BETWEEN AFRO-CENTRISM AND CITIZEN DIPLOMACY, THE DILEMMA OF NIGERIA’S CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISM IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM LIBERIA

By

OLUMUYIWA BABATUNDE AMAO

212553097

Supervisor:

Professor Ufo Okeke-Uzodike

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of a Master of Arts degree in Political Science, in the School of Social Sciences, College of Humanities of the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus

November 2012
DECLARATION

I Olumuyiwa Babatunde Amao, Student Number 212553097 hereby make the following declaration:

(i) That the research initiative reported in this thesis except where otherwise stated is my original work.

(ii) That this thesis has not been submitted for any other degree for examination at any other University.

(iii) That this thesis does not contain any other person’s data, pictures or graphs including any other information without due acknowledgment of those sources.

(iv) That this thesis does not contain any other person’s writing unless specifically acknowledged, has been referenced and where other sources have been quoted, I certify that;

(a) Their words have been re-written and that any general idea attributable to them has been duly referenced;
(b) And where their exact words have been used, they have been placed in quotation marks and equally referenced.

Signature…………………………….     Date……………………………
DEDICATION

To

ALMIGHTY GOD

For giving me the privilege to be alive to tell the Story

To

MR & MRS AMAO

For being alive to their responsibilities when it mattered most

To

OGUNDARE OLUYEMISI MABEL and AKINOLA SARAH FAITH

….an irreplaceable ‘mother’ and sister who could not wait to reap the fruits of their labor

To

MY SUPERVISOR

Without whom this story would never have been told

And

To

All the Martyrs and Legends who watered the

Tree of Liberty and Peace
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to the best supervisor any student could ever have hoped for, Professor Ufo Okeke-Uzodike; a scholar par excellence in whose intellectual sagacity I have been privileged to be baptized! Recalling the events of that cold Monday morning when I walked into his office to announce my decision to return home owing to my state of penury, I cannot but remain grateful to him for giving me that lifeline which saw me to this point. In this distinguished Professor, I must say that I have enjoyed the best of attention and support I never thought existed. He was undoubtedly a Godsend and more than anything else, my pillar of support all through this journey. May his fountain of knowledge never run dry!

I am grateful to: Adeoye Akinola and Adeogun Tolulope who staked everything they had in the defense of truth without which I probably would never have seen KwaZulu-Natal; Kudzai Goto, for being more than a friend; Hakeem Onapajo, an emerging scholar and my „self-appointed supervisor‘, whose consistent critique and input saw this work to where it is today; Richards Ogunnubi; Oluwaseun Tella; Ms Darniel Small; Uduak Johnson; Mzwandile Makhoba; Stella Shulika; Redempta Rwebangira; „Super’ Lulu Mmakola; Calda de Vries; Moses Kafulu; Nancy Mudau; Thenji Gumede; and Zizwe Memela; for their academic and strategic support all through the journey and to Opoola Olaide Omawunmi, for giving me the assurances that our tomorrow will be better and greater than this.

I also cannot forget in a hurry everyone in Nigeria whose widow’s mite laid the foundation for my onward expedition to this beautiful rainbow nation. I am thankful in particular to the „Cokers’, from whose financial generosity I have immensely benefited: Yagboyaju, Dhikru Adewale (PhD) for instilling in me the desire to take up a career in the academia; and to; Pastor Olayinka Olatundun; the Adeagbos; Stella Ajobo; Adekunle Adeniji; Mathew Olaniyi; Kabir Adeboye and Abdu-wasi Adewole; all this may not have been possible without you.

Of all the bends I negotiated in the course of this journey, writing this homily has been more than difficult, because everyone I have been privileged to come across clearly deserves some mention. Unfortunately, I do not have the liberty of space to do so, but I take consolation in the words of Longfellow when he said “Not to die is to live forever in the hearts of those who love you”. You will all live forever in my heart and please know that I surely owe you much more than time and posterity will see me pay! I do hope we can do this again at PhD level!

Gracias!
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<td>Organization of African Unity (OAU)</td>
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<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>Rapid Action Peacekeeping Force</td>
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<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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ABSTRACT

Given the destabilizing effect which conflicts have had on Africa’s socio-economic and political development, attempts have been (and are still being) made by a combination of state and non-state actors towards ensuring the prevention of conflicts before they occur, including the setting up of the required capacity to deal with them. Epitomizing this tradition is Nigeria, which courtesy of its regional hegemonic status and geographic location as well as its military and economic strength has been one of the leading nations in conflict resolution, peace building and peacekeeping in Africa. In view of the foregoing, this study revisits Nigeria’s conflict resolution mechanisms in Africa, through an analysis of its role within Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)-sponsored projects; such as the Nigerian-led military intervention in Liberia between 1990 and 1997. Using the realist approach as its framework of analysis and content analysis as its research methodology, the study interrogates the connection between Nigeria’s interventionist role in Africa and the possible nexus or otherwise with its foreign policy dictates. The study further examines the gains or otherwise that have been achieved courtesy of the Africanization of Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives from 1960 to 2010; and the probable factors responsible for the much „politicized” shift to citizen diplomacy. The study reveals that what is presently at play is a continuation of Nigeria’s traditional Afro-centric posture and advocates the need for Nigeria to put an end to its seemingly „charity inclined foreign policy orientation’. It recommends a re-definition of Nigeria’s foreign policy focus to accommodate a „People first’ approach towards conflict resolution in Africa both in theory and in practice.
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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

1.1 Background to the Study

In the past fifty-two (52) years (1960-2012), Africa has been plagued by a multiplicity of civil wars and protracted conflicts. Notable among such conflicts were the Darfur crises in Western Sudan which erupted in 2004, the Chadian conflicts from 1975 to 2008, the unending post-Mobutu Sese Seko crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo which dates back to 1998, the Mozambican civil war from 1977 to 1992, the Angolan crisis from 1975 to 2002, the Western Sahara conflict between the Polisario movement and the Moroccanis (1975 to 1991), and the genocide in Rwanda (1994), among others (Obiekwe, 2009:1). Given the destabilizing effect which these conflicts have had on Africa’s socio-economic and political development, it has become imperative for state and non-state actors to set up the required capacity to deal with them.

Motivated by the need to put an end to these quagmires, the African Union (AU) adopted a resolution at its extra-ordinary session held in Tripoli, Libya in February 2004 to commission a peacekeeping force known as the Rapid Action Peacekeeping Force (RAPF). The RAPF was conceived as a mechanism that can effectively guarantee continental peace and security. This move is seen as a follow-up to other instruments of African solidarity and cohesion such as the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), and the African Defense and Security Policy (ADSP) (Adedeji and Zabadi, 2004:20).

These institutional frameworks also led to the setting up of a Peace and Security Council (PSC) whose major responsibility is to prevent conflict and a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), expected to serve as an operational instrument for conflict prevention. The onus for ensuring the success of these efforts thus fell on sub-regional organizations on the continent as they are expected to provide the political and economic support required for the successful implementation of these initiatives. Prominent among these organizations are; the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African
Development Community (SADC), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in East Africa and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).

On an international level, attempts have also been (and are still being) made by a combination of state and non-state actors towards ensuring the resolution and prevention of these conflicts, particularly by non-state actors endowed with the political, economic and military resources to do so. According to Kuna (2006:1-2) and Adebajo (2008:12), Nigeria, courtesy of its hegemonic status\(^1\), geographic location, economic strength and military capabilities has been taking a definitive role in conflict resolution in Africa, from its attainment of independence in 1960 to date (2012). This is evident in the series of peace-oriented initiatives the country has undertaken in West Africa in particular and in Africa in general. Examples of these interventions include: Nigeria’s involvement in the Congolese civil war of 1960, the Chadian crisis of 1979-82, the Liberian civil war of 1990 to 1997, the Guinea-Bissau political unrest of 1998 to 2000, the Sierra Leonean civil war of 1991 to 2002, and the Ivorian crisis of 1997 to 2002, among others (Fawole, 2003).

While analyzing Nigeria’s role in conflict management within and outside Africa, Kuna; (2005:3-4) noted that such an analysis could be best situated within the context of the country’s foreign objectives. On attainment of independence in 1960, Nigeria adopted a pro-West, non-aligned and Africa-oriented foreign policy posture. It is however imperative to note that the above assumption has been subject to various contending arguments among scholars. Idisi and Idise (1996:169) note that this argument is divided between two camps: those who believe that Nigeria’s Africa-centred foreign policy concentration is *blatantly* pursued without any specific regard for the country’s domestic interests and economic woes and; those who maintain that Nigeria, by virtue of its huge socio-economic and military resources, has the responsibility to do so. This later school of thought is composed mainly of the National Interest, the Prestige, the Economic Diplomacy and the Hegemonic Stability schools of thought.

Idisi & Idise (1996:171) argue that the underlying assumption of the Prestige school of thought is that Nigeria, by virtue of being a force to be reckoned with in Africa, is

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\(^1\) Hegemonic status as used here refers to the economic, political and military capabilities *cum* reputation of Nigeria on the continent. Other examples of hegemonic powers on the continent are the Republic of South Africa and Egypt (Adebajo, (2003): *In search of Hegemonic War Lords in Liberia*).
predestined to lead in the promotion of peace, as well as in championing Africa’s socio-economic and political development. Such an assertion perhaps informed Ebohon and Obakhedo’s (2012: 163) observation that:

Playing such a noble role in the economic construction and reconstruction of the region presents Nigeria with an opportunity to assert her dominant position in the region as a matter of prestige. Analysts argue that if Nigeria fails to do so, other credible and contending regional challengers such as Ghana, Egypt, Cote d’ Ivoire (formerly Ivory Coast) and South Africa would take on such responsibilities (Ebohon and Obakhedo (2012: 163)).

In examining Nigeria’s role in conflict resolution in Africa, the Economic Diplomacy school of thought argues that such a role could contribute meaningfully towards ending the plethora of intrastate and interstate crises which have become the defining characteristics of most states in the sub-region and on the continent. Moreover, it also believed that Nigeria, by virtue of its being at the forefront of regional economic integration and transformation will help to facilitate a socio-economic and political environment conducive to economic growth and progress (Ebohon and Obakhedo, 2012:163). Such progress is impossible if the atmosphere of war and instability is allowed to remain unchecked; according to Ebohon and Obakhedo (2012:163), this brings to the fore the nexus between politics and economics in inter-state relations.

Similarly and in line with the argument often advanced by the proponents of the Hegemonic Stability school of thought, Rugumamu (2004: 9) citing Keohane (1980) argues that it is the duty of the hegemon to champion the cause of cooperation and integration by showing the less willing and less able countries the way. He adds that this is necessary in order to overcome the difficulties often associated with countries having to move on at the same pace and within the same time-frame. Rugumamu (2004: 10) further argues that the economic strength and political stability of any hegemon (such as Nigeria) is capable of strengthening the region’s economic vitality and political stability; this inevitably supports regional economic integration. Consequently and in line with Ebohon and Obakhedo’s (2012: 163) argument, Nigeria’s leadership role in the politico-economic and military activities of both ECOWAS and the AU have often been premised on the underlying assumptions of the theory of hegemonic stability.
Ebohon and Obakhedo (2012: 163) argue that this hegemonic presence is believed to have the capacity to serve as a positive force for developing and nurturing a viable economic and cooperative arrangement, as well as building a regional peace and security system. It can therefore be concluded, as Agedah (1993:145) observed, that the above schools of thought are of the opinion that Nigeria’s assumption of an “altruistic big brother role” in the sub-region and indeed on the continent is in response to the fulfilment of its manifest destiny of promoting the African cause and its unity.

However, after close to five decades of the pursuance of an Afro-centric foreign policy drive, the Nigerian government announced a shift in foreign policy orientation in 2007 from its hitherto Africa-centered ideology to what the erstwhile Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ojo Maduekwe, conceptualized as “citizen diplomacy” (Bakare, 2007). Citizen diplomacy, as construed by Nigeria, implies the country’s adherence to a foreign policy approach essentially premised on the protection, expansion and advancement of the national interests of the country and her people (Mbachu, 2007).

According to the then Minister for Foreign Affairs (Ojo Maduekwe) the term does not necessarily mean a departure from the country’s traditional Africa-centered foreign policy posture. Rather, it advocates for a re-channeling of foreign policy orientation to cater for the yearnings, aspirations, wellbeing and the national interest(s) of Nigeria and its people. This new foreign policy drive, therefore, seeks to address the ostensible priority placed on Africa by the preceding foreign policy focus and to also strive for a synergy between the broad issues encapsulated in Nigeria’s domestic and foreign policy concentration (Mbachu, 2007).

Informed by this introduction, this study attempts an appraisal of Nigeria’s approach towards conflict resolution in Africa. In doing so, it undertakes an assessment of the ECOWAS-sponsored and Nigeria-led military intervention in Liberia between 1990 and 1997. This is crucial to establish the underlying motive(s) behind Nigeria’s commitment of resources to the resolution of the conflict which could have been used to provide social infrastructure and other basic amenities for its growing population. This study will also examine the gains or
otherwise that have been achieved through the Africanization\(^2\) of Nigeria’s foreign policy goals, the feasibility of its new foreign policy approach of citizen diplomacy and its implications for Nigeria’s commitment to peace in Africa.

1.2 Statement of Problem
After about forty seven (47) years of the operationalization of an Africa-centered foreign policy drive, in 2007 the Nigerian government announced a shift to citizen diplomacy. Against this backdrop, this study intends to unravel the underlying motive(s) behind the seeming redirection of Nigeria’s foreign policy from Afro-centrism to citizen diplomacy. Using Nigeria’s interventionist role in the Liberian crisis as its case study, the study aims to establish the reasons behind the country’s interventionist role in Liberia and the possible gains or otherwise achieved by virtue of that intervention. Furthermore, the study aims to establish the veracity or otherwise of the reported shift in Nigeria’s traditional Afro-centric posture to citizen diplomacy. This will include an examination of the probable nexus or otherwise between the shift in foreign policy focus (if any) and the country’s interventionist role in future mediations. Finally, the study aims to identify the possible changes that have occurred over time in Nigeria’s foreign policy goals, particularly as these affect the country’s commitment to conflict resolution in Africa over the past five decades.

1.3 Scope of the Study
This study will focus on Nigeria’s role in the resolution of conflicts in Africa, with particular focus on Nigeria’s contribution to the ECOMOG-led intervention in the Liberian crisis. This will be examined from the foreign policy perspective of the Nigerian state, with specific focus on the existing nexus or otherwise between the Liberian intervention and Nigeria’s national interest. Concrete attempts will also be made to contextualize other interventionist roles played by Nigeria in the discharge of its commitment to peace and stability in Africa.

1.4 Limitations of the Study
The study may be constrained by difficulties in gaining access to some relevant materials related to the research due to national security restrictions. Issues associated with security are classified as official secrets in most countries. Another possible limitation is the use of

\(^2\) Africanization refers to the continental domestication of certain parts of a country’s derivative principles of state policy or objectives.
secondary data as the study’s research methodology; more often than not, data gathered through this medium may have been sourced previously for other research initiatives. As a result, the accuracy, dependability and relevance of such data to the study may be called into question. Furthermore, the dearth of literature on citizen diplomacy - a concept which, the Nigerian government claims as her present foreign policy focus - might also serve as a limitation to the study because of its recent introduction.

1.5 Significance of the Study

The relevance of the study will be appreciated by academics interested in researching Nigeria’s efforts towards conflict resolution and peace building in Africa. The study will bring to the fore the social, political and economic impact which the country has brought to bear on the continent through her conflict resolution and management efforts. Furthermore, the study will attempt to assess the reasons for Nigeria’s seeming unwillingness to continue with its Africa-centered foreign policy approach and the causal factors which prompted the embracement of a people first foreign policy approach. Furthermore, the study will be a useful guide to academics, resource persons and individuals undertaking a course in foreign policy dynamics or conflict resolution - especially those related to the African continent.

1.6 Objectives of the Study

The study seeks to:

1. Undertake a critical appraisal of the nexus between Nigeria’s role in conflict resolution in Africa and the protection of its national interests;
2. Analyze the connection between Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives and her interventionist role in Africa,
3. Appraise the strategies that have been applied by Nigeria towards conflict resolution in Africa with particular emphasis on the Liberian civil war; and;
4. Examine the rationale behind the shift in Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives from Afro-centrism to citizen diplomacy, particularly as it concerns peace building and conflict resolution in Africa.
1.7 Research Questions

This study intends to examine the following:

1. What has been the role of Nigeria in conflict resolution in Africa?
2. How are the foreign policy goals of Nigeria related to her interventions in Africa’s troubled regions?
3. What are the strategies that have been advanced by Nigeria in resolving conflicts in Africa?
4. Has there been any change in Nigeria’s traditional primary foreign policy objective of Afro-centrism to citizen diplomacy? If so, how has this affected its interventionist policies in Africa?

1.8 Main Hypothesis

Nigeria’s interventionist role and commitment to peace and stability in Africa are determined by the dictates of its foreign policy objectives.

1.9 Theoretical Framework: Rethinking the Utility of the Realist Approach

According to Bull (1966:20), the traditional and scientific points of view are the two major approaches towards understanding the dynamics of the study of foreign policy. The central argument embedded in the traditional school of thought stems from the emphasis it places on the observance of law, morality, and the use of history in the study of foreign policy and in the pursuit of its goals. This school of thought makes the following key assumptions: that states act in a particular way based on their historical experiences and strategic situations and that the basic principles of international law (such as respect for the international sovereignty of nation-states) are operative in the behavior of all nations in foreign relations; that violating basic international laws and morality in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives could be detrimental to the cordial relations existing between a state and other nations. The central notion of Bull’s (1966) argument is premised on the necessity and desirability of making judgments informed by history, law and a sense of morality; this, in turn, is vital in the determination of actions to be taken when relating to external state actors.

In contrast, the main thesis of the scientific point of view is the realist theory. Following its emergence as an off-shoot of the Idealist approach, Realism has come to be identified with the
great debates which occurred during the early 1930s and the 1940s between the inter-war idealists and a new generation of Realist writers. This group of scholars included the likes of E.H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Frederick Schuman and George Kennan. (Dunne and Schmidt, 2005:163). According to Meinecke (1957:1) the essential argument embedded in realism is “premised on the assumption that the state, by virtue of being a major player at the international stage must seek and pursue power, and that it is the duty of the statesman to calculate realistically the most suitable measure(s) to adopt in order to guarantee and protect its interest in a threatening or hostile environment” (Meinecke, 1957:1).

Dunne and Schmidt (2005), further suggests that realists believe that the survival of the state cannot be guaranteed because of the assumption that the use of force in war situations is a legitimate instrument of statecraft. They argue that the sole interest of nation-states at the international level is to strive for their survival in the midst of competing challenges, and high level political volatility. Bearing this in mind, it is also instructive to note that Realism as a concept in international relations does not recognize the place of morality or ethics in the conduct of international politics. More often than not, Realists are cynical about the argument for the existence of universal moral principles. They maintain that the primary responsibility of state leaders is to protect the interests of their states and not act in compliance with any unfamiliar notion of ethical conduct.

As Morgenthau (1948:25) argued; international politics, like all other aspects of politics, remains a struggle for power, and as a result, the basic structure of international politics is laden with a high prevalence of anarchy. Consequently, there is a natural tendency for an increased incidence of violence in the international system. This scenario arises from the fact that every sovereign state considers itself to be its own highest authority and therefore does not recognize any other power as being above it. Therefore, and, as a follow-up to this struggle for control, domination and relevance at the international level, the main concern of state leaders is to ensure the survival of their state, without recourse to the rules of engagement or violence.

Dunne and Schmidt (2005:164) further identify classical, structural, neo-classical and relational choice realism as the main variants of the realist approach. Classical realism emphasizes that the logic of power has universal applicability, and that the nature of man
explains certain dominant features of the international system such as rivalry, fear and war. Structural realism maintains the view that the whole idea of the international system is about the struggle for power, and that the pervasiveness of insecurity, unhealthy rivalry among states and the prevalence of inter-state conflicts in the international system are due to the absence of a supreme authority which oversees the affairs of states, including the distribution of power in the international system.

Neo-classical realism on the other hand, contends that the systemic account of world politics is imperfect and argues for it to be supported by a better account of unit-level variables potent enough to effectively determine the perception of power and how it is exercised. Finally, advocates of choice realism re-affirm their belief in the all-important role which institutions play in international politics, although problems associated with their relative gains, could also mean that they exert less causal force, contrary to the view point held by neo-liberals (Dunne and Schmidt, 2005:164).

In line with the foregoing, this study aligns itself with the viewpoint of structural realism because of its subscription to what Dunne and Schmidt (2005:173-176) call the „three Ss” of realism; statism, survival and self-help - three fundamental notions which to a large extent determine the level and manner of interaction existing in the international system. By way of explanation, the chief idea embedded in statism relates to the notion that a state prefers to see itself as the only actor on the international stage and, as such, considers every other state as less important. The notion of self-help pre-supposes that the idea of co-existence in international politics is only achieved when a state is able to maintain a balance of power and that limited cooperation is only feasible when a state stands to gain more than others. However, the concept of survival; the last of the „three Ss” in realism, concerns the protection of the supreme national interest which all political leaders must adhere to. This suggests that, entrenched in the realist approach is the emphasis it places on the notion and protection of the national interest - a term which in the opinion of Abegurin (2003:7) concerns “the means of providing the link between trying to understand international politics and the facts to be understood”.

Consequently, when situated within the context of foreign policy, realism interrogates the role of specific variables such as the economy, leadership proficiency, military capability and geographical location in shaping the foreign policy decisions of a nation. In line with these
assumptions, scholars such as Idang (1973), Aluko (1981), Ogunsanwo (1986) and Gambari, (1989) have argued that the realist approach is relevant in understanding Nigeria’s foreign policy. This assertion is premised on the assumption that Nigeria’s behavior towards the external environment is often anchored on the need to protect its national interest. Accordingly, Nigeria’s national interest, according to Aluko (1981), includes: (1) self-preservation; (2) defense and maintenance of Nigeria’s territorial sovereignty; (3) promotion of the economic and social wellbeing of its people; (4) to defend, preserve and promote democratic values and institutions; and (5) enhancement of Nigeria’s status in Africa and the world through the promotion of world peace.

This, therefore, implies that the foreign policy of any nation is a product of a multiplicity of its national interests, and, as Kissinger (1969:27) earlier noted, “foreign policy begins where domestic policy ends”. Based on the above, it may be posited, that the notion of national interest remains an important consideration in foreign policy formulation. Consequently, and, in view of the nexus between Nigeria’s foreign policy and its interventionist principle in Africa, this study interrogates its conflict resolution mechanisms from the point of view of the Realist theory. The choice is informed by the emphasis placed on the need to protect the national interest as a cardinal reason why states intervene in conflicts.

Therefore, when one considers the intrinsic relationship between what constitutes Nigeria’s national interest, particularly as it affects Nigeria’s principle of four concentric circles as espoused earlier, the adoption of the theory enables us to put into perspective the seeming correlation (or otherwise) between Nigeria’s national interest and the motivations behind its interventionist role in African conflicts. More importantly when approached from the perspective of Nigeria’s seeming adherence to a set of Africa-centered ideology; a policy which has been the determinant of Nigeria’s external behavior and the guiding principle for its interventionist activities in Africa over the last fifty-two years (1969-2012).

1.10 Research Methodology and Study Design
As a research tool, methodology entails the description and evaluation of the methods, techniques and procedures used in the investigation of a research objective; it deals with the aims of the study and also attempts to justify the reason(s) for its usage. There are two types of research methods: quantitative and qualitative, and the data collection method could further
be classified as primary or secondary (Barbie, 2008:351; Neuman, 2011:254). This study, having taken cognizance of the complex and immeasurable nature of the phenomenon under investigation (foreign policy), will employ a qualitative research methodology (Liebscher, 1998:669).

The analysis of the data will be premised largely on a content analysis approach using secondary sources and methods of data collection. This methodology was arrived at based on the relative accessibility of past literature and an avenue to build on what has previously been done. Shank (2002:6) observes that the content analysis approach has the following advantages: it allows for relatively easy access to data and also provides the researcher with the prerogative of deciding what to use, how to use it and where to use it. Nevertheless, the fact that the origin of the information may be questionable, and the doubts often associated with the validity and reliability of the data gathered could serve as impediments to the approach. To overcome this phenomenon, the researcher will critically evaluate the data gathered with a view to avoiding a misrepresentation of facts.

In line with the above, and for the purposes of this study, Liberia has been chosen as case study. This choice is informed by the huge responsibility assumed by Nigeria under the auspices of ECOWAS throughout the crisis period in Liberia (1990-1997). Two other countries, Sierra-Leone, where Nigeria was active and Sudan, where it remains actively involved, were not adopted because Liberia offers the researcher the opportunity to undertake a review of Nigeria’s interventionist role in Africa from an individualistic point of view. Added to this is the fact that Nigeria’s role in Liberia is more distinctly defined, unlike in Sierra-Leone where the country was involved in a tussle with Ghana at some point over the leadership of the peacekeeping force and in Sudan, where Nigeria is presently engaged as a non-state actor.

In view of the above, the investigation of Nigeria’s conflict resolution mechanisms in Africa, with an emphasis on its role in the resolution of the Liberian civil war from 1990 to 1997 will be carried out using the content analysis approach. Content analysis, according to Patton (2002:452), implies, “any qualitative data reduction and sense-making effort which evaluates a volume of qualitative material and attempts to justify their core consistencies and meanings”. It is expected that the use of this approach will provide a better understanding of
the motivating and underlying factors surrounding Nigeria’s interventionist mission in Liberia.

This approach will also afford the researcher an opportunity to examine the alignment between such interventions and the core issues encapsulated in Nigeria’s hitherto Africa-centered foreign policy. Finally, the approach will provide the researcher with a detailed understanding of the motivations behind the purported shift in Nigeria’s Afro-centric external policy to citizen diplomacy. This will be achieved through a survey of relevant academic books, journals, seminars, articles, government gazettes, and documentaries.

The following chapter will focus on a review of relevant literature on the notion of conflict resolution and Nigeria’s foreign policy. This is intended to provide more insight into the connection between Nigeria’s foreign policy and its interventionist role in conflicts on the continent.
CHAPTER TWO

A Review of Literature on the Notion of Conflict Resolution and Nigeria’s Foreign Policy

2.1 Introduction
Given the seeming absence of effective conflict management mechanisms to manage Africa’s myriad protracted conflicts, it is important to review the concept of conflict and the mechanisms involved in its resolution. A proper understanding of the nature of a conflict remains an indispensable necessity for its effective management.

The majority of conflicts that have occurred on the African continent have been triggered by a number of issues. These range from agitations for resource control (such as the struggle for control over crude oil and gas, and other solid minerals) to politically motivated conflicts, as was the case during the Chadian, Liberian, Ivorian and the Sierra Leonean wars. In the past, Africa has also witnessed conflicts whose causes are attributable to the quests for self-determination, leading to a number of secessionist or separatist wars, as seen during the Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970, the ongoing war of independence between Sudan and South-Sudan and the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Obiekwe, 2009:1).

This implies that when a citizenry is deprived of basic rights, either through some form of injustice or the uneven distribution of available resources by the state or its leadership, the possibility of resistance in the form of either civil disobedience or a total breakdown of law and order becomes inevitable. More often than not, this deprivation is usually manifested in the lack of quality education, the absence of social security, the unavailability of basic societal amenities and high levels of unemployment. In such situations, the worst hit are the able bodied youths; because they represent the bulk of the steady source of recruits for forceful revolt as witnessed during the Liberian and Sierra Leonean wars.

It is also important to note, that these multifaceted goals pose a great challenge to the resolution and managements of conflicts in Africa, including the diverse perspectives of member nations and other multilateral organizations seeking to either resolve or manage them. This chapter will provide a synopsis of the causes of conflicts in Africa, as well as a
review of extant literature and terminological clarifications related to the concepts of conflict and conflict resolution, including its variants, forms and universality. The relevant literature related to the concepts of diplomacy, citizen diplomacy, foreign policy and Nigeria’s foreign policy will also be examined.

2.2 Defining Conflict

Before engaging in a discourse on the notion of conflict resolution, it is important to define the concept of conflict itself; this research study borrows the definitions offered by Coser (1956), Fink (1968) and Galtung (1992). In Coser’s (1956:8) opinion, a conflict may be said to mean "a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources or a struggle in which the aims of the opponent are to neutralize, injure or eliminate its rivals". Fink (1968:456) perceives conflict to mean “the existence of non-compatibility or disagreements between two actors (individuals, groups, organizations or nations) in their interaction over issues of interests, values, beliefs, emotions, goals, space, positions and scarce resources”.

According to Deutsch, (1973:10), a “conflict exists wherever incompatible activities occur”. Similarly, Himes (1980:14) perceives the phenomenon as “the purposeful struggle between collective actors who use social power to defeat or remove opponents and to gain status, control, resources and other scarce values". For Pruitt and Rubin (1986:14), a conflict occurs when there is a “perceived divergence of interest, or a belief that the parties' current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously". Rhoodie (1991:21) argues that a "conflict usually occurs where a group or several groups of people compete for scarce resources."

In Galtung’s (1992:54) view, “a conflict situation takes place when there are instances of incompatibility among two or more parties, thus leading to one goal standing in the way of the other”. Galtung (1992:55) further explains that a conflict may take the form of the “less crystallized and the crystallized”. He notes that when “a conflict is in the less crystallized form; it is seen as an incompatibility between the objective interests of parties in a society, and when in the crystallized form, conflict represents an incompatibility between the subjective goals of action in a society” (Galtung, 1992:55).

Typology wise, scholars such as Maslow (1943), Coser (1956), Fink (1968), Burton (1984), Galtung (1992) and Miller (2005) identified the following as the main types of conflicts that
are pervasive in society, although the list cannot be said to be exhaustive. They include but are not limited to: **Needs based conflict**, which draws references from Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. This theory holds the view that human beings have basic needs which they are driven to satisfy. These needs may be physical or psychological, and they could be quite complex to define. Prominent among these needs are the need for identity, security and control; the denial of these needs can lead to deep-rooted conflict if not well managed (Maslow, 1943).

**Value based conflict** essentially concerns issues arising from differences of opinion and values. The values in this case may be religious, political, or ideological. Examples include a clash between the Capitalist and Socialist ideologies or a religious clash between Muslims and Christians. It is instructive to note that many of the unending social conflicts in the world are value based conflicts and they are usually difficult to manage, due to the adoption of a one zero-sum approach by the actors involved (Coser, 1956). The notion of **Deep-rooted social conflict**, on the other hand refers to conflicts between authorities, individuals and several competing groups within a society over scarce resources (Burton, 1984).

An **Interest based conflict** arises from the insatiable material requirements of human beings and their limited supply. People compete for money, natural resources, jobs and social status. Most of the conflicts which occur among individuals and groups fall into this category (Galtung, 1992). Finally, **Structural conflict**, according to (Miller 2005), refers to a disagreement in socio-economic and political structures. Its distinguishing characteristic is that it pits human beings against one another in what can be likened to a zero sum association.³

Arising from the explanations offered above, it can be argued that a conflict occurs in a society for various reasons, but more often than not, it is largely a function of the following: (1) competition for scarce resources among people, (2) the insatiability of human needs, (3) selfishness, ego and the desire to outwit others. Given the above, it is therefore necessary to

³ A zero-sum association is a variant of the Games theory and it is often used as a weapon of negotiation, war or for the settlement of disputes. Its central argument is premised on the assumption that the loss of one party is automatically the gain of the other, thus leading to fierce rivalry among the contending parties with the ultimate intention of outwitting one another. There are no holds barred in this type of warfare because of its Machiavellian attributes.
provide an antidote capable of preventing such conflicting situations from arising in the first place. This antidote is usually referred to as the notion of conflict prevention.

2.2.1 Conflict Prevention

The term „conflict prevention” has been defined by Burton (1990:18) as “the process of dealing with the causes of conflict before it manifests including the removal of the causal conditions, to enable the positive promotion of environments conducive to collaborative relationships”. Miller (2005) also notes that the term is often referred to as preventive diplomacy or conflict prevention. Miller sees conflict prevention as including “any activity involving the maintenance of status quo due to potential threats associated with the crises or the anticipated outcomes from engaging in a dispute” (Miller, 2005:25).

In more specific terms, conflict prevention is often associated with the concept of the Early Warning system. From an academic perspective, Austin (2004:2), views “Early Warning as any initiative that focuses on systematic data collection, analysis and/or formulation of recommendations, including risk assessment and information sharing, regardless of whether they are quantitative, qualitative or a blend of both”. He further refers to an Early Response as “any initiative that occurs in the latent stages of a perceived potential armed conflict which aims at reducing, resolving or transforming the conflicting situation to a new peaceful order”. Dorn (2004:17) views Early Warning as “the act of alerting a recognized authority (such as the African Union) to a new (or potential) threat to peace at a sufficiently early stage”.

As a follow up to the explanation offered by Dorn (2004), Adelman (2008) identified the essential concern of Early Warning as detecting rising tensions which could lead to violent conflicts and putting mechanisms in place that can stem rising tensions. He added, however, that the concept may not necessarily have the ability to prevent the tensions from arising at all. Adelman (2008) further observed that Early Warning not only includes the gathering of data, but its analysis in order to develop strategic options potent enough to provide an accompanying response when faced with a conflict situation.

Building on the definition offered by Austin (2004), Woocher (2008: 3) similarly identifies the following as the major responsibilities of the Early Warning system: estimating the
magnitude and timing of the relative risks of emerging threats, (2) analyzing the nature of these threats and describing plausible scenarios, and, (3) communicating warning analyses to decision makers (Woocher, 2008: 3). From the foregoing, it can be inferred that the basic assumptions of the Early Warning Response System (EWRS) are deeply rooted in the belief that “international actors have a responsibility to act as ‘protectors’ once the available information is processed in line with the rules and procedures that can prevent the occurrence of conflicts within an international or regional organization” (Barrs, 2006: 1).

Given the above, it can be inferred that the essential concern of conflict prevention is to initiate effective conflict prevention efforts, solid enough to stand the test of time even in the face of egregiously violent circumstances. Such efforts may be constrained by issues such as geo-strategic concerns, security interests, cost-benefit analyses, and refugee issues. The combination of these constraints and their peculiarities has placed the responsibility of conflict prevention on the shoulders of state and non-state actors. Furthermore, Reimann (2004:1) notes that, “whenever this responsibility is assumed by either the nation-states (state actor) or international organizations (non-state actor) they must also endeavor to be neutral if any meaningful result is to be achieved” (Reimann, 2004:1). However, if the process of preventing conflict fails to produce the desired result; it may be necessary for the intervener to devise some other means of managing the conflict, an analysis of which is presented below.

2.2.2 Conflict Management

Scholars such as McGarry and O’Leary (1993); Wallenstein (2002); Fisher et al. (2002); Miall, (2004) and Hamad, Ahmad and Azem (2005) have argued that the idea of conflict management basically involves two schools of thought: the Negativists and the Positivists. They noted that while the ‘negativists’ are of the opinion that a conflict situation cannot be totally remedied, the ‘positivists’ hold the belief that it is possible to eliminate conflicts. For this group (Positivists) conflict management is seen as a stage in the handling of conflicts, which could be followed by later stages. However, as Burton (1984:183) observed, a conflict could only be seen as “settled if the outcome entails a loss for one side and a gain for the other, or a compromise in which all or some of the parties are losers to some degree”, while a conflict stands resolved when the fundamental cause of the conflict is addressed in a
“transparent”, “fair” and “unbiased manner”, particularly by an independent party (Burton, 1984:183).

In their analysis of ethnic conflict regulation, McGarry and O’Leary (1993:4) identified two primary concepts: conflict management and conflict termination. They noted that while the former concerns the handling of the consequences of differences between the conflicting parties, the latter emphasizes the processes that lead to its termination. A case in point is a situation where the parties involved in a conflict are obliged to share scarce resources in such a way that none is completely satisfied. In most cases, parties resort to coercion. However, the conflict stands resolved if the outcome fully meets the needs and interests of all the parties concerned. This occurs where the “parties” agree to exploit and share resources in a way that completely satisfies everyone’s values and interests.

The above scenario, according to Wallenstein (2002:53), emphasizes the containment function of conflict management. He further adds that:

*Conflict management typically focuses on the armed aspects of conflict: bringing the fighting to an end, limiting the spread of the conflict and, thus, containing it. …Conflict resolution is more ambitious, as it expects the parties to face jointly their incompatibility and find a way to live with or dissolve it* (Wallenstein, 2002:53).

This implies that conflict studies views “conflict management as being on the same level as conflict settlement or containment. In other words, the general view of conflict management is that it is less advanced and it covers a narrower range of treatment of conflict in comparison with other more ambitious or advanced methods of dealing with the problem”(Wallenstein, 2002:53). This perhaps underpinned Fisher *et al.’s* (2002:7) observation that, “while there are no claims of a universally accepted typology for the methods used in addressing conflict, there are still some consistent terms, seen as steps in a process and each step taken includes the previous one”. The authors classify these steps as conflict prevention, conflict settlement, conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation and submit that conflict management is intended to limit and avoid future violence by promoting positive behavioral changes among the parties involved (Fisher *et al.*, 2002:7).
In line with the above interpretations, Miall (2004) argued that due to the largely ineradicable consequence of the differences in values and interests within and between communities in a conflict situation, the conflict resolution process essentially becomes unrealistic. Therefore, the best that can be done is to manage and contain conflicts and to occasionally reach a historic compromise which allows for the setting aside of violence for normal negotiations to resume. Hamad, Ahmad and Azem (2005) also observed that conflict resolution and transformation are phases in the treatment of a conflict, and are often more advanced than conflict management. According to them, conflict transformation refers to the process of addressing the wider social and political sources of a conflict while also seeking to transform the negative energy of war into positive social and political change (Hamad, Ahmad and Azem, 2005).

If the process of managing the conflict espoused above fails to yield the expected result, there may be a need for the introduction of a conflict resolution mechanism whose major intent is to resolve the differences created by the conflict. This mechanism is usually called conflict resolution.

### 2.2.3 Conflict Resolution

According to Golwa (2009:279), conflict resolution refers to “the limitation, mitigation and containment of violent conflicts through the use of both forcible (coercive) and non forcible (non-coercive) instruments to stop the recurrence of humanitarian emergency situations”. In the view of Snodderly (2011:17) the primary responsibility of conflict resolution is to address the fundamental causes of conflicts by finding common interests, and by abiding by its all-embracing goals. These, according to him, include: “nurturing positive attitudes and generating trust through reconciliation initiatives, including the building or strengthening of the institutions and processes through which the parties can interact peacefully” (Snodderly, 2011:17).

In order to achieve the goals identified above, Miall (2004) further suggests the need to recognize the interests of the conflicting parties, including their needs, perspectives, and continued existence. He argued that for a conflict resolution technique to be effective and
transformative, it must take cognizance of the identification of the underlying causes of the conflict and address them through solutions that will be mutually satisfactory, self-perpetuating, and self-sustaining in the long run. On the practicability of conflict resolution serving as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism, Miall (2004) suggests the use of cooperation, non-confrontation, non-competition, and positive-sum orientation as possible strategies when dealing with actors and gladiators involved in the conflict.

Miall (2004:14) concludes by noting that “serious challenges are found when warring parties favor for various reasons, the continuation of a conflict over its resolution, in such instances, the role of an external mediator may be quite useful”. This is because the involvement of an external party could help to create a balance of power, in the enforcement of sanctions, and also in making incentives available where and when necessary. However, for this mediation to succeed, Miall (2004) argued for the need for the mediator to be neutral in the resolution or negotiation process.

In situations where a conflict is not responding positively to a non-violent resolution process, there may be the need for the application of some subtle force. Such force and its subsequent application is what Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992) refers to as peacekeeping; a concept which is the pillar on which Nigeria’s interventionist mechanism in Africa rests. It follows therefore that in resolving conflicts, different kinds of mechanisms are involved and generally speaking, the concept of intervention is often seen as the practical aspect of conflict resolution. A wide range of issues and conditions must be satisfied before an intervention can take place. A synopsis of these is presented below.

2.2.4 Intervention

Murphy (1996:11) refers to the concept of intervention as including, “the threat or use of force across state borders; either by a state or group of states in order to end widespread and grave violations of the fundamental rights of its people and other nationals”. According to Rodt (2011:3), “the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) notes that an external intervention becomes inevitable when there are obvious tendencies of genocide or mass killings in an on-going conflict, and, or the actual occurrence of ethnic
cleansing”. This has been a feature of a number of African conflicts in recent times, examples of which include the Rwanda genocide in 1994 and the Darfur genocide in 2005.

Motivated by the desire to forestall or put an end to this occurrence in Africa, the leadership of the African Union\(^4\) (AU) has put mechanisms in place to deal with the quagmire. This is reflected in Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000), which empowers the AU to “intervene in a member state, pursuant to the decision of its assembly of heads of states and head of government. However, this intervention is only expected to be enforced in situations where ‘grave atrocities’, such as, war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity are been committed against the citizens”. Following the ratification of this Act by its Council of Head of States and Government, the AU put the treaty to test in Burundi (2003), Sudan (2004) and Somalia (2007) (Mashudu, 2011:32 -53).

As Rodt (2011:3) observed, the essential argument rooted in the concept of intervention is the challenge it poses to the realist notion of state security, particularly as it involves recognition of the responsibility to protect the civilian population (R2P)\(^5\), when a state fails in its obligation to exercise its sovereignty according to the wishes of its people. Thus according to Crocker (2007:33), the notion of non-intervention should be seen as a conditional right because it could be withdrawn from a state when it can no longer guarantee the security of its own people, as it happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina, (1992-1995) Kosovo, (1999), Sierra Leone (2002), and in Darfur in 2003.

Crocker (2007:34) further identifies „proponents’ and „opponents’ as the two major viewpoints associated with the concept of intervention. The proponents view the assumption of the sanctity of sovereignty as a mere responsibility and not a right; due to the internally

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\(^4\)The African Union succeeded the Organization of African Unity in 2002 following the ratification of the Sirte Accord by its 53 (now 54 with South Sudan since 2011) member countries. It has as its chief objective the responsibility of promoting peace and stability in Africa while pursuing the socio-economic and political development of its member countries. The body’s headquarters is located in Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia and it recognizes the Council of Heads of States and Government as its highest decision making organ.

\(^5\)The doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) emerged as a concept following the work by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Its central goal is to end mass killings and other crimes against humanity; including genocide and also to ensure the protection of civilians, ideally by their own state. However, if the state lacks the will or the ability to fulfill this set of obligations, the international community can intervene and take over responsibility for the protection of civilians within that state’s territory. The concept was adopted by the UNSCR in 2006 under UNSCR 1674 on the protection of civilians and the 2009 UN General Assembly sessions on implementing the Responsibility to Protect.
derived characteristics of conflicts and their tendency to create a stalemate, external intervention becomes inevitable. Crocker notes that this in contrast to the opposing claims made by the critics of intervention. He noted the following as very crucial to the success or otherwise of any intervention: (1) the competence, capability and determination of the intervening forces, (2) the involvement of the affected people, and lastly, (3) the leadership ability of the elites within the conflict zones (Crocker 2007:35).

The point to note from the explorations offered above is that, more often than not, any conflict which does not subscribe to a peaceful form of negotiation or what Crocker (2001) calls diplomatic intervention would have to be resolved through military intervention. Crocker (2001:231) had earlier distinguished between diplomatic intervention and military intervention when he observed that the former meant the use of persuasive tools to negotiate for peace among warring parties. This, he noted, can take several forms and when sustained, it becomes the central feature of a state’s foreign policy towards a country. A case in point is the mediatory role assumed by the United States in the Middle East, which dates back to 1948.

Similarly, Hoffman, (2001:273) commented on the idea of humanitarian intervention in his analyses of the traditional views of intervention and asserted that the justifications for intervening in domestic conflicts, fall into the category of the *jus ad bellum*. He argued that issues such as the justness of defending human rights, the principles of national sovereignty and the selectivity and inconsistency in choosing who to attack are key considerations which determine the efficacy of any humanitarian intervention. Hoffman (2003:274) also noted that the concept of humanitarian intervention is not without its own shortcomings. He identified issues such as the type of rights to be protected, the lack of proper authority to intervene and the use of military force as some of these inadequacies.

Betts (2001:286) noted that for any intervention to achieve its purpose, it must be seen to be both limited and impartial, because when an intervener takes sides in a conflict, this undermines the effectiveness and legitimacy of the external involvement. He stressed that limited intervention is capable of ending a war if the intervener takes sides; when this happens, the balance of power may tilt towards the advantage of the „weak“. However, on the other hand, he noted that impartial intervention may end a conflict if the outsider takes

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6 *Jus ad bellum*, according to Hoffman refers to a theory whose central thesis is premised on having a just cause to intervene in conflicts; such decisions must be made by a legitimate authority or state.
complete command of the situation, intimidates the local competitors and imposes a peace settlement (2001:286-288).

Given the above, it suffices to say that no matter how humanitarian an effort seems, there is an underlying interest attached to it; central to this consideration is the place of foreign policy in intervention. In the contemporary international system, states intervene in conflicts for the singular reason of protecting their „interests’ even when the issues at stake are not necessarily a direct affront on the sanctity of their national interest. The latter point was evident in the enforcement of the UNSCR 1973 of 2011 on Libya, the consequences of which led to the ousting and eventual death of its leader, Col. Muammar Gadhafi. While the enforcement of the resolution may be targeted towards protecting the civilian population, could the same also be said of the unspoken reasons attached to the enforcement of the „No Fly Zone”?

If not, how then do we reconcile the nexus between the intervention and its relationship with the national interest of the key actors (the United States, Britain and France) who enforced the resolution? The probable answer to this questions may be anchored on the doctrine of the responsibility to protect, but behind all this is the undeclared doctrine of necessity to protect either the economic or political interest (or both) of the intervening states. This further lends credence to the fact that crucial to the survival of any foreign policy is the protection of the national interest - a phenomenon which ultimately helps to shape national identity and goals.

In view of the foregoing, this study situates Nigeria’s interventionist role in the Liberian crisis within the context of the failure of the Liberian state under the leadership of Samuel Doe to guarantee the lives and properties of its people; hence the justification for the external intervention. It is also imperative to note that the specificity of reasons for intervention varies widely. It could be political, as in the case of Nigeria’s commanding role in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars; or economic, in terms of what the intervening state stands to gain (for instance the role of the Americans in Iraq and the interest of Russia and China in Syria at the moment (2012)) and it could also be historical, as demonstrated in the case of America’s long standing support for the state of Israel and the French intervention in the civil war in Ivory Coast.

In addition this, is the foreign policy orientation of the intervening state as it was the case with Nigeria’s intervention in Liberia, which was premised on the country’s Africa-centered
foreign policy; a phenomenon that has become the defining characteristic of its conflict resolution mechanisms in Africa. Flowing from the above explication, one can therefore situate Nigeria’s intervention in the Liberian civil war under the auspices of ECOMOG as one which was guided by the principles of its four concentric circles whose major pillar is anchored on the need to maintain peace with its contiguous states in particular and Africa in general. It is however, imperative to note that after every successful intervention in a conflict situation, there is need to put some machinery in motion in order to avoid a relapse into conflict and sustain the fragile peace. This process is often associated with the notion of peace building.

2.2.5 Peace building

In undertaking an assessment of the literature on peace building, this study draws references from the classification of peace offered by Galtung (1964). Galtung is often seen as a pioneer of peace studies. He offered a two stage categorization of the concept of peace: positive peace or preventive initiatives and negative peace (curative measures). The defining characteristics of positive peace according to Galtung, are structural integration, optimism, prevention, and encouraging peace by peaceful means, while negative peace refers to the absence of violence, pessimism and the facilitation of peace through a relatively non-peaceful means (Galtung, 1964). Modern academic discourses on peace studies and peace building are credited to Boutros-Ghali (1992), who argued that post-conflict peace-building is vital if a successful transition to normalcy is to be achieved in a post-war environment. He views the idea of peace-building as a “course of action intended to identify and support structures” which are capable of strengthening and solidifying peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

Boutros-Ghali (1992) further noted that in the aftermath of an international war, post-conflict peace building may take the form of concrete cooperative projects capable of linking two or more countries in a mutually beneficially way. This in turn, can lead to a rapid socio-

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7 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, politician and diplomat hails from Egypt. He served as the secretary-general of the United Nations (UN) from January 1 1992 to December 31 1996. Boutros-Ghali is reputed to be an academic. He submitted *An Agenda for Peace*, a detailed suggestion on how the UN could respond to violent conflicts around the world. However, he was criticized for the UN's failure to act during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, which officially left about one million people dead and was also unable to garner the support of the UN Security Council for a military intervention that could have ended the civil war in Angola. One of his major challenges while in office was the dilemma of how to deal with the crisis that resulted in the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia.
economic development and also enhance the confidence of all concerned. Consequently, in the opinion of Boutros-Ghali (1992), peace building places emphasis on the need for a gradual but consistent transformation of a conflict situation to peace. These transformative efforts can be achieved through the use of preventive diplomacy; peace-making and peace building. According to Boutros-Ghali (1992:1), “preventive diplomacy refers to an action which seeks to prevent disputes from arising between parties, preventing existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and limiting the spread of the latter when they occur”.

On the other hand, peace-making refers to any action aimed at establishing an accord or truce among the warring parties through negotiations or peaceful bargaining, while peacekeeping expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Similarly, Lederach (1997) conceptualized peace building as the long-term transformation of a war system into a peace system, inspired by a quest for the values of peace, justice, truth and mercy. The key dimensions of this process are the changes in the personal, structural, relational and cultural aspects of conflict and this usually happens over a period of time. He also noted that peace building has been concerned with an appropriate time-frame, including concentrating on mid-term steps towards building a peace constituency, while at the same time embracing a vision of the desired future and an awareness of the prevalent crisis.

Clements (2004) however, notes that peacebuilding may at times involve unmasking the powerful and balancing unequal relationships by solving a recurring problem. The central emphasis in peacebuilding according to him is “on justice and fairness rather than on political harmony and political order”. Similarly, Schirch (2008:8) views peacebuilding as “the process of restoring normal relations between people through the reconciliation of differences, the apology and forgiveness of past harm, the establishment of a cooperative relationship between groups, and the replacement of the adversarial or competitive relationship that used to exist” (Schirch, 2008:8).

Schirch (2008) further identifies four main issues as the primary concern(s) of peacebuilding. These include: providing security, establishing the socio-economic foundations for peace, setting up the political framework for long-term peace, and generating reconciliation through the healing of the wounds of war and justice. The three main spheres of peacebuilding according to Schirch (2008:5) are: political peacebuilding, which centers on agreement, legal
issues, formal negotiations and diplomacy; structural peacebuilding which concerns infrastructure such as; “building economic, military, social and cultural systems that support a culture of peace through activities such as voter education, disarming warring parties, police training, building schools, and good governance; and social peacebuilding; this encompasses building relationships which focuses on feelings, attitudes, opinions, beliefs, and sustaining societal values through the use of dialogue, community-building activities and training” (Schirch, 2008:5).

Flowing from the above explications, it could be argued that Nigeria’s role in peacebuilding in Africa has been anchored on the wings of promoting peace and harmony in Africa; this has been demonstrated in a number of interventions, including in Congo, Chad, Equatorial-Guinea, Liberia, Sierra-Leone, Sudan, etc. It is also pertinent to note, that many of these mediations have been made possible by the dictates of Nigeria’s Africa-centered foreign policy objectives. This takes the form of an Afro-centric policy which emphasizes the need to maintain peace among its contiguous states (Benin Republic, Cameroon, Niger and Chad), while also maintaining a broader Africa-centered foreign policy disposition. The combination of these factors has helped shape the direction or pattern which Nigeria’s conflict resolution mechanisms in Africa have followed in the past five decades.

In order to gain a proper understanding of the nexus or otherwise between Nigeria’s foreign policy and its conflict resolution mechanisms in Africa, it is necessary to undertake a brief review of the essential elements embedded in foreign policy articulation.

2.3 Conceptualizing Foreign Policy

In the words of Macridis (1962:2), foreign policy implies the process through which policy making institutions and official actors define their positions and that of their states vis-à-vis the outside world, usually over a period of time. For Handrieder (1967:971), foreign policy is a “coordinated strategy through which institutionally designated decision-makers manipulate the international environment in their bid to achieve certain national objectives”. In similar vein, Crab (1972:2) offers a more comprehensive explanation of the concept by referring to “foreign policy as consisting of two elements; with the first bothering on the national objectives to be achieved while the second focuses on the means of achieving them”. Consequently, the interactions between the national goals and the resources for attaining these
objectives are the perennial subjects of statecraft, while its ingredients are the foreign policy of nations, whether great or small (Crab, 1972:2).

Lenther (1974:3) sees foreign policy as representing the existing intersection between the domestic and international life of a country. In Reynolds’ (1976) view, foreign policy represents a range of governmental actions in its relations with other bodies, acting on a stage for the purpose of advancing the national interest. Similarly, Rosenau (1980:6) sees “foreign policy as an authoritative action which a government takes or is committed to take in order to preserve the desirable aspects of the international environment or alter the undesirable aspect”. Rosenau (1980) further argues that the concept of foreign policy is more often than not a function of an adaptive behavior consisting of all attitudes and activities through which organized national societies seek to cope with and benefit from their external environment. Similarly, Lerch and Said (1979:3) conceptualized foreign policy as the “general principles by which a state governs its reaction to the international environment”.

The point to note from the definitions offered above is the presentation of foreign policy from the perspective of nation-states, taking into cognizance their roles as state actors in their interactions with other states and also the notion of the external environment as the fundamental objective of state policy. However, as Fawole (2003) observes, other non-state and non-human factors are involved in foreign policy considerations. These include the international environment, domestic factors (such as the economy and the political configuration operational in a state at that point in time), and the leadership factor. Fawole’s (2003) analysis appears to be in line with Modelski’s (1967:6) conceptualization of foreign policy as a “system of activities evolved by communities for changing the behaviour of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the international environment”.

Drawing inferences from these scholarly assessments, it is useful to conclude these definitional issues with Abegurin’s (2003:5) concept of foreign policy as “the attempt by human beings to protect against, relate to, and adapt to that which is external while benefitting from it and using same for their constituents’ advantage”. The external factor, according to Evans and Newnman (1998:180), is vital in explaining foreign policy behaviour because it comprises of all those characteristics of a particular state considered by any other state or community to represent that which is different or unfamiliar. He added that when the policy makers of a nation-state perceive that sovereignty and a relatively great power are clashing
with a high degree of external factors, the external factors are likely to be considered a threat or a potential threat to the state. While the constituents’ advantage, according to Idang (1973:5), represents the protection of the national interest, the primary task of all framers of foreign policy is to articulate their country’s national interests and to relate them to those of other nations within the international system.

2.3.1 The Primacy of the National Interest

According to Barnett (2005:263), the protection of the national interest is a key determinant of the foreign policy of any state. There are two schools of thought on the subject of national interest: the subjectivist and the objectivist. While the objectivists argue that “the best interest of a state is a matter of objective reality, the subjectivists contend that what constitutes the national interest of a state rests on the preferences of the leaders, their idiosyncrasies and their priorities. This latter view suggests that the concept of national interest differs from “one country to another” (Barnett, 2005:266). For example, Crab (1974) identifies the national interest of the United States of America as predicated on her collective national security - a term anchored on freedom, equality, democracy, the open market and fundamental human rights; that of Britain, according to Taylor (2000), is defined by its commitment to conservatism, equality and fundamental freedom. Lee (1997) notes that France’s conception of its national interest implies a commitment to European economic integration and the wellbeing of its people, while according to Thomas (2000), that of Russia and China are governed by the sanctity of their economic sovereignty.

South Africa, a leading hegemonic force in Southern Africa has as its national interest the protection of its national sovereignty, national prosperity and respect for the core values captured in its constitution (Naidoo, 2010:210). Egypt, a major force in North Africa, maintains a national interest anchored on its security in the Middle East and respect for its military and religious institutions (Boutros-Ghali, 1977). It is important to note that the protection of the national interest is crucial to any foreign policy articulation. Krasner (1978) defines this encapsulates the general societal goals perceived over time with a consistent ranking of importance, thus serving as a guideline for the conducting of a country’s foreign policy and its relationship with the external environment.
2.3.2 Understanding Nigeria’s Foreign Policy

Following the attainment of independence on October 1, 1960, Nigeria assumed the obligation of getting involved in a multiplicity of socio-political and economic issues that are inextricably tied to the African continent. Politically, the country championed a number of decolonization struggles in Africa, including support to several liberationist movements in Southern Africa. Notable among these are the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, the South-West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia, the Zimbabwe Africa National Union-Patriotic Front, (ZANU-PF) and the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA), among others.

Nigeria has also been at the vanguard of other peacebuilding and conflict resolution initiatives in Africa. The combination these initiatives have earned the country the appellation of ‘big brother’. The point to note however is that such interventionist policies have largely been a function of the country’s foreign policy dictates which, according to Nigeria’s first Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa is premised on the underlying principles of total commitment to the promotion of African unity, decolonization and a just world order.

Years after the articulation of the above foreign policy guidelines, they have continued to form the underlying and guiding principles of Nigeria external relations with the rest of the world. This Africa-centered ideology, which pre-supposes that Africa will remain the centerpiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy considerations and will receive priority in its engagement with the rest of the world, has remained a constant in Nigeria’s engagement with other countries in Africa. Scholars such as Aluko (1981), Akinyemi (1989), Abegunrin (2003), Fawole (2003) and Akinterinwa (2010) have argued that the decision by Nigeria to make Africa its focus was occasioned by a number of factors. These range from geo-political considerations, which see Nigeria as strategically located within the West African sub-region, to demographic explanations; the country is the most populous nation in Africa and the largest Black nation in the world, with a population of over 160 million people. In economic terms, Nigeria accounts for more than 51% of the West African Gross Domestic Product (GDP), with its GDP estimated at more than $407.042B (NNBS, 2012). As a result,

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8 The term ‘big brother’ is popularly ascribed to Nigeria by the virtue of its proven track record in issues involving peacekeeping, peace building and conflict resolution in Africa, including its commitment to decolonization on the continent.
Nigeria possesses the wherewithal to intervene in conflicts to protect its economy and hegemony both within the sub-region and in Africa.

By virtue of its many years of diplomatic commitment and external relations with Africa, Nigeria has undoubtedly contributed immensely to the growth and development of the continent since its attainment of formal independence in 1960. Some critics of Nigeria’s Afro-centric foreign policy have questioned the rationale behind its decision to concentrate its influence in Africa, particularly when considered from the perspective of the socio-economic and political implications for its citizenry. To this end, a review of Nigeria’s foreign policy is best considered in the context of what constitutes its national interest, its foreign policy objectives and the foreign policy orientation of its leaders from independence to date. In doing so, concrete efforts will be made to interrogate the nexus between these foreign policy variables and the factors that have influenced Nigeria’s external behavior in the past five decades, including the reasons for the seeming shift from its hitherto Afro-centric posture to what the government prefers to call citizen diplomacy.

2.3.3 Centripetal determinants of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy

Broadly speaking, the general idea behind classifying foreign policy into centripetal and centrifugal notions is rooted in the belief that there are domestic and external issues involved in any country’s foreign policy formulation. In the case of Nigeria, the centripetal factors involved in its foreign policy formulation are generally built around: the Notion of Four Concentric Circles of National Interest. According to Gambari (1989:21), at the heart of this notion is the assumption that Nigeria must in the course of its engagement with the international community, protect its own security, independence and prosperity; this will be achieved through the maintenance of the spirit of good neighborliness with its contiguous states - Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The second circle concerns Nigeria’s relations with its West African neighbors; the third focuses on continental issues relating to peace, development and democratization; and the fourth circle involves Nigeria’s relations with organizations, institutions and states outside of Africa. This concept is fundamental to the formulation of what was later to become Nigeria’s foreign policy thrust.
2.3.4 The Centrifugal determinants of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy

Aluko (1977:2) maintains that the following essential components comprise the centrifugal forces determining Nigeria’s foreign policy:

1. Commitment to the maintenance of peace and good neighborliness with its immediate neighbors;
2. A general commitment to the African cause (the policy of Afro-centrism); and
3. A commitment to the principles of non-alignment.

He adds that despite the changes that have occurred in Nigeria’s foreign policy dictates over the years, these three elements have remained constant. Aluko (1977), further argues that factors such as the colonial heritage and the legacy the country inherited from the British, the foreign policy machinery of government, the outcome of its civil war and other national and economic interests are key determinants that have helped shape the country’s behavior towards its neighbors in Africa and indeed the rest of the world.

In consonance with the factors listed above, Aluko (1977) broadly captures the following as the essential foreign policy focus of the Nigerian state: the sovereign equality of all African states; respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of every African state; an unwavering commitment to functional co-operation, African Unity and economic development; a general commitment to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other African states; and the maintenance of a just economic world order (Aluko, 1977:2).

It could be argued that Nigeria’s compliance level with the second item on the above list (respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity) is debatable. The country has intervened in a number of conflicts in Africa, and in all cases, the Nigerian state has justified its actions in terms of the overriding compulsion and responsibility to protect its national interest, including the political stability of the West African sub-region. However, it is important to note, that the whole essence of intervention should not just be premised on the need to protect a country’s national interest. It is also important for the intervening state to seek and obtain approval from the de jure government or a well-recognized supra-national institution (such as the UN, AU, and ECOWAS); if it fails to do so, it renders the intervention illegal. When intervention is enforced, this could be interpreted as an encroachment on the sovereignty of another state.
Ogwu (1986) also identifies political considerations, the Nigerian constitution, bureaucratic
tendencies, economic variables, military interests, and idiosyncratic elements as the essential
issues that have contributed to the shaping of Nigeria’s foreign policy direction in the past. In
interrogating Nigeria’s external relations, particularly with the Western world, Ogwu (1986)
noted that the ability of Nigeria to determine its productive forces and its very low reliance on
foreign aid accounted for the robust state of its foreign policy between 1960 and 1980:

\[
\text{The improved state of Nigeria’s economy bestowed on it a leverage which it}
\text{did not possess in the first decade of independence. More significantly,}
\text{perhaps was the government’s ability to determine its own policies}
\text{independent of external influences (Ogwu, 1986:2).}
\]

This is in line with an earlier observation by Aluko (1980:1) who, while exploring the reason
for Nigeria’s foreign policy vibrancy between 1960 and 1980, stated:

\[
\text{The phenomenal growth of the economy largely as a result of the oil boom}
\text{has strengthened Nigeria’s influence in Africa and indeed the rest of the}
\text{world, such that neither of the superpowers (US or USSR) could make use of}
\text{foreign aid as a political leverage on Nigeria... heavy American dependence}
\text{on Nigeria’s oil means that Nigeria is free not only to criticize the United}
\text{States but also to put pressure on her (Aluko, 1980:1).}
\]

Both comments were made in response to the foreign policy articulation and vibrancy
witnessed during the short but impressive reign of the Murtala/Obasanjo administration
(1975-1979). This period saw the country calling the bluff of former United States’ President
Gerald Ford over its recognition of and support for the Jonas Savimbi led UNITA rebels
against Nigeria and the OAU’s preference for the nationalist aspirations of the MPLA, led by
Augustine Neto. Nigeria also nationalized some British interests, including Barclays Bank,
which became Union Bank and British Petroleum, whose name was changed to African
Petroleum by the Obasanjo/ Sheu Yar’ Adua regime in reaction to the now infamous
toothless dog reference made regarding that particular government by iron lady Margret
Thatcher, the then Prime minister of Britain (Adebajo, 2003: 22; Fawole, 2003: 41; Gambari,
2008: 3; and Osuntokun, 2008: 2).

Lending his voice to the discourse, Gambari (1986: 1-5) captured the major characteristics of
Nigeria’s foreign policy as including: national consensus, dynamism in foreign policy, Afro-
centrism and the protection of the national interest, although he averred that these are still largely unrepresented, poorly articulated and lacking in vigor and direction. Flowing from these assessments, this study also considers it necessary to establish exactly what the foreign policy objectives of Nigeria are. In whose interests were they formulated? And to what extent have they been effective? Providing adequate answers to these questions requires an interrogation of the fundamental principles encapsulated in Nigeria’s foreign policy. This is the task of the following sub-section.

2.3.5 Fundamental Principles of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy

A first glimpse of the shape which Nigeria’s foreign policy would take was provided by Nigeria’s first Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, on the occasion of the country’s admittance as a member of the United Nations. In his acceptance speech, Balewa declared:

*It is the desire of Nigeria to remain on friendly terms with all the nations and to participate actively in the work of the United Nations Organizations. Nigeria, by virtue of being the most populous country in West Africa has absolutely no territorial or expansionist ambitions. We are committed to uphold the principles upon which the United Nations is founded. Nigeria hopes to work with other African countries for the progress of Africa and to also assist in bringing all African countries to a state of independence* (Balewa, 1960) cited in Aluko, 1977:2).

While there may be no denial of Nigeria’s commitment to a clearly Afro-centric foreign policy approach, it is important to point out that the direction, pattern and shape which the pursuance of this approach has taken in the past has been a function of the political orientation, leadership style and personal aspirations of the individual in power. This is traceable to the foundation laid by Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, who on assumption of office on October 1, 1960, pronounced the following as the core principles of Nigeria’s foreign policy: (1) Non-alignment with any of the then existing ideological and military power blocs, especially NATO and the Warsaw Pact; (2) respect for the legal equality, political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states; (3) respect for the doctrine of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states; (4) seeking membership of both continental and global multilateral organizations based on their functional importance to
Nigeria; and (5) the recognition of Africa as the centerpiece of Nigeria’s external relations (Fawole, 2003:42).

Sir Tafawa Balewa’s extrapolation of his government’s foreign policy orientation is believed to have provided the underlying philosophy which informed Nigeria’s adherence to its principle of Afro-centrism - a development which saw Nigeria’s foreign policy orientation between 1966 and 1993 tilting towards a firm commitment to decolonization and the social and political and economic liberation of other colonized (occupied) African countries. According to Idang (1973:6-9), Ogunbadejo (1980:675), Abegunrin (2003:33-58) and Fawole (2003:52-81), the period between 1960 and 1993 represents the ‘golden era’ of Nigeria’s foreign policy because it marked the announcement of Nigeria as a key player in Africa by virtue of the successes recorded at that particular point in time.

Similarly, and, according with section 19 of the 1960, 1979 and 1999 constitutions of Nigeria, the country derives its foreign policy objectives from two main sources, namely: the constitution and the actions of its leaders. The essential ingredients embedded in Nigeria’s foreign policy, according to section 19 of the 1999 constitution, includes the following:

(1) Commitment to the Principles of Non-alignment;
(2) Respect for the Legal Equality, Political Independence, Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of all States;
(3) Respect for the Principles of Non-Interference in the Affairs of other States;
(4) Seeking Membership of International Organizations as a means of promoting functional cooperation; and
(5) Africa as the Center-piece of Nigeria’s foreign policy.

In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the essential elements embedded in Nigeria’s foreign policy, it is important to provide a concise explanation of each of the principles listed above.

(1) Commitment to the Principles of Non-alignment

This principle was informed by the bipolarity in world politics at the time of Nigeria’s independence in 1960. As noted by Fawole (2003:42), the world was precariously bifurcated into two antagonistic ideologies of capitalism, as supported by the United States (US) and
communism which was championed by the former Soviet Union (USSR). Mindful of this situation, and informed by the desire to protect its nascent independence, Nigeria opted to be non-partisan in the power play between the Western and the Eastern blocs. However, scholars and critics of Nigeria’s foreign policy have argued that this principle was respected more in theory than in practice. As Fawole (2003:43) argued, “Even the government of Sir Balewa, the progenitor of the idea did little to respect it” Balewa, he added was “so rabidly pro-British and concomitantly pro-Western”. He cited Nigeria’s signing of a bilateral Defense Pact with Britain (a very strong ally of the US) in 1960; this was intended to allow the British to establish a military base in Nigeria. The Defense Pact was later abrogated in 1962, following severe and sustained pressure from the parliamentary opposition and the overwhelming disapproval of Nigerians (Fawole, 2003:43).

(2) Respect for the Legal Equality, Political Independence, Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of all States

Scholars such as Ogunbadejo (1966), Idang (1973) Aluko (1977 & 1980) and Fawole (2003) have interpreted this principle as the expression of Nigeria’s willingness and readiness to conduct its external affairs with other states according to the civilized rules of interaction. By so doing, Nigeria appears to be affirming its belief that the UN remains the legitimate supra-national authority that can guarantee a just world order and that abiding by the decisions reached by the UN is non-negotiable. Nigeria, according to Fawole (2003:44), believed that abiding by and adhering to the dictates of international law and civilized rules of behavior is vital to guarantee the security of newly independent and weak states in a world laden with intense competition between antagonistic superpowers.

Another motivating factor was Nigeria’s desire to assure its contiguous states (Benin, Chad, Niger and Cameroon) and all other states on the continent that the country would not at any point in time impose its authority on any of its neighbors in Africa. As Balewa put it:

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\text{We shall never impose ourselves upon any other country and shall treat every African territory, big or small, as our equal because we honestly feel that it is only on that basis that peace can be maintained in our continent (Balewa, 1960 cited in Fawole, 2003:42)}
\]
Balewa’s assurances to Nigeria’s neighbors and the rest of Africa were intended to prevent any of these nations falling into the embrace of the then power blocs and more importantly, to protect its hard-won independence and that of its contemporaries from the overtures being made by Kwame Nkrumah, through his Pan African movement. Balewa argued that this idea would lead to a loss of sovereignty and as such would return Africa to the pre-colonial age. Fawole (2003: 42) quotes him as saying that, “Nigeria was big enough and does not need to join others and that if others wish to join forces with the country, their legal standing and positions would be made clear to them in such a union”.

(3) Respect for the Principles of Non-Interference in the Affairs of other States

The basic idea encapsulated in this principle is the expression by Nigeria of its readiness and desire not to interfere in any domestic dispute that could arise in other African countries. The key challenge in this commitment is the doctrine of the protection of the national interest, which often compels the country to intervene in order to ensure peace amongst and within its contiguous neighbors. When this happens, the justification for such intervention is couched in what Hoffman (2003); Miall (2004); Crocker (2007); and Peen Rodt (2011) call the „Responsibility to Protect“ (R2P). This has led to Nigeria becoming involved in what ordinarily would have been a negation of its policy of non-interference, although such interventions have been largely executed in its capacity as a non-state actor. Examples include Nigeria’s active role in the United Nations Peace Keeping Mission in the Congo in 1960, its support for a number of liberation movements in Southern Africa between 1970 and 1994, and its role in the resolution of the Liberian (1990-2003) and Sierra-Leonean civil wars (1998-2002), among others.

(4) Seeking Membership of International Organizations as a means of promoting functional cooperation

Nigeria’s subscription to this principle, according to Fawole, (2000:45) and Gambari (2008:58), has been influenced by the overriding advantage which functional cooperation has over a subscription to an African political union which at that time could not guarantee a certain future for a newly independent country like Nigeria. Therefore, Nigeria hoped that its commitment to working with other non-state actors would guarantee it some form of
protection, particularly given the bipolarity that existed at that time. As a consequence of this principle, Nigeria has, over the past fifty-one years, demonstrated its support for international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the Commonwealth of Nations, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, the AU, and ECOWAS, to name but a few.

### (5) Africa as the Center-piece of Nigeria’s foreign policy

Following Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa’s announcement at the UN General Assembly of Nigeria’s intention to make the African cause its top priority, the principle has over the years grown to become the cornerstone of Nigeria’s foreign policy thrust. As noted by Fawole (2003:47), Nigeria’s commitment to a radical Afro-centric policy in the 1970s was more of a product of the psychological belief in and concurrence with what Sir Nnamdi Azikwe called Nigeria’s historic mission in Africa and its manifest destiny to rule and dominate the continent. Long before its independence and the economic/oil boom of the early 1970s which catapulted Nigeria to an enviable economic height in Africa, its people have always believed that the country was preordained to play an important and leading role in African affairs. It is instructive to note that this notion did not only germinate in the minds of Nigerians; it was also believed and validated by the membership of the international community who saw Nigeria as being capable of making a difference in the world on account of its vast potential (Fawole, 2003:47).

Commenting on Nigeria’s participation in the UN’s peace keeping mission in the Congo in 1960, barely one month after the country’s independence Cowan (1962:124) noted that “the dispatch of Nigerian troops to the Congo, created a new public awareness at home for the country, and also placed the country on the world map as well as on the African political space”. Cowan (1962) pointed out that given the size, military might and economic potential of Nigeria, the country was expected to play a leading and decisive role in Africa. The amalgam of this potential and the leadership aspirations of Nigeria’s past and present leaders can be said to have helped sustain and guarantee the continuing pursuit of this cause. By virtue of this commitment, Nigeria has committed substantial resources to peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Africa.

The following section interrogates the place of diplomacy in a country’s foreign policy articulation.
2.4 Reconsidering the Utility of Diplomacy

Satow (1966:1) maintained that diplomacy refers to “the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments’ of independent states”. McDermott (1973:37) defined diplomacy as “a science which permits its practitioners to say nothing and shelter behind mysterious nods of the head…, a science in which the most successful exponent is the person who can swim with his head in the streams of events he pretends to be conducting”. For Morgenthau (1948), diplomacy implies “the technique for accommodating conflicts of interest, and the promotion of national interest by peaceful means.” Morgenthau further captures the following as the basic expectations of diplomacy:

(1) The ability to determine its objectives in the light of actual and potential power and make use of the power that best suits these objectives;
(2) The ability to assess the objectives of other nations while taking into cognizance the actual and potential power available for the pursuit of these objectives;
(3) The ability to determine the extent to which these objectives are compatible with each other; and
(4) Finally, diplomacy must be sufficient to employ the means best suitable for the pursuit of its objectives (Morgenthau, 1948:529).

He noted, however, that, if during its practice, diplomacy fails to meet any of these obligations, then the protection, advancement and success of a country’s foreign policy objectives and world peace may be in jeopardy. In similar vein, Plischke (1977:41) refers to diplomacy “as the political process where states establish and nurture official relationships, directly and indirectly in the pursuance of their respective goals and interest including their substantive and procedural policies in the international environment.”

The point to note from the above is that, if statesmen or diplomats were asked why they take particular actions in their dealings with certain international organizations, their response may very well be premised on the primacy and need to protect the national interest. This lends credence to the importance attached to the sanctity of the national interest in foreign policy articulation, especially on the international stage. If this is true, it then becomes the
responsibility of an effective diplomacy to provide the machinery and the personnel by which a state’s foreign policy is to be executed.

In the opinion of Mingst (2004), the underlying principle behind diplomacy is the attempt made by states to influence the behavior of others either through negotiation, specific action or by refraining from such. Mingst (2004) further argues that when diplomacy is used to project power, the other actor (state) reserves the right to either publicly or privately, express its unhappiness with a policy choice using the same diplomacy as its tool of expression. Mingst (2004) suggested that a better association may follow if the targeted action changes in a specific (positive) way. He was, however, quick to point out that negative consequences might follow if the other state’s action continues to move in a specific direction (negative).

Mingst (2004) notes that if both actors are unable to resolve their differences through the use of diplomacy, they may have to resort to a supra-national institution\(^9\) in order to seek a multilateral legitimization of their positions, by enlisting the support of other states on their side. This, according to Mingst (2004), could be achieved by giving the target state what it wants, which could take the form of diplomatic recognition or foreign aid in return for a desired action; should problems arise from the above relationship, the donor state reserves the right to reduce the foreign aid, withdraw its diplomats or completely sever diplomatic ties with such a state. This, for Mingst (2004), represents the inherent strength in the use of diplomacy.

In the practice of contemporary international relations, it is expected that states must operate within an international environment where there are always competing values and interests. To this end, state actors in the international system usually gear their efforts towards the maximization of their socio-economic and political values in their bid to minimize the effects of these conflicting interests and maximize the chances of realizing their state’s objectives. Diplomacy thus becomes the basic technique of state action or the primary instrument for the execution of its foreign policy and it functions as the main stratagem by which a state

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\(^9\) Supra-nationalism according to Price (2004) is derived from a Latin expression which implies to “be above”. It refers to the existence of an international institution established beyond national sovereignties and is joined by all the participating countries such that there is an expression of partnership and mutual help among them. More often than not, such an authority takes advantage of their partially joined national sovereignties for the protection of the interests of the member countries and also maintains a spirit of cordiality amongst them.
communicates its desires into the decision-making mechanisms of other states. This could be executed through persuasion, modification and the adjustment of the state’s position through the use of force or negotiation.

Flowing from the above, it is can be inferred that the primary responsibility of diplomacy is that it functions and serves as a tool for the preservation and advancement of a country’s national interests. Another important instrument often employed in diplomacy is the notion of collective bargaining. This process, according to Mingst (2004), refers to some form of direct or indirect communication conducted tacitly among the negotiating parties, with each party knowing that a move in one direction could lead to a response by the other party. This suggests that effective diplomacy remains an indispensable tool for a state’s foreign policy execution. It is only when diplomacy fails, that war and the use of force could be used to defend a country’s national interest.

Robinson (cited in Rosenau, 1986:189) asserts that the “primary interest of all nations should be focused on its territorial integrity and security, and the protection of the lives and properties of the people in whose interest it represents”. Holsti (1992:83) similarly captured the collective objectives of a state as self-preservation, security, well-being, prestige, power, and the promotion and protection of its ruling ideology. However, in what appears to be a distinction between foreign policy and diplomacy, Childs (1984:64) posits that the foreign policy of a state is “the substance of a state’s foreign relations, while diplomacy concerns itself with the process through which foreign policy is carried out”. He concludes by positing that, a country’s foreign policy is usually a combination of efforts made by many different persons and government agencies; nevertheless, the final call is still made at the highest level, although subject to many different kinds of controls.

In the case of Nigeria, its national interests, according to Ogunbadejo, (1980); Aluko (1981) Ogunbanbi (1986); Adebajo (2008) and Gambari (2008) include but are not limited to the following: internal cohesion, national unity, the creation of a happy and egalitarian society, the creation of a state where career opportunities are open to talent, where there is employment for those who want to and are qualified to work and where traditional rights such as freedom of speech, religion, association, and, equality before the law are respected, including the defense of the fundamental rights of all peoples, irrespective of race, color, sex, and religion through deliberate government actions and policies.
It can be argued that a country’s interventionist role in conflicts is often predicated on its belief in, respect for and commitment to the sanctity of internal cohesion and national unity. Consequently, Nigeria’s Africa-driven ideology that seeks to create a just, happy and egalitarian society is not limited to the country itself, but extends to its contiguous states and the African continent. This is considered to be the driving force behind its active participation in conflict resolution efforts and peace keeping missions in the Congo in 1960, Chad in 1980, and in Liberia and Sierra-Leone in 1990 and 1998 respectively.

Based on the above analysis, could the purported shift in Nigeria’s foreign policy focus from its hitherto traditional Afro-centric posture to citizen diplomacy represent a more aggressive protection of the country’s national interest? This question is addressed in the following section.

2.5 Conceptualizing Citizen Diplomacy

This section provides a brief examination of the foreign policy focus which the Nigerian government under the leadership of President Olusegun Obasanjo from 1999 to 2007 conceptualized as ‘citizen diplomacy’. Although citizen diplomacy appears self-explanatory, this study will nevertheless analyze the meaning, form, and operationalization of the term as it pertains to Nigeria. Eze (2007:8) defines citizen diplomacy as being people oriented; the domestic and foreign policy objectives of Nigeria seek to promote the welfare and security of its citizens all over the world. The key difference between this approach and the Afro-centric approach, according to Eze (2007:8), is the prioritization of the overall interest of Nigeria and its people over any other sub-regional or continental considerations.

Similarly, Mbachu (2007:9) views citizen diplomacy as a structured action that government takes in order to fast-track the foreign policy objectives of a state as set by policy makers. He noted that these policy objectives must take into cognizance the wellbeing and aspirations of the people in whose interests they were established. Mbachu (2007) further notes that the concept portrays quite significantly, a re-invigoration of Nigeria’s foreign policy pursuit in such a way that its end product (bilateral or multilateral agreements) will be both economically and politically beneficial to Nigerians. According to him, this arose from the
realization that the progress, prosperity and survival of the nation must be the concern of every Nigerian at home and in the diaspora.

In the opinion of Okocha and Nzeshi (2007:3), the central idea behind the notion of citizen diplomacy is the protection of the image, integrity and interests of Nigeria and its people, while also reacting against countries that are hostile to the Nigerian cause and that of its people, including those who brand Nigeria as corrupt. Lending credence to this assertion, Ogunsanwo (2007) advocated the need for Nigerians abroad to be at the heart of Nigeria’s national interest; therefore the country’s entire diplomatic machinery should be geared towards protecting them. He further pointed out that any diplomacy that does not take this into consideration will be running contrary to the basic tenets of the concept.

Maduekwe (Minister for Foreign Affairs and the progenitor of citizen diplomacy in the Olusegun Obasanjo government) provided the following justification for the change in Nigeria’s foreign policy from an Afro-centric approach to citizen diplomacy:

Our foreign policy has come of age and the age of innocence is over. We remain proud of our track record from Tafawa Balewa up till now. The country that is the largest black Nation in the world could not have done otherwise. A world where one in every six black men in the world is a Nigerian could not have done otherwise, or where one in every four Africans is a Nigerian could not have done otherwise. We should ask ourselves some hard question: to what extent has our foreign policy benefited Nigerians? To what extent has our foreign policy put food on our tables? In other words where is the citizen in our foreign policy? (Maduekwe, quoted in Ogunsanwo, 2007:2).

Maduekwe argued that Nigeria carries an enormous burden which requires it to be the symbol of the success of the Black nation and that there could never be a Black story, “unless it is a Nigerian success story”. Thus citizen diplomacy according to Maduekwe, implies ensuring that Nigeria’s foreign policy becomes the most powerful way to express who Nigeria and who its people are, although he was quick to add that embracing citizen diplomacy as an external policy approach should be seen as a branding and not necessarily a total change in the fundamental principles of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Akinterinwa (2010), however, argued for the need for citizen diplomacy to go beyond rhetoric and urged the Nigerian government to
use the policy to immediately address problems such as the refusal to grant entry visas to Nigerians who have legitimate documentation and reasons for wanting to travel, the shabby treatment Nigerians at home and abroad are confronted with and the need to ensure that Nigerian business entrepreneurs benefit from the country’s regional and sub-regional peace-making and peace-building efforts, particularly as they relate to humanitarian aid that could be locally sourced.

It is important to note that while the Olusegun Obasanjo government, through Maduekwe, documented the existence of citizen diplomacy as a concept it never went beyond that point. Rather, it seems to have been an attempt to show Nigerians that the government was serious about reforming the country’s foreign policy orientation. Not much of substance could be said to have been achieved. Furthermore, the economic meltdown experienced by most countries around the world at that particular time stymied the proper implementation of the policy. Given his responsibility as a career diplomat, Maduekwe was expected to protect Nigeria’s national interest; however, several observers of Nigeria’s foreign policy process have argued that citizen diplomacy was very similar to the country’s traditional Afro-centric orientation (See Adebajo, 2008; Gambari, 2008; and Osuntokun, 2008).

Another major issue which probably militated against the success of this shift in foreign policy is the lack of policy continuity and inconsistency that has been the defining characteristic of successive governments in Nigeria. Yar’ Adua, succeeded Obasanjo spent half of his three years in office battling ill health and legal suits/a legitimacy crisis that were triggered by the alleged fraudulent electoral process that brought him to power (Adebajo, 2008:3). This was coupled with an increase in agitation spearheaded by militants from the Niger-Delta who took up arms against the state in an attempt to control the natural resources (oil) they claimed belonged to them.

This left the Yar’ Adua administration incapacitated and unable to continue with Maduekwe’s citizen diplomacy project. Instead, the administration appeared to revert to a foreign policy docility that a common feature during the dying days of the Abacha regime, until Yar’ Adua passed away on May 5, 2010 after a protracted illness. President Goodluck Jonathan, who was next in command to the late president, also failed to define the pattern which Nigeria’s foreign policy would follow in the wake of the high level politicization of the processes which led to his emergence as acting president. Armed with a fresh mandate
from the general election held in April, 2007, government indicated that the administration was set to resuscitate the economic diplomacy approach that emerged during the last years in office of the Babangida regime.

### 2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has conceptualized the notion of conflict resolution as well as concepts such as peace building, intervention, conflict management and prevention, etc. It also focused on the relationship between Nigeria’s foreign policy and the underlying principles behind the country’s conflict resolution mechanisms in Africa. A brief analysis of each of the essential attributes embedded in Nigeria’s foreign policy established that there appears to be a connection between these interventions and Nigeria’s long held commitment to the African cause. It was noted that most of these interventions are a by-product of centripetal issues such as the disposition and orientation of the country’s leaders at various point in time, Nigeria’s vast population and its socio-economic and political resources affords it the luxury of embarking on such undertakings.

The chapter also revealed that factors such as the politics of oil diplomacy and the power play or configuration amongst various actors at the international level were also significantly responsible for Nigeria’s interventionist role in Africa. The chapter ended with a discussion of the possible reasons for the shift in Nigeria’s foreign policy focus from Afro-centrism to citizen diplomacy and observed that not much has really changed in terms of the way Nigeria has handled issues related to Africa. This is evident in a number of interventions the country has made in Africa, including its deployment of troops to Sudan under the auspices of the United Nations and more recently in 2012 (five years after the policy was expected to have commenced) to Mali under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States peace keeping force (ECOMOG).

The next chapter will focus on Nigeria’s interventionist role in the Liberian civil war from 1990 to 1997. Aside from the widely publicized belief that the country was obliged to act in terms of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect, the chapter will investigate whether there was any other motivation attached to Nigeria’s involvement in the crisis.
CHAPTER THREE

Nigeria’s Interventionist Role in the Liberian Civil War: the Myths and Realities of Pax Nigeriana

3.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an analysis of the ECOWAS\textsuperscript{10} led intervention in the Liberian Civil war, which eventually came to an end in 2003 following the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement which led to a general election. The focus of this chapter is the role played by Nigeria under the auspices of ECOMOG between 1990 and 1997, in order to determine the nexus or otherwise between the country’s foreign policy objectives. This chapter provides background information on the historical evolution of the Liberian state, a synopsis of the causative factors of the war, the key actors involved in its prosecution, the international dimensions attached to the crises and post-war reconstruction efforts in Liberia. It concludes with suggestions on how to prevent such occurrences in the future.

3.2 The Historical Evolution of the Liberian State

The history of Liberia dates back to 1821, when the American Colonization Society began its campaign to send freed slaves from the United States to Africa; the country achieved formal independence in 1847. According to Hadden (2006:2-4), Liberia literally means the “Land of the Free”. It is approximately 43,000 squares miles in size, a few degrees north of the equator and lies along the great western bulge of the continent with a coastline approximately 370 miles long. Liberia is divided into 15 counties which are in turn broken down into localities; these include: Bomi; Bong; Gbarpolu; Grand Bassa; Grand Cape Mount; Grand Gedeh; Grand Kru; Lofa; Margibi; Maryland; Montserrado; Nimba; River Cess; River Gee and Sinoe counties.

Liberia’s population was estimated at close to about four million people in 2011. Its immediate neighbors are Sierra-Leone to the west, Ivory-Coast to the east and Guinea to the

\textsuperscript{10} ECOWAS—Economic Community of West African States was formed in May, 1975 for the purpose of fostering sub-regional economic development among its 16 member countries in West Africa. Its membership strength dropped to 15 after Mauritania withdrew its membership in the 2000. The organization’s military/peacekeeping arm is known as ECOMOG (the ECOWAS Monitoring Group). It has successfully resolved a number of conflicts within the West African sub-region, most notably in Liberia (1990-1997) and Sierra-Leone (1998-2002).
north. Its dominant ethnic groups are the Kpelle, Brassa, Gio, Mano, Kru, Lorma, Kissi and the Gola peoples (World Bank, 2011). Its first semblance of nationhood began in 1847, when freed slaves from the United States of America established the first Black-rulled republic in Africa. Out of their experience of slavery, Americo-Liberian group brought with them the ideals of freedom, and respect for the principles of human dignity; the country served as a „safe haven’ for a number of Black Americans who had been victims of oppression (Hadden, 2006).

However, this new wave of “freedom and good governance” eventually lost its steam and was replaced by the domination of an Americo-Liberian political elite\(^{11}\). In 1878 the Americo-Liberians formed the True Whig Party which took charge of Liberia’s socio-economic and political resources between 1847 and 1980. The party subsequently became known for its zero tolerance of any organized political opposition; this resulted in a series of unrelenting uprisings, rebellion and unrests on the part of Natives. The Americo-Liberians controlled key economic resources. They had a higher level of technical and educational skills and enjoyed mutually beneficial relationships with a number of American institutions, including the American government. This led to social stratification and the creation of a cultural and racial caste system in Liberia\(^{12}\) (Adebajo, 2002: 22).

The Americo-Liberians were able to maintain their grip on power courtesy of the unwavering support they received from the United States. This continued until 1980, when the uprising led by Master Sergeant Samuel Doe\(^{13}\) brought their dominance to an abrupt end. Adebajo (2002:23) notes that for more than a decade, Liberia was the theatre of one of the deadliest wars in Africa with well over 200,000 Liberians killed and more than a million others displaced. The attacks, he noted, were reportedly launched from neighbouring Cote d’Ivoire.

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\(^{11}\) American-Liberia elite domination refers to a system of oppression and abuse which transformed Liberia into an ineffective and corrupt system that had become the defining characteristics of many states in post-colonial Africa.

\(^{12}\) A pyramidal societal structure refers to the entrenchment of a system in Liberia, which encouraged and supported the socio-politico- and economic domination of the Americo-Liberians over the local people, thus leading to a system where the former occupied the apex positions in society while the locals were relegated to the base.

\(^{13}\) Master Sergeant Samuel Kayon Doe was the President of Liberia between 1980 and 1990; with the support of the White House, he was reputed to have ruled Liberia with an iron fist, earning himself a place in the class of the late Idi-Amin of Uganda and the self-proclaimed Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa. He was overthrown, arrested and subsequently executed by rebels loyal to Lt. Yormie Johnson in a publicly televised execution.
by a small group of dissidents, trained and armed by Libya with the assistance of Burkina Faso. This left the country with painful memories of destruction, unprecedented, protracted violence, killings and an unparalleled level of state incapacitation, (Adebajo, 2002:23).

3.3 The Samuel Doe Era in Liberia

Like most African states, Liberia is a multi-ethnic and multi-plural society. It comprises mainly of two large ethnic configurations; the Americo-Liberians and the Natives; the former dominated the country’s political space from independence in 1847 until 1980 when Master Sergeant Samuel Kayon Doe overthrew the administration of President William Tolbert in a military coup. According to Osaghae (1996:10), amongst the reasons for this coup were:

1. The fact that the Americo-Liberians constitute only about 3% of the country’s (1.5 million people in 1980) entire population but have been at the helm of affairs since independence in 1847;
2. The Americo-Liberians have been in control of the socio-economic and political structures in Liberia since independence; this negated the principles of true independence the country stood for; and
3. Regardless of the fact that Liberia gained independence in 1847, the country remained largely dominated by outsiders, thus leading to what the natives perceived as marginalization until the revolt against the government of President William Tolbert, (himself an Americo-Liberian) by Samuel Doe (Osaghae, 1996:10).

Doe remained in office until 1990; his arbitrariness and despotic tendencies saw him transform himself to a civilian president, in a manner that has been described by Ajayi (1998:182) as lacking in transparency and integrity. As Ajayi (1998:182) noted “Doe ruled Liberia with an iron fist and the situation became so tense and unbearable for Liberians until it eventually culminated into a civil war”. This marked a turning point in Liberia’s history and the commencement of a fratricidal war described by Nwolise (1992:58) as filled; “with untold hardship, and gross indiscipline amongst the Armed forces of Liberia and on the part of the rebel troops who subsequently got involved in the indiscriminate kidnap of foreign citizens” (Nwolise, 1992:58).

Similarly, Adebajo (2002:19) identified the following as the causes of the Liberian civil war:

1. The exclusionary rule of the Americo-Liberian oligarchy;
Adebajo (2002) listed the six main actors involved in the war: the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL); the Independent National Patriotic Front (INPFL); the NPFL-Central Revolutionary Council (CRC); the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL); the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO); and the Liberian Peace Council (LPC) (Adebajo, 2002:20). It is however instructive to note, that despite the several attempts made by ECOMOG to ensure the containment of the war within Liberia, it nevertheless had a spill-over effect on its neighbouring countries. Consequently, dozens of foreigners were killed in the crises; with countries like Sierra Leone, Ghana and Nigeria witnessing a large influx of refugees (Adebajo, 2008:178).

After a series of peace accords, including the election of a former warlord (Charles Taylor) as president, together with the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), in 2003 the Liberian government and rebel groups put a framework in place for peace building and post-conflict reconstruction. This was consolidated with a successful transition towards democratization, which in November 2005 resulted in a general election that brought Africa’s first female president to office; a development described by Eso (2003:11) as an exceptional phenomenon in a predominantly male-dominated political environment.

An understanding of the reasons for Nigeria’s involvement in the Liberian crisis is necessary to facilitate a proper understanding of the basis for its intervention and its nexus with Nigeria’s conflict resolution mechanisms in Africa.

3.4 Nigeria in Liberia: Between Personal and National Interests
Nigeria’s affinity with Liberia dates backs to the events leading to the formation of the now defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU), particularly the past ties these nations share as
members of the Monrovia group. It was therefore not surprising that the Federal Republic of Nigeria became involved in the Liberian crisis at its onset in the early 1990s through the ECOMOG. Historically, Nigeria’s involvement in the crisis has its root in the 13th session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government held from 28 to 30 May, 1990 at the Gambia. According to Ajayi (1998:183-184), President Babangida of Nigeria canvassed for a community standing mediation committee to intervene in the Liberian dispute, with Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Guinea as members.

As Ajayi (1998) observed, the ECOWAS cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) drew its military contingent from the member countries of the mediation committee and was subsequently mandated to restore peace to war-torn Liberia. Courtesy of its hegemonic status, geographic location, economic strength and military capabilities, Nigeria assumed command of the operation and also contributed about 80% of the of the ECOMOG force in terms of logistics, manpower and financing. For a better understanding of Nigeria’s role in Liberia, it is necessary to examine the interventionist role played by ECOMOG in the crisis.

This is necessary because Nigeria was the only contributing member whose exit from the operation would likely have meant the end of that mission, for the following reasons:

1. Most of the financial costs of that operation were borne by the Nigerian government, firstly under the administration of General Ibrahim Babangida and later under that of General Sani Abacha. It was estimated that Nigeria committed a total amount of $4 billion.

2. Nigeria had the largest number of troops in the 3,600 strong contingents that were deployed for that mission; although Nigeria had the capacity to intervene alone in the conflict, it involved other ECOWAS countries in a bid to still public perceptions of its hegemonic aspirations (Adebajo, 2008:184).

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14The Monrovia group was a rather conservative ideological movement whose merger with the Casablanca and Libreville group later led to the emergence of the Organization of African Unity on May 25, 1963. On July 9, 2002 the OAU changed its name to the African Union following the ratification of the name change by its Council of Heads of States and Government at an extra-ordinary session held in Tripoli, Libya in 2001.
The Contending Arguments for Nigeria’s Involvement in Liberia

This research study examines the reasons for Nigeria’s involvement in Liberia from two relatively different viewpoints and seeks to establish a balance between them. The first school of thought, as captured by Adebajo (2008:185), includes scholars such as: Mays (1994:114), Ofuatiey-Kodjo (1994:273), Adeleke (1995:577-599), Reno (1995:115), Sesay (1996:67), Tarr (1998:115), Walraven (1999:11) and Ellis (1999:5). The following is a summary of their arguments as to why Nigeria intervened:

(1) The close connection existing between Nigeria’s Head of State, Gen. Babangida and his Liberian counterpart, Samuel Doe;
(2) The holding of Nigerians hostages by the NPFL;
(3) Nigeria’s rumored concern over the perceived ambition of the Libyan government under Muammar Gadhafi to establish an anti-Nigerian alliance in concert with Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast in Liberia; and
(4) Nigeria’s longstanding suspicion of the French government’s politico-economic ambition to orchestrate an anti-ECOMOG alliance in West Africa.

Each of the reasons cited above are examined in order to establish their veracity or otherwise. The counter arguments provided by Adebajo (2008) against each of the claims are also outlined.

The Babangida/Doe Connection

The authors argued that understanding the relationship between General Ibrahim Babangida and Samuel Doe is crucial to understanding the reasons behind Nigeria committing such huge resources to restoring peace to Liberia. An undefined, special relationship between Nigeria’s Ibrahim Babangida and Liberia’s Samuel Doe is assumed to have existed. This is premised on the significant investments the Babangida regime made in Liberia during this period.

It was noted that “Babangida had contributed about $1 million towards the establishment of the Ibrahim Babangida Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Liberia; sent a large cache of military supplies to Doe to quell the NPFL rebellion; both countries had just recently signed an Economic, Scientific and Technical Agreement in 1988”. Nigeria had also paid for the Liberian section of the Trans-African highway which the Liberian government named after Babangida; settled the debt (of $25million) Liberia owed the African

While agreeing that Babangida and Doe had a financial relationship, Adebajo (2008:185), expressed reservations about the „special relationship’ believed to exist between them. Adebajo (2008:185) was of the opinion that the issue had been exaggerated. He noted that Babangida had always been very disdainful in his attitude towards Doe, who was a Master Sergeant but promoted himself to General without rising through the ranks; by the time the war began in 1990, he had become an embarrassment to himself and Babangida. Secondly and contrary to the widely held belief that Babangida and Doe were the best of friends, Adebajo (2008:185) argued that Benin, Togo and Niger enjoyed more economic and political ties with Nigeria than Liberia. This, he argued was further buttressed by Babangida’s decision to get Doe to resign (which he never did) despite having supplied him with some weapons at the beginning of the crises. This, he noted, was crucial to the success of the Nigerian-led ECOMOG mission.

Adebajo (2008:185) further contended that Doe’s rejection of the peace plan offered by ECOMOG when he learnt that it called for his resignation (with Babangida fingered as the brain behind the plan) and the fact that Doe was murdered shortly after the ECOMOG forces entered Liberia and the subsequent granting of asylum to Prince Yommie Johnson all point to the fact that Nigeria’s interventionist role in Liberia was not directly targeted at saving Samuel Doe..

**On the Hostage taken of Nigerians in Liberia**

Another reason that was advanced by this group of scholars for Nigeria’s intervention in Liberia was that about 3,000 Nigerians were reported to have been held hostage on account of the on-going war in Liberia. By August 1990, the NPFL forces had launched attacks on Nigerians (mostly embassy staff and lecturers at the University of Monrovia). Although the Babangida regime eventually evacuated the Nigerians, some casualties had already been recorded. Thus calls into question how well the administration protected Nigeria’s national interest in Liberia when countries like the United States and other European countries not only evacuated their citizens but also making use of their security apparatus to protect their assets in Liberia.
Adebajo (2008:187) agreed that Nigeria’s intervention in Liberia was partly premised on the need to free Nigerians held hostage by the NPFL; but he argued further that this could not have been solely responsible for Nigeria’s intervention in Liberia. He noted that the ECOMOG intervening force under the leadership of Nigeria spent about seven years in Liberia; this buttresses the argument that the intervention was a sincere commitment to peace rather than an attempt to support Nigeria’s hegemonic aspirations.

**On the Perceived Anti-Nigerian Alliance in Liberia**

Mays (1994:114), Ofuatey-Kodjoe (1994:272), Adeleke (1995:577-599) and Ellis (1999) suggest that Nigeria’s interventionist role in Liberia was an attempt to foil the renewed efforts by Libya’s Muammar Gadhafi to annex of Burkina Faso, thus removing it from Nigeria’s reach. According to Adebajo (2008:186), this was later proven to be not the case; Libyan expansionism in Liberia was not a particular foreign policy interest to Nigeria; rather the desire to stay committed to the country’s long held principle of its “four concentric circles” mattered most to the country at that point in time, hence its commitment of significant resources for the resolution of the crises through the ECOMOG.

**On Nigeria’s Perceived Growing Influence of the French in Liberia**

Contrary to the widely held belief advanced by Tarr (1998:115) that Nigeria became involved in Liberia to check the growing influence of the French in that country, Adebajo (2008:186) argued that regardless of the fact that the French business community benefitted through some of their dealings in the NPFL’s controlled territory, the French authorities as an institution, showed little or no interest to events in Liberia, which in any case was Anglophone due to colonial antecedents. Instead, what happened was that some private French concerns were involved in several “shady” business transactions with the Charles Taylor-led NPFL.

Adebajo (2008:186) further notes that the argument raised by this school of thought has failed to differentiate between private French interests in the NPFL-controlled areas and the official position the French government adopted through its foreign policy. Adebajo (2008) noted that, not only did the French decline to give military support to the pro-NPFL camp but the country also availed the ECOMOG of some tacit military support through the UN Trust Fund established in 1993. Furthermore, Babangida undertook a state visit to Paris in 1990
ostensibly to build the improved political relationship that had blossomed at a time when the war had already begun.

Against the backdrop of the analysis presented by both schools of thought, this study concludes that there are three alternative explanations for Nigeria’s intervention in Liberia; these are presented below. The below explanations are drawn from the seeming correlation between the arguments presented by scholars and records from that particular point in time.

3.5 Three Alternative Explanation(s) for Nigeria’s Involvement in Liberia

According to the views expressed by Kupolati (1990); Fawole (2008), and Adebajo (2008) the following constitute the “three alternative explanations” for Nigeria’s decision to intervene in Liberia through ECOMOG:

(1) Following the new world order that emerged during and after the Cold War, the possibility of Nigeria flexing its muscles in Africa was enhanced as neither of the two main ideological blocs (east and west) showed renewed interest in Africa after the war ended in 1989. Consequently, it became practicable for Nigeria to command and exert its authority in West Africa; a phenomenon which has been popularly associated with its idea of Pax Nigeriana.15

(2) Another possible explanation for Nigeria’s interventionist role in Liberia was General Babangida’s desire to create an image of himself as „a fearless, brave and great leader’ whose memory he had hoped would remain indelible in Nigeria’s contemporary history; and

(3) The aspirations of the Nigerian Army to show the West African sub-region, Africa and indeed the rest of the world that it had the necessary resources and capabilities to maintain peace within its own constituency (West Africa) (Adebajo, 2008: 87).

It could thus be inferred from the above that Nigeria’s involvement in Liberia was anchored on the desire by the Babangida administration, through the use of the Nigerian Army, to

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15The idea of Pax-Nigeriana according to Adebajo (2008:12) was first mooted in 1970 by Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, Nigeria’s Foreign Affairs Minister between 1985 and 1987. It is a foreign policy term which connotes Nigeria’s leadership role in the establishment of the Organization of African Unity, but broadly speaking, it represents Nigeria’s desire to play a leading politico-economic and military role in Africa, in the United Nations and within the fold of the Non-Aligned Movement where it serves as one of its founding members.
prove that the country under his leadership possessed everything it takes be a peacemaker. This suggests that leadership aspirations were a centrifugal determinant of Nigeria’s foreign policy. General Babangida saw Liberia as the most suitable platform to showcase his charismatic traits and morale and also to boost his ego.

A graphic illustration of Babangida’s drive for power and recognition as a statesman was made by Soyinka (1996:14):

*Babangida’s love for power was visualized in actual terms to mean: power over Nigeria, over the nation’s impressive size, its potential, over the nation’s powerful status and within the committee of nations. The potency of Nigeria was an augmentation of his own sense of power* (Soyinka 1996:14).

Alluding to the amount of power and influence wielded by Babangida between 1985 and 1993, Othman (1989:142-143) observed that “no other Nigerian leader had established such a firmer grip over the military hierarchy and the country than the way Babangida did”. Babangida, he said, relished his personal contribution to Nigeria’s contemporary history, together with the way he exerted his influence and personal authority on matters of state and those concerning Nigeria’s relationship with Liberia.

Adebajo (2008:188) further argues that Babangida’s desire to demonstrate his leadership potential to West Africa and indeed the world, led to the use of Liberia as a centerpiece of his administration’s foreign policy focus; a development which further exacerbated the already strained relationship between Nigeria and the Charles Taylor-led NPFL rebels. Consequently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Babangida became an instrument in the hands of the presidency rather than an „engine room’ for foreign policy articulation and propagation. Power was so concentrated in the Presidency that no one, not even the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs could tell exactly how much Nigeria had spent on the ECOMOG mission in Liberia (Adebajo, 2008:188).

Citing a final reason which influenced Nigeria’s interventionist role in the Liberian crisis, Kupolati (1990:327) noted that the Nigerian Army has been extremely keen to demonstrate to the international community that it possesses the required professionalism, manpower and resources to maintain peace even outside the Nigerian territory. This was necessary to dispel insinuations that the Nigerian army was only proficient in coup making, particularly given the historical antecedents of Nigeria with *coup d’états*. Considering the fact that the army had
been largely inactive after the completion of its mission in Chad between 1980 and 1984, Liberia therefore offered the Nigerian military a suitable environment to demonstrate that it remained an effective peace keeper that could maintain peace as well as exert its authority within a sub-region it considers its primary constituency.

This role was further informed by the successes recorded by the Nigerian military in its United Nations (UN) supervised international peace keeping efforts in the Congo, Balkans, Lebanon, Kuwait, Western Sahara, Somalia and Rwanda, and Sudan. Nigeria also saw Liberia as an opportunity to promote its pursuit of a permanent Security Council seat at the United Nations and as a platform to assert its status and authority as a regional power. Furthermore, as Omede (1995:51) notes, “the Nigerian military made use of the Liberian civil war as a testing ground for both its effectiveness and the viability of its arsenals and to also act as a deterrent to any hypothetical enemy”; an aspiration that was made possible by the oil boom enjoyed by Nigeria in the 1970s (Omede, 1995:51). A combination of all these factors led to Nigeria’s involvement in Liberia between 1990 and 1997, under the auspices of ECOMOG.

By October 1999, ECOMOG had withdrawn its final contingent from a conflict which for most of its seven-year duration hardly touched on Western consciousness. The conflict was a manifestation of a post-cold-war intra-state conflict with all the attendant signs and defining characteristics of state failure; tribal conflict and political disintegration; and a rather overdue response from the UN. ECOMOG’s impact in Liberia was felt more in the area of peacekeeping, whose absence would have seen the conflict drag on unnecessarily, leading to the loss of more innocent lives to a feud occasioned by Charles Taylor and Samuel Doe’s lust and desire for power.

It is however, instructive to note that all this happened at a cost to the ECOMOG and, by extension, Nigeria. Charles Taylor had always nursed ill feelings towards Nigeria for the latter’s role in denying him the “harvest” of his conquest which he felt was inevitable against Samuel Doe before the peace keeping force stepped in, in 1990. This led to the hostility, maltreatment and open confrontation faced by the remaining Nigeria-led ECOMOG troops that stayed back under the terms of the Abuja settlement, as well as the molestation of law-abiding Nigerians resident in Liberia.

It can thus be inferred that Nigeria’s role in Liberia was fuelled primarily by the leadership and international recognition aspirations of the Babangida regime. Through the use of the
army and in terms of the practical interpretation of Nigeria’s theory of four concentric circles (particularly the notion of the need to maintain peace with its contiguous states and West Africa), the regime, as Adebajo (2008:189) notes, assumed the responsibility of restoring peace to Liberia in spite of its huge cost implications. The Babangida administration estimated this cost at more than $4 billion, although it is believed that it might have been as high as $10 billion. It is important to note that this happened at a time when the country’s debt profile was rising, when average Nigerians was barely living from hand to mouth, when electricity and other key social infrastructure were virtually non-existent and more importantly at a time when Nigeria had (and still has) not escaped the appellation of a but ‘poor’ nations (Adebajo, 2008:189).

The following section examines the role played by other state and non-state actors in the Liberian impasse.

3.6 The International Dimension to the Crisis

The Role of the Nigerian-led ECOMOG
The authority and control exercised by Charles Taylor’s NPFL in the mid-1990s left the government of Samuel Doe with no other choice than to appeal to the Economic Community of West African States through the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (ESMC) for support. By 1993, the mission had assumed a fully fledge peacekeeping role, which necessitated the initial deployment of an approximately 3,000-strong army, 70% of which were drawn from the Nigerian Army outside Monrovia to help supervise the then ‘irregular’ implementation of the Cotonou Accord and those preceding it, albeit with the assistance of the international community whose impact was only really felt from 2003 onwards.

As Adeyemi (1999:19) noted, the ECOMOG operation in Liberia was largely sustained by Nigeria’s willingness to bear the operational costs of the mission and it was by no means an easy one, particularly given the complexities associated with Liberia’s ethnic configuration. “Whilst ethnicity was much less of a factor earlier on in the struggle, as the world saw in Bosnia, where the manipulation of ethnic differences by its factional leaders for political purposes led to a conflict increasingly fought along ethnic lines” (Adeyemi, 1999:19). He added that the ethnic politicization of the conflict further embittered the fighting and this led to the adoption of a ‘zero-sum’ approach to negotiations by both parties; for example, “cease
fires were often used as a calculated attempt to provide some breathing space so as to enable the warring factions to consolidate and re-arm” (Adeyemi, 1999:19)

In response to the appeal for intervention by the ESMC, Nmoma (2006:7) notes that a meeting was convened in Banjul, Gambia, where Dr Amos Sawyer was appointed the president of the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU). However, Charles Taylor’s conspicuous absence at the conference was a setback to the relative progress that had already been made by the Sawyer-led and Monrovia-based IGNU. While the Sawyer-led IGNU remained in control of the capital, Monrovia, the NPFL under the auspices of Taylor, remained in firm control of the remaining parts of the country, thus dividing the country into two effective seats of government and two effective currencies (Nmoma, 2006).

Undeterred by this development, ECOWAS remained insistent on its drive for peace in war-torn Liberia. Drawing inspiration from Nigeria’s relentless commitment including the deployment of its financial and military resources to achieve peace in Liberia, a number of meetings were scheduled of the contending forces, with the aim of brokering peace. The first in the series of such accords was held in Ivory-Coast from 29 and 30 October 1991; it is known as the Yamoussoukro IV Accord. The meeting was attended by Dr Amos C. Sawyer, President of the Interim Government of Liberia; Mr Charles Taylor of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL); Dr Salim Ahmed Salim, the then Secretary-General of the now defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU); and Mrs Dayle E. Spencer, who at that time was the special representative of the International Negotiations Network (INN). The meeting subsequently reached an agreement on the implementation of a peace plan that would include the encampment and disarmament of the warring factions under the supervision of the Nigerian-led expanded ECOMOG force, as well as the establishment of transitional institutions that could bring about democratic elections in Liberia (Ero, 1995; Nwolise, 1992; Adebajo, 2002; and Adebajo, 2008).

Following the failure of the warring parties to honor the agreement reached in Yamoussoukro, Ivory Coast, another peace effort was subsequently conveyed by the leadership of ECOWAS, led by Nigeria’s Ibrahim Babangida in Cotonou, the capital of Benin Republic on 25 July, 1992. The meeting called for the establishment of a government of national unity and further appealed to all parties to observe the ceasefire. This ceasefire was later to be supervised by the UN that had increasingly become interested in the Liberian crisis, following widespread criticism and international condemnation arising from its non-
prioritization of the need for a supra-national intervention. The Cotonou Accord of 1992
drawn up by the leadership of the Interim Government of National Unity and representatives
of the leadership of the two main warring factions; the United Liberation Movement for
Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO) and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia. The leadership of
the Heads of State of ECOWAS member countries, led by Nigeria, stood as guarantors for
the implementation of the agreements reached (Ero, 1995: Nwolise, 1992: Adebajo, 2002;
and Adebajo, 2008).

The Cotonou Accord remains the most all-encompassing truce ever signed on Liberia. The
agreement covered a total of 19 articles; which ranged from “ceasefire, disarmament,
demobilization, the structure of the proposed transitional government, election modalities,
repatriation of refugees and a general amnesty plan”. The peace plan was conceived and
executed by the ECOWAS, OAU and the UN. The signatories to the agreements reached at
the meeting included representatives of the IGNU, ULIMO, and the NPFL. Although the UN
played a substantial role on the road to Liberia’s peace process, achieving peace in Liberia
would have almost been impossible, save for Nigeria’s intervention through the
instrumentalities of ECOWAS/ECOMOG. This intervention is even more significant because
it happened at a time when the world was still uncertain about the pattern which the crisis in
Liberia would follow, including the dimension(s) which the intervention should take.

Although the ECOMOG mission in Liberia drew to a close in 1998, a strong detachment of
about of 5,000 (out of which about 3,500 were members of the Nigerian Army) troops
remained in Liberia, albeit largely in a capacity-building role. This saw them helping with the
training of what was to later become the new Liberian armed forces and also the police force.
However, by January 1999, ECOMOG was forced to withdraw a large chunk of its troops
after disputes broke out between ECOMOG’s forces and Taylor’s erstwhile loyalists who
now formed a greater percentage of the newly reconstituted Liberian Armed Forces. These
disputes were caused by complaints of maltreatment by ECOMOG troops at the hands of the
Liberian forces (Adebajo, 2008).

Despite its relative state of non-preparedness and inexperience in undertaking peace missions
in volatile areas, through the ECOMOG, Nigeria played a crucial role in momentarily halting
the NPFL’s violent assault against the ill-equipped, poorly-paid and demotivated Liberian
Armed Forces. As noted earlier in this chapter, the Nigerian government contributed about
80% of the foot soldiers who were instrumental in the restoration of peace in Liberia. Furthermore, the financial cost of the seven-year intervention was shouldered by the government of Nigeria, as in the Chadian conflict in 1980 (Omede, 1995; and Adeyemi, 1999).

As a result of this intervention, an interim government under Nigeria’s watch and the leadership of Amos Sawyer was put in place in 2003 and elections were held. Charles Taylor emerged victorious and became president; he was sworn into office on August 2, 1997. Long before his emergence as president, Taylor had held sway in Liberia’s chequered history, particularly during the events leading to the war and courtesy of the support he received from Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast and Libya16 (See also Tuck, 2000:1; Adebajo, and Ismail, 2004:12; and Akande, 2005:2).

Adebajo, and Ismail (2004:12) noted that on assumption of office as the 22nd President of Liberia, Charles Taylor immediately called for an end to ECOMOG’s operations in Liberia; a development which has been described by close observers of the Liberian crisis as a violation of an agreement reached earlier. This agreement would have seen the ECOMOG oversee the training of the newly integrated professional army that was hitherto part of the disbanded guerrilla fighters. Taylor also ignored all those who had fought against the brutal regime of Samuel Doe, causing the rebels to embark on a revenge mission against him just as he did against Samuel Doe. This led to the outbreak of the second civil war from 1997 to 2003.

### 3.7 Assessing Post-conflict Reconstruction Efforts in Liberia

**The Role of the United Nations (UN)**

The UN’s involvement in Liberia was necessitated by the ratification of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 866 of (2003) which approved the constitution of a

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16 Charles Taylor remained very active and became a major force to reckon with during the war because of the supply of ammunitions and other financial resources he freely got from the governments of Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast for several reasons. Amongst this reasons however were the desire to revenge the killing of President William Tolbert’s son who was murdered alongside his father was married to the daughter of Felix Houphouet-Boigny (the then Ivorian leader) also, Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso was also married to the daughter of Felix Houphouet-Boigny- they wanted outright revenge against President Samuel Doe for killing President William Tolbert and his son.
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). However, as Akande, (2005:4) observed, the late involvement of the United Nations left it confined within the framework and strategies that were already been used by ECOWAS. This problem also extended to its command and control structures, with UNOMIL having to compete with arrangements that in many cases had been established for years. The exclusive authority assigned to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) were widely regarded as inadequate and the degree of authority over ECOMOG was unclear; the SRSG was therefore left to function more as a mere "co-coordinator" with both the UNOMIL and ECOMOG having different and independent lines of command. Thus, “there was no one to decide categorically when, where, or how ECOMOG was to support the UNOMIL teams” (Akande, 2005:4).

Irrespective of this seeming loophole in the command structure and in the working relationship between ECOMOG and UNOMIL, Akande (2005:5) noted that a general election was eventually held in 2005 and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was elected president of Liberia. Following her election, the UN wasted no time in signifying its intention to try Mr Taylor for war crimes in a UN Special Court that was to sit in Sierra Leone. Subsequently, Resolution 1638 of 2005 came into force; it empowered the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to arrest, detain and transfer Mr Taylor to the UN court in Sierra Leone if he showed up in Liberia”. Taylor never showed up to answer any of these charges. Resolution 1638 of 2005 also expressed gratitude to Nigeria and its President, Olusegun Obasanjo, for Nigeria’s relentless commitment to ensuring a free, peaceful and democratic Liberia and for its leadership role in West Africa. It was acknowledged that Nigeria had acted within international ethical guidelines by providing a temporary stay for the former Liberian warlord; Charles Taylor in Nigeria (Akande, 2005:5).

Close observers of the post-Taylor era in Liberia are of the opinion that Resolution 1638 of 2005’s acknowledgement of Nigeria’s contribution to the restoration of peace in Liberia was intended to massage the ego of the country’s former president, Olusegun Obasanjo who was believed to be a no-nonsense man and a firm respecter of the African cause going by his antecedents while he was military head of state between 1976 and 1979. It could therefore be argued that, Resolution 1638 of 2005 was more of a political and diplomatic necessity and

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17 The United Nations Mission in Liberia was a follow up to the earlier UN intervention named the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia. The mission was established courtesy of UNSCR 1309 of 2003. The mission initially comprised of about 15,000 UN personnel. UNMIL came into full force in 2003 at a time when the ECOMOG led intervention was facing opposition from the Charles Taylor-led brigade.
did not carry the affirmative weight usually attached to such resolutions. Technically, one could also say that it was intended to avoid a diplomatic face-off with Nigeria as regards the latter’s possible reluctance to hand over Charles Taylor to the UN Special Court on War Crimes which sat in The Hague. At the same time, it could also be interpreted as a note of warning to Taylor to remind him of the temporary nature of his asylum in Nigeria and the need for him to stay out of Liberia, particularly given the speculation that Taylor might still be meddling in the politics of Liberia, even after his relocation to Nigeria.

**The Influence of the United States of America**

As Nmoma (2006) noted, the government of the United States (US) could not be said to have met the expectations of the international community and that of the Liberian people during the country’s 13-year year civil war. One would have expected that given the close historical ties between the two countries, the US ought to have been at the vanguard of the roles that were later assumed by the likes of ECOWAS and the UN; rather than the last minute supply of military assistance and expertise which the US offered. Some analysts have argued that the US’s lack of concern regarding to the plight of Liberians can be best understood from the perspective of the possible consequences of the end of the Cold War. Adebajo (2008:176) noted that this accounted for a relative loss of strategic interest in Africa by the West.

Cobbs (2003:1) similarly noted that the US’s lack of concern about the crises in Liberia drew much criticism and became a matter of public and political discourse on the continent because it coincided with the visit of the then US President, George W. Bush to Africa in 2003. During the visit, President Bush was confronted with questions from the international community as to why the US had chosen to assume a non-participant role in the Liberian

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18 The UN Special Court on war crimes was an independent tribunal established jointly by the United Nations to try serious violations of international humanitarian laws, including crimes against humanity, committed by Mr Charles Taylor during the blood diamond saga in Sierra Leone between 1996 and 2003, and also all through the period of the country’s civil war. Taylor and two others indicted by the International Criminal Court sitting at The Hague, Netherlands in May 2012. He was found guilty of having committed war crimes and other crimes against humanity; this was seen as serious violation of the basic principles of modern international humanitarian laws. On 30 May, 2012, Mr Taylor alongside two of his accomplices was sentenced to 50 years imprisonment in a British court for having committed what the court President; Richard Lussick described as unpardonable crimes against humanity. The judgement has not been executed because of the appeal filed by Charles Taylor’s defense team.
crisis. This confrontation was led by representatives of countries like Britain, France, the AU, and ECOWAS. However, in what appeared to be a calculated attempt to evade the questions posed to him, Bush declared that he wanted to get enough information before deciding on whether or not to send troops to Liberia.

According to Cobbs (2003:1), former President Bush was quoted thus: “I am in the process of gathering the necessary information capable of assisting the United States in making a rational decision as to how to enforce and keep the ceasefire in place” Cobb (2003:1). Malan (2009: 11) remarked that in what appeared to be a rather late but appreciated effort, the government of the United States provided some financial support for the reconstitution of Liberia’s security sector, including the reform of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), the Ministry of Defense and the funding of the UNMIL supervised police reform in the country. This according to him, was necessary because in a volatile sub-region such as West Africa and in a country just recovering from conflict, “a newly reconstituted army is not only an instrument of security to secure the state of Liberia in an external environment but also an institution that ensures the security of its people and property” (Malan, 2009: 11).

A 15-week training program was organized for new army recruits; this included a three week course on Liberian civil society and history, as well as international human rights. This was intended to make the “new recruits possess a common base from which to overcome ethnic divisions and begin to think of themselves as fellow citizens, rather than as former enemies” (USIP, 2007:5). In addition, the US, through one of its Private Military Companies (PMCs); DynCorp International and Pacific Architects and Engineers, also teamed up with the government of Liberia to establish a 2,000 capacity light army. The new Armed of Forces of Liberia was intended to be comprised of two infantry battalions, an engineering unit, a military police unit, a military band and medical personnel (USIP, 2007). However as Zounmenou (2008:8) notes, serious concerns have been expressed about the suitability and efficacy of employing private security companies to train a national army, with problems such as the lack of transparency in the recruitment process, uncertainties over accountability issues and the loyalty of the new recruits representing the most serious of such concerns.

The overwhelming impact which the Nigeria-led ECOMOG mission had on the foreign policy posture of the United States in West Africa should also be noted. Before the outbreak of the war, the entire West African sub-region was often believed to be tied to the apron strings of the US. It was assumed that Washington dictated the pace, particularly in terms of
who received *what, how and when in these countries*, and most states within the sub-region were believed to be dependent on the US for aid assistance and other forms of official development assistance (ODA). However, the assumption of full responsibility by ECOWAS seems to have changed this, and it is seen as a major victory over the arrogant multilateral posture of the US in the sub-region. It is commendable that Nigeria, a country that has often been referred as lacking the characteristics to act as a sub-regional hegemon in West Africa, could take such strong command of the situation. For example, it has been noted (see, Idisi and Idise, 1996:196; and Adebajo, 2008: 188), that Nigeria’s success in Liberia represents a watershed in the annals of the history of the United States’ hitherto firm grip on the region.

For ECOWAS and Nigeria, the Liberian intervention was not just necessary; it was a mission whose long term objective was to demonstrate to the US and the West that the sub-region, after all, is not just a *dumping ground* or a failed entity as previously believed. Nigeria, with the support of its other willing partners in ECOWAS has shown the US and its associates that their days of unquestionable dominance in West Africa’s socio-political and economic issues, if not on the entire continent, are over. Without any form of assistance in Liberia, Nigeria and ECOWAS were able to bring the situation under control, thus highlighting how much Africa can achieve if and when it works together as a team. It is doubtful if the US will be able to regain the hold it used to have on West Africa before the Nigerian-led ECOMOG intervention. If this initiative is well built on, it has the capacity to extricate West Africa and the continent from the shackles of dependency and the often arrogant and imperialistic posture of the US in particular and the West in general in Africa’s domestic affairs.

**The European Union (EU)**

As observed by Mays (1998), the EU constantly monitored the unfolding events in Liberia, especially the peace process. The EU supported the integration of ECOWAS through the Common Security and Foreign Policy (CFSP) instrument; and it also rendered some technical and diplomatic support to ECOWAS. It helped enforced UN sanctions against the illegal sale of diamonds in Liberia. The EU also mandated the Liberian government to respect the provisions of Resolution 1343 of 1997 which detail the processes of how sanctions could be lifted. It is instructive to note that the imposition of the sanctions in the first place were part of a comprehensive strategy targeted at tightening up security in the West African sub-region. This is due to the fact that the international community wanted to avoid its efforts and the
considerable resources it invested in bringing about relative peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone being sabotaged by political manipulations at the sub-regional level.

3.8 Rethinking the Human Development Crisis in Liberia

It is instructive to note, that ever since the attainment of formal independence in 1847, governments at different stages of Liberia’s political history have never considered human capacity development a top priority. This perhaps accounts for why the country’s human development index has been worsening for several decades. For the overwhelming majority of Liberians, life has become close to the Hobbesian state of nature: short, solitary, brutish and nasty.

After close to 11 years of in-fighting, (1990-1997 and 1999-2003), which witnessed alarming consequences of immeasurable proportion, the Liberian state was granted a moment of respite by the ushering in of a new post-conflict order. This saw the ascension to office of Africa’s first female president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf on January 16, 2006. Her election raised hopes that Liberia’s perennial human development crisis would at least receive some degree of attention. This was affirmed by the President when she said:

At the core of the post-conflict human development project in Liberia must be an expansion of people’s choices and access to the most valued elements of a stable and democratic society; greater access to knowledge; better nutrition and health services; more secure livelihood, crime protection and physical violence; and a sense of inclusion in community activities (USIP, 2007).

However, since her assumption of office in 2006, President Sirleaf been unable to clearly return the Liberian state to a path of democratization and freedom; a major reason why the country went to war. The government seems much too comfortable with the neo-colonial construct it inherited from the Americo-Liberians; this may not be unconnected with the fact that Johnson herself was a product of this construct, having served as Minister for Finance under William Tolbert.

As noted in a UNMIL 2007 report on Liberia, it has becoming increasingly clear that the:

International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, (two arguably imperialist economic institutions), have re-established their influence over the Liberian political economy. Based on the repository of empirical evidence and the
experiences of various third world countries, these Bretton Woods structures have gained notoriety for visiting socio-economic hardships on citizens through their neo-liberal incentives which is more often than not, capable of rolling back the state under the pretext of guaranteeing them a social safety net (UNMIL, 2007:11).

For a better understanding of the crisis of underdevelopment which the Liberian state faces, this study examines the economic and social dimensions of the crisis.

The Economic Dimension

Table 1: Liberia’s Economic Development Indicators, 1985 -2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate (%) (percentage of People Living on less than $1/day)</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>76.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The economic indicators shown in table 1 vividly capture the two most important indices for the measurement of the human development crisis in Liberia: unemployment and the poverty rate. As shown in table 1, in 1985 85% of Liberians were unemployed; by 2009, the figure had dropped to 68%. The percentage of Liberians living in abject poverty in 1985 stood at 86.1%, thus implying that only about 13.9% of the country’s 1.5 million citizens were living above the poverty line. Twenty-four years later, in 2009, the figure dropped slightly to 76.2%. These economic indicators imply that little has changed in the country, six years after the war ended (2003).

This brings to the fore the seeming inability of the state to overcome the damaging consequences of the 13-year war and it further exposes the inability of the government to
formulate and implement the requisite policies that could help create enough jobs to free the Liberian people from the tightening net of deprivation and abject poverty. It is important to note that this does not suggest that the Liberian state is where it is today because of the effects of the war alone. While this was partly responsible for its stagnation and endemic poverty, it is also imperative to note, that the socio-economic and political configuration of the Liberian state since independence tends towards to a neo-colonial construct where the few (Americo-Liberians) have maintained an overwhelming hegemony over the majority (Natives). It may take some time and it will also require a focused and visionary government to address these structural and system inadequacies which continue to widen the gap between the rich and the poor.

The Social Dimension(s)

Table 2 below presents a more comprehensive analysis of the prevailing social conditions in Liberia. It shows that while there have been some improvements in crucial areas of people’s lives, there has also been a measure of stagnation or further retrogression in people’s standard of living. In 1985, the country’s population stood at more than 1.1 million people; by 2009 the population has increased to more than 3.6 million. While there appears to be an appreciable level of improvement in the adult literacy level, no data were available in 1985 to measure illiteracy. However, the 2009 figures show that about 43.17% of the country’s population could still not read and write.

Regarding the adult and child mortality rate, the indicators are not encouraging; the situation appears to be degenerating, except for the relatively stagnant death rate which shows that Liberians are struggling to hold on, even in the face of uncertainty. In 2009, at least 72 out of every 1,000 children died at birth, the maternal mortality rate was pegged at 578 out of every 100,000 Liberians. Only about 31.64% of Liberia’s 3.6 million people have access to education, and only about 46% of the population has access to health care. As noted by Ero, (2005), these indices reflect a country that is yet to fully come to terms with the catastrophic consequences of a war, estimated to have cost more than 150, 000 lives and rendered more than 200,000 people homeless.

Again, it is imperative to note that those worst hit by these negative scenarios are the natives in Liberia; the reasons are not hard to find. For the better part of its history, the Liberian state
has been characterized by socio-political and economic discrimination. This is reminiscent of the relationship which existed between the feudal lords (America-Liberians) and the serfs (natives); adding to this is the age-long distrust within Liberian society itself, (particularly among the natives) which is unrepentantly divided along ethnic lines. In states with these kinds of prevailing circumstances, it is more difficult for things to return to normal after two catastrophic civil wars. Certainly, considerable progress in socio-economic conditions will require more time.

Table 2: Liberia's Social Human Development Indicators, 1985 – 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (in Millions)</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult literacy rate (%)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>63.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiteracy Rate (%)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>43.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult mortality (probability of people dying between the ages of 18-59 per 100,000)</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child mortality (probability of children dying under the age of 5 years) per 1,000 population</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>114.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death rate (%) per 1,000 population</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy (years)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality rate (%) (per 1,000 live Births)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal Mortality Rate (per 100,000 live Births)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People with access to access to Education (%)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>31.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People with access to health services (%)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


- The Consequences of the Crisis

As Zounmenou (2008:8), puts it, “the summary of the perennial human development crisis in Liberia is likeable to a termite that has eaten deep into the fabric of the Liberian society”. The dimensions of the crisis, reflected in the areas outlined above, show that the country is yet to fully recover from the devastating effects of the post Doe and Taylor eras. The accumulative effects of years of redundancy and stagnation, decades of unmitigated poverty, a nearly non-existent health care system, a lack of portable water and a systemic culture of poor sanitation has made it practically impossible for the majority of Liberians to maximize their human potential that could see them live a healthy and economically productive life.

3.9 Conclusion

This chapter has provided background information on the Liberian state and the raison d’être for the crises. It identified the age-old distrust between the Americo Liberians and the Natives as one of the explanations for Samuel Doe’s ascendancy to office in 1980. The Liberian conflict was caused by a combination of bad governance on the part of the Americo-Liberians and Samuel Doe, whose despotic, overbearing attitude and totalitarian leadership style was unbearable to the NPFL movement led by Charles Taylor. Doe’s government was allegedly characterized by political exclusion, marginalization, and tribalism and this led to several orchestrated demands for social change and political reform. Doe’s failure to accede to any of its demands led the rebel group under the auspices of the NPFL to take up arms against his regime.

This chapter has further revealed that the struggle for natural resources such as gold, diamonds and coal, which were exploited to sustain the struggle, was a major motivation for the protracted nature of the crisis. The war was also driven by selfish political ambitions and greed on the part of the warlords, as evidenced by the struggle for control over the mineral-rich regions of Liberia. An appraisal of the arguments for and against Nigeria’s intervention in Liberia revealed that the combination of the personal leadership aspirations of Gen. Ibrahim Babangida, through the use of the army and the enforcement of the sanctity of Nigeria’s Afro-centric foreign policy, informed Nigeria’s intervention in the Liberian war.
This chapter also considered the roles played by various state and non-actors both in the resolution of the Liberian crisis and in the post-reconstruction efforts in Liberia. It concluded by providing selected socio-economic indices to emphasize that the Liberian state is still in a conflict recovery stage more than nine years after the war officially ended. It is submitted that for the Liberian state to be able to escape from humanitarian development catastrophe; a crisis that has been further exacerbated by the continuation of its neo-colonial construct, the country must endeavor to quickly embrace the part of „real” democratization. The alternative to doing so could be a return to its „dark days’. The following chapter examines the nature of the Nigerian state, its foreign policy making instrument, and its contribution to peace building and conflict resolution in Africa. The chapter will also establish the (possible) nexus between this intervention and others that Nigeria has undertaken in Africa within the dictates of the country’s foreign policy.
CHAPTER FOUR

The Nigerian State, its Foreign Policy Institutions and its History with Conflict Resolution in Africa

4.1 Introduction

Having undertaken a review of the nexus between Nigeria’s foreign policy and its role in the resolution of the Liberian crisis, this chapter interrogates Nigeria’s role in peace building and conflict resolution in Africa, particularly when considered from its foreign policy perspective. It also examines the history and nature of the Nigerian state, and the major instruments of its foreign policy formulation. The chapter will also provide a tabular representation of Nigeria’s involvement in conflict resolution in Africa and around the world. It concludes with an examination of how Nigeria’s rich history in conflict resolution in Africa can be channeled to the betterment and enhancement of its status as a regional hegemon in Africa and also to the well-being of its people both at home and abroad.

4.2 Nigeria’s Political History in Brief

Nigeria’s political history is deeply rooted in the events leading to her independence in 1960 and the subsequent amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates by Lord Lugard in 1914. The country’s first taste of political leadership was occasioned by the indirect rule system of government foisted on it by its British colonial masters. This saw a total of seven British Governor-Generals presiding over the affairs of the territory. The only Nigerian to be appointed to that position was Sir Nnamdi Azikwe, whose authority was largely subservient to the British monarchy and who thus wielded only ceremonial powers between 1960 and 1963, when the country attained a republican status.

To date, Nigeria’s political experiment has taken it through six different republics spanning from 1960 to 2012. Sir Tafawa Balewa became Nigeria’s first Prime Minister on October 1, 1960; however, the life of that administration was cut short on 15 of January, 1966, in a foiled military coup led by Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu. The major political beneficiary of that coup, General Aguiyi Ironsi served as Head of State until July 27, 1966.

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when he was overthrown in a counter coup led by Gen. Yakubu Gowon. Gowon remained in office until 1975 when he was displaced by a bloodless coup spearheaded by Gen. Murtala Mohammed. Following the assassination of General Mohammed on February 13, 1976, General Olusegun Obasanjo assumed the mantle of leadership and successfully handed over the reins of power to a democratically elected government led by Alhaji Shehu Shagari on October 1, 1980. On 31 December 1983, barely three months into the second term of the Shagari administration, it was dethroned by Major-General Mohammadu Buhari, who announced that he had seized control of power from the civilian regime (See Anam-Ndu, 1979; and Ajetumobi, 1991).

The Buhari regime lasted from December 1983 to August 1985 before being overthrown by General Babangida, who assumed office first as Head of State and later announced himself as President and Commander in Chief. The Babangida regime spanned between August 27, 1985 and August 27, 1993 before he voluntarily stepped aside following widespread protests and demonstrations that greeted the annulment by the administration of the general election held in 1993. It is remarkable to note that Babangida, while stepping down from office in 1993, had announced the appointment of Ernest Shonekan, as head of what he described as an Interim National Government (ING). According to Fawole (2003) and Gambari (2008), Shonekan’s appointment was more of a mere preparatory stratagem intended to eventually pave the way for the emergence of General Sani Abacha. Following General Abacha’s controversial death in 1998, General Abdulsalam Abubakar, Abacha’s second in command took over and subsequently supervised the transition to civil rule.

The resultant effect of this was the election into office of Olusegun Obasanjo, a retired general and one time military head of state. Following Obasanjo’s return to power in 1999, he embarked on a series of face-saving visits ostensibly to restore the country’s lost glory in foreign relations and also to revive its shrinking status in Africa and indeed around the world. While it may be difficult to measure the level of success achieved by the Obasanjo administration with respect to enhancing Nigeria’s status amongst the community of nations, it is instructive to note that the Obasanjo administration between 1999 and 2003 succeeded in returning Nigeria to its traditional Afro-centric foreign policy posture. Under Obasanjo, Nigeria became very influential in the transformation of the Organization of African Unity to African Union in July 2001.
Nigeria was also very instrumental in the formation of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) in 2002, and was a key player in the restoration to office of President Fradique de Menezes of Sao-Tome and Principe who was deposed from office while on a state visit to Nigeria in 2003. Obasanjo subsequently won a second term in office and thus became the only former military Head of State to achieve this feat. Although scholars such as Fawole (2004); Osuntokun, (2008); Gambari, (2008) and Adebajo, (2008) have argued that fate and posterity had presented Obasanjo the singular opportunity to correct the „mistakes’ he made while serving as military Head of state between 1976 and 1979, it is left to history to decide the extent to which Obasanjo was able to „right’ his so called „wrongs’.

Fawole also similarly noted (2008:45 ) that by the end of Obasanjo’s second term in office as civilian president in 2007, Obasanjo had succeeded in lifting Nigeria from the pariah state which it was prior to 1999 to a gradual but progressive path to normalcy. At the expiration of his term in May, 2007 and following a general election that was won by Umar Musa Yar’ Adua, Nigeria returned to the foreign policy articulation termed by Ojo Maduekwe, (Obasanjo’s former Minister for Foreign Affairs) as „Citizen Diplomacy’ (Mbachu, 2007). However, it remains to be seen how aggressively the government is pursuing this objective. Following Yar’ Adua’s death on May 5, 2010, Goodluck Jonathan, (Yar’ Adua’s deputy) was mandated by constitutional provisions to assume the mantle of leadership first in an acting and later in a substantive capacity having won the presidential elections conducted in April, 2011.

Against this background information, a review of the major institutions, patterns and processes of foreign policy making in Nigeria is undertaken with a view to providing a clearer understanding of some of the underpinning philosophies behind Nigeria’s involvement in conflict resolution in Africa.

4.3 Towards Understanding Nigeria’s Foreign Policy Making Process

Four main sources have been identified by Fawole (2004:8) as vital in explaining Nigeria’s foreign policy making. These sources include the role played by institutions such as the Nigerian constitution; the Presidency, the body responsible for the day-to-day running of the domestic and foreign affairs of the state); the National Assembly, which is constitutionally empowered to make laws for the country; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and all other
agencies of government whose roles and duties are not expressly stated in the constitution. Although the roles of these ministries might not have been expressly defined by the constitution, their activities at various times, as observed by Fawole (2004:9), could be tangential to it. Each of these items is dealt with in the details presented below.

The Constitution

Nigeria presently operates under the provisions of the 1999 constitution, which is largely seen as an amendment to the 1979 version. The constitution came into effect in May 1999, following the country’s return to civilian rule and it thus recognized some state institutions and structures as having inextricable relationships with the conduct of foreign policy. Specifically, Section 19, sub section II of the 1999 constitution recognizes the broad principles encapsulated in Nigeria’s foreign policy as including the:

(1) promotion and protection of the national interest;
(2) promotion of African integration and support for African unity;
(3) promotion of international cooperation for the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect among all nations and the elimination of discrimination in all manifestations;
(4) respect for international law and treaty as well seeking of settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication; and
(5) promotion of a just world order.

However, one noticeable flaw in the 1999 constitution pointed out by Fawole (2004:9) is its failure to spell out the actual content or direction of the Nigeria’s foreign policy. This is evident in the preamble of the constitution where it is stated that:

*We the people of Nigeria firmly and solemnly resolved to promote inter-African Solidarity, World Peace, and International Cooperation and Understanding* (Constitution of the FRN, 1999).

Given this rather generalized conception of foreign policy in the 1999 constitution, the leadership of the country is thus called on to determine the shape and specific direction which Nigeria’s foreign policy should follow. As Fawole (2000) argued, “apart from the meaning
and content of the national interest that are left to the imagination of discerning minds, three out of the four succeeding objectives as stated above are merely grand, idealistic, altruistic and largely unrealizable foreign policy objectives” (Fawole, 2000:281).

The Presidency

Nigeria is presently modelled after the American presidential system of government, whose emphasis is premised on a strong presidency. This system incorporates three principal arms of government (the Executive, Legislative and the Judiciary) and the system of government associated with it is usually known as federalism. However in the Nigerian case, the country’s colonial antecedents and its long history of military rule have corrupted the idea behind the federalist political system. This has resulted in a political situation in which the presidency has become associated with so much power which has been described by Fawole (2004:11) as “an imperial presidency”. Top on the list of the responsibilities of the Presidency according to Section 2, sub-section (2) of the 1999 constitution includes; setting the agenda for domestic and foreign policies, sending bills to the national assembly, and assenting or withholding bills from the National Assembly. The president also runs the affairs of the state on a day-to-day basis.

Fawole (2004:12) equally notes that by virtue of the powers conferred by the constitution on the presidency with regards to foreign policy making, the president is expected to set an agenda according to his vision, his party manifesto and programmes and also in line with the dynamics of world politics. He is seen as the chief maker of both domestic and external policies and the principal actor on foreign matters. On behalf of the government and people of Nigeria, the president is expected to conduct diplomatic visits and sign bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements with other sovereign nations. However, it is in important to note that in the history of Nigeria’s contemporary foreign relations, its foreign policy has

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20 Federalism according to Wheare (1946), refers to a system of government where power is shared among the federating or component units and thus creates a political order which allows these units some form of autonomy to act and make decisions on behalf of their subjects, except when the matter at hand clashes with the constitutional provisions of the country and that of the federal government.

21 Fawole (2004) interprets an „imperial presidency” to mean a political situation where the presidency, courtesy of its long years of military dictatorship, has been reduced to a mere unitary system of government in actual practice although not in nomenclature. Under this system, the presidency wields a near absolute and overbearing power and this is reflected in the responsibilities attached to the central government, including the politics of who gets „what”, „how” and „when”.

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always been dependent on the quality of the president, his/her ideological orientation and his/her ability to grasp the nuances of the dynamics of the ever changing diplomatic world.

This explains how the moderate, conservative, religious and moralistic foreign policy outlook of the Balewa regime, the quiet ‘gentlemanly’ attitude of the Gowon administration, the arguably timid and unconfident foreign policy disposition of the government of Sheu Shagari, and the radical and ‘aggressive’ external policy approach of the Murtala-Obasanjo regime were brought to bear on their administration’s approach to and in the pursuit of foreign policy issues. The same goes for the impressive, courageous and initiative taking foreign policy concentration of the Babangida regime, the reclusive foreign policy instinct of the Abacha regime and Abdul Salam’s quiet diplomacy.

It is also instructive to note, that regardless of the fact that Nigeria’s presidentialism is modelled on that of the United States of America, there is still a wide gap between what obtains in the American federal system and that of Nigeria. For instance, unlike in America, all the main coercive and key apparatus of state such as the police, army, and other security and intelligence agencies are under the command and control of the presidency.

As a consequence of this constitutional provision, the description of a serving governor under the Nigerian federal structure as the chief executive of a state could thus be interpreted as merely ceremonial. This is because the actual control of the security agencies whose title the Governor bears is constitutionally vested in the central government and it is also listed as its exclusive preserve. This may be regarded as a major defect of the Nigerian federal arrangement.

The National Assembly

The constitutional framework recognizing Nigeria’s Fourth Republic (1999 to date) is anchored on the provisions of the 1999 Constitution. The constitution provides for a bicameral Legislature; the Senate and the Federal House of Representatives. The Senate is composed of 109 members, chosen on an equal basis across the 36 states of Nigeria; while the House of Representatives is composed of 360 members representing federal constituencies chosen on a proportional representation basis. The members of the National Assembly are directly elected; citizens can seek election into both houses, as long as they
meet the age and educational requirements (Section 4 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria).

In Nigeria, the constitutional responsibilities of the legislature include law making and influencing government policies through motions and resolutions. However, some responsibilities are the exclusive preserve of the Senate. These include the screening and confirmation of the members of the Federal Executive Council, otherwise known as Ministers and ambassadorial nominees. Both houses are constitutionally mandated to sit for a minimum of 181 days a year.

In terms of foreign policy making, the combined arms of the legislature perform a much greater function. Section 2, sub section (1) of the 1999 constitution confers on the National Assembly the power to make laws for the peace, order and good governance of the federation or any part thereof. Its powers over the direction and conduct of Nigeria’s foreign policy contained in Sections 80, 81 and 82 of the 1999 Constitution include its ability to control the national treasury. This implies that no funds can be withdrawn from the country’s Consolidated Revenue Fund without its approval; the executive arm of government makes its requests for funds to the legislature through budget proposals but it cannot embark on any spending until it gets confirmation from the legislature.

As Fawole (2008:14) notes, all ministries and parastatals including the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs have to defend their budget proposals before the committee on foreign policy of the National Assembly. Funds meant for foreign policy articulation and pursuit may be denied if such initiatives are found to be inconsistent with the nation’s national interest. The National Assembly, in terms of the provisions of Section 5(4a) wields sufficient influence over the executive, particularly when it comes to when the nation can go to war. Should such a request by the executive be turned down by the Assembly, the government through the executive cannot go to war except in emergency situations where the President needs to respond to any threat considered an affront to the country’s territorial sovereignty and that of its people.

Other areas where the National Assembly can exercise its authority on foreign policy matters include the ratification of both bilateral and multilateral treaties agreed to by the executive. This power is vested in the National Assembly by Sections 11 and 12; without the National Assembly’s ratification, such treaties are mere diplomatic parleys and as such are insignificant and non-binding on the state. Furthermore, the National Assembly exercises
some level of control in terms of granting or withholding approval for the Ministerial and Ambassadorial nominees appointed by the President acting under the provisions of Section 171 of the 1999 constitution (Fawole, 2004:15).

**The Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

The essential responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is conducting and managing external affairs; for this reason, the ministry is usually staffed by highly trained officers with practical, theoretical knowledge and a technical grasp of foreign affairs. In represents the main implementation arm of foreign policy and Nigeria’s High Commissions, embassies, and other diplomatic representations fall under its jurisdiction. It also services all of Nigeria’s 94 diplomatic missions including the country’s interest in international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Commonwealth (Fawole, 2004:17). It should be noted that the MFA is not the only ministry that performs a central role in the conduct of foreign policy. Several other ministries, parastatals and, other specialized agencies such as the ministries of Cooperation and Integration; Defense; Finance, Trade and Commerce; Industry and Agriculture, Petroleum Resources, and the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) work in concert with the MFA to ensure that Nigeria’s foreign policy specifics are well advanced within the community of nations.

In the practice of international diplomacy, states no longer leave their foreign policy concerns in the hands of individuals without the required background; modern diplomacy has become too complex an activity to be left to professional diplomats with narrow specializations to handle (Fawole, 2004:17). Emerging world trends go beyond mere political and diplomatic matters. This view is well articulated by Le Pere and Nieuwkerk (2002:188):

>*The world can no longer be understood in the monochromatic colors of the Cold War- it is definitely more complex, driven by impulses which require a range of new and overlapping policy instruments and resources. Foreign policy now include issues as diverse as investment, migration, energy, inflation, food security, human rights, the natural environment and so on* (Nieuwkerk 2002:188).

Flowing from the above observation, one should take into cognizance the role that issues such as sub-regional security in West and Central Africa, regional economic integration,
information and communications technology, and international trade play in foreign policy articulation and propagation. Indeed, the world has now become a global village, and for a state to be able to compete favorably with its contemporaries on all of the issues raised above, it must involve other governmental infrastructure in the conduct of its foreign policy. This role is sacrosanct and requires a great deal of professionalism and diplomacy to protect the nation’s national interests.

The following section provides a brief discussion of the intrinsic relationship between the different regime types Nigeria has passed through and the foreign policy orientation of its governments particularly from the point of view of their level of commitment to Nigeria’s traditional Afro-centric posture.

4.4 Regime Type, Foreign Policy Orientation and Commitment to Afro-centrism

Research by scholars such as Aluko (1981), Akinyemi (1989), Abegunrin (2003), Fawole (2003) and Akinterinwa (2010) has captured Nigeria’s national interest as: National self-preservation, defending national sovereignty and independence, protecting the socio-economic and political interests of Nigerians, ensuring the defense, preservation and promotion of democratic norms and values, enhancing Nigeria’s standing and status in Africa, and the promotion of world peace. Similarly, scholars such as Idang (1973:1-5), Ogunsanwo (1986:1-4) and Gambari (1989:2-7) argue that Nigeria’s national interest is best considered from the perspective of its regional and continental leadership drives. This ambition, according to these scholars represents the underpinning philosophy and overriding impetus which led to Nigeria’s adoption of a policy of “four concentric circles” as espoused earlier.

Prominent among Nigeria’s achievements were its contribution to the birth(s) of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, and ECOWAS in 1975, the attainment of independence by Angola and Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) in 1975 and 1980 respectively, Nigeria’s active participation in peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Africa including the frontline role it played in the resolution of the civil wars in Liberia, and Sierra Leone, and in the eventual demise of apartheid in Namibia in 1988 and later in South Africa in 1994, among others. However, despite these successes, this Africa-centered foreign policy was not without its flaws.
These flaws, according to Aluko (1981), Abegunrin (2003), Fawole (2003), and Adebajo and Mustapha (2008), were soon to become evident in the downturn experienced by the country in its hitherto strong and viable economy and in the neglect of its own domestic responsibilities, specifically the fulfillment of the social obligations expected of a government to its people. The resultant effect of this was a steady decline in the nation’s oil revenue owing to a culture of poor maintenance, corruption and the extensive projects executed by Nigeria in other African countries. Notable among these were the cement and road facility built by the Gowon regime in Benin Republic, the sugar factory constructed in Senegal, the huge costs associated with funding the liberation movement in Southern Africa, the cost of prosecuting its civil war from 1967 to 1970 and the seeming failure of its leadership to take economic advantage of the in-roads it was creating courtesy of its interventionist policies in Africa, for the benefit and protection of its national interests.

The period between 1985 and 1998 in Nigeria’s foreign policy history and practice was described by Fawole (2003:127-146) as the beginning of ultra-nationalism, xenophobia and the beginning of isolationism in Africa, except for the short lived regime of Gen. Buhari (1984-1985) and that of Gen. Babangida (1985-1993), both of whom were noted for their radical ultra-nationalist and interventionist foreign policy orientation. The Babangida regime according to Osaghae, (2002) and Adebajo and Mustapha (2008, p.12), was particularly noted for its „zero tolerance’ for conflict in West Africa; a policy which Babangida executed through the instrumentality of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) as evidenced in Nigeria’s commanding role in the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

The essential foreign policy thrust of the Babangida regime was anchored on the wings of the protection of the national interest, Afro-centrism, strengthening good neighborliness among its contiguous states and the pursuance of greater economic integration within the West African sub-region. Notable among the defining moments of that administration were the introduction of the Technical Aid Corps Scheme under the supervision of the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bolaji Akinyemi, the tactical adoption of “economic diplomacy” as the

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22Economic diplomacy according to Atah (2011) can be credited to Nigeria’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs; Gen. Ike Nwachukwu. The idea seeks to facilitate the promotion of export trade, investment and increased financial assistance from friendly countries. The policy was said to have been inspired by the pressures that were exerted on the Nigerian economy as a result of the introduction of the Structural Adjustment
country’s new foreign policy drive and the renewed bite which the administration gave to the campaign against apartheid in South Africa, as well as commencing diplomatic ties with Israel and the over bearing role it played in the resolution of the Liberian crisis.

However, the succeeding regime of General Abacha plunged Nigeria into what Osaghae (2002:194-196) and Fawole (2003:127) call “Nigeria’s era of foreign policy isolationism”; a ‘feat’ achieved courtesy of the dictatorial and totalitarian Gen. Sani Abacha. Abacha’s style of foreign policy administration was characterized by a high degree of inconsistency and incoherence judging by its ambivalence and quickness to react to international issues without taking cognizance of the cost implications of such decisions. The junta dissipated needless energy on maintaining its monopoly on the country while fending off every attempt by the international community to categorize it as a pariah state. In the words of Osaghae (2002:194-196) “Abacha saw it more as a ‘struggle for survival’ and the Nigerian state witnessed a foreign policy era in which ‘isolationism’ was the rule rather than the ‘exception’ thus seeing diplomacy being replaced by bull fighting. And the country was counting more enemies instead of making more friends”

A number of pro-democracy activists were detained and some unfortunately paid the supreme price with their lives, but the eventual execution of the late leader of the defunct Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSSOP), Ken Saro–Wiwa despite widespread an international appeal for a state pardon appeared to be the turning point for the Abacha regime. Nigeria was subsequently suspended from the Commonwealth of Nations and automatically became a pariah state within the community of nations. Thus all the previous gains the country had attained over the years were eroded courtesy of the reckless abandon with which Gen. Abacha ran the country.

Program (SAP). The highpoints of the policy were the priority it placed on export promotion, the encouragement it gave to direct foreign investment, debt rescheduling, the embracement of neo-liberal measures and deep involvement in the interplay of the capitalist political economy.

23 The Commonwealth of Nations comprises of fifty four countries (54) excluding Mozambique and Rwanda which were not colonized by Great Britain. The group seeks to encourage member states to cooperate within a framework of common values and goals, as stipulated in the Singapore Declaration. These include the promotion of democracy, human rights, good governance, and the rule of law, individual liberty, egalitarianism, free trade, multilateralism, and world peace. The association is not political; rather it is an intergovernmental organization in which countries with diverse social, political and economic backgrounds are regarded as equal in status.
Following the death of Gen. Abacha on June 8, 1998, General Abdul-Salami Abubakar took over the reins of power. He set himself the task of midwifing the re-birth of civilian rule in Nigeria and also made an appreciable impact in bringing some sanity into both the domestic terrain and the country’s external relations. He also succeeded in placing Nigeria back on track on the international scene by encouraging the country to participate in a number of privatization programmes, including investing in a number of export-oriented industries and the campaign for debt relief. On return to democracy on 29 May 1999, and the return to office of Olusegun Obasanjo as President, Nigeria undertook its foreign policy drive re-appraised, resulting in a shift from Afro-centrism to what Ojo Maduekwe termed citizen diplomacy - a policy which, according to Adebajo and Mustapha (2008:12) still awaits take-off.

4.5 Nigeria Role’s in Sub-regional Security

As Rugumamu (2004:11) observed, Nigeria has undoubtedly played an unparalleled role in finding solutions to the plethora of conflicts that have occurred within its sub-region, as evidenced in the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone. Nigeria’s strong political will and financial support has helped to transform ECOWAS from its trade-based foundation to a security-based Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). This according to Ebohon and Obakhedo (2012:168), led to the formation of a sub-regional army which helped to contain the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra-Leone in the early 1990s. Agedah (1993:147) notes that the birth of ECOWAS was a product of the 13th Summit of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) held from August 6-7, 1990 in Banjul, the Gambia. The meeting was led by Nigeria’s former military leader, President Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, who proposed to the Heads of State and Government of the 16 West African States present at the meeting the agenda for intervention.

Agedah (1993:147) further argued that Babangida’s proposal was premised on the need for West African leaders to develop a framework that could help remedy West Africa’s most critical structural-functional defects. This included rethinking the political and security environment through which economic development could take place and as a result creating a more conducive atmosphere for the conduct of economic development. Babangida’s proposal was believed to have been further strengthened by the initial decision of ECOWAS to intervene in Liberia (1990-1997) following the refusal of the US to intervene, notwithstanding the historical ties they share. This, according to Gershoni (1993:21-43) and
Ellis (1999:16), was seen by most West African leaders as an avenue for the experimentation of the doctrine of Pax Africana: a term which according to them implies providing African solutions to African problems.

While attesting to Nigeria’s decisive hegemonic role in Africa, Rugumamu (2004:11) also noted that, from the conception of ECOMOG to its eventual birth, Nigeria deployed huge financial resources to ensure the survival of the group including the contribution of a large contingent of troops. Ellis (1999); Francis (2001); Adebajo (2002a) and Adebajo (2002b) observe that between 1990 and 1997, Nigeria, in concert with other willing ECOWAS member states deployed more than 12,000 troops to the organization’s mission in Liberia; this is aside from the commitment of other resources. Shoup (2007) also credited the ECOMOG with being responsible for the containment of the spill-over effect which the war was starting to have on Sierra Leone, particularly for its role in helping to repel the advances being made by the rebels towards the country until the United Nations forces arrived in 1998.

Furthermore, Nigeria's diplomatic, financial and military involvement in many of these sub-regional interventions have helped to shape their processes and outcomes in a decisive fashion; a development which has further earned valuable international kudos for the Nigerian military dictatorship (Ebohon and Obakhedo, 2012:168). Leatherwood (2001:24) notes that Nigeria played an exemplary role in the West African sub-region and argues that throughout the second term of the Clinton administration, the US was less concerned about curbing the spread of conflicts in Africa; Nigeria wasted no time in stepping up its game in this regard. According to Berman and Sams (2003:46), this implies that the US was more comfortable backing a regional 'anchor' or states, including Nigeria, that were "willing to take losses and sustain deployments" Once more, Abuja's military and financial contributions dwarfed other states' to the extent that it could "brush aside ... continued diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis and pursued a military solution instead" (Berman and Sams (2003:46) cited in Ebohon and Obakhedo (2012:169)).

Consequently, as rightly observed by Fayemi (2004:19), the transformation of the war-like situation in both Liberia and Sierra Leone into what they are today, are testimony to the unprecedented post-conflict state reconstruction predicated on the massive inflow of international aid and the laying of an egalitarian economic reconstruction foundation instigated by Nigeria. In the view of Ebohon and Obakhedo (2012:169), Nigeria’s
commitment to peace and stability in Africa was subsequently carried on by the regimes which succeeded the Babangida administration. This was exemplified by continued attention to the fundamental issue of regional security through the maintenance of troops not only in the two war-torn countries (Liberia and Sierra-Leone) in the sub-region but also in Darfur, Sudan. A case in point was the Olusegun Obasanjo civilian administration (1999 – 2007); when Nigeria was relentless in its pursuit of the founding objectives of ECOWAS.

Ihonvbere (2004:5) averred that:

*Under the current administration, Nigeria’s foreign policy has undergone significant refurbishing, reformation and transformation....At another level, the President’s stature, credibility, power, influence, and understanding of the intricacies of foreign policy....this directly translates into respect for Nigeria. Whether you consider Sierra Leone, Liberia, ECOWAS, NEPAD...Nigeria’s achievement in Liberia is unprecedented. Without American funds or subsidy and with unprecedented courage, Nigeria has brought peace to that country, stopped the killings and helped map out a new path to recovery, reconciliation and reconstruction. The world has acknowledged this feat. And I was present recently when President Blah of Liberia visited Nigeria to thank the President and the Nigerian people and described President Obasanjo as the “Father of the Liberian nation”.*

According to Ebohon and Obakhedo (2012:169), the international clout and personality of the Obasanjo civilian administration turned Nigeria into a key peace-broker for both the UN and the AU. They also noted that Obasanjo's activism within the ECOWAS sub-region and Africa as a whole has boosted international support for the doctrine of 'Pax Africana'. They remarked that this term was beginning to gain more popularity in Europe and in the US, where it is perceived as a useful tool for constructive disengagement. Based on the foregoing, a tabular illustration of Nigeria’s involvement in peacekeeping and conflict resolution is presented to facilitate an understanding of how much of a commitment Nigeria has brought to bear in its quest to guarantee peace and stability in West Africa, Africa and the rest of the world.
# Table 3: Nigeria’s Participation in Global Peace Missions, 1960 - 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SN Area/Country</th>
<th>Name/Acronym</th>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>End date</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in the Congo</td>
<td>July 1960</td>
<td>June 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India-Pakistan</td>
<td>UNIPOM</td>
<td>United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission</td>
<td>September 1965</td>
<td>March 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
<td>March 1978</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Assistance Group</td>
<td>April 1989</td>
<td>March 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in</td>
<td>March 1992</td>
<td>September 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Mission Code</td>
<td>Mission Name</td>
<td>Start Date</td>
<td>End Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra-Leone</td>
<td>Bilateral Special Protection Force in Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Nigerian Neutral Force, Chad (Bilateral)</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>OAU Peacekeeping Force, Chad</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>ECOMOG Task Force in Sierra Leone,</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Start Date</td>
<td>End Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
<td>October 1999</td>
<td>December 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>ECOMIL</td>
<td>LIBERIA</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
<td>September 2003</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Mission in Darfur</td>
<td>2004-</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
<td>July 2007</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>MINURCAT</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad</td>
<td>September 2007</td>
<td>December 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan</td>
<td>July 2011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Table 4: Nigeria's Contribution of Peace Commanders and Chief Military Observers, 1960 - 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SN</th>
<th>Name of Commanders</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Operation Code</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Brig. Gen Ademulegun</td>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td></td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Tanganyika (Tanzania)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Col. J. Dongoyaro</td>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>HARMONY I</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Chad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Col. M. Magoro</td>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>HARMONY I</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Chad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shelpidi</td>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the Author.

* Chief Military Observer
** Chief Military Observer and later Force Commander

4.6 Conclusion - Where is the Citizen in Nigeria’s Afro-centrism?

This chapter has provided an historical appraisal of the Nigerian state. It is clear that Nigeria has been very aggressive in its pursuit of peace in West Africa and on the continent. As clearly demonstrated in the tables above, Nigeria has championed the cause of peace much more than most (if not all) of its contemporaries in Africa. Considering Africa’s endemic conflict profile and Nigeria’s role in its resolution, it could be argued that any study of conflicts in Africa would also require an examination of Nigeria’s catalytic role in conflict management on the continent, particularly given the country’s antecedents and experience in military operations and peacekeeping around the globe.

Nigeria has been actively involved in more than 42 global peace operations, committing more than 250,000 soldiers in the process, under the auspices of the ECOWAS, AU and the UN
Nigeria also prides itself on its current global record of having the highest involvement of female peacekeepers that have been deployed to serve in several peacekeeping missions; the country has consistently ranked fourth out of a total of 118 UN troop contributing countries in the world (Oluyemi-Kusa, 2007:140). However, the question that arises is; what has been the cost of all these interventions for Nigeria and its people?

According to reports emanating from the Nigerian Ministry of Defense in 2011, the country lost more than 2,000 officers while trying to bring peace to a people it probably never had any historical or geographical contiguity with. This is asides the incalculable financial and material costs of participating in these missions. This is the price Nigeria has paid for freedom, peace and the dignity of the human race. More importantly, all of these interventions have been premised on the dictates of the country’s Africa-centered ideology and its foreign policy postulation unwavering commitment to peace, stability and a just world order.

Notwithstanding Nigeria’s commitment to peace keeping and conflict resolution in Africa, it remains to be seen how well this has protected the interests of Nigerians both at home and abroad. There is need for the Nigerian government to realize that having spent the larger part of its 52 year history for Africa, the country needs to begin to attach socio-economic considerations to its peace keeping missions. For instance, there is no law which says the Nigerian business community cannot benefit from the supply of humanitarian aid Nigeria provides to war-torn nations. It may also not be out of place if Nigerians get the necessary political support from the government with regards to taking up key positions in supra-national institutions such as ECOWAS and the AU. Two key organizations, Nigeria has been actively involved with.

In ECOWAS for example, an institution Nigeria hosts and substantially funds, it is doubtful if its citizens get a fair share in terms of the employment opportunities available. One scholar sums up the above scenario in this way:

.....not only did the country (Nigeria) donate substantially towards ECOWAS, set up costs including the Secretariat, it regularly paid its annual contribution of approximately 32.5% of the Community’s budget which was subsequently revised upwards to 40%. In the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice only 7 percent of the staff are Nigerians, and it
is situated here in Abuja. At the African Union since 2003 when Obasanjo fielded two female candidates from Nigeria for the same post, making the country look unserious, no Nigerian has been elected in the AU Commission for the last six years. A nation that has the largest population in Africa is not represented in the African Union Commission. Burkina Faso defeated Nigeria in 2007! Really, what manner of citizen diplomacy is it when the citizens lack representation? (Onyearu 2009 cited in Monday, (2010:8).

Another case in point was that of Dr Ngozi Ugo, who was nominated for the position of UN Ombudsman and the deputy special representative of the Secretary-General in 2007. This position required the diplomatic endorsement of her home government - Nigeria. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which should ordinarily be at the vanguard of this good news and the office of the Attorney-General of the Federation kept foot dragging until she eventually lost the post (Monday, 2010: 8). This calls into question the manner of the citizen diplomacy Nigeria claims to be practicing when it cannot defend the interest of its citizens. As Mahmood (2009:4) observed:

*Dr. Ugo’s presence in the UN System would have enhanced Nigeria’s position for the UN permanent seat. Other more serious countries campaign for their citizens and that is why the highest ranking African in the UN system is a Tanzanian woman. Go to the Commonwealth Secretariat in London you may think you are in India’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs because of the number of Indians there. And this is where our own Chief Anyaoku served for almost four decades. When is Nigeria going to stand and recognize its own? It is sad, unfortunate and indeed painful!* (Mahmood 2009:4).

These are just instances of the kind of citizen diplomacy the Nigerian government is making available to its people. A people who perhaps do not really understand the meaning of real governance until general elections are approaching, and politicians swarm around them, sweet talking them for votes through the instrumentalities of their possibly *ill-gotten* wealth and empty promises. In view of the forgoing, it is doubtful if the Nigerian government has ever been more concerned about its people, notwithstanding the take-off of its much “politicized” citizen diplomacy drive. Ever since its conception in year 2007, Nigerians at home and abroad
are continually been subjected to all forms of discrimination and hate in their host countries and even at the home front.

The cases of the xenophobic attacks on its citizens by a section of the South-African population (in 2009) are sharp reminders of the agony its people face just by being citizens of the most populous Black nation in the world. At both the Lagos and Abuja offices of the High Commissions and Embassies of the major countries in Europe and in America, Nigerians are treated with disdain and disrespect, for merely wanting to visit to some of these countries. Including being beaten up by security agencies for what the “officers” (who incidentally are also Nigerians) call non-compliance with protocol, yet the Nigerian government has not in the recent time, particularly after the commencement of the citizen diplomacy approach, risen up to strongly condemn these attacks on its people or taken any diplomatic measure to stem this tide.

It is doubtful if the American, British or any other government committed to the well-being and the protection of the larger interest of its people will allow that type of treatment to be meted out to its citizens anywhere in the world. Sad enough, this is happening in Nigeria, worse still, on the people’s home soil. The only thing the Nigerian government has done is to watch with rapt attention, while its citizens continue to bear the brunt of this maltreatment and their governments’ ineptitude. The necessary question that may arise out of these occurrences may be; what manner of citizen diplomacy has the Nigerian government adopted in the last five years (2007-2012), when it can not use the same to resolve the multiplicity of home grown economic and diplomacy related issues confronting its people?

Another case in point is the plight of Nigerians who are still resident in the Bakkassi peninsula, an area which used to be part of Nigeria, but was ceded to Cameroon following the verdict of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which awarded the oil rich region to that country (Cameroon). Following this development, it has been reported in some quarters that some Nigerians who have not fully left the region are being treated by the Cameroonian authorities in a manner that is not befitting of a people whose government has been more than cooperative, particularly judging by the way it accepted the ruling of the ICJ (The Punch, December 11, 2012)). These are just a few examples of the way the Nigerian government pursues its citizen diplomacy drive.
In the concluding chapter, attempts shall be made towards providing a way forward on the path Nigeria could follow, if it is to achieve a balance between its national interests, its hegemonic aspirations and how it can effectively articulate the *widely* proclaimed citizen diplomacy approach for the betterment of its people and Nigeria as a whole.
CHAPTER FIVE

Summary, Recommendations and Conclusion

5.1 Summary of findings

This research study has interrogated the essential issues that have influenced Nigeria’s conflict resolution mechanisms in Africa, particularly from the perspective of its foreign policy over a period of 50 years. It was found that Nigeria has committed substantial resources to guarantee sub-regional peace and security in West Africa. The study has revealed that there is an inextricable connection between Nigeria’s foreign policy and its interventionist role in Africa. Aside from the constitutional provision which recognizes Nigeria’s Africa-centered ideology, the country’s involvement in conflicts in Africa have often been influenced by the leadership style and political ideology of the individual in power.

The study has further revealed that the national uproar arising from Nigeria’s ailing economy and the plethora of its unresolved homegrown socio-economic and political woes was a contributory factor to the Babangida administration’s search for a reprieve elsewhere, thus necessitating the country’s intervention in Liberia. The Liberian mission was financed and executed by Nigeria at a time when its foreign debt stood at $35 billion (in 1995), thus calling into question the economic rationality attached to that intervention. It is debatable whether any other Western nation, especially after the Somali-intervention, could have matched such a huge level of commitment. Some would argue that the assumption of such a role by Nigeria was an avenue for the regime at that time to score political points did not necessarily arise out of a genuine commitment to Liberia’s peace and stability.

The study has further observed that the claim by the Babangida administration that it went to Liberia mainly to protect Nigeria’s national interest, remains largely unproven, especially when considered from the perspective of how well the Nigerian authorities succeeded in

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24 Further analysis of the cost of Nigeria’s involvement in Liberia suggests that Nigeria accounted for more than 70% of the force and 80% of the funding, thus expending close to $11 billion in the process on an exercise that has been argued to have negated institutional procedure. For instance, it has been said that the Liberian mission was shrouded in controversies such as the questionable legitimacy of ECOMOG, the issue of poor diplomacy, concerns over inadequate funding and logistics, and the unclear mandate assigned to the ECOMOG forces.
achieving this feat. For example, despite its traditional relations with the country, the United States did not waste time evacuating its citizens from Liberia, while Nigeria, with no relationship with Liberia other than the ECOWAS bond waited and allowed its people to be massacred and taken as hostages before the Babangida administration came to their rescue.

The first chapter of this dissertation outlined the premises on which its other parts of thesis would be built. The second chapter undertook a review of Nigeria’s foreign policy, including its centrifugal and centripetal determinants and the constitutional interpretation of these provisions. The notion of conflict and its accompanying variants were examined. The third chapter interrogated the underlying reasons informing Nigeria’s interventionist role in Liberia. This included a contextualization of the Liberian state; including the roles played by different actors in the seven-year war. The fourth chapter focused on the Nigerian state and the major institutions responsible for its foreign policy formulation. The chapter concluded with an appraisal of Nigeria’s contribution to peacekeeping missions around the globe. The fifth chapter is devoted to the key findings arising from the research study and the policy recommendations.

In terms of the practical application of the qualitative research methodology adopted for the study, through the instrumentality of the content analysis approach, the study interrogated Nigeria’s conflict resolution in Africa largely from the perspective of its foreign policy approach. The data were gathered through secondary sources, were subjected to empirical analysis and were also updated to conform to current trends within the purview of existing literature. Theoretically, the adoption of the Realist approach assisted in understanding the underpinning reasons behind Nigeria’s interventionist role in West Africa and in Africa in general, particularly when considered from the perspective of the three notions of survival, self-help and statism. The study revealed that Nigeria’s sojourn in Liberia was predicated on the need to ensure the continuity of the Liberian state whose existence at that point in time was severely under threat; furthermore, there was a need to protect any ECOWAS member state from disintegration. The study has shown that Nigeria, like every other state-actor is guided by the triple notion of statism, survival and self-help; a core element embedded in structural realism. This has led to Nigeria becoming a colossus on the African continent, championing the cause of conflict resolution. Whether Nigeria succeeded in protecting its national interest in most of these interventions will be shaped and judged by events in the years to come.
Nigeria’s Afrocentric foreign policy prompted its leadership of the ECOWAS / ECOMOG-led intervention in Liberia; this framework was later adopted for the missions in Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Cote D’Ivoire. These missions helped to create conditions that further highlight the Africa’s potential to prevent, manage and resolve its problems on its own. If well managed, this could brighten the prospects of an African solution to African problems.

5.2 Recommendations

This study has demonstrated that Nigeria’s interventionist role in the West African sub-region and in Africa is a consequence of the dictates of its foreign policy as it pertains to its doctrine of four concentric circles and Afro-centrism. It is within this purview that this study offers the following recommendations, which if well-articulated, could help to strike a balance between the notions of public good (which appears to be the philosophical justification for its intervention in conflicts) and the sanctity of its national interest when it comes to conflict resolution.

1. There is an urgent need for the Nigerian state to redefine its responsibilities and priorities at the international level to align with the domestic needs of its citizenry before considering any external intervention.

2. Given the declining state of Nigeria’s economy over the last 32 years, (1980-2012), it is becoming crystal clear that the country, to all intents and purpose, no longer has the strength it had at the time when this Africa-centered policy was conceived. To this end, it is recommended that Nigeria should situate future interventions within the context of economic sustainability and the benefits attached to such interventions.

3. It is also suggested that the country’s foreign policy, which ought to be a dynamic instrument of negotiation and interest articulation, be periodically reviewed to align with emerging trends in international politics and the international system.
4. Nigeria should also consider a redefinition of its national interest and make it more people oriented. After all, a government is not seen as responsible if it increasingly fails to provide for its people, a source of national identity and sense of belonging; this can only be brought about by an improvement in their standard of living and in the fulfillment of the basic obligations expected of government. As long as Nigerians continue to sleep on the streets owing to the failure of the government to provide shelter for them; the unemployment rate continues to sky-rocket; the gap between the rich and the poor continues to widen and critical infrastructure (such as good roads, a stable electricity supply, affordable health care; quality education etc.) continue to elude them, the rationality of continuing with an approach that was conceived at a time when Nigeria’s socio-economic and political environment was convivial and conducive for such interventions is called into question.

5. It is also advised that Nigeria re-consider the widely held underpinning interventionist philosophy that assumes that a threat to international peace and security from any part of the continent represents a threat Nigeria. The way in which America, China, Russia, the United Kingdom etc. make use of their foreign policy should serve as a guideline for Nigeria. The nation must discontinue what this study terms „a charity of foreign policy diplomacy“ or intervening in conflicts for hegemonic reasons without consideration of the national interests at stake. The world has long since moved from this stage.

6. It is recommended that the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs be restructured and strengthened. If this done effectively, it will enable Nigeria’s foreign policy goals to be translated into a more specific national interest and program of action, potent enough to respond in a timely manner to changes in the external environment.

7. It is also submitted that for there to be an element of economic rationality in Nigeria’s interventionist missions in the sub-region, the country must insist on sharing the burden of peacekeeping in line with the ECOWAS security mechanism agreed on in 1999. What happened in Liberia; where the country was responsible for more than 80% of the total cost of funding that mission,
cannot be allowed to repeat itself. This is particularly pertinent in the light of
the fact that the ECOWAS is preparing for another ground assault in Mali,
ostensibly to restore the democratically elected government that was
overthrown by the military on March 27, 2012.

8. Finally, with regards to the African continent, it is advised that Nigeria,
courtesy of being one of the planners and executors of institutions such as the
OAU, ECOWAS, and the AU, among others, should take the lead in the
building of more viable and effective economic communities in Africa. This
would go a long way to reduce the plethora of conflicts the continent
incessantly plays host to. After all, most of these conflicts are a function of
agitations arising from economic stagnation and the inability of governments in
the conflict zones to meet the basic expectations of their people. Nigeria should
direct the path of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)
towards poverty eradication on the continent.

Conclusion
There is no denying the fact that, since independence, Nigeria has pursued international peace
aimed at achieving regional and global objectives; however, it remains to be seen whether
this has paid off in terms of tangible and psychological benefits for Nigerians. Over the years,
Nigerians have not been the net beneficiaries of their country’s foreign policy. In terms of
who gains, it appears that the nation’s foreign policy has been too externally oriented, thus
implying a lack of domestic focus. This failure constitutes a major weakness of the nation’s
foreign policy and it is the considered opinion of this researcher that a re-definition of
Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives has become imperative in order to bridge the discord
between foreign policy and local expectation. Nigeria should endeavor to reconstruct the
goals and values of her foreign policy to include what Nigerians as individuals can
specifically gain from the nation’s peacekeeping efforts.

For instance, while it may be true that Nigeria’s voyage into Liberia, was borne out of its
commitment to and respect for its notion of four concentric circles and the larger foreign
policy dictate of Afro-centrism, it remains to be seen how well the intervention paid off for
the government and the Nigerian people in terms of post-civil war events in Liberia. It is
questionable whether Nigerians were sufficiently protected in Liberia, despite the fact that their government was paying the price for Liberia’s peace and stability. A case in point was the killing of two Nigerian journalists in 1990 (Tayo Awotunsin of The Champion Newspaper and Chris Imodibie of The Guardian) while on professional assignments in Liberia by forces loyal to the late Liberian war lord, Samuel Doe. The Nigerian government’s response was a laughable ultimatum issued to the leadership of the country to either produce the killers of the journalist or be prepared to face dire consequences. The rest is of the story is history.

It is also not out of place to ask how well the Nigerian government has taken care of the men and women of the armed forces who paid the supreme price for freedom and peace in Liberia; including the present state of the Nigeria/Liberia diplomatic relations. Worthy of mention in particular, is the diplomatic row which ensued between Nigeria and Liberia over the latter’s expression of its willingness to allow the US army to make use of its territory as a base for AFRICOM\(^\text{25}\), notwithstanding Nigeria’s strong opposition to the plan. There are many such questions, the answers to which may lie in Nigeria taking drastic and focused steps toward the adoption of a foreign policy approach that takes into cognizance the wellbeing of Nigerians in future intervention.

Arising from the above analysis, and taking cognizance of the governments’ proposed gravitation towards citizen diplomacy, it is advised that the government takes into consideration the welfare and well-being of its people in future intervention. The people must be the government’s top priority. It is not just enough for the government to say it is shifting its foreign policy focus towards citizen diplomacy. Domestic considerations have an intrinsic place in foreign policy formulation. A foreign policy must be pursued as a continuation of a nation’s domestic policy and Nigeria’s domestic policy should be centered on people-oriented governance.

\(^{25}\) According to the United States’ Department of Defense, the United States Africa Command, also known as U.S. AFRICOM, is one of nine Unified Combatant Commands of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) which focuses on Africa and is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for U.S. military relations in all 54 African countries. Its main priority is to enable the Department of Defense, in conjunction with other components of the U.S. government to achieve a more stable environment where political and economic growth that furthers, protects and defends the national security interests of the United States can take place. This is intended to be achieved through the strengthening of the defense capabilities of African states and regional organizations and, when directed to do so, is also empowered to conduct military operations, in order to deter and defeat transnational threats and to provide a security environment conducive to good governance and development.
As Akinterinwa (2010) suggested, government must use its foreign policy to immediately address issues such as the refusal to grant entry visas to Nigerians who have legitimate documentation and reasons for wanting to travel, the shabby treatment Nigerians are confronted with at home and abroad and for Nigerian business entrepreneurs to benefit from the country’s regional and sub-regional peace initiatives, particularly with regard to humanitarian aid that could be locally sourced. The welfare of Nigerians and the alleviation of mass poverty should be prioritized in the nation’s foreign policy considerations. It is important that Nigerians be made the centerpiece of the country’s foreign policy; this needs to be demonstrated both in theory and in practice.
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