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Thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Postgraduate programme in Political Science, School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietemaritzburg, South Africa

2012
DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is my own unaided work. All citations, references and borrowed ideas have been duly acknowledged. It is being submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities, Development and Social Sciences, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa.

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Sadiki Maeresera     Professor Ufo Okeke Uzodike
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Date       Date
DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to my parents, who through the power and blessings of Almighty God have always and will forever remain the source of inspiration.
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ABSTRACT

This study focuses on the premise that national interests of governments are the primary motivating factors that inform decisions on military interventions. Military strategy remains a principal tool in the attainment, pursuance and safeguarding of these interests. Military intervention is the last resort to a series of options that begin with and continue to inform the dynamic: diplomacy, policing, reliance on alliance action and finally, deterrent or pro-active military action. Military interventions in the 20th century have been undertaken at the multilateral, regional and sub-regional levels in given conflicts by a range of actors. Scholarly questions have been asked about the rationale behind the respective governments’ decisions to undertake these interventions. In the case of this study, which focuses on the SADC coalition of willing nations’ military intervention in the Congo conflict, questions have centred on the following: What was the rationale and motive that led governments of the three countries to undertake the decisions for military intervention in the Congo? Was the intervention an altruistic act by the intervening governments seeking to stop aggression of an ally or was it driven by the personal quests by leaders of these intervening countries to secure their share of the DRC mineral wealth? Or, was it merely a case of the three governments intervening as a coalition in pursuit of their varied interests? What was the strategy that this coalition adopted in pursuit of the member countries interests? It is this attempt to explain and determine the rationale and principal factors that informed the three countries’ decision to intervene in the conflict and the military strategy adopted to safeguard these interests that serve as the focal basis for this study.

In trying to answer its key questions, this study uses historical and qualitative approaches in collecting and analysing data not only from both primary and secondary sources but also
interviews with participants (some off the record as still serving). Thus, the findings of the research would be analysed critically within the framework of the core objectives of the study, which seek not only to identify and establish how the interests of the governments that intervened in the DRC conflict were the primary motivating factor that informed their decisions on military interventions, but also to ascertain the extent to which the SADC coalition’s military strategy became a principal tool in the attainment and safeguarding of these varying interests as well as how that strategy was utilised as a mechanism for the translation and development of these varying interests into common ones among the intervening countries. Lastly, the study seeks to offer policy suggestions on the execution of future military interventions in African conflicts, particularly at the SADC sub-regional level.

Whilst literature on military interventions seems to be informed by realpolitik, with the notions by Barry Buzan (and others) that strong states take decisions to intervene when their geostrategic and economic interests are served, states can also militarily intervene for humanitarian purposes. Using the realist paradigm as a theoretical tool of analysis, the study noted that military intervention can best be understood in terms of the power and interests of particular nation states acting individually or collectively as a coalition using the brand of a sub-regional, regional or even international organisation with or without the mandate of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). An analysis is made on the scholarly legal debates surrounding the decision to intervene by the SADC coalition.

The study generally established that the claimed interests that motivated the decisions by the respective governments were generally based on the political, economic and military/security dimensions. A critical evaluation of these respective interests of the interveners show that their interests shifted in regards to the levels of importance (that is primary and secondary
level) at the initial stage of the intervention and during the intervention period. The coalition’s military strategy became a tool for attaining, securing and safeguarding of these respective interests. As part of the strategy, the SADC coalition’s Mutual Defence Pact acted as a political and legal guide in the promotion of complimentary and common interests of the interveners.

Despite formulating such a military strategy, the unexpected longevity of the intervention impacted on the intervening countries’ logistical capacity to sustain the war effort. An initiative by the DRC government to enter into bilateral business ventures with the respective SADC countries and its awarding of mining concessions to the same was meant to be part, arguably, of sustaining the military intervention. However, this war time economic initiative has raised questions among scholars and policy practitioners on whether or not the decision for intervention by a coalition of these countries was basically underpinned by the quest to attain and safeguard national interests or it was aimed at promoting personal elite interests.

Having taken note that the major findings of the study revolve around contentious primary issues relating to foreign policy decision making in the context of military intervention, a number of recommendations are made. These include:

- Firstly, the undertaking of cost benefit analyses in regard to political, legal and economic matters prior to a nation’s decision for military intervention;
- Secondly, the need for an appropriate and effective sub-regional mechanism guided by a sub-regional legal guide or tool for military intervention that would be utilised within the relevant AU and UN political and military framework;

Finally a paradigm shift is needed in the conceptualization of what constitutes national interest. This includes a new theoretical thinking based on unilateral and multilateral military
intervention in the present global order which should be based on the global or collective interest where maintenance of international peace, stability and security (more importantly human security) are of primary importance.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>Angolan Commercial Trade (ACT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Alliance Democratique du Peuples (People’s Democratic Alliance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Allied Democratic Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFZ</td>
<td>Air Force of Zimbabwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFDL</td>
<td>Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la liberation du Congo (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Operational Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMFI</td>
<td>American Mineral Fields Inc (AMFI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>B52</td>
<td>US Bomber</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCG</td>
<td>Barrick Gold Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAAL</td>
<td>Congolese Airline</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capt</td>
<td>Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cdos</td>
<td>Commandos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable News Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRA</td>
<td>Edmond Morels Congo Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRGM</td>
<td>National Centre of Geological and Mine Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSLM</td>
<td>Caprivi Strip Liberation Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CZI</td>
<td>Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMIAP</td>
<td>Military Detection for Anti Patriotic Activities- DRC Military Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EF</td>
<td>Eastern Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAA</td>
<td>Forcas Armadas de Angola (Angolan Armed Forces)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>Forces Armees Congolaise (Congolese Armed Forces) (since 1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAZ</td>
<td>Forces Armees Zairoises (Zairian Armed Forces) (under Mobutu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDD</td>
<td>Front pour la Defense de la Democratic (Forces for the Defence of Democracy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNB</td>
<td>First Banking Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen</td>
<td>General</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFIs</td>
<td>International Financial Institutions (IFIs) (World Bank and International Monetary Fund)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund (IMF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISDSC</td>
<td>Inter-State Defence and Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAG</td>
<td>Judge Advocate General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPC</td>
<td>Joint Permanent Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSE</td>
<td>London Stock Exchange (LSE)</td>
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</table>
Lt  Lieutenant
Lt Gen (rtd)  Lieutenant General Retired
MACC  Military Advisory Command Cell
Maj  Major
Maj Gen  Major General
Mech  Mechanised
MI  Military Intelligence
MLC  Movement for the Liberation of the Congo
MONUC  United Nations Observer Mission in Congo
MPLA  Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
MPR  Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution (Popular Movement of the Revolution)
MDP  Mutual Defence Pact
NAM  Non Aligned Movement
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBS  Namibian Business Confederation
NCN  New Congo News
NDF  Namibian Defence Forces
NF  Northern Front
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation
OAU  Organisation of African Unity
OPDSC  Organ on Politics Defence and Security Committee
OSLEG  Operation Sovereign Legitimacy
Para  Paratroopers
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PTP</td>
<td>Preferential Trade Protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCD-Goma</td>
<td>Rassemblement Congolaise pour la Democratie-Goma (Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma)</td>
</tr>
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<td>RCD-Kisangani</td>
<td>Rassemblement Congolaise pour la Democratie-Kisangani (Rally for Congolese Democracy-Kisangani)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCD-ML</td>
<td>Rassemblement Congolaise pour la Democratie-Mouvement de Liberation (Rally for Congolese Democracy-Liberation Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCD-Originale</td>
<td>Rassemblement Congolaise pour la Democratie-Originale Rally for Congolese Democracy-Originale)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDC</td>
<td>Rassemblement Congolaise pour la Democratie (Rally for Congolese Democracy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPA</td>
<td>Rwandese Patriotic Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPTC</td>
<td>Regional Peace keeping Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwanda Patriotic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAIDSMP</td>
<td>Southern African International Dialogue on Smart Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SABC</td>
<td>South Africa Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAS</td>
<td>Special Air Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFC HQ</td>
<td>Task Force Command Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SONANGOL</td>
<td>Angola National Oil Company.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West Africa Peoples’ Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UB</td>
<td>University of Botswana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPDS</td>
<td>Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UPDS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UNITA
Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)

UNESCO
United Nations Education and Scientific Organisation

UNSC
United Nations Security Council (UNSC)

UNSRC
United Nations Security Council Resolution

UNO
United Nations Organisation

UPDF
Uganda People’s Defence Forces

USA
United States of America

USSR
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

VUOA
Village des Unies Organisation Afrique (OAU Village),

WB
World Bank

WF
Western Front

ZDF
Zimbabwe Defence Forces

ZDI
Zimbabwe Defence Industries
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and outline of research problem

The 20th century was dominated in some ways by military interventions by states in conflicts occurring in other countries. At the multilateral level, military interventions mandated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) were witnessed in the 1990s in Bosnia, East Timor, Haiti, Iraq, Lebanon, Sierra Leone, Somalia and many others. Regionally, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) took a decision to launch “Operation Allied Force” in 1999 in order to prevent Serbian atrocities in Kosovo. At the sub-regional level, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), led by Nigeria, intervened in conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The military contingents of some Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) member states, specifically from Botswana and South Africa, intervened in Lesotho, whilst those from Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia (ANZ) were deployed to assist the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC) to oppose both the capture of Kinshasa and the ousting of President Laurent Desiree Kabila’s government from power by Ugandan, Rwandan and Burundian backed rebels.

Many scholars have questioned the rationale behind the intervention by the armed forces of some countries in the domestic affairs of their neighbours. Indeed, there are fairly robust scholarly debates and analyses about the contexts within which there can be justifiable military intervention. These include intervention at request. Specifically, the UN has accepted that state has an automatic legal right to exercise its sovereignty by requesting assistance from any friendly state or a group of states as witnessed in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait (Barrie, 2000:90). Intervention can also be undertaken by a state as its right to protect its citizens abroad as was the case with the Belgian and French troops in Rwanda in 1994. This
type of intervention is held to be justified when the “nationals are in immediate danger of losing their lives or are threatened with serious injury” (Barrie, 2000:94; Bull, 1984:76). A state can also justify its intervention as a measure of collective defence or in support of self-determination or as a result of a treaty (Barrie, 2000:94).

While some scholars have focused their assessments on issues (such as human rights or state terrorism) that might engender such interventions, others have levelled criticisms against those military interventions which were launched without prior mandate from the UN Security Council such as the Vietnam intervention in Kampuchea (Cambodia) in 1978, and Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda in 1979 (Hippel, 2000:8). The decision by the SADC member states - specifically Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia (AZN) - to intervene militarily in the DRC conflict in 1998, attracted international debate among academics and practitioners in regard to the legal and moral justification of the military intervention under international law. Not surprisingly, the views on the correctness of the decision to intervene have varied. Those who oppose the military intervention argue that the personal interests of some leaders drove the decision. Indeed, widespread criticisms by not only some members of the media in both the intervening and the non-intervening countries but also academic commentators and expert observers have condemned the intervening AZN coalition (Ngoma, 2004:5). Those who have argued in favour of the military intervention have done so on the grounds that the deployment of the coalition troops helped to preserve the government in power and created an environment that resulted in the deployment of UN peacekeepers.

Clearly, there is ongoing scholarly disagreement on the motives behind the AZN coalition’s decision in 1998 to intervene militarily in the DRC. How then can we understand the rationale or motive behind that intervention? Was it an altruistic act by concerned
governments seeking to stop self-immolation by a troubled neighbour? Was it driven by the personal quests of the leaders of Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia to secure their share of the vast mineral wealth of the DRC? Was it a case of regional rivalries for power and influence which pitted AZN leadership against the leadership of Uganda and Rwanda who, purportedly, were attempting to impose Tutsi hegemony in the Great Lakes region? Or was it merely a case of governments pursuing their varied national interests? What was the strategy adopted by the coalition forces? It is this attempt to explain the rationale for the intervention and the military strategy used by the coalition forces that serves as the focal basis for this study. The research wishes to ascertain the central motives of the AZN states with a view to determining the principal factors that informed their decision to intervene in the DRC between 1998 and 2002.

1.2 Research hypothesis

The hypothesis of this study is that the national interests of governments are the primary motivating factors that inform their decisions on military interventions1. Military strategy

1 Whilst there seems to be a general agreement among scholars and practitioners of international relations and security studies that the primary justification of a state’s action is premised on national interest, disagreements among them start when conceptual or substantive issues about national interest are raised in relation to the generally acceptable definition of the concept. These issues include: what would constitute the national interest of a given country; consensus on who decides the priorities of state action and the framework implementation of these actions; definition of a given state’s threat level; by whom and how allies are chosen and the role of government when faced with internal disagreements regarding national goals and values (Krasner, 1978: 98, see also Roskin 1994:78). The above points are reinforced by Professor Uzodike’s comments to author (2007) when he noted that there is no clear demarcation between state and personal interests for those in leadership positions because in some cases leaders can manipulate the basic nationalistic and humanistic sentiments of the electorate for personal gain. Even where national interest is heavily contested within any country, state actions often reflect the national interests as articulated by the dominant coalition within the government or the state (This information is acknowledged as feedback academic guidance to author by Professor Ufo Uzodike, September 2007). Professor Theo Neethling (2008) also reiterated Uzodike’s argument by noting that this would differ from country to country. In some countries, heads of government are well-positioned to exercise executive power and determine or steer – even manipulate - foreign policy. (The Russian political-military action with Georgia is a case in point.) However, Neethling pointed out that in some other countries heads of government are constitutionally constrained in terms of accountability, exercising of executive power and foreign policy decision making (e.g. Switzerland), and are therefore less likely to determine/steer or even manipulate foreign policy for personal gain. The presence – or absence - of a vocal/critical media is of course of further importance (This information is hereby acknowledged as feedback comments through email correspondence by Professor Theo Neethling to the author, August 2008. Professor Neethling, who is now Head of School in the Department
remains a principal tool used for the attainment, pursuance (and promotion) as well as safeguarding of these interests\textsuperscript{2}.

1.3 Preliminary literature review

Du Plessis (2000: 4) broadly defines military intervention as “the interference of one state in the affairs of another state thereby resulting in the temporary interruption of normal bilateral patterns of relationship between the two”. The author further gives a more descriptive definition of military intervention as that action by a state or a group of states as well as an international organisation which is meant to influence or even change the political structures, domestic policies. These changes, which may be done through coercive or non-coercive means, may be against the will of that particular government or through the government’s request. The actions will be in pursuit of given objectives of the interveners (Barrie, 2000:78; see also Geldenhuys, 1998:78).

In the light of the above definition, it can be realised that military intervention is undertaken for achievement of political ends by nation states. Other scholars have defined military intervention with the aim of making it distinct from overt military operations such as those of private mercenaries, terrorist groups and national liberation movements (Du Plessis, 2000:8; see also Tillema, 1989:181; Vertzberger, 1998:114).

Humanitarian intervention is another form of military intervention that is done for humanitarian purposes such as the promotion of peace, provision of relief to war victims

\textsuperscript{2} As a subdiscipline of warfare and foreign policy, military strategy remains key in the securing and safeguarding of those interests that would have made governments to undertake decisions for military intervention. A nation state or a coalition of states will have to wield diplomatic, informational, military and economic resources in order to have the capability to successfully pursue and safeguard these interests (see Chaliand, 1994:95)
particularly unarmed combatants (women and children) (Freedman, 1994:3). In the light of these conceptualizations of military interventions, it can be observed that military intervention can be carried out for humanitarian purposes (Schraeder, 1989:115). Thus, besides the use of coercive force through armed military personnel, military intervention can be undertaken through non coercive means by unarmed personnel particularly in peace support operations which are conducted under the authority of inter-governmental organizations. This thesis project will focus on the “conventional view of coercive military intervention involving combat and combat-ready actions” (Du Plessis, 2000:8).

There are generally agreed reasons that are put forward to justify a state or a group of states intervening in the affairs of another. These include intervention on request which the UN has accepted as the “inherent and lawful right of every state in the exercise of its sovereignty to request assistance from another state or group of states” (Barrie, 2000:89-90). Intervention can also be undertaken by a state as a duty to protect its citizens abroad. Such intervention is justified when the “nationals are in immediate danger of losing their lives or are threatened with serious injury” (Barrie, 2000:94). A state can also justify its intervention as a measure of collective defence or in support of self-determination or as a result of a treaty (Barrie, 2000; 95, see also Bull, 1984:76). Other scholars have argued that in most cases interventions that are made by powerful states are always motivated by power and protection of national interests of these powerful states (Finnemore, 2004:5). It is the concept of national interest, defined as the preferences of a nation’s leaders or the goals that are sought by the state, that continue to serve as a useful “tool in determining the state’s motivations to engage in military interventions” (George and Keohane, 1980:217; see also Van Nieuwkerk, 2003:70). The main assumption here is that issues associated with national identity and survival will motivate intervening states to engage in military intervention.
Apart from the argument that sees military intervention in terms of the protection of national interest and collective interest of states, due to the uncertainty, complexity and potential destructiveness of military intervention, the originally purported and declared objectives are sometimes not achieved (Du Plessis, 2000:32; see also Vertzberger, 1998:180). If this happens, then observers (including other actors) always deem intervention suspect irrespective of the justification (Vertzberger, 1998:180).

Scholars who have written about the military intervention in the DRC conflict by the ANZ coalition have argued that the intervention was meant to restore peace and tranquillity in the DRC whilst safeguarding the varied “national” interests of the intervening countries such as security interests for Angola, strategic economic interests for Zimbabwe, and security and strategic economic interests for Namibia (Mandaza, 1999:35; Tapfumaneyi, 1999:87; Baregu, 1999:38). However, those who argue that personal self-interest dominated the decision to intervene militarily in the DRC opposed this school of thought (Naidoo, 2000:75-79; Wamba, 1999:120-121; Cleaver and Massey, 2004:70;). This study will demonstrate that all the literature on military intervention in the DRC by the AZN coalition fails to bring out the political strategy factors behind the idea of achieving varied interests pursued through a collective and synchronized military intervention mechanism.

1.3.1 Unpacking the concept of “coalition of the willing” in the context of military interventionism

The term “coalition of the willing is a post-1990 political phrase used to collectively describe participants in military or military-humanitarian interventions for which the United Nations Security Council cannot agree to mount a full UN peacekeeping operation” (Meyer and
Coalition of the willing has been used as a political science concept in general and international relations in particular from 1993 to 1994 when UN peacekeeping operations began to experience major complexities. This resulted in the consideration of various options by countries for them to be able to deploy troops in situations they deemed necessary to do so. The concept or phrase was also given reference in 1994 by then US President Bill Clinton over the possibility of carrying out military offensives against North Korea (Meyer and Zdara, 2006:23). This was the time when Washington and Tehran had a standoff over the latter’s nuclear weapons programmes. Coalition of the willing has been applied to the Australian-led operation “INTERFET” in East Timor.

Coalition of the willing as a concept took global centre stage and attention in November 2002 during US President George W Bush’s visit to Europe for a NATO summit. The then US President made a declaration that "should Iraqi President Saddam Hussein choose not to disarm, the United States will lead a coalition of the willing to disarm him."3 Thus the Bush administration briefly used the term "coalition of the willing" to “refer to the countries that supported, militarily or verbally, the 2003 invasion of Iraq and subsequent military presence in post-invasion Iraq” (Meyer and Zdrada, 2006:25). The list of “coalition members provided by the White House included several nations that did not intend to participate in actual military operations” (Meyer and Zdrada, 2006:25). As Meyer and Zdrada (2006:25) observed, “the original list released in March 2003 included 46 members. In April 2003, the list was updated to include 49 countries, though it was reduced to 48 after Costa Rica did not agree to its inclusion” (Meyer and Zdrada, 2006:25). The two authors further noted that “of the 48 states on the list, three contributed troops to the invasion force (the United Kingdom,

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3 President George Bush made the same point during his 2002 state of the nation address; see www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/(accessed 29 June 2008).
Australia and Poland). An additional 37 countries provided some number of troops to support military operations after the invasion was complete (Meyer and Zdrada, 2006:25).

In a coalition of the willing, there may be one influential leader among the leaders of a group of countries. This leader may not necessarily be powerful in terms of his country’s economic and military capability. However, s/he may use his or her political influence or even clout to rally up those countries with which his or her country shares strong intimate diplomatic and historical ties to take up a specific task especially in the context of a military intervention. In the case of the three SADC intervening countries, whilst Zimbabwe’s economic and military power could not be said to have been above or below that of Angola, the fact that the Zimbabwean President held the Chair of the SADC Organ could mean that he was able to use that political influence to make the coalition of the willing. To emphasize the fact that the three countries’ intervention was based on the concept of coalition of the willing, the then SADC OPDSC Chair reiterated that “None is compelled within SADC to go into a campaign of assisting a country beset by conflict. Those who want to keep out, fine. Let them keep out, but let them be silent about those who want to help” (Ngoma, 2004:5).

The debates on circumstances which lead to coalition of the willing vary. In the case of the three SADC countries, these seem to have been centered on the close historical political, economic and military ties that existed among these intervening countries and the close historical relations of the political leadership. In this case, the three countries seem to have been bound by the historical liberation connection that exists between the SWAPO, ZANU PF, and MPLA. In addition to the above, the debate on the coalition of the willing in the context of the SADC intervening countries could be understood also to have been centered on the need to show solidarity with a member state which was in need of such assistance. On
the sidelines of the Southern Africa trade and investment conference in Maputo 1 December 1999, the Namibian and Zimbabwean Presidents jointly noted that the intervention by the three countries which took the form of a coalition of the willing was a response “to a call for assistance by the DRC government following the invasion by Uganda and Rwanda … I think our decision was a gallant one and our response so far has been just as gallant. We have prevented the aggressors from achieving their goal” (Ngoma, 2004:5). In this thesis, the term coalition of the willing would be used interchangeably with allies in reference to the three intervening countries generally within the context discussed. It is also essential to briefly discuss the concept of military strategy.

1.3.2 Military strategy as a tool for the attainment, pursuing and safeguarding of national interests

Military strategy “is a sub discipline of warfare and foreign policy” (Hew, 2007:19). Since it is a principal tool used by nation states in the securing of national interests, military strategy involves the wielding of diplomatic, informational, economic and military resources against the opponent, thereby reducing that particular opponent’s capacity to fight (Hew, 2007:19). In the context of this study, the coalition forces’ ability to design a way of how to plan and conduct the whole campaign viz the deployment of troops and the employment of weapons in order for the military intervention to be a success was part of the military strategy. The SADC coalition strategy ranged from finding out the ways and means of gaining the end of war to “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy” (national or otherwise) (Gartner, 1996:163; see also Carpenter, 2005:25; Matloff, 1996:11; Wilden, 1987:235). Thus the coalition strategy became a key tool for the securing of the member countries’ respective national interests. Writing on the importance of military
strategy, Carl von Clausewitz noted that “war is not merely a political act, but a real political instrument, a continuation of policy carried out by other means” (Clausewitz, 2003:147). In the context of this study, military strategy would be discussed in line with how the coalition troops executed given plans at all levels of the military intervention, the manoeuvring of coalition forces in battles and the replenishment of logistics in order to maintain troops in an effort to attain the respective interests of the intervening countries (Chaliand, 1994:638). (1).

Objective (the coalition forces’ command hierarchy was to come out with a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective viz their respective national interests).

1.4 Research Justification

Although there has been considerable academic debate about the military intervention in the DRC conflict, the various arguments brought forward in regard to the link between the intervention and interests of the intervening states have not been objective. There has been an absence of in-depth research and analysis into what motivated the allies to intervene in the conflict. This study will try to demonstrate systematically and logically that the varying interests of the intervening countries can be achieved through a collective military intervention strategy. This will add impetus to the existing body of literature on military interventions.

The available literature has not explored how motivations behind the military interventions influenced the choice of the intervention strategy. This thesis will attempt to fill that gap by analysing the different motives behind the AZN coalition’s military intervention and establishing why there was a particular centralized and synchronized military strategy during the intervention. In essence, this thesis will attempt to make a meaningful scholarly contribution to the foreign policy decision-making literature by demonstrating why and how
different strategic concerns resulted in a single intervention strategy. Theorizing on why and how states decide to pursue military interventions will improve academia’s understanding of the foreign policy behaviour of the intervening states, which is critical to any meaningful analysis and understanding of political conflict and security matters.

1.5 Research objectives (broader issues)

The major objectives of this study are as follows:

a) To identify and establish how the interests of the governments that intervened in the DRC conflict were the primary motivating factor that informed their decisions on military interventions.

b) To ascertain the extent to which the SADC coalition’s military strategy became a principal tool in the attainment, pursuing, promotion and safeguarding of these varying interests as well as how that strategy was utilised as a mechanism for the translation and development of these varying interests into common ones among the AZN intervening countries.

c) To offer policy suggestions on the execution of future military interventions in African conflicts, particularly at the SADC sub-regional level.

1.6 Research problems: key questions

Some of the research questions that the thesis will endeavour to address include the following:

a) What was the nature or context of the DRC conflict prior to the SADC AZN coalition’s military intervention and did the scenario warrant external military assistance?
b) Did the intervening AZN coalition have an internationally legal and moral basis for military intervention?

c) To what extent should all the major role players in the respective governments of the intervening SADC coalition have been informed about or involved in the preparation, planning and authorisation of the military intervention?

d) To what extent should the key members of the legislatures of the AZN coalition have been informed about the decision to intervene militarily?

e) How should the legal and procedural mandates governing the participation of countries in military interventions be determined viz the UN Charter?

g) What were the specific interests of the intervening countries?

h) How was the SADC coalition’s military strategy formulated and implemented?

i) Did the SADC AZN coalition succeed in protecting their interests through the military intervention strategy?

k) Were the strategic and operational designs of the intervention mission of the SADC AZN coalition maintained throughout the intervention or, did they shift and change?
l) Using the military intervention in the DRC as a case study, what factors should be considered prior to sub-regional deployment in peace missions or military intervention operations?

### 1.7 Theoretical framework

Whilst many theories were considered for the purpose of this study, most of them were found to be inappropriate theoretical tools of analysis for this thesis. Rather than giving a detailed account of each of these different theories, it is essential to only provide a brief outline and why they were found inadequate for this particular study. Amongst these theories is the Balance of Power theory, which is mainly concerned with power relations among states and how such relations are configured with the objective of achieving or preserving peace. Used as a predictor of state behaviour and policy, proponents often employ the concept to explain a condition of, or tendency toward, power equilibrium among states. As Uzodike (2005: 29) notes, “the theory rests on the idea that peace is often more likely where potential enemies are of equal military or, sometimes, political or economic strength.”

Balance of Power was found wanting for this study because its main focus would not help us to deal adequately with the role that is played by national interests with reference to AZN coalition (Haas, 1994:170; Claude, 1994:125). In essence, although its position “that states will tend to align in a manner that will prevent any one state from achieving a preponderance of power” (Uzodike, 2005: 29) might help to explain power shifts due to the formation of alliances, it does little to explain non-military/strategic motivations. While the complex series of military activities in the Great Lakes Region in 1998 that led to the interventions of as many as nine different countries in the DRC conflict, may point to alliance formations that
were driven by military/strategic considerations, the intervention by the AZN coalition lacked
the concision, purposiveness, and precision of a mere balancing mission.

Equally, game theory, which is a decision-making approach that assumes actor rationality in
a competitive situation in which participants work to maximize their gains while minimizing
their losses, can be used to show how states or persons who mutually distrust each other can
benefit by working together cooperatively (Weibull, 1995:87). In essence, game theory
assumes that state cooperation is primarily based on calculations of costs and benefits.
Although it could provide useful insight into state behaviour and decision making by state
leaders, the theory would be too limiting as a tool for analysing social reality in the sense that
it is based on mathematical modelling of instrumental rationalism that is mostly presumed to
be indispensable to self-interested individuals in economics (Bernard, 1957: 64-67). Clearly,
to achieve a meaningful analysis of state behaviour and decision-making apparatus using
game theory would require high level access to key leadership and decision-making
processes. In regard to the AZN coalition, it was challenging to obtain adequate access to
key decision makers and the complementary processes to be able to map out substantively the
key steps leading to their separate decisions to intervene in the DRC.

Another theory that was considered for application in this study, but found inadequate, is the
Just War theory. The Just War theory makes reference to the international legal frameworks
in regard to the rules that guide decision makers on the appropriateness of their “decision to
resort to war (jus ad bellum) and conduct during war (jus in bello)” (Barnes, 1995:90; see
also Weigel, 2002:5; Yoder, 2009:75). However, in the light of this study, the Just War
theory will not be helpful because the main focus is not on the moral and legal justifiability of
war, but on the motives for military intervention in the DRC by AZN coalition forces.
Based on the inappropriateness and inadequacy of the above-mentioned theories, this thesis will use the realist theory as a central tool for analysis. Realism assumes that states act in accordance with their interests, whatever they are. Realists also “believe that states do not act unselfishly in the international system as they are inclined to pursue parochial objectives”, which they often explain as their “national” interests (George and Keohane, 1980:260). This thesis project will argue that when states intervene militarily in other states - even on behalf of the sub-region, region or international community - they do so in pursuit of their foreign policy objectives, which include the protection of their various interests. Thus, the interests (national and other) of the AZN coalition motivated their decision to intervene militarily in the DRC.

1.8 Research methodology and design

The nature and objectives of this study required a combination of historical and qualitative research approaches with some flexibility. Historical research is “the systematic collection of data which is preceded by the objective evaluation of information related to past events so as to test hypotheses in regards to their causes and effects in order to be able to explain the present trends and have focus on the future” (Busha and Harter, 1980: 90). Historical research “involves developing an understanding of the past through the examination and interpretation of evidence” which may exist (or be collected) in the form of texts and recorded data, interviews and observations (Hancock, 2006: 80; Kumar, 2005:188-203). Once a decision has been made to conduct historical research, there are steps that should be followed to achieve reliable results. These include: “the recognition of a historical problem or the identification of a need for certain knowledge; the gathering of as much relevant information about the problem or topic as possible; forming hypotheses that tentatively explain relationships
between historical factors; rigorous collection and organization of evidence and the verification of the authenticity and veracity of information and its sources; the collection, organization and analysis of the most pertinent collected evidence and the drawing of conclusions; and the recording of conclusions in a meaningful narrative” (Busha and Harter, 1980: 90; Kumar, 2005: 192).

Basically, qualitative research is an exploratory process that involves methods of data collection that are non-quantitative or non-numerical (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 32-48). It focuses on “the essence or ambience of something and involves the historical context and sometimes a critique of the ‘front’ being put on to get at the ‘deep structure’ of relations” (Busha and Harter, 1980: 95).

1.9 Data Collection

Data were generated through primary and secondary sources:

1.9.1 Primary Sources:

Primary sources used were those first-hand accounts of information and primary documents. These included personal diaries, eyewitness accounts of events and oral histories. Primary sources are highly sought after in historical research and they are first-hand information because finding and assessing historical data is an exercise which involves logic, intuition, persistence and common sense. The researcher also used questionnaires and personal interviews to collect primary data.
1.9.2 Secondary Sources:

Secondary sources were very useful in giving the researcher a grasp of the subject and the provision of extensive bibliographic information for delving further into the research topic. Secondary sources were used to complement primary sources. Secondary data was gathered from various defence and security sources (including defence and security journals), scholarly journals and books, newspapers and magazines, archival material, declassified operational reports, unpublished theses and the internet as well as seminar papers.

1.9.3 Questionnaires:

Questionnaires proved to be an inexpensive way of gathering data from a potentially large number of respondents. Well-designed questionnaires were effectively used in this study to gather information. Self-administering questionnaires such as e-mail questionnaires were also used and many people responded in a few days. Questionnaires also proved easy to administer confidentially which was necessary to ensure that participants responded relatively honestly. In this study, semi-structured questionnaires made it possible to compare and interpret the respondents’ views because of the formatted nature and standardization of the questions. During the research, questionnaires were administered to a select group of forty (40) academics within the sub-region’s political science/international relations, defence and security related academic institutions, think-tanks as well as non-academic and non-practitioner experts such as journalists, dissidents, NGO officials and opposition party members.

1.9.4 Personal interviews:

The researcher also made use of the unstructured informal interview technique. Entirely informal and not controlled by a specific set of detailed questions, the method required the
interviewer to be guided by only a predetermined list of issues. The advantage with the
unstructured informal interviews is that the respondents were “encouraged to talk freely about
the subject, but kept to the point on issues of interest to the researcher” (Kumar, 2005: 123).
The respondents were encouraged to reveal most of what they felt about the issues under
discussion. This researcher mingled well and controlled the pace of the interviews.

Interviews were conducted in the countries which took part in the military intervention,
including the DRC and those that did not take part, including South Africa. More than 175
interviewees were drawn from the following: senior officials within the military who were
involved in the strategic planning of operations; key military personnel who were involved in
the operations; key politicians; bureaucrats in the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs;
relevant personnel from the Red Cross in Kinshasa and the United Nations Observer Mission
in Congo (MONUC); selected senior military officers and politicians including those
legislators from opposition political parties; human rights activists; and representatives from
civil society groups within SADC whose countries did not intervene. Others interviewed
included journalists, dissidents, NGO officials and opposition party members.

1.9.5 Graphical depiction of the categories of interviewees in the different countries in
which fieldwork research was conducted:

1.9.5.1 Sample

A total of 49 politicians were interviewed from seven African countries. These countries
included Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, DRC, Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa. Of
these participants nine were from the presidium. All countries had one participant from the
presidium except for Zimbabwe and the DRC that had two (2) from each country. A total of
15 participants were from the ministry of defence, two participants each from Angola and the
DRC, three each from Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa, and Botswana and
Mozambique had one participant from each country. From the Foreign Affairs Ministry, a total of 13 participants were interviewed. Of these participants Angola, Namibia, the DRC and South Africa had two participants each. Botswana and Mozambique had one participant each and Zimbabwe was the only country that had three participants from Foreign Affairs. Lastly, a total of twelve participants were interviewed from the ministry of Finance. Angola, Botswana and Mozambique had one representative from each country. Namibia, the DRC and South Africa had two representatives from each country. Finally, Zimbabwe had three representatives interviewed from the Ministry of Finance.

Table 1: Country politicians cross tabulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Politicians Crosstabulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1 2 2 1 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>1 3 2 2 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2 3 3 3 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>2 2 2 2 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>1 1 1 1 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1 1 1 1 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1 3 2 2 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9 15 13 12 49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled by researcher, 2010
A total of 38 participants from the ruling parties and 32 from the opposition parties were interviewed from the seven African countries. Seven participants each were from the ruling parties of Angola and Zimbabwe. Six each were from the DRC and South Africa, five were from Namibia, four from Botswana and three from Mozambique. From the opposition parties eleven were from South Africa, five each were from Namibia and Angola, four were from the DRC, three from Angola and finally, two each were from Botswana and Mozambique.
Table 3: Country legislators from ruling party cross tabulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>7</th>
<th></th>
<th>3</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled by researcher, 2010

Table 4: Bar chart

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled by researcher, 2010
From the seven countries, senior defence officers, military strategists and planners were interviewed: Angola had one senior defence officer, two military strategists and one planner interviewed; Namibia, one military strategist and two planners; Zimbabwe had only two military strategists interviewed; the DRC had four military strategists; Botswana two senior defence officers; Mozambique one senior defence officer; and South Africa had three military strategists interviewed.

Table 5: Country defence cross tabulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Defence</th>
<th>Senior Defence</th>
<th>Military strategists</th>
<th>Planners</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source, compiled by researcher 2010
Table: 6 Bar Chart

Source: compiled by researcher, 2010

From the seven countries, either civil society representatives, NGO representatives or journalists were interviewed. From Angola six civil society representatives and four NGO representatives were interviewed. Four civil society members, six NGO representatives and three journalists were interviewed from Namibia. Six Zimbabwean civil society representatives, five NGO representatives and five journalists were interviewed. From the DRC, the host country, four civil society representatives, five NGO representatives and three
journalists were interviewed. Botswana had three civil society representatives, two NGO representatives and one journalist. Mozambique had two each of civil society representatives, NGO representatives and journalists. Lastly, South Africa had eight civil society representatives, six NGO representatives and three journalists.

Table 7: Country representatives of civil society groups cross tabulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country * Representatives of civil society groups Crosstabulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled by researcher, 2010
1.10 Data Analysis

Collected data was assessed through content analysis, which was aptly described by Lasswell (1949:120) as: “Who says what, to whom, why, to what extent and with what effect?” Basically, content analysis is "any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics within a text" (Holsti, 1969: 85; Krippendorff, 2004: 9). The “definition of content analysis delineates the object of inquiry
and places the researcher into a particular position vis-a-vis his reality” (Altheide, 1996:14). For the purpose of this research, analysis was performed relative to and justified in terms of the context of data. The following basic concepts offered a conceptual framework within which the researcher’s role was represented: the data as communicated to the researcher; the context of the data; how the researcher’s (analyst’s) data partition his/her reality; the target of the content analysis; inferences as the basic intellectual task; and validity as ultimate criterion of success.

The above framework was “intended to serve three purposes: prescriptive, analytical and methodological” (Babbie, 2007:95); Prescriptive in the sense that it guided “the conceptualization and the design of practical content analyses for any given circumstance” (Babbie, 2007:95); Analytical in the sense that it facilitated the critical examination of context analysis results obtained by others; Methodological in the sense that it directed “the growth and systematic improvement of methods for content analysis” (Babbie, 2007: 95). It is important to look at the matrix diagram below in reference to content analysis in this research project:

**Table 9: Data analysis matrix table**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research objectives</th>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Units of analysis</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Data collection method</th>
<th>Data analysis method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objective 1:</strong> Identifying and establishing if the national interests of</td>
<td>1. Government ruling elite, opposition politicians and bureaucrats in intervening and non-</td>
<td>Coalition member 1: Angola</td>
<td>Variable 1: political</td>
<td>Personal interviews (unstructured and informal).</td>
<td>Transcription of the interviews and questionnaires.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sub-regional obligation as member of SADC, MPLA/ADF historical relations and Angolan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coalition member2: Zimbabwe</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variable 1: political</strong></td>
<td>Sub-regional responsibility and obligation as the Organ chair.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zimbabwe government assistance to ADF in fighting Mobutu?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variable 2: economic</strong></td>
<td>DRC debt repayment?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protection of Inga hydroelectric power which provides 10 percent of Zimbabwe’s electricity.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic investment potential (mining industry).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variable 3: security</strong></td>
<td>Guarding against minority Hema-Tutsi hegemonic expansion in the sub-region.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Variable 2: economic | Accessibility to Cabinda enclave oilfields. |  |
|  | Securing of profitable networks for Angola national oil company, Sonangol. |  |

| Variable 3: security/strategic | Preventing UNITA launched attacks from the DRC. |  |

| Open-ended questionnaires. | Coding of similar themes so as to identify and analyse their relationship. |  |
### Objective 2:
To ascertain the extent to which the varying national interests would develop into common interests among the AZN coalition members.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coalition member</th>
<th>Variable 1: political</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Sub-regional obligation as a SADC member state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SWAPO/ ADF historical relations and Namibian government’s assistance to ADF in ousting Mobutu.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable 2: economic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US$25m DRC/Namibia trade deal.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable 3: security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preventing UNITA destabilization of northern Namibia and links with secessionist Caprivi Strip Liberation Movement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commonality of AZN coalition interests</th>
<th>Political:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Government ruling elite, opposition politicians and bureaucrats in intervening and non-intervening SADC countries.</td>
<td>OPDS protocol on mutual defence against foreign aggression of a member state, the AZN coalition’s Mutual Defence Pact meant to harmonise political commonality, the AZN Joint Permanent Commission on politics Defence and Security during the intervention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Key military personnel in intervening and non-intervening SADC countries.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DRC/AZN joint mineral</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal interviews (unstructured and informal).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Open-ended questionnaires.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transcription of the interviews and questionnaire.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coding of similar themes so as to identify and analyse their relationship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective 3: To offer policy suggestions on the executions of future military interventions in African conflicts, particularly at the SADC sub-regional level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic and operational challenges</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Government ruling elite, opposition politicians and bureaucrats in intervening and non-intervening SADC countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Key military personnel in intervening and non-intervening SADC countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Academics in SADC countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Journalists and experts from the target country (DRC).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The synergy between political leadership decisions and top military hierarchy on mission design, joint AZN mission execution and exit strategy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Military:**

**Source:** Compiled by Author, 2007-2011
In any content analysis endeavour, it must be clear which data are being analysed, how they are defined and from which population they are drawn. In this study, data were collected from both primary and secondary sources. The target population was politicians, bureaucrats, military personnel and academics from those countries which took part in the intervention and those countries which did not take part. Whilst data was made available to the researcher, the context was not available. Data gathered only exhibited their own syntax and structure, described in terms of units, categories, and variables, or coded into a multi-dimensional scheme. It was not possible for the research study to manipulate reality. This enabled the research study not to leave out anything of importance by selecting material that fits the researcher’s own ideas and thereby affecting the objectivity of the thesis research project.

In any content analysis, the context relative to which data are analysed must be made explicit and whilst data are made available, the “context is constructed by the content analyst to include all surrounding conditions, antecedent, coexisting, or consequent” (Krippendorff, 2004: 69). The need for delineating the context of the content analysis was particularly important because there were no logical limits as to the kinds of context the researcher would have wanted to consider. This particular thesis project limited itself from the period of the AZN coalition of the willing’s military intervention from 1998 to 2002, although some reference was made to the pre-intervention and post-intervention period. These limitations are often are part and parcel of the disciplinary conventions and practical problems that dictate the choice of these boundaries to any given research (Philipps, 1997:190).

Mostyn observes that “for any content analysis, the analyst’s interest and knowledge determine the construction of the context within which inferences are realised and it is therefore important that a content analyst has knowledge about the origin of the data and that
he reveals the assumptions he makes about how the data and their environment interact” (Mostyn, 1985:77). Mostyn further notes that, “content analysis uses available data and knowledge of stable configurations to remove uncertainties about the unstable pattern in the context of its data” (Mostyn 1985:77). In the context of this research, it is through content analysis that the uncertainties surrounding the varied motivations behind the military intervention by the AZN coalition and the synchronized political strategy were be established.

In any content analysis the aim or target of the inferences must be clearly stated. The target is what the researcher (analyst) will want to know about. In this research the operational hypothesis is that the national interests of governments are the primary motivating factors that inform their decisions on military interventions. This research brought out the political strategy behind the idea of achieving varied interests pursued through a collective and synchronized military intervention mechanism. Weitzmann observes that “since content analysis can provide vicarious knowledge, information about something not directly observed, this target is located in the variable portion of the context of available data. Although there is ample room for exploratory studies during which the researcher makes up his mind as to what his focus of attention will be, he/she has to come up with a clear direction” (Weitzmann, 1995:94). Only if the target of a content analysis is stated can the researcher “judge whether the content analysis is completed and specify the kind of evidence eventually needed to validate the results” (Weitzmann, 1995:94).

Weitzmann further observes that “in any content analysis, the task is to make inferences from data to certain aspects of their context and to justify these inferences in terms of the knowledge about the stable factors in the system of interest” (Weitzmann, 1995:95; see also
Mostyn, 1985:77). Through this process, data can be referred to as symbolic and informative about something of interest to the researcher. The kind of evidence needed to validate the results must be specific or sufficiently clear in advance so as to make validation conceivable. Although it is the raison d’etre of content analysis that direct evidence about the phenomenon of interest is missing and must be inferred, at least the criterion “for an ex post facto validation of results must be clear so as to allow others to gather suitable evidence and see whether the inferences were indeed accurate” (Philipps, 1997:190).

In summary, data were dissociated from sources (both primary and secondary) and communicated to this researcher who in turn placed the data in a context that he constructed, “based on knowledge of the surrounding conditions of the data, including what he intended to know about the target of the content analysis” (Phillips, 1997:190). His knowledge about the stable dependencies within the system of interest allowed him to make inferences to the context of the data. The content analysis results represented some feature of reality and the nature of this reality was verifiable in principle.

1.11 Limitations

There is a possibility of bias among respondents to the interviews that were administered. However, the researcher attempted to overcome this by interviewing relevant and various people from both SADC countries that took part in the military intervention and those that did not take part in order to make an objective analysis. The general topic within which this study can be placed – Military Interventions in African Conflicts - is too wide for a thorough investigation within the limitations of the current research. This means that some issues were not given the thorough discussion which they deserve. As such, this study is restricted to the
1998-2002 timeframe when a series of military activities led to intervention in the DRC by AZN coalition forces.

1.12 Delimitations

The objectives of this research study are not too ambitious as they focus only on the military interventions by the SADC AZN coalition. The research covers the period from 1998 to 2002, although reference will be made not only to the pre-1998 period but also to the developments since the formal end of the conflict.

1.13 Overview of the study

Chapter One is the introduction of the study which as noted includes a general background and outline of the research problem, the research hypotheses, preliminary literature review, research justification, research objectives, research problems, questions, theoretical framework, research methodology and the clarification of concepts used in the study.

Chapter Two provides a detailed contextualization of military intervention in order to project the various dimensions of the subject. The various definitions, forms and evolution of military intervention as well as the rationalities for military interventions as given by scholars are discussed.

Chapter Three gives a critical analysis of what exactly constitutes national interest using the realist concept. The chapter contextualizes national interests through an analytical exploration of the various scholarly definitions, the levels of national interest, the decision making determinants in the formulation and implementation criterion of national interest. The
coherence and disagreements among scholars regarding what constitute national interest is also discussed.

Chapter Four gives a critical examination and analysis of the historical paradox of military interventionism in the Congo from King Leopold II up to Laurent Kabila. It is noted that in almost all of these conflicts, military interventionism by external players at regional and international level, either in support or against a given regime in the Congo, was driven by the various respective interests of these nation states. These external powers adopted different strategies in the attainment and safeguarding these interests.

Chapter Five’s primary objective is to identify and ascertain the rationale behind the SADC coalition’s military intervention decision in the DRC conflict. Prior to identifying the coalition’s varying interests, a brief analysis is made on significance of diplomatic early warning and threat assessment to the decision for intervention. A critical analysis is also made in regards to the decisions for intervention within the national and subregional contexts as well as the decision for intervention under the SADC coalition of the willing and the legal dimensions of those decisions in respect of the SADC, AU and UN legal protocols. After identifying and ascertaining the interests behind the decisions to intervene by the governments of the SADC coalition, a critical evaluation is made in regards to the levels of significance of these interests. This evaluation seeks to project which of the interests were of primary or vital importance at the time of taking the decisions and which of these interests were secondary as well as the shift of these interests in terms of these levels during the course of the intervention.
Chapter Six discusses the significance of the coalition forces’ military strategy in relation to it being a tool used for the attainment, pursuing, and promotion as well as safeguarding of the varying interests of the intervening countries. The relevance of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) as a legal and political guide within the framework of the coalition strategy is also discussed.

Chapter Seven makes a critical analysis on the coalition initiative to logistically sustain the war effort. It is noted the longevity of the military intervention resulted in members of the coalition incurring heavy financial costs that affected their national economies. It will be noted that this initiative involved the bilateral business ventures between the DRC government and the respective intervening countries. The chapter also makes a critical analysis of these economic activities. It will be noted that initiative to sustain the war efforts had its consequences such as the institution of the UN Panel of Experts which was tasked to investigate and report on the allegations of the illegal plunder of the natural resources and other forms of wealth of the DRC. A critical examination and analysis of these UN reports indicate that they could have stemmed from the fact that the coalition’s decision to intervene and the initiative to sustain that war effort was viewed or suspected by the non interveners and critics as well as the international community as “predatory and exploitative.”

Chapter Eight contains the qualitative presentation and analysis of the research findings. The findings of the research are qualitatively analysed within the framework of the core of objectives of the study which were as follows: identification and establishment of how the interests of the governments that intervened in the DRC conflict were the primary motivating factor that informed their decisions on military interventions; ascertaining the extent to which the SADC coalition’s military strategy became a principal tool in the attainment, pursuing,
promotion and safeguarding of these varying interests as well as how that strategy was utilised as a mechanism for the translation and development of these varying interests into common ones among the AZN intervening countries. A consolidated summary of the whole thesis is made after which recommendations are suggested as a significant measure of addressing the third and last core objective of this thesis research project, which is the provision of policy suggestions on the execution of future military interventions in African conflicts, particularly at the SADC sub-regional level.
CHAPTER TWO

CONTEXTUALIZING MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

2.1 Introduction

Whilst the first chapter of this study has provided the scope of the thesis, this chapter’s concern is to provide a detailed contextualisation of military intervention in order to project comprehensively its political, military and ethical dimensions. In the light of the above objective, this chapter is divided into four sections. The first section focuses on definitions of military intervention that have been proffered so far by many scholars from various perspectives.

The second section briefly traces the evolution of military intervention from the pre-Cold War era to the present. It is noted that during the cold war period, the balance of power and the interests of the major powers were maintained and served through their assistance to compliant governments and various political and armed movements in the third world. In the post-Cold War period however, military intervention has been used as a means to avoid humanitarian catastrophes. The general legal debate surrounding military intervention is discussed in the third section. This revolves around the interpretation of the UN Charter. The fourth section focuses on the general factors that are given as justifications for military interventions.

2.2 The Definitional Debate

Military intervention takes place in different contexts in terms of actions involved, the actors, their objectives and place among others. Thus, this results in the term being given many

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4As noted by Professor Sichone of the University of South Africa in an email commentary to the author (Pretoria, December 2009), the rationale for proxy wars was not just to dominate weak states but to avoid direct confrontation between nuclear powers and to avoid casualties that would not be tolerated by the citizens/voters; thus US soldiers were sent to Korea and Vietnam but not to Africa or the Middle East.
definitions by various scholars. In order to reduce ambiguity and for the purpose of definitional clarity, military intervention can best be comprehended by basically understanding intervention. Broadly defined, intervention refers to “…the interference of one state in the affairs of another state thereby resulting in the temporary interruption of normal bilateral patterns of relationship between the two” (Du Plessis, 2000: 4). An important observation made by Du Plessis is that there is little if any distinction between interference and normal activities that a country engages in when implementing its foreign policy (2000:4). In fact, interventions “designate any activity that deliberately seeks to change the political leader(s) or the constitutional structure of a foreign political jurisdiction (Leurdiijk, 1986:90; Holsti, 1995: 204).

Rosenau’s definition of military intervention limits it to those actions undertaken by a given state without the consent of a target state. Those actions affect the internal political, military and economic structures of the target state (Rosenau, 1969:153-54; Amer, 1994:4). Rosenau’s definition seems to be intended at reducing the vagueness of the concept of intervention (Amer, 1994:4). According to Rosenau intervention takes place when the intervening state set aside the existing relations with the target state and put all its efforts towards changing the political structure and authority of that target state (1968: 161-165). Rosenau further observes that intervention also takes place when the intervening state seeks to preserve the existing political structure and authority of the target state (Amer, 1994:5; Rousenau, 1968: 161-165). Thus from the above observations made by Rosenau, intervention seem to have moved away from global norms of coexisting peacefully without interfering in each other’s internal affairs to unlimited actions that are undertaken by states or international organisations for the maintenance of peace and security (Du Plessis, 200:4; see also Rousenau, 1968:167).
Besides the above definitions, Beloff (1968:198) defines intervention as the attempt by a given state to try and change the internal structures of a target state through coercive methods. These coercive methods are meant to affect the modus operandi of the political, military and even economic as well as social structures of the target state. Bull’s definition of intervention is inclined towards takes the one given by international legal experts. Bull (1984:1) summarizes the definition of intervention as “dictatorial interference or coercive interference by an outside party or parties in the sphere of jurisdiction of a sovereign state, or more broadly of an independent political community.” Thus Bull seems to underscore that a basic condition for any action to be called intervention “is that the intervening state is superior in power to the target of the intervention” (Bull, 1984:1). The question of interference which is “dictatorial” or “coercive” arises only because of the intervening state power profile vis-a-vis the target state (Ramses, 1994:4; Bull, 1984:1).

From the foregoing, it seems that the concept of intervention covers a wide range of issues and phenomena such as attempts by given states to change the internal political, economic, military, and social structures of those target states with or without the consent of the target states. Intervention can also refer to those actions undertaken by states or group of states with the approval of international organisations such as the UN Security Council, regional organisations such as the AU and subregional organisations like SADC. The underlying factor is that these actions (whether coercive or non-coercive) will be in pursuit of given objectives (as in the case of intervention by a given state) or regional or international values such as restoration of democracy and peace (as in the case of intervention by multilateral and regional organisations). Thus whilst there may be no agreed definition of intervention, there are broad conceptual issues that need to be taken note as reference points. These include
power, self-interest, international law and morality (Du Plessis, 2000:5 See also Schwarz, 1970:175-177).

Military intervention and other actions related to use of force are distinguished through certain conditions. Among these conditions is the requirement of an asymmetry in power between the intervening country and the target state (Du Plessis, 2000:6). The power capability (mostly military and economic power) of the intervening country should be above that of the target state and that power of the intervener should only be proportionally to that which the target state has as well as in relation to the period of the intervention (Du Plessis, 2000:6).

Since military intervention is considered as an instrument of foreign policy, the military actions of the intervening country or countries should be used for the purposes of achieving the set out goals as determined by the political leadership (Jentleson and Levite, 1992:6-8). Whenever these objectives are attained, it will be up to the political leadership to withdraw their troops from the theatre of operations. Military interventions may take longer than anticipated because the set objectives may be challenging to attain as was (and is still the case) with the US intervention in Iraq in 2003.

Considering that strategically, military intervention is undertaken primarily to attain political objectives, the deployment of forces by a state or a group of states will be intended to change the political, military and economic structures of the target state, resulting in the reestablishment of bilateral relations between the intervening state and the target state. If the political objectives of the intervening state or states are not attained within the planned time, there is a likelihood of escalation (Du Plessis, 2000:6 See also Otte 1995:10-15). The US intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq are notable examples where the non-immediate attainment of Washington’s political objectives resulted in the longevity of the intervention.
It should be realised that most operational definitions of military intervention are made distinct with significant adjectives such as “foreign”, “external”, and “overt” and it is these adjectives that make a difference in terms of their meaning (Du Plessis, 2000:7; Otte, 1995:195). In general, a definition that seems to represent all the other definitions given by political science, international relations and military strategy scholars is the one given by Geldenhuys (8; 6-7) who defines military intervention as:

the calculated action of a state, a group of states, an international organization or some other international actor(s) to influence the political system of another state (including its structures of authority, its domestic policies and its political leaders either against its will or on the government’s request by using coercive or non-coercive means in pursuit of particular political objectives (1998:6-7; see also Barrie, 2000: 78).

From the above definition, it is important to distinguish coercive from peaceful intervention. Coercive intervention refers to those actions undertaken by a state or a group of state in utilising the available conventional military arsenal such as battle tanks, fighter aircraft and strategic, operational and tactical deployment of combat troops who are expected to engage in coercive military action (Du Plessis, 2000:10; see also Kanter and Bruce, 1994:14-15). It is within this coercive action where there is movement of regular troops or forces (airborne and water borne) of the intervening states or states from their territory into the territory or territorial waters of the target state country, or “forceful military action by troops already stationed by one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute” (Pearson and Baumann, 1988:2). It is also important to note that military intervention in intrastate conflicts involves the large scale troop deployment to either stabilize a regime against anti-government forces or to overthrow an established set of authorities. More often,
the intervention is the result of a crisis which calls for such an action; troops are rapidly deployed and the insurgents or rebels are often caught by surprise (Holsti, 1995:206).

In the case of peaceful military intervention, there is non-use of combat and force. Military forces are only deployed for the enforcement of peace. Such deployments are often carried out by multilateral security regimes such as the UN and related regional bodies like the AU or NATO for the purposes of humanitarian assistance involving peace support operations (Seawall, 1994:84-85; Du Plessis, 2000:10). Du Plessis observes that the role of the armed forces in peaceful military interventions would be to assist the vulnerable, that is non-combatants such as women and children, and to help maintain the ceasefire while negotiations among the belligerent parties are underway (Du Plessis, 2000:11, see also Freedman, 1994:3). The idea of employing peacekeeping troops was emphasised by then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 Agenda for Peace which proposed that collective security regimes such as the UN Security Council, NATO, the AU Peace and Security Commission, the SADC OPDSC should be the institutions responsible for the effecting of multilateral peaceful interventions (Du Plessis, 2000:11; see also Ghali, 1992:78). Ghali advocated for the deployment of peacekeeping troops by security regimes for the purposes of preventing the escalation of conflicts which could lead to humanitarian catastrophes such as the 1994 Rwanda genocide. Ghali also proposed that peacekeeping troops could be deployed for the purposes enforcing peace through forcible military intervention (Ramsbotham, 1995:20; Evans, 1993:8-10).

Although humanitarian intervention is sometimes regarded as being similar to peaceful intervention, the difference between the two is that the former is undertaken for humanitarian purposes (Du Plessis, 2000:12; also see Arend and Beck, 1993:112). In humanitarian
intervention, armed force by a state or states is used to protect the citizens of the target state from pronounced human rights violations. The case of UN and AU missions in Darfur are notable examples of this type of humanitarian intervention. Whilst it may be directed at a given regime that violates human rights through repression, humanitarian intervention can also be directed at non-state actors such as ethnic groups involved in genocidal activities. In terms of definition, humanitarian intervention thus refers to the limited to the use of force for altruistic reasons with a humanitarian objective (Du Plessis, 2000:12. It also covers a broad scope of non-forcible action such as humanitarian assistance or relief operations which complement peaceful interventions (Roper, 1998:208; Du Plessis, 2000:12). These operations would include the distribution of food relief aid among others.

Thus, from the above, it can be realised that military intervention can extend beyond the use of unilateral combatant and coercive military force by respective bigger powers such as the US, Russia Britain France and others, to the domain of multilateral, “non combatant peaceful intervention in the form of peace support operations conducted under the auspices of inter-governmental organizations” (Du Plessis, 2000:12). These intergovernmental organisations include the UN and the AU among others. However, there is always controversy when some bigger powers claim to undertake humanitarian intervention under the auspices of the UNSC, when that may not be the case.

It is important to note that whilst military intervention can be understood in various contexts within the international system, it remains an instrument of statecraft whereby the use of military force is done for the attainment of political objectives that nation states pursue. The use of force (combat troops) in military intervention is part and parcel of the instrument or mechanism of foreign policy implementation. It through military intervention that a given
nation state can pursue and attain as well as defend its national interests and foreign policy objectives (Du Plessis 2000:5; Van Nieuwkerk, 2003:70).

There are some scholars who have defined military intervention with the aim of making it distinct from overt military operations such as those of private mercenaries, terrorist groups and national liberation movements. Vertzberger (1998:114), for instance, conceptualizes military interventions in three ways, namely the empirical, conceptual and operational ways. Empirically, Vertzberger (1998:114) contends that military intervention refers to “… the form of intervenient behavior…that includes all authoritative military operations that directly involve a state in foreign combat or unilaterally and irrevocably commit regular military forces to combat should resistance be met.”

Conceptually defined, foreign military intervention refers to coercive military action that is organised, sanctioned and undertaken by a state in the territory of another state for the purpose of attaining a given goal or mission. The aim of such an intervention would be for military personnel to engage in those activities that will change or preserve the political, economic and military or even social structures of the target state. That preservation or change will be intended to influence the target state’s domestic political process and some significant aspects its foreign policies” (Vertzberger, 1998: 114; see also Du Plessis). This seems to be the case with most interventions whereby intervening countries’ quest to defend or remove a given regime will be aimed at influencing the domestic and foreign policies of that regime in to the advantage of the attainment, promotion and safeguarding of their given national interests.
Vertzberger further adds an operational definition of foreign military intervention as involving a state’s rapid and direct deployment of “uniformed, combat ready units and formations to conduct conventional operations in a foreign state.” (Vertzberger, 1998:114). That deployment would be for a limited time. The objective of such a military intervention may be to evacuate nationals in a foreign land whose lives could be in danger or to undertake a counter coup d’état.

Generally, Vertzberger’s definition of military intervention seem to concur with the one given by Pearson who defines foreign military intervention as “the movement of troops or military forces by one independent country or a group of countries across the border of another independent country, or actions to influence (in either a hostile or a friendly manner), political circumstances, or issues of concern to the intervening government” (Pearson, 1974: 259-260). Thus, Vertzberger’s and Pearson’s definitions seem to focus on those military operations such conducted by directly conducted by foreign troops on a foreign territory for attainment of a given objective (Du Plessis, 2000:7).

Schraeder (1989:115) expands on the combat-related conceptualisation by defining military intervention as the economic and military support or aid that is given to an armed insurgency. The provision of that support or assistance would be intended for the overthrow of a given government whose actions are of immediate threat to the intervener(s)’ foreign policy interests. In the context of this thesis, an analysis of the historical paradox of military interventionism in Congo seems to fall within Shraeder’s definition. International and regional powers were involved in the provision of such support to given Congolese armed groups to overthrow certain regimes which were considered uncompliant to the promotion and safeguarding of the interests of the interveners. Whilst Schraeder’s (1989:115) definition
appears to be in relative reference to the proxy utilization of armed force in a covert mode, Duner (1983:60), on the other hand, limits external military intervention to those activities which affect one party’s military fighting capacity. Since Duner’s definition focuses on the level of involvement, that is, on the amount of force and the instruments used, the level of intervention actually refers to the closeness or immediacy of intervention acts to the battle situation (see also Du Plessis, 2000:10).

The above definitions are complemented by Finnemore whose view of military intervention tries to reduce its ambiguity by giving a definition that applies to the universe of potential interventions (2003:9). He does so by asking questions regarding those classes of events coded as intervention with what they correlate to and how they vary in terms of time, space duration and frequency (Finnemore, 2003:9). Finnemore’s definition refers to the “deployment of military personnel across recognized boundaries for the purpose of determining the political authority structure in the target state” (Finnemore, 2003:9; see also Rousenau, 1968:165-167). In Finnemore’s (2003:9) view, the central objective of intervention is to change the “political authority structure” of the target state through the deployment of military personnel beyond borders for the pursuit the same reasons. Thus when the political authority structure is changed or preserved as a result of the intervention, the intervening state or group of states are relatively guaranteed that that their interests can be safeguarded by a friendly and to some extent a compliant regime.

The study of military intervention, which is a central problem in International Relations and, in particular, military strategy and security Studies, requires certain choices to be made. The main concept examined in this thesis project is military intervention in a state by a coalition of member states from a sub-regional grouping (and not necessarily all member states from
the group) and this coalition takes decisions to deploy troops after an invitation from the host government. Considering the time taken from the deployment of coalition troops, the mission execution and the withdrawal of forces from the DRC after the deployment of MONUC, the military intervention referred to in this research is a protracted foreign military intervention executed by three coalition countries under the name of SADC as a sub-regional body. It is now important to briefly discuss the categories of military intervention.

2.3 Categories of Military Intervention

Military intervention can be undertaken in various forms (Du Plessis, 2000:26). The basic forms of military intervention are unilateral and multilateral form of military intervention. Unilateral military intervention is that form of intervention undertaken by a single state and it is not normally approved by regional or international organisations. The 1979 intervention of Tanzania under Nyeyere in Uganda is a notable example of unilateral intervention that was undertaken by a single country without the authority of a regional or international organisation. Multilateral military intervention is that form of intervention that is executed under the authority, name or banner of an international, regional, or sub-regional body (Du Plessis, 2000:26; see also Jentleson and Levite, 1992:9). The 1990 US led “Operation Desert Storm” is an example of a multilateral form of intervention that was undertaken by the US and other countries and was authorised by the UNSC.

There are important stages that are undergone by a nation state or a coalition of states during a protracted foreign military intervention. Jentleson and Levite (1992:9) identify these as the “getting in stage”, “staying in stage” and “getting out stage” (see also Du Plessis, 2000:28). In clear conventional military terminology these stages can be understood within the four phases of war namely defence, advance, attack and withdrawal. The getting in stage, which
normally involves the deployment of troops, falls in the defence phase of war, whilst the staying in stage falls in the advance and attack phases of war. The getting out stage falls in the withdrawal phase of war.

It should be realised that the grand political aim is transformed into military strategic objectives through the consideration of important factors such as the mission, the decision-making process and the actual timing of the decision to deploy troops for the military intervention. There may be adjustments to these factors of execution depending on the challenges that are faced by troops during all the four phases of intervention and at all levels towards the attainment of the grand objective during the military intervention. It will be in this study’s context to analyse how the SADC intervening countries’ various political aims were synchronized into one coalition political objective executable through a joint coalition task force during the military intervention. Whilst challenges such as the logistical incapacity may influence the decision to withdraw, the attainment of the political aim remains a key factor in determining the withdrawal strategy. This research will also try to make an assessment of the link between the mentioned phases of the military intervention through brief lessons learnt in the analysis of the political aim and military strategy nexus.

Besides the above-mentioned stages, military intervention is also carried out at the massive, medium, limited and occasional levels. A massive military intervention refers to a large-scale deployment of troops and equipment to a regional crisis. In this regard combat troops of a brigade strength (more than 3000 troops), or division strength (more than 6000 troops) and fighting equipment such as battle tanks, artillery and fighter aircraft are all deployed to the operational area through a systematic movement capacity that a nation or a coalition of nations has. This maybe done through sea, air and road troop carriers. The US led coalition’s
deployment in Iraq in 2003. A medium scale military intervention entails a medium scale involvement where there is “a considerable willingness to use force and maintain the deployment for a considerable period” (Du Plessis, 2000:28). The deployment of ECOMOG troops during the Sierra Leone Civil war from 1989 to 1996 is a fitting example of a medium scale military intervention. Limited military intervention is basically a low-level engagement of troops “on a temporary basis with a limited willingness to use force” (Du Plessis, 2000:29). The South African Defence Forces (SANDF) and Botswana Defence Forces (BDF)’s intervention in Lesotho can be referred to as a limited military intervention. This is so considering that “Operation Boleas” did not take long, arguably because there was relatively less utilisation of battle tanks and airpower. The occasional level refers to the use of military force, such as air power, for the purpose of only supporting diplomatic and economic involvement (Miller, 1998:75). This level is applicable in situation of evacuation of citizens from abroad as was the case with the French troops prior to the outbreak of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Considering that the coalition troops and equipment were on a medium scale and the deployment was maintained for a considerable period pending the deployment of UN peacekeepers, this study treats the SADC coalition’s military intervention as a medium scale military intervention.

Although scholars such as the behaviourists and traditionalists have taken a significant part in the debate on intervention using operational definitions of intervention that are different in order to address interventionary phenomenon that may be specific on what they want to focus, they seem to use a generally similar definition of the term intervention. From all the definitions explored in this section, it generally depends on the type of action and the instruments used as well as the actors and other factors that several self-explanatory categories can be distinguished, namely, defensive and offensive military intervention,
coercive (forcible) and non-coercive (non forcible) military intervention, direct and indirect military intervention, and overt and covert military intervention (Carpenter, 1989:130). For the purposes of this research, the definition of military intervention is formulated as coercive joint military action preceded by a political decision of a state or a group of states operating under the banner or name of a sub-regional grouping. This military action includes the deployment of coalition troops at the invitation or request of the government of a member state in order to assist that state militarily pending a political solution to a given crisis. This definition draws upon the definition given by Du Plessis (2000:4-5) and those definitions given by Rosenau (1969:153-156), Geldenhuys, (1998:6); Bull (1984:1); Barrie, 2000:78) Friedman (1971:40) and Ramses (1994:4). Thus, the military intervention under study will be referred to as overt foreign military intervention of a combative and coercive nature in an interstate conflict.

Having discussed and analysed the definitional debate among scholars as to what military intervention entails, it is important to look briefly at how military intervention has actually evolved over time as this would provide a base for the general rationale in terms of justification for governments’ decisions for the deployment of troops in different conflict settings.

2.4 The Evolution of Military Interventions

Military intervention is neither a new phenomenon nor new concept in International Security Studies. It has been mentioned in the works of Thomas Aquinas and many other scholars in the age of enlightenment that held the strong belief that any nation that takes the initiative of waging a war should have a justifiable cause for doing so. As argued during the formation of the UN (after the end of World War II), military intervention must be compliant with causes
for going to war and this should be consistent with the principles of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) which will be discussed in the later sections. As Wheeler and Bellamy argue, military intervention is one of the most abused, divisive and contested concepts in International Relations and more specifically International Security Studies (2008:530). The concept is used to justify both humanitarian and military interventions. Thus, it has become clearer that the concept has not been properly comprehended. It is used to justify the interest of the “intervening state rather than the target state” (Wheeler and Bellamy, 2008:530). In fact, military intervention does penetrate the political, military and even ethical context. There are geopolitical prospects and constraints that impact on military intervention. Military intervention does not have ties to any specific international system. It is important at this point to discuss briefly how military intervention has evolved through the pre-Cold War, the Cold War and post-Cold War eras (Jentleson, Levite and Berman, 1992:320).

It is significant to note that military interventions were undertaken even before the modern state system. Military interventions were common from the 17th century. In the 19th century military interventions increased as a result of conflicts and alliance formation by major powers in Europe (Du Plessis, 2000:15). It was during that same period when military intervention began to be recognized as a function of the prevailing multilateral balance of power system and an instrument of statecraft used by major powers to serve their interests (Du Plessis, 2000:15). It was not to be used by these powers among themselves but instead it was meant to control the weaker states not entirely through military means but rather through diplomacy (Levite, 1992:320). Due to the fact that the pre-Cold War period more or less represented the politics of power and dominance, military intervention was therefore viewed from the perspective of international political realism which institutionalised the act (military
intervention) as only and it was institutionalized as an inherent right of the super powers which had the capacity to engage in military intervention (Du Plessis, 2000:15). It is prudent then to look at military intervention during the Cold War era.

During the Cold War period, interventions were dominated by the US and the USSR in their respective “spheres of influence” or in disputed zones because of imperialist and ideological reasons. This spilled into the decolonization process, in a systemic bipolar environment that was so unusual that a new pattern of intervention was defined. The USSR’s intervention in Hungary in 1956 and in Afghanistan in 1979 and the American interventions in the Vietnam civil war from 1964 are cases in point (Kramer, 1999:39-76). It should also be realized that the two superpowers exerted political control over most of their satellites states. Kramer also notes that “whenever those states tried to escape from their hegemonic political influence, they were restrained, sometimes by direct armed intervention, but usually through indirect intervention” (Kramer, 1999:39). The two superpowers’ “interventions were also accompanied by indirect interventions using military assistance to local parties or covert actions (Kramer, 1999:39). In the latter stages of this thesis, an overview and analysis on the history of military interventionism in the Congo indicate that the Cold War rival played a part in as far as intervention in that country was concerned during the Cold war period. There was also competition between these two superpowers over those areas that were outside their spheres of influence (particularly fragile states), and this often fuelled conflicts among the local communities. Particular areas where these superpowers were either directly involved in armed conflicts or offered overt support to the belligerent parties include South East Asia, Central America and Sub-Saharan Africa (Ortega, 2001:1).
Besides the dominant bipolar structure based on the super powerfulness of the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union or USSR), the central features of the Cold War period included a dominant structural balance based on self-restraint and nuclear deterrence, proxy conflict through surrogates in the peripheral Third World, and the ascendancy of high risk foreign policy options in pursuit of national interests (Du Plessis, 2000:16; See also Carlsnaes 1992:260; Kramer, 1999:39). The strategic impetus of the Cold War made military intervention an extension of the geopolitical interventionism. Furthermore, military intervention was regarded as an instrument which had a viable foreign policy utility. Where it became less practical or viable, proxy warfare in the Third World presented an opportunity for new military intervention that was carried out covertly (Otte, 1995:200).

In the post-Cold War period, military intervention has attracted much interest among scholars. This is so because the use of force in most instances was decided and executed by states without the UNSC authorization. As Du Plessis (2000:16) notes, these actions have demonstrated that they have none the less been necessary and acceptable. Unlike during the Cold War era, post-Cold War military intervention has not been an instrument used by powerful states to dominate the weak ones. Instead, military intervention has been used as a means for the attainment of objectives such as the avoidance of humanitarian catastrophes and the reestablishment of international peace and security. This has resulted in the “negative image of intervention that was predominant during the Cold War” (Du Plessis 2000:16). The challenge the world faces is to find a precise definition of the circumstances in which armed intervention is acceptable and when it is appropriate for nation-states to intervene.
As noted by Du Plessis, the post-Cold War political era reflects a geopolitical transition and a new world order that is characterized by a dramatic increase in state and non-state actors, increasing globalization, and a multi-polar global structure dominated by the US as the sole remaining superpower. The period is also characterized by the internal political, economic and security challenges facing many developing countries, and the prevalence of regional and sub-regional conflicts. In the post-Cold War era, international actors seem to be much occupied with tackling new security challenges and the ways and means of dealing with these challenges can only be done through a global security regime that is a result of compromise among member nations of the global community (Du Plessis, 2000:19; see also Kanter and Brooks, 1994:227-228). Such an environment has had an effect on military intervention.

The new environment has much intervention effort being undertaken for humanitarian purposes. US intervention in Somalia in the 1990s is a case in point. The US has undertaken such interventions through the UN and with the support of NATO countries (Malik and Dorman, 1995:181-182, see also Du Plessis, 2000:18-19). This new intervention has also been expressed in the form of different foreign policy behaviours of respective sub-regional and regional powers. However, criticism has been levelled against this approach because of the “stand-off between the authority to intervene and the lack of resources and political will to do so” (Du Plessis, 2000:19; see also Falk and Mendlovitz, 1973: 150-151). There is also the matter of the unevenness of the decisions on which states are committing violations and which ones at which to direct collective intervention projects.

Besides the quest for collective responsibility and the growing demand for humanitarian intervention, the major powers have become increasingly reluctant to become involved in military interventions that do not have anything to do with their geopolitical and national interests (Du Plessis, 2000:19). Financial and logistical challenges have also affected the
undertaking of humanitarian intervention. Even the UN has not been spared this predicament, particularly when one considers the fact that its role in any intervention is determined by the permanent members of the Security Council (Du Plessis, 2000:20). The major powers are neither prepared to accept the undermining of the UN by other states nor to automatically respond to all requests for humanitarian intervention (Malik and Dorman, 1995:181-182; Du Plessis, 2000:20). This has affected the effectiveness of the UN in relation to humanitarian intervention by states at subregional and regional levels.

It is also important to realise that the post-Cold War period has seen the re-emergence of those factors that caused intervention during the Cold War period (Otte, 1995:197-198). This development has resulted in the continuation of military interventions that are driven by geopolitics interests at a regional level. As Dorman puts it, the post-Cold War period is

an environment where the vestiges of former colonial empires remain in the interests of and continue to require the support of former colonial powers, most of whom have had a long history of using military intervention… the internal and external pressures for the use of military intervention have increased in response to the threat posed by ethnic unrest, non-democratic regimes, the proliferation of missile technology and weapons of mass destruction (Dorman, 1995:109; see also Du Plessis, 2000:20).

From the above, it can thus be observed that the unstraining post-Cold War global environment has left room for powerful nations to continue engaging undertaking military interventions even without the authorisation of the UNSC (Du Plessis, 2000:21). Whilst an attempt has been made to trace how military intervention has evolved from the pre-Cold War to the post-Cold War era, there is also a need to highlight briefly the international legal dimensions of military intervention as these have an impact on the decisions that nation-states take at sub-regional, regional and international levels.
2.5 The Legal Dimensions of Military Intervention

According to realist theory, states that undertake military intervention are prepared to do everything in their power in order to secure their national interests even if their actions are in violation of the UN Charter. States can obey international laws only when those laws conform to their self-interest and they can readily violate them if they are against their national interest. Since this research is driven by the premise that states take decisions for military intervention based on the safeguarding of national interest, this generally translates to mean that the pursuit, defence or retention of these national interests as a subject of debate in contemporary international relations and security studies requires justification. This justification is closely linked to the international legal discourse. It is prudent therefore to discuss briefly the general debate on the legalities surrounding military intervention before embarking on some reasons why states engage in military intervention. There is an emerging global consensus that unilateral military intervention is not legitimate and it is only the UN through the UNSC which has the legal mandate to authorize military intervention. However, questions of academic debate that need to be addressed pertain to whether other regional groupings such as the African union or sub-regional groupings such as ECOWAS or SADC cannot grant such authority for military intervention through relevant protocols.

The reasons for condemnation have revolved around what constitutes a legitimate or illegitimate military intervention. There have been arguments that a unilateral military intervention is viewed as illegitimate and a multilateral one is legitimate because multilateralism “increases the transparency of each state’s actions to others and so reassures

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5 In other words, as commented by professor Sichone in the same email correspondence (2009), the operative term is in their power; the UN Charter is only a constraint if it is enforced by sanctions. So what the USA does e.g. invading Iraq or Afghanistan cannot be controlled. Secondly, national interests are actually state interests, ruling elite interests, or even the president’s interests (Sichone, 2009). Thus, in this case it would be naïve to think that in the UNO era conquest is something that nations do. In Marxist theory, the Russian capitalists would rather surrender to German rule than let Russian workers take over; there are no national interests in class society.
states that opportunities for adventurism and expansion will not be used. Unilateral intervention, even for humanitarian objectives, is viewed with suspicion. It is easily subverted to serve less disinterested ends of the intervener” (Finnemore, 2004: 176). Thus the legality or illegality of military intervention can best be understood within the framework of the UN Charter.

2.5.1 Intervention under the UN Mandate

The establishment of the UN after the Second World War saw the agreement between great powers on preventing any future world war and the use of the UNSC for enforcement action on any type of aggression. The UNSC was also regarded as the ultimate authority for any justification for military intervention. As stated in Article 24 of the UN Charter, “the UNSC has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” (Barnett, 2001:58). Through Chapter VII of the UN Charter in Article 39, the UNSC is authorized to “decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Article 41 and 42, to maintain international peace and security” (Barnett, 2001:58).

As Barnett puts it, “…the Charter of the UN is a document that has legal standing among its signatories and a constitutional expression of the international community” (Barnett, 2001:58). Whilst Chapter VI provides the UNSC with the diplomatic option of resolving a conflict through the consent of parties to the conflict, Chapter VII provides for enforcement action which includes both military and non-military mechanisms. Of importance is Article 52 of the UN Charter which deals with regional arrangements. Regional bodies and other agencies are encouraged to deal with matters relating to peace and security. Article 52 further states that there shall not be any enforcement action by regional agencies which will be effected without the authorisation of the Security Council (Taylor, 2001:24). This research
will try to analyse the decision by member states to deploy SADC coalition troops for military intervention within the legal framework of article 52 of the UN Charter. It will also try to look at whether the SADC coalition decision for military intervention was done as a response to a call by a member state of SADC on self-defence as enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter or whether the allies’ decision was based on their respective national interests.

The UN Security Council has the authority to decide whether or not the internal situation in a given country or state justifies a military intervention. It is the UNSC which authorizes regional and sub-regional bodies to undertake military interventions under the terms of the UN Charter (Annan, 1998:5). However, most states and some permanent members of the Security Council, such as France, have been intervening in Francophone countries without the UN mandate. The 1970s Brezhnev doctrine held that the Soviet Union had the right “to intervene in the member states of the socialist commonwealth to protect the principles of socialism” (Taylor, 2001:78). The US intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2000 had no mandate from the UNSC (Taylor, 2001:78). That is probably the case with a range of US interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean such as Grenada and Panama. Unilateral interventions are inconsistent with the UN Charter because as scholars argue, they are taken by governments to serve realists’ interests.

This study investigates the extent to which a military intervention can be said to be under the authorisation of the UN. Should the UN grant permission first for intervening militarily in conflict situations such as the DRC? Should it be rightly argued therefore that any military intervention in the interest of peace should proceed from the assumption that such justification cannot be contradictory to the purposes and principles of the UN as embodied in the UN Charter? To this end, Article 24 of the same Charter “confers upon the Security
Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” (Taylor, 2001:78). It should be noted that Article 52 of the UN Charter deals with regional arrangements, and states that nothing precludes “the existence of regional arrangements or agencies from dealing with matters relating to international peace and security” (Taylor, 2001:78). Yet, the article is clear that “intervention operations should not be contemplated without UN authorisation” (Taylor, 2001:78). Does it mean then that any justification for military intervention on the grounds that it is in the interests of peace and security should be in line with the UN Charter?

2.5.2 Military Intervention without the UN Mandate

Having followed the above discussion, one is bound to pursue further the legal framework of the military intervention debate. Among the questions that can be raised is whether military intervention without a UNSC mandate violates Article 2 (4) of the Charter which provides for the prohibition against the threat or use of force. The ECOMOG military intervention in Liberia in 1990 and Sierra Leone in 1997, NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo in 1999, among others, had no mandate from the UNSC. As realists point out, these were carried out to achieve security interests (Waal, 2007:116). Waal also observed that most African military interventions have not portrayed themselves as primarily humanitarian; rather, these interventions were justified as actions “with reference to some political criteria, specifically the protection or restoration of democracy, or the preservation of regional security” (Waal, 2000:117). As will be argued in this thesis, the decision for intervention by the SADC coalition was based on the national interests of the intervening governments. It is what actually constitutes these national interests that this study will explore.
When states intervene without the authority of the international community, there are bound to be tensions as was the case during the initial stages of the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. This was because the military intervention was not approved by the UNSC and the broader international community. The military intervention in Iraq could be viewed by its detractors as an “oxymoron… devoid of legal sanction, selectively deployed and only achieving ambiguous ends” (Tharoor and Davis, 2001: 21-30). Military intervention can only be legitimate if it conforms to the UN Charter. The deployed force must be acceptable “by the international community and the parties to the conflict, its mandate, and the way it relates to the conflict” (Graham and Hansen, 2009:9).

Having briefly discussed the international legal dimensions of military interventions, it is important to note that there are cases when the UN Charter is violated by member states as was the case with NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia and the US led coalition in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2003. Based on these two cases, it would appear that some states tend to follow the UN Charter in situations where their national interests are not in any way under threat. Thus, this shows to some extent the inconsistencies in the application of the UN Charter (Graham and Hansen, 2009:9). Of importance to note also is the fact that there has not been an equally fair application of the UN Charter in Africa and other parts of the world. The response of the international community in terms of humanitarian intervention has often been varying and questionable. A case in point is the withdrawal of the UN troops in Rwanda in 1994 at a time when their services could have played an important role in the prevention of genocide. There are also cases where an individual country or some countries within a sub-regional grouping may not be interested in taking part in a military intervention because the situation does not have anything to do with their national interests. They would provide an excuse to justify their decision to not participate in the military intervention. (Thompson,
2001:7). As for humanitarian intervention, it fails in most cases because it concentrates on those solutions that are not long term but immediate. This is often carried out without adequately assessing the primary causes of the problem that need to be addressed. This can lead to a situation whereby humanitarian intervention is manipulated by the intervening countries (Thompson, 2001:7). The US led intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, arguably serve as examples.

2.6 The Rationale and Justification for Military Intervention

Whilst the above section looked into the international legal dimensions of military intervention, it is equally important to discuss briefly and in general the rationale and justifications that states give for taking decisions for military intervention. The patterns of military intervention have changed overtime. States used to intervene militarily for reasons and in ways that they no longer do. States now intervene for reasons and in ways that were unimaginable many hundreds of years ago. Dominant arguments in Political Science and Security Studies would expect these changes to be a result of material factors such as alterations in the balance of power. Pearson (1974:261) argues that the motivation for military intervention includes territorial acquisition, the protection of social groups in the target country, and the promotion of an ideology or belief system. Pearson (1974:265) also contends that the domestic conflict in one state might influence the interests of another state thereby causing it to deploy troops. Thus, the author seems to argue that a state (or a group of states) may fear that the change of events in a neighbouring country may influence negatively its (or their) security or economy (among other interests). Hence, the justification for intervention will be to secure national security interests.
Some of the interests that trigger interventions include “targeted domestic disputes, domestic policies and foreign interests to protect social factions, economic and political interests and military or diplomatic facilities, to protect lives or to affect regional power balances and strategic relations between countries” (Arlinghans and Baker, 1986:88). Military intervention in support of a government in power and in opposition to other domestic forces is perceived as motivated by realist interests, which will be discussed in detail in the later segment of this study. Intervention can be understood in relation to the purposes it intends to invoke among the parties involved and the international community. Despite the fact that the intervention might be through invitation by a sovereign state, it should - sooner or later - have the consent of the international community and, specifically, the UNSC (Green, Kahl and Diehl, 1998: 486; Claude, 1996:289-298).

There are certain factors that can trigger or constrain intervention (Macfarlane, 1985: 67). These factors can be diagrammatically presented as follows:
Table 10: Factors that constrain or trigger intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors conducive to intervention</th>
<th>Factors constraining intervention</th>
<th>Factors triggering intervention</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target country</strong></td>
<td><strong>Deep internal divisions in the</strong></td>
<td><strong>Internal instability in the</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>target country</strong></td>
<td><strong>state or opposition to</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>external intervention</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International environment</strong></td>
<td><strong>Regional instability, ideological</strong></td>
<td><strong>The risk of escalation</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>divisions among states in the</strong></td>
<td><strong>including super power</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>region, asymmetry in the</strong></td>
<td><strong>involvement and counter</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>distribution of power</strong></td>
<td><strong>intervention by extra</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>regional powers, legal</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>constraints (international</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>law and UN</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intervening state</strong></td>
<td><strong>Unpopular governments,</strong></td>
<td><strong>Available military force</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>incapable governments, military</strong></td>
<td><strong>including logistic</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>dominance in decision making</strong></td>
<td><strong>capabilities, economic</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>constraints, other</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>domestic constraints like</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>a lack of public support of</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>military operations</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Macfarlane (1985)

Ideology, influence, status, strategic motivations based on political interests and economic considerations are some of the factors that Macfarlane identified as inducing military intervention (Macfarlane, 1985:67; Hughes and May, 1986:177-202). The other generally agreed reasons that most states give to their domestic constituents whenever they intervene
militarily include intervention at request, right to protect its citizens abroad, individual or collective self-defence, self-determination, treaty commitments, and humanitarian purposes (Du Plessis, 2000:89; Finnemore, 2000:20; George and Keohane, 1980:217).

As regards intervention on request, the UN Security Council accepts it as the inherent and lawful right of every individual state to exercise its sovereignty by requesting assistance from another state or a group of states (UNSRC 387, 1976). However the sovereign right to invite assistance becomes contestable in situations where control of the state is disputed because contending legal claims by parties (Zimbabwe and Kenya in 2008 and Libya in 2011) when each party will be claiming to be in charge of the government. In many instances these requests and assistance would be in the form of provision of military forces and equipment (Barrie, 2000:90). Examples of such assistance include the British assistance to Uganda, Tanganyika and Kenya in 1964 at the request of the Kampala and Nairobi governments respectively and the French assistance to Zaire and Chad at their request in 1978 and 1983 respectively. After an attempted coup in the Maldives in 1988, India was requested to deploy its troops to restore order in that country (Barrie, 2000:90).

There are various questions that have often been raised as to the possibility of states abusing the exception of intervention by request. These abuses would include the fabrication of requests by the would-be intervener or the request for assistance coming from a government with limited or temporary authority to govern (Barrie, 2000:90). Thus all relevant circumstances surrounding a particular request should always be analysed in order to be able to determine whether or not a request to intervene was not manipulated. When the US forces landed in Panama in 1989 with the aim of securing the arrest of General Noriega, the then military ruler of Panama, the US government justified its actions by arguing that the landing
had taken place at the request of the constitutional authority of Panama and that Washington was acting with the consent of Estrada who had been sworn in as president of Panama within hours of the landing of the US troops (Barrie, 2000:90).

The question of lawfully established governments being entitled to request assistance from other states to preserve internal law and order as well as defending them against unlawful attacks or aggression has also been a subject of debate, particularly in cases where there is a civil war (Barrie, 2000: 92). In cases where the government is in complete control of the state and that the internal disturbances are isolated terrorist activities that are confined to the domestic laws of a given country, that government, as Jennings and Watts (1992:438) argue, may seek assistance from other states (see also Barrie, 2000:92). Barrie argues that in situations where a country is engulfed in a civil war and state control is divided between the warring factions, intervention could be contrary to international law (2000:92). This may be so because no one seems to have ultimate political authority in the target state. Barrie’s argument is reinforced by the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty 1965 (section 2) declares that “…no state shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another state, or interfere in the civil strife in another state” (Barrie, 2000:92, also see Dugard, 1994:298).

Although the apartheid South African government defended its intervention in Angola in 1975-1976, arguing that the MPLA government was supported by Cuba and the Soviet Union, there was doubtful legality for South Africa’s actions and its defence was condemned by the UN Security Council on the grounds that the evidence supported the claim by the
MPLA that it had invited the Havana government to send troops to Angola to assist the Luanda regime against South African aggression (Barrie, 2000:92). The UN Security Council also rejected South Africa’s subsequent intervention and active support for UNITA which Pretoria justified as an act of self-defence against Angolan supported SWAPO bases (South African Yearbook of International Law, 1982:263). In situations where a civil war is being fought and the control of the state is divided between warring factions, intervention of a humanitarian nature may be allowed (Barrie, 2000:93; see also UNSRC 567, 1985).

The instituting of the UN Charter means that it is no longer a foregone conclusion that there is a right to intervene in any civil war in support of a government unless those forces that are fighting a government are receiving support from another state (Barrie, 2000:93; see also Shearer, 1994:96). In supporting the above argument, Wright (1960:521) noted that the use of force in another state’s territory either on the invitation of a recognized or insurgent government in times of a rebellion, insurrection or civil war is not permitted under international law (also see Barrie, 2000:93). However, a United Kingdom representative in the UN Special Committee on the Principles of International Law put across the argument that the only condition to be met by any government that wants to respond to a request for assistance would be to satisfy itself that its response is proper and that it should expect its actions to be closely scrutinized by the international community (Barrie, 2000, 93-94, also see British Yearbook of International Law, 1986:614). What the British representative did not take cognizance of is that although the international community can scrutinize a particular intervention by a particular country or a group of countries, there will be little if any consensus regarding whether or not the intervention should have taken place. The 2003 US led intervention in Iraq is also a significant example.
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the other reason given by a state in justifying its intervention is the right of that particular state to protect its citizens abroad. Wherever a state realizes that its citizens abroad are being mistreated or that they are in immediate danger of losing lives or they are threatened with serious injury, it is bound to intervene. Such was the case when Belgian troops were deployed in the Congo in 1960 to help Belgian nationals (Barrie, 2000: 94). The French and Belgian forces intervened in Zaire to protect the Belgian and French nationals when a rebellion broke out in Zaire (Barrie, 2000:94). Besides the protection of citizens, the need to protect property can also be used as justification for military intervention. When the then apartheid South African government sent its troops into Angola in 1976, it justified its action by claiming that this was meant to protect the Calueque Dam and construction. The Pretoria regime argued that these two installations were of significance to the economy of then South West Africa (Namibia) which was under the political and military control of the South African regime (Barrie, 2000:95).

The right to self-defence or collective self-defence constitutes one of the justifications used by states for military intervention. In 1990, Kuwait and a number of other states led by the US acted in collective self-defence as a response to the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq. However, this was after the adoption by the UN Security Council of Resolution 678 in November 1990 which authorized the use of force (Barrie, 2000:96).

Literature on military interventions seems to be informed by realpolitik notions that strong states take decisions to intervene when their geostrategic and economic interests are served. However, states can intervene militarily for humanitarian purposes. Finnemore (2003:5) noted that the common problem with the traditional formulation is that interests are indeterminate and “in almost any case of intervention, one could impute a very reasonable set
of interests that would explain intervention and equally plausible set that would explain nonintervention”. In most cases, as Finnemore (2003:5) points out, these opposing conceptions of national interests actually are articulated and pushed on decision makers by groups on different sides of the debate over whether or not to intervene. Of importance here therefore is not the claim that intervention serves interests and in the context of this thesis, it seeks to identify what these national interests were and how the varying national interests of the intervening countries were served through the military intervention. The thesis also tries to bring out the significance of military strategy as a key tool that nation states employ in the pursuance, attainment and protection of these interests.

It is through the examination of broad patterns of intervention behaviour of states and the debate on the subject that one can fully comprehend the coordinated shifts in perceptions of interests among states and how states understand the importance of intervention as a utility tool of policy. As observed by Finnemore, due to the fact that interests shifts more often, nation states have over time taken initiatives to construct rules among themselves about when intervention is legitimate and inevitable (Finnemore, 2003:5). The rules about intervention are not divorced from power and interests. Finnemore further asserts that the rules that guide military interventions are “strongly and entirely shaped by the actions of powerful states that actually have the capacity to intervene” thereby exploring how one set of rules perceived by the powerful to be “in their interest” is replaced by a different set of equally “self interested

6 Whilst there is a general claim that parochial interests (national or otherwise) must be present for a country to intervene militarily (committing troops and resources) to assist another state, Professor Neethling offers a scholarly point of view that there is a need however to try and distinguish between military intervention (e.g. Liberia, Lesotho, Iraq) and ‘peace intervention / intervention in the realm of peace and security’ (especially UN Chapter 6 type operations). According to Neethling (2008), parochial or national interests are less likely to inspire or underpin the latter. In fact, traditional UN troop-contributing nations, such as Canada, Senegal, Ghana, Austria, Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh, do not seem to be inspired or motivated by regional or parochial interests. Rather, these traditional troop-contributing nations seem to be inspired by altruistic reasons – although ‘international profile’ might also play a role in some cases (India, Pakistan) (Views obtained courtesy of feedback comments through email correspondence by Professor Theo Neethling to author, August 2008. Professor Neethling, who is now Head of School in the Department of Political Science and Administration, was then holding the same appointment at the University of Stellenbosch’s Centre for Military Science).
rules” (Finnemore, 2003:5). The current trend of military interventions by the US and NATO seem to support Finnemore’s above observation.

The shifts in terms of what constitutes national interest has also seen literature on the military intervention in DRC by AZN coalition varying as to what motivated this coalition of countries to take the decision to intervene. The shifts in the levels of interests also determined the patterns of execution of the coalition military strategy. Whilst one school points out that the coalition’s military intervention was meant to restore peace and tranquillity in the DRC whilst safeguarding the national interests of these three members of the coalition, the other school of thought argues that personal elite interests dominated the decision to intervene in the conflict. The latter school of thought also argues that the initiative to sustain the war effort can sometimes also become significant for those who intervene militarily if the mission is not achieved according to the time frame or plan of the allies (Nest, 2006:31). Intervening countries may become cognisant of the profit making opportunities available to them from their involvement in the target state (Nest, 2006:31). As Du Plessis noted, “the dynamism, uncertainty, complexity and potential destructiveness of military intervention provide adequate scope, and also enhances its utility, for achieving some other and very different objective(s) than the purported and declared objectives” (2000:33). The point which Du Plessis (2000), Nest (2006) and other scholars seem to try and bring out is that there may be (and arguably not always) some development of personal economic agendas for decision makers within institutions that have significant influence in as far as the decision for military intervention and execution of the intervention is concerned. Combined with political interests, the emergence of economic interests may result in a predatory, exploitative and multiwar complex (Nest, 2006:31). As has been noted previously, this study takes the position that national interest is the prime motivating factor that informs governments to take
the decision for military intervention and military strategy remains a key tool in the attainment and safeguarding of these interests. Therefore, it is required that the next chapter clarifies what constitutes national interest in the context of the military intervention and national interest nexus.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter has provided a detailed contextualisation of military intervention in an effort to project the various dimensions of the subject. The first section focused on the definitions of military intervention as given by various scholars. These definitions differ in terms of their combat and non-combat relatedness. These definitions have shown that generally it depends on the type of action and the instruments used as well as the actors and other factors that serve to distinguish the type of military intervention. The military action is effected at the invitation or request of the government of a member state in order to assist that state militarily pending a political solution to a given crisis. It was suggested that the military intervention under study would be referred to as overt foreign military intervention of a combative and coercive nature in an interstate conflict which was multilaterally undertaken by a coalition of states purportedly representing a sub-regional group.

The second section discussed the evolution of military intervention from the pre-Cold War to post-Cold War period. It was noted that whilst military intervention in the pre-Cold War had more to do with prevailing multilateral balance of power system and the interests of major powers, intervention was carried out through overt and covert assistance by the USSR and the US to support of the two countries’ rival ideologies. The post-Cold War period has seen military intervention being undertaken for humanitarian purposes including the attainment of global peace and security rather than being a mechanism by greater powers to control the
weaker ones. Taking cognizance of the fact that since this thesis project is driven by the
premise that states take decisions for military intervention based on the safeguarding of
national interest, the third section focussed on the general debate on the legalities surrounding
military intervention was made. It was noted that there is an emerging global consensus that
unilateral military intervention is not legitimate. It is therefore only the UNSC which can
legally authorize military intervention.

The fourth and final section discussed the rationalities or justifications for military
interventions. These include intervention on request, a state’s right to protect its citizens
abroad, individual or collective self-defence, self-determination, and treaty obligations.
Factors such as ideology, influence, status, and strategic motivations based on political and
economic interests were noted as some of those factors that can play a part in influencing
military intervention. It was also noted that whilst military intervention involves the use of
military force as an instrument of foreign policy, it is also concerned with the perceived
national interests. It is this paradox which forms the centrality of this thesis as to what
constitutes national interest. Thus, the next chapter will try to configure the national interest
and military intervention discourse within the realist paradigm.
CHAPTER THREE
REALIST PARADIGM: CONFIGURATION OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND MILITARY INTERVENTION DISCOURSE

3.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to make a critical analysis of what exactly constitutes the concept of national interest. The first section gives a general overview of realism as the propounding theory of national interest. The theory argues that where the national interests of a state are concerned, the respective nation states are guided by an ethic of responsibility which they use as justification for breaking the law of war. In the realists’ view power remains a means rather than an end in an anarchic international system and the exercise of power can be defined in terms of a nation state’s military capability, economic and technological capabilities (Dougherty, Robert and Pfaltzgraff, 1990: 84).

The second section contextualises the concept of national interest. It analyses the various definitions of national interest as given by various scholars. It is noted that national interest is determined by the way which foreign policy is formulated and that formulation should be in line with the power and resources available to any given nation. There seems to be a general agreement among scholars and practitioners of international relations and security studies that the primary justification of a state’s action is premised on national interest. However, a disagreement among scholars when conceptual or substantive issues such as what constitutes the national interest.

National interest is also discussed in terms of its levels namely the primary or vital level and the secondary level. A distinction is noted in terms of national interest being temporary or permanent, specific or general. Thus, national interest can be described using three adjectives,
that is, primary, permanent and specific or secondary, temporary or general. In addition to these three levels of national interest, three distinct sets of “international” interests will be discussed. These are identical, complementary and conflicting interests. It is noted that national interests will always change or shift with time.\textsuperscript{7} A brief critical analysis of the elusiveness of national interest as a political concept is made in the same section. It will be shown that whilst the concept of national interest may sound ambiguous, it remains significant in any scholarly attempt to describe, explain, predict, and even prescribe or make recommendations pertaining to actions of nation states in the international political system.

The third section will discuss the decision making determinants in the formulation and implementation criterion of national interest. It will be argued in this section that the formulation of national interest is almost the same as the making of foreign policy as it involves decision making at the highest level of government. It will also be noted that the decision making scheme should make an assessment of what is desirable and essential for the nation’s common good in relation to the nation’s international and domestic environment, the costs involved and the probability of success. The criteria designed to enable decision makers to look at developments abroad and determine the importance of their outcome to a country’s national interests as well as the predicament with respect to the criteria for taking decisions will be discussed.

\textbf{3.2 A general overview of the Realist paradigm}

National interest was usually viewed in early human history as secondary to religion or morality. Rulers needed to justify their actions in these contexts whenever they engaged in

\textsuperscript{7} It is important to note that whilst the state is an institution designed to work in the national interest, namely a) defence against foreign threats and b) defence against internal threats, including those posed by class conflict, this does not mean ALL that the state does is of national importance. Views obtained courtesy of comments made to author by Dr Martin Rupiya, Pretoria (25 August 2010).
war. Nicolo Machiavelli is usually considered as the first thinker to “advocate for the primacy of national interest” (Roskin, 1994:20). France was the first to employ the practice in the Thirty Years War when it intervened on the Protestant side, despite its own Catholicism in order to block the increasing power of the Holy Roman Empire (Roskin, 1994:20).

In the 19th century, bigger states like the US had no interest in particular advantages definable in terms of power politics or of territorial gains. America paid less attention to developments on the international scene such as the Napoleonic wars and it was through this self chosen isolation that the Americans inculcated a doctrine labelled by Alexis de Tocqueville as “self-interest rightly understood” (Shembilku, 2004:10). The doctrine of self-interest saw an “individual citizen pursuing his private interests within the framework of a larger system that allowed all citizens to do the same” (George and Keohane, 1980:121). George and Keohane also note that “the preservation of the system depended on the recognition that diverting some private resources to maintaining the system was in the long run in the interest of citizens and that the demands of private interests had to be moderated by the claims of others” (George and Keohane, 1980:121). The two scholars further note that the “established polity would wield its sovereign government with the authority to use force against those who pressed their interests” (George and Keohane, 1980:121). The common interest here was “noticeably more tangible than the operation of the balance of power” (George and Keohane, 1980:121). The concept of national interest did not attract enough attention as a tool of analysis for many decades. At the turn of the 19th century, national interest was denunciated and the then US president, Woodrow Wilson, called for the “New World safe for democracy” where the national interest would disappear (Morgenthau, 1978:55).
It should be pointed out that despite Woodrow Wilson’s thinking and call, the events of the First and Second World Wars were impressive to most political and military strategy analysts who thought that these two world wars could have been avoided. They thus turned to the national interest as a concept which could be used to “describe, and explain” the foreign policies of nations (Van Nieuwkerk, 2003:70). In other words, foreign policy decisions are made in line with the national interests of a state.

Realist theory, also referred to as Political Realism, identifies power, national interests and state survival as crucial in the analysis of interstate relations (Clapman, 1996:230; Zartman, 1967: 25-54; Heywood, 1997:142; Hoffman, 1999: 241-250; Wolpe, 2001:27-42). This theory advocates that nation states may sometimes break the laws of war for the purpose of safeguarding their national interests which to some extent may be for public benefit. The problem is that whilst an ethic of responsibility “instructs leaders to consider the consequences of their actions, it does not provide a guide to how state leaders should weigh the consequences” (Krasner, 1978:89).

Several opponents of realism argue that national security can best be achieved by its application. Kenneth Waltz describes power as a means rather than an end in an anarchic international system (Dougherty, Robert and Pfaltzgraff, 2000: 84). The exercise of power, which has been defined in terms of military capabilities, plays a central role in realist theory. The elements of power include military, economic and technological capabilities of states. The behaviour and actions of nation states are shaped by the power that these states possess (Dougherty, Robert and Pfaltzgraff, 2000: 84). The theory of realism theory also asserts that a nation state’s military capability is vital or key to the achievement of its national interests. This is so considering that in the global politics, states may be able to achieve their objectives
through the use of threats and military force (Brown and Sean, 1995:9). The threat or use of military power by the US and members of NATO has been the trend particularly in Iraq in and Afghanistan. The current operations are meant to safeguard the interests of the US and members of the NATO coalition. Territorially related elements of national power such as defensive mountain ranges, water bodies, and natural resources such as oil, among others are of significant value in terms of increasing a nation state’s power as realist theorists argue. Realist theorists observe that although nation states can pursue other objectives that are indirectly linked to power and security, these two later elements remain vital or key elements to the leader of any nation in as far as the pursuance and attainment of national objectives is concerned. In other words, in the view of the realists, national security remains the top priority in the hierarchy of state objectives. Waltz (2000: 67) stresses the above argument by pointing out that states can safely seek other goals that are in line with the new security paradigm when they are assured of their survival from physical threats (see also Mearsheimer, 2001:46-48). Thus, it is from the above point that a nation will always adopt a military security strategy when undertaking a military intervention as this strategy will remain a key mechanism for the attainment and safeguarding of its national interests.

Even though new security or human security, as defined by authors such as Kaldor and Duffield, (2007) “goes beyond the dimension of military security, as a paradigm it remains state centric in character”. As Mearsheimer argues, “at minimum, realism offers an orienting framework of analysis that gives the field of security studies much of its intellectual coherence and commonality outlook” (Mearsheimer, 2001:46-48). It is this perspective that shows that military interventions have been studied in realist terms or the selection of realist theory is based on the fact that it has been shown to be reliable in analysing security issues and more specifically state behaviour (Mearsheimer, 2001:46-48).
For the purposes of this research, Political Realism would be applied as a theoretical tool of analysis. Political Realism emerged in response to, or as an attack on the perceived inadequacies, alleged failures and weaknesses inherent in idealism, which had emerged soon after the end of the First World War, with the major purpose of preventing such wars from repeating themselves. However, its failure to prevent the Second World War showed that idealism as a tool for the study of international relations had failed. Idealism did not look as though it had something to say about the major events in international relations in the 1930s (Hollis and Smith, 1990:21). Hence, Morgenthau, Carr, and Waltz proposed a new approach that came to be known as Political Realism.

Perhaps the starting point to observe about realism is that it has a Hobbesian perception of human nature. According to realism, interactions in the international system are simply guided by the laws of nature. The international system is viewed as a ‘self-help system’ in which the state is the major and most important actor of all. The interactions of the state with other actors is shaped and defined by and in terms of national interest which is defined in terms of national power and security of survival (Morgenthau, 1948: 75). Furthermore, realism has a pessimistic view towards not only morality in the international system but also the importance of the role, if any, of international organisations, international treaties and conventions as well as international law in general. As Morgenthau observes, “political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws” (Morgenthau, 1948:75). Realism argues that, because of the anarchic nature of the state-system and the conflicting interests among the actors, the international system becomes one which is marked by constant struggles for dominance by one actor or a group of actors (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1981:189). Therefore, war is an ever-present possibility, which
states must always have to keep in mind and prepare for. This research therefore adopts a realist approach in analysing the military intervention by the SADC coalition forces in the DRC conflict after the “aggression” by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. The three SADC intervening countries were among the major actors in the DRC conflict. International law, treaties and conventions were violated, especially Article 2.1 of the United Nation Charter which provides for the non-intervention norm prohibiting interference in the internal affairs of other countries. The United Nations simply watched as the conflict in the DRC escalated. Although the main aim of the SADC coalition forces was to prevent the rebel advance towards the DRC capital, Kinshasa, pending the response of the international community, national interest as part of the motive force behind the foreign military intervention remained the primary motivating factor.

The scholars of Political Realism share a common belief that nation states are motivated by their desire to have military and economic power or security rather instead of having ideas or ethics. According to Morgenthau, a nation’s interest, that is, that kind of interest which determines the “political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated” (Morgenthau, 1951:18). Morgenthau judged the concept of interest defined in terms of power and argued that the goals of foreign policy must not extend beyond the power available because of the limitations in terms of resources that are needed to obtain national desires. In the context of this research, this means that any state or a coalition of state’s decision to undertake military intervention should be determined by the availability of adequate logistics to undertake the intervention operation. These resources would perhaps include troop carriers, service support rations, ammunition and efficient and effective firepower as well as manpower. From a realist perspective, the success of a statesman is determined by his ability “to make decisions that
would preserve and improve the state’s power and not misuse it in a way that would weaken the state” (Morgenthau, 1951:27). The decisions that a statesman make in relation to military intervention should be followed by the ability and need to utilise resources efficiently and effectively in order to achieve the set out national objectives.

3.3 National Interest in context

3.3.1 A critical exploration of the definitional debate

Before discussing the various definitions of national interest as given by various scholars, it is important to also look at the general meaning of interest. George and Keohane (1980:121) define an interest as an objective and the terms “interest group”, “special interest” and “selfish interest” can be a joining phrase to the term “interest”. Interest can also be defined as a pattern of conduct of an individual or group in pursuit of a goal (George and Keohane, 1980:121). The term interest may be subjectively defined solely by preferences as something that is being desired or sought. Thus, interest is an aggregation of wants, moral, legal justification and it may rest on certain obligatory “standards that can be beneficial for one regardless of one’s wishes or wants” (Nye, 1998:45).

From the above, it can be realised that there is no clear and definitive meaning of “interest.” It is important to also look at various definitions of the concept of national interest. There are two groups of international relations scholars who proffer different opinions in regards to national interest. The first group views national interest as a science which can be arrived at objectively and rationally. The second group view national interest as an art and whose definition is nothing but a struggle among various subjective views and preferences. However, Couloumbis and Wolfers (1990:98) argue that national interest should be a
reflection of the synthesis of objective and subjective approaches and regardless of the type of government in a given state, decisions are made by a selected few individuals.

The term national interest has a variety of meanings, some of which are not in any way conciliatory. There has not been any academic agreement as to what the term means and the existing literatures do not suggest any clear-cut classification of its various uses. In Beard’s (1934:586) view, national interest is an aggregation that is assembled. It is a combined sum of a nation’s objectives. However, George and Keohane argue that national interest cannot be a total of individual interests because of the fact that due to their differences, interests cannot be added or an average cannot be made out of them and they can at most be “a synthesis of interplay of forces, in which individual interests are an inherent part” (George and Keohane, 1980:131).

In some scholars’ views the concept of national interest has a significant inclination towards the political process of society. As Vertzberger observes, “the decision making process in which the foreign policy goals result from bargaining among the needs and wants of the various groups regardless of whether democratic or authoritarian procedures are employed” and whatever policy makers decide becomes the substantive content of national interest (Vertzberger, 1998:57). It is in this regard that national interest can always change whenever the requirements and aspirations of a nation change; thereby, the concept becomes incapable of serving as a standard of judgement for policy formulation and implementation (Van Nieuwkerk, 2004:74). Another meaning of national interest lies in the public’s interest in “maintaining an arena open to free and fair political competition of all interest groups” and all special interests shall act according to one common interest (Lippman, 1947:75). Here we can deduce that that national interest under this definition remains dependent on the balance
of forces in a given polity and the governing rules of its political system. It cannot however serve for the comparison of foreign policies across national boundaries and time (Lippman, 1947:75).

Kramer (2002:133) takes a normative approach when he defined national interest as those preferences of decision makers taking into consideration that policy makers are regularly replaced and national interest changes with how these policy makers bring in new ideas on the formulation of policy. Nuechterlein (2000:55) sees national interest as “the perceived needs and desires of some sovereign state comprising its external environment”. However, in Aron’s view, “national interest depends on the type of the regime” (Aron, 2003:277). The fact that different regimes have different ends would mean that these regimes would require different policies to promote these ends (Aron, 2003:277). However, it cannot be ruled out that whenever there has been a replacement of a regime in one way or the other, there is likelihood that the national interest may be adjusted and refocused.

Nye points out that the term national interest is synonymous with public interest constituting the sum of all particular interests within a society. Nye observes that “in a democracy, national interest is simply what citizens say it is; it is broader than vital strategic interests, though they are a crucial part” (Nye, 1998:51). As one of its functions, national interest can guide the political debate and guide decision makers with the framework of the terms of the debate. It should be realised that the “utility of national interest is not any formula that can provide answers to all complex issues of foreign policy” (Nye, 1998:51). Instead, the decision maker is supposed to as a variety of questions that would assist him or her in making informed decisions. Such questions include: How can current developments affect our nation’s power? To what extent are our state’s vital interests under threat? Which of our
nation’s interests are secondary and how much resources can we commit in order to defend them? If we must compromise the secondary interests of our nation, what sorts of deals are acceptable? (Sheenhan, 2000: 70). An important point to take into account is the fact that decision makers do not arrive at the same answers to the questions because these claimed interests can be potentially justified by making comparison to those national interests of other states in the global system (George and Keohane, 1980:140). This being the case, national interest influences those in leadership positions to take decisions which are in line with the international political environment. It needs to be pointed out that the concept of national interest will continue to be extensively used by political actors.

A case in point is when Condoleezza Rice wrote during America’s 2000 campaign that Washington must act in line with its national interest and the interests of the international community. What Condoleezza Rice might have been referring to was in reference to the circumstantial thinking about foreign policy and contemporary global politics. Because of globalisation, the interaction among nation states tends to shape their respective policies towards their international relations (Vertzberger, 1998:185). Thus, broader interests can be incorporated into a “far sighted” concept of the national interest which “can include different goals shared by other states as well and values such as human rights and democracy’ (Vertzberger, 1998:185). Thus, a better informed political debate is the only way in which states can broadly and narrowly define national interests (Nye, 1998:36-50). Consequently the concept of national interest appears so complex to comprehend. With power as a yardstick, Morgenthau argues that at times national interest can lead states into formulating and implementing aggressive foreign policies whilst giving superficial justification to national egoism (Morgenthau, 1951:18). As suggested by Nye, national interest must be superseded
by “international interests” or “world order” approaches, “which go beyond the inherent selfishness of national interest” (Nye, 1998:36-50).

Morgenthau also noted that national interest “lies in the obligation to protect and promote the good of the society” (1951:18). The yardstick in this definition seems to be that the “common good is above and prior to any policy decision and policy makers have a responsibility to bring their actions into conformity with higher shared interest” (Morgenthau, 1951:18). However, what remains of controversy is where the common good and common interest lies. In order to comprehend the locus of the common good one has to take note of the fact that what determines the common good is either the interaction of interest groups or the public opinion poll answers. In light of the above, it is of huge importance for political leaders to discuss the formulation of policy broadly since a common good can be identified by making an assessment of what leads to the best possible benefit for society. This process can be done through an initial identification of the principles of the regime and adopting public policies that will advance those principles (Nye, 1998: 35, 45). The two fundamental assumptions that Nye made are that there are some values which are more worthy than others and that society is not value neutral. He emphasized this when he said that “in the international realm, a nation’s interest lies in its ability to safeguard the common good of the society and continue its search for the public interest unhindered by outside threats” (1998:35).

What Nye seems to suggest is that a foreign policy guided by the national interest would effectively guard against foreign threats and this would provide a peaceful environment that brings opportunities in the course of the country’s international relations.
3.3.2 The categories of National Interest

There are two levels of national interest, namely the primary or vital level and the secondary level. The primary level concerns the “nation’s physical, political and cultural identity and survival or the security” (Morgenthau, 1951:23). A nation should not hesitate or compromise to go to war and defend them at any price so that these national interests are preserved (Morgenthau, 1951:23). As regards the second level, that is the secondary interests, Morgenthau observed that these can be negotiated or compromised and these are difficult to define because they fall outside the primary category and they represent no threat to sovereignty (Morgenthau, 1951:23). It should be observed that secondary interests have a potential of growing in the minds of statesmen until they seem to be vital and nations can negotiate and reach deals if the interest is secondary and mutually beneficial to those nations (Morgenthau, 1951:23). This research will attempt to ascertain whether the interests that informed the SADC countries’ decision to intervene militarily in the DRC conflict were of the primary or secondary level. It will also be important to analyse whether all the three intervening countries’ interests were on the same level and, if not, to find out the political and military strategy that resulted in the joint operation for military intervention.

In addition to the above mentioned interests, there is a distinction between temporary and permanent interests, as well as specific and general interests. The “permanent interests are relatively constant over a long period of time; variable or temporary interests are what a nation chooses to regard as its national interest at any particular time” (Morgenthau, 1951:35). As Morgenthau noted, general interests are those interests that a country applies in a positive manner to a larger “geographic area, to a large number of nations or in several specific fields” (1951:35). Specific interests are closely defined in time and space and are often a logical outgrowth of general interests (Morgenthau, 1951:35). Thus, it can be said that
national interest can be described using three adjectives, namely primary, permanent and specific or secondary, temporary or general. A long term commitment in defence of human rights in a distant land without any quarrel with a specific country might be secondary, permanent and general. Country A’s support of Country B in the ongoing war against terrorism is a secondary, temporary and general interest, “one that concerns universal peace and stability” (Morgenthau, 1957:25, 2004:70).

In addition to the above levels, there are also three distinct sets of “international” interests, namely identical interests which refer to “those interests which two countries or allies may hold in common” (Roskin, 1994:78). Complementary interests are those interests which though they are “not identical are capable of forming the basis of agreement on specific issues” (Roskin, 1994:78). Conflicting interests are those interests which countries have different perceptions (Roskin, 1994:78). It is through diplomacy that complementary interests can be found and developed and it is also through diplomacy and passage of time that national interests can shift (Roskin, 1994:78). In analysing the SADC coalition’s military intervention, this research also intends to assess the various levels of the intervening countries’ national interests that informed their decision for military intervention in the DRC. The research will look at which interests were of primary or vital importance at the beginning of the intervention and the likely impact that those interests had on the respective decisions to intervene. The research will also try and analyse whether these interests remained of primary or vital importance through out the intervention period. It will also look at which of the interests were of secondary importance and whether these interests remained at that level or they shifted to the primary level during the intervention period. The research will also make an analysis on which of the national interests of the intervening countries were identical, complementary or conflicting. It will also analyse the means (diplomatic or otherwise) that
were used to find common ground for the military intervention by the coalition. The research will analyse how the SADC coalition military strategy was key in the pursuance, protection and defence of these interests.

3.3.4 The elusiveness of National Interest as a political concept

Whilst the concept of national interest may sound ambiguous, it remains significant in any scholarly attempt to make descriptions, explanations, predictions, even prescriptions or recommendations pertaining to actions of nation states in the international political system. In fact, there is a general agreement among scholars and practitioners of international relations and security studies that the primary justification of a state’s action is premised on national interest. The disagreements among these scholars and practitioners start when conceptual or substantive issues about national interest are raised in relation to the generally acceptable definition of national interest. These issues include: what would constitute the national interest of a given country; consensus on who decides the priorities of state action and the framework implementation of these actions; definition of a given state’s threat level; by whom and how allies are chosen and the role of government when faced with internal disagreements regarding national goals and values (Krasner, 1978: 98).

The concept of National Interest is elusive for the following reasons:

1. National Interest needs to be differentiated from “group, class, elite establishment or foreign inspired interest” (Couloumbis and Wolfers, 1990:104). Thus, “national interest is a compromise of conflicting political” interest or “a product of constant internal political competition” and the national interest oriented policies are defined by the government through its various agencies (Couloumbis and Wolfers, 1990:104,);
2. The “elusiveness of national interest as a political concept” revolves around the fact that a country’s national interest must be in proportion to the scope and range of its capabilities (Couloumbis and Wolfers, 1990:104);

3. A country’s national interest should “be related to the interests of other countries” (Roskin, 1994:76). This is important in the field of diplomacy where there is a need to assess one’s own needs and aspirations together with a clear balance between those needs and the aspirations of others.

According to Couloumbis and Wolfers, the “national interest of a nation that is conscious not only to its own interest but also to that of other nations must be defined in terms compatible with the latter. In a multinational world, this is a requirement of political morality. In an age of total war, it is also a condition of total survival” (Couloumbis and Wolfers, 1990:104; see also Morgenthau, 1958:74-75). The same point is emphasized by Roskin who sees the international system as not being peaceful nor being able to prevent wars and the varying levels of continual conflict and threats of war can be minimized by the “piecemeal and prudent adjustment of conflicting interests by diplomatic action” (1994:89).

However, the important issue is how national interest should be related to the requirements of collective or global security. Morgenthau is against actions of a state that are not good and have nothing to do national interests. If the security of every rich state in the world is put on par with the security of poor or developing countries, as seemingly agitated for by the collective security theory, then there is a likelihood of having no localized disputes, thus setting a dangerous and suicidal precedent in the age of nuclear weaponry (Couloumbis and Wolfers, 1990:104). Morgenthau is sceptical of “political leaders who justify their policies on the basis of collective security rather than plain national interest” (see Couloumbis and
Wolfers, 1990:104). Based on the above, it would appear that Morgenthau would oppose an American military intervention in any country in order to restore democracy or collective security. He would also have opposed any Soviet military intervention in support of communism or in solidarity with socialism.  

As Morgenthau puts it, national interests take precedence over regional interests in as far as the relationship between national interests and regional alliance interests are concerned because useful alliances are best supported by “foundations of reciprocal advantage and mutual security of participating nation states rather than by ideological or moralistic frameworks” (1958:74-75). However, Couloumbis and Wolfers (1990:105) argue that a military alliance organization like NATO’s primary role is not only for the protection of the territorial security of member nations but also for the protection of political, economic and cultural identities of states. Thus a regional alliance that does not serve the interests of the member states as pursued by their government will likely not be effective in the long run and its survival is not guaranteed.

This research will also identify the national interests of the countries that intervened in the DRC within the context of the above raised issues, namely how the respective national interests of members of the coalition were differentiated from group, class, elite establishment or foreign inspired interest; whether the national interests of the intervening countries were in proportion to the scope and range of their capabilities, how each country’s national interest was related to the interests of other members of the coalition, and how the respective national interests that informed the governments of the coalition to take the

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8 However, Morgenthau fails to consider the fact that leaders often find it useful “to dress interest motivated policies into moral, legal, or ideological garb” (See Couloumbis and Wolfers, 1990:104).
3.4 Decision Making Determinants in the Formulation and Implementation criteria of National Interest

The formulation of national interest is almost the same as the making of foreign policy as it involves decision making at the highest level of government, that is, the Presidency and Cabinet (Schonberg, 2003:67). It is at this level that the nation’s goals and the aggregation of national interests are determined. However, the operational and tactical levels are responsible for the implementation of the national interest (Schonberg, 2003:67). Thus, political realism views the formulation of national interest within the confines of the goals of foreign policy. Of importance to note is that realist theorists argue that the decision-making scheme should make an assessment of what is desirable and essential for the nation’s common good in relation to the nation’s international and domestic environment. A decision at national level should always be undertaken in relation to the calculation of national power, that is, the costs involved and the probability of success. Morgenthau (1951:40) also noted that those responsible for the formulation of foreign policy should have the moral determination to defend the requirements of the national interest.

A distinction can also be made between desirable goals and essential goals. It is from the list of essential goals that the “total national interest” is derived (Morgenthau, 1951:38, 59; Trubowitz, 1998:65). The first step is to establish a hierarchical order of goals so as to frame a rational foreign policy, and the available power resources are then allocated to the foreign policy objectives that are chosen accordingly and the actions that are required to attain them are specified (Cohen, 1973:95). As Buzan (1998: 36) argues, National Security takes
precedence over other policy objectives such as prosperity, national honour, and cultural enrichment. Thus, any foreign policy matter should then be evaluated with reference or in terms of its importance to National Security which is the nation’s “capacity to control those domestic and foreign conditions that the public of a given community believes necessary to enjoy its own self determination or autonomy, prosperity and well being” (Maier, 1990:280).

A nation should use a rational and systematic criterion when deciding on international commitments and national security should be on the top priority of its objectives. Goldstein came up with a criterion that is made to assist decision makers to analyse international events for them to be able to determine the importance of these events to a country’s national interest (Goldstein, 2002:356). This criterion of national interest include “proximity, strategic location, possession of scarce and vital natural resources, the market for the country’s goods, the repository of the country’s private investment, population, large scale industry, and military power” (Goldstein, 2002:356). Goldstein further notes that: “if a country scores high on all the criteria, that country would be deemed vital to the security of the decision maker’s nation…on the other hand the country would be of little importance to the security of the decision maker’s nation if it scores low on every criterion.” (Goldstein, 2002:356).

It is thus important to discuss briefly the above mentioned factors vis-a-vis how they determine national interest. As regards proximity, it should be in the “state’s interest to have friendly or non hostile governments on its periphery” (Goldstein, 2002:356). Every government should always show a strong interest in the political affairs of its neighbours so as to be able to determine its national interest. It would be within the framework of this research to determine how the proximity of the respective governments of the SADC intervening coalition in relation to the DRC determined their decisions to undertake the military intervention in terms of their respective national interests. As regards the strategic
location, the significance of certain external lands or waterways is considered vital to a nation’s security (Goldstein, 2002:358).

There are external constraints which help statesmen to determine the claims that are prudent to make and likely to be satisfied. This includes the constraint which relates to the state’s geopolitical position in terms of its boundaries and resources which can impact on its national interest. The states which are safer than others can devote some of their resources to the promotion of ideals whilst those in an insecure environment can devote their attention to material interests. In view of the above, this research will assess the extent to which Angola’s geopolitical position had any bearing on its decision to commit its resources, in terms of its military intervention, as one of the members of the SADC coalition. This research will also determine whether or not those states which intervened militarily alongside Angola (such as Zimbabwe and Namibia who were relatively safer in terms of border security than others) devoted some of their resources to the military intervention for the promotion of regional security. This research will analyse how the DRC’s strategic assets, such as the Inga hydroelectric station, were of significance in regards to the national interest of those countries that took the decision to intervene militarily in support of the Kinshasa regime.9

The possession of scarce and vital natural resources is of significance to a country’s national security (Goldstein, 2002:358). The source of raw materials becomes crucial to any country’s decision-making process on issues pertaining to the safeguarding and promotion of national interests. Considering the fact that the DRC has significant deposits of vital natural resources (uranium, tantalite, cobalt and many more), this research will attempt to establish how the

9 An interesting and important observation made by a foreign policy strategic analyst during discussion with author (Pretoria, 25 September 2008) is in regards to whether or not regime change would impact on bilateral trade. This analytical observation stems from the questions such as: Did US oil companies not profit from Angolan oil and did Cuban troops not protect Angolan oil facilities? Would a post-Kabila regime refuse to export electricity to the Southern Africa grid and withdraw from the SADC membership?
issue of natural resources linked with the SADC intervening countries respective national interests and their decision to undertake military intervention in the conflict.

There is an inseparable link between economic security and national security in the sense that the stronger the economic gains which can be attained through a favourable balance of trade, establishment of foreign markets, protection of private firms’ investments in the foreign country, the more desire a country has to protect its national security. In one way or another, every country is always in need of foreign materials or finished products. Private firms or companies of the intervening country may have investments in that country where troops are deployed. These respective investments may have a significant bearing on the country’s decision for military intervention in pursuit (or as a way) of safeguarding and promotion of its national interest (Goldstein, 2002:359). It is in line with this analysis that this research will analyse how the factor of markets for investment impacted on the decision for military intervention in the DRC conflict vis-à-vis the national interest of the SADC intervening countries.

The population of a country and its military and industrial capacity are also significant criteria that enable decision makers to take decisions in determining the country’s national interest. A state’s military power and its large scale industrial capacity are likely to have an impact on the calculations of its national interest (Goldstein, 2002:359). Having noted these factors that determine the selection of criteria on the outcome of a country’s objectives, it is important at this point to discuss how national interest is formulated from a realist perspective.
There are a number of factors that always affect decision makers in the formulation and implementation criterion of national interest. The government officials such as the President or Prime Minister of a country, Defence and Intelligence Chiefs, and the Foreign Minister, among others, are in predicament for taking decisions in defining a respective government’s national interest. The criteria would be based on a combination of factors: operational philosophy, ideology, morality and legality, pragmatism, professional advancement, partisanship, bureaucratic interest, ethnicity and race, as well as foreign dependency (Couloumbis and Wolfers, 1990:107).

The Operational Philosophy criterion depends on the time and location as well as the environment around which a decision maker is operating from. Couloumbis and Wolfers (1990:107) identify the synoptic and incremental approach as two primary styles from which the decision maker may choose. The synoptic approach refers to bold, swift and sweeping decisions such as introducing new practices, policies and institutions whilst discontinuing those of the past like declaring war, joining or revoking membership of a regional organization such as SADC, and nationalizing private property and resources. By adopting an incremental approach, the decision maker takes a continuous, probing and experimental route while taking cognizance of the fact that the political, economic and social or even security problems may be too complex to be studied instantly and proceed with bold initiatives without being worried about the consequences. As Couloumbis and Wolfers (1990:108) noted, the incremental approach allows for the making of a series of decisions, constant assessment of the effect of each decision upon the environment, taking appropriate or corrective action in order to maintain some social equilibrium.
Since most governments employ various types of formal and informal ideologies, the decisions that are made by policy makers in relation to a country’s national interest are normally in relation to or consistent with particular doctrines. A country’s choice to share either intimate or cordial diplomatic relations may be determined by either its inclination to western or eastern countries. For instance, a country may encourage free enterprise, support democratic governments and movements and also oppose totalitarian regimes if it follows an ideology based on liberal democracy (Trubowitz, 1998:79). If a country is traditionally authoritarian, it is likely to support those countries and governments that support its regime or those which do not oppose it whilst at the same time opposing those governments with whom it has unfriendly relations (Couloumbis and Wolfers, 1990:109).

There is a requirement for decision makers to act morally and legally when they make decisions. Acting morally would entail making honest and public decisions whilst legal actions would entail the capacity of decision makers to respect and abide by the requirements of the treaties of which the state is a part or signatory to in terms of the international legal framework (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963:57). In the case of the pragmatic criteria, policy makers are required to make short and long term decisions (if resources permit) as long as these decisions help to improve the external image of the government. Couloumbis and Wolfers (1990:107) also noted that a policy decision maker may lie or even cheat in order to protect a country’s national interests and to solve the problems that confront the regime to which s/he belongs.

In regards to the professional advancement criteria, policymakers have to confront popular pressures from the powerful elites because they consider their support as indispensable for their political survival (Lerche and Said, 1970: 214). As for the partisan criteria, policy
decisions taken at all levels from the Presidium down to the bureaucrat are made on the basis of equating the survival and success of a party or faction with that of a country. It is often difficult for policymakers to support policies that they consider beneficial to the government if this might result in their party losing an election or being removed from power.

With the bureaucratic criteria, the bone of contention stems from the time when bureaucrats try to equate departmental or organisational interests (Defence, Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs and State Security/Intelligence) with national interests. Since a given nation is bound to have limited resources, there is bound to be bureaucratic competition in terms of exaggeration of specific organizational, departmental or organizational requests in the name of national interests rather than bureaucratic interests (Buzan, 1998: 62). Besides the bureaucratic criteria, race and ethnicity are likely to influence the priorities of the decision maker in relation to that particular group or race in the name of safeguarding or promoting national interest. In addition to race and ethnicity, a decision maker’s class or status is likely to determine his or her support for those policies which he or she identifies with (Couloumbis and Wolfers, 1990:111).

As for the foreign dependency criteria, some countries - particularly developing or smaller countries - are regularly in need of assistance from bigger powers in order for their respective governments to retain political rule or power. Policy making in terms of national interests may be interfered with. It has to be in relation to the needs, guidelines and dictates of the bigger power influence since dissenting or disagreeable policies may result in the withdrawal of particular support or even the removal of key players from office (Falk and Mendlovitz, 1973:89). Whilst diplomats and bureaucrats may be urged to act prudently and realistically and to avoid moralistic and legalistic decisions, their main difficulty lies in deriving specific
policies from general guidelines, policies which include alliance formation, declaration and waging of wars, covert foreign intervention and foreign aid can be justified on moralistic, legalistic or realistic grounds (Falk and Mendlovitz, 1973:89).

When justifying important foreign policy decisions, public officials tend to employ any of the above three grounds or at times a combination of them. What complicates the problem of identifying national interest is the fact that the foreign policy decision making process is not a clear-cut or rational process. This is because in the shaping of foreign policies, there are a lot of conflicting criteria that would result in decision makers coming up with a prioritisation programme. What makes the analyst face challenges in identifying the real motives of state action are the official statements which are designed and made for propaganda purposes and public consumption. Such a scenario will end up confusing scholars and analysts of international relations. What politicians say in public or in their constituencies may not necessarily be in line with the goals and objectives that a military intervention in undertaken to achieve, thus leaving analyst with challenges of determining or separating state policies from propaganda.

Realist theory notes that the power status of a given state and the type of the regime determine the level of participation in the formulation of national interest. Morgenthau pointed out that in smaller states with a narrow scope of national interest, the national interest formulation and the prescription of foreign policy is effected at the apex. In bigger powers with a wider scope of national interest there are a number of problems and the process is difficult with a higher degree of decentralization (Schonberg, 2003:89; Morgenthau, 1951:34). In autocratic states where there is limited political participation, the process of national interest formulation is highly centralized. In democratic regimes, discussions of
national value (including national interest formulation) involve all relevant stakeholders (Trubowitz, 1998: 99). This would mean that it would not necessarily be the prerogative of those in political power to determine what a country’s national interest ought to be. The civil society and other pressure groups will have an input through properly designated channels in as far as national interest formulation is concerned.

Based on the above consideration, it can be equally noted that governments are circumstantially compelled by the above groups to take decisions on whether to intervene militarily or not, why to intervene and how. The decisions that are taken by states to intervene militarily in a given state are political decisions that take into account factors such as the electorate’s likely reaction, the potential political, military, economic and social benefits for the intervening states and the feasibility of the operation among other factors. Whilst this research will not analyse the decision making process that takes place in both democratic or non-democratic states and eventually leads to intervention exhaustively, it will try to integrate the political dimension in analysing the SADC coalition forces’ intervention in the DRC conflict. If a military intervention, as argued in this research, is planned and executed with the objective of upholding the various national interests of the intervening states, it would be of prime importance to analyse how the coalition’s military strategy was executed in order to attain and safeguard these varying interests.

Thus, from the above discussion, it is clear that decisions about national interest are not based purely on scientific or mathematical formulations resulting in optimal advantages for a nation state. On the contrary, decisions on national interest appear to be the products of conflicting wills, ambitions, motivations, needs and demands (Aron, 2003:91-92). Collectivities are composed of individuals and groups, each of whom will tend to seek his or her own
objectives, and to maximize those resources, shares of the national income, or position within the social hierarchy. The interests of these individuals or of these groups, as they express themselves in actual behaviour, are not spontaneously in accord with each other and, added together, do not constitute a general interest (Mendlovitz, 1973:1; Jones, 1979:89; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007:120).

From the foregoing it can be concluded that there seems to be a continuous academic debate among scholars as to what national interest is. The concept may be a slogan used to portray certain policies that are defined as national interests on the grounds of “special interest” rather than those interests that serve the common good and would have been arrived at in an undemocratic way. The rhetoric of national interest may endanger the common good due to questionable motives of political players such as economists who may define their investment holdings outside of their borders as national interest, whilst the academic elite may promote views that do not benefit the public at large, and “bureaucratic political elites may employ national interest in their struggle of persuading peers and superiors” (Van Nieuwkerk, 2003:75). Nest noted that there seem to be no clear demarcations “that exist between state and personal interests for those in leadership positions” (Nest, 1999:485). This is generally the case in some non-democracies. However, in democracies, leaders often appeal manipulatively to the basic nationalistic or humanistic instincts of their citizens (Uzodike, 2007). It is also important to note that whilst national interest, which might not necessarily be the defence of national security or territorial integrity, is likely to remain the prime motivation for military intervention, there has always been significant difficulty in distinguishing the exercise of military force for selfish and predatory reasons or for a strategic advantage from its use for lawful, justified or humanitarian purposes (Du Plessis, 2000:32). Furthermore, due to the uncertainty, complexity and potential destructiveness of military
intervention, the originally purported and declared objectives are sometimes not achieved (Verzberger, 1998:180). If this happens, then observers (including other actors) always deem it suspect, irrespective of the justification.

This research will focus on finding out whether or not the purported and declared national interests of the three members of the intervening coalition were achieved and whether the military intervention’s complexity resulted in predatory and personal interests taking centre stage at the expense of the intervening countries’ interests or national interest was key in determining the members of the coalition’s decisions for intervention.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has critically analysed the debate on what exactly constitutes national interest. This analysis was made in three sections. The first section gave a general overview of realist theory in relation to national interest. It was noted that realist theorists believe that a nation state’s power which includes its military, economical, technological capabilities are of primary importance in as far as the achievement of national in an anarchical international system is concerned. This is so considering that a nation’s behaviour is shaped and determined by the power it wields (George and Keohane, 1980:121; Dougherty, Robert and Pfaltzgraff, 2000: 84). The second section contextualized the concept of national interest by making an analytical exploration of the various scholarly definitions. Notable among them is Morgenthau, whose focus is mainly on the need for a nation state’s resource capabilities as key determinants that should shape its foreign policy formulation and implementation (1951:18-27). However, Rousenau views national interest as rooted in values of a nation state (1968:161). It was noted that there is some relative ambiguity concerning the concept of national interest. However, there seems to be a general agreement among scholars and
practitioners of international relations and security studies that national interest is the premise upon which state actions are justified. Disagreements begin on conceptual or substantive issues relating to the generally acceptable definition. These issues have included who decides the priorities of state action and the framework implementation of these actions among others (Krasner, 1978:89).

It was shown that the primary or vital level and the secondary level constitute the two levels of national interest. Whilst the former concerns the nation’s physical, political and cultural identity and survival or the security of the nation the latter represents those interests that can be negotiated or compromised and have no threat to sovereignty (Trobowitz, 1998:89; Morgenthau, 1951:23). A distinction between temporary and permanent interests was made, with time being a key factor in this distinction. National interest can also be a specific or a general interest. Thus, primary, permanent and specific or secondary, temporary or general are the adjectives that can be used to describe national interest. Three sets of “international” interests were discussed. These are identical, complementary and conflicting interests. It was noted that diplomacy is significant in the development of complementary interests. National interests can also change or shift with time (Morgenthau, 1951:37-53). The elusiveness of national interest as a political concept was critically analysed. Despite its ambiguity, scholarly attempts are always made to describe, explain, and predict state actions in the global political system.

The third section identified and analysed the decision making determinants in the formulation and implementation criterion of national interest. It was noted that there are similarities in the formulation of national interest and foreign policy. A nation must formulate its national interests through an assessment of what it deems desirable and essential in relation to its
international and domestic environment. Costs and the probability of success as well as benefits to the nation must be key in a nation state’s decisions. A nation’s goals must be established a hierarchical, systematic and rational order so that decision makers can formulate a foreign policy that is in line with the external environment (Cohen, 1973:95; Buzan, 1983:36; Maier, 1990:280; Goldstein, 2002:356). However, decision makers often experience a criterion predicament in terms of taking decisions that are in line with a respective government’s national interest (Couloumbis and Wolfers, 1990:107; Halberstam, 1972: 69).

It was noted in this chapter that national interest analysis can be made in many different contexts. These include “war and the use of force, alliances and diplomatic negotiations”, among others (Morgenthau, 1951:56). Realist theorists argue that it is through alliances and coalitions that common interests that exist among two or more nations are transformed into legal obligations. These alliances and coalitions are also a result of nation states’ diplomatic manoeuvres. Thus, diplomacy becomes a technique for accommodating conflicting interests as well as coordination of common and complimentary interests (George and Keohane, 1980:140; Morgenthau, 1951:57). Sub-regional, regional and international organisations play a significant part in the rationalisation of national interests of member states. Besides the identification and analysis of the national interests which informed the SADC coalition to take decisions for military intervention, this thesis project will also analyse why and how an alliance, a coalition, and diplomatic process can act as conduits or pivots for bringing together the various national interests of the three intervening countries into complementary interests. The research will establish whether the three interveners worked as a coalition or as an alliance (or this changed with time), and at what level diplomacy played a part in reconciling the varying national interests of these governments which took the decision to undertake the military intervention in the DRC conflict.
CHAPTER FOUR
A HISTORICAL PARADOX OF CONFLICT AND MILITARY INTERVENTIONISM IN THE CONGO

4.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to critically examine the historical paradox of conflict and military interventionism in the Congo from King Leopold to Laurent Kabila. This will be done in order to demonstrate the link between the conflicts that the country experienced and the involvement of external players at regional and international level, either in support or against a respective regime in that country. The conflict and interventionism link had to do with the interests of the intervening countries. These interests could range from ideology, as was the case during the Cold War, to border security and economic interests among others. As already stated, the premise of this thesis is that the national interests of the governments are the primary motivating factors that inform their decisions for military intervention and that military strategy remains a key instrument in the attainment, pursuance and safeguarding of these interests. Thus, it is of paramount importance to make a critical examination and analysis of the historical paradox of interventionism in the Congo and the strategies adopted before attempting to identify the interverners’ interests and the military strategy employed by members of the SADC intervening coalition.

This chapter consists of six sections. The first section is an overview of the Congo’s geo-strategic economic significance. It will be noted in this section that the central location of the Congo, coupled with the abundance of natural resources in the country, has resulted in a historical exploitation of these resources to the benefit of outsiders rather than the local inhabitants. Most conflicts experienced in the country have been centred on competition for these resources. The second section will discuss the turmoil in Congo and the bigger power
intervention tendencies from the period when Congo was placed under the private ownership of King Leopold II up to when it became an official colony of Belgium. The analysis will be focusing on the political, economic, and military developments during that period.

The third section will look at interventionism in Congo by the US and western and its allies in support of the Mobutu regime. It will be observed that the support offered to Mobutu by the west was based on the need by these countries to have a regime in Congo that would assist them to guard against communism. The support for Mobutu was based on the need to safeguard their political, economic and military security interests. The strategies employed by the US and its western allies in protecting these interests will be analysed. The section will also discuss the end of the western support for the Mobutu regime after the Cold War and the reasons for the termination these relations.

The fourth section makes an overview of the great lakes countries (Rwanda, Uganda Burundi and Tanzania) intervention in Congo in support of Laurent Kabila in the quest to oust Mobutu. The great lakes countries received covert political, economic and military support from US and its western allies in the intervention to oust Mobutu through an armed rebellion and install Kabila as the DRC president. All this was meant to be part of the safeguarding of the interests of the great lakes regional countries and those of the US and its western allies. The strategy employed by these countries in the intervention to replace the Mobutu regime with that of Kabila government will be discussed.

The fifth section makes a discussion on the DRC under Laurent Kabila and the great lakes intervention against the Kinshasa regime. It will be observed that the expectations of those countries (the great lakes countries, the US and other western allies) that had played a major
role in bringing Kabila into power through an armed rebellion were not met. The Kabila regime did not, as expected by these countries safeguard their interests. This, thus resulted in the Kabila led government falling out of favour with those former backers that had intervened to replace the Mobutu regime.

The sixth section will discuss the strategy used by the three great lakes with the covert and overt support of the US and some western countries in an attempt to replace Kabila with a more compliant Congolese. The political and military manoeuvres by these countries which formed part of the strategy adopted in attempt to remove Kabila will be analysed. This will be done as a way of leading us to the crux of this research, which is to identify and assess the national interests of the respective members of the SADC coalition that intervened militarily in support of the DRC government and how these national interests informed their decisions to intervene. However, this will be the primary focus of the next chapter.

4.2 The Congo’s geo-strategic economic significance: An overview

The DRC “is the third largest country in Africa after Sudan and Algeria.” It is “two times the size of South Africa, three times the size of Nigeria, five times the size of France and over eighty times the size of its former colonial master, Belgium.” The country has 2 345 406 square kilometres (905 562 square miles). It shares borders with nine countries in Central, Eastern and Southern Africa. These countries are: Sudan to the north, the Central Africa Republic to the north west, Angola to the south, Zambia to the south-east, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania to the east, and Congo Brazzaville to the west (see appendix two). The

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10 Though not yet official, the DRC may now be the second largest country in Africa. This follows the granting of autonomy to Southern Sudan as an independent state (The author acknowledges this comment from Professor Uzodike, Pietermaritzburg, 25 August 2011).


dominating features are the Congo River basin that stretches from the east from Lukashi general area north of Lubumbashi up through Kindu, Kisangani, Lisala and Mbandaka in the north, Kinshasa in the west up to Matadi and then flows into the Indian Ocean (see appendix three). The Congo River is one of the five longest rivers in the world and it has a high volume potential for hydroelectricity production and “part of this potential has been harnessed through the Inga Dam to provide electricity to the Congo and other countries in the sub-region such as Zambia and Zimbabwe.”

The DRC has two time zones. The equator line crosses its northern provincial capital, Mbandaka. As Moyroud and Katunga observed, “the DRC has three distinct land areas: the tropical rain forests, located in the central and northern parts of the country; the savannahs, located in the northern and southern parts of the country and the highlands, which consist of the plateaux, rolling meadows, and mountains found along the country’s eastern border, all along the Great Rift valley” (Moyroud and Katunga, 2002:168). The country is rich in mineral resources such as columbite-tantalite (cobalt/coltan) used for the manufacture of mobile cellular phones and other high tech computer hardware. Coltan is found in abundance in the Kivu and Maniema provinces. Whilst “eighty percent (80%) of the world’s coltan reserves are said to be in Africa, the DRC accounts for all eighty percent (80%) of these African reserves” (Moyroud and Katunga, 2002:168; also see Supporting the War Economy in DRC: European companies and the coltan trade, IPIS Report, Brussels, January 2002). Moyroud and Katunga, also noted that “gold and Manganese are also found in the oldest rock formations of the country” (Moyroud and Katunga, 2002:168). In 1994, a study carried out

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13 As pointed out by the DRC Presidential Special Security Advisor, Professor Mumba (a geo-strategic analyst by profession), the hydroelectric complex has major lighting potential capacity for the entire African continent and Europe (Interview with author, Kinshasa, 05 June 2009).

14 This information was obtained by the author from unclassified paper presentation entitled “DRC geostrategic set up during the SADC military intervention” courtesy of the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre Library, Harare, 2009.
by the National Centre of Geological and Mine Research (CRGM) discovered that the Ituri region has abundant gold deposits from which it is possible to extract pure gold at a ratio of 6-7 kilograms per tonne (Naidoo, 2003:5). Geological specialists revealed that the OKIMO concession, which is situated around Mongbalu city on the border with Uganda, has estimated reserves of between 2,000 and 3,000 tonnes of gold which is worth between US$20 to US$30 billion. Concentrations may reach up to 18 kilograms of pure gold per ton in certain places as compared to an overall global average of 11 grams of pure gold per ton (Bosongo, 1998:13; Naidoo, 2003:5).

The middle “Pre-cambrian formations of the east centre of the country are associated with tin, tungsten and related minerals, and the Katanga series of the Upper Pre-cambrian in Katanga Province are a source of copper, cobalt, zinc, lead, silver, cadmium and nickel” (Moyroud and Katunga, 2002:168). Uranium, an important mineral used for nuclear reactors and other non-mineral resources such as timber, is also found in abundance in the DRC (Moyroud and Katunga, 2002:168). The mineral resources lured powerful nations, particularly western countries and the US, to support the Kinshasa regime during the Cold War period. One third of the country experiences tropical rain for twelve months of the year and much of the rain is in the two Savannah zones on either side of the Equator. The DRC has the agricultural potential to feed the entire African continent. At the end of the twentieth century, an estimated less than three percent of the country’s arable land was under cultivation. For example, “the North and South Kivu provinces in the eastern part of the country have the potential to rank among the most productive places in Africa” (Young, 2002:13). The region is a major supplier of important resources such as water, energy, food and arable land. Most farming can yield up to three harvests per year (Young, 2002:13). It would appear therefore that the availability of vast natural resources explains why there has not been pronounced
mass starvation in the DRC despite the collapse of the formal economy caused by the conflicts after the country’s independence. Even after the end of colonialism, the US and most Western countries and also those from the East have continued to have an interest in the Congo.

The history of the DRC has been subjected to external interests and meddling consistent with its geo-strategic economic significance. Hence Frantz Fanon once famously remarked that Africa is in the “shape of a pistol, with Congo Kinshasa resembling the trigger housing” (see Le Carre, 2006:1). Young corroborated this point by stating that the “violence implicit in the metaphor aptly captures the tumultuous events afflicting a significant part of Africa in the 1990s” (Young, 2002:13). The pistol however, rather than pointing toward Antarctica, aims its fire inwards. Africa has experienced conflicts in twenty-four of the fifty-three states in the last decade, and the Congo has become a veritable epicentre of conflict in Africa with the involvement of almost half a dozen armies (Young, 2002:13). The DRC’s enormous wealth in terms of mineral resources seems to have resulted in a historical exploitation of these minerals for the benefit of foreigners at the expense of Congolese (Chinyanganya, 2006:93). During King Leopold’s rule Congo’s mineral wealth was also exploited for the benefit of the Belgians rather than the Congolese. It was through this exploitation of Congolese minerals that the Belgian government managed to finance the functioning of its civil service particularly the foreign affairs and defence ministries. The competition for Congo’s resource wealth has seen states and even individuals having interests at various levels of the conflict.15

Despite the withdrawal of the Belgians from the Congo, the country’s mineral wealth continued to be exploited by Mobutu and his close cronies who worked closely with western

15 Interview with DRC Presidential Special Security Advisor, Professor Mumba, Kinshasa, 05 June 2009.
nations who had an interest in the strategic mineral resources such as the large uranium deposits. During the Cold War period, the US and its allies initiated a strategy of working closely with a compliant Mobutu regime in an effort to prevent the Congo from being ruled by any leadership that was supportive to the Soviet Union and its eastern bloc allies. The allegations levelled against the Washington administration as having been behind the assassination of Patrice Lumumba are linked to the belief that the US wanted to avoid a situation where Lumbumba would rule the Congo.\textsuperscript{16} It would appear the Washington administration saw the likely danger of a Lumumba administration having close diplomatic ties with the Kremlin, thereby resulting in a possibility of Moscow having access to Congolese uranium.\textsuperscript{17}

The US government also worked closely with western nations during the Cold War period to try and avoid Russia and other communist administrations from having close ties with any of Congo’s post-independence political leadership. To reinforce its plans of thwarting Soviet influence in the Congo, the American government was directly involved in the construction of the Kamina Air force base in the eastern DRC which is one of the most strategic military airbases in sub-Saharan Africa and, to some extent, the world with the capacity to accommodate US military aircrafts such as the B52 Bomber. During the Cold War period, the base was manned and serviced by serviced by US military service personnel (Chinyanganya, 2006:94).

\textsuperscript{16} Interview with Presidential Special Security Advisor, Professor Mumba, Kinshasa, 05 June 2009.

\textsuperscript{17} Interview with DRC Presidential Special Security Advisor, Professor Mumba, Kinshasa, 05 June 2009(see also Chinyanganya, 2006:94).
4.3 Turmoil in the Congo and bigger power interventionist tendencies

From the period 1874 to 1908, the DRC was known as the Congo Free State which was by then a private concession of King Leopold II, the King of Belgium (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:14). It was through the use of money that Leopold managed to win control of the country from rivalry major European powers such as Great Britain, Germany and France who also had interests in Congo. After the Berlin conference in 1885, the country was under the rule of a monarch whose treatment of the Congolese resulted in mass murders of many Congolese inhabitants (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:14; see also Hochschild, 1998:298). Leopold also made use of adventurers, explorers and mercenaries such as Henry Morton Stanley whom he hired to exploit the country’s vast mineral resources in order to make his private enterprise more profitable. Other tactics used for extraction of the Congo’s wealth included terror, violence and quasi slave labour (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:14; see also Chinyanganya, 2006; 102).

Despite a successful coordinated effort by some western countries led by Britain which ended Leopold rule, resulting in the country coming under Belgian colonial administration, Congo continued to face economic exploitation, political repression and brutality remained the same (Hochschild, 1998:298). To ensure that it had total control of the Congo, the Belgian government made it a point that most of the higher decision-making appointments in the civil service and the military were filled by Europeans and mostly Belgians (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:6). When Congo became independent in 1960, the country experienced internal conflict among various political, separatist and neo-colonialist groups (Chinyanganya, 2006:102; see also Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:76-78). The exclusion of Congolese by the Belgians from having civil administrative positions affected the country’s administration when the Belgians withdrew when the country attained independence. The political and administrative
institutions were affected thus creating an environment which led to continuous political instability in the whole country (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:95). That political instability created space for continued exploitation of the Congolese mineral resources by external players with interests in the country’s vast strategic mineral resources.¹⁸

Thus, the origins of the political, military and economic crisis in the DRC and the legacy of military interventionism in the country can be traced back to the 1960s when counter reactionary and neo-colonial elements were overtly and covertly backed by external forces. In the early years after attaining independence, Congo was characterised by a wide range of conflicts and struggles for power. The conflicts that the country experienced resulted in interventionism by foreign forces in one way or the other. It is important to make a brief trace of this historical military interventionism by foreign powers in Congo’s conflict.

Foreign military intervention was witnessed in the Congo in mid July 1960 when the Belgian government deployed troops in the country following a mutiny by the Congolese troops. (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:135). Again there was foreign military intervention in Congo in the early sixties when some European countries deployed their troops to support Moise Thsombe’s initiative to secede the mineral rich Katanga province from the rest of Congo (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:135). The intervention by Belgium and some these European countries in support of Katangese secession was perhaps intended to promote their respective economic interests considering that Katanga province is rich in strategic mineral resources. Foreign military interventionism in the Congo was also witnessed in the mid-1960s and that intervention was at the level of the UN. The UN Security Council passed a resolution on 14 July 1960 which saw the withdrawal of the Belgian troops and the deployment of UN

¹⁸ Interview with Professor Wamba dia Wamba, 25 August 2009.
peacekeepers that were authorised to provide military and technical assistance to the Congolese government to ensure that its national security institutions were effective and efficient enough to execute their constitutional obligations (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:113).

When Congo continued to experience political instability in the early 1960s, the situation again created an environment that resulted in international players getting involved in controlling and influencing the political administration of the country. Controlling any given regime was possibly meant to provide a leeway for access to the country’s resources. When sergeant Joseph Desiree Mobutu successfully staged a coup d’état that resulted in the toppling of Patrice Lumumba from power, his arrest and murder, it is noted that Mobutu had the direct and indirect support of Belgium and the US governments who wanted to install a strong and compliant leader who would protect their interests (Hochschild, 1998:78; Baregu, 2006:60; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:145). The murder of Lumumba was meant to get rid of a Congolese president who supported the Soviet Union and its communist ideology thereby affecting western interests in the Congo.19 The western country’s intelligence services are reported to have played a critical role in as far as making sure that any leadership of the Congo was to be a compliant one that would protect the interests of these western countries.20 The same western countries also continued to keep a keen interest in the Congo even after the end of colonialism in Africa. Even the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, the support of the Katanga secessionist movement led by Moise Thsombe, and Joseph Kasavubu, are widely believed to be linked to the question of who controls the Congo.21

19 Interview with Presidential Special Security Advisor, Professor Mumba, Kinshasa, 05 June 2009.

20 Interview with Professor Mutombo, Kinshasa, 30 August 2009.

21 Professor Wamba dia Wamba also pointed out during the same interview with the author (Kinshasa, 25 August 2009), that Britain, France, Belgium and the US support of the Mobutu dictatorship was because of his regime’s compliance to the wishes and interests of the western world.
The bigger power rivalry for the control and influence of the Congo was also witnessed in the 1960s when the country found itself in a political situation where four separate governments were formed. All of these governments claimed legitimacy. The western countries and a majority of UN members recognised and supported Joseph Kasavubu and Mobutu Sese Seko who were based in Leopoldville (Kinshasa) and both claimed national jurisdiction of the Congo (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:90-100; see also Chinyanganya, 2006:100). On the other hand the Soviet Union and other communist countries as well as some African countries supported and recognised the government of Antoine Gizenga which was based in Stanleyville (Kisangani). The fourth government was that of Moise Kapenda Tshombe claimed the right of Katanga province to separate statehood. In order to enforce his autonomy, Tshombe engaged the Belgian mercenaries.22 Because of Katanga’s vastness in mineral resources, Tshombe received logistical and even military expert support in the form of mercenaries from Belgium, France, South Africa and Rhodesia who all had interests in that province (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 135; see also Chinyanganya, 2006:101).

From the above it can be noted that there is a link between the legacy on the causes of conflict in the Congo, military interventionism and strategies adopted by the bigger powers that had interests in the country’s vast mineral resources. Control over a given regime in the Congo would arguably translate to mean access to these resources (Baregu, 2006:60). It would appear that during the cold war period, greater powers particularly western nations’ support to a given regime in the Congo was not much based on whether or not that regime observed or practiced democratic principles of governance and efficient as well as effective national administration. What appeared to be the main strategy was to offer political and military assistance to a compliant regime that served the interests of these bigger powers. It is

22Author is indebted to Professor Wamba dia Wamba for providing such valuable information during interview, Kinshasa, 25 August 2009.
therefore important at this point to briefly discuss how western nations opted to support the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko despite it being accused of practising authoritarianism.

4.4 US and Western interventionism in the Congo in support of the Mobutu regime

Having come to power through a coup d’état, Mobutu Sese Seko’s authoritarian rule did little for the development of the country despite the enormous logistical, administrative and financial support the country got from the UN agencies and other donors. His thirty-two years in power were marked by divisiveness, patrimonialism, cronyism, economic and political crises, as well as continued repression and oppression (Baregu, 2006:60; see also Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 142-152; Maeresera, 2004:19). Mobutu also tried to consolidate his power through the banning of party politics in the Congo. Even when he formed the Movement Populace de la Revolution (MPR) party in 1966, elections were not held in the country. In order to strengthen the party’s political support base, Mobutu amended the country constitution in the same year which resulted in the legislature, the judiciary and the executive becoming institutions of his party.23 All Congolese thus automatically (though unwillingly) became MPR party members. Political opposition parties were banned, provincial governors were appointed by the President and hence became answerable to him (Mobutu) (Baregu, 2006:60; see also Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 142-152 and Chiyanganya, 2006:103).

Despite all the above-mentioned authoritarian actions by the Mobutu regime, the US and other western countries continued to intervene in the Congo in support of the Mobutu regime24. The rationale for that support for Mobutu was the US and western countries’ quest to keep the Soviet Union and communism under guard. The US and other western countries wanted the Mobutu regime to also continuously play a key role in the East-West Cold War

23 Interview by author with Professor Mutombo, Kinshasa, 30 August 2009.

24 Interview by author with Presidential Special Security Advisor, Professor Mumba, Kinshasa, 05 June 2009.
such as supporting the UNITA rebel movement in Angola and other insurgent groups anywhere in the region as a way of containing the spread of Communism.\textsuperscript{25} Any regime in Congo was to be anti-communist and it was to be supportive of western powers’ interests. The strategy that the US and other western countries’ adopted to safeguard these interests was through the covert and overt deployment of their intelligence services who played a key role in the provision of political and military security advice to the Mobutu regime as directed by their respective governments.\textsuperscript{26}

The US and western countries’ strategy was also reinforced between 1977 and 1978 when France and Morocco deployed troops in the Congo to support the Mobutu regime which had experienced revolts from Katangese secessionists (Chinyanganya, 2006:103-104). It would appear that if the Katanga province had seceded, western interests were possibly going to be affected. An independent regime in Katanga was possibly going to be sympathetic to the Soviet bloc thereby affecting the mining interests of the US and other western countries. As part of its strategy, the Washington administration made provision of billions of US dollars to the Mobutu regime for the training of the Congolese military.\textsuperscript{27} This was possibly meant to ensure that the Congolese government forces under Mobutu could be able to stand and fight any internal threat which could result in the toppling of the Mobutu regime. The possible ousting of Mobutu from power could thereby compromise the interests of the US and other western nations. The US and western countries’ support for the Mobutu regime as part of the strategy to safeguard and promote their respective interest went unchallenged for more than

\textsuperscript{25} Interview with Presidential Special Security Advisor, Professor Mumba, Kinshasa, 05 June 2009; see also Hochschild, 1998:279; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 142-152, Chinyanganya, 2006:104-105).

\textsuperscript{26} Same interview with Presidential Special Security Advisor, Professor Mumba, Kinshasa, 05 June 2009; also see Hochschild, 1998:279; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 142-152, Chinyanganya, 2006:104-105).

\textsuperscript{27} Interview with Presidential Special Security Advisor, Professor Mumba, Kinshasa, 05 June 2009; also see Hochschild, 1998:279; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002: 142-152, Chinyanganya, 2006:104-105).
three decades despite the autocratic tendencies of the Congolese government. Despite all the support rendered by the US and other western governments to the Mobutu regime, the political, economic, military and social structures of Zaire continued to crumble and exploitation of the Congo’s vast mineral wealth continued unabated (Hochschild, 1998:299; also see Chinganyanya, 2006:104).

A major turning point in Congo’s political history and the legacy of military interventionism was when the US and other Western powers reduced and eventually stopped financing Mobutu’s regime. That support could have dwindled following the end of the Cold War. The withdrawal of American and other western countries’ support affected the Mobutu regime. The Congolese began to realise that there Mobutu government’s capacity to continuously crush their efforts for constitutional and democratic reforms was weakened by the withdrawal of the US and western nations’ support (Clarke, 2002:3). When the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) withdrew their assistance to the Mobutu regime, it was viewed by most analysts as a result of a strategic calculation that the Mobutu regime was no longer necessary because it lacked the will and capacity for effective economic management as had become evident by 1990. The US administration had shown no interest in facilitating a settlement that would result in a peaceful and stable Congo after Mobutu (Clark, 2002:3). It would appear the international community particularly the western powers neither synchronised nor agreed on a common strategy in terms of what to do in the Congo after the fall of Mobutu. Perhaps the non development of a post-Mobutu common strategy was a result of the rivalry that was emerging between Paris and Washington in terms of power influence and control in central Africa in the early 1990s (Clark, 2002:2; see also Schraeder, 1992:395).
It is important to observe that in the last decade of his reign, Mobuto Sese Seko had been forced by the Western powers to make some democratic reforms. However, such efforts did not yield any positive results. The security and economic situation was very tense and relatively out of control. The Zairean armed forces resorted to looting civilian belonging and they also engaged in other forms of thuggery that were inconsistent and unexpected of a professional military (Havermans, 1999:12). Economically, the country’s business and commercial sector was affected by economic decline and more specifically the rise in inflation. Production in the mining sector had declined and this affected a significant number of multinational corporations which were conducting business in the Congo (Havermans, 1999:12). It is now important to look at the legacy of military intervention in Congo in support of Kabila against Mobutu.

4.5 Great Lakes countries’ intervention in support of Kabila against the Mobutu regime

Another notable turning point on the legacy of conflict in the Congo and military interventionism was the military support rendered to Kabila against the Mobutu regime. Following the 1994 genocide, the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), composed mostly of Tutsi armed rebels successfully advanced and captured Kigali. This resulted in the influx of more than one million Hutu refugees and Interahamwe fleeing into eastern Zaire fearing for a possible revenge by the new regime in Kigali (Breytenbach, 1999:3). The Kivu provinces experienced tensions among the fleeing armed Rwandan Hutus, the Hutu civilians and the Banyamulenge ethnic Tutsis generally as a result of land space and security among these groups (Havermans, 1998:1).
The initiative by the Rwandan government to follow up and attack the Hutus militia camps in the eastern Congo resulted in the Interahamwe withdrawing and getting scattered into Zaire, with some crossing into Central African Republic (CAR) and Congo Brazzaville (Breytenbach, 1999:3). The Rwandan military effort to follow up and attack the Interahamwe militias was complemented by the support from the Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo (Allied Forces for the Democratic Liberation of the Congo-AFDL) led by Laurent Kabila that had been formed to wage an armed rebellion and oust Mobutu from power.²⁸

Following these brief military skirmishes, the government of Rwanda, together with those of Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania leadership crafted and coordinated the provision of political and logistical military support to the rebel movement led by Laurent Kabila.²⁹ The confidence shown by these great lakes regional countries to commit their respective national resources in support of a rebellion to topple the Mobutu regime could have been caused by the realisation that Mobutu had fallen out of favour with the US and its western allies. The great lakes countries’ support for a rebellion to oust Mobutu could have been generally precipitated by the need to safeguard their respective interests particularly border security concerns. It would also appear that the strategy employed by these countries to safeguard their interests was to intervene in the Congo in support of Kabila’s armed rebel group. Consensus among the political leadership of these great lakes countries to have Kabila as a leader of the rebellion could have been part of their strategy. If the armed rebel movement to topple Mobutu was to be led by a Congolese like Kabila, then a possibility that the movement could appear nationalistic was relatively high, thus ensuring support and sympathy from the general public.

²⁸ Author is indebted to Professor Wambia dia Wamba for providing such valuable information during interview, Kinshasa, 25 August 2009.

²⁹ Interview by author with Professor Mutombo, Kinshasa, 30 August 2009.
Congolese populace and the international community. The hierarchy of the rebel alliance to topple Mobutu was nominated during a coordinating meeting organised by the political leadership of Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania at the beginning of 1997.

It would also appear that as part of their strategy, the great lakes leadership facilitated the impromptu networking among the members of the alliance and the executives of notable multinational companies such as the American Mineral Fields Inc (AMFI) and Barrick Gold Corporation (BGC) which had direct links with high ranking politicians serving in some governments in western countries (Bosongo, 1998:13; see also Naidoo, 2003:5 and Nabudere, 2003: 45). The quest by the great lakes countries to incorporate multinational companies in the logistical and financial support for the Kabila led armed rebellion against Mobutu such as the AMFI’s provision of a hired jet for Kabila during the operation could have been caused by their calculation on the need to get support from the US and other western countries where these multinational corporations’ headquarters are based. It would appear that facilitating the granting of mining concessions amounting to several billions of US dollars particularly in the mineral rich Katanga province, the great lakes countries’ strategy of intervening in the Congo in support of Kabila to topple Mobutu with the US and western support was guaranteed, thereby enhancing the protection and safeguarding of their interests.

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30 Author is indebted to this brief analysis provided to him during interview with Wamba dia Wamba, 25 August 2009.

31 Asked by the author during interview (Kinshasa, 20 June 2009) on what the alliance was all about, Colonel Samuel Songolo (a Mai-Mai Senior Militia Representative in Kinshasa) pointed out that it was that of the AFDL. Songolo further it was at that meeting which took place in Tanzania where Kabila was nominated as leader of the AFDL. The meeting included the Alliance Democratique du Peuples (People’s Democratic Alliance), led by Deogratius Bugera and the group was a Zairean Tutsi organisation, which comprised the Banyamulenge and the Banyamwisi. The other groups that was part of the alliance was the Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Zaire, led by Nasau Ningaga, the National Resistance Council for Democracy, led by Andre Kisae Ngandu, and the People’s Revolutionary Party which was led by Laurent Desire Kabila (see also Maeresera, 2004:22).

32 Author acknowledges analysis given to him by the Presidential Special Security Advisor, Professor Mumba during interview, Kinshasa, 05 June 2009.
It should be noted that the Kabila led rebel troops consisted of Congolese Banyamulenges, backed by troops from Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi as well as technical support from Tanzania. Although the rebel troops initially faced resistance from the Mai Mai in the north and south Kivu during the initial phases of their advance from the east to Kinshasa, the AFDL’s momentum was later boosted by volunteers from the Banyamulenges from the east as well as the former Mobutu soldiers who were surrendering to join the ranks and file of AFDL rebels.33 There was very little resistance that the AFDL faced particularly from the Mobutu government forces.34 This resulted in the AFDL capturing considerable town and cities in the eastern Congo such as Goma, Kindu, Bunia and Bukavu and those in the north Congo which included Buta, Aketi, Gemena, Gbadolite, Basankusu and Mbandaka by the end of 1996.35 Despite trying to initiate dialogue with the rebel forces through the mediation of then South African President Nelson Mandela, the AFDL continued to advance resulting in their successful capture of Kinshasa in May 1997.

Thus, it can be observed that the ousting of Mobutu by the AFDL was through the great lakes regional military interventionism which was crafted by the governments of Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, as well as Tanzania with the covert logistical support from the US and other western

33 Colonel Songolo also indicated during the same interview (Kinshasa, 30 August 2009) that this resistance from the Mai-Mai militia group was based on the fact that the Mai-Mai traditionally refused and resisted any governing authority above it. According to the Colonel, it is therefore no wonder that the Mai-Mai refused to send their representatives to the alliance meeting of 7 January 1997.

34 Major General John Numbi highlighted to the author during a discussion on the sidelines of the conference on Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRRR) in the DRC. (Kinshasa 05 March 2009) that the AFDL’s advance to Kinshasa were made easier by the fact that the Mobutu regime’s military forces had no will to stand and fight because of the government’s incapacity to consistently pay and kit the troops. Quoting him verbatim, General Numbi pointed out that “as expected the world over, an army that is not regularly trained, retrained, kitted, fed and consistently paid will not have the morale and zeal to fight and defend a nation when it is under threat.”(Major General Numbi was one of the AFDL rebel commanders during Kabila’s advance to Kinshasa. He then served as the first air force commander in the Kabila government. Later on he was appointed the commander of the Congolese police under the government of President Joseph Kabila). At the time of writing this thesis, Major General Numbi was under suspension following the alleged murder of a Congolese political rights activist whose death was blamed on the Congolese police.

35 Same interview with Colonel Songolo, Kinshasa 30 August 2009 (see also Le Phare, 28 June 2000).
countries. It is essential to briefly look at the DRC government under Kabila and the great lakes region military interventionism against the Kabila regime

4.5.1 Democratic Republic of Congo under Laurent Kabila and the Great Lakes region military intervention against the Kinshasa regime.

Having changed the country’s name from Zaire to Democratic Republic of Congo after assuming the Presidency, Kabila’s first assignment was to make political, economic and military security reforms as part and parcel of meeting the expectations of the Congolese populace, the great lakes regional countries which had backed him into power as well as the international community (Dunn, 2002: 54-55). Thus, what that implied was that Kabila was to deal with all the issues related to governance, service delivery as well human and state security aspects that the Mobutu regime was finding difficult to address in order to gain support from the Congolese, regional neighbouring countries as well as the international community. There were a lot of expectations from these various constituencies on the new regime of Kabila to deliver. Whilst Kabila could have thought that the first step towards these reforms was to appease those countries which had supported him during his march to Kinshasa that initiative proved otherwise later on.36

These appointments did not in any way address the concerns of Kabila’s former backers notably the Kigali government. The reason being that just like during the Mobutu era, the

36 According to Faustin Bosenge, a Senior Researcher in Conflict, Peace and Security studies with the University of Kinshasa’s UNESCO Programme, Kabila gave five influential posts to Rwandese Tutsis in order to please the Kigali government. These posts were allocated as follows; Commander James Kabarebe as the Congolese Army Chief of Staff (the top military job in the DRC at the time); Bizimama Karaha was made the Minister of Foreign Affairs; Douglas Bugera was made the Minister of State and Secretary General of the AFDL; Moise Ngawengabe as the Chief Executive Officer for Procurement and Acquisition of all capital goods; Michel Tadangwaha was made the Director of Finance in the president’s Office (Interview with Bosenge, Kinshasa, 25 March 2010).
eastern Congo continued to be an operational launching pad against the Rwandan government by the armed militias including the ex-armed forces of Rwanda that had fled to the DRC after the 1994 genocide. The fact that these militias and the ex-Rwandese soldiers were belligerently hostile to the governments of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda possibly meant that the governments of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi expected significant respective bilateral security cooperation from the Kabila government as opposed to what they had experienced from the Mobutu regime.

Whilst the new Kinshasa regime was facing such a tricky situation on the diplomatic front in regards to its relations with neighbouring countries on border security issues, attempts at domestic reforms by Kabila worsened the situation. The regime was found wanting on issues related to democratic governance such as media freedom, human rights, opposition political party participation as well as service delivery (Haermans, 1999:238). Coupled with criticism from local opposition on lack of tangible political, economic and security reforms, Kabila’s relations with national, regional and international community began to unfold to the disadvantage of his government. The US and some European countries such as Britain, France and Belgium were beginning to show reservations with Kabila’s efforts in as far as reforms were concerned. The DRC government’s relations with the governments of neighbouring countries were beginning to turn hostile. Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda seem to have been convinced that Kabila was not an effective leader who could address their concerns hence the need to craft for a more allegiant replacement.

What proved to be of advantage to the above Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian governments’ plan was the costly military security reform efforts that Kabila had made. The

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37 Interview with Bosenge, Kinshasa. 25 March 2010.
38 Interview with Bosenge, Kinshasa. 25 March 2010, (see also Le groupe Lavenir. 16 March 1999).
decommissioning of all Congolese military, navy air force and police rank structures had effect on those former Mobutu soldiers particularly officers of senior ranks. Kabila’s attempt at reforming the military security as a way of diluting and perhaps promote and improve allegiance on him from his former rebel troops who had fought the AFDL war to oust Mobutu had negative impact on the military’s loyalty to his regime. The initiative created disgruntlement among senior ex Mobutu officers who had been incorporated into the Kabila government.\(^{39}\) In fact, this arbitrary decommissioning of trained officers naturally caused widespread disillusionment within the new army.\(^{40}\) That disillusionment meant that Kabila’s army could not fight as a fully unified force and defend any external attempt to oust the regime. Thus, this disgruntlement from some elements in the Congolese military could have been taken advantage of by the Rwandan and Ugandan governments whose ploy to oust Kabila from power were by then at an advanced stage. The leadership of the great lakes region seem to have been convinced that Kabila could not deliver as per their initial expectations in respect to the protection and guaranteeing of their interests in relation to the new regime in the Kinshasa. They hence saw the need for the crafting of another military intervention against the Kabila regime.

Despite awarding significant appointments as rewards to his former backers\(^{41}\), the general actions and statements from the Kigali and Kampala political leadership were frustrating the

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39 Author is indebted to this analytical comments made to him by Bosenge during interview, Kinshasa, 25 March 2010.

40 Interview with Bosenge, Kinshasa, 25 March 2010.

41 It should be noted that all the persons who were given the five influential posts were Rwandese. Being the Congolese Army chief of Staff would give Commander James Kabarebe the advantage of being in charge of all Congolese military operations that would take serious Rwandese considerations specifically Rwanda’s security concerns. This would include the deployment of Congolese troops in the Eastern DRC with the primary objective of fighting any rebel groups such as the 1994 genocidaire who were believed to be operating from the Congo at the time. As for Bizimama Karaha, being in charge of Foreign Affairs was possibly aimed at influencing the Congolese regional and international relations to Rwanda’s (and to some extent Uganda’s favour). By appointing Douglas Bugera to be the Minister of State and Secretary General of the AFDL, that would make him in charge of the daily administrative running of the Presidency (including the coordination of
Kinshasa government. Uganda, Rwanda and to some extent Burundi had all indicated publicly their displeasure with Kabila’s desire to do away with their support against their expectations that he would safeguard their interests as a strategic reward for assisting him into power.

The Rwandese concerns against the Kabila regime revolved around the threat paused by the Interahamwe militias against the Kigali government. The government of Rwanda expected the new DRC government to be fully supportive in getting rid of the Interahamwe militias who were responsible for the 1994 Rwanda genocide. In the general view of the government of Rwanda, the fact that the Interahamwe flee into Congo after the genocide “logically meant that they were now able to operate from the eastern Congo and launch attacks against the Kigali regime, thus pausing a serious national security threat to the Rwandan government”.42

Again in the general view of the government of Rwanda, any regime in Kinshasa that could not significantly cooperate and support the national security concerns (particularly border security) of Rwanda would leave Kigali with no option but to try and deal with its security threats by deploying troops in the Congo in support of any government in Kinshasa that would cooperate with Kigali.43 In addition to the fact that the Interahamwe militias were

intelligence briefings). To have other Rwandese being the Chief Executive Officer for Procurement and Acquisition of all capital goods and the Director of Finance in the president’s Office could have been intended at making sure that Rwanda and Uganda intended economic and security projects with the Kabila regime would be logistically supported from within the Congolese government. Author acknowledges this analysis made to him by Professor Mumba during interview, Kinshasa, 05 June 2009).

42 Author is indebted to this analytical comments made to him by Bosenge during interview, Kinshasa, 25 March 2010.
43 For detailed arguments in regards to Rwanda’s support for the rebellion against Kabila and specifically its support for the RCD Goma, see President Paul Kagame’s lecture to the War College in Abuja, Nigeria. The Lecture was entitled: The Great Lakes Regional Conflict and it was presented in September 2002. The original version of the Lecture was published in The New Times of Rwanda, 22 September 2002. The Rwanda President argued that Rwanda’s support for the AFDL were based on it’s the country’s quest to see a peaceful Great lakes region. The same applied to its support for the rebel RDC against Kabila who in the view of the RPA’s Commander-in-Chief had failed to assist the Kigali regime in its effort to neutralise these security threats paused by the Interahamwe as these threats impacted negatively on Rwanda’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty (see also Maeresera, 2004:29).
operating from the Congo to carry out attacks on Rwanda, the Kigali government also accused the Kinshasa regime of arming these militias.\textsuperscript{44} Perhaps the above argument by the government of Rwanda could have been based on the concept of pre-emptive strike that has become the norm in modern day national security strategy.\textsuperscript{45} However, the argument based on pre-emptive strike was criticised by one senior FDLR rebel official who said that Rwanda’s national security threat (specifically the Interahamwe issue) could not have constituted its efforts to oust Kabila from power and its continued troop deployments presence in the Congo.\textsuperscript{46}

On a related note the Rwanda government denied accusations that its sudden about turn against the Kabila regime was meant to create instability in the Congo and that its support for the ouster of the Kabila regime was based on its quest to exploit the DRC mineral resources.\textsuperscript{47} Whilst the above counter argument against Rwanda are worth noting, it should be realised that the withdrawal of the RPF from the DRC between 2002 and 2003 could perhaps have been based on the fact that the DRC government under Joseph Kabila through regional and international security institutions, notably the AU and the UN, could have

\textsuperscript{44} Interview with Professor Mutombo, Kinshasa, 30 August 2009 (also see The New Times of Rwanda, 20 September 2002).

\textsuperscript{45} The concept of pre-emptive refers to “a military action which is designed to neutralize a potential threat, or to gain a distinct advantage against an enemy. The legality of pre-emptive strikes is questionable, as they are generally considered offensive actions except in very specific circumstances. For example, a pre-emptive strike against troops massing near a nation’s border might be considered justified, while a random airstrike on a known enemy might not be legally acceptable. Despite debates over the legality of such actions, many nations throughout history have used pre-emptive attacks as military tools” (see. http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-a-preemptive-strike.htm, accessed 28 June 2009).

\textsuperscript{46} In an interview with author, Lubumbashi, 25 March 2010, a FDLR high ranking political official (who opted to remain anonymous for his personal security reasons) if the Rwanda government was serious about its security concerns, it could by now have opted for an Inter-Rwandese Dialogue, rather than trying to label every Hutu of Rwandan origin who is based in Congo as Interahamwe. In the official’s view what the Rwandese government should do is to “cooperate with the regional and international community in dealing with the issue of the Interahamwe militias and stop the victimisation of non Rwandese Tutsis based in the eastern Congo”(sic).

\textsuperscript{47} Interview with Professor Mutombo, Kinshasa, 30 August 2009 (see also The New Times of Rwanda, 20 September 2002).
reached an agreement that Rwanda’s security concerns would be addressed as a result of the support that the Congolese government would get to disarm these militias after the deployment of the MONUC troops in Congo. However, when MONUC and the Congolese government did not disarm these militias, the security situation in the eastern Congo continued to be unstable, thus result in Rwanda crafting the provision of logistic and technical military support to the Congolese rebel militias in the DRC led by Laurent Nkunda, a Congolese Tutsi. Despite carrying out a joint military operation with the Congolese army in the eastern DRC in early 2009, Rwanda seems to have reneged on the bilateral agreement to extradite Nkunda to the DRC.48

As has been noted earlier, the Ugandan government was part of the great lakes countries that supported the rebel coalition against Kabila. The Ugandan government seem to have followed Rwanda’s national security strategy of deploying troops in the DRC in support of the rebels as part of pre-emptive attacks on those groups that were operating from the Congo and launching attacks in Uganda particularly the northern part of the country.49 Like the government of Rwanda, the Kampala regime argued that its troops were supporting the rebellion against Kabila as a strategy for self-defence against attacks on Uganda by the Lord resistance Army (LRA).50 Thus, in the view of the Ugandan government, the Kabila regime had to fall and be replaced by the one which could support its concerns.51 Despite these

48 I am indebted to Dr/Col Max John Chinyanganya, Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Security Studies at the University of Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe Defence Staff College for reminding me of these important points.

49 Interview with anonymous security analyst, Lubumbashi, 27 March 2010.

50 Interview with anonymous security analyst, Lubumbashi, 27 March 2010.

51 The Ugandan government’s argument was further reiterated by the then Chief of Ugandan Military Intelligence, the late Colonel Noble Mayombo, in a voice recorded version of the News Bulletin on BBC Kiswahili Africa programme given to the author (Lubumbashi, 27 March 2010) by the same senior Ugandan opposition politician living in exile in the DRC (the exiled opposition politician preferred to be referred to as “Afande”, a pseudonym for his personal safety). In his address to the Joint UPDF/MLC rebel officers meeting on the DRC/Ugandan border, Mayombo said that the military officers were expected to be prepared to reach
arguments, the government of Uganda was however accused of deploying in the Congo as a ploy by President Museveni to try and create the Hema-Tutsi Empire thereby giving the Kampala regime access to control the mineral resources of the Congo as well as establishing political control, authority and influence in the Great Lakes region.\textsuperscript{52}

Just like Rwanda and Uganda, the Burundi government was also concerned with it border security threats paused by the armed rebel group, the Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD) who were launching attacks from the Congo.\textsuperscript{53} Though Tanzania did not deploy any troops in the Congo in support of the rebels against the Kabila regime, information obtained showed that the government of Tanzania withdrew its troops from the DRC’s Kamina military training school when the three great lakes countries turned against the DRC government. These elements of the Tanzania Peoples’ Defence Forces (TPDF) were involved in the training and reintegration of the new Congolese army under Kabila.\textsuperscript{54} The withdrawal was perhaps prompted by Dar es Salaam’s realisation of the combat indicators which showed that the security situation in the Congo was becoming unstable and that the Kabila government was about to face an armed rebellion supported by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. Perhaps the Tanzanian government wanted to remain neutral in the conflict.\textsuperscript{55}

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\textsuperscript{52} Interview with an anonymous exiled Ugandan senior opposition official, Lubumbashi, 27 March 2010 (also see the Ugandan Mercury, 25 November 1999).
\textsuperscript{53} Interview with an anonymous exiled Ugandan senior opposition official, Lubumbashi, 27 March 2010.
\textsuperscript{54} Author’s interview with anonymous DRC senior military training officer, Kinshasa, 06 March 2009. The officer, who served under Mobutu, revealed to author during the same interview that he was part of the training team of the new Congolese army under Kabila.
\textsuperscript{55} Author is indebted to this analytical comment made to him by an anonymous senior Congolese military official during interview, Kinshasa, 25 March 2010. The official worked with the Tanzania People’s Defence
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Having stated and analysed the concerns of the three great lakes countries against the Kabila government, it is now prudent to briefly discuss the strategy that these countries employed in an effort to address their interests.

4.5.1 The Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi strategy to oust Kabila: Operation “Plan Bravo”

The grand objectives of the three countries were to instigate and physically support an armed rebellion that could see the ousting of Kabila from power. Generally, the successful attainment of this objective was possibly going to address the three countries’ already discussed concerns. The three countries’ strategy to oust Kabila was influenced by the political and security developments in the DRC particularly in the capital Kinshasa.

Politically, the Kabila government had faced challenges in implementing political reforms. There was a general disgruntlement among the Congolese over the presence of Rwandese of Tutsi origin that had been seconded to work as political and military advisors in the Kabila regime possibly with “special great lakes regional synchronisation” with Uganda and Burundi. In an effort to play the nationalist card and perhaps get rid of the simmering tensions among the Congolese who had developed high expectations on the new Kinshasa

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56 Plan Bravo” or “Plan B” is a generic military strategic term which refers to an alternative plan of action which is adopted if the principal plan is not successful (see http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1992/TJJ.htm accessed 10 October 2010). Thus it is a backup plan. Supporting Kabila in ousting Mobutu with the aim of having the new Kinshasa regime safeguarding their economic and security interests was Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda’s initial plan. “Plan Bravo” was now the three countries’ alternative plan of trying to remove Kabila by force having noted that he had “reneged” on the agreement to serve their interests.

57 Author is indebted to this analytical comment made to him by Professor (rtd Lt Col) Martin Rupiya during interview, Pretoria, 19 September 2010. Martin, a military strategic analyst and academic, is the Executive Director of the African Public Policy Research Institute (APPRI).
regime, Kabila took the initiative to replace those seconded officials with Congolese nationals. A notable replacement was James Kabarebe or “Commander James” who had been seconded as the Congolese Army Chief of Staff responsible “for giving military technical advice in the training and operations” of Congolese military under Kabila. In addition to the replacement of Kabarebe, President Kabila ordered the expulsion of all Rwandese troops who were deployed in Kinshasa.

It could have been through expertise and experience in military strategic planning that saw Kabarebe taking time to leave Kinshasa after his replacement possibly under the guise of preparing the withdrawal and transportation of his troops back to Kigali. Perhaps having noted that there was tension in the Congolese army generally following the continued disadvantaging of the former Mobutu soldiers (ex FAZ) and Congolese troops of Tutsi origin over the Kadogos in terms of promotions to higher ranks, Kabarebe capitalised on these developments. Without the knowledge of the Congolese government, and with covert coordination with the political and military leadership in Kigali, Kampala and Bujumbura, Kabarebe managed to reinforce Rwandese troops who were deployed at Kitona military base as well as Matadi in the western DRC on the border with Angola. The reinforcement was

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58 Interview with anonymous former DRC senior military intelligence officer, Kinshasa, 15 June 2010

59 Author’s interview with anonymous DRC senior military operations officer, Kinshasa, 15 June 2010. The officer, who served under Mobutu, revealed to author during the same interview that they attended a number of military staff courses with Kabarebe in related international military schools.

60 In Swahili street lingo, “Kadogos” refers to those young AFDL rebel fighters who were by then aged between 8-15 years during Kabila’s advance to Kinshasa to oust Mobutu.

61 Interview with same anonymous senior Congolese Military Intelligence official, 17 June 2010 (see also Chniyanganya, 2006:110).

62 This reinforcement followed a major unstable security development in the DRC capital when members of the Congolese Tutsi (Banyamulenge) who were based at Tshatshi military base in Kinshasa advanced to the headquarters of the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC HQ) on 2 August 1998. Their aim was to capture the Army HQ as this was the centre of gravity to the armed rebellion to fight the Kabila regime. The plan did not succeed, following the successful crushing of the rebellion, the capture and killing of the mutineers by troops loyal to Kabila. Through the crafting of Rwandese strategists based in Goma, the Congolese troops in the eastern Congo
executed through the diversion of a military cargo plane to Kitona military airbase that was carrying Rwandan troops from Kinshasa. Having been the Chief of Staff, Kaberebe was possibly knowledgeable of the fact that most senior ex FAZ officers had access to security installations such as military logistical depots, armouries and fuel points. This was a significant advantage to Kaberebe’s military plan for an armed rebellion to oust Kabila which was as previously noted being covertly coordinated from Kigali, Kampala and Burundi. 63

The great lakes countries’ Rwanda led strategy was so rapid to the extent that within a few days the rebel troops had already captured Kitona, DRC’s only port of Matadi harbour and other vital installations like the Inga hydroelectric power station (Chinyanganya, 2006:111). The capture of these western towns and more specifically installations such as the Inga hydroelectric power station had an effect on the Kinshasa regime’s administration. This is so considering that the movement of goods from the sea as well as the provision of electricity to the capital was significantly affected. Initially, morale was reportedly high in the rebel camps in the western DRC, with information reaching them through their military communication channels that the other DRC strategic towns of Goma and Bukavu in the east were now under rebel control.64 In an effort to enhance the attainment of their grand aim of replacing Kabila (whose chances of addressing their concerns were next to the “zero mark), the political leadership in Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, most probably with another covert coordination and “green light” from the US and some western countries identified Professor Ernest

announced that they were now against the Kabila government and were ready to remove it through an armed rebellion. Besides being a rebellion that was militarily crafted by Rwanda and Uganda as well as Burundi, there were reports that countries like France and to some extent the US covertly provided financial assistance for logistics to the armed rebellion. (Information obtained through author’s discussion with Major General John Numbi, on the sidelines of the conference on Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration DDRRR in the DRC, Kinshasa 05 March 2009).

63 Interview with Major General Numbi, Kinshasa, 05 March 2009.
64 Interview with Major General Numbi, Kinshasa, 05 March 2009.
Wamaba dia Wamba as the political leader of the armed rebellion that was meant to oust Kabila from power. 65

It should be observed that the strategy adopted by the three great lakes countries in attaining their grand objective of ousting Kabila from power through an armed rebellion was systematically organised and executed through the following structures: The governments of three countries through the covert support of the US and other western countries influenced, controlled and supported the political leadership of the armed rebellion through the provision of a mobile command centre with its headquarters in Goma. 66 It cannot be ruled out that this command centre was composed of advisors and to some extent experts from the three great lakes countries as well as the US and other western countries. Militarily, Goma was the operational headquarters of the armed rebellion, the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RDC). A Congolese General, Jean Pierre Ondekane who was based in Goma at the outbreak of the armed rebellion, defected from the DRC government forces and was appointed the military commander of the RCD. 67 The strategy also included the opening up of interior lines of operations with units (battalions) and formations (brigades) from each of the three countries.

65 It cannot be ruled out that Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi could (arguably) have received that covert political, economic and technical military support as well as advice for the crafting and execution of the armed rebellion from the US and other western countries because the Kabila regime had not shown significant promises and actions in terms of fulfilling the expectations of these countries. The western nations support for the great lakes instigated rebellion could also have been caused by their perception of Kabila’s strident nationalism and his government’s efforts at blocking and frustrating UN investigations into the alleged massacres of about nine thousand Hutus by the AFDL during its advance to Kinshasa (Baregu, 2006:61; ICG 2001:18). The fact that the government in Kinshasa continued to publicly lay allegations against the governments of the three great lakes countries together with those governments of the US and other western nations of illegally exploiting valuable Congolese resources by smuggling minerals could have possibly led to that cooperation in ousting Kabila. Author is indebted to these analytical comments made to him by Professor Mumba, DRC Special Presidential Advisor during interview, Kinshasa, 05 June 2009, also see Baregu, 2006:61; ICG 2001:18).

66 Interview with anonymous former DRC senior military intelligence officer, Kinshasa, 15 June 2010. The officer, who once served under Mobutu, revealed to author during the same interview that he was in Goma when the armed rebellion against the Kabila regime broke out. At the time of the interview the retired officer was running a private business enterprise in Kinshasa.

67 Interview with same anonymous former DRC senior military intelligence officer, Kinshasa, 15 June 2010.
being deployed in respective tactical areas of responsibilities fighting alongside the Congolese rebels. Whilst some units and formations comprising of Rwandan troops and Congolese rebels were already deployed in the western DRC, and already in control of the strategic towns of Matadi and Kitona and the key installations such as the Inga dam, the other Rwandese units and formations were deployed and some advancing from the eastern DRC along the Goma-Bukavu-Uvira axis and Goma-Bukavu-Kindu axis as well Goma-Libutu-Kisangani axis. Transportation of troops and logistics from Kigali was through the use of cargo planes and armoured troop careers. The units from Burundi were mostly deployed along the Burundi/ DRC border in those positions immediately inside the DRC.\textsuperscript{68}

As for the Uganda People’s Defence Forces’ units and formations, they were deployed in the northern Congo and advancing along the Bunia-Ituri-Watsa axis and the Bunia-Butambo-Kisangani axis.\textsuperscript{69} The UPDF like the RPF worked alongside the Congolese armed rebel units with most of the command at unit and formation levels being directed by the UPDF.\textsuperscript{70} Movement of troops and logistics from Kampala was through air cargo and road.\textsuperscript{71} Whilst the RPF units and troops deployed, advanced, attacked and captured those towns and cities such as Goma, Bukavu, and Kindu in the east and south east of the DRC alongside the RCD Goma rebels, the UPDF also deployed, advanced, attacked and captured those towns and cities such as Bunia, Ituri, Watsa, Buta, Aketi and Kisangani in the north and north west of the DRC.

\textsuperscript{68} Author is indebted to this valuable information availed to him by means of the DRC map analysis and briefing on the general deployments and movements of the invading troops, Harare, 30 July 2010. Group Captain Chingono was deployed in Kinshasa as the Director of Air Operations based at the SADC coalition of the willing’s Task Force Headquarters.

\textsuperscript{69} Interview with anonymous DRC senior military intelligence officer, Kinshasa, 06 March 2009. The officer was part of those troops who were serving under the Kabila regime and later defected to join the rebel ranks in the rebellion against the Kinshasa government. At the outbreak of the armed rebellion against Kabila, the officer was based in Goma. At the time of the interview, he was serving in the DRC military under President Joseph Kabila, following the reintegration of former DRC rebel troops and government forces.

\textsuperscript{70} Interview with anonymous DRC senior military intelligence officer, Kinshasa, 06 March 2009.

\textsuperscript{71} Interview with anonymous DRC senior military intelligence officer, Kinshasa, 06 March 2009.
alongside Movement for the Liberation of Congo rebels. The units from Burundi deployed and operated in the general areas of Uvira.\textsuperscript{72}

As part of their strategy, the three great lakes countries initially denied that they had deployed troops in the Congo. This denial seems to have been corroborated by reports from the international news channels such as the Cable News Network (CNN) and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) which at first painted a picture that the armed rebellion was an internal matter.\textsuperscript{73} However, the three countries later accepted that their troops were deployed in the DRC perhaps because some of their troops were captured by the SADC coalition forces during the initial battles for the control of Kinshasa. It was after the capture of the invading troops that the DRC government and the SADC coalition took a common position that the three countries’ deployment of troops in the DRC in support of the armed rebellion was “an act of aggression”.\textsuperscript{74} The accusations that the three great lakes countries’ deployment of troops particularly the UPDF in the Congo constituted an act of aggression were publicly conveyed by the DRC government’s information ministry to the region and beyond. For example the Kinshasa regime’s information ministry counter argued to the region and the world against Uganda’s reasons for the deployment of troops.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{72}It is should be noted that in the later stages of the operations Rwanda and Uganda supported two DRC armed rebel groups namely the RCD Goma and MLC respectively. Whilst such developments unfolded, the grand objective of the three great lakes countries (the ousting of Kabila from power through an armed rebellion) remained the same. Author acknowledges this information courtesy of the comments made to him by Bosenge during interview, Kinshasa, 25 March 2010.


\textsuperscript{74} Interview with an anonymous exiled Ugandan senior opposition official, Lubumbashi, 27 March 2010.

\textsuperscript{75} The DRC Minister of Information under President Laurent Kabila, Dr Kikaya bin Karubi (now DRC Ambassador to India), argued that Uganda’s argument about border security concerns were unacceptable considering that Uganda had deployed UPDF troops of a brigade plus strength in Kisangani in eastern DRC which is inside the DRC and not along the two countries’ border (Interview with author, Kinshasa, 15 June 2010).
From the foregoing discussion, it is yet to be established whether or not the deployment of
the three great lakes countries in the DRC in support of an armed rebellion to oust Kabila as
part of the strategy to attain and safeguard their interests constituted an act of aggression that
warranted the three SADC countries to undertake decisions for military intervention in
defence of the Kinshasa government under a coalition of the willing. It is also yet to be
established whether or not the “act of aggression” argument became the common
denominator that formed the basis of the respective interests that motivated the members of
the SADC coalition of the willing to undertake the military intervention decisions.

4.6 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to examine critically the DRC’s conflict predicament in the
context of military interventionism. This was done by tracing the country’s historical paradox
from the rule of King Leopold II up to Laurent Kabila. It was noted that the involvement of
external players in almost all of the country’s conflicts and the various strategies employed
were in relation to the pursuit and safeguarding of the interests of these nation states.
Different strategies were employed in promoting and safeguarding these interests. The first
section gave an overview of the Congo’s geostrategic significance. It was shown that the
DRC’s abundance in strategic natural resources has resulted in the exploitation of these
minerals through the involvement of external players in the country’s conflicts (Nzongola-

The second section traced the conflict in Congo and the bigger power interventionist
tendencies by analysing the political, economic and military/security developments in that
country from the time it was under King Leopold II’s rule up to when it gained independence.
An analysis on the intervention in Congo by the US and some western allies was made in the
third section. It was observed that the support that was given to the Mobutu regime was based specifically on the need by the US and some western countries to promote and safeguard their interests. The strategies used by these countries to safeguard these interests were shaped by the Cold War environment. The US and other western countries wanted to prevent the spread of Soviet influence and communism in the Congo as that was possibly a risk to their interests in that country. The western countries wanted to keep a compliant leadership in Zaire. The strategies employed were of a political, economic and military setting with western intelligence particularly the CIA playing a significant part based on the directives as coordinated from Washington.

It was observed in the fourth section that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the collapse of Communism signified a new era in Congo. Mobutu became irrelevant in as far as the interests of his former backers were concerned. Taking advantage of the new political dispensation and possibly having realised also that Mobutu no longer had support from the west, the three great lakes regional countries together with Tanzania, and with the overt political support and covert technical military assistance from the US and other western allies, crafted and executed the removal of Mobutu from power and installed Laurent Kabila. The strategy employed in this intervention was basically based on initiating an armed rebellion. It was also observed that the strategy to replace the Mobutu regime with that of Kabila was aimed at protecting the claimed interests of the three great lakes countries and those of western countries who offered both covert and overt assistance.

The fifth section critically discussed the political, economic and military developments in the Congo and the intervention by the great lakes regional countries in an attempt to remove Kabila from power. The efforts to replace the Kabila regime were based on the allegations
levelled against the Kinshasa government that it had not met the expectations of the same countries that had played a key role in his ascendancy to the Presidency. The interests of the former backers particularly those of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi were allegedly not met. In their effort to replace the Kabila regime with a compliant leadership, the three great lakes countries crafted a strategy that was meant to be a tool for the protection of their claimed interests. The sixth section analysed the strategy adopted by the three great lakes countries. It was observed that this strategy was based on the planning and execution of an armed rebellion which was to be politically led by a Congolese national, possibly with the aim of making the armed rebellion appear an internal matter among the Congolese. Military formations and units from these great lakes countries deployed, advanced and attacked Congolese government forces’ positions and captured the strategic towns, cities and key national strategic installations with the ultimate aim of dislodging the regime of Laurent Kabila and installing a compliant leadership that, as these countries expected, was going to cooperate in the safeguarding of their claimed interests.

It was also observed in this section that as part of the three countries’ strategy, they initially denied any involvement in the armed rebellion to oust Kabila. The international news agencies such as the BBC and CNN depicted the unstable political and military security situation in the Congo as an internal matter. However, through the request from the DRC government to SADC, some countries in the SADC took up a decision to undertake a military intervention in Congo under a coalition of the willing arrangement. The decisions taken by these countries to undertake military intervention as coalition were based on the need to pursue, attain and safeguard their claimed interests. The primary focus of the next chapter will be to identify and ascertain these respective interests and how they informed the decisions of the member countries of the coalition to intervene.
CHAPTER FIVE

ESTABLISHING THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE AZN COALITION’S MILITARY INTERVENTION DECISION

5.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to identify, analyse, evaluate and ascertain the varying interests of the three intervening SADC countries namely Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia as the primary motivating factors that informed the governments of these countries to undertake the decisions for military intervention. In an effort to achieve this, the chapter is divided into four sections. The first section makes a brief analysis on the significance of diplomatic early warning and threat assessment to the decision for intervention. It will be observed in this section that before a decision for intervention is undertaken by any state or a group states, governments receive an early warning about a looming threat. This early warning is normally received through the set out diplomatic structures at national, subregional, regional and even international levels. On receipt of this early warning, relevant government ministries such as foreign affairs and external security relations institutions liaise with their counterparts in verifying and assessing any looming threat as per early warning given. This analysis will be in relation to whether or not the threat is of any risk to the country’s national interests.

The early warning was given by various sources such as the AZN diplomatic missions accredited to the DRC in 1998, the units of the Angolan armed forces that were deployed in Congo Brazzaville, the advance part of a contingent of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces Training Team in Luanda enroute to Kinshasa and the indication by President Museveni
about the possible outbreak of the full scale conflict during a regional conference in Namibia.
Verifications that were carried out in relation to this threat will be analysed.

The second section will critically make an analysis on decision for intervention within the national context of the intervening countries. As will be observed, the decision at national level will be done in relation to the threat given and verification made as well as analysis done in relation to the interests of a given country. The decision undertaken to commit troops will be made (arguably) in line with the legal constitution of the three SADC intervening countries. The processes undertaken by the relevant national institutions of the respective intervening countries will be critically discussed.

The third section will discuss the decision for intervention within the SADC subregional context. The diplomatic processes undertaken by the respective structures of SADC such as the SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security Committee (OPDSC) and the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (the ISDSC), among others as well as the challenges involved will be critically discussed. The section will also look at how these SADC decision processes and the challenges encountered finally led to the decision for intervention by the three SADC countries under a coalition of the willing arrangement.

Having critically analysed the decision making processes and the challenges encountered at the subregional level, the fourth section will try to identify, and ascertain the national interests of the intervening SADC countries. The fifth section will make a critical evaluation of these interests in terms of whether or not they were primary or secondary, permanent or temporary, general or specific. This evaluation and categorisation will be done in order to try and assess the impact that these interests could have had on the respective countries’
decisions for intervention. It is this evaluation that will assist in analysing how these interests complemented each other thereby leading to the adoption of a coalition military strategy that became a tool for the attainment, pursuance and safeguarding of these respective interests.

5.2 The significance of diplomatic early warning and threat assessment to the decisions for intervention.

The unfolding of events that led to the outbreak of the 1998 conflict in the Congo were monitored and analysed at different levels within the national institutions of the three SADC countries that intervened in the conflict in support of the Kinshasa government. Information about the events in the Congo from the time Kabila ascended into power and the challenges that his regime faced in terms of political and military security threat particularly from the subregion was collected, analysed and gathered by the relevant institutions within the countries that undertook the decision for intervention in support of the Kinshasa regime. Generally the institutions and ministries that collected and analysed such information and disseminated it as early warning to the relevant authorities included the diplomatic missions of the AZN that were accredited to Kinshasa.

In the case of Angola, besides receiving information about the impending threat from its embassy, the Luanda government also got valuable updates about the security situation in Congo from an Angola Armed Forces (FAA) contingent which was deployed in the Congo Brazzaville on bilateral defence arrangements between the government of Angola and that of Congo Brazzaville. The increase in traffic in terms of influx of Congolese refugees from the western DRC into Angola through the Matadi border was a significant indicator for early

76 Author is indebted to this valuable information availed to him by anonymous senior official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Zimbabwe, Harare, 13 February 2010.
warning for the government of Angola that the security situation in Congo-Kinshasa was increasingly getting unstable and threatening the interests of Luanda. The FAA unit that was deployed near Kitona on the DRC/Angola border was also possibly one of the sources of information that provided early warning about the impending threat on Luanda emanating from the Congo.\footnote{Author is indebted to this valuable information availed to him by anonymous senior official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Angola, Luanda, 30March 2009.}

In the case of Namibia, in addition to getting the relevant updates from its diplomatic mission in Kinshasa, the other possible source of information regarding early warning for the government of Namibia was the Namibian Defence Forces (NDF) units which were deployed in Katima Mulilo (Kazungula) on the border of Namibia with Zimbabwe, Angola, Botswana, and Zambia.\footnote{Author is indebted to this valuable information availed to him by anonymous senior official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Namibia, 19 June, 2009.} Besides collecting information from its diplomatic mission in Kinshasa, the government of Zimbabwe had a Military Training Team that was in Luanda enroute to Kinshasa on a mission to reintegrate and train the Congolese armed forces. The possibility was very high that whilst in Luanda, the Zimbabwean contingent was in constant communication with the authorities and its counterparts in Kinshasa about the unfolding events thereby liaising and disseminating that valuable information to Harare for evaluation and analysis in as far as how that threat would impact on the interests of Zimbabwe and the possibility of taking an intervention decision.\footnote{Author acknowledges this valuable information regarding threat analysis processes given to him by an anonymous former senior Intelligence officer in the Angola Armed Forces’ External Relations Directorate, 30 March 2009.}

Another notable source of early warning to the three SADC countries could also have been through the normal routine meetings and briefings that their ministries of foreign affairs held.
with the respective missions accredited to Luanda, Harare and Windhoek as well as their respective missions in Kinshasa. The diplomats, particularly ambassadors and defence attachés could have been critical in the provision of early warning to the relevant government ministries and departments of the three countries that intervened in the conflict.

Perhaps the overall and notable source of early warning was at the level of presidency in the region. President Yoweri Museveni informed President Robert Mugabe (in his capacity as the Chairman of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security- OPDSC) during the Southern African International Dialogue on Smart Partnership in Namibia at the end of July 1998 on the need to convene a meeting of SADC states to discuss the unstable security situation that was unfolding in the Congo. 80 The deteriorating situation in the DRC indicated the possibilities of an imminent outbreak of war. There seems to have been some synchronisation between Museveni and Kagame to jointly support an armed rebellion in the Congo by deploying the UPDF and the RPF to assist the Congolese rebels in the quest to advance attack and capture Kinshasa. 81 The fact that high level foreign affairs, defence and security officials from the government of Kinshasa traded accusations at the meeting with those from Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi provided significant early warning of an impending threat. This provided an initial verification about a breakdown of relations among the former

80 The meeting involved Presidents Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Pasteur Bizimungu of Burundi, Laurent Kabila of the DRC, Sam Nujoma of Namibia, Jose Eduardo dos Santos of Angola, Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania, Fredrick Chiluba of Zambia, and Paul Kagame of Rwanda. This laid the foundation for the First Victoria Falls Summit which was held from 7 to 8 August 1998 (Author’s interview with Dr Stanley Mudenge, Harare, 15 November 2009). Dr Mudenge was the Zimbabwe’s Minister of Foreign Affairs during the period of the coalition’s military intervention. As observed the various statements by the leaders from the great lakes region in regards to the involvement of their troops in the armed rebellion to oust Kabila could have part of the information used for the purpose of early warning and threat analysis and evaluation in respect of the risk of this threat to the intervening countries interests.

81 In Mudenge’s view “Museveni’s statement was part of the early warning that prompted member countries of the SADC coalition to take a closer interest at what was happening and to become eventually involved militarily” (Interview with author, Harare, 15 November 2009).
allies. Kabila was accusing the governments of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi of invading the DRC (Baregu, 1999:143).

On the other hand Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi accused Kabila of not being supportive to their concerns, thereby not showing gratefulness to the role they played in assisting him to topple Mobutu (Baregu, 1999:143). Kabila was also accused of bad governance and issues related to crimes committed by his armed rebels against civilians during the AFDL’s advance to capture Kinshasa. He was also accused of marginalising the ethnic Banyamulenge Tutsis of Rwandan origin, who had sought refuge in the eastern DRC following cycles of genocidal violence in Rwanda since the 1960s.\(^{82}\)

The above trading of accusations between the Kinshasa regime and the governments of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi possibly was verification to the early warning that had already been disseminated to the governments of the SADC intervening countries. The other verification to the unfolding threat in the Congo was done during a meeting of SADC Heads of State that was held between the 7 to 8 August 1998 in Victoria Falls to deliberate on the DRC conflict through Museveni’s initiative. It was agreed at this meeting that a Ministerial Committee comprising of foreign affairs ministers from Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe was then dispatched to Kigali, Kampala and Goma to verify the allegations by the DRC government on Rwanda and Uganda’s involvement. It was dispatched to visit the Great

\(^{82}\) Although no concrete evidence was proffered, public allegations made against Kabila such as the ones that referred to him as a man who practised nepotism, one-man dictatorship and “Mobutism without Mobutu” (Campbell, 1999:21-35, also see Baregu, 1999:143) were all indicators that his regime was under threat. Such anti Kabila statements also provided early warning to the three subregional countries that plans to oust Kabila could have been at an advanced stage. Other unverified allegations that were made public include the fact that, the DRC President had the potential to commit anti-Tutsi genocide to a scale that would dwarf the killing fields in Cambodia (Campbell, 1999: 21-35). When one looks at the Nairobi grapevine sources which alleged that Kabila never called a single cabinet meeting and the state house in Kinshasa saw nothing but an orgy of sex and alcohol during his first nine months in office (Mujaju, 1999:92), it cannot be ruled out that threat analysts within the relevant governments in Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia used such information to evaluate and analyse the threat that the government of Laurent Kabila was facing and the impact of its fall on the respective interests of these three countries.
Lakes region, in particular, Kampala, Kigali, Kinshasa and Goma in the eastern DRC. The findings of the ministerial delegation confirmed the view that only a superior military response would deter the intentions of rebels and their supporters (Rupiya, 2002:96).

Besides the verification made by the respective Foreign Affairs ministers, President Museveni later admitted at the same Victoria Falls meeting (despite having initially denied any involvement of Ugandan troops fighting alongside the Congolese rebels), Kampala had deployed about 52 Ugandan reconnaissance elements to Kitona when hostilities broke out in August, 1998. The admission, which could have been necessitated by Museveni’s concern about the UPDF reconnaissance elements that could have been entrapped by the coalition offensive was part of the information to verify the threat that the Laurent Kabila government was facing, its possible impact on the interests of the three SADC countries. His public appeal to the Americans in Kinshasa to arrange for a safe passage was also possibly used as verification of threat by the three countries. He however argued that as for the two infantry battalions that were deployed inside the DRC in the Ruwenzori Mountains, it was a result of a gentlemen’s agreement that was entered earlier with President Kabila to try to curtail the use of that area by Ugandan rebels infiltrating the north west of the country.

However, President Kabila told the same meeting that the agreement had since been done away with when it became clear that Uganda was abusing its welcome to begin to threaten

83 As also revealed by Dr Mudenge to the author during an interview (Harare, 15 November 2009), he led the verification team, which was expected to recommend a way forward. It was from the findings of this team which were in the form of a very detailed report that it was concluded that while it was true that there was a rebellion in the DRC, there was also undisputed evidence of foreign aggression. He said that the Committee left without any reasonable doubt that Rwanda and Uganda had some overt involvement in the rebellion. Mudenge also noted that although Rwanda and Uganda initially denied any involvement in the rebellion, it was later discovered that the two countries had actually crafted it. Hence, according to him, Uganda and Rwanda were backing the DRC rebels seeking to overthrow Laurent Kabila from power. This information constituted immensely to the early warning and threat assessment and evaluation in respect of the intervening countries’ interests.

the security of the DRC. Thus, the above discussion indicates that early warning, threat assessment and verification were carried out by the three intervening countries in relation to how this threat was going to be a risk to their respective interests. As will be observed in the later sections, the member countries’ decision for intervention were based on the level of the early warning to the impending threat in relation to the three countries’ respective interests.

5.3 The decision for intervention within the national context of the intervening countries

The decision that the three SADC countries took within the national context were informed by the threat assessment and evaluation and the early warning given to the various ministries and departments (defence, foreign affairs, home affairs and security) in the form of updates and briefings at various hierarchical levels by relevant and designated key staff (bureaucrats). Impromptu cabinet briefings were held to inform the relevant ministries of the national impending possible task. It was in the cabinet briefings of the respective countries that respective national defence courses of action were taken.

The presidency of the three respective countries possibly used their constitutional powers as Commanders-in-Chief of the respective armed forces to deploy troops. Those decisions by the respective presidency of the AZN were undertaken within the national setting through the advice (briefings, updates and possibly recommendations) that they would have received from the respective relevant ministers as per the threat assessments, analysis and evaluations given by experts in their ministries as well as the impact of this (the removal of the Kinshasa...
regime by a Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi led armed rebellion). The final decisions for intervention within the national context of the three intervening countries were taken by the respective Commanders-in-Chief of the FAA, ZDF and NDF. Although these decisions have been criticised by some scholars and policy practitioners, it is prudent to briefly discuss the constitutions of these respective intervening countries in relation to the Presidential powers on the decision to deploy troops.

As for the Angolan President, the powers to decide on the deployment of troops could have been based on Article 56(1) of the Constitution of Angola which the Commander-in-Chief of the country’s Defence forces and the President at the helm to declare war and make peace. Whilst criticism has been laid against the decision by the President of Angola that he violated the constitution because he was not authorised by the national assembly, counter arguments were made by the then Angolan government’s Minister of the Interior, Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos "Nando", when he told the members of parliament that the decision by the President to undertake the military intervention was done for national state security reasons as the country was experiencing direct and indirect aggression from Congo Kinshasa and Congo Brazzaville (Likoti, 2006: 206).

In the case Zimbabwe, the decision by the President to undertake a decision to commit troops in the Congo could have been done through Chapter X of the Constitution, which deals with

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87 Author is indebted to this valuable information availed to him by an anonymous senior official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Namibia, 19 June, 2009.


the defence forces.\textsuperscript{90} Section 96(2) of the Zimbabwean Constitution argues that the Commander-in-Chief shall make determinations for the defence of Zimbabwe. The section says that “The supreme command of the Defence Forces shall vest in the President as Commander-in-Chief and, in the exercise of his functions as such, the President shall have power to determine the operational use of the Defence Forces.”\textsuperscript{91} However, there was much criticism from the Zimbabwe civil society, trade unions and human rights groups who generally felt that the decision to deploy troops was supposed to be first debated in parliament (Likoti, 2006:208).

In the case of Namibia, the decision to deploy troops in the Congo could be viewed in the context Article 26(7) of the Constitution of Namibia which gives the President some latitude to decide on the declaration of a state of national defence.\textsuperscript{92} It is this article which probably could have made President Nujoma the sole decision maker when it comes to deployment of the NDF (Likoti, 2006: 203). However, some critics which include members of the Namibia opposition have argued that the decision by the President of Namibia to undertake military intervention in the Congo using the powers enshrined in above articles of the Constitution could “only be consistent with the declaration of martial law only if the DRC was at war with it, which was not the case in this DRC intervention” (Tapscott, 1997:3). The same critics argue that the decision by the Namibia President violated parliamentary democracy (Likoti, 2006: 203). They also argue that the decision could have been based on the historical personal friendship that existed between Kabila and Namibian when the South West People’s Organisation (Likoti, 2006:203).


From the above discussion, it can be realised that the generality of the criticisms centre on parliamentary oversight of the defence forces. Most if not all are of the view that the decision to deploy troops should be debated in parliament first as part of the procedures to be adhered to on democratic control of the armed forces. However, some experts in defence and security studies argue that whilst the idea of parliamentary oversight sounds conventionally progressive, there are certain factors that need to be considered and prescribed to parliamentary debate when the lawmakers discuss issues related to the deployment of troops. These factors include how urgent and quick are troops supposed to be deploy in order to successfully deal with a given threat. Considering the delays that parliamentary processes the world over take to come to an agreement on any given national issue, the case of delaying to deploy troops may compromise the principles of security of personnel, surprise, and mission accomplishment among others. One strategist argues that it would be good for the security of troops and accomplishment of a mission if parliamentary debates follow the deployment as that will not compromise the above mentioned critical principles of war.\(^93\) Having discussed the decision for intervention within the national contexts of the three SADC countries, it is now important to look at the decision for intervention within the SADC subregional context.

5.4 The decision for intervention within the SADC subregional context

The diplomatic processes undertaken by the respective structures of SADC such as the SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security Committee (OPDSC) and the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (the ISDSC), among others constituted the important aspects of the decision for intervention by the three SADC countries within the subregional context.

\(^93\) I am indebted to Dr/Col Max John Chinyanganya, Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Security Studies at the University of Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe Defence Staff College for reminding me of these important points.
As already been observed, the 7 to 8 August 1998 Heads of State meeting in Victoria Falls set the motion in terms of the decision for intervention within the subregional context. The fact that Zimbabwe and Namibia’s Foreign Affairs ministers were part of the verification committee that visited Goma, Kigali and the eastern DRC could have played a part in the two ministers’ influence on their respective Heads of State on the need to deploy troops.\textsuperscript{94} It should be observed that initially the decision for intervention within the subregional context had its own challenges. These challenges revolved around the regional power dynamics between Harare and Pretoria concerning the latter’s desires to assert its regional hegemony (Tapfumaneyi, 1999:9). For instance in an effort to have its call for a diplomatic solution take precedence, South Africa did not attend the ISDSC Meeting at KG6 in Harare, but instead called for another SADC Summit in Pretoria on 23 August 1998. Interestingly, the presidents of non SADC countries such as Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda also attended, in addition to some selected SADC leaders.\textsuperscript{95} The calling of a parallel regional conference attended by those countries that were accused of assisting the armed rebellion could also have provided political and military security analysts and practitioners in the relevant ministries and

\textsuperscript{94} In a general discussion with author on the sidelines of “Force Preparations Africa” conference, Pretoria, 2008, an anonymous Pretoria based Military strategy analyst, critically observed that, of all the ministers that were part of the verification team, those from Zimbabwe and Namibia seem to have had some diplomatic closeness in terms of their countries’ relations with the new DRC regime. In the analyst’s view, this diplomatic intimacy could also have resulted in the two ministers drafting a synchronised report before presenting it to their respective heads of state in order for them (the Presidents of Namibia and Zimbabwe) to take a common position in regards to military intervention in the DRC.

\textsuperscript{95} As noted by Mudenge, the presidents of South Africa and Mozambique did not attend (he was reluctant to explain the reasons for their nonattendance to the author during the interview (Harare, 15 November 2008). He indicated however that it was not surprising that the meeting mandated President Mandela to find a solution to the crisis in consultation with the Secretary General of the OAU, without taking any clear stance on the issue of invasion. Mudenge also noted that in apparent duplication of Victoria Falls 11, the meeting sent its own ministerial fact finding mission to the Great Lakes region. The mission, incidentally, looked at the issue of the internal rebellion at the expense of the violation of the DRC by the invaders. In Mudenge’s view, these emerging divisions follows the previous attempts by South Africa to have Kabila halt his advance to Kinshasa to overthrow Mobutu when Mandela led the negotiations aboard an anchored naval in the Atlantic Ocean in May 1997. According to Mudenge, SADC was again at loggerheads. It would appear that there was a palpable personal rivalry between Mandela and Mugabe that seemed to shape their views on those matters (whether diplomacy was supposed to take precedence over a military solution or vice versa). There was also a tense relationship between the two countries with respect to issues of trade, particularly with respect to textiles and perceptions of SA’s selfish and big brother attitudes within SADC (Author also acknowledges the academic comments made by to him by Professor Uzodiike as part of feedback and guideline on this research work (10 July 2011).
departments in Luanda, Harare and Windhoek in making recommendations to the relevant decision makers on the need for urgent action by the political leadership hierarchy of those SADC member states who were willing to assist the Kinshasa regime militarily.

5. 4.1 Decision for intervention under SADC “Coalition of the willing”

The decision for intervention under SADC coalition of the willing was undertaken as a result of the SADC Inter State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) held a meeting at King George Army HQ (KG6) on 18 August 1998, a week after the outbreak of the armed rebellion to oust Kabila from power. The meeting was attended by the ministers of foreign affairs, defence and security of most SADC member states, except Botswana, South Africa and Tanzania. The High Commissioners of Botswana and South Africa in Harare represented their countries. Mauritius and Seychelles did not attend.\(^{96}\)

The Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) meeting was chaired by the Zambia Minister of Defence, basically because Zambia held the ISDSC chair at the time (Tapfumaneyi, 1999:8). Information obtained indicate that there was a general feeling among some SADC countries that the ISDSC was the only appropriate and competent forum to handle the issue at that time.\(^{97}\) The SADC Organ itself could not do so because its operational and structural modalities had been challenged by a small group of countries, led by South Africa, at the SADC Summit held in Blantyre, Malawi, on 7-8 September, 1997 (Tapfumaneyi, 1999:8). This had effectively thrown the fledging collective security

\(^{96}\) A “quorum”, according to the SADC Treaty, is two thirds of the member states. Clearly, twelve members are more than a quorum. After all, the Seychelles rarely ever attends SADC meetings of any kind. Mauritius usually asks South Africa to represent its interests (see Declaration and Treaty of SADC http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/119 accessed 20 April 2010).

\(^{97}\) Interview with Brig Gen Sibusiso Moyo, Harare, 17 December 2008.
mechanism into limbo, rendering it incapable of tackling effectively such a complex crisis as
was unfolding in the DRC. Specifically, the King George V1 (KG6) Meeting decided that the
DRC needed urgent military assistance (Tapfumaneyi, 1999:8).

Even though the Victoria Falls 1 Ministerial Fact-Finding Mission to the Great Lakes Region
was still out in the field trying to establish whether it had really been invaded, all available
evidence suggested the latter (Tapfumaneyi, 1999:8). The KG6 Meeting also decided that
those countries which had the military capacity and political will to assist a fellow SADC
country in the face of aggression could do so. The Zambian Defence Minister disseminated
the decision of the KG6 meeting to President Mugabe on 18 August 1998 (Tapfumaneyi,
1999:8). The Zimbabwean President informed his counterparts of the decision during the
same night. He also issued a press statement to alert the nation, sub-regions and the
international public of both the decision and the impending SADC reaction, without going
into detail.98

It was therefore on the basis of this Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC)
decision that Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe intervened militarily in support of Laurent
Kabila. Having code-named the intervention “Operation Sovereign Legitimacy” (OSL),
question that arise include whether or not the operation that was authorised by a SADC
institution, the ISDSC? Was the intervention a reaction to “an act of aggression” by willing
member states who were invited by the DRC government? It is important at this point to
discuss briefly the legal dimensions of the intervention.

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98 Author’s interview with Brigadier Walter Tapfumaneyi, Harare, 18 December 2008. Tapfumaneyi was part of
the ISDSC secretariat which attended the KG6 Meeting.
5.4.2 The legal dimensions of the coalition’s decision for military intervention

The coalition’s military intervention has been questioned along international legal lines. Those who hold this view argue that it should have been mandated by a UN Security Council resolution. Tapfumaneyi argues that the fashionable accusation that the SADC coalition’s intervention was in breach of the UN Charter was unfounded considering that, to the contrary, the UN Charter accords countries in distress, like the DRC, the sovereign and legitimate right in international law to call for the assistance of other states. Military intervention is a legitimate option under such circumstances (Tapfumaneyi, 1995:15). This right to self-defence is the first legal premise for the SADC coalition’s military intervention because it was at the express invitation of the DRC government.99

To stress the above point, Africa has, since the 1960s, become accustomed to a UN that normally takes between three to six months to deploy its first troops in any situation, if it does decide to come at all.100 Africa’s record on the issue of resolving African crises has been found wanting especially in the post-cold war period. As pointed out in Chapter Four, the Congo crisis and the assassination of Patrice Lumumba in the 1960s, Somalia, Rwanda and Angola, to name only a few cases where its presence precipitated further disaster, and many other situations that it chose to ignore, are cases in point. Basically, SADC could not afford to await UN reaction before deciding on intervening, especially given that the organization

99 In support of Tapfumaneyi’s argument, a Judge Advocate in the Namibian Defence Forces pointed out that the UN Security Council has never been known to pass a proactive resolution to check a developing crisis. He said that rather, it has now become fashionable for it to grant retrospective approval to local collective security activities, especially where the exigencies of the situation “do not allow the rusty UN machine to be cranked-up” (sic) into gear in time to avert disaster. Thus according to him, Granada, Haiti, Iraq, Bosnia, Yugoslavia, Liberia and Sierra Leone immediately come to mind. In the Judge Advocate’s view, the SADC reaction was reasonable in view of the imminent fall of Kinshasa (Interview with author, Windhoek, 09 June2008). In addition to the above examples, the general sentiment by those who supported the 2011 NATO action in Libya is that the action was taken as part of an international coalition to enforce U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 and protect Libyan civilians (http://blogs.suntimes.com/sweet/2011/06/obama_white_house_on_the_defen.html, accessed 16 September 2011).

100 Interview with Brig Gen Sibusiso Moyo, Harare, 17 December 2008.
had shown marked disinterest in Africa conflicts such as the 1994 Rwanda genocide, the current conflict in Somalia among others.\textsuperscript{101} In an effort to add legitimacy to their military intervention in the conflict the SADC coalition signed a Mutual Defence Pact on 10 April 1999.\textsuperscript{102}

Questions have been asked as to whether or not the government of the DRC under Laurent Kabila had the right under international law to ask for external assistance when it was faced with foreign aggression and also whether or not the decision taken by the ISDSC was an appropriate decision\textsuperscript{103}. Several factors seem to have been used by the coalition to justify the legality of their decision to intervene. They are as follows:

1. It would appear that the common denominator from which the decision for military intervention by the coalition stems from the fact that they viewed the conflict as simply an act of aggression by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi backed by imperialist forces especially the United States of America, Britain, France and Belgium.\textsuperscript{104} From the general view of the intervening coalition, the aggressors were assisted by a recruited, non-spontaneous and ultimately insignificant rebel movement in the DRC.

2. The SADC coalition forces further believed that the overall objective of the aggressors was simply to overthrow Laurent Kabila and install a regime that was not

\textsuperscript{101} Interview with Brig Gen Sibusiso Moyo, Harare, 17 December 2008.

\textsuperscript{102} Quoting the NDF Judge Advocate verbatim, “If everything else could not legitimise the coalition’s military intervention in the DRC, this pact retrospectively gave them the ultimate legal basis to do so as it equates that an attack on one of them is an attack on all” (Interview with author, Windhoek, 15 June 2008).

\textsuperscript{103} In the view of the NDF Judge Advocate, given that the DRC is a member of not only the SADC, but also the international community as a whole, the decision to intervene was appropriate. He argued that the decision is further supported by Article 52 of the UN Charter which states that: “… Nothing in this Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to maintenance of international peace and security as appropriate for regional action…” (Interview with the author, Windhoek, 15 June 2008, also see Baregu, 1999:142).

\textsuperscript{104} The view was drawn from author’s interview with Dr Mudenge, Harare, 15 November 2008. However, whilst the issue of aggression acted as the common denominator for the overall coalition decision for military intervention, a significant attempt would be made to identify the respective national interests of the three intervening countries.
recognised by SADC. If successful, these would have set a very bad precedence in the sub region (Punungwe, 1999:139-156).

3. The SADC coalition further argue that their “intervention was based on the SADC Treaty, Article 4, read in conjunction with the objectives of the OPDS” (Ngoma, 2004:4). In fact, Article 4(c) gives the “achievement of solidarity, peace, and security in the region” as an objective, while objective (a) of the “SADC Organ states in part that people and development of the region shall be protected against inter-state conflict and external aggression through defensive action” (Ngoma, 2004:4; SADC Communiqué, 28 June 1996).

4. Other arguments put across as to support the legality of the coalition’s decision for military intervention include: “adherence to the principles of SADC, which espoused state sovereignty, solidarity, peace and security, human rights, democracy and rule of law, and mutual benefit and peaceful settlement of disputes” (Ngoma, 2004:4;). Further to this argument is the claim that the coalition wanted a timely military intervention through a collaborative arrangement in order to attain genuine peace for the entire region, hence the decision for intervention.

It should also be noted that at the sub-regional level, the SADC coalition’s military intervention was based on the provisions of the OPDSC which was adopted in 1996. The communiqué which established the OPDSC has four key principles, namely, “the sovereign equality of all member states, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence, peaceful settlement of disputes through negotiation, mediation and arbitration, and military interventions of whatever nature after all possible remedies have been exhausted in accordance with the Charter of the UN.”\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{105} It is important to realise that the deployment of troops by only three SADC member states meant that the ISDSC resolution was not mandatory but it was up to the discretion of those member states that had the will to do so. Thus the deployment was based on the principle of “coalition-of-the-willing” (Southern African
It is against the background of these legal dynamics that the following section will try to identify, evaluate and ascertain the interests that motivated the member countries of the coalition of the willing to undertake the decision for intervention.

5.5 Identifying the national interests behind the three countries decisions for intervention

5.5.2 National interests in the context of Angola’s decision

National security interests were key in determining the government of Angola’s decision for military intervention. The military strategy adopted by the government Angola in pursuing, attaining and safeguarding these interests will be discussed in chapter six. As observed by Morgenthau (1951:23), that a nation’s physical survival in terms of security cannot be compromised or negotiated but leaves it with no other option except to go to war and defend itself at any price, it would appear Angola’s national security interest was of primary or vital importance in terms of the government’s decision to undertake military intervention. Thus, it also appears that in the view of the government of Angola, the country’s national security and in this case its border security concerns could not be negotiated or compromised. In a statement issued to the US House of International Relations Sub-Committee on 17 September 1998, the then Angolan Ambassador to the US said that the conflict in the DRC was a direct threat to Angola’s strategic national interest (Nabudere, 2003:57; see also Maeresera, 2004:41). Angola shares a long and strategic northern border with the DRC, which meant

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that the DRC conflict was putting Luanda’s relations with many of its neighbours at stake.\textsuperscript{106} The Angolan Ambassador’s statement is further corroborated by the then Angolan Minister of the Interior, Fernando da Piedade dos Santos, who in his address to parliament noted that the deployment of Angolan forces (FAA) by the government was prompted by “state reasons and imperatives of national security.”\textsuperscript{107} The Interior Minister further explained that the deployment was effected in response to the continued destabilisation of Angola through direct and indirect aggressions.\textsuperscript{108}

In the view of the Angolan Interior Minister, the Luanda government’s argument needed to control effectively the movements and activities of the Jonas Savimbi led rebel National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (\textit{Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola}-UNITA).\textsuperscript{109} Again, a hostile or unfriendly government in Kinshasa would have had a negative effect on the Angolan peace process and the smooth supply of military equipment and movement of UNITA rebel troops from the DRC into Angola.\textsuperscript{110} It should be noted that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{106} Author acknowledges this information availed to him by the Zimbabwe’s Defence Advisor to Angola, Colonel Bernard Dungeni during a courtesy call on the Embassy of Zimbabwe, Luanda, 15 March 2008.
\item \textsuperscript{108} See also ”Angola Parliament pursues debates on troops in DRC” http://www.reliefweb.accessed 25 July 2008).
\item \textsuperscript{109} As the Angolan Army Chief of Staff pointed out to the author during an interview (Luanda, 15 March 2008), the decision by the Angolan government to deploy troops in the DRC meant that Luanda was also fighting UNITA in a foreign land. The Angolan General went on to say that, for the Angolan government, military intervention in support of the DRC government was meant to pre-empt UNITA from launching its military incursions against the MPLA using the DRC. In fact, the Chief of Staff claimed that the Angolan government’s motive for the deployment of FAA in the DRC was also meant to disrupt UNITA’s lines of logistical support (also see Koyame and Clarke, 2002:214).
\item \textsuperscript{110} A senior officer in the Angolan Military Intelligence who opted to remain anonymous revealed to the author during an interview (Luanda, 16 March 2008) that between 1994 and 1997, the Angolan government and specifically the Angolan Military Intelligence had it on good authority that the UNITA rebel movement received significant supplies of military equipment from the Mobutu regime. They also had it on record that the DRC cities of Kinshasa and Gbadolite were used as conduits for military arsenals and other logistics which were delivered by cargo planes from Eastern European countries such as Bulgaria and later on transported and delivered to UNITA bases of Andulo and Bailundo in Angola. These transactions were being carried out by Kinshasa based UNITA agents who also used end user certificates from the DRC government to procure these logistics (also see Nabudere, 2003:57).
\end{itemize}
when UNITA relaunched its offensives in December 1998 on the towns of Huambo and Cuito, the FAA had to repulse these UNITA attacks by flying reinforcements from the DRC (Turner, 2002:86). With the assistance of the Congolese rebels, the Rwandese and Ugandan troops, UNITA managed to capture the town of Maquela do Zombo. That Angolan forces managed to recapture the town of Maquela do Zombo only after a joint operation of the SADC coalition seems to support the claim that the decision by Angola to undertake the military intervention in the Congo was linked to its national security need to destroy UNITA’s launching bases.

The national political interests that informed the government of Angola to undertake the decision for intervention was the country’s subregional obligation to ensure peace and stability by assisting a SADC member state. Nabudere (2003:57) argues that as a member of the SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security (OPDS), Angola may also have acted in conformity with the SADC procedures of collective self-defence. In the opinion of the government of Angola, the crisis in the DRC was a result of the invasion by Rwanda and Uganda (Carvalho, 1999:99). Whilst the government of Angola recognised that there was an internal political problem in the DRC, its decision for military intervention was reached in response to a call by the Kinshasa government which faced an invasion (Carvalho, 1999:99). Although Angola’s own experience had taught it that internal problems cannot be solved from the outside, its military intervention to solve the problem of the invasion would create an environment in which the internal problem could also be tackled (Carvalho, 1999:99). Thus, it cannot be ruled out that the Angolan government could have calculated that like Zimbabwe and Namibia, it also had certain sub-regional responsibilities and obligations conferred upon it as a nation to the sub-region.
The Angolan government’s decision for military intervention was premised on the fact that it had committed itself to deploy troops in the DRC at the King George VI (KG6) Extraordinary Meeting of the Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) that took the crucial decision for SADC to intervene militarily pending a political solution to the crisis. In the opinion of the government of Angola, the conflict in the DRC was a result of aggression.\textsuperscript{111} In the researcher’s view, it can thus be said that the national political interests of Angola were like the national security interests of primacy and also vital in as far as the country’s decision for military intervention in the Congo was concerned. Perhaps the Angolan government realised that any laxity in terms of undertaking a regional obligation to ensure that the change of leadership in Kinshasa was not to be effected through an act of aggression had direct negative repercussions not only to SADC regional peace and stability but to Angola’s national security. Thus it would appear that there was a close link between Angola’s national political interests and national security interests in influencing the government’s decision to deploy troops to defend the Kabila regime. The national security interests and national political interests were of primary or vital importance.

The national economic interests of Angola also influenced the government’s decision for military intervention. Angola contributed some military transport aircraft, advisors and substantial material and logistical assistance to the AFDL’s advance to Kinshasa.\textsuperscript{112} The support rendered to Kabila by the Angolan government seems to have been crucial in the ouster of Mobutu Sese Seko. It could have been from this support that Angola laid the

\textsuperscript{111} Interview by author with a senior Angolan Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Luanda, 25 April 2008.

\textsuperscript{112} Just like the revelations made to author by the senior ZDF official during an interview (Harare, 13 July 2010), the senior Angolan Military Intelligence officer (Interview with author 16 March 2008) corroborated the same information that during the AFDL’s fight to remove Mobutu from power, Angola, together with Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania provided assistance to Kabila’s rebel troops. The assistance included technical and logistical assistance as well as the provision of military intelligence to Kabila’s command centre.
foundation for the construction of very close diplomatic with the DRC. These ties could have resulted in the two countries entering bilateral military and economic agreements.

The government of Angola had offered to assist with technical military training to the new Congolese army. Before the outbreak of the conflict, the Angolan government was also preparing to send a small contingent to the DRC to work together with the Zimbabwean contingent, to lay the groundwork for the integration and training of a new DRC army. The military assistance to Congo could have been part of enhancing the Luanda government’s economic drive in terms of investing in the DRC. Thus, the Angolan government could have viewed the invasion as a threat to the relations and investments which were starting to grow between Luanda and Kinshasa. It cannot be ruled out that the invasion could also have appeared to the Luanda government as endangering the lives of a substantial number of Angolan nationals who were motivated to enter into the DRC for formal and informal business activities after the fall of the Mobutu regime.

The economic drive for Angola’s decision for military intervention stemmed from the possibility of having the National Angolan Fuel Company (Sonangol) gaining control of the DRC’s petroleum distribution and production networks through the military intervention (Turner, 2002:87). The commitment of troops in support of the Kinshasa regime saw the

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113 Such an initiative for the reintegration and training assistance of the DRC military by Angola and Zimbabwe could have been an arrangement stemming from the support the two countries offered to the AFDL during the fight to oust Mobutu. It cannot be ruled out that Harare and Luanda wanted to see a professional and well trained DRC military that could fight and defend the sovereign integrity of the Congo and, more specifically, the new Kabila regime.

114 Having completed fieldwork research in Angola, the author managed to travel from Luanda to Kinshasa by road and had a two week stay at Angola’s northern border with the DRC in Matadi in the Bas Congo province before proceeding to Kinshasa. As an eyewitness experience, the author noted that there are extensive cross border activities including trade by citizens of the two countries. These activities are further boosted by the close cultural links that the two countries’ people share particularly those of the western Congo (Bas Congo and those from Northern Angola on the border with Angola). Thus, there is always a regular presence let alone traffic of the two countries’ nationals on a daily basis.
Angolan government gaining control of about a 1,000 km oilfield stretch on the Atlantic seaboard, including the DRC, Congo-Brazzaville and its own Cabinda enclave, thus enhancing the expansion of its oil industry (International Crisis Group, ICG, “Scramble for the Congo,” in Anatomy of an Ugly War, ICG Africa Report, no.26 (Nairobi/Brussels; 2000, see also Turner 2002:87). Thus the prospects of having an uncooperative and hostile government in Kinshasa would have made it difficult for Angola to access its oil fields in the Kabinda enclave, which is situated between the DRC and the Angolan mainland.

It can be argued that whilst national economic interests of Angola played a part in influencing the government’s decision for intervention, these interests were not of primary or vital importance like the political and national security interests. In the case of Angola, the country could negotiate or compromise its economic interest. This seems true due to the fact that, after the death of UNITA rebel leader, Jonas Savimbi in February 2002 and the end of the Angola civil war, the government of Angola’s national political interests in relation to the DRC have not been as they were during the civil war in Angola. Yet the two countries still have close economic relations. Thus, the national economic relations were of secondary importance in as far as the decision by the government of Angola to deploy troops in defence of the Kinshasa regime was concerned.

The Angolan government’s argument that its decision to deploy troops in the DRC was premised on the quest to safeguard its national interests was also criticised. There were allegations that Luanda’s political elite had secured profitable networks through Angola’s national oil company, Sonangol, which had allegedly been granted concessions and marketing rights by Laurent Kabila (Taylor and Williams, 2001:75). Though unproven, the allegations against some senior officials in the Kabila and Dos Santos governments in the UN
Panel of Experts reports had some impact on argument of elite economic interest as having influenced Angola’s decision for intervention. It was alleged that the close ties in private business deals and more specifically oil business ventures among officials from the two countries could arguably also have been influential in as far as the decision making process that led to Angola’s intervention is concerned.\textsuperscript{115}

5.5.1 National interest calculus and Zimbabwe’s decision

National political interests were key determinants in as far as the Zimbabwe government’s decision for intervention was concerned. The military strategy adopted to safeguard these interests will be discussed in the next chapter. As then Chair of the SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security Committee (OPDSC), the Zimbabwe government had an obligation to lead by example in defending the sovereign legitimacy of the Congo. Harare could have realised the need to take the lead in politically mobilising other willing members in the region to defend the Kinshasa government. As Mudenge stressed, Zimbabwe, chaired of the OPDSC was primarily acting in conformity with SADC procedures.\textsuperscript{116} This responsibility could have been the rationale behind Harare playing a leading role in taking political initiatives that resulted in solution seeking summits such as the already mentioned Victoria Falls Summit of 7-8 August, 1998 and the King George VI (KG6) Extraordinary Meeting of the Interstate

\textsuperscript{115} This view comes as a result of author’s analysis from five consecutive interviews with five anonymous Angolan opposition parliamentarians, Luanda, 15 March 2008.

\textsuperscript{116} As Foreign Affairs Minister during the military intervention and thus speaking from a Zimbabwean government point of view, Mudenge argued that if Zimbabwe and the other countries which supported Laurent Kabila had not done so, history would have been different. He also noted that Zimbabwe’s tenure as Chairman of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1997-98, as well as of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security since its inauguration in 1996 to date, conferred certain responsibilities and obligations upon it as a nation. Speaking from a Zimbabwean government point of view, Mudenge indicated that nursing President Laurent Kabila’s inaugural pledge to hold democratic elections in two years into fruition and playing a leading role in the SADC collective security agenda were some of the direct or residual responsibilities that came with Zimbabwe’s Chair of the OAU and the OPDSC. He further noted that one of the most critical outcomes therefore was that Zimbabwe had to lead by example and commit its troops to the DRC (Interview with author, Harare, 15 November 2008; see also Maeresera, 2004:40).
Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) that took the crucial decision for SADC to intervene militarily.

In the Zimbabwe government’s view, the violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC by Rwanda and Uganda was in flagrant disregard of International law and it also made a mockery of resolutions previously adopted by both the OAU and SADC. Harare felt that it could not shirk its responsibilities to a neighbour under threat from “imperialism” (Rupiya, 2002:96). Reports of international support to the rebels could have precipitated the Zimbabwean leadership to participate in what they perceived as Pan African defence (Rupiya, 2002:96). As the President Mugabe put it during a question and answer session at the 1999 Southern Africa Trade and Investment Conference in Maputo:

The Zimbabweans responded to a call by the DRC government following the invasion by Uganda and Rwanda.... I think our decision was a gallant one and our response so far has been just as gallant. We have prevented the aggressors from achieving their goal (Ngoma: 2004; 4; Rupiya, 2002:96).

President Mugabe further noted that as Commander-in-Chief, he took the necessary action to come to the aid of an aggressed neighbour and fellow member of SADC (Rupiya, 2002:96). As Ngoma (2004:4) puts it, the Zimbabwean President pointed out that Harare was responding “to an urgent appeal by the Congo to the SADC OPDSC........it was an honourable act of enlightened self interests” (see also Rupiya, 2002:96). On a related note, in his address to the parliament of Zimbabwe, the then Minister of Defence, Dr Moven Mahachi, pointed out that the deployment of the ZDF as part of the SADC coalition was a worthwhile cause

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117 The responsibilities and obligations of being the substantive chairman of the SADC OPDSC and the OAU were significant in the government’s decision for intervention (see author’s interview with Dr Mudenge, Harare, 15 November 2008).
and it was done on principle having taken into consideration that Harare could not allow the removal of a legitimate government through force (Rupiya, 2002:96). Corroborating Mahachi’s argument, Tapfumanyi states that the ZDF were deployed in Somalia as a matter of principle; so was the Mozambican deployment. It was also a question of principle when the ZDF deployed in Angola and later on the DRC.\footnote{In a public lecture delivered at the University of Zimbabwe (19 September 1999) entitled “Why the Zimbabwe Defence Forces are deployed in the Democratic Republic of Congo?”, the then Director of Policy and International Affairs at Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Defence Headquarters, Colonel Walter Tapfumaneyi (now rtd Brigadier General) reiterated that point by noting that Zimbabwe has never hesitated to project its forces beyond its borders in defence of its national interests, to deter a real or perceived threat, in pursuance of universally agreed cardinal principles or in the furtherance of international peace and harmony. He noted that it is illustrative to reveal that when Captain Solo nearly succeeded in toppling the Fredrick Chiluba government in his October 1998 coup attempt, the ZDF was placed on “red alert” to intervene to restore civilian rule in Zambia. In Tapfumaneyi’s view (which in this case possibly represented the official government view), failure to act drastically in the DRC situation, would have amounted to a national act of abdication.}

There are certain factors that could then have possibly made the national political interests of the Zimbabwe government vital or primary in terms of Harare’s decision to undertake the military intervention. Perhaps in the view of the Zimbabwe government, defending the Kabila government from being removed from power through an act of aggression could not be negotiated or compromised. It seems in the view of Harare, defending the Kinshasa regime through the deployment of troops was for the survival of regional peace, security and stability. The fact that Zimbabwe had made a traceable positive record in terms of contributions to regional peace support efforts before 1998 could have been a key aspect of its national political interests in terms of the valuable regional recognition, respect and perhaps honour that the country had set on the regional scene. The removal of the Kabila regime through an act of aggression could have affected Harare’s retention of those regional peace values and norms that the country had historically set. Thus the regional clout, in terms of effective contribution to the maintenance of peace and stability through taking the lead in defending the Kabila regime could have been key political interests that the Harare regime could not have compromised by not taking a decision for military intervention.
The national economic interests also determined the Zimbabwe government’s decision for intervention. The strategy employed in the promotion and safeguarding of these interests will be discussed in chapter six. Going by reports that Zimbabwe contributed some military transport aircraft, advisors and substantial material and logistical assistance to the AFDL’s advance to Kinshasa, Harare thus contributed to the ouster of Mobutu Sese Seko.\textsuperscript{119} From thereafter the Zimbabwe government went on to cultivate very close diplomatic/military and economic ties with the DRC government. Zimbabwe made substantial direct investment in trade and commerce, mining, electricity, railway, road and air transport.\textsuperscript{120}

It is also claimed that the Zimbabwean regime loaned given a substantial loan to the Kabila government. In addition to that, a deal of about US$53 million was made before the outbreak armed rebellion to oust Kabila. The deal was between the Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI) and the new Congolese Army (FAC) for the ZDI to supply all logistics (rations, arms, ammunition and uniforms) to FAC.\textsuperscript{121} Prior to the outbreak of the conflict, Zimbabwe had already seconded a small Zimbabwean contingent to the DRC to lay the groundwork for the integration and training of a new DRC army as part of the diplomatic military relations between Zimbabwe and the DRC.\textsuperscript{122}

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{119} During the AFDL’s fight to remove Mobutu from power, Zimbabwe, together with Angola, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania provided assistance to Kabila’s rebel troops. This assistance ranged from technical, logistical assistance to the provision of military intelligence to Kabila’s command centre (Author’s interview with a senior ZDF official, Harare, 13 July 2010. The official opted to remain anonymous for personal security reasons).}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{120} Interview with a senior Zimbabwe Ministry of Finance official, Harare 25 July 2010. The official opted to remain anonymous.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{121} Interview with the same senior Zimbabwe Ministry of Finance official, Harare 25 July 2010.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{122} In the words of a senior Zimbabwean Cabinet Minister, “the outbreak of the war and more specifically the invasion of the DRC threatened these growing relations and investments and, above all, it endangered the lives of a substantial number of Zimbabweans (civilians and military personnel) who were already on the ground in the DRC as leading elements for all forms of these investment opportunities” (Interview with author, Harare, 27 July 2010). The minister opted to remain anonymous.}
\end{footnotesize}
Zimbabwe’s senior Trade Attaché at the country’s Embassy in the DRC noted that Zimbabwe had and still has pertinent grounds to regard a peaceful DRC, with an estimated population of over fifty million, as a crucial alternative market. Clearly then, if economic investment deals were struck, any hostile change of regime would not have been in Harare’s favour or interest. Besides that, it is worth noting that Zimbabwe had had a chronic shortage of sustainable electric power while the DRC’s Inga Dam Project is already connected to the SADC power grid. At the time of the intervention only eight percent of its capacity, it was supplying power as far south as Cape Town and as far north as Cairo, including Harare. The Congo River, being the fastest flowing of the large rivers of the world, and not prone to the effects of droughts, had the potential to be a sustainable source of power for the continent. With these factors in mind, for the Zimbabwean government, committing troops to support a friendly regime would work in its favour in as far as Zimbabwe’s strategic economic interests in boosting its electricity power was concerned, particularly in support of its industrial sector.

Ohlson and Steadman (1994:209) note the Congo River basin is a crucial addition to the shared watercourse systems of drought prone Southern Africa. It is illustrative to note that intentions by South Africa and Zimbabwe to pipe water from the Zambezi for their drought prone interiors drew some criticism from some of their SADC counterparts. In 1993, for example, a junior minister in the government of Botswana threatened that SADC could go to

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123 In an interview with author (Kinshasa, 20 June 2010), the senior Trade Attaché with the Zimbabwean Embassy in Kinshasa noted this is especially so because the SADC Trade Protocol has remained evasive since 1996 mainly because South Africa has adopted a protectionist stance. According to the Trade Attaché, the latter controls over eighty percent (80%) of intra-SADC trade. To make matters worse, prior to the outbreak of the conflict, it had signed a Free Trade Protocol with the European Union. There is the growing fear that SADC goods destined for South Africa might now be subjected to the same rules of the origin and standards regime that make the European market impenetrable for most of them, over and above the already quite stringent South African tariff regime. With this in mind, it is clear that the DRC is not too far from Zimbabwe after all.

124 Interview with then Minister of Energy and Water Resources, Lt General (rtd) Mike Nyambuya, Harare, 12 December 2008. Lt General Nyambuya was the first SADC Coalition Forces Task Force Commander.
war over water (Ohlson and Steadman, 1994:209). Zambia was uneasy about Zimbabwe’s plans to expand the Batoka South Bank Hydroelectric Project in the late 1980s. Part of the Botswana-Namibia Sidudu-Kasikili Island territorial dispute has to do with control over water. Mozambique was equally uneasy about Zimbabwe’s Pungwe River pipeline for Mutare. These chronic water related disputes emphasised the need to harness and defend the waters of the mighty Congo River as a potential solution. Thus, the national economic interests also played a part in the Zimbabwe government’s decision to deploy troops in defence of the Kinshasa government.

Whilst national economic interests could have played a part in the government of Zimbabwe’s decision for intervention, these could be categorised in the secondary level. As Morgenthau (195123) observed that secondary interests can be negotiated or compromised, the national economic interests of Zimbabwe in relation to Congo could have (arguably) been negotiated or compromised with any new regime in Congo. As one economic trade analyst observed, “any bilateral economic investment trade agreements officially entered into by two governments cannot be revoked without proper procedures despite the change of a given regime”126. Perhaps that means national economic interests were secondary in terms of influencing the decision by the government of Zimbabwe to commit troops in the Congo. In the same view, there is a possibility that the Zimbabwe government held the view that if left to its own devices and secure from invasion, the DRC was going to be able to hold elections and in time the country was going to be democratised without any intervention.

125 Same interview with Lt General (rtd) Mike Nyambuya, Harare, 12 December 2008.

126 Same interview by author with an anonymous economic investment trade analyst, Pretoria, 20 September 2009.
In that regard, the Zimbabwe government’s view could possibly have been that any change of government in Kinshasa through ballot and not aggression was not going to affect the bilateral economic investment trade agreements entered between the DRC and Zimbabwe during Kabila’s rule. Perhaps that is why one Zimbabwean constitutional expert observed that “even after the withdrawal of its troops from the Congo, Zimbabwe was keen to see the world devoting its energies to civic political education in the DRC, preparation of a credible voters roll, relevant constitutional reforms and the integration of a new, strong and deterrent national army within the ambit of the agreed Congolese National Political Dialogue”. However, as Morgenthau (1951) observed that secondary interests can have the potential of growing in the minds of statesmen until they seem to be vital, the same could arguably have been the same with Zimbabwe during the course of the intervention. The challenges faced by the members of the intervening SADC coalition (particularly Zimbabwe and Namibia) in terms of sustaining the war effort and other economic opportunities that began to show during the course of the intervention could have impacted in that regard. The national economic interest could have shifted to being of primacy during the course of the intervention period.

The view that Zimbabwe’s economic interests appear to have been of secondary level in terms of the government’s decision for military intervention seem to be corroborated through an observation by Tapfumaneyi (1999:18), that the country’s decision for military intervention in the DRC was not an end in itself but rather as a catalyst without which no progress could be made towards resolving the problem. The military campaign had no meaning outside the ambit of a broader strategy to create lasting peace and security in the DRC and the Great Lakes Region as a whole. In other words, it was an important extension

127 As officially noted by then Zimbabwe’s Senior Economic Analyst during an interview with the author, Harare, 13 July 2010, all these could not take place in a country in which upwards of twenty-five percent (25%) of the national territory, containing an estimated 20 million population, was occupied by invading forces. According to the analyst, once the proper conditions were put in place, then Zimbabwe’s economic interests would have been permanently assured/secured.
of politics and diplomacy (Tapfumaneyi, 1999:18). It would appear that in terms of influencing the government’s decision for military intervention, political national interests were key and vital arguably as against Zimbabwe’s national economic interests.

Whilst the above factors may seem to represent the generality of the official government view in regards to what motivated the decision for military intervention, there has been criticism of these. There have been counter arguments to the above motivations for Zimbabwe’s decision for military intervention. There have been allegations that the decision by Zimbabwe to intervene in the DRC conflict was first and foremost done to prop up Kabila on the grounds of personal friendship that existed between the two leaders (BBC News bulletin, 25 September 1998). However, the above argument about personal friendship between the two leaders as having been significant in the decision for assisting the Kinshasa government did not explain how the presidents Sam Nujoma of Namibia and Jose Eduardo Dos Santos of Angola ended up being part of the intervening coalition. The argument against Zimbabwe’s decision was brought out by a former opposition parliamentarian in Zimbabwe when it was argued the decision to intervene was not widely consultative, that is, parliament did not take any role. It was shrouded in secrecy and hence “ill advised.”

Whilst the aspect of economic investment potential was given as the rationale for taking the decision for military intervention from the government’s point of view, this was not the case with the 2000 Zimbabwe opposition, civil society at large and even the international community. The 2000 Zimbabwe opposition parliamentarians in particular viewed the military intervention as a waste of resources, arguing that the country was undergoing economic challenges. They regarded the decision for military intervention as having nothing

to do with the safeguarding of the country’s national interests. Rather, they insisted, it was a decision that was motivated by personal elite interests.\textsuperscript{129}

In an effort to support the “elite personal gain” argument as having played a key part in the Zimbabwe government’s decision for military intervention, a Washington based NGO, the Congo Watch, alleged that some senior government officials had individual shares in OSLEG, a joint diamond mining venture of the Zimbabwe military and the DRC government (\textit{New Congo News}, 30 August 2001; Moore 2003:30). On the same note and in trying to support the “personal elite gain” argument, R.W Johnson also made allegations (though unproven) against other senior government and ZANU PF officials that they benefited from the intervention as a result of facilitating the purchase of DRC small arms and heavy artillery worth more than US$50 million from a Chinese company (Focus, 19 November 2000).\textsuperscript{130} However these allegations were not illustrative on how this could have influenced the government’s decision for military intervention since the alleged business activities took place when troops had already been deployed.

Thus the above discussion constituted the arguments from the official Zimbabwe government view and counter arguments from the academia, the political opposition as well as the civil society in an effort to try and identify and ascertain the national interests that determined the

\textsuperscript{129} In an interview with author (Harare, 29 July 2010), University of Zimbabwe academic and government critic, Professor John Makumbe pointed out that in his view, elite interest took precedence over national interests in the Zimbabwe government’s decision for military intervention.

\textsuperscript{130} The common baseline in this argument is that the decision for intervention was based more on the aspect of “elite personal gain” than the perceived “national interest” one. According to these counter arguments, the Congo conflict was viewed by those in decision making leadership positions (both political and military) as an opportune moment to commit troops and thereby open up personal business ventures (This is a summary of the views obtained by the author during an interview with a former Zimbabwe opposition politician, Harare, 21 July 2010. The politician, who now holds a Ministerial portfolio in the current Zimbabwe Government of National Unity (GNU), opted to remain anonymous. He preferred to be called JJ. In this thesis, an analysis and debate on economic sustenance of the war effort and the elite self-enrichment is critically discussed in Chapters Six and Seven.
The national political interests of the government of Namibia that made the government to undertake the decision for military intervention are said to have been based on subregional obligation for the maintenance of peace and stability (Baregu, 1999:144). The government of Namibia was also acting in accordance with the OPDSC protocols that call for mutual defence in times of foreign aggression against a SADC member state. Just like Angola and Zimbabwe, Namibia’s decision to deploy troops was also informed by its view that the conflict was the result of an invasion. Thus, the Namibian government’s decision for military intervention was a response to an urgent appeal by the Kinshasa government to the OPDSC to intervene (Nabudere, 2003:58). As Nabudere notes, Namibia’s decision for military intervention was justified under article 51 of the UN Charter (Nabudere, 2003:58). Together with President Mugabe, President Nujoma noted that the Namibian Defence Forces (NDF) were deployed in the DRC to safeguard Namibia’s future security based on the fact that there was a need for Namibians to think along the lines that instability in one part of the sub-region could have long term destabilizing effects on Namibia (IPS September 18, 1998; Nabudere, 2003:58). Thus, as Commander-in-Chief of the NDF, President Sam Nujoma felt there was a need to take the decision for military intervention in aid of an invaded neighbour and fellow member of SADC. As President Nujoma put it, the decision to deploy the NDF was an “honourable act of enlightened self interests” (IPS September 18, 1998; Nabudere, 2003:58). The then Namibian President, further notes that the decision by Namibia to participate in
military intervention was made in consultation with the Presidents of Angola and Zimbabwe who together realised the legal and political legitimacy of rendering assistance to the Congolese government which had been invaded (Nabudere, 2003:58).

Furthermore, Namibia may have been helping Angola in the war against UNITA, which had also been destabilising northern Namibia and possibly had links with the secessionist Caprivi Strip Liberation Movement (CSLM). Koyame and Clark observed that Namibia’s decision for military intervention may have been due to the residual loyalty that President Sam Nujoma had for the Luanda regime owing to the political and financial support Angola’s MPLA rendered to the South West People’s Liberation Army (SWAPO) during Namibia’s struggle for independence (Koyame and Clark, 2002:213). The strategy in safeguarding the national political interest of Namibia will be discussed in chapter six.

Using the realist assertion that primary or vital national interests are those interests that a country cannot compromise or negotiate and that they are interests that a country is left with no option but to go to war for the sake of defending those interests (Morgenthau, 1951:23), one would argue that Namibia’s political national interest could be categorised in the secondary level. The fact that the Namibian government’s decision to deploy troops as an act of regional solidarity for the maintenance of peace and stability in SADC was relatively secondary. The non-deployment of the NDF was perhaps not going to be of any direct and immediate consequences to the Namibian government’s physical, political and security survival.

The decision of Namibia to undertake the military intervention was also influenced by the country’s national economic interests. Namibia’s involvement can partly be explained by the number of trade deals it signed with the DRC government when Laurent Kabila took over power from Mobutu. These trade deals include the more than US$25 million agreement signed between the two governments, among others (Taylor and Williams, 2001:75; BBC Focus on Africa, January-February 1999). The DRC mineral resource base was also of interest to the Namibian government. It should be noted that Namibia is a producer of diamonds itself. Having an agreement with De Beers to exploit its resources for the benefit of the economy of Namibia, the government expressed its interest in mining and selling the gold and diamonds of the DRC (Nabudere, 2003:59). In an address to the Namibian National Assembly on 25 October 1999, the then Minister of Home Affairs, Jerry Ekandjo, pointed out that the primary motivating factor for Namibia’s military intervention in the DRC was to maintain security. However, he underscored that the government of Namibia would accept an invitation by the Congolese government to explore any mineral enterprise through proper channels (The Namibian, 26 October 1999). That being the case, the then Minister of Home Affairs’ assertion may have been a demonstration that what motivated the Namibian government’s decision for military intervention was its interest in having a stable security and political situation in the Congo that would in the future allow it to enter into a bilateral economic Memorandum of Agreements with the Kinshasa government (Nabudere, 2003:59).

The national economic interests of Namibia can also be categorised in the secondary level of importance in terms of influencing the government’s decision for intervention. This is perhaps due to the fact that like Zimbabwe and Angola, whose economic interests could still have been guaranteed even if there was a change of regime in Kinshasa because the
respective bilateral trade investment and economic deals were entered into at government level, the same could have been the case with the Namibian government.

There were also criticisms against the Namibian government’s decision for intervention in the Congo. The general view by some section of the Namibian opposition legislators, civil society and some academics is that national interests were not in any way a key determinant in as far as the decision by the government of Namibia to deploy troop was concerned. The general view by the above critics is that personal and elite interests determined the decision by the government of Namibia to intervene in the conflict.

Whilst the above sections identified and tried to ascertain the respective national interests of the respective governments of the SADC coalition in terms of determining these governments’ decisions for military intervention in the Congo, it is also important to make a brief evaluation of the respective interests of these countries.

**5.5.4 Evaluating the respective interests of the coalition**

Having identified and analysed the respective national interests of the interveners, this section will try to evaluate and ascertain these interests of the coalition within the realist paradigm. This will be done in order to assess the actual weight to be given to the most salient reasons for their intervention. The analysis will also try to sift the most compelling argument that took precedence for each of the three countries’ respective decisions to intervene. Reasons for this would be given within the context of the national interests/military intervention debate. In order to achieve this, a scenario can be set whereby a given academic foreign policy researcher would ask a variety of correlated questions that would form the basis or guide on
which various levels of these respective national interests could have informed their decisions for intervention. Such questions include: Having also identified intervening countries’ national interests that were at the primary (vital) or secondary level, which of these national interests were permanent or temporary, specific or general? Since these interests were safeguarded or pursued in the form of a “coalition of the willing” arrangement, which among them were identical or complementary interests of the interveners? Were there any conflicting interests among them?

Having identified the varying interests of the intervening countries, it would be important to evaluate the respective interests of the SADC coalition. As already observed, among the national interests that motivated the level of national security interests that took precedence in influencing the government of Angola’s decision to intervene appears to have been at the primary or vital level. The threat from UNITA, as mentioned in Chapter five, appears to have been of primary concern to the Angolan government’s political survival and national security. It appears the government of Angola could not hesitate to take a decision for military intervention in the Congo because it wanted to defend and preserve its national security. It should be realised that whilst the national security interest of Angola was primary, temporary and specific at the beginning of the intervention, that same interest shifted to primary, permanent and general following the news political and security developments in Angola following the end of the civil war in that country, thus leading to the withdrawal of FAA from the DRC in 2002. Angola’s national security interests now appear general and they are no longer specific to the issue of UNITA. The national political interests which as already observed was primary or vital because, defending the Kabila regime had a link to the guaranteeing of safeguarding the national security concerns of Angola. However, whilst Angola’s national political interests could be categorised as having been primary, temporary
and specific at the beginning of the intervention, this later shifted to secondary and general after the withdrawal of the Angolan troops from the DRC and the end of the Angolan civil war.\textsuperscript{132}

The national economic interests of Angola can be referred to as secondary, permanent and general. This seems to be the case if one considers the fact that the economic relations between Luanda and Kinshasa existed before deployment of the Angolan troops and after the withdrawal of these troops from the DRC. The two countries had strong economic and trade relations in terms of Kinshasa’s accessibility to the sea and the agreement to equitably exploit the oil reserves in Cabinda before, during and after the intervention period. The order of importance in acknowledging the political national interests behind the Angolan government’s decision for intervention thus can be categorised as primary, temporary and specific which later shifted to secondary and temporary. The economic interests could be referred to as secondary, permanent and general. There also seem to be interplay of these categories in the scholarly analysis of the interests of the government of Angola in relation to its intervention decision.

As already observed, among the national interests that motivated Zimbabwe to intervene, political national interests seem to fall in the primary or vital category. Having been the Chair of the SADC OPDSC and having had a notable record of playing a significant part in regional peace efforts before 1998 through the deployment of the ZDF in peace support operations (in Mozambique, Somalia, Angola among others), the demise of the DRC government’s

\textsuperscript{132} The death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi on 22 February 2002 culminated in the end of the Angolan civil war. Thus the government of Angola’s concerns regarding national security threat emanating from the DRC was reduced. From that time onwards, the diplomatic relations between Kinshasa and Luanda have not been as intimate as they used to be when the later wanted cooperation from the Kinshasa government in order to deal with the threat paused by UNITA. I am indebted to Major General Trust Mugoba for providing mw with these valuable analytical comments.
physical, political, cultural identity, survival or security through an “act of aggression” could arguably have been of grave consequences to the integrity of Zimbabwe (in terms of regional leadership) to the extent that military intervention to defend the Kinshasa regime could have been unavoidable in the view of the government of Zimbabwe. Perhaps the fall of the Kinshasa regime through an “act of aggression” could have set a negative precedent. As chair of the SADC OPDSC, failure to “walk the talk” in terms of taking the lead on subregional responsibility and obligations on maintenance of peace and stability through defending the DRC’s sovereignty by deploying troops whilst awaiting a peaceful solution could have had negative consequences on the government of Zimbabwe’s lead role of the OPDSC.

The subregional responsibility and obligation in the maintenance of peace, security and stability in line with the UN Charter seem to have been part of Zimbabwe’s permanent interest. This seems the case if one considers the country’s historical quest before 1998 to contribute to peace support missions over a relatively long period of time from the Mozambican campaign, UN peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Angola, among others.133

As already observed, the country’s national economic interests were secondary in as far as the decision for intervention was concerned. These economic interests also appear to have been temporary in the sense that soon after the withdrawal of its troops from the Congo there seems to be little if any economic relations between Harare and Kinshasa that is worth noting. The economic interests of Zimbabwe seem to have been during the intervention period.

Since taking the lead in terms of subregional obligation and responsibility in defending the Kabila regime so as to ensure peace and stability pending a political solution could be viewed

in relation to space and time (1998 to 2002), one could describe the political interests of Zimbabwe as primary, temporary and specific throughout the intervention period. The country’s national economic interests seem to have been secondary, temporary and general in terms of determining the decision for military intervention. However, it should be realized that there is always an interplay between the primary and secondary interests in terms of making a scholarly evaluation regarding what determined the Zimbabwe government’s decision for military intervention.

In undertaking the decision for military intervention, the level of the national political interests which could have influenced the Namibian government’s decision for intervention could have been secondary. As already alluded to, issues related to subregional solidarity with Zimbabwe and Angola in maintenance of peace, stability and security could have influenced Namibia’s decision. The maintenance of subregional peace, security and stability could be compromised and negotiated in the same manner that the South African led peace treaty bloc was trying to do. It can be argued that Namibia’s quest for subregional peace, security and stability had relatively little or nothing to do with the country’s sovereignty. Again Namibia’s national political interests on subregional solidarity for the maintenance of peace, stability and security could be distinguished as permanent and general. They could also be regarded as permanent in the sense that the government of Namibia has always been taking part in most SADC initiatives for the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in the region even after the Congo conflict. These interests were also general in the sense that the Windhoek government’s quest for subregional peace, security and stability has always been applied not only to Congo but also to other countries in the region. Thus the national political interests of Namibia could be categorised as secondary, permanent and general in terms of analysing the government’s decision for intervention.
Just like Zimbabwe, Namibia’s national economic interests in the Congo as motivating factors for the government’s decision for intervention also appears to have been secondary. This could be so because as already mentioned, the bilateral economic investment agreements signed between the Kabila regime and the government of Namibia were government to government agreements which the Namibian government could negotiate or compromise with any new regime in Kinshasa. The national economic interests could be considered as having been general and temporary in the sense that after the withdrawal of the Namibian troops from the DRC, there seem to be little if any sound economic relations between Windhoek and Kinshasa. The categorisation of the national economic interests that motivated the Namibian government’s decision for intervention could be as follows: secondary and general and temporary. However, there may be need to realise that there is a link between the categorisation of the political national interests and the national economic interests of Namibia in making an analysis regarding the government’s intervention decision.

Since the three SADC countries intervened as a coalition, there may be need for further evaluation of their respective national interests in order to find out where these interests converged, and perhaps diverged. This evaluation can be done through a distinction of three sets of “international” interests. These include identical interests, that is, those interests which the three intervening countries held in common. From the above, the identical interests seem to have been those of Angola’s and Namibia’s respective border security concerns that were meant to cut UNITA supply lines. This did not however apply to Zimbabwe as the country did not have any border security threats that would come from the DRC. The coalition’s complementary interests, that is, those interests which, though they were not identical, could have capably formed the basis of agreement on specific issues of the interveners, seem to
have been the subregional obligations and responsibilities to promote peace, security and stability. Thus, taking into consideration the realist perspective that national interest can be pursued for the common good and that prior to taking any decision, policy makers have a responsibility to bring their actions into conformity with the higher shared interest (Murove, 2005:178), the locus of the common good and common interest of the SADC coalition seems to have been based on their shared subregional responsibility to defend the sovereign legitimacy of the Congo, avoiding catastrophic consequences that the armed rebellion (and perhaps “act of aggression”) to oust the Kabila regime would have brought to bear. The common good or common interest seems to have been the quest to promote and safeguard subregional peace, security and stability within the confines of the international norms (the UN Charter’s international peace and security agenda). The various SADC summits before and during the military intervention period could have been part of diplomacy possibly intended to develop the coalition’s complementary interests.

5.6 Conclusions

This chapter attempted to identify ascertain and evaluate the respective interests of the members of SADC coalition in terms of the primacy of these interests in informing the governments of these countries to undertake the decisions for military intervention. The chapter consisted of four sections. A brief analysis on the significance of diplomatic early warning and threat assessment to the decision for intervention was made in the first section. It was observed that early warning through national, subregional and regional structures in regards to an impending threat plays a part in terms of influencing the decision making for intervention by a given country. The advice given by bureaucrats to decision makers in regards to the need for intervention is as a result of early warning.
The second section critically highlighted on the decision making processes within the national settings of Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia in 1998. The discussion was done in relation to how these countries dealt with given threat and the impact of this threat to their respective national interest. It was observed that at the national levels of the three countries, the decisions to deploy troops in the Congo was taken arguably in line with the powers that the three countries’ constitutions give to the respective heads of state as commanders in chief of these countries’ defence forces.

The three countries’ decision for intervention within the SADC subregional context was discussed in the third chapter. All the diplomatic decision making processes that were followed through the relevant SADC institutions such as the OPDSC and the ISDSC, the opportunities and challenges encountered were also critically analysed in this section. The finally segment of this section looked at how the decision for intervention under coalition of the willing was reached.

Having critically analysed the decision making processes and the challenges encountered at the subregional level, the fourth section identified and tried to ascertain the those interests that determined the three countries’ decisions for military intervention. It was observed that the interests of the three intervening countries revolved around political, economic and security issues. The fifth section made an evaluation of how and why these national interests were of primary or secondary importance in terms of influencing the intervention decisions. The respective interests were of the three countries were further categorised and the rationale for these categorisation was given. A further evaluation of these interests resulted in the realisation that there were instances that these interests were identical and complimentary.
This lead us to look at the significance of the SADC coalition’s military strategy as an important mechanism for the attainment, promotion and safeguarding of the respective interests of the three countries.
CHAPTER SIX
THE SADC COALITION’S MILITARY STRATEGY

6.1 Introduction

The last chapter identified and evaluated the levels of the varying national interests of the interveners with reference to on how they were significant in motivating the decisions for military intervention. Basing on the realists’ view that a nation’s military capability is vital for it to be able to safeguard, promote or attain its national interest (Brown and Sean, 1995:9), this chapter aims to illustrate how the coalition strategy became a tool for the securing and safeguarding of these respective interests. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section will critically analyse the rationale behind the establishment of the Joint Task Force Headquarters as the strategic coordinating centre for defending and promoting identical and the complementary interests of the coalition. It will also analyse the initial and critical operational relevance of the Western Front in the safeguarding of the various levels of the respective national interests of the intervening countries. The second and third sections discuss the importance of the Eastern and Northern Fronts respectively in safeguarding the interests of the coalition as the levels of these interests shifted during the course of the intervention. The third section analyses the importance of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact as a political and legal guide in the attainment, safeguarding and promotion of the identical and complementary interest of the coalition.

6.2 The Coalition’s Joint Task Force Headquarters

The identical and complementary interest of the coalition was to defend the sovereign legitimacy of the DRC. The overall argument was that their common denominator for the decision to undertake intervention was through the subregional obligation and responsibility to maintain peace, stability and security. It would appear the coalition support to the Kabila
regime against the Rwandese, Ugandan and Burundian backed armed rebellion constituted the complementary interest of the three countries. Thus in an effort to safeguard what could be regarded as the coalition’s complementary interest, the three countries realised the need to mobilise their military capability through unity of effort coordinated by a single higher headquarters (HQ). Defending the Kabila regime was the coalition’s grand objective. The attainment of such a political objective through strategy was significantly noted by Carl von Clausewitz when he wrote that “...war is not merely a political act, but a real political instrument, a continuation of policy carried out by other means” (Clausewitz, 1990:78; See also Gartner, 1999:163; Carpenter, 2005:25; Matloff, 1996:11; Wilden, 1987:235).

It was in the above political outlook that the coalition forces’ command hierarchy was designed in a way that the planning and conduct of the whole campaign would see the deployment of coalition troops and the siting of weapons in a way that would safeguard that identical and complementary interest. There was a need to establish this HQ as it served as the focal point of grand strategy where the coalition’s political leadership would be able to offer direction to the coalition military command hierarchy based at a central HQ. The establishment of the HQ was also intended to promote close liaison between the DRC government with regards to its operational needs and requirements and those of the coalition forces. The Task Force HQ was established and designed in such a way that the Kinshasa government was to be kept abreast of the progress and challenges by the coalition’s Task Force command with respect to the achievement or attainment of the complementary interest (defending the Kabila regime) was concerned.

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134 I am indebted to Lt Col Charles Mashingaidze for this valuable military operational analysis he gave to me. Lt Col Charles, a student of International Relations and Strategic studies, was the Operations Officer at the SADC coalition’s Eastern Front HQ during the military intervention.

135 As noted by one Military Strategic Analyst during interview with the author (Pretoria, 26 September 2008), the coalition strategy ranged from finding out the ways and means of gaining the end of war to the art of
It should be realised that when intervening countries agree on the grand mission such was the case with the three SADC countries, their agreement on a strategy to be adopted would be in line with the complementary interest as outlined by the political leadership.\footnote{Interview by author with same Military Strategic Analyst, Pretoria, 26 September 2008.} The Task Force HQ, established as a result of the political authority to deploy troops by the OPDSC’s ISDSC, was meant to put all coalition forces strategically under a commander, a ZDF Major General who was deputised by three Brigadier Generals from FAA, NDF and FAC.\footnote{According to Major General Francois Olenga, the current FAC Chief of Staff Inspectorate, the reason for a Zimbabwean being appointed the Task Force commander could have been based on the conventional concept of coalition of the willing arrangements and other allied operations that the commander is drawn from either the most “powerful” of the allies or the most troop-contributing country. In this case Zimbabwe was the most troop-contributing country (Interview with author, Kinshasa, 28 June 2010, also see Thompson, 1993:138; Beveren, 1996:11).} The SADC Task Force Command HQ was strategically set up at the Village des Unies Organisation Afrique (the OAU Village), a government conference complex facility overlooking Brazzaville and strategically located near the Congolese Defence Forces headquarters.\footnote{The author acknowledges information obtained from an anonymous senior ZDF official (Harare, 18 December 2008) who was part of the SADC coalition forces “Operation Sovereign Legitimacy” Lessons Learned Board of 2003. The Lessons Learned Board was instituted by the SADC coalition forces command element in an effort to enhance future training capacities based on the challenges that SADC member states would likely face in any future sub-regional deployment of coalition troops in given peace support operations based on the practical experiences encountered at political, strategic, operational and tactical level during the military intervention. The board comprised of defence strategists, analysts and policy practitioners. Information from the board’s report was obtained through interviews carried out with some members of the board. In the course of this thesis, all information obtained from members of this Lessons Learned Board will be acknowledged and referred to as LLB info followed by the date and place the information was obtained) All grand strategic operational updates and briefings to the Kabila political regime, the respective coalition political leadership in Luanda, Harare and Windhoek were coordinated and disseminated from the Task Force (TF) HQ. 

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136 Interview by author with same Military Strategic Analyst, Pretoria, 26 September 2008.

137 According to Major General Francois Olenga, the current FAC Chief of Staff Inspectorate, the reason for a Zimbabwean being appointed the Task Force commander could have been based on the conventional concept of coalition of the willing arrangements and other allied operations that the commander is drawn from either the most “powerful” of the allies or the most troop-contributing country. In this case Zimbabwe was the most troop-contributing country (Interview with author, Kinshasa, 28 June 2010, also see Thompson, 1993:138; Beveren, 1996:11).

138 The author acknowledges information obtained from an anonymous senior ZDF official (Harare, 18 December 2008) who was part of the SADC coalition forces “Operation Sovereign Legitimacy” Lessons Learned Board of 2003. The Lessons Learned Board was instituted by the SADC coalition forces command element in an effort to enhance future training capacities based on the challenges that SADC member states would likely face in any future sub-regional deployment of coalition troops in given peace support operations based on the practical experiences encountered at political, strategic, operational and tactical level during the military intervention. The board comprised of defence strategists, analysts and policy practitioners. Information from the board’s report was obtained through interviews carried out with some members of the board. In the course of this thesis, all information obtained from members of this Lessons Learned Board will be acknowledged and referred to as LLB info followed by the date and place the information was obtained)
When Laurent Kabila was assassinated in 2000, besides being a nerve centre of the coalition’s military operations, the SADC TF HQ also became the de facto seat of power. Just after assuming power, Joseph Kabila operated from the Task Force HQ for convenient security reasons. Thus, the strategic positioning of the HQ in Kinshasa, the political and administrative capital, with its closeness to Ndjili International Airport and the international Harbour on the banks of the Congo River, meant that the coalition’s strategic operational, logistical and administrative requirements could easily be met in attaining the complementary interest. Thus the Task Force HQ became an immediate centre of gravity to the coalition’s military intervention.

Taking cognizance of the doctrinal differences among the coalition troops, the Task Force Commander had to coordinate the coalition military effort. Consultations were always made with the rear HQs in the respective allied countries. Thus it could be possible that the Task Force Command hierarchy would from time to time consult and synchronise on the operational plan and the redeployment of their forces.

The establishment of the TF HQ also meant that military commanders at operational and tactical levels would not necessarily take orders from their respective countries but instead from TF HQ, thus avoiding duplication and slowness in situations that called for impromptu


140 I am again indebted to Lt Col Charles Mashingaidze for giving me this valuable military operational analysis.

141 It is important to note that the ZDF and NDF doctrines are British inclined military doctrines whilst that of FAA is based on the Russian and Cuban systems.

142 As highlighted by a Senior Strategist in the NDF during interview with the author (Windhoek, 17 June 2008), the political hierarchy of the coalitions was continuously consulted and briefed on the overall planning but the military operations as such were led from start to finish by the appointed Task Force Commander and the key staff officers at the SADC coalition’s military HQ in Kinshasa. The Senior Strategist also noted that the placing of SADC coalition forces under one overall command actually enabled each of the four countries to take political and military responsibility. In any of the impending missions or tasks that would follow in tandem with the overall objective of the military intervention, the coalition command hierarchy would map out on the next course of action and agree on the aim of a given operation.
battle theatre decisions. It was at the TF HQ that other integrated command structures at operational and tactical levels on all the three fronts were established. These respective HQs on all Fronts comprised of coalition staff officers from Operations (including Intelligence), Administration and Logistics.\footnote{LLB Info, Harare, 20 December 2008.}

The coalition’s identical and complementary interest of defending the sovereign legitimacy of the Congo as part of their subregional obligation to the maintenance of peace, stability and security, could be done through overcoming strategic, operational and tactical challenges in as far as the utilisation of the coalition forces was concerned. It was the duty and responsibility of the Task Force HQ as the SADC coalition’s integrated command structure to coordinate the employment of weapons systems such as the effective range of missiles in relation to enemy deployment, utilise coalition’s air asserts, coordinate the collecting and dissemination of real-time strategic, operational and tactical intelligence.\footnote{I am indebted to Col Amadhila of the Namibian Defence Forces for sharing with me this valuable military strategic analysis during interview, Windhoek, 19 June 2008. Col Amadhila, an operations officer with the SADC coalition forces later on became part of the Joint Military Commission (JMC), whose responsibility was to monitor the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire and Peace Accord by all the belligerents.} It would thus appear that the grand objective of making the Kinshasa regime survive from the armed rebellion and aggression could only be achieved through the establishment of an integrated command structure which coordinated the rapid execution of the coalition’s strategic, operational and tactical missions and tasks at all levels. The coalition’s complementary interest could be achieved through the Task Force HQ’s considerable efforts in the joint planning of operational logistical requirements.

The safeguarding and promotion of the varying interests of the coalition were also synchronised at the Task Force HQ in terms of allocating respective missions and appropriate


tasks to various operational and tactical HQs in the Western, Eastern and Northern Fronts depending on the security situation at a given time during the military intervention.\textsuperscript{145} It should however be pointed out that one of the challenges to the integrated command involved the issue of quick decision making without contingent commanders wanting to verify first with their rear HQs on certain coalition courses of action, especially on deployment and other operational missions or tasks during the military intervention. They would at times firstly consult and seek authority from their higher military command hierarchy back in their respective countries.\textsuperscript{146}

6.3 Coalition Operations in the Western Front

The Western Front (WF) which had its ad-hoc operational headquarters at Ndjili International Airport was established by the SADC coalition forces at the onset of the campaign in August 1998.\textsuperscript{147} It is important to critically analyse how the coalition forces’ operations in the WF were of significance in the safeguarding of the respective interests of the intervening countries. The intervening countries’ political interests were of primary importance, general and identical. These political interests were complementary in as far as their concerted efforts in defending the Kabila regime from being ousted from power through an armed rebellion was concerned. Whilst all the three intervening countries had that general interest in the WF operations, Angola’s primary (vital) national interest was specific. For Angola the coalition’s

\textsuperscript{145} LLB Info, Gweru, 22 December 2008.

\textsuperscript{146} Such a scenario was emphatically made reference to by a senior officer in the Angolan Armed Forces during the SADC Brigade Field Training Exercise “Exercise Golfinho” central briefing, Kimberley, South Africa (16 August 2009). The senior officer who was once deployed at the SADC Task Force HQ was also taking part in the exercise. He reiterated from a practical point of view on the issue of the complexity of command in coalition missions where contingents’ commanders would at times find themselves trying to verify orders from home countries instead of executing them as given by the appointed Mission or Task Force Commander. The researcher took part in the SADC Brigade training exercise on the civilian component (researchers, scholars and academics), courtesy of the authority granted and logistics availed by the University of KwaZulu-Natal’s Pietermaritzburg School of Politics, specifically the thesis supervisor, Professor Ufo Uzodike.

\textsuperscript{147} LLB Info, Harare, 20 December 2008.
operational success in the WF was also of significance in the safeguarding and promotion of the country’ national security interest. Luanda’s security concern in relation to the threat of UNITA was vital as this could not be negotiated or compromised. Besides defending the sovereign legitimacy of the Congo, the deployment of the FAA (together with the ZDF and NDF) in the WF was thus intended for the Angolans to get rid of any possibilities of this front being used as a launching pad by UNITA into Angola and its possible coordination of and support for the rebel Namibia’s Caprivi secessionists.148 For Angola, the successful coalition operation could not only cater for the complementary interest in defending the Kabila regime from being overthrown. The coalition success in the WF was that of national strategic security advantage to the Angolans because the deployment of FAA in the southwest was going to enable them to keep UNITA under close surveillance and thereby cut the logistical supply lines of the Angolan armed rebels.149 Thus, this would safeguard the primary (vital) level of Angola’s which was national security.

The coalition operations in the WF were meant to defend the Kabila regime from falling. This would translate to mean that the primary interest of Angola (national security guarantee and the defence of the Kabila regime from “aggression”), and the primary interest of Zimbabwe (taking the regional lead in defending the Kabila regime from “aggression”) and the secondary interest of Namibia (the defence of the Kinshasa regime from “aggression” as part of regional solidarity for the promotion of peace and stability) were to be catered for in the coordinated coalition operations on the WF.

The coalition forces through the SADC HQ therefore allocated themselves to critical tasks in an effort to attain the above interests. The coalition forces’ tasks in the WF were allocated as

149 LLB Info, Luanda, 16 March 2009.
follows: The securing of the Ndjili international airport and the defence of Kinshasa through repulsion of rebel advance along the Kitona-Inkisi-Kinshasa axis were allocated to the ZDF and NDF. Thus, it could probably be possible for the ZDF and NDF to advance together, perhaps due to the fact that the two forces shared the same military doctrine. Hence command and control was relatively easy. The attacking of the rebel advance’s rear base in Kitona was allocated to the FAA. The holding of Kinshasa’s Ndjili international airport by the ZDF and NDF paralysed rebel coalition momentum of advance. Additionally, from its strategic location as witnessed and noted by the author during fieldwork research through general ground and map analysis (2008-2009), the control of the airport by the coalition meant that any possible plans by the RPF and UPDF to bring in reinforcements directly to Kinshasa by air could not be carried out. Thus, for the SADC coalition forces, Ndjili became the Ground of Tactical Importance (GTI). The defence of the Ndjili international airport also meant that strategically the political leadership of the coalition could possibly shuttle between their respective capitals (Luanda, Windhoek and Harare) and Kinshasa for diplomatic coordination. Being the gateway to the international world, the control of Ndjili by the coalition forces was also a symbolic reflection of the credibility of Kabila’s hold on power. It was also the nerve centre of all subsequent tactical operations.

151 See the ZDF and NDF Training doctrines
153 GTI refers to an area of ground which, if captured by the enemy, could seriously affect a unit or sub-unit’s ability to fulfil its mission. (http://www.militarydictionary.com/definition/ground-of-tactical-importance.html, accessed 20 October 2010).
154 As can be noted on the appendix of the DRC Map attached to this thesis, Ndjili International Airport is the gateway to the Congo interior, that is, to all provincial administrative capitals and even the outside world. During the coalition intervention operations, Ndjili airport was the nerve centre for all logistical and troop upliftment to the Eastern and Northern Fronts let alone the respective rear bases (home HQs) of the coalition forces. I acknowledge this information as per general DRC operation map orientation/briefing given to the me during fieldwork (Kinshasa, 05 August 2009) by a senior Congolese Military Intelligence operations officer who was deployed at the Western Front during the intervention. The officer opted to remain anonymous.
It should be noted that Ndjili international airport, as the headquarters of the WF remained relevant throughout the campaign. The coordination of aerial logistical lifeline and air sorties in support of coalition ground troops in the WF was launched from Ndjili airport. The task of encircling the rebel coalition from Kitona in the south western DRC was given to the FAA. As noted by Sun Tzu, “enemy encirclement and simultaneous onslaught is a strategy that always gives advantage to the attacking force” (1990:79). That is probably what the SADC coalition forces intended to achieve through tasking the FAA to advance from the south west and encircle the rebel forces.

Besides their primary concern to get rid of UNITA bases in the south west of the DRC, the task was aimed at securing the strategic Inga Hydroelectric Power Station which had been taken by the rebels. The FAA managed to attack and recapture the vital and strategic Inga Dam from the invading forces that had by then resorted to sabotaging the main switch at the dam, thus cutting the supply of electricity to Kinshasa and beyond. The use of Special Forces, mechanised troops supported by air for close ground to air support and logistical replenishment to troops was significant to the recapture of Inga. The securing of Inga was perhaps intended to bring a life line to the Kinshasa capital which had gone for days without electricity, thereby affecting the administrative capacity of the regime’s key strategic departments. The securing of Inga hydroelectric power station could also have been a relief to all the three intervening countries. Inga hydroelectric power station was of economic strategic value to the three intervening countries. Securing it fell into the secondary and general level

155 Interview with Group Captain Biltirm Chingono, Harare, 30 July 2010.
159 Interview by AFZ magazine with Group Captain Biltirm Chingono, September 1999.
of the respective national economic interests of the SADC coalition. Thus, to safeguard the varying interests of the intervening countries, the overall strategy of the SADC coalition forces on the WF was to secure Kinshasa’s Ndjili international airport and the administrative capital (as well as other key vital strategic installations such as the Palace de Mable or Marble Palace (the name given to the state house), radio and television stations). Close air support gave the SADC coalition forces an advantage in maintaining their advance to the withdrawing rebel troops. The NDF and ZDF successfully repelled the invading troops along the Kinshasa-Kasangulu-Inkisi axis whilst the FAA advanced from Kitona. Thus it can be realised that close air support gave the coalition forces an advantage in maintaining their advance to the withdrawing rebel forces.

The SADC coalition’s operation in the WF had significant results in relation to the varying interests of the intervening countries. The identical and complementary interest was relatively attained. The Kabila regime was successfully defended through the securing of Ndjili international airport and other vital and key strategic installations in Kinshasa. This was significant in as far as the continued functioning of the DRC government was concerned. The respective national political interests of Angola, Zimbabwe were relatively attained. The successful defence of the Kabila regime to some extent meant that there was little or no possibility of a hostile new government in Kinshasa that would offer UNITA bases for attacks on the Angolan government. A safe WF under the Kabila-led Kinshasa government meant that the FAA troops were to continue with their quest of monitoring UNITA activities, and, if possible, cut the Angolan rebels’ logistical supply lines. For Zimbabwe, a safe WF

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160 See interview by AFZ Magazine with Group Captain Biltirm Chingono, 10 August 1999. “Airpower proves vital in the battle for Ndjili” September – October issue, 1999, pp. 23-35. Chingono was the first coalition forces’ Director of Air Operations (see also Chinyanganya: 2006).

161 Interview by AFZ magazine with Group Captain Chingono, September 1999.

162 Interview by AFZ Magazine with Group Captain Biltirm Chingono, September 1999.
possibly meant that the Kabila government would continue to function, thus signifying a successful mission to take the subregional lead in defending a SADC member state from “aggression” thereby attaining peace and stability. For Namibia, a safe WF could also mean the quest for solidarity in the maintenance of subregional peace and stability was attained. However, whilst the SADC coalition forces experienced relative success in attaining their respective national political interests at various levels, the withdrawal of the rebel coalition troops off the balance from the WF resulted firstly in their being given a safe passage into Congo Brazzaville, Macquela du Zombo, then a UNITA stronghold in Northern Angola.\textsuperscript{163} Secondly, the rebel coalition regrouped and joined with other units which were, by the time they were engaged in the WF, in control of Goma, Bukavu, Kalemie, and Kisangani in the eastern DRC.\textsuperscript{164} As already noted, Goma was the rebel coalition’s headquarters. It was at this point that the SADC coalition shifted focus to the eastern and northern DRC.

6.4 The Coalition’s Operations in the Eastern Front

The coalition forces’ operations in the Eastern Front (EF) can be viewed in relation to the fact that when the security situation on the WF had proved to be under their military control, the coalition’s political leadership could have realised the need to further extend their support by troop deployment to the eastern part of the country. This was possibly meant to counter the rebel offensives from the eastern DRC which was their stronghold.

The coalition’s operations in the eastern DRC were executed with the aim of safeguarding and pursuing the following respective interests of the intervening countries: Firstly there were the national political interests of all the three countries. The fact that the Kabila regime was

\textsuperscript{163} The safe passage was negotiated by the US despite an earlier denial and continuous insistence by Washington that the situation in the DRC was an internal rebellion which did not warrant any interference by the SADC coalition Forces (\textit{The Sunday Mail}, 29 August 1999).

\textsuperscript{164} LLB Info, Luanda, 17 March 2009, also see annex of DRC map.
now safe following the defence of the WF arguably meant that the political interests of all members of the coalition had now shifted to the secondary level. These interests however remained distinctly identical. They were also complementary and general in that they kept the coalition troops guided by the same grand political objective. The coalition’s operations were aimed at repelling rebel advances from the eastern DRC in order to defend the sovereign legitimacy of the Congo (SADC Allies Communiqué, 21 October 1998). The successful holding of the rebel offensives from the east was aimed at giving political bargaining advantage to the DRC government, supported by the three intervening countries against the rebels supported by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi.

Secondly were the national economic interests of the coalition. Having all been of secondary importance in terms of determining the member countries’ respective decisions for intervention, the respective economic interests of the three intervening countries shifted to the primary (vital) level of importance soon after the coalition’s operations in the EF. The respective national economic interests of the interveners were identical and specific.\(^\text{165}\) All the three intervening countries could have possibly realised the potential of entering into respective bilateral mining concessions with the DRC government for two prime reasons. The first reason was that this was going to open up business opportunities for the corporate sector from the respective intervening countries, thereby impacting positively on the economy of the three countries.\(^\text{166}\) The second reason was that all the three countries’ national coffers were getting affected by the continued deployment of their troops.\(^\text{167}\) Thus it would appear that the SADC intervening coalition could have realised that there was a need to defend the mineral

\(^\text{165}\) Interview with anonymous senior economic analyst, Namibia Ministry of Finance, Windhoek, 20 June 2008.

\(^\text{166}\) Interview with anonymous senior economic analyst, Zimbabwe Ministry of Finance, Harare, 21 December 2008.

\(^\text{167}\) Interview with same anonymous senior economic analyst, Zimbabwe Ministry of Finance, Harare, 21 December 2008.
resource rich towns from which the DRC government and their militaries could bilaterally engage in mining activities to try to financially sustain the war effort.

It is important to note that by the time the coalition forces had started deploying troops in the eastern Congo, the rebel troops had advanced and captured Kalemie and Moba, from the Congolese government soldiers.\textsuperscript{168} A general analysis of the DRC maps shows that Kalemie and Moba could have been two tactical towns which by them being located on the shores of Lake Tanganyika were the gateway to the mineral rich Katanga province.\textsuperscript{169} The rebel coalition’s primary thrust at that time was to capture two strategic towns, namely the diamond rich Mbuji Mayi and Lubumbashi, the second largest DRC city.\textsuperscript{170} Being the second largest city from which the DRC Presidency would alternatively operate, the intervening countries could have realised that the defence of Lubumbashi was significant to the safeguarding of their political interests, which in this case were identical national political interests. The capture of an administrative city would perhaps impact negatively on the quest to safeguard the sovereign legitimacy of the country they were assisting from a foreign instigated armed rebellion as well as keeping the Kabila regime in power.

On a related note, in geo-strategic terms, the EF comprised the eastern half of the Congo.\textsuperscript{171} The opening up of the EF could also have been aimed at giving the coalition forces the strategic and operational closeness to rebel strongholds, particularly Goma, Bukavu, Kindu and Kabalo.\textsuperscript{172} The latter stronghold was of vital importance to the coalition forces since it is

\textsuperscript{168} LLB Info, Gweru, 27 December 2008.

\textsuperscript{169} See appendix of DRC map.

\textsuperscript{170} Interview with Lt General (rtd) Mike Nyambuya, Harare, 12 December 2008.

\textsuperscript{171} See appendix of DRC map.

\textsuperscript{172} See also appendix of DRC map.
where the bridge across the Congo River is positioned. It will be remembered that Germany-Allied forces’ operations during World War II ended in a stalemate across that famed Kabalo Bridge. Thus the control of the strategic Kabalo Bridge was aimed at denying the rebel forces immediate access to Kinshasa by air, water and rail via Kamina, Mbuji-mayi and Lubumbashi. This would thus possibly assist in the safeguarding of the coalition’s political objective, which was the defence of the Kabila regime, as part of their subregional responsibilities and obligations.

As observed earlier on, whilst the respective national economic interests of the three members of the SADC coalition appeared secondary at the time of intervention (particularly during their operations in the WF), the economic interests during the coalition operations in the EF appeared to have shifted. The coalition’s respective economic interests seem to have developed to be of primary or vital importance to the three interveners. The interests were identical and specific. Considering that economically the eastern Congo is the area where strategic minerals such as uranium, cobalt, gold and diamonds are found, particularly in Mbuji-mayi and Lubumbashi, the SADC coalition realised the need to deploy troops to this front so that they would not fall under rebel control and thereby affect the DRC government’s economic investment and perhaps its future commercial relations and activities with the intervening countries.

173 The author acknowledges the provision of this information as per general DRC operation map orientation/briefing given to him (Kinshasa, 05 August 2009 by a senior Congolese military operations officer who was deployed in the Eastern Front during the intervention. The officer opted to remain anonymous.

174 I am indebted to Lt Col Charles Mashingaidze for reminding me of this valuable historical military strategic operational example.

175 Short threat analysis in relation to map orientation/briefing as given to the author by the same Congolese military operations officer (Kinshasa, 05 August 2009).

176 As Kikaya bin Karubi further explained to the author during interview (15 June 2010), the military strategic objective of opening up the Eastern Front was to bring the vital strategic resource areas in the Eastern Congo under immediate control of the Congolese government. Quoting him verbatim, “It was aimed at avoiding
Having anticipated the rebels’ intention to capture the strategic mineral towns in the east, the SADC Task Force set up an operational headquarters at Kamina Airbase from where coalition operations such as air raids meant to disrupt enemy supply lines were to be launched.\textsuperscript{177} Coalition air strikes incapacitated the rebel forces’ advance columns, thus cutting their logistical supply routes and lines of communications.\textsuperscript{178} Air support also enabled rapid deployment and movement of coalition troops whose mobility was sometimes affected by the ragged Congolese terrain.\textsuperscript{179} The coalition boosted their operations through an initiative by the Task Force HQ to train and retrain the Congolese troops through the establishment of a Training Team based at Kamina. This was meant to boost the Congolese troop strength which had been affected by desertions to join rebel forces due to insufficient logistics and inconsistent payment system.\textsuperscript{180}

The coalition operations in the EF had significant challenges in terms of resistance from the rebel forces deployed, notably at Manono and Kabalo, supported by the Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian forces.\textsuperscript{181} However, with the assistance of air power meant to disrupt the rebel momentum of advance, the SADC coalition managed to thwart rebel manoeuvres to exploitation of DRC minerals resources by the armed rebels supported by the RPF and UPDF as this exploitation was going to affect the DRC national economy.”

\textsuperscript{177} Interview with anonymous senior FAA military operations officer, Luanda, 10 March 2009 (see also Chinyanganya, 2006:78).

\textsuperscript{178} Interview with another anonymous senior FAA military operations officer, Luanda, 10 March 2009.

\textsuperscript{179} LLB Info, Luanda, 17 March 2009 (See also Chinyanganya, 2006:78; Appendix of DRC map).

\textsuperscript{180} The coalition forces military training school was established at Kamina Airbase specifically to train Congolese soldiers. The initiative proved effective for the coalition forces and even the Congolese government in the sense that the trained troops were more effective and efficient in battle than others who had not received that same training by the coalition forces at Kamina (Interview by author with Brigadier General Chris Mupande, Harare, 17 December 2008). Brigadier General was the first Commandant of the coalition training school at Kamina during the military intervention.

\textsuperscript{181} LLB Info, Gweru, 24 December 2008.
advance, capture and control Mbuji-mayi, a vital strategic mineral resource town. In fact, it was after fierce battles between the rebel troops and the coalition forces that the SADC coalition forces latter managed to recapture and establish a critical defence of Mbuji-mayi.

The capture of Mbuji Mayi could have negatively affected the respective economic interests of the coalition in terms of prospects for bilateral mineral business deals during and possibly after the intervention. The defence of Mbuji Mayi, Lubumbashi and the whole of Katanga’s mining areas was planned and executed through coalition counter offensive operations that included the halting of the rebel advances along the Kalemie-Lake Mweru subsidiary axis and the holding of strategic areas like Dubie, Gwena, Katutu, Kalemie and Pweto, thus literally sealing off the entire eastern approaches that the rebel forces could use to capture Mbuji Mayi and Lubumbashi.

It can therefore be realised that the EF had become the main strategic determinant where seizing of the initiative by the coalition forces resulted in them managing to make counter offensive operations resulting in them defending the towns of vital strategic significance in terms of mineral resources, thus ensuring their respective governments’ prospects for bilateral mineral business deals.

The successful defence of the vital strategic towns by the coalition forces in the EF had a significant impact in the two sets of the intervening countries’ interests. The rebel forces’

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183 Interview with a senior officer in the ZDF, (Harare, 18 December 2008). The officer who opted to remain anonymous commanded one of the units which formed the Mechanized brigade which was deployed in Kabinda in defence of Mbuji-mayi.

184 Interview by author with a senior officer in the ZDF, (Harare, 18 December 2008). The officer who opted to remain anonymous commanded one of the units which formed the Mechanized brigade which was deployed in Kabinda in defence of Mbuji Mayi.
inability to take control of Mbuji Mayi and Lubumbashi to some extent meant that the Kabila government continued to be in power whilst a political solution was being sought and negotiated. The successful defence of the strategic towns in the EF left the rebel coalition with the option of signing the 1999 Lusaka ceasefire.\textsuperscript{185} The successful defence of the mineral rich towns may have also guaranteed the SADC intervening countries the space for opening mineral concessions with the DRC government. The context of these mining concessions will be critically analysed in chapter seven. Whilst the situation was like this in the east, there were new rebel manoeuvres in the northern part of the DRC against those positions held by the Congolese troops. This prompted the Task Force HQ to deploy coalition troops to the Northern Front.\textsuperscript{186}

6.5 Coalition Operations in the Northern Front

The headquarters of the Northern Front (NF) was established at Mbandaka.\textsuperscript{187} The strategic and operational significance in the choice of Mbandaka as the HQ could have been based on the geo strategic considerations that besides being the Equator provincial capital, it is located on the banks of the mighty Congo River which links the Equator province with Kinshasa.\textsuperscript{188}

\textsuperscript{185} In Major General Joseph Kabila’s view, the initial battle stalemate and the subsequent coalition’s continued defence of Mbuji Mayi left the rebel coalition with the option of pursuing a diplomatic front (namely agreeing to the signing of the 1999 Lusaka Peace Accord). However President Kabila noted that the signing was also meant to be a wider strategy by the political hierarchy of the rebel coalition. This strategy, according to Kabila, appeared to be that of being seen to negotiate for peace whilst regrouping their troops to re-launch further offensives on the coalition defensive positions. Major General Kabila said that this later became the case because after the Lusaka Accord the rebel coalition attacked (though without success) the coalition forces defensive positions with the aim of capturing Mbuji Mayi. President Kabila indicated that as commander of the Congolese Army by then, there was significant liaison among the coalition forces command hierarchy to take what was happening on the political front with caution, particularly the Lusaka Ceasefire Accord, as many such peace agreements in African conflicts are used by belligerents for the purpose of regrouping (Interview with author, Kinshasa, 05 August 2009).

\textsuperscript{186} LLB Info, Windhoek, 24 June 2008.

\textsuperscript{187} LLB Info, Windhoek, 24 June 2008.

\textsuperscript{188} See appendix of DRC map.
Mbandaka is the hub of almost all trade, communication and travel links between cities in the Northern DRC and Kinshasa.\(^{189}\)

The new threat from the Northern DRC followed a split in the rebel coalition after the Rwandese and Ugandan military clashes at Kisangani over control and influence of the area as well as control of the rebel leadership.\(^{190}\) The Ugandan-backed new rebel splinter group, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC), could have started to threaten Congolese-held defensive positions in the Northern DRC. The coalition’s Task Force was concerned with the fall of areas formerly held by Congolese troops to Ugandan backed MLC. The fall of Buta, Aketi, Gbadolite, Gemena, Lisala and Basankusu was a threat to Mbandaka.\(^{191}\) Thus, considering that most of the Ugandan backed rebels had captured most of these cities in the Northern Congo, the fall of Mbandaka would possibly pose an immediate threat to Kinshasa. The defence of Kinshasa could be strategically defended from Mbandaka.\(^{192}\) The interveners’ respective outlined interests were to be safeguarded, promoted or pursued through these operations in the NF.

It is of importance to note that the defence of Mbandaka by the SADC coalition was executed through counter infiltration attacks by coalition’s Special Forces, specifically the

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\(^{189}\) As can be seen on the attached appendix to this thesis project of the DRC map, Mbandaka is the gateway to Kinshasa through the Congo River. Trade and movement of goods as well as people from Kisangani, Gbadolite and Gemena to Kinshasa pass through Mbandaka and generally the rest of the Equator Province and even up to Kisangani in the Orientale province.

\(^{190}\) The split was a result of the battles in 2000 between RPF (led by Brigadier General Kayumba) and UPDF (led by Brigadier General Kazini) in Kisangani. The three battles are referred to as Kisangani I, Kisangani II, and Kisangani III (Interview with author, Kinshasa, 15 June 2010).

\(^{191}\) The author acknowledges the provision of this information as per general DRC operation map orientation/briefing given to him (Kinshasa, 07 August 2009) by a senior Congolese military operations officer who was deployed in the Northern Front during the intervention. The officer opted to remain anonymous.

\(^{192}\) Interview with Lt Gen (rtd) Francois Kisempia, Kinshasa 28 June 2010. At the time of the interview Lt Gen Kisempia was the commander of the Congolese Armed Forces. During the SADC coalition forces’ operations in the NF, Gen Kisempia was Provincial Operations Commander of FAC 5 Military Region Brigade, whose HQ was at Mbandaka and its Area of Operational Responsibility (AOR) covered the Equator Province.
Commandos, who through the assistance of air power, managed to effectively carry out surveillance of enemy attempts at infiltration, counter attack operations, and coup de main operations among others. All this could possibly have been meant to make the HQ NF a sustainable defensive position which the coalition forces could hold or defend against the UPDF backed MLC, with the objective of attaining the political, security and economic interests.

The successful coalition forces’ counter offensive operations in the NF resulted in the deployment of forces along the four main axes that the Ugandan backed MLC and the Rwandan-backed RCD Kisangani were advancing along towards the capture of Mbandaka. The first was the Mbandaka-Bomongo-Zongo axis along the Ubangi River, thus covering any potential rebel infiltrations from the Congo Republic and Central Africa Republic who had retreated during the coalition troops’ counter offensive attacks in the WF in defence of Kinshasa. The second was the Mbandaka-Bolumbu-Gemena-Gbadolite axis along the Ngiri River, thus covering rebel offensives from their HQ in Gbadolite. The third was the Mbandaka-Bolomba-Basankusu-Lisala axis, generally along the Congo River, thus defending rebel advances from Buta and Aketi. The fourth was the Mbandaka-Boende-Bokungu-Ikela axis in defence of enemy advances from Kisangani, the capital city of Maniema.

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193 I am indebted to Lt Col Elliot Piki for sharing with me this valuable information during interview, Harare, 18 December 2008. Lt Col Piki was the Commanding Officer of the Coalition’s Special Forces in the Northern Front during the military intervention.

194 I am again indebted to Dr/Col Max John Chinyanganya for sharing with me this valuable military strategic analysis.


196 LLB Info, Windhoek, 24 June 2008 (See also Appendix of DRC Map).

197 LLB Info, Windhoek, 24 June 2008 (See also Appendix of DRC Map).

198 LLB Info, Windhoek, 24 June 2008 (See also Appendix of DRC Map).
Province and the DRC’s third largest capital which was now the HQ of Rwandese backed RCD Kisangani.  

The SADC coalition’s operations in the NF were executed in relation to the interests of the intervening countries. The Kinshasa government was still under threat from the Rwandese, Ugandan and Burundian backed rebels. The SADC coalition still considered that the three intervening countries’ respective political interests of defending the sovereign legitimacy of the DRC were to be continuously pursued whilst awaiting a peaceful solution to the conflict. Thus there is a possibility that the three countries could still have considered themselves as bound by the subregional obligations and responsibilities for peace, stability and security through assisting a member state that was under foreign aggression. As was the case with the operations in the EF, the political interests of all the three intervening countries in the NF were at the secondary level and identical. Besides the political interest, operations in the NF also catered for the safeguarding of Angola’s national security interests. Intelligence obtained from captured rebel interrogations had revealed that a battalion plus of UNITA rebels was operating alongside the Ugandan backed MLC led by Jean Pierre Bemba.

The three countries also had national economic interests in the NF. These interests were also of primary or vital importance. By having the timber rich equator province under the DRC government control, the Namibian and Zimbabwean government could have possibly realised

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199 The author acknowledges the provision of this information as per general DRC operation map orientation/briefing and short threat and operational analysis given to him (Kinshasa, 07 August 2009) by a senior Congolese military operations officer who was deployed in the Northern Front during the intervention. The officer opted to remain anonymous.

200 Interview with Prof/Lt Col (rtd) Martin Rupiya, Johannesburg, 30 September 2008.

201 Interview with a senior FAA military operations official, Luanda, 30 March 2009. The official who operated in the NF during the intervention opted to remain anonymous.
the potential of respective business opportunities for their corporate sectors. As for the Angolan government, a safer northern DRC would translate to mean the economic viability of Luanda’s economic deals with Kinshasa, specifically with regards to oil exploration in the Cabinda enclave. Whilst the economic interests of Namibia and Zimbabwe in the NF were identical, it was a different situation with Angola.

The capturing of Mbandaka by the Ugandan backed rebel MLC of Jean Pierre Bemba would have given the group a bargaining advantage at any of the political negotiations because of the strategic threat that it caused to the capital Kinshasa.202 The political interests of the coalition would thus have been affected. At one time the rebels made attempts at cutting coalition forces’ logistical supply to Mbandaka from Kinshasa at the Congo and Ubangi River confluences which are within close proximity of Mbandaka.203 The rebel’s besieging of coalition troops at Ikela was also meant to be part of a long term strategy in as far as the initial political bargaining of the Congolese rebels groups against the government was concerned.204 The coalitions’ operations in the NF were aimed at safeguarding the mentioned respective political, security and economic interests.

Whilst the coalition’s military strategy resulted in defensive and counter offensive operations in the WF, EF and NF in an effort to defend, pursue and promote their respective interests, an initiative was taken by the political leadership of the intervening countries in drafting and

202 As noted by a senior Congolese army officer during an interview with the author (Kinshasa, 09 August 2009), the Ugandan backed MLC rebel command hierarchy were summoned to Gbadolite, the then MLC HQ, as part of synchronization on the offensive operations particularly the attack and capture of Mbandaka by the MLC. According to the officer, it was in Gbadolite that the MLC rebel command hierarchy was briefed on the importance of capturing Mbandaka before the signing of the Lusaka ceasefire agreement. (The officer, who opted to remain anonymous, was then part of the MLC rebel command hierarchy).


signing a SADC “coalition of the willing” Mutual Defence Pact. Thus it is important to make a critical overview of this pact in an effort to try and illustrate how it complemented the overall coalition military strategy politically and legally.

6.6 The Coalition’s Mutual Defence Pact and its relevance to the military strategy

It has been noted that the respective interests of the coalition varied. Whilst these interests fell into various levels and categories, at no time were they conflicting. Having realised that whilst the legality of their intervention was arguably based on the UN, AU and SADC protocols, the coalition could have realised the need for drafting a legal document that could assist in the safeguarding, promotion and pursuance of these respective interests during the course of their military intervention. The coalition could also have realised that there was need for a legally binding instrument in the execution of the intervention. The instrument was to be part of the coalition’s strategy in realising their respective interests. Thus the three intervening countries including the DRC signed the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) in April 1999. The fact that the political interests of the three countries were identical and based on the fact that their decisions for intervention was to promote the sovereign legitimacy of the DRC, the MDP intended to be a collective self-defence strategy. It acted as one of the optional modes of self-defence available to a state such as the DRC that was facing an armed attack.

205 Interview with Major (rtd) Anywhere Mutambudzi, Harare, 22 December 2008. Major Mutambudzi, a military strategic analyst and a Doctoral Candidate with the University of Witwatersrand was the coalition’s senior operations officer at the HQ NF during the military intervention.

206 A copy of the Pact is attached as an appendix to this thesis. The author wishes to acknowledge the provision of this document by the SADC HQ Secretariat’s library (archival section) in Gaborone, Botswana during fieldwork, 15 August 2008.

207 According to a Judge Advocate General in the NDF who took part in the drafting of the MDP, the pact was a tool that depicted collective self-defence exercised collectively. In the Advocate’s view, members of the coalition were acting together in supporting the victim, namely the DRC (Interview with the author, Windhoek, 15 June 2008).
Having realised that their political interests were identical and specific, the coalition realised the need to have a legal reference in the form of the MDP which could guide them and on which they could also base their justification for rendering assistance (military or otherwise) to the DRC in particular, and any among them in general who may become a victim of aggression (MDP, 1999:1). As Defence Pacts resemble some existence of a “collective” self of groupings of states (Dinstein, 2001:224), the SADC MDP could thus have been effected on the basis that the safety and independence of the DRC as a sub-regional member state was deemed vital to the safety of all three allies that were assisting through the military intervention. One military legal expert also noted that it was through the MDP that the coalition’s overall security was considered interwoven and as such that their assistance to the Kinshasa government was in the interest of sub-regional security.208

Whilst the interveners had various interests, political interests were complementary and they laid the base upon which all other interests were pursued and safeguarded. The initiative to sign the MDP resulted in the establishment of a Joint Permanent Commission (JPC). The JPC resulted in the setting out of various structures at political and economic level (that is, meetings or Summits that were later held in main at the level of heads of state or government, foreign ministers and ambassadors, defence ministers, chiefs of defence among others).209 These structures were part of the coalition strategy which was aimed at realising other interests such as economic and security interests which had shifted to the primary or vital level during the course of the intervention period. It was through this pact that decisions

208 Interview with a senior Angolan military legal officer, Luanda, 26 April 2008. The officer also took part in the drafting of the pact.

209 During the same interview with the author (Windhoek, 15 June 2008), the Judge Advocate with NDF further made an analytical interpretation that the MDP became the primary political guide through which military strategy was executed during the coalition’s intervention. Kolokwe said that it also acted as a synthesizing tool or political pivot for the coalition’s military strategy and it was meant to act as a tool or guarantee among the coalition members in as far as close cooperation in matters of defence and security for the mutual benefit of their peoples was concerned. Kolokwe emphatically indicated that the pact was not to become a supranational document. Decisions were to be taken through consensus.
related to the safeguarding and promotion of political, economic and security interests of the coalition countries were to be legally binding throughout the duration of the coalition’s intervention\textsuperscript{210}.

It should be noted that the signing of the MDP was done in line international legal frameworks of the UN Charter whose Article 52 (1) sets forth that:

\begin{quote}
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations (Charter of the UN, supra note 1, at 346-347).
\end{quote}

The above assertion is supported by Kelsen when he observed that those states with a common interest in actions which are related to the maintenance of international peace and security are entitled to make such arrangements” (1951:67). Whilst the MDP has been questioned in terms of it being sub-regionally representative of SADC, considering that it was signed by only four member states, it should however be noted that Article 52 of the UN Charter does not delineate the size of the group. Based on Article 52, Akehurst (1967:177) argues that a regional arrangement can thus be limited to even two states. Besides the argument of numbers in such a collective defence arrangement, Dinstein notes that “...whether or not the right of collective self defence can be traced back to the pre-Charter customary norms, there is hardly any doubt that it constitutes an integral part of international law as it stands today...” and even states that are non-members of the UN have an equal right

\textsuperscript{210} Interview with Judge Advocate, NDF, Windhoek, 15 June 2008.
to exercise, and to benefit from collective self-defence (Dinstein, 2001:226; see also Alexandrov, 1996:103). The signing of the MDP was significant in the sense that, in principle, the coalition was practising collective self-defence. Being signatories to the pact also meant that the intervening countries were to commit themselves to the employment of force or deployment of troops in aid of a member state (DRC). Such commitment of troops was done as a way of safeguarding vital interests as perceived at the time of action.\(^{211}\)

As part of a legal guide to the coalition strategy, the MDP assisted in clarifying some of the loopholes pertaining to challenges that the coalition faced in the realisation of their respective interests during of the intervention. One of these was the fact that the signing of the pact did not necessarily mean that all the intervening countries were to commit the same number of troops and resources during military intervention in support of the Congolese government. This was so considering that just like in any collective defence arrangement, members of the coalition can send a token detachment or military unit such as an air squadron, armoured unit, paratroopers or a regular infantry subunit such as a company or platoon (Dinstein, 2001:228). Such legal clarity was thus aimed to justify the fact that the realisation of the coalition strategy was a collective effort. This collectiveness was aimed at achieving the varying interests of the intervening countries. What was significant in realising these objectives was not the number of troops that each intervening country contributed. In the researcher’s view, it would appear commitment and unity of effort in the attainment of the respective interests was of importance. Thus the pact had a complementary effect in as far as the realisation of the interests of the coalition was concerned.\(^{212}\)

\(^{211}\) Interview with Simon Badza, Harare, 18 December 2008. Badza, who at the time of the interview, was a senior Lecturer of International Peace and Security Studies at the University of Zimbabwe’s Department of Political Science, now works as a political officer at the African Union Peace and Security Commission in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia(note that these interests were identified in Chapter Five).

\(^{212}\) LLB Info, Windhoek, 15 June 2008.
The MDP was a primary mechanism for legal clarification of issues pertaining to the strategic safeguarding of the respective interests of the intervening countries. This concern may be clarified through a brief analysis of the articles about the pact. Generally, the parties to the agreement reaffirmed their recognition of the principles of the UN Charter and they sought to unite their efforts to a collective defence and the preservation of peace and security (MDP, 1999:1). Article 1 of the pact stipulates that the members of the coalition were acting in accordance with the UN Charter (MDP, 1999:1). The Articles calls for the settling of any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and they would refrain in their International Resolutions from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations (MDP, 1999:1). Through this Article, the coalition seemed to have wanted to justify that their respective political interests (sub regional obligation and responsibilities to defend the sovereign legitimacy of the Congo) were justifiable and in UN Charter’s quest for peace, security and stability.

Article 2 of the pact states that in order to achieve the objectives of this Protocol more effectively, the members of the coalition were to, separately and jointly, by means of continuous cooperation and assistance, maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack (MDP, 1999:1). The stated cooperation as envisaged in Article 3 of the Pact was to be done in consultation with each of these members, especially whenever the territorial independence or security of either or both of them was in the opinion of either or both of them threatened (MDP, 1999:1). As stated by a then Foreign Affairs Minister of Namibia during the military intervention:
From time to time during the course of the military intervention, the Allied political, military strategic and even operational hierarchy would hold relative special summits, meetings and briefs to review the progress of the military intervention and map the way forward.\(^\text{213}\)

Thus the Article was meant to give guarantee to each member of the coalition that if each of them was to be attacked through foreign aggression they were to assist one another. Considering that the national security interests of Angola and Namibia were at stake from UNITA, and the fact that the armed rebellion in the DRC was externally instigated, the two countries could use this Article as a basis for support from other members of the coalition in a situation where their national security were under threat.

Article 4 of the Pact espoused on the issue relating to the coalition’s respective state security (MDP, 1999:2). It is stated in this Article that:

An armed attack against one or more of them shall be considered an attack against the other and that in the event of such an attack, each of them will assist the Party so attacked by taking forthwith individually or in collaboration with other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to repel such attack and restore peace and security in the territory of the Party so attacked. Any such attack and measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council of the United Nations (MDP, 1999:2).

\(^{213}\) Interview with author, Windhoek, 18 June 2008.
It would appear that this Article was meant to institutionalise the coalition’s effort to act in unison militarily in order to combat such threats. As Dinstein puts it:

An armed attack is like an infectious disease in the body politic of the family of nations. Every nation has a demonstrable self interest in the maintenance of international peace, for once the disease starts to spread, there is no telling if and where it will stop. This is the fundamental concept underlying the United Nations Charter. As long as the system of collective security within the UN organisation is ineffective, collective self-defence constitutes the sole insurance policy against an armed attack (2001:225).

It has been contended that support of a state that is under armed attack is contingent on the existence of a collective self defence treaty (Martin, 1952: 170). This was the case with the MDP. In an effort to reiterate that the decision for military intervention was taken under the auspices of the ISDSC on the basis of the principle of “coalition-of-the willing,” Article 5 of the Pact states that this collective defence arrangement by the four members of the coalition was neither going to affect nor be interpreted as affecting the rights and obligations of each Party under the Charter of the United Nations in any way, or the Organisation of African Unity, or the primary responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security (MDP, 1999;3). Thus, each member was not forcefully obliged to the agreement. Having faced international criticism in regards to the legalities surrounding the decision for intervention in the conflict, it would appear that the Article was meant to reiterate the fact that the decision to undertake the military intervention was voluntary. Hence it was based on a coalition of the willing.
Whilst Article 5 seemed to give the coalition members some leeway of non-committal or a promotion of non-coercive cooperation among them, Article 6 however seemed to have been a counter measure in terms of avoiding the possibility of behind-the-scenes diplomatic manoeuvres from those other states from the sub-region, the region and the international realm that were not part of the alliance. Article 6 stated that the SADC members of the coalition were to refrain from indulging in international engagements between them and any third party or State where such international engagements would be in conflict with the spirit and provisions of this Protocol (MDP, 1999:2). The SADC coalition’s military intervention, like most other military interventions carried out on a ‘coalition-of-the-willing”, was criticised at sub-regional, regional and international levels. As Baregu noted that, “...the DRC conflict was more than meets the eye.....” (1999:36), it cannot be ruled out that the intervening countries came up with this article in an effort to avoid any possibility of diplomatic infiltration and later on weakening of the coalition through the use of hostile intelligence services, thus negatively affecting the image of the coalition’s respective political interests.214

Whilst members of the coalition emphasized the need for close political and security support (military or otherwise), they also realised the need to respect each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and in particular, the observance of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other (MDP, 1999:3). As stated in Article 7 of the pact, the allies reiterated that they were not going to take action in terms of the protocol in the

214 As noted by a senior military analyst during an interview with the author, Pretoria, 10 September 2010, the perceived infiltration could, in the view of the coalition, result in possible negative developments such as premature withdrawal of troops by one of the members of the coalition thereby adversely affecting the whole military campaign.
Territory of either Party for the benefit of that Party save for its own request or with its consent, except where the extent, violence and rapidity of the aggression has disrupted the free and effective functioning of its institutions and rendered the exercise of its sovereignty impracticable (MDP, 1999:3).

It cannot be ruled out that the coalition would have realised that to further synthesize the issue of infiltration or political manipulation that could lead to uncoordinated military support among them, any military intervention in support of one of the coalition members was to be carried out at the invitation of the host government or regime.

Article 8 of the Pact stated that the coalition would undertake not to nurture, harbour or support any elements whose objectives are subversive to the political, military, territorial, and economic as well as social security of each other (MDP, 1999:3). It should be noted that at the time of the signing of the Pact or Protocol, almost all respective governments of the coalition were facing either a political or military opposition threat in their respective rears. Thus, faced with such political and military threats, the members perhaps thought it prudent to emphasize the need among them not to support these elements against one another. Such unforeseen developments would affect their success in one way or another in terms of their military intervention in the DRC because of the pressing political and security challenges in their respective rears. The Article seems to have been aimed at guaranteeing the respective national security interests of the interveners.

215 In the same interview with the author (Harare, 25 February 2009), Badza briefly summarized these threats as follows: “The DRC government was militarily confronted with a Ugandan and Rwandese backed armed rebellion. Angola’s military threat stemmed from UNITA. The Namibia government also faced the military threat from Muyongo’s secessionist rebels in the Caprivi Strip. As for the Zimbabwean government, this was the time that indicators of ‘formidable’ labour organized political opposition were beginning to show” (sic).
The maximum attainment of the overall objectives of the members of the coalition’s MDP is explicitly outlined in Article 9 of the Pact, which states that members were supposed to cooperate in all defence matters, particularly the facilitation of interaction among their armed forces and defence industries in a number of areas of mutual interest (MDP, 1999: 3). Firstly, they sought to cooperate in the training of military personnel in any field of military endeavour and to that end could from time to time hold joint military exercises in each other’s territory (MDP: 1999:3). Considering that the SADC coalition had not trained together nor shared a common doctrine (training methods and equipment tables as well as modus operandi), it was this researcher’s view that Article 9 of the MDP was significant in as far as the need for cohesion in the military operational approach was concerned. The Article was meant to guide the coalition forces legally in modelling a doctrine that would cater for the operational effectiveness of the troops during the military intervention. This was critical in the effective execution of the military strategy to achieve the respective interests of the interveners.

It should be realised that during the height of the coalition’s military intervention in the conflict, military training at all levels (basic and otherwise) was conducted by the constituted SADC coalition’s military training team which reported directly to the Task Force HQ.216 The main training base for basic infantry training as previously noted was established at Kamina Airbase in the Eastern DRC. Having noted the need to boost the FAC infantry strengths, the training team embarked on significant recruitment and training of able-bodied young Congolese.217 The initiative proved effective in the sense that the newly trained FAC soldiers had the confidence and willpower to stand and fight alongside the coalition forces as


217 Interview with Major Simon Shiweda of the NDF, Windhoek, 19 June 2008. Shiweda was part of the training team at Kamina.
As Shiweda puts it, “The joint military exercises that were normally carried out by the coalition forces were meant to synchronise on finding a common doctrine suitable for a circumstantially given phase of war during the military intervention (be it advance, attack, defence and withdrawal)”.

The “training-during-war” initiative by the coalition forces saw the successful training of the FAC 7 Brigade which was later deployed in the Northern Front along the Mbandaka-Buburu axis along the Ubangi River on DRC’s North Western border with the Congo Republic and Central Africa Republic. This coalition trained FAC Brigade was effective in holding Ugandan backed MLC offensives along that axis in their quest to capture Mbandaka, a high value coalition’s defensive position whose fall into the rebel coalition would ultimately be of immediate threat to Kinshasa. The emphasis on joint training during the course of the military intervention as propounded in the MDP served as an important initiative for any future mission executions. This assertion can be collaborated by the fact that prior to the intervention, the intervening forces had divergent command structures, equipment, training and usually languages to act in unison. Joint training as a result of the MDP had a positive impact on the effective execution of the coalition strategy and the realisation of the respective interests of the intervening countries.

The second area of mutual interest that was stipulated in Article 9 concerned the member countries undertaking to exchange intelligence information in all relevant matters subject to

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218 Interview with Shiweda, Windhoek, 19 June 2008.
219 Interview with Shiweda, Windhoek, 19 June 2008.
221 LLB Info, Harare, 22 December 2008 (see also Appendix of DRC Map).
222 As noted earlier, the ZDF and NDF doctrines are British inclined military doctrines whilst that of FAA is based on the Russian and Cuban systems.
any restrictions or otherwise of national security (MDP, 1999:3). The member states had realised the need to develop a framework for the collection and dissemination of intelligence to the appropriate recipients, that is strategic, operational and tactical commanders, at all levels of the military intervention. The realisation of the importance of intelligence could have been influenced by Sun Tzu’s celebrated dictum that:

Know your enemy and yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril... when you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal.... if ignorant of both your enemy and yourself you are certain in every battle to be in peril (Bruneau and Tollefson, 2006:78; Jervis, 1991:165; Gramer, 1999:1).

Tzu’s dictum seems to have played a significant part in the coalition forces’ military intelligence’s need to carry out an inventory of the rebel coalition’s capabilities so that the Task Force command hierarchy could formulate and implement a successful military strategy during the whole duration of the military intervention.\footnote{Reiterating the importance of intelligence in any military campaign, a senior FAA military intelligence officer pointed out to the author during interview in Luanda, 27 April 2009 that “a command decision taken without intelligence is always a risk decision.” The officer opted to remain anonymous.}

\footnote{The author also acknowledges the provision of this information as per general threat and operational analysis given to him (Kinshasa, 10 August 2009) by a senior Congolese military intelligence operations officer who was deployed at the SADC Task Force HQ. The officer opted to remain anonymous.}
The SADC coalition forces’ military intelligence cells were set up on all fronts and they were manned by coalition forces military intelligence personnel who would disseminate intelligence to respective strategic, operational and tactical commanders for the planning and execution of given tasks and missions.\footnote{The author also acknowledges the provision of this information as per general threat and operational analysis given to him (Kinshasa, 10 August 2009) by a senior Congolese military intelligence operations officer who was deployed at the SADC Task Force HQ. The officer opted to remain anonymous.}

However, there were challenges in the coalition’s intelligence sharing, among them timely intelligence dissemination and the tendency by intelligence personnel on all fronts of
disseminating to their respective contingent commanders instead of delivering to the respective overall coalition commanders at given HQs.\(^{225}\)

The final area of mutual interest stipulated in article 9 of the Pact was on the need by the member states to undertake to promote joint research, development and production under licence or otherwise of military equipment, including weapons and munitions, and to facilitate the supply and procurement of defence equipment and services between their defence industries and their respective armed forces (MDP, 1999:3). Based on this segment, it cannot be ruled out that the coalition could have realised the need for self-sustenance in terms of logistical replenishment during the course of the military intervention. The Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI) played a significant part in that regard.\(^{226}\)

Having realised the need for implementation of the provisions of the Pact, the member states sought through Articles 10 to 15 the establishment of a joint committee called the “Angola-DRC-Namibia-Zimbabwe Cooperation Committee” whose function was to ensure the smooth implementation of this Protocol (MDP, 1999:4). The joint committee had sub committees on Politics, Defence and Security as well as trade (MDP, 1999:4). The joint committee would meet alternatively in Angola, the DRC, Namibia and Zimbabwe at such times as was requested by any party.\(^{227}\)

\(^{225}\) Interview with the same military intelligence operations officer. His observation supports an earlier point made by the FAA officer who, during the SADC Brigade Field Training Exercise “Exercise Golfinho” central briefing, Kimberley, South Africa (16 August 2009) highlighted the complexity of command in coalition missions where contingents’ commanders would at times find themselves trying to verify orders from home countries instead of executing them as given by the appointed Mission or Task Force commander. The same applied at the level of intelligence dissemination.

\(^{226}\) The managing director of ZDI, Colonel (rtd) Tshinga Dube pointed out to the author during interview (Harare, 20 December 2008) that during the course of the coalition military intervention, the defence industry played a crucial part in as far as the provision of logistics was concerned, specifically the supply of ammunition.

\(^{227}\) In the author’s view it would appear the joint committee became the linchpin for the SADC coalition’s strategic policy formulation and implementation in terms of the military intervention.
Whilst it may be argued that a collective defence arrangement such as the MDP cannot per se provide assurance that meaningful military aid will actually be obtained when called for, it is however significant to note that the primary benefit derived from such a treaty would lie in the political sphere. This is the case when considering that the publication of a text serves as notice to all friends and foes alike as to the codes of affiliation uniting the contracting parties, thus deterring potential enemies and encouraging states that are favourably disposed (Dinstein, 2001:228). None the less, a mutuality of political interests must not be confused with a binding commitment of reciprocal military support (Dinstein, 2001:228). In the views of one senior military legal expert who was part of the drafting team of the pact, a collective defence arrangement such as the MDP signed between Angola, DRC, Namibia and Zimbabwe was configured in such a way that the member states did not seek a way to evade carrying out the stipulations of the pact during the course of the military intervention.228 There was momentous compliance throughout the period up to the withdrawal of the coalition forces from the DRC following the deployment of MONUC.229 The MDP was thus significantly used as a legal mechanism for the coordination of the military strategic execution of the respective political, security and economic interests of the intervening countries.

6.7 Conclusion

This chapter critically analysed the SADC coalition’s military intervention strategy. The analysis showed how military strategy was executed as a mechanism for the attainment, promotion and safeguarding of the intervening countries’ respective interests. The chapter

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228 Interview with military legal expert, Pretoria, 19 September 2010. The expert opted to remain anonymous.

229 Interview by author with same military legal expert, Pretoria, 19 September 2010.
was divided into four sections. The first section established the rationale for the establishment of the coalition’s Joint Task Force HQ. It was noted that the Task Force HQ was meant to be a vital strategic coordinating centre of the coalition forces. Having realised that the coalition’s common interest was political (that is the defence of the sovereign legitimacy of the DRC as part of their subregional obligations and responsibilities), the TF HQ was thus meant to establish a command hierarchy for the coalition forces. This command hierarchy was to coordinate and give directions to all SADC forces military operations in a manner that the other respective interests of the member countries were catered for during the course of the military intervention. It was through the TF HQ that the coalition political leadership would also obtain operational updates on the progress of the intervention and thereby map the way forward.

The second section discussed the relevance of the coalition forces’ operations in the WF. The respective interests of the members of the coalition were analysed. It was noted that the member countries’ respective political interests remained the same during their operations in the WF. During operations in the WF, the political interests of the coalition were of primary or vital level for the three intervening countries. Defending the sovereign legitimacy of the Congo through military support to the Kabila regime complemented the coalition’s operations in the WF. Thus the political interests of the interveners were generally identical. Angola’s operations in the WF were meant to cater for the country’s national security threats paused by the UNITA rebel group. Besides being vital and primary to Angola, the security interest remained specific to the Luanda government. Coalition operations in the WF initially had very little to do with the safeguarding of the intervening countries’ economic interests, save for the protection of the Inga hydroelectric power station which was strategic in the
provision of power energy to most countries in the SADC region. The economic interests of
the three countries remained secondary and general.

The third section analysed the relevance of the coalition operations the EF. The operations in
the EF were conducted in line with the respective interests of the intervening countries during
that phase of the intervention. Having successfully defended the fall of the Kabila regime,
thereby reducing the threat in the WF, the political interests of the intervening countries in the
EF shifted to secondary level. Kinshasa was relatively safe, so was the regime. The fact that
these political interests remained identical meant that they continued to be a complementary
factor in terms of coalition operations in the EF in defence of other interests that had shifted
in terms of their primacy and vitality. Whilst the respective economic interests of the
interveners were of secondary importance in relation to the operations in the WF, it was noted
in this section that these interests shifted to primary and specific levels during operations in
the EF. The defence of the vitally strategic mineral resource towns in the eastern Congo from
falling under rebel control was the main thrust of the coalition military operations in the EF.
The successful defence of these mineral resource cities was aimed at creating an environment
conducive to investments in the mining industry by the corporate sectors and governments
(and individual business persons) from the respective intervening countries. Considering that
the intervention had taken a bit longer than was anticipated, the coalition’s control of the
mineral towns in the eastern Congo was possibly aimed at creating an environment that
would facilitate the DRC government to sustain the war effort through bilateral mineral
business ventures with the respective militaries of the intervening countries. The specific
developments and challenges of these initiatives will be discussed critically in chapter seven
of this thesis.
The coalition operations in the NF were discussed in the fourth section. It was also noted in this section that the political interests of the interveners still remained a complementary factor to the coalition efforts in pursuing other interests. The threat on the Kabila regime was increasing following the capture of northern DRC towns in the northern DRC by Ugandan and Rwandan backed rebel forces. Unlike in the EF, the political interests of the coalition during operations in the NF had again shifted to the primary or vital level. They were specific and identical. The defence of the NF capital was of primary importance in terms of the coalition’s long term defensive strategy of Kinshasa and the Kabila regime. The defence of Mbandaka was of primary and vital importance because its fall to the rebel forces would have reduced the diplomatic bargaining power of the Kabila regime in subregional peace negotiations. The threat to Kinshasa from Mbandaka possibly would have affected the confidence of the Kabila regime in agreements about rebel concessions during negotiations, such as in the Lusaka Peace Accord.

The fifth section critically discussed the SADC Mutual Defence Pact that was signed by the member countries including the DRC. It was noted that as part of their intervention strategy, members of the SADC coalition signed the pact so that it would become a legal mechanism with respect to the safeguarding, promotion and attainment of their interests. It was through the MDP that the respective interests of the intervening countries were legally complemented. Members of the coalition would also justify their military assistance to the Kabila regime through reference to the pact. Though there were challenges in terms of its protocols, the pact was aimed at being a legal guide to the coalition’s military strategy. The next chapter would discuss the coalition’s initiative to sustain the intervention effort.
CHAPTER SEVEN

FINANCIAL SUSTE NANCE OF THE MILITARY INTERVENTION EFFORT

7.1 Introduction

The previous chapter critically discussed how the coalition’s military strategy provided the conduit for efforts at achieving the respective national interests of the intervening countries. This chapter will critically analyse how the military intervention was financially and logistically sustained by the members of the coalition. The longevity of the intervention had a negative impact on the national economies of the intervening countries. The three members of the coalition and the DRC government had to sustain the war effort financially and logistically. However, the attempt to sustain the war effort was questioned and labelled suspect by civil society groups and opposition politicians from the respective intervening countries as well as the international community.

The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section discusses the nexus between military intervention and economic sustenance. It is noted in this section that due to the common challenge that is faced by the interveners and the target state in so far as the economic sustainability of the intervention is concerned, economic agendas emerge as a function of the war (Nest, 2006:31). Economic interests become significant for those who intervene militarily when victory is not attained during the early stage of the military intervention (Nest, 2006:31). Thus, the intervening countries have to finance their military campaign with some assistance from the target state. Besides financing the war effort, the intervening countries may realise the availability of profit making opportunities during the continued deployment of their troops to the conflict country (Nest, 2006:31). This will result in the corporate sector and business communities from the respective intervening countries trying to invest in the target state.
The second section makes a brief analytical overview of the bilateral business ventures and concessions that were signed between the target country (in this case the DRC) and the respective intervening SADC countries. It will be noted that whilst the economic interests of the respective members of the coalition were not of primary or vital level in as far as the motivations for decisions to intervene by their respective governments were concerned, the economic burden resulted in the member countries entering into bilateral business ventures with the DRC government to sustain the war or to offset the military expenses that were incurred. Thus, the level of the economic interests of the intervening countries shifted from the secondary to the primary or vital level at this stage of the intervention. A two-pronged method was used to make the initiative effective. The first was the encouragement that was given to parastatals by the respective governments of the coalition to enter into commercial ventures with Congolese parastatals. The second was the bilateral commercial activities entered into by the coalition’s respective militaries through the establishment of commercial units in specifically designated projects. The respective joint business ventures between the DRC and Angola, the DRC and Namibia, and the DRC and Zimbabwe are analysed in this section.

The third section makes a critical analysis of the UN reports that were produced by the ‘Panel of Experts on the illegal plunder of the natural resources and other forms of wealth of the DRC’. This stems from the fact that the intervening countries’ quests to sustain the war effort could have resulted in the military intervention being regarded as predatory and exploitative, being questioned and deemed suspect by the non-benefiting interveners (Nest, 2006:31; Du Plessis, 2000:33). It would only be after going to great length in ascertaining the authenticity

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231 Interview with same anonymous senior economic analyst, Zimbabwe Ministry of Finance, Harare, 21 December 2008.
of these reports that one could attempt to make an informed deduction about the extent to which serious considerations of national interest motivated the foreign military intervention in the DRC crisis, especially the SADC coalition of the willing.

7.2 The war execution and logistic sustainability nexus

Military interventions always incur financial and economic costs which can be damaging. Both the intervening state and the host government to some extent face a common challenge in as far as the economic sustainability of the intervention is concerned. Nest (2006:31) points out that “...while economic agendas became a prominent part of the conflict, they emerge as a function of the war; war did not occur as a result of economic interests.” The observation by Nest seems to suggest that economic interests by intervening countries could have not necessarily been initially in the primary level of those interests that motivated respective governments’ decisions for military intervention. Economic interests only become primary because of circumstances during the course of the intervention period. However, if these economic interests emerge, they are not easily distinguishable from political and military security interests (Nest, 2006:31). What is important to note is that interests do shift from one level to the other (that is from primary to secondary and vice versa) during the course of the intervention. In the case of the SADC coalition, whilst economic interests appeared to have been at the secondary level and they seem to have been overshadowed by political and military security interests, economic interests of the respective countries seem to have shifted to the primary or vital level. Due to mission creep, where the attainment of victory is not achieved as early as initially planned, the intervening country or countries need

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232 The author acknowledges feedback comments made to him by Professor Uzodike (March 2011) when he noted that in any analysis on foreign policy decision making in the context of military interventionism such as the one under study, there is always need to try and rank the interests in their order of importance. Uzodike (2011) also noted that whilst it seems clear that the economic interests of the respective members of the coalition may have been secondary at the point of initiating the intervention, these interests did not remain secondary thereafter; but at one point or the other they became primary or less secondary.
to find economic interests as a way of financing their military campaign (Nest 2006:31; Du Plessis, 2000:54). Besides financing the war effort, countries that intervene in a conflict can also realise the opportunities of making profits available for them due their presence in the target country, especially in situations when the mission is not achieved according to the time frame or plan of the allies (Nest, 2006:31). Bilateral business ventures and concessions are signed between the target country and the respective intervening countries. The military stalemate in 1999 resulted in the longevity of the military intervention. Thus, the interveners became stretched in terms of resources for the execution of the war effort. It was then that the members of the SADC coalition realised that achievement of the initial goal (political interest, which is, defending the survival of the Kinshasa regime) could only be achieved through the economic pursuit of the war effort initiative.

7.3 The exploration of trade and investment opportunities by the military and business Sectors

Since the coalition did not achieve quick victory, there was a realisation of the need to sustain the war effort through joint business ventures at bilateral level. These joint business ventures also involved private entrepreneurs who seized these opportunities that militaries from their respective countries gave them to engage in these economic activities. It should be realised that by the time the SADC coalition deployed troops in the Congo, the DRC had lost control

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233 This becomes the case despite the economic thrust not being part of the initial calculus of the military intervention. The quest to sustain the war effort (‘combined with continuing political interests’) may also at times (and not always) result in the military intervention being regarded as a predatory, exploitative and multiwar complex (see Rupiya, 2004:96; Nest, 2006:31).

234 An important point worth noting is that whilst government to government economic agreement between the DRC and any of the three intervening countries could have been signed prior to the 1998 war, it seems the case that commercial interests were a result of circumstances related to ‘mission creep’. However, in terms of influencing the decision for intervention, political interests took precedence over economic interests (Nest, 2006:39-40, also see Nest, “The Evolution of a Fragmented State, pp. 275-276; Rupiya, 2004:96).
of almost half of its territory. Thus its tax and revenue base was significantly affected.\(^{235}\)

There was therefore a need to find sustainable means of funding the logistical requirements of the coalition forces. Moyround and Katunga (2002:171) note that the immense mineral resources such as diamonds, coltan and gold continued to generate billions of US dollars that were not necessarily invested, but instead ploughed into the war effort, that is, they financed the military intervention. It is also important to note that at the beginning of the conflict, foreign aid inflow by international financial institutions was cut from the SADC intervening countries including the Kinshasa government. The respective defence budgets and spending of the SADC intervening countries were scrutinised and allocations were affected.\(^{236}\) Overall, it was the cost of the military intervention that resulted in the interveners seeking to offset military expenses incurred (Nest, 2006:40).

The method used to effect the above initiative was two-pronged. Firstly, the respective governments of the SADC intervening countries encouraged their parastatals to enter into commercial ventures with Congolese parastatals. Secondly, the SADC coalition militaries entered into bilateral commercial activities by establishing commercial units in specifically designated projects.\(^{237}\)

\(^{235}\) In addition to the loss of a significant tax revenue base, the Kinshasa regime’s fiscal problem was further worsened by the reduction in foreign aid particularly from the international financial institutions such as the IMF and WB as well as major donor countries such as the US and Belgium (see Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Geographic Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients, Paris, Development Assistance Committee, various years in Nest, The Political Economy of the Congo War, 2006:38).

\(^{236}\) A senior Military Security analyst, Professor/Lt Col (rtd) Martin Rupiya made an observation in regard to the coalition spending and the reaction of the IFIs. Rupiya noted that the costs of the war such as monthly troop allowances, rations, the hiring of troop and logistical transport and fighter planes from the eastern countries (perhaps Russia and China) was effected in US dollars and this impacted negatively on the defence expenditure. According to Rupiya, the estimated costs for Zimbabwe’s involvement in the war were above US$30million per month. Rupiya cited then Minister of Finance, Dr Simba Makoni as arguing that if the costs of the war were to continue coming from the Zimbabwean budgetary coffers, then they were unsustainable (see Rupiya, “Zimbabwe’s Involvement in the Second Congo War” in John F Clark (ed) African Stakes of the Congo War, 2002,pp100-101).

\(^{237}\) Interview with a senior ZDF official, Harare, 25 July 2010. The official who opted to remain anonymous seems to reinforce the point made earlier on by anonymous senior economic analyst in the Zimbabwe ministry.
It is important to note that there was coordination among the respective SADC countries and business organisations in their respective countries. The FAA worked with the Angolan Commercial Trade (ACT), the ZDF worked with the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI) and the NDF worked with the Namibian Business Confederation (NBS) (The Namibian Economist, 2002). These business partnerships were part of the civil military relations which was meant “to boost confidence and trust in as far as the negative publicity that the allied forces had experienced in the economy of war effort from the hostile national and international media” (ZNA Magazine, June 2000).

Representatives of the civilian business communities from the coalition countries and the militaries’ command element, including the civilian component in the ministries of defence of the respective intervening countries, played a crucial part in the coordination of these activities.238 Parastatal executives from members of the SADC coalition’s national airlines, national railways and others took part in coordinating meetings that were meant to explore ways to develop trade relations and investment with the DRC. The ACT’s, CZI’s and NBS’s cooperation with the SADC military command hierarchy was to enhance trade facilitation, transport, security and payment mechanisms. In fact, it was basically the case that the

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238 With special reference to Zimbabwe, Rupiya (2002:101) makes an important observation worth noting. Rupiya points out that the government began to attach importance in terms of realising the economic benefits that were supposed to be gained from its participation in the military intervention. He notes that the criticism it had undergone was a result of the government’s failure to exploit the economic opportunities that came with its significant participation in the Mozambican campaign, and the fact that it created an environment which led to South African businesses venturing into the lucrative Mozambican market (2002:101). In Rupiya’s view it was from that past experience that efforts were made by the government to sponsor visits that were meant to familiarize the Zimbabwean business companies so as to create a working synergy with companies in the DRC (2002:101; also see Nest, “Ambitions, Profits and Loss” p. 470).
business environment in the DRC called for joint efforts between business people of the three intervening countries and their respective defence forces, plus the DRC government. The business culture of the DRC society during the conflict respected the military. Thus the SADC coalition seems to have realised that there was a need for synergy between the civilian and military business ventures during the time of the intervention.  

Central warehouses were established in Lubumbashi for Namibians and Zimbabweans, and Kitona and Matadi for the Angolans, for the storage of goods before dispersing those to respective consumers around the DRC, particularly to areas under coalition forces’ control. The SADC coalition forces also made provision of security for civilian goods and investments in the DRC.

Another initiative that was undertaken by the SADC members of the coalition was the establishment of trade attaches in the DRC. The idea of having these attaches was carried out through the coalition’s joint permanent commission and the bilateral agreements between the DRC and the respective three intervening countries. These trade attaches were meant to be the business linchpins between the respective business communities of their countries and that of the DRC. They also provided updated information on the evolving DRC business environment. The respective HQs of the SADC intervening countries established Joint Business Venture Secretariats in their countries and in the DRC to work hand in hand with...
the trade attaches and the business communities of the intervening countries. It was also realised that there was a need for a Preferential Trade Protocol (PTP) between the DRC and the respective members of the coalition. This Protocol would allow for preferred duties, investment comfort and the removal of visas. The signing of the respective bilateral trade and investment agreement between the DRC and members of the SADC coalition was meant to boost trade and investments. Having realised that there were rampant illegal foreign exchange deals in the DRC by then, trade transactions were facilitated through the establishment of the First Banking Corporation (FBC) in Lubumbashi and Kinshasa.

The initiative to sustain the military intervention was emphasized by Ed Marek of the Washington based New Congo News (NCN) who noted that whilst it is not the military’s business to exploit mineral opportunities, in the case of the SADC coalition forces, the military had to rely on the Congolese minerals because the intervention had to be financially sustained (Moore, 2003:30). This initiative was further exacerbated by the fact that during the military intervention by the coalition, the IMF and the WB were acutely keen on knowing the respective defence budgets in terms of spending of the coalition militaries, particularly Zimbabwe. This was meant to avoid a situation where the military would seek logistical support for the campaign from treasuries of their respective governments, which in this case would not be availed considering that in the case of Zimbabwe, the IMF and the WB were

242 Author’s interview with Captain Blaise Deo of the Congolese military (Kinshasa, 10 June 2010) who worked as an interpreter/translator on most meetings between the SADC coalition command element, the business community and the three Trade Attachés from the Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean embassies during the conflict.

243 Interview with anonymous senior economic analyst, Namibia Ministry of Finance, Windhoek, 20 June 2008.

244 Interview with senior anonymous official, DRC Ministry of Finance, Kinshasa, 15 August 2009.

245 The two IFIs were concerned perhaps because in these institutions’ view the “unbudgeted military spending” resulted in strained relations among various stakeholders within the Zimbabwean populace. The unplanned defence spending as a result of the country’s military intervention meant that the expenditure on public sector investment welfare as well as production was affected. The country’s foreign currency reserves were also affected (see Martin Rupiya, (2002) “Zimbabwe’s Involvement in the Second Congo War” in John F Clerk (ed.) The African Stakes of the Congo War, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp102.
balking at any more loans to that country because of high defence spending (Moore, 2003:30). The two international financial institutions were critical and concerned over the deployment of coalition forces. They based their criticism on the grounds that the respective governments of the three intervening countries’ over-expenditure on the DRC military intervention were impacting negatively on their economies (Nabudere, 2003:40). In the case of Zimbabwe, the IMF and the WB also went to the extent of looking into the country’s books to check on its military spending in the DRC (Nabudere, 2003:40). This development could be linked to the post-2000 unsound diplomatic relations between Harare and a significant number of western governments, particularly London and Washington.246

Nabudere (2003:40) and Moore (2003:30) noted that the intervening SADC coalition’s military command hierarchy had all the confidence that Gecamines, a DRC state owned mining company that was run by Billy Rautenbach, was going to meet all their respective contingents’ military logistical requirements during the military intervention. When this did not happen, the coalition took other initiatives in the form of bilateral joint business ventures between the DRC and the three respective intervening countries.247 It is important to briefly discuss each of these business ventures.

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246 The diplomatic relations between Harare and the EU countries (together with the US) soured after the 1998 intervention. The situation got worse in 2000 after the Zimbabwe government’s land reform programme. The hostile relations have been centered on one side basing its argument on governance issues (human rights abuse, absence of rule of law, etc) whilst the other side accuses the other of neo-imperialist tendencies.

247 Whilst that could have been the case (the joint business ventures between the DRC and the three intervening countries), there have been allegations made by some academics, opposition legislators and civil society groups from the intervening countries, and the international community particularly western countries that these formal business ventures were at times manipulated by the political and military elites from the host government and the assisting intervening countries by engaging into “purely” personal self-enriching illegal activities such as the smuggling of minerals such as diamonds (see Michael Nest (2006) “The Political Economy of the Congo War” in Michael Nest et al, (eds) The Democratic Republic of Congo: Economic Dimension of War and Peace, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, pp. 41. These allegations were however never verified or authenticated by these critics.
7.3.1 The Zimbabwe and DRC bilateral joint business ventures

The first business agreement between the DRC and Zimbabwe was in the mining sector. This involved a mining agreement signed between the two governments and Billy Rautenbach, a Zimbabwean businessman whose company Ridge Pointe was reported to have been granted cobalt and mining concessions (Nabudere, 2003:40). When Rautenbach was initially given a controlling position on Gecamines, a DRC state owned mining company, the military were confident that this was a significant economic initiative that was going to meet all the logistical requirements during the military intervention.\(^{248}\)

The ZDF took the initiative to enter into an economic joint venture through Oryx diamonds which was reportedly floated on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) as a new mining consortium in partnership between Zimbabwe’s OSLEG (Operation Sovereign Legitimacy) and the DRC’s Congo Sovereign Legitimacy (COSLEG), formerly Comiex, for the purpose of mining diamonds as well as buying gold and diamonds from “small scale producers” in the Congo (Moore, 2003:30; Nabudere, 2003:57). This economic joint venture was meant to raise significant funds for financing the war effort with a profit sharing arrangement that would see Oryx and OSLEG obtaining 40 percent each, whilst COSLEG would get the remaining 20 percent (Nabudere, 2003:57). The continued effort to raise funds for the war effort later saw COSLEG having subsidiaries such as COSLEG Enterprise, COSLEG Venture, COSLEG Mining and Exploration and COSLEG Mines.\(^{249}\) In fact, these companies were meant to handle a wide range of support activities for COSLEG (Moore, 2003:30).

Besides the above commercial activities, the Zimbabwean government also tried other initiatives to boost its economic base. Following the challenges that it faced in the

\(^{248}\) Author’s interview with a senior ZDF official, Harare, 26 July 2010. The officer opted to remain anonymous.

\(^{249}\) Author’s interview with a senior ZDF official, Harare, 27 July 2010. The officer opted to remain anonymous.
organisation of economic activities with respective state enterprises, it also entered into agreements with private corporations based in Zimbabwe and elsewhere (Nabudere, 2003:57). One such deal was the importation of electric power by the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) from Inga Dam in the DRC. Having started to face the challenge of a shortage of foreign exchange, this economic initiative was meant to enable the Zimbabwe government to pay for additional electric power supply in local currency instead of paying in US dollars. In addition to the above, Zimbabwe’s national airline, Air Zimbabwe, entered into an agreement with the DRC Congolese Airline (CAAL) for joint flights to destinations in regions such as Harare-Lubumbashi-Kinshasa and beyond such as Harare-Lubumbashi-Kinshasa-Brussels.\(^{250}\) Whilst the above was the case with the bilateral economic activities between the DRC and Zimbabwe, it is also important now to focus on activities between the DRC and Angola.

### 7.3.2 The Angola and DRC bilateral joint business ventures

The business joint ventures between the governments of Angola and the DRC were organised through a bilateral joint permanent commission. The National Angola Fuel Company (Sonangol) entered into a joint venture with Comiex. The deal involved the distribution and retailing of Angolan petroleum products in the DRC as well as exploration for oil off the DRC-Angola coast (Moore, 2003:50). There were also allegations that Sonangol and Comiex were controlled by the Angolan and DRC political leadership hierarchy.\(^{251}\) One Senior Angolan politician argued that the DRC government gave Sonangol-Congo control over the

\(^{250}\) As indicated to the author by the same official during an interview (Harare, 27 July 2010), all was meant to try and boost the forex base which had to some extent been affected by the financial and logistical requirements to the coalition’s execution of the military intervention.

\(^{251}\) As Moore (2003:31) noted, the Angolan President had the monopoly of control over Sonangol. There were reports to the effect that the Kabila government had given the Angolan government control of offshore crude oil production of about 15 000 barrels per day (also see Thomas Turner, “Angola’s role in the Congo War” in John F Clerk (ed), (2002) *The African Stakes of the Congo War*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York p. 87).
DRC fuel market as a reward for the support that FAA rendered to the FAC.\textsuperscript{252} The government of Angola awarded diamond concessions so that these would assist in financing the Angolan army’s logistical replenishment during the military intervention.\textsuperscript{253} It is also essential to discuss the economic cooperation between the DRC and Namibia briefly.

7.3.3 The Namibia and DRC bilateral joint business ventures

The joint economic ventures between the governments of the DRC and Namibia were based on a trade agreement signed between the two countries on the 08 July 1997, before the outbreak of the conflict.\textsuperscript{254} The agreement, consisting of eleven protocols, facilitated and developed trade between the two countries on the basis of mutual benefit in accordance with international law.\textsuperscript{255} The NDF and the NBS also won mineral concessions to mine diamonds in the areas of Mbuji Mayi in the Eastern Congo.\textsuperscript{256} All was meant to boost the Namibian government’s financial capacity to have the NDF continuously deployed during the coalition’s military intervention.\textsuperscript{257}

Having taken these initiatives to sustain the war effort, there was an international outcry against these commercial activities by the intervening countries’ military, the business sector

\textsuperscript{252} Interview with an Angolan opposition politician, Luanda, 12 March 2009. The politician opted to remain anonymous.
\textsuperscript{253} Interview with anonymous senior economic analyst, Angola Ministry of Finance, 12 March 2009.
\textsuperscript{254} Interview with senior anonymous official, Ministry of Finance, Windhoek, 20 June 2008.
\textsuperscript{255} Interview with same senior anonymous official, Ministry of Finance, Windhoek, 20 June 2008.
\textsuperscript{256} Interview with senior official, Namibian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Windhoek 18 June 2008.
\textsuperscript{257} Although there have been arguments that Namibia had only 2000-3000 troops deployed on the ground, military spending being cut from US$113 million to US$100 million from the time the Namibian government deployed its troops up to the time of withdrawal (Integrated Regional Information Networker, 25November 2000, also see Mungbalemwe Koyame and John F Clark”, The Economic Impact of the Congo War” in John F Clerk (ed), (2002) The African Stakes of the Congo War, Palgrave Macmillan, New York pp. 2114), there was a need in the view of Joel Amadhila (same interview with author, Windhoek, 18 June 2008) that the spending was unbudgeted and the intervention also opened new doors for Namibian investment potential.
and the political leadership. This resulted in the institution of the UN Panel of Experts which was tasked to investigate and report on the alleged illegal plunder of the natural resources and other forms of wealth of the DRC. It is important to examine the outcomes of these reports briefly. However, it should be pointed out that whilst the reports included allegations levelled against those countries that were assisting the Congolese rebels in the armed rebellion against the Kinshasa government, this section would specifically make a critical analysis on those allegations against the SADC intervening countries, since they are the key focus of the present study.

7.4 Examination and analysis of the UN Panel of Experts’ Reports

It was through the request of the UN Security Council that the Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed a Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC (Document S/PRST/2000/20). The panel was given the mandate to follow up on reports and allegations as well as collect information on all activities of illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth of the DRC as well as establishing the link between the continuation of the conflict and the illegal exploitation of Congo’s natural resources. These reports included The Report of the Panel of Experts on Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo (April 2000), The Addendum to the Report (November 2001), and the Final Report (October 2002) (Nest, 2006:44).

One of the major influences to this international outcry was the efforts by information networks such as the BBC and CNN together with South African regional based media who from the onset painted the “whole” intervention effort as “illegitimate” and one which was undertaken without much thought out consideration and advice (see Rupiya M “Zimbabwe’s Involvement in the Second Congo War” in John F Clerk (ed), (2002) The African Stakes of the Congo War, Palgrave Macmillan, New York pp. 100).

In an interview with author, Harare, 19 December 2008, Professor John Makumbe argued that the institution of the “Panel of experts” may have been as a result of the issue of alleged elite or personal interests that seem to have been camouflaged under national interest i.e. military intervention for personal gain. Makumbe also alleged during the same interview with the author that mechanisms that were put in place as initiatives to sustain the war effort were meant to maximise personal opportunities for private predation (see also Document S/PRST/2000/20).
Members of the SADC coalition were exonerated by the first report. As already mentioned that the allegations of these reports against Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi are not the main thrust of this section. However, it is equally important to mention that individual actors such as political and military elites and businessmen from Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda were reported as having been involved in the systematic illegal exploitation of DRC minerals and other forms of wealth to international markets via their respective countries.\textsuperscript{260} These allegations were based on the conviction that the defence budgets of the governments of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi could not sustain the continued deployment of their troops in the Congo hence their involvement in the illegal exploitation of Congolese resources.\textsuperscript{261} As some analysts and critics have argued, the elites at all levels from the three great lakes countries capitalised on the longevity of war and involved themselves in the illegal activities of mineral resource exploitation.\textsuperscript{262}

It is important to note that through the insistence of the French government, the panel took a decision not to investigate the DRC government’s involvement in the exploitation of the natural resources (Samset, 2002:86). Perhaps this was based on the fact that the Kinshasa

\textsuperscript{260} See also Human Rights Watch, Chaos in Eastern Congo: UN Action Needed Now, New York; HWR, October 2002; “Congo-Kinshasa: Soldiers Go, Plunderers Stay” Africa Confidential 43, No 21, October 25, 2002 (see also the unclassified Document S/2001/357, which was part of the report (see also The Mail and Guardian, 10 January 2004, p. 4)

\textsuperscript{261} Author’s interview with a former panel member, Pretoria, 29 September 2008. The former panel member, who opted to remain anonymous and is now based in South Africa, revealed that from the Panel’s findings the military expenditure far outweighed each respective government’s defence budget allocation. He also pointed out that it was in the report that the panel noted that the economies of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi and more specifically their defence budgets appeared to have been directly sustained through the re-exportation of the natural resources of the DRC. The former member also made mention of the fact that the respective treasuries of these countries benefited through allowing them to increase their defence budget allocations.

\textsuperscript{262} Views obtained by the author from a question, answer and discussion session after a paper presentation on the “Economic Nature and Complexity of the 1998 to 2002 DRC conflict” by DRC Ambassador to Zimbabwe, Mwaapanga Mwanananga. The conference which was held on 02 to 05 June 2008 in Harare, Zimbabwe was organized by the University of Zimbabwe’s Centre for Defence Studies and the University of Witwatersrand’s Centre for Defence and Security Management under the Southern Africa Defence and Security Management (SADSEM) network, a Danish sponsored association of SADC university research institutions with research focus on conflict peace and security issues. The author acknowledges the permission and assistance rendered by SADSEM to attend the conference.
government was an internationally recognised state authority which officially invited the SADC member states to assist against the invading coalition. Whilst the initial draft of the report had names of American companies and officials who were involved in the economic exploitation of Congolese natural resources, there have been allegations levelled against the initial draft. Among these was that the initial draft of the report was edited to remove this US link in the mineral exploitation to avoid embarrassment to the US government (Grignon, 2006:87). It should also be noted that the names and activities of most western companies and individuals who were involved in the exploitation were omitted whilst those of African countries involved in the conflict were included. All reference to the US interests was omitted, and only a few British and German companies were mentioned in the report.

The inability of the international community to effect action in line with the findings of the report and the divisions among members of the Security Council resulted in later instituting a third and final report which was viewed by those who crafted it as “credible, balanced and thorough work of all the Experts Panel reports” (Grignon, 2006:88; see also Document (S/2002/565/). The Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts, which was issued on 16 October 2003, made an attempt to include all the detailed information regarding the activities of all actors in the illegal exploitation of Congolese mineral wealth. As Grignon puts it, the final report included “an attempt to refine a framework of analysis with which to characterise the patterns of exploitation (that is, the “elite network” concept that is used by all reports to

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263 In the view of one analyst during a conference discussion (SADSEM, Harare, 02 to 05 June 2008, the inclusion of both the rebel coalition and the SADC intervening countries in the report might have been aimed at putting the needed pressure on all military forces to withdraw and make way for MONUC whose “presence in turn would see the smooth operations (illegal mining activities by multinational corporations).

describe the association of individuals, Congolese and non-Congolese involved in the illegal exploitation of natural resources)" (2006:88). Whilst the Report’s attempt to make a strong case regarding the illegal exploitation of natural resources was challenged by the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the DRC, thus discrediting the initial allegations of the panel, the elite network argument was supported by the fact that despite the withdrawal of foreign troops the illegal exploitation continued.

Whilst the mandate and credibility of the panel has been questioned by political economy analysts and practitioners, the suspension of some key government ministers such as Mwenze Kongolo, then in charge of National Security and Public Order, as well as Augustine Katumba Mwanke (then Resident Minister and Governor of Katanga province), seem to have been used as the basis for argument by some scholars and critics who are of the view that elite interests may be sometimes (but not always be) camouflaged under national interest.265 However, what these same critics seem not to take into consideration is the fact that such action as the one taken by the Congolese government against the above mentioned officials supports the view that some elite activities may not necessarily represent the interests of the state. Hence national interests form the basis of state actions or state decisions.

The UN panel’s final report made allegations against the three intervening SADC countries that they had undertaken a strategy of continuous resource exploitation even after

265 The Panel’s report alleged that at the height of the military intervention in 1998, Mwanke signed a joint venture contract handing the Central Group of Gécamines to Ridgepointe Overseas, a firm controlled by Billy Rautenbach. Mwanke, governor of Katanga from April 1998 to April 2001, was put in charge of the state portfolio in the late Laurent Kabila’s government. The UN Panel of Experts, which reports to the UN Security Council, named Mwanke as a key player in the plunder of the DRC’s resources; he was subsequently removed from government in November 2002, but then in July 2003, was appointed secretary general of the transitional government. The same allegations were levelled against Kongolo (see http://www.afdevinfo.com/htmlreports/peo/peo_33452.html (accessed 02-02-2010).
The final report also made allegations against senior government officials from the intervening SADC member states. The report also alleged that bilateral business arrangements that were entered between the DRC government and the respective governments of the SADC intervening countries were manipulated for personal elite gain. Without providing evidence, the same report also made allegations against the companies that were set up as part of the initiative to sustain the war effort that these companies were used by the elite for personal gain. Perhaps it is on the basis of these unproven allegations in the UN reports that some analysts and scholars in the field of foreign policy decision making and international political economy have argued that bureaucrats may sometimes (but not always) influence the decision making process on military interventionism after foreseeing a likely situation which can develop during the course of the conflict where opportunities for personal gain may prevail. However, the above argument does not take into consideration the fact that these reports have been so varied in their emphasis. There have been some bias and omissions in regards to the activities and names of “outside Africa” international companies.

266 Naidoo (2003:3) reiterates this point by noting that a country or group of countries may device means for accessing resources in order to enable them to continue fighting. However, the quest to sustain the military intervention effort is normally deemed suspect by non-beneficiary actors because these non-interveners tend to oppose the efforts to sustain the war with the view that this initiative is meant to serve as private financial gain by the political and military elite (see Du Plessis, A, (2000), “Military intervention: Nature and Scope” in Du Plessis, L, and Hough, M. (eds.), Managing African Conflicts: The Challenge of Military Intervention. Pretoria, HSRC Publishers pp. 33, also see Hubert D, “Resources, Greed and the Persistence of Violent Conflict”, Ploughshares Monitor, June 2000, p. 15).

267 Some of the details in regards to the alleged involvement of senior political and military and parastatals elites were outlined by the Congo Watcher in Washington which indicated that senior government officials from the intervening SADC countries had significant shares in the companies formed as part of the initiative to sustain the war effort. However, there was no evidence to support these allegations. (see Ed Marek, New Congo News, at www.marekinc.com/ncn.html, (accessed 02-02-2010), also see Sagaren Naidoo “Economic Motivations for the DRC Conflict” in Sagaren Naidoo (ed.), The War Economy in the Democratic Republic of Congo, IGD Occasional Paper, Number 37, Braamfontein, 2003 p. 30).


269 See Document (S/2002/565/.

270 Quoting Professor Wamba dia Wamba verbatim “There are instances where individuals may use their influence in foreign policy decision making (sic) particularly on military interventions based on the fact that they would have foreseen circumstances which will benefit them. Again officials can take advantage of situations that develop during the course of the conflict for personal gain” (Recorded interview by SABC with Professor Wamba dia Wamba on “Special Assignment” programme, 10 December 1999. The author acknowledges the kind provision of the recorded cassette by Professor Wamba dia Wamba during fieldwork research in the DRC).
and individuals who were also allegedly involved in the “exploitation, marketing, processing, and consumption of natural resources” of the DRC (Grignon, 2006:87). In addition to this bias, lack of evidence to back these allegations cannot be used as the basis of argument by some scholars who conclude that elite interests may be camouflaged under national interests. National interests remain the prime motivating factors that lead a government’s decision to undertake military intervention. Military strategy becomes the vital tool used to attain, promote, and safeguard these interests. In the case of the respective members of the SADC coalition of willing, the national political interests of the AZN were behind the respective countries’ decisions for military intervention. A coalition military strategy adopted by these countries became the mechanism or tool for the attainment, pursuance and safeguarding of their identified interests.

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter critically discussed the coalition initiative to logistically sustain their war effort. It was noted that this development was necessitated by the fact that the military intervention took longer than anticipated, thereby resulting in the SADC intervening countries incurring heavy financial costs that in turn had an effect on their national economies (Rupiya, 2002:100-101). Premature withdrawal was not an option for these SADC countries, hence the initiative to sustain the war effort. The initiative to sustain the war effort assisted in indicating how economic interests of the intervening SADC countries had shifted from being at secondary to primary or vital level. This shift in order of importance was outlined in this chapter through an analysis of the interlink of military intervention, the war sustenance and the international response.
It was noted in the first section that as the war progressed, the SADC intervening countries and the target state (the DRC regime) faced the common challenge of sustaining the intervention logistically. The non-attainment of victory during the early stage of the intervention resulted in the coalition devising economic means of sustaining the campaign. The target state had to assist the coalition to finance the military intervention effort. It was during the process of trying to sustain the war effort that profit making opportunities might have been realised by the intervening countries because of their troops’ continued deployment (Nest, 2006:31).

The second section analysed the bilateral business ventures and concessions that were signed between the Kabila regime and the intervening countries. It was observed that whilst economic interests were of secondary level at the initial stage of the intervention as compared to political and military security interests which were of primary and vital importance, these economic interests shifted to the primary and secondary level during the later phase when intervening countries took the initiative to financially sustain the war. Thus, whilst economic or commercial activities were not part of the coalition grand objective that played a key part in as far as the decision for military intervention was concerned the situation later changed, the burden of economically sustaining the war effort from these countries’ respective national coffers resulted in them taking these joint venture initiatives with the Kinshasa government in order for them to be able to offset the military expenses that they were incurring. That initiative was undertaken in two ways. Firstly, parastatals from the respective intervening countries were encouraged to enter into commercial ventures with those parastatals from the DRC. Secondly, the respective militaries from the SADC coalition entered into bilateral commercial activities with their Congolese counterparts through the establishment of commercial ventures for various designated projects. A brief and systematic analysis of the
respective bilateral activities that were entered into between the DRC government and the intervening countries was made.

The third and final section examined and analysed the allegations made by the UN Panel of Experts reports against some elites from the intervening countries (Document S/PRST/2000/20). It was observed that whilst the SADC intervening countries entered into bilateral commercial activities with the Kinshasa regime at government levels, the implication of the allegations by these reports against individual political and military elites in profit making illegal activities have been used by some scholars, academics and policy practitioners to try and qualify the argument that elite interests can sometimes (but not always) be camouflaged as national interest. However, lack of evidence and the fact that the bilateral business agreements were entered into at government level between the DRC and the respective members of the SADC coalition seem to reflect that the national economic interests of the interveners superseded the alleged elite interest argument. As was observed in chapter five that the national political and security interests of the intervening countries (specifically Angola and Zimbabwe) were of primary or vital importance at the beginning of the intervention as against national economic interests which were secondary, the decision by the SADC coalition to undertake military intervention was thus based on the need to attain and safeguard these initial vital political national interests. In the following chapter, I shall qualitatively present and analyse the research findings, draw conclusions and offer policy suggestions on the execution of future military interventions in African conflicts, particularly at the SADC sub-regional level.
CHAPTER EIGHT

FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

8.1 Introduction

In this chapter the research findings will be presented and analysed qualitatively. Having been informed by the premise that the national interests of governments are the primary motivating factors that inform their decisions on military interventions, it has been observed however that even where national interest is heavily contested within any country, state actions often reflect the national interests as articulated by the dominant coalition within the government or the state. Military strategy remains a key tool used to attain, pursue and safeguard these claimed interests. The findings of this research will be qualitatively analysed within the framework of the core of objectives of the study which were the identification and establishment of how the interests of the governments that intervened in the DRC conflict were the primary motivating factor that informed their decisions on military interventions, and ascertain the extent to which the SADC coalition’s military strategy became a principal tool in the attainment and safeguarding of these varying interests as well as how that strategy was utilised as a mechanism for the translation and development of these varying interests into common ones among the AZN intervening countries. After a brief synopsis of the findings, recommendations will be made as a provision for policy suggestions on the execution of future military interventions in African conflicts, particularly at the SADC sub-regional level.
8.2 Qualitative analysis of the Research Findings

8.2.1 Intervention decisions undertaken for National interest considerations

National interests of the three SADC countries that intervened in the DRC conflict were the primary motivating factor that informed these countries to undertake decisions on military intervention.

In the argument of this research, the major factor inducing military intervention is brought by realist theorists who note that military intervention can best be understood in terms of the power and interests of particular nation states, acting individually or collectively and “such states may cloak their interests in the language of the common good and may claim to be acting in the name of the international community” (Amadu, 2000:197). Intervening states always try to obtain consensus from subregional and regional as well as international organisations before undertaking military interventions in order to achieve their given national interests in the target states. National interests in a given country do reflect those actions of the government or state as they are articulated by the dominant coalition (Uzodike; 2009).

In the case of the three SADC countries that intervened in the DRC conflict in support of the Kinshasa regime, the national interests that motivated their decisions fell in the political, security and economic dimensions. Military strategy was a key tool in the pursuance, attainment and safeguarding of these interests. The interests’ levels of importance ranged from primary or vital to secondary levels. They could also either be specific or general, as well as complementary. The levels of interests could shift from being primary to secondary and vice versa depending on circumstances prior the intervention and during the intervention.
period. The respective political interests of the SADC intervening countries were encompassed in their subregional obligations and responsibilities to assist the DRC government against external aggression in order to promote peace, security and stability. These political interests were of primary or vital level to Angola and Zimbabwe and secondary to Namibia in the respective governments’ decisions to undertake military intervention. The political interests were however identical and specific to the three countries throughout the intervention period. These political interests complemented the three countries’ decision making process that led to the intervention as a coalition. The political interests also complemented the coalition’s intervention efforts. The national security dimensions were of primary and vital importance to Angola. Whilst the three countries’ economic interests appeared to be secondary and general at the initial phase of the intervention, circumstances such as the cost of the war and the initiative to sustain the war effort resulted in the shift of these interests to be of primary or vital level, relatively identical and specific. The respective interests that motivated the governments of three countries to undertake decisions for military interventions shifted from one level of importance at the time of the intervention to the other level during the course of the intervention. The shift in the levels of importance of these interests has been a subject of considerable debate among scholars and practitioners in terms of which respective interests of the SADC intervening countries were at stake at the time of the intervention and thereafter.

8.2.1.1 The interests of the government of Angola

This research established that the decision by the government of Angola to undertake military intervention was based on national security strategy, political and economic concerns. Angola’s national security concerns were of primary and vital importance. The political interests of Angola were also vital and critical in the sense that an immediate stable political
situation in the DRC was going to have a positive impact on the national security situation in Angola. Angola’s national security and political interests took precedence over economic interests. Even before the deployment of Angolan troops into the DRC, the Angolan government had its troops in the DRC’s neighbouring Congo Brazzaville where they were deployed to monitor UNITA activities. The government of Angola’s national security concerns were thus specific. Throughout the military intervention, the FAA operations in the DRC were specifically aimed at supporting the Kabila regime so that Luanda would be guaranteed of a friendly Kinshasa regime. A friendly DRC regime would assist the Angolan government in FAA’s efforts at cutting UNITA’s possible operational, intelligence and logistical support and coordination from a possible hostile government in Kinshasa that would come as a result of the fall of the Kabila regime.

The link of UNITA to obtaining support from Rwanda, Uganda and to some extent Burundi resulted in the Angolan government deploying its troops in the western, eastern and northern DRC together with other coalition forces. By undertaking the decision for military intervention, the Angolan government meant to prevent the continued destabilisation of the country through direct and indirect aggression. The Angolan army’s deployment to assist the Congolese army was operationally and tactically aimed at enabling the former to monitor the movements and activities of the then rebel UNITA effectively as well as pre-empt the rebel movement from using the western DRC to launch military attacks against the Luanda regime.271 There was relatively no much mention of national discord in regards to Angola’s decision for military intervention national security concerns. It could be perhaps due to the reasons that the Angolan parliament was by then united by the national threat from UNITA.

271 See appendix of the DRC Map.
Angola’s security concerns remained of primary and vital importance throughout the period of the intervention.

Angola’s political interests were also of primary importance in the government’s decision to undertake military intervention in the Congo. This remained so throughout the intervention period. In addition to being a member of the SADC OPDSC which had an obligation and responsibility to act in conformity with the SADC protocols of collective self-defence and prevent aggression and invasion of a member state, political and security analysts have observed that the government of Angola needed to defend the regime in Kinshasa which could not offer military support to rebel UNITA against the Angolan government.

Unlike its political and security interests that remained of primary and vital importance in terms of motivating the decision for intervention, the economic interests of Angola were of secondary importance. They remained secondary and general throughout the military campaign. Whilst the initiative to sustain the intervention effort by the coalition made economic interests of other two countries (Namibia and Zimbabwe) to shift from primary to secondary levels, the same cannot be said of Angola. This was the case considering that Angola’s economy was not entirely affected by the deployment of its troops in the Congo. Its economic resources were committed to the attainment of its national security objective through dealing successfully with the threat of UNITA. Despite its economic interests being in the secondary level category, the Angolan government’s continued support of the Kinshasa regime also gave it a relative guarantee of having accessibility to the oil fields in the Cabinda enclave. That could have been difficult if there was an unfriendly regime in Kinshasa (Taylor and Williams, 2001:75). Although these bilateral economic activities were between the governments of the two countries, there were allegations levelled against political and
military elite in Angola that they “manipulated” that environment of financial sustenance of the war effort for personal gain. Whilst these allegations against Angola’s economic interests came from within Angola specifically from the opposition and civic groups, these interests were overshadowed by the political and security interests as having taken precedence in the government’s decision to undertake military intervention in the Congo conflict.

8.2.1.3 The interests of the government of Zimbabwe

This research established that the national interests that underpinned Zimbabwe’s decision to undertake military intervention were hinged on political/regional military security and economic motivations. Unlike other members of the coalition, the national political interests of Zimbabwe were of primary and vital importance. They were specific. Subregional power politics, particularly the game play between Harare and Pretoria, to out-manoeuvre each other in influencing and controlling subregional events was of primary and vital importance to the Zimbabwean government. Having enjoyed the status of subregional powerhouse up to the end of apartheid in South Africa, Zimbabwe’s status of being a subregional powerhouse seems to have been “threatened” when South Africa attained majority rule in 1994. As the Chair of the AU in 1997-98 and the SADC OPDSC since its inauguration in 1996 to 1998, Zimbabwe felt obliged to mobilise a coalition of the willing member countries politically and take the lead in its troop deployment in defence of the Kinshasa regime. The positive political precedence set by the government of Zimbabwe before 1998 in terms of contributing to regional peace and security efforts, notably the deployment of the ZDF in Mozambique, Somalia, and Angola could have been affected, especially if the Kabila government was removed from power through an ‘act of aggression’ at a time when Harare was the chair of that subregional institution responsible for the maintenance of peace and stability in SADC.
The political interests of Harare revolved around the government’s quest to try and maintain its status as the OPDSC Chair and to try and win the personality rivalry that had started to show between Mugabe and Mandela. The two leaders’ approaches to resolving the Congo conflict resulted in the subregion being separated between the defence treaty bloc led by Zimbabwe’s Mugabe (and the intervening coalition) and the peace treaty bloc led by Mandela and the non-intervening SADC member states. The political interests of Zimbabwe were thus primary in motivating the government to undertake the decision for intervention in the conflict (Rupiya, 2002:96). It was realised that the allegations were raised in relation to the political interests of the government of Zimbabwe as having been primary and vital in influencing the decision for intervention. A notable allegation was that of personal elitist friendship that had been reportedly cultivated between the leadership of Harare and Kinshasa, and more specifically President Kabila and Mugabe during Kabila’s fight against Mobutu and thereafter, could have been significant on the part of the political leadership of Zimbabwe and specifically the Head of State to forgo parliamentary consultations on the decision to intervene.²⁷²

It was observed that the national economic interests of Zimbabwe were secondary and general in terms of influencing the government’s decision for intervention. These interests were a result of diplomatic relations that had been cultivated between Harare and Kinshasa as a result of the former’s provision of overt operational and intelligence assistance to Kabila’s during the AFDL’s armed rebellion against the Mobutu regime. The bilateral trade and investment deals which included the training and integration of the FAC by the ZDF, the supply of military equipment by the Zimbabwe Defence Industries to the Congolese Defence Forces as well as other economic trade agreements were secondary in terms of influencing

²⁷² Author’s interview with a Zimbabwe’s opposition legislator, Harare, 19 December 2008.
the government of Zimbabwe’s decision for intervention. Since these agreements were signed at government level, any change of regime in Kinshasa would (arguably) honour those economic agreements.

Whilst it was observed that the economic interests of Zimbabwe were secondary and general at the beginning of the intervention, these interests shifted to primary and specific during the course of the intervention. It was established that the country’s economic interests only became primary and specific following the initiative to financially sustain the war effort. That initiative, which resulted in specific bilateral business activities between the DRC government and the Zimbabwe military as well as the DRC government and the Zimbabwe corporate sector, also led some critics to allege that government elitist decision makers could have foreseen a situation or environment conducive to the realisation of personal economic gain during the decision making process. However, those arguments seem to base on allegations and they do not take into account that the national political interests of Zimbabwe took precedence over national economic interests in terms of being vital or primary for the government’s decision for intervention. Economic interests only began to significantly show during the course of the intervention. The government’s national political interests were thus vital in as far as the government’s decision for military intervention was concerned.

8.2.1.2 The interests of the government of Namibia

This research established that the national interests that informed the Namibian government’s decision for military intervention had political/regional militarily security and economic considerations. Namibia’s national political interests were of secondary level throughout the intervention period. They were however identical to the political interests of the other two

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273 Interview with a Zimbabwe Economic Analyst, Harare, 29 July 2010. The Analyst opted to remain anonymous.
members of the coalition. It was argued that although the government of Namibia felt obliged and responsible as a member of the SADC OPDSC to assist a fellow member state which had called for assistance for defence against “foreign aggression”, that obligation had no direct impact or threat to Namibia’s regional political standing. Hence the view that Windhoek’s national political interest was of secondary level in terms of the government’s decision for intervention. It was observed that although Namibia’s decision was based on regional obligation and responsibility to defend the DRC from “an act of aggression” the government’s decision to intervene could have been taken more or less through the influence of subregional solidarity with the other two coalition member states. The decision was however criticised by the Namibian opposition parliamentarians and members of the civil society in general who argued that the decision did not represent the national aspirations of the Namibians. They viewed the national political interests of Namibia as depicting an element of “sub-regional bandwagoning” on the part of the Namibian government because of close ties among the political leadership of Nujoma, Dos Santos and Mugabe and specifically the SWAPO, MPLA and ZANU PF liberation connection”.

However, the same critics perhaps did not take note of the secondary importance that the national political interest of Namibia could have been. Regional solidarity in the promotion of peace and stability could perhaps have positive consequences in as far as the government of Namibia’s request for such assistance from other members of the coalition when faced with political, and security challenges (particularly human security challenges).

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275 When Namibia faced human security threats such as floods particularly in the Caprivi region, SADC member states such as Zimbabwe and Angola have been seen to provide assistance such as deployment of military helicopters to evacuate civilian flood victims. Such assistance could be one among some other positive results of “acts of political regional solidarity”. Author acknowledges this observation made to him during interview, Windhoek, 19 June 2008, by a Namibian legislator who represents SWAPO in the Namibian Parliament.
During the decision making phase of the intervention, the economic interests of Namibia were at the secondary and general level. These interests however shifted during the course of the intervention to be of primary and vital importance. When members of the SADC coalition took the initiative to sustain the war effort, the Namibian government seem to have realised the need to cement the mining concessions that were signed between the Kinshasa government and the De Beers to exploit the mineral resources of the DRC, particularly diamonds, for the benefit of the Namibian economy prior to the outbreak of the conflict. The economic interests of the Namibia government were critical during the course of the intervention, taking into consideration the logistical effects that the longevity of the intervention had brought to bear on the Namibian national economy. Thus the Namibian government realised the need to open up a lucrative economic investment for the Namibian corporate sector (Taylor and Williams, 2001:75).

However, the non-mention of political and military elites in the alleged illegal economic activities in the Congo is of significance to Namibia’s decision for intervention.Whilst the Namibian government’s decision for intervention was criticised by local opposition and civil society groups as not having been nationally consultative and open to legislative debate, critics have not found grounds for linking Namibia national economic interests in terms of decision making for intervention with elite predatory motives in influencing the government’s decision to deploy troops in the Congo.

8.2.2 The coalescence of the varying interests

8.2.2.1 Creating a common legal diplomatic ground for intervention.

In an effort to overcome the national, sub-regional, regional and international challenges surrounding the intervention, the SADC coalition realised that there was a need to take into
considerations the national, sub-regional, regional and to some extent international legal frameworks level in as far as justification for the coalition’s military intervention was concerned. At their respective national levels, the respective Heads of State of the intervening countries used the powers as Commanders in Chief as enshrined in their respective national constitutions to deploy troops when the national interests of their countries are at stake.

At subregional level, the members of the coalition used the national and subregional early warning and verification of threat report by the Foreign Affairs Ministerial verification committee as a legal basis that an act of aggression was committed against a fellow member state. The common denominator among the intervening countries with regards to the political dimension of their respective national political interests was more or less inclined to the aspect of deploying troops to avoid foreign aggression. It was in that regard that the relevant SADC, AU and UN protocols were used as legal basis for the deployment of troops by the coalition. Considering that the UN Charter calls for regional arrangements when a member state which comes under aggression and when that member calls for assistance from fellow member states, the coalition notably used that as a legal basis for their military intervention. This research established that the diplomatic power play which divided SADC between a defence treaty bloc, led by Mugabe, and a peace treaty bloc led by Mandela initially affected the coalition’s legal justification for the military intervention.²⁷⁶ Despite the fact that in principle, “all” SADC member states later on came up with a common position that the sub-regional bloc supported the military intervention, this research established that the initial

²⁷⁶ The diplomatic discord was also a litmus test for the sturdiness of SADC’s new security institutions i.e. the OPDSC and the ISDSC. Whilst SADC indicated some commitment to pursue ‘new security thinking’ or human security in the region in the 1990s, it should be realised that its top leadership was unable to make the OPDS a vehicle for the realisation of a security community. Whilst interesting scholarly questions have been raised in regards to what role the UN should have played in working closely with SADC in finding a common consensus to assist a sub-region that was divided over the approach to resolving the conflict, general suggestions have been that it would be extremely difficult for the UN to resolve such regional issues since these need to be tackled and resolved at a regional level (see Theo Neethling “Pursuing a functional security community in southern Africa: Is it possible after all?” in Security Review for Southern Africa, vol xxv, no 1, May 2003 pp.35-37).
discord among member nations on whether to intervene or not created ground for criticism from some civil society groups, academia, parliamentarians and the international community. Coupled with the fact that not much consultation was undertaken by the respective governments of the intervening countries in drumming up support from civil society groups, academia as well as legislators in their respective countries, the initiative to drum up support for the legal justification of the military intervention was adversely affected, hence the criticism and suspicion it received from various quarters at the sub-regional, regional and international levels.

8.2.2.2 The attempt at rationalisation of the intervention effort through a common military strategy

This research established that members of the coalition realised the need to come up with a common military strategy. This strategy was meant to make provision for some coherence on how the intervening countries were supposed to undertake and execute decisions for military intervention based on their given interests. This research established that the formulation and implementation of the coalition’s military strategy was based on the notion of pursuing, attaining and retaining the respective interests of these three intervening countries. The coalition’s command hierarchy had to design the means of planning and conducting the whole campaign in order to attain their interests. Having noted that the common political dimension of the respective national interests of the three SADC countries was based on the quest to assist the Kabila regime against aggression and thereby keep it in power, this research established that the coalition forces military strategy had to include the identification of high value national strategic targets of the DRC initially, namely, the defence of Kinshasa as the political capital, the defence of Ndjili international airport as the gateway to the regional and international world, the defence of Inga hydroelectric power station as the major
source of power energy to the DRC and SADC. Having also noted that the overall economic dimension of the respective national interests of the three countries was based on the DRC’s resource exploitation potential, this research established that the coalition’s military strategy also included the defence of mineral rich towns and other cities of administrative and economic significance. This was done through counter-offensive and offensive operations on the WF, EF and NF. This research also found that the coalition strategy became a tool for the securing of respective interests. The formulation of the military strategy was done through an integrated command structure, namely the SADC Task Force HQ, which became the nerve centre of all operations that were planned and executed in the WF, EF and NF.

This research also established that as part of their military strategy, an initiative was undertaken in 1999 by the SADC intervening countries to sign a Mutual Defence Pact. This pact became a political and legal guide to collective self defence strategy, thereby providing an optional mode of collective self-defence for the coalition whose member state was facing an armed attack. This research found that the establishment of a Joint Permanent Commission (JPC), which later resulted in the setting out of political and economic structures such as meetings and/or summits later held at the level of heads of state or government, foreign ministers and ambassadors, defence ministers, chiefs of defence among others, was as a result of the provisions of the pact. The safeguarding and retention of the respective interests of the intervening countries was meant to be consolidated through the MDP. The research established that the coalition utilised the MDP as a prime legal mechanism through which military strategy was executed during the intervention. Any provision of political direction to the coalition of the willing forces’ strategy was effected through the MDP as the legal reference.
8.2.2.3 “Mission Creep”: National interest as a facade for intervention?

This research established that the unanticipated longevity of the coalition’s military intervention or “mission creep” had pronounced strategic economic and political consequences. The research established that the military intervention by the SADC intervening countries resulted in increased and unbudgeted military expenditures for three countries. At the time of the military intervention, the Angolan troops were engaged with rebel UNITA forces, whilst some were also deployed in Congo Brazzaville. This meant the creation of a wider front for the government of Angola in as far as meeting the operational costs was concerned. In the case of Namibia and Zimbabwe, this research found that the initial costs of the war were exacerbated by the distances of the two countries from the theatres of deployment (Rupiya 2002; 100-101). Considering the fact that all of Namibian and Zimbabwean troops were mainly lifted by air from their respective countries, the two countries incurred significant transport costs because of the distance between their respective towns and military bases and Kinshasa as well as HQs of the established fronts namely Ndjili, Mbuji Mayi and Mbandaka as well as Lubumbashi.

Coupled with the costs on the payment of allowances of troops which were incurred in US dollars, the logistical upkeep in terms of rations as well as ammunition costs, substantial economic (financial and logistical) costs were incurred by these countries during the military intervention. Thus economic damage was done to the financial economies of the respective SADC intervening countries. Specifically worth noting was the reduction of investor confidence which impacted on the respective countries’ fiscus (Grignon, 2006:87-90, Rupiya, 2002:100-101). The IFIs particularly the IMF and WB were much concerned with the effects that these costs had on the respective intervening countries’ fiscus particularly that of Zimbabwe. Such reaction from the IFIs coupled with media offensive reports on the
intervention had some significant influence on the legislators, academics and the civil society in the respective countries of the intervening countries. They viewed the military intervention by the three SADC countries as illegitimate, unbudgeted military adventurism.

The devising of measures to meet the financial and logistical costs, thereby sustaining the war effort by the intervening countries, primarily included the various joint business ventures between the DRC government and the three respective SADC countries. Whilst the initiative appeared very noble and official, if the military intervention had successfully ended without “mission creep”, and if the joint business ventures between the DRC government and the respective intervening countries were signed after the conflict (that is during the post conflict period), critics and scholars who argue that the economic dimension of the decision for intervention was not a public good and that the decisions for intervention were driven by elite interests could have possibly find challenges in justifying this argument.

This research also found out that whilst some scholars and political economy analysts have used allegations in the UN reports to argue that the decisions taken by the intervening countries were influenced by the quest for personal gain, the same critics did not take into consideration issues related to which interests took precedence over others in terms of primacy and thus being considered as critical in terms of influencing the respective governments’ decisions for military intervention. The national political interests of the interveners took precedence over the national economic interests. The coalition military strategy was initially crafted within the confines of attaining and safeguarding these national political interests.
8.3 Conclusions

Using the realist school in the study of international relations, this research has attempted to determine the extent to which serious considerations about national interest is the primary motivating factor that inform governments to undertake decisions for military interventions. The research also aimed to ascertain the extent to which the SADC coalition’s military strategy became a principal tool in the attainment and safeguarding of these varying interests as well as how that strategy was utilised as a mechanism for the translation and development of these varying interests into common ones among the AZN intervening countries. Using the 1998 military intervention by the SADC coalition of the willing in the Congo conflict as a case study, this research adopted the historical and qualitative research methods in its collection and analysis of data from primary and secondary sources which included the conducting of fieldwork research, and the attendance at conferences and seminars among others.

Chapter one introduced the study by making a general provision of the background and outline of the research problem, the research hypotheses, objectives, questions, theoretical framework, methodological approach as well as a brief clarification of the key concepts.

Chapter two provided a detailed contextualization of military intervention in order to project the various dimensions on the subject. These dimensions included definitions, forms, evolution and the legalities surrounding military intervention. It was generally noted that each definitions of military intervention depends on the type of action taken the instruments used and the actors involved. Military intervention is the deployment of troops as a result of a political decision by a state acting unilaterally or by a group of states acting multilateral purportedly representing a regional or international group. It was noted that intervention can
be undertaken at the invitation of a given state which needs assistance or it can be enforced (Du Plessis, 2000:4-5). The evolution of military intervention was traced from the pre to post cold war period with each phase of history indicating the different dimension under which intervention was undertaken. This ranged from ideological to humanitarian reasons. (Jentleson, Levite and Berman, 1992:320). It was noted with interest that the post-cold war period has also experienced a situation where decisions for military interventions are justified through international legal claims such as the UN charter. Intervention at request, the state’s right to protect its nationals abroad, individual or collective self-defence, safeguarding of national interests among others have been discussed as some of the reasons and justifications given by states for undertaking military interventions. Military strategy remains a key tool when safeguarding these interests through intervention.

Chapter three made a critical contextualization of the concept of national interest. The various definitions, distinctions, levels, decision making determinants of national interests were explored. It was noted that there seems to be little or no difference between the formulation of national interest and foreign policy. A certain criterion on international development such as availability of natural resources and markets can be used as a criterion for enabling decision makers to the outcome to a country’s national interest. Some scholars argue that decision makers are affected by partisanship and bureaucratic interest in taking decisions that are in line with the government’s national interest (Goldstein, 2002:356; Couloumbis and Wolfers, 1990:107). It was noted in this chapter that the concept of national interest has been used to analyse issues related to war, the use of force, alliances and diplomatic negotiations. Nation-states’ interests can only be served through alliances and coalitions. There are advantages and disadvantages of joining these alliances and coalitions. Diplomacy plays a significant role in accommodating and reconciling conflicting interests as well as coordinate
common and complementary interests among nation (George and Keohane, 1980:140; Schonberg, 2003:78).

It was also noted that whilst some ambiguity exists in the concept of national interest, there is a general agreement among scholars in regards to the fact that any given nation state undertakes a decision for military intervention on the primary justification of safeguarding or pursuing its national interests. The point of disagreement among these scholars begin on conceptual or substantive issues about national interest such as what would constitute the national interest, consensus on who decides the a state’s priority of state action and how to implement these actions, the levels of threat, among, as well as who decides and how decisions are taken on a state’s choice of allies or to be a member of a coalition.

Congo’s historical paradox of military interventionism from the time of King Leopold up to Kabila was examined in Chapter Four. It was noted that the country experienced military interventionism by different actors either in support or against a given regime during that period. This external support was driven by the respective interests of the interveners. An overview of the country’s geo-strategic significance in terms of its abundance in strategic natural resources indicates the rationale link between interest in minerals and the involvement of external players in the country’s conflicts. A historical trace of the country’s conflict predicament indicates the direct and indirect involvement of external actors particularly bigger powers which had interests (national or otherwise) in the Congo. In all of these military interventions in Congo, different military strategies were used as mechanisms for the attainment, pursuing and safeguarding of these interests.
Chapter Five identified, ascertained, evaluated and analysed the respective national interests of the members of the SADC coalition that were instrumental in influencing these countries to undertake respective decisions for military intervention in the conflict. Before the identification of these interests, the chapter observed the significance of diplomatic early warning and threat assessment to the decision for intervention. The various institutional arrangements of early warning, threat assessment and analysis as well as recommendations made by security experts to the relevant decision makers at national and subregional levels and the various procedures involved in the taking of these decisions were analysed. A brief discussion was made in regards to the decision for intervention within the national contexts of the intervening countries. It was noted that generally, it was through the respective constitutions of the intervening SADC countries which the three SADC presidents in their capacities as respective commanders in chief used their constitutional powers to deploy troops. In analysing the decision for intervention within the SADC subregional context, it was noted that there was a rift or subregional divide based on the appropriate course of action that the subregion had to take to deal with the threat at hand. It was observed that the subregion later reached a compromise where a decision for intervention was taken and this decision was to be effected under the SADC coalition of the willing whereby those countries which had the will to deploy troops could do so. The legal dimensions and implications of the decision to deploy under coalition of the willing were also analysed.

Having identified and ascertained the varying interests of the three SADC countries the chapter also evaluated and analysed these interests. The political, security and economic interests ranged from being of primary or vital level to secondary level, general or specific to identical. There was a notable shift in terms of the levels of importance of these interests before and during the intervention period. The political interests of the three intervening
countries were identical and specific. They all wanted to defend the DRC from foreign aggression. They all wanted to defend the Kabila regime. The three countries felt the political decisions for intervention were in line with their sub regional obligations and responsibilities. There were however general counter arguments by some members of the legislature, civil society groups, academics who argued that the decision for intervention was not widely consultative.

It was noted that whilst the economic interests were of secondary importance at the time of undertaking the decision for intervention, they shifted to be of primary importance during the course of the conflict. Counter arguments brought against the three countries’ economic dimensions for undertaking the decision for military intervention was that their respective decisions were not in any way meant for the national benefit of the three countries but for elite or personal advantage. These arguments seem not to have taken into consideration issues related to which interests superceded the other at the time of taking the decision for intervention.

Chapter Six discussed the coalition’s military strategy. It was noted that coalition the coalition forces’ military strategy was based on the notion of safeguarding their respective interests. The strategy which included the deployment of forces under an integrated Command structure under a Task Force HQ, counter offensive and defensive operations in the WF, EF, and NF. These were designed to achieve the varying interests of the intervening countries. The Political interests of the interveners remained the linchpin upon which the coalition strategy was designed and executed throughout the intervention period. Other interests such as national security and economic interests were protected and safeguarded in line with the political interests of the members of the SADC coalition. The chapter also
discussed the relevance and importance of the SADC MDP as a legal mechanism for the execution of coalition military strategy. An analysis of the various articles of the MDP indicated that the coalition sought to unite their efforts to collective defence and the preservation of peace and security through the MDP. A conclusive analysis made in this chapter was that the MDP seemed to have become the primary legal political guide and synthesizing tool through which coalition military strategy was executed during the intervention. It acted as a guarantee among members of the coalition in as far as close cooperation in matters of defence and security for the mutual safeguarding and pursuance of their interests was concerned.

Chapter Seven’s main thrust centred on a critical analysis of the coalition initiative to financially sustain the war effort. It was noted that this development was necessitated by the fact that as the military intervention took longer than anticipated. It resulted in the intervening countries incurring heavy financial costs that in turn had an effect on their national economies. Premature withdrawal was not an option for the three SADC countries. Thus, they had to devise ways and means of sustaining the war effort. The bilateral joint business ventures that were entered into between the DRC government and the respective governments of the intervening countries were in principle meant to boost the affected economies (budgets) of the three countries. However, the joint ventures were viewed with suspicion as predatory and exploitative by some members of civil society, parliamentarians, academics and the international community at large, arguably because of their little or non-involvement in these business ventures.

The criticisms levelled against the political leadership of the intervening coalition that their decision was not widely consultative in respect of their legislatures and the allegations made
against the elites from among the intervening countries seem to have created the national interest “problématique” among international relations, military strategy and political economy scholars and practitioners in as far as it (national interest) being the primary motivating factor that informed the governments of the three countries to undertake the decision for military intervention in the DRC conflict. Faced with this practical scenario, it can thus be said that national interest is heavily contested within any country. One school would argue that when closely scrutinised, national interests may be more parochial (national or even personal) and these interests do not take into consideration the humanistic sentiments and needs of the electorate. The other school however argues that national interests will always reflect the state actions as articulated by the dominant coalition within the government or the state. It is this dominant coalition that makes decisions on behalf of the electorate. A government’s decision for military intervention may not directly benefit the electorate, but that decision will be taken for the attainment and safeguarding of subregional, regional or interests namely international peace and security, a decision which will be in line with a given country’s national interests. Strategy remains a key mechanism in the attainment and safeguarding of a given state’s national interests during military intervention.

8.4 Recommendations

Based on the research findings and issues emerging from the concluding remarks, this study makes recommendations which include suggestions for further studies on the subject of sub-regional military intervention and national interest interlink.
8.4.1 Undertaking political, legal and economic cost benefit analysis prior to a nation’s
decision for military intervention

Whilst there is a great possibility that the effects of a given conflict may be brought to bear
on a respective state whether it undertakes military intervention or not, there is need however
for any given nation to make an analysis on the potential political, legal and economic costs
or risks that will come in relation to its national interests by undertaking the decision. A
nation state’s decision to undertake military intervention should subscribe to the fundamental
principle of foreign policy, that is, considerations of all possible political, legal and economic
factors.

8.4.1.1 Political factors

National, sub-regional, regional and international political support is of utmost importance
whenever a state considers undertaking military intervention. There would be need to rally
support from national up to the international level prior to undertaking military intervention
and even during the intervention period. Such support would be attained through what Ortega
(2001:37) refers to as the blocs of legitimacy. First and foremost, in any democracy where
parliament is made up of different political parties with different views, depending on the
level of the threat and the national interests that are at risk at a given time, it would be of
utmost importance for internal political debate and wide consultation at the level of the
legislature before a government undertakes a decision for military intervention. Such a debate
at parliamentary level would have to take into account various political actors and pressure
groups such as the academic community, the civil society (NGOs, public opinion and the
media) and international organisations (Ortega, 2001:38). In the case of the academia, their
expert contribution in terms of analysis and scholarly criticisms as well as opinion may be
used by a given nation-state on coming up with an informed political deduction on whether
undertaking a military intervention individually or as a collective will be to the interests of the nation or not. Besides academia, public opinion, the media and NGOs are also important actors in as far as interventionism is concerned. The input given by these actors has a bearing on the support and views of the international community at large in as far as the justification for military intervention is concerned. Working hand in hand with the media and the NGOs during the course of the intervention would to some extent impact positively in portraying the need for such intervention action particularly where humanitarian catastrophe has been avoided or is being avoided by the deployment of troops under a regional or international grouping.

8.4.1.2 Economic factors

Military intervention has proved to be a costly national undertaking. Whilst policy makers and bureaucrats may be influenced by the fact that undertaking military intervention may enhance a country’s economic capacity by opening up new markets or raw materials for its industry, the situation on the ground may change to the intervener’s economic disadvantage. Due to the fact that there are challenges likely to be faced during the course of the intervention, there should be a clear cut policy in regards to where and when to intervene, that is, coming up with the all available courses of action open and the required efficient logistical support.\textsuperscript{277} The logistical and financial costs of intervention should be weighed against those of non-intervention (Du Plessis, 2000:42).

If the campaign takes longer than expected, the costs incurred may affect the national fiscus. A nation thus should be able to make considerations on the economic impact of the intervention. The economic capacity of a nation’s deployment of troops should be weighed in

\textsuperscript{277} Du Plessis (2000) emphasized the need for a nation to prioritize and decide on the core values, interests, goals and objectives that should be upheld including consideration of compliance with ethical and legal issues.
relation to any economic potential that particular intervention will add to the country’s economic growth. If the intervention negatively affects the nation’s budget then serious considerations should be made not to undertake the decision for military action. If a nation state or a coalition of states undertakes economic activities to sustain the war effort during the course of the intervention, the inclusion of the intervening countries’ respective finance ministries and departments need to channel the profit accrued from these business ventures into their respective treasuries, involve the respective parliamentary portfolio committees on finance, defence and others in informing the nation on the need of such initiatives and the level of national transparency being undertaken without necessarily compromising national strategic security. Whenever allegations are levelled against the government elite, the intervening state must institute a nationally representative and independent commission of inquiry which will investigate such allegations and if need be work cooperatively with the international community in order to come up with credible findings that will exonerate the government in as far as national objectives for intervention are concerned.278

8.4.1.3 Legal factors

It is the duty of the government to make sure that whenever a decision to undertake military intervention is taken, it must conform to the general criterion of a legal and ethical nature of intervention. The primary underlying legal point of departure for any military intervention undertaken by a state, a coalition of states representing a sub-regional, regional or international grouping should be within the operational framework of the UN Security

278 In Neethling’s view, though the three UN Panel of Experts’ reports could not prove or disapprove the allegations of illegal exploitation of resources levelled against the three SADC countries, these reports also impacted on the integrity of the coalition’s military intervention. The fact that SADC was already in a position of serious difficulty in terms of its dual structure, with one organisational component devoted to achieving its objectives of development and integration, and the other dedicated to the promotion of peace and security meant that intervention action in the DRC complicated matters even further. Scholarly arguments have been generally of the view that the citing of mining concessions as compensation for military action and support to Kabila reinforced an impression in the ‘outside world’ that ‘SADC’ intervention action in the DRC was basically or largely underpinned by and aimed at acquiring business interests in the DRC hence the later institution of these reports (Neethling email correspondence to author, August 2008 op. cit).
Council Mandate or Charter. The intervening government or a coalition of states must make sure that before the decision for military intervention is undertaken, the government that seeks assistance makes a formal request to the potential intervener or regional bloc and it is the duty of that government to make sure that the general majority of the populace is informed about the need of such assistance so that the population clearly supports its decision to request intervention (Du Plessis, 2000).

There must be adherence to the principles of “Just War Tradition” by the interveners, be it a country, coalition or a regional body. These principles are (jus ad bellum) or just cause - the reason for going to war (in this case military intervention) must be just. This includes situations whereby innocent lives are in danger and the intervention must be to protect life. Comparative justice means that whilst there may be rights and wrongs on all sides of the conflict, to override the presumption against the use of force, the injustice suffered by one party should significantly outweigh that suffered by the other party. Legitimate authority is the only duly constituted authority to declare war (Michael, W, Brough, M W, Lango, J W, and van der Linden, H, 2007). The jus in bello, (morality in war) includes right intention, which is, using force for a just purpose. A probability of success argues that arms must not be used for a futile cause requiring disproportionate measures. Last resort is using force only after peaceful alternatives had been tried in earnest and exhausted. Proportionality; means that the good achieved should outweigh the overall destruction that would have been expected from the use of force. Non-combat immunity means that offensive operations of war must be directed towards the enemy combatants, only engage military targets, and there must

279 Article 51 of the UN Charter allows the use of force to be used for the maintenance and restoration of international peace and stability. Responsibility for this is delegated to the regional and sub-regional organizations (see Gareth Evans, the Responsibility to Protect: Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention, Address by Gareth Evans, President of the International Crisis Group and Co-Chair of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, to The American Society of International Law, 98th Annual Meeting, Panel on “Rethinking Collective Action”, Washington DC, 1 April 2004 [1], http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech103.html, accessed 02 February 2011).
be minimum indirect harm to civilians (Du Plessis, 2000: 45-46; see also Michael, W, Brough, M W, Lango, J W, and van der Linden, H, 2007).

8.4.2 Perfecting an appropriate sub-regional mechanism for military intervention

The SADC sub-region should try to work out an effective military intervention mechanism that will avoid a repeat of the 1998 scenario where the sub-regional rift ended up with a “coalition of the willing” arrangement. The sub-region should act in concert in the event of future conflicts and should also avoid tendencies of encouraging alliance formations in times of conflicts in any country in the region. The recently formed SADC Standby Brigade (a Rapid Reaction Force), should be a priority if future conflict prevention, management and resolution is to be successful. The recent creation of the SADC Standby Brigade should be utilised as the sub-regional mechanism that will enable military interventions as envisaged in Article 13 of the protocol establishing the Peace and Security Commission of the African Union, which allows for intervention in a member state in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a member state in order to restore peace and security in accordance with article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act (Baker and Maeresera, 2009:107). Efforts should be made to ensure that the brigade’s effectiveness is not significantly affected by political and strategic operational challenges due to the absence of common national interests and common values among member states (Nathan, 2003:78). There has to be development of trust,

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280 Any of the sub-regional structural initiatives in SADC should be informed by the fact that military responses in both the DRC and Lesotho were probably unavoidable (Tsie, 1998:10). The difference lies in the form it took and in the issue of impartiality, which also explains the contrasting outcomes. Whilst some scholars like Neethling, 2008 have argued that the three intervening governments basically gave Kabila a blank cheque by not requiring him to spell out the path to democracy, there is need for the sub-region to take advantage of the current continental efforts. The African continent is in a much better policy and institutional position to deal with crises, such as the one that manifested in the DRC. SADC should work in line with the AU’s Peace and Security Council and its supporting structures, such as the African Standby Force (which has to become operational in Africa’s five developmental regions) and a Military Staff Committee. It is hoped that SADC through the AU will embark on a process to draft and endorse a defence and security policy, which will guide future intervention action and in fact, compel the sub-regional role players (including civil society and NGOs) to deploy peacekeeping forces within a specific framework. This policy framework will (theoretically) also ensure a sound approach towards much needed peacebuilding measures in peacekeeping theatres.
institutional cohesion, common policies and unified responses to any given crisis in the sub-region among member nations (Baker and Maeresera, 2009:108). As key determinants in foreign policy decision making, the national interests of respective SADC member states need to be safeguarded in line/tandem with sub-regional peace and security goals (Baker and Maeresera, 2009, also see Nathan, 2003:78). Efforts and initiatives should also be made at strategic levels to deploy the SADCBRIG in complementarity with AU/UN peace support efforts in the sub-region such as its possible deployment in the current conflict in the eastern DRC.

8.4.3 Enhancing a sub-regional legal framework for the effective utilisation of the military intervention mechanism

Whilst a defence pact was signed by the coalition of the willing that intervened in the 1998 conflict together with the DRC, all SADC member nations should strive to enhance a legal framework, which is the SADC Mutual Defence Pact (SADC MDP) that was signed in Tanzania in 2002. As Van Nieuwkerk noted, the MDP in essence allows for collective self-defence and collective action, stating that ‘an armed attack against a state party shall be considered a threat to regional peace and security and such an attack shall be met with immediate collective action’ (Van Nieuwkerk, 2001:1). Thus whilst the pact is regarded as a non-aggression treaty and a collective defence strategy with the ability to stop member nations to come to the aid of each other when under aggression, there are political and strategic loopholes in the pact ranging from its call for action on a capability and willingness basis. The Pact also states that parties have the option of choosing how to respond to a call for immediate action, which presumably includes the classic ‘do nothing’ option (Maeresera and Uzodike, 2010). This then could result in a scenario where some member states would

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281 The pact was signed by all member states in August 2003 in Arusha Tanzania (see appendix one attached to this thesis).
prefer military solutions while others would opt for more peaceful approaches – diplomatic and other non-military initiatives. Yet others could opt not to take any position, but to remain outside the problem while publicly professing to be determined to solve the problem (Ngoma, 2004:1; Maeresera and Uzodike, 2010).

In addition to the above, there seems to be reluctance on ratification of the pact by member states (SADC MDP, 2003). Member nations should strive to work towards the full ratification of the pact.\textsuperscript{282} The perfection of some of the clauses of the pact would in the future enhance member nations to withstand their differences and thereby promote political commonality and mutual trust (Maeresera and Uzodike, 2010). Considering that member states do not have the capacity to implement ambitious and wide-ranging proposals and that the capacity of member states is uneven, the institutional capacity of SADC member countries will need to be continuously reviewed by the Summit in the implementation of a regional defence policy through the tasking of different sub-committees (Maeresera and Uzodike, 2010).

8.4.4 Need for sub-regional military intervention mechanism supportive of diplomatic conflict prevention and resolution

Any future initiatives by SADC member states to engage in military intervention must be interpreted and applied in a manner that is supportive of conflict prevention and conflict resolution. SADC member states should always try and make reference to the AU and UN

\textsuperscript{282} Maeresera and Uzodike (2010) noted the critical hesitancy to ratify the pact by some member states as shown by article 6(2) which though it ensures total agreement by all member states in the spirit of cooperation, it can also lead to a delay in the execution of emergency action. The 1998 DRC and Lesotho interventions showed that there was little or no common consensus among member states (also see Laurie Nathan, 2003:78). In view of the above proposition about the SADC standby force being a sub-regional mechanism for future military interventions, it remains subject to debate on whether or not SADC will reach a solution-driven consensus by using the MDP as a legal launching pad for a sub-regional military response if the 1998 DRC and Lesotho conflict scenarios were to repeat themselves (also see Maeresera and Uzodike, 2010).
Charter and seek some assistance from the AU and the UN, where necessary, for peace support operations, punitive measures and collective continental or international intervention where conflicts escalate. Any future decisions to undertake military intervention must be taken when all other possible political options have been thoroughly considered in accordance with the AU and UN Charters. Whilst military intervention can sometimes take precedence over the diplomatic option in circumstances where there is rapid escalation of a conflict, before the decision to intervene is made, there is need for a common understanding and shared perceptions of dynamics of the conflict. Any given sub-regional, regional or international grouping should analyse the causes, consequences and the best possible solution in any given conflict situation. When that is done, member nations who form part of any of these respective groupings should try to encourage political will from belligerents so that there is mutual trust and commitment to resolve a given conflict through internationally recognised and acceptable collective peace and security interests.

8.4.5 The need for paradigm shift in the conceptualization or thinking of what constitute national interest

Key concepts and principles such as “sovereignty” and “non-interference” that have guided the international relations since the beginning of the Westphalia system should continuously be revised or even set aside completely when grave situations and circumstances call for such. If this is successfully done, it will pave way for regional and sub-regional organisations to play a vital role in the maintenance of sub-regional, regional and international peace and security. Instead of scholars being driven by realpolitik as a tool of analysis that will incline their analysis to look at the decision making process for military interventions as decisions that are designed to achieve selfish and rather parochial interests, researchers need to consider the globalist or world society view that decisions by nation states to undertake military
intervention in the domestic affairs of other states are guided by the legitimate ‘right’ to intervene in the name of internationally recognized grouping to promote community norms, values or interests which include the prevention of bloodshed and genocide, massive refugee outflows and many other forms of human suffering (Ortega, 2001:62). In fact, the proposed new scholarly analysis on military intervention should integrate the political dimension. Whilst the traditional analysis of military interventions was based on the notion that state decisions for such actions were planned and carried out in order to uphold the national interest of powerful states, contemporary analysis of military interventions must be seen to include the pursuance of wider objectives. This will assist the academia to have a new theoretical approach on the rationale behind nation-states’ decisions to undertake military interventions.

Whilst realist theorists envisage that self-help has to be a guiding principle in a society that is anarchic, there is a need for a scholarly clarification on what exactly should constitute national interest and the unifying threat to that national interest (Du Plessis, 2000:41). It is of primary importance for any state to come up with a considerable definition of what a national or sub-regional threat is during its decision making process. There should be a new theoretical thinking based on the fact that military intervention in the present global order should be based on the general interest. As Ortega (2001:61) noted, in political calculations this would mean that the decisions to undertake military intervention will not be motivated by national interests, but instead collective or global interests. Collective or global interests would be solely for the maintenance of international peace, stability and security- primarily human security.
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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: The Coalition’s Defence Protocol

DEFENCE PROTOCOL

AMONG

THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA
AND
THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE

(hereinafter referred to as “the Parties”)


PROCLAIMING their desire to live at peace with all the peoples and Governments.

RECOGNISING the Sovereign equality of all States and intending to strengthen the bonds between them on the basis of respect for their independence and non-interference in their internal affairs.
DETERMINED to safeguard the freedom of their peoples, their civilizations, their individual liberties and the rule of law.

SEEKING to promote peace stability and well being between their peoples.

RESOLVING to unite their efforts to collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.

CONVINCED that close cooperation in matters of defence and security will be to the mutual benefit of their peoples.

THE PARTIES hereby agree as follows:

ARTICLE 1
That they will in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and will refrain in their International Resolutions from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 2
That in order to more effectively achieve the objectives of this Protocol they shall separately and jointly, by means of continuous cooperation and assistance maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.
ARTICLE 3
That they will consult each other whenever the territory territorial independence or security of either or both of them is in the opinion of either or both of them threatened.

ARTICLE 4
That an armed attack against one or more of them shall be considered an attack against the other and that in the event of such an attack, each of them will assist the Party so attacked by taking forthwith individually or in collaboration with other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to repel such attack and restore peace and security in the territory of the Party so attacked. Any such attack and measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 5
That this Protocol shall not affect, nor be it interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of each Party under the Charter of the United Nations or the Organisation of the African Unity or the primary responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 6
That they refrain from indulging in international engagements between them and any third party or State where such international engagements would be in conflict with the spirit and provisions of this Protocol.

ARTICLE 7
That they shall respect each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and in particular observe the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other. To that end, no
action in terms of this Protocol shall be taken in the territory of either Party for the benefit of that Party save for its own request or with its consent, except where the extent, violence and rapidity of the aggression has disrupted the free and effective functioning of its institutions and rendered the exercise of its sovereignty impracticable.

ARTICLE 8
That they undertake not to nurture, harbour or support any elements whose objectives are subversive to the political, military, territorial, economic or social security of each other.

ARTICLE 9
That in order to realize maximum attainment of the objectives of this Protocol they shall cooperate in all defence matters and in particular they shall facilitate interaction between their armed forces and defence industries in the following and any other areas of mutual interest:

They shall cooperate in the training of military personnel in any field of military endeavour and to that end may from time to time hold joint military exercises in each other’s territory.

They undertake to exchange intelligence information in all relevant matters subject to any restrictions or otherwise of national security. They undertake to promote joint research, development and production under licence or otherwise of military equipment including weapons and munitions and to facilitate the supply and procurement of defence equipment and services between their defence industries and their respective armed forces.
ARTICLE 10
That they may in respect to any particular issue covered by the provisions of this Protocol make such subsequent agreements of a specific or general nature as would in their opinion enhance the effective implementation of this Protocol.

ARTICLE 11
That they establish a Joint Committee to be called the “Angola-DRC-Namibia-Zimbabwe Cooperation Committee” whose function shall be to ensure the smooth implementation of this Protocol. The Joint Committee will meet alternatively in Angola, the DRC, Namibia and Zimbabwe at such times as may be requested by either Party.

ARTICLE 12
That they will be disposed to receiving each other’s delegations for purposes of consultation and coordination of the implementation of this Protocol.

ARTICLE 13
That they undertake to disclose any secret information gained in the implementation of this Protocol or other agreements pursuant to it otherwise than to members of their own staff to whom such disclosure may be essential for purposes of implementing this Protocol or agreements pursuant to it and only after taking all reasonable steps to ensure that such members of staff shall at all times preserve strict secrecy.
ARTICLE 15

That all visiting personnel under this Protocol shall comply with the Security Regulations of the host Party. Any information disclosed or made available to such visiting personnel shall be treated in accordance with the provisions of Article 13 above.

ARTICLE 15

That this Protocol shall come into effect after the exchange of the instruments of ratification by the Parties.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED AT........................ON....................THIS............ DAY OF APRIL 1999 IN THE PRESENCE OF THE UNDERSIGNED WITNESSES.

............................................. .........................................................
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA FOR THE DRC
GEN NUNDI PAIHAMA Kayemba Mbadakulu DIEU-DONNE
Minister of National Defence Vice Minister of Defence

............................................. .........................................................
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA FOR THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE
ARRKI NGHIMITINA MOVEN ENOCK MAHACHI
Minister of Defence Minister of Defence

Source: SADC Secretariat, June 2009
Appendix 2: DRC Map