trucks and 4x4 vehicles have limited combat value since they have no armament. In addition, AMIS employed eighteen Mi-8 helicopters for most air operations. These were contracted, unarmed civilian aircraft without forward-looking infra-red (FLIR), tactical communications or night capability”. Thus, the mission could not send forces into a hostile environment or conduct sustained day or night-time patrols, including along probable approach routes to targets by the militia or along aid agency transportation routes. For the mission to respond to calls for help, personnel had to travel several kilometers to access the helicopters, which were housed in the open though secured by AMIS forces. Once above ground, they could reach any location in their sector within two hours. However, without night flying, AMIS could not carry forces to suspected locations at pre-dawn hours when most violence occurs. The helicopters were also severely hampered by fuel shortages, though they were expected to patrol at least 60 hours per month (Bot, 2006). UNAMID to date also faces similar issues with its call for military equipment (especially for military helicopters and armoured personnel carriers) still unheeded.
In 2007, Rodolphe Adada, the UN/AU Joint Special Representative for Darfur, stated that prospects for the peace process in Darfur remained very slim. He argued that the parties to the conflict did not view peace in Darfur as an attractive prospect either economically or politically. This was because signatories of the Darfur Peace Agreement had lost much of their political credibility and financial support, whereas non-signatories were still being armed and continued to enjoy the financial and logistical support which allowed them to sustain political backing among the grassroots (United Nations, 2008). In spite of such drawbacks, UNAMID achieved its first major breakthrough on the ground, when it secured the release of eight Darfur rebels who had been arrested and detained by the Sudanese government.

On 17 January 2008, the Government of the Sudan released eight Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) detainees into the custody of UNAMID. The detainees were handed over to UNAMID Force Commander, General Martin Luther Agwai, in his capacity as the Chairman of the Ceasefire Commission (CFC), at UNAMID Headquarters in El Fasher. The handover was witnessed by the UN-AU Joint Special Representative for Darfur, Mr. Rodolphe Adada. Six of the detainees were JEM Representatives to the African Union Ceasefire commission, and were arrested on 29 December near the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) Forward Headquarters in El-Fasher. The seventh detainee was arrested earlier in Kulbus, while the eighth belonged to the JEM Collective Leadership Faction and was arrested in El Fasher (UNAMID, 2008B).

However, some security lapses still pose a threat to UNAMID. According to the USA Amnesty International (2008B), logistical challenges still remain the biggest problems as the mission lacks the infrastructure to house thousands of staff expected at full deployment of the UNAMID. Besides that, “UNAMID has still not received the 24 helicopters the UN asked for which are necessary to make UN forces mobile in Sudan. Without helicopters UNAMID is unable to deploy troops to deal with crises, and military or civilian observers cannot investigate incidents which occur in insecure areas” (Amnesty International, 2008B). In addition, UNAMID still lacks adequate and appropriate ground transport equipment. Although some equipment have been delivered (for instance, Canada provided AMIS with 105 armored personnel carriers (APCs) in 2005, which now are operated by UNAMID), UNAMID drivers still need to be trained by a Canadian task force. The problem is that many UNAMID personnel only have a six-month contract which is not enough time to train. Thus, they leave as inexperienced drivers who basically have to go back and continue to struggle in order to achieve their tasks. Clearly, it would be better if trained APC
drivers were brought in from countries that already have trained and qualified drivers (Amnesty International, 2008B). Such aspirations can only be attained if states really have the political will and resources to send out qualified persons who would be able to accomplish any task given to them.

Indeed UNAMID has demonstrated positive advances but must be more proactive on the ground in terms of gaining the confidence of all rebel groups in Darfur. In an attempt to do so their main focus should be to understand the major issues of these rebel groups. Only then can they begin to monitor a prospective peace process as the interest of all groups would have been understood and taken into consideration.

In addition, the objective of UNAMID could remain elusive as it has not fully assisted AMIS with its challenges as highlighted during the period when AMIS was on its own. This by no means connotes that UNAMIS has not made a major difference. The concern here is that these issues were long in existence and should have been addressed. Besides that, one could also argue that there is still lack of commitment on the part of the international community to address the Darfur crisis. With the United States (a world power as a result of its military and economic capability) as one of the main contributors, it is unacceptable that UNAMID still lacks 24 helicopters. This appears to confirm that western powers are only interested in conflicts where their interests or resources are at stake. It would be tragic to see hopes for dialogue dimmed for the wrong reasons. In order to avoid such uncertainties the AU needs to enforce a more realistic method of ensuring peace in Africa. The subsequent chapter seeks to discuss the prospects of the AU ensuring peace and security by putting the human security model into practice.
CHAPTER FIVE

PROSPECTS FOR THE AU IN THE PROMOTION OF PEACE AND
(HUMAN) SECURITY IN AFRICA

The previous chapters of this study have highlighted the severity of human security issues in Africa but more specifically within the context of the Darfur crisis. With an AU force of about 7000 troops it is practically impossible to effectively address the human needs of more than two million people in Darfur and simultaneously respond adequately to the resumed war in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo which has displaced over 20% of the population (six million people) in the Northern part of Kivu. Clearly Africa’s regional approach towards enhancing peace and human (security) needs to be rethought. What then does the AU currently say about humanitarian situations and human rights abuses?

5.1 The responsibility of the AU to protect

When forty-three African leaders met in Durban in July 2002, the transition from the OAU to the AU was accompanied with the aim of making changes to the pan African peace and security agenda, which has fundamental respect both for the parameters of sovereignty and for the need for intervention for human protection purposes.

The principles strengthening the AU’s emerging peace and security regime can be understood as an illustration of the elements of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ framework whose principles acknowledge the AU’s right to intervene without the consent of the target state, to protect populations against severe human right violations (Powell, 2005:29). This suggests that the AU recognizes the idea that security on the African continent is inextricably linked to observance of human rights of all people. Article 3 states that the Union shall “promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance’ and to ‘promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant human rights instruments’’. It can also be seen in the Principles, Article 4 states that the Union shall function in accordance with, inter alia, the principles of; respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law
and good governance; promotion of social justice to ensure balanced economic development; respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities; condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments. Guided by the principle of international human rights law, perpetrators of human rights abuses as expected to be brought to book by the envisaged African Court of Justice (AJC) (Bergholm, 2004:7).

With regards to the AU’s response to humanitarian situations, it has entrusted its peacekeeping capability to the PSC organ which is composed of an African Standby Force, a body of multidisciplinary military and civilian contingents for rapid deployment. Besides its duty to ensure the signing of a peace/ceasefire agreement, the PSC is responsible for providing care to those affected by humanitarian crises. However, consistent with “the prevention-reaction-rebuilding field of protection” as articulated by the ‘Responsibility to Protect’, “the emerging frameworks and the founding documents underscore the importance of conflict prevention and sustainable post conflict reconstruction through development as a means of achieving inter and intra-state peace and security and stresses that sustainable development cannot take place in the context of extreme instability and insecurity” (Powell, 2005:30).

The AU’s future in ensuring peace and security on the African continent has been strengthened by what it has learnt from pervious experiences. Some of the vital examples here would be the OAU/AU contribution in the Chad civil conflict of 1975, the Burundi conflict of 1993 (AMIB\textsuperscript{36} in Burundi) and AMIS in the on going Sudan/Darfur conflict.

\textsuperscript{36} The violent conflict in Burundi has a long and complex history. In 1993, violence erupted when Malchior Ndadye, Burundi’s first democratically elected president and leader of the Hutu Front pour la Democratie au Burundi (FRODEBU) was assassinated by the Tutsi-dominated army, resulting in open warfare between Hutu rebels and the military. This ethno-political violence has claimed the lives of over 300,000 Burundians. In April 2003 the AU deployed its first peacekeeping mission called the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) to support the peace process in Burundi. This mandate comprised of approximately 3,335 troops from South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique with additional military observers from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Togo, Mali and Tunisia (Powell, 2005:42).
5.2 Lessons learnt from the AU experience in African conflicts: Burundi, Chad, and Darfur/Sudan Conflict

5.2.1 Consistent commitment to peace and (human) security in Africa: the peace mission in Chad

Although there is talk about the importance of “African solutions to African problems”, the cultivation of strong global political will is essential to effectively keep peace. The AU possesses the political will to implement its normative commitment to peace and security, including the protection of vulnerable populations. In this the AU has built on the experiences of the OAU. For example, the 1975 civil conflict in Chad provided the OAU with its first opportunity to involve itself in peacekeeping operations. The OAU Assembly deployed a peacekeeping force for Chad in 1981, but this mission was faced with considerable difficulties with regard to the funding modalities and the unwillingness of OAU members to provide soldiers for purposes of intervening within other member states (Walraven, 1999:346). This experience has taught the AU that funding and full commitment by member states to ensuring human security, even if it means intervention in other states.

5.2.2 The African Union Peace Mission in Burundi (AMIB)

On the 3rd of February 2003, the President of Burundi, Pierre Buyoya, called for an African peacekeeping force to assist in resolving the civil war in his country and during, the same year when AMIB was establishment (Murithi, 2005:91). Powell argued that the then chairperson of the AU, Thabo Mbeki, and other African leaders saw the deployment of AMIB as a prospect for the AU to reaffirm its different approach from the OAU and to assume a leading role in Africa (Powell, 2005:35).

The Chad mission had an unclear mandate, which suggested both traditional peacekeeping (Chapter VI of the UN Charter) and peace enforcement functions (Chapter VII of the UN Charter) to ensure the defence and security of the country whilst waiting for the integration of government forces. However, it ended up as a traditional mission in the sense that a cease fire document was established as was requested by the government prior to the deployment of OAU peacekeeping force. The mission was not officially concerned with the humanitarian situation, but with restoring the Chadian territorial integrity as well as law and order for the legitimate government. The force withdrew in 1982, having been severely hampered by the organization’s limited financial, logistical and military capacities for peacekeeping and enforcement activities (Walraven, 1999:346).
AMIB engaged in violent conflict prevention and peace-building during a very complex phase of the conflict. Despite the ceasefire accord there was no peace to keep on the ground for the AU troops. Yet, in February 2004 a UN evaluation team concluded that the conditions were appropriate to establish a UN peacekeeping operation in the country. Thus, AMIB succeeded in bringing some relative peace to almost all provinces and created conditions where the UN felt that it could take over and intervene with its own peacekeeping forces. AMIB forces became UN mandated forces and were boosted by around 2,000 additional troops (Murithi, 2005:93). It is important to note that the mission was not given an explicit mandate to protect civilians but while in the field, senior AMIB officials drafted rules of engagement (ROEs) to allow their troops to use force to protect civilians in imminent danger of serious injury or death.

This meant that troops could, according to these ROEs, intervene with force to protect civilians in cases of genocide and mass killings if they had prior authorization from military and civilian officers. For Powell, “because AMIB eventually adopted rules of engagement for civilian protection, the AU’s experiences in Burundi offer new thinking on the specific challenges of protecting vulnerable populations in the context of an African-led peacekeeping mission” (Powell, 2005:3,35). Thus, despite the fact that the PSC was not yet fully operational in 2003, AMIB set some important examples that had positive outcomes for the human security of the population of Burundi.

5.2.3 The African Union peace mission in Sudan (AMIS)

In Darfur, AMIS was able to contribute to securing the environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief and for the return of displaced persons and refugees; but was still faced with the lack of a planned capacity to deploy as scheduled and with logistical and financial constraints in meeting its peace and security objectives, including its commitment to protect civilians. However, key African leaders and the AU Commission have been eager to demonstrate the AU’s capacity to respond meaningfully to African crises mainly because it could not ignore the international outcry on the mass murder in Darfur, which reminded many of the 1994 Rwandan
genocide (United Nations Security Council, 2000 cited by Kagwanja and Mutahi 2007). The most important aspect to be noted here is that it is encouraging to see how the AU is willing to act in accordance with its rights to intervention, even against the wishes of some concerned states and regardless of the awkwardness of the situation. Even though an evaluation is difficult to make, AMIS has saved numerous lives. It has helped “assemble evidence, provoking the outside world’s condemnation, through its monitoring and observation of human rights abuses”. AMIS has incorporated, for the first time in the O/AU’s history, a Civilian Police\(^\text{38}\) (CivPol) section of the mission. Furthermore, AMIS has to help further information about the conflict by escorting and protecting numerous research teams, diplomatic convoys and humanitarian missions in their efforts to document, interview and understand the atrocities occurring in Darfur. These are small but necessary undertakings in the establishment of a civilian protection capability.

5.2.4 Ownership versus dependency on external actors

African efforts and measures aimed at implementing a new peace and security architecture must be seen as positive; but looking at the AU’s experience in Burundi and especially that in Darfur it is evident that the AU required extensive political and material support from the international community in order to deliver on its commitments to peace and security, including the protection of civilians. In addition, slow decision-making on the part of donors delayed most of the actions of the AU. For instance in Burundi, slow decision making on the part of donors delayed AMIB’s deployment. In Darfur, external support for AMIS was delayed although it was fairly well-coordinated despite the fact that some key members of the international community such as America were slow in providing assistance (Powell, 2005:42).

A vital question one needs to ask is, how is funding for the AU especially in its peace keeping mission to be secured, considering the weak economic conditions of most

\(^{38}\) The original AMIS monitoring mission deployed in June 2004 did not include a Civilian Police (CIVPOL) component as policing was regarded as the sole responsibility of the Government of Sudan. In light of the deteriorating situation in Darfur and the absence of credible mechanisms to monitor the Government of Sudan (GoS) Police, the need became apparent for the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to deploy 815 Civilian Police in Darfur to monitor and assist the GoS Police. With the enhancement to AMIS II at the 28th meeting of the PSC of 28 April 2005, it was decided to expand the CIVPOL contingent by 745, bringing the total to 1560 CIVPOL officers (African Union, 2003)
countries in sub-Sahara Africa? It should not be forgotten that, African states also contribute to the UN peace operations globally. Evidently, this will mean that a large share of the AU’s funding will have to be borne by external donors, even if AU members intensify their efforts to lead the way in terms of paying their share. This is evident in the AU mission in Sudan, where the lion’s share of the costs has been borne by the EU, US and other donors (Klingebiel, 2005:36). There are still reasons for concern as there is no guarantee that Africa will constantly get enough financial and logistical support from donor countries. Worst of all, funds from the EU/Peace Facility for Africa are ‘drawn from envelopes already marked for development thereby begging profound questions about how to negotiate tradeoffs between spending for stability and security with resources for operational and structural conflict prevention and long term development assistance designed to address the root cause of instability and insecurity’ (Sharamo, 2006:40).

Besides this, one also needs to query the authenticity of the role external actors’ play in trying to address African conflicts. In other words, do western countries really have an interest in addressing African conflicts? On one hand one could argue that, yes, they do have Africa’s interests at heart because of contributions made, especially in the light of humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable sections of the population in Darfur. On the other hand, western countries have played a significant role in creating and stirring up coup d’états and civil strife in Africa. This is reflected in the June 2008 trial of British mercenary Simon Mann who implicated former friend Mark Thatcher in the alleged plot to overthrow the President of Equatorial Guinea. Mann claimed that Thatcher paid $350,000 in total and that the money was used to pay for an Alouette III helicopter and an aeroplane which were to be used in the plot (Internet Source, 6). Therefore, in what way can Africa play a leading role in ensuring stability in the continent without seemingly being over dependent on the initiatives and resources of western countries?
5.3 The way forward: is AU the answer to peace and human security issues in Africa.

While the initiation of the AU is a new phenomenon in the sense that African Heads of State are now facing the challenges African peace and security proactively, the establishment of NEPAD and other sub regional organizations such as ECOWAS, have also raised hopes and expectations throughout the continent. The question here is what are the necessary aspects a regional organization such as the AU needs to take into consideration in order to attain its goals of achieving peace on the continent?

In order to answer this question, it is vital to note that since the end of the Cold War era, African leaders have failed to guarantee political, economic and social stability for many Africans mainly because they were faced with challenges such as corruption, the rise in arms dealings and poverty. In Rwanda and the Sudan/Dafur conflicts, individuals and ethnic groups affected by such circumstances took up arms to regain their interests. Human security became even more elusive because warlords commit crimes (such as genocide) against humanity as a means of undermining their opponents. Thus, the continuously high levels of deaths, the mass influx of refugees and the internally-displaced persons have frustrated efforts by international organizations to maintain peace. No doubt a well timed intervention will minimize the major human security concerns and even halt or limit any mass civil violence. However, in order to establish long term stability in Africa, the AU needs to take steps to deal with the root cause(s) of threats to peace. The AU thus needs to deal with the issue of human security in Africa.

The argument here is that AU needs to examine already existing conflict preventive initiatives such as the Continental Early Warning System and to implement them. With the collaborative efforts of civil society, sub-regional organizations and other non-governmental organizations, the AU could establish ‘AU-Alert institutions’ in every African country, whose main focus or area of duty will be to ensure that serious conflicts are prevented by early detection of warning signs and responding timeously to these signs. Other duties will thus be to guarantee a political voice to suppressed minority groups within a country, and advocate for ‘sustainable development projects’
as a long-term preventive security and development model. These two elements will go a long-way to address the issues of social insecurity such as religious diversity and the unequal distribution of national resources, poverty and, above all, the lack of democratic governance. Besides that, it will be vital for the African Union to embark on strengthening the African response capacity by having an African Standby Force to ensure the improved delivery of humanitarian assistance and protection against atrocious crimes, and to strategically use foreign aid.

5.4 ‘AU-Alert Institutions’ to guarantee a Political Voice and Power to Minority groups in Africa

The success of ensuring human security is not for the AU to build upon already existing strategies, rather it is best to keep developing tools for operational ‘conflict prevention’ which includes the Continental Early Warning Systems (CEWS). The AU should focus on achieving a common agenda and working in close collaboration with subregional organizations such as ECOMOG. This is not only because ECOMOG is currently the main sub-regional organization actively involved in addressing regional crises in Africa but also because it has a Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security which goes beyond prescriptions for preventing and managing conflicts as a means of achieving security. ECOMOG approaches the issue of sub-regional security in a more holistic manner by making strong recommendations for the promoting human security (Kagwanja and Mutahi 2007:15).

39 The term conflict prevention refers broadly to strategies and activities designed to reduce tension or prevent the outbreak, escalation, spread or recurrence of violence. The concept and practice of conflict prevention evolved from being focused almost exclusively on preventive diplomacy, to a new more comprehensive approach that can be defined as structural prevention. This new approach includes long-term initiatives targeting the root causes of conflict (http://www.sais-jhu.edu/cmtoolkit/approaches/conflictprevention/index.html). Conflict prevention strategies may be distinguished between operational prevention (measures applicable in the face of looming crisis) and structural prevention (measures to ensure that crises do arise in the first place and even if they do they do not recur). At the regional level, the African Union and its regional economic communities (RECs) have made progress in containing violence, particularly in Burundi and the Mano River basin. They have often successfully combined military intervention with the use of influential mediators in other countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone (Kagwanja and Mutahi 2007:15).
In order to achieve this aim ECOMOG has created a number of organs, institutions and strategies which are implemented specifically to address peace and security issues. For example, an early-warning system, in the form of a regional observation network has been created. Within the Executive Secretariat and also in specific areas within the community are ‘observation centers’ or ‘bureau’, where data on states ranging across the economic, political, security and social sectors are collected and analyzed in order to detect warning signals that may signify potential conflict. This is considered an important tool in the early detection of conflict that should then inform conflict-prevention strategies. Besides that, a “Council of Elders” is proposed in accordance with African traditional practice to assume the roles of mediation, conciliation and negotiation in a situation where there are indicators of potential conflict. This “Council of Elders” is made up of thirty-two eminent persons drawn from within and outside the sub-region whose basic mandate is that of preventive diplomacy (Abdel-Fatau, 2006:5). Institutions such as these are useful in ensuring that minor conflicts do not spiral into major ones. These institutions could therefore be the blueprint for establishing “alert conflict institutions” in every African country. The role/duties of these “alert conflict institutions” could be to keep a record of the political landscape of the country, detect warning signals that may signify potential conflict and ensure that the government adheres to a system of proportionate representation; hence reducing the chances that disgruntled groups who feel excluded or marginalized might resort to violence. Thus, it is essential for the AU to establish such alert institutions to ensure that African governments recognize the needs/interests of all minority groups, a major human security issue of ensuring good governance and the representation of the interests of minority groups in government. Besides that, it also ensures that every government is in power for a limited period of time. In recent years countries such as Cameroon and Zimbabwe have experienced political instability due to the prolonged rule of their presidents. For instance, President Mugabe of Zimbabwe has ruled the country since the 1980s and is currently eighty-four years old but still not willing to hand over political power. His wife Grace Mugabe assured followers of her husband’s ZANU-PF party that. “Even if people vote for the MDC, Morgan Tsvangirai will never step foot inside the State House”. In the current situation in Zimbabwe, “half the population is facing the threat of famine, hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced, 80% of adults are unemployed, and the rule of law has been replaced by the arbitrary and brutal rule of a self-
appointed elite” (Washington Times, May, 2008). In other words, “AU-alert institutions” would ensure to some extent that competent African leaders who look out for the interest of their citizens are in power.

Uzodike (2004) has argued that cultural diversity is the basis for ethnic, racial, interstate, religious, regional and communal conflicts in Africa. Besides that, political upheavals over the past decades increased the level of conflicts in Africa. This is seen when internal state issues affect or result in “societal disturbance”, having a negative impact on the domestic markets, external investments and worst of all the challenge of refugees for receiving countries. Democracy is not easily attained in Africa because leaders are faced with difficult tasks and complex issues in regard to diversified subcultures, the “production and exchange patterns” in colonial period that was geared towards the development of metropolitan states and not for reconstruction of an African economy and the unequal distribution of available resources. The plundering of resources by African politicians and their corrupt nature are some of the tensions or issues giving rise to and feeding on African conflicts (Uzodike, 2004:22). Therefore, it is essential to deal with corruption and recover some of the corrupt money stowed away in foreign countries for productive investment. For example, such funds can be used in setting up or bolstering essential institutions. It is also important to punish those who are found guilty of the embezzlement of state funds to serve as an example to those who have the intention of committing similar crimes.

5.5 The vital role of non-state actors

Besides the importance of establishing a network of African alert institutions in the area of peace and security that could ensure both global participation and the involvement of civil society, sub regional organizations can also designate liaison

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40 In some parts of Africa, colonial rule favored one ethnic group over another, thus creating the basis of intense ethnic conflict and competition in the late colonial and post colonial era. For example, in Guinea, the French favored the Fula over the Mandinka, and Susu, and gave Fula aristocrats the best posts in the chefferies. Samori Toure, the Mandinka leader who led the resistance against French rule in the late nineteenth century organized an anti-Fula alliance which made him admirable during his reign. After independence, hundreds of thousands of Fula fled Guinea as a response to his grandson, Sekou Toure’s hostility towards them.

41 “…in late 1989, civil servants, teachers and traders in Benin were the first to bring an end to autocracy and economic mismanagement. In Zambia, the Congress of Trade Unions followed suit by successfully challenging the three-decade incumbency of Kenneth Kaunda. In Sierra Leone, the
officers within their secretariats to act as links for collaboration. All possible channels of communication between the different organizations should be opened and maintained. Today, non-state actors benefit from closer involvement with the local community during internal conflicts and have greater potential for local conflict resolution than other mechanisms. In addition, International humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, Oxfam and Medecins sans Frontières are able to act as relief agencies when governments are unable or unwilling to do so (Cilliers, 2004:11).

A recommendation for achieving a common agenda for peace and security on the African continent should be centered on achieving a harmonious, safe and stable environment, to make possible the evolution and implementation of development programmes that will provide economic prosperity and above all peace for the African peoples. Achieving these aims is essential, as it provides members of different sub-regional groups with the opportunity of exchanging ideas on how to achieve a common agenda and shape up their vision of a prosperous Africa. To this end, all sub-regional organizations and the AU should aim to achieve a unified concept of human security.

It should not be forgotten that members of these subregional councils/organs are selected based on their social standing and vast experience acquired over the years as statesmen, women, ministers, ambassadors and traditional/religious leaders. As such they require assistance by way of proper pay in between missions, and the provision and use of basic modern information technology as well as regular briefings on developments on the continent and modern mediation techniques (Abdel-Fatau, 2006:9).

The success of this mission will depend on the collaborative efforts between RECs, donors and civil society organizations. The AU and RECs can only be efficient and effective to the degree that the political will for constitutional convergence and irrepressible resolve of the Women’s Forum thwarted the designs of the incumbent military regime to forestall that country’s return to democratic rule in 1996. The damning pastoral letters of such Christian leaders as Bishop Isodore de Souza of Benin, and Archbishop Fanoko Kpodzro of Togo proved highly successful in undermining the authority of the old regimes” (Gyimah-Boadi, 1997 cited by Cilliers, 2004: 46).
solidarity among the constituent states will allow them. At best they can only set norms and standards for national behavior and hope that the member states adherence to them would be achieved through persuasion and increasing rate of constitutional convergence. It is therefore logical to argue that ultimately an African led solution to the unfolding tragedies lies at the national or state level, but nonetheless, non-state actors have a very significant role to play as outlined above.

5.6 ‘AU-Alert Institutions’ to advocate for sustainable development projects as a long-term development model to eradicate poverty

In the last years of the 20th century, Africa spent an estimated $18.7 billion on 28 million people faced with food emergencies due to drought, floods and strife. The World Food Programme (2007) spent 86.1 million on food emergencies in 80 countries. Unless the incidence of hunger is reduced and there is increased output of farm products that African countries can produce with comparative advantage, it will be difficult for NEPAD to attain the high rates of economic growth it seeks. More so, people suffering from hunger are usually marginalized within their economic environment and, as such, contribute little to both output and demand. Therefore, from the economic realm the human security issue can be addressed with the collaborative efforts of “AU Alert institutions”, African Ministries of Agriculture, and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Their role would be to help plan, operationalise and monitor major sustainable development projects in rural areas that will address the socio-economic rights of most citizens. It would also be vital to improve rural infrastructure and trade related capacity for market access.

The national budgets of most African states have development programmes of democratization which have focused on short term initiatives, such as the ‘Africa Growth and Opportunity Act’ and the ‘Millennium Challenge Account’ that place

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NEPAD is a potentially powerful vehicle for growth and development on the African continent. NEPAD describes itself as based on “a pledge by African leaders to eradicate poverty and to place the continent on a path of sustainable development, anchored on Africa’s determination to extricate itself from under-development and global marginalization” (United Nations Development Programme, 2003:2)
overwhelming emphasis on the external trappings of democracy and human rights, as well as the war on terror. During the 1980s, the idea of sustainable development emerged as a move towards improving the living standards for the present as well as future generations. The concept resulted from a global commission (Brundtland commission), which was created to examine the state of the world’s environment and the relationship between environment, development and the realm of businesses. The commission aimed at closing the gap between a deteriorating environment and the importance to feed, clothe, house and provide for the sanitation and health of all mankind (Rubenstein, 1994: 35).

According to the Brundtland Commission, sustainable development was defined as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (World Conference on Environment and Development 1987: 43 cited by United Nations Development Programme 2003: 2). Although there is evidence of many successful sustainable rural development projects having been carried out, the question of who should be responsible for promoting sustainable development is still uncertain. NGOs are known for recognizing the need for democratization in development projects because they can ensure both access and less corrupt management. Therefore, they can best guarantee that the aid reaches the intended communities (Mashinini and Gawie de Villiers, 2002:138). An example of an NGO that successfully addressed the issue of food security is Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR). Between January and July 2007, the HIV/Aids unit of the LHR designed numerous workshops and tasks that empowered and capacitated grandmothers within the Uqweqwe community to address initiatives to alleviate poverty. Some of the main issues they addressed were the provision of basic information on HIV/AIDS prevention and myths around HIV/AIDS, stigma and discrimination, rights in relation to health services, and confidentiality. They also ensured access to ARV drugs and ART, information on mechanisms of adherences and side effects, school fee exemptions, access to grants and identity documents. With the aim of providing essentials food such as seeds for maize, beetroot, cabbage, cauliflower, carrots, beans, tomatoes, spinach, onions and turnips, the LHR created a service.

43 Uqweqwe is a rural community that is situated in Zululand, 70 km north-west from Dundee. The Uqweqwe community falls within the Abaqulusi Municipality (Vryheid), situated approximately 45km from Vryheid (Rajcoomar, 2007:2).
“community garden project” which aimed at educating and empowering elderly women within that region.

However, it is important to note that sometimes such rural development projects fail because NGOs are reluctant to work in remote areas that are hard to reach due to poor infrastructure or harsh environment. In addition, young field staff may dislike the living conditions in rural areas and there is often conflict over power between chiefs and village development councils (Mashinini and Gawie de Villiers, 2002:139). In such instances the AU alert institutions would have to work in close collaboration with project based NGOs and support them to better carry out their task.

5.7 Accountability and good leadership qualities among member states

The AU can play a pragmatic leadership role both in bringing together various peace actors from local, regional and international systems, but its member states will play the biggest role in ensuring the effectiveness of the AU to promote peace and security. In other words the starting point for AU’s success depends on the quality of political will it gathers from its member states.

Financial constraints and logistical difficulties feed on each other and will remain a major obstacle to the AU’s peacekeeping efforts. The Darfur challenge has shown that no organization has the absolute influence to keep peace in Africa. Therefore the focus should be on institutionalization of a collaborative global peacekeeping partnership and a strengthened regional response capacity by addressing the root causes of human security threats. The AU through the NEPAD initiative and the PSC has developed its capacity through a “comprehensive continental plan and diplomatic strategy to marshal the resources from both within and outside the continent” (United Nations Development Programme 2003:2) but this cannot happen when the African Peace and Security Council’s prestige is eroded and in many instances has already been undermined by serious errors of judgment regarding nations where conflict and violence have reigned supreme. The objectives of the AU as enshrined in its Constitutive Act include “promoting and protecting human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other
relevant human rights instruments”. The AU is also based, amongst others on the principle of “respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance” (Solomon and Swart, 2004:13). The key question is whether the values enshrined in the Constitutive Act are implemented by AU member states or the institutions of the AU. There is little evidence to suggest that the AU is willing to hold member states accountable for human rights violations. Again Zimbabwe serves as a veritable example. The crisis in Zimbabwe has demonstrated that a country does not have to be at war to pose a threat to regional stability. The African continent’s inability to confront, address, and contain or deal with the Zimbabwean crisis effectively and authoritatively leaves many question marks and grave concerns as to whether a body such as the Peace and Security Council will in actual fact have the capacity, capability or adequate authority to respond when a genuinely devastating regional war or internal conflict does occur.

5.8 Strengthening African response capacity - an African Standby Force by 2010

The AU is building its capacity to respond rapidly to various types and phases of conflict through the development of an African Standby Force (ASF) by 2010. This will be a force of 15,000–25,000 military and civilian personnel, fully operational to be deployed within 30 days of adoption of a resolution for traditional peacekeeping operations, complex peacekeeping within 90 days and recommendations for the establishment of a robust military force able to deploy in 14 days to respond rapidly to situations of genocide (Motala, 2006:11).

To achieve this dream it is imperative to share the continental responsibility of effectively staffing and equipping the ASF. All the AU member states should in their normal military recruitment, planning and development, designate a unit or certain personnel as part of the ASF - something like a national taskforce for continental security (Motala, 2006:11). Once fully developed the ASF should be able to adopt standard operational procedures for the protection of civilians and to respond rapidly to genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly
because the effective protection of vulnerable groups is a prerequisite for negotiations in any conflict (Brickhill, 2007:13)

According to ASF panel experts, African countries still lack the capacity to support even the most modest of its missions. The ASF panel of experts claimed to have studied various NATO and UN models, but stated they were inappropriate “for various reasons,” for example the question is raised whether the ASF is to be an AU (continent wide) as opposed to a SADC or ECOWAS (regional) project. Serving both the AU and the region will be difficult. Another critical aspect of the ASF that remains to be resolved is the issue of how it will be financed (Brickhill, 2007:15). The lack of central funding and reimbursement for peacekeeping costs has severely inhibited the full participation of less wealthy member states. Unless such issues are addressed one cannot begin to talk of increasing pressures for an AU-UN hybrid force that would be able to resolve conflicts and enhance human security. This again is another reason why it will be imperative for the AU to enhance peace by addressing the root cause of the problem because preventive methods are better than finding a military remedy to an enormous social, economic or political problem. However, the improvement of the quality and nature of humanitarian assistance that should be provided to already existing victims of violent conflicts is vital.

5.9 Improved delivery of humanitarian assistance and protection against crimes against humanity.

The restoration of security is the key to ensuring effective delivery of humanitarian assistance to stem the thousands of deaths relating to lack of food, medicine and shelter. The lack of security has in many cases led humanitarian organizations to abandon their duties. In the case of Darfur, it is evident that various UN bodies and goodwill ambassadors are doing a remarkable job in keeping the plight of the displaced at a low level, but more needs to be done. For instance, specific countries
such as the US and China, as well as organizations such as the EU and Arab League need to step up their financial support for such crisis situations in order to establish basic security in which relief work can be carried out (Kagwanja and Mutahi 2007:15).

In addition to stepping up the security of humanitarian workers and vulnerable civilians in conflict situations, it is integral to arrest and try those responsible for such atrocities because the failure to do so has a potential of escalating the conflict as in the case of Darfur. However, arresting and trying these individuals remains a daunting challenge to the AU and the international community. This is because the International Criminal Court (ICC) is yet to issue arrest warrants against those named in such crimes and, moreover, its authority is being challenged by governments, with Sudan questioning its authority in Darfur. The AU’s PSC must invoke strongly its own protocol on civilian protection and crimes against humanity to ensure that those responsible for these crimes are brought to book. While pushing on with its own investigations on perpetrators of violence in Darfur, ICC and PSC must also cover eastern Chad and the Northeastern region of the Central African Republic, which too are affected by crimes against refugees and displaced population in camps. In the case of Darfur the AU-UN hybrid force must build a capacity to hunt down those identified by the ICC and PSC as perpetrators of war (Kagwanja and Mutahi, 2007:15)
Figure 9. Diagram reflecting conflict preventive approach with a human security paradigm
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

The most violent and disturbing conflicts on the African continent have notably been intra-state in nature with an example being the Sudan/Darfur conflict. Such conflicts have a significant peacekeeping cost for regional and international organizations and to this end, it is commonly accepted that there is a pressing need for Africans and other role-players to start making sense of what really needs to be done in order to address peace in Africa. These issues are of great significance to the African continent, especially since the establishment of the AU in Durban, on July 2002, as one of its main objectives is to intervene in a member state following the decision of the Assembly (of Head of States or government) in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. ‘Humanity’ in this context refers to the protecting of the most vulnerable such as refugees and IDPs in their respective camps and other citizens who are in dire need of basic necessities such as food, security and health care facilities.

This study uses the Darfur conflict as an example to show that the AU has clearly demonstrated its willingness to intervene regardless of its flaws (lack of logistics and inadequate force size). There is a general consensus on how international organizations could best address (for example by establishing a hybrid AU/UN force for the Darfur conflict) peace issues, especially by using mechanisms and approaches that are aligned to the human security paradigm. Promoting human security is the key to sustainable conflict prevention and reduction, but the practical application of these remains problematic. Therefore certain recommendations arise.

The argument of this study is that in cases where it needs to intervene in a conflict that has already spiraled out of control, the AU must continue to play an accountable and pragmatic leadership role. The AU needs to strengthen the African response capacity by establishing an African Standby Force (ASF) and improve the delivery of humanitarian assistance and protection against atrocious crimes. Although it is vital for the AU to uphold these aspects, their quest for enhancing peace in Africa is still questionable. For instance, the proposed ASF is seen as a highly ambiguous and
an ambitious plan that might not be supported financially by external actors. Therefore, we return to the point made above as to why the AU should burn much of its energy in trying to fight the causes rather than the effects of under-development and instability on the African continent. It would be more productive to rather focus on enhancing and implementing its own conflict preventive approaches such as the Continental Early Warning System. In addition, the AU should seek to mobilize efforts of prominent African leaders such as Mbeki and of NEPAD (who have gained a prominent position in the discourse on African ownership and participation) in conflict resolution and development through sustainable development. The role of subregional organizations such as ECOWAS cannot be underestimated because ECOWAS has developed holistic approaches that focus on issues of human security. ECOWAS has also involved civil society organizations, which have early warning capabilities that can spot likely hotbeds of (local, national or regional) conflict. Most importantly, civil society organizations have responded to potential crises by employing preventive mechanisms such as dialogue, negotiation as well as consensus and confidence-building initiatives that address problems faced by inhabitants.

Most African states and regional actors do not have systems in place either to warn them of conflict or to undertake risk assessments, and they are thus not able to predict and respond adequately to conflicts. Therefore, the AU’s success can only be achieved if there is a willingness from all organizations (like the RECs, donors and the civil society which are able to provide early warning of looming crises) to come together to have a common agenda for the peace and security of the African continent. Hence, the establishment of ‘AU Alert institutions’ is crucial because their role will be to gather data and alert the AU on the potential areas of conflicts. AU alert institutions will then have to work in close collaboration with sub-regional organizations and other non-state actors such as the civil society.

In spite of the efforts of a continental organization such as the AU to enhance peace and human security, the state remains the most effective instrument for addressing the main cause of human security issues: the redistribution of wealth. Poverty and competition for resources are the most common root causes of violent conflict. Mbaku
thus exhorts African leaders to revisit the promises they made at independence, because the main source of the continent’s continued economic and political problems originates from the new opportunistic leaders who make policies to enhance their own lives rather than that of their citizens (Mbaku, 1999:320). Therefore, he suggests “the most effective way for Africans to deal with these problems is to engage in state reconstruction through proper constitution making and provide themselves with appropriate laws and institutions”. If these institutional reforms are implemented properly Africans would avoid problems of the past (Mbaku, 1999:329). This will reduce the chances of outbreaks of conflict and war. Therefore, it will be vital for member states of the AU to accelerate agreements on the following internal state prerequisites: to reinstate internal peace and (human) security by guaranteeing a political voice and power to all citizens; and to ensure that competent African leaders have an influential role and advocate for ‘sustainable development’ as a long-term development model. In addition, initiatives from western countries to aid Africa in maintaining stability (for instance, AFICOM) should aim at enhancing humanitarian assistance, information sharing and collaboration on addressing issues of human security.

In conclusion, the human security paradigm is the most appropriate model to employ in dealing with issues of conflict on the African continent. For the AU to either prevent conflict, to end it, and to tackle its aftermath, it needs to understand and operate based on the premise that at their root Africa’s security problems are related to resources and are thus political, social, economic and environmental rather than military in nature. As such, Africa’s conflicts require responses that deal with them not only through armed force but also by tackling issues of human security both as it results from conflict (such as refugees and IDPs) and as it causes conflict (such as the lack of resources or political exclusion).

Lessons learnt from past peacekeeping experiences and opportunities presented by non-state actors can be turned into strategies upon which the AU can create a common agenda for peace and (human) security. This requires collaboration and in particular the recognition that states and governments hold the key to the success of any
developmental or security-related programme because they (states and governments) ultimately control all national resources for social upliftment and are responsible for deciding how and for what purposes to use these resources.
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Annexes Table 19

2005 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/statistics/opendoc.pdf#zoom=100
Table 1. Refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees (refugees and IDPs), stateless persons, and others of concern to UNHCR by country/territory of asylum, end-2007. Data are provisional and subject to change. Table established: 3 June 2008 in 07-TPOC-TB_v3 Microsoft Excel Sheet.
UNHCR Presence, Refugee/IDP locations
Source: UNHCR, 2008
www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/4810526c2.pdf (date visited: 30th May, 2008)