THE POLITICS OF CO-OPTATION AND OF NON-COLLABORATION

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DECLARATION

I hereby certify that this research is the result of my own investigation and that it is not being submitted concurrently in candidature for any other degree.

Signed: [Signature]

I certify that the above statement is correct.

Signed: [Signature]

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ABSTRACT

Since the outbreak of the Soweto uprising in 1976 there has been a noticeable change in the thinking of the South African government. This change has been evident in the departure from classical Verwoerdian apartheid to reform apartheid where the state has increasingly undertaken a programme of restructuring of political positions. The main strategy has been to co-opt blacks into statutory bodies such as the homelands, the tricameral parliament and town councils. In response to this shift in policy, blacks have intensified resistance to reform apartheid by forming a number of "extra-system" organisations which have constituted the extra-parliamentary opposition.

Co-optive reforms have not been limited only to the political sphere, a number of social and economic measures intended to accommodate 'qualifying' blacks have also been introduced notably by the private sector. For instance, private corporations have attempted to 'deracialise' positions at work by instituting 'black advancement' programmes to integrate the workforce and allow for occupational mobility across all races. Further, there has been a measure of relaxation in the social sphere: petty apartheid in the form of restrictions on mixed audiences in places of entertainment has been abolished, the Immorality Act and the Mixed Marriages Act are no longer on the statute book and private schools as well as white liberal universities opened their doors to black pupils and students.

The main objective of this thesis has been to establish how the African elites who qualify as the 'main beneficiaries' of these changes react to reform. The thesis is, therefore, a reflection of the attitudes of 93 respondents selected from the professional and managerial ranks, community leaders and opinion-makers in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging Complex in the Transvaal, the Durban-Pietermaritzburg region in Natal, and
from the Eastern Cape. This almost covers the main urban metropolitan complexes excluding the Western Cape and the Orange Free State, and therefore, almost represents a national survey of African elites.

Findings drawn from the data indicate that, in the main, African elites reject co-optation as an avenue of inclusion into the 'centre' of power primarily on political grounds. In the views of the majority of the subjects in this thesis, the solution to the national question is critical to any strategy of accommodation, and this precedes any other arrangements - economic educational etc. This 'primacy of the political' refutes any suggestions that a subordinate group may be won over through economic and status rewards without attending to the basic issues of human rights which are, in essence, political.

Secondly, the findings demonstrate that co-optation as a hegemonic strategy has not achieved the intended objectives. It has failed to legitimate a process of elite incorporation in spite of derived status and power that accrue to the beneficiaries as individuals. The subjects aligned themselves with the extra-parliamentary opposition as ideological opponents of apartheid including reform apartheid both in terms of policy and strategy.

The thesis ends with three scenarios. The first postulates the failure of co-optation as a strategy and examines the possibility of non-collaboration as a successful substitute. This is, however, not possible in the immediate future given the power of the state on the one side and the weaknesses on the part of the extra-parliamentary opposition on the other, particularly at the level of organisation, and discipline as well as the capacity to deliver the requisite material goods and services to the masses. The second scenario projects a situation where co-optation succeeds. This is, again, a difficult scenario to realise given the massive opposition against the present state and the inability of the South African government, as is presently constituted, to address basic issues of human
rights, issues which lie at the bottom of the present crisis. Finally, the remaining option is that the stalemate continues but with the possibility that both the present government and the extra-parliamentary opposition seek ways to reach workable alternatives as is crystalised in the pre-negotiations that are presently taking place.
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Dedicated to my late Grandparents:  
Daza and MaQiko Zulu  
for their love of Progress through Education.
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THE POLITICS OF CO-OPTATION AND OF NON COLLABORATION

CHAPTER 1

THE PROBLEM AND ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT

1. INTRODUCTION

The subject of this thesis is the attempts by the South African government (complemented by the private sector) to incorporate blacks into the structures of political and economic power. The government hopes to achieve this through a process of co-optation - a mode of differential incorporation of individuals or segments from an outsider group into the centre. In the South African context the mode of incorporation is not without problems. Co-opted elites are not absorbed or integrated into the centre or mainstream of society, but are rather pulled in under the auspices of "own affairs" which is a refined form of apartheid. The result is that this creates conditions which militate against the development of common values between the ruling bloc and the co-opted elites. The social distance created by this separation, coupled with the basic material inequalities between co-optor and co-opted, deprive the co-opted elites of the prerequisites, both material and ideological, for the defense of apartheid. However, in spite of the unevenness in positions and power, co-optation creates new avenues which in turn facilitate vertical social mobility and the acquisition of status and relative power for the collaborating elites.

Because access to power is largely determined by race, thus entailing racial domination, opposition to the status quo has been largely organised along nationalist lines. The emphasis of this thesis lies upon the perceptions, by African elites, of how the
government and the private sector manipulate socio-economic and political variables through the restructuring of political relations and economic positions in order to attain social stability by legitimation. The focus is on African elites because:

(i) Africans constitute the overwhelming majority of the population and racial policy has been directed mainly against them in order to exclude them from both political and economic power;

(ii) because of this they constitute one of the main targets for co-optation.

The thesis will pursue three main themes:

i) that the political and economic exclusion of individuals and groups does not necessarily reflect on their ability to influence or even transform established power structures;

ii) that, because of this ability, those in power respond by making attempts to contain the challenge to their privileged position. Co-optation as a strategy within reform falls within this domain;

iii) that besides creating social stability, co-optation may, and does, empower the co-opted elites to make shifts which may eventually undermine the existing power relations. This is crucial to the concept of co-optation.

In order to examine the above themes, the thesis will seek to achieve two objectives:

i) to test in theoretical terms the possibility of co-opting an African elite as a strategy by the ruling class faced with a major political crisis in the late 1970s and the 1980s, to legitimate the terms of domination; and

ii) to test empirically how African elites as the targeted population respond to a variety of co-optive measures.

Co-optation of the leadership, from the ranks of the opposition, by the state dates back to colonial days when chiefs and local notables were incorporated as an extension of the colonial administration. The formation of the Native Representative Council in 1936 was an attempt to include Africans into the structures of the state without giving them actual power. As an advisory body only, the Council had no voting powers. The government hoped that the Council would be a substitute for the limited franchise that a few Africans in the provinces of Natal and the Cape had enjoyed. The African National Congress (A.N.C.) and particularly the All African Convention protested against this political
emasculating but still agreed to serve on the Council. However, it was not long before the A.N.C. Youth League exposed the ineffectiveness of the Council as a "toy telephone" and applied pressure to the old guard to resign from it. The debate which ensued was over participation in state created structures in the hope of achieving changes in the political power relations.

Evidently, co-optation has a historical time limit. The present contact between the government and the African National Congress, together with the proposed negotiations on the constitutional future of South Africa, fall outside of the conceptualisation of co-optation as used in this thesis. The rationale by the government in the previous period of co-optive reform was that the state would persist in its present form. Whites would not only govern the country, they would continue to control the economy as well. Blacks would be appeased by being given control over "own affairs" with the white government defining what constitutes "own affairs". In the private sector, blacks would be included in the management ranks, and indeed, some could own shares in private corporations. However, because of the historical disadvantages of blacks in general, their access to economic power would not threaten white economic hegemony, particularly given the constraints imposed by legal and institutional structures, i.e. the Group Areas Act and the concentration of wealth in a few white-controlled conglomerates. Co-optation was thus predicated on white political and economic domination within which blacks would play a subordinate role. A system which allowed selective incorporation of outsiders into the mainstream would, however, legitimate the existence of structural inequalities by demonstrating that the onus for inclusion rested with the individual rather than with the system itself. In this way, South Africa could no longer be accused of racial domination.

In explaining the phenomenon of creating compliance from within the dominated, Adam asserts that "the strongest manipulative weapon for ruling elites is a policy that employs co-optation and concomitant fragmentation." He further claims that the practice
weakens adversaries "by skimming off the best talents" (Adam, H. and Moodley, K. 1986:144). This view, particularly the concept of 'concomitant fragmentation' implies opposition to co-optation. This introduces the aspect of non-collaboration which in the South African context has given rise to the extra-parliamentary opposition. In the present context the dominant elite i.e. the state as well as the private sector, hope that by relaxing elite boundaries they will defuse the conflict which has intensified since the Soweto uprisings of 1976. It was only after this violent confrontation that these twin partners in dominance openly accepted for the first time that their house was not in order, and that there was a crisis in the legitimacy of the system as it operated at that time.

Co-optation operates mainly in two spheres - the political and the economic - and in each of these spheres the power relations have been redefined not only between black and white, but between black and black as well. The state has broadened the process of differential incorporation of blacks into the political system in an attempt to defuse the legitimacy crisis. For its part, the private sector independently of the government has intensified initiatives which purportedly aim at 'deracialisation' in the workplace, through integrating the upper echelons of black employees into professional and managerial positions. This is not to imply any conspiracy theory of the economy and the polity, although there has been a circumstantial functional symbiosis between the two: rather it is stating simply the empirical evidence of mechanisms of elite incorporations or 'class differentiation' which may facilitate co-optation. While political pressures both internal and external have prompted the state to embark upon co-optive reform, the private sector has responded largely to market forces although the political component cannot be ignored. Co-optive measures go beyond the inclusion of outsiders as junior partners in the polity or selective upward mobility in the workplace. They include various aspects of social engineering varying from relaxing trade barriers to mixed (but not non-racial) schooling and sport, as well as encompass the new state's policy on urbanisation and
housing. In short, the reform package of the 1980’s shifts “state policy away from classic Verwoerdian apartheid” and entails:

i) “initiating a limited ‘democratisation’ (opening up) of ideological and political life;

ii) implementing the ‘deracialisation/reracialisation’ of social and political life;

iii) instituting a partial, and selective, ‘redistribution’ of social resources towards the black majority” (Morris, M; and Padayachee, V. 1988:7).

In the political sphere the creation of the Tricameral Parliament, the extension of powers of local government bodies, the restructuring of provincial bodies to include blacks and finally, the state president’s statutory council aim at reform by co-opting a segment of the disenfranchised into statutory bodies, albeit on a non-democratic or limited participatory basis. While allowing for a measure of ‘deracialisation’, the accentuation of “own affairs” as against “general affairs” entrenches ‘reracialisation’. And, further, what is significant about the reform programme is that the state possesses both initiative and control, thus accentuating the co-optive attributes in the process.

1.1 FROM VERWOERD TO REFORM

This section deals with reform as a process in the context of structural changes in society. It further highlights firstly, how reform has made co-optation possible, and secondly, how the contradictions inherent in this strategy have set limits on the very process which the strategy seeks to promote.

One major outcome of Verwoerdian apartheid was the compression of horizontal segmental differentiation among blacks, particularly Africans at least in terms of subjecting them to an even overall policy of discrimination irrespective of status and rank. Prior to this a ‘class’ of ‘exempted’ Africans, (ie Africans who were ‘exempted from
Native Law and Custom') had existed. 'Exemptions' had given limited false hopes (limited because they were very few in numbers) that it was possible for Africans to be assimilated into 'European culture' and enjoy limited privileges. What Verwoerd introduced rigidly was territorial, political and educational apartheid which dispelled the myth that Africans 'could ever be like whites'. Politically the bantustans would accommodate the aspirations of Africans within territories predicated upon ethnic and thus 'cultural homogeneity'. Urban areas were redesignated 'White South Africa' and the African was considered a temporary sojourner who was there only to sell his labour and could live there as a production unit for only as long as he was required to fulfill this specific function. The introduction of 'Bantu Education' removed Africans from English-speaking universities which had partially accommodated them until then, and sidelined them to 'bush universities', a tag applied by opponents of apartheid to all tribal colleges designed for separate ethnic groups. In short, Verwoerdian apartheid sought to demonstrate that in the eyes of the dominant group, all Africans were the same and had to remain as such; there would be no question of 'civilised natives', a better 'class' of Africans who could lay claims to the same treatment as whites.

What Verwoerdian apartheid overlooked were the unintended consequences of this 'compression' of segmental differentiation. Reducing all Africans into a 'class' of excluded outsiders was not only a political miscalculation but an economic contradiction as well. Politically, this conscientised the excluded into mass solidarity despite the bantustans, while the economic consequences of this compression were a shortage of skilled manpower in production. By the middle of the 1970s industry and commerce were experiencing shortages in skilled manpower when demographic imperatives demonstrated that whites were no longer meeting this demand. A system of migratory labour could not cope with the need (Hindson, D. 1988; Morris, M. and Padayache, V. 1989).
Political and economic developments in the 1970s created a crisis in Verwoerdian apartheid:

i) The emergence of black consciousness in the late 1960s resulted in greater political conscientisation in the early to mid-1970s.

ii) The growth of capital, especially in manufacturing, generated specific imperatives, ie the provision of skilled and semi-skilled labour.

iii) Pressures on the land rendered the bantustans less capable of sustaining their populations, thus undermining the material bases of migrant labour. The result of this incapacity was rapid urbanisation despite the rigid influx control regulations. Whereas Verwoerdian apartheid had prophesied and tried to plan for an exodus back to the homelands by 1978, the exact opposite occurred.

iv) External pressures, especially on multinational corporations, forced the initiation of codes of conduct which sought to introduce fair employment practices. In essence measures like the Sullivan Code designed for American companies operating in South Africa, meant pressure on those companies to ‘deracialise’ their occupational structures.

v) The labour strikes of 1973 brought home a clear message to capital: ‘accommodation’ of workers’ demands was a reality that capital had to face. The Wiehahn recommendations for the statutory recognition of African trade unions have to be seen within this context.

1.1.1 Major shifts in policy

While the above developments acted as predisposing factors for change, the Soweto riots of 1976 demonstrated that the country was in deep crisis and that immediate steps had to be taken.

The Soweto riots did not only precipitate a major turmoil in education, they also brought to a sudden halt the lull that had lasted for fifteen years since 1960, as well as signalled that there was an urgent need for immediate shifts in policy. Students constitute a potential elite in any society. The revolt by this potential elite was a demonstration that Verwoerd’s attempt to ‘compress’ classes was a failure. Consequently, there was consensus between government and big business that the solution to the problem of political and economic exclusion of the subordinates lay in the creation of a black middle
class with sufficient stake in the system. For this to be realised certain shifts in policy were imperative.

Big business took the initiative when Oppenheimer of the Anglo-American Corporation and Rupert of Rembrandt established the Urban Foundation, a body intended to improve the quality of life for urban Africans by facilitating access to housing, recreational facilities and other community resources in the townships. On its part, the government reciprocated by amending the legislation, particularly the aspects which dealt with the security of tenure, that made it difficult for Africans to access these provisions. The appointment of the Riekert Commission (see later in this chapter) has to be seen within this context.

By accepting the middle class route, it was evident that the ruling bloc had opted for a conscious policy of co-optation. Secondly this policy was directed at the urban segment of the African population and not at the rural section where the homeland policy had partly succeeded. The Transkei had become independent in 1976, Bophuthatswana in 1977, and Venda was on its way to independence as well. The remaining homelands had become administrative entities with government departments akin to those of fully-fledged states. The homeland bureaucracies had, at least, managed to effect day-to-day administration whereas the leadership had become allies for the government. Developing a parallel system in urban areas was, therefore, on the part of the government, both advisable and desirable. Since co-optation in the late 1970s to the early 1980s was directed at the urban areas, this thesis will focus on urban-centred developments rather than on the rural areas.

1.1.2 Structural changes in the ‘class’ nature of the African population

The 1980s have witnessed substantial changes, first in the objective positions occupied
by African workers in the economy, and secondly in the racial configuration of workers in industry, commerce and even in the public sector. For instance, the base of the occupational pyramid has altered. The number of Africans in the semi-skilled and skilled ranks has increased dramatically, while some have made encroachments into supervisory and management positions. In some instances, structurally, a number of Africans supervise whites or occupy positions higher than those occupied by whites. These developments have ushered in changes in the earning capacity of Africans and correspondingly changes in their spending power as well. The nett effect has been an increase in the demand for consumption items, including better houses.

The following tables demonstrate the changes in:

i) the enrollment of Africans at universities and technikons (1970 - 1989); and

ii) the number of Africans in mid to higher level positions in the economy, between 1970 and 1985.

### Table A

**Enrollment of Africans at Universities at Technikons 1970 - 1989**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Enrolled at universities</th>
<th>Enrolled at technikons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>7936</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>30689</td>
<td>2919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>123784</td>
<td>19292</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table B

**Africans in mid level to higher level occupations 1970 - 1985**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1 Professional, technical and related workers</th>
<th>2 Administrative, managerial and executive</th>
<th>3 Clerical, sales and related workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>83160</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>190,089</td>
<td>5108</td>
<td>374,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>192,463</td>
<td>10802</td>
<td>318,984</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In 1970 there was no distinction made between 1 and 2. The figure of 83,160 therefore includes Category 2 as well.

Tables A and B demonstrate:

i) the base from which both the government and big business could draw candidates for co-optation both into the state and into positions in industry and commerce;

ii) the extent, particularly Table B, of de-racialisation in the South African economy.

Changes in the occupational pyramid have necessitated changes in the sphere of reproduction, i.e., the migratory labour system predicated on temporary labour units did not have the capacity to reproduce skilled workers where stability, enshrined in permanent residence at the place of work, is an essential prerequisite. In addition, and particularly in times of recession, urbanisation could stimulate the economy through the provision of housing. Calls for 'orderly urbanisation' were thus intensified by the private sector, firstly to ensure a stable permanent labour force and secondly, to defuse the political bomb that influx control regulations seemed to keep on manufacturing. It is within this context that the Riekert recommendations have to be appraised, because it was their failure that led to the intensification of 'orderly urbanisation'.

Although the Riekert recommendations did not depart from classical Verwoerdian apartheid, they signified cracks in the edifice. Later developments in both the economy and the polity were to signify that if the South African state was to maintain stability, radical shifts were necessary in both the economy and the polity. The following sections will illustrate the moves from classical Verwoerdian apartheid to the current situation of reform apartheid.

1.1.3 The Process of Co-optive Reform

Between 1978 and 1984 the government was caught up in a two way process:

i) its own programme of co-optive reform;
ii) a combination of internal and external pressures some of which, particularly the internal ones, were partly generated by the reform process itself and partly by their own momentum.

1.1.3.1 The Government's process of Co-optive Reform

This aspect is elaborately dealt with in the sections 1.2.1 to 1.2.9 below. What I shall focus upon in this section are the manifestations of the deepening crisis, firstly the internal crisis and secondly a selective account of external variables.

1.1.3.2 The Deepening Internal Crisis

A The 'Revolution' in the Townships

The creation of town councils with extended powers (part of the Recommendations of the Riekert Commission) brought more problems than the intended solutions. The main cause of these was that firstly as local government structures the town councils were not financially viable, and secondly as 'substitutes' for political participation at the national level, Africans rejected them. Matters came to a climax when these illegitimate structures substantially increased rents and service charges in an attempt to raise revenue. In the meantime students had been intermittently restive since 1976/77. There were widespread riots in 1980 and 1981 mainly by African and Coloured students. By 1983 two additional developments had consolidated the opposition against the state. First, Koornhoff, then Minister for Co-operation and Development introduced bills proposing to further divide the urban 'insiders' from the rural 'outsiders', and secondly the government's Tricameral Constitution (see below) came into operation. When in 1984 the town councils announced the rent increases, all hell broke loose. The first response came in September 1984 from townships in the Vaal Triangle. Townships in Pretoria followed suit when students joined in protest against conditions in the schools. The
revolts soon spread to the townships in the Orange Free State, the Cape and Natal. The government responded first by deploying the police force and later the army to quell the riots. This started a wave of violence unprecedented in the country's history of protest.

In terms of magnitude and scale, the violence had a devastating impact both on the state and the protesting masses. By April 1986, 1 559 people, the vast majority of whom were Africans, had been killed, almost 13 000 had been detained, about 25 000 had been brought to trial for violent 'unrest' related offenses, approximately 3 000 private and 1 200 government buildings had been damaged; 807 police homes had been attacked, 33 policemen killed and 584 injured (Weekly Mail Unrest Barometer April 1986: Quoting figures released by the Minister of Justice in response to question in the House of Assembly). Since figures given by the government tend to be conservative when compared to those of private and academic institutions that monitor politically related violence, the position might, indeed, have been worse than is reflected in the above figures.

By mid 1985 the 'legitimacy crisis' had reached such proportions that the government had to declare a partial state of emergency. By then African local government in the townships had almost ground to a halt. "There were 350 000 African township residents in the Vaal Triangle who had not paid rent since September 1984, further 155 townships were caught up in the riots, 12 town councillors had been killed while 240 had resigned their positions and between 250,000 and 650 000 African students had boycotted classes at any given time" (Greenberg, S.B. 1987: 179).

In June 1986 the government was forced to declare a national state of emergency, a condition which lasted until 1990.
B Increase in Guerrilla Activity

By 1978 some of the exiles who had left the country immediately after Soweto 76 had started to come back as ANC guerrillas. The increase in guerrilla activity was such that between September 1984 and February 1986 there were 255 recorded incidents (Zulu 1986). More than the actual damage inflicted on the state, guerrilla action caused consternation among whites while it raised hopes among the subordinate groups who started to believe that the state was about to capitulate.

C External Pressures: A selective account

Increasing international isolation: Sanctions and disinvestment.

International pressure in the form of sports boycotts, trading restrictions ranging from limited sanctions to disinvestment and total embargoes have had a psychological and direct economic effect on both the government and business. By 1985 South Africa was 'officially' barred from almost 90 percent of world sports. International artists had almost ceased coming to South Africa and some sporting codes intensified the sports boycott by barring individual sportspersons from playing in South Africa. What, however, precipitated and intensified the crisis was the financial isolation of South Africa from the international fraternity.

D Financial implications of sanctions

Imposing embargoes on specific items had enormous financial implications on the South African economy. For instance, to take a strategic commodity, Woldendorp reports that between 1973 and 1984 South Africa had to pay an extra R22 billion in order to
circumvent the oil embargo. These costs included "the expenditure for the Sasol oil-from-coal plants, premiums paid to international oil traders and the cost of the strategic stockpile of oil" (Woldendorp 1990:197). Threats for mandatory sanctions revealed the vulnerability of the country's mineral trade and brought shivers to both businessmen and the government. Osborne's trade data for 1984 revealed that the costs of a trade embargo on South Africa's mineral exports would be R3,2 billion, an equivalent of 11,5% of the total export earnings of 1984 or a decline of 4,5% in the GDP (Colin Stoneman 1990).

The statistics quoted above are selective and very far from being exhaustive. What is intended is to demonstrate the enormous impact of trade embargoes and sanctions on key commodities such as oil and minerals which form the backbone of the South African economy.

It was largely in a direct response to the above political, social and economic pressures from both local and international forces that the government as the principal actor decided on reform as the main strategy to restore a measure of equilibrium in the system.

1.2 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF REFORM STRATEGIES: THE LATE 1970s TO THE 1980s

Co-optation finds visible expression in the reform strategy. While political reform in the form of a qualified franchise was proposed by the Progressive Party in the 1960s, and economic reform expressed in the various black advancement programmes also dates back to the 1960s, two events brought about a radical departure in the policies, first of the private sector and secondly, of the state. The labour strikes which broke out in 1973 and the Soweto riots in 1976 changed the political and economic complexion of South
Africa. While historically the state made concessions within apartheid, and most of these were symbolic (such as allowing foreign black diplomats to reside in white suburbs), recently a radical shift in the state’s position has occurred. Today the state accepts the inevitability of political and economic incorporation of the subordinates in a single national state. The problem is how to achieve this and still maintain control as well as the position of privilege.

1.2.1 Reforms in the Sphere of Production

Class analysts, notably of the structuralist version, have always discerned a determinant relationship between capital and the state (Legassick 1974, Wolpe 1976) or a collusion of interests between the two (Mann 1988, Cobbett, Glaser, Hindson and Swilling 1988, and finally Morris and Padayachee 1988). Nolutshungu (1983) regards race as a qualification for entry into economic power - a symbiotic relationship between the economy and the polity. In contrast, those theorists who espouse a liberal modernisation position (Horwitz 1967; O’Dowd, 1978; Adam 1971, 1975 and 1986 and to an extent James 1984) claim that racism and capital accumulation are incompatible. Hence, as more accumulation takes place, South African capital will deracialise, and is indeed deracialising.

In response to the 1973 strikes, capital embarked upon a programme of black advancement in industry and commerce. This was meant to absorb blacks into professional and managerial positions, particularly in the sphere of industrial relations where they would be best qualified to deal with labour problems. Later, because of the growth in black consumer power stimulated by rising wages, black professionals were appointed into positions in marketing and sales. However, this strategy could only cater for a few graduates: a shortage of technical skills as well as worsening labour relations needed urgent attention. Consequently, the government appointed the Wiehahn Commission to investigate labour relations. There is general agreement even among
divergent theorists (O'Meara, 1982; Nolutshungu 1983 and Adam and Moodley, 1986) that Afrikaner capitalism had reached sufficient maturity to be willing to engage in 'constructive reform'. "The defeat of Mulder marked a significant shift in the balance of class forces organised by the N.P. qua party under the banner of Afrikaner nationalism. By now Afrikaner business had effectively established itself as the dominant force in the alliance" (O'Meara 1982:14). On its part, capital had long been calling for reform in the sphere of production. With the dominant section in the state i.e. the government, willing to embark upon reform, the way was open for the Wiehahn Commission to operate. What later prevailed were the unintended consequences of the Wiehahn Commission, rather than the 'control' measure envisaged by the state, thus reflecting on the dynamics of co-optive reform.

Wiehahn recommended statutory recognition of African trade unions but emphasised the distinction between the economy and the polity by stipulating that the prerequisite for recognition was registration with the Industrial Council. One of the preconditions for this registration was that unions should desist from participating in undertakings other than purely union activities. By stipulating what constituted 'mutually defined rules' the state hoped that it would contain union activity, thus ensuring that there was no change in the power relations. The battle over the issue of registration is now history. What eventually emerged was a very powerful worker organisation incarnate in COSATU and NACTU, which poses challenges to power relations both on the shopfloor (economic) and community (political) levels. While the Act forbade formal association between registered unions and political organisations, in practice it is difficult to abstract a unionist who is also a member of the community, a commuter and a rent payer. Further workers used their power to effect a shift in the economic and ideological positions. For instance, the national calendar will never be the same after the workers' definition of May 1 and June 16 as 'national' public holidays.
With the unions sure-footed regarding their rights, demands for the removal of job reservation were intensified. Employers responded by applying more pressure on the state and finally in 1987, the last statutory remains of discriminatory legislation in employment, the Mines and Works Act, was amended. Thus, following an extensive investigation into occupational mobility in South African industry and commerce, Ngidi and Zulu concluded that "Evidence of upward mobility was found in the manpower survey material and in the policies of the surveyed companies. Coloured, Asian and African employees moved in large absolute numbers into operative, clerical and service occupations and now make up a large share of these job categories". (S.C. Ngidi and P.M. Zulu 1988:12) In a separate survey, Hindson expresses the same views (Hindson 1988). Although the survey by Ngidi and Zulu demonstrated small evidence of shifts in ratios in the professional and managerial occupations, in terms of absolute numbers, there has been a rapid increase in the number of blacks. It is only the smallness of the base from which they originate as well as their numbers in terms of the total population that makes such shifts appear negligible. In terms of social visibility they constitute a significant segment. The formation of the Black Management Forum (BMF) a professional association of blacks in management positions, is a clear crystallisation of this development and is not without social significance in the political economy of labour.

1.2.2 Reform Measures in African Urbanisation

Conventional apartheid policy was emphatic in two provisions:

i) territorial separation, and concomitantly

 ii) the temporariness of Africans in urban metropolitan centres as these fell within 'white South Africa'.

Soweto '76 forced a measure of sobriety in government thinking when for the first time the latter tacitly accepted that African urbanisation was a reality and introduced first the
30-year and subsequently the 99 year leasehold for African urban residents as substitutes for freehold rights. The appointment of the Riekert Commission in 1979 was envisaged to crystallise these rights as well as the necessary administrative mechanisms into policy in order to streamline and control subsequent developments. The Riekert Commission sought to consolidate the principle of territorial separation as well as achieve a ‘breakthrough’ in African urbanisation policy by ‘legalising’ the ‘acceptance’ of the permanence of Africans in urban metropolitan centres. It therefore, recommended:

i) that recognition be given to the permanence of Africans in urban centres. To this end those Africans who were in possession of Section 10.1 (a) and (b) rights were to be considered as ‘settled’ in urban areas. (Africans in possession of Section 10 1a or 1b rights were those who were a) born in urban areas or b) who had an unbroken service of 10 years with one employer or 15 years continuous service with different employers in one city or town). They could thus move freely within urban areas as long as there was both housing and employment for them. Politically, they would be accommodated in town councils in as far as local issues were concerned, and nationally they would achieve their political expression in their respective homelands;

ii) that influx control be removed from the ambit of the Administration Boards which were to be turned into Development Boards, and be relocated in the town councils which were to replace Community Councils.

Thus through a process of restructuring and renaming the state hoped to defuse the urban political bomb. The demise of the town councils following the township riots of 1984 to 1986 is now history. The causes were both material and ideological. The fiscal crises in the town councils following the ‘withdrawal’ of the Administration Boards compelled the former to raise rent and service charges in order to create revenue as the Administration Boards had been partly financed by the State. Meanwhile the private sector had long been assiduously lobbying for a new urban policy. Following the Soweto riots in 1976, Anton Rupert from Rembrandt and Harry Oppenheimer, Chairman of the Anglo-American Corporation, had founded the Urban Foundation specifically to attend to the sphere of reproduction i.e. housing and other resources and amenities in the townships. This initiative led to the constitution of the Private Sector Council on
Urbanisation - a body which lobbied for 'orderly urbanisation' and the consequent abolition of the notorious Influx Control regulations in 1986.

'Orderly urbanisation' resonates well with both monetarist or privatisation policies and with co-optive political reform.

i) It absolves the state from the responsibility for urbanisation and relocates this on individuals who have to provide their own housing and find jobs provided such housing conforms to the legal and health stipulations. Accordingly 'squatting' is prohibited while the Group Areas Act still limits the freedom of acquiring property and even constrains access to residences other than those situated within 'own group' areas.

ii) The abolition of influx control measures, coupled with the withdrawal of the state from active involvement in the construction of houses in favour of private enterprise has ushered in a number of construction companies into the township building industry. The incorporation of Africans in the professional and managerial categories into full benefits in employment both in the public and private sectors has facilitated the reality of privatisation in housing. Access to the housing subsidy or to housing loans has led to the establishment of "middle class" suburbs in the townships while loopholes in the legislation have created grey areas in white suburbs. Exponents of liberal modernisation hope this will create a safety valve for those Africans who can afford it, to move out of the humdrum of township life, thus facilitating a process of embourgeoisement.

Finally co-optive mechanisms are intended to stabilise the townships through a process of redistribution while leaving the social configuration between black and white unchanged. Creating middle class suburbs and allowing a few Africans to move into grey areas are on their own not sufficient to buy off mass dissatisfaction. The millions that reside in the periphery of cities, the shack dwellers as well as the bulk of the townships' residents are supposedly meant to benefit from the creation of Regional Services Councils. These bodies will comprise representatives from each 'own affair' area elected on the basis of consumption of specific commodities, say electricity. Their function will be the provision of public goods at the local level. Regional Services Councils constitute a form of deracialisation within racialisation, in that they are a form of local government that cuts across racial barriers while the constituent elements rest on race. The revenue will be generated from two sources:
i) "a regional establishment levy which is a tax on turnover; and

ii) the regional services levy which is a tax on wages and salaries" (Cobbett et al 1988:24).

Notwithstanding political implications as well as the mechanics of redistribution, it must be admitted that for the first time the state has openly acknowledged the contribution that Africans make to the generation of wealth in the country. In this is demonstrated the power of co-optation, the attempt to de-ideologise those aspects of socio-political life whose very origins and essence are ideological.

1.2.3 Education: Mixed Schooling

The precipitating catalyst in Soweto 1976 was the enforcement of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in African schools. It soon became evident that the entire system of 'Bantu Education' was in a state of collapse and had to be abolished. In response first the Roman Catholic Church and later the Anglican and the Methodist Churches decided to open their schools which operated as private (white) institutions to children of all races. The government responded first by threatening to withdraw subsidies from such schools but later relented, under pressure especially from the liberal press and the fear of international repercussions, and ruled that the majority population in those schools should remain white. This stipulation would enable the school to be registered under a specific 'own affairs' department and thus qualify for the appropriate subsidy. (The per capita subsidy for pupils is racially determined). By 1978 the government was allowing universities to register students of other race groups for special courses which were either not available in their 'own institutions' or where 'special circumstances’ obtained.

Reasons for this change of heart on the part of the government reflected the embryonic stages of co-optive reform and included accommodating the attempts at deracialisation.
by the private sector. A shortage of skills was creating problems for the economy especially in the midst of an economic boom of 1977-1980. Multinational companies responding to pressure from the Sullivan and E.E.C. Codes of Employment as well as South African companies answering to the Saccola Code were in the process of creating new avenues for black employees. The Anglo-American Corporation embarked on the Cadet Scheme which identified potential graduates in Science, Commerce and Engineering and sponsored their education at the University of the Witwatersrand with a view to offering them employment on completion of their degrees. The need to broaden the educational base of Africans, therefore, had its origins in moral as well as politico-economic pressures since Bantu Education had proved incapable of producing the required goods. When the educational and skills crises further deepened, the government appointed the de Lange Commission to look into the education and training of Africans, particularly with a focus on the provision of skills training, a further device for limited incorporation.

In spite of the Commission's recommendations for a single ministry of Education, the government opted for 'upgrading' particularly African education rather than integrating education in the country as a whole. "Educational reform is crucial to the strategy of limited incorporation of small numbers of blacks". (Chisholm L. in Kallaway, 1988:388).

While the state still lingered in uncertainty, the private schools as well as the English speaking universities had further opened their doors to black students. With regard to the universities the government attempted to impose a quota system whereby integration would not be allowed to exceed a specific percentage which it left to the universities to decide upon and submit to the Minister of Education. 'Open' universities vehemently opposed this move and eventually won the battle. Integration has gradually taken place at the four English speaking universities of the Witwatersrand, Cape Town, Natal and Rhodes as well as at the University of the Western Cape and of Durban.
Westville. The number of African students in Afrikaans speaking universities is insignificant.

The private sector made its most visible mark in the sphere of attempted integration in education when in 1984 it established the New Era Schools Trust (NEST) "a body dedicated to the establishment of schools in South Africa in which each of the race groups will be fully and fairly represented in the pupil enrolment." (The Nest Manifesto:1984). To date three such schools have been established, one near Johannesburg, the second one near Durban and the third in Port Elizabeth. The schools are 'multi-racial' i.e. take pupils on a principle of proportionate racial representation rather than 'non-racial' and are expensive boarding institutions (there are some limited scholarships) with a limited intake of students. In reality very few upper class Africans can afford the charges for tuition and accommodation.

Developments in education are, to a certain extent, compatible with the nature and tempo of deracialisation in the economy. Private schools and integrated universities will provide the necessary manpower with appropriate social and intellectual skills required in corporate management. On the political side they are intended to skim off the best talents from the disadvantaged, thus depriving the protesting masses of a great section of the leadership. The unintended consequences may yet become manifest, such as when in some areas, notably the Eastern Cape, protesting pupils in 1985 ostracised and, in some instances threatened, those pupils who attended multiracial schools on the rationale that they 'isolated themselves from the struggle'.

1.2.4 Business and the Dialectic between Co-option and Non-Collaboration

Towards the end of the seventies two actors emerged from the business sector and each played a significant role in the politics of co-optive reform. These were:
i) big business represented by the large conglomerates as well as the business associations, the Federated Chambers of Industries (F.C.I) the Associated Chambers of Industries and Commerce (ASSOCOM) as well as the Afrikaanse Handels Instituut (A.H.I);

ii) the African petit bourgeoisie represented by the National African Federated Chambers of Commerce (NAFCOC).

1.2.5 The Private Sector: Big Business

In November 1979, at the Carlton Centre, the Prime Minister assured 350 leaders of the private sector of his commitment to "a policy of strengthening the free enterprise system and introducing orderly reform" (Mann, 1988:60). The Carlton Conference was followed by the Good Hope Conference two years later.

The significance of both conferences lay in two developments:

i) the discovery of the concept of 'free enterprise' as the panacea of South Africa's ills, especially as a vital force that would satisfy the needs of the economically disadvantaged and the politically disenfranchised;

ii) the state's assertion of its prerogative to determine the political tempo by warning big business that its role lay in attempts to solve the development problems in South Africa whilst the constitutional domain belonged to the state.

The combination of the 'development strategy' and the 'free enterprise' doctrine gave birth to the Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC) in 1980, "as a partnership between the private sector and the state, aimed at encouraging 'entrepreneurship' among all population groups and providing additional job opportunities" (Ibid:68). The S.B.D.C. was to provide financial assistance in the form of loans to small entrepreneurs thus enabling them to participate in the economy. Shareholding in the S.B.D.C. was equally divided between the private sector where approximately 90 major corporations took part, and the state. What the protagonists of 'free enterprise' overlooked, however, was that the bulk of the African population was too poor to participate in 'free enterprise'
and that, at best, the benefits could accrue to very few, thus rendering the concept selective and thus tantamount to co-optation.

Big business was not slow in realising that, on its own, ‘free enterprise’ was insufficient. It therefore embarked on complementary problems in education, housing and other welfarist schemes. In education and training the private sector hoped to achieve two goals:

i) It hoped to attempt to solve the skills shortage; and

ii) it relocated the failure to advance on the job (as well as in the business) on the individual, thus absolving the system from blame - and in so doing advanced the ‘free enterprise’ ethic.

The thrust by big business into areas of reform in education, housing, the promotion of small business and other schemes became known as ‘corporate social responsibility’. Corporate social responsibility has been most visible, in terms of budgets, in the sphere of housing. Besides the numerous housing companies that have mushroomed in the townships (the bulk of them are white), big corporations like the Standard Building Corporation (1,5 million rands) in Mamelodi, Volkswagen of South Africa (2.9 million rands) and the Anglo-American Corporation have provided large sums for assistance in housing, whilst Coca-Cola declared in 1986 that it would invest R20 million to create a new foundation to help assist Africans in education, business and housing (lbid:70).

Faced with the magnitude of the problem, i.e. poverty and political powerlessness, the above development programmes have limited impact as the bulk of the masses could not access them. Moreover, the programmes are by definition small business development and private housing schemes, meant to benefit the relatively advantaged and thus discriminatory against the poor. For instance, housing loans benefit the professionals in state employment (teachers, administrative staff and nurses) who have access to housing subsidies as well as those in the upper echelons in the private sector.
where housing loans are provided. The rank and file have no access to such schemes because they can not provide the required deposits nor afford the bond repayments.

Finally, big business called upon the state to further assist the development of ‘free enterprise’ by ‘deregulating’ the sphere of business, first by allowing the informal sector to pursue its business without restrictions, and secondly by opening up the centres of cities and towns to trading by all race groups. The latter would open opportunities for the African petit bourgeoisie in particular to trade in the city.

1.2.6 Rapprochement between the State and the African Petit Bourgeoisie

Verwoerdian apartheid paid no attention to class differences, thus encouraging the notion of an alliance against apartheid by all racially oppressed classes. From 1975, however, new developments threatened this alliance (assuming that it did, in fact, exist). In 1969 African Traders constituted the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce (NAFCOC), a body which later enabled African business to speak with one voice. Immediately upon its formation, NAFCOC acted as a business lobby, seeking to redress imbalances between white and black trading practices, as well as obtaining exemptions from restrictions which affected Africans, particularly if these hampered their trading opportunities. In this, NAFCOC sought to consolidate itself as an elite class, distinct from the lot of ordinary Africans. For instance, it sought exemption for the trading classes from influx control regulations, pressed for ownership of property and for the right to carry firearms. Developments since 1975 included a relaxation on some of the regulations perceived to hamper African business as well as the formation of the African Bank which was hailed as a breakthrough in African business.

While the financial significance of the African Bank cannot be overemphasised, its political implications were, in terms of previous policy, also far reaching. Hudson and Sarakinsky describe it as "an illegal African financial institution, as well as an illegal
African-owned and controlled public company in partnership with white capital (Hudson, P. and Sarakinsky, M. 1986:174) The bank was situated in the centre of Johannesburg, a proclaimed white area, Africans bought shares in it (thus infringing the law which forbade business partnerships among Africans), and white big business owned 30 percent of the shares. This was, indeed, a rare alliance between the state, African business, homelands and white capital. Hudson and Sarakinsky quote the president of NAFCOC as saying that the bank would mark “the promotion of sound working relationships between NAFCOC and both the central and homeland governments, to the end that a favourable climate for black business can be created” (Ibid:174).

Later years were to demonstrate this working relationship when white capital, represented by the Federated Chamber of Industries (F.C.I.), the Afrikaanse Handels Instituut (A.H.I) and the Association of Chambers of Commerce (ASSOCOM), lobbied not only for the removal of the remaining restrictions on African business, but also called for the establishment of African industrial and manufacturing plants. This was not just a call for humanitarian reasons but a necessity for the fulfillment of the ‘free enterprise’ ethos. On its part NAFCOC consumated the rapprochement with the state when it agreed to participate in the much-discredited community councils, a decision which stemmed largely from enlightened self-interest. Participation in the local state would place individuals in the echelons of power, from where they could gain access to state departments. Part of these hopes were fulfilled when in 1978 NAFCOC met the Minister of Plural Relations who announced further concessions to African business by allowing service industries such as panel-beating, welding and building to be owned by African entrepreneurs. Later, community councils were granted control over the allocation of trading sites in the townships, thus enabling individual councillors to command influence in the township economy.
The courtship between African business and the state as well as between African
business and big capital was rewarded by three developments in the eighties:

i) the Presidents' Council report recommended that if the 'free market' system was to succeed, it had to be accepted by those who felt disadvantaged. To this end the Council sought the removal of those restrictions which hampered African trades as well as called for the 'deregulation' of the small business sector, i.e. removing regulations which militated against the formation and operation of small businesses;

ii) in 1984 the Group Areas Act was amended to enable the proclamation of central business districts as free zones in 'white' towns and cities;

iii) finally the government accepted the principle of land ownerships by urban Africans.

However the 'alliance' between African business and the state was short-lived. The township uprisings of 1984/85 were to prove that an alliance by all racially oppressed classes against apartheid was possible. This came about not because of ideological consciousness but because of the invidious roles that African businessmen played, first as traders and secondly, as town councillors. As traders they were aloof from the problems experienced by the masses. They exploited their employees by making them work long hours and underpaying them. As Councillors they exploited the influx control regulations by employing 'illegal' Africans who could not enter the job market since they did not qualify to be in the proclaimed areas. Further, as councillors they were perceived as part of the oppressive state apparatus, responsible for the raising of rents and service charges. The burning and looting of township businesses in 1984/85 is closely associated with this trend of thinking.

The isolation of the African petit bourgeoisie from the fight against apartheid conscientised a number of individuals from among them 'into the struggle'. It was not unexpected, therefore, when in 1986 a deputation from NAFCOC made its first pilgrimage to Lusaka to meet the African National Congress (A.N.C.) Whether this marked the consolidation of all oppressed classes against apartheid remains yet to be
seen. What is significant is that this has split the Natal branch of NAFCOC, Inyanda, into two, where those who oppose links with the A.N.C. have formed the Kwa Natal Chamber of Commerce (Kwa NACOC), whilst the pro-NAFCOC group remains as Inyanda. The position was further complicated by NAFCOC's equivocal stand on sanctions and disinvestment, an issue over which Inkatha had come out clearly in support of the state's anti-sanctions position. The problem is that despite NAFCOC's flirtation with the extra-parliamentary opposition, individual traders' pursue their own political lines and NAFCOC itself is a conglomerate of disparate political affiliations which allows even homeland branches to affiliate qua homeland entities.

1.2.7 Deracialising and Reracialising Politics: Constitutional Developments in the 1980s

The 1973 labour strikes and Soweto 76 introduced a new dimension in South African politics. The rhetoric of black consciousness was translated into proactive politics as:

i) blacks applied pressure on the government-sponsored institutions. Support for Community Councils was so negligible that they were a farce while the Coloured Persons Representative Council collapsed. (The government had to appoint Althea Jansen, a Social Worker as 'chairman' of the Council when the Reverend Allan Hendrickse refused to pass a 'discriminatory' budget). The South African Indian Council was functioning only in name;

ii) the mass exodus out of the country by the youth, following Soweto 76, increased the numerical strength of the ANC with the result that a few years later the internal presence of the ANC resurfaced dramatically.

iii) protest action, particularly in the schools, spread from African to Coloured and Indian schools. This created a new solidarity among the youth, a solidarity which inevitably reached the communities and became a forerunner to the present charterist movement;

iv) workers became more militant and demanded the right to organise. Developments in the workplace were to translate into community politics at a later stage, as explained in an earlier section in this chapter.

Black consciousness had not only united Africans, Coloureds and Indians as blacks and disadvantaged; through Soweto and subsequent developments it had also exacerbated
the state’s legitimacy crisis. The government’s response was to try to accommodate the grievances within a reformed apartheid. The rationale was that the political cake should be enlarged but the ingredients would remain the same.

1.2.8 The 1983 Constitution and the Tricameral Parliament

The legitimacy crisis prompted some rethinking within the ruling group. The belief was that a Westminster-type democracy was perhaps not compatible with a ‘plural’ society as existed in South Africa. The solution, according to the state’s think tank machine, lay in a consociational formula which accords well with a federal arrangement since this could accommodate even those homelands which refused to opt for independence. This ultimate ‘consociational democracy’ could be implemented in stages and the Tricameral Constitution of 1983 was the first step in this direction. The practical implementation had started with the appointment of the President’s Council, a step which sidelined parliament and centralised power in the State President, thus paving the way for the grand coalition of elites, or a technocratic oligarchy within apartheid.

The 1983 constitution sought to enlist the support of the Coloured and Indian sectors of the population while retaining control in white hands. Briefly, the new constitution created three racial and separate parliaments which were to sit simultaneously in Cape Town, the ‘whites only’ House of Assembly, the House of Representatives for Coloureds and the House of Delegates for Indians.

The creation of the three separate parliaments was tied to the establishment of ‘own’ and ‘general’ affairs, the former catering exclusively for the affairs of each racial group and falling within the ambit of ‘own’ parliament, while the latter fell within the sovereignty of the white House of Assembly. To ensure that blacks could not sabotage the constitution from within, the constitutional provisions allotted weights to the three houses such that
the majority party in the 'whites only' House of Assembly had four representatives to two Coloured and one Indian representative. The 4:2:1 ratios ensured that in those matters which fell under 'general affairs' the white governing party was assured of a majority vote.

One glaring omission in the Tricameral Constitution was that Africans were left out. However, a number of reasons for leaving out Africans can be advanced. In the first place, apartheid has operated on the principle of *divide et impera*. In addition, the homeland policy had created geo-political spaces for control and thus distanced the government from the daily conflicts in those areas. At most the policy had produced four 'independent' homelands while the rest could be relied upon to function, thus averting a total legitimacy crisis. This demonstrates the partial success of the co-optive strategy. Finally, including Africans would have created a moral (and consequently a political) dilemma for the government. Since it could justify the 4.2.1 ratios on the basis of numbers where this concerned whites, Coloureds and Indians, involving Africans would challenge the legitimacy on which the formula rested. In terms of the formula their numbers were prohibitive and any manipulation would have revealed naked white baaskap.

The Tricameral constitution did not prove the success that co-optive reform had envisaged. On the positive side it brought the Coloured Labour Party back into collaborative politics and brought some life to participatory politics among Indians. On the negative side, at least for the government, it created a common ground for political co-operation among the black races. The United Democratic Front came into being partly as a result of the new constitution and partly because of the then-proposed bills by Kornhoff, at that time the Minister for Co-operation and Development, who sought to intensify influx control regulations through what was euphemistically known as 'orderly urbanisation'. The United Democratic Front, an umbrella body comprising professional,
youth, community and labour groupings, pinned its principles on the Freedom Charter, thus marking the beginnings of the present Charterist movement. When COSATU joined in, the Charterist movement became visibly the most powerful internally placed opposition to the state.

In a sense the Tricameral constitution both “deracialised and reracialised politics” (Morris and Padayache 1988 Op Cit). By co-opting a segment of the elites from the Coloured and Indian subordinate groups and creating three parliaments, the constitution underpinned the racial nature of South African politics. Excluding Africans from this new arrangement gave further assurances to the conservative white voters that white hegemony would still be preserved. However, the new constitution was not without psychological and material benefits to the participants and to the state. It gave power to the participating elites who could distribute patronage to their supporters and thus create further bases for support. On the side of the government, it could ‘demonstrate’ to the world that parliament was no longer an apartheid institution as people of colour could sit in the legislative capital of South Africa and pass laws (albeit within separation). That the constitution had little significance in altering the power relations was evidenced by the inability, of both the Houses of Representatives and of Delegates, to prevent the passing of the Internal Security Act in 1986, despite vehement protestations. Notwithstanding the shortcomings, in terms of piece-meal reform the new constitution was not without significance. It at least demonstrated to the white voters that the heavens do not fall when people of colour sit in the parliamentary chambers in Cape Town. This is the psychological side of co-optive reform as part of the deracialisation of politics.

1.2.9 From the Tricameral Parliament to the National Council

The Tricameral formula resulted in two major unintended consequences.
i) the resurgence of charterism which consolidated the extra-parliamentary opposition and, with this, the gaining of momentum by the protest movement. As more organisation took place within the charterists, more people became conscientised into their political position as the disadvantaged;

ii) the exclusion of Africans from the Tricameral system alienated even those elites who had opted for participatory politics or 'working from within the system'.

A number of developments since 1976 had compelled the government to opt for reform as an alternative to naked repression. The most important of these was the vulnerability of the economy to political pressures. The continual 'uprisings' whose origins lay as much in material deprivation as in repression had a negative effect on investor confidence and consequently on the size of the economic cake in the country. Paradoxically, the government needed this cake for distribution, however unevenly, if it was to avert the political crisis of its own making. Political reform, the government hoped, would create favourable conditions for economic growth which in turn would facilitate further reforms. However, the government had a mandate from white voters and was thus not prepared to move beyond apartheid in instituting the conceived reforms. The exclusion of Africans from the Tricameral Parliament in the 1983 Constitution had prompted the state president to appoint the Special Cabinet Committee (February 1983) to "consider the position of Africans outside the non-independent homelands" (Race Relations Survey 1986:92). This was followed in 1985 by the establishment of a Non Statutory Forum which could supplement the activities of the Special Cabinet Committee by deliberating on a range of constitutional and related issues which affected Africans. Finally in 1986 the State President announced the intention to constitute a National Council "to serve as an instrument for the negotiation of a new constitution" (Ibid:93).

That the National Council would be an extension of co-optive politics is evidenced in its intended composition. It "would consist of the chief ministers of the non-independent
homelands, ten representatives of Africans permanently resident in white-designated areas appointed by the state president from nominations submitted to him, such members of the cabinet as the state president saw fit, the chairmen of the three ministers' councils, and not more than ten other people nominated by the state president. The state president would chair the council and determine when and where it met" (Ibid:93).

African reaction to the National Council was largely negative and, more significantly, developments to date have indicated that support is not enough to see it off the ground. Significant actors within the extra-parliamentary opposition, the United Democratic Front, the National Forum and COSATU have rejected it while, among the homelands, KwaZulu and KaNgwane have respectively laid down the release of political prisoners and the unbanning of political organisations as preconditions for participation in it. Further, African participants in urban political structures, the Urban Councils Association (UCASA) and the United Municipalities of South Africa (UMSA) also refused participation in the National Council. Finally, NAFCOC stated that it would not participate in the council "if acknowledged African leaders were still imprisoned and African organisations were banned" (Race Relations Survey 1987/88:113). In short this meant that at an organisational level, the government had no one to negotiate with on the envisaged new constitution.

The significance of the constitutional reform programme from the Tricameral Constitution to the National Council lies in the theoretical position that informs it. The programme is predicated on the notion of consociationalism which translates into government by elite incorporation. The assumptions are that by giving collaborating elites access to limited state power (in the South African context) this will diffuse opposition to white domination by 'proving' that the system is open, thus relocating the onus of access on individuals or the subordinate groups themselves. This became even more apparent when the
government shifted emphasis for recruitment into the council from groups on to individuals. Hence in May 1987 the government, through the state president, placed an invitation in various local newspapers calling upon 'all South Africans of goodwill' to join in 'talks and negotiations' to find a solution for the future (Ibid:113). The proposed National Council Bill in 1987 made a slight departure from the state president's announcement in 1986 when it provided for the 'election' of nine African representatives from white-designated areas instead of the original ten appointed by the state president. Focus on the co-option of individuals became more clear when in the 1987 parliamentary session the government claimed to have received 150 memoranda on the bill from communities and individuals whom, for reasons of security and their personal safety, it could not name (Ibid:114).

While the government wished to, and could, approach individual elites to co-operate with its programme on the National Council, laws such as those which prevented Africans from ownership of property in 'white-designated' areas remained a major source of deprivation. Also, the call for co-operation to work out a constitutional future for South Africa contradicted the fundamental policy of apartheid since, as non-citizens, it was irrational to expect Africans, as foreigners, to deliberate and negotiate on a constitution in which they had no stake. The government resolved to work around these two issues by passing, in 1986, the Restoration of South African Citizenship Act and the Black Communities Development Amendment Act. The first granted South African citizenship to citizens of 'independent' homelands (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC) born in South Africa prior to their homelands becoming independent and who had resided in South Africa permanently, provided they informed the director general of home affairs that they wanted to regain their South African citizenship. Other citizens of the TBVC countries could apply for South African citizenship if they had completed five years of permanent residence in South Africa. (Race Relations Survey 1986).
The second Act granted freehold rights to Africans in urban areas in white-designated South Africa, but the grantees had to be 'legally' settled in South Africa. Finally, to complete this aspect of the reform process the Abolition of Influx Control Act was passed, repealing the Black Urban Areas Consolidation Act and thus making allowances for 'orderly urbanisation'.

The three Acts were hailed as a major breakthrough within reform circles (the liberal press and big capital through the Urban Foundation). However, all of them have to be seen in context if an appropriate appraisal of them is to be made. Their limitations lay in the constraints operating in most reform initiatives which by definition seek to maintain rather than transform or abolish existing power relations. The first two suffered from a historical legacy. Apartheid had carved out a number of townships around the major metropolitan areas of Pretoria, Durban, East London and other centres away from South Africa by declaring them parts of the respective homelands adjacent to them. Consequently, a great number of Africans who had been estranged from South Africa through the proclamation of 'independence' in their homelands could no longer be re-South Africanised. It was claimed that only 1,75 million Africans could qualify to regain South African citizenship while 7,5 million would remain out in the cold. (Ibid 1986) If the first Act was defective in terms of numbers involved the second was equally defective in both economic and numerical terms. Besides the limitations imposed by what constituted white-designated South Africa, thus excluding from freehold those Africans who resided in homeland-designated townships, the financial requirements excluded many Africans who had been paying rents on their houses for generations. This latter failing actually became the key rallying point behind the refusal to buy houses later.

The abolition of influx control regulations had profound political effects at the level of policy. In theory it meant that Africans could enter 'designated urban areas' without fear of prosecution; however, the practical implications were different. In the first instance,
entry into the urban areas depends on the availability of approved accommodation, i.e. the availability of land and housing which meets the minimum health requirements. In South Africa, the availability of land is primarily a function of the Group Areas Act, hence (despite 'orderly urbanisation') the shack problem still bedevils the country. To prevent "illegal squatting", a concept which is laden with heavy political connotations, the government drafted the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Bill, a double edged sword aimed at increasing penalties for 'illegal squatting' on the one side while providing for the upgrading of 'squatter settlements' on the other. In practice, while 'orderly urbanisation' may have distanced the poor from the police vans, in essence only a few have escaped the poverty and squalour of shack settlements. For the relatively better off as well as the housing companies (mostly white-owned), orderly urbanisation has ushered in an economic boom. In terms of the strategy of co-optation, 'orderly urbanisation' has facilitated and promoted a process of 'class differentiation' in the townships where the justification for this is based on the principle of 'access' and 'market forces' rather than on the conventional class relations.

1.3 REFLECTIONS ON CO-OPTIVE REFORM

As a mode of 'class differentiation', co-optation suffered from two main weaknesses:

i) the political and economic aspects were based on two separate and, at times, contradictory theoretical frameworks in spite of a common objective, i.e. that of creating a burgeoning middle class hopefully with a capacity to defend the political and economic order of white domination. The political aspect of co-optive reform operated within 'own affairs' and was based on a theory of racial separation while the economic aspect was largely integrationist, i.e. in industry and commerce black executives operated within non-racial parameters. Given the diversity of capital, particularly the nature of multinationals and the pragmatism inherent in accumulation the relationship between co-optation by the state and that by the private sector was bound to be asymmetrical.

ii) because co-optation is predicated on containment beneficiaries of the policy experienced a measure of cognitive dissonance. Opposition to co-optation in the early to the mid 1980s was based on a revolutionary theory of transition where the opposition sought to destroy the state. Co-opted elites had, therefore, two limited options:
a) to be fully co-opted and risk being branded as having 'sold out' on the popular course, or

b) to hold on to their jobs and at the same time engage in revolutionary rhetoric against themselves since co-optation was into the system that some of them wished to destroy.

The United Municipalities Association of South Africa occupied this invidious position where through their president, Tom Boya, they frequently called upon the government to scrap separate and racial representation at the local level.

Tensions arising from pressures to support some of the co-optive reform measures such as mixed schooling which facilitated access to better education and consequently vertical mobility in the occupational ladder, created inconsistencies in individual responses to co-optation. The same position obtained with regard to the other variables, programmes on black advancement, and the opening up of central business districts to name a few critical ones. Individuals were thus faced with difficult choices:

i) how to respond to the co-optive forces of the state and capital, forces which had an immediate positive valence at the individual level; and

ii) how to react to the background forces, the vociferous and often turbulent wave of opposition from the popular forces which operated more from the 'promise' than from the actual capacity to usher in the long term changes.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 CONCEPTUALISING AND CONTEXTUALISING CO-OPTATION

In common parlance, co-optation refers to "electing to committee by votes of existing members" (The Concise Oxford Dictionary). The definition implies full incorporation of the co-opted individuals or groups i.e. full voting powers within the committees into which they get co-opted. In the context of the "reform packages" of the late 1970s to the 1980s, co-optation refers to a selective process of incorporation of those outside the echelons of power into the socio-economic and political spheres. Further, this selective inclusion does not envisage full but rather unequal membership since the terms and mode of incorporation as well as the derived power are exclusively defined by the dominant group.

What is central to co-optation is that in the first instance differential incorporation entails a limited entry by the erstwhile excluded individuals and groups as the co-opting group can devise structural guarantees to safeguard its own position. Hence Selznick views co-optation as "the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organisation as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence" (Bloom L, and Selznick, 1977:228). In this sense co-optation is a mode of adaptation, a strategy for survival. In co-optation the state takes cognisance of two attributes in the individuals or groups targeted for incorporation. These are power and influence, and both derive either from personal qualifications or from the location of individuals in the social structure within their own groups. Accordingly, individuals or groups are pulled in through a process of individuation, where "Individuals, in certain of
their roles, become detached from the original racial matrix and enter into new relationships across racial lines, creating new racial structures, formal and informal" (Kuper, 1974:142). While in some instances co-optation is a form of individuation, there is a qualitative difference between the two. In individuation, the new recruits are culturally assimilated into the dominant group whereas in co-optation they need not be. For instance, the state does not intend to assimilate blacks into white culture but rather incorporates them into the state apparatus as 'representatives' of their own groups. It is only in the business sector that an attempt is made to incorporate the new recruits into the 'business culture'.

2.2 THE MEANING AND LEVELS OF CO-OPTATION

In South Africa co-optation operates at two levels and each level has its own set of push-pull factors as well as its own consequences. What is common to both levels is that the intention of the dominant political and economic groups is to legitimise the system by broadening the social bases of support. At the first level blacks are differentially incorporated or pulled into the central state or its apparatus e.g. the Tricameral Parliament, homelands and town councils. At the second level private enterprise selectively employs blacks into professional and management positions formerly reserved for whites. The first level of co-optation is a clearly definable case in terms of the intentions of the state as the co-optor or pulling force; the second level constitutes a grey area of co-optation by consequence. Vertical mobility in the workplace does not, on its own, constitute co-optation, and it is not that simple to attribute intention to action. What defines some forms of vertical mobility as co-optation is firstly the 'controlled' nature of entry of blacks into those positions i.e. entry is not an open door policy which is determined by market forces but operates rather by 'fitting' incumbents into strategic positions in response to political and economic pressures. Secondly the positions
impose constraints on the political activities of the incumbents. Structurally a black personnel or marketing manager can not openly side with a union in a dispute between management and the union, nor can he or she actively hold office in (say for instance) the extra-parliamentary opposition movements without jeopardising his/her position at work. Thus, while the boundaries of co-optation are hard to define, the consequences are fairly easy to delineate.

However, a definition of co-optation based on the intentions of the dominant group or pull factors alone is not complete. Participating or incorporated elites (since co-opting groups mostly target the elites) or groups may have their own agendas or push factors. Push factors may vary from total collaboration to strategic brinkmanship on the part of participating elites, or incumbents in specific positions may find themselves co-opted by circumstance. The latter applies only to those individuals who may be constrained by their occupational positions in public or private corporations where their positions are structurally problematic e.g. industrial relations; or where an open political stance may be viewed as contrary to the organisation’s interests or strategic position. The boundaries of co-optation or collaboration are therefore difficult to define and the following section is an attempt to set these in place through a review of literature on this subject. In this thesis co-optation and collaboration are used in a strictly non-pejorative sense and only refer to structural and subjective positions in the South African political economy without attaching any moral judgement on them.

2.3 REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON CO-OPTATION

In general there is a dearth of literature on co-optation in South Africa, partly because the dominant focus has been on the incompatibility of apartheid with any form of social change. The few authors who have paid a substantial attention to the subject are Adam (1971), Adam and Moodley (1986), Nolutshungu (1983), Van Zyl Slabbert (1985, 1987).
and marginally Erwin and Webster (1975). Apart from these authors who specifically focus on South Africa, Robinson (1972) advances a theory of elite collaboration through co-optation as an explanation of the successful penetration of Europe into Africa and Asia whilst Therborn (1980) discusses co-optation in general as a dialectical process of bringing about an asymmetric unity between the rulers and the ruled.

Adam (1971) and Adam and Moodley (1986) view co-optation as an inherently positive and accommodative process of relaxing elite boundaries in order to allow for the incorporation of outsiders into the system. "Throughout history dominant groups have accepted selected outsiders. This aids in perpetuation of their rule by increasing their numbers while simultaneously weakening their adversaries by skimming off the best talents. Oligarchies collapsed when elite boundaries became frozen and social mobility became barred by rigid membership definitions (such as race or ancestry)" (Adam and Moodley, 1986:144). However, the positive and accommodative process seems to stop with the statement that the process begins at all, for Adam and Moodley devote the remainder of their rejoinder on co-optation to the contradictions it raises and, therefore, to the probability of its failure.

Basically the joint authors view co-optation as operating mainly in two areas, the political and the economic. Politically through co-optation the state gives symbolic trappings of power to the co-opted elites while it plays for time to get ready the machinery of reforms, such as the upgrading of townships, creating career opportunities and financing education. However, Adam and Moodley assert, co-optation as social engineering raises a number of contradictions. In the first place among coloureds and Indians it appeals to the less educated lower income elites among the disadvantaged rather than to the 'middle class' elites that it is intended to attract. Thus giving power to the collaborating elites undermines the professional and intellectual elite who feel insulted by being made dependant on the lower-educated, less-sophisticated functionaries turned
bureaucrats. What obtains among coloureds and Indians is equally applicable to Africans. It is often not the better educated and more sophisticated Africans who constitute the cabinets in the homelands or the councillors in the townships. Adam and Moodley feel that the practice of recruiting collaborators from the non-professionals (who, because they have a lower market value, are vulnerable to co-optation) fragments the black challenge and directs "its anger inwards towards its own group members..." (Ibid:150). The current violence in Natal may be illustrative of this point. Here the battle is between Inkatha, a mass-based organisation which operates within the state-created framework, and the extra-parliamentary opposition represented by the COSATU, UDF-ANC alliance. Both Inkatha and the extra-parliamentary opposition purport to 'oppose' the state's programme of balkanising South Africa through separate development. However, the fact that Inkatha, through the KwaZulu bantustan which it controls, also controls the basic resources such as housing, land and the entry into commercial activities, however limited, makes it an extension of the central state.

Secondly, according to Adam and Moodley, co-optation creates a system of patronage where co-opted individuals have access to political and economic resources such as business sites and financial undertakings. This patronage has had two negative developments. Firstly it has isolated "moderates" from "radicals". Secondly it has created a commercial class which, however, can not properly flourish, given the scale and tempo of monopoly capital in South Africa. Hence the frustrated commercial bourgeoisie will want to capture state power. In this Adam cites Nolutshungu who stresses that (1) in a colonial relationship blacks will never be successfully co-opted and (2) that a racial state is in any case structurally incapable of deracialisation (Ibid:146).

Finally Adam and Moodley conclude that to succeed co-optation has to go beyond political machinations through economic rewards and include full incorporation of elites into the political system. "Privatisation of public interests into a depoliticised
consumerism - the Americanisation of South Africa - can only succeed when status
denigration is abolished through genuine deracialisation" (Ibid:153).

Van Zyl Slabbert conceptualises co-optation as co-optive domination (1985, 1987), and
separates co-optive domination away from the centre, (the case of homelands) from co­
optive domination into the centre, (the case of the Tricameral Constitution). In both
instances Van Zyl Slabbert alleges that the intention of the co-optor is to dominate, and
he perceives the rewards to the co-opted as lying in the nature of the political patronage
at their disposal. However, while Adam and Moodley are not explicit in portraying the
dialectic of co-optation, Van Zyl Slabbert credits the co-opted with the potential to effect
changes within the dynamics of co-optation which lie "in the likelihood of interest groups
using the same instrument to pursue alternative goals" (Van Zyl Slabbert, F. 1985:110).
Therefore, what becomes significant in Van Zyl Slabbert's treatment of co-optation is the
dynamic relationship between the co-optor and the co-opted. He offers 'engagement'
as a mechanism of coping with the system rather than 'abandonment' on the principle of
non-collaboration.

According to Van Zyl Slabbert, 'engagement' is measured by the amount of pressure
exerted (or which can be exerted) on the system in order to bring about rational (non
violent) change, rational for logic and non violent for predictability, since it is difficult to
predict the outcome of violence. A demonstration effect of 'engaging' the system is the
case of trade unions who have done this from a position of "using co-optive structures
for pursuing consequences unintended by those who created them" (Ibid:136). In
'engagement' Van Zyl Slabbert makes a distinction between being co-opted and
operating within co-optive structures in order to utilise the space provided. The
advantages of this strategy, according to Van Zyl Slabbert, are that it institutionalises
leverage and indemnifies protest from counter-repressive measures, thus forming the
power base for both organisation and mobilisation. Hence, by exploring the
contradictions in the system and by exploiting "the unintended consequences which flow from the actions of those who govern" (Ibid:136), subordinate groups may advance their cause. However, separating seduction from stratagem is a difficult task and Van Zyl Slabbert himself offers a word of caution: "It is possible to be seduced by the perks of institutional participation. A 'stooge', 'collaborator' or 'Uncle Tom' is not determined by the fact of participation but by the manner" (Ibid:137).

Nolutshungu, like Adam and Moodley, posits that South Africa operates on a middle class model of co-optation, and his conceptualisation is political, "the attempt by the ruling oligarchy and its supporters to engineer a 'neo-colonial solution' through elite accommodation..." (Nolutshungu, 1983:6). He attributes this development to pressures by blacks for inclusion into the polity. His emphasis is on the political since "both the alignments for conservation and those that demand change are defined, in the first place, in terms of political rather than economic relations. Positions occupied by the various 'races' in the order of domination itself modify the general social effects of the positions they occupy in the relations of production" (Ibid:xii).

Reform, according to Nolutshungu, facilitates the conditions for co-optation. The central issue, however, is that the process of reform inherently benefits blacks unequally; hence the belief among commentators of all persuasions that the regime is both committed to and engaged in the creation of a black middle class. The creation of political positions for well-disposed blacks in the homelands has been politically and economically beneficial to the incumbents. However, Nolutshungu makes a clear distinction between political encadrement and economic embourgeoisement where the latter implies "the creation of the economic, social and political conditions for the emergence of a bourgeoisie" (Ibid, p82). Because co-optation creates political encadrement and not economic embourgeoisement, Nolutshungu does not predict much success for it.
In co-optation, Nolutshungu maintains, the ruling elite has two specific objectives to achieve: "first, to gain popular acquiescence to rule and so to forestall the danger of revolution; and, secondly, to divide the black opposition in order to buy time to initiate the further reforms that might seal popular acceptance and create a stable order" (Ibid: 120). However, if this has to be achieved by creating a collaborative black middle class, the success of the strategy would depend on the effectiveness of the ideological appeal by the contrived middle class as well as its political organisation and leadership. Like Adam and Moodley, Nolutshungu feels this is not easy to attain given the contradictions of apartheid.

Firstly, co-optation creates status incongruity and rank disequilibrium, both of which militate against the development of a harmony of interests between white and black elites. In status incongruity the acquired status does not carry power commensurate with it, whereas in rank disequilibrium there is no equality among incumbents falling within the same rank particularly between black and white. The consequent disharmony results in relative deprivation on the part of the black elites, thus fanning protest. Secondly, political repression has imposed severe economic disabilities on Africans as a race, and deprived the middle classes from access to the state, an access which is necessary for the protection and advancement of their economic interests. Thirdly and 'most importantly' (my emphasis) "Models of middle class accommodation invariably presuppose a black middle class with considerable ideological and political influence over the rest of their kind, sufficient to deflect workers and others less privileged from the paths of revolution" (Ibid: 122). The strategy, therefore, calls for a middle class with sufficient hegemonic control over the masses who are unlikely to immediately enjoy the fruits of incorporation. Nolutshungu finds this position difficult to obtain since the black middle class neither has the economic power nor the traditional appeals for hegemony, the former because race laws have stifled the growth of a true black bourgeoisie class, and the latter because the central state tampered with tradition in its attempts to create a
collaborating elite. The South African middle class model of elite accommodation is thus predicated on a middle class culture that lacks the appropriate ideological basis for hegemony.

Finally, on the basis of the history of black and particularly African resistance where the elite has led on the basis of opposition to rather than collaboration with the state's programmes, Nolutshungu maintains that the state has not been able to raise a collaborating elite with sufficient credibility to successfully facilitate the state's programme of political engineering.

Erwin and Webster on their part dealt with co-optation in the pre-reform era and thus offer a limited and one-sided conceptualisation. They define co-optation as "a process whereby the leadership of a conflict group is absorbed into the dominant group's institutions in such a way that no shift in the balance of power takes place. The opposition conflict group is given a platform without an independent power base, and so opposition is stifled without having to alter the distribution of power" (Erwin, A. and Webster, E. in L. Schlemmer and E. Webster, 1975:100). The definition is the product of its historical epoch. Conceptualised within Verwoerdian apartheid it overlooks the dynamic nature as well as the unintended consequences of co-optation. For instance, the leadership from the dominated group may accept incorporation and in due course create relatively autonomous power bases. Selznick stresses this dialectic nature of co-optation by affirming that while the co-opting group wants participation, but only for itself, and does not want to surrender or even weaken its hold on power, in the long run it has been discovered that co-optation leads to the sharing of power (Bloom and Selznick op cit:228).

Therborn does not specifically address South Africa but rather focusses on how in general the ruling class manipulates resources at its disposal in order to increase
support for the state. Co-optation is thus one form of incorporating outsiders into a predetermined system such that their inclusion does not alter the structures of power. According to this version, bourgeois democracy is a form of co-opting the working classes into the bourgeois state apparatus through free elections, universal suffrage and governmental responsibility to the electorate. However, it is the bourgeoisie that successfully determine the timing and modality of incorporation (democratisation) thus leaving the bourgeois institutions intact and, therefore, managing to integrate the working class into a democratised bourgeois polity (Therborn 1980).

Co-optation, in Therborn’s conceptualisation, is more than incorporating a handful of political leaders into the traditional elite but rather a large scale social process whose objective is to bring about unity between the ruler and the ruled. However, the resultant unity is not symmetrical and herein lies the dialectic of co-optation, since the lack of symmetry creates contradictions between co-optors and the co-opted. “Entry of the ruled classes into unity with their rulers provides both means to secure their active and willing submission and a platform for their demands and opposition” (Ibid:234).

Robinson draws historical evidence of colonial powers co-opting indigenous elites in the days of imperial penetration into Africa and Asia. He then argues that in order to accomplish their programmes, at minimum cost, dominant groups relied on mediation by the local indigenous elites on their behalf. However, such mediation was not without what the indigenous elites considered to be meaningful advantages to accrue to their positions vis-a-vis the imperialists as well as their own subjects. Robinson thus postulates a theory stating that collaborative mechanisms comprise two linkages “one consisting of arrangements between the agents of industrial society and the indigenous elites drawn into co-operation with them, and the other connecting these elites to the rigidities of local interests and institutions” (Robinson, R. 1972:121). The more efficient the collaborating elites were in solving the indigenous “politicoeconomic equations” the
more facilitative they were to European imperialism and vice versa (ibid:122). Robinson's stand reinforces the dialectic nature of co-optation where the strategy of elite collaboration serves to explain two processes in the relationship between governors and the governed or between ruler and ruled. In the context of imperialism and its subsequent demise, it "explains why Europe was able to rule large areas of the world, so cheaply and with so few troops. It also provides an explanation of the process of decolonisation in terms of the growing ability of the independent movements in the colonies to disrupt the arrangements for collaboration or to use them for their own ends" (ibid:177).

2.4 THE DIALECTIC NATURE OF CO-OPTATION

The above literature on co-optation is almost unanimous on the intentions of the co-opting forces. What is, however, not clearly spelt out is the capacity of the co-opted elites to use the space provided by their participation to advance their own or their group's cause. Robinson, Van Zyl Slabbert and Therborn come close to this in their dialectical approach to co-optation while Adam and Moodley, Erwin and Webster as well as Nolutshungu emphasise only the manipulative aspects of co-optation. Admittedly, the latter three authors are influenced by the nature of white power in South Africa and their analyses are based on events in the late 1970's to the early 1980's. Both Adam and Moodley and Nolutshungu are cognisant of the constraints from below on the role and effectiveness of the collaborating elites, but this is a cognisance drawn from viewing co-optation as primarily the co-optor's domain where the co-opted are mainly manipulated and have no power to redefine or partly influence the relationships.

The thrust of co-optation is its dialectical nature and the consequent ability of the incorporated elites to manipulate the same symbols to modify or transform the very system that seeks to absorb them.
Robinson’s theory of elite collaboration in facilitating external dominance applies equally to internal domination. In the case of South Africa, the state derives specific advantages: with regard to both local and regional governments, it can distance itself from the day-to-day conflicts which emanate primarily from its inability to redistribute resources equitably. Secondly, it can operate a relatively cheap administration by proxy and still maintain the policy of ‘own affairs’ without losing control. This helps reconcile apartheid with the realities of day-to-day administrative demands. It is thus basically a form of divide and rule. From the point of view of the private sector, the gains are both political and economic. The marketing advantages are that individual corporations can, by using indigenous professionals, obtain an insight into the dynamics of the indigenous markets. The political benefits relate to both the internal and external dynamics. Internally, the corporation “stabilises” the relations between management and workers by utilising the skills of indigenous elites whose immediacy to the perceptions and problems of workers makes them better qualified as mediators. Secondly by “demonstrating” that it is an “equal opportunity” employer, the corporation hopes to elicit a positive image not only internally among workers but externally as well. The strategy thus serves as a public relations as well as a marketing tool, while at the same time it resolves the problem of skills and efficiency. There are thus both political and economic advantages to be derived where both parties, i.e. the corporation and employees, benefit.

While the primary goal of co-optation is to maintain the social relations between dominator and dominated or between exploiter and exploited, the social consequences deriving from the strategy are crucial to both parties and may defeat the original intentions. For instance, it is arguable whether collaborating elites such as homeland leaders have not, in some instances, established relatively independent power bases. KwaZulu has done this in creating Inkatha, a movement which goes beyond being an ordinary political party in a homeland. Indeed, Inkatha has been able to operate freely
where the extra-parliamentary opposition has not been able to do so. Through Inkatha, KwaZulu is bargaining for a position in national politics.

On the extreme side of the continuum the unions have made advances from a different politico-economic ideology. However, these advances have materialised following emotional debates over the issue of registration with the Industrial Council in the late 1970's to the early 1980's. In this instance the debates arose over the narrow versus broad definitions of registration as collaboration/co-optation, where unions affiliated to the Council of Unions of South Africa adopted a narrow definition that situated co-optation within 'absorption into the institutions of the dominant group'. This was notwithstanding that the nature of collective bargaining entails operating within rules that are drawn by parties which do not necessarily have to be compatible. Unions affiliated to the Federation of South African Trade Unions adopted the stance of strategic brinkmanship and used registration as a base for creating more space for organisation. Today, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) as well as the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU) between them command a formidable power base which not only gives them relative autonomy in labour relations but has also enabled them to gain a foothold in community politics, i.e. in the sphere of reproduction.

What happened in the sphere of labour can, in many ways, be compared to the developments that took place in black academic institutions. The Extension of the Universities Act of 1959 sought, among other things, to create a black middle class that would bolster the hegemonic institutions of apartheid. Separate educational institutions would create avenues of upward mobility for the burgeoning black intelligentsia, thus legitimating the practice of separatism. An upwardly mobile intellectual cadre would demonstrate to the world and essentially to black South Africans that, in separate development, the sky was the limit. Secondly, handing over the administration and the responsibility for disseminating the state ideology to blacks would remove the stigma of
internal colonialism away from the state. Afrikaner leadership of these institutions was thus presented as temporary tutelage, intended only to guide and lead them to academic independence. To demonstrate the sincerity of Pretoria, the University of South Africa gradually withdrew its authority and guidance from the black universities and by 1975 all had attained autonomous status.

The state intentions floundered in the face of a determined opposition from the blacks who first opposed the political programme of tying the universities to the bureaucratic and political institutions, particularly the homelands in the case of African universities. As political events unfolded, blacks started to create organisational space within the same universities, and by 1987 Professor Gerwel, rector of the University of the Western Cape, could openly state that his campus was 'the intellectual centre of the left.' The university of Durban-Westville also transcended its 'Indian' character and admitted Africans on such a scale that they presently account for over forty percent of the student population. Further, all black universities (Zululand is lagging behind in this case) have injected blood from the extra-parliamentary opposition into their councils, a development which has changed their character away from state-supporting institutions into centres where the opposition feels at home.

Dreams of creating a sympathetic black middle class had been shattered as early as the 1970s when academics and students from these universities elected to join forces with black consciousness. The Universities of the North and of the Western Cape were leaders in this campaign. In spite of attempts by the administrations, as well as by Afrikaner academics, in the black universities, to turn these institutions into intellectual centres of apartheid, the intended beneficiaries (students and academics) vehemently rejected the product as marketed to them. Black universities were, therefore, the main ideological battlefields for control and resistance to the extent that the black community looked up to them for guidance.
However, while opposition to the state’s programme mounted mainly by academics and students constituted the norm, some blacks in the top echelons of power in these institutions evidently fell into the co-option trap and tacitly promoted the state’s programme. Further, the ideological concomitants of apartheid are evident in the research and academic pursuits of some black academics who have assiduously promoted ethnic and separatist interests, particularly in the field of pedagogics. However, the co-opted academics have not been successful in attaining the intended power and influence. They remain constrained to their institutions and exert very little influence outside of the lecture hall, where their influence derives more from their power to accord or withhold rewards, than from academic merit and expertise, or from being ‘relevant’ as the popular saying goes. Theirs, as Nolutshugu would state, is a case of political encadrement without the attendant hegemonic influence. The dialectics of co-optation become more complex as the realities unveil.

In this thesis the dialectical nature of co-optation will be examined specifically within the context where both the superordinate and the subordinate groups make shifts either to accommodate each other or to gain space in order to undermine each other’s power. This is particularly significant because of the prevailing inequality in the power positions between the two. In this relationship, the result in the balance of power is a shift in positions despite the persistence of the original configurations of superordination and subordination. The nature and dynamics of co-optation have given rise to at least three distinct types of responses from the subordinate groups:

i) there are individuals and groups who are prepared to co-operate with the broader system at the local, regional and lately at the national levels. Participation in local government, homeland politics, the Tricameral Parliament and the envisaged national council constitutes this broad category of responses;

ii) the second type of response, which is a direct opposite of the first, constitutes the strategy of total rejection of structures that are created or
sponsored by the state. It is characterised by the broad principle of 'non-collaboration' or 'non co-operation' with the 'system' - a principle which governs the operation of the extra-parliamentary opposition at least at the political level;

iii) thirdly, there are those who feel that even though state structures and policies are intractable, organisations can create space for advancing their 'cause' within them. The difference between this type of response and the first is that the terms of operation are defined by the participants rather than by the state which because of its legal power defines the terms of reference. The rationale for this type of response is that legality is a function of the power relations operating at a given time and that by changing these power relations the legal position will also shift. Secondly, the strategy can only be pursued within the discipline of an organisation and related structures where the leadership is accountable to the mass organisation of members.

Within these three broad categories of responses lie a number of intermediate positions ranging from purely non political ones where individuals simply "do a job" to enlightened self interest. In the latter, collaborators are fully conscious of the consequences of their actions but are motivated by immediate short-term gains irrespective of the long-term results. This diversity of responses despite the uniformly racial nature of apartheid and the concomitant economic privileges, i.e. the visible black-white gap, is due to the unevenness with which the impact of political and economic exclusion is experienced by blacks in general and by Africans in particular.

2.5 THE EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION AND THE POLITICS OF NON-COLLABORATION *(This section is based on a mimeographed paper presented at a conference on Southern Africa into the 21st Century held in Maputo in December 1989.)

While the state endeavours to legitimate the existing social order through co-optation, the response from the subordinates has been to form groupings to oppose the state's programme. Opposition to exclusion did not start with apartheid. It has a history dating back to the last decades of the nineteenth century when Jabavu, Gandhi and Abduraman respectively founded the Union of the Africans (Imbumba Yama Afrika), the Natal Indian Congress and the African People's Organisation. In 1912 the African National Congress was formed to champion the cause of African inclusion into the
dominant system. Presently, opposition to exclusion from the centre of power is primarily
championed by the extra-parliamentary opposition - a label derived from the fact that it is
an opposition constituted outside of the state's created institutions.

2.5.1 Locating the extra-parliamentary opposition

The extra-parliamentary opposition is a metamorphosis of the process of history and
demonstrates the resilience and adaptability of the spirit of the subordinates in the face
of a determined white oligarchy. As a movement, the extra-parliamentary opposition
draws its intellectual, ideological strategic and organisational strength mainly from the
traditions of the Congress Alliance of the 1950s as well as from the Black Consciousness
movement of the late 1960s to the early 1970s. It is this intellectual, organisational and
ideological heritage which gives the extra-parliamentary opposition a sense of continuity
with the past and consequently a sense of mission. The material deprivation, i.e. the
discriminatory allocation of basic resources, on a racial basis, which results in an
imbalance in redistribution accounts for the specific forms of expressions of resistance,
against the state, by the extra-parliamentary opposition. Opposition to the state arises
primarily out of three sources:

i) material deprivation reflected in gross inequalities which have developed along
racial lines;

ii) ideological arrangements which emanate from the correspondence between
material well-being and political power and the converse to that;

iii) the national question, i.e. who does the state actually represent? Here the state is
conceived as a white regime representing the political and economic interests of
the white race. The struggle for political control thus assumes an assertion of a
black nationalism fighting for inclusion in a single non-racial state through a
majority decision.

Because of the coincidence between black political emasculation and material
deprivation, as champion of the black cause, the extra-parliamentary opposition
commands a messianic appeal to the disenfranchised masses. This is a pertinent observation to note at this stage because without this messianic appeal the mode of articulation of extra-parliamentary politics would probably have taken a different form. I must emphasise here that the extra-parliamentary opposition has both an empirical existence and a mystic hegemonic influence which transcends both individuals and numbers. It is more or less like the kind of influence that the 'class struggle' exerts among Marxists or the pulling power of the Holy Ghost in Christian circles. Both make things happen yet both have no tangible physical existence except by effect.

I do not intend to go into the history of the extra-parliamentary opposition in this chapter as this is already well documented elsewhere (Gerhart, 1974, Leatt, Kneffel and Nuremberger, 1986; Lodge, 1975 and to an extent Zulu, 1987). Rather, my intention is twofold:

i) Firstly, to situate the extra-parliamentary opposition within the politics of the 1970s and through to the 1980s, by demonstrating how it has influenced and in turn has been shaped by the reform policies of both the state and the private sector;

ii) Secondly, to present the extra-parliamentary opposition as a significant force to contribute to the process of working out a future negotiated settlement for South Africa. In both instances I shall draw from the empirical as well as the spiritual attributes.

2.5.2 Social composition

The extra-parliamentary opposition is both a political movement and a product of specific issues, for instance civic matters, educational issues and developments in the workplace. Such specifics may result in the creation of ad hoc or permanent organisations to deal with them. What is, however, common in all of the formations is the spontaneous rejection of the state created organs as mediators in these times of crises and the readiness with which newly formed structures seek assistance from or affiliation with
already formed organisations elsewhere. For instance, anti-removal committees or civic organisations formed to fight specific developments such as a hike in rent or service charges or a rise in transport fares, soon develop into civic associations affiliated to the United Democratic Front (UDF). The broad categories which constitute the extra-parliamentary movement are:

i) Youth organisations which are mainly located in educational institutions but which include a significant section of the unemployed youth and some of the youth affiliated to the unions;

ii) Civic and community organisations with a cross cutting membership which may include church, women’s and even youth organisations. Most of the ad hoc groups such as rent, transport and anti-removal organisations fall within this category;

iii) Worker and labour organisations mainly located on the factory floor but which are also involved in civic and community issues;

iv) Professional and occupational associations sympathetic to and co-operating with civic and national organisations;

v) Institutional groups such as the churches.

Earlier in the above lines I stated that the extra-parliamentary opposition was both a movement and a metamorphosis of historical forces. This is evidenced in the strategic shifts that have taken place between 1987 and early 1990. Since 1985 a number of influential organisations and personalities from inside South Africa have held consultations with the African National Congress in Lusaka and abroad. Organisations like the Afrikaanse Studente Bond, the National Union of South African Students, the Union of Democratic University Staff Association, the Institute for A Democratic Alternative, the Churches, the National Medical and Dental Association, the Congress of South African Trade Unions, some homeland leaders, the National Federated Chambers of Commerce, the Natal Indian Congress and, finally the newly formed Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa) have held deliberations with the A.N.C. on a wide variety of issues pertaining to the future of South Africa. It is these consultations together with the de facto presence of the A.N.C. internally that have
facilitated the metamorphosis in the extra-parliamentary opposition. In turn, this has brought about a mellowing in the strategies as well, hence whereas non-collaboration formerly meant no contact with organisations and individuals 'working within the system', presently there is a broad consultation and, at times, co-operation with such individuals and bodies.

Ideologically, the extra-parliamentary opposition falls into two broad strands, the charterist and the black consciousness elements. The main constituents in the charterist element are the UDF and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) while the black consciousness element is represented by the Azanian Peoples' Organisation (A.Z.A.P.O.) - National Forum (N.F.) combination as well as by the National Congress of Trade Unions (N.A.C.T.U.). While ideological differences between the two elements exist particularly with regard to the race question and the future economic arrangements in the country, there are areas of mutual agreement between the two. Indeed, there have been a number of instances where COSATU and N.A.C.T.U. have organised stayaways and consumer boycotts as if they were one unit, and where the UDF and the A.Z.A.P.O.-N.F. coalition have also co-operated in organising community-based resistance campaigns. There have been serious on-the-ground frictions as well but they seem to be overshadowed by the presence of a common enemy, the white regime, at least for the present.

2.5.3 The United Democratic Front (UDF)

The UDF was formed in 1983 to oppose both the Tricameral Constitution and the Koornhoff Bills. The former sought to incorporate the 'coloured' and Indian groups as junior partners in parliament while the latter sought to entrench influx control in the guise of 'orderly urbanisation'. Material grievances such as problems in education, township civic matters and at work led to the affiliation, with the UDF, by organisations involved in
fighting these ills. Later, professional and other related associations also joined the UDF either as affiliates or as working partners.

As the UDF is not a 'card carrying' organisation it is difficult to estimate its strength in terms of numbers. What is significant, however, is that the UDF is one of the driving forces behind the resistance to apartheid. It constitutes the electro-motive force of the resistance movement. While it may be difficult to locate the UDF and its strength in terms of structures, like the Holy Ghost it makes things happen and much of what is happening in resistance politics, the state attributes to the UDF. This intangible form is, therefore, both a source of strength and weakness in the UDF. The strength part is its capacity to act, the weakness is the difficulty to manage and organise effectively and to control its constituencies. Despite these weaknesses the UDF is an effective mobilising force and has managed to survive a three-year state of emergency which resulted in most of its top leadership being detained, imprisoned, gagged or gone into hiding.

The biblical canon of the UDF is the Freedom Charter, and its policy is to isolate the state from popular and civic constituencies. Its strategy is non-collaboration with state-created institutions, a practice which sometimes becomes problematic in the face of the broad consultative tactics that the Front espouses.

2.5.4 The Azanian People's Organisation (A.Z.A.P.O.) - National Forum (N.F.) Coalition

The A.Z.A.P.O.-N.F. coalition represent the continuation of the black consciousness movement. Unlike the UDF, A.Z.A.P.O. is a card-carrying organisation, and in 1987 claimed "membership of 98 branches differing in size and spread throughout the country" and further, the organisation "tends to attract only militant people, who are prepared to carry the consequences of being card-carrying members of a political organisation" (Maphai, 1987:1). In terms of numbers, the A.Z.A.P.O.-N.F. coalition is
much smaller than the UDF firstly because its main areas of influence are the Western Cape and the Reef while the UDF commands a significant presence nationally.

Differences between the UDF and the A.Z.A.P.O.-N.F. coalition lie in their interpretation of the national question in South Africa. The UDF, in line with the Freedom Charter adopts a non-racial approach while the A.Z.A.P.O.-N.F. line defines the oppressed as black where black is a political rather than an ethnic expression, but definitely refers to those who do not have the vote. This makes collaboration with white liberals and progressives difficult on the part of A.Z.A.P.O.-N.F. while this does not pose any problems for the UDF.

2.5.5 Institutional and professional organisations

2.5.5.1 The Church

Perhaps the greatest problem for apartheid is not the existence of political organisations but rather the oppositional ethos it has generated in numerous institutions in the country. The organised church, through the South African Council of Churches and the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference, has acted as the spiritual benefactor of the extra-parliamentary opposition, not only by preaching against apartheid as a sin but also by providing the leadership and direction during mass action. Personalities like Dr Beyers Naude, Archbishop Tutu, the Reverend Alan Boesak, Archbishop Hurley and the Reverend Frank Chikane have not only championed the cause of the underprivileged but have personally intervened or led peaceful protest marches thus giving both dignity and restraint in situations where circumstances might precipitate conflict and disorder. Their presence has, in a number of instances, prevented the outbreak of physical conflict between protesting marchers and the police.
2.5.5.2 Professional Groupings

There are two factors which account for the inclination of black professionals to identify with the extra-parliamentary opposition, and, in a sense, these belie the strategy of a middle class accommodation by the state and the private sector:

i) At an intellectual level apartheid does not resonate well with professional ethics. The material effects of discrimination alienate professionals from the state or state institutions. A number of the young professionals are products of the black consciousness era and, therefore, much more assertive in self expression and much more sensitive to discriminatory practices within the professions than has been the case with previous generations.

ii) The dominance of the state's ideology in professional practice and within the institutions that offer service to the population, for instance, in social welfare, health and education, has encouraged the formation of organisations that espouse an alternative ethos.

Professionals in various spheres of activity have formed alternative bodies whose main objectives are both to render a service as well as empower communities to self realisation so that they do not become dependent consumers or rely on outside sources for the delivery of those services. Associations like the National Medical and Dental Association (NAMDA), the Black Management Forum (BMF), the Association of Black Accountants of South Africa (ABASA), the South African Black Social Workers' Association (SABSWA), the National Democratic Lawyers' Association (D.A.D.E.L.), the National Educational Union of South Africa (N.E.U.S.A.), the Union of Democratic University Staff Associations (U.D.U.S.A.) and many others constitute this category. They co-operate with community, worker and business organisations in the development and management of programmes designed to undermine apartheid.

2.5.5.3 Black Business

From about 1985 African businessmen as represented by the National African Federated Chambers of Commerce (N.A.F.C.O.C.) has played an increasingly significant role in the
extra-parliamentary opposition. This role has been complemented by the activities of blacks in professional and managerial positions as represented in the BMF. This complementary position has resulted in a number of consultations, by both groups, with both the A.N.C. and the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM). Despite the heterogeneity in N.A.F.C.O.C. (its constituents include homeland-based affiliates with a membership ranging from independent traders to incumbents in state-created structures), the organisation seems to have succeeded to identify more with the extra-parliamentary opposition than pursue an ideology in line with the structural determinants of its formation. By promoting a black middle class the state had hoped that it would increase its own support base, but N.A.F.C.O.C.'s ideological associations as well as its practical pursuits belie these expectations.

2.5.5.4 Labour

The Wiehahn Commission which recommended the legal recognition of African trade unions ushered in a new era in extra-parliamentary opposition politics. Subsequent developments on the labour front resulted in the formation of two confederations - COSATU with alignments to the Charterist principles, and N.A.C.T.U. aligned to the Black Consciousness movement.

In terms of numbers alone, COSATU has approximately one million paid up members while NACTU has about one hundred thousand (1989 figures).

The principle of 'one industry one union' has further strengthened the federations such that a strike can almost paralyse the entire industry. What is of more significance, however, is first the captive constituency that unions command, and secondly the way in which unions advanced their political power from purely shopfloor to community issues. Webster argues that this has changed the political terrain such that the unions have not
"only pushed forward the visible frontiers of control" but have also instituted a form of 'deracialisation' from below (Webster, 1985:279). The emergence of African trade unions on the labour scene has thus brought in new challenges to racial capitalism and the ethnic state and, consequently strengthened the extra-parliamentary opposition. The fact that in South Africa worker and community politics coincide has facilitated cooperation between community-based organisations and the unions.

Unions have also injected both organisation and a form of accountability to community politics as well as provided a leadership with a strong constituency. This has been noticeable lately in the organisation of stayaways and consumer boycotts as well as in the recent protest and celebration marches organised by the Mass Democratic Movement. Whereas in the past protest marches assumed more of the form of mobilisation and were often difficult to discipline, the recent marches and celebrations are well organised, disciplined and have a clear sense of direction.

2.5.5.6 The Strategic Logic of the Extra-Parliamentary Opposition

In broad terms the extra-parliamentary opposition sees South Africa as a country where white people both dominate and exploit black people. This is an observation which is rooted in the empirical and therefore, the existential situation of the black person in South Africa. The belief in a non-racial, democratic South Africa is, therefore, a natural reaction to what obtains and has to be expected. Because the visible structures of inequality are predicated upon race, a number of black people see the dismantling of racial structures as a necessary precondition for democracy. The growth of trade unionism among black workers has, however, introduced a brand of worker politics into the scene thus allowing for a class-based analysis of the South African social formation. African workers, in particular, have begun to attribute the South African social formation to capitalist forces where the state is an instrument of the ruling class. In this
instance, democracy will come about when socialism replaces the present capitalist mode of production. Because of the composition of the extra-parliamentary opposition, the political vision of the future of South Africa hinges between a non-racial democracy and a non-racial socialist democracy. What further complicates the articulation of a clear uniform vision is that at this time the extra-parliamentary opposition is still much of a movement of a coalition of forces where no individual force has clearly asserted its hegemony.

Two visions dominate the conception of the future by the extra-parliamentary opposition, the political and the economic. The extra-parliamentary opposition proposes a 'unitary, non-racial democratic' South Africa. The future vision has moved through historical periods and has encompassed the following:

i) making South Africa ungovernable. This was to be achieved by refusing to cooperate with the state's programmes at every level thus creating a legitimacy and administrative crisis for the state. Attempts to create 'alternative structures' in local government, education etc were part of this 'positive programme' of isolating the state from all popular constituencies;

ii) organising the masses around specific issues such as education, housing, rent, transport, health etc, which would act as rallying points. Programmes within these specific areas would act as educating catalysts within a specific political context thus acting further as conscientising agents;

iii) creating "space" within some official structures in order to advance the cause of liberation. Part of the reason for changing the slogan "liberation first and education later" into "people's education for people's power" or "education for liberation" was to use the school as 'space' for organisation besides the pedagogical purpose which schools serve.

Besides the organisation and mobilisation of constituencies, the extra parliamentary opposition engages in various forms of resistance to state initiated activities. Such resistance includes either the withdrawal of support or active defiance manifested in boycotts, stayaways, or even 'breaking the laws' as has been the case in the recent defiance campaigns organised around hospitals, beaches and other separatist amenities. The objective of these is to force the state either to change the laws and
policies or to come to the negotiating table. However, the ultimate objective is to force the state to negotiate the future of South Africa, and to this end the extra-parliamentary opposition set specific preconditions:

i) creating a political climate which is conducive to free political participation. This could only come about through unbanning individuals and organisations, freeing all political prisoners and detainees, allowing political exiles to return and scrapping the state of emergency. Such steps would create a climate that is facilitative to free political organisation by all groups;

ii) following upon (i), calling a national convention of the representatives of the people to draw up a programme for negotiations.

Economic visions pertain to the future economic system for the country. To allude that there is a uniform economic vision by the extra-parliamentary opposition would be an oversimplification of an otherwise complicated and contentious subject. Firstly, it must be stated that the extra-parliamentary opposition is an alliance of otherwise heterogeneous groups in terms of social origin. Support ranges from bodies such as NAFCOC and the BMF through to COSATU and NACTU. What unites them is the shared location under apartheid and the commitment to an alternative political dispensation. There may, indeed, be different economic agendas. It was in the realisation of the impact of the specific objective location of groups within the political economy of South Africa that Innes and O'Meara pertinently observed with regard to the African petit bourgeoisie, "Given its position between capital and labour in the class struggle, the petit bourgeoisie tends to see the solution to its problems in purely political terms - reform in the political structures rather than changes in the relations of production" (Innes, D. and O'Meara, D. 1976:83). The Constitutional Guidelines drawn by the A.N.C. in 1988 are probably the most developed document drawn on the economic visions for the future.

In terms of day to day pronouncements by significant sections from the extra-parliamentary opposition there is strong support for:
i) "Nationalisation of the major industries or a significant portion of them;

ii) Equality of opportunity in access to training and work as well as to rewards;

iii) A more equitable redistribution of the country's resources, i.e. land and profits;

iv) Free access by all to the state's social security systems including medical services and social welfare" (Zulu, P. 1987:148).

The above proposals together with the A.N.C. Constitutional Guidelines point more to a social democratic alternative than either to a pure capitalist or socialist economic vision for the future. That is, perhaps, understandable given first the heterogeneity of the forces within the extra-parliamentary opposition, and secondly, the fact that until the recent ascendancy of the A.N.C., no faction had been able to command a hegemonic position within the movement.

The significance of the extra-parliamentary opposition lies in its capacity to sustain opposition to the state against great odds when considering its power relative to that of the state. The state has not been loath to use its power against individuals and organisations when it felt that its interests were threatened beyond specific thresholds. Against these odds, the extra-parliamentary opposition has demonstrated resilience and the capacity to be innovative. It is this opposition which has forced the state, on many occasions to go back to the drawing board in an effort to produce a workable constitutional formula.
CHAPTER 3

3.1 CONCEPTUALISING THE SOUTH AFRICAN STATE

Differential incorporation of blacks into structures of political and economic power does not occur at random. It is rather a process whereby the ruling regime is systematically restructuring social and political relations within the state in order to 'solve' the legitimacy crisis which has resulted in intensified conflict between the state and (mainly) blacks, particularly Africans. The emphasis in this thesis will be on the present conjuncture i.e. the conjuncture of co-optive reform since Soweto 1976. A discussion of the state as the arena of activity becomes critical. In this contextualisation I am mindful of the impact of historical factors on the present. The analysis is therefore not ahistorical. In the discourse I shall focus specifically on the state, particularly on the capacity of the regime to incorporate outsiders into the structures of power without basically losing control. Two main reactions emerge from this: collaboration and active resistance. The twin processes of domination and the consequent reaction will be examined at the group rather than at the individual level. To this end a theoretical framework situating the South African state in context is essential.

In the treatment of the state I make a distinction between the state and the government of the day. The state is taken as "including civil service, judiciary, police and army - the institutions that make and enforce public policy, both symbolically and actually; ...." (Yudelman, 1987:253). This definition of the state allows for the inclusion of social and economic forces that constitute the social base of support for the state and transcend the conventional territorial and legal definitions which restricted the analysis of the state to formal operations only. It also goes beyond the dominant trend in neo-Marxist
literature and the liberal democratic positions which reduce the state to an instrumental role either as a tool of capital in the case of the former or a neutral arbiter among competing forces in the latter. The view taken here places the state in the position of an organisation in its own right, relatively autonomous from its social and economic bases of support.

Reasons for the discussion of the state are that it is through the manipulation of state power with co-optation as the principal strategy, that the ruling bloc, essentially the regime, is able to effect control. In the discussion of the South African state it is essential to note that in spite of its predominantly white character, it is not a homogeneous entity in terms of ideology. There are tensions within the state itself ie. between the 'conservative' and 'enlightened' factions. For instance, one has to realise the differences between Magnus Malan and Adriaan Vlok, Ministers of Defense and the Police respectively on the one hand, and Chris Heunis, former Minister of Constitutional Affairs and Gerrit Viljoen, Minister of Education, on the other. The governing National Party has, however, dominated the political scene and consequently state activity for over forty years such that the distinction between party and state has been tremendously blurred.

South Africa is a multi-party state. The nature of this multipartism operates only to the extent that it reflects differences among white parties. There was almost consensus among white parties on the need to protect and maintain white hegemony and white privilege. Differences existed with regard to the means of maintaining that privilege as well as to the nature and extent of white control. Hence the former official opposition - the Democratic Party, encouraged the reform initiatives by the ruling National Party, because co-optive reform is in essence part of the policy of a qualified franchise developed by the former Progressive Party which evolved into the present Democratic Party. The only difference is that co-optation as practiced by the National Party is racially based on "own affairs" while through the qualified franchise policy, the Progressive Party
sought to assimilate the upper segments from within the disenfranchised into an integrated South African society. A discussion of the South African state together with the main influencing sub-actors is thus essential to the understanding of co-optation as a strategy to maintain a critical equilibrium between control and resistance to such control.

Basically four theoretical positions posit an explanation of the South African state, and they fall broadly into:

i) class theories dominant in the 1960's and the early 1970's, which locate the state as an instrument of, if not wholly determined by capitalist forces, hence the usual allegation to the ruling class (Legassick 1974, Wolpe);

ii) race or pluralist theories within which the assumption is that race predicates social and economic relations within the South African state (Van den Bergh 1965, Kuper 1974 and to a certain extent Nolutshungu's variant of an internal colonial model of a special type, [Nolutshungu, 1983]);

iii) liberal modernisation theories which base political change on the operation of economic forces. Their starting point is that economic processes are by definition rational since if they were not this would render them obsolete and incapable of maximising profits. *Ipso facto* ascriptive criteria such as race or caste have no place in a competitive economy. Hence, as the economy grows, so too does its capacity to modernise and break racial barriers, thus necessitating a corresponding change in the polity. The highest form of political development in a modern economy is a corporate meritocracy, a form of class rule where class is defined in terms of market opportunities rather than in terms of relations to the means of production (Horwitz 1967, Adam 1971, Lipton 1986 and Lijphart 1977);

iv) finally, there are those theories which have reintroduced the state as a principal actor in political life, i.e. as a relatively autonomous organisation responsible for the 'regulation' of the conditions of socio-political and economic life within its domain (Mitchell and Russell 1988, to an extent Yudelman 1987 and Nolutshungu 1983, O'Meara and Morris 1976).

Given both the nature and operation of the South African state I am persuaded in constructing a theoretical model which seeks to explain the present political configurations in South Africa to follow the line taken by Mitchell and Russell and to incorporate into it some aspects from Yudelman and Nolutshungu. The model is based on an autonomous state whose activities are influenced by social forces within it, its
position vis-a-vis the international community of states, its power to administer as well as its organisational capacity and internal cohesion. In reiterating the autonomy of the state Skocpol asserts "It is, rather, a set of administrative, policing, and military organisations headed, and more or less co-ordinated by, an executive authority. Any state first and fundamentally extracts resources from society and deploys these to create and support coercive and administrative organisations" (Skocpol, T. 1985:29).

There is almost general agreement that the South African state is facing a legitimacy crisis (Mitchell and Russell, Yudelman, Adam etc.). Mitchell and Russell aver that this crisis has created an impasse in which the state is unable to reimpose control from above while the opposition forces are unable to seize power from below (Mitchell and Russell, 1988). Echoing this view Yudelman feels that "a new approach to an analysis of the South African conflict is now focussing on the South African state's legitimation crisis, its lack of accepted authority whether deemed moral or not, and increasing inability to perform its everyday functions without the exercise of naked force" (Yudelman, Op Cit:250). In a comparison of the authoritarianism of the South African state with authoritarian regimes elsewhere Adam writes: "The South African state, however, differs from authoritarian governments elsewhere in fundamental respects that make it an illegitimate polity and an outcast among the nations of the world. The essence of South Africa's illegitimacy lies in three aspects of its corporatism: (1) imposed group membership; (2) legalised group boundaries; and (3) the convergence of race and class" (Adam, H. and, Moodley, K. 1986:13).

In asserting that race and class converge Adam and Moodley lead us to the central cause of the legitimacy crisis in the South African state. The main functions of any state are to appropriate resources from society, regulate the relations in the society through organisation and administration as well as to redistribute the appropriated resources through the delivery of various services to the society. Further, the state has the
monopoly over the use of coercive power to enforce compliance with its constituted social order. The South African state is first and foremost perceived as a racist state. This is due to the convergence of race and access to economic and political power where whites as a race have access to the franchise as well as to the ownership and control of the means of production. Further, there are visible racial inequalities in South Africa, differences in the living space - white suburbs against black townships and shanty towns, white bosses versus black servants, inequalities in educational expenditure etc. It is these empirical demonstrations of inequality that constitute both the origins of the legitimacy crisis as well as the demands for change. Both lie in the political domain hence Nolutshungu stresses "It is a major theme of the discussion that follows that there is a problem of political change in South Africa that is not reducible to the question of economic change, but which, on the contrary, both limits the range of possible economic and social reform and affects the composition of the forces engaged in the struggle for change" (Nolutshungu, 1983:12).

The rationale for the proposed model is that co-optation originates in the political domain either as political manipulation or as an aspect of reform. In both instances the regime as an executive arm of the state is the principal actor. The model allows for a degree of eclecticism and perhaps that is a source of strength rather than a weakness since a number of theoretical positions which over-emphasise specific analytical constructs or categories to the exclusion of others tend to be reductionist. In arguing towards a theoretical account of the state Jessop (1983) proposes moving away from a general theory of the state to the construction of theoretical tools for the examination of specific conjunctures in order to reproduce the 'real concrete' i.e. as complex syntheses of many different determinations which can be combined to give a coherent, consistent account of the concrete situation. In support of Jessop my own contention is that in order for a theoretical explanation to be valid it has to withstand empirical testing on the ground, otherwise its plausibility borders on faith thus blurring the distinction between the
'scientific' and the 'theological'. By this I do not deny the role of theoretical reflection upon situations but rather wish to accentuate the relevance of the empirical as the basis for the formulation of theory. After all, social science addresses itself to social issues which involve society, and society has an empirical existence which cannot be reduced to single determinant categories such as race, class, politics and the economy. Jessop confirms this position when he states that "an analysis of the state, and its various conditions of existence, and its effects on social relations will include much more than the issue of economic conditions and class forces" (Jessop 1983).

There are specific reasons why I have opted for rather an eclectic model instead of limiting the theoretical framework to a specific theoretical position or paradigm. The proposed model has two distinct advantages:

i) It is both historical and conjunctural and can, therefore, be applied across historical epochs without being either empiricist or reductionist and creating 'moments' in history;

ii) It accommodates the three theoretical positions, referred to above, as contributions to the understanding of how the South African state operates without reducing the question of social change to an instrument of a particular set of forces ad infinitum.
A THEORETICAL MODEL DEPICTING THE OPERATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN STATE AS AN AUTONOMOUS ORGANISATION INFLUENCED BY:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competing Demands in Society - Constituting the Social Base of Support</th>
<th>The Organisational Capacity and Internal Cohesion - A Plurality of Units and Apparatuses - Unity is Politically Constituted</th>
<th>The Power to Administer and Coerce</th>
<th>The Position vis-à-vis the International Community of States</th>
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<td><strong>Capital</strong></td>
<td><strong>Labour</strong></td>
<td><strong>Race Privilege and Power</strong></td>
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<td>To generate Revenue for the State's Social &amp; Political Programmes</td>
<td>To generate profits for capital.</td>
<td>Struggle for 'Space' Dominant Groups</td>
<td>The role of the Afrikaaner in the Bureaucracy. The 'Political' Nature of the Civil Service &amp; the Judiciary - Internal Contradictions &amp; the Exclusion of Blacks from the Central State</td>
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The model seeks to achieve two things:

i) to explain attempts by the regime to broaden the state’s social base of support where co-optation is the main strategy;

ii) to situate the state-capital relationship as this is essential to co-optation by the private sector.

The model rests on the thesis that the state through its executive arm is an actor in its own right. However, the freedom and scope of the state’s acting capacity are constrained by factors outside the state hence the notion of relative autonomy. Constraining factors are:

i) competing demands in society i.e. from capital, labour and the national question. The state-society relationship constitutes a critical variable in the operation of the state since it is from society or from significant elements within society that the state derives its social base of support;

ii) the state’s position vis-a-vis the international community of states. Here the geo-political dynamics in the region as well as the international position of South Africa particularly the role of multi-national corporations, the issue of sanctions and disinvestment, the question of international sporting and religious links and the international diplomatic offensive of the African National Congress are powerful contributing factors;

iii) the state’s own power to administer and to coerce. This variable is closely linked with the fourth; namely,

iv) the organisational capacity of the state. As the state seldom consists of homogeneous sub-groupings, institutions and apparatuses, its organisational capacity largely depends on internal cohesion within the state. As internal cohesion is a politically determined variable, the political culture within the state is an essential ingredient in its creation.

An examination of how the theoretical linkages in the model impact upon the reality will demonstrate the effectiveness of the model as a tool for analysis. Fundamentally, the power of the state to mediate in society and to regulate social relations originates in its capacity i.e. “its own institutional resources and internal organisation (Michell and Russell op cit:316). A brief analysis of the above elements will illustrate the relationships as provided in the model.
3.1.1 Institutional Resources

3.1.1.1. Capital

In South Africa the fit between capital and the state is a curious one. In the first instance South Africa is a capitalist country, that is to say that the dominant mode of production is capitalist. Secondly, what is singular about South Africa is the racial base of capital i.e. the coincidence between the ownership of the means of production and race. Thirdly, capital is not a homogeneous entity; there are fractions within white capital based partly on ethnicity (English and Afrikaner corporations) and partly on nationality (South African versus multi-national corporations). However there is a tendency towards monopoly by the big conglomerates hence the reference to 'capital'. Fourthly, only whites enjoy the franchise in South Africa, and that implies white domination over the rest. This coincidence between ownership of the means of production and race on the one side and between the franchise and race on the other has given the South African state a distinct character, a racial capitalist tag (Saul and Gelb 1986). In turn this has given rise to an opposition which is in the main nationalist in character and socialist at least in rhetoric, thus weakening the ideological basis of support to the state.

Two views have dominated the debate on the relationship between capital accumulation and the state as well as the way this relationship impacts upon social change in general and apartheid in particular. Neo-Marxists have always argued that apartheid is functional to capital accumulation (Legassick, 1974; Wolpe, 1976 etc.) while liberal modernisation theorists maintained that economic growth (purportedly along capitalist lines) would negate apartheid (Lipton, 1986; Adam, 1971). Critics of the Lipton-Adam view, such as Yudelman, maintain that the relationship is more than being merely functional or oppositional but rather symbiotic (Yudelman, 1987). Capital's primary function is to generate profits in order to reproduce itself. On the other hand, the state directly
benefits from capital's performance in the form of revenue which the state needs to fund its social and political programmes. Because of this, Yudelman maintains, a contingency relationship between capital and the state develops. "Because the state needed private enterprise to optimise the accumulation function, and because capital needed the state to perform the legitimation function, a relationship of mutual dependence was the natural outcome" (Yudelman, 1987:253).

In dealing with the relationship between state and capital in South Africa certain structural and ideological relationships need a close examination. Firstly South African capital consists of multi-national as well as national corporations which broadly fall into private corporations and parastatals respectively. The latter includes large establishments such as the Industrial and Steel Corporation (ISCOR) and the Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM). Besides, the state itself until very recently has owned large concerns such as the South Africa Transport Services (railways, road transport and harbours), the South African Airways as well as the Postal and telecommunication Services. In addition, there are claims that some individual state officials serve on management boards of large corporations such as the Public Utility Transport Corporation (PUTCO). Finally, there is a distinction which is clearly reflected in the associations of pressure groups representative of such capital, the English-oriented Federated Chambers of Industries and Chambers of Commerce as against the Afrikaans oriented Handels Instituut and Sakekamers. The plurality of these segments, the multi-national/national, English and Afrikaner is fraught with ideological connotations which reflect particularly in the relationships between state and capital and between capital and labour.

The contingent relationship between capital and the state derives partly from the plurality in the structure of South African capital and partly from the ideological or ethnic character of some segments of capital. Hence when the state legalised the
recommendations enshrined in the Wiehahn Commission report, multi-nationals acting mostly from pressures from the mother countries were the first to recognise African trade unions while the parastatals, notably Sasol, had to face protracted battles with labour before accepting a working relationship with unions. This causes unevenness in state-capital-labour relations such that in spite of legislating for the legal recognition of African unions the state mediated on behalf of the conservative elements within capital each time there were disputes between capital and labour. There are further areas of mutual interest between capital and state such as, for instance, in the area of social stability in the country. Where activities, particularly from the subordinate population threaten - in the eyes of capital and the state - to undermine social stability the contingent relationship shifts to a 'partnership'. Hence when the state promulgated the first national state of emergency in 1986, most corporations supported it in spite of token resolutions to the contrary by the Federated Chamber of Industries. Likewise when the state has legislated to protect white business interests against competition, capital has supported the state. This was the case with the Group Areas Act when the white petty bourgeois of the Transvaal and Natal supported the Act because of their fear of competition from Indian traders (Freund W. 1988:90). Similarly there was a time when influx control and the migratory labour system provided both the state and capital with opportunities for savings (O'Meara, 1976; Leggasick, 1974 etc.).

What becomes significant in state-capital relationships is the vulnerability of the latter to pressure from labour, community sanctions and international practices, and how this impacts on the potential for social change, especially given the international political dimension. Secondly, a vulnerable business sector weakens a powerful support base for the state, thus rendering the state itself vulnerable. It is exactly this vulnerability which has prompted the state to shift from classical Verwoerdian apartheid to reform apartheid, thus creating 'space' for the opposition forces outside the state.
There are practical instances where opposition forces have pressurised capital or sections of capital into taking up issues with the state. For instance, the consumer boycott in the Eastern Cape forced the Chamber of Commerce to mediate for the release of the community leadership (Mkhuseli Jack and others) from detention. Also, it was through protracted intervention by capital that the state eventually relented on influx control regulations. The collusion between capital and state in the Labour Relations Act of 1988 is a test case. Here both the state and capital have a vested interest in containing the power of organised labour. Labour’s strategy is to exploit capital’s weaknesses through organised protests, consumer boycotts and stay-aways and in this way force capital to abandon or modify the partnership with the state. The significance of these developments lies in the ‘space’ that emerges in the relationship between capital and labour and finally gets translated to the relationship between the state and popular forces.

3.1.1.2 Labour

Labour as a relation of production exists, in the main, to generate profits for capital. Secondly, South African labour is mainly black, in contrast to a predominantly white capital. The coincidence between non-ownership of the means of production and race on the one side, and between race and the franchise on the other has produced a unique brand of politics. In the first instance the exploitative relationships inherent in capitalism as a mode of production are exacerbated by their racial content particularly in the context of an additional factor, i.e. a white labour aristocracy which is relatively privileged vis-a-vis its black counterpart. Secondly, it is this white labour aristocracy that, through fear of competition from blacks, demonstrates a rigidly conservative stance towards reforms in the sphere of labour, as Kuper notes “the overwhelming majority of white workers identified with the policies of white domination and used their political power as voters to press for discrimination in employment, racial reservation of many
skilled categories of work, segregation and other forms of racial oppression" (Kuper, L. 1974:206).

The divisions between black and white labour are both historical and politically significant in terms of contemporary politics. Firstly with regard to the former it was the state that created the divisions when, in an attempt to legitimate itself, at least in the white population, it broadened representative institutions among whites (including labour) as an act of mobilisation for support (Yudelman, 1987 op cit.). In doing this the state disadvantaged black labour, by excluding it from the collective bargaining system, imposing a system of influx controls, and barring it from skills through the colour bar clause in the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924. Secondly, by co-opting white labour on to its side the state blurred the line between production and community politics. As Webster notes, independent working class organisations have brought about a new form of working class politics "seen most clearly in the evolving shop steward councils which readily concern themselves with non-foundry issues, pushing unions beyond pure and simple trade unionism" (Webster, 1985:278). In this way, as Webster maintains, the involvement of Africans in the unions and worker politics has gone beyond a demand for representation on the factory floor and has become a struggle against the system of racial capitalism (Ibid).

It is not that the state lacked foresight into the probable consequences of a unionised black labour force legally recognised, when it adopted the recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission. By enforcing the clause, in the commission's report, which sought to prevent black unions from engaging in political activities, the state hoped to co-opt black labour particularly Africans, into operating within its defined rules. In this way it would undermine attempts, by oppositional community organisations, to further insulate the state from popular constituencies. The state failed and soon labour and the community based organisations acted in concert to achieve exactly what the state
hoped they would not accomplish. The working relationship between COSATU and the United Democratic Front on the one side and the National Confederation of Trade Unions (NACTU) and the Black Consciousness organisations on the other gives expression to this strategic logic by the opposition forces. Webster ascribes this development to the fact that African trade unions have their roots in the political economy of South Africa, and therefore take on some of the characteristics of social movements (Ibid).

Webster further notes that African trade unions have not "only pushed forward the visible frontiers of control" (p.279) by addressing issues other than those directly related to the work place (such as issues of housing and pensions) in the negotiation packages: they have also instituted a form of 'deracialisation' from below. Because of the historical developments in capitalist productive processes, from crafts to machine-based monopoly capitalist exploitation of resources, new conditions for new forms of worker organisations are created, and these include mass-based non-racial unions (Ibid). The emergence of African trade unions on the labour scene has thus brought in new challenges to the ethnic state and consequently undermined its social base of support. This has imposed new forms of constraint on the state not only by isolating it from popular constituencies but also by cracking the ideological basis of apartheid. The isolation from popular bases has meant that the state's entry, besides its coercive arm, into the constituencies of the disenfranchised is limited mainly to 'commission politics' where commissions of enquiry "serve to broaden the basis of the political debate beyond the narrow confines of the National party" (Mitchell and Russell, 1988 Op Cit:324). The cracking of the ideological base has created debate within state quarters, where issues of inter-racial mixing (including the moral position of the Group Areas Act), once holy cows, have become issues for public debate. Hence as 'deracialisation' from below creates dissonance within a racialised society, the challenges to an ethnic state become even much bigger.
Questions arise with regard to the cohesion of black labour as a force and as a movement. Adam, for instance, refers to African trade unions as mirroring the three political and ideological tendencies prevailing in black political organisations. He maintains that NACTU mirrors the black consciousness ideology while COSATU reflects charterism. On the other hand the United Workers’ Union of South Africa (UWUSA), an Inkatha-created organisation, resonates with a conservative, even tribal, politics (Adam, H. 1987). While this may be indicative of tensions and a lack of ideological cohesion in black politics and (to an extent) unions, at the level of opposition to the state such divisions tend to fade. Both COSATU and NACTU have presented a united front on numerous issues, for instance in stay-aways and boycotts. UWUSA, on the other hand, has become inconsequential in labour politics except in the current turmoil in Natal where it is more the Inkatha movement than UWUSA that operates. Hence besides its much publicised launch in 1986 UWUSA exists only in name. Adam himself sees resilience in the independent labour unions and states that “continuous, and increased, strike activities during a severe recession also indicate a surprising worker militancy” (Ibid:328).

Black, and essentially African, labour has, therefore, shifted the base of the struggle for power in South Africa from the township to the factory floor, particularly when the state of emergency has rendered organisation within the township difficult. Firstly it has exposed the vulnerability of capital, especially when South African capital is itself divided and has a tradition of accumulation without much opposition from cheap black labour. This has forced capital to review its traditional basis of co-operation with the state: for instance, capital has pressurised the state into making political concessions. ‘Orderly urbanisation’ and the subsequent removal of influx control are partly a result of this new basis of co-operation and partly an outcome of the shortage of skills in industry where the migrant labour system could no longer cope. Secondly, by directly entering the political arena
black unions have broadened the mass base of opposition to the state. Both developments have had a profound impact on the support base of the state and have accelerated the reform process of which they are products, thus demonstrating the dialectical nature of reform and resistance. The state’s capacity to rule has come under severe pressure, especially given the recession that has been a feature of the South African economy since the beginning of the eighties.

3.1.1.3 The State-Capital-Labour Relations

As a support base to the state, capital is finding itself in an increasingly invidious position vis-a-vis labour and the reform process. This is particularly in response to both the accumulation and legitimation crises (Yudelman, 1987 op cit.). This is where the symbiotic relationship “where mutual dependence will survive most disputes no matter how acrimonious they emerge in public debate” (Ibid:253) operates. The current dispute between organised capital and organised labour over the Labour Relations Act is a test case where the state, in response to the crisis in capital-labour relations, attempted to apply brakes to what it defined as ‘disruptive activity’ by labour. The Act makes organised labour responsible for ‘damages’ and, therefore, liable to be sued by capital for losses resulting from ‘illegal’ strike action (The Labour Relations Amendment Act 1988). Labour has responded to the Act by directly challenging capital to either desist from applying the provisions of the Act in the event of any confrontation or to openly revoke the Act. The Act is a test case in that it challenges capital to openly declare its position vis-a-vis the state as well as organised labour.

The relationship between state and capital is, indeed, far from being instrumental and is closer to accommodation and, therefore, closer to symbiosis. While O’Meara could confidently state “As a system of brutal and violent labour exploitation which controls, directs, channels and allocates labour on behalf of all capitalists and keeps South African
workers divided and oppressed and their labour power cheap, little in apartheid is changing" (O'Meara, 1982:18), the opposite can equally hold. It is largely in response to representations by capital through the private Sector Council on Urbanisation that the state dropped the notorious influx control regulations. Further, developments such as 'grey areas' and Central Business Districts as challenges to the Group Areas Act are sponsored by capitalists. In a sense they represent the paradox between ideology and accumulation which further weaken the social base of support for the apartheid state.

3.2 THE STATE'S ORGANISATIONAL CAPACITY AND INTERNAL COHESION

3.2.1 The Ethnic State

In an analysis of the 'capitalist state' Milliband maintains that it is not only the instrumental relationship between capital and the state that accounts for the nature of the state but also the predominance of members of the capitalist class in influential positions in state institutions: the bureaucracy, police, army and the judiciary (Milliband, R. 1982). The historical predominance of Afrikaners in the South African state bureaucracy, particularly the civil service, police and the army is significant in the internal cohesion of the state. Also, although not to the same extent as in the other sectors, the judiciary has an Afrikaans character with the state president appointing members to the bench. Afrikanerdom provides a common ideological base which facilitates the subordination of the subject races by relegating them to a category of humans separated from mainstream society by differences in culture. The assumption is that whites in general and the Afrikaner in particular have inherited a superior cultural heritage to which blacks have no access by virtue of their own heritages. This provided and still provides a formidable resource to the bureaucrats, the police and the army. The administrative clerk could, therefore, enforce influx control regulations without much feelings for the personal pain suffered by the victims who were an anonymous collectivity of "bantu" debarred by law from entering "white areas" without permits. By reducing the person to
a document, the reference book, the state succeeded in depersonalising African workseekers, and clerks in Administration Boards dealt with pieces of paper rather than with human beings. Also, in spite of the 'enlightened' position of some of the members of the judiciary, "terrorists" are tried as criminals in spite of their being regarded internationally as guerrillas or 'freedom fighters' in a war against apartheid. By transferring the ideological tenets of apartheid onto its institutional ensemble, the state achieved a cohesive machine which kept policy and operation together thus contributing to a functioning unit.

The state's apparatus is thus held together by a national allegiance mediated by economic interests since positions occupied by individuals within the state's institutions carry with them both status and financial rewards. Afrikanerdom without the attendant privileges would not on its own bestow legitimacy to a system of racial exclusion. It is the fear of competition from the subordinate majority that reinforces the ideology of racial superiority. Admittedly, there are instances where sections of the state apparatus have acted against the state. The judiciary, for instance has set aside governmental decisions as in the Rikhotho case on influx control and has declared some provisions in the emergency regulations invalid. These are, however, rare cases and are exceptions more than the rule. The basis of legality in any state resides in power relations. In South Africa that entails power of the minority white group.
3.2.2 Co-optation

A predominantly white state bureaucracy has been both the strength and the weakness of the South African state. Demographic imperatives have made it impossible for the state to rely on whites alone to staff positions in the civil service. For ideological as well as practical reasons the regime has had to co-opt blacks into positions within the state apparatuses, particularly in 'own affairs' sections (56% of the civil service is black, but these are mainly in relatively junior positions). However, while the state still determines policy in 'own affairs', a large section of the bureaucracy serves only as junior functionaries, and even the elites within this section do not formulate policy. This has achieved two goals for the state. Firstly the state is seen to have 'deracialised' its institutional apparatuses and blacks are seen to be part of the central state. Where this 'deracialisation' occurs at the senior levels such as in the homeland or own affairs ministries, secretariats and the upper echelons in the bureaucracy, elite boundaries are expanded thus increasing the number of blacks with a stake in the operating system. Secondly, by creating 'own affairs' sections and getting blacks to run them, the regime distances the state from the daily conflicts of its own creation and locates the problems at the door of the 'own affairs' departments. Hence, when education, health and welfare services break down in the homelands, it is the various homeland ministries that the public perceives as incompetent or corrupt and not the government that controls both the budget and the policies that operate in the same ministries. In co-optation the state politically constitutes institutional unity and cohesion thus further enhancing the effectiveness of control by the ethnic hierarchy.

However the policy of co-optation has its own internal contradictions which act as a source of weakness for the ethnic state. Co-optation creates contrived solidarity through clientelism. Whereas the majority of white incumbents in offices in the civil service and other institutions are bound by the organic solidarity emanating from Afrikaner ideology,
co-opted black functionaries emerge from a patron-client relationship with the state. Firstly, co-opted functionaries do not command the support of the subordinate groups who see them as collaborating with the oppressor. The conflict with town councillors in 1984/85 as well as the 'internal war' in Natal in 1986-89 have to be seen partly from within this perspective. Secondly, because clientelism is based on "the exchange of political support in return for the allocation of politically-mediated resources...." (Jessop, Op Cit:230) co-opted functionaries have themselves endeavoured to create their own clients in a bid to sustain their positions. This in turn has generated corruption within the 'own affairs' departments thus not only undermining these subdivisions but also the legitimacy of the state itself.

It is therefore evident that while co-optation empowers the state by increasing its organisational capacity, and particularly through politically constituted unity, the contradictions of an ethnic state remain. This is mainly because the South African state is not representative of the population and as a form of representation co-optation can, by definition, only cater for a small segment of the excluded groups.

A corollary to the regime's co-optive strategy, but with a different set of underlying imperatives, exists in the private sector. Here companies are driven by both political and economic reasons to embark upon reforms in the sphere of production. Part of the drive for these developments in the private sector originated in the international character of South African capital and part from the pressure from demographic factors where the requirements for skilled labour cannot be met from the white population alone as has been traditionally the case. Multi-national corporations operating in South Africa have come under severe pressure from anti-apartheid lobbyists at home. In response they have instituted Codes of Employment which, among other things, call for 'deracialisation' which in effect means introducing blacks into management and other skilled ranks. South African companies have had to follow suit as well. The growth in numbers in the
political, bureaucratic and corporate elites has had a profound impact on South Africa's black society and particularly Africans. The state, in response to pressure from capital in particular, has had to tolerate a measure of 'deracialisation' in social life. For instance, grey areas came into being in what were traditionally white enclaves such as Hillbrow when the new elite that could not be accommodated in match-box township housing moved into the flats. Simultaneously, big capital like the Anglo-American Corporation and others have selectively moved their African managers into white suburbs.

The essence of the above developments is that they did not contribute to the organisational cohesion of the ethnic state but rather that in trying to consolidate its power base the ethnic state had not anticipated the unintended consequences of co-optation. Co-optation thus weakened its ideological hold on the bureaucracy, both political and corporate, thus creating space for 'deracialisation'. This in turn has taken the initiative away from the state, and together with the growing accumulation crisis, has strengthened capital's hand in negotiating for new terms of domination, a shift away from classical Verwoerdian apartheid. Some analysts, notably Morris and Padayache (1989) see in this a restructuring of class relations, particularly when taking into account the new housing policy in the townships. That may be the case but what is crucial in this discussion is that the weakening in the ideological dimensions of classical apartheid through co-optation has created contradictions which have weakened the internal cohesion of the ethnic state.

Another weakness internal to the system of representation by co-optation lies in the oppositional political culture engendered by excluding the majority of the population from legitimate channels of representation. Instead of turning to the co-opted elites for mediation, members of the subordinate group create their own structures. "In this way the state's own structures and activities have shaped a political culture of black politics that is itself inimical to the success of the new collaborative machinery being created for
the co-optation of black politicians and trade union leaders" (Mitchell and Russell, Op Cit:317). The formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) at the height of preparations of the Tricameral Constitution and the amalgamation of trade unions into the Congress of South African Trade Unions have tremendously weakened the support base of the South African state despite intensified moves to co-opt for the consolidation of the same base.

3.3 THE POWER TO ADMINISTER AND TO COERCCE

3.3.1 Centralisation of Power

If co-optation has weakened the cohesion of the ethnic state this has been compensated for by a centralised administrative system instituted by the executive arm of the state in the late seventies. There was much talk, in government circles, to move away from the Westminster system, and coupled with Prime Minister Botha's "total strategy" policy there was room for political and administrative restructuring to create internal unity within the state. South Africa created a presidential system and the State Security Council as means of centralising power in the executive. The State Security Council which meets under the chairmanship of the state president ramifies down into Joint Management Centres i.e. specially-created bodies which co-ordinate security matters at the local and regional levels. This co-ordination includes looking for potential flash points or conflict areas and reporting these to the appropriate bodies for corrective action if necessary. Joint Management Centres comprise the leadership from the military, the police (particularly the security police), local representatives from business and the civil service. There are also allegations that there are representative from black local authorities and from local political structures operating within the government created institutions, or that if these are not represented, there is liaison between them and the JMC's. As Mitchell and Russell state "the precise composition and functioning of these secret committees remains unclear" (Ibid:322).
The inauguration of the policy of total strategy and its attendant structures, the State Security Council and the Joint Management Centres could be taken as tacit admission by the government of two developments. Firstly, that the ethnic state was in the process of ideological disintegration and could no longer hold. Secondly, that capital as well as the emergent co-opted elites were leading the state away from traditional Verwoerdian apartheid. Both these processes could endanger white control. 'Total strategy' would, therefore, reinstate the state as the regulating power in social relations and if necessary strengthen the state's coercive capacity. Paradoxically, the government could claim to have 'deracialised' South African society by scrapping petty apartheid and by removing impediments to racial harmony, influx control regulations, discriminatory practices in the workplace, the Immorality and Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Acts. It is this paradox between reform and coercion that calls for more examination as "The state's reform process significantly did not mean that the repressive apparatus of the state was being disbanded" (Morris, M. and Padayache, V., 1989:8). The central objective of the South African state is to retain control and if reform or co-optation can not attain this goal the government invokes the state's coercive apparatuses in whatever form, and it is to these that I shall focus attention in the following section.

3.3.2 Coercion

Conventional political science literature, both Marxist and non-Marxist, maintains that what distinguishes the state from other social organisations is its claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical coercion in a given territory (Easton, D. 1963; Therborn, G. 1980; Milliband, R. 1982; Skocpol, T. 1985). Milliband further asserts that the government of the day speaks and acts on behalf of the state, hence a defiance of its orders is a defiance of the state. However, this does not mean that the government which is formally invested with state power controls the state or that power, rather the
state's capacity to coerce lies both with the government of the day and outside it in the other institutions of the state (Milliband, R. 1982). Generally, the police and the army constitute the state's coercive apparatus. Further, the extent to which these are used for internal control varies with the degree of challenge to the state which necessitates resorting to these two organs to contain it.

There is general agreement among political analysts of the South African state that it relies heavily on its coercive apparatus to enforce compliance, particularly now that it is faced with a growing legitimacy crisis (Adam, H. 1971, 1986; Evans, M. and Phillips, M. 1988). That alone does not constitute an anomaly, besides that the ethnic nature of both the police and army, particularly at the upper echelons of the police force, (the army is almost totally white) further reinforces both racial divisions and white control, thus cementing the white social base of domination. What further exacerbates coercion is the penetration of the state into civil life, the Joint Management Councils and lately the co-optation of vigilantes, forces based in the communities, to execute brutal repression against opponents of apartheid at the local levels.

### 3.3.3 The Police

There are claims that the South African state is relatively under-policed with a police force of 62,000 or 2 police persons per 1,000 of the population (Schlemmer, L. in Berger and Godsell 1988). What the figures do not tell, however, is the distribution of the police force in times of calm, as well as its role during the endemic conflicts with the opponents of the state. White suburbs and state institutions enjoy a relatively better protection from the police force than do black townships, thus increasing the ratio of police persons in the white population. The position is worse in informal settlements where there are neither police stations nor a police force. The origins of community guards, an innovation from the township communities, as a protective mechanism against crime,
can be located in the inability of the police force to protect township and shack residents against crime.

Despite the relatively small numbers in the conventional police force vis-a-vis the total population, the South African police are a formidable force when confronted with political dissidents. Firstly, besides the South African police the state can call upon the railway police to augment its forces in times of crisis and has often done so. Secondly, there are municipal police who can also be used for law enforcements, for instance the notorious 'black jacks' who vigorously enforced influx control measures.

Thirdly, the creation of special police, the 'kitskonstabels' or instant police, who are recruited from the townships and trained for three months has provided an auxiliary force to the South African police. Fourthly, the security police attend to political matters and are known for their brutality when handling political dissidents (the number of people who die in detention or in police custody is high enough to deter further overt opposition to the state in many instances).

It is significant that the South African police force is not only heavily armed with sophisticated weapons and military vehicles which it uses when dealing with protesters, it also has a military culture and exercises an overt political role. In the first instance, as in the bureaucracy in general, the hierarchy in the police force is predominantly Afrikaans and shares the state’s official ideology. There are even claims that the police force harbours right wing elements i.e. members of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbevordering. This ideological stance has distanced the police from the general population thus alienating them from their communities. Hence between September 1984 and the end of 1985 at the height of unrest in the townships 33 policemen were killed, 584 were injured and 807 police homes were attacked (Zulu, P. 1986). In turn the security forces i.e. the police and the army combined, had killed 628 people between September 1984 and December

3.3.4 The South African Defence Force

The establishment of the State's Security Council in 1972 introduced the South African Defence Force into an overt political role in the internal affairs of the South African state. It therefore came as no surprise when in October 1984 the government deployed the army into the townships to augment the size of the police force in riot situations as the latter could no longer cope. As is the case with the police force, arguments about the size of the defence force do not hold much in a polarised situation where almost the entire white population is armed while very few blacks are permitted to carry firearms. Secondly in comparison with countries on par with South Africa in terms of development, Canada and Australia, the Republic is relatively well armed, more especially when considering that the main focus of the military is the defence of the country against its own citizens (the defence of the borders is against incursion by guerrilla forces of the African National Congress, the Pan African Congress and until lately the South West African People's Organisation). The entry of the army into the townships was in line with the rationale that resistance in the townships was fanned by forces from outside, mainly from the African National Congress.

The role of the defence force in suppressing internal resistance to the state goes beyond the overtly military to the insidiously political. In 1985, 35 372 soldiers were deployed into the townships and by April 1987, 96 townships were occupied by the army. To date, members of the defence force are deployed in civilian functions, as well as medical personnel. In addition there is a close co-operation between the army, the police and vigilantes (forces recruited by functionaries in state-created institutions, or by 'warlords' in charge of shack settlements to fight groupings in the extra-parliamentary opposition.
when dealing with protesters in the townships). There is strong evidence from affidavits and eye witness accounts, and I have personally witnessed some incidents of casspirs and police vans flanking busloads of vigilantes on their way to attack areas allegedly occupied by radical or protesting elements in the townships. There are numerous affidavits alleging, beside other things, the provision of "assistance and a line of defence for right wing vigilantes in their attacks on members of political, community and labour organisations" (Evans, M. and Phillips, M. Op Cit:130).

Further, the political role of the defence force is demonstrated in the direct links between the army, the security police, business, community or town councils and local bureaucracies in the Joint Management Councils (Ibid); and the regional demarcation of the Joint Management Councils corresponds to the nine Defence Force Commando Areas (Schlemmer, 1987). Further, Schlemmer states "although Joint Management Council have no executive powers, they appear to be 'grey' areas, where national security management intrudes into the affairs of local government structures" (Ibid:29). Evidently, it is the penetration of the defence force into civil society rather than its size that accounts for the effectiveness of the army as a coercive organ of the state, a penetration which has been further enhanced by the 1985 amendment to the Defence Act. In the Act "Soldiers were given the right to search, seize articles, disperse crowds and man road blocks without police assistance". Further, "Any Defence Force member with rank equivalent to that of a warrant officer would now be entitled to prevent a prohibited gathering, disperse an unlawful gathering and order the detention of anyone" (Ibid:134). Indeed the South African state enhances its coercive capacity to deal with challenges in times of crisis, and it is the flexing of this coercive muscle rather than the response to the causes of popular challenges that earns it the label of an authoritarian oligarchy. The emergence of white right wing elements such as the Wit Wolwe and the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging who are prepared to take the law into their hands when
they feel the state demonstrates a weakness in dealing with dissidents can only add to the coercive repression of opposition.

Finally, the coercive arm of the state is strengthened by the state's resorting to a state of emergency each time the government feels that the legitimacy crisis becomes difficult to manage. The emergency is a drastic step which suspends the rule of law by placing certain activities outside the normal legal ambit and also by granting extraordinary powers to specific state functionaries or organs such as specific ministers, the police or the army. In fact a state of emergency falls just short of martial law. By the beginning of 1990 South Africa was on the forth year of a total state of emergency first proclaimed partially in 1985 as the government's response to the 'revolts' in the townships. The exercise of overt coercion by the state is generally the last resort when both propaganda and covert pressure fail to elicit the desired response from the subordinates. There is generally the provision to detain suspected or overt opponents of the government under various measures historically ranging from the Ninety Day Detention Act of 1963 to the present Internal Security Act. For instance between September 1984 and February 1987, at the height of unrest in the townships, 34,987 people were detained under the Emergency regulations and the various Acts which provide for the detention of people who, in the opinion of the Minister of Law and Order or his representatives, are deemed to constitute a danger to the state (Evans, M. and Phillips, M. 1988). Besides detention, the laws also provide for restricting the movements of the listed opponents of the state.
Mitchell and Russell maintain that the capacity of the South African state to manage crisis effectively depends to some degree on the impact of transnational pressure such as the complex geo-political and economic pressures that arise "from its specific location within the wider international system of states" (Mitchell and Russell Op Cit:328). In particular, apartheid has ostracised South Africa internationally thus rendering it vulnerable to international pressures and therefore, to a degree, sensitive to international opinion.

3.4.1 South Africa's Regional Position

Economically and militarily, South Africa is in a very powerful position within the region. This is, however, in sharp contrast to the moral position of the Republic in the same region. It is indeed this contrast that is a source of weakness within power for in spite of its massive strength South Africa is involved "in the economic destabilisation of frontline states...", and has had also to deploy extensively the South African Defence Force on the borders, especially in Namibia (Evans and Phillips, Op Cit:328). Tensions between South Africa and her neighbours, particularly the frontline states, arise out of the Republic's policy of apartheid and the attendant disenfranchisement of the indigenous population which conflicts with the anti-colonial drive, a movement which dates back to the early 1950s. The conflict is further exacerbated by the growing strength of South Africa's own nationalist movement, the African National Congress, which on being proscribed from South Africa sought sanctuary in the frontline states and has headquarters in Lusaka, the Zambian capital. The constant incursion by the guerrilla forces of the A.N.C. has sharpened the security consciousness of the state, hence the deployment of the South African Defence Force on the country's northern and north eastern borders, an exercise that has proved to be financially very expensive.
Military involvement by South Africa on the borders has had a dramatic impact on developments internally. Firstly, by drawing an increasing number of young white males into the army, the state has created an artificial skills shortage on the labour market, particularly in the light of the country’s educational system, which heavily limits access by blacks into opportunities for training. Secondly because both the state and the private sector desperately need skills to enable the economy to operate, especially given the increasing costs of maintaining the army on the borders (the costs of maintaining the army rose by more than 50 percent in real terms between 1977 and 1982), spaces in white educational institutions, universities and technicons were increasingly open to black students in the 1980s. Such development did not only demonstrate the impact of economic pressures on state policy but also signified the gradual erosion of the social base of support for the state. Actual mixing at schools, as well as ‘deracialisation’ on the factory floor, has weakened the ideological basis of Verwoerdian separatism, thus giving way to further reforms.

3.4.2 Economic Pressures - Sanctions and Disinvestment

If South Africa’s regional economic and military dominance are a source of both strength and weakness, so is her international economic position. While mining accounts for 21 percent of the gross domestic product, gold alone accounts for about 60 percent of the Republic’s exports (Yudelman. Op Cit:257). Further, investor confidence in South Africa has fluctuated with changes in the Republic’s political fortunes and the Rand has demonstrated a sensitivity to these fluctuations. South Africa’s manufactured products are not highly competitive, hence most of the country’s foreign exchange is earned through exporting minerals. Further, multinational companies account for a large slice of the secondary and tertiary sectors.
The 1980s have witnessed growing pressure for punitive economic measures by the international community against South Africa, especially pressure for sanctions and disinvestment. Given the vulnerable economic position, the state has been on the defensive. The international debt crisis, together with the threats for more economic pressures, has precipitated changes internally which a few years ago appeared very remote. A change in the leadership within the governing National Party has also facilitated such changes since a new leader has more space for innovation without losing face. Simultaneously with the changes in the fortunes of the National Party there has been the consolidation of the extra-parliamentary opposition. This has facilitated an increase in the incidents of protests with less anomie, partly because the state has ordered the police to assume a low profile, and partly because the opposition has been effective in controlling and directing its forces. Such developments are creating more space for a changing political culture despite the resistance from the far right wing of Afrikanerdom. The freeing of high profile political prisoners such as some A.N.C. cadres serving life sentences has to be seen within this context.

3.5 APPRAISAL OF THE RELATIVE AUTONOMY OF THE STATE

In this chapter what has surfaced is, as Mitchell and Russell maintain, the contradictory nature of state power, and as the authors affirm, "it is our contention that, paradoxically the South African state is at one and the same time both relatively strong and relatively ineffective." (Mitchell and Russell. Op Cit:330).

Led by an ethnic fraction the South African state demonstrated an effective coercive and organisational machine, but this effectiveness lasted only as long as there was a fit between the coercive and ideological components on the one hand and between these and the demands of the economy on the other. As the challenges to the ethnic hegemony grew, they generated structural and organisational problems which
undermined the social base of support for the state. A plural bureaucracy introduced cracks in the implementation of policy and this created loopholes in the legal machinery. For instance, some judges have questioned and further set aside state provisions by exploiting legal loopholes on evidence that might rest on extra-legal grounds. At the same time economic necessities have created space for actors from outside of the traditional state-capital partnership, by introducing African labour as one of the principal actors and this has altered the conventional power relations in the South African political economy. The response by the regime, has been to promote reform and intensify repression, but this has also created its own momentum and paradoxes.

Reforms have created political opportunities which have generated further formations, the United Democratic Front and the Congress of South African Trade Unions to name the most populous. Consequently the opposition has become more mass-based, more broad-based and better organised than before. While repression might have diminished the visibility of resistance for some time, it has rendered the state more vulnerable both nationally and internationally, thus precipitating further reform, albeit not to the satisfaction of the subordinates. This puts emphasis on the state's capacity to effectively manage the process of change. In essence, the South African state is confronted with the problem of changing from a white dominated racial oligarchy to a position where all South Africans can share power without risking domination by the black and essentially African majority. The analysis in this chapter, so far, demonstrates the organisational and ideological constraints to the state's capacity either to dominate effectively or regulate the process of change without risking total capitulation. What the government, as an executive arm of the state, has come to accept is that total domination can no longer work. It has thus resorted to a strategy of broadening its support base through an incremental process of elite incorporation into the structures of political power. The following chapters will examine the probability of success of the various co-optive strategies.
CHAPTER 4

4. DISCUSSING THE AFRICAN ELITES

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Basically, there are two ways of looking at the African elites in South Africa. The first is to examine them in terms of their class location and position in South African society as a whole, and the second is to assess them through their position and influence within the subordinate group to which they are allocated in terms of the country's laws. In an earlier statement it was evident that, for co-optation to be effective, individuals and groups targetted for incorporation have to have both power and influence in their communities or groups. This is because co-optation is, by definition a selective incorporation of individuals or groups from among non-members in order to hold out the promise, to the rest of the non-membership, that the system is open. In this way both the system and the process of selective incorporation are legitimised.

Since the intention in co-optation is not to incorporate outsiders fully, only the top or influential members from the subordinate groups are targetted for inclusion. Also, because the elites have played a leading role in articulating, firstly opposition to the state and secondly, the need for inclusion into the structures of political and economic power, they provide the candidates for co-optation. Finally, it is the elites who, by virtue of their professional or academic qualifications, are eligible for recruitment into professional and managerial positions in both the private and public sectors. Co-optation, therefore, takes the form whereby co-opting powers relax the boundaries of entry into the dominant system by redefining the terms of participation in order to facilitate the
incorporation of elites. For these reasons, a description of the African elites is necessary.

4.2 **THE AFRICAN ELITES IN CONTEXT**

In classical terms, elites constitute the ruling classes, or individuals with the best attributes in specific pre-occupations. This is the version of elites as advanced by Mosca and Pareto (Parry, G, 1969, Bottomore, T.B. 1982). However, in South Africa because of the laws based on race, African elites do not constitute the ruling class. In terms of objective class location, Africans who own and control the means of production are placed in a subjective dilemma. They are precluded, in legal and institutional terms, from identification with their white counterparts. They can not own property in the most developed areas of South Africa because of the Group Areas Act, nor can they become members of the Federated Chambers of Industries or the Associated Chambers of Commerce, and finally, they cannot vote. Hence, they can not be part of the ruling class in classical Marxist terms. Their historical disadvantages as well as the legal and institutional constraints which presently operate, consign them to a special 'class' of their own. As Kuper observed, "Their property rights are weak, in the sense that not much sanctity attaches to the little property they own. Even those meagre rights they can not protect - far less can they build a structure of power on the basis of private property" (Kuper, L. 1963:4)

Kuper's analysis, incisive as it is, was made almost thirty years ago. Since then, major shifts have occurred in both the material position and relative power of the African elites. In spite of these shifts, however, both historical disadvantages and legal and institutional constraints still constitute barriers against a fully-fledged African bourgeoisie. As a consequence of these constraints, allegiances on the part of the African elites shift away from an objective class position to that to which they are allocated. In other words,
African elites are more conscious of the exclusion from power as a group than of their relatively privileged position. Both NAFCOC, an association of the commercial bourgeoisie, and various professional bodies have thrown their weight behind the extra-parliamentary opposition rather than with the government precisely because they perceive the status and material disparities between white and black elites.

Seen from the point of view of their position and influence within the subordinate group, African elites enjoy a position of relative privilege within their communities both in terms of status and power. Historically, educated Africans have constituted the social and political leadership among the disadvantaged. They have articulated African aspirations and commanded a strong influence in social, political and cultural issues. There are strong reasons to account for the identification of African elites with the disadvantaged masses rather than with their white counterparts. Both institutional and legal constraints, as well as the fact that the majority of members within this segment comprise the first generation of African elites, create linkages for downward identification.

Institutional constraints such as the historical, racial restriction on membership to specific professional and occupational bodies have created an exclusivist culture where race, rather than class, constitutes the divide. Also legal constraints such as the Group Areas Act compel Africans to reside in townships and homelands, thus precluding them from affective association out of their group. There is no social ‘golf’ syndrome across the races, even at a professional level in general. At the level of material well-being, African elites have to contend with the poor services and the absence of adequate amenities and resources in the townships (to say nothing of the quality of these resources). This creates common bonds between the bourgeoisie and the masses and politicises not only the relationship between the elites and the poor, but also the social distance between black and white.
Finally, the fact that a predominant number of the African elites constitute the first generation of their category, implies that their immediate kin are still part of the disadvantaged masses. Kinship ties necessitate exchanges in material support between the elites and their families, thus creating even stronger bonds between the two. Excluded from their white counterparts, and driven by legally-enforced sources of material discontent as well as by affective kinship ties, African elites are compelled to address the issues of the poor especially because they are inextricably linked with them. In the final analysis, apartheid provides the masses with a tailored leadership.

The African elites originated firstly in an education located in the values of the western Christian schools operated by missionary orders. This remained a small but very influential segment of the African population. In addition, when the homeland policy came into being, it created a segment or ‘class’ of political, professional, bureaucratic and commercial elites. Further, the state’s urban policy generated a political, bureaucratic and entrepreneurial middle class. Finally, there has been a noticeable growth in the number of professionals in academic institutions, the public sector and in the commercial and industrial spheres. For instance, whereas in 1970, 9 720 or 0,06 percent of Africans were in the category of professional, technical and related workers (Nolutshungu, 1983:117); in 1985 this figure had risen to 243 000 or 1,18 percent and included those designated as managerial, executive and administrative workers’ (The National Manpower Commission Annual Report 1988). The latter figures exclude the territories of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and the Ciskei. Subjectively, this has two implications for the ideological position of the elites. Firstly, because of their diverse social bases they do not constitute a homogeneous ideological clique; and secondly, their rapid increase in numbers creates both possibilities and the ‘promise’ that the rest of the subordinate population can access their positions and the attendant status.
The above discussion indicates that in spite of their exclusion from the centre of power, African elites constitute a distinct and significant segment within the African society. Further there is consensus among a number of authors that there is a status and power elite consisting of the commercial bourgeoisie, intellectuals, professional and managerial personnel, as well as the political and organisational elite drawn from the state created institutions, the extra-parliamentary organisations, the churches and from labour (Charney, 1984, Innes and O'Meara, 1976, Kuper, 1963, Ngcobo, 1968, Nolutshungu, 1983, Nzimande, 1985 and Zulu, 1981). Individuals within these spheres exercise a great amount of influence in their communities as well as at the level of organisation. This is not without historical significance as national organisations such as the African National Congress, the Pan African Congress and currently both the United Democratic Front, the National Forum, COSATU, NACTU and organisations operating within the state-created institutions draw their leadership from within the above-named elites or have elite associations affiliated to them.

What is significant for the strategy of co-optation is that the African elites do not constitute a homogeneous group, partly because of their bases of recruitment, and partly because of their location and function within the social division of labour. Secondly, co-optation produces unevenness in the experiences under apartheid where the co-opted elites are relatively privileged vis-a-vis their colleagues, particularly by the state which needs the former for its own legitimation. Hence, homeland leaders and functionaries in local government can easily call meetings during a state of emergency when the leadership in the extra-parliamentary opposition can not. The diverse sources of recruitment result in the elites themselves not being able to adopt a uniform strategy towards co-optation. For instance, the commercial bourgeoisie owes its position to the apartheid laws which restricted trading in African areas only to Africans, thus promoting a trading class fraction in the townships as well as in the homelands. Similarly, the
bureaucratic, professional and managerial elites in both the public and private sectors are tied relatively to the operating culture of the institutions that employ them. In contrast, independent professionals such as doctors and lawyers enjoy a degree of relative autonomy from both the state and capital in terms of their professional and ideological status. The ideological position of the political and organisational elites is essentially determined by the position of their organisations within the South African political economy, i.e. they are generally the organic functionaries of the institutions that mould and produce them.

While the structural location of the elites in the country’s political economy partly determines their political positions, at best this can only provide constraints to the political choices that an individual can make. In addition to structural influences and constraints, individuals create history on the basis of their experiences and personal choices as well, and it is on the basis of this theoretical position that this thesis seeks to elicit responses to specific indicators of co-optation from African elites as a group that the state has targeted for its co-optive strategies. However, both experience and personal choice occur within specific environmental factors which constrain and shape them. Furthermore, the choice of elites as the target population for this thesis was influenced by the social position of elites, especially in societies undergoing social and political change. Parry maintains “The core of the elitist doctrine is that there may exist in any society a minority of the population which takes the major decisions in the society. Because these decisions are of such wide scope, affecting the most general aspects of the society, they are usually regarded as political decisions even where the minority taking them are not politicians in the usual sense of members of a government or legislature” (Parry, 1969:11).

In co-opting the elites, the dominant group attempts to legitimate the operating system of power relations firstly by demonstrating that it is an open system and secondly by
relocating control of the subordinate groups in the incorporated elites. In this way the dominant group hopes to retain control over the overall system of power since it regulates both the tempo and direction as well as the terms of incorporation. The success of this strategy depends on the responses by the co-opted elites and a brief examination of their respective locations will help explain the unforeseen dilemmas of co-optation.

4.2.1 The Social Origins of African Elites

A variety of historical factors have produced the present African elites in South Africa. These are: a liberal mission school education, an interplay between the traditional patriarchal system and the British Colonial and later Afrikaner administration, and finally, recent developments in the South African political economy. Instead of going into the historical evolution of each sector of elites, I shall briefly sketch how the structural location of each shapes and constrains the range of political choices available to individuals.

4.2.2. The Intellectuals

While there may be variations on the composition of intellectuals as a category, there is almost consensus on their role as producers and disseminators of ideas. (Gramsci, A. 1978; Poulantzas, N 1979; Abercombie, N 1980 and Bottomore, T.B. 1982). There is further consensus among the above authors on the political and ideological functions of these ideas in the realm of social relations. Hence Poulantzas argues that what distinguishes intellectuals from the bureaucracy defined by "its relation to the state apparatus", is that intellectuals are defined "by their role in elaborating and deploying ideology". (Poulantzas N 1979. 23), and Gramsci states that intellectuals perform an essential mediating function in the class struggle, by providing both a theory and an
ideology for a mass base of non-intellectuals (Gramsci A. 1978). Implicit in the association of intellectuals with the generation and transmission of ideas, is the role that they can play on behalf of the rulers and the ruled. It is in this context that intellectuals in general, and African intellectuals in particular, have to be reviewed. This is essentially because apartheid has made attempts to generate its own organic intellectuals, and partly because African intellectuals have been in the forefront in mounting and articulating opposition to apartheid.

There is agreement among some authors that while there is an association between intellectuals and the production and dissemination of ruling ideas, this does not necessarily tie intellectuals to the ruling class (Abercombie, N 1980; Bottomore, T.B. 1982). In this case the composition of intellectuals shifts from the older debates of manual versus mental labour to a functionalist role but of a different nature, where the intellectual is both a defender of the status quo and a revolutionary. Bottomore lists a variety of functions he considers to qualify for inclusion of individuals into the category of intellectuals. "The intellectuals, on the other hand, are generally regarded as comprising the much smaller group of those who contribute directly to the creation, transmission and criticism of ideas; they include writers, artists, scientists, philosophers, religious thinkers, social theorists, political commentators." (Bottomore, T.B. 1982:70). Further, Bottomore cites the literati in China, who for generations provided the ruling stratum although he also argues in the same text that the intellectuals of the French revolution did exactly the opposite. (Ibid). The revolutionary theme extends to the present. "Their part in revolutionary movements, in the labour movement as a whole, and more recently in the transformation of the underdeveloped countries, has been emphasised in numerous writings, very often in the context of a critique of Marx's theory of the proletarian revolution" (Ibid: 71)
The South African state was not slow to realise this dual role of intellectuals and through the Bantu Education Act, actively mediated to produce organic intellectuals of apartheid. The creation of ethnic universities through the Extension of the Universities Act of 1959 had far reaching consequences:

(i) It removed blacks from the traditional liberal white universities where they had been accommodated either as a separate category (the University of Natal non-European section, for instance) or as minorities in certain faculties. Ethnic universities were not only reduced to tribal institutions, they were also staffed predominantly by Afrikaners who were: (a) from Afrikaans medium universities, and (b) supporters of the government's official policy. This resulted in an intellectual climate which was either depressing or alienative to the subjects that it was intended to serve. In the first place, graduates from Afrikaans medium universities were not sufficiently equipped with linguistic skills required for a critical approach to studies at a university level where English was a medium of learning. Secondly, their sympathy with Christian National Education, with its attendant accent on pedagogics as a philosophy of education and didactics as a form of instruction, stifled the development of a critical academic heritage.

(ii) The establishment of separate ethnic universities brought with it a form of 'parochial intellectualism' where focus shifted from a general education to the ethnic unit which often corresponded with the physical location of the university. This is particularly evident in the research interests of the postgraduate students, where candidates for Masters and Doctoral degrees took to researching their immediate communities, often on issues compatible with the doctrine of racial and ethnic separation. For instance, topics such as "The Education of a Tsonga child" and "Towards a Zulu-Oriented Curriculum", to name just two that have caused great stir in academic circles, demonstrate the influence of the ethnic and, therefore, apartheid influence on thinking in education.

Evidently, the attempted production of organic intellectuals of apartheid was partly successful on the part of the state and partly challenged by the blacks themselves. Challenges came in the form of (a) an exodus by academics and other intellectuals out of the country; and (b) the emergence of black consciousness from the very institutions which the state had intended to disseminate its official ideology. In 1969 a group of African university students broke off from the University Christian Movement, which had been formed in 1966 as "a more liberal alternative to the older Students' Christian Association" (Nolutshungu 1983: 168), and formed the South African Students'
Association (SASO). This marked the beginnings of the black consciousness movement. The emergence of black consciousness as a political philosophy marked two significant achievements in the political course of the disenfranchised:

(i) It signified the beginnings of the first organised, overt political opposition since the banning of the ANC and the PAC;

(ii) It constituted a significant political departure from earlier oppositional tendencies, by accentuating the independence of blacks from whites, in the organisation of opposition to apartheid. The slogan "black man you are on your own" became both an operational philosophy and a practical organisational way of life.

As a consequence of black consciousness, there is a growing body of intellectuals located particularly in the universities, the churches and alternative community institutions, which has started to engage critically in day-to-day analyses of the South African question. Black consciousness became the intellectual dogma of political resistance throughout the 1970s. It provided the internal political leadership until it was eclipsed in numbers by charterism in the early 1980s, a result of the reassertion of political and ideological hegemony by the ANC. It was ironic that black consciousness had, in essence, made it possible for the ANC and charterism to re-emerge as the dominant political forces by precipitating the exodus from the country particularly of the youth after Soweto 76. This helped swell the numbers in the ranks of the ANC, thus facilitating its resurfacing in the latter part of the 1970s and the early 1980s. Presently, the leadership in the extra-parliamentary opposition, be this in the Mass Democratic Movement, Black Consciousness or Labour consists of individuals groomed in the black consciousness tradition.

While the majority of 'visible' intellectuals operates in opposition to the present political status quo, as a segment intellectuals do not constitute a homogeneous group either socially or politically. And this heterogeneity is critical for co-optation to operate. At one level there is a general discontent with discriminatory practices while at other levels there
are various tendencies ranging from political collaboration with the state or system at one extreme, to anti-system activism on the other. For instance, black academic institutions have produced a homeland chief minister, a few members in the homeland cabinets, secretaries of departments etc, while on the opposite extreme both the general secretary of the Mineworkers' Union and the publicity secretary of the United Democratic Front, to name just a few, are graduates of ethnic universities. Finally the intellectual elite does not only consist of people in the extremes of political ideology. There is also a broad middle grouping consisting of individuals with different forms of lifestyle, including a bourgeois consumerist culture. Given these diverse ideological formations, it is not surprising that both the state and the opposition have drawn their organic intellectuals from the same institutions.

A group which is almost homogeneous, at least at the level of political visibility, consists of students at the tertiary institutions. They constitute a growing body of intellectuals who have increasingly acted as catalysts for change. Through organisations like the South African Students' Association, the Congress of South African Students, the South African Students Congress and the Azanian Students' Movement, students have mounted campaigns against discriminatory practices in education and against social and economic domination of blacks. Their campaigns have precipitated a number of reforms in the country, and were it not for the student's protests in the late 1970s through to the 1980s, most of the educational reforms such as equality in remuneration among teachers with equal qualifications across the races, as well as the principle of supplying free textbooks and stationery in African schools, would not have materialised.

Finally, it must be stated that the intellectual tradition among Africans in particular has undergone stresses and strains which have created a fundamental ideological diversity, in spite of the very strong common opposition to apartheid. In the first place, the present generation of political activists, whose entire political function has been inside the
country, is a product of black consciousness, a philosophy which, as Nolutshungu aptly puts it, grew up in "isolation from these extremely small pockets of neo-Marxism that continued to exist among some white intellectuals, who had better access to books and publications and ideas that were forbidden in South Africa". (Nolutshungu 1983:158)

Secondly, as stated above, the leadership outside of those organisations which subscribe to black consciousness consists mainly of graduates of black consciousness. This is very true of the Mass Democratic Movement and also of the African leadership in COSATU. The re-assertion of political and ideological hegemony by the ANC did not only eclipse black consciousness, but also shrunk the space that the latter had occupied for a decade. Black consciousness had not only been insurrectionist in practice, it was exclusivist in ideology as well. Charterism, while not lacking in the former, was inclusive and broader in its ideological references, particularly given the degree of interracial and international exposure of some of its proponents. The battles are thus fought at two levels: (a) the shrinkage of personal space as individuals feel their influences diminishing, and (b) the distrust of whites as committed comrades in the struggle, given that as a group they benefit from the continuation of the status quo.

Finally, as political space opens, there are increasing demands on African intellectuals to come to terms with the realities of building a political and organisational tradition which goes beyond 'collaboration' and 'insurrection' and takes into account the skills needed in reconstruction and governance.

4.2.3 Political and Bureaucratic Functionaries In State-Created Institutions

In an examination of class formation and ideology in the Transkei, Innes and O'Meara refer to a 'class of collaborationist petit bourgeoisie' i.e. those elites whose positions
derive from state policy - "chiefs, headmen and their clients" (Innes, D. and O'Meara, D. 1976:76). In addition to the political functionaries in the homelands there are the bureaucratic and managerial fractions within both homeland structures and institutions of local government in the townships; town councillors and personnel in administrative positions. Then there is the bureaucracy or the civil service. Currently, blacks account for almost 1,09 million or 56 percent of positions in the state bureaucracy or public service (Bekker, S. 1989). This is not to say that all individuals in state positions constitute the elite: some of these positions are fairly junior in rank. However, the attendant fringe benefits, housing subsidies, job security, leave and pensions provide a relative position of privilege to these incumbents. Further, what this highlights is the potential for recruitment into co-opted positions especially through occupational mobility in the public service or through a system of patronage in the bureaucracy. Finally, there may be an overlap between being a functionary in state structures and being a businessman, as it is the same functionaries that control the allocation of business undertakings.

Besides direct service to the state, Development Corporations in the homelands and in commuter townships provide further avenues for fostering a collaborationist rather than a nationalist bourgeoisie. Innes and O'Meara assert that this is a bourgeoisie "which the South African state itself brings into being and maintains in a relationship of dependence" (Ibid:80). Structurally, this is a fraction or sector that should form an alliance with the state, but the contradictions in apartheid set their own limitations thus leaving only the very top echelons of the bureaucratic and political bourgeoisie in a strong collaborationist position. The position of this fraction remains therefore both difficult and dubious because:

i) chiefs and headmen have to contend continually with restless peasants who need land and jobs to survive;

ii) as part of the petit bourgeoisie or commercial elites, traders face problems of capital for expansion, and, therefore, join organisations, like
NAFCOC, that espouse an ideology which is different from that of the state;

iii) only the upper echelons of the bureaucracy have much to lose substantially in terms of material and status rewards by openly adopting a stance that is anti-state.

The political and bureaucratic elites may not pursue a socialist line of thinking, partly because of their privileges relative to the masses, but they are not difficult to win over into the nationalist struggle. It is on the basis of this observation that the position taken by Innes and O'Meara becomes pertinent. The authors state: "Given its position between capital and labour, in the class struggle, the petit bourgeoisie tends to see the solution to its problems in purely political terms - reform in the political structures rather than changes in the relations of production" (Ibid:83). This assertion is pertinent to the probability of success of the politics of co-optation. Given the limited distributive capacity of the co-optation strategy, as well as the logical attractions of African nationalism in the context of the national question in South Africa, chances for co-optation along status lines only are reduced as the contradictions grow. More economic incentives become necessary.

4.2.4 The Commercial Elites

In 1987 there were approximately 15 000 African business persons, affiliated to NAFCOC, whose activities ranged from sole ownership of trading stores, tearooms, bottle stores, butcheries and small supermarkets in the townships and rural areas to partnerships in slightly bigger ventures such as hotels in the townships. The introduction of Tripartite companies, where big business, homelands, and the elites in townships situated in the homelands, provided access to share ownership in business to some African businessmen, as well as to functionaries in the homeland administrations. As stated above, the overlap between positions in state-created institutions and ownership of businesses in African areas further complicates the structural position of a large
number of African business persons. The majority of the commercial elites are affiliated to NAFCOC through its branches. Despite this affiliation, the commercial elite does not constitute a homogeneous group within itself. Historically, the commercial elite has constituted a conservative segment within the elites. It was only after the attack on the property of African business persons during the 1984-86 township riots that NAFCOC as well as some individual entrepreneurs changed their political stances and joined in popular politics, at least at the level of rhetoric. In spite of this official change in the position of NAFCOC, a number of business persons still continue to occupy positions in state-created structures both in the homelands and in the townships. It is in this context that the earlier references to NAFCOC as a conglomerate of disparate political affiliations was made. The majority of the commercial elites are affiliated to NAFCOC through its branches.

Structurally, a number of constraints operate on African business persons. In the first place, participation in state-created institutions facilitates access to business undertakings. Secondly, until recently legislation which allowed only Africans to trade in African areas has been beneficial to African business persons. It provided them with a captive market in the townships, despite the fact that many could not turn this advantage into a marketing tool as their overpricing has encouraged a number of township residents to shop in town. Such structural links have imposed limitations on a number of business persons who have found it hard to break ties with the hand that feeds them, i.e. the state-created institutions. The socialist rhetoric of the masses does not offer them much solace either, hence they tend either to adopt a conservative stance or at best take an equivocal position.
4.2.5 The Professional and Managerial Elites in the Private Sector

In 1985, a number of blacks, the vast majority of whom were employed in the private sector, constituted themselves into the Black Management Forum (BMF). Accountants formed a body known as the Association of Black Accountants of South Africa (ABASA) with a membership of almost 300. In terms of absolute numbers, there has been a remarkable increase in the number of blacks in professional and managerial positions since the concerted drive by private corporations to embark upon programmes of black advancement. As a body, the BMF has endeavoured to create rapprochement with both labour and the corporate world. In this way it has attempted to straddle the position between the two extremes i.e. capital and labour, although its principal objective is to facilitate the development of black managers in the economy. Understandably, a very large component of the BMF is African. The location of the professional and managerial elites in the corporate structure constrains their movements both within the corporations and the broader society. For instance, it is relatively difficult for an African industrial relations manager in a corporation, to openly identify with demands from a predominantly black union in a management-union dispute at the company level. Similarly, the same African manager would find it relatively difficult to hold office or a position of leadership in the extra-parliamentary opposition, such as in the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM). Corporations might argue that they do not control their managers' political activities, yet it is the same corporations that define what constitutes an 'interest group', thus structurally barring their managers from joining unions. They then expect those who fall outside of the defined interest group not to participate in activities which are outside their spheres of interest. Boycotts and stayaways, which form the most popular strategies of protest, are sponsored mainly by workers, and thus fall outside of the interests of the management group. This excludes the professional and managerial elites from participation in popular politics at the demonstration or public
level. In practice, however, there is a wide gap between corporate expectations and the political affiliations or inclinations of individual African managers and professionals. The historical racial cleavages at the workplace have not totally disappeared. Also, individual disaffection with conditions at work as well as with the political lot of Africans in the broader society finds expression in the nationalist movements, to which many of the elites in this sector willingly affiliate.

4.2.6 Independent Professionals

Independent professionals consist mainly of doctors and lawyers. The number of architects and other independent consultants is negligible: in 1985, when the last census was taken, Africans accounted for 20% of those designated as high-level manpower, but their representation in the professions like law, medicine, dentistry, architecture etc was below 5% in each case. (Manpower Surveys. Department of Manpower. 1987) Both lawyers and doctors have constituted themselves into national bodies, the former into the National Association of Democratic Lawyers (NADEL) a charterist oriented group, and the black consciousness oriented Black Lawyers Association (BLA). Doctor’s have formed the National Medical and Dental Association (NAMDA) with very strong charterist orientations. This does not necessarily imply that all lawyers and doctors are members of the respective associations. What is significant, however, is that these associations represent and, therefore act as the voices of, their respective professional memberships.

Of all the elites, independent professionals have relatively the least constraints on their political choices. It came as no surprise, therefore, when doctors in the employment of the KwaZulu administration refused to sign a pledge of loyalty to the 'cabinet' of that homeland, while nurses, teachers and other less independent elites found it difficult to resist for fear of losing their jobs. Traditionally, it is the independent elites that have provided the leadership in the nationalist movement: Dr Dube, Dr Xuma, Anton.
Lembede, Dr Moroka, Nelson Mandela, Robert Sobukwe and Oliver Thambo, to name a few. Currently a number of individuals from the independent professionals occupy leading positions in the extra-parliamentary opposition.

The existence of organisations like NAMDA, NADEL and the BLA has promoted what are popularly known as 'alternative services' at the community level. These are programmes designed to counter apartheid by enabling communities to develop a sense of self awareness, and the initiative to promote self-help programmes. Organisations like the Legal Resources Centres and the Progressive Primary Health Programmes are part of this initiative. A very large majority of the members within this group are products of the black consciousness era and are therefore believers in black self-reliance; in addition they espouse the politics of non-collaboration with the state and its extended apparatus (homelands, the Tricameral parliament, and town councils). In addition, their independence from the state, relative to the other elites, allows them more space to play a leading role in extra-parliamentary opposition. Furthermore, specific training in independent professional fields such as law empowers them to challenge the operating system from a position of strength. The role played by the Legal Resources Centre, some members of the NADEL and the BLA, in defence of the victims of apartheid is indicative of this strength.

Finally, the above discourse refers to those elites, from within the independent professions, who are 'politically visible' in terms of this thesis. Admittedly there are a number of doctors and lawyers who are politically inactive and go on with their daily tasks, as well as a few in homeland politics. What is significant is that, as a category, independent professionals have much space open to them to exercise political options and where they choose to do so, their power derives from this 'special' position.
4.2.7 Organisational Elites

The marked growth in extra-parliamentary opposition has brought with it an increase in the number of community and labour organisations opposed to the politics of participation in state institutions. Further, institutions such as the church have also made a great contribution to this development. A reciprocal relationship between individuals and organisations has developed whereby organisations have produced leaders who in turn have moulded, and at times reshaped, the same organisations. What is critical about organisational elites is that they become the organic intellectuals charged with the articulation of organisational policies and programmes. Further, by using organisations as a power base, organisational elites have managed to extend a measure of political influence in society. Personalities like Archbishop Tutu of the Anglican Church, the Reverend Frank Chicane of the South African Council of Churches, Cyril Ramaphosa of the National Union of Mineworkers, Father Mkhatshwa of the Southern African Bishops' Conference and Moses Mayekiso of the National Union of Metal and Allied Workers of South Africa, to name just a few, readily come to mind. Organisational elites are not limited only to the extra-parliamentary organisations: homeland-based organisations, operating within state structures, have also brought forth their own leaders. However it is difficult to estimate the personal influence, as distinct from their structural impact, that these elites have on the general membership within their organisations, given the overlap between the latter and the state.

What is significant about organisational elites, particularly in those organisations which form part of the extra-parliamentary opposition, is their relative measure of independence from the state and corresponding influences, an independence which largely derives from the raison d'etre, of the existence of the extra-parliamentary opposition. As the extra-parliamentary opposition think of themselves increasingly as the alternative to the
present state, elites within their organisations share the same view with regard to themselves. Because of this, they command tremendous influence at both the national and regional levels, especially because of their grassroots contact with individuals and groups. This is particularly true with regard to labour, where organisation is at an advanced stage primarily because of the accessibility of individual workers to organisers, together with the presence of shared value by the constituents. What obtains in the sphere of labour is replicated in the domain of community politics, although at a less structured level.

Organisational elites thus became the 'peoples' spokespersons' and this capacity carries an additional weight. They, more than the rest of the membership among the elites, act as the representatives of specific constituencies. This enables them to command a relatively significant measure of power in the communities.

4.3. ELITES AND POWER

It is largely on the basis of power and influence of the elites that this thesis focuses on their responses to co-optive strategies. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, African elites play a significant role in the political process, either as facilitators or as opponents of state policy. As facilitators of state policy, elites operate from two bases:

i) The state gives them backing through the operation of what Bachrach and Baratz refer to as the mobilisation of bias. In this instance, the state extends preferential treatment to the collaborating elites by allowing them free scope for organisation and mobilisation. For instance, homeland-based organisations and those organisations which are formed to strengthen the state's participation programme freely hold meetings when this right is denied to the extra-parliamentary opposition. Where necessary, the state offers physical protection to those leaders who operate within its institutions, when the same protection is not afforded to those leaders whose organisations oppose the state's programme.

ii) Through a system of patron-client relations, collaborating elites can distribute limited rewards to their supporters. Because they control resources such as housing, access to business opportunities as well as
other crucial resources, collaborating elites command power in their communities independently of the ideological support which communities may offer or withhold.

In contrast, oppositional elites have to rely on leadership qualities and ideological persuasiveness in order to elicit a following from the masses. In most instances, opposition to the state's programme emanates from material deprivation. It is spontaneous and sometimes unco-ordinated. Oppositional elites thus become the organisational intellectuals of the masses. Their function is first to articulate the demands of the masses and secondly to organise these into a programme of action. In the long run, oppositional elites have to keep the momentum of opposition as well as to translate mass demands into ideological symbols. They have thus to assert a hegemonic influence from a position of relative disadvantage among the very masses that they lead.

This discussion demonstrates that neither the collaborating nor the oppositional elites have absolute hegemony over the masses. Consequently, the reaction of the elites to co-optation or to what might be perceived as co-optation has to entail a rational calculation of costs and benefits. In the previous chapter I referred to the push factors which operate on co-opted or incorporated elites - total collaboration or strategic brinkmanship. It may also be that incumbents in certain positions find themselves co-opted by circumstance i.e. structural co-optation. Finally, individuals may find opportunity benefits and participate in actions or programmes that may be perceived by the membership within the subordinate groups to constitute co-optation. The following indicators of co-optation have been created within the context of these circumstances and limited options.
CHAPTER 5

5. OPERATIONALISING THE ATTITUDINAL DIMENSIONS OF CO-OPTATION

5.1 OBJECTIVES

At this point the second overall objective of this thesis needs to be restated, i.e. to test empirically how African elites, as the targeted population, respond to a variety of co-optive measures given:

a) the contradictions in policy between the state and capital; and
b) tensions within the elites themselves.

The specific objectives of this thesis are therefore:

i) to explore areas of co-optation or collaboration among African elites within the context of social, political and economic programmes designed by the state as well as by the private sector. Indicators of co-optation or rejection will be measured in terms of the subjects' perceptions of and attitudes towards:

a) The 1983 Constitution, which created the Tricameral Parliament as well as local authorities for urban Africans. A further enquiry will elicit responses to the progress made by homelands as geopolitical entities;

b) the shifts in economic policy and practice by both the state and private corporations, i.e. the legal recognition of Africans in trade unions, job advancement by blacks in the industrial and commercial spheres, the position of African traders within the Group Areas Act, the role of Development Corporations in African areas, as well as the protective legislation which allows only Africans to trade in areas zoned for residence by Africans. A close look at the subjects' attitudes towards foreign investment, divestment and disinvestment as well as sanctions will be made, in order to assess perceptions, by the elites, of these variables as catalysts for change;

c) the impact of mixed schooling on the education of Africans together with the social and ideological role that this might have on African solidarity;
d) the role of sporting ties which are being created internally and the consequences that such links might have in the social and political spheres;

ii) to investigate the probable alternatives to the status quo as perceived by the subjects, as well as strategies which might be appropriate for the attainment of such alternatives;

iii) to establish analytical categories used by the subjects to describe South Africa in terms of their own world views. Various authors often refer to South Africa in terms of:

a) class - explanation;
b) race - domination and discrimination;
c) ethnicity - pluralism;
d) both race and class - racial capitalism;
e) non-class interest groups including power as a specific interest.

It is hoped in this thesis that responses from the subjects will help to situate the conflict in South Africa in its proper perspective, at least in as far as understanding what, in the minds of the subordinates, constitutes the underlying problems.

iv) to investigate elite perceptions of the process of reform and the consequent advantages or disadvantages thereof.

Throughout the indicators listed above, care will be taken to attempt to distinguish between support for co-optation on the one side, and using 'spaces' in co-optation in order to advance specific strategic objectives on the other. In both instances, the structural location of individuals or groups within co-optation strongly modifies their capacity to effect changes in the structures of power.

5.2 METHODOLOGY

A study of this nature immediately plunges one into methodological problems - problems of intensity which in this instance is qualitative, and problems of representativeness which is a quantitative dimension. There were two imperatives which could not be overlooked.

i) Because the issues investigated are crucial to the understanding of the political processes in South Africa, the qualitative dimension demanded that discussions with individuals affected by the practice of co-optation be in-depth and probing.
ii) However, the same reasons that apply to the first imperative are equally applicable to the second. There was need to cover a reasonably sufficient number of individuals over a wide area and from various loci of power in order to draw a range of responses from a broad spectrum of power bases.

This presented an array of problems. Firstly, despite the sectorial breakdown of 'elites' in the surveys by the National Manpower Commission, there are no indications of where the individuals are located geographically or by organisation within the sectors. Secondly, the sectors or professions are not weighted in order of importance or the power they wield so that one could draw inferences with regard to the relative power that such individuals may command, although this may not necessarily be so. This left one option open, and that was to use positions within specific aggregates or groupings as:

i) the sources of identification of the individuals; and
ii) the basis of power and influence both within the organisations and in the broader society.

To this end organisations (professional, occupational and promotive) were identified and members of the executives of these organisations were approached. The rationale was that they constituted the leadership or spokespersons of the organisations. The following organisational or sectorial groups formed the universe from which individuals were selected.

i) professional groups in state or state aided institutions - college or university - teachers, nurses and social workers;
ii) independent professionals - doctors, lawyers;
iii) professional and managerial groups in the private sector;
iv) trade unionists;
v) media
vi) church or religious organisations;
vii) politics (a) state created institutions (b) oppositional civic and political organisations;
In total 93 interviews were conducted with individuals drawn from the Pretoria, Witwatersrand, Vereeniging (PWV) area, Natal (Durban and Pietermaritzburg) and the Border region (East London and King Williamstown). This decision was predicated on two reasons. Firstly, the greatest concentrations of urban Africans in the country are to be found within these three areas. Secondly, the Border region in the Eastern Cape, and Natal have, between them, a mixture of urban and commuter townships (the latter refers to townships situated in and administered by homelands). This left Cape Town and Bloemfontein out of the sample, the former because the distance made it prohibitive in terms of field work considerations and the latter, because it was felt the PWV area provided an appropriate parallel. Rural areas were left out because not all of the indicators under examination would be applicable there. For instance there are very few rural elites who are employed in the private sector, and central business districts do not exist in rural areas.

Interviews were carried out in 1985 using a structured open-ended interview schedule as the point of reference. Discussions with respondents took approximately three hours and were conducted by the author and three graduate assistants.

There are specific limitations in the methodology. Firstly, the range of items covered in the interview schedule was exhaustive, and this tended to affect the quality of the responses towards the end of the discussions. However, this was overcome by randomising the order of questions in order to allow for an even spread of the fatigue effect. Secondly, a sample of 93 can hardly be "representative" of elites in national terms. However, from inception, the study was not intended to give a representative picture of elite responses to co-optation but rather to draw out a broad range of possible responses to co-optive indicators as perceived by the elites. Finally, the interviews were
carried out four years ago, and the same respondents might now be persuaded, by the developments inside the country, to express different views or to modify their original stances. Despite this, however, the central features of the government's co-optive strategy still remain, and, the study still provides a focal point of reference.

It was hypothesised that:

i) pressures for collaboration apply unevenly on African elites because of their structural locations within the polity and the economy;

This is perhaps an obvious statement to make. What is not obvious is the extent to which this shapes attitudes of individuals to their 'captive' situations. Co-opted elites, that is in terms of objective location particularly in state sponsored institutions, have tended to take an antagonistic stance to those issues that are championed by the extra-parliamentary opposition as the principal opponents of the state. Some possible explanations can be advanced as the rationale for this behaviour. A number of incumbents in state-sponsored institutions have either been ostracised or had their lives threatened if not physically attacked by elements within the extra-parliamentary opposition (see Chapter 1 on the township revolts above). The vigilantes who have acted as a very powerful 'informal army' for the state, have their origins in this dichotomy. They were raised by township councillors, homeland parliamentarians and shacklords firstly for personal protection and later as private armies that went out to hunt for opponents of the establishment i.e. those who actively opposed the politics of participation. The distinctive role of Inkatha vigilantes in the conflict in Natal as well as that of the Witdoeke in the Cape Peninsular provide typical demonstration effects of the capacity of co-opted elites to defend the order of domination. What is not clear, however, is why those elites who acted in this manner behaved the way they did. One of the possible explanations is that because of the actual and potential threats to their lives they decided to engage in preemptive self-defense, or that they entered in an alliance of convenience with some
aspects of the state, particularly the security apparatus. Another is that they consciously engaged in 'anti-revolutionary' activity in defense of the structures of apartheid. An enquiry into the attitudes of these elites towards a series of co-optive indicators will identify their subjective positions vis-a-vis the rest of the elites.

ii) because of the complex nature of co-optation as demonstrated in the indicators discussed above, there would be an internal inconsistency in the responses to what might be broadly perceived as co-optive strategies.

Theoretically and in practice, co-optation is a dialectic process of give and take although this process takes place in a situation of unequal power relations. As stated in chapter one, the architects of co-optation sought to relax 'class' boundaries by creating an African 'middle class' with a stake in the system. The range of co-optive indicators consists of discrete variables which individually and collectively contribute to a process of 'class differentiation' as conceived in the programmes by the state and business respectively. What is critical in this thesis is to test whether those involved in the process respond to these variables as separate entities or as part of an overall programme. Such a distinction is essential since it renders co-optability either as a deliberate conscious process or as an incidental development dictated by the nature of events. The second hypothesis is a critical statement to make since it raises ontological questions regarding the nature of social change and what accounts for stability in social systems. Secondly, it raises questions about power and its role in structuring individual responses to given situations. The following chapters constitute an attempt to give structure to these vital issues.
CHAPTER 6

6. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS - GENERAL

The discussion of the research findings consists of two parts. The first section gives a broad generalisation of the attitudinal responses, by the subjects, to the indicators of co-optation as noted in the previous chapter. The second section (Chapter 7) is a refined development of the first and presents a factor analysis, regression analysis and discriminant analysis of the findings given in this present chapter. Following upon the hypothesis that pressures for collaboration apply unevenly on African elites, because of their structural location within the polity and economy, the subjects in this sample have been grouped into three major segments:

(i) "Constrained" Elites:

The first group comprises those respondents whose occupational location relatively predisposes them to pressure to collaborate. These were respondents employed in the higher echelons in the civil service - administrators, educators and nurses, as well as occupants in state created institutions, for instance, members of legislative assemblies in the homelands, as well as town councillors. Because social workers are employed either by the state or in conservative state-subsidized agencies, they were included in this group despite their association's (SABSWA's) unofficial inclination towards groupings in the extra-parliamentary opposition. Two reasons account for this arrangement. The first is that values in state institutions tend to be conservative and relatively static, i.e. "political neutrality", which expresses itself more in support of the authority of the state than in neutrality in the objective sense. The second is that the structural position in the economy has a regulating effect on political attitudes. It was felt
that this group would experience constraints in expressing their attitudes on politically laden issues, hence the label "constrained". A total of 25 respondents fell into this group.

(ii) The Professional and Managerial Elites:

The second group consists of respondents who have been pulled into the economy through the process of individuation and who, therefore, have a stake in the economic dispensation, in spite of their alienation from the institutional or political arrangements. This group consists of incumbents in the professional and managerial positions in the private sector as well as academics in the universities. Besides their high professional qualifications, elites within this group work in institutions where values which promote market principles, individualism and respect for freedom are strongly safeguarded. It was therefore expected that this group would be more vocal, relative to the first, in expressing their feelings on issues under discussion. Further, it was hypothesized that economic as well as status gains, by this group, would facilitate a rational approach to the economic developments and thus promote a selective response to both economic and political indicators of co-optation. In total, 33 individuals constitute this group.

(iii) Independent Elites:

Finally, there are those individuals who have been recruited into the elite ranks through the formation of anti-apartheid extra-parliamentary organizations such as civic and political organizations, trade unions and students' groupings. In addition, independent professionals such as lawyers and medical practitioners were included in this sub-sample. Because of the relative independence of this group, from both the state and the private sector, it was felt that as a group, membership of this sub-category experienced the least pressure to collaborate with the programme of co-optation. However, there were a few problems regarding the predictability of responses from a group which has
such a heterogeneous composition both in terms of the age spread as well as the structural location of members in the economy. The only unifying points in this group are ideology and the consequent membership in the extra-parliamentary opposition, as well as independence from direct state pressure in the form of rewards. A total of 35 respondents were included in this sub category.

It must be further emphasized that the above groupings are not entirely homogeneous within themselves since, in practice, it is not unusual for individuals employed in the civil service such as teachers and nurses, to be members of organizations affiliated to bodies in the extra-parliamentary opposition. For instance, there are teachers who are affiliated to the National Education Crisis Committee, which is an affiliate of the United Democratic Front; while in Natal, the Natal African Teachers’ Union is an affiliate of Inkatha, an organization which operates within a state-sponsored institution - KwaZulu. This is not an observation peculiar to teachers only: it applies to nurses and other para-professionals as well.

The second section in the analysis i.e. chapter 7, examines the degree of internal consistency within the subjects in the responses to the indicators of co-optation. The discrete nature of the variables could have an impact which might result in individuals responding selectively to the specific indicators.

6.1 REACTIONS TO CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

Respondents were asked to express their opinions on:

(i) The tricameral constitution;
(ii) Local authorities for urban Africans; and
(iii) The homelands.

In all instances the subjects had to respond to two sets of questions. The first set consisted of three precoded responses, i.e. they were requested to state whether they
felt the developments had a positive/negative effect, or whether the moves had both positive and negative attributes. The second part was an open-ended probe wherein respondents had to give detailed reasons for the choices they had made.

6.1.1 The Tricameral Constitution

Table 1 gives the responses to both sets of questions regarding the Tricameral Constitution.

Table 1: (A) Is the new constitutional dispensation a positive or negative development?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Positive = 0 responses)</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both positive and negative</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reasons

It excludes some South Africans from the decision-making process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>74</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It alienates the sub-ordinate groups from the political system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It differentiates and polarizes South Africans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It exemplifies white political domination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It signifies black economic exclusion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It stratifies groups politically

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Predictably, responses to the Tricameral constitution were negative, largely on the grounds that "it excludes some South Africans from the decision making process" or that "it differentiates and polarizes South Africans". Asked what they felt the minimum provision for the success of the constitution could have been, the majority of the respondents felt that it should have included Africans, or that "it should have been a fully representative constitution." What was rather unpredictable, however, was the small number or respondents who rejected the constitution explicitly on its inability to fulfil the principle of non-racialism, particularly given the rhetoric by anti-apartheid organisations internally. This is not to suggest that the subjects subscribed to the creation of a fourth chamber for Africans (this was expressive in the 6% who voiced this opinion). Rather, what could be inferred from the majority statements is that the respondents had thought

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It should have included Africans</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It should have been a non-racial constitution</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It should have been a fully-representative constitution</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before arriving at a constitution detainees should first be freed</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There should have been a 4th chamber for Africans</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
through the issue and were responding rationally and not through slogans, most probably because the new Constitution was a definite attempt by the government to isolate the majority African population by trying to close ranks with Indians and coloureds.

6.1.2 The New Local Authorities For Urban Africans

Table 2 gives a reflection of the respondents' thinking about the town and village councils, which were meant not only to fulfil the functions of local government but to satisfy national political aspirations as well.
Table 2:  
(A) Is the establishment of the new local authorities for urban Africans a positive, negative or both a positive and negative development?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A positive development</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A negative development</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both a negative and positive</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reasons:

- It promotes self representation
  - Total: 10
  - "Constrained": 26
  - %: 9

- It is imposed on blacks - no consultation
  - Total: 33
  - "Constrained": 35
  - Profes and Manager: 33
  - "Independent": 32

- It lacks credibility
  - Total: 20
  - "Constrained": 26
  - Profes and Manager: 18
  - "Independent": 18

- It is cosmetic, does not demonstrate change
  - Total: 31
  - "Constrained": 26
  - Profes and Manager: 46
  - "Independent": 21

- Co-optive, does not give blacks any power base
  - Total: 17
  - "Constrained": 9
  - Profes and Manager: 21
  - "Independent": 18

- Only for material self-enrichment
  - Total: 11
  - "Constrained": 22
  - Profes and Manager: 6
  - "Independent": 9

- It is not financially viable
  - Total: 9
  - "Constrained": 9
  - Profes and Manager: 9
  - "Independent": 9

- It constitutes divide and rule tactics
  - Total: 36
  - "Constrained": 17
  - Profes and Manager: 36
  - "Independent": 47
Like the Tricameral Constitution, the new local authorities drew negative comments and were largely rejected - the exception being only 4 out of the 93 respondents (three of whom were councillors themselves). Reasons for this positive view by the minority were that such a development "promotes self-representation" and this also came from the councillors. The majority that rejected town councils did so largely on political grounds: "it (the move) constitutes divide and rule tactics," "it is imposed on blacks, there is no consultation." "these are cosmetic changes, they do not demonstrate real change," and "co-optive, does not give blacks any power base". A minority of the respondents objected to the developments on economic grounds, "material self enrichment" and "the councils are not financially viable."

In response to the probe "what would have been the minimum provisions to make the town councils to succeed?" the majority of the respondents gave a non-racial local authority as the bottom line. This was followed by the desire to see democratic principles upheld "consult with the people and let them decide". Only a few of the subjects wanted to see the councils given an economic base.
6.1.3 Homelands

Table 3 demonstrates how the respondents view homelands: firstly their general attitudes towards homelands, secondly the failures of homelands and thirdly, their successes.

Table 3:
(A) Can homelands be used as a base from which to advance the socio-political cause of the black people?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, they can</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, they cannot</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Its a bit of both</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### (B) Where have the homelands failed? Total sample = 79

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>They are structurally illegitimate</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They constitute the basis of exploitation (labour camps)</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They are oppressive</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They encourage division</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They attract defective corrupt personalities</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They are a delaying tactic</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They are not representative of African political aspirations</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deprive Africans of the SA citizenship</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attract only Government puppets</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### (C) In which areas of life have homeland achieved any positive contribution? Total sample = 14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>They have introduced change</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They have provided administrative experience</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 demonstrates that the majority of the respondents in the sample rejected the homelands, mainly on political grounds. "They are structurally illegitimate," and "encourage ethnic divisions, thus weakening the thrust for freedom by the African majority". Also, homelands have apparently failed to deliver the 'promises': instead, they have demonstrated inefficiency and ineptitude, "they attract defective and corrupt personalities," and "only puppets get attracted into the homelands". A minority of 14 out of 93 respondents felt homelands had made a positive contribution, particularly through initiating some changes such as "reintroducing English as a medium of instruction in schools" or "providing administrative experience to black people".

6.1.4 Discussion

Across the three political indicators, i.e. the Tricameral Constitution, Black Local Authorities and Homelands, political reasons constituted the main objections. At a general level, there were no indications that the structural location of the respondents within the economy and the polity had any influence on the expressed attitudes, as there were no significant differences across the sub-samples. However, the professional and managerial elites, as well as academics, tended to express views marginally more radical than the other two sub-samples, particularly the constrained elites i.e. civil servants, administrators, educationists in government institutions, and occupants of positions in state-created bodies, whence the minority opinions that demonstrated some compromises came. Two reasons (although not conclusive) may account for this observation. Firstly, within the sub-sample of the elites who are most vulnerable to pressure to collaborate, there were town councillors and homeland parliamentarians. Their compromising stance is, therefore, understandable, given that subconsciously they had to rationalize their own positions. Secondly, responses from the sub-sample which contained organisational elites could be a reflection of material realities in which individuals are forced to think of concrete circumstances rather than muse over
hypothetical intellectual and ideological positions. However, at this stage the data is not in a form which permits finer forms of analysis and the findings are therefore inconclusive.

6.2 RESPONSES TO DEVELOPMENT IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE:

Respondents were questioned about a set of economic indicators which included the legal recognition of African trade unions, programmes on black advancement by private corporations, laws which restricted trading to members of specific racial groups in their areas, the creation of Central Business Districts (CBD) in specific areas in some metropolitan districts, and the Development Corporations in the homelands. Further, respondents had to comment on foreign economic pressures against apartheid, i.e. on the role of disinvestment or continued investment as catalysts for change.

6.2.1 The legal recognition of Africans in trade unions:

Respondents had to state whether the legal recognition of Africans in trade unions was beneficial or detrimental to the interests of black workers. Responses to this question appear in Table 4.
Table 4: Have trade unions been to the benefit or disadvantage of black workers?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefits</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disadvantage</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A bit of both</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reasons

- They give workers bargaining power: 62, 48, 65, 67
- They are a source of unity and strength among workers (collective security): 17, 16, 16, 17
- They are educative to workers and thus a source of empowerment: 20, 28, 10, 33
- They protect workers from unfair labour practices: 40, 40, 42, 37
- They facilitate improved/good labour relations: 8, 4, 7, 11
- A political power base: 9, 8, 7, 11
- Encourage false expectations among workers: 22, 12, 39, 14

The almost total absence of negative responses to the question is predictable. What, however, is thought-provoking is the equivocal position taken particularly by the sub-sample comprising the professional and managerial elites, mostly located in the private sector. Firstly, relatively fewer respondents in this sub-sample perceived benefits in this development compared to the other two sub-samples while more expressed an ambivalent position. Secondly, in explaining their position, a significant number of respondents from the managerial sub-sample felt that the development "encourages
false expectations among workers". Such a stance might be attributed to the protection of own interests. A number of the elites in this category have to contend with demands from workers and are affected directly by the growing power of the unions. Consequently they feel threatened immediately by a growing worker consciousness.

Positive reasons pertained to the newly-won power by workers, as well as to collective security: "this gives workers bargaining power," and "the move protects workers from unfair labour practices", or "this is a source of unity and strength among workers." Understandably, power constitutes the central focus of the struggle between employers and employees.

6.2.2 Black advancement:

Table 5 illustrates feelings about the advancement by blacks, in jobs in industry and commerce i.e. the upward mobility brought about by equal opportunity programmes.

Black advancement elicited more ambiguous than direct feelings. Slightly more than half of the respondents in the sample felt it had created opportunities for blacks, while almost half the number dismissed it as cosmetic change and "window dressing". Part of the criticism was that the opportunities created by black advancement were limited, as blacks "lacked exposure and experience" in the positions to which they were promoted. There were a few who discerned an increase in the living standards of blacks but an equal number of respondents viewed black advancement as "co-optation of blacks, creating a black middle class".

Seen across the three sub-samples, respondents who fell into the professional and managerial group expressed more ambiguous views than was the case with the other two sub-groupings. To the subjects within this sub-sample black advancement
constitutes the torment of Tantalus - hopes achieved and treasures withdrawn. Promotion to managerial positions without the exercise of managerial power is, to a number of blacks, a reality. Yet another reality derives from the fact that a number of blacks do indeed, exercise and enjoy managerial power. The equivocal or ambiguous stance is, therefore, predictable in the light of the actual over the expected gains.

Table 5: Has black advancement in industry and commerce been a meaningful improvement or no improvement at all?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Profes Manager&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An improvement</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No improvement</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is a bit of both</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reasons:

Has created opportunities for blacks: 59% 84% 42% 57%

Only cosmetic changes/window dressing: 45% 32% 52% 49%

Only limited opportunities, blacks lack exposure and experience: 27% 20% 30% 29%

Has promoted education of blacks: 9% 16% 6% 6%

Increased living standards of blacks: 9% 12% 9% 6%

It co-opts blacks, creates a black middle class: 8% 4% 9% 9%

Can't succeed within a defective educational system: 5% - 12% 3%
6.2.3 Social and economic implications of black advancement:

A further probe regarding what respondents felt to be the social and economic implications of black advancement elicited the comments which appear in Table 6.

Table 6: Besides better jobs, what are the social and economic implications of black advancement?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>93</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It will improve the quality of life among blacks</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will promote sound race relations</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will improve the political and economic power of blacks</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is a co-optive strategy</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It still perpetuates political powerlessness</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the whole respondents felt black advancement would yield positive social and economic rewards. The most immediate of these pertained to material well-being: "it will improve the quality of life among blacks," and "it will improve the political and economic power of blacks". These views were shared by the majority of the respondents in the sample. However, a sizeable number of the interviewees felt that black advancement had negative political connotations: "it is a co-optive strategy", and "it still perpetuates political powerlessness". This attitude came mainly from the sub-sample consisting of the professional and managerial elites. Members in this sub-grouping expressed
skepticism on black advancement as a concept and particularly of the process as applied in the corporations on a day-to-day basis.

6.2.4 Protective trading laws in the townships

One way in which the government sought to placate the African commercial bourgeoisie was to prevent entrepreneurs from the other racial groups from trading in areas designated for Africans, both urban and rural. This legislation was an extension of the Group Areas Act, which restricted trading by business people to "own areas", ostensibly to protect white trading interests particularly from competition, which came mostly from Indian traders. Questions on how Africans perceived laws which prevented members of other racial groups from trading in African areas placed the respondents in an invidious position. Support for the laws could be interpreted as support for apartheid, yet the material benefits which these laws brought for small traders were not insignificant. Tables 7 and 8 give an illustration of the responses to these questions.

Table 7: Feelings about protective trading laws in the townships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer free unrestricted enterprise</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good, they protect the underprivileged</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They are restrictive, do not promote fair competition</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They are part of the discrimination process</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8: What are your feelings on the opening up of some CBDs in some cities?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Let market forces operate, business people and not the state should decide where the busy want to trade</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This constitutes a financial impediment: lack of capital for blacks is still an obstacle</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This is a positive development, blacks to benefit from black consumers who shop in town</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>These are half measures - why only trade if one can't live there, or why not open town councils to all as well?</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skeptical, too late there may be a catch somewhere</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To create an African middle class a buffer between the whites and the masses</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A response by the state to internal pressures for change</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A response by the state to external pressures for changes</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An economic strategy, to salvage CBDs from inevitable deterioration as high rents force whites out of CBDs for raising more sales tax by government</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proof that the government is willing to reform</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On the whole respondents rejected the restrictive laws on the grounds that they contradicted the spirit of free enterprise or were "part of the process of discrimination". However, almost a third of the interviewees approved of these laws and felt that "they protected the underprivileged". The second question in this series dealt with the opening up of some Central Business Districts in some cities. Here respondents expressed ambivalent views. The two dominant views reflected both positive and negative attitudes. Those who approved of the move saw market opportunities: "this is a positive development, blacks will benefit from black consumers who shop in town, after all there is more black than white traffic in the cities". Negative views were largely political. The main objections were that a selective derestriction in some trading areas was in itself insufficient. Further, there was no use in trading in areas where one could not live. One respondent put it succinctly, "why not open up the entire city, including the city council?". Besides political objections, economic realities had their own contribution to the rejection as well. Some respondents felt that the state should withdraw from the economy and leave business to the operation of market forces, while others felt that in spite of the relaxation of the laws, the economic position of blacks would not enable them to participate effectively in the new dispensation.

Finally, in response to the question probing into the perceived motives for these trading relaxations, respondents advanced both political and economic reasons, none of which gave credit to the state. Political reasons included both internal and external pressures on the state. On the economic side respondents felt that the Central Business Districts were, after all, in the process of deterioration. High rents were forcing a number of whites out of the city centres and the government needed taxes for revenue. Opening up some central business districts would bring in revenue in the form of rents as well as sales tax, thus salvaging the state from the impending economic demise. Very few of the respondents (9%) gave the government credit for its willingness to reform.
6.2.5 Development corporations in African areas:

Development corporations were set up by the government, mainly to provide capital for the African commercial bourgeoisie in the homelands. Later they provided finance for housing as well and even went on to set up some small industries in the homelands. The Group Areas Act, as well as the fact that, in the main, Africans did not own fixed property, prevented banks and other financial houses from affording loans to Africans as the latter could not pledge fixed property as security. Development Corporations thus had a monopoly over the African commercial and housing markets. Respondents were asked to state their feelings about the role of these Development Corporations. Table 9 gives an illustration of the responses.

In the main, respondents were negatively critical of Development Corporations. Negative perceptions came essentially from political and economic motives that respondents attributed to the corporations. Firstly, discussants saw the corporations as white capitalist fronts into the black market. Such fronts charged high interest rates mainly because they had the monopoly of the black market. Secondly interviewees saw the Development Corporations as nepotistic institutions that served the homeland politicians and sympathetic bureaucrats. Professional and managerial elites were more critical of the Development Corporations than the rest of the sample, while members of the sub-sample containing state employees and functionaries in state-sponsored institutions were the least critical or even expressed some positive views, such as that, by giving loans to blacks, these corporations improved the quality of life and the standard of living among blacks.
Table 9: Feelings about development corporations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>They are a capitalist front in white hands, generate profits for those who put them up, make it easier for white financiers to penetrate into homelands. They have not produced independent black entrepreneurs, whites still pull strings.</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They benefit only a few - building a middle class</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charge high interest rates</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictive, people should get loans from where they like</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part of homeland policies, they cater for those affiliated to ruling parties, Inkatha, T.N.I.P., C.N.I.P. etc - fulfil wishes of S.D. by representing separate ethnic groups</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive, improve quality of life and standard of living - give loans to blacks whereas banks do not</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They are corrupt, they help those who help themselves, e.g. the homeland elites</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.2.6 Investment/disinvestment:

One of the most contentious topics in South African politics concerns the role of foreign investment in shaping the political future of the country. Respondents were invited to comment on specific aspects of foreign investment as a tool for political change. Table 10 reflects their views.
Table 10: Should controlling firms withdraw their operations from South Africa, or should they continue to invest in South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, continue</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, discontinue</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional Investment</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Advantages of continued investment for the government and big business:

- Economic, revenue for government from company tax supports the system, technical and administrative assistance from overseas
  - Total: 90, "Constrained": 92, "Independent": 82

- Encourage the government to resist change, gives South Africa the opportunity to strengthen its military power, boosts white morale at a time of panic and uncertainty about the future - helps government with computer technology for oppression
  - Total: 10, "Constrained": 4, "Independent": 13

- Has educational advantages, more positive about the training of blacks, provide scholarships etc.
  - Total: 6, "Constrained": 9, "Independent": 6

Advantages of continued investment for black people

- Creation of jobs
  - Total: 71, "Constrained": 79, "Independent": 81
- Improving the quality of life
  - Total: 23, "Constrained": 33, "Independent": 28
- Continued exploitation
  - Total: 14, "Constrained": 17, "Independent": 9
- No advantages
  - Total: 24, "Constrained": 8, "Independent": 47
- Improvement of knowledge
  - Total: 5, "Constrained": 13, "Independent": 13
- Provide better working conditions
  - Total: 5, "Constrained": 4, "Independent": 6
Respondents were almost equally divided on the need for continued investment by foreign corporations in South Africa, while a small minority, particularly in the sub-sample of "dependents", i.e. trade unionists, students and members of the extra-parliamentary opposition, opted for conditional investment. Asked further to list the advantages of continued investment for big business and the state, an overwhelming majority cited economic and technical benefits, particularly to the present state. Further comments on this question were equally uncomplimentary towards investment and pointed to the benefits for apartheid and the maintenance of the status quo. When asked further to comment on the benefits of continued investment to the African people in South Africa, the responses were pragmatic i.e. "creation of jobs, improving the quality of life". Those who saw no advantages mentioned "continued exploitation". It is essential to point out that pragmatism does not necessarily imply approval as responses in the following table demonstrate. What is, however, significant is that this is an issue which transcends politico-ideological positions and calls for a realistic appraisal of hard facts and the attendant consequences.

6.2.7 Effects of continuing investment on change in South Africa:

Table 11: (A) Impact/effects of continuing investment on change in South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improvement in the quality of life</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creates employment opportunities this in turn will raise the</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>standard of living</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No effects, cannot bring about any changes - only disinvestment can</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change is conditional - only if companies press for it, hence they have to</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It will promote skills</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What effects would disinvestment have in promoting change in South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;Indepen-</th>
<th>dent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>93</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Speeding up of the dismantling of apartheid, - reform, the economic shock will make whites think, unstable situation will compel government to channel funds to development rather than to the military

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>25</th>
<th>27</th>
<th>29</th>
<th>19</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Will hit SA economically, it will force change, it will bring creative chaos as in countering ungovernability the country will turn to creative mechanisms - SA is not economically self sufficient thus needs foreign financial assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>64</th>
<th>68</th>
<th>68</th>
<th>58</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Blacks will be hard hit, poverty among Africans will be aggravated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>10</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It will force SA to negotiate, will force SA to eventually hand over power to the majority

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>6</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No change, whoever moves out, others will move in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>10</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two dominant attitudes prevailed. Firstly, approximately half the number of respondents felt that investment can not change the political position in South Africa, and secondly, about a third of the sample felt that the changes could only come about on condition that foreign companies pressed for them. Positive remarks such as the creation of jobs, promotion of skills and improvement in the quality of life reflected a minority opinion.

When asked how they viewed disinvestment as a catalyst for change almost two thirds of the subjects stated that economic decline would create a management crisis which, in
their words, would lead to "creative chaos, where alternative systems could develop". Further, an economic crisis would force whites to pressurise the government to accelerate the reform process, "to channel funds to development rather than to the military". However in spite of the political positives of disinvestment, a few of the respondents felt that disinvestment would not bring any changes as the few operations that moved out of the country would easily be replaced by others coming in, or would even sell to South African companies.

6.2.8 Discussion

Economic indicators revealed a measure of clustering of attitudes across the three sub-samples. For instance, the sample of professional and managerial elites demonstrated greater sensitivity to economic interventions than was the case with either the constrained or independent elites. Part of the reason for this could be the immediacy of the indicators to members of this sub-sample. In the first place, membership within this group experiences the frustrations and the reality of black advancement programmes, as well as confrontation with the unionised work force. Sandwiched between white management and black labour, they find themselves being accepted fully into neither the management ranks nor labour. Secondly, their economic rewards, without the corresponding social status, comprise other sources of frustration. Further, this is the group that is most exposed to white competition, liberal values and critical analysis on a day-to-day basis, while the other two sub-samples are relatively distanced from these influences. The relative radicalism expressed by this group might therefore reflect their daily practices rather than their location on the ideological spectrum.

In contrast, trade unions face stark economic realities and thus act as restraining forces on their allies in the extra-parliamentary opposition. The debate on disinvestment took another turn in 1985 when trade unions argued that profits reaped in South Africa were
the product of the sweat of black workers. Disinvestment would therefore rob black workers of the hard-earned fruits of their labours. The sample of constrained elites responded predictably to the economic indicators. They saw market opportunities in trading relaxations, and at the same time were not willing to forego their captive markets in the townships. Their ambiguous stance on a number of economic variables reflected their existential diemma. Also, their conservative environment was reflected throughout the responses as they tended to opt for less radical or confrontationist opinions as catalysts for change.

6.3 EDUCATIONAL INDICATORS

The opening of white private schools became a hotly-debated issue in the early 1980s. There were those blacks who saw an opportunity for their children to compete in an open market as a sound schooling would facilitate entry into good positions in the economy. On the other hand, radicals argued that multi-racial schools were another means of co-opting blacks into white ranks. If there was any sincerity in this, they argued, why were these schools not reflective of the population strengths in the country instead of being predominantly white with small black minorities?

Other issues in education pertained to school boycotts as part of the catalysts for change. Respondents were then asked to comment on these educational indicators for change in order to ascertain their positions in the debates.

6.3.1 Attitudes to the opening up of formerly white schools to blacks

Respondents' comments on the mixed schools appear in Table 12 below.
Table 12: What are your feelings about formerly whites only schools now accepting black pupils

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;Indepen-</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited only for a select few, has a</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>limited impact as high fees are a</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constraint to the poor. Not impressed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>schools should be open to all.</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elitist, created an elitist middle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>class, children will develop an</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>identity crisis, will create white</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blacks with a wrong ethos, superiority</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and materialism - children might be</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ostracised by their peers in the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>community</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good thing, encourages integration</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and good race relations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Will mixed schools help bring about change or will they entrench the elites? Explain

They are for a selected few, expenses are the main limitation, black workers can not afford them

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;Indepen-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They are for a selected few, expenses</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>are the main limitation, black workers</td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>can not afford them</td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

They create an elitist middle class, entrench elitism and encourage a loss of cultural values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;Indepen-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They create an elitist middle class,</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>entrench elitism and encourage a loss</td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of cultural values</td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Encourage good race relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;Indepen-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage good race relations</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

They are cosmetic, they should be mixed from management down to the classes, they give children a choice of school but parents do not have the freedom to choose where they wish to stay

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;Indepen-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They are cosmetic, they should be</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mixed from management down to the</td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>classes, they give children a choice</td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of school but parents do not have the</td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>freedom to choose where they wish to</td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stay</td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Respondents were almost equally divided on the question of opening up of formerly whites-only schools to blacks. Reasons for this were both ideological and pragmatic. On the ideological side there were those who opposed the move mainly because they felt that this would skim off the cream of African society, as the prohibitive fees would only allow a few financially-capable individuals into the system. Secondly, opponents of this reform measure branded the gesture as "elitist, creating a middle class" and further argued that products of these schools would develop an identity crisis - materialist and arrogant, such that they would face the danger of ostracism from their communities. On the other hand those who expressed positive views felt that integration at school level would augur well for sound race relations in the future.

On the practical side respondents felt that the fee structure in the "open" schools would exclude the poor from benefiting from the new dispensation. The result would be a middle class education for the rich, thus entrenching the elites.

A further probe prompting for views on the promotion of change versus entrenching the elites debate elicited further explanations for the respondents' adoption of the stance they had taken earlier. Feelings against a possible elitism ran high among the respondents, particularly the professional and managerial elites and the 'independents', while the sub-sample of constrained elites was more favourably disposed to the move mainly because they felt it would create sound race relations. Finally, a minority criticism referred to the entirely white administration of the mixed schools. Respondents felt this perpetuated white super-ordination and black sub-ordination, as children would have to look up to white mentors, thus entrenching the belief that blacks will always be subservient.
6.3.2 School boycotts

Two questions were intended to elicit the respondents' perception of the role of school boycotts in the change process in South Africa. The first dealt with the factors that respondents felt had contributed to school boycotts, and the second sought to elicit the perceived role of school boycotts in African education. Table 13 illustrates.

Table 13: What are the factors that have contributed to school boycotts?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apartheid, inadequate facilities unequal education, inferior bantu education, unequal education leads to unequal opportunities in life = (Material disadvantages)</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools are government instruments of oppression, white principals over black teachers, corporal punishment, age-limit regulations, authoritarian top down approach by government - no consultation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A development of political consciousness among blacks - strategies by SRC's students participation in politics, symbols of generalised protest.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A predominantly large number of respondents located the causes of the school boycotts in material disadvantages (inadequate facilities) which they felt lead directly to unequal
opportunities in life. Secondly, almost a third of the respondents viewed the school as the terrain where political battles are fought out. They saw the schools as instruments of oppression by the government and therefore, as sites of political consciousness for the youth. While the government used the schools for control, the youth saw them as arenas for political mobilization and the sites where they could develop alternative strategies of government, Students Representative Councils and other politicising agencies. School boycotts were, thus, a signal of the failure of ideological control in the classroom - an evidence of the challenge to the state's drive for hegemonic control over the minds of the subordinates.

6.3.3 Effects of School Boycotts

(i) On African Education

Respondents were further required to state what they felt the effect of school boycotts on African education were likely to be. Table 14 (A) reflects their views:

There was almost an equal division between those who felt the boycotts would yield positive results and those who felt they had a negative impact on education. Those who approved of the boycotts felt that the government would eventually yield to pressure, both internally and internationally. Further, as the educational crisis deepened, the government would institute reforms in order to reduce frustrations. Those who expressed negative feelings about school boycotts argued that this would only increase the number of school dropouts, a condition which that blacks could ill-afford, given their position in the economy. Negative views on school boycotts were more prevalent among the constrained and independent elites while the professional and managerial elites were more accommodative and felt that school boycotts were part of the strategy to bring pressure on the government.
Table 14
(A) Will school boycotts have a positive or negative effect on African education? Explain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>93 %</td>
<td>25 %</td>
<td>33 %</td>
<td>35 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Positive: will promote change, they can’t continue closing down all schools; eventually they’ll design better education to reduce frustrations

| 57    | 52           | 69                 | 48            |

Negative: there is need for education. This will result in heavy school dropouts when educated blacks are most needed.

| 54    | 65           | 37                 | 62            |

The government has to respond, there is too much criticism - both internally and externally

| 6     | 4            | 14                 |               |

Good tactic, create crisis and there has to be a response by the government

| 7     | 4            | 7                  | 10            |

(ii) On the Country as a Whole

Finally, to elicit more comments on the relationship between school boycotts and political resistance, respondents were asked to state what they felt to be the most likely effects of school boycotts on political developments in the country as a whole. Their responses appear on Table 14 (B) below.
### Table 14: What effects, if any, will school boycotts have on political developments in the country as a whole

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Will result in more politicisation and militancy - will create a number of freedom fighters as more youngsters move out of the country - urban unrest will increase - has united parents and children - the general population has been activated to join the mass struggle</td>
<td>93 %</td>
<td>25 %</td>
<td>33 %</td>
<td>35 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will force educational changes and reforms in education - the government wishes to avoid a bad image from adverse publicity</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative, politicians are capitalising on them and acting as agitators</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will result in uneducated blacks</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will cause internal strife among Africans</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative, can harden government attitudes</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The majority feeling was that school boycotts had led to adverse publicity for the government. Because of this the government would be eager to project a better image, and the most likely response would be to accelerate reforms in education. Another view held by a substantial number of subjects was that as more youths became politicized they would leave the country to become freedom fighters. Further, the school boycotts...
had united parents and children, thus acting as a politicizing agent and thereby increasing membership in the mass struggle. Only small minorities of respondents felt that "agitators are capitalizing on unrest", "blacks will miss on changes in education", "there will be internal strife among black people", and "boycotts will harden government attitudes".

6.3.4 Discussion

Evidence from the discussion on schools suggests that education constitutes one of the main terrains in the battle for resistance and control. The school is a natural area for mobilization and organization on the part of the forces of opposition, simply because the state has made it a site for ideological control. There is a school of thought in the townships that believes the opening up of white schools to blacks is a development that must be approached with caution, since it may have a debilitating effect on black solidarity, by creating a few privileged children in contrast to the masses who have to contend with bantu education.

6.4 STRATEGIES FOR BRINGING ABOUT CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA

The politics of the mid 1980s brought to the fore the debate on strategies for effecting change in the power relations in South Africa. This was the period when the extra-parliamentary opposition, particularly the United Democratic Front, was in the ascendant. It was also the period when insurrectionist politics dominated the political scene in the townships. The struggle for hegemony between the ANC and Black Consciousness on one side and between the extra-parliamentary opposition (the charterists and Black Consciousness) and the "moderates", i.e. those forces which operated from within the state-created structures, was also at its height during this period. Further, there was confusion on all sides with regard to the distinctions between
policy and strategy. It was thus appropriate to pose questions of strategy to individuals who were considered to constitute the leadership within the forces that purported to fight for change.

6.4.1 Choice of strategies

Respondents were asked to state what they considered to be the most promising strategies for bringing about change in South Africa. See Table 15.

Table 15: The most promising strategies for bringing about change in South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation with various groupings, dialogue, a national convention</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Release, unbanned political prisoners, organisations and the exiles</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confrontation school and consumer boycotts and stay aways</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilisation and consolidation of the organisational bases</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political and economic pressures externally i.e. sanctions, diplomatic isolation and disinvestment</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The armed struggle as pursued by ANC</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education for all, improve and give equal education</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Almost half the respondents opted for consultation and dialogue among the various political groupings. This would eventually lead to a national convention ostensibly staged by the same groupings. The second most frequently mentioned strategy (about a third of the respondents) was that of confrontation through boycotts (school and consumer boycotts as well as stay aways). External pressures, such as sanctions and the armed struggle by the exiled nationalist movements, received a minority mention by about a tenth of the respondents in total. There were preconditions attached to the realization of each strategy as well. For instance, respondents saw negotiations as predicated upon the creation of a free political climate i.e. the release of political prisoners and the unbanning of political organizations, while confrontation would be consequent upon proper mobilization and consolidation of organizations against apartheid.

6.4.2 Problems on the way to achieving perceived strategies

In the response to a probe into what made it difficult to realize the strategies as cited, discussants mentioned the obstacles reflected in Table 16 below.

Table 16 reflects the respondents' perceptions of the massive power of the state as well as its determination not to shed that power. The converse is equally true, i.e. the perception that the opposition to the state is not powerful enough to carry out its programme. Allegations that the state is both "insensitive" and "intransigent", "selectively consults with certain blacks and refuses to consult with the real leaders" and, "makes it difficult for the opposition to operate", as well as commands military power, reinforce the notion of a strong state. On the other hand, claims of the state "infiltrating" into the opposition, and the "fear, weakness and inability to move within a repressive governmental system" by the opposition can only reflect perceptions of the weaknesses of a strategy that pursues the path of direct confrontation with a powerful state.
**Table 16: (A) Problems that stand in the way to achieving perceived strategies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem Description</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disunity among organisations fighting for the same cause - also the state has infiltrated into these organisations</td>
<td>93 %</td>
<td>25 %</td>
<td>33 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government selectively consults with certain blacks and refuses consultation with the real leaders</td>
<td>18 %</td>
<td>28 %</td>
<td>7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites and particularly the government are intransigent, insensitive to the real demands of the people.</td>
<td>20 %</td>
<td>36 %</td>
<td>14 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government has military might</td>
<td>44 %</td>
<td>48 %</td>
<td>48 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear, weakness and inability to move within a repressive government system, states of emergency etc. make it difficult for the opposition to operate</td>
<td>9 %</td>
<td>9 %</td>
<td>7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunistic blacks within state - created structures fragment unity</td>
<td>21 %</td>
<td>4 %</td>
<td>24 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supportive states such as the USA and Britain contribute to SA's intransigence</td>
<td>6 %</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.4.3 Prompted choice of strategy

In order to assess further the respondents' perceptions of the viability of strategies, two alternative views were presented to them. The first placed accent on the strength of the state against guerrilla incursions and internal unrest while the second advanced the vulnerability of the state and, consequently, its collapse, given guerrilla warfare and internal unrest as precipitants. Table 16(B) illustrates the position of the respondents on the two views.
Table 16: (B) Two views

i) External force combined with internal unrest cannot precipitate the collapse of the SA Government

ii) Internal unrest and Guerrilla warfare will cause economic collapse and ungovernability thus precipitating the demise of the SA state.

Which View Do You Feel Is Most Valid?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profess and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>25 %</td>
<td>33 %</td>
<td>35 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second view - economically the rand has plummeted, affected by guerrilla warfare and internal unrest

35 % 35 % 40 29

Second view - internal mobilisation has mounted resistance, the government is not as powerful - if so, why need a state of emergency?

58 % 35 % 72 % 63

The first - government has all the security and defence, blacks are unarmed

7 % 20 % - % 4

The second view - but only if change comes about peacefully

6 % 5 % - % 13

Views expressed in Table 16 (B) seem to contradict the earlier notion of a strong and unshakable state. The explanation might be that the second probe brought to the fore the realities of the situation as it obtained in 1985/86 when fieldwork was carried out. The rand had hit its lowest ebb while the notions of "ungovernability", "peoples' power" and a "collapsing state" were popular in the vocabulary of the opposition. Indeed Table 16(B) demonstrates that there was more reference to the notion of a "state in trouble" from the professional and managerial elites as well as from the independent elites than was the case with the elites in state-dependent positions. This second view was, most
probably, an echo of the popular rhetoric of the time and reinforcement of an already held ideological position.

6.4.4 Township unrest

Since 1976 the centre of political gravity has shifted to the townships, and unrest in the townships has come to be equated with the "revolution". It was thus essential to probe into the perceptions of this "liberatory weapon" as a strategy for effecting change. Further, it was necessary to establish the extent to which respondents perceived unrest in the townships as a double-edged sword i.e. as harmful to both the state and the townships themselves.

6.4.4.1 Factors contributing to township unrest

An overwhelming number of responses attributed unrest in the townships to educational factors (over 100% of the multiple responses). This was not surprising since school children were in the "vanguard" in the struggle. Next in line was a combination of items constituting the basis of material deprivation - unemployment, housing problems and increases in rent. These were broadly factors which affect the quality of life of citizens. Finally, about a third of the respondents attributed the conflict in the townships to purely political factors - "loss of hope after the establishment of the tricameral parliament" and "the imposition of community councils in the townships". Table 17, below, reflects:
Table 17: Factors that have produced township unrest 1984-85

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and dissatisfaction with education related issues poor quality of teachers, Afrikaans etc.</td>
<td>127*</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent increases</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imposition of community councils on the townships</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment (Deterioration in material conditions)</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing problems</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government failure to give blacks their political rights - loss of hope after the Tricameral Constitution</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor standard of living</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Multi-responses - education-related issues grouped together.

6.4.4.2 Effects on township unrest on the government

Subsequent to what respondents felt were the causes of unrest in the townships, a further probe sought to elicit their perceptions of what the effects of township unrest would be, specifically on the South African government. Table 18 gives a number of observations as cited by the respondents.
Table 18: Effects of township unrest on the government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An intensification of repression with anti ANC propaganda, will harden government attitude - more detentions etc.</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government will increase the pace of reform, these will largely be delaying tactics in order to avoid further confrontation</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The country will be more destabilised economically, part of this will be because of the government’s attempt at a reparation programme</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This will force the government to negotiate</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for the government will weaken, and its legitimacy will be further undermined</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International pressure on government will increase</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More external economic pressure disinvestment etc.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government may capitulate</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In total the majority of respondents felt that unrest in the townships would impact negatively on the state and consequently, the government would lose political control. Unrest in the townships reflected a legitimacy crisis in the government, and, as international and local pressures intensified, there would be growing instability in the...
economy and the polity. These will force the government to increase the pace of reform as a delaying tactic to regain lost space. Contrary to government expectations, reform would further weaken the government while, at the same time, it would lead to rising expectations on the part of the opponents of apartheid. This would force the government to make further concessions which increasingly would undermine its own power. An apposite view shared by about a fifth of the respondents was that township unrest would drive the government into a defensive position with an intensification of repression: “there will be more anti ANC propaganda and more detention of the opponents of apartheid.”

6.4.4.3 Effects of unrest in the townships

In response to the question “what effects will unrest have in the townships”, views expressed in Table 19 are an indication of the way respondents saw the role of violence in their daily lives.

Approximately half the number of respondents in the sample viewed township unrest in politically constructive ways. Their stand was that it was a conscientising agent and would therefore, promote solidarity against apartheid. However, a sizable number of respondents had by then started to see the potential for more prolonged political polarization of the township community. The latter feared an increase in “black on black” violence as well as an increase in the use of force by the state through the security apparatus. Further, about a fifth of the respondents in the sample feared that an increase in township conflict would lead to an increase in unemployment and related social problems. In the final instance it appeared that in as far as the townships were concerned, no party stood to gain from the conflict and unrest that went with it.
Table 19: What effects will unrest have in the townships?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It will increase polarisation among blacks, &quot;black on black violence&quot;; there will be further mistrust and further divisions in the black community</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There will be an increase in the use of force - the SADF and police will shoot more people, and the high profile opposition leadership will be wiped out.</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It will intensify black political conscious-ness, solidarity against apartheid will grow, the struggle will become part and parcel of life</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government collaborators will be further isolated, they may eventually disappear</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment will increase, there will be an increase in the social problems e.g. crime</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There will be loss of property by blacks, houses and other materials some of which are purchased through loans</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.5 CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES (SPONTANEOUS)

Respondents were requested to propose principles that they felt were vital in the drawing up a future constitution for South Africa. Table 20 illustrates these main guidelines.
Table 20: What principles would you propose in drawing up a future constitution for South Africa? Spell out in detail (list)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One person one vote. Free political participation by all in one country</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abolish apartheid in all spheres</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One educational system, free and compulsory education for all</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialism - equal distribution of wealth</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill of rights</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents expressed an overwhelming support for a unitary South Africa with a one person one vote as the basis of the electoral system. Further details included the abolition of apartheid in all spheres (25%) and an "equal distribution of wealth" (18%). When probed further to state what they felt to be the minimum that blacks would settle for, respondent's replied as indicated in Table 21.
Table 21: In the light of the views expressed in the previous question, what is the minimum that you think black people will settle for as change or reform?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independ-ent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The total abolition of apartheid</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free and total participation in decision making by all in a unitary non-racial SA where all South Africans are recognised as full citizens</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Release of all political prisoners, return of exiles, unbanning of political activists, release of Nelson Mandela</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access by all to the country's economic resources, equality in taxation and redistribution, equality in the quality of life</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of movement, abolition of influx control and the group areas act</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was consistency in the views expressed over the two probes. Respondents were still in favour of both a unitary, non-racial South Africa as well as the total abolition of apartheid in all spheres. Finally, there was a probe into the respondents' own personal views as to what they themselves would settle for as the main constitutional provision for a future South Africa. Table 22 illustrates these views.
Table 22: What would you personally settle for?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiated power sharing, decision making in a democratically elected platform</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total abolition of apartheid</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One person one vote, full franchise for all and a government based on a majority decision</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unbanning political organisations allowing the exiles to return freeing political prisoners</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abolition of the Group Areas Act, the land act and other acts which pertain to land rights</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was a sudden shift in emphasis from the idealist to a more considered set of probabilities, when approximately half the number of respondents proposed negotiated power sharing as the main constitutional guideline. Other principles such as the abolition of apartheid, one person one vote and the creation of a climate conducive to free politics were still consistent with the views expressed in the two earlier probes.

6.6 CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES (PROMPTED)

Following upon the comments on principles for constitutional guidelines which respondents had spontaneously presented, a list of prompted alternatives was laid down for further discussion. Respondents had to make a first and second choice from a list of
four alternatives including a "none of the above" category. It was evident that the first choice would be guided by the popular rhetoric and thus subjects were presented with a second choice where the feeling was that this would indicate the bottom line in their choices. A variety of reasons for this approach can be advanced, the main one being that there is a tendency among respondents to go for (a) what they consider to be popular options, thereby echoing the party line or the leadership in popular organizations; and (b) what they themselves wish to see happen as a matter of ideological persuasion. Faced with these methodological assumptions, it became necessary to probe further into the respondents perceived reality by offering them a second choice of alternatives. This became even more essential as negotiations are about compromises and the second alternative presented such a compromise situation. Table 23 is an illustration of these points.

Table 23: Choice of constitutional alternatives (promoted)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>First choice:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federation</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partition along racial lines</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A confederation of states</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A unitary state</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of the above</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Second choice:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federation</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confederation</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A unitary state</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Predictably, the choice of a unitary state was significantly greater than all others. The federation was a distant second and none of the other options is worthy of any mention.
As a second choice, the federal option was selected by a third of the respondents and notably by the sub-sample of the independent elites who, unlike the elites in state-sponsored or paid occupations stood least to gain personally by retaining the existing political entities.

In order to further explore the issues of constitutional alternatives, respondents were requested to give reasons for making specific choices. These appear in Table 24 below.

Table 24: Reasons for choosing specific political alternatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A unitary state will give a chance to all to participate in government: ensures complete liberation, satisfies everybody, it is the people’s choice</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federation ensures that different states come together under a relatively powerful government for a common purpose, the Swiss model is a good example; protects minorities and is a good compromise</td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of the above because the rest are laden with biases and may still be manipulated by the government</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A federation is a compromise solution (Part II)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional power</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reject Homelands - Ethnic lines</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA is one country</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The unitary state was an obvious choice for two reasons:

i) it represents what in popular perceptions is a true democracy, wherein the principle of one person one vote works without any constraints or restrictions;

ii) it vindicates the "people's struggle" against the balkanisation of South Africa into homelands: as some respondents put it, "we reject homelands which divide people on ethnic lines" and "South African is one country".

The federal option offered a compromise where the concept of regional power could be accommodated within a single state. Respondents who made this choice were explicit on this. "Federation is a model for compromise; the Swiss model is a good example of this" said one respondent. Another explanation was that "it protects minorities and takes into account the strength of the regions in a state". A minority of the respondents felt that the prompted alternatives besides the unitary option, could still be manipulated by the government. They, therefore, preferred to take no options from the given list.

6.7 INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS VERSUS GROUP RIGHTS

Following upon the probe on constitutional alternatives, subjects were further presented with another thorny issue that could present great obstacles to the creation of a future dispensation for South Africa. This was the question of group rights, particularly given the context within which it emerges, i.e. the present power relations as exist in the country. Table 25 is a reflection of what the subjects felt about the position of individual and group rights in a new constitution for South Africa.

Respondents laid more emphasis on individual rather than group rights. Half the number expressed a categorical preference for a constitutional framework based on the individual. It was felt that, in the protection of individual rights, groups were automatically protected, since these were inter-dependent entities. "It is the individual that matters,
there can be no groups without individuals" said one respondent; while others argued, "an individual has a legal relationship with the state and it is this relationship that has to be constitutionally defined and safeguarded". The group concept evoked negative emotive feelings and about a fifth of the respondents perceived the protection of group rights as a subtle protection of racism and the white economic and political interests that go with it. This was succinctly summed up by one respondent, a lawyer. "What group rights do Africans and other blacks have as a group to warrant their attachment to the concept; the right to stay in shacks and the right to be servants? No, when you speak of group rights you mean the right of the white to continue monopoly of power, of privilege and of exploitation." Finally about a tenth of the respondents felt that groups are a reality in South Africa, that the politico-legal framework had reinforced this for generations and that this was, therefore, a reality that could not be wished away.

Table 25: Group versus individual rights in a new constitution for South Africa?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In SA groups are a reality, this has been further reinforced by the present politico-legal framework</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual rights and freedom of speech matter</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual and group are interdependent concepts</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of group rights implies protection of white rights - an individual has a legal relationship with the state and not with the group</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals matter more than groups, it is individuals and not groups who, in the end, either suffer or gain</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group protection is a form of racialism</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.8 PERCEPTIONS OF SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIETY

In order to elicit how respondents perceived South African society as is presently constituted, two views were presented to them. The first depicted South Africa as a country which practices racial domination while the second presented her as a capitalist state. It was hoped that the analytical categories used by the respondents would be useful as predictors of the likely strategies for change, as the formation of organisations and alliances ensuring from specific analyses would be directed at changing these specific natures of an unwanted order. Table 26 below illustrates these positions.

Table 26: Perceptions of South Africa (from two prompted views)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes and Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>93</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA is a racial capitalist society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>59</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA is a white dominated society</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA is a purely capitalist exploitative country</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The majority view held by almost two-thirds of the subjects was that South Africa practices both racial discrimination and capitalist exploitation. This view prevailed among the professional and managerial elites as well as among the independent elites. About a third saw white domination as the characteristic feature of the country while a
tenth of the subjects viewed it in purely class terms. A qualitative analysis of the reasons for holding specific views offered greater insight into the problem. Most interviewees saw race as a qualification for access into political power, which in turn predicated entry into economic well-being. In this way class and race coincide with race as a determinant for both class location and class position. South Africa is divided by class because capitalists are white and because only whites vote and thus control political power in the country as a whole. The class issue, therefore, centers around both politics and the work place. Whites do not only govern the country, they also own and control the means of production, occupy higher positions in both the private and public sectors, and pay low wages to blacks. In contrast, blacks are voteless, they constitute the bulk of the working class and are, therefore, both dominated and exploited by whites. One respondent argued, "The South African state is there to protect white power both political and economic. In essence, it is the executive of the capitalist class. Blacks are there only as tools to service and promote racial capitalism".

6.9 PERCEIVED CHANGES IN SA OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS

Reform, since the beginning of the 1980s had brought about some constitutional and economic changes. For instance in the Tricameral parliament, the new black local authorities as well as in the repeal of influx control regulations, the government felt it was making the required constitutional changes and was moving away from classical Verwoerdian apartheid. Similarly, the new labour dispensation of the late 1970s to the early 1980s was, in official circles, a major change in the economic sphere. It was therefore essential to pose questions of change to the respondents without mentioning any specific developments in order to assess how they viewed the recent shifts in the socio-political and socio-economic relations in the country. Respondents were thus asked to state whether they felt conditions in the past five years had (a) improved, (b) deteriorated or (c) remained the same, as well as to state the reasons for feeling they
way they felt. Table 27 gives a picture of the responses to these probes.

### Table 27: Perceptions of South Africa (from two prompted views)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&quot;Constrained&quot;</th>
<th>Profes Manager</th>
<th>&quot;Independent&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conditions have improved</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They remain the same</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They have become worse</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They have improved slightly</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Reasons:**

- Relaxations of laws, ie. mixed marriages and shared amenities
  - Total: 8
  - "Constrained": 13
  - Profes Manager: -
  - "Independent": 13
- Improvements in home ownership schemes
  - Total: 7
  - "Constrained": 4
  - Profes Manager: 3
  - "Independent": 13
- The educational system and state have led to school boycotts, high matric failure rate and general deterioration
  - Total: 10
  - "Constrained": 13
  - Profes Manager: 16
  - "Independent": 3
- Economic conditions have worsened, price hikes, a lot of basic commodities have become luxuries, inflation, underpaid blacks cannot cope
  - Total: 27
  - "Constrained": 17
  - Profes Manager: 34
  - "Independent": 28
- Political conditions have deteriorated, the New Constitution (Tricameral) is a slap in the face to blacks, more repression etc.
  - Total: 24
  - "Constrained": 17
  - Profes Manager: 28
  - "Independent": 25
- No change in areas that matter - no voting right for blacks, political and economic power still remains in white hands, fundamentally the status quo is intact
  - Total: 33
  - "Constrained": 25
  - Profes Manager: 38
  - "Independent": 34
- Small improvements, companies are trying to upgrade their workers (deracialisation in the workplace)
  - Total: 5
  - "Constrained": 4
  - Profes Manager: 3
  - "Independent": 6
- Number of educated blacks has increased still in the minority though
  - Total: 6
  - "Constrained": 13
  - Profes Manager: -
  - "Independent": 6
- Improvements affect only a few, only the educated who have broken through the employment barriers
  - Total: 14
  - "Constrained": 17
  - Profes Manager: 16
  - "Independent": 9
- Economic, blacks now own supermarkets and live in luxurious houses
  - Total: 14
  - "Constrained": 21
  - Profes Manager: 3
  - "Independent": 19
- No improvements, shanty towns on the increase
  - Total: 6
  - "Constrained": 4
  - Profes Manager: 6
  - "Independent": 6
There were more respondents who expressed pessimistic views than those who felt that conditions have improved (39% and 31% respectively), while almost a third of the subjects felt conditions remained the same. In total, therefore, almost three fifths of the interviewees did not consider the reforms mentioned above to constitute an intention on behalf of the state to eliminate apartheid. Respondents in state-dependent positions expressed more appreciation (48%) of the changes than was the case in the other two sub-samples, while the professional and managerial elites were the most vocal among the pessimists. Subjects cited the worsening economic conditions, i.e. hikes in prices, inflation and low wages as constituting the major sources of concern. On the political front the inception of the new Tricameral system was felt as "a slap in the face to blacks", while the crisis in education was yet another "deterioration" as perceived by the respondents. Those who felt that there had been no changes cited the status quo in the franchise: "Political and economic power still remains in white hands, there is no change in areas that matter and blacks still have no voting rights". A number of them felt that whatever reforms there had been, the government was using these as means to buy time in order to safeguard white hegemony.

A minority of the respondents did affirm that there had been minor changes or improvements, minor to the extent that they affected only a few blacks, "Improvements affect only a few, the educated few who have broken through the employment barrier". Another segment within this group stated that there were economic improvements where "blacks who own supermarkets live in luxurious houses". On the whole, however, the general belief was that the lot of the black people had not improved despite the reform programmes of the state and the capitalists.
The following section maps out:

i) the constructs or dimensions that subjects created in their responses to a group of co-optive indicators;

ii) the most salient variables that account for the subjects' adopting specific response patterns;

iii) the relationship between structural location in the political economy and the response to co-optation; and finally

iv) the consistency, or otherwise, of the subjects' responses across the variables.

Three distinct statistical procedures were used to accomplish the above objectives: factor analysis, regression analysis and, discriminant analysis. Generally, co-optive measures come as discrete incidents of reform hence individuals and groups may respond to them in two ways:

i) they may take each measure as a distinct event and respond to it in terms of immediate and/or long term benefits; or

ii) they may situate the reform measure within the overall policy of co-optation and respond to it accordingly.

The above statistical measures assist in establishing these distinctive responses by reorganising the data into clusters (correlations) and further differentiating (discriminating) between or among the clusters. This, in a way, demonstrates the patterning of responses, a development which individuals generate as a 'bouncing board' as each stimulus (question) impinges upon them. The three statistical procedures i.e. factor, regression and discriminant analyses were intended to accomplish these processes.
7.1 DATA PREPARATION

Responses to specific critical questions, in the discussion schedule, were weighted on a scale of one to three, from collaborative to radical in that order. A response was recorded as collaborative where the subject indicated a positive attitude to co-optive action by the state and other significant actors, such as the private sector, or where the subject approved of local or international action that would reinforce the structures of apartheid. Anti-collaboration or radical responses were those that expressed dissent or non-support for reformist or gradualist actions by the state and other significant actors. The scale thus reads from collaborative to neutral and finally to radical responses; hence high loadings on the data represent dissent, 'radicalism' or anti-collaboration.

7.1.1 Factor analysis

A total of 26 variables were put through the programme and this produced eleven factors where Eigen values (statistical measures related to the amount of variance accounted for) were greater than one and the percentage of variation was more than four. The eleven factors accounted for 69 percent of the total variance. The factors were rotated and produced the matrices presented below. The advantages of factor analysis are that all variables with a high correlation load heavily on a factor. It can therefore be assumed that variables which represent the convergence of thinking on specific issues will load highly under one factor, thus indicating the patterns of thinking on given issues. As a technique, factor analysis has its limitations. Firstly, it works well only with large samples, and secondly, non-related variables may load heavily under one factor. However, as a tool for organising data in a meaningful and logical way, it is very useful. Also, factor analysis is a convenient step to further treatment of data, e.g. regression and discriminant analysis. The following presentation briefly describes the results for the
eleven factors generated from the data:

**Factor 1: “Indentification with the Extra-parliamentary opposition” (Broad Abstraction of Political Policy at the Macro Level)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Loadings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homelands cannot be used as bases for liberation</td>
<td>.73800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign investment will not bring about political changes in South Africa</td>
<td>.63471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disinvestment will precipitate political changes in South Africa</td>
<td>.61809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opening of White Schools to Blacks is window dressing</td>
<td>.46021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The high factor loadings in the above variables resonates well with the rhetoric by the extra-parliamentary mass mobilisation movements and account for 17% of the variation in the subjects' responses. The thinking among the respondents is therefore reflective of the support for the extra-parliamentary opposition. The converse is equally true, i.e. the rejection of official state policy together with the structures that derive from the same policy. Homelands have always been rejected by the majority of educated Africans. In 1985-86, expression of this rejection had further significance. This was the era of "alternative structures" and "ungovernability". Any compromise towards homelands would thus have negated important elements in "the popular struggle". Also, the period between 1985 and 1987 marked the era when the issues of sanctions and foreign investment were debated heatedly in political and economic circles. That these issues were foremost in the respondents' minds, therefore comes as no surprise.

Finally, it was in 1984 that the New Era Schools Trust was formed, by the private sector, as its contribution to the betterment of African education. A number of organisations within the extra-parliamentary opposition criticised this move as part of the multi-pronged strategy, by capital in concert with the state, to further co-opt well-to-do Africans into the state and capital's hegemonic thinking, i.e. the creation of a black bourgeoisie as a buffer against the masses. The loading of this "schools" variable on factor one is, however, relatively low (below .5)
Factor one, therefore, represents a broad dimension of agreement/disagreement with the mass movement, and high scores reflect a strong anti-collaborationist line.

**Factor 2. Rejection of the Main Co-optive Indicators - Political and Economic**

(Major National reforms with an immediate impact at the local level variables)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Factor Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opening of central business districts to other races</td>
<td>.61970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Tricameral Constitution is a political fraud</td>
<td>.59668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Advancement in industry is window dressing</td>
<td>.58234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Local Authorities are a political sham</td>
<td>.50435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrest in the townships discredits the Government</td>
<td>.50543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign companies should pull out of S.A.</td>
<td>.46362</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The principal 'particular' co-optive indicators load heavily on factor 2, ie. economic and political measures designed to create a burgeoning black middle class. The rejection of these measures is indicated in the negative wording. Factor two accounts for seven percent of the variation in the responses, and as a second dimension it deals with major national reform measures together with some of the immediate consequences. What is salient about these developments is that the reforms impacted unevenly among the subordinates, and also that their impact was immediately felt at the local level. As such, they evoked strong local reactions. Between 1983 and 1985, the government took the initiative. It introduced the Tricameral Constitution, opened some central business districts in some towns and cities, to trade by all race groups, and redefined community councils as town councils with powers to raise their own revenues. The reaction to these political reforms was immediate and predictable. The United Democratic Front was formed as a broad 'alternative' umbrella to oppose political and civic incorporation into the government's policy and in 1984 major revolts against town councils erupted almost in every township.

While the government was busy repairing the political damage the private sector, particularly foreign multinational corporations, had since the middle 1970s embarked
upon a policy of black advancement as a step towards ‘deracialisation’ in the economy. There was widespread talk, at the level of business circles, of creating a black middle class with a stake in the system, and the Carlton Conference in 1979 had demonstrated consensus, between the government and the private sector, on the desirability of marketing the ‘free enterprise’ system to those who had been deprived of participation in the decision-making process.

The constructs in factor two, therefore, bring together macro- and micro-political issues, particularly the concrete developments which impacted on the daily lives of individuals. Also, factor two locates the subjects’ immediate reactions to local level reforms within the broader abstracted strategies by the mass-based mobilisation forces, the United Democratic Front, the National Forum and Azapo. The politics of non-collaboration was on the ascendant in 1984-86 and the subjects in this sample represented the spokespersons in black politics.

Factors 3, 4 and 5. Support for Pressure Politics:

Factor 3. Township Unrest

Variables

- Township unrest raises political consciousness among black people
- Development corporations do not help black people

Loadings

- .89074
- .57003

Factor 4. School Boycotts

Variables

- School boycotts are a natural reaction to an efficient, corrupt education designed for subservience
- South Africa is a racist capitalist state
- The future constitution should provide for a unitary constitution based on one person, one vote electoral system

Loadings

- .80934
- .56786
- .54077

Factor 5. The Armed Struggle

Variables

- Externally-based guerrilla invasion, together with internal unrest, will force S.A. to change

Loadings

- .86054
Factors three, four and five individually and collectively place the accent on township politics, particularly the position of pressure politics in the political consciousness of the subjects.

In factor 3, respondents placed a value on insurrection in the townships while deprecating the co-optive role by the development corporations which they saw as promoting the process of embourgeoisement and its consequent divide and rule strategy.

Factor 4 brings together school boycotts and their causal factor "the racist exploitative nature of the South African politico-economic system". The belief among the subordinate groups in South Africa is that the government has designed black education to:

i) promote subservience to authority. Here the system employees hegemonic tools at the intellectual level to instill values that justify apartheid as a rational and democratic system which promotes self-determination for each group. The group concept is accentuated at the expense of the individual, in order to sustain white superiority in the guise of group identity;

ii) to control the allocation of individuals into the various slots in the social division of labour. Critics of 'bantu education', as separatist African education has come known to be known, maintain that the government manipulates not only the content of African education, but also the process through which graduation into tertiary institutions, as well as into the workplace, takes place. According to this view, matriculation results under the control of the Department of Education and Training do not reflect the actual performance of the candidates but are 'doctored' to allow specific numbers to proceed to the limited available spaces. In this way, it is asserted, the system relocates its failures onto individual candidates who see themselves as having failed to meet the requirements rather than blame the system for its inefficiencies.

In the context of the above beliefs the clustering of educational political and desired constitutional variables under one factor is understandable logically in terms of the effect-cause-solution relationship.
Factor five is dominated by a single variable, i.e. that the solution to the political problem in South Africa lies in a combination of two strategies - the externally-based armed struggle, manifest in guerrilla incursions into the country, coupled with internal uprising. At one level this echoes the rhetoric by the mass-based extra-parliamentary organisations, while at another level, the utterances reflect the realities as they existed in 1985-86. The townships were almost ungovernable - rent boycotts, the collapse of town councils (out of 104 designed to function in 1984, 34 were actually set up and by April 1985 only 3 were still functioning, a record of 2.8 percent (Cobbet et al. 1986)) and "alternative structures", i.e. "people’s education" and "people’s courts" were on the ascendant. On their own, ‘alternative structures’ were not capable of delivering the requisite goods, but they were a departure from the universally hated collaborationist institutions - the state-created town councils, the police and bantu education.

Factor 6. Disapproval of Trade Restrictions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protective trade restrictions in the townships are bad</td>
<td>.84699</td>
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</table>

Factor 6 has to be read in the context of the anti-collaborationist stand taken by the mass organisations, as well as the general 'anti-system' climate in the townships. In the first place protective trade restrictions were the economic tool of apartheid as policy, but they went beyond that. The beneficiaries of protective trade were, in the main, the much hated town councillors and tribal authorities who, in terms of their official functions, had the power to allocate business and trading licenses. In almost all instances, they allocated these either to themselves or to their supporters, thus incurring the wrath of their political opponents who either hated the policy which brought this position about, or felt excluded from sharing in the spoils.
Factor 7. Blame on government for Township Unrest

Variable
Unrest in the townships is a legitimate response to imposed political structures together with their corrupt and inefficient administration .83016

Sequentially, factor 7 starts from where factor 6 left off. If self-enriching town councils are bad, not only because of the individuals who serve on them but also because of their structural location in the political economy, then the revolts in the townships constitute a legitimate response by the people. Also what factor 7 succinctly spells out is that respondents lay the blame for the turmoil in the townships on the government, thus absolving the rioting youths from responsibility.

Factor 8. Maximum Constitutional Benefits

Variable
Maximum democracy will come from a unitary constitution .86157

Factor 9. Anti Gradualism

Variable
Total abolition of apartheid, scrapping the homelands, unbanning political organisations and releasing all political prisoners are the minimum demands for change in S.A. The position of black people in S.A. has become worse over the past five years .83075 .57048

Factor 10. Trade Unions as catalysts for change

Variable
Trade Unions will not solve all the problems in the workplace -.84930

Factor 11. Future Constitution

Variable
A unitary constitution is my first choice .86603

Factors 8 through to eleven address broad issues of social change in South Africa, including the desired political and constitutional changes. Factor nine is vehemently anti-
gradualist and reflects the respondents' impatience with the pace of change through reform, while factor 10 contrasts changes from above with initiatives made from below. Respondents describe trade unions as a strong catalyst for change but admit that they will not solve major problems in the workplace, probably in the context of there being no progress in the position of black people over the last five years (as expressed in factor 9). Finally, subjects place emphasis on the capacity of a unitary constitution to effect democracy.

7.1.2 Summary

In summary it must be stated that the eleven factors generated in the data are not very crystallised. This is, however, a function of the size of the sample (93 is not a large enough sample for factor analysis). It was nevertheless necessary to go through this step in order to understand the data better and also to generate further statistical analyses.

In total, a vast majority of the variables which loaded highly in the factor analysis reflect two main trends in the data:

i) a strong stand on collaboration or non-collaboration; and

ii) strong support or non support for the extra-parliamentary mass movement.

Sampling African elites could have established one of the two options available to a highly mobile group in terms of either the state’s or the private sector’s co-optive strategies. As a minority that qualifies for selective incorporation into the structures of power, a collaborating elite stands to benefit in the short term. However, in the long term it is through non-collaboration that an indigenous elite can command the respect of the masses as well as gain status and material rewards. In the event of liberation, which
appeared not too distant in 1985-86, the non-collaborating elites would become the new rulers in a post-apartheid South Africa. Hence, there is a predictable rejection of state policy and all the supportive structures as against a strong approval of almost all strategies designed to overthrow apartheid. Further processing of the data through regression and finally discriminant analysis was thus necessary to indicate the position of the respondents on these issues.

7.2 REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Following upon factor analysis, factor scores were generated from the data (factors) and four variables - age, education, gender and occupation - were correlated, as dependant variables, with the factor scores. The objective was to assess the possible association between demographic and structural variables and the degree of collaboration or dissent as expressed firstly, in the cross tabulation and secondly, in the factor analysis. A regression analysis was applied to the data and the results obtained appear in the tables below. As the data from the cross tabulations, as well as the wording of the variables in the factor analysis, indicate strong dissent from the government's policy and the reform programme, a positive relationship between the factor scores and the dependant variables is indicative of 'radicalism' or non-collaboration. The following tables demonstrate the relationship between the four dependant variables named above and certain factor scores as generated in the factor analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age as Dependant Variable</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Variables in the Equation:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification with the Extra-parliamentary Mass Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support for confrontationist strategies (armed struggle &amp; Township uprisings)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N = 93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Age "explains" approximately 18 percent of the variation in the data pertaining to identification with the extra parliamentary opposition as well as support for confrontationist strategies. There is a negative correlation between these two variables and age, indicating a negative relationship between age and dissent from the government's policy, i.e., the older individuals become the less they dissent in relative terms. The correlations are, however, modest and the relationship is significant at the 99 percent level, thus indicating strong reliability. Age is, therefore, a reliable predictor of "political radicalism".

**Education as a Dependant Variable**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables in the Equation:</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>Co-efficients</th>
<th>T. Score</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identification with the extra-parliamentary mass movement</td>
<td>.0705</td>
<td>-.21202</td>
<td>-2.797</td>
<td>.0063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.58863</td>
<td>21.092</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 93

Level of education attained "accounts" for seven percent of the variation in the data relating to identification with the extra-parliamentary mass organisation. The table demonstrates a negative relationship between education and identification with the mass movement. However, all the respondents in the sample had educational levels above matric. They are thus very well-educated relative to the African population on the whole. The relationship expressed in the data is relative and indicates that at very high levels of education there is a slight propensity for individuals to be guided by their own discretion on political issues rather than take the party line. The results are statistically highly significant. (P = 99.37%)
Gender as a Dependant Variable

Variables in the Equation: | Variance | Co-efficient | T. Score | Significance |
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
Support for Confrontationist strategies (school boycotts) | .0914 | -.13255 | -3.171 | .0021 |
Constant | 1.22005 | 29.323 |
N = 93

Gender "explains" nine percent of the variation in the data relating to support for school boycotts as a strategy for change in South Africa. The relationship between this and gender is moderately negative. This shows that in spite of the general high level of non-collaboration in the sample, females tend to be on the lower end of the scale, particularly when their children have to be in the forefront in the confrontationist strategy. The relationship is statistically highly significant (P = 99.9%)

"Occupation" as a Dependant Variable

Variables in the Equation: | Variance | Co-efficient | T. Score | Significance |
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
Co-optation indicators- the creation of a black middle class, ie. opening of CBDS, Black Advancement, local authorities and the Tricameral Constitution | .1029 | .27188 | 3.365 | .011 |
Constant | 26.687 | 26.687 |
N = 93

Occupation "accounted" for 10 percent of the variation in the responses to the main co-optive indicators, ie. economic and political variables. These are probably central to the thesis since, besides the issue of the homelands, incorporation of subordinates into the "centre" is through the tricameral parliament and local authorities. From the economic aspect black advancement and the opening of some central business districts to blacks constitute the core of economic ‘deracialisation’. A politically and economically incorporated elite is essential to co-optation. The data shows a mildly positive correlation.
between occupation as defined in the sample, and reflection of the co-optive indicators. This mildly confirms the hypothesis that pressures to collaborate vary with the position of individuals within the polity and the economy. The further individuals are from the state and the private sector in terms of employment, the more dissenting they are on co-optive indicators.

7.3 DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS

As in the cross tabulations in chapter 6, respondents were allocated into three groups following their structural location in the economy and in the polity respectively. The groups were assigned weightings on a scale of 1 to 3 where 1 represented a collaborationist placing and 3 the opposite. It was predicted that respondents in group one would demonstrate the greatest propensity to collaborate while those in group three would score highly on dissent or anti-collaboration. Group two was expected to adopt a middle position relative to the other two groups. The groups were constituted as follows:

Group 1 "Constrained elites", ie. state appointed officials and state dependent employees; n = 25
Group 2 "Professional and managerial elites"; n = 33
Group 3 Independent elites, ie. lawyers, medical practitioners, students, officials in the extra-parliamentary organisations and trade unionists; n = 35.

The data from the factor scores was then processed and two independent functions were generated by means of correlations of factor scores in a rotated factor matrix. The first function consisted of the following factors:

i) the rejection of the main co-optive indicators. (F Scr 02)
ii) anti gradualism (F Scr 09)
iii) support for confrontationist strategies (township unrest) (F Scr 03)
The tables below illustrate the correlations in function one as well as the relationship between the above three groups and the factors in the function.

**Function 1 % Variance = 63.39**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Co-efficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F Scr 02. Rejection of the main co-optive indicators</td>
<td>.75526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Scr 03. Support for confrontationist strategies (township unrest)</td>
<td>.50184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Scr 09. Anti-gradualism</td>
<td>.55170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Relationship between function 1 and the three groups:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>-.78751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>.21658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>.36689</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The negative correlation between function one and group one indicates an inverse relationship or a very low score by Group one on this function, relative to the other two groups. In contrast group 3 has the highest score on function one, as indicated in the strong positive correlation, which is statistically significant (P = 99.99) between the two.

Group two occupies an intermediate position, relative to the other two groups, on this function. Given the wording in the factors which comprise function one, it is evidently clear that the function represents anti-collaborationist sentiments. Function one accounts for 63.39 percent of the variation in the data and is apparently the dominant function.

**Function 2. % Variance = 36.61**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Co-efficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F Scr 01 Support for the extra-parliamentary mass movement</td>
<td>.60468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Scr 07 Blame on government for township unrest</td>
<td>.42632</td>
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<tr>
<td>F Scr 08 Maximum constitutional benefits</td>
<td>.39624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Scr 10 Trade unions as catalysts for change</td>
<td>.37702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Scr 04 School boycotts blamed on racism and oppression</td>
<td>.35337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Scr 05 The armed struggle and internal unrest will bring change</td>
<td>.28883</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Relationship between Function 2 and the Three Groups:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>-.44057</td>
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<td>.46681</td>
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Relative to function 1, function 2, although anti-collaborationist in substance, reflects a different level of opposition. Only group 3 scores high on function two.

The three groups are separated as follows:

i) Group 1 scores low on both functions
   ii) Group 2 scores high on function 1 and low on function 2
   iii) Group 3 scores high on both functions.

In relative terms, group 3 expresses the greatest degree of dissent.

Consequently a territorial map indicating the position of the three groups was generated as shown below.
## DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS

**TERRITORIAL MAP**

*INDICATES A GROUP CENTROID

**CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION 1**

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<th>Discriminant Score</th>
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**TERRITORIAL MAP**

*INDICATES A GROUP CENTROID

**CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION 1**

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The map shows the positions of the groups on both functions 1 and 2 on a scale of 1 to 4. The highest points on the x and y axes represent positive correlations with the functions. The map demonstrates that the majority of individuals predicted as falling into group 3 scored highly on both functions while those predicted as group 1 had low scores on both functions. Group 2 took a middle position on function 1 and a relatively low position on function 2.

Finally the scatter plot and the table below illustrate the positions of individuals as derived from their average scores throughout the survey.
ALL-GROUPS SCATTERPLOT - * INDICATES A GROUP CENTROID

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A Table demonstrating the predicted versus the actual or assigned positions of respondents

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Actual Group</th>
<th>No of cases</th>
<th>Predicted Group Membership</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1 (60%)</td>
<td>2 (20%)</td>
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<td>Constrained</td>
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<td>Prof &amp; Managerial</td>
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<td>3 (8.6%)</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4 (18.2%)</td>
<td>6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Percentage of grouped cases correctly classified = 64,52%.

7.4 HYPOTHESIS ONE AND THE STATISTICAL RESULTS

The above findings, from factor analysis through to discriminant analysis including the territorial map, as well as the table depicting the position of the groups in the scattergram, indicate that the hypothesis that the degree of collaboration with the co-optive (reform) strategy varies with the structural position of individuals in the economy and the polity has a high validity. Groups 1 and 2 presented some problems which should not be difficult to explain. There were more dissenters in group one than predicted. Firstly reference to the problematic position of social workers and some nurses, and teachers (all of whom are affiliated to 'progressive' organisations like SABSWA, NEHAWU) was made earlier in Chapter 5. Not surprisingly, therefore, the defectors in group 1 adopted a more radical position than that to which they were assigned. Likewise, respondents in group 2 belong to organisations like the BMF and UDUSA, both of which like to be seen to support 'radical' forces of change. Understandably, therefore, the shift in group 2 was towards 'radicalism' more than towards 'collaboration'. Relative to the other two groups, group 3 demonstrated the greatest degree of internal cohesion (Predictive validity = 70%), although the 12 percent shift towards 'collaboration' could not be predicted. What has to be borne in mind however, is that the degrees of 'collaboration' and 'dissent' are relative to the sample. Overall the sample demonstrated a high level of rejection of the government's policy and expressed strong support for mechanisms of changing the status quo.
7.5 HYPOTHESIS TWO AND THE STATISTICAL RESULTS:

"The complex nature of co-optation will cause internal inconsistency among the respondents - in their responses to what might broadly be perceived as co-optive indicators."

In the generation of the indicators for co-optation all the variables, ie. economic, educational, political etc., were taken as equal (ie. no weighting was given to certain variables at the expense of others). It was, however, hypothesised that there would be an internal inconsistency in the responses to what might be broadly perceived as co-optive strategies. Precisely, it was expected that individuals would moderate their responses in line with what they perceived to be immediate gains in spite of an overall collaborationist or dissenting stance.

In the light of this observation a number of 'check indicators' were included in the interview schedule in order to test for consistency. These were:

i) the opening of some white schools to blacks;
ii) the declaration of some central business districts as free trading zones;
iii) protective trade restrictions, ie. prohibiting non-members from trading in areas other than those zoned for their specific racial groups;
iv) the issue of foreign investment in and disinvestment from South Africa;
and
v) the advancement of black personnel to supervisory and managerial positions in the corporate sector.

It was anticipated that an aspirant and upwardly-mobile elite would welcome the opening of white schools to blacks albeit on a limited basis, mainly because a good education would better equip their children for entry into the dominant economic system. The same rationale applies to the issue of black advancement in industry and commerce. Some corporations go beyond granting symbolic power to black managers and engage them
in actual decision making positions. It is in the private sector that the process of individuation rather than symbolic co-optation has a measure of applicability. Some corporations such as the Anglo-American Corporation, Anglo-Vaal and Tongaat-Hulett, to name a few, have Africans who function as fully-fledged directors, with all the attendant financial and status trappings.

Because of the impact of the above two variables, it was expected that respondents would demonstrate less overt hostility, since the benefits are immediate, concrete and not directly political. Respondents showed less hostility to the opening of white schools to blacks than they did towards participation in homeland, local government or the tricameral structures. This was particularly clear at the level of visual analysis, i.e. the cross tabulations. This observation is reinforced in the relatively weak correlation of this variable in the factor analysis. Similarly, responses to black advancement were moderately positive and less condemnatory in the visual analysis, although this correlated moderately in the factor analysis. The correlation may, however, refer to the negative aspect of the practice and not to the rejection of the concept of black advancement.

The opening of some central business districts as free trading zones raises some pertinent issues. First, given the economic disparities between black and white, blacks are aware of the constraints which will apply to them if they venture into such areas. The lifting of legal restrictions, without corresponding financial empowerment to the disadvantaged, will not rectify the existing disparities in economic power. The same logic applies to the question of protective trade restrictions. Inasmuch as the government claimed to have protected blacks from unfair competition, whites were equally protected from black competition, however weak. Respondents could easily see through the veneer. These variables did not, therefore, fit into the group as had been anticipated. While on the surface they appeared beneficial to blacks, as practical measures they were
of no consequence. Respondents therefore rejected them as futile pronouncements since they could not bring about any changes to the economic status quo.

Finally, in spite of the much publicised pronouncements by the extra-parliamentary opposition supporting disinvestment from South Africa by foreign companies, at the level of visual analysis respondents equivocated on this issue. Disinvestment had become largely associated with the loss of jobs, particularly as a result of efforts by the local media and pro-government spokespersons. In the thinking of number of respondents this had become a reality, especially given that the opposite view did not go beyond rhetoric. The wavering attitude is therefore understandable.

In conclusion, therefore, respondents did demonstrate a relatively mild measure of inconsistency in their stand on some of what might broadly constitute co-optive indicators. This was essentially in the areas of:

i) the opening of white schools to blacks;
ii) advancement by blacks to professional and managerial positions in the private sector;
iii) the question of foreign investment.

The findings demonstrate that it is not only the ideological factors that operate in the construction of attitudes to a given set of variables or constructs. Pragmatic components are equally significant and do act as brakes on ideological elements, thus producing what might mistakenly be interpreted as contradictions in the individual. There is always an internal logic which takes account of both the ideological and pragmatic dimensions.
CHAPTER 8

8. CONCLUSION

This final discussion centres on the main constructs that individuals create in their response to specific stimuli, in this instance to co-optation. The main themes attempt to resolve the debate on the role of either political or economic forces in co-optation, and finally, a construction of possible future scenarios helps to take the debate on the success of the co-optation strategy beyond the present.

The empirical findings in the previous two chapters have produced a number of themes, most of which bear relevance to the theoretical discourse on co-optation as a process of social engineering. The architects of co-optation hoped to create a terrain which, by capitalising on material and status rewards, would limit to the terms prescribed and dictated by the ruling group the range of political and ideological alignments for those who would be incorporated. The outcome would be the acceptance, by the subordinates, of political changes which would leave the ruling white group virtually in control of both political and economic power for a considerable period. However, a number of pertinent observations have emerged from the empirical findings relating to the data.

8.1 THE PRIMACY OF THE POLITICAL

In the first instance, respondents saw co-optation in political rather than in economic terms. This was demonstrated in their strong identification with the extra-parliamentary mass mobilisation movements in terms of ideology and strategy. The extra-parliamentary organisations are distinctively political in their formations and articulation, although they
engage in economic formulations as well. This is understandable, given that, in the main, the disenfranchised are also economic underdogs. Secondly, the respondents articulated their reactions more in political that in economic terms. Their objection to co-optation was on the basis of its inability to meet the fundamental provisions of human rights. This was the case specifically with regard to the national question, i.e. who does the state actually represent? Respondents first perceived the state as a white regime representing the political and economic interests of the white race. Secondly, they saw the struggle for political control as an assertion by black people fighting for political and economic equality through inclusion in a single non-racial state.

A number of analysts, notably Adam and Moodley, Nolutshungu and Rhodie, maintain that the problem in South Africa is primarily political and that other forms of deprivation such as economic and status deprivation flow from this (Adam and Moodley 1986, Nolutshungu 1983 and Rhodie 1987). Adam and Moodley argue that "A frustrated bourgeoisie wants to capture state power in order to alter the system that excludes it" (Adam and Moodley 1986: 147). Echoing the same theme Nolutshungu states "The basic reason is that both the alignments for conservation and those that demand change are defined, in the first place, in terms of political rather than economic relations. Positions occupied by the various "races" in the order of domination itself modify the general social effects of the positions they occupy in the relations of production" (Nolutshungu 1983: xii). And finally, in an appraisal of black alienation from the existing socio-economic system, Rhodie asserts that blacks, particularly the elites and opinion-makers, increasingly see political rights as the chief route and direct access to equal socio-economic opportunities (Rhodie 1988).

The extra-parliamentary opposition provides a vehicle of expression for the disenfranchised masses. Their strategic logic concurs well with the aspirations and expressions of the African elites as demonstrated in this sample. Central to the strategic
logic of the extra-parliamentary opposition, is the demand for the creation of a 'free, non-racial and democratic South Africa' through the exercise of a one person, one vote electoral system. That is purely a political demand based on the belief in the principles of liberty, equality and justice. Rhoodie (1987) confirms this in his observation that the common denominator in the extra-parliamentary organisations is that they identify themselves with the aspirations which are defined by blacks, to a greater or lesser extent, in terms of human rights and experienced as some of other form of deprivation.

That respondents conceptualised co-optation negatively and mainly in political terms has certain implications. Firstly the architects of co-optation marketed it in ethical and moral terms, with financial and status rewards attached. Homeland parliamentarians, town councillors, members of the tricameral parliament and bureaucratic functionaries in state institutions, were portrayed as rendering a service to their own people and were given mass coverage in the government-controlled media, such as radio and television, as well as in the liberal press. Secondly, through mediation on behalf of the collaborating elites, the state intended to promote the co-optation strategy to hegemonic status. The state did not only endow the collaborating elites with power but intervened frequently and decisively in their favour when their positions were challenged. Collaborating elites were, therefore, not only given status and power but also a hegemonic position in black politics. That this did not succeed as designed is a function of the strength of the rejection of the co-optation strategy. Two significant observations can be made from the findings in this thesis.

Firstly, the strong identification by the respondents with the extra-parliamentary mass movement indicates that, at an ideological level, co-optation has had very little impact. Secondly, respondents in this thesis rejected the gradualist accommodation politics, as is envisaged in the reform packages of the early to mid-1980s.
It is not difficult to establish reasons for the above developments. Strong support for anti-gradualist confrontational strategies for change indicates an impatience with the pace of change as emanating from the co-optation strategy. Support for the extra-parliamentary opposition implies acceptance of their ideological position. This demonstrates a case of aspirational deprivation on the part of the dissenting elites, the majority of whom are economically well-off relative to their group, and in some instances, in universal terms as well. However, the same elites resent the politico-legal obstacles that (a) stand on their way to full economic incorporation and (b) block and frustrate their political and status ambitions. Rhoodie (1987) maintains that there is an asymmetrical relationship between black socio-economic development and black political accommodation. He argues that this creates status incongruity, which infuriates and radicalises blacks. The strong anti-collaborationist line demonstrated by the respondents in this thesis calls into question the capacity of co-optation and reform as hegemonic processes. A necessary condition for co-optation is that, at least, it creates a climate which facilitates the absence of active opposition. Strong support for anti-gradualist and confrontationist strategies negates this very basic condition at the ideological level.

8.2 THE DILEMMA OF COLLABORATION AS STRATEGIC BRINKMANSHIP

While the above observations reflect the practical as well as ideological inclinations of the majority of respondents, the views were far from being homogeneous, first among the respondents, and secondly across the indicators of co-optation. There were, broadly, two distinct cultures which emerged from the findings, a dominant anti-collaborationist culture to which a vast majority of the respondents subscribed (and which has been discussed above), and a mild culture of acquiescence and tolerance, if not resignation, shared by a minority of the respondents, particularly within the group comprising the 'constrained' elites. What is of particular significance here is that co-optation is not a numbers game, since the state can always prop up and bolster its sympathisers in times
of crisis. Respondents within the minority culture, though not necessarily approving of apartheid, perceived merit in reform and did not see co-optation as collaboration into subservience but rather as a gradual gaining of access to power and influence. At an ideological level they tended to ignore questions of principle in favour of practical developments in the guise of pragmatism. This blurs the boundaries between pragmatism and opportunism and begs the question whether these individuals do not respond to co-optation in terms of immediate personal gains, instead of long term national benefits. Robinson’s expose’ of collaborating elites eventually using the symbols of the colonial system to create opportunities for freedom, or Bloom and Selznick’s postulation that co-optation can lead to the eventual sharing of power, can only be verified by the outcome (Robinson 1972; Bloom and Selznick 1977). Beyond the empirical demonstration in this thesis, of the inability by the majority of co-opted elites, to perceive co-optation in terms of the long-term potential to undermine the dominant group, developments within the collaborative culture in general, have failed to effectively demonstrate the dialectic nature of co-optation, as explained at the conceptual stage of this thesis. Co-opted elites have, in national terms, shifted more towards absorption by the instruments of the dominant group, rather than towards championing the cause of the subordinates. This has been the case in the homelands where four have opted for ‘independence’ while developments in the non-independent ones do not demonstrate any significant difference.

Adam and Moodley (1986) make a distinction between collaboration as envisaged in the case of homelands which have opted for independence together with the tricameral parliament, and pragmatic institutional opposition as demonstrated by Inkatha on the one side and the unions on the other. Grouping Inkatha which is a strategic homeland-based institution, created "from above", together with the unions which are "grassroots" shop floor organisations raises specific fundamental questions, particularly at the level of both ideology and strategy. For instance, Inkatha’s track record is not different from that
of other homelands. Inkatha administers local level functions just like any other homeland. The difference between the Transkei and KwaZulu is only a matter of degree or at best statutory. Statements by the KwaZulu hierarchy that Inkatha has created a liberated zone beg the question "whose liberation?".

Although Adam and Moodley made their analysis four years ago, and this thesis has the advantage of hindsight, at the time of Adam's analysis there was a clear ideological distinction between Inkatha and the unions. Events since then have demonstrated the limitations of the strategy of trying to change the 'system' from within. The reality of the situation is that he who pays the piper calls the tune. Inkatha has not only been unable to transform the system from within, it has eventually been absorbed into the state apparatus - a logical development given the vast power of the South African state, both as dispenser of rewards and an ideological force (evidence of Inkatha's role in the violence against the extra-parliamentary opposition since 1985 and particularly its alliance with the state's security apparatus in suppressing resistance is clearly stated in Aicheson 1990, Gwala Z, 1985, Gwala N 1988, Kentridge 1990, Mare and Hamilton 1987, Mare and Ncube 1990, Meer 1985, Sitas 1985 and Zulu 1988). The ideological leanings of the majority of the respondents within the 'constrained' group, as well as the 'politics of loyal resistance' practised by Inkatha, clearly demonstrate the complexity of co-optation together with the power of the state to mould the ideological destiny of collaborating elites decisively, irrespective of how strategic the objectives of such collaboration were at the beginning.

8.3 CO-OPTATION AND RACIAL SEPARATION ARE MUTUALLY INCOMPATIBLE

Evidence in this thesis suggests that the majority of the elites do not see the possibility of creating "space" within the system of white supremacy, through collaboration. Perhaps this reflects a realisation by the subjects of the determination of the state to maintain
white power. In the South African political context, co-optation has taken the form of inclusion within separation, where incorporated blacks have not joined the mainstream of society, but have rather been elevated within their "own group"; and in general are still subservient to whites. Not surprisingly therefore, this has evoked rejection among blacks who perceive the strategy as an extension of apartheid. Further, experience has demonstrated to black people that the state does not envisage, in its intended programme, to create a single non-racial South Africa which is the final goal of the disenfranchised. On this account, there is total rejection, by the elites, of any form of either gradualism or federalism on the grounds that they constitute devices to maintain the status quo of white power and black subordination.

8.4 POSSIBLE FUTURE SCENARIOS

In conclusion, it may be necessary to speculate, by way of constructing some possible future scenarios, on the probability of the success of co-optation as a legitimation strategy in South African politics. Since co-optation is by definition predicated on elite incorporation, it has to be mediated through successful ideological and material trappings. The elites should first be convinced that the cause they are called upon to fulfill is both justifiable and practically possible, and secondly have the capacity to deliver the goods to the masses. The demonstration in this thesis is that the first precondition does not exist. This creates space for three possible scenarios to be generated from the findings.

8.5 SCENARIO 1

8.5.1 Total rejection and consequent failure of co-optation as a legitimation strategy

Under this scenario the African elite totally refuses to co-operate with the state's official
programme and aligns itself with the extra-parliamentary opposition. This creates a need for "alternative structures" to demonstrate the capacity of the non-collaborating elite to deliver the necessary goods and services, particularly at the level of the local state, thereby totally excluding the state from popular constituencies. The mass mobilisation movements which constitute the extra-parliamentary opposition will have to transform themselves from being protest and insurrectionist organs into alternative service delivery structures with fiscal powers, in order to raise the necessary revenue to pay for the services. Such a development will deprive the government of its most potent weapon - the capacity to control and, if necessary, threaten to or actually withdraw basic services. Further, the mass movements will have to be selective in their targets. For instance, there was almost consensus, in this sample, on the negative status of local authorities, the tricameral constitution and the homelands. Selective targeting will have to entail: (a) avoiding areas where it is difficult to obtain consensus and secondly, (b) leaving out the domain of social security such as education, health and welfare, where the central state has an obligation to deliver because of the tax implications.

This is a tall order scenario and demands astute leadership, discipline on the part of the mass movements, and above all the willingness on the part of the people to pay for the delivery of services. While the leadership question is not debatable, the other two conditions may not be realistic. By definition, mass organisations thrive on popular disaffection and have very low, if any, extractive capacity. There is a reluctance to pay, expressed both in the popular rhetoric and in the tendency by the mass organisations to boycott. Discipline is also lacking as is demonstrated in a number of rallies and campaigns. For instance the off-handed manner in which "comrades" have 'enforced' consumer boycotts and stayaways, as well as the looting and destruction of property by elements in the crowds attending mass rallies, have not endeared the struggle to the "uncommitted" or to the "opponents of freedom". Further, while the dissenting elite has the ideological competence to lead, it lacks the material capacity vis-a-vis the state to
deliver equal or improved services to the masses. The state would easily take advantage of the collapse in service delivery to discredit the dissenters and enhance the performance of its reinstated collaborators. This scenario raises a number of problems. In the first place it presupposes a measure of devolution of power from the centre by the local state - a condition which is only possible in a symbiotic relationship between the centre and the periphery. Given the ideological disparity between the state and the dissenting elites as expressed in this thesis, such a relationship is most unlikely. The probability of success of this scenario is therefore low, although this does not necessarily enhance the chances of success of the state's programme as is illustrated in scenario two below.

8.6 SCENARIO 2

8.6.1 Success of the co-optation strategy

Nolutshungu lists two essential objectives of co-optation through elite or middle class accommodation, and further presents three preconditions necessary for the strategy to succeed. The two essential objectives, cited earlier in this thesis, are:

i) "to gain popular acquiescence to rule and so to forestall the danger of revolution"; and

ii) "secondly, to divide the black opposition in order to buy time to initiate the further reforms that might seal popular acceptance and create a stable order". (Nolutshungu 1983: 120)

The three preconditions are that the elite or the middle class:

i) commands an effective ideological appeal;

ii) has quality in both political leadership and organisation; and

iii) has the capacity to deliver tangible material improvements to the masses (ibid: 120).

A close examination of both the objectives and the preconditions within the context of the findings in this thesis presents a number of problems. Firstly the two objectives are
only possible given that the carrots extended to the collaborating elites include both political and socio-economic attributes. There is a consensus of opinion among analysts of the South African question, firstly that a number of changes have taken place particularly in the economic sphere, and secondly that economic concessions alone will not appease a radicalised black, and particularly African, elite. (Adam 1986, Nolutshungu 1983 and Rhoodie 1988). Results in this thesis confirm this observation. In spite of a relative measure of 'deracialisation' in the workplace, as well as opportunities for the emergent black elite to move into 'mixed' residential areas and send their children to 'integrated' schools, the degree of dissent indicated in this thesis undermines the achievements of co-optive reform.

The success of scenario two also depends on the viability of the preconditions necessary to carry out the intended objectives. Firstly, while the elite intended for co-optation commands sufficient ideological and probably organisational sway over the masses, the ideology is a counter-ideology to that propounded by the state. The degree of success by the elites is proportionate to their level of identification with the lot of the masses and not with the state. As soon as they indicate shifts in position, they are discredited by the masses and their influence is weakened. Secondly, the capacity to deliver tangible material improvements to the masses creates a paradox within apartheid and the attendant material inequalities on which it rests. The conflict in South Africa is about fundamental human rights and the material inequalities which emanate from the denial of these rights to the majority of the population. Even if one were to accept that it is relatively easier to redress the question of material inequalities (which is not the case at present), questions of the franchise, freedom and other ideals cannot be addressed by co-opting a segment from within the subordinates and leaving the rest in limbo. This is what actually constitutes the main reasons for dissent as demonstrated in the findings in this thesis. This is, however, a short to medium-term scenario. As Robinson (1972) and Bloom and Selznick (1977) state, in the long term either; (a) collaborating elites may
utilise the state’s own symbols to promote the cause of the subordinates; or (b) in the light of Bloom and Selznick’s postulation, the momentum created out of the dialectic nature of co-optation may lead to the eventual sharing of power. Gradualism is an historical agent of change, as was the case in the Industrial Revolution with its attendant reforms. The problem in South Africa, however, is that co-optation as a conscious strategy for change is fraught with major politico-ideological problems. Scenario two, therefore, has a very low probability of success.

8.7 SCENARIO 3

8.7.1 The present stalemate continues

This is perhaps less of a scenario than an affirmation that the politics of co-optation has not ushered in the ‘promise’ and the consequent quiescence that its architects had hoped it would achieve. Reasons for this failure exist at two levels. At one level, co-optation rests on the premise that it is possible to relocate what are "systemic" responsibilities and obligations away from the source onto individuals by shifting elite boundaries and pretending that the system is suddenly open to all. By admitting into the structures of political and economic power a segment of the subordinates on a limited basis, and further by carrying this out within the ideology of group separation, the state hoped that it would defuse the current of opposition. Individuals would blame themselves for not possessing the requisite qualifications to break into the system, thereby absolving the state from responsibility. The smokescreen is too thin, as is evidenced even within the tricameral parliament, which is the most that co-optation has achieved. There are constant clamours for the abolition of ‘own affairs’, together with the veto by the majority party in the white House of Assembly. The extra-parliamentary opposition is on the ascendant in influence, in terms of empirical evidence on the ground, as well as support demonstrated by the findings in this thesis. As Nolutshungu maintains, “It is the inability
of the system of dominance to provide terms of black submission to the social order that collaborating black classes could themselves uphold, and, in their turn, purvey to others persuasively" (Nolutshungu 1983: 206).

The second level at which co-optation operates is that of the material and status trappings. This is fraught with two main problems. The first is that limiting the rewards to the elites creates acute relative deprivation on the part of the masses, who either expect the redistribution process to include them, or look up to the elites to effect this. The second is that the incorporated elites in turn suffer from relative deprivation as their newly acquired status offers them only derived power. They still have to refer to the state as the chief dispenser of power, even on issues which fall within their ‘territorial ambit’, should these impinge on national policy. And, above all, collaborating elites have to face the daily onslaught from the popular forces. Their positions become more untenable as the level of popular protest mounts. It is precisely because of these limitations that the stalemate has forced the state to seek alternatives to co-optation. The era of pre-negotiations which started on the second of February 1990 is exactly about this.
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3. UmAfrika
4. Ilanga
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6. The Sunday Times
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9. The Weekly Mail

**Selected Articles regularly consulted in Journals**

a) Indicator South Africa, 1984 - 1990
b) Work In Progress, Volumes 1 - 60

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Appendix A. The Sample Profile

Table C below reflects the profile of the sample by area, gender, age, education, occupation and by organisational affiliation.

Table C. The Sample Profile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Absolute Frequencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Area</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natal (Durban; Pietermaritzburg)</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border (East London; King Williamstown)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The PWV (Pretoria, Soweto, Sharpville)</td>
<td>23*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 30 years</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 - 40 years</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 - 50 years</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 - 60 years</td>
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<td>Over 60 years</td>
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<td>Graduate</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post graduate</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Occupation</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Education (Teachers and School Inspectors)</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>Social Workers</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nursing</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionists</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional and Managerial in the Private Sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administrative and Clerical in the State bureaucracy</td>
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<td>Doctors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legal Profession</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media (Journalists and Editors)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministers of Religion</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University lecturers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisational officials</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business persons</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Organisational Affiliation

Urban councillors Association  
Women’s Organisations  
South African Medical and Dental Association  
South African Nursing Association  
National Association of Democratic Lawyers  
Black Lawyers Association  
Business Organisations (NAFCOC)  
Student’s and youth organisations  
Welfare organisations  
Civic Associations  
Teacher Organisations  
Media  
Religious organisations  
Inkatha  
The United Democratic Front  
The Azanian Peoples Organisation  
Trade Unions  
No organisations

* Because of the intensity of the township revolts in the PWV region it became increasingly difficult to carry on with the interviews and the research had to be abandoned. The original sample in this region would have been 50.

Comments on the Sample

First it should be noted that there may be an overlap between occupation and organisational affiliation. Secondly because the extra-parliamentary organisations were under scrutiny, from the state, during the 1985/86 period, a number of individuals were not keen to reveal their organisational affiliations beyond the obvious ones. Finally, a number of individuals were not affiliated to any organisations operating at the time.
Appendix B

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

A. THE NEW "CONSTITUTIONAL DISPENSATION"

1. Let us consider the new "Constitutional Dispensation" in South Africa, i.e. the creation of the chambers for "coloureds" and "Indians, but not for Africans; do you feel this will have a positive or negative effect, or a bit of both?

Negative _________
Positive _________
A bit of both _________

POSITIVE: Can you explain why it will have a positive effect; in which areas of life? PROBE What else?

NEGATIVE: Why will it have a negative effect; in which areas of life? PROBE What else?

A BIT OF BOTH: Can you explain your "A bit of both" in which areas of life? PROBE What else?

2. FOR POSITIVE PERCEPTIONS ONLY: What strategies you think the members of parliament "Coloured" and "Indian" will use to attain the positive effects?
3. FOR NEGATIVE PERCEPTIONS ONLY: In your opinion, what would have been the minimum provisions to make the new "Constitution" succeed?

B. NEW LOCAL AUTHORITIES FOR URBAN BLACKS

4. Coming to the new local authorities for urban blacks, i.e. the new Town Councils which replaced the Community councils, do you feel this will have positive, negative effects or a bit of both? Positive _______ Negative _______ A Bit of Both _______

POSITIVE: Why will this have a positive effect; in which areas of life? PROBE What else?

NEGATIVE: Why will this have a negative effect; in which areas of life? PROBE What else?

If "A bit of Both" can you explain the positive and negative effects; in which areas of life? PROBE What else?
5. FOR POSITIVE PERCEPTIONS ONLY: What steps or strategies do you envisage the town councillors will take to make these achievements?

____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________

6. FOR NEGATIVE PERCEPTIONS ONLY: In your opinion, what would have been the minimum steps to make this provision work?

____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________

7. If "A bit of Both" can you explain the positive and negative effects; in which areas of life? PROBE What else?

____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________

C. HOMELANDS 'LEGISLATURES'

8. Do you think that homelands, i.e. the homeland governments can be used as a base from which to advance the socio-political cause of the black people or not, or a bit of both?

Yes ___
No ___
a Bit of both ___

If "YES": a) How can this be done?

____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________

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b) In which areas or spheres of life have homelands achieved any positive contribution?


c) If "A Bit of Both", which are the positive and which are the negative areas?


If "NO" : a) Why do you feel that homelands cannot be used as a springboard for the advancement of the socio-political cause of the black people?


b) Where or in which spheres of life have homelands failed most? Please explain


D. ECONOMIC ISSUES

9. Since 1979, blacks are recognised as employees and can be members of trade unions. Has this been the benefit, disadvantage of black workers or a bit of both? Benefits _____ Disadvantage _____ A bit of both _____
BENEFITS: What benefits has this brought about?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

DISADVANTAGES: What are the disadvantages that blacks have had to suffer as a result of this move?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

A BIT OF BOTH: Can you spell out the partial advantages and the partial disadvantages this has brought about?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

10. Regarding the advancement by blacks in jobs in industry and commerce, do you think that there has been a meaningful improvement, no improvement at all, or a bit of both?

Meaningful improvement
No improvement
A bit of both

11. If MEANINGFUL IMPROVEMENTS: Could you give aspects where this has been affected?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
12. IF NO IMPROVEMENTS: Could you please explain why you feel this has not taken place?

13. If A BIT OF BOTH: Could you explain the successes and failures in this move?

14. Apart from people having better jobs, what will be the social and political implications of "Advancement of blacks in jobs" for black people in general?

15. At present only Africans can trade in African areas and townships, people belonging to other racial groups cannot. What are your feelings about this? Could you please explain.
16. The government has since announced the opening up of Central Business Districts in some areas in the towns and cities to all races. What are your feelings on this? Please explain in detail.

__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

17. In your opinion, what are the reasons behind these trading "relaxations" or moves?

__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

18. You may be aware of the Development Corporations such as the K.D.C. X.D.C etc. They give loans to Africans for housing, business, etc. What are your feelings about these Corporations? Please explain.

__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

19. A large number of firms which operate in S A are controlled from overseas, e.g. Unilever, Colgate & Palmolive, I B M etc. Would you feel the controlling firm should withdraw its operation from S A or should they continue investing in S A business?

Yes - continue ____  
No - discontinue ____
20. What are the advantages, if any, of continued investment by foreign companies to the people in control in S A i.e. the government and important or big businessmen.

21. What advantages, if any, does continued investment have for African people in this country?

22. What effects, if any, would continued investment have in encouraging change in S A?

23. What effects, if any, would disinvestment have in promoting change in S A?

E. EDUCATION

24. As you may know, some formerly white schools now accept black pupils, what are your feelings about this?
25. Some people feel that these "mixed" schools can help bring about change in South Africa. Others feel that they can only help to entrench the elites. What are your feelings on this? Would you please explain?

26. What are the factors that have contributed to school boycotts by African pupils? PROBE. Can you explain in detail.

27. Will the school boycotts have a positive or negative effect on African education? PROBE. Why?

28. What effects, if any, will school boycotts have on political developments in the country as a whole? Please explain.
29. If you were to be asked to draw a future constitution for South Africa, what major principles would you propose? Please spell out in detail.

30. Let us bear in mind what some people say. Some say the present government is too powerful to be overthrown by a guerilla movement operating from outside the country, and that black people are economically and politically limited in their thrust to force change. Others feel that internal unrest along with an external guerilla movement can prove to very costly for the government and could even make the country ungovernable, hence forcing the government to change. Which of these two views do you think is most valid, and why?

31. In the light of these two views, what do you think is the minimum that black people will settle for as change or reform?

31b) What would you personally settle for?
32. (SHOW PROMPT) If you were given the following as the future constitutional alternatives for S A, which one would you opt for? (EXPLAIN THE TERMS) Make your options from this card.

(a) Federation
(b) Partition of the country along racial lines
(c) A confederation of states
(d) A unitary State
(e) None of the above

What would be your second choice?

FOR SECOND CHOICE ONLY:

(a) If FEDERATION, why?

(b) If PARTITION OF THE COUNTRY ALONG RACIAL LINES, why?

(c) If A CONFEDERATION OF STATES, why?
(d) IF A UNITARY STATE, why?

(e) IF NONE OF THE ABOVE, why?

33. What, in your opinion, are the most promising strategies for bringing about change in South Africa?

34. What are the problems, as you see them, that stand in the way of implementing the strategies as you perceive them?

35. What factors, do you feel, have produced the township unrests of 1984 and 1985?
36. What effects will this have on:

(a) The government:

(b) Black people in the townships:

(c) People describe S A in two ways: Some see it as a country where one race dominates the other races, and in the process discriminates against them. Others see it as a capitalist state where one class i.e. people who own and control big business, industry and commerce, exploits other classes. What do you see it as? Please explain.

38. In the framing of a constitution, should concentration be placed on individual rights such as freedom of speech etc. or on the protection of group rights? Please explain in detail.
39. Comparing the present to what it was say FIVE years ago, do you think:

(i) There have been improvements in the conditions for life for blacks: __________

(ii) Conditions of life still remain the same: __________

(iii) Conditions of life have become worse: __________

40. Please explain your response in 38, i.e. the spheres of life where conditions have __________

41. PERSONAL PARTICULARS:

Organisational Membership __________
Age _____
Occupation __________
Language __________
Sex __________
Education __________
Township __________