THE ZULU ROYAL FAMILY UNDER THE SOUTH AFRICAN
GOVERNMENT, 1910-1933: SOLOMON KADINUZULU,
INKATHA AND ZULU NATIONALISM

by

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## ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALU</td>
<td>Abaquclusi Land Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress (previously SANNC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNC</td>
<td>Chief Native Commissioner (Natal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>(South African) Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPSA</td>
<td>Church of the Province of South Africa (Anglican)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNC</td>
<td>District Native Commissioner</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICU</td>
<td>Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>member of parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAD</td>
<td>(Union) Native Affairs Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC</td>
<td>Native Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNC</td>
<td>Natal Native Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>SANNC</td>
<td>South African Native National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>South African Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNA</td>
<td>(Union) Secretary for Native Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZNTI</td>
<td>Zululand National Training Institution</td>
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## ABBREVIATIONS IN THE REFERENCES TO SOURCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AWGC</td>
<td>A.W.G.Champion Collection, University of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CK</td>
<td>Carter/Karis Collection of South African Political Materials (microfilm)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNC</td>
<td>Chief Native Commissioner's Correspondence, 1910-1919, Natal Archives</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNC PMB</td>
<td>Chief Native Commissioner's Correspondence, 1919-1950, Natal Archives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Colonial Office Confidential Print (Africa South) (microfilm)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DZ</td>
<td>Zululand Diocesan Records, Offices of the Diocese of Zululand, Eshowe</td>
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<td>Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>EGJ</td>
<td>E.G. Jansen Collection, University of the Orange Free State</td>
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<td>JUS</td>
<td>Archives of the Secretary of Justice, State Archives</td>
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<tr>
<td>KCAL</td>
<td>Killie Campbell Africana Library, Durban</td>
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<tr>
<td>MS CAMP</td>
<td>Sir Marshall Campbell Collection, KCAL</td>
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<tr>
<td>MS CHAM</td>
<td>Champion Papers, University of the Witwatersrand</td>
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<td>MS LUG</td>
<td>H.C. Lugg Collection, KCAL</td>
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<tr>
<td>MS MAR</td>
<td>J.S. Marwick Papers, KCAL</td>
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<tr>
<td>MS NIC</td>
<td>George Heaton Nicholls Collection, KCAL</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>Native Economic Commission, 1930-1932, Evidence, State Archives</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTS</td>
<td>Archives of the Department of Native Affairs, State Archives</td>
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<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister's Records, Natal Archives</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Archives of the Commissioner of the South African Police, 1901-1960, State Archives</td>
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<tr>
<td>SASJ</td>
<td>South African Sugar Journal</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNA</td>
<td>Secretary of Native Affairs' Records, Natal Archives</td>
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Before the declaration of Union in 1910, the institution of Zulu kingship repeatedly acted as a rallying point for Zulu taking up arms against the prospect or practice of white overrule. The political roles played by Cetshwayo kaMpande during the Anglo-Zulu war of 1879, and Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo during both the Zulu civil war which persisted until 1888 and the 'Zulu rebellion' of 1906, are illustrative in this respect. After each of these periods of violent confrontation between the Zulu and the forces of imperialism or colonialism, white authorities responded by banishing the head of the Zulu royal family from Zululand. The imprisonment and exile of Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo after the 1906 rebellion, however, was the third and last occasion on which the head of the head of the Zulu royal family was banished from Zululand.

Since Dinuzulu's death in exile in 1913, the heirs to the Zulu royal house have been domiciled in Zululand without interruption: Solomon Nkayishana kaDinuzulu (1913 to 1933); Cyprian Bhekuzulu kaSolomon (1948 to 1968 - Mshiyeni Arthur kaDinuzulu acted as regent during Cyprian's long minority); and Goodwill Zwelithini kaCyprian (1971 to date - after a brief regency period under Israel Mcwayizeni kaSolomon). Their political influence has remained a central theme in Zulu history throughout the post-Union period. But their political role has become increasingly distanced from the politics of protest and rebellion, and closer to the politics of compromise and collaboration.

In the early 1950s, while the 'Congress Alliance' (primarily comprising the African National Congress and the South African Indian Congress) was co-ordinating the unprecedentedly united and broad-based 'Defiance Campaign' against the policies of the apartheid regime, Cyprian was proving himself
to be amenable to the evolving state policy of 'separate
development' and the 1951 'Bantu Tribal Authorities
Act' which was its cornerstone. In 1953, the South African
Government for the first time recognised the head of the
Zulu royal family as 'paramount chief' of the 'Zulu nation',
in response to the ideological imperatives of the Verwoerdian
era. Following the inauguration of the KwaZulu Territorial
Authority in 1970 and, subsequently, under the terms of
the 1971 'Bantu Homelands Constitution Act', the KwaZulu
Legislative Assembly, Zwelithini and his royal council
played the leading role in a series of Pretoria-
sponsored attempts to dislodge the 'rebel' Chief Gatsha
Buthelezi from control over Zulu politics. It was partly
in response to the backstairs intrigues between 'king's
parties' (of which the 'Zulu National Party' and the
'Umkhonto kaShaka Party' were examples) and South African
state officials that members of the KwaZulu Legislative
Assembly, under Buthelezi's leadership, resuscitated in
1975 the Zulu 'Inkatha' organisation that had existed during
the 1920s.

Having established its hegemony in Zulu politics, the present
Inkatha has determinedly relegated Zwelithini to the role
of a 'non-political' constitutional monarch, and rejected
Pretoria's attempts to force KwaZulu to secede from 'white
South Africa' by accepting formal independence as a Zulu
homeland or nation-state. Inkatha has been the most
outspoken critic of South African Government policy to
emerge from within the structure of apartheid. But because
Inkatha appeals to a somewhat belligerently exclusive Zulu
nationalism (revealed most clearly in its reverence for
the institution of Zulu kingship, a symbol of Zulu tradition,
historic national unity and independence) and combines the
politics of protest and compromise, it has been a matter for
controversy whether the organisation, in the words of one
analyst, "undermines or underpins the white state". In the
light of Inkatha's role during the current (1984 - 1985) resurgence and expansion of anti-apartheid political action in South Africa, however, it would seem that Inkatha at present undermines apartheid's opponents far more than it undermines apartheid itself. The stance that Inkatha has adopted against the banned but influential African National Congress, the United Democratic Front and the recently-formed (November 1985) Congress of South African Trade Unions is illustrative in this respect.

The changing and problematical political role that the Zulu royal family and Zulu nationalism has played in the post-Union period, in the contexts of both Zulu politics and wider South African white and black politics, has not received the scholarly attention that it would seem to deserve. The notable and only exception, which focusses on the early post-Union period, is Shula Marks' pioneering article entitled "Natal, the Zulu Royal Family and the Ideology of Segregation". In that article, Marks offers a penetrating overview of the interconnections between the Natal African petty bourgeoisie and the Zulu royal family, which were embodied in the Inkatha of the 1920s, as well as the interconnections between the early Inkatha and the development of segregationist thinking at state level.

This dissertation sets out to examine thoroughly the political role of the Zulu royal family and Zulu nationalism during the first two decades after the Act of Union, during which period Solomon kaDinuzulu was the head of the Zulu royal family. For the second half of the 1920s, the focus necessarily falls not on Solomon but on Inkatha: the organisation had become the leading exponent of Zulu nationalism, and, being primarily a vehicle for the aspirations of the Zulu-speaking petty bourgeoisie, had succeeded in seizing the political initiative from the Zulu tribal elite and defining Solomon's role as that of a constitutional
monarch. An essential objective is to establish a narrative framework of Zulu royal and nationalist political history during the early post-Union period, since, indeed, none already exists. However, recognizing that developments in the sphere of Zulu politics cannot be understood in isolation from changes at the social and economic levels, as in the history of every human social formation, this dissertation does not simply or exclusively focus on Zulu 'politics'. For the Zulu people of Zululand and Northern Natal (the lands of the 'old Zulu kingdom'), and also the Zulu-speaking people of Natal proper (the territory of the original Colony of Natal, on the southern borders of the Zulu kingdom), the first two decades of Union was a period of accelerated socio-economic change. This was largely a consequence of their becoming increasingly enmeshed, as a subordinant people, in a wider South African economy and society. Moreover, because the pace and impact of industrialisation and acculturation was not equally experienced throughout Zulu society, new forms of social stratification developed among the Zulu. In the process, the roles of 'traditional' Zulu political authorities (which included the institution of Zulu kingship as well as the lesser tribal authorities which had been incorporated into the colonial system of 'indirect rule'), together with the ideologies with which they were associated (which included Zulu nationalism), themselves underwent substantial change. While attempting to situate the changing political role of Zulu royalty and Zulu nationalism in a broader social context, and in particular to 'look beneath the skin' of Zulu nationalism to identify the social forces which shaped it, this dissertation thus broadens its focus to include Zulu social change and class formation. As with Zulu political history, no account of Zulu social history for the early post-Union period already exists.

This dissertation follows on from Jeff Guy's The destruction of the Zulu Kingdom (first published in 1979), which focusses
on the post-conquest Zulu civil war, and Shula Marks' Reluctant Rebellion (published in 1970), which focusses on the 1906 rebellion.5 Guy's and Marks' thorough and stimulating histories, together with their subsequently-published articles,6 have not only acted as sources of inspiration but also as essential reference works in the preparation of this dissertation. The following reconstruction of Zulu history during the early post-Union period, however, is based almost exclusively on primary research materials.

This dissertation's concern is with the history of the Zulu people in particular. The processes of change which it identifies taking place among the Zulu during the early post-Union period, however, were to a certain extent mirrored in African societies elsewhere in southern Africa. Both for this reason, and because it addresses certain topics and ventures into various analytical domains which represent undeveloped areas in South African historiography, the study could be of value to researchers whose interests do not lie particularly or exclusively in Zulu history. Indeed, this study has itself drawn on other studies whose focus falls on African societies beyond the borders of the province of Natal.7

Twentieth century South African rural history represents an especially severely undeveloped area in South African historiography. Even though Colin Bundy's work does not proceed much further than the first decade of the twentieth century, his pioneering study entitled The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry is an exception in this regard8 — and has proved useful in the preparation of this dissertation. So too have Slater's and Guy's articles, which focus on the late nineteenth century in the Natal region.9 In regard to the early twentieth century, Helen Bradford's work on the ICU in Natal proper has been both stimulating and informative.10
Although the geographical and chronological scope of this dissertation is considerably broader than Bradford's article, like Bradford's work it addresses both African and white rural history. This dissertation could also make a contribution to the historiography of South African state racial policy, particularly since it highlights the contacts between Natal's leading white 'native policy' legislators, who are recognised to have played an important role in the development of state segregationism in the 1920s and early 1930s, and Zulu nationalist politicians. In contrast to other analyses, with the exception of Marks' "Ideology of Segregation", it describes the interconnections between African politics (as expressed in the Zulu nationalist context) and white segregationist thinking at state level.

Considerable advances have been made within the last decade in the field of South African 'Africanist' historiography, largely as a consequence of the growth of the 'revisionist' school of South African historiography. Many lacunae nonetheless remain. When the extant literature on African history during the post-Union period does refer to tribal authorities, for example, it does so often only to dismiss them as inert 'traditionalists' or as state employees and therefore collaborators. This dissertation, by contrast, pays special attention to the development and political role of tribal authorities - the 'chiefly stratum' - as a class. For the earlier period, it draws on Guy's "Destruction and reconstruction of Zulu society", and, to a lesser extent, Patrick Harries' study of labour migration from the Delagoa Bay hinterland until the close of the nineteenth century. While there is an important and growing body of literature on the African petty bourgeoisie, with the notable exception of Bundy's Peasantry studies have tended to focus on the African petty bourgeoisie as an urban phenomenon. Furthermore, with the notable exception of Phillip Bonner's study of the African petty bourgeoisie in Johannesburg between 1917
and 1920, studies have tended to focus on the pre-Union history of the African petty bourgeoisie.\textsuperscript{15} Similarly, there is a dearth of secondary material regarding the African 'underclass' in the rural areas (which this dissertation describes as the 'rank-and-file', to avoid the specific connotations which attach to the term 'working class') during the post-Union period, although Bradford's study of the ICU in Natal proper makes a significant contribution to the redress of this lacuna.\textsuperscript{16}

In accordance with University requirements, I hereby state that, unless specifically indicated to the contrary in the text or footnotes, this dissertation is my own original work.
Footnotes to the Preface


7. See references in the text, and especially in the footnotes.


11. See Marks, "Ideology of Segregation".


13. See, for example, M. Lacey, *Working for Boroko"
(Johannesburg, 1931); and F. Roux, Time Longer than Rope (Madison, 1964).

14 P. Harries, "Kinship, ideology and the nature of pre-colonial labour migration: labour migration from the Delagoa Bay hinterland to South Africa, up to 1895", in Marks and Rathbone (eds), Industrialisation and Social Change.

15 P. Bonner, "The Transvaal Native Congress, 1917-1920: the radicalisation of the black petty bourgeoisie on the Rand", in Marks and Rathbone (eds), Industrialisation and Social Change. In this context, however, important contributions have been made by H. Bradford, "Mass movements and the petty bourgeoisie: the social origins of ICU leadership, 1924-1929", Journal of African History, 25, 1984; and T. Couzens, "Moralizing leisure time: the transatlantic connection and black Johannesburg, 1918-1936", in Marks and Rathbone (eds), Industrialisation and Social Change.

16 Bradford, "The ICU in Umvoti".
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Sir Theophilus Shepstone and 'Shepstonism' in Natal

No account of the role of Zulu chiefs in general, or the Zulu royal family in particular, during the period covered by this thesis is possible without an appraisal of the policy of indirect rule known as 'Shepstonism' - so named after Sir Theophilus Shepstone. Although it had developed in Natal as a means of dealing with the African population, it subsequently informed official policy in Zululand after the Anglo-Zulu war of 1879. The theory and practice of indirect rule in Natal, however, was not Shepstone's brainchild. The groundwork had been laid long before Shepstone took charge as Diplomatic Agent to the Native Tribes in 1846; moreover, Shepstone himself was initially one of its staunchest critics.

One of the two foundations of Shepstonism - the recognition of existing African authorities, laws and customs - was central to an agreement that Sir Benjamin D'Urban made with chiefs in the Port Natal region as early as 1833. Whilst they and their wards were to be subjects of the king of England and were to abide by the "general laws of the Colony", Colonial law "...would not interfere with the domestic and internal regulations of the Chiefs for their tribes ... nor with their customs." The other foundation was implicit in this agreement: the African chiefs and their followers would retain their access to land and could continue to exploit it and distribute it among themselves in accordance with their own laws and customs. Both D'Urban's annexation of the territory and the above agreement were soon annulled; at that stage London saw no reason for the extension of British sovereignty over the area. When Britain did annex Natal in 1845, she did
so for objectives that were essentially negative. She did not want an independent Afrikaner republic on the South African coast, nor did she want Afrikaner settlers to displace a large African population to the south of Natal, where they might further complicate matters on the Cape Colony's explosive frontier. As far as the Colonial Office was concerned, the intrinsic value of the Colony of Natal was negligible and, accordingly, the amount spent on her governance should be minimal.

In a memorandum drawn up during the sitting of the 1846 Natal Natives Location Commission, Shepstone had proposed a policy which envisaged an African population assimilated to European law, under the direct supervision of European magistrates, and the encouragement of an educational and 'civilising' endeavour. However, the Colonial Office was not prepared to embark on a costly programme of social and economic reform, even if this might forge a self-supporting colony with African peasant cultivators contributing to the Imperial economy both a supply of raw materials and a market for British manufactured goods. More acceptable was a colony paying for its own administration through the extraction of surplus from extant African homestead production in the form of tax. British capital, too, was not intent on developing new patterns of production; it was more interested in land speculation. The policy of indirect rule in Natal was borne of expediency and parsimony.

The Location Commission had recommended the establishment of what were to become Natal's African reserves. The administrative policy laid down by Royal Instructions issued in 1848, embodied the thinking of the Colonial Office rather than of colonial officials. Within the overarching control of British authority, which could intervene at its pleasure, African customary law was
recognised and chiefs were to continue to exercise authority over their 'tribes' in accordance with this law. Shepstone initially raised strong objections, particularly to the wide powers accorded to chiefs whom he was inclined to characterise as despots. Shepstone also sympathised with white colonists' opposition to the Location policy and indirect rule on the grounds that it perpetuated 'barbarism' and independent homestead production, thereby 'locking up' labour that the colonists urgently needed. However, he realised that the Natal African population, whatever its weaknesses was still strong enough to resist a frontal attack on its independent way of life. Given no alternative, Shepstone gradually began to see merit in the policy of indirect rule. He embraced it and left his personal stamp on it.

The 'Shepstone system' was a policy of legal, political and territorial segregation, under an umbrella of white dominance. At the apex of Shepstonism was the office of Supreme Chief, an office which vested in the Governor of Natal the powers that an African paramount chief was presumed to wield. In the hands of the Supreme Chief were to rest all executive, political and judicial power, to be delegated as he wished through the Secretary of Native Affairs in Natal, the magistrates beneath him, and, in turn, the chiefs and headmen beneath them. It was a prerogative that exceeded the traditional powers of a paramount chief - and anyway there had never been one in Natal.

It was, however, in the lowest reaches of the hierarchy that the essence of indirect rule lay. Shepstonism imposed two duties on chiefs. On the one hand chiefs were to function as cheap civil servants who were ultimately
responsible to the Supreme Chief; on the other they were to act out their traditional role in presiding over, guiding and coordinating the activities of their 'tribes' in accordance with customary law and usage. Though the Supreme Chief could intervene where and whenever he thought it necessary, in the daily running of affairs the chiefs had a large measure of independence.

The whole system was set within the matrix of African customary law which was to be administered through the medium of white officials and African chiefs, with the right of appeal to the Supreme Chief. Since African customary law was so vital a component of African administration, great efforts were made to codify it and commit it to paper after the European fashion. The Natal 'Code of Native Law' was first gazetted in 1878, and was periodically amended thereafter. The Code not only entreated the judicial and legal aspects of segregation in Natal; as Natal's Chief Native Commissioner appreciatively reflected forty-seven years later, it also "embraces the administrative, social and moral aspects of native life." Exceptions to the operation of customary law were made where it was deemed to be "repugnant to the general principles of humanity observed throughout the civilized world". Furthermore in 1846, provision was made for African individuals to be exempted from customary law and to fall under the purview of European law. In practice, few attained the educational and 'civilized' standards laid down as qualifications for exemption. Nevertheless, 'exempted natives' were to become an important African social group.

The system contained within it the seeds of its own breakdown. Alongside each of the roles of a Shepstonist
chief lay two separate sets of responsibilities and loyalties, and it was frequently impossible to fulfill both simultaneously. Shepstone believed it to be an "axiom" that

it is impossible to govern effectively a Zulu population, such as either that of Natal or Zululand, without the aid of their own institutions at the head of which are their Chiefs and Headmen.

However, Shepstone was in no doubt where the primary responsibilities of chiefs should lie whenever the interests of government and people conflicted. Indeed, he would ideally have weeded out hereditary chiefs and supplanted them with government appointees, who, dependent directly on the government for their office, would act as more quiescent servants. He employed hereditary chiefs because it was impossible to eliminate their influence immediately, but he foresaw their gradual elimination. Furthermore, he encouraged the fissiparous tendencies inherent in the Nguni socio-political system with a view to forging new "government tribes", under appointed chiefs, from the resultant fragments.

In Natal, where Shepstone's ideas had evolved, the African population comprised separate tribal groups. Furthermore, here Shepstone was often dealing with tribal groups which had been disrupted by raiders from the Zulu kingdom or disturbed by an influx of refugees from Zulu rule. The Natal African population was somewhat malleable - and Shepstone's ideas of 'government tribes' under 'appointed chiefs' could therefore be more readily implemented in Natal than in Zululand. The Zulu had a strong tradition of centralised rule and national unity, and their independent spirit had been vividly manifested in the way in which they had confronted British imperial might in 1879. The deportation of their king after the Anglo-Zulu war did
not simply erase the Zulu political heritage. However, Shepstone's ideas dominated official thinking when it came to devising British policy in Zululand after the war.

Shepstonism in Zululand

On 1 September 1879, Sir Garnet Wolseley, General Officer in command of the British troops and now vested with civil authority to effect a settlement in Zululand, addressed the Zulu people through the medium of John Shepstone, Acting Secretary of Native Affairs for Natal and brother of Sir Theophilus.

"Only yesterday you yourselves have seen Cetshwayo carried away a prisoner, never", he emphasized, "to return again to Zululand. ... His country is now to be divided up into different chieftainships, and I hope his fate will be a warning to all chiefs not to follow in his footsteps, but to act according to the commands and terms given by the British Queen, who will most surely punish any who do not do so. ... Zululand now belongs to the Queen of England. She has, however, already enough land in Africa, and so has, through me as her representative, appointed certain chiefs to rule over the districts which I shall presently name, ... following the laws and customs held good before Chaka."21

Thus were Shepstonist principles, in the form of Wolseley's 'settlement', ushered into Zululand. A decade of disastrous civil wars ensued, which, as Jeff Guy has demonstrated, proved more devastating to the Zulu people than the Zulu war itself.22 Of crucial significance were the particular chiefs whom Wolseley had appointed, the groups of people and districts they were to administer, and the policy that had been adopted towards the Zulu royal family and their closest adherents, the Usuthu. In all these matters
Wolseley had been closely influenced by Shepstone and "the Shepstone clique"\textsuperscript{23} - as had Melmoth Osborn, the British Resident that Wolseley appointed in Zululand.

If Shepstone was apprehensive of the independent powers of hereditary chiefs in Natal, suspecting them to be likely sources of dissent, his fears were compounded when faced with the Zulu royal family. Shepstone and Shepstonists characterised the Zulu royal family as a fearsome and disruptive remnant of a "pure military despotism", unequivocally "opposed to the quiet of the country and the happiness of the people."\textsuperscript{24} Shepstone himself regarded monarchical authority within a unitary political structure as an imposition on the Zulu people, who, "composed originally of conquered and incorporated tribes", yearned for their "ancient and separate existence, relieved of the terrible incubus of the Zulu royal family."\textsuperscript{25} Given the freedom and official encouragement to do so, he reasoned these divisive 'yearnings' would place the Zulu royal family in check. Thus the aim of the British administrators was, on the one hand, to demolish the Zulu state and impress upon the Zulu that the powers and pretentions of the Zulu royal family had permanently expired, and, on the other, to replace the rule of the Zulu king with that of a number of independent chiefs appointed over resuscitated pre-Shakan chiefdoms.

In practice, the majority of the thirteen chiefs appointed by Wolseley bore no links with any pre-Shakan arrangement. Furthermore, the boundaries of their 'chiefdoms' cut indiscriminately across social and political groupings - in some cases chiefs did not even live in the districts over which they were to rule.\textsuperscript{26} Two chiefs were aliens: the Englishman John Dunn who had turned against his friend and patron, Cetshwayo, during the war, and Hlubi, a Sotho chief, who had served as a mercenary with the British
forces. More significant was the appointment of Zibhebhu
and Hamu, two restless members of the Zulu royal lineage
who had exploited the events of 1879 to pursue their own
separate ambitions. Both had been closely connected with
the colonial world before the war through the media of
trade, labour recruiting, and European advisors, and
after the war were eager to collaborate with the victors
to consolidate their positions. The cultivation of
such a group of collaborating 'new men' who were indebted
to British intervention for their status was the mainspring
of British policy.

The royalist cause was dealt its heaviest blow by the
appointment of the royal collaborators, Hamu and Zibhebhu,
to rule over its northern territories. Hamu was assigned
a large territory in the north-west that included his own
followers, the Ngenetsheni, the staunchly royalist Qulusi,
and a large part of the Buthelezi, including the
personal homestead of their lineage head, Mnyamana, who
had been Cetshwayo's chief counsellor. To the east of
Hamu, Zibhebhu was awarded extensive territory which
included the core of the Usuthu, including Cetshwayo's son
and heir-apparent, Dinuzulu, and Ndabuko and Ziwedu
who were Cetshwayo's most powerful brothers. It was
one of the vagaries of the settlement, however, that not
all of Zibhebhu's direct followers, the Mandlakazi, were
included in his 'chiefdom'.

Hamu and particularly Zibhebhu immediately scrambled to
consolidate and exploit their positions, turning on the
Usuthu and royalist adherents to do so. In the chaos
arising out of the Usuthu backlash, the British Resident,
Melmoth Osborn, showed his "true Shepstonian colours" in
throwing his weight behind the collaborators against the
Usuthu. No cure for anarchy was found, and by 1883 the British Government saw no alternative but to restore to Cetshwayo to Zululand. He returned to rule over Central Zululand, excluding Zibhebhu and Hamu's lands to the north, and also excluding a newly proclaimed Reserve Territory which was to act as a buffer to the south. This arrangement did not end the disturbances, but rather resulted in a full-scale civil war.

Within a year, Cetshwayo had died, the Usuthu having been thoroughly defeated in a series of clashes with the Mandlakazi. Dinuzulu pursued the royalist cause with the help of new found allies - the Boers. Zibhebhu was routed and fled to the Reserve Territory. The vast territorial claims of the Boers, as reward for their services, brought about British intervention and arbitration between Boer and Zulu - in response to Zulu appeals and in defence of British strategic interests. The new 'settlement' was reached in 1887: the partition of Zululand between Britain and the Boers. In the north-west the Boers were rewarded approximately one third of Zululand, including the best grazing land. The Ngenetsheni, the Qulusi, and important sections of the Buthelezi and the Usuthu now found themselves subjects of the Boer 'New Republic'. In addition, an adjoining area designated 'Proviso B' was set aside for European settlement. The rest of the country was annexed directly to the British Crown.

Shepstonist principles of administration were not only confirmed in British Zululand, but carried a stage further by the appointment of the Governor of Natal, Sir Arthur Havelock, as Special Commissioner and Supreme Chief of Zululand. "The House of Shaka is a thing of the past", he announced, "it is like water spilt on the
Both Dinuzulu and Zibhebhu were recognised as chiefs under the new authority. British policy had not departed from its prejudice against the Zulu royal family: the prescription for administrative success was still seen to lie in the appointment of collaborators as a counter balance to royal power. The restoration of Zibhebhu resulted in the displacement of five thousand Usuthu from their homes. Osborn, now Resident Commissioner in Zululand, saw Zibhebhu's loyalty to the Crown since 1879 as a strong contrast to Usuthu disaffection.

The Usuthu resisted the partition of Zululand and the restoration of Zibhebhu - and the colonial order that the latter, together with the hut tax that was imposed in 1887, represented. The annexation had, however, succeeded in fracturing unity among the royalist group. Dinuzulu initially refused to accept copies of Havelock's proclamation of the annexation or a stipend from the government; but Mnyamana, the Buthelezi leader, did, thus initiating a rift between the Usuthu and the Buthelezi that was to linger for over two decades. Finally, after violence had erupted once again between the Usuthu and the Mandlakazi in 1888, Dinuzulu and his uncles, Ndabuko and Shingana, were arrested and tried for high treason. Found guilty, they were exiled to St. Helena. As with the exile of Cetshwayo in 1879, the influence of the Zulu royal family could not so easily be eliminated in Zululand - as British policy makers were now beginning to realize.

The 'Basutolandization' alternative

The prospect of a basic change in policy came in 1893. In
that year, Shepstone died, and Osborn and Sir Charles Mitchell, Governor of Natal and Zululand, retired simultaneously. Lord Ripon, Secretary of State for Colonies in the newly elected Liberal Government in Britain, strongly disapproved of past policy in Zululand and therefore appointed Sir Marshal Clarke as new Resident Commissioner precisely because he had not been brought up in the Shepstonist mould. Whilst British Resident in Basutoland (1884 – 1893), Clarke had successfully put into practice a form of indirect rule that was very different to the Shepstonist model that had been applied in Zululand. Both the Southern Sotho under Moshweshwe and the Zulu under Cetshwayo had been politically centralised kingdoms when they fell under British jurisdiction, but whilst British administrators in Zululand had made every effort to destroy all vestiges of monarchical authority, Clarke in Basutoland had merely superimposed British overrule on top of it. Once in Zululand, Clarke swiftly perceived the principle of 'divide and rule' and excessive European intervention to be root causes of the disorder there. Clarke aimed to discourage rather than encourage the fissiparous tendencies in Zulu society, and to rule through hereditary chiefs so far as that was possible. For this scheme he gained the support of the Colonial Office and the new Governor of Natal and Zululand, Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson.

As a priority, Clarke set out to revitalize customary law by securing greater uniformity in its administration, and by granting hereditary chiefs larger judicial powers. Of special significance, whereas previously chiefs had jurisdiction only in cases involving members of their own wards, certain chiefs were now to be also granted jurisdiction in cases (including certain criminal cases) arising within their wards where those involved were individuals from other wards. The discrete administrative and legal jurisdiction granted
to the existing eighty-seven petty chiefs had become "practically inoperative," he observed, and had done great damage to the traditions of Zulu law and custom upon which the British administration depended.

Instead of splitting the natives up into factions and undermining the power of the hereditary chiefs, and attempting to get the natives by degrees to look to the magistrates instead of the chiefs in all matters of more than trifling importance, certain hereditary chiefs and certain others ... are to be endowed with considerable powers, and the natives are to be taught to look to them in the first instance and through them to the Resident Commissioner.

To this end the 'Laws and Regulations for the Government of Zululand' were amended by Zululand Proclamation No. VI of 1894.

Simultaneously Clarke turned his attention to preventing the recurrence of civil disturbances in Zululand. Much of the "tension", as he described the bloodbath of the last fourteen years, he attributed to the policy adopted towards the Usuthu. His remedy was to recommend "clemency and oblivion" for the Usuthu exiles and their repatriation to Zululand. The Basutoland model was not, however, entirely applicable because the "policy, pursued in Zululand...has had the result of exaggerating intertribal differences, and any attempt to impose upon the people a native head would be unfair, [and] would lead to marked opposition..." Nonetheless, he advocated that Dinuzulu be appointed "Government induna and adviser" in recognition of the realities of his extraordinary status among Zulu chiefs. Hely-Hutchinson strongly supported Clarke, and encapsulated the rationale of the proposed policy: though Dinuzulu
was not to return as paramount chief, his special appointment would enable the government to "maintain its influence over Dinuzulu, making use of whatever power or influence he may possess, or obtain for consolidating the power of the local administration." 49

However, substantial change in British policy in Zululand could not be arranged by the Colonial Office and its local officials alone. Since responsible government was granted to Natal in 1893, the Natal Government was dominated by expansionist colonist interests intent on incorporating Zululand into Natal. As details of Clarke's policy proposals unfolded, colonists' fears that Zululand was being turned into a 'native location' offering "neither room nor scope for the enterprise of white colonists" increased accordingly. 50 The prospect of Dinuzulu's repatriation, however, was of even greater weight in mobilising a colonist population who had long regarded the Zulu royal family with fervent and fearful antipathy. 51 In the event Natal succeeded in making the repatriation of Dinuzulu conditional upon the incorporation of Zululand into Natal. 52 In 1898, Dinuzulu did return to Zululand as chief of the Usuthu and government induna' with a liberal stipend of five hundred pounds a year, but much to his chagrin he returned to a Zululand under the jurisdiction of Natal rather than the Colonial Office. In practice, Clarke's stipulation that Dinuzulu occupy some sort of central position in close contact with the government was ignored by the Natal Government 53 - Shepstonist principles still obtained. Natal was not prepared to give Dinuzulu a chance to prove himself in a new role. It was because of these attitudes that Clarke terminated his work in Zululand. 54 Eight years later there was to be another Zulu rebellion - this time levelled directly against the colonial establishment rather than its African
collaborators - followed by more treason trials.

British policy in Zululand between 1879 and 1893 had been dominated by Natal colonial officials and colonist opinion. Through them it had been imbued with a Shepstonist vision of 'native' administration and a deep-seated prejudice against the Zulu royal family. Almost all the policy makers and administrators in Zululand had issued from the ranks of Natal's 'native' administrators - and those who had been appointed from outside the fold soon fell under the influence of the ideas and prejudices of their colleagues. Clarke, however, was an exception. His transfer from Basutoland to Zululand represented an attempt by the Colonial Office to surmount or by-pass local white preconceptions with a view to implementing administrative reform. However, by successfully linking the issue of Dinuzulu's repatriation to the transfer of the jurisdiction over Zululand from the Colonial Office to Natal, the local ideas and prejudices prevailed in 1897 - and they were to overflow to the post-Union period.

From self-governing colony to province of the Union: official postures and the Zulu royal family

The above overview of the administration of Zululand, focusing on the handling of the Zulu royal family, provides an essential background to official attitudes to Dinuzulu's successor, Solomon. In the first place, some were to see any recognition of Solomon's special position as inimical to the political stability of Natal and Zululand, and sought to eradicate the influence of the Zulu royal family. Others sought to recognise Solomon's special position and co-opt him as part of the administrative machinery. These two positions respectively approximate
to what have been described as 'Shepstonist principles' and the ideas of Clarke. In the second place, one may discern that the Natal officials of the Union Native Affairs Department (hereafter NAD) tended to adopt the former view, and the central authorities tended to adopt the latter, following the trends set by their predecessors in the pre-Union period. In other words, the Natal NAD tended to take over the role of the defunct Natal Government and its Native Affairs Department, whilst certain officials of the NAD head office in Pretoria and certain Union Statesmen tended to take over the role of the Colonial Office.

The position and status of the Zulu royal family during the period of Natal Colonial rule (1897-1910) was uncertain. The Natal Government, which wielded ultimate authority, repeatedly denied or denounced the fact of Dinuzulu's influence over Africans outside his Usuthu 'tribe', and attempted to prevent any situations arising when that influence might be manifested or consolidated. Nevertheless, on occasion Dinuzulu found that he was called upon to exercise the influence that he was at all other times called upon to renounce. On the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer war, the imperial forces approached Dinuzulu to provide Zulu 'scouts' or 'spies' to infiltrate Boer military encampments in the Vryheid district which, since 1884, had been Boer territory - firstly as part of the New Republic and subsequently of the South African (Transvaal) Republic. Dinuzulu agreed, and Zulu spies subsequently played a vital role in that theatre of war, ferrying information of Boer numerical strength and logistics to the British lines. Furthermore, Dinuzulu was asked to "exercise his influence" over Zulu in the Vryheid district during the Boer war to persuade them not to do the same for the Boers. However, after the end of the war and the transfer of the territory of the defunct New Republic
to Natal (this territory became 'Northern Natal', comprising the districts of Vryheid, including Babanango sub-district, Ngotshe, Paulpietersburg and Utrecht), the Natal Government responded to evidence of contact between Dinuzulu and Vryheid headmen by instructing Dinuzulu that he had "no political influence over that district" and that he had "nothing whatever to do with Vryheid natives". 59

Although the Natal Government's attitude towards Dinuzulu was consistently antipathetic, its policy towards him was not wholly consistent. This was clear during the 1906 'Zulu' rebellion which erupted in Natal proper (which distinguishes the territory of the original Colony of Natal from the subsequently included territories of Zululand and Northern Natal) and spread to Zululand after Natal rebels took refuge in Zululand. The Natal Government regarded it as Dinuzulu's duty to use his influence to halt the rebellion, and was keenly aware how hostilities throughout the colony would escalate should he do otherwise. It was therefore appreciative of his "openly expressed attitude" against the rebellion, and the governor happily noted this attitude had had "good effect" well outside his own ward. 60 At the same time, however, the government refused to be seen to recognise or give sanction to Dinuzulu's influence beyond the Usuthu, on the grounds that this would strengthen his status among the Zulu as paramount chief. For this reason it declined Dinuzulu's offer to raise an impi to assist the government forces against rebels in various parts of Natal - although it accepted similar offers from other chiefs in Zululand. 61 Natal's paranoia for the Zulu royal family, even when evidence of its 'loyalty' was abundant, was clearly illustrated in 1907. On the grounds of scarce and incoherent
evidence of his disloyalty during the 1906 rebellion, the Natal Government was injudiciously eager to secure Dinuzulu's conviction on a charge of high treason for complicity with the rebels. 62

These Natal colonial attitudes persisted after Union and exercised considerable influence on policy towards the Zulu royal family. When Union was declared in 1910, officials of the Natal colonial Department of Native Affairs continued in their posts as employees of the newly established Union NAD. Even after Union, the Natal NAD was continually infused with members of Natal families which had been closely associated with 'native' matters - whether as administrators, missionaries or educators. Within the Natal NAD - and among interested white Natalians - there was a solid phalanx which could, with some justification, claim to 'know best', and which jealously guarded what was seen as a Natal tradition in 'native' administration. As the 'men on the spot', Natal officials perceived themselves as the ones who were in touch with the 'realities' of the situation.

Significantly, at Union the Natal NAD was treated as a special case, and was allowed a certain independence which was anomalous to the "ultimate objective" of the NAD to "coordinate and harmonize the divergent and disparate systems of Native administration previously operative in the various Provinces of the Union ...." 63 In pursuit of this objective, the Union Governor-General-in-Council was vested with all powers previously exercised by the various colonial Governors where the African population was concerned (in Natal he became Supreme Chief), and a single Native Affairs Department was established under a permanent head - the Union Secretary of Native Affairs (hereafter SNA) - who was
responsible to the Minister of Native Affairs. At the same time a commission was appointed to study the internal organisation of the NAD and recommend changes where necessary. The commission reported that

The Native Administration of the four colonies is now centralized in Pretoria ... in Natal, however, considerable local administrative functions have been vested in the Chief Native Commissioner and this arrangement has required the retention in that province of a proportion of the Natal headquarters staff. It also recommended the retention of the post of District Native Commissioner (hereafter DNC) of Zululand, created by the Natal Government, "in view of the character of the population and the latent possibilities of unrest." These arrangements were unique to Natal, and provided institutional sanction and scope for the independent-mindedness of Natal officials. Significantly, the first person to serve as Chief Native Commissioner in Natal (hereafter CNC) was D. J. Shepstone, previously Natal Secretary of Native Affairs, who himself noted the great value of the "personal factor" in 'native' administration and that 'natives' had "invariably" expressed their satisfaction that a "son of Somtseu" had been appointed their permanent head. On his death in 1912 he was succeeded by R. H. (Dick) Addison who had begun his career in the Natal Native Affairs Department in 1876. Addison had been Resident Magistrate in the Ndwandwe District of Zululand during the disturbances of 1888 - and he considered the Usuthu attack on the Mandlakazi that occurred within one thousand yards of his magistracy to have been intended for his magistracy itself. During the course of the
subsequent treason trial, Addison was revealed to be culpable of "extreme partiality" and "startling acts of illegitimate violence against the Usuthu." As DNC of Zululand immediately prior to his appointment as CNC, he proved that his attitudes had not changed.

Addison's undoubted arrogance, intransigence and violence was not typical of the Natal NAD as a whole. Natal officials' outlooks were certainly coloured by Social Darwinist ideology, but it is important that many had clearly made their careers in 'native' administration to take up the philanthropic responsibilities that this ideology placed on the 'more evolved' race: to protect, uplift, and administer justice. However, they were also influenced by the more naked racism of white settler society - whose priorities were more exploitative than philanthropic. Moreover, as the intermediaries between dominant white and subordinate black in the province that housed the Zulu people (whose military history inspired fear and respect) and in which the numerical ratio of black to white far exceeded any other in the Union, they were subject to a nagging apprehension of the fragility of white rule. In practice this was translated into opposition to any change in established modes of interaction and administrative control. An important facet of this mental inertia was expressed in their attitude to the Zulu royal family. Even this generalization needs qualification: C.A. Wheelwright, CNC for the larger part of Solomon's chieftainship, was by no means intransigent on the subject of official policy towards the Zulu royal family - and his popularity in white Natal suffered accordingly.

While on the one hand the course of the 1906 rebellion
and the subsequent treason trial illustrate colonial Natal's antipathy to the Zulu royal family, on the other they illustrate the less excitable and even sympathetic stance of both the British Government and politicians in the other South African colonies - some of whom were soon to become the leading statesmen of the Union. Natal's actions incurred widespread criticism - perhaps most significantly from Generals Botha and Smuts who were to be the first and second Prime Ministers of the Union of South Africa. Botha and Dinuzulu had fought alongside one another during the Boer-Zulu alliance of 1884 against Zibhebhu, and subsequently Botha was said to look upon Dinuzulu as a "personal friend" and "a sort of foster brother." He in particular was convinced Dinuzulu was not a rebel. A representative of the Transvaal Government observed that it was "to the credit of the Boer members of our ministry that they think the Natal Government action to be horrible.... Something must be done to save Natal from herself."79

Indeed there was also a feeling among South African statesmen who were currently negotiating the forthcoming Act of Union, that South Africa needed to be saved from Natal: her unjust and heavy-handed actions might cause unwelcome imperial intervention or provoke an African backlash that would threaten the security of the whole of South Africa. For John X. Merriman (Prime Minister, Cape Colony) in particular, the prospect of watching over Natal's 'native' policy and intervening where necessary, was one of the attractions of Union.80

Botha and Smuts, moreover, had a personal interest in the Zulu royal family - an interest that was reflected in its changed fortunes immediately after the Act of Union.
The significance of the 1906 rebellion

Beneath the official condemnations, justifications and recriminations, the 1906 rebellion revealed that there was in progress considerable ferment and change in African politics in Natal proper and Zululand - a change that white authorities recognized only partially and comprehended even less. An aspect of change was the new political significance of the Zulu royal family. Although there is little evidence of Zulu royalty deliberately and of their own accord involving themselves in the rebellion, there is no doubt that the Zulu royal family did play a role, even if that role was an uninvited and unwelcome imposition from the rebels themselves. For the rebels, the Zulu royal family was a living reminder of a powerful and independent African past - what has been described as the "golden age" of traditional African life. Rebels throughout Natal proper and Zululand used Dinuzulu's name and royal symbols as morale boosters and rallying points. Unsubstantiated rumours that Dinuzulu was preparing for rebellion and that he expected others to do likewise had been rife among the African population immediately prior to hostilities. During the disturbances, the royal war cry 'usuthu' was used, and the traditional war emblem, the tshokobesi, was worn by rebel fighters. Importantly, the bulk of the rebels were Natal Africans - the people whom the Zulu kingdom had raided with devastating effect when at the zenith of its power and whom the Zulu contemp tuously referred to as 'amakhafula' ('those who have been spat out'). In 1906, however, the Zulu royal family became a source of inspiration and a focus for unity. It was significant too that the social base of the rebellion, which took place in
the rural districts, was not restricted to 'tribal' Africans. First, considerable numbers of wage labourers deserted their employment in urban areas to supplement rebels in the rural areas. Second, Natal khoiwa Africans (literally Christian Africans, but also connoting educated and 'civilized'), who had hitherto tended to identify with the colonial order and distance themselves from tribal society, were clearly ambiguous about the rebellion. The division between Christian and non-Christian Africans was less clear cut in 1906: many Christians forebore to condemn the rebels and some went so far as to join them. Moreover, Dinuzulu's treatment by the Natal Government in the aftermath of the rebellion drew strong condemnation from the African press. The 1906 rebellion thus was not merely an instance of 'primary resistance', but reflected the early development of African nationalism in a modern sense - which was simultaneously being reflected in the Separatist church movement of which the Ethiopian churches were examples. The undercurrents that briefly broke through to the surface in 1906 revealed that the Zulu royal family had a wider base of potential support - both territorially and socially - than it had had in 1879.

These political developments must be understood in their socio-economic context. As Slater has demonstrated for Natal, and Guy for Zululand, the imposition of white overrule and the demands of an expanding capitalist economy during the nineteenth century had caused severe social dislocation and ultimately increasing impoverishment among the African population. In Natal the twin pressures of tax and declining African access to land were intensified at the turn of the
century. Hut tax in the reserves was increased dramatically between 1902 and 1905, a new £3 tax was levied on the inhabitants of mission reserves in 1903, and in the same year the rent payable by tenants on Crown lands was raised from £1 to £2.91 On top of this, in 1905 a poll tax was imposed on all African males who did not pay hut tax - this provided the immediate spark for the 1906 rebellion. At the same time, the rapid commercialization of white agriculture stimulated by the new markets and wealth generated on the gold fields from the 1880s onwards caused a sharp rise in land values. For many African tenants on white land holdings, this meant either increased rent or eviction by white landlords now anxious to exploit the land themselves.92 The overall effect was that fewer Africans were able to pursue a relatively independent existence either as subsistence producers or as peasants, and so were forced off the land to seek wage labour - itself one of the motivations of white tax and land policy.

These trends were mirrored in Zululand, although their effect was more delayed in comparison to neighbouring Natal. Large-scale labour migration from Zululand, Guy argues, can be dated from 1888, as a consequence of the imposition of hut tax in British Zululand in that year.93 After the incorporation of British Zululand into Natal in 1897, taxes levied in Natal proper were similarly levied in Zululand. One of the conditions of the incorporation of British Zululand was that no alienation of land should occur for five years, after which time a Commission could be appointed with authority to set aside areas for alienation by purchase.94 The report of the Zululand Lands Delimitation Commission
of 1904 set aside more than 40% of what remained of Zululand to be so alienated - and it transpired that this was for white purchase only. For the inhabitants of the north-western expanse of the original Zululand - which was now Northern Natal - the pressures were considerably greater. Here, no lands had been set aside for African occupation: all inhabitants summarily became tenants of white landlords and were required to render labour service or rent for the privilege. These arrangements have remained a special source of grievance throughout the twentieth century.

Added to these burdens came a devastating series of ostensibly natural disasters that wrought their greatest havoc in African agriculture. First came the locust plague in 1896, followed by rinderpest in 1897 which destroyed six-sevenths of all African owned cattle. This was in turn followed by a lingering cattle disease in the form of east coast fever. Furthermore, several years of poor rains culminated in the drought of 1903. Immediately before the rebellion, therefore, many were faced with a spectre of severe poverty, and proportionately more Africans were forced onto the labour market in order to provide subsistence for their families.

The social and economic hardship and ferment occasioned by this cumulation of factors were reflected in the events of 1906. Their pervasiveness had the effect of instilling a sense of unity where previously there was none. In casting about for a central figure, these early pan-Natal African nationalist sentiments focussed on the Zulu royal family as a source of inspiration and leadership. Whilst some chiefs might have become identified as government servants and oppressors, this was
not so in the case of the Zulu royal family. That it too had been 'maltreated' by colonial rulers was certainly a reason for its uninvited and unexpected mass support in 1906. Perhaps not surprisingly in the light of the Natal Government's past attitude to the Zulu royal family, this nicety was not recognised in 1906; it certainly did not inform subsequent policy.

The transition to Union: administrative arrangements

Prior to the treason trial, Dinuzulu had been deprived of his chieftainship of the Usuthu. The judgement, made in 1908, exonerated him on eighteen and a half of the original twenty-three charges made against him, but found him guilty of harbouring rebels at various stages of the rebellion. For this he was incarcerated in Pietermaritzburg gaol in 1909. Mankulumana, Dinuzulu's chief counsellor, was also imprisoned, and on his release just before Union was prohibited by order of the Supreme Chief from returning to Zululand. Shingana, Dinuzulu's uncle, adviser and guardian during his minority, was banished to an area south of Durban where he was shortly to die. Once again the Usuthu were left chiefless.

In making administrative arrangements for the Usuthu, the Natal Government redoubled its efforts to apply the dictum of 'divide and rule'. In early 1910, R. H. Addison (then Natal's DNC for Zululand) "abolished" the Usuthu and parcelled out its members among four local chiefs - only one of whom was a member of the Zulu royal family proper, and all of whom had in some way seceded from the royal cause. Indeed, one was a Mandlakazi, and another was a Buthelezi. Only once previously had this rash expedient been attempted (in the post war settlement of 1879), and then its
impracticality had forced its abandonment by 1883.

On the other side of the coin, one of the first acts of the newly constituted Union Cabinet of 1910 was to order the release of Dinuzulu from prison. Although Harriette Colenso's long standing campaign for justice and sympathy for Zulu royalty undoubtedly had had effect, it was Louis Botha himself who was primarily responsible for this action. Presumably wishing to avoid a political crisis, Botha arranged for a farm in the Transvaal to be set aside for Dinuzulu and his immediate retinue rather than suggest his return to Zululand. Mankulumana was allowed to accompany Dinuzulu. Even so, as Dinuzulu left Newcastle gaol for the relative freedom of the Transvaal, Natal officials forced him to sign a declaration stating that he would never return to Natal. He refused, and only signed when Botha wired him asking him to comply. Dinuzulu was settled on the farm 'Rietfontein' in the Middelburg district, and his annual stipend of five hundred pounds was restored to him. African opinion all over the province of Natal and beyond applauded the action of the Union Government, though significantly there were isolated official reports that in Zululand Africans 'loyal' to the Government were concerned that Dinuzulu might be repatriated. Indeed, rumours that Dinuzulu was to return were strong in Zululand which in themselves indicated that the Usuthu and other royalist groups were not quiescent.

The release of Dinuzulu attracted widespread news coverage. Apart from the major British dailies reports even found their way into regional British newspapers such as the Bristol Times, Cork Examiner, Glasgow News and Manchester Courier - all of which applauded the action of the Union
Government and very often explicitly condemned Natal's treatment of Dinuzulu.113

In general, the release of Dinuzulu was not a great issue in the minds of Natal's whites - after all, he was being sent further away from Zululand than Newcastle gaol. Perhaps, as the Plymouth News perceptively reasoned, because Natal was now no longer "alone" but part of a united white bloc in southern Africa, she could afford to be less paranoiac about the Zulu royal family.114 The death of Dinuzulu three years later whilst in exile in the Transvaal caused greater consternation in white Natal, for it raised the questions of whether Dinuzulu would be allowed to be buried in Zululand and whether his heir would be allowed to live there.115

Two developments are notable at this stage regarding future official policy towards the Zulu royal family. First, the Act of Union had vested a completely new body with paramount authority in 'native affairs', with which it could - as it soon did - override Natal officials of the NAD in forging a new 'settlement' in Zululand. Second, the death of Dinuzulu on the 18 October 1913 provided this body with the opportunity to 'wipe the state clean' and review official policy towards Dinuzulu's heir. Indeed, Solomon had signed no 'self denying ordinance' as had Dinuzulu.
CHAPTER 2
THE ZULU ROYAL FAMILY AND ITS SOCIAL CONTEXT
AT THE TIME OF SOLOMON'S SUCCESSION

Dinuzulu's funeral procession

On news of Dinuzulu's death, the Union Government immediately extended its condolences and sympathy to the bereaved family through the magistrate at Middleburg, Mr Herold. The government went on to offer Herold's services "for the sake of Dinuzulu's memory" to help make arrangements for the settlement of Dinuzulu's financial affairs and the welfare of his dependants at KwaThengisa¹ - the name by which his Transvaal residence in exile was known, abbreviated from 'KwaThengisangaye' meaning 'the place where he was sold'.² If the total of Dinuzulu's debts was "reasonable", the SNA assured Mankulumana that he would recommend that the government settle them;³ furthermore, the government would pay for the education of Dinuzulu's two eldest sons, Solomon Nkayishana Maphumuzana and David Nyawana, at Lovedale College.⁴ The question of whether it was permissible to return Dinuzulu's body to Zululand for burial was not even raised. For the Zulu royal family it was never a question. Barely a day after his death, Dinuzulu's body was being transported by train to Vryheid station - en route to the ancestral heartland of royal Zululand, Emakhosini, 'the place of the kings', where the heads of the House of Zulu had been buried since the turn of the seventeenth century.⁵

The Natal NAD had no time to raise objections. The personal influence of General Botha, whom Dinuzulu had regarded as his "best friend in the government",⁶ was evident in all these developments. When Dinuzulu died, there are some suggestions that Botha and Harriette Colenso were making secret arrangements for the repatriation of Dinuzulu to Zululand, contrary to the document that Natal had forced Dinuzulu to sign in 1910.⁷
News of Dinuzulu's death was brought to the royal family in Zululand by Ndabankulu kaLukhwazi Ntombela, an aged chief and one of Dinuzulu's izinduna who had been an aggressive Usuthu supporter since the civil wars between Cetshwayo and Zibhebhu. Mnyazi kaNdabuko Zulu (Ndabuko kaMpende Zulu, Dinuzulu's uncle, had been Dinuzulu's guardian and advisor) sent messengers out into the country to report the news to Zulu chiefs and dignitaries. He further notified them that the funeral was shortly to take place at Nobamba - the historic royal homestead established three generations before Shaka and situated in the midst of Emakhosini. Thus when the train bearing Dinuzulu's body arrived at Vryheid station, a large concourse of Zulu mourners had arrived to meet it. These mainly comprised members of the Qulusi, Mdlalose and Ntombela sections which now fell in the Vryheid district. They accosted the magistrate of Vryheid, Mr Colenbrander, and spoke "very disparagingly of the Government", accusing it of causing Dinuzulu's death and ruin.

At Vryheid, Dinuzulu's body was placed on a wagon for the journey to Nobamba. There were many signs that Dinuzulu's body was returning to a Zululand substantially different to the Zululand in which he was born. The body had arrived in a European-style coffin and was conveyed by train - a symbol of industrialisation and, to many local Zulu, the vehicle which transported sons and daughters away to distant labour centres and townships, perhaps never to return. This translation of the izibongo - praise poem - of "The European Railway Train" recorded by James Stuart, presumably between 1910 and 1920, vividly encapsulates the train's image and effect.

Go thou metal of the white people!
Take them and transport them.
It is long since you deserted them.

Go with them and put them out of sight yonder far!
Loose woman that causes people to wander
Who takes women and men and sends them to Johannesburg,
When they get there they will be swallowed by the dumps.
... Drive them that they may go, 
And make for a far-away land. 
Let them go to where ploughing is no longer done 
Beans are no longer planted 
And the one at home will wait awhile 
Until the tears rain down; 
Because it takes them and captures them 
And sends them where it is far away.15

Heading the large funeral procession en route to Nobamba was an entourage of dignitaries whose presence reflects how the beliefs and values of European civilization, together with its dynamic - capitalist production - had penetrated Zulu life. An African cleric, Reverend Twala, had arrived from Pretoria. Despite the scant enthusiasm that the royal family - Dinuzulu in particular - had shown for Christianity, Rev. Twala was to attend the funeral to intervene and officiate where necessary and so ensure that the ceremony also satisfied Christian belief.16 In a wagon directly behind the one bearing the coffin sat Harriette Colenso or 'Musihelu',17 - the missionary, educationalist, philanthropist, watchdog on government policy, and the most trusted white friend and advisor to the Zulu royal family. At one stage her visits to Dinuzulu's residence had become so frequent and prolonged that the Zulu royal family had expected her to settle permanently with them.18 Next to Harriette Colenso sat two white labour agents from Johannesburg known to the Zulu as 'Muhle' and 'Zithulele'.19 Both were employed by Transvaal mining houses to secure a supply of African labour for the goldfields, and were primarily interested in the Zulu as wage labourers. One was J. S. Marwick who had earned his name 'Muhle' (the good one) when, as Zululand Native Agent and Transvaal representative of the Natal Native Affairs Department at the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer war, he had organized the evacuation of an estimated seven thousand Zulu labourers from the Johannesburg gold mines back to their homes.20 Since 1907 he had been employed by the Farrar Group of Mines with a particular brief to secure labour from
Zululand and Swaziland. Although positive identification is unavailable, it is likely that 'Zithulele' was Lt. Col. Morris, longstanding Transvaal labour agent and associate of Marwick's.

Members of the Zulu royal family who were themselves employed on the mines when Dinuzulu died had travelled to Vryheid with Marwick and his colleague; they, together with Dinuzulu's wives from KwaThengisa, followed the wagons on foot. Among them, too, were Dinuzulu's children who had been at KwaThengisa when he died, including David Nyawana and Arthur Edward Mshiyeni.

The funeral procession took three days to reach Nobamba. On the third day it was joined by many Zulu who had set out from Nobamba to meet it, among whom was Solomon Nkayishana. When the procession arrived at Nobamba, the chiefs and headmen who together represented the core of traditional and royal Zululand were re-united. Apart from Mankulumana kaSomaphunga Ndawandwe and Ndbankulu kaLukhwazi Ntombela, there was Zidunge (lineage head of the Khoza, son and heir of Ntshingwayo who had died leading Cetshwayo's army against Zibhebhu); Masimba kaNokhokhela Buthelezi (the great headman of Nobamba); Mbuzini and Zinzo (sons of Ntuzwa and nephews of Sekethwayo of the Mdlatole, both leading Usuthu since 1879), and many other "great men of the nation". Also present were Dinuzulu's personal attendants: Lokothwayo kaZembe Mangadini, Mvingana kaNompanda Manzimeleni and Nobiyana kaMholo Manzimeleni. Notable members of the Zulu royal family - all of Dinuzulu's generation, the grandsons of Mpande - were Mnyaiza kaNdabuko, Mgixo, Mpikanina and Citekana kaZiwedu, Mkebeni, Franz (France or Flansi) and Mdumela kaDabulamanzi and Dotela (Dokotela) kaMgidlana. The traditional status of these men, however, belied the strong links that some had established with precisely those social forces that had undermined Zulu independence. Mnyaiza, for example, was employed by Colonel Royston (an independent labour
agent who also attended the funeral) to recruit labourers for
the gold mines. Similarly, Franz was employed on the
gold mines as a labour supervisor, eventually to hold the
position of "Head Induna of Brakpan Compound".

After the main body of mourners had arrived with the funeral
procession, latecomers continued to pour into Nobamba. It
might seem incongruous that certain of these latecomers had
travelled such distances to attend a display of Zulu tradition
and past monarchical grandeur. One was Pixley Seme, born to
a Natal kholwa family and brought up by American missionaries.
Having trained in law at the universities of Columbia (New
York) and Oxford, he returned to South Africa to be accepted
as an attorney of the Supreme Court and to establish a
practice in Johannesburg. There he became the driving
force behind the formation of the South African Native
National Congress (SANNC, later the African National Congress).
He also established links with Swazi and Zulu royalty. During
Dinuzulu's final illness, Seme had brought a Johannesburg
doctor to attend to him, and had also established a fund
to send Dinuzulu to Europe for treatment. A small group
of local officials had also arrived to be "the eye of the
government", including a few Nongqai mounted policemen from
Eshowe, even though it was official policy in Natal to pretend
that the Zulu kingship was defunct. The funeral party was
said to number seven thousand.

The variety of individuals present at the funeral ceremony
provides an insight into the variety of social forces at work
among the Zulu and exposes the dangers of assigning to the
Zulu royal family in the twentieth century the image that it
had earned in the nineteenth. Moreover, they disclose the
need to identify changes that had occurred in the economic
and social life of the Zulu, for it is only in these contexts
that developments in their political life can be more fully
understood.
The social context of Solomon's succession: land tenure

At approximately the same time as Dinuzulu's funeral, Sir Rider Haggard was touring Zululand in the company of J.Y. Gibson (DNC of Zululand) and James Stuart (previously Assistant SNA for Natal), both accomplished scholars of Zulu history. In the course of an unusually perceptive letter Haggard set out his impressions of the country and its people, comparing it to the Zululand he knew when he had last visited there in 1876. Whilst the observations he made on economic pressure and the development of new social divisions are brief and need further development, they form a useful starting point and framework for further comment.

In 1899 Haggard had written a poem entitled "The White Man's Burden" in which he exalted British imperial expansion and Britain's civilizing mission among the "new caught, sullen peoples, half-devil and half-child" of the Empire. But his visit to Zululand persuaded him that there the 'burden of the white man' had fallen more heavily on those whom it was supposed to benefit. "We are left orphaned and owe our existence to the fact that England is ..., he was told by a Zulu chief at an indaba. Alluding to Haggard himself, another said "It is good that we should find friends among the people to whom we have given our loyalty, for we need them".

"Since the year 1879", wrote Haggard in 1914, "the history of the Zulus has been a long tale of misfortune". However, he drew a sharp distinction between the policies of the Colonial Office and Colonial Government. His reasons for doing so - which have some justification - were that the latter had been responsible for alienating 40 per cent of British Zululand for white ownership (following the 1902-4 Zululand Lands Delimitation Commission) and for imposing the £1 poll
tax in 1905.

In 1897 Zululand and its people were handed over to Natal instead of being allowed to remain under the direct control of the Imperial Government like Basutoland, which, of course, they would have preferred, as it is a matter of common knowledge that self-governing colonies look at their responsibilities to native races from a very different standpoint to that which has always been adopted by the Home Government. 40

Haggard was concerned that, since he had first known the Zulu, "about two thirds of Zulu territory...including many of the best lands", had passed into "the hands of white men, Boers and English together". He then referred to the latest piece of land legislation - The 1913 Natives Land Act. This was particularly onerous to those Zulu whose lands had passed into the private ownership of white men, he argued, because it laid down that in future all tenants on 'white land' would have to provide labour service for the landowner, and that all other terms of African tenancy on white owned land be phased out. 41 These other forms of tenancy to which Haggard alluded fall under the generic term 'squatting'. There were two main forms: first, that in which the tenant paid his landlord a cash rent and, secondly, that in which the tenant's payment took the form of agricultural produce (sharecropping). 42

As the Union Government's first step towards a uniform South African "native policy", the 1913 Act established the principle of territorial segregation. The mainspring of the 1913 Act was not, however, to eliminate the mingling of black and white in the rural areas, but to reduce the ability of Africans to maintain economic independence and so force them to enter labour contracts either on white farms or in the urban areas (primarily the gold mines). Of the two most influential capitalist sectors of the South African economy - agriculture and gold
mining - it was the former which had become the implacable enemy of squatting (or 'Kaffir farming') and African land purchase, since they locked up labour and denied it to white farms. John Dube, President of the SANNC and a political figure of especial influence in Natal and Zululand, perceptively observed that

it is abundantly clear to us...that the authorities know perfectly well that the natives cannot leave private lands entirely...the Bill simply aims at compelling the natives to say they will rather remain on the farms and live under those irksome conditions than to leave the farms and go and live in distant places...

The 1913 Act aimed to eliminate both African purchase of land outside the existing reserves and the practice of African squatting on white owned land, and to create a supply of 'tenant-labourers' for white farmers. In return for the labour service labour tenants performed, they received grazing rights for a few head of cattle or goats, a small area of arable land, some rations and sometimes a small cash compensation. As a general rule, however, what the labour tenant received for his labour service was not sufficient to cover his and his dependants' subsistence needs and tax obligations to the state. Thus, labour tenancy also imposed on the labour tenant the need to supplement his subsistence with cash earned through labour migrancy during the non-service period.

In pursuit of its objective to ensure that Africans on white land were henceforth farm labourers, the 1913 Act made efforts to ensure that each landowner kept only as many tenants as his need for labour warranted - all 'surplus' tenants he was called upon to evict. It was envisaged that these ejected tenants would remove to the African 'reserve' areas in which land was held by the state for inalienable and exclusive African use. The 1913 Act confirmed the existing reserve areas
and envisaged their future enlargement. It did not, however, have immediate nor uniform Union-wide effect. Correspondingly, its social and economic consequences for the African population were neither simultaneously nor uniformly felt. This was particularly true within the Zulu population.

The Zulu may be divided into two main categories in terms of land tenure. First, there were those who had access to land within the reserves. The latter was held, distributed and administered by chiefs on the basis of communal tribal tenure. Since the 1913 Act confirmed the existing boundaries and arrangements within the Zululand reserves, as established by the 1902-4 Zululand Lands Delimitation Commission, it did not have direct significance for this group. However, its effects were felt insofar as reserve dwellers would henceforth be far less able to gain access to more extensive or fertile land outside the reserves either by purchase or rental. But most important, the number of evictions from white-owned land greatly increased after the 1913 Act resulting in an influx of evicted squatters into the reserves. In 1914, chiefs in the Zululand reserves represented that their land was becoming congested: Chief Mfunglewa concisely observed that "natives have been turned off private farms and we are now overcrowded." More graphically, Headman Nfuzewa stated that "the country is being taken up by farms. We are living on the edge of cliffs". Complaints were especially strong in the Eshowe, Nkandhla and Emtonjaneni reserves which were soaking up evictions from both the expanding sugar estates on the coast and the white farms in Northern Natal. As the reserves became increasingly more congested, they became increasingly unable to provide for the subsistence needs of their inhabitants. Consequently Zulu in the reserves became more dependent on outside sources of income - primarily money earned by migrant labourers on the gold mines.

Zulu living on land outside the reserves form the second main
category of Zulu landholder. This group was primarily located in the large ex-Republican districts of Northern Natal where no African reserves had been allocated. The overwhelming majority had become tenants on white-owned land, paying for their tenure either in cash, produce or labour. Because of the latter payments, the cost of land tenure in Northern Natal compared unfavourably with the adjacent reserves. This higher 'cost' was reflected socially in the lower masculinity rates (ie. proportion of male to female inhabitants) in Northern Natal, reflecting a higher rate of labour migration.  

Labour tenants (ie. after they had served their contractual six month term of free service for their landlords) and squatters in Northern Natal, like the Zulu in the reserves, as a rule did not take up waged work on local farms to earn their cash requirements; wages were better in the urban centres, the Natal collieries and the gold mines. The Northern Natal district of Vryheid and the Zululand district of Ndwandwe (renamed Nongoma district after Union) shared an extensive boundary, were ecologically similar and were equally remote from employment centres. However, shortly after the turn of the century, the masculinity rate in Vryheid was less than half that in Ndwandwe.

Prior to the 1913 Land Act, squatters' tenure in Northern Natal was becoming increasingly less secure and more expensive. These developments paralleled those in Natal proper. As has already been noted, rural capital in Natal during the nineteenth century had been more interested in land speculation than in the development of commercial agriculture. Large tracts of land had fallen into the hands of land speculators who rented their holdings out to African squatters in order to gain a return on their investments, rather than working the land themselves. The relationship between African access to land in the reserves, or as squatters on crown land or private land, and their ability to resist farm work was not
lost on Natal's white commercial farmers. The latter were generally undercapitalized and their production processes were labour intensive - they could not afford to compete with the wages offered by the gold mines. Hence they were dependent on labour tenants for a labour supply, and their policy was to attempt to undermine African options to labour tenancy. 56 Whilst Natal's commercial farmers opposed the reserve policy because it 'locked up' potential labour tenants, they identified absentee landlords or 'Kaffir farmers' as their sworn enemies. 57 Towards the end of the nineteenth century, political and economic developments had begun to swing in their favour. The complex set of factors that brought about this change in the political economy of Natal may be reduced to two fundamental changes. First, the development of the mining industry and new urban centres generated a quantitively and qualitatively different market for agricultural produce. Second, the granting of responsible government to Natal in 1893, with an electoral system that favoured the rural areas, afforded the white farming lobby a measure of power that it so far had lacked. 58 These developments also took effect in the ex-Republican districts of Northern Natal after they had been incorporated into Natal subsequent to the Anglo-Boer war.

The change from 'Kaffir farming' to commercial agricultural production in Northern Natal was, however, neither abruptly nor uniformly carried out. Correspondingly, the move against rent-paying squatters, either by evicting them or by transforming them into labour tenants, was an uneven process. Renting out rather than directly working the land remained an attractive option for many Northern Natal landholders - and objections to the 1913 Act were raised for this reason. The DNC of Northern Natal reported in 1910 that squatters were paying up to the "exhorbitant" rate of £5 per hut (hut tax in the reserves was 14/-) as rental on white farms. 59 Thus, as
the magistrate of Vryheid observed in 1915, certain landowners "really do not want the rent-payers to turn to labourers". It is significant that W. H. Beaumont, the only Natalian on the Natives Lands Commission (appointed to finalize the delimitation of the African reserves and to report on the operation of the 1913 Act in general) submitted a minority report in 1916, stating that there had been "no unanimous demand in Natal for the enforcement of a Squatters Act or for any further segregation of the natives...". This statement indicates the continued strength of rentier interests - which were especially strong in Northern Natal.

However, the pressure on land in Northern Natal (in the complete absence of reserves) was such that those landowners who wished to produce for the expanding market for agricultural produce were able to engage Zulu labour tenants long before the anti-squatting provisions of the 1913 Act. By 1910, the "majority" of tenants in Northern Natal were already supplying labour service as a part of their tenancy payments. In contrast to the concurrent situation in Natal proper, aspiring commercial farmers in Northern Natal barely complained of labour shortage. Even after the 1913 Act, the latter often exacted less than maximum labour service from their tenants, in exchange for a cash 'consideration'. However, as white commercial agriculture expanded in Northern Natal in the period 1910 to 1920, white farmers made increasing labour demands on their tenants. Those tenants who were determined to avoid the constraints of labour service obligations were subject to increasing rents - or eviction. The 1913 Act accelerated these processes. Indeed, it imposed the state hut tax on squatters (previously exempt) on top of their rental commitments; this alone undermined Zulu alternatives to labour tenancy.

In the wake of the 1913 Act, the Natal NAD became concerned
about the insecurity of Zulu tenure on white farms - particularly in regard to its employees, the chiefs. The status and influence of tenant chiefs among their wards was threatened by the frequently unsympathetic - and in effect degrading - authority of their respective landlords. The NAD sometimes felt compelled to intervene. Because Chief Kambi kaHamu Zulu of the Ngenetsheni, the "biggest chief" in the Ngotshe district whose ward included 1250 homesteads, was "being harassed by his landlord", the NAD stepped in and provided him with a section of government land on which to live. Similarly, the two important royal homes Nobamba and Zibindini were situated on the farm 'Koningsdal' owned by S. B. Buys. The Zulu royal family (including Solomon himself after 1913) and Buys were continually at odds with one another. During 1915 Buys complained to the local magistrate that Solomon had not built a cattle dipping tank despite repeated requests to do so. To this the magistrate correctly reminded him that Solomon was a rent-paying tenant and was not required to supply labour. Indeed, it was the issue of rent for these homesteads that came to be an ongoing cause for disagreement and litigation during Solomon's chieftainship. In 1916, Buys issued Solomon with a final notice to vacate the twenty-seven huts that comprised Nobamba and Zibindini, and a court order for the sum of £100 which allegedly had accrued as unpaid rent. While the Zulu royal family had fallen behind in rental payments, Buys' additional reason for the eviction order reveals that he either misunderstood Solomon's rights as a rent-paying tenant or chose to disregard them: he complained that he could neither "get labour from these kraals [nor] use [the land] for grazing...therefore he is obliged to hire farms for grazing every year." By the time the case came to court a year later, the NAD had appointed Solomon as chief of the Usuthu. When the judgement was made against him and he was ordered to pay Buys £60 in
rental arrears, the CNC and SNA quickly arranged for the government to settle this amount on Solomon's behalf and to pay a further £60 to cover the costs of the case. Furthermore, the NAD had prevailed on Buys to withdraw his notice of eviction, sign a written agreement with Solomon defining the terms of his tenure, and even to reduce the rent from £3 to £2 per hut per annum.

The Zulu royal family's altercations with Buys represent only one example of its problems with land tenure in the Vryheid district. It rented land on other nearby farms for the purposes of cultivation and grazing. In January 1917, Anton Potgieter petitioned General Botha personally to induce the Zulu royal family to pay for the use of part of 'Welgekozen' - a farm adjoining Koningsdal and owned by Potgieter's wife. The farm had been ploughed without payment, he complained, adding that he was a "poor man and should like to live as a white man". It is evident that Potgieter's complaints were in part fabrications designed to induce the government to buy Welgekozen for the use of the Zulu royal family - for a sum that his wife could not get on the open market. Indeed, in response to the administrative disruption caused by such problems of tenure experienced by one of their chiefs, the NAD was making arrangements for the purchase of a number of farms on which to settle Solomon and his dependants. These farms included Buys' 'Koningsdal', Potgieter's 'Welgekozen' and also F. P. Duminy's 'Welverdiend'. In the eyes of the NAD, however, this project was problematical because of the special status of the Zulu royal family. Solomon had been recognized as chief of the Usuthu, but the NAD reasoned that if it was seen to make special efforts to settle him securely (as it had done in the case of Kambi), the Zulu would construe this as "tangible recognition on the part of the government of the position of Paramount Chief which though not openly he practically claims today".
On the other hand, the CNC argued that if the government did not purchase land for Solomon's use, "tribal collections" to enable Solomon himself to do so might ensue. These might similarly strengthen allegiance to Solomon as the "unofficial head of the Zulus". Ultimately these problems faded when Solomon took up permanent residence at Mahashini, one of Dinuzulu's old homes that lay in reserve land in the Ndwandwe (hereafter Nongoma) district.

These examples of NAD intervention on behalf of chiefs testify to the financially draining, insecure and exploitable nature of Zulu tenure on white farms. For Zulu commoners, on whose behalf the NAD was less inclined to intervene, the position was worse. They were subject to a variety of obligations: the payment of hut tax to the state, and labour service, agricultural produce and rentals for huts, arable and grazing land to the landlord. But the increasing insecurity of tenure itself was yet more disruptive than the increasing costs of tenure. In 1914 Chief Nkantini kaSitheku Zulu, a grandson of Mpande who lived in reserve lands in the Emtonjaneni district, reported that some of his ward live on what is known as Proviso 'B' Babanango sub-district. We are troubled because we are on private lands. We who are in charge of tribes do not know what to do with our natives because they are turned off one private farm and not allowed to go to another. Having been conquered we are as the Government's fowls and we therefore look to the Government to give us a piece of land on which we can go.

For those who remained as labour tenants, the quality of life deteriorated. Shortly after the 1913 Act, the Babanango sub-district became known as 'Ekuhlupekeni' - the place of trouble. At a meeting with the CNC in 1920, every chief's representative in this area complained of the conditions of tenure on white farms. One Dhludhla observed that the
"Natives are loyal - they pay taxes" but was dismayed that they also had to make payments to their landlords for their huts. Chief Zombode's representative lamented that landlords were "turning people off farms, not being satisfied with work and rents rendered to them by tenants". "We shall never get accustomed to tenure on farms, Sir", another said. "Our children work and are not paid. Even our chiefs are in the same position". Another added "we cry continually, trusting ever in our rulers". To these lamentations the CNC "responded suitably" and "emphasized the need for adherence to contracts".

Among the Zulu living outside the reserves, there was a minute sub-category of Zulu who owned the land on which they lived. African land purchase had begun in Natal proper as long ago as the 1860s, and developed as a key means by which some could produce independently for the market and avoid entering labour relationships. The significance of African land purchase, however, extended beyond purely material considerations: it was originally fostered in mission locations, and was designed to instil both the religious and secular values of 'civilization'. Thus, whilst those on mission locations imbibed Christianity, they simultaneously tended to discard their ancestors' secular values, material culture, technology, production techniques and economic practices in favour of those of European civilization. Hoes gave way to oxen and ploughs, round huts to rectangular upright houses, subsistence agriculture to agriculture geared to the production of a marketable surplus, and the communal ethos of a redistributive economy gave way to one of individual accumulation. Wagons were purchased, European clothes were worn, and some individuals earned their livings as skilled tradesmen - as builders, carpenters, brickmakers, masons and thatchers.

These small groups of proprietors represented an emerging African petty bourgeoisie which was distinguishable from the
rest of the African population, as Colin Bundy argues, "both in material standards of life and in their cultural and ideological distance from traditional African society". Although not all land purchased by Africans in Natal was on an individual basis - some was bought by communal subscription - and not all purchasers were directly associated with a particular mission station, there was a strong correlation between land purchase and social, cultural, economic, and political adaptation.

When the 1902-4 Zululand Lands Delimitation Commission divided Zululand into areas of reserved land and areas wherein land could be alienated by purchase, it did so on the understanding that Zulu in common with other British subjects will be allowed to purchase if they wish to do so, and considers that the fact of their being landowners would be a guarantee of their loyalty and a safeguard against future disturbances: indeed in view of the pledges given from time to time by Her Majesty's Government...we do not see how they can in common fairness be prohibited from purchasing land, notwithstanding the fact that reserves are now being delimited for their occupation. These wishes of the Commissioners were not put into practice, and consequently opportunities for the Zulu to purchase land in Zululand barely existed. This became a source of grievance. Thus two hundred Zulu from the Emtonjaneni district, "many from the Mission Station", met to declare their displeasure at the 1913 Act's provisions against African land purchase outside the reserves. And as early as 1910, the "amakholwa" at Eshowe had inaugurated a "closer settlement" scheme - which envisaged the development of a 'respectable' African township of landowners.

After the north-western districts of original Zululand were
incorporated into Natal as Northern Natal after the Anglo-Boer war, Zulu were able to purchase land there on the same terms as anyone else. By 1905 there was a growing settlement of Zulu landowners three miles to the east of Vryheid, all of whom held their land on an individual basis and by freehold tenure - and had title deeds to prove it.\(^9\) It seems that a group had formed a syndicate to raise sufficient capital to buy property, and had thereafter divided it up among themselves as individual allotments.\(^9\)

The fact of individual land ownership was in itself a significant indication of social change. In preconquest Zululand, all land in theory belonged to the Zulu king (representing the state) and he allowed the use of specific districts to respective sections of his subjects, and delegated land distribution and administration to his local representatives. Although individuals had rights to certain pieces of land, these rights had been given by the local chief who also had the authority to revoke them. Thus while theoretically all land belonged to the king, at a local level and in practice land was held by the local inhabitants, represented by their chief, on the basis of communal tenure. These notions of land tenure and administration continued to operate in the Zululand reserves under indirect rule. The notion of individual and private ownership was a European one - and this was by no means the only European notion that distinguished the people of 'Vryheid East Township' from the Zulu rank and file.

Since the turn of the century, a small but assertive Zulu petty bourgeoisie had grown rapidly in Northern Natal. The DNC of Northern Natal reported in 1910 that "this class has adopted European clothing, and they live in square houses, divided into rooms and suitably furnished...they have separated themselves as much as possible from the raw native".\(^9\) In the same year, 12 per cent of all Zulu marriages in the Vryheid district
were Christian marriages. The relationship between Christianity, 'westernization' and land ownership was strongly evident in the Vryheid East Township. William Washington Ndhllovu, a founder member of the township in 1903, was a 'kholwa' and 'exempted Native' (ie. exempted from customary law and assimilated to European law under Natal's 'exemption clause' of 1864 - an exemption rarely given). He explicitly argued that the system of "individual tenure" was essential if the "progressive native" was to reap all the benefits that were due to him. In 1915 he gave an illuminating description of the settlement:

I think it is a good thing for the native people to have such a place in which we can make our homes. We have planted trees and put up respectable houses to live in, and we have tried to improve our holdings in every possible way.... Most of us work in the town. We have one Lutheran Church, which was erected some two years ago. The Wesleyan Methodist Church are also putting up a small church for the use of their adherents.... We have been thinking that self government may be allowed to us on the same principle perhaps as the Council in the Transkeian Territories, or a Village Management Board.... The majority are Christians and hardly without exception they are Zulus.

Some of the residents were cash-crop cultivators.

The social and ideological distance that separated this group from the 'tribal' chiefs of the 'tribal' Zulu did not preclude considerable social and ideological interchange at a more subtle level, nor the possibility of political alliance. W. W. Ndhllovu himself had been a personal secretary (umbali - literally a writer) to Dinuzulu since about 1905 until Dinuzulu's death in exile, and in the 1920s he was to be an influential political ally of the Zulu royal family under Solomon. In part, the origins of the formal alliance between the petty
bourgeois and tribal elites in the 1920s lay in the process in which petty bourgeois 'civilized' and 'progressive' aspirations were repressed in the years after Union.

African land purchase had been strongly opposed by white commercial farming interests in Natal - as it had been elsewhere in the Union - and this too was reflected in provisions of the 1913 Act. It was a means by which Africans could free themselves from both labour and rental obligations to white landowners. Moreover, African cash-crop production competed with white farmers in the market place. The use of new technology and means of transport (eg. the plough and wagons), the extensive use of family labour rather than hired labour, and a less consumer-orientated lifestyle together had enabled a Natal African peasantry to produce a considerable marketable surplus at a price with which white farmers found difficulty in competing. Furthermore, the act of African land purchase itself was a cause for colonist uneasiness. Africans successfully competing with whites in an open land market on the one hand, and the consequent geographical incursions they made into rural colonial society on the other, both threatened the social relations upon which colonist society was based. These ideological and emotional considerations lie behind the following seemingly illogical statement made by a Natal farmer before the Natal Lands Committee in 1917: before the 1913 Act, he said, he was in "fear of being forced off his land by powerful Native Syndicates who were committed to buying up as much land as possible". Such 'encroachment' had led him to consider "yielding" and leaving the country. These sentiments were evidently especially strong among the settlers of Dutch descent in Northern Natal.

The 1913 Act prohibited Africans from purchasing land in 'white' rural areas except from another African. Otherwise, applications for African land purchase could only be granted...
by the Governor-General-in-council and such permission was not readily granted. When the Natives Lands Commission's recommendations for the extension of African areas (both reserves and 'neutral' areas where Africans may purchase) were not approved by parliament, as an interim measure the government proposed to allow African individuals or syndicates of up to five individuals to purchase land in certain areas. Leading Kholwa such as W. W. Ndhlovu (Vryheid East Township), Chief Stephen Mini (Edendale Community), Rev. John Dube (Durban and urban environs), Chief Martin Luthuli (Groutville) and Rev. Abner Mtimkulu (Pietermaritzburg) forcefully argued that these explicitly racial provisions were an unjust attack on their previous rights to buy (theoretically) anywhere and the limitation of syndicates to five made the raising of sufficient capital for land purchase almost impossible.

The clampdown on Zulu land purchase in Northern Natal after the 1913 Act, coupled with the increasing tendency among farmers to enforce labour obligations on their tenants, tended to stifle the further development of the Zulu petty bourgeoisie. Whilst those who had already bought land, or had entered 'respectable' professions in education or the church, remained relatively secure, the next generation found difficulty in realizing the ambitions a mission education had inspired. The political consequences of petty bourgeois frustrations run threadlike through Natal African and Zulu politics in the 1920s.

The social context of Solomon's succession: cattle and 'social disintegration'

In his essay on the state of Zululand, Haggard was struck by the paucity of cattle in Zululand. "The great herds are no more", he observed. This he ascribed to two successive scourges: herds had had only six years in which to recover from
the devastation of rinderpest (1897-1898) before east coast fever swept Natal and Zululand and lingered until after Union. Moreover, Zululand had been struck by a severe drought in 1912.107

At the time of Union, the DNC of Zululand reported that the "deadly course" of east coast fever had left Zululand "pitifully denuded",108 and the DNC of Northern Natal similarly reported that his region was "almost depleted of its cattle".109 Local magistrates and the Zulu held that the disease was a consequence of the game laws which prohibited the hunting of wild game.110 In the low-lying regions of Zululand, which had been densely populated during the nineteenth century, the spread of east coast fever had been accompanied by the spread of malaria; the latter was becoming endemic on the coast as the sugar plantations expanded there.111 The twin impact of east coast fever and malaria caused an efflux of Zulu from the stricken areas to the healthier uplands. This, coupled with the influx of evicted tenants, exacerbated land congestion in the early years of Union. Explaining the high rate of human and livestock mortality and homestead removals within his district, the magistrate of Mahlabatini told the Natives Lands Commission in 1915 that the lower reaches of Mahlabatini "had gradually become uninhabitable". "First of all it is the loss of their cattle, and then they get the fever one after another."112

Zulu homestead production was based on three staple resources: access to sufficient land for grazing and cultivation, the labour power of the family, and a supply of cattle.113 Apart from their purely economic importance, cattle played a vital social role. Through their transfer from one group to another, society was knitted together, its reproduction ensured, new homesteads were forged and relations between homesteads were regulated. As will be argued below, the relationship between
the economic and social roles of cattle was one of such interdependence that to separate the two roles is almost impossible.

The loss of large numbers of cattle had pervasive consequences. Haggard referred to two of these. First, the prevalence of "considerable infant mortality" on account of the diminishing availability of milk - a staple nutriment.\textsuperscript{114} The accelerated rate of infant mortality had concerned local officials for some years before Haggard's visit in 1914. Whilst they agreed that cattle loss and malnutrition was primarily responsible, they identified another cause which deserves incidental mention here: venereal disease. As labour migration from Zululand and Northern Natal accelerated after the last years of the nineteenth century, syphilis spread through the countryside "caused principally by natives who have been working on the mines in Johannesburg".\textsuperscript{115} The Zulu term isimpantsholo, describing venereal disorders, dates from the first years of the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{116} In 1910, syphilis in Zululand and Northern Natal had reached "epidemic" proportions - and toddlers were already suffering the consequences of secondary infection.\textsuperscript{117} Local officials also pointed to another directly economic consequence of the loss of cattle: some homesteads were no longer able to plough, and could not cultivate the same acreage as efficiently by hand with hoes. On account of lesser crop yields, Zulu wage earnings were being stretched to buy food from local trading stores as well as the payment of rents and taxes.\textsuperscript{118} Money could not cover the deficiencies of Zulu homestead production during the drought of 1912. The government responded by allowing homestead heads in the worst-hit districts to kill a quota of game each week for the subsistence of their dependants.\textsuperscript{119}

Secondly, Haggard reported that lobolo (marriage gift or bride-price) was now being exchanged in the form of money rather
than cattle. This new development, he observed, was detrimental to the Zulu economy: money was liable to be spent, whereas cattle were a more permanent form of wealth. The transfer of lobolo from the groom's family to that of the bride was only confirmed and concluded when the wife had borne children for her husband. In hard terms of property exchange, lobolo was a consideration for the bride's potential to produce children rather than for the bride herself. If the marriage broke up or the wife proved to be infertile, lobolo was refundable. Haggard recounted the situation in which his personal servant, Mazooku, found himself when his daughter's marriage dissolved. Being in difficulties following the death of his cattle from east coast fever, Mazooku had spent the £10 he had received as lobolo, and was unable to repay it. He was on the point of being imprisoned under the provisions of the Native Code, as applied through the courts, when Haggard intervened.

In the hands of the overwhelming majority of the Zulu, money was only useful as a medium of exchange. By contrast - and apart from their role as a medium of exchange - cattle produced valuable by-products (milk, dung for fertilizer), could be used for ploughing, and could be slaughtered for food. Moreover, cattle could reproduce themselves and thus they were a potentially generative form of wealth. Money, to the Zulu, was not: capitalist enterprise was extraneous to Zulu cultural traditions. The change in the form of lobolo from cattle to cash (a gradual and uneven process) exacerbated the economic difficulties in which its origins lay. It simultaneously reflected the decline of the homestead economy and a greater Zulu dependence on monetary wealth; furthermore, since some young men were now having to earn money in order to marry, a greater need was imposed upon them to divert their labour to the industrial and commercial sectors of the economy. The outlook for independent production in Zululand
at the time of Union was bleak.

The economic effects of the change in the form of lobolo describe only part of its impact on Zulu society. At a deeper and more subtle level, the consequences were neither solely economic nor uniformly experienced throughout Zulu society. H. C. Lugg, veteran Native Commissioner, Zulu linguist and scholar, emphasized that the custom of lobolo was not the mere exchange of property: "the Natives have always appreciated the wider implications of the term lobolo, and, to avoid confusion, refer to the cattle actually handed over as amabeka." As the more visible features of the lobolo custom changed, so too did its 'wider implications'. The changing social significance of lobolo both reflected the existence of important social changes and promoted their further development. In an attempt to specify the nature and import of these social changes, it will be first necessary to examine the significance of cattle and lobolo in 'traditional' or preconquest Zulu society.

The importance that the Zulu attached to cattle was represented culturally in the rituals associated with their care, their sacrificial uses, and the pride with which they were held. The roots of their importance, however, lay in the close relationship between the possession of cattle and material power: in exchange for cattle as lobolo, a man could establish his economic independence by taking a wife, having children, and establishing his own homestead and lineage. A man already married (umnumzana - homestead head) could increase the number of his wives and children, the size of the lineage and the number of its homesteads. The production of cereals and dairy products, which formed the basis of the Zulu diet, was dependent on the labour power of wives and children. Wives and children represented productive labour and homesteads represented the productive units upon which Zulu life was based.
Cattle, as lobolo, were the way in which this labour and these productive units were materialised.

Simultaneously, the exchange of cattle as lobolo established important social relationships. Each wife and her offspring constituted a new segment of her husband's lineage, and the number of cattle exchanged for each wife (which depended largely on the status of the bride's father) related directly to how her segment was ranked in relation to other segments of the lineage group. Ties of affiliation and cooperation were also established between the husband's and the wife's father's lineages. The husband was referred to as the isigodo - the stump upon which the father could lean for support. The number of cattle owned by an individual was a clear indication of his status and political power - the exchange of cattle between 'patron' and 'client' underpinned the political hierarchy, and since the daughters of men commanded more cattle than those of commoners, the material foundations of their political dominance were perpetuated.

After the annexation of Zululand, the demands that the colonial state placed on homestead production (primarily through the need to raise a monetary surplus to pay hut tax) and the reduction of the number of cattle available to the Zulu as a whole (primarily as a result of the livestock diseases of the 1890s) were developments that necessitated considerable social adjustment. The changes that took place in the Zulu social structure relate directly to the changes that took place within and around a social custom that lay at its heart: lobolo.

In preconquest Zululand, young men had laboured in their fathers' homesteads, and when the time came for them to marry it was their fathers who supplied the lobolo for them to do so. When hut tax was imposed, increasing numbers of
young men sought wage labour to earn wages to pay their fathers' hut tax, whilst their fathers fulfilled their side of the obligation by raising lobolo for their sons. However, in the decade after annexation, the lobolo transaction became increasingly expensive and difficult to fulfil. Because of cattle losses, fathers found difficulty in providing lobolo for their sons. Consequently, young men began to prolong their periods of wage labour in order to earn sufficient money to buy their own cattle. This development alone suggests that the social ramifications which surrounded the lobolo transaction were already being corroded. Moreover, the Natal Code (which was applied through the magistrates' courts in Zululand after annexation) laid down a maximum figure (ten) for the number of cattle that could be demanded as lobolo, and allowed claims arising from lobolo transactions to be heard before the courts. This maximum figure soon became the standard rate. 129

During the 1890s, the custom of lobolo gradually changed in three important ways. First, the tendency developed for the father to demand a fixed number of cattle whereas previously the matter was subject to negotiation. Second, these cattle were payable before the marriage took place, whereas the transfer of cattle had previously taken place over an extended period of time. Third, the number of cattle demanded doubled or even trebled. In the words of Guy, these changes signify an "increasing concern for individual accumulation and a shift from a practice based on reciprocal obligations to one based on direct exchange"; and they had the effect of sharpening the division between Zulu with property (cattle and daughters) and those without. 130

It was in 1914 that Haggard observed the substitution of money for cattle in the lobolo transaction. This represented a further development of the changes identifiable in the
1890s. First, it suggests that the lobolo was being supplied by the migrant labourer himself rather than by his father - and hence that the lobolo transaction no longer depended on the existence of the reciprocal obligations between the generations of father and son. Furthermore, given the social implications that attached particularly to the transfer of cattle, it suggests that the laterally integrative functions of the custom - the establishment of ties of reciprocal obligation between two lineages - were weakening. Generally, it both reflected and promoted the decay of social integration and the established ethic of communal responsibility. Second, the payment of lobolo in cash rather than cattle was testimony to the incursions made by the cash economy into Zulu society and to Zulu acculturation generally.

The change in the purpose and significance of the lobolo transactions was to become increasingly marked in the period covered by this thesis. Although cattle were usually to be regarded as a necessary component of the property that changed hands as lobolo - particularly after cattle herds had recovered from the scourges of the period 1890-1910 - this did not signify a reversion to the original essence of the custom. Increasing emphasis was placed on the material value of the property that was exchanged, even at the cost of estranging rather than enjoining the lineages between which the marriage was taking place. Such developments so concerned one NAD official in Zululand that, in 1927, he published an article contrasting the "real Zulu customs" with innovations in the practice of lobolo. H. P. Braatvedt, the author of the article, was born the son of a Zululand missionary in the 1880s and had lived and worked among the Zulu all his life. He referred to a new practice which required a young man to present a beast to each of the prospective bride's parents at the time when the marriage proposal was made. Thereafter, the groom was required to send the bride numerous small presents,
named izibizo ('things by which to call/summons') and "mostly cash", in order to 'call' her to his home for the wedding ceremony. These izibizo, which amounted to as much as £10, ultimately went to the bride's father over and above the lobolo payment. These practices, Braatvedt argued, "are utterly foreign to the real Zulu custom and are resented by the great majority of Zulus."  

This resentment arose because the value of the 'social contract' in the lobolo custom was being subordinated to the value of the property that was exchanged (daughters for cattle and cash). More specifically, it seems that the generation of fathers increasingly regarded the lobolo custom as a means whereby they could extract wealth from the generation of sons.

It was primarily the young men of Zululand who proceeded to distant labour centres to earn money. The periods that they served at these centres not only imparted a material basis for a certain independence, but also served to instil a new set of social values and aspirations derived from a different economy and a different society. The fissure that had developed between age and youth was expressed in the complaints made about the breakdown of morality and the lack of respect among youth for the authority and customs of the older generation. Something of a 'youth subculture' was developing in the reserves of Zululand. In 1910, the magistrate of Nongoma complained of "beer-drinking parties" held by young men and women; this was an "evil practice", he believed, since it lessened the authority of men over boys and increased female immorality.

In 1914, Haggard was struck by the desire "among the young" in Zululand for European education - or "the knowledge of how to make use of the resources of civilization". This aspiration, he argued, had been inspired "by observation in Johannesburg and other cities". Haggard continued:

Of course this is not the view of the older men who served under Cetywayo and perhaps under
Panda. Indeed, one of these amused me much by a remark he made at an indaba I attended, which I quote as representative of the opinions of his generation. "Our children try to be white", he said, alluding to the young Zulus and their aping of the garments and manners of the English, "but they will never be".134

The older generation was concerned not only by the social distance that they saw developing between their own generation and that of their sons, but complained that young men were disregarding their obligations to their fathers and dependants at home and were treating the money that they earned as their personal property.135 Labour migrants, Vilakazi observes, entered into employment contracts and earned money as individuals rather than as members of families or tribes. This insidious individualism which was being insinuated into their lives far away from the tribal setting and the close kinship of family group, began the destruction of the strong sense of social solidarity...There developed a new class of Africans called abaqafi...characterised by his absolute lack of respect for old traditions.136

The 'individualism' and 'lack of respect' that characterised the abaqafi was a form of resistance to the demands of the homestead in its need to pay hut tax or, on white owned land, to pay rents or provide labour. This resistance sometimes took a more radical form: the cutting of links with 'home' and permanent residence at the place of work. The dissatisfaction of youth was particularly evident among labour tenants. The tenancy contract was made with the homestead head who was required to bind his sons to labour service. As a Northern Natal missionary commented, "a boy deserts and gives up his home largely because he does not see that he has any chance
...because he is not working directly for himself...." Because the desertion of a son constituted a breach of the tenancy contract, it sometimes caused the homestead to be evicted.137

Chiefs, homestead heads and their dependants on the one hand, and the state on the other, had common ground in opposing this new class - the abaqafi - since money lost to the homestead was also lost to state revenue. The abaqafi exacerbated economic fragility in the rural areas. In the drought year of 1912, during which homestead production over practically the whole of Zululand failed to provide for basic nutritional requirements, the DNC for Zululand lamented the "growing tendency on the part of the Zulus proceeding to distant labour centres to entirely forget the claims of those dependent upon them at their homes... and to waste their substance to the detriment of their dependants."138 As representative of the Natal Native Affairs Department and Zululand Native Agent at the turn of the century, it was J. S. Marwick's job to ensure that wages were safely remitted back to Natal and Zululand, and to trace tax defaulters. Between 1895 and 1899, the system he devised - described as a "system of Native thrift" - reportedly secured the remittance of an average of £30,000 per annum to Natal.139 Significantly, Marwick was assisted by Sikonyela, previously induna to Mnyamana, chief of the Buthelezi.140

Marwick's later career contains further evidence of links between the Zulu 'establishment', labour agents and the state. When he evacuated Zulu labourers from Johannesburg on the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer war, he was assisted by Hlobeni Buthelezi who described himself as a descendant of Masiphula, chief counsellor to Mpande, and as "well known to all the Zulus".141 In 1916, as newly appointed manager of the Durban Municipal Native Affairs Department, in charge of large numbers of migrant labourers, Marwick was assisted by Pika kaSiteku Zulu,
grandson of Mpande, who had been amongst those evacuated from Johannesburg by Marwick in 1899. Similarly, in 1908 Colonel H. F. Trew of the Johannesburg police had in his employ a grandson of Mpande, known to him as 'Stephen Matambo', an authoritarian, violent and complex character, who had previously been employed as a personal attendant to Lord Selborne on the High Commissioner's train. Matambo was specifically enlisted to assist in the destruction of a Zulu 'amalaita gang' in Pretoria whose "speciality" was the robbery of mineworkers returning from the goldmines. This he did with such brutal efficiency that the police were shortly afterwards compelled to dismiss him.

During the early twentieth century, Zululand and Northern Natal were becoming increasingly enmeshed as a dependent periphery in an expanding capitalist economy. With homestead production undermined by cattle disease, drought, rising cash needs and, most important, land alienation, the Zulu were correspondingly more dependent upon money for survival. Nonetheless, the process of underdevelopment was not linear. The period between the declaration of Union and the end of the first world war was a time of particular hardship for the Zulu. But in the years following the war, conditions were to improve. Moreover, as has been emphasized, the consequences were unevenly felt through Zulu society.

During his tour of Zululand, Haggard attended a number of meetings between administrators and Zulu chiefs. His impression was that "...the people are crushed and bewildered". He reported chiefs saying that they "wander and wander" and "have no head". In preconquest Zululand, it had been the Zulu king who was the Zulu 'head'. The king stood at the apex of the social and political structure, symbolised the unity of the Zulu people and the ancestral land upon which they lived, ensured their spiritual wellbeing and acted as father
and redistributor.\footnote{Although the death of Dinuzulu had now in effect restored the heir to the Zulu royal house to Zululand, the heir was no longer the Zulu king and Zululand could no longer naturally look to a single 'head'. Even among the tribal Zulu deep in the reserves, the image of the Zulu king had suffered in the prolonged series of civil wars between the Usuthu of Dinuzulu and the Mandlakazi of Zibhebhu. Furthermore, Zulu society was now being corroded by economic hardship and the evolution of new social divisions - developments which were transforming the role of tribal leaders themselves. There was the small, repressed, yet important petty bourgeoisie. And there was a tendency among youth to become 'detribalized' and 'selfish'. Rather than having no 'head', one could suggest that the Zulu now had many heads: it was just that to the older and more conservative Zulu these 'heads' were neither as visible as the Zulu king had been nor represented anything with which they could identify.}

Many of these social contradictions were expressed at Dinuzulu's funeral ceremony. A variety of individuals and representatives of social groups, both black and white, mixed together to pay their respects to the dead king and observe the succession of his heir. Particularly significant were individuals like Mnyaiza and Franz: whilst both were entrenched in the Zulu establishment by birth, they were also trading with and controlling Zulu labourers for the gold mines. Although many representatives of the old Zulu establishment still held positions of authority in Zululand as chiefs and izinduna, the continuities in form belied the shifts that had occurred in practice. This was subtly revealed in the case of the Zulu royal family by a rumour that was in circulation at the time. When speaking of Dinuzulu's funeral, one Madikana revealed what expectations some Zulu held about the political role of his successor. He referred to the 1913 Act and reported
that

he had heard that the Government had given out that there would be a territorial separation of the two races, the white and the black...[and] that there would be a competition between the white inhabitants of Natal and the Zulus as to who should purchase the ground.

In order that they may purchase land, he said, "two muid sacks" had been set aside and "the black race was to fill these with money". The Zulu royal family would transfer to these sacks all "those contributions which were given as condolences" on Dinuzulu's death.146 There is a basis of truth in this rumour: the architects of the 1913 Act had envisaged that competitive buying between black and white would be permitted in certain 'released areas',147 (sometimes referred to as 'neutral areas'), and the collections made by the Zulu royal family on Dinuzulu's death were associated with a project to buy land. But the Zulu royal family had no intention of contributing this money to a communal fund for the benefit of the 'black race' nor redistributing the land it bought, as Madikana and others imagined. It was intended to buy ground in the Vryheid district for the personal use of Solomon and his dependants to free Solomon from the burdens and insecurities that he - like many other Zulu - suffered as a tenant on a white farm.148

Nevertheless, the pomp and splendour of the funeral ceremony and the expressions of sympathy and loyalty made at it were by no means hollow. For many Zulu, the Zulu royal family still had a very positive role to play in instilling a sense of continuity, identity and unity at a time when social realities did not.

The succession of Solomon

As the dead king's great induna (induna enkulu), Mankulumana
was in charge of proceedings at the funeral. While it was not essential that the heir be announced before the burial took place, it was customary that if the heir had already been nominated, he should symbolise his succession by taking his father's spear and with it turning the first sod of his father's grave. Right from the outset the funeral was held up because the heir had not been nominated, and there were fears on the part of the Usuthu that if they did not do so quickly "the Government would raise Kambi, the son of Hamu, to the position". The turning of the first sod was thus a vital issue - and for two days Dinuzulu's body lay in his principal hut at Nobamba whilst outside the succession dispute raged.

Since Dinuzulu had left no name with his advisors, Mankulumana sought the advice of Dinuzulu's inceku (sing. inceku - personal attendant), Lokothwayo, Mvingana and Nobiyana, whom the king had relied upon as loyal and discreet confidantes. They all reported that when Dinuzulu had been seriously ill and thought he was dying prior to his exile to KwaThengisa, he had confided that the heir was David Nyawana. Mankulumana announced this to the assembly and, after other 'great men of the nation', including Ndabankulu and Zidunge had announced that there was no reason to doubt the words of Dinuzulu's servants, the assembly rose and praised their new king with the salutation 'bayede'.

Even as the thunder of praises subsided, dissenting voices were heard from the central cluster of dignitaries. "You, son of Samaphunga, is the family of the King always to be spoilt by headmen?", accused Mbuzini Mdlalose, brother of Solomon's mother. Others, including Dotela kaMgidlana and Mnyaiza voiced their disapproval. During the discussion and deadlock that ensued, white clergymen measured off the grave and, when this was done, the izinduna took the unusual
decision of authorising David's full sister, Victoria Mpatshana, to turn the first sod on the grave. The digging of the grave was started as the dispute continued. Harriette Colenso intervened and took David by her right hand and Solomon by her left, and took them back to the Nobamba huts. As dusk fell, Mnyaiza announced that a meeting of Mpande's grandsons (Dinuzulu's generation), Dinuzulu's izinduna and his servants was to decide the matter in the morning; he also announced that Harriette Colenso and Pixley Seme would be called in because they had seen Dinuzulu's letters, in which he might have named an heir.

There were many who argued that Dinuzulu had subsequently cancelled his nomination of David. Dinuzulu's wishes were not the only consideration: it was plain that the majority of those in the inner circle and those commoners who knew David did not want him to succeed. Apart from the testimony of Dinuzulu's servants, David's claim rested on his being the eldest of Dinuzulu's sons. Further, Dinuzulu had named him Nyawana - "the feet that will walk for me". By all accounts, however, David had developed into an unpleasant character. Reports received by the CNC suggested that he was "of violent morose temperament, and addicted to drink", whilst Solomon was "modest, sober and intelligent". Oral tradition similarly emphasizes the importance of Solomon's character in determining his succession.

During the night Solomon was reported to have produced a letter from Dinuzulu nominating him as heir, and to have given it to Harriette Colenso. The following morning, Mnyaiza addressed the meeting and reprimanded Mankulumana for making David's succession public without first referring to all the izikhulu (great men of the nation) and izinduna. He then summoned Seme and Colenso. Seme had no specific evidence but said that he had understood Solomon to be the heir.
Harriette Colenso reported that she had evidence of Dinuzulu's wishes but, no doubt wary of a possible furore should David be deposed, refused to divulge the information until Dinuzulu had been buried.\footnote{163}

Thus royal cattle were slaughtered and Dinuzulu was placed in his grave. After the Assistant Magistrate of Babanango had expressed the government's condolences, it fell to Mankulumana to make a reply.

> It is you \[meaning the Government\] who killed the one we have now buried. You killed his father, and killed him. We did not invade your country, but you invaded ours...The one whom we now mourn did no wrong. There is no bone that will not decay. What we now ask is, as you have killed the father, to take care of the children.\footnote{164}

Whilst this was a cause for great consternation in administrative circles, it was how Mankulumana ended his speech that caused uproar among the Zulu. "Oh! Here I have buried the son of the King. Now I die with him as I died with him yesterday", he said, deeply upset by the succession dispute. "I am now going away...back to my Ndwandwe people".\footnote{165} "And with whom are you leaving your mistakes?", he was asked - and once more the ceremony was brought to a standstill as various izikhulu and izinduna insisted that the heir should be established, for it was he who should be the first to put a stone into Dinuzulu's grave. Mankulumana referred the whole matter to Harriette Colenso. Discreetly, she told the keeper of the royal homesteads, Mandlenyatha kaNobetha Zulu, to take Solomon's hand and let him select a stone and place it on the coffin. This was done in front of the whole assembly. No letter was ever produced - at least in public. David was then led to the grave to do the same; after him followed all the other men of importance, and the grave was presently filled.\footnote{166}

Thereafter, Rev. Twala of Pretoria conducted a Christian funeral
service which was immediately followed by the traditional Zulu counterpart. Songs were sung, Dinuzulu's praises were intoned, and lastly "Cetshwayo's song" was sung, as it had been when he was buried at Nkandla. Mankulumana then rose to announce that it was Solomon Maphumuzana ('the shelter', 'the giver of rest') "who will be our comfort", at which the whole assembly roared 'bayede' "as if the whole world shook with their praise."\textsuperscript{167}

In his report to the funeral ceremony, the magistrate of Vryheid outlined three "outstanding features". He was struck by the "lavish attention, pecuniarily and otherwise personally bestowed on the funeral party and mourners by all sections of the Native Labour Recruiting Agencies". He proceeded that the spectacle was "...undesirable and unedifying", and "one might aptly apply Verse 28, Chapter 24, St. Matthew", which reads "For wheresoever the carcase is, there will be eagles gathered together". Another feature was the sympathy shown by the "rank and file of natives", some 7000 attending the funeral. But in contrast to this, he noted a third feature: the reluctance on the part of certain chiefs and headmen in both Natal and Zululand to attend. While the rank and file regarded Dinuzulu as "King and Leader", he said, chiefs and headmen were mostly government appointees and were therefore afraid that expressions of sympathy would weaken their positions.\textsuperscript{168}

Tribal divisions within the Zulu

The division between those 'loyal' to the government and those 'loyal' to the royal house was very clear. Socwatsha and Nongejeni, who compiled for the NAD the reports from which much of this account is taken, were too afraid to visit a royal homestead even though they were unknown in Zululand and had visited many other homesteads without a qualm.\textsuperscript{169} This was
especially well illustrated in the case of Chief Mpikanina kaziwedu Zulu, who was one of the four chiefs to accept jurisdiction over members of the Usuthu when they were divided up by the Natal Government. He had been despised - especially as he was a grandson of Mpande - for accepting this appointment, and had proceeded to attract other 'traitors' to him. Nobiyana, who had once been a trusted servant of Dinuzulu's but who had been discovered conveying information about matters at the Usuthu homesteads to government officials during the 1906 rebellion, was now an induna to Mpikanina. Dinuzulu's children had "verbally set upon" Nobiyana when he visited the royal homestead, Nsindeni, in 1911; he was correctly called a "spy for the Government" and was told that he had no business on the property since he now "belonged to Mpikanina". Although Mpikanina arrived to attend the funeral, he stood "quite alone", and after a remonstration with Mankulumana on the subject of the 1906 rebellion, he became afraid and fled before the ceremony was completed. So too in the case of Acting Chief Muzimubi of the Buthelezi, who had also accepted jurisdiction over a portion of the truncated Usuthu. He chose not to attend, though he did send some men to express condolences, and "a beast in the form of money". He alluded to the estrangement that had come about between the Usuthu and Buthelezi, by complaining that in the old days the Zulu royal house would not have nominated a successor without the presence of the Buthelezi.

There were other examples. Chief Zambode, who had recently been appointed in the place of a deposed chief, was waved away from the mourners before Mankulumana intervened. Despite Mankulumana and Mnyaiza's efforts to unite as many people as possible in the mourning, Natal NAD spies reported that "Dinuzulu's cousins and relatives never spoke to any of the people who came to mourn who were known to be loyal to the Government. They only addressed people who they knew were still
supporters of the Usuthu cause.\textsuperscript{175}

The tension between Mandlakazi and Usuthu, however, showed signs of repair. There had been moves towards a reconciliation on the part of the Usuthu for some time; soon after his return from St. Helena, Dinuzulu had visited Zibhebhu and said that he wished to "forget past animosity".\textsuperscript{176} Following the death of Zibhebhu in 1905, the Mandlakazi had dissipated some of the energy and unity in a succession dispute. A commission of inquiry, presided over by Sir Charles Saunders, decided that Bokwe was the heir and set aside the claim of Msenteli. Because Msenteli had a large following and civil war was imminent, he and some of his leading supporters were removed to Eshowe and Nkandla districts. Bokwe was still very young, and Mciteki (another son of Zibhebhu) was appointed as Mandlakazi regent and chief during Bokwe's minority.\textsuperscript{181} Despite Mnyaiza's invitation to attend the funeral, Mciteki himself refused to do so. He did nonetheless send a few of his izinduna - some of whom did not go personally but merely sent representatives. When the Mandlakazi representatives arrived, they were brusquely asked why they had brought no beast with which to mourn - but Mankulumana was quick to soothe by expressing particular thanks that the Mandlakazi had sent mourners. The mere fact that the Usuthu and the Mandlakazi representatives came together and mixed was a cause for especial comment by observers.\textsuperscript{178}

The dispute now lived on mainly in the minds of those who could recall the tragedies of the 1880s - and in the minds of people like Mciteki who, even in 1917, could proclaim that

My father gave orders that we had to meet the Usuthu only at stores and at the Court House. I know it is the intention to bring about a reconciliation...that will never be. We must clean our guns. I have as many men as there are Rheibucks and bushes and the paths will soon run red with blood if we are forced to a reconciliation.\textsuperscript{179}
Although such violence lurked beneath the surface, in practice the animosity henceforth waned - soothed as much by time and the diplomatic approaches of the Usuthu as by the awareness that the exigencies of the twentieth century left little space for a family squabble that had outlived those circumstances that had sustained the civil war.

This was also true of the split between the Ngenetsheni and the Usuthu. An urgency had been imparted to the succession dispute because the Usuthu feared that the government would find in Kambi, Hamu's heir, a collaborative tool foolhardy enough to accept appointment as Dinuzulu's successor. In the event, however, Kambi sent mourners to the funeral, and there was no mention of animosity. Overall, however, the funeral reflected that there was still much animosity against chiefs and sections regarded as government collaborators.

The succession of Solomon had also brought to light new divisions within the Zulu royal family itself. These were to be an annoyance for the first few years of Solomon's chieftainship, but, in comparison with the ruptures during Dinuzulu's time, they were to be of trifling importance. Most worrisome was the truculence of David, who had been 'king' for a day. His uncharacteristically meek acceptance of the cancellation of his appointment in itself indicated that he knew that he did not have the support for a showdown. However, when the izikhulu met shortly after the funeral to set the internal affairs of the Zulu royal family in order, an attempt was made to placate David by awarding him the Nobamba homestead and the care of both sections of the traditionally royalist Qulusi people, under the royal izinduna Mnyaiza Mthethwa and Hali Mdlalose. For the time being, Solomon's principal homestead was to be Zibindini in the Babanango district, where his mother had been placed by Dinuzulu. Solomon was also awarded the now dilapidated Mahashini homestead in the Nongoma district, in the
ward of Chief Moya Ndwandwe who was one of the chiefs appointed over the Usuthu. Mankulumana, who made these arrangements, earned widespread censure because the Qulusi had been personally administered by the king since Shaka had incorporated them; and Nobamba had been the property of the king since the time of Ndaba, Shaka's great-grandfather. Nobamba and Zibindini were not more than three hundred yards distant from each other, and the tension that existed between them is recorded in the izibongo of Solomon's mother ('oka-Ntuzwa' - the daughter of Ntuzwa of the Mdlalose, Silomo):

Wild person that is barked at by the Nobamba dogs
Likewise those of Zibindini greet her
They say 'Good day daughter of the King'
'You must turn your back on those who reject you
Since those who love you are facing them'.

and of Solomon himself:

The hare that outdistanced the dogs of Ondini
The matter was started by the men of Nobamba
It was started by Mankulumana son of Somaphunga
It was begun by Ndabankulu son of Lukhwazi
It was promoted by Lokhotwayo son of Zembe
It was urged by Mvingana son of Nomphanda
They took the cattle of the Mahashini kraal
And mixed them with those of Nobamba
...
Our own eater-up from Zibindini
The honeybird that drinks from deep pools
If he drank from shallow pools his beak would be muddied
Tuft of soft hair he speaks not, neither has heavy words,
He is like unto one who is surrounded by the shields of warriors.

The other division within the Zulu royal family was a consequence of the succession dispute that followed the death of Cetshwayo in 1884. Manzolwandle's claim had been passed over in favour of Dinuzulu - who was the son of a low-ranking wife of Cetshwayo. Manzolwandle had thereafter been "a wanderer, shunned
by nearly all his old relatives and therefore practically an orphan dependent on the Supreme Chief." In 1907 he was appointed as chief to a ward in the Ngutu division - which evidently annoyed Dinuzulu - and was given a hundred head of cattle by the Natal Government "to enable him to maintain the prestige and dignity attaching to the position to which he had been appointed."\(^{184}\)

On news of Dinuzulu's death, Manzolwandle and his mother, okaQethuke, reopened the question of his claim to the estate of Cetshwayo. Hence he claimed part of Dinuzulu's estate and also began a campaign to claim the unpaid lobolo for six daughters of Cetshwayo who had been married after Cetshwayo's death. Furthermore, he demanded lobolo for women of Cetshwayo's isigodlo ('harem') who had been subsequently married, and for the return of cattle his late father had lent out in accordance with the ukusisa custom.\(^{185}\) Manzolwandle also took the case to Sir Charles Saunders when Dinuzulu died. The government, however, refused to act on his behalf because, it argued, all Cetshwayo's property (including all his cattle and women) had become the government's property after the Anglo-Zulu war.\(^ {186}\) Thus it was up to the government to decide whether to pursue the return of Cetshwayo's 'sisa'd' cattle or the payment of lobolo for his daughters and isigodlo women. Moreover, the government reminded him that it was a condition of his appointment as chief in 1907 that he renounce all claims as heir to Cetshwayo.\(^ {187}\) Despite Manzowandle's futile but divisive rumblings, Mankulumana telegraphed him three times informing him of Dinuzulu's funeral\(^ {188}\) - another example of the conciliatory stance adopted by the Usuthu leadership. Manzolwandle did not attend. At Nobamba, it was said that "Manzolwandle had been unable to attend the funeral as his trap had broken down. Then he had got onto a horse, and it, also, broke down, but the people were still expecting him".\(^ {189}\)
These were some of the tensions that faced the new head of the Zulu royal house. In the space of one week, Solomon had had to endure the death of his father, the trauma of a succession dispute, the jealousies of his siblings and uncles, the lurking antagonism of the enemies of his father and grandfather, a break in the trust which had obtained between Dinuzulu and his chief counsellor, Mankulumana, the attentions of a wide range of courtiers, and the pressures imposed by a great multitude of people who had felt his succession to be an event of both public and deeply personal importance. He also had succeeded to the particular loyalty of a section of the Zulu people, the Usuthu, who were still administratively divided among four separate chiefs. Their recognition of Solomon as Dinuzulu's successor had taken place regardless of the administrative arrangements imposed by the Natal NAD, and the contradictions so generated made Solomon's position yet more complex.

Solomon had also inherited the attentions of the many creditors of Dinuzulu's estate. Although he was allowed a £100 stipend from the government to care for Dinuzulu's widows and dependants (of which £5 per annum was paid directly to Potgieter for the lease of 20 acres of 'Welgekozen'), this was nowhere near sufficient. Apart from any other expenses, Solomon was obliged to pay about £60 per annum for hut rentals on Buys' 'Koningsdal' alone, apart from dues for grazing and arable land.

Influences on Solomon's early life

As may be expected of a child of Dinuzulu, Solomon had not had a secure childhood. He was born sometime between 1891 and 1893 on the island of St. Helena whilst Dinuzulu was in exile there. Dinuzulu had taken two wives with him to St. Helena: Indlunkulu Silomo, daughter of Ntuzwa Mdlatlose,
and Indlunkulu Zihlazile, daughter of Qethuka Magwaza. OkaNtuzwa's first child died, but while at St. Helena she bore two sons, Solomon Nkayishana Maphumuzana and Arthur Edward Mshiyeni. OkaQethuka bore two sons and a daughter - David Nyawana, Samuel Bhekelendoda and Victoria Mphaphu.

Life on St. Helena was easy. The children "roamed" and "played" - and it was said that they soon lost their milk teeth on account of the number of sweets given to them by whites on the island. More importantly, strong European influence was brought to bear on their upbringing through the media of elementary education and the Church. After Dinuzulu was sent into exile, Harriette Colenso arranged for Bubi Mthuli to go to St. Helena to educate Dinuzulu and the royal youngsters. When Mthuli fell out with the interpreter, Colenso sought a replacement from among those who had been educated at the school of her father, Bishop Colenso. Magema Magwaza Fuze was selected and went out to St. Helena to relieve Mthuli and join Rev. Barraclough in teaching the Zulu royal family.

Dinuzulu was given instruction in speaking, reading and writing of English. The youngsters' education, however, was informal. They were instructed to be literate only in Zulu, and did not achieve any great proficiency. Nonetheless, they were educated in a broader sense through the Church which infused into them the habits and beliefs of European life. As Magogo kaDinuzulu related, Solomon and the other youngsters were

...never educated. [Solomon] never went to school. They merely learnt to read a little Zulu. In our home..., from the beginning we were educated for the Lord, so that we may be able to read the Bible....We were not concerned with education for speech. We were being educated to Christianity.
Every Sunday they attended church where they heard services conducted by Bishop Welby and Rev. Barraclough. It was in this church that they were all baptised, and received their intriguing blend of British royal and old testament first names. They also learnt such skills as horse-riding. Zulu interviewees all emphasized that Solomon was 'Christian' and 'civilized' - the fact that he was brought up in European clothes and not in a beshu (loin skin) was regarded as sufficient evidence of this.

After the Zulu royal family returned to Zululand in 1898, Solomon moved back and forth between Osuthu and the European-style house Dinuzulu had constructed near the magistracy at Eshowe, where the Natal Government had obliged him to live. There followed two periods of major upheaval: the Anglo-Boer war and the 1906 rebellion. This latter was far more disruptive. As white hostility to Dinuzulu mounted, rumours spread that the boy princes would be "singled out and transfixed on poles in the ground". They were thus taken into hiding. After the long treason trial, Dinuzulu's imprisonment and subsequent exile to the Transvaal, the royal youngsters spent their time alternately at their respective mothers' homesteads near Nongoma and Babanango, or with their father at KwaThengisa. It was at KwaThengisa that Solomon met Pixley Seme, who was to be a strong influence on him immediately after his succession. During this time, Solomon was also duly enrolled as a member of the Vukayibambe ibutho (age set or 'regiment') by Dinuzulu, which established in him and his peers a sense of identity and common citizenship fired by the traditions of the amabutho in preconquest Zululand. Despite - or perhaps because of - the insecurities and complexities of his upbringing, all sources affirm Solomon's humility, sense of social concern and justice, open nature and ready sense of humour.

Overall, the western influences on Solomon had sunk deep. The
following description made by an American journalist who conducted a series of interviews with Solomon's first wife during the early 1930s, refers to Solomon a few years after his succession:

He wore underwear, shoes, military uniforms, and cocked hats; his riding breeches and boots were made to order. He preferred the soft outlines of a chair, to rest on a mattress, sit at a table for meals, have a light cast upon him after night fall; to cover himself with ample blankets rather than skins, and lie between clean sheets; to use warm water, and soft towels to dry with, and the feel of a sponge after riding.

It itself, Solomon's personal hut at Zibindini illustrates the distinction that must be made between form and content when conceptualising the Zulu royal family in the early twentieth century. Although it was a traditional Zulu hut, surrounded by a finely built reed stockade, it contained a "brass bed, with its hand embroidered spread, some chairs, an open cupboard with brightly patterned china, and a table covered with a gleaming patterned oilcloth."

On his succession, Solomon immediately fell under a number of different - or even contradictory - influences. One was the result of the initiative of a local African priest of the (Anglican) Church of the Province of South Africa (hereafter CPSA), William Afrikander. Within a couple of months of Solomon's succession, Afrikander had "converted" Solomon and David, and in February 1914 Solomon was confirmed by the Bishop of Zululand, Wilmot Vyvyan. In a fund-raising appeal published in The Net, Rev. L. E. Oscroft (then stationed at Etaleni in central Zululand) emphasized that the church initiative should not end there:

I was at Afrikander's station (Emtonjaneni) a fortnight ago and had several talks with Solomon and his brother David (older than
Solomon but not chosen by the people). One of the chief Royal Kraals is at a place called KwaNobamba in the midst of a large heathen population. At present we have no station there, but we are hoping to start there within the next three months. It will be a great task - there is strong heathen opposition to meet, especially from the boy King's advisors.... Think what it means to the Church. The head of the Zulu nation, worshipping in his own church, at or near his own home....Afrikander has great influence over Solomon and David, and I know from their own mouths that they look to him for guidance. We must not fail them....despite many disappointments, there does seem at the present time a special movement towards Light taking place amongst the Zulu people. We have created their hunger - now we must satisfy it.

Another influence issued from the stratum of mission educated African churchmen, teachers and clerks. For some among them, Solomon's succession was an event of significance not only beyond Zululand, but beyond the borders of Natal: it rekindled those nascent African nationalist sentiments that had briefly flared under the Ethiopianist banner at the turn of the century and subsided after the 1906 rebellion. Amos Nxumalo, a landowner of a "Kholwa house" in Pietermaritzburg, held that Solomon "has been crowned as King and elevated to that position..." and argued "...you must understand that he has been made King of all us black people - the whole black race." The 'black people' were not as much in need of leadership to provide political direction as identity, pride and inspiration. Their interest in Solomon was not a passive one. If Solomon was to provide the image that was required of him he would have to symbolise more than blackness, power, independence and romanticised tradition; he would also need to conform to their petty bourgeois social, cultural, and political aspirations. It was a matter of concern that Solomon should not transpire to be a 'backward' Zulu tribal chief.

The views expressed by a leading mission-published Zulu language
newspaper, Izindaba Zabantu, are especially illuminating. It is alone significant that the editor speaks both as a 'Zulu' himself and to a 'Zulu' readership, whereas Natal Africans had not long previously been despised as the amakhafula of esilungwini (literally 'the place of the whites' - Natal) by the Zulus of Zululand.

[Dinuzulu] once held the position of King, but he was misled by his elders and fought with the English Government. The kingdom was taken away from him...What was left with him was just the dignity with which he was born.... With the Zulus Dinuzulu was their King until he died. His son, Solomon, will be recognized as King even if he is nothing to the Government and white people's eyes.

It's that dignity and power which Solomon will have among Africans that we want to talk about today. Is this power and dignity to be just nothing at all, of no use to its owner and his people? We think there is plenty he can do that is wise. We don't think he will ever see the Kingdom of Zululand, no! That Kingdom is dead and will never be again. There is another good position he can take for his people...the position of leading his people to Light. This position can be the same as a King's position indeed, because of its dignity, because of its help to the Zulus. Here is the position that can suit this son from the Royal Family, Solomon. Let's not mean for the Kingdom that is of no use ....Let something which is useful be desired for these days we are living in....

If our hopes and other people's hopes are to come true with this child, it will depend on how he is guided....It is up to the relatives to narrate the mistakes [of Dinuzulu] to this son who is taking up this high position....He must be taken away from foolish people...and be brought up in a westernized respectable manner which is correct for a King these days...We are aware that Mankulumana and Mnyaiza are men in high positions in the Royal family, but even so they are still raw, they are still in a dark pit and they don't want to go out of it so that they can see the light. If you want to see good from Solomon, these are not the people to lead him and teach him.212
Izindaba Zabantu then provided information on how other sons of kings of African nations had been brought up. In Uganda, it says, the young heir was kept under the observation of a white advisor and was taught only what was 'correct'. In Tanganyika the heir was taken to a school in England for education, while "in our country" the son of Lewanika of the Rotse had been taken to Lovedale "so that he may be enlightened there". The article concluded by giving notice of Solomon's forthcoming meeting with the people of Johannesburg, arranged by Seme. "Bring some money", it urged, "so that the child of Senzangakhona does not starve in the presence of his father's people." 

In a leading article eighteen months later, the same newspaper expressed both dismay that its earlier advice had not been well heeded and displeasure with Solomon's advisors. "There are people who have asked us when we are to hear that our King Solomon is being taught the way of light....If all that we hear is truth, then it is obvious that he will follow his father's footsteps. Where his father went you all know." The paper in fact had no cause to be so despondent.

Apart from the initiatives of William Afrikander, which were soon to be followed up by a vigorous CPSA backup, the 'raw' and 'unenlightened' influence of Mankulumana and Mnyaiza was being balanced by the attentions of leading petty bourgeois individuals. Although his influence was to be more pronounced later, John Dube was quick to show interest in Solomon. Dube had been born of a Natal Kholwa family in 1871, and was educated at Inanda and Amanzimtoti Theological College before furthering his studies at Oberlin College in America. In America, Dube raised the funds that enabled him to establish the 'Zulu Christian Industrial School' at Ohlange (in the Inanda district, near Durban) in 1901. Dube's Christian beliefs and concern for education and "social progress" (in western terms) were intimately intertwined.
Inspired by the American Negro educationist and political theorist Booker T. Washington, Dube at least initially felt that Christianity and education took priority over political action in terms of both short and long term benefits. He told a white audience: "Christianity will usher in a new civilization and the 'Dark Continent' will be transformed into a land of commerce and Christian institutions. Then shall Africa take her place as a nation among nations." 216

In Natal, Dube's optimism was misplaced; white colonists were especially distrustful of the attempts of the kholwa to master the beliefs and practices of European life, and erected barriers against their progress. Shortly after the turn of the century, Dube became politically active through Ilanga Lase Natal, a Zulu-English newspaper, and the Natal Native Congress. The latter were both primarily vehicles for the aspirations of the westernized kholwa elite, and both tended to express disdain for the 'backwardness' and 'stagnancy' of 'unimproved kraal life'. 217 Nonetheless, with his "recollections of pride in the Zulu past", Dube had campaigned on Dinuzulu's behalf during the treason trial that followed the 1906 rebellion. 218 In 1912 he became the first president of the SANNC, and one of his first actions in this capacity testifies to his desire to garner the support of the very tribal Africans whose beliefs and customs he largely rejected. At a meeting with the Zulu at Eshowe in November 1912, he made an impassioned appeal for black political unity and "beneficial representation" in view of the forthcoming segregationist legislation. He further spoke glowingly of white industriousness and disparagingly of black laziness and sensual gratification (beer, women and food) and urged his audience to educate themselves and their children. Mtonga kaMpande was present, and he agreed to support Dube. 219

Shortly after Solomon's succession, Dube was concerned about
the way in which Solomon was being guided by his advisors. When, in December 1913, Harriette Colenso intended to present Solomon to Botha for recognition (presumably as successor to Dinuzulu's one-time position as chief of the Usuthu), Dube denounced the idea on the grounds that it was improper so soon after Dinuzulu's death - the customary period of mourning had not yet been observed. This period of mourning was approximately one year in length, at the end of which an ihlambo was held: a ceremonial meeting of the amabutho and a ritual hunt (inqina) during which the spears of the nation were cleansed in the blood of the prey. That Dube was anxious for the mourning period to be correctly observed reflected his ambiguity about the customs and traditions of the Zulu; this was especially marked when it came to royal traditions. Harriette Colenso wrote a deferential letter to Dube, agreeing with his views and adding that Mankulumana had been of the same opinion. She noted, incidentally, that she and Seme were presently at KwaThengisa, attempting to sort out Dinuzulu's financial affairs.

It seems that soon afterwards Dube contacted Solomon to secure Solomon's support for a fund-raising scheme to send a deputation to England. This was to protest against the 1913 Act. The Native Commissioner at Piet Retief saw links between Dube's activities and collections that were currently being made for the Zulu royal family:

I claim that it is not unreasonable to suppose and to assume that such educated and enlightened natives as Mr John Dube and Mr P. ka L. Seme are labouring quietly and diplomatically amongst the Zulu speaking peoples with the object of achieving a complete reunion of the Zulu Nation and thereby a resuscitation and revival of the Zulu Royal House and power.

It was Seme who came to be the greatest 'outside' influence on
Solomon immediately after his succession. The basis of Seme's association with the Zulu royal family at this stage was in a professional capacity. He assisted in settling the claims of Dinuzulu's creditors and reviving the financial fortunes of the Zulu royal family. Describing himself as "legal advisor to the late Chief Dinuzulu" and as acting in that capacity "on behalf of his heir Solomon", Seme wrote to the prime minister's office requesting permission for Solomon to proceed to Johannesburg to receive "voluntary gifts" to settle Dinuzulu's estate. Seme's request was not granted. Four days after Seme's request, the SNA similarly instructed Mankulumana that no-one was to "exploit Solomon for the purpose of settling debts". Nevertheless, a massive tribute-collecting campaign was launched by Seme and Mnyaiza, during which Solomon was made well aware that of all the people who were willing to pay tribute to him, it was urban dwellers and migrant workers who could most readily do so. Thus he gained an insight into the 'political economy' of his 'kingship'.

The royal tribute-collectors did not confine their attentions to urban areas: they were also at work deep in the rural districts. Here, their activities threw light on two factors that were important for the political fortunes of the royal house. In the first place, the rural districts constituted the numerical core of Solomon's political constituency. Their response to the royal tribute-collectors showed that past divisions were breaking down and a sense of unity was fast being established under the figure of Solomon. In the second place, the reaction of the NAD to these developments was negative; a sense of political unity among the inhabitants of the rural districts was anomalous to an administration which was based on the existence of tribal and sectional divisions.

In the Piet Retief district, despite the opposition of the local
Native Commissioner, Chief Tunzi had collected £20 from his ward (numbering only 200 tax payers - adult males - who were labour tenants and squatters) and had handed this to Seme and Mnyaiza for transmission to Solomon. In a state of consternation, the Native Commissioner reported that Chief Tunzi and his ward were the descendants of a small section which had been expelled from Zululand by Cetshwayo after an altercation, but today they are contributing to a fund for the benefit of the heir to the Zulu Royal House, against which they actively bore arms in the Anglo-Zulu war of 1879. Though Tunzi and his small following may only be an infinitesimal unit there are other tribes in which the feeling of resentment against the Zulu Royal House is dying out...225

The magistrate of Nongoma similarly reported that Solomon was receiving presents from "all over Zululand, both in money and in kind". Contributions from individuals had been as high as £10, and Mnyaiza had collected a "considerable amount" for Solomon when he stopped off at Charlestown on his way between KwaThengisa and Zululand. Tribute was pouring into the royal homesteads in Zululand, and Phikisile, one of Solomon's sisters, had been instructed to keep an account of the money received. The magistrate concluded with a plea to the CNC that Solomon should not be allowed to reside in the locality, as Solomon's being "paraded about as a chief of great standing" had "considerably unsettled"his district.226

In response to such reports, the CNC summoned Mnyaiza to his office. "Where are you leading this boy of Solomon?", he asked, and proceeded, "Look here, you know what these lawyers are. This man Seme is a Natal man. I know his father who lives at Richmond. Lawyers want money only. They will end by leaving you in the lurch."227 Mnyaiza replied that "the people"
wanted to see Solomon, and that he had indeed gone about to solicit money even though he knew the government had forbidden it. In the face of this unabashed defiance, the CNC merely asked Mnyaiza whether he ever visited Chief Mpikanina, under whose jurisdiction Mnyaiza fell - a question which reflected how the present administrative arrangements for the Usuthu were not proving viable. Mnyaiza answered by referring to his duties as a labour recruiter which, he said, kept him away from home. There was little the CNC could do. He could barely forbid Mnyaiza himself to move about the country since he was committing no wrong in doing so, and he could barely forbid the collection of subscriptions that were by all accounts voluntarily given. All he could do was to reiterate that "Dinuzulu's children have been given away to others appointed chiefs and it is wrong to act as you have been acting."228

As the CNC related to the SNA, the activities of Seme and Mnyaiza, and of Solomon, were posing a grave danger to the administration of not only the Usuthu, but of Zululand. "I am anxious therefore to prevent Solomon as far as possible from acquiring a following. If any indication in this direction is not nipped in the bud, I forsee that the Government will have the same trouble with him as experienced with his late father."229

Solomon soon began organising 'progressions' and collections on his own. His application for a pass to visit the Transvaal was refused when it was discovered that he intended to visit Franz at the Brakpan mine and "collect money from natives in compounds to enable him to pay his debts."230 It is significant that NAD officials regarded the influence of Solomon's 'non-tribal' associates with especial disfavour. The CNC held that Solomon "may confidently be expected to lead a quiet life, unless led away by the headmen and agitators,
such as John Dube, Seme and others", and he referred to Mnyaiza and Franz as "perhaps the most disloyal people in Zululand".

The traditional context and the ihlambo (the washing of the spears

Apart from the influence of kholwa courtiers, the Church and his more worldly royal associates like Mnyaiza and Franz, Solomon was the central figure in the world of Zulu traditionalism. Although, as has been argued, the 'traditionalism' was one of form rather than content, the niche that Solomon occupied in this context was of immense social and political importance. Ultimately it was the entire basis of his status. As the administration was only too painfully aware, Solomon had a huge groundswell of support in the rural districts, and for them Solomon was 'king'.

That Solomon inherited from Dinuzulu a large number of royal homesteads dotted about the core of the Zulu country undoubtedly made his presence and influence more widely felt. Apart from Zibindini and Nobamba in the Vryheid district (although David had been given Nobamba for his personal use, it was ultimately the property of the king), there were the Gqikazi, Sikalenisenyoka, Mahashini and Ekubuseni royal homesteads in the Nongoma district, and Nsindeni in the Mahlabatini district. Not surprisingly, the Natal NAD saw this scatter of royal homesteads as a problem. The cluster of royal graves (Emakhosini) in the Vryheid district were also of great significance. Dinuzulu had recently been buried on the farm 'Koningsdal'. Jama and Senzangakhona were buried on neighbouring 'Welgekozen', Ndaba and Mageba on Pandasgraf, and Punga on 'Heelgoed'. The gravesites were held to be the sacred preserve of the Zulu people, and it was one of Solomon's first political preoccupations to get them out of the hands of white landowners and into his own, as
the representative of the Zulu nation. Harriette Colenso strongly supported Solomon in this matter, and although he was not successful, his campaign itself did much to establish his status as national figurehead.236

In Zululand, Solomon surrounded himself with izinduna and izinceku who were all men of especial rank and who had historic claims to positions of responsibility in the royal house. Virtually all were men who had either themselves held positions under past Zulu kings or were descendants of such men. As sons of Cetshwayo's powerful brothers Ndabuko and Dabulamanzi, Mnyaiza and Franz filled this bill. Since they were close members of the Zulu royal family, however, they could not act as izinduna but only as informal advisors or 'assistants'.237 Solomon's great izinduna were Mankulumana and Gilbert kaNcgongcwana Zulu. Although there is evidence of some tension between Solomon and Mankulumana soon after Solomon's succession238 (which was probably related to Mankulumana's role in the succession dispute), Mankulumana was soon securely back in his role of respected and powerful royal advisor. Gilbert was a member of a collateral branch of the Zulu royal family which traced its descent back to Jama.239 Gilbert's father, Ngcongwana, had been an adviser who accompanied Cetshwayo to London for an audience with Queen Victoria shortly after the Anglo-Zulu war. Subsequently, back in Zululand, he was killed by the Mandlakazi in 1883.240

In the earlier part of Solomon's chieftainship, it was Mankulumana who was the most influential 'induna of the nation', but as time went on and he grew more aged, Gilbert gradually assumed more responsibility. Gilbert never rose to such great status as Mankulumana, because Solomon came to rely increasingly on petty bourgeois individuals for advice. Moreover, in the early 1920s, Solomon was to revive the tradition, which had fallen into disuse after the Usuthu/Buthelezi disagreement of 1888, whereby the head of the Buthelezi
acted as prime minister and chief counsellor to the Zulu kingship. Shortly after the NAD recognized him as chief of the Usuthu, Solomon made formal application for the appointment of Mankulumana and Gilbert - together with Nkunzi Buthelezi - as Usuthu izinduna with authority to try civil cases arising in his ward.

Maphelu kaMkhosana was Solomon's chief personal bodyguard and personal attendant or inceku. He had acted in a similar capacity to Dinuzulu and had been implicated in the 1906 rebellion. However, perhaps because of his age, his extensive knowledge of history and custom, and his status as a loyal servant of Dinuzulu who had shared many of his late master's trials, Maphelu had an influence that exceeded the usual powers of an inceku. Although he held no public position, he had Solomon's confidence and ear at all times; and in practice his advice was sought on matters beyond the royal homesteads—which worried those white administrators who remembered the 1906 rebellion all too vividly.

Lastly, among those who were consistently close to Solomon was Zazeni kaLokhotwayo of the Mngadi section. Lokhotwayo had been inceku to Dinuzulu, and Zazeni succeeded his father as inceku and body servant (insila) to the king. The term insila also refers to the 'spiritual essence' of a person, which is held to attach to his body matter (sweat, hair, skin, urine) and property. If such fell into the wrong hands, its owner's health and security would be at risk. As Solomon's insila, Zazeni was thus in a position of some responsibility.

One year after Dinuzulu's death, the occasion of Dinuzulu's ihlambo ceremony illustrated Solomon's role within the world of Zulu traditionalism, and simultaneously revealed what a danger he posed to the existing administrative arrangements in Zululand. For many reasons, the NAD was appalled by the
prospect of large numbers of Zulu gathering together as a nation to pay final respects to Dinuzulu and to perform the requisite rites to complete the period of mourning. Most obviously, the ihlambo would free Solomon from the fetters of mourning that had so far inhibited his political activities. Moreover, it would be a national festival, presided over by Solomon. The NAD considered that such a demonstration would pose a threat to the white population not only by eroding the operation of indirect rule in Zululand: there were also fears that there was to be another Zulu rebellion. Long before the ihlambo, there was persistent and widespread consternation that, contrary to emphatic instructions, Solomon was inviting men from all over the country to attend the ceremony. Writing to the SNA, the CNC (Addison) stated that it was clear that the ihlambo would not be a "local matter", and that the "loyal Mandlekazi tribe" might be attacked. He proceeded to outline how the ihlambo, the World War and the 'Dutch' rebellion against South Africa's participation in it on the side of Britain, were all linked together. The Boers in Northern Natal, intelligence reports indicated, had informed the Zulu that they would be better off under German rule. B. Colenbrander, magistrate of Vryheid, who was normally a calm and sympathetic official, similarly expressed "great apprehension" at the prospect of the ihlambo "in view of the present rebellion [Dutch] in the Union." Despite instructions, large numbers of Zulu were already proceeding to Nobamba, and already rumours of an imminent 'native uprising' were spreading among whites. He felt certain that when the ihlambo took place "we will have a panic in this district". He felt it was "perhaps more than a coincidence" that the Boer rebellion and the ihlambo were taking place concurrently. The CNC arranged for a military detachment - the 'Vryheid Commando' - to remain in the vicinity of Nobamba during the ihlambo.

These fears say much more about the Natal NAD and the local
white population than about the intentions of the Zulu royal family. The **ihlambo** was a peaceful and highly disciplined ceremony, and there was no hint that something sinister lay behind it. The **ihlambo** did prove, however, that the NAD's present application of indirect rule was severely threatened. Furthermore, by lifting the veil of mourning from Solomon and his advisors, it inaugurated the 'reign' of Solomon. Soon the NAD found that their present administrative arrangements were absolutely unworkable.

Solomon and Mankulumana had indeed sent for people from all over Zululand and Northern Natal to attend the **ihlambo**. It was a pedantically traditional ceremony; Mkhosana kaZangwana of the Zungu, who had been an adviser to Cetshwayo and had accompanied him to London after the Anglo-Zulu war, was especially fetched from the Mhlabatini district to preside over the ceremony, since he was an expert on ancient custom. Because he was aged and frail, Solomon sent Mankulumana with a wagon to fetch him. A number of royal cattle were slaughtered to provide food for the assembly. Whilst the meat was being prepared, the **izinyanga** (medicine men) prepared ritual medicines for the purification of Solomon at Dinuzulu's grave, and for the **amabutho**, numbering some five thousand men, who crowded into the cattle kraal. Once they had expressed their final devotions and praises to Dinuzulu, the Assistant Magistrate of Babanango addressed the gathering and emphasized the government's goodwill to the Zulu, as shown by its gift of 15 head of cattle. In order of rank, he named the "friends of the Zulus" in the government: J. Y. Gibson (DNC, Zululand), R. H. Addison (CNC, Natal), E. Dower (SNA), and General Botha (Prime Minister and Minister of Native Affairs). He concluded by reminding the chiefs present that it was their duty "to see that Solomon does not get into trouble by keeping your men in hand, whom you have brought here...".

In accordance with the **ihlambo** custom, there was to follow a
ritual hunt (ingina) to 'wash the spears' of the nation. The NAD had already forbidden this, but, faced with the question at the ihlambo itself, the Assistant Magistrate of Babanango felt that "tact" was called for and allowed the hunt to proceed.\textsuperscript{253} At sunrise the following morning the hunt began. Solomon cut a dashing figure among the amabutho, riding a horse and carrying a rifle. He personally, with his royal dogs, were responsible for many of the slain buck that were brought back to Nobamba at sunset, carried on the shoulders of those of the various amabatho as they sung "great songs of Zulu kings".\textsuperscript{254} Before the amabutho dispersed, they constructed a cattle kraal for Solomon at Zibindini. The reign of the new king was well and truly under way.

The ihlambo was the first traditional national ceremony that Solomon presided over. The adherence to custom that was such a feature of the ceremony had been arranged by Solomon himself when he summoned Mkhosana to prescribe proceedings. Solomon, together with the Zulu royal family as a whole, represented continuity with the past, national unity, and a sense of independent identity. Solomon's role as an embodiment of tradition was vital in establishing his social and political status. At ceremonies such as the ihlambo, men were drawn together from all sections of the Zulu people and grouped themselves together not in the 'tribal' units that the NAD prescribed, but in their amabutho - wherein the criterion for membership was age rather than lineage or territorial origin. The activities of the amabutho at the ihlambo focussed on the Zulu royal family and in so doing, made strong appeals to nationalist sentiments. In such contexts of tradition and custom, Solomon was undeniably the king of the Zulu.\textsuperscript{255} In this light, Solomon's baptism into the Church by the Bishop of Zululand in February 1914 and his appearance a few months later in his late father's cattle kraal, virtually naked whilst being washed down with ritual medicines, were not contradictory. The function of the ihlambo was not only to
complete the period of mourning for Dinuzulu: as the burning of bones after the feast in Dinuzulu's cattle kraal and the work of the amabutho in building a cattle kraal for Solomon symbolized, Solomon was now no longer the nation's 'comfort' for the loss of Dinuzulu, but was its new leader.

It was precisely this fact that appalled the Natal NAD. As the magistrate of Entonjaneni reported of the ihlambo,

large numbers of Zulu were drawn together from every centre of Zululand, and that these ignorant people now, naturally, looked on the youthful son Solomon Zulu, alias Nkaitshana, as the successor to his father Dinuzulu, and not merely as the simple heir to his estate, and that Solomon himself believes that the mantle of King or chieftain worn by his late father now clothes him, there is promise of further trouble in the near future...
The policy that the NAD adopted towards Solomon until 1920 falls into two periods. The retirement of Dick Addison as CNC in early 1916 and his replacement by Charles Wheelwright marks the change in policy. Addison was dogmatically opposed to the influence of the Zulu royal family. Under his administration, the Usuthu remained divided among four chiefs and Solomon was officially treated as a private individual. In public he ignored Solomon as far as possible, but Addison's frantic scribblings to his departmental subordinates and superiors reflected that he was obsessed by Solomon's influence.

The major crisis of Addison's administration in Zululand came in early 1916, on the eve of his retirement, when Solomon enrolled the first ibutho of his 'reign'. Wheelwright inherited a Zululand administration which was in a state of panic. Although he regarded Solomon as a thorn in his side, he was prepared to consider coming to terms with Solomon in order to restore order to the administration. Wheelwright soon came to realize that since Solomon could not be beaten he would have to be joined, and the NAD set out to use Solomon's influence rather than to repress it.

On the succession of Solomon, the Usuthu had in practice reconstituted itself around him in defiance of their official partition. Four months before the ihlambo, this threat to the administration led Addison to instruct Gibson, DNC of Zululand, to compile a report on the matter. In this report, the case of Mankulumana was also to be considered - the Natal NAD was piqued that NAD head office in Pretoria had unilaterally...
sanctioned his return to Zululand from exile at KwaThengisa. After a detailed overview of the role of the Zulu royal family in Zululand since 1879, Gibson dwelt on the existing position of the royal house and the administrative arrangements made for the Usuthu. Referring to Mankulumana, Gibson suggested that he be regarded as no more than a private individual and be separated from the royal house by removal to a magisterial district distant from the royal epicentre. Turning to the Usuthu, Gibson felt that the four appointed chiefs over the Usuthu - Mpikanina Zulu, Muzimubi Buthelezi, Mciteki Zulu and Moya Nqwandwe - could not be relied upon to defend their positions against "any recrudescence of Royal pretensions". Chief Moya, he stated, "has been habituated since childhood to be defential to the Royal family", and further it "might naturally be supposed that his uncle Mankulumana could dominate him."¹

Apart from Chief Moya, the other chiefs found that their authority was simply being disregarded. The NAD, in turn, found that it could exert very little control over the Usuthu through these chiefs. Referring to the Usuthu people under Chief Muzimubi, the magistrate of Mahlabatini complained that

There is a tendency on the part of these natives to regard Dinuzulu's second son as the lawful heir...he pays periodical visits to the district and invariably the chiefs disapprove of this very strongly; they say their influence is being taken away by 'the boy', who always gets a large following from the tribes....³

Chief Mpikanina had virtually no control over the Usuthu in his ward, and his complaints on this matter were frequent. Solomon never visited Mpikanina and did not keep in touch with 'his chief' even by messenger,⁴ whilst Mnyaiza, who was "a member of his Mpikanina's tribe", repeatedly disobeyed him and refused to visit him when summoned to do so.⁵ The only
chief upon whom the NAD felt it could rely to counter the influence of Solomon was Chief Mciteki of the Mandlakazi; but the NAD realized that to back the Mandlakazi as a counter-weight to the Usuthu in the present political climate in Zululand would not only be futile but could provoke another civil war.

The administrative disruption Solomon was deemed to be causing in Zululand was by no means confined to those chiefs appointed over the Usuthu. Solomon's "roaming about" was reportedly causing chiefs to lose control of their followers who were "declaring their allegiance to Solomon". In an attempt to minimise disruption, the CNC instructed the DNC of Zululand to inform chiefs

in unmistakable terms that Solomon holds no official position in Zululand or elsewhere, and he has no right to summon them to any meetings, and they must not attend, but if contributions are called for by him, it is purely a personal matter for themselves whether they contribute or not.

Since Solomon held no official position, the NAD was almost powerless to take disciplinary action against him. Instead, the Natal NAD took out their frustrations on Mankulumana, whose actions had been the least 'troublesome' of all the royal advisers since the death of Dinuzulu. On no pretext whatsoever, the NAD ruled that Mankulumana could not reside in Nongoma or Mahlabatini districts, and had to live in Eshowe district. Mankulumana was deeply upset that he would no longer be able to act as the guardian of Dinuzulu's children, and repeatedly requested to know what wrong he had committed. Addison replied that Mankulumana should look upon "his being allowed to reside in Zululand at all as a distinct concession".

Since the NAD refused officially to acknowledge his status,
Solomon was understandably truculent. When the magistrate of Nongoma was attempting to draw up a list of Dinuzulu's dependants so that the government allowance for their welfare might be fairly distributed, he first asked Mankulumana and Mnyaiza and only then did he approach Solomon for assistance. Solomon refused to help on the grounds that the magistrate should have referred to him and no-one else in the first instance. When, in 1916, the Governor-General visited Eshowe, Solomon was not personally invited to the indaba that was held - which especially upset Zulu in the Nongoma district. Solomon nonetheless arrived on horseback and instructed the induna attached to the magistrate's office at Eshowe, Sijulu Tabete, to interrupt the proceedings in order to introduce him personally to the Governor-General. When Sijulu refused, Solomon rode off in a temper, causing some disturbance. Sijulu reported that the prevailing opinion among the Zulu at the indaba was that he "did wrong in refusing to introduce The Child (Prince)."

Solomon's response to officialdom was not merely to adopt a truculent posture. He put considerable pressure on Addison's administration for permission to visit General Botha in Pretoria. Soon after the ihlambo, in January 1915, the Natal NAD was thrown into consternation by Solomon's request to gather forty-one representatives of the royal family and of Zulu chiefs and headmen from districts all over the Zulu country (Zululand and Northern Natal) to proceed to Pretoria to simultaneously interview General Botha, the SNA, the CNC and all Zululand magistrates. The scale of the request and the evidence that the whole matter had been carefully planned, suggested that Solomon had concrete proposals to make during his prospective interview. What further alarmed the Natal NAD was that the list of proposed "delegates" to Pretoria (which Solomon had submitted to the NAD) included men whom the NAD had regarded as leading opponents of the
Usuthu. Manzolwandle was named, as were the existing 'Usuthu' chiefs, Mpikanina and Muzimubi. Also on the list was Msenenteli kaZibhebhu of the Mandlakazi, Chief Mciteki's powerful brother, Kambi kaHamu of the Ngenetsheni, and Mtonga kaMpanede who had defected to Natal prior to the Anglo-Zulu war.\textsuperscript{15}

The Natal NAD, with some justification, concluded that a deputation of this scope was not necessary to discuss the topics which Solomon had outlined: the education of himself and David, the dispersal of Dinuzulu's property at KwaThengisa, and matters concerning his dependants, and, ominously, "any other matters". In a printed circular to all magistrates in Natal and Northern Natal, the CNC declared that the request was not granted and that Solomon had no right to summon chiefs in this manner.\textsuperscript{16} In the meantime, Mnyaiza was forging ahead, sending instructions to all the proposed delegates to attend Solomon since the interview with General Botha was arranged.\textsuperscript{17} Recriminations were made within the Natal NAD; for instance, that the government should not have given a gift of cattle at the ihlambo ceremony, as this pandered to the royal house's pretensions. The statement of the magistrate at Melmoth was representative of the general Natal NAD attitude.

The whole movement should most unmistakably be nipped in the bud....No further communications as to deputations should be entered into, but Solomon should be sent for at once...and be informed that his future position (status) is that of a commoner and the Government is determined for all time never to place any of Dinuzulu's descendants in charge of any tribe or section thereof. If "His Excellency's" claim to greatness is pandered to or in any way sanctioned, it is sure to lead to further trouble in the future.\textsuperscript{18}

After the deputation crisis had faded, Solomon's activities
were still constantly featured in NAD correspondence. The CNC and DNC Zululand continually exchanged information to "correct any false rumours that may be in circulation". To them, evidence suggested that Solomon's influence was increasing. In April 1915, Solomon visited the paramount chief of Pondoland, and came away with one of the latter's daughters as a prospective wife. This was a perturbing contact, for tribalism in Pondoland was still very strong as in Zululand, and unlike Zululand, Pondoland had a paramount chief. More directly disturbing to the NAD was that en route to Pondoland, Solomon had called at Durban for the first time and established his support in the city. He was given "quite a royal reception, the Natives contributing coins for his support". These actions, the magistrate of Nkandla argued, were designed to induce Africans to regard Solomon as their "paramount head, instead of merely an ordinary person". Indeed, Solomon's status was already such that it was highly profitable to impersonate him. By doing so, one 'Bhekumteto' had received large tributes from Africans in Johannesburg and elsewhere. There were similar instances in the Natal midlands.

If evidence of Solomon's influence was disquieting enough, much worse was the spread of rumours that Solomon was now to use the influence that the NAD refused to accommodate for seditious purposes. Not long after the passage of the 1913 Act, Britain and her overseas dominions had been plunged into the first world war. Rumours abounded that Africans in Natal and Zululand - particularly those on white farms who were the most affected by the Act - were to take advantage of the war to throw off the burden of white rule. Although not endemic, these rumours were widespread. Reports received by the Union Defence Force at Dundee in late 1914 held that "certain natives" were at work in the rural districts saying,
for example, that

now the English are at war...you have a good chance to fight against them, and England cannot send men to assist. Why should you forever be under contract to a white man in order that you may be allowed to sit on his farm? What are you to do? The locations [Reserves] are now full and your **sic** chance to ease your burdens is to fight the white man and get your country back.\(^{24}\)

In Northern Natal, reports were received that certain Europeans "chiefly of Dutch descent" were encouraging these notions of rebellion. As the magistrate of Nkandla reported of the Babanango sub-district, "...these persons indulge in seditious talk with the Natives, and tell them that Germany is sure to win...the Natives must join with them and overthrow the British power." As a counter-measure, he urged the recruitment of Zulu spies to locate the source of these rumours, and a corps of Zulu scouts to serve against the Germans in East Africa. A member of the Zulu royal family, he suggested, should be appointed to recruit and lead these scouts.\(^{25}\)

It was the role of the Zulu royal family in the context of these rumours of revolt that caused greatest consternation. The large gathering that Solomon summoned in early 1916 ostensibly to hold a hunt, amplified this consternation to hysteria. In fact, Solomon had called the gathering for the purpose of enrolling the first ibutho of his 'reign', and since it was a practice expressly forbidden by the NAD, he had requested permission merely for a hunt (the ingina was an integral part of the ukubuthwa or enrolment ceremony) in the hope of screening his real intentions. Although permission was refused, Solomon went ahead with arrangements for the event.\(^{26}\) Invitations were issued to the districts of Mahlabatini, Nongoma, Vryheid and Ngotshe, to gather at Solomon's
Sikalenisenyoka homestead. Following the pattern that had already been established, NAD officials scrambled to countermand Solomon's 'invitations', making particular efforts to prevent members of the wards of Chiefs Moya, Mpikanina, Muzimubi and Mciteki from attending.27

Solomon's attempt to screen his activities were near futile, given the NAD's and Defence Force's network of 'intelligence messengers' in the countryside. When it was reported that numbers of young men were gathering at the Sikalenisenyoka homestead in January 1916, a police patrol was sent to investigate. It discovered about 200 Zulu "giyaing" (ukugiya - to perform competitive and demonstrative dancing displays) in front of Solomon. The conclusion that Solomon was in the process of forming a new "regiment" was confirmed by reports that the young men not only intended to join the hunt but to reap Solomon's fields - an important aspect of the activities of the ukubuthwa custom. The new ibutho was to be called the"Nqabakucetshwangabesizwe" - "the-will-not-be-betrayed-by-foreigners".28 Although administrative intervention evidently prevented the inqina from taking place, Solomon did succeed in enrolling a new ibutho in small 'batches' during January and February 1916 under the noses of the local officials. J. Y. Gibson, DNC of Zululand - one of the most calm of Zululand officials - identified the significance of the event for both the administration and for Solomon. As can only be expected, he expressed it from the point of view of the administration:

A great deal of harm has been done. The act amounted to an exercise of authority over tribes in various parts of Zululand and the Vryheid District. It amounted to the exercise of superior authority over Chiefs in charge of these tribes. The response has amounted to a recognition of such authority.29

From Solomon's point of view, such traditional national
ceremonies were a central means of establishing his political power, because the Zulu regarded his authority to summon individuals to take part in them as legitimate.

In essence, indirect rule is a method of overrule rather than rule - and depends on an element of consensus between rulers and the ruled. In order that the Zulu might take on a large part of the duties of their own administration, the NAD was required to incorporate into its own structure and administrative practice those leaders whom the Zulu perceived as leaders of particular social and political standing. As events during the past two years in Zululand, Natal proper, the eastern Transvaal and Johannesburg had emphasized, Solomon's social status and political authority was widely recognized to be legitimate. Solomon had no official position, and when he succeeded Dingiswila he had had virtually no personal wealth. All the social status and political authority he had now had been voluntarily accorded him from below. That Solomon exercised his influence from a position that was outside the ranks of the administration, and that he was not interested in cooperating with the administration precisely because it was hostile, were the root causes of the administrative breakdown. Gibson had in effect identified that the Zululand administration was being undercut so long as Solomon was not incorporated into it. Gibson and Colenbrander, Magistrate of Umgabe, were the only officials in the Zululand administration, however, who had the capacity to speak of the Zulu royal family in an unemotional and pragmatic manner. It was Addison as CNC and the magistrates of Nongoma, Mbaselatini, Emonjaneni, and Nkandla who expressed the dominant NAD views on the Zulu royal family. In 1916 they found especial cause to do so since there was evidence that the idea of the 'hunt' was a front for something far larger than an umntathiwa ceremony and more directly threatening.

During the 'hunt crisis', a rumour in circulation held that
Africans as far afield as Basutoland and Swaziland had been notified of the event, and that the intention was to "hunt down the Black Umfolosi [river] and there they would meet the Germans who would hand Dinuzulu back to them". Such rumours gave those so inclined ample cause to reawaken vivid memories of the 1906 rebellion. In fact they were justified in doing so. In 1916, Zululand was indeed in a state of ferment and a rebellion was imminent. As in the case of Dinuzulu in 1906, there was no evidence in 1916 that Solomon had in some way associated himself with the prospect of a rebellion. However, the high incidence of rumours implicating the Zulu royal family in a 'plot' to liberate the Zulu from the yoke of white rule was not meaningless: it was a clear index to the existence of civil unrest as it had been in the months preceding the 1906 rebellion.

It has already been demonstrated that socio-economic conditions among the Zulu in 1916 provided ample cause for civil unrest. It is significant that in January 1916, whilst Solomon was conducting the ukubuthwa ceremony, the CNC telegraphed magistrates in Zululand and Natal:

Am informed that number telegrams sent from different places this Province by Natives recalling friends and relatives working Johannesburg and other Transvaal labour centres on pretext of illness or death in family. Please keep watch on exit and ingress Natives from and to your Division and report anything unusual. Also endeavour ascertain significance of such action.  

As Addison knew only too well, this pattern had existed immediately before and during the 1906 rebellion, when relatives were recalled from urban areas to assist in a rural revolt. The Natal NAD's reaction to the rumours must be seen in the context of a real threat of rebellion.

The situation was doubly alarming because the state's military
forces were distracted by the war effort and because of the threat of incitement on the part of 'Dutch' partisans. Indeed, the magistrate of Nkandla reported rumours that Germans at St Lucia Bay intended to "conquer this country and assist the Natives by restoring the Royal House of Zululand"; he believed that the Zulu royal family was plotting to restore the institution of kingship in Zululand, and were "being assisted by certain disloyal persons of Dutch descent in Babanango and Melmoth (Emtonjaneni) districts".32 Whilst emphasizing the "gravity of the situation", he urged that the whole Zulu royal family "be deported to the Cape (not the Transkei) or the Free State, where they would be comparatively innocuous", and that an "Intelligence Department" be created for Zululand.34

In a lengthy memorandum to the SNA on Solomon's activities, particularly in regard to the 'hunt', Addison did not mince words.

Solomon...holds no responsible position under the Government, and I hope he never will. He is a menace to the peace of the country and it is time that measures were taken against him which will be sufficiently severe to have a salutory effect on his ideas and aspirations.

He advocated "swift punishment", and particularly since he was vacating his office in the near future, he urged that this be dealt out by the highest possible authority: the Governor-General as Supreme Chief. No criminal charge could be brought against Solomon, hence Addison recommended that the Governor-General use his autocratic powers to inflict a "heavy fine" on Solomon and to detain him in Pretoria until it was paid.35 These were Addison's parting shots to the Zulu royal family.
The appointment of Wheelwright as Chief Native Commissioner (1916) and of Solomon as Chief of the Usuthu (1917)

Wheelwright, Addison's replacement as CNC, in effect dismissed the whole 'hunt' affair by merely reprimanding Solomon and emphasizing that he should ensure he had authority for holding meetings in the future. In his final judgement, in fact, he told the SNA that Solomon "might reasonably" have been inadequately informed of the result of his initial application for a large hunt, and he apportioned some blame on the magistrate of Mahlabatini for this reason.36

As soon after his appointment as possible, Wheelwright summoned a huge meeting at the Nongoma magistrate's office. The Acting DNC for Zululand and the magistrates at Nongoma, Mahlabatini, Vryheid and Ngotshe, attended, together with most of the chiefs in these districts, and Solomon. Despite the NAD's attempts to restrict the number of 'commoners' who attended, some three hundred or more congregated outside the magistrate's office.37

The whole spirit in which the new CNC approached the meeting contrasted with the pedagogic and repressive approach of his predecessor. He carefully explained the governmental changes that the declaration of Union had brought about: Zululand was now an "integral part of the Union" which had one government, the administrative centre being in Pretoria and the legislative centre being in Cape Town - apparently this had not been done before. Having reprimanded Solomon for attempting to hold a hunt after it had been refused, the CNC assured the chiefs whose authority had been overridden by Solomon's calling the hunt, that they had the support of the government. His address then broke into two sections: first he read the 'message of the government' and second he
gave his personal views.

The message of the government, as read by the CNC, expressed "the Government's displeasure at the attitude [Solomon] was assuming", and warned that it had the power to keep him out of harm's way...if his conduct does not shew improvement". It also stressed that "the Government has not at any time recognised Solomon as chief": "the question of his relations with the Government must depend on the manner in which he behaves himself."38 Despite the CNC's claim, the message was patently not the precise words of the government. The CNC had expressed the message in a way to emphasize that General Botha was at the head of the Union Government, and that he, the CNC, was Botha's induna over the Zulu people. The message had begun: "General Botha directs that you [the CNC]..." These subtleties of approach were a consistent feature of the address.

Similarly, the CNC's personal address set out to appeal to his audience's sense of reason - in a most revealing way - to persuade them that Solomon's activities were inappropriate and dangerous. It was no longer necessary for the Zulu to form 'regiments', he said, because the government was prepared to keep the peace, and moreover, because the "whole aspect" of Zululand had changed.

We now have railways, mines, sugar industries and numerous other indications of a different aspect which formerly did not exist...The object of the people today is to attend to work and to peaceful methods of living. They have to earn money to pay taxes, to buy clothing, to feed themselves...And yet in the same breath we hear of the formation of a new regiment by Solomon. Who is this regiment to be used against? What is its purpose?

He concluded by reminding the present generation that the Zulu
had been defeated at the zenith of their power.\(^{39}\)

As the CNC wrote in his personal report of the meeting, Solomon and all chiefs present "expressed their gratitude at the manner in which the Government had seen fit to treat this matter". He was also correct in identifying that "there was a pretty general feeling of sympathy on the part of all the Chiefs present towards Solomon."\(^{40}\)

Solomon initially tried to deny that his invitations to the 'hunt' had been as widespread as the NAD alleged. As regards the 'regiment', Solomon stated that he had formed one, but not with the object of war: "I was just gathering the men together". The statements of various chiefs expressed thanks to the CNC for the warning he had given to Solomon. As Headman Nkunzi of Nongoma put it, "when we slip the Government assists us and picks us up. Solomon has slipped and the Government today picks him up." Several attributed the 'lapse' to the fact that "he has no elders to advise him". An aside on the gradual healing of the rift between the Usuthu and Mandlakazi is reflected in these statements: Mnyaiza stated that neither Mciteki nor "those who had been placed under him by the Government" had been called to the hunt, but, as Mciteki related, "My people armed and went to the hunt and I was very angry".\(^{41}\) Part of the alarm that had surrounded the whole affair was because it had been suspected that Solomon's intention was to gather an impi (military force, comprising amabutho) to attack the Mandlakazi. The undignified and groundless fears of both Mciteki and the Natal NAD in the face of Solomon's power are celebrated in Solomon's izibongo.

Tree-fern that overcame the judges at Nongoma
On the day the Royal One made them sit on one log
Like hadadaws contending for worms.
Starer whose eyes are red,
Who looks at a person as if he is angry,
Looking at the authorities in Nongoma,
The buttocks of the authorities trembled.
The Royal One armed as he betook himself to the forest
And the bowels of the judges were excited;
Mciteki's became excited,
He was born of Zibhebhu,
Whereas the Royal One
Had quarrelled with no-one,
He was going to hunt the game
On the hill where the lion lived,
Even the weather feared the storm.
Black darkness of Phunga and Mageba
which was seen by Mthusheyana who said "The Royal One
is making an attack!"
Whereas he was merely going to hunt game.42

For the NAD, the public conclusion of the 'hunt' saga was
by no means the end of the 'Solomon question'. The hunt,
indeed, had thrown into relief many of the aspects of the
more general problem. It had been associated with the
rumours of imminent revolt. It had revealed the influence
that Solomon had over even those Zulu who lived in distant
districts and under chiefs unsympathetic to the royal cause,
and the potential havoc that Solomon could wreak on the
administration of Zululand and Northern Natal. Moreover,
it had shown how little control the NAD could exert over
Solomon, precisely because he was shunned by the NAD.

All these issues confronted Wheelwright when he assumed office
in March 1916. From the first week of his period of duty
he was concerned with two aspects of the 'Solomon question'.
First, to provide for Solomon a domicile more permanent
and secure than the present Zibindini which fell on white-
owned land: Wheelwright wanted to stop him 'wandering' about
the country as if he had no home. Second, to officially
define Solomon's 'status' within the structure of indirect rule
in Natal. In both these endeavours he had been prompted
by Solomon himself. In a letter carefully timed to arrive
on the CNC's desk precisely when the CNC assumed duty, Solomon
made two requests. He noted that as Dinuzulu and all his ancestors had been chiefs and kings of the Zulu, he had hoped he would also be so. He had thus far been disappointed but now wished to be "relieved of the suspense" and be informed if he can hope for a chieftainship. Second, he requested that the land on which Nobamba and Zibindini lay, presently white-owned, be given to himself and his people as it was their "old home" and where their kings were buried. 43

It is important to realise that the CNC's negotiations with the SNA to find a solution to these 'problems' were conducted against a background of increasingly alarming rumours. By mid 1916, now six months after the ukubuthwa ceremony, it was being put about that Solomon was in league with the Germans and that the Zulu would not begin to hoe before the Germans arrived to liberate them. Two Zulu, who were eventually arrested, were touring the country saying that they had come from the Great Person /Solomon/ to tell all the Chiefs in the Land that seeing the English were being defeated by the Germans..., that the men of the Zulus were to be on the watch, and have their arms ready. 44

Significantly, one of the Zulu constables sent out to locate the sources of such rumours reported difficulty in finding places to stay in Zululand during this search. "What are you going to eat, you of Government people", he had been asked. 45 The magistrate of Ngotshe similarly reported that the inhabitants of his district had been informed that Solomon wished "all chiefs and people to sleep on their assegies /sic/, as something extraordinary is expected to happen soon". 46 And a Zulu reported that in mid 1916 in the eastern Transvaal, on the border of Northern Natal, a large meeting had been convened by a "white Africanders
Secret Society". Local chiefs had been urged not to supply recruits for the government's 'Native Labour Battalion' (for non-combatant service in Europe) because they would be used against Dinuzulu who was "now acting in Germany to free his land against the British Government". Direct attempts were made to persuade Solomon to inspire a rebellion. In early 1917, Solomon received a letter from one Ben Machemula of Rosebank, Transvaal, which read as follows:

Dear Nkosi of the Zulus,
We, your people, are still well. Well, Zulu, we ask what you say about the matter of the English. All the Chiefs are uniting the people in order that we might fight the English. The Chief of the Pondos has consented, as also three Chiefs of the Basutus...I am a Shangane from Louis Trichardt...the Chiefs have sent people to me in order that I might unite the people here at Johannesburg. Well, I have been to speak to the labourers at Lyndhurst and Alexandra Township; some have consented, but they look to you...

If we rise against the white people now we shall triumph over them, because the Germans too are drowning them in the water. We shall begin on them in June. You too rise and fight, because they killed Dinuzulu. It would be well that you send men to speak with our Chiefs to agree on a day to start the impi [war]. We do not want to pay taxes; even if we pay this year, we shall not do so the coming one....Reply to me father....

Developments of this nature emphasized to the NAD the need to accommodate Solomon in some way.

Wheelwright paid little attention to the rumours of revolt that so exercised local officials. His prime concern was with the administrative aspects of the 'Solomon problem', and he felt that the priority was to provide Solomon with a 'suitable' domicile. Soon after his appointment, Wheelwright
noted that whilst the Usuthu were administratively divided, Solomon's continual movements between his private lands near Babanango and his late father's homesteads in Zululand reserve lands placed the appointed chiefs in an "invidious position". "Solomon and his adherents continue to intrigue against the tribal authority of such chiefs. On one hand, they have a duty to perform towards the Government and on the other they are faced with a strong sentimental and actual opposition in Solomon's favour...." The solution that the new CNC proposed was the purchase for Solomon and his relatives of the Zulu ancestral lands on which the royal graves lay, near Babanango. The corollary was that this would "do away with the late Dinuzulu's kraals in Zululand" and so remove "the necessity of Solomon's constant visits to that place."49 His object was simply to remove Solomon from the Zululand reserves. The only problem he foresaw was that Solomon and his advisers would not accept the arrangements. Wheelwright's proposed solution was reportedly received by Botha with some favour, but the SNA, Edward Dower, whose knowledge of the Zululand situation had been gained under Addison's tutelage, foresaw complications. The SNA argued that the funds used to buy "the sacred lands" would have to be repaid (Solomon was officially no more than a private individual) and the national collections Solomon would undoubtedly arrange to enable him to do so would give the impression that he had government support. The real difficulty with Solomon, he realised, was that "he is not formally recognized in any position and we have no hold over him".50

Directly after the public meeting at Nongoma to lay the issue of the 'hunt' at rest, the CNC had held a private discussion with Solomon which he emphasized was strictly confidential—a condition which Solomon thoroughly appreciated. Here he
tentatively outlined his proposal to Solomon, to which Solomon "unhesitatingly replied that such a course of action would be most unacceptable". The CNC remarked later that he "never contemplated that he [Solomon] would willingly be prepared to abandon the kraals in Zululand Proper, which form such a convenient stepping stone to his aspirations to become the Paramount Chief of the Zulus". 51

The discussion had also turned to the issue of Solomon's official status. The CNC made a serious appeal to Solomon to "patiently await the time when the Government could consider his application for the definition of his status". Although Solomon's demeanour was impeccable, the CNC observed:

He kept repeating "I do not ask these people to follow me and to show me any sort of respect; wherever I go they recognize me as the representative of the Zulu House, and accord me the respect due thereto". He kept impressing on me that [such devotion] was gratuitously given on the part of the Natives.

This the CNC believed to be true. He concluded by arguing that

There is no room for doubt in my mind that at some very early and convenient date action of a definite nature must be taken to establish the man's status once and for all. At the present time he is engaged in attempting to build up his status as a leader of the Zulu people...selecting as his advisers only those who would be suitable to the furtherance of his scheme. I do not hope for a moment that the best of us will ever be able, or at any rate for a very considerable space of time, to eliminate the inherent sentiment and attachment to the Zulu House and to Solomon as its direct representative...so that Solomon, whether he looks for it or not, has the very ready sympathy of a considerable body of people. 52

Despite the priority that both the CNC and the SNA gave to the
resolution of the 'Solomon question', for eight months no action was taken. Instead there followed lengthy correspondence and a number of official discussions in which clarity of administrative vision was blurred by a marked reluctance to make a commitment to any particular course of action, and an equally marked preoccupation with any red tape that could possibly pose impediments. These were consistent characteristics of the NAD which often were to forestall substantial administrative change. Indeed, the inertia and obstinacy of the Natal NAD officials also were to frustrate the implementation in Natal of wide-ranging changes in 'Native policy' that were being advocated at the national level by members of the Union Government.53

During this period, Solomon constantly pressed the CNC for a formal interview.54 After a delay of over three months from Solomon's first application, an interview eventually took place. Solomon did not pursue the matter of his status, but concentrated on the matter of his domicile. He requested first, a "permanent domicile", and, second, relief from tax due on the huts of his father's dependants. Mnyaiza, who had accompanied Solomon, added a request that Solomon be permitted to re-establish the Osuthu royal kraal to the west of Nongoma. The CNC supported Solomon's requests, particularly the first. But he strongly disapproved of Mnyaiza's suggestion: he was determined that it should be the NAD and not the Zulu royal family which specified the location of Solomon's domicile.55

The CNC's subsequent discussion of these issues with the SNA were inconclusive. Nearly a month later, he wrote to the SNA reiterating the urgency of the problem and his proposed solution - and went so far as to name Buys' 'Koningsdal' and Potgieter's 'Welgekozen' as the farms the government should buy for Solomon. The Usuthu, he reported, presently referred
to Solomon as the "government's orphan...a wanderer and uncarred for..." He rather cleverly turned the argument that the SNA had used so that it now supported his proposal: if the government did not buy the land for Solomon, Solomon would conduct collections and buy the sacred grounds for himself, and so build up his status as a national leader. Another advantage of the proposal, he argued, was that it would remove the "magnet to which will be attracted those who still desire to render personal fealty as the representative of the old Zulu regime" from the Zululand reserves. Despite the forceful way in which Wheelwright argued his case, in the last instance he was still inclined to dither: almost as an afterthought he observed that the government could lose Zulu goodwill if it insisted that Solomon abandon all royal homesteads in Zululand. Perhaps, then, "for the time being", he should be allowed to retain the latter. 57 Wheelwright's argument had always stressed the desirability of removing Solomon from the Zululand reserves and confining his influence to a circumscribed area; his final suggestion thus destroyed the whole force of his argument.

Solomon was unaware of the mental exertions he was causing within the NAD, and could only assume that the polite requests he had made by letters or at the meeting with Wheelwright were having no effect. He now adopted a different strategy, making use of the opportunity provided by the government's decision to recruit a 'Native Labour Battalion' (or 'Contingent' or 'Corps') for non-combatant service against the German forces in Europe.

The issue of 'Solomon and the Natal Native Labour Battalion' is important in many respects. It throws light on relationships between Solomon and his petty bourgeois advisers
or courtiers, Solomon and the Zulu rank-and-file, Solomon and the NAD, the NAD and the Prime Minister, the NAD and white Natal, and white Natal and the African population. Moreover, it was the issue that precipitated the government's recognition of Solomon as chief over a reunited Usuthu.

Botha was both the initiator and the driving force behind the Native Labour Battalion scheme. Natal whites slated the prospect of the Zulu assisting the war effort as soon as the scheme was publicised in September 1916. They were fearful that Zulu experience of the war situation in Europe would stir Zulu militarism at home, but more so did they fear that the social experiences of the recruits overseas would upset the delicate balance of social relationships in Natal. A correspondent signing himself "A Colonial in Zululand" wrote to the Natal Mercury, for example, predicting that expressions of appreciation for African assistance would arouse in the recruits certain feelings of equality with the white man. "The respect for the white man would go....We have too much of this sort of thing today."

The scheme also aroused far more complex fears - fears which revealed that the sexual monopoly of white males over white females was related to the social dominance of white over black. "An abominable danger", wrote one Natal colonist in the same issue of the Natal Mercury, was being placed in "the path of the women of France...at the hands of these male brutes....It is no party question but one of race...." He predicted "the pollution of our race and unthinkable horrors when those natives return". The 'abominable danger', however, was not Zulu male lust; on the contrary, it was that white women in Europe did not know the social code of white settler society in Natal. The editor of the Natal Mercury concluded that "the balance of authoritative opinion in Natal...is not favourable to the Native Contingent scheme". These sentiments were yet more stridently expressed outside
Natal - particularly by representatives of Hertzog's National Party. It fell to Botha to emphasize that all recruits were to be strictly confined to compounds whilst in Europe, and that they were categorically never to take up a combatant role. 62

In Natal, immediately the scheme was publicized, Wheelwright received a telegram from Seme stating that he and Solomon wished to discuss the prospect of Zulus "helping the Empire". 63 Regarding this as yet another of Solomon's ploys to elevate his status, the CNC replied that he had no intention of discussing the matter with Solomon, but was prepared to discuss it privately with Seme. 64 In fact the evidence suggests that Seme had acted independently and that Solomon had no intention of serving a government that would not accommodate him. It was a consistent characteristic of Solomon's petty bourgeois advisers that they counselled restraint, 'doing the right thing', and cooperation with the government when trying to win political advantage. Seme was undoubtedly concerned that Solomon's image in the eyes of the NAD had been tarnished by rumours of revolt and the saga of the 'hunt' - he thus pleaded that the CNC allow Solomon the "opportunity of justifying his verbal assurances of loyalty to the Government". 65 For Dube, too, there was no question of how Solomon should respond in this matter. He published an emotional plea in Ilanga Lase Natal: "Arise ye Zulus", he urged, "Don't bring shame over us." 66

Individuals like Seme and Dube were often to claim to speak for Solomon when they had no authority to do so. Although the strategy of hamba kahle politics (literally, 'go carefully') deeply influenced Solomon - and largely accorded with his own personality - the political face adopted by Solomon and his tribal advisers (who were not products of mission
education) tended to have its own unique characteristics. While on the one hand they were inclined to adopt a posture of utmost subjection, describing their relationship with state authorities in images of master and dog or father and child, on the other hand they were on occasion inclined to be more blunt than the niceties of the *hamba kahle* posture would allow.

In the matter of recruitment for the Native Labour Battalion, Solomon was quite bluntly not prepared to lend the government his unconditional assistance. He was, however, prepared to play a delicate political manoeuvre: he would only use his influence to assist the government under conditions that would serve his own political aspirations. By recruiting Zulu for the Native Labour Battalion he could demonstrate to the Zulu people that he was their paramount head, and emphasize to the NAD that if it wanted anything from the Zulu it would have to work through him. Until such time as he could recruit under conditions that suited him, Solomon would use his influence to prevent recruits from enlisting. From the time that Seme announced to the CNC that Solomon wished to 'help the Empire', nearly three months of unsuccessful pleading for recruits passed before the CNC realized that Solomon's stance was not merely inconsistent and irresolute - which had been his own and certain Zululand officials' conclusion so far. 68

Immediately after the discussion between Seme and the CNC in August, the CNC instructed the magistrate of Mahlabatini, in whose district Solomon was at the time, to "get in touch with Solomon and to use him as far as he [the magistrate] considered advisable and necessary". 69 It was precisely this sort of attitude that Solomon rejected. Thus, as the magistrate's report of the meeting related, Solomon "blew
hot and cold”, changed his mind frequently, and was evidently not willing to assist in recruitment. Maphelu reported that Solomon had informed the magistrate that the “Government knows well that I don't rule anyone. If I had people I would let them go to help the Government”. Subsequently the NAD called a large meeting of Zulu at Mahashini in the presence of Solomon. Maphelu observed that “officials had been asking him to answer in connection with this matter. They did not care about the fact he was not officially installed”. The officials provided many cattle to feed the gathering. Solomon then addressed the people and stated that it would be better to assist the war in Europe now and so prevent it from coming to Zululand. The officials then pleaded for recruits. Not one came forward – and moreover the Zulu refused to touch the meat that had been provided for them. “They just walked away”. This was a real affront to the NAD, and it is apparent that instructions had been issued to the Zulu by Solomon prior to the gathering that no-one should enlist.

Meanwhile the Natal NAD was becoming increasingly embarrassed that of all the provinces in the Union the response of Natal and Zululand to recruitment had been the poorest. The failure of the Natal NAD to gain recruits did not reflect well on the administration either in the eyes of the white public or at NAD head office. The Natal NAD thus put great effort into the recruitment campaign. It sent Mnyaiza to Cape Town for example, so that he could personally report back to the Zulu about the conditions on troopships. And NAD head office appealed to the Zululand Diocese of the CPSA for assistance. The desperation of those who were identified with the Natal NAD is illustrated in the poem that R.C.A. Samuelson composed in Zulu to urge the Zulu to enlist, of which a few extracts give the tone:
Forward! Forward; Forward!
Bayede, King George, Where is he?
The Black House of Zulu, Where is it?
You greet those of Zulu, but what has become of them?
Useless braggarts, loafers, self-seekers and the worthless?

The rallying call of Bayede, King George,
Has reached all parts of the world seen by the sun
All have responded,
But the Zulus and Natal remain.

Answer an urgent call,
Manhood of Zulu and Natal,
That disgrace may not befall you,
You scions of a Black Race

...The sons of Malandela's Zulus were wont to declare:
"Awo! Awo! Awo!"
"The king's cattle are with the Basutos"
(In the hands of the enemy demanding recovery).
We should now also declare:
"The Germans, the filth of the earth."
"Destroy them."

...This is for you, our warring men! 78
Bayede, King George is calling you. 78

Solomon was in the meantime getting on with his own affairs. When, however, he applied for a permit to visit the Transvaal shortly after obstructing the magistrate of Mahlabatini's attempts to recruit Zulu, the SNA refused: Solomon could better employ himself assisting recruitment than going on a "begging expedition to the mines". 79 In early September, Seme once more contacted the CNC. Solomon now wished to call a meeting of Zulu chiefs at Nobamba to prevail on them to cooperate, Seme said, and added - as the CNC related to the SNA - that this"would be the only way" of getting Zulu recruits. It was at this stage that the CNC realized the intricacies of Solomon's stance. Although Solomon's request had not been formally submitted, Wheelwright immediately wrote at length to the SNA stating that "the failure to recruit Natives from the Zulus has been largely,
if not entirely, due to the scheme and influence of Solomon", and demanding an immediate resolution of the whole 'Solomon problem'. Realizing by now that the SNA was hardly inclined to take action, Wheelwright suggested that his letter be referred to General Botha "so that he may see our position".  

A few days later, Solomon's official request to convene a meeting of chiefs came through and was transferred to the SNA. The SNA immediately telegrammed the CNC as follows: the prime minister regarded it as a matter of duty that the Zulu should respond to the king's call for overseas service, that the Zulu should remove the reproach of being the most uncooperative of "all South African tribes", but that "any assistance rendered by Solomon...in inducing Zulus to view matter in right light...will naturally be placed to his credit". The telegram continued, "Government is quite unprepared to treat with him /Solomon/ on the basis of a bargain".

For Solomon, to provide immediate assistance for a possible future reward was to put the cart before the horse. In contrast to the SNA, the CNC realized that the NAD was now not in a position to prescribe 'rules' of diplomacy to Solomon - it had to bargain. The CNC's memorandum to the SNA, which had now been referred to Botha, analysed the situation pragmatically and with clinical clarity.

The more one sees of it the more one realises the influence /Solomon/ possesses...over the people. To permit him to hold such a meeting and to conduct recruiting would without doubt be a recognition of the position of Solomon as the head of the Zulus. I believe he would get the Natives required, but he has undoubtedly chosen the opportunity - which is that of a lifetime - to try and reestablish himself. We cannot get
away from the fact of his influence - it is unquestionably there. The question is, is it to be harnessed or is it to be left? To employ him on a mission of the kind suggested would have far-reaching effects - it would, in a measure, disturb the influence of many of the Chiefs and tribes in Zululand more especially the loyal Mandhlakazi [sic] section, and would build up his hopes and aspirations to become the paramount head of the Zulus.... It might be worth risking a good deal... at the risk of the influences mentioned. 82

The last sentence is of particular importance.

Within a matter of weeks, Solomon, Mnyaiza and other royal advisers were summoned to Pretoria to appear before General Botha and the SNA, the Under SNA, and the CNC. Solomon and his advisers had no idea why they were being summoned, and were apprehensive about it. 83 Botha had taken the initiative. At the meeting, in November 1916, Botha announced that Solomon was to be recognised as a chief, his ward would be the reunited Usuthu people, and his domicile would be in the Nongoma district.

Overall, the emphasis of Botha's address was that Solomon was now a servant of the government. Botha instructed Solomon that he must go back to Zululand with the purpose of serving the NAD and the Zulu people. He was to be a chief over the Usuthu only, and was to abide by his local magistrate "no matter what orders he may give you". He was not to raise 'regiments', but was to maintain the peace, especially with the Mandlakazi and Ngenetsheni. If he did anything wrong he would be removed from Zululand without hesitation, but if Solomon behaved correctly Botha hinted that Solomon's status would be officially elevated. Botha particularly emphasized two points. First, the government stipend of £300 per annum which he was now to receive "will make you an official.... I
am going to make use of you in Zululand. I will watch with open eyes and see...what influence goes out from your kraal". Second, he broached the subject of education. It was the government's intention to place a school nearby Solomon's new domicile, and "when the school is started, I want you to take a personal interest in it and so stimulate the Zulu people to take an interest in it".

Solomon was effusive in his thanks and expressed these in deferential fashion. "I am your child", he said. "You have treated me with the greatest consideration."84

The significance of Solomon's appointment

The action taken by Botha, strongly encouraged by Wheelwright, was a real attempt to cure the administrative problem. All actions previously taken by the NAD had been merely to dispense relief to their ailing administration. The funeral ceremony, the ihlambo, the ukubuthwa, the rumours of rebellion and Solomon's constant disruptive 'wanderings' about the country had brought Solomon and the NAD into continual conflict in an indirect way. In the first instance, in these cases, the problem had lain in the relationship between Solomon and the Zulu people, thereafter in the relationship between the Zulu people and the Natal NAD, and only then in the relationship between the Natal NAD and Solomon. The role of Solomon in the Natal NAD's attempts to recruit for the Native Labour Battalion, however, had brought the Natal NAD and Solomon to a direct confrontation for the first time. The Natal NAD had attempted to employ the influence of Solomon in Zululand for their own ends; and Solomon had shown that not only was he not prepared to cooperate but that he was prepared to use his influence to frustrate its objectives. In this confrontation, Solomon emerged as the unconditional
victor. There were horrified comments in Natal newspapers that the NAD had committed the blunder of appointing Solomon as a chief to enable it to commit the blunder of sending Zulu to Europe. But this was not so. The NAD had far broader administrative objectives in mind. In fact, no attempt was made to use Solomon to enlist Zulu for the Native Labour Battalion after his appointment.

The recognition of Solomon as chief of the Usuthu was a significant reversal of past Natal policy of 'divide and rule'. No longer were the Usuthu parcelled out into the wards of four separate chiefs: they were recognized to be a coherent group and their hereditary head was recognized as their chief. The administration had in effect been forced to take this action. The Natal NAD as a whole - including Wheelwright - still strongly adhered to the notion that 'divide and rule' was the prescription for administrative success, and most especially in the case of the Zulu royal family. However, the return of the Zulu royal family to Zululand had made this notion unworkable in practice. Solomon had attracted widespread loyalty and moreover the enmity that had existed between his father and the Mandlakazi and Ngenetsheni sections - enmity that had previously been 'grist to the mill' of the local administration - was clearly ebbing. The recognition of Solomon was thus not the rash 'experiment' that some Natal newspapers held it to be, but was rather a rational response designed to bolster the administration's powers of control that were patently tenuous under existing arrangements.

Solomon's recognition might not have occurred when it did, however, but for the more flexible and perceptive stance adopted by Wheelwright. In contrast to Addison, Wheelwright had consistently been tolerant of the Zulu royal family. This
was no doubt partly related to a difference in temperament - Wheelwright was a far more fair and generous-minded person - but also had much to do with Wheelwright's clearer administrative vision. His attitude was again in evidence immediately after Solomon's recognition in the way in which he arranged for the government to intervene in Solomon's tenancy problems, and to settle the debts he had accrued in this matter. Furthermore, quietly and without fuss, Mankulumana was allowed to leave his place of exile at Ndulinde near Eshowe and reestablish himself in the Usuthu heartland. The government paid his relocation expenses. Despite Wheelwright's attitude, however, it took the swift and decisive action of an 'outsider' in the person of Botha to break departmental paralysis and implement the requisite administrative reform.

Whilst relations between the Zulu royal family and the NAD at the beginning of 1916 were extremely sour, by the end of 1916 they were extremely amicable. Two vital changes in NAD personnel were soon to improve relations even further. First, Mr Oswald Fynney was appointed as magistrate of Nongoma - the district in which Solomon's new domicile, Mahashini, was situated. Whilst his predecessor, T. R. Bennet, had been particularly obstructive to the Zulu royal family, Fynney transpired to be a keen supporter of the royal cause - and on this account he was to have an unrestrained public showdown with the Natal NAD in the late 1920s. Second, Dower left the office of the SNA in Pretoria and was replaced by personnel whose attitudes were not burdened by the events of 1914 to 1916.

Relations between the Natal NAD and the Natal white public at the end of 1916, on the other hand, were anything but rosy. Natal newspapers disapproved of the secrecy in which the "unexpected and incomprehensible departure in Union
policy" had been carried out. Fears were expressed that Solomon's appointment could unite the Zulu, and fears were also expressed that it could accentuate divisions within the Zulu. Whatever the details of their arguments, all commentators condemned the change and, in the rhetoric of the day, were "apprehensive of a recrudescence of native effervescence in Zululand". The Natal Advertiser argued that Solomon would not in practice adhere to the conditions of his appointment.

The Zulus will flock from every corner of Zululand to congratulate their new "king" and pay homage to him. Will Solomon turn them away? Certainly not! He will feel flattered ....And so the game will go on...the Usutu kraal will again become the centre of intrigue ....The Usutu location? What is that?... Zululand remains Zululand, and populated from end to end by Zulus, all of whom...are either avowed, or potential, Usutus.

A public meeting held in Eshowe forwarded an "emphatic message" to the government that Solomon's appointment would "jeopardize the security of the country" and that the government should therefore cancel its action. The scheme was attributed to Wheelwright, and the NAD head office was held to have acted on his recommendations without even informing the Union cabinet or the 'older' and 'more experienced' officials in the Natal NAD. Prominence was given to the view that"Solomon was being promoted on account of his demerits than on account of his merits" - and it was said that Solomon's main 'demerit', in the eyes of the NAD, had been his refusal to assist the Native Labour Battalion scheme which was so unpopular in white Natal.

Solomon need only raise his hand and every able-bodied Zulu in the country will respond to the
call. Will it be worse for the Government to reveal its own impotence, by resorting to this means of getting the men? One should say, certainly not!\textsuperscript{93}

Similar sentiments were expressed in a lengthy article in the \textit{Natal Mercury} by J. S. Marwick, now manager of the Durban Municipal Native Affairs Department. He too condemned the appointment as representative of government weakness.\textsuperscript{94} Those who held such views obviously preferred to believe the NAD to be capable of ruling in an authoritarian and heavy-handed manner and to have no cause to adapt to political realities. They thus misunderstood the basic tenet of indirect rule.

Government policy was not deflected. At a meeting held at the Nkandla magistrate's office in January 1917, Solomon was publicly appointed to his new position by Lord Buxton, the Governor-General, in his capacity as Supreme Chief.\textsuperscript{95} The initiative did not stop there, however. Steps were taken to place Solomon in contact with influences which were thought to be desirable, and the cooperation of the CPSA was readily secured.

After Dinuzulu's ilhambo ceremony, Harriette Colenso's position as a close white adviser to the royal house had rapidly fallen into abeyance. As she remarked in 1915, "I am getting almost too old for excursions into Zululand and such proceedings". Moreover, it was she who had previously occupied the position of 'missionary to the Zulu royal family'. In 1910 the passage of the Church Properties Spoilation Act in effect forced her to retire from her missionary activities. Harriette and her sister, Agnes, were forced to vacate Bishopstowe (Bishop Colenso's mission station) since the Act removed it from the ownership of the Church of England - Harriette had lost the lay battle against
the CPSA's attempts to appropriate the property. This, coupled with her activities in defence of Dinuzulu during the 1908 treason trial, left her physically and financially exhausted. 96

The Zululand Diocese of the CPSA was quick to fill the vacuum Harriette had reluctantly left. It had first established an outstation in the Isikwebezi valley near Nongoma, in 1898. Here work had begun among the Usuthu by Rev. F. W. Walters (also the local government medical officer) soon after Dinuzulu returned from St Helena - but Walters found himself "up against a stone wall" which he ascribed to the negative influence of Dinuzulu. After Dinuzulu's trial and exile to Kwarhengisa, Walters found that his missionary work began to take effect. 97 Thus, at the time of Dinuzulu's death, the CPSA had an established base from which to bring its influence to bear on his heir - who, it seemed, was more sympathetic to Christianity than his father. After Solomon and David had been speedily confirmed by the Bishop of Zululand, Rev. David Ntombela took up work at St Phillips, the new outstation near Mahashini.

In the same month as he confirmed Solomon, the Bishop wrote to the Minister of Native Affairs urging that the royal youngsters be placed at KwaMagwaza, the CPSA mission school near Melmoth, for their education. 98 His exertions were not rewarded during the period of Addison's administration: the Zulu people, the NAD informed him, did not want Solomon and David to be educated, and the royal youngsters were "content as they are". 99 Judging by his views on Seme and Dube, Addison was not fond of educated African politicians, and in the light of his views on the Zulu royal family, he was hardly likely to support a project to educate its young
heir.

By the end of 1916, the NAD attitude was reversed. The closer relationship that had been generated between the CPSA and the Zulu royal family laid the foundations for the cooperation between the NAD and the CPSA soon after Solomon's recognition. Both were keen to manipulate Solomon's influence. Thus the Bishop of Zululand was approached to "cooperate with the government and the CNC about the future of Solomon". Rev Oscroft was requested to move to Nongoma "to be near Solomon a kind of European adviser to him", and also to consider the possibility of establishing a school at Solomon's new domicile at Mahashini. These developments caused great excitement in the CPSA. "So much may come of this", enthused the Bishop, "that I think it best to say no more, but to wait for the guidance of God in the matter".

It was Wheelwright who put the 'education project' in motion and, in so doing, had the fullest support of Botha. Right from the outset it was clear that the proposed school was to be no ordinary school, but an experiment unique not only in Natal but the whole of South Africa. The Zululand National Training Institution (commonly referred to as the ZNTI) was established specifically and exclusively for the benefit of the sons of Zulu chiefs and headmen. It was to offer an education designed to prepare its students for the tribal administrative tasks they were expected to take up. The CPSA knew exactly where the interests of the NAD lay in the matter, and took care to maintain NAD enthusiasm. At a meeting of the Diocesan Synod, Oscroft proposed a motion urging the government to establish such an institution because chiefs "frequently fail through lack of knowledge and incompetence to carry out...the various duties they are called upon to perform". The motion, which was carried unanimously, was merely one of encouragement, because Wheelwright
Fynney and Oscroft had already been making concrete plans. During these early negotiations, an issue of some significance arose: the question of who should be Oscroft's employer and hence to whom Oscroft would be primarily responsible. Although the church in the early twentieth century was not the outspoken critic of state policy that it was to become later in the century, there were many points on which church and state differed in the matter of 'Native policy'. An example of their differences lay in the issue of 'Ethiopianism'.

Whilst the NAD aimed to repress it at all costs after the 1906 rebellion, the CPSA went so far as to support it. In 1912, The Net argued that "at the bottom of what is called Ethiopianism ...is this - the desire to have some voice in the management of their own affairs, not entirely to be the underdog," and to suppress it was "bad for future progress." The Net saw Ethiopianism as a religious reflection of the emergence of 'progressive' secular aspirations: "As in State, so in Church, they wish to have a voice." This was precisely the reason why the state opposed it. Another area over which church and state differed was land dispensation. The CPSA held the same views as the president of the SANNC, John Dube. The Rev. Archdeacon Johnson of Zululand told the 1917 Natal Local Land Committee that he was "thoroughly in sympathy with the Government in its scheme of segregation", but when details of the proposed land delimitation came out, the CPSA felt that it was inequitable. An article entitled "The Absorption of Zululand" published in The Net saw the delimitation as violating the two commandments "Thou shalt not steal" and "Though shalt not covet".

Although the Bishop pronounced that "our one aim is to assist the Government" in the ZNTI scheme, the real feelings of the CPSA were expressed privately. On the occasions the Bishop's Council discussed the matter of Oscroft's payment, it
recommended that he "be paid chiefly by the Diocese, with Government assistance...and that he should not be a Government official" - despite its constant shortage of funds. In practice, when Oscroft moved to Nongoma to take up his new work, it was the Government who paid his salary for his work as educator and adviser to the Zulu royal family. The ZNTI was to be a government and not a mission school. Oscroft was appointed principal of the ZNTI in August 1918 (although it only opened in 1920), and during his principalship the government repeatedly emphasized to Oscroft that he was a government servant first and foremost. In the cases of both Solomon and Oscroft, the NAD had coopted influential persons whose influence operated from a base outside its direct control.

By the end of 1920, the construction of the ZNTI was complete. It was situated at Evuna (named after a nearby stream) some 15 miles from Nongoma and in the ward of Chief Solomon. There was a house for the principal, a hostel, a school building, and tracts of arable and grazing land for practical instruction in agriculture. It was aptly described as a "Civil Service College for Natives". It was purely a school for the tribal elite, and the education that sons of chiefs and headmen received there was carefully designed to prepare them for the posts they were to hold under the system of indirect rule. When General Smuts visited the ZNTI in 1922, he pointed out to the students that "a people without leaders cannot possibly ever become a people, and to be good leaders whom the people will always follow you must keep ahead of your people".

The Report of the NAD for the years 1919-1921 outlined the ZNTI's spheres of activity. The normal course was 3 years,
and it was expected that students would reach the 'book education' equivalent of Standard IV. But included in the academic course was instruction in jurisprudence (customary law) to prepare students for their juridical responsibilities. On the moral side, the "virtues of discipline, cleanliness, punctuality and loyalty" were inculcated. Great emphasis was placed on "industrial training", which included practical farming, irrigation, treeplanting and building - a European farm manager was added to the staff (Principal and 3 African teachers) for this purpose. Out of an 8 hour school day, 6 were spent on working on the land, ploughing, planting, weeding, and harvesting, according to the season. Only 2 hours a day were devoted to "the three Rs" and jurisprudence. The school, which was built to accommodate twenty-five students, gradually built up its attendance figures from ten in 1920 to thirty in 1922, and forty in 1924.

The policy adopted by the government when it recognized Solomon, which included the ZNTI scheme, was a fundamental departure from established policy. The specific consequences and wider implications of this change in policy must now be considered. It is essential to locate these within the contexts of first, development within Union-wide African politics, and second, the development of Union 'native policy' in the period 1917 to 1920. Although these two contexts will be treated separately, they are mutually interdependent, as will become apparent.

The Zulu royal family and African politics, 1917-1920

From the NAD's point of view, the policy that it adopted towards Solomon from January 1917 was an unqualified success: the 'Solomon problem' simply ceased to exist. Until the early 1920s, Solomon's activities are mentioned only sporadically in the official records. With the exception of Solomon's
interminable problems with his white landlords, there was no official correspondence on Solomon either important or voluminous enough for the CNC's clerk to justify establishing a separate file to contain it - whereas before 1917 there were a number of files dealing with different aspects of the 'Solomon problem' running concurrently.

After his recognition, Solomon was primarily concerned with settling into his new domicile at Mahashini and his new duties as chief over the Usuthu. Although Solomon and his advisers clearly indicated that they felt the status of mere chief to be insufficient for Solomon, they expressed their feelings in a relatively innocuous manner and the Natal NAD did not become unduly alarmed. When the Governor-General held an indaba with the Zulu at Nkandla in July 1918, it was noticed that the Zulu saluted him with 'Nkosi' only - and, in his address, Mankulumana requested that the Governor-General permit the Zulu to publicly salute Solomon with 'bayede'. Solomon occasionally interfered with the jurisdiction of other chiefs, indicating that he regarded himself as de facto paramount chief. In early 1918, for example, he had occasion to reprimand a chief in the Eshowe district for actions he had taken (not specified in official correspondence). He was also in the habit of using a personalized rubber stamp on his correspondence which bore the legend "Inkosi Yamabandhla Onke" ('King of all assemblies') beneath his name. This caused some consternation among officials and the white public. Administrative action against him was almost nonchalant. When asked later what action he had taken against Solomon for these 'misdemeanours', Wheelwright replied that he had merely sent a message through Oscroft to Solomon "not to be a silly ass".

Solomon also emphasized his status in more concrete ways.
Most important, in 1918 he once more summoned young men to complete the *ibutho* enrolment that had not been completed in 1916 on account of administrative pressure. In fact, the *ukubuthwa* of 1918 was a complete ceremony in itself and was far larger and more organised than the *ukubuthwa* of 1916. Although the ceremonies of 1916 and 1918 enrolled essentially the same *ibutho* (the time between enrolments was usually seven or eight years), those enrolled in 1918 were given a slightly different name, *Nqabakucasha* ('the-will-not-hide'), to distinguish them from those enrolled in 1916, *Nqabakucetshwa* ('the-will-not-be-betrayed').

The *ukubuthwa* of 1918 reveals how important such traditional ceremonies were in establishing Solomon's social and political status. As in 1916, Solomon sent messages to chiefs and *izinduna*, who in turn called large meetings in their districts to announce the news and make arrangements for the journey to Mahashini. All were instructed to congregate fully armed (sticks and shields) and in full traditional dress. On the journey to Mahashini, each man had a carrier - either a younger brother or cousin. When the groups of men from the various districts arrived at Mahashini, the *umpati* (organizer or controller) of each group handed them over to the direct control of one of Solomon's *izinduna*.

Their initial work was to build temporary huts for their own accommodation during the *ukubuthwa* period. Thereafter, every day, they congregated in line formation around the royal cattle kraal at Mahashini to be issued with their instructions for the particular day's activities. Solomon's *izinduna* required the young conscripts to perform a variety of tasks, all of which focussed on the person of Solomon. For instance, they had to collect wood and repair the royal cattle kraal, they had to plough and sow Solomon's fields, and, most important, they were to construct a new royal homestead. The new homestead was named *KwaDlamahlahla* and became
Solomon's principal residence. Apart from these special tasks, there were routine daily activities. Each day songs and dances were performed in the royal cattle kraal usually with Solomon in attendance. Every time the conscripts approached the cattle kraal, and every time Solomon appeared or left, they gave the royal salute 'bayede' on the signal of one of Solomon's izinduna. The young men were also given instruction on the necessity to observe customs and traditions, to maintain personal discipline, to abide by moral codes, to respect and honour elders and tribal authority, to work hard and to honour their responsibilities to their relatives. Thus, the importance of the ukubuthwa ceremony was not only to foster a sense of unity under Solomon, but also to inculcate in the conscripts a set of tribal attitudes of mind and codes of conduct. These were just as important a foundation of Solomon's political power as the sense of loyalty to Solomon personally that the ukubuthwa inspired.

Surprisingly, there is no record of the CNC having been aware of the 1918 ukubuthwa. The possible reasons are twofold. First, Mahashini needed to be reconstructed as Solomon's new domicile and the new Usuthu administrative centre, which justified Solomon's having large numbers of 'labourers' there. Second, the new magistrate of Nongoma, Fynney, had already established a personal friendship with Solomon and was unlikely to make reports that would land Solomon in trouble.

Immediately after the ukubuthwa ceremony, Solomon opened the issue of lobolo cattle due on women who had been members of Cetshwayo's isigodlo but who had been married subsequent to his death - exactly the same claims that Manzolwandle had made in 1913. This action was to emphasize his claim to the status of Zulu king, and, at the same time, to build up the
wealth of the Zulu royal house. To this end, Solomon called a number of meetings in the Nongoma, Vryheid, Mahlabatini and Emtonjaneni districts between early 1919 and late 1920. In contrast to Manzolwandle's attempts, Solomon's right to claim lobolo cattle from the father's of Cetshwayo's isigodlo women was seen as legitimate. The response he received from the Mahlabatini district affirmed that "there are many cattle belonging to the King in the neighbourhood" and promised that "if they are required they will be produced". Chief Somkhele reportedly transferred sixty head of cattle to Solomon in settlement of the lobolo 'debts' claimed from him alone. The magistrate of Nkandla described Solomon's activities as "a tyrannical practice" and urged action to be taken to prevent any further transfer of cattle. The NAD, however, took no action other than to refuse Solomon government assistance in securing these lobolo cattle. In contrast to Natal NAD policy prior to Solomon's appointment, the administration now seemed to take the attitude that Solomon could make whatever claims he wished on the Zulu people and it was up to the latter to accept or reject these claims.

Although the NAD had denied Solomon a political constituency beyond the confines of the Usuthu ward, Solomon had by now established himself as the figurehead of the Zulu people. Solomon certainly had a keen sense of what image a Zulu king should present. He was naturally athletic and good looking. Being a good horseman, he was in the habit of riding between his various homesteads in Zululand, clothed in military-style khaki and sporting a leopard skin sash (the symbol of royalty), with the royal dogs running beside him. Solomon's image as Zulu head was not confined to the tribal inhabitants of Zululand. He was also called upon to act as a figurehead for kholwa organisations which, whilst
being products of European educational and missionary endeavour, were anxious to establish their 'separateness' and independence from their mentors. These kholwa attempts to forge a new Africanist 'counter-culture' - of which the Ethiopianism of the previous decade had been an example - reflected both disillusionment with the prospects for being accepted into white society as equals, and the development of a modernist black (or more particularly, Zulu) consciousness.

In early 1919 Gardener Mvuyana, who had recently broken away from the American Mission in the Transvaal, established an independent church at Doornfontein. He requested Solomon to lay the foundation stone of the new church, which he wished to name the 'National Zulu Church'. The Bishop of Pretoria observed that Mvuyana was associated with "the young nationalist crowd of the Batho-Bantu SANNC". The NAD made successful efforts to persuade Solomon to have nothing to do with the movement; since Solomon was at the time visiting the Transvaal labour compounds, the NAD passed its advice to Solomon through the medium of the Director of Native Labour in Johannesburg.

Solomon did not establish a clear political role in the context of 'new generation' African political movements - whether petty bourgeois or worker - until the mid 1920s. But as early as 1920 there were signs that his role as 'social head' was already proving incapable of papering over the new divisions that were developing within Zulu society. An atmosphere of unrest had grown in Zululand. This unrest was partly related to an attempt by David to exploit a new-found source of support to usurp Solomon's position. The undercurrents that lay beneath the unrest, however, were far more complex and reveal that important new influences were at work within the realm of Zulu politics. The events in Zululand in 1920 are also significant in two other respects. First, the reaction of the Natal NAD reveals
that it was still prone to paranoia about the activities and influence of the Zulu royal family, and second, the fact that its alarmist outbursts in 1920 justifiably focussed on the person of David was in part a reflection of the success of the policy it had adopted towards Solomon since 1917.

It is difficult to identify conclusively the social origins of the unrest of 1920 - partly because NAD officials themselves were at a loss to explain the events that were taking place beneath their noses. At face value, the cause of the unrest appeared to be David's attempts to usurp Solomon's position - but NAD officials knew that there was much more to the situation. The unrest was associated with a number of strange rumours that were not related to - and even contradicted the existence of - the royal 'sibling rivalry'. In 1906 and 1916, the existence of rumours that centred on the person of the Zulu 'king' - whether Dinuzulu or Solomon - had in fact less to do with the Zulu 'king' than with a more generalized social ferment. On these occasions, the ferment was primarily related to the land and taxation policies of the state. In 1920, there is strong cause to believe that the unrest was related to the growth of African political militancy that found expression in the urban areas shortly after the first world war.

Before and during the war years, the SANNC had adopted 'moderate' and 'conciliatory' methods of protest, expressing itself primarily through evidence given to government commissions and select committees, and by sending petitions and deputations to various authorities. After the war there was a wave of 'direct action' and militancy in the form of civil disobedience campaigns and strike action. Although petty bourgeois individuals as a rule continued to provide
leadership for African protest, certain sections of the urban petty bourgeoisie became 'radicalized', as Bonner has argued, and began to appeal to the political constituency of African urban workers which was currently mobilizing.\textsuperscript{133}

The move towards militancy was reflected in changes in the personnel of the SANNC itself. Dube, who had not opposed territorial segregation in principle and who was committed to non-militant forms of protest, was ousted from the presidency in 1917 by Sam Makgatho of the Transvaal, who infused a more aggressive spirit into Congress activities. Inspired by Ghandi's passive resistance campaigns, the Johannesburg branch in 1918 organized a civil disobedience campaign against the pass laws. In 1919, the Bloemfontein branch held a successful wage strike. These actions were part of a broader movement among urban Africans towards militant industrial and political action, spearheaded by radical worker organizations. In 1918, there was the pioneering 'bucket strike' (sanitary workers) in Johannesburg, following the work of the International Socialist League among the African workforce. In 1919, the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU) was formed in Cape Town, and in the same year led the dockworkers into strike action. In Natal, which of all the provinces had been least affected by these new developments, African workers on the coal fields struck for higher wages in 1919.\textsuperscript{134} In 1920, the activities of the Port Elizabeth branch of the ICU culminated in a clash with police which resulted in 21 deaths - the first martyrs of the new strategies of African political protest. In February 1920, the wave of militant action was brought to a head by the combined activities of the International Socialist League and the SANNC: the Johannesburg gold fields were virtually brought to a standstill by a strike of 71,000 of their African workforce (primarily to demand higher pay), which incidentally put 8,000 white miners out of work.\textsuperscript{135}
This was the largest and most effective instance of worker protest that South Africa's primary industry had yet experienced.

The events of 1906 in Natal and Zululand and of 1916 in Zululand had demonstrated the close relationship that existed between the African rural and urban areas in times of civil disturbance. The contact and interchange between the two had been expressed in the messages sent from the rural areas calling migrant labourers home, and the migrant labourers who returned home on hearing news of civil disturbance in the rural areas. A few months after the major strike on the gold fields, a number of strange rumours associated with Dinuzulu, Solomon and David were reported in Zululand. The overwhelming majority of Zulu proceeding to Johannesburg did so to work on the gold fields. It is unlikely that these facts are coincidental. More specifically, there are a number of reasons that suggest that the 'strained relations' between Solomon and David were directly linked to urban unrest.

Before considering these reasons, it is useful to make three points. First, Zulu mineworkers formed the Zulu royal family's most important constituency in Johannesburg - and in a financial sense they were the Zulu royal family's most important constituency altogether. Soon after his succession, Solomon had established the pattern of Zulu royalty maintaining contact with Zulu mineworkers, either personally in the course of what the NAD accurately described as 'begging expeditions to the mines', or through the medium of royal representatives such as Franz and Mnyaiza. From the point of view of the mineworkers, however, the monetary tribute they paid to their royal visitors placed an obligation on the latter to provide political leadership and a means
whereby their grievances may be redressed - particularly if they had been recruited by a member of the Zulu royal family. The type of political leadership the royal representatives offered is thus very important. Second, it must be remembered that as a personality, Solomon tended to be humble and conciliatory, whereas David was restless, aggressive and even violent. The third comment is better expressed in the form of a question: Why did David have sufficient support to attempt to usurp Solomon's position in 1920 whereas he had meekly accepted his deposition in 1913, and had not challenged Solomon before 1920?

In August 1919, Solomon completed an extensive tour of the Johannesburg mining areas, visiting the labour compounds of Brakpan Mines (where Franz worked as a labour supervisor), New Modderfontein, New Kleinfontein, Geduld Proprietary, East Rand Proprietary, Crown Mines, and also the Municipal Compound which housed labour for the Jubilee and Salisbury Mines. In each compound that he visited he met with complaints of grave dissatisfaction with the conditions of work. Of the many grievances that were laid before him, the main and universal grievance was low wages. Complaints about the pass laws and pass arrests ranked next in importance. There were many other grievances: "injured for small wages and no compensation", "burials delayed until rotten", "post-mortem examinations not wanted", "starved in hospital and given same kind of medicine for all classes of diseases including injuries", "not allowed to brew beer which is our natural food".

Solomon had each set of grievances for each particular mine transcribed, and before leaving Johannesburg he called on the Director of Native Labour. He discussed the grievances with the latter, and handed him the lists he had compiled so that action may be taken to redress them. In response
the Director of Native Labour instructed inspectors to investigate the complaints and compile reports. On the matter of wages, the various reports merely indicated what the wage levels were and made no recommendation for increases. On all other matters the reports either simply denied that the grievances were justified or gave reasons why they could not be remedied. Post-mortems, for example, were "required by the Miners' Pthisis Bureau", brewing of beer was "a contravention of Liquor Laws", and labourers were only arrested on pass offences because they so "frequently disregarded" the pass laws. The inspectors' reports were forwarded to Solomon through the CNC and the magistrate of Nongoma, and the matter was evidently closed.

Although their emotional identification with and loyalty to the Zulu royal family was unquestionable, it is patent that in the militant mood of 1920, Zulu mineworkers could not find in Solomon the leadership that they wanted. Seven months after Solomon's visit and futile attempt to redress miners' grievances, the mineworkers took matters into their own hands and came out on strike. During the period in which the strike took place, Solomon was in Zululand, engrossed in his attempts to claim lobolo for Cetshwayo's isigodlo women. David, however, was in Johannesburg. The purpose of David's visit to Johannesburg was, following the pattern set by his younger brother, to visit the mine compounds and collect revenue. The militant atmosphere within the workforce which David met acceded well with David's character.

When considered together, the rumours circulating in Zululand in May 1920 were inconsistent. There were again rumours that Dinuzulu was not dead but was soon to return to liberate his country. It was also said that the government had
instructed Socwatsha of the Magwaza people (i.e. the NAD spy who had reported on Dinuzulu's burial ceremony) to assassinate Solomon. 139 But added to these rumours, which indicated Zulu hostility towards their existing white rulers, there were rumours that David was to usurp Solomon's position. 140 It soon became evident that David had the support to do so, which indicated the existence of hostility towards Solomon's mode of leadership. The latter rumours were accompanied by reports of friction between David and Solomon and reports of strange occurrences at Solomon's homesteads. Several of Solomon's donkeys and a bull had been stabbed to death and organs of ritual significance had been removed from them. Mankulumana stated the purpose was to challenge Solomon. The magistrate of Ngotshe commented that there were Zulu who saw David as the true heir, and that these had prevailed upon David to lead the "discontents against Solomon's order". Solomon reported to Fynney that the people of his Sikalenesinyoka homestead had twice recently attempted to poison him. 141 Then - and this caused panic in the Natal NAD - it was reported that David was holding "political meetings" in the Nkandla district, had visited Cetshwayo's grave there, and was collecting money to provide the 'sinews of war'. 142 At this stage the Natal NAD became convinced that the reports of 'sibling rivalry' were symptoms of a deeper malady.

In response, the CNC chaired an inquiry into the matter at Nkandla in May 1920. David was not present to account for himself. The inquiry turned into a farce: witnesses were prepared to reiterate the various rumours and confirm that David's meetings had taken place, but refused to report what had been discussed at the latter. The CNC's questions revealed that he knew that people had come from outside Zululand especially to attend David's meetings. Moreover, as he related, the news of David's activities had
"thundered through the country had been talked about hundreds of miles away". Eventually, in exasperation, the CNC said that if they did not wish to disclose the motive of the meetings, he would not mention the motives that had been reported to him. He concluded by warning the gathering that they "had learned one lesson during the Rebellion and now they are deliberately courting trouble again by becoming mixed up with royal youngsters..." It was clear that the Natal NAD knew a rebellion to be imminent, and that David would lead it. By the second half of 1920, however, rumours of rebellion had died away. David settled down in a new homestead he had constructed near Nobamba, and never again challenged Solomon's succession. For the rest of his life (he died in 1935) he was plagued with problems with his white landlords.

The events of 1920, although apparently 'sibling rivalry', at a deeper level were a reflection of a political militancy that David acted on for his own ends. In this he gained the support of those who had become disillusioned with Solomon's conciliatory stance. The year 1920 thus revealed that Solomon could not assume that his dynastic status entitled him to the unconditional loyalty of the Zulu people as a whole. The approach that he took on issues of central importance to his 'subjects' - such as wage levels and working conditions in both urban and rural areas - was vital to his political status. Whilst still seeking to consolidate his status as Zulu king, Solomon was in the process of redefining the political image of the Zulu royal house in such a way that it was impossible to associate it with rebellion or militant political action. The new forms of African political expression that flared between 1918 and 1920 prefigured a far more militant and widespread movement in the late 1920s. During this period the political distance between Solomon and the rank-and-file was to become
unambiguous and explicit. Solomon nonetheless retained his emotional appeal as hereditary Zulu king and his place in the affections of the Zulu people as a whole.

The political distance that came to separate Solomon and the Zulu 'rank-and-file', however, cannot be reduced to their different perceptions of political method. During the 1920s, class divisions among the Zulu became increasingly pronounced both objectively (in terms of economic activity and lifestyle) and subjectively (in terms of self-perception, class identification and political expression). Attached to the occupations of teacher, minister of religion or clerical worker, for example, were 'life experiences' and social and political aspirations that were very different to those of labour tenant or urban wage labourer. Socially and politically, Solomon and the Zulu 'establishment' associated and even identified more and more with the numerically small petty bourgeois elite than with those who constituted the 'commoners' of tribal society and the 'working class' of the new society of the twentieth century.

In terms of political method and of social and political objectives, there was increasing cause for a political alliance between the tribal and petty bourgeois elites. Indeed, Natal's large measure of immunity from the militancy of the 1918-1920 period was a consequence of the doggedly hamba kahle posture of Natal's petty bourgeois African leadership. In 1918, militancy had spread to the workforce in Durban. In April of that year, the ricksha-pullers came out on strike. In August, the workforce of the Royal Hotel in West Street struck successfully for higher wages. In response to these new developments, Dube called a meeting of African workers in Durban on 10 August 1918. He told the workers that they "must not do this sort of thing. When
there was a request for a rise in wages, work must not be stopped...no trouble should be caused...Europeans should be spoken fairly to". He then handed out copies of a petition he had drawn up addressed to "The Government, Municipal Authorities and Employers of Labour Generally"; this he argued, was the form that protest should take. The petition had been adopted at a "mass meeting of Natives held at the Victoria Street Bioscope" on 26 July 1918, and was signed by Dube "For the Native Workers". It opened by requesting that "with a view to securing relief, your assistance is sought in such a direction as you in your wisdom may deem proper". The focus of the grievances listed was inadequate wage levels in Durban, especially since prices had rocketed during the war. Other grievances were evictions following the 1913 Act, the increase of rents on white farms and various restrictions imposed by government laws and municipal regulations. In conclusion, the petition stated that the "petitioners desire particularly to contradict allegations in the Press that they are working in accordance with the Socialistic Movement taking place in Johannesburg or elsewhere". Yet the very reason why Dube had called the meeting was precisely because workers had shown that they did sympathize with this 'socialistic movement'. The political distance between the Natal petty bourgeois leaders and the African workers matched that which was developing between Solomon and the Zulu rank-and-file.

Turning to the relationship between petty bourgeois leadership and Solomon, it is of more than symbolic significance that precisely when Zulu mineworkers were striking in early 1920, John Dube was in the Nongoma district discussing with Solomon the "organization of a proposed mission of congratulation to the Throne on the successful issue of the war, with which Solomon and his people were in full sympathy..." - a nicety distant indeed from the exigencies facing the masses.
Later in the same year Solomon was campaigning to be allowed to go to England to visit the king, on his own initiative, presumably to ask for his recognition as Zulu king. The forthcoming political 'marriage of convenience' between the elite leaders of the old and new worlds of the Zulu was symbolically represented in May 1920 by the marriage of Pixley Seme to Phikisile Harriette Zulu, Solomon's sister. Phikisile was one of the most beautiful of the royal children and perhaps the most 'civilized' and educated.

In many respects, 1920 represents a watershed. Before attempting to unravel some of the complexities of Zulu politics during the 1920s, however, it is necessary to comment on new trends that emerged in the administration of Zululand after 1917, and to note the development of 'Native policy' at state level until 1920. In certain respects, developments in these contexts defined the parameters of and gave direction to African politics during the 1920s.

The Zululand National Training Institution, the Native Affairs Department and 'Native policy', 1917-1920

The establishment of the ZNTI, under the patronage of Solomon, was not only an attempt to place Solomon in contact with 'beneficial' influences and, in turn, to manipulate Solomon as a medium for diffusing 'beneficial' influences among the Zulu as a whole. It also confirmed the Natal NAD's commitment to tribalism and indirect rule. The function of the ZNTI was to entrench chiefly rule by making it more 'efficient' and 'progressive' and hence more capable of meeting the demands that the twentieth century presented. Equally significantly, it reflected that indirect rule in Zululand was to be based on the principle of hereditary leadership. Like Clarke's scheme in the 1890s, the intention was to coopt Zululand's
'aristocratic establishment'. The Zululand Native Trust's statements of annual expenditure during the early years of the ZNTI's existence testify to its importance in the eyes of the Natal NAD: in 1920, the construction and maintenance of the ZNTI accounted for 90.2% of the Trust's total expenditure, whilst in 1921 it accounted for 59.7%.153

This commitment represented a shift from earlier policy directions. The report of the 1903-1905 South African Native Affairs Commission (Lagden Commission), which was a strong influence on 'Native policy' in the years after Union, most notably in its segregationist recommendations, observed that although chiefs continued to be recognised as a means of administration, their jurisdiction was being "gradually transferred to European Magistrates and Commissioners". "The abolition of the tribal system and chieftainship is being left to time...assisted by legislation where necessary and administrative methods." It argued that "assimilation" should be seen as the "ultimate goal".154 The report of the 1906-1907 Natal Native Affairs Commission similarly stated that whilst tribalism must of necessity remain "an indispensible component part of the government of the natives" for some time to come, it was nonetheless disintegrating of its own accord - and for reasons of morality and 'progress in civilization' such disintegration should be encouraged. As a means of breaking the power of hereditary chiefs, it argued that chiefs should be appointed to "territorial" rather than "personal" wards.155

In practice, the Natal NAD had continued to depend on tribalism. Addison even advocated that chiefly control be extended to the urban areas. In 1915 he had written to the Chief Magistrate of Durban arguing that the appointment of a chief over "Natives permanently living in the Borough" would
be an asset to the administration by reporting "cases of distress", "any undue influx of Natives and their wives who are being ejected from neighbouring farms" and to "trace Hut Tax defaulters". He felt sure that some "respectable families" in Durban would appreciate such an appointment. Although no chief was appointed, Addison's suggestions were in effect taken up by J. S. Marwick when he was appointed Manager of the Municipal Native Affairs Department in 1916. Marwick appointed Pika kaSiteku Zulu, Solomon's uncle, as his departmental induna. Furthermore, Addison was not a supporter of African education: he did not support the suggestion that Dinuzulu's sons be educated, and he certainly preferred to deal with chiefs and tribal Africans than with educated Africans. The attitude of Addison's successor was initially rather different. Wheelwright regarded the government's use of tribalism for administrative purposes as expedient rather than desirable; soon after he took office he stated that "to a very great extent we hope to replace the Chief by the Location Supervisor /i.e. a white official/. He was also a keen advocate of African education - and John Dube, leading educationist and politician, was said to have his "chief supporter" in Wheelwright. However, confronted by the realities of his administrative duties in Natal, he came to realise that tribalism would have to be maintained. Through the ZNTI, he hoped to modernize chiefly rule from within. From the early 1920s, Wheelwright in practice strongly defended tribalism and opposed the application of government legislation which would serve to undermine the authority of chiefs.

Tribalism and the set of paternal relationships that weaved through it, was deeply ingrained in the Natal system of 'Native administration'. This was reflected in the interviews that took place between the CNC and various chiefs or representatives of chiefs at the Natal NAD head office in
Pietermaritzburg. Many of these interviews were sought by chiefs merely to 'pay respects to' (khonza) or 'make the acquaintance of' the CNC. The CNC, on the other hand, played his role with consummate care. Attached to the minutes of the interviews in the CNC's records are notes recording brief history of the visiting chief and his ward for the information of the CNC. These were prepared by the CNC's clerical staff, and enabled the CNC to present himself as personally interested in his visitors and their particular concerns. Discussions sometimes covered a wide range of topics. When Chief Mathole Buthelezi (Mahlabatini district) came to "pay his respects" in 1922, for example, the CNC and Mathole discussed, among other topics, the problem of locusts, Mathole's personal health (he had been unwell, and the CNC urged him to heed the advice of doctors and avoid exertions), and the CNC also took the opportunity to speak of labour being urgently required on the gold fields.

Those who were directly involved in 'Native administration' in Natal were constantly made aware of the administrative advantages of tribalism. As a social and political order, it described a set of responsibilities between leaders and their people layered downwards through the hierarchy (a chief for his ward, an induna for his section of the ward, a homestead head for his wives and children); and, in turn, it required the respect and obedience of the people to their leaders upwards through the hierarchy. Generally, in comparison to 'detribalized' Africans, tribal Africans were far more amenable to control. They had a place in the 'old order', and their 'representatives', chiefs and headmen, were employees of the state.

It is interesting that the Native Affairs Administration Bill that was introduced to parliament in 1917 by General Botha
included provisions that sought to entrench tribalism in the reserves and extend the autocratic power of the government over Africans in Natal, where the Governor-General as Supreme Chief could legislate by proclamation) to the rest of the Union. It also provided for the establishment of African local councils with restricted administrative powers, on the model provided by the Cape Glen Grey Act of 1894, in areas where the local Native Commissioner felt that such a delegation of responsibility was feasible and desirable. The reason why the 1917 Bill failed to pass into law was primarily because it also sought to entrench territorial segregation on the basis of the 1913 Act and the recommendations of the subsequent land commissions - which had been the subject of a public outcry by both white and black. The administrative provisions of the 1917 Bill illuminate significant new developments in the sphere of state ideology - and the importance of the 1917 Bill in these respects has nowhere been recognized. 163

There is a direct link between the administrative initiatives Botha had set in motion in Zululand - the entrenchment of tribal rule through the medium of the ZNTI - and those that he placed before parliament in 1917. Whilst the 1917 Bill aimed to transform the 1913 Act's principle of territorial segregation into reality (by finalizing the delimitation of the reserves) the Bill was also the first attempt on the part of Union policy-makers to introduce statutory political segregation. The administrative proposals drew strong criticism from the 'liberal' backbenchers on the grounds that they were anti-democratic, 'anti-progressive' and entrenched the jurisdiction of chiefs. 164 The proponents of the Bill argued that it was essential to get back to 'administrative basics': indirect rule and tribalism. 165 Yet there were far greater issues involved. Great emphasis
was placed on the need for the preservation of racial separateness. Hertzog, who strongly supported the Bill, argued that the educated African who "tried to force his society on the white man...was a traitor to his own kith and kin". Other Nationalist representatives spoke of irreconcilable separateness of 'native kultur'; and the phrase 'development on their own lines' was frequently repeated among the Bill's supporters. Moreover, Botha made frequent references to the larger African territories in the Union - Zululand and the Transkei - and suggested that these might be administered as separate and discrete units by single large regional councils. In this context he alluded to the arrangements made for the High Commission Territories of Basutoland and Swaziland.

In the context of the 1917 Bill, Botha's appointment of Solomon as chief of the Usuthu, his hint that if Solomon behaved correctly he would become a 'big man' in Zululand, and his interest in the ZNTI scheme, take on a wider significance. In short, it seems that Botha had in mind a political settlement in Zululand that would serve as a guiding light for 'Native policy' in the rest of the Union. The 1917 Bill is also significant in that it reflects the existence of thoroughgoing territorial and political segregationist thinking at parliamentary level long before it is conventionally held to originate. Moreover, it reflects an early association between segregation, the policy of 'retribalization' and the Natal model of 'Native administration'. Even more specifically, the 1917 Bill indicates two sets of relationships that are of vital importance. First, that between the Zulu royal family and state attempts to explore a solution to the 'native problem' on segregationist lines. Second, that between the aspirations of the African petty bourgeoisie towards 'white South Africa' and state attempts to divert their aspirations towards 'their own people' - partly through the medium of
local councils. The next piece of 'native' legislation (which passed into law) actively encouraged the latter.

However, before the next attempt on the part of the state to lay down a uniform South African 'Native policy' for the whole country, there were important developments in African political action. These were reflected in the waves of militant activity that spread through South Africa in the period 1918 to 1920, primarily in the urban areas. These developments served to influence both the provisions of the new legislation and the development of state ideology.

The events of 1918 to 1920 provoked grave fears in the ranks of the government and white public. It was a new form of political protest far more dangerous than the hamba kahle posture of the SANNC before 1917 and the more localized examples of 'primary resistance' - of which the 1906 rebellion is an example. The emphasis was primarily in the sphere of industrial action, and as such it constituted a direct assault on the very foundations of white South Africa. More than any abstract arguments on the necessity of defining the political rights of Africans in the Union and establishing channels through which they could express themselves politically, the events of 1918 to 1920 persuaded the state that the matter was now a priority. The "pleas for delay" made during the debates on the 1917 Bill, on the grounds that legislators had not devoted sufficient time to the contemplation of the direction that 'political Native policy' should take, were not heard in 1920. The first five pages of the 1919-1921 report of the NAD dwelled on the new developments in African politics and the need for state action. The report detailed the more articulate and direct manner in which Africans had expressed themselves after the end of the war - and noted the attempts of the "Bolshevist section" to capture and exploit the "Native races" for the
purposes of subversion. Noting that the "inevitable development of a race consciousness" was now underway, it argued that it was "very necessary that the attitude to be observed towards this natural development should...be controlling and directive".170

The sense of alarm was not confined to the departments of state, urban areas and industries that had been directly affected in the recent events. Even in Zululand, the sugar planters (the sugar industry was the prime industry of Zululand) had noted signs of new opposition on the part of their workforce - which the South African Sugar Journal ascribed to "insidious propaganda of what...are called Bolsheviks, but what are known in other countries as International Workers of the World; in other words the riff-raff of revolutionary Europe".171 In 1920, the Superintendent of the Natal Coast Labour Recruiting Corporation (which had been established by the sugar industry in an attempt to ameliorate its perennial labour shortage) wrote that

the native you are getting today is not the same you got last year...A few years ago, the 'Native Labour Party' was an unknown quantity, but today it is a reality, and its power is steadily growing and one can see 'the writing on the wall'...172

In August 1919, Botha died and General Smuts succeeded him as leader of the SAP, Prime Minister and Minister of Native Affairs. In early 1920, Smuts introduced his 'Native Affairs Bill' to parliament. This Bill was purely a 'political' Bill, designed to meet the political challenges of the period 1918 to 1920. The proponents of the 1917 Bill, Smuts argued, had "taken too much hay on their forks, in mixing up large questions of native administration...together with the
demarcation of South Africa into various areas for whites and blacks". In 1920, Smuts kept the 'political' priorities squarely in mind.

Specifically, the 1920 Act had two purposes. First, to provide a "constitutional outlet" for Africans to express their "views and grievances". This aimed to entice Africans to discharge their political energies within government institutions where they would be more amenable to state control. Thus Smuts proposed the extension of the Cape Glen Grey system of local councils for rural areas to the rest of the Union, and for an annual 'Native Conference' in which African representatives from all over the Union could meet to discuss 'native affairs'. Second, he realised that the solution to the political aspects of the 'native problem' needed considerable investigation and could not be finalized in 1920. Thus the Bill provided for the establishment of a permanent 'Native Affairs Commission' to investigate all aspects of 'native affairs' and make recommendations to the Minister of Native Affairs. The Native Affairs Commission was to be an all white body and, in function, an extra-parliamentary state 'think tank'.

The local councils provided for under the 1920 Act were vested with responsibility to administer and advise on matters affecting their local communities. Areas of responsibility included the construction and maintenance of roads, suppression of livestock diseases and noxious weeds, improvement of agricultural methods, and could extend to medical and educational facilities. They could make bye-laws to put their policies into practice, and were empowered to impose a levy on each adult male in their local community to enable them to carry out their work. Members of the council could either be elected or appointed. The internal operation of the local councils, however, was to be firmly based on the democratic
principle. So was the operation of the annual Union-wide Native Conferences. However, the state was determined not to extend democratic institutions for Africans to their logical conclusion. As Smuts affirmed, it had already become accepted state policy that

there should be no extension of the Cape African franchise to other parts of South Africa ....

the proper solution of the native question was to divide South Africa into two camps - white and black - and build up specific institutions for the blacks and whites .... 178

The 'democratic principles' contained within the 1920 Act were introduced in response to the demands of the most vocal African leaders. The latter - those responsible for the disturbances of 1918-1920 - were based in the urban rather than the rural areas, and were educated and 'detribalized' rather than tribal Africans. It is significant that the local councils, which were designed to attract educated and politicized African leadership, were to be established in the rural areas and not in the towns. Legislators regarded the cooperation that had been seen to take place between educated 'agitators' and the labouring masses in the urban areas as an especial danger. In part, the 1920 Act was an attempt on the part of the state to divert the political energies of the former towards the rural areas and into 'safe' constitutional outlets.

In the parliamentary debates on the 1920 Bill, there was a striking discrepancy between the legislators' preoccupation with the urban areas as the core of the 'native problem', and the legislation that they enacted - which dealt primarily with the rural areas. Smuts observed that "our future difficulty would not be with the raw tribal native in his location, but in the big centres...." 179 Merriman referred to Johannesburg as the Africans' "university of crime" and every other large city as their "high schools of crime". 180 Such sentiments were vigorously endorsed by two newly-elected representatives from Natal: J.S.Marwick,
the representative for Illovo (south and inland of Durban) and George Heaton Nicholls, the representative for Zululand.\textsuperscript{181}

The 1920 Act was the first step in the implementation of political segregation in the Union. What is more, the Act firmly based this political segregation on the pattern of territorial segregation already introduced by the 1913 Act: local councils could only be established in areas scheduled as African reserves. By tying local councils to the reserves and by placing both the local councils and the Native Conferences under the control of the NAD and the extra-parliamentary Native Affairs Commission, the state emphasized that both urban areas and the central government were to be the preserve of 'white South Africa'. Smuts affirmed that the "principle of self government for natives" was a development of the "law" of segregation:

\begin{quote}
The white parliament would always remain the sovereign power in the country, but, subject to the sovereign power, he [Smuts] did not see why a certain amount of \textbf{self government} should not be allowed to the natives so that in their own territories they would be able to attend to their own domestic affairs.\textsuperscript{182}
\end{quote}

The 1920 Act established on the statute book the principle that the state was not to permit African political institutions in 'white South Africa', whether in rural or urban areas. Three years later, this was made more explicit by the Natives Urban Areas Act of 1923.\textsuperscript{183} The corollary to the displacement of African politics from the realm of 'white South Africa' was that African political institutions were to lie in African rural areas.

The year 1920 thus represents something of a watershed in the context of state policy. It was the year in which the state first resolutely grappled with the 'political' aspect...
of 'native policy' and attempted to control by legislative action the dangers of 'uncontrolled' African political action. This legislation established the guidelines for the future development of 'native policy'. Furthermore, it ushered in a period of intense debate on 'native policy' during which state ideology was refined and state policy was clarified.

More specifically, 1920 was also a watershed in that Marwick and Nicholls were elected to parliament. Both made their first parliamentary speeches on 'native affairs' and were to take an influential part in the 'native affairs' debates during the turbulent period from the 1920s to the mid 1930s. Both had a keen sense of the Natal tradition in 'native affairs'. Marwick had for a considerable time been in direct contact with the Zulu royal family in various capacities, and Nicholls was soon to pursue a keen - even obsessive - interest in Solomon and all that he represented.

In important respects, the 1920 Act reflected back on African politics. The lull in militant action that followed it can in part be attributed to the success of the measure. It did have some success in disengaging the educated African leadership from the labouring masses by redirecting their energies into constitutional outlets. Furthermore, as the evidence for Natal was to indicate, leadership that was primarily based in the urban areas soon took a marked interest in the 'political development' of the rural areas. As evidence given before the Select Committee on the 1920 Act illustrates, for the first time since Union, petty bourgeois interests welcomed a new piece of 'native' legislation. Dube was almost euphoric: "I support the Bill with my whole heart. This is what we have always been wanting the Government to do. We have no voice...in the administration of our interests, and these councils will meet that general need."
But he added that the "difficulty...is that the chiefs may think that their power is going to be undermined".\textsuperscript{184} For this and a variety of other reasons there was a clear need for some more formal interchange between petty bourgeois and tribal leadership.
CHAPTER 4

THE ZULU ROYAL FAMILY AND INKATHA, 1920-1927

The formation of Inkatha

The history of African politics in the province of Natal during the decade of the 1920s falls naturally into two periods. The break comes after approximately 1926, when the dissatisfaction of the Natal African and Zulu 'commoners' or 'rank-and-file' were given political direction. Over the Union as a whole, the period 1927-1930 forms a high watermark of African protest; at the forefront of this development was the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU), which appealed to and stimulated a new form of African political militancy in the rural areas. Divisive regional loyalties seemed to give way to political identities and methods more pertinent to the exigencies of the twentieth century. Somewhat incongruously in view of the strength of tribalism, the Natal branch of the ICU established Natal proper as the leading exponent of this new form of political protest. To a lesser extent, this 'socialistic propaganda' (perhaps the least emotive term employed by white Natalians) also found receptive ears in Northern Natal and even in Zululand. The support that such 'propaganda' found among the rank-and-file was directly related to a multifaceted process of rural impoverishment, social disintegration and political repression which came to a head in the late 1920s. Among the Zulu, these conditions differentially affected the three major class-groupings which crystallized during the 1920s: the rank-and-file, the tribal elite and the petty bourgeoisie. The politicization of the rank-and-file in this later period restructures the character of Zulu politics - which until then was dominated by the petty bourgeoisie and tribal elites.

In contrast to the situation in the late 1920s, the earlier
half of the decade for Zululand was one of recovery, if not one of prosperity. No further land alienation had taken place since the declaration of Union and flush of evictions from white farms in Northern Natal after the passage of the 1913 Act had slowed to a trickle during the post-war depression. A drought of the proportions of 1912 was not repeated until 1930/1931 and the rains were consistently good. Nor did the locusts return in any appreciable numbers. And however much the Zulu bemoaned the state's livestock-dipping regulations, by 1920 these had succeeded in controlling the various diseases (most importantly east coast fever) which had decimated Zulu cattle between the 1890s and 1913. Indeed, Zulu cattle herds had been so successfully replenished by the late 1920s that overgrazing and consequent soil erosion were important causes of the ensuing economic crisis. Moreover, the high incidence of venereal disease among migrant workers and hence the rural areas had decreased from about 1914; indeed, after the post-war influenza pandemic the Zulu were relatively disease-free until the malaria epidemic of 1930. The Zulu 'Inkatha' organisation was formed during this period of relative prosperity.

The initial inspiration for the formation of the "Zulu National Congress" (later named 'Inkatha') came from "educated natives from outside" rather than from the Zulu in Zululand. Most prominent among this group was Rev. Samuel D. Simelane who, in the company of Mnyaiza, called upon Fynney in February 1921 to learn whether the 1920 Native Affairs Bill was now law. He then requested permission for a deputation of "prominent and progressive Natives" to see the CNC in order to discuss how they could respond to the Act. Simelane had been educated at Amanzimtoti Training Institute before being ordained into the Dutch Reformed Church. He now
lived in Chief Mathole Buthelezi's ward in the Nongoma district, and although his ministerial duties lay primarily in the Vryheid and Ngotshe districts, he was in close contact with Mahashini. During his private meeting with the CNC in March 1921, he took pains to emphasize that the proposals he was making were the outcome of discussions with Solomon, and had Solomon's fullest support. First, he stated that it was "our wish" to follow the advice of the government (referring to the 1920 Act) and establish an "annual meeting" to discuss "matters that will tend to promote the welfare of the people". This reflected Simelane's possibly deliberate misreading of the 1920 Act's provision for an annual Union-wide 'Native Conference', and represents an attempt to establish an exclusively Zulu forum. Second, he requested permission for the establishment of a "cooperative agricultural scheme" in Zululand. It transpired that the intention was to buy land and farm it for commercial purposes.

The formation of Inkatha was essentially an attempt on the part of local educated individuals (mainly from the Vryheid district) to cooperate with rural chiefs in order to take advantage of the 'progressive' provisions of the 1920 Act. Further, Inkatha was seen as a means through which commercial agriculture could be set underway on land purchased ostensibly by a 'tribe' - non-tribal land-buying syndicates had been practically outlawed following the 1913 Act.

However, there was more behind the formation of Inkatha. The prime movers were either members of or in contact with Natal's veteran African 'gentleman's club', the Natal Native Congress (NNC). For less tangible political objectives individuals in Pietermaritzburg were just as interested in the formation of Inkatha as those in Zululand and Northern Natal. It seems that the NNC leadership deliberately
stayed in the background whilst the case for the establishment of Inkatha was presented to the NAD. The NNC's reticence apparently arose from an awareness that the scheme would be more acceptable in official eyes if it was presented - as Simelane so pointedly did - as the wishes of the chiefs of Zululand.

Those at the NNC headquarters in Pietermaritzburg were less interested in Inkatha for the tangible political advantages that it might realize in Zululand - whether directly political (in the form of a state-recognized local or regional council) or material (in the form of a commercial agricultural scheme). Their interest was primarily a reflex of the 'pan-Africanist' ideology which was becoming increasingly influential among the educated African elite. In the Natal context, this ideology imparted to the Zulu royal family an undefined and rather mystical role of leadership. In the second instance, their interest was related to the events of 1918-1920. These had shown the petty bourgeois hamba kahle leadership that it was in need of influential new allies if it was not to be swept aside in the new moods of popular militancy.6

Since Dube had lost the SANNC leadership to the more radical Makgatho in 1917, he had virtually run the NNC as an independent and conservative fief of his own. Dube was the medium through which the NNC made contact with Solomon, and Solomon was urged to associate himself with NNC activities. In March 1921, on the same day that Simelane was meeting the CNC with his proposals for the Zulu National Congress, Albert kaTshingana Zulu was in Pietermaritzburg to attend the annual meeting of the NNC as Solomon's representative. Solomon had been requested to send "someone to listen for him".7 Solomon's tentative acknowledgement of NNC activities sharply contrasts with the NNC's obsession with
Solomon. The June 1922 NNC meeting in Durban clearly exposed the ideological influences at work on the NNC, and the way in which these were being interpreted in Natal.

Dube had just returned from England where he had attended a "Pan-African Congress" composed of representatives of black people in French, Belgian and British Africa and America. After a formal welcome by the chairman, William Bhulose, Dube reported that the Pan African Congress had agreed that "if any native in any part of the world was oppressed or living under hardships that such conditions should move every black man throughout the world". During his presidential address Dube announced that he was shortly to leave for America "as a result of an invitation of prominent Negroes" there.8

Dube in particular and the African elite that he represented had long been influenced by Americans, Booker T. Washington (who argued that black advancement towards equality with whites could best be achieved through education and industry rather than political agitation), and later, W. E. B. DuBois (who conversely argued that black nationalism should be stirred as a political force in the struggle for equality). After 1920, the appeal of a world-wide black consciousness came increasingly to inform the practical politics of SANNC and NNC activities. The 'transatlantic inspiration' was now transformed into a more concrete 'transatlantic connection' through such media as the Pan African Congress and - for the first time - visits of 'foreign' black dignitaries to South Africa. Although Washington's doctrine was still influential (especially after the visit in 1921 of James Aggrey, an American-based West African educationist who advocated black progress through 'enlightenment') it was the more assertive doctrines of DuBois and Marcus Garvey
that found most purchase within the national and provincial Native Congresses in South Africa. Garvey, a Jamaican now resident in America, introduced a new facet to the cause of a world-wide black consciousness: the search for roots. His 'Back to Africa' movement swept black America in the early 1920s. In Natal, the search for 'roots' inevitably turned to the Zulu royal family. In addresses to the NNC meeting, Dube announced that

he regretted that he was not prepared to expose the very important matters that had been discussed at the Pan African Congress... He desired to meet the Paramount Chief of the Zulus, 'Solomon ka Dinuzulu' to whom he would make a full report...[this] could only be submitted to 'Solomon' and no other man.

Dube reiterated these views at an NNC meeting the following day in Pietermaritzburg, chaired by a member of the Msimang family from the Edenvale Kholwa Community. Henceforth references to Solomon, with the implication that he was in support of NNC activities, were frequent at NNC gatherings.

If the NNC aimed to establish Solomon as its ideological centrepoint, Solomon proved to be a highly elusive quarry. A meeting which was held at Mahashini, two months after Dube's report-back to the NNC, made this quite clear: Solomon was not prepared to associate himself openly with 'Congress people' whose social and political aspirations were removed from his own. Moreover, they might jeopardize his standing in the eyes of the NAD. Inkatha therefore necessarily got off to a slow start, and although prominent NNC members were consistently in the wings, it was not until late 1924 that they held official positions in Inkatha. It was only then that Inkatha was established in practice. Prior to this date, all that existed of Inkatha was a 'Zulu National Fund' (Isigijimi sika Zulu), which was established
for no particular purpose other than to accumulate money to 'conduct the business' of the Zulu National Congress. The driving force behind this fund was Rev. Simelane, who held the office of secretary. The 'acting chairman' was Mnyaiza kaNdabuko, and its treasurer was Mankulumana kaSomaphunga. Publicity leaflets distributed in February 1923 called for contributions on a sliding scale - which illustrates how Simelane envisaged the social composition of the fund's supporters.

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<td>Ministers</td>
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Whilst Mnyaiza's support for the venture was unquestionable, both Solomon and Mankulumana "repudiate[d] any association with the fund under its present auspices". Mankulumana informed Fynney that he had "protested his unwillingness ...to bear any other part than that of subscriber to the Fund..." but had had the treasurership foisted upon him. 14 His appointment was in the first instance to lend the Fund a national and royal image. As Fynney remarked, Mankulumana could not even write his name 15 - and was thus hardly capable of acting as treasurer. When attempts were made in 1923 to establish formally a 'Zulu National Congress', Solomon informed Fynney that he was in favour of the establishment on constitutional lines of a representative national organization, and realizes the necessity for a fund, 'but' he is opposed to its creation other than under government auspices, i.e. he 'Solomon' required that any fund established for such a purpose should have as its treasurer...a Government officer..."
Solomon had already approached both Fynney himself and Rev. L. E. Oscroft to act as treasurer to the Fund into which money was already pouring.  

Although Solomon's statements to NAD officials must be read with some caution, this is less so in the case of Fynney. It is nonetheless clear that Solomon felt himself to be under considerable pressure from petty bourgeois interests, and that he baulked at the political ascendancy in 'his' preserve. But perhaps most of all, whilst he realized that the proposed Zulu National Congress could contribute to his drive for recognition as Zulu king, he was equally aware that such recognition had to come from the South African government. Thus he wished - quite literally - to 'tarry to the magistrate', and wished only to be associated with the organisation when he had ascertained it had NAD approval.

It was during 1923 that the organisation was given the name 'Inkatha' (or Nkata, or Inkata, in the orthography of the time) - a name charged with royal and mystical associations. It was a remarkable and enlightening choice in view of Solomon's refusal to openly associate himself with what he referred to as "Simelane's activities." The original Zulu inkatha was a coil of woven grass containing ingredients of mystical significance, and representing the unity and spiritual essence (insila) of the nation. It also represented "supreme power", and was thus a symbol of the kingship. In the words of Baleni kaSilwana (one of Stuart's informants), its purpose was "to keep our nation standing firm. The binding round and round symbolizes the binding together of the people so that they should not be scattered."

Every year, on the occasion of the umkhosi festival ('first fruits' agricultural ceremony), the royal izinyanga
administered the assembled amabutho with an emetic. Thereafter the amabutho were required to vomit into specially dug trenches which had been lined with the wisps of grass taken from the king's huts. The royal izinduna then incorporated these wisps into the existing inkatha, which was then presented to the royal ancestors in the royal cattle kraal before being replaced in the king's hut. In this way, the insila of the whole nation was vested in the inkatha every year. Thus the inkatha also symbolized the continuity of the nation through time: until 1879, when it was destroyed as the British fired Cetshwayo's huts at Ondini (Ulundi), the coil had been passed down from king to king. Though Dinuzulu evidently created a new national inkatha, Solomon had not inherited it.

The resuscitation of the inkatha concept in 1923 represents a striking instance of syncretism. A traditional royal symbol was being invoked to serve political purposes that were quite different from those which it originally served. In their search for 'roots' and a suitable symbol for their present cultural and political objectives, educated and 'civilized' Africans passed over the very many rituals associated with the original inkatha which they would unquestionably have regarded as 'backward', if not loathsome.

At this stage there were clear differences of political objective between petty bourgeois leadership and Solomon. Apart from their demands for better educational facilities and their longer-term aspirations for the franchise, the Natal petty bourgeoisie had two more immediate and urgent political goals. Both related closely to the ethos of private ownership and accumulation to which they adhered, and which separated them from 'tribal' Africans whose worldview was more informed by the communal and redistributive
First, there was the desire to establish business pursuits in both urban and rural areas. The obstacles here were trading rights (even in African reserves, white trading monopolies were sanctioned by law) and insufficient capital. At the annual convention of the SANNC in Bloemfontein in 1922, a decision was made to create a fund to purchase and run a number of trading stores. Whilst these would remain SANNC property and profits would return to SANNC coffers, they were to be managed by individual members providing them with 'respectable' employment and valuable business experience. Josiah S. Gumede, secretary of the NNC, was one of the prime movers behind this scheme. The 'business interest' was strongly represented in the NNC by its chairman, William Foshla Bhulose, who was also a member of its 'Organizing and Finance Committee'. Bhulose, who was born in Inanda and educated at Amanzimtoti, entered business as a storekeeper "at an early age" to become "one of the most progressive businessmen in Durban".

Second, there was a desire for private land ownership - both as a matter of cultural and ideological principle, and with a view to commercial agricultural production. William Washington Ndhlouvu of Vryheid East Township had been a longstanding member of the committee which drew up the constitution of the SANNC in 1919. With the 'radicalisation' of the SANNC following Dube's replacement as president, Ndhlouvu found a more comfortable political home in the NNC as member of the executive committee, on which he succeeded Seme as treasurer. The attitude of the NNC leadership as a whole accorded with those of Ndhlouvu - the NNC meeting of October 1923 (addressed by Dube, Bhulose and Gumede) focussed primarily on the issue of how the "Native population was being generally held back, more especially in respect to owning land..."
These desiderata are reflected in Simelane's proposed 'cooperative agricultural scheme' - the only area in which the early Inkatha took practical action. For Simelane the purchase of land in the Vryheid district for commercial agricultural production was the prime reason for collecting funds. Like the SANNC's scheme for business pursuits, its envisaged advantages were twofold: first, to generate profits which would revert to Inkatha funds and, second, to provide an instructive model of 'progressive' agricultural techniques to assist those who wished to pursue careers in commercial agriculture. To these ends, Simelane took it upon himself to establish at the Johannesburg goldmines a fund called "Imali yo Umpini" (literally, 'money for the (hoe) handle') - which was to be united with the Zululand-based Zulu National Fund in furtherance of the agricultural scheme. He also began negotiations with a Vryheid solicitor, Mr Horace Guy, with a view to purchasing a farm.

The acquisition of land was a central political objective for tribal Zulu. But they, in contrast to petty bourgeois interests, wanted more reserve land, held under communal tribal tenure. Tribal Zulu had at various times since 1913 associated the Zulu royal family with schemes to regain Zulu lands either by purchase or by reconquest, on the understanding that the Zulu royal family would redistribute such lands among the Zulu as in precolonial times. The reasons are quite clear: for those who did not aim to engage in commercial agricultural production, and thus did not feel oppressed by the 'unprogressiveness' of communal tribal tenure, reserve land provided the cheapest and most secure means of carrying out (sub)subsistence agriculture. The indaba between the Governor-General (Prince Arthur of Connaught) and the Zulu at Nongoma in July 1923, held at the same time as
Simelane was negotiating with Horace Guy, provided tribal representatives with a forum through which to voice their land demands. Such 'royal interchanges' were the manner in which Solomon preferred to deal with his white rulers; here it was his role to express Zulu loyalty and make the appropriate gestures with the utmost dignity - on this occasion he presented His Royal Highness with a loin skin, a meat mat, a beer strainer, and an autographed portrait of himself. Mankulumana however, whose role it was to be more pithy, dwelt on the lands that had been alienated from the Zulu and argued that the areas now reserved for them were inadequate. He called for more land to be given to the Zulu.28

Such pleas for the extension of the reserves were frequently made by tribal leadership. In a series of interviews with Fynney, Solomon and Mankulumana made it clear that they saw little value in - and were not fully informed of - Simelane's scheme. Solomon notified Fynney that the "campaign is entirely unauthorized so far as he [Solomon] is concerned".29 Significantly, the fund had been publicized in the Vryheid district and not in the Nongoma district which lay in the Zululand reserves. Equally significantly, it was publicized primarily by way of posters rather than through the network of tribal leaders, and non-literate Zulu seemed to have only the vaguest awareness of the existence of an agricultural scheme and much less understanding of what it was all about.30

Notwithstanding Solomon's middle class tastes and the weight of petty bourgeois influence on him, his stance on the land issue illustrates that his political attitudes remained deeply informed by the tribal system to which he owed his position of leadership. Indeed, during the 1920s when the ideological and material underpinnings of tribal leadership were becoming increasingly insecure, Solomon adopted the
role of defender of the tribal order. His middle class tastes should not blur his role in this context: Solomon's policy was to seek to modernize tribal leadership rather than to assert blindly the privileges of the 'ancien regime'. However, the power to allocate land in the reserves - land held on the basis of communal tribal tenure - was perhaps the prime material support to the rule of chiefs, and was thus to be defended at all costs. That Solomon personally was in the process of buying landed property in Johannesburg (through Seme) does not mean that he supported private ownership of land by 'commoners' in the rural areas. Land ownership was an appendage and buttress to his status as Zulu 'king' at a time when the cultural climate of Zulu leadership was undergoing change.31

Until October 1924, Inkatha barely existed except in name and in the Fund that Simelane had established. The reasons may be summarized as threefold. First, from the outset, both petty bourgeois and tribal leaders had wished Inkatha to be formally constituted with NAD approval. Although Fynney had been moderately supportive, he was nonetheless perturbed about the influence of non-tribal 'outsiders'. The CNC had adopted a non-committal and voyeuristic 'wait and see' policy.32 Second, as Solomon and Mankulumana made clear, political differences and suspicions existed between the tribal and petty bourgeois leaders who were intended to be 'allies' within Inkatha. Third, the petty bourgeois initiative had been tentative, somewhat disorganised and without the full organisational backing of the NNC - partly for the reasons cited above, and partly because petty bourgeois backers in the urban areas of Natal proper held political priorities different from those represented by Simelane.

The failure on the part of Natal's conservative petty bourgeois leaders to institutionalize a relationship with Solomon
became an urgent political issue in mid-1924. The origins of the urgency lie in the radicalization of African political consciousness in Natal proper. Since the NNC was practically the only African political organisation in Natal at the time and since it defined its political constituency as all-embracing, the NNC was in the first place susceptible to currents of political opinion that took hold outside the ranks of its conservative 'old guard' leadership. What happened in 1924, however - with consequences that were all the more devastating for the NNC 'old guard' - was more in the nature of a palace revolt: certain members of the existing NNC leadership became radicalized and identified with the mood of militancy among the rank-and-file. Before looking into the consequences this wrought within the NNC, however, it is useful to explore what this 'revolt' suggests about the African petty bourgeoisie.

This development mirrors the way in which the petty bourgeois leadership of the Transvaal Native Congress radicalised during the period of worker militancy on the Rand between 1917 and 1920. Similarly, ICU leadership in the late 1920s was mainly composed of Africans who, in view of their social origins and educational background, could be described as unfulfilled members of the African petty bourgeoisie rather than 'organic leaders of the working class'. As both Philip Bonner and Helen Bradford have argued, the key to understanding the political instability and apparently poor 'class instinct' of the petty bourgeoisie is the recognition that "a cohesive middle class does not exist" and there is no clear "disjuncture between the masses and the lower middle classes". The petty bourgeoisie as a whole was primarily an aspirant class which was being prevented from achieving its social, economic and political objectives - objectives which, if achieved, might have stabilized its political stance. For all the educated or 'civilized' individuals
who successfully took up 'respectable' professional, clerical or skilled occupations there was a great substratum which hovered uneasily in the upper levels of the working class. It was this group, the unfulfilled, marginalised and petty bourgeois in little more than cultural and ideological terms, which was prone to identify downwards with the masses in particular phases of the economic, political and ideological class struggle. The petty bourgeois establishment, which was correspondingly more secure in its class position, was clearly represented in the NNC by Dube (educationalist, minister and journalist), Bhulose (businessman), Ndhlovu (lawyer's clerk), Chiefs Stephen Mini, Walter Khumalo and D. Sioka (all 'kholwa chiefs' - one of the anomalies of indirect rule in Natal) and, though he held no office in the NNC, Simelane (minister).

At the NNC annual general meeting in Estcourt in April 1924, the core of the NNC's hamba kahle leadership was not returned to office. Remarkably, John Dube himself was not re-elected to the executive, and neither were W. W. Ndhlovu or William Bhulose. "The better type of educated Native", the SAP report of the meeting recounted, felt that "the election of the present [new] office bearers was rushed through with the object of getting rid of Dube and other moderate minded officials." The new president was Josiah Gumede (previously secretary) who, in the space of a year, had risen to become "the most prominent speaker in Native meetings in Maritzburg...an extremist [whose] utterances disclose a bitter hatred towards the European". The SAP report further observed that "although he has attained a certain amount of popularity amongst the young Native hotheads, he carries very little weight with the older men". Gumede had been educated in Grahamstown and had taught in the Cape before coming to Natal at the turn of the century. Little is known of Gumede's life outside politics after his
arrival in Natal. Whether his rootlessness and restlessness was an inborn personality trait or a reflex of his inability to find a respectable petty bourgeois niche in Natal remains unclear.40

Another 'hot head' elected to the executive committee was Alexander (or 'Eric') Madune, a man who had not previously held a formal position of leadership but who had been noted for his fiery speeches alongside Gumede during the past year.41 The Natal police alleged that he had at some stage served a five-year prison sentence in the Cape. In his new capacity as assistant secretary to the NNC, Madune's report-back to the NNC in Pietermaritzburg took the following form: Dube had been "thrown out", Gumede was "now supreme" and hence "Natives must now get their money ready as the Government would now be attacked and told what the Natives wanted". He added that Africans should expect to incur imprisonment in the process. The audience was reportedly "very satisfied with the proceedings".42 The new character of the NNC was made equally clear in the course of Gumede's presidential address to a meeting in August 1924. Great emphasis lay on "our bounden duty to help the ICU to organise Native Labour in Natal and Zululand", and Gumede announced that formal cooperation with the ICU had already been established. However, he further announced that the NNC was to pay special attention to land alienation in Zululand (presumably referring to Northern Natal) and to assisting Inkatha.43 The other three members of the new NNC executive were, however, all "moderate men". All were kholwa chiefs. The new vice-president, Chief Stephen Mini, was chief of the Edenvale community and had been influential in the NNC for some time. Chief D. Sioka, of a Christian community near Pietermaritzburg, became secretary. Chief Walter Khumalo of Driefontein Township near Ladysmith, became treasurer.44
Nevertheless, the dominant clique was a militant one - which accorded with the mood of the working people in the Natal midlands. Especially significant was the displacement of the conservative old guard from leadership of the organisation which they had in practice regarded as their own.

The erstwhile slow-moving dignity or even complacency of petty bourgeois politics in Natal proper had been shattered by Gumede and Madune identifying with the spirit of militancy and drawing the rank-and-file into the NNC's body politic. One aspect of the clash between the old guard and the new radicals in the NNC was a battle for the 'royal patronage'. Apart from the more ethereal significance that petty bourgeois ideologues attached to the person of Solomon, his support was vital in a practical sense since it would serve to impart a broad legitimacy and thus a populist character to the political organisation with which he had identified. In this respect, Solomon held the key to African politics in Natal.

The first major meeting of Inkatha, and certainly the most thoroughly organised, was held at Mahashini in October 1924. Inkatha's executive committee was enlarged - and provided a political home for the two most prominent conservative petty bourgeois leaders who had been displaced from positions of leadership in the NNC. John Dube and William Bhulose were joint chairmen of the new Inkatha committee. Apart from Rev. Timothy Mathe (an associate of Simelane's evidently from the Vryheid district), the balance of the committee was made up of existing office holders: Simelane (secretary), Mnyaiza and Mankulumana. The success of the petty bourgeois conservatives in associating themselves with royalty through Inkatha was, however, something of
phyrric victory at this stage. Although Solomon was interested in Inkatha - after all he had allowed its meetings to take place at Mahashini - and various royal advisers were influential within the organisation (Franz and Gilbert were active during the 1924 meeting though they did not hold formal positions like Mnyaiza and Mankulumana), Solomon still refused to give it his open support.

An important factor in Solomon's hesitancy was the influence of his two closest white advisers or confidantes: Fynney and Oscroft. Both keenly supported the principle of a Zulu 'national gathering' and advocated that the government in some way adopt Inkatha as part of the administrative machinery of Zululand, but - and this was a crucial qualification - they were anxious that Inkatha should be a separate 'Zulu' organisation. Furthermore, they knew that the NAD would be unsympathetic to an organisation that was in practice an offshoot of the NNC. Through Fynney and Oscroft, Solomon was made well aware that his standing in the eyes of the NAD would be prejudiced if he openly associated himself with 'outside' politicians. Since Solomon's ultimate political objective - official recognition as king of the Zulu - in the last instance defined his political strategy as collaborative, this was persuasive advice indeed. Hence Mankulumana's motion (an ironic one) that since "this Congress [Inkatha] would be independent of any other such association in the Union...it should have the approval of the Government". Apart from these considerations, the apprehensions held by Solomon and the tribal elite themselves about committing themselves to an organisation dominated by non-tribal outsiders were exacerbated in 1924.

The coexistence of prominent tribal and conservative petty bourgeois leaders on the Inkatha executive committee, the "peaceful and decent character of proceedings", and the
instance in which a speaker who "tried to create a sensation concerning the Cattle and goat Dipping Levy...was called to order", all suggest that the elitist alliance had been consummated with some success. However, the proceedings provided a wealth of evidence that the alliance was extremely tenuous. The meeting had been called at the instigation of petty bourgeois leaders and with petty bourgeois interests in mind. It had been advertised in Dube's Ilanga lase Natal, and, further, notices had been personally circularized to "abafundisi" (teachers or educated people) in Natal. Zulu chiefs had simply not been called to the meeting; the only local Zulu present were those "who through coincidence merely, were at Mahashini", amongst whom was Chief Mthethwa of the Qulusi. The main body of those present comprised "delegates from Johannesburg, Newcastle, Umzimkulu and from all parts of Natal". Oscroft concluded that "the meeting was certainly not representative of Zululand or even Natal and Zululand". Chief Mthethwa, Mnyaiza and Mankulumana strongly censured Simelane for having been "most concerned for the attendance of outside natives"; and at the outset Mankulumana announced that any resolutions that the meeting might pass could not be regarded as those of the "Zulu Nation" since its chiefs were not present to represent it. Before the public meeting got underway, a private meeting took place between Solomon, his advisers and the Inkatha executive committee. Even here, the discussion dwelt on three petty bourgeois issues: first, "that Natives should be admitted to the Franchise" (never demanded by Zulu tribal chiefs); second, a project to erect a church at Mahashini wherein "the nation" could worship; and third, the local council provisions of the 1920 Act (apart from Mnyaiza, there is no record of any member of the Zulu tribal elite expressing interest in the 1920 Act). This was the
only meeting in which Solomon participated - he did not appear during the public meetings.

The franchise issue was not raised at the public meetings, but the church question preoccupied proceedings. It was purely a petty bourgeois motion, and reflects the importance attached to culture and ideology in petty bourgeois politics. It transpired that the project was to establish not an interdenominational place of worship, but an independent African church on the Ethiopianist model. Situated at Mahashini, it could not fail to be of an explicitly nationalist character. During the private meeting Solomon had agreed that a building be erected in which "various Christian bodies could all hold services", and he had requested that the building be called "Chaka Zulu's Church" in commemoration of the founder of the Zulu nation. The practical details were then delegated to a special sub-committee of five, all of whom were educated and - with the exception of Daniel Vilakazi - from Natal proper. Vilakazi was a Zulu of the Vryheid district who had once served Dinuzulu as a secretary, and who was now an induna of the Qulusi under Chief Mthethwa. Illustrating the more expansive ideological tenets of 'modern' (or petty bourgeois) African nationalism, the sub-committee reported that the building should be called the "African National Church" rather than the Shaka Zulu Church. As Oscroft remarked, "it was patently obvious that these people wished to establish a black church apart from any white control....Such a church would be religious only in name and would quickly become a political organization under the cloak of religion". The proposal met with strong opposition from local Zulu - Solomon (whose objections were made in private), Gilbert, Franz and Mnyaiza - and from Bhulose. The whole project was shelved as a consequence. A related project to erect a memorial and
public building on the site of Shaka's grave, however, was set underway. A separate fund was established for this purpose.61

Regarding the 1920 Act, the public meeting passed a resolution against its application to Zululand, and resolved that "the present means of government through Solomon should not be interfered with". In Oscroft's opinion, the church fiasco helped harden local feeling against the 1920 Act and national councils for it is felt that they will injure the name and power of the present heads of the Zulu race...certain natives from outside Zululand want to acquire gradually the leadership in all native matters.62

The resolution against the 1920 Act was remarkable in the light of petty bourgeois support for the council scheme; indeed, Simelane had at the outset intended Inkatha to be a local representative organisation that would seek state recognition under the 1920 Act. To understand why petty bourgeois leaders were prepared to retract on this issue and even support the resolution, two points must be borne in mind. First, the very reason why petty bourgeois leaders were at Mahashini was because they wished to ally themselves with the Zulu tribal elite, and some political compromises were essential. Furthermore, whereas educated leaders had previously shown disdain towards their tribal brethren, by the 1920s they had developed a respectful regard for the tribal 'aristocracy'. This attitude was most pronounced in relation to Solomon; the petty bourgeoisie did not wish to undercut the status of the 'aristocracy' at its very heart when it was so central to petty bourgeois ideology. Second, it is important to remember that the resolution was opposed to the application of the 1920 Act in Zululand.
In 1924, petty bourgeois leaders from Natal proper had swept into dominance in Inkatha and had swamped the different political priorities of the relatively small Zulu petty bourgeoisie - represented on the Inkatha executive committee by the lone figure of Simelane. The outsiders from Natal proper were less interested in social and political conditions in Zululand than in the transcendent significance of their alliance with Solomon; for them, the ideological issue was paramount in 1924. Oscroft perceptively remarked that Inkatha was part of a broader movement whose "real aim [was] the uniting of all the black races of the Union ....They are casting about for a rallying point - a central figure - and that would seem to be Solomon".63

The question of unity was also a prime consideration for tribal Inkatha personnel. However, the question was a Zulu one and not a Union-wide or pan-African one. During the meeting, Mankulumana rose to lament the divisions within "the Zulu house" which prevented the Zulu from being a true nation. It was thereafter resolved that "the two streams (Usuta sic! and Mandlakazi) must be made one".64 This resolution - which was the only resolution introduced to the meeting by a tribal leader - highlights another feature of the royal drive for national unity, a drive which distinguished it from its petty bourgeois counterpart. In the first instance, the divisions that preoccupied Solomon and his tribal advisers at this stage were vertical (dynastic or tribal enmities like those between Usuthu, Mandlakazi, Buthelezi and Ngenetsheni) rather than horizontal (or class) divisions.65

Closely related to this aim to revive Zulu national unity was the aim to resuscitate the institution of kingship as the socio-political centre of the Zulu nation. Integral
to this was the need to build up Solomon's monetary wealth to support his increasingly extravagant lifestyle and western tastes. In the cultural climate within which African leaders now operated, the latter were seen to be an essential support to the image of a king.

Whatever reservations Solomon and his tribal advisers had about Inkatha, they recognized the role that the organisation could play in securing their objectives. Inkatha's petty bourgeois leaders played on this to entice them more concretely into the Inkatha fold. Significantly, during the 1924 meeting, the purpose of Simelane's scheme for an agricultural cooperative was presented with a subtly different emphasis: the 'Umpini' fund was "for the purpose of buying implements and growing crops for the subsistence of Solomon, his children, and those who come to Mahashini". It was still to be an "agricultural undertaking to be run at a profit...while teaching improved agriculture", but it was now made clear that any "profits [were] to go to the benefit of Chief Solomon".

Solomon was indeed soon to be totally dependent on the revenue he received by way of Inkatha, and the 'confusion' that existed between Solomon's personal finances and those of Inkatha were to become a scandal in the late 1920s. During the 1924 meeting, Inkatha's funds were said to stand at £3000, banked at the National Bank at Vryheid (shortly afterwards they were estimated to be £5000); and there was "much discussion as to the ownership of the money and much division of opinion". It seems that this money was eventually invested directly in Solomon's name, and in practice Solomon treated Inkatha money as his own. Solomon's son, Thandayiphi, observed that there was "no difference between Solomon's personal money and Inkatha. That /sic/
At the time of the 1924 meeting, Solomon was already heavily in debt to the Denny Dalton liquor retailers in the Vryheid district and was 'embarrassed' on account of his investments in private land in Johannesburg through Seme.71 Directly after the 1924 meeting, Solomon bought a new car at Vryheid for £500 and hired a chauffeur to drive him.72

The 1924 meeting was the first meeting of 'Inkatha proper', as opposed to Simelane's 'one-man-show' that had existed previously. Despite the internal strife at the meeting — this was to characterize Inkatha throughout its existence — it had established something of a working relationship between the conservative petty bourgeoisie and the tribal elite, and it had gone some way in clarifying their inter-relationship and political objectives. The 1924 meeting had unquestionably established the conservative Natal petty bourgeoisie as the group most favoured by royalty and most able to manipulate the royal influence. It had also demonstrated that the tribal elite could not remain aloof from 'new generation' politics and its petty bourgeois leaders — the latter had much needed organisational skills and a political awareness which the exigencies of the twentieth century demanded. Moreover, Inkatha provided Solomon with a far greater source of support and a far more efficient means of collecting tribute than he could otherwise muster. The interdependence and cooperation (albeit uneasy) between conservative petty bourgeois leadership and tribal chiefs was hereafter consolidated, and the former made every effort to include the latter in the 'modern' political process. In October 1924, for the first time a tribal chief (as opposed to a kholwa chief) — and furthermore, one from Zululand — participated directly in the 'civilized' and democratic political world: Chief Mathole Buthelezi of the Mahlabatini
district attended the annual 'Native Conference' called at Pretoria under the 1920 Act. He was accompanied by John Dube and W. W. Ndlovu in the Natal delegation. 73

After its major meeting in 1924, the single area in which Inkatha took practical action was the scheme for an agricultural cooperative. Here too, it is significant that Mankulumana now took an active role. The agricultural fund, Umpini ka Zulu, was based in Johannesburg in accordance with financial good sense. Its chairman, Emmanuel Peter Mart Zulu, was a progressive man: he owned the property on which he lived and was a member of the 'Alexandria Township Ratepayers' Association', an organisation dedicated to the defence of private landholding rights and the maintenance of the township's 'respectable' character. 74 Umpini in fact presented itself not only as an agricultural fund but as the "Transvaal branch" of Inkatha, which represented "practically all of the Zulus on the Witwatersrand". 75 Evidently, however, its main support came from the local petty bourgeoisie and white collar workers, for it had virtually no support in the mining compounds. Interestingly, Umpini made special efforts to represent itself at the Native Conference to state its opposition to the establishment of local councils in Zululand, since these would "weaken the power of chiefs in Zululand". 76 Similar to the Natal-based petty bourgeoisie, it wished to preserve Zululand as a museum piece of Zulu tradition which all could revere. Mankulumana and Daniel Vilakazi came up from Zululand to assist in the collections Umpini made, and they took the money back to Inkatha headquarters at Mahashini. 77

Eleven months after the 1924 Inkatha meeting, the NAD blocked Inkatha's hopes for the agricultural scheme. Bhulose had requested that Inkatha be officially permitted to buy a farm in the Vryheid district, comprising 2444 acres, from
its present white owner for the sum of £5288. Contrary to the then current NAD information, Bhulose had stated that the profits from the scheme were to be returned to the public fund rather than Solomon personally. Whilst the CNC was not unsympathetic to the proposal, the SNA adamantly opposed it. Land should be purchased by "definite tribal bodies" rather than an "irresponsible general fund", he stated, and Inkatha should employ its funds "usefully or philanthropic purposes, such as an asylum for the crippled and the destitute". Ironically, an asylum for the destitute was soon to be much needed in the Vryheid district, and an agricultural cooperative might have been the most constructive form that it could take. But Inkatha's agricultural scheme was not designed to be of benefit to those who were destitute.

The only role which the rank-and-file had played in the formation of Inkatha was a negative one: it was through its militancy in Natal proper that the conservative petty bourgeois leaders had been displaced from the NNC. After the rumblings of 1920, Zululand had lapsed into a period of quiescence that was hardly ended by the few rumours of rebellion that circulated shortly after the 1924 Inkatha meeting. It was a measure of how uninformed the rank-and-file was that some chose to believe that the spate of Inkatha collections was to buy arms and ammunition from neighbouring Portuguese East Africa. Once more, messages were sent to relatives working in Johannesburg instructing them to return to Zululand because some kind of disturbance was imminent. One Paul B. M. Mdhluli of the Vryheid district, an authorised Inkatha collecting agent, publicized the notion that "Solomon is making this collection from the Black Nation of South Africa to fight for their country and rights which the white race is occupying..." He was believed to have a revolver
in his possession. Mdluli certainly knew he was mis-representing Inkatha's intentions; perhaps he was expressing his own hopes of what course Inkatha should take.

If, in the context of Inkatha, 1924 had been the golden year of the conservative petty bourgeoisie, 1925 was to prove to be the golden year of the tribal elite. In the period 1920 to 1925, Solomon's main sphere of activities lay quite separate from Inkatha. In June 1925, when Solomon and the Prince of Wales met in the course of a flamboyant royal extravaganza, Solomon's drive for Zulu unity and his own recognition as Zulu king reached a peak. The next section examines this royal and tribal side of the story.

Tribal politics: Solomon, 'royal culture', and Zulu unity

Until the late 1920s, Solomon's political activities did not make a significant break with the tribal mould, although in various spheres he had adapted tribal leadership to the twentieth century. His prime source of wealth lay not in cattle and tribute from Zululand's subsistence farmers, but in money collected from wage labourers on the gold mines. Part of his political duties now lay in representing miners' grievances. And he was closely associated with an educational project for the tribal elite. His main political objectives in this period, however, were to reunite the Zulu people as one nation as they had been in precolonial times, and to establish himself as Zulu king as his grandfather had been.

At the same time, however, Solomon was fashioning a royal 'culture' that was very different from that of his dynastic forebears of the precolonial period. Whilst his predecessors' world-views, religious beliefs and way of life in general - the food they ate, the clothing they wore, the type of dwellings
they lived in, the sort of furniture they used - were at one with those of Zulu society as a whole, those of Solomon set him apart from ordinary Zulu people. Although Solomon continued to play out his traditional cultural role with great care - and his role in ceremonies like the enrolment of *ibutho* continued to be central to his political status - his tastes and habits became increasingly of a middle class character after 1920. The influence of Solomon's petty bourgeois courtiers and advisers took hold primarily at the cultural level - the sphere in which individuals and groups define their perception and experience of both themselves and the world about them, and into which they project their aspirations.

Solomon's cultural eclecticism illustrates the struggle of a tribal leader to maintain a position of dominance during a period of accelerated socio-economic and political change. Tribalism and all that it encompassed - an agricultural and pastoral subsistence economy socially ordered by a redistributive rationale, a social ethos of reciprocal obligation and a political ideology that defined rulers as organic components of the society that they ruled but as inherently authoritative - was being assailed by social forces that tended to divide society into two groups. One one hand there were those who were 'improved', 'progressive', 'respectable' and 'civilized', and on the other hand there were those who were not. In this new order that was developing, it was clearly the 'black Englishmen' who were the new social and political elite - and they assuredly knew so themselves. 82 If Solomon was to be a twentieth century African leader he would in some way have to identify with this class. It must be emphasized, however, that Solomon's increasingly middle class tastes and habits were in the first instance the trappings of a modern African leader: Solomon was not becoming part of
Solomon remained a tribal leader but adapted the image and role of tribal leadership to the twentieth century — and he was not alone among Zulu tribal leaders in doing so. The following account of social and cultural adaptation among the elite of tribal Zululand is nonetheless not merely a mirror to their changing 'appearance': deeper changes were also taking place. After all, the trappings of middle class life were expensive and required considerable private monetary wealth to obtain and maintain. Whereas precolonial Zululand had always been socially stratified, it was characterized by consensus between chiefs and commoners. By the end of the 1920s, however, chiefs could no longer pretend to embody the unity of the people: they defined themselves against rank-and-file militants. Socially, culturally and politically the trend during the 1920s was for the tribal elite to distinguish themselves as a separate class, drawing their economic power from their control of land, their salaried public office, from their own and their wards' agricultural pursuits in Zululand, and monetary earnings in the urban areas. These contradictions and complexities form the context within which Solomon pursued his objectives. 83

There is little need to make out a case for Solomon's definitive role in the context of 'traditional' Zulu culture. It is significant that James Stuart called on Solomon to assist him in recording Zulu history and custom. One of the informants Solomon sent to Stuart in 1921 was Hoye kaSoxalase, Solomon's imbongi (the royal bard, or reciter of izibongo). 84 In many ways, the imbongi may be regarded as the prime custodian of Zulu tradition. Both the context in which Solomon's imbongi performed (such as ukubuthwa ceremonies) and the content of his performance (the outstanding qualities and
heroic deeds of successive Zulu leaders since Shaka) served to identify Solomon as inheritor, embodiment and guardian of Zulu history and custom. This, and the heroic form in which Solomon's own achievements were recited, presented Solomon as a living legend.\textsuperscript{85}

However plausibly Solomon played out his traditional role during ceremonial occasions, there is no doubt that he himself had discarded the belief system that had once informed the king's function in these contexts. The 1918-1920 influenza pandemic, which caused considerable loss of life in Zululand,\textsuperscript{86} provided the context in which the king would traditionally have played the role of high priest and 'medicine man', assembling the nation's izinyanga and presiding over ceremonies to appease the ancestral spirits.\textsuperscript{87} Indeed, forms of ancestor possession - amandiki or amandawe possession, reflecting psychopathological disorders - were rife in the reserves\textsuperscript{88} and called out for this type of remedial action. Solomon's response to the messages of widespread illness that arrived at Mahashini, however, was to act as a dispenser of European medicines which Mrs Fynney, the magistrate's wife, supplied him. Sometimes included with the medicinal supplies were "comforting delicacies" - packets of tea and sugar.\textsuperscript{89}

Such cultural incongruities were demonstrated in a wide variety of contexts. Though they were undoubtedly a reflex of the disparate pressures to which Solomon was subject, there is similarly no doubt that Solomon of his own accord 'pooled' the different belief systems and cultural practices and selected whatever was appropriate to the particular occasion. An example here is the way in which Solomon presented himself to Denys Reitz when the latter was touring Zululand shortly after his appointment as Minister for Crown Lands and
Irrigation. Whilst Solomon's retinue was clad in skins and ostrich feathers, Solomon appeared as a respectable gentleman, wearing a frock coat and top hat. Reitz found Solomon's clothing incongruous at the time, but more incongruous was a request made by Solomon whilst so clothed: he reopened the issue of unpaid lobolo for Cetshwayo's isigodlo women, and asked that the government assist him in recovering lobolo from the various men who had married them after Cetshwayo's death.²⁰

Solomon's marriages offer the most instructive example of his cultural eclecticism. Whereas Solomon's sexual tastes knew few boundaries - he was by all accounts an epic lover and at times a wanton lecher - his taste in women he wished to marry was quite specific: they should be Christian, 'sophisticated' and, if possible, 'educated'.²¹ They were primarily the products of a mission-station upbringing, for it was here that they learnt at close quarters all the habits so essential to the business of respectable living - the brewing of tea, the turning down of bedspreads and a tasteful abhorrence for the frivolity of young 'heathen' maidens.²²

Solomon's first wife (and the one he evidently held most dear, despite their subsequent separation) had been brought up in a kholwa family on a Norwegian mission station near Nhlazatshe in the Vryheid district. When Christina Sibiya was only eight years old, her father, Hezekiah Matatela Sibiya, had 'recanted' and taken two heathen wives with the result that he was rejected by both the mission and his Christian wife, Elizabeth. Perhaps reinforced by this trauma and her family's subsequent poverty, Elizabeth clung to Christianity and her 'superior ways' with a vigour that was remarkable even
within the mission community. At the age of ten, Christina left home and moved into the mission house to work as babysitter to Rev. and Mrs Eckenbren's new baby. Here her days were devoted to her domestic duties and attendance at school and church. She was also taught to sew, knit, crochet and embroider by Mrs Eckenbren. Whilst still a naive teenager, Christina left this cloistered environment for another: she took up a salaried post as primary teacher at a nearby outstation. Here she caught Solomon's attention.

Because Christina was so shy of both marriage and the Zulu king, Solomon courted her mainly through letters and gifts. The letters followed the prescriptions laid down by mission education, and the gifts included combs, an ornate brooch and a silk scarf. For permission to marry Christina, Solomon approached the "head of her kraal" - the African pastor at the outstation, then Rev. Eckenbren - and only in the last instance the Sibiya family. She thus left the mission world - and was immediately plunged into a night of beer-drinking and ribald celebration. In the cultural disorientation and trauma that followed, Solomon instructed Maphelu to be an "uncle" to Christina, to educate her in the "customs and laws of my house...and whatever those Christian women who have brought her up have forgotten to tell her".

Solomon was nonetheless determined that Christina should preserve her 'civilized' image. Yet the first shopping spree at Denny Dalton's store in Babanango to which he treated her proved that her new image was not to be the dull propriety of the mission station, but the sophistication of a social leaderene. She was bought a hat and coat, and selections of flamboyant striped material which Mrs Dalton made up into a dress. The marriage itself was a traditional ceremony at Christina's father's homestead, but it was subtly blended with
western influences. In the course of the ceremony, Solomon and Christina held hands after the European fashion (traditionally the bride and groom never touched during the ceremony, and opposite sexes did not hold hands), Solomon presented Elizabeth Sibiya with dress materials in consideration for the pain she suffered in bringing Christina into the world (this ingquthu transaction was traditionally a beast), and Solomon formally indicated to Hezekiah that he would honour his lobolo commitments (no mention was made of the form or value of the lobolo and in the event it was never paid). Thereafter followed a ceremonial dance at Zibindini during which Christina was formally introduced as a member of the royal household and, as tangible confirmation, was presented with a beast as her personal property (the umneke token).

As Solomon's first choice, Christina's appeal lay in the first instance in the refined qualities exhibited in herself and the social station she represented - though there is no doubt that Solomon became genuinely fond of her as a person. Her family's material poverty and inconsequential place in the network of tribal kinship linkages and structures of authority did nothing to recommend her. However, having followed his personal preferences in marrying Christina - and making a social statement in the process - Solomon then proceeded to enter into polygamous marriages in accordance with Zulu custom. This horrified Christina's sensibilities and was the major reason for her subsequent desertion. Solomon's undoubted lustiness does not explain the number of wives he amassed in his lifetime - variously estimated to be between thirty and seventy - for, as 'king', he was both entitled and encouraged to accommodate as many isigodlo women (concubines) as he was able. As much as Solomon himself used the institution of Zulu marriage to consummate important
socio-political linkages with various groups within his realm, he was subject to great pressure from below to accept the many daughters that were proferred to him. In the tribal context, a marital connection established between a subordinate and dominant kin group was, for the former, an important means of upward social mobility.

The women Solomon married after Christina shared two characteristics in their social origins. First, despite all the opportunities provided by his extensive travels and widespread veneration, Solomon only married Zulu women - as Magogo expressed it, "he didn't even want to hear of marrying a foreign girl". Solomon's concern throughout his life was with the Zulu, and he singlemindedly carried this through to his married life. Second, Solomon married primarily into what Mahaye calls the "hero families" of the Zulu. Speaking of Solomon's wives, Mahaye stated that Solomon "just loved them according to...their grandfathers, they were the heroes who defended Zululand...." Thus he married into the descent groups of preconquest ikizulu, izinduna ezinkulu and warriors of outstanding merit.

Since the internecine strife in Zululand in the post-conquest period had served to explode its pre-conquest unity, the arrangement of many of Solomon's marriages required great perseverance on his part. Yet the difficulties Solomon encountered provided the precise reasons why he persevered: through marriage, Solomon could dissolve old animosities and reconcile disaffected sections and lineage groups to the royal house. Thus he married three women from the Buthelezi, because of rather than despite the tension that had existed between the Usuthu and Buthelezi since 1888. One of these marriages was to Sokwenzeka, daughter of Mbulawa kaMnyamana Buthelezi. Apart from being Mnyamana's son, the latter had
OkaMbulawa (nee Sokwenzeka) was destined to become Solomon's highest ranking wife alongside okaMatatela (nee Christina): indeed, when okaMatatela's son, Cyprian, and okaMbulawa's son, Thandayiphi, reached their majority in the early 1940s, they were locked in a five year succession dispute that only a government Board of Inquiry was able to resolve. Magogo's account of okaMbulawa's marriage ceremony, given as evidence at the Board of Inquiry in 1945, testifies to its broader political significance: all members of the Zulu royal family from every royal homestead were summoned to be present, the amabutho were called up, and Solomon invited Fynney to attend as witness (Fynney gave the bride a present of two blankets) - all of which was unprecedented.

However, as Mahaye reveals, Solomon did not confine himself to marrying into the descendants of pre-conquest heroes. The turbulent years since conquest had thrown up a new set of individuals who had earned their places in Zulu history in less than heroic ways. Solomon married Malele, daughter of Sintwangu of the Cele, who had been one of Cetshwayo's lesser izinduna. However, the reason Solomon married into this lineage group was because Mayatana Cele, Sintwangu's brother, was popularly believed to be the man who murdered the magistrate of Mahlabatini during the 1906 rebellion. This deed was barely heroic in the traditional Zulu sense (the open battle field, like Ndondakasuka or Isandlwana were the venues for heroism), but it was nonetheless "the fact that made Solomon marry the daughter of Sintwangu". Although incongruous at first sight, Solomon also married into the descent groups of those who had made their marks as traitors to the royal cause. Before 1920, Solomon and the Usuthu had reserved a particular animosity to Zulu commoners who had collaborated with the colonial powers. After 1920,
however, Solomon embarked on a thoroughgoing drive for Zulu unity and attempted to reconcile even traitors to the royal cause - however unpleasant a task this may have been on a personal level. Thus he married the daughter of Shibilika, who had earned infamy as a spy who assisted colonial forces in hunting down Dinuzulu after the civil disturbances of 1888.  

Solomon also used marriage as a political device by arranging his sisters' marriages. In accordance with Zulu custom, when Solomon succeeded Dinuzulu he simultaneously inherited the responsibility of acting as 'father' to his sisters with the power to 'advise' them in their choice of husband. Magogo describes a meeting, held in approximately 1920, to which Solomon summoned all his sisters. Nearly twenty princesses attended (Magogo was one) and, faced with Solomon and his izinduna, each was required to announce the names of their "sweethearts". As each sister did so, the merits of their choices were discussed by Solomon and the izinduna, and almost without fail their affections were the objects of public hilarity and ridicule. "Whose daughter would marry such a thing?", various princesses were asked. Beneath the teasings lay a very serious purpose. Solomon proceeded to instruct his sisters to put on 'top knots' (headdress signifying eligibility for marriage). With the exception of three, all refused. In effect they were refusing to empower Solomon to assign them to a man of his choice. Ultimately, this was not much more than a delaying tactic because, short of absconding, they had to get Solomon's approval for their 'choices'. Apart from the socio-political gains he could make, Solomon also stood to gain the hundred head of cattle (or equivalent) which princesses could command as lobolo - and he would only do so if the princesses married men of wealth and rank. He thus had good cause to defend his
prerogative, and he refused to accept the regrets that were tendered to him for 'disobedience'. The remaining three "trembled...not knowing whether when we had put up our top knots we would be given men with headrings, going grey".  

Magogo agreed to put on a top knot even though she had already developed an affection for a son of Mankulumana Ndwandwe - a choice that would have been highly acceptable to the patriarchs were it not for their political priorities. Magogo was thereafter assigned to Mathole, chief of the Buthelezi. This was the most celebrated marriage arrangement Solomon made, and was responsible, more than any other single event, for the reconciliation between the Usuthu and Buthelezi.  

Magogo was Solomon's eldest and highest ranked unmarried sister (she was the only daughter of Dinuzulu's great wife, and hence Solomon's only full sister). Moreover, she was highly attractive. Although, as Magogo relates, "I was taken away from my fiance by Solomon by his own hands", Solomon left it to his Buthelezi wife, okaMbulawa, to persuade Magogo to marry Mathole: "My mother [ie. okaMbulawa] asked me if I loved Mathole, and I said 'Yes, since it is your desire'". She also observed that she would have loved Mathole in any case. Thereafter Solomon announced

Today I am enhancing the prestige of the Buthelezis and establishing a blood relationship between the two tribes, for never since the advent of their ancestor Ngengelele [sic - referring to the appointment of Ngegenelele, Mnyamana's father, as counsellor to Shaka]...has there been any fusion of our blood with that of the Buthelezis: I have merely appointed indunas for them. This is the first time a Royal girl has been given as a bride to them.

That the whole Buthelezi chiefdom rather than Mathole personally supplied the hundred head of cattle required as lobolo for Magogo is testimony to the wider significance of the marriage. As a special gesture, Mathole added another eighteen
head of cattle to this hundred, plus £40 in cash. For Solomon, the immediate benefit of the marriage was that, by selling the lobolo cattle, he was able to buy his first motor car. But the reconciliation between Usuthu and Buthelezi was of far greater and more lasting value.

There were two other marriages of note. Whilst the marriage between Phikisile Harriette and Pixley Seme was not a 'blind' assignation (they had met and worked together in 1913) arranged by Solomon, Solomon gave the marriage his fullest support. Indeed, during the 1920s the family connection with Seme was of great value to Solomon as a source of independent advice (Seme never got involved in Inkatha) and a frequent source of legal assistance. And as much as Seme benefited by his association with the Zulu royal family, the Zulu royal family's image among the petty bourgeois elite benefited by its association with such a luminary as Seme. Second, Solomon's sister, Kessie Impiyamaxhegu, was married to Prince Dlamini of the Swazi royal family. This was the only instance in which a member of the Zulu royal family was married to a 'foreigner' during Solomon's time. There is little doubt that Seme had persuaded Solomon of the importance of this marriage. Throughout the 1920s, Seme acted as adviser and legal officer to the Swazi royal family, and there seemed to be no contact between the two dynasties but through the indirect medium of Seme. Moreover, while Solomon's political ambitions lay squarely within the Zulu, it was the ideologues of the petty bourgeoisie (of whom Seme was a leading exponent) who were anxious to promote the notion of a pan-African aristocratic 'super culture'. This was an integral part of the Garvey-inspired search for roots.

Overall, Solomon's 'marriage policy' sought to extract advantage
in two social contexts. First, in the tribal context Solomon employed the Zulu institution of polygamy and his patriarchal powers over his sisters as a central part of his 'reconciliation' and 'reunification' strategy. Second, as a twentieth century Zulu king, Solomon aspired to establish a royal image that would not be outshone by the effete ways of the new African elite, and so he attempted to ensure that the marriages he arranged also served to 'keep up with the Dubes' and their perceptions of social propriety. Solomon's marriage policy had a single aim - the achievement of Zulu unity and the preservation of his royal status - and the incongruities that these entailed are a measure of the complexity of his task. Solomon had married Christina knowing that the core of her 'civilized' attractiveness lay in a set of religious beliefs which abhorred polygamy. Not only did Solomon establish himself as a polygamist, but he insisted that each woman he married become a 'Christian' when they took up residence at one of his homesteads.

The term 'Christian' here raises problems. In Zulu, the term *kholwa* has two interrelated meanings. On the one hand, it refers to a person who believes in Christ and the teachings of the Bible, and on the other it is used to refer to people who wear European clothing. Importantly, the opposite of *kholwa* - in both of the above senses - is *bhincayo* which describes a person who wears traditional clothing. For Solomon, the term *kholwa* was primarily interpreted in a cultural rather than a religious sense. Indeed, the Christian veneer which he prescribed for his wives was designed for a cultural purpose. The incongruities were never far from the surface, for not only did Solomon require all his wives to dress after the European fashion but he also encouraged their attendance at church. In its role as earthly
outstation for the great finishing school in the sky, the church gave instruction in 'decorum'. It also dispensed the fundamentals of Christian belief within which lay an injunction against polygamy. Solomon was not permitted to receive Holy Communion because he was a polygamist, but his wives could do so because each had only one husband. Despite all the incongruities, through his problematical relationship with the church Solomon succeeded in forging for the Zulu royal family an image of western respectability even in the midst of a social practice that was its antithesis. The gains he extracted in the tribal context through the practice of polygamy were thus not incompatible with gains in the 'civilized' context.

These observations on Solomon's marriage policy indicate that Solomon was forging a particularly 'royal' cultural hybrid that drew from the cultural worlds of both Zulu traditionalism and the mission station. During the 1920s, there was a trend among the Zulu royal family and other members of Zululand's aristocratic establishment to associate themselves increasingly with the very font of African 'civilized' counter-culture: the church and education. In 1922, Solomon had given the CPSA a site for a church in a part of his ward within three miles of the ZNTI. In the same year Solomon gave a site for a church and a priest's house at Mahashini itself, and a catechist named Mbuko Mhlongo took up residence there to assist Oscroft in his part-time pastoral duties among royalty and the Usuthu. Mhlongo was ordained at Nongoma in 1924 and thereafter took over full responsibility for the Mahashini congregation. In 1929, Solomon gave the CPSA another site for a church and African school in a part of his ward that abutted Nongoma - which by then was no longer merely an administrative centre but a thriving trading centre and European enclave employing
employing its own 'urbanised' labour force. When the Bishop of Zululand blessed the site, he was accompanied by a representative from Solomon, dressed in skins and with a tall feather standing from his headring, in both the service and the procession around the site.

These developments were not peculiar to Solomon. As the secular civilisedness associated with Christianity came to be the mark of social excellence and political leadership, chiefs in various parts of Zululand scrambled to consolidate their positions by associating themselves with the church. In 1922, the CPSA established four "preaching places" among the Mandlakazi, long the most implacable opponents of missionary endeavour in north-western Zululand. Some of these developed into regular outstations with their own catechists in charge, and by 1926 Oscroft had built a wattle and daub church at Bangonomo itself - the principal homestead of the Mandlakazi, corresponding to Mahashini of the Usuthu. In 1929, the Bishop blessed a substantial church at Emsebe (stone construction, with a capacity for 500 people) built on a site given by Chief Bokwe of the Mandlakazi - after which there was a huge feast given by Bokwe and his izinduna. Further, in the mid 1920s a new outstation at Emngeni - towards the south of the Nongoma district where it served Usuthu and Buthelezi communicants - was graced with a properly constructed church, and Rev. Cuthbert Buthelezi took up duties there. Chief Silimane kaMkungo, a grandson of Mpande whose ward lay to the east of Eshowe, approached the CPSA in 1923 to build a church at his principal homestead. After it was built, Silimane was not permitted to take Holy Communion in it - but his wives could. In 1925 Silimane requested the CPSA to conduct a special service at 'his' church for the benefit of the souls of those who had died at the battle of Ndondakasuka in 1856 (at which Cetshwayo
defeated his rival brother, Mbulazi, and so secured the succession to Mpande). Especially in the north-western regions of Zululand, the mission work of the CPSA during the 1920s rode on an unprecedented wave of success, with many new centres of worship being opened "at the request of the people". Whilst the CPSA ascribed the developments variously to the will of God, a spontaneous Zulu rush towards 'the light', or, more plausibly, the influence of the ZNTI on the tribal elite, the causes are primarily to be located in the changing cultural climate within which tribal leaders found themselves.

There are three other manifestations of Solomon's 'royal culture' which deserve especial mention: motor cars, liquor, and houses. Collectively, these were the prime causes of the private and public maladies that beset Solomon's later life. They did much to establish a 'fitting' image for a twentieth century Zulu king, but Solomon seemed powerless to curb his extravagance. By 1925 Solomon already had two cars - and his preference was for the largest, fastest and arguably the most prestigious available to him: Buick 'Straight Eights' and Chrysler 'Imperials'. His Buick was soon seized by Charles Adams, an Eshowe storekeeper, on account of debt.

His tastes in liquor were considerably more catholic: whisky, brandy, beer and wine in order of preference. As early as 1918, Solomon was seen to be drunk in the company of Albert Zulu. In 1920 he was involved in two affrays whilst under the influence of alcohol - one at a wedding in Zululand and one at a store in Johannesburg where he was "badly assaulted" and fined £5. The CID responded by employing an agent in Zululand to unearth the source from which Solomon bought his liquor. Other members of the Zulu royal family and
tribal elite were also great drinkers - very notably so in the case of the young Chief Bokwe. Their consumption of liquor should not be taken at face value. In the first place, as the 'respectable' anodyne of the white man's leisure time, it had social implications. In the second place, by the 1920s liquor had come to be regarded as the 'drink of kings' and, perhaps heightened by its illegality, a very high ranking form of royal or chiefly tribute. Magogo refers to cases of liquor being brought to Solomon. Perhaps most revealingly, Rev. Oscroft's son, Basil Oscroft, recalls how Solomon used to demarcate the flower beds alongside his magnificent new house at Mahashini with row upon row of empty bottles of 'hard tack' buried head down. This display of bottles and the flower beds themselves formed a twin cultural statement.

When Solomon moved into Mahashini it was no more than a collection of dilapidated and largely uninhabited beehive huts. His initial renovations included building a few rectangular wattle and daub kholwa houses set slightly apart from Mahashini, which were called KwaDlamahlahla. Soon after 1920 he set about having an imposing stone house constructed, modelled on the prevalent colonial style but outstripping it in grandeur; this became the new KwaDlamahlahla. Significantly, at the same time as Solomon was constructing his respectable home at Mahashini, he was also in the process of building a five-roomed brick house in Sophiatown township, Johannesburg, on a stand which he had bought on freehold tenure through Seme. (Soon after this house was completed, however, Solomon sold it through Seme to King Sobhuza II of Swaziland - who had already bought 5 other stands there through Seme.)

In the construction of KwaDlamahlahla Solomon drew on the
experience that Oscroft had had in the construction of
the ZNTI. Oscroft not only assisted in designing the house
but acted as Solomon's agent in supervising Mr Grassi,
the Italian builder hired by Solomon. In accordance with
colonial style, the house was basically a square bungalow,
encompassed by a deep verandah and surmounted by dummy
turrets (above the bay windows) with turned woodwork.
Set on a slight slope on the crest of Nongoma range, the
front of the house is raised about five feet from the ground
and access is gained by broad flights of stairs that fan
out from the verandah. The decorated brickwork on the house
itself (indigenous sandstone is juxtaposed with 'imported'
bluestone) and the large classical urns that stand atop
the pillars beside each flight of stairs - probably reflecting
Mr Grassi's interpretation of the colonial style - lend
distinction to KwaDlamahlahla. For all its European-style
ambience, however, it was - and still is - set not in a
landscaped garden but amidst veld grass and bare earth.
Also in the grounds, moreover, is a 'monument' to the fusion
of European and Zulu material culture: from a distance this
seems to be a traditional Zulu beehive hut (domed structure
of saplings and grass) but in fact it is made of concrete,
has a square door and glass windows, and a fitted fireplace
at the rear, complete with chimney. On the roof is a
concrete ornament which, the present caretaker suggested to
me, represented a traditional beer gourd. The 'hut' was
evidently built to be habitable, and, though the caretaker
could offer no explanation of its purpose, it is interesting
that a white journalist who visited in 1946 made the
following (arrogantly phrased) report:

...when Solomon grew tired of the European
corners and angles and the many windows that
are obnoxious to the primitive soul [Referring
to the main house] he too had his rondavel. This
was a peculiar structure of cement with a domed
roof close to those of his wives.
Mahashini thus represented in itself the unique distillation of the cultural forms that Solomon had so carefully aimed to balance. The 'blend' proceeded from the traditional beehive huts of the original Mahashini and the royal cattle kraal in which traditional ceremonies were performed, through the wattle and daub kholwa houses with the royal wagons and stables nearby, through Rev. Mhlongo's rectory and the small church and school in which the royal children received their primary education, and finally to the imposing house, KwaDlamhlahla, with the Buicks in the forecourt. There was at least something here with which every Zulu could identify. As much as it was a fitting meeting place for the organisation that aimed or claimed to represent them all - Inkatha - it was the perfect base for Solomon's drive for national unity.

This drive, the overriding concern of the Zulu royal house, was tackled in a variety of ways. The little CPSA outstation at Mahashini where all Solomon's tribal wives and children were baptised (mainly by Oscroft, on his frequent visits to Mahashini 150) soon developed into an elitist educational centre for the very young. Magogo was the first to gather the children at Mahashini to teach them the alphabet and the singing of hymns. Rev. Mhlongo then took up duties as primary teacher - holding his lessons on the verandah of KwaDlamhlahla before the school building was completed. This school did not, however, only teach the royal children born to Solomon's wives who lived at Mahashini; royal children from royal homesteads all over Zululand, together with children of other 'great men of the nation', came to Mahashini to live and to be taught for extended periods of time. 151 An important example was Gatsha Buthelezi, son of Chief Mathole Buthelezi and Magogo, and present Chief Minister of the KwaZulu Government. After his birth at Ceza mission hospital in the late 1920s, the young Gatsha was
"immediately rushed" to KwaDlamahlahla "as was the custom in those days" where he was to live and complete his primary education.\textsuperscript{152} He only came to live at KwaPhindangene (literally 'return again', the name of the principal homestead of the Buthelezi) when he was a "strapping young boy".\textsuperscript{153}

The value of the ZNTI as a centralising device was, however, of far greater importance than the royal 'kindergarten'. Since its inception, the ZNTI had been popularly regarded as 'Solomon's school'. This had considerable justification because Solomon had thrown his full support behind the venture, as General Botha had pleaded for him to do in 1917. Solomon had been personally responsible for sending six of his younger brothers there - which constituted about a third of the ZNTI's whole enrolment in the early years of its existence.\textsuperscript{154} Solomon attended the end of term concerts and prizegiving ceremonies, usually making a speech himself and presenting the prizes. Incidentally, the links Solomon forged through the ZNTI were not confined to the Zulu: the prizes that Solomon presented in 1922 were donated by C. G. Smith, the Natal sugar baron;\textsuperscript{155} and the visit of the Prime Minister, General Smuts, and two Natal MPs, Marwick and Nicholls, to the school earlier in the same year had a part in establishing contacts that were to be vital later in the 1920s.\textsuperscript{156} The Zulu royal family's priorities, however, were revealed by the comments of Ndesheni: "the whole [Zulu] country", he stated, came to the ZNTI since they "needed to learn the protocol of the royal household".\textsuperscript{157}

The ZNTI was in fact the means by which Solomon accomplished the most difficult and important tribal reconciliation of his chieftainship: the Usuthu/Mandlakazi dispute. Since the Mandlakazi leaders were a collateral branch of the Zulu royal family, Solomon could not use intermarriage as a part
of his reconciliation strategy. Besides this difficulty, the dispute had had no hope of ending while the fiery Mciteki was Mandlakazi regent. Even shortly after Bokwe assumed the chieftaincy in January 1922, a major conflagration nearly erupted between the Usuthu and Mandlakazi during a wedding ceremony in the Nongoma district. The police estimated that fifteen hundred combatants would have been involved had officials not intervened. Evidently Mnyaiza (who had led the four hundred strong and fully armed Usuthu party) had been the aggressor, and Solomon responded by conducting a Usuthu tribal inquiry into the incident in which he personally reprimanded Mnyaiza. The incident caused such a stir in NAD and police circles that arrangements were made to increase the size of the Nongoma police force.

At the beginning of 1924, however, Bokwe enrolled at the ZNTI as a student and remained there for three years. Oscroft initially saw Bokwe as one who showed "promise and enthusiasm", but, in Oscroft's view, Bokwe regressed to "an indifferent pupil". Oscroft was, however, pleased to note that the school was vindicated in the improved agricultural practices Bokwe had introduced at Bangonomo. For Solomon, it was far more of an achievement that the chief of the Mandlakazi was attending a school which was spoken of as 'Solomon's school'; it reflected the success of Solomon's persistent diplomatic approaches. The friendship cemented by Solomon and Bokwe while the latter was at the ZNTI permanently doused any possibility of a resurgence of the forty-year-old family feud. The Zulu held this to be the most memorable achievement of Solomon's lifetime. With the major reconciliations between Usuthu, Mandlakazi and Buthelezi achieved, the stage was set for the display of unity at the indaba with the Prince of Wales in 1925.

The other major tribal reconciliation that had faced Solomon
at the time of his succession was that between the Usuthu and the Ngenetsheni - led by Hamu's son, Chief Kambi. However, the gradual disintegration of the Ngenetsheni as a social group meant that Solomon's diplomatic manoeuvres with Kambi were ultimately of less importance than those with Mathole and Bokwe. Solomon's policy towards Kambi and the Ngenetsheni was one of consistent goodwill, and it was a somewhat ironic measure of its success that Solomon's death in 1933 occurred whilst he was at Kambi's homestead attempting to resolve a dispute between two of Kambi's sons.162

The reasons for the disintegration of the Ngenetsheni were twofold. First and foremost, in 1884 the lands upon which the Ngenetsheni lived had summarily become Boer land, depriving the Ngenetsheni leadership of the prime material foundation of their power. Each individual Ngenetsheni homestead head was thereafter required to make his own tenancy agreements with his white landlord. Moreover, here they were subject to the near autocratic powers of their landlords who, particularly after the 1913 Act and during the late 1920s, tended to evict 'surplus' tenants and impose more stringent labour tenancy requirements on those who remained.163 Geographical and socio-economic dislocation corroded Ngenetsheni unity. In the second place, Chief Kambi showed no inclination to perpetuate the family feud initiated by his father. This was no doubt related to his ebbing authority over a disintegrating Ngenetsheni - a process which the NAD's purchase of a 'government farm' in the Ngotshe district for his personal use had done little to arrest.164 But it was also a reflex of Kambi's peaceable - or thoroughly benign - disposition, his advanced age, and deteriorating health.165 Thus Kambi's conspicuous absence from the display of Zulu unity at the meeting with the Prince of Wales was not because he did not wish to attend, but because he was so "old and bedridden" that he could not make the journey to Eshowe. The magistrate of Ngotshe took charge of the bedraggled Ngenetsheni delegation to the indaba.166
The indaba with the Prince of Wales, 1925

The news that Edward, Prince of Wales and heir-apparent, was to visit Zululand had thrown English-speaking Zululanders into a frenzy of excitement. A public fund was floated to cover the cost of decorations, triumphal arches, and the celebrations themselves. Arrangements were made to present a farm to HRH (a plan abandoned because of the Hertzog Government's opposition), a new bridge was built across the Tugela, and a dance hall was especially erected at Eshowe for the Grand Royal Ball. Whilst the reaction of the settler community is understandable, the reasons why the Zulu felt the visit to be so evocative are less obvious and require some preliminary explanation.

If anything, the Act of Union which had vested South Africa's white settlers with sovereign power over South Africa had heightened the wistful and emotional attachment that Africans in Natal and Zululand (both petty bourgeois and tribal) had for the 'imperial connection'. Among educated Africans there had arisen a belief in the colour-blindness of Queen Victoria's rule, founded on the Natal 'exemption clause' and African land purchase rights prior to the 1913 Act. The drift of legislation since Union tended to dash any previous hopes that 'civilization' was to be a more persuasive social criterion than skin colour - thus the calls for a return to the 'good old days of Queen Victoria'. In the post-Union period, educated leaders drew heavily on liberal democratic ideology in arguing that Africans too were 'His Majesty's subjects' and hence that discriminatory legislation was unethical. The faith in the imperial connection was reflected in the series of deputations that were arranged to go to England to complain about the 1913 Act. As Brian Willan has argued, the mainspring of the attachment was not only on account of the foreseen
advantages of direct political control from London; it was also an expression of the socio-cultural values and beliefs that the petty bourgeoisie had imbibed, all of which came to be associated with the symbol of Queen Victoria. 171

Though incongruous at first sight, even in tribal Zululand a romanticized memory of 'the Great White Queen across the seas' had remained equally strong. It was a matter of importance that, after 1879, she had left the Zulu in possession of their land even if not their king. It was the Boers who had taken the prime Zulu lands in the north-west as their 'New Republic', and it was the colonial settlers who, in 1905, were seen to parcel out the remainder of Zululand into Zulu reserves and areas for white occupation. In the disastrous two decades of civil strife following the Anglo-Zulu war, it was not only the imperial government's Zulu collaborators (primarily Zibhebhu and Hamu) who felt an attachment to British rule; for their part, the royalists also came to draw a distinction between the representatives of the 'mother country' and of colonial Natal. 172 When Union was declared, with Dinuzulu in prison and with memories of the ruthless way in which the Natal Government had suppressed the 1906 rebellion, the Zulu had displayed a very marked indifference to the death of the Natal Government and the transfer of power to the new Union Government. The death of King Edward VII in the same year, however, occasioned a "spontaneous outburst of sorrow amongst the Natives of Natal and Zululand". Expressions of condolences poured into the magistrates' offices throughout the countryside and some "expressed their sympathy in a practical way" by collecting money for the bereaved House of Saxe-Coburg. 173 Where hostility was directed to white rule, it was directed to white settlers who encroached on Zulu lands or offered unattractive terms of employment, or to Natal or South African state officials who were seen to implement
policy. The British royal family was not directly implicated in the black experience of white rule in South Africa and it had an immunity from black protest arising from it. Moreover, the British royal family appealed to the monarchical sentiments so ingrained in the tribal worldview - at the heart of which was the notion that political legitimacy was in the first instance imputed by birth. For all the liberal-democratic ideology - and soon, Marxist ideology of organised labour - to which sections of the Zulu were so receptive, the weight of their own political traditions were not lightly shed. If Solomon naturally stood at the apex of the Zulu social and political order in the imaginations of the vast majority of the Zulu, the Zulu also had a more detached and ethereal monarchy in the British royal family. Zulu attachment to the latter was very evident in Solomon himself. Indeed, Solomon hung portraits of British royalty on the walls of KwaDlamahlahla.

The sixty thousand Zulu who amassed on the Eshowe golf links to meet the Prince formed the first mass assembly of the Zulu since their conquest in 1879. Groups had come from as far afield as the Ubombo and Ingwavuma districts and the borders of Portuguese East Africa to be present. They met as a Zulu nation, not as a collection of colonised lackeys or discrete tribal chiefdoms. Most had marched to Eshowe dressed in odd scraps of European clothing, but on arrival they stripped and turned out in traditional ceremonial dress - loin skins, three dancing sticks each, oval hide shields and plumed head-dress. Furthermore, they camped in the open and slept on their shields, as was the custom in pre-conquest times on occasions requiring a national assembly. In a remarkable expression of their mutual reconciliation, Solomon and Bokwe had together led the Usuthu and Mandlakazi concourses from Nongoma to Eshowe. On arrival, Solomon received massed royal salutes from those
already encamped, and then pitched his own camp - three tents on a promontory above the Umlalazi river, overlooking the whole assembly. Thereafter, he assembled all the Zulu tribal leaders present and (once more with Bokwe beside him) led a "picturesque cavalcade of Chiefs and Zulu notables four abreast" through the streets of Eshowe to confer with NAD officials. 177

This was the first in a series of coups for Solomon. Those assembled quite clearly saw Solomon as their leader and Solomon had made a great effort to ensure that they did so. In accordance with his royal duties, Solomon had made a substantial personal contribution to the fund to cater for the Zulu mass that assembled to meet the Prince. 178 At a meeting of all chiefs held on the day before the indaba, Solomon and Mankulumana were unanimously selected as the representatives who were to address the Prince, and Solomon was to lead the nation in the royal salutes. The CNC, too, had placed a special responsibility on Solomon to control the whole Zulu assembly. 179 But more important, the indaba showed that the Prince himself had no doubt about Solomon's superordinate status.

The proceedings of 6 June 1925 were divided into two parts: first, the formal exchange of greetings and gifts between the Prince and the Zulu during the morning, and, second, a less formal display of Zulu dance and song during the afternoon. In the morning ceremony, Solomon and his royal entourage was seated before the crescent-shaped Zulu assembly and directly facing the Prince's dais. Solomon's arrival was greeted with a roar of 'bayede' from the Zulu concourse - a demonstration which some white observers believed Solomon had deliberately engineered as a public affirmation of his royal status and as an insult to the Prince. 180 Solomon wore
a uniform of British military cut which he had had tailored especially for the occasion. It was of black cloth and faced with leopard skin - the symbol of Zulu royalty - and on his epaulettes and his white sun helmet were brass insignia bearing the elephant emblem of Zululand. Ceremonial sticks and white gloves completed his outfit. So attired, Solomon clearly stood out among the other Zulu dignitaries: Zulu teachers and ministers wore nondescript morning suits and other tribal chiefs presented themselves in various idiosyncratic combinations of traditional and European clothing. Mankulumana was the only other Zulu who was conspicuous - though in a very different way, naked as he was but for a loin skin and a necklace of leopard claws. Solomon's only real rival was the Prince himself. The Prince also wore a military uniform with a white sun helmet. In keeping with the pomp of the occasion he was "laden" with decorations, and his scarlet tunic was traversed by the blue sash of the Garter. When the Prince arrived to ascend the dais, Solomon led the royal salute 'bayede' by raising his helmet three times - and it was unclear to which royal figure the salute was given.

In his address, Solomon did not restrict himself to the customary expressions of devotion and great joy, but made a direct political appeal from 'king' to 'king': the Zulu were a nation, he proclaimed, and should have the opportunity to take a part in framing the laws that applied to them. Solomon's speech was ultimately of less significance than the four separate occasions during the course of the day on which he spoke to the Prince on a one to one basis. Only the first of these was officially scheduled; the rest represent a unique achievement on Solomon's part, for he alone in Zululand was singled out for such repeated royal favours.

After the speeches, the Prince made presentations to ten high-
ranking Zulu chiefs. Nine were presented with silver-mounted ceremonial sticks, but to Solomon he gave a gold-mounted ceremonial stick.184 Having received the presentation, Solomon alone delayed to make a personal statement of loyalty to the crown - to which he pointedly added that the Prince should "take that not only from himself but from the whole Zulu nation".185 Solomon thereafter made his own presentation of two elephant tusks to the Prince, again on behalf of the Zulu as a whole. Months before the indaba, Solomon had personally equipped an expedition to East Africa to shoot an elephant bull with tusks of suitable proportions.186

At the close of the morning's proceedings, Solomon made a special request for a private interview with the Prince. This took place on the royal train at Eshowe station, and Solomon was accompanied by Mnyaiza, Dube and two other "native ministers".187 No account appears to survive of what transpired there, but that Solomon made further presentations: an extravagant gold album of pressed flowers, and a personal letter expressing devotion to the British crown.188 However, the very privacy of the meeting gave rise to a rumour Solomon took care not to quash: before the Zulu dispersed from the indaba it was 'common knowledge' that the Prince had appointed Solomon as Zulu king.189

When Solomon returned to the indaba grounds he progressed around the perimeter of the assembly, being acclaimed as he did so, before resuming his seat before the dais. In the course of the afternoon's dances, the Prince summoned Solomon with a request for some shields and assegais as souvenirs. In presenting them, Solomon delayed once more to chat with the Prince. This third meeting was openly observed by the whole multitude, and was evidently taken as a cue for the
climax of the dancing. The performing amabutho raised their sticks aloft and charged the royal dais, causing panic in some officials. At this point Solomon distinguished himself by taking control of the dancers, driving them back and reforming them into their amabutho. 190

Solomon then approached the Prince for a fourth consultation - this time requesting permission for his two thousand horsemen to absent themselves for refreshment. The Prince readily acceded, and thanked Solomon for the magnificent display. He then left, having undoubtedly been impressed by the emotional power of the indaba, and by Solomon himself.

However politically innocent the Prince's intentions were, he left behind him a Zulu throng charged with monarchical and nationalist euphoria. Solomon had expertly transformed the indaba into a combined zulu and British royal showpiece - all the while maintaining a fastidious deference to the Prince.191 He now seized upon this moment to consolidate his achievements: Solomon called the whole Zulu gathering together on his own account and enrolled a new ibutho. The full ukubuthwa ceremony could not be performed since the location and time available prevented it. But balanced against these deficiencies was the unprecedented size of the Zulu assembly, the new unity Solomon had achieved since the ukubuthwa of 1918, and the emotional atmosphere that the inter-royal indaba had generated. The new ibutho was named 'Phondowenhlovu' ('the tusks of the elephant') in commemoration of the 'Zulu nation's gift' to the Prince - an appropriate symbolic climax to the whole event.192

Solomon's high profile during the indaba not only intensified national attachment to him but effectively broadened the geographic and demographic base of his support. Beforehand,
there had been Zulu enclaves distant from the royal epicentre in north-western Zululand and Northern Natal which, while occasionally expressing loyalty to Solomon, had never seen Solomon nor in practice looked to Mahashini as the font of Zulu political authority. Of great importance was the rumour - which, in practice, was 'accepted fact' - that the Prince of Wales had appointed Solomon as Zulu king. It was understood that the appointment had deliberately not been made public at the indaba because of the presence of South African Government officials. It was more in the nature of a secret pact between the Houses of Windsor and Zulu. That this 'appointment' was seen to be so important highlights a feature of Zulu political consciousness. In contrast to the situation in pre-conquest Zululand, political authority was no longer simply bestowed by the Zulu on their chosen leader; subjugation and dependency had now pervaded Zulu political consciousness and the Zulu clearly felt that their 'chosen leader' should also be the one chosen for them by their white overlords. Although the Zulu royal family was perceived in some quarters as a rallying point for rebellion against white rule in times of rural distress and political militancy, in the more usual quiescent mood (which had a part in sustaining their own dependency), they favoured a correspondingly more quiescent leader who commanded the approval of at least some quarters of the white oligarchy. In this light, Solomon's consistent aim to gain recognition as Zulu king by the South African state must not only be taken at face value - the issue was also intimately related to his standing among his own people.¹⁹³

The legend of Solomon's appointment was exploited by A. H. Todd and Co., a Durban-based retailer of patent cure-all medicines for the African market. Late in 1925, A. H. Todd issued a 'commemorative' pamphlet bearing portraits of the
Prince of Wales and Solomon alongside each other, and including a small notice announcing that "Edward kaNkosi George" (Edward the son of King George) had appointed Solomon as king. It also included a word from Solomon endorsing A. H. Todd's medicinal supplies. 194

This was the first of many instances in which Solomon allowed his name to be used for commercial purposes, and clearly represents one of the concrete advantages he gained from his petty bourgeois contacts. Simpson Isaac Bhengu was the intermediary between A. H. Todd and Solomon. Bhengu was born into the royal house of the Ngcolosi of Krantzkop in Natal; after receiving a mission education he moved to Durban to sell his literacy on the job market. In about 1918 he became secretary of the Durban branch of the NNC, organiser of the Durban African night schools, and an official of the Football Association. In 1922 he took up employment with A. H. Todd as a clerk and, after the petty bourgeois initiatives at Mahashini two years later, he met Solomon. He soon developed a friendship with Solomon, and after having taken up residence at Vryheid, he took up the dual role of Solomon's private secretary and secretary to Inkatha in 1929 - replacing Simelane's successor, Leonard Ncapayi. 195

Solomon's endorsement of A. H. Todd's merchandise both established a precedent for similar business relationships and continued in itself to constitute a means whereby Solomon could earn additional revenue and keep himself in the public eye. By the late 1920s, A. H. Todd's advertisement repeatedly dominated the front page of Ilanga lase Natal, featuring a facsimile of a letter from Solomon, the "Inkosi yamabandla onke" ('King of all assemblies'). The medicines themselves were headlined as "Inkosi Yemiti Yonke" ('King of all medicines') and "Umuti Wamakhosi" ('medicine of kings'). 196

These advertisements reflect Solomon's new image among the
petty bourgeoisie. Ten years previously, when newspapers like *Izindaba Zabantu* were bewailing Solomon's basic education, 'rawnness', and inadequate acquaintance with 'civilization', Solomon's endorsement of European medicines would have been plainly farcical and not commercially viable. The adverts that appeared in 1925 were thus in a sense a manifestation of the way in which he had redefined the royal image in a suitably 'civilized' manner - while simultaneously remaining at the forefront of a tribal and populist nationalism.

Local officials and white residents soon recognised the consequences of the visit of the Prince of Wales. In a new departure, even those in southern Zululand now found cause to complain that Solomon's influence was disrupting the day-to-day running of their districts. A local resident notified the Defence Force that "something queer" was afoot in the Gingindlovu and Melmoth districts. Zulu had refused to disclose any details, but the local resident had noticed that individual labourers were sending all the money they had - as much as £4 apiece - to Solomon. Others were selling their mealies and goats to realise further capital for this purpose. The magistrate of Lower Umfolosi district made a similar report, and complained that Solomon had issued instructions to chiefs that they were to attend a gathering of the Zulu people at Mahashini on 6 October 1925 - which was to be the occasion of the annual Inkatha meeting. What perturbed him most, however, was that a "petty chief" (meaning Solomon) held the power to override his magisterial authority over chiefs in his district - and that the Zulu believed that Solomon legitimately held this power because he had been "appointed Paramount Chief of Zululand...by the Prince of Wales". He also reported that on the day following the *indaba*, Solomon had addressed the Zulu saying that Zululand belonged to the Zulu and whites should live elsewhere.
The complaints of the magistrate of Eshowe, A. D. Graham, expressed substantially similar sentiments. The notices of the Inkatha meeting, of which he had not been informed, constituted a "great breach of etiquette", he said, and his own powers and those of 'his' chiefs were being undermined accordingly. In his district it was similarly alleged that Solomon was now paramount chief and that his intention was to drive the whites from Zululand. Indeed, the rumours of Solomon's appointment were so endemic and were expressed with such certainty that some officials came to wonder if it was in fact true. In a somewhat piqued letter to the CNC the magistrate of Mtunzini asked that Solomon's status and powers be defined if he now really was the Zulu paramount chief. State officials outside the ranks of the NAD were now baldly referring to Solomon as "the King".

What officials were observing was a new wave of Zulu nationalism that was unprecedented since 1879. What was different in late 1925, however, was that the role of the Zulu 'king' as national leader was now being supported by a modern organisation such as Inkatha. The indaba had brought to a head and fused two parallel political developments both of which centred on the person of Solomon: first, the petty bourgeois drive to formalise Inkatha as a link between themselves and the tribal elite, and second, Solomon's own drive for tribal reconciliation. The sixty thousand Zulu who had assembled at the indaba represented all sections of the Zulu people - in both a tribal and class sense. Together they had seen Solomon in the company of advisers ranging from Mankulumana in his beshu (loinskin) to Dube in his morning suit, behaving and being treated as a king by all present. The suspicions and divisions between tribal and petty-bourgeois Zulu that had hitherto hamstrung Inkatha were nowhere evident in the euphoria of 1925. Riding on the crest of this new wave of adulation, Solomon openly turned to Inkatha's organisational
structure to consolidate his success. As the above magistrates' reports indicate, the instructions that were being issued within Zululand to attend the forthcoming Inkatha meeting were held to be from Solomon himself. As Solomon now publicly took up his role at the pinnacle of Inkatha, even those Zulu furthest from the royal epicentre were now not only aware of Inkatha as a political force, but regarded the names 'Inkatha' and 'Solomon' as inseparable.

Solomon's new acclaim was reflected in the scramblings of various bodies to associate themselves with him. Similarly, the welcome that Solomon gave them reflected his new confidence in his role as Zulu king. For example, Gardener Mvuyana, who had led an offshoot from the African Congregational Church, conducted the 1926 general synod of his Church at Mahashini. Solomon had previously rejected Mvuyana's approaches, evidently because he had lacked the confidence to disregard NAD 'advice' to keep his distance. Isiah Shembe, the flamboyant and influential leader of the large Nazarite sect based at Ekuphakameni (in Inanda, near Durban) similarly succeeded in forging a link with Solomon. Solomon accepted Shembe's daughter, Zondi, in marriage, a special house was built for Solomon at Ekuphakameni, and a Nazarite hymn soon affirmed the relationship in the following manner:

King Solomon is called
He, the son of Dinuzulu
And the fame of Jehovah
Is in Ekuphakameni.

After 1925, Solomon's multifaceted role as Zulu king thus represented a more powerful and pervasive presence in Natal African and Zulu society. The political consequence was that the Zulu now clearly felt the institution of kingship to be functioning once more in a 'real' and practical sense. Before examining developments within Zulu politics
in the ensuing period, however, it is first necessary to identify the NAD attitude.

Inkatha through official eyes, 1921-1925

The NAD had adopted a "neutral" and "non-committal" attitude to Inkatha from the time of its formation. The CNC and SNA consistently rejected the pleas from Simelane, Mnyaiza, Mankulumana, Solomon, Gilbert and Bhulose for government recognition - which in practice meant the integration of Inkatha into the system of indirect rule. They had similarly rejected Oscroft's and Fynney's suggestions that a government official be formally appointed as adviser and bookkeeper to Inkatha as a preliminary to making more formal use of the organisation.

Until the 1924 Inkatha meeting, the reasons the CNC and SNA offered for their reticence was that Inkatha was a "political organization" (the NAD was elsewhere creating political organisations in the form of local councils), it had "no definite object" (the NAD had quashed Inkatha's main practical objects by refusing permission to buy a Vryheid farm and by refusing to recognise it as a form of local council), and it lacked an accredited bookkeeper and system of accounting for its finances (the last word in tautology). 206

The essential problem was that, in presenting itself as a basis for a local council for north-western Zululand or a general council for the whole of Zululand in 1921, Inkatha had taken the NAD by surprise. The Natal NAD had not persuaded itself that such a body was desirable so soon after the 1920 Act, let alone formulated any plans of its own as to what form the council might take. 207 The NAD's response had merely been to identify the ways in which Inkatha was not suitable for recognition - a response which overlooked the fact that the
early Inkatha had explicitly offered itself to the NAD as a loose organisation which could be fashioned into a local council suitable to the NAD.

Inkatha's expansion and formalisation in late 1924 forced the NAD to take greater cognisance of the organisation. But the NAD continued to resist recognising it for four specific reasons. First, since Inkatha was associated with Solomon, the CNC and SNA had to consider the opposition that would issue from the many Natal NAD officials who still held a deep mistrust for the Zulu royal family. Second, both were greatly perturbed that the influence of Natal petty bourgeois ideologues far outweighed the influence of local Zulu in Inkatha - although the SNA, J. F. Herbst, at one stage suggested that formal recognition might be the best way to "get ahead of them and not be dragged after...and to knock out the status of any outside men". Third, the CNC was of the opinion that the local councils envisaged under the 1920 Act were unsuitable for Zululand because the Zulu were insufficiently 'advanced' to take over responsibility for their own local government. Moreover, the democratic principle which underlay the councils would undermine the tribal system upon which his administration depended. Fourth, the 1920 Act was unsuitable because it only provided for the establishment of local councils in reserve areas - and about forty percent of Natal's African population lived on lands outside the reserves. The core of Inkatha's local support was itself split between the Zululand reserves and white-owned land in Northern Natal. Overall, however, NAD inaction concerning Inkatha can be attributed to the ever-present factor of NAD inertia. Moreover, there was little organic need for change in administrative arrangements because between 1920 and 1925 the NAD's Zululand administration had functioned with a smoothness which it had never previously known.
This was not so, however, after June 1925. Local officials found that Solomon's de facto power was disrupting their administration. The situation mirrored that which had existed between 1914 and 1916, except that now Solomon's unaccommodated influence was far more widespread. In response, just as in 1916, the NAD began to think more seriously of coopting Solomon's influence. There is another factor, however, that contributed to the subtle changes of attitude that took place in certain NAD officials. Whilst Solomon's conduct at the indaba had infuriated a number of Natal NAD officials and certain sections of the Natal white public, others had evidently identified with Solomon and had felt a glow of pride that 'their' Zulu king had presented himself in such a way as to visibly impress the heir to the British throne. That these were the emotional responses of Fynney and Oscroft goes without saying, but it is important that they were also felt by the CPSA as a whole and, indeed, by those at Natal NAD headquarters in Pietermaritzburg - including the CNC himself and his influential clerk, Carl Faye.

In July 1925 the CNC catalogued the weaknesses of Inkatha as he perceived them: it was representative mainly of Natal proper rather than Zululand; "bogus collectors" were defrauding the local population; the custody and "proper use" of Inkatha subscriptions were not vouchsafed, and the motive for the collections was still unclear. His general conclusion, however, was that the NAD had little need to suppress Inkatha since it was likely to dissolve of its own accord:

The people will tire of contributing hard cash to a nebulous object, and...the Fund will become dissipated as easily as large amounts of money in the hands of Native Chiefs and their courtiers have been frittered away in the past.

But directly after the CNC had received the wad of magisterial
complaints about Solomon's influence between July and September 1925 (some of which are recorded above), the CNC dramatically changed his stance. "Magistrates generally seem to be unnecessarily fearful of the results which will follow collections for the Zulu National Fund", he wrote to the SNA, and argued that the official definition of Solomon's and Inkatha's status was now a priority:

I would be the last to suggest any action which would tend to decry Solomon's influence as the representative of the Zulu Royal House, for I feel that his influence can be made to serve a useful purpose in Native Administration in this Province.214

The CNC's new attitude had also been stimulated by the news that Inkatha had accepted the new 'Natives Taxation and Development Act' - a measure which replaced the existing system of taxation (14s hut tax and, in the reserves, a 5s livestock dipping levy) with a new £1 poll tax which was coupled with a 10s 'local tax' in the reserve areas. The 1925 Tax Act was integral to the state's determination to implement local council policy in the reserve areas - the local tax was specifically designed to constitute the local councils' source of revenue. Where no local council existed, local tax payments would accrue to a 'Native Development Account', which would be deployed by state officials for improvements in reserve areas. The £1 poll tax would accrue to state revenue, and amounted to a reimposition of the poll tax that sparked off the 1906 rebellion. Natal officials had thus been apprehensive of the reception it would receive in 1925.215 "Had Inkatha's decision been otherwise we should have had considerable difficulty in making collections next year", the CNC observed.216

The larger question of 'recognition' would take some time to
resolve. In the meantime, Solomon and Inkatha were presenting the administration with problems that needed immediate attention. The first problem was that royal agents "are prone to belittle local Chiefs and to suggest that they are but puppets directly subject to Solomon's control", with the result that the influence of local chiefs "will be seriously undermined". The CNC's interim solution to this problem, together with the problem of ever-increasing collections, was to suggest that Inkatha be instructed to abstain from making any further collections until further notice. The second problem was one of magisterial "umbrage" to Solomon's influence. Here the CNC recommended that magistrates be informed that Solomon's status had not changed since his appointment in 1917, but that "the Government does not wish to close the door to possible future use of Solomon's services..." The following month the CNC and SNA met to discuss the larger issue of Solomon's and Inkatha's future, and the interim measures were soon put into practice.

While the overall attitude of the NAD towards Solomon and Inkatha in late 1925 was by no means supportive, it was clearly one of active interest in the latter's future. Indeed, the events of 1925 had demonstrated to the NAD for the first time that according greater official cognisance of Inkatha might be expedient, both because of the extent of the organisation's unaccommodated influence in practice, and, as its response to the 1925 Taxation and Development Act had proved, because of its potential administrative value. The NAD was nevertheless extremely hesitant to redefine its policy of studied 'neutrality' towards Inkatha, and, moreover, was absolutely determined that the fact that it was contemplating doing so should remain secret. Not knowing of the deliberations of the NAD's high-ranking officials, Solomon and Inkatha inevitably interpreted the order that no further collections be made as an unprecedentedly blunt sign of official disfavour - a factor which contributed to Inkatha's loss of momentum during 1926 and 1927.
The fissures beneath the populist facade: Inkatha, 1925-1927

The tensions that were so much in evidence in the Inkatha meeting of 1924 were overlaid by a buoyant nationalism in the meeting of 1925. The immediate consequence of the indaba for Inkatha was the vastly increased weight of tribal representatives within its body politic. Whereas only one tribal chief had attended the 1924 meeting (Chief Mthethwa - Solomon only attended the private preliminary meeting), twenty-five chiefs attended the 1925 meeting. They were supplemented by a number of representatives of chiefs who had been unable to attend, and a number of izinduna from all over Natal and Zululand. Three other features of the meeting deserve comment. First, a comprehensive report found its way into the Natal Mercury, reflecting the new prominence that Solomon and Inkatha had achieved in white Natal. Second, Solomon clearly played the role of constitutional monarch at the meeting - providing the venue, the food, and, most important, an air of legitimacy by his mere presence. Third, Inkatha now took up the task of acting as a Zulu 'shadow government' to the South African Government. The proceedings and resolutions of the 1925 meeting were forwarded to the NAD for its advice and information. The new way in which the organisation perceived itself was reflected in its new insignia: two hands clasped in the manner of a European handshake, surrounded by laurels and bearing the legends "Ukuhlangana ku Ngamandhla" and "Unity is Strength" - the Zulu and English translations of the Latin Ex Unitate Vires of the South African coat of arms.

The resolutions of the 1925 meeting covered a wide range of topics which reflected the broad base of its support. The most important related to education and political representation, and reflected the tribal and petty bourgeois composition of its leadership. First, a plea was made that the education of the sons of chiefs and headmen be made compulsory; this was effectively a motion of support for the ZNTI. But the meeting also resolved that "some primary education" be made compulsory for all African children (as with white children) since "much trouble and unrest emanates from the uneducated class of Natives through ignorance". The latter was probably
an allusion to the expanding body of ICU supporters in Natal proper. Second, the meeting applauded the establishment of the 'Native Development Account' under the 1925 Tax Act. However, for Zululand, it rejected the underlying significance of the 'local tax' - the implementation of 'local councils' policy. In a resolution which reflected the new power of the tribal elite in Inkatha, and subtly pointed a finger at the petty bourgeois excesses of 1924, it was said that

the time for Native Councils in Zululand has not yet arrived,... only outside blood would rule the Council and the people of Zululand would be left out in the cold as they were not yet sufficiently educated to know the rules of debate, etc., but they request that heretofore the 'Inkata ka Zulu' should be recognised as the official mouthpiece of all the Chiefs of Natal and Zululand.225

Nationalist fervour had thus not dissolved the differences that existed between Inkatha's old and new elites. Soon, however, the tussles within Inkatha's elitist alliance were to be overshadowed by a confrontation between this alliance and a new element: a militant rank-and-file.

In the province of Natal as a whole, the years 1925 and 1926 represent the watershed between the rank-and-file's phase of more informal and disunited action (reflected in instances of desertion from employment, 'absconding' to the towns, and attempts to avoid payment of the hut tax and dipping levy226) to its phase of organised and explicitly class-based action. The midlands of Natal proper became the storm-centre of rural militancy in the province. Here, rent-paying tenants - who comprised about one third of the African farm population shortly after Union - had been reduced to labour tenants by the mid 1920s. During the post-war depression,
white commercial farmers intensified labour demands on labour tenants; simultaneously they reduced the quality and quantity of tenant-homesteads' land and fixed wages for farm labour at pre-war levels. But the local African farm population suffered most during the period in which agrarian capital sought to recoup the losses of the post-war depression by producing for the newly-lucrative markets for wool and wattle bark. As land values soared in the mid 1920s and more land was required for grazing and the cultivation of wattle, an unprecedented wave of tenant evictions took place. Moreover, corporate capital now flooded into the rural districts to establish wattle production on a large-scale industrial footing - farms were bought up, tenants were evicted, and African wage labour was engaged. The advent of wattle plantations (on which work was strenuous and the 'task system' of payment kept wages at a low level), accelerated the process of rural proletarianisation.227

The politicisation of the rank-and-file owed much to the activities of the ICU. During 1925, A. W. G. Champion moved from the Transvaal to Natal to take up the post of secretary to the Natal branch of the ICU. Here he spearheaded the meteoric rise of the Natal ICU to the role of the bastion of the whole ICU by 1926.228 Although lesser ICU officials and local organisers were often drawn directly from the rank-and-file, most ICU leaders had petty bourgeois backgrounds - and the relationship between the latter and the illiterate poor who formed the phalanx of the ICU's support was somewhat problematical. Champion was born to a kholwa family resident on the border between Natal proper and Zululand, and after being suspended for rebelliousness from Amanzimtoti Training College in the middle of his secondary education, he entered the police force. Interestingly, in the course of his duties as an intelligence officer (spy) in Northern Natal in 1915, he first saw Solomon - which meeting, Champion later suggested,
caused him some discomfort and assisted his decision to leave the police force. He thereafter took employment as a clerk on the Crown Mines in Johannesburg. Here he gained his first experience in politics as president of the African Mine Clerks' Association, and met Clements Kadalie, general secretary of the ICU. Two months after Champion's arrival in Natal, the Natal ICU established the Durban-based 'African Workers' Club'. This social club hardly catered for ordinary 'African workers': it provided dancing, singing, boxing and dining facilities, writing tables, rest rooms and was rigidly opposed to the consumption of alcohol. In practice it can be seen as a forerunner of the arch petty bourgeois 'Bantu Social Centres' that were established (sponsored by the South African Institute of Race Relations and the inter-racial Joint Councils movement) in urban areas throughout the Union a few years later. The ambiguities of Champion's role as a 'militant working class leader' were to be especially evident during the Durban Beer Hall riots of 1929 - and significantly he was then simultaneously attempting to inaugurate a scheme at Clermont (inland of Durban) for a respectable African township of land-owners. However, the class ambiguities of some of those in the upper echelons of the ICU leadership should not disguise the political impact that the ICU made among urban workers and particularly the rank-and-file in the rural areas. At local ICU meetings in the countryside, the latter heard promises of a thorough-going redistribution of economic and political power, couched in terms derived from Marxist ideology of apocalyptic class struggle (and inspired by the success of the revolution in Russia), and infused with an awareness of the linkages that existed between class and racial oppression in South Africa. Moreover, the ICU was prepared to intervene directly, with legal assistance, on behalf of aggrieved workers and labour
Champion was a vitriolic and dynamic character, and he personally played a large part in the expansion of the ICU in Natal proper. However, by the time Champion arrived in late 1925, the post-1920 period of quiescence was already drawing to a close throughout the Union and Natal was no exception - as the 1924 'palace revolt' within the NNC indicates. Soon after Champion's arrival, the Natal ICU and the NNC established an informal alliance: the March 1926 meeting of the NNC stated its disgust that the Durban Municipal Native Affairs Department refused both the ICU and NNC the use of the public hall in Depot Road Native Location, and resolved that "all men and women be requested to join the NNC and ICU...".

The campaign among Natal's militant leaders to organise the Zulu of Zululand and Northern Natal really only got underway in 1927. Yet as early as August 1925, the inhabitants of the Vryheid district in the heart of Solomon's immediate domain had begun to organise themselves in accord with the ideologies of working class action. Superficially, local magistrates identified an "entirely new...and distinctly defiant" attitude among the local Zulu appearing in the magistrates courts, and were convinced of "impending unrest among the Zulus" - similar to the reports that issued from magistrates in the Zululand reserves. The local Defence Force Commanding Officer suggested that the new mood was related to the "general bearing and conduct of Solomon - the King" after the indaba. Undoubtedly the surge of nationalism had raised rebellious spirits, but there was something more underlying the mood of the Vryheid district. On the Candover Estates (a newly established cotton plantation, employing eight tenants. It was for these reasons that the ICU grew to be the "mass movement for national liberation" which was at the forefront of popular protest.
thousand Zulu and eighty whites) the Zulu employees had recently become "very insolent" and had threatened to strike "and so on". Similarly, the Commanding Officer noted that the "strike fever" was "very prevalent on the Vryheid Coal Mines". He was so impressed with the situation that he recommended that the manager of the Candover Estates be issued with ten rifles and five thousand rounds of ammunition, and that eighty rifles be distributed amongst the defence auxiliaries in the Vryheid and Piet Retief districts. The 'strike fever' on the Candover Estates and the Coal Mines represent the onset of a particularly Zulu rank-and-file militancy. Although the Inkatha meeting of 1925 had made brief and disparaging reference to "unrest", it was not until 1927 that this new force came to be a factor determining the evolution of the political stance of Solomon and Inkatha. However, it is against the background of the development of this new force that the activities of Inkatha's two elites during 1926 must be seen.

After the meeting of 1925, Inkatha's petty bourgeois leaders preoccupied themselves with the task of drawing up a formal constitution for Inkatha with a view to formal approval by the NAD. This would serve two purposes. First, it would satisfy petty bourgeois and - more important - NAD conceptions of a properly constituted political organisation. As the CNC himself observed when he was served with a copy of the constitution, part of its function was to persuade the NAD to lift its 'ban' on further Inkatha collections. Second, the constitution would define the specifically petty bourgeois interests and objectives it was hoped Inkatha would pursue.

The 1926 constitution was drawn up under the guidance and in the Durban offices of J. Ray Msimang - evidently a man of some legal training. Details about J. Ray Msimang are
unavailable, but it seems likely that he was a member of the same kholwa Msimang family that had produced a number of church and political leaders. The preamble to the constitution dwelt on the need for Zulu national unity:

...it is necessary to attempt to have unity amongst the Zulu people now scattered throughout and outside the Union with a view to establishing something tangible and worth the name of the once powerful ZULU NATION and also with the ideas of obtaining a place under the sun and not infinitely to suffer to be trodden and looked down upon by other nations....

Inkatha, which had as its "Patron" the "Hereditary Paramount Chief of the Zulu Nation" was the organisation which aimed to realise the aspirations of the nation as a whole. The constitution's statement of Inkatha's aims, however, clearly identified the petty bourgeois interests that lay beneath this nationalism. First, Inkatha aimed to "encourage thrift amongst the Zulus and also establish industries and Trades...." The appended reasons for this - to ensure that the Zulu were "worthy of the name and traditions of their Ancestors" - hints at the intricacies of the petty bourgeois stance in Inkatha: it was not only a cynical attempt to manipulate Zulu nationalism for sectional interests, it was also a reflex of their cultural disorientation and their paradoxical preoccupation with 'roots' and 'progress'. The second, third and fourth aims all related to the agricultural cooperative for which the Umpini ka Zulu fund had been established. Thus Inkatha aimed to buy or hire farms for the purposes of cultivating sugar cane and cotton (the plantation cash crops then cultivated by white farmers in Zululand and Northern Natal) together with a variety of other vegetables and fruits that "might prove to be remunerative to Inkata ka Zulu". It was emphasised that the produce was for the open market rather than subsistence. Moreover,
apart from supplying the markets with its own produce, Inkatha intended to establish itself as a trading broker buying and selling hides and livestock. The fifth aim was to establish "Educational and Industrial Schools" for the Zulu (on the lines of Dube's Ohlange Institute). It was hoped that those who qualified in these schools would be able to find employment in Inkatha's own expanding agricultural and commercial concerns. 241

In accordance with western prescriptions, the constitution mapped out the structure of Inkatha's executive, the powers and duties of its office-holders, the rules of procedure during meetings, the methods by which its activities would be publicised and subscriptions collected, and its financial regulations. Overall, great emphasis was placed on Inkatha's 'respectableness' in western terms and its loyalty to the South African Government and British Crown. It was written into the constitution that every meeting was to open with prayers, and that the "regulations for the conduct of Meetings of civilised Races shall operate at the sittings of Inkatha ka Zulu". All government officials were entitled to attend and participate in Inkatha meetings (otherwise restricted to paid-up Inkatha members), and any Inkatha member who evidenced a "spirit of disloyalty to the throne" would be immediately "evicted". 242 The constitution furthermore firmly stated that the decision-making process would be democratic. It stated equally firmly that Solomon's relationship to Inkatha was that of "Patron" - the executive leader was to be the elected president. The only regulation not based on the democratic principle was that a member of the Zulu royal family would always automatically be a treasurer to Inkatha - in practice this meant Solomon and his heirs. 243

Though the constitution as a whole was foreign to Inkatha's
tribal elite, it was the democratic principles enshrined in it that were clearly contrary to their interests. During 1926, Inkatha's tribal elite prepared a petition to the Minister of Native Affairs that stood in stark contrast to the 1925 constitution. This petition, signed by Solomon's most wordly tribal associates, Mnyaiza and Franz, and presented to the CNC personally by Solomon in January 1927, was an attempt on the part of the Zulu royal family to establish its own and separate concord with the South African Government. But apart from being symptomatic of class struggle within Inkatha leadership, it was also related to two other developments of 'national' importance. First, Mankulumana had died late in 1926 whilst in Johannesburg. He had been visiting the Transvaal to attend to Inkatha and Umpini matters there, and to arrange the collection of royal tributes through Franz at Brakpan Mine Compound. He further intended to visit the NAD head office to speak the "words" of the Zulu people. Mankulumana, a man who had been a forthright and eloquent national leader throughout the turbulent era since the conquest of Zululand, had been deeply respected by the Zulu (including the Mandlakazi) and whites alike. His death left a very marked gap in the ranks of Zululand's royal and national leadership. Second, while Solomon's policy of tribal reconciliation had been effectively achieved in 1925, the reconciliation had not been 'officially' formalised by the appointment of Mandlakazi and Buthelezi leaders to positions of leadership at Mahashini.

The petition began with a bald statement that Solomon's "present Title, Chief of the Usuthu merely, is misleading to the authorities because he is in fact recognised by the Zulus as head of all the clans which form the Zulu Nation". The request was that Solomon's title should be such as would "adequately express his responsibility to the Government
and to the people as head of the Zulu Nation". In practice this was a request for the recognition of Solomon as paramount chief - a fact immediately recognised by the NAD despite the care that had been taken to dwell on the matter of Solomon's 'title' rather than his official powers. The force of the argument was that the Zulu themselves saw Solomon as king, and, - in a feat of legerdemain the NAD found difficult to counter - had done so since the indaba with the Governor-General (Lord Buxton) in 1917, because the latter had intimated that this was to be so. It went on to complain that Zululand magistrates were forbidding local chiefs to attend national gatherings at Mahashini and that the CNC had forbidden the Zulu to continue making contributions to the Inkatha fund.

The petition made two further requests. First, that Mathole kaTshanibezwe Buthelezi "be restored to the office of his grandfather Mnyamana" - that is, chief counsellor to the head of the Zulu royal house. The death of Mankulumana provided the petitioners with a tangible pretext for the resuscitation of the national role of the Buthelezi leader, and it was integral to Solomon's own drive for recognition that recognition should be sought for Mathole's new petition. Similarly, it was requested that Bokwe kaZibhebhu Zulu of the Mandlakazi be appointed to the position of "Induna of the Nation" so that "the two of them Mathole and Bokwe can assist each other in the affairs of the Nation, they being next to Solomon, the principal men of the Nation".

The NAD response to both the 1926 constitution and the royal petition was coloured by the retirement of Oswald Fynney from the key post of magistrate of Nongoma. His replacement, Mr Gebers, was no supporter of the Zulu royal cause. The 1926 constitution had confirmed two of the CNC's earlier fears:
first, that educated men from outside were seeking to 'interfere' with Solomon and so might disrupt the tribal system in Zululand, and, second, that Inkatha did not see itself as an organisation that represented only Zululand, or even just Natal and Zululand. The CNC's response was to argue that Inkatha's stated aims were still "hopelessly indefinite", and accordingly the NAD informed Inkatha that it could not be given official recognition. In regard to the royal petition, the new magistrate of Nongoma stated that he feared the "very powerful combination of Natives under Solomon in Zululand" if the historically 'loyal' (i.e. loyal to the British Crown subsequent to conquest) leaders of the Buthelezi and Mandlakazi were allowed to become Solomon's chief counsellors. He was convinced that there was no room in the administration for the office of paramount chief. In turn, the CNC's response to being explicitly 'hurried' by the Zulu royal family was to retreat from his recent pragmatism. Referring to the conditions of Solomon's appointment in 1917, he suggested Solomon be informed that his jurisdiction was limited to the Usuthu ward alone and was "still temporary" - a rash and unrealistic response. He went on to argue that if Mathole and Bokwe wished to take up posts with Solomon, they would have to renounce their chieftainships of the Buthelezi and Mandlakazi - he was particularly fearful of the consequences that the unification of the Usuthu and Mandlakazi would have for Solomon's status. In late 1926 and early 1927 the NAD could feel the Solomon and local council issue to be less pressing; the emotional euphoria of 1925 had ebbed and the events of 1926 had proved Inkatha to be less a monolithic populist movement than it had appeared in 1925.

The annual meeting of Inkatha held during September 1926 is one of crucial importance; it highlighted a number of important features of the organisation and signalled that it was entering a new phase of its history. First, there was a comparatively
small attendance at the 1926 meeting. In particular there were very few tribal leaders present. The simultaneous meeting of the Native Affairs Commission at Vryheid, together with the inclement weather, had a role in keeping the attendance down. But the main factor was that the recent NAD instructions against Inkatha collections had been interpreted as a sign of the government's disapproval of Inkatha's existence altogether. The sensitivity of Inkatha's body politic (especially among its tribal supporters) to the wishes of the government emphasised that Inkatha was essentially a collaborative organisation and was largely dependent on government approval. Second, during the 1926 meeting there was an attempt on the part of local militant leadership to redefine Inkatha's political stance. This introduced a new fissure within Inkatha. As the poor attendance and the low spirits of the Inkatha leadership (Oscroft's report spoke of a sense of "futility") at the 1926 meeting indicated, Inkatha's impetus and sense of direction in late 1925 had been corroded by discord within its leadership during 1926. The import of the meeting was not, however, purely negative: the way in which Inkatha personnel reacted against the militant element at the meeting indicated that there were new grounds for an elitist alliance, and that Inkatha had a role to play in representing it.

Solomon chose not to attend any of the proceedings of the 1926 meeting - not even the private executive committee meeting which the 'patron' and 'treasurer' was obliged to attend. He preferred instead to remain out of sight in his house for the duration of the meeting. Furthermore, the cost of catering for the gathering was not met by Solomon personally as in 1925, but by Inkatha funds. Divisions were expressed even within Inkatha's petty bourgeois leadership: friction existed between the secretary, Simelane, and the chairman, Bhulose, which was
probably a reflection of the different political priorities of the local Zulu petty bourgeoisie as opposed to the 'outsider' from Natal proper. Nonetheless, it was the petty bourgeoisie as a whole that was undeniably dominant.

The proceedings of the meeting were almost wholly taken up in discussion of the three new 'Native Bills' that Hertzog had tabled during the 1926 parliamentary session. Apart from the 'Native Lands Further Release and Acquisition Bill', which aimed to 'release' certain tracts of land abutting the reserves for African ownership, the bills were barely of interest to Zululand's tribal elite. The 'Union Native Council Bill' aimed to establish a council of fifty Africans, of whom thirty five were to be elective, as a substitute for the Native Conferences established under the 1920 Act. The 'Representation of Natives in Parliament Bill' aimed to remove Cape Africans from the common voters' roll in the Cape, and as an alternative provide seven white representatives of African interests in the House of Assembly.

The meeting passed two related resolutions. One was an "appreciation of the life and work of the late Hon. J. X. Merriman" (the prominent defender of the 'Cape liberal tradition'). The other was an expression of "regret that certain Cape Natives should be deprived of the Franchise, which ...they have never abused". These issues were far divorced from the political priorities of those tribal Zulu who were present; and the resolutions were passed despite Mankulumana's statement that the meeting had "no right" to pass any resolutions since the chiefs were absent.

M. L. E. Maling, a delegate from Northern Natal, also disagreed with these resolutions but for very different reasons: he believed that they were not forceful enough. Maling was a Christian (Wesleyan Methodist), educated and exempted African
from the Vryheid district who was employed as a clerk. Although details of his career before 1926 are fragmentary, it seems that Maling had been connected in some way with the NNC and, like other educated Natal Africans, had become 'radicalised' in the mid 1920s. When the ICU took off in Natal under Champion in late 1925, Maling took up the role of ICU organiser in Northern Natal - a role that he strenuously denied before NAD officials. During 1926 - prior to his arrival at the Inkatha meeting - Maling had conducted a number of meetings throughout Northern Natal, and had consolidated a solid base of support among impoverished labour tenants and farm workers. He was by nature a flamboyant and confident character, and his forthright approach to politicizing the local rank-and-file soon earned him the archetypal image of an "out of work agitator, exploiting the Natives...for his own advancement and selfish ends" in the eyes of the Natal NAD. Indeed, there were strong parallels between Maling and Champion. Maling's stylish clothing, flourishing handwriting and good command of English also made a particular impression on the CNC.

However, living in a region in which the authority of chiefs was stronger than in Natal proper, and in which Inkatha was unquestionably the dominant political organisation, Maling needed in some way to establish a relationship with Inkatha. This need was also prompted by Maling's personal reverence for Solomon. Thus he attended the 1926 Inkatha meeting, accompanied by a group of supporters from Northern Natal. Although Maling's prime concern had hitherto been with the relations between labour tenant and landlord in the Vryheid (including Babanango sub-district), Ngotshe, Utrecht, Paulpietersburg and Piet Retief districts, at his first appearance in Inkatha he chose to focus on what seemed to be the issue of the day - Hertzog's 'Native Bills'. Addressing
the meeting, Maling used his considerable oratorial skills in a rigorous denunciation of state policy. As Oscroft remarked, "his views obviously appealed very strongly to the gathering". He would have led the assembly to pass a resolution in condemnation of Hertzog's 'Native Bills' were it not for the intervention of Inkatha's existing conservative rulers. Oscroft was deeply impressed by the way in which Mankulumana and Mnyaiza arose to "counteract the influence of extremists...a striking illustration of the powers of leadership still retained by the headmen of Zululand". Mankulumana and Mnyaiza were strongly supported by the chairman, Bhulose.

This incident set the shape of Inkatha politics for the rest of its existence. Whatever the differences between Inkatha's petty bourgeois and tribal elites and however strongly these were contested, petty bourgeois and tribal leaders were to unite solidly against rank-and-file radicalism and militant leadership. From 1927, Zulu politics resolve into a struggle between three classes: the petty bourgeoisie, the tribal elite and the rank-and-file, and the dominant cleavage is between the two elites on the one hand and the rank-and-file on the other. As an organisation that pretended to represent all Zulu, Inkatha was liable to 'subversion' from within just as the NNC had been in 1924. What distinguished Inkatha from the NNC at these equivalent points in their history, however, was that Inkatha was necessarily inseparable from Solomon and the Zulu tribal establishment. Within Inkatha there was thus an inbuilt bias towards those leaders most favoured by the latter. The pressures on Solomon to identify with radical leadership were thus considerable.

The political struggles that ensued within Zulu politics at large and within Inkatha in particular were much more than a
struggle between two political strategies - militancy versus hamba kahle respectability: a real understanding of the clashes must be located in a context of an understanding of Zulu social change and class differentiation. Moreover, the political struggles cannot be understood in the context of Zulu politics exclusively, for various white interest groups, in their own struggle against the threat of the ICU and kindred movements, began to seek Zulu allies. In so doing, they were to exert a crucial influence on the course of Zulu politics.
CHAPTER 5

MILITANT AFRICAN ADVERSARIES AND WHITE ALLIES: THE ORIGINS AND PURPOSE OF INKATHA'S RECONSTITUTION IN 1928

Economic crisis and social stratification among the Zulu

After the respite of the early 1920s, Africans in Zululand and Northern Natal entered a period of socio-economic hardship and dislocation far worse than they had endured in the period immediately preceding and during the first world war. The crisis point came in 1931 and 1932, for in these years the already fragile economic life of the rural areas was subject to two additional afflictions. First, the early 1930s in Zululand and Northern Natal were drought years comparable to those of the late 1890s. However, the consequences in 1931, when the drought was at its height, were far more devastating – partly as a result of the pressures that human and livestock population growth during the 1920s had placed on the land. Between 1916 and 1936, the African population in the Zululand inland reserves increased by approximately 43 per cent;¹ and, although contemporary official reports do not provide statistics, it is evident that livestock population growth in these reserves for this period far outstripped human population growth.² In the neighbouring non-reserve districts of Vryheid and Ngotshe – where east coast fever had also been virtually eradicated by 1920 – the number of African-owned cattle were increasing at the phenomenal rate of approximately 11 per cent per annum during the mid-1920s.³ Ndesheni kaMnyaiza vividly recalled that in the aftermath of the drought in the Nongoma and Mahlabatini districts, a snake could be seen moving across the other side of the valley for there was no grass left at all.⁴ In 1931 the Natal Witness reported that all that stood between the Zulu and starvation was "feeding daily on the dying cattle".⁵
Second, as a dependent periphery of the capitalist economy, Zululand and Northern Natal shared in the consequences of the Great Depression. More and more would-be migrants were unable to find employment, and rural families were thus less able to supplement their sub-subsistence agricultural production with wages earned in the capitalist sector. Under these conditions, the demands made on those who were employed were intensified. In late 1931 the Natal NAD instructed the Director of Native Labour in Johannesburg and all local officials and pass officers in Natal to "impress upon all employed Africans from Northern Natal and Zululand the necessity for making regular remittances as money is now required at their homes more than ever". Local chiefs followed this up with personal visits to employment centres - Chief Mathole, for example, arranged to tour the mining compounds and Natal collieries in early 1932. Many Zulu resorted to selling their cattle in order to buy food from local trading stores. Local traders and NAD officials arranged cattle sales in Eshowe, Nongoma and Vryheid districts; these proved to be highly popular. Another response, however, was to seek employment on the Zululand sugar estates - which the Zulu had hitherto resisted, despite the efforts of the sugar industry, because working conditions and wages compared unfavourably with those on the gold fields and in urban centres. The consequence was a major malaria epidemic in the Zululand inland reserves and Northern Natal. Inland Zulu had not developed an immunity to malaria which had become endemic in the coastal districts following the extension of plantation production and the railway network. In early 1932 Oscroft reported that there were homesteads in the Nongoma district in which half a dozen people had died of the disease. Further factors in the spread of the disease were the evictions of Zulu from white-owned land in Northern Natal and the overcrowding of the healthy and more fertile Zululand inland reserves: this increasingly forced non-immune Zulu to settle
In late 1931, the state of the Zulu people became a matter for widespread public concern. In one of its many articles on the matter, the Natal Witness reported that "practically all sign of plant life has been killed...famine prevails in all its intensity". This same report's estimate that deaths among Zulu-owned cattle were to be numbered in "tens of thousands" was undoubtedly conservative: E. G. Jansen, Minister of Native Affairs and MP for Vryheid, informed parliament that over two hundred thousand Zulu cattle died in the period June to November 1931 alone. The Bishop of Zululand petitioned the government for the distribution of emergency rations. The Natal Witness also gave prominence to Zulu representations to the SNA during an indaba in Nongoma in 1931. Chief Mathole announced that the Zulu were starving and could only hope that their hitherto unsympathetic father, the government, would now provide food. Msenteli Zulu of the Mandlakazi, Chief Bokwe's brother, developed the patriarchal imagery in his emotive observation that "we are in the position of orphans". In an unprecedented move, the NAD declared the Zululand inland reserves to be famine areas and instituted the distribution of emergency maize rations to the inhabitants on the basis of nine months credit. For the financial year 1931-1932 the NAD spent £35,800 on the "relief of distress" in Zululand and Northern Natal - 81 per cent of its total expenditure in this category over the whole Union. It also wrote off £30,000 of the £80,000 local tax arrears that had accrued in the Zululand inland reserves.

The drought was only the immediate cause of the famine; the underlying causes lie in the complex process of socio-economic decline which had accelerated after 1925. The famine relief distributed by the government in the early 1930s saved many
Zulu from starvation - and informed white opinion said so at the time with a sense of benevolent pride. Emergency food was not distributed during the comparable drought years of the 1890s - at which time Zulu subsistence was simultaneously afflicted by locust plagues and cattle losses through disease - and no mass starvation resulted. The intensity of the famine in the early 1930s illustrates how Zulu economic life in the reserves and on neighbouring white farms had become more fragile between the two periods of drought. However, these observations on economic decline among the Zulu as a whole do not by themselves provide a basis for an understanding of developments in Zulu politics in the late 1920s. Indeed, not all sections of the Zulu became poorer during this period.

During the late 1920s, the existence of sparsely inhabited low-lying regions in the reserves and the increasing number of Zulu-owned cattle led certain magistrates and many local settlers to claim that the Zululand reserves were not congested and that the Zulu were prosperous. The sugar industry's persistent complaints that Zulu prosperity in the reserves kept them away from wage labour on the sugar plantations was prejudiced and hence is not entirely reliable - the sugar industry resolutely refused to accept that poor wages and health conditions rendered plantation work unattractive to the Zulu. But there was an element of truth in these local white views on the state of the reserves. As Charles Simkins has shown in his detailed analysis of agricultural production in the Union's reserves between 1918 and 1969, the value of agricultural production in the Zululand reserves in relationship to the number of inhabitants in 1927 was the highest in the whole Union except for the Transkei. He concludes that Zululand and the Transkei were the two reserve regions "most nearly self sufficient in food..." This must not, however, be taken at face value.
Two crucial qualifications must be made. First, the relative prosperity of many Zulu in the reserves masks the fact that very many more were becoming acutely impoverished. Simkins' conclusions are based on statistics arrived at by dividing the value of agricultural production in the Zululand reserves as a whole by population figures. They do not, in Simkins' words, take account of "the distribution of production and productive assets" within Zulu society - in other words, differential distribution of wealth and social stratification. Second, about one-third of the Zulu lived outside Simkins' domain of study - the reserves. The following survey of socio-economic change among the Zulu considers conditions in both the Zululand reserves and Northern Natal.

In order to provide an index to social stratification among reserve dwellers, Simkins goes on to calculate the distribution of cattle among the population of selected reserves. His findings indicate that in the Nongoma district in 1945, 53 per cent of the population owned no cattle at all. Of those who did own cattle, 55 per cent (ie. 27.5 per cent of the whole population) owned herds of more than twenty-five. Social stratification was, however, even more marked than these figures suggest, because the average herd size was thirty-six. By comparison, in Umtata district (Transkei) in 1942, 26 per cent of the population owned no cattle at all, and only 7 per cent (ie. 3.5 per cent of the Umtata population) owned herds of more than twenty-five. The reserves in which the distribution of cattle among the population was most egalitarian were those of Natal proper. The Nongoma district represents the most striking instance of inequality of cattle ownership in all the Union's reserves. The next highest disparity is recorded in the Ngutu district - the only other Zululand district to be considered in Simkins' survey. Simkins' findings describe conditions approximately fifteen years after our period. The late 1920s, however, were the
years in which differences of wealth widened within the Zululand reserves and social stratification crystallised in a new form.

In giving evidence before the Native Economic Commission in 1930, Archdeacon Lee reported that individuals in the Zululand reserves had herds of as many as three hundred to four hundred cattle. More tellingly, he argued that "one of the obstacles in the way of more economic use of the land is through the land-grabbing by men of importance in the community".\(^{26}\) In reply to a question about wealth among the Zulu, Chief Mgixo kaZiwedu Zulu (a grandson of Mpande) told the same commission that "some are very poor; in other words it \([\text{wealth}]\) is unevenly distributed".\(^{27}\) Chiefs, like Mgixo, constituted the wealthiest stratum within the reserves. Their status and role as allocators of land accorded them positions of advantage in gaining access to the most fertile areas within their wards for their personal use. Furthermore, the tribute that tribal leaders received from their wards, together with the higher sums their daughters commanded as lobolo, continually reinforced their material predominance. Chiefs and headmen also had a consistent source of monetary income by way of the fines that they imposed in the course of carrying out their judicial functions under customary law - they were also empowered to impose 'spot fines' for "any defiance or disregard for their orders"\(^{28}\) - and by way of the regular stipends they drew from the state. In the late 1920s, Zululand chiefs' stipends mainly fell between £250 and £350 per annum, depending on the size of their wards (Solomon's was the highest at £500 per annum).\(^{29}\) Chiefs had the largest cash incomes in the reserves and did not have to face the insecurities of possible unemployment - the NAD very rarely deposed chiefs. Commoner homesteads had no correspondingly large and stable insurance against the failure of the harvest; in such times they were
forced to divert more of their labour-power from their own agricultural activities to the wage sector, or resort to selling their cattle to generate cash for subsistence. The latter responses served, in the long term, to undermine the resilience and productive potentiality of commoner homesteads. In this way, years of poor crop yields had the effect of drawing more sharply the divisions of wealth within Zulu society.

The comparative wealth of chiefs and headmen was not so marked in Northern Natal, primarily because they had no more control over land allocation and use than commoners in their wards. The government's purchase of a farm in the Ngotshe district for Chief Kambi's personal use was an exception. Like every homestead head within their wards, chiefs on white-owned land had to negotiate their separate tenancy agreements with their white landlords. And because every homestead head was beholden to his respective landlord rather than his chief for the land upon which his homestead lay, and more often than not was required to offer labour service to his landlord, the authority of chiefs was attenuated and truncated. Moreover, chiefs on white farms were sometimes subject to the indignity of personally having to provide labour service to their landlords - which tended to act as a social leveller. When the CNC heard that Chief Mshudulwana of Paulpietersburg district had been required by his landlord to perform the "humiliating task" of wagon leader (normally performed by youngsters), he intervened and attempted to ensure that Chief Mshudulwana was not given such work again. Generally, the erosion of the status of chiefs in Northern Natal perturbed the CNC: it was in the interests of the "better government of the natives", he argued in 1928, that land be bought for the "personal occupation of chiefs themselves". But, as Rev. Mahamba of Dundee remarked to the Native Economic Commission, the reason why Africans were
"abandoning their chiefs" was because of the difficulties that all Africans (not only chiefs) experienced with land tenure in the white countryside. And indeed, those who had to remove during the wave of evictions in the late 1920s were in effect forced to 'abandon' their chiefs. These factors were compounded by ideological and cultural forces corrosive to the tribal order. Without fail, those individuals who have been mentioned so far who can be seen as part of a local Zulu petty bourgeoisie - Rev. S. D. Simelane, W. W. Ndhlovu, the Sibiya family, Daniel Vilakazi, Rev. T. Mathe, Rev. C. Buthelezi, Rev. M. Mhlongo, M. L. E. Maling - either lived, worked, or had originated from that part of the Zulu country which had become the Boer New Republic and, subsequently, Northern Natal.

These were conditions corrosive to the status of chiefs and sense of unity among each chief's ward that had no parallel in the reserves. The process of 'social levelling' in Northern Natal should not, however, be overemphasised. Most chiefs here were hereditary Zulu chiefs, and they retained considerable status at the ideological level: in the late 1920s they clearly held more sway than those in the white countryside of Natal proper. And, unlike commoners, they could still look to the state for financial support and special intervention in their personal tenancy problems. Nonetheless, it is more useful to regard chiefs in Northern Natal as a privileged and conservative component of the rank-and-file, rather than - as in the case of chiefs in the Zululand reserves - an entrenched class of wealthy aristocrats.

Hitherto, the Zulu petty bourgeoisie (as distinct from that in Natal proper) was comparatively underdeveloped and had only really come into being in Northern Natal; even there, the move against African landownership and cash tenancy after Union repressed its development. However, by the late 1920s there was a small stratum of Zulu in the reserves who pursued
careers as commercial farmers or trading brokers—and there were many more who aimed to do so. These individuals were predominantly western-influenced (whether through a basic education or through experience of urban life) and young. S. Mncwango, Mkwintye, and T. Kumalo were examples: all were commoners resident in the Nongoma district (none were exempted), and they gave evidence before the Native Economic Commission representing the 'Young Zulu Movement.' Mncwango made his living as a broker of skins and poultry, and was also keenly interested in commercial agriculture. There were an appreciable number of individuals like Mncwango who traded under hawkers' licences, and they provided the medium through which the local commercial farmers sold their produce. Others were taking out licences to open butcheries and, though prospective shopowners were being 'held back' by the white monopoly of trading stores, some of Zululand's trading stores were now managed by Zulu. Mkwintye was a successful commercial farmer in Zululand. He employed forty to sixty Zulu "assistants" on a seasonal basis, and his labourers were paid 1/- a day—the same rate that obtained for wage labour on white farms. Notwithstanding the successful few, Mncwango observed that prospects for "progressive agriculturalists" were poor in the reserves because chiefs and headmen (Mncwango lived in Chief Bowke's ward) refused to allocate them sufficient and suitable land. 'Progressive' individuals living in the reserves throughout the province of Natal were confronting opposition from the tribal elite. A representative of the 'Bantu Youth League' (an association similar to the Young Zulu Movement but based in the reserves of Natal proper) told the Native Economic Commission that chiefs held their wards in a "state of stagnation...new ideas coming from people other than chiefs and headmen receive no recognition; the door to individual initiative is closed and thus progress is hampered...".
Speaking generally of Natal and Zululand, Dube observed that tribal commoners opposed 'progress' as much as the chiefs themselves. 'Progress', in Dube's view, meant that "there must be some people getting ahead of the others" but "the old idea of communal life [means] that all people should stay on the same level". Wheelwright instanced a case in which an individual who fenced 'his' lands, employed labour and produced cash crops was "got at" by other reserve dwellers through witchcraft because he was deemed to be "apeing the white man". Tribal opposition was as much a reaction against the different social habits and values of 'progressive' Africans as a jealousy for the latter's private wealth. Oscroft told the Native Economic Commission that there was a "growing intolerance between tribal and detribalised natives" in Zululand; and Solomon reported that migrants returning to the reserves from the urban areas tended to find traditional food and housing to be "inconveniences".

The evolution of a small petty bourgeoisie in the Zululand reserves in the later half of the 1920s was a significant development. Specifically, it was to lend greater power to petty bourgeois interests in Inkatha. However, like the African petty bourgeoisie in both the white countryside and urban environs throughout the Union, the Zulu petty bourgeoisie in the reserves was stunted and repressed, and was primarily an aspirant class. Beneath the comparatively few who did fulfil their 'progressive' ambitions in Zululand, there were many who were struggling to do so - and in the meantime oscillated between wage labour outside Zululand and the fringes of tribal life at home. This latter group was particularly unstable and in practice formed an important component of the somewhat amorphous underclass, the rank-and-file.
Political developments among the Zulu and Natal African rank-and-file

The rank-and-file were indeed such an amorphous social grouping that it can be most succintly defined in a negative sense: broadly, it included those who were not chiefs and headmen in the reserves or were not relatively successful members of the petty bourgeoisie both in the reserves and in the 'white countryside'. As a broad rural underclass, comprised of disparate elements, the rank-and-file lacked objective unity within itself. The manifestations of a specifically rank-and-file political consciousness tended to be sporadic, isolated and often inconclusive. Nonetheless, during the late 1920s the rank-and-file developed a certain self-identity, based on a common experience of impoverishment, exploitation and insecurity. This was coupled with a shared frustration with 'the system' - whether this was represented by state officials and the laws they enforced, conservative tribal authorities and demanding parents, employers or landlords. Moreover, there developed a basis of shared political attitudes: a predisposition to reject established structures of authority and the modes of political representation that worked through them, a tendency to abjure acquiescence and 'polite pleading' in favour of organisation and action, an impatience with piecemeal reforms, and an enthusiasm for fundamental changes in property relations and the distribution of political power. These attitudes were expressed with varying degrees of conviction through the province of Natal. The power of chiefs and the extent to which the rural population felt themselves to be politically compartmentalised into discrete tribal units were not uniform throughout the province - and the particular socio-political conditions extant in the rural districts defined the parameters for the evolution of rank-and-file unity and consciousness. The power of local chiefs and the attitude they
adopted to the political inclinations of the rank-and-file was thus of great importance. Even more so was the attitude of Solomon: since popular consciousness accorded him the role of popular leader, Solomon in practice held the key to the political development of the rank-and-file.

As a rule, however, the tribal elite disavowed militancy and saw the development of popular protest as inimical to their social and political dominance. It is notable that in the regions in which social stratification was greatest and the rule of chiefs was most entrenched, popular protest was least in evidence. Nonetheless, even in the Zululand reserves, chiefs perceived their positions to be potentially threatened. This was to be a dynamic influence on the political stance of the tribal elite - and on the political alliance within Inkatha. The following account outlines some of the social and political forces at work in the rural areas which the tribal elite perceived to be threatening. It is important to remember that the Zulu royal house and Inkatha defined the whole province of Natal as its political domain and all the inhabitants as 'Zulu'; hence, developments among Natal Africans in the white countryside of Natal proper were not seen in isolation from those among the Zulu in Northern Natal and Zululand.

Throughout the province of Natal, the power base of the ICU lay not in the reserves but among the rural poor resident on white-owned land - and for clear reasons. Outside the reserves, the constraining tribal order was more fragile and 'social disintegration' was more pronounced. Reflecting the lesser material division between chiefs and common people in the white countryside, chiefs tended to identify more with the rank-and-file. Rather than deploying their influence in an attempt to undermine popular struggles (as did chiefs in the Zululand reserves), many chiefs in Northern Natal lent the latter their support - albeit conditionally and,
in practice, at the cost of dampening popular militancy. The white countryside of Natal proper came to be the storm-centre of rank-and-file militancy in the province, as was reflected in the strength of the ICU there, and Northern Natal was the region in which the ICU gained most support among the Zulu. Rank-and-file political concerns in Northern Natal, however, were mainly expressed through the medium of the 'Abaqulusi Land Union' (ALU) - a local ICU-derivative organisation established by Maling in 1927. Above all, the exploitative relations between tenants/labourers and landlords/employers in the white countryside caused rank-and-file political mobilisation to be far more urgent and political issues far clearer than in the reserves. As Maling expressed it (referring specifically to the Zulu rather than Natal Africans), whatever the problems of reserve dwellers, they were "infinitely better than people living on farms".

Although conditions on white farms gave cause for Zulu in Northern Natal to wage their separate struggles against their landlords and the state, the division between Northern Natal and the Zululand reserves should not be too boldly drawn. Not only were the Zulu in the two regions bound together by kinship linkages and tribal political affiliations (Chief Nkantini kaSitheku Zulu's ward, for example, was divided between the Emtonjaneni reserve and the Babanango sub-district): the unprecedented wave of tenant evictions that accompanied the extension of white commercial farming in the late 1920s caused physical translocations as homeless Zulu poured into the reserves for shelter. This had the twin effects of heightening the discontent of the reserves on account of overcrowding and land degeneration, and introducing to the reserves a body of inhabitants whose political outlooks had been shaped by direct experience of political struggle in the white countryside - and by the pronouncements of ICU and ALU leadership. Evictions and,
more broadly, decreasing land availability, were thus urgent political issues for Africans on both white farm land and in the reserves.

Local NAD officials in Northern Natal and Zululand were unusually explicit in their complaints about the "unscrupulous landlord...being unjust to his tenants", and they were well aware that the socio-economic consequences were not confined to the aggrieved tenants themselves. Maling held that more evictions took place in Northern Natal between 1928 and 1930 than in the whole twentieth century history of the region prior to 1928. A representative of a chief who lived in the Vryheid district held that generally "people on farms are being scattered and are drifting...being deprived of all that home connotes". Revealing their different perspective on the matter of evictions, chiefs in the neighbouring reserves complained of refugees "flocking" to 'their' land from not only Northern Natal but from Natal proper as well - and, as one chief put it, "crowding me out". Chief Mgixo of the Nongoma district vividly described the border between his reserve and white farm land as a "yawning crack that empties forth human beings". He continued that "these unfortunate people come along to me and plead with me to accommodate them; after all we are of them and they are of us...". Though Mgixo made efforts to accommodate the people themselves on his already overcrowded lands, he prevented them bringing their livestock with them. However, the response of the 'unfortunate people' to such additional deprivations was not only, as Mgixo related, to "just fold their arms and look at me in a sad way". Indeed, during the late 1920s the Zulu tribal elite in the reserves expended much energy in forestalling the growth of rank-and-file militancy which, to them, was coterminous with the breakdown of the tribal order and the corrosion of chiefly authority by 'young upstarts', 'agitators', 'self-seekers' or people with 'a bit
of book learning'. Although he was somewhat over-emphatic, there was considerable truth in the SNA's statement to the Select Committee on the 1926 'Prevention of Disorders Bill' (ie. anti-sedition Bill): "None of this\textsc{IU} and kindred\textsc{7} propaganda is being carried out in Zululand. The Zulu chiefs are very strict...they do not allow these agitators to come into Zululand."  

Apart from the impoverished new arrivals from the white farms, the reserves contained numbers of 'detribalised' Zulu. From the point of view of the tribal establishment, the latter were the abaqafi - or 'those whose heads have turned' who reneged on their 'tribal' obligations and did not offer financial support to their relatives. In 1927 Chief Kula of the Msinga district (in Natal proper, on the south-western border of Zululand) described "a certain element of the younger natives who are...becoming entirely separated from the tribal natives. They are found in the native reserves also. They are irresponsible and disrespectful and recognise no authority at all." More broadly, these people were part of the restive floating population of acculturated social 'misfits' and unfulfilled 'progressive' men - as Kula's description went to to indicate. There "is also this tendency amongst them \textsc{detribalised youngsters}," Kula observed, "that the ground allotted in the locations \textsc{reserves} should be recognised as belonging to certain individuals, but this is not recognised by tribal rule." The largest (and also the least volatile) part of the rank-and-file in the reserves comprised the inhabitants of small homesteads who no longer owned cattle and who, in the course of increasing land congestion, social stratification and labour migration, had been left with neither adequate land or labour-power to generate a subsistence by 'picking the eyes of the ground'. One response of these impoverished homestead heads was to look to their chiefs and headmen to assist them in forcing
the abagafi to fulfil their tribal obligations. But another was to dispense with such inherently conservative and piecemeal attempts to alleviate their poverty, and - alongside other restive elements within the Zulu, including the abagafi - lend support to militant leadership whose sweeping promises of more land and higher wages seemed to offer the long term solution.

The expression of popular discontent in the reserves - and the politicisation of the rank-and-file there - was consistently undercut by the rearguard action of chiefs, supported by state officials and white interest groups. When, for example, the ICU held a meeting in Empangeni in mid-1927, it was well attended by enthusiastic local Zulu. Two local chiefs, having been told that Solomon was also to be present, also attended. Soon afterwards, the Empangeni and District Farmers' Association and local NAD officials together convened an indaba with seven local chiefs and their headmen ('commoners' did not attend) to discuss how to eradicate the ICU. The meeting also discussed the disturbing influence of a firebrand "ex-minister" from Durban who had been in the region: he had reportedly told the locals that aggressive political action would force the authorities to redress grievances. Col. Tanner, magistrate of Empangeni, and George Higgs, sugar planter and representative of the local Farmers' Association, warned the intimate gathering of the consequences of ICU policy and emphasised that the main casualty would be the position of chiefs. Why listen to "a man who was nothing, who stood on a chair and waved his arms and cast his shadow over [you]", Higgs asked, and continued, "why must your grievances be voiced from a man in Durban?" The chiefs needed little persuasion.

In Northern Natal, the history of Maling and the ALU highlight the difficulties in the path of mobilising the rank-and-file
in a society in which tribal traditions weighed so heavily upon political consciousness. Maling's formation of a separate and regional ICU-style organisation after his unsuccessful debut at the 1926 Inkatha meeting, rather than assisting the new Vryheid branch of the ICU, was partly a reflection of his own personal ambition. Maling showed every sign of being as ambitious and fiery as Champion himself. However, the ALU was also designed to appeal to those notions of Zulu 'superiority' and exclusivity that formed such a tenacious component of the political traditions of Northern Natal. The name 'Abaqulusi Land Union' is itself significant: 'Land' identified the main political concern of the local inhabitants, and 'Abaqulusi' indicated that the organisation's leadership sought to integrate tradition with present popular protest. The Qulusi section in the Vryheid district - which formed a numerically small part of the ALU's political constituency - was traditionally a 'royal section' of the Zulu. In preconquest times the Qulusi were administered directly by the Zulu royal family and the Qulusi menfolk used to mobilise as an ibutho on their own (they were not conscripted into the usual age-grade amabutho). In the 1920s it retained its fervently royalist character and keen sense of military heritage. From the outset, therefore, the ALU attempted to come to terms with Zulu political traditions, rather than to present itself as a completely 'new' political organisation whose appeal was purely class-based.

The mood of the ALU's constituency in Northern Natal was illustrated in a statement that was drawn up in early 1927 following a number of regional meetings convened by Maling. Rather than dealing with grievances in a fragmentary fashion, the statement went to the heart of the matter: it contested white rights to the land in Northern Natal and called for the reversion of the land to the Zulu. Maling went to Cape Town and submitted this statement to A. B. Payn, MP for
Tembuland and leading parliamentary philanthropist. Payn arranged for Maling to see the Prime Minister personally, but this meeting served no purpose. On Maling's return to Northern Natal, the ALU's immediate priority was to compile comprehensive and plainly worded statements of Zulu tenants' and farm labourers' grievances, also including indictments of the behaviour of white farmers, the justice dispensed by magistrates' courts, and the partiality of local state officials. These formed the basis of a petition which was sent directly to the Prime Minister - an action that was regarded as an open breach of the etiquette of both indirect rule and employer-employee relations. Obviously struck by the directness of the petition, and also very sensitive to the growing power of the ICU in Natal proper, the NAD immediately arranged a thorough inquiry into the allegations. The petition itself, the evidence collected during the CNC's inquiry, and the CNC's subsequent report immediately predated the 1928-1930 period of accelerated evictions, and thus focussed on conditions of Zulu tenure and employment of white farms.

By the mid-1920s, the payment of cash rent for 'unbound' tenure on white-owned land in Northern Natal had been phased out: labour tenancy was the only way in which Zulu could retain access to land in the region. In the latter half of the 1920s the move among white landlords to exploit their landholdings more thoroughly for the purposes of commercial agriculture had adverse consequences for labour tenants in two broad respects. First, the plots of land available to the labour tenant for his personal use were reduced. Second, white farmers attempted to extract as much labour service as they were able from each homestead on their farms - making use of child labour and often requiring tenants to perform more than the six months free labour service that the 1913 Act had laid down as the maximum in Natal. Tenant homesteads which could not or would not acquiesce to such
demands were liable to retribution from the farmer (in the form of livestock seizure, for example) or, ultimately, eviction. Moreover, corporate capital flooded into the region, buying up farms from white landowners who had sunk deeply into debt during the post-war depression, and establishing large cotton plantations. On these plantations, of which the Candover Estates and Goss Estates were examples, labour tenancy was phased out and replaced by wage labour. For the Zulu in Northern Natal, these developments initiated a period of acute impoverishment and disruption of home life.

The ALU petition and the evidence given before the CNC's inquiry emphasised the autocratic and brutal nature of exploitation on white farms. Several complaints of physical assault were made against white farmers. In the course of a detailed investigation into one complaint, the CNC uncovered evidence that on the newly-established Goss Estates — comprising twelve cotton farms in the Ngotshe and Vryheid districts owned by a single company — staff were 'disciplined' by farm managers and Zulu "farm constables" by way of handcuffs, leg-irons, solitary detention in special "lock-ups" and arbitrary appropriation of personal property. Mtateni Ndwandwe, a labour tenant on a Goss Farm who had been subjected to all these forms of violence and who had provided eighteen months unbroken free service, stated that he had not complained to the local magistrate or police because "I thought Goss was acting under Government authority". Generally there was a sense among the rank-and-file in Northern Natal that state officials and farmers were in collusion: complaints were made that magistrates' courts offered little protection against farmers either breaching the statutory rights of labour tenants or dispensing their own 'justice' and punishment on their farms. Although the CNC felt the accusation of injustice in the magistrates' courts (ie.that
"Europeans always win") to be unfounded, he did not deny that farmers took the law into their own hands and forced their labour tenants to acquiesce under the threat of eviction.\(^71\)

As in Natal proper, farmers engaged complete homesteads in labour tenancy contracts (which were often verbal and thus easily 'modified' to suit the farmer) under what was known as the "kraalhead system".\(^72\) The contract was made with the homestead head and it was he who was responsible for ensuring that all his dependants discharged their 'contractual' obligations to the farmer. The labour contract was thus superimposed on the tribal hierarchy at the familial level, and, like indirect rule, was predicated on the survival of the tribal order. However, these contracts ultimately undermined the tribal order at its very base. Not only were sons and daughters required to perform six months free service, but they were often required to continue working on the farm afterwards at the "current rate of [farm\(^73\)] wages" (and frequent complaints were made that they were sometimes not paid at all\(^74\)) which meant that they could not seek more remunerative employment elsewhere. Moreover, sons could not look to their fathers or chiefs to provide land for them to establish their own homesteads and families. The high incidence of youth breaking free from their labour obligations to their fathers and landlords and deserting permanently to the towns was a direct consequence of these conditions.\(^75\) Following a desertion, the homestead head was responsible for either providing a replacement labourer at his own expense, or paying "damages" to the farmer. If the homestead head failed to do so, he faced eviction.\(^76\)

Even when tenant homesteads were not depleted of their full labour complement through the desertion of youths, they had difficulty in meeting their subsistence requirements and monetary needs. Since farmers made such stringent labour
service demands on all members of the tenant homestead - from children to the very elderly - throughout the seasonal cycle, little time and labour power was left for tenants to cultivate their own plots of land to produce a subsistence. Tenant homesteads thus became increasingly dependent on a cash income for food. In view of the poor local rates of pay, they were already hard pressed - or unable - to pay government taxes, the annual livestock dipping fees (in the reserves, dips were state controlled and the levy was standardised, but in Northern Natal, white farmers used their dipping tanks as "profit making concerns"), and provide for "general necessities"like clothing. Tenant homesteads thus looked to two sources of cash income: first, the sale of their livestock, and, second, remittances sent to them by members of the homestead who had taken up paid employment after the expiry of their six-month period of free service. Remittances sent 'home' from the urban areas were at best sporadic, which further reflected the breakdown of familial unity and the tribal ethos on which it was based. Rural dependants' complaints of the irresponsibility of youth were more forceful and widespread during the late 1920s in comparison to the early post-Union period: this suggests both that rural subsistence production had become less supportive and that the generational fissure in Zulu society had widened. Ultimately, especially after they had no more cattle which they were able to sell (the sale of tenant livestock, incidentally, was applauded by white farmers, and high dipping charges encouraged the process), tenant homesteads became dependent on food rations from their landlords and employers. The 'debt' incurred by the receipt of food could be repaid in the form of labour service over and above the six-month period of free service.

The conditions under which labour tenants in Northern Natal lived and worked varied according to the different labour
tenancy contracts that respective farmer/employers enforced. Nonetheless, it was a trend in the late 1920s that considerable numbers of Zulu in Northern Natal were becoming enmeshed in a downward spiral of impoverishment that was transforming them from labour tenants into rural serfs, almost wholly dependent on their landlords for daily survival and all the more exploitable for it. Conditions on the twelve farms of the Goss Estates provided an example. Here, individual labourers (even children) were summarily shifted from one farm to another, and those who had completed their term of free service were contractually not free to choose their own employment - they were still obliged to "turn out when called upon to perform any work which the landlord may require to be done". Moreover, no tenant was permitted to leave the Goss farm on which he or she was employed at any time "for any purpose whatsoever without the written permission of the landlord". Although the CNC noted that "the younger Natives" were generally leaving for the towns, he opined that if conditions were as bad as had been represented there would be a "general exodus of tenants from farms" - and this was not occurring. Such a 'general exodus' was, however, underway within a year. The cause was not voluntary migration on the part of tenants but forcible evictions on the part of white farmers. Rather than signifying that farmers needed less labour, evictions reflect that farmers were exploiting more thoroughly the labour tenants that they chose to retain. Despite the worsening conditions on white farms, Zulu were loathe to sever their connections with the land of their ancestors on which, if little else, they could still cultivate hollow illusions of former independence. Moreover, because east coast fever regulations laid down that livestock could not be moved from one district to another without expensive veterinarian and bureaucratic sanction, emigre tenants were sometimes forced to "lose all they possess" in the course of moving.
The ALU petition and the CNC's inquiry it provoked were in practice of little material benefit to labour tenants in Northern Natal as a whole. The CNC's report called for minor changes in judicial practice in the magistrates' courts (designed to enlighten tenants of their rights), the standardisation of labour tenancy contracts, and, most important, the establishment of reserve areas in Northern Natal - he was satisfied that the Zulu could not raise the requisite cash for land purchase by means of 'tribal levies'. No action, however, was taken. And despite the evidence he had collected, the CNC still tended to subscribe to the colonial 'agitator thesis' on African protest: he argued that the ALU and ICU had "accentuated the state of affairs in the region". It is notable, however, that the influence of the ALU on the Goss Estates, which led forty tenants to go on strike during the CNC's inquiry and represent themselves to the CNC in a single deputation, resulted in an important victory. The CNC made special efforts to investigate conditions on the Goss Estates, and not only prevailed on management not to punish the strikers but also to ameliorate the terms of its labour tenancy contracts. In the final analysis, there is little doubt that the CNC's inquiry served to contain the further development of popular protest in Northern Natal. Indeed, striking Goss tenants immediately obeyed the CNC's instruction to return to work after he had promised that the NAD would negotiate with Goss management on their behalf. In the midlands of Natal proper - where racial violence was shortly to erupt - the Natal NAD head office had at no stage formally intervened to play the role of an impartial intermediary between the rank-and-file and white farmers.

The CNC's inquiry highlighted two other factors that hindered the development of rank-and-file militancy in Northern Natal to a level comparable to that in Natal proper. First, the
predominantly Afrikaner settlers in the region displayed a marked disregard for the rule of law, and were prone to 'administer' the African inhabitants of their farms in a manner reminiscent of the traditions of the white South African frontier. The transition to capitalist relations of production was carried through with a ruthlessness underpinned by an everyday brutality that seems to have been unequalled in the countryside of Natal proper. That the rank-and-file in Northern Natal were subject to more stringent everyday repression, and had every cause to believe that not only their livelihoods but their lives were endangered if they dropped their facade of servility, was certainly a reason why it could not mobilise so openly as the rank-and-file in the neighbouring Natal midlands. Although there were isolated cases of Northern Natal farmers being fined for assault, local police and NAD officials generally turned a blind eye to the flagrant transgressions of civil and criminal law that were committed on white farms. 87

Second, and most important, the hierarchical nature of Zulu society was reflected in the ALU - which proved to be a profoundly undemocratic organisation. Positions of leadership remained in the hands of unfulfilled 'progressive' men like Maling, and the popular appeal of the organisation relied heavily on the moral support it received from local chiefs. The apogee of rank-and-file radicalism in Natal proper was reached when 'ordinary people' - with neither educational or hereditary claims to positions of leadership - adopted the Natal ICU as their own representative organisation and became unpaid local organisers or, in Bradford's words, "self-appointed propagandists". 88 By contrast, the ALU's local leadership was never infused by Zulu 'ordinary people'. For all their radical and emotive exhortations, both Maling of the ALU and Champion of the Natal ICU were prone to be less militant in practice than the political
constituencies they purported to represent. When the Goss tenants went on strike, for example, Maling immediately "disclaimed all responsibility for what they had done" - just as the Natal ICU headquarters in Durban had disowned the spontaneous strikes that took place in Durban and on the Northern Natal coal mines during 1927.89

Maling's role of leadership among the Zulu rank-and-file was underpinned by the status and skills that a petty bourgeois background and a mission education had imparted to him. Even so, despite the inroads that white occupation had made on the status of chiefs in Northern Natal, the Zulu inhabitants did not easily transfer the role of political leadership to 'commoners' like Maling when it came to so weighty a matter as confronting white rule. Although the socio-economic conditions in Northern Natal were virtually indistinguishable from those which fostered the ebullient militancy of the ICU in the Natal midlands, Maling was operating in a context in which cultural and political traditions were both more rigid and tenacious - as his rebuttal at the hands of Inkatha's leadership had emphasised. The Zulu looked to tribal leadership to give sanction and morale to popular protest. But, in the words of the CNC, it was a "significant fact" that "no Chief associated himself with Malinga's representations" or presented himself voluntarily to give evidence before the CNC's inquiry.90 This was despite the support that chiefs had pledged the ALU before the inquiry.91 However, when the CNC summoned certain chiefs to him to give evidence, they left him in "no doubt...that they are solidly with Maling in regard to the representations touching land".92 The stance of chiefs in Northern Natal was ambiguous: while they tended to support the political objectives of popular movements they were extremely hesitant to do so openly. Thus chiefs stopped short from taking up the vital popular role that
popular consciousness accorded them. Because of their ambiguity, they often tended to undermine the militancy and effectiveness of popular protest from within. The action of one chief resident near the border between the Ngutu district and Babanango sub-district provides an illustrative example. When it became known that this chief's whole ward - including the chief - supported the ICU, the magistrate of Ngutu, F. W. Ahrens, refused to hear any representations from them. The chief immediately responded by calling on Ahrens to apologise for "offending" him, to offer £1 as obeisance, and to promise that his ward would leave the ICU.

The available evidence indicates that there were many parallels between the ALU and the Natal ICU (ie. the latter's rural network) during late 1926 and early 1927. The two organisations shared essentially the same class character, political objectives, and militant style. The ALU petition clearly identified ordinary labour tenants in Northern Natal as the group that the ALU represented - not tenant chiefs in particular, and categorically not the Northern Natal petty bourgeois establishment. Like the Natal ICU, ALU leadership was mainly composed of men of some education who, in occupational terms, stood in the lower echelons of the petty bourgeoisie. Chiefs or chiefs' representatives did not hold positions on the executive committee (although chiefs were represented in the ALU): the early ALU did not take special cognisance of the tribal political order, for it perceived itself to be the direct representative organisation of the rank-and-file. The ALU chairman, A. M. Khubeka, and the regional organiser in Paulpietersburg district, E. H. S. Xaba, both described themselves as 'evangelists', but neither were ordained.

Maling himself was born to a Wesleyan Methodist family of
Newcastle sharecroppers. P. Maling, who was evidently M. L. E. (Lymon) Maling's father or uncle, was an archetypal example of the petty bourgeois hamba kahle establishment of 'black Englishmen'. He was a founder member of the NNC, had subsequently acted as a representative of the Wesleyan Methodist Chief T. Gule of the Newcastle district. It is significant that P. Maling chose to change his name from the original Zulu 'Malinga' to the more English-sounding 'Maling' (Lymon Maling sometimes reverted to the Zulu form). Lymon Maling, however, had reached adulthood in the post-Union period when the prosperity and status of the colonial African petty bourgeoisie was being undermined. Despite his fluent English, literacy and high-society inclinations (as reflected in his taste in clothing), he had only managed to penetrate the lower ranks of the urban salariat before turning to full-time politics. In these respects, Lymon Maling's personal history correlates closely with that of Gilbert Coka, a leading figure in the ICU, whose relatively prosperous Vryheid sharecropping parents had moved to town soon after Union when their landlord attempted to bind them to labour tenancy. Thus both Lymon and Gilbert came from 'respectable' backgrounds, and, like many others of their generation, found difficulty in fulfilling their own and their parents' aspirations. It was because this generation was, Bradford argues, "being precipitated into the under-classes" that it was "ideologically linked" to the latter.

Despite their early similarities, however, the political priorities of the ALU and Natal ICU diverged during 1927. In the white countryside of Natal proper, the Natal ICU continued to focus on rank-and-file grievances, and its local branch executives were infused by local 'commoners'. But the ALU increasingly devoted its attention in the first instance to tribal authorities, in an attempt to secure the latter's open and active support, and only in the second instance
to the rank-and-file. The ALU was partly forced to do so by the political consciousness of the Northern Natal rank-and-file itself — which was preoccupied with Zulu chiefs and Zulu nationalism. Thus the ALU leadership sought to associate itself with the latter in order to consolidate its popular support. In effect, the Northern Natal rank-and-file dug its own political grave in the ALU: the emphasis of ALU activities came to lie less in practical politics — the redress of material grievances among the rank-and-file — and more in the realm of ideology. Moreover, Maling's militant spirit, which was in the first place somewhat fragile, was to be increasingly dampened as his direct political contact with the rank-and-file decreased.

By late 1927, the ALU had had some success in gaining the support of chiefs. Chief Sikukuku Sibisi (Paulpietersburg district), Chief Mtshikila Buthelezi (Ngotshe district) and Chief Hali Mdlalose (Vryheid district) were all represented in the organisation. Chief Hali's support was especially important. His ward included most of the Qulusi section in the Vryheid district, and, moreover, his representative in the ALU was Zinyo Mdlalose, a brother of Solomon's mother, Silomo Mdlalose, and one of Solomon's lesser izinduna. As soon as the NAD became aware of the ALU's new-found support among chiefs, the SNA instructed that chiefs be informed that their allowing the ALU to represent them would "lessen their own dignity, abdicate their privilege and acknowledge their inability to perform their proper functions". Simultaneously, he suggested that the CNC personally warn Maling that he was "courting inconvenient consequences to himself".

Maling's ideological preoccupation with chiefs and Zulu nationalism in practice served to cripple the effectiveness of the ALU. Not only were chiefs themselves inclined to be considerably less volatile than ordinary labour tenants and
farm labourers, but, as state employees, they were more amenable to NAD 'advice' - which inevitably influenced the ALU through the chief's representatives in the organisation. It is significant that when it became known in September 1927 that Hertzog was to visit Vryheid, Maling called upon the magistrate of Vryheid with two traditional Zulu earthenware pots which he wished Hertzog to accept as a gift. Each pot bore Hertzog's name, the date 1927, and the initials "Z. N." which stood for "Zulu Nation". Such a conciliatory or even ingratiating gesture would have been very out of character for Maling in late 1926 or early 1927. Like Inkatha, the ALU set out to affirm its political legitimacy among the rank-and-file by presenting itself not only as a vehicle for Zulu nationalism but as an organisation which was in some way 'recognised' by the government. The magistrate of Vryheid astutely observed that the prospective presentation to the Prime Minister was probably a ruse to gain government recognition - and the SNA ruled that the pots would not be accepted.

It seems that the ALU dissolved soon after the CNC's inquiry in January 1928. Maling thereafter turned his attention to Inkatha, attempting once more to insinuate himself into the organisation as a delegate representing Northern Natal. The reason why Maling did so was probably because Inkatha was formalised in early 1928, on the basis of a new constitution drawn up by some of the organisation's new-found white allies, and it seemed that it was soon to be recognised by the government. As they were during the 1926 Inkatha meeting, Maling's class identification and militant views were disdained by Inkatha's leadership in 1928. But before relating the fate of Maling in his problematical role as 'militant' and 'rank-and-file representative' in Inkatha, it is necessary to identify the immediate reasons why Inkatha had attracted white allies and was formalised primarily through their efforts
in early 1928.

The 'hlonipa' code of social etiquette (which affirmed acceptance of sexual role and social rank) and the 'khonza' custom (which prescribed obedience to elders, social 'superiors' and political 'authority') were socio-political traditions common to both Zulu and Natal African society. Among Natal Africans in Natal proper, however, such conservative traditions demanding obeisance and 'respect' were not as tenacious and had never been as rigid. Moreover, Natal African society was considerably less stratified in both a material and political sense than in Zululand, and popular protest was less dependent on the sanction of tribal or royal authorities. For these reasons, the impediments to the growth of rank-and-file militancy were not so great in Natal proper, and both the petty bourgeois establishment and tribal authorities were less able to undermine the increasing radicalism of popular politics there. But Inkatha had become the representative organisation of the conservative petty bourgeoisie and tribal authorities from all over the province of Natal after 1925 - chiefs from the reserves of Natal proper were increasingly represented in the organisation - and both Solomon and Inkatha were as concerned about the rise of militant popular movements south of the Tugela as in Northern Natal and Zululand.

In the white countryside of the Natal midlands during 1927 and 1928, rank-and-file grievances were expressed with a rigour that was unprecedented since 1906. Champion's role as general secretary of the Natal ICU was certainly important in this context. But it was the local ICU organisers who, issuing from the communities they represented and being closely aquainted with the burning local issues of evictions, wage levels and labour conditions on white farms, were primarily responsible for disseminating the radical message in the most
turbulent districts of Umvoti, Kranskop and New Hanover. The latter proclaimed that the land rightly belonged to the black people, and the whites and white rule were to be driven from the country: as Bradford argues, their preoccupations were less with wages and the terms of labour tenancy than with the eradication of wage labour and labour obligations altogether. Local officials simultaneously spoke the language of Zulu nationalism, urging attendance at separatist, rather than white churches, and invoking Zulu royal symbols and memories of the 1906 rebellion. Soon after Zabuloni Gwaza became ICU branch secretary in Greytown (Umvoti district) in mid-1927, he personally smashed a wreath on the graves of white policemen killed in 1906, and proudly announced this to local Africans. 105

Apart from offering a vision of a prosperous future unburdened by white rule, the ICU also promised - and often provided - its supporters immediate practical benefits. It employed lawyers to act in court for members who brought evidence of maltreatment or harsh contracts of tenancy and employment to its offices, and was sometimes successful in reversing eviction orders through legal action. From mid-1927, Champion was also conducting much-publicised negotiations on behalf of the Natal ICU for the purchase of farms in the Natal midlands on which to settle evicted members - which proved to be unsuccessful, as were those conducted by national leader Kadalie on the latter's visits to Natal. 106 Thus the ICU ultimately did not fulfil its promise to provide land for its members; nor its promise that members would get 8/- a day as a minimum wage - the figure currently being demanded by the Labour Party for whites. 107 Even when these 'failures' became evident in 1928, however, they did little to quell enthusiasm for the ICU.

During 1927, ICU membership mushroomed as Natal Africans flocked...
to ICU meetings in the small towns of the white countryside to buy their 'red tickets'. By early 1928, Umvoti membership allegedly amounted to over 80 per cent of the adult population of the district. The political consequences were soon apparent to white farmers. Many tenants now simply refused to obey eviction orders - and resolutely returned to their old homes even after they had been forcibly evicted - and farmers were increasingly forced to go to court to have their eviction orders enforced. Moreover, when good rains provided an unusually good harvest in 1927, farmers all over the Natal midlands found that many in their workforces refused to continue working for less than 8/- a day. The political impact of this 'strike' became more accentuated as it persisted well into the labour-intensive wattle stripping season. Reflecting the new mood of the African population in the Natal midlands, the magistrate of Umvoti reported a significant increase in the incidence of 'crime', and in particular, assaults on whites.108

Such developments were cause for intense consternation among white farmers and the white public at large: the role of the ICU was interpreted as a threat not only to employer interests but also to white rule itself, 'white civilisation', and the physical safety of white families in the countryside. As early as September 1926, when the dramatic expansion of the ICU in the countryside had just begun, the Natal Witness published an alarmed account of ICU support and activities in the Natal midlands. This article, entitled "Watch the ICU", expressed a plethora of revealing fears: the ICU leaders did not intend to limit themselves to their stated 'trades union' aims, they were recruiting by way of a "gang spirit", Natal Africans were "naturally combative", and a "General Strike" was imminent. Europeans had to take countermeasures, it argued, and called on the government for the introduction of a sedition bill.109
White fears became more widespread during 1927, when the work stoppages on white farms were accompanied by strikes on the Northern Natal coal mines and at the Durban docks. Farmers' Associations and MPs for the Natal country constituencies made repeated calls for police and NAD reprisals against the ICU, and for the enactment of repressive legislation to enable the latter to do so more efficiently. Demands were also made for changes to the Masters and Servants Law which would serve to tighten control over the rural labour force and define breaches of employment contracts as a criminal rather than a civil offence. But rural whites' strategy was not merely to rely on state coercion, as was reflected in the widespread "counter defensive action", as the MP for Weenen described it, on the part of farmers in evicting or refusing to employ any African who was believed to be an ICU member. Such class action, which was made 'official' policy by various local Farmers' Associations in early 1927, took effect in the most troubled midlands districts of Umvoti, Kranskop and New Hanover and also the neighbouring districts of Weenen, Estcourt and Dundee. Furthermore, rural whites mobilised through the medium of 'vigilance associations' - often formed on the initiative of the local Farmers' Association - which were dedicated to the defence of all the ICU was perceived to threaten. Perhaps the most belligerent of these, the aptly-named 'Anti-ICU', was formed in early 1928 in the Umvoti district soon after one hundred gravestones were overturned in Greytown's white cemetery - allegedly by an ICU activist.

In the context of both European and African beliefs surrounding death and the afterlife, the wrecking of gravesites was an act of sacrilege. The desecration of white graves in Greytown in February 1928 occasioned fear, anger and deep personal distress among the white community. Undoubtedly it was designed to do so, while, as Bradford suggests,
simultaneously appealing to a sense of revenge among those Africans whose ancestors' graves had been ploughed over by landlords. But given the mystical ties that Africans traditionally believed to conjoin ancestral spirits, their living descendants, and the land in which ancestors were buried, the gesture can be seen to have had a deeper symbolic meaning. It amounted to a repudiation of the right of the white community to become spiritually and materially 'embedded' in the land, and a 'policy statement' that white occupation was not permanent. That one white and one black cowtail had been placed at the cemetery - which evoked associations with traditional Zulu war symbols and the tshokobesi badges worn by the rebels in 1906 - is further testimony to the way in which traditional symbols and beliefs were now being interwoven with what was essentially rank-and-file class action.\textsuperscript{112}

The gestures made in the cemetery transformed what had hitherto been a simmering class conflict with racial or nationalist overtones into a series of violent racial confrontations in the countryside. Armed with shotguns, incensed whites first grappled with police guarding the cell containing Zabuloni Gwanza, the ICU official who had been arrested as the prime suspect. Thereafter the Greytown men scoured Greytown and the Umvoti countryside for all trace of the ICU, and fired the ICU offices in Greytown and the nearby village of Kranskop despite the defensive efforts of local ICU members and the police. In the five days of race violence that ensued, white mobs also attacked ICU property in Bergville, Estcourt, Weenen and Pietermaritzburg itself.

At Estcourt the local magistrate condoned the action taken by the white mobs: who could blame them, he wrote to the SNA, if they "adopt primitive measures for redress" if the state had taken inadequate action against the "noxious society
Tacit support for the white reprisals was widespread both within departments of state and the white public. Indeed, the ICU assailed almost every aspect of white rule and thus attracted explicit condemnation from almost every quarter of the white establishment. While the organisation's class character and 'direct action' strategy were a threat to property and 'the peace', its ideologues' Marxist-derived denunciations of religion - and Christianity in particular - were an offence to the god that the colonisers had brought with them. In July 1927, the Ecclesiastical Authorities of the 'Roman Catholic Church of South Africa and Rhodesia' responded in kind to the ICU's ideological warfare by pronouncing that all Catholics who were ICU members be refused the sacraments - an injunction that the Pope subsequently confirmed. In parliament, the eradication of the ICU and the enactment of a more disciplinary 'native policy' was now being presented as the most urgent objective facing the state. Deane, the MP for Umvoti, and, more especially, Marwick and Nicholls were leading protagonists of this cause.

As the social forces which physically clashed in March 1928 were polarising during 1927, the leading exponents of Natal African popular interests had come increasingly to issue from the ranks of local 'commoners' who were mainly young and without formal education; the political role of tribal authorities had become increasingly peripheral. Certainly the NAD instructions to local chiefs in mid-1927 to inform their wards that farmers would not be dispossessed of their land and that tenants would not be freed from their labour obligations did little to dampen popular support for the ICU. Deane nonetheless looked upon African chiefs within his constituency and elsewhere in the province as allies against the ICU - although his statement that they "prohibited agitators addressing meetings and they did not allow their young men to attend..." was an exaggeration of their practical
role. There is in fact little evidence that chiefs resident on white farms resolutely and of their own volition took actions to undermine the ICU, nor had the power to do so. Indeed, it seems that at least one openly sympathised with the ICU. A meeting of Kranskop farmers in May 1927 called upon the government to take punitive action against Kranskop Chief Mxamo, since, it was alleged, an ICU meeting that had recently taken place in his ward was both arranged and supported by him.

It is apparent, however, that the different responses of Zulu chiefs in the Zululand reserves on the one hand and in Northern Natal on the other was mirrored in Natal proper. The most vociferous African opponents of the ICU in the Natal midlands were chiefs who were resident on reserve land. In giving evidence before the select committee on Hertzog's Native Bills (Marwick and Nicholls were members of this committee) in June 1927, Chief Kula of the Msinga district and Chief Swayimana of the New Hanover district delivered broadside attacks on all "detribalised" elements in African society, and the ICU "thieves" with whom they were associated. They claimed that ICU activists had not penetrated their wards - even though the latter abutted the Umvoti, Kranskop and Weenen stormcentres. Both emphasised the disciplinary virtues of tribalism, and felt that "the proper system of rule was by a king and council", and felt that "Solomon is by birth the big chief of the natives in Natal". It was likely that they were Inkatha members.

Until August 1927, neither Solomon personally nor Inkatha had made any public comment on the struggles that were being waged in the countryside under the ICU banner. In that month, however, Solomon made a bitter attack on the ICU, which was publicised through the columns of Ilanga lase Natal. Since he had heard that the ICU was in the countryside,
including Babanango and Vryheid, Solomon said, he realised that it was not the "town movement" he had originally thought it to be. At no stage had ICU leaders reported to him. Moreover, it was "wicked" that they presented themselves as "independent makers of law", capable of both forcing Europeans to pay 8/- a day in wages and seizing farms. Solomon reminded the readers what had happened to the white miners who had "tried to do things unconstitutionally" in 1922. The people were now being misled, he concluded, and it was the duty of chiefs and headmen to "kill the ICU in their tribes". In a tract published in English, the editor, Dube, added his own observations. These highlighted the threat that Natal's kholwa landowners and employers of labour felt the ICU to pose to them:

(Solomon) regards the activities of the leaders ...as very dangerous... The ICU are exploiting poor Native workers.... The leaders are irresponsible, they do not understand the relations of capital to labour, the need for investment, ...what workers are they looking for in the native areas and reserves? Are any of their leaders engaged in business employing a number of people for farming and paying 8 shillings a day to their workers? How about that for the men of Groutville, Amanzimtoti and Ifafa! Are they prepared to pay their employees that wage? How long can they raise cane at a profit if they pay such wages?

These twin statements expressing unity between Inkatha's tribal and petty bourgeois elites against the ICU - which Champion described as an "underground political plot of a gang of Bantu political traitors" - evidently had not been solicited by either the NAD or white farmers' representatives. They alerted the latter, however, to the role that Solomon and Inkatha could play in combatting the ICU. Twelve days after Solomon's and Dube's views were published, the intimate 'anti-ICU indaba' between George Higgs (Empangeni
and District Farmers' Association), Col. Tanner (Magistrate at Empangeni), and local chiefs and headmen - as related above - took place at Empangeni. That local ICU officials had recently claimed that they had Solomon's sanction had particularly perturbed local whites, but there is no evidence to suggest that either Higgs or Tanner knew of Solomon's public denunciation of the ICU when the indaba was convened. But at the close of the indaba, Higgs introduced one Saul Gumede to the assembled chiefs who then read Solomon's views to them. None of the tribal leaders present had already heard of Solomon's instructions that they 'kill the ICU' in their wards, and the latter had a great impact on them. As one chief remarked, "the position had now been made clear, and we know what to do". For the Zululand Times reporter who attended, the attitude adopted by the chiefs at the indaba, and the influence that Solomon's wards had so clearly exerted on them, "generated the wish that the old days were back again and that the ICU could be dealt with by the Chiefs themselves".123

Shortly afterwards, a similar but far larger indaba took place on the Campbell Sugar Estates in Mount Edgecombe in Natal proper, inland of Durban. It was presided over by William Campbell, leading Natal sugar baron, and the most prominent personnel of the Zulu royal family and Inkatha: Solomon, Mnyaiza, Dube and Bhulose. The proceedings took the form of an 'anti-ICU festival', nine head of cattle and beer having been provided for the large workforce that attended.124

In an attempt to counter the propaganda disseminated at such meetings, Champion published a pamphlet entitled "The Truth about the ICU" in which he slated the Campbell indaba in characteristic style: "The workers' minds were set thinking of a new economic gospel...many glasses were consumed to make them forget the new gospel...there was an organisation
to be killed and the ICU lamb was there to be slaughtered all to the honour of one who is of the royal blood "Solomon." Despite the fact that Solomon had by then clearly announced himself to be antagonistic to the ICU, Champion studiously avoided any criticism of Solomon personally for attending the Campbell indaba. Instead, Champion sought to suggest that Solomon was not in full agreement with the proceedings, and had attended somewhat unwittingly and only on the advice of Dube - who was there in the capacity of church minister "to bless the occasion" and "mouthpiece of the son of Dinuzulu". Thus Champion heaped scorn on Dube:

When educated men who are the accepted leaders of the people play the role of Mr Facing-both-ways, when they go so far as to mislead ignorant chiefs, members of the royal blood, when ministers of the gospel of Christ stoop so low as to take advantage of the weak...the position becomes deplorable and outrageous.

He emphasised that Solomon merely "sat still, with the marked feelings as of one who realised the seriousness of the occasion...Solomon maintained his silence, to the amazement of the crowds".125

The anti-ICU gatherings presided over by representatives of white farmers, the NAD, Zululand's tribal elite and the petty bourgeois establishment, following shortly after Solomon's and Dube's denunciations of the ICU through the columns of Ilanga lase Natal, signified that new class were being made explicit - and these were soon to be embodied in the reconstituted Inkatha of 1928. Before giving an account of Inkatha's reconstitution, however, it is necessary to reflect further on the seminal role played by militant rank-and-file politics in forging a political situation conducive to Inkatha's recovery from its post-1925 period of internal discord and directionlessness.
Popular consciousness and the ironic courtships: ICU leaders approach Solomon

By early 1928, African politics in the province of Natal had entered a period in their history in which class divisions within African society were reflected at the political level more clearly and with greater emotional power than ever before. That white employer interests and the NAD directly intervened to manipulate African leadership and popular consciousness made the class dynamics of African politics in the province yet more complex. Nonetheless, there were direct parallels between the way in which African politics developed during 1924 - when class divisions were also clearly represented at the political level, following the rise to prominence of militant leaders who appealed to the rank-and-file - and the period late 1927 to early 1928. In both periods, the importance that popular consciousness attached to the Zulu royal family was highlighted, as was the practical political role played by the Zulu royal family. It is illuminating to outline the similarities between these two periods - which both led to the reorganisation and formalisation of Inkatha as an alliance of elites which opposed rank-and-file militancy.

In 1924, before the ICU became a significant political force in the province, the NNC had become radicalised when key members of its conservative petty bourgeois leadership, Dube and Bhulose, were deposed and the militants Gumede and Madune were elected to the NNC executive committee. Although they did so with ultimately less success than leaders like Maling and Champion of the later period, Gumede and Madune in 1924 adopted the role of militant leaders who in the first instance represented the rank-and-file. The political trends reflected in the rise of Gumede, Madune, Maling and Champion respectively to positions of political influence met with the disapproval of the tribal elite, and particularly the petty bourgeois establishment - which, of all elements in African society, was most distanced
from the basic issues of evictions, working conditions and wage levels in both rural and urban areas. In their attempts to consolidate their political standing among the rank-and-file, however, all of these militant leaders at their respective historical 'moments' sought to associate the Zulu royal family or Zulu nationalism with popular protest. All were well aware that the rank-and-file increasingly looked to the Zulu royal family as a source of political morale in times of militancy— as 1906 had demonstrated so clearly. In both 1924 and 1928, an important area of struggle between militant leaders and their political opponents was the battle for the 'royal patronage'.

Thus Gumede announced in one of his first presidential addresses in 1924 that the 'new' NNC was to work together with both the ICU and the nascent Inkatha organisation, and would pay particular attention to land alienation in Zululand. And subsequently the NNC invited Solomon personally to attend NNC functions. Similarly, Maling in early 1928 was attempting to find a niche within Inkatha having failed to do so in 1926, and having failed to independently associate himself with Zulu nationalism despite his appropriation of the name 'Abaqulusi', contacts with Zulu chiefs, and attempts to make a public presentation to the Prime Minister on behalf of the Zulu nation. Also in early 1928, and far more significant, Kadalie, the national ICU leader, and Champion were separately attempting to forge concrete links with Solomon, as will be related below.

In 1924, the radicalisation of the NNC lent urgency to the attempts on the part of the petty bourgeois establishment to make a political alliance with Solomon and the tribal elite. It succeeded in October 1924: Inkatha was transformed from little more than a moribund 'Zulu National Fund' into an active political organisation under the joint chairmanship
of deposed NNC leaders Dube and Bhulose, and Inkatha pleaded for government recognition. Thus it was made clear that, under pressure to make a 'choice', the Zulu royal family was more disposed to ally itself with representatives of the petty bourgeois establishment than a militant rank-and-file, and that it favoured a collaborative rather than 'confrontationist' political strategy. Similarly, the activities of especially the Natal ICU during 1927 acted as a catalyst that united all those anxious to counter rank-and-file militancy. And the approaches made to Solomon by Kadalie and Champion in early 1928 further emphasised the urgency of formally and publicly clarifying Solomon's antagonism towards the ICU. Indeed, local ICU officials, like those at Empangeni, were wont to claim Solomon's sanction if local ignorance of Solomon's views on the ICU enabled them to do so, and Champion had published a pamphlet that was calculated to ensure that an element of doubt remained about what Solomon's views really were - which Solomon could barely have made more explicit. The June 1928 Inkatha meeting, which resolved to accept a new 'official' constitution drawn up by the leading Durban solicitors 'Nicholson and Thorpe', signified that a new alliance around the figurehead of Solomon had taken shape - which covertly included representatives of white landowner and employer interests and had the qualified approval of the Natal NAD. In both periods, therefore, rank-and-file militancy played a negative but leading role in strengthening Inkatha as perhaps its most influential opponent - even though the alliances within Inkatha were in themselves problematical.

The negotiations between the various interest groups that were to comprise the new Inkatha alliance of 1928 took place at a time when Zulu nationalism was coming to play an increasingly important role in the articulation of popular protest in the province of Natal. Speaking in 1930 about
Africans from all over the province - including the towns - who had rejected the authority of 'their' chiefs, Oscroft remarked that "it is an amusing thing when you see these detribalised natives coming to the Zululand National gatherings how they konza [sic] to the [Zulu] chiefs, especially Chief Solomon. It is very marked."129 State officials, white farmers' representatives, petty bourgeois establishment leaders and rank-and-file leaders alike were well aware that the act of khonza'ing to Solomon was not merely a politically innocent expression of personal devotion. To them, Solomon represented a key means by which popular consciousness could be politically manipulated. During the period 1927 to 1930 - which was a highwatermark of popular protest in the province - Solomon was for this reason subjected to unprecedented pressure by diverse political organisations and interest groups to use his influence to support their respective political objectives.

In this period when the rank-and-file increasingly felt the need to perceive themselves as 'Zulu warriors' (popular protest was conducted almost exclusively by males at this time) when confronting white employers, the state or municipal authorities, leaders like Champion grappled with popular consciousness by appealing simultaneously to popular class interests and popular 'Zuluness'. In Durban, which was Champion's most important urban constituency, African workers had long interwoven traditional Zulu quasi-combative customs into popular culture. This was particularly reflected in the ngoma dance groups (the dances derived directly from the giya'ing performed by the amabutho, and by clan groups at traditional weddings) which were an important form of popular association and entertainment in the city. Paul la Hausse suggests that links existed between ngoma groups and the belligerent amalaita gangs (comprised of young male 'criminals', often unemployed), and that the 'faction fights' that occurred
between the latter were possibly "expressions of intra-working class competition for jobs". The way in which traditional Zulu symbols and concepts were employed in the late 1920s to serve contemporary popular economic and political objectives were especially clear during the disturbances surrounding the 1929 boycott of the Durban Municipal Native Affairs Department beer halls - whose monopoly over the sale of utshwala (beer) to urban Africans financed African administration in the city. Utshwala was referred to as 'Zulu beer', Champion pointedly spoke of 'Zulu workers', and when addressing their supporters ICU leaders used phrases that the royal izinduna had used when giving instructions to the amabutho at national ceremonies in times of old.

In early 1928, Solomon was 'courted' with unusual persistency by ICU leaders Champion and Kadalie - particularly the latter who, as an outsider to the Natal ICU, was more distanced from Solomon's wrath. The reason for this sense of urgency, of which police and NAD officials were unaware at the time, was that Kadalie, the general secretary of the national ICU, and Champion, secretary of the Natal provincial branch, were waging a personal battle with each other for the leadership of the Natal ICU. When Kadalie returned to South Africa in November 1927, after having spent about five months making contacts with leading trades unionists in Britain and Europe, the Natal ICU had already established itself as the politically and financially most powerful provincial branch of the ICU in the Union. From Kadalie's point of view, Champion presented a threat to his position as national leader; there were also political differences between them, since Kadalie was intent on reorganising the ICU on 'proper' trades union lines and affiliating it with white South African trades unions and overseas labour organisations. On the grounds of alleged financial corruption within the Natal ICU, a national ICU disciplinary tribunal suspended Champion as secretary for Natal.
Before the ICU annual congress met in April 1928 and confirmed Champion's dismissal, however, Champion had rallied Natal branches to his personal support. As a result, the 'ICU yase Natal' was formed, a separate Natal organisation with Champion in charge.\textsuperscript{132} The secession of the Natal ICU can in part be attributed to Champion's personal ambition; but it was also designed to appeal to the sense of 'Zulu' superiority and exclusivity that was so prevalent in the province even south of the Tugela river. Kadalie was to explicitly play on these two factors in mid-1928 when he was attempting to entice Champion and the ICU yase Natal back into the national fold: "what is self to be compared with the great cause \$?\$", he wrote to Champion, and continued, "To day Durban is talking about the Great Zulus to stand \$sic\$ alone and have nothing to do with greater South Africa. Are we going to allow this?"\textsuperscript{133}

In the midst of the power struggles that resulted in the formation of the ICU yase Natal, Kadalie visited Natal in a desperate attempt to save the province for himself. While in Natal during February 1928 he adopted two strategies. On the one hand, he toured the Natal countryside with Mr Glass, the white bookkeeper Kadalie had employed to assist in the 'cleansing' of the ICU, presenting himself as the leader of a 'proper' trades union, the revamped national ICU. In the Natal midlands he indicated that he was specially interested in buying land for evicted tenants, and gave out that the policy of the national ICU in this matter would be to buy as much land as possible in one area rather than having pieces scattered all over the province.\textsuperscript{134} On the other hand, Kadalie sought to affiliate himself with Solomon; if he could present himself as, in a sense, Solomon's induna-in-charge of labour matters, this would be possibly his greatest asset in his drive to secure the leadership of the ICU in Natal. Thus one of Kadalie's first actions on arrival in Natal
was to intercept Solomon on the road between Nongoma and Durban. Kadalie was accompanied by Glass, whose presence, as a white and professional person, could perhaps persuade Solomon more than anything else that Kadalie's ICU was not the same as the 'riff-raff ICU' which was causing havoc in the Natal midlands. The police inspector at Eshowe was unable to ascertain what transpired at this meeting, but felt that any further developments in this matter would demand the "closest attention of the Government". In the personal opinion of the inspector, however, an ICU-Solomon affiliation was unlikely for two reasons. First, because of Solomon's public stand against the ICU. Second, Solomon had recently fallen into "financial difficulties", and the cause was that "contributions to the Nkata have fallen off, and particularly among the Tribes of Natal proper, since the rise of the ICU".

Yet unbeknown to the inspector at Eshowe, Kadalie was making plans immediately after his apparently unsuccessful meeting with Solomon to exploit the latter's financial problems - in a way which suggested that Kadalie knew Solomon to be sensitive about the way in which ICU popularity had reduced the royal revenue. The Johannesburg CID had succeeded in finding an informant among Kadalie's personal staff, and this source reported in late February that two meetings of Kadalie's cabal, then in Natal, had focussed on the "matter of enlisting the sympathies of Dinuzulu [sic]". It had been resolved that Kadalie and Glass were to proceed to Mahashini as soon as they had finished issuing instructions for a civil case against Keable Mote, the ICU 'Lion of the Orange Free State', who was then attempting to break away from the national ICU as was Champion. At Mahashini they would "offer Dinuzulu [sic] a certain percentage of the contributions of the ICU members, in order to secure his support".
That Champion too was attempting to make arrangements with Solomon while the latter was visiting Durban during February served to exacerbate official consternation. Following reports that Champion was in contact with Solomon, the Natal NAD requested the CID to undertake a special investigation into what had taken place and what might transpire. In the light of reports of contacts between Solomon and the ICU, NAD and police officials feared that a "furtive alliance" might be made between the former parties - and that Solomon's denunciations of the ICU could not be trusted. As the police inspector at Eshowe reminded the police Deputy Commissioner at Pietermaritzburg, Dinuzulu had publicly denounced the rebellion in 1906 but was subsequently found to be sheltering certain rebels.

These fears were in fact groundless. The CNC, who had by then known Solomon for twelve years and was best informed of Solomon's movements in early 1928, had at no stage succumbed to them. In early February 1928, so the magistrate of Vryheid notified the CNC, Solomon's attention was in the first place focussed on festivities at Mahashini in celebration of his important marriage to a daughter of Chief Manziyekofi Sithole of the Nkandla district. Manziyekofi's late father, Chief Matshana Sithole, had been a man of some standing in tribal society and was suspected of assisting the rebels in 1906. Indeed, left to his own devices, Solomon was as a rule far more disposed to the making of very public tribal alliances - which were innocuous from the administration's point of view - than the making of 'furtive' and threatening alliances with the likes of Kadalie or Champion. Nonetheless, Solomon was in the process of making a 'furtive alliance'; officials knew nothing of it despite the close watch that was being kept on Solomon's movements, but had they known they would no doubt have been relieved of their anxiety. The reason why Solomon visited Durban in February 1928 was to keep an appointment with Mr J. H. Nicolson, a Durban solicitor. Nicolson was acting on the instructions of Nicholls, Zululand sugar planter, member of the select committee on Hertzog's 'Native Bills' and MP for Zululand, to inform Solomon how he might better use his influence against the ICU and, no doubt, how he might expect to benefit personally by doing
only other persons who knew of the negotiations between Solomon and Nicholls were Dube and Marwick, champion of Natal white farming interests, member of the select committee on Hertzog's 'Native Bills' and MP for Illovo.¹⁴¹

That ICU leaders were approaching Solomon for support at precisely the same time as Solomon was conferring with the ICU's most outspoken antagonists was not merely ironic; there was a causal link between the activities of ICU leaders and those of Solomon during February 1928. Kadalie's and Champion's determined efforts to appropriate the emotive symbol of Zulu royalty to the cause of militant political action made it clear to the tribal and petty bourgeois elites, together with representatives of white planting and farming interests (whose sensitivity to the dynamics of popular consciousness was particularly well evidenced in the two anti-ICU gatherings of late 1927), that the 'menace' of the ICU was currently threatening to escalate. The CNC, furthermore, was similarly to draw the latter conclusion. Though it was a crucial factor, however, the reconstitution of Inkatha cannot be understood solely in terms of a pre-emptive strike on the part of the above interest groups against an escalation of ICU power.

The reconstitution of Inkatha, 1928

As has been noted, a deep fissure had emerged during 1926 between the petty bourgeois and tribal elites within Inkatha. This fissure, combined with the NAD's instructions in early 1926 that Inkatha cease making collections and the NAD's rejection of the petty bourgeois 1926 constitution, had been reflected in the low spirits and directionlessness that had pervaded Inkatha's annual meeting in late 1926. And subsequently royal morale had been dealt a blow when the NAD curtly rejected the royal petition to the Prime Minister.¹⁴² During 1927, the differences between Inkatha's petty bourgeois and tribal leaders remained unresolved, and the NAD did not withdraw its instructions against Inkatha collections. For Inkatha these were crippling problems: the organisation in the first instance represented an alliance between the petty bourgeois and tribal elites, and from the outset had sought NAD approval with a view to formal 'recognition'.
Inkatha was virtually inactive during 1927, and the annual meeting of October 1927 clearly reflected its near-moribund state. Following tension between Simelane and Bhulose, Simelane had left the office of Inkatha secretary with the result that the meeting was poorly organised. Because of an administrative "oversight", Oscroft was for the first time since 1924 not invited to attend as government observer. The meeting itself was notable for three absences. First, the absence of a large crowd. Only three chiefs attended. Second, the absence of the leading representatives of both the petty bourgeois and tribal elites in Inkatha - including Solomon, Dube and Bhulose. The meeting was chaired by Rev. Mathe, a low-ranking Inkatha official who was an associate of Simelane. Third, the absence of any sense of purpose and conviction. The politely-expressed and somewhat vague resolutions called variously for better education, an end to the dipping of goats, a clampdown on "unknown churches", and permission to "go back to our own laws and customs and govern ourselves in our own way, all things to be known to our Hereditary Chief." While Inkatha itself was at a low ebb from 1926 to early 1928, however, the political interdependency of and interconnections between the Natal African and Zulu petty bourgeois and tribal elites were increasing during this period. Moreover, during the course of 1927 the NAD came to look upon Solomon's and Inkatha's potential political role in an increasingly favourable light. Both of these trends, which were accelerated by the rising mood of militancy among the rank-and-file, augered well for the future of Inkatha - as was illustrated in the rapid and dramatic way in which Inkatha re-established itself in early 1928.

Relations between Solomon and the NAD could barely have been worse in early 1927. Solomon was as a rule punctilious about reporting to the magistrate of a district which he was visiting, as was prescribed by official etiquette, but he was not in 1927. In March 1927 the magistrate of Emtonjaneni, who was a not unemotional opponent of the Zulu royal family, concluded with unusual clarity that Solomon's
recent lapses in "paying respects" when passing through his district indicated that Solomon had no "respect" to pay. In July, Solomon sent a letter to the magistrate of Nongoma, for transferal to the CNC, recounting the conditions of his appointment as chief of the Usuthu as explained to him by both General Botha at Pretoria in November 1916 and the Governor-General at Nkandla in January 1917, and adding the falsification that the latter had also appointed him as King George's "induna enkulhu" for the province of Natal. Solomon then correctly recounted Botha's words that if Solomon carried out the conditions of his appointment as chief of the Usuthu he could expect his status to be elevated. This letter was evidently a counter to the CNC's response earlier that year to the royal petition: Solomon should be advised that his appointment as chief was "still temporary". The CNC promptly replied, through the magistrate of Nongoma, that the NAD "cannot take cognisance" of a letter not signed by Solomon personally - it had been signed on Solomon's behalf by Solomon's private secretary, Leonard Ncapayi. In a confidential minute to the magistrate of Nongoma, the CNC stated that Solomon knew exactly how the government had defined his status, and that Solomon was possibly the "victim of flatterers...who might gain from Solomon's enhanced position".

The CNC's stance was modified after Solomon's views on the ICU were published in Ilanga lase Natal in August; the latter were translated at Natal NAD headquarters for the information of the CNC. In September the CNC learnt from the Bishop of Zululand that Solomon was describing himself in writing as "Paramount Chief of the Zulus"; he thereupon wrote to the SNA seeking concurrence with his view that the NAD should take no action to contradict Solomon's new designation of himself, and adding that there was "a spirit antagonistic to Solomon among Europeans, including I regret
to say some officials, and it is in the interests of sound administration to keep a check upon it...". To the Bishop of Zululand the CNC wrote that Solomon would be 'paramount chief' in the eyes of the Zulu irrespective of any official assertions to the contrary, and, moreover, that Solomon was currently steering "quite a good middle course" in the matter of politics.

In April 1928, when police and NAD intelligence reports of ICU approaches to Solomon were still frequent, the CNC received an application from Inkatha for permission to hold a "formal meeting" for the purpose of passing a new constitution which had been drawn up by Nicolson and Thorpe. At this stage the CNC came out in strong support of both Solomon and Inkatha: he immediately granted Inkatha's request, and also wrote an illuminating confidential memorandum to the SNA. In the latter, he described in detail the "crisis in the affairs of the ICU in Natal" that had recently come to his notice. He noted Kadalie's frequent attempts to gain Solomon's support, and then reported that a few days previously a large "Native meeting" in Durban had passed a unanimous vote of confidence in Champion - and the CNC had subsequently learnt that Champion intended once more to make approaches to Solomon. The CNC then alluded to the replacement of the cautious and conservative president of the African National Congress (hereafter ANC - the renamed SANNC), Rev. Z. R. Mahambane, with the radical Josiah Gumede (previously president of the NNC) in late 1927: "despite Gumede's reported repudiation of Bolshevik doctrines", the CNC argued, it seemed that there was now an "affiliation of the ICU and the Native National Congress (ANC)". All of these considerations, in his opinion, had to be taken into account when reviewing official policy towards Solomon and Inkatha. Solomon was currently trying
to build up the power of Inkatha because Solomon knew that an increase in the influence of the ICU and the ANC would undermine the power of chiefs in general and himself in particular, the CNC opined, and continued

...I do really feel that at the stage that matters have now reached the question of giving some moral support to the Nkata...might well be considered as the most promising counterblast to the ICU.

The CNC concluded by referring to the 'problem' of Inkatha in the context of official local council policy. That Inkatha did not accord with the description of a local or regional council under the terms of the 1920 Act should not preclude the possibility of the government 'recognising' Inkatha: a council could be established alongside a 'recognised' Inkatha (which would presumably act as a 'House of Lords'), he suggested, for "there would be ample work to do for both in their respective spheres.../Inkatha/ might be made a power for good".155 This wave of unprecedentedly favourable opinion, which was infused through the ranks of the Natal NAD, was to be of great value to Inkatha while it was reconstituting in 1928.

The political interconnections between the petty bourgeois and tribal elites during 1926 and 1927 were reflected in a variety of contexts. Chief Mathole (who also acted as Solomon's representative) and Chief Msiyane (Lower Umfolosi district) were familiar faces among the Natal provincial delegations to the annual Native Conferences held in Pretoria, as were Dube (who did not attend in 1926), Bhulose, and Ndhlovu. Of all the provincial delegations, Natal's were unique in that about half the delegates were chiefs. The latter ranged from extremely conservative tribal 'aristocrats', like Chiefs Kula (Msinga district) and Msiyane, to 'progressive'
kholwa chiefs, like Chiefs Walter Khumalo and Dirk Sioka (both of whom were from the Natal midlands, and were members of the NNC conservative 'old guard' who remained on the NNC executive after the 1924 'coup').

Natal's delegations reflected that in Natal in particular, the political division between the old and new elites was crumbling - even if the tribal leaders were somewhat out of their depth during the conferences. The 1926 conference, for example, was dominated by a detailed and perceptive debate on Hertzog's 'Native Bills', focussing on the issue of African parliamentary franchise. Chief Mathole did not speak at all; Chief Msiyane merely announced that he "deplored the changes which had occurred since the days of Queen Victoria"; and Chief Sioka's main contribution was to successfully propose a motion that "all the Natives in Natal request that the Umtwana 'child'or 'prince' u Solomon ka Dinuzulu be officially recognised as the Paramount Chief of Zululand...".

Of greater overall significance was the establishment of the 'South African Native Chiefs' Convention' in April 1927 under the auspices of the ANC. This was a result of the process of courtship between 'Congress people', particularly in Natal and the Transvaal, and chiefs that had been underway since 1920. Rev. Z. R. Mahambane, the ANC president who had called the inaugural Chiefs' Convention in 1927, regarded Solomon as the "most important" chief in the Union. Since only twenty-two chiefs attended, mainly from Natal and the Transvaal, the Chiefs' Convention could not justifiably claim that it "consists of the chiefs of the whole Union". It was nonetheless regarded as successful by those who attended, and became a permanent body - the 'upper house' within the ANC. From the province of Natal, prominent members were Chiefs Mathole, W. Khumalo and Simon G. Majozi (kholwa chief of the Indaleni mission community, near Richmond), and Solomon was represented by an emissary.
The ANC Chiefs' Convention provided a vital medium of contact between petty bourgeois and tribal leaders, and between tribal leaders themselves (many of whom were kholwa chiefs). One of the specific consequences of the contacts that were made was that Chief Majozi, who had hitherto taken no part in African politics in Natal, became interested in Inkatha; after 1928 he was to be an influential figure in that organisation.

Within the ANC, the Chiefs' Convention acted as an ally of the ANC's conservative petty bourgeois leaders and an opponent of militancy. This was especially clear after Gumede was elected to replace Mahambane as ANC president in late 1927. Gumede's election indicated that the move towards African radicalism - which had hitherto been expressed by only a few ICU leaders, and in isolated urban and rural 'irruptions' - was becoming more pervasive: it was now penetrating the mainstream of 'establishment' African politics.

In this development, the South African Communist Party (hereafter CP) was playing a leading role - indeed, at the time of his election Gumede was consolidating links with Communists in both South Africa and Europe. The CP had after 1924 resolved to divert its focus from white South African workers and 'turn to the masses'. This objective was not easily realised: the CP was dealt a particularly severe setback when it crossed swords with the ICU over matters of organisation and strategy in 1926, whereafter CP members were expelled from the ICU. But in the ensuing few years the scope of CP activities among African workers and political leaders broadened. In July 1927 the CP moved its headquarters to an African quarter in Johannesburg, and the Communist newspaper, the South African Worker, was transformed into a primarily African-language (Xhosa, Sotho and Zulu) publication. And in March 1928 it established the 'South African Federation
of Non-European Trades Unions', comprising black trades
unions not affiliated with the ICU. These developments
were stimulated, if not initiated, by the new policy
directives that were being enunciated by Soviet leaders -
notably Stalin - in the Comintern after 1926. The latter
were based on Lenin's 'Colonial Theses'; the principle that
an "independent Native Republic" should be established in
South Africa was mooted during 1927, and was promulgated
as a policy directive at the Sixth World Congress of the
Comintern in early 1928. In 1927, James La Guma, previously
an ICU leader, and Gumede were nominated by the CP to attend
the 'League Against Imperialism' (also named the 'Congress
of Oppressed Nationalities') in Brussels. Both then went
on to visit Soviet Russia - where La Guma conferred with
Bukharin and Gumede was taken on a tour of the Asiatic
regions towards the east. On their return, La Guma was
appointed general secretary of the Federation of Non-European
Trades Unions, in which capacity he championed the cause
of the 'Native Republic', and Gumede set about attempting to
convert the ANC to communist principles.163

In the ANC, Gumede encountered the concerted opposition of
the petty bourgeois conservatives and the Chiefs' Convention.
At the ANC Easter conference in 1928, the chiefs passed a
resolution dissapproving of the "fraternisation" between
the ANC and CP. Roux reports that the mover of the resolution
argued that the Communists had "brought Russia to the stage
it is now. The Tsar was a great man in his country, of
royal blood like us chiefs, and where is he now?" Though the
chiefs withdrew their resolution following an eloquent appeal
on behalf of the CP by Gumede, they continued to act as
a powerful opponent of radicalism. Kadalie appeared at the
same conference and proposed that the ANC and ICU establish
a loose 'united front'; he somewhat opportunistically addressed
the gathering as "Comrades", to which the chiefs replied with
scornful laughter. 164

During the period 1926 to late 1927, there was much evidence of interchange between Inkatha's petty bourgeois and tribal elites closer 'home', though this took place outside the context of Inkatha. Two examples will suffice. First, in mid-1926, Solomon and some of his tribal advisers paid an unexpected visit to a mission school at Inanda; Dube too accompanied them. Solomon addressed the pupils, speaking encouraging words on the value of education. 165 Second, early in 1928 the CPSA's Zululand 'Diocesan Native Conference' was held at the ZNTI. The climax of the four-day session was a visit to KwaDlamahlaha, where the delegates were cordially received by Solomon and conducted a discussion with him. 166 The then-current division between the petty bourgeois and tribal leaders in the context of Inkatha belied the essential interdependency of the classes they represented.

As the spread of ICU power especially had emphasised, the tribal political process was under unprecedented threat of becoming anachronistic and sterile even in its rural preserves. With the speed with which social, economic and political change was taking place among the African population of the province of Natal, emmeshing it increasingly in a wider, industrialised South Africa, the political issues it faced were becoming increasingly less 'parochial' and 'tribal' in nature. In particular, the political questions of the day demanded a detailed knowledge of legislation, and an informed understanding of the Westminster parliamentary system and the process of law. These were skills possessed by very few tribal chiefs, and the latter were largely dependent on their educated petty bourgeois allies to 'educate' and advise them in these matters. From the point of view of the tribal elite, Inkatha and the Chiefs' Convention played an important role in this context. While the proceedings
of the 1926 Native Conference had left tribal delegates plainly flummoxed, those of the 1927 Chiefs' Convention—which also focussed on Hertzog's 'Native Bills'—did not. Away from the somewhat noisy and abrasive company of 'hotheads', tribal delegates at the Chiefs' Convention in a congenial atmosphere took part in a discussion of the Bills—which was inevitably led by their kholwa chief colleagues whose political attitudes were as a rule virtually indistinguishable from those of the conservative petty bourgeoisie. Accordingly, the resolutions of the 1927 Chiefs' Convention made frequent appeals to liberal democratic ideology, and might just as well have been drawn up by the likes of Rev. Mahambane of the ANC proper, or the Dubes, Bhuloses, and Ndhlovus of Natal.167

From the point of view of Natal's conservative petty bourgeois leaders, their need to consolidate their alliance with chiefs in the few years after 1925 was similarly becoming more urgent. First, it was of more than mere symbolic significance that Gumede in 1926 formed a new Congress organisation in Natal which was named the 'Natal African Congress'. Although the change in name was in keeping with the current replacement of the word 'Native' with 'African' in the name of the national Congress (ANC), it also signified a more complete break with the traditions of the NNC prior to the 'coup' of 1924. It seems that the NNC 'old guard', who had remained on the NNC executive committee after 1924 alongside Gumede and Madune, attempted to split away in 1926 to preserve the NNC as an independent provincial Congress disaffiliated from the national body. This was not, however, successful. Gumede's election to the presidency of the ANC in the following year served to further accentuate the Natal conservatives' sense of isolation from the 'mainstream' of African politics.168

Second, after their initial expressions of enthusiasm for the
1920 Acts' mechanisms for direct Union-wide inter-racial consultation - the annual Native Conferences and the Native Affairs Commission - even Natal's most hamba kahle leaders soon grew disillusioned. The meeting of the Native Conference at Pretoria in December 1925 demonstrated its impotence: Hertzog, in the capacity of both Prime Minister and Minister of Native Affairs, addressed the gathering in regard to the 'Native Bills', but (as the SNA, J. F. Herbst, put it) he did so purely "as a matter of courtesy". The delegates were not allowed to discuss the Bills. Instead, they were instructed to consider matters concerning 'native administration'; for example, the recognition of customary law, problems relating to lobolo transactions, and the system of rule by way of (Supreme Chiefs') proclamation. Although it was not made explicit at the time, the state was inviting feedback on what was to become the 'retribalising' 'Native Administration Act' of 1927. Such proceedings were hardly congenial to the predominantly petty bourgeois and educated African delegates. John Dube, perhaps the prime exponent of the compliant hamba kahle tradition, refused to attend the 1926 Native Conference in protest against their ineffectiveness. Furthermore, after the 1926 meeting - which slated the 'Native Bills' - the government did not call a Native Conference again until 1930; and in 1930 any discussion of the Bills was forbidden.

Alongside these alienations and disillusionments, however, a sense of direction was imparted by the current trends in state 'native policy' and the segregationist ideology that informed its formulators. These influences form the third reason why petty bourgeois conservatives sought to consolidate their alliance with tribal authorities. The hamba kahle disposition that was such a feature of the Natal petty bourgeois establishment was more than mere 'strategy': it derived from their adherence to liberal democratic ideology and,
in particular, the rule of law. For all the grievances that they voiced through the accepted channels, their politics was always informed by an ingrained deference to 'authority' - however illegitimate that authority might be in liberal democratic terms - and a desire to work within the law. Yet the legislation that was enacted and the Bills that were being debated during the 1920s served to disillusion their hopes of a 'liberal-democratic' solution to the South African 'native question'. The soured enthusiasm for the quasi-liberal mechanisms for the consultation of African opinion established under the 1920 Act was hardly ameliorated by Hertzog's two 'political Native Bills' of 1926: the 'Union Native Council Bill' and the ironically named 'Representation of Natives in Parliament Bill'. The kholwa chief-dominated Chiefs' Convention declared that the Bills were unacceptable in view of "sixteen years' experience of indirect representation of Bantu interests" since Union, and the 1926 Native Conference rejected the Bills far more bluntly. During the latter conference, Rev. A. Mtimkulu (an arch-'establishment' Natal man, who was to earn infamy in the 1930s as Dube's accomplice in fracturing the unity of African opposition to the disenfranchisement of Cape Africans) sardonically observed that he now understood "development on our own lines" to mean "send the natives back to tribalism". All the more reason, therefore, that the key exponents of 'tribalism', the chiefs, should be made more amenable to petty bourgeois interests.

The basic import of Hertzog's 'political Native Bills' was that the state was firm in its resolve to keep Africans out of parliament. On the other hand, the legislation that was accumulating on the statute book emphasised that, first, the state was committed to its local council policy for limited African self-government in the rural areas; and, second, the state did not intend 'tribalism' to die a 'natural
death' - particularly in Natal. The 1925 Natives Taxation and Development Act laid down new financial regulations designed to promote the implementation of local councils' policy, and provide the local councils with the financial means to perform their duties. In 1926 and 1927 respectively, moreover, two crucial further enactments were made concerning the local council policy: the 'Native Affairs, 1920, Amendment Act' (No. 27 of 1926) and the 'Native Affairs, 1920, further Amendment Act' (No. 15 of 1927). The first referred to local populations whose "stage of development...did not permit of the delegation of the comparatively extensive powers contemplated by the 1920 Act". In these cases provision was made that the Governor-General, in consultation with the Native Affairs Commission and the Minister of Native Affairs, be specially empowered to issue proclamations modifying the internal structure and operation of the local council, and limiting its powers. In presenting this Bill to parliament, Hertzog stated that it was particularly intended for conditions in Natal. The second specially empowered the Governor-General to proclaim sections of white-owned land adjacent to African reserves as "a Native area for local council purposes" - hence Africans living on white-owned land were no longer excluded from the operation of the 1920 Act. These two amendments removed the SNA's and particularly the CNC's reservations about the appropriateness of the original Act's local councils in Natal: they now had legislative encouragement to realise their vision of hybrid 'chiefs' councils' and local councils, on the Pondoland model, spanning the African reserves and Natal white countryside.

The 'retribalising' Native Administration Bill was enacted in 1927. Until 1927, 'native administration' in each of the four provinces of the Union was based on the separate systems that each had inherited from the colonial period.
With a view to 'administrative uniformity', the 1927 Act extended the operation of the Natal system of indirect rule to African areas throughout the Union. The Natal system was to be applied complete with the recognition of 'customary' law, the employment of chiefs as administrative and judicial officials, and, moreover, the appointment of the Governor-General as Supreme Chief with the power to rule by proclamation. The 1927 Act thus represented a substantial commitment on the part of the state to the preservation of the tribal order: where no local councils had been established, the autocratic system of rule through Supreme Chief, magistrates and native commissioners, chiefs and headmen was to obtain. Moreover, the Native Affairs Amendment Acts of 1926 and 1927 had provided that local councils did not have to be incompatible with the maintenance of tribal authorities. For those African leaders who held a particular respect for 'the law' and were particularly disposed to 'work within the law', however onerous it might be, the 1927 Act and the (rural) local councils' Acts together provided them with their legislative guidelines.

Simultaneously, the state was offering new ideological guidelines; these directly conflicted with the British-derived liberal-democratic notions that the African petty bourgeoisie had imbibed from its missionary mentors. What so endeared the Natal system of 'native administration' to the state in 1927 was not only that it nurtured the disciplinary virtues that were embodied in 'tribalism': it was also because it entrenched a division between white and African political and cultural systems. The rash of 'Native Bills' that had been tabled before parliament between 1920 and 1927, and particularly between 1925 and 1927, had given legislators in parliament, the select committees and the Native Affairs Commission the opportunity to focus resolutely on the 'native question'. With exception of a few renegade 'liberals' or
'philanthropists' and Labour Party MPs, these legislators achieved a unanimity that a policy of segregation provided the answer. Hence the importance of the Natal 'Sheptonist' model as opposed to the Cape 'liberal-democratic' model - which envisaged the assimilation of 'non-Europeans' to white civilisation and, through the medium of the franchise, the white political system.\textsuperscript{180}

The 1927 Act was a clear reflection of the way in which the ideology of segregation was being refined. Fired by new developments in social anthropology, the time-honoured arguments concerning the inherent separateness of the races were currently being elevated from the status of mere bigotry or white self-interest to that of observed 'scientific fact'. And the need to preserve racial separateness was currently being presented as not only in accordance with the immutable logic of positivist social science, but also as ethically correct and a moral duty. There were certain points of 'agreement', albeit very problematical, between these trends in white segregationist ideology and the racially-exclusive ideology of African nationalism which was a strong influence on educated African opinion during the 1920s - and which was clearly enunciated at various times by key ideologues of the petty bourgeois establishment like Dube and Seme.\textsuperscript{181} The academic purification of the ideology of segregation exerted a subtle but sure influence on those African leaders who kept closely in touch with 'advances' in the field of 'scientific' knowledge (which was seldom regarded as derivative or value-bound) and the pulse of white political thought. Moreover, the florescence of anthropology as an academic discipline captured the attention of the 'friends of the natives', the white liberals; some of the latter now came to see a logical connection between the 'cultural pluralism' of contemporary anthropology and political segregation. And the educated African elite was exposed to
such ideological developments through the media of liberal-sponsored institutions like the Joint Councils and Bantu Men's Social Centres. In the late 1920s there developed something of a consensus among members of Natal's petty bourgeois establishment that the solution to the 'native question' from their point of view no longer lay in the pursuit of acceptance into the propertied and professional elite of a colour-blind unitary South Africa: it seemed instead to lie in the 'development' of 'their own people'. Furthermore, they were anxious, as was the state, that the likes of Gumede, La Guma and ICU leaders should be prevented from finding a solution to the 'native question' by means of class struggle. Indeed, it was in the first instance the consensus of anti-ICU opinion between Natal's petty bourgeois establishment, Natal's key 'native policy' legislators, white employer and propertied interests, the tribal elite, and the NAD that led to the reconstitution of Inkatha in 1928. But it was to become clear that the 'new' Inkatha embodied far broader, more subtle and more long-term objectives than merely the destruction of the ICU.

Representatives of sugar planter interests in Zululand and Natal proper played a leading role in the negotiations that led to the reconstitution of Inkatha. George Higgs, who had co-organised the Empangeni indaba, was a prominent Zululand sugar planter and well known to Nicholls. In 1917, when the latter was president of the Zululand Planters' Union, Higgs and Nicholls were co-signatories of a Zululand Planters' Union pamphlet in protest against the Natives' Lands Commission's recommendations for enlargement of the Zululand reserves. William Campbell, who had hosted the second anti-ICU indaba, was a prominent Natal sugar planter and the managing director of the Natal Estates Ltd. He was well known to Dube, for the Campbell family had long taken a special interest in 'native' matters and had been since before Union a keen supporter and
financial benefactor of Dube's Ohlanga Institute at Inanda. Dube, incidentally, also had close contacts with the Huletts, who were perhaps the most prominent Natal north coast sugar planting family: in his capacity of president of the SANNC soon after Union, Dube advised Congress members in Natal to refer their legal cases to the lawyer G. H. Hulett. Nicholls, who was now instructing Nicolson to 'advise' Solomon, had first met Solomon when, accompanied by Marwick, he attended the prizegiving ceremony of the ZNTI in 1922: here Solomon had distributed prizes that had been donated by C. G. Smith, the leading Natal south coast sugar planter.

Marwick's involvement in the 'Inkatha negotiations' signified that white motives were not only, as Marks has suggested, to "make Zululand safe for the sugar planters". After 1920 Marwick had become the most determined parliamentary representative of white commercial farming interests in Natal proper. Marwick in fact played a vital 'linking' role, for he had built up an extensive web of contacts during his career in 'native administration' and white politics in Natal since the 1890s. He had long been well known to members of the Zulu royal family and to Dube. His relationship with the latter before 1920 was not always cordial. In 1917 Marwick had sued Dube for an article published in Ilanga lase Natal which denounced 'native administration' in Durban, and also alleged that Marwick was no longer known as 'Muhle' (the good one) but as 'Mubi' (the evil one). Since 1920, Marwick and Nicholls had cooperated closely in parliament to express the interests of Natal's rural employers on matters concerning labour, and to expound the Shepstonist or 'Natal view' on 'native affairs'; they continued to act together when both were appointed as members of the successive select committees on Hertzog's 'Native Bills' after 1926. It is perhaps significant that while Marwick was manager of the Durban Municipal Native Affairs Department before 1920, the
mayor of Durban was J. H. Nicolson - the same person who was acting for Nicholls in negotiations with Solomon in early 1928. 190

In early 1928, Nicholls supplied Solomon, through Nicolson, with a draft speech. Nicholls wished Solomon to recite this speech on the occasion of the ZNTI's graduation and prizegiving ceremony for the students of 1927. Nicolson at the same time made arrangements that 'Solomon's address' be given extensive coverage in the Natal Advertizer. These arrangements were very confidential. As Nicolson wrote to Nicholls, "Of course I have kept your name out altogether (ie. from the newspaper report). Nobody knows you had any part in it, nor will they know." 191

On 7 February 1928, the Natal Advertizer published a leading article emblazoned under no less than five headlines: "SOLOMON KA DINUZULU TO HIS PEOPLE: ADDRESS TO 'FUTURE LEADERS OF OUR RACE': WARNING AGAINST 'NOISY BAND OF SELF SEEKERS': ZULUS MUST DEVELOP ALONG THEIR OWN LINES: WARRIORS YESTERDAY, PEACEFUL TOILERS TO-DAY." The "Paramount Chief of the Zulus" seldom made speeches, it reported - but the ZNTI prizegiving "was one of those rare occasions when he lets himself go...". 'Solomon's speech' bore the unmistakable imprint of Nicholls' polemical style and political views. It also included some quaint phraseology similar to that which Chief Kula (Msinga district) had used while bitterly denouncing the ICU in mid-1927. Kula had made this denunciation while giving evidence before the select committee on the 'Native Bills', and, in doing so, he had been keenly questioned by Nicholls. 192

'Solomon's speech' began by emphasising that the Zulu had ample cause for "pride of ancestry" because of their renowned courage, virtue, discipline and imperial might in preconquest times. But in "the quagmires of the new world", Solomon said, many Zulu were no longer under the control of tribal authorities or, indeed, under any control at all. Some had begun to pursue
"strange gods". The whole nation was crying aloud for guidance which, Solomon continued, could be best provided by hereditary leaders. The ZNTI was specially for the educational "training of those inherent gifts of leadership" that reposed in the sons of chiefs, so that the "standards of the tribal system...[could] be adapted to meet the changing needs of the times." Solomon emphasised that the Zulu were a different race to the white people, and it was correct that the Zulu should preserve their separate culture - within which they could attain their own "high state of civilisation". The ZNTI stood for the "maintenance of the tribal system", and indicated that it was also "the wish of the Government that we should be given a full opportunity to develop along our own lines". The Zulu were to be thankful that the government was not requiring them "to abandon a harmonious brotherhood in exchange for a discordant individualism". Solomon then gave an account of the political activities of certain "well-clothed newcomers, trading on a little book-education..." The latter were working in the towns "to seduce [the Zulu people] from their tribal allegiance", and were also sowing "the seeds of discontent in the kraals". They could only cause "conflict and darkness", and Solomon suggested that their existence further stressed the urgency of rebuilding the tribal order. Solomon concluded by noting that there were white men who had come to understand the problems that the Zulu nation was experiencing, and that these white men were keen to lend their assistance. 193

At this stage - in early 1928 - it is evident that Nicholls had made contact with only Solomon, rather than the leadership of Inkatha. Furthermore, although Nicholls envisaged making further use of Solomon, the arrangements that had been made between these two figures so far related only to the ZNTI speech. But Dube was working quietly in the background, and it seems that it was he who was responsible for 'opening up'
the negotiations to Campbell and Marwick; and other Inkatha personnel. A couple of weeks after the ZNTI speech Marwick received an unexpected letter from Dube. In this letter Dube chose to dwell on the matter of the ICU, undoubtedly because Marwick was the most dedicated and outspoken white opponent of the ICU in Natal. The latter had been so since 1926, when Kadalie sued the Natal Witness for libel: Marwick voluntarily assisted the counsel for the defence in building up a dossier on ICU 'sedition', and he was the prime witness for the defence at the court case in 1927. Dube denounced ICU leaders' "misleading and dangerous propaganda, their absurd promises, their international socialistic inclinations and communism" which would be "misconstrued amongst our backward Natives". He continued: "We, the moderate section of the Bantu people, feel just as you do that communism, whether among white or black, is a real danger to the community."

The real purpose of Dube's letter, however, was to ascertain whether Marwick concurred with his views on how the 'native question', in broader perspective, should be resolved. More specifically, it was intended to ascertain whether Marwick would be a supporter of Inkatha - although Dube avoided making this explicit. Thus Dube went on to argue that the victory of 'socialistic' doctrines would mean breaking down of parental control and restraint, tribal responsibility and our whole traditions, - the whole structure upon which our Bantu Nation rests ...

...We have got to maintain, in my opinion, the sense of paternal and tribal responsibility by Bantu traditions with all its obligations of courage, honour, truth, loyalty and obedience for all we are worth ...

...Don't think for one moment I am not progressive. I am anxious as any man could be for the development of my people, but on the right lines."
Just as 'Solomon' had done recently, Dube thus affirmed his willingness to collaborate in the evolving state policy of 'development on their own lines'. Dube ended the letter in an open-ended fashion; it was up to Marwick to decide whether to collaborate with the state's African collaborators.

Although records of Dube's activities are fragmentary, it seems that he was successful during the following month in establishing contact between Nicholls, Marwick and Campbell on the one hand, and the personnel of the Inkatha executive on the other hand; he and Nicolson acted as the 'middle men'. The solicitors Nicolson and Thorpe then began drafting the new Inkatha constitution. When the draft was complete in mid-April 1928, Campbell paid a personal visit to the Minister of Native Affairs and requested that Solomon now be recognised as Zulu king. He also argued that Solomon was in need of guidance, particularly in view of his financial difficulties, and therefore that "a retired magistrate" should be appointed as Solomon's private secretary. There was little doubt that the 'retired magistrate' that Campbell had in mind was Oswald Fynney - who later in 1928 was to begin personally petitioning the CNC for the recognition of Inkatha. Campbell further intimated that if the government complied with these requests concerning Solomon, "friends of his [Solomon's]" would be prepared to settle his debts. The Minister replied that he would "seriously consider" these propositions.

The main strategy of Inkatha's white allies in April 1928, however, was to ensure that the 1928 Inkatha meeting was well attended and had official sanction. Thus Nicolson and Thorpe requested that the NAD be represented at the forthcoming meeting, since the latter was to consider the acceptance of a new constitution. In a remarkable departure the NAD nominated Oscroft to attend in an official capacity; previously NAD officials were instructed not to attend Inkatha
meetings except in a personal capacity and only when invited to do so. Then Nicolson and Thorpe requested that the NAD circularise all magistrates in the province of Natal, inviting their cooperation in making the meeting as representative as possible. Accordingly, the CNC instructed all magistrates to inform their districts that the government had no objection to the forthcoming Inkatha meeting. In this way, the NAD - or, more specifically, the CNC - played an active role in making the Inkatha meeting of 31 May-4 June the largest in Inkatha's history.

Apart from Oscroft, the only white people to attend the 1928 meeting were Nicolson, who attended in a professional capacity, and Fynney; it had always been the intention of Inkatha's leading white allies to remain in the background. The proceedings began, as was customary, with a private meeting of the executive committee. The latter unanimously passed the new draft constitution. It is significant that Solomon did not attend this meeting, nor the 'open' meetings of Inkatha's ordinary members in the following days. He was confined to bed, being seriously ill with what Oscroft described as "rheumatic gout". Solomon's addiction to liquor was now taking its toll.

Oscroft estimated that over two thousand Zulu attended the meeting. Among these were over sixty chiefs or accredited chiefs' representatives. The latter came mainly from Zululand and Northern Natal, but some had come from as far afield as Umzinto, Richmond, Harding and Pinetown in Natal proper, and the Ingwavuma district on the border of Portuguese East Africa. The Natal African and Zulu petty bourgeoisie was also strongly represented, and the close cooperation of the old and new elites was a marked feature of the 1928 meeting in every sphere of its proceedings.

The chairman, Bhulose, opened the general Inkatha meeting by
arguing that the time had come for Inkatha to be "legally" established "so that it should obtain the recognition and favourable support of the Government". He then explained the main points of the proposed new constitution, and moved that the latter be formally approved by the meeting. Chiefs Nkantini and Msiyane (who had represented Zululand alongside Mathole at the Native Conferences) seconded Bhulose.

There followed many objections from the general quorum that the proposed constitution could not be passed without a thorough discussion of its contents. The size of the meeting made this impracticable, and a compromise was agreed upon: all the chiefs and ministers of religion present were appointed to form a special committee to discuss the constitution. This special committee, whose deliberations occupied the third day of the Inkatha meeting, made minor amendments to the constitution before accepting it. At the same time, the special committee elected Inkatha's office bearers for the forthcoming year: Bhulose was re-elected as chairman; Chief S. G. E. Majozzi became vice-chairman; and Solomon was elected as treasurer. Significantly, the appointment of the secretary was left to a later date; it was very likely that Inkatha leaders desired the government to nominate an NAD official for this position. The following non-office bearing members completed the new Inkatha executive committee: Mnyaiza, Chief Nkantini, Chief Silimane (son of Mkungo Zulu, a brother of Cetshwayo who had fled to the Colony of Natal in 1856), Dube, and Rev. E. A. Mahamba (a minister of the Free Church of Scotland from the Dundee district). Finally, two "patrons" of Inkatha were elected: one was Solomon, and the other was Fynney – which reflected Inkatha's anxiety for official approval. All the actions of the special committee were subsequently approved by the general quorum of the Inkatha meeting, and Nicolson and Thorpe were authorised to legally "execute" the "Deed of Trust and Constitution of the Inkata ka Zulu".

The 1928 constitution was clearly based on the 1926 petty bourgeois Inkatha constitution. In places, the only difference between the two constitutions was that the 1928 version was expressed in more pedantic legal terminology. However, there were certain important differences of emphasis in the 'official' constitution which presented Inkatha in a more favourable light from the perspectives of both segregationist ideology and the local council policy. Thus the preamble to the 1928 constitution emphasised that it was necessary "to foster by every constitutional means the spirit of unity among the people of the Zulu Nation...and to keep alive the Nation's fine traditions, and its sense of obligations imposed upon it by these traditions..." Furthermore, it had become expedient to "organise the heads of the Nation, and its responsible members in such a manner, and under such constitution as will have the approval and sympathy of the Government of the Union of South Africa".

The 1928 constitution's statement of Inkatha's aims was essentially identical to that of 1926; if anything it was more vague, since it did not specify precisely how Inkatha intended to "develop" the farms it wished to buy. But there were important additional aims in 1928. First, Inkatha now dedicated itself to the "proper development" of the reserves - which probably meant that commercial agriculture, trade and small industries would be encouraged there. Second, Inkatha would foster the Zulu wish to maintain their separate traditions, social discipline and sense of nationhood. In this context, it was said that Inkatha would promote and encourage the development and progress of the Nation along such lines as will naturally be evolved out of the life and traditions of its people and to prepare them for the establishment of their own trade and industries.

Overall, Inkatha presented itself as a 'self-help scheme' writ
large - and one that accorded well with segregationist thinking at state level.

The rest of the constitution dealt with Inkatha's regulations concerning membership, the conduct of meetings, the composition and powers of the executive committee, and financial regulations. Three points deserve especial mention. First, no "agents" or "collectors" were to be authorised to receive subscriptions; all payments had to be made directly to the secretary who would keep "proper books". Moreover, a "European accountant" would examine Inkatha's balance sheets and financial statements annually. By 1928 it had become widely known in NAD circles that Inkatha's monies were being misappropriated, primarily by Solomon, and these regulations were presumably intended to persuade the government that this would not happen in future. Second, the Inkatha executive committee was empowered to coopt white people to "assist in their deliberations", even though whites could not be members of Inkatha. Third, and concerning the relationship of Inkatha to the head of the Zulu royal family, it was laid down that the latter would always be a "patron" of Inkatha; and "if possible" a descendant of the Zulu kings would always be treasurer. The chairman would be "in charge" of Inkatha, and would have a casting vote in the executive committee. The executive committee was not bound to act on the resolutions of Inkatha's committee of 'heads of the nation' - comprising all chiefs and certain appointed ministers of religion; in the event of deadlock between these two bodies, however, the ultimate decision would rest in the hands of all of Inkatha's members voting together at a general meeting.

It was thus envisaged that, under Inkatha, the Zulu nation would be a constitutional monarchy.212

The constitutional 'democratisation' of Inkatha was an important development. Solomon had always attempted to
superimpose the traditional prerogatives of a Zulu monarch on top of Inkatha's organisational structure: he had sought to treat the executive committee as a royal ibandla (king's council) in which he, and not the elected chairman, remained the executive head. The differences between royal interests and petty bourgeois interests on this matter had been one of the main reasons for Inkatha's virtual disintegration in 1926 and 1927. In 1928, petty bourgeois interests triumphed. The democratisation of Inkatha also meant that the organisation was now more in accordance with the basic tenets of local council policy - which, even as amended in 1926, envisaged that the internal operation of the local councils would accord with the Westminster-style democratic principle. Moreover, it meant that Inkatha might now be more readily favoured by the Natal NAD, which overall was still vehemently opposed to the resurrection of the historic 'autocratic' powers of the Zulu royal family. In 1928, Oscroft appreciatively reported: "In the past, Solomon's word was law...the Indhlu Nkulu [Great house] was supreme. The Inkata existed for the royal house. Under the new Constitution, the position will gradually be reversed, the royal house becoming part of the Inkata..." In the light of this development, on top of the disparate pressures with which Solomon had been confronted between 1925 and 1928, the reason why Solomon was bed-ridden with a liquor-induced illness during the 1928 meeting can be better understood.

Apart from approving the new constitution and re-establishing Inkatha as a working alliance between the petty bourgeois and tribal elites, the 1928 meeting was also important insofar as it clearly defined Inkatha as an opponent of militancy. Oscroft's report stated that there was no evidence of "the slightest connection" between Inkatha and the ICU. In view of the strong suspicions of police and Natal NAD officials during the first half of 1928 that a connection did exist, this statement was not as redundant as it might appear. While
no ICU leader dared to attend the meeting, Maling did do so. An account of Inkatha's responses to both Maling's appearance at the 1928 meeting and his subsequent attempts to penetrate the 'new' Inkatha not only illustrates Inkatha's role as an opponent of militancy: it also effectively summarises Inkatha's activities between 1928 and 1930.

Oscroft's report of the 1928 meeting recounted that Maling, "of the agitator type, from Vryheid", attempted to address the meeting: "those present were obviously quite hostile towards him, and he was pulled up by the chairman and informed that he had no right to speak as he was not a member of the Inkata. Nothing more was heard of him." Maling reappeared at the annual Inkatha meeting in June 1929. Bhulose submitted a report of the meeting's resolutions, where it was recorded that the "most vital question largely discussed" at the meeting was that of land tenure; the matter had been "introduced by poor suffering Natives - especially from the district of Vryheid". No resolution was permitted, however, "owing to the overheated arguments advanced". It was thereafter decided to refer the matter to "a special meeting of Chiefs only" the following month. Somewhat ironically, this same report described Inkatha as the "widely recognised organisation of all Native human beings in and out of the Union of South Africa".

Maling attended the special Inkatha meeting in August 1929, even though it was called for chiefs only. Chief Nkantini took the chair. This meeting transpired to be Maling's greatest success in the context of Inkatha: he was elected to represent the Vryheid district on a specially-convened 'Inkatha land committee' which was to accompany Solomon to Pretoria to "take forward our wail to the Government". Of the twelve members of this committee, only Maling, Rev. Mathe and Samuel kaDinuzulu Zulu (David's full brother) were
not chiefs. In this context, Maling was forced to defer to the hamba kahle and ineffectual political strategies of the Zulu tribal establishment. In contrast to the ALU petitions, which had been forthright in content and were sent directly to the House of Assembly or the Prime Minister, the chiefs' meeting sent a somewhat florid 'request' to the magistrate of Nongoma:

Natives are cast out in the country by white people on farms and we hear nothing which the Government replies on their behalf to find a place where they might fall, and they are without cause deprived of their cattle...we have not fought after the Queen restored Cetywayo ka Mpande saying to him your country is yours always, I take your sovereignty only...we pray to go to hear from our father the Government what it is that we his children have now done that we then should be made mere wanderers in the hills now. 216

While the NAD could fear civil disturbance and strike action if it ignored the ALU petitions of two years previously, such 'chiefly prose' was barely threatening. The request was routinely rejected, with the instruction that "individual" complaints should be made to "respective Native Commissioners. 217

Because of the support Maling commanded among the Zulu in Northern Natal, including certain important chiefs there, he could not be simply rejected by Inkatha's dominant clique. After Maling had gained a foothold in Inkatha, however, it was his rather than Inkatha's class position that was redefined. Inkatha's role in defusing what hope there had been of effective rank-and-file class action among the Zulu was thus a very subtle one. Maling adopted an increasingly conciliatory stance. In 1920 he gave evidence before the Native Economic Commission, accompanied by a deputation, and claimed to be the chosen representative of all Zulu
in Northern Natal and Solomon's regional official in that area. Evidence suggests that these claims were not unjustified. He spoke almost exclusively on behalf of ordinary labour tenants and farm workers, but the political opinions he tendered before the commission suggested that he was now identifying more with the tribal and petty bourgeois elites. "Everything in native custom is good except the practice of witchcraft", he said; "[natives] must be given a chance to develop their own civilisation and good things in their customs", the most important of which was the "showing of respect to elders and those in authority". He also reported that he had been attempting to establish a Joint Council in Vryheid. There was in fact nothing in Maling's evidence that would not have been heartily endorsed at the Inkatha meeting of 1928.

Between 1928 and 1930, Inkatha played the role of an ideological bulwark against rank-and-file militancy on the one hand, and an ideological bastion of Zulu nationalism and the most conservative elements in Zulu society on the other hand. Apart from the aborted attempt to send a chiefs' deputation to Pretoria in 1929 to 'wail' about evictions, Inkatha took virtually no practical political action of its own accord. The main purpose of the reconstitution of Inkatha in 1928 had been to formalise Inkatha in such a way as to make it a more attractive ally of the state. In effect, Inkatha was pressing the Union Government to implement among the Zulu a more thoroughgoing policy of segregation than was currently envisaged in ruling circles - a policy which bore resemblances to the 'Bantustan' policy of the 1950s. After the 1928 meeting, Inkatha entered a period of paralysis as it awaited the government's response. But before recounting how the government responded and how the question was finally resolved in 1930, it is first necessary to comment on the objectives of those who were the driving forces behind and within the 'new' Inkatha: first, white sugar planting and commercial farming interests and 'native policy' legislators in Natal, and, second, the Natal African and Zulu petty bourgeoisie.
The broader purpose of Inkatha's reconstitution

The class actors who were primarily responsible for the reconstitution of Inkatha had come together in the first instance because they wished to counter the class threat that the ICU was seen to represent. In the context of the reconstituted Inkatha however, they cooperated not only as opponents of the ICU but also as advocates of 'tribalism', Zulu nationalism, and Zulu 'self government'. Clearly enough, the aim to foster those aspects of tribalism that prescribed respect for 'authority' and 'social discipline' generally was not in the interests of popular protest; neither was the cultivation of Zulu nationalism as an unambiguously hamba kahle political force. But the aim to establish a measure of Zulu national autonomy or self government - which was keenly supported by Nicholls - made it manifest that Inkatha's purpose went beyond the obstruction of popular protest.

An overview of the objectives of white interest groups in allying themselves to the Zulu political 'establishment' is essential to an understanding of the history of Solomon and Inkatha after 1928. Inkatha's white supporters primarily represented, first, the sugar planting interest ('sugar barons' were the most prominent of Inkatha's white supporters) and second, the Natal commercial farming interest. These two 'fractions' of rural capital in Natal had acted in alliance since 1920 in regard to labour matters and 'native policy'. Their support for Inkatha after 1928 was a further development of this existing alliance - which in the first instance had set out to secure a cheap, tractable and abundant supply of African labour.

The sugar industry had become dependent on an African labour supply by the first few years of Union (the importation of indentured Indian labour was terminated by the Union Government in 1911). Sugar planters found that they could not rely on the African reserves in the province for a labour supply; the
highly-capitalised gold mining recruitment networks had long held a virtual monopoly over those reserve Africans who were willing to bind themselves to employment contracts. Neither could they draw labour from the African population in the province's white countryside: farmers fiercely defended 'their' labour supply against encroachment by labour recruiters, and, moreover, tended to demand labour service from their tenants erratically throughout the year which prevented the latter taking up 'outside' contract work. In the transition from indentured Indian labour, the sugar industry came to favour a migrant form of African labour, and drew its labourers from mainly Pondoland, Tongaland and Mocambique - rather than within the province.

However, following the rapid expansion of the sugar industry - particularly in Zululand - during the first decade of Union, the industry was afflicted with a chronic labour shortage. The latter persisted although the industry expanded the geographical scope of its recruiting activities in 1918 by establishing the 'Natal Coast Labour Recruiting Corporation' (which was based on the model of the gold mines' Native Recruiting Corporation). By 1920, the sugar industry had come to realise that the only hope for a long-term solution to its labour shortage lay in the greater exploitation of the labour resources within the province of Natal. Moreover, labour from the coastal and midlands districts of the province offered two important advantages over 'imported' labour. First, it was cheaper because of reduced recruitment and transportation costs. Second, it was more resistant to the fever (mainly malaria) which had become virtually endemic in the 'sugar belt'. The sugar industry's drive to employ Zulu and Natal African labourers, which became increasingly urgent in the course of the 1920s, did not bring it into conflict with Natal's farmers. The sugar planters sought to employ the inhabitants of the province's reserves as migrant labourers, whereas the farmers sought to bind the African inhabitants of the white countryside to more stringent labour tenancy
agreements. While planters and farmers did not compete with each other over labour supplied, however, they both competed against urban employers and the gold mines. The existence of 'common enemies' provided cause for an alliance.

Soon after their election to parliament in 1920, Nicholls (who had stood for parliament as a sugar representative) and Marwick (who acted as leader of the MPs for the rural constituencies of Natal proper) established themselves as inseparable allies and Natal's leading spokesmen on labour, land and 'native' matters. Their alliance as representatives of the labour interests of Natal's planters and farmers was clearly illustrated in 1921. In that year, Marwick introduced to parliament a catalogue of proposals - which Nicholls was first to support.- regarding "methods of ensuring an increased and more constant supply" of African labour in the country districts. The proposals sought to remedy two complaints on the part of Natal's rural employers. First, the "extreme tendency...for natives to drift to the towns and labour centres" (Marwick) where there was already "an enormous amount of wastage in native labour" (Nicholls); rural industries, however, were afflicted with unreliable and insufficient labour. Furthermore, the experience of urban life had a "strong detribalising influence" on migrant youths, who returned to the rural areas "utterly demoralised" and incapable of respect for authority (Marwick). These factors were seen to be the root causes of the labour problems in the rural areas. Second, extant legislation pertaining to labour contracts and African identification passes was regarded as inadequate and in need of revision. This legislation, it was felt, did not place sufficient control over the workforce in the hands of the rural employer (civil actions were a clumsy way of enforcing obedience); and, more especially, it did not provide a failsafe means of apprehending and prosecuting labourers who deserted prior to the expiry of their contracts. The 1921 proposals outlined the main objectives of the Natal planter/farmer alliance throughout the 1920s."
Among the measures that were persistently advocated to counter the 'rural exodus' were the revision of the Pass Laws (so that a more rigorous policy of influx and efflux control could be implemented), and the prohibition of the system of 'advances' (mining recruiters had instituted the practice of paying large advance wages to lure labour to the compounds). It was alleged that the 'injudicious persuasion' and superior buying power of the mine recruiters were largely responsible for the breaches of labour contracts in the rural areas. Thus it was argued that the recruitment and distribution of labour be placed under 'impartial' state control, and that 'government agencies' be established in the reserves - not in the white countryside - for that purpose. And the Zululand Planters' Union in particular repeatedly called for the closure of the Zululand reserves to 'outside' (ie. mine) recruiting. The demands for new legislation pertaining to labour tenancy contracts on white farms (which then fell under the purview of the Natal Masters and Servants (Natives) Law of 1894) and migrant labour contracts on sugar plantations (which were modelled on those of the gold mines, and did not fall under the purview of any law applicable in Natal) were closely related to the aim to halt the townward drift. Through this proposed new legislation, Natal's rural employers sought to ensure that more rigorous criminal action could be taken against both those labourers who deserted to the towns, and those employers who employed deserted labour. Furthermore, it was envisaged that the revision of the Pass Laws would be of service in arresting the escape of both potential labourers and deserting labourers towards the towns and gold mines. Overall, the objectives of the Natal planter/farmer alliance were first to retain Natal's rural labour reserves in Natal's rural districts, and, second, to shackle African labourers to Natal's rural employers. More specifically, the alliance sought to secure 'first option' on the labour resources of Natal's coastal and midlands reserves for the sugar industry, and to bind more securely the labour resources of the white countryside to Natal's farmers.
Yet Natal's planters and farmers did not only call upon the state to resolve their labour problems - particularly since the state was so slow to respond. They also took action of their own accord at a local level, and sought to use tribalism and tribal authorities - whether chiefs or ordinary homestead heads - as a means of securing better control over the local labour force. In the rural districts of Natal in the 1920s, there is evidence that a particularly Natal-style 'solution' to both the labour and 'native' questions was taking form: this was based on a loose accord, if not an alliance, between rural employers and tribal authorities. That MPs for the rural districts of the province were concurrently waging a battle at state level for the preservation of tribalism and the 'Natal system' of 'native administration' suggests that the expressly political aspects of Natal's 'native policy' proposals were closely interrelated with the labour interests of rural employers. And at the local level, the way in which planters and farmers supported chiefs and tribalism as the main antidotes to 'socialistic propaganda' and the truculence of the labour force is perhaps even more illustrative in this respect.

Natal's farmers strongly favoured labour tenancy arrangements that were based on the tribal order at the level of the family (ie. the 'kraalhead system' where the contract was made with only the household head and not each member of the family) for two reasons. First, it placed in the hands of the homestead heads much of the responsibility of 'policing' the labour force on the farmers' behalf. Second, the engagement of whole homesteads as productive units meant that the labour force was able to provide for its own subsistence - the costs of feeding and housing were not incurred by the farmer. Farmers felt that the process of 'detribalisation' was a social evil, particularly since it increased the likelihood of young labourers deserting the labour contracts to which their elders had bound them. The desertion of youths deprived both farmers and the
tenanted homesteads of their most productive labour - which could serve to increase the hunger of the tenanted homesteads to an extent that they became dependent on the farmer for food. As a spokesman for three Farmers' Associations in the Dundee district told the Native Economic Commission: "Detribalisation has no advantages for the European farmer, nor yet does it benefit the native." Indeed, farmers were keenly aware that those individuals who farmers despised as deserters were often equally despised by tribal authorities and parents as abaqafi. The chairman of a Newcastle Farmers' Association might have been speaking on behalf of tribal authorities when he complained of the tendency of youths to "defy their parents" and to abscond to the towns where they learnt further "irresponsible" habits; so too when he painted an idyllic picture of the "olden days" when chiefs and homestead heads were "respected and obeyed by everyone in the kraal" and any disagreements between labourers, homestead heads and farmers were "fixed up at once" by the intervention of the local chief.

In the 1920s, farmers sought to rehabilitate the tribal order and the web of inter-generational obligations that underpinned it. Their attempt to do so was extremely problematical: the nature of African land tenure on white farms had itself done much to undermine the status of tribal authorities and the rationale of tribalism. Tribal authorities, too, had many grievances about tenure on white farms - as had been evidenced, for example, in the support that they had given the ALU in Northern Natal. Moreover, some farmers in effect used the 'kraalhead system' to punish their lieutenants, the homestead heads, by fining or eviction if any of the latters' dependants deserted. However, although the overall effect of African tenure on white farms had been to forge a restive rank-and-file from the ruins of the tribal order, a strong element of generational struggle between tribal authorities and detribalised youth still persisted. And while tribal authorities continued to defend their tribal prerogatives against the forces of 'social disintegration', farmers had African compatriots in the
struggle to defend the 'kraalhead system'. In the latter context, three points can be made.

First, by resisting the 'individualism' of sons who sought to make their own separate labour tenancy arrangements, farmers served to force youth to maintain their allegiance with their parents and tribal superiors if they wished to maintain a link with the land in the white countryside. One of the farmers' main complaints about the old Masters and Servants Law was that it did not lend legal weight to the defence of the 'kraalhead system', since it did not prescribe that the 'unit of employment' was a married man together with his wives and offspring. The long-demanded 1932 Native Service Contract Act, however, did do so; moreover, it provided that 'native juveniles' from the white countryside could not be employed by outside employers except with the written consent of both their 'guardians' and their landlords. It is significant that Nicholls, in strongly supporting the Native Service Contract Bill in parliament (even though the bill was of little value to the sugar industry), elaborately explained how such provisions were welcomed by tribal authorities who, like farmers, were deeply troubled by 'social disintegration' and urbanisation.\(^{232}\) Second, once the 'kraalhead contract' had been made, farmers reinforced its tribal nature by resisting the 'individualism' of sons who demanded to be paid individually for work performed outside the six-month term of free labour service. Instead, farmers paid an 'aggregated wage' to homestead heads; this bolstered patriarchal authority and enabled the patriarchs to take their 'commission' in the course of redistributing the money to their 'dependants'.\(^{233}\) Third, and perhaps most illustrative, farmers looked upon chiefs as a means of tracing deserters and returning them to the farms. Deserters could not be efficiently traced by means of the extant pass laws, and, since the Masters and Servants Law did not recognise a 'kraalhead contract' as binding except in respect of the homestead head himself, most deserters could not be prosecuted in court. As Warwick reported to parliament, Katel's farmers favoured the employment of chiefs
to combat desertion since this represented "an inexpensive form of carrying out the Masters and Servants Act in Natal where it is practically a dead letter". Marwick was justifiably accused of condoning the use of chiefs as "spies" among their own people. Indeed, farmers' attempts to coerce 'retribalisation' by enforcing the 'kraalhead system', in which process they implicated tribal authorities, also had the effect of generating further tensions within the tribal structure - a paradox that farmers evidently did (or would) not recognise.

Like Natal's farmers, the sugar planters were well aware that the preservation of the tribal order was in their interests as employers of labour. Empangeni planter George Higgs, for example, lamented the decline of "self control" that was evident even among the rural Zulu. Since Africans had "lost their nice old ways", he continued, their respect for whites had ebbed, and employers found difficulty in controlling their labour forces. He related this to the growth of a stratum of "semi-educated natives" in the rural areas. Planters generally regarded the process of detribalisation to be closely associated with the increasing incidence of desertion. Moreover, as on the Natal farms, the cheapness of the plantation labour supply was based on the survival of homestead production - which detribalisation threatened. Duncan Eadie, a leading miller-cum-planter who gave evidence before the Native Economic Commission, justified the low wages on the plantations by arguing that migrant labourers were "tribal": only the labourer himself needed to be paid, fed and housed since it was "quite feasible that his family may be fully supported from his tribal holding".

It is significant that planters were becoming increasingly concerned about detribalisation at the same time as their demands for Zulu labour were becoming more urgent. Moreover, planters knew that Zulu tribal authorities were also concerned about detribalisation, since the latter were anxious that
migrants returned their wages to the reserves to be redistributed in a tribal fashion. Planters and Zulu tribal authorities thus had common cause against detribalisation and the social influence of the urban areas; and planters came to realise that this 'accord' could be of service in resolving their chronic difficulties with the supply of and control over plantation labourers. For the planters, the possibility of a 'labour alliance' with tribal authorities became particularly attractive after 1925.

By the mid-1920s, planters had become thoroughly disenchanted with both the system of labour recruitment itself, and the suitability of most recruited labour for plantation work. To compete with the gold mines' recruiters, the sugar industry's labour agents were forced to offer advances considerably in excess of the £2 maximum prescribed by the 1921 Native Advances Regulation Act.237 All that the recruiter, and subsequently the employer, held as security against the advance was the recruited labourer's pass book. The expense of this system rose dramatically in the mid-1920s, since plantation labourers had learnt that they could, either themselves or through a local accomplice, buy replacement pass books at local magistracies; this enabled them to desert, be 're-recruited', and accumulate advances - while the planters accumulated pass books. On top of this development, planters found that a significant proportion of recruited labourers were 'rejects' from the mines (some were suffering from miners' pthisis, venereal diseases or tuberculosis), increasing numbers were succumbing to 'sugar belt' fever, and, as was emphasised during the 1925 season, the industry's recruiters were simply unable to supply enough labourers. It was for these reasons that Mr C. W. Dent, secretary of the Zululand Planters' Union, argued in late 1925 that the "serious labour troubles" always endured by Zululand planters had now become "acute".238

Zulu labourers were seen to offer the remedy to the expensiveness, insufficiency, poor health and low fever-tolerance of recruited
labourers. Although more Zulu labourers had begun to arrive on the plantations in the wake of evictions from the white countryside and reserve congestion, they neither arrived in sufficient numbers nor with any intention of adhering to the six-month plantation contracts (which covered the labour intensive cutting season). While it was very convenient to the planters that Zulu labourers 'deserted' to their nearby homesteads when they fell ill, rather than involving the planter in hospitalisation expenses (as did recruited labour), it was most inconvenient that they deserted whenever they pleased. Thus planters sought not only to attract more Zulu labourers to the plantations, but also to devise a method of ensuring that they adhered to their contracts - which extant labour legislation and pass laws did little to ensure. Various 'experts' - including Dr G. A. Park-Ross (District Medical Officer of Health), C. A. Wheelwright (CNC), and H. S. Fynn (Inspector of Native Labour, Natal) - advised the sugar industry that increased wages and better food, housing and working conditions were the ways to achieve its objectives among the Zulu. Such advice was not welcomed, largely on the grounds of expense. That the sugar industry favoured coercive strategies is perhaps most vividly illustrated in the South African Sugar Association's proposals to the NAD, shortly after the latter began distributing food among the Zulu during the famine of 1931/1932. This "scheme" (which the NAD rejected) proposed that the NAD require every homestead head who accepted food to undertake to supply labour to the sugar industry; in return, the sugar industry would assist in defraying the costs of the famine relief.

The main coercive strategy that the sugar industry favoured after the mid-1920s, however, was rather more subtle: it aimed to motivate Zulu tribal authorities to force young Zulu males onto the plantations. The sugar industry sought to institutionalise a 'deferred pay scheme'. Under this scheme, plantation labourers would only receive small payments for incidental expenses while they were working, but would be paid a lump sum at
the expiry of their contract and on the eve of their return to their reserve homesteads. From the point of view of the tribal authorities and migrants' dependants, this would ensure that plantation labourers would return to the reserves with almost six months' wages intact. For their part, the planters could rest assured that labourers did not desert before the expiry of their contracts. Moreover, it was envisaged that tribal authorities would act as the sugar industry's labour agents, altering the pattern of Zulu labour migration away from the towns (where wages were so easily 'squandered' and detribalised ideas were learnt) and towards the plantations. G. M. Robinson, a sugar planter and representative of the Zululand Farmers' Union (to which all local Planters' Unions in Zululand were affiliated), expected that deferred pay would also cause Zulu women to "force" their husbands and sons onto the plantations "since the money would be coming home".242

When notifying the CNC of the proposals relating to Solomon and Inkatha which Campbell laid before the Minister of Native Affairs in early 1928, the SNA appended some indignant personal observations.

The scheme suggested by Mr Campbell is nothing more nor less than an attempt to get Solomon under the thumb of the employers of labour, and to use him against the ICU. They would also subject the activities of the magistrate of Nongoma and of the [proposed white] private secretary to that end, and to complete the picture, the Chief Native Commissioner would also be included in this objective.243

There was considerable truth in these views. The planters had particular cause in 1928 to take such drastic action as offering to settle Solomon's debts (which already amounted to thousands of pounds) in order to secure Zulu labour. Under the terms of the 1928 Mocambique Convention, the government of Mocambique ruled that Mocambique migrants could not take up employment in the Union anywhere except on the gold mines. Hitherto, labourers from the Portuguese east coast had formed the largest component
of the planters' labour force, and represented the latters' only reliable supply of labour that was immune to malaria. It is very likely that the planters' offer to Solomon was made in the nature of a bargain for Zulu labour. More broadly, however, the aim to assist in the resurrection of the Zulu monarchy represented an extension of the planters' and farmers' labour policy during the 1920s. This had revolved around the preservation of tribalism and the homestead mode of production on which it was based, and the use of tribal authorities as suppliers and controllers of labour - objectives that had become more urgent in view of the rise of the ICU. And in the context of a 'recognised' semi-autonomous Zulu monarchy and Inkatha, planters and farmers undoubtedly would have acted as a powerful backstairs lobby in supporting the rebuilding of African socio-economic and political life in the rural areas, denouncing the social influence of the urban areas, and persuading tribal authorities that their interests lay in the retention of African labour in Natal's countryside.

Planters' and farmers' objectives regarding Solomon and Inkatha were not only, however, directly related to their labour objectives. As has been noted, the spread of 'socialistic' and revolutionary ideas among the African population had persuaded Natal's rural whites that the whole structure of white rule in South Africa was under threat. The ominous references to the security of "isolated farms", homes to white women and children, that Marwick made during his parliamentary denunciations of the ICU were not unrepresentative: mortal fears among Natal's rural whites lent an urgency to their drive to ensure the long-term survival of white economic and political supremacy. One response had been to call for more vigorous state repression. In this context, it is significant that the Natal Agricultural Union (primarily representative of Farmers' Associations in the province, but also representative of Planters' Unions) made a special deputation to the Minister of Native Affairs in 1927 to plead for the banning of all "native meetings", except those conducted with official sanction.
Another response, however, was to call for the implementation of a thoroughgoing segregationist 'native policy' which would meet the expressly political threats that were seen to be confronting white South Africa. Solomon and Inkatha, whose political objectives were both collaboratory and separatist, were seen to be the planters' and farmers' African allies in the pursuit of a segregationist 'settlement' of the 'native question' in Natal.

Natal's rural whites were bitterly antagonistic to the tendency among African leaders to adopt 'European' political ideas and practices. 'British' liberal-democratic notions among the African petty bourgeoisie were seen to be as fundamentally revolutionary as 'Russian' socialist notions among African workers. Hertzog's 1926 'Native Bills', however, were considered to give state encouragement to the 'Europeanisation' of African politics: they envisaged the establishment of an elective Union Native Council and sought to permit Africans to elect seven white representatives to the House of Assembly. These provisions would give Africans in Natal a voice in the central white government for the first time, and, moreover, would do so on the basis of the democratic principle. When the select committee on Hertzog's 'Native Bills' began touring the Union during 1927 to consult public opinion, Farmers' Associations and Planters' Unions in Natal mobilised to enter into the discourse on the 'political' aspects of 'native policy' - and in doing so they rallied to the defence of the Natal 'Shepstonist' model of political, judicial and cultural segregation.

The Rosebank Farmers' Association, for example, submitted a resolution to its representative body, the Natal Agricultural Union, which opined that

> the governance of the Natives in South Africa on any principles of democracy is both premature and unwise...the advancement of the Natives towards civilization would be speedier and more satisfactory under the more drastic and effective control of their own Native Chiefs whose status and jurisdiction should be increased rather than diminished.
Farmers' Associations and Planters' Unions from all over the province authorised the Natal Agricultural Union to express their consensus of opinion before the select committee on the 'Native Bills' in mid-1927. William Elliot, an Estcourt farmer, acted as the leading spokesman before the committee - whose members included Marwick and Nicholls. Elliot represented that it was "extremely dangerous for European civilization to be built on a black base and then admit them [Africans] to representation in our supreme governing body". The issue was one of "racial preservation". While endorsing the abolition of the Cape African franchise, he argued that the proposal regarding the election of white parliamentary representatives of African interests would effectively extend the African "franchise right" throughout the Union. The state should "not give the educated native who had left his tribal conditions any share in the government of the country so far as the European parliament is concerned": these Africans would launch a clamour for equality with whites and "make it impossible and intolerable for Europeans to live in this country". And referring to the activities of the ICU in both rural and urban areas in Natal, Elliot argued that worker unrest could only worsen if Africans were given any encouragement to regard themselves as equal citizens of a unitary South Africa. The situation might then arise that "if we [whites] want to hold our own we must exterminate them [Africans]".

As an alternative, Elliot expounded a scheme of political segregation whereby Africans would have no political rights in 'white South Africa' - whether in parliament or by way of African councils in the urban areas or white countryside. In the African reserves, he argued, a structure of local and regional representative bodies could be established to train Africans in "citizenship" in their "own areas". The reserves, which could be amalgamated to form larger territorial units should be "native" from top to bottom: reserve 'citizens' should not be debarred from any professional or executive posts there. In this way, he concluded, Africans could "ultimately
reach self-government in their own areas, the only point we reserve is that in the last resort the white man must remain master". 248

Throughout the 1920s, Marwick and Nicholls were the most ardent parliamentary advocates of both the Natal system of 'native administration' and the tribal system on which it was based. They had consistently advocated the extension of the powers of chiefs, and, though they approved of the principle of African local self-government and political representation in the rural areas, they opposed the application of local councils policy in Natal on the grounds that it would undermine tribalism. 249 And in a long and elaborate speech in early 1927, Nicholls argued that the democratic principles embodied in Hertzog's 'Native Bills' were both dangerous and unnecessary. What was necessary, he suggested, was that a more thorough understanding of "the psychology of the native" and of tribal law and custom should guide the evolution of state 'native policy': Africans should be governed in a way which suited their particular beliefs, customs and needs. Moreover, Nicholls reminded parliament that Africans had a particular economic role to play in South Africa, since cheap African labour was the foundation upon which white South African civilisation and wealth depended; he contended that Hertzog had not adequately considered this fact when formulating his political proposals. Marwick strongly supported Nicholls' views. 250

Before taking up their work as members of the select committee on Hertzog's 'Native Bills', Marwick and Nicholls developed their segregationist ideas in the course of supporting the Native Administration Bill. They not only expounded the administrative virtues of the Natal Code of Native Law and the maintenance of tribalism, but went on to argue that, by prescribing the political, judicial and cultural separateness of Africans from Europeans, the Bill was founded on anthropological 'fact'. For Marwick, the Bill connoted a return to a native policy that was in harmony with the "philosophy of the natives". "Native
customs and usages were invested with a national and civic value", he noted, but until recently the tendency had been to regard them with "mere academic or ethnological interest". To support his view that it was the state's duty to uphold tribalism, Marwick quoted the similar opinions of an anthropologist who had recently studied tribal society in the Sudan. He then detailed how African acculturation of European values and practices was neither in the interests of Africans nor Europeans; in this context Marwick dwelt on the ideological origins and the purpose of the ICU.251 Nicholls argued that state 'native policy' had to choose between two alternatives: the Natal system which sought to maintain tribalism and "develop the native on his own lines", and the Cape system, which sought to foster "individualism" and impose European-style democracy on the African population. The "vast majority of natives in this country", he argued, asked that they "be allowed to develop along their own lines and maintain their purity of race, and that the administration of the native laws should be in the hands of their chiefs". And the proportionately small number of "detribalized, Europeanized" Africans who sought to develop on the lines of the "selfish individualism" of the European - which the Cape system encouraged - would and should always be shunned by the majority of whites and Africans alike; they threatened both European and African civilisation. Nicholls concluded by urging the state to discard the "false conceptions of the Victorian era" which regarded every African as a potential parliamentary voter and "imitation European"; policy should rather be based on modern anthropological knowledge and build upon "the sure foundations of tribal custom and tradition".252

By Nicholls' own account, Natal MPs together agreed that he and Marwick should represent the 'Natal view' and "act according to a plan that was agreed upon" in the select committee on the 'Native Bills'.253 In this context Nicholls emerged as the leading ideologue, reinterpreting and elaborating the segregationist principles which Natal had inherited from the days of Shepstone.
While simultaneously negotiating with Solomon and Inkatha, he set out his ideas in a number of illuminating memoranda and private letters. Nicholls outlined his policy, which he named 'adaptationist' to distinguish it from the Cape 'assimilationist' alternative, in an undated memorandum (evidently written during 1930):

An adaptationist policy demands as its primary concept the maintenance of chieftaindom \[\text{as}\] the necessary pivot around which all tribal evolution must take place. \[\text{It}\] assumes a difference between the Bantu and the Europeans \[\text{and}\] some measure of territorial segregation \[\text{and}\] the growth of a national consciousness among the Bantu themselves. The opposite policy of assimilation substitutes class for race, and, if continued on its present basis, must lead to the evolution of a native proletariat, inspired by the usual antagonisms of the class war. The process of assimilation has already gone very far, and unless some effort is made to stem the tide of tribal disintegration, it will soon be too late.\textsuperscript{254}

Perhaps more bluntly, he wrote in a private letter dated May 1929 that "I do not believe that black and white can continue to exist as two separate classes in a South African democracy \[\ldots\] we cannot long continue as a white aristocracy and black proletariat". Whites were faced with a choice between "a Bantu Nation whose evolving civilisation we can advance and respect, which shall find its national pride in the cultivation of its separateness, or a Black proletariat using all the recognised methods for the complete overthrow of the whites on the basis of class".\textsuperscript{255}

As an alternative to a unitary South Africa with African representation in the House of Assembly, Nicholls believed that state policy should foster self-governing 'Bantu Nations' in the Union's reserves. He was determined that 'Bantu self government' should operate on the tribal rather than democratic principle. "Democracy exists in chieftaindom but it is not the Western democracy of the ballot box. We must get back to the essence of native life - communalism - \[Otherwise\]
Nicholls disapproved of the Transkeian General Council (Bunga) because, he maintained, its elected members tended to adopt an "aggressive attitude" to NAD officials. By contrast, a tribal council would be dominated by chiefs who were NAD employees. Moreover, Nicholls felt that hereditary chiefs would play an essential ideological role in stimulating a sense of 'national' loyalty. In an unaddressed and undated copy of a letter, probably written in 1929, he related this to the Zulu case:

The policy of a Bantu Nation...obviously brings in its train a pride of race. The most race proud man I know is Solomon. He glories in his race and its past prowess; and there is no native in the Union who is so earnestly desirous of maintaining Bantu Purity...There is everything to be said for creating the Inkata the Native Council for Zululand.

Although Nicholls mainly emphasised the importance of resuscitating paramount chiefs, tribal authorities and tribalism, he felt that the African petty bourgeoisie had a leading role to play in 'educating' and 'developing' their respective 'Bantu Nations'. And Nicholls' envisaged 'solution' offered tangible advantages for the African petty bourgeoisie. In the reserves, Africans were to be eligible for all posts in the civil service, and were to be encouraged to enter the professional and commercial careers that, in practice, were currently monopolised by whites.

There was considerable congruity between Nicholls' views and those that developed among ideologues of Natal's hamba kahle petty bourgeoisie during the late 1920s. The latter, on their own account, had become increasingly anxious to stave off a 'class war' as class antagonisms sharpened both within African society and between Africans and whites. Indeed, the petty bourgeois establishment hovered uncomfortably in the social 'grey area' between the dominant social forces - black workers and white capitalists - and was keenly aware of the insecurities of its position. Dube personally had a foretaste of what seemed
to lie in store when, as tension was mounting between African workers and whites in Durban prior to the Beer Hall riots of mid-1929, a 'class skirmish' disrupted his meeting to revive the Durban branch of the old NNC. An "amalayita gang", Ilanga lase Natal reported, invaded this meeting of "chiefs and respectable natives", and turned it into a debacle. The editorial related the amalayita action to Dube's recent denunciation of the "rotten social conditions" which were being fomented in the town "largely by those associated by sic all-night dances". During the late 1920s, the ideological mainstream of Natal's petty bourgeois establishment was infused with a powerful new element: a moral indignation for 'foreign' (ie. Russian), 'anti-religious' and 'socially divisive' working class doctrines. Simultaneously, petty bourgeois ideologues further elaborated the ideology of African or, more specifically, Zulu nationalism that had underpinned their interest in Inkatha since the latter's inception. This ideology came to be more explicitly expressed as one of 'national rebuilding', which envisaged the construction of a 'new African civilization' upon the foundation of its tribal predecessor. Increasing moral value was attached to social unity and respect for hereditary chiefs. And the latter's residual appeal to vertical tribal loyalties was seen to be the key to the reimposition of 'control' over a society that was fast falling apart at the seams, and, in so doing, was threatening to decapitate itself of both its old and new elites.

After 1928 and until the early 1930s, Ilanga lase Natal frequently featured articles which were intended to "warn our people against Bolshevism which is now being freely preached" and to counter the "ignorance that makes our people listen to these foreigners". Considerable detail was provided about social and political conditions in Russia (for example, that tax defaulters were "lined up in batches before a firing squad"), and the overall conclusion was that communism had "destroyed Russia its own mother". These articles sometimes sought to predict the consequences of CP, ICU and "Red ANC" policy in South
Africa. Readers were advised against joining Gumede's 'League of African Rights' because "to hand over the reigns of power to the proletariat is for the most savage and ruthless brute...to do absolutely what he likes. Such a prospect might be pleasing...to one who hates all the moral laws of God".261 Ilanga lase Natal expected that its readers' respect for both the 'laws' of the Christian God and those of African tradition - which would have been considered as incompatible a decade previously - should assist them in their rejection of communism. As one editorial argued, communism was inappropriate and undesirable since African governments had been "of monarchical form from time immemorial".262 The implication was that African government should remain so - and while the Russian model had proved that communism was incompatible with monarchical forms, the British model proved that bourgeois democracy was not.

The florescence of an inward-looking and tribal-based African nationalism among Natal's petty bourgeois establishment was not only an ideological response against specific working class doctrines. More broadly, the social influence of the urban areas was seen to be the root cause of African 'social disintegration'. There, it was believed, 'ignorant' and 'uneducated' Africans picked up the worst of white habits. For example, while decrying the activities of urban "amalayita mobs", Ilanga lase Natal argued that "Natives were ladies and gentlemen before they came under the influence of the criminal element of the Whites".263 This question of undesirable white influence was a factor in stimulating a separatist or segregationist ideological response.

The evidence of leading petty bourgeois ideologues before the Native Economic Commission indicated that the rural areas - and, more particularly, the reserves - were being regarded as the natural domain of 'respectable' African culture. Moreover, whereas the petty bourgeoisie had long considered tribal 'barbarity' and 'primitiveness' as the antithesis of mission-station 'respectability', great emphasis was now placed on the
inherent dignity of hereditary chiefs, their importance as inheritors of African tradition, and the value of tribalism as a means of ensuring social hygiene. Chief Simon Majozi of the Indaleni mission community, a member of Inkatha's executive committee and a keen tennis player, dwelled on the value of the "hlonipa" custom which prescribed "respect". He argued that the tribal system was "in essence representative", as was so clearly illustrated in the action that chiefs took against "agitators". Kholwa Chiefs Stephen Mini and Dirk Sioka (both of whom had been stalwarts of the old NNC) endorsed Majozi's call for the extension of chiefly authority. Mini spoke of chiefs as the "heritages of the distant past of Zulu culture", and of tribalism as the "rational feeling of the people which calls for conservation". Mrs Violet Makanya, secretary of the 'progressive' rural 'Bantu Youth League', strongly supported chiefly rule because it encouraged a sense of social unity and cooperation - even though chiefs had hampered her organisation's objectives. She was particularly concerned about the social effects of migrancy, and saw tribalism as a remedy. "But it should be guided in the right lines and not assisted when it stands in the way of progress." In all these ideological developments, Natal's petty bourgeois establishment had been influenced by white liberals. After 1925, while the CP was developing a network of night schools in the urban areas to offer an 'appropriate' education to African workers, Christian and liberal organisations established a variety of educational and social institutions designed primarily to assist the petty bourgeoisie to take up roles of social leadership. The ideological dissimilarity between CP and liberal night schools was very clear. In the former, Roux relates that pupils "struggled with complicated political doctrines at the same time as they learnt their letters", and, by contrast, the Bantu Men's Social Centres offered up to Junior Certificate classes in the interests of "development and civilisation" and bookkeeping classes for "business pursuits".
As African education flourished so too did African newspapers, stimulating an unprecedented spirit of African public enquiry into the question of social engineering - which state legislators had been anxious to preserve as their exclusive domain.269

The guidance that liberals/Christians offered to the petty bourgeoisie in this context was illustrated in the address that Rev. R. E. Phillips of the Johannesburg Bantu Men's Social Centre presented to the Natal Missionary Conference in 1929. This address, which was entitled "Communism or Christianity: The present-day question for Native youth", was dominated by a measured denunciation of the moral evils of communism. But it went further, and, having outlined the socio-economic ills that were seen to be communism's breeding-ground, urged Christians to take positive action in "moulding and shaping the new Bantu Society". To this end, he favoured the encouragement of African commercial and agricultural cooperative societies - or 'self-help' schemes - through which media Africans themselves were to play a leading role in their own 'social reconstruction' on 'progressive' lines.270

D. R. O. Thomas, the tutor of the Durban 'Workers' Educational Association' (i.e.a liberal institution) in 1931 clearly enunciated why the 'self-help' strategy was particularly appropriate in the African context. He addressed himself to the questions of "how the Native people may advance, yet not adopt the disastrous individualism of the European ... how they may not lose the valuable attributes of the tribal unit, and yet combat its conservatism ...". The answer, he concluded, lay in cooperative societies which were compatible with "the tradition of the Native people to look to communal prosperity". Thus tribal communalism, which was morally applaudable, was to be a positive advantage in the transition from a redistributive subsistence economy to one of "industrial progress" - or capital accumulation.271

The burden of liberal guidance to petty bourgeois leaders was therefore that they should grapple with the social problems of their day with their own hands, and go out among their own
people' with the express purpose of building a progressive new African society on the old tribal base. In this context it is significant that J. D. Rheinallt Jones, editor of the anthropological journal *Bantu Studies*, instituted a weekly seminar within the Bantu Men's Social Centres wherein the "African who aspires for leadership among his people" could "discuss Native Law and Custom and Economics". Although liberals/white Christians still tended to verbalise a fondness for a liberal-democratic solution to the political 'native question', in practice they were now coming to explore a solution that closely accorded with the anthropological/segregationist ideas of Natal's leading 'native policy' legislators.

In 1929, Seme began a campaign through the columns of *Ilanga lase Natal* to publicise the newly-established "Native Land and Trust Company of Africa, Limited". The latter in practice represented part of his political manifesto in his election campaign for the presidency of the ANC. And Seme, a Natalian in Johannesburg, largely owed his successful replacement of the 'red' Gumede in 1930 to the strong support of the Natal petty bourgeois establishment. The purpose of the company was described to *Ilanga lase Natal*'s readership as follows:

> Our main object should be to develop our people and the Native Reserves to the very best extent of which they may be capable, commercially and industrially, and to inspire into our people the spirit of cooperation and self-help - to form model modern Townships for the tribal Natives after the style of the Mission Reserves in Natal... Our main object must be to help create for each Native a home such as can appeal to his heart. Then and not until then can we Africans hope to develop a civilisation which shall be our own, a civilisation which shall be more spiritual and humanistic than the Europeans' - by implication.

Seme argued that if Africans were "to achieve their economic independence and self help" they had to have more land than the "Union Landless Natives Act" had set aside as reserves. More land, moreover, would curb the "drift of landless Natives to towns..."
where they become demoralised". It was therefore especially important that Africans subscribe to the company's "Trust Fund ...for the purpose of buying our country back". Indeed, Africans were "most silly" to imagine that whites would ever leave the country or give Africans more land "free of charge". Seme then begged that all African leaders - including those of the ICU - unite in this matter of rebuilding a land-based African civilisation, since it was beneficial to the whole African people as opposed to any particular "section" of the African population.274

Throughout the 1920s and until 1929, Seme had played a low-profile role in African politics while focusing his attention on his legal practice in Johannesburg. Nonetheless, he had maintained his personal and professional links with Swazi and Zulu royalty during this period; in making his political comeback in the late 1920s, he was to display an inclination to interpret African nationalism not in a pan-Africanist sense but in a narrower ethnic sense. And on his election in 1930 to the presidency of the ANC, which supposedly embodied a pan-South African nationalism, he simultaneously expressed unprecedented personal interest in Inkatha.275 Although the 'self-help' proposals that Seme publicised through Ilanga lase Natal in 1929 did not refer to the 'Zulu people' as a special case, in all other respects they exemplified the main features of Natal petty bourgeois ideology as it had developed in the late 1920s. Within an African nationalist context, the proposals referred to the problem of 'intra-national' class struggle; the immoral or demoralising nature of African life in the urban areas; the futility of merely relying on the state to implement reforms; and the need for Africans to take it upon themselves to reconstruct African society in the rural areas. It is very significant, furthermore, that Seme used the word 'civilisation' in a purely African context: hitherto it was always assumed that 'civilisation' could only be European.

The reconstituted Inkatha of 1928, which can be regarded as a
Zulu national self-help scheme, made the implicitly segregationist ideology of 'national rebuilding' explicit: Inkatha sought state 'recognition' as the representative organ of a self-governing Zulu nation. In giving evidence before the Native Economic Commission, representatives of the Natal petty bourgeoisie clearly outlined the practical objectives that underlay their interest in a more thoroughgoing segregationism. Great emphasis was placed on the desirability of encouraging 'progressive careers in the African reserves, while at the same time ensuring that the career opportunities there should be reserved solely for Africans. In particular, frequent calls were made for the opportunity to trade 'among our own people' - an often repeated phrase. As kholwa Chief Josiah Mqwebu of Stanger complained, Christianity and education had "aroused in certain of the reserve Natives a liking for business pursuits" but they were denied opportunities even in the African reserves since whites monopolised the trading stores. More bluntly, Seme argued that "segregation" should mean the dispossession of all white storekeepers in the African reserves. Both W. W. Ndhlovu and Dube expressed similar views.

Dube's evidence, furthermore, envisaged a thorough 'modernisation' of the reserves: he advocated the introduction of state-assisted irrigation schemes, and foresaw the establishment of large-scale commercial agriculture (including sugar plantations), business concerns, and "centres of industry" (including furniture factories and leather tanneries). Thus the reserves were to be "a stepping stone towards civilisation". Dube emphasised at length the necessity of more land for African occupation. Turning to the political development of the reserves, he stated that he "believed in the tribal system" - particularly in view of the problem of social disintegration. Tribalism was to be a progressive force under "an educated chief who is open to progress, and educated councillors who are going to support forward movements"; in this way Africans could "have a degree of freedom in exercising intelligence in their own areas". "Progressive committees" were to be the main decision-making bodies,"with the
chief made a mere figurehead, so that he could not be an obstruction and the councillors of the chief must be people who are progressive in their ideas. In effect, Dube's evidence identified why Natal's petty bourgeoisie was so anxious to secure Inkatha's control over the reserves in Zululand and Natal proper. As a 'progressive committee', Inkatha had laid down in its 1928 constitution that Solomon was to be a 'mere figurehead'. Inkatha's practical objectives were attractive to all of the disparate elements within the Natal petty bourgeoisie, 'establishment' and 'unfulfilled' alike - including members of the urban petty bourgeoisie who were disillusioned with African prospects and quality of life in the towns, the stifled petty bourgeoisie in the white countryside, and the aspiring petty bourgeois stratum that had developed within the reserves.

The common political ideas among Natal's 'native policy' legislators/representatives of white rural employers and representatives of Natal's African petty bourgeoisie had been clearly expressed in the context of Solomon and Inkatha in early 1928. The ZNTI speech that Nicholls had written for Solomon, the letter that Dube had written to Marwick, and the constitution that Nicolson and Thorpe had prepared for Inkatha, all endorsed a tribal-based political and cultural segregation and a reserve-based territorial segregation. All of these statements had applauded the disciplinary virtues of tribalism, but had maintained that the preservation of tribal socio-political traditions did not preclude African political and economic 'modernisation'. Moreover, all had referred to the historical and inherent separateness of the 'Bantu' or Zulu 'nation', and asserted that the latter should 'develop on its own lines'.

The objectives of the reconstituted Inkatha can be summarised as fourfold. First, to inspire a sense of united Zulu nationhood among all African inhabitants of the province of Natal, thus defusing 'intra-national' class antagonisms. Inkatha's Zulu nationalism was to be underpinned by 'traditional' patriarchal authority and tribal discipline. Second, to entrench the petty bourgeois and tribal elites as Zulu national leaders. Third, to effect fundamental socio-economic and political
'reforms' within the tribal system. The rural areas, and particularly the reserves (which Inkatha aimed to enlarge), were to be the focal point of the 'new African civilisation'.

Fourth and most important, to press the South African state to confer upon the 'Zulu nation', under the figurehead of Solomon and the practical leadership of Inkatha, a large measure of autonomy in attending to its 'own affairs'. Inkatha was not only advocating that a geographically and demographically 'stretched' version of the rural local council policy should be implemented in the province of Natal: it was also promoting the further development of the ideology and practice of segregation. Whereas the architects of the local council policy tended to regard local councils as mere administrative instruments of the NAD, the officially-recognised Zulu national council that Inkatha envisaged would be an embodiment of the Zulu nation's desire to maintain its political and cultural separateness - from both whites and other African 'nations' or 'ethnic groups' within the Union. And although it was not made explicit in Inkatha's calls for official recognition, Inkatha ultimately sought greater political autonomy from 'white South Africa' than was currently endorsed by the consensus of segregationist opinion at state level. Inkatha's leading exponents clearly looked upon the neighbouring High Commission Territories as attractive models for the settlement of Zululand; Basutoland and Swaziland were effectively Southern Sotho and Swazi 'nation-states', in which British sovereignty was superimposed upon the authority of the indigenous monarchs and central representative councils (pitso and libandla respectively). In this context it is important to note that although Nicholls' and Dube's interests lay primarily within the province of Natal, both envisaged that the implementation of a thoroughgoing policy of Zulu political and territorial segregation might serve as a guideline for 'native policy' throughout the Union.282
CHAPTER 6

STATE RECOGNITION FOR INKATHA AND THE ZULU KINGSHIP?

The official response to Solomon and Inkatha, 1928-1929

The drive for official recognition was the most crucial of Inkatha's objectives; indeed, the realisation of any of Inkatha's objectives was largely dependent upon its being accorded official status. The question of how the state should respond to Inkatha lay in the hands of the NAD. Under the terms of the 1926 and 1927 Native Affairs (Amendment) Acts, and the 1927 Act's definition of the powers of the 'Supreme Chief', the CNC and SNA could call upon the Governor-General to proclaim modified and larger councils than were envisaged under the 1920 Act. The NAD was thus empowered to establish a council such as Inkatha at its own discretion.

Although the SNA and CNC knew (or suspected) in 1928 that white rural employers aimed to use Solomon and Inkatha to secure greater control over African labour, they were not cognisant of the broader political objectives pursued by either the leading white or African exponents of the reconstituted Inkatha. Nicholls' 'adaptionist' views were not expressed in public until the 1930s, and the NAD was ill-informed of the political ideas that were being discussed among the 'African intelligentsia' in such institutions as the Bantu Men's Social Centres. Moreover, the negotiations between white and African leaders that led to the reconstitution of Inkatha had been strictly secret. For the NAD, the question of Inkatha's recognition was purely an administrative question.

As has been noted, the CNC had come to regard Inkatha in an unprecedentedly favourable light in the two months prior to the crucial June 1928 Inkatha meeting - and he had urged that the organisation be accorded official support as a counterblast to the ICU. The SNA, moreover, had unhesitatingly granted
the CNC's requests during April to nominate an NAD representative to attend the 1928 meeting, and to instruct magistrates to inform their districts that the 1928 meeting had official sanction.\footnote{The SNA's attitude changed dramatically, however, when he heard of Campbell's proposals to the Minister of Native Affairs. In early May 1928, the SNA wrote a personal note to the CNC (Wheelwright) suggesting that the drive for the recognition of Solomon and Inkatha was being orchestrated by white rural employers. The latter "outside influences", he argued, sought to subject the Natal NAD to their control. In the light of this possibility, the SNA instructed the CNC to draw up a carefully considered statement of his views on the questions of both Solomon's status and Inkatha's recognition. In an accompanying official minute, the SNA argued that the NAD's council policy in Zululand had not yet "matured", and that there should not be "any hurry to give Inkatha official recognition".\footnote{The CNC was clearly taken aback by the SNA's changed attitude. He did not reply to the SNA's two letters for nearly a month (by which time the Inkatha meeting was already underway), and, when he did reply, he requested that the NAD postpone discussion of the matter until some two months after the Inkatha meeting.\footnote{The SNA, however, responded by reiterating his instruction that the CNC immediately draw up a memorandum on policy towards Solomon and Inkatha. There were two reasons why the SNA regarded the finalisation of policy to be a matter of urgency. First, Wheelwright was due to retire at the end of 1928, and the SNA did not wish the 'recognition question' to be unresolved when a replacement CNC assumed office. Wheelwright was the NAD official most responsible for appointing Solomon as chief of the Usuthu in 1917, and, furthermore, had been closely acquainted with Inkatha since its formation. Second, Nicolson and Thorpe had issued the NAD with a draft of Inkatha's new constitution in April, implicitly inviting the NAD to suggest amendments and hence become involved in the organisation. The SNA was aware}
that once the new constitution had been executed as a legal
Deed of Trust, which the 1928 Inkatha meeting had now instructed
Nicolson and Thorpe to arrange, the NAD could expect Inkatha
to submit a formal request for official recognition. 4

In preparing his statement of proposed policy, the CNC was
heavily influenced by the opinions that local Natal NAD officials
expressed regarding the 1928 Inkatha meeting. The very
favourable report submitted by Oscroft, who had acted as the
NAD's observer and was the only NAD official to attend the
meeting, was an exception to the rule. E. N. Braatvedt, the
magistrate of Emtonjaneni, was clearly displeased that the CNC
had sanctioned the meeting. He informed the CNC that the power
of Solomon and Inkatha directly undermined the authority of
magistrates, and noted that the members of Inkatha's newly-
elected executive committee came from all over the province
- which reflected Inkatha's expanding ambitions. Inkatha was
being revived, he suggested, primarily because Solomon was
being pressed by creditors. In this context he reported that
the Zulu had not benefitted from the money accumulated during
the extensive Inkatha collections of 1925. Braatvedt was
convinced that a resurgence of Inkatha's activities would cause
rebellious rumours, like those of 1925, to begin circulating among
the Zulu once more. 5 H. L. Gebers, the magistrate of
Nongoma, remarked that it was impossible to predict whether
Inkatha's new "fire" would "warm people or burn them up". But
he referred to a particular source of potential danger. The
"Mandlakazi Tribe" had not attended the 1928 meeting, he
reported, and it seemed that Chief Bokwe had deliberately arranged
this conspicuous absence. 6 N. W. Pringle, a member of the
CNC's personal staff at the Natal NAD's Pietermaritzburg
headquarters, felt that the possibility of re-awakening the
Usuthu/Mandlakazi feud should receive particular consideration
when reformulating policy towards Solomon and Inkatha. While
the CNC was absent from his office for a few days in mid-June,
Pringle took it upon himself to write directly to the SNA to
say so. He also commented that the CNC was shortly to visit
Nongoma to discuss the matter with Gebers. Nicholls justifiably commented in his autobiography that his attempts to resurrect the Zulu monarchy were confronted by Natal magistrates of the "Zulu war, plus Bambata \(1906\) rebellion, mentality...".

In mid-July 1928, the CNC submitted two memoranda to the SNA. The first, which was the most detailed, addressed the question of Solomon's recognition: the CNC concluded that "it would be extremely undesirable to approve of any extension of Solomon's present status of Chief of the Usutu \(sic\)". The second focussed on policy towards Inkatha: "on further consideration", the CNC reported, he was now "constrained to withdraw" his recent suggestion that Inkatha be given official support.

Regarding Solomon, the CNC reported that General Botha had expressly intended to make Solomon a "big man" in Zululand if he proved to be a responsible chief over the Usuthu. And Solomon's political conduct had been commendable: recently he had maintained an "attitude of aloofness" towards various African political organisations, which had been of great value to the NAD during a difficult period. However, the CNC felt that Solomon had displayed a number of weaknesses of character. Solomon was now suffering the physical consequences of "self-indulgence", and the financial consequences of "spendthrift ways" - two firms of Durban solicitors had been employed to "unravel the tangle" of Solomon's heavy debts. In this context, the CNC reported that it had become clear that Solomon and his advisers had purloined "many thousands of pounds" from Inkatha, and certain Inkatha members were currently attempting to recover some of these extorted funds. Apart from Solomon's character and financial corruption, the CNC offered four other reasons why the Zulu monarchy should not be officially revived. First, it would be strongly opposed by the majority of Natal whites. Second, the Mandlakazi absence from the 1928 Inkatha meeting suggested that the civil war was not yet over in the minds of the Zulu. Third, while it might have been wise to establish
the monarchy "under full European control" in 1879, the "whole idea now is antiquated". Fourth, "Native political bodies" and "a certain small section of the Europeans" had inspired in Solomon a desire to be recognised as king of the African population throughout the province of Natal rather than only in Zululand. Indeed, the CNC continued, whereas formerly Natal Africans had feared the Zulu, all African inhabitants of the province now regarded themselves as Zulu people and looked upon Solomon as "the chief race representative of their Nation". The CNC categorically opposed this pan-Natal Zulu unity. 

The CNC concluded his 'Solomon memorandum' by suggesting that the NAD attempt to persuade Solomon, first, to renounce all claims to political authority except in Zululand, and, second, to repudiate Inkatha. It was desirable that the NAD establish a single council for the whole of Zululand, based on the model of the Pondoland General Council. Solomon's support for the establishment of a Zululand General Council, as opposed to the recognition of Inkatha, could be won if Solomon was informed that such a council would pay him a "considerable grant" from its annual revenue. Furthermore, the CNC continued, Solomon could be accorded the privilege of nominating most of the members of this council by virtue of his royal blood - though Solomon would still not be recognised as paramount chief or king. Finally, the CNC suggested that Solomon and a large deputation of Zululand chiefs be sent to observe the Pondoland Session of the Transkeian Bunga, so as to awaken their enthusiasm for the project. In a strictly personal note to the SNA of the same date, the CNC recommended that the NAD bribe Solomon to undermine Inkatha and support the proposed Zululand General Council by presenting him with a "blunt offer to take over his liabilities".

The CNC's 'Inkatha memorandum' laid particular emphasis on two points. First, the current drive for the recognition of Inkatha was "nothing more nor less than a deliberate attempt on the part
of the 'die hard' Usutu supporters to build up the power of Solomon" — which the CNC had already stated to be undesirable.

Second, the 1928 Inkatha meeting had indicated that Inkatha wished to become the General Council for the whole province of Natal. The CNC therefore regarded Inkatha as "a prime obstacle to the establishment of the contemplated General Council for Zululand". When Inkatha submitted its formal Deed of Trust to the NAD, the CNC recommended that the NAD should unambiguously reply that Inkatha would not be recognised, and, furthermore, that "Native Chiefs and people of Zululand should await the NAD's council proposals which will be submitted to them in due course". In the meantime, he recommended that magistrates be reminded of the NAD's ban on Inkatha collections, and that "a vigorous and intensive campaign of council propaganda" be arranged for Zululand.

During the six weeks between the 1928 Inkatha meeting and the submission of his memoranda, the CNC had thus unequivocally reversed his attitude towards Inkatha: he no longer defined Inkatha as an ally which should be nurtured and officially incorporated into the NAD's administrative structure, but as an opponent which the NAD should actively attempt to destroy. Before giving an account of the consequences of the CNC's memoranda, it is essential to identify some of the inconsistencies contained within them— and attempt to explain why the CNC redefined his policy in the way in which he did.

Fourteen months previously, while giving evidence in the court case that Solomon brought against the Natal Mercury (re. Solomon's alleged insult to the Prince of Wales), Wheelwright had commended Solomon's action in healing the Usuthu/Mandlakazi rift. In his 'Solomon memorandum', however, he suggested that the recognition of the Zulu monarchy could rekindle the Zulu civil war. Furthermore, Wheelwright and other Natal NAD officials had at various times in the past seven years reported (and complained) that 'educated natives' from Natal proper were
the dominant influence in Inkatha. Yet in his 'Inkatha memo-
randum', Wheelwright reported that 'die-hard Usuthu supporters'
were the prime movers behind the resurgence of Inkatha in 1928.
(In itself, this statement contradicted the 'Solomon memorandum's'
comments on the role played by 'native politicians' and
'certain Europeans'.) The fallacies of these assertions in
Wheelwright's memoranda were illustrated in August 1928 (three
weeks after the memoranda were submitted), when fourteen thousand
Zulu mustered at Nongoma for an indaba with Hertzog. At the
forefront of the Zulu mass sat Solomon and Bokwe, side by side.
The leaders of Inkatha were strongly represented, headed by
Dube. And whereas Solomon gave a short speech expressing Zulu
loyalty to the government, Dube gave a long political speech
"on behalf of the Zulu people". Significantly, Dube stressed
that the Zulu were wholeheartedly in support of the "conceptions"
in Hertzog's 'Native Bills', since it was their earnest desire
to "develop along the lines of their own traditions".15 In
his memoranda, Wheelwright tended to conceptualise Zulu politics
in an anachronistic tribal mould. This was inconsistent with
Wheelwright's understanding, which he had demonstrated during
the first half of 1928, that class divisions were the major
dynamic of current Zulu politics. 16

Wheelwright's proposals regarding the establishment of a Zululand
General Council would seem to be extremely ill-considered.
Solomon's official status was to remain no more than that of
an ordinary chief. And yet Solomon was to have the unique
privilege of appointing members to, and being financially
supported by, the Zululand General Council. In both memoranda,
Wheelwright had emphasised Solomon's personal weaknesses as a
reason for refusing to recognise Solomon and Inkatha. However,
Solomon would clearly have far greater control over Wheelwright's
proposed Zululand General Council - which, in effect, would be
Solomon's personal ibandla - than he had over Inkatha. Inkatha's
1928 constitution had defined Solomon's role as that of a 'patron',
and had accorded him no right to influence the membership or
policies of the executive committee.
Of all the reasons that Wheelwright assembled to condemn the recognition of Solomon and Inkatha, perhaps the most plausible were those relating to Solomon's character: before mid-1928, the Natal NAD was unaware of the extent of Solomon's financial malpractices, indebtedness, and debilitating addiction to liquor. Indeed, while Solomon had overspent consistently, drawn upon Inkatha's funds, and drunk freely since the early 1920s, he had done so in a relatively controlled manner until 1927. However, it seems that there were two main reasons why Wheelwright reversed his attitude towards Inkatha and instead proposed the establishment of a Zululand General Council — and neither of these were made explicit in his memoranda.

First, in proposing that Inkatha be accorded official support, Wheelwright had advocated that the NAD adopt a policy which was unprecedented and somewhat adventurous. Hitherto the NAD had been 'creating' councils, as opposed to 'recognising' councils that Africans themselves had created. And Wheelwright had suggested that the NAD conduct its first experiment with none other than Inkatha — when independent Zulu power and the Zulu royal family still conjured up fearsome associations in the corporate consciousness of the Natal NAD. Wheelwright had incorrectly assumed that his proposal would be supported by the SNA, but instead found that it was condemned throughout the NAD. In 1916, his tentative suggestion that Solomon be recognised as chief of the Usuthu was fully supported by General Botha (Prime Minister and Minister of Native Affairs). The latter had thereupon recognised Solomon and the 'Usuthu tribe' with such swiftness that Wheelwright had no time to reconsider — and no-one else in the Natal NAD had had the opportunity of considering the question at all. Undoubtedly Wheelwright recalled the subsequent clamour that had been raised in white Natal and the Natal NAD; the same could be expected were Solomon to be recognised as Zulu king in 1928. In preparing his 1928 memoranda, it would seem that Wheelwright was partly motivated by a desire to extricate himself from his beleagured position. Thus he simply
expressed the corporate Natal NAD views on Solomon and Inkatha - which the CNC had explicitly condemned ten months previously - rather than his own. At the same time, realising that Solomon's influence could not be ignored and that administrative change had to be implemented in Zululand, he hurriedly sketched out a capricious proposal which he opportunistically described as a 'council' policy. Wheelwright did not submit the well-considered statement of his views on the 'recognition question' that the SNA requested; instead he submitted a statement which would cause least controversy, and, in practice, leave the policy-making to the new CNC.

Second, it would seem that, in the aftermath of the large 1928 Inkatha meeting, Wheelwright had genuinely come to doubt that the recognition of Inkatha was reconcilable with the administrative interests of the NAD. Wheelwright had supported Inkatha for reasons that were political (ie. it was an 'anti-dote' to the ICU) rather than administrative. In his 'Inkatha memorandum', Wheelwright alluded to the problem of Inkatha's independent will: if Inkatha was recognised as a Zululand Council, he observed, it would work to extend its authority over the whole province regardless of government instructions. The assumption that Inkatha had built up so much independent power that the NAD would be unable to control it clearly underlay Wheelwright's support for the establishment of an alternative Zululand General Council. This was manifest in the statements Wheelwright made to Fynney, his erstwhile colleague who was now a 'patron' of Inkatha, when the latter visited the Natal NAD headquarters in November 1928 to enquire why Inkatha had not yet been officially recognised. Wheelwright replied that he could not see "any purpose" in doing so; the government had the necessary legislation to establish its own council in Zululand, and it expected that "in the course of time" the Zulu would accept what they were offered.  

The CNC's memoranda defined the NAD's policy in Zululand; none of the judgements contained within them were queried by the SNA.
When Inkatha's formal Deed of Trust was submitted to the NAD in August 1928, however, it was not accompanied by a request for official recognition. This seems to have been a very astute tactical move on the part of Inkatha's leaders and advisers. A request would force the NAD to give a direct answer. If the NAD officially informed Inkatha in 1928 that it would not be recognised, the NAD would be disinclined to re-open the 'recognition question' at a later date should it wish to reconsider. And if the NAD wished to recognise Inkatha in 1928, it would not have to be directly requested to do so - the Deed of Trust was sufficient a prompt. Having received the Deed of Trust, the SNA instructed the CNC merely to acknowledge receipt - and not, as the CNC had recommended, to divulge that Inkatha would not be recognised. An acknowledgement was all that was necessary, the SNA argued. In view of the SNA's instructions, Wheelwright was placed in an uncomfortable position when he was unexpectedly visited by Fynney in November 1928; Wheelwright emphasised to Fynney that his observations regarding Inkatha were strictly unofficial, and were purely his personal opinions. At no stage was Inkatha officially informed that the NAD had decided against recognition.

When the new CNC, T. W. C. Norton, took office in 1929, both he and the SNA immediately acted on Wheelwright's proposals relating to the establishment of a Zululand General Council. The first step that they took was to send Solomon and a large deputation of Zululand chiefs, in the charge of F. W. Ahrens (magistrate of Ngutu) and H. L. Gebers (magistrate of Nongoma), to Umtata in April 1929 so that they could observe how the council system operated in the Transkei. Although Dube also accompanied this 'Zululand deputation', evidently at the instance of Solomon, the whole episode received markedly low-key coverage in Ilanga lase Natal. The chiefs were under instructions to call a meeting of chiefs and headmen on their return to Zululand, and discuss how council policy should be implemented there.
The second step taken by the SNA and CNC was to call a conference of all native commissioners in Natal in May 1929. At this conference, the SNA argued that the time was "ripe" for the implementation of council policy in Natal, and that Natal's councils should take the form of the 'chiefs' councils' in Pondoland. The CNC explained that the government wished to form two large councils in the province, one for Natal proper and one for Zululand. Certain Zululand magistrates, most notably Braatvedt, expressed strong misgivings about the extension of council policy to Zululand, whatever form it might take. Gebers reported that Solomon was shortly to make a statement regarding his visit to Umtata. He intimated that this statement would determine whether the Zulu would accept the NAD's council proposals, since "everything" that happened in Zululand only happened after a word from Mahashini. Summing up, the CNC stated that the conference had proved itself to be favourable towards the government's proposals, and draft proclamations for the establishment of Natal's special councils would therefore be drawn up.

In his 1928 memoranda, Wheelwright had proposed that Solomon and other Zulu chiefs be taken to observe the Pondoland Session of the Transkeian Bunga. By what can only be assumed to be grossly inept planning on the part of the NAD in 1929, the 'Zululand deputation' attended the General Session of the Transkeian Bunga. Thus the Zulu chiefs observed the deliberations of a council that was made up of elected members - and 'new men' rather than chiefs. Some of the speeches were given in English, and were consequently incomprehensible to the visitors from Zululand. On their return to Zululand, Solomon and the Zulu delegates who had accompanied him to Umtata held a large meeting of Zulu chiefs and headmen outside the Nongoma magistracy. This meeting, which conducted no more than a preliminary discussion of the 'council system', did not support the establishment of government councils in Zululand.

Very ironically for the NAD, the main discussions on this matter
took place during the two Inkatha meetings of 1929: first, at the annual general meeting in June, and, second, at the special Inkatha chiefs' meeting in September. The latter had primarily been called to discuss the question of land congestion and evictions - it was this meeting that elected Maling as a member of the 'Inkatha land committee' which sought permission to visit Pretoria. Inkatha's leaders, both petty bourgeois and tribal, clearly believed that the government intended to establish in Zululand a council like the Transkeian Territories General Council - as opposed to the Pondoland General Council. They felt that this was too 'advanced' for Zululand, and, moreover, that it would cause a political division between educated Zulu and tribal authorities. The Inkatha annual general meeting, which was chaired by Bhulose, resolved that "the European standard of Government is not known by the ordinary kraal Natives" and therefore that the council system was unsuitable. The "presiding Magistrate" would effectively control the council, the resolution continued, and this would "defeat the ends intended to be focussed / achieved/ by the Council". If council policy was to be implemented, Inkatha suggested that local councils be gradually introduced at mission stations where the Zulu "have an inkling of the Western civilisation and are sufficiently educated to follow the debating rules". The Inkatha report also stated that Solomon had "personally attended" this meeting, and "contributed to the deliberations and resolutions herein". The subsequent Inkatha chiefs' meeting, which was chaired by Chief Nkantini, resolved that

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\text{it is difficult for us to agree to this Council of the Cape Province at Umtata, we see that this might come right and even be fitted to our children if the Government would teach them so that they understand the procedure of the white people, for ourselves we see that this bead ornament will fit us not at all.}
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While rejecting the Umtata-style 'bead ornament', the chiefs affirmed their support for Inkatha. Furthermore, they pleaded that the government take notice of the "head" of the Zulu people,
Solomon, and "we his [Solomon's] izinduna who support him in his control on behalf of the Government".  

Zulu petty bourgeois and tribal leaders thus united to block the NAD's alternatives to the recognition of Solomon and Inkatha. In the ensuing deadlock, the NAD deferred the implementation of its council policy in the whole province of Natal, although draft proclamations for the establishment of a Zululand General Council and Natal General Council had already been prepared.

Inkatha's leaders, for their part, made no further attempts to 'politely prompt' the NAD to recognise Solomon and Inkatha - although the drive for official recognition continued to be their overriding objective. By early 1929, when the NAD had made no move to recognise Inkatha but instead sent the 'Zululand deputation' to Umtata, it had become clear that Inkatha's drive for recognition required new strategies.

The frustration of Zulu 'self government': Solomon's drunken confrontation with the Governor-General, 1930

After mid-1929, the leaders of Inkatha adopted two strategies in their drive for the official recognition of the Zulu kingship and Inkatha. The first strategy was mainly passive: Inkatha merely affirmed that it still existed despite the NAD's unfavourable attitude, and that it had the power to frustrate any 'alternative settlement' that it deemed to be unacceptable. Indeed, Inkatha was undoubtedly the most influential representative organisation of the Zulu people. Furthermore, Inkatha affirmed that Zulu petty bourgeois and tribal leaders wished to be the conjoint leaders of the Zulu nation, and, more particularly, that Inkatha and Solomon were inseparable. Moreover, it continued to verify that it was a committed opponent of militant political action, and pronounce that it was a loyal servant of the Crown and Union Government. All of these points were expressed — obliquely or explicitly — in the Inkatha "Yearly Report" which Bhulose submitted to the CNC in July 1929.
The second strategy, which was the more important, was to enlist the assistance of Inkatha's influential white allies in taking Inkatha's cause to the highest councils of state, thus circumventing the obdurate officials of the NAD. The basic reason why Inkatha had had white allies after 1927 was because it had common cause with the latter against the influence of the ICU - an organisation whose activities, from the white perspective, not only sought to subvert capital accumulation in the towns and countryside, but also signified the breakdown of tribal control and respect for authority, the 'Europeanisation' of African politics and the evolution of powerful revolutionary forces. In short, the ICU was seen to threaten the economic predominance of white rural and urban employers, together with the socio-cultural and political segregationist ideologies that underpinned it. In accordance with the priorities of Inkatha's white allies, Inkatha's appeal for recognition after mid-1929 dwelled on grounds that were primarily 'political' (Inkatha presented itself as an antidote to the ICU, and as an embodiment of the 'Zulu nation's' concordance with segregationist ideology and policy) rather than administrative - as it had been during 1928, when Inkatha had presented its case for recognition as one of 'administrative reform' consistent with the essence of local council policy. And indeed, it was MPs, ministers of state and the Governor-General upon whom Inkatha based its hopes for recognition after mid-1929, rather than NAD officials.

As MPs, members of the select committee on native affairs and leading parliamentary spokesmen on 'native policy', Nicholls and Marwick were to be Inkatha's key white allies in the context of its redefined drive for official recognition. There were, however, other important though less influential individuals, most notably Charles Adams, an Eshowe general dealer and arguably Zululand's most prominent businessman. Adams had become involved with the affairs of the Zulu royal house when Solomon fell heavily into debt in 1928, in the first instance because he was one of Solomon's creditors. Having then adopted the role of Solomon's financial advisor, Adams soon took an active interest in Zulu royal politics and became a keen supporter of the recognition of Solomon and
Inkatha. Evidently at the invitation of Solomon, he attended the mid-1929 meeting of Zulu chiefs and headmen outside the Nongoma magistracy which discussed the 'Zululand deputation's recent visit to the Transkeian Bunga. Subsequently he addressed the 1929 Inkatha annual general meeting, and, according to Bhulose's report, made "certain suggestions" which "encouraged and greatly inspired" the assembly. Adams' evidence before the Native Economic Commission in September 1930 disclosed the segregationist principles that underlay his concern for the political future of Solomon and Inkatha: he lamented that whites generally neither understood the "native mind" nor, more specifically, the "soul of the Zulu", and that they tended to regard chiefs as mere administrative instruments of the government. While he did allude to the administrative advantages that might accrue from Solomon's recognition, Adams' main emphasis lay on its significance as an affirmation and extension of segregationist ideology and policy. As a personal friend of Nicholls, Adams acted as a vital means of communication between Inkatha's leaders and most influential white allies. In this respect, mention must also be made of the role played by Oswald Fynney, Inkatha's white patron since 1928. Although his contacts and influence lay in the first instance within the NAD hierarchy of which he was once a part, the also had the confidence of representatives of the sugar industry - clearly so in the case of William Campbell. And indeed, as was manifest in his statement to the Natal Witness in 1931, Fynney was not squeamish about using his 'inside knowledge' of both the NAD and Inkatha to authoritatively castigate the attitude which the former had adopted towards the latter.

The strategy of circumventing the NAD and appealing for the recognition of Solomon and Inkatha on political or ideological rather than administrative grounds was, in practice, the only strategy that had any hope of success after mid-1929. Solomon's drunkenness and irresponsible habits worsened after his return from Umtata, and this doused any possibility that the NAD would of its own volition reconsider the 'recognition question'. Indeed even if Solomon had fully supported the NAD's proposals for a Zululand General Council, it is unlikely that the NAD would have proceeded to implement this policy after mid-1929 if it entailed
any official extension of Solomon's powers. Before expanding on Solomon's personal decline - and its political implications - however, it is first necessary to comment on the causes of this development.

Contrary to the prevailing opinion within the NAD, Solomon's personal decline - which can be dated from early 1928 - was not simply indicative of weakness of character, self indulgence or 'intoxication' with personal power: it was directly related to the frustrations of Solomon's political position which had become so acute by 1928. The latter may be summarised as threefold. First, Solomon's main objective, particularly since the indaba with the Prince of Wales in 1925, had been to secure the official recognition of himself as Zulu king and Inkatha as the 'Zulu National Council'. Although Solomon had successfully made great efforts to ensure that the NAD could find no fault with his political behaviour, and both he and Inkatha had provided ample proof of the administrative and political advantages that could be reaped from their incorporation into the structure of indirect rule in Zululand, the overall policy that the NAD had adopted towards them had been one of 'studied neutrality'. Moreover, as when Inkatha collections were banned in 1926, the NAD was also seen to attempt to undermine their influence and support. The stance that the NAD took regarding the royal petition of 1927 and Inkatha after its recognition in 1928 could only serve to compound Solomon's sense of political frustration.

Second, the class antagonisms that developed within the Zulu in the late 1920s eroded the populist Zulu national unity that Solomon personally had worked so hard to foster. But Solomon had not only been forced to witness the disintegration of his drive for Zulu unity after 1925; he had also found little alternative but to 'take sides' in the newly-developed class conflicts, and thus, ironically, to accentuate them further. Solomon clearly saw himself in the traditional - and somewhat vague and mythological - political role of 'head of the house of Zulu', and, more broadly, head of the whole 'family' of the
Zulu: a figure who simultaneously represented and guided the Zulu as a whole, and was a physical embodiment of their national unity. Solomon did not perceive his role as that of a politician fighting in the first instance for the interests of a particular class within the Zulu - a role that better fitted men like Champion Dube and (less influential but equally as illustrative in this context) the conservative Chief Kula. And as much as the suppression of Solomon's 'easy-going populism' of 1925 by the class conflicts of the late 1920s was politically irksome for Solomon, it was also personally irksome. By nature Solomon was a conciliator and not a fighter; such a nature, which had played so important a role in securing the succession of Solomon rather than David in 1913, and, subsequently, the resurrection of a strong sense of Zulu national unity around the figurehead of the heir to the Zulu royal house, ill accorded with the belligerence between social classes and their representatives that characterised Zulu politics in the late 1920s.

Third, Solomon had clearly lost the initiative in Zulu royal - or 'national' - politics by the late 1920s. Previously, while working to re-establish the position of the Zulu royal family in tribal Zululand and spearheading the broader Zulu 'unity movement', Solomon had managed to retain a large measure of autonomy from 'outside' political influences - mainly the African bourgeoisie, acting through the media of the NNC and nascient Inkatha. This was not so after 1927. In 1928, when police and NAD officials were perturbed that Solomon might become a 'tool' of ICU activists, Solomon had in reality already become a 'tool' of two other interest groups: Natal's African petty bourgeoisie and white rural employers. And in the process, Solomon was having to acquiesce to policies he would rather oppose - perhaps the most illustrative example being the 1928 decision to 'democratise' Inkatha. 35

That Solomon's fondness for spirits had become a physical illness by mid-1928 must be understood in the context of the tensions, contradictions and frustrations of his public life. In a rather
self-recriminatory and desperate letter, significantly written from his sick-bed during the overwhelmingly petty-bourgeois-dominated Inkatha meeting of 1928, Solomon had pleaded with the magistrate of Nongoma that he be given a permit of exemption from the liquor law (which did not permit Africans to purchase 'European liquor'). Evidently setting aside personal pride, Solomon confided that he needed liquor; he also argued that he would drink less if he had a permit since he would no longer be continually afraid that his illegal supply would be interrupted. Solomon's request was granted. \(^{37}\) There is no doubt, however, that Solomon's consumption of liquor increased after the permit was issued. And by mid-1929, Solomon's conciliatory, gentle and somewhat self-effacing nature was increasingly less in evidence - both in his interaction with NAD officials and his 'subjects'.

A series of incidents in the Eshowe district in late 1929 provided evidence of Solomon's deteriorating condition, and simultaneously illustrate why the NAD's opinion of Solomon was becoming increasingly negative. In September Solomon visited Chief Mehlwana's homestead near Eshowe, having angered the local NAD official for omitting to report his arrival in the district. The police District Commandant reported that Solomon then sent messengers out to a number of Eshowe chiefs' wards to conduct collections for him, so that he could pay an instalment on his car. Solomon also established an illegal supply of liquor (his permit was only valid in the Nongoma district), the District Commandant continued, and was in the habit of having "immoral relations" with girls sent to him with food. Moreover, Solomon took a number of Eshowe girls with him to Nongoma when he left, on the pretext of intending to marry them, but it transpired that he had not cared for them - with the result that they had become "destitute wanderers". \(^{38}\)

The District Commandant subsequently reported that Solomon returned to the Eshowe district during the following month, accompanied by a party in a number of cars. He visited Chief Mfunglewa's homestead where he addressed a gathering of between two and three thousand, speaking about the benefits of education
and the need to avoid "faction fights". Although the gathering gave Solomon fourteen head of cattle and £40/6/3, Solomon indicated that he felt this was insufficient. That evening Solomon selected two young women from Chief Mfungelwa's ward to sleep with him. When the latter refused to have sexual intercourse, they were required to drink utshwala mixed with brandy which induced them to do so.39

On being required to explain himself, Solomon wrote to the CNC denying all the allegations regarding his behaviour in the Eshowe district, and added that he had never been under the influence of liquor either in Eshowe or anywhere else.40 Solomon thereafter called upon the native commissioner at Eshowe and expressed irritation that he had been reported to the CNC. In the course of this interview, however, Solomon admitted that he was indeed at fault. Before leaving, he unsuccessfully asked the native commissioner to supply him with some liquor. Solomon was subsequently permitted to have one bottle on the authority of the District Surgeon in Eshowe.41

The official view of Solomon, already at a low ebb on account of the way in which he was treating his 'subjects' in the Eshowe district, together with the administrative disruption his activities were causing (which led the native commissioner at Eshowe to submit a formal memorandum of complaint to the CNC42), was worsened when Solomon wrote to the CNC simply lying about both his recent actions in the Eshowe district and his problems with alcohol. And official opinion was hardly improved when Solomon approached the NAD six weeks later, in January 1930, with the request that the government settle his debts43 - which amounted to an admission that even the most reputable legal firms in Durban had been unable to repair the consequences of, or halt, the spendthrift habits and financial corruption of the Zulu royal house. Solomon's activities in the Eshowe district not only earned him the displeasure of NAD and police officials. To the "annoyance" of local white farmers, Zulu farm labourers had abandoned their work to attend Solomon's meetings.44 Furthermore, some local Zulu were clearly aggrieved about the way in which
Solomon had used them - and especially the young women among them. In November 1929 the native commissioner at Eshowe called an *indaba* with local chiefs to emphasize to them that Solomon was Chief of the Usuthu ward alone, and was not entitled to exercise authority over Eshowe chiefs or their followers. During this *indaba*, Chief Mehlwana commented that Solomon had shown by his own actions that he was not paramount chief of the Zulu: if he were, Mehlwana asserted, "he would have been killed for not going to Nkata ka Zulu [sic] meetings..." Such sentiments, which might have been fairly representative of those of Mehlwana's ward generally, could not have been expressed in 1925.45

While Solomon was proving himself to be a positive hindrance to the administration and, in the eyes of the NAD, a most unattractive candidate for the appointment as Zulu king, however, an unprecedented upsurge of African worker militancy in Durban was fostering a political climate very conducive to Inkatha's redefined drive for official recognition. For the year following the desecration of the Greytown cemetery in early 1928, which had provoked a violent and somewhat devastating white backlash against ICU branches in the Natal midlands, African political militancy had remained at a comparatively low ebb. But towards the end of May 1929 the boycott of the Durban municipal beer halls began, coordinated - but by no means spearheaded - by Champion's ICU *yase* Natal.

State and Durban municipal officials as a rule incorrectly ascribed the boycott to the 'agitation' of 'shebeen queens' (independent brewers whose livelihoods were undercut by the municipal *utshwala* monopoly) and, more especially, the political influence of Champion. As La Hausse has evidenced, however, the dockside togt (daily work) labour barracks were the cradle of the 1929 beer hall boycott and ensuing disturbances, and the protests were directed against the oppressive and exploitative nature of the whole 'Durban system' of municipal 'native administration'. Indeed, the decision to boycott the beer halls, whose revenue financed 'native administration' in the city, showed that the
connection between the beer monopoly and the municipal 'native affairs' bureaucracy had been closely identified. That instances in which workers stoned municipal property, called for strike action, and assaulted white civilians, took place during the few months preceding the boycott emphasised that the protests could only be understood in the context of the Durban workforce's heightened militancy and sharpened perception of its political opponents. Moreover, while the ICU yase Natal provided workers with an organisational structure, Champion's role in the protests was very ambivalent. He clearly did not identify closely with the togt workers' cause: rejecting strike action as a strategy, he opined that togt workers were earning a "very good salary". And living conditions in the togt barracks were "good for the class of people they are provided for", though they were inadequate for "other classes of natives". At one stage, furthermore, he agreed to call off the boycott - without consulting the workers - when subjected to municipal pressure. Champion, always keen to use his polemical skills and to rouse support, had hoped to garner Durban's militant political constituency under the ICU yase Natal banner while guiding the protests along 'reasonable' and relatively moderate lines. But the struggles assumed a momentum which Champion could not contain, particularly since local activists appreciated the ICU name to their more radical objectives. In the eyes of whites and the African petty bourgeois establishment generally, however, Champion's image ironically remained that of a dangerous agitator. 46

A major riot erupted in Durban in mid-June when five hundred white civilian 'vigilantes' - outraged because of the large demonstration of worker solidarity that had been occurring in various parts of the city, including a clash between police and armed ICU pickets - besieged the ICU hall in the city centre. The besiegers were then attacked by two 'relief columns' of irate workers, and the police found that their intervention was violently opposed by both the conflicting factions. When the two thousand combatants dispersed they left several dead behind them, and over a hundred had been injured. The speed with which the specially-appointed 'De Waal Commission' began its work of inquiring into the origins
of the beer hall disturbances reflected the extent and force of the latter's political impact. While political violence on the streets of Durban died away, the beer hall boycott persisted (with crippling consequences for Durban's 'Native Revenue Account') well into 1930 - sustaining a considerable state of class/race tension in Durban itself, and political anxiety throughout white Natal as well as at state level.

White Natalians, state officials and politicians were not the only groups to be gravely alarmed by the 1929 beer hall boycott and related disturbances; so too was Natal's African petty bourgeois establishment. Immediately after the beer hall boycott came into force, and when worker demonstrations were still comparatively low-key, *Ilanga lase Natal* came out in strong support of 'law and order' and clearly enunciated its disapproval of the "processions" that were taking place in the streets of Durban. Such protests were not "constitutional" behaviour on the part of the ICU *yase Natal*, the newspaper's editorial argued: there were many alternatives to the adoption of a "militaristic and defiant attitude" towards authority. Significantly, this *Ilanga lase Natal* editorial was published in English; its function was not simply to provide a statement of the petty bourgeois establishment's position regarding worker militancy in Durban, but also to communicate the latter to the petty bourgeoisie's white allies - so as to reaffirm the basis and purpose of their mutual alliance, consummated in the context of Inkatha in early 1928. And, against the background of the beerhall boycott and disturbances, the 'Inkatha alliance' did indeed draw together once more and reanimate, representing to members of the Union Government that the official recognition of Solomon and Inkatha would counter the sort of political unrest that was currently exemplified in Durban.

The 'Inkatha alliance's' first move came in early September 1929, while the De Waal Commission was still busy with its investigations, and was spearheaded by Dube and Marwick. *Ilanga lase Natal*'s coverage of this development was necessarily somewhat oblique and uninformative: both the African and the white political...
leaders who acted together in the context of Inkatha had always been determined that their relationship with each other should remain secret, or at least understated. Ilanga lase Natal's first edition for September 1929 included a small stop-press report noting that Dube and Marwick had made a "deputation" to Pietermaritzburg to have discussions with the Minister of Native Affairs. 49 One week later, the newspaper published a report of the discussions that had taken place. The CNC was also in attendance, it was reported, and Dube was accompanied by Francis Xulu and Gilbert Nxaba (evidently members of the resuscitated Durban branch of the NNC), but no mention was made of Marwick's involvement. Significantly, the Minister of Native Affairs was the newly-appointed E. G. Jansen, MP for Vryheid (Hertzog had relinquished this portfolio after the 'black peril' general election of 1929). Marwick and Jansen had long acted together in parliament - despite their party political differences as representatives of Natal farming interests, particularly in regard to control over farm labour. 50 Clearly Marwick had 'pulled strings' to arrange Dube's consultation with Jansen and while doing so had undoubtedly intimated to Jansen that the political organisations which Dube represented could play a leading role in quelling the resurgence of militancy in Natal.

At this consultation, Ilanga lase Natal reported, Dube told Jansen that he had come to speak about what "was foremost in his mind": "the state of the people in Durban". Not once did Dube mention any of the grievances that caused the disturbances, however, but instead focussed on methods of containing militancy. While expressing disapproval for the Riotous Assemblies Bill that was then before parliament, he proposed two courses of remedial action. First, the establishment of an African council in Durban. Second, and most important, the appointment of Solomon as "Paramount Chief" of the Zulu. If Solomon was placed in a position where he could influence all Zulu, Dube explained, Solomon would be able to quieten the "umsindo" (literally 'noise', meaning disturbance) and be a "great help" to the government. Dube made no mention of Inkatha - but in practice the recognition of Solomon necessarily
included Inkatha, just as much as the recognition of Inkatha included Solomon. The purpose of Dube's representations, which Marwick had facilitated, was clearly to persuade the new Minister of Native Affairs to redefine his department's policy towards Solomon and Inkatha. It seems, however, that Dube's representations did not succeed in doing so - although both the Minister of Native Affairs and the CNC reportedly responded to them with considerable interest during the consultation itself. 51

The 'Inkatha alliance's' second move, which was by far the more important, came in mid-1930 and was spearheaded by Nicholls. It took place against the background of three parallel developments, all of which seemed to indicate to increasingly fearful white observers that a revolutionary mood was growing within the African population throughout the province of Natal, spanning town and countryside and embodying a sense of unity and purpose greater than that of the 1906 rebellion. 52 Durban itself became more politically explosive in the months following the meeting between Dube and Jansen - even though a riot comparable to that of June 1929 did not recur. By November 1929, for example, it had become evident that African residents were not only boycotting the municipal beer halls but also refusing to pay the state poll tax, a refusal which signified that the state was being rejected as illegitimate and served to reawaken memories of the 1906 rebellion. An armed battalion responded by making African Durban the testing ground for a novel method of social control: the deployment of tear-gas against civilians. Despite this demonstration of state power, Durban's ricksha-pullers went on strike in early 1930, so indicating that militant spirits were not going to be repressed easily. African political militancy, however, was no longer confined to Durban: it was also developing in the small population centres of the predominantly rural hinterlands. In September, for example, the beerhall at Weenen was attacked by local Africans. 53 At about the same time, the Empangeni branch of the ICU (which had been dormant since the Empangeni 'anti-ICU' indaba of 1927) held a well-attended meeting - which was disrupted by the intervention of the local police. Summoned to Empangeni police station, the local ICU organiser was informed
that "abelungu bayesaba" (the whites are frightened) and that the meeting should terminate. 54

Perhaps most disturbing for the state, however, was the clear evidence of interconnections between the rising tide of militancy in the urban areas on the one hand and the rural areas on the other. The evidence that George Hulett, a prominent Stanger sugar planter, gave before the Native Economic Commission in October 1930 illustrated that the rural rank-and-file was sympathising with and being inspired by events in Durban - and by the political doctrines that were being disseminated there. Moreover, Hulett's evidence indicated that Zulu nationalism and the figurehead of Solomon was being independently appropriated by the militants. The prospect of such a development had deeply concerned Natal NAD and police officials in early 1928. Hulett reported that Africans on his estate sometimes asked to borrow money, saying that they wished to go and khonza to Solomon on the Cartwright Flats in Durban. Hulett observed that Solomon "always picks a Sunday, and you will have the whole tribe go down there giving this money. He [Solomon] does this periodically; he goes to Durban and gets pots of money." 55 Hulett was gravely misinformed. The ICU yase Natal and the CP's Durban branch (established in 1929) regularly held Sunday-afternoon rallies on the Cartwright Flats - whereas Solomon never did so. Hulett's tenants and employees undoubtedly did not wish to tell Hulett whose meetings they were attending in order to 'khonza to Solomon', and had omitted to mention that these meetings were never attended by Solomon. 56 The interconnections between the urban and rural areas were clearly evidenced in June 1930 when a number of chiefs and headmen from Natal's countryside attended a meeting of the ICU yase Natal in Durban. Champion, who had invited them to Durban to discuss the ricksha strike, subsequently claimed that their attendance "showed that now the District and Rural areas would combine with them in one general movement". As La Hausse has observed, Champion's statement confirmed the NAD's worst fears. 57

In July 1930, against the background of the above developments, Nicholls despatched a series of three letters to the Minister of
Native Affairs, E.G. Jansen, arguing that the recognition of Solomon and the "Zulu National Council" (Inkatha) had become an urgent necessity. At the same time he was confidentially in communication with the Governor-General, the Earl of Athlone, to whom - it subsequently transpired - he expressed similar sentiments. The signs that African militancy in the province of Natal was to escalate, however, did not comprise the only reason why Nicholls' representations bore a note of urgency. The Governor-General was to tour Zululand between late July and early August, and Nicholls hoped to persuade the Minister of Native Affairs and the Governor-General to make use of the autocratic powers vested in the Supreme Chief, on the occasion of the Governor-General's scheduled 'Zulu indaba' at Eshowe, to unilaterally initiate 'political reform' among the Zulu.

For Nicholls, the Governor-General's tour of Zululand represented a key opportunity to secure the official recognition of Solomon and Inkatha. Most obviously, the Governor-General, in his capacity of Supreme Chief, was empowered to rule the African population by proclamation. And this "edictal system" of 'native administration', whose operation had been extended from Natal to other parts of the Union by the 1927 Native Administration Act, was commended in ruling circles specifically because it allowed the state the "flexibility" to legislate according to the "varied needs of natives in particular areas." In practice the Supreme Chief's powers were most frequently exercised in response to recommendations that had issued from regional NAD officials and were endorsed by the SNA and Minister of Native Affairs. However, the 'Governor-General-in-council' (ie. in consultation with ministers of state) had the power to override or simply bypass the NAD when proclaiming regional 'native legislation'. And since the Minister of Native Affairs was likely to be the most influential individual alongside the Governor-General within this decision-making body, together they were the two individuals most able to introduce changes in regional 'native policy' which were not advocated by regional NAD officials.

Nicholls could also feel assured that both Jansen and Athlone would...
consider his representations with great care — and even a certain a priori partiality. Jansen, whose Vryheid constituency adjoined Nicholls' Zululand, had for many years been an active member of the Natal planter/farmer parliamentary alliance which Nicholls and Marwick jointly spearheaded. And although Jansen had not frequently addressed the house on the more theoretical aspects of 'native policy' prior to his appointment as Minister of Native Affairs, the occasions on which he had done so proved that he adhered to the 'Natal view' on 'native affairs'—of which Nicholls was the leading spokesman. 60 Athlone, for his part, had long shown a special concern for the interests of agricultural industries in the Union, including the Natal sugar industry, and for this reason he was made especially welcome in white Natal when he visited the province in July 1930. 61 Moreover, it seems that Nicholls and Athlone were personally acquainted; and Nicholls not only arranged the itinerary for Athlone's Zululand tour, but acted as Athlone's guide and companion when the tour took place. 62

Not least important, it could be expected that Athlone's tour would inspire in the province of Natal, among the majority of the African as well as the white population, an emotional and celebratory atmosphere similar to that which the Prince of Wales' 'royal progress' had inspired in 1925. Indeed, a high-ranking member of the British aristocracy himself, Athlone was King George V's personal representative in South Africa; furthermore, this was Athlone's 'farewell tour', for he was shortly to return to England. More particularly, it could be expected that a spirit of Zulu unity beneath Solomon, and of Zulu loyalty to the British Crown, could characterise the 'Zulu indaba' at Eshowe — which would therefore be an appropriate occasion on which to initiate official moves to resurrect the Zulu monarchy and devolve upon the Zulu a measure of self-government. 63

In his correspondence with the Minister of Native Affairs during July 1930, Nicholls focussed on the 'political' advantages that could be gleaned from the incorporation of Solomon and Inkatha into the structure of indirect rule in Natal. And the ideas that Nicholls expressed drew heavily on those that he had developed
while supporting the 1927 Native Administration Bill in parliament, and had subsequently expounded more formally while setting out his 'adaptationist policy' proposals in private letters and memoranda. The recognition of Solomon and Inkatha, Nicholls argued, would appeal to the most "conservative elements" in Zulu society, and would "strengthen the chiefs in their fight against communism". Referring to the recent ICU meeting with chiefs in Durban, Nicholls opined that some chiefs were beginning to "imitate the agitator" because the government did not accord either them or their king sufficient status. "Fearful combinations" were therefore taking shape. Solomon, who stood at the apex of the Zulu tribal hierarchy and who the Zulu perceived as their "natural leader", was the means by which the state could reassert political and administrative control over the whole Zulu population: "We can guide the head of the nation when we can do nothing to guide the mass". Nicholls also passionately denounced the disinclination of NAD officials to change extant policy towards the Zulu royal house. While Solomon certainly did have personal "disabilities", Nicholls admitted, it was not Solomon's character but the ideas that Solomon stood for in the "native mind" that should be the sole consideration of policymakers.

Nicholls further emphasised that his proposal was in line with both official policy towards tribalism, as was embodied in the 1927 Native Administration Act, and the ideology and practice of segregation. Indeed, the recognition of Solomon and Inkatha would serve to "counter the disintegrative process against which tribalism is fighting", while at the same time ensuring that Zulu self government would be firmly based on the Zulu's "own institutions". In this context, it is illuminating that Nicholls requested the Minister of Native Affairs to reschedule the main 'Zulu indaba' so that it took place at Nongoma since the Nongoma district was the "focus of Zulu loyalty" whereas Eshowe was a white town: "the emphasis of all native development should be in the native reserve".65

In his first letter Nicholls proposed that the Minister of Native
Affairs and the Governor-General should summarily recognise Solomon during the Governor-General's forthcoming tour of Zululand. To this suggestion the Minister of Native Affairs replied simply that his department had already considered the question of extending Solomon's status, and that he was 'not prepared to depart from the policy the NAD had adopted. Perhaps realising that he had expected too much, Nicholls subsequently withdrew his initial proposal and merely requested that "chieftaindom" be emphasised and Solomon be paid special attention during the Governor-General's tour - with a view to taking action on the recognition issue soon thereafter. On the grounds of these subsequent representations from Nicholls, the Minister of Native Affairs then reopened the 'recognition question' in the NAD. He sent all three of Nicholls' letters to the SNA, who in turn submitted copies to the CNC. Simultaneously, as the Under-SNA wrote to the CNC in late July, the Minister of Native Affairs informed the NAD that he favoured the establishment of a Zululand Council whose membership was confined to Zulu chiefs and the latter's nominees. While the Governor-General was touring Zululand therefore, the NAD was reconsidering policy towards Solomon and Inkatha.

The Minister of Native Affairs - and the NAD - was unaware that Nicholls had communicated similarly with the Governor-General as the latter was preparing to venture into the heart of the Zulu country. And the Governor-General keenly espoused Nicholls' views and proposals, as was most clearly revealed in the memorandum on Zululand policy that he submitted to members of the Union cabinet in the month following his return from Zululand (hereafter referred to as the 'Athlone memorandum'). Indeed, once the Athlone memorandum had been received at the office of the Minister of Native Affairs, the minister's private secretary was so struck by the congruity between Nicholls' writing and Athlone's expressly secret treatise - primarily in terms of content and only occasionally in phraseology, for the latter was shorn of Nicholls' polemical style - that he made special comment: "Vir my lyk dit asof 'iemand wat ons goed ken' met sy Eskell. destyds gesels het!" (To me it seems that 'someone we
Athlone engaged the question of political reform in Zululand in a spirit of clinical detachment that had long evaded those who were directly responsible for the day-to-day administration of the region. The unassuming forthrightness of his memorandum distinguished him as a dispassionate yet concerned outsider; and it contrasted with, on the one hand, the inate timidity and red-tape pettyness of the NAD bureaucracy, and, on the other hand, the overblown and sometimes acerbic rhetoric of Nicholls. At the outset, the Athlone memorandum indicated that it would not address itself to Solomon's personal behaviour, but to "Solomon's position" in the context of 'native policy' in Zululand. And in doing so, it examined the ways in which a redefinition of Solomon's status could, with regard to the administration of the Zulu, revitalise the operation of indirect rule in Zululand, and, with regard to the political life of the Zulu, quell the growth of disrespect for authority and of militancy.

Having made an appraisal of the tribal system and chiefly authority, and their interrelationship with the theory and practice of indirect rule, Athlone inferred that the Zululand administration was based ultimately on the Zulu's adherence to "the idea of personal leadership". To the Zulu, he proceeded, Solomon was the "material manifestation of this idea, to which their allegiance and unqualified obedience are due". It was thus questionable whether the administration's policy of denying Solomon's status as king was consistent with its policy of preserving tribalism and chiefly authority. Like Nicholls, who favoured the encouragement of a sense of 'nationhood' among the Zulu, and unlike the Zululand administration, whose policy had been one of 'divide and rule' since 1879, Athlone felt that there was nothing to fear from Zulu unity. He concluded that "so long as 'indirect Government' is the accepted system, efficient administration can be assumed only by the fullest use of tribal
custom and organization, at the head of which, whether we like it or not, stands Solomon and the Zulu royal house”. Athlone then turned to consider the recent spread of "revolutionary and subversive influences" among the African population, which he ascribed to the rapid process of African social change. But the Zulu's adherence to tribalism and devotion to their royal house, he contended, were "natural obstacles" to the spread of "bolshevism" among them. Athlone concluded that the choice seemed to lie between "the recognition of a Paramount Chief" and the "disintegration of the Zulu Nation through the influence of the ICU and kindred organizations".

Athlone did not simply propose that Solomon, after a supervised "probationary period" and under the "tutelage of a Government Agent", be recognised as Zulu king with overarching authority above all other Zulu chiefs. Convinced that the Zulu were not ready for the 'council system' as the state had originally envisaged it, he also proposed that official use be made of Inkatha - which he saw as the only basis on which a "popular Native Council" could be established in Zululand. Furthermore, he proposed that the responsibility for administering Zululand be removed from the NAD, and vested primarily in the Governor-General (in his capacity as Supreme Chief); and, similar to the arrangements made for the High Commission Territories of Basutoland and Swaziland, the Governor-General would then in practice make Solomon and Inkatha responsible for governing the Zulu, only intervening if they did not do so "reasonably well". While emphasising that the finer details of his envisaged Zululand policy were subject to negotiation, Athlone summarised his proposals as follows:

First, the recognition of Solomon as Paramount Chief, administering the present laws and customs, and responsible to the Supreme Chief for good order and government in Zululand, and watched over by a Government Agent, who would be answerable direct to the Minister of Native Affairs without reference to the Chief Native Commissioner of Natal. Zululand to be regarded as administratively separate from Natal.

Second, the institution of a Native Council for Zululand on a foundation of the present 'Nkata, in which the Paramount Chief would preside. Such a Council to have legislative functions, subject to the advice and final 'recommendation' of the Government Agent direct to the Governor-General-in-Council.
Athlone's objectives in Zululand closely correlated with those of Nicholls. Both sought to preserve the system of tribal rule among the Zulu, and, recognising its conservative and authoritarian qualities, use it as a base on which to build overarching and reinforcing national political institutions. The latter, which would be derived primarily from the monarchical traditions of preconquest Zululand but would also accord with the 'tribal' and 'council' traditions that had evolved in state segregationist policy during the 1920s, were to guide the reconstruction of a reserve-based and inherently conservative Zulu nation. More important, they were to assume the responsibilities of Zulu self government.

Athlone's proposals differed from those of Nicholls insofar as they were solely concerned with the political future of Zululand; and his response was effectively to advocate that the Zululand administration be made independent from the structure of 'native administration' operative in the rest of the Union, and that the Zulu be governed more on the model of the neighbouring High Commission territories - by way of a Crown representative watching over the activities of a 'traditional' monarchical political structure. Athlone's proposals were in these respects similar to the 'Basutolandization' proposals made by Zululand's Resident Commissioner Sir Marshal Clarke during the 1890s; the latter, if heeded, would have caused Zululand to be 'settled' along the lines of a High Commission Territory rather than being simply incorporated into the Colony of Natal and therefore, subsequently, the Union. Although Nicholls' special concern was for 'political reform' among the Zulu, as a leading Union 'native policy' legislator he also hoped that the practical application of his 'adaptationist policy' in Zululand would encourage similar initiatives elsewhere in the Union. Furthermore, Nicholls had at no stage considered that the Union Government should permit as large an influence over a 'self governing' Zulu nation as was envisaged in the Athlone memorandum to fall into the hands of a potentially independent authority such as the Governor-General - who might not always be amenable to white settler interests.
Yet the differences between Athlone's and Nicholls' ideas should not be overemphasised here. Indeed, although Nicholls had in May 1930 already begun formally to expound his 'adaptationist policy' proposals before the select committee on 'native affairs' (without, incidentally, divulging that he was also making efforts to have his ideas practically applied in Zululand), the focus of his attention fell on the basics of his policy: the extension and development of the reserves, and the theoretical considerations that underlay his scheme for socio-cultural and political segregation. He was less concerned with describing in detail the relationship that might obtain between his envisaged 'self governing Bantu nations' and the Union Government. It seems that Athlone, for his part, had only been alerted to the question of Zululand policy in early July 1930, and his opinions had barely become inflexible by the time his Zululand tour took place. Moreover he only formally drew up his memorandum in the few weeks after his Zululand tour; and in it he emphasised that he did not wish "to stress points of detail or method" concerning his proposals, but hoped that the "most earnest attention" be paid to the principle of his "main contention" which was that Solomon's hereditary position be officially recognised.

Immediately prior to the Zulu indaba, Athlone and Nicholls were clearly in agreement about the central points of their ideas. In practice these meant the official recognition of Solomon and Inkatha as the responsible political institutions of a limitedly self governing Zulu nation - which accorded precisely with the central points of Solomon's and Inkatha's long-standing hopes. From the point of view of all those who were seriously concerned with how these objectives might be realised, the Zulu indaba with the Governor-General scheduled for 24 July was an event of some promise. It could be expected to be a showcase of Zulu national unity and discipline, of Zulu loyalty to Crown and government, and of the pre-eminent importance of Solomon and his advisers in the political life of the Zulu. And even if the Governor-General was not going to announce far-reaching political reforms for the Zulu at the indaba, as Nicholls had originally
hoped, it was his intention to make subtle initiatives in that direction and to pay special attention to Solomon during his tour. Perhaps most important, the indaba might serve to impress the Minister of Native Affairs and the NAD with the value of Solomon's political influence among the Zulu and the conduct of a large mass of Zulu people when in Solomon's presence. Indeed, the Minister of Native Affairs, the SNA and the CNC were the most influential individuals who had yet to be convinced of the wisdom of the 'recognition strategy'.

In late July the Governor-General, accompanied by his wife and daughter, Princess Alice and Lady May Cambridge, and a number of aides-de-camp, entered Zululand to a rapturous welcome from white Zululanders. As Nicholls relates in his autobiography, the tour was quite unlike earlier 'political' tours undertaken by even such nationally and internationally esteemed dignitaries as Smuts; it was more in the nature of a royal progress, similar to that of the Prince of Wales in 1925, punctuated by grandiose social functions at each siding at which the White Train hesitated. Yet the principal engagement of the Governor-General's tour was unquestionably to be his Zulu indaba at Eshowe - on the golf links, as the Prince of Wales' indaba had been in 1925 - to which every chief in Zululand, with followers, had been officially invited. This event, which was to take place during the afternoon of 24 July, overshadowed the Governor-General's formal reception in white Eshowe during the morning - when the somewhat unglamorous person of the chairman of the Eshowe Town Board declared that Eshowe specially welcomed H.E. because of the particular interest H.E. had always shown in (white) agriculture.

Unbeknown to anyone but NAD officials, however, it had become clear in the few days before the indaba that the Zulu were unlikely to welcome the Governor-General in the same way as they had welcomed the Prince. It seemed that they regarded the Governor-General less as King George V's representative and 'their' Supreme Chief than as a representative of the state which had not long previously tear-gassed their relatives in Durban.
Additional and contributory to this hostile attitude, however, was the influence of Solomon: he ironically seemed to identify the Governor-General as the head of the NAD that had refused to recognise his hereditary position, and made efforts to ensure that both his own and the Zulu's consequent displeasure was expressed on the day of the indaba.

In the week prior to the indaba, unmistakable evidence had come to light that the royal nucleus nearby Nongoma was the epicentre of Zulu disaffection. On 20 July, the NC at Nongoma telegraphed the NC at Eshowe that, for various reasons, every chief in his district had indicated that he was unable to attend the indaba. A personal message from the CNC to every Nongoma chief transmitted on the same day, advising them that "their absence would be regarded as a very serious affront to His Excellency unless unimpeachable reasons for absenting themselves existed", seemed to make no impact. Indeed, when the CNC arrived in Eshowe on 23 July he learnt from Nongoma that Solomon would definitely not be present. Moreover, he was informed by the NC at Eshowe that a rumour was in circulation among the Zulu to the effect that "Solomon would not attend, and that therefore others need not attend". Having been advised that it was the Governor-General's special desire to see the head of the Zulu royal house at Eshowe, the CNC made a number of urgent attempts to contact Solomon. Solomon, however, simply gave out that he was "ill in bed with gout, and could not move". The CNC consequently felt that he would be forced to explain to the Governor-General that Solomon would be absent from the indaba on account of illness.

Officials were astonished and perturbed when Solomon nonetheless arrived in Eshowe on the morning of 24 July. Not only was he extremely drunk, but he was - in the CNC's words - "very impudent and truculent" with every official with whom he came into contact. He had left Mahashini by car the previous evening, and had allegedly been drinking ever since. A subsequent enquiry into the records of the Nongoma bottle store, incidentally, proved that nearly sixty bottles of spirits and twenty bottles of wine had been bought on Solomon's account between 1 and 23 July.
Even though neither NAD officials nor Solomon's advisers could induce Solomon to "behave properly", the CNC decided that he had no choice but to allow Solomon to attend the indaba since those Zulu who were already assembled were well aware that the royal party had arrived from Nongoma. Solomon's attitude was soon reflected in the disposition of the assembled Zulu. On the arrival of the Governor-General at the indaba, so the NC at Eshowe observed, a "very large number of natives" shouted "Bayeza" (literally 'they are coming', a traditional rallying call) at him in the place of the royal salutation 'bayede'. The Governor-General was thus threatened rather than welcomed.

The proceedings were to commence with a speech of welcome to the Governor-General, given by a Zulu chief on behalf of the Zulu people; in practice this representative could only be Solomon. Solomon clearly evidenced his feelings towards the NAD in the course of his speech. Although it had been arranged that the clerk at the Eshowe magistrate's office was to act as interpreter during the indaba, Solomon summarily rejected the services of this NAD interpreter and instead used his own. The speech as a whole was as a result barely comprehensible to anyone present, since Solomon was almost incoherently drunk and his interpreter was not fluent in English.

Those parts of the speech that were decipherable were of considerable interest, however, indicating that Solomon had completely lost faith in the value of making representations to any quarter of the South African state. Instead he called upon members of the British royal family in England to assist "the country", saying that they were the Zulu's only hope, and requested that the Governor-General transmit this plea to his relatives in the mother country. Solomon ironically appeared to believe that it was they alone who could cause his hereditary position to be officially recognised. His speech at the same time indicated that he respected only the authority of the British monarch, and not that of the South African Government. Indeed, whereas it was customary on such occasions to express loyalty to 'the British Crown and the Union Government' as though they were inseparably interlinked, Solomon on this particular occasion
was heard only to express loyalty to the former. Furthermore, he entered into a somewhat convoluted discourse on the merits of monarchs as opposed to elected authorities: they were unequal, Solomon asserted, "because a King was a member of a royal family and crowned by God and not by any human being". Such sentiments compounded Solomon's disgrace in the eyes of the NAD.

Mnyaiza, who was the only other Zulu officially to make a speech, reiterated Solomon's request for the intervention of the British royal family. And significantly, it was Chief Nkantini and not Solomon who made the presentation of a Zulu knobkerrie and shield to the Governor-General, which could be interpreted either as a reflection of Solomon's incapacitation or disaffection.

Seated at the forefront of the Zulu assembly, Solomon once more made his views readily apparent during the course of the Governor-General's address. He repeatedly shook his head at various points of the address, the NC at Eshowe reported, to demonstrate his disagreement with statements that were being made. This was particularly marked when the Governor-General pronounced that "in your CNC and NCs you have men to look after your welfare...go to them with your troubles and difficulties", and warned the Zulu to beware of "mischief makers" who denigrated the government's "good works". But for the subsequent display of Zulu dancing, which H.E. and Princess Alice apparently enjoyed, Solomon had succeeded in transforming the indaba into a display of Zulu antagonism arguably unparalleled in the history of formal meetings between the Zulu and white authorities since Piet Retief's unfortunate indaba with Dingane in 1838.

It was a measure of the Governor-General's determination to keep alive a hope for the recognition of Solomon and Inkatha that he visited Nongoma two weeks after the indaba, and held a private interview with Solomon. Here his purpose was not merely to reprimand but also to express his great personal disappointment about the manner in which Solomon had behaved; and, hinting that the Zulu royal house might yet be rewarded should its image
improve, he urged Solomon to "show yourself worthy of the position you hold in [Zulu] eyes". Having secured an apology from Solomon, the Governor-General evidently felt that no further action need be taken on the matter of Solomon's behaviour. The Governor-General's attempts to keep open the possibility of 'recognition', however, were in practice futile.

On his return to Pietermaritzburg from Zululand, the CNC simply dismissed the 'reopened recognition question'. Referring to the correspondence between Nicholls and the Minister of Native Affairs which NAD head office had forwarded for his consideration, he succinctly replied that Solomon's behaviour on 24 July "was such to preclude any thoughts of improvement in Solomon's official status". Neither the SNA nor Minister of Native Affairs questioned this view. Indeed, Solomon had deliberately insulted the head of state in the full view of a large mass of Zulu people, and had encouraged the antagonistic attitude of the Zulu at the indaba. Both the NC at Eshowe and the CNC (the highest ranking NAD officials present at the indaba) for these reasons urged that the government severely punish Solomon. They were strongly supported by the Minister of Native Affairs: "it is imperative that [Solomon] be punished", he wrote to the Governor-General in early August, and that immediate action be taken.

The Governor-General had only just returned from Zululand, and was in the process of formalising his 'Athlone memorandum', when the Minister of Native Affairs began pressing him to authorise some form of concrete punishment for Solomon. Referring to the suggestions in this regard made by the NC at Eshowe and the CNC, the Governor-General argued that Solomon was "drunk and irresponsible (original emphasis) at the indaba, and that he should not be punished for "discourtesies" that were a "natural outcome of his irresponsible condition". In this view, Solomon's sole misdeed was that he had appeared drunk in public. Moreover, the Governor-General intimated to the Minister of Native Affairs, "I have reasons for not wishing any too drastic treatment to be meted out to Solomon" - reasons which were to be embodied in the forthcoming Athlone memorandum. And in his attempts to minimise Solomon's culpability, he attempted to argue
that inadequate arrangements on the part of the NAD were partly responsible for the public debacle. 95 Within a month after the indaba, however, the Governor-General had bowed to ministerial and NAD pressure to punish Solomon: he authorised the cancellation of Solomon's liquor permit, and the reduction of Solomon's stipend by half for a probationary period of one year. Both of these 'punishments' were implemented by 8 September, 96 and, in effect, they made absolutely final the CNC's dismissal of the 'recognition question' immediately after the indaba.

By the time that the Athlone memorandum was submitted to members of the Union cabinet ten days later, therefore, the recognition issue was no longer a political reality. It was nonetheless significant, as an illustration of the Governor-General's very different perspective from those of the Minister of Native Affairs and NAD officials, that the Athlone memorandum presented its proposals as all the more cogent in view of the spirit of "discontent and mistrust" evident in not only Solomon but a number of Zulu at the indaba. Furthermore, it included a 'final resort' clause recommending that, should Solomon's official status remain unimproved after a period of two years, the government then undertake to reconsider the whole issue. 97 However, as will be noted below, when the NAD did reconsider the 'recognition question' in 1932 it did little more than routinely dismiss the proposals once more. From the point of view of the Governor-General, Nicholls, Solomon and Inkatha, and all those who supported their common purpose, the Athlone memorandum would remain simply as testimony to a lost opportunity.

Solomon's conduct during the indaba with the Governor-General in 1930 sharply contrasted with the masterful way in which he had, in effect, taken charge at the indaba with the Prince of Wales in 1925: rising above local officials and NAD policy, Solomon had entertained and consorted with the Prince on a level of royal equality. At the indaba of 1930, Solomon eroded rather than enhanced his political status among the Zulu, and frustrated rather than furthered his aim for official recognition as Zulu
king. He proved not only that he was physically ill, but that he had lost his sense of political judgement and direction. Ironically, he failed to contain his resentment for the NAD - or to distinguish between the NAD and the Supreme Chief - at a time when his life-long ambition to be recognised as Zulu king was most likely to be realised. The Governor-General and Nicholls, acting together with such powerful African allies as Solomon and Inkatha, and with the qualified acquiescence of both the Minister of Native Affairs and the NAD (which seemed likely prior to the indaba), would certainly have spearheaded a formidable pressure group in pursuit of the ideal of Zulu self government. Solomon further evidenced his political ineptitude in the pleas for assistance he made to members of the British royal family in England, whom Solomon might already have realised were palpably incapable of influencing South African politics. And in making these pleas, he simultaneously rejected the assistance of his most influential possible allies - in the presence of whom he was then standing. Perhaps most ironically, though with less long-term consequences, Solomon failed even to give political direction to the restiveness of the Zulu assembly at the indaba.

Solomon's conduct at the indaba of 1930 effectively terminated his political career, as well as the possibility of official 'political reform' among the Zulu during his lifetime. Indeed, Solomon's activities during the remaining few years of his life served, on the one hand, to render his longstanding and vital alliance with the African petty bourgeoisie increasingly unworkable, and, on the other hand, to confirm to the NAD that his official status could not be improved.

The Decline of Solomon and Inkatha

Inkatha had always defined itself as the Zulu 'royal party', and its political fortunes were inseparable from those of the Zulu royal house. As Solomon's hopes of recognition died in the aftermath of the indaba, so did those of Inkatha; the organisation was thus forced to accept that, at least in the short term, its overriding political objective had been defeated. Solomon's personal and political decline accelerated after mid-1930, and this
too was inevitably reflected in Inkatha. Indeed, Solomon had barely two and a half years left to live following the indaba debacle, and, in terms of practical politics, Inkatha had considerably less.

At Mahashini three weeks after the indaba, Inkatha's annual general meeting of 1930 proved to be one of the best attended in the organisation's history, comparable in size to the 1928 meeting. The 1930 meeting had already been widely advertised prior to the indaba: as well as in the province of Natal, printed notices were in circulation in urban and rural localities as far afield as the eastern Transvaal, Johannesburg, and even parts of the Orange Free State. It had undoubtedly been keenly anticipated by Inkatha's organisers, since it was an occasion on which the populist Zulu nationalism that the indaba seemed sure to inspire could be politically consolidated under Inkatha's organisational umbrella, just as the 1925 meeting had done after the celebrated indaba with the Prince of Wales. The occasion of the 1930 meeting, however, was in reality scarred by internal dissension and recriminations, and lacked either optimism or any clear sense of purpose. Ilanga lase Natal's authorised report made no reference to any discussion of the recent indaba having taken place during the meeting - at which, significantly, no white official or observer was present.

The private deliberations of the general committee (comprising all chiefs and certain appointed ministers of religion) and the executive committee, which took up the first two days of the meeting as was customary, focussed on two main issues. First, the desirability of making representations directly to the Union Government rather than through the 'unfavourable' NAD hierarchy; and second, a scheme whereby Inkatha's income would be put to practical use by buying up land to alleviate Zulu land pressure. The first resolution upon which unanimous agreement was reached, however, advocated that Solomon be sent to England for specialist medical treatment. This resolution also noted that "the change to another place would do Solomon good". Solomon's absence would certainly do Inkatha good, especially if he returned a reformed person, and it was not unlikely that such reasoning
When Solomon appeared before the public assembly on the final day of the meeting, he made a somewhat startling proposal: neither he nor any member of the Zulu royal family, he moved, should continue to hold positions on the executive committee (Solomon personally had been treasurer since 1928). Solomon was evidently acting on the 'advice' of petty bourgeois leaders who foresaw that Solomon would have to be dissociated from the practical affairs of Inkatha if the organisation was to survive. Although this proposal was initially approved by Inkatha as a whole, Chief Mathole spearheaded sufficiently strong resistance to the measure to prevent it being formally accepted. In the ensuing deadlock, the meeting was unable to elect a new executive committee - which, under the terms of the 1928 constitution, was one of the central functions of an Inkatha annual general meeting. Inkatha thus had no legally-constituted leadership after the 1930 meeting.

Another of the central constitutional functions of an Inkatha annual general meeting was to ratify the organisation's annual financial statement. Describing the atmosphere as "tense", Ilanga lase Natal reported how detailed revelations were made regarding unauthorised 'Inkatha collectors', whose collections were not forwarded to Inkatha, and the misappropriation of Inkatha funds. That the unauthorised collectors were able to produce official Inkatha receipts and photographs of King Solomon conclusively indicated that the corruption was internal. Although Solomon was not - and could not - be implicated at the meeting, it was clear that he, in conjunction with his private secretary, Simpson Bhengu, who also held the office of secretary to Inkatha, was primarily responsible for both the fraudulent collections and the misappropriation of funds. Mshiyeni, Solomon's full brother who worked as a labour supervisor on the gold mines and, as a practising Christian, identified more with the petty bourgeois than the tribal elite, was especially outraged at the evidence of gross corruption in Inkatha. So too was Bhulose, the chairman, who charged that various chiefs were retaining Inkatha subscriptions for their own use. At the 1930 meeting, it seemed that not only the petty bourgeois's relationship with Solomon
but its alliance with the tribal elite had become strained. This development, combined with Inkatha's problems with finances and an untrustworthy constitutional monarch, and deficiencies in respect of a legally-constituted leadership and a sense of political purpose, signalled that Inkatha's demise was imminent.  

Ten days after the 1930 Inkatha meeting, Solomon, deeply in debt, went to Durban to consult his lawyers on financial matters. In Durban, he also held a meeting with dock workers resident in the municipal togt labour compounds, evidently in an attempt to consolidate his urban support. On the completion of this meeting at the Bell Street Compound beer hall, one of the institutions that the ICU yase Natal had long boycotted, Solomon immediately thereafter attended a meeting of the ICU yase Natal.  

Solomon's purpose in 'dropping in' on Champion's meeting at the ICU Hall on 3 September was evidently to stake a claim to the organisation's revenue. The ICU yase Natal had been wilfully invoking Zulu nationalism at its meetings on the Cartwright Flats over the past year, and much of the tribute that would have been paid to Solomon had undoubtedly been paid in subscriptions to the ICU yase Natal.  And during his discussion with Champion, Solomon advocated that the present division between the ICU yase Natal and the NNC should be healed; to this end, he suggested the calling of a conference at which both organisations would be represented, with Solomon himself presiding.  Solomon's expressed concern for Zulu unity in this context should not be taken at face value – and not only because it was resoundingly hollow in view of the particular class position he had adopted since late 1927. For Solomon in 1930, the fact that political divisions among the Zulu caused the loss of royal revenue was more immediately important than political issues. Indeed, Solomon's decision on 3 September to commit himself to an open and direct association with the ICU yase Natal was utterly incompatible with his own and Inkatha's 'anti-ICU' policy since 1927 – a policy which had played a central role in their mutual drive for official recognition. It seemed that Solomon's desperate need for revenue had overcome in him
any sense of political purpose beyond cultivating Zulu national allegiance to the institution of Zulu kingship. In meeting with Champion, however, Solomon was apparently hoping to reassert not only his own political position, but also the rights of the whole rural-based 'tribal' order, together with the values and obligations of 'tribal' tradition. The latter after all underpinned the political status of the Zulu 'ancien regime'. Explaining to the CNC the reasons why he met Champion, Solomon stated that he wished to complain that workers in Durban came from "us" (evidently referring to tribal authorities in the rural areas) to earn money to pay taxes, but then "you get them".106 A weakening of political loyalties to the 'tribal' order as a whole meant a diminished cash flow in the rural areas.

Following their meeting, which caused great excitement in ICU quarters, Champion and Solomon arranged to appear together at a specially convened Zulu mass meeting at the ICU Hall on 6 September. The event was widely publicised by way of ICU handbills, which also advertised that Dube and "all the educated people of Durban" would be in attendance.107 This was barely likely; it was more likely that Solomon had implicated Dube without having consulted him. Significantly, the advertisement published in Ilanga lase Natal made no reference to Dube: "King Solomon will be greeted by the ICU yase Natal at a resounding meeting of African workers", it said, "Come Zulus and see the head of the nation meeting his people."108 Needless to say, neither Dube nor any other representative of the NNC attended the meeting. Neither did Solomon. He had one of his increasingly frequent attacks of alcohol-induced illness and refused to leave his quarters at Depot Road Native Location. It was clear, however, that he had also become alarmed about the publicity that the event had attracted, and feared NAD and police retribution. When Champion and three thousand ICU yase Natal supporters thereupon congregated outside Solomon's quarters on the evening of 6 September, Solomon remained in hiding, but nonetheless accepted a cash gift. He left for Eshowe shortly afterwards.109

The most immediate consequences of Solomon's brief association
with the ICU yase Natal was the banishment of Champion from the province of Natal under the terms of the Riotous Assemblies Act. Roux has incorrectly asserted that Champion was banished simply for his involvement in the beer-hall disturbances. More recently, La Hausse has astutely suggested that while Champion's banishment should be understood in the context of the beer-hall protests as a whole, the Union Government also regarded banishment as "a means of preventing the emergence of a militant 'general movement' encompassing town and countryside, a possibility which had been suggested by the presence of Solomon in Durban." Indeed, in calling for this repressive response, the Commissioner of the South African Police informed the Minister of Justice that

Champion, by reason of his association with Solomon Dinuzulu (sic) and with other Zulu Chiefs, has greatly gained in prestige amongst the natives of Durban, particularly amongst members of the I.C.U. and that he is, consequently, at present a very much greater menace to Law and Order than he has ever been in the past...this prestige is bound to increase and a conflict between Europeans and Natives seems to be more than a probability in the near future.

The banishment of Champion in the first instance reflected the government's sensitivity to the dangerous political role Solomon could play in the context of militant African opposition. The action caused something of a political controversy: the mayor of Durban, Rev. A. Lamont, who was supported by certain "leading citizens" of the city including the MP for Durban County A. H. J. Eaton, petitioned the Minister of Justice to delay the banning order until protests had been considered. Ilanga lase Natal also objected. These protests, however, were not directed against the banishment of Champion specifically, but against the Riotous Assemblies Act which was seen to subvert liberal-democratic principles: the rights of freedom of speech and association, the sovereignty of parliament, and the rule of law. Marwick and the Natal Mercury, however, vigorously endorsed the banning order.

The banishment of Champion effectively decapitated the ICU yase Natal, and the organisation went into an abrupt political decline.
This was so, even though unpaid local activists had always spearheaded the most telling protests to be made under the ICU banner in the province of Natal; and Champion's provincial leadership had in practice (if not in terms of rhetoric) tended to be irresolute and somewhat 'moderate' - and so not duly representative of its claimed political constituency. Champion had often displayed the class ambivalence of a man who, vengefully disillusioned about the expectations implanted by a petty bourgeois background, had made his career as a political organiser of the more volatile 'working class'. Yet Champion had played a vital role in the articulation of popular protest in the province of Natal. His skills as an organiser and propagandist had been largely responsible for the growth of a mass movement there. He was moreover a rousing and apparently fearless orator who, while appealing to popular 'Zuluness', had captured popular imagination with innovatory political doctrines and strategies, and a vision of a somewhat utopian future free of class and racial oppression. In the five years since his return from the Transvaal to Natal as provincial ICU organiser, Champion had virtually come to personify popular protest in the region. And although opportunities had long existed for a more radical popular leader to displace Champion from his niche in popular politics, or at least to significantly challenge him, no-one had done so by the time he was exiled in 1930. In early 1931, the Department of Justice was pleased to report that the ICU yase Natal had become an organisation of "little consequence" since Champion's departure. Its leadership was wracked with divisive quarrels, and attendance at its Cartwright Flats meetings had plunged from averages of two thousand to two hundred and fifty. Its political role, moreover, had become increasingly distanced from popular protest. Indeed, by 1932 the Natal Workers Club (an ICU centre for social activities and political education, founded by Champion in 1925) had attracted moral support from Dube and financial assistance from Natal Estates Limited; the latter had been implacable opponents of the ICU in the late 1920s.

Champion meanwhile lived out his exile in Johannesburg. Irrevocably
a Natal-based politician, he withdrew from political life. He nonetheless did occasionally pen self-pitying reflections on his political martyrdom and exile for the ANC newspaper Abantu-Batho, while earning a living as a cashier with the Colonial Banking and Trust Company. On his return to Natal, after his banning order was lifted by Smuts in early 1933, Champion occupied himself with political objectives which were fundamentally 'respectable', conciliatory and petty bourgeois in character.

If the ICU yase Natal was not to play a significant role in the articulation of popular protest after 1930, it seemed in late 1930 that Champion's absence would enable the Durban branch of the CP to rise in influence as a potent embodiment of the more radical elements within the spectrum of popular consciousness. Johannes Nkosi, the organiser of the Durban CP, had previously always deferred to Champion as the city's 'elder statesman' of popular protest, and, according to Roux, had customarily sought Champion's permission before hawking the CP organ Umsebenzi at the regular Sunday-afternoon political rallies at Cartwright Flats. Perhaps partly because Nkosi refused on principle to invoke ethnic loyalties, the Durban CP's meetings were never so enthusiastically attended as those of the ICU yase Natal. But in the same month as Champion was banished, the Durban CP acquired a new hall; and it was from there that Nkosi orchestrated the Durban workforce's exceptional response to the communists' union-wide call for a one-day general strike and pass-burning demonstration. On 'Dingaan's Day' (16 December) 1930, however, the demonstration at Cartwright Flats was attacked by the police, and four Africans including Nkosi were fatally wounded. Many arrests of communist sympathisers immediately ensued, while police forestalled the regeneration of the Durban CP by simply deporting those officials sent by CP headquarters to replace Nkosi. Durban's Detective Sergeant R. H. Arnold, who had been a prime mover in the banishment of Champion in September, boasted with considerable justification that he was now crushing the communists just as he had crushed the ICU yase Natal. The strategies he adopted were indeed identical: for the police, Champion's banishment under the terms of autocratic
'enabling legislation' had set a precedent which they were not shy to exploit. Solomon's meeting with Champion, which ironically had seemed to promise much for the popular movement, had in practice set in motion a train of events which ultimately served to repress large-scale and effective popular protest in Natal until the defiance campaign of the 1950s.

The consequence of the 'Solomon-Champion episode' for Inkatha was to increase concern and unease among Inkatha's petty bourgeois leaders. Following so soon after the indaba debacle of July 1930, Solomon's association with Champion forced petty bourgeois leaders to the realisation that they could not maintain a working political alliance with so unpredictable and irresponsible a constitutional monarch. That the Riotous Assemblies Act was first used in Natal as a consequence of Solomon's political behaviour was a cause for great embarrassment on Inkatha's part: one year previously, Dube had confidently told the Minister of Native Affairs and the CNC that such repressive legislation would be unnecessary if Solomon were recognised as Zulu paramount chief. In the month after Solomon's meeting with Champion, Ilanga lase Natal published an oblique article which, while ostensibly addressing the question of Solomon's health, in reality expressed the petty bourgeois leadership's disillusionment with Solomon. It was reported that Solomon had been given wise and caring advice by Dube, Bhulose and Seme (the newly-elected president of the ANC, who was taking a special interest in 'Zulu affairs'). Continuing, the article said that "however much they miss him Solomon", it was indeed not right that Solomon "lying down and ill should be aroused for our affairs of the Zulu nation." The article illustrated the anxiety among petty bourgeois leaders generally that Solomon should be persuaded to bow out of an active role in Zulu politics.

In practice, however, representatives of the Natal petty bourgeois establishment did not resolutely take action to constrain Solomon's political role. Realistically perceiving that Solomon was barely tractable and that Inkatha was inseperably identified with Solomon, they instead distanced themselves from Inkatha, no longer regarding it as a viable representative organisation
for petty bourgeois politics. In 1930 Solomon demonstrated that he was no longer only a financial liability from Inkatha's point of view, but also - ironically - a political liability. As much as the 'royal party' - Inkatha - could not exist without Solomon, Solomon thus effectively ensured that Inkatha could not survive with him. But although Natal's petty bourgeois leaders clearly decided during late 1930 that Inkatha's role as their representative political organisation was over, they neither made their views explicit in public nor made any attempt to dissolve the organisation which had been established and sustained primarily through their own efforts. Significantly, neither did they ever hint that Solomon should be persuaded to 'abdicate' from his essentially passive role as Zulu national figurehead. Because a tradition-based Zulu nationalism remained central to petty-bourgeois ideology, petty bourgeois ideologues perceived that 'Solomon and Inkatha', as a single image, still had an important cultural - if not directly political - role to perform as an embodiment of Zulu nationalist concepts.

Before considering Inkatha's 'cultural initiative' after 1930, however, it is necessary to relate how Inkatha's political decline was accelerated by an important factor which was unrelated to Solomon's political unreliability and the organisation's chaotic financial state. Seme, who had recently replaced the radical Gumede as ANC president, mounted a campaign in October 1930 to rejuvenate the Natal branch of the ANC and so firmly bring Natal back into the national Congress' fold. Following the 1924 'militant coup' in the NNC, the majority of the Natal petty bourgeois establishment had simply dissociated themselves from their provincial and national Congress organisations and had regrouped in Inkatha. Notwithstanding the existence of Inkatha, Dube had also resuscitated the Durban branch of the 'old' NNC during the late 1920s - this acted as a congenial forum for the most conservative elements of the city's African establishment. And despite its radical leadership, the 'new' NNC (later renamed the Natal African Congress, and then the Natal branch of the ANC) had not become an influential political organisation; its promised role in popular politics had instead been performed by the Natal branch of the ICU and, subsequently,
the ICU yase Natal. The concept of a united Union-wide Congress organisation, which Seme and Dube had played so leading a role in institutionalising in 1912, had thus died in the province of Natal during the 1920s.

During his 1929 election for the ANC presidency, Seme had expounded in Ilanga lase Natal an ideology of African national unity, encompassing educated Africans, tribal chiefs, 'commoners' and recently-politicised 'working class' elements; on the practical basis of co-operation and 'self-help', this ideology foresaw the reconstruction of a new and independent 'African civilisation'. The way in which Seme had equated African national unity with the ethos of 'cooperation', and 'cooperation' with 'self-help' schemes, and 'self-help' with social reconstruction or 'progress', correlated closely with ideas current among the Natal petty bourgeois establishment - though the latter interpreted African national unity in a narrower Zulu ethnic sense. But Seme himself was not unreceptive to the call of a Zulu ethnic nationalism, as was illustrated in his campaign in late 1930 to unite African politics in the province of Natal under the ANC umbrella (and, therefore, his leadership).

Lamenting the "divisions in Natal" in an open letter to Ilanga lase Natal in October 1930, the president of the ANC announced that a "conference" was to be held in Durban to secure "progress and unity for our Native people", and the election of officials for the Natal branch of the ANC. Seme also emphasised that his wife "Princess Harriet ka Dinuzulu would be in Durban for the first time in the interests of the African National Congress", and that if the latest news of Solomon's health was good, she would be the hostess at a "Grand Concert and Dance" for local ANC members.

Seme's efforts seemed to be rewarded when the Natal branch of the ANC was formally reconstituted in October 1930; and Bhulose, who had been Inkatha chairman since 1924 and had acted as a vital mediator between Inkatha's petty bourgeois and tribal elites, accepted a position on the new provincial executive committee. Bhulose nominally remained Inkatha chairman, but he henceforth directed his political energies into
the ANC. His shift away from Mahashini reflected a general withdrawal of petty bourgeois support for Inkatha. Yet the Natal petty bourgeoisie as a whole did not simply transfer its political allegiance to the Natal branch of the ANC along with Bhulose, as Seme had hoped. Dube, the most prominent petty bourgeois leader in the province, remained aloof: having accepted office on the ANC National Executive when Seme became president in April 1930, Dube had soon disagreed with Seme's somewhat autocratic attempts to reclaim Natal for the ANC. Dube and many of his most hamba kahle supporters thus determinedly retained their independent NNC stronghold—which white authorities appreciated. The third most prominent local petty bourgeois leader after Dube and Bhulose, Inkatha's vice-chairman, Chief Majozi, meanwhile maintained a low profile in the emerging power struggle between Seme and Dube (although he clearly favoured the latter). Majozi instead focussed his attention on Inkatha's 'cultural initiative'.

Seme's frustration with the NNC's obstinant separation, together with his determination to unite even ICU yase Natal supporters under the ANC, was reflected in his attempts to come to terms with Champion soon after the latter's banishment. He wrote to Champion in late October 1930, proclaiming the ANC's drive for African national unity and stating that the ICU yase Natal was representative of only "a section of the community". In order to present himself as an ally, Seme played on Champion's long-standing antipathy for Dube by intimating that the ANC too wished to "drive Ilanga out of Natal". Seme also played on the exiled ICU yase Natal leader's insecurity, arguing that the ANC could assist Champion to avoid further disastrous confrontations with the government. "You must realise that I have written as President General of a senior organisation", Seme wrote, "I must command all under me". That Champion in typical fashion rejected Seme's appeal, however, undoubtedly saved Seme from a severe setback in the context of Natal petty bourgeois politics. An alliance between Seme and Champion in 1930 against Dube could only have accentuated the new political disunity among the Natal petty bourgeoisie, and rebounded ultimately to Dube's advantage.
The abrupt collapse of Inkatha as a viable political organisation in 1930 had shattered petty bourgeois political unity in the province of Natal. Many petty bourgeois individuals were left politically homeless, not knowing whether to focus their allegiance on Dube's NNC or Seme's Natal branch of the ANC. Inkatha's practical disintegration was manifested in May 1931 when the CNC, concerned about numerous complaints from NCs regarding the activities of alleged Inkatha collectors and about evidence of gross mismanagement within Inkatha, held a meeting with members of the organisation's executive committee. The CNC had pressed for this meeting since February 1931, but had been delayed by the reticence of Inkatha office-holders - primarily Bhulose. Significantly, Fynney had desperately attempted to persuade the CNC to cancel the meeting; evidently he was anxious to prevent revelations being made that could lead the CNC to order Inkatha's dissolution. Furthermore, it is significant that Seme had contrarily encouraged the CNC to hold the meeting, possibly because he wished to embarrass Dube and usurp the latter's position of influence over Inkatha. In the event, Inkatha's chairman, Bhulose, and vice-chairman, Majozi, appeared before the CNC; Seme, at his own insistence, was also in attendance, as was a member of the legal firm J.H.Nicholson and Son (which had drawn up Inkatha's 1928 constitution), attending as Inkatha's solicitor at the insistence of Fynney.

At the meeting it was openly disclosed for the first time that Solomon was misappropriating Inkatha funds. Bhulose informed the CNC that his own position in Inkatha was "most difficult", and that on one occasion alone a sum of £2000 had been taken from Inkatha to settle Solomon's debts. The CNC noted that, after the formal meeting was over, he was confidentially advised that "upwards of £10,000 had been disposed of for Solomon's benefit." When Bhulose agreed to supply the CNC with a written statement that Inkatha had not appointed any itinerant collectors, Inkatha's solicitor intervened to advise Bhulose to be "cautious in this connection". It was then revealed that Bhengu, Inkatha's secretary who had emerged as Solomon's right hand man, had had new Inkatha receipt books printed without Bhulose's knowledge, and that these were being used by fraudulent collectors. The CNC
observed that Bhulose "appeared to know very little of what was going on" in Inkatha. Majozi played little part in the meeting's proceedings, while Seme sat "mostly shaking his head in disapproval of the disclosures".  

Since Bhulose undertook to terminate Inkatha collections and to cause the Inkatha executive committee to draw up a financial statement for submission to the NAD, the CNC decided that immediate intervention was unnecessary. Bhulose, however, was successful in neither of these undertakings. In the first place, he was powerless to halt collections that were being made on the authority of Solomon and his corrupt accomplices rather than that of the Inkatha executive committee. In the second place, it seemed that Dube and his clique, perceiving the demand for an unavoidably damning financial statement as a part of Seme's drive to discredit his political opponents in the province, united against Bhulose to ensure that no such statement was procured. The Inkatha executive committee meeting which, according to Bhulose's promise to the CNC, was to investigate Inkatha's financial affairs took place at Mahashini in July 1931. The meeting was delayed for a couple of days while committee members prayed for Solomon's safety: they had arrived to discover that 'the king' had been rushed off for urgent medical treatment, and shortly thereafter had learnt that the royal car had overturned while returning along a precipitous section of the Nongoma road. Although Bhulose chaired the eventual meeting, it was Dube, Majozi and Edgar Mini (kholwa chief of the Edendale community, and stalwart NNC supporter) who dominated the proceedings. No discussion of Inkatha's financial affairs took place - at least according to the meeting's authorised report in Ilanga lase Natal - and no financial statement was ever produced.  

The NAD for its part took no action when Bhulose failed to submit the promised financial statement. By this stage the NAD had come to realise that the Inkatha executive committee was not responsible for 'Inkatha's' financial and administrative disorders. The fault lay in Mahashini itself and in Solomon's unprincipled 'hanger-on', and therefore the NAD brought its alarm and concern to bear directly on the Zulu royal house. 'Inkatha'
continued to exist, even if only in name and in the minds of those who surrendered money to 'Inkatha collectors'. Dube, the most tenacious of Solomon's petty bourgeois advisers, tendered his formal resignation from the organisation personally to Solomon in October 1932\textsuperscript{136}—by which time the name 'Inkatha' had become synonymous with such gross corruption that Dube could no longer endure association with it. Inkatha was formally dissolved only after Solomon's death, on the instructions of the regent Mshiyeni who was embarrassed and indignant about the image of the Zulu royal house that he had inherited.\textsuperscript{137} But Inkatha had long previously ceased to function as a viable political organisation: its demise dated in the first instance from the Zulu indaba debacle of July 1930.

It was in the context of the sudden political disunity, political insecurity and sense of directionlessness among the Natal petty bourgeoisie, consequent on Solomon and Inkatha's abrupt political decline, that Inkatha's 'cultural initiative' was set in motion in late 1930. It is to be emphasised that the political divisions that developed within the Natal petty bourgeoisie in 1930 were largely superficial, being the result of inter-personal power struggles to fill the political vacuum that Inkatha's decline had left. Ironically, there was a strong consensus of political opinion among the Natal petty bourgeoisie: the ideal of Zulu unity was wholeheartedly embraced, and all endorsed the ideology and practical purpose of the 'nation-building' policies that Dube and Seme had separately come to advocate in the late 1920s. The latter policies themselves had always been interpreted in a Zulu nationalist context in the province of Natal. The broader purposes of Inkatha's cultural initiative, whose central material objective was to organise the construction of a national memorial to Shaka, may be summarised as threefold: first, to nurture, sustain and further develop a sense of nationhood among all Zulu people; second, to forge among the Zulu an awareness of a cultural heritage which was suitable to petty bourgeois sensibilities and conducive to ethnic pride in terms of both traditional and 'western' values; third, to define Zulu nationalism as a social force which was rousing yet 'respectable', and somewhat inward-looking and self-congratulatory, as opposed to one which was an
emotional spur to popular militancy. For the Natal petty bourgeoisie, therefore, the function of the cultural initiative was not simply to assuage practical political disappointments by celebrating 'Zuluness' and constructing security in the cosy interiors of an inclusive Zulu nationalism. There was also a covert political purpose: to assert socio-political control over the 'Zulu nation' by defining the ideological 'content' of an ethnic nationalism to which all Zulu were susceptible.

The 'Shaka Memorial' project was not the only project to be endorsed by the cultural engineers that acted under Inkatha's name from 1930, but it was the only one to be energetically and effectively promoted. A separate project, for example, aimed to collect money to buy the lands in the Babanango sub-district known as 'Emakhosini' - 'the place of the kings', the main burial grounds for heads of the house of Zulu since the turn of the seventeenth century. Apparently this sacred preserve of the Zulu was to be owned communally by the nation as a whole, and held in trust by Zulu royalty. The decision to put the Shaka Memorial project into practice was first made at the Inkatha annual general meeting of 1930 (the 'original' Inkatha's last annual general meeting). Subsequently, at a special Inkatha executive committee meeting at Mahashini on 16 December 1930 (the day of the Durban CP's pass-burning demonstration at Cartwright Flats), arrangements were made for the official launch of the publicity and fundraising campaign. Before describing the main features of this project, however, it is important to note that the idea of a Shaka Memorial was not new in 1930: it was discussed and supported by delegates at the first 'real' Inkatha annual general meeting in 1924. That the project had remained dormant for six years before being revived in 1930 reflects the importance that the Natal petty bourgeoisie attached to their ostensibly 'apolitical' drive for cultural reconstruction, at a time when Natal petty bourgeois political unity - and, therefore, political power - had been fractured, and militant popular movements were threatening to appropriate and thus 'radicalise' Zulu nationalism.

At the Inkatha executive committee meeting in December 1930, it
was resolved that a 'Shaka Memorial Fund Organising Committee' be established. Chief Majozi became organising secretary and treasurer, and the committee included Bhulose, Dube and W. W. Ndhlovu - reflecting that the project was not simply a party political manoeuvre on the part of Dube's NNC. Special provision was also made for "Native ministers and the Teachers" in the province to appoint further members to the committee. Before any action was taken, however, the committee sought NAD approval for its project. Realising that the NAD would ban any project organised by Inkatha which involved the making of further public collections, Majozi emphasised to the CNC that "the movement is apart and strictly distinct from any existing organization of whatsoever kind or any political organization". Subsequently, emphasising that the Shaka Memorial Fund was independent of any other fund, Majozi assured the CNC that the names of all subscribers together with the sums they had subscribed would be published in Ilanga lase Natal; and that all monies were to be deposited in the Richmond branch of Barclays Bank. The committee thus focussed great attention on the delicate issue of financial management.

The original project was simply to erect a stone monument dedicated to Shaka, as founder of the Zulu nation, on his grave at Dukuza (Stanger). As money flooded into the fund, however, instructions were given to leading monumental stonemasons to carve monuments, to not only Shaka but also to Mpande, Cetshwayo and Dinuzulu. Dingane was not included, probably because petty bourgeois morality could not be identified with a royal usurper who had murdered his incumbent brother, and had suppressed missionary endeavour among the Zulu. Furthermore, a metal bust of Shaka was ordered from Italy. The project was also expanded to include the erection of a public building on the site of the monuments, which would serve as a "Rest House" for travelling Zulu dignitaries. The latter decision illustrated an important aspect of the whole project's purpose: to promote interchange and unity between 'royal and tribal' Zululand and 'petty bourgeois and detribalised' Natal proper. It was probably partly for this reason that the committee had selected the Dukuza site for the monuments, rather than the geographically remote (i.e. from Natal.
proper) Emakhosini - which was unquestionably the Zulu nation's spiritual heartland in terms of traditional ideology. The Dukuza site was thus not intended to be a venue for inert and enigmatic monuments to the past. Indeed, it was clearly designed to become a modern Zulu cultural centre, manifesting the unity of Zulu past and present; and beckoning quietly to a future Zulu civilisation wherein the (perceived) logic of Zulu national development since the rise of Shaka would be vindicated. Long before the monuments were even carved, the Shaka Memorial organi- committee was carefully defining the activities which would be part of the unveiling ceremony. The programme would begin in Durban with a sports gala, followed by a concert in Durban city hall. Thereafter Durban Zulu would board special trains to Dukuza where, along with local Zulu, they would build huts in which to shelter during the ceremony itself. Appropriate addresses would be made by various dignitaries, including the Governor-General, a representative of the Union Government, Solomon, two other Zulu chiefs (one from Natal proper and the other from Zulu- land), and a "representative educated Native". A traditional "war dance" would then ensue.

Public subscriptions to the Shaka Memorial Fund were first called for in May 1931, when large appeals signed by Solomon were published in Ilanga lase Natal. Having emphasised that the project was fully supported by the government, Solomon continued: "Here is nobleness, Zulus! There is no nation whose 'great ones do not have memorials. Let us also make something by which our people will be famed." All Zulu people, wherever they lived, were in this way invited to create a heritage which "the future generations of Zulus will always remember." The Zulu editorial in which Solomon's appeal first appeared described Shaka's greatest achievement: uniting the Zulu speaking peoples as one Zulu nation. Specifically naming the clans which Shaka had united, the editorial significantly referred not only to large pre-Shakan power blocs north of the Tugela (the Mthethwa, Qwabe, Nd wandwe), but also to the Cunu and Nyuswa clans south of the Tugela - which Shaka had in reality plundered in military exercises. As a further indication that Zulu history was being
consciously reconstructed, it is significant that the editorial omitted to mention the large (but comparatively unaggressive) Buthelezi pre-Shakan polity; perhaps, particularly since a central achievement of Solomon's 'unity movement' had been the reconciliation of the houses of Zulu and Buthelezi after their post-conquest differences, it was incorrect to record that the Zulu and Buthelezi had once been completely separate. The editorial then described the repercussions which the rise of the Zulu nation had had for other African peoples in the Union and beyond - in East Africa and Rhodesia. And it was the creation of the Zulu nation, so the editorial went on to suggest, that had prepared the Zulu for the Bible and for progress. For these reasons it was imperative that a monument be erected "above where Shaka sleeps to show to everybody that here lies a man who did great feats in this country."150

From the outset, the project had been a petty bourgeois initiative. Although chiefs throughout the province were circularised with lists to record the subscriptions collected from their wards,151 most of the fund-raising work was carried out by ministers of religion. When Majozi called a meeting of ministers in June 1931 to discuss the Shaka Memorial Fund's financial arrangements (whereafter "ministers rejoiced at his well organised bookkeeping") he also invited them to advise him on the nature of the ceremonies to be held at the Dukuza site.152 Soon after the project was first announced, the CNC had circularised NCs in Zululand to ascertain whether "any general desire" existed in their districts for the proposed memorial. NCs generally had responded that such a desire did not exist, except among 'educated natives'.153 But once set underway, the project proved to appeal to all strata of Zulu society. In Durban, indeed, the institutions which responded most enthusiastically with subscriptions were the Bell Street Compound (which housed togt workers) and the ICU yase Natal. Subscriptions also poured in from rural areas whose inhabitants had not long previously been threatening to combine with the militant movement in Durban, and appropriate Zulu nationalism to popular protest.154

Just as part of the attraction of the Shaka Memorial Project for
the Natal petty bourgeoisie was that it offered a celebratory cultural refuge from the political tribulations of 1930, it seems that this too was the case for those who had been left directionless following the decapitation of the ICU vace Natal — and the harsh repression of the subsequent attempts on the part of popular elements to reorganise. For togt workers, the Zulu nationalism of the Shaka Memorial Fund may have appeared as a welcome opiate, simultaneously numbing despair and inducing pride. And the subscriptions that they paid to Majozi signified that it was the moderate petty bourgeois interpretation of Zulu nationalism, as opposed to the militant popular interpretation, which had triumphed as the dominant ideology. Subscriptions also poured in from the Johannesburg gold mining labour compounds, and the peri-urban African townships in the Transvaal.155

The project also attracted considerable support from white quarters. Perhaps most striking was the attitude of Zululand and Northern Natal NCs as a whole — even though only two went so far as to explicitly commend the idea. While concern was expressed that (as the NC at Nqutu put it) the subscriptions would be squandered "paying Solomon's numerous debts and extravagance brought about by the purchase of expensive Motor Cars, petrol and throat lubricants", not one official expressed concern on the grounds that the project would reinforce Zulu national unity around the figurehead of Solomon.156 By the early 1930s, the Zululand administration had finally come to realise that the Zulu nationalism that Solomon inspired was not a subversive force. Indeed, so long as the Zulu royal house exercised its authority through officially recognised tribal authorities (as it did in the context of the Shaka Memorial project) rather than independent royal emissaries, its political influence could positively buttress the administration. Concrete support came from various other sectors of the white establishment. The Native Welfare Officer attached to the Durban municipal Native Affairs Department, which had recently been plagued by the Zulu nationalism of Cartwright Flats, contributed to the fund.157 So too did the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association.158 In Zululand, Oscroft took an active interest in the project, while George Armstrong, a prominent sugar planter and apparently the largest landowner
in central Zululand, became a financial benefactor and behind-the-scenes administrative adviser. And in mid-1932, when it seemed that the fund was almost fully subscribed, Nicholls petitioned the NAD encouraging them to assist the preparations for the unveiling ceremony. He also contacted the Governor-General (the Earl of Clarendon) describing the importance of the latter's prospective role on the day of the unveiling. Clarendon, furthermore, responded favourably to Nicholls' suggestions. By the early 1930s, there was thus a growing consensus of white opinion that the Zulu royal family's appeal to a conservative Zulu nationalism was ideologically, politically and administratively advantageous - and was therefore to be supported. The Shaka Memorial project, which at face value appeared to be politically 'innocent', played a crucial role in broadening this base of white support.

The CNC, SNA, Minister of Native Affairs, and the Governor-General resolved in early 1932 to lend formal support to the unveiling ceremony, as was requested by the organising committee, but on condition that Majozi furnished proof beforehand that the costs of the monuments had been settled in full. Majozi, however, never submitted the Shaka Memorial Fund's financial records to the NAD for official approval (as the CNC requested in May 1932) he suddenly died in early July, having just completed a month-long fund-raising campaign in the Transvaal. And the CNC in the meantime ascertained that the monumental stonemasons were still owed £3309 on the memorials. It seemed that the organising committee had been overambitious, ordering numerous memorials without ensuring that enough money could be collected to pay for them before the scheduled date of the unveiling ceremony - which therefore had to be postponed.

Within a few weeks of Majozi's death, a meeting of the Inkatha executive committee (which was in practice the Shaka Memorial Fund organising committee) was held at Mahashini to make new arrangements for the administration of the fund. For reasons which cannot readily be understood, the custody of the remaining money in the fund, together with that which was still coming in from local collectors, was handed over to Solomon. Solomon announced
in *Ilanga lase Natal* that he had arranged for the money to be banked - at the same National Bank in which Inkatha's much-plundered assets had been invested since 1924. This was the last that was heard of the money belonging to the Shaka Memorial Fund: it seemed to vanish into thin air. It remained unclear who precisely was responsible for misappropriating the funds. That no witch-hunt for the thieves was ever conducted, however, suggests that the Zulu royal house was directly implicated. As the financial scandal unfolded, Dube simply resigned from the Shaka Memorial Fund organising committee; his resignation was privately tendered directly to Solomon. In late 1932, *Ilanga lase Natal* - which had played a leading role in the project's publicity and fundraising campaign - was subjected to a flood of queries from the Zulu public as to why the unveiling ceremony had not taken place. Apparently acting in self-defence, the newspaper responded by arguing somewhat weakly that only Bhulose was in a position to explain. Bhulose in turn responded just as weakly, saying that he had been unable to trace the money which had been accumulated while Majozi was in charge.

After November 1932, *Ilanga lase Natal* evidently repressed any further public discussion of the fate of the fund and the memorial, which, in the newspaper's own ashamed final words, had led "poor people who are suffering from starvation [to part] with their little tickeys in order that their project may prosper." Indeed, the Zulu had been called upon to make subscriptions in the midst of a devastating rural famine; and it was very probable that the shrouded monument at Dukuza was, in effect, not only Shaka's gravestone. The memorial to Shaka subsequently "remained covered with sheeting for a long time", Nicholls recorded in his unpublished memoirs, "until the wind and the rain and the sun rotted it [the sheeting] and disclosed a Grecian urn". The monumental stonemasons, who were still in possession of the three monuments to Mpande, Cetshwayo and Dinuzulu, continued to press the government and the Zulu royal house to settle the outstanding debts until the eve of the second world war. The government disclaimed all responsibility, however, while the Zulu regent, Mshiyeni, indignantly (in the CNC's words) "kept aloof from the whole business." The government even rejected a request
from the South African Historical Monuments Commission in 1937 for permission to proclaim the Shaka Memorial as a protected Union monument: the issue was a matter of "delicacy", it was said, from the points of view of both the NAD and Mshiyeni. The Shaka Memorial project cannot, however, be simply dismissed as a failure. The publicity and fund-raising campaign had itself succeeded in defining, both among the Zulu as a whole and for whites, Inkatha's late-1920s interpretation of Zulu nationalism as the dominant ideology of Zulu nationalist politics - thus fighting off the 'militant challenge' of 1929-1930. This was to prove to be an enduring success.

The history of the Shaka Memorial project is also the history of the post-1930 'Inkatha' - which, neither having a constitutionally elected executive committee nor calling any annual general meetings, was substantially different from the representative political organisation of the same name which had existed before 1930. In the post-1930 period, however, the names of 'Solomon' and 'Inkatha' were also associated with a practical project which was quite separate from the Shaka Memorial project: the establishment of the independently-administered African 'Clermont Township', on the outskirts of Durban, in which Africans could purchase residential and business lots on the basis of freehold tenure. Although Inkatha's executive committee neither initiated nor played a leading administrative role in the Clermont Township project, the scheme represented a practical application of the self-help 'nation-building' ideology promoted by Dube and Seme in the late 1920s, as was embodied in the reconstituted Inkatha and expressed in a cultural context in the Shaka Memorial project. Significantly, the 'Clermont Township Company' advertisements which appeared in Ilanga lase Natal from late 1931 spoke the language of an inclusive Zulu nationalism while urging Zulu to purchase lots at Clermont - whereas it could be expected that Zulu purchases would be almost exclusively petty bourgeois. The dominance of the petty bourgeois interpretation of Zulu nationalism was strikingly reflected in the support that the ICU yase Natal (now led by James Ngcobo) gave this essentially petty bourgeois project. And Champion too was actively involved as a prime mover and subsequently an administrator; in Johannesburg in late
1931 he took up work as the Clermont Township Company's Transvaal sales representative. 172

The 1500-acre property on which the freehold African township of Clermont was to be established once belonged to the Lutheran Berlin Missionary Society. It was put on the property market in the late 1920s; and because it fell under the jurisdiction of the Natal (colonial) law for mission glebe lands, it could be purchased freehold by Africans. The African petty bourgeoisie and permanently urbanised Africans in Natal had long sought the opportunity, particularly since the turn of the century, to purchase real estate in the urban areas - to free themselves of the expense and insecurities of a rented tenancy, and to attain an independent stake in the urban areas on which to pursue a stable 'civilised' lifestyle. This desire, which attracted increasing support among white liberals/Christians as the 'native policy' debates and 'race relations industry' grew in the late 1920s, 173 was not favoured by the Durban municipality. 174 But the original impetus for the transformation of the mission property into the Clermont freehold African township, rather than being 'developed' as a white residential or light industrial area, came perhaps ironically not from a leader of the petty bourgeois establishment nor a white liberal but from Champion.

In 1929, shortly after the Durban beer hall disturbances, Champion urged his lawyer, J.W. Van Aardt, to arrange the formation of a private company to buy the mission property for subdivision and resale to Africans. Champion presented the project to Van Aardt (a National Party supporter who was a close friend of Hertzog, and was well connected in governing circles) as a "practical attempt to settle the Native Unrest": "to have advanced Natives buy freehold plots of land...will give such Natives security of tenure and will create that happy feeling of independence in the minds of Natives and generally make them forget many of the irritative [sic] bye-laws...that are a source of petty ill-feeling which at times grow to the degrees which cause what is not called Unrest." 175 It was a measure of Champion's political opportunism that he had only recently been attempting to give political direction to popular militancy through the ICU
yase Natal's promotion of the beer-hall boycott; but by late 1929, it seemed that Champion had begun to feel uncomfortable in his role as militant popular leader.

By 1931, the 'Clermont Township (Pty) Ltd' had been formed, as Swanson relates, involving Van Aardt and his legal colleagues Rossouw and Brink; E.G.Jansen, Minister of Native Affairs; Col. W.R.Collins, Minister of Agriculture, MP for Ermelo and Orange Free State land speculator; and possibly personnel of the Colonial Banking and Trust Company for whom the exiled Champion worked as a junior clerk. The primary purpose of this company was the pursuit of profit through land speculation. The white interests which the company embodied, however, were not only of a commercial character. As Champion had emphasised to Van Aardt, the project was also politically attractive as an experiment in the amelioration of urban unrest. More crucially, perhaps, it was to be a practical application of state segregationist thinking which seemed likely to attract considerable support from influential African quarters. The Clermont Township project indeed strikingly manifested a confluence of white and African opinion in the context of segregationist policy. Moreover, as was illustrated by the explicitly Zulu nationalist language in which the project was promoted, it also manifested a confluence of white and African opinion regarding a class-inclusive but ethnically exclusive 'self-help' interpretation of Zulu nationalism.

Government authority to sell Clermont to Africans was confirmed in 1931, and a large publicity campaign was set underway in Ilanga lase Natal in October of that year. The recurring advertisements of the Durban-based Clermont Township Company cited a list of influential African "gentlemen who support this project": J.L.Dube of Ohlange, the "Agent Enkulu" (Agent Extraordinary); Chief Majozi of Indaleni; W.W.Ndhlovu of Vryheid; M.M.Gumede of Amanzimtoti; J.Ngcobo of the ICU yase Natal; and W.Bhulose of Inkatha. It is significant that Dube was not cited as 'of the NNC' and Bhulose was not cited as 'of the Natal branch of the ANC': like the Shaka Memorial project, the Clermont Township project
underplayed party political divisions among the Natal petty bourgeoisie, and appealed to an inclusive Zulu nationalism. The advertisements also carried a letter from Solomon, encouraging Zulu to come forward and buy their lots at Clermont; the Clermont Township Company further arranged for Solomon to attend two promotional meetings, one on Dingane's Day 1931 in Pinetown near Clermont, and the other on New Year's Day 1932 in Johannesburg. The newspaper advertisements proclaimed that "THE HEAD OF THE ZULU NATION WILL BE IN PINETOWN TO PRAISE THE BLACK TOWNSHIP, HAVING CHOSEN FOR HIMSELF HIS OWN STAND/LOT/".

It is hoped that everyone who likes the forward progress of our nation will...see the Great King Solomon, and buy for themselves a stand in the Great Bantu Town which is established. It is pleasing to see that the King is supporting with all efforts the upliftment of the 'Black Stem'...FIND THE DOG AND CATCH THIS YOUNG ONE /this young town/! THE DOG IS MONEY. THERE WILL BE BUILT A TOWN OF REST, AND YOU WILL GET YOUR STAND IN IT.

It was also emphasised that no "whites, Indians or Coloureds" would be permitted to buy lots in Clermont:

This town will be the Bantu's town, as Durban and other towns are the white's towns. Bantu people will ...come out of the little tin houses of the Indians for which they have to pay rent. A good thing is that they will elect their own Mayor and Town Council.

Encapsulating the segregationist principles which the Clermont Township project embodied, and which the white government as well as Zulu political leaders endorsed, the advertisements exalted that "Everything to do with this town will be for indigenous people. It is necessary that Bantu people should identify what they are aiming for, and the /white/ people in authority have resolved that there should be a town for Bantu only."178

The only opposition to the project came from the embattled Durban branch of the CP. On Dingane's Day 1931, communists distributed circulars announcing that "Chief Solomon and the ICU have betrayed the Natives in advising them to buy land", since the land should be simply given back to its rightful African owners.179 Sales of
lots in Clermont were initially slow, partly no doubt as a consequence of the Great Depression. But particularly after a facsimile of the first Clermont title deed to be issued to an African purchaser was published in Ilanga lase Natal in late 1932, sales soon gained momentum. During the mid-1930s, Clermont rapidly developed into the self-administering freehold African township that it was intended to be.

While the Clermont Township project was important in itself because it was an unequivocal practical success, it had an overriding ideological and political significance. Zulu political leaders (including all of the most prominent leaders, as well as the head of the Zulu royal house) had openly allied themselves with influential white segregationists (including ministers of state) to implement a segregationist scheme for the settlement of urban Zulu. Beyond the jurisdiction of 'white Durban', Clermont had been set aside exclusively as an outlet for the aspirations of 'progressive' Zulu who sought stability and permanency in an urban setting, and who, in accordance with Inkatha's ideology of Zulu nationalism, regarded segregation and self-government as necessary springboards for the reconstruction of a proud 'Zulu civilisation'. The existence of Clermont provided the first concrete evidence that the ideology of Zulu nationalism which the reconstituted Inkatha had formalised in 1928 was directly reconcilable with state segregationism. It also provided concrete evidence that 'Inkatha's Zulu nationalism' had unquestionably become the dominant Zulu nationalist ideology since 1930 - a development in which the Shaka Memorial project had played a major role. It was perhaps ironic that the township of Clermont, which embodied so many of Inkatha's objectives, was established only after Inkatha's political demise. But at the same time, it signified that the ideological constructs and the political concepts which Inkatha had nurtured during the 1920s had independently taken root in Zulu political consciousness. And indeed, the ideas and political alignments pioneered by the 'original' Inkatha of the 1920s can be traced through the subsequent twentieth century history of not only Zulu politics, but also South African segregationist policy - as will be indicated below.
Solomon's death

Solomon's last few years until his death in March 1933 were marked by the disastrous consequences of his alcoholism, physical and emotional instability, and large cash needs. On a few notable occasions during this period, however, Solomon was capable of recovering sufficiently to present a public image befitting his role as 'Zulu king', and to represent the Zulu national interest (at least as he defined it) to state authorities with both dignity and clarity. The evidence he gave before the Native Economic Commission in April 1931, for example, reflected a sensitive awareness of the difficulties confronting rural Zulu as a consequence of rapid socio-economic change.\(^{182}\) Directly after giving evidence, incidentally, he addressed a meeting of Zulu at a Pietermaritzburg beer-hall and spoke against the influence of the ICU yase Natal and communists.\(^{183}\) And in September 1931, Solomon took up his traditional role at the head of a large assembly of Zulu chiefs and people which had gathered at Nongoma for an indaba with the SNA. This indaba focussed on Zulu local tax arrears - which totalled £80,000 - and the growing rural famine. Solomon also took the opportunity to speak at length with a Natal Witness journalist, emphasising the value of officially recognising a "council composed of the Zulu chiefs ...as the mouthpiece of the Zulu nation." And Solomon asserted that "I personally have never had anything to do with the ICU". The journalist came away considerably impressed with every aspect of Solomon's character and political views.\(^{184}\) But apart from these occasions, and those on which he publicly gave support to the Shaka Memorial and Clermont Township projects, Solomon mainly lived out a withdrawn and private life after 1930, at Mahashini. There he sought comfort in alcohol, fancy clothing and motor cars, and the company of corrupt royal sycophants, while exploiting Zulu devotion to royalty in a vain attempt to cover the extravagance of the royal clique.

Solomon's more controlled extravagance during the 1920s had a clearly defined political purpose. Through his luxury cars, stylish clothing, well-presented wives, magnificent royal residence at KwaDlamahlaha, large supply of liquor, and his generous
provision of food and accommodation for the thousands who attended the Inkatha meetings, Solomon had fashioned an image for the Zulu royal house which was appropriate to its claimed socio-political status. But after 1930, royal extravagance could only be associated with nepotism and corruption, and an often sordid personal breakdown of a 'Zulu king' who seemed to sink ever deeper into a despairing nihilism. In July 1931, Solomon appeared in Melmoth courthouse to answer to a criminal charge of having "wrongfully and unlawfully publicly and indecently, expose[d] his penis and whilst dancing around relieved himself" on the forecourt of a local garage. This had allegedly been the way in which an ill-tempered and drunk Solomon had expressed his irritation that his Buick's puncture could not be repaired immediately. A charge of criminal injuria brought by the garage proprietor was also pending against Solomon.\(^{185}\) Earlier in the year, Solomon had had a confrontation with Melmoth police when he allegedly refused to stop drinking from a Johnny Walker bottle in public, and attempted to grab a rifle from a policeman before disappearing in the royal car. For diplomatic reasons, the police had decided against pressing charges.\(^{186}\) Such reports, together with news of his sudden bouts of dangerously poor health,\(^{187}\) were a feature of Solomon's last few years.

Once Inkatha's funds were exhausted, Solomon's main source of income after 1930 lay in a network of royal collectors, some of whom seemed to collect as much for themselves as they did for Solomon. The most prominent among these collectors were Simpson Bhengu (Solomon's private secretary, and his principal accomplice in ransacking Inkatha funds); Daniel Vilakazi (a royal induna in the Vryheid district, previously secretary to the late Dinuzulu and a minor official in Inkatha); Lymon Maling (previously an ALU leader and chiefs' representative in Inkatha); and two whites, A.S.B. Blackhurst (previously the messenger of the Nongoma court); and Mr Pretorius (a cattle broker from Babanango). As a consequence of the Great Depression and the famine, which placed an additional burden on the cash resources of ordinary Zulu homesteads, royal collectors found difficulty in accumulating considerable cash tribute in Zululand and Northern Natal. For this reason, the main 'currency' which the collectors handled
was not cash but cattle. Although precise figures could not be obtained, various officials' reports indicated that the Zulu offered up cattle numbering in the tens of thousands to the Zulu royal house between 1931 and early 1933. 188

Two separate cattle-collecting schemes were in operation under Solomon's name from 1931. One was organised by Pretorius, a man of dubious character whose career as a small-time entrepreneur in Northern Natal had included periods of employment as Solomon's chaffeur, and Daniel Vilakazi. The latter collected cattle in Northern Natal on Solomon's behalf; the former then sold the cattle and handed over a proportion of the proceeds to Solomon. 189

The more important scheme, which took effect mainly in the Zululand reserves, was organised by Blackhurst. As messenger of the Nongoma court, Blackhurst had first become involved in the financial affairs of the Zulu royal house in the course of serving summonses on Solomon for debt. Blackhurst had advised Solomon to aggregate all royal debts 'under one head'; and had arranged for H.J. Brook, a Durban livestock dealer, to advance £2000 to pay Solomon's numerous creditors on the basis of an agreement whereby Solomon would repay Brook's loan in regular instalments. But when Solomon did not honour this agreement, Blackhurst (who was receiving a retainer from Solomon for financial services) began to repay Brook on Solomon's behalf. Then, as writs for debts not settled by Brook's loan continued to flow into Mahashini, and Solomon went on to incur new debts after the 'Brook agreement', Blackhurst agreed to loan Solomon further capital for the settlement of royal debts. Under the terms of a new 'Blackhurst agreement', Solomon would authorise Blackhurst to conduct 'royal cattle collections' throughout Zululand; Blackhurst would then sell the cattle through Brook and other Durban livestock dealers; and the proceeds would go towards the settlement of Solomon's debt to Blackhurst.

It seemed that Blackhurst had initially set out to earn some commission, and to establish himself in a new career as financial agent and cattle dealer among the Zulu, in the course of assisting the Zulu royal house in its financial difficulties. But as Blackhurst personally had become increasingly entangled in
Mahashini's web of financial chaos, his attempts to recoup his losses - and to extract some profit for his efforts - became increasingly desperate, corrupt, and extortionate. And it was the already famine-stricken Zulu 'commoners' who bore the burden of Blackhurst's and the royal clique's combined exploitative practices. In the wake of the 1931 drought, when Zulu crops had failed and cattle had begun to succumb to starvation, more and more Zulu had made use of the newly-introduced NAD-organised livestock auctions to sell their cattle for money to buy food and pay taxes. But Blackhurst, Bhengu, and the royal izinduna Mnyaiza and Gilbert, all of whom acted under Solomon's authority, instructed the Zulu instead to hand over their cattle to Blackhurst, who would sell direct to Durban dealers and so raise higher prices than were obtainable locally. Blackhurst and the royal clique also - so NAD sources in Zululand alleged - prevented the establishment of an independent Zulu cooperative which aimed to sell Zulu cattle directly to urban abattoirs. It transpired, however, that Zulu received considerably less for cattle sold through Blackhurst than through the local NAD auctions - most of the proceeds appeared to go towards the repayment of Solomon's debts, and into the pockets of Blackhurst and his assistant 'middle men'. There were other indications that the royal cattle collections were being made under false pretences: some Zulu understood that their cattle were to be sold for the benefit of the Shaka Memorial Fund, while others believed that Solomon was establishing a 'national fund' to buy Vryheid farms for the resettlement of dislocated Zulu. But the majority of the Zulu who responded to the royal cattle collections certainly knew that they were contributing towards the repayment of Solomon's debts. And they were generous indeed.

The cattle collections proved to be an extremely inefficient method of reducing royal debts. In November 1931, the NC at Nongoma uncovered what seemed to be incontrovertible evidence of administrative and financial malpractice on Blackhurst's part. The NC had ascertained that Blackhurst, plus two Vryheid whites named Buys and De Witt whom Blackhurst employed on Solomon's behalf, drew salaries from the proceeds of the sale of Zulu cattle.
Blackhurst also charged 'expenses' for "collecting"; "herding, grazing, and dipping"; and "castrating" the cattle while their sale was negotiated with Durban-based purchasers. Instancing a case of four hundred and seventy-one cattle collected from Chief Nkantini's ward in October 1931, the NC reported that Blackhurst had already prepared a charge of over £130 for the latter 'expenses' - and the cattle had not yet been sold. They were still on Blackhurst's farm near Babanango, apparently still incurring 'expenses'. The NC went on to recount how Blackhurst's 'expenses' for a particular previous consignment of cattle had exceeded the consignment's market value: in this case, the sale of forty-five head of cattle to the 'Union Cold Storage Co.' of Durban increased Solomon's debt to Blackhurst by about £11. While there was little reason to disbelieve such reports regarding particular consignments of cattle, Blackhurst's dealings as a whole were clearly to Solomon's financial advantage. Official attempts during 1931 to curtail Blackhurst's activities among the Zulu certainly did not endear the NAD to Solomon.

The extent of the Zulu response to Solomon's appeal for financial assistance can be gauged from the "List of cattle offered to Chief Solomon" (and yet to be collected) which royal staff at Mahashini drew up in November 1932 - when the royal cattle collections had already been underway for about eighteen months. Recording the number of cattle offered by each of fifty-four Zulu chiefs who were domiciled in eighteen different magisterial districts, most of which fell in Zululand but including several in Northern Natal and some in Natal proper and the eastern Transvaal, the list indicated that a total of two thousand one hundred and ninety-six cattle had still to be collected. Perhaps more revealingly, the NC at Nkandla reported in January 1933 that, according to his records (which were very probably incomplete), his district had recently handed over a total of £104 and one thousand and forty-one head of cattle to royal collectors; while a further sixty-three head of cattle had still to be collected from local contributors. But despite Zulu generosity throughout 1931 and 1932, the total debt of the Zulu royal house increased during this period. While writs for pre-1931 debts originally unknown to Blackhurst continued to arrive at Mahashini, new debts were being
incurred faster than the old debts were being settled. In May 1931, when royal cash and cattle collections had already discharged some royal debts, Blackhurst informed the NAD that the total debt of the Zulu royal house was £1564. But the NAD ascertained in June 1931 that Eshowe general dealer Charles Adams, who had been attempting to repair the royal house's financial problems since they had become grave in 1928, was separately owed £1300. Then in November 1931, Blackhurst drew up a statement, which was approved by Bhengu as well as Solomon and Dube, indicating that the total royal debt was £3783. And in July 1932, a statement drawn up by the NAD which neither took into account Solomon's remaining debt to Blackhurst (Solomon was unable to specify the amount Blackhurst was still owed) nor any new debts incurred after 31 January 1932 (which alone amounted to thousands) set the total royal debt at £4174.

Although Solomon personally did not incur every 'royal debt' (some were incurred under Solomon's name by royal advisers), he was certainly responsible for incurring the majority. Indeed, the largest and most numerous debts related to Solomon's motor car expenses, whether purchase, repair, or running costs. Another major source of debt was doctors' fees and pharmacists' claims, largely a consequence of Solomon's alcohol-induced illnesses. Liquor costs, incidentally, which might have been the royal house's largest routine expense, were never reflected in royal debts because after 1930 royal liquor had to be bought illegally and therefore for cash. Lawyers' fees and court costs were also included in the three largest single sources of royal debt. Some of these legal expenses related to actions arising from Solomon's behaviour (eg. the 'public indecency' and 'criminal injuria' cases of 1931), and others, ironically, arose from Solomon's attempts to forestall his creditors' taking him to court. Other debts were owed to numerous retailers throughout the province of Natal and on the Rand, including Durban's leading high-street fashion houses 'Woolfsons' and 'Greenacres', and Johannesburg's exclusive 'Brimson and Rough, Specialité Outfitters'. Such were the royal expenses that the famine-stricken Zulu were still attempting to subsidise, and which various white individuals
(ranging from Blackhurst and his associates to Charles Adams),
Natal politicians (including Dube and Nicholls) and NAD officials
were attempting to curtail.

The major part of the fraud and corruption within the royal
clique thus did not take the form of royal 'hangers on' running-up
debts under Solomon's name. Royal 'hangers on' instead
misappropriated a large proportion of the income from the royal
cash and cattle collections. And Solomon, who could not fail
to identify such flagrant dishonesty, on these grounds frequently
denounced his fraudulent collectors - even though he was in
practice dependent on their voluntary services. On different
occasions during 1931 when attempting to explain his financial
affairs to white authorities, Solomon made specific accusations
of fraud against Leonard Ncapayi (Bhungu's predecessor as
Solomon's private secretary), Simpson Bhengu, and Lymon Maling
(whom Solomon had appointed as a royal collector in Northern
Natal, alongside the local Inkatha officials Daniel Vilakazi
and Timothy Mathe).

Valid though such accusations might have been, they were singularly hollow coming from a man who himself
represented the quintessence of Zulu financial irresponsibility.
In purely personal terms, Solomon's predicament in the last few
years of his life was a very unenviable one: he was surrounded
by courtiers whom he could neither trust nor afford to dismiss.
Added to this, there were indications that Solomon was growing to
be unpopular among Zulu chiefs, upon whom Solomon had hitherto
been able to rely for support. As royal collections increased
during the famine, tribal authorities in the Zulu heartlands
had found that their loyalties to the Zulu royal house increasingly
conflicted with their traditional roles as 'father' and
'guardian' to their wards - which felt duty bound to respond
to Solomon's appeals for assistance. As early as June 1931, the
CNC had received reports that certain Zulu chiefs had become
"very perturbed" about Solomon's extortionate activities, and
were considering means of imposing some form of discipline on
Solomon. It was thus not only Solomon's petty bourgeois support
but, to a certain extent, his chiefly support that ebbed after
1930.
For its part, the NAD too became increasingly concerned — and, in the case of NCs near the royal epicentre in north-western Zululand, exasperated — during 1931 about Solomon's financial difficulties and widespread collections. The reasons may be summarised as threefold. First, officials perceived it to be unjust that Solomon was making such impositions on the Zulu people in the midst of a famine, at a time when the NAD was distributing famine relief to the value of £35,800 in Zululand and Northern Natal, and when local tax arrears in the Zululand inland reserves stood at £80,000. Certain Zululand officials felt that the Zulu people were being 'fleeced', and were in need of protection. Second, officials had cause to complain that the frequent presence of royal collectors in their districts was interfering with their own and their chiefs' routine administrative work. It was nonetheless significant, reflecting the changed official perspective on Zulu national unity and the Zulu royal house's role in that context, that Zululand officials did not argue that such practical affirmations of Solomon's widespread influence was inherently undesirable — as they had done until the late-1920s. Third and most important, the NAD as a whole, always very sensitive to the pervasive influence of the Zulu royal house among the Zulu, had been favourably impressed with Solomon's political role during the late 1920s period of African political turbulence throughout the province of Natal. Even though the Zulu monarchy was not officially recognised, the NAD (including the new Natal CNC, J. Mould Young, who succeeded T. W. C. Norton in 1931) was thus apprehensive of the political consequences which might follow the sudden collapse of the institution of Zulu kingship — which seemed possible in view of the current head of the Zulu royal family's gross personal irresponsibility. More particularly, fears were expressed regarding the political consequences should Solomon be imprisoned for debt. It might be added, however, that while many NCs were simply annoyed about Solomon's lack of self-discipline, some evidenced a human concern for his private and public predicaments.

As early as May 1931, the NAD considered the possibility of intervening to impose official control over the royal cash and
cattle collections, and to offer Solomon guidance in the task of discharging his debts. Such strategies, which were tentatively proposed by the SNA, were initially not favoured by either the CNC or the NC at Nongoma. But after Solomon had personally implored the CNC in July 1931 for government financial assistance, the CNC came to be more amenable to this idea. The question of official assistance became more pressing when Solomon anxiously informed the NC at Nongoma in October 1931 that "writs of execution" had been issued against him, meaning that royal property was soon to be attached by the courts. This persuaded the NC at Nongoma, the CNC and the SNA that some form of official assistance was essential; and it was agreed that the preconditions should be that, first, an NAD official should investigate and ratify Solomon's statement of debts, and, second, that Solomon should dismiss Bhengu and appoint a trustworthy private secretary. But the SNA and CNC still procrastinated, unable to agree about the precise form that official assistance should take. It was left to the Minister of Native Affairs (whom Nicholls had petitioned on Solomon's behalf) to dramatically break departmental indecision: "most important that sale in execution [at Mahashini] is prevented" he telegrammed his department in January 1932, and immediately authorised the NC at Nongoma to guarantee to Solomon's creditors that the government would settle Solomon's debts. The SNA then arranged for every adult male of the Usuthu ward to pay a £1 annual levy to the government, until such time as Solomon's debt to the government was repaid. That the Minister of Native Affairs and the NAD had cooperated to take so bold and unprecedented an action as using public money to repay a state employee's private debts reflected the importance which white authorities had come to attach to the institution of Zulu kingship.

On 7 January 1932, the day on which Mahashini was informed of the government loan to repay royal debts, Mahashini despatched a letter to the CNC expressing Solomon's humble thanks for government assistance. "My name would otherwise have been changed into the mud" said this letter which, though bearing Solomon's signature, was unmistakably written in Dube's handwriting.

On 8 January 1932, however, Solomon went to Durban and bought a
brand new Chrysler de luxe 8 cylinder, on hire purchase terms, costing a total of £825. Solomon was soon to be seen at Nongoma, being driven in his new limosine by a white chauffeur. When questioned by the CNC in late February, he denied that the car was his. But after 'Colonial Motors Ltd' began legal proceedings against Solomon because he had failed to pay the first instalment on the purchase, and following further investigations by the CNC, the truth leaked out. Officials were astonished, and the CNC concluded that Solomon was "nothing more than a spendthrift and a liar, whose word is not to be believed even at the moment he utters it". Solomon apologised to the CNC for both his purchase and his lie: on 8 January, Solomon explained, "my mind was more occupied by the suggestions of the Government with regards to the liquidation of my present liabilities". It was for reasons such as this that total royal debts increased between 1931 and 1932.

Although utterly disillusioned with Solomon on account of the car issue, the NAD felt that it had no choice but to go ahead with the government loan to Solomon for the repayment of royal debts: Solomon's creditors had already been informed of the government's undertaking, and the Usuthu ward had already agreed to the Usuthu levy. Furthermore, the Minister of Native Affairs and the NAD did not cancel the government loan even when Solomon proved to be unwilling to abide by any of the conditions that were attached to it. Solomon refused to dismiss Bhengu (even though he himself had accused Bhengu of fraud not long previously) and instead offered the NAD weak excuses as to why Bhengu's services had to be retained. Neither did he accept the services of Oscroft as his official financial adviser. And although Solomon handed over to the NAD all the writs for debts he had in his possession, he never submitted the required full and final statement of royal debts - evidently because neither he nor his staff at Mahashini knew what all the royal debts were. The Minister of Native Affairs did, however, instruct that the government would not settle any of Solomon's debts incurred after 31 January 1932 - which included the debts on Solomon's new car, since the instalments were only payable from February 1932. The government paid out a total of £4,266/19/2 to liquidate
Solomon's personal debts. This loan, incidentally, was never fully repaid: the Usuthu ward continued to pay the annual levy for the reduction of Solomon's debt to the government until 1937, four years after Solomon's death, when the Minister of Finance wrote off the remaining debt. The government loan reduced but did not remedy Solomon's insolvency and cattle collections - to which the Zulu people continued to contribute until Solomon's death. Solomon himself continued to live under the threat of imprisonment for debt, or having his property attached by the courts. In September 1932, for example, Charles Adams pleaded with the CNC, on Solomon's behalf, for a further government loan to liquidate royal debts incurred since January of that year. Adams, who was disinterestedly assisting the administration of the royal cattle collections, implored the CNC to realise that from the perspective of "a wider vision of things...it would be disastrous to let things drift into a Court Messenger's sale". The CNC was unmoved.

The official attitude to Solomon from 1932 until his death in March 1933 was a mixture of concern and contempt - contempt because it was felt that Solomon was exploiting both the Zulu people's loyalty to their royal family and the government's goodwill. In March 1932, in view of Solomon's purchase of a new car and his failure to abide by the conditions of the government loan, the Minister of Native Affairs and the SNA decided that Solomon should be officially reprimanded at a special indaba attended by Solomon, his advisers, Usuthu tribal authorities and Usuthu 'tribespeople'. The SNA wished this gathering to be informed that the government was unable to trust Solomon, and would not "stir a finger" to help him meet any new debts "even if it involves his detention in gaol under order of civil imprisonment", and that if Solomon was imprisoned, the government would have to consider his replacement with a "reliable chief". Such a meeting was held at Nongoma in April 1932, and in addition to reading out the 'message of the government' prepared by the SNA, the CNC expressed his own critical opinions about Solomon's behaviour and financial predicament. An abashed Solomon replied simply that he was at fault and could say no more.
From 1932, there was little that even the most sympathetic of NAD officials could find in Solomon to justify any amelioration of official attitudes towards him. Carl Faye, the long-serving chief clerk and translator at the CNC's offices who had been favourably disposed to the Zulu royal family even in the heyday of Natal NAD antipathy, noted in September 1932 that the "good" that was in Solomon was somehow "not dominant in his conduct". Elaborating, Faye referred to the recent death of Harriette Colenso, a woman who had in a sense been a surrogate 'father' to Solomon during Dinuzulu's imprisonment and exile after the 1906 rebellion, and who had played a leading role in securing Solomon's succession in 1913. Increasingly frail and even somewhat disillusioned during the last years of her life, Colenso had nonetheless clung with affection to the memories of her association with 'Dinuzulu's family'. But, although Solomon had recently indicated that he wished to lay a wreath on her grave, Solomon had over the past few years ignored Faye's repeated suggestions that Solomon should pay her the courtesy of a visit. Solomon had always said that he was too busy, Faye recorded. Faye was similarly disillusioned with Solomon's "apparent ingratitude" to the many Zulu who had responded to the royal cash and cattle collections.

In the light of NAD attitudes towards Solomon, it may appear incongruous that the 'recognition question' was reopened in the NAD during July 1932. But, as will be noted below, this occurred solely on the insistence of the Minister of Native Affairs (E. G. Jansen), whose interest in the ideological aspects of Solomon's recognition had been sharpened by the broad-ranging and highly theoretical 'native policy' debates then current in ruling circles. And although the NAD went through the motions of reconsidering Solomon's official 'elevation', it decisively blocked the minister's initiative. Solomon and his advisers played no part in causing the 'recognition question' to be reopened, but they did get wind that the issue was being reconsidered - which inspired Solomon to make a final attempt to secure the official recognition of the Zulu kingship.

At some stage in mid-1932, Solomon received an intimation from
Adams, who had recently been consulted by the Minister of Native Affairs on matters concerning Solomon's finances and political status, that the Zulu royal house could expect to be financially and politically rewarded if it redeemed itself in the eyes of the NAD. Evidently acting on Adams' advice, Solomon approached the NC at Nongoma in September 1932, indicating that he wished to reform his behaviour and use his influence to assist the government. As a consequence of these representations, Solomon was granted an interview with the CNC in early October. Before the CNC, Solomon stated that the Zulu delighted in living in harmony with the government, but that he personally needed greater official powers to be able to guide the Zulu to do so. Pursuing his appeal for official recognition, Solomon asked "If the Government finds itself unable to bring me close to itself, how will the Government ever find out what Solomon is like?" Solomon's approaches to the NAD came too late to influence the NAD's position regarding the 'recognition question', since the SNA, CNC and the NC at Nongoma had already suppressed the possibility of Solomon's official 'elevation' in late August. But because Solomon had specifically asked that his official powers be extended, which suggested that Solomon had become aware that the 'recognition question' had been formally reopened, and had for the past eighteen months been allowed special privileges above all other Zulu chiefs (apart from repaying Solomon's debts, the government had not prohibited the widespread royal cash and cattle collections), the NAD deemed it essential that Solomon be formally reminded of his official status.

It was thus that Solomon, together with his Usuthu tribal advisers Mnyaiza kaNdabuko Zulu, Gilbert kaNgcongwana Zulu, Franz kaDabulamanzi Zulu, and Zinyo kaNtuzwa Mdalose (one of Solomon's maternal uncles), was summoned to Pretoria on 13 December 1932 for an interview with the Minister of Native Affairs. In addressing Solomon at this interview, which was also attended by the SNA (J. F. Herbst), CNC (J. M. Young) and NC at Nongoma (E. N. Braatvedt), the minister drew heavily on a draft address that the Natal NAD head office at Pietermaritzburg had drawn up specially for the occasion. Accordingly, the minister reiterated the conditions of Solomon's appointment as chief of the Usuthu in 1916, and proceeded
to describe how General Botha's advice to Solomon in 1916 had not been satisfactorily heeded: Solomon had not always behaved with chiefly dignity, nor had he consistently paid due respect to NAD officials; he drank too much, and had led so extravagant and unsettled a life that his health had suffered, and he had persistently claimed authority over Zulu outside the Usuthu ward. Moreover, Solomon had fallen deeply in debt, and had failed to reform his financial irresponsibility even when officially instructed to do so at the time of the government loan. Solomon was thus informed that, on the one hand, he had not set a good example to his own people, and on the other hand, he had often been more of a hindrance than a help to the government. Solomon responded to these reprimands by restating his desire to use his influence to assist the government. Again following the NAD-prepared draft-address, the Minister of Native Affairs replied saying that Solomon had not shown the government proof that he could be trusted in a position of greater authority. But at the conclusion of the interview, the minister deviated from the NAD-prepared address in a way which reflected his different attitude towards the question of Solomon's 'elevation'. Whereas the NAD wished the minister to inform Solomon categorically that there was, and would be, no "overlord" over Zulu chiefs except the Supreme Chief, the minister instead gave out that he still hoped to make use of Solomon in the administration of the Zulu people. Solomon first had to demonstrate to the government, however, that he was worthy of a position of greater authority. So ended Solomon's final interview with white authorities.

After the unfortunate Zulu indaba with the Governor-General in 1930, Solomon's attitude towards white authorities and his general conduct suggested that Solomon had given up hope of achieving the ultimate objective of his political career: the official recognition of the Zulu kingship. The news in mid-1932 that white authorities had reopened the 'recognition question', which must have come as a surprise to those at Mahashini, seemed to rekindle in Solomon a spark of hope. The overall tenor of Solomon's interview with the Minister of Native Affairs, held in the presence of the most influential members of the NAD hierarchy in regard to policy towards the Zulu royal house, doused this spark. Although
the minister had closed the interview on a conditionally positive note, Solomon himself did not expect to live long enough to persuade the government that his expressed desire to reform his ways and 'assist the government' was genuine.

By May 1932, Solomon had already sensed that his death was imminent - even though he was barely forty years old. In a letter of that month replying to Nicholls' enquiries about the progress of the Shaka Memorial project, Solomon had written that "if alive" he would certainly be present at the prospective Shaka Memorial unveiling ceremony in July. In November 1932, the CNC had similarly expressed the opinion that Solomon, as a consequence of "dissolute living" and "self gratification", could not be expected to survive for much longer. Solomon would continue "undermining his constitution", the CNC predicted, "until he snuffs himself out like a candle".

Solomon collapsed and died suddenly in the first week of March 1933, less than three months after his interview with the Minister of Native Affairs. He died not at Mahashini, but at the homestead of Chief Kambi of the Ngenetsheni, having gone there to act as peacemaker in a dispute between two of Kambi's sons. Particularly in view of the severe antagonism that had existed between the Zulu royal house and the Ngenetsheni before Solomon's succession, the circumstances of Solomon's death reflected Solomon's dedication to the settling of tribal and dynastic disputes which might fracture the unity of all Zulu beneath the Zulu 'king'. Notwithstanding his personal failings during the last few years of his life, and his parasitic activities during the famine, Solomon's funeral ceremony at Mahashini four days after his death was the occasion of a stirring display of Zulu mass loyalty to the institution of Zulu kingship. Ilanga lase Natal's exclamations on the death of "Solomon the King of the Zulu" indeed seemed to represent the sense of bereavement felt by the Zulu as a whole: "We have died, Zulu people! We have no place to hide! He is no more, the honeybird that drinks from deep pools /a line from Solomon's izibongo/! The giver of rest /one of Solomon's praise names/ has gone!" and, using Christian imagery, "We are like sheep
without a shepherd." In page after page of appreciative journalism on Solomon's life and work, the only hint of criticism came in the form of an oblique and somewhat self-righteous aside to the newspaper's predominantly petty bourgeois readership. Solomon's fatal liver and abdominal complaints, it was mentioned, were symptoms of "an illness which is not known at Groutville".231

There was no doubt that Solomon died a king in Zulu eyes, and not only so in the eyes of the Zulu of the 'old kingdom' but in the eyes of Zulu speaking people throughout the province of Natal. No longer was it valid to distinguish between 'Zulu' and 'Natal African': all were Zulu and, as Wheelwright had observed in 1928, all regarded the heir to the Zulu royal house as "the chief race representative of their Nation."232 The furtherance of such a sense of Zulu national unity, as well as a pride in 'Zuluness', and the resurrection of the political fortunes of the Zulu royal house were together Solomon's most enduring achievements.

Zulu nationalism and state segregationism after 1930

Earlier in this study, it has been argued that white segregationist thinking had an influence on the development of Zulu nationalist politics; and that this influence was particularly apparent in the reconstituted (i.e. post-1928) Inkatha's ideologies of economic 'self-help', socio-cultural 'reconstruction', and political 'self-government', all of which were expounded within an overarching ideology of exclusivist Zulu nationalism. 'White segregationist thinking', so far as it affected Zulu nationalist politics, was overtly or covertly expressed in three inter-related contexts: first, state segregationist legislation of the 1920s, and more especially the policy proposals put forward by Natal's key 'native policy' legislators, Nicholls and Marwick; second, the findings of the developing academic discipline of 'scientific anthropology'; and third, the 'advice' dispensed by white liberals and Christians through the 'progressive' African or multi-racial institutions that they sponsored, notably the Bantu Men's Social Centres and Joint Councils.233

Notwithstanding the influence of white segregationist thinking
on the development of Zulu nationalist ideology, Inkatha's drive
for Zulu 'self-government' during the crucial 1928-1930 period
of the organisation's history was by no means simply derivative,
nor simply a part of Inkatha's policy of appeasing - or collaborating
with - white rule. This drive was in the first instance a Zulu
initiative, arising from two ideological systems current among
the Zulu people (including 'Natal Africans') during the 1920s:
first, the backward-looking and somewhat wistful 'tribal' outlook,
which celebrated and envisaged a resuscitation of pre-conquest
Zulu economic, socio-cultural and political independence; and,
second, the pan-Africanist and black nationalist/consciousness
doctrines which, having been adopted by the educated elite and
reinterpreted in the particularly Zulu context, were both assertive
(i.e. seeking to demonstrate black worth in relation to whites)
and inward-looking, as was especially manifest in the 'search for
roots'. These two ideological systems had always been inter-
twined and embodied in Inkatha, particularly after the organisation
was formalised in 1924 as a Zulu nationalist alliance between the
petty bourgeois and tribal elites. White segregationist thinking
in the late 1920s meshed with and further developed the socio-
culturally and politically separatist inclinations already inherent
in Inkatha's Zulu nationalism of the mid-1920s, gradually guiding
Inkatha's Zulu nationalism of the late-1920s towards a more
explicitly segregationist position.

The relationship between white segregationism, as was expounded
by Natal's leading white 'native policy' ideologues, and Zulu
nationalist politics was, however, a dialectical one. This study
has already alluded to - though not explored - the influence that
the latter had on the former. Indeed, it has been shown that
Nicholls in 1929 set about formalising his 'adaptationist' policy
proposals, which were based on the recognition of 'traditional'
African authorities and institutions, and the nurturing of
politically discrete 'Bantu Nations' within the Union, after having
been actively involved in Zulu nationalist politics during 1928
in the capacity of an informal adviser assisting the reconstitution
of Inkatha. Much of the imagery and many of the political
'facts' that Nicholls used to support his draft policy proposals
were directly derived from his understanding of Zulu nationalist
politics, which illustrated the influence that Solomon and Inkatha had on the development of Nicholls' segregationist ideas. Though a commentary on the development of state segregationism does not strictly fall within the scope of this study, this subsection will sketch how Zulu nationalism influenced the evolution of the 'separate development', or 'parallel development', state ideology which was ultimately to be most clearly embodied in the apartheid government's 'Bantustans' (subsequently 'Homelands') policy after 1948. In so doing, it hopes to throw some new light on the evolution of state segregationism: the extant literature has recognised the important role played by Natal white 'native policy' ideologues in the refinement of segregationist thinking at state level, but has not alluded to the role played by Zulu nationalist politicians.

For the history of both Zulu nationalist politics and Natal white 'native policy' legislators' attempts to implement a settlement to the 'native question', the year 1930 was something of a watershed. Regarding the former, 1930 was the year in which hopes that the NAD could be persuaded to recognise Solomon and Inkatha, so securing the implementation of a thoroughgoing policy of Zulu political and territorial segregation as a special 'local settlement' of the 'native question' in the province of Natal, were extinguished among Inkatha's leaders. Yet the disastrous Zulu indaba with the Governor-General and the ensuing disintegration of Inkatha as a viable political organisation did not cause the segregation ideal to wither among Zulu nationalist leaders. Indeed, as has been shown, Inkatha's late-1920s segregationist interpretation of Zulu nationalism became more pervasively influential among the Zulu after 1930 - following the decline of the ICU yase Natal as a militant 'working class' Zulu nationalist organisation (together with the repression of the Durban CP), and the success of Inkatha's covertly political 'cultural initiative'. Zulu nationalist politicians continued to support the immediate implementation of local segregationist policy among the Zulu, as was illustrated in the Clermont Township project, but it was evident that they had realised that their ultimate objective - the official recognition of Inkatha, together with the institution of Zulu kingship, as the central representative institution of a
self-governing Zulu nation - could not be achieved unless Nicholls' and Inkatha's thoroughgoing segregationist ideas had been formally embodied in Union 'native policy'. Zulu nationalist politicians adopted a new strategy for, rather than abandoned, the drive for Zulu self-government after 1930: whereas the strategy previously was to press the NAD and Union Government to implement a special 'local settlement' of the 'native question' in the province of Natal by recognising Solomon and Inkatha, after 1930 the strategy was to influence a redefinition of Union 'native policy' in such a way that Zulu self-government flowed naturally from it. It was thus that Dube (who had the full backing of at least Chief Majozi and W. W. Ndhlovu) entered into negotiations with Nicholls after 1930, seeking to influence the character of the 'native policy' decided upon by the 'Joint Select Committee on the Native Bills', in whose deliberations Nicholls was playing a leading role. Furthermore, as will be noted below, Dube also toured the Union to secure the support of African leaders in other provinces for the proposals that Nicholls was expounding in the Joint Select Committee.241

For Nicholls, as the most influential of Natal 'native policy' legislators, 1930 was something of a watershed because in May of that year he began formally to expound his adaptationist policy proposals before the Joint Select Committee, having had his draft 'Natives' Land Development Bill' and 'Natives' Parliamentary Representation Bill' accepted by the committee as bases for discussion.242 During mid-1930, Nicholls was also attempting to persuade the Minister of Native Affairs and the Governor-General officially to recognise Solomon and Inkatha on the occasion of the forthcoming indaba with the Governor-General at Eshowe;243 if such 'political reform' had been implemented among the Zulu, it would no doubt have provided Nicholls with an illustrative source of reference for the political proposals that he was unfolding before the committee. Following the indaba debacle in July, Nicholls focussed his energies on embodying his adaptationist ideas in Union 'native policy'. Political conditions were favourable for his doing so successfully. The 1925 Natives' Taxation and Development Act and the 1927 Native Administration
Act, which had been enacted largely through the efforts of Nicholls and Marwick, together with the two Native Affairs, 1920, Amendment Acts of 1926 and 1927, had already laid on the statute book the financial, political and ideological groundwork of Nicholls' adaptationism. The 1927 Native Administration Act's 'anti-sedition' Section 29 and the amended Riotous Assemblies Act of 1930 (which, again, Nicholls and Marwick had played a leading role in enacting), furthermore, provided the repressive rampart from behind which Nicholls' proposals - which necessarily involved the controversial removal of Cape Africans from the common voters' roll - could be confidently embodied in Union 'native policy'. (When the disenfranchisement of Cape Africans was first mooted in Hertzog's 'Native Bills' of 1926, the suggestion had been so decisively condemned by the 1926 annual Native Conference that Hertzog omitted to call another Conference until 1930 - and in 1930 any discussion of the Bills was forbidden.)

Furthermore, Nicholls could draw confidence from the knowledge that his adaptationist ideas had a broad base of support from both outside and within the Joint Select Committee. When Hertzog's 'Native Bills' were first referred to Select Committee in 1927, Natal MPs had agreed that Nicholls and Marwick should represent them on that Select Committee and, by Nicholls' own account, "act according to a plan that was agreed upon". With this Natal backing, Nicholls could with some justification refer to the political proposals that he presented to the Joint Select Committee in 1930 as a "Natal Bill". And with the support of Zulu nationalist politicians, together with that of a number of prominent African leaders from other provinces of the Union whom Dube had canvassed successfully, Nicholls could also assert with some confidence that "Natal's effort to find a solution to the native question...met with the full approval of a number of the leading natives..." In the Joint Select Committee, moreover, wherein it was agreed that members' party political affiliations should not influence their voting, Nicholls found the ready support of a cross-section of influential individuals, notably Col. Stallard (of the SAP, who had emerged during the 1920s as the Union's leading ideologue on urban segregationism);
Collins (also of the SAP, who in 1931 was to become a major shareholder of the Clermont Township Company); 'Pen' Wessels (of the Nationalist Party, who was to play an important role in the formation of the coalition government in 1933); and the Nationalist Minister of Native Affairs, E. G. Jansen, who acted as chairman of the Joint Select Committee.

In its work of laying down a uniform Union 'native policy', the twenty-seven member Joint Select Committee was faced with essentially two tasks. First, to define the form of African political representation at central government level. The consultative annual Native Conferences established under Smuts' 1920 Native Affairs Act had not proved successful: many African leaders, including Dube, had already rejected them as powerless, and Hertzog had not called a Native Conference since 1926. In the Cape province, furthermore, Africans were eligible - if they had passed the 'franchise test' - to vote alongside whites for members of the House of Assembly, whereas Africans of other provinces in the Union did not have the franchise. Second, to settle the 'land question'. The 1916 Natives' Lands Commission and the ensuing Local Land Committees had neither produced agreement on the extent of land to be 'alienated' for exclusive African occupation under the terms of the 1913 Natives' Lands Act, nor the demarcation of 'scheduled areas' in which Africans could purchase property. The 1913 Act had moreover been declared ultra vires in the Cape province, since by curtailing Cape Africans' previous land-purchase rights it simultaneously interfered with their ability to qualify as registered parliamentary voters under the terms of the Cape 'franchise test'. These two tasks thus related directly to the maintenance of white control over the central government, and white access to land and cheap African labour, which together were the foundation upon which white South African society had been built.

Introducing his adaptationist proposals before the Joint Select Committee in May 1930, Nicholls asserted that his aim was to "ensure beyond question, and permanently, (1) The dominance of the European, (2) While ensuring the dominance of the European,
to recognise the native's right to his own development in such a way as to win his approval". Nicholls went on to denounce the 'assimilationist' political proposals made by the Cape liberal Sir James Rose-Innes (which sought to enfranchise on the common voters' roll all Africans who had passed a high 'franchise test') as "not being practical politics": these proposals did not safeguard 'European dominance', nor recognise "the Bantu as a race, with all its traditions, feelings, and customs, and...separate tribal ideas...". He similarly denounced Hertzog's amended political Bill of 1929 (which sought to place Cape Africans on a separate voters' roll and permit them to elect three white 'natives' representatives' to the House of Assembly, while Africans elsewhere in the Union were to be represented solely by a maximum of four white 'natives' representatives' in the Senate),\(^{256}\) arguing that it did not "ensure the complete and permanent dominance of the European by the destruction of democracy amongst the natives and their exclusion completely from participation in the election of members to the Lower House".

His own adaptationist policy proposals, Nicholls asserted, were "based upon the recognition of a separate Bantu Ethos which it is our duty to protect and develop" in such a way as to "preserve the separateness of the native". In a statement which drew heavily on the ideas he had set out in private letters and memoranda subsequent to his becoming involved in Inkatha, Nicholls argued that the foundations of African political representation ought to "go back to the native kraal, to the native family, to the tribe, to the tribal council, [and then] to the Native Provincial Council, which would have considerable powers of local self-government...". For Nicholls, this separate and "complete chain of representation" was the way in which "the Bantu Nation" - including Africans who were "detribalized, civilized and uncivilized" - should express itself politically. In this context, Nicholls contended that legislators had not paid adequate attention to the establishment of such a 'chain of representation', though he did not divulge that he personally had attempted to do so for the Zulu by assisting Inkatha's drive for official recognition. Nicholls argued that African representation in the "House of Democracy" (the House of Assembly) was not only inappropriate,
because "democratic institutions are completely alien to the Bantu race", but also unnecessary; because Africans would have their own tribal-based national councils through which to represent and govern themselves. Yet, conceding that some form of African representation in the central government was necessary, he argued that African councils should be directly represented by African senators in the Senate. Nicholls thus submitted a draft 'Natives' Parliamentary Representation Bill', to prohibit the registration of Africans as parliamentary voters and provide for African representation in the Senate, for the consideration of the committee.257

Nicholls linked his political Bill to a land Bill, which provided for a substantial increase in the land set aside for exclusive African occupation. Nicholls proposed that the government make £30 million available to an African land fund; half of this sum would be used to purchase additional land adjacent to existing reserve areas, while the other half would be made set aside for "native development in the reserves" through, for example, agricultural education and irrigation works. The economic development of the reserves, Nicholls noted, would ameliorate the 'problem' of African influx to the urban areas: "redundant detribalised natives" could be expelled from the towns and resettled in their own rural domains on land held in communal tribal tenure. To forestall potential fears among committee members that white economic interests would be threatened, Nicholls further argued that reserve agriculture could be steered away from the production of crops which were produced by white farmers; and, somewhat weakly, that the African labour force would remain undiminished for at least a "long time to come".258 In 1931, Nicholls' land Bill became the 'Natives' Trust and Land Bill', which proclaimed that not less than seven and one quarter million morgen be set aside for exclusive African occupation, and that a government-funded 'South African Native Trust' be established (based on the model of the Natal Native Trust and Zululand Native Trust) to acquire this land, and to "develop the material, moral and social wellbeing" of Africans in the reserves.259 Nicholls' political and land Bills were the bases of the Joint Select
Committee's discussions between 1930 and 1934.

The essence of Nicholls' proposals was that the focus of African social, political, and, to a certain extent, economic life should lie in the reserves. The white countryside and more particularly the urban areas were, by contrast, to be the inalienable domain of white South Africa; so too was South Africa's central legislative and executive political institution, the House of Assembly. The hierarchy of tribal-based African political institutions, rooted in the reserves, were to lead different African groups within the Union to their separate 'national destinies'. Nicholls aimed to encourage Africans to perceive themselves as a separate race from 'Europeans', rather than - as he expressed it - a 'black proletariat' beneath a 'white aristocracy', thus defusing the inter-racial class struggles that had so threatened the status quo during the 1920s. Furthermore, he aimed to encourage Africans to perceive themselves in the first instance as separate 'Bantu nations' within a separate 'Bantu race'. It was in the course of his work on the Joint Select Committee that Nicholls invoked the concept of 'parallel development': in a private memorandum evidently written in 1934, Nicholls noted that his Bills embodied "a policy known as adaptation, a policy of native development politically and economically on parallel lines to our own". There was a striking similarity between Nicholls' ideology and policy proposals of the early 1930s and the apartheid government's 'Bantustans' ideology and policies after 1948. Through successive 'Bantu affairs' enactments, the latter aimed to domicile all Africans in 'their own' reserve areas, which were to be 'consolidated' and enlarged - or created if none already existed - and subjected to a long-term programme of economic development. Furthermore, specifically through the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act and the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, it aimed to fragment the African population into discrete tribal-national entities, introspectively detached from each other and 'white South Africa'. And both Nicholls and apartheid's ideologues sought to ensure that South Africa's whites retained control of the majority of South Africa's most fertile agricultural land and the vast mineral deposits of the interior, which would continue to be exploited for the purposes
of white capital accumulation primarily through the efforts of cheap migrant African labour. 261

Dube and Nicholls were in contact with each other during 1930, discussing future Union 'native policy'. Although there is no direct evidence that Dube played a role in formulating the adaptationist proposals that Nicholls expounded before the Joint Select Committee, it is not unlikely that Dube did so. 262 Early in 1931, Dube made arrangements to tour the Transvaal, Orange Free State and Cape provinces to solicit the support of African leaders outside Natal for the adaptationist political and land Bills. Apparently Dube had received financial assistance for his travels from the leading Zululand sugar planter G. Armstrong, who also financially assisted the Shaka Memorial project. 263 Writing in February 1931 to inform Nicholls of his intentions, and to request Nicholls to "send me your papers to start my campaign", Dube added that

We [Dube and Nicholls] are up against a strong fight as some big guns of the white race have given lead to Native opinion in this matter like Sir James Rose-Innes and others but I still feel that sane views of responsible leaders may be won for our side of thinking ... To have land is uppermost in the minds of our people. There are comparatively small sections of urban natives who no longer wish to be under tribal control. 264

Later in February 1931, Nicholls supplied Dube with a concise statement of his political and land Bills - though he noted that "I think that by this time you are fully acquainted with my proposals now before the Select Committee". The overriding purpose of the land Bill, Nicholls wrote, was "to enable the natives to attain a high standard of economic production under a system of local self-Government. You can fill in the picture of these two principles [Reserve enlargement and development funds] from the conversations we have had together. It will enable the native nation to obtain, in their own areas, a state of independent economic well-being, which can never be obtained by merely remaining a black proletariat of white South Africa". Justifying the abolition of the Cape African franchise which the political Bill prescribed, Nicholls laid down that "the principle
of political representation in the Union Parliament must conform to the semi-independent economic and political control by the natives in their own areas". On the positive side, however, Nicholls emphasised that the political Bill "means the removal of the Colour Bar restrictions as applied to the Senate. Native senators will have equal rights in speech and voting with the Europeans, and will have the same qualifications and will draw the same salaries... This great liberal measure is on the full lines of development of the Native Reserves, and the chain of representation from the kraal to the tribal or district council to the Native Provincial Council or Bunga up to the Senate...". Nicholls urged Dube to supply a report on the support that these proposals received among African leaders throughout the Union, because Nicholls wished to produce such a report as evidence before the Joint Select Committee.265

Dube and Nicholls kept in touch with each other throughout 1931. In May, for example, Dube wrote to Nicholls reporting on his discussions with African leaders of the Transkei and Pondoland: "It was quite clear to me", Dube concluded, "that we need have no fear of Natives opposing this measure. They all say natives want land more than the vote".266 And in July, Nicholls regretfully informed Dube that the Joint Select Committee would only agree to white representatives of African interests - and not African senators - in the Senate. It was necessary that he and Dube met for further discussions, Nicholls wrote: "It is not yet too late...we shall have to fight to get back to the original idea when we meet again".267

Dube drew up a document entitled "The Land Settlement", based on the adaptationist political and land Bills, to which he obtained the signatures of Chief Majozi, W. W. Ndlovu (from Natal), R. V. Selepe-Thema, H. Selby Msimang (from the Transvaal), T. Mapikela and E. K. Royne (from the Orange Free State). Zulu nationalist politicians were evidently not alone in supporting the adaptationist policy proposals. This document, which was clearly drawn up by Dube without Nicholls' assistance, was also significant because it provided an insight into Dube's political objectives in allying himself with Nicholls. In a statement that
reflected Dube's attraction to the ideological and political aspects of the adaptationist policy proposals, Dube wrote that "in each Province of the Union there should be a large compact Native area like the Transkei, because without such a reserve Natives cannot develop a real national life, ie. they cannot develop a becoming race-consciousness". On the question of African self-government in these 'compact native areas', Dube wrote that the governing councils should have "more legislative powers and functions than the Transkeian Bungha [sic]". Dube was thus not simply attracted to the prospect of more land being allocated to the African population. Significantly, Dube added that the governing councils were "to be elected by the people" - whereas Nicholls envisaged that the councils would mainly comprise tribal authorities. Dube also took care to describe the advantages that the proposals held for the African petty bourgeoisie: "In these reserves the Civil Service to be opened to competent Natives"; "Fullest facilities for trading by Natives in the reserves should be allowed"; and the Native Trust's funds were to "develop local industries etc. in the reserves". Dube virtually dismissed the issue of the disenfranchisement of Cape Africans, saying that it was "a matter which primarily concerns the Cape Province. But we think the proposal that those who are on the roll should remain 'until they disappear from natural causes' is a concession which should be acceptable to the Cape Natives."268

The political objectives which Dube expressed in his document entitled 'The Land Settlement', did not, however, only reflect Dube's personal or idiosyncratic political views.269 As this study's analysis of the reconstituted Inkatha has indicated, these political objectives were integral to the ideology of Zulu nationalism which had been formulated in the context of Inkatha after 1928, and which had been the dominant ideology among the most influential Zulu-speaking politicians since 1930.270 The signatures of the Transvaal and Orange Free State African leaders that Dube obtained for his document suggested, furthermore, that the political objectives that flowed from Inkatha's ideology of Zulu nationalism held an appeal for some African leaders outside the province of Natal, even at the cost of abandoning the demand for the vote. It was manifest, however, that the majority of the
latter defined the enfranchisement of the African population as their ultimate political objective, for the vote was seen to be the key to full African citizenship in a unitary and non-racial South Africa. 271

The adaptationist political and land Bills, which had been endorsed by Dube at least between 1930 and 1933, and whose main advocate in the Joint Select Committee had been Nicholls, exerted a considerable influence on the 'native legislation' that was placed on statute book in 1936. In so doing, furthermore, the adaptationist Bills played a major role in reinforcing and developing the South African state's commitment to political and territorial segregation. The second (1931) draft of Nicholls' land Bill was enacted virtually unmodified as the 1936 Natives' Trust and Land Act. This Act represented a real commitment to the principle of race-based territorial segregation, particularly because, by establishing the South African Native Trust, it provided the mechanism whereby lands currently under white ownership or held by the state could be set aside for exclusive African occupation. The Act also embodied the principle that Africans should exclusively look upon the communally-held lands of the reserves as their social and economic domain (the 1913 Natives' Land Act, by contrast, had provided for the demarcation of areas in which Africans could purchase property). Indeed, the Act specifically favoured tribes or tribal communities, rather than individuals, as recipients of the extra land or development funds that the Native Trust was to make available to the African population. 272 The Act thus indirectly prescribed African 'retribalisation', which had grown to be central to the ideology and practice of 'political' segregationism.

Similarly, some of the essential principles of the second (1931) draft of Nicholls' political Bill (whose main difference from Nicholls' original draft Bill was that it abandoned the proposal to 'abolish the colour bar in the Senate') were embodied in the 1936 Natives' Representation Act. This Act represented a commitment to the principle of political segregation: Cape Africans were no longer permitted to register on the common voters' roll, which for the first time gave explicit legislative expression
to the state's rejection of the Cape's 'assimilationism' in favour of segregationism, and four white representatives of African interests were to be returned to the Senate. The removal of the existing right of Cape Africans to enrol as voters alongside whites was especially significant insofar as it laid down that Africans should not look upon the central parliament as a forum for the representation of African interests, and that Africans were to be denied full citizenship rights in 'white South Africa'. Indeed, the Act did much to translate more clearly the concept of 'white South Africa' into reality. The Act nonetheless differed from Nicholls' political Bill in two respects: first, it laid down that Cape Africans henceforth be registered on a separate voters' roll and be permitted to elect three white representatives of Cape African interests to the House of Assembly; and, second, it provided for the establishment of a 'Natives' Representative Council' to advise the government on African opinion. Nicholls had opposed both of these provisions on the grounds that they conflicted with the principles of his political proposals: the first because it retained a semblance of African representation in the central 'House of Democracy' (although the Cape African franchise was henceforth segregated); and the second because the Natives' Representative Council was to represent the Union's African population as a whole (Nicholls sought to fragment African political representation into separate provincial and tribal/ethnic units), and all of those members of the Council not appointed by the government were to be elected by the African people (Nicholls sought to ensure that African political representation was conducted mainly through the medium of tribal authorities and their representatives). It was significant however, that the system of voting for the elected African members of the Natives' Representative Council was carefully designed strongly to favour rural and tribal interests. The Act therefore did embody the state's commitment to the preservation of 'tribalism'.

That the 1936 Natives' Representation Act differed from the adaptationist political Bill in the above two respects was a great disappointment for Nicholls. Nicholls ascribed the modification of his political Bill to developments in white party
politics. The coalition between Hertzog's National Party and Smuts' South African Party ripened into fusion in 1934; and, with Smuts alongside him in the cabinet, Hertzog felt that he had to compromise with the more 'liberal' wing of the South African Party which Smuts himself spearheaded. Smuts had consistently opposed the disenfranchisement of Cape Africans. With fusion, Nicholls further argued, the "political force" of the small but united group of Natal MPs within the South African Party was so diluted that "the influence of Natal, where the real Africa lies and where the destiny of South Africa will ultimately be determined, vanished." 274

From Nicholls' perspective, the 1936 Natives' Representation Act did not make provision for the implementation of - and it even conflicted with - the adaptationist policy of 'parallel development'. The latter essentially sought to establish a number of discrete self-governing African polities within the Union, each rooted in the reserves, and each represented and administered through their particular hierarchy of tribal-based political institutions. Instead of encouraging the establishment of such structures of African political representation and self-government, the Act established a single Union-wide Natives' Representative Council whose sole function was to comment on the policies pursued by a government over which it had no decisive influence. The Act also deviated from the adaptationist principle that the only avenue for the representation of African interests to the central government should be through the Senate. Dube too was disappointed with the 1936 Natives' Representation Act, correctly perceiving that the Natives' Representative Council would be largely impotent, and dominated by representatives of tribal interests. But Dube had already withdrawn his support for Nicholls' adaptationist Bills as early as 1934. There seemed to be two reasons for Dube's about-turn. After fusion, he possibly sensed that the full ramifications of Nicholls' political proposals, particularly those concerning African self-government, would not be accepted as state policy. It was probably this that led him to doubt the wisdom of continuing to back African self-government, at the expense of condoning African disenfranchisement. In addition,
Dube was subjected to the scorn of many Union African leaders during 1935 because of the 'soft' public line that he was taking with regard to the prospective disenfranchisement of Cape Africans. And indeed, not all Natal leaders were prepared to forego their own demands for the franchise, even if it did enhance the likelihood of African self-government in the reserves. In mid-1935, Dube publicly returned to the principle of democratic African representation in parliament: "We want to be represented in the Lower House", he pronounced in Cape leader Tengo Jabavu's pamphlet entitled 'Criticisms of the Native Bills', "preferably by our own people".275

That both Nicholls and Dube were dissatisfied with the "native legislation" of 1936 does not alter the fact that the adaptationist political and land Bills, which Nicholls and Dube had together promoted, played a leading role in determining the character of the 1936 Acts; nor that, through their influence on the 1936 Acts, the adaptationist policy proposals did much to reinforce and develop state segregationism. Largely on account of those adaptationist principles which had been embodied in the 1936 Acts, in conjunction with the Nicholls/Stallard-inspired 1937 Native Laws Amendment Act (which restricted African access to the urban areas according to the demand for labour), Lacey concludes that "by 1937 the main struts of the modern Apartheid state had come into being".276 The ways in which the Zulu nationalism of the late-1920s and early-1930s influenced state segregationism may at this stage be summarised as threefold. First, Zulu nationalism and its leading exponents in Inkatha played an important role in the development of Nicholls' segregationist thinking during the period 1928-1930. Second, Nicholls sought and obtained Dube's advice and support between 1930 and 1934 for the adaptationist policy proposals before the Joint Select Committee. Dube's support was clearly an important source of inspiration and confidence for Nicholls, and also served to fracture the unity of African opposition to the elaboration of state segregationism. Third, as has been noted above, the adaptationist policy proposals had considerable influence on the uniform Union 'native policy' that was laid on the statute book in the mid-1930s, particularly in regard to the territorially and politically segregationist
principles that the latter embodied.

There is a further - though more indirect - way, however, in which the Zulu nationalism of the late-1920s and early-1930s played a part in the evolution of state segregationism. It has already been noted that there was considerable congruity between, on the one hand, the adaptationist policy proposals which were being discussed in ruling circles during the 1930s (and which were closely related to the 'recognition question' regarding Solomon and Inkatha), and, on the other hand, the 'Bantustans' and later 'Homelands' political schemes which the apartheid government put into practice after 1948. Indeed, those 'political' aspects of the adaptationist policy proposals which were not implemented in the 1930s were implemented in the 1950s: the apartheid government did establish hierarchies of tribal-based African political institutions in the reserves, and also set about devolving a measure of self-government upon the ethnic or African 'tribal' language groups to which these hierarchies were attached; it moreover abolished the Natives' Representative Council and Cape African representation in the House of Assembly. These striking similarities between the policy proposals of the 1930s and the policy that was implemented in the 1950s were not coincidental.

The principles of the adaptationist policy proposals were widely publicised among state policy-makers during the 1930s, as were the principles underlying Solomon and Inkatha's 'self-government' ambitions (Nicholls had communicated this information to various state officials and members of the Union Government; the Athlone memorandum had been circulated through Hertzog's National Party cabinet in late-1930; and the Minister of Native Affairs between 1929 and 1933, E. G. Jansen, who was the National Party MP for Vryheid, had taken a special interest in 'Zulu national affairs'). There is evidence that these principles acted as ideological seeds which, having been 'hybridised' by Afrikaner nationalist ideologues, eventually germinated as state policy following the rise to power of Dr. D. F. Malan's (Afrikaner) National Party in 1948. Significantly, after Malan's 'purified (Afrikaner) nationalists' had broken away from Hertzog at the time
of fusion in 1934, the first major parliamentary confrontation between Malan's National Party and the newly-formed United South African National Party of Hertzog and Smuts was over the issue of Cape African representation in the House of Assembly. Malan's National Party played a crucial role in the development of Afrikaner nationalism as a political force during the 1930s and 1940s, as did the rapid growth of numerous inward-looking and self-help Afrikaner agencies in the political, cultural and economic fields. Included among the latter were the Afrikaner Broederbond, the 'Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings' (which, in the decade before the outbreak of the second world war, became the coordinating body for about three hundred cultural organisations) and the 'Suid-Afrikaanse Bond vir Rassestudie' (South African League for Racial Studies). It was during this period that Afrikaner nationalism, which had originally risen as a cultural and political defence against British imperialism, nurtured its systematic racial ideology of apartheid. In asserting that the 1930s ideologies of Zulu nationalism and adaptationism were an influence on the evolution of apartheid as a political model, it is illustrative to sketch the interconnecting role played by a single Afrikaner nationalist politician and 'native policy' ideologue: E. G. Jansen, who was to become the Malan Government's first Minister of Native Affairs, charged with putting the apartheid policy into practice.

Jansen had been in close touch with Zulu nationalist policies since the second half of the 1920s. He had acted alongside Nicholls and Marwick as a parliamentary representative of the Natal planter/farmer alliance in labour and 'native policy' matters for several years prior to his appointment as Minister of Natives in 1929, during which period Natal's white rural employers became increasingly interested in the political potential of the tribal authorities and Inkatha. Shortly after taking ministerial office, he was (in the course of an interview arranged by Marwick) given personal advice by Dube regarding the political advantages of officially recognising the Zulu kingship. In the following year, following persuasive representations from Nicholls, Jansen and ordered the 'recognition question' to be reopened in the NAD; and in the aftermath of the indaba debacle of 1930, he of all ministers
of state was most closely acquainted with the reasoning that underpinned the Athlone memorandum's call for far-reaching reforms in the administration of Zululand. Similarly, as chairman of the Joint Select Committee on the 'Native Bills' from 1930, Jansen became familiar with the principles of the adaptationist policy proposals - which he supported. It was a reflection of Jansen's special interest in the political future of Solomon and Zulu nationalism that, mainly through his intervention, royal debts were discharged by a government loan in early 1932. Shortly thereafter Jansen assented to Chief Majozi's request that the Minister of Native Affairs and the Governor-General be present at the Shaka Memorial unveiling ceremony. Moreover, Jansen played the leading role in causing the recognition question to be reopened in mid-1932 - a role which deserves further investigation here. 279

Between early-1931 and mid-1932, Jansen had been encouraged to reopen the recognition question - notwithstanding Solomon’s worsening irresponsibility and Inkatha's political decline - by a broad spectrum of white opinion. Perhaps most significantly, in February 1931, Jansen was for the first time subject to a written appeal for the recognition of the Zulu kingship from his own Afrikaans-speaking Vryheid constituents. Previously Solomon and Inkatha's white political supporters had been exclusively English-speaking. The reasoning that underpinned the 'Vryheid representation' was substantially similar to that of both Nicholls and Athlone. But whereas Nicholls and Athlone intended Solomon and his advisers to have a considerable measure of real independence in the administration of Zulu affairs, C. J. Vermaak, the author of the Vryheid representation, clearly envisaged that the currently "ongekroonde koning [Uncrowned king] Solomon ka Dinusulu" was to be a puppet directly subject to the control of the central government. A. N. Steenkamp, a local resident whom Vermaak wished the government to appoint as Solomon's secretary and treasurer, rather than Solomon or any of Solomon's advisers was in practice to be the greatest influence over the "Sulu volk". 280

In late 1931, furthermore, the possibility of officially recognisin
Solomon and Inkatha received extensive favourable coverage in the Natal English-language media. This coverage, so markedly at variance with the consensus of Natal white opinion regarding the Zulu royal family since 1879, had been stimulated by two developments. First, Zulu suffering as a consequence of the drought and famine had already focussed media attention on the living conditions of the Zulu inhabitants of north-western Zululand and the southern regions of Northern Natal. Second, immediately after the indaba between the SNA and the Zulu at Nongoma in September 1931, which focussed on Zulu local tax arrears and the growing rural famine, Solomon had impressed a Natal Witness journalist by explaining the role that the Zulu kingship, Zulu tribal authorities and Inkatha wished to play in the administration of the Zulu - and Solomon particularly emphasised his disapproval of the ICU. In the same edition in which this interview with Solomon was published, the Natal Witness' editorial urged the government to heed Solomon's words:

What other body [than Inkatha] could more efficiently bridge the hiatus between white and black in this Province? ... the official recognition of the Inkatha [sic] as presently constituted would be a gesture of encouragement to a people who...are manfully striving, as evidenced in the Inkata, to solve their difficulties on lines as nearly approximating to those which our own example holds before them, as their present social system will allow.

If Inkatha were officially ignored, the editorial questioned, "at whose door must the blame be laid for the birth in our midst of societies more potent for evil than the I.C.U.?" In the same month, Fynney made a lengthy and detailed public attack on the policy that the NAD had adopted towards Solomon and Inkatha since the early 1920s. Fynney accused the NAD of refusing to recognise the Zulu king, at the cost of alienating Zulu goodwill, but nonetheless using the influence of Solomon and Inkatha when it suited the NAD to do so. Fynney's attack caused something of a political storm within the NAD, which responded by attempting to explain itself through the columns of the Natal Witness. The Natal Witness nonetheless continued to publish articles that questioned official treatment of Zulu economic problems and political development - which undoubtedly continued to be an
embarrassment to the state department of which Jansen was ministerial head.

Two other influences on Jansen in the period early-1931 to mid-1932 must be mentioned. On the one hand, while not specifically urging that the recognition question be reopened, Nicholls petitioned Jansen to ensure that official support was given to the Shaka Memorial unveiling ceremony, and that official assistance was given to Solomon to settle royal debts. In so doing, Nicholls kept alive Jansen's interest in the political future of Solomon and Zulu nationalism. On the other hand, the Governor-General (the Earl of Clarendon) became personally interested in the question of official policy towards the Zulu kingship in early-1932, after Nicholls had spoken to him about the importance of the Shaka Memorial project. Evidently as a result of his conversation with Nicholls, Clarendon consulted a copy of the Athlone memorandum - which contained a clause recommending that the recognition question be reconsidered in 1932. Hertzog referred Clarendon's enquiries regarding Solomon's official status to Jansen; and Jansen thereupon informed Clarendon in May 1932 that arrangements had already been made for the official reopening of the recognition question. Jansen delayed divulging to the NAD that the recognition question was to be reopened, however, until July 1932.

That Jansen personally favoured the recognition of Solomon and Inkatha was illustrated by Jansen's attempts to ensure that the NAD would not simply reject the recognition question in 1932, as it had done in 1928 and 1930; and it was also illustrated by Jansen's efforts to consult authoritative white opinion which was favourable to Solomon's 'elevation'. As early as January 1932, Jansen requested Nicholls to meet with him to discuss policy towards Solomon. Some months later (but before he had informed the NAD of his reawakened interest in Solomon's political future), Jansen similarly consulted Charles Adams. With Jansen's connivance, Adams subsequently made secret contact with Solomon, and urged Solomon to attempt to redeem himself in the eyes of the NAD. Jansen then held secret discussions with Fynney at Pretoria. When the NC at Nongoma belatedly discovered that these discussions had taken place, he was outraged - and the CNC also appeared to be
annoyed. In August 1932, furthermore, shortly before he formally consulted current NAD opinion on the recognition question, Jansen discussed the history of the Zulu royal family, Inkatha, and the Zululand administration with J. Y. Gibson, an accomplished scholar of Zulu history and a retired Zululand magistrate.

Jansen's purpose in conducting these discussions, it seems, was to reassure himself that his desire to make official use of the institution of Zulu kingship had a broad base of authoritative support. And his considerable efforts to consult 'outside' (i.e. non-NAD) opinion in the first half of 1932, at a time when the administrative interests of the NAD could barely have been less reconcilable with Solomon's official 'elevation', signified that his interest in the recognition strategy did not lie in 'administrative reform' in Zululand: Jansen was primarily interested in the overriding ideological and political significance that the official recognition of the Zulu kingship would have. Jansen's manifest keenness to experiment with 'native policy' in Zululand, however, was decisively blocked by the NAD. In the course of a formal meeting in late August 1932 between the Minister of Native Affairs, the SNA, the CNC and the NC at Nongoma, the latter three officials declared themselves to be categorically opposed to any official extension of Solomon's status or authority, particularly in view of his recent behaviour. Indeed, they desired that further royal cash and cattle collections be forbidden, and that Solomon be officially punished if he had not dismissed Bhengu within a month. Jansen evidently felt that he could not override such united and resolute opposition from his own department of state. The recognition was thus closed once more.

After 1932 Jansen by no means lost interest in the political future of the Zulu kingship and Zulu nationalism. And between 1934 (when Jansen left the office of the Minister of Native Affairs, in the course of a cabinet reshuffle at the time of fusion) and 1948, during which period Jansen held the position of speaker of the House of Assembly, Zulu leaders continued to press for the official recognition of the Zulu kingship. At Solomon's ihlambo
ceremony in August 1934, for example, both Chief Nkantini and Dube appealed for the appointment of Solomon's heir as Zulu king. This ceremony was attended by large numbers of whites, including social anthropologists, NAD officials, and representatives of the Durban municipality, the Transvaal Chamber of Mines and the Union Government. In September 1935, during a meeting with the SNA, the CNC and Natal NCs at Pietermaritzburg, chiefs from throughout the province of Natal (including the Zulu regent, Chief Mshiyeni kaDinizulu) urged the Union Government to establish in the province a "Bantu Ibandla Council" led by "our hereditary Zulu head...to unite us and place matters affecting us before us and enable us to place our matters before the Government." This resolution also intimated that the Zulu people were not interested in representation in the central government.

Reflecting the continuing concern among the African petty bourgeoisie in the province of Natal for Zulu 'traditionalism', Zulu nationalism and the Zulu royal family, the Natal Bantu Teachers' Union established the "Ibandla likaZulu" or "Zulu Society" in January 1936. This organisation's main object was to preserve and promote the culture, laws and customs of the Zulu nation; and its Zulu patron was "The Scion of the Zulu Principal House, Regent Mshiyeni kaDinzulu", while its white patron was the incumbent Minister of Native Affairs. Similarly, the lengthy succession dispute between Solomon's heirs, which was only settled by a specially-appointed 'Government Board of Inquiry' that began sitting in 1945, kept Zulu nationalism and the political significance of the institution of Zulu kingship firmly in the eyes of white authorities.

During the period 1934-1948, Jansen clearly developed his political ideas, drawing on his personal knowledge of Zulu nationalist politics and the adaptationist policy proposals of the 1930s. He did so in the context of the rapid development of Afrikaner nationalist ideology into an embracing socio-political ideological system, and in the process Jansen's ideas were disseminated among fellow Afrikaner nationalist ideologues. Significantly, Mrs E. G. Jansen was chairman of the 'Suid-Afrikaanse Bond vir Rassestudie' during the mid-1930s, while M. C. De Wet Nel was secretary. This Afrikaner 'native policy think tank' was the
predecessor of the 'Suid-Afrikaanse Buro vir Rasse Aangeleentheid' (South African Bureau for Racial Affairs, commonly known as SABRA), which was formed in 1948 to further develop the intellectual foundations of the apartheid concept. M. C. De Wet Nel, as a member of the 'native affairs group' in Malan's National Party caucus, was to be a leading promoter of the apartheid policy after 1948. Jansen himself was the key speaker at the 1944 Afrikaner 'Volkskongres' (People's Congress) of Afrikaner cultural organisations, and in the course of his address he announced that "it is time the Afrikaner policy of separate development be given a chance to be put into practice...whites and non-whites should develop separately and be treated separately". This statement reflected how the ideology of 'separate development' or 'parallel development' was being woven into the ideology of Afrikaner nationalism; and it simultaneously illustrated Jansen's role in interweaving these two ideologies, a development which was crucial for the evolution of apartheid ideology.

It was no mere coincidence that in 1948 E. G. Jansen was selected to be the apartheid government's first Minister of Native Affairs. Nor was it a coincidence that a couple of years later the NAD officially recognised the head of the Zulu royal house, Cyprian kaSolomon Zulu, as paramount chief of the Zulu. The aim to secure the official recognition of the institution of Zulu kingship, which had preoccupied Solomon and Inkatha during the 1920s, was thus achieved only some two decades later - when the South African Government began to implement its policy of apartheid.
In its account of Zulu politics between the Act of Union and the early-1930s, this dissertation focusses on essentially two closely interrelated topics. First, the political role of the Zulu royal family, and particularly the hereditary 'Zulu king' whom white authorities denied official recognition. Second, the political functions and significance of Zulu nationalism, whose most emotive rallying point and most powerful exponent was without question the 'traditional' institution of Zulu kingship.

While the political histories of the Zulu royal family and Zulu nationalism remain the essential focus, however, the dissertation also explores concurrent Zulu socio-economic and cultural change, particularly investigating the evolution of new social divisions (or class formation) among the Zulu, for it is only within this broader context that developments in the expressly political sphere of Zulu life can be understood. Furthermore, attention is given to various 'extraneous influences' that played a major role in the development of Zulu royal and nationalist politics. Among these 'extraneous influences', four were the most important.

First, the pan-Africanist and black nationalist/consciousness doctrines which, having been developed primarily by black American intellectuals as a response to their own experience of racial oppression in the USA, were adopted by the African petty bourgeois educated elite in the province of Natal and reinterpreted in the particularly Zulu context. The drive for pan-African unity and nationalism thus became a drive for Zulu unity and nationalism; and, instead of turning their backs on the 'backwardness' and 'barbarousness' of their tribal past,
the African petty bourgeoisie 'searched for roots' and sought to include the Zulu royal family and 'traditional' institutions in an embracing programme of Zulu social, economic, cultural and political 'redevelopment'. This ideological shift away from the 'British' liberal-democratic values which members of the African petty bourgeoisie had imbibed primarily from their missionary mentors, and which had led educated Africans to strive (vainly) for the franchise and inclusion as full citizens in a non-racial South Africa, was a very marked development of the 1920s. And it was a seminal ideological shift for Zulu nationalist politics, as was manifest in the African petty bourgeoisie's role in formalising and developing Inkatha as a Zulu national 'self-help' scheme and representative political organisation. 2

Second, the Marxist-derived theories of apocalyptic class struggle which, seeming especially meaningful in view of the recent successful revolution in Russia, caught the imagination of the provinces of Natal's urban African workers and rural African 'rank-and-file' - a deliberately loose term used by this dissertation to describe the broad African underclass in the rural areas. The latter developed a certain self-identity during the course of the late-1920s, based on a common experience of impoverishment, exploitation and insecurity; and reinforced by a shared frustration with 'the system', whether this was represented by state officials and the laws that they enforced, conservative tribal authorities and demanding parents, employers or landlords. Moreover, there developed a basis of shared political attitudes: a predisposition to reject established structures of authority and the modes of political representation that that worked through them, a tendency to abjure acquiescence and 'polite pleading' in favour of organisation and action, an impatience with piecemeal reforms, and an
enthusiasm for fundamental changes in property relations
and the distribution of political power.

The ICU (ICU yase Natal after 1928) and, in Northern Natal,
the ALU played a leading role in disseminating the radical
message in the rural areas, and so politicising the rank­
and-file. While making use of Marxist political theory,
both of these organisations sought to integrate
'traditional' Zulu ideas and symbols into militant
popular protest. Both appealed to Zulu nationalist
sentiments, and looked to the institution of Zulu king­
ship for moral support, inspiration and patronage. While
these popular movements were important in themselves, their
main significance for this dissertation is that they
represented a 'common enemy' which led the somewhat
tenuous alliance between the Zulu tribal and petty bourgeois
elites in Inkatha to become more united; and, moreover,
which catalysed a new alliance between Inkatha and
representatives of Natal white propertied and employer
interests. These developments were together crucial
to the redefinition of Inkatha's political role and
political objectives from 1928.³

Third, the influence of Natal's leading white 'native
policy' legislators and representatives of rural white
propertied and employer interests, who intervened in
Zulu politics in early 1928 and allied themselves with
Inkatha. Inkatha's white supporters in the first
instance represented, on the one hand, the Natal sugar
planting interest, and, on the other hand, the Natal
commercial farming interest. These two 'fractions' of
Natal rural capital had, while acting in alliance at
parliamentary level throughout the 1920s, sought to
retain the province's rural labour resources in the
rural districts (stemming the drift of labour towards
the towns and gold mines) and shackle African labour
more securely to the province's rural employers. A vital facet of the Natal planter/farmer alliance's labour policy was the maintenance of the 'tribal system', together with the web of social obligations that underpinned it and the homestead mode of production which was its material foundation, and the use of tribal authorities as suppliers and controllers of labour. That 'socialistic' and revolutionary ideas spread among the African population in the province during the second half of the 1920s, mainly through the influence of ICU activists, emphasised to Natal's rural whites that the maintenance of the tribal order had an expressly political value. Natal's rural whites, moreover, felt that 'British' liberal-democratic notions among the African petty bourgeoisie were as fundamentally revolutionary as 'Russian' socialist notions among the African workforce, and were thus dismayed with Hertzog's 1926 'Native Bills' which sought to permit Africans of the Union to elect white 'native representatives' to the House of Assembly. They responded by rallying to the defence of the Natal 'Shepstonist' model of political, judicial and cultural segregation, which was based on the maintenance of 'tribalism'.

In supporting and advising Inkatha from 1928, Natal's white segregationist thinkers further developed the socio-culturally and politically separatist inclinations already inherent in Inkatha's Zulu nationalism of the mid-1920s, gradually guiding Inkatha's Zulu nationalism of the late-1920s towards a more explicitly segregationist position. At a diplomatic level, Inkatha's white supporters played a vital role as intermediaries between Inkatha and the South African Government. Most importantly, they were the means whereby Inkatha communicated to government personnel its desire for Zulu national 'self-government' under the figurehead of the Zulu king. The history of Solomon and Inkatha from 1928 until Solomon's
death and Inkatha's collapse in the early-1930s cannot be considered as simply 'Zulu history', such was the impact of white intervention.  

Fourth, but not least important, the influence of the NAD. It was the NAD, and more particularly the Natal NAD, which in practice defined official policy towards Solomon and Inkatha - and official policy exerted considerable influence on the political histories of the Zulu royal family and Zulu nationalism. Indeed, Solomon throughout his life appealed for official recognition, initially (and successfully) as chief of the Usuthu ward and subsequently as king of the Zulu nation. For Solomon, the official recognition of the Zulu kingship was an end in itself: he wished all the Zulu people to be united as a nation beneath himself as their king, just as they had been in the days of his predecessors. His official status as chief of the Usuthu was parochial and inadequate - and it was not sufficient that the Zulu people recognised his claim to kingship if white authorities did not. The drive for official recognition was similarly Inkatha's overriding concern. The realisation of any of Inkatha's social, economic, cultural and political objectives was largely dependent on the organisation's being accorded official status and authority, in the capacity of the Zulu nation's representative political organisation and instrument for national 'self-government'.

The NAD's role in the history of Zulu nationalist politics was not simply to deny Solomon and Inkatha official recognition, which was essential if Inkatha's Zulu 'self-government' and 'national reconstruction' policies were to be put into practice. In numerous ways, the NAD succeeded in hindering Solomon's and Inkatha's political activities, whether by persuading Solomon not to get involved in the independent church movement; refusing to
hear deputations from the 'Zulu nation' led by Solomon; preventing Inkatha from purchasing land for development in the Vryheid district; or banning Inkatha collections. And by publicly rebuffing Solomon and Inkatha, the NAD was to a certain extent able to undermine the latter's Zulu support: while the institution of Zulu kingship was on occasion perceived to be a rallying point for rebellion against white rule, subjugation and dependency had so pervaded Zulu political consciousness that most Zulu as a rule desired their leaders to command the approval of their white overlords. The Natal NAD jealously guarded its 'expertise' in the administration of the Zulu, and never quite lost its apprehensiveness for Zulu unity beneath Cetshwayo's and Dinuzulu's heirs. It perceived itself to be a 'disinterested' and independent authority - which, to a limited extent, was true. It certainly was not simply a slave to white interests and the government. Part of the reason why the appeal for the recognition of the Zulu kingship was rejected in 1928, for example, was that the NAD regarded the appeal as integral to an improper 'plot' furthered by Natal's rural white employer interests to gain greater control over Zulu labour. And the Natal NAD, Solomon and Inkatha together succeeded in resisting the implementation of the government's (elective) local council policy in the province of Natal, on the grounds that it would undermine the 'traditional' tribal system of government - 'traditional' to both the Natal NAD and the Zulu themselves. Ultimately, however, the Natal NAD took such pride in its own 'administrative tradition' and so ensnared itself in red tape that it was loathe to consider any adjustment to the administrative system it had inherited from the days of Shepstone. And Solomon's personal behaviour during the five years before his premature death (by which time Natal officials had become more sympathetic to Solomon's royal claims and Zulu national unity), together with Inkatha's internal corruption, doused any possibility of the Natal NAD supporting the resurrection of the Zulu monarchy.
The way in which Zulu royal and nationalist politics developed in the early post-Union period cannot, however, be solely understood in terms of the roles played by the above four 'extraneous influences'. The conquest of the Zulu kingdom in 1879 transformed the Zulu royal family and Zulu nationalism into, in essence, little more than anachronistic political remnants of past Zulu independence. The Zululand administration successfully prevented Cetshwayo and his heir, Dinuzulu, from taking up the role of head of the Zulu nation, as preconquest kings had done; and the violent internecine rivalries of the Zulu civil war effectively shattered Zulu national unity. But, at the ideological level, Zulu identification with the central royal family and a united Zulu nationalism did not simply disappear, however divorced the latter concepts were from the realities post-conquest Zulu politics. Monarchical and nationalist sentiments clearly remained embedded, if often hidden, in Zulu consciousness, sustained by the Zulu people's respect for tradition and their memories of past Zulu independence and imperial power. The main inheritors, custodians, and exponents of Zulu tradition and oral history were the hereditary Zulu tribal authorities – including the royal family which had stood at the apex of the Zulu tribal hierarchy. Particularly after Solomon's drive for tribal reconciliation had healed the dynastic rifts of the Zulu civil war, Zulu chiefs and izinduna together acted as Solomon's closest allies in working towards the reunification of the Zulu nation under the leadership of the Zulu king. In the 1920s, however, the Zulu tribal elite's interest in the resurrection of Zulu nationhood and the Zulu monarchy did not simply flow from a somewhat wistful nostalgia for the 'good old days' of the Zulu kingdom: the political role of Zulu tribal authorities had undergone considerable change since 1879, and so too had their political priorities.

With accelerated effect after the declaration of Union, the Zulu experience of and response to white overrule progressively
eroded tribalism and all that it encompassed: an agricultural and pastoral subsistence economy socially ordered by a redistributive rationale, a social ethos of reciprocal obligation, and a political ideology that defined rulers as organic components of the society that they ruled but as inherently authoritative. The status and power of tribal authorities was threatened by the evolution of new classes within the Zulu, notably the 'westernised' petty bourgeoisie and the 'detribalised' abagafi - the 'selfish' youthful stratum which renaged on their tribal responsibilities, and which was to form the backbone of the militant rank-and-file of the late-1920s. Tribal authorities no longer represented the unity of their 'followers', as they had done in precolonial times. Socially, culturally and politically, the trend - especially during the 1920s - was for the tribal elite to distinguish themselves as a separate class, drawing their economic power from their control of land, their salaried public office, and from their own and their wards' agricultural pursuits in Zululand, and monetary earnings in the urban areas. In espousing the cause of Zulu national unity beneath Solomon from the 1920s, the Zulu tribal elite sought to mobilise Zulu nationalism as a profoundly conservative social force, which would safeguard the privileges of the 'ancien regime' - including the privileges that the tribal elite enjoyed under white overrule. The Zulu tribal elite, under the leadership of the Zulu royal family, thus themselves played a leading role in the history of Zulu royal and nationalist politics. 7

This dissertation attempts to combine a narrative and a thematic approach to the subject matter. In structuring the sequence of chapters, however, the dominant concern has been with chronology and the narrative rather than with analytical themes. Indeed, an important objective of this study has been to establish a narrative framework of Zulu
history during the early post-Union period, for none already exists.

Thus Chapter one, which is simply and introductory chapter, sketches the history of the Zulu royal family and official policy in Zululand from the conquest of the Zulu in 1879 until the death of Dinuzulu in exile in 1913. Chapter two, having examined socio-economic change among the Zulu during the first few years after the Act of Union (1910), deals with the re-establishment of the Zulu royal family in Zululand, under Solomon's leadership, in the years 1913 and 1914. Chapter three covers the years 1914 to 1920, during which Solomon was officially appointed as chief of the Usuthu ward, following a prolonged confrontation between Zulu royalists and the Natal NAD. It also refers to developments in the sphere of African petty bourgeois and worker politics, and Union 'native policy', which together were to be a dynamic influence on Zulu nationalist politics in the decade to follow. Chapter four in turn covers the years 1920 to 1927, and describes how two concurrent political processes caused Zulu nationalism and the Zulu royal family to develop into potent political forces among the Zulu-speaking people as a whole. On the one hand, there was the increasing fraternisation between the Natal African and Zulu petty bourgeoisie and the Zulu tribal elite, which was expressed in the formalisation of the Inkatha organisation; and, on the other hand, there was the drive for tribal or dynastic 'reconciliation' which was successfully promoted by Solomon. Tensions between the petty bourgeois and tribal elites, together with the NAD's adverse attitude towards Zulu unity beneath Solomon and Inkatha, however, left Inkatha in a near moribund state by 1927. The focus of Chapter five falls on the crucial year 1928, in which Inkatha's petty bourgeois and tribal elites together allied themselves with white interest groups, and opposed the growing militancy of the urban African workforce and rural African rank-
These political developments are placed in the context of accelerated socio-economic and ideological change within the Zulu, together with increased fears among Natal whites for their own economic and political security; so too is the reconstitution of Inkatha in 1928, and the organisation's new drive for Zulu national 'self-government' under the figurehead of Solomon. The concluding Chapter six covers the period 1928 to 1933, which ends with Inkatha's collapse and Solomon's death. It begins by tracing Inkatha's attempts to secure the official recognition of the Zulu kingship and the implementation of Zulu national 'self-government', leading up to the disastrous Zulu indaba with the Governor-General in 1930. Particular emphasis is placed on the role played by Inkatha's white supporters, and the proposal made by the Governor-General, the Earl of Athlone, that Zululand be separately administered along the lines of the neighbouring High Commission Territories. Thereafter it traces Solomon's and Inkatha's decline, while indicating how the ideologies and policies developed by Inkatha and Inkatha's white supporters during the late-1920s had an enduring influence on Zulu nationalist politics - and state segregationism.

Considering the dissertation as a whole, the central theme is the resuscitation of Zulu national identity and the resurrection of the political status of the Zulu royal house. These two concurrent and interrelated developments, indeed, are absolutely crucial to the history of Zulu politics between the Act of Union and the early-1930s. The Zulu display that Solomon had arranged to greet the Prince of Wales in 1925 represented the apogee of a united Zulu nationalism beneath the Zulu kingship. Largely through Solomon's own diplomacy, the rifts between the Usuthu and the dissidents of the civil war period (Mandlakazi, Ngenetsheni and Buthelezi) had been healed; and the gulf between 'tribal' and 'kholwa' had been bridged. However, the populist nationalism of 1925 proved incapable of containing the class divisions.
that had crystallised within Zulu society during the 1920s. Both the alliance of petty bourgeois and tribal elites in Inkatha, on the one hand, and the rural rank-and-file and urban working class (mainly represented by the ICU), on the other hand, appropriated Zulu nationalism to their class interests. The former sought to define Zulu nationalism as a conservative, hamba kahle and collaborative social force, and encouraged the state to implement for the 'Zulu nation' a thoroughgoing policy of political and territorial segregation. The latter sought to interweave Zulu nationalism with militant and revolutionary ideologies of working class action. Solomon identified himself and the Zulu royal family with Inkatha's interpretation of Zulu nationalism, which thus became the mainstream of Zulu nationalism.

The ambiguities that emerged within Zulu nationalism during Solomon's period, however, have not disappeared. While Zulu workers were mobilising under the cry 'Usuthu' during the 1973 Durban strikes, for example, the incumbent Zulu monarch, King Goodwill Zwelithini, and his royal council were intriguing with Pretoria to dislodge the less compliant Chief Gatsha Buthelezi from control over Zulu politics. A similar ambiguousness has been expressed by the present Inkatha: the organisation operates from within the structure of apartheid, but has acted as the most outspoken critic of South African Government policy to have emerged from within apartheid's own structure.
FOOTNOTES
and
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Footnotes to Chapter 1

1 Diplomatic Agent to the Native Tribes, and Secretary of Native Affairs for Natal, 1846 - 1876.
6 For analyses of the precapitalist mode of production in Natal and Zululand, see J. Guy, "Ecological factors in the rise of Shaka and the Zulu Kingdom", in Marks and Atmore, Economy and Society, pp. 112 ff, and Slater, "Changing pattern", pp. 154, 155.
8 Etherington, "Origins of Indirect Rule", p. 15.
14 Hahlo and Kahn, South Africa, p. 322
17 Edgecombe, "Clarke, 1893 - 7", p. 43.
18 In the terminology of social anthropology, 'Nguni society' is characterised as a "patrilineal segmentary lineage system", which allowed for the constant fission of political power. In this sense the Zulu Kingdom was a not entirely typical example of the Nguni society. For a brief analysis,

19 Edgecombe, "Clarke, 1893 - 7".
21 Wolseley's address, 1/9/1879, quoted by J. S. Marwick in a review of the administration of Zululand, Natal Mercury, 5/1/1917. See also Guy, Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom, p.69.
22 This is the major thesis of his Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom.
23 The phrase is from Guy, Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom, p.80. This does not suggest that Shepstone agreed with all the details of policy as it was implemented. For his criticisms of the Wolseley settlement, see ibid., pp.80 - 81.
24 Memoranda by Shepstone during 1887 and 1888, quoted in Edgecombe, "Clarke, 1893 - 7", p.44.
26 Guy, Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom, p.76.
27 Ibid., pp.72, 73.
28 Hamu had the dubious distinction of being the only Zulu of note to defect to the British during the war. For details on Hamu, see N. L. G. Cope, "The Defection of Hamu" (unpublished B. A. Hons dissertation, University of Natal, 1980), particularly pp.34 - 51, and on Zibhebh u and Hamu, Guy, Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom, pp.74, 75, and 83 - 87.
29 For details of the Qulusi and Mnyamana Buthelezi, see Guy, Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom, pp. 36, and 32, 74 respectively.
30 Ibid., p.75.
32 The main sources for the above overview of the admin- istration of Zululand, 1879 - 1887 are: Guy, Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom, parts II and III; Laband, "Dick Addison", pp.11 - 77; and Brookes and Webb, Natal, ch. 15.
34 Shepstone himself was directly responsible for the arrangements made in 1887. Laband, "Dick Addison", pp.17, 18.
This was healed on Solomon's initiatives. See ch. 4 below.

Ibid., "Clarke, 1893 - 7", pp. 43, 46.

Colonial Office Confidential Print (hereafter CO), Series 871/41, No. 471, Clarke Despatch encl. in Sir W. Hely - Hutchinson, Governor of Natal and Zululand, to Lord Ripon, 16/12/1893.

Clarke to Ripon, 8/12/1893, quoted in Edgecombe, "Clarke, 1893 - 7", p. 46.


CO 879/41, No. 471, Hely - Hutchinson to Ripon, 16/12/1893.

Quoted in Edgecombe, "Clarke, 1893 - 7", p. 50.

CO 879/41, No. 471, Clarke to Hely - Hutchinson, 18/1/1894.

Ibid.


For details, see D. Buys, "The negotiations between the Colony of Natal and the Colonial Office leading to the passing of the Annexation of Zululand Act (No. 37) of 1897, 1894 - 1897", (unpublished B.A. Hons dissertation, University of Natal, 1980); and Edgecombe, "Clarke, 1893 - 7", pp. 51, 52.

The Governor of Natal did not even grant Dinuzulu his wish to "pay his respects" to the Natal Government on his return. Swart, "Harriette Colenso", pp. 26-28.

Perhaps the most striking example was Sir Garnet Wolseley. See Guy, Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom, pp. 69 - 72.

The Resident Commissioner and other civil authorities opposed this move. Swart, "Harriette Colenso", p. 30.
The person chosen to lead the spies was Maphelu keMkosana of the Zungu, one of Cetshwayo's trusted aids and a warrior who had served with distinction in the Anglo-Zulu war. After 1884 he had been a close confidante of Dinuzulu. For a biographical outline of Maphelu, see Killie Campbell Africana Library (hereafter KCAL), Zulu Society Collection, doc. 16662, notes made by C. Mpanza, secretary, Zulu Society, n.d.; for details on the Zulu role during the Anglo-Boer war, see doc. 16665, Maphelu's own account of his life and Zulu history as transcribed by the Zulu Society in the 1930s (hereafter Account of Maphelu. I worked from a private translation, but all page references refer to the original Zulu typescript.) p.91.

Account of Maphelu, p.92.

Natal Archives Depot, Prime Minister's Records (hereafter PM), 103, 81/1907, Magistrate Eshowe to Acting Prime Minister, 3/5/1907.

PM 103, 81/1907, Acting Prime Minister to Magistrate Eshowe, 1/5/1907.


H. Rogers, Native Administration in the Union of South Africa, (Johannesburg, 1933), p.6.

I. L. Evans, Native Policy in Southern Africa, (Cambridge, 1934), pp. 17, 18; and Rogers, Native Administration, pp. 6, 7.

Commission to make recommendations for the reorganisation of the Public Service, Eighth Report: Department of Native Affairs, UG22 - 1912.

Ibid., p. 113. See also Rogers, Native Administration, p. 7; and Evans, Native Policy, p. 18.

Commission for reorganisation of the N A D, UG22 - 1912, p. 111. The post was abolished in about 1916.

Rogers, Native Administration, p. 7.

Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1910, U17 - 1911, p. 18. 'Somtseu' was the African name of Sir Theophilus Shepstone; it is very improbable that the Zulu as opposed Natal Africans would have received Somtseu's son so welcomingly.


See his report in Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1910, U17-1911, p.43. The Addison family continued its links with African administration, and its dealings with the Zulu royal family. Addison's son, Vivian, also entered the Natal NAD and served as senior member of the Government Board of Inquiry appointed in 1945 under B. W. Martin (see footnote 75) to resolve the Zulu royal succession dispute.

Shula Marks describes white attitudes at the turn of the century as a "peculiar blend of paternalism, fear and contempt". Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 11.


Evidence for these generalizations on Natal officials lie in a diverse set of sources. For a sociological analysis of the role of a few selected officials, and the ties of affiliation that obtained between them and African people, see the contemporary research and findings of M. Gluckman, "Analysis of a Social Situation in modern Zululand", Bantu Studies, Vol. 14, 1940, pp. 1 - 30 (Part I), and pp. 147 - 174 (Part II); and his further analysis in "The Tribal Area in South and Central Africa", in L. Kuper, and M. G. Smith (eds), Pluralism in Africa, (Los Angeles, 1971), pp. 373 - 409, especially pp. 382 - 385. More personal insights, are to be found in autobiographies and accounts of Natal officials themselves, eg. H. P. Braatvedt, Roaming Zululand with a Native Commissioner, (Pietermaritzburg, 1949) (The son of a missionary, born and brought up in Zululand. Both he and his brother E. N. Braatvedt entered the NAD and spent much of their careers in Zululand); H. C. Lugg, A Natal Family Looks Back, (Durban, 1970) (Interpreter and magistrate, appointed Natal CNC in 1936, accomplished Zulu linguist and scholar. His father was one of the survivors of the defence of Rorke's Drift); B. W. Martin, "Old Soldiers Never Die", (unpublished Mss autobiography, KCAL, B. W. Martin Papers, 3.09, KCM 2668) (Captain of the S. A. Native Labour Corps in France during World War I, magistrate, president of the Native Appeal Court, Union Director of Native Labour, and Acting Natal CNC); F. W. Ahrens, From Bench to Bench, (Pietermaritzburg, 1948) (Zululand magistrate in the 1920s and 1930s - an authoritarian and oppressive official); R. C. A. Samuelson, Long Long Ago, (Durban, 1929) (Interpreter, later Natal Under-Secretary for Native Affairs); and also J. Y. Gibson, The Story of the Zulus, (London, 1911) (A historical work. Gibson was a magistrate, eventually serving as DNC of Zululand). Finally, instructive material lies throughout the archival collections of the Natal NAD, in the Natal Archives Depot, some of which will be brought to light in this thesis.
See ch. 3 below for details. It is perhaps significant that although wheelwright began his career in Zululand in 1890, he spent the 14 years prior to his appointment as CNC well away from Natal – in the Soutpansberg district of the northern Transvaal. State Archives, Pretoria, Native Economic Commission 1930 – 1932, Evidence (hereafter NEC), Box 4, evidence of C. A. Wheelwright, 25/9/1930, p. 1721.

For brief details on the views of the British Government and Botha (Prime Minister, Transvaal Colony), Smuts (cabinet member, Transvaal Colony), Steyn (ex-President, Orange River Colony), and Merriman (Prime Minister, Cape Colony), see Brookes and Webb, Natal, pp. 229 – 230. Before the trial, the Natal Government withheld Dinuzulu's £500 stipend, leaving him without means to cover his own defence. W. P. Schreiner, former Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, undertook to defend Dinuzulu at drastically reduced rates. Furthermore, the Imperial Government assisted his defence by way of a secret grant. Ibid., pp. 226 – 227.


Ibid.


The precise practical role played by Dinuzulu is still unclear. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 251.


For detailed accounts of Dinuzulu's 'miraculous feats' and intended actions, see the contemporary account in M. M. Fuze, The Black People and whence they came, (Pietermaritzburg, 1979), ch. 64; and Brookes and Webb, Natal, p. 220.

Guy, Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom, pp. 18, 244.

Further observations are made in Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 336 ff.

The word 'tribal' is a descriptive term, and does not suggest that those described as 'tribal' had been left fundamentally unaffected by white rule and industrialization. It refers primarily to those who still lived on the land, herding and cultivating in the custom of their predecessors, and who were still closely enmeshed in the social and cultural traditions of pre-colonial African society. More narrowly, it refers to those who still wore traditional clothing.

D. Hemson, "Class Consciousness and Migrant Workers: Dockworkers of Durban, (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Warwick, 1979), pp. 121, 122; Marks Reluctant Rebellion, p. 230. In challenging the conventional view that the rebellion was an essentially tribal revolt, Hemson perhaps over-emphasizes the role of workers - whose awareness of "new techniques of struggles (strikes, attacks on the police, legal action by workers) was subordinated to the traditional methods of massed attack" in 1906. Hemson, "Dockworkers of Durban", p. 123.
Kholwa responses to the rebellion and to Dinuzulu's treason trial are detailed in Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 326 ff, 358, 361, and for Ethiopianism, see pp. 59 ff, 74 - 79.


This was in contravention of the recommendations of the Commission. Ibid. The balance was demarcated into twenty-one 'Native reserves' and was formally vested in the Zululand Native Trust, following the precedent set in Natal proper, by Deed of Grant dated 6 April 1909. The Trustees (the Governor and Natal Government) were to control the use and occupation of the reserves and were responsible for the administration of the inhabitants. The Union Government inherited these powers in 1912. See Rogers, Native Administration, pp. 96, 97, and transcript of Deed of Grant, 6/4/1909, pp. 284 - 288.

At the turn of the century, the proportion of labour migration per capita population from the Vryheid district was the highest in the whole of Natal. Hemson, "Dockworkers of Durban", p. 53, and Figure 2.1 opposite. For a detailed account, see C. Ballard, "A Year of Scarcity': The 1896 Locust Plague in Natal", South African Historical Journal, 15, 1983.

Bundy, Peasantry, p. 188. For an eyewitness account, see Account of Maphelu, p. 88.

Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1910, U17 - 1911, p. 15.

Ibid., p. 33.

Ibid., p. 43.
They were: 1. Mciteki, son of Zibhebhu and acting chief of the Mandakazi pending the majority of the heir, Bokwe. 2. Mpikanina, son of Ziwedu. Ziwedu was one of Dinuzulu's uncles who became an Usuthu leader after 1879. He broke with Dinuzulu, however, during the rebellion of 1888. 3. Moya, son of Mgojana and descendent of Zwide of the Ndwalwe who had been expelled from Zululand by Shaka in about 1817. Mgijana had been one of Wolseley's most ineffectual 'Kinlets', and was killed by the Usuthu in 1888 as an adherent of Zibhebhu. 4. Mkandumba, son of Tshanibezwe son of Myamana of the Buthelezi. The latter was chief councillor to Cetshwayo but had fallen out with Dinuzulu in 1888. Mkandumba was soon afterwards sentenced to death for murder, and was replaced as chief by a brother, Acting Chief Muzimubi. Natal Archives Depot, Chief Native Commissioner's Correspondence, 1910 - 1919 (hereafter CNC), 144, memorandum by J. Y. Gibson, DNC Zululand, 5/8/1914, pp. 4 - 6; Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1910, U17 - 1911, pp. 20, 43; and also Natal Mercury, 5/1/1917.

Harriette was a daughter of Bishop Colenso (Sobantu), and like her father was a tireless champion of Zulu rights after 1879. After Dinuzulu's death her activities lessened. See S. Marks, "Harriette Colenso and the Zulus, 1874 - 1913", Journal of African History, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1963.

Botha had kept in contact with Dinuzulu during the latter's imprisonment. He was also responsible for the release of other Usuthu prisoners. Account of Maphelu, pp. 96, 97.

The Xhosa (Cape) newspaper observed that Dinuzulu's release was to Botha's "lasting credit", and that Botha had put Dinuzulu in exile in the Transvaal only to appease "the susceptibilities of his Natal enemies". Imvo, 21/10/1913, Dinuzulu's obituary.

Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1910, U17 - 1911, DNC's and Magistrate's reports, pp. 35, 336, 337.

Harriette Colenso kept the cuttings. KCAL, Miss (Harriette Emily) Colenso Newscutting Book, Vol. 2, ref. 20026, pp. 121 - 5.
Footnotes to Chapter 2

1 CNC 144, 1985/1913, notes of interview between the SNA and Mankulumana, three other izinduna of the late Dinuzulu, Rev. Twala, Miss Colenso and Mr Herold, Magistrate Middelburg, 12/12/1913, during which events since Dinuzulu's death were discussed.

2 The suggestion here is that Dinuzulu had been sold by the Zulu people into the hands of foreigners. Account of Maphelu, p. 95; and Fuze, Black People, p. 145.

3 This was not only an act of magnanimity. It was also designed to prevent royal agents being sent out to make collections and in the process 'unsettling' the population.

4 CNC 144, 1985/1913, notes of interview between SNA and Mankulumana, 12/12/1913.

5 Date provided by A.T.Bryant, Olden Times in Zululand and Natal (London, 1929), pp. 35, 45. Some Zulu kings were not buried here (eg. Dingane, Cetshwayo) on account of civil disturbance at the time of their deaths. See Natal Archives Depot, CNC's Correspondence 1919-1950 (hereafter CNC PMB. Note: This more recent collection of the CNC's records is not yet 'classified', and hence box numbers are impermanent. The file references quoted after the box numbers are more useful for locating sources), 72, 57/29, Map and Notes of Emakhosini, compiled by Natal Surveyor-General's Office, 1910; and KCAL, Lugg Collection (hereafter MS LUG), 1.09, MS 1406, notes recorded by Charles J. Mpanza.

6 CNC 144, 1985/1913, Pixley kaI. Seme to Dr Bok, private secretary to the Prime Minister, 8/12/1913.

7 CNC 144, 1985/1913, report of Socwatsha and Nongejeni, political intelligence messengers attached to the Natal NAD, 28/11/1913, reporting Chief Moya's (p. 6) and Chief Mciteki's (p. 8) accounts of Miss Colenso's statement to the Zulu at Dinuzulu's funeral.

8 Induna (sing), izinduna (pl) refer to persons appointed by a chief to carry out administrative duties on his behalf, which may include hearing court cases. Under the Natal Code of Native Law they are referred to as 'headmen'. More loosely, the term can refer to advisers or representatives of a chief.

9 See Account of Maphelu, p. 98.

10 CNC 144, 1985/1913, report of Socwatsha and Nongejeni, 28/11/1913.

11 'Nobamba' means "stronghold of unity" and "preserver". MS LUG 1.09, MS 1406, notes recorded by Mpanza and appended notes by H. C. Lugg.

12 Account of Maphelu, p. 98.

Account of Maphe1u, p. 99.

University of Natal, Durban, Department of Zulu Language and Literature, unpublished collection of Zulu Praise Poems recorded by James Stuart and translated by D. McK. Malcolm and A. T. Cope.

See account of Maphe1u, p. 103.

'Musihe1u' is a Zulu corruption of 'Miss Harriette'. She was also known as 'uDh1edh1we' (the staff) since in the later years of her father Bishop Colenso's life, she had sat at his right hand, acting as interpreter and secretary during his interviews with Zulu. KCAL, Harriette Colenso Collection, ref. 13083, notes on the life of Harriette Colenso by Alice Werner, 1932, p. 12.

Pers. Comm., Magogo Buthelezi, daughter of Dinuzulu, KwaPhindangene, Zululand, 6/1/1982, part I, p.3. (All page references to interviews conducted by myself refer to the transcripts now stored in KCAL.)

Account of Maphe1u, p. 98.

In approximately 1915 Marwick and Morris formed 'Marwick and Morris Agency, Ltd' to supply labour on contract to the Native Recruiting Corporation. MS MAR, File 21, KCM 3155 (a). Although the magistrate of Eshowe in the mid 1920's, A. D. Graham, was known as Zithulele, it seems unlikely that it was he who Maphele refers to in this context. See Natal Mercury, 6/5/1927.

Account of Maphe1u, p. 98.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 99.

Ibid.


CNC 144, 1985/1913, notes of interview between CNC and Mnyaiza kaNdabuko, 19/2/1914.


CNC 144, 1985/1913, notes of interview between SNA and Mankulumana, 12/12/1913. For Seme's role at the funeral, see Account of Maphelu, p. 101.


CNC 144, 1985/1913, B. Colenbrander, Magistrate Vryheid, to CNC, 12/11/1913.

CO 879/115, Sir Rider Haggard to Right Hon. Lewis Harcourt, 1/6/1914, relating his impressions of Rhodesia and Zululand during his recent visit, p. 6. Precise dates of his travels in Zululand not provided.

Ibid., p. 7


Official at important meeting.


Ibid., pp. 7, 8.

Ibid.

These forms of tenancy were sometimes mixed in individual cases.


See Greenberg, Race and State, p. 81; and Morris, "Capitalism in South African Agriculture", pp. 325ff. The precise terms of tenancy varied from area to area and between different landowners; there was no established form.

Lacey, Boroko, pp. 126, 127. Squatters who remained would be required to pay the state hut tax as well as rentals to their landlord, which would persuade them to leave even without an eviction notice from the landlord.


See ibid., especially pp. 458ff, 488ff.

It was therefore a political issue of great importance that there was a growing tendency among migrant labourers to treat their wages as their private property - and to decrease the amounts remitted 'home' to their rural dependants. See below.

Hemson, "Dockworkers of Durban", p. 54.

See Guy, Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom, pp. 4-8; and "Ecological factors in the rise of Shaka".

Hemson, "Dockworkers of Durban", pp. 51-54, and Figure 2.2 (opposite p. 53).

Slater, "Changing pattern", pp. 152-155, 160-163; and Bundy, Peasantry, pp. 168ff. Not all 'rentier capital' or absentee landowners were necessarily large landowners or speculators.


Slater, "Changing pattern", pp. 157-159.

Ibid., p. 163; and Bundy, Peasantry, p. 183.

Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1910, U17-'11, report of DNC No. 3 (Northern Natal), p. 38.


Debates of the House of Assembly as reported in the Cape Times (hereafter Cape Times; the latter provide a comprehensive coverage of parliamentary proceedings between 1915 and 1923 when these were not officially published), 4/5/1916, tabling of Beaumont's minority report on Natal.


See Lacey, Boroko, p. 127.

See the remarks on this matter in Brookes and Hurwitz, Natal Regional Survey, p. 28.


CNC 221, 1628/1915, Detached Assistant Magistrate Babanango to Magistrate Vryheid, 19/11/1915.

CNC PMB 72, 57/29, Assistant Magistrate Babanango to Magistrate Vryheid, 6/11/1916.

For "many years" prior to his death, Dinuzu1u had not paid rental for Nobamba. CNC 144, 1985/1913, CNC to SNA, 30/12/1913. Solomon inherited these debts. Moreover, after the state hut tax was imposed on 'surplus' tenants, Solomon fell behind on hut tax payments for Nobamba and Zidindini. He argued that the £100 p.a. allowance he received from the government to support Dinuzu1u's dependants was insufficient because many were "amakholwa" and so needed European clothing. He also pointed to crop failure. CNC 221, 1628/1915, Detached Assistant Magistrate Babanango to Magistrate Vryheid, 19/11/1915.

CNC PMB 72, 57/29, Assistant Magistrate Babanango to Magistrate Vryheid, 6/11/1916.


CNC PMB 72, 57/29, SNA to CNC enclosing £120 in favour of Buys, 18/3/1918. A total of £180/17/0 was spent from NAD funds to settle this case. See Report of the Controller and Auditor-General for the financial year 1917-1918, UG 42-'18, p. 40.

CNC PMB 72, 57/29, SNA to CNC, 18/3/1918. See also extensive correspondence on this matter during the period April to July 1918. Strife between Solomon and Buys persisted nonetheless. See, in this file, correspondence during the periods February to September 1920, June and July 1921, and September 1928 to August 1929.

CNC PMB 72, 57/29, CNC to SNA, 17/8/1916; and Anton Potgieter to General Botha, 18/1/1917.

CNC PMB 72, 57/29, Potgieter to Botha 18/1/1917.

See CNC PMB 72, 57/29, CNC to SNA, 17/8/1916; and Magistrate Nongoma to CNC, 22/3/1917.

See CNC PMB 72, 57/29, CNC to SNA, 17/8/1916; and CNC to Magistrate Vryheid, 8/10/1928.
79 CNC PMB 81, 58/7/1, SNA to CNC, 28/4/1916.
80 CNC PMB 72, 57/29, CNC to SNA, 17/8/1916.
81 See below for details.
82 Land Commission Report, UG 22-16, evidence of Chief Nkantini (Emtonjaneni), 16/7/1914, p. 486.
83 Natal Archives Depot, Archives of the Secretary of Native Affairs (hereafter SNA), I/9/5, statement of Dhludhla to CNC at meeting of representatives of local chiefs, Babanango, 25/5/1920.
84 Ibid.
85 See Bundy, Peasantry, p. 179, and Slater, "Changing pattern", p. 163.
86 See Bundy, Peasantry, pp. 172, 179 for details on the communities at Umvoti Mission reserve (Rev. A. Grout's congregation) and Edendale (Rev. J. Allison).
87 Bundy, Peasantry, p. 179.
90 See Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1910, U17-'11, report of DNC No. 4 (Zulu land), p. 42.
94 Ibid., report of magistrate of Vryheid, p. 313.
95 NEC Box 4, evidence of W. W. Ndhlolvu, Vryheid, p. 1528. See also p. 1523.
97 Ibid., evidence of S. E. Henwood (Vryheid solicitor), 4/6/1915, p. 629.
98 Account of Mapelu, pp. 90, 97.
Policy-makers in Natal tended to see African land purchase in a quite different light: land ownership would give Africans a stake in the country and would be a safeguard against future disturbance. See quotation from the report of the Zululand Lands Delimitation Commission above; and Bundy, Peasantry, p. 181.

SNA II/5/2, Natives Land Committee, minutes of evidence of George Coventry, taken at magistrate's office, Bergville, 27/2/1917.

Bundy, Peasantry, p. 181.

These proposals were set out in the Native Administration Bill which was not accepted by parliament. See Natal Land Committee Evidence, UG 35-'18, evidence of W. W. Ndhlovu, 24/3/1917, pp. 76, 235; Stephen Mini, pp. 98, 99; John Dube, pp. 99-101; Martin Luthuli, pp. 101-103; and Select Committee on Native Affairs, 1917, SC6A-'17, evidence of Stephen Mini, Josiah Gumede, and Abner Mtikulu, 5/6/1917, pp. 618ff.


Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1910, U17-'11, report of DNC No. 4, p. 42.

Ibid., report of DNC No.3, p. 37.


See the magisterial reports under 'Health' in Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1910, U17-'11, pp. 96ff.


CO 879/115, Haggard to Harcourt, p. 7.

Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1910, U17-'11, 'Health' report, Mahlabatini and Nguthu, pp. 97-98.

A. Werner, "Native Affairs in Natal", Journal of African Society, No. XVII, October 1905, p. 83. Alice Werner, an academic at the University of London, was an associate of Harriette Coleso.

See the various entries under 'Health' in Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1910, U17-'11, pp. 96ff, and reports of DNC No.3, p. 37, and DNC No.4, p. 41.

This was particularly true in Northern Natal, see ibid., report of DNC No.3, p. 38.

Report of the Native Affairs Department, 1912, UG33-'13, report of the CNC, p. 57.
CO 879/115, Haggard to Harcourt, p. 7.

Ibid.

H. C. Lugg, "The practice of lobolo in Natal", Bantu Studies, Vol. 4, 1945, p. 23. Lugg's understanding of the transfer of amabeka, considered separately, is most useful. "The payment of lobolo constitutes a token or symbol providing proof of the ratification of the marriage contract, and although the transaction cannot be regarded as one of purchase and sale it nevertheless represents compensation for the loss of the woman's services in her father's home, and for this reason must be regarded as its most important feature. She must be replaced by cattle or other value which will in turn be made available for the acquisition of another woman as a wife for one of the inmates of the kraal. The term covers a wide field and for this reason is difficult to define, but I would prefer to regard it as being the consideration received by the father or guardian of a woman in exchange for his ward on her marriage, symbolising the implementation of the marriage compact, and making compensation for the loss of her services." Ibid.


For details see Lugg, "Lobolo", pp. 24, 25.


This should not be exaggerated. Wives and their segments were also ranked by the umnumzana's choice of which should be his 'great wife' (i.e. the one who would most likely bear his heir) or who was his favourite, and his choice was not necessarily determined by the status that each of his wives drew from their social origin. For an analysis and graphic representations of Zulu social structure (the form and functioning of the patrilineal segmentary lineage system, the definition of lineage segment, lineage group and clan, and the composition of political units or chiefdoms) see Guy, Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom, pp. 21-30.

Guy, "Destruction and reconstruction", p. 181.

Ibid., pp. 170ff, 181ff.

Ibid., pp. 181, 182.

Ibid.
These complaints became current in the late 1890s. Guy, "Destruction and reconstruction", pp. 185, 188.

Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1910, U17-'11, report of Magistrate Ndwandwe re. 'Social Conditions', p. 315. See also reports of Magistrates Vryheid and Hlabisa, pp. 313-314.

CO 879/115, Haggard to Harcourt, pp. 8, 9.

The imposition of the poll tax in 1905 hastened these developments, which began at the turn of the century, by placing a tax on individual young men. The hut tax, by contrast, was a tax on the productive community, as a social unit, in the Zulu homestead. See Guy, "Destruction and reconstruction", pp. 185, 186, 190. Much African evidence to the 1905-6 Natal Native Affairs Commission that followed the 1906 ('Poll Tax') Rebellion was concerned with the consequences. Cloete, "Social and economic context", p. 9.

A. Vilakazi, Zulu Transformations: A Study in the dynamics of Social Change (Pietermaritzburg, 1965). Vilakazi's term abaqafi does not occur in the contemporary documents, but is a convenient description here.


NAD Report, 1912, UG33-'13, report of DNC of Zululand, entry for 'Labour', p. 63. Re. failure of subsistence production, see entry for 'Agriculture', p. 63.

MS MAR 2.08.4, KCM 3074, noteform biography. These functions were taken over by the Natal Native Labour Agency, established in Johannesburg in 1908 to maintain contact between labourers and their families in Natal. Cloete, "Social and economic context", p. 9.


MS MAR 2.08.5, KCM 2570 (b), Notes on Marwick's march, unsigned, n. d.; and KCM 2576 (b), "Marwick's Memorable March". Masiphula was Mnyamana's predecessor as chief counsellor to the king.

See MS MAR 2.08.5, File 7, KCM 2661, J. N. D. Mkwanazi to Marwick 20/6/1953; File 19, KCM 2887 (a), Marwick to H. A. Robson, Manager of Durban Municipal Native Affairs Department, 30/11/1948; and KCAL, Killie Campbell's Newscutting Book No. 36, ref. 20438, p. 88, article reporting a letter from Pika to Marwick, 10/10/1948.
It is not certain that the particular individuals referred to above had taken up their posts partly to ensure that migrant labourers' earnings made their way back to Natal. In some cases, it just may have been that their higher status entitled them to higher supervisory posts and made them correspondingly more useful to their employers. Nevertheless, particularly in the years following 1913, the community of interests that existed between the tribal Zulu in Zululand and the administration in this matter was explicit. For details of this phenomenon elsewhere in the Union, see A. H. Jeeves, "Migrant labour in the political economy of the Mines: the Native Recruiting Commission and its rivals, 1909-1919", (presented at the conference 'South Africa and the West', University of Natal, Durban, 1982), pp. 1-4.

The collections were also intended to liquidate Dinuzulu's outstanding debts, some of which were unpaid rentals for the use of white-owned land. The influence of Harriette Colenso and Pixley Seme was strong here. See Land Commission Report, UG22-'16, evidence of Miss H. E. Colenso, pp. 522, 523; and CNC 144, 1985/1913, SNA to CNC, 23/12/1913.

This royal salute can only be given once the heir is confirmed and publicly accepted; prior to this, he may only be saluted with 'Ndabazitha', a salutation to which all members of the Zulu royal family were entitled. Webb and Wright (eds.), Stuart Archive, p. 172.
She was reprimanded for doing so. By taking David in her right hand rather than Solomon, it was thought that she favoured David: the lineage segment that was to bear the heir was referred to as the 'right hand house'. See ibid., pp. 3, 4; and Account of Maphelu, p. 101.

Account of Maphelu, pp. 100, 101.

This was important. When Cetshwayo died, his sons too were in their minority. Although it seems that Manzolwandle had a stronger claim than Dinuzulu, Dinuzulu was older and more capable of taking on the responsibilities of kingship in a turbulent period of Zulu history.

Fuze, Black People, p. 90.

CNC 144, 1985/1913, CNC to SNA, 30/11/1913. See also report of Socwatsha and Nongejeni, 28/11/1913, p. 2.

For example, Pers. Comm., Ndesheni, Part II, pp. 4, 5, and Pers. Comm., Mkandandlovu, daughter of Dinuzulu, Nongoma district, 15/12/1981, pp. 6, 7. Ndesheni remembered that "this young man [David] used to ride on horseback. If he found a white man's fence put up, he would put a pair of pliers to it. He would not follow the official road". Mkandandlovu reported what she had heard from her elders: when Dinuzulu was still alive, Solomon had a field of his own and cultivated it personally (remarkable for a royal youngster) and he shared the produce with his "messengers" and brothers. "It was found that there was so much integrity in the younger one and that not because he had his eye on the kingship. It was just his nature. They took away the kingship from the older one and gave it to Solomon because of his humility, his integrity and his knowledge of the people - knowledge that the people were starving and knowledge that evil must not be committed."


Account of Maphelu, p. 101. The 'great men' of the nation comprised hereditary chiefs and members of the royal ibandla - the council of state.

Ibid., p. 102.

CNC 144, 1985/1913, G. W. Kinsman, Assistant Magistrate Babanango to CNC, 28/10/1913, reporting occurrences at Dinuzulu's funeral. The speech caused alarm and controversy within the administration. See extensive correspondence on this issue, in the same file, during November 1913; and also report of Socwatsha and Nongejeni, 28/11/1913, p. 4. Some reports (eg. Marwick's)
suggested that the overall tenor of the speech was conciliatory, and that he had rebuked the Zulu equally for "killing" Dinuzulu by visiting him at KwaThengisa only "in strings".

165 Account of Maphe1u, p. 102.
166 Ibid., pp. 102, 103; and CNC 144, 1985/1913, report of Socwatsha and Nongejeni, 28/11/1913, p. 4.
167 Account of Maphe1u, pp. 103, 104.
168 CNC 144, 1985/1913, B. Colenbrander, Magistrate Vryheid to CNC, 12/12/1913.
170 CNC 54, 97/1912, notes of interview between Magistrate Nongoma and Nobiyana, 5/12/1911; and DNC Eshowe to CNC, 12/1/1912.
171 Ibid., p. 5. See also CNC 144, 1985/1913, Magistrate Nongoma to CNC, 11/12/1914.
173 Ibid., pp. 9, 10.
174 Natal Archives Depot, Zulu Society Collection, File IV/5/6, Typescript of "A discussion between the Zulus and Zibhebhu", 23/12/1898.
175 CNC PMB 73, 57/18, Native Commissioner Nongoma to CNC, 29/6/1932, enclosing history of the Mandlakazi tribe; and statement of Mciteki before Native Commissioner Nongoma, 30/9/1933.
176 CNC 144, 1985/1913, report of Socwatsha and Nongejeni, 28/11/1913, evidence of Chief Zombode, p. 3.
177 Ibid., pp. 7, 8.
180 CNC 144, 1985/1913, CNC to SNA, 29/11/1913, commenting on the reports of his "confidential messengers" in Zululand. 'Mahashini' means 'place of the horses', in commemoration of the combative role played by horses during Dinuzulu's successful attacks on the Mandlakazi at the battles of Tshaneni and Ndunu. See izibongo of Mahashini, in Unpublished Collection of Zulu Praise Poems.
181 CNC 144, 1985/1913, T. R. Bennet, Magistrate Nongoma to CNC, 12/11/1913, and MS LUG 1.09, MS 1406, "Documentation of Nobamba", by Charles Mpanza.
182 Unpublished Collection of Zulu Praise Poems, 'Izibongo sika okaNtuzwa uNina kaMphumuzana', and 'Izibongo sika uMaphumuzana kaDinuzulu'. 'Ondini' was Cetshwayo's principal residence at Ulundi.
The isigodlo comprised daughters given to the king as tribute and, though they were primarily servants, the king could marry them. Ukusisa refers to a cattle-loaning custom by which the 'patron' could consolidate his political influence.

This provides a fascinating insight into the application of indirect rule in Zululand. The isigodlo comprised daughters given to the king as tribute and, though they were primarily servants, the king could marry them. Ukusisa refers to a cattle-loaning custom by which the 'patron' could consolidate his political influence.

Fuze, Black People, p. 135. The author, Masema Fuze, is the person who taught the Zulu royal family at St Helena. See also The Net, June 1933, p. 4.

In response to my question "Was he a Christian - did he go to church?", Mkhandandlovu replied "He was a believer...there was no-one who wore traditional dress (obincayo - those who wore traditional dress) in our family". Pers. Comm., Mkhandandlovu, p. 18. Similar is the following interchange with Ndesheni: "Was he a real Christian?" Ndesheni: "He was a Christian."
"Even though he had many wives?" Ndesheni: "He didn't wear a loin skin. Moreover, his brothers were also Christians. Even though they were not Christians in the sense of observing the rules of the Church, still they conducted themselves in a Christian way." Pers. Comm., Ndesheni, part I, p. 6.

A royal homestead north-west of Nongoma, meaning 'the place of the Usuthu'.

Princess Magogo, who would have been about five at the time, recalled being carried away on someone's back during the night to be hidden. Pers. Comm., Magogo, part I, p. 7.

Ibutho (sing), amabutho (pl) consisted of males of similar age drawn by the king from all sections of the kingdom. The amabutho built and repaired buildings, tended the royal gardens and livestock, acted as law enforcement agencies, and, at times of war, regiments. Furthermore, the individual's identification with his ibutho cut across local loyalties 'and inspired a sense of national unity. See J. Wright, "Pre-Shakan age-group formation among the Northern Nguni", Natalia, 8, 1978, pp. 22-28; and Guy, "Production and Exchange in the Zulu Kingdom", p. 101.

Rebecca Hourwich Reyher first toured Zululand in the early 1920's and returned in 1934 to research for an historical romance centred on the life of Solomon's great wife - Christina Sibiya -, who was her main interviewee. Oswald Fynney, magistrate of Nongoma during the 1920's, and Sir Charles Saunders put her in touch with a wide number of royal sources - and the CNC assisted by making introductions to NAD officials. See CNC 509, 17/2, CNC to L. E. Oscroft, 14/1/1924. Despite its analytical and stylistic flaws, the book Reyher produced is based on solid factual foundations. R. H. Reyher, Zulu Woman (Columbia, 1948), pp. 33, 34.

These were Christina Sibiya's impressions of the royal hut when she first entered it in 1915. Ibid., p. 54.

The Net, September 1914, p. 9, letter from Rev. L. E. Oscroft, dated 9/7/1914; and The Net, June 1933, p. 4.
210  *The Net*, September 1914, p. 9. For details of the role of the church, see below.

211  CNC 144, 1985/1913, report of the Nonjejeni Zuma, native messenger attached to the office of the CNC, Natal, 2/1/1914.

212  *Izindaba Zabantu*, 15/1/1914, editorial comment, private translation.

213  Ibid.


218  For insights into Dube's stance, see the evidence he and other "exempted and educated natives living in the Verulam (Inanda) district" gave before the 1906-1907 Natal Native Affairs Commission, as published in the Minutes of Evidence, Cd. 3888, pp. 957-975.

219  Marks, "Ambiguities of dependence", p. 175.

220  The source here is Carl Faye, an interpreter attached to the Natal NAD. See Faye, *Zulu References*, pp. 80-89, regarding a meeting between J. L. Dube and the Zulus, Eshowe, 30/11/1912; and KCAL, Marshall Campbell Collection (hereafter MS CAMP), Sir Marshall Campbell, File 4, KCM 32590, notes by Carl Faye on the same meeting.

221  The denunciation was presumably made through the columns of Ilanga. See Natal Archives Depot, Colenso Collection, Box 76, Harriette Colenso to Mr Dube, 5/12/1913 (address of origin is 'Kwathengisile').

222  Ibid. *Izindaba Zabantu*, 15/1/1914, reported this incident in some detail. Uncharacteristically, the paper fully supported Mankulumama and Mnyaiza in this instance, and observed that their action showed that "customs are very much cared for".

223  CNC 144, 1985/1913, W. E. Peachey, NC Piet Retief, to SNA, 9/1/1914.

224  CNC 144, 1985/1913, Seme to Dr Bok, private secretary to the Prime Minister, 8/12/1913.

225  CNC 144, 1985/1913, notes of interview between SNA and Mankulumama, 12/12/1913.


227  Record of interview between CNC and Mnyaiza with three others, Pietermaritzburg, 19/2/1914.
Ibid.

CNC 144, 1985/1913, CNC to SNA, 18/3/1914. In fact, as the CNC related in earlier correspondence, Solomon had already acquired an independent following. See CNC to SNA, 2/12/1913.

CNC 254, 1557/1916, Detached Assistant Magistrate Babanango to Magistrate Vryheid, 21/9/1916. See also CNC to SNA, 3/10/1916; and SNA to CNC, 12/10/1916.

CNC 144, 1985/1913, Magistrate Nongoma to CNC, 25/11/1913. "Confidential messengers" attached to the Natal NAD head office in Pietermaritzburg had confirmed this barely a month after Solomon's succession. See, for example, CNC 144, 1985/1913, CNC to SNA, 2/11/1913, referring to incoming intelligence reports.


CNC PMB 72, 57/29, map and notes compiled by the Surveyor-General's office, Natal, 1910.

For details see CNC PMB 72, 57/29, Solomon kaDinuzulu to Assistant Magistrate Babanango, 25/2/1916 (written in Zulu); Assistant Magistrate Babanango to Magistrate Vryheid, 19/3/1916; and Land Commission Report, UG22-'16, evidence of Miss H. E. Colenso, 19/5/1915, pp. 522, 523.


Solomon objected to Mankulumana acting as his agent in the settlement of Dinuzulu's estate. CNC 144, 1985/1913, CNC to DNC Zululand, 16/1/1915.


Guy, Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom, p. 250.

See Ch. 4, below.

CNC PMB 72, 57/31, O. Fynney, Magistrate Nongoma to CNC, 9/5/1917. The Governor-General, in his capacity as Supreme Chief, approved these appointments. See SNA to CNC, 20/11/1917.

See Reyher, Zulu Woman, p. 44.

The CNC attempted to persuade Solomon to rid himself of Maphelu - whom the CNC described as a "criminal". CNC PMB 92, 64/3, minutes of interview between CNC, Magistrate Nongoma, Solomon, Mankulumana, Mnyaiza, and others, 31/4/1920.


Ilanga lase Natal, 17/3/1933, for example refers to Zazeni as insila kaSolomon. For further details of insila as 'spiritual essence', see H. C. Lugg, Life Under a Zulu Shield (Pietermaritzburg, 1975), p. 14.

CNC 144, 1985/1913, CNC to SNA, 2/11/1914.

CNC 144, 1985/1913, Magistrate Vryheid to CNC, 5/11/1914.
Mkosana was Maphelu's father. The details of the ihlambo that are reproduced here are drawn primarily from three sources: Account of Maphelu, pp. 104-107; and CNC 144, 1985/1913, report of Dinuzulu's ihlambo ceremony by Assistant Magistrate Babanango, 16/11/1914; and report of the ihlambo by Lt. C. von Keyserlingh, 3rd SAMR, Vryheid, to District Commandant, Dundee, 18/11/1914. Maphelu's account provides highly detailed information on the conduct of the ceremony and the significance of the rituals within it – information which will be omitted here. The last-mentioned sources provide the viewpoint of the NAD and the military, including concrete details of the ceremony, i.e. attendance figures, the sequence of events.

251 Account of Maphelu, p. 105.
252 CNC 144, 1985/1913, report of Assistant Magistrate Babanango, 16/11/1914.
253 Ibid.
254 Account of Maphelu, p. 106.
255 See below for details of Solomon's ukubuthwa ceremonies -during which new amabutho were enrolled.
Footnotes to Chapter 3

2 Ibid.
4 CNC 219, 1488/1915, Magistrate Nongoma to DNC, Zululand, 3/2/1916.
6 CNC 226B, 25/1916, Magistrate Mahlabatini to DNC, Zululand, 19/1/1916, and enclosures.
7 CNC 144, 1985/1913, CNC to DNC, Zululand, 20/2/1915.
8 CNC 144, 1985/1913, Magistrate Nongoma to CNC, 9/2/1915; and DNC, Zululand, to CNC, 8/3/1915.
9 CNC 144, 1985/1913, CNC to DNC, Zululand, 10/3/1915.
10 CNC 144, 1985/1913, Magistrate Nongoma to DNC, Zululand, 9/2/1915.
12 CNC 219, 1488/1915, statement of Sijulu Tabete, NAD induna, Eshowe, 26/7/1916.
13 During 1914, the NAD procrastinated rather than rejected his applications outright. See CNC 144, 1985/1913, G. N. Godley, Under-SNA, to Solomon kaDinuzulu, 27/7/1914.
14 CNC 144, 1985/1913, printed circular issued by the CNC for the information of all magistrates in Zululand and the Northern Districts of Natal, 28/1/1915, which cites Solomon's request of 6/1/1915.
15 CNC 144, 1985/1913, Solomon kaDinuzulu's list of names for proposed deputation to Pretoria, n. d.
16 CNC 144, 1985/1913, printed circular issued by the CNC, 28/1/1915.
17 See, for example, CNC 144, 1985/1913, Magistrate Ngotshe to CNC, 23/1/1915, for a report of Mnyaiza's activities.
18 CNC 144, 1985/1913, H. T. Colenbrander, Magistrate Emtonjaneni, to DNC, Zululand, 2/2/1915.
19 CNC 144, DNC, Zululand, to CNC, 3/5/1915.
20 CNC 144, 1985/1913, Magistrate Nkandla to DNC, Zululand, 30/4/1915. Incidentally, on his return from Pondoland, Solomon did not return to Zululand but proceeded to Pietermaritzburg and then directly to the Transvaal — an example of the sort of 'wandering' that so perturbed the NAD. See CNC to DNC, Zululand, 5/5/1915.
22 CNC 214, 1915/1142, Assistant Magistrate Babanango to Magistrate Vryheid, 14/9/1915.
24 State Archives, Pretoria, Archives of the Secretary of Justice (hereafter JUS) 205, 4/467/14, Lt. T. West, O. C. 'B' Squadron, 3rd SAMR, to Adjutant, 3rd SAMR, Dundee,
18/8/1914, quoting report submitted from Mpofana district. Many such reports, covering various districts of Natal and Zululand, occur in this file.

CNC 219, 1485/1915, Magistrate Nkandla to Col. Leuchars, Chief Intelligence Officer, Pietermaritzburg, 22/12/1915. Confidential.

There might have been some misunderstanding involved. See below. CNC 219, 1488/1915. All NAD correspondence on the 'hunt' was summarized on two undated and unsigned pages for use during the subsequent departmental inquiry. These form the main sources on this matter.

Ibid., report of Magistrate Nongoma, 17/1/1916.

Ibid., reports of DNC, Zululand, 18/1/1916 and Magistrate Nongoma, 19/1/1916. Regarding the name of the ibutho, see also Faye, Zulu References, p. 51.

CNC 219, 1488/1915, DNC, Zululand, to CNC, 25/1/1916.

CNC 219, 1488/1915, Magistrate Nongoma to DNC, Zululand, 3/2/1916, forwarding copies of various reports of interviews. The particular quotation is a statement made by a "native constable".

CNC 219, 1488/1915, CNC telegram to all magistrates in Zululand and Natal districts nearby Zululand, 24/1/1916. In this file is a huge wad of telegram copies, as described by the CNC.

See Shula Marks' comments in Reluctant Rebellion, p. 230.


Unpublished collection of zulu Praise Poems, 'Izibongo sika Solomon kaDinuzulu'.

CNC PMB 72, 57/29. This letter is dated 25/2/1916. It was submitted to the CNC with meticulous observation of the bureaucratic procedures of the NAD. In the first instance, it was handed to the assistant magistrate of Babanango for transfer to the magistrate of Vryheid. Thereafter it was passed on to the DNC of Zululand and eventually to the office of the CNC in Pietermaritzburg. Its contents were summarized in English in Assistant Magistrate Babanango to Magistrate Vryheid, 17/3/1916.
CNC 219, 1488/1915, reports of Native Constable (Political Messenger) at Nongoma, 3, 19, 20/7/1916.

Ibid., report dated 20/7/1916.

CNC 219, 1488/1915, Magistrate Ngotshe to CNC, 25/7/1916.

State Archives, Pretoria, Archives of the Commissioner of the South African Police (hereafter SAP) 36, 6/592/18, Dhlangyana Ngema, Native Chief, Wakkerstoom District, to Director of Prisons, Pretoria, 26/6/1918, reporting earlier events, cf. Director of Prisons to Commissioner of Police, 12/7/1918.


CNC PMB 72, 57/29, CNC to SNA, 4/4/1916.

CNC PMB 81, 58/7/1, SNA to CNC, 28/4/1916.


Ibid., pp. 3-5.

See Ch. 4 and 5 below.

CNC PMB 72, 57/29, CNC to SNA, 19/7/1916. The CNC refers to this in his opening remarks.

CNC PMB 72, 57/29, CNC to SNA, 17/8/1916.


CNC 248, 1254/1916, CNC to P. Seme, 12/8/1916.


MS MAR, Newscutting Book, KCM 3196, p. 46, undated newscutting from Natal Advertizer, reporting Dube's open letter to the Zulu people published in Ilanga.

The phrase is used by E. Roux in Time Longer than Rope (Madison, 1964), Ch. XV, to describe the policies of moderacy, 'gentle persuasion' and non-militancy that were such features of African politics in the early post-Union period.

Until Solomon's objectives and strategy are understood, the documents relating to his involvement in the NAD's attempts to recruit for the Native Labour Battalion make confusing reading. A brief reconstruction of events follows.

Ibid., referring to Magistrate Mahlabatini's report.

Account of Maphelu, p. 108. Maphelu's account is a problematical source on this issue. As a man keenly proud of his martial expertise, he was personally keen to join the first world war, and was actually aware that Zulu resistance to recruitment was being construed as cowardice. At no stage does he implicate Solomon in this 'cowardice', but chooses instead to argue (rather inconsistently) that whatever Solomon may have done to encourage recruitment, the Zulu would not have responded because they were angry with the government for refusing to recognize Solomon as a chief. See Ibid., p. 109.

Ibid., p. 108. This incident is not recorded in the CNC's correspondence. The available evidence suggests that it took place during October 1916. See also Pers. Comm., Ndeseni, part I, p. 12. Further, during the civil case Solomon brought against the Natal Mercury for libel in 1927 (see Ch. 4 below), C. A. Wheelwright gave evidence on this event whilst in the witness box. When the counsel for the defence suggested that the Zulu's refusal to eat the meat was symbolically "repudiating Solomon", Wheelwright replied "No. That was repudiating us. They thought that if they touched the meat they would be sent... overseas...", Natal Mercury, 6/5/1927.

The Zulu in any case needed little encouragement to refuse: rumours of Dinuzulu's collusion with Germany were still among them, and they were apprehensive of traversing the seas to a distant continent. See Account of Maphelu, pp. 108, 109; and CNC 261, 1881/1916, CNC to SNA, 3/11/1916, p. 2.


Political capital was made from this issue by Transvaal members of the House of Assembly. See Cape Times, 5/4/1917, 21/4/1917.

Account of Maphelu, p. 108.

Records of the Church of the Province of South Africa, Diocese of Zululand, Diocesan Offices, Eshowe (henceforth DZ), classification S/2c, Minutes of meeting of the Diocesan Synods, 26/6/1917.

MS MAR, File 21, KCM 3185 (b). This manuscript was translated from Samuelson's Zulu original by H. C. Lugg, and the translation bears the date 27/6/1917.

CNC 254, 1557/1916, SNA to CNC, 12/10/1916. For Solomon's application, see Assistant Magistrate Babanango to Magistrate Vryheid, 21/9/1916, and CNC to SNA, 3/10/1916.


Wheelwright also added that it would "be a great pity if the Zulus cannot be got to Europe...since the educational influence of the trip would be lost", which illustrates his generally more broad-minded approach - which set him apart from many white South Africans.

Faye, Zulu References, p. 90. Carl Faye travelled with the royal party to Pretoria, and acted as interpreter at the meeting itself. In the book cited here, he published his record of the meeting.

Two reasons can be volunteered for this. First, Solomon's appointment came too late. He was officially installed in January 1917, and the Battalion left for Europe in February. Incidentally, the troopship 'Mendi' that carried it was sunk by a mine before reaching Europe and the majority of the recruits drowned. Second, Solomon's appointment aroused intense opposition among Natal whites and local officials of the Natal NAD. Wheelwright was singled out for public condemnation: NAD head office found it necessary to attempt to prevent the publication of commentaries appearing in the Natal Mercury and also to issue a statement emphasising Solomon would have no jurisdiction whatsoever outside the Usuthu ward. Under these conditions, Solomon could barely be used in a recruitment campaign. See KCAL, Sir Marshall Campbell Collection, File 4, KCM 32591, T. Watt, Department of Public Works, to Senator The Hon Sir Marshall Campbell, 15/12/1916; and below for comment on the reaction of white Natal.

See Ch. 2 above.

Significantly, there is no record of the sort of lengthy official correspondence that might be expected on this issue - which the 'undoing' of what the Natal NAD under Addison had so determinedly and pointedly done barely two years previously. The Report of the Union Auditor and Controller-General, 1917-1918, UG 42-'18, p. 40, refers to an individual sum of £142/6/5 "being the cost of the transfer of certain native from Endulendi and his reestablishment at the Usuthu kraal in Zululand".

Similarly, there is no record of any negotiations on the matter within the NAD in the four weeks prior to the Pretoria meeting.

See Chs. 4 and 5 below for further details on Fynney.

The quotations are taken from articles published in the Natal Mercury, 18/12/1916 and 27/12/1916.

Natal Advertizer, 3/1/1917.

Natal Mercury, 18/12/1916 and 27/12/1916.
Natal Advertizer, 3/1/1917.

Marwick suggested that if Solomon had to be made a chief, he should have been summarily appointed to some 'government tribe' somewhere far away from the Usuthu and which consisted of persons who weren't interested in Solomon's royal 'pretensions'. Other 'authoritative' opinions published in Natal newspapers were equally absurd, eg. Solomon was not the accepted heir to Dinuzulu, in view of the claims of Manzolwandle and David. See Natal Mercury, 18/12/1916, and Natal Advertizer, 3/1/1917.

When Solomon was pressing for his elevation to the status of Paramount Chief in the 1920's, the precise wording of Buxton's address became a matter of controversy. See Ch. 4 below.


The Net, September 1926, p. 9, Walters' historical overview of CPSA activities at Nongoma. For a detailed account of the CPSA's activities in Zululand until the 1930's, see C. Lewis and G. E. Edwards, Historical Records of the Church of the Province of South Africa (London, 1934), pp. 659-704.

CNC 144, 1985/1913, Bishop of Zululand to Minister of Native Affairs, 5/2/1914. Various other letters on this matter occur in this file.

CNC 144, 1985/1913, DNC, Zululand, to Bishop of Zululand, 9/1/1915. See also SNA to CNC, 4/1/1915.


DZ/S/2c, meeting of Diocesan Synods, 26/6/1917.


The Net, June 1912, p. 22.

SNA II/5/2, evidence of Rev. Archdeacon Johnson, Nqutu, Zululand, 17/3/1917.

Apart from the inequitable apportionment of lands, the Church was particularly upset by the restrictions on African land purchase. For Dube's attitudes to the principle and practice of segregation, see D. J. Mackenzie, "Dube and the Land Issue, 1913-1936" (unpublished B. Soc. Sci. dissertation, University of Natal, 1980); and Marks, "Ambiguities of dependence", pp. 175-176.

The Net, December 1920.

DZ/B/3, meeting of the Bishop's Council, 20, 22/3/1917; and see also 11/9/1917.
The Net, March 1918; and see DZ/B/3, meetings of the Bishop’s Council, 23/3/1920 and 8/12/1920. The CPSA would continue to pay Oscroft for his missionary work in the Nongoma district. See CNC PMB 102, 73/46, Bishop of Zululand to CNC, 11/3/1919; and DZ/B/3, meeting of the Bishop's Council, 20/3/1920.

Pers. Comm., Mr Basil Oscroft, son of Rev. L. E. Oscroft, letter dated 24/11/1981. The jockeying for control over the adviser and educator to the Zulu establishment was not confined to the CPSA and NAD. Rev. H. Cotton, Chairman of the Natal District Wesleyan Methodist Church, protested to Wheelwright about Oscroft's appointment. Wheelwright replied that the ZNTI was not to be denominational and Oscroft had been selected on the grounds of his "close touch with Solomon". CNC PMB 102, 73/46, notes of meeting between Rev. H. Cotton and CNC, 9/10/1917; and Rev. H. Cotton to CNC, 10/10/1917. The CPSA nonetheless reaped considerable evangelical advantage from its association with the ZNTI and Solomon. See Ch. 4 below.

DZ/M/4, Zululand Mission Report, 1920; and DZ/B/3, meeting of the Bishop’s Council, 13/3/1918.

The Net, March 1918.

The Net, December 1922, p. 13, "The Premier at the Training School".


The Net, September 1922, p. 10.

NAD Report, 1919-1921, UG 34-1922, p. 22; and DZ/M/4, Zululand Mission Report, 1922 and 1924.

CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, CNC’s memorandum for the information of the Minister of Native Affairs, 15/8/1932, p. 4. This memorandum is an historical overview of Solomon's quest for a 'higher status', and was prepared when the NAD was considering his 'elevation' in 1932. See below, Ch. 6.

Ibid.

This statement was made by Wheelwright during evidence at the libel action Solomon brought against the Natal Mercury in 1927. Natal Mercury, 6/5/1927.

See Faye, Zulu Interpreters, p. 51, who lists the different names but offers no explanation of the cause. The details of the 1918 ukubuthwa are drawn from G.W.K. Mahlobo and E. J. Krige, "Transition from childhood to adulthood amongst the Zulus", Bantu Studies, Vol. 8, 1934, pp. 182-187. The authors' sources were persons who were enrolled in 1918. Their reconstruction of the event has to be read with care since their anthropological approach leads them to focus upon social continuities - and at times it appears that their search
for these flavours or renders inaccurate their reconstruction of the 
ukubuthwa of 1918. Only 
information that is presented as 'fact' or as the 
accounts of the participants of 1918 are recorded 
here.


Literally, this means 'the place where the branches 
were devoured'. According to Mr. J. K. Dladla 
(Cultural Affairs Officer, KwaZulu Government), the 
homestead was so named in memory of a nearby engagement 
between Natal Government forces and Zulu rebels 
during the 1906 rebellion. The Zulu took cover in 
the trees, and the bullets of the government soldiers 
merely struck (devoured) the branches overhead. Pers. 


CNC 349, 453/1919, evidence of Nyosana Tshangase 
kaMasiphula re. Solomon's claims, taken before R. D. 
Lyle, Magistrate Mahlabatini, 23/1/1920.

CNC 349, 453/1919, Magistrate Nkandla to CNC, 22/2/1919.

Ibid.

CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, CNC's memorandum for the Minister 
of Native Affairs, 15/8/1932, p. 5. Solomon's request 
made during his interview with General Smuts on 29/11/1920 
was refused.

Whilst all the children of Dinuzulu were attractive, 
Magogo stated, there were three who "hit us over the 
head" with their beauty. They were Solomon, Phikisile 

See Maphelu's account of meeting Solomon on the road 

CNC 332, 2337/1918, Bishop of Pretoria to CNC, 21/5/1919.

CNC 332, 2337/1918, CNC to Lord Bishop of Pretoria, 
27/4/1919. The CNC's investigations revealed Mvuyana 
to be domiciled at Ifafa on the Natal coast.

This was particularly apparent during the inquiry into 
the matter which the CNC conducted in May 1920. See 
below.

P. Bonner, "The Transvaal Native Congress, 1917-1920: 
The radicalization of the black petty bourgeoisie on the 
Rand", in Marks and Rathbone, Industrialisation and social 
change, pp. 270ff.

Report of the Native Affairs Department, 1919-1921, 
UG 34-1922, pp. 4, 5, 10.

For the broad details of the increasingly militant action 
adopted by Africans after the first world war, see 
Roux, Time Longer than Rope, especially Chs. XII, XV, 
and Davenport, South Africa, pp. 178-180.

CNC 359, 1558/1919, Mr. Pritchard, Director of Native 
Labour, Johannesburg, to CNC, 7/8/1919, re. Alleged
Grievances brought to notice of Chief Solomon Dinuzulu during stay on Witwatersrand, and enclosures.

Ibid., enclosure listing the grievances brought to Solomon's attention at each mine, together with a precis of each inspector's report.

SNA I/9/5, notes of interview between CNC and Joel Maduna, representative of David kaDinuzulu, Babanango court room, 25/5/1920. Maduna refers, incidentally, to his having "met David at Johannesburg" in the course of replying to the CNC's questions about the recent unrest in Zululand.

CNC PMB 92, 64/3, Magistrate Eshowe to CNC, 10 May 1920. When the CNC requested that Manzolwandele use his influence to stop the rumours concerning Dinuzulu, Manzolwandele replied he would do so and added "John Dube does not represent the responsible people of Zululand. He was not born to represent people." Although Dube certainly was not associated with the rumour, Manzolwandele's comment in this context suggests Manzolwandele knew the rumours to issue from outside influences - the townspeople. SNA I/9/5, notes of interview between Chief Manzolwandele and CNC, 24/6/1920.

CNC PMB 92, 64/3, Magistrate Ngotshe to CNC, 3/5/1920; and Magistrate Nongoma to CNC, 20/5/1920.

Ibid.

CNC PMB 92, 64/3, Magistrate Nkandla to CNC, 10/5/1920; and SNA I/9/5, notes of CNC's enquiry into the visit of David to Cetshwayo's grave, Nkandla, 20/5/1920.

SNA I/9/5, enquiry into David's visit to Cetshwayo's grave, 24/5/1920.

SNA II/5/5, J. S. Marwick, Manager, Municipal Native Affairs Department, to Mr. Clayton, member of the Natal Local Land Committee, 16/4/1918.

JUS 270, 4/267/18, report of meeting of Natives called by John Dube, 10/8/1918, made by police Detective Robb.

Ibid.

JUS 270, 4/267/18, copy of petition, as cited.

Ibid.


Solomon made this request during his interview with Smuts on 29/11/1920. See CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, CNC's memorandum for the Minister of Native Affairs, 15/8/1932, p. 5.

CNC PMB 92, 64/2, minutes of interview between CNC, Magistrate Nongoma and Solomon, Mankulumana, Mnyalza and others, 31/5/1920.

See references in Ch. 2 above.

Calculated from Zululand Native Trust statements of annual expenditure published in NAD Report, 1919-1921, UG 34-1922, p. 28.

Report of the Natal Native Affairs Commission, 1906-1907, Cd 3889, pp. 16-18. Despite these statements, the report also emphasised the value of tribalism as a means of social control.


See Ch. 2 above.

SNA II/5/4, minutes of evidence taken before the Natal Local Lands Committee, evidence of C. A. Wheelwright, CNC, 12, 13/4/1918.

Marks, "Ambiguities of dependence", quoting Howard Pim to Secretary, Aborigines Protection Society, 4/12/1922.

In particular, he opposed the establishment of local councils in Zululand as envisaged by the 1920 Native Affairs Act. For details of the Act, see below, and for Wheelwright's opposition to its application in Zululand see Ch. 4 below.

These are general features of interviews conducted at the CNC's office. For specific examples, see records filed in SNA I/9/4 and I/9/5.

SNA I/9/4, notes of interview between CNC and Chief Mathole with followers, 22/5/1922.

See the debates in the House of Assembly on the 1917 Bill as published in the Cape Times, 3/4/1917, 5/4/1917, 17/4/1917, 20/4/1917 and 21/4/1917, and the evidence taken before the Select Committee on Native Affairs dealing with the 1917 Bill, SC6A-1917. The omissions in its treatment in current literature are particularly notable in Lacey's Boroko, which focusses on the interests represented by the white state and the political and ideological means it employed to secure these ends between 1910 and 1932. Lacey primarily treats the 1917 Bill as a failed 'Land Bill', and no attempt is made to explain the 'tribal' administrative provisions and the extension of the Natal system to the rest of the Union, beyond commenting that they were intended to expand a "national coercive system". See Lacey, Boroko, pp. 17, 86-94. Precise details of the 1917 Bill are difficult to assemble for it was evidently not published by the Union Government on account of war-time economy measures. Much, however, can be gleaned from the debates in the House of Assembly as published in the Cape Times. A full explanation of the political and ideological significance of the 1917 Bill cannot be attempted here.

For a broad overview of 'liberal' criticism, see Botha's "Replies to his critics", in Cape Times, 5/4/1917.

See, for example, Cape Times, 17/4/1917, speech of Minister of the Interior (Sir Thomas Watt, the MP for Dundee); and 21/4/1917, Botha's speech.
Natal petty bourgeois Africans were appalled by the land provisions of the 1917 Bill, and for this reason never got as far as pondering the attractions that the envisaged local councils might offer. See evidence given by representatives of the Natal Native Congress before the Select Committee on the Native Affairs Administration Bill, 1917, SC 6A-1917, pp. 618-623.

For Dube's response, see also Natal Mercury, 19/2/1917.

For precise details of the Native Affairs Commission, see Rogers, Native Administration, Ch. III.
Footnotes to Chapter 4

1 This somewhat impressionistic overview is an explicitly comparative one. See the beginning of Ch. 5 below for a survey of socio-economic developments in the late 1920s.

2 The phrase is Fynney's, the Magistrate of Nongoma. In this context it clearly included those resident in the Vryheid district and those who - like Simelane - were now resident in the Zululand reserves but had not been born and brought up there. See SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, CNC to SNA, 3/11/1924, transmitting Fynney's reports on Inkatha, during which he quotes his correspondence dated 8/5/1920.

3 CNC PMB 92, 64/2, Magistrate Nongoma to CNC, 14/2/1921.

4 CNC PMB 92, 64/2, notes of interview between CNC and Rev. Simelane, 31/3/1921.

5 Ibid.; and CNC PMB 92, 64/2, Magistrate Nongoma to CNC, 14/2/1921. See below for details.

6 The trend among Congress leadership to 'turn to the chiefs' after 1920, as will be documented below, was not confined to Natal. For the Transvaal case, see Bonner, "The Transvaal Native Congress, 1917-1920", p. 304.

7 CNC PMB 92, 64/2, notes of interview between CNC and Albert Zulu, from Chief Solomon, 31/3/1921.

8 CNC PMB 92, 64/2, Inspector CID, Johannesburg, to Deputy Commissioner (Dep. Comm.), SAP, 12/6/1922, reporting NNC meeting, Durban, 7/6/1922.

9 For comments on the 'transatlantic connection' and its political consequences, see (for the earlier period) Marks, "Ambiguities of dependence", pp. 167ff.; and (for the 1920s), T. Couzens, "Moralizing leisure time: The transatlantic connection and black Johannesburg, 1918-1936", in Marks and Rathbone, Industrialisation and Social Change, pp. 315ff. Aggrey's visit in 1921 was instrumental in the formation of the inter-racial Joint Councils, in the interests of 'racial cooperation' and 'mutual welfare'. For details see J. W. Horton, "South Africa's Joint Councils: Black-White Cooperation between the two world wars", South African Historical Journal, No. 4, 1972.

10 CNC PMB 92, 64/2, CID report, 12/6/1922, of NNC meetings, Durban, 7/6/1922, and Pietermaritzburg, 8/6/1922.

11 See SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, Dep. Comm. SAP, Natal, to Dep. Comm. SAP, Pretoria, 18/7/1923, reporting NNC meeting Pietermaritzburg, 15/7/1923; for further examples see below.

12 See below. For reference to the initial Mahashini meeting, see NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 10/11/1923, quoting earlier correspondence with magistrate of Nongoma.
15 NTS 7205, 20/326, Magistrate Nongoma to CNC, 14/1/1924.
16 NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 10/11/1923, quoting Magistrate Nongoma's report, 28/10/1923.
17 NTS 7205, 20/326, Magistrate Nongoma to CNC, 14/1/1924.
18 Ibid.
19 NEC Box 7, evidence of Acting Chief Gebemeweni Qwabi (Mahlabatini district), Durban, 1/4/1931, p. 6194. Although speaking in 1931, Gebemeweni refers to the artefact inkatha rather than the organisation. He argued that the Zulu no longer had an inkatha since they had been subjugated by Queen Victoria, who subsequently held 'supreme power' over the Zulu. He was therefore of the opinion that King George now had the Zulu inkatha.
21 Apart from the sources cited above this summary is also drawn from Krige, Social System; Fuze, Black People, pp. 90, 91; H. C. Lugg, A Natal Family Looks Back (Durban, 1970), pp. 3, 4, 15; C.de B. Webb and J. B. Wright (eds.), The James Stuart Archive, Vol. II (Pietermaritzburg, 1979), evidence of Mangati kaGodide, 13/6/1920, p. 203. Baleni kaSilwana's assertion that the ritual vomiting took place only during preparations for war is contradicted by all other sources. Natal chiefs also kept an inkatha to bind their tribes together. The notion that inkatha refers to the grass rings worn on the heads of Zulu women to support pots of water - where Inkatha (the organisation) alludes its role in 'bearing the load of the nation' - is incorrect.
22 Webb and Wright, The James Stuart Archive, Vol. I, evidence of Hoya kaSoxalase, 16/9/1921, p. 171. Hoye was Solomon's imbongi (bard who recited izibongo) and was sent by Solomon to assist Stuart. Ibid., p. 167.
23 CNC PMB 92, 64/2, Inspector CID, Johannesburg, to Deputy Comm. SAP, Johannesburg, 12/6/1922, reporting Gumede's address to Congress at Nancefield Location, Johannesburg, 11/6/1922. See also various NNC circulars and pamphlets dated 1922 and 1923 also contained in this file, and SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, various CID correspondence on NNC activities between February and July 1923. Gumede's second initial is sometimes cited as 'S'.
24 CK 9A, 2:XB16: 91, biographical notes on W. F. Bhulose. For further details of Bhulose - in the context of Inkatha - see below.
25 Ibid., biographical notes on W. W. Ndhllovu; and CNC PME '92, 64/2, NNC circulars and pamphlets dated 1922 and 1923.
26 SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, report by Detective Sergeant Arnold, CID Durban, 13/10/1923, covering NNC meeting, Durban, 1/10/1923.
27 See NTS 7205, 20/326, memorandum by Magistrate Nongoma for information of CNC, 14/1/1924. For further comment on this scheme, see below.
28 Natal Archives Depot, Carl Faye Papers, Box 12/29, 'Account of the visit of HRH Prince Arthur of Connaught, Governor-General of the Union etc. etc., to Zululand, 15-23/7/1923' (at which Faye was the interpreter), pp. 10-12.
29 NTS 7205, 20/326, Magistrate Nongoma to CNC, 14/1/1924, reporting interviews with Solomon and Mankulumana.
31 For further details of Solomon's land-buying activities, his 'cultural eclecticism' and manipulation of different cultural forms, see below.
32 For Fynney's view, see NTS 7205, 20/326, Magistrate Nongoma to CNC, 14/1/1924, particularly p. 2, and for the CNC's view, see CNC to SNA, 14/2/1924. In the latter, the CNC argues that it would be both unwise and unnecessary either to "actively oppose the organisation" or to give it "the stamp of officialdom". Voluntary contributions made to Inkatha would provide an index to its support. In the meantime he aimed to keep in touch with the leaders through the magistrates, and to informally "guide them [the leaders] as far as may be possible towards cooperation with the Government..."
33 In 1923 the rapid rise of the ICI began, advancing into the rural areas and northern provinces, this foretelling the resurgence of militancy that had been dormant since 1920. See Roux, Time Longer than Rope, p. 157. In August 1924, Marwick referred to the recent reawakenings in "certain parts of Natal", which he ascribed to communist propaganda. He specifically mentioned the unruliness of African labour on white farms, and urged police action. Debates of the House of Assembly, Vol. 2, speech by Marwick, 20/8/1924, col. 723. Natal's period of militancy can only be said to have truly begun after 1925, however, when A. W. G. Champion took charge of the ICU in Natal. See below.
34 For a penetrating analysis, see P. Bonner, "The Transvaal Native Congress 1917-1920", pp. 270-313.
35 For a brief account (which asserts that the petty bourgeois nature of ICU leadership was a reason for the Union's limited


After arrival in Natal, he was a founder member of the NNC and also became "adviser to Natal and O.F.S. chiefs." In 1906 he was a member of a delegation to Britain over the land laws of the Orange Free State, and in the same year was arrested and fined for leaving Natal without a pass. He was a founder member of the SANNC, and during the 1920's he also became president of the 'League of African Rights' and was a delegate to the 'First International Conference against Imperialism' in Belgium. See Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 359, 360. For further reference to Gumede, see below.

These are detailed in SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, series of SAP reports on 'Congress Meetings', Natal, dated February to July 1923.


Natal Witness, 19/8/1924, report of NNC meeting, date and venue not cited.

CNC PMB 92, 64/2, Senior Inspector, Natal SAP, to Dep. Comm., Natal SAP, 23/4/1924. In 1906, whilst Johannes Khumalo (Walter's predecessor) was kholwa chief at Driefontein, it seems that Walter Khumalo was active within the 'Catholic Apostolic Church in Zion'. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 332. For a summary of Stephen Mini's Wesleyan Methodist background and role in the early history of the NNC, see also Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 69, 72.

SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, report of meeting of 'Nkata ka Zulu', Mahashini, 8-10/10/1924, made by Rev. L. E. Oscroft, 13/10/1924, p. 1. The dual appointment to the office of chairman is unusual. In practice, Bhulose took on the duties of chairman - it seems Dube's appointment was nominal or honorific.
The CNC proudly saw this as an indication of the "effectiveness of the contact that is being made /by Fynney and Oscroft/". NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 26/11/1924.

See SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, Oscroft's report of Inkatha meeting, 13/10/1924, p. 3 (for Oscroft); Fynney's report of Inkatha meeting, n. d., enclosed in CNC to SNA, 3/11/1924 (for Fynney); and CNC to SNA, 3/11/1924 (Oscroft and Fynney).

Even more ironically, the motion was passed. In his report of the meeting, Fynney emphasised the importance of this motion and urged government cooperation. SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, Fynney's report of Inkatha meeting, n. d., enclosed in CNC to SNA, 3/11/1924.

The personal notices of the Inkatha meeting served on abafundisi cited the church project as the sole purpose of the meeting.

The committee was apparently headed by Rev. Lamula of Durban. Ibid. Vilakazi's career illustrates that the division between the petty bourgeois and tribal elites should not be too clearly drawn. Vilikazi and W. W. Ndhlouvo served Dinuzulu as secretaries concurrently. See Ch. 2 above.

Whilst it does not seem to be a direct outcome of the Inkatha meeting, it is significant that a new independent African church called the 'Shaka Zulu Church' came into being in 1924. It was a secession from the Zulu Congregational Church which had flourished during the apogee of Ethiopianism at the time of the 1906 rebellion. The Zulu Congregational Church was itself a secession from the American Board Mission. B. G. M. Sundkler, Bantu Prophets in South Africa (London, 1961), p. 45. See p. 53 for Sundkler's comments on the essentially nationalist/political character of "congregational offshoot" or 'Ethiopianist' churches.

Ibid.

Ibid.

The Mandlakazi had not attended the meeting. Fynney was requested to assist the reconciliation. Ibid., and SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, Fynney's report of Inkatha meeting, n. d., enclosed in CNC to SNA, 3/11/1924.

For their efforts to repair these, see below.


NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 10/7/1925, reporting on the purpose of Inkatha collections as stated in 1924.

SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, Oscroft's report of Inkatha meeting, 13/10/1924, pp. 2, 3. For the estimate of Inkatha finances after the 1924 meeting, see NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 10/7/1925, p. 3.

See NTS 7205, 20/326, T. J. Robinson, Sub-Inspector, SAP Vryheid, to Divisional CID Officer, Pietermaritzburg, 19/1/1925.


See NTS 7205, 20/326, SNA to Director of Native Labour, Johannesburg, 9/7/1926, enclosing copy of Umpini ka Zulu literature; and NEC, Box 8, evidence of E. P. M. Zulu, on behalf of 'Alexandria Township Ratepayers' Association', Johannesburg, 15/5/1931, pp. 7914-7916.

NTS 7205, 20/326, SNA to Director of Native Labour, Johannesburg, 9/7/1926.

NTS 7205 20/326, Acting Director of Native Labour to SNA, 14/8/1926, enclosing J. T. Boast's special report on Umpini ka Zulu, 12/8/1926.

Ibid.


NTS 7205, 20/326, SNA to CNC, 2/10/1925.

NTS 7205, 20/326, F. E. Trenchell, Detective Head Constable, Dundee, to District Commandant, SAP, Dundee, 4/12/1924, reporting on rumours and events in Northern Natal and Zululand.

NTS 7205, 20/326, T. J. Robinson, Sub-Inspector, SAP, Vryheid, to Divisional CID Officer, Pietermaritzburg, 19/1/1925.
For excellent analyses of the African petty bourgeois social and cultural milieu, see Brian Willan, "An African in Kimberley: Sol. T. Plaatje, 1894-1898", in Marks and Rathbone, Industrialisation and Social Change, pp. 238-258; and Couzens, "Moralizing Leisure Time".

See Ch. 5 below for further comment on Zulu chiefs.


For details of Solomon's imbongi, the traditional context of his activities and their ideological significance, see ibid., pp. 168-171. For a thorough exposition of the role of the imbongi and izibongo, see A. T. Cope (ed.), Izibongo: Zulu Praise Poems (Cambridge, 1968).

There were many deaths even among those who had access to expert European medical care. The CPSA lost several of its African clerics and teachers, and it was necessary to close certain schools. See DZ/M/4, Zululand Mission Report, 1918, p. 3, DZ/E/1, MacKenzie Memorial College Log Book, 1896-1937, entries dated 1918, p. 56; and The Net, March 1919, Bishop's letter, p. 2.

For details on the relationship traditionally seen to exist between illness and the ancestral spirits, together with the traditional role of the king in times of public crisis, see Sundkler, Bantu Prophets, p. 21.

Reyher, Zulu Woman, pp. 90-92. Solomon's kholwa wife, Christina, sometimes accompanied Solomon in dispensing medicines and used her influence as an educated person and Ndlovukazi (wife of the king) to overcome tribal resistance to European medicine. Ibid., p. 92.

D. Reitz, No Outspan (London, 1943), pp. 27ff., 44.

As previously, the request was refused.

I refer here to Solomon's personal preferences. Since, however, Zulu marriage has political functions, Solomon could not confine his attentions to kholwa women. See below.

For an excellent account of the ideological and cultural influence of missionary endeavour on African women, see D. Gaitskill, "Wailing for purity: prayer unions, African mothers and adolescent daughters, 1912-1940", in Marks and Rathbone, Industrialisation and Social Change, pp. 344ff.

This account is gleaned substantially from Christina's own recollections, as recorded by Rebecca Reyher. For Elizabeth Sibiya's social attitudes and lifestyle, see Reyher, Zulu Woman, pp. 20-22.

Ibid., pp. 27-29, 35.

Ibid., pp. 36-38.

Ibid., pp. 39, 41ff, 50ff. This illustrates the way in which the tribal set of patriarchal relationships were transposed to the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the mission world. The local African pastor was delighted, but the
Eckenbrens and Elizabeth Sibiya were appalled. Solomon's royal status nonetheless overcame their moral objections to his uncertain 'civilized' credentials.

Ibid., p. 45.

Ibid., p. 49.


Reyher, Zulu Woman, p. 57; Braatvedt, "Zulu marriage", p. 563.

Solomon's profligate and dissolute lifestyle later in the 1920's, together with his parental irresponsibility, were other factors, as Reyher's reconstruction catalogues. See also Pers. Comm., Mahaye, part II, p. 3.

Pers. Comm., Mahaye, part I, p. 17 (70); Thandayiphi, part I, p. 3 (30); Magogo, part II, p. 8 (40).

Pers. Comm., Magogo, part II, p. 7. Although a daughter of Paramount Chief Sigcawu of Pondoland took up residence at one of Solomon's homesteads (see Ch. 3 above), the union was never formalized. Ibid.


For specific details, see ibid., pp. 19-20.

Ibid.

Ibid., part II, p. 1.

For the bare details, see KCAL, B. W. Martin Papers, 3.09, KCM 2668, Manuscript autobiography entitled 'Old Soldiers Never Die', pp. 60-61. Martin was the chairman of the Board of Inquiry - which decided in favour of Cyprian. See also Pers. Comm., Mahaye, part II, p. 1ff. During the inquiry Mahaye placed his extensive knowledge of Zulu history at the disposal of Mshiyeni (Solomon's brother and regent after Solomon's death) who supported Thandayiphi's claim.

MS MAR, File 50, KCM 2761 (d), 'Zulu Chieftainship dispute', Inquiry, 7/2/1945 - 19/4/1945, evidence of Magogo Buthelezi, pp. 103, 104.

Pers. Comm., Mahaye, part I, p. 19. The magistrate's murderer was never found. For further important details of Mayatana's activities, see Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 296-298.

Ibid.

Pers. Comm., Magogo, part I, pp. 18-20; part II, pp. 1-6. Significantly, in the course of her account of the meeting, Magogo refers to her brother, Solomon, not by his name nor as 'the king' as she usually did, but as 'my father'.

Ibid., part II, p. 5.

Ibid., p. 1.

Ibid., p. 19; and see also part I, p. 18.
The following account of Magogo's marriage is drawn primarily from Magogo's own accounts - evidently it is her favourite story - made on various occasions. First, during my interview with her, part I, pp. 17-20; part II, pp. 1-6. Second, in her evidence to the Board of Inquiry into the 1945 succession dispute, MS MAR, File 50, KCM 2761 (d), pp. 105, 106. Third, further details were gleaned during conversations with Mr. J. E. Ndhllovu, Secretary of Education and Culture, KwaZulu Government, at Ulundi, 12/11/1981, 4/1/1982. Mr Ndhllovu had heard tell the same story at various public ceremonies. Magogo is not an unproblematical source for she, as a daughter of Dinuzulu who married a grandson of Mnyamana (it was the disagreement between these two in 1888 that initiated the Usuthu/Buthelezi rift), refused to admit that any rift ever existed and therefore that Solomon had no political purpose in arranging her marriage. See the lengthy deadlock during our interview, Pers. Comrn., Magogo, part I, pp. 11ff. This is of course untrue as her own evidence suggests, as does that of Mkandandhlovu (Magogo's sister who was at Mahashini and aged about eleven at the time of the wedding), Pers. Comrn., Mkandandhlovu, pp. 11, 12. See also Pers. Comrn., Mahaye, part II, p. 9.

MS MAR, File 50, KCM 2761 (d), evidence of Magogo to Board of Inquiry, 1945, p. 105.
Ibid., p. 106.
See Ch. 2 above, and for their marriage, see Ch. 3 above.
Particularly after the late 1920's during Solomon's years of financial ruin.
For Seme and the Swazis, see below. The Swazi state's tributary relationship to the Zulu state had fallen into abeyance after the subjugation of Zululand. The last instance of formal contact between the two (until recent times) was the marriage of one of Cetshwayo's daughters to King Sobhuza I of Swaziland. The date of marriage is not known. Webb and Wright (eds.), The James Stuart Archive, Vol. I, evidence of Huye kaSoxalase, 16/9/1921, p. 171.

For similar observations - relating to the cultural context of Solomon's upbringing - see Ch. 2 above.
They thus all became 'Christians'. See Pers. Comrn., Ndesheni, part II, p. 13; Magogo, part II, p. 10; and Mahaye, part I, p. 18. See also the revealing observation in Reyher, Zulu Woman, p. 33.
See The Net, March 1928, Bishop's letter, p. 6; and Pers. Comrn., Mahaye, part I, p. 18. Solomon's children, incidentally, were all baptized into the CPSA.
The Net, September 1922, article by A. W. Lee, p. 10. Incidentally, this was of great value to the CPSA since it sidestepped the NAD's injunction that the ZNTI be non-denominational.

See DZ/B/3, Meetings of the Bishop's Council, 20/9/1922, 13, 14/12/1922, 7/3/1923, 10/10/1923, 2/5/1924, 21/9/1927; and DZ/P/4, Zululand Diocesan Magazine, June 1922, Bishop's letter; and The Net, June 1925, Oscroft's letter.

The Net, September 1925, article by F. W. Walters.

The Net, December 1929, Bishop's letter, p. 3.

The Net, September 1922, article by A. W. Lee, p. 10.


DZ/M/4, Zululand Mission Report, 1929, Bishop's letter, pp. 1, 2.

DZ/M/4, Zululand Mission Report, 1924, p. 6, and 1926, p. 2.

The Net, June 1923 and September 1923, Bishop's letters. Mkungo had fled Zululand during the civil war of 1856 and had returned after 1879. As a consequence of his stay in Natal he "lent towards Christianity" - in the words of a missionary - after his return, and his death in 1916 and was followed by a "Christian burial". The Net, September 1917, p. 15.

The Net, March 1925, p. 6.

DZ/M/4, Zululand Mission Report, 1926, p. 2. The wave of expansion only died during the depression years when funds from England decreased in value because South Africa's adherence to the gold standard reduced the rate of exchange. See ibid., reports for the years 1930-1932, for the consequences in Zululand.

See The Net, September 1922, article by A. W. Lee, p. 10; and December 1923, Bishop's letter, p. 4.

CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, CNC to Native Commissioner (hereafter NC) Nongoma, 27/10/1932, in which he refers to Solomon's earlier problems with cars and debts.

CNC 341, 3268/1918, Commanding Officer, 3rd SAMR, to CNC, 3/10/1918 and 6/10/1918.

CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, CNC's memorandum for the information of the Minister of Native Affairs, 15/8/1932, p. 5.

JUS 575, 9491/30, CNC to Col. Douglas, CID, 26/5/1922. The sale of European liquor to Africans was illegal.

Ibid.

Pers. Comm., Magogo, part II, p. 3. Professor Eileen Krige (author of the classic work, The Social System of the Zulus and one of the white guests at Solomon's iIhambo ceremony in 1934) suggested that accepting and drinking European liquor was one of Solomon's royal duties. Pers. Comm., Prof. Eileen Krige, Durban, 6/10/1981.


See Ch. 3 above. Solomon's imbongi referred to these in the course of his interview with James Stuart in 1921. Webb and Wright (eds.), The James Stuart Archive, Vol. I, evidence of Hoye kaSoxalase, 10/9/1921, p. 171.
H. Kuper, Sobhuza II: Ngwenyama and King of Swaziland (London, 1978), p. 101. See also the incidental reference to Solomon and Seme's land-buying activities in Johannesburg in SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, T. H. Hedges, District Commandant, SAP, Eshowe, to Dep. Comm., Natal SAP, 6/9/1923. Seme was introduced to the Queen Regent of Swaziland in 1912 by Richard Msimang, co-founder of the SANNRC. Thereafter, Queen Labotsibenini financed Seme's paper, Abantu Batho and Seme became adviser to the young Sobhuza. Apart from the Sophiatown purchases, Seme's influence is reflected in the successful recruitment of young Swazi for the Native Labour Contingent during World War I, the numerous petitions (drawn up by Seme) and deputations (including Seme) to England on the Swazi land issue and as protests against Swaziland's prospective inclusion into the Union of South Africa, Sobhuza's concern with education and the employment of funds from the 'Swazi National Fund' to establish a high school. Just as Seme had married into Zulu royalty, he also married one of Sobhuza II's maternal aunts. Sobhuza, incidentally, was educated at Lovedale in the Cape (Seme had wished Solomon and David to go there) and other high ranking Swazi's sons went to Dube's Ohlange Institute or Amanzimtoti College in Natal. That Sobhuza II was formally invested as Swazi king in December 1921 was undoubtedly a spur to Solomon's concurrent activities. There is a correlation between Seme's relationship with the Zulu and Swazi royal families. See Kuper, Sobhuza II, pp. 48-50, 64, 75-96, 104.

For Oscroft, see, for example, CNC 509, 17/2, Rev. L. E. Oscroft to CNC, 24/1/1924. For Mr Grassi, see Pers. Comm., Ndesheni, part II, p. 16 (Ndesheni emphasises the financial burdens the house occasioned); and Mahlobo and Krije, "Transition", footnote on p. 185.

The following account is drawn primarily from my own visit to KwaDlamahlahla in 1982, and the conversations I had with the caretaker and elderly persons resident nearby. Additional information was gained through correspondence with Mr. F. B. Oscroft, letter dated 24/11/1981. Early photographs published in Ilangalase Natal (eg. edition of 17/3/1933) prove that the KwaDlamahlahla I saw had not been altered since its construction. KwaDlamahlahla is now maintained as one of the residences of the present Zulu king, King Goodwill Zwelethini Zulu.

KCAL, Killie Campbell Newscutting Book No. 30, ref. 22160, Cape Times, 14/9/1946.

Pers. Comm., F. B. Oscroft, letter dated 24/11/1981, and see also Reyher, Zulu Woman, p. 124. Interestingly, Reyher writes that Solomon had his children baptized so that they would also have Christian names.

G. R. Naidoo, "Buthelezi - the Man with the Key to Zulustan: the Rebel Chief of Zululand", Drum, May 1964, p. 13, reporting Chief Buthelezi's account of his upbringing.


CNC 509, 17/7, Rev. Oscroft to CNC, 21/12/1922, forwarding ZNTI Report, 1922.

CNC 509, 17/7, Rev. Oscroft to CNC, 3/10/1922; and The Net, December 1922, 'Premier at the Zulu's Training School', p. 13.


JUS 575, 949/30, T. H. Hedges, Sub. Inspector, SAP Nongoma, to District Commandant, Eshowe, 18/2/1922. See also Sergeant M. Manger, SAP Nongoma, to District Commandant, Eshowe, 7/1/1922.


See CNC 509, 17/2, CNC to Rev. Oscroft, 14/1/1925; and 17/3, Rev. Oscroft to CNC, 18/1/1928, enclosing 'ZNTI, Nongoma, General Report for the Year 1927'.

Account of Maphelu, p. 110.; Pers. Comm., Mahaye, part II, p. 9 (Mahaye specifically states that Solomon 'putting' Bokwe at the ZNTI healed the rift); Mkandandhlovu, pp. 10, 13; Ndesheni, part I, p. 5. Since the formation of the present-day Inkatha in 1976, the most important achievement of Solomon's reign has been held to be 'his' formation of the first Inkatha. This is now taught to Zulu primary and secondary school pupils as a part of a compulsory course entitled 'The National Cultural Liberation Movement'. Mr. J. K. Dladla, Cultural Affairs Organizer, KwaZulu Government, kindly gave me a copy of the Department of Education and Culture's first draft syllabus for this course, dated 1978.


For the earlier period see Ch. 2 above, and for the later period, see Ch. 5 below.

See Ch. 2 above.
As the son of Cetshwayo's elder half brother, it is likely that he was in his seventies during the 1920's. Although this was not a particularly great age, Kambi's constitution had been sapped by the bottle.

Ahrens, From Bench to Bench, pp. 70, 74. For further details of the arrangements made for Kambi's domicile and the financial burdens to which the Ngentsheni were subject, see ibid., pp. 64-65.


See the NNC evidence given before the Select Committee on the 1917 Native Affairs Administration Bill, SC6A-’17, pp. 618 ff (note particularly the phrase "Queen Victoria, in her wisdom...", frequently repeated by none other than Josiah Gumede); and Natal Natives Land Committee, UG35-’18, pp. 699 ff.

For clear and representative statements, see SNA II/5/4, Natal Local Lands Committee, evidence of Philip Ntaba, Ixopo, 6/10/1917; and Select Committee on the (1926) Native Bills, SC 10-’27, evidence of Natal kholwa chiefs, pp. 263ff.

See Roux, Time Longer than Rope, pp. 110ff; and CO 879/114, correspondence regarding appeals and deputations to the High Commissioner and British Government on the subject of the 1913 Act. John Dube, Rubusana, Sol Plaatje, Saul Msane and Thomas Mapikela were the leading figures. For Dube and Solomon's plans for a deputation to England after World War I, see Ch. 3 above.


See Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, part II; and the comments in Ch. 1 above.

NAD Report, U17-1911, p. 18. See also 'Summarized reports by Magistrates/Commissioners', pp. 335ff.

Reyher, Zulu Woman, p. 224.

No record of the visit of the Prince of Wales could be located in the NAD archives. The main source for the following account is the evidence given before court during the libel case Solomon brought against the Natal Mercury in 1927. The grounds of the case were the allegations of the magistrate of Eshowe, A. D. Graham (alias 'Zithulele'), published in the Natal Mercury of 13/6/1925, that Solomon's behaviour during the royal indaba had "constituted a direct insult to HRH". The evidence of C. A. Wheelwright, CNC, and Carl Faye, CNC's clerk and interpreter to the Prince in 1925, are comprehensively reproduced in the Natal Mercury, 6/5/1927 (hereafter Wheelwright's evidence and Faye's evidence). The evidence of O. Fynney, magistrate of Nongoma, is recorded in KCAL, Mrs. Mary Tyler Gray's Collection of Press Cuttings, Book 4, ref. 19958, p. 132,
unsourced cutting, n. d. (hereafter Fynney's evidence).
(All these NAD officials, incidentally, gave evidence for the prosecution and contributed substantially to the successful outcome of the action: Solomon was awarded £600 damages with costs.) Other useful sources include The Net, September 1925, 'Zululand Welcomes the Prince', pp. 3ff; Moberley, Eshowe, pp. 76ff; T. Aronson, Royal Ambassadors in South Africa, 1860-1947, pp. 91ff; and the authorized history of the Prince's tour, G. Wardprice, Through South Africa With the Prince (London, 1926), pp. 178ff.

176 See the description in Wardprice, With the Prince, pp. 179-180.
177 Moberley, Eshowe, p. 78; The Net, September 1925, p. 4.
178 Fynney's evidence.
179 Wheelwright's evidence.
180 This spontaneous display was one of many similar instances which together persuaded the magistrate of Eshowe (and other white witnesses) that Solomon should be punished. See the leading article by 'Zithulele' (magistrate of Eshowe) entitled 'The Royal Visit to Eshowe: Solomon's significant behaviour - Saluting the 'King' - Whole Affair Premeditated', Natal Mercury, 13/6/1925.

181 See Wardprice, With the Prince, pp. 179-182; and Wheelwright's evidence. During the libel case, the counsel for the defence sought to suggest that Solomon's dress itself was an affront to the Prince.
182 Aronson, Royal Ambassadors, p. 92; Moberley, Eshowe, p. 81.
183 See Wardprice, With the Prince, p. 184; Aronson, Royal Ambassadors, p. 93; and Moberley, Eshowe, p. 81.
184 Wheelwright's evidence; and Moberley, Eshowe, p. 81.
186 Fynney's evidence.
187 Wheelwright's evidence.
188 Fynney's evidence; Wheelwright's evidence.
189 See below.
190 See the various accounts in Wheelwright's evidence; Aronson, Royal Ambassadors, pp. 92, 93; Moberley, Eshowe, pp. 81, 82; Wardprice, With the Prince, pp. 185, 186.
191 It was the ambiguity of Solomon's actions that so infuriated certain white observers. That the court case was resolved in Solomon's favour is a measure of the subtlety with which he conducted himself.
192 NAD officials were unaware of the enrolment of the Phondowendhlovu, and information regarding the precise time of its enrolment is unavailable. Ndesheni, for example, merely reports that it took place "at the time of the Prince of Wales' visit". Pers. Comm., Ndesheni,
part I, p. 5. It seems, however, that a rudimentary ceremony was performed on the evening or day after the indaba, before the crowds dispersed.

The issue of the rumour has many nuances and ramifications that can only be sketched here. The rumour is still alive today. For a clear statement, see Pers. Comm., Mahaye, part I, pp. 1-6. Mahaye, who fervently believes the appointment to have occurred (as a youth he attended the indaba), embroiders the legend by arguing that Solomon was appointed king in 1916 as a "foil" to the disloyal Boers during World War I, but it was only in 1925 that Solomon was officially informed of this. He incorrectly argues that Solomon's stipend was paid from England and not South Africa, and hence that Solomon had a special relationship with British royalty. It transpired that this inaccuracy stems from the role of the Governor-General as 'Supreme Chief' (i.e. the payer of stipends) in Natal, where the Governor-General in Solomon's time was always a member of the British aristocracy. Mahaye further argues that the real reason for the court case after the indaba was a Natal attempt to prevent "the truth" of Solomon's appointment from leaking out. See ibid., part I, pp. 11, 12; part II, pp. 13, 14. Ndesheni (who also attended the indaba) states that he was too young to truly understand the proceedings, but it was clear that the Prince and Solomon "were in agreement in their talks about this country. The Prince of Wales said something about it belonging to the Zulus and to Solomon." Pers. Comm., Ndesheni, part I, p. 7. At the time, the rumour was sometimes expressed with a subtly different emphasis: the Prince had not so much 'restored Solomon to Zululand' as 'restored Zululand to Solomon', with the implication that Europeans would be turned out. See NEC, Box 4, evidence of Sir Charles Saunders, Melmoth, 29/9/1930, p. 1897, and below.

A copy is to be found in NTS 7205, 20/326, together with NAD correspondence on the matter.

See CK 9A 2: XB 13: 91, biographical notes on Bhengu; and MS MAR, File 50, KCM 2761 (d), Zulu Chieftainship Dispute, 1945, Board of Inquiry, evidence of Simpson Bhengu, pp. 92, 109. In the latter Bhengu seems to suggest that he had nothing to do with Solomon before 1929. He had good cause to attempt to minimize his association with Solomon since he was deeply implicated in the financial scandals that characterized Solomon's later life - and though Solomon ignored the NAD's repeated injunctions to sack him, the more compliant Mshiyeni (Zulu regent after Solomon's death) fully supported the NAD's action in banishing him from the

The front-page advertisements referred to here appeared frequently on Ilanga lase Natal's editions during 1929 and 1930.

JUS 408, 4/323/25, Capt. L. Smith to District Staff Officer, Pietermaritzburg, 21/7/1925, enclosing copy of correspondence received from a "reliable" source.

NTS 7205, 20/326, R. M. Tanner, Magistrate Lower Umfolosi, to CNC, 28/9/1925.

Ibid. His informant here was Chief Msiyana (Msiyane) of his district.

NTS 7205, 20/326, Magistrate Eshowe to CNC, 21/9/1925.

CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, E. N. Braatvedt, Magistrate Mtunzini, to CNC, 8/10/1925. For NAD correspondence in a similar vein, see CNC to SNA, 12/10/1925, and enclosed minutes from magistrates in Zululand; and NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 12/10/1925 and enclosures (the same letter, but with additional accompanying material).

JUS 408, 4/323/25, Divisional Staff Officer, No. 6 Military District, Standerton, to Chief of General Staff, Union Defence Force, 11/7/1925.

Sundkler, Bantu Prophets, p. 103. For Solomon's earlier association with Mvuyana, see Ch. 3 above.

Sundkler, Bantu Prophets, p. 103. The Hymn quoted is Hymn number 116 of the 'Nazarite Hymnbook'. See also Sundkler, Zulu Zion, p. 168.

In this regard, see the sympathetic and perceptive commentary entitled 'A Nation Without a Leader' in The Net, March 1927, pp. 12, 13, which identifies the "new desire for real unity" among the Zulu that followed the indaba.

The key documents in this regard are NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 10/11/1923, enclosing transcription of Magistrate Nongoma to CNC, 28/10/1923; Magistrate Nongoma to CNC, 14/1/1924; and the two vital interchanges CNC to SNA, 7/2/1924 and SNA to CNC, 28/2/1924. See also SAP 41, 6/953/23/4, Oscroft's report of Inkatha meeting, n.d., enclosed in CNC to SNA, 3/11/1924; and the remarks in SAP 41, 6/953/23/1, Dep. Comm., Natal SAP, to Secretary, SAP, Pretoria, 25/11/1924.

This was clear from the CNC's attempts to delay the interview with Simelane in 1921. See in particular CNC PMB 92, 64/2, CNC to Magistrate Nongoma, 15/4/1921.

The opposition was not confined to the Natal NAD. Senator Schofield, for example, questioned the Minister of Native Affairs why he had not suppressed Inkatha let alone
recognise it. NTS 7205 20/326, unsigned memorandum re. 'Questions asked of the Minister of Native Affairs in the Senate', 14/7/1925; and accompanying minute CNC to SNA, 10/7/1925.

209 NTS 7205, 20/326, SNA to CNC, 12/11/1924. Herbst astutely compared the development of Inkatha to developments in the Transvaal. "Here in the Transvaal The Congress has done untold harm in the Locations reserved and are fast undermining the authority of the Chiefs. They are clever enough in Natal to begin on the side of the chiefs, but as soon as they find their feet, over will go the Chiefs." Ibid.

210 See the CNC's extensive memorandum on the subject in NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 28/11/1924, especially pp. 2-5. Both the SNA and CNC were far more in favour of establishing councils in Natal on the lines of those existent in Pondoland. These offered the advantages of integrating the tribal order directly with the composition and operation of the councils (in effect 'chiefs councils'), and retaining considerable power in the hands of the local NAD official. However, the Pondoland councils were modelled on the Transkeian Proclamations that followed on the Cape Colony's Glen Grey Act - and not the Union's 1920 Act. If they were to be implemented in Natal, the NAD would have to make special arrangements with the Native Affairs Commission and call on the Governor-General, as Supreme Chief, to utilize his powers to rule by proclamation. Faced with these 'difficulties', together with the prospect of establishing 'deviationist' precedents, the prospect of practical action dissolved. As the CNC put it, there was the "practical difficulty in overcoming that sentiment which mistakenly regards the 1920 Act as the Magna Carta of the South African Natives". Ibid., p. 4. See also SNA to CNC, 12/11/1924 and 6/1/1925.

211 CNC PMB 84, 88/7/4, CNC to SNA, 12/10/1925, p. 4.

212 This is evident in Wheelwright's and Faye's evidence before the court case that followed the indaba, Natal Mercury, 6/5/1927. For an impression of the CPSA view, see the tenor of the leading report of the indaba in The Net, September 1928, 'Zululand Welcomes the Prince', pp. 3ff.

213 NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 10/7/1925, p. 1.

214 CNC PMB 84, 88/7/4, CNC to SNA, 12/10/1925.

215 For the basic purposes and provisions of the 1925 Tax Act, see Rogers, Native Administration, pp. 99, 100. The purposes are more clearly stated in the relevant Native Affairs sessions in the House of Assembly. See Debates of the House of Assembly, speeches by Payn (Tembuland), Marwick, and the Minister of Finance, 9/7/1925, cols.5781-5792; and also the speech by Nel
CNC PMB 84, 88/7/4, CNC to SNA, 12/10/1925, p. 1.
Ibid., pp. 1-3.
Ibid., p. 4.
See NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 30/11/1925, in which the CNC refers to this meeting. No record of the proceedings appears to survive.
NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 30/11/1925 and 5/2/1926 (re. stopping of Inkatha collections); and CNC's circular to all magistrates in Natal, 21/1/1926 (re. Solomon's present and future status).
See below.
NTS 7205, 20/326, extract from Natal Mercury, 31/10/1925, reporting Inkatha meeting of 6-8/10/1925. Interestingly, the meeting is referred to as the sixth annual meeting, which suggests that Inkatha was inaugurated in 1920, a year before Simelane and Mnyaiza approached the NAD.
Ibid. Previously the NAD had kept itself informed through its own officials acting in the capacity of 'government spies'.
This was featured on the Inkatha leaflet advertising the 1925 meeting, a copy of which is to be found in NTS 7205, 20/326.
Natal Mercury, 31/10/1925, report of Inkatha meeting.
These responses can not be exclusively regarded as forms of active protest, for they were also a reflection of the breakdown of 'old tribal discipline'. The formal political organisations that blossomed in the later 1920's did not supersede these responses as much as they did not halt 'social disintegration'. See also Ch. 5 below.
Marks, "Ideology of Segregation", p. 185.
The most comprehensive source on Champion is M. W. Swanson, The Views of Mahlati (Pietermaritzburg, 1983), (Mahlati was Champion's journalistic nom-de-plume). The outlines of his life are recorded in Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, Vol. 4, pp. 18-19, and some of Champion's own reminiscences are located in A. W. G. Champion Collection, Documentation Centre for African Studies, University of South Africa, Pretoria (hereafter AWGC).
For the 'African Workers' Club' (after 1928 the 'Natal Workers' Club') see AWGC Box 3, Files 4.1, and 5.1 to 5.3, and for a brief account of the Bantu Social Centres, see Couzens, "Moralizing leisure time", pp. 318, 329ff. For the initiation of this scheme, see University of the Witwatersrand, Department of Historical and Literary Papers, Champion Papers (hereafter MS CHAM), A 922/A, correspondence relating to Champion's negotiations with
white politicians and land speculators. Some of the material I collected on Champion and Clermont has been analysed by M. W. Swanson in "The Rise of Clermont" (presented to the workshop on African urban life in Durban, University of Natal, Durban, 1983). For Champion and the 1929 Beer Hall riots, see Paul La Hausse's forthcoming "The struggle for the City: Alcohol, Ematsheni and Popular Culture in Durban, 1902-1936" (unpublished MA thesis, University of Cape Town, 1984). (I was able to see a section of this thesis while it was still being examined.)

The phrase used is in Bradford, "Social origins of ICU leadership", p. 295. For further reference to ICU activities, see Ch. 5 below.

Specifically, this was reflected in the ICU's campaigns for a minimum wage in East London and Bloemfontein, and the race riot that erupted in Bloemfontein following a police liquor raid. See Roux, Time Longer than Rope, pp. 157, 158.

CNC PMB 92, 64/2, J. Gumede, President NNC, to CNC, 17/3/1926, forwarding resolutions of NNC meeting.

JUS 408, 4/323/25, Staff Officer, No. 6 Military District, Standerton, To Chief of General Staff, Union Defence Force, Pretoria, 11/7/1925, also reporting the feelings of local magistrates.

Ibid.

NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 1/3/1926.

Ibid.

Joel Msimang (founder of the Independent Methodist Church of South Africa, circa 1910), Z. Msimang (pastor and member of the Wesleyan Methodist District Committee, Natal, 1909), Selby Msimang (prominent in the SANNC and also ICU during the 1920's), and Richard Msimang (son of Joel, graduate of Dube's Ohlange Institute, British-trained solicitor, founder-member and legal adviser to the SANNC, and principal author - in collaboration with W. W. Ndhlovu - of the 1919 SANNC constitution). See Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 70; Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, Vol. 4, p. 106.


Ibid.

Ibid., pp. 2-5.

Ibid., pp. 3, 4. Although the constitution set out rules for the election of office-bearers, discussion of subjects introduced from the assembly, and voting on motions put to the assembly, it did not make it clear that the executive was necessarily responsible to the assembly.
A copy is to be found in KCAL, George Heaton Nicholls Collection (hereafter MS NIC) 2.08.1, File 2, KCM 3305 (a), 'Mnyayiza ka Ndabuko and Franz Zulu [Signatories], By Authority of the Nation', to the Rt. Hon. Gen. Hertzog, Prime Minister and Minister of Native Affairs, n. d. NAD correspondence relating to this petition is located in CNC PMB 81, 88/7/1, notes of interview between CNC and Solomon, 13/1/1927; memorandum by Magistrate Nongoma, 29/1/1927; and CNC to SNA, 14/2/1927.

See NTS 7205, 20/326, report of the 'Annual Meeting of the Inkata ka Zulu', 1926, by Rev. L. E. Oscroft, 6/10/1926, p. 3. The Native Recruiting Corporation covered all expenses connected with Mankulumana's death and the return of his body to Zululand - although it subsequently reclaimed its £115/14/2 outlay from Solomon. Solomon instructed Franz to conduct a collection in Johannesburg mining compounds for this purpose. CNC PMB 81, 58/7/1, H. M. Taberer, Native Labour Adviser, Johannesburg, to Major H. S. Cooke, Director of Native Labour, Johannesburg, 4/3/1930.

See, for example, Reitz's glowing account of the way in which Mankulumana transformed the tension between the Usuthu and Mandlakazi into jocularity on the occasion of a public gathering in 1922. Reitz, No Outspan, pp. 65-67.

MS NIC 2.08.1, File 2, KCM 3305 (a), royal petition to Hertzog, p. 1.

See CNC PMB 81, 58/7/1, CNC to SNA, 14/2/1927; and memorandum by Magistrate Nongoma, 29/1/1927.

Evidently Lord Buxton's translator on the day of the 1917 indaba did not faithfully translate all the nuances and subtleties of the official address, and this provided the opportunity for the petitioners to misrepresent the facts. See Solomon's further communication on this issue, CNC PMB 81, 58/7/1, Solomon kaDinuzulu to Magistrate Nongoma, 4/7/1927 (Zulu typescript and NAD translation). Fynney (whose views must be treated with some caution for he was not an unemotional supporter of Solomon and Inkatha in the late 1920s) held that Buxton's interpreter ended the address with the words "obey him" (meaning Solomon) unbeknown to Lord Buxton. Natal Witness, 17/9/1931, 'Ex-Magistrate's Opinion: Inkata Ignored by Government.'

MS NIC 2.08.1, File 2, KCM 3305 (a), royal petition to Hertzog, pp. 2, 3.

Ibid., p. 2.

See NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 1/3/1926; SNA to CNC, 25/3/1926; and CNC's printed circular to all Natal magistrates, 8/4/1926.
253 CNC PMB 81, 58/7/1, memorandum by Magistrate Nongoma, 29/1/1927.
254 CNC PMB 81, 58/7/1, CNC to SNA, 14/2/1927.
256 Ibid., p. 4.
257 Ibid., p. 3. Unfortunately Oscroft does not comment on the substance of their differences.
258 Davenport, South Africa, p. 206.
259 NTS 7205, 20/326, report of Inkatha meeting, 1926, by Rev. L. E. Oscroft, 6/10/1926, p. 3.
260 It is likely that M. L. E. Maling (sometimes referred to as 'Malinga') was related to the P. Maling who was a founder member of the NNC. The latter also acted as a representative to the kholwa Chief Gule of a Wesleyan Methodist community near Newcastle, Northern Natal. See Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 71. This summary of M. L. E. Maling's activities has been pieced together from a number of sources: NEC Box 4, evidence of M. L. E. Maling, 'exempted Native', Vryheid, 20/9/1930, pp. 1563ff; evidence of C. A. W. Wheelwright, former CNC, Mtubatuba, 25/9/1930, pp. 1762-1764; and NTS 280, 227/53, "Matters concerning Northern Natal land and labour", which contains official correspondence on the subject of Maling's activities, particularly during 1927 and 1928.
262 NTS 280, 227/53, CNC to SNA, 23/9/1927.
264 Ibid., pp. 3, 4.
Footnotes to Chapter 5

1 The figure is calculated from the table cited in Lacey, Boroko, appendix A.1, p. 380. It does not only represent the natural increase of the reserve population, for considerable numbers of Zulu moved from the white-owned farms to the reserves during this period (see below). "Inland" in this context refers to the Nongoma, Mahlabatini, Emtonjaneni (Melmoth), Eshowe, Nkandla and Nquthu districts. See NEC Box 4, evidence of Archdeacon A. W. Lee, Vryheid, 18/9/1930, p. 1414; Chief Mgixo (kaZiwedu kaMpande Zulu), Nongoma, 24/9/1930; G. M. Robinson (representative of Zululand Farmers' Union), Empangeni, 26/9/1930, pp. 1842-3; and, on the need for stock reduction, Box 7, evidence of John Dube, Durban, 2/4/1931, p. 6266.


5 Natal Witness, 17/9/1931.

6 Oscroft observed that "famine and lack of employment is working sad havoc amongst the people". MS NIC 2.08.1, File 5, L. E. Oscroft to G. H. Nicholls, 14/5/1932. See also SASJ, Vol. 15, No. 10, October 1931, p. 653; and Natal Advertizer, 17/9/1931.

7 For the sugar industry's efforts to recruit Zulu, see SASJ, Vol. 9, No. 11, November 1925, pp. 741ff; Vol. 9, No. 12, December 1925, pp. 817ff; Vol. 15, No. 12, December 1931, pp. 761ff. For poor wages, health and working conditions, see SASJ, Congress and Exhibition Number, 1924, articles by Dr. G. A. Park-Ross (regional Medical Officer of Health), pp. 67ff; C. A. Wheelwright, pp. 72ff; and H. S. Fynn (Inspector of Native Labour, Coastal Area, Natal), pp. 77ff. See also Report of the Native Affairs Commission, 1932-1933, UG3-'34, Annexure A, report of special investigation, pp. 8-12; and the International Labour Organisation's report, "Native Labour on the Zululand Sugar Estates", International Labour Review, Vol. 33, 1936, pp. 861-863.
MS NIC 2.08.1, File 5, KCM 3353 (a), L. E. Oscroft to G. H. Nicholls, 14/5/1932. For further references to the spread of malaria, see The Net, March 1933, p. 6; SASJ, Vol. 15, No. 12, p. 769; Vol. 16, No. 4, April 1932, p. 201; Vol. 16, No. 9, September 1932, pp. 483, 489.

Maling referred to evicted tenants from Northern Natal being forced to go to "unhealthy places in native reserves". NEC Box 4, evidence of M. L. E. Maling, Vryheid, 20/9/1930, p. 1583. Regarding evictions and overcrowding, see below.


The full text of the petition was printed in Natal Witness, 17/10/1931.


Natal Witness, 8, 9/9/1931, and Natal Advertiser, 8/9/1931, reporting SNA's address to the Zulu at Nongoma.


The Zululand Government subsidised the sale of maize at cost price through trading stores in certain years. Unlike the early 1930s, the Zulu were able to fall back on cash resources for subsistence. Guy, "Destruction and reconstruction", pp. 183, 184.

See, for example, NEC Box 4, evidence of Archdeacon A. W. Lee, Vryheid, 18/9/1930, pp. 1409, 1414; evidence of C. A. Wheelwright, Mtubatuba, 25/9/1930, pp. 1742, 1749. Similarly, when Mr H. B. Butler of the International Labour Office toured South Africa in 1928, he reported that the Zulu were "under less pressure to seek work owing to the comparative sufficiency of their lands to meet their present requirements..." South African Outlook, 2/7/1928, p. 135, quoting Butler's report.

The Zulu were also deemed to be "indolent" and to have "insufficient wants" (eg. clothing). See SASJ, Vol. 3, No. 5, May 1919, pp. 373ff; and Vol. 15, No. 12, December 1931, p. 769. Even during the famine of 1931/32, the sugar industry could not rely on purely economic factors to force Zulu into the sugar plantations. See below.


Ibid., p. 272.
25 Ibid., p. 274, Table 5; and see pp. 272, 273 and 276 for exposition and commentary.

26 NEC Box 4, evidence of Archdeacon A. W. Lee, Vryheid, 18/9/1930, p. 1414; and see Marks, "Ideology of Segregation", p. 190.

27 NEC Box 4, evidence of Chief Mgixo, Nongoma, 24/9/1930, p. 1690.


29 See, for example, Reports of the Auditor-General for financial years 1925-26, UG40-'26, p. 213; 1926-27, UG39-'27, p. 205; and 1928-29, UG44-'29, p. 199.

30 NTS 7205, 227/53, CNC's report, pp. 4, 9, 10. Re. chiefs' labour service obligations, see also NEC Box 4, evidence of M. Zondo (representative of Acting Chief of the Madide), Vryheid, 20/9/1930, p. 1528.

31 NEC Box 4, evidence of Rev. E. A. Mahamba (minister of the Free Church of Scotland), Dundee, 17/9/1930, p. 1363.

32 For comment on the political role of Northern Natal chiefs, as distinct from chiefs in the Zululand reserves, see below.

33 It seems that the Young Zulu Movement was more of an informal 'club' or society than a political pressure group. See NEC Box 4, interchange between Commissioner Lucas and C. A. Wheelwright during evidence of the latter, Mtubatuba, 25/9/1930, p. 1746.

34 NEC Box 4, evidence of Shiyabanye Mncwango, Nongoma, 24/9/1930, p. 1700.

35 See NEC Box 4, evidence of Archdeacon A. W. Lee, Vryheid, 18/9/1930, pp. 1453, 1454; Chief Mqwebu (Umzoti mission reserve, on the southern border of Zululand), Stanger, 2/10/1930, pp. 2036-2039, during which he speaks of conditions in the reserves; and Mose Mtuli (representative of the 'Committee' of the CPSA), Nongoma, 29/9/1930, p. 1903.

36 Marks, "Ideology of segregation", p. 190.

37 NEC Box 4, evidence of S. Mncwango, Nongoma, 24/9/1930, p. 1693. See also evidence of C. A. Wheelwright, Mtubatuba, 25/9/1930, p. 1746.

38 NEC Box 7, evidence of Mrs V. S. Makanya (representing the Bantu Youth League), Durban, 2/4/1931, pp. 6302, 6303.


40 NEC Box 4, evidence of C. A. Wheelwright, Mtubatuba, 25/9/1930, pp. 1734, 1735.


42 NEC Box 7, evidence of Chief Solomon Zulu, Pietermaritzburg, 8/4/1931, pp. 6551, 6552.

43 This mirrors the fluidity or "mobility" between the petty bourgeoisie and "upper levels of the working class"
in the urban areas. See Bonner, "The Transvaal Native Congress, 1917-1920", pp. 272, 305.
44 See below.
46 For reserve influx, see below. The other important consequence was influx to the urban areas.
47 The quotation is from NEC Box 4, evidence of E. N. Braadveldt, Magistrate Melmoth (Emtonjaneni), Melmoth, 29/9/1930, pp. 1873(a). Re. the expansion of white farming, increased evictions and influx, see ibid.; p. 1873; and also H. C. Lugg, Magistrate Verulam (north and inland of Durban), Durban, 1/4/1931, pp. 6150, 6151.
48 NEC Box 4, evidence of Maling, Vryheid, 20/9/1930, p. 1583.
49 NEC Box 4, evidence of Magungwana Zondo (representative of acting chief of the Madide), Vryheid, 20/9/1930, p. 1528.
50 NEC Box 7, evidence of Acting Chief Magiyana, Mapumulo district, and Acting Chief Gebemeweni, Mahlabatini district, Durban, 1/4/1931, pp. 6183ff.
51 NEC Box 4, evidence of Chief Mgixo, Nongoma, 24/9/1930, pp. 1685-1687.
52 These were terms frequently employed by reserve chiefs to describe militant leadership. For specific examples see below, and Report of the Select Committee on the Native Bills, SC19-'27, evidence of Chiefs Kula (Msinga district, adjoining Zululand) and Swayimana (New Hanover district) (both, incidentally, saw Solomon as their "big chief"), 15/6/1927, pp. 382ff.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 This Zulu idiom is quoted in an enlightening article on Zulu socio-economic change in The Net, June 1924, p. 7.
58 Re. the attitude of chiefs to improvident youth, see NEC Box 4, evidence of Archdeacon Lee, Vryheid, 18/9/1930, pp. 1449-1452; Rev. L. E. Oscroft, Nongoma, 22/9/1930, pp. 1631-1633; Chief Mgixo, Nongoma, 24/9/1930, p. 1685; and Natal Witness, 9/9/1931, statement of Chief Mathole to the SNA at Nongoma. In recognition of the problem of abagafi, the revised Natal Code of Native Law (1932) defines one of the duties of chiefs and headmen as "the enforcement of obedience to authority, of the duty of children to parents and of the obligations of inmates of kraals towards their kraal heads". Tribal
authorities were empowered to impose fines of up to £2 on any individual who defied orders to honour tribal obligations. See Rogers, Native Administration, pp. 319, 320.

59 It is difficult to explore rank-and-file consciousness in a highly oppressive situation. It is significant, however, that local whites identified a new antagonism among the ordinary Zulu towards them - which was accompanied by a breakdown of Zulu respect for authority and "old etiquette" generally. NEC Box 4, evidence of George Higgs (Empangeni sugar planter), Empangeni, 26/9/1930, pp. 1772, 1774; and also Rev. L. E. Oscroft, Nongoma, 22/9/1930, p. 1648.

60 Zululand Times, 1/9/1927.

61 Ibid. For further details and comment on this incident, see below.

62 See Ch. 2 above.

63 NTS 280, 227/53, petition to the Prime Minister, n. d. (approximately April 1927) claiming the embody the wishes of all Zulu in Northern Natal, submitted to A. B. Payn, MP. For Maling's role in drawing up the petition, see CNC's report on "Labour Conditions in Northern Districts of Natal - Malinga [sic]", 9/2/1928, p. 2. The basis of the contention was the legality of the agreement allegedly made between Dinuzulu and the Boers in 1884. For Maling's meeting with the Prime Minister, see Debates of the House of Assembly, Vol. 19, speech by Payn, 9/5/1932, Col. 4299.

64 NTS 280, 227/53, ALU petition to General Hertzog, Prime Minister and Minister of Native Affairs, 1/9/1927, signed by M. L. E. Maling. This petition was accompanied by another petition, dated 31/8/1927, requesting that the Prime Minister personally receive a delegation of twelve ALU representatives.

65 NTS 280, 227/53, SNA to CNC, 19/9/1927.

66 White farmers did not, however, aim to end the system of labour tenancy (as opposed to wage labour, for example). Labour tenancy was effectively the only means by which undercapitalised white landlords could set their own agricultural activities on a capitalist footing. See Morris, "Capitalism in South African agriculture", pp. 308ff; and Ch. 2 above.

67 These developments were taking place concurrently in the midlands of Natal proper. See Bradford, "The ICU in Umvoti, 1927-1928", pp. 4ff. For the Candover Estates, see Ch. 4 above, and for the Goss Estates, see below.


70 NTS 280, 227/53, ALU petition to the Prime Minister, 1/9/1927; and CNC's inquiry, 1928, Annexure I, evidence.
The term is used in the contract that Goss Estates required all "kraalheads" (homestead heads resident on its holdings) to sign. NTS 280, 227/53, CNC's inquiry, 1928, Annexure III, copy of Goss Estates "Agreement";

Ibid.

This process, which had been initiated long previously, (see Ch. 2 above) was accentuated in the late 1920s. See below.

NTS 280, 227/53, CNC's inquiry, 1928; Annexure III, Goss Estates "Agreement". See also ALU petition to the Prime Minister, 1/9/1927; CNC's inquiry, Annexure I, evidence; and CNC's report, 9/2/1928, p. 7.

NTS 280, 227/53, ALU petition to the Prime Minister, 1/9/1927. See also CNC's comments in CNC's report, 9/2/1928, p. 2.

NTS 280, 227/53, ALU petition to the Prime Minister, 1/9/1927. For individual cases, see CNC's inquiry, Annexure I, evidence; NEC Box 4, evidence of W. W. Ndhlovu, Vryheid, 20/9/1930, p. 1523, 1554; M. Zondo (representative of acting chief of the Madide), Vryheid, 20/9/1930, p. 1528.

NTS 280, 227/53, ALU petition to the Prime Minister, 1/9/1927. See also CNC's remark in NTS 280, 227/53, CNC's report, 9/2/1928, p. 7. Looking at the issue of desertion from the point of view of a young man, Ndhlovu argued that homestead heads tended to demand whatever money was earned by their sons on the farms "leaving nothing for the boy himself". NEC Box 4, evidence of W. W. Ndhlovu, Vryheid, 20/9/1930, p. 1554. Even Zulu labourers on the Northern Natal coal mines returned very little of their earnings to their nearby families. See evidence of Col. Peachey, (ex-magistrate of Vryheid), 19/9/1930, p. 1510; M. L. E. Maling, Vryheid, 20/9/1930, pp. 1591-1592; and Archdeacon Lee, Vryheid, 18/9/1930, p. 1449.

The details and ramifications of this process are explored in Morris, "Capitalism in South African agriculture". See also Bradford, "The ICU in Umvoti, 1927-1928."


NTS 280, 227/53, ALU petition to Prime Minister, 1/9/1927; and see also CNC's report, 9/2/1928, p. 2.


Ibid., pp. 7, 8.

For evidence of detentions, floggings and culpable
homicide, the use of sjamboks and firearms in 'labour relations', and the role of local officials, see NTS 280, 227/53, CNC's inquiry, 1928, Annexure I, evidence.


91 See NTS 280, 227/53, ALU to Magistrate Vryheid, 13/9/1927, furnishing names of representatives of chiefs in the ALU.


93 Ahrens, From Bench to Bench, pp. 91, 92. Ahrens had been magistrate of Ngotshe from 1922 until about 1927.


95 See Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 71.

96 See Ch. 2 above; and Bradford, "Social Origins of ICU leadership," p. 296.

97 See Ch. 4 above.

98 Bradford, "Social origins of ICU leadership," p. 296, and for details about Gilbert Coka, see pp. 297ff.


100 NTS 280, 227/53, SNA to CNC, 4/10/1927.

101 NTS 280, 227/53, SNA to CNC, 4/10/1927 (different letter of the same date).

102 NTS 280, 227/53, Magistrate Vryheid to CNC, 17/9/1927.

103 Ibid; and SNA to CNC, 4/10/1927. See also CNC to SNA, 23/9/1927.

104 See comments made above, in the context of a discussion of Simkins's analysis of agricultural production in the Union's reserves.


106 CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, A. E. Trigger, Divisional CID Officer, Johannesburg to Divisional CID Officer, Pietermaritzburg, 22/2/1928; and Bradford, "The ICU in Umvoti, 1927-1928," p. 22.


See below for a detailed treatment of the response of white farmers.


See below.


Debates of the House of Assembly, Vol. 14, speech by Deane, 26/3/1920, Cols. 2351ff. This statement, which referred to the role of chiefs during the irruptions in the Natal Midlands in 1927-28, were made in the context of a speech in support of the Riotous Assemblies Bill - which Deane held was favoured by the majority of Natal chiefs.

Natal Mercury, 19/5/1927.

Select Committee Report on Native Bills, SC 10-'27, evidence of Chief Kula and Chief Swayimana, 15/6/1927, pp. 382ff. See above for quotations of Kula's views on 'detribalised' Africans.

Ilanga lase Natal, 12/8/1927; NAD translations located in CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3 and 58/7/1.


Udibi lwase Africa, September 1927, quoted in La Hausse, "Struggle for the City," p. 221.

Zululand Times, 1/9/1927.


For Gumede's 1924 presidential address, see Ch. 4 above; and for NNC invitation to Solomon, see CNC PMB 92, 64/2, D. J. Sioka, General Secretary, NNC, to CNC, 19/7/1926.

See above.

See Ch. 4 above.


Ibid., pp. 222, 274, 275.

For further details of the secession of the Natal ICU, see Roux, Time Longer than Rope, pp. 175ff, and P. Wickins, The ICU of Africa (Cape Town, 1978).
A. W. G. Champion, "Mehlomadala" (Zulu-English pamphlet, n. d.), in which Champion quotes a letter he received from Kadalie, dated 5/6/1928, expressing concern that the Natal ICU had seceded from the "Great ICU". A copy of this pamphlet is to be found in AWGC Box 2: 3.2.2.

See CNC PMB 81, 57/7/3, Head Constable, SAP Ladysmith, to District Commandant, Dundee, 13/2/1928; and 58/7/3, A. E. Trigger, Divisional CID Officer, Johannesburg, to Divisional CID Officer, Pietermaritzburg, 22/2/1928.


CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, A. E. Trigger, Divisional CID Officer, Johannesburg, to Divisional CID Officer, Pietermaritzburg, 22/2/1928. For Mote, see Roux, Time Longer than Rope, pp. 168, 178.

CNC PMB 81, 57/7/3, handwritten NAD fragment, unaddressed and unsigned, 16/2/1928.


CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, Magistrate Vryheid to CNC, 15/2/1927. See below.

MS NIC 2.08.1, File 5, J. H. Nicolson to G. Heaton-Nicholls, 8/2/1928. See below for further details.

See Ch. 4 above.

See Ch. 4 above.

Ibid., and enclosed translation of Mathe's report of Inkatha meeting, Mahashini, 31/10/1927.

CNC PMB 81, 58/7/1, Magistrate Emtonjaneni to CNC, 9/3/1927.

Ibid., and enclosed translation of Mathe's report of Inkatha meeting, Mahashini, 31/10/1927.

CNC PMB 81, 58/7/1, Solomon kaDinuzulu to Magistrate Nongoma, 4/7/1927 (signed by "L. N." - Leonard Ncapayi - on behalf of Solomon).

See Ch. 4 above.

CNC PMB 81, 58/7/1, CNC to Magistrate Nongoma, 9/7/1927.

CNC PMB 81, 58/7/1, CNC to Magistrate Nongoma, 13/7/1927.

CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, translation of Solomon's views in Ilanga lase Natal, 12/8/1927.

CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, Bishop of Zululand (Vyvyan) to CNC, 3/9/1927.

CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, CNC to SNA, 19/10/1927.

CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, CNC to SNA, 19/10/1927.

CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, CNC to Bishop of Zululand, 8/11/1927.

NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 20/4/1928.

NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 23/4/1928.


Report of the Native Affairs Commission, 1925-1926, UG 17-'27, minutes of Native Conference, Pretoria, 2-5/11/1926, pp. 56-73, 83, 84 (for the debate); and p. 74 (Msiyane); p. 86 (Sioka).
See P. Walshe, *The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa* (London, 1970), especially pp. 113ff. For the Transvaal in particular, see Bonner, "The Transvaal Native Congress, 1917-1920", p. 304; and for Natal, see Ch. 4 above.


Ibid., evidence of Chief W. Khumalo (member of the South African Chiefs' Convention), 1/6/1927, p. 289.

Ibid., evidence of Chief W. Khumalo, Rev. Z. R. Mahambane, and Mr. J. D. Ngoso, 1/6/1927, pp. 289, 295, 299, 300. News of the formation of the Chiefs' Convention was not welcomed by all chiefs in Natal. See evidence of Chiefs Kula and Swayimana, 15/6/1927, pp. 382ff. The latter argued that "we do not feel the need to keep in touch with Natives in other provinces to listen to these young people who think because they have book learning they know much more than I do". Ibid.

This overview of the Communist role in African politics has been drawn from the following sources: Roux, *Time Longer than Rope*, especially Ch. XVII; Davenport, *South Africa*, pp. 211ff; and N. Weyl, *Traitors End: The rise and fall of the Communist Movement in Southern Africa* (New York, 1970), Ch. 5. (Note: Weyl's work must be treated with some circumspection. It takes the form of an anti-communist polemic written from the perspective of the 1960s - in celebration of the 'South African David' having shattered the 'Communist Goliath' "without abandoning parliamentary government, due process of law, or the independence and vigilance of the judiciary" [p. 9]. It is nonetheless a useful factual source.) For further details on the Federation of Non-European Trades Unions, see J. Lewis, "'The new unionism': industrialisation and industrial unions in South Africa, 1925-1930", in Webster (ed.), *Essays in Southern African Labour History*, pp. 121ff.

Roux, *Time Longer than Rope*, pp. 211, 212.


The *Net*, March 1928, p. 6, Bishop's letter.


Extant documentation on the history of the NNC/Natal African Congress during the mid- to late-1920s is extremely scanty. For reference to the formation of the Natal African Congress, see Karis and Carter, *From Protest to Challenge*, Vol. 4, p. 25. During 1926 Dube
evidently withdrew from politics in Natal proper in order to concentrate on his educational work. See Marks, "The ambiguities of dependence".


Marks, "The ambiguities of dependence", p. 25.


Generally, what attractions this conference saw in the 'Union Native Council Bill' were overshadowed by the impotency of the extant Native Conferences the Council was to supersede, together with the loss of the Cape African franchise. See Report of the Native Affairs Commission, 1925-1926, UG 17-'27, minutes of Native Conference, Pretoria, 2-5/11/1926, pp. 56-84; and comments of Native Affairs Commissioner, pp. 42-49. For Mtikulu, see ibid., p. 72. Mtikulu was then acting as a representative of the 'Cape Native Voters' Convention'. See Select Committee Report on the Native Bills, SC 10-'27, evidence of Dr. C. T. Loram, 6/2/1928, p. 73; and evidence of Prof. D. D. T. Jabavu, Dr. W. B. Rubusana, and Rev. A. Mtikulu, 30/5/1927, p. 280. Despite this 'Cape interlude', he was a solid member of the Natal 'old guard'. For further details, see A. Luthuli, Let My People Go (London, 1963), pp. 86ff; and Haines, "Opposition to Hertzog's Native Bills", p. 166 (incorrectly typed as p. 165).

See Ch. 4 above.

Rogers, Native Administration, pp. 82, 83.


Rogers, Native Administration, p. 83.

For the SNA's and CNC's reservations about the appropriateness of the 1920 Act in Natal, see Ch. 4 above; for the NAD's further deliberations on 'local council policy' in Natal, see below.

For a useful analysis of the 1927 Act, see Lacey, Boroko, pp. 94ff. See below for some comment on the role of Natal legislators in this enactment.

Lacey provides an illuminating contrast between the "erosion of the Cape African franchise", and the growth of the Natal-based "segregation ideal" in Boroko, pp. 59-69, and 84ff respectively. See below re. Natal legislators and the ideology of segregation.
In this context, Dube's interest in the Pan-African Congress in 1924 is illustrative (see Ch. 4 above). For Seme, see for example his publication entitled "The African National Congress: is it dead?" (n. d., evidently circa 1932), especially pp. 1-6. A copy is reproduced in CK Reel 14A, 2: XS14: 84.

Recently there have been some important commentaries on the relationship between anthropology and the ideology of segregation during the 1920s and 1930s: S. Dubow, "'Understanding the native mind': the impact of anthropological thought on segregationist discourse in South Africa, 1919-1933" (paper presented at the Workshop on Class, Community and Conflict, University of the Witwatersrand, February 1984); P. Rich, "The South African Institute of Race Relations and the debate on 'Race Relations', 1929-1958" (University of London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, collected seminar papers No. 28, The societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th centuries, Vol. 12); and see also Couzens, "Moralizing leisure time", pp. 317ff (which suggests but does not explore the existence of interconnections between anthropology, white liberals, and educated African opinion). The relationship between anthropology and the ideology of segregation on the one hand, and the changing political ideology of the African petty bourgeoisie in the 1920s and 1930s on the other hand, has not been explored in the extant literature. The main assertions that this dissertation makes in this respect are substantiated in the course of the narrative that follows; and in the further observations below on the development of petty bourgeois ideology in Natal.

G. Heaton Nicholls, et al, "Report of Special Committee on Natives' Land Commission: £11,000,000 per annum: A permanent asset worth more than the Rand is being thrown away" (published by the Zululand Planters' Union, 1917). A copy is stored in SNA II/5/4.

See MS CAMP, File 4, especially J. L. Dube to M. Campbell, 29/10/1908; and Marks, "Ambiguities of dependence", p. 174.

See Marks, "Ambiguities of dependence", p. 172, footnote 50. G. H. Hulett maintained his interest in 'native affairs' in Natal in the 1920s - though in the late 1920s he was one of the few 'sugar barons' who opposed an official resurrection of the Zulu monarchy. NEC Box 4, evidence of G. H. Hulett, Stanger, 2/10/1930, pp. 2002ff.

See Ch. 4 above.

See below.

See Chs. 2 and 3 above.

Natal Advertiser, 15/8/1917.

It is interesting, too, that during the first world war Nicolson felt that Dube was a dangerous agitator - whose
influence was behind the worker unrest in Durban in 1918-1919. See Marks, "Ideology of segregation", p. 182.

MS NIC 2.08.1, File 5, J. H. Nicolson to G. Heaton Nicholls, 8/2/1928.


Natal Advertizer, 7/2/1928.

See MS NIC 2.08.1, File 5, J. H. Nicolson to G. Heaton Nicholls, 8/2/1928 - the last paragraph of which made a cryptic reference to possible future arrangements.

See MS MAR 2.08.5, File 74, KCM 8338, statement of 'Cowley and Cowley' (acting for Kadalie) re. Natal Witness, 11/9/1926; Hawthorn, Cameron and Co. (acting for the Natal Witness) to J. Marwick, 21/3/1927; Marwick to Mr Advocate Carlisle, 16/4/1927; and copies of evidence Marwick assembled for the defence.

See MS MAR 2.08.5, File 74, KCM 8337, J. L. Dube to J. S. Marwick, 24/2/1928.

Ibid.

See NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 9/11/1928.

CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, SNA to CNC, 7/5/1928, reporting Campbell's 'recent' interview with the Minister. Confidential.

NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 20/4/1928.

NTS 7205, 20/326, SNA to CNC, 5/5/1928.


See NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 30/4/1928; and CNC's circular to all magistrates in Natal and Zululand, 7/5/1928.

NTS 7205, 20/326, annual report of 'Inkata ka Zulu', 6/6/1928, by L. E. Oscroft, p. 5. Oscroft's report is the main source for the account that follows.

See above for details of Majozi.

NTS 7205, 20/326, Oscroft's report of Inkatha meeting, 6/6/1928, pp. 1-4. For details re. Mahamba, see NEC Box 4, evidence of Rev. E. A. Mahamba, Dundee, 17/9/1930, p. 1363; for Silimane, see also Ch. 4 above.

This was completed on 28/7/1928, which is the date that appears on the 'official' 1928 constitution.

For an original copy of the 1928 constitution, bearing signatures, see NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 16/8/1928, enclosing 'Deed of Trust and Constitution of the Inkata ka Zulu', dated 28/7/1928. See Ch. 4 above for comment on the 1926 constitution.

Ibid., preamble, p. 2.

See below for an analysis of petty bourgeois interests in the 'modernisation' of the reserves.

NTS 7205, 20/326, Inkatha constitution, 28/7/1928, pp. 4, 5.

See ibid., pp. 5-14.

NTS 7205, 20/326, Oscroft's report of Inkatha meeting, 6/6/1928, p. 5.

NTS 7205, 20/326, report and resolutions of Inkatha chiefs' meeting, 16/8/1929, enclosed in NC (the term 'magistrate' was superseded in the Natal NAD in 1929) Nongoma to CNC, 10/9/1929. For thorough reports of the Inkatha chiefs' meeting and its appointment of the "Komiti ukuyo kala ePitoli" ('Committee to wail at Pretoria'), see Ilanga lase Natal, 13/9/1929; and 20/9/1929 (Zulu language reports only).

NTS 7205, 20/326, report and resolutions of Inkatha chiefs' meeting, 16/8/1929, enclosed in NC Nongoma to CNC, 10/9/1929. The Zulu of course had fought after Cetshwayo's restoration, and it was as a consequence of the Boer/Usuthu alliance during the civil war that the territory now known as Northern Natal was alienated from the Zulu.

NTS 7205, 20/326, SNA to CNC, 26/11/1929; see also CNC to SNA, 18/9/1929.

Maling had conducted a meeting in Northern Natal to discuss what he should represent to the Native Economic Commission, and while giving evidence he produced documentary proof that he worked for Solomon in some capacity. The commissioners held that Solomon had repudiated any association with Maling. NEC Box 4, evidence of M. L. E. Maling, Vryheid, 20/9/1930, pp. 1563-1568, 1572.

Ibid., pp. 1563, 1576, 1593.

It is outside the scope of this dissertation to offer a thorough commentary of white objectives in their own right. The following 'overview' seeks only to sketch, first, the deeper reasons for the 'white intervention' in Inkatha after 1928 and, second, how white interests sought to influence Inkatha's history. Very little work has been done on the political economy of Natal as a regional sub-system of the Union in the early post-Union period (Bradford's work is an exception). Moreover, no thorough attempt has been made to explain the determinants of the Natal 'native policy' proposals of the 1920s and 1930s, nor the disproportionate influence that these had on state 'native policy' in the crucial period 1925-1936. This overview, which dips into some of this 'unexplored territory', is based mainly on the following sources: Debates of the House of Assembly; Reports (and evidence) of the Select Committees on Native Affairs; evidence given before the Native Economic Commission; the SASJ; and the G. Heaton Nicholls and J. S. Marwick manuscript collections in the KCAL. Footnote references are made only to the most illustrative sources. Note: The relationship between the 'inter-racial interchange' in the context of Inkatha and the Natal 'native policy' proposals that Nicholls and Marwick expounded in parliament and select committees throws important light on
the development of the ideology of segregation. The leading role played by Natal leaders, both white and African, in the refinement of segregationist thinking at state level calls out for detailed exposition. (In this regard, see the comments in Marks, "Ideology of segregation", pp. 173-177.) At an analytical level, such an exposition stands to contribute to the debate in South African historiography concerning the origins and dynamic of state 'native' and land policy. The evidence for Natal would seem to question the extant revisionist perspectives which tend to characterise, on the one hand, the state and the expressly economic interests that it represented as dictatorial and as the virtually exclusive progenitors of state policy; and, on the other hand, the African population as a passive object of state policy. (See, for example, Wolpe, "Capitalism and cheap labour power"; Legassick, "Gold, agriculture, and secondary industry in South Africa, 1885-1970", in Palmer and Parsons (eds.), Roots of Rural Poverty; and for a 'fractionalist' view, Lacey, Boroko, Chs. 4-7. A valuable critique of current perspectives is offered by S. Clarke, "Capital, fractions of capital and the state: 'neo-Marxist' analysis of the South African state", Capital and Class, 5, 1978.) The Natal 'native policy' proposals were the outcome of considerable interchange between white and African political leaders - whether as allies or as opponents. In the light of Natal's strong influence on segregationist policy, it would appear that analyses of the origins and dynamic of state policy need to look beyond the (by definition, white) interests which were dominant within the apparatus of the state, and identify more clearly the way in which African class action influenced the policy-making process. The confidential negotiations between Nicholls and Dube in 1931 regarding the former's thoroughgoing segregationist proposals - which had a considerable influence on the 1936 'Native Acts' - is illustrative in this respect. (For reference to the Nicholls/Dube 'compact', see Marks, "Ambiguities of dependence", p. 178.)

221 See, for example, MS CAMP, File 10, KCM 32795, typescript report entitled 'Natal Sugar Association', unsigned, n. d. (1910?).

222 For further details of the sugar industry's transition to African labour, see J. D. Beall and M. D. North-Coombes, "The 1913 disturbances in Natal: the social and economic background to 'passive resistance'" (paper presented at the Workshop on Natal History, 1910-1961, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, October 1982), pp. 8ff.

223 SASJ, Vol. 1, No. 12, July 1918, p. 863.

224 In response to a deputation of sugar representatives, the NAD conducted a departmental committee of inquiry into the supply of labour to industries in Natal - specifically the sugar and coal industries. The committee's report in 1919, which argued that the latter need not look
beyond the province for its labour supply, was of considerable influence in redefining the sugar industry's labour policy. See SASJ, Vol. 3, No. 6, May 1919, pp. 373ff; and the frequent 'labour policy' debates in the SASJ throughout 1920.

Re. the advantages of local labour, see the series of four articles in SASJ, Vol. 9, No. 11, November 1925, pp. 707, 721, 741 and 770; and NEC Box 4, evidence of the Zululand Farmers' Union (which mainly represented the Zululand sugar planters), Empangeni, 26/9/1930, pp. 1815ff.

Cape Times, 11/5/1921, speeches by Marwick and Nicholls. The following sources are particularly illustrative: ibid.; NEC Box 4, evidence of A. Wood (chairman of Ngogo Farmers' Association), Newcastle, 16/9/1930, pp.1180; Evidence of the Zululand Farmers' Union, Empangeni 26/9/1930.


The Native Service Contract Act, which met many of their demands for 'tighter' labour legislation, was only enacted in 1932; moreover, it dealt primarily with labour tenancy agreements and therefore was of limited value to the sugar planters.

NEC Box 4, evidence of J. A. Graham (spokesman for three Farmers' Associations), Dundee, 17/9/1930, pp. 1257, 1258.

NEC Box 4, evidence of A. Wood (chairman of the Ngogo Farmers' Association), Newcastle, 16/9/1930, pp. 1180, 1186.

See the comments above on the socio-economic origins of rank-and-file militancy; and see also the treatment given to labour tenancy arrangements in Chs. 2 and 4 above.

Debates of the House of Assembly, Vol. 18, speech by Nicholls, 24/2/1932, Cols. 1401-1406; Vol. 19, speech by Nicholls, 9/5/1932, Cols. 4317-4322. For a summary of the 1932 Act, see Lacey, Boroko, pp. 169ff. A valuable insight into the interconnections between tribal authorities, tribalism, familial unity and Natal's commercial farmers that were embodied in the 'kraalhead' labour tenancy contract is provided in NEC Box 4, evidence of A. Wood, Newcastle, 16/9/1930, pp. 1180-1186.

One of the questions that the Native Economic Commission asked its consultants in the rural districts of Natal related specifically to these practices; evidently they
were unique to Natal. See NEC Box 4.


NEC Box 4, evidence of G. W. Higgs, Empangeni, 26/9/1930, pp. 1770-1775.

NEC Boc 7, evidence of D. M. Eadie, (secretary, Natal Millers' Association), Durban, 2/4/1931, pp. 6197-6201. For a consideration of the relationship between homestead production in the reserves and the cheapness of migrant labour (in the context of state land and 'native' policy), see Wolpe, "Capitalism and cheap labour power".

See Report of the Native Affairs Department, 1919-1921, UG34-'22, p. 9. The sugar industry's attempts to enforce adherence to this Act through the formation of a 'Recruiters' Association' in 1923 was of little success. See SASJ, Vol. 7, No. 12, December 1923, p. 995.


SASJ, Vol. 7, No. 10, October 1923, p. 802; and Vol. 9, No. 11, November 1925, p. 741.

See the series of articles in SASJ, Congress and Exhibition Number, 1924, pp. 67-78; and for planters' objections to the proposals, see pp. 78-82.

CNC PMB 97, 68/33, CNC to D. M. Eadie (secretary, South African Sugar Association), 24/2/1932. This scheme represented a homocidal attempt at blackmail for two reasons. First, if the homestead refused to comply with the labour demands, it could face starvation. Second, famine relief was being distributed almost exclusively in the worst-hit Zululand inland districts - where the inhabitants were just as prone to malaria as labourers from inland districts elsewhere in the Union. At the time, the SASJ itself reported that non-immune labourers were "dying in their hundreds" after working on the plantations. SASJ, Vol. 16, No. 4, April 1932, p. 201.

NEC Box 4, evidence of G. M. Robinson (representing the Zululand Farmers' Union), Empangeni, 26/9/1930, p. 1830 (a). See also NEC Box 7, evidence of D. Saunders (acting chairman, Natal Sugar Millers' Association), 2/4/1931, p. 6214. The sugar industry could not satisfactorily implement the deferred pay scheme because of resistance from the labour force.

CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, SNA to CNC, 7/5/1928 (confidential).

For brief details of the 1928 Mocambique Convention, see Official Yearbook of the Union of South Africa, No. 14,

For Marwick, see Debates of the House of Assembly, Vol. 9, 20/6/1927, Cols. 5300-5308; see also Natal Mercury, 19/8/1927 (re. Kranskop district); Report of the Select Committee on the Native Bills, SC19-'27, evidence of F. Rowland, 16/2/1928, pp. 136-142 (re. Hammarsdale district). See also above.

Debates of the House of Assembly, Vol. 10, question by Mr Nel (Ladysmith), 25/10/1927, Col. 208.


Select Committee Report on the Native Bills, SC10-27, evidence of William Elliot, with Alexander Stone and August Jansen (representatives of the Natal Agricultural Union), 13/5/1927, pp. 86-110. See SASJ, Vol. 12, No. 8, August 1928, p. 493, where G. H. Hullett states that sugar planters in Natal proper had authorised Elliot to represent them.


Debates of the House of Assembly, Vol. 9, speech by Marwick, 2/5/1927, Cols. 2990-2997; and MS MAR, File 74, KCM 8343 (b) and (c), fragments of Marwick's notes re. Native Administration Bill, n. d.

Debates of the House of Assembly, Vol. 9, speech by Nicholls, 28/4/1927, Cols. 2921-2929. The similarity between these views and those expressed by Solomon to the ZNTI is notable.

MS NIC 2.08.1, Bantu Affairs File 2, KCM 3307, fragment entitled 'Native Affairs', n. d.

MS NIC 2.08.1, Bantu Affairs File 3, KCM 3323, handwritten draft memorandum, n. d. (1930?); see also Marks, "Ideology of segregation", pp. 180, 181.

MS NIC 2.08.1, Bantu Affairs File 5, G. Heaton-Nicholls to J. H. Zutphen, 28/5/1929.

Ibid.

MS NIC 2.08.1, Bantu Affairs File 2, KCM 3303 (b); memorandum, carbon fragment, n. d. (1933?).

MS NIC 2.08.1, Bantu Affairs File 5, KCM 3362, unaddressed carbon fragment, n. d. (1929?). See also Bantu Affairs File 3, KCM 3323, handwritten draft memorandum, n. d.

This was most explicitly expressed in the correspondence between Nicholls and Dube in late 1930 and early 1931, in which Nicholls was soliciting African support for the 'Natal' or 'adaptionist' proposal before the select committee. See in particular MS NIC 2.08.1, Bantu Affairs File 5, KCM 3350 (a), document entitled 'The Land Settlement', n. d.; and KCM 3350 (b), G. Heaton-Nicholls to Rev. John Dube, 11/2/1931. Marks comments on Dube's negotiations with Nicholls in "Ambiguities of dependence",
pp. 178ff, and "Ideology of segregation", pp. 181ff. For a thorough exposition of Nicholls' ideas, see MS NIC 2.08.1, Bantu Affairs File 3, KCM 3336, draft memorandum on 'native affairs' (35pp.), n. d. (1934?).


Quotations are taken from editions dated 26/4/1929; 17/5/1929; and 22/11/1929.

Ilanga lase Natal, 1/1/1932.


For details on Majoezi, see above. Re. tennis, see Ilanga lase Natal, 19/4/1929, Zulu-language letter to the editor.


NEC Box 4, evidence of Chiefs S. Mini and D. Sioka, Pietermaritzburg, 10/4/1931, pp. 6772-6773. See above, and Ch. 4 above for details of Mini and Sioka.

NEC Box 7, evidence of V. S. Makanya, Durban, 2/4/1931, pp. 6303, 6304. See above re. reserve chiefs' response to the Bantu Youth League.


The deliberations of the select committees on the 'Native Bills' between 1927 and the mid 1930s were secret, and could not even be divulged to parliament. Re. African newspapers, see Roux, Time Longer than Rope, pp. 342ff.


On this question, see also the brief comments above, under the sub-heading 'The reconstitution of Inkatha, 1928'; and the relevant footnotes.


See Ch. 4 above re. Seme and Swazi/Zulu royalty; and below for references to his association with Inkatha. For some illuminating views on his 'ethnic' interpretation of African nationalism, see CK Reel 14A, 2: XS14, which contains biographical notes on Seme, and several news-cuttings. Of particular interest are Seme's obituary by J. K. Ngubane, Inkundla ya Bantu, 30/6/1951; and an article by Z. K. Matthews, Imvo, 25/11/1961. See also R. V. Selope-Thema's account of Seme's life in Drum, July 1953.

NEC Box 4, evidence of Chief Josiah Mqwebu (Umvoti Mission Reserve), Stanger, 2/10/1931, pp. 2036-2039.

NEC Box 8, evidence of Dr. P. Kali. Seme, Johannesburg, 6/5/1931, pp. 7427-7428.

NEC Box 4, evidence of W. W. Ndhlovu, Vryheid, 20/9/1930, p. 1526; and for Dube, see footnote 280. More broadly, regarding commerce as well as craft trades and craft industries, see NEC Box 4, evidence of Phillip Mtombu (lawyer's clerk), Dundee, pp. 1358-1359; Mose Ntuli (spokesman of the 'Committee' of the CPSA), pp. 1902-1903; Chief Josiah Mqwebu, pp. 2036-2039.
NEC Box 4, evidence of J. L. Dube, Durban, 2/4/1931, pp. 6228-6269. The most useful sections were pp. 6228-6237 (land); and 6252-6259 and 6261-6269 (reserve development and tribalism).

The plight of the rural petty bourgeoisie receives comment mainly in Ch.2; and above under the sub-heading 'Economic crisis and social stratification among the Zulu'.

See above; and refer to the originals of these statements for fuller substantiation of the assertions made here.

See below for comments on the proposal to 'settle' Zululand on the model of the High Commission Territories. For a somewhat superficial but nonetheless illuminating overview of the political role of the monarchy and royal council in Swaziland during the 1920s and 1930s see Kuper, Sobhuza II, pp. 64-104. The Union-wide portent of Inkatha's drive for recognition was clearly expressed in the 'native policy' proposals represented an elaboration and theorisation of the 'local settlement' Nicholls was attempting to implement in Natal through the medium of Solomon and Inkatha, and were strongly supported by Dube. See Marks, "Ambiguities of dependence", pp. 178-179; Haines, "Opposition to Hertzog's Segregation Bills", pp. 127ff; and Ch.6 below for further comment.
Footnotes to Chapter 6

1 See Ch. 5 above, under subheading 'The reconstitution of Inkatha, 1928'.
2 CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, SNA to CNC, 7/5/1928 (personal note); NTS 7205, SNA to CNC, 7/5/1928 (official minute).
3 CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, CNC to SNA, 2/6/1928.
4 CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, CNC to SNA, 21/6/1928; see also SNA to CNC, 7/5/1928; and NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 23/4/1928, enclosing draft Inkatha constitution.
5 NTS 7205, 20/326, report by E. N. Braatvedt re. Inkatha meeting, 11/6/1928.
6 NTS 7205, 20/326, report of H. L. Gebers re. Inkatha meeting, 4/6/1928.
7 NTS 7205, 20/326, N. W. Pringle (office of the CNC) to SNA, 15/6/1928.
9 CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, CNC to SNA, 17/7/1928 (Strictly Confidential), p. 8.
10 NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 18/7/1928 (Confidential), p. 1.
11 CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, CNC to SNA, 17/7/1928 (Strictly Confidential), pp. 4-10.
12 Ibid., pp. 9-10; and for the personal note, CNC to SNA, 17/7/1928 (Private and Confidential).
13 NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 18/7/1928 (Confidential), pp. 1-3.
14 Natal Mercury, 6/5/1927.
15 Natal Mercury, 7/8/1928.
16 This was most clearly revealed in NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 23/4/1928. Here the CNC spoke of the activities of and divisions within the Natal ICU; ICU leaders' attempts to gain Solomon's support; the communist penetration of the ANC; the likelihood of an ICU/ANC alliance; and Inkatha's opposition to such developments. Sections of this letter are quoted above.
17 In this regard, see NEC Box 4, evidence of C. A. Wheelwright, Mtubatuba, 25/9/1930, pp. 1728-1730. Here, Wheelwright argued that, while he was CNC, he had strongly favoured the resurrection of the Zulu monarchy (i.e. under NAD supervision) in principle, but had found that Solomon was too unreliable to be recognised. Significantly, Wheelwright also complained of the "prejudices against anything in the shape of Paramountcy in Zululand" among whites.
18 See CNC PMB 81, 57/7/3, 19/10/1927. The CNC argued here that it was essential to counter local officials' and Natal whites' antagonism towards Solomon, but in so doing the NAD should not appear to be Solomon's "protagonist". An extract of this letter is quoted above.
19 NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 9/11/1928, reporting his interview with Fynney.
20 See NTS 7205, 20/326, Nicolson and Thorpe to CNC, 2/8/28, enclosing Deed of Trust and Constitution of Inkatha ka Zulu; CNC to SNA, 16/8/1928, forwarding the above; and SNA to CNC, 3/9/1928.
Background information about Norton is unavailable. However, he was certainly not a member of the Natal NAD 'old guard'. It seems that Norton had at some stage been employed in the Transkei Territories.

Ilanga lase Natal, 5/4/1929; 26/4/1929. By contrast, the 'Zululand deputation' caused considerable excitement in the Transkei, and not only in the Bunga. Ahrens reported that some Xhosa hid themselves from Solomon, saying that they were afraid to look upon the descendant of Shaka. See Ahrens, From Bench to Bench, pp. 81-82.

CNC PMB 108, 94/8, minutes and proceedings of native commissioners' conference, Durban, 14-16/5/1929. See also CNC PMB 109, 94/4, memorandum entitled 'Local Councils on Locations', n. d. /1933/, which offers an overview of 'council policy' deliberations in Natal, 1929-1933. See NEC Box 4, evidence of C. F. Adams (Eshowe businessman), Nongoma, 22/9/1930, pp. 1669-1670. For comment on Adams, see below. For Solomon's personal views on the Bunga (ie. that it was too 'advanced' for Zululand) see NEC Box 7, evidence of Chief Solomon Zulu, Pietermaritzburg, 8/4/1931, pp. 6557-6558; and CNC PMB 108, 94/8, minutes of conference of native commissioners, 1929, statement by Gebers. See above.

While Inkatha had always aimed to secure official recognition, in the period 1921 to 1927 Inkatha's leaders had also interested themselves in various practical projects (eg. the purchase of farms, encouragement of commercial agriculture, establishment of a Zulu National Church, and the erection of a monument to Shaka). Between 1928 and 1930, however, Inkatha's leaders singlemindedly focussed their attention on the attempt to secure official recognition - Inkatha was merely maintained as a representative political body which, in practical or 'self help' terms, was inactive.


NTS 7205, 20/326, resolutions of Inkatha chiefs' meeting, 13-16/8/1929 (all the quotations are taken from this source), enclosed in CNC to SNA, 18/9/1929; and Ilanga lase Natal, 13/9/1929, 20/9/1929 (Zulu language reports).

CNC PMB 109, 94/9, memorandum re. 'Local Councils on Locations', 1933.

Adams' activities in this respect are well documented for the period 1930-1933 in CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4. for his association with Nicholls since the early 1920s, see Nicholls, South Africa in my time, p. 150.
See Natal Witness, 17/9/1931; and below for further details. Re. Fynney and William Campbell, see Ch. 5 above, under the subheading 'The reconstitution of Inkatha, 1928'.

That 'Solomon's speech' to the ZNTI in early 1928 was in fact written by Nicholls is also significant in this context. See Ch. 5 above, under the subheading 'The reconstitution of Inkatha, 1928'.

JUS 448, 4/2/67/28, Solomon kaDinuzulu to Magistrate Nongoma, 9/6/1928; Magistrate Nongoma to CNC, 12/6/1928; and CNC to SNA, 17/8/1928.

CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, District Commandant, Eshowe, to Magistrate Eshowe, 27/9/1929.

CNC PME 81, 58/7/3, District Commandant, Eshowe, to Magistrate Eshowe, 2/11/1929.

CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, Solomon kaDinuzulu to CNC, 30/11/1929.

CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, NC Eshowe to CNC, 3/12/1929.

CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, NC Eshowe to CNC, 26/11/1929.

CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, Solomon kaDinuzulu to NC Nongoma, 12/1/1930. The NAD refused this request, and also refused to support Solomon's application for an increased stipend. See CNC to NC Nongoma, 23/1/1930.

CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, District Commandant, Eshowe, to Magistrate Eshowe, 2/11/1929.

CNC PMB 81, 58/7/1, untitled memorandum re. Solomon's attempts to be recognised as paramount chief, n. d. 1932?; minutes of meeting between NC Eshowe and Eshowe chiefs and izinduna, 8/11/1929. The reaction of Zulu in the Eshowe district against Solomon should not, however, be overemphasised. The majority of the Eshowe chiefs at the above-mentioned indaba, for example, argued that they would always pay special respect to Solomon because he was 'the child' of preconquest Zulu monarchs.

See La Hausse, "Drinking in a Cage", pp. 70-73.

Ibid.; and Roux, Time Longer than Rope, pp. 190ff.; for fuller treatment of the 1929 beer hall disturbances, see La Hausse's "Struggle for the City". The role played by the beer hall riots in persuading white political opinion of the increased urgency of combating 'agitators' and 'communistic propaganda' is amply illustrated in the parliamentary debates on the 'Riotous Assemblies Bill'; in particular, see Debates of the House of Assembly, Vol. 14, speeches by Nicholls and Deane, 26/3/1930, Cols. 2345-2354.

Ilanga lase Natal, 31/5/1929.

Ilanga lase Natal, 6/9/1929 (Zulu language report).

See Ch. 5 above, under the subheading "The broader purpose of Inkatha's reconstitution".

Ilanga lase Natal, 13/9/1929 (Zulu language report).

See the observations in La Hausse, "Struggle for the City", especially pp. 220-224.

For reference to this incident, together with the events recounted immediately above, see Roux, Time Longer than Rope, pp. 191-192.

Ilanga lase Natal, 6/9/1929 (Zulu language report).

Re. meetings on the Cartwright Flats, see Roux, Time Longer than Rope, pp. 245-246. See above for further comment on the role played by Zulu nationalism during the beer hall boycott.

Report of the District Commandant, SAP, 16/6/1930, quoted in La Hausse, "The Struggle for the City", pp. 222-223. La Hausse provides a detailed and illuminating account of this meeting, but his assertion that Solomon was present is incorrect. Solomon did attend an ICU meeting in 1930 - but it was in September.

See below for references to Nicholls' contact with the Minister of Native Affairs and the Governor-General.

See Rogers, Native Administration, pp. 19-23. For examples of the regional 'native legislation' proclaimed by the Governor-General after 1927, see pp. 26ff.

For the Natal planter/farmer alliance including reference to the role of Jansen, see Ch. 5 above under the subheading "The broader purpose of Inkatha's reconstitution". See also the comments above re. the meeting between Dube and Jansen, arranged by Marwick.

Specifically see Natal Witness, 25/7/1930 (re. the chairman of the 'Eshowe Town Board's' speech of welcome to Athlone, and the latter's reply); Natal Mercury, 3/7/1930 (re. Athlone's address to the 'Society of Agriculture and Industry' in Durban). More generally, see the Natal Witness' and the Natal Mercury's coverage of Athlone's attendance at the Royal (Agricultural) Show, Pietermaritzburg, in mid-1930.

Nicholls relates with some pride his role in the Governor-General's 1930 tour of Zululand in his autobiography, South Africa in My Time, pp. 154-158. Significantly, Nicholls omits to relate Athlone's meeting with Solomon at Eshowe.

For details of the Prince of Wales' tour of the province of Natal, together with comments on its significance for both the white and African population, see Ch. 4 above under the subheading "The indaba with the Prince of Wales, 1925". Athlone's duties as Governor-General of the Union ended in 1930; he was succeeded by the Earl of Clarendon in January 1931.

See Ch. 5 above under the subheading "The broader purpose of Inkatha's reconstitution".

Summary of Nicholls' correspondence drawn from CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, G. Heaton-Nicholls to E. G. Jansen, 4/7/1930; 16/7/1930; and 18/7/1930, enclosed in Under-SNA to CNC, 30/7/1930.

CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, G. Heaton-Nicholls to E. G. Jansen, 4/7/1930, enclosed in Under-SNA to CNC, 30/7/1930.

CNC PMB, 58/7/3, E. G. Jansen to G. Heaton-Nicholls, 12/7/1930, enclosed in Under-SNA to CNC, 30/7/1930.

CNC PMB, 58/7/3, G. Heaton-Nicholls to E. G. Jansen, 16/7/1930; and 18/7/1930, enclosed in Under-SNA to CNC, 30/7/1930.
CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, Under-SNA to CNC, 30/7/1930, enclosing correspondence between Nicholls and Jansen.

Institute of Contemporary History, University of the Orange Free State, E. G. Jansen Collection (hereafter EGJ), File 140, handwritten covering note addressed to Mr Herbst, n.d., enclosing a copy of the Athlone memorandum, 18/9/1930.


See Ch. 1 above, under the subheading "The 'Basutolandization' alternative".

Before early 1930, Nicholls had not set out his 'adaptationist policy' proposals formally and presented them to members of the house of assembly or government; he had only expressed his ideas in private letters and memoranda. See Ch. 5 above under the subheading "The broader purpose of Inkatha's reconstitution". After May 1930, however, he presented his proposals in more systematic form before the select committee on 'native affairs'. See below.

Although Nicholls' proposals described clearly how African local/national councils - whether tribal or elected - would be represented in the central white state by representatives in the senate, he did not spell out how the central white state would exert influence over the activities of the African councils - either in terms of which individuals/bodies within the former would have the authority to do so, or in terms of the powers of 'intervention' that they would have. For further details, see below.

This was evident in his actions while in Zululand, as will be shown below.

Nicholls, South Africa in My Time, pp. 154-156. Perhaps understandably in view of what took place, Nicholls omits to describe the Governor-General's meeting with Solomon. Natal Witness, 25/7/1930, report of H. E.'s reception in Eshowe by Mr. C. E. Hoo-Foster, chairman of the Eshowe Town Board.

EGJ 140, CNC's additional report re. the meeting of His Excellency the Governor-General with the Zulu, for the information of the Minister of Native Affairs, 15/8/1930. Ibid.

CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, NC Eshowe to CNC, 12/8/1930, enclosing extract from Nongoma Bottle Store records.

EGJ 140, CNC's additional report re. the meeting of His Excellency the Governor-General, 15/8/1930.

CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, NC Eshowe to CNC, 8/8/1930.

For various references to these events, see EGJ 140, Athlone's 'Remarks on CNC's Report', 13/8/1930; CNC's additional report re. the meeting of His Excellency the Governor-General, 15/8/1930; CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, CNC to SNA, 9/8/1930; and Natal Mercury, 25/7/1930.

Natal Mercury, 25/7/1930. The quotations reflect a necessarily loose transcription of Solomon's address. The reporter prefacing his report with the words "Solomon was understood to say that..."
The CNC described Solomon's address as "flagrant and insulting". CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, CNC to SNA, 9/8/1930.

Natal Mercury, 25/7/1930.

See CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, NC Eshowe to CNC, 7/8/1930; and Natal Mercury, 25/7/1930.


See, for example, the tenor of his remarks in EGJ 140, Athlone to E. G. Jansen, 13/8/1930.

CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, CNC to SNA, 8/8/1930, submitting comments on correspondence between G.H. Nicholls and E. G. Jansen, and memorandum on Solomon's official status.

CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, NC Eshowe to CNC, 7/8/1930; and CNC to SNA, 9/8/1930.

EGJ 140, E. G. Jansen to H. E. the Governor-General, 11/8/1930.


EGJ 140, Athlone to E. G. Jansen, 13/8/1930; and the enclosed 'Remarks on Report of NC Eshowe'.

See CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, CNC to Dep. Comm., SAP, Pietermaritzburg, 26/8/1930; and Acting SNA to CNC, 8/9/1930. See also EGJ 140, Minister of Native Affairs to Acting SNA re. 'Ex.Co. minute: Solomon ka Dinuzulu' (official minute and covering letter), n. d.

EGJ 140, Athlone memorandum, 18/9/1930, pp. 1, 6.

See the concluding paragraphs of Ch. 5 above for comment on the objectives of the 'reconstituted Inkatha'.

See NTS 7205, 20/326, NC Piet Retief to SNA, 21/7/1930 (re. the eastern Transvaal); and Ilanga lase Natal, 5/9/1930 report of Inkatha meeting, 18-20/8/1930 (Zulu language report).

Only once previously had no white official or observer been present at an Inkatha annual general meeting. For details of the comparably directionless 1927 meeting, see Ch. 5 above, under the subheading "The reconstitution of Inkatha, 1928".

See directly below; and also below under the subheading 'Solomon's death'.

The above overview of the 1930 meeting is drawn from Inkatha's authorised report, as published in Ilanga lase Natal, 5/9/1930 (Zulu language report). Although this report was necessarily circumspect and incomplete, particularly since it was 'authorised' by Simpson Bhengu, it nonetheless represents a very illuminating source on Inkatha's impending collapse. For the constitutional functions of Inkatha's annual general meetings, see the comments on the 1928 meeting and constitution in Ch. 5 above, under the subheading "The reconstitution of Inkatha, 1928", together with relevant footnote references.

CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, Detective Sergeant R. H. Arnold, CID, Durban, to O.I.C., CID, 16/9/1930, re. Solomon's movements between 2 and 9/9/1930; and memorandum by the Commissioner of the SAP, Pretoria, for the information of the Minister of Justice, 19/9/1930, re. 'Champion and Solomon Dinuzulu'.
See above comments on Hulett's evidence before the Native Economic Commission, re. 'Solomon's meetings' at Cartwright Flats.

CNP PMB 81, 58/7/3, Detective Sergeant R. H. Arnold, CID, Durban, to O.I.C., CID, 16/9/1930. During an interview with the CNC on 22 September, Solomon confirmed that he and Champion had spoken about these matters — but implied that Champion had made the proposals rather than he. This was barely feasible: there were considerable political differences between the ICU yase Natal, which had played a leadership role during the beer-hall protests, and the NNC 'gentlemen's club'; and considerable personal acrimony existed between Champion and Dube. For Solomon's account of his meeting with Champion, see minutes of meeting between CNC and Chief Solomon, Nongoma, 22/9/1930, re. Solomon's association with the ICU yase Natal.

Solomon also stated somewhat weakly that he wished to reprimand Champion for upsetting the white people during the beer-hall disturbances. CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, minutes of meeting between CNC and Chief Solomon, Nongoma, 22/9/1930.

AWGC Box 2: 3.3.4.1., Zulu language handbill headlined 'Inkosi u Solomon ka Dinuzulu', signed by A. W. G. Champion, Durban, 4/9/1930.

Ilanga lase Natal, 5/9/1930 (Zulu language advertisement).

CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, Detective Sergeant R. H. Arnold, CID, Durban, to O.I.C., CID, 16/9/1930; memorandum by the Commissioner of the SAP, Pretoria, for the information of the Minister of Justice, 19/9/1930; and minutes of interviews between CNC and Chief Solomon, Nongoma, 22/9/1930.

Roux, Time Longer than Rope, pp. 192-193.

La Hausse, "Struggle for the City", p. 224.

CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, memorandum by the Commissioner of the SAP, Pretoria, for the information of the Minister of Justice, 19/9/1930. Champion himself was well aware that he was banished because of his contacts with Solomon. See AWGC Box 1: l.1., short manuscript autobiography by Champion entitled "Time is Longer than Rope in the Life of Every Man", Durban, 1974, p. 4.

See MS CHAM A922/A, copy of telegram from Mayor of Durban to Minister of Justice, 26/9/1930; Roux, Time Longer than Rope, p. 193; Ilanga lase Natal, 3/10/1930 (Zulu language report); AWGC Box 27: 23:1., various manuscripts re. Champion's banishment, 1930-1933. For the 'liberal-democratic' opposition of Eaton and other Natal MPs (notably excluding Nicholls, Marwick, and Deane) to the enactment of the Riotous Assemblies Bill, see Debates of the House of Assembly, 15/4/1930 (especially Cols. 3229ff); and 1/5/1930 (especially Cols. 3606ff).

See, for illustrative examples, Ch. 4 above under the subheading "The fissures beneath the populist facade: Inkatha, 1925-1927" (re. his establishment of the 'respectable' and elitist 'African [later 'Natal'] Workers' Club'); Ch. 5 above under the subheading "Political developments..."
among the Zulu and Natal African rank-and-file" (re. his refusal to support the spontaneous strikes in the province, 1927-1928); and above under the subheading "The frustration of Zulu 'self government': Solomon's drunken confrontation with the Governor-General, 1930" (re. his role in the beer hall boycott and related disturbances).


See AWGC Box 1: 1.1, Champion, "Time is Longer than Rope in the Life of Every Man", p. 5; and see also Box 1: 1.3.2, further autobiographical fragments by Champion, circa 1974; and Box 27: 23.1, various documents re. Champion's exile from Natal, 1930-1933.

See directly below, in the context of the 'Clermont Township project'.

Roux, *Time Longer than Rope*, p. 245.

For Nkosi's opposition to ethnic distinctions, see La Hausse, "Struggle for the City", pp. 196 and 274.


Communist officials were charged under the 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act, which empowered the police to cause an "idle, dissolute or disorderly person" to be deported; they were barely allowed the time to be party to a 'riotous assembly'.

See above, p. 360.

*Ilanga lase Natal*, 17/10/1930 (Zulu language report).

For references to the 1924 'militant coup' in the NNC; the subsequent 'new' NNC; and Dube's resuscitation of the 'old' NNC, see Ch. 4 above under the subheading "The formation of Inkatha"; and Ch. 5 above under the subheadings "The reconstitution of Inkatha, 1928" and The broader purpose of Inkatha's reconstitution".

See Ch. 5 above under the subheading "The broader purpose of Inkatha's reconstitution".


*Ilanga lase Natal*, 17/10/1930.


See directly below, in the context of the 'Shaka Memorial project'.

133 CK Reel 15A, 2: XC9:41/14, A. W. G. Champion to Dr. P. Seme, 24/10/1930.
134 NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 2/6/1931, reporting confidentially on his investigations re. Inkatha, February–June 1931.
135 Ilanga lase Natal, 17/7/1931, report of Inkatha executive committee meeting, 6-8/7/1931 (Zulu language report).
136 CNC PMB 72, 57/29, unaddressed handwritten memorandum, signed W. R. B. [?], 8/10/1932, referring to Dube's correspondence to Solomon kaDinuzulu, 6/10/1932.
138 See Ilanga lase Natal, 17/7/1931. This project was not an original idea: soon after his succession in 1913, Solomon had pressed the NAD for permission to purchase the royal burial grounds on behalf of the Zulu people. See Ch. 2 above under the subheading "The traditional context and the ihalambo (the washing of the spears)".
139 Ilanga lase Natal, 5/9/1930.
140 See CNC PMB 72, 57/29, Chief S. Gilbert E. Majozi to CNC, 12/1/1931; and Ilanga lase Natal, 12/6/1931, public notice re. "Itshe lesikumbuzo sika Tshaka" ('Commemorative Stone of Shaka'), given under authority of Solomon ka Dinuzulu.
141 See Ch. 4 above under the subheading 'The formation of Inkatha'.
142 CNC PMB 72, 57/29, Chief Majozi to CNC, 17/6/1931.
143 CNC PMB 72, 57/29, Chief Majozi to CNC, 12/1/1931.
144 CNC PMB 72, 57/29, Chief Majozi to CNC, 17/6/1931.
145 See CNC PMB 72, 57/29, CNC to SNA, 18/7/1932.
146 CNC PMB 72, 57/29, CNC to SNA, 17/12/1931.
147 CNC PMB 72, 57/29, minutes of interview between Minister of Native Affairs, and Chief Majozi and Mr Bhulose, 6/7/1931.
148 See CNC PMB 72, 57/29, minutes of interview between Minister of Native Affairs, and Majozi and Bhulose, 6/7/1931; and undated and unsigned 'Draft Programme' for Shaka Memorial unveiling ceremony (evidently submitted by Majozi circa December 1931).
149 Ilanga lase Natal, 22/5/1931 (Zulu language appeal), recurring in subsequent editions.
150 Ilanga lase Natal, 22/5/1931 (Zulu language editorial).
151 CNC PMB 72, 57/29, CNC to SNA, 17/12/1931.
152 Ilanga lase Natal, 10/7/1931 (Zulu language report).
153 See CNC PMB 72, 57/29, printed circular from CNC to NCs in Zululand, 10/2/1931; and numerous appended replies from respective NCs.
154 See Ilanga lase Natal's editions between February and July 1932, which consistently published lists of contributors to the Shaka Memorial Fund. It is interesting to note in this context, however, that in a few rural areas - mainly in Zululand - the Shaka Memorial project was popularly associated with the possibility of an impending Zulu rebellion. See CNC PMB 72, 57/29, NC Melmoth to CNC, 20/5/1932 and 8/6/1932; Acting NC Ixopo to CNC, 22/7/1932; and CNC to SNA, 8/8/1932.
See Ilanga lase Natal, February-July 1932, lists of contributors to the Shaka Memorial Fund.

See CNC PMB 72, 57/29, NC Melmoth to CNC, 12/2/1931; and Acting NC Nongoma to CNC, 19/3/1931 (for favourable responses); and NC Nqutu to CNC, 21/2/1931. Other NCs' reports are stored in the same file.

The Durban municipality had initially resolved not to support the project. See La Hausse, "Struggle for the City", pp. 275-276.


For the roles of Oscroft, Armstrong and Nicholls see MS NIC 2.08.1, File 5, KCM 3353 (a), Solomon ka Dinuzulu to G. Heaton Nicholls, 13/5/1932; L. E. Oscroft to Mr Nicholls, 14/5/1932; and EGJ 140, Solomon ka Dinuzulu to G. Heaton Nicholls, 28/5/1932; unsigned handwritten memorandum entitled 'Solomon ka Dinuzulu' re. arrangements for unveiling ceremony (evidently written by E. G. Jansen), 28/5/1932; and CNC PMB 72, 57/29, G. Heaton Nicholls to Minister of Native Affairs, 8/6/1932; Rev. L. E. Oscroft to NC Nongoma, 7/12/1932.

See CNC PMB 72, 57/29, CNC to SNA, 9/4/1932; and EGJ 140, unsigned handwritten memorandum entitled 'Solomon ka Dinuzulu' re. arrangements for unveiling ceremony, 28/5/1932.

CNC PMB 72, 57/29, CNC to organising secretary, Shaka Memorial Fund, 17/5/1932.

For Majozi's fundraising efforts in the Transvaal, see Ilanga lase Natal, 24/6/1932; 1/7/1932; 15/7/1932; and for Majozi's death and the outstanding debts, see CNC PMB 72, 57/29, CNC to SNA, 18/7/1932.

Ilanga lase Natal, 29/7/1932 (Zulu language report).


Ibid.

See Ch. 5 above, under the subheading "Economic crisis and social stratification among the Zulu".

MS NIC 2.08.4, File 19, KCM 3833, G. Heaton Nicholls, "The Old Zululand Constituency" (undated manuscript), p. 23.

See CNC PMB 72, 57/29, Shaw and Co. (solicitors representing Dove Bros, Monumental Masons) to Chief Mathole, 15/6/1933; Shaw and Co. to CNC, 4/7/1933; CNC to Shaw and Co., 6/7/1933; CNC to SNA, 24/10/1936 (the source of the quotation); and James Crankshaw Ltd (inheritor of Dove Bros) to CNC, 28/4/1938.

CNC PMB 72, 57/29, 'Commission for the Preservation of Natural and Historical Monuments, Relics and Antiques' to CNC, 7/9/1937; and CNC's reply, 7/10/1937.

See below.

See AWGC Box 1: 1.1, Champion, "Time is Longer than Rope in the Life of Every Man", p. 5; and MS CHAM A 922/A, J. W. Van Aardt (director, Clermont Township (Pty) Ltd, Durban) to A.W.G. Champion, 20/11/1931. See also

For the 'self-help' and implicitly segregationist inclinations of Institute of Race Relations, church and Joint Council opinion, see Ch. 5 above under the subheading "The broader purpose of Inkatha's reconstitution". Swanson, "The Rise of Clermont", pp. 6-9.


Re. the company's arrangements for Solomon's attendance at the Johannesburg meeting, see MS CHAM A 922/A, J. W. Van Aardt to A. W. G. Champion, 20/11/1931.


Ilanga lase Natal, 1/1/1932.


For an outline of the subsequent history of Clermont, see Swanson, "The Rise of Clermont".


CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, NC Nongoma to CNC, 27/5/1931; and records of the criminal case, Melmoth, 14/7/1931.

CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, memoranda by police officers, Melmoth, re. Solomon's intoxication, 3/2/1931; and Deputy Commissioner, SAP, Natal Division, to CNC, 6/2/1931. See, for example, Natal Witness, 15/9/1931; and Ilanga lase Natal, 18/9/1931; and 25/9/1931.

For further details on Bhengu, see Ch. 4 above; on Vilakazi, see Ch. 2 above; and on Maling, see Chs. 4 and 5 above. These individuals' activities, together with those of Blackhurst and Pretorius, between 1931 and 1933, are recorded principally in the extensive official correspondence re. Solomon's financial disorders in CNC PMB 82, 58/7/4; 58/7/5; and CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4. See CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, Detective L. Van Vuuren, CID Vryheid, to NC Vryheid, 24/6/1932; NC Nongoma to CNC, 15/6/1932; and CNC PMB 82, 58/7/5, Master of the South African Supreme Court to CNC, 8/1/1935, providing details re. Solomon's insolvent estate and comments re. Solomon's financial arrangements.

See Ch. 5 above, under the subheading 'Economic crisis and social stratification among the Zulu'.

The key documents concerning Blackhurst and the 'royal cattle collections' are CNC PMB 82, 58/7/5, NC Melmoth to CNC, 8/4/1931 and 15/4/1931; NC Nongoma to CNC, 15/6/1931; A. S. Blackhurst to CNC, 13/6/1931; NC Nongoma to CNC, 20/6/1931; 'Report of Round Table Conference on the representations of Mr A. S. Blackhurst', Nongoma magistrate's court, 12/8/1931; NC Nongoma to CNC, 24/11/1931; and
It was impossible to quantify the extent to which Blackhurst assisted Solomon, since the corruption and duplicity in royal circles was so pervasive that no-one's testimony could be regarded as reliable. And 'authoritative' official reports were based on the testimonies of necessarily partly-informed or prejudiced informants.
EGJ 140, G. Heaton Nicholls to E. G. Jansen, 19/12/1931, petitioning the Minister of Native Affairs to assist Solomon; and CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, CNC to NC Nongoma (telegram - the source of the quotation), 5/1/1932, transmitting substance of Minister of Native Affairs' telegraphed instructions to NAD.

CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, SNA to CNC (telegram), 5/2/1932; and report of meeting between Solomon kaDinuzulu and Usuthu Tribe, Mahashini, 13/12/1932, re. repayment of government loan.

CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, Solomon kaDinuzulu to CNC, 7/1/1932.

CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, CNC to SNA, 26/2/1932.

CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, Solomon kaDinuzulu to CNC, 19/2/1932. See also Additional NC Durban to CNC, 13/2/1932, enclosing copy of Solomon's hire purchase agreement with 'Colonial Motors Ltd', 8/1/1932; 'Wynne and Wynne' (solicitors representing 'Colonial Motors Ltd') to CNC, 18/2/1932; and NC Nongoma to CNC, 18/3/1932.

See CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, SNA to CNC, 27/1/1932, re. urgency of implementing the government conditions; Rev. L. E. Oscroft to NC Nongoma, 17/2/1932, accepting the post of Solomon's official financial adviser; minutes of meeting between CNC and Chief Solomon and the Usuthu Tribe, Nongoma, 12/4/1932; NC Nongoma to CNC, 7/7/1932 and 15/7/1932; CNC to NC Nongoma, 20/7/1932; NC Nongoma to CNC, 14/2/1933; and CNC PMB 81, 58/7/3, CNC to SNA, 26/2/1932, re. Solomon's failure to abide by the government conditions.


CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, C. F. Adams to CNC, 30/9/1932 (two letters of the same date, one marked 'Private'); and CNC to C. F. Adams, 5/10/1932. Re. Adams' assisting the royal cattle collections, see C. F. Adams to NC Nongoma, 16/5/1932 and NC Nongoma to CNC, 25/5/1932.

CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, SNA to CNC, 24/3/1932.

CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, minutes of meeting between CNC and Chief Solomon and the Usuthu Tribe, Nongoma, 12/4/1932.

See Ch. 4 above, under the subheading 'Inkatha through official eyes, 1921-1925'; and Faye's notes about Solomon, written in about 1922, in Faye, Zulu Interpreters.

See Ch. 1 above, under the subheading 'The transition to Union: administrative arrangements'; and various references throughout Ch. 2.

CNC PMB 81, 58/7/1, handwritten memorandum entitled 'Observations on minute addressed to CNC by NC Nongoma, 23/9/1932', by C. Faye, 5/10/1932.

See below, under the subheading 'Zulu nationalism and state segregationism after 1930'.

See EGJ 140, handwritten memorandum and accompanying fragments of notes (7pp) entitled 'Mr Adams', n. d., clearly being minutes of interview between Adams and
E. G. Jansen. These documents significantly indicate that Adams was acting as Solomon's 'ambassador' to the Minister of Native Affairs: Adams represented that Solomon desired "administrative guidance", regretted his past "mistakes"; would do anything to assist the government; and, while he felt comfortable with the new CNC J. M. Young, he disliked the new NC at Nongoma E. N. Braatvedt. Adams himself requested that the government make a further loan to Solomon for the repayment of new debts (Adams made the same request to the CNC in September 1932); and that "I be allowed to privately advise Solomon to interview the N.C. [at Nongoma] to whom he will make overtures [and request] to be allowed to discuss with the chiefs of Zululand the establishment of the Zulu National Council...";

224 See CNC PMB 81, 58/7/1, handwritten memorandum entitled 'Observations on minute addressed to CNC by NC Nongoma, 23/9/1932' by C. Faye, 5/10/1932. The minute from the NC Nongoma to the CNC to which Faye refers appears to be missing from the sources, but Faye's memorandum itself, by allusion, outlines the main substance of this minute.

225 CNC PMB 82, 58/7/4, Solomon kaDinuzulu to CNC, 12/10/1932 (NAD translation), delivered by hand at Solomon's interview with the CNC of the same date. See also CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, CNC to SNA, 24/10/1932, commenting on his interview with Solomon on 12/10/1932.

226 See EGJ 140, unsigned handwritten minutes of meeting between Minister of Native Affairs, SNA, CNC and NC Nongoma, 24/8/1932, re. Solomon's status. See also below, under the subheading 'Zulu nationalism and state segregationism after 1930'.

227 For details of the descent of these individuals, see Ch. 2 above, under the subheadings 'Dinuzulu's funeral procession'; 'Tribal divisions within the Zulu'; and 'The traditional context and the ilhambo (the washing of the spears)'.

228 Solomon also went on to appeal for improved educational and medical facilities for the Zulu, and request that his full stipend - which had been halved following the indaba debacle of 1930 - be restored to him. The CNC explained that Solomon's full stipend had already been restored, but half was being retained to pay off his loan from the government. See CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, minutes of meeting between Minister of Native Affairs, SNA, CNC, NC Nongoma, and Chief Solomon, Mnyaiza, Gilbert, Franz and Zinyo Mdralose, 13/12/1932, at the Union Buildings, Pretoria (with Carl Faye interpreting).

229 See CNC PMB 81, 58/7/1, unsigned 'Suggested Memorandum' entitled 'Position of Solomon kaDinuzulu', 7/11/1932, being the NAD-prepared draft address to Solomon; CNC to SNA, 9/11/1932 and SNA to CNC, 2/12/1932 (telegram), arranging the interview; and CNC PMB, 58/7/4, minutes of meeting between Minister of Native Affairs, SNA, CNC, NC Nongoma, and Chief Solomon, Mnyaiza, Gilbert, Franz, and Zinyo Mdralose, 13/12/1932, at the Union Buildings, Pretoria (with Carl Faye interpreting), re. the actual proceedings of the interview.

Ilanga lase Natal, 10/3/1933 and 17/3/1933 (Zulu language reports). For further commentaries on Solomon's death and funeral ceremony, see The Net, June 1933, pp. 4-9; Reyher, Zulu Woman; and Pers. Comm., Ndesheni, part II, pp. 5ff.

CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, CNC to SNA, 17/7/1928 (Confidential).

See Ch. 5 above, under the subheadings 'The reconstitution of Inkatha, 1928', pp. 291ff; and 'The broader purpose of Inkatha's reconstitution', pp. 328ff.

The existence of such a 'tribal outlook' was made particularly manifest during the 1906 rebellion, and, subsequently, in the rumours that periodically circulated among the Zulu associating the Zulu royal family with an impending revolt against white rule.

See Ch. 4 above, under the subheading 'The formation of Inkatha', pp. 157ff.

See Ch. 5 above, under the subheading 'The reconstitution of Inkatha, 1928', pp. 297ff.

See Ch. 5 above, under the subheading 'The broader purpose of Inkatha's reconstitution', pp. 325ff, together with the full transcripts of Nicholls' policy proposals as referred to in the relevant footnotes. In this context it might be added that the Zulu nationalist support for the Clermont Township project could have enlightened state authorities of the value of the segregationist ideas popular among Natal's Zulu and white political leaders. See above, under the subheading 'The decline of Solomon and Inkatha'.

It is to be emphasised that this subsection only addresses itself to the evolution of state segregationism as an ideological and political construct; it does not consider state segregationism's expressly economic origins. The latter, for Natal's white rural employers, are considered in Ch. 5 above, under the subheading 'The broader purpose of Inkatha's reconstitution', pp. 311ff.

This is true of the extant literature, with the possible exception of Marks, "Ideology of segregation" (though Marks does not explicitly conclude that Zulu nationalist politicians influenced Nicholls' segregationist formulations). For further observations in this regard, see Ch. 5 above, footnote 220.

See above, under the subheading 'The decline of Solomon and Inkatha'.

See directly below.

See Reports and Proceedings of the Joint Committees on Native and Coloured Persons, 1930-1934, printed as supplement to JC1-1935, pp. 12ff. For details of these Bills, see directly below.

See above, under the subheading 'The frustration of Zulu 'self-government': Solomon's drunken confrontation with the Governor-General, 1930', pp.362ff.

See Ch. 5 above, under the subheadings 'The reconstitution of Inkatha, 1928', pp.293ff; and 'The broader purpose of Inkatha's reconstitution', pp.325ff.

See Ch. 5 above, under the subheading 'The reconstitution of Inkatha, 1928', p. 292.

MS NIC 2.08.1, Bantu Affairs File 2, KCM 3307, fragment entitled 'Native Affairs', n. d. Natal MPs' concerted action was not unique here; they also used this strategy in the course of the 'provincial councils' and 'Natal devolution' crises. Such solidarity lent Natal inappropriately weighty influence in parliament - and particularly within Smuts' SAP when, during the 1920s and early 1930s, the party was increasingly dependent on English-speaking support.

Nicholls, South Africa in My Time, p. 285. Marwick, incidentally, was not appointed to the Joint Select Committee on the Native Bills.

Ibid., p. 290.

Stallard was largely responsible for the 1923 Natives' (Urban Areas) Act.

See above, under the subheading 'The decline of Solomon and Inkatha'.

Davenport, South Africa, p. 214.

For Jansen's personal acquaintance with Dube and Dube's objectives, and Jansen's favourable response to Nicholls' appeal for the official recognition of Solomon and Inkatha in July 1930, see above, under the subheading 'The frustration of Zulu 'self-government': Solomon's drunken confrontation with the Governor-General, 1930', pp. 359-361, and p. 366 respectively. For the ready support that Nicholls found in the Joint Select Committee, see Nicholls, South Africa in My Time, pp. 285ff; and Reports and Proceedings of the Joint Committees on Native and Coloured Persons, 1930-1934, JCl-1935, pp. 12ff.

Re. the Native Conferences, see Ch. 3 above, under the subheading 'The Zululand National Training Institution, the Native Affairs Department and native policy', 1917-1920', pp. 149ff; and Ch. 5 above, under the subheading 'The reconstitution of Inkatha, 1928', pp. 291ff. Re. the Cape African franchise, see Lacey, Boroko, pp. 52ff.

See Ch. 2 above, under the subheading 'The social context of Solomon's succession: land tenure', pp. 34ff, and particularly the references in footnote 43; for the failure of the 1917 Native Administration Bill because of its relationship with the problematical 1913 Act, see Ch. 3 above, under the subheading 'The Zululand National Training Institution, the Native Affairs Department and native policy', 1917-1920', p. 145.

Lacey, Boroko, p. 60.


MS NIC 2.08.1, Bantu Affairs Folder 2, KCM 3309, Nicholls' introductory speech, 2/5/1930, pp. 6-8.

MS NIC 2.08.1, Bantu Affairs File 3, KCM 3334 (a), unsigned and incomplete memorandum, n.d., p. 3. For other key documents expressing Nicholls' 'native policy' ideas for the period 1930-193, see also KCM 3323, unsigned and incomplete handwritten memorandum, n.d. 

KCM 3334 (b), unsigned and incomplete memorandum, n.d. 

KCM 3335, Text of Nicholls' speech to the Joint Select Committee, 1935, (35pp.); and Bantu Affairs File 2, KCM 3302, Nicholls' draft 'Appendix to the Report of the Native Affairs Commission for the years 1939-1940'.


The negotiations between Dube and Nicholls in this context were strictly private and confidential, and it can be assumed that the only evidence regarding their negotiations would be contained in their private correspondence. Dube's private records, however, appear not to have survived. (In this regard, see Haines, "Opposition to Hertzog's Segregation Bills", p. 4.). Nicholls' private papers, stored in the KCAL, are moreover far from complete. The records of the earliest correspondence between Dube and Nicholls re. Union 'native policy' are dated early February 1931; and their content indicates that considerable interchange had already taken place between Dube and Nicholls. See MS NIC 2.08.1, Bantu Affairs File 5, KCM 3350 (c), J. L. Dube to G. Heaton Nicholls, 6/2/1931; and G. Heaton Nicholls to Rev. John Dube, 11/2/1931.

See above, under the subheading 'The decline of Solomon and Inkatha'.

MS NIC 2.08.1, Bantu Affairs File 5, KCM 3350 (c), J. L. Dube to G. Heaton Nicholls, 6/2/1931 (Private and Confidential).

MS NIC 2.08.1, Bantu Affairs File 5, KCM 3350 (b), G. Heaton Nicholls to Rev. John Dube, 11/2/1931.

MS NIC 2.08.1, Bantu Affairs File 5, J. L. Dube to G. Heaton Nicholls, 13/5/1931.

MS NIC 2.08.1, Bantu Affairs File 5, KCM 3350 (c), G. Heaton Nicholls to J. L. Dube, 9/7/1931.

MS NIC 2.08.1, Bantu Affairs File 5, KCM 3350 (a), 'The Land Settlement' (Copy: signatures in Dube's handwriting, and with appended handwritten notes from Dube to Nicholls), n. d. 

The notable absence of Bhulose's signature from this document may be ascribed to the current power struggle in the province of Natal between Dube's NNC and Seme's Natal branch of the ANC - on whose executive committee Bhulose had accepted a position. (See above, under the subheading 'The decline of Solomon and Inkatha'.) That Dube drew up this document without Nicholls' assistance is indicated by the way in which the proposals were expressed, and by certain inconsistencies. For example, the document incorrectly maintained that the adaptationist policy proposals included the establishment of an 'Union Native Council' to advise the government on 'native legislation'; the establishment of such a council had been
part of Hertzog's 'native policy' proposals, and was opposed by Nicholls.

Other accounts of the negotiations between Dube and Nicholls during 1931 have tended to focus on Dube as an individual, rather than on the ideology of Zulu nationalism which informed the political attitudes of Dube as well as other African leaders in the province of Natal; furthermore, some have suggested that Dube's willingness to 'flirt' with segregationist legislation - primarily in response to the 'bait' of more African land - was indeed an idiosyncratic response, which starkly contrasted with the strong consensus among the majority of the Union's African leaders in opposition to the segregationist legislation. See Haines, 'Opposition to Hertzog's Segregation Bills', pp. 127, 128 (Haines suggests that some of the African leaders who signed Dube's document did so by mistake); D. J. Mackenzie, "Dube and the land issue, 1913-1936" (unpublished B.Soc.Sci. Hons. diss., University of Natal, 1980), pp. 8, 25ff; Marks, "Ambiguities of dependence", pp. 178-9; and Roux, Time Longer than Rope, p. 288. My comments do not strictly apply to Marks, "Ideology of Segregation".

See especially Ch. 5 above, under the subheading 'The broader purpose of the reconstitution of Inkatha', pp. 328ff; and above, under the subheading 'The decline of Solomon and Inkatha'.

For a useful (but not very searching) account of African opposition to the segregation Bills, 1926-1935, see Haines, 'Opposition to Hertzog's Segregation Bills'; for more concise accounts, see Walshe, African Nationalism; Davenport, South Africa; and Roux, Time Longer than Rope. The finer details of the 1936 Natives' Trust and Land Act are discussed in Lekhela, "Native Land Settlement in South Africa", pp. 149-161.

For further observations on the origins of the 1936 Natives' Representation Act, together with its broader implications, see Lacey, Boroko, pp. 62-65.

Nicholls, South Africa in My Time, p. 291.


Lacey, Boroko, p. 11. For fuller substantiation of this conclusion, see ibid., pp. 273-308.

Davenport, South Africa, pp. 216-222.

See ibid., pp. 224-229; and 252-253.

For Jansen's role in these contexts, see Ch. 5 above, under the subheading 'The broader purpose of Inkatha's reconstitution', pp. 311ff; and above, under the subheadings 'The frustration of Zulu 'self-government': Solomon's drunken confrontation with the Governor-General, 1930', pp. 359-361 and 362-377; 'The decline of Solomon and Inkatha', p. 397; and 'Solomon's death'.
EGJ 140, C. J. Vermaak to E. G. Jansen, 10/2/1931.

For reference to the Zulu indaba of 1931 and Solomon's subsequent interview with a Natal Witness journalist, see above, under the subheading 'Solomon's death', p. 404; and for Natal English-speaking media coverage of the Zulu drought and famine, see Ch. 5 above, under the subheading 'Economic crisis and social stratification among the Zulu', p. 237.


Natal Witness, 17/9/1931. See also the edition of 10/9/1931, in which A. R. Pierson (an ex-attorney of Pietermaritzburg) makes similar accusations to those made by Fynney.

See NTS 7205, 20/326, CNC to SNA, 17/9/1931; and SNA to CNC, 22/9/1931, enclosing NAD memorandum for submission to the Natal Witness.

See, for example, Natal Witness, 7/10/1931; 17/10/1931; and 22/1/1932.

See above, under the subheading 'The decline of Solomon and Inkatha', p. 397; CNC PMB 72, 57/29, G. Heaton Nicholls to E. G. Jansen, 8/6/1932, urging government support for the Shaka Memorial unveiling ceremony; and above, under the subheading 'Solomon's death', p. 412.

See EGJ 140, unsigned handwritten memorandum entitled 'Solomon ka Dinuzulu' (5 pp.) re. arrangements for Shaka Memorial unveiling ceremony and events leading to Jansen's discussion with Clarendon (evidently written by E. G. Jansen), 28/5/1932.

See CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, SNA to CNC, 20/7/1932.

EGJ 140, Jansen's private secretary to G. Heaton Nicholls, 7/1/1932.

See above, under the subheading 'Solomon's death' and EGJ 140, undated handwritten memorandum entitled 'Mr Adams' (7 pp.), re. interview between Jansen and Adams.

See CNC PMB 84, 58/7/4, NC Nongoma to CNC, 19/9/1932; and SNA to CNC, 7/10/1932.

See EGJ 140, J. Y. Gibson to E. G. Jansen, 29/8/1932, elaborating on the topics discussed during their recent conversation at Pietermaritzburg. For earlier references to Gibson, see Ch. 2 above, under the subheading 'The social context of Solomon's succession: land tenure', p. 35; and Ch. 3 above, under the subheading 'The administration of Zululand and the Zulu royal family, 1914-1916', pp. 89ff.

EGJ 140, undated, unsigned, handwritten minutes of meeting between Minister of Native Affairs, SNA, CNC, and NC at Nongoma, 24/8/1932, re. Solomon's status (in the Afrikaans language, evidently written by Jansen). See also the accompanying memorandum entitled 'The Honourable the Minister of Native Affairs' (being an overview of Solomon's political activities and personal behaviour, 1916-1932, 8pp.), drawn up in the offices of the SNA, 15/8/1932.

See above, under the subheading 'Solomon's death'.

See KCAL, E. N. Braatvedt Collection, MS BRA 1.091, MS 1628, manuscript entitled 'Ihlambo Ceremony - cleansing from mourning for the death of Chief Solomon ka Dinuzulu', by E. N. Braatvedt, n. d.; CNC PMB 82, 58/7/5, undated, unsigned transcript of Dube's address at Solomon's
ihlambo ceremony; and accompanying reports and correspondence re. the ihlambo ceremony.


297 Quotation from 'The Charter of the Zulu Society', 1937. Material regarding the Zulu Society is located in KCAL, Zulu Society Collection, refs. 16656-16672; and Natal Archives, Pietermaritzburg, Zulu Society Collection, 1936-1948. See also Brooks and Hurwitz, Natal Regional Survey, Vol. 7, p. 166.

298 See MS MAR, File 50, KCM 2761 (a) to (d), minutes of evidence before the Government Board of Inquiry into the Zulu Chieftainship Dispute; and KCAL, B. W. Martin Collection, MS MAR (T), 3.09, KCM 2668, manuscript, autobiography entitled 'Old Soldiers Never Die', uncompleted, n. d., containing account of Zulu Chieftainship Dispute, pp. 60-62.

299 Davenport's assertion that Jansen was not an important apartheid ideologue, even though he was the first apartheid Minister of Native Affairs, calls out for investigation. See Davenport, South Africa, pp. 266-267.

300 See Davenport, South Africa, pp. 253; and 266-267.

Footnotes to the Overview

1 For Zulu socio-economic change and class formation, see in particular Ch. 2 'The social context of Solomon's succession: land tenure' and 'The social context of Solomon's succession: cattle and 'social disintegration''; and Ch. 5 'Economic crisis and social stratification among the Zulu'.

2 For petty bourgeois attitudes towards land tenure, education and 'civilisation' in the earlier period, see Ch. 2 'The social context of Solomon's succession: land tenure', pp. 43-49, and 'Influences on Solomon's early life', pp. 75-78; for the subsequent development of petty bourgeois ideology, see Ch. 3 'The Zulu royal family and African politics, 1917-1920', pp. 130-131; Ch. 4 'The formation of Inkatha' and 'The indaba with the Prince of Wales, 1925', pp. 202-203; and Ch. 5 'The reconstitution of Inkatha, 1928' and 'The broader purpose of Inkatha's reconstitution'.

3 Rank-and-file and urban worker militancy is covered mainly in Ch. 5 'Political development among the Zulu and Natal African rank-and-file' and 'Popular consciousness and the ironic courtships: ICU leaders approach Solomon'. Isolated references occur in Ch. 4 'The fissures beneath the populist facade: Inkatha, 1925-1927'; and Ch. 6 'The frustration of Zulu 'self-government': Solomon's drunken confrontation with the Governor-General, 1930'.

4 For the Natal planter/farmer alliance and white intervention in Inkatha, see Ch. 5 'The reconstitution of Inkatha, 1928' and 'The broader purpose of Inkatha's reconstitution'.

5 Lacey's Boroko, for example, explicitly characterises the NAD as a whole in this way, and in so doing it expresses the conventional view.

6 References to the role of the NAD and the Natal NAD in particular are contained in Ch. 1 'From self-governing colony to province of the Union: official postures and the Zulu royal family'; Ch. 2 'The traditional context and the ihlambo (the washing of the spears)'; the whole of Ch. 3; Ch. 4 'Inkatha through official eyes, 1921-1925'; and, for the later period, Ch. 5 'Popular consciousness and the ironic courtships' ICU leaders approach Solomon' and 'The reconstitution of Inkatha, 1928'; and the whole of Ch. 6, with the exception of 'Zulu nationalism and state segregationism after 1930'.

7 For the political interests and role of the Zulu tribal elite, see especially Ch. 4 'Tribal politics: Solomon, 'royal culture' and Zulu unity' and Ch. 5 'Economic crisis and social stratification among the Zulu'; see also Ch. 2 'The social context of Solomon's succession: cattle and 'social disintegration'', pp. 58-61; and various references in Ch. 4 'The formation of Inkatha'.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

This bibliography has been set out as follows:

I. PRIMARY SOURCES

A. Manuscript
   (i) Official
   (ii) Unofficial

B. Printed
   (i) Official
   (ii) Unofficial

II. SECONDARY SOURCES

A. Books
B. Articles, pamphlets and unpublished papers
C. Unpublished theses

III. INTERVIEWS

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I. PRIMARY SOURCES

A. Manuscript

(Note: Where possible, the respective archivists' descriptions of the files' contents have been used. Where these were not provided, or were inaccurate or very unenlightening, I have briefly described the particular file's contents myself; this was especially necessary for the vital CNC and CNC PMB collections in the Natal Archives, Pietermaritzburg, which were in the process of being 'classified' when I consulted them. Any personal observations have been appended in brackets.)

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1. Chief Native Commissioners' Correspondence, 1910-1919

   CNC 54. Miscellaneous correspondence re the Zulu royal family, 1911-1912.

   CNC 144. Correspondence re. Dinuzulu's funeral and ihlambo, and administrative arrangements made for the Usuthu, 1913-1915.


CNC 221. Correspondence re. the Zulu royal family's tenancy in Babanango sub-district, 1915-1916.

CNC 226B. Solomon's influence in the Mahlabatini district, 1916.


CNC 254. Solomon's application to visit the Transvaal and make collections, 1916.

CNC 261, 262. Solomon's application to summon a meeting of all Zulu chiefs north of Eshowe district re. assisting the Native Labour Battalion, 1916, and related correspondence.


CNC 341. Reports re. drunkenness within the Zulu royal family, 1918.

CNC 349. Correspondence re. Solomon's lobolo claims for Cestswayo's isigodlo women, and tension between Solomon and David, 1919-1920.

CNC 359. Zulu mineworkers' grievances brought to notice of Solomon during his visit to the Witwatersrand, 1919.


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CNC PMB 41, 42. Correspondence re. Natal members of the Native Representative Council, 1937.


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correspondence re. ICU approaches to Solomon, 1928; the Zulu indaba with the Governor-General, 1930; the banishment of Champion, 1930; and Solomon's financial affairs, 1931-1933.

CNC PMB 82. Correspondence. Solomon's cattle collections and financial affairs, 1931-1933; and Solomon's ihlambo, 1934.

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3. Colonial Secretary's Office


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PM 103. Confidential correspondence, 1907.
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(b) State Archives, Pretoria

1. Archives of the Commissioner of the South African Police, 1901-1960

SAP 35. Confidential correspondence - sedition, 1917.

SAP 36. Native unrest - generally, 1918.


2. Archives of the Department of Native Affairs

NTS 248. Zulu succession dispute, 1933-1947 (Solomon's sons).


NTS 2781. Usuthu school - Zululand National Training Institution, 1925-1941.

NTS 7205. Zulu National Fund: Nkata ka Zulu, 1923-1931. (The Department of Co-operation and Development and the Director of Archives granted my special application to see this most informative volume on Inkatha - which had been withdrawn from the archives in 1975 when the current Inkatha was formed. Sub-jackets entitled 'Nkata ka Zulu, 1932-1962' also occur in this volume, but I was not permitted to see them.)

NTS 7276. Zulu National Organisation, 1955. (This volume is sub-titled in pencil 'Nkata ka Zulu' - but there seems to be no relationship between the two organisations.)
3. Economic and Wage Commission, 1925, Evidence (classification K139)

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(a) Church of the Province of South Africa, Offices of the Diocese of Zululand, Eshowe

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(e) Institute of Contemporary History, University of the Orange Free State, Bloemfontein

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(f) Killie Campbell Africana Library, Durban

1. E. N. Braatvedt Collection


2. Sir Marshall Campbell Collection

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3. Harriette Colenso Collection

Several unnumbered files. (Not very useful.)

4. Carl Faye Papers

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8. George Heaton Nicholls Collection

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Report of the Commission to make recommendations for the re-organisation of the Departments of the Public Service, UG22-'12.


Report of the Local Natives' Land Committee (Natal Province), UG34-'18.

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Report of the Native Affairs Commission, 1925-1926, 17-'27.


Report of the Native Affairs Commission, 1932-1933, UG3-'34.

(g) Departments of State

1. Report of the Controller and Auditor-General for the financial year
   - 1917-1918, UG42-'18.
   - 1918-1919, UG49-'19.
   - 1919-1920, UG59-'20.
   - 1920-1921, UG43-'21.
   - 1921-1922, UG33-'22.
   - 1922-1923, UG38-'23.
   - 1924-1925, UG45-'25.
   - 1926-1927, UG39-'27.
   - 1927-1928, UG41-'28.
   - 1928-1929, UG44-'29.
   - 1930-1931, UG27-'31.
   - 1931-1932, UG29-'32.
   - 1932-1933, UG26-'33.
   - 1933-1934, UG41-'34.
   - 1934-1935, UG39-'35.
   - 1935-1936, UG44-'36.
   - 1936-1937, UG46-'37.

2. Annual Report of the Department of Justice for the Calendar Year
   - 1914, UG28-'15.
   - 1918, UG36-'19.
   - 1919, UG35-'20.
   - 1928, UG21-'29.

3. Department of Mines and Industries, Annual Report,
   - 1913, UG21-'14.
   - 1917, UG37-'18.
   - 1932, UG13-'33.

4. Report of the Native Affairs Department,
   - 1910, U17-1911.
   - 1912, UG33-'13.
   - 1913-1918, UG7-'19.
   - 1919-1921, UG34-'22.
   - 1922-1926, UG14-'27.

(ii) Unofficial

(a) Books


(b) Microfilm


(c) Newspapers and Periodicals

1. Examined thoroughly between years shown

Cape Times (1915-1922; parliamentary reports only).
Ilanga lase Natal (1929-1933).
The Net (1907-1935).
The South African Outlook (1927-1933).
Zululand Diocesan Magazine (1911-1922).

2. Examined for smaller periods, or for reports of specific occurrences

Izindaba Zabantu.
The Natal Advertizer.
The Natal Mercury.
The Natal Witness.
The Zululand Times.

3. Collections of Newspaper Cuttings, Killie Campbell Africana Library, Durban.

Killie Campbell's Newscutting Books,
No. 10, K. C. 19701;
No. 30, K. C. 22160;
No. 33, K. C. 19436;
No. 36, K. C. 20438.
(Circa 1935-1955).


Mrs Mary Tyler Gray's Collection of Press Cuttings,
Book 4, Ref. 19958 (Circa 1925-1940).

Marwick Papers, Newscutting Books located in Files 38, 40, 73; and one separately referenced as KCM 3196 (Circa 1910-1940).
II. SECONDARY SOURCES

A. Books

Ahrens, F. W., From Bench to Bench, Pietermaritzburg, 1948.


Braatvedt, H. P., Roaming Zululand with a Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, 1949.


Burnett, B. B., Anglicans in Natal, Durban.


Faye, C., Zulu References for interpreters and students, Pietermaritzburg, 1923.


B. Articles, pamphlets and unpublished papers


Beinart, W., "Production and the material basis of chieftainship: Pondoland, c. 1830-80", in Marks and Atmore (eds.), Economy and Society, Ch. 5.


Bonner, P., "The Transvaal Native Congress, 1917-1920: the radicalisation of the black petty bourgeoisie on the Rand", in Marks and Rathbone (eds.), Industrialisation and social change, Ch. 11.


Coplan, D., "The emergence of an African working-class culture", in Marks and Rathbone (eds.), Industrialisation and social change, Ch. 14.

Couzens, T., "Moralizing leisure time': the transatlantic connection and black Johannesburg, 1918-1936", in Marks and Rathbone (eds.), Industrialisation and social change, Ch. 12.


Dubow, S., "Understanding the 'Native Mind': the impact of anthropological thought on segregationist discourse in South Africa, 1919-1933", paper presented at the Workshop on Class, Community and Conflict: Local Perspectives, University of the Witwatersrand, 1984.


Guy, J., "Ecological factors in the rise of Shaka and the Zulu kingdom", in Marks and Atmore (eds.), Economy and society in pre-industrial South Africa, Ch. 4.

Guy, J., "The destruction and reconstruction of Zulu society", in Marks and Rathbone (eds.), Industrialisation and social change, Ch. 6.

Heaton-Nicholls, G. et al, "Report of Special Committee on Natives' Land Commission: £11,000,000 per annum: A permanent asset worth more than the Rand is being thrown away", pamphlet published by the Zululand Planters' Union, 1917.


Slater, H., "The changing pattern of economic relationships in rural Natal, 1838-1914", in Marks and Atmore (eds.), Economy and Society, Ch. 6.


C. Unpublished theses

Buys, D., "The negotiations between the Colony of Natal and the Colonial Office leading to the passing of the Annexation


III. INTERVIEWS

A. Interviews conducted under the auspices of the Oral History Project, University of Natal, Durban, 1981-1982. The original recordings and translated transcripts are now stored in the Killie Campbell Africana Library, Durban.


Zulu, Ndesheni Ernest. Born 1907, Zululand. Son of Mnyaiza. Educated at the ZNTI. In 1939 he took up employment as induna at the Nongoma magistrate's court. Ndesheni acted as adviser to Cyprian Bhekuzulu kaSolomon, and acts as adviser to and representative of the present king, Goodwill Zwelethini kaCyprian. He is also consulted on historical matters by Inkatha, and serves on the 'Ondini Restoration Committee' (Cetshwayo's Ondini homestead was burnt by the British in 1879). Interviewed at his home, Nongoma district, 10/11/1981.
Zulu, Thandayiphi Absolom. Born 1925, Zululand. Principal son of Solomon's marriage to okaMbulawa, a high-ranking woman of the Buthelezi. In the late 1930s Thandayiphi was declared to be Solomon's successor. Following a succession dispute, a government Board of Inquiry in 1945 set aside his claim in favour of Cyprian - against the wishes of the Zulu regent, Mshiyeni Arthur kaDinuzulu. Interviewed outside a liquor store, Nongoma district, 10/11/1981.

B. Other interviews

Kanyi, C. Private secretary to Cyprian Bhekuzulu kaSolomon during the 1960s. Interviewed at his home, Nongoma, 15/12/1981.
