DURBAN'S INDUSTRIALISATION
AND THE LIFE AND LABOUR
OF BLACK WORKERS
1920-1950

BY

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1989
In Memory
of my brother,
Charles,
this thesis is affectionally
dedicated
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The Secretary of the Department of Economic History, Mrs Norma Hatcher, although not involved in thetyping of the final script, deserves mention as well as for urgently typing the author's seminar presentations and, at the final hour, for assisting in my search for a suitable typist. Mauritz Moolman of the South African Institute of Race Relations assisted in correcting and re-typing the final draft.

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The author accepts all responsibility for errors of fact or interpretation and testifies to the originality of the present text, despite the wide variety of literature which has influenced the content.
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<td>B.R.F.</td>
<td>Borough Rate Fund</td>
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<td>D.N.A.C.</td>
<td>Durban Native Administration Commission</td>
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<td>I.C.U.</td>
<td>Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union</td>
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<td>I.M.S.</td>
<td>Iron Moulders' Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>M.O.H.</td>
<td>Medical Officer of Health</td>
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<td>N.A.D.</td>
<td>Native Administration (Affairs) Department</td>
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<td>N.E.C.</td>
<td>Native Economic Commission</td>
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<td>N.I.A.</td>
<td>Natal Indian Association</td>
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<td>South African Railways and Harbour Administration</td>
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<td>W.N.L.A.</td>
<td>Witwatersrand Native Labour Association</td>
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INTRODUCTION

Recent South African studies, especially that of academics involved in the University of the Witwatersrand History Workshop series, have been occupied by a concern to study class – not as the determined structure of political, social and economic relationships within a particular social formation, but rather as a process in the 'making' through the day-to-day struggles of 'ordinary' men and women. Thus, recently, Marks and Rathbone edited a useful collection of essays which attempts 'to show the actual conflicts and struggles out of which classes are born' [1]. Of great interest in this respect is Bonner's essay on the Transvaal Native Congress in the early 1920s. Bonner attempts to argue that the common experience of low wages, high cost of living, pass laws and the very fluid process of upward or downward mobility between the black working-class and the petit bourgeoisie on the Rand in the early 1920s, made it possible for the petit bourgeoisie to be driven 'closer together with the rank and file of the working-class' in militant class struggle[2]. Thus, the effort in much of this work is to explicate class as a process in continuous (yet incomplete) formation. In other words, classes within capitalist or pre-capitalist social formations exist not as definite categories or structured relations of which individuals are unconsciously agents. Instead, class, the consciousness of class and struggles, are often shaped by the very diverse meanings individuals from different pre-colonial or pre-capitalist cultures and backgrounds grant to them. This argument is given concise expression by Bozzoli:

While the historical past may be governed by abstract and objective tendencies, those who lived that history, and those who are living its continuation today, experience it subjectively, and their experiences are embodied in the culture around them [3].

Work of this nature renders to the majority of South African people striving for political, economic and cultural liberation from class, racial and sexual domination both a readable and usable understanding of their living past and present. Such work has opened the door fruitfully to enthusiastically collected oral history, while the subject matter has widened to include topics which do not necessarily involve questions of state or class struggle directly. For example, Dunbar Moodie's essay on the culture of male African gold miners provides an interesting preliminary search into the way in which workers forge and maintain identities and interests between themselves as individuals and as members of various ethnic groups [4].

In particular, this author is influenced by the remarkable extent to which recent South African studies have implicitly or explicitly challenged any notion that the way in which the South African economy and society has developed is either the consequence of the racist whims of the politically dominant population group or the underlying imperatives of capital accumulation. For instance, Alan Jeeves has produced a major study which transcends the conventional Marxist thesis that the manner in which the gold mining industry's labour market structure and supply develop historically were determined solely by the specific needs of capital accumulation in that industry [5]. Although written within a non-Marxist framework Jeeves's work provides a detailed study on the various classes, within the political economy of capitalist goldmining and in colonial regimes.
and pre-capitalist economies, involved in the exploitation of migrant labour power as a commodity. The strength of Jeeves' study rests in the demonstration that the socio-economic context within which capitalist mining sought to acquire its black workforce was not shaped by the hegemony of that class, but was conditioned by the resilience of pre-capitalist relations of production and distribution which halted the widespread emergence of 'free' wage labour. The consequent relative shortage of labour prevented the success of attempts by the Chamber of Mines to halt competition for labour within its own ranks by forming a common labour system since 1890, through the establishment of the Rand Native Labour Association (1897) and the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (W.N.L.A.) in 1900 [6]. In fact the need for adequate and reliable supplies of labour saw the emergence of various independent recruiting companies and individuals. To an extent these independent recruiters tended to operate as a competing sphere for the supply of labour, because many Africans found employment as runners for recruiters more lucrative than mine work [7]. This privileged position, however, lasted for only as long as the mines were dependent on their services for the acquisition of unskilled African labour power. By the early 1920s the consolidation of financial control within the industry reduced competition for labour drastically and thereby facilitated the emergence of a stronger recruiting monopoly.

Similar work on the gold mine labour supply has emerged from recent Marxist scholars. The essays by Kimble and Harries in the Marks/Rathbone collection on pre-colonial migrant labour from Basutoland and the Delagoa Bay region, Beinart's study of Pondoland and Bozzoli's essay on Marxism and feminism have provided useful insights into the way in which pre-capitalist class and kinship relations have subordinated the labour of direct producers (both men and women) and determined the pace and the extent to which African men and women became involved in capitalist wage labour. Moreover, as Beinart has argued, given the encroachment of an alien socio-political force on pre-capitalist societies, 'where communal tenure remained intact, there was a significant degree of coincidence between chiefly interests and popular demands to protect rural resources' [9]. Thus, in 1913 the eastern Mpondo paramount supported some aspects of the Native Land Act to prevent the commoditisation of land which would threaten communal tenure. This was because the threat to communal tenure would deprive chiefs of their right to extract surplus product in the form of cash or 'gifts', as the allotment of communal plots was their preserve [10]. The direct producers also defended their right to communal land as the access to land prevented their total subordination to wage labour. Therefore, 'as much of the wage income earned was still invested in stock, general access to grazing...[11]. Interestingly, Judy Kimble has argued that one of the reasons for the participation of the Sotho in wage labour for the diamond mines in the 1870s was to acquire guns in order to defend the ruling lineage's 'rights of surplus appropriation against the Queen's government' [12]. Harries' essay on the Delagoa Bay migrant labour supply to the gold mines in the 1890s is of particular interest as it explicitly calls to question the cheap labour theory. The point of his argument is that while these migrants held access to viable pre-capitalist means of subsistence and in the absence of effective control over the movement of labour, these workers successfully challenged any attempts on the part of mine owners to control production costs by reducing their wages. In fact, according to Harries, so successful was workers' resistance (even in the covert form of desertion) in the 1870s that the wages paid to
unskilled labour on the mines were comparatively higher than wages paid to some sectors of European labour. For example, Irish wages were as low as 1s 6d per day in 1870, while Danish farmhands earned approximately 1 pound sterling monthly. This compared unfavourably with the basic average of three pounds ten shillings on the Rand and four pounds in Kimberley in the same year [13]. Moreover, as Jeeves has shown, as long as an effective system of state pass controls and a strong recruiting monopoly could not be achieved before 1920, the cost of mine migrant labour power could be subject to the interest of the various groups involved in recruiting labour rather than to the interest of mine owners. For example, in 1910 recruiting costs for workers acquired through independent labour contractors 'averaged 50 per cent higher than for those black miners recruited directly by the mining companies' [14].

Significantly, interest in the role of workers' struggles in constraining the efforts of the capitalist class to gain control over labour markets (i.e. even within the labour process itself) and to increase the rate of surplus value appropriation has not been restricted to mining. In 1979 Hemson produced a remarkable thesis on the struggles of Durban's dock workers which challenges the conventional notion that migrant and even casual labourers were the most docile workers. He argues that the militancy of these workers' struggles were effective enough to prompt large employers (e.g. the S.A.R. & H) in the industry to attempt to curtail progressively their reliance on casual and migrant labour generally, although the seasonal nature of the industry halted the process [15]. Similar work has been produced by Fredrick Cooper in his book From Slaves to Squatters which focuses largely on the agricultural and urban economy (especially, the docks) of coastal Kenya and Zanzibar until 1925, and a recent seminar paper on the struggles of Kenyan dock workers in the 1940s [16]. Cooper's writing is particularly concerned to discard the structuralist-functionalist arguments of cheap labour theory.

For example, in his study of dock labour in Mombasa, while Cooper concedes that shipping companies found casual labour favourable as 'they could adjust their payroll to the daily fluctuations of shipping and avoid paying most of the social cost of labour', [17] he asserts that 'the wages capital must pay are not set by an abstract relationship of modes of production but by the specific struggles of specific classes...' [18] However, the struggles of casual workers was conditioned by the fact that many, especially those who, lived and farmed around Mombasa, could often combine income from wage work or agricultural labour or moved between wage labour and informal sector activity [19]. At harvest season workers who lived further from Mombasa in the 1920s left work 'causing a seasonal shortage of labour and a slight rise in wages' [20]. The relative incapacity of the colonial state and capital to secure political and social control over casual workers saw 'endemic strikes and rumours of strikes' throughout the Second World War which climaxed in early 1947 when 15 000 workers participated in a general strike of 12 days. [21] These conditions of labour militancy caused continuous pressure to be exerted on wage rates. Thus according to Cooper, 'what most officials and more and more managers and businessmen were saying from the first general strike through the labour reforms of the mid 1950s...amounted to a total rejection of the system of cheap migratory labour.' [22] A recent South African study by Webster has shifted the focus from migrant workers' struggles to conflict within the foundry labour process between craft unions and engineering employers, and the more recent struggles between black industrial unions and employers.
Webster’s work is of particular significance as it stresses ‘...the contradictory nature of capitalist development’ which ‘offers new opportunities for workplace organisation.’ [23]

According to Webster, a barrier to maximum surplus value appropriation in South African foundries has historically been upheld by the significant measure of control white craft unions (e.g. the IMS) held over the foundry labour process i.e. given the scarcity of their skills and their remarkable organisation. Foundry employers have consistently pushed back this ‘frontier of control’ by endeavouring to dilute the skills monopolised by craft unions. Throughout the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s efforts were made to institute new techniques of production which could be operated by less skilled black workers (e.g. Indian and coloured production moulders) or gradually even semi- and unskilled African workers. This process of mechanisation was further facilitated by the re-organisation of foundry production processes in the manufacture of munitions during the Second World War. However, Webster argues that ‘mechanisation had not created a single homogeneous mass of skilled workers’ and the pace at which work processes were transformed were not ‘set exclusively by management.’ [24] This would be the case for as long as workers maintained strong organisations to challenge management imperatives. For instance, the 1934 railway strike in Pretoria ensured that ‘South African Railways had not been able to establish that the artisan moulder had become a semi-skilled worker because of the introduction of modern moulding machines...’ [26] The outcome of the struggles of the 1960s and the 1970s was that by 1978 craft unions were beginning to open even to African workers. Yet mechanisation had not resulted in a process of surplus value appropriation devoid of class struggle. Thus, while mechanisation has destroyed the organised strength of craft workers, it has not rendered to management command over the work process. Thus Webster insists as well that mechanisation has also transformed unskilled labour into semi-skilled labour, thereby increasing the bargaining strength of that section of the labour force. [27] The historical outcome in South African foundries (as in other spheres of manufacturing) has been the emergence of a ‘mass-based, non-racial, industrial unionism...’ [28]

Unlike most of the literature discussed above, the present dissertation is not specific to the study of labour, but rather is an attempt to consider broadly the industrialisation and development of a city (i.e. Durban) and the social reproduction and control of the black working-class. However, it shares with other work the concern to conceive of the limits to capitalist development rooted within class struggle and its effects on (and through) the articulation of modes of production. Most recent South African historiography unfortunately has tended to avoid the broader question of the relation between class struggle and the development/underdevelopment of the South African social formation. The focus on class formation, culture and consciousness has become so regionalised that questions about the manner in which these forces affect the evolution of the general structure of class relations within and between modes of production have tended to be ignored or avoided. In fact, as in the case of the interesting collection on agriculture edited by Beinart, Delius and Trapido, the concept of mode of production and the class relations specific to any particular mode, does not seem to inform the work of some of the contributors. [29] For example, the essay by Ross argues that the origins of capitalist accumulation here lies in the exploitation and coercion of slave labour. [30]
Therefore, although the present dissertation is influenced by recent South African attempts to confront structuralism with indepth social history, it seeks with the empirical backing of social history to reconsider important issues first raised by the structuralist-functionalists. These issues include the articulation of modes of production and its effects on the reproduction and control of the black working-class as well as its effects on the development of capitalism. The author accepts Kay's assertion, in support of a classical Marxist understanding of development which is 'that the historical role of capitalism is to develop men's [sic] productive forces to a hitherto unprecedented extent...' [31] Moreover, like Brenner, the author desires to show that the limits to capitalism's successful exploitation of the productive capacities of labour in South Africa may be found in its articulation with pre-capitalist modes which prevented the universal emergence of commoditised labour resources. [32] Related to this was the role of class (and indeed, kinship) relations and struggles in determining the extent to which labour power did or did not become commoditised and the effects this had on the process of capital accumulation. Thus Chapter II challenges the idea that capital accumulation in South Africa has thrived on the functional articulation between capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production, by studying Durban's industrialisation and the proletarianisation of its black labour force between 1920 and 1950. The argument presented in Chapter II refers to various forces such as access to means of production, class and rural gender struggles within the kinship mode of production, and asserts that these forces allowed migrant workers a capacity to resist total subordination to capitalist work processes. It is consequently these pre-capitalist processes, rather than the capital accumulation process, which reinforced the migrant labour system in the market for unskilled labour in Durban. The author acknowledges here his debt to the work produced by Beinart, Bozzoli, Cooper, Jeeves, Harries and Hemson as their ideas inform the content of Chapter II.

In South Africa, the maximum exploitation of African labour power was not only constrained by the resilience of the African kinship mode of production. For in the emergence of South African capitalism there arose as well forms of petty commodity production, reproduction and distribution which absorbed the labour of many potential wage labourers. An example we have mentioned is the competitive recruiting system centred around gold mining which provided alternatives to capitalist wage labour on the mines for unemployed whites on the Rand or for Africans who found employment as runners more lucrative than mine work.

As the study involved here concerns the development of the city of Durban, the form of 'petty economy' which is of interest to the present writer is the emergence of land and shack renting on the periphery of the Durban borough. Within this sphere, forms of petty commodity distribution occurred e.g. prostitution, liquor selling and, among Indians, market gardening. These activities not only served to augment the incomes of black working-class households, but also provided alternative spheres of employment for many, especially women. Moreover, capital's quest to transform the work norms and habits of the working-classes in the interest of maximum productivity and distribution was challenged by the existence of an alternative culture in shantytowns. Thus, according to Cooper, shack settlements 'bred values antithetical to a work culture...The spontaneous settlement undermined the symbolic value of urbanism as much as that
Therefore, although the local state expressed its desire to rid the city of informal settlements in terms of their allegedly poor health and sanitary facilities and the effects they might have on the health of the urban population generally, according to Preteceille 'reproduction of the existing labour force only becomes a necessity politically, through class struggle'. Indeed, because shack settlements around Durban were not under sufficient police surveillance, they allowed many workers a means to resist the imposition of social controls exercised in municipal locations and compounds. Part I of Chapter III discusses this issue in relation to the persistent resistance over wages among migrant workers living in compounds in the 1930s and 1940s. It is suggested that the access compound residents had to the culture and economy of informal settlements, and the congested arrangement of compounds within the sphere of industrial and commercial space, rendered efforts to exert control over compound residents ineffective. Part II of Chapter III develops the theme of residence and control in a more complex manner, focusing particularly on the position of African women. This section endeavours to show that the relatively independent status acquired by African women in the culture and economy of informal settlements, threatened the reproduction of a particularly important basis of surplus value appropriation and bourgeois hegemony, i.e the nuclear family. It is suggested that in the perception of liberal reformers and the local state, formal housing was the soundest means to reimpose male patriarchy over African women.

If the functionalism endemic within the cheap labour theory is to be finally abandoned, the underlying value concepts of the thesis require to be challenged. An attempt to explicate this position in Chapter IV will centre around the question of housing costs in Durban 1920-1950. This author rejects the notion implicit in the cheap labour thesis, which conceives of the value of labour power and the wage as indistinguishable concepts. For as Curtis has argued recently, 'capitalist labour power is a commodity. As such it has both use-value and exchange-value. The use-value of capitalist labour power is value-creating labour. Its exchange value is the value of labour'. Significantly, some writers who challenge cheap labour theory broadly while accepting its implicit concept of the value of labour power tend to reinforce its structuralist-functionalist understanding of the articulation of modes of production. An example, in this regard, is Hindson's work on the pass laws which attempts to challenge the cheap labour thesis by arguing that the changing imperatives of industrial capital accumulation required the differentiated reproduction and control of differentiated supplies of African labour power. The concept of differentiation refers to specialisation within the market for African labour power, i.e between proletarian and migrant labour power.

The important contribution of Hindson's thesis is to show that in the development of secondary industry, contrary to the views of cheap labour theory, migrant labour was not a permanent structural requirement. Thus his work is acutely sensitive to capitalism's capacity for dynamic and rapid transformation within its own relations of exploitation and reproduction. Thus, contrary to the conventional impression that the apartheid period in South Africa concerns state entrenchment of a system of migratory labour, he argues that by the 1970s 'the division between migrant and settled labour was replaced by a more complex occupation and class
differentiation'. [36] For example, the influx control policies of the 1970s were less concerned to maintain the social conditions of articulation between capitalist industry and agriculture and pre-capitalist reserve agriculture. Influx control laws were backed since the 1960s by a policy of decentralised industrialisation to control African urbanisation outside of the bantustans. Thus, although migrant labour was significant numerically, it was becoming a workforce solely dependent on wages, whose families were increasingly concentrated in quasi-urban settlements in the countryside. [37]

However, as Hindson does not address the concept of value implicit in the cheap labour thesis, he regards the transition between migrant and proletarianised labour largely as functional aspects of two phases, in the capital accumulation process, i.e. absolute and relative surplus value appropriation. Thus the crucial role of class struggle in transforming relations of production is largely ignored. (This issue is taken up to some extent in Chapter II when we consider the transformation of the labour-market for industry in Durban). As a result, Hindson accepts without question the rather deterministic view of migrant labour contained in Wolpe's work:

Social historians' criticisms of Wolpe - for example that he neglects the rural dimensions of migrant labour, the role of agency and class struggle - do not negate his theoretical contribution: that migrant labour stimulated capitalist expansion by making available supplies of labour whose costs of reproduction were partially met outside the capitalist sector. [38]

However, if the articulation of modes of production secured in this manner a lower value of labour power (in that the means of subsistence of the workers' family were met outside the circulation of capitalist wage commodities), it did not necessarily ensure that the wages paid to migrant workers were necessarily consistent with the requirements of absolute surplus value appropriation. As historians such as Harries, Jeeves and Cooper have shown, migrant workers showed a remarkable level of militancy in making demands for higher wages than capitalists were prepared to pay. Moreover, in view of the concept of the value of labour power mentioned above, it is precisely the minimisation of the value of labour power in this form which restricts capitalist expansion. Thus, as Brenner has argued:

Only under conditions of free wage labour will the individual producing units (combining labour power and the means of production) be forced to sell in order to buy, to buy in order to survive and reproduce, and ultimately to expand and innovate in order to maintain this position in relation to other competing production units. [39]

However, some subsistence commodities may be produced and distributed by the state at subsidised rates to the working class. An example, is sub-economic accommodation provided by the central and local state in South Africa. In South Africa, during the period under consideration (1920-1950) capital accumulation by private speculators in the provision of housing has generally tended to be limited. This is particularly true in the case of black working class accommodation generally. It is argued in Chapter IV that this was because the capital costs of housing were determined by the wage rates demanded by skilled white artisans who monopolised skilled labour positions in the building process. As a result it was difficult for private
accumulators to replace these costs with income from the potential black working-class occupants whose wages were markedly lower than the wages received by white workers. This, as the cost of commoditised housing would have been beyond the capacity of black working class households to pay for it, and given its effects on the value of labour power, may have galvanised struggles over the wage. In this context, the subsidised provision of housing by the state has generally tended to be a form of wage subsidy which (as part of the social wage) contributes to a lower value of labour power. Some writers tend to assume that implicitly informal settlements subsidised the value of labour power in the same manner. As we shall argue in Chapter IV, this argument only stands if informal housing was provided in a non-commodity form and commoditised at a low price. It is suggested that in Durban this position did not hold. Therefore, shantytowns had contradictory costs and benefits for the local state and capital in their quest for the maximum of surplus value. [40]
Synopsis

The analysis for this study is divided into three chapters in which the cheap labour theory and other forms of Marxian structuralism are challenged. In order to achieve this, the author combines the perspective of the social historian, sensitive to the role of human agency in historical transformation, with Marxian social theory. This is intended to show that historical change occurs through the complex articulation between socio-economic structure and human agency.

For example, Chapter II on Durban's labour market studies the tension between broad structural transformation in secondary industry's labour requirements and the constraints placed on those by a workforce which was insufficiently 'conditioned' socially or culturally. It is suggested that this situation was caused by the underlying persistence of pre-capitalist socio-economic structures, which provided migrant workers with a partial alternative to wage labour under capitalism.

Chapter III, divided into two parts, attempts to uncover the specific social struggles in the urban area (i.e. Durban) which produced particularly repressive forms of reproduction (e.g. compound accommodation) and control (e.g. pass controls) which have long been characteristic of South African mechanisms of social domination. By focusing on social conflict, the author has attempted to show that there is no necessary structural functionality between South African institutions of social control and the need to reproduce a cheap labour 'system'.

Chapter IV on housing finance, does not focus specifically on social agency, although this is conceived to be the soundest explanation for the local state's insufficient provision for black sub-economic housing. The central aim of this chapter is to show that within capitalism there were various mechanisms (e.g. state managed housing finance based largely on an indirect taxation of workers' incomes) which have been used to provide for cost effective social reproduction of workers without dependence on pre-capitalist forms of social reproduction.
FOOTNOTES (Introduction)

4 Moodie, D "Mine Culture and Miners' Identity on the South African Gold Mines. in Ibid, pp. 176-197
6 Ibid, p.13
7 Ibid, p.88
8 Ibid, p.183
10 Ibid, p.127
11 Ibid, p.1226
12 Kimble, J "Labour migration in Basutoland, C 1870-1885" in Marks, S and Rathbone, R (eds) (1982) op cit, P.131
13 Harries, P "Kinship, ideology and the nature of pre-colonial labour migration" in Ibid, p.161
14 Jeeves, A.H (1985), op cit, p.126
15 Hemson, D (1979) "Dockworkers of Durban", D.Phil thesis, University of Sussex
17 Ibid, pp. 1-2
18 Ibid, p.5
19 Cooper, F (1980), op cit, pp.243-252
20 Ibid, p.243
21 Cooper, F (1982), op cit, p.3
22 Ibid, p.7
24 Ibid, p.66
25 Ibid, p.52
26 Ibid, p.55
27 Ibid, p.14
28 Ibid, p.278
29 Beinart, W, Delius P, Trapido, S (eds) (1986) Putting a plough to the ground, Ravan Press
33 Cooper, F (ed) (1983) "Introduction", The Struggle for the City, SAGE Publications Ltd., p.32
34 Pretceaille, E "Collective consumption, the state and the crisis of capitalist society" in Harloe, M and Lebas, E (eds) (1981), City, Class and Capital, Edward Arnold
36 Hindson, D (1987), Pass Controls, Ravan Press, p.xi
Although Chapter IV is cast in the form of a critique of Paul Maylam (a social historian), the general content of that critique is not concerned specifically to deride his contribution to an understanding of African life and labour in Durban. In fact, the strength of the argument of Chapter IV is informed largely by Maylam's extensive and stimulating comments, on an earlier draft of that chapter presented to the History Workshop in February 1987. Maylam's work is subjected to critique as it provides the most explicit (and challenging) statement on the relation between shanty towns and their potential subsidy effects on the resources of state and capital. [See Maylam, P.R (1983) "The 'Black Belt': African Squatters in Durban, 1935-1950", Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol.17,3, p.419]. Ultimately this critique does not imply that Maylam subscribes to the cheap labour thesis.
Chapter one
A Brief Survey of the Economy, Population and Labour
Resources of Durban, 1920-1950

The present chapter is not based on rigorous analytical investigation into the political economy of Durban, but is merely intended to present, briefly, facts on industry, population and employment collected by researchers of the Natal Regional Survey (NRS), connected to the Department of Economics (Natal University College) in the 1940s and 1950s. As the latter sections of the dissertation depend largely on this information, it is intended here to facilitate easy reference for readers, unfamiliar with the political economy of Durban (all sources referenced in footnotes).

Although most of the data refer to Natal generally, or to the combined areas of Durban-Pinetown, its usage is restricted to the extended boundaries of Durban between the Umlaas River in the south and the Umgeni in the north, and bounded by the added areas of Cato Manor, Mayville and Sydenham in the west. This is because the authors' research on the life and labour of black workers did not include Pinetown. Moreover, the main core of industrialisation and urbanisation among all population groups occurred in Durban.

From a small contribution to manufacturing output in the Union as a whole, valued at 3,744,088 pounds sterling in 1904, the colony of Natal's contribution increased only marginally by 1911 to 4,434,562 pounds. [1] The First World War (1914-1918) stimulated such rapid industrialisation that Natal's manufacturing output increased to 33,791,000 pounds in 1920/21. The main centre of manufacturing output was in Durban which contributed "just over half in 1919/20 to just under three-quarters in 1949/50". [2] Although the contribution of industry in Natal (excluding Durban-Pinetown) to manufacturing output in the Union declined from 9% in 1919/20 to only 4% in 1949/50, the Durban-Pinetown regions' share was maintained at a constant of 12-13%. [3] The relative importance of Durban as an industrial centre in Natal may be shown in employment data as well. For example, between 1924/25 and in 1952/53 (despite a slight decline in 1929/30) the percentage contribution of Durban to employment in Natal increased from 59% to 70% in 1949/50. However, when post-war industrialisation had stabilised in the 1950s, this share had decreased to 66% by 1952/53. [4]

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929/30</td>
<td>44 833</td>
<td>26 013</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934/35</td>
<td>47 229</td>
<td>28 146</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939/40</td>
<td>65 070</td>
<td>41 074</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944/45</td>
<td>86 401</td>
<td>57 873</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949/50</td>
<td>113 033</td>
<td>78 888</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952/53</td>
<td>135 390</td>
<td>89 695</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Before 1910, Durban was largely a commercial port town in which the main sectors of economic activity included shipping, commerce, transport and domestic service. Industry had hardly developed to any significant extent 'and was localised along Point Road near the harbour...', [5] consisting largely of small jobbing foundries and
workshops for 'wagon repairs, repairs to the sugar machinery on the estates on the North and South Coasts, and repairs to the machinery of the coal mining industry of northern Natal....' [6] A major stimulus to the development of small engineering workshops in Durban had been provided by the Anglo-Boer war as the British army required repairs to 'warships, hospital ships, troop transports and auxiliary vessels using the port.' [7] An unusual development occurred in 1905 with the establishment in Durban of the first engineering firm employing mechanised production methods, which came to be known as the Durban Falkirk Iron Company in 1923. In 1908 already this firm was famous for the production of 'garden rollers, gates, stoves and plough shares,' [8] to cater for local white households and the agricultural hinterland.

Various other small industrial undertakings, however, had also emerged in Durban before 1910. A famous example is the Bakers' Company Limited established in 1892, and involved in large scale grain milling as early as 1906. It is clear that bread making and grain processing were located in Durban because of the local market, rather than the availability of grain resources such as wheat or maize in Natal, where the main agricultural activities are sugar, dairy farming and tree planting (Wattle). Thus, the Union Flour Mills (Durban) in 1906 imported wheat from Canada and Australia. This gradually changed as the main grain sources were increasingly located in the Western Cape and the Orange Free State. Chemical firms such as the Natal Soap Works (1900) and the Durban Oil and Soap Company (established in 1903) produced an output of 50,000 pounds sterling in 1906 and employed 120 people. The success of these establishments was limited by foreign competition, given a particularly small local market, and the high costs of imported raw materials. A successful candle making factory was established at Jacobs (Durban) as early as 1899 'supplying merchants in Natal and coastal ports from Beira to Cape Town.' [9] This factory was transferred to the Lion Match Company formed in 1903, which continued to produce throughout the period under review. [10] When this company came into operation, matches were produced by Indian workers manually. When the factory was mechanised and more favourable wage rates began to be paid by 1912, Indian labour was gradually replaced by white labour. [11] However, by the Second World War the factory increasingly employed African workers in semi-skilled work positions such as welders. Another chemical firm with a long history in Durban was the South African Fertilizer Company (SAFCO) established in 1904. [12] Although secondary industry in Natal before 1910 was limited, it was the second largest employer, employing a total of 73,804 workers, including male and female whites, Africans and Indians. The craft basis of secondary industry before 1910 is indicated in the racial composition of the labour force which included 15,115 white workers (40%), 12,337 Indian workers (33%) and 10,400 African workers, constituting only 27% of the total in 1904. [13] As a consequence of intensive engineering work between 1904 and 1906 to expand harbour space, Durban emerged as South Africa's main port by 1910. Thus the total tonnage of vessels cleared increased from 600,000 [14] in 1900 to 3,051,000 in 1910. [15] Durban, situated 484 rail miles from the Witwatersrand as compared with Cape Town and Port Elizabeth (distanced at 949 and 712 rail miles from the Rand, respectively), [16] was destined to maintain this position at the height of the industrial development in the 1930s and 1940s. Durban’s favourable position was further enhanced as it was, 'the port of entry for traffic to the Suez Canal and for the increasing traffic to the East....' [17] Therefore, by 1951, while the Cape Town and Port
Elizabeth ports handled 3,100,000 and 1,800,000 tons respectively, Durban handled about 6,200,000 tons.

Durban's favourable position as a port allowed for a rapid expansion of certain sectors such as food, textiles and clothing, construction and engineering. These sectors had collectively contributed 52% of employment in 1925, increasing to 70% in 1954. [18] Moreover, Durban's locational advantages as an international port facilitated its specialisation in industries 'dependent on imported raw materials' such as chemicals and textiles. The concentration of chemicals in Durban was central to the city's development although the Rand produced 40% of chemicals output whereas Durban contributed 31% to national output. Most chemical firms moved to the Rand as they were closest to their markets, although 'Durban is best placed among the coastal centres to serve the Witwatersrand....' [19] Despite its disadvantages relative to the Witwatersrand, the Durban chemical industry was the main producer of paint, contributing 50% to national output as compared to 30% on the Rand and 20% in the Cape. Durban was also an important centre for textiles production, contributing 22.2% of the total Union output in 1953/4.

Although the chemical industry was the most highly mechanised industry in Durban (employing a total horse-power of 22,244 in 1950/51), it was the fourth largest employer after the metal and engineering, food and drink, and clothing and textiles industries in the 1940s, respectively. This is shown in the data below indicating employment in these four sectors between 1940/41 and 1945/46 for all population groups: [20]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Metal and Engineering</th>
<th>Food &amp; Drink</th>
<th>Clothing and Textiles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940-41</td>
<td>6,576</td>
<td>5,546</td>
<td>5,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>7,626</td>
<td>6,104</td>
<td>6,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>8,783</td>
<td>6,098</td>
<td>6,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>9,716</td>
<td>6,279</td>
<td>6,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>10,447</td>
<td>6,696</td>
<td>6,806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-46</td>
<td>9,611</td>
<td>6,399</td>
<td>7,308</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, if one compares (for instance) changes in employment patterns over the period 1924/25 and 1945/46, between the highly mechanised Chemical industry and the Metal and Engineering Industry, there appears to be a relative decline in the total employment in the Chemical industry after the depression which persisted into the 1940s: [21]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Chemicals</th>
<th>Metal &amp; Engineering</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1924/25</td>
<td>2 632</td>
<td>2 296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925/26</td>
<td>2 860</td>
<td>2 358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>2 907</td>
<td>2 303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>2 912</td>
<td>2 472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>2 894</td>
<td>2 522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>2 966</td>
<td>2 733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930/31</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>1 841</td>
<td>2 170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>2 249</td>
<td>2 660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>2 744</td>
<td>3 016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935/36</td>
<td>3 074</td>
<td>3 529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>3 176</td>
<td>3 915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>3 376</td>
<td>4 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>3 481</td>
<td>4 595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>3 753</td>
<td>5 191</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the 1920s, the food and drink industry was of particular significance, accounting for 22% of all employees engaged in private industry in Durban and Pinetown and produced an average of 38% of the total gross value of output. [22] The relative expansion of sectors such as textiles, metals and engineering, chemicals and clothing industries caused the contribution of the food industry to output in Durban to decline to 13% in the late 1940s. As an employer, however, the food production industry remained important because as a highly mechanised sector, the industry employed a large number of Indian and African workers in semi-skilled positions in the various sugar refining and grain milling factories in Durban.

An important advantage of location in Durban for certain industries was the fact that the proportion of black workers employed relative to white workers employed was higher than for the Union generally. This was conditioned by the fact that relative to the Cape and Transvaal, the white population of Natal was markedly smaller than the black population. This population tendency is shown in the table below indicating the percentage distribution of South Africa’s population in 1951: [23]
This was facilitated by the existence of large African reserves in Natal and Zululand wherein the population increased by 54% as against 34% for the Union as a whole over the period under review, [24] and a high rate of natural increase among Indians (despite the 1920s government policy of enforced repatriation to India). Thus, among Indians in Natal, the rate of population growth was '37 per 1,000 birthrate as against 20 per 1,000 of Europeans,' [25] although 'the Indian death rate was 16.13 per 1,000...as against [only]...9.32' among whites. [26] This advantage was considered to be particularly favourable for the location of mass production industries (e.g. chemicals, textiles, clothing) in Durban. Thus a journalist for a business journal, Commercial Opinion, boasted in 1956 that:

...Natal has by far the greatest reserve of Natives available for industrial employment while over three quarters of the Asiatic population of the Union reside in the Province. It is noteworthy that both Native and Asiatic have shown a remarkable aptitude for semi-skilled repetition work which is the significant feature of modern industrial techniques. [27]

The suggestion may be supported in a comparison of the total wages paid out in an industry employing a high proportion of blacks as against whites (such as clothing and textiles), and an industry employing a white labour-force (see table below) such as metal and engineering in the 1940s. [28]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Clothing and Textiles</th>
<th>Metal and Engineering</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940/41</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>1,011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>1,413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>1,921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>2,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>1,095</td>
<td>2,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>1,218</td>
<td>2,350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among Indian and African workers a high proportion tended to occupy work positions of a semi- and unskilled nature. This statement requires qualification, however, in that at least 60% of the African male workforce in 1951 were enumerated as being labourers, while the Indian labour-force was more widely distributed although 'the largest proportion of Indian men (17.2%) were occupied as farm or miscellaneous labourers...' [29] This pattern of employment among the Indian working population was not only affected by their position in industrial employment (except perhaps in managerial positions), but was shaped as well by the relatively high proportion of Indians self-employed as hawkers, traders and pedlars (accounting for 8.3% of the Indian working population). [30] Among the coloured working population by 1951, although women were concentrated in semi-skilled and unskilled positions in the textiles and clothing industries, there was a high proportion (three-fifths) employed in more skilled work positions such as bricklayers, carpenters and production moulders and semi-skilled artisan positions such as painters, welders
and plumbers.

The structure of employment of Indian and African workers was affected by the concentration of those workers in, on the one hand, labour intensive or highly mechanised sectors such as chemicals, food and textiles; and on the other hand, in labour 'extensive' sectors such as clothing, where the "reorganisation of production on...increased subdivision of labour" was "not marked by any great breakthrough in sewing machine technology." [31] This was conditioned by the fact that within the clothing industry there was no strong craft trade union tradition. In Durban many small clothing establishments were owned by "some worker who had "picked up" his knowledge..." [32] and employed others at particularly scandalous wages. Although the Wage Board report in 1926 argued that 8 clothing factories in Durban were employing 319 white and coloured women, [33] it would seem that as early as 1924/25 Indian men were predominantly employed in the clothing industry. Thus, as R.H. Smith has shown, 610 Indians were employed as against 519 white men and women and 193 coloured men and women. [34]

The employment structure in the metal and engineering industry was markedly different. Despite employers' attempts to reorganise the labour process through mechanisation, the process of deskilling was halted by white craft unions in the industry. This was true, even allowing for the significant gain in African and Indian employment at unskilled labour positions. As the table below indicates, white employment was still strongly represented in metal and engineering by the 1940s: [35]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Native</th>
<th>Asiatic</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940/41</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>3191</td>
<td>1022</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>2427</td>
<td>3845</td>
<td>1022</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>2627</td>
<td>4658</td>
<td>1098</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>2959</td>
<td>5223</td>
<td>1063</td>
<td>461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>3203</td>
<td>5595</td>
<td>1136</td>
<td>513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>3013</td>
<td>4993</td>
<td>1122</td>
<td>483</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Burrows' survey in 1959, the relative extent to which women of all population groups were employed in wage labour was lower than that for men. This tendency is demonstrated in the table below which shows that in 1951 among the population considered as 'worker' (i.e. people formally employed in industry and commerce), women were less frequently represented in the percentage distribution of each population group. Among that section of the population referred to as 'non-workers' (presumably those people not engaged in earning wages or salaries as income such as housewives or people seeking employment), Burrows' figures show that it was men who were less frequently represented: [36]

| Workers and Non-workers of Natal by race and sex, 1951 (% distribution) |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
|                             | Europeans          | Indians             | Coloured            | Natives             |
|                             | Men    | Women | Men    | Women | Men    | Women | Men    | Women | Men    | Women |
| Workers                    | 60.6   | 20.0  | 45.8   | 3.2   | 50.4   | 19.4  | 55.7   | 10.0  |
| Non-workers                | 11.1   | 52.8  | 7.3    | 47.6  | 5.3    | 38.2  | 2.9    | 51.1  |

However, this was neither a static or uniform tendency. For example, between 1925 and 1945, the relative importance of white women in
industry increased from 12.6% to 20.0%, declining to 15.4% in the period 1950/54. The employment pattern among Indian and coloured women fluctuated, showing a slight decline in the mid-1930s and stabilising in the post-war years. Among African women there was no remarkable increase in their work participation, and in fact during the period 1945-50 their work participation showed a slight decline from 1.0 in 1940-45 to 0.8% in 1945-50. This situation may be summarised in the table below:

**Average percentage of Women in Manufacturing Employment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Europeans</th>
<th>Natives</th>
<th>Indians</th>
<th>Coloureds</th>
<th>All Races</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1925-30</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-35</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935-40</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-45</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-50</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-54</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Burrow’s data shows (see table below) the employment of women was largely concentrated in the clothing and textiles (23.9%) and to a lesser extent in the paper and chemical industries (8.0% and 9.2% respectively). The employment of women in industries other than clothing and textiles is represented largely by white women employed in clerical positions: [38]

**Sex and Race in the Manufacturing Industries of Greater Durban, 1953/54**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex and Race</th>
<th>Clothing, Constr.</th>
<th>Chem.</th>
<th>Engineering</th>
<th>Food</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europ. men</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europ. women</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native men</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native women</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian men</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian women</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured men</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured women</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total men</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>99.1</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>97.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total women</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total persons</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The work participation rate of the various groups by sex shows the highest rate of working women among the coloured group (35.5%) and the white group (31.4%). The work participation rate was lowest among African women (17.7%) and among Indian women (6.5%). This pattern within the Indian population group was affected by the survival in the urban areas of the extended family system, while the position of the African woman was affected both by their performance of pre-capitalist agricultural labour and the kinship patriarchal system, which subordinated them in the countryside. However, Burrows' data do not take into consideration the involvement of larger numbers of African women in informal sector activity in the peri-urban areas of Durban and other towns. The work participation rate among coloured women may have been slightly higher than that for white women, because the incomes of male white household heads may have been sufficient for them to support their wives.

The concentration of most of Natal's secondary industry in and around Durban produced a regional redistribution of the provincial population towards the coastal region. In the table below the province of Natal is demarcated into four regions, that is, the coastal, midlands, northern and Zululand. The percentage figures show a higher regional distribution of all population groups in the Coastal areas which absorbed 106% of the total population as against 48.8%, 36% and 63.8% for the midlands, northern and Zululand districts respectively.

However, there are significant variations in the relative degree of urbanisation among the main population groups. For example, while 85.5% whites, 81.0% coloureds and 74.0% Indians were urbanised, only 15.9% of the African population was urbanised by 1951. This population shift towards urban areas among Indians, whites and coloureds was affected by the relative expansion of urban industrial and commercial employment. For instance, among Indians between 1904 and the early 1940s agricultural employment declined "from nearly 50% to only 18 per cent...whereas in industry there has been an increase from 6% to 12%..."
African rural-urban distribution was affected by the persistence on white farms of the labour tenancy system whereby 440,000 Africans by 1936 were maintained in agricultural employment, and by the fact that the African population was largely located in the reserves in which the main economic activity was agricultural labour. Most of this labour was undertaken by African women, while males generally migrated to urban areas as wage labourers. The result was that the masculinity rate among Africans in urban areas was generally higher than in the reserves (i.e. 240.6% and 71.4% respectively in 1936).

It must be noted that the urbanisation index of 15.9% among Africans is in itself an insufficient basis for an estimation of the relative degree of either proletarianisation or continued migrancy among African workers. Hindson argues that the most accurate method is to gauge the proportion of Africans living under urban family conditions. By the early 1930s, it may be argued that a very large proportion of Durban’s African population was proletarianised, for, according to the Joint Council of Europeans and Natives, in Durban’s peri-urban shantytowns 75% of the Africans lived under family conditions. This is estimated on the grounds that ‘peri-urban areas show males in relation to females as only 2:1, approximately with from 15% to 25% of the whole being children’. Yet, as we shall argue in Section 2 of Chapter III, even this index has limited validity.

Most of those who migrated tended to be young adults, while those who remained in the reserves tended to be older people and children. Thus the highest number of Africans registering in Durban in 1953 were between the ages of 18 and 42. This pattern changed for the age distribution of the urban population groups between 43 to 53 years and over. This tendency seems to have been constant over the whole period between 1917 and 1950. For example, the age groups 15-38 in the period 1917 to 1942 were most strongly represented as workers in Durban.
Distribution of arrival ages: Male Native workseekers in Durban 1917-1942

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Range</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 15</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-18</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-22</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-26</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-30</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-34</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-38</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39-42</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43-46</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47 and over</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unspecified</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,231</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The majority of African youth arriving in Durban tended to find their first employment in commerce and domestic service, this tendency indicating the preference among industrial employers for more experienced workers. Thus, while industry absorbed 9.7% of new arrivals to Durban, commerce absorbed 35.4% and domestic service 29.3%. [49] Employment sectors such as 'building, industrial, hotel and municipal...feature far more frequently as subsequent than as initial jobs...’ [50] In contrast, as we shall argue in the next chapter, the industrial employment of Indians in certain sectors (e.g. food, clothing and textiles) was strongly influenced by the 'youthfulness' of the Indian population. [51]

Throughout the period under review, Durban acquired a significant number of its migrant workers from reserves in closest proximity to the city. However, although these areas supplied 41% of the migrant workforce in the period 1916 to 1924, by the Second World War these areas supplied only 17%. [52] Despite this, areas contiguous to Durban continued to be the main source of migrant labour. For instance, as the table below demonstrates, by 1946 regions within easy travelling distance (i.e. within a radius 0-25 miles) from Durban such as Pinetown, Ndwenwe and Umzinto supplied the second largest proportion of migrants to the Dunlop factory in Durban (21.3%). Areas, (between 51 and 75 miles radius from Durban) such as Eshowe and Ixopo, contributed the largest proportion [53] which is 23.1%, although regions between 76 and over 150 miles from Durban contributed progressively smaller proportions as we move further from the city.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Magisterial Districts</th>
<th>Radius from Durban (miles)</th>
<th>Sample of workers included in Dunlop factory September 1946</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Durban, Pinetown, Inanda, Ndwedwe, Umlazi</td>
<td>0-25</td>
<td>No. 47, % 21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umzinto, Richmond, Mapumulo, New Hanover, P.Maritzburg, Camperdown Lower Tugela</td>
<td>26-50</td>
<td>No. 41, % 18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Shepstone, Ixopo, Eshowe, Umvoti, Mtunzini</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lion’s River, Impendhle</td>
<td>51-57</td>
<td>No. 51, % 23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kranskop, Alfred, Polela, Estcourt, Weenen, Umsinga, Nkhandhla, Etonjaneni</td>
<td>76-100</td>
<td>No. 33, % 14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underberg, Klip River, Dundee, Nqutu, Babanango, Mahlabatini, Lower</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umfolozi, Helpmekar</td>
<td>101-125</td>
<td>No. 19, % 8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bergville, Vryheid, Hlabisa, Nongoma</td>
<td>126-150</td>
<td>No. 16, % 7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle, Utrecht, Ubombo, Paul Pietersburg, Ngotshe, Ingwavuma</td>
<td>Over 150</td>
<td>No. 14, % 6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>221</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Most of Durban's migrant labour supply tended to be housed in compounds in and around the industrial and commercial zone [see map 1: appended at the end of this chapter showing concentrations of the African population around the city in 1946]. In the period under review, manufacturing industry in Durban moved increasingly southwards from the Point area, along the extended dock area of Maydon Wharf and Congella [see map 2]. In this area, by 1949, a total of 326 acres of industrial land had been sold. [54] Further industrial development occurred in Jacobs (153.3 acres), an area far south of the central borough. As a consequence of the tension between residential and industrial space in the 1930s and 1940s, the council increasingly sought to re-establish compounds to the south of the borough. Moreover, the extension of the borough in 1933 to incorporate such peri-urban areas as Mayville, Sydenham and Greenwood Park, prompted the City Council to establish segregated urban family housing. This was ostensibly because a large population of Indians, Africans, whites and coloureds were overcrowded in small, informal dwellings whereby 'five or six people commonly inhabited rooms of 800 to 1 000 cubic feet' in 1930. [55] The total population in peri-urban areas by 1932 included 21 000 Africans, 51 000 Indians and 20 000 Whites. [56]

However, as we shall argue in Chapter III (Part II), the city council's desire to eliminate peri-urban slums and replace these with segregated municipal family housing, was crucially informed by the need to gain firmer control over the lives of a socially and culturally autonomous black working-class.

Increasingly, over the years these informal settlements became populated largely by blacks as 45% of the 2 062 formal dwellings constructed between 1936 and 1941 were occupied by whites. [57] Thus, by the late 1940s shack settlements housed the largest proportion of the city's urban African population. For example, the Broome Commission estimated in 1948 that a total of 30 500 Africans lived in shacks or 'unknown' dwellings, whereas a total of only 11 000 urban Africans were housed in municipal locations. [58] By 1950, the Housing Survey estimated that the non-shack population consisted of approximately 66 000 people, excluding migrant workers housed in municipal or employers' compounds or domestic servants' quarters. The situation is detailed in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>Municipal locations</th>
<th>11 000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Municipal hostels</td>
<td>12 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Municipal hostels (casuals)</td>
<td>2 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Government compounds</td>
<td>8 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Private employers (licensed premises)</td>
<td>10 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Private employers (unlicensed premises)</td>
<td>5 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Licensed premises (not employed by licensee)</td>
<td>2 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Domestic servants</td>
<td>27 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Native owned property</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the 'urban' African population simultaneously constituted a social and political threat to a well regulated bourgeois city their formal housing 'needs' would be catered for beyond the southern boundaries of the borough. Thus, Durban's first African township, Lamont, was located on the Umlazi River bordering the Umlazi Mission Reserve, which the council increasingly sought to acquire for further African
housing. However, the urgency of the need to eliminate shantytowns provided incentive for the establishment of an African housing settlement near Cato Manor, on Blackhurst Estate, later named Chesterville [see Map 2].

Like the African population, the largest section of Durban’s Indian households resided in shantytowns, as indicated in the table below summarising data from a 1943/4 survey of 640 households containing 3,783 persons. [59]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Persons</th>
<th>1,283</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shacks and poor areas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poorly serviced areas</td>
<td>687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrack flats</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slums in Old Borough</td>
<td>465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasonably satisfactory dwellings</td>
<td>983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,783</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indian shack settlements were largely concentrated in the Clairwood area consisting of 600 acres, although many working class Indians were overcrowded in backyard huts or outbuildings of middle class Indians in the Old Borough. [60] Thus, in 1936 the 'average number of occupants per dwelling' among Indian residents 'was 6.9 in...one- to four-roomed dwellings and 7.6 in all dwellings.' [61] As we shall observe in Chapter IV, the municipality’s efforts to provide sub-economic housing to Indians made little progress, given the struggles of Indian political organisations against segregationalism and the council’s threats to deprive Indian landowners and their tenants of their land for Council housing purposes. Thus, by 1950, with a waiting list of 2,700 Indian applicants, the Council had only completed a total of 973 sub-economic houses for Indians at Cato Manor and Springfield [see Maps 2].
Conclusion

This chapter has endeavoured to summarise important facts on the history and structure of secondary industry, employment, population and housing in Durban. It has been shown that from its cradle days in the first decade of the present century, manufacturing industry in Durban-Pinetown came to be an important contributor to national and regional output and employment. It has been suggested that given Durban’s locational advantages as a port, it has been an important centre for the establishment of industries such as chemicals, heavily dependent on imported raw materials. Durban’s position as a port was also advantaged by its relative position to the Transvaal, the centre of the South African economy. Significantly, Durban was also favourable for the establishment of highly mechanised production units, as the local black population was noticeably larger than the white population, a situation unusual amongst the main industrial centres of South Africa. The consequence was that local manufacturers could dispense with skilled white workers more easily and engage large numbers of semi-skilled and unskilled Indian and African workers.

It has been further suggested that the regional concentration of industry around Durban produced re-distribution towards the coast of Natal’s population, although there were variations in the urbanisation of various population groups. The African population in particular, remained largely rural especially given the kinship patriarchal system which maintained women and children in rural areas. Those Africans who migrated were usually young adult males between the ages of 18 and 26. The rural areas which were major suppliers of African migrant labour to Durban tended to be those areas closest to Durban, although areas located further from the city contributed a greater proportion over the 1940s. This migrant workforce was usually housed in compounds. However, the increasing emergence of informal settlements around Durban housing the various population groups, produced the need to establish segregated housing zones. Thus, between 1930 and 1946, two important housing schemes for urban Africans had been completed which included Lamont and Chesterville. However, these efforts to rehouse Africans were limited in scope for, by 1950, an estimated 50 000 Africans still resided in shantytowns. A similar situation existed among the Indian working population.
FOOTNOTES (Chapter 1)

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10 McWhirter, D (1959) Industry in Greater Durban: Part II, Natal Town and Regional Planning Reports, Vol. 4, p.47
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20 Ibid, pp. 165, 175, 179, 183
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30 Ibid, pp 133-135
32 Katzen, M (1961), op cit, p.34
33 Ibid
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37 Burrows, J.R (1959), op cit, p.200
38 Ibid, p.201
39 Burrows, J.R (1959b), op cit, p.97
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41 Ibid, p.51
42 Burrows, J.R (1943), op cit, p.7
43 Brookes, E.H and Hurwitz, N (1957), op cit, p.69
45 Joint Council of Europeans and Natives Report of Committee
appointed to investigate and report on 'Health of Durban Natives'
(1931), Records of the Joint Council (Durban Committee)
46 Brookes, E.H and Hurwitz, N (1957), op cit, p.90
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49 Ibid, pp 335-6
50 Burrows, H.R (1943), op cit, p.3
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CHAPTER II

Durban's Industrialisation, unskilled labour supplies and proletarianisation, 1920 - 1950

1. Introduction

In developed capitalist social formations, an important manner in which to increase the absolute amount of surplus value (and thereby the general rate of profit) is through labour intensification. Labour intensification refers to the reduction of labour time necessary for the production of particular commodities, and thereby 'imposes on the worker an increased expenditure of labour within a time which remains constant, a heightened tension of labour power, and closer filling up of the pores of the working day...'

Labour intensification is largely effected through the mechanisation of the production process, and is accompanied by a higher productivity of labour which refers to 'an increase in the rate of material production per unit of time'.

However, in the history of capitalism the achievement of labour intensification involved more than only technical changes in the production process. An additional condition was the transformation and struggle (both on a cultural and ideological level) over the leisure and leisure-time perspectives of the emerging proletariat. In other words, workers had to be weaned away from old habits of labour (acquired through previous involvement in agricultural or petty commodity production) and disciplined to accept the regulated time and work rhythm of wage or capitalist employment. Thus one of Marx's sources, Andrew Ure, asserted in 1835 that:

The main difficulty (in the automatic factory) lay...above all in having human beings to renounce their desultory habits, of work, and to identify with the unvarying regularity of complex automation. To devise and administer a successful code of factory discipline, suited to the necessities of factory diligence...

According to E.P. Thompson, in England this was achieved 'by the division of labour; fines; bells and clocks; money incentives; preachings and schoolings; the suppression of fairs and sports...'

In the final analysis, the success of these efforts to transform the work habits of the working classes were crucially conditioned by the broader success in capitalists' dispossession of the immediate producers. In other words, capitalists could achieve a greater measure of control over workers' time, if the working class through non-ownership of means of production are compelled to 'seek employment for a wage'.

Many South African scholars, influenced by the cheap labour theory, have tended to locate South African capitalism's quest for a greater level of surplus value appropriation in the enforced migrancy of the African work-force between the spheres of pre-capitalist and capitalist modes of production. According to this thesis, migrancy ensures a higher rate of surplus value, as part of the value of African migrant labour power is subsidised through pre-capitalist processes of reproduction in the reserves. The soundest exposition of this view was made by Wolpe (1972):

When the migrant-labourer has access to means of subsistence,
outside the capitalist sector, as he does in South Africa, then the relationship between wages and the cost of the production and reproduction of labour power is changed. That is to say, capital is able to pay the worker below the cost of his reproduction. [6]

What cheap labour theorists fail to appreciate is that surplus value appropriation in this form tends to limit the further expansion of capitalist accumulation. This is because the effects of the pre-capitalist 'subsidy' on the value of migrant labour power does not allow for relative surplus value appropriation, i.e. the process whereby the value of labour power is lowered through the production and consumption of capitalist wage goods by workers. The process of relative surplus-value appropriation occurs where the productivity of labour in consumer goods industry has been raised to the extent that a greater mass of wage goods are made available (at a lower value per unit use-value) for consumption by the working class. This, for long as workers are able to purchase these commodities, ensures that a constantly expanding rate of surplus value appropriation is maintained. However, where a lower value of labour power is maintained through pre-capitalist production and reproduction, the tendency is for the rate of surplus value to be restricted. Thereby the general development of capitalism within a social formation may be restricted as well. In the mid-1940s the Board of Trade and Industries explained this position in South Africa:

It was previously shown that the gross and nett output per employee was appreciably lower in the case of local industry than for most other countries. Industries in this country therefore use, on the average, less plant and equipment and produces less per employee. This usually happens where labour is relatively cheap. [7]

Moreover, the cheap labour thesis ignores the problem migrancy poses for the rate of surplus value appropriation, in the sense that the continued access migrants had to pre-capitalist means of subsistence granted workers a relatively strong capacity to resist subordination to capitalist work disciplines. If capitalists, as Webster argues, could not deprive white workers of some measure of control over the division of labour within South Africa's foundries (given the relative strength of resistance and organisation in white craft unions), neither were capitalists successful at making migrant workers accept the work disciplines of capitalist production. This has resulted, throughout the the period under review, in a constant (if not absolute) shortage of unskilled labour to various industries and sectors. Interestingly, the Economic an Wage Commission of 1925 was unusually sensitive to the capacity pre-capitalist means of subsistence in the reserves provided African migrants to resist exploitation under capitalism:

Reserves...serve two purposes: they provide the most apt safeguard against economic exploitation of the native, and they provide the best means of maintaining his morale...Adequate reserves protect the native against exploitation, because they give him an alternative to employment on unjust terms. [8]

Moreover, the continued existence of pre-capitalist social structures of reproduction, e.g. the kinship system, in rural areas deprived capitalists of potentially cheaper African female labour. Of course,
as we shall argue in the case of Indian women, if pre-capitalist kinship structures and ideology survive even within fully proletarianised families, capitalism may still be deprived of potential female labour supplies. Where African women did escape kinship obligations, they avoided subordination to capitalist wage employment by their involvement in the informal sector. The main concern of this chapter is to show that contrary to the structuralist perspectives of cheap labour theory, the imperatives of capitalist accumulation did not alone determine the manner and pace of insertion of the black (especially African) population into the labour market.

2 The Labour Market Position of Fully Proletarianised Indian Workers

In 1946 the Social and Economic Planning Council made a concise statement on the problem migrancy posed for capital accumulation and economic development of the Union generally:

The system is, in fact, wasteful of the country's greatest asset - its human resources. Industrial development will be retarded, and productivity and the national income will remain low, unless our labour resources are used more effectively. As a result of migration, the actual man years which could be devoted to the industrial and agricultural development of the Union are only a fraction of its total labour potential. [9]

In fact, as far as Durban's industry is concerned from the cradle days of the first decade of this century into the mid-1930s, local employers showed no particular preference for migrant labour. Instead, the industrial labour market was crucially based on a supply of proletarianised Indian workers performing unskilled and even semi-skilled tasks. As early as 1904, census figures show the employment of Indian workers in the slowly emerging industries of Natal reasonably (though not markedly) exceeded the employment of African workers. The numbers were 12,337 and 10,400 Indian and African workers respectively. [10] Employers tended to prefer Indian labour rather than African labour, as they could exercise effective discipline over indentured workers who, unlike African migrant workers, had no relatively productive peasant economy to return to after short periods of wage employment. Such discipline ensured a regular supply of experienced workers necessary to maintain a steady level of 'productivity', under conditions in which local industries were subject to the severe competition of their more long established rivals at the centre of the British empire. Mr. George Bulkby of the Natal Tanning Company Ltd. in Durban expressed this position in 1906:

...I may say that the most favourable for this industry is Coolie labour. We have imported them under the Immigration Scheme and we have had to teach them...the difficulty about the kaffir is that, although quite teachable, he is apt to go off to his kraal as soon as he becomes valuable. The Coolies came out under indenture, and we can keep them...[11]

By 1909 the number of free Indians by far exceeded the number of indentured Indians. [12] Thus, the proletarian condition of Indian workers was sufficient for youthful industries to view the employment of Indian workers as favourable. In fact, the Lion Match Company in Durban, at the time employing only Indian workers, could state: 'We find free Indian labour the most satisfactory, and comparatively few indentured Coolies are employed'. [13] This proletarianised
labour-force, given that effective control could be exercised over its movement and actions, was potentially more favourable to the concerns for the profitability of developing industries as 'it was frequently stated in evidence, that the higher wage the native is paid the sooner he leaves his work...' [14]

Although the absolute numerical increase in the number of Africans employed (from 11,745 to 46,436) was greater than the increase in Indian industrial employment (from 4,720 to 15,517) in Durban between 1924/25 and 1952/53, to argue that African labour was a cheaper substitute would be too simplistic (i.e. if we assume for the moment that all African workers were migrant). For, although the relative numerical decline in Indian employment was comparatively remarkable, this tendency did not occur to the same extent among the various industrial groups. In some cases, Indian employment remained relatively stable. In others there was a tendency for Indian employment to increase at the expense of African employment. In the Durban-Pinetown region, as in the rest of Natal, Indian employment showed the greatest relative decrease in the chemical industry (the largest sector in Durban) and to a lesser extent in the metal and engineering industry. In metal and engineering, and in the large food and drink industry, Indian labour seems to have been retained at a constant rate of increase - although the increase in African employment dwarfed this markedly. Within industries such as textiles and clothing, Indian employment gained at the expense of African employment. Significantly, the employment of Indians in the food and drink industry was related to the relative preponderance of Indian workers in sugar milling up to the early 1940s. These workers resided on the sugar estates with their families. By 1955 it was estimated that 'about 13% of the total Indian population in Natal was associated with the European sugar industry'. [15] An absolute decline of Indian employment in the sugar industry occurred only on the agricultural side where Indian workers were largely replaced by African migrant labour. [16]

An interesting manner in which to view the industrial employment patterns discussed above may be through a comparison between changes in the average wages of Indian and African workers in selected industries of Natal (1915/16 to 1936/37). This is shown in percentage figures on average wages, drawn from data presented by R.H. Smith in 1945.

These data showing differences between the percentage increase in average wages for Indians and African workers indicates no necessary or clear correlation between "cheap labour needs" and the relative decline of Indian employment in certain sectors. For example, in the clothing industry where Indian employment remained particularly crucial, the disparity between Indian and African average wages was not very remarkable. The figures are 75 and 69%, respectively. Yet, in another industry of considerable importance for the employment of Indians (i.e. food and drink) the disparity in average wages between Indian and African workers was vast. The figures are 133 and 55%, respectively.

If the 'cheapness' of labour is still to be considered as significant in determining 'who?' capitalists employed, it must be understood that the instability of the labour-force was not necessarily the most favoured form. Other forms of cheapening labour costs could be used. [17] For example, the racialist concept of 'western' or 'civilized' standards of living could be used to justify differentiation in the minimum wages required to reproduce workers of particular population
groups. Thus the Wage Board differentiated between black and white wages on the grounds that blacks consumed goods that were cheaper than those consumed by whites. Of course, this was a double-edged sword which was used by white skilled labour to restrict entry into certain positions within the 'internal' labour market (i.e. the hierarchy of skill demarcated in the production process).

Since the very introduction of Indian labour in Natal, and given that in the early decades of this century white labour competed with Indian, rather than African labour in the emerging industries in Natal, there was a concerted attempt on the part of white workers to challenge the importation of Indian artisans. When the Tongaat Sugar Company applied in 1896 for 12 Indian artisans there was an 'outcry from Europeans...in Durban and Pietermaritzburg' which pressured the Tongaat Sugar Company to withdraw its application. [18] Significantly, the Wages Act No. 27 of 1925 not only excluded Africans from the official definition of 'employee' but also workers whose conditions of service were 'regulated by Natal’s Indian labour statutes'. [19] Although the Economic Commission of 1914 could confidently report that the Indian worker had 'increasingly entered the semi-skilled and skilled trades...' [20], by the early 1930s the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) complained that the 'number of Indian apprentices has declined...and the number of journeymen has decreased correspondingly.' [21] This was considered as a result of the inadequate provision for Indian education which prevented any benefits Indian workers could achieve from the Apprenticeship Act. [22] Thus Indian workers in Durban, like African workers, were excluded from established trade unionism and were employed in unskilled positions at particularly low and irregular wages.

If the position of Indian workers on the labour market was restricted by the actions of white labour, the value and possibly the price of their labour power may also have been affected by the fact that the Indian population group was not officially considered as a permanent element of South Africa's population. This is evidenced in the unsuccessful repatriation schemes implemented by the Union government from 1914 and formulated in Act 37 of 1927, following the Cape Town agreement. [23] The failure of the repatriation scheme may have been a factor encouraging government to neglect the formal housing and education of Indians generally; conditions which provide employers with justification for employing workers at low wages and in unskilled work. However, there are other possible explanations as to why employers may have considered Indian workers as reasonably 'cheap'. For example, while the Department of Mines and Industries could comment that the food industry in the Western Cape was employing 'a good class of European, and coloured women...' [24] it found that in Natal such women in food factories 'may be working together with Indian juveniles whose standard of living is very low'. [25] In industries such as clothing and laundries, although women (coloured, white and less frequently African) were found to be employed in most parts of the country, the Department Report commented that 'in Natal nearly everywhere male Indian juveniles take place' while heavy work was performed by Indian and Native male adults. [26] In 1929, although the chief inspector of factories noted a remarkable increase in the employment of women in the western Cape, there seemed to be a very small increase in Natal, although the position had, to an extent, changed in the early 1930s. The relatively strong position of male Indian workers in such industries as clothing, printing and food, as opposed to African and women workers, may be explained (at least before Indian workers in these industries became unionised) by the fact that there were no effective...
restrictions on the employment of Indian youth as 'cheap' labourers. This tendency may have been further facilitated by the remarkable 'youthfulness' of the Indian population. It was estimated in 1936 that 47% of the Indians in Natal 'were under the age of fifteen years'. [27] For Durban the frequency of the age group 4 to 15 years was significantly higher among Indians than either Africans or whites. Such frequency decreases remarkably among Indians for the age distribution between 15 and 40 years. [28]

Durban's unskilled and semi-skilled labour supply in industry was provided for, to a large extent by a proletarianised Indian workforce. Interestingly, even in the industries (such as printing) where Indian labour was mostly concentrated by the early 1950s, these workers occupied largely unskilled positions. For instance, in the Typographical Union out of a total of 962 Indian members in the early 1950s only 19 were journeymen. [29] The proletarianisation of the Indian labour-force may be shown, in the percentage increase in the urban population between 1921 and 1931 from 55.8% to 74.0% of the total Indian population in Natal.

The increase in African urban population in the same period was from 7.5% to 15.9%. [30] The small coloured group, which showed a higher rate of urbanisation than either Indians or Africans, tended to be employed in more skilled artisanal or semi-skilled operative places. [31] Significantly, by 1931 in Natal the work participation rate of coloured women tended to increase on the wage labour market. Coloured women were employed mainly in the clothing and textile industries. It is possible that they increasingly substituted for the employment of Indian juveniles, given the passing of the Registration of employment Act, 1922, (an Act which had previously only regulated the employment of white juveniles and adults). [32] The labour-market position of women will be discussed at greater length when we consider the question of industrialisation and proletarianisation within the African workforce below.

3. Migrancy Reserve Productivity and Labour Supplies

Since the earliest period of this century African migrant workers were mainly employed in domestic service which employed 40 300 males and females in Natal. This exceeded industrial employment for Africans by an enormous margin. [33] In commerce, the number of Indian workers was also far in excess of Africans employed in that sector. It was only in the transport service sector, especially the docks, which posed as a significant outlet for the employment of African migrant labour, and this is perhaps one reason why dock workers have found a large space in the limited historiography of labour in Durban. Yet, the potential threat migrant workers posed to the regular functioning of this sector was most consistently felt by employers of dock workers, especially those employed on a daily (tocht) basis. Workers were able to resist, often successfully, except at times when African peasant productivity had declined, attempts to weaken their bargaining position or to control their movement, e.g. through formal compound accommodation. Such a high level of militancy was maintained by dock migrants in the period after World War I, with the ultimate result that many employers began to employ, by the late 1930s, more permanent workers in place of 'tocht' labourers. [34] In fact, the South African Railways and Harbours Administration (S.A.R. & H.) in Durban, for a long time the largest employer of 'tocht' labour, revealed in 1947 that it was implementing a scheme of incentives to workers to become 'stabilised'. These incentives to workers included pay increments for service, provision for sick
leave, travelling facilities for workers and their families and a pension scheme. [35] Although the S.A.R. and H. complained that the housing requirements for its single migrants had increased dramatically and its 'togt' labour supply (given seasonal fluctuations in shipping) had increased from 450 'togts' in 1939 to 580 'togts' per day, the S.A.R. and H. stated that it had had set up a rent subsidy scheme for its married (i.e. fully proletarianised) black workers.

If dock employers found migrant workers extremely difficult to regiment it would be no exaggeration to suggest further that local migrant labour supplies for most employers whether agricultural, industrial, commercial (and even domestic) was no cause for happiness. Although the reserves of Natal carried the second largest reserve African population in the Union by 1936, the Natal reserves exported only 1.6% of its population to other reserves. [38] Yet, despite this remarkable stability of residence, of the African population in the province, the 1937-39 Native Farm Labour Committee reported that 'employers of labour (especially sugar farming and coal mining) in Natal employ collectively 38 labour agents to recruit beyond its borders. The evidence available to us is to the effect that in places, upwards of 60% of the labour employed came from beyond the border of the province. [39] By 1940 the geographic distribution of those imported supplies were Portuguese Africans for the Zululand sugar farmers, and in the rest of Natal, Transkeian Africans were employed. Although the Native Affairs Commission noted (quite accurately) that Africans preferred employment as domestic servants, policemen, clerks and other employment in urban areas like Durban where wages were higher, [40] a situation local farmers detested, this does not sufficiently explain the remarkable failure of sugar farmers to secure local supplies of migrant labour.

It would seem that, generally, employers in Durban, like farmers, experienced consistent shortages of unskilled African labour. For instance, when the new Nationalist Party government vigorously enforced influx control regulations limiting the entry of Africans into urban areas, Durban industrial employers complained to the Native Affairs Department that 'the present rigid control of the flow of African labour to industries threatens our interests because the large army of unemployed Africans necessary to maintain low rates of pay will be seriously depleted.' [41] Although the Durban Chamber of Commerce suggested to the Durban Native Administration Commission (DNAC), on the contrary, that tighter influx controls should be imposed over migrant labour to Durban, this must be understood as a concern motivated by the security problems faced by commercial firms. Thus, when the DNAC queried the extent to which commercial employers had a labour supply sufficient 'to replace wastage', [42] the chamber's representatives claimed that 'there are a lot of vagrant Natives in the towns' evident in the fact that 'we have had so many burglaries'. [43] However, these informants hastened to add that influx controls should affect the 'criminal' elements only, while 'the ones seeking work' [44] should not be condemned and returned to the countryside.

Shortages of labour occurred despite the fact that the absentee rate from the reserves (one-eighth of the population in May 1936) was high or that the low number of males between the ages of 20 and 69 in the reserves was drastically lower than the rate for the urban African population by 1946. [45] Thus, if a representative of the Umfolosi Co-operative Sugar Mill could complain that his company found that Zulu workers on contracts of 12 months often completed only 5 months [46] by 1946, the complaint in Durban was that there was a tremendous movement in town from job to job. [47] An illustration of the high
rate of job mobility among Africans in Durban is the difference between 'the number of contracts of service registered annually (78,000) and the number of contracts renewed (511,000) during the period July 1939 to August 1940' [48]. Although the complaints of farmers and urban industrial employers seemed to concern essentially different (though closely related) problems both shared the basic concern that 'the reserve provides an opportunity for a means of escape from European wage employment and environment'. [49]

For many official and even academic observers in this period, most reserves were critically overstocked or overcrowded. Under these conditions reserves did not provide sufficiently for the subsistence of their populations. This argument was supported by evidence showing the limited nutritional value of crops, ill health, cattle disease and soil erosion. According to these observers, given deteriorating conditions in the reserves, many African (if not the majority) were superfluous to the requirements of reserve agriculture and could be considered to be at 'rest' when not in wage employment. In order to ensure that this superfluous population in the reserves gave up their 'idle' habits and enter wage employment, the Social and Economic Planning Council could shamelessly recommend a process of enforced proletarianisation:

A large number will have to give up all thought of having a right to arable and pastoral land, and will have to live on a residential site in one or other of the village or urban centres. [50]

The means to enforce such proletarianisation found ideological justification in conservationist terms. For example, the Magistrate of Verulam in 1930-32 suggested individual land tenure and fencing as means to solve overstocking.

However, there were some official commentators who made favourable (if exaggerated) statements on conditions in the reserves of Zululand. Thus, it may be argued that the ecological arguments put forward to encourage the reduction of cattle stock and human population of the reserves was more about creating adequate labour supplies for capitalist agriculture and industry and less about the maintenance of the conditions of reproduction in the reserves. A good example of this was the Union Native Affairs Department (NAD) in its report on African labour in Zululand:

In most areas of the Union in which the recruiting of Native labour occurs, the impoverishment of the Native population and the process of industrialisation are potent forces in forcing out labour and in making it more disposed to seek employment for longer and more frequent periods. These factors are very slightly felt in Zululand with the exception of the Ingwavuma and Ubono Districts...[52]

A similar perspective was held by the Native Economic Commission (NEC) in its report on Zululand, [53] although it was more sensitive to regional differences between coastal and northern areas such as Eshowe, Nkandla and Ngutu in which, by the late 1950s, 'most of the land can be classified as unproductive'. [54] Vegetation here consisted of ngongonq, a fibrous grass which was unsuitable for grazing. Moreover, where the coastal reserves received a well distributed annual rainfall of 40 inches, inland it was less than 25 inches. Conditions in the coastal areas were so favourable that 'tropical fruits and some vegetables are grown here for the market'.

Thus, a fairly optimistic impression of conditions in Zululand generally (if not the rest of Natal) is legitimate. For example, Simkins has shown recently that over the period 1927-1960, although the population density (per square mile) in Zululand increased from 20 to about 50, output per head was maintained stable at between three and four pounds sterling per head. [56]

Therefore, if representatives of the Natal University College (Department of Economics) could complain to the DNAC in 1947 that 'our labour areas are one huge casual market...' [57] this was largely because many migrant workers from the surrounding reserves had access to resources which enabled them to resist total subjection to the work disciplines of wage employment. Interestingly, to avoid unemployment during the Great Depression, many migrant workers in Durban used their access to pre-capitalist means of production advantageously. For instance, these workers indebted themselves to employers, and tended to leave town without paying all their debts. Consequently, even if a firm employed a replacement, when the former employee returned he was engaged in his previous position, 'because then [the firm] is more secure of redeeming its money'. [58]

The pattern of movement of migrant labour either between town and country and/or within town from job to job seems to contradict the argument being developed here. For example, African workers from the northern reserves where conditions of agricultural productivity had deteriorated more severely, show a greater tendency to move between employment in Durban and home. [59] Among Africans from reserves closer to Durban 'movement between a single job and home...is relatively less marked...'. [60] However, the argument may be salvaged if we consider that, in general, the average mobility of this group was not necessarily lower. In fact, given the relatively stable conditions within the coastal reserves, 'it can be seen that it was Natives coming from areas close to Durban who undertook the highest number of separate jobs.' [61] Their movement out of town may have had less noticeable effects on productivity as the relatively short distance of some areas from Durban may have allowed some workers a means to undertake regular week-end visits home. It may be challenged that the rapid movement of workers from job to job in town was conditioned less by their access to pre-capitalist means of production, and more by the seasonal nature of Durban's economy as South Africa's premier port, holiday resort and commercial centre. In this context, industrial and commercial demand for labour fluctuated seasonally and during 'constant changes within the import and export trade...'. [62] This argument seems to apply most aptly to shipping and commerce rather than mechanised industrial firms which could only replace the increased cost of imported raw materials and higher investment in capital equipment during the 1940s, by maximising output. This could not occur on the basis of a largely irregular or casualised labour supply.

Moreover, as Cooper has suggested, while access to means of production did not mean that migrant workers 'could [not] avoid work altogether' by combining access to land with options for short-term labour, they could choose not to work steadily or well...'. [63] Thus, fluctuations on the labour market for unskilled African migrant workers was often the consequence, not of excess or reduced capacity even on the docks (for instance) but of the struggles of migrant workers. For example, it was stated by the manager of the municipal NAD in 1949 that 'since the work involved at the harbour is extremely strenuous, labourers are often reluctant to work overtime, and fresh gangs of labourers are thus sometimes engaged in the afternoons,
accounting for hundreds of additional labourers." [64] Moreover, even during a period of post-war decline in the rate of growth of output in Durban from 14% in 1944/45 to 11% between 1948/49 and 1952/53, and a concomitant decline in total employment from 7% to 5% over the same period, [65] the manager of the NAD complained that a large reservoir of unskilled labour was needed in Durban, 'since most tribal labourers return to their homes for varying periods, and often at short notice...'

Just as it is historically inaccurate to assume a fundamental collapse in the reproductive capacities of the reserves, it would be no more accurate to argue that reserves were self-sufficient enclaves. Although it was the widespread view among contemporary liberals such as Mabel Palmer, who regarded migrants' wages as no more than 'pocket money wages', [67] that pre-capitalist production subsidised migrant wages, there is evidence for Durban which indicates that the wage was often used to maintain pre-capitalist economy and society. For example, in submitting a budget of 5 pounds 18/6d as the potential wage necessary for African workers, the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) Natal suggested to the NEC that even this budget was insufficient. The explanation was that, given the relative poverty of rural production, a young worker often had a 'family depending on him because when he comes to work he has to support his aged father and mother' while 'lobola forms another item for additional expenditure.' [68] Moreover, even if wages for migrants were particularly low it was clear to local authorities that the wage was required to reproduce the socio-economic framework of the reserves. Thus, the local NAD granted workers facilities to 'lodge money in safekeeping and to make remittances through the Department [and] it found that considerable sums find their way to the kraals for the purchase of food and support of relatives.' [69] It was found that in the short period between August 1924 and July 1925, an important item of expenditure for African workers was stock purchases, an essential component in the maintenance of African peasant agriculture. [70]

Throughout the period 1920-1950, migrant workers submitted regular proportions of their earnings towards the reproduction of their families in rural areas - as in the case of 88% of Dunlop's workers who 'made allocations within a period of ten months' in 1946. [71] Significantly, 77.9% of the total allocations to families were for general purposes which included lobola, clothes, debt payment, cattle, school fees and even gifts to lovers. [72] The fact that Dunlop's workers' remittances covered such general expenses, suggests that either the workers at this particular factory received sufficiently high wages, or that the conditions of agricultural production in the areas in which the families of Dunlop's employees resided had not declined dramatically. Where remittances home tended to be largely for the purchase of food, it may be assumed that rural productivity had declined as in the instance of 'Nyuswa men [who] spend most of their wages on food for their families in the reserve.' [73] In the months of February, March, April, May and June, when the production of food crops in the Nyuswa reserve of Botha's Hill could be harvested, there was a slight decline in the purchase of food (and perhaps more money was available for other purposes). [74]

Although remittances home were sometimes less than half the wage paid to workers (as in the case of Muntuyena Phewa of Botha's Hill who, out of a monthly wage, submitted only 15s to one pound per week to his family in the late 1950s); the wage was perceived to be of particular significance in the maintenance of the political economy
of the reserves. Indeed, the pre-colonial system of resource allocation (such as land or cattle) by kraal heads to the families in his household (kraal) was generally used to ensure that the workers' wage was distributed for the benefit of the whole kraal. This money was used in the purchase of cattle or food. [75] However, this system was increasingly evaded by workers as kraal heads often did not ensure that an equilibrium was maintained in the distribution of wages between families. To avoid this, workers began increasingly to withhold a large part of their earnings for personal expenditure in town or paid all their wages to their fathers and mothers. In the case of married workers, remittances were given directly to their wives. [76]

It would seem that if through a temporary drought the balance between rural productivity and urban incomes is affected, increased pressure is exerted on the wage to reproduce the social conditions of pre-capitalist production. The effect, according to Curtis, was that "this reduced the real standard of living of the African productive labourers who had received the R2 [non-commodity] use values and...tended to increase pressure on the value of African labour-power and the wage" [77] and in turn the rate of surplus value extraction. However, this does not necessarily assure a higher price or value of labour power if the supply of labour increases. [78] But this pressure may be effective if the deterioration of agricultural conditions in the reserves has the effect of being partly responsible for galvanising worker struggles over the wage. In late 1935 and early 1936, 12 areas in Natal and Zululand (largely in the reserves) were declared drought-stricken by the government. [79] By mid-1937 when the effects of the drought may have produced an extended period of recession in the reproductive capacities of the reserves, Durban experienced for the first time major industrial strikes among African workers. These include the lengthy Falkirks dispute, a strike at a box-making factory at Jacobs, the Durban docks and at the explosives factory at Umbogintwini. [80] However, the extent of worker protest may not have been limited to recorded strike activity only. For instance, Mr. Chester of the municipal NAD, in making a public call in 1937 for a meeting of large employers to discuss African workers' wages, 'drew attention to the fact that on several occasions recently he has been called upon to mediate in cases of requests of increases of pay to gangs of Natives employed in industrial and commercial undertakings.' [81] The depth of protest against low wages surfaced in a widely publicised mass meeting of African workers in Durban on 9 August 1937 at which it was resolved to make representation to the local NAD and central Native Affairs authorities and to employer organisations on:

...our universal complaint, which is that in spite of the admitted general prosperity of the country, the Native has not been affected and is still receiving the same wages as during the depression. We desire that serious and sympathetic consideration be given to our request, that a minimum wage be fixed throughout the country. [82]

However, it needs to be noted as well that it was not only the conditions of migrant workers which came under public notice. For in the same year the destitute position of both African and Indian workers was given further publicity in the visit of the Inter-departmental Committee on poor relief to Durban. This committee recorded evidence that in Durban "the prevalent wage rates for non-Europeans...do not permit a family to live according to [the] minimum standard...poverty conditions, malnutrition, slumdom, preventable disease and crime must arise". [83] A similar report was
accounting for hundreds of additional labourers." [64] Moreover, even during a period of post-war decline in the rate of growth of output in Durban from 14% in 1944/45 to 11% between 1948/49 and 1952/53, and a concomitant decline in total employment from 7% to 5% over the same period, [65] the manager of the NAD complained that a large reservoir of unskilled labour was needed in Durban, "since most tribal labourers return to their homes for varying periods, and often at short notice..." [66]

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published by the Durban Medical Officer of Health (MOH) who complained that 'as [Natives] have not the money to buy the protective foods, such as milk, eggs and vegetables, etc... the effects on their health was disastrous. [84] Given the general upsurge in class struggle in Durban and the fact that the conditions of reproduction of the black working class as a whole was threatened, on 10 September 1937, a meeting of major employers resolved that the government should set up a commission to go into the question of a minimum wage determination for unskilled labour nationally. However, the first wage determination for unskilled labour (Determination No. 72 of 1940) was intended to affect conditions in Durban specifically. This determination raised the wage from an average of approximately 56/- per week in 1931 to about 76/- per week in 1940. A number of subsequent adjustments raised the minimum wage to one pound 6s and 6d per week in 1944-45. [85]

Significantly, if one of the forces galvanising class struggles over wages in Durban may have been drought induced recession in reserve productivity, such recession does not seem to have had the long-term effect of increasing the supply of migrant labour to Durban. An interesting impression of this is gained from a press report on the shortages of domestic servants in Durban in late 1937. [86] It would seem that the effect of this shortage was serious enough for a Native Affairs official to grant his 'expert' opinion that 'this shortage... was due to the fact that at the moment many Natives have gone home following the reaping of good crops in certain areas. When there was plenty of food at home the Native naturally went back to the country to have a rest.' [87] This expert suggested further that he understood that casual labour in Durban was not reliable, but employers of domestic labour could retain their labour for longer periods if a training institute for servants were established. In February 1938 it was reported that generally 'the quantity of Native labour in Durban is not as large as is the case generally at this time of year' given an increased demand for African labour. [88]

By the late 1940s even when war-time industrialisation contributed to a rapid expansion in industrial employment opportunities, the Wage Board report on unskilled labour conditions in Durban could comment that 'it is difficult to understand and appreciate why some employers are able to obtain the required and suitable supply of labour and others not'. [89] However, apart from the potential bargaining strength workers could exercise in this situation of relative labour scarcity, a major concern among employers was that they could not derive maximum productivity from a 'casual' or migrant labour supply. For instance, when the question of the need for a wage determination in Durban was raised by the NEC in the early 1930s, Mr. Joseph E Borain, an engineering employer representing the Natal Chamber of Industries, argued that as migrant labour usually performed the most unskilled work such as 'lifting and that sort of thing' in the foundry process, their productivity was particularly low. A similar view was shared by a representative of the Durban Chamber of Commerce who argued that migrants did not deserve a 'decent wage, others are hardly worth anything at all'. [90] As a strategy to encourage stabilisation among a larger proportion of the workforce, Mr Borain who had experienced the process whereby 'some boys you have for years become very skilled at holding up the rivet; others are hitting rivets and so on,' suggested a discriminatory wage determination:

If you are going to bring in wage determination for Natives, there will have to be varying degrees in accordance with the absolutely unskilled in the various phases as they rise to the
4 Industrialisation, Transformation in the Labour Process and Proletarianisation

Over the period under review, especially the post-World War II era, a process of differentiation between proletarian and migrant African workers was occurring. According to Hindson, this differentiation was less the result of the absolute expansion of South Africa's secondary industry's labour demands than the effect of "...the restructuring of the production relations and the industrial division of labour". The essential effect of such restructuring included the re-organisation of the racial and occupational division of labour, whereby the division between white craft and black unskilled labour became less rigid through mechanisation. This change consisted in the development of a "...substantial layer of semi-skilled, generally operative workplaces" which were ultimately to be filled by black workers. What is most significant about this process was that larger numbers of African workers were needed to fill occupational positions requiring a substantial period of training. The result was that among industrial employers there developed a desire for "settled urban workers for use in semi-skilled jobs." For example, the Industrial Employers' Association (Natal Section), in its memorandum to the DNAC (1947) expressed the view that industry preferred a stabilised labour-force, "if we're going to have efficient well trained native workers". According to Hindson, the linkage between African urban settlement and occupational position was reinforced by the preference exercised by settled urban workers themselves who were in a stronger position to compete for such jobs given their superior knowledge of the labour market..." However, given the general evasion of migrants to total subjection to capitalist employment, it is no exaggeration to argue that many exercised preference for jobs in sectors (e.g. domestic) which required less obligation on their part to remain in one job or in town for any lengthy period of time. This argument may be given some support through evidence on the relative pace of entry of individual workers by sector onto the labour market. This evidence is provided by Smith for the area of Durban between 1917 and 1942. According to Smith's findings, it was sectors of urban employment (especially commerce and domestic service) in which there occurred less developed occupational divisions of labour, which absorbed the largest proportion of new arrivals in Durban. This may have been the case, because many new arrivals may have been considered legally as minors, and therefore under the guardianship of rural patriarchs. Commerce and domestic service, including transport and communications, flats and hotels, absorbed 35.4% and 29.3% of all new arrivals in Durban. Industry absorbed a mere 9.7% of such new arrivals. The Municipality and government service absorbed even less of the new arrivals to Durban, but it must be noted that these sectors were not as significant as industry or even commerce in the employment of African labour.

Smith arrived at such conclusions through studying the occupational distribution of a total of 2 231 workers. Moreover, Smith supports his argument by considering the age distribution of first and subsequent jobs of African workers finding that "...of the juveniles (under 18 years of age) coming into town about 50% enter domestic service as their first form of employment, although on average this type of occupation accounts for less than 25% of initial jobs." It was commerce which catered for the employment of the largest proportion of new arrivals by age.
employers were successful at stabilising migrants at particular semi-skilled jobs, we may agree with the Wage Board that 'some employers are more capable of selecting and training labour suitable for their requirements.' [99]

Ultimately, the process of industrialisation and transformation in labour processes within Durban does not seem to have affected the labour market for African labour as fundamentally as may be assumed from data on the absolute expansion of African employment in secondary industry. Indeed, by 1946 domestic service still absorbed almost half the registered African labour force employed in industry. Registered employment in the municipality, commerce and the service sector, though not as expansive as domestic service, absorbed a considerable number of workers. Thus the share of industrial employment contributed an even smaller, although the most significant proportion, of the total registered employed African population in Durban. This pattern may be clearly seen in data provided by the Municipal NAD to the Broome Commission on registered African employment between 1934 and 1946 (shown in the table below): [100]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Registered Domestic Commerce Industry</th>
<th>Misc.</th>
<th>Flats, Hotels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>Population 37,081</td>
<td>service 10,022</td>
<td>8,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>41,328</td>
<td>11,086</td>
<td>9,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>45,937</td>
<td>11,982</td>
<td>9,985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>48,787</td>
<td>12,913</td>
<td>9,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>52,342</td>
<td>12,077</td>
<td>10,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>54,201</td>
<td>12,043</td>
<td>10,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>53,017</td>
<td>12,003</td>
<td>10,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>57,987</td>
<td>12,995</td>
<td>10,997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>60,697</td>
<td>12,936</td>
<td>10,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>66,627</td>
<td>13,921</td>
<td>11,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>69,759</td>
<td>14,154</td>
<td>12,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>71,210</td>
<td>15,042</td>
<td>13,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>75,553</td>
<td>16,776</td>
<td>14,680</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If industry, where the process of differentiation is crucially related to workers' places in the production process, did not absorb the majority of the registered employed African population in Durban, then the effect of differentiation in proletarianising a section of the African workforce cannot be too strongly emphasised. Admittedly this point does not seem to have been missed by Hindson as he maintains that '...the impact of the expansion of capital in industry was not uniformly to hasten the process of proletarianisation.' [101] In the case of Durban-Pinetown the point may be taken further because over the period under consideration the major part of the African
industrial workforce was still migrant.

The complexity of the problem may be studied through a brief discussion of the Dunlop Rubber Company’s African workforce. The Dunlop factory, after its establishment in Durban in 1934, introduced a highly mechanised process involving six parts: (1) mastication; (2) compounding; (3) mixing; (4) fabric preparation; (5) tyre building and; (6) vulcanisation. All these processes involved a complex of chemical and mechanical interactions to produce a durable product from very 'plastic' raw rubber. [102] This process was highly capital-intensive and involved a labour process of repetitive tasks performed by well selected workers to be trained in the operation of the whole process. [103] Initially Dunlop employed largely Indian and white workers in semi-skilled positions but, following the unsuccessful strike of Indian and African workers in 1942, the company increasingly employed African migrant workers, whose numbers increased from 120 in February 1943 and 1 250 in June/July 1945. [104]

Significantly, the majority of Dunlop's African workers were migrants by 1946. For example, of 269 men interviewed in 1946, 208 occupied land 'from one to 27 acres.' [105] Of this sample only 22 (8%) occupied no land, 17 of whom had families living in town. But the company complained that migrant labour showed low productivity rates. In order to overcome this and to contribute to the gradual stabilisation (if not full proletarianisation), the company instituted a very rigid selection and testing procedure, [106] with the result that 'Native productivity...was raised from a figure of 29 to 50, an increase of 72%...'. [107] This success was facilitated by the fact that even though the workforce was migrant, 'about one-fifth of the labour force came from homes within a 25 mile radius of Durban and rather less than this proportion from within a radius of between 51 and 75 miles.' [108] Generally, the more distant reserves from Durban contributed a smaller supply of migrants to Dunlop. [109] Workers from areas closer to Durban such as Pinetown, Ixopo, Port Shepstone, Estcourt, Mapumulo and Nkandla tended to be the most 'permanent'. [110] This tendency may have been achieved through the use of a recruitment strategy dependent on factory indunas. The Dunlop survey (1950) suggests, for instance, that 'one of the factory indunas (Jaca) was a sub-chief in the Ixopo ward of Chief Molibaniso and was...likely to attract a number of workers from the area'. [111] A further factor contributing to 'stabilisation' among Dunlop's African migrant labour supply was the practice among foremen to develop preferences for workers from particular rural areas. [112]

Dunlop's success may have been facilitated further by the weak position of its small white workforce over the labour process, although their position was protected by an Industrial Agreement No. 1412 which classified white workers into five grades, while Africans were considered to be general workers. In Durban, the expansion of employment for Africans at semi-skilled positions in industry was restricted not only because of the migrancy of a large part of its workforce but also because the Wage Board 'is bound to take into account the representations made by organised [white] labour (my emphasis)'. [113] Significantly, one of the side effects of the relative strength of white workers' organisations in industrial labour relations was an unfavourable situation in which migrant workers' wages varied sharply in different industries, depending on the relative strength of white labour unions as 'each industry lays down its own wage after consultation with the trade unions...'. [114] The consequence, according to the Industrial Employers' Association
to the DNAC in Durban was that:

...out of 78 controlled industries, there are 20 different basic minimum wages for unskilled workers, ranging from 76/- per week down to 23/- per week, and there are a number of industries paying less than 23/- a week...[115]

The Association suggested that this situation should be changed by the Wage Board enforcing a standard regional minimum. This would presumably stabilise the cost and supply of migrant labour especially to sectors of industry which were less competitive.

This raises a question considered by neither Hindson nor cheap labour theory, i.e. the potential effects of white labour struggles to protect their relatively secure control over the labour process on the continued migrancy of large numbers of African workers. Hindson argues that the process of differentiation between migrant and fully proletarianised African workers is crucially linked to the re-organisation of the production process. This re-organisation meant the incorporation of black workers into more strategic positions in the capitalist production process, which in the interest of maximum productivity required stabilised or fully proletarianised workforces. However, this ignores the historical struggles of white craft unions to halt this process effectively. A good example of this was the struggle of the Iron Moulders' Society (IMS) which used two-pronged strategies to halt the process of dissolution. One of these was to relax the closed shop and allow the entry of a limited number of black workers into the union such as the coloured "non-artisan production moulders in Durban Falkirk..." [116] in the late 1930s. Another was through the formalisation of the closed shop system in the 1940s previously only "enforced by shop stewards and IMS members at particular foundries." [117] Thus, concludes Webster, 'blacks have secondary market [i.e. jobs requiring little formal training - my emphasis] jobs because of a system of control in the labour process.' [118] Although this did not determine the continued migrancy of a large section of the African workforce, it at least halted the process of change in the production process which could contribute to the dissolution of the migrant labour system.

Paradoxically, the pace of industrialisation in Durban, in the period under consideration (especially the years of World War II), may have been too rapid to effect immediately the re-organisation of production relations. Hindson was aware of this problem as he notes that re-organisation involved the employment of larger numbers of workers with existing plant and machinery. One of the causes was the war - which had a two-edged effect of disrupting supplies of imported capital goods while placing increased demands on the capacity of South African industry. Another reason was the fact that many industrialists were accustomed to the employment of large numbers of 'cheap' unskilled labour. The effect was the production process in industry was re-organised without increasing the technical composition of capital appreciably.

If this was true of South Africa as a whole, the argument is of particular relevance in the case of Durban-Pinetown. Admittedly, given the preponderance of the chemical industry in Durban, the technical composition of capital in this region was much higher than in either Port Elizabeth or the Western Cape. But the relative increase in the technical composition of capital for industry in Greater Durban as compared to all regions in the Union in the post-war period, does not appear to have been remarkable. In fact, in
the post-depression period in Durban there was a relative decline in the technical composition of capital, which increased only marginally into the war and post-war period. This is evidenced in data on the average horsepower per employee in industries throughout the Union: [119]

**Average Horsepower per Employee in Industries in the Union and the main Industrial areas - 1924/25 to 1953/54 (private Industries only)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Union</th>
<th>S.Tvl</th>
<th>W.Cape</th>
<th>P.E.</th>
<th>Durban-Pinetown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1924/25 to 1929/30</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932/33 to 1934/35</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935/36 to 1937/40</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940/41 to 1944/45</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945/46 to 1949/50</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950/51 to 1953/54</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given the low composition of capital in South African industries, it has been admitted by Hindson that 'capitalist expansion appears to have been based essentially on absolute rather than relative surplus value expropriation...'. [120] In a sense, at the regional level of Durban-Pinetown, this weakens the effectiveness of the link between re-organisation of the production process and the extent of proletarianisation as the low technical composition of capital must have limited the extent to which this re-organisation could have occurred. This becomes particularly clear if one considers that the vast majority of production units were very small and "with a very small annual turnover". [121] Thus Smith has noted that in the period up to 1941-42 "less than 10% of establishments have a gross output of over 50 000 pounds sterling a year". [122] In Durban-Pinetown, between 1920 and 1948 although total industrial employment showed a marked increase from 21 382 to 74 511 the increase in the number of employees per establishment was less significant rising from 45.6 to 64 per establishment. [123]

Yet Greater Durban did experience a remarkable expansion of an urbanised section of the African population. Thus, although the increase in African urban fully proletarianised (people permanently resident in the town and people who have lost total access to means of production and subsistence) population showed a small relative increase from 7.5% to 15.9% of the total African population in Natal between 1921 and 1951, the percentage contribution of the African urban population to the total was by 1946 greater than that for any other group. [124] This occurred despite the fact that the degree to which Indians, coloureds and whites had been urbanised exceeded by far the extent to which the African population became urbanised. This tendency may be seen in the brief table below: [125]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Urbanisation, Natal 1946</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban percentage of each racial group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If industrialisation and changes in capitalist labour processes do not adequately explain the gradual process of differentiation between migrant and proletarian Africans, neither does the widely assumed decline in reserve productivity explain why some Africans opted to live with their families in Durban. As we have suggested above, the relative stability of the reserve economy provided sufficient reason...
for most Africans to enter urban employment without bringing their families to live with them. For example, Mr. John Bristro, a retired magistrate of the NAD, gave evidence to the DNAC that he once met an African from Harding whom he asked: "Don't you want your people here, your family?" and he said "No, they are doing 'very well'".

[126] For migrant African workers, access to means of subsistence provided a means to evade total subordination to the time discipline of wage employment. Thus, it would seem that many Africans left the reserves with their families, less because they could not survive on production in the reserves with their families, but rather because they perceived more fruitful opportunities in informal sector activity (e.g. shack renting) in areas such as Cato Manor. An interesting case is the example of a workers' father documented by Iain Edwards:

My father was a farmer down the South Coast at Harding. He was good and even the Europeans respected him. He sent me to this Mission school where I learnt about machines and passed standard five and six. Then we all came to Durban...we stayed at Cabazini (in Mkhumbane) where my father had some shacks. I was a conductor...[127]

Many others settled permanently around Durban were defrauded by sweepstake operators who 'encouraged peasants to sell off their cattle to purchase 'shares'..." [128] The loss of such valued stock in this way led many families to settle around towns such as Durban. [129]

We have suggested above that the access many workers had to pre-capitalist means of production allowed them sufficient capacity to determine the pace and the extent to which they became proletarianised, relatively independent of the needs of capitalist employers. Significantly, most migrant workers in Durban were males. This is evident in statistical data on the higher masculinity rate of the urban population in contrast to the reserve population of Natal in 1946. The total masculinity rate for reserves was 84 as opposed to 201 for urban areas for all age groups between 4 and 70. [130]

Writers who uphold the cheap labour thesis would explain the relative non-participation of African women in urban wage employment by arguing that women performed the essential task of reproducing future migrant labour supplies both as wives and mothers, and as performers of non-capitalist agricultural labour. Thus African women functioned centrally in reproducing the subsidising role of pre-capitalist production on the wage paid to migrant workers by capitalist employers.

Moreover, if capitalists did not effectively control the processes of either migrancy or even proletarianisation, there is no reason to assume that the imperatives of capital accumulation determined or explains 'the fact that it was women who remained behind, and men who left the reserves'. [131] The question has crucial significance if we consider that pass laws such as the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 in the period did not contain sufficient powers to control or even prevent the movement of African women into the towns.
Thus in Durban between 1936 and 1946 the estimated African female population increased from from 14 234 to 28 523, the relative increase being 100.6% as compared to only 53% for males. [132] Attempts by the Durban authorities in the mid-1920s and early 1930s to have further controls instituted over the movement of African women into urban areas do not seem to have been motivated by any fear that the movement of women from the reserves would threaten the maintenance of the migrant labour system, but was informed by the real threat African women posed to the municipal monopoly over the production of sorghum beer and the political militancy demonstrated by women in defending their role as petty producers of sorghum beer. For indeed, the first formally organised resistance to the municipal beer monopoly occurred as early as 1914, and was led by African women in the Women's Christian Temperance Union. [133] According to Henson, petty traders (usually African women) in the 1920s provided strong competition for the municipal beer monopoly as they were prepared to sell at lower prices and introduced a more intoxicating home-brew known as itisimiyane. [134] Another related explanation was the fact that the involvement of African women in prostitution and illegal petty commodity selling, allowed them a capacity to resist male patriarchy, thereby threatening the basis of the regulated or socially 'stabilised' proletarian family. (These issues are taken up in detail in Section 2 of Chapter III).

The most compelling (though as yet insufficiently developed) explanation as to why African women did not generally enter the urban labour market is that provided by Bozzoli. Bozzoli argues that it was the form of subordination of women in the economy and society of African pre-capitalist formations which halted their proletarianisation. For example, the exclusion of women from the means of creating wealth, especially cattle, hunting and trading, caused, after decades of encroachment (and perhaps erosion) on these 'male' spheres of labour, 'in the era of full-blooded migration' the vast bulk of rural labour to be performed by women. [125] Bozzoli suggests further that it was the kinship system whereby 'chiefly' or 'tribal' authority extended patriarchal domination beyond the household which provided a very important means to prevent the proletarianisation of women. To support this contention, Bozzoli points to recent historiography which provides evidence of the 'crassic measures adopted by chiefs and tribesmen to stop their women from migrating.' [136] These included measures to prevent women buying bus and rail tickets or travelling by themselves. [137] Bozzoli argues further that Boer women, unlike their African counterparts, became proletarianised faster than their men as patriarchal domination was limited to the household alone. Moreover, Boer women performed household rather than agricultural labour. Therefore the 'spread of commodity exchange relieved women of certain tasks' as some of their tasks such as breadmaking or the manufacture of clothing occurred outside the household. [138] Among coloured rural families the patriarchal division of labour may have been similar to that among Boer families. For example, within 27 coloured subsistence farms in the Dunn reserve only male labour was listed by a 1952 survey as being employed in subsistence agriculture. [139] In this context, it is not surprising that 'Durban had attracted two-thirds of the females who had previously lived in the Dunn reserve.' [140] Many African women resisted their subordination and dependent position within the kinship system by migrating to town without obtaining the consent of their patriarchs (i.e. both their husbands and tribal heads). This form of resistance was often provoked by the failure of male migrants 'to send money to the rural
household' [141] or simply because they had heard that their husbands had been unfaithful. [142] This not only grants further support to the argument that proletarianisation in the South African context was by no means a process determined totally by the imperatives of capital accumulation, but provides as well evidence that proletarianisation may also be one consequence of rural gender struggles or, according to Bozoli, struggles in the domestic sphere.

However, as we have noted above, the work participation rate of Indian women in Durban was lower than for any other population group. Where the work participation rate for coloured, African and white women was 35.5, 17.7 and 31.4 respectively, the work participation rate for Indian women was 6.5 in Natal by 1951. [143] This was despite the fact that Indians in Durban had been fully urbanised except for a number of market gardeners on the fringes of the city. The reason for this may have been that pre-capitalist forms of kinship and patriarchy among Indians persisted even in urban areas. Thus, the liberating advantages proletarianisation offered to African women were hardly to be experienced by Indian women. Kinship ideology among Indians was no different to that affecting Boer women as the role of Indian women in both rural and urban societies were strongly perceived to rest within the household and not in the wider world of agricultural or wage employment in industry. Thus, according to Kuper in rural and semi-rural areas, women may work with the man and children in the fields and help sell produce, and in urban areas women may earn money through home industries...but contact with the outer world must be restricted.' [144] This tradition was so strong that 'no matter how poor the family may be, a wife is not supposed to sell her labour on the open market.' [145] This kinship ideology was reinforced by a very restrictive patriarchal system. Indian women after marriage transferred legal and religious obligations from her family to her husband's family. [146] Therefore, the Indian woman was not only subject to the authority of her husband, but to that of her in-laws as well. [147] This was a similar form of control exercised over African women in the wider kinship group in rural areas and may (through the extended family system) have been effective in halting widespread incorporation of Indian women onto the labour market. There is, however, some indication that young Indian men and women resisted the kinship controls of the joint family system. For instance, at a South African Institute of Race Relations conference on Indian life and labour held in Pietermaritzburg in 1943, it was commented that:

Investigations in Natal have revealed that, in 40% of the households examined, the sons have established separate households. The young bride of today seeks independence, and even older women say that the joint family system bears heavily upon women and shortens their life. [148]

It may be argued that African women, being proletarianised relatively late were disadvantaged in urban areas as well, as they could not obtain formal sector employment. For example, in Durban even in domestic service African males tended to predominate. By 1930 while domestic workers constituted 25% of Durban's African working population, only 3% were females. [149] Other limited spheres of formal sector employment open to African women in Durban included nursing, teaching and laundries. [150] In Durban, African women could escape, more successfully than men, subordination to capitalist work disciplines through their involvement in informal sector such as illegal beer or liquor brewing, or prostitution. As long as attempts
to control or prevent these activities by local authorities could be resisted successfully by African women, [151] the advantages of informal sector activity were potentially more attractive than wage employment. For instance, attempts by the local authorities to control prostitution through the enforcement of medical examination were not very successful. In 1943, when the Durban city council recommended that the government grant the council legislative powers to impose controls on African women through compulsory medical examination, 'the central government replied that it did not favour the examination of females because of African opinion on the matter.' [152]

Conclusion:

The persistence of the migrant labour system in South Africa, even in the period of secondary industrialisation, has been explained by the need of capital accumulation for cheap labour. The maintenance of surplus value appropriation on the basis of cheap migrant labour requires that part of the social reproduction of that labour power is subsidised by pre-capitalist socio-economic processes, e.g. subsistence agricultural and rural household labour performed by women. This allows for a greater level of surplus value appropriation as pre-capitalist processes subsidise for part of the value of African labour power. It has been noted that although it is not easy to deny that the pre-capitalist mode of production subsidised part of the value of African labour power, the dependence of South African capitalism on this form of surplus value appropriation inhibited the development of relative surplus value appropriation. This was because poorly paid migrant workers were not generally consumers of capitalist produced wage goods.

However, the main focus of the argument has been on the labour market. Through analysis of the labour market for Durban, an attempt has been made to show that migrant labour was not as functional to the requirements of capitalist accumulation. This was because migrant workers themselves could manipulate the system to their own advantage. As long as migrants had access to some means of pre-capitalist subsistence they could effectively resist total subjection to capitalist work discipline. An essential requirement for the expansion of capital accumulation is a disciplined and stable labour supply if productivity is to be increased and more goods are produced at a lower value per unit. Therefore, the high rates of mobility of migrants (depending on the distance or the relative productivity of the reserve economy from which they came) either between job and job or between town and country, for capital not only caused problems in raising the productivity of labour but constituted as well a state of relative labour shortage. This relative shortage of labour in Durban, combined with the temporary effects of a drought on the subsistence production, allowed for the galvanising of worker struggles over the wage in the mid-1930s and 1940s.

It has been argued further that migrants could even resist capitalist attempts to stabilise a larger section of the labour force by involving Africans in semi-skilled positions within the labour process. This was facilitated in Durban by the existence of spheres of employment (such as domestic service) which required less obligation on the part of workers to remain in town. Moreover, as long as white labour could still determine the racial structure of the 'internal' labour market in industry, attempts by capital to encourage proletarianisation by involving workers in semi-skilled
jobs were further halted.

But the proletarianisation of a large section of the African workforce did occur over the period under review. However, in view of the failure of employer attempts to transform fundamentally the place of African workers in the production process, the full proletarianisation of a section of the African workforce may be explained by factors which did not relate directly to the requirements of capital accumulation. For example, the struggle of African women against their subordination to the patriarchal division of labour in the reserve economy and society caused many to move to towns, thereby encouraging many men to forge settled relationships in these urban areas.
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CHAPTER III

The Social Basis of Reproduction and Control

Introduction

In Chapter II, an attempt was made to study proletarianisation and the development of Durban's labour market for unskilled black workers over the years between 1920 and 1950. The main intention was to show that contrary to the views of some South African scholars (in particular the cheap labour theorists), the access migrant workers had to pre-capitalist means of subsistence and production was not as functional to the needs of capital accumulation as has been conventionally assumed. The argument is that since general access to the means of production provided migrant workers with some capacity to resist total subordination to capitalist work processes, the productivity of capitalist labour power was adversely affected. Consequently, the value of labour power could not be reduced through the production of more commodities at a lower value per unit use value.

The capacity for resistance among workers discussed in the previous chapter does not specifically refer to the capacity for overt forms of struggle such as work stoppages, but concerns largely the extent to which workers themselves could determine whether or not they participated in wage labour. In other words, the point is that the relative extent to which workers became proletarianised was not totally subject to the push and pull of economic forces, such as the expansion of capital accumulation or the relative decline of subsistence production. It has been implicitly suggested as well that while the processes of supply and demand for labour were not fully subordinate to the power of capital, overt forms of resistance by migrant workers could occur without hindrance from the threat of losing employment. An example was the struggles of African dock workers in the 1930s and 1940s who maintained remarkable levels of militancy, despite the offensive of large employers such as the South African Railways and Harbours Administration (S.A.R. & H.) which increasingly sought to replace striking dock workers with recruited 'scab' labour in the hope that the latter would become permanent and stabilised employees. When S.A.R. & H. workers experienced a massive defeat after a lengthy strike in late 1937, Hemson points out that 'the result was not the docility of repression but further strike action by other togt harbour workers'. [1]

According to Webster, 'capitalist production' is 'a contradictory process of co-operation and conflict'. [2] The underlying basis for this duality in the capitalist production process lies in the fact that, on the one hand, the relationship between capitalist and workers as owner and non-owners of the social means of production respectively, necessitates co-operation if capitalists are to appropriate surplus labour and if workers are to receive the product of necessary labour as part of their subsistence. On the other hand, conflict in the production process occurs because capital constantly strives to increase the product of surplus labour (i.e. surplus
value) and to diminish the product of necessary labour (i.e. the value of labour power). Thus, 'class struggles in production is about the continuous power struggle over how much is to be done for what reward'. In attempting to assert their relative power over the labour process capitalists and workers tend to develop organisations (such as labour recruiting agencies or trade unions) to defend and advance their conflicting interests. However, especially in the absence of effective legal rights to trade unions (as has been the case for most black workers in South Africa before the 1970s) and given a broader socio-economic sphere outside of the production process (i.e. the city as a whole) not totally subordinate to the capitalist accumulation process, the advance of workers' struggles may depend on their capacity to resist social controls imposed by capital and state. In Durban, the struggle between African workers and their employers was marked by a process whereby employers and the state strove to enforce restrictions on the residence of workers in town and the attempt on the part of these workers to evade residence controls. Thus, Part I focuses on the attempt by employers in Durban to impose social discipline over migrant workers by developing a system of accommodation (i.e. single sex compound and hostel housing) through which the activity of workers could be under constant surveillance. However, these institutions of social control were not imposed on a docile and unimaginative workforce. Therefore, the resistance of workers to this form of social control is discussed as well.

As the problem of migrant accommodation was located within a social environment beyond the watchful eye of compound supervision, gradually over the period under review, the local state and capital (following the suggestions of liberal reformers) began to perceive the need to develop compounds situated in such a manner as to allow for the provision of recreational facilities. In this way migrant workers' leisure time could be directed towards sporting and 'educational' entertainment such as bioscope shows, and away from the 'drunken' and 'immoral' environment of informal settlements. Yet, the problems posed by the existence of informal settlements around Durban were threatening not only to employers' need for a sober and content workforce, but to the very existence of a well regulated bourgeois (i.e. that class which subsists totally on the appropriation of surplus value) social order in the city as a whole. The shantytown tended to be most conducive to the existence of an environment which challenged even such basic bourgeois institutions as the family (conceived to be an 'individual' household headed by a male breadwinner; a female to perform domestic tasks such as housework and motherhood and; children under the moral guidance and protection of their parents, especially mothers).

Significantly, within shanty towns many African women found refuge from kinship patriarchs in rural areas and from police intent on enforcing pass controls or in thwarting their involvement in illegal commodity transactions, e.g. liquor brewing and prostitution. Although, as Luise White has pointed out for Nairobi, prostitutes provided the support work that enabled the male labour force to return to work at least 'slightly replenished' in the sense that they provided essential services such as bedspace, food, sexual intercourse and companionship to workers; the instability of sexual relationships, the illegality and 'immorality' of some of these services was conceived to be unfavourable for the reproduction of a law abiding, stable and 'peaceful' urban workforce. As Cooper has suggested: 'The slums bred values antithetical to a work culture...the spontaneous settlement undermined the symbolic value of
urbanism as much as that of the law'. [5] Moreover, the transformation of industrial labour processes required the emergence of an urbanised African workforce which would gradually replace migrant labour. However, the existence of such a group needed to be formally and clearly distinguished from a migrant workforce if capital was to gain a greater measure of control over the labour market. The instability of sexual and family ties, especially in shanty towns, complicated this task. It is for this and for other reasons outlined above, that the need for municipal provision of family accommodation became such a pressing issue in the period under review here. Part 2 of the present Chapter is devoted to the problem of informal settlements, sub-economic family housing and the reproduction of an urban proletariat.

Part 1

Disciplines and Controls within Compounds and Hostels

Single sex accommodation for single male migrant workers in Durban did not emerge as an attempt by the local state and employers to maintain some abstract process of articulation between capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production. Rather, this form of accommodation arose out of the concrete conditions of class struggle (especially in shipping and harbour industry) in Durban in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The Durban docks, which were generally subject to day-to-day fluctuations in shipping, (or seasonal fluctuations in the market for commodities passing in and through Durban) depended on a fluid and unskilled labour force which could easily be mobilised on a daily basis. According to Cooper, writing on the port of Mombasa, casual or day ('togt' as it became to be known in Durban) labour could be favourable to shipping companies as 'they could adjust their payroll to the daily fluctuations of shipping, and avoid paying most of the social cost of labour.' [6] Interestingly, in British port cities such as London, similar conditions existed where both employers and workers shunned attempts by trade union leaders, social reformers or the state to champion the cause of decasualisation in this industry. [7]

In Durban, according to Hemson, the remarkable level of militancy among 'togt' workers, which threatened to push wages constantly upwards, produced an insistence among employers on the longest possible contracts of employment. [8] This was set against 'the insistence by African workers on working daily contracts, not only on the docks...but in other sectors (e.g. transport riding and industry such as ship repairing).' [9] During this period, the continued access migrant workers had to precapitalist means of subsistence was one of the conditions which strengthened their capacity for militant action, as in the case of 100 workers in 1879 who marched back to their kraals demonstrating their opposition to the state and the repressiveness of employers. As the ill-disciplined 'togt' workers threatened to push for wages 'far in excess of the highest rate paid to monthly servants...' [10] or generally posed problems in the supply of labour, the earliest attempts to control their employment and movement took the form of 'togt' regulations which applied to all Africans in the borough of Durban. The 'togt' regulations endeavoured to enforce a system whereby workers were bound to accept employment on any terms while, at the same time, 'togt' registration fees and fines for contravening 'togt' regulations payable by workers created
the first system in South Africa whereby workers themselves were taxed to pay for their own repression. Income from 'togt', regulation fees and fines were paid into the 'togt' fund used to finance the establishment of the first large barracks in 1878. [11] These regulations were backed by a more stringent enforcement of vagrancy laws, e.g. the Masters and Servants Act.

However, these repressive measures were insufficient to control or discipline 'togt' workers, for by 1874 resistance to these regulations 'forced wages up to "a comparatively high figure"'. [12] Since the establishment of the first barracks for 'to gt' workers in Durban in 1878, the employers began to look towards the extension of control over the accommodation of workers as a complement of by-laws regulating movement and employment. But workers resisted being forced to reside in compounds as they could often 'squat' among friends living in the backyards of their domestic employers. Significantly, as early as the late 19th century, informal shack accommodation of workers rented by Indian landowners had also emerged in the area. The result was that by ....1900 there were only 250 men, at any one time, in barracks capable of housing at least 450.[13]

In the early 1900s, despite the expansion of tonnage handled at Durban (i.e. given the demands of the British in the Anglo-Boer War), the supply of dock labour was limited while 'to gt' workers continued to put pressure on existing wage scales. As the local state had attempted previously to drive workers out of backyards or the rid the port area of informal accommodation, by 1902 a new 'to gt' law was passed which 'prescribed strict controls over all African access to town...'. [14] and particularly required 'to gt' workers to reside in compounds. As Sites has suggested in a rather different case, this was intended not only to secure the availability of labour but the manner of that labour's availability as well. [15] This was because the new law, apart from requiring workers to accept employment at any wages offered, established comprehensive regulations governing the movement of workers into and out of municipal or employers' compounds. This was designed to ensure that workers' time had become employers' time and that workers' behaviour was orderly, particularly in a context where an urban culture of drinking and 'Leita' gangs threatened attempts to transform workers' work norms and the harmonious development of the bourgeois order.

The emergence of a small group of manufacturing capitalists in Durban requiring a core of stabilised workers, gave rise to a debate in 1904 on the form and spatial location of accommodation to be made available to workers. This debate occurred, according to Hemson, between the segregationist, representing manufacturing capital, and the repressionist representing the dominant shipping and commercial interests. The segregationists argued for the establishment of a comprehensively developed African location on the outskirts of the borough under municipal supervision because scattered private barracks were not under sufficient police supervision. [16] Moreover, this settlement would be ideal as its suburban form would be protected from the expansion of industrial space, and would thereby provide all the social conveniences necessary to keep the workers disciplined, healthy and happy. These conditions were essential to maintaining and developing the productivity of labour, as a labour force housed in this manner could be easily encouraged to become urbanised rather than to persist in migrating between urban and rural areas. This workforce would be culturally and socially 'stabilised' as well because it would be effectively protected from the temptations of liquor sellers in the 'nooks and crannies' of the
borough, while the threat of violent riots to white citizens of the borough would be contained in a separate location.

It was, however, the repressionists who won the day. Their arguments centred on the prohibitive costs of such a location scheme, and more especially on the need for 'an immediate supply of labour available for work in the docks at any time of the day.' [17] The persuasiveness of the repressionist argument seems to have been so successful that by the 1940s compounds and hostels for male African workers were still located close to the workplace, while major decentralised hostel and location schemes were only constructed from the mid-1930s. Housing schemes for African workers in Durban between 1900 and 1930 included the Point Barracks [which] had been built in 1903; in 1913 a location to house single male Africans was constructed at Depot Road; and between 1915 and 1916 thirty six "cottages" were built at Baumanville, near Depot Road, to accommodate married Africans." [18]

Significantly, a similar concern to maintain centrally organised management and control over workers throughout the period 1920-1950, caused the city council to maintain a widely condemned system of barrack accommodation for its Indian workers and their families. This form of accommodation included the large Magazine Barracks housing over 1 000 sanitary workers and their families at Somtseu Road, the Congella Barracks, the Point and Botanic Gardens Barracks. [19] Public criticism of the barracks system for the council's Indian employees and their families concerned various aspects of health, including ventilation, space and sanitation; yet the council showed no intention of abandoning barrack housing. This was the case regardless of the evidence existing to show that the incidence of death from 'acute intestinal infection at these barracks [were] definitely in excess of that occurring among the general Indian population.' [20] Insanitary conditions in the barracks were explained away by the characteristic of the 'Indians as a race' who were 'filthy'. [21]

In a memorandum submitted to the Wage Board in 1939 a council representative defended the barrack system by asserting that:

'It is my Council's practice to require that its Indian population should live in its Municipal Barracks...for the purpose of an efficient and economical administration...this is a very suitable and desirable arrangement. [22]

Like compounds for African migrant workers, this involved a rigid system of labour control and discipline. For instance, if an Indian sanitary worker was absent for a day, his rations would be reduced. Moreover, if a worker took sick leave on a Sunday he would have to provide a substitute or lose his wages. The rationale behind this ruling was that as workers lived in close proximity to each other in the barracks, they would be more successful than overseers at finding substitutes to commence work 'at an early hour of the morning...' [23] Through its by-laws governing the barracks, the council sought to maintain control over workers' time; both work and leisure time. Therefore, barrack by-laws contained stringent measures to control the entrance and exit of workers and visitors to the barracks between the hours of 10.00 p.m. and 6.00 a.m. [24] Although there is only documentation on the council's barracks for Indian workers, this does not mean that there were no other employers who found the system convenient. For example, the sugar refineries in the borough made provision for the accommodation of their Indian employees and some of
their families in barracks. The S.A.R and H. provided similar accommodation at Somtseu Road. [25]

However, some scholars have assessed too positively the role of compounds as institutions of social control. A classic example is John Rex's comment on urban locations developed in South Africa since the 1940s, which presented an impression of a situation where class or political struggles had been permanently contained.

The harassment and close scrutiny and supervision of inhabitants which goes on in locations serves to supplement and strengthen the paternalistic controls exercised in the workplace. [26]

But as Van Onselen has suggested in the case of the Rhodesian gold mines, employers' attempts through the compound system to enforce social control over migrant workers was often frustrated by 'workers' insistence on, and defense of, a relatively independent social life.' [27] In an important essay on the miners' strike of 1946 in South Africa, Dunbar Moodie, although accepting that broadly South African gold mines 'imposed certain limits on what black miners...perceived to be possibilities for change,' [28] suggests that workers established informal organisational network between rooms under elected 'isibonda' or room headmen. [29] This informal network, where African Mineworkers Union (AMWU) organisation was limited, was not only used as a means to depose unpopular indunas or to arrange meetings to present grievances to compound managers, but was an effective means through which many workers came to support the miners' strike of 1946. [30]

Hemson, informed by the persistent militancy of dock workers in the 1930s and 1940s in Durban, similarly suggests that while compounds are used to exert control over the workers, the concentration of workers in these institutions facilitates 'greater communication among workers'. [31] For example, the wage agitations during the late 1930s did not produce any clearly identifiable leadership since the decline of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICWU) in Natal in the late 1920s or the failure of the Communist Party to maintain or develop mass support since the abortive anti-pass campaign of the early 1930s. This lack of an identifiable worker leadership was present even though a mass meeting of workers in 1937 demanding higher wages, had elected a deputation to present their grievances to the mayor. [32] In fact, the deputation to the Mayor was not even constituted by workers themselves as it was recorded at a conference on African wages in 1937 that 'the Natives, who had formed the deputation, were of the educated class and had been led by Rev. John Nduli.' [33]

However, this does not mean that migrant workers never produced any leadership from their own ranks. Indeed, many of the 'togt' workers' struggles in the 1940s were led by a man who was a migrant worker himself, known as Zulu Phungula who 'was able to articulate the ideology and demands of migrant workers while avoiding all forms of petty bourgeois personality...' [34] However, Hemson suggests that the strength of underground organisation among 'togt' workers was so effective that even after Phungula had been banished from Durban their struggles continued, ostensibly leaderless. [35] Employers did not find the lack of formal organisation among their workers totally desirable as it was impossible to stabilise wage agitations by more or less uniform increases. Thus, at the conference convened by the Mayor of Durban to discuss African workers' wages in 1937, Mr.
Johnstone, representing the Natal Chamber of Industries, complained that:

The difficulty was that there appeared to be no definite organisation with which to deal with in regard to the Native question. It created a very invidious position because any offer of increased wages in one direction could be used as a lever in another direction. [36]

Significantly, acquiescence (if not leadership of) in workers' disputes in Durban may have emanated from within the local state and employers' organisation of their own institutions of social control. For example, many employers in Durban (as elsewhere) engaged compound indunas to police their compounds under the supervision of a white compound manager or welfare officer. [37] In a situation where there was a relative shortage of unskilled African labour, it was not uncommon for employers to charge indunas with the additional task of recruiting labour directly. According to an unpublished report by the Natal Regional Survey in 1950: 'The preference of indunas for men from their own districts is, of course, understandable since it makes for better control of the labour force.' [38] The advantages of such a system in the recruitment of a 'stable' supply of labour seems indisputable, but its advantages in the control of labour is less clear. For instance, Van Onselen has suggested that in the Rhodesian gold mine compounds 'management ideally required' for the role of compound policemen, 'men from a different cultural background to that of the rest of the workers who...would implement discipline without fear or favour.' [39] Durban's harbour employers, particularly vulnerable to the militancy of their 'toft' employees, became gradually sensitive to this particular contradiction in a recruiting system dependent on the efforts of compound indunas. By the late 1950s, as part of a general effort to centralise control in the large compounds of dock employers, the recruiting of labour was removed from indunas and taken over by the Durban Stevedoring Harbour Supply Company. [40]

Recently, a distinction has been made between compounds and hostels (a more recent development in the accommodation of workers), stressing differences in the relative degree of control achieved in each form:

On the mines, as J. Rex had shown, the compound system was an extension of rationalisation...of the needs of the industry. There the rhythms of work...rest hours formed part and parcel of a planned and rationalised work cycle. This was an organic form of control. In contradistinction, the hostels are only capable of a diffusional form of control. Here, the rhythms of work of an industrial town, with many productive units working longer or shorter hours...and at 24 km commuting distances do not permit the level of rationalisation on the mines. [41]

A more historically grounded distinction between hostels and compounds is that provided by the Durban Housing survey. According to this report, compounds or barracks refer to employer provided accommodation whereas a hostel refers to municipal accommodation housing workers of various employers. [42] The relative degree of control or rationalisation of work of leisure time which could be achieved was often perceived to be more effective in municipal rather than employers' institutions, especially given the wider resources available to the former. An attempt shall be made to demonstrate below that the quest for total municipal responsibility for migrant
accommodation in segregated zones was intended to meet this need for rationalised labour force control. The contradiction was that totally segregated hostel accommodation conflicted with harbour employers' persistent reliance on 'togo' labour. It has been argued above the repressionist view that the accommodation of migrant workers in Durban should be centralised in the vicinity of the work place, took precedence in the municipality's housing policy for migrant workers. For example, three of Durban's earliest municipal hostels, i.e. Somtseu Road, Dalton Road and especially Bell Street hostels were erected in the vicinity of Durban's harbour to facilitate housing of workers required for urgent labour in the port. Those employers who accommodated workers in their own compounds tend to locate these so close to the workplace that the Durban Housing Survey commented that 'some private barracks were found attached to shops, offices, butcheries, etc.' [43]

Although the number of African workers housed by employers increased from 1,149 in 1937 to 9,495 in 1945, there was a relative decline in the rate of increase in the total number of workers housed especially after 1942. This position is shown in the table below: [44]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>1,149</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>1,149</td>
<td>2,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>3,653</td>
<td>1,345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>4,993</td>
<td>1,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>6,711</td>
<td>1,268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>7,979</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>8,179</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>8,442</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>8,803</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>9,123</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>9,495</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Chamber of Commerce survey in 1937, to assess the extent to which its own membership made provision for migrant accommodation, showed no major reluctance on the part of employers to house their workers because '56% are accommodated in the members' own establishments'. [45] However, if the Durban Housing Survey found that by 1950, 'for the most part, compounds visited were overcrowded,' [46] it is clear that the provision of such accommodation did not increase proportionate to the number of workers required to be housed in this manner. This is true although the Natives Urban Areas Act and its subsequent amendments into the 1940s empowered municipalities to 'require any employer (including the Union Government with which is included the Railway Administration...) within the urban area to provide accommodation for any Native in his employment'. [47] However, the council was not granted effective powers to demand that employers provide such accommodation 'provided land could be made available...'. [48]

A local employers' organisation representative argued in 1946 that employers were losing interest in the compound system because of 'the...opposition [my emphasis] of organised labour which is generally antagonistic to the employer provided housing and feeding facilities...'. [49] Although there is no substantive evidence to support this view, there is no doubt that throughout the period African workers in Durban articulated or demonstrated opposition to communal accommodation and feeding in compounds. For instance, the ICU yase Natal submitted evidence to the Native Economic Commission...
that workers wanted 'to be paid in cash rather than be fed by employers, because the quality of the food in many cases even the quantity, is not satisfactory'. [50] In 1941, Lion Breweries' workers complained that they preferred to house and feed themselves. [51] The company accepted this on condition that these workers accept municipal hostel accommodation. In other cases workers' dissatisfaction in the communal feeding provoked open resistance. For instance, in 1942, 39 workers at a jam factory withheld their labour as they were not satisfied with the wages and the food provided at the factory compound. One of the workers stated in court that 'what we got to eat at the compound was mealie meal three times a day for a week and on Saturday two mouthfuls of meat. On Wednesday they got sap in the evening. They received nothing else - no green vegetables'. [52] Despite employers' claims that communal feeding was in the interest of African workers who themselves could not determine the nutritional value of food on the market, conditions in the baking industry (for instance) where workers' rations were sometimes limited to 'what is manufactured at that place,' were indeed so insufficient as to make workers reluctant to accept compound accommodation. [53] However, African workers may have also refused to be fed communally in employers' compounds to demonstrate an underlying psychological rejection of the colonial stereotype that the African mind reached maturity at a slower pace than that of whites. This notion was pervasive among whites in Durban as is reflected in 'common terms' of address such as "kaffer". "boy", "Jim Fish" used even by white children. [54] However, instances of African workers' protest against compound accommodation were few, and the absence of widespread trade unionism among the workers rendered them rather inarticulate. In forwarding evidence to the Durban Native Affairs Commission (DNAC) in 1947, a retired magistrate complained that: [55]

A few industries put up a few rooms, but very, very few were properly controlled. When the employers leave, of course, the Native is at liberty to do as he pleases...

Thus, apart from the suggested increase in land values in the city centre, a compelling explanation as to why some employers abandoned the compound system was that employers were beginning to experience difficulties in the administration of social control of workers in their compounds:

...even with the large firm, the management and administration of native hostels [sic] has become difficult and onerous. From an administrative point of view, it is unrelated to other activities of a business, and from the civic point of view, it has the unsatisfactory feature of establishing isolated groups of natives in scattered and haphazard residential headquarters spread over the business centre. [56]

These conditions were conducive to the persistent militancy of migrant (especially dock) workers. Although employers saw the solution to these problems in the municipality assuming sole responsibility for hostel accommodation, it was clear that discipline and control over migrant workers was, in practice, hardly more successful even in municipal institutions. For example, when Mr. Robson, superintendent of the Soatseu Road hostel was questioned by the DNAC on arrests at the hostel, he replied that arrest were made on 'innumerable occasions' for offences such as assault and gambling. [57] Significantly, if the problem of compound and hostel accommodation in Durban is to be understood, it is essential to be clear that compounds were not established in a social vacuum.
Moreover, single-sex accommodation was not located in a social sphere completely under the direction of state and capital. As Hemson has shown, for the period 1870 to 1920 the local state, and capital’s effort to enforce the residence of workers in compounds, hinged on the elimination of informal sector housing as workers showed an equal determination to defy, wriggle out, or look for alternative forms of housing in the town. Yet, in the period under review, the issue was not particularly that of coercing workers to reside in compounds, but one of making compound residents conform to compound regulations governing their leisure time.

Ultimately, the main problem for an efficient compound system was that in the peri-urban areas of Durban, shack settlements had emerged in which informal economic activities such as beer and shimiyaan brewing, gambling dens and prostitution attracted the attentions of migrant workers residing in the compounds. An official report compiled from eye witness accounts in the 1940s sufficiently supports this contention:

From investigations which I have made, Booth Road appears to have developed over a period into the drinking den of many Natives, resident within the centre and residential areas of Durban, including those housed in compounds and hostels…An hour or two spent at the Terminus on Sunday evenings confirms this impression, when one witnesses large numbers of men and women making their way back to the city, most of them in an intoxicated or semi-intoxicated condition. [58]

After the 1949 riots in Cato Manor, it was suggested by the manager of the Municipal Native Affairs Department (NAD) that it was not shack residents themselves who threatened social order in the capitalist city as: 'They are on the whole decent working men trying their best to provide for their families.' [60] On the contrary, argued the manager, referring to the evidence of the SA Police to the Riots Commission, 'Cato Manor’s crime is primarily due to the efflux of unattached males from municipal and industrial hostels'. [61]

Apart from the possibility that migrant workers’ access to the shantytown culture may have affected (especially dock) employers’ endeavours to regiment from day to day a sober labour force, the social gathering of workers in ‘these drinking dens’ may have further facilitated underground planning and organisation of strikes beyond compound authorities’ sphere of surveillance. The manager of the Municipal NAD criticised the compound system in Durban as being worse than even army garrison (where a minimum of social facilities were at least provided) towns in its repression of workers’ sexual and social needs. The rather unlikely consequence of such extravagant control was not docility but: 'Drunkenness, shebeening, prostitution and violence…which are inevitable concomitants of a situation where tens of thousands of men are forced to live in barrack conditions…' [62]

In those circumstances, compound accommodation itself did not seem to require critical reassessment. It was the haphazard location of compounds in the sphere of industrial and commercial space which was a cause for concern among municipal officials and employers. The solution suggested by the Durban Chamber of Commerce to the Post-War Works and Reconstruction Committee was formulated within a broad policy of residential segregation of Durban’s population in comprehensively established zones. The chamber intimated as well that over time these segregated zones would evolve as self-governing
systems. [63] In the late 1930s, a decade of heightened class and political action among Africans in Durban, a scheme to build a decentralised municipal hostel to the south of the borough was proposed by the municipal NAD as a means to restrict the number of workers housed at the Point. This hostel was to be constructed at Merebank in close proximity to the council’s housing scheme for proletarianised workers at Lamont and ‘would provide accommodation for approximately 5 000 single Natives...’ [64] This hostel, completed in 1946. accommodating 4 128 men, came to be known as the S. J. Smith Hostel. [65]

This scheme formed part of a broad strategy on the part of the council since the 1930s to reduce the number of workers resident at the Point. The concern was that in this area adequate recreational space ‘as the Chamber of Commerce and Industry have so long urged’ [66] could not be provided because of the demands of industry for factory and warehousing space and the increasing transformation of parts of the area into a white residential zone. According to La Hausse the existence of ‘controlled recreation’ in various barracks scattered around the central borough provoked a report by Dr. Gunn, the Medical Officer of Health (M.O.H.), as well as City Councillor J.H. Kemp who complained that:

Obscene and filthy language, gambling and shouting which arises from an uncontrolled Native location, with all its bestialities, surely ought not to be allowed to exist in a European area. [67]

Thus, the need to establish compounds adequately provided with recreational facilities, in a social setting where existing controls were insufficient to regulate the leisure time of workers (especially in the face of social attractions of shantytowns to migrant workers), seemed to the local authority in the 1930s and 1940s essential for the maintenance of social order.

This perception had been influenced by the early 1920s movement among liberals and ‘moderate’ Africans, in the face of increasing militancy among black workers on the Rand and a radicalisation of the black petit bourgeoisie, to establish various forms of ‘culture and entertainment’ such as recreational facilities, literature and drama as a means ‘to counteract the work of agitators...by ameliorating the conditions which breed such “discontent” and “agitation”.’ [68] La Hausse has made the interesting suggestion, however, that the subject of providing for African recreation and culture in the City of Durban was not an uncontested issue between local authorities and liberals. Thus, ‘While Durban’s Native Affairs bureaucracy placed greater emphasis on organising and controlling leisure time, the liberal reform movement placed greater emphasis on moralising it in a “proper”...way.’ [69] But his suggestion that, ‘Mechanisms for the control of leisure-time were obviously more easily implemented in the coercive physical environments of Durban’s African municipal barracks and hostels,’ [70] requires qualification.

This is particularly true in a context where compounds congested or scattered in the harbour and industrial area caused the problem of controlling leisure-time to persist. Thus, at a meeting on the question of rezoning the Point area in 1948, it was recorded that according to Haveman, manager of the municipal NAD:

The concentration of such a large number of Natives in a small area without adequate recreational facilities was productive of
crime, violence and general unrest...He accordingly considered it desirable that as few Natives as possible be housed in the Point area unless recreational facilities were made available to them. [71]

The South African Railways and Harbours Administration (SAR & H), as one of the largest harbour employers affected by the council's plan to rezone the Point area, conceded that adequate recreational facilities were a social necessity. In late 1948, Mr Hoffe, General Manager of the S.A.R. and H. in Durban, expressed a view on this matter in the idiom of humanitarianism:

You must have a compound...where there is adequate room for recreation and trees etc. in the vicinity. Considering the hours and conditions of their labour, the Natives are entitled to all the amenities we can give them. [72]

One of the most central elements in the council's plan to rezone the Point area was the ultimate elimination of the Bell Street barracks which in July 1938 housed 2 164 Natives of whom approximately 1 800 are togt labourers and 500 are Natives in private employ..." [73] But the desire for total segregation conflicted with the practical work processes specific to the shipping industry, a point which the S.A.R. and H. management emphasised:

We have considered whether the whole of the supply of Native labour could not be housed out of town, but from a practical point of view this is absolutely impossible. There is certain work to be done in a minimum amount of time. [74]

The Administration considered that 3 000 Africans (including togt workers) were required to be resident at the Point. As the administration agreed with the council that the number of Africans living at the Point should be reduced, it was accepted that that part of the workforce which did not perform essential tasks at the harbour should be housed elsewhere. [75] Significantly, as part of the process to eliminate congestion at the Point, the administration considered that 'an endeavour should be made to get a higher percentage of those togt labourers employed on a monthly basis'. [76] By 1946 (as we mentioned in Chapter II), the S.A.R and H. revealed to the DNAC that it had formulated a comprehensive plan of incentives to encourage stabilisation among its migrant workers. However, the process of eliminating togt labour was not achieved in the short-term. In fact, when the council had, by the late 1940s, indicated its intention to demolish the Bell Street barracks and, significantly, to 'withdraw...the licenses issued to togt labour' the Systems Manager of the S.A.R. and H. did not hesitate to point out the 'absolute chaos' which would result. [77]

The council announced its immediate intention to demolish the Bell Street barracks and eliminate togt labour because of the failure of the S.A.R and H. to fulfill its part of the agreement. The SAR and H. had accepted that if rezoning was not to affect the harbour labour supply, adequate provision of recreational facilities at the Point should be made. By early 1949, when the ultimate demolition of the Bell Street barracks seemed imminent, the S.A.R. and H. (given its persistent reliance on togt labour) was in the process of erecting a compound elsewhere at the Point to house 1 200 men. [79] Although, by April 1948, it seemed clear that any compound accommodation which was to remain at the Point would be sited in such a manner that there would be space for a new beer hall and an eating
house. [80] no tangible results in this direction seems to have been
achieved by 1950. Major success had neither been achieved in
reshaping the compound system nor in reducing or eliminating all
African worker residence in the harbour area.

Part II

Shanty towns, municipal family housing and the reproduction and
control of an urban African proletariat

South African scholars have tended to view the problem of
urbanisation and urban residence control rather mechanistically.
Hindson, in reconsidering the role of pass laws in South Africa,
suggests that successful state intervention in meeting the conditions
of reproduction (e.g. housing) of proletarianised African workers and
their families necessarily required that tighter influx controls were
to be enforced to prevent the growth of a reserve army of labour from
threatening the solvency of the state’s housing schemes. [81] As the
state (via its local structures) provision of housing for African
workers depended largely on the direct (through rent, fines for pass
offences, etc.) and on indirect taxation (through the sale of
sorghum beer to African consumers) of workers themselves, the
financial position of state housing was delicate. It could be
affected by any increase in wages caused by changes on the labour
market, such as the expansion of the reserve army of labour in the
secondary labour market (consisting of work positions requiring a
minimum of skill) by an unregulated inflow of new migrants prepared
to perform work at competitively low wages. Therefore, the tightening
of influx controls in the 1930s (although largely ineffective) was
intended to ensure that wage levels of urban Africans were not to be
threated by competition from an influx of unemployed Africans,
including women. This view is not totally without substance and may
be sufficiently supported in a statement by Durban’s mayor in 1936:

This pressure from outside, together with the natural increase
in the urban Native population, which is further augmented by an
influx of non-Union races, means that the City is carrying a
population in excess of its requirements. The employment of Natives
from territories beyond the Union places the urban Native resident
at a disadvantage...[82]

Hindson further maintains that influx control ‘together with labour
depots and compounds, perpetuated temporary migrant labour from the
reserves, and thus secured the system of cheap labour power by
discouraging settlement of migrant workers’. [83] According to
Legassick, an important manner in which the cheapness of migrant
labour would be secured by these ‘instruments of extra-economic’
coection was that these would ‘regulate the “market” flows of labour
among mining, farming and other employment; in particular pass laws
could be used to retain labour in the least attractive sectors’. [84]

In view of the particularly unattractive conditions of work in
certain sectors (especially agriculture) this argument is (at an
economic level) indisputable and finds resonance in Hindson’s
differentiation thesis:

Restrictions on the movement of farm labour to the towns
shored up a collapsing system of exploitation in the white
agricultural areas. [85]
However, this argument implicitly assumes that the supply and demand for African labour power in urban areas was determined solely by the expansion or the contraction of the capital accumulation process set in motion by transformations in capitalist labour processes.

However, Marx establishes the initial conditions for proletarianisation in the changing relations of production in pre-capitalist economies. For example, according to Marx "a mass of "free" and unattached proletarians" (86) was created by transformation within the English feudal economy. This transformation was set in motion by feudal lords "...forcibly driving the peasantry from the land...and usurpation of common lands." (87) In South African agriculture this process did not occur uniformly. For instance, although the 1913 Land Act was intended to eliminate squatting and share-cropping by Africans on white farms, the Land Act was not "an enclosure movement". (88) Instead of creating a landless proletariat the Act had the effect of pressuring Africans to "renegotiate their tenancy arrangements and expand their labour services," (89) especially in Natal and the Transvaal. In fact, even by the 1970s, capitalist agriculture in Natal, for farmers, did not imply the elimination of labour tenancy and the creation of a 'free' wage labour force. Natal farmers defended tenancy arrangements even under pressure from the Department of Agriculture and the South African Agricultural Union (SAAU). (90)

Under the 1913 Natives' Land Act African rights to communal land were granted at least minimal protection in the reserve system. African access to land consisted of only 10,25 million morgen located especially in the Transkei and Natal (Zululand). (91) Yet, despite this, many Africans could still subsist sufficiently on pre-capitalist agriculture in the reserves. If proletarianisation did occur this was often because some African farm workers sought refuge in towns from the conditions of 'ultra-exploitation' in agricultural tenancy arrangements. Many reserve Africans (even in cases where rural subsistence was still viable) sought better fortunes in the urban informal economy. In some instances African men found themselves caught in the web of urbanisation (and, consequently, proletarianisation) because their wives and daughters took the initiative to defy their husbands' and broader kinship controls in the reserves and moved to the city, with or without offspring. Others were single women seeking the freedom of the urban social network and an independent income.

Most African women were not employed in capitalist wage labour or even in domestic work, particularly in Durban. In these circumstances their livelihood depended mainly on 'informal' economic activities such as liquor selling and prostitution. It is in this context where the African (especially female) population had access to various ways and means to evade pre-capitalist kinship obligations, capitalist work processes and the social controls of the local state, that an understanding of efforts to restructure the system of pass and social controls (such as housing) must be sought.

Deborah Galtscell, a South African feminist historian, has produced an interesting article on the efforts, among liberal Christian institutions and increasingly African women of the Kholwa (educated) elite, to develop an ideology and lifestyle of domesticity among urban African women. (92) This implied the encouragement of a bourgeois ideal of motherhood among African women in which the role
of the women was to take care of their households and to rear children while their husbands earned a wage to support the household. This family ideal had crucial social implications for the capital accumulation process. The appropriation of surplus value requires that that part of the working day consumed by the working class as necessary labour (or the equivalent of the value of labour power) must be kept at a minimum. The development of the capital accumulation process (i.e. the labour process) according to Lise Vogel, tends towards "a severe spatial, temporal and institutional separation between domestic labour [i.e. including processes of consumption involving the reproduction of the class of commodity producers; e.g. through child rearing - my emphasis] and the capitalist production process. [93] Historically territorial and spatial separation between the domestic sphere and the production process was set in motion by the decline of domestic industry (in which the family existed as both a productive and reproductive unit) and the concomitant emergence of the factory system which replaced the male household head as supervisor with factory owner as supervisor. [94] If the domestic sphere is not to compete 'with capital's drive for accumulation' [95] the reproduction of that sphere must occur within the capitalist circulation of commodities. In other words, workers and their families must be separated from pre-capitalist means of production in the distant countryside if 'the amount of time and energy available for wage labour' [96] is to be increased. In order to offset this problem in South Africa, for instance, capitalism has required increasingly the emergence of a domestic sphere involving the reproduction of labour power by women in private households. [97] This was one reason 'then [that] liberals and some industrialists began moving towards the idea of women as housewives..." [98] The potential effect of this would be to increase the value of labour power as the wage paid to workers must necessarily cover the costs of reproduction of that household. However, those cost effects on the domestic sphere may be reduced by the tendency among the dominant classes to encourage 'male supremacy within the exploited class' because "any attempt by women to appropriate to themselves more than is required for their subsistence is an indirect demand for part of the surplus appropriated by the ruling class". [99]

However, according to Gaitskell, this family ideal could not be realistically achieved among African women because often the wages of men (based on the value of migrant labour power) were too low to support their families. The result was that many African women went out to work or became involved in various forms of informal sector activity in order to subsidise their husbands' wages. [100] This view seems to have been widely current among the African Kholwa elite and liberal commentators in the period under review. For example, John L. Dube, president of the Natal Native Congress (NNC), in his evidence to a Durban sitting of the Native Economic Commission claimed that: "Women must augment family income, which they do by charring or washing or illicit brewing and sale of liquor". [101] Another reason for the failure of the bourgeois family ideal, according to Gaitskell, was the 'lack of democratic political conditions in South Africa' and, consequently, a capitalist system which tended generally to avoid covering the cost of reproduction of the African labour force, 'at the expense of lower productivity, because there is tighter control over the conditions of class struggle'. [102] Gaitskell suggests further that municipalities and the state were sensitive to the financial costs of social reproduction of urban Africans. Therefore, both preferred to impose those costs on the
Firstly, this argument contains an underlying conception of reproduction and control influenced by the cheap labour hypothesis. Secondly, Baitskell assumes that African women had internalised an ideology of domesticity and defended the maintenance of urban nuclear families against the challenge of the state:

Family life is and has long been for black women, something to struggle for, rather than against. This is in marked contrast to the approach of British feminists who see the family 'as a central site of women's oppression...’ [104]

Moreover, this argument is based on the assumption held by many South African scholars that the presence of African women in urban areas necessarily implies the existence of nucleated families. This ignores the fact that urbanisation among African women was often a conscious process of resistance to patriarchal domination and the desire for an independent income. Significantly, as we shall see below, even the more strict criterion of conceiving urbanisation in terms of 'continuous residence in family circumstances in town' is limited by this factor. [105]

The extent to which the desire of African women for an independent status caused them to leave the countryside is illustrated in the cases of women leaving home in defiance of custom, legally enforced through the Natal Code of Bantu Law which stated that "any native may acquire property, but this, in so far as females, minor sons and kraal inmates are concerned is subject to Section 35," [106] which makes income from homestead production by minors subject to the control of male kraal heads. Thus, Mrs. Sibusisiwe Violet Makanya, an educated African woman involved in the Bantu Youth League established in Natal to "put this family model into effect," [107] in her evidence to the NEC testified that: 'I know of cases in our district where, when the parents have died and the brothers have become the heirs, the girls are not in any way provided for. I am thinking of one or two cases where the girls have actually left their homes and have gone to urban areas where they are working and providing for themselves...’ [108]

Moreover, as Helen Bradford has suggested, many African women in Natal had accepted Christianity as a strategy to challenge kinship patriarchs. This did not, therefore, imply acceptance of every tenet of Christianity such as teetotalism, chastity and even motherhood. [109] There is evidence to suggest that many African women rejected the bonds of regulated family life. For instance, La Hausse has suggested that two important women leaders of the beer boycott in Durban in 1929, 'Hilda Jackson and Bertha Mhize...rejected female roles as mothers and wives: both were, and remained, unmarried’. [110] This tendency to reject the bondage of marriage and family life seems to have been widespread among African women. For instance, Mbatsha claimed in 1960 that of 10 women who deserted their homes among the Nyuswa clan of Botha's Hill: 'Two were married women who deserted their husbands in the area, were working in Durban, and living in concubinage with men there. The remaining eight were unmarried but were known or suspected to be living with men in Durban’. [111]

If the need of secondary industry was increasingly for a stabilised
and reliable workforce, urban residence and employment controls gradually became necessary for the reproduction and control of such group specifically. Unfortunately, the distinction between migrant and proletarianised Africans could not be established firmly under conditions where family ties were unstable. For instance, Miriam Janiach (welfare officer for Johannesburg) claimed in 1940 that the visit of African male migrant workers to shebeens on the Reef resulted 'too frequently' in the establishment of temporary marriage unions. [112] Some men married town women under common law, but at the same time visited a wife married by customary rites in the countryside at 'regular intervals'. [113] The same tendency seems to have developed among migrant workers in Durban. For example, an African worker interviewed by Iain Edwards states that:

When I got a job at SAFCO (South African Fertilizer Company, Durban) I took a wife in Mkhumbane...I stayed in the compound in Sydney Road but I had rooms in Cato Manor for us. When my wife came from the farm I stayed in the compound. It was a common practice. [114]

African women escaping the sanctions of regulated family life, found refuge in the shantytowns of South Africa's largest cities such as Durban. Within these informal settlements, the involvement of women in the informal economy was so deeply entrenched that household arrangements were a clear contrast to the bourgeois ideal of motherhood. Anthropologist Ellen Hellman, in an unofficial Witwatersrand commission report on illicit liquor in 1935 suggested that 'prostitution...cannot be dissociated from the illicit liquor trade' [115] in informal settlements. Hellman comments as well that in Johannesburg's Rooiyard, '...girls will commence their sexual experiences and form the habit of drinking very soon after the age of puberty. Some mothers expressively retain their daughters to attract beer custom'. [116] In some cases, if shebeen owners themselves or female members of their households were not involved in prostitution, they encouraged other women to visit dwellings to attract customers. For instance, a report in the Natal Mercury on 27 July 1936 claimed that in Durban:

there were prostitutes in all the shebeens visited...but in nearly every case they were not actual employees of the institutions...but were women who were encouraged to visit the shebeens at night in order to draw customs. [117]

Although a municipal survey in Durban of Karia Shah's Cato Manor shack settlement in 1948 showed that out of a population of 224 men and 210 women, there were only 27 bachelors and 6 spinsters, such data must be viewed very carefully. [118] This is because the people interviewed may have claimed married status as a means to defuse any suspicion on the part of the NAD representatives that there was any incidence of prostitution within the settlement. Many women who had received treatment for venereal diseases tended to deny residence in peri-urban shantytowns (perhaps) as a means to protect that social sphere. For example, a statement regarding venereal diseases by various Heads of Departments in Durban claimed that;

20 per cent of all Durban's Native venereal disease cases gave addresses in Mayville [of which Cato Manor was a part] and it is known that a large percentage of others gave working addresses in the city whereas they actually reside in Mayville. [119]
A rather different impression is gained from the Joint Council of Europeans and Africans, commenting on the peri-urban areas of Durban to the Native Economic Commission, statement that:

Naturally in those circumstances of overcrowding, and poverty, morality is not high. Many women are not legally married to the men they live with and change mates frequently with disastrous effects on the children. Isitshialiyanee brewing is so common and provides a better income than honest work. [120]

Significantly, men living in informal households often seemed to have lacked the capacity or will to exercise male supremacy within shack households. For example, R.F. Drew, a policeman posted in Cato Manor in the 1940s has testified about women employing 'live in' men:

You should have seen it! Everyone had a little pondok there. Just the girlfriend - often young - like my daughter - and the cheek. Shit, you would think you were talking to the queen. Even the Bantu constables were furious. They were just girlfriends but they controlled the whole show... [121]

The assertion of their acquired 'relative' independence by African women was demonstrated explicitly in their employment of violence on men denying support of the beer boycott in 1929. A number of these women 'were arrested [in 1930] for attacking men drinking in municipal beerhalls or... for assaulting policemen'. [122] The involvement of women in the boycotts of 1929, which had spread from the docks into the peri-urban areas, as alternative suppliers of beer and other more intoxicating brews, strengthened the boycott. It was a result of their intervention that between 1932 [and] 1934, Durban's Native Revenue Account had shown nett losses'. [123] Despite the establishment of a municipal monopoly over the brewing of beer in 1908, the brewing of illicit liquor (including beer) continued unabated in the 1920s in the peri-urban areas such as Mayville, Greenwood Park and Sydenham in which it was reported by 1929 that '... "drunken orgies" were held weekly'. [124] In the shantytowns sorghum beer (regarded as a wholesome food) was substituted with more potent brews such as skolkaan (manufactured from yeast and sugar) which are quick to ferment and therefore ready for consumption before police could detect it. [125] In 1929, the Liquor Act endeavoured, by proscribing the manufacturing of liquor in rural and peri-urban slums, to extend municipal control over an important aspect of life in informal settlements. Yet, it was the militancy of African women, adopting a militancy perceived to be 'the prerogative of men' [126] which most alarmed the ruling classes. In fact, many of those women, "by violating every norm of feminine behaviour" [127] in their protests, demonstrated openly their rejection of male patriarchal domination. The success of beer boycotts facilitated by the involvement of African women was demonstrated again in 1948 when a boycott against the high price of municipal beer was so effective that the municipality was compelled to close all its beerhalls. The success of beer boycotts, it must be admitted, however, was also strengthened by the remarkable level of solidarity among African consumers. For example, boycotters claimed in 1948 that the boycott action was decided upon without the assistance "of any organisations". [128] There was little formal arrangement for the boycott because: 'We discussed plans over the beer tables. We just refuse to drink corporation beer until they carry out their promise to reduce the price'. [129]
As early as 1920, the lack of male supervision over African women
seemed to threaten municipal social control over Africans generally.
Thus, in 1920 A.W. Harwick, the manager of the Municipal Native
Affairs Department, called for more effective control to be exercised
over African women.

I consider that the most difficult problem for solution in
connection with the administration of Native Affairs in the Borough
is that of satisfactorily controlling and handling Native
women...These Native women are systematically resisting any policy
which resulted in bringing them under proper control. [130]

In the 1920s the Durban municipality was still largely under the
influence of the repressionist outlook (see Part 1 above) articulated
in the first decade of this century. The repressionists had insisted
on the maintenance of social forms of control over urban African
workers which were largely consistent with a migrant labour system.
Typically, C.F. Layman, the new manager of the Municipal NAD stated
to a Parliamentary Select Committee on Native Affairs in 1923 that:

Those Natives who wish to maintain touch with their households
should receive every possible encouragement to do so, and the
permanent settlement of Native families in urban areas should only
be assented to as an unavoidable evil. [131]

Thus the initial response of the Durban municipality was to demand
more effective pass controls to be exercised over the entrance and
residence of African women in urban areas. By 1927 at a conference of
various municipal NADs it was resolved that former influx controls
should be exercised over the residence of African women in urban
areas. The matter was referred to the Union NAD which introduced an
Urban Areas Amendment Bill passed in 1930, a year in which African
female assertion of their desire for independence was articulated in
the political ferment of the beer boycotts in Natal. A section of the
amended Act read:

...any female native [was prohibited] from entering the
proclaimed area...without a certificate from the urban local
authority...that accommodation is available for her, and to require
any female native after having entered such area to produce such
certificate on demand by an authorised officer provided that such
certificate should be issued to any female native whose husband or
in the case of an unmarried women whose father has been resident and
continuously employed in the said area for a period of not less than
two years. [132]

As K.A. Eales has suggested recently in an unpublished conference
paper on patriarchs and passes in Johannesburg, support for such pass
controls over African women may have found resonance among African
rural patriarchs. [133] This suggestion is of particular relevance in
the reserves of Natal where the Zulu monarch, Solomon Ka Dinizulu,
was making a quest for state recognition of his paramountcy.
Therefore, although a recent study by Shula Marks focuses largely on
the political gestures of the Zulu monarch and his supporters, [134]
the success or failure of his quest was crucially determined as well
by the maintenance of control over his subjects through a firmly
based kinship system. The movement of African women to urban areas in
defiance of kinship patriarchs tended to undermine the material basis
of the kinship system, as it was women who performed the bulk of
agricultural labour. Consequently, while Dinizulu encouraged
"increased educational and industrial opportunities for his people", he insisted on maintaining "the traditional merits of his race, the virtue of our women and the honesty of our people". [135]

Support for pass controls over African (in particular uneducated) women may have been endorsed as well by the African Kholwa elite in Natal, consisting of large peasant farmers, teachers, clerks, clergymen and even chiefs. This class was led by John Dube's Natal Native Congress (NNC) which had severed links with the more radical South African Native National Congress in 1917. The NNC gravitated increasingly towards supporting the Zulu royal family because of the "increasing segregationism of the state". [136] It is therefore in this context that John Dube's complaint to the NEC that even amongst the uneducated urbanised Africans "individuality has been firmly established", [137] an unacceptable position as these Africans became "contaminated with the criminal classes [e.g. prostitutes]"[138] and would not come under tribal discipline. However, African men generally supported the opposition of women over the period under review to [the] pass laws being imposed on them. This was generally because passes "undermine the right of men to be the sole masters of the affairs in their household", [139] a concern given clear expression in an African newspaper editorial in Johannesburg'.

The Native man is himself the arbiter of his women's conduct and is resentful of any interference on his matters marital. [140]

In Durban, the concern among African men that the prerogative of control over women should rest with African patriarchs themselves rather than the state was expressed in a denunciation of police harassment of women for registration certificates in 1936. [141]

The radicalism of African resistance against pass controls demonstrated in Johannesburg in 1920 and in Durban, especially among dock workers in late 1930 under the leadership of the South African Communist Party, and the strong opposition of Africans to the imposition of pass controls on women, increasingly suggested the need for more 'liberal' measures of social control over Africans. This is true although a more conservative response was articulated by observers such as Heaton Nicholls (a sugar planter and Member of Parliament for Zululand), who even suggested that the Zulu paramount be granted a more independent basis of power if segregation was to prevent the evolution of a native proletariat, inspired by the antagonisms of class war" [142] as was evidenced in the actions of the ICU yase Natal in 1929.

Richard Elphick has recently denied that liberalism in the period before World War Two was 'part of the "system" of oppressing blacks', although he concedes that liberals rather than 'mount a sustained critique of the South African political order' were 'more typically' concerned with issues such as 'declining productivity on the reserves, crime in the cities, drunkenness, abusive police, or inadequate housing...'. [143] Elphick ignores the fact that liberalism in the period under review had re-emerged in the 1920s to contain an increasing tendency among the African 'urban elite' in cities like Johannesburg to adopt the militant style of the African working class on issues such as wages, passes and housing. [144] Thus, as Legassick has suggested, 'most of their [i.e. liberals] activities can be simply interpreted in terms of social control, and many of the reforms they advocated were intended to resolve the contradictions of
segregation rather than to challenge its premises." [145] This was based on the urgent need to "...convince selected Africans that the grievances they felt could be ameliorated through reforms which liberals could promulgate". [146]

One of the ways in which this could be achieved would be through pressuring local authorities to provide family housing settlements as a means to separate this elite and sections of the African working-class from the mass of migrant workers. Although the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 had "empowered urban local authorities to set aside sites for African (family) occupation...in separate areas described as "locations, native villages [etc]"", [147] the Durban city council had persisted throughout the 1920s in providing accommodation specific to a migrant labour system. By 1929, out of a formally accommodated population of 38 460, only 400 resided in municipal sub-economic family houses. [148] In its report on the 1929 beer boycott, the liberal Joint Council of Europeans and Natives "put great emphasis on the establishment of a location..." [149] In his evidence to the De Waal Commission appointed to report on beer hall riots, one of Champion's complaints was that the boycott occurred as a means to resolve a number of grievances such as "the absence of a location..." [150] A Native Affairs Commission visiting Durban in December 1929 supported the need for family housing, [151] while the De Waal Commission "...castigated the Durban municipality for negligence...in not providing housing and welfare facilities for its African population..." [152] Thus, by 1934 Durban's first major housing scheme was opened for occupation at Lamont. [153]

However, the success of family housing as a form of social control required that African women were well prepared to perform their domestic roles as wives and mothers. Gaitskell has argued that, as early as 1908-09 in Johannesburg, liberal Christian institutions had established schools for girls in which they were taught cooking, laundry and needlework. [154] In Durban, by 1933, the Wayfarer's organisation which was endeavouring to make African girls conform to "a type of life which their parents had scarcely known", [155] consisted of 8 branches of forty members each. Similar work among Christian African women in Natal generally was performed by Sibusiswe Makanya and the Bantu Youth League. [156] It does not seem, however, that attempts to "educate" African women in the domestic roles of mothers and housekeepers gained widespread support among Africans in Durban. Thus, the Workers' Educational Association representatives to the NEC argued that one means to assist in the education of African women and to "enable them to look after their own houses very much better when they are married", [157] would be to encourage white households to employ more African women as domestic servants. It was claimed as well that some measure of training of women for domestic work was being undertaken, but this was "not widely known by the Europeans as a whole". [158]

The failure to interest urban African women in domestic education seems to have persisted throughout the period under review. For example, by 1945 Sibusiswe Makanya was holding winter schools in domestic science in the rural area of Umbuabulu in which 22 branches had been formed. [159] Moreover, an Association for the Education of Non-European Women and Girls organised by liberals such as Mabel Palmer in Durban on 27 July 1944, which taught household skills like knitting, sewing, singing and even toy-making did not attract any African women. [160] The result was that the association had a class of only 30 young Indian women from the corporation and railway
It is difficult to persuade Indian girls to attend educational institutions. One reason is that parents feel the curricula are too academic and not suitable for future domestic life. [162]

The need to educate African women in the direction of 'proper' housewives and mothers, was of particular urgency in a context in which a cult of gangsterism had emerged among African youth in urban areas. It was this problem which concerned the Native Welfare Officer when he complained to the manager of the Municipal NAD in 1935 that:

There is a permanent Native population whose children know nothing whatever of tribal or country life...in many cases the parents are at work all day with the result that their children are running about the streets uncontrolled with no training whatever. [163]

Youth gangs in Durban were known as the amalaita gangs, consisting initially of youthful migrant domestic servants who used their afternoons off from work to congregate around intoxicating brews or dagga and methylated spirits. [164] These gangs were notorious for involvement in theft (i.e. through housebreaking) and gang violence derived from 'traditions of sport-fighting' [165] in the kraals. Their involvement in theft and their drunken appearance at work seems to have prompted white housewives in Durban to request in 1947 the establishment of more beerhalls for domestic servants in white residential areas like Durban North. [166] Significantly, La Hauße has suggested that amalaitas could often demonstrate a more positive political consciousness. This is seen most clearly in the running battles between one of these gangs and the police in 1919, [167] and more significantly in the backing the gangs granted to the beerhall boycotts evidenced in secret meetings between the ICU yase Natal leader, Champion and gang leaders, one of whom pronounced: "I say that all the lietas today are in league with the ICU". [168]

As amalaita gangs were composed of boys from the age of '11 years to 14 years of age...,' and did 'not understand civic life'; [169] a possible fear was that they would contaminate African youth born under unstable family conditions in Durban with values inimical to a capitalist work culture. In fact, La Hauße has observed that 'after 1925 the Municipal NAD noted with concern that a new generation of amalaitas comprising the habitually idle classes' [170] had emerged in town. Within liberal perception a useful means to control the amalaitas was through educative movements such as the 'Pathfinders' or Boy Scout' movements. [171] Yet it was perceived that only through the elimination of the housing problem could African youth be placed under the proper guardianship of their parents. This view was most succinctly articulated by Mr Maurice Webb (of the Joint Council of Europeans and Natives) when he stated to the NEC that: 'Surely the best solution would be to press forward with a native village and the boys would be under guardianship of home'. [172]

It must be added, however, that the housing issue was of urgent concern not only (although significantly) because it was intended to impinge on the relative freedom of African women, but also because of the need of the local authority to make the city a sphere of 'total' control over the lives of the black working class generally. Many Africans had lived on private premises in the central borough areas
such as Greyville and were involved in the manufacture and sale of illicit liquor. For instance, in Greyville in 1934, 1,817 gallons of beer and isitshimiyane were destroyed by police, and a large number of Africans and Indians were prosecuted under the Liquor Act and Natives (Urban Areas) Act. [173] Proclamation of these areas under the Natives (Urban Areas) Act and constant police harassment had the effect of pushing many Africans out of the central borough into the peri-urban slum areas. Interestingly, the proclamation had the indirect effect as well of increasing the cost of living among Africans in the central borough. For example, by proclamation landlords had to pay an average licence fee of 2/6d per annum to house Africans. [174] To offset these costs landlords charged a high rental of approximately One Pound 12/6d, thereby making central borough residence less attractive to Africans. [175] Ironically, by the 1940s, within peri-urban areas there was to be no limit on the rents landlords charged there as well [discussed in detail in the following chapter].

The congested arrangement of dwellings within peri-urban illicit space concealed a vibrant world alien to a regulated bourgeois social order. Interestingly, the black fiction writer, Peter Abrahams, in his novel Mine Boy published in 1946, provided dramatic insight into an environment (i.e. Johannesburg Malay Camp) only superficially uncovered by official observers in the 1930s and the 1940s.

Leaning, dark houses that hid life and death and love and hate and would not show anything to the passing stranger... Puddles of dirty water and sandy pavements. Little children playing in these puddles. Groups of men gambling on street corners...Prostitutes on street corners and pimps calling after them.

And from somewhere, the low monotonous wall of a broken down piano...and the sound of thudding feet dancing to it. Shouts and screams and curses. Fighting and thieving and lying. [176]

Official hostility towards the subaltern social and cultural environment existing in shantytowns is well illustrated in the name "black belt" given to peri-urban settlements (such as Cato Manor) by Durban's local authorities in the 1930s. This title is opposed to the name "Mkhumbane our home" [177] adopted by residents of Cato Manor shantytown. Iain Edwards' study shows that the informal economic activities in the Cato Manor shantytown were far more lucrative than the superficial observations of the municipal authorities suggests. For instance, one of Edwards' informants recalls that although the shack settlement "was a smelly place...everybody had money..." [178] the variety of activities open to both men and women went far beyond the more apparent activities such as liquor brewing; it included dagga selling, forgery and sale of passes, a market in stolen goods and less offensive employment in the manufacture of leather products and the sale of fruit, vegetables and offal. [179]

Most local officials venturing to comment on conditions within those peri-urban settlements articulated their views in the societal metaphor Swanson terms 'the sanitation syndrome which, as early as 1902, in the Cape had penetrated into all prescriptions of the day...Disease was both a biological fact and a social metaphor'. [180] Concrete data indicating the relative contribution of shanty towns to the outbreak of disease in the city did not seem to guide policy. For instance, a provincial health organisation concerned with combating tuberculosis admitted in 1947 that no statistics were...
available to the organisation on whether or not the shantytown environment was the main source of the disease. [181] Significantly, contrary to most official observers, the municipal NAD survey of the shacks on the land of Karim Shah in late 1948, reported that "whilst the living conditions of those people are certainly crude, their general health and well-being shows no sign of deterioration". [182]

Nevertheless, although the scientific basis of the sanitation syndrome tended to be of ambiguous validity, it provided a useful ideological tool for the practical exercise of municipal policies of control. For instance, in the absence of successful pass measures against African women, the incidence of venereal disease among African men and women in Durban gave vent to a call for African women to be compulsorily examined for the disease. [183] This was supported by a fear among local white citizens that venereal disease could be passed on from African nursemaids to their children. Underlying the council's quest for control over the incidence of venereal disease was the matter of eliminating shanty towns and reimposing male guardianship over women; a concern clearly expressed by the municipality's Medical Officer of Health (MOH) in 1935:

I do not see the solution of the Native venereal disease problem until the Native is decently housed and has facilities for family life and clean recreation comparable to our own... As I see it, a fundamental defect of our position in Durban is the complete divorce of the treatment of V.D. from its prevention. [184]

The MOH's call in 1943 for "a public health engineering programme of basic sanitary services... necessary for the protection of the health of the general community was intended to compel landowners to bear the expense of installing modern sanitary and water facilities so that the effect was a decrease in the number of these dwellings". [185] As most landlords found the cost of installing sanitary facilities prohibitive many took legal 'proceedings for the eviction of all Natives on [their] property...'. [186] This resulted in a process of 'slum shifting' whereby evicted tenants moved to other areas. A potential advantage of this, from the point of view of the local authorities, was that it kept shack residents under constant harassment. But its effects remained marginal in Durban as the council lacked a comprehensive "emergency camp" scheme (especially given its failure to acquire additional land for such a purpose in the Umlazi Glebe lands). An emergency camp scheme in Johannesburg in 1945 was relatively successful as it was based on the division of shantytown movements by municipal provision of cheaper accommodation in the emergency camp. [187]

The ineffectiveness of the system of shack dispersal is well illustrated in the case of Booth Road (Cato Manor) where land owners in 1944 were required to install sanitary facilities. A number of these landlords, rather than incur the necessary expenditure for such facilities, decided to evict their tenants. The result was that 'a number of the Native tenants moved to properties in the Haviland Road area of Cato Manor and very speedily erected a settlement of sizeable proportions'. [188] Consequently, although shacks in the Haviland Road area had been previously surveyed and "pegged" by the corporation, and limited to a size of two or three rooms, by 1941 African shacklords had enlarged "the structures with the result that some shacks now consist of as many as fifteen to twenty rooms". [189] These conditions persisted throughout the 1940s and even outpaced the most ambitious endeavours of the council to build formal housing for
urban Africans. For example, when the Blackhill (Chesterville) housing scheme was completed with over 1 200 new houses, the MOH lamented that 'its effects upon the progress of shack settlements has hardly been perceptible'. [190]

Significantly, the erection of shacks at a rate of approximately two per day in 1946 in itself demonstrates the limited success of local officials to exert control over the social, cultural and economic life within shantytowns. In fact, shantytowns provided, like access to pre-capitalist means of subsistence, many Africans [including men] in Durban further means to evade partially, or even totally, subordination to capitalist wage labour. Thus, it was in view of the unpredictable problems this posed for the unskilled labour market that the manager of the NAD cautioned in 1949 that in the imposition of stricter influx controls the state must make 'a distinction...between unemployed Natives on the one hand, and idlers, vagrants and criminal elements on the other'. [191] This was necessary, according to the manager, because the conditions of informal housing of an estimated 30 000 employed Africans among the 'criminal elements' rendered 'the elimination of idlers and vagrants...a most complex matter' which could affect the supply of 'hardworking' natives if indiscriminately administered. [192]

Ironically, the stringent regulations governing family housing tended to contribute to the persistence of the shantytown problem. For instance, unlike residence in shantytowns, municipal accommodation was made conditional on the marital status of house occupants. Moreover, the residence of women in municipal dwellings without the guardianship of a husband or, on the death of the husband, a male child old enough to earn an income for the household, was proscribed. In his evidence to the DNAC, Mr. Robson, superintendent of the Soetseu Road Location (part of which had been converted for family residence), stated that the objection to single women without a 'guardian' living in municipal houses was '...that they became the target of hooligans; they have no male protection and are continually being pestered by the hooligan type'. [193] This paternalistic concern for the welfare of women residents was undeniably calculated to prevent the spread of prostitution or illicit liquor brewing in municipal locations for the same witness stated to the DNAC that the 'problems' associated with the residence of single women (especially widows) in the Soetseu Road Location were solved by the construction of a laundry. The laundry was intended to encourage these women to abstain from involvement in these illicit activities and to keep them occupied in 'useful' domestic work.

Significantly, the legal status of African women as minors under customary civil law made it difficult for young Africans to enter into marriage contracts. [195] This was because many young women who had left their kraals often found it difficult to get guardians prepared to assist them. [196] In the case of widows without male guardians, although many were allowed to continue living in municipal locations, their position was insecure. Thus, according to Mrs. Maggie Gumede, a mother of six children in Baumanville, '...we never knew when we might be dismissed from the location...' [197] This insecurity of tenure within municipal institutions made many African widows seek refuge in the shantytowns where the grants they had received from the Bantu Child Welfare Society were consumed by 'the payment of high rents...'. [198]

The frustration of the council's efforts to speed up its housing
programme ahead of the expansion of peri-urban shanty towns, however, were not in practice compensated for by the achievement of 'organic' control in existing locations. For example, Bonner has shown recently that on the east Rand prohibition of unmarried couples from securing municipal housing was often evaded for as 'yet no serious test was applied to establish bona fide customary union'. [199] The result was that in Orlando township half the marriages were irregular. [200] In Durban's municipal locations, regulations governing marriage do not seem to have been remarkably effective either. For instance, Mr. Jeroma Khumalo (a Catholic African Union member) claimed in 1947 that in Chesterville there were men who were prone to taking other men as 'wives'. [201]

In Baumanville, according to the NRS in 1959: 'Approximately forty-three per cent of the total population of marriageable age are single'. [202] These included young single mothers, forty-eight widows of whom only twenty-two were 'genuine' widows. There were nineteen men and women recorded as 'being separated, divorced or deserted by their spouses'. [203] The NRS' assertion that 'it was doubtful whether these are judicial divorces and separations since no papers were produced to support the informants' claims', is further suggestive of a widespread tendency among Africans to evade municipal marriage regulations in its locations. [204] The instability of sexual and family relations in Durban is further evidenced in the attitude expressed by some Baumanville residents to the NRS on marriage:

Women replied somewhat mistfully that, provided a girl had nice work, led a clean life and helped her family, it would be a good thing not to marry, while the male viewpoint was one of disillusionment; marriage does not work in urban life. [205]

Thus, the insistence of the manager of the NAD in 1949 that 'municipal locations at Chesterville, Baumanville and Lamont suffer in the same way [i.e. like shantytowns] from their weekend visitors...' [206] is testimony to the persistent resistance of subordinate classes. This situation existed despite the fact that location superintendents in towns like Lamont were granted 'exceedingly wide powers and many of the township's activities depended on his discretion and administration'. [207] However, in a memorandum to the the DNAC, location superintendents recommended the amendment of existing regulations granting them more effective powers to control the exit and entry of residents and visitors into locations. When challenged by the Durban Native Administration Commissioner on this issue, Mr. J.J. Johnson (superintendent of Lamont Location) asserted that the powers of location superintendents did not cover 'domestic relations' as 'we can [only] prohibit entry between 8 p.m. and 5 a.m.' [208] The evidence of illegal beer brewing in Lamont, which prompted the establishment of a beer hall in the location by the council in 1940, is suggestive of a situation in which people could still find means to be involved in the informal economy. [209] Representatives of the Chesterville Location Tenants to the DNAC suggested that the inadequate wages of African working-class men gave incentive to supposedly married women in locations to turn (in the absence of other alternatives) to prostitution and illicit liquor brewing and selling:

If a married quarter is situated near a men's single quarters, the men will cast longing eyes at the women they see about the location. Most of the families in the married quarters have not got
enough income to buy all the desirable commodities they see everyday, when they go to town. The women must find a way of increasing the income by supplying liquor to single men who visit the married quarters regularly...to drink or to procure women. [210] The result was that even in municipal locations the involvement of some women in informal sector (or less often as laundry and domestic workers) activity results in "...the poor children [being] left at home unattended...they are left to fend for themselves, they eventually become problem children". [211] Under conditions where the provision of schools was inadequate to impose constraints on the leisure-time of African youth, it is not surprising that among the children of Baumanville residents there were many "who go about robbing other people; they are like the people who go about gambling". [212]

Conclusion

The two intimately related concepts of reproduction and control inform the theoretical contribution of the cheap labour theorists. An attempt has been made in this chapter to use a social historical perspective to challenge the mechanistic manner in which these concepts have been employed. It has been argued, in Part 1, that the institutions of control over migrant workers did not emerge to maintain the cheap labour system of reproduction by enforcing the return of workers to the reserves, but emerged in a historical context of class struggle over workers' attempts to gain higher wages and employers' quest to minimise those wages. The example discussed was the struggles of Durban's dock workers, well documented by Hemson. Moreover, compounds were also established in Durban to control workers' leisure-time if a sober, reliable and docile workforce was to be forthcoming. It is suggested, however, that the success of the compound system was limited to the extent that workers consistently demonstrated a capacity to resist these social controls. This was especially true, in an urban context, as yet insufficiently developed under the control of the local authority (particularly given the existence of informal settlements on the outskirts of the city).

Part 2 has been intended to reinterpet the notion that the reproduction and control of a stable and proletarianised section of the African workforce was necessarily a process set in motion by changes in the process of capital accumulation. It is suggested that proletarianisation among a section of the African population had occurred as part of a process of struggle (especially on the part of African women) by Africans against excessive exploitation in capitalist agriculture and against traditional kinship patriarchs. It is argued that the presence of women and children in urban areas was not necessarily indicative of Africans living under supposed family conditions. It is shown in fact that often family ties among proletarianised Africans were so unstable socially that it was difficult in practice to distinguish clearly between migrant and proletarianised Africans. This was true given the resistance of many women involved in the "shantytown economy" to patriarchal domination or regulated family life. It was this problem, in addition to the general need to make the city into a sphere of total bourgeois social control, which produced the need for the establishment of housing for African families.
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CHAPTER IV

Housing in Durban: The financial costs of reproduction and control

1) Housing Finance and Working-Class Incomes

It was intended in Chapter III to uncover the social, cultural and political threat informal housing settlements around Durban posed for the hegemony of capitalist relations of reproduction and distribution. Thus, because capitalist accumulation is not 'just grabbing of resources, but a process of generalising and legitimising an economic and social system,' the unbound access Africans in Durban had to various forms of illegal and 'immoral' activities was not conducive to the universal dominance of capitalist 'principles, of law, property, and regular ways of doing things...''[1] As the home was the 'refuge from the physical, economic and social storms of life' devoted to 'rearing children, preparing and consuming food, and enjoying rest...recreation and study,'[2] it provided the idyllic conditions for the reproduction of a contented and socially 'stabilised' working class. Shack settlements around Durban were perceived to fail in this task among Africans, as the very existence of these settlements as informal, congested and insanitary dwellings constituted an antithesis to a regulated bourgeois social order. The apparent effects of this on the labour force were perceived in drunkenness, juvenile delinquency and high rates of job mobility among African workers.

The Durban city council's response was to speed up the construction of African housing in the 1940s, evidenced in the large Chesterville scheme. Yet, throughout the period under review, the council failed dismally to house a large proportion of its African population. Therefore, by 1949, out of a total population of 150 000, only 82 700 people were housed in municipal and employer institutions while a shortfall of 67 000 lived in 'backyards, shacks...and includes 5 500 people over-crowding municipal hostels.'[3] To overcome this shortfall the council planned five schemes which included extensions of Lamont, Somsen Road Location, a women's hostel and an intended scheme at the Umalazi Mission Reserve to house 16 500 people. These extensions collectively would cater for a population of 28 900, leaving a surplus of 38 400 people still requiring council accommodation.[4] The council's provision of housing for Indians and coloureds in the period under review were limited as well. For instance, although six out of every ten houses built for Indians were constructed by the municipality, by 1950, the Indian population had increased by 28 340 while accommodation for Indians increased by 1 502 units which could only house 9 000 people.[5]

The city council generally explained the housing shortage for blacks (especially Africans) by pointing to the "prohibitive" costs of subsidised housing. For example, the council submitted evidence to the DNAC indicating that the deficit on African housing had increased tremendously from 324 pounds sterling in July 1942 to 62 486 pounds in 1947.[6] Even though deficits on housing for Africans were credited by surpluses in the Native Revenue Account (NRA), the council claimed that 'the provision in full measure of the amount of sub-economic housing that is required for natives...would involve the payment of a subsidy...through this local authority's general revenue fund...''[7] Increasingly, in the 1940s, the Durban city council argued vehemently that some share of the burden of housing costs should be borne by capitalist employers as the local authority did...
'not share in the benefits from the availability of cheap labour in the urban area.' [6] As housing settlements had developed on the fringes of the old borough and the council's future housing plans were envisaged on the outskirts of the extended city, the problem of subsidising transport was inclusive in this demand. Although some employers, especially in commerce, saw the merit in the need for employers to bear some of the burden of costs for housing, the question of a transport subsidy was considered as a problem which "should fall on the community as a whole...", as the 'community generally benefitted from the segregation of Africans.' [9]

The complaints by the city council regarding the financial burden of carrying out its housing plans has led some writers to perceive shack settlements as a form of economic relief for the local state and for capital. This, Maylam has argued, is because:

...the shacks were a cheap form of accommodation which placed no financial burden on rate payers, and employers were relieved of both the cost of housing their shack-dwelling employees and the burden of subsidising the transport costs of those workers whose shacks were close to their place of employment.

Maylam considers the social costs of informal settlements as the only factor burdening the local state and employers, for he argues further that:

However, the basic contradiction arose between the need, on the one hand, to exploit a labour force that could reproduce itself cheaply, and on the other, to exercise social and political control over that labour force. [10]

A similar view is shared by Frederick Cooper who argues that:

African entrepreneurs who take over vacant land or acquire it under customary law and allow workers to build houses on it or arrange for low wage, unregulated builders to construct housing...their efforts costs the state and capital very little...[11]

Such an argument is reasonably sound if it is assumed that the land, the material used in the construction of informal housing, and the accommodation actually provided are all distributed in a non-commodity form or, are marketed at a low exchange value. Thus, Burgess has asserted that informal sector housing was allowed to exist in Africa by the 'dominant capitalist mode of production' because:

'...the self production of such activities [e.g. housing] particularly when the absence of rents and the association of such housing with various forms of subsistence activities that extend family budgets, will ensure less pressure for wage increases.' [12]

While it is not intended in this chapter to dismiss the thesis that shack settlements provided to some extent a subsidy for the costs of housing to the state and/or capital, the author will endeavour, however, to subject that thesis to a historical and theoretical critique as a means to demonstrate that capital accumulation is a contradictory process both in production and the social sphere. Significantly, the 'subsidy' (in so far as the role of shanty towns is conceived to minimise the transfer of surplus value to black housing) contributed by informal housing to the resources of state and capital was effective to the extent that the wages paid to black
industrial workers tended to be markedly below their costs of subsistence, i.e. including housing. For example, although Wage Board determinations raised the minimum wage for unskilled workers to $6.62.4d in 1944/45, this minimum wage was marginally sufficient for workers to acquire their barest essentials such as food and clothing which, at 1944 prices, cost $5.11s.0d. [13] In this context, compounded by increases in building costs from 100 to 150 per cent between 1939 and 1946, [14] there was little incentive for private speculative investment in African housing. Even private utility companies such as the Citizens Housing League, formed in 1927 and which boasted '1 550 lettings housing 7 300 happy souls' among whites in Durban, would not risk investment in African housing because: [15]

"...house ownership, private tenancy, boarding houses, etc., are so rare among natives; a consequence not only of the economic position of the native, but also of the legislation which restricts the acquisition of land...by natives'. [16]

Significantly, especially outside of the central borough of Durban, Indian rights to land ownership were not too limited. The result was a remarkable 'eagerness of Indians to acquire ownership of their own houses...', [17] a tendency exploited by large Indian landowners. Thus, although it was claimed in 1929 that "a large number of...Indians own small plots of ground on which they have built...houses of a kind..." [18] By the early 1940s the city council asserted that it desired to "acquire land from concentrated ownership of the land speculators and spread [real] ownership of that land...to thousands of Indians..." [19] These Indian land speculators sold small lots of land to 'low income' Indians "for as much as they gave for an acre..." [20] Moreover, at a conference on Indian living conditions held by the South African Institute of Race Relations in 1943, a participant claimed that in "...one case he knew of, six pounds out of nine pounds wages went in payments under a bond..." [21] This was consequently detrimental to the household incomes and consumption among working-class Indians. For example, among Indians living in the Clairwood area, predominantly a shack settlement in the period under review, a survey found that expenditure on food per capita among the poorest families was eleven shillings per month. [22] The total calorie intake of two families interviewed in the same area was 2,424, which was lower than the 'accepted standard of 3,000 calories.' [23]

In the case of Indians, it was these limits to the 'beneficial effects' of the subsidy, provided to the resources of state and capital by informal housing which prompted the city council to desire the expropriation of land from Indian landowners in areas such as Merebank/Wentworth and Springfield for sub-economic housing for working-class Indians. (A topic referred to in more detail below). The high cost of informal housing to working-class occupants posed a potential threat to the maintenance of a low value of labour power and wage among black workers. It is undeniable that shack accommodation was often commoditised at high rental and purchase values. For although shack construction in itself required a minimum of expenditure on building materials, and despite the Natal African Tenants and Peasants Association claim in 1947 that rent for sub-tenants ranged between ten shillings and one pound, [24] there is sufficient evidence that rents were often between twenty and thirty shillings per month. Even sub-units of shack structures were valued high. For example, 'Tenancy rates per month varied from as low as 7/6d to 32/6d per month.' [25] The problem of high shack rents was
compounded by the city council’s efforts to coerce shacklords to bear the expense for sanitary facilities in the 1940s. For example, a rent payer, Mr Mhlakoana of Bellair to the South of Durban, complained on 17 May 1947 that:

We have been told by the Shunties [sic] owners that they have been informed by the Durban Water Dept. to increase rents...from one Pound 7/6d to one Pound 10/- because the Water Dept has put in a water pipe in the Shunties...[26]

These costs workers had to bear in the shacks may have contributed to an upsurge in black worker militancy in the late 1930s and 1940s. For instance: "Of the total of 58 strikes in the period 1930-1950, 46 occurred between 1937 and the end of 1942..." [27]

The rentals payable in municipal locations placed these residents in a better position. Rents in municipal locations ranged from about 12/6d to 17/6d for houses endowed with differential access to facilities such as space, sewerage and electricity. In May 1949, the municipal NAD suggested that rentals in Chesterville, where fuel and lighting consisted of paraffin and candles, should be 27/6d when electrical facilities would be installed. This became effective under Regulation No. 140 of 1952, which increased rentals at Baumanville to 20/- and at Chesterville to 27/6d. Lamontville rentals were to be maintained at 8/- for a one-roomed cottage and 15/- for a "large" two-roomed dwelling. [28] However, because the council had failed to provide Chesterville with electricity, the manager of the municipal NAD instructed the superintendent on 17 April 1952, "that in spite of this amendment to the regulations you will continue to charge your tenants only 17/6d per month." [29]

It may be argued that the comparative advantage of council housing in so far as it affected the costs to occupants were offset by the advantageous geographical position of shantytowns, located in closer proximity to the centres of of employment and shopping. Moreover, shack dwellers were not constrained by compound and location regulations to augment their household incomes by their involvement in formal sector activity. On the contrary, the city council’s Lamont location was established at an inconvenient distance from the city centre. For example, in 1934, the M.O.H complained that:

The Corporation’s Native Housing scheme at Umlazi (100 houses) is virtually an expensive failure owing to the factors of distance from work and the inadequacy of transport and shopping facilities which offset the advantages of reasonable rent and superior environment...[30]

Because the council was reluctant in the early 1930s to bear the expense of subsidised municipal transport and the Railway Administration’s rather minimal reduction of monthly charges from 15/- to 8/6d, [31] private Indian bus operators took up the challenge charging a flat rate of 6d per trip from any point in Lamont. The result was that, generally, transportation expenses for Lamont residents averaged 24/- per month. The distance of Lamont, located 10 miles from the central borough of Durban, made it difficult for travellers to avoid these costs by walking.

It is perhaps with this problem in view that the city council established its most ambitious housing scheme, Chesterville, in the vicinity of Cato Manor. However, because the municipality anticipated
providing a municipal bus service to Chesterville, it passed a by-law preventing private operations entering the location causing many residents to resort to walking. [33] In fact, only 20 per cent of the African workers in Durban travelled by bus, train or tram [34] even though the average cost of travelling within the borough from compounds or locations were generally between 2/- and 3/-. [35] This was because, short of sufficient municipal subsidisation, existing transport facilities were so unreliable that workers waited for 'considerable periods on certain routes...' [36] The result was a considerable loss of time. For instance, the Dunlop survey found that among Dunlop workers 'only a small percentage (1.5%) of bus travellers took less than ten minutes to reach the factory from their homes...', [37] while for walkers 'the modal time...was less than ten minutes...'. [38] However, to achieve this 'saving in time' many walkers left home particularly early. [39] The loss of leisure time and the consequent fatigue resulting from long walks over the hilly areas of Cato Manor was not favourable for a "standard of efficiency of work." [40]

Therefore, the urgent need for adequate and subsidised municipal transport was stressed by the Durban Chamber of Commerce even if this "should fall on the community as a whole." [41] However, when the council began to contemplate increasing its role in the provision of transport in the late 1940s, it had to compete with a strongly entrenched monopoly of Indian bus owners. It is clear that it was organised action of the Indian Bus Owners' Association which halted any attempts on the part of the city council to increase its involvement in the provision of transport. Thus, the Transport Enquiry Commission of 1945 appointed by the city council stated:

The private operators, through the Bus Owners Association, have vigorously opposed any attempt by the council to encroach upon what they consider to be their rightful preserves in the matter of non-European passenger transportation, and have been very successful in their representations to the local Transportation Board. [42]

The city council, backed by aspirant African entrepreneurs, attempted to oust the Indian bus service from Lamont township in the 1940s, although rather unsuccessfully. A major municipal bus service was established in the township only in 1957 when additional houses had been built.

Significantly, the relatively uninhibited involvement of African women in the production and sale of liquor in the shantytowns tended to expand household incomes and consumption. For example, the households of two Dunlop workers who lived in Cato Manor and participated in the liquor trade, increased their food consumption from 2/4d to 3/3d per person per day 'as against an average of 1/2d.' [44] However, among two other households paying three pounds rent for a dwelling owned by an Indian, food consumption per day was only 8d below the average of 1/2d. [45] A factor which may have adversely affected the cost of living and consumption within the shanty towns, was the lack of adequate food storage facilities, especially for products such as milk, eggs and vegetables. Thus, in 1950, the Natal Regional Survey reported that:

It is in households living in backyards and slum shacks that the lack of food storage facilities is most serious. An investigation conducted in 1944 among 115 Cato Manor families...showed one household in six kept its food supply in the kitchen and more than one-third in the living room. [46]
A feature of council locations, especially Lamont, was that houses were spatially separated to allow occupants a small garden in which to grow fruit and vegetables. For instance, in 1943, the council boasted that, at Lamont, "an experimental plot is under cultivation by a Native demonstrator, who gives advice to residents on the best methods to adopt for the most economical use of the land." [47] This was augmented by a system of regular distribution of milk at a cost in Lamont by the municipality while, on 6 September 1943, the council passed a resolution seeking ministerial approval for a similar scheme for the distribution of food and vegetables. [48] Significantly, by 1951, Dr. E.J. Krige of King Edward hospital reported that 90% of malnutrition cases came from shantytowns and "only 3 per cent from municipal family locations." [49]

(i1) The Native Revenue Account
In this situation the provision of sub-economic housing by the local state was an urgent requirement. As a form of wage subsidy sub-economic housing tends to contribute to a lower value of labour power in so far as it tends to reduce the amount expendable from the wage on the use-value accommodation. Such an effect on the value of African labour power has been noted by Curtis to have occurred in the apartheid period:

...the transfer of surplus value to and within the state lowered the price below the value of state capitalist housing and transportation commodities thereby reducing their cost to African productive labourers. Such decreases in the cost to African productive labourers of purchasing these elements of their social existence all tended to lower the value of African labour power. [50]

This surplus value transfer towards the social wage in the apartheid period was achieved by the passage of the Native Services Levy Act, 1952 (Act No. 64) which collected a sum of over 14 million pounds from employers by January 1956. [51]

Yet, prior to the passage of the Native Services Levy Act, was there any manner in which the local state, the central state and employers sought to meet the financial costs of the social wage for black workers? It is clear that for the largest part of the period under review neither the state nor capital were willing to contribute financially to black (and in particular, African) housing. However, some form of provision for state managed financing of housing for black and low income white workers seemed necessary. This was achieved through the Housing Act of 1920 and the Natives Urban Act of 1923. Through the housing Act, the expense of working class housing was to be borne by ratepayers generally, through central state advances of loans to local authorities repayable out of municipal funds. In the case of Africans, under the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, the cost of social amenities such as housing, were to be borne by Africans themselves, although indirectly through the NRA established under the Urban Areas Act of 1923. As the system of subsidisation of sub-economic rentals by the state and local state established by the Housing Act reduced the cost of housing to the occupier, it thereby functioned to increase the social wage and potentially lowered the direct cost of labour to capital. This effect of the state housing subsidy was apparent to contemporary observers, including the Durban municipality. For example, in a memorandum prepared for the Wage Board investigation into unskilled labour in Durban between 1940 and 1945, the city and water engineer complained that:
Subsidising housing as a general policy amounts, in effect, to a subvention to employers of labour - it is a means by which industry, agriculture and the Government pay low wages to its workers in order to lower costs of production or distribution. [52]

A similar view had been expressed by the majority report of the housing committee of 1920 which 'considered that the urgent problem in housing was to build houses to let at economic rentals'. [53]

However, because wages paid to most workers in the early 1920s did not measure up to post-war price inflation, the principle of subsidisation was passed into legislation on the recommendation of the minority report. [54]

Subsidisation, in terms of the Housing Act of 1920, meant that in the provision of housing for the 'poorer classes', losses on sub-economic rentals had to be borne between the government and the local authority at an initial interest rate of three per cent. In other words, local authorities could borrow money from the government in order to carry out sub-economic housing, repayable at an interest rate of three per cent. However, because this scheme was not generally used by local authorities for black housing (particularly Africans), the Central Housing Board, in 1934, made it clear that sub-economic loans for African housing was to be firmly encouraged:

Hitherto sub-economic loans have only been granted for assisting local authorities to provide housing for the very poor among the European and coloured population and not facilitating the working of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act No. 21 of 1923. The Board, however, has now been granted wider discretion and is allowed in special cases to recommend the financing of location schemes out of sub-economic loans. [55]

In order to effect this reform to the loan scheme, the interest rate was dropped from three to 2% in March 1934 to 3/4 (0.75%) in the period 1936 to 1939. Thus, by 1937, approved sub-economic loans for black housing increased sharply from £272 666 in 1936 to £2 824 796. [56]

However, this increase was not maintained because, by 1939, loans granted for the purpose of black housing declined to 364 642 pounds. [57] One of the reasons for this was that many municipalities, even given a concession of between 3 and 4%, were still inadequately financed to fulfill their obligations for sub-economic black housing. In his evidence to the Durban Health Enquiry (1944), Mr Howes (representing the city council) mentioned that municipalities were so dissatisfied with government concessions that, in 1943, "...the Municipal Executive, on behalf of all local authorities, protested to the government in no uncertain terms that the assistance offered by government was certainly not enough and the local authorities refused to proceed with any comprehensive housing schemes for the very poor..." [58] A reason for this was that municipalities were sensitive to the fact that, because sub-economic financing was intended to shift the burden from the cash wage paid to black workers, subsidisation was in effect a partial taxation of the white community in general rather than industrial and commercial employers of black labour specifically. Consequently the Durban city council, among others, became embroiled in a debate with employers and the central state over which of the three parties should carry the largest share of the burden for black housing finance. However, it will be argued below that, in the case of the Durban city council,
the importance of the financial question was exaggerated and cannot be considered as a sufficient explanation for the city council's failure to effect shack removals and construct segregated black housing in the 1940s.

According to Marx, capitalists may secure higher rates of surplus-value in the production process by expanding that part of the working day which accrues to the capitalist as surplus labour against the portion of the working day referred to as necessary labour (i.e. necessary for the reproduction of labour power at its value). This form of capital accumulation is called absolute surplus-value. [59] However, under conditions where the technical productivity of labour-power is increased, e.g. through mechanisation in the labour process, especially in those sectors of industry producing wage goods, the value of labour power may be reduced and surplus labour increased without lengthening the workday. This is known as relative surplus-value appropriation. [60]

In other words, under conditions of relative surplus-value appropriation, capital accumulation requires the reduction in the price of wage goods necessary for the reproduction of that labour or the value of labour power. One means to effect this reduction in the value of labour power was to encourage home ownership which results in the elimination of rent and thereby potentially lower the wage. The result would be an indirect expansion of that part of capital accruing to the capitalist as surplus-value. [61] However, in a situation where the wages paid to productive labourers is insufficient even to encourage capital investment in the housing market, some other means must be found to effect a reduction of housing costs as part of the social wage. One of the means to effect this reduction is that suggested by F. Curtis (discussed above) whereby, in the apartheid period up to 1978, part of the surplus value appropriated by the state was expended in the production of wage goods at lower value per unit. Another means was for the state (especially before the Services' Levy Act was passed) to tax workers indirectly by, in urban areas, monopolising the production and sale of commodities previously consumed by workers as non-commodity household products or sold to workers by petty commodity producers. In this manner surplus value is transferred through the wage, [62] and held by the local state in a trust fund, to be consumed in the provision of the present and future housing and other social requirements of workers, at a lower value per unit. Although this system in many areas was not securely established, over the period under review Durban seems to have perfected the system.

This system was instituted in the NRA established under the Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 to function as a separate account for the general social reproduction of urban African working classes into which "...there must be paid, among other amounts, all rents, fees for services, and other revenue of any kind whatsoever derived by the urban local authority from occupants or residents of any location (etc.)." [63] In Durban, the main source of revenue for this account was profits from its beer monopoly which showed a total profit of 417 161 pounds by the financial year ending 31 July 1937, a figure markedly above the total profit of 165 746 pounds for the NRA as a whole in the same period. [64] To facilitate an understanding of how the system functioned, the section below will document its history and structure in Durban.

The implementation of an NRA financed largely by a municipal beer monopoly was not adopted uniformly in all municipalities after 1923. For instance, even though the Johannesburg council had established
However, the success of the 'Durban system' had a history which preceded the Natives (Urban Areas) Act by 16 years. According to La Hausse, there were two sources of beer supply prior to the establishment of a municipal beer monopoly in Durban in 1908. One source was petty traders (mainly women) who sold beer from dwellings scattered throughout the borough, or 'from the main market, where it was freely supplied.' [66] A second source was from rural areas, supplied by African women who were allowed to enter the town on five-day passes. According to Hemson, the existence of these petty traders and suppliers in backyards and other informal premises 'tended to consolidate working-class communities outside the barracks...' [67] Moreover, one of the factors informing migrant workers' class struggles over the wage in Durban was the 'to-go' registration fees payable by African workers (and to be used to finance their accommodation and control), which was an unmasked form of taxation. It was for these reasons that Durban and other local authorities in Natal supported the 1906 Report of the Native Affairs Commission's recommendation 'that the manufacture and sale of beer in the towns should be regulated and placed entirely under municipal control.' [68] This monopoly was established under the Natal Beer Act (No. 23 of 1908). According to Hemson, in the period before 1920 the main success of the beer monopoly was that it financed a successful bureaucracy of control known as the Municipal Native Administration Department. Consequently, the indirect advantage of 'welfare provision of African workers was less remarkable than strengthened police force and a sophisticated system of pass controls. [69]

The remarkable financial success of the system of beer monopoly in Durban before 1940 may be seen in the figures below. The decrease in beer revenue after the 1929 peak is explained by the remarkable success of the beerhall boycotts of 1929 and the early 1930s. The figure indicating expenditure on welfare as compared to income, demonstrates the limited extent to which the fund was being used in the provision of the social wage:

### Beer Hall and Eating House Income Compared with Welfare Expenditure, 1909–1936: Income figures to the nearest pound [70]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Ending</th>
<th>Beer Revenue</th>
<th>Haist Grain</th>
<th>Eating</th>
<th>Welfare</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>House</td>
<td>expenditure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>7 937</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>932</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>28 079</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>2 640</td>
<td>990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>50 375</td>
<td>1 056</td>
<td>4 062</td>
<td>1 554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>48 759</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>3 779</td>
<td>10 558</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, although the above figures indicate clearly that Native Revenue (especially profits on beer) was not adequately used before 1940 to provide for African housing and other social amenities, it was surpluses from these monopoly profits which formed the main basis for the municipality's capacity to avoid losses on African housing in the 1940s being incurred by employers and the Borough Rate Fund (BRF).
According to the Smit Committee, the main source of income for the Native Revenue Account was derived from sub-economic rentals, a consolidated charge on "water supply, sanitation, medical services, roads, lighting and administration [including police]." Although this may be true generally, in Durban medical services, general administration of "native affairs" and police forces deployed within urban locations before 1936 were made chargeable against the NRA generally and did not come out of rentals. Another charge against the NRA were rates on land for housing and other amenities such as hospitals. This was because the land is only leased to the Native Affairs Department. These rates were to be used for the benefit of the BRF rather than the operations of the NRA.

Significantly, before 1936 the rates charged to the NRA must have contributed considerable amounts to the BRF because the rates charged to the NRA were charged on the same basis as rates charged to the other municipal departments as "all land is valued according to the area which they occupy, and the land is rated accordingly." These charges against the NRA were the subject of constant dispute between the city council and the Minister of Native Affairs. According to the council's financial memorandum to the DNAC, an agreement was reached eventually whereby the Minister initially made a total sum of 166 845 pounds (including the amount charged for rates, rents, ambulance hire, audit, indirect administration, police, sanitary and water charges and ricksha licences) refundable to the NRA. The Minister subsequently allowed the council to claim a legitimate charge against the account an amount of 136 648 pounds and 2s which included 53 612 pounds 17s and 4d for rates and 83 026 pounds 4s and 8d for rent. A sum of only 29 689 pounds 17s would be refunded to the NRA.

Rates charged to the NRA were reduced to six per cent on land and ten per cent on buildings. This provision in the agreement excluded Lamont location, and privately owned properties, which continued to be rated on the old basis. It is possible that through this system that large sums (not specified in municipal data) may have passed through to the BRF. For instance, on private properties council representatives to the DNAC stated that whatever was charged by private enterprise would be charged to the natives. Moreover, for the Lamont location which formed part of Woods Estate, the rental charged to the NRA on land 'approximates and possibly equals, the interest charged on the mortgage.'

Yet, representatives of the council often insisted that the NRA benefitted from the BRF. For example, when a Witwatersrand University economist, Randall criticised the Durban Council in 1939 for using profits on beer to offset losses on the NRA as a form of taxation bearing 'proportionally harder upon the poorer Natives..." the Native Welfare Officer in Durban, D.G. Shepstone, replied that:

...it should not be overlooked that certain advances have been made from rates, that the onus is always on the Borough fund to make good any deficit on the Native revenue Account, that certain items of interest on Native housing borrowing are borne by the Borough, and that the Corporation's liability in respect of the Native Revenue Account is increasing.

Shepstone claimed that the contribution which the borough fund had made to the NRA amounted to 50 000 pounds in the form of loans. Randall responded by arguing that even if this were true the ultimate advantage would be to the borough fund rather than the NRA because
The natives have presumably to pay interest and redemption on the loan. [79] Moreover, the estimated loss of 36 559 pounds as against a profit of 165 746 pounds on the account between 1925 and 1937 were credited by accumulated surpluses within the NRA. It was only in 1933-34, the peak of African resistance to the municipal beer monopoly, that the borough fund contributed only 272 pounds to offset a temporary deficit on the NRA.

The council presented evidence in 1947 to the DNAC showing the loss on housing for Africans had increased from 3 245 pounds in 1942 to 62 486 pounds. In this data, the Durban city council had at its disposal statistical information which allowed it to exaggerate the costs it had to bear in subsidising African housing. The information provided by the Durban city council for reference by the DNAC are reproduced here in full, as the discussion which follows below is based on an explication and critique of the city councils figures. [80]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Surplus or Deficit</th>
<th>Total Surplus</th>
<th>How dealt with:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ending</td>
<td>Surplus</td>
<td>Deficit</td>
<td>Surplus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31/97</td>
<td>(Pounds Sterling: thousands)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>20 987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>2 452</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>37 617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>2 558</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>37 122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>4 354</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>46 655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39 496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3 245</td>
<td>38 354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4 390</td>
<td>28 744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9 831</td>
<td>46 322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21 209</td>
<td>44 809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39 659</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>62 486</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6 874</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The council argued at the DNAC in 1947 that: 'Neither the municipal assessment rate nor the Native Revenue Account was ever designed to bear a charge or burden of this description,' [81] i.e. as is shown in its figures on the housing deficit between 1942 and 1946. The council claimed that throughout the 1940s it was subsidising the wages paid to workers by employers because its costs "could not be met by increased rentals as this would have been contrary to the expressed policy of Government..." [82] A similar argument was presented at its appearance before the Wage Board in the mid-1940s. This consisted of statistics showing the difference between the amount permissible for deduction (under the Wage Determination Act No. 72 of 1940) from the wage as rent, the actual rent and the amount justifiable if the council was to cope with the financial responsibility for black housing. The table below shows this position for all major black housing schemes in Durban. [83]
Area | Min. Reduction | Actual Rentals | Sub-economic rents permissible chargeable (Pounds/Shillings/Pennies)
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
Cato Manor (Indian) | 8s.8d. | 15/- | 1/4/10
Springfield (Indian) | 8s.8d. | 15/- | 1/6/0 1/7/8
Scott-Inanda Rds | 8s.8d. | 17s.6d.
Springfield | 17s.6d. | 1 pound
Cato Manor Indian Municipal Employ | 8s.8d. | 1/15/0 1/5/0 2/1/8 2/8/1
Coloured Sparks Estates | 8s.8d. | 12s.6d. 17s.6d. 1/2/6 1/11/6
Lamont (Native) | 8s.8d. | 17s.6d. | 1/16/6
Blackhurst Estate (Native) | 8s.8d. | 17s.6d. |

However, although the above figures reflect the extent to which employers were saved the burden of African housing finance, this data conceals the extent to which the council as well could substantially avoid responsibility for the total loss on African housing. For instance, within terms of the National Housing formula, the council's share of the losses for its proposed Lamont extension scheme, the total cost of which would exceed income by $39 872.19s.5d. per annum, were particularly generous. Of this amount the council was expected to bear only 9 968 pounds 4s.10d. whereas the government's share of the burden would amount to 29 904 pounds 14s.7d. [84] This formula could be made applicable to existing housing schemes subject to the approval of the National Housing Commission established under the 1944 Housing Amendment Act. [85] Admittedly, on the total loss of 63 853 pounds for Chesterville by 1949, the government did not accept the full implications of the National Housing formula, which provided that the government should bear 75% of the cost. Yet, even the government's acceptance of only 37 950 pounds (i.e. 59.4%) of the cost makes the councils claim that financial problems prevented it from embarking on new housing schemes after Chesterville seem rather dubious. [86]

Significantly, although the council was, on the one hand, adamant that the excessive losses its NRA had to bear would soon become a problem too enormous for the resources within the account (a consequence which could affect the BRF); on the other hand, council representatives expressed confidence that through the NRA "...we can still get that development and can still provide for posterity..." [87] Given this position Durban's commissioner for Native Administration charged that: 'that somewhat alarming state of affairs' which would threaten the BRF had hardly arrived yet. [88] This situation was made possible not only by the establishment of a Kaffir Beer Sub-account, which would be self-balancing and bear its own 'losses incurred on Native housing...' in 1944, [89] but also by the existence of a Working Balance Reserve made up of contributions 'built up over a period of years by appropriations from surpluses on Revenue Account' [90] In other words, as Councillor Green explained to the DNAC, this account was augmented yearly 'when an account shows a credit balance or a surplus...one of the ways in which it may be
used is to set aside that profit to a special account to meet future or some unseen contingencies..." [91] This account stood at an enormous £137 687 in July 1947 after closing with a deficit of £35 785 for the previous year. [92] The principle of the Working Balance Reserve was aptly criticised by Mr. Caney of the Joint Council of Europeans and Natives, as an unjustifiable form of taxation of poorer Africans - not for their benefit but for that of posterity because 'it is in their own interest that money should be expended for their current benefit or welfare...'

Despite the agreement between the council and the Minister of Native Affairs which disallowed indirect administrative costs to be charged to the NRA, considerable sums continued to be misappropriated from the account for such charges. This seems to have been an impression gained by the Smit Committee of 1942 as well. The committee commented in its report that it was:

...struck by the fact that in almost every instance, the charge for control was being debited as a whole against the Native Revenue Account. In some cases high salaries are paid to Managers of the Native Administration Department and location superintendents and the Native Revenue Account is called upon to bear the whole brunt of their service in so far as Natives are concerned. [94]

At Somtseu Road Location, 98 African employees were paid £11 900 per annum to collectively cover monthly wages of four pounds. For the white staff at the same location, presumably the superintendent alone, an amount of £2 519 was charged for wages in 1947. This excluded a housing allowance of £100 paid from the NRA to the superintendent. [96] Moreover, the agreement had stated specifically that although 'capital expenditure on roads, storm water drainage, etc...were to be borne by the Native Revenue Account,' maintenance charges had to be covered by the BRF. [97] This had been accepted because maintenance was considered as a service 'normally rendered to ratepayers' which should not be borne by the NRA. [98] The council seems to have ignored this provision in the agreement, for at Somtseu Road it charged an estimated 3 000 pounds against the NRA for building maintenance. [99]

Interestingly, although the 'Kaffir Beer' Enquiry in 1942 claimed confidently that: 'The methods of government control and audit of expenditure of Native Revenue Account monies offers a very real safeguard from abuse,' [100] there is evidence that in Durban there was considerable maladministration of NRA funds. For example, before Mr. Robson was employed at Somtseu Road Location, the previous superintendent had allowed an African clerk to collect money from residents which was supposed to have been paid into a so-called Safe Custody Account (see below). However, the clerk kept the money in an account of his own. At the start of World War II, his records of income and expenditure showed a shortfall of 800 pounds which 'he had surreptitiously taken.' [101]

When questioned about funds collected from an entertainment hall at Somtseu Road, the Superintendent stated that the money was not deposited but kept in the council's own Safe Custody Account. [102] However, the Superintendent (Robson) does not seem to have kept a record of amounts withdrawn from the account. This is apparent in the following extract from a verbal exchange between the DNAC and the Superintendent:

...What has been withdrawn? [From the Safe Custody Account]
Was no account kept or rendered of the monies coming from these other takings?

- I do not know; the committee [responsible for collecting funds] would know that. [103]

The above illustrations have been intended to demonstrate that within the NRA the city council had access to a soundly balanced resource which was sufficient to prevent the municipality's BRF incurring any financial burden on African housing. In fact, through the establishment of the Working Balance Reserve and the enormous amounts used for extravagant charges, the council failed to exploit the NRA adequately for the provision of sub-economic housing. This does not imply that, as a result, the council would countenance the existence of informal housing to avoid expenditure even from its NRA for sub-economic African housing. This was because within informal housing settlements the illicit liquor trade, in a variety of cheaply produced and more potent brews, did not only pose the social threat of black working-class drunkenness, but challenged the profitability of the municipal beer monopoly. In fact, many Africans complained that "the high price of beer was one of the main incentives to brew illicitly." [104] The losses incurred by the NRA after the beer hall boycotts of the early 1930s and the deficit of 2,933 pounds in 1944/45 on the Kaffir Beer Sub-Account in Durban due to high prices and short supply [105] indicates the extent to which illicit trading (largely in the shantytowns) provided an alternative outlet for consumers. It is in these circumstances that the social threat posed by informal housing in the perception of local authorities could overshadow even the financial question, a position articulated by a city council representative to the Durban Health Enquiry in 1944:

...Now I gathered you said that you agreed with me upon that except that you did not take any notice of the financial side, you thought it didn't matter...: [Reply] Not exactly that...but that it should not have a prominent place such as it has, because I contend that the social and economic side are saved a great deal by the proper housing of people. [106]

In this context, settlement of the housing finance question seemed imperative. One solution which employers favoured was the construction of sub-economic housing by lower paid African labour. For example, the Durban Chamber of Commerce insisted 'that if the Natives had not been precluded for so long from taking part in building activities, the present position would not have been as it is.' [107] Yet even after the government had extended the Central Organisation of Technical Training (COTT) scheme to include African builders in Johannesburg in 1946, considerable opposition from white building artisans prevented the implementation of a widespread policy of employing African builders. The strength of white artisan opposition is evident in the fact that even a scheme to employ Africans on housing maintenance work in Durban in 1948 was successfully opposed. [108] It was only after 1951 when the Building Workers Act was passed allowing for the employment of Africans at lower wages within certain restricted areas that progress could be made. Therefore, by 1955 the council was employing African building contractors and converting from sub-economic to economic housing schemes in order to reduce costs.

In the 1940s, failing successful implementation of a scheme whereby African building artisans could be used in place of white artisans, the Durban city council began increasingly to demand that employers
should bear some of the costs for African housing. In December 1945, the Finance Committee of the municipality threatened publicly that if employers did not provide accommodation for their own African employees, they should be compelled to 'pay the city council an economic rent.' [110] While the city and water engineer suggested 'that serious consideration should be given by the Government to introducing legislation...whereby the government or local authority could be empowered to collect from the employer...the difference between formula rents and actual rentals which have been assessed according to the ability of the tenant to pay..." [111] According to the municipal NAD this was justifiable because subsidisation became necessary given the fact that Africans could not afford economic rentals as a consequence of 'the low wages paid by employers.' [112] However, to avoid such a policy having detrimental effects on the profitability of industry in Durban, a city council representative to the DNAC pointed out that the matter had to be viewed 'from the employers' point of view' as well. For if employers were compelled to share in the subsidisation of African housing, their share in the subsidisation of African housing would have to be adjusted in the wage paid to workers. It was suggested, therefore, that the wage determination applicable in Durban since 1940 'should be amended to provide that an employer shall be entitled to deduct a maximum of one-tenth of the wage...' [113]

However, representatives of commerce and industry do not seem to have been unanimous on the issue of African housing costs. In 1949 the president of the Natal Chamber of Industries, Peppercorn, criticised any scheme of subsidisation arguing that, at existing wages, African workers could afford the cost of economic housing. [114] After a meeting between the Minister of Native Affairs and representatives of various municipalities in 1949, when a levy of 2/6d on all employers of African workers was proposed for the first time, the Natal Chamber of Industries complained that the effect would be an increase in the real wage of one section of the industrial labour-force while that of other sections remained unaltered. [115] In contrast, the Durban Chamber of Commerce indicated to the DNAC that its members were prepared to contribute to African housing finance as long as this was backed by concomitant 'deduction...from the Natives' wages as well.' [116] The Industrial Employers' Association representatives to the same commission held that at least a few very large industrialists in Durban 'would be prepared to contribute towards a sufficiency, although their views are not quite unanimous.' [117] Interestingly, it was the Durban Chamber of Commerce alone which stood firmly on the issue. At the Pietermaritzburg Conference of the Associated Chamber of Commerce in October 1949, 'eloquent pleas by Durban members asking for "reasonable contributions" from employers were turned down.' [118] The division among capitalists regarding the financing of African housing may be explained by the fact that many had become accustomed to a system of housing finance dependent largely on the wage paid to African workers. Moreover, as most industrial capital within the period was not sufficiently involved in the production of wage goods aimed at black workers, most capitalists could not perceive immediate advantages from an increase in the real wage resulting from a decrease in the burden of housing costs on workers. Thus, a decrease in the value of commodities which enter only marginally (if ever) into the value of African labour power, as Marx has argued, 'causes only a relative fall in the value of labour-power.' [119] Consequently, an increase in African real wages in this context would potentially constrain rather than contribute to surplus-value appropriation. Although the government accepted in principle that employers should be taxed on African housing in 1949,
the new Minister of Native Affairs (H.F. Verwoerd), pending the passage of the Building Workers' Act, on 1 May 1951 refused to proceed with legislation imposing a tax on employers:

Because there is the aim of building economically, I have decided for the time being not to proceed with a Bill which was under consideration, and that was to impose a special burden on the employers...[120]

It was only as a consequence of consistent municipal protests that the Services Levy Act was gazetted on 11 July 1952. The Act imposed a charge of 2/6d to cover housing and transport costs for every employee not accommodated by employers. These contributions would be paid into an NRA sub-account entitled the Native Services Levy Fund.

(iii) The Land Question

It has been suggested above that recent arguments on the persistence of informal settlements around South African cities (Durban in particular) in the 1930s and 1940s have been too strongly influenced by local authorities' claims of financial incapacity. The Durban city council's NRA has been analysed to demonstrate that this municipality was financially not as weak as may be assumed from the council's official pronouncements. However, even if financial considerations motivated the council to allow shanty towns to expand, it has been argued that the existence of these settlements posed other contradictions which threatened not only the financial stability of council resources but also the profitability of capitalist industry. In this section, it is endeavoured to demonstrate that other factors could have limited the municipality's housing policy as well. An interesting example studied here briefly is the determination on the part of Indians and Africans to maintain their limited access and rights to land in rural and peri-urban areas surrounding Durban.

On 10 November 1939, the city council resolved to expend an amount of £546 000 pounds for both economic (3 848 000 pounds) and sub-economic (1 698 000 pounds) housing of the Indian, white and coloured population of the city. The programme envisaged the construction of a total of 5 630 houses to be completed over 8 years. [121] The success of this scheme, if it was to be consistent with municipal segregationist policy, would require the expropriation of land owned by whites and Indians in five areas. These were: Riverside (Umlazi North), Merebank/Wentworth, Sparks Extension, Springfield Extension and Sydenham. Although Indians were to gain more land in the form of housing schemes for that section of the population as a whole, there was vehement opposition among Indians to the council's scheme. For example, on 2 March 1941 a mass gathering of 3 000 Indians convened by the Natal Indian Association (NIA) condemned the council's scheme as an infringement on existing rights of Indians in these areas and committed the organization to make representation to the central government and the government of India to defend these "vested rights". [122]

Among the Indian population in Durban the question of access to urban land has significance in the quest among wealthier Indians to accumulate wealth through the letting and sale of land. Among poorer Indians, access to land was a crucial means to resist proletarianisation or total subordination to wage labour. At the end of their indentures many Indians set up as smallholders involved in market gardening in the 1860s on land leased from white owners or bought for as much as 25 - 60 pounds an acre. [123] In the 1880s, however, despite these high costs, market gardeners were so
successful that it was reported in 1882 that "they almost monopolised the maize, tobacco and garden production in the coastal districts". [124] This success must be attributed to the enthusiasm demonstrated by market gardeners for their trade, a tendency dramatically recorded by the Indian Immigrants Commission Report of 1885-87:

From an early hour in the morning Indian hawkers, male and female, adults and children, go busily with heavy baskets on their heads from house to house and the citizens can daily, at their own doors and at low rates, purchase wholesome vegetables and fruit...[125]

The result was that, by 1904, Indian smallholders achieved profits of 335 300 pounds while total acreage cultivated increased from 3 000 in 1877 to 41 000 acres by 1907. [126] The earliest gardeners had established gardens within the vicinity of the central borough (in the Bayhead area), but were increasingly pressured outwards towards peri-urban areas such as Cato Manor, Sydenham and beyond the Berea Ridge. [127] This process of "decentralisation" of market gardening was made effective through the council's segregationist policy of reserving most central borough areas largely for white residential and industrial purposes over the period under review. Some smallholders began to use their plots for other economic purposes. For example, in the Riverside area, by 1941, there were 18 general dealer shops, 12 fresh produce dealers, 7 butcheries, 13 laundries and 6 dairies. Other activities included bankers, shoemakers and tin smiths. [128]

Yet, in this period under review, most smallholders did not have totally independent control over their land. During the late 1920s, despite legislation such as the Durban Land Alienation Ordinance passed in 1922 and designed to limit Indian land acquisition within the central borough, many petit bourgeois Indians invested in property purchased from whites. Most of this property was not acquired for personal use and accommodation by their owners. Instead, land and housing premises were a means for the Indian section of the petit bourgeoisie to accumulate wealth in the form of rent. For instance, the 'First Indian Penetration Commission...disclosed that, of the 512 subdivisions acquired by Indians from Europeans in the predominantly European areas of the Old Borough of Durban...only 150 were in Indian occupation'. [129] This process of so-called "penetration" by Indian land speculators was curbed by the Slums Act No. 53 of 1934 as the 'council deliberately pursued a policy of expropriating Indian-owned properties in the Old Borough...[130] Moreover, persistent white opposition to Indian 'penetration' over the 1930s culminated in the passage of the Trading and Occupation of Land (Transvaal and Natal) Registration Bill on 4 April 1943. [131]

It is possible that a consequence of these efforts to restrict Indian land rights in the central borough was to push many Indian housing and land speculators towards peri-urban areas. Therefore, even though the council planned to establish 1 050 acres for Indian housing in Merebank/Wentworth (above the total of 629 acres owned by Indians in the area), [132] this scheme was considered as unacceptable to Indian political organisations. One of the fears articulated was that large-scale Indian land speculators could lose a potential source of revenue as 'quite a number of Indian smallholders had not completed paying for the land they occupied...'. [133] These Indian land speculators may have accumulated considerable profits from the lease of land to gardeners - a situation which seemed clear to observers in 1949. Thus, it was reported that 'at present, lands suitable for
cultivation of vegetables in and near Durban are leased at annual
rentals of one Pound and 10/- to four pounds per acre, and lands
under bananas, pineapples and other fruits are let at one Pound to
two pounds and 10/- per acre’. [134]

However, smallholders may have supported the opposition to the
council’s expropriation proposals despite the low per capita incomes
derived from gardening. In 1949, the average annual income per garden
was only 122 pounds and 7/-. [135] But even such low incomes from
market gardening were for many a useful subsidy for low wages paid in
capitalist industry. For instance, a hotel waiter gardening ‘one and
a half acres added 60 pounds a year to his total wage of 15 pounds
per month...’ [136] Even if market gardening became less lucrative,
access to peri-urban land could be used to generate other sources of
income such as shack renting. The success of Indian opposition to
land expropriation for council housing purposes seems to have been
sustained throughout the 1940s. Therefore, the council’s 704
sub-economic houses constructed at Springfield by 7 June 1940
remained unoccupied by 20 November of the same year, despite the fact
that low rentals were charged for municipal sub-economic housing.
[137] Moreover, it was only in 1949/50 that land purchases for Indian
housing schemes were completed, [138] even though Ministerial
approval had been granted for expropriation of land in
Merebank/Wentworth as early as 1942.

The council’s plans for African housing, over the period under
review, were consistently perceived within a segregationist framework
which envisaged the establishment of African housing in areas south
of the old borough. One of the reasons for this was that the spatial
growth of most industries occurred in Durban towards the south of the
old borough. Another incentive was to keep African housing
settlements 'a safe distance from the city centre,' [139] and clearly
separated from white-occupied land. For instance, the quest to
establish an African location on Wood’s estate in the 1920s and early
1930s was opposed by the South Coast Junction Area Local
Administration and Health Board, which represented white interests.
[140] However, these interests were appeased firstly, by establishing
the Lamont Location on 425 hilly acres of Wood’s Estate while flat
land was reserved for industrial purposes; and secondly, a suggestion
was made that 'a neutral belt of ground should separate the township
area from land likely to be occupied by whites.’ [141] Ultimately,
the most significant appeasement was that Africans housed in the
area were not allowed freehold title to the land.

As a consequence of African complaints regarding the inconvenient
distance from the city centre of the Lamont Location, the council
constructed its second housing scheme in Cato Manor, known as
Chesterville. However, the council did not intend to extend the
Chesterville location as it envisaged the transformation of the whole
of Cato Manor into an Indian residential area. In fact, the existence
of Chesterville seemed to have been a thorn in the exercise of a
thoroughly segregationist policy. Therefore, the Natal Provincial
Post-War Works and Reconstruction Commission in its Ninth Report
(1945):

Opposed the existence of a Native Island at Blackhurst Estate
(Chesterville) where there are between 10,000 to 14,000 Natives. It
was proposed that the Native area should be allocated for Native
settlements...[142]

At Lamont there was only sufficient land for 850 houses. According to
the committee on post-war development, the only area available which could be suitable for all future housing schemes was the 7 821 acres to the south of Durban, known as the Umlazi Mission reserve. The commission supported its arguments by pointing to the potential advantages to industry of locating African housing in the Mission Reserve, stating:

That the Umlazi Mission Reserve is ideally situated for serving the southern half by reason of its proximity to the existing and potential industrial area stretching from the head of the Bay to the Umbogintwini River and also on account of its accessibility to rapid road and rail transport. [143]

These proposals were put forward despite the residence on this land of 800 rural African families. The justification for this was that many of these residents worked in Durban as ‘...264 weekly and 43 monthly tickets are purchased by members of these families to enable them to travel to and from employment in Durban, the reserve is actually well on its way to urbanisation. [144]

In the same year, the city council decided to apply to the Minister of Native Affairs to acquire this land ‘free of charge,’ [145] to rehouse the city’s African population residing in informal settlements. No special concessions were conceived to be necessary for the residents of the Umlazi Mission because, according to the town clerk of Durban: ‘In any case, it is not proposed to remove the present occupiers but rather to rehouse them where necessary and make available to them various services common to other urban locations...’ [146] Thus, in the case of the Umlazi Mission Reserve as well, the council confronted the ‘vested interests’ of the area’s inhabitants consisting of over ‘100 cane growers and a rapidly increasing number of market gardeners,’ [147] subsisting on land with ‘soil, although for the most part sandy, is capable of growing many subtropical crops’. [148] Under such favourable conditions it is not surprising that residents feared the consequences of the council’s urbanisation schemes. Therefore, one of the questions which African residents posed to the city council regarding the council’s plans to acquire the land was about ‘the nature of the future settlement and approximately what proportion will be set aside for individual tenure.’ [149] As a consequence of the ‘vigorous opposition from the residents of the reserve and their ecclesiastical leaders’, the Native Affairs Commissioner appointed to enquire into the matter denied the city council the right to purchase this territory for urban African housing. [150] The commission rejected the council’s application on the grounds that the area of 2 200 acres was still valuable for the agricultural production of bananas, mangoes, avocado, pears and citrus. [151] Moreover, the commission argued that the Mission Reserve had been occupied as a rural settlement as early as the Deed of Grant by the Church of England in 1862 and was too remote from the city centre. Locations such as Lamont and Chesterville, it was insisted, could be extended to accommodate Durban’s increasing African population.

Faced with the persistence of its shantytown problem, the council was not deterred in its efforts to acquire land in the Mission Reserve for its African population. As a concession, the Broome Commission of 1947 had conceded that at least 170 acres should be made available to the city council for a ‘transit camp’ accommodating 600 families. [153] The council rejected this concession, arguing that it was too limited to allow for rapid population increases in Durban. Consequently, the Broome concession could not effectively replace the
shack settlement problem which, moreover, constrained the city council's capacity to enforce influx controls. [154] As a more reasonable proposal, the council suggested to the Minister of Native Affairs that between 700 and 1,000 acres of reserve land should be granted for its housing purposes. At a conference with the Minister in early 1948, it seemed that some settlement in favour of the council would be achieved. For example, it was accepted that while a Native Affairs Commission would investigate the council's proposals, in the interim 'the Durban City Council should proceed forthwith to establish a controlled "transit camp"' [155] for shack 'families'. However, by 1948 the Native Affairs Commission, 'ever sensitive' to obtaining 'the goodwill of the Natives,' reported that the Minister of Native Affairs could not implement the council's scheme. [156] In June the government decided to urbanise the Mission Reserve without transferring it to the Durban local authority, setting out specific concessions to the residents. Some of these concessions were:

2(a) ...the provision of plots with individual title.
(b) ...the provision of dwellings on a leasehold basis with option to purchase after a qualifying period...
3 Existing Mission reserve residents disposessed of their holdings would be given preference in the allocation of sites and be permitted to acquire individual title.
4 Such disposessed residents would be paid compensation. [157]

These concessions were intended to appease the fear among Mission reserve residents that they 'would be subject to municipal control' whereby they would be forced to pay monthly rents and would thereby be deprived of security of tenure. [158] Consequently, by 1956 the council's own housing plans were pushed northwards towards the Umgeni River where Kwa Mashu was established as a municipal housing scheme. [159]

Apart from the land question, however, the council's housing plans were also frustrated by administrative deficiencies. For example, the council complained that there tended to be long periods of lapse between the municipality's efforts to complete its housing schemes and the obtaining of Ministerial approval. In this regard there were no legislative limits on the time before a Minister could legitimately approve of any scheme. [160] For example, Mr. Howes of the city council, complained in 1944 that four or five years had elapsed in the construction of the Merebank Native Hostel pending Ministerial approval. [161] Moreover, the council's inadequate provision of formal housing had the side effect of rendering even the councils efforts to 'peg' or limit the day to day expansion of shack settlements ineffective.

For instance, it was reported that the police had refused to take action against shack dwellers, or magistrates would not grant orders for removals. The frequent inaction of the police or magistrates found justification in terms of Section 5 of the Municipal Native Registration Regulations in which it was made compulsory that 'natives should only live on their employers' premises, or in locations' and, in terms of an agreement 'between the council and the responsible Minister, that until we could provide alternative housing for the people living on premises, they would not be disturbed... [162] These factors, rather than providing an incentive for the council to speed up its housing programme, merely allowed for the escalation of the shack settlement problem.
Conclusion:

As part of the broader effort in this dissertation to develop a historical and theoretical critique of the cheap labour thesis and the structuralist-functionalist manner in which it conceives the problems of reproduction and control, this chapter has endeavoured to subject a weaker variant of that thesis informing social historians to criticism. For example, where the cheap labour thesis conceives of relations of reproduction and control on the level of articulating modes of production, where one mode (i.e. capitalist) 'subsists' on the other (pre-capitalist), the argument under consideration here seems to perceive a similar relation between the social and spatial framework (i.e. the capitalist city) of the capitalist mode, and the social and spatial sphere (i.e. shanty towns) of an informal petty commodity mode.

These shanty towns have been conceived to have saved the local state and capitalists the need to incur the costs for part of the social reproduction of black workers (especially housing). This is because informal housing provided a cheap form of accommodation, constructed with a minimum of capital outlay. In Durban, a further advantage was that these settlements were in close proximity to centres of employment and shopping than the council's current and planned housing schemes at the time. This eliminated the need for subsidising transport or developing subsidised transport facilities. It has been suggested here, however, that the contradictions involved were more complex. For instance, although informal settlements were cheaper to construct (and without municipal involvement), the commoditisation of shack accommodation at high values by shanty town landlords tended to increase the cost of living to occupants and thereby provided incentive for workers' struggles over the wage. Furthermore, the lack of adequate transport subsidisation affected capitalist productivity adversely as workers either waited long hours for a limited bus service or took to walking long distances to save time.

Another related argument which has been reviewed here is the notion that the local state neglected its task of eliminating informal settlements and providing sub-economic housing as a consequence of its financial limitations. This has been challenged on the grounds that the local state (i.e. the Durban municipality) tended to exaggerate the financial problem, especially given the remarkable solvency of its NRA, based largely on indirect taxation of African workers themselves. Attempts by the council to make the NRA appear as a particularly limited resource have thus been subjected to critique. This has been particularly necessary because the city council's official comments on the NRA have influenced recent historical writing.

Having subjected the financial issue to critical assessment, the final section proposes briefly that an alternative explanation for the housing crisis in Durban in the period under review should be sought in the struggle on the part of the petit bourgeoisie intent on accumulating profit through leasing land for housing and market gardening purposes, and the resistance by smallholder tenants to full proletarianisation. Examples considered here are the opposition of Indians to the council's plans to expropriate land within the extended borough of Durban for housing purposes, and the opposition of African tenants in the Umlazi Mission reserve to the councils attempts to transform the reserve into an urban residential area for its African shack population. However, more detailed research on the land and housing issue is required if the questions raised in this chapter are to render tangible answers.
FOOTNOTES (Chapter IV)

1 Cooper F. (ed) op cit, p.32
2 Durban Housing Survey, Natal Regional Survey, 1950, p.1
3 City Treasurer, Durban 'Memorandum on the financing of Native Housing' n.d., PNAB Manuscripts KCF52, 0.4
4 Ibid, p.4
5 Durban Housing Survey, op cit, p.277
6 Judicial Commission on Native Affairs in Durban - City Council Memoranda, Chapter VIII, p.4
7 Durban City Council evidence DNAC, 10 December 1947, p.12
8 City Treasurer, Durban: 'Memorandum on the financing of native housing,' op cit, p.6
9 'Notes on the views of the Durban Chamber of Commerce on certain aspects of the Inquiry,' 29 October 1947, p.3
11 Cooper, F (ed) (1983) op cit, p.29
12 Burgess, R. (1978) "Petty Commodity Housing or Dweller Control?" World Development, Vol.6, 9/10, p.1115
13 Durban Housing Survey, p.388
14 'Meeting held in the office of the Honourable Minister of Health on 21 March 1946 to discuss the Native Housing Problem', p.2

M. Ballanger Papers item B.2 14.12 (1941-1950)
15 Letter from J.D. Rossouw to Mr. Ballanger, 8th Jan. 1942, Ibid
16 Durban Municipal NAD, "Memorandum for Delegates to the Municipal Executive Committee and Conference with the Minister of Native Affairs, C.T., April 1949", p.12 PNAB Manuscripts KCF52
17 South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), 'Report of the Natal Regional Conference' 31 July 1943, p.3
18 Kajee, A.I. "Indian Housing in and around Durban", Mabel Palmer Papers, KCM17 790, p.8
19 Replies to specific points raised in letters of protest received by the Durban City Council from several Indian Associations, TCF Box 4/1/3/2099, p.4
20 Annexure, Ibid, p.5
21 SAIRR, 1943, op cit
23 Malherbe, M. "A study of some Indian families in Durban", Ibid, p.40
25 Natal Regional Survey "Draft Chapter on Zulus of Natal submitted to the Durban Native Administration Dept.", 17 August 1950, pp. 15-16, PNAB, KCF 45
26 Letter by M. Mhlakoana to Town Clerk, 13 May 1947, TCF Box 4/1/3/168
28 Regulation for Native locations and hostels with the City of Durban, Amendment No. 140, 1952, PNAB, KCF52
29 Letter from S. Bourquin to the Superintendent, Chesterville Location, 17 April 1952, PNAB, KCF52
30 Quoted in Torr, L. (1985), op cit, p.90
Ibid, p.146
Ibid, p.158
Ibid, p.154
Natal Regional Survey, "Draft Chapter on Zulus", op cit, p.25
The Dunlop Survey, op cit, p.131
Ibid, p.128
Ibid, p.130
Ibid, p.129
Ibid
Notes on the views of the Durban Chamber of Commerce, op cit, p.3
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Torr, L. (1985), op cit, p.150
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Ibid, p.45
Natal Regional Survey, "Draft Chapter on Zulus", op cit, p.18
Town Clerk to the Secretary for Native Affairs, 30 November 1943, TCF Box 4/1/3/1712, p.1
The Guardian, 12 July 1951
Curtis, F.A. (1983), op cit, p.54
City and Water Engineer's Memorandum re Wage Board investigation, unskilled work, Durban 1940-1945, TCF Box 4/1/3/11
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Ibid, p.109
Quoted in Guernault, P.H. and Randall, R.J. (1940) "Urban Native Housing in South Africa" Race Relations, Fourth Quarter, p.75
Ibid, p.77
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CONCLUSION

In the period between 1920 and 1950, the South African political economy experienced important socio-economic changes, such as the rapid expansion of an industrial capitalist sector (particularly in the post-depression years) and the emergence of a proletarianised African labour force which was distinguishable from the mass of unskilled migrant workers. Throughout the period under review, the state attempted, by constantly amending and reinforcing the pass laws, to manage this process of differentiation in the interests of industrial capital without necessarily harming those of mining or agriculture.

Before Hindson (1983 and 1987) this process of differentiation between migrant and proletarianised workers had not been adequately conceptualised to produce a sound Marxist interpretation of the South African political economy. South African Marxism has been strongly influenced by a 'dual' economy model in which pre-capitalist modes of production and reproduction necessarily decline relative to the expansion of the capitalist mode. Wolpe (in particular) used this model to develop a theory in which capital accumulation occurred less on the basis of its own relations of production and reproduction. The persistence of pre-capitalist relations of production ensured that African labour power was not fully commoditised, and thereby contributed to higher rates of surplus value appropriation in the capitalist economy. This occurred because part of the value of that labour power was subsidised through the families of workers subsisting on consumption goods produced within the pre-capitalist economies of African reserves. In addition, because workers migrated between capitalist urban and pre-capitalist rural areas the reproduction of that labour power was partially catered within pre-capitalist relations of production.

In Wolpe's analysis the intensified enforcement of pass regulations in the apartheid period (post-1948) was mainly intended to maintain the conditions of reproduction of migrant labour power, which were passing through a period of rapid deterioration. This thesis has been challenged recently by Hindson. The basis of Hindson's critique is the demonstration that, historically, pass laws functioned in various ways not specific to the reproduction of migrant labour power. For example, in the period under consideration here, and for most part of the apartheid period, pass laws were used to regulate and to differentiate between the conditions of reproduction and control of both migrant and proletarianised African workers. This was crucial, especially given industrial capital's increasing requirements for a socially stabilised workforce to perform various semi-skilled operative tasks in the industrial labour process.

By pointing to changes in capitalist labour processes (consequent upon mechanisation) and by relating these to changes to the emergence of a proletarianised African workforce, Hindson implicitly relocates the process of surplus value appropriation within capitalist relations of production. However, Hindson accepts Wolpe's understanding of migrant labour power. In Hindson's argument at a less developed stage in South African capitalist development (i.e. when mining industry was the main sector of the economy), capitalists did rely on migrant labour power. Such an argument ignores Marx's conception of absolute surplus value appropriation in which the rate of surplus value extraction is increased through an extension of the
working day. This is achieved through the lengthening of that part of a day’s labour which accrues to the capitalist as unpaid labour and a minimisation of that part which is paid to the worker for his own subsistence. If the extension of the working day was to be successful, historically capitalists have had to deprive workers of access to alternative means of production (and subsistence) and to challenge the control certain sections of the working class exercised within the labour process. In our introduction, reviewing the literature on South African political economy, it was shown that even amongst mine employers, the migrancy of the South African labour-force made any efforts to regiment that labour supply a rather arduous process. In fact, the underlying explanation for the failure to establish an effective recruiting monopsony among mine employers before 1920 lies in the access migrant workers had to pre-capitalist means of production.

Following Frederick Cooper’s analysis of dock workers in Mombasa, in Chapter II it is argued that despite the ‘subsidy’ pre-capitalist means of subsistence provided towards the value of African labour-power, this did not necessarily ensure that migrant labour would remain absolutely cheap. As social agents with a capacity for struggle, Durban’s migrant workers used their access to pre-capitalist means of production consistently to challenge employers for higher wages. One of the ways in which this could be effective was through open conflict (e.g. strikes) especially among Durban’s dock workers in the 1930s and 1940s. Some employers (e.g. the S.A.R. & H.) responded by increasingly replacing migrant labour with proletarianised labour.

In Chapter III, the themes introduced in Chapter II are developed further. The first part of the chapter challenges the mechanistic manner in which cheap labour theorists (e.g. John Rex) have conceived institutions of social control over migrant labour as functional to the cheap labour system. It is suggested firstly that compounds did not emerge as a means to enforce the return of workers to their reserves, but were established in a context of class struggle between employers and workers. Secondly, contrary to Rex’s view that compounds were institutions of total control, it is argued (following recent social historiography) that workers repeatedly challenged their subordination within these institutions of social control. In Durban, their struggles were facilitated by the existence of an alternative socio-economic sphere in the shantytowns which attracted the attentions of migrant workers congested in compounds on the docks and industrial areas. The local state’s response was to endeavour to decentralise compound accommodation and to segregate compounds in comprehensive urban locations where adequate recreational facilities could be provided if workers were to be weaned from the subversive shanty town environment.

In the latter part of Chapter II, the argument that the process of differentiation was necessarily a function of changes in the capitalist labour process, was challenged. One of the arguments advanced in this regard was that transformation in capitalist labour processes in South Africa were halted by the strong control white craft unions held over the labour process in sections of secondary industry. This contributed to the persistance of migrancy among a large section of the African population in the sense that many work positions requiring more stabilised labour supplies were not open to them before 1950. In Section II of Chapter III, Hindson’s concept of differentiation is developed in a rather different way. In this
section, I focus on the social and cultural conditions through which differentiation may be perceived. In Hindson’s thesis differentiation between proletarian and migrant workers was an observable fact which the State, through pass regulations, intended to entrench. Such differentiation is observable in the increasing number of women and children living in urban areas, as their presence indicated that a larger number of Africans were living under urban family conditions. Section II of Chapter III shows that given the struggles of many African women for independence from patriarchal domination, family life among urban Africans was so unstable that it was difficult in practice to clearly distinguish between migrant and proletarianised Africans. For example, one informant (a migrant worker in Durban during the 1940s) claimed that many migrant workers living in compounds had two ‘wives’, and urban ‘wife’ and a rural ‘wife’.

However, Chapters II and III did not confront directly the ‘dual’ economy model contained in the Wolpe thesis. This task is taken up in Chapter IV through a discussion of the housing finance question. Wolpe’s work is not addressed specifically. Instead, his understanding of the relation between capitalist and pre-capitalist relations of production and reproduction were considered through a discussion of social historians’ view of the relation between housing finance and informal housing. These social historians, it is argued, tend, like Wolpe, to conceive the informal or petty commodity mode on the outskirts of the capitalist city as providing a form of non-capitalist subsidy towards the costs of social reproduction of black workers (especially in housing).

It is argued that this view is limited in the context of Durban, as informal housing was not provided in a non-commodity form. Indeed, rents for shack accommodation tended to be higher than municipal rents. Moreover, contrary to the view popularised by the city council itself that black (especially African) housing was a financial liability, it is argued that the existence of the NRA (based largely on the indirect taxation of African workers themselves) provided a particularly viable source of income which effectively prevented the council from taxing employers or the white community generally.

Through a study of three particular aspects of black working-class life and labour in Durban (1920–1950), namely the unskilled labour market, social control and housing, the present dissertation has endeavoured to challenge the cheap labour theory. The argument draws both on classical Marxian theory on the relation between production and reproduction (especially in Chapters II and IV) and on recent social historiography to show that, historically, capitalism in South Africa was not functionally dependent on pre-capitalist relations of production and reproduction.

It has been suggested, in fact, that the existence of pre-capitalist modes constrained the development of South African capitalism. These constraints were various, including:

a) The capacity for resistance to total subordination under capitalist labour processes migrant workers demonstrated, given their access to some means of production and subsistence.

b) Labour shortages caused by the rapid movement of workers between capitalist and non-capitalist spheres of production and reproduction.

c) The incapacity of the state and capital to impose social controls over a working-class which had not been culturally conditioned in the norms of capitalist time and work rhythms.
Furthermore, contradictions in capitalist surplus value appropriation were compounded by the limited extent to which capitalists provided for (i.e. given their dependence on non-commodity or petty commodity processes of distribution and exchange) the social reproduction of its black workforce. This problem is studied in Chapter IV on sub-economic housing and the financing of such housing in Durban. It is argued that the state and capital had to devise means such as state pass controls and state housing financing systems (although themselves contradictory), within the capitalist sphere of production and reproduction to overcome these contradictions.
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