NGOs and development in the Third World: assessing NGO policy orientation in Angola’s post-conflict reconstruction and development process.

By

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This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for Masters Degree in Development Studies to the School of Development Studies, Howard College, University of KwaZulu Natal, Durban.
ABSTRACT

This study explores the role of NGOs in Angola’s post-conflict reconstruction and development process. The study was motivated by a perception obtained from a preliminary literature acquaintance and events that pointed to the developing of a centralised, state-led model. As a result, NGOs were facing funding crises and political pressure which were obstructing their participation in the process. Thus, the study sought to investigate the substance of these trends and how NGOs were responding to them. The study finds that the current policy dynamics underlying the process supports the perception that a centralised, state-led model is developing. At the same time, NGOs are shifting their engagement from emergency work to a development paradigm; they are focusing their activities on rural development and civic awareness; and they are lobbying for the opening of the public space. NGOs believe that they can contribute a unique socio-economic and political capital to the process which neither the public sector nor the private sector can. For this, they argue that the process should be participatory to enable openness and accommodate the contributions of all social actors. However, they believe that the government should play a leading role because of the need to create the infrastructural basis the country lacks to rebuild and develop.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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DECLARATION

The work contained in this document was undertaken in partial fulfilment of a Masters Degree from the School of Development Studies at the University of KwaZulu Natal.

This is to declare that this research is my own work, and has not been used previously in fulfilment of another degree at this University, or any other. Any use of the work of others has been fully noted in the text.

Signed

Date

Zefani Tseke

28 Nov 08
# ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

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<tr>
<td>ACORD</td>
<td>Agency for Co-operation and Research in Development</td>
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<td>ADRA</td>
<td>Action for Rural and Environmental Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>United Nations Consolidated Inter-agency Appeal</td>
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<td>CAPCF</td>
<td>Future Child Club of Friends</td>
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<td>CAPP</td>
<td>China’s African Policy Paper</td>
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<td>CBOs</td>
<td>Community-based organisations</td>
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<td>CONGA</td>
<td>Forum of International Non-governmental organisations</td>
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<td>CS</td>
<td>Civil Society</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DW</td>
<td>Development Workshop</td>
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<td>EC</td>
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<td>European Community Humanitarian Office</td>
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<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>United Nations Economic and Social Development Committee</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>FHI</td>
<td>Family Health International</td>
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<td>FNLA</td>
<td>National Front for the Liberation of Angola</td>
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<td>FONGA</td>
<td>Forum of National Non-governmental organisations</td>
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<td>GoA</td>
<td>Angolan government</td>
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<td>IC</td>
<td>International Community</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>INGOs</td>
<td>International non-governmental organisations</td>
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<td>LNGOs</td>
<td>Local non-governmental organisations</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MPLA</td>
<td>People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>NPA</td>
<td>Norwegian People’s Aid</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation of Economic Development</td>
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<td>OTI</td>
<td>Office and Transition Initiatives</td>
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<td>PRSPs</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers</td>
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<td>SA</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>UK</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Report</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations Human Rights Commission for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States International Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>UTCAH</td>
<td>Technical Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>WSP</td>
<td>The International Peace Academy</td>
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

This study looks at the role of Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in development, with a specific focus on Angola’s post-conflict reconstruction and development process. After independence from Portuguese colonialism in 1975, Angola was immersed in a civil war that lasted for nearly three decades until it finally ended in early 2002. The war had erupted as a direct result of power struggle between the three political movements that led the national liberation struggle (Teka 2006:24). Its end in 2002 came after the death of the leader of the armed opposition movement and the signing of a memorandum of peace between the armed opposition movement and the ruling party.

From 1975 to 1992, when the country underwent its first democratic electoral process, the incumbent party was communist and ruled the country under a one-party regime. During this regime, NGOs were dormant since civil assembly and association were outlawed. Only organisations created by the vanguard party itself were allowed to operate. Such organisations served as instruments of political and ideological mobilisation for the party (Faria 2003). It was not until early 1990s that NGOs and the larger civil society organisation could begin to emerge following the sanctioning of civil activities under the 1991 Association Law, Law 14/91 (Comerford 2006). Although many local NGOs were initially state-linked, they have gradually grown more autonomous and critical of the political status quo. This has not been least influenced by partnerships with donor-agencies and international NGOs (Faria 2003; Hodges 2004:88).

From 1992 to 2002, the country alternated from peace to war as peace agreements were repeatedly violated. During warring times, NGOs acted as humanitarian agents and international assistance was primarily channelled through United Nations humanitarian agencies and international NGOs. Since the end of the war in 2002, the bulk of this assistance has been channelled through the government toward macro reconstruction projects. As a result, the number of international NGOs active in the country is decreasing; local NGOs,

1 People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA).
2 Legislative elections took place for the second time on September 5, 2008. Although the results have given the ruling party an overwhelming victory, the major opposition party, UNITA, has claimed procedural irregularities, and is set to challenge the results in court. Presidential elections are envisaged for 2009.
3 The number of international NGOs decreased from 97 in 2006 to 78 in 2007 (UTCAH 2007).
who have mainly depended on intermediary funding from donors through international NGOs, are facing funding crisis; and the government has used the political legitimacy that it is gradually obtaining from the international community as a leverage against NGO activity in the country (Chatham 2005:10; DWA 2006a).

In this juncture, concern rises about the survival and role of NGOs, as a distinct form of civil society organisation, in the country’s post-conflict reconstruction and development process. Thus, the current study sought to investigate the following main question: what policy response are NGOs, local and international, giving to ensure their relevance in the country’s post-conflict reconstruction and development process? This question aimed to ascertain what value NGO stakeholders believe the sector can contribute to the country’s reconstruction process, whose absence could be an asset cost.

For consideration of the main research question, the following sub-questions were posed:

What theoretical and practical instruments are NGOs pursuing for the sector to survive and lend its contribution to the country’s post-conflict reconstruction and development context?

How do [NGO] stakeholders understand the role/value of NGOs in Angola’s post-conflict reconstruction and development process?

What are the major debates on the issue of centralisation and decentralisation of Angola’s post-conflict reconstruction and development process?

The study is theoretically posed within the broader context of post-conflict politics that emerged after the Cold War. This politics is framed in the Peacebuilding Agenda that the United Nations introduced in 1992. Contrary to the reactive politics of the Cold War, the new agenda posits a proactive approach to conflict. It advocates pre-crisis intervention, peace searching and peacebuilding based on “preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, and peacebuilding” (Boutros-Ghali 1992:np)\(^4\). Respectively, these pillars predicate engagement with existing and potential disputes before they escalate into crisis, halting conflict and preserving peace once it is attained, and preventing recurrence of conflict

\(^4\) The \(np\) symbol is used in the text to indicate that a document is not paginated or that pages are not available.
This engagement has been mediated by a set of political principles, a two-prong diplomatic mechanism and an operational agenda. The political principles involve "fundamental human rights, state sovereignty and integrity, humanity, neutrality and impartiality" (Boutros-Ghali 1992:np). And the diplomatic mechanism refers to international assistance as an instrument of relief and development, and to policy response to the phenomenon of "new wars" which have defined the face of conflict in the post-Cold War era. The priority areas of the operational agenda have been demilitarisation, peace and security, humanitarian assistance, support to displaced peoples, human rights monitoring, democratisation and good governance, infrastructure and economic development. These interventions have been posited as crucial for the advancement of reconciliation, rehabilitation and development (Eric et al 2007:3). In this agenda, NGO activity has found opportune resource, political and structural spaces to evolve by having been co-opted by the United Nations, international institutions and liberal states of the North as complementary partners in the work of reconstruction, peacebuilding and development in post-conflict context (Boutros-Ghali 1992:np; Reimann 2006:46).

The study finds that policy dynamics, national and international policy developments towards Angola, support a centralised, state-led development model. The primacy that NGOs had as welfare and sustainability agents during the conflict period is politically fading out. Instead, the state is being elevated to the leading role in the country's post-conflict reconstruction and development. This is the reason why NGOs, especially local NGOs, are facing funding crises because the bulk of international assistance is by policy now being channelled through the government towards macro development projects. And the government has used the legitimacy it is obtaining from the international community as a political leverage against NGO activity in the country. In response, NGOs believe that they still have a unique socio-economic and political contribution to make in the country's post-conflict reconstruction and development process, which neither the public sector nor the private sector can. For this, NGOs are shifting their engagement from emergency work to a development paradigm; they are focusing most of their activities on rural development and civic awareness; and they are lobbying for the opening of the public space so that every social actor can lend their contribution. However, NGOs are of the view that the public sector should have a leading role in creating the infrastructural basis the country needs to rebuild and develop.
The study has six chapters. Following this introductory chapter, chapters two and three engage with literature on the role that NGOs have played on the international stage and the comparative role they are being assigned in Angola's post-conflict reconstruction process, respectively. Chapter four discusses the methods and methodologies employed in the study, and chapter five engages with fieldwork data. The text ends with a synthesis chapter.
CHAPTER TWO
THE ROLE OF NGOs IN THE PEACEBUILDING AGENDA

2. Introduction

This chapter engages with literature on the role that NGOs have played on the international stage of the Peacebuilding Agenda that was formally introduced by former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali in 1992. This agenda establishes the broader context in which the project of development has been evolving since the end of the Cold War. As such, the review focuses on two aspects. The first is the role NGOs have been assigned on this agenda at international level. The second is the comparative role NGOs are being assigned in the post-conflict reconstruction and development process that Angola has been undergoing since the three decade civil war ended in 2002. This review structure is based on the broader objective of the study which is to identify what specific contribution NGOs can make in Angola’s reconstruction and development. The review looks at the principles on which the Peacebuilding Agenda is built, namely, “human security” and “sovereignty”, and aid as an instrument of relief and development. This is followed by the debate on the “new wars” phenomenon. On the second part, focus is placed on how the different elements of the Peacebuilding Agenda relate to Angola’s reconstruction context.

2.1 The [post-conflict] Peacebuilding Agenda

Formally, the “post-conflict peacebuilding agenda” goes back to An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, Peace-making and Peace-keeping (1992) proposal made by former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros-Ghali. This proposal was a pursuant to the conclusion of the UN Security Council Heads of State and Government level [first time] Summit held on 31 January 1992. The summit had argued that “the absence of war and military states does not itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security” (Macrae 2001:32). Thus, the summit issued a communiqué that called on the UN Secretary-General to issue, for circulation to the UN member states, “an analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the [UN] Charter the capacity of the United Nations for

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5 A subsequent and more detailed paper was formulated in 1995 under the title An Agenda for Development.
preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping” (Boutros-Ghali 1992:np). In *An Agenda for Peace* (1992) proposal, Boutros-Ghali added a fourth concept: *post-conflict peacebuilding*, arguing that all the four concepts are both interconnected and distinct in their individual inputs; that they are interconnected in the purpose of securing peace, yet distinct on how each contributes to the process of securing the peace (Boutros-Ghali 1992:np).

Preventive diplomacy is defined as “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflict” and to limit occurring conflicts from spreading (Boutros-Ghali 1992:np). Peacemaking is defined as action to bring belligerent parties together into conflict resolution space. Peacekeeping is defined as “a technique” to expand possibilities of both conflict prevention and peacemaking. This is to be pursued through UN physical presence in field of conflict by using either UN military, police, personnel or even civilian deployment. And post-conflict peacebuilding is the overall end-goal of all the four concepts. It is defined as the process of preventing “the recurrence of conflict among nations and peoples”. This involves action to identify and establish “support structures” that can consolidate peace and advance welfare (Boutros-Ghali 1992: np, 1994: np). That is how the entire agenda has been generally called “peacebuilding agenda”.

However, the term “post-conflict” has been widely debated. The World Bank (1998) and even the UN Humanitarian Commission for Refugees (UNHCR 1999) have recognised that the term “post-conflict” fails to account for the reality of continued experience of violence beyond formal ceasefires. The UNHCR has remarked,

...it may be inaccurate, even misleading to talk about ‘post-conflict situations’ as such situations do not pass directly from conflict to post-conflict conditions. We shall however retain the term ‘post-conflict’ to indicate those war-torn societies that are undergoing some form of transition towards a more peaceful and stable situation. (UNHCR 1999: xviii)

As the quote indicates, notwithstanding the controversy, the term has been retained “with the caveat that it does not imply absolute peace” (Macrae 2001:42). From political economic and international relations perspectives, critics have argued that there is ambivalence between the concept of post-conflict development and humanitarian relief projects and programmes, as well as a militancy between “neoliberal and more interventionist visions of development in general” (Moore 2007a:388). Concerning the first claim, it is observed that the claimed “post-conflict era” is not devoid of conflict. And despite the recognition that continuing conflicts
being experienced in certain contexts may demonstrate considerably “apolitical tendencies” (Moore 2007a:388), critics argue that the “post-conflict” concept could be a strategy to excuse main development agencies and rich nations for reducing their assistance to complex emergency situations in the Third World. Notwithstanding the risk that protracted assistance may feed into the dependency syndrome, critics argue that pulling out assistance in the face of critical needs does not produce better outcome either since life remains challenged during the transitional phase from conflict to post-conflict (Cohen and Anderson 1999; Moore 2007a). Concerning the claim of militancy between neoliberal and more interventionist visions of development, it has been argued that the “post-conflict” concept supports the status quo of structural adjustment policies, which are now designed as poverty strategy papers, “instead of the supposed dependency-inducing tendencies of welfarist humanitarian assistance” (Moore 2007a:391, see also Edkins 1996). In this light, Moore (2007a:397) argues that the debate being raised here is not about choice between relief and development, but about the kind of development that can best be pursued in the Third World. Like other critics, Moore (2007a:397) argues that the “post-conflict” concept contributes to a capitalistic development approach that proves to be unsuitable for recovery in the transitional phase from conflict to post-conflict. Moreover, such an approach remains ideologically ambivalent as long as the humanitarian relief agenda is extant (Moore 2007a:397). Thus, two prominent terms, believed to better describe the vision captured by the UN’s proposal, have been used as alternatives to the “post-conflict” term. The UN Research Institute for Social Development has used the term “war-torn societies” instead of “post-conflict situations” and others have suggested the term “complex political emergencies” (Macrae 1998; Moore 2007b). Some authors suggest that despite ambiguities and complexes involved, the term “post-conflict” is still applicable to some situations in Africa (Duffield 1999; Chabal and Daloz 1999). Given its hegemonic source, however, the term “post-conflict” has prevailed even in critical literature, although mostly employed in descriptive terms rather than as an endorsement.

The post-conflict peacebuilding agenda, as articulated by the UN, recognises the end of the Cold War as an opportunity for ideological shift from reactive and adversarial politics to proactive and globally constructive politics. It also recognises the shift that occurred from the interstate nature of conflict during the Cold War to the intrastate nature of conflict in the post-Cold War era. In terms of principle, the peacebuilding agenda was built on the notions of “fundamental human rights”, “state sovereignty and integrity”, and on the principles of “humanity, neutrality and impartiality” which were ratified by the General Assembly
resolution 46/182 of December 1991 (Boutros-Ghali 1992: np). Following these premises, new approaches have emerged in foreign policy and international relations agendas, in the aid system, and in development praxis generally. These various topics are surveyed ahead. Operationally, the agenda for peace includes the elements of demilitarisation, peace and security, humanitarian assistance, support to displaced peoples, human rights monitoring, democratisation and good governance, infrastructure and economic development (Boutros-Ghali 1992: np; Reimann 2006: 46).

Because of convenience and relevance, the notions of "humanity, neutrality and impartiality" are explored ahead under the review of the aid system and the theme of "new wars", while the notions of "human security (or fundamental human rights)" and "state sovereignty and integrity" are separately considered next.

2.1.1 Human Security

*An Agenda for Peace* (1992) was announced in an optimistic time characterised by a relative success of a first round of peace agreements that followed the end of the Cold War, such as in Angola 1991, Cambodia 1991, Nicaragua 1991, El Salvador 1992, Mozambique 1992 (Pearce 2005). This announcement has been considered the first phase of the peacebuilding agenda (Pearce 2005; Shannon 2004: 38). Macrae (2001: 32) and Pearce (2005) posit that the UN was seeking for a new role in the global stage, which, in *An Agenda for Peace*, it commendably articulated as the pursuit of global peace.

Initially, the term "human security" did not *per se* feature in UN policy documents until its mainstreaming into all UN agencies and activities following the UN reforms begun in 1997 (Shannon 2004: 38). However, the meaning that it came to embody from the mid-1990s had already been essentially captured in *An Agenda for Peace* proposal. It was captured in the notion of fundamental human rights as the centre of the agenda and work of peace in the world, and in the interconnection made between the political, economic, social and environmental aspects of development. This interconnection and its success were posited as necessary structural basis for meeting fundamental human rights of people. The 1992 version of *An Agenda for Peace* stated, "The sources of conflict and war are pervasive and deep. To

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6 In 1997, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced a "comprehensive reform agenda that included a review of programming tools used by the UN system" (UNDAF 2005/2008: 6).
reach them will require our utmost effort to enhance respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to promote sustainable economic and social development for wider prosperity, to alleviate distress and to curtail the existence and use of massively destructive weapons”. This framework is reaffirmed and elaborated in the 1995 *An Agenda for Development* which reinforced the idea of global sharing of the benefits of economic liberalization and growth “among all countries and peoples” (Boutros-Ghali 1995:np).

Subsequently, global compacts began to adjust their activities to this vision. This conceptual evolution was not least marked by the 1993 Vienna Declaration on Human Rights which linked human rights with development, democracy, environmental responsibility and peace. It saw all these factors as “interrelated and interdependent” and as part and parcel of individual rights (Shannon 2004:37-38). The 1994 UNDP Human Development Report interpreted the concept of peacebuilding as a component of “human security” which it defined as people’s ability to choose a future they want and to secure a livelihood. This understanding delineated a conceptual shift from the state and military senses of security to the security of individual human person even within the boundaries of a nation state. This understanding has also been markedly propounded by the *Canadian School* in Canada. Axworthy (1997) argues that human security involves economic security, decent living, guarantee of fundamental human rights and physical safety. Individual access to these life conditions should be the measure of global security. He posits that although state security may remain an important condition for people’s security, this security has increasingly proved insufficient to guarantee people’s security since the end of the Cold War. In fact, the security of many citizens has been threatened instead of protected by their states (Axworthy 1997, 2001, 2004). For example, minority Muslims in India, Tamils in Sri Lanka, Kosovards in Serbia, Kurds in Turkey, and Tutsis in Rwanda were targets of “structural violence”, meaning insecurity perpetrated by ruling people groups within sovereign state borders (Swan 1995:41).

Notwithstanding the consensus that human security should be primarily people-centred rather than state-centred, the definition of what it involves has been debatable. One camp posits a narrower definition of human security as a set of essentials that can put a person’s life at high risk, including “poverty, health, education, and civic and political freedoms”. Because a narrow definition, it is argued, makes causal analysis more feasible and can provide better guide for policy-making (King and Murray 2000; Krause 2004; Mack 2004; Macfarlane
In response, the other camp posits that concern should not be primarily about workable definition, but rather about the reality that even such security essentials are also to be interpreted in terms of security as people-centred rather than as outside notions that can determine the content of [human] security. As such, the definition toolkit also expands since the concern is no longer threats alone but also society’s ability to counter such threats (Alkire 2004; Axworthy 2004; Bajpai 2004; Hampson 2004; Thakur 2004; Winslow and Eriksen 2004).

At donor level, the European Union (EU), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) pushed their policy guidelines and practice “further into the world and work of development” (Shannon 2004:35). From a high level meeting of the DAC held in May 1995 emerged the *DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation on the Threshold of the 21st Century*. This document premises the achievement of “structural stability” as the goal of development cooperation. That is, there is to be “coherence between aid and foreign and defence policies” (Macrae 2001:33). In 1996, the European Commission issued a communiqué to the European Council of Ministers and the European Parliament under the title *Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development*. Similar to the UN proposal, this document advocated for the concept of “structural stability” i.e. “sustainable economic development, democracy, respect for human rights, viable political structures and health, social and environmental conditions” as a bridging link between European trade, aid and security policy (EC 1996:np; see also EC 2001:13-22). Macrae (2001:33) observes that this document was a contribution toward a common European Union foreign and security policy following the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1994. This link and its implications are further explored in the sections 2.2, 2.4, 2.5 ahead.

### 2.1.2 State Sovereignty and Integrity

Concurrent with the notion of human security is the notion of “state sovereignty and integrity”. *An Agenda for Peace* (1992) posits state sovereignty and integrity “as the fundamental entity of the international community...the foundation-stone of this work [of
peace] is and must remain the State. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international progress”. However, it also clearly notes that “the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty...has passed; its theory was never matched by reality...it is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world” (Boutros-Ghali 1992:np).

Two elements are central in the above quote: sovereignty and standard of governance as bases for international relations and global peace and security. The element of state sovereignty bears continuity from the Cold War regime during which it was promoted by both the capitalist and communist blocs who courted sovereign states for alignment with their respective ideological positions and development models, and in this way direct military confrontation between the two superpowers was also avoided (Macrae 2001:8). However, it has been argued that the origin of the policy of unconditional sovereignty and integrity is not only the Cold War regime despite the geopolitical benefits that the two superpowers obtained from it. It also derives from decolonisation politics. This politics held a homogeneous, Western model of statehood which predicated as sovereign a state with control over a delimited territorial space and with the purpose and ability to garner and redistribute resources for the public good (Jackson 1990:12; Clapham 1996:5). However, in the post-Cold War development agenda, the principle of state sovereignty is no longer unconditional. Instead, it becomes conditioned upon the standard of “good governance”. It is in view of this fundamental ideological line that the proposal for greater democratisation and larger development assistance is posited and understood in An Agenda for Peace (1992). While wealthier member states and international institutions are particularly persuaded to contribute more to the rising needs of the world, recipient states are advised to pursue good governance, to safeguard civil, human, social and political rights within their sovereign borders through more liberalised and democratic politics and practice (Boutros-Ghali 1992:np). This element of state sovereignty is further considered in the review of aid politics below.

*Italicics is my emphasis*
2.2 International Assistance and the Peacebuilding Agenda

Aid has been an integral part of international relations and political economy since the end of the Second World War. From 1940s to 1970s, aid transfer from North to South was premised on the principle of sovereignty and the vision of development (Jackson 1990; Macrae 2001). As observed in the previous section, the principle of sovereignty is posited to have drawn, on the one hand, on decolonisation politics since the Western model of statehood was also assumed for the newly independent states of the South (Jackson 1990; Clapham 1996). On the other hand, the notion of sovereignty was also largely influenced by geopolitical interests of the superpowers during the Cold War. Both the capitalist and communist blocs engaged in aid projects (Macrae 2001:12). Importantly, the sovereignty principle implies that an aid recipient state-government was assumed to be benign, holder of “juridical and empirical” power and capacity to adequately manage and distribute aid resources (Macrae 2001:4).

In turn, despite the rivalry of socialism from the soviet bloc, modernisation theory, which was prominent in the capitalist bloc, arguably dominated the development rationale of aid among the capitalists. Aid was viewed as a means to advance progress by compensating the victims of the evolutionary process of development through “transfer of public resources from the rich countries of Western Europe and North America to the Third World” (Macrae 2001:12; see also Larrain 1989). This rationale was not only economistic in that it was viewed as the best way to advance global progress, but also politically expedient in terms of relations between North and South (Jackson 1990; Macrae 2001). On this account, the real purpose of aid during the mentioned period is said to have been “palliative” i.e. one of appeasing poorer Third World states from succumbing to the flatteries of socialism, as well as to alleviate “humanitarian crises associated with contemporary [proxy] wars” (Macrae 2001:2).

Between 1970s-1980s, the aid system obtained some significant changes, although maintaining a centrally humanitarian and relief purpose. According to Macrae (2001:4), it began to be adjusted to respond to the reality of “quasi-statehood”. The latter is a state theory propounded initially by Jackson (1990) and then furthered by Clapham (1996). They posit as “quasi” the Third World states that lack “juridical and empirical” powers i.e. legitimacy and tangible territorial control to replicate the functions that their Western prototypes exert. Thus, aid channelling from North to South obtained two new aspects. One was the Structural Adjustment Programmes, also called “redistribution with growth and basic needs approach”,

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whose policy objective was human development and creation of “an enabling environment for economic growth through a series of economic policy reforms” (Macrae 2001:14). The addition of this aspect to the aid system was arguably motivated by the twin factors of the declining intensity of the Cold War and the economic crisis of the 1970s that severely affected most of the developing countries’ economies. In terms of policy, governments were advised to cut-down on basic services and infrastructure expenditures and to pursue privatisation (Duffield 1991; Streeten 1981), while NGOs were promoted as primary agents of humanitarian and relief intervention over the state. Multilateral assistance and a bulk of bilateral assistance began to be channelled through NGOs for humanitarian relief (Commins 2000:71; Hillhorst 2003:218). This development agency issue is explored ahead in the review of the role of NGOs in the development agenda.

With the end of the Cold War and the launch of the Agenda for Peace in 1992, aid obtained a new dimension as an instrument of international relations and development. Besides the humanitarian and relief object, the Agenda for Peace also proposed aid as a useful instrument in the prevention and resolution of intrastate conflict and in advancing global development (Boutros-Ghali 1992, 1994; Macrae 2001:2). Its dispensation, however, was conditioned upon the practice of democratic politics and alignment with the principle of flexible sovereignty as measured by the standard of good governance (Boutros-Ghali 1992). This means that aid can and should seek to fulfil simultaneously both a relief and a developmental function, hence the notion of “relief-development continuum”. Moreover, the peace proposal also means that in order to access international aid, aid receiving states have to prove themselves worthy by demonstrating good [democratic] governance. This implies that the international community could, without consent from local sovereign authorities, directly intervene in a country for a just cause i.e. when there is evidence of “extensive violation of human rights” (Macrae 2001:2). This is exemplified in sanctions that the international community emitted against Iraq and Serbia in the early 1990s; the international peace enforcement in Bosnia Herzegovina after 1994 and in Sierra Leone after 1996; the international humanitarian war fought by NATO in Kosovo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999. All these international community interventions, with exception of Iraq, responded to conflicts within sovereign states borders (Macrae 2001:2).

But this new aid paradigm has not obtained absolute consensus. Three major critiques have been made on its viability and purpose, points that were briefly mentioned in the previous
section on state sovereignty. Macrae (2001:4) contends that the additional element of development assumes that the problem of quasi-statehood still being experienced in most aid receiving countries has been resolved; that unless this problem is adequately addressed, development aid can only exacerbate existing conflicts instead of assisting to resolve them, and any possible impact it could have on sustainable development would be undermined. This is because a weak [local] state just cannot provide “the legal, institutional and operational tools” that development aid needs in order to engage effectively (ibid p.4-6). In the same vein, Moore, (cited in Macrae 2001:6), argues that the neoliberal paradigm in which development aid is framed actually militates against the strong, empirical state expectation that aid agencies need in order to operate since this paradigm promotes state minimalism. In reaction to the 1997 World Bank Development Report which saw cooperation with post-conflict weak states as necessary in sustainable development efforts, he argues that the World Bank’s analysis still remains inadequate. It simply revisits the same pragmatism of decolonisation politics without concretely reflecting on how aid can contribute to the international legitimacy of fragile states (ibid). In a critique of the analysis by Jackson (1990) which traces the origins of quasi-statehood to decolonisation politics, Inayatullah and Blaney (1995) argue that the failures of new states to obtain empirical legitimacy are not only due to internal factors as suggested by Jackson. Rather, such failures have also been caused by the global political economic structure which has sustained Third World poverty and dependency. This is because poverty of itself is a major cause of state fragility.

A second critique posits that while relief aid has been traditionally conceived as politically neutral, development aid is in fact necessarily partisan because it raises the conditionality bar from the previous premise of unconditional state sovereignty to the current premise of democratic satisfaction. This factor gives donor countries and agencies political leverage to decide what institutional changes need or need not be made as a condition for aid access (Macrae and Leader 2000; Macrae 2001). Lastly, there is the critique of diminishing aid package. It is argued that this is being motivated by the increasing emphasis within development discourse on notions such as “self-reliance, sustainability of assistance, and partnership”, especially in conflict situations, as opposed to dependency and from the need for capital and savings (Macrae 2001:40). This is because the cause(s) of conflict is being

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9 This policy line is also now being championed by the United States through its “fragile state” policy in the channelling of its bilateral development aid through USAID to countries needing post-conflict reconstruction and development assistance.
increasingly ascribed to internal and psycho-social factors, hence the dominating emphasis on internal and personal change as a solution (especially in conflict resolution manuals) rather than on transfer of resources (Adelman 1996; Duffield 1997; Macrae 2001). In the new development aid context, therefore, recipient countries are being persuaded to become partners with donor countries and agencies in the implementation of neoliberal economics and democratic political reforms (Stiglitz 1998; Wolfensohn 1999). This discussion is further pursued in the review of the so-called “new wars” below.

2.3. “New Wars” and the Peacebuilding Agenda

The concept of “new wars” emerged in the mid-1990s. It was employed to capture the reality of violent conflicts that have erupted in the post-Cold War era. It is observed that most of these wars have occurred in the South, although they are a global phenomenon. They have been experienced in direct geographical incidences of violence and through interlinkages between global politics and economy and the effects and factors of such conflicts (Ballentine and Sherman 2003:8-9). Kaldor (1999:7, 199) posits that the new wars are “local, global, national and transnational”. This geographical transcendence is permeated by aid, bilateral relations between nation states, liberalising trade and the black market in which conflicting parties are trading agents, the role of international institutions, global security, and the global effects of people displacement and refugees (Kaldor 1999:199). Ballentine and Sherman (2003:8-9) remark that both “the supply and demand sides of war-making have become more internationalised” as warring agents have tended to exploit the opportunities of international free markets to trade in lucrative natural resources for war equipments and financing.

Generally, the direct incidence of the new wars has been observed to be mostly “intrastate” rather than “interstate” or conventional. Shannon (2004:35) informs us that about 90% of conflict occurrence between the 1990s and early 2000s was within states. Sirvard (1993) observes that although this unconventional form of warfare has existed since the end of Second World War, this was not a frontline development issue during the period 1945-1992, even though the peak of war mortality was in the 1950s and not in the 1990s. In the 1990s, the new wars became a major development issue not least because of their mainstream conceptualisation as being a result of “processes of maldevelopment”, which poses a threat to international security (Macrae 2001:38). This thesis is particularly associated with Kaplan (1994) who argued that West African and Yugoslav wars were a matter of “loose molecules”;

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that these societies failed to respond positively to the experience of demographic diversity and modernisation. Thus they succumbed to anarchy i.e. “new barbarism” (Cramer 2002:1848). Kaldor (1999:8-9) posited that the collapse of the soviet bloc in the 1990s brought about “political, social and economic uncertainty” for many former satellite states and proxy agents. This opportunistic environment “opened a field for internal political aspirations, individuals and groups emerged eager to establish new systems and structures”. However, these processes lacked foundational principles that could shape “a better future society”. Instead, appeal is made to identity and subgroup support within a society. As such, the new wars are “not a progressive but a retrograde phenomenon” (Kaldor 1999:9).

This mainstream thinking has not gone unchallenged. Many authors have interpreted the new wars phenomenon more positively as a necessary process of “social transformation” (Duffield 2002:1053). Cramer (2002:1849) argues that one blurred reality underlying the new wars is “powerful material interests” of international actors in geographical incidences of conflict; that this factor was neglected by ideological explanations for conflicts in Africa, Asia and the Middle East during the Cold War period. And this factor was also sidelined by “naive explanations” for these wars, namely, “primordial ethnic antipathies” between belligerents. He concludes that the new wars cannot be analysed without considering the power factor. That is, many incidences of conflict have been stirred by struggle to end “hierarchy” i.e. “regime change” toward more accommodating politics and societal organisation. And this has been a particular experience in post-colonial and post-Cold War contexts where external pressures for democratisation have been exerted. Thus, although grievance for “end of hierarchy” may not be sufficient to cause conflict, it nevertheless opens up opportunistic environment for “desperate conflict over position, power, wealth, voice, survival” (Cramer 2002:1857). Duffield (2002:1051) argues that the new wars are a “resistance” to global liberal governance that is being promoted through elitist politico-economic reforms across the world. As such, rather than “social regression”, the new wars may signify a process toward alternative societal organisations to westernisation. This insinuation is echoed in Macrae’s (2001:39) argument that the violence of the new wars is not being “orchestrated by the poor only and primarily”, but by political elites in order “to maintain power through control over means of production”. Therefore, in order to resolve the conflicts, it is not enough to seek to compensate the losers of development. It is also necessary to confront those who have benefited from development (Macrae 2001:39).
Critics posit as the primary fallacy of the mainstream thinking the neoclassical economics framework. Based on the premise of methodological individualism and the logic of optimum choice, neoclassical war economists and scholars have studied the cause of the violent conflicts in the frame of "greed vs. grievance" (Ballentine and Sherman 2003:6). *Homo Economicus* has explained [all] the situations and motivations for the new wars through its "greed theory", positing that greed, rather than grievance for justice or change for the better, undergirds the new wars (Azam 2001; Grossman 1991; Hirshleifer 1994). Keen (2000:26) posits that many combatants see more to war than winning, because they exploit conflict situation to accumulate crude resources, and this economic rationale motivates such war agents irrespective of cumulative consequences their actions may bear on collective society.

Collier (2000:14), who headed a World Bank research team that undertook a series of quantitative statistical analyses to determine what variables were most salient to the risk of violent conflict for all the civil wars since 1965 to late 1990s, reported that "ethnic heterogeneity, level of political rights, economic mismanagement and regime change type" have no statistical bearing on the incidence of civil war. Rather, the real factors are economic, especially in resource rich countries. Later, Collier and Hoeffer (2001:3-7) propounded the "greed theory" in terms of opportunity for organised violence. They posited that easy acquisition of war funds through access to lucrative natural resources, to diaspora networks and redundant and uneducated youth make war feasible regardless of grievance. Vlassenroot and Romkema (2002) have posited that "stakeholder analysis", structural strategies for resource management, and equitable economic governance make adequate responses in efforts to curb violent conflicts. These propositions are based on the deduction that violent conflicts involve beneficiary actors. Thus, to curb violence, the bounty hunters in a conflict are to be identified, and resource reserves and trading are to be structurally monitored at both local and international levels (ibid). As Cramer (2002:1847) observes, some *Homo Economicus* authors have also formulated the "greed theory" in terms of the trade-off between the risk of war and the pay-off of war. They argue that although conflict is dangerous, war agents would choose war if they judged that the pay-off of a war outweighed its calculated risk (see also Azam 2001; Grossman 1991; Neary 1997).

The counterargument is that the *Homo Economicus*’ "greed vs. grievance" framework is narrow and reductionist. Secondly, it is argued that its econometrics is unable to adequately capture the sociology of conflict, which is the primary factor that informs all other dynamics that may fuel a conflict. While acknowledging the relevance of the economic factor to the
risk of conflict, critics of the “greed theory” argue that it still remains contentious as to how this factor levels up with other risk factors like politics, culture, strategic factors of conflict making, conflict duration, and the character of intrastate conflicts (Ballentine and Sherman 2003; Cramer 2002). Ballentine and Sherman (2003:6) argue that the “greed vs. grievance” analytical framework imposes “an unnecessarily limiting dichotomy on what is, in reality, a highly diverse, complex set of incentives and opportunity structures that vary across time and location”. They further argue that because this theory is a product of quantitative statistical analyses, its propositions are necessarily “probabilistic” in terms of both motive and opportunity for violent conflict; that while statistical methods may be useful to identify key variables across a class of cases, at best they only generate broad correlations that illuminate only part of the picture. They do not clarify “whether and how economic factors promote or sustain particular armed conflicts”. They argue that to make such correlation requires deeper and case specific empirical analyses comparing the applicability of the economic factor with other factors (ibid p.5). Some authors argue that the dynamics of conflict are highly “fluid”; that motives and factors undergirding a conflict change and diversify the longer the conflict lasts. This is identified to be the case with national liberation struggles which are said to generate new grievances and incentives for predation as a result of protracted violence (Sandole 1999; Stewart 2002). Other authors argue that the reality of “weak and failing state” is another cause of violent conflicts (Ballentine and Sherman 2003:10). A state affected by poor economic governance, large informal economy, weak army and incomplete control of territory is posited to be more prone to the experience of rebellion, because the cost of insurgency would be lower, and would-be challengers would see greater prospects of a relatively rapid victory, combined with their easy access to income-generating resources and capacities. Thus, weak state, rather than the physical presence of lootable resources, would be a more direct factor behind a resource driven rebellion (Herbst 2000). Cramer (2002:1854) argues that in the greed theory “the encounter between methodological individualism and rational choice is fraught” because the rational choice is ultimately a “myth”. Although choice and economic incentives may have relevance to incidence of conflict, such factors would have been primarily moulded by “specific conditions and social and historical features of change”. And Homo Economicus has failed to relate to and properly engage these realities in its conceptual framework (ibid p.1854, 1857).

In terms of the post-conflict peacebuilding project, two debates are most relevant to the issue of new wars. The first concerns the role and impact of aid in context of conflict. According to
An Agenda for Peace proposal, aid can and should also play a developmental role in addition to the humanitarian purpose that it has served, particularly in conflict prevention and resolution (Boutros-Ghali 1992, 1995; Macrae 2001:2). In this, the most pertinent question has been the nature of aid impact on civil conflicts. The most influential work in this debate is Mary Anderson’s Do No Harm (1999). In this work she argues that aid given in context of conflict involves collateral consequences from the purposes of both relief and conflict resolution. First, aid does not only affect a conflict situation, but it is itself also affected by the situation (Anderson 1999:37). The main reasons behind this are the realities that aid resources are often stolen by combatants who use it to support their wars by buying weapons with them or with revenues derived from them, and by using them to provide logistics for their armies (ibid p.38). Aid can also support either “war economy” or “peace economy” because it often serves as a supply source to markets in conflict zones. When such markets are used by needy and victim populations, they can be said to serve peace economy. But if and when they are [also] used by war agents, it can conversely be said that they serve war economy (ibid). Aid affects intergroup relationships. It can feed “tensions” under the experience of discriminatory dispensation, while contributing to connectivity under the experience of equitable dispensation (ibid). Aid can contribute to conflict when it meets needs of civilians who may be partisans of conflict; and aid can legitimate an agenda of conflict when it is channelled to war belligerents (ibid p.39). Second, aid administered in context of conflict can become a source of livelihood for skilled and professional aid workers, most of whom happen to be expatriates, who obtain their wages from it (ibid p.14). Third, aid is also entangled in implicit ethical dilemmas. This is detectable in varied aspects of aid enterprise: when arms are used to protect aid transporting convoy; in perceived inequalities when expatriate aid workers are given preferential treatment over local aid workers. For example, in crisis situations the safety of expatriate workers has taken precedence over that of local aid workers; and the reality of “competition, disrespect or mistrust” among aid agencies (ibid p.59).

In the light of these critical issues involved in the practice of aid politics, Anderson posited her seminal notion of “do not harm” i.e. since the purpose of aid is “to save lives, reduce human suffering, and support the pursuit of greater economic and social security in conflict settings”, aid should therefore be employed in a manner that “it does not cause harm” (ibid p.67). This means that aid should be kept from practice, economic and political factors that may fuel or contribute to conflict. This can be done by obtaining proper understanding of a
conflict context, keeping aid from becoming a source of logistical support for belligerents and partisans. Instead, aid should only serve needy and victim populations and be utilised to enforce peace efforts (ibid p.59-67).

While the theoretical contribution of *Do not harm* is clear, its practical impact has been questioned. Pearce (2005:45) observes that although it was initially a critique directed at the aid work of Western agencies, *Do not harm* “grew into a more wholesale attack on the global humanitarian agenda of the post-conflict Cold War”. Shannon (2004:36-37) posits that the *Do not harm* debate “served to highlight the need for more systematic attention to the impact of aid on conflict”; that this debate gave birth to the Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) framework in the area of conflict resolution. This framework advocates a deeper exploration of the relationship between local conflicts and the delivery of development and humanitarian assistance. As such, the PCIA invites an active involvement of NGOs in the conflict resolution discourse which until the end of the Cold War was a reserve of political scientists and economists, while lawyers, diplomats and politicians shared the task of human rights work (ibid). Through the Human Rights Declaration that emerged out of the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, the PCIA was used to elevate a “rights based approach” to the centre of the development agenda and work (ibid). Shannon (2004:36) posits that besides the PCIA, the *Do not harm* debate also prompted the emergence of major policy documents that went beyond impact assessment to setting out methodologies for assessing the impact of an agency’s work on conflict.

On the other hand, some authors have argued that the impact of *Do not harm* has been limited to evaluation, strategic, methodological, monitoring, planning, programming tools; that although such tools may be useful for purposes of short-term and long-term review of programmes, crises, sector management, and for project planning and participatory projects planning, the debate has failed to produce paradigmatic shift at the broader level of aid politics and thinking. Terlinden (2002) argues that this failure is evidenced in the lack of adjustment in the mandate or core aims of the work of NGOs. Such an adjustment or change would require a considerable expansion of NGO work in conflict prevention beyond mere project based activities and perception of violent conflict (ibid). Hardt, (cited in Shannon 2004:37), argues that “do not harm has failed to develop a broader political perspective, looking at the use of aid for promoting broader foreign policy, economic, cultural or military objectives by actors in both donor and recipient countries”.

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Another relevant debate between peacebuilding project and new wars concerns the effectiveness of the agenda for peace itself. Pearce (2005:44) observes that concern over the varied impact of aid on conflicts has divided the critics of the global peacebuilding agenda, especially regarding the just cause intervention issue. While some have advocated intervention as a way of preventing genocide, others have feared "the consequences of legitimised international violations of national sovereignty". Others support intervention by the UN, although not unilaterally (Pearce 2005:44). Pearce (2005:44) posits that since no consensus could be built before on whether or not to establish "legitimate forms of humanitarian intervention", the debate has been made harder by the contentious 2003 Iraq intervention of the occidental coalition led by the US. Thus, Pearce (2005:45) argues, the 9/11 event of 2001 and the 2003 Iraq intervention set a new international context that challenges the 1992 peacebuilding agenda launched by the UN Secretary-General. This is because while the latter project has struggled to build "the foundations for global peace", the synchrony between the former events raises new questions regarding the global peace agenda (ibid). Pearce’s assertion has been widely echoed and poses a concrete critique of An Agenda for Peace vision and the prospects of its outcome. This critique is further explored in the conclusion of this first part of the literature review.

2.4 NGOs as instruments of [international] development

The rise of NGOs in the international development scene has been generally traced back to the 19th century non-profit based movements that lobbied on issues ranging from the plight of slaves and slavery itself, women’s suffrage, international law, and human rights issues (Fischer 2006:4; Fitzduff 2004:3). This first NGO generation was marked by the formation of non-profit organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1864, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) in 1917, Save the Children Fund in 1917, Oxfam in 1942, who “saw themselves as primarily service oriented, dedicated to addressing the consequences of war on the victims” (Fitzduff 2004:4). The second generation came after WWII. Contrary to the previous generation, the work of this generation took a less political line. It focused more on humanitarian work, dealing with “scarcity problems previously handled by missionary societies” (Fitzduff 2004:4). Some of such organisations include the Salvation Army, the YMCA, and CARE (Fitzduff 2006:4).
From a longitudinal literary study analysing the operational and strategic aspects of NGO work for half a century since 1950s, Hailey (1999:468) found significant changes over time. He deduces four periodical shifts in the role of NGOs. From the colonial period 1950-1970s, NGO activity was based on a “public-private” framework in which NGOs operated as “welfare, humanitarian organisations”\(^{10}\) (ibid). In this period, thinking revolved around the need to create co-operation between government and community as a strategy to support the work of development since development was conceived as a “corporate task” (Schumacher and McRobie, cited in Hailey 1999:472-3). This early engagement framework is affirmed by most of the literature that has engaged with the work of NGOs in this period (see Fischer 2006; Fitzduff 2004; Richmond 2005). This corporate responsibility rationale seems to correspond with the notion of “compensation” that was propounded by champions of modernisation theory; that assistance to victims of modernisation would buffer the potential of discontentment and revolutionary chaos (Larrain 1989; Macrae 2001) (see section 2.3, p. 9). Although Korten’s (1990) critique of the level of development engagement in the colonial period may be strategically valid in that it highlights its limitations for change at structural and political levels and for sustainable development, it nevertheless confirms it. In his four stages, generational scheme of development engagement, Korten observes that the first stage, under which the colonial period falls, was confined to “relief and welfare” activity. This involved “relief efforts, feeding programs, hospital-based or dispensary-based curative care”, among others. Thus the problem being tackled was basic resource “shortage”, whose timeframe was “immediate” and short-term, the “scope” was “individual and family”, and NGOs were the “chief actors” operating as “logistics” managers (ibid p.117).

In the period 1970s-1980s, NGOs assumed a more independent, community oriented work. They tended to distance themselves from state designed development programmes toward programmes that were more rural and community integrated. In this phase, NGOs took a more critical perspective “on the role and status of co-operatives” and obtained a greater awareness of the potential of voluntary organisations and NGOs in development (Hailey 1999:473). Fitzduff (2004:4) remarks that in this period NGOs “adopted a more confrontational approach to the occurrence of war and other ills of the world. After long and difficult debate they decided they had to address not only the ravages of famines and war, but

\(^{10}\) Hailey (1999:468) remarks that generally “colonial authorities actively promoted voluntary organisations and community-based institutions, whereas more progressive authorities even cooperated with indigenous NGOs, self-help groups, village organisations and local co-operatives”.
also their causes through advocacy, campaigning, or lobbying” (ibid). In the following period of 1980s and 1990s, “the decade of structural adjustment programmes, privatisation and decentralisation, NGOs came full circle as they resumed a more public-private partnership term of engagement” which they had pursued in the colonial period of 1950-1970 (Hailey 1999:468). They took a more centralised role of “resource provider”. They became key channels for international aid, took up a complementing role in public service delivery alongside the state, they became prominent actors in the work of social change, in the mobilisation of local resources and in the empowerment of local communities (Hailey 1999:475). However, whereas the “public-private partnership” between local colonial authorities and NGOs was cordial, the relationship between independent state-governments and NGOs seem to have been more politically antagonistic. This is because in the colonial period, NGO work was conceived as complementary to public agenda, whereas in the period 1980s-1990s NGO work was conceived as opposite of failing public enterprise. This new state-NGO relationship has been associated with neoliberalism. The neoliberal label has been widely used to describe the mainstream policy-making paradigm. Neoliberalism promotes a free market and growth oriented economics. This theory has been generally promoted by mainstream policy technocrats and thinkers and by leading international institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, various multilateral aid agencies and donors, and by the major capitalist states of the North (Fowler 2000:64; Kamat 2003:70). In this framework, NGOs are generally viewed as “apolitical, operational instruments” able to do and supplement what incompetent and venal governments in the developing world are unable to do for the advancement of the vision of economic development, democratisation and human rights (Fowler 2000: vii; Howell 2002: 117). In the period 1980-1990s, this agenda was launched in response to mounting economic crises, rising incidences of poverty and the grave social morbidities caused by politico-military conflicts and instabilities and by natural disasters that were affecting developing countries in particular (Commins 2000:71; Hillhorst 2003:218).

Hailey (1999:468, 478) argues that from 1990s onward, NGOs’ strategic and operational status is more ambivalent. While they have grown as major players in the development work, they are exhibiting both a mainstream position and a leftist, community oriented stance. The former position refers to the fact that they have continued to be key aid channels and because of the international observer status they now have in the UN and in the international development work. On the other hand, their leftist position is seen in the diversifying NGO sector which includes labels such as “voluntary, self-help, community development, private
voluntary organisations, non-profit organisations". Work being done by these diverse types of NGOs ranges from isolated missions to "sophisticated programmes of mainstream development" (Hailey 1999:469, 478). While Hailey's assessment is echoed all across the board, it fails to clearly name the current frame of the debate between the neoliberal agenda and more social development discourses. In the context of the peacebuilding agenda, NGOs have found resource opportunity and political and structural spaces that have been catalysts in expanding their relations (initially facilitated by the policy environment of the 1980s) with international, multilateral and governmental agencies and with the private sector. Through such relations, the status of NGOs' agency on the international development stage has been boosted (Reimann 2006:46).

On the UN's *An Agenda for Peace* (1992) and *An Agenda for Development* (1995) proposals, NGOs were welcomed as capable and viable partners in the work of peacebuilding, reconstruction and development in post-conflict context. This invitation has been extended by international institutions and liberal states of the North (Reimann 2006:46; Eric et al 2007:3). Reimann (2006:45) has identified this platform as "top-down pro-NGO international norm". He contrasts this view to the views that the expansion and ascendance of NGOs onto the international stage are due to "bottom-up sociological, technological forces" and the reality of state weakness (ibid). Respectively, sociological forces allude to popular reactions to socio-economic factors such as democracy, development, education levels (Kaldor 2003), and technological forces and state weakness refer to realities of revolution in information and telecommunication technology, globalising activism, and the declining state (Richmond 2005). Reimann's insight can be observed in the policy and in the structural integration of NGOs with international institutions, aid agencies, intergovernmental organisations and individual governments, especially liberal states of the North. For example, the UN-NGO "Arria Formula" relationship (Fitzduff 2004:6)11 signified by the establishment of the NGO Working Group of the UN Security Council in 1995 with the aim of enabling an "off-the-record dialogue" between NGO agents and council members (about 30) "to share perspectives on issues of conflict around the world" (Fitzduff 2004:5). It is reported that

11 The "Arria Formula" is a strategy of greater direct interaction between the UN and [grassroots] social agents and agencies. It was developed and named after Diego Arria - a UN Security Council Ambassador from Venezuela to the Balkans – in 1993. On the occasion of a Security Council members' visit to the Balkans, Arria made the consultation more open and informal by including coffee drinking and the participation of a Bosnian priest to express local, firsthand experience. Learning from that experience, UN consultations with governments and NGOs were framed more informally. Various UN organs have adopted this formula in their diverse areas of work (Fitzduff 2006:4).

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about 2,100 NGOs have now a “consultative status” within the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). ECOSOC is the UN organ that coordinates economic, social, and related work of the 14 UN specialised agencies, functional commissions and five regional commissions. In 1997, former Secretary-General Kofi-Annan stated, “NGOs are now seen as essential partners of the UN, not only in mobilising public opinion, but also in the process of deliberation and policy formulation and even more important in the execution of policies, in work on the ground” (see Fitzduff 2004:2; Shannon 2004:38).

The World Bank-NGO Committee that had been established as a global mechanism for policy dialogue in 1983 was decentralised in 1995. Regional and national WB-NGO Committees were established “to consolidate and extend dialogue on WB policies, programs and loans” (Fitzduff 2004:5). The Commission of the European Communities (EC) (2001:15) designates NGOs as “implementing partners”, alongside the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), of its development policies and programmes. The EC’s 2001 policy document also qualifies NGOs as partners in development planning, and it reports that 65% of its total humanitarian assistance in the year 2000 was used to finance NGO projects, with only 20% channelled through UN agencies and 15% through the Red Cross and other international organisations (EC 2001:15). Steen, (cited in Reimann 2006:53), points out that in Sweden and Norway, for example, advocacy NGOs are often fully dependent on public funding. Smillie and Helmich, (cited in Reimann 2006:53), report that since the end of the Cold War to late 1990s, between 15 and 20% of the bilateral aid of the US, Canada, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland and Nordic countries were channelled directly through NGOs. This aid was aimed at the works of humanitarian relief, democratisation, civil society development and advocacy (Carothers 1999:207-254; Reimann 2006:53). Fitzduff (2004:5) notes that since the mid-1990s, there has been more intimate collaboration between British government and international NGOs. This is observed, for example, in the regular consultations there have been between the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence, Department for International Development and UK conflict and aid agencies with the aim of sharing analyses and addressing issues of “common concern about conflicts around the world” (Fitzduff 2004:5).

On the other hand, NGOs have also expanded relations with the private sector, from which they have obtained increased resource opportunity to advance their work and status on the global development stage. Keck and Sikkink (1998:98-99) observe that although NGOs have received funding from the private sector in the past, they received an unprecedented level of this funding during the 1980s and 1990s. For example, Reimann (2006:54) reports that NGOs received about $1.1 billion in the period 1990-2000 from about 14 American private foundations, including Alton Jones, Ford, Gates, Rockefeller, and Turner foundations.

Although they have been often characterised by a top-down approach, NGOs have also continued to use leftist methods. They have engaged in grassroots and community development activities, such as civic and formal education, income-generation, empowerment, peace culture, inter-religious dialogue, gender and women empowerment, human rights promotion and monitoring, relief and reintegration of displaced peoples and refugees, provision of psycho-social support to victims of war, action against human trafficking, and partnership with community-based groups (CBOs) (Fischer 2006; van Tongeren et al 2005). NGOs have further engaged in campaigns and lobbying at local and international levels on crises management. For this, they have often organised into regional and global networks to raise public awareness of issues and needs regarding various observed crises (Serbin 2005). This engagement has been undergirded by a host of operational narratives. NGOs have been deemed as an alternative to state-led development model, hence the increasing level of aid channelling through them and trust that they can better respond to socio-economic issues particularly in the developing world. This view is based on the rationale that “NGOs are equipped with some better comparative advantages in peacebuilding than states, such as their political independence, the flexibility of their mandates, their impartiality, high standards of credibility” and the community-based nature of their activity (Fischer 2006:8, also see Edwards and Hulme 1996; Ottaway and Carothers 2000). It is posited that NGO work is crucial for poverty alleviation and the creation of conditions for industrialisation through community capacity building (Hilhorst 2003). Moreover, NGOs are viewed as catalysts in the buffering of the effects of the process of economic reforms, in the securing of adequate public service delivery and facilitation of successful political transitions from authoritarianism to democratisation (Kaldor 2003). In the words of Edward and Hume (1996), this glorification of civil society, in particular NGOs, in the post-Cold War vision and work of development marks a “New Policy Agenda”.

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Social-development-oriented discourses, on the other hand, have on varied fronts criticised the NGOs’ top-down platform and their claimed community-based engagement. Not least, this criticism has partially emerged from within the NGO community itself, and its fundamental premise is an unreserved opposition to the neoliberal doctrine. It is argued that the neoliberal policy agenda and implementation are fundamentally flawed. On the one hand, its market fundamentalist system encourages uneven development between the rich and the poor. While the former are resourcefully equipped to grow richer within the system, the latter are doomed to worsening poverty because of their disadvantaged footing (Fischer 1997:443). On the other hand, the neoliberal focus on growth economics sets stage for an ecologically unsustainable development because of over exploration of resources and the resultant environmental pollution from expanding manufacturing (Sklair 2004:46). Hence the critique that NGOs have consciously or unconsciously supported neoliberalism because of their funding partnerships with institutions, donor agencies and states that have advocated and served the neoliberal agenda (Kamat 2003:67). Some authors have gone as far as dubbing NGOs as new agents of political and economic imperialism (see Manji 2005; Petras and Veltmeyer 1999). Thus, social-development-oriented discourses have argued that the role of NGOs in development can be “valuable” only if it can be steered toward “alternative development discourses and practices” (Fischer 1997:444). This perspective follows after the social movements’ pursuit for alternative discourses to the neoliberal free-market economics and democratisation politics (Fischer 1997:441). Lofredo, (cited in Pearce 2000:20), argued that the neoliberal development model simply amounts to a “sustainable [self] development” of rich countries. Commins (2000:70, 72) cautioned that unless NGOs re-examine the nature of the impact of their role in development and relief amidst the high platform and preference they have obtained in structures of the world order, they risk to recede to mere “ladles in the global soup kitchen” i.e. “the delivery agency” of “meagre comfort amidst harsh economic changes and complex political emergencies in a world that is characterised by global economic integration and the social exclusion of low-income communities, as well as continuing and widespread levels of civil strife” (Commins 2000:70).

In counterargument to the mainstream’s positive narrative that NGO work is community-based, socially oriented discourses have criticised international or Northern NGOs (INGOs) for paternalism in their relationship with local or Southern NGOs (LNGOs), and thereby of lack of community accountability. The paternalism criticism refers to the nature of the partnership between INGOs and LNGOs; that following the NGO ascension to high-platform,
rent-seeking has taken precedence over effective engagement. That is, there has been greater emphasis on technical capacity, including how to best meet donor project priorities and timeframe and funding acquisition and accountability principles, over the politics characterising such work (Hulme and Edwards 1997:20; Pearce 2000:22). On this count, as primary intermediaries of donor funding\(^\text{13}\), INGOs have generally sought the homogenisation of their LNGOs counterparts into their image in terms “outlook, identity and work” (Fowler 2000:11) as shaped by donor agenda and priorities. For this reason, Taylor, (cited in Pearce 2000:28), argued that INGOs should shift the approach of their partnership with LNGOs towards “internationalism”. That is, “no international NGO would have a core identity in a Northern country, but would be one part of an organisation, each of whose parts, wherever located (whether North or South), would build up a strong and competent capacity of its own and combine with the others to speak to the international organisation together” (ibid).

The donor-NGO relationship is considered crucial to the question of NGO accountability. The fact that INGOs obtain their funding from stakeholders with specific interests and have arguably subjected their strategic and operational activities to their reins, have been considered as compromising factors. Kamat (2003:66) argues that NGOs have been more accountable to the “interests of powerful states, national elites, and private capital” than to the communities they serve. This reality makes the notion of NGO autonomy a “mirage”. Moreover, “NGOs’ dependence on external funding and compliance with funding agency targets raise doubts about whether their accountability lies with the people or with funding agencies” (ibid). However, this line of argument has been countered before. Valderrama and Coscio (1998:420) have argued that if NGOs shifted their funding source to self, internal funding activities, such as economies of scale and finance, there is a risk that they could digress from their original objectives of social-change. Nevertheless, the question of accountability has spilled over onto the questions of “representation, participation and legitimacy”. The credibility of NGOs as a voice of civil society and poor communities in international development circles, consultations, summits on human rights and advocacy, economic and political conferences of Western countries such as the G8, in policy debates on bilateral aid processes, has been questioned (Fowler 2000:35). This is because while they have grown closer to such high entities, the genuineness and wholeness of their connection

\(^{13}\) Pearce (2000:25) claims that by mid-1990s, official donors began to also channel funding directly to Southern NGOs who as a result became gradually less dependent on Northern NGOs and began “to set their own agendas and to develop research, policy and advocacy capacities”. However, she posits that this shift was interfered with by protest from British INGOs.
with intended beneficiaries and their fundamental human rights have increasingly been questioned. This factor has consequentially put into question their legitimacy to represent and speak on behalf of the poor (ibid p.39).

Mainstream promotion of NGOs over weak states has also been criticised. Goodhand and Chamberlain, (cited in Pearce 2000:29), observe that in taking up certain state responsibilities, NGOs run the risk of falling in the grip of particular interest groups in the process of negotiating for space to fulfil such tasks with the strongmen in a society. From empirical studies conducted in Uganda and Zambia, respectively, Cannon (1996) and Collier (1996) agreed that the fact that NGOs may have taken up certain state responsibilities should not mean that the state should have a lesser role in the provision of public goods. Rather, it should mean that NGOs may have the significant role of complementing state work, particularly by alerting it to issues and social situations that it may be oblivious about.

Whaites (1998:125-130) has argued that the theoretical framework that aid agencies and development practitioners have obtained from liberal philosophers of civil society, such as de Tocqueville, of strengthening civil society and not the state is not completely adequate for the current situation of the South. This is because the problem being faced in the South is the very opposite of the problem that such thinkers were addressing in the North. While the Occident was threatened by the problem of excessive state power, the South is instead confronted with the problem of extreme state weakness. Therefore, neglecting the state and focusing on strengthening civil society alone has the risk of rendering the state hostage to the most powerful social group in a society, which can subsequently create a major obstacle to the process of development (ibid). In response, Pearce (2000:31) argues that although there may be evidence to support Whaites’ argument, the main issue at stake however relates more to state “capacity to develop the ability to distance itself from dominant groups” rather than about state strength or weakness.

NGO actors themselves have understood their role in development as a third way between undependable and authoritarian statism and the unrestrained market capitalism that has

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14 Petras and Veltmeyer (2001:131-132) argue that during 1980s-1990s, NGOs were prominent players in “democratic transitions” from old regimes in various countries such as Chile, Philippines, South Korea. They used their “grass roots rhetoric, organisational resources and status as democratic human rights advocates to channel popular support behind politicians and parties”. However, their action was limited to a transition that involved “legal-political reforms, but not socio-economic changes” (ibid).
caused the deterioration of the welfare of many peoples and communities around the world. This perspective has been named NGOs' “moral high ground” (Holloway 1999:21). At the same time, however, NGOs have also expressed concern about the challenge to clarify their policy stance within the international political economic regime. In the first international NGO conference organised in 1992 under the theme *NGOs and Development*, NGO stakeholders reflected on the tensions that NGOs’ recent rise on the international development stage was creating within the development NGO community. Warnings were made about the gains as well as costs this new status could bring. The following was stated in the final report of the conference, 

> Increasing interest and support for NGOs among official donor agencies may create a predisposition, or foster a shift, towards operational and organisational expansion. These incentives need to be treated cautiously, because decisions to expand with official finance may have various unwelcome consequences: for example, they may close off potential courses of action; or make NGOs feel more accountable to their official donors than to their intended beneficiaries; or imply support for policies of wholesale economic liberalisation. (Hulme and Edwards 1997: 20)

It was against this background that Lofredo and Commins’ critique and caution were respectively made. Lofredo criticised the neoliberal system of simply advancing the “sustainable [self] development” of rich countries; meaning that Hulme and Edwards’ caution went unheeded (Pearce 2000:20). And Commins (2000) cautioned about the risk of NGOs becoming mere “ladles in the global soup kitchen”, particularly because they were now participating in the implementation of social safety-net programmes without however actively engaging with the neoliberal reform policies contributing to such crises in the first place.

The second international NGO conference was realised in 1994 under the theme *NGOs and Development: Performance and Accountability in the New World Order*. The dominant point in this round was the call for NGOs “to return to their original roots” if they were to have a meaningful impact on the eradication of mass poverty (Pearce 2000:22). However, Pearce (2000:23) argues, this call was buried by a drive toward “professionalism”. As a participant in that conference, Pearce argues that a split occurred during discussions between two broad camps. The majority emphasised the need for NGOs to emancipate technically according to the new [neoliberal] economic order if they were to remain relevant. This would involve building more capacity institutionally, in donor accountability, and in the ability to measure development through social indicators. Conversely, the minority camp emphasised the need “to get the politics right first and resist donor-driven agendas if these served only to
bureaucratise and depoliticise NGOs". Pearce (2000:23) argues that NGOs lost the opportunity to develop their own critique of neoliberalism because the majority view of "professionalism" prevailed, and because the debate was posed in terms of "technical agendas versus politics" instead of a fusion of the two.

The theme of the third conference was NGOs in a Global Future realised in 1999. Debate at this third round is considered to have been a continuum from the second round. On the table remained the call for NGOs to return to their roots "as promoters of social change and of non-market values of co-operation, non-violence, and respect for human rights and democratic processes, and to make these the bottom line in decision over economics and the environment, social policy, and politics" (Pearce 2000:24). However, Wallace (1999:2) remarks, given the split in perspective since the second round, this round did not produce much in terms of a new way forward. Pearce (2000:24) posits that despite the wide attendance, the abovementioned ideas were not really engaged. Nevertheless, the lack of emergence of a clear future direction from this conference clarifies "the parameters of debate" within the development NGO community (i.e. continued search for their self-redefinition) (Pearce 2000:24).

2.5 Conclusion: NGOs and the Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Agenda

While it is hardly feasible to mathematically measure the outcome of the peacebuilding agenda, it seems nevertheless relevant and useful to conclude this systemic review with the major critical issues being raised about the prospects of the agenda and its relationship with the development role of NGOs. The International Peace Academy (WSP)\textsuperscript{15} report of 2004 entitled Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited, posits that the difficulty of evaluating the outcome of the peacebuilding agenda is owed to the lack of consensus about the definition and the ultimate goals of the agenda, and because its long-term process would pervade the limited scope of any analysis (Tschirgi 2004:10)\textsuperscript{16}. For what it is worth, however, the WSP

\textsuperscript{15} The International Peace Academy (WSP) is an international research institute that engages in "Security-Development Nexus Program", whose aim is to contribute to "a better understanding of the linkages between security and development strategies in conflict management". Through its research projects, conferences and publications, the program seeks to provide concrete advice to the UN system and the broader international community so that they may engage more effectively in the agenda and work of sustainable development (Tschirgi 2004).

\textsuperscript{16} Necla Tschirgi is the Vice-President of the WSP and Director of the Security-Development Nexus Program. He is also the author of the 2004 report.
indicates that two major strands of finding have emerged from the few evaluative studies that have been attempted. One is the indication that despite the recorded decrease in the number of violent conflicts since the end of the Cold War, recidivism to war is a strong fact in most post-conflict countries. Two, end of conflict has not necessarily translated into peacebuilding in most cases, because peace agreements have widely failed to lead to the establishment of "structural factors lying at the source of the original conflict...and [such factors] continue to fester" (Tschirgi 2004:10). These findings are mostly associated with conflict because throughout the 1990s the UN's peacebuilding work was dominated by peacekeeping operations (Ibid p.3). In such operations, NGOs engaged in early warning conflict prevention activities and preventive diplomacy, and in "facilitation of dialogue workshops and mediation, negotiations, networking and initiatives for cross-cultural understanding and relationship-building" (Fischer 2006:5).

One critical issue confronting the peacebuilding agenda is the lack of cohesion in the international response to the post-conflict reconstruction process. According to the WSP (Tschirgi 2004:5-7), while the humanitarian and peacekeeping aspects were institutionally, politically and conceptually coherent, the post-conflict reconstruction aspect "was and still remains an institutional orphan". Each international actor's approach has been particular. The WSP (Tschirgi 2004:5) posits that this is because the post-conflict reconstruction element has been considered a "temporary stage in the unilinear transition from war to peace and considered as part of the relief-development continuum". As such, despite sharing the broader neoliberal paradigm and major policy principles like human security, democratisation, and fundamental human rights (see section 2.4), international development compacts and governments have generally pursued individual agendas and specific elements of response17. The WSP (Tschirgi 2004:6-8) posits that this is the factor underlying the ongoing realities of a lack of policy coherence and the consequential lack of donor funding alignment (including quantity shortage and delivery sequence), as well as the factor that is making international

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17 For example, the US has engaged through its USAID based Office and Transition and Initiatives (OTI) created in 1994; the UK through its Department for International Development (DFID) based Conflict and Human Affairs Department (CHAD) created in 1997; Canada through its Department of Foreign Affairs and Canadian Aid Agency (CIDA) based Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative created in 1996; the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the Directorate of Crisis Management and International Assistance (DCH) in 1996; The UNDP formed the Emergence Response Division (ERD) in 1995; the World Bank established a Post-Conflict Unit in 1997. The OECD DAC guidelines (2001) have been major informative frameworks for most of the European sub-country schemes (Tschirgi 2004:6-7).
actors rely mostly on NGO agency for the implementation of their programmes and activities on the ground in the complex emergence situations (Tschirgi 2004:6-8).

In this juncture, NGO praxis has been criticised for being top-down in approach, and the conflict resolution and management approach being promoted by international agents as being exclusivist. Pearce (2005:46-48) argues that international donors have used NGOs and civil society as “technical instruments and projects for externally driven agenda”. As a result, rather than helping, often NGOs and civil society have caused more harm. Therefore, a strategic way forward might be to emancipate the “local and weaker voices” both into the peacebuilding approach and into the public sphere (Pearce 2005:46-48). However, Pearce’s proposition is not new. It has been part of the NGO repertoire for a while. It goes back to Coombs’ (1980) seminal concept of integrated development; Korten’s (1980) notion of learning process; Uppoff’s (1986:195) insight that the best practice for institutional development should be to seek to make their contributions “additive rather than substitutive or subtractive”, which nearly a decade later Edwards (1994:67-70) developed into the concept of “enabling state” – capturing the need to develop public administration alongside civil society. Instead, the problem has been the failure by international actors to apply such knowledge in practice. For this reason, Stiefel (1999:16-19) argues that one way of reforming operational practice would be to promote more in-depth principles such as the transfer of project control from donors to local, recipient agents beyond just participation; and the criteria for measuring success should supersede “cost-efficiency” to “indirect social impact of interventions”18.

The concept of “peacebuilding from below” emerged as a counter-discourse in the field of conflict resolution in the 1990s (Pearce 2005:42). This praxis discourse was significantly influenced by John Lederach’s seminal work Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (1997). In this work, Lederach (1997) argued for “multi-track and multi-dimensional” (including all levels of society) approaches to peacebuilding practice, as well as the need for cultural, structural, personal and relational changes within war-torn societies. Pearce (2005:42) observes that the “peacebuilding from below” discourse was well received

18 It is to note that some considerably positive steps have been taken by the United Nations, donor governments, regional organisations, international NGOs and other international actors in documenting knowledge obtained from experience on the ground in order to inform future endeavours (Tschirgi 2004:16).
because the environment into which it emerged was opportune, filled with failed “elite led negotiations between unarmed actors to deliver peace in its broadest sense to the majority”.

Another critical issue confronting the peacebuilding agenda is the neoliberal content. Some critics argue that the merger of the agenda with the assumption that neoliberalism can bring about prosperity to all humanity is dangerous because neoliberalism has often contradicted and militated against needs and priorities of post-conflict reconstruction (Bendaña 2003; Boyce 1996; Date-Bah 2003; Desoto and Castillo 1994; Pearce 2005). Besides the lack of recognition of these contradictions in international development circles, this critique is mainly based on the experienced absence of an “economics of peace” (global welfare/development) under the neoliberal regime (Pearce 2005:47). As a result, some have questioned the legitimacy of the peacebuilding agenda itself in the first place. It has been argued that this agenda was flawed from the beginning because it was based on the erroneous assumption that the rich countries of the global north are “neutral” actors who would deliver policy and finance to end civil wars in the global south and to assist them in post-conflict reconstruction and development (Pearce 2005; Duffield 1994). This shows an initial failure to engage the reality of behind the scenes involvement of northern countries in many such conflicts, and the fact that many of the protracted conflicts today derive from proxy-wars that northern powers engineered in the Third World during the Cold War regime (Macrae 2001; Pearce 2005). Furthermore, the peacebuilding agenda has been met with growing “mistrust” because of the problematic identified in the notion of “international community” (Pearce 2005:47-48). The fact that the international community (multilateral and bilateral actors designated as the agenda’s prime agents) consists of actors with different levels of “power and wealth, goals, and values” is seen as the reason behind the many contradictions and inconsistencies that the peacebuilding process has had. For example, the report of the international workshop of the [Canadian] International Development Research Centre (IDRC) realised in 2002 to mark the 10th anniversary of An Agenda for Peace was tellingly themed What Kind of Peace, Whose Peace and Peace for Whom? The report summarised that the real beneficiaries of the peacebuilding programmes being conducted across the world are not the poor from the complex emergence situations, but the network of local, national elites and international actors, and institutions of the peacebuilding process themselves (Bendana 2003). Duffield (1999, 2001, 2002, 2005) has argued that the primary concern of the international community in conflict resolution is the security of their own borderlands from the instability of the violent conflicts in the South. Thus, humanitarian and development
assistance have not been dispensed in a manner they can contribute to the sustainable recovery and progress that countries in the South need to overcome the devastation of wars. Instead, through the new framework of “public-private partnership”, metropolitan states have used aid as a political leverage to globalise the liberal system i.e. exercise “global governance”, and to accumulate wealth from the South through the private sector. The latter is being facilitated by institutional and policy reforms, the introduction of private sector management techniques into public administration, and “aid practice networks that bring together donor governments, UN agencies, NGOs, private companies”. He calls this manoeuvre the “secularisation of development” (Duffield 2002:1050-63).

Lastly, the peacebuilding agenda is also confronted by the post 9/11 2001 factor. The WSP (Tschirgi 2004: ii) posits that since the 9/11 event, the peacebuilding agenda has been overshadowed by a new discourse on “nation-building, regime change and stabilisation and reconstruction”. This discourse is being driven by “certain powerful states” to guarantee that their security is not affected by the consequences of the instability of “weak and failing states”. The WSP (Tschirgi 2004: ii) posits that the premise of this discourse undermines the premise of the peacebuilding agenda. While the latter is about security “nurtured internally through patient, flexible, responsive strategies that are in tune with domestic political realities”, the former is an imposition driven by powerful “external concerns” alone. Therefore, the challenge for the peacebuilding agenda now is to resist against being replaced by “the stabilisation agenda of certain powerful states” (Tschirgi 2004: ii). Pearce (2005:44) concurs that the new post 9/11 context is not “favourable” for the peacebuilding agenda; that this is a critical phase for the agenda, and concern and questions are being raised about whose interests are really at stake. For some authors, however, the post 9/11 context has helped to put the issue of fragile state back on the map, which until 9/11 was only engaged by humanitarian organisations (Burke 2006). Other authors, however, question the link between fragile state and security. They argue that this connection elevates security concern over development; it conditions aid to security over development concerns. As such, this connection makes excuse for the cutting down of aid assistance, overlooking real causes of poverty, and it can even interfere with NGO work (Matthews 2002; Woodward 2002).
CHAPTER THREE
NGOs AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN ANGOLA

3. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to identify the role that NGOs are being assigned in the process of post-conflict reconstruction in Angola following the end of the three decade civil war in 2002. The survey is based on the review of relevant NGO policies in Angola, international assistance policies and behaviours, and most relevant academic literature and news-events. The objective is to test the perception of the current study that space for NGO contribution to the reconstruction process is dwindling since the state is becoming the primary donor-partner over NGOs, and on account of the exclusivist model of policy and law-making that the Angolan state seems to be practicing and its resultant pressure on NGO activity in the country.

3.1 Background of NGO activity in Angola

The background of NGO activity in Angola differs in many respects from the international picture captured in the first part of the review. In Angola, NGOs have evolved concurrently with the larger civil society. This evolvement is however still embryonic because of the political legacy that has historically confronted civil society organisation in the country. Under the Portuguese colonial regime that lasted until 1975, the only form of civil organisation authorised was religion. A similarly oppressive regime was continued by the independent Marxist government of Angola until late 1980s. This included the outlawing of civil assembly and association and any form of democratic politics. Only local NGOs (LNGOs) that were created as social branches of the ruling party were allowed to operate (Faria 2003; Tevdten 1997:46). Any other form of NGO, local or international, that may have been active during this period would have had a passive political policy. Its activity would have been limited to basic needs assistance to subsistence farmers and shanty dwellers in rural areas, and to war victims and displaced populations (Faria 2003)19.

19 The only NGOs that were allowed to operate in the country besides the party created NGOs were a few church-based development organisations, such as Caritas Angola and the Conselho de Organizações Evangélicas de Angola. But the activity scope of such organisations was limited to basic needs assistance to poor communities. Throughout this period churches did not generally dare to challenge the regime (Best 1979:139, 144).
With the politico-ideological shift that occurred in the country in 1990 from Marxist-Leninism and one-party system to social-democracy and multipartyism, civil society and NGOs could emerge following the ratification of the Association Law 14/91 (Comerford 2006; Faria 2003). While LNGOs were initially state-linked, increasingly, not least because of partnerships they came to entertain with international NGOs (INGOs) and donor agencies, many LNGOs have grown independent from the State (Faria 2003; Hodges 2004:88). According to the latest official census published by the Technical Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UTCAH 2007), 320 NGOs are currently operating in Angola, of which 200 are local and 120 are international. However, given the exploding trend of NGO emergence and the complex legalisation process existing in the country, there could be a slightly higher number of actively engaged LNGOs than the officially recorded.

With the change of the political system in the early 1990s, the relatively more democratic environment, and the influential presence of INGOs, NGO activity has been taking an increasingly more active and political outlook. Besides humanitarian and relief projects, both LNGOs and INGOs have been more vocal on issues of human rights, governance, public finance, accountability, and democratisation. LNGOs’ most remarkable political action so far was the integral role they played in the civil campaign for peace in 1999-2002 under the leadership of the umbrella church organisation designated as Inter-Ecclesial Commission for Peace in Angola (COIEPA). Civil society demanded both the ruling party and the then armed opposition movement to put an end to the three decade conflict that was increasingly destroying the country (Comerford 2006; Faria 2003; Teka 2006).

However, as many studies and reports have recorded, NGO activity has continued to experience serious political challenges in the post-conflict era that ushered with the end of the conflict in 2002. The main factor behind such challenges has been the generally unclear and often ambivalent government behaviour toward NGO activity in the country, which has varied across “alignment, co-option or rivalry” (Chatham 2005:21). This can be exemplified in the new Association Law 84/02 that became effective in 2004. While building on onto the same bureaucratism of the previous law, the new law also does away with many of the freedoms provisioned in the former. It defines NGOs only as service organisations that intervene in basic social assistance. It outlaws their involvement in political and partisan

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20 UTCAH is the public organ charged with the legal registration and coordination of civil organisations and their activities in Angola, and it falls under the Angolan Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration.
activity, it requires NGOs to have proof of sufficient funding in order to be legal actors, and it requires NGOs to report regularly about their activities to UTCAH (Amundsen and Abreu 2006:7; Chatham 2005:23). At the same time, relationship between NGOs and various state organs has varied from favourable to antagonistic. For example, there was a six month long spat between the UTCAH and NGOs that spilled from 2006 over to 2007. The General Director of UTCAH threatened to purge both LNOGs and INGOs that were breaking the law (Law 84/02) and were mobilising masses against the government under the pretence of human rights work. In the meantime, the government had already banned a human rights organisation, Mpabalanda Associação Cívica, in the enclave province of Cabinda. The Cabinda Provincial Court had ruled that Mpabalanda was carrying out “political activities rather than being a civil society organisation”.

Conversely, the Angolan Interior Ministry has worked closely with NGOs on human rights issues (Amundsen and Abreu 2006:12). Another example is the invitation the parliament opened to NGOs to participate in the debate on the drafting of the Lei Terra (Land Law) (Shaxson et al 2008:58). A subtler feature of government behaviour towards NGOs is what Amundsen and Abreu (2006:7) have called “a communist and corporatist” strategy. The government has used party affiliated mass organisations to corral the people behind it and the ruling party in order to boost its juridical legitimacy. Most of these organisations date back to the one-party regime when only the ruling party-based people organisations were lawful. These organisations were used for political indoctrination of the masses and party propaganda. They include Organização da Mulher Angolana (OMA), Juventude do MPLA (JMPLA), and the Organização dos Pioneiros Agostinho Neto (OPA) (Faria 2003; Tevdten 1997). Recently, the government has developed new corporatist tools like the President’s Fundação Eduardo dos Santos (FESA) and the first lady’s Fundo de Solidariedade Social (Lwiny). Through these social instruments, even NGO leaders are being co-opted into the government partisanship by means of “clientelism” i.e. bribery (Amundsen and Abreu 2006; Messiant 2001). Interestingly enough, the two presidential NGOs which are supposed to be civil foundations are not enlisted in the registry and directory of UTCAH.

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21 The author followed these developments closely through Angolan Public and Independent media, and out of it produced an Op-Ed in 2007 under the title “Whose democracy is Democracy?”

22 Respectively, Organisation of the Angolan Woman, Youth of the MPLA (the ruling party), Organisation of the Disciples of Agostinho Neto (MPLA and Angola’s first president).
Besides government apathy, NGOs are not generally the most credible civil society organisation in the country; the church owns this credential. Although recognised as important actors in the post-conflict reconstruction and development process by many, especially in remote areas and at local government levels, NGOs have also been associated with bourgeoisie. It has been observed that NGOs, especially INGOs, have concentrated their activities mostly in urban areas, and that careerism rather than service has dominated the work ethics of their hard currency earning professionals. This is exacerbated by the perception of their being closer and more accountable to donors than to communities (Vines et al 2005:21-26; Shaxson et al 2008:56-57). Moreover, NGOs and civil society have also been challenged by their limited political leverage. This is because their activities have been dominantly humanitarian, “project limited, excessive concern to meet members’ interests, and weak capacity to negotiate with state and donors” (Pacheco 2002:61-63).

3.2 Aid as a measure of international policy for NGO activity in Angola

The most telling feature of the international policy for NGO activity in Angola since independence is the aid instrument. On the early phase of the aid doctrine, which in the first part of the review is identified to have been between 1940s and 1970s (section 3p.9), Angola was not yet an independent state. It was still under Portuguese colonialism until 1975. As an independent state, Angola only became part of the aid dispensationalism at the second and third phases, respectively identified to have been between 1970s-1980s and from 1990s to date. In the second phase, Angola was not on the scheme of the capitalist bloc. It rather received the bulk of its aid from former communist allies, mainly, the USSR and Cuba and other Eastern Bloc countries. Apart from some UN humanitarian assistance, the most known exception of Western assistance to Angola was Sweden. As already observed, there were barely any INGOs in Angola during that period (Tevdten 2002:12; UN 2003:85). As such, Angola did not undergo World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programmes. It was not until the fall of communism and Angola’s politico-ideological shift to social democracy that the country acceded to the third stage of the aid dispensation. Since then, Angola began to receive less aid from the Soviet Bloc and more aid from industrialised Western countries. The main bilateral donor-countries to Angola since then have been the US, Norway, the UK, Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands. The main multilateral donors have been the EU, the UN and lately also the World Bank (Tevdten 2002:12; UN 2003:85; USAID 2008/5).
In 1992, Angola had its first democratic elections following the *Bicesse Peace Agreement* that the ruling party and the former armed opposition had signed. But this process failed to deliver stable peace and reconciliation as the electoral outcome was contested\(^{23}\). This led to full resumption of war with a respite in 1994 for new peace talks – the *Lusaka Talks* (Adams 1996:3). Due to failures in the implementation of accords, the *Lusaka Protocol* collapsed and war resumed from 1998 until 2002 (Hodges 2004:16). Substantial bilateral and multilateral development aid was channelled from the West to Angola through the UN to support the electoral process in 1992 (Tevdten 2002:13; UN 2003:86). With the resumption of war, however, the content of the aid was redirected to humanitarian assistance. As a result, a large number of NGOs eventually flooded the country (Tevdten 2002:12). With the signing of the *Lusaka Protocol* in 1994, aid once again began to be channelled through the government towards a “rehabilitation and recovery” agenda (Tevdten 2002:13; UN 2003:86). A remarkable artefact of this shift was the September 1995 Brussels round table between the Angolan Government and donors (UNDP and the European Commission). From this round, $900 million were pledged to sponsor an integrated, community-level programme, the *Programa de Reabilitar Comunitária e de Reconstrução Nacional* (PRC) (Cain 2002:7; Tevdten 2002:13; UN 2003:86). With the collapse of the *Lusaka Protocol* in 1998 and the full resumption of war, aid was again redirected toward humanitarian crisis. Most multilateral assistance was submitted under the coordination of the UN Humanitarian Assistance Agency (UCHA), later renamed Organisation for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA). Bilateral aid was also channelled through the UN and INGOs. Only a few donors like the US and the EC continued to channel some assistance to the GoA toward “rehabilitation and development” (UN 2003:93; UNDP 2002). Important is the issue of donor fatigue which significantly decreased aid size during this period (Hodges 2002:40-41) following the 1990s international trend of declining aid package (see section 2.3). Also, donor policy was justified by the rationale that the GoA was a “fragile partner” i.e. one lacking political “commitment” and governance and institutional “capacity” to pursue a “pro-poor” agenda and policies (Hodges 2002:40-41; UN 2003:92; World Bank 1998).

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\(^{23}\) In August 1992 the People’s Republic of Angola was renamed “Republic of Angola”. Polling took place on 29-30 September 1992 and both the legislative and presidential results were published on 17 October 1992 by the UN Electoral Commission. The ruling party won 53.74% of the legislative vote against 34.1% of the main opposition (formal armed movement); and the ruling party’s candidate won 49.57% of the presidential vote against 40.07% of the opposition’s candidate. Since none could gather 50% of the total vote, the two presidential candidates had to go for a run-off according to the country’s electoral law. The opposition protested that there had been “widespread systematic vote irregularity and fraud” and armed conflict resumed subsequently (Adams 1996:3).
However, from the mid-2000s, donor policies and projects have pointed toward a new significant shift in relations between donors, the government, NGOs and the private sector. This shift is framed in terms of the standard model of “public-private partnership” whereby the government is placed as the central development agent, although without the exclusion of NGOs and the larger civil society and the private sector. And aid is ascribed the double function of relief and development. It is this shifting policy gear that seems to underline a rising concern from some NGO circles that the responsibility of the country’s reconstruction is being optimistically centralised on the shoulders of the State. In this conjuncture, the agency of NGOs is facing uncertainty about the future due partially to INGOs’ growing reluctance to avail them funding. However, the agency of both NGOs and INGOs is threatened by diminishing funding and legal pressure from the government (Chatham 2005:21; DWA 2006a).

Two factors have defined the centrality of the government in the new “public-private partnership” framework, namely, the government’s development plans and their donor sponsorship. Since 2002, government has issued four such plans designed according to the donor principle of [country] Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), which has been widely perceived as a new form of structural adjustment programme (Lopes 2008). Significantly, in the government’s PRSPs, NGOs are posited as an integral part of the necessary collective agency alongside the government, donors, the private sector and the general public in the achievement of the goals of poverty eradication and national development (GoA 2004:15-16; 2005:45).

Besides the EC, the US is the only major donor that has continued to avail bilateral aid for “rehabilitation and recovery” to Angola since mid-1990s, while most donor countries and international institutions had shifted their aid toward humanitarian crisis only. This US policy has expanded since the end of the war in 2002. Through USAID-Angola and its Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), the US has set out a strategic framework of cooperation with Angola moulded by the US policy of “fragile state”24. This policy premises that the framing of USAID projects for Angola must be placed within the framework of the government’s

24 This is a post 9/11 addition to the US foreign policy whose two earlier pillars were “defence and diplomacy”. The “fragile state” pillar posits that the security of the US and of the larger international community is intrinsically linked to development. The underdevelopment that is ravaging the world creates an opportune environment for the operation of “destabilising forces manifesting on the dark side of globalisation and pose a different kind of national security challenge”. To deal with underdevelopment, the key is to ensure that “fragile, failing states” are back on their feet to meeting the needs and goals of development (USAID 2005b:7-9).
The international community’s policy for Angola is shifting despite its earlier rejection of the government’s request for a second donor conference for Angola in the aftermath of the war. The government sought for a discussion on possibilities of funding Angola’s reconstruction (Chatham 2005a:43). As observed earlier, the international community argued that the GoA lacked commitment and capacity to pursue pro-poor policies (Hodges 2002:40-41; UN 2003:92). Thus, the government turned east to China from which it obtained a $2billion loan in September 2004, giving China a growing geopolitical advantage in the country. This was partially the motivation behind the change of policy among Western donors, coupled with security concerns (Africa Confidential 2004:7; Aguilar 2005:2; Chatham 2005:43). This is

26 China’s repayment terms seem considerably flexible: a span of twelve years including grace period. However, it is still disputable whether its deal is really better than Western donors’ (Africa Confidential 2004:7; Aguilar 2005:2; Chatham 2005:43). But appealing to the GoA were China’s non-interference and non-intervention African Policy principles (CAPP 2006).
not least confirmed by the high donor forum realised in Paris in March 2005, although Angola was not an official participant, whose outcome was expressed on the *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability* (2005). Both donors and partners (recipient countries) pledged to greater integration and coordination between donor projects, local PRSPs and MDGs, synchronised aid delivery, and accountability between the parties.

After the war, the UN, through its Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for 2002 (CAP 2002), resuscitated into the donor policy the need to place the government as the leading player in Angola’s reconstruction and development. This appeal “explicitly [re] introduced the paradigm of a partnership in support of the realisation of rights as the foundation for humanitarian action. This highlighted the leading responsibility of the government, while appealing to donors for complementary support...the role of external partners, both financial donors and the international agencies and NGOs involved in delivering humanitarian relief, was to complement the actions taken by Government” (UN 2003:84-85). The UN adapted the CAP 2002 after the government’s 2003-2004 Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) as framework for UN intervention in Angola during 2004. For the period 2005-2008, UN intervention in the country has been framed in the 2005-2008 mid-term UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF 2005/2008:5-6). This framework is adapted to the ten development priority areas established in the government’s 2005-2008 mid-term PRSP, while awaiting the issuing of government’s 2009-2025 long-term plan so that it can also develop a long-term UNDAF (UNDAF 2005/2008:7-8). Thus, as the representative UN system in Angola, UNDAF’s goal is to assist the country’s reconstruction and development agenda by supporting “efforts of the government, and the Angolan society at large”

27 This partnership paradigm was fundamental in the UN’s peace agenda from the beginning; later it was also adopted by the OECD/DAC strategy paper (1996), only to be abandoned, with regard to Angola, at the failure of the *Lusaka Protocol* in 1998 (see sections 2.11, 2.1.2; 2.4; 2.5).

28 UNDAF is “a common planning framework”, one of the two instruments alongside Common Country Assessment (CCA), that resulted from the 1997 UN reform “to guide UN agencies at country level towards a set of jointly agreed outcomes...it is also a tool for strengthening external partnerships in the support of national priorities” (UNDAF 2005/2008:6-7).

29 The government’s ten priority areas are reintegration of IDPs, refugees, demobilised soldiers to their areas of origin; guaranteeing of “basic security through demining, disarmament and upholding of law and order throughout the country”; minimisation of food security; control HIV/AIDS spread; universal access to primary education; improvement of health care provision; “rehabilitation and expansion of basic infrastructure for economic, social and human development”; the valuing of “national resources, workers rights”, creation of employment opportunities and enhancing of the labour market; consolidation of “the rule of law through improvement of administration and management of resources and [public] transparency”; and creation of enabling environment for macroeconomic growth that allows a steady development of the markets ensuring the reduction of poverty” (GoA 2004, 2005; UNDAF 2005/2008).
meeting this objective (UNDAF 2005/2008:2, 5). UNDAF sees the government as its primary partner on technocratic, policy, coordination and institutional affairs, while also recommending a strengthening of UN’s “pragmatic links with NGOs and civil society” (UNDAF 2005/2008:11). During the UNDP 2007 Annual Programme Review, government’s Vice Minister of Planning stated, “…the former cooperation models fell short of tending to the economic, political and local setting of each country…fortunately, the cooperation partners became aware that it was no longer possible to go on applying the traditional criteria in development aid…[they] have since been introducing profound changes to this cooperation” (UNDP 2007:15).

Lastly, government’s relations with Bretton Woods Institutions are relatively recent. Angola joined the World Bank and the IMF in 1989. The IMF is yet to lend funding to Angola following the failure of the two Staff Monitored Programmes (SMPs) briefly attempted in 1995 and then in 2000-2001. The IMF has claimed that on both occasions the government failed to meet the principles of financial transparency and proper economic management (Hodges 2004:26; UN 2003:85-86; WB 2008). On the other hand, the World Bank has maintained a multi-prong public-private partnership engagement in Angola through its Angola Country Office. This has included the government, UN agencies, donors, NGOs, and the private sector. However, government’s leverage in this alliance is its privilege to set the agenda and framework, although in view of the Bank’s liberalising and administrative software technology (WB 2008)30.

3.4 Conclusion

Policy dynamics do indicate that the post-conflict reconstruction and development process in Angola is indeed centralising toward a state-led model. Since mid-2000s, both multilateral and bilateral partners have been increasingly elevating the government as the leading development partner in their policies and engagement with Angola. This trend is particularly marked by the central and defining place that the government’s PRSPs now have in any development agenda and plan for Angola. However, NGOs and the larger CSO are not being shunned, but simply relegated behind the government in terms of agenda setting, policymaking and coordination. NGOs are being assigned a more pragmatic role in the

implementation of social and civil projects and programmes. Their “watchdog” status is being remoulded from anti-statism to one that is more complementary to state. Thus, the concern arising from some NGO and CSO quarters about this centralising paradigm seems to be motivated by the experience of the mid-1990s and early 2000s when NGOs and CSOs were at the centre of donor policy and the primary channels of aid for humanitarian relief and assistance. The difference now is that the tone is changing from temporal relief goals to long-term development agenda. Moreover, deepening donor-government relations are undercutting NGOs and CSOs’ international privilege, which may sideline them politically as the international community would now have reasons to be more lenient toward the government.
4. Introduction

The previous chapter surveyed the literature on the role of NGOs in development in the post-Cold War era. It observed that the primacy that NGOs have enjoyed as agents of development on the international stage is politically fading out in Angola’s post-war reconstruction and development context. Indeed, a centralising agenda is emerging whereby the State is being ascribed the central and leading role.

This chapter concerns the collection of fieldwork data. It sets out the research method employed to collect first hand empirical data from the research location, and spells out the theoretical framework/methodology for data analysis.

4.1 Research method

This study has employed a qualitative research method, complemented by desk research. The instruments used for the qualitative method were in-depth and semi-structured interviews, and library-based literature study made up the desk research. The qualitative research method was adopted because the study has sought to collect [the] subjective perspectives and experiences of the study population (FHI 2007). Thus, since the study problem was to identify NGOs’ policy response in the face of the apparently centralising development model that is taking shape in Angola and which has potential to alienate the contribution of NGOs, the interviews were targeted at senior management staff of both local and international NGOs that are operating in the country. As organisational policy custodian, this staff group is best placed to reveal their organisations’ policies and operational frameworks.

4.1.1 Sampling and data collection

The sampling frame was limited to Luanda, the capital of Angola. This is because Luanda is the base of the most number of NGOs that are active in the country and is the primary trendsetter. Also, almost all NGOs that are operating in the provinces still have their headquarters in Luanda. The census was obtained from the latest updated Directory of National and
International NGOs produced by the *Unidade Técnica de Coordenação da Ajuda Humanitária* (UTCAH) i.e. Technical Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, which operates under the Angolan Ministry for Social Assistance and Reintegration. The directory is dated 2007, and UTCAH is the public organ charged with the registration and coordination of civil organisations and their activities in the country. As such, the census used is the latest national official record (UTCAH 2007). The UTCAH's 273 page directory contains all the organisational details of registered and recognised NGOs that are active in the country including organisation name, country of origin, name of the national representatives, genre of activity, geographical area(s) of operation, contacts: physical and telephonic addresses, and registration status. To obtain this information, the researcher submitted a formal request to UTCAH's General Office. The request stated the reason and purpose of seeking the information.

The UTCAH directory records a total of 320 legally recognised NGOs operating in Angola, of which 200 are national/local and 120 are international. It records 212 fully registered NGOs, 124 of which are local and 88 are international. The latter data is a reversal of the data of 2006 which recorded seventy-eight (78) fully registered local NGOs and ninety-seven (97) fully registered international NGOs, together totalling 175 fully registered NGOs (UTCAH 2007:6). Of the total 320 recognised NGOs operating countrywide, 220 are active in Luanda, the capital province and the research site. Of the 220 NGOs, 120 are local/national and 55 international. Of the 212 fully registered NGOs operating countrywide, 134 are active in Luanda, from which 89 are local and 45 are international NGOs (UTCAH 2007).

A sample of eighteen (18) NGOs was randomly selected for interview. The selection criteria were the following NGO activities: involvement in the areas of social, development and welfare, human rights and emergency assistance. The NGOs were directly invited to participate in the research via telephone and physical invitations. At least three respondents from each organisation’s senior management staff best placed to speak on behalf of the organisation were solicited as interlocutors. In most cases, however, the organisations availed only one respondent for reasons of time constraint and to avoid content repetition, except for three international NGOs which availed two respondents each. The status of the respondents

31 Not all recognised NGOs that are active in Angola have a full registration status according to the law issued in 2004 concerning the coordination of NGOs and their activities in the country. This law ratifies that all NGOs must have sufficient funding, although the meaning of sufficiency is not clearly defined, and must regularly report about their activities in the country to the Government through the UTCAH.
interviewed ranges from national representatives to country directors, deputy general directors and programme coordinators and managers. Because of time constraints, some interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner i.e. a strictly question and response process and others involved in-depth interview sessions. A total of nineteen (19) interviews were conducted, including seven (7) national NGOs and eleven (11) international NGOs.

4.2 Theoretical framework/methodology

The theoretical framework employed for data analysis draws distantly on Snavely and Desai's (2001) “government-non-profit relationship” framework developed to analyse interactions between local government and NGOs in a context of decentralisation of public administration. This framework obtains rationale in the context of the expanding role of NGOs in development, the character of non-profit social service enterprise that both government and NGOs share, and the subsequent complementarity they can share on account of their individual weaknesses and strengths in the fulfilment of their social enterprise services (Snavely and Desai 2001:248-249). This framework also lends value to the systemic, rather than issue-specific, nature of the study whose concern is the role of NGOs in the structural agency of Angola's post-conflict reconstruction and development process. While NGOs’ issue-specific agency is not of primary concern in the study, this component can be detected in their work values and motivations as subsumed in their policy response (s).

The framework engages with the wide dynamics of development process through the three analytical tools employed, namely, politics, policy and economy. These three categories capture the essence of the various strategic and operational mechanisms that have been employed in the process and agenda of peacebuilding and development, and they are the main spheres where NGOs and CSOs have engaged in the outworking of this project. The political tool is employed to assess the unique contribution that NGOs can lend to the process of political transition the country is undergoing from war to peace, and to the long-term process of national political stabilisation and development. Based on the empirical data, this is pursued by examining NGOs’ subjective experience(s) and perspective(s) on the country’s political transition process, and their immediate/short-term and long-term responses as civil actors in terms of both policy and action. The policy tool is employed to permeate the

32 See appendix I to view the interview questionnaire.
assessment of what unique contribution NGOs can make to public policy development and implementation in the current transitional context, and in terms of the long-term vision and process of national reconstruction and development. Based on the empirical data, this is pursued by examining what distinct endowments NGOs may have in the area of policy-making and service delivery that other social stakeholders, particularly the public sector, may not necessarily have. This is observed in terms of strategy, practice, action and vision. Lastly, the economy tool refers to unique market activities that NGOs can perform in the economy that can contribute to the country’s social and economic development. Based on the empirical data, this is pursued by analysing whether NGOs have policies and are pursuing activities as economic “multipliers” i.e. policies and activities that can contribute income into the economy through for example “grants, contracts, sales of services”, and job creation (Snavely and Desai 2001:255); as “producers of amenities” i.e. policies and activities that can contribute in creating an attractive economic environment through provision of facilities like “museums, performance art, libraries, education, recreation, sports, and youth and senior services” (ibid); as “suppliers of producer services” i.e. policies and activities related to “job training, creation of skilled workforce through education, and advancement of technology” (ibid); and as “suppliers of consumer goods” i.e. if NGOs have policies and are pursuing activities that can provide services that consumers can buy, such as “health care, recreation, entertainment, cultural activities, education, housing, and counselling services” (ibid p.256).

The employment of these three analytical tools is useful for assessing whether or not NGOs can make a distinct contribution in the country’s reconstruction and development process. The analysis draws on NGOs’ experiences and perspectives as expressed on the empirical data, and is placed in the current national development context in which a centralising, state-led model is taking shape.
### MAP OF THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Politics</th>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Economy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Transition, stabilisation, development</td>
<td>Public policy/development</td>
<td>Multiplier, provider of amenities, provider of services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy/activity</td>
<td>NGO unique contribution</td>
<td>NGO unique contribution</td>
<td>NGO unique contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
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Figure 1
5. Introduction

The previous chapter looked at the data collection method and the data analysis framework the study has employed. This chapter analyses the data in two stages. The first stage descriptively identifies the main themes emerging from the data guided by the items that were used in the questionnaire for data collection. The second stage is a critical, issue-based analysis. It focuses on the key questions that the research seeks to answer, namely, to what extent can NGOs participate in the country’s post-conflict reconstruction and development process; do NGOs have the potential to make a unique contribution to this process; what is the NGO policy response to the trends? What is the better approach for the country’s post-conflict reconstruction and development, a centralised, command or a decentralised, participatory approach? This chapter is followed by a synthesis chapter.

5.1 NGO vision for the post-conflict reconstruction of Angola

Regarding the mission of NGOs, there is consensus among the NGOs studied that there should be a move from emergency intervention to sustainable development engagement, while recognising the existence of cases and situations that still require relief assistance. They posit that war damages demanded emergency succour, and the socio-political environment was not conducive for development. Now that the war has ended, stage is set for the pursuit of long-term sustainable development agenda and intervention.

...with the end of the conflict NGOs have had to renew or adapt their visions and work to the new context in order to continue to operate since there is no more justification for an emergency only kind of mission. NPA has managed to restructure and adapt itself to the new context. (NPA)

During the conflict period in Angola its [Africare’s] mission and work focused on emergence assistance to refugees and displaced peoples. From 2003 its mission changed to development project. (Africare)

In the past we engaged in emergency projects which we have now transformed into development projects to respond to the new context in which we are. Our projects are being restructured to focus more on development. (CICA)
For NGOs, the vision of post-conflict development should be larger than an economic development of growth indicators alone. They are thinking about a development based on fundamental human rights. That is, they view that the country’s development should be based on the goals, principles and norms of social development and human welfare, justice and equity, gender emancipation, participation, democratisation, transparency and accountability, institutional efficiency, and homegrown agenda and approaches.

Social development and human welfare are viewed in two ways. It is first argued that rural and agrarian development should have a central place in the development agenda. This is posited in view of the urban-based modernisation projects being pursued by the government, while the larger rural section of the country lacks social infrastructures and security and physical links with modern facilities that are necessary for socio-economic development. Agricultural development is posited as a potential alternative source of development besides oil, because development cannot dependent on oil resources alone, and because agriculture has been the major source of subsistence for the majority of the population. Second, social development and human welfare are viewed in human development terms. Since the vast majority of the population lacks economic and political capacity to be self-reliant and active participants in the country’s development process, it is posited that health care, food security, civic and formal education should occupy a central place in the development agenda so that all Angolans may be active instead of passive agents in the development process.

Oil wealth has proved to have negative impact in development process because of interest issues that underlie it. That is why there is a need to develop the agricultural sector since most of the population is rural and lives on agriculture. Agriculture...rural development...should be main aspects in the country’s economic development. (ADRA)

Economics is certainly an important aspect of development, but for us that is not the central aspect. For us development is primarily about the improvement of human capacity to become able to respond to the challenges that life presents...to have the ability to meet one’s basic needs and to have the ability to be an active participant in the process of reconstruction and advancement of society towards a better reality and conditions. (AAEA)

Justice, equity and gender emancipation are expressed in terms of fair distribution of resources. This means that the provision of social infrastructures and services, especially in the areas of health and HIV/AIDS, child care, education, job creation, should be proportionate to the country’s economic product and capacity. Moreover, the vision of public

33 Angola is Sub-Saharan Africa’s biggest oil producer after Nigeria. Oil resources have been the backbone of the country’s economy, accounting for over 80% of the annual GNP and total public revenue (Teka 2008:2).
service and development should decentralise from Luanda, the capital province, into the hinterland, and there should be an end to the clientelism and cronyism of the public sector.

Luanda should not continue to be the beginning and the end of all things; the point of departure and the point of arrival. This needs to be changed. It is in this way that there will be a stronger possibility of eliminating the problem of clientelism that is assailing the country’s public sector. (ADRA)

...the question is how to bring about a development that includes social development. I think creation and distribution of wealth are essential. What is happening is that many individual elites get big money shares from public funds in the course of the so-called liberalisation/privatisation reform which have not happened fairly. Only elites have benefited because the whole process has been filled with cronyism. (NPA)

The vision we have is one of a just Angola...all Angolan citizens should have the same rights to the country’s resources...there should be no violation of human rights...all children should have the right to have education, all Angolan citizens should have the right to participate in the governance of their country...there should be social peace, access to employment, clean water and other basic human rights. (NCA)

Development must be about social welfare of human beings in various aspects...satisfaction of basic human needs. CICA has many social projects that target the development of the human person. (CIA)

NGOs posit that the revival of democratic politics in the country is vital to advance participation, transparency, accountability, and public institutional efficiency. They argue that homegrown development agenda and methods can better occur in a context where power is mediated by electoral processes and monitored through decentralisation of public administration, cultivation of capacity in the public sector, good governance, transparent and accountable economic management, and research-based policy-making.

Generally, the development process that the government is undertaking has failed to hold interaction and dialogue with communities; it has not been informed by proper empirical research; and it has lacked public consultation. We are insisting for these elements to be incorporated in the country’s development agenda. (NCC)

The problem is: the Angolan government has a weak link with the people, which is characterised by for example weak public services delivery, among other things. The government has access to oil resources which it uses to do whatever it decides to do without consulting the people. The government has development plans that we do not consider to be the best for the country at the stage where it is now. Such plans are not pro-poor. All that is being pursued is an economic growth based on indicators that do not necessarily include the people, let alone the children. (SCA)

What Angola needs is democratic institutions to manage the country's resources and socio-political and economic affairs in an adequate manner...what is needed are proper structures
that would enable adequate distribution of resources, safeguard human rights, build infrastructures. (NPA)

These NGO concerns for democratisation underline the views they [NGOs] express about the roles the international community, government and the civil sector should play in the country’s reconstruction process as observed in the sections below.

5.2 NGOs’ perspective on the role of the international community

There is some divergence in view between LNGOs and INGOs regarding the role of the international community in the country’s reconstruction and development process. LNGOs are critical of the international community’s rejection of a second donor conference that the Angolan government requested in the aftermath of the war in 2002 to discuss funding possibilities for the country’s reconstruction. It is argued that such a conference would have enabled an open interface between the government and international community’s perspectives, and it could have fast tracked the reconstruction and development process. Contrary to the widely held international perception that Angola possesses sufficient resources to fund the reconstruction project itself, LNGOs widely believe that the country still needs aid despite its vast economic potential. They argue that the government cannot yet adequately optimise, manage and utilise such potential because of its limited capacity, poor distribution policy, and that the country is currently faced with many needs. It is posited that the conditions the international community imposed for the realisation of the conference were too strict and failed to prioritise the interests of the Angolan people.

One negative move the international community made was to reject the government’s call for an international donor conference. It is wrong that donors refused this discussion to take place...it would have directly confronted the perspectives of the international community and national perspectives on issues. From there a way forward for the country’s development process would have been openly discussed...the country’s reconstruction and development process still needs aid despite its oil wealth. It is the lack of aid that has motivated the government to mortgage oil for cash in agreements with certain lenient bilateral partners. Western donors imposed conditionalities are mostly unhelpful although some of them may be useful. (ADRA)

You cannot punish an entire nation because of a few corrupt, bad public officials. That is just not fair. The role of the international community should be to support the Angolan people unconditionally because this is a people barely emerging from a painful war. This should be the priority...instead of just focusing on issues of poor governance...as a means of ensuring government does not mismanage aid-funds...strict measures of accountability instead of pre-aid conditionalities...would be a more helpful approach. (CAPCF)
...the image that has been built about Angola at both global and local levels is that Angola is a wealthy country. It is no longer in need of assistance because it has oil, diamonds, etc...But the reality is that it is still international donors who are financing development projects in Angola, at least those projects that are pronounced. (NCC)

However, INGOs are expressing a somewhat different view. They believe that Angola does not primarily need financial assistance; neither should the donor conference appeal have been about money. Rather, Angola has the capacity to shoulder most of the financial budget it needs to rebuild and develop. For this, the public sector needs liberalising. The assistance the international community should therefore provide is technical assistance in economic management and accountability, and in good governance. This is because of Angola’s poor soft i.e. human and hard i.e. public structures and institutions capacity. However, INGOs do not completely write out the possibility and eventual need of complementary financial assistance by the international community to Angola.

The international community assistance to Angola’s reconstruction and development does not have to be financial only. One major problem facing Angola in its development is the lack of trained and educated cadres. If the international community is not willing to assist financially, it may assist in terms of training. (DWh)

Many equate the international community with money. But that is not what Angola needs. What Angola needs are democratic institutions to manage the country’s resources and socio-political and economic affairs in an adequate manner...it is unfortunate that the GoA’s intention for the donor conference also was about money. That is wrong. (NPA)

What the international community can give in terms of aid is nothing compared to the resources the government has access to internally. The government does not need the WB, IMF or anybody else to fund the country’s reconstruction and development project. (SCA)

LNGOs have however noticed a recent policy shifting among Western donors, believed to be a result of the government turning eastward and the subsequent geopolitical advantage that particularly China, among other Asian Drivers, is gaining in the country.

The Chinese wave has awakened the West. Now a growing number of diplomatic and cooperation treaties is happening between the government and Western countries. Western countries are now realising that China is steadily beginning to control the Angolan market and they do not want to be left out of the bounty. They are now finding it worth a while to re-establish relations and cooperation with Angola. (NCC)

...for the past two years or so, the West has been showing a more lenient approach because it is realising that it is gradually losing the central position it used to have in Angola’s international policy scheme since the donor conference debacle. It is realising that Asia is steadily becoming a more central and commanding player. The international community is beginning to look beyond just the issue of poor governance. It is now focusing more on how Angola can be helped in this transitional phase of development from civil war. (CAPCF)
The majority of NGOs are relying on foreign funding to be active, which, as both the NGOs and INGOs concur, is being normatively channelled through INGOs. Only a limited number of well established NGOs have received some funding directly from international donors. Otherwise, NGOs can accede to international funding only through the mediation of INGOs. Besides multilateral sources and their own internally developing funding mechanisms, INGOs are receiving a significant bulk of their funding from their governments of origin, foreign private sector agents operating both abroad and in Angola, community fundraisers from their countries of origin, as well as from different foreign governments. Thus despite the short-term international community funding horizon for Angola, INGOs are confident they can secure funding for up to 2010 on average, with relative and contingent prospects of securing further funding for the period beyond. Conversely, NGOs have been facing funding crises since the end of the emergence context. Along with a direct access to international funding, NGOs are finding it hard to obtain intermediary funding from INGOs as a result of deemed lengthy processes and procedures being required by their international counterparts. This has been a discomforting experience for NGOs, some of which are growing sceptical of the motives underlying INGOs’ presence in the country. The next three quotes are from INGOs, followed by three quotes from NGOs.

As an international NGO, ACORD’s operation is dependent on donor funding...we do have donors seeking for partnerships with local organisations and to implement their projects through those local organisations. Such donors include the IMF, Oxfam, governments (such as Norway and Netherlands). This also creates funding possibilities for organisations like ACORD. (ACORD)

We receive our funds from international donor agencies and some foreign governments that have endorsed our vision and shown interest in social development issues...we also have some self-initiatives toward fundraising such as the kixierérito...DW has partnered with many local and international organisations. Without partnering with other NGOs work can be more difficult. (DWb)

INGOs are main channels of funding from the IC to NGOs. The IC prefers to channel funding through us, INGOs, rather than directly to local NGOs...an attempt is being made to get donors to possibly also directly support NGOs. However, the challenge is on fund management...besides these [i.e. USAID and Exxomobil], we have other donors such as UNICEF and the WB... (Africare)

In 2004 we had a short partnership with People’s Development Aid (ADPP)...but things did not go well when it came to implementation...ADPP did not really have a good faith. They had motives that were different from philanthropy. There are many other INGOs with much money they get from their governments of origin, but without a genuine interest to cooperate with NGOs...the relationship between NGOs and INGOs has been a partnership of beggary...to receive anything a NGO has to submit a modest financial project proposal (perhaps worth K20/30 thousand - $300/400). Then it has to go back and forth for many
months to be granted anything...many of their [INGOs'] governments use them as agents to carry out projects that advance the foreign policy of their countries. (CAPCF)

Relationship between INGOs and LNGOs tends to depend on international donors...donors need local agents to implement their projects and fulfil their agendas. In turn, LNGOs need donors to function. We [NCC] have received funding from various international organisations...such as Global Witness, Christian Aid, European Union, OECD, Open Society, Embassies. (NCC)

Funds are a problem...there are INGOs whose representatives are more racist than anything else. Until we find alternative ways of fundraising...we will remain subjected to such attitudes. For you to get just a little money for one single project they make you go back and forth for a long time...in our own country we are being obliged to write reports in English. It is the INGOs who should learn to speak Portuguese if they want to come here work. (N/A)34

Despite this intermediary funding controversy, INGOs and LNGOs have had a structural collaboration under two umbrella organisations, namely, the Forum of LNGOs (FONGA) and Forum of INGOs (CONGA). The main challenge being faced at this compact level is poor coordination. There is not a concerted NGO front on issues confronting the country. Despite some unison activities, such as the Angola Peacebuilding Program (PCP)35 and the first conference of Angola’s CSOs realised in November 2007 under the leadership of FONGA36, generally each NGO has pursued individual agenda and programmes.

There is no concerted CSO perspective about things in the country. CSO would partner better with the GoA in the country’s development process by concerted its ideas into a common front. (DW1)

Generally, there has been an important partnership between INGOs and LNGOs, especially through the two main organisational bodies: CONGA and FONGA...there is interchange between the two organisations but not yet a common agenda per se. (ACORD)

5.3 NGOs’ perspective on the role of the government

There is consensus among both INGOs and LNGOs that the GoA should lead the country’s reconstruction and development process. It is posited that the primary responsibility of the process falls upon the public sector because the people are still fragile and unprepared, and the country is in rubbles that need cleaning. Hence the need to build human, structural and institutional bases that can support a sustainable nation-building. This perspective is however

34 Undisclosed source for reasons of confidentiality
35 This program was initiated in 1998 by eight NGOs, local and international. It aimed to build the capacity of partner NGOs in leadership, conflict resolution and human rights as a way to contribute to peacemaking and peacebuilding (Efraim et al 2001:3).
36 The main achievements of this conference were the addressing of some challenges facing NGOs in the country, such as a feeling of illegitimacy, lacking leadership capacity, and an horizontal platform and relational proximity it encouraged between Luanda and other provinces based NGOs (Chatham 2008b:11-12).
cautious. NGOs posit that the state alone cannot rebuild and develop the nation without substantive collaboration with the private and civil sectors. Thus, the public space should open up to democratic debate. The initiative of administrative decentralisation and deconcentration the GoA initiated in 2004 is viewed positively. However, its development and implementation is deemed too slow and reluctant.

The main reasons advanced for a public-private-civil development effort are the state’s limited capacity in terms of human, institutional and structural resources, and the culture of clientelism and patrimonialism and poor resource utility and distribution that have assailed and marked the public sector. Moreover, NGOs oppose a capitalistic development model because of the hegemony and monopoly this gives the private sector at the expense of social development and the poorer population.

Contrary to the democratic doctrine of shrinking the state, we believe that at the present stage where Angola is the GoA has an important role to play. The private sector itself is not devoid of problems. It ends up building monopolies that ultimately get used only to advance individual and corporate interests over social and national interests...however, what is necessary and pivotal in a model where government has a strong function is to open the public sector for debate...the public space needs to be opened in order to impede anybody from taking monopoly over it and to claim it their own. (ADRA)

...we agree that the government should lead the country. What we do not agree with is that civil society should not challenge and hold the government accountable for what it is or not doing; that civil society should not advocate for human rights, fight the government on some issues. (AIN)

There are crucial areas that the government needs to take up such as education, social infrastructure, health...[otherwise] the people will suffer. Even in Germany the government intervenes in these areas...market activities need expanding at local, provincial and national levels...this would be difficult without infrastructures...the government has the responsibility to intervene more in this context. The country’s economy is not yet mature for the government to get out completely...the government is not an independent institution...therefore, it is fundamental for there to be a participatory governance process. The government should open up more to allow civil society to participate in the governance of the country. (AAA)

There is a unanimous reaction to the hostile politics affecting NGO activity in the country. NGOs posit that civil action is important for development and it should not be dampened. However, views on public regulation of NGO activity are more nuanced. Some LNGOs disapprove of the Law 84/02 and the supervisory mandate of the UTCAH. They believe that the real purpose of this law is “control” i.e. to give GoA leverage to stop NGO activities that may hurt the state politically. Furthermore, it is believed that due to the cost that it adds to the
legalisation process of new organisations, this law poses hindrance to the birth of new civil organisations and therefore an obstacle to growth of civil power. It is argued that the UTCAH is constitutionally illegitimate because its coordination authority limits the legal space of NGO operation. Also, because NGOs only provide summary reports of their activities, UTCAH’s coordination is considered to be practically pointless since such summaries cannot really capture the full extent of NGOs’ activities. And to provide comprehensive reports would not work because writing them would cost activity time.

The law that was issued in 2004 is absurd because it clashes with the constitution which allows for freedom of association and assembly as long as no infringement is made...I could still get people together to discuss and undertake open activities about the coming electoral process...even if our views did not support the current government. We may do all these things although we do not have money... some organisations are facing difficulties to legalise because of the cost the process involves... UTCAH expects NGOs to submit regular reports... in the current context of development those sketches are inappropriate. They cannot really show all an organisation is doing... a much bigger report is not viable to do on a regular basis due to time and other constraints there would be. (AAEA)

...that law is very absurd since UTCAH simply wants to interfere with NGO activity because NGOs pose obstacles to the government from freely realising its private agendas. This law makes legal room for government to be able to completely close down an organisation if it really feels bothered by it... the law that was enacted before in 1991, law 14/91... does not force us to account to anybody about what we do as long as our existence is constitutionally legal... we can constitutionally argue that UTCAH is not a legitimate institution... UTCAH is about analysing activities and how much they are or not affecting the government... this law [84/02] is and will continue to affect the work of many organisations. New NGOs will be discouraged from emerging due to the compounded bureaucracy and cost involved in the process of legalisation. Some NGOs will simply dismantle. (NCe)

Other LNGOs have more flexible sentiments about the logic of UTCAH coordination. However, they still argue that even those LNGOs that may lack the funding security required by law in order to be legitimate actors are still driven by social consciousness and will to make a difference. Such virtues are important and should not be discarded. Rather, the government should support them with funding.

Those organisations that are being unproductive may have to close down. Perhaps that is a fair point being made by the government. However, I also cannot fully blame such organisations for lacking resources to become duly active because national organisations are mostly formed on the basis of a modest ideal which is to contribute in the country’s reconstruction and development process... they need support. And this is a dilemma because the government is not being sensitive. (CAPCF)

Our organisation has up to this point depended solely on member contribution... for us to be able to do more work the government should support NGOs financially according to project proposals. (IWA)
On the other hand, many INGOs concur with the institution of public supervision of NGO activity in the country because of the need for order and accountability. At the same time, however, they complain about the bureaucracy this has involved. They also have concern that any political motivation that may underline this institution could limit the scope of civil engagement, and some gauge that UTCAH does not necessarily have the logistical capacity to see its supervisory role through anyway.

We do not experience any form of legal pressure from the government. In fact, we do not think the law here is that strict. In the United States, for example, the law is much stricter. So I do not quite understand it when I hear NGOs critique the government of being controlling. That is just an excuse for them not to be accountable to anybody and to be under no form of control whatsoever. I think that some accountability is very necessary. For example, the NGO called Mãos Livres de Angola recently had many problems with the government simply because it was going too far beyond limits...but the bottom-line is that the government does not want NGOs meddling into its politics. (SCA)

Let me say that UTCAH does not have the capacity to monitor the work of NGOs in the entire country. (NPA)

...we do not have a problem with the coordination of NGO activity. But what can be problematic is control or exaggerated control over this activity. That is not good. (NCA)

5.4 Are NGOs being excluded from the reconstruction process?

The international community’s policy towards Angola is certainly shifting from state alienation to its elevation as central partner in the country’s reconstruction and development. In turn, this shifting policy is influencing the trend of aid channelling from a predominantly NGO and humanitarian relief orientation to an increasing focus on long-term development projects. But despite the primacy of the state, NGOs and CSOs remain part of the policy scheme. They are being posed as necessary partners to the state (see section 3.3).

How are NGOs themselves viewing this? As observed in the previous section (4.1), both LNGOs and INGOs generally agree that the government should play a leading role given the country’s lack of basic development infrastructures needed to sustain the reconstruction process. However, NGOs feel the need for a proactive liberalisation of the public sector through participatory governance and decentralisation given the country’s history of strong political centralisation, clientelism, patrimonialism and weak civil sector. Moreover, NGOs argue that the government currently lacks sufficient human and institutional capacity, and there is concern that the Law 84/02 can limit the political space of NGOs and CSOs.
However, NGOs are not without weaknesses of their own. Their weakness in policy coordination, especially the lack of a common front between the FONGA and the CONGA, can undermine the potential of their collective contribution to the reconstruction process. Apart from occasional collaborations and partnerships there have been between individual NGOs, NGOs express different feelings and points of view on a number of issues, for example in the relationship between LNGOs and INGOs regarding funding and public regulation of NGO activity. Experience elsewhere suggests that a common front and solid intra-relations are essential for successful lobbying and positive development impact. By taking a “unified stance”, the Agency Coordination Body for Afghanistan Relief (ACBAR), the umbrella organisation of NGOs in Afghanistan, succeeded in having combat troops removed from their provincial humanitarian assistance missions in 2005. The troops’ presence had been jeopardising their missions (Zaklilwal and Thomas 2006:7). Recent studies on the relationship between NGOs and the strengthening of peacebuilding in Guatemala, Myanmar and Sri Lanka show that NGOs can often cause more harm than good. In Guatemala, Pearce (2005:47) found that NGOs and social organisations were turned into “projects for an externally driven agenda” by donors because the latter had taken “a very technical and instrumental approach to the idea of civil society”. In Myanmar, Pearce (2005:47) found that such a technical and instrumental approach and “its attached practice had divided Mayans rather than strengthening them, delinking well-funded urban based organisations from the rural areas, for instance”. In Sri Lanka, Orjuela (2003:210) found that civil society is “necessary but not enough”, especially because many of their activities were “top-down, reaching the rural periphery from an urban centre. Civil society is not the same as the people”. He adds that NGOs’ peace work in Sri Lanka “is done in rather fragmented projects...rather than in the form of a dynamic mass-based social movement” (ibid). Angolan LNGOs’ feeling of entitlement for public funding to amend their financial woes can result in distracting rent-seeking behaviour, as well as in a weakening of their voices on issues due to the compunction of donor loyalty that dependence on a public funding scheme may involve.

5.5 Unique contribution NGOs can make in the reconstruction process

NGOs are claiming to have a unique socio-economic and political capital that the public sector, and even the private sector, lacks. They argue that they can bridge the gap between micro, meso and macro processes through their background in individual, community and provincial levels of engagement, and their unique areas of activity. This is seen as a unique
NGO potentiality given the GoA’s lack of experience, expertise and logistics to engage at these various levels outside its traditionally centralised approach, and because the GoA is yet to tread in certain development areas. While the multi-level engagement experience is indisputable, one critical element in the NGOs’ claim of greater experience in certain development areas is the fact that until recently most NGOs operating in the country only accumulated experience in emergency work. It is only now that shift is being made to development work. Only a handful of NGOs, mainly international, have since had a dual engagement in both emergency and development, although such experience is not necessarily completely local but international. Thus, only a handful of NGOs could actually lend unique expertise to the initial phase of the development process since most, not unlike the GoA, are merely beginning to embark on the new territory of development work.

NGOs claim to have a unique ability to create a link between politics at grassroots level and politics at formal level through their activities in community empowerment, mobilisation, education, and human rights lobbying and advocacy. In this way, the political aspirations, concerns and agency of individual citizens and communities can be aroused and the country’s political culture subsequently advanced.

NGOs are essential for village work...government’s work is failing to reach deep in the communities in the remotest parts of the country. This means that government is not yet properly prepared and lacks capacity to facilitate work at various levels. In this NGOs can work as facilitators. (AAA)

The question of human rights, promotion and protection against violations is another area where NGOs can play a unique role: as watchdog over government... (OCHA)

NGOs can enable other forms of civil organisations to better organise themselves. (NPA)

We are engaging in rural areas where the government has not operated and will take rather long to reach, and has been unsuccessful to reach. (CAPCF)

NGOs claim that they can uniquely contribute to public policy development through their community experience and research, and to its implementation through their innovative dynamics in social service delivery. This contribution can help to advance the decentralisation process of the public administration, to build local autonomy and community ownership of the development agenda and process.

NGOs can communicate efficiency skills to government in service delivery...there have already been some inroads with the departments of health and agriculture. (Africare)
NGOs can advice toward a more unified development approach that includes both rural and urban areas rather than prioritising one, in most cases urban areas. (OCHA)

NGOs understand development issues and engage them from the view of communities. (AAEA)

NGOs claim to be able to uniquely contribute to the expansion of market activities as economic multipliers by contributing to job creation by virtue of their expanding demographics. “Statistically, NGOs have a strong weight in our society. There is a very high number of people depending on them” (DW1). But such a potential could be boosted by commitment, especially by INGOs, to a policy of preferential employment of local labour. “Many INGOs bring with them everything even their own drivers and they find no room to employ Angolans” (CICA).

Through their civic, informal and formal education and professional training activities, NGOs are doubtless supplying the job market with more equipped labourers that business need to develop, which seems to be an indirect and unique way of contributing to job creation and livelihood security. This would make NGOs unique suppliers of producer goods as they would be making a unique contribution to formation of human capital, which is fundamental for the expansion of market activities. “We have started schools building projects in the province of Cunene. In the Luanda province we are active in the districts of Sambizanga, Cacuaco and Viana where we are engaging in water supply, combat against malaria and polio, and in professional training projects. The latter aims at capacity building within communities” (Africare). This contribution is particularly important given the country’s poor human development index. The latest statistics place Angola’s HDI at 0.446, which gives it a rank of 162nd out 177 countries with available data (UNDP 2007/2008).

NGOs also have a traditionally strong involvement in the informal economy and agriculture. These are currently the country’s largest sources of livelihood and the largest source of rural subsistence. Their involvement in these sectors is very developmental because their diverse activities seek to upgrade the level of entrepreneurship in the informal economy and the level of production and commercialisation in the communities’ agricultural activity. On this account, NGOs seem to have a unique potential as suppliers of consumer goods by providing products that many people need to survive and to better themselves economically.
ADRA has a twofold strategy: (i) we have a rural development programme whose main components are food security in terms of both production and distribution. (ii) We have a credit programme which has two aspects: (a) micro-credit and (b) land management. In these two programmes we seek to revive citizenry capacity to do local development work...to run formal education programmes to strengthen schooling in the country... (ADRA)

DW work has focused on (i) land: with projects aimed at assisting poor communities to gain land access and ownership. Without land ownership it is difficult for the poor to be sustainable development agents. (ii) Formal and informal economic issues: DW has been involved in work on informal economy...one major outcome of this work is the micro-credit project called *kixicédito*. Credit is very important for the poor to become active economic agents. (DW2)

These unique economic contributions that NGOs show the ability to make are vital to economic development. While the government is still comparatively limited to engage at lower layers of rural setting, it can facilitate and help to expand what NGOs can and are doing by providing infrastructure, policy incentives and strategic regulation.

**MAP OF NGOs’ UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION**

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<tr>
<th>POLITICS</th>
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<th>ECONOMICS</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACTIVITIES</td>
<td>Citizen/community political aspirations and concerns</td>
<td>Public policy-making/implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTRIBUTION</td>
<td>Socio-political capital</td>
<td>Community research, experience, innovation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME</td>
<td>Inclusive democracy and electoral processes/system</td>
<td>Decentralisation of public sector, local autonomy, community ownership of development</td>
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Figure 2

5.6 NGO policy response to the development trends

The GoA is gaining lead and primacy over NGOs as an agent of development in the policy agenda of the international community for Angola’s post-conflict peacebuilding project, and
NGOs themselves concur that the GoA should play a central role in the process. However, NGOs’ concurrence is accompanied by the proviso that such a central state role is not an assent to a state-autocratic development model. Rather, they are calling for a public-private-civil partnership. To make sure that such partnership is attained, NGOs are pursuing a set of strategic policy responses. They are first and foremost readjusting their former emergency oriented engagement to development engagement in order to be relevant in the new context in which the country now is and to secure continuity of funding. On the one hand, INGOs are seeking to secure funding from their donor countries and agencies beyond 2010, while also developing internal funding mechanisms. On the other hand, LNGOs are seeking to persuade INGOs for more favourable terms of intermediary funding, while trying to access the donor funding system so that they too may start receiving more direct funding without the mediation of INGOs. Furthermore, a majority of LNGOs are also lobbying for a public funding scheme, while some more established LNGOs are pursuing complementary internal funding mechanisms. NGOs are also lobbying for a “public space” i.e. the decentralisation of the public process including administration, policy-making, institutional building, budgeting. They are seeking to make their unique contribution to the country’s reconstruction process through this space. NGOs are also seeking to focus their activities on rural and remote areas because they identify that that is where the most immediate needs are and where the development base the country needs is most scarce. They posit that the government does not only lack experience to engage at such community level, but that its policy and logistical arms are also still rather short to reach there.

One major weakness in these policy responses is the absence of a movement based vision. The NGO community is failing to express a realisation for the need to transcend a project-based framework of engagement if they are to stay the long course of development. This is particularly relevant to the fact that there is no common front on issues within the sector, and to the intermediary funding tension between local and international NGOs. A non-uniformist, yet common vision can help turn the NGO sector into a more solid and credible non-governmental and non-profit sector. A movement-based framework could also help transcend the weak collective coordination the sector faces. Likewise, the cumbersomeness, protracted delivery, and the project-only-based model of the intermediary funding from INGOs to LNGOs about which LNGOs are complaining could be overcome by a model based on longer-term partnerships, although according to organisational activity focus and concern.
5.7 A centralised or a decentralised development model?

Quasi-statehood theory is helpful in pointing out the legitimacy and empirical weaknesses that a developing state like Angola’s can have as a liability to the process of development. Moreover, the centralising post-conflict development model that is taking shape in the country is not necessarily being motivated by a demonstrated government capacity to lead the process. Rather, it is a result of various factors from the current international and Angola’s national political economic contexts. Of such, the most influential are the international concern and discourse on security and the rising influence of the Asian Drivers, especially China, in the Angolan political economy. The former factor is prioritising the role of state in the international security agenda in the face of international terrorism threat. The latter factor refers to Western superpowers and liberal states favourably changing policy towards the GoA on account of the door that their previously hard stance opened for China to make geopolitical gains in the country and in the Sub-Sahara African region more generally. On the other hand, Angola’s lack of both hard and soft developmental base plus the precarious socio-economic conditions in which most of its population are in the current transitional phase from war to reconstruction, beg for the role of the state. The state is necessary in the pursuit of a calculated and productive industrial policy towards the establishment of the solid and sustainable development foundations the country needs.

Given the weaknesses and strengths that the public, private and civil sectors have individually, there is a need for sectoral complementarity in order to achieve the developmental base the country needs. Therefore, a participatory state-led development framework seems both viable and necessary. The process of transition from war to reconstruction and development will hardly be successful under a state-autocratic system, given the current state’s weaknesses in terms of human and institutional capacity and its ongoing practice of clientelism and patrimonialism. Neither does it seem viable to shrink the state to the neoliberal model given the massive socio-economic crises, discrepancy and inequality prevailing in the country today. But a participatory state-led model can enable complementarity between the public, private and civil sectors, as well as checks-and-balances on vision, policy and socio-economic and political conditions.
CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION

This study set out to investigate the substance of a perception that had been obtained from a preliminary literature study on Angola’s post-conflict reconstruction and development process. Literature and events indicated that a centralising development model was taking shape. As a result, NGOs were facing serious funding crises and political pressure in the exercise of their activities. This perception raised concern about the role [and survival] of NGOs in the post-conflict nation-building agenda. Thus, the study set out to investigate what policy response NGOs are giving to the trends. Alongside this main objective, the study also sought to identify what unique contribution the NGO sector can make to the nation-building process, and to evaluate the validity and viability of the better development model between a centralised, command approach and a decentralised, participatory approach.

To address this objective, the study employed a qualitative research method in order to obtain NGOs’ subjective experiences and perspectives. This process was mediated by in-depth and semi-structured interviews with international and national NGOs that are based in Luanda, Angola’s capital province, although most of them are active countrywide.

The study is situated within the broader context of post-conflict peacebuilding agenda that was formally introduced by former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali in 1992. It is within this broader politico-economic context that development has been discoursed in the post-Cold War era. As such, the study has explored the role that NGOs can play in Angola’s post-conflict peacebuilding agenda comparatively to the role that NGOs have been ascribed on the international development stage. This analysis is mediated by three functional categories, namely, politics, policy, economy.

The study found that a centralising development model is indeed taking shape in Angola’s post-conflict reconstruction and development process. This trend is not necessarily being motivated by the Angolan state’s show of competence to lead the process, but primarily by the international security agenda and geopolitical concerns. NGOs report being pressed by a funding crisis since most of the international assistance to Angola is by policy now being generally channelled through the state towards macro reconstruction and development.
projects. Also, Angola’s political environment still continues to be considerably hostile to NGO and CSO activities.

In response, NGOs concur that the state should lead the nation-building process. This is because the role of the public sector is viewed as central in the creation of the supportive bases the country lacks for sustainable development. However, NGOs posit that such a state-led framework should be participatory, accommodating of both the civil and private sectors given the state’s weaknesses in soft and hard capacity and its historically intransigent politics. Thus, NGOs are committed to shifting their engagement from emergency to development, securing development funding, lobbying for the opening of the public space, and focusing their activities on rural, agricultural, human development and civic awareness.

Based on this policy and instrumental response, NGOs claim to have the ability to contribute a unique socio-economic and political capital to the nation-building. Politically, NGOs show the potential of bridging the gap between politics at informal and community level and politics at formal level towards the building of an inclusive democracy. They show potential to contribute distinctly to public policy development and implementation through their community work experience and research and innovative dynamics in social service delivery. Economically, NGOs show a unique potential as multipliers and suppliers of producer and consumer goods that are vital to economic development.

The major weaknesses facing the NGO sector are a lack of common vision and coordination on [certain key socio-political] issues; divisive intermediary funding relations between INGOs and LNGOs; lack of a realisation for the need of a movement-based engagement beyond a project-based engagement only; and the fact that only a handful of NGOs actually have experience in development work, as most of them are barely beginning to shift gears from the emergence paradigm to a development engagement paradigm.

However, given the dual reality of the Angolan quasi-statehood and the need for a strong public sector intervention in the establishment of the developmental base the country needs for sustainable development, a participatory state-led development model seems viable and necessary for the current transitional phase at which the country is.
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APPENDIX ONE: OPEN-ENDED INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

1. What vision of reconstruction and development does your organisation have for the post-conflict Angola?

2. How does your organisation view the current stance of the international community on Angola’s post-conflict reconstruction and development process? What role does your organisation view the international community should play?

3. What role does your organisation view the Angolan government should play in the country’s post-conflict reconstruction and development process?

4. What role does your organisation view civil society should play in the country’s post-conflict reconstruction and development process?

5. What role does your organisation view NGOs, as a distinct form of civil organisation, should play in the country’s post-conflict reconstruction and development process?

6. What instruments, theoretical and practical, is your organisation applying to play a role in the country’s post-conflict reconstruction and development process?

7. What kind of relationship does your organisation entertain with local/international NGOs? What is your organisation’s policy on that?

8. Does your organisation have secure funding? What is your source of finding? Are there other ways your organisation plans to raise funding in the near/long future?

9. Is your organisation under any legal pressure? If not, why? If yes, what is your policy response?
APPENDIX TWO: LIST OF RESPONDENT ORGANISATIONS

 Organisation: Action for Rural and Environmental Development (ADRA)  
 Origin: Angola  
 Activity: Social services, agriculture, community development, institutional building, emergency  
 (included sub-sectors: public service, social assistance, food security, agro-cattle breeding, seed  
 distribution, civil society)  
 Interviewee: Programme Manager/Coordinator, Mr. Jelembe Berlamino  
 Date of interview: 10/04/08  
 Place of interview: ADRA Head-office in Ingombota/Maculusso, Luanda

 Organisation: Development Workshop (DWa)  
 Origin: Canada  
 Activity: Social services, income-generation, institutional building (included sub-sectors: social  
 assistance, micro-credit, civil society)  
 Interviewee: Programme Manager/Coordinator, Mr. Willy Piassa  
 Date of interview: 11/04/08  
 Place of interview: DW Project Office in Maculusso, Luanda

 Organisation: Agency for Co-operation and Research in Development (ACORD)  
 Origin: Germany  
 Activity: Health, human rights, income-generation (sub-sectors: HIV/AIDS, civic education, gender,  
 micro-credit)  
 Interviewee: National Coordinator, Dr. Amilcar Salumbo  
 Date of interview: 15/04/08  
 Place of interview: ACORD Office in Largo 1º de Maio, Luanda

 Organisation: Development Workshop (DWb)  
 Origin: Canada  
 Activity: Social services, income-generation, institutional building (included sub-sectors: social  
 assistance, micro-credit, civil society)  
 Interviewee: Programme Manager/Coordinator, Mr. Fabrice Beutler  
 Date of interview: 16/04/08  
 Place of interview: DW Project Office in Maculusso, Luanda

 Organisation: Future Child Club of Friends (CAPCF)  
 Origin: Angola  
 Activity: Agriculture, education, health, culture, emergence (sub-sectors: general education, nutrition,  
 sport and entertainment, food assistance)  
 Interviewee: National Representative, Mr. Jose Manuel Pedrinho  
 Date of interview: 17/04/08  
 Place of interview: CAPCF Head-office in Ingombota, Luanda

 Organisation: Islamic Wing of Angola (IWA)  
 Origin: Angola  
 Activity: Education, social services, professional training, construction and rehabilitation  
 Interviewee: President, Mr. Alhaji Foday Jabbi  
 Date of interview: 17/04/08  
 Place of interview: IWA Head-office in Martes/Cassequele, Luanda

 Organisation: Africa Group of Sweden (GAS)  
 Origin: Sweden  
 Activity: Agriculture, education, human rights, health
Interviewee: Country Representative in Angola Ms. Elin Schennings and Programme Administrator Ms. Georgina de Matos
Date of interview: 18/04/08
Place of interview: GAS Head-office in Bairro Patrice Lumbumba, Luanda

Organisation: Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
Origin: Norway
Activity: Community development, Action Against Mines
Interviewee: Development Programme Manager, Ms. Helena Zefanias Lowe
Date of interview: 21/04/08
Place of interview: NPA Head-office in Alvalade, Luanda

Interviewee: Development Programme Manager, Ms. Helena Zefanias Lowe
Date of interview: 21/04/08
Place of interview: NPA Head-office in Alvalade, Luanda

Organisation: Norwegian Church AID (AIN)
Origin: Norway
Activity: Human rights, health, social services, institutional building
Interviewee: Country Representative in Angola, Ms. Berit Strømme
Date of interview: 21/04/08
Place of interview: AIN Office in Ingombota, Luanda

Organisation: AFRICARE
Origin: United States of America
Activity: Health, emergency, agriculture, social services
Interviewee: Programme Coordinator, Mr. Mariano Lucas
Date of interview: 22/04/08
Place of interview: Africare Head-office in Martal, Luanda

Organisation: International Child Development Programmes (ICDP)
Origin: Norway
Activity: Health and Education
Interviewee: Country Deputy Representative in Angola, Ms. Maria Luisa Martins
Date of interview: 22/04/08
Place of interview: ICDP Office in Ilha do Cabo, Luanda

Organisation: Association for the Support of the Abandoned Child (AACA)
Origin: Angola
Activity: Education, social services, agriculture (included sub-sectors: general education, public service)
Interviewee: National Director, Ms. Rosâria Maria Conceição Pereira
Date of interview: 22/04/08
Place of interview: AACA Head-office in Maculusso, Luanda

Organisation: German Agrarian Action (AAA)
Origin: Germany
Activity: Community Development and Integrated Projects
Interviewee: National Programme Coordinator, Ms. Ursula Languamp and Asst. National Programme Coordinator Mr. Manfred Bischofberger
Date of interview: 23/04/08
Place of interview: AAA Office in Largo Lucrecia Paim, Luanda

Organisation: Angolan Association for Adult Education (AAEA)
Origin: Angola
Activity: [Informal] Education and Civic Education
Interviewee: National Representative, Mr. Victor Manuel Barbosa
Date of interview: 23/04/08
Place of interview: AAEA Office in Maianga/Cassenda, Luanda
Organisation: National Counselling Centre (NCC)
Origin: Angola
Activity: Socio-political development, civic education, human rights, democracy, legal counselling and advocacy, activism
Interviewee: Executive Director, Dr. Reis Luis
Date of interview: 24/04/08
Place of interview: NCC Head-quarters in Vila Alice, Luanda

Organisation: Save the Children in Angola (SCA)
Origin: England
Activity: Health, education, social services: HIV/AIDS, general education, child protection
Interviewee: National Director, Mr. Douglas Steinberg
Date of interview: 24/04/08
Place of interview: SCA Office in Sambizanga/Bairro Operário, Luanda

Organisation: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
Origin: International Community Organisation (UN)
Activity: Media: education, democracy, human rights, democracy and reconciliation
Interviewee: Country Project Coordinator, Ms. Inês Filipa José
Date of interview: 25/04/08
Place of interview: OCHA Head-quarters in Bairro dos Combatentes, Luanda

Organisation: Angola Council of Churches (CICA)
Origin: Angola
Activity: Health, human rights, emergency, social services
Interviewee: National Director of the Department of Social Assistance and Development Mr. Antonio Alfonso Lopes
Date of interview: 28/04/08
Place of interview: CICA Head-quarters in Maianga/Cassenda, Luanda

Organisation: Development Organisation of Netherlands (SNV)
Origin: Netherlands
Activity: Social services, community development (sub-sectors: water and sanitation, micro-credit)
Interviewee: General Director, Mr. Carlos Figuereido
Date of interview: 28/04/08
Place of interview: SNV Head Office in Martal, Luanda