A CORE-PERIPHERY ANALYSIS OF
POPULATION AND URBANISATION PATTERNS
IN NATAL/KWAZULU

by

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degree of Master of Social Science in
the Centre for Social and Development Studies,
University of Natal, Durban.

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PREFACE

I hereby certify that this thesis is my own work (unless otherwise indicated) and that it has not been submitted to any other university.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A study on population and urbanisation dynamics is particularly difficult, and without the assistance of many people and institutions I would not have been able to complete the task.

My deepest gratitude is to my initial supervisor, the late Professor Jill Nattrass, who not only assisted and encouraged me with most of this study but initiated and shaped my interest in the sphere of development studies throughout my period at Natal University and thereafter. Although no longer with us she has been, and will continue to remain, my mentor and source of inspiration.

I am also very indebted to my present supervisors Professor Errol Haarhoff, of the Department of Architecture, and Mr Peter Corbett, of the Department of Economics, for their valuable assistance and encouragement.

I wish to thank especially Professor Gavin Maasdorp, of the Economic Research Unit and Mr Johan de V Graaf, Department of Sociology (University of Stellenbosch) for their advice and opinions, and to the Department of Economic Affairs of the KwaZulu Government and the Human Sciences Research Council for their financial assistance.
Last but not least, a very big thank you to Miss N J Williamson for undertaking the unenviable task of both typing and proof reading the manuscript, to Dr P A Clancey for also proof reading the manuscript, to my colleagues at the Centre for Social and Development Studies, the KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation and the Inkatha Institute for South Africa for the many stimulating and beneficial discussions, and to my family and friends for their encouragement during my moments of despair.

Any errors, inaccuracies or deficiencies remain strictly my own.
ABSTRACT

This study aims to expose the impact of racial separation policies on the spatial distribution of the population groups in Natal/ KwaZulu, and on Black urbanisation, within a core-periphery framework.

Chapter One focuses on global population and urbanisation trends to highlight the difference between First and Third World characteristics, and applies the First and Third World distinction to South Africa.

Chapter Two outlines the impact of colonialism, apartheid and separate development on the spatial distribution of the population in South Africa, and especially Natal/KwaZulu.

Chapter Three discusses the Friedmann core-periphery model, and the application of the core-periphery model to the Southern African region, as well as the modernisation/dependency debate in terms of its impact on shaping differing perspectives of the relationship between core and peripheral regions and perspectives of the urbanisation process.

Chapter Four is comprised of an empirical examination of the core-periphery structure of the Natal/KwaZulu regional economy, and the core-periphery distribution of its population settlement, both between and within such regions, as well as the geographical
distribution of the types of population settlements and the size of the urban population. An assessment of the size and distribution of the population in the Durban Functional Region is also made.

Chapter Five draws the main conclusions of the previous Chapters together, critically examines the validity of the Friedmann model in terms of its application to the Southern African and Natal/KwaZulu regions and discusses the development/underdevelopment relationship between Natal and KwaZulu and its implications for the immediate future.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1 The Aim of the Study

The major aim of this study is to reveal the extent to which the history of colonialism, apartheid and separate development has shaped the spatial distribution of population between and within the core-periphery regions of Natal/KwaZulu, as well as to assess the impact of racial segregation on the Black urbanisation process. The study will also critically assess the validity of the Friedmann core-periphery theoretical model in terms of its use in determining the outcome of the relationship between core and periphery regions, based on applications of his model to more contemporary real world situations in the Southern African region and especially in the Natal/KwaZulu region. Through revealing the population and urbanisation dynamics of Natal/KwaZulu within the core-periphery framework it is proposed that the magnitude of the socio-economic and political problems can be more clearly perceived, which in turn holds strong implications for the determination of the future evolution of socio-economic and political relationships between the core and periphery regions of Natal/KwaZulu.
2 **Hypothesis**

It is hypothesised that:

1 The history of colonialism, apartheid and separate development has led to a considerable degree of spatial distancing between the population groups in Natal/KwaZulu, in both the rural and the urban settings, despite the close geographical proximity of core and peripheral regions through the scattered disposition of KwaZulu;

2 The economic growth in the core areas of Natal has had the impact of causing a large section of the Black population to be settled in close proximity to wealth generating areas, whilst remaining socially, economically and politically divorced from access to them;

3 The Natal economy dominates the economic output of the Natal/KwaZulu region, and that there is a growing gap in economic disparity between Natal and KwaZulu;

4 The Black urban population of Natal/KwaZulu is considerably larger than the level of 25% determined by the Central Statistical Services;
5 The inequalities between the core and periphery regions of Natal and KwaZulu will continue to widen, with highly pervasive socio-economic and political consequences irrespective of what is done at this stage to narrow the inequalities.

3 Outline of the Structure of the Study

To substantiate these hypotheses the study will use three main approaches:

1 A historical approach outlining the impact of colonialism, apartheid and separate development on the spatial distribution of the population in South Africa, and especially Natal/KwaZulu. This will be the subject of Chapter Two.

2 A theoretical approach discussing the core-periphery model, and its application to the Southern African region, as well as the modernisation/dependency debate in terms of its impact on shaping differing perspectives of the relationship between core and periphery regions and perspectives of the urbanisation process. This will be the subject of Chapter Three.

3 An empirical approach on the core-periphery structure of the Natal/KwaZulu regional economy, and the core-periphery
distribution of its population settlement, both between and within core-periphery regions, as well as the geographical distribution of the types of population settlement and the size of the urban population. An assessment of the size and distribution of the population in the Durban Functional Region will also be made. This will be the subject of Chapter Four.

Finally, in Chapter Five, the main conclusions will be drawn together from the three main Chapters outlined above, upon which the validity of the original core-periphery model (as presented by Friedmann) will be critically examined. Thereafter, the nature of the relationship between Natal and KwaZulu will be assessed in relation to whether it has contributed, and continues to contribute, to the underdevelopment of KwaZulu, and the implications thereof for the future evolution of population and urban settlement for the region.

The rest of this Chapter focuses on global population and urbanisation trends to highlight the difference between First and Third World characteristics, and applies the First and Third World distinction to South Africa.

Footnotes where applicable appear at the end of each Chapter.
The growth of towns and cities is a very recent phenomenon in relation to the length of human existence. Despite this, it could be said to have had the deepest impact on society than any other social transformation. The combination of its recent origins and the extent of its impact has meant that the world is only now beginning to realise how critical the proportions are, and is not fully equipped with the means to facilitate and accommodate the process.

The global urbanisation process can be divided into First and Third World trends. The urbanisation process began with today's industrially developed First World, with the Industrial Revolution in the United Kingdom in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Urbanisation has taken place on an international scale since the beginning of this century, once capitalism had spread to and become dominant in other countries that are now industrially advanced. However, it has only been in the last number of decades that urbanisation has become rapid in the underdeveloped Third World countries, at a pace and a magnitude far greater than it occurred in the First World.

These last few decades, which began around the 1950s, represents a structural shift in global urbanisation patterns. While urbanisa-
tion levels in the First World seem to be nearing full capacity, and its pace has somewhat slackened in more recent years (and is currently around 1.7% per annum) in the Third World it is taking place at a rate of over 4% per annum, and is expected to increase still further in the future. In 1975 the urbanised population sizes of the First and Third Worlds were roughly equal, yet the First World was 67% urbanised and the Third World contained 1.1 billion people in comparison to 2.9 million people in the First World. It is expected that, by the year 2000, over half the total population of the world will be urbanised - and that this urban population will number 3.15 billion people. The Third World share of this population will be twice as high as that of the First World, even though the urbanisation level in the Third World is expected to be 43% in comparison to the level in the First World of 78% (Tyler Miller, 1979: 210-212).

The socio-economic and political implications of such rapid urbanisation in the Third World are indeed critical in that they are least equipped to absorb their growing urban populations. This means that the impact of future urbanisation will press most heavily upon the societies of the world that are at present the most deficient in economic, technological and managerial resources that are essential for the accommodation of very high urbanisation rates.
The contrast between First and Third World population and urbanisation trends is important to an understanding of population and urbanisation trends in South Africa. Although South Africa is frequently referred to as a First World country, it contains characteristics of both First and Third World countries.

Although South Africa was ranked 9th wealthiest of 59 middle-income countries according to the World Bank Development Report of 1988, in terms of the poverty in the Reserves and the unequal distribution of income between the population groups the ranking should be much lower. The World Bank Development Report has placed South Africa in the middle-income category for some years, and this ranking is based on the average indicators of social well-being which does not reflect the internal socio-economic disparities. Nattrass pointed out that in relation to life expectancy, infant deaths, child deaths and population growth South Africa ranks among the least developed countries of the world, with KwaZulu as low as one of the ten poorest (Nattrass, 1983:6).

In terms of population growth, Table 1.1 shows the results of various official censuses between 1904 and 1985 for South Africa, by population groups (excluding the 'independent' TBVC states).
From this Table it is evident that the Black population group is by far the largest population group, and has grown more rapidly than the other population groups throughout this century.

This is clarified further in Table 1.2 which shows the changing racial composition of the population for this century (based on Table 1.1).

The Black population proportion of the total population increased from 67% to 76% between 1904 and 1985 while the White population decreased from 22% to 14%. The Coloured and Asian proportions remain fairly consistent throughout this period, which indicates that their growth rates were somewhat higher than that of the White population, but lower than that of the Black population.

Turning to the urbanised proportion of the population of South Africa, Table 1.3 shows the following important trends:

1) The size of the Black urban population, according to official census results, has increased throughout this century to where it is roughly half the size of the total urbanised population of South Africa;

2) Despite the large size of the Black urban population, it is still the least urbanised of all the population groups;
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<td>2 373</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>11 418</td>
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<tr>
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<td>8 560</td>
<td>2 642</td>
<td>1 103</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>12 672</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>10 928</td>
<td>3 088</td>
<td>1 509</td>
<td>477</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>15 340</td>
<td>3 773</td>
<td>2 051</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>21 794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>20 365</td>
<td>4 488</td>
<td>2 601</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>28 285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985*</td>
<td>22 038</td>
<td>4 574</td>
<td>2 838</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>30 275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985e</td>
<td>27 146</td>
<td>4 947</td>
<td>2 862</td>
<td>861</td>
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Source: Department of Statistics Reports, 1904 - 1985

1 As enumerated (excludes 'independent' Black States)

### TABLE 1.2

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>1985¹</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
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**Source:** Table 1.1

¹ Based on HSRC adjusted estimate which includes 'independent' Black States.
The White, Coloured and Asian population groups have urbanised more rapidly than the black population throughout the century and, despite the large size of the Black urban population, are the most urbanised population groups.

While it is clear from Table 1.3 that the Black urban population has grown fairly rapidly throughout this century, it should be pointed out the statistics under the second main column of the Table suggest that the level of Black urbanisation has only increased marginally between 1951 and 1970 (27.2 and 33.1% respectively) and to an even lesser extent between 1970 and 1980 (33.1 and 33.4% respectively). Does this mean that the level of Black urbanisation has come to a halt? No, it will be argued in Chapter Four of this thesis that these figures of the Black urban population (supplied by the Central Statistical Services) are misleading and do not reveal the full extent of Black urbanisation, due to an inadequate definition by the Central Statistical Services of an urbanised population. The Central Statistical Services statistics reveal only the Black urban population that falls within areas controlled by officially recognised local authorities, and thereby omits many informal dwellers who are, to all intents and purposes urbanised.
### TABLE 1.3  
THE URBANISED POPULATION OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1904-1980  
(Excluding 'Independent' TBVC States)

#### URBANISED POPULATION (1 000s)

<table>
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<th>Coloureds</th>
<th>Asians</th>
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<td>353</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>45</td>
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<td>1911</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1 463</td>
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<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>1 751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>1 307</td>
<td>1 142</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>3 010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1 719</td>
<td>1 689</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>4 148</td>
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<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>2 071</td>
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<td>713</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>5 397</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3 471</td>
<td>1 031</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>7 481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3 274</td>
<td>5 070</td>
<td>1 520</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>10 411</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>3 965</td>
<td>6 494</td>
<td>1 983</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>13 167</td>
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#### LEVEL OF URBANISATION (%)

<table>
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<td>49,9</td>
<td>33,5</td>
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<td>12,5</td>
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<td>65,2</td>
<td>17,3</td>
<td>53,9</td>
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<td>1946</td>
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<td>58,2</td>
<td>70,2</td>
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<td>1960</td>
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<td>31,8</td>
<td>68,3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>86,8</td>
<td>33,1</td>
<td>74,1</td>
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<td>47,8</td>
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<td>1980</td>
<td>88,8</td>
<td>33,4</td>
<td>77,2</td>
<td>91,3</td>
<td>48,2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Department of Statistics Census Reports, 1904-1980.*
Despite the inadequacies in the official statistics relating to Black urbanisation trends, the following broad conclusions can nevertheless be made concerning First and Third World population and urbanisation trends in South Africa:

1) It would seem that the White, Coloured and Asian population groups have virtually completed their urbanisation process, and presently have reasonably low rates of urban growth—which is a characteristic of First World population and urbanisation trends.

2) It would seem that the Black population group has a very large urban population which is growing very rapidly, along with high levels of overall population growth—which is a characteristic of Third World population and urbanisation trends.

The Third World nature of Black population and urbanisation trends will have a strong impact on shaping the future socio-economic and political scenario in South Africa. For this reason it is important that studies on urbanisation and demography focus primarily on the implications of Black population and urbanisation trends. This study aims to make a contribution to this need through examining the core-periphery aspects of population and urbanisation trends in Natal/KwaZulu.
Having drawn attention to the combination and magnitude of First and Third World urbanisation and population trends in South Africa in this chapter, the following chapter will examine the historical impact of racial segregation on urbanisation in South Africa, and Natal/KwaZulu to reveal how and why the First/Third World relationship emerged.
Conclusion

The process of urbanisation, although a recent phenomenon in relation to the period of human existence, is an unprecedented social transformation in terms of its rapidity and magnitude, having taken place on an international scale since the beginning of this century.

While the industrially developed First World countries seem to be nearing full capacity in their urbanisation levels, together with slackening rates of urban and population growth, urbanisation and population growth in the industrially less-developed Third World, which became rapid only in the past number of decades, has been of a magnitude far greater than which was experienced previously in presently industrially advanced First World countries. The socio-economic and political implications of such rapid urbanisation and population growth in the Third World, which is expected to increase with further rapidity in the future, are critical in that Third World countries are least equipped in economic, technological and managerial skills and human potential necessary to accommodate it.

The sharp contrast between First and Third World urbanisation and demographic patterns has an important bearing for South Africa, which contains a stark combination of First and Third World characteristics. As noted above, the White, Coloured and Asian
population groups have virtually completed their urbanisation process, and presently have reasonably low rates of population growth (conforming to First World trends), the Black population group has a very large urban complement which is burgeoning rapidly in tandem with high levels of overall population growth (conforming to Third World trends).

For this reason it is important that studies on urbanisation and demography should focus primarily on the implications of rapid Black urbanisation and population growth for South Africa as a whole, in that the future South African socio-economic and political scenario is likely to be shaped primarily by the way in which the Black population group continues to urbanise.
Footnotes

1. The four major classifications of the population groups, according to the Population Registration Act of 1950, are 'White', 'Coloured', 'Asian' and 'Native' (subsequently 'Bantu', then 'Black'). Although this study uses this terminology it is merely for the purposes of clarity and not for the purpose of legitimising apartheid legislation. In certain unavoidable cases the terms 'Native' and 'Bantu' do appear as a result of reference to early legislation. The term 'reserve' is used where possible instead of the term 'homeland' which has racist connotations.
CHAPTER TWO

THE HISTORICAL IMPACT OF COLONIALISM, APARTHEID AND SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT ON SPATIAL PATTERNS OF POPULATION SETTLEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA AND NATAL/KWAZULU

The difference between First and Third characteristics in South Africa, and particularly the magnitude of population growth and urbanisation amongst the Black group, has a strong spacial dimension in terms of the geographical dispersion of population settlement. The main purpose of this Chapter is essentially twofold: firstly it is to provide a background interest for the Chapters that follow, and secondly (and more importantly) it is to emphasise the extent to which the political history of South Africa, and Natal/KwaZulu, has had on shaping the present spatial nature of population settlement. This Chapter begins with colonialism and the laying of the African reserves, then examines the emergence and development of apartheid capitalism and finally focuses on the modern era of separate development. By relating the impact of political evolution on spatial patterns of population settlement, together with the transition of the economy from being predominantly agrarian to industrial capitalist and its subsequent evolution, it is intended to show that the present urban and economic crisis is not merely a contemporary product but a manifestation of a process that is firmly entrenched in the past.

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Colonialism and the Laying of the African Reserves

The history of the urbanisation process in Natal/KwaZulu can be seen to have had its origins in the era of colonial conquest during the second half of the nineteenth century. This period was marked by conflict between the White settlers and the indigenous population over rights to the occupation of land. Subsistence agriculture (i.e. for self-consumption rather than for sale in the market) was the sole form of economic activity during and just prior to the arrival of the first settlers in Natal. Hence, the issue over the occupation of land and who owned it was of primary importance, because it was becoming increasingly scarce with the growing population numbers. The Mfecane (land wars in the early nineteenth century during which the Zulu, Basotho and Ndebele nations were formed) were fought primarily over the occupation of land even before the arrival of the Dutch and British settlers, and with the inland movement of these settlers the problem of land scarcity became even more severe. Callinicos (1982: 6) comments on the conflict over land as follows:

The White trekkers only dimly understood what was happening to Black society. They too were subsistence farmers in search of new land. Nevertheless they profited from the Mfecane. Large areas were deserted. When Black farmers came from their places of refuge after the wars to their traditional pastures, White
settlers had already claimed them. There began a bitter struggle for land, first in the Eastern Cape between the Xhosa and the Dutch and later the British, then in Natal between the Zulus and the Dutch and the British, and then in the interior.

The subsequent policy of separate land areas for the different races (which persists to this day) is likely to have been the integrated result of arable land scarcity, the conflict for land between the settlers and the indigenous population and the need for a cheap labour supply for settler agriculture. This type of colonialism should be distinguished from most other kinds of colonialism that was taking place in the World at that time, and should strictly be termed 'internal' colonialism. The difference between 'internal' colonialism and other types of colonialism is explained by Rogerson as follows:

'Internal' is to be defined from 'normal' colonialism: in the former both the coloniser and the colonised people occupy the same territory, in the latter the colony constitutes a distinct geographic entity, spatially detached from its material metropoles. In all other important respects, the implication is that the components of the 'normal' imperial-colonial relation are to be found within the borders of a single state to the extent which justifies the view that it constitutes.
an internal colonialism (Rogerson, 1981).

Colonial conquest throughout the world led to the loss of exclusive use and control by indigenous populations over the land, and was usually accompanied by the extermination of large sections of such indigenous peoples by settlers. However, in South Africa, the Black population was not exterminated in great numbers but incorporated in a subordinate capacity into the economy for the purpose of performing a labour-supply function for the White economy (Browett, in Smith (ed), 1982:14).

The first separate land areas in South Africa for the indigenous peoples were in Natal, and had their origins with the 1846/7 Land Commission for Locating the Natives for the establishment of six Reserves. This Commission excluded the area north of the Tugela River which at that time was a powerful Zulu kingdom (until it was handed over to the Natal Government by the British in 1897).

The recommendation of the 1846/7 Commission were implemented by the Diplomatic Agent to the Native Tribes in Natal, who at that time was Sir Theophilus Shepstone. While the laying of the six Reserves was met with the problem of a lack of funds from the British Government (which led to supervisory problems) and were still somewhat inaccessible to settler farmers as a source of labour, by 1870, following the relocation of 90 000 people, there were over 300 000 Blacks confined to an area of just over 800 000
hectares in the Natal Colony (Browett, in Smith(ed), 1982:13).

Map 1, on the following page, shows the general distribution of these Reserves during the 1870s.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, but especially following the Anglo-Zulu War and the defeat of the Zulus by the British in 1879, the Zulu kingdom (the region north of the Tugela River) became encroached upon by the Boers from the South African Republic (present day Transvaal) who laid large claims to the land. Successive attempts by the British to halt this process failed, resulting in part of the region being annexed for the New Boer Republic in 1884. The New Boer Republic had a land surface of approximately 4 000 square miles, and existed in the present-day districts of Mtonjaneni, Babanango, Vryheid and Ngotshe (Surplus People Project, Vol 4, 1983:21). The New Boer Republic, although incorporated into the South African Republic in 1887, was handed back to the Natal Government in 1897, and from this time became completely open to White settlement. The relations of land ownership between the conquered indigenous peoples and the White rulers in this region conformed to that of 'internal' colonialism (discussed earlier) and is confirmed by the Surplus People Project (Vol.4, 1983: 21) as follows:

The Zulu people, whose land this once was, were not necessarily removed from these districts. Many con-
The Colony of Natal and the Distribution of the Reserves as Established in the 1850s
continued to live on the White farms as labour tenants or rate paying tenants, gradually brought under the increased control of both individual farmers and the State. Their status on their land had thus been fundamentally altered - their security of tenure now depended on the goodwill of their White landlord.

Following the mineral discoveries at the end of the nineteenth century and the political power struggle between the Boers of the South African Republic and the British over the access to mining capital and railway interests, and the culmination of this in the Anglo-Boer war (1899 - 1902) with British victory, the Natal Government appointed the 1902/04 Delimitations Commission to set aside a further 1 573 019 hectares for an additional 21 Reserves while the remaining 1 057 444 hectares were opened for purchase (Brookes and Webb, 1965:186). The purchasing of the remaining land outside the Reserves was restricted exclusively to the White population of the colony and consisted of areas, according to Marks (1970:128), that had the best grazing land as well as all the major sugar growing areas. It was in the sugar farming areas and the midland farming districts that the bulk of the White population came to dwell, while the urban core that serviced their agricultural economy was Pietermaritzburg, since Port Natal (present-day Durban) was still relatively undeveloped at this time. Map 2 shows the general outlay of the Reserves according to the 1902/04 Delimitations Commission.
The Distribution of the Reserves following the 1902/04 Delimitations Commission
The discovery of diamonds near Kimberley in 1867 and gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886 had, alongside the power struggle between the British and the Boers, a very significant impact on the economic structure of South Africa and Natal/KwaZulu. In a relatively short space of time, South Africa was transformed from a colonial society to an industrial, capitalist country. The rapid growth of the inland mining centres especially in the present-day PWV region created a need for a more efficient transport system for imports and exports, and the Durban-Witwatersrand rail link completed in October 1885 (Muller, 1981: 227) stimulated the growth of Durban as an important secondary urban centre in the South African national economy. The simultaneous opening up of new capitalist markets also provided a boost for White agriculture, through the increased demand for agricultural products in the rapidly growing urban centres. From this early time, the Durban-Witwatersrand corridor in Natal became an important development region, both for White agriculture and for the urban centres of Durban, Pietermaritzburg, Ladysmith and Newcastle. The Reserves in Natal, at this stage, were largely underdeveloped and spatially distanced from this developed corridor for it to provide economic stimulation to produce an agricultural surplus for marketing purposes. Consequently
agricultural output in the Reserves remained largely subsistence orientated, while the integration of the Reserves into the Natal economy became steadily restricted, not only as a labour supplier to White agriculture, but also to that of a provider of labour to the industries, of which most were situated in the urban cores.

The economic transformation in South Africa also had a profound impact on the spatial distribution of population settlement, through the generation of two main migration streams. The first was the permanent immigration of European migrants of which many were skilled workers and experienced in trade union activity. The second was an oscillatory migration pattern of Black labourers between the Reserves and the urban centres. Along with the rapid economic growth, and the high wage demands of European migrants, went an increasing demand for labour pegged to low wages, but while the Black population filled this need, very vigorous statutory controls largely prevented the permanent settlement of Black labourers in urban centres.

Following the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the 1913 Natives Land Act legally prohibited the sale of land outside the Reserves to Blacks as well as the purchase of land inside the Reserves to Whites. 10,5 million morgen of the land surface of South Africa was reserved for exclusive Black occupation, to which a further 7,25 million was added in terms of the 1936 Land Act Amendments. The statutory division of the land in
Natal reserved 22.8% for exclusive Black occupation in 1913, and this proportion rose to 27% in terms of the 1936 Land Act Amendments (Lacey, 1981:25). Since this time the basic structure of KwaZulu has remained fairly consistent, except for changes made through the KwaZulu consolidation process since 1975. It can be seen from Map 3 on the following page, which shows the present distribution of KwaZulu, that the original laying of the Reserves imposed a geographical structure of racial separation that has been perpetuated from colonial times to the present. The position of Vulindlela (next to Pietermaritzburg) and the KwaZulu districts north and south of Durban can be traced back to the 1850s, which is evident from a comparison between Map 1 and Map 3, while a comparison between Map 2 and Map 3 shows that the present configuration for the whole of KwaZulu was well established by the turn of the century.

Of all the restrictions on Black mobility, influx control has existed for the longest period, and dates back to 1797 when slaves of the Cape Colony were made to carry passes. Despite its recent abolition in 1986 influx control could be said to have been the main law (alongside the Land Acts and the Group Areas Act) that has sustained the oscillatory flow of Black labour between the Reserves and the White towns and cities, and thereby has served as a major pillar of the migrant labour system. In Natal, influx control was enacted for the first time in the Vagrancy Law (Act
The Present Distribution of KwaZulu
Number 15) of 1869 which regulated the presence of Blacks in the White residential areas of Durban and Pietermaritzburg after dark. In the early part of the twentieth century, the influx control system was upheld by the Union Government through the formulation of a uniform pass law system to control the movement of Blacks into the urban areas. The Stallard Commission of 1922 made the following recommendation regarding the control of Black mobility:

We consider that the history of the races, especially with regard to South African history, shows that the commingling of Black and White is undesirable. The Native should only be allowed to enter urban areas, which are essentially the White man's creation, when he is willing to enter and to administer to the needs of the White man, and should depart therefrom when he ceases to minister.

Following this the 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act, which legally entrenched these provisions on a country-wide basis, was introduced. This Act included the decision not to grant freehold rights to Blacks and introduced stricter de jure controls over their movement into urban areas, by making the qualification for permanent residence in urban areas more difficult for Blacks to acquire. It also stated that Government sub-economic housing would not be provided and that the Government would not accept the notion of permanency for Black urbanisation (Donald, 1981:22).
The Urban Areas Act was amended in 1930 (introducing curfews in White residential areas), in 1937 (giving additional powers to local municipalities) in 1945 (for the establishment of separate Black townships, in an attempt to house the informal population) and in 1952 (for the introduction of Section 10 provisions).

This firmly entrenched the principle of impermanence into the urban Black policies of the Government. A short-lived exception, however, was the Fagan Commission Report of 1948 under the brief reign of the United Party, just prior to the coming to power of the Nationalist Party later that year.

The Fagan Commission stressed, on the contrary, that the rural-urban flow of the Black population towards the White urban centres was a normal socio-economic phenomenon and that permanent Black urbanisation was neither practical nor desirable to reverse. It recommended the geographical stabilisation of the Black labour force, and outrightly rejected racial segregation. General J C Smuts said the following in October 1947 regarding the influx of Blacks to the cities:

"The problem that arises is not to stem this tide. You won't stem it here in the Peninsula and you won't stem it in Johannesburg ... The time is ripe when a new Native Policy has to provide ... for this new development" (quoted in Hellman, 1949:320).
This statement was echoed in the following section of the Fagan Commission:

It should be clear, firstly, that the idea of total segregation is utterly impracticable; secondly, that the movement from country to town has a background of economic necessity - that it may, so one hopes, be guided and regulated but it cannot be stopped or turned in the other direction; and thirdly, that in our urban areas there are not many Native migrant labourers, but there is also a permanent, settled Native population (Native Laws Commission Report [Fagan Report], 1948:19).

The prospects of putting the recommendation of the Fagan Report into practice were short lived, however, when the Nationalist Party returned to power in that same year. The Nationalist Party rejected the findings of the Fagan Commission, and placed further restrictive measures on the movement of Blacks to urban areas, based on the findings of the Stallard Commission of 1922, through the tightening and stricter enforcement of racial legislation.
2.2 1948 to the Present

The Nationalist Party applied racial legislation to the urban areas through the introduction of the Group Areas Act Number 41/1950. The Group Areas Act designated separate residential areas for each race group (according to the Population Registration Act of 1950) which has had a substantial spatial impact on urbanisation settlement patterns in South African urban centres. It more effectively implemented the separation of the race groups in the urban setting through giving the State more control over inter-racial property transactions and over the private occupation of land in residential areas (Horrell, 1956). The Group Areas Act, which came into operation on 30 March 1951, allowed for racial mixing in the work and market places but not in the residential areas, and a Durban Housing Survey summarised its main principles as follows:

1. There should be consolidated residential areas for each race group;

2. Each consolidated area should be so placed as to have access to a growth hinterland for future development;

3. The consolidated areas should, wherever possible, be separated from each other by strong physical barriers (eg. a river valley). As a second option strong man-made barriers
should be used (eg. railways, highways etc.). In the event of neither of these options being available, ‘buffer zones’ of open space should be employed as a divide;

4 Each group should have access to and from the work zone where interaction is permissible (and indeed, obligatory). In the process of movement to and from the work zone, however, no ethnic group should cross the residential area of another. Consequently, ‘ethnic islands’ should also be avoided;

5 The Black areas should be located as closely as possible to the work centres, since it is they who will have to bear transport costs on low wages; and

6 Each area should become self-governed and should become as functionally independent as possible of all other areas. Areas should proceed towards equality in all respects (Durban Housing Survey, 1952, cited in Davis and McCarthy, 1984:34-36).

The Group Areas Act affected the Indian and Coloured population groups more directly than it affected the Black population, whose freedom of movement and settlement was, by this time, already severely restricted. However, while the Group Areas Act led to the relocation of many Indians and Coloureds (as well as a marginal number of Whites) to conform with segregated settlement.
dictates, many Blacks were relocated to make way for the residential areas of all three other groups. Blacks that had urbanised in the inner-city areas prior to the introduction of the Group Areas Act were relocated to the outer-city areas (and further) while their urban settlement since this has been largely confined to the outer-city areas, mostly inside the Reserves.

Group Areas proclamations were first made in Durban in the 1950s, while the first forced removals and property expropriations began in the 1960s (Surplus Peoples Project, Vol 4, 1983:220). Although it is not possible to estimate the number of Blacks affected by Group Areas removals (since it has not been officially recorded), in Natal a total of 23,227 Indian, 3,588 Coloured and 814 White families had been moved by 1981 (South African Institute of Race Relations, 1981:210). The Act also served to protect White trading interests, especially against Indian entrepreneurs, while many small Indian traders in the Durban area were forced either to close or relocate (Surplus Peoples Project, Vol 4, 1983:227).

Complementing this, influx control legislation was strengthened, as mentioned earlier, by the Native (Urban Areas) Amendment Act of 1952 through the introduction of Section 10 provisions for Blacks in White designated urban areas. In terms of this Act no Black person could remain for longer than 72 hours in any White designated area unless:
1. He/she had been born there and had lived there ever since;

2. He/she had worked for a single employer in the same area for an uninterrupted period of not less than ten years, or had resided legally in the area for an uninterrupted period of fifteen years, and had not been sentenced to a fine exceeding R500 or to imprisonment for a period exceeding six months;

3. Wives (one), daughters (unmarried) and sons (under the age of eighteen years) of those qualifying under (1) or (2) above;

4. Special permission granted to seek temporary employment as a contract or migrant labourer.

These enhanced restrictions (although recently removed) could be said to have greatly increased the cost of urbanising for the rural-urban migrant, both in terms of not being able to reside in, or close to, the same area for more than two consecutive nights while seeking employment and through the legal penalties that would be imposed if such stipulations were transgressed. Influx control and the carrying of passbooks has been said to be one of the most hated of apartheid laws by Black people, and between 1916 and 1981 17 million Blacks were arrested for pass law offences (Schlemmer and Giliomee, 1985:1). Despite the practice of influx control, ‘illegal’ entry into the urban areas occurred on an ever
increasing scale, and for this reason the President’s Council Report (1985:148) on urbanisation recommended that influx control was no longer workable, and showed evidence of this in terms of the rapid increase in pass law arrests from 158 400 in 1980 to 238 900 in 1984.

Concomitant with the tightening of urban statutory controls soon after the coming to power of the Nationalist Government, went the implementation of the policy of separate development. The intention of separate development was to enforce racial separation through the creation of separate but ‘equal’ facilities for the respective population groups (Nattrass, 1981:223). The cornerstone of this policy was to turn the Reserves into ‘independent national states’, and to have them operate on the lines of separate socio-economic and political entities between each other and with the rest of South Africa. To this effect Dr H F Verwoerd, who heralded this policy, stated in 1959:

> We are giving the Bantu as our wards every opportunity to move along a road of development by which they can progress in accordance with their ability (cited in Giliomee, 1985:39).

A significant measure to implement separate development was the Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 which statutorily divided the Reserves into eight ethnic territorial authorities and abolished
Black representation in the South African Parliament. Another measure was the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970 which forced all Blacks to become citizens of the ethnic territorial authorities in accordance with their tribal affiliations. With this, the official control over the rural-urban movement of Blacks fell to the Labour Bureaus, which were to regulate the influx of Black labour in accordance with the employment needs of the economy of South Africa. The political philosophy of separate development was therefore clearly intended to make Black people, irrespective of whether they were employed in South Africa or a Reserve, a member of a specific and separate ‘nation’ other than of South Africa, and to enjoy citizenship rights only in the separate ‘nation’ to which they were attached in terms of ethnicity.

Separate development also aimed to stem and reverse the process of Black urbanisation, and to contain Black urbanisation within the Reserves wherever it was not possible to stem or reverse it. This is clear from the following request from the Secretary for the Department of Bantu Administration to local authorities in 1969 to consider the following two proposals:

1. Where a (White) city was situated in the vicinity of a Reserve the Blacks employed in such a town should be accommodated on a family basis in a Black township in the Reserve concerned; and
Should the distance between the city and the nearest Reserve be too far to make it feasible for Blacks to travel to and from work on a daily basis, the families should nevertheless be accommodated in the Reserve while hostel accommodation would be provided for the workers in the urban areas. The workers would be able to visit their families periodically (Cited in Haarhoff, 1984: 178).

It was later announced, on the basis of the above, by the Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration in May 1971 that the official planners had considered it feasible for the daily transportation of workers over a distance of 70 miles, and over a distance of up to 400 miles on a weekend basis (Haarhoff, 1984: 178). Along with this went the increased allocation of Government finance for housing in the Reserves, and policies were implemented to inhibit Black urban development in White urban areas. To this effect, it was made compulsory for local authorities to have approval from the principle of the Department of Bantu Administration for any housing scheme (Morris, 1981:77).

The implementation of separate development also led to the forced removal of large numbers of Blacks from so-called 'black spots' (mostly freehold land, acquired prior to the 1913 Land Act, situated in White designated areas) and their resettlement in highly congested settlements inside the Reserves. The Native
Resettlement Act of 1954 facilitated the removal of Blacks from rural areas (mainly in the White agricultural areas) while the Native (Urban Areas) Amendment Act of 1955 facilitated the removal of Black residential areas from White urban areas.

Between 1960 and 1982 a total of 745,000 Blacks were removed from Natal, with an additional 622,000 under threat of removal (Surplus People Project, Vol. 4, 1983). Map 4, on the following page, shows the directions of the major relocations that have taken place between 1960 and 1982. This Map shows that most of the relocations have taken place in the Natal Midlands, involving a spatial transfer of Black people from Natal to KwaZulu.

In South Africa the total number of people removed between 1960 and 1982 was 3,372,900, with an additional 1,740,500 people under threat of removal (Surplus People Project, Vol. 1: 8). Cilliers and Groenewald (1982: 29) note that 95% of all removals in South Africa since 1956 affected Black people, of which the majority were relocated in urban areas inside the Reserves. Whites, Coloureds and Asians have also been affected but on a much smaller scale.

Mandy (1984: 90) notes that in South Africa, by 1982, 77,930 Coloureds had been relocated (with 7,376 remaining under threat), 36,747 Indians (8,457 remaining under threat) and a much smaller number of 1,773 Whites (187 remaining under threat). The Buthe-
The Directions of Major Relocations Between 1960 and 1982
The lezi Commission noted that the 1975 consolidation proposals to reduce the forty scattered land units of KwaZulu to ten units would involve the forced removal of between 300,000 to 500,000 Black people from Natal.

The process of relocation has had the spatial impact of a geographical displacement of many Black people from Natal to KwaZulu, through enforced physical movement. In addition, boundary adjustments between Natal and KwaZulu have also resulted in Blacks being partially displaced without physical relocation, for example by the incorporation of Umlazi (in the 1960s) and KwaMashu and Edendale (in the 1970s) into KwaZulu. With this the administration of these townships was transferred from Natal to the KwaZulu Government.

Despite a rapid level of economic growth up to the end of the 1970s in South Africa, with gross domestic product having increased at an average of 8% since the turn of the century (Nattrass, 1985:3), the regional concentration of economic activity continued to intensify, resulting in an overriding dominance of economic output by a small number of urban centres, but especially that of the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging region, which in 1975 produced 41% of the gross domestic product of Southern Africa (Fair, 1982:52), and the seaports which have facilitated trading to and from the gold fields, i.e. Durban.
The highly localised nature of economic activity can be attributed firstly to the geological dispersion of rich mineral deposits in northern and western areas of South Africa, and its attraction to industrial and commercial enterprises, and secondly by the entrenchment of racial legislation. Nattrass (1981:181) pointed out that in 1975, 81% of South Africa's industrial output was produced in the four major metropolitan regions. Of the 272 administrative districts (263 magisterial districts and 9 Black homelands) in 1972, only 54 (ie. 20%), had industrial capacities large enough to enable industry to contribute 20% or more to the district's total output. Along with the unequal regional concentration of wealth went an increasing level of differentiation in living standards, and to this effect Nattrass (1981) estimated that the richest 10% of South Africa had an average income per capita of R1 215 while for the poorest 10% of South Africa it was R100.

In an attempt to narrow the extent of economic polarisation, and to raise the standards of living in the Reserves, the Government formulated decentralisation and deconcentration policies. Two important cornerstones of this policy have been the Tomlinson Commission and the Good Hope Plan.

The Tomlinson Commission which investigated the prospects for industrial deconcentration reported in 1954 that industrial growth should be encouraged, by means of creating economic incentives to
potential investors, in various growth points inside the Reserves. The recommendation to locate industry inside the Reserves was not accepted initially by the Government who strictly reserved incentives for the location of industry in the 'Border Areas' lying adjacent to the Reserves. Incentives to attract industrialists to the areas have been the assistance in the erection of fixed capital, low-rate loans, transport rebates, housing provision (for White personnel) as well as the relaxation of job reservation and minimum wage legislation (Nattrass, 1981:183). These concessions were also increased in 1964, 1968 and 1972, in a bid to stimulate the process. In 1969, the Government allowed industry to locate inside the Reserves for the first time, but only on an 'agency basis'. The 'agency basis' meant that they were not to own land or buildings permanently.

However, economic decentralisation policies do not seem to have had much success. A BENS study (1976) estimated that, by 1974, only 11,500 Blacks were employed by industries located inside all the Reserves, while an additional 37,000 commuted from the Reserves to the industries that were established in the 'Border Areas'. In addition, inequalities in wealth generation continued to widen between the Reserves and South Africa between 1968 and 1972. To this effect Nattrass (1981:183) stated:

It seems highly likely that despite Government efforts, spatial inequality has widened in South Africa.
Certainly over the period 1968-72 the growth rates of output were higher on average in the richest top 20% of the districts and lowest in the districts that comprised the poorest 20%.

A more recent industrial decentralisation programme, the Good Hope Plan for Southern Africa, was announced on the 12 November 1981. This programme defined eight development regions for South Africa with the highest priority given to the Eastern Cape/Ciskei and the Natal/KwaZulu region, as well as 20 industrial development points in the White areas and 27 in the Black areas. It recommended that economic growth should take place in the development regions, both inside and adjacent to the Reserves, through further increasing the financial incentives to potential investors. While it is very difficult to ascertain the impact of the Good Hope Plan, in that it has only been implemented recently, there seems to have been little success to date. This is most evident in terms of the expenditure on investment in relation to the creation of employment.

Fair (1982:65) noted that by 1978 about 25 000 jobs were created in the Reserves with an additional 44 000 in the 'border areas', while the total investment for this by the Government and the Private Sector amounted to over R1 000 million. Although this does represent some local diffusion of economic activity, it means that only 4 500 jobs per year were created while, Fair notes,
approximately 100,000 Blacks entered the labour market per year.
The Decentralisation Board (1982) estimated that between 1960 and
1981 a maximum of 206,744 jobs were created in decentralisation
points throughout South Africa while McCarthy (1983) estimated
that there were 120,000 job entrants to the Reserve labour market
each year throughout this period. In addition, Fair stressed that
most of this employment creation had taken place, not in the
outlying peripheral regions, but in close proximity to existing
metropolitan centres. The Reserves also seemingly benefitted
little from the growth of commerce.

Fair (1982:66) noted that, in 1975, roughly only 15.8% of South
African Black purchasing power accrued to the homelands. In terms
of Government expenditure on the reserves, Nattrass (1981:180)
noted that although it trebled between 1970 to 1975 the gap in the
level of development between South Africa and the Reserves still
widened, and stressed that the widening gap can be largely
attributed to the fact that, while the public sector is by far the
largest in the Reserves' economies and that 80% of it came from
the Central Government, only 21% of the total was used for
investment in development projects in relation to a very high
percentage used for running expenses (mainly administration
costs). Industrial dispersal policies have also been exceedingly
expensive, amounting to a total of R521 million by 1985/6 (Glaser,
It is possible to link the lack of success of industrial dispersion policies with separate development, in that it has not made provision for integrated economic development, but on the contrary has merely served to sustain the role of the Reserves as a labour supplier to South Africa, and has ignored the importance of rural development in the Reserves to alleviate the urban congestion that accommodates economic congestion. As an economic measure to reduce the pressure of Black urbanisation, by keeping Blacks out of the cities, and to add legitimacy to the political structures of the Reserves, it also seems to have failed. To this effect, Bell (1987:215) states:

From the beginning of the recession in late 1981, and with the simultaneous introduction of the Good Hope Conference package of decentralisation incentives, to 1984 or perhaps later, the financial inducements almost certainly had a significant impact. Nevertheless, they may not have been a major factor in the observed long-term trend towards deconcentration; nor are they likely to be in the future.

Although, the impact of industrial dispersion policies did have some impact on alleviating economic and demographic concentration, it can be said that this impact has been (and will continue to be) marginal, through having taken place within the parameters of separate development, and subsequently has not led to the socio-
economic integration of the Reserve economies with the South African economy through having served to sustain the labour export function of the Reserves.

It could be said that a culmination of the racial segregationist measures practiced in South Africa since the days of colonialism is the current economic recession. Although the recession is not directly linked with separate development, in that it is part of global recessional malaise affecting many countries, it can be argued that the constraints placed on the movement and settlement of Blacks, and the restrictions placed on a more meaningful integration of the Black population into the fabric of the modern economy and society (which has been almost exclusively reserved for the White population) are significant contributory factors to the economic recession in South Africa, and the perpetuation of racial segregation further exacerbates the recessionary climate.

Despite efforts by the Government to redress the situation, especially in terms of industrial dispersion policies discussed above, real economic growth grew at an average annual increase of only 1.1% between 1980 and 1985 while the total population for South Africa grew at an average of 2.5% per annum for the same period (South African Institute of Race Relations, 1986:62). The South African Reserve Bank (1987) estimated that in August 1986 the South African economy operated at three-quarters of its 1980 level, that manufacturing sector activity fell by 8% between these
years, and that the overall level of business activity had declined by 4.5% between August 1985 and August 1986.

Rising unemployment and underemployment, deepening rural poverty, mushrooming informal settlements and increasing social unrest in the urban areas, alongside the economic recession, are likely to have been strong factors behind the President’s Council report entitled *An Urbanisation Strategy for the Republic of South Africa*, set up in early 1983, to reformulate the urban policies of the Government. The Report was significant in that, for this first time (with the exception of the Fagan Report of 1948, under the United Party), it recommended an acceptance of the inevitability and economic desirability of Black urbanisation, as confirmed in section 1.19:

The challenge as regards the South African problem of urbanisation lies in finding a positive approach, which recognises the common features and inevitabilities of urbanisation trends all over the world, and is designed to deal with these, as well as the acceptance, accommodation and effective economic and socio-cultural integration of the urban population as a whole, in as orderly and cost-effective manner as possible.

It argued further that influx control was a negative force in the process of orderly urbanisation, calling for a positive urbanisa-
tion strategy (in section 9.152) as follows:

...neither the present system nor any other direct form of 'negative' influx control should be retained. There is, however, a need for a positive approach to urbanisation that would allow the orderliness of the process to be promoted. It is necessary for influx control to be replaced by a positive urbanisation strategy that, by making use of market forces, subsidies and development, among other things, will encourage people to settle in certain suitable areas rather than forbidding them to move to certain urban areas.

With respect to industrial decentralisation, the Report stated (paragraph 5.29):

Future urbanisation linked to industrial development should be spread over larger geographical areas and therefore more evenly, with a reasonable degree of stimulation of urban development in the outer-peripheral areas of certain metropolitan areas and large towns and not so much in remote border areas.

It is difficult to comment on the likely impact of the President's Council Report given its recent introduction. However, it does signify a shift from direct prohibitions over the movement and
settlement patterns of the urban Black population to more indirect measures, such as regionally differentiated financial penalties and incentives designed to influence settlement patterns (Hindson, 1987:89). Despite this it seems that the Government will remain committed to residential segregation along racial lines. Although influx control was abolished on the 1 July 1986, as well as the abolition of the African (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act No. 25 of 1945 (as amended) which does away with Section 10 rights, further measures have taken, and are taking place, that would suggest that the President's Council Report is not a departure from separate development, but rather a refinement of separate development. Evidence to this effect can be found in the proposed structure of the Regional Services Councils, as well as in the proposed Group Areas Amendment Bill and the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment Bill.

Regional Services Councils (RSCs) had their origins in 1985 when the Government seriously began to seek a means of financing the operations of local and regional authorities in the place of direct Government grants. With most services (especially water, electricity and sewerage) being very expensive to provide, and the pressure placed on the Government to seek additional sources of revenue, the Permanent Finance Liaison Committee reported to Parliament in 1983 that additional revenue for municipalities was necessary, and that wealth needed to be redistributed from wealthy to poor communities. Upon acceptance of this recommendation the
Regional Services Councils Act 109 was passed by the Government in 1985, and the main aims of the RSCs can be outlined as follows:

1. To rationalise the allocation of resources;
2. To redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor;
3. To introduce 'multi-racial democracy' at the local level;
4. To assist in regional decentralisation; and

To achieve these aims the RSCs propose to:

1. Enable services to be rendered on a regional, rather than on a local, scale and to consolidate the administration of these services 'under one roof';

2. Determine the areas of greatest need, especially the under-serviced Black urban areas, and to give them top priority in terms of infrastructural services and facilities;

3. Be served by representatives from both White and Black communities;
4 Levy taxes on businesses in urban areas to encourage them to relocate to outlying rural areas; and

5 Enable Government ministers to have a greater say in the upgrading of urban areas (Juta's RSC Report, July 1987: 1-11).

While the RSCs would seem, at face value, to be a Government-initiated move to remove interregional socio-economic and political disparities, there are inherent contradictions that suggest that this will not be achieved, for the following reasons:

1 The RSC are Central Government creations, and very little direct consultation with the Black community has taken place to date in the planning process. Because of this, it is likely that the Government will have considerable difficulty in making the Black community accept the RSCs. For this reason it would seem that Blacks will view the RSCs with suspicion and Black boycotts of the RSCs is highly likely. In April 1986 an RSC was proposed for metropolitan Durban, to be followed by others for Pietermaritzburg as well as for other urban areas in Natal/KwaZulu where local authorities are in close proximity. To date, however, the implementation of RSCs in Natal/KwaZulu has come to a standstill as a result of the refusal of the KwaZulu Government to play a part in them. RSCs rely heavily on the willingness of Blacks to
participate in them and without such co-operation the councils cannot fulfil any of their intended aims;

2 Although the RSCs are to be multi-racial they are not non-racial in that, although they are to be served by representatives of both White and Black communities, representation will be made on a strictly segregated basis: Whites will represent White communities and Blacks will represent Black communities. Communities will not vote for an RSC of its own choice, they will also not vote directly for RSC members but instead vote for a town council or a local authority which, in turn, will appoint their own RSC members. Furthermore, members of RSCs will not serve in their personal capacities, but as representatives of a local authority or management body, and no more than five representatives will represent a single local authority;

3 Although sources of income through levies at 0.1% of business turnover and 0.25% of payroll might not seem excessive, the recessionary climate under which business operates is very likely to have the tendency for business to push up prices to maintain profit margins and to become more capital intensive than labour intensive. It can therefore be expected that the effect of the levies will be stagflatory (i.e. higher rates of inflation with higher rates of unemployment simultaneously). Businesses can also be expected to minimise their intake of
new labour. Although it is illegal for businesses to add
levies to their prices under Section 12(7) of the Regional
Services Councils Act 109/1985, it would be very difficult,
if not impossible, for the Government to control it;

4. In view of the strong possibility of business pushing up
prices to compensate for the levies it is ultimately the
consumer who will be paying the levies. Given that Blacks
constitute the majority of the population, a redistribution
of wealth seems unlikely.

It therefore seems that in terms of the three major objectives of
the RSCs (namely, cost-effective services, racial democracy and a
redistribution of wealth from rich to poor communities) there is
little chance of measurable success, in that regional disparities
are likely to persist.

As already discussed, one of the major cornerstones of separate
development has been the Group Areas Act. Through the Group Areas
Act Blacks have had to contend with high transport costs, exces-
sive travelling time between home and work, a lack of local
employment opportunities and a lack of physical access to shopping
amenities. While the Group Areas Act can be said to have largely
succeeded in its aims of engineering people of different race
groups into separate residential areas, as well as strengthening
the economic position of the White group, it also seems that in
practice the Government has not been able to apply the theory of the Group Areas Act in its entirety. The slowing down in the rate of economic output since the late 1970s, and its associated problems of growing unemployment, poverty, housing backlogs and increased political pressure, together with the sheer magnitude to Black urbanisation and population growth, seems to have forced the Government to make adjustments to allow, or accommodate, for a certain (and indeed minimal) amount of racial mixing. In this respect, three Group Areas Amendment Bills were introduced in the latter half of 1988, and are as follows:

1. A Free Areas Bill which sets up procedures for declaring certain areas open to all races;

2. A Group Areas Amendment Bill to strengthen existing legislation to facilitate the forced eviction of people living in group areas not zoned for their own race group; and

3. A third Bill concerning the voting rights of various race groups in open areas that fall under a single local authority (since local authorities are not racially mixed).

While the acceptance of open residential areas is progressive, it is clear that the Government is entrenching racial separation in all other respects. On the one hand the Government intends making allowances for the inevitable process of desegregation (of which
it has lost control), while on the other hand it is making efforts to control the process of urbanisation along a strictly racially segregated basis. It seems highly likely that, under the proposed Group Areas Amendments, that regional disparities will also persist. How the Government will deal with voting rights of people in open residential areas is also equivocal since this will require a distinction to be drawn between 'own affairs' and 'general affairs' while the Government is not likely to deviate from the existing franchise framework at Central Government level. Open residential areas will be declared only once this has been resolved, which would inevitably entail lengthy investigations and official consideration, which could take years to materialise. It is also likely to prevent people from moving into open areas until such time that the issue is clarified, and the administrative system that will eventually arise is likely to be complicated, cumbersome and expensive. Finally, the real intention of the draft legislation, which is to empower the Government to evict 'illegals' from premises and to confiscate such premises (even in the absence of alternative accommodation) is likely to have a devastating effect. This could well bring the existing unrest in the townships in to the centres and radicalise many middle-class Blacks.

Together with the draft legislation for the Group Areas act, the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment Bill was introduced. The intention of this Bill is to control the growth of informal
settlements through further restricting the existing rights of evicted informal dwellers to legal redress (informal dwellers would be able to be evicted even without the availability of alternative accommodation) and through the placing of a R10 000 fine (or five years imprisonment) upon owners of land and buildings which occupy informal populations, irrespective of whether this has occurred with or without the consent of the landowner. According to this Bill certain informal settlements will be declared ‘transitory’ areas (which will be supplied with a minimum of essential services) while land will be sought for ‘designated’ settlements. ‘Designated’ settlements are likely to take the form of low-cost housing projects, but it is unclear at this stage where the ‘designated’ areas will be. Yet it can be strongly speculated that they will be mainly within the Reserves.

Preliminary studies by the Inkatha Institute (Jeffrey, 1988) estimate that roughly between 340 000 to 350 000 informal dwellers in the Inanda region north of Durban reside outside KwaZulu on South African Development Trust Land. While these Trust controlled areas are earmarked for consolidation into KwaZulu, the timing and exact nature of the consolidation is still unclear. In addition, this area is also earmarked for upgrading, but it is also not clear whether the upgrading will entail that of the existing informal settlements or the removal of the informal settlements to make way for the implementation of new housing projects. Notwithstanding this, it does seem that the future of
the informal dwellers in the Inanda region falling within the Trust controlled area is somewhat uncertain, especially in terms of the pending amendment legislation. Should the Amendment Bill be implemented many of these people could face forced eviction. If these people are evicted, it is unlikely that they would settle in rural KwaZulu, given the low resource capacity to sustain its population at present. Instead, it seems likely that they would move into, or erect new, informal settlements inside KwaZulu surrounding the Durban-Pinetown metropole. The result of this would be to contain informal urbanisation inside KwaZulu, and extensively compound the already volatile social and economic conditions that exist in the informal settlements of KwaZulu, especially in terms of health, political unrest and faction fighting. There are also extensive informal settlements outside of KwaZulu in the Pietermaritzburg region.

On the rural side of the spectrum, Natal contains remnants of the labour tenancy system, which exists despite its statutory abolition in the mid-1960s. This is particularly prevalent in the Vryheid, Utrecht and Paulpietersburg districts of Northern Natal, where the concentration of Black rural subsistence agriculture is relatively high (Jeffrey, 1988). In terms of the Amendment Bill rural Blacks not in direct employment, which includes retired people and the dependents of employees, will face eviction. As with urban informal dwellers who could be evicted, the rural dwellers are also unlikely to settle in rural KwaZulu. It is more
likely that they would settle mainly in the urbanising sections of KwaZulu such as Madadeni near Newcastle, Emnambithi next to Ladysmith, the northern areas of Nqutu near Vryheid, mostly in peri-urban and informal settlements. A certain number would possibly move down to the urban areas of KwaZulu next to Pietermaritzburg and Durban-Pinetown.

It would therefore seem that, given certain of the latest political measures of the Government pertaining to Black urbanisation, that official urban planning will continue along separate development lines. With this regional urban and socio-economic disparities will inevitably persist, along with a continued economic recession together with an expanding Black urban population. This situation is likely to sustain the adverse situation of growing unemployment, housing backlogs, mushrooming of informal settlements, lack of services and infrastructure to informal and peri-urban settlements, ill-health, criminal activities, political unrest (which could well spread to the urban centres) and friction between tribal factions.
Conclusion

This Chapter has shown that racial segregation in South Africa, and Natal/KwaZulu, has had a long history dating back to early colonial times. The perpetuation of racial segregation since the transition from an economy based primarily on agricultural production to an industrial capitalist economy had the effect of relegating the economies of the Reserves from labour suppliers to settler agriculture prior to the mineral discoveries before the turn of the century, and to labour suppliers to capitalist industry (as well as to White commercial agriculture) subsequent to the mineral discoveries.

Apartheid and separate development (which has been argued to be merely a refinement of apartheid) has had three major impacts. Firstly, it has constrained the pace at which Black urbanisation took place, secondly, it severely restricted the socio-economic integration of the Black urban population into the fabric of the First World socio-economy and, thirdly, it has sustained the regional disparities of economic concentration and population congestion. The consequences have been artificially distorted yet highly engrained spatial patterns of urbanised settlement whereby the Black urban population has become fettered by its ambient Third World underdeveloped conditions, and as a corollary highly dependent on the First World economy for employment.
The various political measures undertaken by the Nationalist Government to redress regional disparities, through separate development policies aimed at homeland 'independence', forced removals of Black people from South Africa to the Reserves and industrial decentralisation and deconcentration has not altered these regional disparities. On the contrary it has served merely to sustain them in that these Government measures remained within the racial segregationist parameters of separate development on the national, regional and inter-regional levels.

It was further argued that the very latest measures of the Nationalist Government towards urbanisation, such as the Regional Services Councils, as well as the proposed Group Areas Amendment Bills and the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment Bill would serve to sustain the regional disparities, despite rapid Black urbanisation, in that they seem to be measures to sustain racial segregation in the wake of the abolition of influx control. Consequently, the deepening economic recession since the late 1970s, for which the perpetuation of separate development can be held largely responsible, is likely to enhance (rather than discourage) the pace of Black urbanisation through increasing rural poverty levels while the urban areas within the Reserves are likely to become more the recipients of the growing unemployed section of the Black population than suppliers of labour. It therefore seems that these measures to merely constitute a further political refinement of apartheid.
It was concluded that, because racial separation has become so engrained through artificial political barriers, the regional socio-economic disparities will persist well into the future.
CHAPTER THREE

THE CORE-PERIPHERY MODEL AND IDEOLOGICAL CONCEPTIONS OF URBANISATION

The purpose of this Chapter is to briefly outline the core-periphery model by John Friedmann and discuss its application to the Southern African region, and to focus on the impact of modernisation/dependency debate on ideological perspectives of the urbanisation process. The core-periphery model and its application will be the subject of Section One while the ideological perspectives will be the subject of Section Two of this Chapter. The nature of the core-periphery relationship in Natal/KwaZulu in terms of whether it is complementary or parasitical and the implications of that, in turn, for economic development will be discussed at the end of this study in the final appraisal (Chapter 5), on the basis of the conclusions of the empirical Chapter (Chapter 4) and the historical assessment (Chapter 2).

Section One: The Theoretical Core-Periphery Model and its Application to the Southern African Region

1 John Friedmann’s Core-Periphery Model

The spatial relationship between economic development and the growth of urban centres has been the subject of considerable
academic attention. The most notable theoretical model of spatial
development in less developed countries has been that of John
Friedmann (1966) who applied economic development to spatial
theory in his centre-periphery space economy model. Although his
original model does not explain many of the persisting and
deepening regional inequalities throughout the world, it still has
a strong impact on urban theory today, in that it embodies many of
the presently prevailing ideas of many urban theorists and
planners.

Friedmann's original model, based on a study of regional policy in
Venezuela in 1966 (and drawing on a wide range of other theorists'
ideas on spatial economies¹), consisted of four stages of economic
development to demonstrate that 'for each major period of economic
development through which a country passes there is a correspond­
ing structure of the space economy' (Friedmann, 1966:36). The
notion of a 'space economy' is derived here by the way in which
the functioning of an economy is reflected spatially. The 'space
economy' is further comprised of nodes (centres of political,
economic and social activity), networks (the infrastructural
connections between the nodes) and surfaces (the sphere of human
activity around the nodes).

Urbanisation is described by Friedmann as 'one of the most
compelling societal forces operating in history' and city growth
as 'an irrepressible accompaniment of the modern development ex-
perience' (Friedmann, 1973:25, 65). Urbanisation, according to Friedmann, takes on both the material aspect of a 'geographic concentration of population and non-agricultural activities in urban environments of varying size and form' and the sociological aspect of 'a geographic diffusion of urbanisation values, behaviour, organisation and institutions' (Friedmann, 1973:65). Urbanisation, according to Friedmann, is a transfer of population from periphery to core (through rural-urban migration), and the distribution of a population between the core and periphery (ie. the relative proportions of rural and urban dwellers) indicates the level of urbanisation at any given time.

As shown in Figure 1, phase one of Friedmann's model consists of sparsely situated rural settlements, but is accompanied by the establishment of agricultural and mining interests of the colonial powers which form small urban centres for the functions of service and administration. Industrialisation begins phase two (the 'transitional' state of development), which becomes concentrated in one or two of the main urban centres. Resources are allocated to the industrialising urban centres which give rise to a dualistic spatial structure causing the centres to develop, but the periphery (ie. the surrounding rural areas) to relatively stagnate. Migration from the periphery to the core takes place as a result of rural poverty and the better economic opportunities in the core.
FIGURE 1

THE FRIEDMANN MODEL

1. independent local centres, no hierarchy

2. A single strong centre

3. A single national centre strong peripheral subcentres

4. A functionally interdependent system of cities

Source: Friedmann 1966: 36
Friedmann outlines the development regions that emerge during the second (or 'transitional') stage as follows:

1. The core (or centre) region consisting of 'one or more clustered cities' and their daily commuting zones. This region has 'a high capacity for generating and absorbing innovative change' (Friedmann, 1973). It is the dominant centre of the space economy and the remainder of the national domain, or periphery, stands in a dependent relationship to it.

2. The periphery comprises a number of parts:
   a) upward-transitional regions - areas favoured in terms of their resource endowments, their location relative to the core regions, and their comparatively high level of economic development and population in-migration (alternatively termed the inner-periphery).
   b) downward transitional regions - areas whose economies are stagnant or retrogressing relative to the country as a whole. They supply the bulk of migrant workers to the core, or cores, and the upward transitional regions and the resource frontiers (the outer periphery).
   c) resource frontier regions - zones of new settlement in which 'virgin territory is occupied and made productive' through
mineral, agricultural or forestry development.

d) special problem regions - areas with particular development problems such as regions bordering on foreign countries, tourist and military areas (in Fair, 1982:17-18).

Industry matures further in phase three, but the rural areas become increasingly aware of the relative deprivation and politically mobilise which causes the national government to respond in the form of a regional development policy. This then decreases the regional inequalities leading to an improved spatial equilibrium, although poverty is not entirely eradicated, and the newly emerging urban centres begin to stimulate, rather than deprive, the surrounding agricultural regions. These conclusions stem from his reformulation of his model in 1973 to include the socio-cultural and political diffusion from core to periphery, the previous version having concentrated merely on the diffusion of economic values, and hypothesised the following:

1 Politically the evolution of spatial structure will proceed from a highly centralised to a polycentric system of decision making, i.e. core-elites who control political power decentralise some or all of this power to counter-elites in the periphery.
2 Socio-culturally the evolution of spatial structure will proceed from relatively isolated 'islands of innovation' to a continuously modernised surface, i.e. spreading out from the centre there develops 'a shared frame of socio-cultural expectations' and the increasing interaction of social and cultural groups as the country becomes modernised.

3 Economically, the evolution of spatial structure will proceed from a high degree of concentration of economic activity to a pattern that is much more deconcentrated.

4 Physically, the evolution of spatial structure will proceed from primacy in urban settlements to a log-normal position in the hierarchy of cities (Friedmann, 1973:83, cited in Fair, 1982:15-16).

Phase four is reached when a combination is met between 'national integration, efficiency in the location of individual firms, maximum potential for individual growth, and minimum essential interregional imbalances' (Friedmann, 1966:37).

Friedmann's model holds certain important implications which have contributed to the conception of spatial locations. The most important contribution in this respect is the perspective of a region having a dualistic structure consisting of an urban core and a surrounding periphery which is predominantly rural, as well
as stressing the changing relationships between the two in terms of the influence of the core (as the agent of change for social and economic development) upon the periphery.

2 The Adaptation of Friedmann’s Core-Periphery Model to the Southern African Region

Friedmann’s (1966) core-periphery model has been adapted to the Southern African economy by Browett (1980) and Fair (1982). The evolution of the South African economy through the pre-industrial, transitional and industrial stages of growth was traced, especially the industrial stage, based on data on the gross domestic product by magisterial district.

Fair tested the core-periphery hypothesis on the South African space economy for the years between 1955 and 1975, and found three main developmental fields that corresponded to Friedmann’s core, upward periphery and downward periphery zones. These are: (1) the core, (2) the inner periphery and (3) the outer periphery, arranged in a hierarchy of core-periphery relationships centred on the Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging complex. The Natal regional economy, in the context of the South African national economy, was regarded as one of the main peripheral regions.

In the South African economy the core consists of the eight major metropolitan centres which are the Pretoria/Witwatersrand/
Vereeniging complex, Cape Town and Durban-Pinetown, which also include the smaller urban centres of Port Elizabeth, East London, Kimberley, Bloemfontein and Pietermaritzburg. The inner periphery consists of the area between the major metropolitan centres and the Reserves (ie. 'the rest of South Africa under White, Coloured and Asian ownership' - Fair, 1982:57). The outer periphery consists of the Black Reserves (including the national states of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and the Ciskei).

Spatial interaction is strong between the core and the inner-periphery through an advanced infrastructure that facilitates trade and communications. Like interaction is weak between the former and the outer-periphery in terms of trade and communications, except for the oscillatory flows of labour by road and rail.

Fair noted the relative contributions to the total gross domestic product of these three principle regions between the years 1955 and 1975, as well as their relative population shares, as shown in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 shows that over the twenty-year period between 1955 and 1975 the core and the inner-periphery have maintained their relative share of gross domestic product at around 97% of the total, with the remainder of around 3% being made up by the outer-periphery. It also shows that the gap between the former and the
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<td>72,2</td>
<td>7 849</td>
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<td>Outer periphery</td>
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<td>South Africa</td>
<td>3 599</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>11 452</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>25 228</td>
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**Source:** Fair (1982:52)

¹ ROWSA - Rest of White, Coloured and Asian South Africa

² Black Reserves including TBVC states

### TABLE 3.2

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**Source:** Fair (1982:52)

¹ ROWSA - Rest of White South Africa

² Black Reserves including TBVC states
latter has increased very substantially: The core and the inner-periphery increasing by R20 802 million, while the outer-periphery increasing by a mere R705 million (Fair, 1982:52).

In addition to relative changes in economic output between the core and the periphery regions, Fair also examined the core-periphery demographic characteristics between 1960 and 1970. His findings are listed in Table 3.2.

Fair’s Table shows that, as a percentage of the total population, the population in the core remained fairly static, falling only by a margin of 0.6% between 1960 and 1970, while the percentage contribution of the inner-periphery to the total population fell from 42.6 to 36.1%. The percentage contribution of the population in the outer-periphery, however, rose from 25.8 to 32.9% throughout this period. The bulk of the Whites, Coloureds and Asians were located in the core, and this proportion rose from 54.9 to 59.2% between 1960 and 1970, while the percentage contribution of these groups in the inner-periphery fell from 44.6 to 40.2%. Whites, Coloureds and Asians in the outer-periphery was negligible as a percentage of these groups in the core and inner-periphery and only increased marginally from 0.5 to 0.6 over the period.

An important distinction to be made between Friedmann’s model and that of Browett and Fair is the necessary accommodation in the latter for the geographical closeness of the outer-periphery to
the core and inner-periphery, and the perpetuation of economic stagnation in the outer-periphery. The core and outer-periphery are more closely bound than in Friedmann's core and upward transitional zones, and it will be shown in the following Chapter how this has a strong bearing on urbanisation trends in KwaZulu in terms of the location of population settlement. Despite the geographical closeness between the core and periphery in the Southern African case, Fair points out that "full integration of the space economy in the Friedmann model, ie. the stage when the periphery is eliminated and replaced by a single interdependent system of urban regions, is not attained until the post-industrial phase and this, in economic terms, South Africa has still not reached" (Fair, 1982:55).

Section Two: The Impact of the Modernisation/Dependency Debate on Ideological Perspectives of Urbanisation

It is important, at this juncture, to draw attention to the two opposed theoretical paradigms through which the urbanisation process is perceived. These are: (1) the modernisation paradigm, and (2) the dependency paradigm. It will be shown that both these schools of thought use the basic conception of the core-periphery model (ie. a dualistic spatial economy) but deviate fundamentally as to the relationship between the two, which in turn is related to their different perspectives of what the causes and the restrictions of human development are.
The modernisation paradigm has been the dominant conventional stream of thought which posits that societies move through stages of development, from traditional to modern, through the diffusion of innovation and cultural values. The notion of evolutionary stages of economic development can be traced back to Rostow’s stages of growth theory in which it was implied that all countries would follow a similar path of economic development to those of the presently industrialised First World. Fair comments on this mode of thought as follows:

The essence of the thinking is that if underdeveloped countries are to become developed then they must follow the path taken by the advanced industrial countries over the past 100 to 200 years. Western values, production systems and technology have to be diffused to the developing countries so that their traditional and their conservative societies can be modernised along capitalist lines and their people and their institutions developed (Fair, 1982:5).

Friedmann’s model is within the modernisation framework in that it posits that the periphery, although initially economically unequalised, will eventually become developed by the spread effects of innovative change from the core to the periphery. This
process is held to ultimately bring economic and social progress, and political stability, hence human development to the previously undeveloped periphery. Economic growth is thus the main generator of such development, in that it is perceived as the essence of wealth for further re-investment for economic growth and, via the spread effects, social advancement. Friedmann's model clearly contains the modernisation perspective of the core ultimately benefiting the periphery on a national scale.

Since the urban cores are perceived as the generators of progressive change for human development, through economic growth, the urbanisation process is accepted as a positive procedure in that it assists the diffusion of innovative values through the social integration of the newly urbanised population into the urban environment, which is the hub of economic, social and political activity. Informal settlements are viewed as the outcome of market imperfections that have hampered the otherwise normal urbanisation process taking place in these areas. Market imperfections are seen to arise through artificially, or politically, imposed restrictions that inhibit access to capital and access to markets, through unfair competitive situations with large businesses in the formal sector and through stringent legislation concerning licensing requirements. Faith is, however, maintained in the diffusion of innovation which is expected to eventually remove the market imperfections and cause the members with a capitalist potential to boost economic growth that will upgrade
In relatively recent years, beginning in the late 1960s, the dependency paradigm has emerged through various criticisms of the modernisation paradigm. Firstly, modernisation theory was criticised for being based on Western capitalist development, thereby accepting that Western capitalist techniques are the only production methods and hence their adoption by less developed countries inevitable. Secondly, modernisation theory has been criticised for failing to explain the increasing, rather than decreasing the gap between the rich and the poor, which has taken place on both the national and international scale.

The dependency theorists stress rather the negative aspects of modernity on traditional societies, through the perspective of industrialisation at the core taking place at the expense of the continued underdevelopment of the periphery.

Dependency theory shares the core-periphery mode of analysis, but differs fundamentally on the relationship between the two. Rather than the urban centre being viewed as a core of values, it is viewed as a locus of economic power in the organisation of production and distribution. Diffusion, and the provision of
infrastructure, are viewed as deliberate means of underdevelopment to create a situation of dependency for the periphery upon the core, and the underdevelopment of the periphery is regarded as the prerequisite for development at the core. Thus, because of the exploitative relationship between core and periphery, dependency theory views it impossible for less developed countries to follow the same paths of development as the presently developed countries. Further, the apparent backwardness of the periphery is viewed, not as a failure to adapt to the challenges of modernisation, but as a consequence of underdevelopment. This perspective, as with modernisation theory, applies to both national and international scales.

Because dependency theory perceives an inherent domination of the periphery by the core (on international, national and regional levels), and the perpetuation of this domination for the socioeconomic benefit of the latter, it views the urbanisation process as the outcome of deliberate rural underdevelopment. Rural underdevelopment is seen as a device for the creation of a labour force for the capitalist industries. Despite the concentration of wealth at the core, the relations of dominance are said to be continued within the urban area through the social division between the rich and the poor. Consequently, on the extreme end of the dependency paradigm, cities become 'destructive, dehumanising and corrupting' (Berry, 1973: 106).
Castell (1976: 13) said the following about South American cities:

... an urban population unrelated to the productive level of the system; an absence of a direct relation between industrial employment and urbanisation; but a link between industrial employment and urban growth; a strong imbalance in the urban network in favour of one predominating urban area; increasing acceleration of the process of urbanisation; lack of jobs and services for the new urban masses and consequently, a reinforcement of the ecological segregation of the social classes and a polarisation of the system of stratification as far as consumption is concerned.

Informal settlements are viewed as being functional to the capitalist economy in that the latter absorbs the unemployed and decreases the bargaining power of those in employment due to the willingness of the unemployed to do the same work for an even smaller wage. The informal settlements are also viewed as a means of sheltering the labour supply (or potential labour supply) at little cost to the State, which is dominated and responds to the needs of the capitalist class. The informal settlements, in this view, exist entirely for the benefit of the formal sector, and has no long-run economic growth potential. Poverty and economic stagnation are forecast, leading to revolution, the overthrow of capitalism, and replacement with a socio-economic order based on
socialist principles.

In South Africa, perspectives of the urbanisation process are similarly divided, and fall into the following three ideological camps: (1) conservative apartheid ideology, (2) liberal/reformist ideology and (3) radical alternative ideology.

Conservative apartheid ideology espouses the philosophy of harmonious separation. Mixing the race groups is seen as a potential source of conflict. Urbanisation of the Black population has deliberately been discouraged through apartheid legislation such as influx control and the Group Areas Act, and its major challenge is the inevitable high level of Black urbanisation that will take place in the immediate future, especially that of informal settlements on the fringes of White urban areas (despite still within the Black Reserves). Informal settlements here have been viewed as 'slums' and 'health hazards', and these have often been used as reasons for the forced removal thereof. Having realised that its conventional approach to housing the Black population through the establishment of townships has failed, it is placing more hope on the 'site and service' schemes. 'Site and service' schemes are welcomed especially where they serve as resettlement villages for relocated informal dwellers.

The liberal/reformist ideology views the process of urbanisation as a potential means of economic liberalisation since it is
ultimately a process that will necessitate the removal of racial legislation and lead to racial mixing (Hobart Houghton, 1964, Browett and Fair, 1974, Nattrass, 1981). Apartheid regulations are viewed as irrational in the sense that they restrict the mobility of the labour force making the system inflexible, and also create an extensive and costly administration process. The removal of the regulations is to come through the rationality of the capitalist system to overcome political restrictions against further economic growth, and the deregulation of Black mobility is regarded as an important prerequisite. Upgrading of informal settlements, especially through the improved provision of essential services and infrastructure, and ‘site and service’ projects as an alternative means of housing to the conventional township approach is recommended.

The radical alternative perspective challenges both the conservative apartheid and the liberal/reformist ideologies. Rather than viewing racism to be the primary cause of apartheid policy, it believes South African capitalism to have adopted a racist ideology to sustain the division between the predominantly Black working class and the privileged positions of the White population (Wright Harrison, 1977). Racial segregation is not seen as irrational, but as having enabled a greater level of worker exploitation. This perspective of collaboration between apartheid policy and capitalism is seen to be the cause of the increasing polarisation between poverty and wealth, and thus urbanisation is
viewed as degenerative for the Black population (through the perpetuation of poverty in the urban setting). Informal settlements are viewed as the outcome of policies to perpetuate poverty, and thereby dependency on the core, and are thus destined to remain so under a capitalist government. The Black urban population (and to some extent the Black rural population) through the perpetuation of poverty, and their growing consciousness of the exploitation, will (it is believed) politically mobilise and through their strength of numbers and growing militancy overthrow the capitalist government by force. ‘Site and service’ schemes are viewed as a method used by the capitalist government with an economic crisis on its hands to shift the burden of housing onto the poor and at the same time release itself from any responsibility to house them.

It is important to acknowledge that it is impossible to study any aspect of urbanisation in South Africa without an awareness of these different and conflicting interpretations. These are the issues of the present that will shape the future of South Africa.
Conclusion

In this Chapter the theoretical core-periphery model and its application to the Southern African region was discussed, as well as the impact of the modernisation/dependency debate on perspectives of the core/periphery relationship and urbanisation.

Friedmann's four-phase model held that regional disparities between the core and periphery would increase initially, but that these regional disparities would become narrowed until eventually there would be a minimum of inter-regional imbalances. Friedmann argued that the agent for narrowing such imbalances would be the continued economic growth of the core, through its stimulation of the surrounding agricultural region, and through the assistance of socio-cultural and political diffusion. While the validity of Friedmann's model can be questioned in terms of contemporary circumstances that suggest continued economic widening between cores and peripheries with a minimum of socio-cultural and political diffusion in the Southern African context, his model nevertheless makes the important contribution of stressing dualistic structures of regions and that, whatever the precise nature of the core/periphery relationship, that the two do affect one another and are in a constant state of change.

Browett and Fair's application of the core-periphery model to the Southern African context showed that, although the core and the
periphery are geographically closer than in Friedmann’s model, spatial economic and population settlement imbalances were still increasing and that the stage of narrowing inequalities posited by Friedmann had not been reached. The unsolved question on the relationship between the core and the periphery was therefore discussed in terms of the perspectives of the modernisation and dependency schools of thought, and how the different ideological interpretations in turn lead to differing perspectives of the urbanisation process.

The modernisation perspective sees, as did Friedmann, a positive relationship between the core and the periphery, through its belief that all societies move through stages from traditional to modern through the diffusion of wealth generated at the core, together with the diffusion of innovation and cultural values. The emphasis of the modernisation school therefore lies in diffusion of the output of capitalism which transforms traditional societies in a way that they benefit from it, and that present Third World countries will follow the same development paths of todays industrially-developed First World countries. Urbanisation and the continued concentration of people at the urban centres are viewed as necessary for the diffusion process, and usually views the formation of informal settlements and underdeveloped regions as the result of inappropriate political interference with the capitalist market which is seen to have an inherent capacity to stabilise economic imbalances.
The dependency perspective, which emerged since the late 1960s, shares the core-periphery concept of analysis but differs fundamentally on the relationship between the core and the periphery, in that it perceives an inherent domination of the periphery by the core resulting in the continued underdevelopment of the periphery. Capitalism is viewed as a process that perpetuates relations of dominance and subservience, through the social divisions it creates between the capitalists (owners of the means of production) and the working class (who sell their labour power to the capitalists). Dependency theorists have also criticised modernisation theorists for applying Western capitalist concepts and techniques to Third World countries, and for believing that Third World countries will inevitably follow the capitalist development paths taken by today's First World countries, and that modernisation theory has not been able to adequately explain the growing gap between poverty and affluence on national and international levels. Because of the concept of an inherently exploitative core/periphery relationship, urbanisation is viewed as an essentially negative process in that the primary cause of urbanisation is not considered to be the attraction of the rural population by the economic growth of the core, but the underdevelopment of the rural areas which forces people out of the periphery to sell their labour power in the core. Dependency theory argues further that the socio-economic imbalances are also perpetuated in the urban environment, through the spatial division between the working and the ruling classes. Informal settlements
are viewed as a functional part of the capitalist system through absorbing the unemployed during times of economic recession, which decreases the bargaining power of those in employment for higher wages. Informal settlements are viewed also as a means of sheltering an urban labour (or potential labour) force at very little cost to the State, which is dominated and responds primarily to the needs of the capitalist class.

In South Africa, ideological views are similarly divided between conservative, liberals and radicals. Conservatives view racial mixing as undesirable, have tried to discourage Black urbanisation through apartheid legislation and advocate the forced removal of informal settlements. Liberals view racial mixing as desirable, but that apartheid legislation has been irrational and has interfered with the capitalist system which, if left unhindered, is believed to reduce inequalities through the interaction of market forces. For this apartheid legislation is to be removed, Black urbanisation encouraged, and informal settlements upgraded. Radicals conversely see capitalism and apartheid as functionally linked in that apartheid has supplied a cheap labour force for capitalism and has thereby sustained rapid levels of economic growth. Under a capitalist system, the inequalities are expected to widen, and for inequalities to narrow and racial mixing to take place would require not just the abolition of apartheid but also the abolition of capitalism, in a simultaneous manner, through social revolution.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE CORE-PERIPHERY STRUCTURE OF THE NATAL/KWAZULU REGIONAL ECONOMY, AND ITS IMPACT ON THE LOCATION OF POPULATION SETTLEMENT

1 Introduction

In this Chapter the core-periphery framework, that has previously been discussed both theoretically and in its adaptation to Southern Africa, is applied to the Natal/KwaZulu regional economy with the intention to identify the relationship between this and the spatial patterns of Black population settlement.

It is intended to expose the relationship on a regional and on a local level. The regional level will cover the whole of Natal/KwaZulu, while on a local level attention will be focussed on the Durban Functional Region.

The very complex nature of this exercise requires an examination of the following aspects, which make up the sub-sections of this chapter.

Regional level: Natal/KwaZulu

1 The economic criteria that determines where all the regions of Natal/KwaZulu lie within the core-periphery spectrum;
2 An estimation of the size of the total population of Natal/KwaZulu, and its racial composition;

3 The core-periphery distribution of this population;

4 The geographical locations of the population settlement patterns of Natal/KwaZulu and the size of the Black urban population of Natal/KwaZulu;

Local level: the Durban Functional Region

1 The total population size of the Durban Functional Region, and its racial composition;

2 The geographical location of the total population of the Durban Functional Region in terms of its core-periphery structure; and

3 The size and rate of growth of the informal urban population of the Durban Functional Region.

2 The Core-Periphery and Population Dynamics of Natal/KwaZulu

2.1 The Core-Periphery Regions of Natal/KwaZulu

To determine the core-periphery relationships within Natal/KwaZulu
it is important to compare the relative contributions of its districts to the gross domestic product of the region, and the extent of the types of economic activity within the districts.

Access to the statistical data for this purpose is almost entirely limited to that supplied by the Central Statistical Services, since no other comprehensive source for this information is available in South Africa. While the intention here is not to discredit the data supplied by the Central Statistical Services, this study has faced two limitations with regard to the use of economic statistics for Natal/KwaZulu:

1. There is NO breakdown of the relative contributions of each KwaZulu district to the total gross domestic product of KwaZulu; and

2. Although there is a breakdown of the relative contributions of each Natal district to the gross domestic product of Natal, the latest figures are those of 1981. However, gross domestic product figures for KwaZulu (as a whole) are provided up to 1985.

This is unfortunate in that much has changed within the regional economy since 1981, mainly as a result of the deepening economic recession since this time, and the economic nature and extent of this impact cannot be adequately assessed on a core-periphery
basis. Nevertheless, a comparison of the gross domestic products of Natal and KwaZulu for 1981 reveals stark disparities in their contributions to total output, as Table 4.1 shows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gross Domestic Product of Natal and KwaZulu, 1981</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natal</td>
<td>8 461 415</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu</td>
<td>588 512</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9 049 927</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Statistical Services, Report Number 04-01-01.

A very broad core-periphery relationship emerges from this Table. It reveals that there was a large gap in terms of the economic output levels of the two regions in 1981. With KwaZulu having comprised less than one-tenth of the gross domestic product of Natal/KwaZulu, it is possible to place KwaZulu into the category of a 'periphery' region and Natal into the category of a 'core' region. While this core/periphery distinction can be made on the lines of a broad comparison of the economic output of the Natal and KwaZulu regions in relative terms, the very scattered geographical configuration of KwaZulu (with certain KwaZulu districts lying adjacent to the major and secondary urban centres of Natal) and the different types of economic activity throughout the entire region necessitates a deeper examination of regional economic characteristics to determine the core-periphery structure of Natal/KwaZulu.
Table 4.2 provides a breakdown of the gross domestic product for Natal between 1975 and 1981 by district, as well as the percentage contributions of each Natal district to the total output of the Natal region.

The most striking feature of this Table is the very high concentration of economic output in the Durban-Pinetown-Pietermaritzburg region. Although the contribution to gross domestic product of this region declined slightly between 1975 and 1981, the proportions of 68.9 and 67.0 (for 1975 and 1981 respectively) is an indication that the bulk of economic activity in Natal takes place in this region. The statistics also show that Durban alone produces over half of the economic output of Natal. Districts that show fairly significant increases in their share of total output are Pinetown (from 7.8 to 8.1%), Newcastle (2.5 to 4.1%), Vryheid (2.1 to 3.3%), Glencoe (0.5 to 0.7%), Utrecht (0.4 to 0.7%) and Dannhauser (0.3 to 0.7%). While the greater shares of Pinetown and Newcastle can be attributed the growth of their manufacturing sectors, the greater shares of Vryheid, Glencoe, Utrecht and Dannhauser can be attributed to their large mining sectors which (along with being located in close proximity to Newcastle) seem to have had positive economic spin-off effects on their other sectors.
### Table 4.2: Gross Domestic Product for Natal 1975-1981: Breakdown by Magisterial District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>1975 R000</th>
<th>1981 R000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Durban</td>
<td>1 757 184</td>
<td>4 258 021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pietermaritzburg</td>
<td>345 467</td>
<td>725 417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pinetown</td>
<td>268 890</td>
<td>683 490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Umfolozi</td>
<td>118 667</td>
<td>320 931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle</td>
<td>86 717</td>
<td>345 128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inanda</td>
<td>78 726</td>
<td>177 858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Tugela</td>
<td>73 144</td>
<td>135 522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vryheid</td>
<td>71 440</td>
<td>280 223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umzinto</td>
<td>70 172</td>
<td>144 408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klipriver</td>
<td>69 330</td>
<td>183 572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Shepstone</td>
<td>59 172</td>
<td>134 265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camperdown</td>
<td>49 687</td>
<td>110 803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mtunzini</td>
<td>43 752</td>
<td>101 027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estcourt</td>
<td>43 612</td>
<td>101 558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mt Currie</td>
<td>29 701</td>
<td>47 793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dundee</td>
<td>28 774</td>
<td>73 702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lions River</td>
<td>27 973</td>
<td>63 018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eshowe</td>
<td>23 249</td>
<td>40 496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hanover</td>
<td>22 664</td>
<td>44 741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hlabisa</td>
<td>22 118</td>
<td>50 263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glencoe</td>
<td>18 703</td>
<td>56 467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umwoti</td>
<td>18 049</td>
<td>43 927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utrecht</td>
<td>14 282</td>
<td>59 376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dannhauser</td>
<td>11 948</td>
<td>58 896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ixopo</td>
<td>10 226</td>
<td>24 804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mooi River</td>
<td>10 194</td>
<td>37 279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngotsho</td>
<td>9 674</td>
<td>20 102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richmond</td>
<td>9 637</td>
<td>20 279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berville</td>
<td>9 242</td>
<td>24 701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mtjonjaneni</td>
<td>7 629</td>
<td>16 656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulpietersburg</td>
<td>5 234</td>
<td>17 011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfred</td>
<td>4 756</td>
<td>13 619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underberg</td>
<td>4 699</td>
<td>10 985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ubombo</td>
<td>3 818</td>
<td>9 728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weenen</td>
<td>3 321</td>
<td>6 725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kranskop</td>
<td>2 791</td>
<td>6 682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polela</td>
<td>2 090</td>
<td>4 317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babanango</td>
<td>1 405</td>
<td>3 230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impendle</td>
<td>1 328</td>
<td>4 395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3 439 435</strong></td>
<td><strong>8 461 415</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Excludes KwaZulu*

**Source:** Central Statistical Services, Reports Number 09-14-01 and 04-01-01.
Further insight into the regional structure of total output by district, is provided in Table 4.3 which shows the contributions of main economic activity within each district of Natal to its economic output for 1981.

A comparison between Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 (both of which display the Natal districts in the same order, from highest to lowest levels of economic output) reveals that the districts with higher levels of such contributions generally have a wealth of secondary and tertiary economic activity (mainly manufacturing) while districts with lower levels of output have in the main a preponderance of primary activities, such as agriculture. This is because, in 1981, manufacturing comprised 35.0% of the total economic output of Natal, with agriculture, forestry and fishing a mere 5.2% of such output.

From this statistical information on the Natal economy it is possible to divide the region into core-periphery zones. The high concentration of business and manufacturing activity in the Durban-Pinetown-Pietermaritzburg districts strongly predetermines that they be viewed as the economic centre of Natal. To this main economic focal point Inanda and Camperdown can be added because of their close proximity and high contributory outputs in manufacturing in relation to agriculture. The core of the Natal economy therefore consists of Durban, Pinetown, Inanda, Pietermaritzburg and Camperdown. It is appropriate to consider this as the main
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Agr</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Man</th>
<th>Ele</th>
<th>Con</th>
<th>Tra</th>
<th>Tpt</th>
<th>Fin</th>
<th>Com</th>
<th>Imp</th>
<th>Gov</th>
<th>Oth</th>
<th>Tot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Durban</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMB</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pinetown</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Umfolozi</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Castle</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inanda</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Tugela</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vryheid</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umzinto</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klip River</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
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* Key to Type of Activities
  Agr = Agriculture, forestry and fishing
  Min = Mining and quarrying
  Man = Manufacturing
  Ele = Electricity
  Con = Construction
  Tra = Trade and Catering
  Tpt = Transport
  Fin = Finance and real estate
  Com = Community services
  Imp = Minus imputations
  Gov = General government
  Oth = Other
  Tot = Total

Area PMB = Pietermaritzburg

Source: Central Statistical Services, Report Number 04-01-01.

economic core for the additional fact that Durban does tend to
monopolise the industrial and commercial activities within these
districts while Pietermaritzburg provides an important administra-
tive function².
These districts of the main Natal core, together with their percentage contributions of manufacturing to their output and their percentage contribution to the total output of Natal for 1981 are listed in Table 4,4 below:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>% contribution to the total economic output of Natal, 1981</th>
<th>% contribution to manufacturing to output of district 1981</th>
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<td>Durban</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pinetown</td>
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<td>Inanda</td>
<td>2,1</td>
<td>44,5</td>
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<td>Pietermaritzburg</td>
<td>8,6</td>
<td>29,2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>70,4 (Value - 5 955 509)</td>
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</table>

Source: Tables 4,2 and 4,3

Once again, the concentration of economic activity is evident from this Table, in that it demonstrates that the said economic core produces over 70% of the gross domestic product of Natal.

Having established the districts that comprise the economic centre Natal, the next step is to establish the districts that effect a secondary function. While the economic core contains the major metropolitan centres of Natal, the secondary economic core areas should contain the next largest metropolitan centres of Natal. In this respect, it is useful to consider the main transport and communication networks of Natal as initial indicators, and then to examine the contribution of economic output and the main type of such activity within the districts that contain the main in-
There are three main relatively developed corridors in Natal which contain the main infrastructural networks: the northern, southern and interior corridors. Such corridors perform the important function of facilitating the flow of goods and services, information as well as people, between the economic core which is centred in Durban and the Secondary metropolitan regions of Natal. The northern corridor lies between Durban and Richards Bay/Emangeni, the southern one lies between Durban and Port Shepstone and the interior one between Durban and Newcastle, the latter is in turn linked to the PWV-region (the main economic core of South Africa).

Table 4,5 lists the districts lying within, and adjacent to, these three developed corridors that have a reasonably high contribution to the gross domestic product of Natal, and have a high contribution of manufacturing to their district output levels. The Natal districts that lie either within or adjacent to the developed corridors that have a relatively high agricultural output (as opposed to manufacturing) are excluded from this Table, and are placed into a further category of Natal peripheral districts. The mining centres of Northern Natal were included in this Table, despite having reasonably low levels of manufacturing output, for the reasons that these districts have all increased their share of
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>% contribution to the total economic output of Natal, 1981</th>
<th>% contribution of manufacturing to output of district 1981</th>
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<td>Mtunzini</td>
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<td>73.3</td>
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<td>Lower Umfolozi</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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Source: Tables 4.2 and 4.3

the total economic output of Natal between 1975 and 1981, and the economic importance of mining to Northern Natal secondary metropol- litan centres such as Newcastle and Richards Bay/Empangeni.

Table 4.5 shows that the secondary core areas produced about one-sixth of the gross domestic product of Natal in 1981. The bulk of the output was produced in the interior corridor (about 60%) mainly due to Newcastle and the mining districts, while the
northern and southern analogues contributed about 26 and 14% respectively.

The balance of the Natal districts, being those lying outside of the main economic core and secondary core areas, all have a high agricultural output in relation to their other activities. These districts are classified as the Natal peri-phereral areas, even though some do fall within and lie adjacent to the developed corridors. They are listed in Table 4,6.

It can be seen from Table 4,6 that the main agricultural districts of Natal produced a mere 4.7% of the gross domestic product of the Province. This is an indication that the relative importance of agricultural output is extremely low and that Natal is primarily geared towards the more modern manufacturing, industrial and commercial fields of endeavour.

The changing structure of the core-periphery nature of the Natal economy between 1978 and 1981 is provided in Table 4,7, in terms of the changes in the contribution of its relevant regions to total Natal economic output. Added to this is the KwaZulu economy, as a whole.

The findings of Table 4,7 have close parallels with the findings of Fair's application of the core-periphery relationship to Southern Africa. As in Fair's Table in the previous Chapter, the
TABLE 4.6  
DISTRICTS COMPRISING THE NATAL PERIPHERAL AREAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>% contribution to the total economic output of Natal, 1981</th>
<th>% contribution of agriculture to output of district, 1981</th>
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<td>29,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mt Currie</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>30,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hanover</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>38,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umboombo</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>41,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kranskop</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>42,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bergville</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>43,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hlabisa</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>44,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mooi River</td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td>47,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ixopo</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>49,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underberg</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>52,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulpietersburg</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>52,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richmond</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>54,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weenen</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>56,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mtonjaneni</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>61,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngotshe</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>67,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpendle</td>
<td>0,05</td>
<td>80,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babanango</td>
<td>0,025</td>
<td>85,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 4,8 (Value - 403 806)

Source: Tables 4.2 and 4.3

TABLE 4.7  
GROSS GEOGRAPHICAL PRODUCT OF THE MAIN ECONOMIC ZONES OF NATAL, 1978 TO 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>% 1975</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>% 1981</th>
<th>% Growth Rate % per year 1975-1981</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natal</td>
<td>2 499 954</td>
<td>66,9</td>
<td>5 955 589</td>
<td>65,8</td>
<td>15,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core</td>
<td>755 705</td>
<td>20,2</td>
<td>2 102 020</td>
<td>23,2</td>
<td>18,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>183 776</td>
<td>4,9</td>
<td>403 806</td>
<td>4,5</td>
<td>14,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periphery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>3 439 435</td>
<td>92,0</td>
<td>8 461 415</td>
<td>93,5</td>
<td>16,2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KwaZulu 294 641 8,0 588 512 6,5 12,2

KwaZulu | 3 734 076 | 100 9 049 927 | 100 16,9 |

Source: Tables 4.4; 4.5; 4.6 and Central Statistical Services, Report Number 04-01-01.
economic core is dominant, and monopolises the greatest share in productive activity, while the periphery (which is KwaZulu in the Natal/KwaZulu context) has but a marginal share. Also similar to Fair’s findings, the centre of the core region, despite its monopoly, has had a falling contribution to total output, while the secondary core and inner-peripheral regions have had an increasing share in relevant output. However, while Fair’s Table shows an increasing contribution to total output by the homelands, the findings above reveal that, in the case of KwaZulu, the contribution has in fact declined. This points to an even greater polarisation of economic activity in Natal/KwaZulu than there is for Southern Africa as a whole.

The previous sections to this chapter have highlighted the extent to which economic activity is concentrated in Natal, and its breakdown by magisterial district has facilitated the core-periphery classification of the various regions of Natal. However, to arrive at a more adequate comparable structure for Natal and KwaZulu, consideration has to be given to the analogous status of KwaZulu.

For example, the economic core region centred on Durban should ideally include the KwaZulu districts that almost entirely surround Durban-Pinetown, from which many thousands of Blacks commute to work in Durban-Pinetown each day. The same should be done for the KwaZulu regions that lie in close proximity to other
major and secondary Natal metropolitan centres, such as Pietermaritzburg, Ladysmith, Newcastle, Richards Bay and Port Shepstone. Yet, it has already been stated previously in this Chapter that economic statistics on KwaZulu are aggregated which renders economic information on specific districts unobtainable for this purpose.

Nevertheless, it is useful to examine the changing economic structure of the KwaZulu economy as a whole, since statistics are provided up to 1985 by the Central Statistical Services. This can serve to gain some insight into the possible extent of economic activity that could be taking place depending on the spatial locations of KwaZulu districts. For example, it can be expected that the districts in close proximity to the major and secondary Natal metropoles will have a greater degree of secondary and tertiary economic activities while those further away would have a greater degree of primary economic activities, such as subsistence agriculture. Table 4,8 shows the gross geographic product for KwaZulu by type of economic activity, and changes in percentage contribution in economic activity between 1981 and 1985.

From Table 4,8 it is clear, as was expected, that non-market agriculture (ie. subsistence agriculture) is the predominant form of economic activity in KwaZulu, although its percentage contribution to total output declined somewhat between 1981 and 1985, from
Gross Domestic Product for KwaZulu by Type of Economic Activity, 1981 - 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic activity</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1982</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1983</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Production:</td>
<td>45 597</td>
<td>9,9</td>
<td>54 615</td>
<td>9,2</td>
<td>61 145</td>
<td>9,2</td>
<td>101 953</td>
<td>11,6</td>
<td>89 412</td>
<td>8,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, forestry and fishing</td>
<td>45 597</td>
<td>9,9</td>
<td>54 615</td>
<td>9,2</td>
<td>61 145</td>
<td>9,2</td>
<td>101 953</td>
<td>11,6</td>
<td>89 412</td>
<td>8,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and quarrying</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>0,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>45 684</td>
<td>9,9</td>
<td>65 131</td>
<td>11,0</td>
<td>76 638</td>
<td>11,5</td>
<td>113 878</td>
<td>12,9</td>
<td>133 296</td>
<td>12,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity, gas and water</td>
<td>43 940</td>
<td>9,6</td>
<td>59 221</td>
<td>10,8</td>
<td>53 140</td>
<td>7,9</td>
<td>79 783</td>
<td>9,0</td>
<td>78 464</td>
<td>7,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction (contractors)</td>
<td>25 599</td>
<td>5,5</td>
<td>28 105</td>
<td>4,7</td>
<td>31 557</td>
<td>4,7</td>
<td>35 697</td>
<td>4,0</td>
<td>40 776</td>
<td>3,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate and sales services</td>
<td>56 529</td>
<td>12,3</td>
<td>74 475</td>
<td>12,6</td>
<td>85 613</td>
<td>12,8</td>
<td>97 448</td>
<td>11,0</td>
<td>109 349</td>
<td>10,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and retail trade, catering and services</td>
<td>52 524</td>
<td>11,4</td>
<td>61 498</td>
<td>10,4</td>
<td>65 848</td>
<td>9,9</td>
<td>82 598</td>
<td>9,4</td>
<td>104 251</td>
<td>10,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government, social and personal services</td>
<td>61 967</td>
<td>13,5</td>
<td>74 373</td>
<td>12,6</td>
<td>82 050</td>
<td>12,3</td>
<td>103 710</td>
<td>11,7</td>
<td>139 621</td>
<td>13,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial services</td>
<td>85 477</td>
<td>18,6</td>
<td>112 285</td>
<td>19,0</td>
<td>134 477</td>
<td>20,1</td>
<td>171 398</td>
<td>19,4</td>
<td>242 258</td>
<td>22,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total: MARKET PRODUCTION</td>
<td>459 799</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>592 457</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>667 668</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>881 878</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1 042 546</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market: MARKET PRODUCTION</td>
<td>458 937</td>
<td>99,8</td>
<td>591 677</td>
<td>99,8</td>
<td>666 614</td>
<td>99,8</td>
<td>879 902</td>
<td>99,8</td>
<td>1 040 534</td>
<td>99,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imputed charges for financial services</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>1 054</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>1 976</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>2 012</td>
<td>0,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL: NON-MARKET PRODUCTION</td>
<td>129 575</td>
<td>28,2</td>
<td>158 611</td>
<td>26,6</td>
<td>150 080</td>
<td>22,4</td>
<td>152 785</td>
<td>17,2</td>
<td>252 354</td>
<td>24,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>588 512</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>750 268</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>816 694</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1 094 687</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1 292 888</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

roughly 62 to 59%. The second most important economic activity is non-market manufacturing (and water) and this increased in its share of total output from roughly 26 to 29% between 1981 and 1985. It is likely that this increase could be contributed mainly to the growth of the informal economic sector. The third most important was market-orientated manufacturing, which also increased its share of total output from roughly 10 to 13% between 1981 and 1985. The rest of the economic activities remained fairly marginal in terms of their contribution to total output and, with the exception of health services, showed either a constant or a declining contribution to the total economic output of KwaZulu. If one excludes the non-market production section from the gross domestic product of KwaZulu, the contribution of KwaZulu to the total gross domestic product of Natal/KwaZulu falls from 6.5% to 5.1% for 1981. Although statistics for Natal are not available for the years between 1981 and 1985, it is highly likely that the polarisation of the economic contributions of Natal and KwaZulu total output has further increased.

Although this information does provide some important insight about the KwaZulu economy, and its broad relationship with the Natal economy, it is of little help with regard to identifying core-periphery relationships on a scale smaller than the total Natal/KwaZulu area. For this reason the method used to incorporate the districts of KwaZulu into the regional core-periphery spectrum is limited to that of using their spatial location in
relation to the Natal main core, secondary cores and peripheral areas as the main determinant. The outcome is as follows:

1 Added to the Natal main core districts of Durban, Pinetown, Inanda, Pietermaritzburg and Camperdown are the KwaZulu districts of Umlazi, Ndwedwe, Ntuzuma, Umbumbulu, Mpumalanga and Vulindlela.

2(a) Added to the north coast Natal secondary core districts of Lower Tugela, Mtunzini and Lower Umfolozi are the KwaZulu districts of Ongoye, Maphumulo, Inkanyezi and Enseleni.

(b) Added to the south coast Natal secondary core districts of Umzinto and Port Shepstone are the KwaZulu districts of Vulamehlo, Emzumbe and Ezingolweni.

(c) Added to the interior corridor Natal secondary core districts of Lions River, Estcourt, Klipriver, Newcastle, Glencoe, Dannhauser, Dundee, Vryheid, Umvoti and Utrecht are the KwaZulu districts of Okhahlamba, Emnambithi, Ngutu and Madadeni.

In addition, for the purpose of including KwaZulu into the core-periphery structure, the predominantly agricultural Natal peripheral regions will be viewed as a separate entity, while the outlying (supposedly predominantly subsistence - agricultural)
KwaZulu areas will be viewed separately.

In view of the above arrangement the components of the core-periphery structure of Natal/KwaZulu is categorised as follows:

The inner (containing the major metropolitan centres) and outer-cores (containing the secondary metropolitan centres), the inner (comprising Natal commercial agricultural districts) and the outer-peripheries (comprising the KwaZulu subsistence agricultural districts), these are listed in Table 4,9 below. Map 5, on the following page, presents the location of the Natal and KwaZulu districts to assist the reader if necessary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 4,9</th>
<th>NATAL AND KWAZULU DISTRICTS COMPRISING THE CORE-PERIPHERY STRUCTURE OF NATAL/KWAZULU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inner-Core</strong></td>
<td>Natal: Durban, Pinetown, Inanda, Pietermaritzburg, Camperdown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outer-Core</strong></td>
<td>Natal: Lower Tugela, Mtunzini, Lower Umfolozi, Umzinto, Port Shepstone, Lions River, Estcourt, Klip River, Newcastle, Glencoe, Dannhauser, Dundee, Vryheid, Umvoti, Utrecht</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inner-Periphery</strong></td>
<td>Natal (only): Alfred, Eshowe, Polela, Mt Currie, New Hanover, Uhomme, Kranskop, Bergville, Hlabisa, Mooi River, Ixopo, Underberg, Paulpietersburg, Richmond, Weenen, Mtonjaneni, Ngotshe, Mpendle, Babanango</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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MAP 5 - The Natal and KwaZulu Districts.

1. INGWAVUMA
2. SIMDLANGENTSHA
3. UBOMBO
4. NONGOMA
5. MLABISA
6. MHLABATISHI
7. MSELENI
8. MADADENI
9. NQUITU
10. NKANDLA
11. MSINGA
12. EMMAMBITHI
13. OKHAMLAMBA
14. INKANYEZE
15. ONGOYE
16. KWMAPUNWULO
17. NDWEDWE
18. MPMALANGA
19. NTUZUMA
20. UMLAZI
21. EMBUMBULU
22. VULINOLELA
23. HLHANGANANI
24. VULAMEHLO
25. EMMUMBULU
26. EISINGOLWENI
These Natal/KwaZulu districts, under the core-periphery classification as they appear in this Table, will be used in Subsection 2.3 of this Chapter which examines the core-periphery geographical location of the population, and how this has changed over previous trends. Proceeding this, however, it is necessary to examine the population size of Natal/KwaZulu so that it can be applied to the core-periphery regions, and this is the subject of the next sub-section.

2.2 An Estimation of the Size of the Total Population of Natal/KwaZulu and its Racial Composition

The base-line data on the population size of Natal/KwaZulu in this study is derived from Central Statistical Services statistics. The latest country wide (excluding TBVC states) population census was undertaken in 1985, and before this population censuses have been carried out at roughly 5 to 10 year intervals for most of this century.

The population census figures for Natal/KwaZulu are provided for all districts of both Natal and KwaZulu, and in this sense are very useful to this study. The 1985 census report also provides a useful historical overview of adjusted figures of the total population of Natal/KwaZulu by district between the years 1960 and 1980. However, two major problems arising from the use of these
figures are: firstly, there is considered to be a high degree of undercounting in the 1985 census especially that of the Black population and, secondly, the size of the Black informal urban population is 'provided' but is not classified as urban and is also underenumerated.

In this sub-section of the Chapter, the first problem will be dealt with (ie. the problem of under-enumeration) to derive a more accurate picture of what the size and racial composition of the total population of Natal/KwaZulu was in 1985. An attempt at estimating the size of the informal urban population will be made in sub-section 2.4, which examines the possible size of the total Black regional urban population.

It is almost unanimously accepted that there was a large degree of undercounting in the 1985 Population Census (Nattrass, 1987:3). The Central Statistical Services concedes that it does have difficulties in its endeavour to adequately enumerate the population and describes such problems as 'inevitable' and 'unavoidable'.

There is a lack of comprehensive and reliable estimations on what the undercount was for the population of Natal/KwaZulu. One possible lead, and perhaps the only, is a study that was undertaken by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) to attempt the comprehensive task of estimating the extent of under-enumeration.
in the 1985 census. This report is based on a reconstruction of the age structures of the population groups since 1936 and pertains to the Republic of South Africa and the Self-Governing National States (excluding TBVC states). It is unfortunate that it does not provide a regional breakdown, as this would greatly assist researchers involved with demographic analysis on a regional basis, but it does provide a breakdown between the extent of considered underestimation in the Republic and in the National States. The Central Statistical Services warns that the extent of the undercount may therefore differ from region to region and therefore that "the estimated undercount rates in respect of the RSA should not merely be applied directly in the case of smaller geographical divisions" (Central Statistical Services, Report Number 02-85-01, 1985:xxi). However, in view of the lack of other comprehensive undercount estimations, there are only three choices open to the regional researcher:

1. To accept the Natal/KwaZulu population census figures at face value

2. To make "thumb sucked" estimations of the real size of the population, based on broad assumptions and generalisations, or

3. To use the HSRC study findings and adjust the population figure of Natal by the estimated undercount proportion for

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the RSA, and adjust the population figure of KwaZulu by the estimated undercount proportion for the National States.

Given the unacceptability of the first two options, it has been decided to adopt the third option (although this is also not strictly ideal).

Table 4.10 shows that the HSRC study estimated an undercount of 7.6% for the White population, 1.0% for the Coloured population, 4.6% for the Asian population and 20.4% for the Black population in the RSA and 15.1% for the Black population in the National States.

According to the HSRC investigation, national undercounts for the Black population in previous census years had also been reasonably high: 14.3% in 1960, 10.7% in 1970 and 22.7% in 1980.

In this study the enumerated Black population for 1985 in KwaZulu is adjusted upwards by 15.1% (the HSRCs estimate for National States), while the Black population in Natal was adjusted upwards by 20.4% (the HSRCs estimate for the RSA). The White, Coloured and Asian population groups were also adjusted upwards by the HSRC estimates for the RSA - 7.6, 1.0 and 4.6% respectively. Similarly, adjustments were made to all the population groups of Natal/
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Group</th>
<th>Republic of South Africa</th>
<th>National States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whites as enumerated</td>
<td>4 568 739</td>
<td>5 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSRC estimation</td>
<td>4 947 100</td>
<td>6 105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% undercount</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloureds as enumerated</td>
<td>2 832 705</td>
<td>3 415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSRC estimation</td>
<td>2 862 200</td>
<td>6 094 700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% undercount</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asians as enumerated</td>
<td>821 361</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSRC estimation</td>
<td>861 300</td>
<td>15 276 053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% undercount</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>35 816 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks as enumerated</td>
<td>15 162 840</td>
<td>6 875 288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSRC estimation</td>
<td>19 051 500</td>
<td>8 094 700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% undercount</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Statistical Services, Report Number 02-85-01.

According to this method of adjusting the Natal/KwaZulu population, the Table shows that the total population of Natal/KwaZulu was approximately 6,85 million in 1985. The size of the Black population, 5.4 million, comprises almost 80% of the total.
### TABLE 4.11
TOTAL POPULATION OF NATAL/KWAZULU, 1970-1985
(PERCENTAGES IN BRACKETS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>3 326 544</td>
<td>3 909 159</td>
<td>4 861 893 (19.6)</td>
<td>4 567 875</td>
<td>5 443 656 (16.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloureds</td>
<td>74 316</td>
<td>86 861</td>
<td>93 858 (7.5)</td>
<td>99 155</td>
<td>100 200 (1.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asians</td>
<td>527 456</td>
<td>607 070</td>
<td>669 435 (9.9)</td>
<td>662 896</td>
<td>695 000 (4.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>448 536</td>
<td>528 131</td>
<td>576 305 (8.3)</td>
<td>562 107</td>
<td>608 500 (7.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4 376 852</td>
<td>5 131 221</td>
<td>6 201 491 (17.3)</td>
<td>5 892 033</td>
<td>6 847 356 (13.9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Central Statistical Services, Report Number 02-85-01 (for base-line information).

The population of Natal/KwaZulu, and it is also interesting to note that there are more Asians than there are Whites. The total such population comprises roughly 20% of the total population in South Africa excluding the TBVC States. Approximately 82% of the Black population resides in KwaZulu while the remaining 18% resides in Natal and on South African Development Trust Land.

From the information in Table 4.11 it is also possible to derive the changing racial composition of the population, as well as the respective growth rates. These specific characteristics are shown in Table 4.12.

Table 4.12 reveals that the Black population proportion of the total population of Natal/KwaZulu has expanded from 76% to almost 80% between 1970 and 1985, while the proportions of the other population groups has declined over the same period (from 24 to
### TABLE 4.12 CHANGING RACIAL COMPOSITION AND GROWTH RATES OF THE NATAL/KWAZULU POPULATION, 1970-1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Group</th>
<th>% contribution to total population 1970</th>
<th>% contribution to total population 1985</th>
<th>% growth rate 1970-1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>76.00</td>
<td>79.51</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloureds</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asians</td>
<td>12.05</td>
<td>10.14</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>10.25</td>
<td>8.89</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Table 4.11*

20% collectively). This changing composition can be attributed to the combination of the much larger size of the Black population and its more rapid rate of population growth in relation to the other population groups.

In terms of broad demographic trends, the population dynamics outlined in this sub-section of the Chapter reflect a combination of First and Third World characteristics. The White, Asian and Coloured population groups comprises the minority of the population of Natal/KwaZulu and have reasonably low rates of population growth (conforming to First World demographic trends). The Black population group, on the other hand, comprises the majority of the local population and has a reasonably high rate of population growth (conforming to Third World demographic trends).
2.3 The Core-Periphery Distribution of the Population of Natal/KwaZulu

Having applied the core-periphery relationship to Natal/KwaZulu in sub-section 2.1 and having estimated the size of the total population of the same in sub-section 2.2 of this Chapter, the objective of this sub-section is to examine the distribution of the local population in association with the core-periphery regions of Natal/KwaZulu. Table 4.13 shows the results of having calculated the population numbers for each population group within the core-periphery structure available for 1985 (on the basis of the districts listed in Table 4.9), and making adjustments to the population size of each district to compensate with the degree of underenumeration for each population group (on the basis of estimations of undercounting in Table 4.11).

Table 4.13 reveals the following important core-periphery aspects of population distribution:

1. The bulk of the total population (42%) is situated in the inner-core region, closely followed by the outer-core region which holds 35% of the total population. The inner and outer core regions here considered therefore contain a very large 77% of the total population;
### TABLE 4.13(A) THE CORE-PERIPHERY DISTRIBUTION OF THE NATAL/KWAZULU POPULATION, 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Asians</th>
<th>Coloureds</th>
<th>Blacks</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Natal</strong></td>
<td>415,087</td>
<td>578,872</td>
<td>74,879</td>
<td>264,212</td>
<td>1,333,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kwazulu</strong></td>
<td>486</td>
<td>3,058</td>
<td>1,633</td>
<td>1,512,712</td>
<td>1,517,889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>415,573</td>
<td>581,930</td>
<td>76,512</td>
<td>1,776,924</td>
<td>2,850,939</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**% size of population group**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Inner-Core</th>
<th>Outer-Core</th>
<th>Inner-Periphery</th>
<th>Outer-Periphery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Natal</strong></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kwazulu</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 4.13(B) PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE NATAL/KWAZULU POPULATION WITHIN CORE-PERIPHERY REGIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%Whites</th>
<th>%Asians</th>
<th>%Coloured</th>
<th>%Black</th>
<th>%Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Natal</strong></td>
<td>68,21</td>
<td>83,29</td>
<td>74,72</td>
<td>4,85</td>
<td>19,47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kwazulu</strong></td>
<td>0,08</td>
<td>0,44</td>
<td>1,63</td>
<td>27,79</td>
<td>22,17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>68,29</td>
<td>83,73</td>
<td>76,35</td>
<td>32,64</td>
<td>41,64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Continued over the page**
TABLE 4,13 (B) continued:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%Whites</th>
<th>%Asians</th>
<th>%Coloured</th>
<th>%Black</th>
<th>%Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inner-Periphery</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natal</td>
<td>7.83</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>10.92</td>
<td>6.45</td>
<td>6.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>21.40</td>
<td>17.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Statistical Services, Report Number 02-85-01

2. The inner-periphery and the outer-periphery holds only 23% of the total population: 6% and 17% respectively;

3. The White, Coloured and Asian population groups are highly concentrated in the Inner-core region, 68, 83 and 75% respectively, while the Black population group is comparatively more evenly dispersed across the core-periphery spectrum - mainly as a result of the outer-periphery that consists entirely of KwaZulu districts;

4. The Blacks comprise the largest population group in each core-periphery region: 62% in the inner-core region, 89% in the outer-core region, 84% in the inner-periphery region and almost 100% in the outer-periphery region;

5. Of the Black population situated in the core regions, 84% was contained within KwaZulu: 85% and 83% in the inner-core and the outer-core respectively.
The main conclusion that can be drawn from the above is the strong impact that regions of greater economic output have had on the location of population settlement. The core areas holding most of the population is an indication that the major wealth generating areas have drawn larger numbers of people than other areas of lesser economic output. The high concentration of the White, Coloured and Asian groups in the inner-core region, the comparatively more even spread of the Black group across the core-periphery spectrum and the high concentration of Whites, Coloureds and Asians in Natal and Blacks in KwaZulu is also evidence of the impact of the policies of racial separation on the patterns of population settlement on the various population groups. Despite the proportion of the Black population being very high in all areas, its proportion in the inner-core would have been much higher (and much lower in the outer-periphery) in the absence of enforced racial separation, and the concentration of Blacks in the relevant districts of the core-periphery regions would have been much lower.

2.4 The Geographical Location of the Population Settlement Patterns of Natal/KwaZulu, and an Estimation of Size of the Black Urban Population

A valuable insight into the geographical locations of the urban population (formal and informal) of the region concerned (as well
as peri-urban and rural settlement patterns) is provided by a map that was produced in 1987 by the Inkatha Institute for South Africa. A generalised version of this map appears on the following page, as Map 6.

This map was compiled from 169 aerial photographs at a scale of 1:150 000 which covers the entire region of Natal/KwaZulu, which were taken in mid-1986. From photographic enlargements to 1:50 000 various types of settlements could be identified throughout the region, using the stereoscopic photo-interpretation technique, which ranged from urban through to rural. Within this urban-rural spectrum, five major settlement types were identified:

a) Formal Urban
b) Dense informal
c) Transitional Rural to Urban (or "peri-urban")
d) Subsistence Rural
e) Farmlands and scattered Rural

These major types of settlement are defined in an accompanying Inkatha Institute publication as follows:

a) **Formal Urban** (depicted in red on map)

Formal urban settlement is predominantly planned. Densely and less densely developed towns and townships are inhabited.
GENERALISED MAP OF SETTLEMENT DISTRIBUTION IN KWAZULU / NATAL

ORANGE FREE STATE

LESOTHO

TRANSKEI

TRANSVAAL

SWAZILAND

MOCAMBIQUE

COMPILATION BY THE AIR SURVEY CO. OF AFRICA LTD. DECEMBER 1987

PHOTOGRAPHY: JOB SUR 100/85 APRIL-JULY 1986. SURVEY AND MAPPING DIVISION DEPARTMENT FOR WORKS KWAZULU GOVERNMENT

INFORMATION FROM OFFICIAL MAPS REPRODUCED UNDER GOVERNMENT PRINTERS COPYRIGHT AUTHORITY 8680 OF 21 APRIL 1987

CONSULTANT: PROFESSOR D.A. SCOGGINGS

SOURCE: 1:250,000 MAP SERIES "PRELIMINARY MAPPING OF SETTLEMENT DISTRIBUTION KWA ZULU NATAL"

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THE INKATHA INSTITUTE FOR SOUTH AFRICA

SETTLEMENT TYPES

- Formal Urban
- Dense Informal
- Transitional Rural to Urban
- Rural
- Farmlands and scattered rural

To supplement information on this map, refer to explanatory notes obtainable from The Inkatha Institute For South Africa.
by people among whom urban-orientated activities and attitudes prevail. Agricultural activities are virtually non-existent.

b) **Dense Informal.** (depicted in orange on map)

Dense informal settlement is unplanned and spontaneous in nature. The people who occupy the informal, mainly square-shaped single dwellings in these thickly-settled areas, consider themselves to be urban. There is little sign of open land or agricultural activity.

c) **Transitional Rural to Urban.** (depicted in yellow on map)

This type of settlement cannot be classified as being entirely rural or urban. It lies in the transitional zone. These settlements could be considered to be semi-urban and consist mainly of square-shaped buildings. They are of medium density relative to the less dense rural settlement and the more dense informal urban settlement. Activities are both rural- and urban-orientated, with agricultural activities being generally present but not dominant. Commuters, rather than migrants, often live in these areas.

d) **Subsistence Rural.** (depicted in green on map)

This settlement type represents rural areas, mainly in KwaZulu, where subsistence agricultural activities predominate and the settlement density is fairly low. Typical
dwellings are the traditional, round homesteads or imizi, as well as some interspersed square dwellings. This settlement type includes a mixed or general land use comprising residential, cultivated or grazing land together with small tracts of unused land.

e) Farmlands and scattered Rural. (depicted in white on map)
This settlement type includes a number of patterns reflecting sparse settlement. The predominant settlement pattern of this type occurs in Natal. It consists of White-owned farms with extensive agriculture and virtually no habitation. Other patterns of this settlement type, both in Natal and KwaZulu, include state lands, forestry areas and game reserves. Those areas of KwaZulu which follow this pattern are largely uninhabitable terrain due to steepness of contour or marsh land.


The researchers involved with the making of this map arrived at the following conclusions at the end of the study:

a) Although one would expect rural subsistence agriculture to appear only within the KwaZulu boundaries there were areas where it had 'spilled over' into Natal. The researchers
noted that this usually extended into Natal to where it came up against a topographical boundary (for example, a krantz or a river) or against roads and fences, and therefore "although apartheid planning had confined Black people to specific areas, it had not been entirely successful".

b) Although one would expect, given the land tenure system and the pressure for land in KwaZulu, to find no large tracts of uninhabited or sparsely inhabited land in KwaZulu, it was noted that there were in fact large tracts of land in KwaZulu of this nature. However, this was only in a few cases and most of this land was uninhabitable as a result of being very steep, marshy or were forest and game reserve areas, the researchers conclude.

c) Although one would expect most of the formal urban settlements and the farmlands and scattered rural areas to be contained within Natal, the researchers stress that, although they were predominantly so positioned, there was also a fair deal of interspersion between these and dense informal, transitional rural to urban and subsistence rural type settlements. Again, this reflects the fact that apartheid planning has not been entirely successful in practice. The researchers referred to the anomalous settlements in Natal as consisting of: trust farms, 'Black spots', informal settlements on freehold, mission and South African Development
Trust land, mixed farming / market gardening, labour tenancy (especially in northern Natal, and general 'overspill' from KwaZulu.

(Summarised from - C. Fourie, D. Scogings, R. Hillermann, and D. Aitken, (for) the Inkatha Institute, 1987: pp. 22-23).

This map shows the effect of the very scattered geographical dispersion of the KwaZulu districts on the spatial locations of the urban Black population. Although apartheid has not been entirely successful in practice (as the researchers rightly state), the combination of the geographical configuration of KwaZulu and the restrictive policies on urban settlement, has resulted in most urbanisation in KwaZulu having taken place in those districts that are closest to the major and secondary Natal metropoles. This is particularly clear in the Durban-Pinetown and Richards Bay areas, as well as at Pietermaritzburg and Newcastle.

Usually situated in closest proximity to the Natal metropoles are the formal Black townships, and adjacent to these are the dense informal settlements (most of which are in KwaZulu) while further into the hinterland of the latter, (yet still in reasonably close proximity to the Natal metropoles) are the "peri-urban" settlements.

The relationship between regional levels of economic output and
the attraction of this on population settlement that was shown in the previous sub-sections is visibly displayed on the map, which confirms that the major metropolitan centres of secondary and tertiary economic activity in Natal/KwaZulu, have had the affect of being the focus of Black urbanisation, (even though the bulk of the Black urbanisation, formal and informal is situated in KwaZulu).

Having shown the geographical spread of population settlements, it would be appropriate to estimate the size of the Black urban population. It is most unfortunate that the Inkatha Institute map does not provide an estimation of the population sizes within the demarcated settlement patterns. However, a dwelling count to ascertain the population sizes (in conjunction with dwelling occupancy rate survey) was not possible on a scale as large as 1:150 000, as the use of this scale for this purpose would present an unacceptable under-estimation of the number of dwellings. The researchers who compiled the map regarded a scale of 1:20 000 as the maximum for dwelling counts, but that the cost and extensivity of such an exercise for the whole of Natal/KwaZulu would be to excessive. Population counts for the wider Durban region have been carried out by the Inkatha Institute using 1:20 000 scale photography for 1983 and 1987, and the results of these will be discussed shortly.

The difficulties involved in determining the size of the Black
urban population necessitates the use of the information provided by the Central Statistical Services. While regional population statistics from this source were somewhat equivocal, its urban statistics for the Black population are considerably more so. Although the 1985 Population Census provided a rural urban breakdown of the Black population for Natal and KwaZulu, its urban proportion is not an accurate reflection of the true size of the Black urban population.

This ambivalence stems from the inadequate definition of an urban population in the 1985 and earlier censuses. The Census defines 'urban' as 'areas with some or other form of local authority' and 'non-urban' as 'industrial and mining towns which have no form of local government, as well as other areas not included in "urban areas"'. This definition of what constitutes (and what does not constitute) an urban area therefore excludes most of the informal settlements which do not have recognised local authorities, but which to all intents and purposes are functionally urban. The urban proportion of the White population is more likely to be accurate, and to a somewhat lesser degree that of the Asian and Coloured population (of which some also reside in informal settlements). Nevertheless, as a starting point, Table 4.14 shows the urban/rural proportions of all the population groups in Natal/KwaZulu as presented in the 1985 Population Census.
TABLE 4.14 URBAN/NON-URBAN PROPORTIONS OF THE POPULATION OF NATAL/KWAZULU, 1985*  
(IN PERCENTAGES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Urban (based on official definition)</th>
<th>Non-Urban (based on official definition)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>Coloureds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natal</td>
<td>91,92</td>
<td>91,53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu</td>
<td>34,37</td>
<td>56,16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natal/KwaZulu</td>
<td>91,68</td>
<td>89,62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* based on unadjusted Census figures

Source: Central Statistical Services, Report Number 02-85-01

This Table reveals the very high urbanisation levels of the White, Coloured and Asian groups 91,68%; 89,62% and 92,36% respectively. The Black population group is considerably lower, at 24,71% (which amounts to just over 1,1 million people). The Black urbanisation level is likely to be an underestimate, not only because of the exclusion of most informal settlements, but also for the reason that it is likely that many ‘illegal’ lodgers in the townships and backyard squatters will have avoided enumeration through their suspicion of the official census documents. A comparison of the Black urbanisation levels in 1970 and 1980 suggests that the urban population has grown only marginally over the past decade and a half - from 22,5% in 1970, to 23,0% in 1980 and 24,7% in 1985. These suggested urban growth levels do not comply with the evidence of extremely high Black population levels in the inner-
and outer-core regions of Natal/KwaZulu, and the very conspicuous growth of the Black urban population, especially the large informal settlements around Durban-Pinetown which have led certain observers to conclude that Durban-Pinetown is one of the fastest growing cities of the world.

An accurate estimation of the total local Black urban population is therefore difficult to arrive at. One means of formulating a more accurate picture is to compare the statistics provided by the Central Statistical Services with those provided by the KwaZulu-Natal Planning Council report of 1986. Although the latter body's report focuses only on Black urban settlements in the Greater Durban and Pietermaritzburg regions, its contents (particularly urban population statistics) are of considerable worth given the general lack of comprehensive data from other sources. Table 4.15 lists the formally urbanised population of the major townships of Natal/KwaZulu as provided by the Central Statistical Services (unadjusted) and, where possible, compares them with the urban estimates provided by the Planning Council, and with estimates from various township managers.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Township</th>
<th>KwaZulu/Natal Planning Council estimate, 1986</th>
<th>1985 Population Census Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Durban-Pinetown region</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaMashu</td>
<td>210 000†</td>
<td>111 593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ntuzuma</td>
<td>25 000‡</td>
<td>61 834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clermont</td>
<td>76 000</td>
<td>26 997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaDabeka</td>
<td>28 000</td>
<td>15 571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaNdengezi</td>
<td>13 900</td>
<td>11 433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chesterville</td>
<td>12 590</td>
<td>8 008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lamontville</td>
<td>41 850</td>
<td>21 019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>100 000</td>
<td>47 892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umlazi</td>
<td>300 000</td>
<td>194 933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaMakutha</td>
<td>22 000</td>
<td>71 379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>829 340§</td>
<td>522 766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pietermaritzburg region</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edendale</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>46 633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plessislaer</td>
<td>1 880</td>
<td>1 049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashdown</td>
<td>8 730</td>
<td>6 128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imbali</td>
<td>35 000</td>
<td>1 354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mphophomeni</td>
<td>16 000</td>
<td>9 237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sobantu</td>
<td>12 000</td>
<td>6 969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>123 610</td>
<td>71 370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total: Durban-Pinetown-Pietermaritzburg</strong></td>
<td>952 950</td>
<td>594 136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rest of Natal/KwaZulu</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magabeni</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>3 547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ezikhaweni</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>13 918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngweleza</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>6 070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nseleni</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>5 667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madadeni</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>65 744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osizweni</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>51 909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ezakheni</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>27 248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekuvakeni</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>9 794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wembesi</td>
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<td>11 705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nongoma</td>
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<td>1 159</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ulundi</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>4 299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpungamhlope</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1 145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nondweni</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>7 030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mondlo</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>17 743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nqutu</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1 696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundumbili</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>10 371</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued over the page
TABLE 4.15 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Township</th>
<th>KwaZulu/Natal Planning Council estimate, 1986</th>
<th>1985 Population Census Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ginzinsela</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2 371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gamalakhe</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>3 546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sibongile</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>6 924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inkanyezi</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1 131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hambanati</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>4 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steadville</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>6 551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shakaville</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1 920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunville</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>3 571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhongweni</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>4 502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dumebe</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2 490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BhokuZulu</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>6 365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>---</strong></td>
<td><strong>282 416</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total: Natal/KwaZulu + Rest of Urban Black population (ie. domestics and in smaller urban settlements)**

**GRAND TOTAL** 1 128 265

1 Township manager's estimate for KwaMashu - 250 000 (1988). This is probably also an underestimate.

2 Township manager's estimate for Ntuzuma - 75 000 (1988). Hence, it seems that the KwaZulu/Natal Planning Council's figure of 25 000 is likely to be an underestimate.

3 The KwaZulu/Natal Planning Council does not provide an estimate for Mpumalanga - this is therefore the estimate of the township manager, 1988.

4 Township manager's estimate for Umlazi - 800 000 (1988). Hence, it also seems that the KwaZulu/Natal Planning Council's figure of 300 000 is an underestimate (or that the Township manager's figure is an overestimate).

5 Township manager's estimate for KwaMakutha - 40 000 (1988).

6 Includes Township manager of Mpumalanga’s estimate of 100 000.

Source: Central Statistical Services, Report Number 02-85-01, KwaZulu/Natal Planning Council Report, Township Managers of KwaMashu, Ntuzuma, Mpumalanga, Umlazi and KwaMakutha (the rest of

---
the Township managers of the Durban-Pinetown region were not sure enough to make a reasonably accurate estimation, or were not prepared to comment.

Although the figures provided by the aforesaid Planning Council are for 1986 and those of the Central Statistical Services for 1985 (while township manager estimates are for 1988), the Table does provide some proof that the census figures are too low. It is still, however, impossible to reach a fairly accurate estimation of what the size of the urban Black population was in 1985. It is possible that it was somewhere between 1.3 million and 1.5 million in 1985, but it must be stressed that this is only a very rough estimate, and is the only conclusion that can be reached given the absence of enough supportive data.

The size of the informal Black population is even more difficult to assess, in that the only up-to-date reliable information is that which is available for the Durban Functional Region, produced by the Inkatha Institute. The findings of the Institute will be more fully discussed in the following section of this Chapter, however it is necessary to mention at this juncture that the Institute estimated the informal population of the Durban Functional Region to be as large as 1.7 million people in 1987. If one examines the map provided of the distribution of population settlement in Natal/KwaZulu, it is clearly evident that there are extensive informal urban settlements in other regions of Natal/KwaZulu as well, especially in the Pietermaritzburg, Newcastle and Richards Bay/Empangeni regions. On the basis of the 1.7 million
people in informal settlements in the Durban Functional Region and the extensiveness of informal urban settlement in other parts it is possible that the total informal population of Natal/KwaZulu lay somewhere between 2 and 2.5 million in 1985 (this includes the 'peri-urban' areas). On the basis of these very rough estimates of formal and informal population dimensions, one can conclude (albeit a very rough guess) that the total urban population was circa 3.3 million and 4 million in 1985. This, in turn, provides an urbanisation level of the Black population of between 61 and 74%, in comparison with the Central Statistical Services estimate of 25%.

While the Black urbanisation levels presented above should be viewed with caution, and not taken as authoritative, they do indicate that the factual extent of Black urbanisation is considerably greater than that provided by the Central Statistical Services. Along with this the magnitude of the associated problems attendant on urbanisation can also be expected to be much larger.

3 Urbanisation Trends in the Durban Functional Region

3.1 The Population of the Durban Functional Region

The Durban Functional Region contains roughly 9% of the total
population of South Africa and about half of the total population of Natal/KwaZulu, according to preliminary findings of the Inkatha Institute population settlement survey of 1987. The Durban Functional Region is the area that extends from Tongaat in the north, to Umkomaas in the south and Cato Ridge in the west, covering an area of approximately 3,000 square kilometers and includes large areas of KwaZulu. The Functional Region is smaller than the Inner-Core region of Natal/KwaZulu that was identified in the first part of this Chapter in that it excludes the Pietermaritzburg region and covers only the population which is functionally linked to Durban-Pinetown in terms of employment, transport, trade and services, and which identifies itself with the centres stated. Table 4.16 shows the results of the 1983 Inkatha Institute survey together with the preliminary results of the later 1987 survey of the total population in the Region.

This Table reveals that in 1983 Blacks constituted 68% of the total number of people present in the Region, while in 1987 it constituted 71% of the entire population. The Black informal section was 44% of the total population in 1983, while in 1987 it comprised 48% (almost half). The size of the Black informal element of 1.7 million people constituted 68% of the total Black population (formal and informal). Whites, Coloureds and Indians
TABLE 4.16


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Racial Group</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Black Formal</th>
<th>Black Informal</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Population in 1983</td>
<td>357 700</td>
<td>63 440</td>
<td>540 834</td>
<td>733 770</td>
<td>1 345 983</td>
<td>2 079 753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population as % of total population in 1983</td>
<td>11,76%</td>
<td>2,09%</td>
<td>17,78%</td>
<td>24,12%</td>
<td>44,25%</td>
<td>68,37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average % population growth rate per year</td>
<td>2,0%</td>
<td>2,4%</td>
<td>2,2%</td>
<td>3,0%</td>
<td>6,5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated population in 1987</td>
<td>387 341</td>
<td>69 793</td>
<td>590 307</td>
<td>826 609</td>
<td>1 731 562</td>
<td>2 558 171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population as % of estimated total population in 1987</td>
<td>10,74%</td>
<td>1,94%</td>
<td>16,37%</td>
<td>22,93%</td>
<td>48,02%</td>
<td>70,95%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


constituted marginal proportions to the total number of people in the Durban Functional Region, 11,2 and 16% respectively¹⁴.

This Table also shows that the Black population has had the highest growth rates between 1983 and 1987, 3% for the formal population and 6,5% for the informal one, while Whites, Coloureds and Indians have had growth rates of 2,0; 2,4 and 2,2% respectively.
ly.

If one assumes that the population groups of the Functional Region continues to grow at the same rates as they did between 1983 and 1987, the total population will be over 6 million by the turn of the century. Of this the total Black population will be almost 5 million, and the informal section of it almost 4 million.

3.2 The Geographical Dispersion of the Informal Population of the Durban Functional Region

The preliminary results of the 1987 Inkatha Institute Survey reveal that there are four main clusters of informal settlements in the Durban Functional Region:

1. Inanda - to the north of Durban-Pinetown

2. Those to the south of Pinetown (Mariannhill, St Wendolins, Dassenhoek, etc.)

3. Those to the south of Durban in the Umbumbulu region near Umlazi (Malukazi, Mgaga, Ezimbokodweni, etc.) and

4. Those to the west of Durban-Pinetown in the Mpumalanga region (Georgedale, Shongweni, Fredville, etc.).
The preliminary estimations of the population sizes for these four major clusters is listed in Table 4.17 while the general location of these settlements, along with the formal townships, is provided in Map 7. Map 8 is the section of the Inkatha Institute map of population settlement covering the present Functional Region which reflects the proximity of Black formal and informal settlements to the metropolitan centres.

The statistics provided in Tables 4.16 and 4.17, together with the spatial locations of population settlement depicted in the two maps, reveal important characteristics about the Durban Functional Region. Unlike most cities of the world where the poorer sections of the population generally reside closer to the centre while the affluent reside mostly along the periphery, in the Durban area the more affluent sections of the population generally reside closer to the centre while the poor reside on the periphery. This inverse spatial relationship can largely be explained in terms of the effect of apartheid. It was explained in Chapter Two how the apartheid system has served to sustain White-minority political and economic power, and to deny access to this power to the other population groups, especially the Black population. The spatial distribution of the population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% of Area’s Population</th>
<th>% of Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Area 1: Inanda</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindelani and Ntuzuma</td>
<td>30 476</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Released</td>
<td>217 138</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molweni</td>
<td>36 363</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of Informal Population</td>
<td>377 402</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>661 379¹</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Area 2: Pinetown** |            |                         |                       |
| Marianhill, Thornwood and Dassenhoek | 83 634 | 47                      |                       |
| St. Wendolins         | 14 545     | 8                       |                       |
| Welbedacht            | 13 572     | 8                       |                       |
| Balance of Informal Population | 65 453 | 37                      |                       |
| Total                 | 177 204    | 100                     | 10                    |

| **Area 3: Umbumbulu** |            |                         |                       |
| Malukazi              | 29 090     | 7                       |                       |
| Mgaga                 | 20 779     | 5                       |                       |
| Umboqintwini          | 78 959     | 18                      |                       |
| Balance of Informal Population | 294 447 | 70                      |                       |
| Total                 | 423 275    | 100                     | 24                    |

| **Area 4: Mpumalanga** |            |                         |                       |
| Fredville             | 43 636     | 9                       |                       |
| Georgedale and Woodyglen | 109 088 | 23                      |                       |
| Nyuswa                | 15 584     | 3                       |                       |
| Shongweni             | 62 336     | 13                      |                       |
| Clermont              | 101 816    | 21                      |                       |
| Embo                  | 47 272     | 10                      |                       |

Continued over the page
### TABLE 4.17 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% of Area's Population</th>
<th>% of Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balance of Informal Population</td>
<td>98 353</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>478 085</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Informal Population of the Durban Functional Region</td>
<td>1 739 943</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Inkatha Institute, preliminary findings of 1987 in formal population survey.

1 350 000 (or 53%) of this population lies outside of KwaZulu on South African Development Trust Land.

The White residential areas situated closest to the Central Business District, and (although they also extend into the outlying urban areas, especially to the west of Durban-Pinetown) are the closest of all the population groups to major infrastructural networks and places of employment.

The Indian and Coloured residential areas are also generally situated close to the major infrastructural networks and places of employment, but are mostly further away from them than the White population group.
MAP 7

KEY

- Dense Shack Areas
- KwaZulu Boundary
- Less Dense Shack Areas
- Formal Townships
- New Shack Areas

Impressionistic Shack Location: Inkatha Institute, Durban.
Base Map and Details: Department of Surveying and Mapping, University of Natal, Durban.

SHACK AREAS IN GREATER DURBAN

Produced by Inkatha Institute, Durban, October 1996.
PRELIMINARY MAPPING OF SETTLEMENT DISTRIBUTION
KWAZULU/NATAL

SETTLEMENT TYPES
3. The Black population group resides furthest away from the major infrastructural networks and places of employment. Umlazi and KwaMashu (the two largest townships) are, however, adjacent to the infrastructural network as well as Chesterville and Lamontville. Here it must be stressed that these townships had been built to accommodate the informal Black population of Cato Manor which had become part of the city core by the 1950s. Their location was such that they could be within the periphery (or at least further from the city) while the infrastructural network could serve to transport labour between the periphery and the core simultaneously.

4. By far the largest section of the Black population which is in the periphery is the informal population. This section is situated furthest of all away from the main infrastructural network and places of employment, yet the most densely populated of these settlements are usually adjacent to the formal townships and the outlying infrastructural extensions that link the periphery with the core. Beyond the informal settlements lie the peri-urban areas which are also densely populated but not as extensively as the informal settlements.

This core-periphery spatial distribution of the population groups shows that apartheid has, through the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts and the Group Areas Act, restricted most of the settlement of the Black urban population within KwaZulu. While on a broad scale the
close proximity of the KwaZulu areas around Durban-Pinetown, and the fact that Durban-Pinetown produces over half of the gross domestic product of Natal/KwaZulu, has caused these said areas to be the main attractant to Black urbanisation (and therefore, on this score, they were classified as part of the main economic core). On a local level there is a distinct core-periphery relationship operating between the KwaZulu and the Natal districts in the Functional Region. The main urban densities closest to the Natal border is an indication that the Black urban population is piling up against and spilling over the "apartheid walls" of the city, to be as close as possible to the employment centres which are provided by the wealth generated by the city core.

For further insight into how the core-periphery relationship came about, the following sub-section of this Chapter covers a brief history of urban Black settlement in the Durban Functional Region.

3.3 A Short history of Urban Black Settlement in the Durban Functional Region

The history of urban Black settlement as a whole in the region is inextricably integrated with the history of its informal settlements. The first urban Black settlement was Cato Manor, just west of Durban, which area was originally owned by Whites who sold the land to Indians, the latter in turn rented it out to Blacks who
built dwellings there as early as the 1920s. It is difficult to estimate the population of Cato Manor for this time, but Maylam has estimated it to have been approximately 2,500 in 1936 (Maylam, 1983:414). Maasdorp and Humphreys (1978) estimated that numbers peaked at circa 89,000 in 1952, which not only comprised Blacks—although they constituted some 79% the rest made up of Indians, Coloureds and even some Whites. Cato Manor was declared an emergency camp in 1952, to which basic services were provided. Removals began in 1958, mainly to the newly erected townships on the urban periphery. By 1966 Cato Manor ceased to exist. During the removal at least 30,000 to 40,000 people "went missing", and it is suggested that they possibly moved back to the rural areas, or erected smaller informal settlements around Durban-Pinetown (Morris, 1981:55).

The construction of the formal townships of KwaMashu, Umlazi, Lamontville and Chesterville was primarily to re-house the Black population of Cato Manor, while Chatsworth was erected to house its informal Indian population. Lamontville was established in 1939 and Chesterville in 1946. These two townships were soon found to be inadequate to absorb the informal population, which continued to grow rapidly and consequently KwaMashu and Umlazi were built (Maylam, 1983:422).

In 1953 915 hectares of land 18 kilometers north of Durban was acquired by the Durban Corporation and in 1956 was proclaimed a
municipal housing scheme, which came to be KwaMashu. The first houses in the scheme became available in 1958. In 1977, after the completions of approximately 15 500 houses and 1 576 hostel rooms, KwaMashu was incorporated into KwaZulu (Morris, 1981).

In 1950 the S J Smith hostel in the Umlazi area was built for single Black males, and the Umlazi Gubeland area (next to Lamontville) was also established as a permanent Black housing area at this time. In 1960 the Umlazi Mission Reserve housing scheme for the accommodation of 10 000 Black families with freehold title was proposed. By 1960 the first houses in Umlazi became available, and by 1970 there was a total number of 18 254 dwellings, with additional accommodation of approximately 120 000 single males in the hostels (Morris, 1981).

Throughout this time to the present the informal population continued to grow, from 2 500 in 1936 (Maylam, 1983) to 89 000 in 1952 (Maasdorp and Humphreys, 1978) to 94 000 in 1966 (Watts, Davies and Waters, 1967) to 1,3 million in 1983 and to 1,7 million in 1987 (Inkatha Institute, 1987). The continued growth of the informal population is evidence that the formal township approach has failed in its attempt to adequately house the urbanising Black population in the Durban Functional Region. The removal of Cato Manor and the building of townships has shifted a significant size of the Black population from the inner-city area to the outer-city area, to fit the apartheid policy of racial separation within the
urban area. This spatial relationship has been maintained by the Group Areas Act, the Land Acts, influx control (which was recently abolished) and the squatting laws. Consequently most of the informal settlements are situated within KwaZulu, rather than in the districts of Durban-Pinetown.

While the intention during the Verwoerdian era of apartheid was to stem and eventually reverse the process of Black urbanisation the opposite has happened in the Durban Functional Region and other metropolitan centres in Natal. The fact that the urban Black population (formal and informal) constitutes 71% of the total population in the region makes this urban population an intrinsic part of the city of Durban-Pinetown. According to the Inkatha Institute informal population survey of 1983, 86% of those interviewed in the informal settlements did not intend to return to the rural areas, 46% had been born within the Durban Functional Region and 60% were employed and did their shopping in the Durban-Pinetown area (this includes people living in the peri-urban areas). While they have negligible services and facilities, the survey also points out that they rely heavily on the adjacent townships for transport, schools, clinics, shops, clean water supply and sanitation provisions.

There is a common misconception that informal settlements are places of arrival for new in-migrants from the rural areas. A Provisional Report undertaken by Schlemmer, Fourie, Gumede and
Coughlin on Informal Communities in the Greater Durban Region (Inkatha Institute, 1986), based on aerial photographs and a sample of 670 informal dwelling units in the Durban-Pinetown area, found that most of the informal dwellers were not recent rural-urban migrants\(^1\). The preliminary figures show that roughly 21% of the informal population was born in the Durban-Pinetown region\(^2\) while the remaining 63% had migrated to the Durban-Pinetown region between the 1930s and 1976 and only 16% had migrated since 1976. More importantly, the Report states that only around 41% of the rural migrants came to the informal settlements first while the remaining 59% had lived as lodgers and hostel dwellers in the townships, or as domestic servants in White, Coloured and Indian residential areas. Well over half of those who migrated had done so in search of employment, while around 10 to 15% had come to join relatives, especially husbands.

While it is true that the concentration of economic activity in the Durban-Pinetown area does provide a wide catchment area for rural-urban migrants (particularly the KwaZulu districts), the Report does stress that "the importance of rural-urban migration should not be over-emphasised" as a result of its findings (1986:13). The main characteristics of rural-urban migration and spatial location of informal settlement were listed as follows:

1 Some one-quarter of the people who have urbanised have in fact simply edged in closer to the transportation routes to
the city from areas within the sphere of influence of the city;

2 The largest single category of people in the informal areas were born in these types of settlements in Durban;

3 The KwaZulu 'hinterland' (i.e. the northern areas of KwaZulu) does not provide the bulk of the longer-distance urban migrants. It is the relatively more urbanised central area and the troubled western areas (including the Msinga area, known for faction fighting, and the Drakensberg Reserves, whose future is insecure) which provide the bulk of the rural-urban migrants.

4 Non-Zulu areas provide as much as one-fifth of the most recent in-migrants, mainly the Transkei (1986:13-14).
Conclusion

In this main Chapter of the study where the core-periphery model was applied to Natal/KwaZulu and the spatial distribution of the population between and within the core-periphery regions were examined, the following important characteristics can be outlined:

1. In broad terms, Natal produced 93% of the gross domestic product of Natal/KwaZulu, while KwaZulu produced 7%. However, Natal held only 16% of the population of Natal/KwaZulu, while KwaZulu held 84%;

2. The high concentration of economic activity in Natal was extreme. The Durban-Pinetown-Pietermartizburg region produced 67% of the gross domestic product of Natal. Durban alone produced 50% of the gross domestic product of Natal/KwaZulu;

3. The economic inequalities between Natal and KwaZulu widened between 1975 and 1981, in that the average growth rate for Natal was 16.2% while the growth rate for KwaZulu was 12.2%;

4. The inner- and outer-core regions of Natal/KwaZulu held 77% of the population of Natal/KwaZulu, while the inner- and outer-periphery regions held 23%;
5 The White, Coloured and Asian groups were highly concentrated in the inner-core region, 68%, 83% and 75% respectively, while the Black group was more evenly dispersed across the core-periphery spectrum - mainly as a result of the outer-periphery that consisted entirely of KwaZulu districts, and held 21% of the Black population;

6 The Blacks comprised the largest population group in each core-periphery region: 62% in the inner-core, 89% in the outer-core, 84% in the inner-periphery and almost 100% in the outer-periphery;

7 Of the Black population situated in the core regions, 84% was contained within KwaZulu: 85 and 83% in the inner-core and outer-core respectively;

8 Most of the Black population is inside KwaZulu, and urbanisation in KwaZulu is taking place where the districts lie in close proximity to the Natal metropoles, especially those close to Durban-Pinetown, Pietermaritzburg, Newcastle, Ladysmith, Richards Bay/Empangeni and Port Shepstone. Formal townships and informal settlements lie almost adjacent to the Natal magisterial boundaries (and in some cases 'spill over' into Natal). The transitional rural to urban (or 'peri-urban') areas generally lie adjacent to the formal and informal settlements, but extend further into the KwaZulu
Although the size of the Black urban population is difficult to determine, it is roughly estimated that at least between 24 and 28% of the Black population is formally urbanised while between 37 and 46% is informalised (this includes the 'peri-urban' areas). This, in turn, results in a total urbanisation level of between 61 and 74%. This is much higher than the Central Statistical Services estimate of 25%, but still lower than the urbanisation levels of the White, Coloured and Asian groups, which is 92; 90 and 92% respectively;

On a more local scale, in the Durban Functional Region, the core-periphery relationship is also replicated. The White, Coloured and Asian groups are situated closest to the major infrastructural networks and places of employment (especially the White population) while the bulk of the Black population is situated furthest away from the major infrastructural networks and places of employment.

On the basis of these ten points, it can be concluded (as did Browett and Fair for the Southern African region) that Natal/KwaZulu has not reached the stage of narrowing inequalities posited by Friedmann in his core-periphery model. It can also be concluded that this Chapter, together with the conclusions of the
Historical Chapter, presents enough evidence to substantiate four of the hypotheses presented at the outset of the study, namely:

1. That the history of colonialism, apartheid and separate development has led to a considerable degree of spatial distancing between the population groups in Natal/KwaZulu, in both the rural and urban settings, despite the close geographical closeness between the core and peripheral regions through the mosaic-like dispersal of KwaZulu;

2. That economic growth in the core areas of Natal has had the impact of causing a large section of the Black population to be settled in close proximity to the wealth generating areas, whilst remaining socially, economically and politically divorced from access to them;

3. That the Natal economy dominates the economic output of the entire region, and that there is a growing gap in the economic disparities between Natal and KwaZulu; and

4. That the Black urban population of Natal/KwaZulu is considerably larger than the level of 25% which is provided by the Central Statistical Services.
Footnotes

1 It is interesting to note that the contribution of the Natal/KwaZulu economy to the South African economy (excluding TBVC States) was 14% in 1981. In broad terms, this could be argued to place the Natal/KwaZulu region in a peripheral role especially to that of the PWV region.

2 The local manufacturing sector increased its share of the economic output of Pinetown from 44,0% in 1975 to 49,5% in 1981, while the comparable sector of Newcastle increased its share from 36,1% in 1975 to 49,6% in 1981.

3 It was decided not to include Lower Tugela in the main economic core despite its large manufacturing sector component and its reasonably close links with Durban. Lower Tugela is nevertheless comparatively more agricultural, located further from Durban than the other core-districts and not yet at a level of development comparable with them.

4 Although comprising part of the north coast sugar-belt, it was decided to classify the districts of Lower Umfolozi and Lower Tugela as part of the secondary core area for the following reasons: Lower Umfolozi contains the important secondary metropolitan centre of Richards Bay/Empangeni, Lower Tugela also has a large agricultural sector but an even
larger secondary and tertiary adjunct and is strategically placed between Durban and Richards Bay/Empangeni. Agricultural output was placed in secondary importance to strategic spatial location with regard to these two districts (since the Natal regional scale is being dealt with and in consideration that agricultural output comprised only 5% of total regional output in 1981). It was for this reason too that Inanda, which also falls within the sugar-belt, was placed under the category of the main core region. Lower Umfolozi and Lower Tugela also had high levels of economic output by comparison with districts that are predominantly agricultural.

5 See sub-section 10 of the explanatory notes in the front of the 1985 Population Census, Report Number 02-85-01.

6 The title of the HSRC report is: Rekonstruksie van die Sensus - ouderdomstrukture van die Suid-Afrikaanse Swart Bevolking: 1936 - 1985, and was undertaken by Dr W P Mostert, Mr J L van Tonder and Mrs B Hofmeyer of the Human Sciences Research Council.

7 This map is titled "Preliminary Mapping of Settlement Distribution for KwaZulu/Natal" and was produced by Clarissa Fourie of the Inkatha Institute, with the close assistance of Prof David Scogings of the Survey and Mapping Department of
the University of Natal, Durban, Rudi Hillermann of Innova Homes and the Air Survey Company of Africa.

8 See sub-section 6 of the explanatory notes in the front of the 1985 Population Census, Report Number 02-85-01.

9 The Housing in South Africa magazine (August 1988), a publication of the Institute for Housing of Southern Africa, mentioned that Durban was "the world's second fastest growing metropolitan region - eclipsed only by sprawling, slum-ridden Mexico City".

10 Although the KwaZulu/Natal Planning Council report is confidential, permission was received from its technical co-ordinator Dr P S Viljoen to make use of its contents for the purpose of this study.


12 The boundary of the Durban Functional Region is defined by the Urbanisation Study of the Urban Foundation, 1984. It includes Cato Ridge to the west, and Umkomaas to the south and bulges northwards to include Nsuze.
The proportions for the White, Coloured and Indian populations, and growth rates, were based on population percentages and annual growth rates in *Powerhouse or Poorhouse* by Peter Mansfield, Urban Foundation, 1985. The average annual growth rate of the Black population in the formal areas of 3% also takes into account the lodgers who are often informal backyard inhabitants.

This report is confidential. Permission was received for the Inkatha Institute to refer to its findings for this study.

This should not be confused with the 46% of the informal population born in the Durban Functional Region mentioned earlier in that the said region is much larger than the area covered by the Provisional Report. The 21% in the latter Report refers more specifically to those born in existing informal settlements.
CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

In the Introductory Chapter the widely differing population and urbanisation trends between First and Third World countries were exposed. In the First World population growth rates are low and urbanisation levels are high (but the pace of urbanisation is low), while in the Third World population growth rates are high and urbanisation levels are comparatively low (but the pace of urbanisation is very high). It was also shown that South Africa has a combination of First and Third World population and urbanisation characteristics: while the White, Coloured and Asian groups have high levels of urbanisation and comparatively low rates of population growth (conforming to First World trends), the Black group had a much lower level of urbanisation and a comparatively high rate of population growth (conforming to Third World trends).

The Historical Chapter showed the impact that colonialism and apartheid has had on population and urbanisation trends in South Africa. It was concluded that the perpetuation of racial segregation throughout the phase of industrial capitalism had constrained the pace at which Black urbanisation took place, and severely restricted the socio-economic integration of the Black urban population into the fabric of the First World socio-economy. The result is the artificially distorted, yet highly engrained,
spatial patterns of urban settlement whereby the Black urban population (which constitutes the bulk of the total urban population) is relegated to Third World conditions, and highly dependent on the First World economy for social subsistence. The consequent absence of a viable economic base in the Black urban settlements, and the underdeveloped conditions in the rural areas of the Reserves, has sustained the labour-supply function of both rural and urban areas within the Reserves, as well as dumping grounds for the unemployed since the deepening economic recession since the late 1970s.

In the theoretical Chapter, Friedmann's core-periphery model was outlined, together with its practical implementation to the Southern African region by Browett and Fair. Friedmann's model stressed that the inequalities between the core and the periphery would eventually narrow to a stage characterised by, 'national integration, efficiency in the location of individual firms, maximum potential for individual growth, and minimum essential interregional imbalances' (Friedmann, 1966:37). However, Browett and Fair's application of the core-periphery model to the Southern African region exposed widening inequalities between the core and the periphery. It is therefore clear that, in the Southern African context, the stage of narrowing inequalities in Friedmann's model had not been reached. The modernisation / dependency debate was also discussed, in terms of how the different schools of thought perceived the relationship between the core and the
periphery and how this in turn shaped their perspectives of the urbanisation process. Whether one sees the relationship as complementary between core and periphery, and thereby urbanisation as an essential positive force, or as parasitical leading to the underdevelopment of the periphery, and thereby urbanisation as an essentially negative force, depends on ideological persuasion.

In Chapter Four, where the core-periphery model was applied to Natal/KwaZulu and the spatial distribution between and within core-periphery regions was examined, it was concluded that (as did Browett and Fair for the Southern African context) that, although the core and periphery regions were in most cases closer than in Friedmann's model (and even closer than in Browett and Fair's model), the stage of narrowing core / periphery inequalities had not been reached. Natal still produced the bulk of economic output while the bulk of the population resided in KwaZulu, economic concentration was still extreme in the core, economic inequalities were widening, while the core held the bulk of the population most of this population was inside KwaZulu (where spatial inequalities were perpetuated) and rural KwaZulu areas still held about a fifth of the Black population. Although apartheid and separate development policies had not been entirely replicated in practice, the affects of these policies were clearly visable from the findings of this Chapter.

To return, therefore, to the important issue related to the
validity of Friedmann’s theoretical predictions of narrowing inequalities it is necessary at this final stage in the study to attempt to answer these interrelated questions:

1. Is Friedmann’s model (in the context of South Africa and Natal/KwaZulu) flawed in that narrowing inequalities on a significant scale might be impossible to attain?

2. What is the core/periphery relationship between Natal and KwaZulu – is it complementary (conforming to the modernisation paradigm) or parasitical (conforming to the dependency paradigm)? and

3. What are the implications of questions (1) and (2) for future spatial patterns of economic concentration, population settlement and urbanisation in Natal/KwaZulu?

On the question of Friedmann’s theoretical implications, it seems that, in the first instance, Friedmann assumed that colonialism took place in sparsely populated areas. This implies that there would be no significant restrictions on the flow between the phases of his model from small urban centres to an eventual highly integrated socio-economic spatial structure. The Historical Chapter showed that even before the arrival of the settlers in Natal, there had been considerable pressure and conflict to acquire land for agricultural purposes by the indigenous popula-
tion. Once the settlers arrived and made claims to the land of the indigenous population, the situation became even more conflict-ridden. Although Natal was not densely populated at the time of colonialism, it was in terms of its limited agricultural resource base, and it was argued in the Historical Chapter that this was one of the main reasons for the enforcement of racial separation, together with the need for cheap labour to work on settler farms, and hence the establishment of the Reserves of Natal as early as the 1850s. Rather than the spatial structure evolving in accordance to the dictates of economic forces, whereby the population might have been able to locate itself wherever it wished, the said structure from this time became unequal in terms of access to wealth generating areas by the indigenous population, with unequal urban centres.

Secondly, despite Friedmann’s political modifications to his original model, this could still be argued to have remained largely apolitical. He seemed to have neglected to address the extent to which colonial and post-colonial regimes would protect their vested interests against the indigenous population once it became increasingly aware of its relative deprivation and began to mobilise itself politically. Instead, Friedmann foresaw a regional development policy which would decentralise decision making, and thereby deconcentrate centres of economic activity. The perpetuation of the main laws of apartheid, namely the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts and the Group Areas Act, is evidence that the
system of White-minority rule in South Africa protecting its vested socio-economic interests, in spite of the spiralling social unrest since 1976, and especially since 1985. While Friedmann saw a regional development policy arising out of consensus and goodwill between 'core-elites' and 'counter-elites' in the periphery, the reality in South Africa seems to be an inadequate piecemeal and an exceedingly slow 'reform' process by the Government, not as a spontaneous evolutionary process, but as a response to increasing protests to apartheid on both a national and an international scale.

Thirdly, Friedmann's model has a regional bias in that it neglects the possibility of a perpetuation of relative poverty within the urban-cores, or on the immediate peripheries of the urban cores. In Browett and Fair's application of his model, the core and periphery were in closer proximity to each other (than in Friedmann's model), and it can be argued that, in the case of Natal/KwaZulu, the core and the periphery are even closer, because of the scattered geographical configuration of KwaZulu where various districts lie adjacent to Natal metropoles. It cannot be said that these KwaZulu districts adjacent to the Natal metropoles (which contain the bulk of the Black urban population) are the upward-transitional zones of stage two of Friedmann's model, despite the very close spatial proximity. Yet the outlying rural KwaZulu areas can be compared with the downward-transitional areas of Friedmann's model. Nattrass stated: 'In 1980 half of the
Blacks living and working in towns earned more than R1 600 per year; not a great sum when compared with White earnings but, nevertheless, considerably more than could be earned by those in the rural areas, where half earned less than R700 per year and 45% less than R300 per year (Nattrass, 1985:4). Although urban Black standards are higher than rural Black living standards, the high levels of urban unemployment, estimated to be around 30% in the townships and 45% in the informal settlements, the lack of adequate housing (and the sprawl of informal settlements), the lack of adequate service facilities, the lack of adequate infrastructural linkages and the fact that the employment centres are in Natal to which workers have to commute daily could well place the KwaZulu areas in close proximity to the Natal metropoles in the downward-transitory zone. In relation to this, Gilbert and Gugler state that 'the (Friedmann) model fails to treat the issue of poverty in the cities or indeed the personal disparities in income which exist in most Third World countries. Because poverty is treated purely in spatial terms it is easy for Friedmann to slip into the belief that regional development will eliminate its worst manifestations' (Gilbert and Gugler, 1987:34-35).

Lastly, it can be said that Friedmann's model conforms closely with the Rostowian evolutionary stages of growth theory whereby it is assumed that Third World countries will follow the same stages of growth, or economic path, that was taken by the First World countries, without considering the possibility of an alternative
development path for Third World countries. In the context of Natal/KwaZulu, where the First and Third Worlds are juxtaposed, it is highly unlikely that the development path would follow those of First World nations, and it seems that it might follow a very unique development path, in that it has one of the most unequal spatial distributions and income inequalities in the world (Nattrass, 1985:3).

Friedmann seemed to assume a very direct relationship between changes in the spatial structure, together with urbanisation, and economic growth, whereas in practice it is shown that there is not necessarily a continuous link between urbanisation and economic growth through time. While there would seem to be a strong relationship between economic growth and urbanisation, the fact that the pace of economic growth has been outstripped by the pace of urbanisation in the Third World, renders the relationship between urbanisation and economic growth highly complex, and it is best to refer to a general relationship between the two. The complexity of the relationship can partly be explained by pointing out that although economic growth is a prerequisite for development, economic growth and social development and not necessarily synonymous. Dwyer (1977) points out that 'although the average per capita income of the Third World increased by approximately 50% between 1960 and the mid-1970s, the benefits were very unequally distributed among countries, regions within countries and especially between socio-economic groups' (cited in Fair, 164.
1982:19). Given this, the very rapid rate of urbanisation in the Third World is much more likely to be spurred, not by economic growth nor development, but by the resulting rural poverty caused by enhanced income inequalities. Urbanisation thus results from the perceived advantages of living in the cities, even though they offer so little, outweighing the perceived prospects of living in the countryside to the rural population of the Third World. In addition, urbanisation would accelerate during an economic recession, as in South Africa, because of the deepening rural poverty. Mears, drawing strongly from the findings of Harrison (1980), makes the following distinctions between First and Third World patterns of urbanisation:

In Western countries, there is often very little difference between urban and rural incomes, and even less so when relative costs of living are taken into account. In the Third World, urban incomes have been found to be, on average, two-and-a-half times higher than rural incomes. Such differentials are generally highest in Africa, where urban growth has been fastest. The pattern of urbanisation in Third World countries is often characterised by a heavy concentration of economic activity and wealth in a few large population centres, standing in sharp contrast to the economic stagnation and the much lower average incomes found in some non-urban regions (Mears, 1988:50-51).
It would therefore seem that Durban-Pinetown can be classified a Third World city in that: 1) it contains almost half of the total Black population of Natal/KwaZulu - 2,5 million people out of 5,4 million people, 2) its living standards are almost thirty times better, on average, than those of KwaZulu (Nattrass, 1985:21) and 3) it produces over half of the gross domestic product of Natal/ KwaZulu. It can therefore be concluded that the patterns of future regional and urban changes, as pointed in Friedmann's model, are unlikely to be replicated in Third World countries, and especially in the Natal/KwaZulu region. Thus, on the question of the core-periphery relationship, it can also be concluded that the said relationship between Natal and KwaZulu places KwaZulu in a dependency status to Natal, and that this has contributed to the underdevelopment of KwaZulu, for the following additional reasons.

Firstly, with regard to employment, the main export function of the KwaZulu economy is not goods and services, but labour for the Natal economy. The Buthelezi Commission (1982:154-155) estimated that 78% of the income of KwaZulu in 1978 was derived through the export of labour to Natal. The regional dependency on migrant labour remittances has increased, rather than decreased, and the rapidly increasing numbers of cross-border commuters and in-migrants to the fringe settlements around the Natal metropoles is proof of this. Haarhoff (1985:99) noted that roughly half of the employed portions of the population of KwaZulu are commuters to and from the Natal economy and live in the fringe areas of
KwaZulu, bordering the main Natal towns and cities. KwaZulu also has, by far, the largest number of cross-border commuters of all the Reserves (including TBVC states). The Reserve with the second largest number of commuters, Bophuthatswana, only had half the number of commuters of KwaZulu (Mastouroudes, 1982). Between 1970 and 1981 the estimated number of cross-border commuters between Natal and KwaZulu rose from 127 000 to 400 600, at a very high average annual increase of 13% (Smit, Olivier and Booysens, in Smith (ed) 1982:103).

Nattrass stated the following in 1985 concerning the impact of the migrant labour system and wage remittances on KwaZulu:

Studies show that typically in the rural areas of KwaZulu, between 70 and 80% of families have members away as migrant workers, by far the majority of whom, (usually over 80%) are men, usually in the 20 to 50 year age bracket. Most of the migrants (usually more than 75%) send money back to their families on a regular basis. However, the amounts sent back are generally small and typically range between R12 and R22 per month. When one compares the level of remittances with the level of urban Black wage rates which range between R800 and R1 200 per annum, it is clear that migrants are only able to send home a small proportion of their total urban wage earnings (Nattrass, 1985:20).
Secondly, with regard to production and consumption, most of this takes place in the Natal economy. Natal produces 93% of the gross domestic product of the region, while the Buthelezi Commission (1982:81) reported that 80% of the earnings of economically active KwaZulu citizens are spent in the Natal economy. In 1980, the average annual income of a KwaZulu citizen was R534, whereas that of the average South African (including all races) was R1 900. Also, in 1980, the annual value of goods and services produced within KwaZulu per head of its population was R124, whereas the equivalent value for South Africa as a whole (including TBVC states) was R1 950 — nearly 16 times greater (Nattrass, 1985:4).

Thirdly, with regard to fiscal aspects, KwaZulu relies very heavily on the Central Government as a source of finance. Government expenditure on the Reserves as a whole almost trebled between 1970 and 1975, but the gap between the Reserves and the rest of South Africa continued to widen in terms of public investment projects (Nattrass, 1981:206). Three quarters of those employed in KwaZulu in 1976 were employed by the public sector which is almost totally State funded (Nattrass, 1981:211), and today the proportion is roughly the same. The very strong dependency of the KwaZulu economy on Central Government funding also constrains the autonomy of its Government to formulate strategies of its own that might conflict with the overall strategy of the Central Government (Nattrass, 1981:216).
Lastly, subsistence agricultural output has remained virtually stagnant while the rural population has grown at an average of 2.8% per annum (Nattrass, 1981 and Haarhoff, 1981).

Whether there will be a narrowing of inequalities between Natal and KwaZulu in the future is debatable. Yet, it could be said that, given the very high degree of economic concentration in the Natal economic core and in terms of the emphasis by the modernisation school on the diffusion of economic benefits towards the periphery, the stage of narrowing inequalities should have been reached at an earlier stage in the economic history of the region. The resulting spatial structures of Natal/KwaZulu, in which the bulk of the population is spatially divorced from the major wealth producing areas, is a situation which has not been conducive to development (in the sense of upgrading the living standards of the bulk of the population), and is therefore also not conducive to further economic growth. As Schmidt (1975) pointed out, apartheid and separate development 'relegates Blacks the control over the economically poor and underdeveloped parts of South Africa, and allows the Whites to control the prosperous and more developed areas' (cited in Fair, 1982:81).

It was emphasised, in the Theoretical Chapter, that there is evidence on international, national and regional scales, to suggest that the diffusionist beliefs of the modernisation school and the conventional approaches to development, have been inade-
quate in theoretically predicting and practically implementing the reduction of economic and spatial inequalities. The evidence of the growing disparities in Natal/KwaZulu suggests that a modernisation perspective applied to this region would be an inadequate tool of analysis, and that the reasons posited by the dependency school for widening inequalities should be more seriously considered, especially by policy makers.

The dependency paradigm, having emerged in the late-1960s and 1970s, is still a new school of thought, and, as Gilbert and Gugler (1987:35) point out 'a fully developed neo-Marxist theory of spatial evolution and underdevelopment has not yet emerged'. While dependency theory has its origins mainly in the critique of modernisation theory, it does not present a clear picture of the future. It would seem that, as with the disillusionment with modernisation theory as a result of evidence of persisting inequalities, there is a disillusionment with socialism as a means to narrow inequalities. Despite the valid contribution of dependency theory as an extremely rigorous analytical tool in explaining the causes of narrowing inequalities between the core and periphery, it is still incomplete. In addition, while it is true that deep structural transformation of the political economy, especially in the context of Natal/KwaZulu, and South Africa, might seem to be the only possible solution to ending the high levels of dependency and underdevelopment of the periphery, by means of a Revolution, this would only seem to offer part of the
solution. While Friedmann viewed the inequalities between the core and periphery merely in spatial terms and fell into the trap of believing that further economic growth would narrow the inequalities, the dependency paradigm would seem to believe that a revolutionary overthrow of the existing political order is a prerequisite to the halting of underdevelopment. Revolutions are historical facts and are not merely socialist, but capitalist eg. the French Revolution, and nationalist. Given the widening inequalities in the Southern African context and Natal/KwaZulu despite Government reforms together with rapid population growth and urbanisation, a Revolution does seem inevitable. The reason, though, why it only offers part of the solution is that a transformation to a socialist society in Natal/KwaZulu, apart from causing immense economic destruction, will be exceedingly slow, because of the deeply ingrained, socio-economic and spatial distortions through the political history of racial separation. As Fair (1982:36) points out:

The transformation can seldom be quick, for a country is in part trapped within its own past. Its inherited social and economic infrastructure and the distribution of skills and wealth among certain groups in its population, all designed previously to serve capitalist interests, cannot be rearranged or redistributed overnight to serve new socialist interests directed at the mass of the population. A critical period for such
Finally, on the question of future implications it would seem that, on the basis of the above, whatever the political future of Natal/KwaZulu, the future scenario for the core-periphery population and urban settlement patterns is likely to be as follows:

1. The socio-economic spatial imbalances between the core and periphery will persist;

2. Urbanisation rates will be low amongst the White, Asian and Coloured population groups, but the Black urbanisation rate will continue to be rapid. Black population growth can also be expected to be rapid, only tapering off slightly;

3. The settlement of the Black urban population will continue to take place in the fringe areas of KwaZulu in close proximity to the Natal metropoles, and mainly in the form of informal settlements. The 'peri-urban' areas can also be expected to become more densely populated, taking on the characteristics of the existing densely populated informal settlements, with more 'peri-urban' settlements forming on their fringes towards the KwaZulu hinterland in turn. Only a marginal amount of racial mixing is likely to take place in the urban areas;
The economic recession also seems likely to persist, as a result of the expected lack of meaningful socio-economic integration of the Black population into the fabric of the First World economy given the structural constraints in terms of the ingrained nature of spatial settlement patterns and economic activities. Without the integration of the First World and Third World economies of Natal/KwaZulu in a manner that arrests the continued underdevelopment of KwaZulu, the entire region will be subject to further socio-economic stagnation.

The above provides speculative substantiation to the fifth hypothesis at the outset of the study, namely that the spatial imbalances between the core and periphery will persist, and that the gap in economic inequalities will continue to widen, leading to highly pervasive, and potentially destructive, consequences irrespective of what is done at this stage to narrow the inequalities, since they are so firmly entrenched.
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